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

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VICTIMS AND HELPERS: REACTIONS TO CRIME

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Kenneth Friedman
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ACQUISITIONS

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CHAPTER I

THE REACTION OF VICTIMS TO CRIMES

During the last decade, crime has become the metaphor for fear and insecurity. In one way or another, every day each of us is aware of the threat of being a crime victim. Whether it is locking the door or crossing the street to avoid a threatening scene, our sense of potential victimization is always there. The ultimate fear is that we will become like Kitty Genovese, a victim screaming in the night on whom strangers turn their backs. As much experience has shown, the concern for who would help, especially in major cities, is a real one. But help is more than just on the spot assistance: It includes, as well, providing aid with the problems that result from the crime.

This research was carried out to find out who helps and who doesn't, what help is and isn't there after a person becomes the victim of a crime. We wanted to know what the pains of victimization were for the victim of more common crimes and where the help came from not hypothetically but in actuality. We wanted to know whether strangers helped and if they did, how it assisted the victim's adjustment. We wanted

to know who else helped -- friends, neighbors, relatives, official agencies -- and what combinations of characteristics of victim, crime, helpers and neighborhood made for better adjustment after the crime.

The formal intent of this research was to investigate (a) the problems victims face as a result of a crime, (b) the sources of aid available to crime victims, (c) victims' knowledge of formal assistance programs, (d) the extent to which victims choose to activate their available informal social networks rather than formal assistance programs, (e) the reasons for their choices, and (f) the consequences of their choices for both victims and those giving assistance.

Although many studies have focused on crime victims (Knudten 1976; Garofalo, 1977; Garofalo and Hindelang, 1977; Burgess and Holmstrom, 1974, 1978), few have interviewed victims within weeks of the crime, few have followed the victim longitudinally through the help-seeking process and none, to our knowledge, have interviewed the people who assisted the victim in dealing with problems resulting from the crime. Additionally, most studies of victims have focused on the more violent crimes -- rape and spouse abuse. In order to examine the effects of less violent crimes on victims, this study is limited to burglaries, robberies and assaults. Although the study was conducted in New York City, the neighborhoods, crimes

and victims chosen for study were selected to help insure that the results could be generalized to other urban areas.

The study surveys victims of burglary, robbery, and assault selected from three communities in New York City -- one with a high crime rate in a low income area; one with a moderate crime rate in a moderate income area; and one with a high crime rate in a mixed income area. The first interview, which took place within a few weeks of the crime, covered the crime, the victim's problems, the supporters, the victim's relationship to his neighborhood, and the victim's network of friends and relatives. In order to understand the needs of victims in the months following the victimization, the support-seeking behavior of victims, and victims' perceptions of the responses of formal organizations and members of their support networks to requests for help, the same victims were interviewed again four months later. Between the first and second interviews supporters for whom victims had provided contact information on the first interview were also interviewed. These interviews covered the type of help the supporter gave, the supporter's reaction to the victim, the supporter's assessment of the psychological state of the victim, problems the supporter had as a result of helping, and the supporter's fear of crime. The interviews included both open-ended and closed segments and were oriented toward developing a comprehensive profile of the effects of

victimization on the victim and the individuals supporting the victim. Of the 274 victims interviewed about two weeks after the crime, 181 were interviewed four months later and 152 members of their support networks were interviewed.

The aim of the research was to provide criminal justice and social service policy makers with information that could be used in determining the focus of future victim assistance programs and optimal methods for reaching their client populations. Of particular interest was how programs could be designed so as not to be redundant with existing networks of support for victims, how programs could strengthen, rather than supplant, victims' support from neighbors, friends and kin.

This chapter reviews literature relevant to the psychological and practical problems of crime victims, the increased fear of crime that victims often experience, the process of adjustment, victims' use of formal agencies and networks of support and the effects of the crime on those who assist the victim in the adjustment process. The chapter also examines the relationship between each of these bodies of literature and the approach used in the research at hand.

PROBLEMS FOLLOWING VICTIMIZATION

As a result of victimization, people suffer a variety of practical and psychological problems. Problems range from financial difficulties to feeling violated by a stranger who went through one's personal possessions to paralyzing fear. The literature discusses these problems among others.

The most common problem victims experience, especially following a violent crime, is emotional upset (Zeigenhagen, 1974; Knudten, 1976; Vera Institute of Justice, 1979). Davis et al. (1980) present data on problems of complainants in criminal cases, citing emotional difficulties as a result of victimization in 32 percent of the cases. Knudten et al. (1977) document the problems of victims and note that emotional suffering was the most frequently noted problem. If these emotional reactions are extreme, they may constitute a crisis. Crisis reactions often include feelings of helplessness, confusion, or anxiety in maintaining social relationships and exhaustion or physical illness (Halpern, 1973). These extreme reactions typically last up to six weeks (Rappoport, 1976), although the Vera Institute study (1979)suggests that some degree of emotional upset may persist well past the crisis stage.

Severe reactions have been studied most among women who have been raped. Rape victims may require extensive counseling before they can resume a normal life (Burgess and Holstrom, 1974). Robbery victims may also experience a crisis (Syvrud, 1967; American Institutes for Research, 1978). The proportion of victims who undergo a crisis reaction is difficult to estimate because it depends on the manner in which crisis is defined.

Severe emotional trauma is not limited to victims of violent crimes. Victims of property crimes may also experience crises. The American Institutes for Research (1978) found that some victims of nonviolent crimes experience more long-term adverse effects than victims of violent crimes. This study indicates that although robbery victims generally experience a more serious immediate crisis, burglary has a lasting impact on the victim's life. The burglary victims who were surveyed felt that the crime was an invasion of their territory, and in a sense, a violation of their person. The study concludes that "from the victims' point of view, burglary is often a crime against the person."

Researchers and clinicians suggest that many victims, regardless of type of crime, undergo similar psychological stress. Ochberg (1979) states victims feel less powerful and "knocked down in the dominance hierarchy." Symonds (1980)

refers to "the second wound" of victimization -- the isolation, humiliation and degradation that accompanies one's lowering on the scale of dominance. Bard and Sangrey (1979) theorize that victims are particularly susceptible to feelings of loss of control: They suggest that even if the victim is not harmed or abused, the incident can produce serious psychological trauma because the victim's belief in an orderly and controllable world has been threatened. Many of these researchers suggest that the victim progresses pyschologically through a common series of identifiable stages.

Often victims suffer financial losses from crimes. Losses may be a direct result of a property crime, or an indirect result, such as medical expenses, or days lost from work because of an injury or time spent in court (Zeigenhagen, 1974). Knudten (1976) found that loss of income and property loss were rated as serious to very serious by more victims than any other type of problem. Knutden interviewed victims of violent and property crimes one year after the incidents and found that "these latter problems [income and property loss] were more likely than even physical injury to be perceived as serious" (Knudten, 1976:24).

Physical injury, of course, is a serious problem for victims of violent crimes. Twenty-seven percent of Knutden's (1976) sample was physically injured and 78% of these

rated the injury as a serious or very serious problem. In Knudten's sample women suffered more physical injury than men and non-Whites more than Whites.

In addition, a crime can produce a crisis that involves many other aspects of the victim's life. Some have difficulties documenting their losses for insurance claims. Others react so strongly to a burglary, robbery, or assault in their neighborhood that they feel they must move immediately.

This study documents and records the frequency of each type of problem that crime victims suffer and examines the interrelationships among problems. We wanted to know if financial loss and physical injury were related to emotional reaction. We also wanted to know whether certain groups of victims -- the poor, the elderly, women, residents of different neighborhoods, different ethnic groups -- suffered from specific kinds of problems. Although the basic questions are similar to those of other studies, this research adds to existing knowledge. First, we interviewed victims within three weeks of the crime when their experience of problems was still fresh. Second, to measure emotional reaction we relied on a standardized test of affect instead of clinical assessments or self-reports of emotional problems. We consider standardized tests to provide a more reliable measure of emotional reaction.

(Although the study did use self-reports, it was not the only method of recording emotional problems.) Third, we surveyed the sample a second time, four months after the crime, to examine change in problems over time.

FEAR OF CRIME

Another aspect of psychological reaction to crime is increased fear of crime (Davis et al., 1980; Knudten, 1976). A number of studies, (Biderman, et al., 1967; LeJune and Alex, 1973) report no relationship between fear of crime and actual victimization. But Skogan and Klecka (1977) reported that victims of robberies, assaults and thefts were more fearful than non-victims. He did not find, however, that victims of personal crimes show any higher levels of fear than victims of property crimes.

The National Crime Surveys, based on data from victims and non-victims, demonstrate, according to Garofalo (1979), that fear of crime does not relate directly to rates of victimization. Although women and senior citizens fear victimization more, they are at a lower risk of victimization. Garofalo believes that women and the elderly are taught to be more afraid of crime than others. Risk and fear of crime do correlate, however, for race and income groups. Lower income people have greater fear and greater

rates of victimization. Whites have less fear than Blacks and lower chances of being victimized. Balkin (1979), however, points out that both the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and victimization data from the National Crime Surveys (NCS) do not adequately take into account exposure to crime, or risk. He argues that fear among women and the elderly is a rational response to the risk of victimization. The elderly and women have higher levels of fear and take more precautions to avoid crime. Thus the actual rates are lower only because the exposure to risk is lower. Balkin believes that if exposure to risk could be controlled for, fear would be consistent with rates of victimization.

Garofalo and Laub (1978) argue that fear of crime is a reflection of many factors that relate to quality of life. Consistent in some way with this is the work of Cohen, et al. (1978), which demonstrates that those who work to reduce crime by participating in social programs within their communities, are less fearful of crime than those who take avoidance actions, like improving the locks on their doors or not going out at night. To the first group, quality of life might be viewed as within their control. But to the other, a defensive reaction may be indicative of a lack of control over the environment. Baumer and Hunter (1979) suggest that people familiar with their neighbors and their neighbors' patterns of behavior are less fearful. As the National Crime Commission

summarized, "fear of crime is fear of strangers." The elderly, who are usually less active and more isolated, face more strangers. Riger, Gordon and Lebailly (1978), however, find that among women the high rate of fear of crime is related to their limited abilities to defend themselves and to their concern with rape.

Although our study is only indirectly related to the issue of fear of crime and risk, it presents a perspective on the reaction of different types of victims to crime in terms of fear and the precautions people take to reduce risk. In this study we examine the relationship between fear of crime within a month of the incident, fear of crime four months after the incident, demographic characteristics of the victim, and types of precautions taken by the victim. If women and the elderly, take precautions or alter their lifestyles more readily in response to crime than do other groups, it might be an indication of lowered risk that would explain lower victimization rates. We also examine the relationship between the victim's attitude toward his or her neighborhood, neighborhood organizing efforts, and fear of crime.

STAGES OF THE COPING PROCESS

Based upon clinical and anecdotal accounts, much of which is grounded in studies of hostages (c.f. Ochberg, 1979; Symonds, 1975), distinct phases of the victim's experience in coping with the effects of crime have been suggested. The first phase, generally called the impact stage (Bard and Sangrey, 1979), occurs immediately after the crime, when victims commonly experience a feeling of shock, disbelief or numbness. Many victims report a sense of "I couldn't believe this was happening to me." Symonds (1975) describes this reaction as frozen fright because victims sometimes become immobile. To others it is often interpreted as submission to or compliance with the attacker, and victims may blame themselves for allowing the crime to happen. The impact phase may last for hours or days. During this period victims may find it difficult to eat or sleep. Disorientation and feelings of helplessness and vulnerability are common.

The second phase, generally referred to as recoil, is viewed as a period in which victims begin to accept the crime, and feelings of fear, anger, and sadness are manifested (Bard and Sangrey, 1979). Many victims who appear to be adjusting well at this point are in reality denying the seriousness of the event and perhaps suppressing fears and even phobic reactions. The denial process is regarded by some

clinicians as a positive mechanism through which victims can gradually begin to cope with victimization. As denial wears off, victims may attempt to deal with their feelings by reliving the crime and talking about it frequently. Feelings of guilt are often present during this stage. Burgess and Holmstrom (1974) note rape victims may experience an excessive fear of being alone and have recurring nightmares during this time.

The third stage is described as reorganization -- a time when fear and anger decrease, and victims become less preoccupied with the incident. Obsessive talking and thinking about the crime decline, and victims begin to focus again on their lives.

According to those who accept the notion of stages, the duration and intensity of the stages through which victims pass depend on the individual, the type of victimization and the help received from others. Clinicians and academicians agree that victims, as they struggle with these feelings, often slip in and out of stages, though usually the general progression is as outlined (Bard and Sangrey, 1979; Symonds, 1975; Burgess and Holmstrom, 1974). It should be emphasized that although researchers agree on the stages of recovery in crime victims, their theories are based on a relatively small number of clinical cases.

Some empirical studies support the clinical studies. Kilpatrick, Veronen and Resnick (1979) rigorously studied the readjustment process, comparing rape victims to non-victim controls on psychological measures of fear and anxiety for six months. They found that while rape victims experienced extreme trauma immediately after the rape, their fears gradually decreased over the six months. Measures taken after the third month show both a decrease in fear scores on rape-related cues (such as, knives, intercourse, darkness and being alone) and an increase in scores on feelings of vulnerability to attack. After six months, rape victims were similar to controls on most measures of mood and pathology, but they still experienced more general anxiety and phobias than the controls.

The reactions of crime victims described above are similar to reactions of victims of other catastrophies, such as fires, natural disasters, accidents and cancer (See Tyhurst, 1951; Leopold and Dillon, 1960; Bloom, 1979; Hamburg and Adams, 1967). Feelings of fear, anxiety, helplessness, loss of esteem, and guilt are apparent in most types of victimizations. According to research, these victims also react to the initial realization of the illness or victimization with shock and disbelief, followed by a period of denial that gradually allows victims to reassert control. Another theme discussed by researchers of all types of victims is the need for regaining control. Victims who develop control

strategies are the most successful in recovering from their emotional trauma.

Recently a few reseachers have called into question the concept of stages of reaction to crisis. Silver and Wortman (1980), after an extensive review of the literature, conclude that, in research that is methodologically sophisticated, there is no evidence of stages of adjustment in response to life crises and that only in studies that do not use carefully constructed instruments and quantitative methods, do stages appear. Moreover, there is little regularity that can be discovered in the existing research on crisis reaction and, most importantly, there appear to be many cases in which resolution, the final outcome in all stage models, does not occur. Four to six years after the rape 26% of the victims studied by Burgess and Holmstrom (1978) still did not feel that they had recovered. Glick, et al. (1974) report that almost one quarter of their sample of widows and widowers stated, a year after the death of their partner, that they thought the death was not real and they would wake up one morning to find their spouse alive and well. Not only is recovery not inevitable, but what appears as adjustment shortly after a crisis can break down at some later time. Burgess and Holmstrom (1974) report that distress can appear years later in what they refer to as a silent rape reaction. Figley and Sprenkle (1978) descibed a delayed stress response syndrome for

combat veterans in which an extended period of denial is followed by a phase marked by anger and emotional problems.

Certainly, there is little doubt that many crime victims, despite the type of crime, suffer emotional trauma. But the significant issue for the practitioner is what conditions promote adjustment and what conditions do not. Rather than examine the extent to which an ideal progession of stages is reflected in reality, this research attempts to elucidate the factors that affect adjustment and the interaction of factors that influence coping techniques. Our intent is to discover whether certain types of victims need little assistance and which types need help in order to cope successfully.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE COPING PROCESS

Numerous factors affect the victim's ability to cope with crisis. Among these are the extent to which the victim blames himself for the incident, the extent to which others blame the victim, the victim's history of confronting misfortune, and the resources available to the victim.

Self-Blame and Blame by Others

The social psychological interest in blame and self-blame has its origins in attribution theory or the examination of people's perceptions of the causes of behavior. Attribution theory (Jones, et al., 1972:6),

> "...is an analysis of the assumptions and expectations the attributor brings to his task of causal understanding. These assumptions and expectations shape the attribution process by filling gaps in information, relating behavioral data to comparative standards, and effecting shifts in attention or emphasis. Because attribution goes beyond the information given, the attributor's causal interpretations may be accurate or in error, functional or dysfunctional."

Thus blame or self-blame can be taken as a basic perception of an incident that has psychological consequences, regardless of the accuracy of the assignment of responsibility.

Blame of victims and self-blame by victims have been the object of numerous studies (Caplan and Nelson, 1974; Tyan, 1971; Coates, Wortman and Abbey 1979). Attempts have been made to differentiate the response of victims on the basis of whether others blamed them and whether they blamed themselves. Ryan (1971) argues that victims, too often, are blamed for their own plight in order to relieve society from its responsibility for general social conditions. Lerner (Lerner and Miller, 1978), in the justworld model, argues that

people are taught to see the world as a fair, ordered place in which people are victimized only if they deserve to be punished. Those who suffer some tragedy deserve it. People blame the victim and if victimized, blame themselves (Walster, 1966) in order to preserve their sense of order in the world. Shaver (1975) states, however, that when people see themselves as potential objects of the same tragedy as the victim, they are more lenient and less judgmental of the victim.

Wortman (1976), in a review article, demonstrated that self-blame is common in many crises -- death of a child, loss of a relative in concentration camps, and rape. Bulman and Wortman (1977) argue that self-blame might even be beneficial. They found that in victims with severe spinal injuries, those who blamed themselves adapted better. Janoff-Bulman (1979) distinguishes characterological self-blame, blame based on one's general traits, and behavioral self-blame, blame based on one's specific actions. Behavioral self-blame, according to Janoff-Bulman, is common among rape victims and adaptive because it provides victims with a sense of control over the situation. Control is the appropriate context within which to view the attribution of blame and self-blame as an explanation for events. Kelly (1971) states,

> ...attribution processes are to be understood, not only as a means of providing the individual with a view of his world, but as a means of encouraging and maintaining his effective exercise of control in that world. The purpose

> of causal analysis -- the function it serves for the species and the individual -- is effective control.

Kelley might have added, "or the image of control" since attribution of causality, we know, has no necessary relationship to scientific causality.

Because it has no necessary relationship to reality, self-blame is a tenuous control mechanism. Although such behavioral self-blame might be adaptive with the first victimization, the evidence from Burgess and Holmstrom (1978) indicates that a second victimization breaks the bubble of control. Rape victims who suffered an assault in another incident before the rape recovered at a slower rate than other rape victims. In this research, we attempted to examine behavioral self-blame with the question, "Is there anything you could have done to prevent the crime?" Because characterological self-blame is a more difficult concept to examine with a questionnaire data on this form of self-blame was not collected. We eliminated the term "blame" from the victim interview, and used rather the concept of self-responsibility, the victim's feeling in some way responsible for the incident. Nevertheless, we compare our findings on self-responsibility to other research on blame. Supporters were asked, "Do you think the victim blamed him/herself for what happened?" and "Do you feel that if the victim had been a little more careful that he/she wouldn't have been (assaulted, robbed, burglarized)?" These questions provide another measure of self-responsibility and blame by supporters.

Victim's History of Stressful Events

Another factor that appears to affect response to crisis is the victim's history of dealing with stressful events. But data are contradictory. According to Bard (Institute of Justice, 1980), in his ongoing study of families of homicide victims, victims who are poor, Black or Puerto Rican, who have dealt with adversities all their lives and who are more likely to have dealt with death, cope better than others. Similarly, states Bard, Korean War POW's who survived best were those who were abandoned as children and were raised in institutions or foster homes. But it appears that in other crimes, prior stress does not lead to better coping. As discussed, Burgess and Holmstrom (1978) discovered that women who had been the object of another assault before the rape took longer to recover. Yet women who had lost someone close to them in death or through divorce or separation recovered more rapidly than other rape victims. Silver and Wortman (1980) suggest that both reactions might be explained by self-blame. Crime victims appear to blame themselves for the behavior that led to the crime ("I should have been more careful") and to thereby give themselves control over the situation ("I won't do

that again!"). A second victimization, however, attacks the sense of control. But a death or loss, as Burgess and Holmstrom (1978:173) state, "strengthens a person psychologically" and promotes the development of the skill needed for coping with stress generally. This study collected data only on previous victimization, so we examine the effects of previous crimes but not other stressful events.

One factor that should affect the adjustment process is the resources available to the victim. We would expect that victims with higher incomes would suffer less from the financial loss and could afford professional counselors to assist with psychological adjustment. In addition to having the financial resources available to purchase professional services, we would expect this group to have at least some level of professional services available to it through its network of friends and relatives. The elderly, many of whom live on fixed incomes, may be particularly ill-prepared to bear the financial costs of victimization (Cook, 1978). It is not surprising that they have been found to be more likely to suffer financial, physical, and emotional problems than other age groups (Midwest Research Institute, 1977; Goldsmith and Goldsmith, 1975).

In addition to financial resources, personal resources or socialization of different groups in coping responses might affect reaction to crime. For example, women report more physical injury, problems with their families, and more mental or emotional suffering than men (Knudten, 1976).

ASSISTANCE FROM FORMAL AGENCIES

One of the crucial responses to crime is to seek help from formal organizations or from one's network of friends, relatives, neighbors and acquaintances.

In a survey of 1,106 adults in Chicago, researchers attempted to sort out the characteristics of those who do not seek help, those who seek help from their networks and those who go to formal agencies (Brown, 1978). A number of distinctive groups were distinguished: Self-reliant non-seekers who had strong informal networks and appeared to be comforted by the mere availability of people to assist them, reluctant non-seekers who had the lowest self-esteem and the least effective coping responses and were the most vulnerable, help-seekers who used only informal supports, and help-seekers who used only agencies. Those who sought only agency support were distinguished from those who used informal supports by higher levels of role strain and more stress, but also by less adequate informal supports and reticence about problems. Those

who used both informal and organized supports differed from those who used only informal assistance in the number stressful events they had to deal with. Brown (1978:438) concludes, "While others have suggested the professionals are contacted only after informal associates fail to provide assistance, it seems more likely that these respondents were simply reluctant to keep asking informal associates for assistance."

But the most consistent pattern is that most people do not go to agencies for help. Knudten et al. (1976) surveyed the Milwaukee area and found numerous agencies providing services for crime victims. Yet Knudten, et al., (1976) found that, except for physical injuries, most victims did not know that help was available from formal organizations. Even many of those who did know help was available did not go for help. (Since the time of Knudten's study there has been a burst of new agencies throughout the United States specifically oriented toward providing assistance to crime victims.)

A number of explanations for this lack of use of services are available. Sociologists have found that the poor are likely to be suspicious of involvement with bureaucratic organizations, and are reluctant to seek their assistance (Briar, 1966; Carlin, Howard and Messinger, 1967; Paulsen, 1966). The fact that a disproportionate number of victims tend to be from economically disadvantaged groups

(Criminal Victimization Surveys in 13 American Cities, 1975) may partially explain the low use of services among crime victims. Instead, trusted persons from their informal social networks may be called upon to provide assistance.

Informal assistance may be preferable to the victim in particular situations. For example, informal supports may be best-suited to provide practical aid, such as the temporary use of an automobile for victims of auto theft. Treatment of serious injuries, on the other hand, usually requires the competence of professionals and formal organizations. Formal organizations may be essential for certain types of victims who do not have well-developed social networks. Gurin, Veroff and Feld (1960) found that the elderly do not seek assistance from informal contacts as often as younger people. Formal assistance programs and informal means of support may play complementary roles in assisting the victim. Nevertheless, most support for most people comes from their informal ties. One of the aims of this study is to examine if there is any connection between formal agency assistance and informal networks of support. Additionally, the study examines the ways in which formal agencies might promote assistance to crime victims through victims' informal networks.

Network of Support

During the past ten years the notion of social networks has become common in social work, crisis intervention, medical sociology, and numerous other fields. The concept of the network was developed as a research tool with which to examine the numerous social ties in which individuals participate in contemporary life. Instead of examining people in different groups, on the job and at home, for instance, the individual's social life is traced through the ties the person has to all the people he knows and the ties those people have to each other. Sketching these ties out, with lines connecting all the people who know each other, the lines form a net-like pattern, hence the term network.

The concept of the network has been crucial to the reinterpretation of urban life. Almost as a backlash against the image of life in contemporary, industrial, urban society as alienating, isolating and unfulfilling, many researchers (Fischer, 1979; Wellman, 1976, 1979; Bott; 1957; Barnes, 1954, Granovetter, 1973) have demonstrated that friendship, support and intimacy are available by means of networks. Fischer (1979), in a study conducted in northern California, found that the average adult had 17 people he could call on in his immediate network for everything from discussions of personal problems to watering the plants while

he was away. Wellman (1979) asked residents of the East York section of Toronto to name six people they felt closest to and found 98% of his sample had at least one intimate tie and 61% had five or more intimate ties. Networks, however, do not function as extended families because the members of a person's network do not form a tight group of people who are members of each other's networks. In Wellman's sample, the average network density (measured as the percent of potential ties between members of a network that actually exist) was only 33%. In an extended family the density would be 100% since everyone knows everyone else. Curiously, when a sample of those named as network members by one person was interviewed about their networks, only 36% mentioned the initial source as a network member.

Networks also differ, at least in some cases, from extended families in that network members do not live near each other. In Wellman's sample, only 13% of network members lived in the same neighborhood, but 75% lived within Metropolitan Toronto. In Fischer's sample, 71% lived within an hour drive of the respondent. But a concentrated network is common among some ethnic groups in the United States. In a study of support systems of low income, Spanish and Italian families, Nuttal and Nuttal (1979) found a strong reliance on relatives living nearby among both ethnic groups and almost no reliance on neighbors or friends. The network of kin living in

the Boston area for the Spanish families averaged around 40 people. Modern technology expands the geographic area within which one can be considered to be surrounded by friends and relatives.

Research indicates, that networks provide that main sources of assistance in times of crisis. According to Wellman (1979), 81% of the sample said help was available in emergency situations from members of their network and 60% reported that help was available on routine everyday matters from at least one member of their network. Warren (1979:2), in a sample of 4000 adults in 11 cities throughout the United States, concludes that helping networks are "the largest 'human service delivery system' in the country." Extrapolating from the number of helping behaviors recorded for the sample studied, Warren concludes that on an annual basis, throughout the United States, networks account for 2.1 billion acts of help. Of the 4,000 people interviewed, 82% of the married people named their spouses as helpers, 41% named friends, 37% named other relatives, 27% named neighbors and 28% named co-workers. Fischer found that almost 40% of helpers were relatives (including 14% of these who were in the household) and 11% were neighbors. In a study of life crises and where people turn for help, Veroff, Douvan and Kulka (1980) conclude

that "informal support systems are probably the critical way that people in the new generations have adapted to deal with their life problems."

Clinical researchers on crime victims agree that a key ingredient in the passage to a new integration and stability after the crime is other people. Ochberg (1979) says that treatment for the first phase of crisis, which can be either rage or resignation, or alternating rage and resignation, is ventilation and others rallying around the victim. The need for support is so great that Bard and Sangrey (1979:39) note, "If a victim does not get proper support during the impact phase, his or her defenses may come back together in a dysfunctional way that will cause considerable difficulty later." Symonds (1975) thinks that a lot of anger expressed at officials, especially the police, is anger over lack of support generally from the people the victim knows. He quotes (1975:25) one victim: "What hurt me most was the complete indifference and lack of consideration for my feelings in my hour of need by people I know and work with." The Kansas City Police Response Project (Bieck) reported that the first thing many crime victims do is call a friend, or relative to talk about calling the police. Burgess and Holmstrom (1978), in their study of rape victims, note that 45% of the victims with

adequate support recovered (ceased to react with fear to rape related stimuli). Four to six years later, over half of those without adequate support still had not recovered.

Lack of a support network appears to be strongly associated with physiological and psychological pathology. One indication of a collapsed social network can be divorce or separation. According to Pilisk and Froland (1978:275),

> divorced and separated people also have higher rates of suicides, homicides, automobile accidents, alcoholism, psychoses, cancer and diseases of the heart. All describe symptom syndromes for which the needed agent of the disease is already, by virtue of genetic potential and/or prior experience and exposure, with us and susceptibility appears more a matter of the state of the host. The evidence suggests that breakdown occurs in response to a rise in the presence of environmental stressors, but that the presence of cohesive social support networks can preclude the effect of these stressors. Hence, social marginality has been linked to tuberculosis, schizophrenia and proness to accidents.

Pattison (1975) discovered that psychotics have networks that average from four to five. Normals have networks significantly larger than psychotics. Hammer, Makiesky-Barrow and Gutwirth (1978:526) find that "Schizophrenic subjects tend to have personal networks that are smaller than those non-psychotic controls." Because of the many different techniques for elucidation of network data, comparisons cannot be made across studies. Thus, despite the fact that many of our subjects had

networks with 5 members or less, this does not mean they were psychotics. Within each study, however, the general assumption is that people with larger networks are likely to receive more support and be mentally healthier than people with smaller networks.

The effects of network density, however, seem ambiguous. Kadushin found that when personal network members were known to each other, support improved and continued over time, and that this facilitated the adjustment of the patient. Pattison (1975:1249), noted just the opposite for the networks of psychotics: "The psychotic is caught in an exclusive small social matrix that binds him and fails to provide a healthy interpersonal matrix." High density networks might limit victims in the diversity of help available to them. According to a theory by Granovetter (1973), close acquaintances frequently share common knowledge and therefore are unable to provide each other with new information; however, distant acquaintances may possess information previously unknown to those weakly tied to the victim. Acquaintances or neighbors, for instance, might play a significant role in third party contacts.

The healthiest network, we can speculate, might be one with a size of about 10 individuals, a portion of which is characterized by high density so that support is

coordinated among a few individuals. Yet, because there is also a low-density segment, the high density segment does not shield the individual from the rest of the world.

Although Wellman (1976) notes that immediate kin are usually called on for emergency assistance, people tend to specialize their networks in either relatives or friends. Wellman does not discuss the differences between these two groups, but this fits the data on low income Hispanic and Italian families (Nuttal and Nuttal, 1979) already discussed. Specialization of one's network in relatives might be common to certain ethnic groups and those with low socioeconimic status. Specialization in friends might be related to upward mobility.

Warren (1979), in a survey of problems ranging from feeling blue to a desire to make major change in one's life, examined the kinds of help that were offered and the effectiveness of the help based on an evaluation of the psychological state of the respondent after the crisis. More than three-quarters (78%) of the respondents had helpers who "just listened," more than a half (57%) had helpers who "asked questions," for about a third (32%) one helper "showed me a new way to look at things," for (15%), a helper "told me who to see" and for less than one tenth (7%), a helper "took me to someone who took action." Comparing the type of help to the psychological state of the respondent, Warren (1979:18)

concludes about the effectiveness of different types of help, "Help which is only listening and is not linked simultaneously to more active behavior, such as, asking questions, referring, intervening by taking the individual to someone for help or providing a 'new way to look at the problem' is not much better than the individual coping alone." Fourteen percent of Warren's sample used no helpers.

The relationship between help and improvement in one's state, however, is difficult to establish. It could be that people in continuously distressed states effectively inhibit extensive social contact and social support or that poorly adjusted people lack the inter-personal abilities to seek out support. If the latter were true, poor adaptation and lack of social support would be products of the same condition and not causually associated. In one longitudinal study of adults in crisis or transition by Lieberman and Mullan (1978), those who went to professionals, those who went only to network members and those who sought no help showed no statistically significant differences on nine measures of adaption. The researchers conclude (1978:517), "Does help help? For our sample, for the range of human predicaments studied, and with the variety of outcome measures we have applied, the only answer that makes sense at this stage is that we are not sure."

We examined many aspects of the structure of crime victims' networks of support in order to answer the questions, "Who gets help?" and "What kinds of help do they get?" We studied the effects of the size of the networks of support on the extent of crime related problems, the types of help the victim received, and the type of psychological adjustment the victim made over time. Additionally, we looked at the relationship between the structure of the victim's network of support and his or her adjustment. By structure we mean the extent to which the network is made up of friends or relatives and neighbors or more distant people, and network density. We did not examine network density because the method used for sampling each victim's network did not permit an accurate measure of density.

We defined the network of support as those who assisted with crime related matters. In addition to the network of support, we collected information on the victim's network of exchange or general set of friends, relatives, and others with whom the victim exchanges material and personal assistance, (such as, borrowing money from or talking to about problems). We compared the network of exchange to the network of support that develops around the criminal victimization in order to better understand whether those victims who were isolated had trouble getting assistance in an emergency.

EFFECT ON SUPPORTERS

As has been discussed, support is a crucial aspect of the adjustment process that victims go through, but it is not aid given free and clear by the supporter. Supporters, in the process of listening to the victims, suffer a facsimile of the victim's trauma. This has been called indirect or secondary victimization (Ochberg, 1979; Symonds, 1980). Supporters may be burdened with helping the victim in practical ways, as well. Just as listening is a psychological sharing of the burden, so are time spent helping and money loaned sharing the loss. Another aspect of the supporter's reaction to the victim is the supporter's effort to "explain" the crime to himself. (This aspect was discussed above in the section on blame and self-responsibility.)

Knowing a crime victim appears to be a common phenomenon. Only 7% of those interviewed by the National Crime Survey (1975) had been victimized in the previous year, but 42% knew someone who had been victimized. The psychological ripple effect of knowing a crime victim is widespread. Those who knew a victim of crime had higher ratings on fear of crime than those who were neither victimized nor knew a victim. (Reactions To Crime Project, 1978).

Knudten et al. (1976) asked two samples of crime victims in Milwaukee (one from court cases and the second from respondents in the National Crime Survey) if others had been affected by their victimization. In the first sample 18% said others had been financially burdened, 35% said others had been emotionally burdened and 36% said others had been inconvenienced. Figures for the second sample were significantly lower: Only 3% report financial problems for others because they had been victimized, 8% reported mental or emotional problems for others and 6% reported inconvenience for others. (The lower rates in the second sample can probably be attributed to those cases being in general less serious. For the most part, they were not involved in court cases, and many had not been reported to the police.) The only significant relationship between victim's characteristics and reports of secondary victimization in Knudten's study were sex and type of crime. Women were more likely to report that others had suffered and victims of personal, as opposed to property, crimes were more likely to report that others had suffered.

Even members of victims' social networks who did not lend direct aid to the victim (non-supporters) may feel the impact. by the crime. Studies indicate that knowing a victim of crime frequently results in indirect victimization, i.e. an enhanced fear of crime, a reduction in trust of others (including neighbors), lack of faith in the ability of the

police to control crime, feelings of helplessness, the avoidance of certain areas in the neighborhood and a reluctance to venture out at night alone (Conklin, 1971a; Reactions to Crime Project, 1978; Conklin, 1971b).

When indirect victimization affects a number of residents of the same area, neighborhoods and local law enforcement agencies may feel the impact. Because individuals are afraid to walk in a neighborhood or interact with neighbors, a deterioration of social solidarity in the community may result (Conklin, 1971a). Conklin's research (1971a;1971b) showed that people are less willing to call the police in neighborhoods where the actual or perceived crime rate is high.

This is the first study of indirect victimization, to our knowledge, to collect data directly from supporters. We asked supporters about the effects of providing assistance to the victims of different crimes, the effects of providing different types of assistance and the extent to which the emotional reaction of the victims, including fear of crime, was reflected in the secondary victimization of the supporter. We also examined the relationship between blaming the victim and self-responsibility by the victim, as well as the effects of helping on the relationship between the victim and the supporter.

After discussing the methods used in the research and describing the samples studied, the chapters that follow examine victims' problems, the types of support victims received, adjustment four months after the crime and the reactions of supporters. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings and provides programmatic suggestions for victim assistance services.

II

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will first describe the research design and instruments, then compare the sample to the population and the sub-samples to the sample, and finally describes the communities studied and the sample.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This research was designed to be exploratory and to generate hypotheses about victims' support networks. Rather than taking a broad survey approach the study was designed as intensive, longitudinal study of a relatively small sample of crime victims and members of their support networks. Data for the study was generated from extensive, open-ended interviews with 274 crime victims and a four-month follow-up interview with 182 of the same victims. One hundred and fifty-two supporters named by the victims were interviewed as well. The sample of victims was drawn from four police precincts in New York City, which facilitated the task of contacting the victims and localized the sample to permit collection of qualitative data describing each area. We believe that a description of the local environment is important to understanding the extent and use of victims' local

support networks, particularly among poor and elderly victims whose activities are often geographically restricted.

The neighborhoods selected for study included typical urban environments -- one area with a high crime rate in a low income area, one with a moderate crime rate in a moderate income area, and one with a high crime rate in a mixed income area. The high crime, low income neighborhood represents inner city areas; the moderate crime, moderate income neighborhood, middle-class urban areas; and the high crime, mixed income neighborhood, heterogeneous urban areas. Low crime areas were excluded because these areas are presumably least in need of programs specifically tailored to augment the support networks of crime victims.

The interviews were limited to victims of robberies, assaults and household burglaries who were 18 years old or older and residents of the area or people who worked or spent a lot of time in the area. The research focused on these crimes because they are among the most common and, in the cases of burglaries, among the least studied. Commercial burglaries were not included. In cases of burglaries of multiple person households or in assaults and robberies involving multiple victims, we interviewed the first adult victim we reached, regardless of whether they considered themselves the head of household or the primary victim. In assaults and robberies in

which the victim was hospitalized, we did not call the victim in the hospital but waited until he or she got home. In domestic violence cases we interviewed victims only away from their homes, either at our offices or in some neutral place where we were sure the offender would not intrude. Other victims were given a choice of being interviewed in their homes or at VSA's offices.

The initial interview covered the crime and the events surrounding the incident, interactions with the police, the problems the victim had, the people who helped the victim, how they helped and what their relationship was to the victim, the people who make up the victim's network, attitudes toward and participation in the neighborhood and the victim's psychological state. Questions also were included to examine blame by others, self-responsibility and fear of crime. In addition, basic demographic data on victims were collected.

To understand changes in crime-related problems, the victim's adaptation to them, and to whom the victim turned for help in the months following victimization, a follow-up interview was conducted. This interview repeated some of the questions asked in the first interview, specifically asking the victim when problems declined, if they sought more help, and from whom they sought help. Thus, an extensive profile of the victim's needs and the relationship of those needs to the

victim's informal network was constructed. In addition, victims whose cases resulted in prosecution were asked about their use of support networks to assist with any problems resulting from going to court.

In addition to the interviews with victims, interviews were conducted with a sample of the individuals whom victims identified as lending support to them following the crime. The term "supporter" was broadly defined to include those friends, relatives and neighbors of the victim and others who rendered material help (such as financial assistance, temporary housing, childcare, transportation and food) and non-material help (such as comfort, sympathetic listening, advice and referral to other informal or formal sources of assistance). On both the initial and follow-up interviews victims were asked to name their informal supporters.

Notes were taken on each neighborhood to gain an understanding of the characteristics of the research sites. Because the initial interviews with crime victims were usually conducted in the victim's home, the interviewers had opportunities to observe the neighborhoods, the types of dwellings, the use of public areas, and the ambience. This provided qualitative data on the neighborhoods under study.

Site Selection

The criteria for the selection of communities were crime rates and income. But both crime rate and income criteria presented problems because the available data, the 1970 census and police department statistics, were imperfect for research purposes. The major problem with the census data was that it was eight years old and New York City's population had shifted dramatically from 1970 to 1978. The problem with police statistics was that they were not calculated as rates per unit of population and did not reflect crime rates but rather the absolute number of burglaries, robberies and assaults. In order to calculate crime rates, we attempted to collect population statistics, but the only available data was the outdated 1970 census. In a few cases there were population updates, but these were done in units of community boards, which did not match police precinct boundaries.

To respond to this problem, we examined the available outdated statistics and assessed the direction of change in demographic characteristics of the area by interviewing informed community representatives and police officials.

In addition to the income and crime rate criteria, we wanted areas that would include Blacks, Whites and Hispanics, and senior citizens. To assure diversity, we chose areas in three boroughs, Brooklyn, Queens and the Bronx. In the Bronx we selected the Fordham area as the high crime, low income area, in Brooklyn we chose Park Slope as the high crime, mixed income area and in Queens we chose Flushing as the moderate crime, moderate income area. A detailed description of these areas follows later in this chapter.

Questionnaire Design and Pretest

The Police Department agreed to cooperate with the study by providing access to crime victims through complaint reports but suggested that we first try approaching victims by having police officers hand victims a card describing the study while the officers were filling out the complaint reports. This left it up to the victims to contact us if they wanted to participate. After one month we received only one call from a victim and the Police Department agreed to allow us to pick up the complaint reports directly from the precincts and to send a letter and call victims directly.

Meanwhile, we started the pretest using crime victims referred to us by the court notifications unit operated by VSA for the Brooklyn Criminal Court. This limited us to cases

in Brooklyn in which an arrest had been made. In total for the pretest, we completed 15 interviews with VSA-referred crime victims and ten more with referrals from Police Department complaint reports. In addition, we interviewed a set of victims with the follow-up questionnaire two, three, and four months after the crime in order to consider the most effective timing for the follow-up.

The first version of the initial interview consisted of eight parts: the crime, the victim's problems, supporters, the victim's network, demographics of the victim's network, the victim's neighborhood, victim's demographic data and court data. The most difficult part to design was the network segment because networks have been examined with complex instruments, some of which require hours of interviewing with each subject. We felt that in order to assess the network of support that arose around the specific incident of crime, we needed to know about the basic network of exchange of the victim. As discussed in Chapter I, the network of exchange is the general network of relationships a person maintains with friends, relatives and others in which social interchange and assistance play a major part. We chose McCallister and Fischer's (1978) method of eliciting the network of exchange because it took only 20 minutes and it provided a clear method for collecting demographic data on supporters as well as network members. McCallister and

Fischer's method only samples the closest members of the exchange network by collecting the names of people with whom specific items are exchanged, such as talk about problems, socializing, and apartment watching. Following McCallister and Fischer methods, demographic data was collected only on a subset of these people. To facilitate interviews with Hispanic victims, the questionnaire was translated into Spanish.

The major problems emerging from the pretest were 1) our definition of supporters and eliciting the names of supporters, 2) measurement of fear of crime, and self-blame , 3) measurement of psychological reactions and 4) sampling problems. With the assistance of the advisory committee, we considered each of these issues.

1) We had a sense that we were missing the types of interactions in which, after the crime, the victim meets someone he or she knows, quickly relates what happened, and receives a brief expression of sympathy, after which the conversation ends or moves on to other topics. These types of interactions are so brief and natural that victims may overlook them, although they could be an important part of the coping process. The general sense of the advisory committee, however, was that those interactions were too brief to be explored in detail and we should record only the most concrete forms of assistance that the victim defined as having been helpful.

To collect more supporter names we used a few different approaches. Instead of "Who did you talk to first, who second, etc.?", we started with "Could you tell me what happened after the crime?", then "Who did you see or talk to?" followed by an inquiry into who the victim spoke to "in the weeks after the crime," and finally, "Who else knows about the incident?" These changes were effective. During the pretest the victims provided the names of an average of three supporters each. During the actual survey, the number of supporters averaged more than four. We also decided to include police officers as supporters if they were mentioned by the victims as having helped, but not to interview them because the police are in a special category of official helpers and have been the object of numerous studies.

2) In the pretest, to measure fear of crime, we used a question from the National Crime Survey: "Since the incident do you feel less safe about going out at night alone?" We felt, however, that respondents were not clearly differentiating between before and after the crime and although they were saying "no" to this question, in response to other questions they reported that their fear of crime had increased. The consensus of the advisory committee was that the question was too vague and should be made more specific. Thus we substituted, "Since the crime do you go out at night more often than before, less often than before or about the same?" and a

similar question about going out during the day. We also asked whether the victim felt less safe at home and in the neighborhood.

In addressing feelings of responsibility and guilt, we decided to focus on behavior as a reflection of feelings. We asked "Do you think you could have done something to prevent the crime?" and about each supporter we asked "Did they suggest that you could have been more careful?" As already discussed, we consider these questions as probes into the degree of self-responsibility the victim carries and not guilt or self-blame.

3) At the suggestion of the advisory committee that the interview include more measures of psychological reactions to crime, the Affect Balance Scale (ABS) was used. The Affect Balance Scale (Derogatis and Meyer, 1979) is a 40-item checklist of adjectives. The scale is multi-dimensional, containing four positive (Joy, Contentment, Vigor, and Affection) and four negative (Anxiety, Depression, Guilt, and Hostility) dimensions of mood. The ABS has been used in studies of coping mechanisms among cancer patients (Derogatis, et al. 1979), and sexual dysfunction (Derogatis, et al. 1979), among others. These studies found that reactions to crisis were more likely to entail a reduction in positive affect than an increase in negative affect. It seemed

possible that criminal victimization might produce the same reaction, which would contribute to the literature describing the psychological effect of criminal victimization. Because there was no Spanish version of the ABS that had been tested and verified as accurate, the ABS was excluded from interviews done in Spanish.

4) During the pretest it became obvious that we could not fulfill the requirements of the stratified sample as anticipated in the original design, 90 victims from each community divided by age (elderly and non-elderly) and crime type to form subgroups with 15 respondents each. The first samples indicated that the number of elderly and assault victims and particularly the combination of the two were not high enough. There were also too few robberies to deal with these sampling problems, the division by age was dropped, but we tried to interview as many elderly victims as possible and to assure that robberies and assaults constituted between 33% and 50% of the final sample. These efforts included expanding the areas under study in Queens and Brooklyn, offering payment of $15 to victims for each completed interview, and selectively pursuing interviews with assault and robbery victims, and elderly victims. The effects of payment on the sample are discussed below. In the final sample 11% of victims were elderly, 65 years old or older, and 37% were victims of personal crimes, robberies and assaults.

The follow-up interview consisted of sections on crime-related court involvement, continued assistance by supporters , needs assessment, new supporters, fear of crime, precautions, and psychological state. The section on problems asked only about those problems that were mentioned in the initial interview and when they stopped. Since only 7 percent of the victims reported that an arrest had been made and that they had been to court, court involvement was not a major focus. In the supporter section we asked whether each of the people named as supporters in the first interview was still helping. The list of needs was the same as used in the initial interview and was meant to detect needs that continued, new needs that developed since the first interview and the names of new supporters. Only those who expressed fear initially were asked whether they were still fearful, but all victims were asked again about precautions. To measure changes in psychological state, the Affect Balance Scale was used again. As with the initial interview, the follow-up interview was translated into Spanish.

During the pretest we had been concerned with the timing of the follow-up interview. In order to test the relative merits of 2, 3 and months month follow-ups, we interviewed 10 victims referred to us by VSA's court-based operations in each time category. We found that even four months after the crime many victims were still experiencing

problems even though there were fewer problems expressed overall. On this basis, together with the advisory committee, we decided that a four month follow-up would give us perspective on the decline of short-term problems and a reliable record of long-term ones.

The follow-up interview, although originally planned as an in-person interview, was carried out over the telephone for purposes of speed and efficiency. A major source of expense in the first wave of interviews was no-shows, interviews that were scheduled but for which the respondent did not show. Telephone follow-ups reduced this expense. Comparing telephone follow-ups and in-person follow-ups, we found that we were able to collect equally complete data on the telephone. The follow-up interview was closely tied to the initial interview so there were few new areas to be explored, and the personal relationship established in the initial interview appeared to carry over into the telephone follow-up. Whenever possible, we tried to have the same person do the follow-up as visited the victim for the initial interview. In order to examine any sampling biases due to the use of the telephone, we compared the follow-up population to the initial interview population.

The supporter interview records how the victim and the supporter contacted each other, details on the help provided and the effect's on the supporter of providing help, the extent to which the supporter thought the victim responsible for the crime, the supporter's assessment of the victim's reactions to the crime and increases in fear of crime and precautions among supporters. The major thrust of this interview was toward examining indirect victimization and blame. The interview was done on the telephone in Spanish or English only with supporters for whom victims had supplied a telephone number.

Additionally, because shared victimization appeared to be so important to victims ("At least I had someone to talk to who was there during the crime."), we decided to give co-victims who were named as supporters a separate interview. The questions on this interview dealt with the interactions between the co-victims, the extent of mutual support and fear of crime. Indirect victimization was not a relevant issue for co-victims, so those segments were eliminated.

POPULATION, SAMPLE AND SUBSAMPLES

The population from which the sample was drawn consists of the 1,819 victims who filed complaint reports in the three communities under study from mid-March to

mid-August. The sample consists of the 274 victims who completed the initial interview. The subsamples that require examination because they could be sources of bias in the sample are those who were paid to complete the initial interview, those who completed the follow-up, those who completed the ABS and those who provided supporter contact information.

Population Interviewed

The project staff processed 1,819 complaint reports with a response rate of 15 %, or 274 interviews. The most common reason for not interviewing victims was inability to contact them by telephone (See Table 2.1). One-third could not be reached by telephone despite repeated efforts, in most cases 3 to 5 attempts. In another 7% of the cases, letters were returned for lack of the proper name or address. One-quarter of those who did not respond to our letter had no telephone and were therefore unreachable. Thus, we failed to make verbal contact with 63% of the population. Of the remaining 37%, half refused to interviewed, a sixth did not show up for the scheduled interview and the rest completed interviews. Overall, most of those not interviewed were not successfully contacted by telephone either because they did not have a telephone, did not answer their telephones or gave wrong contact information to the police.

Table 2.1

Attrition Chart of Potential Respondents



In Park Slope the response rate was 23%, in Fordham 14% and in Flushing 12%. Compared to the complaint reports processed, Park Slope is significantly over-represented in our sample(See Table 2.2). The response rate was twice as high among victims with telephones, 18% compared to 9%. Since we could not call those without telephones to arrange an interview, we interviewed more people with telephones. We made concerted efforts to visit or leave notes at the doors of victims without telephones when interviewers were in the area, but this rarely resulted in an interview. As we discuss in the following section, the policy of paying $15 for each additional interview improved the number of respondents among victims without telephones. But there still appears to be a skewing of the sample toward those with telephones and in all likelihood, toward those with higher socioeconomic status. It would have been helpful to have a corroborating measure of this but police complaint reports contain no such measures.(In this study socioeconomic variables consisted of household income, education, race and neighborhood of residence. All these variables are highly associated. The table of association is presented in Appendix C)

In terms of prior relationship to offender, those interviewed and those not interviewed show no differences. We had expected that prior relationship victims would be less willing to talk to us and that our restrictions on where the

TABLE 2.2

RESPONSE RATES OF COMPLAINANTS

Population n=1,819

Sample n=274

Overall Response Rate	15%
Borough	
Park Slope	23% *
Fordham	14
Flushing	12
Crime Type	
Assault	10%
Burglary	16
Robbery	18
Sex	
Male	16%
Female	20
Telephone	
Has telephone	18%
No telephone	9
Relationship to Offender	
Yes	14%
No	14
Age	
18-29 years	16%
30-39 years	17
40-49 years	14
50-64 years	15
65 + years	13

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

interviews could take place would reduce their numbers in the sample. But this did not prove to be so. We had also expected differences on the basis of age and sex because of the free time different age groups have available for an hour long interview. But there was no significant difference in age or sex between the population and the sample.

Because we could only compare the population and the sample on the basis of information provided on police department complaint reports, the comparison is limited. Significant differences appear in the response rate by borough and by whether the victim had a telephone. The responsiveness of Park Slope residents might be a reflection of their relative youth and community spirit. Sample size for each borough was kept equal by processing more complaint reports in the other communities. The responsiveness of victims with telephones indicates that our sample is biased toward the better off members of the communities. Although not a statistically significant difference, assault victims were less responsive than robbery or burglary victims.

A distinguishing feature of the VSA sample was that all victims reported the crime, and therefore all had some form of interaction with the police. The police response was especially important because they were the first, and usually the only, formal organization crime victims dealt with. It has

been suggested that victims' initial experience with the police defines the general reaction of the victim thereafter. Bard (1976: 109) noted that research has supported the crisis theory notion that "early skillful and authoritative intervention in disruptively stressful life experiences offered the prospect of forestalling the long-term maladaptive consequences of such events."

Almost two-thirds of the sample reported the crime to the police themselves. In another 12% of the cases co-victim relatives reported the incident. Neighbors reported another 9%, landlords and superintendants 4% and strangers 4%. In most cases (71%), victims had direct contact with the police either at the scene of the crime (which included the home in the case of burglaries) or at the police station or some other place (23%). In only 6% of the cases was contact limited to a telephone report of the crime. In about half the cases the police arrived within 30 minutes of the call. In a third of the cases they stayed for 10 minutes or less. Slightly more than 20% of the victims went down to the police station.

Effects of Paying Victims for Interviews

In May 1980, in order to increase the number of completed interviews, especially in low income areas in which victims often did not appear for appointments, we began

to offer $15 for a completed interview. This had the hoped for effect. It increased response rates in Fordham. Seventy-four percent of the sample in the Fordham, the poorest area, was paid compared to 34% in Park Slope and 25% in Flushing. Similarly, it improved the interview rate among robbery and assault victims (See Table 2.3).

A comparison those who were paid to those who were not paid revealed that there were no significant differences in terms of age, sex, martial status, time in neighborhood, or prior victimization. There was a difference, however, for socioeconomic status and type of crime. The offer of payment attracted lower income victims, minority group members, those with less education and residents of the poorest community. In addition, it attracted those who knew the offender previously and those who were injured, both of which are characteristics common to robberies and assaults rather than burglaries. Payment reversed the bias in the sample toward higher socioeconomic status victims by inducing the poor, minority group members, victims with less education, and victims from the poorest community to participate in the study. This is especially clear in terms of victims without telephones. Before we offered payment, 6 % of the victims interviewed did not have telephones, afterward 22% did not have telephones.

TABLE 2.3

THOSE WHO WERE PAID FOR INITIAL INTERVIEW COMPARED TO THOSE WHO WERE NOT PAID

	Paid	Not Paid
Borough		
Park Slope	25% (29)	36% (57)
Fordham	54 (64)	15 (23)
Flushing	21 (25)	49 (76)
	100%	100%
Crime Type		
Burglary	50% (59)	72% (112)
Robbery	37 (44)	23 (36)
Assault	13 (15)	5 (8)
	100%	100%
Relationship to Offender		
No	75% (88)	85% (129)
Yes	25 (29)	15 (22)
	100%	100%
Previous Victimization		
No	65% (77)	60% (94)
Yes	35 (41)	40 (62)
	100%	100%
Age		
18-29 years	35% (41)	32% (50)
30-39 years	22 (26)	24 (38)
40-49 years	13 (15)	15 (23)
50-64 years	22 (26)	17 (26)
65 + years	8 (10)	12 (19)
	100%	100%
Sex		
Male	50% (59)	42% (65)
Female	50 (59)	58 (91)
	100%	100%
Race		
Hispanic	28% (32)	16% (23)
Black	34 (39)	13 (19)
White	38 (44)	71 (105)
	100%	100%
Income		
$0-$4,999	42% (40)	22% (32)
$5,000-$9,999	21 (20)	16 (22)
$10,000-$14,999	16 (15)	21 (30)
$15,000-$19,999	8 (8)	16 (23)
$20,000 +	14 (13)	25 (35)
	101%	100%
Education		
Some High School or less	43% (50)	30% (46)
High School or Trade School	30 (35)	21 (33)
Some College or More	27 (32)	49 (77)
	100%	100%

TABLE 2.3
(CONTINUED)

	Paid	Not Paid
Marital Status		
Never Married	45% (53)	32% (50)
Separated, Divorced, or Widowed	24 (28)	35 (54)
Married or Living Together	31 (37)	33 (52)
	100%	100%
Telephone		
No	22% (26)	6% (9)
Yes	78 (91)	94 (147)
	100%	100%
Time In Neighborhood		
Less than 1 year	18% (21)	9% (14)
1 to 5 years	37 (44)	41 (64)
5 + years	45 (53)	50 (77)
	100%	100%
Injury		
None	68% (80)	86% (134)
No Medical Attention	15 (18)	5 (8)
No Hospitalization	13 (15)	6 (10)
Hospitalization	4 (5)	3 (4)
	100%	100%

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

Follow-up Population

We had hoped to interview 80% of our initial sample a second time. But after strenuous efforts that included an offer of $5 to complete the interview over the telephone, two letters and ten attempts to reach each victim by telephone, we completed 182 follow-up interviews or 66% of our initial 274 victims. Thirteen people (5%) refused to be interviewed a second time, and 79 people (29%) could not be reached.

As anticipated, those who completed the follow-up were more likely to have telephones than those who did not (See Table 2.4). The completion rate among those without telephones was 31% compared to 72% among victims with telephones. The offer of $5 to complete the second interview, apparently did not stimulate interest.

Minority groups, who were less likely to have telephones than Whites, were recontacted at a lower rate than Whites. Three-quarters of the Whites compared to only slightly more than half the Black and Hispanic victims completed the follow-up. The victims who completed the follow-up reflects no significant differences from those who did not complete the follow-up on the following variables: type of crime, sex, income, age, education, marital status, relationship to offender, previous victimization, time in

TABLE 2.4

RESPONSE RATES FOR FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS

Initial Interviews n=274

Follow-ups n=182

Overall Response Rate	66%
Borough	
Park Slope	69%
Fordham	59
Flushing	71
Crime Type	
Assault	65%
Burglary	68
Robbery	64
Relationship to Offender	
No	65%
Yes	69
Previous Victimization	
No	66%
Yes	67
Age	
18-29 years	57%
30-39 years	67
40-49 years	74
50-64 years	71
65 + years	76
Sex	
Male	62%
Female	70

TABLE 2.4

(CONTINUED)

Race	
Hispanic	51%
Black	57
White	74
Other	9
Income	
0-$4,999	68%
$5,000-$9,999	64
$10,000-$14,999	67
$15,000-$19,999	77
$20,000 +	75
Education	
Some High School or less	61%
High School or Trade School	62
Some College or more	74
Marital Status	
Never Married	64%
Married or living together	64
Separated, Divorced, Widowed	73
Telephone	
Telephone	72%
No Telephone	31
Time in Neighborhood	
Less than 1 year	49%
1 to 5 years	64
5 years +	73

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

neighborhood or feelings of being a part of the neighborhood. We reinterviewed more high socioeconomic status victims than low status victims, the differences were not statistically significant. The victims who completed the follow-up were similar to those who did not on all independent variables measured except for race.

Victims Who Completed the ABS

Not all victims completed valid Affect Balance Scales. ABS scales were eliminated for respondents whose test sheets indicated that they had not carefully considered each phrase, for instance, those who drew one long oval around 2 for all 40 items. Tests were also eliminated for those who did not respond to more than two of the five items on any subscale. For the following discussion, scores invalidated for the above reasons were grouped with respondents who refused to take the ABS on the grounds that these are subtle forms of refusal. Spanish speakers, who, as discussed above, were not given the ABS, are also included among those who did not take the test.

One hundred and ninety-eight, 72%, of the victims completed the ABS. Significantly fewer victims (60%) from the Fordham area completed it than from Flushing or Park Slope, which reflects the concentration of Spanish speaking victims in

the Bronx. Refusal to complete the ABS, however, does not correlate with crime type, but it does correlate with age. Older victims were less likely to take the ABS. Neither relationship to offender nor previous victimization nor sex affected completion of the ABS. But education and size of network was highly correlated with completion of the ABS. Eighty-four percent of those with at least some college took the ABS compared to 65% of those with less education. Eighty-three percent of those with 4 or more people in their network took the ABS compared to 65% with fewer people in their network. Although highly speculative, it might be that those with larger networks consider themselves mentally healthy and are more willing to take a psychological test. Overall, the population that completed the ABS scale was younger, more educated and had a larger network.

Victims Who Provided Supporter Contact Information

Only 55% of supporters provided contact information on at least one supporter. More were willing but some did not know the telephone numbers of their supporters and some supporters did not have telephones.

Comparing victims who provided contact information for supporters with those who did not, there is no difference between the groups from neighborhood to

neighborhood. Females, however, were much more likely to give contact information than males. Those with fewer people in their networks also provided contact information more often. Victims' income did not correlate with contact information, nor did education or prior relationship to the offender. The supporter interviews overrepresented supporters of female victims and victims whose networks were smaller than average.

In summary the sample generally reflects the population of complainants in the three precincts. Despite the fact that only 15% of the individuals who reported the types of crimes under study were interviewed, they represent a cross-section of the population. On the follow-up, however, the sample was skewed away from minorities and away from Fordham, (the area with the highest percentage of minority population). Yet the sample was not skewed in terms of standard socioeconomic measures -- income and education. Considering the importance of socioeconomic measures in the data analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that neither the initial nor follow-up sample was seriously flawed.

DESCRIPTION OF NEIGHBORHOODS AND POPULATION

This section is intended to familiarize the reader with the neighborhoods and the population under study. In Table 2.5, demographic data on the three neighborhoods is presented with data on New York City.

Park Slope, Brooklyn

The Park Slope area of Brooklyn was selected as representative of a high crime, mixed income area. The neighborhood gets its name from Prospect Park, which forms the western border. The community district in which Park Slope is located covers an area twice as large as the area included in the study so the Community District data are only approximate. In 1970, about a third of the population was under 18 years old and a tenth 65 or older, close to the figures for the city as a whole (See Table 2.5). A quarter of the population lived in single person households, indicative of the large young, single population in the area, and most rented. The population was mostly White, reasonably well educated, but with an average income $1,600 below the city average. The low income of some sectors of the population is reflected in the welfare rolls. In 1977, one out of every six families had an income below the poverty line and one of every five was on welfare.

TABLE 2.5

PROFILE OF RESIDENTS OF COMMUNITY BOARDS BASED ON 1970 CENSUS

	C.B. 6 Fordham	C.B. 6 Park Slope	C.B. 7 Flushing	New York City
AGE				
% of population less than 18 yrs. old	40	33	26	31
% between 18 and 64 years old	53	57	62	52
% over 64 years old	7	10	11	13*
HOUSING				
% of one person households	18	25	16	25
% owner occupied	5	16	46	20
% renting	92	80	52	76
% rated overcrowded (more than 1 person per room)	20	13	6	
ETHNIC AFFILIATION				
% White	34	65	94	68
% Black	32	14	2	20
% Puerto Rican	34	19	1	10
INCOME				
median family income	$4,977	$8,005	$11,230	$9,682
% families below poverty line	28	16	4	30
% on welfare (1977)	28	19	4	12
EDUCATION				
% H.S. graduates	5	39	59	47

*For reasons we do not understand the published figures for New York City do not total to 100%.

Because the area has been improving over the last 15 years, with an accelerated rate of change during the last five years, we anticipate that the 1980 census will show a higher level of economic well-being than the 1970 census. Yet, the number of people below the poverty line or on public assistance as late as 1977 speaks to the mixture of different groups found in Park Slope.

Park Slope is served by two police precincts, both of which serve other areas as well, making the crime figures imprecise. There are 23 precincts in Brooklyn and the two that cover Park Slope rank 15th and 16th for robberies, 10th and 11th for assaults and 11th and 21st for burglaries. Without a crime rate, however, it is hard to say more than that Park Slope is neither the highest nor the lowest crime area in Brooklyn. The police designation of Park Slope as a high crime area was our guide to designating it as such even though there is probably less crime in Park Slope than in Fordham.

According to community leaders, the types of crimes vary within the neighborhood. On the northern side of Park Slope, where community representatives reported a major drug problem, street crimes were common. But further south, the predominant crimes were household burglaries and robberies.

Most of the housing in Park Slope consists of attached brick homes, called brownstones, townhouses or row houses. Nearest Prospect Park are ornate townhouses with arched windows, and elaborate interior woodwork. Moving away from the park, the houses become narrower, the floors fewer, the external iron work less ornate and the interior woodwork more modest. The buildings near the park are well maintained, but further away many of the buildings were turned into boarding houses after World War II, when the previous residents moved to the suburbs. Some of these buildings are now in disrepair, with garbage in the area around the houses, broken windows and a few empty lots. As the quality of the housing shifts, the population changes from predominately White to Hispanic.

In the early 1960s urban homesteaders started purchasing the boarding houses in the area and renovating them as single family dwellings or homes with one rental unit. The homesteading area has shifted over the last 20 years toward the poorer area to produce an upper-middle class section that is gradually infringing on the poor section. Many of the families participating in the revitalization of Park Slope are professional couples with young children. Many of those who rent in Park Slope are young and single.

Along the main shopping avenue are health food stores, craft shops, bars and restaurants, as well as supermarkets and other providers of goods to a residential clientele. Bulletin boards that post signs for residents free of charge -- advertising apartments to rent or to share, used items for sale, or lessons to offer -- are frequent along this street. Community events are numerous and Park Slope has more community activity than the other neighborhoods understudy.

Park Slope also has its share of community conflict. Indicative of this was the confrontation that occurred in one neighborhood association that covered four blocks. The better off residents who lived on the eastern two blocks were concerned about trees and the general appearance of the blocks. Those who lived in the less affluent area, were concerned about burglaries and street crime. Because they could not resolve their differences, the organization split into two separate associations, each to concentrate on what it felt to be its pressing needs.

Fordham, the Bronx

The Fordham section of the South Bronx is a high crime, low income area. As of 1970 a larger proportion of the population in Fordham was under 18 years old and a smaller proportion over 64 years old than the rest of the borough or

the rest of New York City (See Table 2.5). Most people rented and one-fifth of the dwellings were considered over-crowded, i.e. more than one person per room. In 1970 the population was divided equally among Blacks, Whites and Puerto Ricans, but the White population has declined in the last ten years. The residents have, on the average, less education than the rest of New York City and an average income less than half the citywide average. As of September 1977, it was estimated that 28% of the population was on welfare.

The 48th precinct, which covers Fordham, ranks 8th in robberies, 5th in assaults and 6th in burglaries of the 11 Bronx precincts. Because the precinct is relatively small, we believe that a crime rate would place the 48th precinct higher on the list. Community leaders agreed that the crime rate was high, but the community board said that reported crimes had been declining because the population was discouraged by lack of police reponse. Because police patrols are allocated on the basis of reported crimes, the number of officers assigned to the precinct was declining.

Fordham is overtly poor and the physical structures are generally in disrepair. The main shopping blocks are dominated by bargain stores with baskets of cheap items in the store and outside on the street, quick food stores and ethnic stores. The northern 10 square blocks of the area make up the

Little Italy of the Bronx, which is dominated by Italian restaurants and luncheonettes, fruits stands, pork stores, bread stores and bakeries.

In the southern two-thirds of the district, on almost every block, there is at least one burnt out or abandoned building. Occupied building are only in slightly better condition. The paint is peeling both inside and out, intercoms don't work, steps are broken and living conditions are poor. Interspersed among these worn buildings are new housing projects that appear to be well-maintained. Along each block are a few abandoned cars slowly rotting or being stripped for parts.

Along the streets of this area are groups of men in their 20's and 30's, many unemployed, although Liebow (1967) notes that many such men probably are between jobs or work at night. These "street-corner men" made the area threatening to our interviewers sometimes, and in a number of cases, interviewers did not enter buildings for interviews. In one case the group hanging out in the lobby of a building was accused by the victims, residents of the building, of being the offenders. The victim said that residents felt restricted to their apartments in order to protect their belongings. But there is another side to these groups. In some cases they know the residents well and offer the protection of an occupied

street at odd hours. Residents of the Fordham area told us that they recognize and talk to many people on the block, implying a sense of comfort with the presence of those who hang out on the street. Probably the reaction of residents to those on the street varies among residents and from block to block.

Flushing, Queens

The Flushing area of Queens was chosen as representative of a moderate crime, moderate income area. Most of the statistics on Flushing indicate the affluence of the area compared to the rest of New York City. Almost half the households are owner occupied, most residents are high school graduates and one-quarter college graduates, and less that 4% have incomes below the poverty line. Although more than 90% of the population is White, in recent years, there has been an influx of Koreans, Asians Indians and Japanese. There is also a small Hispanic population.

There are 15 precincts in Queens and the 109th precinct, in which Flushing lies, is 8th in robberies, 7th in assaults and 6th in burglaries. The number of robberies and assaults are almost what they were in Brooklyn and Bronx, and since this area has a larger population we categorized it as

moderate to low crime area. According to the community board, crime has become a problem in the high-rises with the reductions in housing authority police.

The area is centered on a downtown shopping area that includes a number of major department stores, the police station, the post office and numerous other government service offices. Within walking distance to the west is a small industrial area and to the south are private homes, some rundown, older homes, and some of recent construction -- attached and brick. The area to the east and north is dominated by private homes and well-maintained, post-1960 apartment houses. Toward the far north the homes indicate that the residents are wealthy and along Long Island Sound, the northernmost border, the homes are estates. The northwest corner of the district is characterized by light industry and working-class, private homes, many in need of repair. Overall the area is suburban in terms of the number of private homes and the general wealth of the population.

The streets are lightly travelled with most people walking only from home to car and back. In contrast to Park Slope and especially the Bronx, the interviewers were often the only ones walking around. There are no overt signs of community involvement -- no posters of activities in the community and no people on the street talking to each other --

but and relationships apparently exist between neighbors. Community leaders reported relatively few, but well organized and effective, community organizations. In part this is a result of the contacts available to the population.

Comparing the three areas to New York City as a whole (See Table 2.5), Fordham residents are clearly the worst off, then comes Park Slope and finally relatively affluent Flushing. The people in Fordham are significantly poorer than the average for New York City, have received less education, rent more often and are more likely to be on welfare. In Park Slope residents have an average income only slightly lower than the city average and the proportion of college graduates is also only slighyly lower than average. The percent on welfare in Park Slope is higher than average, although not as high as Fordham. Flushing has a higher average income than the rest of New York City, a higher percentage of high school graduates, a higher percentage of home owners and a lower percentage on welfare.

Description of the Sample

A comparison among our sample from Fordham, Flushing and Park Slope, in term of crime characteristics, demographics, socioeconomic status and neighborhood ties is presented in Table 2.6.

TABLE 2.6

BASIC DEMOGRAPHICS OF SAMPLE BY BOROUGH

	Fordham n=87	Park Slope n=86	Flushing n=101	Total Sample
Crime Type				
Burglary	59%	70%	59%	62%
Robbery	29%	23%	35%	29%
Assault	13%	7%	6%	8%
Sex				
Male	52%	43%	42%	45%
Female	48%	57%	58%	55%
Age				
18-29 years	34%	45%	22%	33%
30-39 years	22%	27%	22%	23%
40-49 years	13%	9%	19%	14%
50-64 years	22%	12%	23%	19%
65 years +	9%	7%	15%	11%
Income				
0=$4,999	56%	23%	15%	30%
$5,000-$9,999	20%	12%	21%	18%
$10,000=$14,999	12%	30%	15%	19%
$15,000-$19,999	3%	19%	16%	13%
$20,000 +	8%	17%	33%	20%
Education				
Some High School or less	51%	23%	32%	35%
High School or Trade School Graduate	37%	12%	26%	25%
Some College or More	12%	65%	43%	40%
Race				
Hispanic	36%	16%	11%	21%
Black	46%	11%	10%	22%
White	18%	73%	79%	57%
Prior Victimization				
Yes	37%	51%	27%	38%
No	63%	49%	73%	62%
Relationship with Offender				
Yes	40%	14%	6%	19%
No	60%	86%	94%	81%
Time in Neighborhood				
Less than 1 year	14%	16%	9%	13%
1 to 5 years	44%	42%	34%	40%
More than 5 years	42%	42%	57%	48%
Living Situation				
Lives Alone	29%	35%	34%	33%
With Others	71%	65%	66%	67%

Examination of crime related characteristics reveals that relationship cases were most typical in the Fordham area. In a number of instances the offender was an acquaintance, friend or relative of the victim. Although prior relationship cases have normally been linked to violent crimes (Vera Institue of Justice, 1977), many such cases in our sample included burglary victims. One respondent stated that his apartment had been burglarized by her boyfriend and his sister. (Neighbors had recognized his sister carrying boxes from the apartment and assumed everything was all right.) Another victim was burglarized by an ex-superintendent, who she had had "in for coffee" the day before.

It was anticipated that Fordham residents would report higher rates of prior victimization. However, Park Slope residents were the most likely to have been previously victimized. No significant differences were found in the types of crime reported by neighborhood since the sample was stratified to insure an equal distribution of burglaries, robberies and assaults in each area.

As expected, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sample varied by neighborhood. Respondents in Flushing were older than Fordham who in turn were older than Park Slope victims. Also, as anticipated, the Fordham sample was comprised primarily of Black and Hispanic

victims. Only 18% of respondents in this area were White. Although Fordham was also expected to be the least affluent of the three communities, the difference between these victims and others was startling. More than 56% of the victims in this area had incomes under $5,000 compared to 23% in Park Slope and 15% in Flushing. Flushing victims reported the highest incomes. Despite the greater affluence reported by Flushing residents, Park Slope respondents were better educated and more likely to be employed than others. These findings may be attributed to the larger percentage of younger victims residing in Park Slope.

When victims' neighborhood ties were compared, little difference was found among victims' sense of belonging to their area. Differences did appear, however, if attachment was measured in terms of length residence in an area or by the number of relatives living in the neighborhood. Flushing victims had resided in their nieghborhoods longer than others victims. (This may be partially explained by the higher percentage of older victims included in the Flushing sample.) It was also found that Fordham victims were most likely to have relatives residing within the local area.

Social Networks of Crime Victims

The role social networks play in providing assistance in daily life and emergency situations has been described in Chapter I. In light of their importance, information on victims' social networks was collected.

An overall examination of victims networks yielded predictable results (See Table 2.7). Over two-thirds of all network members were friends or relatives, were in touch with victims on a weekly basis and had known victims more than five years. Slightly less than half of network members resided in the victim's neighborhood.

Further examination revealed variations in the structure of social networks by neighborhood (See Table 2.8). Victims in Fordham had smaller social networks than Park Slope or Flushing residents. In addition, members of Fordham victims' networks were more likely to be relatives and to live in the victim's neighborhood. Fordham victims were also the most likely to have social networks comprised entirely of relatives. Park Slope victims' knew network members for the shortest time and were the least likely to see victims on at least a weekly basis.

TABLE 2.7

CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIMS' SOCIAL NETWORKS

Relationship to Victim(n=929)

Relative	52%
Friend	35
Neighbor	11
Landlord	1
Other	1
	100

Residence(n=924)

In Victim's Neighborhood	46%
In Victim's Borough	24
Outside Victim's Borough	30
	100

Frequency of Contact With Victim(n=924)

Once a Week or More	82%
Once a Month or More	9
Less Than Once a Month	9
	100

Length of Acquaintance With Victim(n=923)

Less Than One Year	8%
One to Five Years	17
More Than Five Years	75
	100

TABLE 2.8

COMPARISON OF SOCIAL NETWORKS BY NEIGHBORHOOD

	Fordham	Park Slope	Flushing
% Network Members in Victim's Neighborhood	53%	45%	43%
% Network Members Who Were Relatives	44	60	52 *
% Network Members Who Saw Victim at least Weekly	88	76	84
% Network Members Who Knew Victim for 5 Years or Longer	77	66	83
% Victims With Only Relatives in Network	25	11	18
% Victims With All Network Members Living in Neighborhood	24	18	16
% Victims with 6 or More Network Members	31	48	42

*Boxes indicate that the differences between distributions are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

The findings on size of social network, suggest that lower socio-economic group have smaller social networks, and are somewhat more likely to rely on relatives and local ties than more affluent victims. Whether victims' networks alleviated some of the problems related to victimization, the extent to which victims relied on their networks for support, and the types of assistance provide by network members are discussed in the following chapters.

III

VICTIM RESPONSES TO CRIME

Until five years ago, little attention had been given to criminal victimization as a form of life stress. Since that time, there have been several empirical and clinical studies of victim's reactions to crime. Knudten (1976) reported on crime-related problems experienced by victims, and on the impact of victimization on fear of crime and the taking of precautions. Studies of rape victims (Burgess and Holstrom, 1974; Kilpatrick, Veronen, and Resnick, 1979) and other victims of serious violent crimes (Bard and Sangrey, 1979; Symonds, 1975) indicate that at least some victims experience serious emotional disturbance that may last several months or longer. A study by the American Institutes for Research (1978) found that many burglary victims as well exhibit "crisis behavior" following the incident, and Waller and Okihiro (1978) report that burglary may have long-lasting effects on victim's trust of other people, fear of being alone, and fear of entering their residence.

In addition to practical problems and emotional distress, crime also elicits other responses by victims. It sometimes results in feelings of guilt or self-blame among victims -- an "I deserved it" reaction (Wortman, 1976). Although counselors often view self-blame as an impediment to

recovery, a recent study of accident victims suggested that, under certain circumstances, self-blame may be indicative of positive coping efforts (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). Finally, victims may also engage in collective responses, such as trying to organize with neighbors to combat crime through neighborhood patrols, and mutual surveillance of residences.

Previous research has provided insight into victim responses to crime, but also leaves important questions unanswered. Are the effects of crime (in terms of reported problems, fear, taking of precautions, emotional distress, and social relationships of victims) relatively consistent from victim to victim? Or, do victims respond in different ways, exhibiting more or less severe degrees of emotional distress and more or less constructive responses to the situation? If responses do vary, does the nature of the response depend on the type of crime, previous victimization history, or the age, socioeconomic status or other characteristics of the victims? Are those victims most in need able to get the assistance they require from agencies or from informal sources? Do most victims adjust following the crime, or are they thrown into a permanent state of fear disequilibrium? How significant a role does assistance from others play in the adjustment process?

The present study examined these issues in a longitudinal fashion, measuring the short-term impact of crime upon people's lives and their adjustment during a four-month period. This chapter focuses on the immediate effects of crime.

Crime-Related Problems

- The most common problems reported by the 274 victims resulted from stolen property (68%), disruption of daily routines (65%), and difficulty sleeping (59%).
- Seventy-five percent of victims mentioned problems that could be interpreted as emotional reactions to the crime. These included nervousness self-responsibility (self-blame), shame, anger anxiety, and difficulty sleeping.
- Victims with lower socioecomonic status (defined by income and education) and those living in the poorest neighborhood reported problems that were more severe.
- The magnitude of problems did not vary with the age or sex of the victim.

On the initial interview, victims were asked about the problems they were experiencing or had experienced as a result of the crime. The most common problems (reported as either 'major' or 'minor' by at least half the sample) were those resulting from stolen property (68%); disruption of daily routines (65%); and difficulty sleeping (59%). 'Disruption of daily routines' covered a range of different problems. One victim lost time from school in order to travel to Virginia to replace a stolen driver's license. A victim who suffered a broken shoulder

during a robbery had to have help washing and dressing, and was unable to leave home for several weeks. Several burglary victims had to take a few days out of their regular activities to repair damage done by the intruders. Finally, many victims curtailed or limited usual activites out of fear: A woman who was followed and robbed while shopping reported that, since the crime, she hadn't "done any real shopping because I'm afraid I'm being watched."

Other types of problems reported by less than half the sample but still a substantial portion included: damaged property, (usually doors or windows damaged in burglary attempts), 28%; difficulty with friends or family, 22%; physical pain or limited mobility 19%; fear of harrassment by the criminal, 15%; lost income, 16%; medical expenses, 6%; problems with employer, 5%; and loss of job, 2%. One woman robbery victim reported having fights with her boyfriend because he treated her "as if I couldn't handle things", insisting, for example, that he meet her at her subway stop each evening on her way home from work. Another woman had problems understanding the behavior of her boyfriend who fled during a robbery leaving her to confront the criminals alone.

When asked if there were other problems, 23% mentioned emotional distress or heightened fear of crime. Several victims mentioned elevation in blood pressure, fear of

entering their apartments, or restricting activities that would make them more vulnerable to crime (such as, going out alone at night).

The data on the frequency of victims' responses to questions about problems are consistent with results obtained by Knudten (1976)from a sample of crime victims surveyed in Milwaukee (See Table 3.1). On items common to both questionnaires, there is a relatively similar ordering of the frequency of types of problems reported by victims. In both studies, property loss was the problem most frequenty mentioned by victims. A higher proportion of the New York sample however, responded affirmatively to each category of crime-related problems. This may reflect the fact that the New York sample was drawn from police complaint reports (generally more serious incidents), while the Milwaukee sample was drawn from the results of a victimization survey. Also the New York sample was interviewed within three weeks of the crime and Milwaukee sample a year after the incident, allowing more time to forget.

As found in an earlier Vera Institute/Victim Services Agency study (Davis, Russell, and Kunreuther, 1980), the consequences of victimization -- even simple property loss or damage -- often affect victims emotionally. Victims' answers to questions about crime-related problems were categorized by

CONTINUED

1 OF 4



TABLE 3.1

COMPARISON OF VICTIMS' CRIME-RELATED PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK AND MILWAUKEE

Nature of Problem	Incidents in Which Victims Experienced Problems: VSA/New York Sample (Based on Crime Reports) N=284	Milwaukee Sample[1] (Based on Victimization Survey) N=3,210
Property loss	68%	55
Disruption of routine	65	*
Difficulty sleeping	59	*
Damaged property	28	24
Difficulty with friends of family	22	10
Physical pain/limited mobility	19	11
Fear of harrassment	15	*
Lost income	16	7
Loss of job/other problems with employer	7	*
Medical expenses	6	*

[1]Based on results reported by Knudten (1976). Knudten's categories for mental/emotional suffering, time loss, and reputation damage are not directly comparable to results from the New York City sample.

*Not asked by Knudten (1976).

uniform code. Whether a victim responded to the questions about property loss or daily routine, for instance, the answer was categorized as emotional reaction if anxiety was mentioned. On this basis, 45% percent of victims expressed an emotional reaction to the crime that included nervousness, self-responsibility (self-blame), shame, anger, or anxiety (See Table 3.2). If difficulty sleeping is included as an emotional reaction, three-quarters of the victims reported an emotional reaction to the crime. Many of these responses centered on fear of revictimization. One burglary victim, for example, was upset mostly because the incident touched off anxiety about an attempted rape that had happened several months earlier.

In contrast to the high proportion of victims who expressed problems in emotional terms, only 32% expressed concern about the financial loss, 11% expressed concern over loss of an object of sentimental value and 14% were concerned with the loss of the use and enjoyment of what was taken. Thus, the major impact of crime is the pyschological effect on the victim. Even when the victim has no contact with the offender, the victim experiences the the crime as a personal attack. The fear, the anxiety, and the tension created by the invasion of a person's private space apparently are more upsetting than the loss of possessions.

TABLE 3.2

VICTIM'S PROBLEMS AS CODED BY RESEARCHERS

	Percentage Of Victims with Each Problem N=274
Emotional reaction - including nervousness, self-responsibility, shame anger and/or anxiety	45%
Emotional reaction and/or disturbed sleep	75%
Fear of revictimization at home or on street	48%
Financial loss	32%
Inconvenience in replacing or repairing loss	23%
Use and enjoyment of lost object	14%
Sentimental value of lost object	11%
General loss of object	11%

One of the questions addressed by the present study was which victims receive assistance and which have needs that are not met by existing informal and formal support systems. As a first step in answering the question, this section looks at various sub-groups of victims to determine whether some victims are harder hit by crime-related problems than others.

To condense into manageable form what would otherwise be a voluminous amount of data, a summary measure of crime-related problems was created for purposes of this analysis. The summary measure is an additive index, based on the 14 individual problem items that were asked on the initial interview with victims. On the problem index, a victim received two points for each problem reported as 'major,' and a single point for each problem reported as minor.[1] Thus, the index reflects both number and intensity of crime-related problems; as such, it is referred to as measuring the magnitude of crime-related problems. (Correlations between individual problem items and various victim, crime, and network characteristics are presented in Appendix A. In addition, Appendix B presents correlations between each of the items that make up the problem index. Appendixes A and B contain the same information for each of the constructed indices in the study.)

Scores on the problem index were compared for subsamples according to victim characteristics, crime characteristics, and network and neighborhood ties of the victim. Because many of the factors examined were correlated with type of crime (e.g., injury, socioeconomic factors, prior victim/criminal relationship), analyses presented in this chapter control for type of crime (property or personal crimes). The results are displayed in Table 3.3.

As Table 3.3 shows, the magnitude of crime-related problems increased as victims' socioeconomic status decreased. Victims who had lower annual personal incomes, who had less education, and who lived in the Bronx (the least affluent of the three neighborhoods studied) and minority group members all scored higher on the problem index than other victims.

Additional analysis of the data revealed that victims of lower socioeconomic status scored higher on the composite problem index not because they reported a greater number of crime-related problems than others, but because they rated the problems they reported as being more severe than other victims. A Black woman who lived in Fordham, for example, was robbed by two men after cashing her welfare check. To this woman, who supported two children as well as herself on less than $5,000 per year, the $87 stolen by the

TABLE 3.3
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAGNITUDE OF CRIME-RELATED PROBLEMS REPORTED BY VICTIMS

	Means on Problem Index[1] Range 0 to 26
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	6.20[2]
$5,000, to $15,000	5.64
$15,000 and over	5.07
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	6.22
High school graduate	5.31
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	5.62
Employed	5.63
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	5.10
Fordham	6.30
Flushing	5.50
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	5.65
50 - 64	5.96
65 and over	4.90
Sex:	
Men	5.48
Women	5.76
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	5.88
Black	6.47
White	5.16
Prior Victim:	
Yes	5.62
No	5.63
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type:	
Violent Crime	6.20
Property Crime	5.28
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	5.38
Knew each other before crime	6.90

TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

	Means on Problem Index[1] Range 0 to 26
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	4.88
Minor (not treated)	6.94
Medical attention sought	9.35
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	4.23
$100 thru $499	6.00
$500 thru $999	5.59
$1,000 and over	6.49
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	5.83
Two or more	5.48
Number in Network:	
Three or less	5.85
Four to six	6.03
Seven and over	5.26
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	5.72
One to five years	5.29
Five years and over	5.87
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	5.59
One or two	5.89
Three or more	5.46
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	5.68
Somewhat	5.51
Not at all	5.64

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

offender left her with no way to pay her bills. (Fortunately, a friend lent her enough money to get her through until her next welfare check.)

Several crime characteristics were associated with problems that victims experienced. Not surprisingly, victims who were injured scored higher on the probblem index than victims who were not injured. Injured victims, of course, encountered problems with pain, limited mobility, and medical expenses that other victims did not. But injured victims also experienced more job-related problems -- loss of income and loss of jobs.

Reflecting the differences in victims' problems according to injury, victims of assaults and robberies scored higher on the problem index than victims of burglaries. Among burglary victims, however, there was a considerable difference in the magnitude of crime-related problems according to whether vandalism accompanied the break-in. Victims whose residences or businesses were "trashed," or vandalized, in conjunction with the burglary had significantly higher scores on the problem index than other burglary victims.

Victims who knew the criminal prior to the crime also experienced a greater magnitude of crime-related problems than other victims. Victims who knew the criminal

suffered more than other victims in terms of injury-related problems, fear of harrasment, and problems with family or friends. One spouse abuse victim, for example, was forced to leave her home to stay with friends and to take her children out of school for fear that her husband would continue to harrass her and the children.

Other victim characteristics - age, sex, and previous victimizations - bore no significant relationship to the problems index. For the purposes of presentation in tables, age was broken down into three categories, under 50 years old, 50 to 64 and 65 and over. Analysis, however, was based on age as a continuous variable. We had expected that the elderly, because of limited resources and physical vulnerability, would have more crime-related problems than the non-elderly. In fact, the mean problem index for those 65 years old and over was lower than those 50 to 64 years old and those 18 to 49 years old. We offer no explanation for this anomaly except to note that these data contradict commonly held assumptions about the elderly. One weakness of these data, however, is that there were only 29 victims 65 years old and over, a small percentage (11%) of the sample and a small number upon which to base firm conclusions. If the sample was larger, for instance, we might have found that the poor elderly are extremely vulnerable to crime-related problems but the non-poor elderly are below the general sample mean.

Although women scored higher on the problem index than men, the difference was not significant. Men and women appear to suffer from crime to the same degree. This also contradicts common expectations. As will be shown, however, when other aspects of reaction to crime are examined, sex-differences do appear.

We were also surprised that there was no difference between victims with and without a prior victimization in the preceding year. A second victimization within a short period of time does not appear to multiply problems.

Contrary to one assumption of the study, neighborhood and network ties did not affect the problem index. Whether victims lived with other adults, had stronger ties to their neighborhood, or had more extensive or more tightly-knit social networks did not influence the magnitude of crime-related problems they experienced. The number and severity of initial problems was not affectd by the number of social ties. Victims with larger networks did not have fewer problems and victims with smaller networks did not have more problems. It has been noted(Pilisuk and Froland, 1978) that, although larger networks are associated with quicker recoveries from crises, researchers have not been sure whether psychologically healthier people had larger networks, in which case the relationship between large networks and recovery is

secondary, or larger networks facilitated recovery. The data indicate that there is no relationship between network size and initial problems in a crisis so that any affect network size has on outcome is a result of the recovery process.

Fear of Crime

- More than 60% of the victims felt less safe in their homes and 42% felt less safe in their neighborhoods after the crime.
- Female victims and victims with lower incomes and less education experienced greater increases in fear of crime.
- Fear of crime did not increase with age.

Being a victim sharply reduced people's feelings of safety in their homes and neighborhoods. A majority of the sample reported feeling either 'very much' less safe(28%) or 'somewhat' less safe(35%) in their homes as a result of the crime: A smaller, but still sizeable, proportion felt 'very much'(18%) or 'somewhat'(24%) less safe in their neighborhoods. Thirty-five percent of the sample reported that they would like to move to another neighborhood. (It was not clear because of the wording of the question, however, whether affirmative answers were attributable to the experience of being victimized.) When asked if they felt it was likely that they would be victimized again during the next year, 64% of those responding felt it was 'very likely' or 'likely' and 36% thought it was "unlikely".

A composite 'fear of crime' index was constructed from the questions on feeling safe at home and in the neighborhood and desire to move in order to determine whether heightened fear of crime was more prevalent among some subgroups of victims than others.[3] (For details on the fear of crime index see Appendices A and B)

As was true for the problem index, heightened fear of crime was more pronounced among victims lower on the socioeconomic scale. Victims with lower incomes, less education, and those who lived in Fordham suffered greater increases in fear of crime following victimization than other respondents (See Table 3.4).

The extreme fear among less well off victims was evident in the case of a 54-year-old resident of Fordham who lived on public assistance. He was robbed one night at knifepoint by two youths who broke down the door to his apartment. When he told the youths that he only had $15, they forced him to disclose when he would receive his next check, and said that they would by back on that date; if he didn't have more money to give them then, they said they would kill him. The victim reported that because he feared that the youths would return, he slept with furniture stacked in front of the door and a large pair of scissors and a can of mace near his bed: "If they come back, I'll be awakened by them trying to

TABLE 3.4

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED FEAR OF CRIME FOLLOWING VICTIMIZATION

	Means on Fear of Crime Index[1] Range 0 to 5
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income[2]	
Less than $5,000	2.28
$5,000, to $15,000	1.72
$15,000 and over	1.58
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	2.15
High school graduate	1.69
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	1.99
Employed	1.74
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	1.57
Fordham	2.13
Flushing	1.86
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	1.69
50 - 64	2.58
65 and over	1.58
Sex:	
Men	1.63
Women	2.03
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	2.01
Black	2.09
White	1.70
Prior Victim:	
Yes	1.87
No	1.81
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type[3]:	
Violent Crime	1.74
Property Crime	1.92
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	1.87
Knew each other before crime	1.76

TABLE 3.4 (Continued)

	Means of Fear of Crime Index[1] Range 0 to 5
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	1.85
Minor (not treated)	2.11
Medical attention sought	1.64
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	1.61
$100 thru $499	1.98
$500 thru $999	1.53
$1,000 and over	2.09
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	1.95
Two or more	1.76
Number in Network:	
Three or less	2.10
Four to six	1.80
Seven and over	1.80
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	1.40
One to five years	1.89
Five years and over	1.94
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	1.85
One or two	1.88
Three or more	1.98
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	1.81
Somewhat	1.78
Not at all	2.30

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

get past the furniture in front on the door. It'll give me time to get dressed and get my scissors and mace to defend myself." In another context, this victim's reaction might seem extreme; in the environment in which he lived, however, his fears may have been well founded.

Table 3.4 also shows that victimization reduced women's sense of security more than men's. Other victim characteristics (age, ethnicity, and previous victimization), however, did not correlate with changes in fear of crime.

There was no consistent association between crime characteristics -- offense type, victim/offender relationship, extent of injury, or amount of financial loss -- and increases in fear of crime following victimization. However (as shown in Appendix A), type of offense was significantly related to certain components of the fear of crime index. That is, victims of violent crimes (assault and robbery) were more likely than burglary victims to report feeling less safe in their neighborhoods. Conversely, burglary victims more often reported feeling less safe in their residence. Among burglary victims there were no differences in feelings of safety in victims' residences according to whether their residences were vandalized.

None of the measures of neighborhood and network ties were significantly associated with changes in fear of crime following victimization.

Precautions Taken as a Result of Victimization

- More than 60% of victims took precautions in their homes after the crime.
- After the crime, 38% reported going out less at night and 24% going out less during the day.
- Victims with lower socioeconomic status and women took more precautions on the street after the crime.

Many people reported taking added precautions since the crime, especially in their homes. Six of every ten respondents stated that they had installed new locks or bars on doors and windows; had their valuables marked with identification numbers, moved to a safer location, or hidden, got a dog; or installed an alarm system. Forty-seven percent reported being more cautious about making sure doors were locked and 35% said that they had begun leaving the lights, the television, or the radio on when going out. Although the question was not specifically asked, several victims volunteered that they had secured weapons to protect themselves. One victim said, for example, that he kept a baseball bat in the kitchen for protection and carried a knife whenever he went outside.

Increased precautions were also taken by many victims outside of their residence. Twenty-four percent said they went out less during the day and 38% less at night compared to before the crime. When they did go out, 39% stated that they were more likely than before to avoid particular places and 45% were more suspicious of people on the street.

Two indices of precautions were constructed, one reflecting the number of additional precautions taken by victims inside their residences and the other the number taken outside the residence.[4] Each index was examined against the list of victim characteristics, crime characteristics, and neighborhood/network ties in an effort to isolate subgroups of victims most prone to take added precautions following victimization. (See Appendices A and B for details on the construction of the precautions indices.)

As measured by the indices, taking of precautions inside or outside the residence was primarily associated with type of crime. Victims of burglary were more likely to take precautions inside the residence (especially if vandalism accompanied the burglary[5]), while victims of assault or robbery were more likely to take precautions on the street (See Table 3.5). However, 73% of burglary victims, as a result of the crime, took precautions outside of the residence, while 36% of assault and robbery victims took added precautions inside

TABLE 3.5

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH TAKING ADDED PRECAUTIONS INSIDE THE RESIDENCE AND OUTSIDE THE RESIDENCE

	Means on In-House Index[1] Range 0 to 5	Means on Out-House Index[1] Range 0 to 5
Socioeconomic Status of Victim		
Personal Income:		
Less than $5,000	1.49	1.62[2]
$5,000 to $15,000	1.50	1.63[2]
$15,000 and over	1.51	1.19[2]
Education:		
Did not graduate high school	1.35	1.57
High School graduate	1.43	1.51
Employment Status:		
Not Employed	1.36	1.53
Employed	1.47	1.53
Neighborhood:		
Park Slope	1.45	1.53
Fordham	1.43	1.73
Flushing	1.36	1.36
Other Victim Characteristics		
Age:		
Under 50	1.46	1.59
50 - 64	1.33	1.72
65 and over	1.26	0.81
Sex:		
Men	1.38	1.20
Women	1.43	1.80
Ethnicity:		
Hispanic	1.43	1.73
Black	1.37	1.76
White	1.45	1.36
Prior Victim:		
Yes	1.36	1.47
No	1.49	1.63
Crime Characteristics		
Offense Type:[3]		
Violent Crime	0.59[2]	1.86[2]
Property Crime	1.90	1.33
Victim/offender Relationship:		
Strangers	1.37	1.48
Knew each other before crime	1.47	1.64

TABLE 3.5

(Continued)

	Means on In-House Index[1] Range 0 to 5	Means on Out-House Index[1] Range 0 to 5
Extent of Injury to Victim:		
None	1.37	1.47
Minor (not treated)	1.	1.77
Medical attention sought	1.62	1.74
Financial Loss:		
Under $100	1.42	1.29
$100 thru $499	1.34	1.79
$500 thru $999	1.61	1.63
$1,000 and over	1.60	1.33
Neighborhood and Network Ties		
Adults in Household:		
One	1.46	1.53
Two or more	1.35	1.53
Number in Network:		
Three or less	1.23	1.28
Four to six	1.57	1.66
Seven and over	1.42	1.58
Time in Neighborhood:		
Less than one year	1.21	1.64
One to five years	1.49	1.53
Five years and over	1.40	1.50
Relatives in Neighborhood:		
None	1.35	1.52
One or Two	1.61	1.63
Three or more	1.53	1.59
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:		
Very much	1.45	1.69
Somewhat	1.49	1.54
Not at all	1.32	1.30

[1]Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

[2]Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

[3]Not adjusted for type of offense.

the residence.[6] Thus, although victims' responses were consistent with the circumstances of their victimization, there was a general increase in wariness.

Surprisingly, none of the other factors examined was associated with the number of added precautions victims took inside their residences. Several additional factors, however, were related to added precautions taken outside the victim's home. Once again, socioeconomic status played a part in shaping victims' response to crime; victims with lower personal incomes and minority group members took more precautions outside of their residences than victims with higher incomes or Whites. Women -- who, showed greater increase in fear of crime following victimization -- also took more additional precautions on the street than men.

One case illustrates the increased precautions taken outside the home among the poor, women, and victims of violent crimes. This case involved a Hispanic woman who supported herself and her son on a income of less than $10,000 per year. On her way to her car one night, she was confronted by a man with a knife who, tried to rob her. After the incident the woman, who had recently been the victim of a chain-snatch attempt on the subway, was shaken. She reported that she was

> scared to walk around by myself. I dread going into the garage. When I come home from work now, I go straight to my apartment and bolt the door. I don't even like being in the hallways. I used to visit neighbors in my building or take my car out at night to visit friends. I don't do that anymore.

Age also affected the number of added precautions taken outside the residence, but in a puzzling manner. Victims in the 50-64 age range took more precautions than those under 50; those 65 and over, however, took the least new precautions of any age group. Whether this is because senior citizens already were extremely cautious cannot be determined from these data.

The extent to which victims felt a part of their neighborhood also affected the number of added precautions taken outside the residence in an unpredicted manner: Victims who most felt a part of their neighborhood took the most new precautions. Victims who felt most a part of their neighborhood may have taken the fewest precautions before the crime because they felt safe in the area.

Affective Reactions

- After the crime victims felt significantly more anxious, depressed, guilty and hostile and less joyful, contented, vigorous and affectionate than a non-victim sample of college students.

Respondents' affective reactions to victimization were measured by the Affect Balance Scale(ABS), a multi-dimensional 40-item checklist of adjectives containing four positive (Joy, Contentment, Vigor, and Affection) and four negative (Anxiety, Depression, Guilt, and Hostility) dimensions of mood. Table 3.6 compares mean scores on subscales of the ABS administered at the time of the initial interview with test norms from a sample of college students (norms in the table are weighted to reflect the frequency of male versus female victims in the present study). The table shows that victims scored significantly lower than the test norm on the four positive subscales, and significantly higher on the four negative subscales. These results suggest that victimization does affect both positive and negative affective states. But, looking at these data alone, the possiblity cannot be ruled out that the victim sample was experiencing greater emotional distress than the norm sample prior to victimization. In the section on readjustment following victimization, additional data are examined which support the contention that reduced positive and increased negative affect in this sample were (at least largely) a result of victimization.

Following Derogatis and Meyer, a summary measure of the ABS was derived by subtracting the total of the scores on the negative scales from the total of the scores on the positive scales. The resulting affect balance measure was then

TABLE 3.6

COMPARISON OF VICTIMS ABS SCORES ON INITIAL INTERVIEW WITH TEST NORMS

Scales	Victim Sample (n=200)	Norm Sample (n=200)*	Significance
Positive:			
Joy	10.1	13.0	t (199) = -8.12**
Contentment	10.1	13.0	t (199) = -9.70
Vigor	11.0	13.7	t (197) = -8.36
Affection	12.4	14.1	t (197) = -5.67
Negative:			
Anxiety	9.5	7.2	t (197) = 8.85
Depression	6.6	4.7	t (196) = 6.91
Guilt	5.2	3.9	t (197) = 5.06
Hostility	8.6	5.3	t (197) = 10.89

*Source: Derogatis and Meyer (1979). Norm means were weighted to reflect frequency of men versus women in the victim sample.

**All t values are significant at the .01 level or better (two-tailed test).

examined for various subgroups of victims defined by victim and case characteristics and neighborhood and network ties.

The results are presented in Table 3.7. As the table shows, only one of the factors examined bore a significant relationship to the affect balance measure: Positive mood states were more common among victims with larger social networks than among those with smaller networks, which supports previous research on network size and pyschological state. It is also worth noting that, congruent with other sections of this chapter, victims of lower socioeconomic status (those with lower incomes, less education, who were unemployed, and who lived in Fordham) had relatively lower positive composite ABS scores than other victims. These differences, however, did not reach statistical significance. (Correlations between individual ABS scales and victim, crime, and network characteristics and intercorrelations between the eight ABS scales are presented in Appendices A and B.) The reader is again cautioned that we do not know the extent to which ABS scores reflect reactions to victimization versus psychological states that existed prior to the crime. Thus we cannot know whether the relative predominance of positive to negative moods among persons with more extensive networks is because they are generally more 'well-balanced' individuals or because their large social networks provided immediate support which helped to lessen the impact of victimization.

Efforts to Organize

- One of six victims made some attempt to organize crime prevention activities with friend or neighbors where they lived.

Another victim response to crime that the present study examined was efforts made by victims to organize with friends or neighbors. Sixteen percent of the sample reported that they had made some attempt to take action with others to combat crime. These efforts were directed toward persuading landlords to enhance security in their buildings (by installing locks, intercoms in the lobby, or hiring a doorman), beginning citizen street patrol in their neighborhoods, or encouraging area residents to watch each other's residences. One of the more unusual efforts was an attempt to picket a local drug paraphenalia store, which the victim apparently felt attracted undesirable people to the area. The interviews came too soon after the crime to ascertain whether these efforts were successful. Several victims noted, however, apathetic responses from their landlords and from other residents.

As Table 3.8 shows, efforts to organize were most prevalent among victims of higher socioeconomic status. Those who were employed, had higher incomes and/or better educations were more likely to report attempts to get together with friends and neighbors to fight crime. Efforts to organize also varied according to the size of victims' social

TABLE 3.7

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VICTIMS' "AFFECT BALANCE"

	Means on Composite ABS Index[1] Range -1 to +1
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	0.48
$5,000, to $15,000	0.78
$15,000 and over	0.90
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	0.59
High school graduate	0.74
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	0.52
Employed	0.81
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	0.87
Fordham	0.52
Flushing	0.64
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	0.70
50 - 64	0.65
65 and over	0.67
Sex:	
Men	0.84
Women	0.56
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	0.68
Black	0.58
White	0.75
Prior Victim:	
Yes	0.64
No	0.78
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type[3]:	
Violent Crime	0.60
Property Crime	0.75
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	0.72
Knew each other before crime	0.56

TABLE 3.7 (Continued)

	Means on Composite ABS Index[1] Range -1 to +1
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	0.70
Minor (not treated)	0.61
Medical attention sought	0.71
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	1.02
$100 thru $499	0.71
$500 thru $999	0.58
$1,000 and over	0.52
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	0.55
Two or more	0.83
Number in Network:[2]	
Three or less	0.33
Four to six	0.61
Seven and over	0.90
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	0.37
One to five years	0.82
Five years and over	0.68
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	0.72
One or two	0.69
Three or more	0.68
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	0.83
Somewhat	0.68
Not at all	0.46

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

TABLE 3.8

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE WITH FRIENDS OR NEIGHBORS AFTER VICTIMIZATION

	Percent Who Tried to Organize[1]
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income[2]	
Less than $5,000	9%
$5,000, to $15,000	18
$15,000 and over	23
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	8
High school graduate	19
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	11
Employed	20
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	19
Fordham	13
Flushing	16
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	17
50 - 64	16
65 and over	11
Sex:	
Men	16
Women	16
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	15
Black	14
White	17
Prior Victim:	
Yes	15
No	18
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type[3]:	
Violent Crime	11
Property Crime	18
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	16
Knew each other before crime	15

TABLE 3.8 (Continued)

	Percent Who Tried to Organize[1]
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	15%
Minor (not treated)	23
Medical attention sought	15
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	14
$100 thru $499	14
$500 thru $999	13
$1,000 and over	21
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	16
Two or more	14
Number in Network:	
Three or less	7
Four to six	15
Seven and over	22
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	12
One to five years	14
Five years and over	
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	13
One or two	22
Three or more	20
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	16
Somewhat	19
Not at all	12

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

networks: Victims with seven or more people in their networks were more more likely to attempt to organize others than victims with networks of three or fewer.

Although it was not statistically significant, Park Slope had the highest percentage of residents who attempted to organize neighbors to prevent crime. This is consistent with our observations of the neighborhood. As mentioned in Chapter II, along the main shopping block in Park Slope are a number of locations with signs posted free of charge advertising apartments to rent or share, used items for sale and lessons of various kinds. The numerous community organizations and events are also advertised in this way. The high level of community activity is probably related to the fact that the area is undergoing reclamation and renovation by middle-class families. Neither the poor Fordham area nor the wealthier, but stable Flushing area demonstrated as much community involvement.

Attribution of Responsibility for Victimization

- Victims with lower incomes and less education, and members of minorities were less likely to feel that they could have prevented the crime.

It is well documented that crime victims often blame themselves for victimization(Burgess and Holmstrom, 1974). This tendency has been regarded as negative, indicative of a

state of depression(Beck, 1967) and detrimental to victims' readjustment(Bard and Sangrey, 1979). Recently, however, Bulman and Wortman(1977) found that self-blame among paralyzed victims facilitated coping. Janoff-Bulman(1979) explains this apparently anomolous findings by suggesting that there are two distinguishable forms of self-blame, characterological and behavioral,the former destructive and the latter constructive. According to Janoff-Bulman:

> Recognizing that self-blame may be both adaptive and maladaptive is a first step towards the conclusion that there are two different types of self-blame...individuals can blame themselves for having engaged in (or having failed to engage in) a particular activity, thereby attributing blame to past behaviors; or individuals can blame themselves for the kind of people they are, thereby faulting their character (1979:1799).

Behavioral self-blame is seen by Janoff-Bulman to be indicative of a belief in personal control over outcomes, a mechanism social psychologists have demonstrated to be advantageous (eg. Bowers, 1968; Glass and Singer, 1972; Dweck, 1975).

In the present study, respondents were queried if there was anything they felt they could have done that would have prevented their victimization. Thirty-six percent of the sample responded affirmatively. Many stated that they might have taken greater measures to protect their residence, been more cautious about dangerous areas or carrying valuables,

or been more alert. Others felt that their behavior should have been different once confronted by the criminal. One victim said, "We should have given the guys the money". An assault and attempted rape followed the victims' refusal. Another robbery victim had the opposite sentiment: "They didn't seem to sure of themselves when they came up to me. If I had yelled at first, they might have run".

Table 3.9 shows that the belief that victimization was avoidable was strongly associated with the socioeconomic status of the victim. Victims who had lower personal incomes, were less educated, were unemployed, were residents of Fordham, or were members of ethnic minorities were less likely to feel that they could have prevented their victimization. Age of the victim also influenced their feelings of control: older victims (those in the 50-64 and 65 and over age groups) less often believed that victimization was avoidable than younger victims, which may be an accurate assesment of their vulnerability.

Table 3.9 also shows that several crime characteristics also affected victims' feelings of control. The belief that victimization was avoidable was more prevalent among burglary victims than among robbery and assault victims. This finding probably reflects the fact that there are many easy and relatively inexpensive ways to make it harder

TABLE 3.9

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RESPONDENTS' BELIEFS THAT THEY COULD HAVE AVOIDED VICTIMIZATION

	Percent Who Felt They Could Have Prevented the Crime[1]
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	19% [2]
$5,000, to $15,000	31
$15,000 and over	53
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	19
High school graduate	45
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	27
Employed	43
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	45
Fordham	28
Flushing	35
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	41
50 - 64	23
65 and over	23
Sex:	
Men	36
Women	36
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	22
Black	29
White	44
Prior Victim:	
Yes	33
No	42
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type[3]:	
Violent Crime	20
Property Crime	45
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	37
Knew each other before crime	30

TABLE 3.9 (Continued)

	Percent Who Felt They Could Have Prevented the Crime[1]
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	36%
Minor (not treated)	48
Medical attention sought	28
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	45
$100 thru $499	48
$500 thru $999	28
$1,000 and over	24
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	30
Two or more	39
Number in Network:	
Three or less	26
Four to six	31
Seven and over	46
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	51
One to five years	39
Five years and over	30
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	37
One or two	30
Three or more	32
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	37
Somewhat	41
Not at all	28

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

for a thief to break into a residence, but fewer obvious ways to decrease the chances of becoming a victim of a street crime in one's own neighborhood (where most of the sample was victimized). The amount of victims' financial loss also affected beliefs that their victimization might have been prevented: The more victims lost financially, the less they tended to think the crime was avoidable.

Finally, several measures of neighborhood and network ties were associated with victims perceptions of control. Those who had more extensive social networks and those who had lived in their neighborhoods for the shortest times were more likely than other respondents to feel that their actions contributed to their victimization.

Patterns of Response To Crime

- Two patterns of response to crime were found, a general stress reaction characterized by fear and defensiveness and an instrumental response characterized by attempts at organized crime prevention.
- Women and victims with lower socioeconomic status exhibited the general stress reaction.
- Victims with larger social networks, higher socio-economic status, and younger victims exhibited the instrumental response.

We have seen that crime produces a variety of responses by victims. This section examines the question of whether any patterns can be identified among the responses. Are certain types of responses tend to occur together? Are certain types of responses exclude other responses or substitute for each other? (i.e., does one response reduce the likelihood of another)?

Table 3.10 displays the intercorrelations among the responses measured in this study. The table reveals that four of the responses examined often occured together; victims who reported more extensive or more serious crime-related problems also showed a greater increase in fear of crime, exhibited more severe negative affect, and took more precautions on the street.

Three other responses -- taking efforts to secure one's residence, organizing with friends and neighbors to fight crime, and the perceiving that victimization could have been avoided -- also grouped together. These reactions are suggestive of efforts by victims to establish, or re-establish, control over their environment.

Factor analysis of these data confirmed that responses to crime fell into two distinct groups. Table 3.11 displays the strength of the relationship between each of

TABLE 3.10

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG DIFFERENT VICTIM RESPONSES TO CRIME

	Problem Index	Fear of Crime Index	ABS Composite Score	Precautions On Street	Could Have Avoided Crime	Precautions In House
Fear of Crime Index	.39					
ABS Composite Score	-.26	-.17				
Precautions Index: On Street	.38	.37	-.18			
Could Have Avoided Crime	-.12	-.11	.00	.00		
Precautions Index: In House	.07	.05	.00	.00	.11	
Attempts to Organize	.03	-.02	-.06	.04	.12*	.15

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

TABLE 3.11

RELATIONSHIP AMONG FACTORS AND VICTIM RESPONSE MEASURES

	General Distress Reaction Factor	Instrumental Response Factor
Problem Index	0.774	-0.022
Fear of Crime Index	0.726	-0.092
ABS Composite Score	-0.502	-0.097
Precautions: On Street	0.712	0.018
Precautions: In-House	0.098	0.636
Attempts to Organize	0.069	0.681
Could Have Avoided Crime	-0.151	0.611

the victim response measures and the two general responses. The first response is associated with high scores on the problem index, high fear of crime, predominance of negative over positive mood states, and taking precautions on the street (which, it will be recalled, consists primarily of restricting one's activities, or avoidance responses). We termed this response a "general distress reaction." The second response is associated with taking precautions inside the residence (making it more secure against break-ins), organizing with friends and neighbors, and the victim's belief that he might have avoided victimization through precautions. We termed this response an "instrumental response" to victimization--an effort by the victim to try to regain a sense of control over the environment.

Table 3.12 displays the associations between the two different types of responses to crime extracted from the factor analysis and victim crime, and neighborhood/network characteristics (controlling for type of crime). The general distress reaction - is more common among women, injured victims, and victims of lower socioeconomic status (those with lower incomes, less education, residents of Fordham, and members of ethnic minorities). The instrumental response is more common among younger victims, victims with larger social

TABLE 3.12

ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM, CRIME, AND NEIGHBORHOOD/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS WITH 'GENERAL DISTRESS' AND 'INSTRUMENTAL' RESPONSES TO CRIME

	Means[1] On: (Range -1 to +1) General Distress Reaction	Instrumental Response
Socioeconomic Status of Victim		
Personal Income:		
Less than $5,000	0.28	-0.28
$5,000 to $15,000	0.00	0.01
$15,000 and over	-0.28	0.33
Education:[2]		
Did not graduate high school	0.21	-0.33
High school graduate	-0.11	0.15
Employment Status:		
Not employed	0.09	-0.18
Employed	-0.05	0.15
Neighborhood:		
Park Slope	-0.19	0.14
Fordham	0.26	-0.15
Flushing	-0.06	-0.05
Other Victim Characteristics		
Age:		
Under 50	-0.02	0.07
50 - 64	0.32	-0.23
65 and over	-0.43	-0.27
Sex:		
Men	-0.21	-0.03
Women	0.18	-0.01

TABLE 3.12 (Continued)

ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM, CRIME, AND NEIGHBORHOOD/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS WITH 'GENERAL DISTRESS' AND 'INSTRUMENTAL' RESPONSES TO CRIME

	Means[1] On: (Range -1 to +1) General Distress Reaction	Instrumental Response
Ethnicity:		
Hispanic	0.18	0.17
Black	0.27	-0.12
White	-0.18	0.11
Prior Victim:		
Yes	0.01	-0.10
No	-0.02	0.11
Crime Characteristics		
Offense Type:[3]		
Violent Crime	0.13	-0.60
Property Crime	-0.07	0.34
Victim/Offender Relationship:		
Strangers	-0.04	-0.01
Knew each other before crime	0.20	-0.05
Extent of Injury to Victim:		
None	-0.12	-0.04
Minor (not treated)	-.34	-.18
Medical attention sought	0.49	-0.04
Financial Loss:		
Under $100	-0.37	0.06
$100 thru $499	0.15	0.05
$500 thru $999	-0.02	-0.03
$1,000 and over	0.16	0.01

TABLE 3.12 (Continued)

ASSOCIATION OF VICTIM, CRIME, AND NEIGHBORHOOD/NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS WITH 'GENERAL DISTRESS' AND 'INSTRUMENTAL' RESPONSES TO CRIME

	Means[1] On: (Range -1 to +1)	
	General Distress Reaction	Instrumental Response
Neighborhood and Network Ties		
Adults in Household:		
One	0.09	-0.03
Two or more	-0.06	-0.03
Number in Network:		
Three or less	0.09	-0.36
Four to six	0.10	-0.01
Seven and over	-0.09	0.16
Time in Neighborhood:		
Less than one year	-0.08	0.02
One to five years	-0.04	0.01
Five years and over	0.06	-0.05
Relatives in neighborhood:		
None	-0.01	-0.08
One to two	0.11	0.14
Three or more	-0.06	0.17
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:		
Very much	0.02	0.02
Somewhat	-0.03	0.13
Not at all	0.04	-0.20

1. Adjusted for type of offense using analysis of covariance.

2. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

3. Not adjusted for type of offense.

networks, burglary victims and victims of higher socioeconomic status (those with higher incomes, more education, and those who are employed).

Discussion

This chapter undertook to describe the problems victims have, and how responses to victimization vary. We found that there were considerable differences among victims in how they reacted to crime. The factors that most consistently explained variation in victims' reactions were type of offense and socioeconomic status. It was not surprising that victims of violent crimes had more extensive and more serious crime-related problems, limited activities outside of their residence to a greater extent, and were less likely to feel they might have avoided victimization. These findings are generally consistent with the literature on victimization and with common sense.

More disturbing were the differences in responses according to the socioeconomic status of victims: Lower socioeconomic status victims reported more serious problems stemming from the crime, greater increase in fear of crime, and more curtailment of outside activities. Lower socioeconomic status also victims were less likely to engage in efforts to organize with friends and neighbors and less likely to believe

that they could have prevented the crime. Lower socioeconomic status victims appear to react to victmization with greater stress and greater passivity, perhaps both resulting from reduced feelings of personal control over their environments. Trapped in high crime neighborhoods with fewer economic resources at their disposal to mitigate the effects of victimization, they seem to bear a disporportionate burden of crime in our society.

The consistency with which lower socioeconomic staus victims suffer more on almost every variable measured calls into question the notion that stressful living in general adapts one for crisis. Some of the literature suggests(Bard in Transcript of National Institute of Justice Conference on Research Priorities, 1980; Burgess and Holmstrom, 1978) adversity leads to the development of better coping mechanisms, but it might be that only specific types of adversity preadapt an individual to coping with crisis. The generally harsh and antagonistic living conditions that the poor deal with do not seem to provide a classroom for coping. Our data indicate that the conditions that the poor contend with lower their tolerance rather than prepare them for victimization. (Burgess and Holmstrom (1978) found that women who have faced the death of a close relative or a loss such as divorce dealt with the aftermath of rape better, but we have no data on specific crises in the lives of those we interviewed.) In a related

issue, we had thought that for middle-class victims, crime would generate a more severe crisis than for working class and poor people because it was a less expected event. This proved erroneous.

Aside from socioeconomic status and type of offense, few of the other factors examined consistently differentiated victims' reactions. Particularly surprising was the fact that elderly victims experienced no greater magnitude of crime related problems, and no greater increase in fear of crime than non-elderly victims. The elderly did, however, restrict their activities outside of their residences to a greater extent than younger victims. Also, there was no indication that the impact of victimization (at least initially) was mitigated by larger social networks or greater neighborhood ties.

Chapter III - Footnotes

1. Maximum possible score on the problem index was 25 (on three of the 14 items, 'major' and 'minor' categories were not distinguished). Only 4% of the sample had a score of zero on the scale (indication that they reported no problems); the highest score was 19. The mean score was 5.63

2. Among burglary victims, Tau C = 0.14, $p<.05$ between reports of vandalism and magnitude of crime-related problems.

3. The fear of crime index is a summation of responses to the questions about changes in perceptions of safety in victims' homes and in their neighborhoods, and about their desire to move. Two points were given for a response of 'very much' and one point for 'somewhat' on the first two questions, and a single point for an affirmative answer to the question about wanting to move. Thus, the highest possible score on the scale was five; the mean for the sample was 1.85.

4. Median score on the in-house precaution index was 1.41 (reflecting an average of 1-2 distinct precautions taken inside the residence). Mean score on the out-of-house precaution index was 1.53.

5. Tau C = 0.11, $p<.09$.

6. In part this may result from the fact that 34% of the assaults and robberies took place in the victim's residence or apartment building.

IV

HELP FROM OTHERS IN COPING WITH VICTIMIZATION

As the previous chapter illustrates, practically all the crime victims in our sample experienced emotional, financial or practical problems. This chapter examines the aid victims received to deal with these problems. The question of where victims go for assistance has not been closely examined in the victimology literature. As Chapter I indicates, however, some researchers have studied help-seeking in response to other types of crises. These studies reveal that people rely on relatives and friends when in a crisis(Wellman 1979; Fischer 1979; Warren 1979). Much of the research, however, has examined help-seeking by having subjects respond to hypothetical situations. This study was based on victims' reports of actual incidents of help-seeking in response to crisis.

The first section discusses the types of assistance needed by victims in our sample. The next section describes support that victims received from the police, from service organizations, and from individuals. In the final section we discusss the extent to which victims' needs were satisfied by these three sources and examine which groups of victims were most and least successful in obtaining help.

Forms of Assistance Sought by Victims

- Victims most frequently needed help with lock installations, home repairs, and financial aid.
- Despite emotional distress and fear, few victims expressed a need for counseling.
- Twenty-one percent of the sample reported that they did not need any help.

The study participants were asked to respond to 12 questions about assistance victims might require. The questions dealt with; 1) practical considerations, such as, transportation, babysitting, lock repairs, having to borrow money, help with shopping or getting to the doctors office and legal advice; 2) emotional support, including questions concerning victims' desire to have someone stay with them, and their need for escorts and counseling; and 3) other types of help that were not specified.

The two types of help most frequently requested were help with repairs and locks(40% of the victims requested this service) and finanicial assistance(27% needed to borrow money). Although the installation of new locks and repairs created a finanical burden, victims' needs in this area created emotional problems as well. A burglary victim whose door had been kicked in reported that because the landlady had not yet

fixed the door she was afraid: "I can't sleep, it doesn't feel safe with the door broken. I sleep with a knife under my pillow."

Other types of help were requested less frequently: 21% of victims needed someone to stay with them; 18% needed rides; 17% needed someone to watch their home; 12% required assistance getting to a doctor or hospital; 12% needed help shopping; 11% needed legal advice; 11% needed a place to stay; 10% needed counseling; 10% needed an escort and 8% needed a babysitter. The fact that only 10% of the victims requested counseling is noteworthy. Although researchers (Burgess and Holmstrom, 1978; Bard, 1979) have pointed to the severe emotional stress that accompanies victimization and although a large percentage of victims in our study reported trouble sleeping and increased fear, victims did not perceive counseling as a means of helping them deal with these problems. It may be that many victims did not understand what counseling involves, or equated counseling with therapy or mental illness and felt that some type of stigma was attached to seeking such services. On the other hand, sympathetic friends and relatives may adequately fill the role of counselor for the majority of victims.

In addition to the types of assistance listed in the interview, victims also reported needing other types of help. Six percent needed assistance in finding a new place to live, and 4% needed security related information or services other than locks and repairs. Other types of help needed included: help filing insurance claims and continuing medical assistance.

Overall it was found that 21% of victims in our sample did not need any type of help; 47% reported needing one or two types of assistance; 25% needed three to five types of assistance; and 5% needed more than five different kinds of help.

Support from Individuals

- All but two of the 274 victims in the sample received help from at least one person.
- Victims averaged four supporters each.
- Victims were in touch with almost two-thirds of supporters within one day of the crime.
- More than half the supporters were people the victim knew well and saw often but helpers the victim did not know well also provided significant assistance.

The major source of support for crime victims comes from relatives, friends, and neighbors. These individuals comprise what may be called a victim's support system. This section discusses the types of individuals who provided

assistance to victims, how and when these persons gave aid, and the kinds of aid they gave.

Before describing the findings, one case is presented that illustrates the types of people who offered assistance and from whom victims sought assistance. A young, single, Queens woman recounted her recent experience:

> I was walking home with my groceries when this guy came out of nowhere and grabbed one of the gold chains around my neck. I grabbed the other. It was funny because he stared at me for few seconds as if he was going to change his mind. Then he said "Let go." I said "No." Then he pulled the one chain he was holding and ran.
>
> A Spanish-speaking woman stopped and asked if I was alright. Then a Spanish-speaking man came and asked the woman what happened. She told him and he started to chase the robber. I started to walk down the street and an elderly woman who'd been sitting on a park bench came over and asked me if I was alright. I said "Yes," and kept walking till I saw a police car and flagged it down. The police pulled over and then I became hysterical. They helped me and calmed me down. They were really concerned. Even when they dropped me off at my house they asked me if I was going to be alright alone.
>
> When I got inside I tried to call my boyfriend but he wasn't home. I know it wasn't his fault but I was mad that he wasn't there when I needed him. Then I called his brother, and told him what happened. He came over and talked and that helped. The next day I was going to Connecticut to visit my parents. When I got there I told my sister what happened, but I made her promise she wouldn't tell my parents. They didn't want me to move to New York City. When I went back to work on Monday I told two of my friends there. Talking to both of them helped, but one said, "Why did you let him take it?," as if I had a choice!

Most of the crime victims in the sample, like this Queens woman, did not have dramatic tales of woe to tell. Yet, the help they received was crucial to their adjustment. Virtually all victims received some assistance from other individuals. The number of supporters that victims named ranged form 0 to 16, and averaged four per victim.

It should be noted that victims recounted their experinece to more people than they listed as supporters. Although "talk" was considered an important form of emotional support, an effort was made to distingush between talk victims found therapeutic and other conversations. Victims reported they had mentioned the incident to neighbors, co-workers and friends, but distinguished between those to whom they felt talking was helpful and others. In some instances the victims believed they were doing others a service by telling them about the crime and thereby warning them to be more careful.

Contact with supporters usually occurred shortly after the incident (See Table 4.1). Only 12% of supporters were contacted after two days and no victims named additional supporters at the time of the follow up interview, four months later. Not surprisingly, victims usually sought there supporters. Yet supporter-initiated contact was substantial. Twenty-seven percent of supporters were either there when the crime was discovered (10%) or contacted the

TABLE 4.1

SUPPORTER CHARACTERISTICS

First Contact Between Victim and Supporter (n=1040)	
First day	61%
After first day	39
	100
How Contact Occurred (n=1039)	
Initiated by victim	53
Supporter there when crime occurred or discovered	17
Supporter contacted victim	10
Other*	20
	100
Supporter's Relationship to Victim (n=1108)	
Relative	42
Friend	32
Neighbor	16
Landlord/Superintendent	3
Stranger	2
Other	5
	100
Where Supporter Lives (n=1081)	
Same neighborhood	57
Same borough	22
Outside borough	21
	100
Frequency of Contact Before Crime (n=1074)	
Once a week or more	81
Once a month or more	14
Less than once a month	3
Never(stranger)	2
	100
Length of Acquaintance (n=1066)	
More than 5 years	64
1 to 5 years	22
Less than 1 year	12
Strangers	2
	100
Supporter is Network Member (n=1063)	
Yes	61
No	39
	100

* Includes supporters who found out about crime in a more casual manner, such as, a household member coming home from work or a friend dropping by for other reasons.

victim subsequently (17%). In one case a neighbor called a Queens couple who were on vacation and told them their apartment had been burglarized. He kept in touch with the police for them until they returned.

Occasionally supporter initiated contact was not welcomed. Some victims did not want certain people to know what happened. As the case of the Queens woman illustrated, this was particularly true of younger victims who did not want their parents to worry. One young woman whose apartment had been burglarized told her brother, but specifically asked him not to tell their mother what happened. Disregarding her wishes, he informed the victim's mother anyway. Upon hearing, the mother contacted her daughter. Although the victim had not initially wanted her mother to know, she found her support and concern helpful.

In another case, however, the good intentions of others were not appreciated. A burglary victim in Brooklyn came home to find his house in shambles. The back door had been broken in and everything of value had been taken. He was horrified and ashamed because he had been meaning to secure that door better but hadn't gotten around to it. Because of this he did not want anyone to know about the incident. Despite desires, his wife told her parents and his parents what had happened. When they called him to offer

comfort, he felt, that they were being critical and got angry at them for interfering. Then he had a fought with his wife for telling their parents.

This study reinforced findings from previous network research about the tendency of individuals to turn to persons with whom they have well-established ties in times of crisis. Eighty-one percent of supporters were individuals that victims saw at least once a week, 64% of supporters were persons that victims had known for five years or more, and 61% of supporters were persons that victims had named as members of their social networks. Forty-two percent of supporters were blood relatives of victims and 57% of supporters lived in the same neighborhood as the victim.

Still, the crime victims in our sample relied less heavily on individuals with whom they had strong ties than would have been predicted from the results of other studies of people in crisis. For example, victims in our study relied less on relatives and more on friends and neighbors than persons undergoing stressful life events studied by Warren (1979). Forty-one percent of Warren's respondents named friends as helpers and 27% named neighbors, but 59% of the crime victims in our study named at least one friend as a supporter and 47% named at least one neighbor. In addition, although social networks were important, only 23% of the sample

relied exclusively on members of their social networks for assistance.

These findings suggest that the help seeking that occurs as a result of criminal victimization differs from help seeking behavior in other types of stressful situations, such as illness, depression or changing life circumstances. Crime victims go through a more immediate type of crisis, one of the inherent characteristics of which is reliance on whoever is present. This means that dependence on people with whom the victim has weaker ties (including neighbors, landlords, superintendents or even strangers) may be more common than if the crisis was of a more extended nature, such as an illness. Dependence on people with whom the victim has weaker ties was especially common among burglary victims. Whereas 54% of these victims counted neighbors among their supporters, only 33% of victims of violent crimes named such individuals. Greater participation of neighbors as supporters of burglary victims is understandable in terms of both proximity (a neighbor was often the only person available to turn to after the discovery of the crime and in some cases was responsible for the discovery) and the greater degree of self-interest that neighbors might have in a burglary.

Although only two percent of the people who provided help to victims were strangers, these individuals provided important tangible assistance and emotional support to victims, and left them with a feeling that "someone cared." In one case, a struggle between an elderly Fordham man and a mugger was interrupted by a bus driver. According to the old man "I was saved by him." In another incident a Brooklyn man who had been robbed, reported, "I started chasing the two men, when a car pulled up. The man inside had seen what happened and told me to get in. Although we didn't catch the guys, it felt good that someone had cared enough to get involved."

Some victims, however, had disappointing experiences with bystanders. A Queens couple robbed as they walked in their neighborhood complained that the street was alive with people after the incident, but no one stepped forward during it. One man began to get out of his car when he saw what was happening and got back in. A woman who observed the incident from her window called the police. After the robber had left, a college student ran over to ask how they were. The couple felt that if these people had stepped forward during the crime, the thief would have fled.

A small percentage of individuals (12%) appeared to be supporters in some respects and non-supporters in other respects. One example of a support/non-support situation

involved a young Hispanic burglary victim. Because his landlord refused to fix his ground floor window (used by the burglar to get into the apartment), he was forced to move back home with his mother. She agreed to let him to stay with her, but they got into frequent arguments about the burglary and other matters. At the same time she offered the support of a place to stay, his mother criticized him for not protecting his home. The young, Flushing chain-snatch victim mentioned earlier provides another example. Although the victim felt that talking to one co-worker was helpful, she was disturbed by the insistence of another co-worker, that the incident was her fault.

Types of Help Provided by Supporters

- Emotional support in the form of someone to talk to was provided by 78% of supporters.
- Almost half the supporters continued to provide assistance to the victim after helping the first time.

The most common form of aid given to victims by other individuals was emotional support(provided by 78% of supporters). Many supporters provided practical services (19%) (which included babysitting, help shopping and rides) or long-term assistance (46%). Long-term assistance was defined as any tangible or non-tangible assistance that the victim continued to receive after the initial contact and for the

purpose of analysis was treated as a separate type of assistance. Less common types of support included financial assistance (8%), help with lock repairs (8%), calling a third party (10%) or staying with the victim (8%).

Types of help provided by supporters varied according to the supporter's relationship to the victim(See Table 4.2). Emotional support and long-term assistance were given more often by relatives or friends than by neighbors or landlords, by members of the victim's social networks than by non-members, by people who knew the victim more than one year and by people who saw the victim at least once a week.

Long-term assistance included practical forms of assistance, such as driving victims for subsequent visits to the doctor, but in most cases consisted of emotional support. For example, victims reported that family and friends called to check on them or dropped by to see them more frequently than before the crime. In one instance a burglary victim's friends took her out to dinner on five consecutive nights following the incident.

Financial assistance was more often provided by members of victims' social networks than by non-network individuals, however, lending financial assistance was about as common among neighbors and landlords as among relatives and

TABLE 4.2

TYPES OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY SUPPORTER'S RELATIONSHIP, LENGTH OF ACQUAINTANCE AND FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH VICTIM

	Emotional Support	Financial Support	Stayed With Victim	Repairs	Practical Services	Long-term Assistance
Relationship *						
Relative	77%	15%	9%	5%	19%	51%
Friend	79	14	6	4	16	49
Neighbor	60	11	6	5	16	40
Landlord/super.	33	17	0	58	3	27
Network Member						
Yes	76	20	9	6	19	53
No	66	8	5	8	16	33
Length of Acquaintance						
Less than 1 year	63	7	5	9	21	35
1 to 5 years	75	5	5	8	14	41
More than 5 years	75	8	8	5	18	50
Frequency of Contact Before Crime						
Once a week or more	75	7	7	5	19	51
Less than once a week	66	5	5	11	9	22

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

friends. (Financial assistance from landlords normally took the form of allowing the victim to pay his rent late or discounting a month's rent.) The frequency of financial help did not vary according to length of acquaintance or frequency of contact between victim and supporter.

Neighbors were as likely to stay with victims and to provide practical services as relatives and friends. One 70-year-old Flushing victim who was robbed and beaten in his apartment, was cared for primarily by his neighbors. A woman across the hall cleaned his apartment. After being released from the hospital, she cooked meals for him and brought them over to his apartment. Another neighbor checked on him periodically to make sure he had no problems. Providing locks and repairs was more prevalent among landlords than among relatives, friends, and neighbors of victims.

The fact that non-network individuals were as likely to stay with the victim as supporters with closer ties suggests that due to the immediacy of the crisis in criminal victimization, neighbors or other non-intimates may be called upon to render services that in other kinds of crises would be provided by individuals closer to the victim.

Support from the Police

- Four-fifths of the sample felt that the police "had taken the time to listen to their story."
- Two-fifths of the sample reported that the police had provided significant assistance, but only one-fifth thought they "went out of their way" to help.
- Higher income victims and Whites felt more positive about the police than lower income victims and minority group members.

Most victims (78%) felt that the police "had taken time to listen to their story." Fewer victims (41%), however, reported that the police provided special forms of assistance, which included security inspections, rides, help in searching for the criminal, emotional support and referrals. In one case the police helped repair the window gate of a Park Slope victim. Of the referrals, four were referred to the Victim Services Agency, three to welfare, one to a senior citizen's center, and 12 to other agencies. In many instances, emotional support was provided by the police simply by their presence at the scene. One Queens robbery victim said "when the police arrived I felt so much better. They made me feel so safe." One in five victims believed that the police "went out of their way" to assist them. Sixty-six percent felt that the police had "just done their job" and 14% felt that the police had been "not at all helpful".

Although in the minority, some victims were very displeased with the treatment they received from the police. One Park Slope burglary victim said "When I asked him (the police officer) if they were going to take finger prints, he said, 'This isn't Kojak, lady'." Another victim reported smelling alcohol on one of the police officer's breath and said, "The police made me feel like I was the robber not the victim."

Other victims however came away with very positive feelings about the police. A burglary victim in the Bronx reported that the police "were very nice." One of the officers came back a few days after the crime to give her some advice on security measures. He told her to call him if she had any problems. Another Bronx burglary victim, whose car keys had been stolen, said the police offered to follow her if she wanted to move her car to a safer spot and to drive her back home. Although she declined the offer, she was impressed with the police officer's concern.

Table 4.3 shows victims' assessments of support provided by the police according to crime, victim, and neighborhood/network characteristics. The table shows that victims with incomes in excess of $15,000 per year were more likely than victims in lower income categories to believe that the police had gone out of their way. White victims more often

TABLE 4.3
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VICTIMS' ASSESSMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE POLICE

	Percent of Victims Stating Police Went Out of Their Way to Aid Victim
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	17% [1]
$5,000, to $15,000	15
$15,000 and over	25
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	20
High school graduate	13
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	18
Employed	20
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	10
Fordham	19
Flushing	28
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	18
50 - 64	26
65 and over	19
Sex:	
Men	16
Women	22
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	9
Black	18
White	24
Prior Victim:	
Yes	16
No	22
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type :	
Violent Crime	24
Property Crime	17
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	20
Knew each other before crime	18

TABLE 4.3 (Continued)

	Percent of Victims Stating Police Went Out of Their Way to Aid Victim
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	17%
Minor (not treated)	31
Medical attention sought	27
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	25
$100 thru $499	11
$500 thru $999	17
$1,000 and over	18
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	15
Two or more	23
Number in Network:	
Three or less	12
Four to six	22
Seven and over	20
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	12
One to five years	17
Five years and over	24
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	18
One or two	18
Three or more	29
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	22
Somewhat	19
Not at all	16

1. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

than Black or Hispanic victims felt that the police had gone out of their way to give assistance. For Hispanics, language may have been part of the problem. Victim evaluations of the police response also varied according to neighborhood. Victims in Flushing rated the police as most helpful, while victims in Park Slope rated them as least helpful. The differences by neighborhood do not follow income lines, since victims in the two most affluent neighborhoods, Flushing and Park Slope, rated police assistance highest and lowest, respectively. The differences by neighborhood do, however, parallel differences in ratings of police assistance by length of residence. Victims who had lived in their neighborhoods five years or longer - most common in Flushing and Fordham - rated the police as more helpful than victims who had lived in their neighborhoods for a shorter time.

A difference in the evaluation of police assistance was found between victims of violent and property crimes, but it was not statistically significant. Consistent with a recent study (American institues for Research, 1978) that reported that police received much higher ratings from robbery victims than from burglary victims, victims of violent crimes in this sample rated the police higher than victims of property crimes.

Support from Service Organizations

- Only 19% of the sample knew of organizations to go to for assistance, but three-quarters of those (15% of the sample) went to the organization for help.
- Low-income victims and victims with more needs were more likely to go to agencies for assistance.
- Victims went to agencies they had been in contact with previously.

Little information is available on the proportion of crime victims that contact service agencies for assistance, or on the role that these agencies play in helping victims. Other research suggests that lower socioeconomic groups are less likely to go to agencies for assistance because they distrust formal organizations (Briar, 1966; Carlin, Howard, and Messinger, 1967; Paulsen, 1966). Knudten (1976) found, however, that people were simply unaware of services and seldom used them. Since our sample is largely comprised of lower socioeconomic status victims, the literature implies that these victims would not seek assistance from formal organizations.

Results revealed that only 15% of the victims in our sample approached service agencies for assistance. Unlike Knudten's findings, however, failure to contact agencies often stemmed from lack of awareness of their existence rather than an intentional decision not to use them. When victims were asked if they knew of any agency that could provide support,

only 19% responded affirmatively. Since 15% of victims went to agencies, only 4% of the sample who were aware of organizations that could help, did not use them.

Victims with lower incomes and those who lived in Fordham, the lowest income neighborhood, were more likely than other victims to seek help from service organizations (See Table 4.4). As reported in the previous chapter, these victims reported more serious crime-related problems than other victims. These findings suggest that victims with more serious problems are more likely to seek aid from formal sources. Only 7% of victims with scores of two or less on the problem index sought agency assistance, compared to 19% of victims with scores of seven and more.

Use of formal support sources was also more common among individuals who had been previously victimized than among first time victims. Since information was not collected on support seeking behavior that occurred in response to past victimization experiences, it is not clear whether victims were returning to agencies they had found helpful when dealing with an earlier incident or if the most recent occurrence had prompted them to explore agencies as a new resource.

TABLE 4.4

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH AGENCY USE

	Percent of Victims Who Contacted Agency
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	25% [1]
$5,000, to $15,000	15
$15,000 and over	9
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	17
High school graduate	15
Employment Status:	
Not Employed	18
Employed	14
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	16
Fordham	22
Flushing	9
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	15
50 - 64	19
65 and over	11
Sex:	
Men	13
Women	17
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	13
Black	25
White	14
Prior Victim:	
Yes	22
No	12
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type :	
Violent Crime	16
Property Crime	15
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	15
Knew each other before crime	18

TABLE 4.4 (Continued)

	Percent of Victims Who Contacted Agency
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	15%
Minor (not treated)	8
Medical attention sought	24
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	14
$100 thru $499	19
$500 thru $999	14
$1,000 and over	14
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	20
Two or more	12
Number in Network:	
Three or less	18
Four to six	17
Seven and over	10
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	21
One to five years	14
Five years and over	15
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	14
One or two	20
Three or more	14
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	11
Somewhat	10
Not at all	29

1. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

Finally, seeking support from service organizations was more common among victims who reported not feeling a part of their neighborhood. This finding suggests that victims are more likely to seek help from formal sources when they have less well-developed informal support systems in their neighborhoods.

Victims turned to a number of different service organizations for assistance. Five percent sought help from public assistance and 2% from the housing authority. Other agencies that were mentioned by one or two victims included; Social Security, senior citizens groups, the Victim Services Agency, and the Crime Victims Compensation Board.

The majority of victims reported prior experience with the agencies they contacted. This was particularly true of welfare and social security recipients, who contacted agencies to see if stolen money or food stamps could be replaced. Although few elderly victims contacted senior citizens centers for help, some elderly victims went to centers for advice on whether to respond to the VSA research letter requesting an interview. VSA staff received calls from senior citizen center staff made on the behalf of elderly victims who wanted more information about VSA and the study. The fact that victims turn to agencies they are familiar with (even if these are not appropriately equipped to deal with their problems)

suggests that such organizations could be instrumental in helping victims, and should be provided with information to pass on to crime victims.

Victims requested the following types of help from organizations: financial assistance, help with repairs, information on insurance, relocation assistance, and help from the housing authority to pressure landlords to make repairs. A little over half the victims who sought agency assistance received the help they requested. Victims received help with repairs, applications for federal crime insurance and counseling but had difficulty obtaining financial assistance and help relocating.

Cases in which financial assistance was not obtained usually involved victims who wanted public assistance to re-issue stolen checks or foodstamps. Since in most cases the checks had been cashed, case workers said that there was little they could do.

At the time of the interview, victims who had filed claims with the Crime Victims Compensation Board, had not received a reply. Since none of these victims responded to the followup interview, it is not known whether these victims received the assistance they sought.

Some victims expressed annoyance at the lack of help provided by public assistance after victimization. One Fordham burglary victim stated she had called her case worker about receiving financial assistance. Although the social worker promised to look into the matter, the victim never received a response. "Everytime I called the social worker wasn't in and didn't return any of my calls. It was very disturbing." In another case, however, an elderly burglary victim, fearing for her safety after the incident, desperately wanted to move. With the help of a social worker at a senior citizen's center, she relocated to a new apartment.

Victims most in need of services (lower socioeconomic status victims and those with greater problems and needs) were the most likely to turn to agencies for assistance. The finding that three quarters of the victims who thought they knew of an agency that could help contacted the organization suggests that with appropriate publicity, agencies should be expected to attract a larger percentage of victims. However, since 41% of the individuals who went to agencies did not receive the services they needed, agencies should be concerned with educating victims about what they can realistically expect from the organization or expand the types of services they offer.

TABLE 4.5

NEIGHBORHOOD SUPPORT PATTERNS

	Park Slope(n=86)	Fordham(n=86)	Flushing(n=97)
Victim Sees All Supporters Once A Week	42	67	54 *
Victim Knows All Supporters More Than 1 Year	62	72	80
All Victim's Supporters Are Relatives	6	21	22
All Victim's Supporters Live in Heighborhood	19	40	33
Victim Has More Than Four Supporters	62	39	37

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

Neighborhood Difference in Support Patterns

- Fordham and Flushing residents had more homogeneous and smaller support networks than Park Slope residents.

One question in this study was whether victims' ability to obtain support from individuals varies according to the victim's neighborhood. That is, are patterns of support seeking and sources of informal support affected by the affluence, crime rates, and residential stability of the victim's neighborhood? The following section examines support from individuals in Flushing, a high income, low crime area in which the average length of residence was relatively long (9% in neighborhood for less than a year and 57% for more than 5 years); Park Slope, a mixed income, moderate crime area in which the average length of residence was relatively short (16% in neighborhood for less than a year and 42% for more than 5 years); and Fordham, a low income, high crime neighborhood in which the average length of residence was also relatively short (14% in neighborhood for less than a year and 42% for more than 5 years).

As Table 4.5 shows, significant differences in characteristics of support networks by neighborhood did emerge. In both Fordham and Flushing, a greater proportion of victims had homogeneous support networks compared to Park Slope. That is, support networks were more often comprised

solely of individuals who were blood relatives, who lived in the victim's neighborhood, whom the victim had known for once year or longer, and/or whom the victim saw at least once a week. In contrast, Park Slope victims more often had more hetergeneous support networks, including individuals not related to the victim, individuals who resided outside of the victim's neighborhood, and/or individuals whom the victims had know for less than one year. Relative to victims in the other two neighborhoods, victims in Park Slope relied less on persons with whom they had close ties defined in terms of blood, propinquity, length of association and frequency of contact. For example, a young, single, burglary victim in Park Slope, who had only moved to New York recently, came home to find her apartment ransacked. She said, "I'm from a suburb of Washington, D.C. A burglary was the farthest thing form my mind. First I thought my roommate had had a fight with someone and started throwing things. Then I realized we'd been burglarized so I called the landlord." He called the police and sent a carpenter to repair the locks and door frame. Although the victim acknowledged the landlord's help, she was angry at him. There had been burglary in the building the day before and he had not told her. When her roommate returned, she told her what had happened. Her roommate reacted with intense fear and "it only made things worse." She called another girl friend, whom she had met recently, and arranged to stay at her apartment in Manhattan for the night. Before she

left the apartment a friend dropped by and she told him what happened. "It was good he was there," she said. A few days later she talked about the incident with a neighbor who told her about Federal Crime Insurance, which she applied for immediately. Because her parents did not like where she was living, she hesitated calling them. When she did tell them about the burglary a few weeks later, they took the opportunity to pressure her to move.

Park Slope residents differed from residents of Fordham and Flushing also in terms of the extensiveness of their support networks. A larger proportion of victims in Park Slope reported receiving support from four or more individuals than in Fordham or Flushing.

The similarities between Fordham and Flushing -- high proportions of victims with homogeneous support networks and smaller support networks -- are surprising given that the residents of the two neighborhoods are so different. Table 4.6, however, shows that several distinct victim characteristics were associated with homogenous and small support networks. Some of these characteristics were more predominant among Fordham victims, and others among Flushing victims. Socioeconomic characteristics were one set of factors that differentiated victims with homogeneous and small support networks: Less education, unemployment, lack of a telephone,

TABLE 4.6

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH MAKE-UP AND SIZE OF SUPPORT NETWORKS

Victim Characteristics	Proportion of Victims with: Locally-Based Support Network	Kin-Based Support Network	3 or Fewer in Support Network
Education			
Did not graduate high school	37% *	23%	51%
High school graduate	26	12	33
Empoyment Status			
Not employed	39	25	49
Employed	23	9	31
Has Telephone			
No	47	12	48
Yes	28	17	38
Time in Neighborhood			
Less than 1 year	15	12	39
1 to 5 years	25	14	33
More than 5 years	39	19	43
Relatives in Neighborhood			
None	22	13	39
One or two	41	20	38
Three or more	57	26	35
Age			
Under 50	29	12	34
50 to 64	39	24	50
65 and over	28	31	48
Ethnicity			
Hispanic	41	28	49
Black	25	14	39
White	30	14	35

*Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

and Hispanic ethnicity were all positively related to kin-based, locally-based, and/or less extensive support networks. These characteristics were most common among victims living in Fordham. These findings reinforce the results of numerous other studies that have described certain minority groups, the unemployed, the less educated and the less affluent as having social ties that are restricted to their local area and/or to relatives (Gans, 1962; Nuttal, 1979; Keller, 1968; Suttles, 1968). For example, a Hispanic woman from the Bronx was robbed on the street of $100 by three men. She escaped unhurt. When she reached home she called her daughter who lived in the same apartment building. Her daughter came over and calmed her mother down. The victim then called her brother, who lived in the same neighborhood. He accompanied her to the police station to report the incident. Later that evening, the victim called her sister who also lived in her neighborhood. Her sister loaned her money to help make up for the money that was stolen.

Neighborhood and social network ties also differentiated victims with homogeneous and small support networks. Longer residence in the neighborhood, more relatives in the neighborhood were positively related to having locally-based support networks. These characteristics were more common among victims in Fordham than in Park Slope, but were most predominent among Flushing victims. Elderly victims

who more often had kin-based, less extensive support networks than younger victims, comprised a larger portion of respondents in Flushing than in the other two neighborhoods. A 68-year-old Queens woman was knocked down and seriously injured during a purse-snatching incident. She was helped by a school crossing guard who called an ambulance. A neighborhood friend, whom she was on her way to meet, saw the purse snatching and accompanied the victim to the hospital. The friend notified the woman's brother. He visited his sister in the hospital, and once she was released did her shopping and acted as her escort. The victim said that her friend called frequently to see how she was.

The greater number of victims with smaller, homogeneous support networks in Fordham and Flushing seems to be explained by the greater concentration of lower socioeconomic status people in Fordham and by stronger neighborhood ties and a greater concentration of older people in Flushing.

Did Victims Get the Help they Needed?

- Victims received in general the non-skilled aid that friends and relatives could provide such as babysitting and help shopping, but did not receive skilled help, such as legal advice, counseling, repairs, and financial assistance.
- Lower socioeconomic status victims were less likely to receive all the help they needed.

We have seen that victims receive help from a variety of sources -- almost all receive aid from people they knew, some from the police and fewer from service organizations. In this section, we examine whether victims received adequate assistance and whether certain groups had more difficulty getting the aid they needed.

Table 4.7 shows the proportion of victims who received various forms of assistance. The table shows that victims more often received assistance that could be provided by relatives or acquaintances, (such as, babysitting, help shopping and rides) than professional types of assistance (such as legal advice and counseling) friends and relatives could not be expected to provide. For example, although only 11% of the sample wanted either legal advice and 10% counseling, these were the least likely needs to be met. Sixty-six percent of victims needing legal advice and 69% needing counseling said they did not receive the needed assistance. Victims also seldom received other types of services that their friends or relatives would be less likely to provide, such as, changing locks, repairs or loaning money. These results reflect the finding that most victims sought help from people they knew, but few sought help from service organizations.

TABLE 4.7

PERCENTAGE OF VICTIMS THAT DID NOT RECEIVE HELP ON EACH ITEM
(Ordered by frequency of request)

	Number Requesting Help	Percent Not Receiving Help
Locks	107	27%
Borrow Money	73	33
Stay with Victim	57	30
Ride	50	14
Someone to Watch Home	46	37
Help Getting to Doctor or Hospital	31	13
Place to Stay	31	39
Help Shopping	29	10
Legal Assistance	29	66
Escort	28	21
Counselling	26	69
Babysitting	22	18
% Not Receiving Any Help Requested		16%
% Not Receiving At Least 1 Kind of Help Requested		41%

Over time, victims' need for assistance abated. Fewer victims needed help at the time of the follow-up interview than at the initial interview (Table 4.8). New locks or lock repairs remained the most frequent form of assistance needed, followed by borrowing money, rides, having someone keep an eye on their residence, and having someone stay with them. Other types of assistance victims were asked about were needed by less than 10% of respondents at the time of the follow-up.

A principal objective of the study was to find out whether victims not getting the assistance they needed through either formal or informal sources. To look at this, an index was constructed consisting of the number of separate forms of assistance victims needed, but failed to get.

Not surprisingly, the data in Table 4.9 show that victims with stronger neighborhood/network ties had fewer unmet needs than other victims. Victims with larger social networks, longer time in the neighborhood, a greater number of relatives in the neighborhood, and feeling a part of the neighborhood were more likely to get the assistance they needed.

TABLE 4.8

TYPES OF HELP VICTIMS NEEDED OVER TIME*

	Percentage of Victims Needing Assistance: Initial Interview (2 Weeks)	Follow-up Interview (4 Months)
Locks/Repairs	42%	30%
Borrow Money	26	17
Stay with Victim	20	11
Ride	20	13
Someone to Watch Home	20	13
Help Getting to Doctor/Hospital	12	5
Help Shopping	11	8
Legal Assistance	9	8
Place to Stay	10	6
Counselling	10	7
Escort	12	7
Babysitting	8	4

*For comparison purposes, only victims who completed the follow-up interview were included(n=182).

TABLE 4.9

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH VICTIMS' FAILURE TO RECEIVE ONE OR MORE TYPES OF NEEDED ASSISTANCE

	Mean Number of Types of Help Not Received (Range 0 - 8)
Socioeconomic Status of Victim	
Personal Income	
Less than $5,000	0.72
$5,000, to $15,000	0.63
$15,000 and over	0.80
Education:	
Did not graduate high school	0.65
High school graduate	0.78
Employment Status:[1]	
Not Employed	0.94
Employed	0.53
Neighborhood:	
Park Slope	0.45
Fordham	0.90
Flushing	0.84
Other Victim Characteristics	
Age:	
Under 50	0.78
50 - 64	0.58
65 and over	0.75
Sex:	
Men	0.70
Women	0.76
Ethnicity:	
Hispanic	0.82
Black	1.10
White	0.52
Prior Victim:	
Yes	0.59
No	1.00
Crime Characteristics	
Offense Type :	
Violent Crime	0.78
Property Crime	0.67
Victim/Offender Relationship:	
Strangers	0.69
Knew each other before crime	0.76

TABLE 4.9(Continued)

	Mean Number of Types of Help Not Received (Range 0 - 8)
Extent of Injury to Victim	
None	0.80
Minor (not treated)	0.65
Medical attention sought	0.45
Financial Loss:	
Under $100	0.60
$100 thru $499	0.93
$500 thru $999	0.47
$1,000 and over	0.83
Neighborhood and Network Ties	
Adults in Household:	
One	0.82
Two or more	0.67
Number in Network:	
Three or less	1.10
Four to six	0.69
Seven and over	0.56
Time in Neighborhood:	
Less than one year	1.30
One to five years	1.33
Five years and over	0.94
Relatives in Neighborhood:	
None	0.78
One or two	0.83
Three or more	0.12
Victim Feels a Part of Neighborhood:	
Very much	0.49
Somewhat	0.63
Not at all	1.17

1. Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .05 level or better by two-tailed tests. Although the data has been grouped for presentation, statistical tests were performed on the data in its continuous form.

Victims with lower socioeconomic status had more difficulty getting their needs met than other victims (Table 4.9). Specifically, victims who were unemployed and/or members of ethnic minorities failed to receive assistance more often than other victims. A 50 year-old Bronx man had $60 and food stamps stolen during a robbery. For the victim, a public assistance recipient, this constituted a major hardship. He contacted public assistance, but the case worker informed him that once he had cashed his check there was little she could do. The victim then attempted to borrow money from his sister and his girlfriend. "They're both living on tight budgets. They couldn't help me." Because the victim's apartment keys were also stolen, he wanted to have his locks replaced. However, he was also unsuccessful in finding assistance with this. He used an extra set of keys he had and lived with the thought that his apartment might be burglarized at any time.

The neighborhood victims lived in is also related to their ability to obtain assistance. Victims who resided in Fordham reported failing to get help with the most items, followed by victims in Flushing and in Park Slope, respectively. Originally it was suspected that failure to receive help might be linked to the lack of diverse resources in the local and kinship-based support networks of many Fordham and Flushing residents (Granovetter, -- ;Warren, --).

However, when kinship and local ties of victims in each of the three areas were taken into account, the differences remained among neighborhoods in failure to receive assistance. Therefore, kinship or local based support systems are not responsible for Fordham and Flushing victims' failure to receive assistance. But when other victim characteristics (employment, education, and ethnicity) were introduced, the difference between neighborhoods was no longer significant. It appears that socioeconomic status rather than homogeneity of support networks was primarily responsible for the greater number of unmet needs of victims in Fordham.

The finding that socioeconomic status was related to the number of different needs victims failed to receive assistance with is not surprising given the greater crime-related problems that lower socioeconomic status victims had and the fewer individuals who lent them assistance. (There was a strong negative correlation ($r=.14$, $<.05$) between numbers of supporters and the number of needs victims failed to get help with). Indeed, the differences that resulted from socioeconomic status might have been more pronounced had it not been for the fact that lower socioeconomic status victims made greater use of services organizations in seeking to recover from the effects of the crime.

Finally, prior victimization also proved to be a significant factor in victims' ability to get the assistance they needed. Respondents who had been victims before reported fewer items that they had failed to get help with. The ability of former victims to get the help they needed may be attributable, in part, to their greater use of service organizations.

DISCUSSION

This chapter focused on victims' needs for assistance and whether they were able to rely on the police, service organizations, and individuals for the support they required to help them through this crisis. Our analysis indicated that most victims required some type of assistance and that few dealt with the aftermath of criminal victimization alone.

Since few victims were found to use agency services (except for the initial contact with the police), most victims were helped by non-professionals. The most important source of support was victims' informal ties. Friends, relatives, and acquaintances were the primary providers of most emotional support, financial assistance and other types of

practical services. Similar to findings of other studies concerning help seeking behavior, most victims relied on members of their existing social networks for assistance. Although these individuals played a major role, non-network members were also an important source of support.

The importance of supporters in helping victims suggests that efforts should be made to "support the supporters." This could be accomplished by making information available to the public on how to help victims and by having service agencies provide the kinds of assistance that place the most burden on victims' informal ties.

In general, supporters were successful in providing victims with the help they needed. However, victims with fewest resources, the unemployed and minorities, and victims with weak ties to the neighborhood often failed to have their needs met, indicating that the less advantaged and those with fewer neighborhood ties are the least equipped to deal with victimization.

Surprisingly, the elderly did not require greater assistance than others. Another unexpected finding was that despite having fewer supporters and smaller networks, the elderly were as likely to receive assistance as the rest of the sample. Although the elderly had either kin or local support

systems and fewer supporters, this did not appear to effect the amount of help they received. In certain circumstances, therefore, the quality of relationships (indicated by kin and strong local ties) may make up for the quantity of supporters.

The types of assistance victims received could be only partially explained by victims' relationship to the supporter. As might be expected, friends, relatives, and network members most often provided emotional support and long-term assistance, and landlords help with repairs. However, relationship was not an important factor in determining who stayed with victims or whether financial assistance or practical services were provided.

Our data suggest that there is an important role for service organizations to play in aiding crime victims. The types of services that organizations are best able to provide include both those most requested by victims (such as, help with locks and repairs and financial assistance) and those that victims in our sample were least likely to receive (such as, legal advice or counseling). Morever, economically disadvantaged victims, who appear to feel the impact of crime most severly, have difficulty getting all of their needs met by individuals alone. The fact that most victims who were aware of the availability of services from organizations sought such

assistance suggests that, with appropriate publicity, service organizations could expect to aid substantial numbers of victims.

CONTINUED

2 OF 4

CHAPTER IV - FOOTNOTES

1. An analysis of variance was performed on these factors. The zero order association between neighborhood and failure to receive assistance produced an eta of .15. When kin and local support variables were introduced, eta remained at .15. However, with the introduction of other covariates (employment, education and ethnicity), eta dropped to .09 and the relationship between neighborhood and failure to receive assistance was no longer significant.

V

READJUSTMENT AFTER VICTIMIZATION

Few longitudinal studies have been conducted that have examined readjustment among victims of criminal victimization. Those studies that have been conducted have been largely confined to victims of rape (e.g., Burgess and Holmstrom, 1974; 1978; Kilpatrick, Veronen, and Resnick, 1979). They have generally found that, over the months following victimization, emotional distress diminishes considerably, but that victims may not have fully recovered even years later. This section discusses adjustment of 182 robbery, assault, and burglary victims from the time of the initial interview (conducted 2 - 3 weeks after victimization) to the time of the follow-up interview (conducted approximately four months after victimization). It examines the extent to which victims recover and return to normal functioning; the groups of victims who adjust less well than others; and the role of social support in the recovery process. The first section will examine changes in problems between the initial and follow-up interviews. The second section will examine changes in fear of crime over time and changes in the precautions victims take. Finally, we will look at changes in the scores on the Affect Balance Scale and the effects of the incident on the victim's general sense of trust in people.

Crime-Related Problems

- Four months after the crime victims' problems had declined substantially, but many victims still had ongoing problems.
- Although victims of violent crimes had more problems at the time of the initial interview than burglary victims, four months after the incident, differences had disappeared.
- Victims with lower incomes, less education and from poorer neighborhoods, and minority group members still had more problems than other victims four months later.
- People with more supporters and those who went to agencies did not adjust better.
- Those who received all the help they needed had fewer problems after four months.

By the time of the follow-up interview, four months after the crime, all categories of crime-related problems had declined substantially. Table 5.1 shows problems with daily routine, problems resulting from property being stolen, and difficulty sleeping remained the most common problems at the time of the second interview. But roughly half of the people who reported these problems on the first interview no longer considered them a problem. Mean scores on the composite problem index declined from 5.66 on the first interview to 2.35 on the second ($t = -15.64$, $df = 181$, $p<.001$), a score roughly equivalent to one 'major' or two 'minor' problems for each victim.

TABLE 5.1

VICTIMS' REPORTS OF PROBLEMS: FIRST AND SECOND INTERVIEWS COMPARED

		Major	Minor	None	Total	
Pain	Initial**	8%	8	84	100%	(191)
	Follow-up	1%	5	94	100%	
Movement	Initial**	5%	3	92	100%	(187)
	Follow-up	0%	3	97	100%	
Medical Expenses	Initial**	3%	2	95	100%	(190)
	Follow-up	1%	2	97	100%	
Property Stolen	Initial**	41%	27	32	100%	(187)
	Follow-up	12%	18	70	100%	
Property Damaged	Initial**	14%	14	72	100%	(191)
	Follow-up	3%	5	92	100%	
Problems with Employer	Initial**	2%	1	97	100%	(192)
	Follow-up	1%	0	99	100%	
Lost Income	Initial**	8%	5	87	100%	(192)
	Follow-up	2%	1	97	100%	
Lost Job	Initial**	0%	0	100	100%	(189)
	Follow-up	0%	0	100	100%	
Daily Routine	Initial**	41%	23	36	100%	(189)
	Follow-up	15%	21	64	100%	
Family/Friends	Initial**	11%	14	75	100%	(189)
	Follow-up	1%	4	95	100%	
Sleep	Initial**	32%	27	41	100%	(188)
	Follow-up	7%	16	77	100%	
Fear Harrassment*	Initial**	15%		85	100%	(191)
	Follow-up	7%		93	100%	
Other*	Initial**	30%		70	100%	(176)
	Follow-up	38%		62	100%	

*For these problems, victims were not asked to give a 'major' or 'minor' rating.

**Percentages differ slightly from those reported in Chapter 3 because they are based on only those victims who responded to both first and second interviews.

Althouh reports of crime-related problems declined over time for all sub-groups examined, groups who had more serious problems at the time of the initial interview had a harder time adjusting than others. Figure 5.2 shows the change in the problem index over time for those groups of victims who had significantly higher scores than others on the initial interview - victims of violent crimes, victims who were injured, victims who were less educated, victims who had lower incomes, victims who were members of ethnic minorities. Although respondents who were victims of violent crimes and those who knew the offender prior to victimization reported a greater magnitude of problems initially, they also showed a greater decline in problems over time. Thus, four months after the crime victims who knew the criminal and those who did not differ significantly in the magnitude of problems they reported. Victims of violent crimes did not differ from victims of burglary by the time of the final interview.

Victims who were injured registered greater scores on the problem index on the initial interview, but showed a greater reduction in problems over time relative to non-injured victims. There remained, however, a significant difference in magnitude of reported problems between injured and non-injured victims four months after the crime. A female victim from Park Slope illustrated this pattern. Her ankle was injured in a robbery and attempted rape. The ankle became

FIGURE 5.2

CHANGES IN EXTENT OF VICTIMS' PROBLEMS OVER TIME ACCORDING TO VICTIM/OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP, INJURY, INCOME, EDUCATION, NEIGHBORHOOD, ETHNICITY, AND TYPE OF OFFENSE







FIGURE 5.2

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







badly infected and she couldn't walk on it. As a result, she was unable to perform her job as a restaurant hostess. Although she reported that her employer was sympathetic at first, he eventually let her go. She was still out of work when interviewed the second time.

A different pattern in problems over time is evident according to the socioeconomic indicators of education, income, neighborhood, and ethnicity. Not only did lower socioeconomic status victims report more extensive problems on the initial interview, but the gap between these victims and more affluent victims on the problem index was as large at the time of the final interview as it had been at the time of the initial interview. In fact there was even a larger difference in problems according to income groups four months following the crime than there had been two weeks after the crime. Thus, at the time of the follow-up interview, significant differences in the magnitude of reported problems remained according to income, education level, neighborhood, and ethnicity (See Figure 5.2). An example of such a victim was an elderly Black woman who lived in Fordham and was burglarized four times in a single week. The woman, who was legally disabled and lived on a meager social security check, lost all her valuables -- a television, radios, and a watch. In addition, her apartment had been ransacked. When interviewed the second time, she still had not been able to replace most of the items. The

woman, however, was coping emotionally with her situation. The thing that most upset her was that "I can't have friends over now...I have nothing with which to entertain."

There was some evidence that social support helped reduce the magnitude of crime-related problems during the follow-up period, but the relationship is not clear. The number of supporters victims had did not affect adjustment over time, as measured by the problem index (See Figure 5.3); no significant differences in the problem index emerged by number of supporters either two weeks or four months after the crime. There also were no differences in abatement of crime-related problems over-time between the victims who sought help from organizations and those who did not (See Figure 5.3). Victims who sought assistance had slightly (but not significantly) higher scores on the problem index both on the initial interview and on the follow-up interview. But victims who received all the assistance they needed had significantly lower problem scores after four months than those who did not received all needed services. The problem index for these two groups of victims was roughly equivalent initially. These differences suggest that support should not be measured in terms of numbers of supporters but in terms of whether victims received the help they needed. Whether victims received the help they needed or not had more bearing on problems than number of supporters. Most studies of networks and crisis find

FIGURE 5.3

CHANGES IN EXTENT OF VICTIMS' PROBLEMS OVER TIME ACCORDING TO AMOUNT OF SOCIAL SUPPORT





a relationship between size of the support system and outcome. Yet except for one group, such a relationship did not emerge in this study. (The 15 victims who reported not needing any assistance registered the lowest magnitude of problems on both initial and follow-up interviews). It appears that the reaction to criminal victimization poses specific problems to be addressed by the network of support and that, despite size, if these needs are not met, problems persist. The specificity of needs suggests that assistance to crime victims through formal organizations could significantly benefit victims' adjustment process.

Fear of Crime

- Fear of crime declined four months after the incident, but a significant residue of fear remained.
- By four months after the crime no differences existed between men and women in fear of crime.
- Higher levels of fear of crime among lower socioeconomic status groups persisted even four months after the crime.
- Victims with more social support had significantly less fear of crime four months later than those with less social support.

The increased fear of crime that followed victimization subsided substantially four months after the crime.

Scores on the fear of crime index (described in Chapter 3) declined from a mean of 1.80 on the initial interview to 1.30 on the follow-up interview ($t = 4.84$, $df = 180$, $p<.01$).

Women and long-term residents (respondents who had resided in their neighborhoods for at least five years) had shown greater increases in fear of crime on the problem index shortly after victimization than men and short-term residents. However, by the time of the follow-up interview, fear scores for men and women and for long- and short-term residents were the same.

A different pattern in fear of crime emerged, however, by socioeconomic groups. The differences in fear of crime between victims who had lower incomes or who were less educated and victims with higher incomes or more education were just as large (in fact, by income, slightly larger) on the follow-up interview as on the initial interview (by income, $F(1,161) = 3.86$, $p<.05$; by education, $F(1,177) = 4.02$, $p<.05$). A victim of attempted robbery in the elevator of her apartment building said, on the second interivew, "Every day when I come home I get a horrible feeling. I don't know what I will face. The danger zone is from the lobby to my door. I'm still upset and on my guard." The longer lasting impact of crime on victims with low socioeconomic profiles reflected in the fear of crime scales. It was also noted in regard to problems.

There was some evidence that social support led to a lessening of respondents' fear of crime. Figure 5.4 shows that victims who had three or more supporters showed significantly less fear of crime at the time of the follow-up interview than victims who had two or fewer supporter, even though the two groups of respondents had not differed in fear of crime shortly after victimization. In other words, social support appeared, during a four month period, to counteract the heightened fear of crime that accompanied victimization.

Other measures of social support, such as whether victims received all the assistance they needed, and whether they sought help from an organization, were associated (although not statistically significantly) with a reduction in fear of crime. Victims who received all the assistance they needed had lower scores on the fear of crime index initially than persons who failed to get one or more forms of needed assistance. The difference in fear of crime between these two groups of victims was even greater at the time of the follow-up interview, but still did not reach statistical significance. (The 15 victims who reported not needing any forms of assistance registered the lowest fear of crime on both initial and follow-up interviews.) Victims who sought assistance from organizations had slightly (but not significantly) higher scores than other victims on the fear of crime index initially.

By the time of the follow-up interview, victims who had sought assistance and those who had not indistinguishable on the fear of crime index.

Unlike the problem index, the fear of crime was associated with the number of supporters: The more supporters, the greater the decrease in fear.

Precautions

- Nearly all respondents who started to take precautions after the crime were taking those same precautions four months later.
- More than half the victims reported taking additional precautions at the time of the follow-up interview.

Although the increase in fear of crime that followed victimization had subsided substantially by the time of the follow-up interview, nearly all respondents continued to take the extra precautions they had begun after victimization. Ninety-eight percent of those who reported on the initial interview that they had begun to check doors and windows before going out still did so at the time of the follow-up interview. Eighty-five percent of those who had begun leaving lights, television, or radio on when going out still did so. Eighty percent of those who had begun avoiding particular areas still did so. And 95% of victims who had begun taking other precautions (not going out alone at night, riding in cabs at

FIGURE 5.4

CHANGES IN FEAR OF CRIME OVER TIME ACCORDING TO AMOUNT OF SOCIAL SUPPORT



(F(1,176)=0.83,n.s.) (F(1,177)=3.95,p<.05)

Number of Supporters



(F(1,179)=0.66,n.s.) (F(1,180)=0.00,n.s.)

Sought Agency Assistance



(F(2,178)=0.98,n.s.) (F(2,179)=1.59,n.s.)

Help Received

night, coming home earlier, hiding valuables or removing valuables from their residence, or not carrying valuables on the street) following victimization still did so four months later.

In the interval between the first interview about two weeks after the crime and the follow-up interview four months later more than half the victims had begun taking additional precautions. Fifty-three percent reported additional behavioral precautions (not going out alone at night, riding in cabs, and so forth), and 52% reported installing new locks on doors or windows. Thus, the measures stemming from heightened fear of crime persisted even after the fear appeared to have subsided. One 71-year-old woman whose apartment in Fordham had been burglarized feared for her safety. When interviewed the second time, she had, with the help of a social worker at a senior citizen's center, been relocated to a new apartment. Although she reported feeling secure in her new home, she nonetheless reported having an alarm installed, never carrying a purse when going out, and not replacing the jewelry that had been stolen for fear that it might be taken again.

Affective Reaction

- Scores on the affect balance scale four months after the incid ent indicated that victims' moods had improved.
- Those victims with two or fewer supporters did not differ from those with more supporters on the affect balance scale either on the initial or the follow-up interviews.
- Although differences in the affect balance scores did exist initally among victims with fewer network members compared to the others, by the time of the follow-up, no such differences existed.

In light of previous studies, it was anticipated that respondents' scores on the negative subscales of the ABS - particularly depression and anxiety - would decrease in the months following victimization. It was also anticipated (although less strongly) that scores on the positive mood scales would increase as time passed.

Table 5.5 shows that these expectations were confirmed. At the time of the follow-up interview, victims scored significantly lower on three of the four negative mood scales (Depression, Anxiety, and Hostility) than they had at the time of the initial interview. Only the Guilt scale showed little change over time. Moreover, at the time of the follow-up interview, victims scored significantly higher on the positive subscales of the ABS (Affection, Contentment, Joy, and Vigor) than they had at the time of the initial interview.

TABLE 5.5

ABS SCORES:
FIRST AND SECOND INTERVIEWS COMPARED

Scale	Initial Mean**	Follow-Up Mean	Significance
Joy	10.1	12.7	t (105) = -4.93*
Contentment	10.1	12.3	t (105) = -4.48
Vigor	11.0	12.4	t (104) = -3.33
Affection	12.2	13.7	t (104) = -3.31
Anxiety	9.5	8.4	t (104) = 2.60
Depression	6.5	5.5	t (104) = 2.79
Guilt	5.1	5.0	t (104) = 0.36
Hostility	4.3	3.4	t (104) = 4.48

*Differences between initial and final scores are significant at the .05 level or better (two-tailed test) for all subscales except Guilt.

**Means differ slightly from those reported in Chapter 3 because they are based on only those victims who responded to both first and second interviews.

These results suggest that victimization produces both a suppression of positive moods and an augmentation of negative moods followed by a return to more positive and less negative affective states. Whether the sample had recovered completely by the time of the follow-up interview cannot be known. Significant differences between the victims sampled and the test norm sample still existed on six of the affect balance subscales (Contentment, Vigor, Anxiety, Depression, Guilt, and Hostility) at the time of the follow-up interview. These differences may indicate that respondents had not recovered fully four months following victimization, or simply that the victim sample differed from the norm sample prior to victimization. The norm sample consisted of college students.

Norm data from the affect balance scale on samples with characteristics similar to those of crime victims would be useful in interpreting the results presented here. We can conclude, however, that one of the reactions to victimization is a temporary imbalance between positive and negative affective states, and that the affect balance scale appears to be sensitive to changes over time.

Victims with smaller social networks had lower positive scores on the affect balance index (i.e., lower scores on the positive scales and higher scores on the negative

scales) than victims with larger social networks (See Chapter 3). Figure 5.6 examines changes over time in this index for victims with large, medium, and small social networks. The figure shows that by the time of the follow-up interview, approximately four months after victimization, scores of all three sub-groups of victims on the affect balance index had become more positive; victims who had the smallest social networks, whose scores were most depressed initially, showed the greatest improvement. While these victims still had the least positive scores on the affect balance index after four months, the difference between subgroups of victims defined by size of social networks was no longer statistically significant.

Changes in the affect balance index over time were examined to determine whether there was evidence that the receipt of social support aided victims in regaining a more positive mood. Figure 5.7 does not provide any support for this supposition. Victims who had two or fewer supporters did not have significantly different affect balance scores than those with three or more supporters on either the initial interview or the follow-up interview . Nor did victims who reported receiving all the assistance they required differ significantly from victims who failed to get all the assistance they needed or victims who reported not needing assistance on either initial or follow-up interviews. Similarly, there was

no difference in affect balance scores on either initial or follow-up interviews between victims who sought assistance from an agency and those who did not. This appears to contradict the literature that associates psychological health and adjustment with network size and support systems, but many of those are studies of the psychologically and physically severely impaired and the same relationship might not hold for an otherwise normal population in crisis.

The Effect of Crime On Victim's Feelings About People In General

- One-third of the victims felt their relationships with others had deteriorated because of the crime.
- More than half felt better about peoples' willingness to help.
- Victims with more supporters and those who felt the police were sympathetic felt more positive about people.

The long-term effects of victimization on respondents' feelngs about people was examined. Many victims feel bitter toward the offender, and these feelings may generalize toward other people. Victims also may perceive the reactions of people as unsympathetic and this may alienate them. On the other hand, if people do get the help they need, particularly unexpected assistance from other people, victimization may lead to a greater appreciation of the good

FIGURE 5.6

CHANGES IN VICTIMS' AFFECT BALANCE OVER TIME ACCORDING TO SIZE OF NETWORK



(F(2,108)=1.24,n.s.)

FIGURE 5.7

CHANGES IN VICTIMS' AFFECT BALANCE OVER TIME ACCORDING TO AMOUNT OF SOCIAL SUPPORT



(F(1,131)=0.00,n.s.) (F(1,110)=0.01,n.s.)

Number of Supporters



(F(2,132)=0.08,n.s.) (F(2,111)=0.38,n.s.)

Help Received



(F(1,112)=0.02,n.s.)

Sought Agency Assistance

side of human nature. These issues are addressed in this section.

On the follow-up interview, victims were asked two questions that produced somewhat contradictory results, whether crime affected their relationships with other people and whether their experience made them feel better or worse about people's willingness to help other people. Sixty-four percent said that their relationships had not been altered. But when victimization did affect relationships with other people, the effect was usually negative: Thirty-two percent of respondents felt that their relationships were worse while 3% felt they were improved. Distrust seemed to be the reason why some victims felt that their relationships with other people had deteriorated. For example, one victim said, "I used to talk to anyone. Now I don't." In other cases, the deterioration seemed to stem from the victim's belief that other people had been unwilling to help. (One robbery victim said,"I don't talk to people as much anymore. The only people who helped were my family."). Some victims isolated themselves because they felt people did not want to be around them. (A man in Park Slope who had been mugged said, "I was very depressed, so people didn't want to be near me.")

In response to the question "Did your experience make you feel better or worse about people's willingness to help other people?", 51% of the respondents said that they felt better about people's willingness to help, while 26% reported no change, and only 22% said they had less confidence in people's willingness to help. The response of other people to them prompted several victims to say that they would be more willing to help others if the need arose. A 45-year-old man from Flushing whose apartment had been burglarized and vandalized felt that others had been sympathetic toward his problems. He said "You always want to help someone else because you know how it feels to go through it."

The amount of support victims received affected how the victims reacted to people following the crime. Victims were more likely to feel that people were willing to help if they had three or more supporters or if they felt the police had responded sympathetically. They were less likely to feel that people were willing to help if they reported that one or more individuals whom they spoke to about the crime had not been helpful, or if they failed to receive one or more of the forms of assistance that they had needed (See Table 5.8). Similarly, victims' assessments of their relationships with others were more negative if the police had not responded sympathetically, if one or more individuals had not been helpful, or if they failed to get one or more of the types of

TABLE 5.8

HOW EXPERIENCE AFFECTED VICTIMS' BELIEF THAT PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO HELP BY AMOUNT OF SOCIAL SUPPORT VICTIMS RECEIVED

	Belief That People Willing To Help More	No Change	Belief That People Willing To Help Less	Total
Number Of Supporters[1]				
2 or less	36%	32%	32%	100% (n=28)
3 or more	56	26	18	100 (n=101)
Police Response[2]				
Went out of way	62%	19%	19%	100% (n=21)
Just did their job	51	27	22	100 (n=85)
Not helpful	33	33	33	100 (n=15)
Anyone Not Helpful[2]				
Yes	44%	28%	28%	100% (n=54)
No	57	23	20	100 (n=77)
Help Received[1]				
Got All Help Needed	57%	25%	18%	100% (n=68)
Didn't get 1+ types of help	44	27	29	100 (n=55)

[1] Associations are significant at .05 level or better by two-tailed tests.

[2] Associations are significant at .10 level or better by two-tailed tests.

help that they needed (See Table 5.9). One disillusioned assault victim, a man in his mid-twenties, said, "It's hard to trust people...Nobody would help me when I was held up. I screamed, asked people to help but they didn't." Victims' assessments of their relationships with others were also more negative if victims named two or less people as providing support, but this relationships did not approach statistical significance.

In sum, victimization apparently had the paradoxical result of adversely affecting victims' ability or willingness to relate to other people, yet giving them more faith in human nature. Social support seemed to play a key role in how victims perceived others after their experience. Since most victims had had only one contact with the police several months earlier, it is noteworthy that the response of the police played an influential role in formulating these perceptions. Perhaps because their contact with victims occurs when victims are most distraught, police may play a critical role in setting the tone for the adjustment process victims undergo during the months following the crime.

TABLE 5.9

HOW EXPERIENCE AFFECTED VICTIMS' RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHERS
BY AMOUNT OF SOCIAL SUPPORT VICTIMS RECEIVED

	Effect Of Crime On Relationships:			
	Relationships Better	Relationships the Same	Relationships Worse/Victim More Wary	Total
Number Of Supporters				
2 or less	4%	57%	39%	100% (n=28)
3 or more	3	68	30	100 (n=120)
Police Response [1]				
Went out of way	9%	70%	22%	100% (n=23)
Just did their job	2	65	34	100 (n=107)
Not helpful	0	56	44	100 (n=10)
Anyone Not Helpful				
Yes	0%	52%	48%	100% (n=60)
No	4	74	21	100 (n=89)
Help Received				
Got all help needed	4%	70%	26%	100% (n=77)
Didn't get 1+ types of help	2	59	39	100 (n=61)

[1] Boxes indicate that associations are significant at .05 level or better by two-tailed tests.

Discussion

The data in this section show that the impact of crime on people's lives subsides substantially in the months following victimization. During the approximately 14 weeks between the initial and follow-up interviews, the incidence of crime-related problems dropped, the increase in fear of crime that occurred immediately following victimization abated, and victims' moods improved.

There was some evidence that social support moderated the effect of crime upon victims' feelings about people. Even though the police usually only interact with the victim briefly immediately after the crime, the degree of support which they are perceived to lend to the victim at the time of particular vulnerability seems to set the tone of the victims' responses to others for many months to come.

Although substantial readjustment was observed among the study's respondents, recovery was not complete, even four months after victimization. Victims still were experiencing some crime-related problems and fear of crime remained above pre-victimization levels. Residual effects of victimization were particularly evident among lower socioeconmic status victims (who had greater residual levels of crime-related problems and fear of crime) and among injured victims (who had

greater residual crime-related problems). If these groups of victims are to recover from victimization, they appear to need greater assistance than they are currently getting.

Of the responses to victimization measured in the study, taking of precautions showed the least change over time. Nearly all of the extra precautions taken by respondents shortly after victimization were still being taken four months later, and many new precautions were taken as well. This finding is of particular significance in light of the fact that the increase in fear of crime that followed victimization did abate over time (or perhaps victims became adapted to living with greater fear and no longer regarded their level of fear as higher than normal at the time of the follow-up interview). These results suggest a parallel to avoidance learning in the experimental psychology literature in which avoidance responses persist long after the noxious stimuli that gave rise to them have been removed, and even after the subject no longer appears to show signs of distress. Moreover, the finding that precautions generated by victimization persist even after the victim has recovered, suggests they may be cumulative. That is, each time a person is victimized (or learns that an acquaintance is victimized), new precautions may be added to the precautions the victim already engages in as a result of previous victimizations. These precautions may reduce victims' vulnerability to crime and may have also help victims

regain a sense of control over their environment. However, one may speculate that the logical conclusion of such a process is a society in which residences turn into armed fortresses from which people are reluctant to venture out, public spaces in the neighborhood decline in use, and the feeling of 'neighborhood' gives way to mistrust and suspicion.

Such a scenario is reinforced by the fact that a third of the sample reported a worsening of relationships with other people and/or increased suspicion of people as a result of victimization. On the positive side, though, it is encouraging that half of the sample felt more optimistic about people's willingness to help as a result of the experience.

VI

THE EXPERIENCES OF SUPPORTERS

People who undergo the trauma of being a crime victim need psychological support and practical help from those around them. Ironically, however, at the time that people most need supportive relationships, others may be most likely to turn away from them. Coates, Wortman, and Abbey (1979) review evidence that people frequently don't want to hear about the victim's problems or shun the victim altogether, and often blame the victim for his or her misfortune.

People close to the victim are caught up in an approach-avoidance conflict. They sincerely want to help, but may experience considerable costs in doing so. Psychologists have suggested that victims threaten people's belief in a just, orderly world: Lerner (1971) argues that people have a need to believe that the world is a fair place where bad things do not happen to good people. Victims challenge this belief and make others aware of their own falibility. Studies have suggested that people around the victim frequently experience a heightened fear of crime as well as serious mental/emotional suffering (Knudten, 1976). Conklin (1971) has referred to these reactions as 'secondary victimization.'

Those around the victim may also become secondary victims by virtue of the fact that they are called on by the victim to provide financial assistance that they are ill-equipped to provide. This burden may fall most heavily on supporters of economically disadvantaged victims because these victims need the greatest financial assistance and because their supporters are least able to afford it.

Because of the threat that victims may pose to those around them, some people simply avoid contact with the victim. Others who do try to help may unwittingly exacerbate the victims' problems. They may blame the victim for his misfortune - and encourage the victim to blame himself - because by attributing responsibility to the victim they are able to maintain their belief that "it can't happen to me." Or they may discourage victims from talking about their experiences or problems because it makes them feel vulnerable or because they believe that it is not healthy for victims to dwell on their problems. Yet, according to Silver & Wortman (1980) and Bard and Sangrey (1979), the opportunity to go over the experience mentally and to 'ventilate' feelings with other people is an important part of the readjustment process for victims.

Even the best-intentioned supporters may have a difficult time giving victims sustained psychological assistance. If a victim is seriously depressed, attempts to provide understanding and reassurance may meet with little visible success. When these initial attempts fail, supporters may become frustrated, first giving unintentional covert signs of disapproval to the victim, and finally losing patience and demanding that the victim stop indulging himself and return to living a normal life. Bard and Sangrey (1979) state that "People ...may become moralistic and judgmental, during the victim's appeal for aid. They seem to be saying, 'You're an adult. Act like one." Coates and Wortman, (1980) believe this response is often counter-productive.

Thus supporters, no matter how sincerely they wish to help the victim, may find it hard to do so because of the emotional and sometimes financial problems it creates for them. At best, they can provide valuable assistance and speed the victim's recovery. But at worst, rather than helping the victim, they may insist that the victim assume responsibility for his misfortune or that the victim not discuss his experience as implicit prerequisites to giving support.

Past research has suggested several factors which influence the reactions of others to victims. People have been found to react more positively to victims when victims do

not express their misery or need for consolation (Coates, Wortman, and Abbey, 1979) and when they think that the chances of their own victimization are high (Chaiken and Darley, 1973; Sorrentino and Boutillier, 1974). Research results on the effects of self-blame by victims on their supporter's reactions have been mixed. One study has found that victims who express blame are responded to more positively than victims who do not blame themselves (Godfrey and Lowe, 1975). Clinicians, however, have traditionally regarded self-blame as a sign of maladjustment (Janoff-Bulman, 1979) and one study (Coates, Wortman, and Abbey, 1979) found that this was also true of college students acting as subjects in a laboratory experiment.

These and other issues are explored in this chapter on the experiences of supporters, based on the responses of 152 supporters who had given some type of help to victims in our sample. As discussed in earlier chapters, the most frequent type of help was emotional support in the form of talking or sympathizing with the victim. The second most frequent type of help was services, such as staying with the victim, doing repairs, or escorting the victim. Finally, a small segment of the supporters provided the victim with financial assistance.

Blaming the Victim

- Twenty-three percent of supporters thought the victim had some responsibility for the crime.
- Supporter attributions of responsibilty were not consistent with victim's attributions of self-responsibility.

Twenty-three percent of the supporters interviewed agreed that the victim "could have been a little more careful." Most supporters who stated this belief felt that victims could have done a better job of securing their residences, that victims might have avoided dangerous areas of the city, or that victims would have been wiser not to carry valuables on the street. The nephew of a 75-year-old woman who was the victim of a robbery at gunpoint outside of her home, suggested tongue in cheek, that his aunt should have "hit the guy with her cane."

The proportion of supporters who thought that the victim could have exercised greater caution (23%) was smaller than the 40% of victims who reported that they might have done something to avoid victimization. We do not know if this discrepancy stems from victims judging their own actions more harshly than others do, or from a more thorough knowledge by the victim than the supporter of events that preceded the crime. There was no correspondence between supporters' attributions of the victim's responsibility for the crime

and the victim's own attribution (See Table 6.1a). However, when supporters attributed some responsibility for the crime to the victim, supporters were more likely to state that they believed that the victim blamed himself partially for the crime (See Table 6.1b). This suggests a dissonance reduction mechanism at work among supporters: Supporters may have been more comfortable attributing responsibility to the victim if they assumed that the victim felt the same way (even though, in fact, victims did not feel that way).

As reported in an earlier chapter, victims of burglary were more likely to believe that they could have prevented the crime than victims of violent crimes. However, type of crime was not a factor in whether supporters attributed responsibility to victims (See Table 6.2), nor was whether supporters had been victims themselves. Closeness of supporters to the victim, as measured by type of relationship between victim and supporter, whether supporters felt 'close' to the victim, whether victim and supporter normally discussed problems with each other, and whether victim and supporter lived in the same neighborhood, also was not related to supporter attribution.

Table 6.2 shows that supporters' attributions were related to socioeconomic status. Supporters who gave assistance to less educated or lower income victims (who

TABLE 6.1

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SUPPORTER'S ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE VICTIM, THE VICTIM'S OWN ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY, AND SUPPORTER'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE VICTIM'S ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME

6.1 (a): Victims' Attributions by Supporters' Attributions

		Supporter Believed Victim Could Have Been More Careful: Yes	No	Total
Victim believed he or she could have prevented the crime from occuring:	Yes	26%	74	100% (n=54)
	No	23%	77	100% (n=75)

6.1 (b): Supporters' Attributions By Supporters' Beliefs That Victim Blamed Self

		Supporter Believed Victim Blamed Self: Yes	No	Total
Supporter believed victim could have been more careful	Yes	43%	57	100% (n=23) [1]
	No	9%	91	100% (n=100)

[1] Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .01 level or better by two-tailed tests.

TABLE 6.2

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUPPORTERS' BELIEF THAT THE VICTIM COULD HAVE AVOIDED VICTIMIZATION BY EXERCISING GREATER CAUTION

	Proportion of Supporters Who Believed That Victim Could Have Prevented Crime	
Supporter-Victim Ties		
Lived in same neighborhood (n = 71)	23%	
Lived in different neighborhood (n = 57)	23	
Supporter felt close to victim (n = 109)	22	
Supporter not close to victim (n = 18)	28	
Frequently discussed problems (n = 76)	26	
Discussed problems occasionally/never (n = 58)	19	
Blood relatives/lovers (n = 99)	22	
Other relationships (n = 34)	24	
Socioeconomic Status		
Supporter lived in Fordham (n = 24)	46	[1]
Supporter lived in Flushing (n = 29)	17	
Supporter lived in Park Slope (n = 0)	0	
Supporter lived in other neighborhood (n = 57)	23	
Supporter was Black (n = 24)	46	[1]
Supporter was Hispanic (n = 20)	35	
Supporter was White (n = 88)	14	
Victim's income was less than $5,000 (n = 33)	21	[3]
Victim's income was $5,000 - $15,000 (n = 39)	26	
Victim's income was more than $15,000 (n = 46)	15	
Victim graduated high school (n = 89)	19	[2]
Victim did not graduate high school (n = 46)	30	
Type of Offense		
Burglary (n = 80)	20	
Robbery or assault (n = 55)	27	
Supporter a Prior Victim		
Yes (n = 24)	21	
No (n = 111)	23	

[1] Significant at .01 level
[2] Significant at .05 level
[3] Significant at .10 level

presumably were themselves less educated and less affluent), supporters who lived in Fordham, and supporters who were members of ethnic minorities were more likely to believe than other supporters that the victim should have been more careful. The relationship between socioeconomic status and supporters' attributions of victim responsibility is opposite to the relationship between socioeconomic status and victims' own attributions (In Chapter 3 it was reported that higher socioeconomic status victims were more likely to believe that they might have prevented the crime than lower socioeconomic status victims).

One explanation of the greater attribution of responsibility to victims by lower socioeconomic status supporters is that most of these supporters, like the victim, lived in high crime areas; by attributing the crime in part to the victim's carelessness, supporters may have been trying to deny the threat of crime to themselves. This explanation is supported by the fact that of all socioeconomic measures, the supporter's neighborhood was most strongly related to attributing responsibility to the victim: Supporters who live in Fordham, the high crime neighborhood, were three times as likely to blame the victim as supporters living in Flushing, the moderate crime area.

There was little evidence that supporters' perceptions of victims' self-blame affected the supporters' opinions of how well the victim was coping, either positively or negatively (See Table 6.3). Supporters who believed that victims blamed themselves were more likely than other supporters to believe that the victim talked too much about the crime. There was no difference, however, in supporters' beliefs that victims were depressed or that they were upset or frightened according to whether the supporter believed that the victim blamed himself.

Fear of Crime and Taking Precautions Among Supporters

- As a result of contact with the victim, about one-third of supporters reported feeling nervous and frightened; more than one-third said they were more suspicious of people and that they felt less safe at home and in the neighborhood.
- Nineteen percent of supporters reported taking extra precautions in their homes.
- Supporters who felt close to the victim and who lived near the victim were more fearful and took more precautions than other supporters.

Data from the supporter interviews strongly confirm previous studies suggesting that knowing a victim enhances fear of crime (Conklin, 1971a and 1971b; Reactions to Crime Project, 1978). Thirty-two percent of supporters reported feeling nervous and frightened as a result of their interaction with the victim. Thirty-nine percent said they were more

TABLE 6.3

SUPPORTER PERCEPTIONS OF VICTIM ADJUSTMENT ACCORDING TO SUPPORTERS' BELIEF THAT THE VICTIM BLAMED HIMSELF FOR THE CRIME

	Proportion of Supporters who saw Victim As:		
	Depressed/ Unhappy	Upset/ Frightened	Talking Too Much About The Crime
Supporter believed victim blamed self:	57%	19%	23%[1]
Supporter did not believe victim blamed self:	53	18	12

[1] Boxes indicate that differences are significant at the .10 level or better by two-tailed tests.

suspicious of people, while 38% said they felt less safe in the home and 35% felt less safe in the neighborhood. The effects of the original crime were, therefore, multiplied to include those who helped the victims: Four out of five supporters responded affirmatively to at least one of the fear items.

Moreover, these data on increased fear of crime among supporters may underrepresent fear because many supporters were already adjusted to the idea of living with the threat of crime as a constant reality. The grandmother of a burglary victim reported no increased fear of crime as a result of the victim's experience; yet she also said, "We live in a jungle. (All we can do is) try to protect ourselves and trust in God." The victim in this case expressed a similar fatalism when she phoned another family member to inform her of the burglary, and began the conversation by saying, "Well, they finally got me."

As was true among the victim sample, many supporters reported that the increase in fear they felt immediately upon hearing of the victim's experience abated after a while. "It affects you for a month or two", one supporter said. As with victims, however, it is not clear whether fear declined, or merely became assimilated into supporters' thought processes. The same supporter who said that the crime affected her for a month or two, when interviewed several months after her neighbor's victimization, reported still taking an

elaborate series of precautions. Each time she left her residence she would check the windows, put on the radio and one light, lock the door and the check the door again to make sure it was locked.

Supporters took added precautions following the victim's experience, although at a lower rate than victims. Sixty percent of supporters reported that they had become more cautious since hearing about the victim's experience. Nineteen percent of supporters reported installing new locks or other measures to protect their residences from break-ins (checking to make sure doors/windows were locked before going out; leaving lights, television or radio on when out; or removing or hiding valuables). Some supporters also reported restricting their outside activities. Thirteen percent reported going out less at night and 3% less during the day. One supporter, a neighbor of a burglary victim, reported that she had begun carrying a machete to go the mailbox.

Table 6.4 displays the factors that contributed to increased fear and precautions among supporters. The summary measure of fear of crime used in the table was derived by summing responses to the questions about feelings of safety in the home, feelings of safety in the neighborhood, feelings of nervousness or fear, being more cautious, and increased suspicion of people. For all but the last component, one point

TABLE 6.4

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED FEAR OF CRIME AND PRECAUTIONS AMONG SUPPORTERS

	Proportion of Supporters Who: Had Scores of 3 or more on the fear of crime index	Took at least 1 precaution in their homes	Took at least 1 precaution in their neighborhood
Attribution of Responsibility			
Supporter blamed victim (n = 31)	42%	58%	13%
Supporter didn't blame victim (n = 104)	48	65	15
Supporter believed victim blamed self (n = 23)	39	52	13
Supporter didn't believe victim blamed self (n = 112)	46	67	13
Supporter-Victim Ties			
Live in same neighborhood (n = 78)	53	73	26
Live in different neighborhood (n = 67)	34	54	2
Supporter feels close to victim (n = 120)	47	69	17
Supporter not close to victim (n = 23)	22	39	0
Frequently discuss problems (n = 83)	51	72	17
Occasionally/never discuss problems (n = 67)	36	54	10
Blood relatives/lovers (n = 111)	47	68	14
Other relationships (n = 39)	33	49	13
Victim Adjustment			
Victim score of 7 or more on problem index (n = 82)	48	61	16
Victim score of 6 or less on problem index (n = 70)	39	66	13
Victim score of 2 or more on fear index (n = 79)	43	58	15
Victim score of 1 or less on fear index (n = 72)	44	66	14

TABLE 6.4 (CONTINUED)

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED FEAR OF CRIME AND PRECAUTIONS AMONG SUPPORTERS

	Proportion of Supporters Who: Had Scores of 3 or more on the fear of crime index	Took at least 1 precaution in their homes	Took at least 1 precaution in their neighborhood
Victim depressed/unhappy (n = 80)	49%	71%	19%
Victim not depressed/unhappy (n = 60)	38	55	8
Victim frightened/upset (n = 27)	44	63	22
Victim not frightened/upset (n = 109)	46	66	15
Victim talks too much about crime (n = 21)	57	76	24
Victim doesn't talk too much about crime (n = 122)	44	64	13
Socioeconomic Status			
Supporter lives in Fordham (n = 26)	58	80	24
Supporter lives in Flushing (n = 34)	44	66	28
Supporter lives in Park Slope (n = 23)	57	76	24
Supporter lives in other neighborhood (n = 69)	33	54	2
Supporter is Black (n = 26)	31	46	12
Supporter is Hispanic (n = 22)	59	82	32
Supporter is White (n = 100)	44	64	11
Victim's income less than $5,000 (n = 34)	47	59	9
Victim's income $5,000 - $15,000 (n = 49)	43	53	14
Victim's income more than $15,000 (n = 51)	37	71	12
Victim graduated high school (n = 101)	42	63	14
Victim did not graduate high school (n = 51)	47	63	16

TABLE 6.4 (CONTINUED)

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED FEAR OF CRIME AND PRECAUTIONS AMONG SUPPORTERS

	Proportion of Supporters Who:		
	Had Scores of 3 or more on the fear of crime index	Took at least 1 precaution in their homes	Took at least 1 precaution in their neighborhood
Type of Offense			[2]
Burglary (n = 87)	46%	66%	[10%]
Robbery or assault (n = 65)	40	60	[20]
Supporter a Prior Victim	[2]		[1]
Yes (n = 24)	[54]	63	[29]
No (n = 126)	[42]	64	[12]

[1] Significant at .01 level
[2] Significant at .05 level
[3] Significant at .10 level

was given for an answer of 'somewhat' and two points for an answer of 'very much.' For increased suspicion of people, one point was given for 'yes' and none for 'no'.

The table shows that fear and precautions among supporters were strongly affected by the strength of ties between victim and supporter. For example, fear of crime, added precautions in the home and added precautions on the street were all greater among supporters who lived in the victim's neighborhood than among other supporters. A supporter who lived across the hall from a burglary victims was extremely frightened because the victim suspected that the crime had been committed by tenants living downstairs in the same building. Increased fear and precautions were also more common among supporters who felt close to the victim, supporters who reported frequently discussing problems with the victim, and supporters who were blood relations or lovers of the victim than among supporters with less close ties to the victim. The mother of a victim said that she "never had thought about being robbed" before her daughter's apartment had been burglarized. She added that because her daughter lived in a better area than she did, "It makes me think more."

When supporters attributed partial responsibility for the crime to the victim or when supporters believed that victims blamed themselves, supporters were less likely to

report increased fear of crime or added precautions. However, only one of the relationships between blame and supporter reactions reached even a marginal level of statistical significance: When supporters thought victims blamed themselves for the crime, they were less likely to take added precautions in their homes. These data provide at best weak support for the proposition that attributing responsibility to the victim reduces supporters' beliefs in his or her own vulnerability to crime.

Surprisingly, fear and precaution among supporters was not strongly related to the victim's reactions to his experience. Supporters of victims who reported more serious/extensive problems, more fear of crime and who were judged more frightened or upset by supporters did not consistently experience a greater fear of crime or take more precautions inside or outside of their residences. Marginally, significant relationships were found, however, (a) between supporters' beliefs that victims were depressed and supporters' precautions inside and outside of their residences, and (b) between supporters' beliefs that victims talked too much about the crime and supporters' fear of crime and precautions taken the street.

Socioeconomic status likewise did not have much effect on supporters' fear of crime and precautions, in spite of the fact that, as noted in Chapter 3, low socioeconomic status victims experienced greater increases in fear than higher socioeconomic status victims. Moreover, the significant relationships between socioeconomic status factors and supporters' reactions are hard to explain. Hispanic supporters reported the most fear of crime and the most new precautions, Black supporters reported the least, and Whites were in the middle. Supporters of victims in the highest income group were more likely than other supporters to take added precautions inside their homes.

As was true among the victim sample, nature of the offense affected the types of precautions taken by supporters. Supporters of robbery and assault victims more often reported taking precautions outside of their homes, while supporters of burglary victims more often took precautions in their residences (the latter relationship did not reach statistical significance).

Finally, whether supporters had themselves been victims of crime influenced the fear they felt and precautions they took. Supporters who were previous victims reported greater increases in fear of crime and more precautionary behavior on the street than other supporters.For

example, a supporter of an assault victim (who was also an eyewitness to the incident) had twice been a victim of robbery during the previous year. At the time of the interview, she said, "I don't go out at night. I don't let anyone inside my door unless I know them and they identify themselves. I'm suspicious of everybody." Supporters' previous experience with crime, in other words, seemed to sensitize them to its dangers.

Supporters' Reactions to Giving Aid to Victims

- Almost half the supporters reported feeling uncomfortable as a result of listening to the victim talk about the crime.
- Supporters who felt close to the victim and those aiding victims with more problems reported more discomfort than other supporters.

Nearly half of supporters (46%) reported feeling uncomfortable as a result of listening to the victim talk about the crime. This finding confirms the observations of other researchers and clinicians, cited in the introduction to this chapter, that people - even those who do not turn away - have a difficult time dealing with victims.

In most cases, the discomfort that supporters felt was a result of their own feelings of increased vulnerability. A roommate of a victim who was beaten in an unsuccessful robbery effort in the hallway of their apartment house arrived home shortly after the attack occurred. She

calmed the victim down and got her to call the police. But, as a result of the incident, the victim's roommate was left very nervous and frightened because, she said, "It could have been me." The supporter couldn't even relate her fears to her parents for fear they would want her to give up her apartment and return home. Some supporters felt uncomfortable because hearing the victim relate the incident made them feel concerned about the victim's safety, as in the case of a father whose daughter's apartment was burglarized. Other supporters reported feeling uncomfortable listening to the victim talk about the incident because the victim's experience angered them: The son-in-law of an old man who was robbed and then assaulted was upset by "the thought that this would happen to an old man." Finally, a mother witnessed an assault upon her 22 year old son and subsequently testified in court. As a result of her testimony, she was threatened and her other two sons, who lived with her, were shot at. She reported being uncomfortable listening to the victim talk about the incident because it reminded her of the impact that crime had had on all of their lives. She said that none of them saw friends any more because, "No one wants to be around people who are targets for shooting".

As Table 6.5 shows, supporters who felt that the victim might have avoided the misfortune if he had been more cautious were less likely to feel uncomfortable talking to

TABLE 6.5

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUPPORTERS' FEELINGS OF DISCOMFORT

	Proportion of Supporters Who Felt Uncomfortable While Giving Assistance
Attribution of Responsibility	
Supporter blamed victim (n = 29)	41%
Supporter didn't blame victim (n = 101)	49
Supporter believed victim blamed self (n = 23)	65 [1]
Supporter didn't believe victim blamed self (n = 108)	42
Supporter-Victim Ties	
Lived in same neighborhood (n = 74)	49
Lived in different neighborhood (n = 65)	48
Supporter felt close to victim (n = 116)	50 [3]
Supporter not close to victim (n = 22)	32
Frequently discussed problems (n= 81)	51 [3]
Occasionally/never discussed problems (n = 64)	42
Blood relatives/lovers (n = 108)	55 [1]
Other relationship (n = 36)	22
Victim Adjustment	
Victim scored 7 or more on problem index (n = 82)	59 [1]
Victim scored 6 or less on problem index (n = 64)	31
Victim scored 2 or more on fear index (n = 78)	51 [3]
Victim scored 1 or less on fear index (n = 67)	42
Victim depressed/unhappy (n = 78)	59 [1]
Victim not depressed/unhappy (n = 58)	29
Victim frightened/upset (n = 26)	58 [2]
Victim not frightened/upset (n = 105)	45
Victim talked too much about crime (n = 20)	65 [2]
Victim didn't talk too much about crime (n = 117)	42

TABLE 6.5 (CONTINUED)

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SUPPORTERS' FEELINGS OF DISCOMFORT

	Proportion of Supporters Who Felt Uncomfortable While Giving Assistance
Socioeconomic Status	
Supporter lived in Fordham (n = 26)	54%
Supporter lived in Flushing (n = 33)	42
Supporter lived in Park Slope (n = 20)	45
Supporter lived in other neighborhood (n = 67)	46
Supporter was Black (n = 26)	50
Supporter was Hispanic (n = 20)	55
Supporter was White (n = 96)	45
Victim's income less than $5,000 (n = 34)	59 [1]
Victim's income $5,000 - $15,000 (n = 47)	47
Victim's income more than $15,000 (n = 48)	33
Victim graduated high school (n = 98)	44 [3]
Victim did not graduate high school (n = 48)	52
Supporter a Prior Victim	
Yes (n = 23)	35 [2]
No (n = 122)	49
Type of Assistance Provided	
Supporter gave emotional help (n = 96)	45
Supporter didn't give emotional help (n = 50)	50
Supporter gave financial help (n = 21)	61 [2]
Supporter didn't give financial help (n = 128)	44
Supporter gave other help (n = 79)	49
Supporter didn't give other help (n = 67)	43

[1] Significant at .01 level
[2] Significant at .05 level
[3] Significant at .10 level

the victim about the crime than supporters who did not attribute responsibility to the victim. As discussed earlier, in attributing responsibility to the victim, supporters may have reduced their own fear of vulnerability to crime. On the other hand, when supporters perceived the victims to blame themselves, the supporters were more likely to report feeling uncomfortable. This may reflect the fact - observed earlier in this chapter - that there was some tendency for supporters to believe that victims who blamed themselves were not coping as well as other victims.

Supporters were more uncomfortable when victims appeared to be more distressed. Supporters were most likely to express discomfort when talking to victims who had more serious problems; who were more afraid of crime; and who the supporters believed were depressed, upset, or talked too much about the crime. The daughter of a 66-year-old burglary victim said she felt uncomfortable talking to her mother because "she keeps going back to the incident. She's very nervous and wants to move." The supporter said she feared for her mother's safety.

Supporters with closer ties to the victim expressed greater discomfort dealing with the victim than supporters with weaker ties. Supporters who were blood relations or boyfriend/girlfriend of the victim, who felt close to the

victim, or who frequently discussed problems with the victim reported feeling more uncomfortable than other supporters. It seems that the discomfort of those closest to the victim stemmed from the greater fear of crime that these supporters experienced. Fear of crime was strongly related to supporters' feelings of discomfort ($r = .23$, $p < .01$) and, when fear of crime is statistically controlled, the associations between supporter/victim ties are no longer significant. This indicates that the increased fear of crime was the cause of the discomfort among supporters.

Supporters' socioeconomic status was also related to their feelings of discomfort in dealing with victims. Supporters of victims with lower incomes and less education were significantly more uncomfortable in talking to the victims than other supporters. (Supporters who resided in the Fordham area of the Bronx and who were members of ethnic minorities also felt more uncomfortable than those who lived in the two more affluent communities and who were white, but the results did not reach statistical significance.)

The relationship between socioeconomic status and supporters' feelings of discomfort in talking to the victim seems to be linked to the provision of financial assistance. As seen in Table 6.5, the small number of supporters who provided financial assistance were significantly

more likely to be uncomfortable than supporters who gave only other forms of aid. Table 6.6 (a) shows that supporters of low income victims - who presumably had low incomes themselves - were more likely to be called upon by the victim to lend financial assistance. Moreover, in Table 6.6 (b), all supporters of victims with incomes under $5,000 who provided financial help regarded it as posing a problem for themselves, while none of the supporters of victims with incomes in excess of $15,000 who provided financial help regarded it as a problem. Thus, the burden of providing financial help falls disproportionately on those least able to afford it. For example, one burglary victim's landlady called the police for the victim, had his door repaired and locks changed, and accepted only half the rent due for the next month. She did this in spite of the fact that helping the victim financially posed a "major problem" for her because the rent money she received for the building was her only income.

Finally, supporters' reports of discomfort in talking to victims were more pronounced when the supporters had themselves been victims of crime. As was the case with supporters who had close ties to victims, the greater discomfort of supporters who had been victims themselves is likely the result of the greater fear of crime they felt in listening to the victim relate his experience.

TABLE 6.6

PROPORTION OF SUPPORTERS WHO LENT THE VICTIM FINANCIAL HELP, AND THE EFFECT ON SUPPORTERS, BY INCOME GROUPS

6.6(a): Financial Support by Income Groups

Victim's Income	Percent of Supporters Who Gave Financial Help
Less than $5,000 (n = 34)	24%
$5,000 - $15,000 (n = 49)	18
$15,000 and over (n = 51)	8

[1]

6.6(b): Effect of Giving Financial Support by Income Groups

Victim's Income	Percent of Supporters Who Gave Financial Help Who Found it to be a Problem
Less than $5,000 (n = 8)	100%
$5,000 - $15,000 (n = 9)	56
$15,000 and over (n = 4)	0

[2]

[1] $p < .05$
[2] $p < .01$

Yet, most supporters did not seem to regret that the victim had turned to them for assistance. One fifth of the supporters reported they were brought closer together by the experience, and indeed, only two supporters stated that their relationship was in jeopardy because of the incident. Nine in ten supporters viewed their contribution to the victim as important. And the overwhelming majority (97%) did not wish that the victim had gone elsewhere for help. For one supporter the experience even had a markedly positive effect on her life. She reported that her assistance to the victim "made her a different person" because it gave her something to talk about with her neighbors, with whom she previously had not gotten along. Since the victim's experience, the supporter said she had become friends with all of her neighbors.

Co-victims

Interviews were conducted with a special group individuals who along with providing support were also victims of the same incident. These individuals, or co-victims, accounted for 10% of all supporters. In order to examine the extent of mutual assistance and the impact of shared victimization, co-victims were asked to respond to an interview that varied slightly from the one administered to other supporters.

Approximately 20% of the sample, or 21 co-victims, were interviewed. Of these 63% were relatives of the victim, 28% were friends and 10% were neighbors. Three-quarters of the co-victims were involved in burglary cases, the remainder were robbery victims. Interviews occurred primarily with co-victims of Flushing (47%) and Park Slope (42%) victims. Only two interviews (10%) were completed by Fordham co-victims. Due to the small sample size and the over representation of Flushing and Park Slope areas, the co-victim responses have not been compared to those of other supporters.

Co-victims reported that conversations with victims were more emotionally charged than were discussions with other supporters. Conversations with other supporters were more likely to focus on practical matters or to involve general expressions of sympathy and concern. Although more than two-thirds of the co-victims stated that their initial conversation with the victim had evoked feelings of anger and/or fear, 76% said they felt the crime was easier to deal with because another party was involved. It appears that sharing emotions with the person who shared the experience is helpful. One co-victim of a robbery said, "Other people couldn't understand why I was so upset and angry, but my friend (the co-victim) could understand. He was good to talk to. We were both so angry."

The type of help co-victims most frequently reported providing to or receiving from the victim was emotional support in the form of "just talking." Since most co-victims are members of the same household and have similar financial situations, it was not surprising to find that only one co-victim provided financial assistance. Other types of practical help that co-victims both gave and received included help with shopping, calling a third party, and acting as an escort. Two-thirds of the co-victims thought that the help they provided to and received from the victim was very important. However, some co-victims discounted the help they received. Twenty-four percent reported that the assistance they received was "not very important", but only 10% felt that the support they gave to victims could be classified as such.

Seventeen of the 21 co-victims felt that both they and the victim handled the incident well. Yet when asked if the victim appeared more depressed or unhappy since the incident, more than two-thirds of the 21 co-victims responded affirmatively. This may indicate that co-victims regard a certain amount of depression as a normal response and not as a sign of maladaption. In addition, three-quarters of co-victims stated that they did not mind if the victim talked to them about the incident, nor did they believe that the victim objected to them bringing up the subject.

Despite this apparent lack of censorship, 7% stated that they seldomly or never discussed the incident with the victim.

Questions concerning self-responsibility and blame yielded puzzling results. Over two-thirds of co-victims stated they felt that either they or the victim could have prevented the crime. This figure in itself is surprising because it is much higher than the percent of other supporters who blamed the victim or the percent of victims who attributed responsibility to themselves.

As a result of the incident co-victims stated they had become more careful. Ninety percent reported they had taken increased precautions since the crime and 86% had discussed these precautions with the victim. Twenty-nine percent of co-victims said they were more nervous or afraid as a result of the incident. In some cases shared victimization aggravated rather than alleviated victims' problems and fears. This appeared to be particularly true of co-victims who were not related. One young burglary victim thought she would feel more secure if she purchased new locks and put up window bars. These additions were not as comforting as she had anticipated because her roommate insisted that such security measures "wouldn't stop someone who really wanted to get in." Conversely, other co-victims complained of their roommates' "fortess mentality", and had arguments with them about moving.

In another instance, a co-victim, was annoyed that despite the fact she, and not the victim, had sustained a material loss, the victim was more upset. "I get so mad. They didn't even take anything of hers. Why is she carrying on? It only makes the whole thing worse." Despite these exceptions, co-victimization appears to have made the incident easier for victims to deal with, providing them with an additional and unique source of support.

Discussion

In spite of the considerable literature that describes how others blame the victim, supporters in this study attributed responsibility for the crime to victims far less often than victims blamed themselves. Supporters who felt that the victim might have been more cautious were from lower socioeconomic groups with higher victimization rates; these supporters had more reason to fear crime and to deny their own vulnerability by attributing responsibility to the victim's behavior. There was some evidence that when victims were seen as blaming themselves, supporters were less uncomfortable talking to the victim and less afraid of crime themselves. However, some victims who blamed themselves were perceived by supporters as coping less well with their misfortune.

The interviews with supporters provided substantial evidence that the effects of crime do not end with the victim. Supporters reported being more afraid of crime and taking more precautions (although at a lower rate than victims themselves reported these changes) and feeling uncomfortable in talking to victims about the crime. This emotional secondary victimization was directly related to the closeness of the ties between victim and supporter and greater emotional distress of the victim. Those supporters who had been victims themselves also reported that helping the victim generated more fear of crime than other supporters. But at the same time people who had been through a similar experience felt less uncomfortable dealing with the victim - and therefore may bave been the most effective supporters.

Just as victims from lower socioeconomic groups seemed to incur greater costs than other victims, so did their supporters bear the greatest financial burden. Supporters of less affluent victims were more often called upon for financial assistance than other supporters, and more often found this posed a problem for them.

Interviews with co-victims suggest that talking with someone who shared the experience of victimization can be even more helpful than talking to someone who was not there.

Shared victimization provided an opportunity for mutual assistance that was beneficial to both parties.

In spite of the psychological, and sometimes financial, costs that supporters incurred they seemed glad to have been of assistance, and stood ready to help again. Ironically, while crime may ultimately damage communities, it sometimes has the immediate effect of bringing victims and those who care about them closer together.

VII

REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY: WHAT DO THE FINDINGS MEAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VICTIM PROGRAMS?

When we began this study, we were interested in trying to better define an approriate role for victim service organizations, given our suspicion that victims receive much support and assistance informally from family, friends and acquaintances. This chapter first summarizes the major findings of the study -- the kinds of reactions crime elicits in victims, the kinds of help that victims get informally from others, the effect of lending assistance on victims' supporters, and the kinds of help that victims seek from government sources and other service organizations. The summary is followed by a discussion of the programmatic implications of the information collected. In particular, we examine the role that victim service organizations can play in helping victims to readjust, and how victim service organizations might best be structured to strengthen rather than supplant natural supports. Finally, we discuss some ideas for additional research that has emerged from this study.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STUDY

Responses to Victimization

The impact of crime is first and foremost psychological. The psychological efforts of crime include reports of nervousness, difficulty sleeping, anger, shame, helplessness, and frustration. Victims experience a decrease in positive feelings such as joy and contentment and an increase in negative feelings, such as depression, anxiety, and hostility. These feelings may last several months or longer. Even when describing practical problems stemming from the crime -- stolen property, disruption of daily routine, damaged property, medical complications, medical expenses, lost income, problems with employers -- three-quarters of the victims described impact of the practical problems in psychological terms.

Another indication of the strong psychological reaction to crime is the fact that more than 60% of victims felt "very much" or "somewhat" less safe in their homes and more than 40% felt similarly less safe in their neighborhoods. Sixty percent of the 274 victims interviewed took precautions in their homes after the crime and 38% said they went out less at night. Twenty-four percent went out less during the day.

For victims of burglary, robbery and assault, the world is a less safe place to live. Whether or not the crime involved personal contact between the victim and the offender, for the victim it was still a crime against the person. The psychological impact of crime appeared more acute than other life crises because there was often little that victims could do to right the wrong or to ensure that it would not happen again. To be sure, some victims tried to organize their neighbors to take steps to insure their safety. But more common were feelings of helplessness or resignation, especially among poor victims who were least able to control their continued vulnerability.

Help in Coping With Victimization

Victims sought many different forms of assistance. Some people needed a ride to one place or another; some needed an escort to go out or to go to court; some needed repairs made to a door or to items damaged during the commission of the crime; some people needed legal advice or counseling. The services victims needed varied with individual circumstances, and no single type of help was desired by a majority of victims. The most common form of help needed, lock repairs, was noted by 40% of the victims. Twenty-seven percent of victims stated they needed financial assistance.

One of the first people many victims came in contact with after the crime was a police officer, and the officers usually lent assistance to victims. Two in five victims reported that the police had lent significant assistance, but only one in five reported that the police "went out of their way" to help.

Most of the aid crime victims received came from other individuals -- friends, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, and a few strangers. Indeed, one of the most surprising, and happiest, findings of the study was that virtually all the victims in the sample had received support from other individuals. This was true in spite of the fact that many victims lived alone.

Most supporters were contacted within two days of the incident and were people the victim saw often and knew for a long time. More than half the supporters lived in the same neighborhood and close to 80% lived in the same borough as the victim. About two-thirds of victims' supporters were also members of victims' social networks, the people the victim usually turned to for assistance. Among the members of the support network who were not members of the social network were neighbors, landlords, and superintendents. (Landlords, however, were most often named by victims as those who could not or would not help.)

Victims received the most emotional support and practical assistance from people they were close to -- relatives, friends and social network members. But neighbors and non-network individuals were as likely to stay with the victim as were supporters with closer ties and surprisingly neighbors and even landlords were among the people who extended finanical assistance to victims. Supporters who belonged to the victim's pre-existing social network, however, were the most likely to provide financial assistance.

The strong local nature of support, demonstrated in the high frequency of neighbors in the support network compared to the social network, suggests that physical proximity is an important attribute of people who help the victim of a crime. Although most support consisted of talk, it appeared that in person contact was important. Perhaps support was simply not as effective if given over the telephone. It may be also that strong local support expressed the common interests of neighbors in dealing with crime.

There were well defined differences between the services people were and were not able to get from other individuals. Victims received the types of services that required time but no special skills, such as, babysitting and help with shopping. The services that victims most often reported that they failed to receive were legal advice and

psychological counseling -- both professional services. Other services that victims failed to receive from other individuals included temporary shelters, financial assistance, and lock repairs.

Only 15% of the victims in the sample sought assistance from service agencies. Failure to contact agencies usually stemmed from lack of awareness of their existence. When victims were asked if they knew of any agency that could provide support, only 19% responded affirmatively.

Victims who did seek assistance from formal organizations, looked to a variety of agencies. Five percent sought help from public assistance and 2% from the New York Public Housing Authority. Other agencies mentioned by one or two victims included: Social Security, senior citizens groups, the Victim Services Agency and the New York State Crime Victims Compensation Board.

The majority of victims reported prior experience with the agencies they contacted, particularly public assistance and Social Security recipients. Low income victims and victims who reported the most needs were the most likely to approach formal organizations for help.

Victims requested the following types of help from organizations: Replacement of stolen benefit checks, or food stamps, and other forms of financial assistance; help with repairs; information on insurance; relocation assistance; and help from housing agencies to pressure landlords to make repairs. A little over half the victims who sought agency assistance received the help they requested. Victims were more likely to recieve help with repairs, applications for federal crime insurance and counseling than to obtain financial and relocation assistance. Victims who could not obtain the financial assistance they needed usually were those who wanted welfare to reissue stolen checks or foodstamps.

Victims who were least successful in getting their needs met either through informal or formal sources were. Victims with weak neighborhood network ties; victims belonging to lower socioeconomic groups, victims who reported serious crime-related problems and victims with smaller social networks than other victims.

Readjustment After Victimization

Substantial adjustment occurred among victims during the four months between the crime and the administration of the follow-up interview. Still, many victims continued to report crime-related problems, increased fear of crime and

increased precautions. Victims belonging to lower socioeconomic groups more frequently reported residual problems and heightened fear of crime than other victims responding to the follow-up interview. Thus, contrary to the suggestions of some writers, the greater hardships generally experienced by less affluent citizens apparently did not help them to cope better with the trauma of victimization; in fact, they had more difficulty coping.

Assistance from others benefited victims in coping with the aftermath of crime. In specific, (a) victims who received all the help they reported needing on the initial interview reported significantly fewer crime-related problems on the follow-up interview than victims who failed to get one or more types of needed assistance, (b) victims who had three or more supporters reported significantly less fear of crime on the follow-up interview than victims with two or fewer supporters, and (c) victims with more supporters, victims who felt the police had been sympathetic, and victims who got all the assistance they needed felt more positively about other people at the time of the follow-up interview than other victims.

The Effects of Providing Help on Supporters

Friends, relatives and neighbors suffer hidden costs of helping victims that agencies promoting informal support should be aware of. In one form or another most supporters reported experiencing secondary victimization. In some this took the form of feeling nervous or frightened, in others increased suspicion of people and in others feeling less safe at home or on the street. These reactions were more common among supporters who lived in the same neighborhood than those who lived elsewhere and among those who felt close to the victim or were relatives than those who did not feel close to the victim.

Nearly half the supporters reported feeling uncomfortable when talking to the victim about the crime. In most cases this stemmed from the supporters' increased feeling of vulnerability. But the discomfort also reflected the level of distress of the victim. Supporters of victims with more problems and greater fear of crime and victims who supporters thought were depressed, upset or talked too much expressed more discomfort than others. Supporters of low socioeconomic status victims experienced greater discomfort than others, apparently because they felt imposed upon by

requests for money. Since they had low incomes themselves, the financial burden was falling on those who could least afford it.

Overall there was substantial evidence from supporter interviews that the effects of crime do not end with the victim. Yet, most supporters did not regret that the victim had turned to them for assistance. One fifth of the supporters reported they were brought closer to the victim by the experience, and indeed, only two supporters stated that their relationship with the victim was jeopardized because of the incident. Nine in ten supporters viewed their contribution to the victim as important. And the overwhelming majority (97%) of supporters did not wish that the victim had gone elsewhere for help.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

In his study of Milwaukee crime victims, Knudten (1976:12) suggested that

> extensive victim/witness service programs are not needed by most victims and witnesses. What is needed is greater knowledge about the coordination of already existing community services, increased public and private agency willingness to service these client groups...

While the data from the study confirmed that many victims had limited, simple needs -- getting a ride somewhere, help with shopping, someone to stay with or comfort them -- and were successful in receiving assistance with those needs from other individuals, the data also suggested that victims suffered from some problems which were not provided for by informal networks indicating the need for formal assistance programs.

Our data suggest various roles for victim service programs which appeared important and non-duplicative of informal supports. First, the data strongly indicate that victims from lower socioeconomic groups experience the most serious hardship as a result of crime and are <u>not</u> always successful in getting the assistance they need from other individuals or from the social service agencies with which they have ongoing relationships. These victims need some form of organized assistance to help them cope with the aftermath of victimization.

Second, there are several kinds of assistance that victims often fail to receive from their informal helpers or from social service agencies not designed specifically to serve victims. These include crisis counseling, legal assistance, lock repair, emergency financial aid, and temporary shelter. Some of these forms of assistance, particularly

crisis counseling and legal advice, require professional training to administer and victims could not normally get these kinds of help from their social and support networks. Moreover, some of these forms of assistance, particularly legal assistance and lock repair, are so specific to crime victims that social service organizations created for other purposes could not reasonably be expected to provide them. Programs specifically tailored to the needs of victims are thus useful, and perhaps essential to provide aid that victims cannot readily obtain from other sources.

A third role for victim programs suggested by the data is in placing victims in touch with organizations that can help them. Data from both Knudten's study and this one indicated that many victims do not know that they can get assistance from service organizations and government agencies for crime-related problems. Knudten implicitly concludes that the solution to this problem lies in public education efforts. The data from this study are silent on the value of public education, however, the Victim Services Agency's experience with outreach suggests that if a person has not been a crime victim public announcements about victim services unconsciously avoided because they seem to make people uncomfortable as much as talking to a victim about the crime made supporters uncomfortable. A better approach may be to make sure that if people become victims, they are informed about assistance

programs. This goal could be achieved by the police telling victims about such programs (orally, or by giving out cards), or by programs routinely contacting victims who have reported crimes. (Both of these approaches would limit outreach to victims who have reported crimes to the police). Once program staff had ascertained the victim's needs, a decision could be made about whether the victim ought to be encouraged to rely on their informal support network for help, whether the victim had a specialized need best provided by the program, or whether the victim should be referred to another service organization for assistance.

Another role for victim programs suggested by the research would be to develop ways to help supporters in their efforts to help victims. Interviews with those helpers who provided assistance to victims showed that supporters suffer many of the same aftereffects of victimization as the victim -- increased fear of crime, increased suspicion about other peole and general anxiety. If victim programs could give advice and emotional support to potential helpers to prepare them for helping victims, it would benefit both victims and supporters and perhaps partially contain the ripple effect of crime. Supporter programs might involve education about as well as the impact of crime on its victims, the impact that helping has on the helper, tips on providing psychological first aid to crime victims, mutual support groups and

suggestions for community and individual crime prevention activities. Engaging in anti-crime activities could help both victim and supporter develop a sense of control over their environment (by introducing ways to reduce vulnerability to crime).

To summarize, many victims' needs can be met without the intervention of victim assistance programs. However, this study suggests that victim programs are essential for disadvantaged victims who are not as successful as others in finding help with their problems, for certain types of assistance that other service organizations cannot easily provide, and helping those supporters who want to help the victims. If, as this study indicated, 40% of victims do not get all the help they need, the potential client population each year in New York City is well over 300,000 people.

On the assumption that victim assistance programs are needed, how ought such programs be organized? The data from this study strongly suggest that programs be comprehensive and locally based.

The arguments for the development of comprehensive programs emerge from the findings that victims of the three types of crime studied - burglary, robbery, and assault - had similar responses and similar needs resulting from the

crimes. In addition, women and elderly - two groups of crime victims for whom special programs have been developed - did not appear to have qualitatively different types of needs than men or non-elderly victims. Both groups were as successful as other victims in receiving the help they needed. They were not more likely to use formal agencies and they showed no distinctive patterns of adjustment over time. Measures of difficulty that decreased over time for the entire sample decreased for women and the elderly as well. These findings are in agreement with those of Knudten who argues that:

> the development of programs oriented to one particular age, sex , or racial group may actually undermine the potential value of the service offered. Not all men or women experiencing a particular crime share the same degree of seriousness of the crime event or have the same reaction although many elderly now believe they are being increasingly victimized, the data do not support this contention (1976:10).

Programs that are comprehensive in terms of the types of victims they serve and the types of crimes they respond to would appear to have advantages over programs targeted for one type of victim or one type of crime. Among the advantages would be a capacity, because of the larger volume, to offer a wider range of services, greater economics in service delivery, and better potential for stable funding because of a broader constituency. (During the last decade, at different times funding has been more plentiful for certain types of victims

than others.) If staffing permitted it would be desirable within a comprehensive program to have specialists who would be sensitive to special techniques of outreach and the particular needs of certain types of crime victims.

While the data did not strongly support the need to target programs for specific types of crimes or victims it did indicate that a disproportionate share of the problems resulting from victimization is borne by the poor. Moreover, the poor were less successful than other victims in getting the help they needed. This suggests the need for special efforts to reach out to these victims, while not excluding other victims. Because the poor are often segregated geographically, an effective way to reach them may be through easily accessible, local satellite offices of an urban victim program, such as the Fordham area we studied in New York.

Such storefront offices would permit outreach efforts (letters or phone calls) with those victims most serioulsy affected by crime and most in danger of subsequent victimization. Neighborhood offices in selected areas would have other advantages as well. Local offices could more easily offer aid to supporters and on local services through churches, senior citizen centers, block associations, and other community groups to provide assistance for victims. These local groups could be aided in sponsoring programs to educate people about

how to reduce their vulnerability to crime, and organize collective anti-crime efforts (such as citizen patrols, block watching, and persuading landlords to improve security). These decentralized adjuncts to victim programs might cost more than a single central office, but would increase the abilty of programs to target services to the most needy and, would probably be used more than centers which were located downtown. With local offices capable of providing a broad range of services or directing victims to appropriate agencies, crime victims would be better served.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Our research project was intended to be exploratory in nature, providing tentative answers to some questions, but also raising new issues. In retrospect, the data were surprisingly unequivocal on some issues -- the important role that support from others plays for nearly all victims and the particular need of the poor for programs to supplement the support they were able to obtain on their own. Still, there are a number of issues raised by the study which merit further exploration.

First, we need to know more about the long-term impact of victimzation. This study followed victims for four months after the crime -- long enough to see a reduction

in crime-related problems, significant adjustment in moods, and an abatement in the heightened fear of crime that followed victimization. But, for many victims, the psychological adjustment process was not completed within four months. Do some victims of assault, robbery, and burglary continue to experience depression, frustration, fear and have difficulty functioning long after the crime, as seems to be true of rape victims? If so, can such victims be identified early, and helped?

Second, we need to understand more about the meaning of precautions victims take after a crime. It is puzzling that our data showed no evidence that elderly victims were more likely to initiate new precautions after the crime than other victims. Is this because they already had done all they could to secure their residences and reduce their vulnerability outside their homes? It is also puzzling that we found that the heightened fear of crime following victimization abated over four months, but victims continued to take far more precautions than before the crime. Did victims adapt to a higher level of fear, frustrating our attempt to measure fear levels? Or is there a direct relationship between fear of crime and efforts to reduce vulnerability. Or does the act of taking precautions itself give victims a feeling of control over their environment, and thus act to reduce their fear of crime?

Third, we need to better understand the effects of crime on victims' perception of their neighborhood. Almost 50 percent of victims interviewed reported that they wanted to relocate. Does victimization often weaken the victims' ties to their neighborhoods or lessen their use of neighborhood facilities? How many victims relocate because of their experience? What do the answers to these questions imply for the continuation of healthy urban neighborhoods?

Fourth, there are suggestions from this study that the police officer, as one of the first persons a victim comes into contact with after the crime, plays a significant role in shaping how people react to victimization. However, our data with respect to the role of the police are minimal, and the topic merits further investigation. How important an influence is the police officer to the victim's adjustment, and how can officers best help victims cope with the aftermath of crime?

Fifth, while we argue that counseling is a service that programs ought to provide to victims, there are no data we are aware of that speak to what kind of counseling is most effective for victims, or even whether counseling helps at all. We should know more about what models of counseling (such as crisis counseling, peer counseling, family counseling,

or group counseling) are appropriate, and about the kinds of situations in which each is most effective.

Sixth, the question whether certain forms of self-blame by the victim (i.e., feeling that victimization might have been avoided had certain actions been taken) are constructive deserves greater exploration. Self-blame has been traditionally regarded as an unhealthy sign by clinicians. But this research suggests that victims' beliefs that they could have prevented the crime were associated with positive efforts to re-establish control over their environments. This study did not, however, attempt a rigorous definition of self-blame, or to separate out constructive and destructive components.

Seventh, and lastly, we need to obtain better normative data on measures of psychological adjustment from non-victim populations. The conclusions about victims' adjustment over time, as measured on the affect balance scale, were seriously limited because there was no data on how victims would have scored prior to the crime. For example, it was not possible to compare with confidence the adjustment process of one group of victims with another because we could not know if differences observed between the groups immediately after victimization were the result of the crime or of pre-existing differences between the groups. Normative data on selected

samples of non-victims would enable us to determine much more about the length of the adjustment process and about the adjustment of one group of victims versus another.

Searching for a broad perspective from which to view the results of this study, we find ourselves turning to the data that most surprised us. On the side of disturbing and disheartening, we were stunned at the general impact of a crime on the victim's psychological state and at the alterations in daily life that were so often a part of the post-victimization experience. In response to burglaries, parents who worked suddenly rearranged their lives so that the children would not be home alone after school. Young and old, male and female victims stayed home at night for fear of the streets. Many victims expressed the desire to uproot their lives and move to what they perceived as a safer area. This side of the response to criminal victimization.

But there is another side to this research, one that is comforting and cause for optimism. That comes from help that was offered crime victims by friends, relatives, neighbors, and strangers. Many of the victims we spoke discovered care and comfort from unexpected people. The elderly found neighbors delivering meals to their doorstep and calling regularly to check on them. Young victims who lived alone discovered people at work to talk to and previously

unnoticed neighbors. Those who got help where they expected to were also thankful and recognized the caring that surrounded them.

There seems little point to weighing the balance between these two sides of the research findings. Both exist and as the program suggestions indicate, we believe victim service programs should take both aspects into account in an effort to help victims cope with crime while contributing to the caring and supportive side of human nature.

APPENDICES

TABLE A-1: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VICTIM, CRIME, AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THE PROBLEM INDEX

	Pain	Limited Mobility	Medical Expenses	Property Stolen	Property Damaged	Difficulties With Employer	Loss Of Income
Socioeconomic Status							
Income	-.10	-.04	-.07	-.10	.08	-.12	.02
Education	-.09	-.06	-.06	[-.16]	.00	[-.13]	-.06
Employment Status	-.04	-.06	-.10	[-.13]	.09	.11	[.35]
Neighborhood	.05	.05	.11	.11	.11	[.17]	.08
Other Victim Characteristics							
Age	-.08	-.01	-.03	.01	.00	-.08	-.11
Sex	[-.17]	-.09	[-.15]	.09	-.03	-.07	-.11
Race	.11	.10	.05	[.21]	.04	[.16]	.12
Previous Victimization	-.05	-.06	-.08	.09	.07	-.02	-.04
Crime Characteristics							
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	[.58]	[.45]	[.31]	[-.16]	[-.29]	.03	.01
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	[.12]	[.15]	.00	-.05	.11	.02	.00
Extent of injury	[.76]	[.67]	[.55]	-.05	-.03	[.12]	[.14]
Extent of financial loss	.03	.02	.03	.08	.11	-.08	.02
Neighborhood Ties							
Lives alone	[.12]	.02	-.03	-.07	.10	[.14]	.11
Number in network	-.07	-.02	-.05	-.05	.01	-.09	-.06
Network density	.06	.09	-.05	.04	.09	.07	.00
Time in neighborhood	.01	.03	.06	-.05	.08	-.01	-.03
Number relatives in neighborhood	.05	.06	.03	-.01	-.09	.09	.00
Victim feels a part of neighborhood	.02	.01	-.07	.01	-.01	-.06	-.08

TABLE A-1 (Continued)

	Loss Of Job	Daily Activities	Family/ Friends	Difficulty Sleeping	Fear Harrassment	Other (1st Response)	Other (2nd Response)
Socioeconomic Status							
Income	-.09	-.07	.10	[-.17]	[-.20]	.00	-.02
Education	-.07	-.08	-.05	[-.19]	-.01	.04	.03
Employment Status	.01	-.08	.01	[-.15]	-.01	.08	-.02
Neighborhood	.12	.04	.02	[.20]	[.19]	.09	.12
Other Victim Characteristics							
Age	-.07	-.01	-.01	-.05	.06	.01	.09
Sex	-.04	[.13]	-.06	[.21]	.04	.06	[.16]
Race	.08	.03	.05	.13	[.19]	.04	.02
Previous Victimization	.00	.06	.07	-.05	.11	.06	-.03
Crime Characteristics							
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	.11	.03	-.11	-.10	.06	.04	[.18]
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	.02	.08	[.19]	-.01	[.30]	[.13]	-.03
Extent of injury	[.12]	.08	-.03	.11	.03	.04	-.06
Extent of financial loss	-.03	.08	.07	.07	-.08	.03	-.03
Neighborhood Ties							
Lives alone	[.13]	-.02	.08	[-.23]	-.06	-.03	[-.17]
Number in network	-.03	-.01	.01	[-.12]	-.01	.00	-.02
Network density	.02	-.02	-.06	.07	-.09	[-.14]	.06
Time in neighborhood	.04	.07	.04	.06	-.08	-.09	.04
Number relatives in neighborhood	[.13]	.00	.01	[.13]	-.07	[-.14]	.02
Victim feels a part of neighborhood	-.09	-.01	-.03	.05	.03	.05	-.01

TABLE A-2: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VICTIM, CRIME, AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THE FEAR OF CRIME INDEX

	Feels Less Safe In Home	Feels Less Safe In Neighborhood	Would Like To Move
Socioeconomic Status			
Income	-.06	-.10	.12
Education	-.22	-.11	-.21
Employment Status	-.08	-.01	-.08
Neighborhood	.17	.06	.22
Other Victim Characteristics			
Age	.03	-.01	-.07
Sex	.18	.10	.01
Race	.06	.02	.19
Previous Victimization	.04	-.04	.14
Crime Characteristics			
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	-.33	.23	.01
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	-.08	-.06	.11
Extent of injury	-.04	-.07	.03
Extent of financial loss	.02	.04	-.05
Neighborhood Ties			
Lives alone	-.06	.03	-.03
Number in network	.00	.04	-.12
Network density	.05	.08	.10
Time in neighborhood	.11	.06	-.06
Number relatives in neighborhood	.04	.00	-.01
Victim feels a part of neighborhood	.05	-.04	.14

CONTINUED

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TABLE A-3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTIM,CRIME, AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THE IN-HOUSE PRECAUTION INDEX

	Install Security Devices	Check Doors, Windows Before Going Out	Leave Lights, Radio, TV When Going Out	Get Dog/Remove Or Hide Valuables
Socioeconomic Status				
Income	.12	-.05	-.03	.08
Education	.04	-.08	-.04	.10
Employment Status	.06	.07	-.02	.02
Neighborhood	.03	.11	.08	.09
Other Victim Characteristics				
Age	-.06	-.10	.05	-.08
Sex	-.04	.03	.07	-.02
Race	.09	.13	.08	.15
Previous Victimization	.09	-.01	.05	.02
Crime Characteristics				
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	.57	-.34	-.33	-.12
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	.07	.07	-.05	.00
Extent of injury	.03	.06	.05	.00
Extent of financial loss	.07	.00	-.10	.09
Neighborhood Ties				
Lives alone	.03	-.06	-.06	-.05
Number in network	.06	.01	.00	.06
Network density	-.09	-.06	-.05	.09
Time in neighborhood	.03	-.09	.01	-.08
Number relatives in neighborhood	.09	.03	.07	.02
Victim feels a part of neighborhood	-.10	-.03	.00	.03

TABLE A-4

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VICTIM, CRIME, AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IN THE OUT-OF-HOME PRECAUTION INDEX

	Avoids Places	Avoids People On Street	Goes Out Less During Day	Takes Taxis/Comes Home Early/Doesn't Carry Valuables	Goes Out Less At Night
Socioeconomic Status					
Income	-.06	-.05	[-.15]	.10	[-.13]
Education	-.02	[.16]	[-.30]	[.19]	[-.20]
Employment Status	.08	.09	[-.21]	[.19]	-.10
Neighborhood	.12	[.22]	[.28]	.13	[.16]
Other Victim Characteristics					
Age	[-.13]	[-.16]	-.02	-.09	-.10
Sex	.08	[.20]	[.12]	[.18]	.11
Race	.08	.14	[.27]	.10	.12
Previous Victimization	.09	.10	.09	-.01	.04
Crime Characteristics					
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	[.18]	.03	-.01	[.34]	[.13]
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	.01	.07	[.15]	-.10	-.03
Extent of injury	.11	-.01	.10	[-.21]	.09
Extent of financial loss	.00	[-.16]	-.07	-.06	.04
Neighborhood Ties					
Lives alone	.03	-.02	.07	.09	.04
Number in network	.10	[.19]	[-.16]	.06	-.08
Network density	-.05	[-.14]	.11	-.01	.07
Time in neighborhood	-.04	[-.19]	.06	-.05	.03
Number relatives in neighborhood	.02	-.07	.06	-.07	.04
Victims feels a part of neighborhood	[-.16]	-.07	-.08	-.01	-.01

TABLE A-5: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VICTIM, CRIME, AND NETOWRK CHARACTERISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL SCALES OF THE ABS

	Joy	Contentment	Vigor	Affection	Anxiety	Depression	Guilt	Hostility
Socioeconomic Status								
Income	.11	.11	.09	.01	-.02	-.14	.04	-.01
Education	.13	.09	.19	-.03	.03	-.05	.08	.09
Employment Status	.18	.12	.28	.05	.02	.07	.00	.03
Neighborhood	.19	.15	.22	.05	.05	.10	.04	.03
Other Victim Characteristics								
Age	-.10	-.03	-.19	-.01	.07	-.10	-.16	-.15
Sex	.07	-.03	-.03	.01	.37	.18	.12	.10
Race	.09	.08	.07	.04	.08	.08	.08	.08
Previous Victimization	-.07	-.07	.00	-.06	.08	.03	-.08	.01
Crime Characteristics								
Crime type (violent/non-violent)	-.06	-.05	-.10	.05	.05	.09	.05	.02
Victim/offender relationship (no/yes)	.00	-.06	-.06	.07	.04	.07	.00	.14
Extent of injury	-.03	.03	-.12	.07	-.02	.02	.03	.03
Extent of financial loss	-.06	-.01	-.02	.02	.11	.14	.08	.11
Neighborhood Ties								
Lives alone	.06	.10	.07	.06	-.05	-.08	.02	-.07
Number in network	.18	.18	.20	.07	.06	-.13	.00	-.14
Network density	.07	.04	.01	.11	-.08	.06	.11	.02
Time in neighborhood	.03	.00	-.11	-.09	.09	-.10	.17	-.10
Number relatives in neighborhood	-.03	-.07	-.08	.03	.00	.05	.00	-.03
Victim feels a part of neighborhood	-.12	-.12	-.10	-.14	-.02	.10	.05	.05

TABLE B-1: INTERCORRELATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF PROBLEM INDEX

	Pain	Limited Movement	Medical Expenses	Property Stolen	Property Damaged	Difficulty With Employer	Lost Income
Limited Movement	.79*						
Medical Expenses	.56	.56					
Property Stolen	-.09	-.11	-.06				
Property Damaged	-.16	-.12	-.14	.08			
Difficulty With Employer	.14	.12	.14	.00	.14		
Lost Income	.14	.05	.09	.05	.14	.51	
Lost Job	.17	.11	.12	.00	.04	.66	.35
Daily Activities	.06	.09	.06	.11	.06	.05	.06
Family/Friends	-.06	-.02	-.08	-.01	.08	.09	.11
Trouble Sleeping	.06	.04	.08	.17	-.04	.02	-.01
Fear Harrassment	.13	.13	.03	.02	.05	.12	.01
Other (1st Answer)	.05	.08	-.01	-.01	.07	.03	-.03
Other (snd Answer)	.02	.09	.03	-.03	-.04	-.05	-.08

*Correlations of 0.12 or greater are significant at the 5% confidence level (two-tailed test).

TABLE B-1: (Continued)

	Lost Job	Daily Activities	Family/ Friends	Trouble Sleeping	Fear Harassment	Other (1st Answer)
Limited Movement						
Medical Expenses						
Property Stolen						
Property Damaged						
Difficulty With Employer						
Lost Income						
Lost Job						
Daily Activities	-.03					
Family/Friends	.05	.16				
Trouble Sleeping	.00	.29	.04			
Fear Harrassment	.05	.13	.05	.12		
Other (1st Answer)	.06	.16	-.06	.11	.12	
Other (snd Answer)	-.03	.10	-.07	.13	.07	.39

TABLE B-2: INTERCORRELATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF FEAR OF CRIME INDEX

	Less Safe In Home	Less Safe In Neighborhood
Less Safe In Neighborhood	.25	
Would Like To Move	.24	.28

TABLE B-3: INTERCORRELATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF IN-HOUSE PRECAUTION INDEX

	Install Servirity Devices	Lock Doors, Windows	Leave Radio/TV On
Check Doors, Windows	.38		
Leave Radio/TV On	.30	.45	
Get Dog/Hide Valuables	.14	.11	.05

TABLE B-4: INTERCORRELATIONS OF COMPONENTS OF OUT-OF-HOUSE PRECAUTION INDEX

	Avoids Places	Avoids People On Street	Goes Out Less At Night	Goes Out Less During Day
Avoids People On Street	.33			
Goes Out Less At Night	.15	.02		
Goes Out Less During Day	.15	.04	.52	
Takes Taxis/Home Early/ Doesn't Carry Valuables	.13	.07	.19	.02

TABLE B-5: INTERCORRELATIONS OF ABS SCALES

	Joy	Contentment	Vigor	Affection	Anxiety	Depression	Guilt
Contentment	.81						
Vigor	.72	.70					
Affection	.63	.66	.65				
Anxiety	-.03	-.14	-.10	-.02			
Depression	-.21	-.34	-.22	-.07	.56		
Guilt	-.03	-.10	-.09	.01	.40	.66	
Hostility	-.29	-.40	-.20	-.21	.45	.65	.53

APPENDIX C

TABLE C-1

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS VARIABLES

	Income	Education	Race
Education	.439 [1]		
Race	.400	.300	
Neighborhood	.339	.192	.414

[1] Boxes indicate that the associations are significant at the .001 level or better by two-tailed tests.

APPENDIX D

Excerpts from the
New York State Criminal Code
defining assault, burglary and robbery.

120.00 Assault in the third degree. (A/MISD.)

A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.

Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.

120.05 Assault in the second degree. (D/FELONY)

A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
3. With intent to prevent a peace officer or a fireman or an employee of the office of drug abuse services who is charged with the duty of securing the custody of a certified drug dependent person or a narcotic addict required to undergo a period of inpatient treatment as a condition of probation or a detained alleged drug dependent person from performing a lawful duty, he causes physical injury to such peace officer or fireman or employee; or
4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
5. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or the physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or
6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony defined in article one hundred thirty which requires corroboration for conviction, or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes physical injury to another person other than one of the participants.

Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.

120.10 Assault in the first degree. (C/FELONY)

A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such perosn or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the participants.

Assault in the first degree is a class C felony.

140.20 Burglary in the third degree. (D/FELONY)

A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.

Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.

140.25 Burglary in the second degree.

A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and when:
1. In effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
   (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
   (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
   (c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
   (d) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shot gun, machine gun or other firearm; or
2. The building is a dwelling and the entering or remaining occurs at night.

Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.

140.30 Burglary in the first degree. (B/FELONY)

A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree or any other crime.

Burglary in the first degree in a class B felony.

160.00 Robbery; defined.

Robbery is forcible stealing. A person forcibly steals property and commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of:
1. Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or
2. Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.

160.05 Robbery in the third degree. (D/FELONY)

A person is guilty of robbery in the third degree when he forcibly steals property. Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.

160.10 Robbery in the second degree. (C/FELONY)

A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property and when:
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(b)Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm.

Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.

160.15 Robbery in the first degree. (B/FELONY)

A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.

Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony.

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