


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# THE DETECTIVE



THE JOURNAL OF ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

SUMMER 1978



U.S. Department of Justice  
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**HOSTAGE  
NEGOTIATIONS**  
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The Detective magazine is published quarterly by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).

The Detective publishes articles providing factual information and guidance to USACIDC special agents and staff members, as well as to other members of the military and civilian law enforcement community, on criminal investigative and law enforcement equipment, doctrines, training, and techniques.

Although some articles in the Detective may discuss controversial subjects or contain the opinions of individual authors, these opinions do not necessarily agree with those of the USACIDC commanding general or the Department of the Army.

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# the Detective

the journal of Army Criminal Investigation

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
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
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**CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**  
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### About the issue :

The Detective's feature article explores special agents' role in hostage negotiations. Problems posed by the increased use of terrorism by political and criminal groups in the world today also affect Army

investigators. Terrorism is a form of crime that can be prevented with organized and well informed law forces. As technology advances, so do modern terrorist tactics. It is therefore necessary for law enforcement officials to keep informed of the latest developments on the international terrorist scene.

## A problem of definition-- guerrilla, terrorist political, transnational

by  
Special Agent  
Gregory Petrakis

Special Agent Gregory Petrakis studied the problems of terrorism and terrorist explosive devices with the 10th Special Forces Group in Europe, while assigned to the Munich Resident Agency. Petrakis, a professionally Certified Protection Specialist, has recently completed a PhD dissertation on terrorism. He teaches courses in criminal justice at two Washington, D.C., area colleges and is scheduled to retire this fall from his position as a logistics specialist at USACIDC Headquarters' Economic Crime Division.

The terms "guerrilla" and "terrorist" have been used synonymously by the press, reporters, and many authors. This usage reflects the confusion wrought by these two terms. Can we distinguish between the guerrilla and the terrorist?

Guerrilla units act against generally declared enemies, during open hostilities or actual war, with the primary intention of capturing, reconnoitering, destroying, or denying use of military targets to the enemy. The advantage sought by the guerrilla unit is to obtain military superiority. The use of the "strategic offensive" is important in guerrilla encounters as the guerrilla's strategy "must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack."<sup>1,2</sup> The importance of territorial control is no longer a necessary element in guerrilla movement, especially since the advent of urban guerrilla warfare.<sup>3</sup> The control sought by the urban guerrilla is mental, that is, over the minds of the population, rather than over territory as in the classical and historical concepts of warfare. A territorial base of operations, considered vital to the classical guerrilla, is no longer considered essential to the tactics and techniques of the urban guerrilla.

Guerrilla warfare can therefore be seen as violent action taken within the normally accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and laws of war, as generally understood by all nations. Guerrilla warfare has a legal base. Terrorism, on the other hand, has characteristics that are in many ways very different from the characteristics normally


associated with guerrilla warfare, despite the seemingly endless list of similarities. The violence in terrorism is directed mainly against civilian targets. The goal of the terrorist is publicity, and with that aim in mind, the acts of terrorism are "carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity."<sup>4</sup> Public attention is essential to the terrorist. The proximate objectives of terrorism, according to Thomas P. Thornton, a leading authority on models of terrorism, include morale building within a movement, advertising the movement among the general population, destroying the enemy, and destroying the power and authority structure within a given area.<sup>5</sup> To be able to realize these goals, it is important that maximum public exposure be obtained by the terrorist either at the time of the terrorist act, or during the coverage by the news media immediately following the activity. Of course, the terrorist seeks the veil of secrecy in the clandestine nature of the planning and preparations that go into the final terrorist act. This, however, is only a method to increase fear when he actually does strike and to avoid being captured before staging the act. The insecurity that is thus created by the unknown elements of when, where, and at whom the terrorist will strike, coupled with the fear invoked by the possibility that any innocent bystander may well become involved, increases the importance of the act of terrorism in the eyes of the public.

It is the "aim of the terrorists to provoke... feelings among the people to realize their goals" and

toward that view the targets of his activities are often primarily civilian.<sup>6</sup>

There is an entire series of psychological traits to be found among the terrorists that are notably absent in the guerrilla. These include the notion that the terrorist is both a "judge and a jury, and the martyr...the hunted, as well as the hunter."<sup>7</sup> Obsession, fanaticism, and paranoia are also common to the terrorist, and can frequently explain his actions in a way that nothing else can.<sup>8</sup>

The unstabilizing effect of the terrorist act results in all governments reacting much more quickly and in larger force to these threats than to ordinary criminal acts of violence. The criminal act of violence is usually hidden, or because of the spontaneous nature of the act will invariably be less well covered by the media. The media react to an act of terrorism in a manner similar to governments, which results in exaggerated attention to the terrorist act. The recent technological advances in mass communication have not only created the terrorists' desired effect, that is, increased advertisement, but have also resulted in a tendency by other terrorist-bent organizations seeking similar publicity to imitate them.



Terrorism is violence "outside the system" and waged against the "system" as contrasted to guerrilla warfare, wherein theoretically those not engaged in the struggle are not the targets of violence.<sup>9</sup> Terrorism, because it is primarily of political significance rather than military significance, can simply be defined as intimidation or subjugation of the civilian population for political ends.

To determine if a particular movement or event is a product of guerrilla warfare or is an act of terrorist intent, some of the factors that should be considered include: the intentions and motives of those involved; if actual acts or threats of violence were committed; the targets of the violence if targets were of primary importance or simply innocent bystanders; the effect of the act on the targets and victims, including any behavior or attitude modification, as well as physical or mental damage or harm to the targets or victims; and any international impact of the acts involved.<sup>10</sup>

The problem of definition with regards to which organizations are guerrilla and which are terrorist is still unsolved. In fact, genuine guerrilla organizations frequently lapse into acts of terrorism.<sup>11</sup>

The Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism of the United Nations was unable to decide upon a definition for terrorism because of the many factors involved. Various opinions were expressed even on the question of "the necessity and desirability of a definition of international terrorism," but some representatives went so far as to say that "a definition of international terrorism was neither necessary nor useful," thus leaving the entire matter unsolved.<sup>12,13</sup> Instead of a debate on the substance of a definition for terrorism, the delegates could not even confirm the necessity for having a definition.

When does a terrorist organization become an "international terrorist organization"? In an attempt to answer this question with regards to a particular group, we should look at the elements that are generally acknowledged to be required of any international organization.

The first requirement of any international organization is a goal, aim, or purpose. We might ask if the goal of the terrorist organization in question is international, that is, involves more than one nation-state, or deals with persons living in more than one country. The Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that one of the elements necessary to be taken into account in defining the concept of international terrorism is the "motives for such acts."<sup>14</sup> A distinction is made separating "criminal" acts of terrorism from "political" acts, with international criminal terrorist acts defined as those

attempting extortion of funds, or made for personal gain.<sup>15</sup> The difficulty rests with those acts of international terrorism which are political in origins and goals. As Sweden's delegate to the United Nations states: "It is a well-known fact that a government will often be inclined to consider acts directed against itself or against the political regime of the country as terrorist acts, whereas large sectors of the public opinion, at the national or international level, may find it difficult in some cases to accept this view."<sup>16</sup> Thus, if a nation-state supports the motives of an international "terrorist" organization, such as in the support given by many nation-states to "the struggle against all forms of colonialist and imperialistic practices" and "national liberation movements," then it may not consider the aims of the group as terrorist at all, and in fact consider it the duty of the United Nations to support and assist such organizations in their struggle in any and all ways possible.<sup>17</sup>

A second area of concern with regards to the "international" character of terrorism deals with the membership, structure, and officers of the organization. If members and officers are from more than one country of origin, and act as agents or delegates from that country, or if the structure of the organization is such as to be located in more than one nation-state, then an "international" organization exists in the sense of a multinational base.

Another area deals with the type of support a terrorist organization might be able to receive. There are numerous types of "outside" support, including moral, political, technical, financial, and military support to include hardware, personnel, or ideas.<sup>18</sup> An example would be the arms support received by the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Motives range from religious, thru political, to genocidal, not to mention financial gain.<sup>19</sup>

### Terrorists adapt technology

Yet another area of concern deals with the ideological output of a terrorist organization. The improved technology evident in the communications field today has impacted with a "transnational communication" with the net result that current "revolutionary guerrilla [sic] groups have a transnational myth to sustain morale and legitimacy."<sup>20,21</sup>

Yet to be considered are the locations of the terrorist acts in the international spectrum. Some authors define international terrorism as that which takes place against foreign officials and diplomats or

international carriers, such as ships and airlines engaged in international commerce, regardless of the location of such targets, and in those cases where the terrorist must cross international borders to carry out his activity.<sup>22</sup> The mobility of the new international terrorist is multiplied by the ever-increasing mobility of the world's population in general.<sup>23</sup> Some countries consider an act of terrorism international when it "originates, is aided, or has effects in a second country."<sup>24</sup>


An organization could enter into the international scene by making overtures to an international organization (either governmental or nongovernmental). The importance of the United Nations to terrorist groups seeking formal recognition is invaluable, for no terrorist organization can "afford to ignore the work of the United Nations. Actions may well be taken elsewhere, but the United Nations system is an important place for the shaping of major issues."<sup>25</sup>

### Political terrorism expands

One of the most disruptive elements in the contemporary western world has been the staggering increase of political terrorism. Airplanes have been hijacked, diplomats have been captured, and many innocent people have been killed. The rise of the terrorists has been spectacular and their effect on transnational relations significant. It can be definitively stated that "political terrorism is a distinctive disorder of the modern world."<sup>26</sup>

Using terror as an instrument of political action is not a novel concept. States have used it to maintain power and many guerrilla organizations have owed a large share of their success to their terrorist campaigns. The difference in modern terrorism is its transnational aspect. The guerrillas are no longer limited in scope or area of operation; the world is their stage and all people their victims. The transnational aspect of the conflict is further emphasized by the cooperation between different political terrorist organizations with seemingly different political objectives.<sup>27</sup>

With new modern weapons the terrorists have been able to grab the world's headlines and to publicize their ideological goals by inflicting, or threatening to inflict, death and destruction. As a result, terrorism has entered the political arena on a massive scale and as a consequence it has become an acceptable, if not desirable, form of transnational relations.<sup>28</sup> By disrupting the normal functions of society, terrorist organizations have added a new perspective on the traditional diplomatic means of conflict resolution.



The most powerful and most successful international terrorist organization is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Not only is it the only terrorist organization to have gained political legitimacy without actual control of any political entity, but it is also at the forefront of international terror and at the center of the cabal of other political organizations devoted to terrorist practices.

Terrorist organizations operating on the transnational level are revolutionary organizations who seek the violent transformation of the existing political framework. Their goals may be localized, attempting to gain control of a specific political entity to effect the desired ideological change, or they may be international in character, attempting to undermine the existing world order by localizing the conflict. These diminished revolutionary movements tend to be transnational by necessity, not by design.<sup>29</sup>

The terrorist is an actor in transnational relations whose objective is to undermine the existing political order.<sup>30</sup> To do this they hope that terrorist action will force governments to act in an authoritative manner and suppress the civil liberties of the people. The terrorists realize that they will lose the battle, that in a direct confrontation they cannot win. But, they hope that through terrorism they will force the government to shred its mask of liberalism and political virility and show itself for the autocratic regime it really is.<sup>31</sup> The strategy of terrorism is thus "that it achieves its goals not through its acts but through the response to its acts."<sup>32</sup>

Frustrated and deprived persons unable to influence political decision by a lack of both political and military power are drawn to terrorism as the only recourse to gain what they consider justice for their cause.<sup>33</sup> Their methods and acts also appeal to national entities, who see it as an inexpensive, albeit dangerous, means of undermining enemy states.<sup>34</sup> Thus, for those who lack the military means and/or the political power, terrorism enables them to actively pursue their political objectives and to publicize their causes through the international news media which usually plays up the terrorists' actions.

The effective terrorists create fear. By showing their adversaries the tenacity to which they hold their ideals and the disproportionate amount of damage they can cause, they hope to induce either disproportionate repression which could undermine the regime or cause the acceptance of their point of view.<sup>35</sup> Fear is an important psychological factor which can cause the behavior changes desired by those using terror as a tool. In the political arena, its uses have been varied and often successful.

Political terrorism can be categorized into four areas: indiscriminate, discriminate, mass, and transnational. Indiscriminate terrorism, in the classic Maoist sense, can cause a government to severely curtail civil liberties and thereby cause members of the oppressed population to support the terrorists. It is localized usually in the area of conflict and the recipients of the terror and repression are the persons

for whose political allegiance the conflict is fought. A perfect example of this is in Algeria, where French repression against the Moslem population as a result of Front Liberation Movement terrorism caused the population to identify with the political goals of the terrorists.

Discriminate terrorism occurs when the terrorists attempt to achieve the same objectives as the indiscriminate terrorists but because of ideological or tactical reasons, their attacks are waged only on those they consider enemies. A perfect example of this is the Irgun terrorist organization in Israel, which, through its attacks on British installations, not only publicized the plight of the Zionists but also made the maintenance of peace in Palestine a costly proposition. Even though the Irgun struck outside Palestine, in Cairo and Rome for example, it did limit the conflict by attacking specific British installations and individuals.

Mass terrorism occurs when terror is used to maintain political control. Although political in nature, it is repressive in character and terrorist in application. It is more than just the elimination of political opposition, a characteristic practiced by most autocratic governments. It is the total control of all citizens by means of fear and the replacement of political legitimacy with terror. A perfect example is the Soviet Union and the Communist block, where the governments have used mass arrests, Siberian exile, and murder, of not only political opponents but of ordinary citizens, to instill fear and obedience in the masses.<sup>36</sup>

### No bounds exist

The transnational terrorism is not only indiscriminate but international in character. Terrorists no longer feel bound to their respective arenas. The world is now their stage. As George Habash, the leader of the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) stated, "in today's world, no one is innocent, no one is neutral."<sup>37</sup> For Habash, the enemy is no longer national entities, but rather the transnational order that permits such perceived injustices as Israeli repression of Palestinians and Indonesian control of South Molluca. Furthermore, because these states are rather effective in controlling terrorism, these revolutionary organizations are much more likely to achieve positive results, which they need to survive, by operating against the liberal West European States where they currently conduct the bulk of their terrorist campaigns.

The transnational political terror campaigns have appeared to be somewhat successful. Terrorism has usually caused an immediate backlash against the objectives of the terrorists, but at the same time their plight has been publicized, and recruiting of members and funds from revolutionary governments such as Lybia has increased. Although no new transnational terrorist organization has yet achieved its political aspirations, a disproportionate amount of influence in the international arena has been obtained. Furthermore, since 1968 only 20 percent of all terrorists have been killed or are still in jail, making transnational violence a worthwhile profession.<sup>38</sup>

The strategy has been to cause the power elites to use repression to crush the terrorists. It is this repression which in turn would give terrorists their life, their reason for existence. It is by manipulating those in power so they will resort to the use of brutality that the terrorist hopes to succeed.<sup>39</sup> The hope is that the repression would create the conditions by which the objectives of the terrorists would become attainable.

### Transnational terrorism fails

The transnational terrorists have failed, despite their visible successes. They have failed to provoke the kind of massive repression they had envisioned. Furthermore, they have also failed to make significant gains in political influence in their respective areas of interest. It is in this aspect that their relatively weak military and political posture is most readily apparent.

The PLO is the best example of a transnational terrorist organization. It was born out of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinian refugees. The PLO was established in 1965 by Nasser as a power in his quest for Pan-Arabism. After traumatic loss in 1967, the PLO was discredited and its place as the leading exponent of Palestinian desires was taken over by Al-fatah, a Palestinian entity that had carried an effective organization campaign within the refugee camps and which had the loyalties of a large segment of the Palestinian population. Furthermore, Al-fatah enjoyed the financial support of Palestinian exiles in the employ of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. In 1969, Al-fatah gained prominence within the Palestinian movement by becoming the leading element of the PLO. Because of the diversity of ideologies, the PLO lacks any real cohesion, but the power of the Al-fatah organization is such that it has been able to project itself as the spokesman for the Palestinian people.

The immediate objectives of the PLO are to create

a climate of insecurity within Israel, through guerrilla warfare, to maintain a state of tensions between Israel and its neighbors, and to bring about a war between Israel and the Arab countries.<sup>40</sup> The PLO hopes that by maintaining tensions in Israel, it can isolate the Jewish State and force it to accept the stated objective of the PLO in the creation of a secular Palestinian State for both Arabs and Jews in what is now Israel.<sup>41</sup>

### PLO changes image

The Palestinian attempts at guerrilla warfare were disastrous. The Israeli security forces were more than a match for the Fedayeen units which tried to infiltrate across the Jordan. The PLO realized its impotence at guerrilla warfare and sensed that despite the political and financial support of the Arab States, it could not maintain the allegiance of the Palestinian people without dramatic action.<sup>42</sup> Thus, politically and militarily impotent, they turned to the only weapon left to them, terrorism.<sup>43</sup>

Despite the moral outrages against terrorism, political points were made as the Palestinian issue was debated in the international press. Through their relentless terrorist campaign they also gained the support of radical and oil rich Arab States who felt that the PLO was shedding blood to publicize the gravest injustices against the Arab people.

As a result of the increase in support both from within and outside the Arab world, the PLO has moved toward legitimizing its position as the spokesman for the Palestinian people, a move regarded as revolutionary and progressive.<sup>44</sup> Thus, the PLO was close to being, by Arab states' standards, spokesman of the Palestinians, a move which was endorsed by the United Nations in late 1974.<sup>45,46</sup> The support of the PLO was evident, for as Arafat spoke at the United Nations, rioting broke out in the occupied Gaza strip, showing at least that the Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories had not been quelled.<sup>47</sup>

The PLO, having attained its immediate goal of legitimization, has moved away from international terrorism. Some Palestinian fringe groups continue to conduct transnational terrorist operations such as the kidnapping of an Egyptian diplomat in Madrid and the kidnapping of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries oil ministers. The main PLO office not only disassociated itself from these attacks, but condemned the Madrid operation and further vowed to punish by death any Palestinian that conducts an aircraft hijacking resulting in death.<sup>48,49</sup>

By finally renouncing transnational terrorism and the support of the Arab oil cartel, the PLO has managed to become a more significant actor in the international arena, thus giving proof that judiciously applied transnational terrorism has a measure of success.

The PLO, however, is the only successful example of a transnational terrorist organization. Because of that, it will continue to be an example of a modern revolutionary organization. It must be recognized, however, that its success was due mostly to the support from the Arab States and the Third World. Further, in its quest for legitimacy it has all but abandoned its international terror campaign. Despite its worldwide acceptance, the PLO has yet to be recognized by Israel and its terror campaign against Israel has been ineffective. Thus, despite its successful organization, the PLO has remained at the mercy of its supporters, an entity without a country.

### International unity lacking

The example of the PLO shows that a certain amount of success can be gained by transnational terrorist methods and as such it has encouraged the growth of international violence. The Western World has attempted to deal with this phenomenon, but with little success. International agreements on the protection of diplomats and against hijacking have been violated because there were no enforcement clauses in the treaties.<sup>50</sup> The United States has also tried to bring this matter before the United Nations, but it has met with little success.<sup>51</sup>

With such little success, the ability to control terrorism by international cooperation is unlikely. Many states cooperate with terrorist organizations because their government shares the political objectives of the terrorists, or they like to stay on good terms with those governments that share the political beliefs of the terrorists and because they fear terrorist reprisals.<sup>52</sup> It is obvious that in such a political climate the most desirable method of eliminating transnational terrorism, that is, the elimination of safe havens for terrorists, is unfeasible.

Nevertheless, individual nations can eliminate the terrorist threat from their national territory. First, nations must realize that they cannot eliminate terrorism altogether, that at best they can only minimize its effects. Second, the mentality of the terrorist must be understood. He is not necessarily a criminal, but rather an idealist, frustrated with the existing political realities and fighting for radical

change. He is much like a soldier, willing to risk his life for his ideals, but is not usually suicidal in nature. For the most part, he will act only if there is a chance for survival.

In view of this, governments must show themselves as uncompromising when dealing with terrorists and must make no deals. The only reward a terrorist then can expect is either death or life imprisonment. Publicity should be kept at a minimum. Similarly, negotiations should be kept at a low profile. All attempts should be made to treat the political terrorists as common criminals. Glorifying terrorists should be eliminated. Further, diplomatic pressures should be used to close the terrorists' safe havens.

These measures, if adopted, will not eliminate terrorism. However, such measures will restrain others from violence or will create such frustrations that they will turn on their supporters such as the OPEC kidnappings in late 1975. It will become apparent that terrorism, once initiated cannot be controlled. Thus, the terrorism of the early 70's enjoying outside support will surely diminish.

Despite this, terrorism will still be around, in one form or another. But terrorism can be minimized. If international cooperation is not likely, as international cooperation on this subject is almost nonexistent, nations can protect themselves by strict measures. In their fight for self preservation, they must implement methods to minimize the impact of transnational terrorism.

There are two precepts involved. First, governments must understand that some types of terroristic activity are against their self-interest, or as otherwise expressed, "only if the bureaucratic network is stronger than the ethnic and ideological networks" is a convention possible.<sup>53</sup> The second precept is obvious, but too often overlooked. Governments involved in the negotiations for drafting an international convention must realize that one party that is subject to the convention is not present, that is, the terrorist. These two precepts are invaluable considerations in forming any effective document.

Elementary to the adoption of any acceptable convention is the interest of the world community for "where there is no community of interest...there is no international law."<sup>54</sup> Once the interest of the international community has been determined there still remain at least two further obstacles to the convention.

The first stumbling block, as stated by Karl Marx in 1849, is the idea that in "wars of national liberation,...a nation fighting for its liberty ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere..."<sup>55</sup> This idea has been upheld by international law, for force may be used in the exercise of self-defense. The problem here involves

the legitimacy of colonialism as recognized by the United Nations Charter (Chapter XI) and the growing idea that the legitimacy of colonialism is suspect (United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960).<sup>56</sup> At issue is whether the laws of war apply to the "wars of national liberation." One question raised here is whether or not a "war of liberation" is in progress or not.

The second area of concern and dispute involves the "highly treasured right of states to grant asylum to political offenders."<sup>57</sup>

### Views diverge in U.N.

There exist severely divergent views among the different political blocs within the United Nations. The Western Powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, et al., generally favor the adoption of a resolution and convention that would punish acts committed and prevent acts from being committed. Specifically, the United States is concerned about the hijacking and sabotage of civil aircraft, the legal protection of diplomats, and the "export of international terrorism to countries not involved in the conflicts which spawned... [these] ... acts of terrorism."<sup>58</sup> In the American Draft Resolution to the United Nations, introduced on December 8, 1972, these points were reaffirmed.<sup>59</sup> The Third World and Communist blocs, consisting primarily of African, Arabian, and East European countries, were concerned primarily with "the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist, and alien regimes in denying their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedom."<sup>60</sup>

Additionally, this bloc of nations was concerned with the underlying causes of terrorism and consistently refused to support any resolution that would condemn "national wars of liberation," or which would not condemn organized terror within a state conducted by the government in power.<sup>61</sup>

The resolution finally passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 18, 1972, expressed the opinions of the Third World and Communist bloc countries, clearly reflecting their altogether powerful majority in that body.<sup>62</sup> Inis L. Claude reflects that this causes an obvious dilemma: "If dissatisfied states or peoples behave themselves, their demands are not considered urgent enough to deserve attention; if they do not, they are accused of blackmail, of trying to shoot their way onto the agenda..." and further: "...the United Nations would do well to make itself useful, as a matter of principle, to disgruntled states that do not press their demands in such fashion as to engender a threat to the peace."<sup>63,64</sup>

Other questions for the future which also remain unanswered include the actual forms of punishment to be meted out to convicted terrorists. Are we to treat terrorists as political prisoners, or as criminals? Are we to judge only the act, or must the motive be taken into consideration in giving the sentence? If motives are ignored, then the effect may be to depoliticize the terrorist, and subsequently destroy the reason for committing these acts.

The question of minority groups in many different nations which are seeing separate "national identities" and the right to "self-determination" also remains unanswered. These conflicts could easily spread across borders as terrorism reigns over all. The major question of International Security in the world today is at stake, and we must add "to the long catalogue of possible conflicts between nations ... the problem of terrorism by groups or individuals, to which no answer is yet in sight."<sup>65</sup>

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- 3 Brian M. Jenkins, "Soldiers Versus Gunmen: The Challenge of Urban Guerrilla Warfare," pp. 1-7.
- 4 Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict," p.2.
- 5 Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*, p. 249.
- 6 George Sliwowski, "Legal Aspects of Terrorism," pp. 3 and 4.
- 7 Bouthoul, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-7.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 Jenkins, *loc. cit.*
- 10 Jordan J. Paust, "Some Thoughts of 'Preliminary Thoughts' on Terrorism," *The American Journal of International Law*, July 1974, Vol. 68, No. 3, p. 502.
- 11 A. J. Barker, *Bloody Ulster*, p. 135.
- 12 United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism," General Assembly Official Records, 28th Session, Supplement No. 28, Document No. N9028, pp. 11 and 12.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 11, also see: John Dugard, "International Terrorism: Problems of Definition," *Journal of International Affairs*, January 1974, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 73 and 74.
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- 18 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, pp. 39-42.
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- 23 Brian M. Jenkins, *An Urban Strategy for Guerrillas and Governments*, p. 3.
- 24 U. N. General Assembly Document No. A/AC. 160/2, p.6.
- 25 Curtis Roosevelt, *The Political Future of Transnational Associations*, *The Open Society of the Future*, p. 95.
- 26 David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 1975), p. 683.
- 27 *The Terrorist International*, *Newsweek*, Sept. 18, 1972, p. 33.
- 28 David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, (July 1975), p. 683.
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- Jr. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 153, 167, and 168.
- 30 *Ibid.*, pp. 154 and 163.
- 31 David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 1975), pp. 691 and 692.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 692.
- 33 "Around the Globe-Outbreak of Terror," *U. S. News and World Report*, Sept. 29, 1975, p. 76
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 David Fromkin, "The Strategy of Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 1975), pp. 687 and 693.
- 36 A Russian joke goes like this: "Guard to prisoner in Siberian Camp, What did you get 25 years for? Oh, for nothing, is the prisoner's response, That's ridiculous! For nothing you get 10 years."
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- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 61 See United Nations General Assembly, "Observations," Document Nos. A/AC, 160/1/Add. 2.
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