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RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS:

a discussion of causes, preventive measures and methods of control

Prepared by the American Correctional Association
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FOREWORD

The volatility of the problems of overcrowding, inmate idleness, understaffing, severe budget constraints and other issues endemic to the management of contemporary corrections require extraordinary vigilance concerning the potential for and response to riot and disturbance situations. Correctional administrators and subordinate personnel must actively consider the development of emergency response plans. The necessity that a formal criteria for making decisions about how to handle riot and disturbance situations involves sophisticated planning for a response network that will utilize critical points of management and physical plant deployment on an integrated and agency-wide basis in the case of such emergencies.

This management response plan needs to address not only the actual emergency situation but pre and post riot exigencies as well. It is imperative that such considerations as needs for due process, preservation of evidence for subsequent prosecutions; emergency innovations for physical plant usage, evacuation, security and liaison with other state, local and/or federal agencies and appropriate public and press access be well-established and maintained as staff alert policy to times of normalcy as well as in the emergency setting.

Sensitivity to matters of utilizing state and local law enforcement during a prison riot; the necessity for understanding the appropriate roles of staff from a state governor’s office and/or state office of the attorney general have also emerged as critical to post-riot investigations and subsequent lawsuits. The extension of emergency operating plans; temporary suspension of certain administrative rules and special reassignment of staff; transfer of inmates; and other matters of due process now require that these two key offices of state government be involved as agents critical to the effective management of all phases of riot situations. It is only through an immediate, organized, and professional response that order can be restored.

Finally, and most importantly, despite the gravity of the situation, this response must be decent and humane in order to garner and sustain the necessary support from the public and their representatives to enable correctional administrators to ensure the ongoing safety and security of the correctional facility.

This manual details the significance of causes, prevention, and methods of controlling riots and disturbances.

It is our hope that everyone concerned can appreciate the dire implications thrust upon the correctional community if these thoughts contained herein are not heeded.

Many fine correctional officials took part in the publication of the first volume published in 1978, and their work was revised and brought up-to-date by more correctional experts during 1980. Riots and disturbances have been a part of correctional history since our country began. However, it need not be a part of our future.

Anthony P. Travisono
Executive Director
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INTRODUCTION

Although riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are not a new phenomenon in the U.S., recent decades have seen an alarming increase in the numbers, extent, and destructiveness of such events. Furthermore, as waves of prison violence have indiscriminately struck our correctional institutions, an increasing cause of concern nationwide. The first major wave occurred during 1952 and 1953 when at least twenty-five different institutions had to quell revolts among their inmates which resulted in many injuries and millions of dollars lost due to damage or destruction to facilities and equipment. After a period of relative calm, a new series of riots began in Oregon in 1969 and spread across the country. The Attica Riot in 1971 and the New Mexico Riot at the Santa Fe Penitentiary in 1980 resulted in loss of life, human suffering, and property damage which make these riots rank among major U.S. disasters of recent history.

The damaging physical and psychological effects on staff and inmates caught up in riots in correctional institutions, and on their families, can neither be measured nor easily remedied. Furthermore, riots usually result in extensive property damage, frequently amounting to millions of dollars. In these days of dwindling resources and pared down budgets, the replacement of riot damaged or destroyed buildings and equipment often becomes a fiscal impossibility.

Although it has been determined that more than ninety percent of all reported prison riots have occurred since 1952, the reasons for the increased frequency and violence of such eruptions are not entirely well known. Although improved reporting might account for a small amount of the increase in the number of riots, other root causes must be sought.

In recent years our society has experienced some dramatic changes. Crime has continued to increase, with the resulting increase in inmate population soaring to an all time high. Prison gangs have formed and prison violence increased. In addition, revolutionary organizations with their terrorist tactics have extended their influence inside correctional institutions and are becoming a threat to inmates and their families on the outside (Kalin & Zins, 1979). This relatively new phenomenon seems to parallel the development of television, with its widespread influence and instant coverage, as well as the increased effectiveness of the other communications media to mold and influence public attitudes.

The prison riot as a phenomenon can also be interpreted in various ways. To a behavioral scientist, a riot might be seen as a form of communication or expression, one utilized after other less drastic means have proved unsuccessful. To the revolutionary, a riot is a form of social protest and a tool for radical change. To the correctional administrator, it is a challenge of authority. For all involved, however, riots and disturbances are fundamentally a threat to life and safety, which can turn an already sordid existence into a tragedy.

Considering the havoc and suffering wreaked by riots and disturbances in correctional institutions, one cannot fail to notice a certain tragic irony. The present level of knowledge and experience in correction is sufficient to enable competent correctional administrators to operate their institutions in a relatively calm and with ever increasing effectiveness. In other words, many riots could have been prevented with proper knowledge, prudence, and preventive measures taken in time.

This updated and thoroughly revised edition of Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions provides a summary of the available information and experience on the causes, preventive measures, and methods of controlling riots and disturbances in correctional institutions. The purpose of this publication is to encourage correctional administrators, staff, and relevant public officials to take necessary preventive measures as well as to develop a comprehensive riot control plan for each institution within their charge. The material in this publication has been kept relatively broad and general. This is with the recognition that each prison is unique; therefore, the suggested measures need to be considered in the context of the specific physical design, personnel resources, inmate population, and administrative practices of each correctional institution.

Although prisons are the primary focus of this publication, it should still be of relevance to jails and, in interest to jail administrators as well. This information is directed to corrections personnel at all levels—administrators, middle management, and line officers. It might also be of some interest to legislators, other public officials, and the concerned general public—all of whom have a stake in trying to prevent further violent and costly outbreaks in our correctional institutions.
Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions

Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are too complex and varied to be attributed to any one cause or group of causes. Although it is well known that overcrowding, idleness, faulty security, lack of staff and staff training, substandard facilities and lack of programs all play contributory parts, it is not possible to identify a specific cause, or set of causes, the presence of which will always precipitate a riot or major disturbance or the absence of which will always prevent such events. Although many riots and disturbances have seemingly been caused by a simple, critical incident; such incidents are most likely sparks igniting already volatile, riot-prone situations.

The causes of riots and disturbances should be viewed as complex, interrelated variables contributing to a total problem, erupting in violence when left uncontrolled. Many of these variables are well known, and a causal relationship can be identified between one or more of the variables discussed in this chapter and most major riots and disturbances in United States correctional institutions. Broadly speaking, these causative factors can be divided into institutional and non-institutional factors.

Institutional administrators must be aware of all causes of riots and disturbances. While they find it within their power to implement reform within their institutions, they often find themselves helpless in the face of noninstitutional causes. Yet, these causes are often underlying the unrest in the overall system and, therefore, must be understood and dealt with as well.

Institutional causes of disturbances are, of course, of primary concern to correctional administrators; if these can be overcome, the possibility of major disturbances occurring will be substantially reduced.

For that reason, this chapter focuses on the institutional causes of riots and disturbances with emphasis on those which can be attributed to the institutional environment, certain inmate characteristics, and administrative practices.

Institutional Environment

A correctional institution is by its very nature an unnatural environment which invariably contributes to the emotional stress of the incarcerated. There is limited personal freedom, monotony and boredom, regimentation, a sense of injustice and frustration, hopelessness, sexual deprivation, anxiety about family and friends, and many similar sources of emotional stress.

The frustration and stress that are the inevitable result of incarceration per se easily reach explosive levels when to the loss of freedom are added such factors as substandard and overcrowded physical space, bad food, brutality, racial conflicts, unfair or capricious treatment, and poor management, security and supervision.
Substandard Facilities

Man is responsive to his physical environment, and there can be little doubt that physical environment is almost always a part of the structure of riots and, in some instances, may be the detonator. Life in correctional institutions is destructive of the human spirit, often beyond the intention of the punishment and defeating the possibility of rehabilitation in too large a proportion of cases. Long-standing convictions in the architectural design of correctional institutions and the attendant concepts of efficiency and functionality have contributed to the dehumanization of the prison environment. Long corridors, repeated doorways, highly polished floors, and hard finishes are hypnotic and result in depersonalization of surroundings. Furthermore, cells frequently face blank walls, paved courtyards and a treeless landscape.

Not only is prison architecture frequently drab and dehumanizing, but many correctional institutions are very old. Many of these antiquated facilities have been poorly maintained. To a large degree, these institutions were built prior to 1900, and their representative atmosphere affects both staff and inmates. These outmoded facilities and the accompanying lack of treatment programs can cause an increased incidence of emotional tension in the inmate and staff and result in major disturbances. Plumbing, heating, lighting and ventilation are frequently inadequate. Soundproofing is often non-existent. The result is that thousands of inmates live in an environment that is not only uncomfortable, but frequently unhealthy.

Riots and disturbances are not confined to outmoded facilities alone. Obviously, disturbances occur in some of our most modern facilities; however, the physical inadequacy of an institution is a contributing factor which can lead to disturbances.

Since many riots have occurred in old institutions with excessive populations, and since most inmates are still held in facilities of this type, it is apparent that the immediate problem is primarily in the area of making improvements in what already exists.

Overcrowding

Overcrowding in correctional institutions is of increasing concern. The U.S. prison population is at an all time high, and there is every indication that it will continue to escalate (Potter, 1969). In many prisons, two or more inmates are forced to live in cells designed for only one. Even in some of our most modern facilities; obviously, disturbances and the propensity to violent eruption increases dramatically. Support facilities, such as gymnasiums, kitchens, dining rooms, industries, and medical facilities, are all severely stressed. Program resources in many cases have become inadequate for the increased numbers of inmates they must serve. Inmate/staff ratios have increased with resulting depersonalization, inadequate security, and stress within many institutions. It is not difficult to imagine that in certain inmates the combined depersonalization of human and physical environment can result in emotional stress which seeks release in the form of violence. Antiquated facilities which are large, overcrowded, and isolated from the community are conducive to the development of frustration and anger. As the institutions increase in size, the ability of management to control the population is often decreased; and the result is obvious. Small, well-designed institutions with individual cells are much more effective in reducing disturbances and tension within the institution.

Large, overcrowded, poorly designed correctional institutions with open dormitories, however, are the realities which most correctional administrators live with. Therefore, correctional administrators must be constantly aware of innovative methods for improving institutional facilities. Chapter II contains several suggestions in that regard.

Idleness and Lack of Programming

Constructive programs and meaningful activities are methods which have proved successful in many institutions. It has long been recognized that interesting and satisfying work is an important factor in maintaining emotional stability. Programs for constructive, meaningful activities for the institutional population can be justified for many reasons. Primarily, they provide an alternative for enforced idleness and the resultant rise in tensions.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INMATE POPULATION

The characteristics of the inmate population cannot be overlooked as a basic general cause of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions. The correctional institutions in the United States are populated primarily by young, unmarried males who are from the lower social and economic strata of society. They are frequently the products of broken homes, poorly educated, unskilled, and with unstable work records. They are apt to have a prior criminal record, low self-esteem, and be uncommitted to any major goals in life. Material failure in a
culture firmly oriented toward material success is the most common denominator of offenders. In the present situation, no one stands to lose more in a riot than the black population. As a result, minority inmates often view themselves as political prisoners, victimized by an unjust society.

Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Racial/ethnic minority groups are grossly over-represented in the nation's prisons as compared to their proportion in the U.S. population. Approximately 44 percent of the U.S. prison population is black; whereas, in the nation as a whole, the black population amounts to about 12 percent. Similarly, Hispanics are over-represented in the prison population in certain states. As a result, minority inmates often view themselves as political prisoners, victimized by an unjust society.

Anti-Social Inmates

Some inmates are sociopaths, angry at society and lacking in what we consider normal societal values. They are prone to wanton destruction of property and injury to others. Freely scheming to overthrow authority, as represented in prison society by the administration—may make themselves aware of breaches of security and become astute students of every aspect of the physical plant as well as institutional procedures. Since they spend 24 hours each day within the institution, their knowledge of security weaknesses can easily exceed that of administrative staff. Such inmates should be of significant concern to correctional staff.

Mentally Ill Inmates

Due to recent legislation making it increasingly more difficult to gain commitments to mental hospitals for the criminally insane, a growing number of inmates are placed as psychopathic. Some commonly accepted characteristics of the psychopath are: (1) inability to develop meaningful interpersonal relationships; (2) absence of conscience; (3) need for immediate gratification; (4) low frustration tolerance; and (5) a need to learn from experience. These inmates are frequently hard to understand and manage, especially by correctional staff without appropriate training in the mental health area. The problem is complicated by a small number of inmates who experience psychotic episodes where they lose contact with reality. In some cases they can become very dangerous because their behavior is so unpredictable and bizarre. They also have a tendency to disturb or create unrest in the remainder of the inmate population.

Prison Gangs

Prison gangs have been in existence in the present situation for a long time. But the size and influence of prison gangs have increased at an incredible rate in the last few years. As a result, prison gang leaders need to be watched and controlled carefully.

Revolutionary Organizations

An increasing number of inmates have engaged in revolutionary organizations. Some are simply political agitators. This type of inmate is fed a diet of relocation and in sympathy with the political philosophies of the organization, many of which are as follows: (1) a high priority and easy target for recruitment by revolutionary organizations. There is evidence to suggest that some of these organizations have attempted to infiltrate and influence existing prison gangs. The effort appears to be the one of training gangs for a large-scale revolt in the future and in gaining sympathy for political philosophies. Acts of terrorism have become more frequent inside correctional institutions and there has been an increase in support. Certainly not the least serious example of this was the plot to kidnap the children of California correctional officials. A list of terrorist organizations known to exist in correctional institutions is not apt to be an inclusive list; however, prison staff should certainly be informed of the organizations of a revolutionary nature that might have contact with their inmates.

Principles of Collective Behavior

Inmates as a whole have difficulty in sharing goals and objectives and are unlikely to unite over anything but the strongest issues. Although it is not unusual for an inmate leader to command a large following of loyal supporters, it is unusual for such a leader to control an entire institution for any length of time. When inmates become frustrated, however, agitators have a much easier time getting others to join them in aggressive acts.
Staff Recruitment and Hiring

The high turnover of correctional officers is another serious problem. Since in most jurisdictions pay is low and stress is high, and new staff is often given the least desirable jobs and shifts, it is hardly surprising that in many institutions more than fifty percent of all new correctional officers fail to complete their first year on the job. Inexperienced officers cannot be expected to deal with serious crises as wisely and effectively as more seasoned staff. The result can be disastrous as was seen in the case of the New Mexico 1980 riot in which a lack of experienced officers on the scene at the onset of disturbances was one of several errors in the management of the institution.

Since correctional institutions have a high percentage of inmates representing racial and ethnic minorities, some believe that it would be desirable to have a similar ethnic/racial ratio within the staff. Such staffing patterns are difficult to achieve, however, since many institutions are located in rural areas where there tend to be fewer minority members. Finding and retaining minority staff are problems that need considerable attention.

Inadequate Staff Training

All too often, correctional personnel enter service with little or no training. This lack of training together with no prior experience can be a volatile combination in a correctional institution. A comprehensive, well-organized training program is an essential part of every correctional institution. The American Correctional Association/Commission on Accreditation for Corrections Standards (1981) require that new correctional officers receive 180 hours of training during their first year and 40 hours each year thereafter as long as they have contact with inmates. Many institutions do not meet this standard; some do not even come close.

In addition to preassignment training for new personnel, an ongoing staff-development program for personnel at all levels should be a requirement for all correctional systems. Such a program should provide for the continuing personal and professional improvement of all personnel. The ability to act and react to problems immediately and appropriately can mean the difference between preventing a disturbance and quelling a riot.

Breach of Security

Considerable attention has been paid in most correctional institutions to establishing security procedures to prevent, or at least discourage, disturbances or riots. In too many cases security procedures are inadequate or, if adequate, are not adequately followed. Inmates readily become aware of breaches of security, and there are always a few inmates in every institution who will try to take advantage of them. Sound security procedures need to be established and then continuously monitored to ensure compliance.

The previous discussion of institutional causes of riots and disturbances is not all-inclusive. It does, however, review some of the more common variables potentially leading to the eruption of institutional violence. Broken promises, precipitous changes in policies, procedures, privileges taken away, legitimate grievances ignored—all lead to an explosive institutional atmosphere.

NON-INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES

Just as the correctional administrator must be aware of the conditions and practices within the institution which precipitate riots and disturbances, he must be aware of those causes outside the institution that may lie beneath the tension and hostility in the institution. Whereas, he may take steps to remedy institutional causes through proper management, he is severely handicapped in his ability to manage causes arising in the larger community. At best he can maintain a constant awareness and understanding of these conditions and educate his correctional staff as to their meaning and possible consequences.

Public Apathy

The public is often only concerned with having the offender committed, thus removing the disruptive agent from society, and there is little concern for treatment methods and policies of the correctional institution. This apathy often pervades the institution and the inmates react to this feeling in a variety of ways. The result is often apathy within the institutional population, with little motivation or enthusiasm to participate in planned treatment programs. Correctional institution staff can also be affected by community apathy. With little or no support from the community, it is a continuous challenge for the correctional administrator to maintain morale and implement realistic programs of correction.

Punitive Attitude

In an era of increase in violent crime, it is not surprising that society responds by demanding punishment and retribution. Yet, the punitive attitude of a large segment of society is another factor which underlies many major disturbances. Often the personnel reflect this attitude of punishment as opposed to treatment, and the correctional administrator must use in-service training to educate the staff as to
his philosophy and the goals of the institution. There must be an established policy affecting some balance between these two philosophies. It is the job of the correctional administrator to understand the punitive attitude of the community and to recruit and train a staff which is committed to the positive values of correctional treatment.

Social Unrest

Today, as never before, the correctional institutions are feeling the impact of unrest in the larger community. Correctional administrators must be constantly aware of the disruptive influence of social strife, militant movements, and civil disorder on the offenders in the institution. Even though an institution is physically remote, it is not insulated from this unrest. Reports in the press and on radio and television keep inmates well informed on unrest in the larger community.

Inadequate Funding

All institutional and non-institutional causes of riots and disturbances in correctional institutions are important; but inadequate financing is an underlying cause in many, if not most, of them. Hand-to-mouth budget practices and deficit financing, usually stemming from political considerations, are found to be at the root of many of the inadequacies of personnel, plant, and program which result in riots and disturbances in correctional institutions.

Inequities in the Criminal Justice System

Finally, there is one non-institutional cause of disturbances which merits attention. There are many inequities and complexities in the criminal justice system. The most frequent target of attack is the disparity of the sentencing practices of various courts. States which have indeterminate sentence laws and central boards for the fixing of definite terms and the granting of paroles have the least difficulty from this source. This problem of disparity of sentences is further complicated by the old adage that money buys a good attorney; and therefore, the rich man goes free and the poor man is sentenced to life or longer sentences.

As long as men have grievances that they feel powerless to resolve, the possibility exists that they will erupt into irrational and destructive behavior. Administrators of correctional institutions can reduce but not eliminate this possibility by diligent and concerned attention to all of the innumerable facets of correctional institution operation which affect the stability and morale of the institutional community.

Many factors seem beyond the control of the administrators—overcrowding, lack of funds, public attitudes or unwise legislation. These, however, can be recognized, and their effects on the institution understood. The correctional administrator certainly should not abdicate responsibility in these areas. Part of the job includes a sound public relations program which informs the public of needed corrections programs, develops a constituency for them, and makes a strong appeal for sufficient funds to satisfactorily operate the institution.

The complexity of the system and the inflexible restrictions placed on it by legislators often add to the inequity. However, no rationalization will change the fact that inequities in the criminal justice system are a source of problems for the correctional administrator. It is human to excuse and to rationalize one's own behavior, and the criminal justice system is a logical scapegoat for the offender.

In the first chapter, we looked at some of the causative factors of riots and disturbances. Suggestive toward these should lead to preventive measures. Prevention, as discussed in Chapter II, has two distinct meanings. On the one hand, it refers to all the steps that can and should be taken to ensure that an institution is well administered and provides a sanitary, safe, and humane environment, respectful of the rights of both inmates and staff. On the other hand, prevention refers to detecting the signs of mounting tensions and brewing unrest, and to effective measures of defusing volatile situations in time to forestall violence and disorder. Since the best prevention is a well-run institution, the emphasis in this chapter is on long-range planning and implementation rather than on crisis management.

With few exceptions, the factors discussed in this chapter apply to both inmates and line employees. Unwillingness to consider the feelings and viewpoints of either group can lead to the same disastrous end.

Effective Communication

From one perspective, a riot or disturbance is a form of communication—a dramatic one that is seldom used unless other forms of communication have been tried and failed. Open channels of communication, both formal and informal, permit valuable information to become available to staff for decision and policy making and, in turn, permit institutional policy and procedure to be made clear to all staff and inmates.

Disturbances may be prevented if both staff and inmates know exactly what is expected and allowed, and what the other thinks and feels. This requires a climate where inmates and employees alike can express constructive opinions and feelings without
meeting defensiveness, ridicule, or later reprisal. Numerous informal contacts will give management a better idea of the general institutional tone than will any number of formal reports.

Administrative personnel, from the managing officer to the first level counselors and supervisors, should circulate throughout the institution, maintaining as much contact as possible with inmates and employees. This contact will serve to answer questions and relieve the anxieties and tensions of both the inmates and line employees.

A nationwide study found that there were less disturbances in institutions where high level administrators made themselves available in cell blocks for both inmate and staff to communicate with.

**Information Gathering**

Reliable information, systematically collected and analyzed, is of vital importance in preventing riots and disturbances. The collection of intelligence data should be a day-to-day operation with all staff involved. The information gathered by supervisory, commission, medical, program and other staff should be organized into an information system. All information should be channeled into a common collecting point in the institution which would combine all this information from all of these areas into an understandable sequence and where this information can be analyzed and determinations made as to the mood of the institution and the growing possibilities for a disturbance. Based on such analysis, top staff should be briefed each day as to the mood of the inmate population and necessary steps to be taken.

Inmates are a good source of intelligence, if used responsibly. A relationship with inmates must be maintained so that they are willing to communicate when problems and concerns become potentially troublesome.

Experience has shown that staff can collect more and better information from communication with more respected inmates (Gettinger, 1980) than by the use of dubious informants, who are willing to trade information for privileges and special favors. Labeled "snitches," such inmates often become the targets of great hostility from other inmates. As the New Mexico riot in which numerous "snitches" were murdered by other inmates indicated, such a system of intelligence can have disastrous effects.

**Information Sharing**

Inmates and staff should also receive reliable, official information about programs and policies, particularly when changes are to be made or new policies instituted. When inmates lack facts, the rumor mongers start to work, and misinformation spreads throughout the institution, which can lead to unrest and disorder.

Unmistakably, clearly written policies and procedures made available to relevant staff and inmates are an important source of information and form of communication. The correctional supervisor should insure that all staff under his supervision and in his area of responsibility are following the policies established by the institution. One of the causes of disturbances in institutions is the breakdown of discipline and organizational procedures.

**Communication Between Shifts**

In order to prevent dangerous gaps in the information system, it is important to stress the need for a full exchange of information from one shift to another. It is important that the relieving officer have good understanding of the "current situation" as he comes on shift. The safety of the institution as well as the officer may well be determined by such knowledge. Carefully kept logs, roll calls and post rules should be augmented as needed with verbal briefings.

**SIGNS OF TENSION**

Disturbances in correctional institutions can be prevented by being able to interpret and act on change in institutional atmosphere and behavior patterns.

Experienced institutional personnel can sense in most cases any change in the general climate of the institution. Among the signs looked for are unusual quiet or subdued actions by inmates; reduced tendency to communicate with employees; increased purchases of foodstuffs at inmate canteens; unusual inmate gatherings or increased self-segregation by racial or ethnic groups; appearance of inflammatory written material; an increase in voluntary lockups; a drop in attendance at movies or other popular function; an increase in complaints about some operation of the institution. (For a more detailed list, see Appendix A.)

When tensions are mounting, employees must use restraint and discretion so as not to aggravate the situation. During such tense times an appearance of assured control and confidence reduces tension.
as granting a request in reducing an individual inmate's tension, particularly if he feels the problem has been given genuine consideration by appropriate officials and if given a reason for the denial. Equivocation and vague answers create false hopes and thus increase the inmate's anger when nothing is done. A most dangerous situation arises, however, when inmates have grievances they feel can be corrected if only the proper officials are made aware of the problem. Inmates know that disturbances are certain to give their complaints wide publicity when less drastic measures fail.

A formal grievance procedure such as promulgated by the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1978 is essential in preventing grievances from becoming sources of riot and disorder. Written policy and procedure, providing a rationale with the

rules and regulatory guidelines, are additional preventive tools. All policies and procedures relating to inmates should be made available to inmates during orientation to the institution. Staff should receive comparable information in pre-service training.

The grievance procedure should include, at a minimum, the elements set forth in ACA standard 2-4434 in the Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Second Edition (1981).

Administrators must ensure that fair and just practices are used in the management of inmates, and they must pay particular attention to areas of basic concern to all inmates. Palatable food, adequate clothing, good sanitation and medical care, prompt mail service and training and experience must be provided for in a manner that a reasonable person can accept. What is reasonable is subject to redefinition in this era of rising expectations, and managers must be flexible enough to change with the change in social perspectives. Access to courts and lawyers and the inmate's rights to prepare legal appeals, for example, are basic rights today.

There are some significant grievances about which institution staff can do little or nothing. These will usually involve feelings of injustice concerning an inmate's original conviction or the manner in which the paroling authority has handled the setting of a term of confinement or parole violation. The institutional management can explain policies or get representatives of the paroling authority to do so and inform inmates of the proper channels of appeal.

IMPROVING EXISTING FACILITIES

Old, substandard and overcrowded correctional institutions are frequently a cause of grievances, litigation, and, at an extreme, riots and disturbances. In the absence of new facilities, however, such facilities have to be utilized.

Significant physical improvements of an old facility can be accomplished with a fairly limited budget when compared to the expense of new construction and could be a significant preventive measure against riots and disturbances. What follows are but a few suggestions for such improvements.

Painting is an important element of such a plan. Although it is a cosmetic approach, it can be psychologically significant. Color can change the apparent size of a cell and bring relief to the confining monotony of an individual inmate's life. Color also has security use as an aid in identification of location.

Another obvious area needing urgent attention in most old correctional institutions is the water supply. The communal showers and toilets, and cell toilets, are in most cases obsolete, and often have become repulsive with neglect. New epoxies and other plastic surfacings can be used to fill in cracks in these areas. This not only improves appearance and reduces noxious odors, but prevents concealment of contraband. Advice from the fire authorities should be sought to determine whether fire and smoke propagation of these materials are within acceptable limits.

Poor lighting is another common source of inmate complaints. The quality of light—which includes the surfaces which reflect it, and the shadow it makes—is as important to consider as the light itself. A simple increase of light intensity is not necessarily the solution. From the inmate viewpoint, it is an improvement. In many cases, however, it is obvious that more and better lighting is needed. One relatively recent innovation in lighting technology is the Full Spectrum Vile-Lite marketed by the Duco-Test Corporation. This light source provides a full spectrum of light waves as is found naturally outdoors from the sun and reflected light. Studies have demonstrated that full spectrum artificial light sources indoors provide a number of mental and physical health benefits including improved biological functioning of body organs and more positive attitudes toward inmates and the environment. This common "cold" (partial spectrum) light tubes or bulbs.

Noise pollution in old institutions was made inevitable in many of the original designs and is a common source of discomfort to both inmates and staff. As in the case of lighting and the new plastics and epoxies, there now exists a whole range of relatively inexpensive soundproofing materials. But even before these are considered, the use of simple rubber bumpers in doors and gates can make an important reduction in this noise source.

The application of soundproofing surfaces, in well-planned and well-executed jobs, could go far to abate much of the noise pollution in old cell blocks.

In many cases, the soundproofing project could also function like the "cosmetic" effect of new paint or could be used in connection with new paint.

In all of these considerations, fireproofing and fire prevention are to be considered. Almost all new materials of this kind have this factor built in at the source, but this cannot be assumed, and safety
One important factor in reducing the potential of a riot or disturbance is having efficient personnel who can handle their responsibilities and the emergencies they will inevitably meet in a calm, confident manner because they have been thoroughly trained in the necessary technical and interpersonal skills. A trained employee will respond to urgent situations quickly, without emotionalism and with a minimum of wasted motions. Training combined with experience will enable him/her to react appropriately to the many kinds of situations which will confront him. Assuming salaries are competitive, hiring is nonpolitical, supervision is effective, and training is complete, line employees can be expected to develop the highest levels of skill in handling inmates and the problems they create.

It is outside the scope of this publication to delineate an entire training program for correctional staff. However, of particular importance in preventing riots and disturbances are the following skills, which must be included and stressed in training:

1. Causes of criminal or deviant behavior. If employees understand the reasons why people act in antisocial or deviant ways, they are better prepared to manage difficult prisoners and they can be more objective in their actions.

2. Understanding minorities. The disproportionate large percentage of minority members in the prison population and the disproportionately large number of white correctional officers have, in many cases, led to severe problems and tensions. It is, therefore, imperative that all staff are trained to understand cultural, social, or ethnic differences, as reflected in language, appearances, gestures, and value systems.

Hostilities between groups of inmates of different racial or ethnic origin are also a common phenomenon in today's correctional institution. These same inmates in different cell blocks along racial/ethnic lines tends to increase the problem.

In order to prepare correctional staff to deal with problems arising from clashes between personalities, minorities, and different value systems and attitudes, training programs should include courses in human behavior, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and the effects of cultural differences on behavior.

3. Legitimate rights of inmates. Various state and federal court decisions and actions have extended into the area of the offender's constitutional rights and equal protection under the law. These actions are in regard not only to litigation relative to the offender's commitment but also what rights he has after being committed. Personnel properly instructed regarding basic human rights of inmates—decent food, housekeeping as well as legal rights—are less apt to create disturbances.

*For further information, see the American Correctional Association Correctional Officer Training Guide.

SECURITY

The evolution of participatory democracy, inmate councils, employee/labor relations groups and expanded public access have, incorrectly, led to the belief that security is no longer the top priority in a correctional institution.

Correctional Administrators

Many feel that the security of an institution can no longer be guaranteed where all of these conditions are prevalent. However, security remains paramount within the operation of an Institution. Security is necessary for the protection of the public and the protection of all staff and all inmates. All other activities and functions of an institution must operate within a conscious security policy.

The standards of the American Correctional Association regarding security and control outline all of the areas which are significant to a proper program of security within an institution.

Security involves a good physical plant, a well-trained and disciplined professional staff, a sound classification system, an efficient communication system, and a desire to listen to problems of staff and inmates and effectively deal with them in a timely manner. All of these may successfully eliminate the chances of disturbance.
should be made outside the security perimeter of the institution. Constant attention should be focused upon the seriousness of a disturbance and what an institution cannot do without in the event of one taking place.

Effective Communication

In order to effect security within the modern institutions, an effective communication system must be maintained which not only allows staff to be in constant electronic touch but allows for a variety of methods by which staff can learn rapidly and adequately of institution policy before the policy is disseminated throughout the inmate population. There is nothing more demoralizing to staff than to hear of policy changes for the institution within the scuttlebutt route.

In any major institution there are thousands of work tools which are an essential way to reduce the chance of disturbance. There is nothing more necessary than to routinize the security procedures and provide searches only at shift end. A screening type of security for tool control can be achieved by developing search procedures at the point where inmates enter the area are a must. Inmates who leave on pass during the regular working shift are potential suspects and should be given careful searches. Care should be taken to avoid the tendency to routinize the security procedures and provide searches reflect the attitudes of those conducting them. There is nothing more demoralizing to staff than to hear of policy changes for the institution within the scuttlebutt route.

In any major institution there are thousands of work tools necessary for maintenance, food service, industries, and vocational education. In order to effectively control tools, it is mandatory that a system of tool control be maintained. Each institution must develop a system which is easily understood by staff. Again, no control system can function adequately without the positive input of staff toward the security of the institution. Shadow boards and tool check out systems are functional and easy to place into effect. A periodic inventory of all equipment and tools is a good practice to observe.

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Contraband Control

Each institution defines contraband somewhat differently, usually as a result of past experience and values which are peculiar to that institution. Generally, contraband is considered to be materials such as weapons, drugs, or printed information which the administration feels may impair negative sensitivity of staff toward the security of the institution. Shadown boards and tool check out systems are functional and easy to place into effect. A periodic inventory of all equipment and tools is a good practice to observe.

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vide routine and special searches of work and industrial areas as well as living areas.

Classification

Classification of inmates on a continuing basis and proper placement is an important security factor—perhaps more important that the security of brick and mortar. Classification contributes to a smoothly, efficiently operated correction program by pooling all of the relevant information concerning the offender. A program is then devised for the individual based upon that information, and by keeping the program realistically in line with the individual's requirements. It furnishes an orderly method to the institution administrator by which the varied needs and requirements of each inmate may be followed through from commitment to discharge. Through its diagnostic and coordinating functions, classification not only contributes to the objective of rehabilitation, but also to custody, discipline, work assignments, officer and inmate morale (American Correctional Association, 1978).

Classification also provides the opportunity to structure the correctional institution in such a way as to minimize the likelihood of a riot or disturbance. The principal purpose of classification should be to place each offender in the least restrictive setting consistent with the protection of society, staff, and other inmates. After this, programs or classification options should be made available to meet the needs of offenders at each level of security. This suggests that a number of classification options should exist. Furthermore, by dividing the inmate population into smaller groups, the likelihood of a major disturbance is greatly reduced. If a unit management concept is utilized, communication is enhanced because staff become responsible for fewer inmates and more staff become involved in the classification process. Having a variety of different groups or classifications also aids in another important classification function, that of separating or isolating the troublemakers.

Programs for the Inmate Population

Low morale often becomes a starting point of a disturbance. A wide range of institutional activity can have a positive effect on morale and can aid in the preparation of an inmate for his return to society. When inmates have a wide choice of self-improvement activities or constructive leisure time programs, tensions are reduced and the individual inmate is less inclined toward disruptive behavior.

In addition to structured programs such as academic education, vocational training, organized athletics and handicraft; small voluntary groups in public speaking, drama, creative writing, chess, music, and other special interests can be provided. Often minimal equipment is necessary, and an employee sponsor is the only other requirement. Benefits from such activities include reduction of boredom and idleness, improved physical well-being, increased ability to function in a constructive social group, and acquisition of skills to increase the person's sense of self-worth.

Formal, budgeted programs such as education will be organized according to accepted guidelines. Inmate voluntary groups should be organized in some orderly fashion which includes submission of a statement of purpose, rules or procedure, and meeting times, etc., to be approved by a staff member. These groups should always be sponsored by an employee who will be present at all group activities. This prevents use of the group as a power base by predatory inmates or for the planning of disruptive activities.

Where citizens from the community wish to assist in an activity, they should be carefully supervised and informed of the pitfalls of correctional work. Co-
of willingness to acknowledge many of its problems and to seek appropriate solutions. In this process, the field has adopted national standards which address minimum conditions for correctional institutions and most other areas requiring minimal levels of performance. The American Correctional Association and the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections have published these standards for adult and juvenile corrections. The standards for Adult Cor-

Sponsorship sometimes works well where one sponsor is an employee and the other a citizen with special skills to contribute. While the use of volunteers in correctional institutions has many dangers, it is one way in which administrators with very small budget allotments can provide a wide range of programs. Not only should citizen volunteers, student interns, and outside groups working as correctional volunteers be thoroughly oriented, but the scope and limits of their activities should be specified in written agreements with the outside organization or agency involved.

Finally, ideas for voluntary programs can come from inmates in response to their own interests and should be considered and evaluated as well as those programs originating from the staff.

Standards and Accreditation

Progress has been made in many areas of correctional institutions in recent years. The field has reached the point where another edition of the Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions was published in 1977 and are now being used by the Commission to accredit correctional institutions. Several institutions at the federal and state level have been accredited. A second edition of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions was published in April 1981.

The adoption of uniform national standards and their use in accreditation are a positive step by correctional professionals toward eliminating many of the causes of riots and disturbances, as well as removing other conditions in institutions.
Organization for Riot Control

As part of planning for riot control, there should be provisions in the event of a riot on the role of the Governor, Attorney General, County Attorney, State Police Commander, and National Guard Commander. The central corrections office and head of each institution must insure that such understandings exist. These agreements should be written with responsible persons identified.

Such agreements should include some ironclad rules agreed upon by all parties and made well known to inmates as well as staff. The following are strongly recommended in this instance:

- Riots will be granted no illegal freedom;
- Neither immunity nor amnesty will be granted;
- Neither keys nor weapons will be surrendered;
- No transportation will be provided to assist inmates in leaving the institution.

It is also important that the roles of all institutional staff during disturbance are designated in an organizational chart, which clearly shows the chain of command. It is important that there be unity of command with only one person designated as being in charge. Typically this should be the warden of the institution, and the organization chart should show a typical organization configuration.

Emergency Personnel and Equipment

The mobilization of personnel should be described generally in three phases:

1. The call-up of co-duty personnel
2. The call-up of off-duty personnel
3. The call-up of supportive personnel from law enforcement agencies and/or the National Guard.

Training of personnel should be provided for the role of the inmate. The following chart shows a typical organizational chart, which clearly shows the chain of command. It is important that there be unity of command with only one person designated as being in charge. Typically this should be the warden of the institution, and the organization chart should show a typical organization configuration.

In the past, a desire on the part of management to extend the visual usefulness of the control center—has caused architects to employ large glass areas to extend the visual usefulness of the control center. This has caused architects to employ large glass areas to extend the visual usefulness of the control center. In order to function, sliding gates can maintain horizontal flow of materials and manufacturing processes. Other building areas requiring special study are: dining halls and gymnasiums where large groups of inmates may be incited to panic and riot by virtue of numbers. Large dining halls seating several hundred men should be avoided whenever possible. The cafeteria line should flow into several separate spaces isolating the diners into groups of 75 to 100 persons. Small dining rooms adjacent to housing units are preferable for maximum security situations.

In our offices, the riot plan begins with establishing what doors, gates, or other barriers already exist, of determining that they are inoperable or difficult to control. The process of systematic and strategic planning must begin with determining the flow of materials and to allow existing heating and ventilating systems to function. Sliding gates can maintain horizontal flow of materials and manufacturing processes. Other building areas requiring special study are: dining halls and gymnasiums where large groups of inmates may be incited to panic and riot by virtue of numbers.

In many cases, this will lead to the obvious but important first step of a riot control plan—that of containment. The theory of containment is a variation of the "divide and conquer" theory. It is also referred to as the "lockdown" of all areas and defined zones beginning with already existing natural barriers such as the cell, the dayrooms and the housing building perimeter. But it also applies to all assigned areas and buildings including exterior zones. The implementation of the containment step of the riot plan begins with establishing what doors, gates, or other barriers already exist, of determining that they are inoperable or difficult to control.

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Role of Physical Facilities in Containing and Controlling Riots

In terms of architecture and design, and the modifications required for making buildings more secure, the riot control plan begins with the study of all facilities and systems. The administration must have a complete knowledge of what exists—both visibly and behind walls and under surfaces.
The exterior areas of the correctional institutions should be carefully delineated through analysis of the site plans' arrangement of buildings, circulation routes, recreational yards and industrial areas. Consideration in developing the final exterior zones are tower or designated riot observing point, and the site plans' arrangement of buildings, circulation should be carefully delineated through analysis of routes, recreational yards and industrial areas.

A second aspect of the control plan is the securing of those areas which may increase the riot potential if the riot occurs in the open or cannot be contained. The hospital drug room which provides stimulants; the kitchen and food storage areas which provide sustenance; shop, factory, and warehouse areas which tools and flammable liquids are available; all must be secured and controlled. Not to be overlooked is the administrative area where the destruction of records may be an objective.

The Control Center air conditioning should be 100% fresh air and should be pressurized to prevent the room from being gased. The fan supply unit should be in a secure equipment room. The lighting system of the Control Center should be on dimmers to allow adjustment of level of light for monitoring equipment with LED signal lights, CRT screens, CCTV and other devices.

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If a utilities tunnel system exists in the institution, consideration should be given to connecting the tunnel system with a nearby guard tower which would provide a supervised entrance point. The maintenance of all utilities and communications systems in operating order is most important under normal conditions. However, as in the event of riot, the fire escape plan will be effective in reaching many locations.

A. Floor plans or sketches of buildings should be instantly available to command personnel during such emergencies.

The Need for Special Training

Before turning to a discussion of control measures, strategies, and actions employed in quelling riots and disturbances; we shall give a brief summary of some special weapons and equipment which correctional institutions should consider investing in as part of their general riot preparedness.

A. Supplies, especially those which can be burned or used as weapons: i.e., gasoline, poisons, ladders, torches, etc.

B. Firearms and ammunition (ammo should be kept updated).

C. Gas supply and equipment (gas supply should be updated—old gas may be used for training purposes)

D. Activating emergency lighting equipment and facilities; including those available from outside agencies

E. Fire-fighting equipment and personnel

F. Shutoff valves for water, electricity, gas, heat, and ventilation

G. Emergency entrances to all buildings

H. Emergency keys

I. General alarm system

J. Availability of emergency personnel (current phone lists)

K. Amplifiers, public address system, communications equipment

25 WATTS POWER OUTPUT

No. 193-6002

GAS MASK / MEGAPHONE

ION MASK / HELMET

V. overshoot direction will be effective in reaching many locations.

D. Special weapons which can be used as weapons such as water cannon, tear gas, and tear gas canisters.
that a Special Reaction Team be established. Sufficient staff should be trained to minimize the shortfalls associated with shift work, vacations, and job turnover. Careful records should be kept on those who receive such training so they can be identified and located quickly.

Protective Equipment

Staff involved in the riot area should be provided with protective clothing, such as helmets, shields, gloves, and boots. If the rioters are thought to have weapons, then staff should be provided with body armor. If chemical agents such as tear gas are likely to be employed, then gas masks are mandatory for staff.

Communications Equipment

Effective communication is critical in controlling riots and disturbances. A public address system and bullhorns should be available to allow communication with a large number of people and to overcome noise and confusion. Hand signals and smoke signals may also be appropriately utilized. Provision and training should be undertaken to make this option effective.

Field phones provide a secure means of communication. If normal telephone communication is not available in a hostage situation, a field phone should be provided to the hostage takers. This will be very helpful in establishing leadership among the hostage takers. This will be very helpful in establishing leadership among the hostage takers, providing intelligence information, and monitoring the condition and whereabouts of the hostages. Walkie-talkies should generally not be provided to rioters since this usually would provide a breach of communication security. However, walkie-talkies should be available to appropriate staff controlling the riot. Ideally, a dedicated frequency should be utilized. If possible, consideration should be made in selecting this frequency so as to be compatible with state police and national guard equipment.

Two other specialized types of equipment are also very desirable. The principle negotiator should wear a small wireless microphone to allow recording of any negotiations that take place and to permit prompting from secondary negotiators. Specialized listening devices, or bugs, may be helpful in protracted riot situations to determine rioters' plans, general mood, and the location and condition of hostages.

Evidence Gathering Equipment

Evidence gathering equipment is also important, both during and after a riot or hostage situation. Tape recorders are needed to make a record of all telephone calls that take place in the institution as well as for debriefing staff and inmates. Cameras (particularly movie cameras) and video tape equipment allow for valuable documentation of events as they transpire.

Weapons

The shotgun is the most common riot control weapon in correctional institutions. Twelve gauge slide action shotguns are recommended because of their reliability and flexibility. They offer considerable flexibility since they permit several choices in loads. Buckshot 00 is less likely to ricochet than a rifle bullet, yet is accurate and offers tremendous stopping power at up to fifty yards. Its use, however, obviously constitutes deadly force. Birdshot (17½ shot) on the other hand, can be used so as not to inflict substantial injury, yet provides stopping power. It is generally recommended that a warning shot be fired initially about three feet in front of rioters so as to ricochet off the floor. This generally proves effective without causing disabling injuries. To avoid serious damage to rioters, the general rule in using the shotgun is to aim low.
A special shotgun shell filled with wooden blocks is also available and has proved effective when used in the same manner as blankshot. Other loads are available and may be considered (i.e., putty projectiles, soft rubber bullets, tempered glass beads, mold- ed rock salt, plastic pellets, etc.) Many of these special loads, however, will not work in a semi-automatic shotgun.

The stungun is another riot control tool. It basically involves the firing of a flat, variable diameter shot bag by powder activated cartidges. A special 40mm hand-held launcher, that doubles as a baton, is used to fire a 3 inch loading directly at a rioter. It has a non-penetrating, knockdown effect at various ranges depending on the type of load. Generally the stungun should not be aimed at the head or neck regions.

Another frequently used riot control device is the baton. This is an effective weapon in deterring attack. It is especially useful in close-in situations where a shotgun or pistol would be deadly. Certain-ly, the baton can easily be lethal; but in the hands of a well trained officer, it is a very functional protective weapon.

The rifle has no place in crowd or general riot control. However, it may prove very useful in the hands of an excellent marksman in protecting the lives of hostages if they are in imminent danger. Telescopic sights are a necessity, and night vision scope may also be extremely useful at times.

A stubbomb has recently been developed for use in aircraft hijacking situations. It is quite expensive, but may have some utility in the institutional setting. The bomb is designed not to inflict permanent injury, but the explosion typically disables those exposed to it for several seconds. In some instances, this may provide the time necessary to save a hostage from a precarious situation.

The use of smoke is a possible alternative to the use of either CN or CS. It may be dispersed in the same manner as tear gas and may initially produce much the same psychological effect since rioters would probably assume that it is tear gas and seek cover to avoid it. DM (dephenylaminemichlorarsine) commonly referred to as “sickening” or “knock-out” gas, is not recommended for use in correctional institutions. It takes from fifteen to thirty minutes to take effect, and produces increasingly severe nausea. If fully expos- ed, a person can expect to feel the effects of this gas for up to twenty-four hours.

All of the chemical agents discussed above are available commercially, and literature concerning them is available from the distributors. They may be dispersed by various means. The most common is a grenade. This can be of the exploding or non- exploding variety where the agent typically burns and produces smoke. Since the varieties have the potential to cause fires, care must be exercised in

Chemical Agents

Chemical agents can also provide an excellent means of quelling a riot without causing death or severe bodily harm. The most common chemical agent used in quelling riots and disturbances in correctional institutions is tear gas. There are two common varieties: CN (chloracetophenone) and CS (Orthochlorobenzalmalononitrile).

CN is the milder form of tear gas. It will cause the skin to smart, irritation of the eyes, tears, a burning sensation in the mucous areas, and an overall feeling of discomfort. These symptoms are fleeting and will usually disappear within a few minutes after the individual is removed from the contaminated area. Persons exposed to heavy concentrations for pro-longed periods of time should have medical atten-

tion. General treatment includes the use of commercial eyewash or a very diluted salt solution to wash the eyes, and soap and water to wash the body.

CS is more powerful than CN and is sometimes called “super tear gas.” It has replaced CN for use by the military. It produces extreme burning of the eyes, coughing, labored breathing, chest tightness, sting- sing sensations on moist areas of the skin, and nausea. Because of its power, CS requires first aid by knowledgeable personnel. Affected persons should be moved to an uncontaminated area, preferably out of doors. They should be cautioned against rubbing their eyes. After three to six hours they should shower with cold water for a few minutes, then soap and shower as usual.

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their deployment. Another method of dispersing gas is the projectile. There is a variety of these available, some of them having the capability to penetrate substantial barricades. Care should be taken not to fire such projectiles into the midst of crowds as they could easily cause serious injury or death. Chemical agents can also be dispersed mechanically, in the form of a micropulverized powder. The means of dispersing the powder ranges from a small, hand-held aerosol can to helicopters, which can cover an entire yard.

Additional Equipment and Supplies
A comprehensive and detailed list of weapons, tools, and equipment that might be required in the control of a major riot, disturbance or hostage-taking situation in a correctional institution is beyond the scope of this publication. Obviously, however, is the need for medical equipment and personnel on a stand-by basis, prior agreements with the Red Cross, National Guard, and local medical facilities. Emergency shelter and sleeping accommodations as well as special food supplies must also be planned for in advance. Barricade removal may require the use of axes, crowbars, pinchbars, etc. There may also be a need for special concrete and steel cutting equipment to gain access into the buildings or to allow those inmates who do not want to participate in the disturbance a chance to exit. This equipment should be on hand or readily available.

THE PLAN OF ACTION
Notification of an Emergency
Proper policy, procedure, and training should ensure that all staff know and have the means to report a disturbance immediately to a central location so as to give the officials in charge of the institution the maximum amount of time to isolate and bring the disturbance under control prior to involving a greater area. Immediately upon receiving notification of a disturbance, the control center officer should contact the supervisor in charge of the watch. Based upon the control officer's instructions and written emergency procedures, contact should be made with the administrative staff (the Warden, Associate Warden, Chief Correctional Supervisor). Also to be contacted immediately are the particular security, front and rear entrances; powerhouses; industry; food service; and all areas where there are likely to be groups of inmates. In the event the watch supervisor cannot be contacted, the emergency procedures should allow for the control center officer to institute certain emergency operation procedures. Therefore, the officers who are assigned to the control center must have experience and a great amount of knowledge of the institution operations as well as the emergency procedures.

Control Center
The control center officer receiving an emergency call should ascertain as much as he can about the situation. At a minimum, the following information should be obtained: (1) The part of the correctional institution that is involved; (2) The number of inmates involved; (3) The number of hostages taken, if any; (4) The location of the hostages; and, (5) who the ringleaders are. In the event the control center officer is unable to question the caller, he should immediately contact the supervisor of the watch or other available officers, to advise them of receiving an emergency call so that they can initiate action to seal off the area where the disturbance is located.

Security Keys
To prevent rioting inmates from using security keys and gaining access to tools, weapons, or breaking out of secure areas it is essential that a set of procedures be implemented to assure the control of security keys and locks.

RESOURCES FOR RIOT CONTROL
Controlling the riot or disturbance situation is one of the most difficult tasks a correctional administrator must face. It is, therefore, imperative that resources have been developed and organized in advance to be mastered on very short notice. These should include: (1) Sound intelligence gathering resources; (2) A "think tank"; (3) A negotiation team; (4) Staff trained in riot control and the use of chemical agents; (5) A properly equipped assault force; and, (6) Highly trained marksmen. Some of the alternatives and tasks that need to be considered are shown in the following flowchart which may serve as a checklist in making preparation.

![Flowchart](https://via.placeholder.com/150)
Confine the Disturbance

In order to avoid widespread rioting, the disturbance must be confined to the smallest portion of the institution as soon as possible. When a disturbance occurs, an internal perimeter should be established to control movement out of and into the area of the disturbance. All non-correctional personnel (citizens) should be removed from the institution. The potential for intrusion by outside groups into the institution should not be overlooked in the planning, as such events have recently occurred. Inmates not involved in the disturbance should be isolated and at least temporarily restrained to keep the disturbance to a minimum. These inmates, however, must not be ignored; their needs must be attended to, and their activities and attitudes monitored.

Concern for Protective Custody

Considerable concern must be given to protecting inmates who have requested protection, since in major riots there are inevitably some attempts to kill the "snitches." It is advantageous to have a sallyport entrance that can be quickly sealed off, a place where protective custody cases are housed. Some alternative emergency exit also is desirable.

Importance of Speed in Quelling Disturbance

Riots and disturbances in correctional institutions generally should be resolved as quickly as possible to minimize the amount of property damage, reduce injury and death, and serve as a deterrent to future uprisings. In hostage situations outside correctional institutions, prolonged negotiations might be advisable to permit a phenomenon called the "Stockholm effect" (a strong bond between captors and hostages) to occur which lessens the chance of hostages being killed. Inside correctional institutions, however, relationships already exist between captors and hostages—innmates and staff—which might be highly negative. With prolonged time, therefore, chances might increase rather than decrease of hostages being physically violated or killed.

Another reason for speed is that in most massive riot situations, inmates will immediately start brewing "hooch," which can take only about 24 hours to ferment. Therefore, there is considerable advantage to retaking the institution before the inmates become intoxicated. Furthermore, the longer inmates go without proper supervision, the more likely it is that they will start settling old accounts and grievances violently.

Determine Appropriate Intervention

The most critical decision to be made in a riot or disturbance situation is the type and timing of the intervention to be made to bring it under control. Many correctional administrators feel that it is helpful to have a carefully selected group of people serve as a "think tank" (Cawley, 1974) or "War Council" (Estelle, 1976) to advise them throughout the disturbance. Having negotiators, staff who are proficient in chemical agents and riot control, a well-disciplined assault force, and a force of skilled marksmen provide flexibility and options of considerable benefit when faced with a crisis. All of these "teams" should be at the ready on very short notice.

The decisions to be made are likely to include the following: How much risk should be imposed on hostages? Is it proper to negotiate with rioters? When and how much force should be employed? In planning any action, however, the following rules should be observed:

1. Do not make any statements to the group or rioters as to the use of force until you are completely prepared and decisions have been made
as to the attack plans formulated and be prepared to carry out any instructions which you relay to the assaultive group; (2) Give top priority to any inmate who harms or threatens an employee. Be sure that this inmate once taken into custody is handled in such a manner that his prosecution would be possible and start an investigation of his actions as soon as possible once the group is brought under control; (3) Do not attempt more than can logically be handled. A sizable portion of the available personnel should be in reserve during the taking of action against the riot group to allow for unexpected strain from the inmate groups.

Hostages

There has been much discussion and difference of opinion as to how much risk should be imposed upon a hostage or hostages in the process of bringing barricaded mutineers to submission. Certainly, a reckless disregard for a hostage's life would not be upon a hostage or hostages in the process of bringing barricaded mutineers to submission. Certainly, a reckless disregard for a hostage's life would not be. (2) His authority to make decisions may put him under undue emotional stress thus increasing the likelihood of making a bad decision; (3) Having someone other than the authority figure as negotiator buys time and allows consultation in the negotiation process and, (4) A nonauthority person is less likely to be subject to retaliation if inmates are not pleased with the response. There should be at least two negotiators, backed up by the decision maker and "think tank." Mature appearing males seem to be the most effective in the formal setting; they must be intelligent, practical, have good verbal skills, and proven ability to think clearly under stress. In many prisons, negotiators should be bilingual.

Ideally, negotiations should take place in a private place outside the riot area to reduce the possibility of theatrics and peer pressure. Consideration should also be given to conducting negotiations over the telephone or in writing if practicable. Some guarantees need to be made to insure the safety of all negotiators.

Generally, negotiations should be conducted privately without the presence of the press, although the press should be briefed as to the progress of negotiations. Caution should be taken so that rigid statements of demands are not released to the press since these might decrease the likelihood of subsequent concessions.
Although as previously indicated, there are some "hidden" microphones in the institution to allow "think tank" members and decision makers to monitor the process and gather intelligence information in case an assault becomes necessary. It must be recognized, however, that by the security which the "hidden" microphone might become counter-productive—even dangerous—if discovered by hostile inmates.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

Any major disturbance in a correctional institution will attract the attention of the news media. The presence of the news media is often the first thing inmates demand when there is an institutional disturbance. The riot control plan of an institution must include dealing with the press so that sensational reporting is discouraged, rumors are dispelled, and misunderstandings are corrected before further tensions are created.

It is important that proper physical facilities and an official spokesman be provided for media representatives, to ensure timely and accurate information flow. It is best to establish a press relations center where dispatches are released and inquiries answered. This will prevent newsroom from roaming about endangering themselves or jeopardizing riot control activities. Media representatives should not become involved in negotiation or riot control activities.

THE USE OF FORCE

If negotiations fail, or if the situation is judged by those in charge to be an emergency, use of force might have to be applied to quell the riot and prevent it from spreading or intensifying.

At times the show of force might be enough to convince the mob of the ability of staff to maintain order and wrest control from rioters with force if necessary. A show of force, such as trained staff with riot control gear, has proven effective in bringing some riots and disturbances to a conclusion. However, if this is not enough, force will have to be used.

The five most common riot control formations are (1) "the circle," used to move a group of rioters directly away from you (e.g., down a corridor) (2) "echelon right," used to move a group of rioters in the left (3) "echelon left," used to move a group of rioters in the right (4) "the wedge," used to disperse rioters to either side; and (5) "the diamond," used to provide protection on all sides. For psychological purposes in the institution, it may prove advantageous to utilize staff with riot batons interspersed with shotguns. Use of deadly force should be avoided unless other methods have failed or it becomes necessary to save life, prevent serious injury, protect property, damage, or escape. The courts react with disfavor when an intervention is used in an unwarranted fashion. If the situation is such that deadly force must be used, it should be employed with utmost precision and selectivity against the particular threat which justifies its use. When possible, the use of deadly force should be preceded by a clear warning that the use of such force is contemplated.

The use of deadly force always entails considerable risks, and everything possible should be done to minimize them. The following are some suggestions: Those entrusted with firearms should be highly trained and carefully screened to ensure that they are not "trigger happy." Marksmen should have a particular weapon assigned to them with which they are familiar and have personally zeroed. All firearms and loads should be carefully allocated so that they are appropriate for the need and setting in which they may be used. Those using weapons should aim to dissociate rather than kill. All who participate in an assault should be carefully briefed as to what they will likely encounter. They should know the building and the location of the rioters. If hostages are involved, their identity and locations are critical. All involved must be aware of the possibility that inmates might have forced hostages to exchange clothes, thus making identification more troublesome. Those participating in the assault should be properly equipped. Protective gear such as "flak jackets" or vests should be worn as should helmets and boots. If the use of chemical agents is anticipated, gas masks should be available. The appropriate mix of weaponry must be determined for each situation as must the need for any additional equipment. Good communication is essential.

POST-RIOT ACTIVITIES

As soon as the riot or disturbance has been controlled, the following steps need to be taken: (1) All inmate participants in the riot should be confined, and sufficient staff must be assigned to their supervision to prevent a recurrence of disturbances; (2) An official count must be taken of all inmates; (3) All ringleaders and agitators must be segregated; (4) If necessary, all work and recreational activities should be halted and dining schedules reviewed so supervision can be provided over smaller groups during meal periods; (5) Sufficient amount of staff should be provided in quarters and dining rooms until it is ascertained that the disorder is completely subside and a normal atmosphere prevails in the institution; (6) An extensive and thorough investigation should be initiated, to include interviewing ringleaders and
participants in the incident. Normally, rioting inmates should only be questioned by staff who are appointed by the warden to this task. Individuals, officers, and staff members should not indiscriminately question inmates who have participated in the riot; (7) Employees involved or witnesses in the disturbance will be interviewed for statements as indicated; (8) Immediate arrangements for repairing the damage of the institution and physical security will be undertaken. All damaged areas will be photographed prior to being repaired; (9) The hospital will complete a dossier on all injuries sustained by employees and inmates. Special care should be provided for hostages who might have sustained physical and psychological damage during the disturbances. Nervous tensions of both inmates and personnel will be in a delicate state for some time after a major disturbance. It is obvious that the sooner a relatively normal atmosphere can be restored, the better. In some jurisdictions, an ad hoc inmate committee selected by and meeting with administrative personnel has proved useful in alleviating post-disorder tensions and restoring normalcy. The committee should not be allowed to develop a power-base or to engage in bargaining. The function of the committee is restricted to facilitating understanding and communication. Just as soon as it seems safe to do so, the cautious return to work and other programs can then begin with the objective of restoring the whole institution to normal. As a last word, principles of good management dictate that an objective critique be held for the staff after full control has been restored.

APPENDIX A

INDICATORS OF PRISON TENSION OFTEN PRECEDING RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES

Disturbances in correctional institutions can be prevented if staff are able to interpret and act on changes in institutional atmosphere and behavior patterns. Among the signs indicating growing tensions and potential disturbances are the following:

- Increased separation by racial or ethnic groups;
- Increased purchases of foodstuffs at inmate canteens;
- Increased requests for transfer;
- Decrease in the number of workers;
- Many inmates spending more time in their cells;
- Inmate groupings with point men facing away from the group;
- Increase in disciplinary cases;
- Increase in inmate/officer confrontations;
- Increases in inmates trying to intimidate officers who are in the process of writing up an inmate;
- Increase in threats against officers;
- Increase in voluntary lockups;
- Increase in inmate sick calls;
- Increase in inmate violence;
- Increase in number of weapons found in shake-downs;
- Harsh stares from inmates;
- Drop in attendance at movies or other popular functions;
- Unusual and/or audible actions by inmate groups;
- Resentment on the part of inmates to communicate with staff;
- Inmates avoiding eye contact with staff;
- Inmates making excessive and/or specific demands;
- Appearance of inflammatory and anti-authority materials;
- Warnings to "friendly" officers to take sick leave or vacation;
- Increased safety demands from employees;
- Significant increase in employee resignations;
- Letters and/or phone calls from concerned inmate families demanding protection for inmates;
- Unusual number of telephone inquiries about prison conditions;
- Outside agitation.
GUIDELINES FOR HOSTAGES

1. Continue to be firm. Don't get flustered.
2. Be cooperative and try to take the hostage's demands without appearing servile or antagonistic.
3. Look for a secluded place where you could dive or fall if either authorities or inmates attempt to reassure your location with force.
4. Keep cool. Attempt to relax by thinking about pleasant memories.
5. Keep a low profile. Avoid the appearance of observing crimes that discussions or activities.
6. Do not make threats against hostage takers or give any indication that you would testify against them. If inmates are attempting to conceal their identities, make no indication that you recognize them.
7. Be reluctant to give up your identification or clothes. Loss of these things is demoralizing. Inmates will use them for bargaining. Be
8. As a result of the stress of the hostage situation, you may have
9. Be cautious about making suggestions to your captors as you may be
10. Think of persuasive reasons the hostage takers should keep you and
11. You should be debriefed. This will give you an opportunity to discuss what happened to you and how you feel. Express your feelings freely. Deal openly with your reactions and any problems you may have subsequently. You never nothing to be ashamed of.
12. Even though you must appear disoriented while being held hostage, observe all you can. Insure that you are thoroughly disoriented and make your own notes after your release. All of these things will help in the subsequent prosecution of the ripher

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE RIOT AND DISTURBANCE PLAN

I. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE

Emergency requiring a response by the institution may range from small or large inmate disturbances to community disorders. This procedure is designed to provide general guidance for all emergencies and specific procedures governing internal disturbance control and hostage retrieval. Each type of emergency requires a different response and control tactic; therefore, sufficient flexibility of this plan affords for a response appropriate to the situation. The object of the plan is:

A. To provide a contingency plan to control the various emergencies that may occur;
B. To train staff to provide an appropriate controlled response to emergencies;
C. To gather necessary resources to contain, control, and resolve institutional disturbances in an appropriate manner;
D. To maintain effective control over all non-involvd entities of the institution;
E. To return the institution to normal operating order as quickly as possible;
F. To provide a modified command procedure designed to assist in achieving the above objectives.

II. APPROVAL AND REVIEW

A. This plan will be submitted by the warden to the director of corrections for final approval. This plan will be reviewed and, if necessary, revised annually. The complete version will be submitted to the director by the end of each year. A final review will be conducted during the month of December.

III. RESPONSIBILITY

A. It is the responsibility of every unit administrator to ensure that all employees within the unit are adequately trained and instructed as to their proper specific response to emergencies.
B. It is the responsibility of the training section to ensure that all new employees are trained in the appropriate sections of this procedure.
C. It is the responsibility of every departmental employee to respond appropriately, as trained and ordered, to every emergency situation. Nature of their individual response will depend upon the type of emergency, their position at the time of the alarm, instructions given by supervisors, and by prior training.

The riot and disturbance plan outlined below is adapted from an original plan presented in a maximum security institution. The plan is used for the use of the reader and is to be considered a guide. Portions of excerpts regarding hostage and dual command post were used with permission of Jeffrey and Cynthia Grimes from their Management of Hostage Situations. Copyright 1977.
IV. METHODS

B. Response

A. Emergency

1. Incident should be managed consistent with the procedures set forth to facilitate management of the total range of emergencies. The following guidelines and response within this procedure, the response must be geared to the situation. The following guidelines and response where a controlled response is indicated, the alarm be given by activating a personal alarm device signal. In situations such as an accomplished escape or a job change; the emergency area be alerted so that assistance can be provided and nullify rumors with facts.

2. The public information officer will make periodic reports to the incident commander until released by direct command from the incident commander. Staff responding to an incident are under the command of the incident commander until released by direct command from the incident commander.

3. Initial emergency response—At the sounding of an alarm, all staff in the immediate area will respond to the alarm according to predesignated plans. Staff in areas not affected from the incident are not to respond to the incident but will maintain control of their area. To provide an organized response and ensure continued control of the total institution, each unit of the institution will have an internal response plan detailing the expected response of the assigned staff within that unit. The plan will specify expected response for emergencies outside of the institution. These plans will provide for immediate existence to adjacent areas while maintaining sufficient staff to secure the unit. Unit response plans will also provide a secondary response in the event initially responding staff cannot control the situation or further security measures are needed.

4. General secondary response—in the event an emergency situation has not been controlled by the staff initially responding to the emergency, a subsequent action requiring additional staff to be taken, a general secondary response may be called by the person or persons in charge of the incident. This will be done by either the designated officer or by the incident commander. A general secondary response will be called by the incident commander.

5. Specific secondary response—in the event a general secondary response was not needed but a limited situation was required following the initial response to an emergency, the emergency commander could call for a specific secondary response. Examples of such a request could include weapons coverage, initial lock-down, etc. In such an event the control sergeant, after taking notice of the specific need, will use the implement the specific response.

C. Firearms and Chemical Agents

1. The policies of the director of corrections concerning the use of firearms and chemical agents are sufficient in most cases, as they provide for immediate emergency use of both. Circumstances permitting, approval of the weapon would be obtained.

2. The weapon and associated weapons or their containers, will be the person in charge of the use of firearms and chemical agents. Note: No employee will be assigned to carry or use a firearm who has not completed emergency training.

4. General mobilization—Emergencies may become serious enough to require the mobilization of all staff on duty and off duty. This decision will be made by the warden, institutional staff at the program administration level or above.

a. The form system—

(1) The control sergeant will sound the institutional siren.

(2) The control sergeant will assign two employees (preferably from clerical staff) to report to the institution. These cells will be made from inside emergency area.

(3) The sounds of the alarm will alert not only the institution employees but also the security areas of the institution and control directly to the designated staging areas.

b. Employees on duty at time of alarm—

(1) If immediate additional firearm coverage will be provided. Due to reduced staffing on weekends, holidays, first and third watchs—the watch commander will order specific available staff to emergency gun positions. The ranking or designated officer will assume control of the disturbance area.
Employees in housing units will immediately secure immediately after the alarm is sounded.

2. Conduct an orderly lockup of the staff on duty in housing units will leave selected doors unlocked. Nonemployees inside the walls will be asserted immediately after the alarm is sounded.

3. Nonemployees inside the walls will leave selected doors unlocked. Nonemployees inside the walls will be escorted from inside the walls, Nonemployees inside the walls will be escorted from inside the walls, Nonemployees inside the walls will be escorted from inside the walls.

4. Nonuniformed female employees who have medical training will report to the hospital for medical training.

5. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

6. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

7. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

8. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

9. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

10. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

11. Nonemployees becoming involved in a disturbance will be escorted from inside the walls.

12. Entrance gate officers shall contact the public information officer for authority before admitting new media personnel.

4. Employees off duty at time of alarm—

a. Dooms of the telephones will be activated at the time of the alarm.

b. Notify the warden, the chief medical officer, and the public information officer.

c. The employees assigned to call off-duty staff will call all off-duty staff employees.

d. Notify the employees that they have been called and report to them in the staging area indicated.

f. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

g. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

h. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

i. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

j. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

k. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

l. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

m. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

n. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

o. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

p. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

q. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

r. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

s. The employees will then report to the staging area indicated.

4. Program administrators and program units' administrators, assistant superintendents, assistant wardens, assistant warden, and assistant wardens shall be instructed accordingly.

5. If during an incident it is determined that hostages are being held and they are not freed by the initial response, the hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

6. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

7. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

8. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

9. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

10. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

11. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.

12. The hostage situation should be cleared before outside agencies are contacted.
D. Resolution—

1. The resolution phase of any incident proceeds naturally from either the initial response phase or sequential response. The resolution phase is primarily the function of the incident commander. During this phase of the operation, the incident commander will make use of those resources previously provided to resolve the incident. The action of the incident and the incident commander will be in keeping with the incident training of staff placed in these assignments.

2. All resources to the vicinity of a stable threat incident will be given an unconflicted body search and inspected for weapons, injuries, or other evidence of involvement.

3. All involved in the vicinity of any incident will be isolated and identified. A list of these personnel will be compiled. Their location will be given to the scene of the incident and other involved facilities will be noted.

4. When the incident has been resolved and control has been reestablished, the institution will revert to an operation level consistent with the existing situation.

E. Dual command procedure—

Emergency situations may by their nature, magnitude, or duration make a dual command operation advisable. The dual command operation is a modification of the normal chain of command-placing an incident commander in charge of the emergency situation and an operations officer in charge of other operational duties. The decision to implement a dual command procedure should not be made lightly. There could be problems of conflict between two commanders. The following is a dual command organizational chart to assist a single commander.

1. Incident commander-The incident commander's responsibility will be to work toward a reasonable solution of the emergency consistent with existing policies, procedures and circumstances. All resources will be available to the incident commander for use in effecting his function. Under the incident commander's personal command, the incident commander will be individuals and groups selected to provide support and assistance. This may include the security squad commander, assault squad commander, intelligence officer, liaison officer, and other individuals and groups as deemed appropriate.

2. Operations officer-The operations officer is the second half of the dual command system. Responsibility is to direct attention to the uninvolved areas of the institution and to organize and provide resources to the incident commander. The operations officer will have a liaison officer who will work directly with the incident commander. Other staff will be designated as deemed appropriate. Unless circumstances dictate otherwise, the associate warden's operations office will be the operations command post.

F. Incident Command Post—

An incident may be of such magnitude or duration that an incident command post may be advisable. The established incident command post will be placed inside or near the facility to be served. This post will be available to command staff and support staff. Specifically a manual for each post will be prepared. These will be prepared in two sets, one to be kept on file and another to be used in the emergency situation.

1. The deactivation phase follows the resolution of the incident. All personnel committed to their respective destinations. The incident commander, control sergeants, and others as designated by the warden will receive specific training.
There is an affirmative action program that has been approved by the appropriate governmental agency. (Essential)

There are no, or at least at the time of their entry, individuals who have, as a part of their regular job roles, any support person who would require specialized training to perform their particular role of expertise. Those individuals should be familiar with policies and procedures of the institution, plus the basic rules of inmate supervision and security. Ongoing training during subsequent years of employment must result in shoring skills and keep abreast of changes in operational procedures. (Related Standards 2-4174 and 2-4210)

A program of orientation, in-service training, constructive supervision, and opportunities for advancement can provide the institution with valuable manpower. (Related Standard 2-4092)

An individual who is assigned to a particular job should be provided with sufficient training to enable him or her to effectively perform the duties of the job. This training should be comprehensive. Ongoing training during subsequent years of employment must result in shoring skills and keep abreast of changes in operational procedures. (Related Standards 2-4174, 2-4196, 2-4210, 2-4211)

A program of orientation which requires 80 hours of training during their first year of employment, and an additional 40 hours of training each subsequent year of employment. At a minimum this training covers the following areas:

- Security procedures
- Supervision of inmates
- Use of force regulations and tactics
- Request writing
- Inmates rules and regulations
- Rights and responsibilities of inmates
- Fire and emergency procedures
- Firearms training
- Key control
- Intergroup relations
- Professional cultural lifestyles of the inmate population
- Communication skills

First aid, (Essential)

DISCUSSION: Since this policy of training is frequently involve most institutional operations, their training should be comprehensive. Ongoing training during subsequent years of employment must result in shoring skills and keep abreast of changes in operational procedures. (Related Standards 2-4088, 2-4089, 2-4096, 2-4098, 2-4099, 2-4300, and 2-4677)

There is an emergency unit, written policy and procedure provide for meetings to plan and procedures for prior training received. (Essential)

A program of training should cover the following areas:

- Food service
- Industrial supervisors
- Financial management
- Employment of qualified ex-offenders. (Important)

DISCUSSION: Most institutional policies and procedures are self-explanatory. In other words, the policies are written in such a way that they can be easily understood by the reader. However, it is important to note that not all policies are self-explanatory. (Related Standards 2-4025 and 2-4040)

A program of training should be comprehensive. Ongoing training during subsequent years of employment must result in shoring skills and keep abreast of changes in operational procedures. (Related Standards 2-4088, 2-4089, 2-4096, 2-4098, 2-4099, 2-4300, and 2-4677)

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care, and constraints involved in the use of firearms. All authorized personnel are required to demonstrate competency on at least an annual basis. (Mandatory)

DISCUSSION: Staff authorized to use firearms require thorough training in their use, safety, and care. A specific curriculum should be established that includes individual and group instruction by competent authorities. Instructions should include training regarding the limited conditions under which the use of firearms would be condoned; this training should be comparable to the police constraints or regulations of that particular jurisdiction. (Related Standard 2-4092 and 2-4166)

2-4097 All personnel authorized to use chemical agents are thoroughly trained in their use and in the treatment of individuals exposed to the chemical agent. (Mandatory)

DISCUSSION: Chemical agents, if not properly used and handled, could result in serious injury. A special curriculum should be established that includes both individual and group instruction by competent authorities. Personnel from the military, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the state and local police could provide the instruction.

2-4098 All security and custodial personnel are trained in approved methods of self-defense and the use of force as a last resort to control inmates. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: It is sometimes necessary to use physical force to control and/or move inmates. All security and custodial personnel should be trained in the techniques by which this can be done with minimal harm and discomfort to the inmates and staff.

2-4170 The institution has equipment necessary to maintain essential lights, power, and communications in an emergency. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: The institution should have emergency power units, either battery or motor driven, to provide essential lighting and to maintain the life-sustaining functions within the institution and to continue communications with outside interests. (Related Standards 2-4213)

2-4171 Power generators are tested at least every two weeks and other emergency equipment and systems are tested at least every quarter for effectiveness and are repaired or replaced if necessary. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: Frequent checks of emergency equipment, such as standby lighting, batteries, power generators, fire fighting apparatus, communications systems and alarms, ensure their reliability in time of need. (Related Standards 2-4151 and 2-4164)

2-4172 The institution has a written evacuation plan prepared in the event of fire or major emergency which is certified by an independent, outside inspector trained in the application of national fire safety codes. The plan is reviewed annually, updated if necessary, and released to the local fire jurisdiction. The plan includes the following:

Location of building/room floor plans
Use of exit signs and directional arrows for traffic flow
Location of publicly posted plan
At least quarterly drills in all institution locations
Staff drills when evacuation of extremely dangerous inmates may not be included. (Mandatory)
DISCUSSION: The evacuation plan should also specify routes of evacuation, subsequent disposition and housing of inmates, and provisions for medical care or hospital facilities. The plan should be clear and convincing evidence that institutional security is maintained. Upon such showing, actual evacuation during drills is not required, although staff supervising such inmates must be trained to perform their role according to quarterly drills. (Related Standard 2-4100)

2-4174 All Institution personnel are trained in the implementation of written emergency plans. (Mandatory)

DISCUSSION: Review of all emergency plans should be an essential element of personnel training and maintaining programs. New employees should be familiar with all emergency plans in effect and be expected to work efficiently.

2-4180 Written policy and procedure govern the use of firearms, and use of firearms, emergency chemical agents and other security devices, and specify the level of authority required for access to and use of security devices. Chemical agents are used only at the direction of the warden/superintendent or officer in charge. (Related Standard 2-4100)

DISCUSSION: In order to reduce the risk of firearms being lost or misused, institution personnel who spend most of their time in direct personal contact with inmates must not carry firearms. Use of firearms is to be restricted to inmates and/or the officer in charge of security. (Related Standard 2-4100)

2-4188 Written policy and procedure govern the availability, control, and use of firearms, emergency chemical agents and related security devices, and specify the level of authority required for access to and use of security devices. Chemical agents are used only at the direction of the warden/superintendent or officer in charge. (Related Standard 2-4100)

DISCUSSION: Designated staff should determine, based on an analysis of the physical plant and number and profile of the inmate population, what firearms, chemical agents, and other security devices (such as batons, bins, first-aid, radios, body protectors, etc.) the institution needs. Written policies and procedures should specify the level of authority required for access to and use of security devices. Chemical agents are used only at the direction of the warden/superintendent or officer in charge. (Related Standard 2-4100)

DISCUSSION: Inmates are instructed to use firearms only at the direction of the warden/superintendent of delegated subordinate.

2-4190 Written policy and procedure require that personnel discharging firearms, using chemical agents or any other weapon, or using force in control inmates should keep written reports to the warden/superintendent or designee no later than the conclusion of the tour of duty. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: All instances involving the discharge of firearms and use of chemical agents should be documented to establish the identity of personnel and inmates involved and to describe the nature of the incident.

2-4200 Written policy and procedure require that the chief security officer inspect at least weekly, and report in writing, all security devices needing repair or maintenance. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: There should be an inspection of each security device on a regular basis. This inspection should be made at least weekly, to ensure that all bars, locks, windows, doors, and other security devices are fully operational. Emergency keys should be checked at least weekly. Inmates should be made aware of the importance of this inspection and the importance of proper maintenance of security devices.

2-4202 Written policy and procedure restrict the use of physical force to instances of justifiable self-protection, defense of others, protection of property, and prevention of escape, as a last resort and in accordance with appropriate statutory authority. In no instance is physical force justifiable as punishment. A written report is required following all use of force and is submitted to the administrative staff for review. (Mandatory)

DISCUSSION: The institution should maintain a record of the nature, extent, and activities area. Written policy should specify who has access to the record.

2-4204 Written policy and procedure provide that the institution maintains a written record of any written document or emergency distribution of security equipment. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: A written record detailing who receives security equipment and what equipment they receive is necessary to establish responsibility and accountability for its use.

2-4211 Where there is a special unit of employees to assist in the event of disturbances, these employees are selected and evaluated according to written criteria and receive special training in methods of negotiation and confrontation. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: A small unit of selected employees should receive special training in methods of confrontation and negotiation. The purpose of this unit should be to provide order, with minimum damage, as quickly as possible. Therefore, unit members should be selected carefully and trained to perform the duties of these special units. Their performance evaluations should be based upon the specific aspects of the special duty. The unit should be activated only by the wardens/superintendents or delegates. (Related Standard 2-4100)

2-4212 There are written plans that specify procedures to be followed in situations which threaten institutional security, including, but not limited to, riots, hunger strikes, disturbances, and taking of hostages. These plans are made available to all applicable personnel and reviewed and updated at least annually. (Mandatory)

DISCUSSION: The plans should designate the personnel who are to implement such procedures, and with whom authorities and media should be notified, how the problem should be controlled, and what should be done after the incident is quelled. The plans presuppose regular inspection and maintenance of specialized equipment necessary to implement the procedures. All personnel should be familiar with the plans. Personnel involved in the investigation should be involved in the formulation of the written plans, since they are responsible for the safety of their patients. (Related Standards 2-4090-1, 2-4091, and 2-4092)

2-4213 There is a written inmate grievance procedure which is made available to all inmates and which includes at least one level of appeal. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: A grievance procedure is an administrative means for the expression and resolution of inmate problems. The institution's grievance mechanism should include the following: provision for written responses to all grievances, including the reasons for the decision; provision for response within a prescribed, reasonable time limit; provision for responding to grievances; provision for supervisory review of grievances; provision for participation by staff and inmates in the design and operation of the grievance procedure; provision for access by all inmates, without guarantees against retaliation, applicability over a broad range of issues; and means for resolving questions of jurisdiction. (Mandatory)

2-4214 The system for classifying inmates specifies the level of custodial control required and requires a regular review of each classification. (Essential)

DISCUSSION: A classification system should provide for at least three degrees of custodial control for inmates. All inmates should be assigned the least restrictive custodial level necessary.

DISCUSSION: The evacuation plan should also specify routes of evacuation, subsequent disposition and housing of inmates, and provisions for medical care or hospital facilities. The plan should be clear and convincing evidence that institutional security is maintained. Upon such showing, actual evacuation during drills is not required, although staff supervising such inmates must be trained to perform their role according to quarterly drills. (Related Standard 2-4100)

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