


TERRORISM: ORIGINS, DIRECTION AND SUPPORT



HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE ORIGINS, DIRECTION AND SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

APRIL 24, 1981

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TERRORISM: ORIGINS, DIRECTION AND SUPPORT

FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:15 a.m. in room 6226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Also present: Senator Leahy.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. The hearing will come to order.

I want to welcome my distinguished colleague from Vermont who has a great deal more senatorial background in the general subjects which we will be studying in the course of these hearings, a man from whom I have learned a great deal in my visits to the Select Committee on Intelligence, and we are delighted to have him with us today, Senator Pat Leahy from Vermont.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Other Senators who would have been here—the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Senator Biden, is in Delaware taking care of his interests there. The Senate is not actually in session now.

Senator Thurmond is in South Carolina. He is the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, as you know. He is pursuing the interest of the administration in supporting President Reagan's economic package in speeches throughout the South.

Senator East asked that I mention that his presence today is deterred only by his chairing another subcommittee at the same time, and it is concerned with legislation very close to Senator East's heart. He says, however, were that not the case he would be here; that he supports our work and, needless to say, Senator Thurmond does also.

I would like to welcome our most distinguished witnesses, one of them has not yet arrived. We have the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and an attorney at law in Washington, D.C., Mr. William Colby.

We have an international journalist, a lady of great prestige in her profession and with a profound background in the subject we are addressing today. She is the author of a book, "The Terror Network," and has written another book—Mrs. Claire Sterling.

Michael Ledeen has not yet arrived, he will be the third witness this morning. He has a Ph. D. in modern European history. He is

presently associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University here in Washington.

We have another international journalist of extensive experience in journalism and with the subjects on which he has written, including the subject of disinformation and espionage. He, too, is associated presently with the Center for Strategic International Studies at Georgetown University, Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave.

My own familiarity with the writings and experience of these four witnesses makes me deeply appreciative of their qualifications and of our good fortune in having them here at the first hearing on Terrorism: Origins, Direction and Support.

I will ask Senators, if any others arrive, and Senator Leahy, to try to limit opening statements to 10 minutes; I shall do so and I shall, with your permission, sir, read my opening statement.

The deepest purpose of this and our subsequent hearings is the preservation and support of freedom. We know that America is a fount of freedom for its own citizens and, in relative historic terms, has been a source of, and a support for, freedom throughout the world.

The security of the United States, then, has especially intense interest to us because of our national contributions to the bestowal of this great and rare privilege of freedom. This interest is shared by liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans on this subcommittee, and by citizens throughout this land.

There are those in the world whose avowed purpose is to destroy, or overthrow, and recast our government in a form barren of the freedoms which we deeply cherish. Freedom is short-lived for those who take it for granted. The threats against our freedom, our security, are as diverse as the groups seeking to employ them.

It is urgent realism, not paranoia, to note the threat of ICBM's targeted against our country; to discern the significance of the resort to outright naked aggression by the Soviet Union against the sovereign nation of Afghanistan. That naked aggression opens a new phase in international affairs, a regression to the "Might Makes Right" law of the jungle syndrome.

That syndrome had been recognized and addressed with increasing effectiveness since the late 19th century. The Concert of Europe, the Hague Tribunal, the Geneva Conventions, the League of Nations, the declaration of war by the free nations when Germany invaded Poland were all examples of escalating deterrents to the ultimate in terrorism—international aggression.

Faced with the United Nations concept of using international military forces to repel open aggression, the expansive ambitions of communism took more subtle forms such as Communist subversion, ambiguous and/or surrogate aggression such as against South Korea and South Vietnam.

Now, emboldened by free world confusion and disarray after the American Vietnam experience, the U.S.S.R. openly invades Afghanistan.

In parallel, she has achieved the balance of power in the strategic nuclear field, given the situation resulting from their lack of principled restraint in contemplating the option of an unprovoked offensive strike against us.

These dimensions of threat are well known to Americans versed in international affairs, and considerable effort is now being applied to offset our present disadvantage in these fields.

However, there is a new threat which is not recognized, and remains essentially unaddressed, threatening the survival of freedom here and elsewhere.

This new and most insidious threat is terrorism.

The Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism is charged with the responsibility of assessing the terrorist threat to our freedom and national security. This will be achieved in part by examining the record of terrorist activity throughout the world so as to be in a position to better evaluate the experience of other nations who have fallen victim to this insidious tactic.

Today we commence this urgently necessary process of examination of terrorism through the testimony of three men and a woman who know it well: A former professional intelligence officer, two journalists, and a scholar, all of whom have in their professional endeavors examined, analyzed, and dissected this complex international problem.

A primary purpose of this subcommittee is to raise public consciousness and support for our country's efforts to address and respond to the terrorist threat which we are witnessing throughout the world today. In subsequent sessions, we plan to hear from additional witnesses, some of whom may have differing viewpoints on the subject of terrorism.

It is anticipated that these hearings will assist the subcommittee in focusing more directly on the subject matter in a way which will facilitate recommendations for possible courses of action addressing these problems.

Some have suggested that national security and terrorism are nonissues; that the threat is ethereal and illusory. I do not share these views. Surely, at one time or another, all the diverse victims of terrorism have been led to believe that there is no threat—"It cannot happen here." These words were undoubtedly spoken time and again in Uruguay, Rome, Munich, Paris, Stockholm, Madrid, Vienna, and Belfast. Then came the Tupamaros, the Red Brigades, the Front Line, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Provisional Wing of the IRA, to name but a few.

If we continue to ignore the threat or define it away by academic gymnastics, the sand in which we bury our heads will eventually bury our Nation.

Another tactic which the enemies of this country are employing against us with a measure of success is that of disinformation. This is a term which, contrary to the implication of a recent account published in a large, local newspaper, was not created by any segment of America, right or left. It is a term used by the Soviets themselves. The KGB's Disinformation Department was created for the express purpose of discrediting the policies of the United States and other non-Communist countries across the world. It was structured particularly to attack the integrity and competence of the western intelligence services, including the CIA.

This is to be accomplished by fabricating lies, planting forged documents and spreading issue-obfuscating propaganda in situa-

tions where a story-hungry and sometimes gullible press would seize upon them. According to its own textbooks, considerable effort is devoted by the KGB to recruitment of western journalists much the same as it recruits those occupying military, scientific, academic, and intelligence positions.

Disinformation is used in combination with terrorism to enhance its effect. As John Barron points out in his book, "KGB," the Russian term "Dezinformatsiya" embraces not only forgeries, literary hoaxes, and dissemination of false information, but also the commission of physical acts such as sabotage and murder for psychological effect.

Our first witness today is William Colby. Mr. Colby, a career intelligence officer, occupied the Office of Director during a critical period in the development of international terrorism from 1973 to 1976. He will be followed by Mrs. Claire Sterling, whose credentials were previously mentioned. It was during her 30 years of experience while stationed in Italy that she compiled, by traveling a great deal, the information and impressions from which she wrote the book, "The Terror Network," which is a combination of several years of intensive research. The book examined the interworkings of various terrorist organizations and documents and the international connections between them.

The third witness, probably in the afternoon, will be Michael Ledeen, a well-known scholar and expert on European history who has written extensively on this subject.

Concluding today's testimony will be Arnaud de Borchgrave, also an international journalist who, together with Robert Moss, authored "The Spike," a fictionalized account of KGB disinformation activities. Mr. de Borchgrave, who is also associated with the Georgetown organization previously mentioned, has written extensively on the subject of overall KGB operations.

Senator Leahy, would you care to make an opening statement, sir?

Senator LEAHY. No, Mr. Chairman. I think probably the most important thing is to go forward with the hearings. I do not know when I have read so much with such anticipation in preparation for hearings. I think that perhaps now we might be in a better position to have the hearings and it will not be necessary for anybody to speculate on their precise content.

I would note that a number of these issues, of course, are addressed—as you have noted on other occasions—by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I think that it is good that these are open hearings, hearings in the public eye. I commend Public Radio for carrying them live and in toto because it makes it possible for the American people to judge the hearings in their totality, and I look forward to them.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Senator Leahy. I felt it necessary to make some kind of definition of what my own concept as chairman was, what we intend to accomplish. I thank you for your previous and present support of the general direction, and respect the fact that you will be objective in all the inputs you make here, sir.

I would request that the three witnesses stand to be sworn in, please. Would you please stand, Mr. de Borchgrave and Mrs. Sterling?

Please raise your right hands. Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. COLBY. I do.

Mrs. STERLING. I do.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please, be seated.

We will commence with the opening statement from Mr. Colby.

**TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to participate in this hearing. While I have no current connections with CIA and, indeed, have not seen classified material since my departure from there in 1976, I have long been interested in the problem of terrorism and how to combat it effectively. Perhaps this stems from my early days in World War II when the Nazi command considered me and my fellows in the French Resistance to be terrorists, and assured us that we would be shot if captured, whatever our nationality or uniform.

Terrorism, of course, is not new. We have had terrorists in our own country from the Ku Klux Klan to the Weathermen. British officers would include Francis Marion and the Sons of Liberty. The term, however, is a highly emotional one and needs to be filled out with specific content if it is to be properly used and understood in our decisionmaking.

Terrorism is of course a tactic. It particularly applies to endangering innocent people in order to demonstrate a terrorist's power or to influence others. Thus, the deliberate tactic of the FLN in Algeria was to demonstrate French inability to maintain order by randomly machinegunning passengers waiting at bus stops. The grenade in the village market place in Vietnam was comparable. There is no justification for the cynical and deliberate use of violence against innocents, whatever the possible justification of the aims of the terrorists.

Another meaning of terrorism is that of secret attacks against an authority and its representatives. This gives rise to the old "My freedom fighter and your terrorist" argument. Old religious doctrine, however, can help distinguish these. It is proper, and our American Declaration of Independence even said it is our duty to throw off a despot. But the target must be a true despot, by definition permitting no other alternative means of urging amelioration of a "long train of abuses."

It is against this background that we should look at terrorism in the world today. Some groups in a paranoic hatred of whatever force they happen to be opposed to deliberately involve and utilize innocent civilians in the process. There is little doubt that they are engaged in terrorism, nor is there any question over the necessity and propriety for us to strengthen our and our allies' defenses against them.

Other groups which we can properly name terrorist have announced their hostility to the United States and its friends and are busily attacking us and our friends in their home countries. Our political processes are sufficiently open so that there is no justifica-

tion for terrorism to achieve change when the real explanation for these groups' failure is that they cannot attract sufficient support for their cause to influence an open political process.

It is also perfectly appropriate that we support our friends against similar attacks and not be lulled into inactivity by the fact that some of our friends may not be perfect angels. Too many refugees attest to the fact that what has followed their overthrow has been sufficiently worse to cause them to flee in leaky boats, raising the question of which side constitutes the true despotism.

There is little doubt of Soviet responsibility for such terrorism. They have directly trained and supplied elements around the world engaged in what they euphemistically call wars of national liberation.

They have employed their proxies and surrogates of Cubans, East Germans, Czechs, and others to extend this direct effort aimed not only at the imperialism of America and its allies but at a variety of less despotic states than their own, from Mexico to Uruguay, to Columbia, to North Yemen, to Morocco, to Puerto Rico.

They have provided training and logistics to a number of groups who used these in their own terrorist attacks. They have supported a heterogeneous group of terrormongers, from Libya's Qaddafi to Palestinian kidnapers of Arab oil leaders to Cuban trainers of Shaba invaders to Bulgarian assassins.

The Soviet Union has another responsibility. A basic tenet of Leninism is that socialism can only be achieved through revolution. Thus a terrorist force is a necessary element of a party's structure. It is not a coincidence that Communists are frequently found in a leading role in revolutionary movements, due to the conscious training and ideological preparation they receive as a part of their indoctrination. Thus, Communist resistance movements in a series of nations, from France and Italy to Malaya, played a leading role against occupiers during World War II.

They then maintained a separate existence as the illegal apparatus of the party, reflecting Communist concern that the legal party might be suppressed. This illegal structure thereafter received training, arms, and so forth, for the finer forms of sabotage, demolitions, and guerrilla action. In certain parties such as the Italian, the anticipated suppression did not take place. Instead, the party found itself with a major role in the nation's political structure.

As the split between Mao and what he called Soviet revisionism took place, some of these elements, originally developed and trained by direct Soviet or satellite assistance, drifted onto the Maoist side. Some even went further into some of the autonomous hate groups determined to tear down all Western liberal society in favor of some new structure of their own.

Today, they may not be directly commanded by some central Soviet headquarters in Moscow. But the Soviet Union has a responsibility for having originally trained and set their operations into motion. The groups operating out of Florida as alumni of the Bay of Pigs and similar actions against Cuba are held to American law that they no longer conduct operations against Cuba on their own, after American policy turned from support of such activity. There has been no similar Soviet action against their former aides and collaborators.

The point is clear. The Soviets must be seen to be responsible for the obvious consequences of their actions, and not be able to hide behind the plausible denial that the groups they trained and supplied, and the proxies they support in Cuba, Libya and among Palestinians, are operating on their own. We do not need to provide proof of their responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt for a court of law, but sufficient evidence exists to permit serious and responsible decisionmaking as to Soviet responsibility.

There are terrorists in the world who have no connections with the Soviets. There are others, however, who have or have had connections. We have every right to demand that the Soviets participate in positive actions to eliminate these or take responsibility for encouraging them. We are also more than justified in assisting those who combat such terrorists.

The practical struggle against terrorism, Mr. Chairman, involves three elements: The first is intelligence, which must be collected on the identities and activities and plans of terrorists. This is not an easy task, as terrorists normally compartment their groups to a high degree and conduct their operations in special secrecy. But careful recordkeeping, methodical accumulation of data and reasonable projection of probabilities can add to what the counterintelligence agent and friendly liaison service can provide.

Second, security practices are essential. The most effective example of this was our own airport screening system, at minimal cost and disruption of public convenience. Similar procedures need to be applied in certain areas to protect exposed individuals, to limit terrorist access to weaponry, and to prevent terrorists from using national borders as hedges behind which to escape.

Third, public support is an essential element of the struggle against terrorism. This is the importance of these hearings, Mr. Chairman, to clearly inform our people of the problems of terrorism so that they can see the necessity for action against it. A number of years ago, a young lady named Kitty Genovesi was murdered in New York City, while 38 people watched and not one called a policeman. A few years ago the "Son of Sam" was identified by a neighbor who noticed something suspicious about his car and tipped the police off to it. The difference in the two cases lies in the degree to which the public will support and take responsibility to assist the struggle against crime.

An informed public determined to reduce the danger of terrorism will find many ways to contribute to the front line fighters against it in our Nation's and other nations' security services. In part, this sympathy will be dependent upon the use of proper and legal tactics against terrorists, so that no sympathy for them is created by arbitrary actions by those opposing them.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the fact that terrorism is no novelty in the world does not mean that it is not a danger. As our society has become more delicately tuned, even small disruptions can have larger effects than in the past. We must meet such challenges by appropriate actions against all enemies, foreign and domestic. And we must hold other nations to our Declaration of Independence's choice that they be "Enemies in war" or "In peace, friends" and not to permit them to claim surface friendship while they engage in secret terrorist war against us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Colby, for that most authoritative, informative, articulate statement.

I have one comment. Where you said that many refugees attest to the fact that what has followed their overthrow has been sufficiently worse to cause them to flee in leaky boats, raising the question of which side constitutes the true despotism, I would have to say it settled the question for those who had doubts, and many had doubts. That was a great problem during the Vietnam experience, what was the relative despotism involved between the Governments of South Vietnam and North Vietnam.

That question, which exacerbated a normal and healthy difference between them, the media establishment exacerbated it, unfortunately, widely and deeply to our detriment and to the loss of freedom in the ultimate for tens of millions of people in Southeast Asia. They voted with their feet with a 50-percent chance of life or death when they took out such logs. Such exodus was not taking place from the North. It settled the question. Would you agree with that, sir?

Mr. COLBY. I think so, sir. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Recent statements by high administration officials called into question the basic definition of terrorism which this country's primary foreign intelligence agency uses as a standard against which to evaluate and report violent activity abroad.

The CIA has, in connection with the new national intelligence estimate, redefined terrorism. I am going to read that definition to you, sir—it is rather long—and ask if you have agreement with it, or any problem with it so that we can advance our understanding.

Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political symbolic effect that is aimed at achieving a psychological impact on a target group wider than its immediate victim. Assassination, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking and other activities undertaken primarily for publicity, intimidation, or disorientation fall within this definition. Activities with more immediate operational military, paramilitary, or insurrectionary goals are included when they involve terrorist acts. International terrorism is terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and targeted against foreign national institutions or governments. Terrorism is involved in groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes, for example, Yugoslavia and El Salvador; to rectify national or group grievances, for example, Palestinians; or to undermine international order as an end in itself, for example, Japanese Red Army.

That is the end of the definition. I wish, having read Mrs. Sterling's book, that the group seeking to overthrow specific regimes would have included within the examples Uruguay, which I thought was the most classic example of the insidiousness of the way they work. I am hopeful that Mrs. Sterling will bring that out in her testimony.

Do you agree with this definition and, if not, what problems does it pose and how would you define it?

Mr. COLBY. I have a little problem with it as I hear it, Mr. Chairman. It says that the purpose of the terrorist act must be to affect a wider group. I think a number of terrorist acts can affect just the target and be part of a struggle against that target.

The wider group impact is the first category that I mentioned, involving the innocent civilians for the impact that this then produces. But I can think of a number of what I would call terrorist acts which are aimed at a particular individual and are trying to

just eliminate him, or a group, or a facility, something of this nature.

Senator DENTON. The effort to wipe out General Haig when he was SACEUR.

Mr. COLBY. I think an attack on an individual like that is an attack on that individual and his institution.

Senator DENTON. Can you tell this subcommittee why it has taken so long, or would speculate on why it has taken so long, for the CIA to articulate this new and expanded definition?

Mr. COLBY. I really do not know anything about that argument, Mr. Chairman. We were active in identifying terrorists and exchanging information about terrorists in various parts of the world when I was there. I do not recall any great problem of the definition. We were to act to identify who the people were.

Senator DENTON. This line of questioning may be somewhat academic, but we are looking at definitions. In your view, how did the previous, more restrictive, definition of terrorism—if you are familiar with it—affect the CIA's ability to collect intelligence of international terrorist organizations and individuals and identify them?

Mr. COLBY. Well, apparently there was some story about our not being involved in the Italian situation with Prime Minister Moro; that was long after I left. I am uninformed as to the reason for that, I just do not know.

Senator DENTON. In an August 25, 1979, interview with Roberto Gervaso of the *Corriere della Sera* you were partially quoted in that publication as follows:

Question: "Who conducts the worldwide terrorist orchestra."

Your reply: "Nobody, directly."

Question: "And who provides the instruments," *Corriere* further inquired, to which you are quoted as replying: "For the Italians, Moscow and Prague."

Do these answers fully reflect your present views, and would you explain and amplify?

Mr. COLBY. They certainly reflect my present views and the attention I paid to this subject when I lived in Italy from 1953 to 1958, and my continuing reading on the subject of terrorism since that time.

There is no question about it that the Soviets supported an illegal apparatus of the party, as well as a legal apparatus. There is no question that the training areas were in Czechoslovakia, and supporting that kind of activity.

As I said in my statement here, some of these groups drifted away from direct control by the Soviet Union or even by Prague. But for many, many years there have been clandestine broadcasts from Czechoslovakia aimed at Italy, in Italian, designed to support the cause of anti-Americanism, anti the center parties there, and generally stir up the opposition to Italy's role in NATO and Italy's role in support and as a friend of the United States.

Now, as I indicated, some of these groups did drift off on their own, although they were originally started by the Communist leadership. With reference to directing the "orchestra," no, the Soviets are not directly directing the orchestra today. But yes, they did provide the instruments in the training and some of the equipment

that these people had originally and a year responsibility for their use.

As I said, they cannot wash their hands and just say that they have no more responsibility unless they take an active role against the activity, as I think we have taken an active role in trying to limit the activities of those Cubans who would continue their struggle after American policy turned against it.

We are trying to limit this kind of activity out of Florida. They are not. I think that is the difference in the two situations.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. My time is up. I have further questions, but I will defer now to my colleague from Vermont, Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to have Mr. Colby here, and I compliment you for inviting him. It feels very natural to have him here. I think Mr. Colby was testifying at some of the first committee hearings I attended, on the Armed Services Committee many years ago. I have heard him testify many times since then. I welcome you here.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you.

Senator LEAHY. I realize that the four people who are going to testify will be testifying one after another, but if I might, I would like to go into something that Mr. de Borchgrave says in his statement to the subcommittee.

He says,

According to West European intelligence services the basic decision to support international terrorist groups was taken at the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in 1966. Implementation of this decision began in 1968, and some European counterintelligence specialists began collecting circumstantial evidence in 1972. At least one European service obtained irrefutable proof in 1974.

Now, in answer to one of the chairman's earlier questions you talked about the fact that the agency had been active in this area for some time. Did the CIA have this evidence in 1974, evidence of the material that I just quoted?

Mr. COLBY. I do not recall the specific reports, Senator; it may or may not. I just frankly cannot say for sure one way or another. As I said, I do know that we were concerned about terrorism. We were collecting information on training camps, on support lines, on identities of different groups, travel techniques and routes, and so forth.

Now, I do not recall one way or the other whether we had that specific item of intelligence that you mentioned. We were talking with our colleagues in the world about the problems of terrorism and we were exchanging information about it. I really cannot specify whether we had any particular item of information at this point.

Senator LEAHY. Maybe another way of going at it, there will be, both from Mrs. Sterling—in her book and in her testimony today—and Mr. de Borchgrave, conclusions regarding the Soviet role in international terrorism.

During your term as Director of the CIA, did you see evidence to support those conclusions on the Soviet role in international terrorism?

Mr. COLBY. Certainly. Training of Palestinians; training in Cuba with Soviet support of a variety of terrorists, revolutionaries from

various parts of Latin America. There was a very distinct Soviet role in this activity in many regards.

The activity in Czechoslovakia, there were Soviets involved in it. There are Soviets involved, I understand, today in some of the training in Libya.

The answer is "Yes," there has been Soviet involvement.

Senator LEAHY. During your term as CIA Director, were you able to put a dollar figure on this, or a manpower figure? I realize we are dealing with nebulous terms. But was an attempt made to, and was, any kind of figure put on that?

Mr. COLBY. I do not recall any such attempt and I frankly would resist it because I think it is kind of a meaningless thing, discussing our safety in terms of dollars and the cost to us against the cost to somebody else. It is how effective you are, not how much you spend, that I think is the problem. You know, terrorism is a very low-cost operation, let us face it.

Senator LEAHY. In your prepared testimony you state that there are three elements which you call the practical struggle against terrorism. The third element is public support, the need to clearly inform our people of the problems of terrorism so they can see the necessity for action against it.

Certainly, from what the chairman has said in his statements, that is one of the reasons for the activities of this subcommittee.

When you were Director of the CIA, did the agency itself take steps to inform the public of the threat of international terrorism?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the agency is not in the business of informing the public, in most cases. Its job is to inform the Government and the Congress in various situations.

There was a certain amount of information passed along at that time. President Nixon had a Cabinet Committee on Terrorism and there was a certain amount of information passed in to the public domain at that time.

Senator LEAHY. Mrs. Sterling quotes you in answer to the question, "Who conducts the worldwide terrorist orchestra?" and you answered, "Nobody directly." What did you mean by that, Mr. Colby?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think there is a feeling that there is some central war room with flashing lights and red arrows on the wall, and so forth; that it is all being run from some big center. That is not the way terrorism works, and I do not think that there is such a central war room for the whole movement.

I do think that there is a certain amount of collaboration between different terrorist groups, that is well documented and well known. We also know that there is a deliberate support and training of people in the finer arts of sabotage, and demolition, and guerrilla warfare, that sort of thing, the use of weapons, concealed attacks and that sort of thing, ambushes. All that sort of thing is trained by the Soviets. They put it under the euphemism, as I say, of wars of national liberation, as though that is fair game.

Well, I do not think it is. When some of these groups make no secret of their hostility to the United States and our allies, I do not think the fact that it is called a war of national liberation gives them a free run to do what they want. I think we are entitled to react and defend ourselves and our friends.

Senator LEAHY. Rather than with the war room with the flashing signs, you would describe it as dealing in many instances more with targets of opportunity that may be developed over a week, or over a month, or a short period of time, rather than as a long range, overall coordinated plan.

Mr. COLBY. What it amounts to is providing the capability and then allowing the capability to be used in a decentralized manner. The U.S. Navy does not direct a submarine commander to torpedo a certain boat. They send him out into the enemy areas with instructions to identify an enemy boat and sink it. It is up to him to choose which boat; but it is an American naval craft provided to him, and he is trained to sink that particular boat.

Senator LEAHY. Let me go back to something that came out recently, I think it was toward the end of March. There were reports that a draft of the national intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA concluded that there is not enough evidence to support Secretary Haig's statement that the Soviet Union had conscious policies and programs to "foster, support and expand terrorist activity."

There have also been reports in the public press that the administration has ordered a review of the CIA draft.

Now, I would really like to ask two questions about that. One is, as Director of the CIA you were charged with collecting and analyzing data on international terrorism. Were you ever directed by President Nixon or Ford, or any member of the White House staff, to deliberately alter the agency's conclusions concerning the support for or extent of terrorist activity in the world? That is question No. 1.

Mr. COLBY. The answer is "No."

Senator LEAHY. That takes care of that one. Well, maybe I should ask the question a little more broadly, were you ever directed, directly or indirectly?

Mr. COLBY. No; I am trying to answer it straight. No, I was not told what to write or what to conclude. I had arguments with what I concluded on various subjects after I concluded them.

Senator LEAHY. Don't we all?

Mr. COLBY. That is natural, there is nothing wrong with that. But as for telling me what should be produced, no, that never happened to me.

Senator LEAHY. Well, let me go to these news accounts, and I refer again just to what has been in the public press. According to these accounts it appears that the NIE, or the National Intelligence Estimate, prepared by the CIA was withdrawn and is going through redrafting to reflect more accurately the public statements made by the Secretary of State.

Was there any such practice of doing that when you were Director of the CIA and is there danger in having control over intelligence estimates exercised by people outside the agency?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the old theory, Senator, is that the analysis function is somehow totally separated from policymaking so that it cannot be in any way influenced by it. That is a great theory but I do not think it works very well because it results in a kind of academic detachment of the analysis from the problems that the policymaker is trying to answer himself.

Now, in that respect I think it is very useful for a very close connection to exist between the policymaker and the analyst so that he can contribute his knowledge and wisdom, and analytical capability, directly to the kinds of problems the policymaker is facing.

In this respect, frequently the first definition of a problem may be written in a certain way. The policymaker may then say, "Well, that really does not help me very much. Will you try to cover this subject, too? Will you look at it from a different side because I am concerned about this aspect."

That is a natural relationship between a policymaker and analyst. If the Government is concerned about some part of the world, then there will be questions asked about that part of the world. There will be additional questions asked, "Well, put some more effort on that subject to see whether there is anything there or not." The agency has done that on many occasions in the past.

One example of it—of course it is not a good one but it is an example—was when both President Johnson and President Nixon asked the intelligence agencies, including CIA, to find out whether there was foreign support and control of the antiwar movement.

Now, we looked for that, and that is a perfectly natural thing to look for because when we had that kind of an uproar here it was appropriate to wonder whether foreigners were supporting it, running it, directing it.

The agencies reported back to them, "No, there is not. This is an indigenous phenomenon, this is something that is happening here and it cannot be explained that way."

Now, they asked, yes. They got the answer, an honest, straight answer. I think that is the way that kind of a question will come up. I do not know what this argument about the definition is, but perhaps one of the people in the administration had the same reservation about this definition that I just expressed, that it is too narrow. That if you say it has to be for symbolic effect, I can think of incidents that are aimed at an individual, period. They may have some other, symbolic effects, but then you get into a motive problem. How you are going to distinguish that in the ordinary terrorist act, I am not quite sure.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator DENTON. Thank you. You will have another turn, sir.

The Soviets and their apologists have argued that the U.S. Government is the prime instigator of worldwide terrorism. They argue that recent history is replete with examples such as the Phoenix programs in Vietnam.

Since this program was implemented during your service in CIA and you had responsibility for the program, would you explain it and respond to the allegation that this activity constituted terrorism?

Mr. COLBY. I have testified under oath on this several times, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to be able to do so again.

The fact is that the Phoenix program was started in 1968 as an attempt to bring some order and propriety, and effectiveness, to

the government side of the struggle against the secret apparatus of the Communists in Vietnam.

During the mid-1960's there was a very brutal and bloody war going on there, as you know only too well. There was a struggle going on between a secret apparatus and a government apparatus, and during those periods of the middle 1960's there were brutalities and there was wrongdoing on both sides.

Now, it was my conviction, as I have indicated in my testimony here, that it is important that our side of that kind of a struggle use proper and legal tactics and techniques. So, we began the Phoenix program, and when I got out there we began that program as an attempt to coordinate the intelligence on the secret political apparatus that the government was struggling against—not just the military side of the war, but the political order of battle as well as the military order of battle.

We developed a whole series of techniques by which we could improve intelligence coverage of the political apparatus. We insisted on accurate dossiers instead of broad statements that somebody was a Communist. We divided the kinds of people we were talking about into different categories; A were the leaders; B were the cadre; and C were the ordinary, casual supporters. We said that we were not interested in building the documents on the C category; those were not the target, they were not the problem. They were the ones who were dragged into support of the problem.

We were trying to identify and know precisely who the real target was. We instituted a program of instructing in decent interrogation methods for a very simple reason. If you want good intelligence you had better use good interrogation methods because if you use bad ones, you will get bad information. That we have known for many years.

There were a variety of other activities of this nature that we conducted.

Now, once we got the information, of course, we wanted to try to get ahold of the people. One, by inviting them to rally to the government, in which case they would be freed of any punishment for any behavior that they had engaged in while on the enemy side. As of about 1971, the last figures I recall, we had something like 17,000 of those names who we had identified, who rallied to the government.

We captured about 28,000 of them, as I recall, and I think that was the way it should have been done. We wanted them alive because they had information and they came in with the information if they were alive. And some 20,000 of the names on our list were killed, mostly in military combat. When a battle took place outside the village in the night and we looked in the morning to see who was killed on both sides, sure enough, one Mr. Nguyen was on our list and he had been killed. But he had not been assassinated, he had been killed in military action.

In one of the earliest directives about the program, I wrote that it is not a program of assassination. I told our officers that if they ran into such cases they were to tell me and I would take it up with the government to get it straightened out. I got some reports, and I took them up with the government, and I had people punished for wrongdoing.

So, the answer to the question, Mr. Chairman, is that the Phoenix program was a program against terrorism. It was not a program of terrorism. Incidentally, the Communists today say that that period of the war was the lowest part of their effort to overthrow South Vietnam, and that they were really pushed out of the country. That happens to be true.

DISINFORMATION

Senator DENTON. The way the question is worded here, the next question, will require me to make a prefatory remark. It says, would you regard the impressions in the United States which were developed within our own system that Phoenix was indeed a terroristic operation, would you regard that as in any way disinformation?

That causes me to feel the necessity for making some remarks because we are using words, we have difficulties with semantics here. First of all, you responded that the CIA looked into the query by the Nixon administration as to whether or not there was external direction of the antiwar movement. Your findings were negative.

I have no doubt that that finding is correct. However, were the question to have been asked, "Are the media in the United States contributing to the support of the United States cause in Southeast Asia, or detracting from it on balance," I think the answer might have been different and the CIA might not have been the proper authority to ask the question of.

I must run on a bit here because I want to establish some basis of understanding with the media which I regard as essential to a democracy. A government can exist in a totalitarian state; a free press can only exist in freedom. So, I cherish the existence of that free press.

Let us recognize, and I am speaking to members of the press from the bottom of my heart, that it is fortunate for this country and inevitable that the press, the media in general, the church, academe, all lean to the left. If you did not lean to the left, there would be no progress toward the ideals laid down by our Founding Fathers, ideals which we have not yet realized—the equality of opportunity for all men and women, for example. We have not realized that.

So, to the extent that "left" means progress and change it is a necessity that the press, the church, academe and so forth, lean to the left.

Given that propensity and necessity, and looking at the Vietnam experience, there were many good reasons for the press, the media, to object to aspects of that war. For example, we had the wrong strategic approach; we violated Sun Tzu's ancient dicta about how you fight a war. The object of the war is to break the enemy's will, not twist his arm gradually.

I am not sure the press picked up on that at all, but we military certainly did, and it led to a great many problems. It led to equivocation and eventually even some prevarication. It led to light at the end of the tunnel being estimated as being at such and such a distance when indeed it was much farther. It led to an inequitable draft. It led to not calling up the Reserves when perhaps that

should have been done under this relatively stupid way we fought the war. We were indeed using tactical forces to try to achieve strategic objectives and strategic forces to attack tactical objectives. There were many things wrong with it but most wars are lost, not won, and we were well on our way to losing that one through mistakes.

It prolonged the war. Any overseas war for a long time, colonial wars in the old days, would exhaust the patience of the nation involved.

Let us just think, for example, to give you an innocent example of how the press hurt our cause, what would have happened in August 1914, the span of time addressed by Barbara Tuckman's great book, "Guns of August." What would have happened had there been television and in England and France all the citizenry of that nation were exposed to the slaughter that took place as the German Army swept through Belgium, approached Paris with the intention of taking it and then because of some general's optimism about what might be accomplished, decided instead to wheel and take the rear of the French who were engaged in the holding action which the Germans were presenting on the central front.

In other words, they decided not to take Paris but to sweep around and take the rear, and bottle up the entire French Army, ending the war right there. That failed. As the flank of the German Army came by Paris, the taxi-cab owners went out there and attacked them on their flank. The war eventually bogged down in trench warfare which took the flower of the manhood of France, Germany, England over causes which were somewhat ambiguous to say the least.

Suppose in that 1 month of August in which much of that carnage and slaughter took place the people of England and France were to have been subjected to that slaughter and the people of Germany were not? The war would have ended in August 1914 in Germany's favor.

I can assure you, having been in Hanoi, that the kind of view of the war presented to the North Vietnamese was not the kind of view of the war presented in the United States. "War is hell," as Sherman said. It is justifiable only when a worse kind of hell requires military force.

I heard Averell Harriman from the stage of the Naval War College state that we had exhausted our diplomatic means of coping with a provocative situation in Southeast Asia and military forces should be employed. Later he changed his tune because of the way the war was being conducted.

What I am getting at is that on balance the press became convinced, the media became convinced, that there was not all that much justice involved; there was not all that much need involved. I agree entirely with President Reagan that it was a just cause. We went about it with many errors, but it was just. The press did not realize it at the time that it was worth a war.

It hurt—it hurt for the North Vietnamese to be seeing all the glory of it and the United States to be seeing all the hell of it. The Civil War, the war between the States was hell, as Sherman said, but it was justifiable in that it eliminated an even worse form of

hell, slavery, which lasted longer, killed more people, caused more suffering.

I say to you that the 57,000, or so, men of the United States who lie dead in that war died in a cause which is now obviously just because of the tens of millions of people who are now in a slavery worse than the kind that existed in the United States, in spite of their efforts. Those dead men are dead in nobility.

I think we had better go back and look at whether that cause was just, and whether or not we did correctly, though, had I been a member of the press, I might have gone exactly the same way.

But we must get our perspective back. We have lost it since then. The dominoes are falling so thunderously that we cannot hear ourselves argue whether the domino theory is correct or not.

So, as to whether or not the media were a favorable influence in a just U.S. cause, I would say indisputably, on balance, no. I do not blame them, but I say no. I say, they themselves will agree if they go back and look at a terrorist operation known as the Tet Offensive which was portrayed as a victory for the North Vietnamese when it actually was a terrorist operation conducted with a suicidal military mode—and yet, the target was back in the United States and they succeeded in reaching that target, the American media.

I must say that it was extremely disheartening to prisoners of war to hear Radio Moscow come out with a new line, a paragraph of about three sentences, hear that line 2 days later broadcast by Radio Hanoi, and 3 days later a brandnew idea, articulated in precisely the same phrase by some member of the press, or even a Member of Congress, when I knew those three lines to be another manifestation of the big lie. I would be a hypocrite were I not to say that I have been through that experience and that I do have that bias as I think about what disinformation means.

Now, that is not subverting a journalist, it is not the KGB getting to a journalist. It is a journalist responding to what he believes is a noble purpose, there was something wrong and he went after it. I say, we have to be careful. We have to be careful about respecting the beneficence of this Government's intent. We do have principles, they do not.

I pass to Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, was there a pending question?

Mr. COLBY. I think the chairman asked me whether I thought that disinformation played a role. My answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is that the solution to disinformation is better information. We have an open marketplace of public opinion. I think we should have an open marketplace of information.

I think the responsibility for articulating the rationale for our cause is the responsibility of our Government. The responsibility of the press is to point out sometimes where we have our failings, where things are not working right because in our concept their function is to point them out so we can correct them.

But I am not one who believes that we should somehow stop disinformation by cutting off information. I think we stop it by answering better. I think that we are beginning to do that today.

Senator DENTON. I think so, too.

Mr. COLBY. I think that historical developments over the last years have demonstrated that the Marxism-Leninism, which was such a heady wine at one point, is now ideologically dead. There are too many states around the world which have applied the programed system of development and management of their economies and their political scenes that are a mess today; and there are too many states that have applied the concept of freedom in their politics and in their economics which are successes. They are states living right next to each other in lots of parts of the world: Cuba and Costa Rica; the Ivory Coast and Guinea; Kenya and Tanzania, Singapore and Burma. These contrasts exist all over the place.

I like to judge countries by whether refugees move toward them or away from them. On that, it seems to me, that the dramatics of today's world are demonstrating that the disinformation is really not working, that it is the information that gives a better answer.

Senator DENTON. I acknowledge the emotion and irrelevance to the question with which I got carried away. I intended to make the point regarding disinformation, that disinformation does not identify with a wrong decision on the part of a journalist or the media in general. That is a conscientious error, as the military make errors; as the Presidents of the United States make errors.

I am just saying that whatever antiwar thrust was wrong in that war does not constitute, in essence, disinformation, manipulation, or in any way unconscientious action on the part of the press. That was the point I was trying to make. Our semantics right now, our labels, do not permit classification of that kind of distinction.

Senator Leahy?

Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To just probe a little bit more on this, and again, anticipating testimony to come later on, Mr. de Borchgrave says that the reason the western intelligence agencies did not inform the public that there was Soviet support for international terrorism was that "Soviet disinformation in these matters, coupled with intensive disinformation and the true meaning of détente, successfully prevented western governments from facing up to this critical problem."

That would seem to be somewhat of an indictment of your agency at the time, Mr. Colby. How would you respond on that?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know what he is referring to, sir. I have some troubles with his book in other respects, but I also have trouble with that statement because the fact is that we were engaged when I was there in an effort to document and develop specific intelligence coverage of terrorism. As I say, we knew very well some elements of Soviet support and Soviet activities. Détente did not have anything to do with causing us to call it off. We were involved in covering it and concerned about it.

CHIEF PRIORITY OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator LEAHY. I have been hearing statements recently from the administration that we will move away from a thrust on human rights, and the chief priority of foreign policy will be to work against terrorism, to fight terrorism wherever it might be.

Now, I am not too sure just how that is seen by some of our allies, Ireland, the United Kingdom generally, Italy, France, Ger-

many, a number of those countries that have very significant terrorist problems.

I do not know if that means that we are going to come in and take over the fight for them, or whether we will let them ask us for our help. I am sure that we are well meaning, but it may be one of those terms that becomes a little bit oversimplified by the time it works its way out into the public.

Nobody is in favor of terrorism. I cannot imagine anybody being in favor of it. I also wonder—I wonder aloud not so much as a question—if we can as a country say that we can go and turn a button on or off to stop terrorism. Certainly, the countries most concerned with terrorism—whether it be in areas like the north of Ireland, or whether it will be in a whole country like Italy, Germany, Turkey, or a number of places that I have visited within the past week or so—probably would be delighted if the United States could wave such a magic wand. But I do not think that they really feel that we are about to, or that we can.

I did not really ask them how they felt about the rhetoric, but certainly the reality did not escape them.

But you have recommended that the United States support our friends against terrorist attacks even though those friends may not be perfect angels. Could you elaborate a little bit on the definition of "friends" and tell us how we do give such support?

LIBYA SUPPORTING TERRORISTS

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think there are a lot of examples of that, Senator. We have various friendly countries that are being troubled by terrorists supported from other countries by training, by supplies coming from Libya.

Now, in the early 1800's there was a lot of terrorism going on along the Barbary Coast and the other countries really did not want to bother much about it and paid some ransom. Our country finally decided that it was not going to have our ships and those of our friends around the world harassed by that kind of piracy and terrorism. That is when the Marines first went to the "Shores of Tripoli."

We did suppress that form of terrorism, directly in that case as an affront and an attack on the international system.

Now, we have another problem in the same general region, a training program with foreigners from all over the world being trained in assassination and attacks, explosives, and all the rest of it.

Senator LEAHY. You mean within Libya?

Mr. COLBY. In Libya, yes. You have money coming out of Libya supporting various terrorist groups around the world. There were heat-seeking missiles moved up to Rome, courtesy of the Libyan diplomatic service, for use against an aircraft landing at the Rome civilian airport, presumably, which luckily were caught before they were used.

Now, I think we can help by a cooperative effort against a problem of this nature. We have had a certain effectiveness in our cooperative effort to stamp out the drug trade around the world. We have not eliminated it, but we have had an impact on it by indicating that we want to help people stamp this thing out.

Senator LEAHY. And also by, in effect, paying a ransom in foreign aid in some countries to stop the drug trade.

Mr. COLBY. In some cases. In some cases leading them to some other kind of effort.

Senator LEAHY. Or subsidizing some kind of effort, too.

Mr. COLBY. Subsidizing an effort against that kind of trade, yes. I think it is appropriate that we assist nations to develop their ability to fight the terrorism that comes out of Libya—know what the names of the people are; know what the whole programs are about; take action to control the traffic that moves in and out of Libya. Preventing aircraft from taking terrorists back and forth to Libya from a variety of other countries; getting the collaboration of the other countries in that kind of cooperation and, if necessary, including the effort to control those routes in and out of Libya by refusing to allow normal traffic in and out of some country which allows itself to be used as a way station.

Now, that means you are conducting a very vigorous program to isolate and cauterize a very dangerous cancer that is spreading its way through the international system. I think that is the way you fight terrorism.

You demonstrate that there are other centers of it and take similar steps against those.

Senator LEAHY. Are we limited in our efforts to move against Libya by ideology, or are we limited by the fact that we rely on Libya for a great deal of oil, as do a number of our western allies? Does that reliance on oil end up making us take steps that really are not in our best interest, or refrain from taking steps that might be in our best interest?

Do we end up with a sort of ideological dishonesty, in effect because of our reliance or our allies' reliance on oil from various parts of the world, including Libya?

Mr. COLBY. I think in the Libyan case we have an embargo on certain kinds of equipment going into Libya. We have refused to sell them certain kinds of aircraft and things of that nature. I think for good reason.

On the other hand, we are buying 1 million barrels a day, more or less, from Libya today and I really question whether we should be supporting that particular treasury in that fashion.

I think there should be a way in which to use our economic pressures with no great shock to our overall energy position. That is not going to make that much difference to our energy position, as against what the Libyan assistance to terrorism is doing to our international community.

Senator LEAHY. It might affect some of our allies. Do our allies share that same kind of view?

Mr. COLBY. Well, if they do not want to, they can stay out. I say we do not have to get everybody in the world to join us, we can still act. We can show leadership which is, I think, what people expect America to show on problems like this.

Senator LEAHY. Let me go to a somewhat tangential question, and it is really not as tangential—certainly not in my mind—as it might seem. We seem to have been drawn into things in the Middle East that I sometimes question whether they are always in our best interest. We seem to put artificial limitations on our

intelligence-gathering abilities. That happened in Iran because of not wanting to upset a then ally or major source of oil, and so forth.

And yet, we are talking about an area of the world that is not a model of stability by any means. It is certainly one under close scrutiny by the Soviet Union. You take Saudi Arabia, for example, where 40 percent of the work force is a nonnative population. Many of them are Palestinians, Yemeni; and yet, now we are talking about selling very, very sophisticated equipment to Saudi Arabia, the AWACS, specifically.

The former director of the CIA, one of your successors, Admiral Turner, in an article in the paper yesterday, or the day before, opposed the sale of the AWACS because he thought that the Russians would make an effort to compromise that sensitive equipment.

Do you share that concern? Do you feel that they would try to exploit whatever ties they have to terrorist organizations for purposes of espionage or sabotage?

Mr. COLBY. Certainly, they will try, but that does not mean they will necessarily succeed. I mean, that same problem of sending too much highly technical equipment to Iran was discussed. The fact is that Iran has gone into a position hostile to us, and very little of that highly technical equipment is really working now because of the lack of the American continued support and technology.

I think that the same could be said, if you are worried about the risk that the AWACS would fall into unfriendly hands and be used against us, against our will. Then, I think, the chances are really very small that it will actually be used in that fashion because if we pulled our support and our technology support for it, it probably would not work. I think that is the protection against that particular problem.

Senator LEAHY. That is not specifically my question, Mr. Colby, if I can just follow up. Let us take our Trident submarine as an example. If it somehow, with all its advanced technology, were to end up in Soviet hands I do not expect them to sail the thing back out against us. But is there not a very real danger in the fact that the AWACS, or the technology incorporated in AWACS, may fall into unfriendly hands? That is my concern.

Do you share the concern of Admiral Turner that it is an unwise move to sell such equipment to Saudi Arabia because of the fact that the technology incorporated in it might end up being compromised?

Mr. COLBY. Whenever you let technology go to another country you are taking a risk that the knowledge of it and the secrecy, if any, of the machinery will become known not only to that single country but to other countries, including the Soviets. Yes, they are very vigorously trying to collect intelligence on our technology through a variety of places around the world. So, there is a certain degree of risk.

Now, how valuable is it to you to retain that secret at the cost of not giving it to that particular country? Sometimes it is very valuable and sometimes it is not, it depends on the particular situation.

Admiral Turner's point in his article was, I thought—I do not agree with his conclusion but I agree with his concern—that the major problem facing Saudi Arabia is the problem of internal stability and internal cohesion, and that is what they should be putting their major thrust and their major concern on. I do not have any argument with that, that is a very valid point.

There are problems there, as you mentioned, the labor force problems. There are a lot of other problems: foreigners in the country; a rapid development of industry; enormous wealth; distribution problems. There are religious differences in the eastern provinces, and so forth. Those are the internal sociological and political problems that do need to be solved.

But I am not an "either—or" man. I think that you can do both, frequently. Yes, you should be working on this category. The Saudis themselves feel that they have that in hand. I think to the extent we can be helpful to them, fine. To the extent that they want us to mind our own business, maybe we ought to mind our own business with a good friend.

But that does not mean that you thereby, since they have that problem, you thereby do not sell them an aircraft. The two are not necessarily exclusive.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. We will try to adjust our questioning of the first and second witness so that they have equal time this morning.

I hope, Senator Leahy, that you will reraise the questions regarding the Soviet decision to spend 1,000 percent more—although I agree with Mr. Colby that it is a very inexpensive operation. I do not think there is a lack of significance to the Soviet decision which is mentioned in Mrs. Sterling's book, to shift from the old traditional abhorrence—and I hope I do not misstate Mrs. Sterling or the facts—but the Soviets were not particularly terroristically inclined in the sense of the fragmented terrorism that was going on around the world.

But when they sensed that was going to be to their net advantage to support it, I think that was a significant decision. I will defer to Mrs. Sterling later and hope you will raise that point.

U.S. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

The, I believe, misconception is somewhat broad among some circles in the United States that if the Soviets are terroristic, we are also unclean with respect to having involved ourselves in what might be called terrorism. I think some valid claims may be made that we might have undertaken to acquiesce in, if not arranged for, assassination of certain leaders of what we considered to be dangerous Communist nations.

I think, however, that the relativity of that is important. I would ask you first, to what degree has the United States engaged in terroristic activities; and then to give some statement of relativity if you will, sir.

Mr. COLBY. Well, we had more or less a year of investigation into the sins of CIA over 25 years a few years ago. One of the findings of the Senate committee which investigated us in great depth was that no foreign leader had been assassinated by CIA.

Now, that was not for lack of trying with respect to Mr. Castro. There is no possible defense of that affair. There is also an inability to pinpoint at exactly the point at which the decision was urged, encouraged, or even taken because of the doctrine at that time that the President should be protected from responsibility for any such activities.

Now, that overall conclusion, in other words, that no foreign leader was ever assassinated by CIA, I think, got lost in the titillation over the very poor thinking that led into our venturing off to the Mafia to get their help in doing away with Mr. Castro. There is no possible defense for that, as Talleyrand once told Napoleon about a plan to assassinate the Duke D'Enghein, "Sire, that is not only wrong, it is worse than wrong, it is stupid." That one fit very much in that category.

But I think the proportion needs to be realized. There were other situations brought out in the report in which CIA was in touch with individuals around the world who themselves assassinated their leaders. Yes, in some cases that was done with CIA's knowledge. In some cases we should have been more thoughtful about the possibility. I refer particularly to an old friend of mine, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, that they were assassinated by generals who were encouraged to overthrow them by the United States, and that decision was made in the White House.

Now, I happen to disagree with that decision, I disagreed with it then and I still do.

Senator DENTON. It was a very split decision, sir.

Mr. COLBY. It was a very split decision, you are right. But it was a wrong decision.

I think, though, if you go back in American history you can find cases of aggression—just ask the Mexicans; and you can find cases in which we have done the wrong thing. But I think that on the overall standard, that test that I gave you before about nations indicates that there must be something right going on in this country if it attracts so many people around the world.

I am not going to say we never committed anything wrong; of course we did. But we stand in rather sharp contrast with the rest of the world.

Senator DENTON. Late last night, in pursuance of what you are getting into, I deleted from my opening statement a remark which I think should be made now.

Americans in general are not fractionally appreciative of this relativity of badness or goodness. While I was a prisoner and after the torture phase ended in North Vietnam in 1969 and the dialog between us prisoners and the interrogators became almost casual and philosophical, I had a number of opportunities to discuss what you are into now with senior Communist officials of North Vietnam.

In a number of those discussions when we almost lost ourselves in heart-to-heart talk, invariably the North Vietnam officer would not only agree but would actually develop from where I had left him the point that he had no doubt whatever that the United States of America was the greatest Nation ever to come down the pike in the sense of having endowed its citizenry with freedom, and

in the sense of having contributed to freedom's support around the world.

These sometimes were tearful exchanges in which we would go into the way in which Marxist philosophy with a relatively few operators took over Russia as a result of conditions that justified indignation within the country. There was indeed corruption at the high governmental levels as well as the high church levels which they and I would agree resulted in an extreme form of revolutionary philosophy, developed over a period of decades, in which the conclusion was reached that if the government, if the king is that bad, if we have people like Rasputin up there, then we cannot trust a ruler. We must have an oligarchy.

Second, if the church is that corrupt, there cannot be a God whom they represent. Therefore the extremity, the patience of the Russian people was the very thing which delayed the revolution to such a point that its form became so extreme. They would agree with that.

I would predict to them that 25 years down the pike the North Vietnamese would begin to sense that they were being bled as the Poles, and the Czechs, and the Hungarians had sensed it, and two of them of the three had to that point revolted.

In one discussion—and this I think you might find interesting, sir—I said:

You know, the one thing I cannot understand, having seen the Hungarian Revolution in 1956; having seen the Poles do what they did, I cannot understand why being bled the way they are, the former fine-tool industry centered in Czechoslovakia, the great capitalist and free society that that represented, has not yet revolted.

As I thought a little further I slammed my fist on the desk and said, "I predict the Czechs will revolt, and revolt soon," at which point the man with whom I was having this discussion paled, stood up trembling, called for the guard; had me sent back to my cell; searched every crevice of my body; searched my cell for 2 hours—and it was a tiny cell—looking for the radio that I must have had, which told me that the Czechs had revolted day before yesterday. He was sure I had a radio.

So they know, the whole world knows, and we were sorrier for the citizens of North Vietnam than we were for ourselves. Eldridge Cleaver who was a great antiwar guy now knows from having gone. Solzhenitsyn knows. Sakharov knows. Why cannot all of us know?

Based on operating procedures enforced during your tenure as Director of the CIA or in the period prior thereto, as contrasted with present time, are you aware of any deficiencies now existing which impact adversely on the Agency's ability to gather intelligence dealing with groups or individuals which could pose a threat to our national security?

Mr. COLBY. I believe there are some deficiencies. One is the deficiency that a CIA officer can leave CIA and go out and publish a book with the names of the agents that CIA used, and be subjected only to contract action.

I think he ought to be subjected to criminal action. I think also that the CIA is entitled to the same protection from the U.S. Congress as our military forces are. It is a crime to attempt to raise

rebellion within the Armed Forces with the specific intent of destroying the cohesion and unity of our Armed Forces.

I think it ought to be a crime to try and destroy the effectiveness of our intelligence services by revealing the names of the individuals who serve it and work for it around the world.

I think that is within the constitutional limits because the specific intent which is included in that definition meets the high threshold of proving that kind of an intent and not the casual journalist's reference to a name. That will not endanger him.

I think there are a few other changes of law that would be appropriate. I think that we ought to, in good sense, exempt the operational, clandestine operational work of our CIA from the workings of the Freedom of Information Act.

I think it is just nonsense that we require ourselves to go over old papers to see whether they presently would endanger some situation and then let them go, and find out later that they provide a last jigsaw puzzle piece to fill in the last little detail of something that somebody has built up—something not obvious on the surface of a particular piece of paper, which is the reason why it was let go.

I do not think that is a very substantial limitation of the basic interest we have in historical knowledge about our country and its activity. It merely says that there is a clandestine area of our Government's effort which should be exempted from that kind of exposure. Not the whole of CIA, not the substance of its reports, but the operations only.

I think that these are the main ones, Mr. Chairman. I have no objection to the guidelines with respect to the workings of the CIA now in the executive order; I think they should be incorporated in the legislative charter.

I think that you might look at the guidelines which require the FBI to have probable cause to believe that a crime was committed before they are allowed to collect information on a particular individual.

I think there could be a somewhat broader definition of that ability with respect to subversives, terrorists. Nowadays, as distinct from 10 years ago, such investigations would be conducted with the active supervision of the Congress and the active control of a series of committees in the executive branch; and the active requirement of a warrant from a special court, so that the application of the constitutional separation of powers is applied to our intelligence work.

I think in that sense we should be able to go beyond having probable cause that a crime is in process before we actually collect information on this area.

I do not think we are going to repeat the abuses of the past with the kind of supervision that the structure has now, that it did not have in the past.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. I am confident you are aware of S. 391, originated by Mr. Chafee and being cosponsored by many Republicans and Democrats, which will achieve what you mentioned regarding the revelation of the identity of an agent.

We have only recently, within a week, received back from the Justice Department their opinions regarding adjustments that

should be made in the bill; and on the eighth of May we will be holding hearings. The Justice Department and Mr. Casey both support it, and we hope to get the bill before the Senate very shortly after that.

Both Senator Leahy and I have further questions which we will submit to you in writing, Mr. Colby. I will ask you to respond to them, we will keep the record open for the receipt of your response. Thank you very much, sir, for your enlightening and most helpful testimony this morning.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you.

[Questions by Senators Thurmond and Leahy (with responses) to Mr. Colby follow:]

REID & PRIEST
40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005
212 344-2233

MIDTOWN OFFICE
80 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020
212 344-2233

CABLE ADDRESS: "REIDAPT"
TWX NO. 7105816751 RDPT NYR
NEW YORK ONLY
TELEX CMH 64207
WASH. ONLY

WASHINGTON OFFICE
111 19TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
202 525-0100

Washington, D.C.,
May 4, 1981

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your assistant very kindly gave me the two questions you would have posed had you been able to be present at my testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary. I informed him that I would be delighted to answer them in writing and asked him particularly to carry to you my respects and my father's continued appreciation for your courtesies to him.

QUESTION: You have stated that we need security procedures similar to airport screening systems in certain areas. What areas are you referring to and what class of individuals are you proposing that we protect?

ANSWER: The areas I referred to are ones favored by terrorists, i.e. areas of high symbolic value or centers of public activity. Those of symbolic value are buildings such as the Capitol where there is already a screening system in force. Other areas are inadequately protected, such as many state and municipal centers, monuments, etc. I do not mean to imply that a full scale airport screening system be established in all of these places, but I do believe that lesser steps could be taken to raise the level of security in these areas, i.e. various electronic sensors, dogs trained to identify particular odors, etc. The primary class of individuals I am suggesting to protect are the public generally, but individuals of high symbolic importance should receive extra protection. To an extent, this is provided by the Secret Service for certain officials or by executive protection systems for private individuals. These are quite expensive, however, and I suggest that research might provide some new technology which would be

The Honorable
Strom Thurmond

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
May 4, 1981

helpful in identifying potential threats before they occur. For example a form of metal detector might be directed at a crowd to highlight individuals with substantial collections of metal on their persons, so that particular attention could be directed to them without in any way interfering with the liberties of innocent individuals who happen to carry a non-dangerous item, or even those with a weapon who do not act in any way hostilely.

QUESTION: What are some of the methods of informing the public of the dangers of terrorism in order to reduce this threat?

ANSWER: The hearing held by the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism is one method of presenting an accurate perception of the dangers of terrorism. Many other activities should be encouraged, such as Mrs. Claire Sterling's book, The Terror Network, with its precise scholarship. Academic studies and seminars as to terrorism and how to combat it would also be valuable. Official entities such as the Defense and State Departments, the FBI and the CIA could also contribute by releasing unclassified summaries, assessments and statistics in order to provide a base for public knowledge and debate on the subject. To the extent feasible, other nations should be encouraged to join the United States in release of similar material to demonstrate the international dimensions of terrorism.

Sincerely,



W.E. Colby

WEC:pdk

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR
WILLIAM COLBY (April 24, 1981)

- Q 1. Mr. Colby, could you very briefly give us some idea of the role of the Soviet Union in supporting terrorist movements and activities, based on your own experience in the Central Intelligence Agency and especially during your period in Italy?
- A. The Soviet Union for many years considered terror a necessary element of revolutionary action against recalcitrant capitalism. As a matter of doctrine, it was thought essential for Communist movements throughout the world to be trained in guerrilla tactics, sabotage, etc. as this would be a necessary element of the inevitable conflict for power with capitalists. The Soviet Union has provided extensive training to foreigners in the Soviet Union. In addition, a number of individual actions were taken against its exiles and defectors, in support of revolution in other nations and in attacks on adversaries in various parts of the world. The ultimate "terrorism" of the Gulag Archipelago has been outlined in great detail by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others.

After World War II, the Soviet Union continued to support foreign Communist movements, providing training, supplies and financial assistance to such parties throughout the world. A decision was made in 1948 to support violent revolution in various parts of Asia and this was followed by a series of uprisings supported by Soviet power. These were later euphemistically called "wars of national liberation" but they were a direct reflection of earlier Soviet philosophy of assisting revolution against established states to assist the

growth of the Communist movement throughout the world. The Soviets cannot be absolved of responsibility for terrorism by changing its name to "wars of national liberation." The Soviets continue to support training camps in guerrilla activities, fire arms, sabotage and demolitions in Libya, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and even in the Soviet Union itself. They also provide support to their proxies and surrogates from Cuba, East Germany, and several other satellites. They thus bear a direct responsibility for the resulting activity of the organizations so trained and assisted.

Q 2. According to some recent news stories, the CIA is having some problems in substantiating allegations of Soviet support for terrorism. Why do you think that is?

a. Are there perhaps semantic problems with the use of the word "terrorism" or other terms?

A. The problem of associating the Soviets with terrorism sometimes comes from the discussion of whether terrorism must fit some particular definition. It has been my belief that it refers to the use of violence against innocent bystanders as well as direct attack on targets outside the rules of war through secret techniques. Over-refinement of this intellectual process sometimes leads to an ivory tower abstraction far from the rather scruffy world in which terrorists operate and must be met. Some differences may also arise over whether direct Soviet action must be involved, whether an indirect Soviet proxy (Cuban) must be involved, or whether the Soviets are responsible because of their training, supplies and other support for groups

ultimately involved in terrorist actions, from which the Soviets may have tried to sanitize themselves by remaining two or three intermediaries apart.

b. There seems to be a considerable amount of information in the public record that would verify that the Soviets or their surrogates and satellites are involved with terrorism. Are you familiar with some of this literature, and may I ask your opinion of it insofar as you have read it?

A. There is considerable information in the public record from serious researchers such as Mrs. Claire Sterling in The Terror Network and statements of defectors from Soviet and satellite nations. Since the Soviets obviously are trying to keep secret their support and involvement with terrorism, it is obviously difficult to document it in great detail. On the other hand, we are not dealing with the requirement of a court of law of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We are entitled to draw the natural conclusions from circumstances which we do know. We can come to a proper political (not legal) determination that the Soviets bear a responsibility. Soviet refusal to allow freedom of access to Soviet territories for neutral and uncommitted observers also bespeaks a desire to keep evidence to a minimum rather than innocence.

c. Are perhaps problems of evidence and of what constitutes proof for the support of terrorism in the current dispute over the Soviet role? Are some skeptics perhaps demanding too high a level of proof for what is being claimed?

A. As noted above, there are certainly many problems as to the proper standard of evidence and proof for Soviet activity. As I indicated, I do not believe that the requirement is one of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Soviet guilt. Rather that we are entitled to make a reasonable decision on the basis of the evidence available to us. The absence of any Soviet willingness to allow free inquiry can certainly be relevant to the possibility that they may be involved in such activities.

Q 3. Could you tell us what in your view is the best way to fight or prevent terrorism?

A. As indicated in my testimony, I believe there are three necessary elements of the struggle against terrorism. (1) Effective intelligence to determine the character and objectives of groups conducting terrorist actions, their personalities and supporters, their supply links and to the extent feasible their actual plans; (2) effective security procedures to reduce the vulnerability of targets to terrorist action. The example of our airline screening system was cited, but there are other procedural protections for innocent and even targeted individuals; and (3) public support of the government in its actions to eliminate terrorism and apprehend terrorists. This must consist of confidence that the government is acting in accordance with the dictates of law. It is equally important to demonstrate that the government is determined and effective when it does secure evidence upon which it can act through its legal procedures. It must also convince the public that it will provide

requisite protection in return for cooperation against the terrorists.

Q 4. In regard to the intelligence "leg" of a counter-terrorist policy, what is your opinion of the so-called "criminal standard" for intelligence activities? That is, there has been a tendency in this country in the recent past to forbid intelligence and law enforcement agencies from investigating or surveilling a group or individual unless it is known to be engaged or about to be engaged in criminal or violent activities. Yet, many activities associated with and necessary to terrorism do not necessarily involve violence or even illegalities. So, can we really have adequate intelligence against terrorism and thereby prevent some terrorist actions if we are bound by the criminal standard?

A. I believe it is not necessary to wait until there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime is being committed before taking steps against terrorism. I believe we can protect our constitutional rights and at the same time, establish a system which allows non-obtrusive investigation of suspicious action. Control by the courts and congressional committees can ensure that no excess of action is undertaken under the guise of combatting terrorism. This obviously requires a delicate balance but I believe that procedures are in place to protect the public against abuse through the clear guidelines of behavior given in Executive Orders, the responsibilities of the members of the intelligence community themselves to conduct their

affairs in a manner which will avoid a repetition of the experience of public doubt and the review procedures of the Congressional committees and the courts. These would permit something less than the "criminal standard" prior to investigation with respect to possible terrorist activity, and not endanger our Constitutional rights.

- Q 5. What do you believe are the dangers of terrorism to the United States today, both to this country and to the citizens at home or abroad?
- A. Thanks to our constitutional system and the free political channels open for protest and change, I do not believe that terrorism on a mass scale is likely in this country. We have, however, had terrorists of right and left over the years since the Republic was founded, and we are apt to continue to have a few of these extremist groups. Even a few successes by them however can produce a counterproductive public reaction and of course fear. U.S. citizens are more exposed abroad to many terrorist groups, some supported by the Soviets and some others. The best protection against these is a very direct focus on the terrorist problem in the different nations plus diplomatic efforts to improve the cooperation of the security services of the different nations against such dangers.

Senator DENTON. Mrs. Claire Sterling will be the next witness. We are happy to see that Mr. Michael Ledeen has arrived and we look forward to hearing from him later.

Mrs. Sterling has indicated that she will not have a written opening statement but will speak extemporaneously, and we welcome that. Mrs. Sterling, welcome to our hearing this morning.

TESTIMONY OF CLAIRE STERLING, INTERNATIONAL JOURNALIST, AUTHOR OF "THE TERROR NETWORK"

Mrs. STERLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for coming without a written statement. I have been traveling constantly for some weeks and simply have not had the time to prepare one.

Senator DENTON. Could you put the mike just a little closer? Mrs. Sterling was delayed by tornadoes and other things.

Mrs. STERLING. I would like to, I think, without a written statement, start by explaining my own position, professional background, and the qualifications I have acquired, such as they are, for addressing myself to this subject.

I have been based in Rome for 30 years as a foreign correspondent and have traveled from there throughout Africa, the Middle East, East and West Europe, Southeast Asia, reporting for such publications as the Reporter Magazine of which I was a staff member for 20 years; for the New York Times Sunday Magazine; for the Atlantic Monthly; for Life; for the Reader's Digest; for the New Republic; frequent contributions to the Washington Post editorial page and the International Herald Tribune.

In this time I have been an investigative reporter, I have not done daily news coverage. My entire training, professionally, as a journalist from the time I left the Journalism School at Columbia, has been to spend time on investigating, going below the surface of political situations to attempt to understand and analyze the causes behind political, social, economic crises.

On this book, of course, I had been writing about terrorist problems among other political questions that I was writing about from Italy all during the 1970's. I began to work on the specific question of linkage among various terrorist groups in 1978, at the time when Aldo Moro, the leading Christian Democratic statesman of Italy was kidnapped by the Red Brigades and eventually murdered.

Since that episode was identically executed to the one 6 months earlier in West Germany by the Baader-Meinhof gang and the kidnaping and murder of industrial leader Hans-Martin Schleyer, it seemed to me that this indicated the kind of link that required investigation.

I would like to make it clear at the outset that I am talking in this book not about situations in which the problem has to do with rightwing, oppressive military governments or any kind of totalitarian and military governments, or oppressive regimes in which there is no possibility for expressing a voice of opposition.

I am talking about the industrialized democracies of the West, and I am talking particularly—these are all countries I have known for many years and traveled in for many years to do my own work before—countries which when looked at on a map indicate a strategic crescent going from Turkey with the largest land army in Europe, a most important part of our NATO alliance and

the key to the eastern entrance to the Mediterranean, from Turkey to Italy, to Spain, to Northern Ireland, to Western Germany.

In all of these countries we have had a constantly accelerating and even exponentially rising rate of terrorism over these 10 years, over the 10 years I write about, from 1970 to 1980.

I do not attempt to define a terrorist or a freedom fighter, or a guerrilla fighter in situations where one has a confrontation between extreme right and extreme left. Nor does my concern have to do with people's views or desires for communism, socialism, free enterprise. Nor does it have to do with their choice of ideological labels or positions.

It has to do with the indications I have found in the course of a year of traveling specifically in 10 countries to do research on the book and another year to write it. It has to do with the concern I felt by the time I reached my conclusion about Soviet expansionism, which I separate from any other kinds of considerations I have just mentioned, and to which I would not like to address myself.

My concern is the evidence I have found of a Soviet interest in equipping, training, sheltering the kinds of terrorist groups which have emerged in democratic societies which have, since 1970, roughly, come very close to bringing these societies to their knees.

I would like to, just to give some indication to an American audience which has not lived through this experience directly, something of the kind of concern which I believe Americans might feel if they had been living in Italy in these 10 years as I have.

Let us suppose—and I am now repeating the situation as I lived through it in Italy in the last 4 or 5 years. Let us suppose that beyond an attempt to assassinate the President of the United States we should have within a space, let us say, of 2 years, the assassination of the President of the United States; the assassination of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; the assassination of the editor in chief of the New York Times; the assassination of the chief anchormen of the major television network, let us say Dan Rather and John Chancellor; the assassination of the dean of the Law School of Harvard University; the assassination of the major columnists in our major newspapers east and west; the assassination of our major political thinkers, our most thoughtful commentators from the east coast to the west.

This may sound like a spectacular presentation of the case, but it is in fact exactly what has been happening in Italy in the past few years. Therefore, when we speak of the capacity for relatively small groups of terrorists—in these cases I define them as terrorists because they are operating in a democratic society where they have rejected the use of the instruments of democracy for change and have deliberately attempted to block the use of these instruments, that the work of these terrorists has come very close—and Italy is just one case—to so undermining the authority of a democratic state that it was for a period—I think perhaps the worst danger is past for the moment—but it was for a period very close to collapse and all that that might imply.

In Turkey, where the situation was incomparably worse when I was there. By the time I was there the "kill rate" between right-wing and leftwing terrorism had reached 10 a day. By the time the

army took over last summer, the kill rate was 1 an hour, 24 or 25 a day, and Turkey was what you might call a "basket case."

In that instance the terrorism began on the left and then became a left-right situation. I cite this because I would again like to make clear that my discussion of the emergence of leftwing terrorism in the 1970's does not in any way exclude my appreciation of the enormous danger of terrorism of the right.

My reason for speaking of the leftwing terrorist phenomenon in the 1970's is that during the 1960's it was rightwing terrorism which had the headlines and which was most active. A good deal has been written on this subject.

During the 1970's, when leftwing terrorism emerged, ultraleft terrorism emerged in the democratic societies of the West. For a good part of the decade most right-thinking people—I mean in the civilized sense of the word, decent-thinking people—found it impossible to believe that the terrorism really was coming from the left and blamed it on agents provocateurs coming from the rights.

As I was living in this situation myself in Europe and reporting on it, it seemed to me at a certain point late in the 1970's that the time had come to point out with carefully documented evidence that democratic societies are indeed faced with a threat from both the right and the left, both extremes; but unless our societies recognize this danger we are not in a position to defend our security.

One more point I would like to make before I answer your questions, and that is my conclusion about the responsibility of the Soviet Union in this regard.

On my coming back to the United States after finishing this book which, I should point out, I did finish last summer and sent to the printers last October before the election. So I do not really think it is quite fair to call this a book written for the new administration or in any way connected with what Secretary Haig has said on the subject. It was fortunate for the book sales, I suppose, but it was certainly not part of my professional undertaking.

When I came here I found a great difficulty, incredulity on the part of people in the media at the suggestion that the Soviet Union could be so wicked—which was the phrase used in one case by a young interviewer—so wicked as to have supported this underhanded, clandestine form of warfare against Western society.

The suggestion being that from the time that détente was agreed upon in the early 1970's the Soviet Union for its part, as Western countries for their part, would no longer be expected to do these things.

I should point out in this regard that I think anybody who studied the subject at all is familiar with this argument that at no time when détente was reached, either then or since, did the Soviet Union agree in any way to stop doing what it had always been doing in this connection. That is, it never said that it would not continue to press for the expansion of a Soviet zone of influence. It never said that it would stop trying to undermine, weaken, humiliate, or sap the authority of the Western societies it was dealing with. This was an accepted part of the Soviet position and I believe that it was really we in the Western countries who wanted to

believe something else and therefore brought ourselves to believe something else.

Therefore, suggesting now that the Soviet Union has indeed played a primary role in training, equipping, and sheltering these terrorists in Western societies comes as a much greater shock than it should. I think we should have been aware of this ongoing process all along.

Just to indicate, to give one example of how the Soviet ideological thinkers have themselves said this over and over again, I would just like to quote from Boris Ponomarev, who is the leading ideological thinker of the Soviet Union, particularly in regard to the problems and situations of the worldwide Communist parties where they are not in power.

The article which he wrote in "Communist," which is a Soviet Communist publication for worldwide Communist consumption, was written in 1971 and I think clearly defines how it has come about that the Soviet Union should indeed have provided logistic and training aid to various terrorist groups who call themselves Trotskyites, anarchists, Maoists, nihilists, separatists on ethnic grounds or on religious grounds, including many groups who are indeed very hostile to the Soviet Union ideologically and have frequently condemned Soviet policy—most particularly the Trotskyites who are the classic ideological enemies.

Mr. Ponomarev in 1971 in "Communist" wrote what really has become a set of guidelines in this connection as regards the Soviet Union's attitude toward these people when they are engaged in active forms of political violence. "He conceded"—I quote now from the book—

That the New Left was "neither ideologically nor organizationally homogeneous," embracing as it did "various types of adventuristic elements, including Maoist and Trotskyites." Its members were "easily affected by revolutionary phrasology" and "clearly contaminated by anti-Communist prejudices." Nevertheless, their "overall anti-imperialistic direction is obvious." To neglect them, therefore, would be to "weaken the anti-imperialist struggle and the prospects for a united front against monopolistic capitalism."

He closed with a brisk reminder:

The Communists always remain the party of socialist revolution, a party which never tolerates the capitalist order and is always ready to head the struggle for the total political power of the working-class.

It is with this definition of the Soviet position in this regard that one can begin to understand why it was possible and has indeed become fact for the Soviet Union officially to reject and fight against, resist politically, the very groups operating in this area which were receiving its aid unofficially and in many cases indirectly for what it conceived to be that aspect of the struggle against Western society.

SITUATION IN URUGUAY

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Mrs. Sterling.

In reading your book I must say that I went from a man who was blind to the significance of terrorism, having dealt more in military terms all my life and having been away when all of the terrorist activity was really beginning in an explosive fashion.

I thought the most illuminating part of your book that could possibly serve us today was your exposition of the situation in Uruguay by which a government, relatively liberal, in South America was by designed contrivance, through terroristic means, forced to become more authoritarian than before; imposed martial law and then, having been seized upon as a media point of interest for certainly innocent purposes, held up and castigated before the world, and particularly in the United States, as a government reprehensible and unworthy of our support.

I believe that is a pattern. Would you just, for the benefit of all of us, tell us again, in your words, what took place in Uruguay?

Mrs. STERLING. Yes. Very briefly, Uruguay was one of the few functioning democracies in South America—more than merely a functioning democracy, it was very proud of its freedom. It had a moderate left Social-Democratic government at the time of the great crisis. It had the freest trade unions in all of Latin America. It had the first comprehensive social welfare program in the Western Hemisphere. Everybody belonged to a trade union, I think 90 percent of the working class belonged to trade unions.

It had the lowest infant mortality rate in South America. In short, it was, if not a model, free of a great many of the rankling grievances that have created such difficulties in other parts of Latin America.

The Tupamaros in their first years, during the mid-1960's, were a political force at first and they were a far-left political force, perfectly authentic and legitimate in the sense that they argued for Marxist revolution, as many political groups do.

In 1966, however, Raul Sendic, who was their leader, met with Castro and arranged for training of Tupamaro guerrillas, guerrillas in Cuba. In 1969 he announced that they now had 300 kilometers, 200 miles or something like that, of streets on which to conduct guerrilla warfare, whereupon they did.

Their guerrilla warfare tactics, urban guerrilla warfare tactics then began in 1970 with bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, first of Dan Mitrione, an American official working with the anti-insurgent forces there, and then going on to assassinate more or less indiscriminately: to seize radio stations; to bomb commercial buildings and stores; to bomb automobiles; to burn houses. It became an indiscriminate attack against the civilian population.

First of all, to force the government into repressive measures, which is a classic technique described in Carlos Marighella's "Mini Manual for Guerrilla Warfare," which is the standard work used by terrorist groups all over the world.

The efforts was to exasperate social tensions, to show the government as an impotent force, incapable of maintaining public order, and to force it into repressive measures of response.

Between 1970 and 1972, the situation became so bad that an elected parliament which, by the way, had held its last free election in the middle of this, in 1971, at which time the Tupamaros and the Communist Party supporting them could not get more than 19 percent of the vote. By 1972 there were thousands of people demonstrating in the streets against the Tupamaros and against this terrorism, whereupon the elected parliament invited the army to come in and take over.

The army has been there ever since. It has behaved as armies do in this sort of situation. One of its first acts was then to outlaw all political parties in Uruguay for the following 15 years.

This example one might consider to be a failure of the theory of guerrilla warfare as outlined by Maïrighella in his famous mini-manual, but in fact the Tupamaros have been a model for every emerging terrorist group since then.

The first terrorist group in West Germany called itself the Tupamaros of West Berlin. Bernadine Dohrn came out with an enthusiastic endorsement of the Tupamaros model which, she said, should be the model for the Weathermen Underground.

It has been used by every terrorist group I studied, from Turkey to Italy, to Spain, to Northern Ireland.

Senator DENTON. I would hope that opinion formers in the United States read your book, and particularly that section, because it is insidious and, unless it is recognized, I do not see how it can be stopped worldwide.

You have written that 1968 was clearly the year when the generation born after the last world war declared its own war on society with a brief but stunning show of strength.

Would you explain in detail the reason for your conclusion and cite examples?

Mrs. STERLING. Well, I think we should be aware by now of what happened from the time things broke out at Berkeley in 1968. We certainly know that what happened in America was that an entire generation, especially at the universities, rose up in protest against all the sins of the generation preceding theirs. It was a semi-insurrectional situation and it was one of total protest—although it did not propose alternatives to the society it was attacking.

I, as a mother, at the time certainly understood the passions aroused in young people of that age, and it did not seem to me that 1968 was a frightful year. On the contrary, it seemed to me that it might perhaps open new horizons and make possible changes in society that have been long overdue.

Unfortunately, it did not really change very much. It spread from Berkeley, of course, across the United States. The expression in Paris was the "Paris May" when young people held the barricades against the authorities for some time and very nearly overthrew General de Gaulle's Fifth Republic.

The same phenomenon happened in West Germany, that was with the riots in the streets. There was a semi-civil-war situation, or it looked like that for a while. It went right around the world to Spain, to Italy where the universities were occupied and closed for a year, and all the way to Tokyo.

I think that within a year or two—I was reporting the situation from Europe at the time—and within a year or two of that enormous year of the "Big No" as it was called, people did not forget their participation in this protest, they did begin to be reabsorbed into normal political life in one way or another, with left-wing parties or not left-wing parties, or with no parties. They perhaps dropped out of politics and took up normal working lives.

But in that period very small groups in a good many countries who felt committed to the classic concepts of Marxist-Leninist revolution, the old concept that sometimes seemed to be forgotten in

the modern parlance about Euro-communism, those committed to revolution by violence in the traditional Russian sense of the way that revolution was carried through from 1865 onward, I think these groups emerged—very small groups in a great many countries—and felt that this was the time for them to launch what they really thought was going to be an instant revolution. That they could catch this historic moment to arouse a movement that was more than simply a movement of protest, of social protest, but that would actually become a disciplined, revolutionary movement.

The problem here was—the problem for these groups—that some of them got to meet each other, but they started out from nothing. They did not know how to conduct guerrilla warfare, which is a fine art and requires training. They had no weapons. They had no money. They did not really know each other. They certainly did not have the kinds of contacts which would give them a safe getaway when they made a terrorist hit, to get across the border and get somewhere where hot pursuit was impossible, and so on.

They were brought together. The contacts among them were helped along and access was given to them to acquire all the things they lacked in order to emerge as genuinely professional urban guerrillas, starting from 1968 onward.

This is, of course, where the linkage and the interlock among these groups begins, the information I put into my book. They were given first access to the guerrilla training camps in Cuba, around Havana, which had been opened first for guerrilla fighters from Latin America and Africa. But, starting in 1968 and in some cases before, were then opened to Europeans as well, Spanish Basques, IRA before they became Provisionals, Italians, French, Germans, and so on and, of course, many Palestinians who were just beginning what became their present form of exported terrorism. That is, of exporting their terrorist tactics from the Middle East to the outside world, to Western Europe in particular.

They went to Cuban training camps supervised by a Soviet colonel of the KGB, called Col. Vadim Kotchergine. From these camps the emphasis then shifted to the Middle East where various Palestinian formations were setting up their camps, starting in 1968.

As early as 1968 and 1969, the first IRA forces were going to these camps in Jordan, and from then on to South Yemen. The first Spanish Basques were in Cuban camps starting in 1964. The Italian Red Brigades and groups around them, whose names have changed many times over the decade, but the founding group of what became modern terrorism in Italy were all starting to go to the camps in the Middle East for training from 1969 and 1970 onward.

By 1972 and 1973, further facilities were offered by Libya which began to set up its own network of training camps which by now, of course, have some 20 camps that we know about, where people from all over the world are trained—about 7,000 from Black Africa and the rest from Europe, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Latin America, and so on.

The origins were there. The people who began in 1968 were committed to a Communist revolution. I want to make clear that I am not talking now about the orthodox Communist parties of Western Europe whose connection is a much more complicated

thing and, in fact, they were not connected. This was something that emerged from the explosive worldwide situation in 1968.

What then followed began to make the pattern, that is, when they began to acquire the expertise, the arms, the knowledge of how to raise money by hijacking, kidnaping, and bank robberies, and so on; the safe houses and sanctuaries abroad, all these things were made accessible to them from 1968 onward.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much. Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. Sterling, I also read your book. I brought it to Vermont with me over the weekend to read and found it most interesting. I read it, keeping in mind one of my other committee assignments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the briefings that we have had over the past couple of years there.

The question that kept recurring to me throughout the reading of the book is, do you feel that the CIA can substantiate the facts and conclusions contained in your book?

Mrs. STERLING. Well, I am really not in a position to answer that question, Senator.

Senator LEAHY. Maybe I should say it this way, do you feel they should be able to?

Mrs. STERLING. I would certainly feel they should be able to. As I explain in the book, I had no information at all from the CIA. In fact, I was not able to have any meetings. I was denied the possibility to meet with the CIA while I was working on the book.

I was told that this was because the CIA was not permitted to speak with journalists. I did speak with all the other Western intelligence services.

Senator LEAHY. Many of whom get their information from the CIA.

Mrs. STERLING. Yes. I do believe in the last 2 years there has been a reluctance on the part of some Western intelligence services to pass information on to the CIA, since the big scandals here. The theory being that anything passed on here would appear on the front page of the New York Times and the Washington Post the next day.

So, it is possible in the last years, which were quite crucial because more and more information was beginning to come out by the late 1970's, that some of this information may not have been. It is possible. I do not know. I do not pretend to know what has gone on in the CIA.

I can only say that my information is not based, primarily, on intelligence service information, either from the CIA or from any other country. The overwhelming evidence has come from sources accessible to the public.

Senator LEAHY. I understand, and you have made that very clear in your book. Maybe there is another way of putting it, and I think this is something that could probably be answered yes or no.

If you were able to come up with this information, and if indeed the conclusions you reach are accurate, is there any reason that the CIA with all of its facilities, all of its personnel and so on, should not be able to come to the same conclusions?

Mrs. STERLING. Senator, I would assume the CIA has access to more information, certainly, than I had.

Senator LEAHY. Would you assume that if you were able to reach these conclusions and if they are correct, the CIA also would be able to reach the same conclusions?

Mrs. STERLING. I would assume so, yes.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

If they do, and if they were not to turn over such information to the committees that oversee them, or to the Government agencies they are responsible to, what would that mean, that they would be deliberately withholding information? Would they be resorting to so-called "cooked" intelligence?

Mrs. STERLING. Senator, I think that question should more properly be addressed to the CIA than to me. I am just not in a position to know.

Senator LEAHY. What would be your reaction?

Mrs. STERLING. I really would prefer not to comment on the CIA's position. I understand there is a very complicated situation here in Washington. As you know, I have been working abroad for 30 years and I am not really inside the workings of this administration, nor was I of the former one. I just do not feel qualified to make a public statement of opinion about it.

Senator LEAHY. I understand your reluctance and I appreciate it, but the conclusion of your book begins, "Crime pays if the fix is in, and it was. Western governments knew but would not talk."

Mrs. STERLING. Yes.

Senator LEAHY. I understand you saying that you would not want to respond to what I said earlier. But that is your statement and it seems to be an indictment not only of the FBI and the CIA, but every Western intelligence agency and every Western government. Is it indeed?

Mrs. STERLING. Yes.

Senator LEAHY. Have the CIA and the FBI been bought?

Mrs. STERLING. I do not know about the FBI because I was really talking about the situation in European countries or in countries outside the United States where it would be a CIA problem rather than an FBI one.

Senator LEAHY. Has the CIA been bought?

Mrs. STERLING. When I made that statement I was really not just speaking of the CIA, I was speaking, indeed, of the attitude taken by all the Western governments under attack, under terrorist attack. I found it extraordinary and very difficult, baffling, and difficult to understand, in fact, impossible to understand why officially government antiterrorist units, ministries of the interior, political spokesmen, refused to confirm and indeed covered for, in some situations, facts which I knew they knew because they were accessible to the public; they were not secrets.

For example, in speaking to the head of the antiterrorist unit of the West German Federal Ministry of the Interior I was told by him—and I cite the quotation in the book—I was assured by him that South Yemen had ceased to provide sanctuary to West German terrorists. Even as he told me this, one of the most wanted West German terrorists, wanted for the Schleyer killing, Sieglinde Hofman, was in hiding in South Yemen as developed very soon thereafter when she went to Paris and was arrested by the French police. She and four others, all wanted women terrorists, had all

been hiding in South Yemen at the time this statement was made to me.

Well, since I have a great respect for the efficiency of the West German police—and their data bank on the subject is perhaps the best in the world—it is very difficult for me to believe that the West German authorities were not aware of her presence in South Yemen when this statement was made. Let me just cite one example—

Senator LEAHY. No; if we can just follow upon that example before you go to another one. Does that mean in your mind, one, that they were either, reluctant to talk with a journalist about some area of intelligence they were aware of, or two, that "the fix was in," or three, a different conclusion? I am not sure I follow you, Mrs. Sterling.

Mrs. STERLING. To sum it up, I believe that all these governments have been extremely reluctant to point a finger in any way at the Soviet Union for its responsibility in the development of terrorism from a cottage industry to the kind of sophisticated high-technology industry or craft that it has become.

I think the reasons are complicated and I do not know them all. I can suggest a few of them, or a general one. Surely, none of the Western governments wanted to risk a relationship that is called "détente" and were extremely reluctant to take a position which might seem confrontational.

They also, in order to make a case against the Soviet Union, would necessarily also have to make a case against the Palestinian resistance groups who have been the main source in the last 5 or 6 years of highly sophisticated guerrilla training and the main province of Soviet-provided arms that have gone to the Palestinian resistance groups and reshipped through a staging post in Bulgaria, through Eastern Europe, to Western Europe.

To say this, to establish the Soviet line of responsibility, would require establishing a line passing through Cuba on the one side, and the Palestine resistance on the other, which would then mean not just having to face the Soviet Union with this, but having to face the Arab States supporting the Palestinian resistance, and Cuba, and all the people who feel attracted to Cuba's form of what is called "Third World revolutionism."

Besides these considerations, West Germany has to live with East Germany. For the West German Government to admit that the first safe house for the Baader-Meinhof gang was 5 minutes away on the subway in East Berlin, and that from 1970 onward the main entrance and exit and protected passage for West German terrorists and Palestinian terrorist groups operating in West Germany has been through East Germany, for the West German Government to say this is to add to friction which nobody wants in West Germany and East Germany.

For the Italians to speak of Soviet responsibility in a country where the Communist Party is the largest in the Western World and holds roughly a third of the national vote, has its obvious embarrassments.

I believe also, for all of these governments where moderate left-wing opinion, or opinion going from the center to the left, all the way over to the left, this kind of opinion finds it very difficult to

accept these unpleasant facts about the Soviet Union. All of these factors, I think, have been part of the coverup. There has been a coverup. Certainly, there has been a coverup, in my opinion, and I can prove it. I think the book proves it.

Senator LEAHY. Mrs. Sterling, I am not sure I fully understand your answer, and you have to bear with me on this a little bit.

Mrs. STERLING. Sure.

Senator LEAHY. We small-town boys just come to these things bit by bit.

Let me go back, still, to the original statement, "Crime pays if the fix is in, and it was. Western governments knew but would not talk." Now, we deal in intelligence matters very closely, that is no secret at all, with MI-6, MI-5 in the United Kingdom, with the German intelligence agencies. In fact, you can go all the way down through all the NATO countries, just to use the Western Alliance as an example, to say nothing about, obviously, intelligence services of other countries outside of NATO.

A great deal of the intelligence that some of these countries have is acquired directly or indirectly through the United States, irrespective of their concerns about what might appear on the front page of the papers. That is a very real concern, I have heard it from all of them.

At the same time, we acquire a lot of ours from them, the same way. Again, if that is so, who has been fixed and how? I mean, I can see somebody having read through the book and being startled by this one conclusion. Have all these intelligence services been paid off, or is it a political timidity, which do you mean? I do not fully understand the statement.

Mrs. STERLING. I do not have a plottist mentality and I certainly do not think these services have been paid off—they may have been, but I have certainly no evidence of that, nor is that my theory at all.

Senator LEAHY. What is the "fix," then?

Mrs. STERLING. The "fix" is political, I think. It is a political attitude. It is an unwillingness, on the one hand, to face certain realities which are unpleasant and therefore to not put together what could be taken as isolated incidents unless and until you find that the isolated incidents become such a massive heap that you can no longer keep them separated.

Also, it could be—surely in part—a considered political position of agencies that simply do not think it is good for the public to know these things because it just makes waves and complicates the life at the top for those who have to deal in international diplomacy.

Since I, fortunately, am not a member of any government or any agency, and am a reporter, my own feeling is, as a reporter of long-standing traditions of this nature that when one comes across a series of facts like these, one should make them public if they are impressive enough when put together to make what would appear to me, at least, to be a convincing theory.

An intelligence service might have a different motivation and a different idea of what is good or not good for the public to know.

FATHER OF TERRORISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

I would just like to give one example in this connection. It is the case of a man I write about in the book, called Giangiacomo Feltrinelli who was a millionaire publisher in Italy, and who formed the first left-wing—

Senator LEAHY. The one who was blown up?

Mrs. STERLING. That is right, in 1972. He formed the first underground armed terrorist group in Italy. He showed others how to do it. When he died, his money and his organization passed over to the Italian Red Brigades who were just setting up in business at the time.

He was the one who brought together the Germans, and the French, and the Spanish, and the Irish, and the Italians and sponsored the first summit meeting to organize a terrorist international group in Europe in 1971 in Florence, which was attended by terrorist groups from 14 different countries.

Now, Feltrinelli, as we know now—although we did not at the time—was trained, took three different training courses in Czechoslovakia between 1964 and 1968, although he was a renegade from the Italian Communist Party, had broken with them in 1957. He nevertheless, 10 years later, did go back to have one course with the KGB and two with the Soviet military, GRU, in Czechoslovakia. The testimony to this effect has been provided publicly by General Jan Sejna of Czechoslovakia who was military adviser to the Czechoslovak Communist Party and liaison at the Warsaw Pact.

In any case, I could come to that point later. What is relevant here to the question of the CIA is that Feltrinelli also, although he was supposed to be as renegade Communist who had broken openly and spectacularly with the Communist Party in 1957, maintained a guest house in Prague in 1971, which was 3 years after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Czechoslovakia was under Soviet military occupation.

I happen to have written a book about Czechoslovakia and I was there in 1968 and in 1969 and therefore I know how difficult it is for anybody—or it was—for anybody to get into that country from any Western country in the world with any kinds of credentials at all. I mean, even as a tourist you had to show for some years that you needed health treatment at Karlovy Vary in order to get a temporary visa to enter the country.

Nevertheless, Feltrinelli maintained a guest house near Prague, and one of the people he took there was a terrorist fugitive from Italian justice called Augusto Viel who is presently in prison—had joined the Red Brigades. He is presently serving a long term in prison and testified in court that Feltrinelli drove him to his villa in Prague, put him up there for 6 months where he shared these guest quarters with terrorists from many parts of the world, Western World, and then Feltrinelli went back and got him out.

Now, this is courtroom testimony, this is not a question of secret intelligence information. The testimony was given by Augusto Viel himself in a courtroom in Italy.

Also, when Feltrinelli blew himself up when he was trying to blow up a pylon in Milan in 1972, the police then found that he had five or six safe houses around Milan, one of them shared with

the Red Brigades, and in the Red Brigades' safe house his original passport was found. He also had five or six fake passports.

The original passport indicated that he had made 22 entries into Czechoslovakia in the preceding few years. These were the years of a Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Now, this information was reported in the New York Times by Richard Burt, who has presently been nominated to be an Assistant Secretary of State and who, in a conversation I had with him some weeks ago, indicated to me that he had received this information from White House sources he did not specify. These were White House sources under the Carter administration. His report was published in the spring of 1978.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Burt is said to have one at the White House on a fairly consistent basis.

Mrs. STERLING. In any case, in 1978 the story that he did write for the New York Times contained a good deal of very specific information along these lines, which I was then able to confirm with Italian authorities.

Well, how was it possible? I mean, Feltrinelli played such an important position in the development of Italian terrorism, he was the father of Italian terrorism and he was in a sense the father of terrorism in all of Western Europe as my book, I think, gives reasonable evidence to prove. These kinds of facts are a matter of public record, the public has access to them. How is it possible for our agencies or our Government not to have known these things?

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman?

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

Not to be a master of the obvious, but you have established the fact that Mr. Feltrinelli operated very actively safe houses for terrorist training and hideout in Czechoslovakia at a time when the Soviets were in total control and therefore could not possibly not have known of what he was doing.

Mrs. STERLING. Well, as a journalist who was operating in that part of the world at that time I can personally testify to the impossibility of any Western citizen, particularly one in the public eye who has openly and spectacularly broken with the Communist Party, the impossibility of such a person running a guest house in Prague under these circumstances without the consent of the KGB; it could not have been done.

Senator DENTON. There have been a number of inferences regarding your conclusions. Czechoslovakian defector General Jan Sejna, a former Secretary General of the Defense Committee of the Czech Central Committee, First Secretary of the Ministry of Defense and a member of the Collegium of the Defense Ministry who defected on February 27, 1968 stated that Giangiacomo Feltrinelli was one of the first Italians trained at the Doupov Camp.

Some critics of your analysis of the Feltrinelli case, as described by you, have suggested privately that the 22 Czech visas stamped in his passport did not exist or, if they did exist, then they were related to his business and contacts with regard to the "Problems of Peace and Communism"; that is a title—published by the Common Forum in Czechoslovakia.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mrs. STERLING. I wonder if the statement requires comment. Feltrinelli was a publisher, of course, he was the first publisher in Europe to publish the Tri-Continental magazine published in Cuba after the Tri-Continental Conference of 1966. He was certainly interested in left-wing publications all over Europe and he put out a great many of them himself. That was part of his whole personality and political role.

But if he had any interest in any publication in Czechoslovakia, the only one that could possibly have interested him was "Problems of Peace and Communism," which is edited and published by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to provide guidelines for the Communist Parties of the world.

I do not understand why anybody could explain why he would have to make 22 visits to Prague to discuss this publication.

Senator DENTON. You would have to describe such an inference as incredible.

Mrs. STERLING. I would find it really impossible to believe, yes.

Senator DENTON. Would you describe for those who are not aware your personal political orientation throughout your life? I know this is difficult, having been asked the same kind of question, but would you call yourself ultraright, right, slightly right, center, slightly left, etc.? [Laughter.]

Mrs. STERLING. I would like to think that my book ought to be read for its merits and the facts within it, and I should not be challenged on what political belief I may have held any time in the 30 years that I have been a reporter.

But I see that it is not really possible for me to avoid all discussion of this question because such issues have been raised, first of all, by people who had not read the book, before the book was published, so tending to discredit me as a reporter that I feel I should just say very briefly that apart from a childhood leap into the Young Communist League 41 years ago, which lasted 2 years when I was in college, at a time when everybody I knew was doing the same thing. It was just the time when everybody was doing it at school, and I was a child and understood nothing about politics—although I certainly learned from that experience. I have never again in any way been affiliated with any political group, organization, institution, body, movement, whatever you would like to call it.

I have never, certainly, been in any way identified with right-wing groups of any sort. I think I should not have to defend this position because I have been writing about it publicly for so long that I think anybody who has read what I have written would know that my position on political affairs has consistently been one of moderate left, center to moderate left.

I hate to have to make this specification. I do it regretfully.

Senator DENTON. I did not ask you with any malice.

Would you say that the Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, has overstated his charge that the Soviet Union is supporting terrorism against the Western democracies?

Mrs. STERLING. I really think the Secretary of State has his own problems and his own considerations in this regard. [Laughter.]

I really hesitate to comment on statements made either by Secretary Haig or anybody else in this administration.

I can say that insofar as his statement indicated, a primary Soviet responsibility in funding, training, and protecting and sheltering international terrorists in the countries I write about, his statement was true.

I do not write about, nor do I want to in any way identify myself with any other area where the use of armed violence is concerned, especially in Third World countries or in countries where one has problems of right-wing military dictatorship; or, where does the line end between a freedom fighter and a terrorist in that kind of situation.

I can say that insofar as my knowledge of terrorism in the industrialized democracies of the West is concerned, I believe that statement of General Haig's to be true.

TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE

Senator DENTON. Thank you.

In your book you mentioned conferences such as the Tri-Continental Conference in Cuba in 1966 where multinational terrorist groups met to plan international terrorist strategy.

Would you discuss that in sufficient degree to impart the significance, as you see it, of those conferences?

Mrs. STERLING. I believe that most scholars who have addressed themselves to this whole problem of emerging terrorism, left-wing terrorism, combined with the parallel development of national liberation movements—not to be confused one with the other, although they often overrun—that the starting moment is generally set in January 1966, with the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana.

This was the first meeting of its kind since the Soviet Revolution, since the Bolshevik Revolution. It gathered several hundred—I forget the exact number, they are in the book—500 or something like that, 600 delegates from all over Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Western Europe, as well as the United States and Canada. Although it was supposed to be a Third World conference, it was spoken of as the "Democratic and Workers Movements of Europe and the United States."

Its purpose was to devise a global strategy, or that is what it said in its resolution, to devise a global strategy to counteract the strategy of American imperialism, or Western imperialism.

I think there was also, simultaneously, an effort to identify so closely as to be unable to separate the interests of what were called the Socialist countries, that is the Soviet Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, with these national liberation movements as they spoke of them all over the world, in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and so on.

The "hook" in that conference was that the people attending it and the resolutions were addressed not only to the problems of anticolonialism, or antiracism in the Third World, but also to the problems of "liberating" was the phrase used, the Democratic countries of Western Europe and the northern part of the Western Hemisphere.

It was directly after that, within a few months, that the first important network of guerrilla training camps was set up around Havana, and it was in these camps, starting in 1968 and 1969 that

Europeans, Western Europeans came for their first guerrilla training.

CARLOS THE JACKAL

Some of the most important people on the terrorist scene in the 1970's were also trained there. For example, Carlos the Jackal, the most notorious, I suppose, of all the figures on the world scene in terrorism during the 1970's trained in Camp Matanzas in Cuba in 1966. In fact, he came in 1966 directly after the Tri-Continental Conference. He was sent there by the Communist Party of Venezuela; he had his first training there. There he studied under the man who became his KGB control when he was operating as a terrorist leader in Europe, Antonio Dages Bouvier, with the fake Equadorian name.

From there he then went on; from the Camp Matanzas training he was sent on by the Venezuelan Communist Party to the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow for 2 years. This is not made up, but it does not come from the intelligence services, he has said so himself in an interview granted in November 1979 to an Arab weekly, which is published in my book.

Others, John Okello, for example, were training in these camps until he came back with several hundred comparably trained guerrilla warfare people for the first Marxist coup in Africa on the Island of Zanzibar.

I think it can fairly be said that it was starting from that time, from the Tri-Continental Conference, that what might be called a Guerrilla International began to take force.

Senator DENTON. Would you think that there has been a withholding of terrorist activity within the United States while very effective terrorist activity takes place in other countries, could you speculate on that, is that deliberate?

Mrs. STERLING. No, Senator, I have been working in Europe in all these years, in fact all during the 1960's and the whole big antiwar movement in America; I was not here.

I do know from my own studies connected with what I was doing for the book that there certainly were the beginnings of the same kind of terrorist movement in America so long as the Vietnam war went on and the passionate feelings about it continued in America. The Weathermen Underground, the Symbionese Liberation Army, other, smaller groups whose names we have probably forgotten by now, were beginning along the same course as the Baader-Meinhof group, the Italian Red Brigades, and so on.

When the Vietnam war began to phase out, I believe, the major factor creating the kind of situation in which a terrorist group could thrive was removed from the scene. I think with the end of the Vietnam war the atmosphere in American universities and among American young people was such that—it is very hard in this country to get attention for active political terrorism since there are so many other kinds of terrorisms, crimes of violence here. The acts have to be very spectacular to attract attention and that requires a good, solid degree of organization, more so, perhaps, than in many other countries.

I just think the atmosphere for it was not right. We have had smaller ongoing terrorist phenomena here such as the Puerto

Rican group which has been trained and equipped in Cuba and which represents, as I think we all know, a very tiny fraction of the sentiment of the people of Puerto Rico.

They have been committing ongoing acts of terrorism. Recently, we have heard acts of terrorism committed here against Turks by Armenians. That is the kind of situation, of course, that is covered in so many layers of hypocrisy that it is hard to get at the facts of it. The Armenians have been trained in Palestinian camps, as they announced at a press conference last year, reported in the New York Times. They have a very effective system of frightening the public with a double bomb technique. You leave one bomb before a crowded theater when the people come out and are blown up. Everybody gathers around to see who got killed, the second bomb goes off to get the people who have come around to see the effects of the first one.

This technique has now been used all over Europe and is beginning to be used here, I believe. I think situations like these may develop. I simply do not know enough about it, I must confess, as an American, but as one who has worked overseas so long; I do not know enough about the entire American scene to feel qualified to talk about this too much.

Senator DENTON. The thrust behind my question, Mrs. Sterling, was personal. I feel as a student toward a tutor in this field toward you, but I am not inexperienced in having had applied on me terrorism throughout the spectrum of, "Would you like a cup of tea, Commander," to torture to unconsciousness. I have seen their pragmatism and the long-range chess philosophy with which they move.

It occurred to me that since, as you have stated, Italy was practically brought to her knees, Turkey to hers, Uruguay really overthrown—

Mrs. STERLING. Spain very nearly.

Senator DENTON. Right. And yet, the consciousness in the United States of the significance of those events overseas and the consciousness of the vulnerability of the United States to the kind of far-out sounding example which you offered earlier, which I agree is not that far out, it would occur to me that their way of looking at it would possibly entail the consideration that it would be better were the giant to remain sleeping, unconscious of this, while they made their progress elsewhere; putting us on the time table, perhaps, for some other time.

Mrs. STERLING. That could be, Senator. I do know that there have been constant communications between very small groups here, like-minded groups, with groups in Europe who have been carrying out the terrorist campaign there. It may be that America is being saved for last. That is certainly not out of the question.

I do feel that whether or not that is true, it is impossible for me to imagine an assumption that the United States is not affected by what is happening in these countries of Western Europe on whom our security so closely depends.

If we think that Turkey, which was our anchor and our key to the defense of Europe through NATO was reduced to a state of total collapse, forcing an army takeover; if we think of what very nearly happened in Italy; if we think of Britain with 16,000 troops

tied down in Northern Ireland perhaps for another 10 years—they have already been there more than 10; if we think of Spain, where after 40 years of dictatorship a fragile democracy has not been allowed to draw a free breath because of the continuing and accelerating terrorism of the Basques and ETA-Militar; if we think of the possible revival of terrorism in West Germany as there are unfortunately signs in the last few weeks of what might occur, I do not understand how we can fail to see this as a direct threat to our own security.

Just as we have been shown to be impotent, humiliated for over a year in Iran, this was our trauma, but it was just one. Is it really any different if it is American hostages being held in Tehran; or the temple at Mecca being seized and occupied by trained guerrilla forces; or Hans-Martin Schleyer being kidnapped and killed in Germany; or the OPEC raid in Vienna, in which 11 Arab oil ministers were seized and taken hostage and three guards were killed? There is really no national separation that is really possible in this kind of consideration of our security.

I do believe that this kind of effort, this is an undeclared war, I believe, against Western democratic societies. The immediate objectives are those which we see in that strategic crescent. All of those countries under attack are our closest and most important allies and the terrorists themselves have said that the ultimate objective is us.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mrs. Sterling. Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately in a relatively short while I am going to have to leave for another commitment like some of our other members of the committee, commitments involving my home State.

I would like to follow up on the subject we were on when I finished my last question, and that involved Mr. Feltrinelli. I was struck in reading about him in your book and reading about how he blew himself up and so on. It was something almost out of a comedy. I use that term advisedly, of course, because of the tragic consequences of what he was trying to accomplish.

But if there was ever a person who seemed to be uncoordinated and an absolute boob to be running this, it was he. And yet, the Czechs and the Soviets end up relying on him to become the "patron saint" of Soviet terrorism.

You referred to the Czech defector General Sejna and he talks about Feltrinelli as being the founder of the Italian terrorist movement, and so on.

And yet, you also sum up in your book saying that Mr. Feltrinelli's Czech instructors considered him too impulsive and un-nervy to be reliable, and hard to control.

Mrs. STERLING. Yes.

Senator LEAHY. Why would they pick somebody like that? I mean, does it not almost fly in the face of the conclusion that this is the man picked out to be the patron saint of this kind of terrorism?

Mrs. STERLING. I think there is a misunderstanding, Senator. I did not say that General Sejna said he was picked out to found this movement. I said this—I did not say he was picked, either; he picked himself, really.

He happened to be one of the richest men in Europe. He had very strong revolutionary convictions.

Senator LEAHY. But would his money be enough to get the Czechs and the Soviets to rely on him? I mean, they have money of their own.

Mrs. STERLING. No, certainly not. As General Sejna pointed out, he was always maladroit. He kept falling off his bicycle when he was 14 years old, so his stepfather has told me. He could not manage things with his hands very well, and the reason he died, actually, was a maladroit use of explosives, with fumbling because he was trying to prove that he could do it himself and not just tell others how to do it. This was part of his personal tragedy.

What made him the "father" if you like, of terrorism, is that he was ahead of his time in foreseeing the kind of terrorist movement that could be developed in Europe. He hero-worshipped Castro. He went to visit Castro many times over, starting from the year after Castro took power. He adored the whole concept of Third World revolution. He wore the tupamaro uniforms in his last few years of life.

Senator LEAHY. The last few minutes of his life, too.

Mrs. STERLING. As I say, he was not a reliable man, he was not a sound man. He was not anybody you would count on to make a real revolution.

But as I also say in the book, the Soviet Union has not tried to make real revolutions with these terrorists. That is certainly not what I believe to be their design.

Senator LEAHY. But would you say this is a case of the Soviet Union coming in after the fact, not before the fact?

Mrs. STERLING. Well, I think it is two things. I think the Soviet Union has always found Feltrinelli useful because he did have an enormous sum of money to put at the disposal of the game he was playing, which was to organize a clandestine and underground armed resistance for the destruction of the democratic state—not only in his own country but all over Europe and all over the Western world.

That was useful to the Soviet Union, as I believe all of these terrorist structures have been, as a destabilizing factor. I do not think they ever would have relied on Feltrinelli to make a real revolution, nor would they rely on the Baader-Meinhof Gang, or the Trotskyites supporting the Spanish Basques, and so on.

When and if they should find a situation where a Communist revolution is possible, I am sure they would prefer to rely on their own Communist Party forces. Here we are talking simply about, as I say in the book, putting a loaded gun on the table, or providing a do-it-yourself kit, really, for terrorist warfare. You provide the kit, you provide the instructions and if people can succeed in destabilizing, undermining, weakening Western societies, so much the better.

If they do not, not very much has been lost.

Senator LEAHY. Is that conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion of Gen. Umberto Capuzzo, the national commander of the Italian carabinieri?

He is charged with fighting Italian terrorism and he said in the New York Times recently that, "Italian terrorism is sui generis,

there is no brain abroad." Apparently he admits that some may have sporadic contact with groups abroad, but he disagrees with the conclusions drawn in your book that there may be a network of terrorism, somewhat of a well-oiled machine.

Is what you are saying inconsistent with what he is saying?

Mrs. STERLING. Not at all. I am very glad you asked the question, Senator.

Senator LEAHY. I thought you might be.

Mrs. STERLING. Before the book was published, it was branded as the mastermind theory or the copout theory of terrorism. That is, terrorism was invented by the Russians and has been orchestrated and directed by the Russians from some subterranean map room where they give out the daily orders of who to hit the following morning.

I say exactly the contrary. My conclusion is, there is no mastermind, just as Mr. Colby has pointed out before me. Certainly, I do not believe there is a mastermind. I do not think any of these groups were invented or created by the Soviet Union. All of them emerged within the context of their own countries' problems, whether they were economic, or social: too much consumerism in West Germany; too much poverty in Turkey; a Basque separatist problem in Spain; a Catholic-Protestant crisis in Northern Ireland. They all came out of their own national situations.

It would be absurd to suggest the Soviet Union brought them into being. Equally absurd to suggest that the Soviet Union tries to tell them what to do from day to day. I do not believe that for a moment.

What I do say is that these groups have been in very close touch with each other. For one thing, they have all received their guerrilla training from the same sources. They have met in the same camps, especially in South Yemen and in Libya over the last 7 or 8 years. They have met frequently at summit meetings which are recorded by so many sources that they can hardly be listed, from Lebanon in 1972 through Cyprus and Crete, in Frankfurt, many times in Dublin, in Barcelona, in Milan, in Belgrade. They meet together and they receive their arms.

In the last few years the provenance of their arms has been primarily from the Palestinian forces who receive the arms, in turn, from the Soviet Union—paid for by the Arab oil states, naturally, but provided by the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries.

After I finished writing my book, the nature of this connection—I would like to say this because it comes close to, perhaps, my answer to the "smoking gun" theory, that unless you find the Soviet Union with a smoking gun in its hand you cannot claim that it is responsible.

What I am saying is that it is responsible one or two degrees removed in almost all of these cases. That is, it has made possible the training and the arms and the sanctuary through Cuba first, and later through various formations of the Palestine resistance.

The biggest single piece of confirmation from a direct source came after I finished writing this book from the cofounder of "Front Line" in Italy, Prima Linia, who upon his arrest was among

the 100 terrorists who then gave detailed confessions published in the press in Italy.

He pointed out, among several others who had said the same thing, that in the last years of terrorism in Italy the provenance of all their weapons, aside from those they stole from the police, were from the Palestinian formations. Then he added:

Never, never could we have received Koloskikovs and Straehle missiles, and other sophisticated equipment of military nature from these Palestinian formations without the consent of the Soviet Union.

I think that is where the case really rests. The provision of the training and the arms has come almost always indirectly from Palestinians trained in the Soviet Union who then go to South Yemen, a Soviet-protected satellite, where they have passed on their expertise and the arms they have received from the Soviet Union to every major group, terrorist group, operating in free democratic societies since 1970, from the Japanese Red Army to the Turkish People's Liberation Army, to the Italian Red Brigade, to the Spanish Basques and ETA-Militar, to the IRA Provisionals, to every formation, Baader-Meinhof Gang, June 2d movement in Western Germany.

Senator DENTON. Senator, will you just for 10 seconds yield?

Senator LEAHY. Sure.

Senator DENTON. This may be wrong, but I think it would piggy-back on and contribute to what I think you are getting at.

Feltrinelli was a pain in the neck to the Soviets, to the Communist movement in general. But on balance, on net evaluation, he was considered a plus.

The same, I think you are establishing, is true with respect to their accommodating this bastard spectrum of terrorist organizations. Net, they help them. Individually, in many cases, they are a terrible pain in the neck. But the policy is pragmatic and correct from their point of view.

This is complicated by the turn which the Red Brigades took in Italy, at which time they became such a pain in the neck that another attitude developed toward that specific group by the Soviets. Is that correct or incorrect?

Mrs. STERLING. If you are speaking about the Italian Communist Party in this connection, the Italian Communist Party has been—I must give it credit—the most coherent and consistent opponent of the Red Brigades in Italy since 1978. I believe them to have behaved in a most courageous way as the largest party of the left, as the party with their size and standing in Italy, to have helped the police, to have given information to the police that would help the police to make the kinds of arrests that have at least weakened, substantially, the structure of terrorism.

I should explain, of course, that this was now a self-interested policy on the part of the Communist Party. The Communist Party in Italy is the biggest single objective of the Red Brigades, as they have said themselves in various communiques which are cited in this book. That is, they consider the ruling Christian Democratic Party to be an enemy, but not "the" major target because their major target is the largest Communist Party in the Western world which they want to turn around. They wanted to prevent that party from moving on in a so-called historic compromise to a

government partnership with the Catholics and other political parties, and force that party to return to the classic role of Communist Parties in the old-style Bolshevik sense.

They attacked therefore the Berlingueriani of the Communist Party around the leader Enrico Berlinguer, who has favored a government partnership.

Whatever their motivations, however, I think that credit should be given to the Communist Party of Italy for the really coherent and strong position of support it has given to the forces of the police against the Red Brigades.

Mr. LEAHY. If I could sum up, then, my understanding of what you are saying is, it was a number of those groups, whether it was Feltrinelli or anybody else. It is not a case, in your estimation, that the Soviet Union went out and created them, but rather that whatever the motivation might be—social, political, economic or something else, or individual personality—gave rise to these groups and then, directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union would go and provide arms, support them to keep the ferment going.

Now, in many instances these groups are very, very small, relatively, a handful of people. It would appear that, again, following what you have told us, what you put in your book, that this action of the Soviet Union would appear to be directed against these various Western nations.

So, the thought comes to my mind, why have they not provided support to the small terrorist groups within this country? The Symbionese Liberation Army being an example. Why have they not moved in here, or have they?

Mrs. STERLING. I do not know. I think we should count our blessings so far. I really do not know.

Senator LEAHY. But does it not seem to be totally out of the picture?

Mrs. STERLING. All I do know is that in the early years, for example, there were some Black Panthers who were trained in guerrilla camps in the Middle East. Weathermen made frequent visits to Cuba. Certain other groups hid out in Algeria, then passed through Paris through a service group connected with the KGB, and so on.

These were early manifestations, after which, I just think the atmosphere was such in America that it was not promising for the growth of this activity. But there may be other reasons and I really do not know what they are.

Senator LEAHY. Why would our atmosphere be different, an anti-Soviet attitude or whatever attitude, a security attitude be different here than, say, Germany or the United Kingdom?

Mrs. STERLING. I am not thinking of government attitudes. I am thinking of the attitudes of the kinds of people who have provided for the terrorists of democratic Europe what they call a second society which puts up a protective wall around the terrorist hardcore so that they can be shielded from the police; that is, groups of leftists who are prepared to consider these people as authentic, if misguided revolutionaries, and therefore protect them from being caught by the police even though they may not always approve of their terrorist tactics.

You have to have a group like that. You have to have a hinterland like that in order to be able to have safe houses, to make your getaway, to be protected after a hit, for all kinds of logistics supply reasons, and so on.

It may be that it simply has not been possible so far in the years after the Vietnam war to create that kind of second society in America. This does not exclude the possibility that of course it could happen.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize again for the fact that I will not be able to be with you this afternoon, but I appreciate the opportunity to submit some questions. I would like to have heard more from Mrs. Sterling, as well as the next two witnesses.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy, for your marvelous contribution.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator DENTON. Senator East sent us a question which I will read. He is chairing a subcommittee at this time, as I mentioned and as a matter of courtesy I will read it to you.

He says: "On page 211—presumably of your book—

in discussing the Red Brigades of Italy you indicate that the violence the terrorists commit is only "the tip of the iceberg. What matters is the before and after, money, weapons, drill, documents, reconnaissance, deep security," etc. Many of these support activities that are necessary to successful terrorism are in fact legal and nonviolent and are not necessarily indicative of imminent violence. Yet, it would seem that in order to track terrorism adequately and for an intelligence or law enforcement agency to predict the occurrence of terrorism, it would have to have some surveillance of legal and nonviolent support.

Would you agree?

Mrs. STERLING. Well, I do of course believe that it is necessary for police forces to be as aware as they can be of these kinds of protective activities, certainly. I absolutely do not want to get into a domestic policy question in America of exactly what measures are necessary or not necessary. As I said before, this is not my "beat" and I just am not qualified to discuss it.

IRA PROVISIONALS

Senator DENTON. I do not think the stage of this hearing has reached that point, either.

Recently, we have been alerted of imminent IRA terrorist activity linked to the possible death of an IRA terrorist who is now engaged in a self-imposed hunger strike. You imply that the campaign of terror waged by the Provisional IRA is nothing more than a thinly disguised extension of European terrorism and manifests significant elements of collaboration with European and Arab terrorists.

Would you develop that?

Mrs. STERLING. Yes. I have a rather long chapter on the transition which the IRA Provisionals have gone through from the earliest days of this conflict when indeed they did set out in a nonpolitical way to defend Catholics who were in very deep trouble because of Protestant violence.

Indeed, the IRA Provisionals broke away from the official IRA on the grounds that they called the official IRA a "bunch of Commu-

nists" at the time and said that they were simply interested in defending the Catholic population, which I believe to be true.

Unfortunately, over the years in their appeals to especially the Irish-American public for money and help, they have allowed the perception to continue, the illusion to continue, that that is still their sole interest in Northern Ireland and that they are indeed fighting to unite Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland to the south. That is no longer in fact the case.

I can read you just a few quotations from their own publications indicating what it is they want now, or what it is they do not want now. They are in fact against the federation of the North and the South and have said so. I will find you that quote.

They are for the destruction of the existing establishments in both what they call the "Colonial North" and the "Fascist South." In just a minute, if you will have patience, I will find the exact quotes. Here we are.

They said—I am quoting now from their own statements or in their interviews with underground newspapers in Europe. The one is:

There is no future in either a restructured Parliament and Bill of Rights for the North or in the Fascist Free State to the South, whose legitimacy we will certainly never accept.

Lest a small doubt remain, I go on, they stated flatly:

Both the Quisling Regime in the Free State, and the Colonial Regime in the northern war zone have failed to produce a lasting solution. The war will continue until these structures are demolished.

Later on, upon assassinating Lord Mountbatten, the head of the Provisional Sinn Fein, which is their legal arm for political propaganda, explained that Lord Mountbatten was assassinated just as the promising moment seemed to be coming for a political solution to this problem of Northern Ireland with the Fitzgerald plan, which was favorably regarded by Irish-American men of importance, such as Senator Kennedy and Senator Moynihan, I believe, and the Irish Government in the Free Republic and the British Government, and various moderate forces in Northern Ireland.

Upon the assassination of Lord Mountbatten, within a few days—in fact, just a week after he died—Rory O'Bradaigh, who is the spokesman for the Provisional Sinn Fein said, "We do not want a confederation of the South with the North, nor do we want an independent Ulster. We want a general dismantling of the existing establishments in the Irish Republic and Ulster both."

He went on to explain what they did want in the Provisional IRA. "We want a Democratic Socialist Republic, something 'Third-World-ish,' a bit like Allende's Chile," flavored with thoughts, I add, from Colonel Qaddafi's green book to which he referred.

Then he goes on, "Similar to communism, but not exactly like it. Marxist in analysis" if not necessarily in practice, designed to "nationalize industries, control the means of production and distribution, and take over agriculture under state-run cooperatives. Not German Social Democracy and not quite a dictatorship of the proletariat," but speaking of the Stalinist model of democratic centralism he said, "We could not risk having parties around who want to bring colonialism back. There would have to be a reckoning with them."

In short, he was clearly implying the existence of a one-party state solution. There have been, of course, a series of other statements.

Senator DENTON. That is more than sufficient. Thank you.

I want to take advantage of the next 10 minutes before we recess and ask that you indulge your endurance a little longer.

In trying to think back on what this hearing has so far elicited from you, and the impressions that I got from your book, I find a couple of areas that I think still need to be brought out.

You have indicated the support and so forth of the Soviets for terrorism and the manner in which it is given. I do not think we have established the degree of unity which exists in that movement. We have talked about it being loose and bastardized. We have talked about the pragmatic accommodation of those groups.

But we have not brought out such things as the communality of reading the text, Mini Manual on Urban—what was it?

Mrs. STERLING. Urban Guerrilla.

MINI MANUAL FOR URBAN GUERRILLAS

Senator DENTON. Urban Guerrillas by another Carlos, not the Jackal. We have not brought out the unity of training that is taking place in Yemen. Would you bring that sort of thing out?

Mrs. STERLING. Yes. I would like to first just read a very brief section of the "Mini Manual for Urban Guerrillas," written by Carlos Marighella, a Brazilian, not to be confused with "Carlos the Jackal" in Paris.

This was published in 1969 and has since that time been found translated into 15 or more languages in terrorist hideouts, in cars, scenes of terrorist attacks all over the world. It is the theory of forcing a democratic government to behave like a police state. Of forcing a democratic society into an increasingly repressive posture so as to arouse the population to revolution, as Marighella says himself.

I can read to you very briefly the two paragraphs.

Senator DENTON. As I recall, it was most explicit and illuminating.

Mrs. STERLING. All right. He says,

First the urban guerrilla must use revolutionary violence to identify with popular causes and so win a popular base. Then, the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, arrests of innocent people make life in the city unbearable. The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation is transformed into a military situation in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence.

When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangman for elections and other tripe designed to fool the masses. Rejecting the so-called political solution, the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without let-up to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

That has become the standard formula of operations for the terrorist groups I have spoken of in all the democratic societies of the West.

Senator DENTON. In other words, there is a great communality of study on that textbook.

Mrs. STERLING. Oh, yes, the same words have been used by Erika Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Renato Curcio, the founder of the Red Brigades, by leaders of the Spanish ETA-Militar, by the Turkish People's Liberation Army, by IRA Provisionals—exactly the same words, transforming a military situation into a political one, forcing a democratic society to behave as a repressive police state.

Senator DENTON. And to then be perceived, understandably, by other democracies as a revolting government which should not be supported.

Mrs. STERLING. Yes, clearly.

Senator DENTON. Would you just mention some of the nationalities involved in the training going on, say, in Yemen?

Mrs. STERLING. Yes. I can read you a list of those who were observed marching in a parade from the guerrilla camps. The observers were three members of a reporting team of *Afrique* which is a black magazine published in Paris for black Africa, and a much respected magazine.

This report is only one of many about the guerrilla training camps being operated in Libya now for terrorists from all over the world. I will come to it in 1 second, if you will bear with me.

On September 1, 1979, the whole African contingent came out on parade in Benghazi where they were observed by the team. "You would have to see this army to understand its importance for Libyan leaders," he wrote. "Seven thousand black men went goose-stepping past a hysterical crowd under the gaze of Qadaffi, his eyes full of malice. Some drove tanks, others carried bazookas." He went on to describe who was passing in this parade.

"The would be future conquerors of Mali, Nigeria, Mauritania, the Cameroons, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, Benin, Niger, Chad, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and the Polisario Front." These are only the African contingents that he spoke about.

Apart from that, there are eyewitness accounts which are documented here of people training side by side in these camps, Italians, Germans, the IRA provisionals, including those who were trained to be frogmen who blew up Lord Mountbatten's fishing boat. The Spanish Basques, Germans, along with the group in the Philippines which bombed the cathedral on Easter Sunday; along with insurgents in Malaysia and Thailand; along with Puerto Ricans who have been given special attention by Colonel Qadaffi, and a number of other Latin American guerrilla representatives.

Senator DENTON. To use a Wall Street term, could you talk about the "margin" on which terrorism operates with such tremendous effect?

I was shocked to learn about this in your book. For example, an instance in which terrorists commit an absolutely atrocious act such as a kidnaping and murder. Some of them are arrested, and then the terrorists will do something—others of them in the same group—will seize an embassy, not only obtaining release after negotiation with the government of the original criminals, but then extorting a ransom also.

Could you give us an example?

Mrs. STERLING. Oh, yes, indeed. The very first occupation of an embassy in Europe was done by Carlos in 1973, in the fall of 1973.

He invented the technique which was then copied in a great many other places, as we all know to our sorrow by now; also in America.

In that case he called in a team of Japanese Red Army terrorists who had been trained in Lebanon by George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in order to liberate a member of the Japanese Red Army who, upon coming to Paris, had been caught by the police with false documents and forged passports and money.

Since he was in a Paris prison, Carlos organized the occupation of the French Embassy in Holland, using a Japanese Red Army team which he directed, sitting in Amsterdam.

While they were holding the French Embassy hostage, he demanded the release of the Japanese who was being held in the Paris prison, plus a \$1 million ransom. In order to strengthen the case, he blew up the drugstore, the famous Boulevard St. Germain hangout for the "chic" of all Paris. It was a terrible shock, of course, to the French. He threatened further terrorist episodes inside France in order to back up the operation in Holland.

Upon winning his case in that case, the Japanese terrorist was released from prison in Paris, along with the Japanese Red Army holding the embassy siege in Holland. All of them were put on a French plane and sent on a long route to Damascus. The French Government also gave them sort of pocket money of \$300,000 to see them on their way.

In other cases the ransom that has been paid has gone to as much as \$4 and \$5 million. The Germans once paid \$5 million in such a case.

Senator DENTON. Mrs. Sterling, I must say that, although I have great respect for the CIA and our other institutions, I believe that they have such a multitude of matters with which to concern themselves, necessarily, that you, in the field of terrorism, in my opinion are the most valuable source I know of from which to extract that which is significant and news.

Significant news is the only thing a democracy can have if the citizenry is to provide footing for government leadership in the interest of well-being and security.

So, I hope that this will not be your last availability to this subcommittee. I would like to thank you and congratulate you for your testimony this morning, and to thank you especially for your endurance.

We will recess until 2 o'clock. We stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p.m. on the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator DENTON. The afternoon session of the hearing will come to order.

I will ask Mr. Michael Ledeen if he will step forward. Do not sit down, please, Mr. Ledeen, I have not had the opportunity to swear you in. You have been introduced more or less twice in terms of your credentials in your absence. I will ask you, sir, if you will raise your right hand.

Mrs. STERLING. Oh, yes, the same words have been used by Erika Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Renato Curcio, the founder of the Red Brigades, by leaders of the Spanish ETA-Militar, by the Turkish People's Liberation Army, by IRA Provisionals—exactly the same words, transforming a military situation into a political one, forcing a democratic society to behave as a repressive police state.

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In other cases the ransom that has been paid has gone to as much as \$4 and \$5 million. The Germans once paid \$5 million in such a case.

Senator DENTON. Mrs. Sterling, I must say that, although I have great respect for the CIA and our other institutions, I believe that they have such a multitude of matters with which to concern themselves, necessarily, that you, in the field of terrorism, in my opinion are the most valuable source I know of from which to extract that which is significant and news.

Significant news is the only thing a democracy can have if the citizenry is to provide footing for government leadership in the interest of well-being and security.

So, I hope that this will not be your last availability to this subcommittee. I would like to thank you and congratulate you for your testimony this morning, and to thank you especially for your endurance.

We will recess until 2 o'clock. We stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p.m. on the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator DENTON. The afternoon session of the hearing will come to order.

I will ask Mr. Michael Ledeen if he will step forward. Do not sit down, please, Mr. Ledeen, I have not had the opportunity to swear you in. You have been introduced more or less twice in terms of your credentials in your absence. I will ask you, sir, if you will raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony which you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LEDEEN. I do.

Senator DENTON. Please be seated. I invite you to make any opening statement you care to, Mr. Ledeen.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL LEDEEN, PH. D., MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. LEDEEN. Mr. Chairman, I thought in the interest of brevity, rather than trying to summarize my statement, I would read it. [Laughter.]

Senator DENTON. I found that to be a very wise choice, for brevity's sake.

Mr. LEDEEN. My own work on the subject of terrorism is on the public record and I do not wish to take valuable time from the work of this subcommittee by rehearsing it here before you.

I do, however, wish to stress one aspect of it which I feel may have been ignored in the somewhat overheated discussion that has accompanied the publication of Claire Sterling's book; the remarks of the President and Secretary of State of the United States, and the work of this subcommittee.

My training is not in the field of journalism, and certainly not in the area of intelligence. I am, rather, a scholar by training and my work in European history has for the most part been conducted in the archives of the United States and Western Europe. As a result, the bulk of the evidence that has convinced me of the active Soviet role in the field of international terrorism comes from archival and documentary sources. It is not, as has so often been alleged and implied in the popular press, merely a repetition of things said in private by unnamed sources.

Before discussing this phenomenon in greater detail, I would like to add one further personal observation. I have come to this conclusion with the greatest reluctance, in no small part because I know from firsthand experience that much of the rage that drives young persons into terrorist organizations is both understandable and commendable.

INJUSTICES OF SOCIETIES

Whatever the degree of Soviet support, control, and manipulation of terrorism, many of the participants were driven to this extreme stance because of frustration and anger about the patent injustices of their own societies. It is sometimes difficult for Americans to appreciate the extent to which young persons overseas, even in relatively advanced societies, find themselves doomed to an unfulfilling life simply because of their social class or of the political persuasion of their parents.

When I taught at the University of Rome, I met numerous young people of great talent and high emotions who became increasingly enraged by what they considered to be gross social inequities in their own country. This ambience is the classic recruitment ground for terrorist organizations, and no one who has spent any amount

of time around such a university campus can fail to develop a certain sympathy for the emotional state of the young people there.

Yet, as Claire Sterling has written in her excellent book, the end result of terrorism is not greater democracy, but greater repression. If the terrorists were to succeed in their plan to destroy modern societies—which they call bourgeois democracies—I am sure that they would impose an institutional terror upon their countries that would be a dreadful spectacle to behold.

To borrow a phrase from the distinguished Italian journalist Indro Montanelli, if the Red Brigades really carried out the Communist revolution of which they speak, they would themselves become the KGB of postrevolutionary Italy.

My concern about terrorism, then, is not that of one who argues for the defense of the established order in countries like Italy, Spain, and Turkey, but is rather the concern of a person who has become convinced that the terrorists are a major obstacle to any realistic chance for greater democracy and social justice in such countries.

I say this, Mr. Chairman, because there is an unfortunate stereotype in some sectors of the popular press that would have it that all those who urge the American Government to take seriously the threat of international terrorism are spokesmen for a position termed "far right." And I would like the record to show that I, for one, believe that all those concerned with social justice and the advance of democracy in the world must unite against terrorists who today have provoked the fall of civilian government in Turkey, and have driven the Spanish military—or at least a certain portion of them—to attempt a coup d'etat.

It follows from what I have said that I believe we should be concerned about terrorism whatever its source may be. Even if I were convinced that there were no Soviet support for international terrorism, I should still be worried about it, and I would urge my Government to protect against an outbreak of terrorism here, as well as to assist our allies to defend themselves against it in their own countries.

The fact that so many terrorist organizations get support from the Russians adds a degree of urgency to our task and I do not think the facts are open to serious question. The Russians train PLO terrorists in the Soviet Union, supervise the training of terrorists from all over the world in Czechoslovakia—or at least they did until quite recently, according to the testimony of a leading defector, General Jan Sejna—and work hand in glove with countries like Libya, Cuba, and South Yemen in the training of terrorists.

The British press reports laconically that the killer of Lord Mountbatten got Soviet training in Libya; PLO leaders openly brag of their training in the Soviet Union; the first generation of Red Brigades leaders beat a regular path between Italy and Prague, long the headquarters of Soviet support for, and influence and control over, clandestine Communist operations in Italy.

CONNECTION BETWEEN ITALY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I would like to dwell for a moment on this historic connection between Italy and Czechoslovakia, to show the continuity that

characterizes Soviet actions. As is well known, in the early days of the international Communist movement, local Communist parties were under fairly strict Soviet control. In the case of Italy the Communist Party, the PCI, was controlled to a great extent through Prague.

Indeed, in the period that runs from the end of the Second World War at least until the death of Stalin in the mid-fifties, the archives of the PCI were physically in Prague.

There was a courier network between Rome and Prague, and the Communist runners brought documents and other information to Czechoslovakia and returned with money and instructions to Rome.

At the end of the war an organization known as the Volante Rossa came into being in Italy for a few years. This was a semi-clandestine group of armed men that served both as a security force for the PCI and for distinguished foreign visitors to Italy—the French Communist Party leader Thorez was guarded by them when he went to Rome—and as an assault force against the Communists' enemies. When the government finally clamped down on the Volante Rossa, several of its exponents went into exile—in Prague.

Thus, for one who studies the history of Russian activities in Italy, it is no surprise that a person like Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, the founding father of so much of contemporary Italian terrorism, should go so often to Czechoslovakia; nor that Carlo Curcio, the first chief of the Red Brigades, should have spent so much time there. This is a matter of continuity. Indeed, I believe it to be established that the Soviet Union actively supported and to at least a certain degree controlled clandestine paramilitary groups in Italy from the 1930's at least until the early 1970's.

In other words, the presence today of Soviet-supported paramilitary groups in Italy is not at all surprising; it is simply a continuation of a well-known policy.

Why, then, is there so much resistance to the claims of the Secretary of State and, coincidentally, of Claire Sterling on her recent book? Why, in particular, have some of the experts in our own Government disputed claims that appear to be commonplace in so much of the international press, and so well documented in our own archives and those of other countries?

One reason is undoubtedly a desire to refrain from making inflammatory statements without the sort of evidence that would convince even the most skeptical observer. Not to put too fine an edge on it, many of our experts feel that they should not accuse the Russians of supporting international terrorism without such overwhelming firsthand evidence that could be taken before a judge.

Given such an attitude, our experts have brought their critical faculties to bear on the available evidence and have discovered that they can doubt most all of it. Defectors' stories are always open to question; material in the archives simply shows what was reported, or what was believed, and not necessarily what was true; journalists, as we have recently been reminded anew, are not the most reliable sources; and our experts have even found it in themselves to doubt the public statements of PLO leaders about their own training in Russia. On other occasions they have gotten around this problem by asserting that not all members of the PLO are

terrorists, thereby begging the question, for it is precisely those who are trained in terrorist camps that we are interested in.

One can sympathize with the experts. To accuse the Russians in active complicity in international terrorism is a grave step, and certainly not one to be taken lightly. It is one thing to arrive at a conviction through an examination of highly convincing but still for the most part circumstantial evidence; it is another matter to publicly announce that conviction.

In other words, in the world of intelligence one may reach certain operational conclusions, valid for the conduct of policy and the tasking of one's own personnel, but one would not necessarily wish to make these conclusions public. I believe those of us who disagree with some of the recent statements attributed to governmental experts should try to understand their dilemma. When we speak, we do so on the basis of information we are willing to share with the public, and we speak with a private voice. When the Government announces a conclusion it is an event of far greater magnitude.

But the governmental critics of the "Terror Network" and of Secretary of State Haig have not been content to withhold their conclusions; they have felt compelled to tell inquiring journalists that they disagree. According to published accounts, they simply do not believe the claim that the Soviet Union is an active supporter of international terrorism. This, I believe, requires explanation.

If you will indulge a political hypothesis, Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that at least a part of the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the unfortunate political history of this country in the early 1950's when that intense anti-Communist wave known as McCarthyism hit the front pages. As a result of the deplorable excesses of Senator McCarthy and his ilk, it became virtually automatic for educated persons to equate anti-Communism with "McCarthyism." And a kind of simple syllogism was developed in the popular culture: McCarthy was anti-Communist; X is anti-Communist; therefore X is a McCarthyite.

In other words, anyone who took an anti-Communist position was branded a McCarthyite and that was the end of it. It was considered bad manners, reactionary, and generally poor form.

I suggest that a good deal of the hostile reaction to those who are calling for a serious examination of international terrorism is due to this conditioned cultural reflex. It is an unfortunate reflex, albeit an understandable one, for it gets in the way of serious analysis and examination of the facts. Much of what I have read of late on the subject has been an attempt to link persons like Claire Sterling to the atmosphere of paranoia that characterized the McCarthy period. This can only be attributed to a failure of serious examination, for no one who knows Claire, and no one who has taken the time to read her careful book, could make such a confusion.

This means that our country faces a dual task: Not only must we seriously consider the problem of terrorism, and its linkage to Russian activities, but we must also manage to overcome some stereotypes of our own making. I am sure that in the end, we shall manage to do both things. But it will not be easy.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Ledeen. I called you "Mister" because here in the Senate we call one another "Mister" on occasion instead of Senator. I recognize you have your Ph. D. well earned and exemplified by the scholarly statement you just made.

Before beginning questioning—and I think I will be solo this afternoon—I would have to say that I tend to agree totally with what you said. Even if it were not Soviet supported, I would be as interested as you in protecting against an outbreak of terrorism here and in the effort to assist our allies to defend themselves against it in their own countries. And also to the fact that since the Russians do support it, it does add a degree of urgency.

I will get to the end of your remarks where you characterize in rather mild terms—the same terms I would use—McCarthyism, the X is a McCarthyite thing, bad manners, reactionary, and generally poor form.

You say that you think we will get out of these stereotypes of our own making. I want to assure anyone who has any ideas to the contrary that my faith in that fact, or that hope that we will get out of our stereotypes, that we will achieve a rapprochement among the elements within our society who have fallen prey to that stereotypic thinking, some in academe, some in the press, some even in the church.

My faith in the working out of that rapprochement is that it is going to be entirely voluntary. I believe that the honesty in the press, in the media, is the source of optimism that I have. I believe that it is going to be worked out. When we get to disinformation and so forth, I have no intention of thinking in legislative terms and even investigative terms from an initiative on my part regarding digging that out.

It will be dug out to the degree that it can be, if it exists, as it will be with respect to intelligence agents who may have been contaminated, or academics, or politicians, Senators like myself, but that is not the thrust of my interest. My interest is in the honesty of what I know to be a "messianic" profession, the media, journalism in thinking soberly from where we are now and taking their step toward that rapprochement.

In your statement you indicated that you have a certain empathy for the highly motivated young people who attempt to overcome a rigid social structure and find themselves involved in terrorist activities.

From your experience and observation, what types of individuals are targeted for recruitment, and how do they become involved?

Mr. LEDEEN. Well, the identikit of West European terrorists is that they are young; they tend to range in age from about 18 to midtwenties. They are well educated, a surprising proportion go to the university; and they tend to be middle class or lower middle class.

Senator DENTON. With some exceptions, I guess, like the "limousine liberal" at least in the older age groups.

Mr. LEDEEN. Well, I would not confuse "limousine liberals" with terrorists, Senator, that I was talking about.

Senator DENTON. There are some in Claire's book.

Mr. LEDEEN. This Feltrinelli who was a millionaire terrorist, there are plenty of those, and there are aristocratic terrorists, members of European aristocracy that have become active in terrorism, on both left and right.

So, it is fairly democratic in its recruitment methods, it does not require class credentials in order to have you sign up. But sociologically it is primarily a middle-class phenomenon.

Senator DENTON. Let me balance my statement by saying that I am perfectly aware there are more conservative "limousine conservatives" than there are liberals.

Would you explain your perception of Soviet involvement with international terrorism, and what that involvement consists of?

Mr. LEDEEN. My perception?

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir.

GENERAL SEJNA INTERVIEW

Mr. LEDEEN. The bulk of what Claire says in her book—I think there is no real reason to rehearse it—I would just like to dwell on one aspect, which is the testimony of General Sejna, since I was the person who conducted the original interview with him that has produced so much work.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir; I am aware of that.

Mr. LEDEEN. What he told me—and I think that on the record he has proven to be quite a good source of all kinds of information, military as well as this kind of information—what he said was that the Soviet Union made a conscious decision at the level of Politburo in the midsixties, and they so advised their Warsaw Pact partners, that they were going to increase spending in the field of what they called strategic intelligence and what we would call paramilitary or terroristic operations, by 1,000 percent.

This decision was communicated to the pact countries as well as to the Cubans, and every country was then tasked to do its role. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was running these various Communist training camps which, as he explained, functioned on various levels. There was, if you will, a kind of "elementary school" camp where you were taught: this is a hand grenade, this is how to throw it. This is what Lenin said, this is how to repeat it.

Then, there were the postgraduate schools where people were trained in coded messages and secret writing, political organization and clandestine communication and so forth. It was this latter kind of camp where, according to Sejna, Feltrinelli was trained.

If what he says is right—and there is a great body of confirming evidence that has cropped up in the last few years—what we are dealing with is a conscious decision at the military level because, remember, General Sejna was a military officer and not an intelligence officer. So, his knowledge of this stuff, his participation in it, his role, was as a military officer running military camps; often not under KGB control but under GRU, that is to say, Soviet military intelligence control.

So, this was viewed by the Russians—again if this information is right—as a military operation. I think that is quite important.

I fully endorse what Claire has to say about the PLO. The only amazing thing about public reaction to her work on the PLO is that anybody challenges it because the PLO themselves were the

first to announce it on national television and interviews all over the place. They have announced not only their training in the Soviet Union, but their close working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Just in February the Kuwaiti News Agency published a long interview with the PLO's man in Moscow where he said:

We have a signed treaty that requires that before we take any kind of serious action we sit down and discuss it with the Russians, and coordinate our activities.

The reason I spent so little time on it in my statement, Senator, is because no one really seems to deny it except people around here.

Senator DENTON. How do you account for the fact that the CIA and members within the Department of State, as you mentioned, seemed to have overlooked the apparent wealth of evidence establishing Soviet involvement with international terrorism?

Mr. LEDEEN. It is complicated. I offer two answers. One is a proper diplomatic prudence. In a way it is not their move. Prior to the statements of the Secretary of State, since no American Government official was eager, or willing, or convinced to make such a statement, it would have been inappropriate, I think, for anyone at a lower level in the Government to have produced it on his or her own.

Second, there is this conditioned political reflex which has led a lot of people to be extremely reluctant to say anything that looks like it may be branded as viscerally anticommunism. This political reflex, as I suggested in my statement, simply means that in our current political culture, according to the conventional wisdom, there is no such thing as "left anticommunism," which is a very peculiar state of affairs as you will discover if you discuss this subject with any decent European Socialist, most of whom are violently anti-Communist and with good reason because they have had trouble with their Communists and are well aware that success of communism produces a reactionary system. They are fighting against this, as am I.

Finally, there has been the systematic damage to the intelligence community that has been done over the last decade. We are now paying a heavy price for it, and we are paying a price for it in a variety of ways, many of which are not immediately obvious.

LEAK TO MEDIA

One, Claire referred to, which is the fear that information transmitted to the American Government will be leaked to the media. I can just give you my own experience in this connection.

A few weeks ago I was asked by some people at the State Department to come over and share with them information and my analysis about terrorism in Italy. I agreed to do that on the basis that it would be a strictly off-the-record conversation.

I went over and talked to a group of about 10 persons collected from the State Department and the intelligence community, and 3 hours after I got back to my office I received a call from a person at the Washington Post rehearsing in great detail the conversations that I had had at the State Department, including a good deal

of information that I would not have discussed with these people if I had expected it would have been dealt with in that way.

Now, I can only assume that I was not singled out for special punishment and that this is standard operating procedure. On this basis it would be amazing that anyone with delicate information shared it with anybody in the American Government.

So, I am sure that there is a great reluctance on the part of both informed Americans and foreign citizens and foreign governments to share, if my experience is in any way typical, and I am sure it is. So, you have a great range of factors.

REGIONAL SPECIALIST CONSIDERED A FAILURE

There is one more thing, if you will permit me, and that is that a lot of the bureaucratic decisions in the American Government which are paralleled, interestingly enough, by the same kinds of decisions in the American media, make it very difficult for the United States, whether in journalism or in Government, to reward a person for spending his career as a regional specialist.

That is to say, whether you are in a regional bureau in the State Department or the intelligence community, or the Pentagon, or whether you are a foreign correspondent for the New York Times, the Washington Post, or whoever, your career is advanced as a result of constant horizontal motion; that is, shifting from one country to another, one region to another, one city to another, one kind of task to another. That is the way you advance and get promotions.

If you were simply to sit, let us say, as correspondent in Rome or in the Bureau for West European Affairs in the Department of State and spent 20 years there, you would be considered a failure, you would not advance.

This means that it is very hard to build up, either in the press or in the American Government, something that I call a valid, ongoing, institutional memory. So that every 2, 3, 4, or 5 years you have to begin the task all over again. It is hard to maintain continuity of understanding, information, concentration, focus, sources, and so forth.

Probably, not to be too immodest, we in the press and the private sector do it better than the Government because there is a kind of institutional pride, if you will, that has been rather more weakened in the Government of late than it has in the media.

So that a New York Times correspondent who replaces another New York Times correspondent inherits a certain mantle, New York Times mantle, which he is anxious to sustain. Often, since appointments in the bureaucracy are made on a political basis, the loyalty is to one administration or another rather than to the particular institution. So, that kind of continuity tends to be weakened.

I am trying to suggest it is a very complicated question as to why we do not know more about this. The fact remains, we do not seem to know an awful lot.

However, it follows from what I have said that we know more than we currently think we know. My guess is that if the State Department and the intelligence community put serious scholars to work on their files they would discover there is a lot more there

than they think there is. I have personally gotten a great deal of it under Freedom of Information Act requests, and if I can get it, they can too.

Senator DENTON. You are saying there is an institutional problem in terms of understanding the continuum of events, necessarily, in a democracy with a four-year Presidential administration, too, of course.

The military have the same problem to an even greater degree. You shift from job to job in senior ranks within a 1-year time frame, more or less concentrating upon the stepping stone or the brownny point and not have the value that institutional memory in a single job would give.

I would have to mention that Admiral Gorshkov has been the Chief of Naval Operations for some 30 years. The kinds of innovations that he comes up with, like trawlers, are not likely to come from a system like ours.

Mr. LEDEEN. They have had also, I think, in all three foreign ministers since the Revolution.

Senator DENTON. Gromyko, people like that who have been around since almost the revolution, yes, in the U.N. and all that. Our guys come and go. So, the institutional memory thing is definitely a problem.

I would think within the press, however, those who are in the field of international affairs would constitute a relatively constant institutional memory—I see a head shaking back there. But there have been a number who have been in international affairs for quite some time.

Mr. LEDEEN. A shrinking number. Arnaud has been often characterized as the last foreign correspondent, which is a slight overstatement but not all that much. You will find, I think, if you will poll the journalists in this room, that they will tell you that from the standpoint of their career they are much better off being in Washington than they are being overseas. That is doubly true for anyone who is in broadcast journalism because if you are overseas, the chances of your making it on the air on any given evening are slim. Your best shot is to find some good Washington story, that will get you on for sure.

Senator DENTON. To talk about institutional memory. In television, which most sociopsychologists say is the No. 1 socializing agent, I imagine they would have to agree that it is certainly an extremely important influence in forming conclusions about what represents truth in international affairs.

We have the dilemma of enslavement to the Neilsens, the president of the network being most conscious of his success in that regard; having power beyond his grasp, responsibility because of the nature of his job. The shallowness is inevitable; the lack of continuity is inevitable; sensationalism is inevitable, and it is a dilemma for which I see no particular solution.

I once talked to the president of a network and the vice president of another and did get one of the networks to put on something that I had asked for; namely, a review of international affairs since World War II.

Well, they actually did it. They put it on on a 3-hour, single-shot basis and even I went to sleep after about 1 hour and 45 minutes.

But were they to be encouraged, even underwritten, perhaps by some kind of collegium of Democratic-Republican political pack, as it were, to put on one which would come within the spectrum of agreement between McGovern on the one hand, and Goldwater on the other, and constitute the truth, and put it on in serial form, it would at least be a partial offset to the drumming in, bombardment of propaganda which is achieved in the Soviet Union and in other Communist nations.

I really do not have any concept of how that is to be brought about, or if it can be. But it seems to me that we are not even swimming in the ocean and the water is running out because they are drinking it all up on the other side.

Please, evaluate the respective roles of Cuba, Libya, East Germany, PLO, Czechoslovakia with respect to the training and support of terrorists. That is Cuba, Libya, East Germany, PLO, and Czechoslovakia.

Mr. LEDEEN. I am not really in a position to answer that question.

Senator DENTON. Can you describe the history and development of the Red Brigades in Italy, especially with regard to its connection and involvement with other international terrorists and the Soviet Union?

Mr. LEDEEN. Yes; I can do that for any number of hours, Senator.

The short answer is that the Red Brigades are an outgrowth of an ongoing discussion within the Italian far-left community, a discussion which had been ongoing ever since the mid-1950's.

I am afraid I have to go back into some historical background because I do not think it is possible to understand something like the Red Brigades out of a fairly broad historical context. I want to repeat what I said in my prepared statement.

If you go into the archives on Italian history, I do not believe that you can find a period of time between the early 1930's and the early 1970's in which there are not clandestine, far-left, paramilitary organizations in Italy with links to the Soviet Union.

Now, in the 1930's these were organizations designed to fight fascism, and all the way through the fascist period these organizations continued to run. When you get into the resistance period from 1943 to 1945, these armed groups emerge, multiply, strengthen until they take on the role of a fairly substantial fighting force.

After the war the question arose what to do with these armed men and women. Officially, they laid down their weapons, turned them over to the Allies and demobilized. In reality, a certain number of them—and estimates vary—remained in training, but they went underground.

If you read the intelligence reports that are in our National Archives you find that the assessments vary in the period between 1945 and the early 1950s between about 70,000 and about 150,000 trained, disciplined, paramilitary formations. You saw this secret army briefly for a few days in December 1948 when there was an attempt to assassinate the Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, and spontaneously in many of the cities of Italy, particularly in the north, these bands emerged and started to take charge since they had always believed, along with lots of other people, that

eventually they would be the fighting wedge of the Communist revolution.

Now, we can have a fascinating discussion—probably not today or here—as to whether Stalin actually ever intended to use these people as a fighting formation, but the important thing is, they believed that would be their historic role.

It is a substantial number, even if you take the minimum estimates produced by the American Government during that period.

Now, the groups were, to a certain extent, dismantled in the mid-1950's with the death of Stalin and a series of scandals within the Italian Communist Party. But if you take the leading figures in that organization, Pietro Secchia and his various associates, and you then track them through the 1960's and into the early 1970's, you find that they disappear for a while; they go to work in regional organizations, generally around the cities in which the Red Brigades will be strongest in the 1970's. That is to say, Genoa, Turin, and Milan.

Then they resurfaced all over again in the 1970's, this time around Feltrinelli and the Red Brigades. There are several of these figures. I can give you a long document, research document which will shortly be printed as part of a book on this subject because I do not think we have time to go into it in this degree of detail here today.

Suffice it to say that many of these people are now on trial in Italy and so a lot of the missing details of their biographies are in the process of being filled in. But the general statement, I think, is a perfectly accurate one: There is a continuity of these people from the clandestine Communist Party organizations of the 1940's and 1950's to the Red Brigades in the 1970's, even though many of these people became much more marginal in the party, and even though, as Claire rightly said this morning, the Communist Party itself, from the date of the Moro assassination, has been really quite good in its public statements on terrorism.

Now, the other curious thing about the biographical continuity that leads from these paramilitary groups to the Red Brigades is the tourist continuity, if you like, of trips to Prague and, starting in the mid-1960's, trips to Havana. You find that Feltrinelli is simply typical of a whole group of people who have a kind of regular itinerary which takes them to Rome, Havana, and Prague, Rome, Havana, Prague, over and over again. Feltrinelli as well as other, lesser-known people beat this well-worn path.

It is, as I said in my statement, similar to the path that used to be trodden by the Communist couriers when the Italian Communist Party archives were under Czechoslovakian control.

So, the moral of all of this, it seems to me, is that there is an ongoing operational network in which these people have functioned over a long period of time and continue to function today.

I would like to address for a moment the question of control because Claire often says, there is no impression about Soviet support for these organizations, and that is true. There is a great deal of impression about the degree of Soviet control over these organizations, and that is really an academic question but important for understanding.

The issue is this: that the existence of the two levels of training in Czechoslovakia and presumably other places, I think, shows that there are going to be at least some cases in which the Russians will want to maintain a certain degree of control over some of these people. Now, interestingly, we have a drastic example of a man who was given the best training and over whom the Russians despaired of ever having anything approaching good control, and that is Feltrinelli.

He was too mercurial and he was too independent-minded. He was too much of a character. But I think that the kind of training that goes on at those camps leads one to conclude that they would attempt to maintain at least a certain degree of control over some of these groups.

NO U.S. ASSISTANCE IN SPAIN

Senator DENTON. It has been mentioned before, but after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco the Spanish Government for the first time in many years had an opportunity to try democracy. The new government was immediately beset with violent attacks from the Basque separatists, ETA.

In 1977, officials of the struggling democracy turned to the new U.S. administration for assistance in coping with this problem but were rebuffed. The Spanish Government viewed the U.S. reaction as confusing since they had been led to believe we would support the new democracy.

Can you enlighten the subcommittee as to the dynamics of this situation, how it occurred?

Mr. LEDEEN. Yes. In 1977, the Carter administration issued an Executive order which forbade the CIA from giving assistance to foreign countries in dealing with terrorism unless it could be demonstrated that the terrorism in question was international.

Now, the perfectly admirable reason for this Executive order was that the Carter administration did not wish to have the Central Intelligence Agency supporting repressive regimes who would clamp down on domestic dissents in their own countries simply by labeling it terrorism. So, they wanted to make it as difficult as possible for the American Government to provide assistance to such countries.

Unfortunately, the Executive order was issued in such a way that it was extremely difficult for the lawyers at CIA to make a finding that a given terrorist organization was international. It had to meet a very vigorous set of criteria. In the case of ETA they failed to give it its international degree and advised the President that they could not make such a finding, and the President therefore communicated to the Spanish Government that we could not help them.

Now, I in fact had a long conversation with one of the highest ranking members of the Spanish Government in the autumn of 1977 where this gentleman got extremely angry and pounded the table and said, "Why does your government wish to see us fail over here?" Because from his standpoint the failure of the American Government to help Spanish democracy against terrorism could only mean one thing, that it did not wish to see that Spanish Government survive or flourish.

When I tried to explain to him that he was not singled out for special punishment, but that we were quite democratic about it and that we were equally reluctant to help the Italians or whom-ever because we could not find that the Red Brigades were international, either, he simply could not grasp it.

I think for a traditional country which does not have the kind of moralistic legislation that we have passed here in the last 10 or 15 years, it is simply incomprehensible and a normal misunderstanding.

I am positive that the latest flap over the presumed slowness of the American administration to come to the support of the King, or Spanish democracy, during the attempted coup stems from years of rage at our failure to help them fight the Basques. In that sense, for years they have been furious at us and have been secretly convinced that we wanted to see them destroyed.

But simply because the Secretary of State could not find an appropriate person with whom to communicate during the night of the coup—and I observe parenthetically that the Spanish Ambassador in Washington in the same period could not find a government to communicate with, either—that simply because this was not transmitted rapidly enough, and simply because the Secretary of State wished to stay out of the matter before he knew anything about it and thereby saying, so far as he knew it was an internal matter, all of this rage then exploded at this time, where it had not exploded publicly before.

I can only say that the consequences of our failure to help the Spaniards defend themselves against ETA terrorism are very profound ones, not only for our relations with Spain, which are strained today in large part because of it, but also for other countries because other countries familiar with this history must ask themselves similar questions.

"When our time comes, when we will have our terrorists here, will the U.S. Government ask us to bring them moving pictures of these terrorists crossing borders, operating on both sides" and so forth. After all, ETA lived in France, killed in Spain, and trained in Algeria. That would seem to be international enough for most anyone.

SMOKING GUN THEORY

Senator DENTON. That example is almost minuscule compared to four Presidents assuring the people of South Vietnam that we would persevere, use any means necessary to preserve their freedom; and somehow we did not make it.

The questions asked around the world on that are still being asked and perhaps dwarf the example you offered, although it is certainly an interesting one.

Those who are critical of the conclusion that the Soviets and their surrogates feed international terrorism apparently subscribe to a smoking gun theory which is something you have been touching on. You must find a Soviet with a smoking gun in hand, or in close proximity to the body.

The way the question is worded, when, in your opinion, does circumstantial evidence constitute direct evidence of culpability in terrorist activity?

I would like to modify that to say, how do you see a way out of that presently apparent dilemma?

Mr. LEDDEN. Well, is not the bragging of PLO officials sufficient for starters when they themselves say they are trained in the Soviet Union by the Soviet Union, armed by them, fed by them, paid by them, that they work jointly with them? Why do we not believe that when all the evidence supports it? When defectors come out and say that there are training camps in these countries where terrorists train, when this fits with the information on the movements of people like Feltrinelli?

When eight members are arrested at an airport in Spain on a flight coming from South Yemen and when they are then interrogated by Spanish security officials and say, "We were trained in South Yemen at a terrorist camp," whose existence has been confirmed by East Germans and Cubans, why should we not believe this?

This evidence, Senator, in my opinion is not circumstantial, this is direct. If by direct evidence they mean a tape recording or a document of the conversations of the Politburo by which these decisions have arrived at, which show that these are conscious political decisions by the Kremlin elite, I think that we shall have to wait until the Soviet Union passes its version of the Freedom of Information Act before we will ever have this.

I do not think we will ever have it, I am not optimistic.

Senator DENTON. This morning—I think you had not arrived—I asked Mrs. Sterling a question about her opinion of whether the Secretary of State had gone too far in ascribing Soviet backing to terrorism, and her response was almost lost in the laughter which occurred after she began her statement by saying, "Well, I realize the Secretary of State has his problems."

I found that ironic and symptomatic, and it deals with the next set of questions. What is your understanding of U.S. public perception concerning the U.S.S.R.'s role in international terrorism?

The public's perception, and perhaps distinct from that the press' presentation of a perception.

Mr. LEDDEN. I think that the public is confused, as I believe most of the journalists who have addressed this question are themselves confused. I think they are entitled to be confused.

How can the public not be confused when the Secretary of State says one thing and members of the bureaucracy say something quite different?

How can any reasonable journalist in Washington not be confused when the Secretary of State strongly says he has this information and then these journalists inquire and seem to discover that the intelligence community does not have it? They begin to wonder, what does the Secretary of State base his statements on, anyway; or why are these people in the bureaucracy saying they do not know what the Secretary of State knows.

I do not think there is any great mystery about it. As you have gathered, I am convinced that the Secretary of State is correct about this, and I am quite convinced that the Secretary of State knows a great deal more about this subject than I do, or that Claire Sterling does.

I believe the reason he knows it is that during his tour in Europe as Supreme Allied Commander he was briefed by the heads of these various services in Western Europe who share tidbits with people like Claire and me, but who undoubtedly sit down and pour out their hearts to people like General Haig.

General Haig cannot use this information, he is bound by the same codes any good journalist is when the journalist sits down with such people. We cannot identify these sources, and he certainly cannot, either. It must have been a bit of a shock to him, and some day when he writes his memoirs I expect that this will play at least some small part in it, to discover that the stuff they were telling him was not being shared in Washington and Langley. I expect that is what has happened in this case.

Senator DENTON. I hope it is a long time before General Haig has to write his memoirs. As I traveled from Birmingham to Pittsburgh to Los Angeles, I found a great many Americans out there who have the same hope in spite of what has been presented to them as cartoons and vilification of the man.

The remarkable thing about him, you know, when he went to Europe from the White House, General Goodpastor, a good friend of mine also, was his predecessor, as you know. There was considerable antipathy from within the Army itself because of this White House general going over there to replace this beloved man who in his own right is a great man.

Within 6 months, that had entirely turned around. General Haig had gained the respect and admiration of all of his military colleagues in Europe, other nationals, as well as the respect of the entire U.S. Army and the other services involved.

I find it a crying shame that a man who has given as much and tries so hard is being attacked in such a shallow way by people who think they are doing the right thing, in many cases.

To what degree are U.S. citizens informed with regard to terrorism, and how does this affect the U.S. Government's ability to perform its function in protecting national security? A very related question, perhaps you have already answered it.

Mr. LEDEEN. I do not believe that we are very well informed about terrorism, although the publication and sales of this book will certainly help matters considerably.

As to the ability of the U.S. Government to cope with this problem, at the moment, domestically, there is no problem to cope with because we are blessedly free of the kind of mass terrorism that has afflicted so many other countries.

I suppose the question must be, if it were to happen here, how well would we deal with it. The answer is that we, like every other democratic country, would deal with it poorly in the beginning because we conduct our affairs to guarantee maximum freedom to our citizens. In so doing, we make it very difficult for security forces, police officials, and intelligence agencies to do their work in this country. That is the way it should be.

When and if we have an emergency of this nature, it will take us quite some time to get on top of it, as it took the Italians a long time to get on top of it, at some cost to individual freedom, I must add. The Spaniards still are not on top of it, and they are now

asking the military to play a larger role in it. There is a nasty history of where that kind of activity leads.

So, it is a real tough problem because as Claire said, terrorists very often do succeed in destroying democracy. That is what they are best at, killing people and destroying democracy.

Senator DENTON. Dr. Ledeen, I want to thank you. I understand that your convenience requires your departure at 3 o'clock. Your testimony will add much value to this record. I give you permission to leave and thank you very much.

Before asking for the next witness, I often get put on report by my Navy friends for saying something that is apparently critical. I believe that our Navy because of its freedom, the freedom of all of us and the flexibility within the individuals out there, will more than compensate man for man, ship for ship, with the Soviets.

I maintain, however, that we do have a problem with institutional ticket punching, 1 year in command of one kind of a ship, another year in the command of another; then on to another job for a year, and so on. I do not know what to do about it, it is a problem and I mentioned it.

Mr. de Borchgrave, would you come forward please, sir? We have already gone through the oath.

I would like to preface my invitation to you to begin your opening statement with a statement of my own. There was a question and answer version of an interview which was some 10 times longer than the questions and answers would indicate. I have no reservation about the goodwill in the printed interview; it was read to me on the telephone yesterday.

I tried to correct the reference to you by saying, I said a good bit more than that, that is sort of out of context and was told, "But you said that."

I want to say something else right now for the record. I believe you are a man of courage. I believe that your book, "The Spike," presents an example very typical of the young idealist mentioned by both Claire Sterling and Dr. Ledeen, who misguidedly, but well-meaningly espouses a cause and undertakes conduct which he later comes to regret, coming the full circle in realizing that idealism can be sought best within the system, the glorious system established in this country.

I think the fact that the young man happened to be a journalist and, although an extreme example, it in an extreme way characterizes the kind of metamorphosis that I think is taking place within American journalism today and will continue to take place.

I do not want that to sound condescending because I realize there are many journalists much smarter than I, much more patriotic than I. But what I said earlier about a rapprochement I feel is the only solution to the real threat to our security. If our public does not have news in proportion, facts in terms of relative significance, they cannot serve as footing for leadership in government which will survive the security and well-being of this Nation and civilization in the world.

I think your book, considering the context of the last 15 years, that which has been printed, that which has been said, was an extremely relevant and helpful contribution and I want to state that I admire you very much.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Thank you, Senator.
 Senator Denton. Would you care to make an opening statement, sir?

TESTIMONY OF ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, INTERNATIONAL JOURNALIST, COAUTHOR OF "THE SPIKE", ASSOCIATED WITH CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Perhaps I should preface the opening statement by reminding you, Mr. Chairman, that the book which I coauthored with Robert Moss was a novel.

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. In a letter smuggled out to the New York Times last spring, Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the inventor of the Soviet H-bomb and a member in good standing of the Soviet establishment before he became Russia's leading dissident, now as you know in KGB-imposed exile in the city of Gorki, warned the Western world not to reject allegations of links between the KGB and its proxy services on the one hand and international terrorist groups on the other.

According to West European intelligence services, the basic decision to support international terrorist groups—as I believe was made clear earlier today—was taken at the Tri-Continental Conference at Havana in 1966. The implementation of this decision began in 1968.

Some European counterintelligence specialists began collecting circumstantial evidence in 1972 and at least one European service obtained irrefutable proof in 1974. I should perhaps add that I also know of three others, including the Israeli Secret Service, who now have the same kind of proof.

But Soviet disinformation on these matters, coupled with intensive disinformation on the true meaning of detente, successfully prevented Western governments from facing up to this critical problem. The distinguished Senator from Vermont and Mr. Colby seemed to have a little difficulty with this statement earlier today, but I thought that Mrs. Sterling amplified it and explained it most eloquently.

ORGANIZED DECEIT

The objective of the revised strategy agreed upon at Havana in 1966 was to undermine Western interests in the Third World and to destabilize Western societies while keeping Western governments and opinion makers anesthetized with a policy of peaceful coexistence, known in the West as *détente*.

Organized deceit has always occupied a major role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The history of Soviet deception goes all the way back to the founder of the Bolshevik Secret Service, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who created a secret political department under Yakov Shulovich Agronov, whose mission was to conduct demoralization exercises against the West.

In 1921, Lenin wrote a memo to Tchitcherin, then commissar for foreign affairs, which stated that:

To tell the truth is a petty bourgeois habit, whereas for us to lie is justified by our objectives.

He said:

Capitalists the world over and their governments will close their eyes on our activities and will become blind as well as deaf-mute. They will send us credits which will in turn serve to finance the Communist Party in their countries. They will supply us with equipment and the technology that we lack, and will help us to rebuild our military industry which we need later to launch victorious attacks against our suppliers. In other words, they will always work to prepare their own suicide.

Disinformation, Mr. Chairman—which happens to be my own particular field of research—has been central to Soviet strategy for defeating the West since 1968 when the newly appointed KGB chief, General Yuri Andropov, elevated the Disinformation Department of the KGB to the status of an independent Directorate, known as Directorate A.

Working closely with Boris Ponomarev, who was referred to earlier today by Mrs. Sterling, the veteran Stalinist who still runs the powerful International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee, the KGB drew up a long-range program of active measures; 1968, let me remind you, was the age of the Tet offensive in Vietnam, student revolts all over the Western world, and the May uprising in France.

Encouraged by this general attack on authority in Western countries, the ultimate goal of the KGB plan—confirmed to us by numerous defectors from Eastern secret services—was to bring about the strategic defeat of the "main enemy"; namely, the United States and the NATO Alliance as a whole without having to fight a war.

The guiding principles behind the KGB's "active measures" program are embodied in the quotations from the Chinese philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, who said 2,500 years ago that "fighting is the most primitive way of making war on your enemies." It was, therefore, important, explained Sun Tzu to:

One. Cover with ridicule all of the valid traditions in your opponent's country.

Two. Implicate their leaders in criminal affairs and then at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen.

Three. Aggravate by every means at your command all of the existing differences in your opponent's country.

Four. Agitate the young against the old.

"Because" concluded Sun Tzu 25 centuries ago, "the supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles, the supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies without ever having to fight them."

These quotations, frequently referred to in KGB training courses are crucial to an understanding of how disinformation functions.

The methods of this new "active measures" program approved by the Soviet Politburo in 1968 were to include: increased recruitment of agents of influence in Western countries; character assassination campaigns to discredit Western leaders; covertly sponsored strikes and demonstrations; the spreading of false information to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and between the industrial West and the Third World on the other. The infiltration and manipulation of new left groups; covert support for terrorism; and, above all, the manipulation of the Western media.

A primary objective was also the sabotage of Western intelligence services through press exposure.

MYTH MAKING

The Polish UB, East Germany's MFS, the Czech STB, the Hungarian AVH, the Cuban DGI and other Soviet proxy services all have disinformation departments. Professor Bitman, now in this country, who is a Czech defector, was at one time the deputy director of the Disinformation Department of the Czech Secret Service.

I think it is worth noting that a book titled "Who's Who in the CIA" was published in East Berlin in 1968 and was the brainchild of the East German Secret Service which closely coordinates all of its activities with the KGB, as does every satellite and proxy service in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and in several Marxist regimes of the Third World.

The book was a major breakthrough for the KGB and led to a new investigative genre of journalism for the Western media which consisted of exposing the CIA while largely ignoring the KGB.

The man charged with executing disinformation operations in the West, along with other active measures, was the head of Directorate A, General Agayants, an Armenian. When he died later in 1968 his deputy, Sergei Kondrashev—a very supple, sophisticated operative, fluent in several Western languages—took over.

It might be worth noting at this point that Sergei Kondrashev showed up with the Soviet delegation in Madrid a few months ago on the implementation of the Helsinki accords.

Myth making is a large part of the Soviet disinformation brief. The head of the KGB's Disinformation Directorate is quoted by Soviet defectors now in Western Europe as having told his agents in 1968 that "Our friends must always be encouraged to write or say precisely the opposite of our real objectives. Conflict between East and West is a permanent premise of Soviet thought" he said, "until the final demise of capitalist power in the West. But this must constantly be dismissed and ridiculed as rightist cold war thinking."

Lenin once said, Mr. Chairman, that "To pin a label on someone is half the battle." I think one notices that with accusations of McCarthyism which have come to my attention recently and which I believe you have been a victim of and I have been a victim of.

Nothing will change the fact that Soviet disinformation does indeed exist and is indeed managed by Directorate A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. It is a real problem, posing serious dangers for any democratic society, especially one that accords instinctive respect and constitutional protection to an untrammelled free press.

DR. SAKHAROV'S POLITICAL TESTAMENT

May I respectfully suggest, sir, that you read, along with your colleagues if they have not already done so, a report on Soviet covert operations, including disinformation successes, released by the House Select Committee on Intelligence in February of last year. This report contains many examples of the hundreds of oper-

ations conducted yearly by the KGB and its proxies in the Western media.

Senator DENTON. I am told we have it, and we shall read it.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Thank you, sir.

"The West and developing countries," said Sakharov in that letter smuggled out to the New York Times, "are filled with citizens who by reason of their positions are able to promote Soviet influence and expansionist goals. Some," he said, "are ideologically motivated." Which Sakharov conceded "were motivations worthy of discussion. But there are others," he added, "who conduct themselves in a 'progressive' manner because they consider it profitable, prestigious, or fashionable."

"A third category," Sakharov explained, "consists of naive, poorly informed or indifferent people who close their eyes and ears to the bitter truth and eagerly swallow any sweet lie. These are the people that Lenin once called 'useful idiots'."

"Finally," said Sakharov, "there is the fourth group, people who have been 'bought' in the most direct sense of the word and not always with money. These," said Sakharov, "include political figures, businessmen, a great many writers and journalists, government advisers, and even some heads of press and television."

Sakharov, as I recall in that letter, Mr. Chairman, said that he had seen envelopes change hands. He did live at the top of the Soviet establishment for 25 years with access to the Kremlin. I think this gentleman knows what he is talking about, as opposed to Mr. Solzhenitsyn who suffered in the concentration camps but was never at the top of the Soviet establishment.

"The world," says Sakharov, "is facing very critical times and cruel cataclysms because the West and developing countries do not show the required firmness, unity and consistency in resisting the totalitarian challenge" from his country. And this, he explained, relates to governments, to the intelligentsia, to the media and to business. "It is critically important," Sakharov concluded, "that the common danger be fully understood and then everything else will fall into place."

That happens to be the purpose of this statement, Mr. Chairman.

A prominent member of the French Communist Party, Auguste Lecoq, was kicked out of the party for objecting to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and last year he published a book titled in French, "La Strategie du Mensonge"—the strategy of lies. "Everything we did," he wrote, "was based on lies."

SOVIET PLANS

A recent defector from the KGB who is being debriefed at the present time by the West German intelligence services, the BND and the BFV, has provided important information on what the Soviet leadership has been planning.

His name is Major Korolyuk, whose cover was as an interpreter with the Soviet delegation to the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, known as MBFR, in Vienna. Last year he said to his German debriefers the Soviet Politburo resolved to step up the general offensive against the West in 1981—concentrating on areas that are not covered by the NATO alliance, especially in the

Persian Gulf, in Southern and Central Africa, and in Central America.

The plan, said Major Korolyuk, is to seek through covert action to install pro-Soviet regimes that can appeal, when necessary, for military assistance in the name of "fraternal socialist aid," thus denying the NATO powers a legal or political pretext for taking effective countermeasures.

In this country, as I am sure you realize, the FBI recently increased its counterintelligence staff to counter increasingly aggressive operations being mounted by the KGB to recruit agents and sources inside the Reagan administration and to steal industrial and high-technology secrets.

On an average day—and these figures are about 10 years old, I understand it has been stepped up—Mr. Chairman, on an average day three American citizens are approached somewhere in the world for recruitment purposes by the KGB and its allied services. That is over 1,000 a year and an estimated 10-percent payoff for the KGB in one way or another.

I personally was approached twice, once in the early 1950's when I was a young Paris Bureau chief for Newsweek magazine. I was 24 at the time, and I reported that attempt to the CIA in Paris. The second time was in New York when I was serving as foreign editor in the late 1950's, and I reported the proposed arrangement to the FBI.

A top secret KGB manual titled, "The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries," published by the First Chief Directorate of the KGB and which has been in the possession of the CIA for a number of years, listed in order of priority 12 categories of recruitment targets. The first was government personnel with access to classified information; the second was members of the media.

This high priority is not too hard to understand. Richard Reeves, a very distinguished liberal columnist writing in the Columbia Review of Journalism last year, said that the most powerful people in our country today are no longer the national political bosses but the national political reporters. Many people have written about the power of the media. So, it is perfectly normal that the media should be a high-priority target for the KGB for penetration purposes. Penetration is the name of the game.

THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL

A number of leading scientists, ranging from Andrei Sakharov to Dr. Fred Hoyle, have suggested that as part of Russia's strategy of control of the Western world's oil supplies in the Middle East, the Soviet Union today is playing a covert role in promoting the anti-nuclear lobby. Western intelligence services have irrefutable proof of this too about a direct link between the World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet front organization, and antinuclear lobbies, both in the United States and in Western Europe.

The World Peace Council's U.S. branch, known as the U.S. Peace Council, and the Communist Party U.S.A. are affiliated with MFS, which stands for Mobilization for Survival, which is a leading umbrella organization for antinuclear groups. Interestingly

enough, MFS has now linked the antinuclear protest to unilateral disarmament advocates, new left activists, and some ecologists.

The FBI cannot investigate groups that are not in the act of committing—or about to commit—a crime under the current domestic security guidelines, as we heard earlier today. Under other guidelines, the FBI cannot investigate groups that cannot be shown to be directed by a foreign power. That, of course, makes it very difficult indeed for the FBI to monitor the very groups and individuals that the KGB hopes to manipulate or recruit.

Arkady Chevchenko, who was once the highest ranking Russian on the staff of U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has stated on the public record that the 300-odd KGB and GRU agents stationed in New York include Victor Lessiovsky, currently special assistant to Mr. Waldheim. Mr. Lessiovsky, Mr. Chairman, has been known to be a KGB agent since the early 1950's when he was stationed in Burma. More recently, Lessiovsky has been very active, cultivating businessmen close to the Reagan administration.

THE U.N.-KGB CONNECTION

Top United Nations sources in New York and Geneva have told me that the U.N. infrastructure is under increasing KGB control. Recently there was a defector from the U.N. organization in Geneva, he was making \$50,000 a year as a press officer for the World Health Organization. He defected to MI-6 in England and pointed out to his British debriefers that 25 percent of his salary was paid by the American taxpayer.

My sources, many of whom until quite recently insisted that suspicions of such a massive operation were quite unfounded, stressed that basic decisions at the U.N. on personnel appointments, foreign travel, and even the political content of official U.N. publications, are largely in Russian hands. I live in Geneva, and I can certainly testify that that is the case in Geneva.

Some of these publications are prime conduits for Soviet disinformation in the Third World.

This statement, Mr. Chairman, is merely designed to try to paint the broad brush strokes of the sort of intelligence problems our society is confronted with.

Thank you, sir.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. de Borchgrave, you mentioned that your book was a novel, it is fiction. But for about 8 years I have been making speeches throughout this country, contacts throughout this country, trying to express some things that I believe need expressing.

I have had not tens, but hundreds of young men and women come up to me after a speech in which I tried to describe the misperceptions in this country during the latter stages of Vietnam and after it, and they have said that they went precisely the same route that the hero of your book went.

So, I do not think your book is just fiction. I think it is extremely relevant to our day and I think that some of the characters in your book are painted so accurately that one need but change the name. I happened to come in contact directly with one of them. I do not recall what you named him, but immediately after being interviewed by a Japanese who later defected because he got a scoop

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Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. de Borchgrave, you mentioned that your book was a novel, it is fiction. But for about 8 years I have been making speeches throughout this country, contacts throughout this country, trying to express some things that I believe need expressing.

I have had not tens, but hundreds of young men and women come up to me after a speech in which I tried to describe the misperceptions in this country during the latter stages of Vietnam and after it, and they have said that they went precisely the same route that the hero of your book went.

So, I do not think your book is just fiction. I think it is extremely relevant to our day and I think that some of the characters in your book are painted so accurately that one need but change the name. I happened to come in contact directly with one of them. I do not recall what you named him, but immediately after being interviewed by a Japanese who later defected because he got a scoop

when I did not respond before his television cameras the way I had been prepared through torture to respond and he knew he had a scoop, although he had been over there procommunizing it for about a year, he absconded with the tape and sold it to American television for \$50,000. He later went to work for the South Vietnamese.

But the next gentleman they had scheduled to interview me—they did not want to lose face by not proceeding with it—was a gentleman by the name of Wilford Burchett, and if I am not mistaken, he is one of the characters in your book by another name.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I am afraid you are mistaken, Senator, because all the characters in the book are fictional characters.

Senator DENTON. All right, Mr. de Borchgrave.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. The situations we described, sir, insofar as disinformation operations are concerned, are factual. As a matter of fact, Dr. Igor Glagolev, once a consultant to the ruling Soviet Politburo who lives in this city, said that insofar as disinformation operations are concerned, and the way they were described, we had understated the truth.

As for Arkady Chevchenko, former assistant to Kurt Waldheim, he said publicly, sir, that this was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth insofar, again, as disinformation operations are concerned because he said, "I lived all of that for 30 years." He was even instructed once to write a book by the KGB on Soviet disarmament proposals which was later published in Western Europe under somebody else's name.

Senator DENTON. I respect the sources of your derivations of characters.

Your statement on page 4 of your testimony indicates that no longer are political bosses in control but national political reporters. For your information, that is why I tried to retire from the service in 1975. I perceived the relative irrelevancy in terms of governmental direction, considering the way we were going on the Vietnamese situation, the Southeast Asian situation, in spite of attempted government leadership.

I refused to run for office in 1978 and again in 1980 because I perceived the same thing. The action was in the media and to a lesser degree in academe. I believe now there is an opportunity. I believe that Iran and Afghanistan, and the terrorism that we are discussing now, are sufficient evidence onto the need.

I believe that the media will serve to inform our public. I believe there will be, as I said, a reexamination, a gradual representation of that which is significant, or I would not be here, it would be futile.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I see it happening every day. I would agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir. I am amazed to hear you say that simply because I respect your observations.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. May I point out, sir, that it was not my statement on page 4, it was a statement made by Richard Reeves in the Columbia Review of Journalism.

Senator DENTON. Right.

Is there any evidence of disinformation emanating from countries other than the Soviet Union, or countries operating as its surrogates?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Yes, sir. The disinformation departments of all the Eastern secret services and Third World proxy services are carefully coordinated.

We talked about Libya earlier today, but nobody pointed out that the Libyan secret service, known as the Mukhabarat is almost entirely controlled these days by the East German secret service. The East German secret service has done a lot of subcontracting work for the KGB in friendly Third World countries under Marxist regimes, such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen.

DISINFORMATION

Senator DENTON. There are those, as I indicated in my opening statement, who would suggest that disinformation is a creature of conservative political thought; you have discussed that at some length in the historical context, but can you be more elaborative, how did the term originate and why?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. The term "disinformation," Senator?

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. It is a Russian word, Senator, "Desinformat-siya," it is also a Polish word. It is now a French word because it was introduced by the French Academy last year. They were, fortunately for us, working on the letter "d" otherwise we might have had to wait another 30 years before they got around to the letter "d" again.

But it is a Russian word, and "disinformation" in this country is frequently confused with propaganda. Disinformation is a deliberate attempt to mislead your opponent as to your real intentions.

Propaganda is the big lie which, repeated often enough, is finally believed—at least by some.

Senator DENTON. I imagine that you can, if no one else in this room can, understand how it happened and how I felt when I would be arguing a given prediction made directly to me by my captors that a given "big lie" or a given effort at "disinformation" was being undertaken. I would say, "My country will never buy it. You know it is a lie. I know it is a lie."

They never thought I was going to come home, so they would kind of sneer and say, "But you watch." Sure enough, within weeks, there it would be. I am still eaten with that experience and I am happy to see that, I believe, it may be coming to an end.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Senator, you might be interested to know that Stanley Karnow, who is a very good friend of mine, a columnist, was in Ho Chi Min City, recently, ex-Saigon and discovered a former friend of ours, whose name is Pham Xuan An, once a Time magazine correspondent, is a high-ranking member of the Communist administration today.

During that period of service as an American correspondent he did reach the status of staff correspondent for Time. He was in charge of relaying disinformation to the U.S. Embassy and to his journalistic colleagues.

Senator DENTON. This is rather off the subject and I do not know what effect it is going to have in Alabama, but the Huntsville, Ala.,

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television station called at noon and wanted to know, was it true that I was wearing a bulletproof vest. The answer is no. I do not have any bulletproof vest on. [Laughter.]

FRENCH JOURNALIST JAILED

Senator East has passed a question on to us, I relay it.

The fact that a person is disseminating false information does not mean that a person is necessarily disloyal or even a bad journalist—I made that point earlier. It could mean as in the Pathé case in France, but not necessarily correct. It sounds like a typographical error to me.

Can you explain the Pathé case in France?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. The Pathé case in France was discovered accidentally by the French FBI, known as the DST, the year before last, in the fall of 1979, as I recall, when a new Soviet agent in the guise of a UNESCO official arrived in Paris, well-known to Western intelligence services. His name is Igor Kuznetsov. Igor was routinely followed around since the French DST knew that he was a Soviet agent.

That is how they discovered that he was meeting in remote parts of Paris a prominent French journalist by the name of Pierre-Charles Pathé; the son of Charles Pathé, the famous inventor of the news reel at the turn of the century.

He was caught literally redhanded receiving documents written for him in Moscow to be published under his name in France and in a private newsletter which he later confessed the KGB had originally financed.

The Russian agent was routinely expelled from France since he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, but Pathé was arrested and made a full confession. His career went back 20 years, working for the KGB's Disinformation Department. It had started rather innocently with a booklet that he had written, praising Soviet foreign policy and even excusing Stalin's crimes as a necessary evil in order to bring about true social justice.

This, of course, came to the attention of the Soviet Ambassador. Pathé was wined and dined and cultivated, and then assigned a KGB case officer who befriended him. Pierre-Charles then explained what his ambitions were. Interestingly enough, his ambitions were to become a serious journalist of international repute, which he was not at the time.

That is all the KGB wanted to hear. They helped finance this newsletter for him which at the end of his career was being read or subscribed to, rather, by 400 French parliamentarians, 50 foreign embassies, and 50 publications and journalists based in Paris.

He was, Mr. Chairman, tried, sentenced, convicted to 5 years in jail last May 23, after making a full confession. He had been handled, in his 20-year career, by six different case officers, all with the KGB.

Now, I am not trying to suggest that there are dozens of Pierre-Charles Pathés running around in our business. There are a few, however. One I knew very well too, in France, and that is how I first got interested in disinformation.

In 1967 the CIA in Paris informed me that one of my close friends, a prominent French journalist, was on the KGB payroll. I

simply could not believe it. He was certainly not a Communist. He was anti-American, on the left as many of them were because of the Vietnam war, and that I understood very well. Our wives were close friends, as well.

I then went and checked with my French DST sources and they confirmed what the CIA had told me. I said, "I still do not believe it," and they produced evidence which was absolutely irrefutable.

The CIA then tried to enlist my cooperation, sir, in weaning him away from his Soviet connection because they agreed with me that he was not a Communist, that he had been sexually compromised through his wife, and would I please help in weaning him away from his Soviet connection.

I said, "How can I do that" and they said, "Perhaps you could double the retainer he is getting from the KGB." I refused to get involved. But I was very thankful for the information, very grateful for the information, and that got me interested in the KGB and disinformation activities.

TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES?

Senator DENTON. I do not know what your response is going to be to this, but I have had some experience in dealing with their tactics, have become familiar with the way they think and how they move. I have great respect for their cleverness and yet, sometimes they are extremely heavy-handed and overoptimistic in their reach.

Would you comment, as Claire Sterling did; she said it was not beyond question. Do you think it is possible that the Soviets, in backing terrorism around the world, would prefer not to have much terrorism going on in the United States, at least of such a spectacular nature that it would raise our conscious level to the point where we would have, perhaps, earlier taken effective action to assist friendly governments overseas to resist terrorism?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. That is not the information I have, Senator, again from non-American intelligence sources. Some rather interesting meetings have taken place in Central America, notably in Nicaragua last June on what would be the game plan if the Carter administration were to be defeated and someone like Reagan were to come to power.

Senator DENTON. I am not talking about the future, I am talking about the past.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Oh, the past?

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I do not think all the returns are in about the future because from what I have heard I think something is about to happen.

Senator DENTON. I totally agree with the line of thoughts you are about to develop.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I am sorry I misunderstood you, Senator.

DEFINITION OF DÉTENTE

Senator DENTON. It is such a horrible thought, you can express it, but I do not want to—that is, about the future.

In your opening statement you indicate disinformation has been central to the Soviet strategy for defeating the West since 1968. Do you believe that prior to 1968 the Soviets relied heavily on this technique since it has previously been a department of the KGB, prior to its elevation to the status of a directorate?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Yes. It has always been very important to them, Mr. Chairman, but it only became a full directorate in 1968, and became one of the five principal directorates of the KGB. That letter "A" gives you a measure of its importance.

I think, if you talk in general terms, one of their most successful operations, of course, has been that word "détente" which has become sacrosanct as evidenced by some of the testimony this morning.

I think that one key quote which was not mentioned this morning, also known to Western intelligence services because this particular meeting had been penetrated by a British agent in the form of a high-ranking East European official who subsequently defected to the United Kingdom.

This meeting took place in April 1973, in Prague of Warsaw Pact chiefs. At the time Brezhnev said to them, Chairman Brezhnev said, "Comrades, the development of our new weapon systems and our policy of peaceful coexistence with the West are designed to achieve global military supremacy by 1985, at which time," he went on to explain, "we will be in a position, the forces of world socialism, will be in a position to dictate their will to the remnants of capitalist power in the West."

This was not taken seriously by Western leaders at the time. I know of one leader, at least, who dismissed this as the work of an "untried agent." But I think the real reason for rejecting it, again as made clear by Mrs. Sterling, is that it did not fit into the policies of détente as practiced by Western leaders at the time, and again quite recently.

CHINA'S ROLE

Senator DENTON. In Claire Sterling's book—and I do not know whether it came up this morning or not, I cannot recall—I believe she established that the Soviets would not touch any terrorists with financial aid, support of any kind, were they known to have received financial aid from the Chinese Communists.

What role have the Chinese Communists played in support of international terrorism?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Quite a bit at the beginning, a long time ago. Certainly in Africa, the Chinese were very busy in Africa in the field of terrorism 15 years ago. But more recently, what they seem to deplore wherever I go, especially during the 4 years of the Carter administration, was the lack of backbone in America's foreign policy insofar as resisting Soviet encroachments in the Third World.

I remember covering the two invasions of Shaba Province in Zaire and Chinese "diplomats" and "journalists" would show up a few days after the fighting had died down and deplore the fact that the United States was not doing anything about this, and that it was left entirely to the French and to the Moroccans.

Senator DENTON. Those who are critical of the conclusion that the Soviets and their surrogates feed international terrorism apparently subscribe to a "smoking gun" theory. We asked this of another witness.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. I think it is an important question, sir, because I do not think that anybody is going to be satisfied until they have a letter addressed to "Dear Colonel Qaddafi, you are doing a great job with your terrorists. Love and kisses, Leonid Brezhnev."

Senator DENTON. I am not sure that will do it, sir. [Laughter.]

I am not sure that will do it.

What is your understanding of U.S. public perception concerning the U.S.S.R.'s role in international terrorism and in disinformation? We did ask that of a previous witness.

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. It is essential that the KGB, Mr. Chairman, is in the ideal position of never having to get its own hands dirty. It has proxy services. I think the Libyans have been extremely active in this field.

Senator DENTON. The success of it, to me—I will bring up another personal anecdote—is appalling.

In December 1974, I could see that the cause for which so many Americans died and which was truly won militarily in December 1972, with "Linebacker II" operations and related operations, the North Vietnamese with whom I came in direct contact—and you can ask any other American over there, or any North Vietnamese for that matter, if you give him truth serum—their war was totally broken by that series of events and they never thought they were going to get their clammy little fingers back into South Vietnam. All they wanted was—and they gave that to me directly just before I went home—they wanted an assurance that I and other senior officers would insure that there would be no exaggeration about our treatment.

The specific thing they wanted was an admission that treatment had changed in October 1969 and torture had stopped. The gambit there, and I think you would understand this, was that they were concerned that President Nixon was going to find the wherewithal somehow to end the war on favorable terms to the United States, achieve a military victory, and they would be tried for war crimes.

They reached that conclusion, I would guess, in about the summer of 1969, figure out what to do about it, and they found their solution when Ho Chi Min died on September 3.

In October, they came to me with an apology and an admission that they had never, indeed, followed their policy of leniency with respect to prisoners. They admitted torture for the first time—they had previously used the word "punishment" and said they would change the policies and we would be treated better.

The gambit was to bury it with Ho Chi Min, establish a few scapegoats who would then be tried at war crimes trials. I will not develop how we know that, but there is no question about it.

Later, at the same time that the Four Point Agreements were being signed, some outfit here in Congress—I think it was something called the Democratic Caucus—was passing a resolution to the effect they were going to cut off all aid to South Vietnam, in

spite of the agreement which our Government had just signed, which contained four points of which that was not one.

So, later, in December 1974, President Ford wrote me a letter which gave me the protocol excuse to go right back to him with one directly, which I did. In one enclosure dealing with South Vietnam I said, "Sir, I suggest that the information you are getting from your intelligence sources and from the media to the effect that there will be no North Vietnamese push into the South in calendar 1975 is incorrect," and I laid out a schedule of events which involved their probing with the bayonet until they felt steel. I saw no steel forthcoming.

My bottom line recommendations were two. First, that he take the supplementary appropriation for South Vietnam, then pending on the back burner, put it on the front burner and multiply it by 10. It was about \$600 million, as I recall. I asked him to raise it to \$6 billion—tell it like it was, not underestimate the way we had earlier in the war, and what the cost was going to be.

But it would have required no manpower on the part of the United States.

That letter went over to the State Department, was there about 3 weeks. I was informed that it had become a hot piece of paper because it was sort of saying, "The Emperor is not wearing any clothes," and the President did get Dr. Kissinger to go on television and ask for the two things I had suggested.

He was torn apart on the evening news, torn to shreds. The next day Congress responded, and that ended South Vietnam's and Southeast Asia's chances.

So I, like you, have some personal involvement in the success of disinformation and I retain the optimism that we are going to overcome it.

You said that you had noted an improvement in the way the media are presenting news. Would you care to offer any kind of an outline of the manner in which you see that taking place?

VULNERABLE YOUTH

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. Well, I think there is a better realization among younger journalists, Mr. Chairman, on what the geopolitical game is all about. I must say that it is a profession where one goes very far very fast, at a very early age, without the proper background.

I am a typical example, I think—maybe atypical in terms of age—but certainly I moved very fast. At the age of 21 I was appointed UPI bureau chief in Brussels, where I happened to have been born. I became an American citizen.

Newsweek appointed me bureau chief in Paris when I was 24, and foreign editor in New York when I was 27. When I look back at my career I realize that at that time I did not know one-hundredth of 1 percent of what I know today.

Senator DENTON. That has been my own experience and the experience of those hundreds of young men and women who have come to me and said the same thing.

I cannot believe you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. I am old, I am learning new tricks. I have seen older journalists in the United States, and in France, and in England now in many cases

beating their breasts as the military and the political have to beat theirs about many mistakes in Vietnam. So, I am not trying to make this a one-sided thing at all.

They are beating their breasts about such things as misreporting the Tet Offensive which, in my view, was an act of terrorism applied, as I have previously said, in South Vietnam with the target in the United States. A military farce as anyone knowledgeable, from the rank of private up, knew in South Vietnam; but the public in the United States has never learned it.

Even here in the Senate I find that my colleagues, and even the director of the Republican Policy Committee ending in 1977-78, is not aware that we did win a military victory. Maybe you were not, sir, in December 1972. But we did.

Those things, I hope, will be looked at historically again and we can get them in perspective and then see what the realities of developments of that time signify.

Do you have anything else you would like to add, Mr. de Borchgrave, to any of your previous testimony?

Mr. DE BORCHGRAVE. No; not unless you have any further questions.

While we are still on the subject of Vietnam, I think it might be worth quoting what the former Minister of Justice of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front said when he escaped among the boat people, a bitterly disillusioned man, a devastating indictment, if I have ever heard one.

He said, "Compared to the tyrants who rule us today, former President Thieu, once described as a fascist American puppet in the American media, was a liberal." That was the first press conference he gave in Paris after arriving as a refugee.

Senator DENTON. If we can all absorb the significance of that lesson in the next 6 months I will have achieved half of my objective here in the U.S. Senate.

Thank you very much.

I thank all of you for your interest and politeness, whether you agree or disagree with the way the hearing was conducted.

This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN P. EAST FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM, APRIL 24, 1981

I regret very much that, because of the hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, I will be unable to attend today's hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism.

I would like to reiterate my admiration of the complete support for Senator Denton as the chairman of this subcommittee. I would also like to confirm my own great interest in the subject being discussed today and my relief that it is of the greatest importance to the security of this country. International terrorism is one of the most serious threats to civilized life today. The Congress must be informed of the realities of terrorism, propaganda, and disinformation, and the international connections of and support for terrorism. To this end, and to the end of designing legislation and policies that can defend free societies from terror, I believe this subcommittee on security and terrorism plays a vital role.

I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses, Mr. Colby, Miss Sterling, Dr. Ledeen, and Mr. de Borchgrave, and to express my regrets to them that I am unable to hear their testimony. I believe their statements and their learning and expertise will be most useful to the work of this subcommittee and the U.S. Senate

and I look forward to participation in the work and hearings of this subcommittee in the near future.

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