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URBAN PROFILE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO CRIME IN INDIANAPOLIS, 1948-78

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POLITICAL ISSUES IN MAYORAL ELECTIONS 1948-78

For all the subsequent discussion about the politics of crime reporting, criminal justice issues played little role in mayoral elections during this 31 year period. At most in this conservative city, the law enforcement backgrounds of several candidates -- Al Feeney in 1947, and Phil Bayt in 1955, -- and Charles Boswell's background in juvenile probation in 1959, lent personal credibility to them as upstanding citizens.

The politics of mayoral elections can be summed up thus: Until 1967, the strong grassroots organization of the Democrats, with close neighborhood ties, built on ethnic foundations (particularly with Irish Catholics), virtually guaranteed them a hold on the Mayor's office. The only exception was 1951, when as we shall see, a protest against national Democrat policies -- Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal -- swept a lone Republican, Alex Clark, into office. Even then, it was made clear that this was not a personal rebuff to Phil Bayt, the Democratic loser, and he was swept into office himself in the succeeding election.

The national constituency of the Republicans was the business community. But as Dertch (January 9-24, 1980), a ranking figure in the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce during the period, stressed, Republicans were not so troubled by Democratic leadership until 1964. Until then Democratic Mayors were careful to maintain a stance of fiscal conservation -- particularly leary of seeking federal funds for urban development. In general, Democrats took care to stay in the good graces of the business community.

The new Mayor in 1964, John Barton, changed that. In the period of the Great Society, he set up the Housing Authority and openly sought federal funds. In so doing, he resurrected the association of Democrats with "big government" and "the welfare state" that had undone the party in 1951. When an attractive young Republican candidate, Richard Lugar, appeared on the scene in 1967, promising fiscal responsibility and proposing government reorganization (which came to be known as "Uni-Gov"), he was embraced and elected by a landslide. He had been one of the incorporators of Head Start, and identified with the War on Poverty, which may have helped him win black votes (Liell, 1980), but he still did not suffer identification as a member of the Great Society Party.

It was largely Lugar's charisma that got the Uni-Gov Law enacted by the Indiana General Assembly in early 1969. He argued that this change -- a unification of city and county government -- would make urban planning and fiscal management more efficient. Suburban growth was rapid, suburban residents active in economic acitvity in Indianapolis. It seemed an anachronism to manage the suburbs and the city proper independently. It also helped Lugar that he was becoming the Mayoral darling of the new Republican President, Richard Nixon.

To an extent, Lugar's popularity was also his partial undoing in the Uni-Gov. Afraid that he would gain too much power, the legislators qualified unification by maintaining the independence of some government authorities -- notably at the Airport, the Hospitals, and some municipalities like Speedway. In addition, they delayed unification of law enforcement, and as we shall see, the Sheriff (together with a number of five districts) has maintained his independence to this day.

Lugar's popularity in Indianapolis grew. For the first time, the Uni-Gov law permitted the Mayor to succeed himself, and Lugar was handily re-elected in 1971. When he decided he would run for the U.S. Senate in 1975, (which he did successfully) the continued strength of the new Republican order carried his successor, a Presbyterian Minister named William Hudnut, into office. The Democrats, then, have been unable to recover the strength they held until Barton's 1963 election.

Thus, local issues have had little impact on Mayoral politics compared to party strength and the force of personalities. A burning issue of the early 1950s, school integration (and for the past 12 years, the busing issue), had no impact because the Marion County School Corporation operates independently of the Mayor's Office (Hartman, December 15, 1979). Acknowledging this, it might still be useful to outline issues that arose in each of the elections (as claimed from Knowledgeables Interviews and the newspaper from the week preceeding each election).

1947-needs for civic leadership, civic housekeeping (e.g., streets and sewers), laxity of municipal courts, and need for selection of officials on merit.

1951-Roosevelt/Trumanism, government by merit, efficient provision of municipal services (e.g., sewage treatment), urban renewal, attraction of business investment.

1955-leadership, redevelopment, development of budgetary policy, provision of services like street maintenance, quality law enforcement.

1959-same as 1955.

1963-urban redevelopment, race relations.

1967-urban redevelopment, government reorganization.

1971-success or failure of Uni-Gov, race relations.

1975-confidence in the integrity and management of city-county government, attraction of investment, fiscal responsibility, race relations.

In sum, from the viewpoint of the criminal justice system, its problem was its low political visibility. The Mayor had both formal and (if he cared) effective power over police management, but his strength hardly depended on support from law enforcement. In general, the police in particular and the criminal justice system overall were hard put to generate increases in budget allocation, as for salaries or for a new jail. Law enforcement attained its greatest visibility during corruption and brutality scandals, notably in 1954, 1964, and 1974. This made efforts to generate support especially by the Indianapolis Police Department, more dramatic and overstated than they otherwise might have been. With this, we turn to looking at the details of governmental response to crime -- 1948-78.

INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive history of Indianapolis is to be found in Leary (1971). Indianapolis was conceived as the center of a yet-to-be-developed Hoosier State. Only the southern half of Indiana, which had achieved statehood in 1816, had been settled by white people, but the Indians had ceded the remainder by treaty. With an eye to the future, the legislature decided to place a capital in the wilderness at the geographical center of the state, where Fox Creek flowed into the supposedly (but in fact not) navigable White River. Surveyors mapped out a side a mile square -- an adaptation of Jefferson's design for the national capital. Circle Street (now the Circle) would surround a governor's mansion. Market Street would run through the circle east to west; Meridian Street north to south. Indiana Avenue would run from the Circle northwest, Massachusetts Avenue northeast, Virginia Avenue southeast, and Kentucky Avenue southwest. The 10-block-square grid of east-west, north-south streets was founded on the north by North Street, on the east by East Street, and so forth.

The capital was moved from Corydon to Indianapolis -- a settlement of a few hundred persons -- in 1825. Isolated and malaria-ridden, the town grew slowly until the 1850s, when eight railroads connected the City to the outside world and the population jumped from 8,000 to more than 18,000. The National Road had passed through the City in the 1830s. By the 1850s, Indianapolis was becoming a wholesale and manufacturing center. A City Ordinance established a regular, paid police force of 14 men. Previously, with the notable exception of the first hanging of (three) white men for killing Indians in 1825, out of fear that the Indians would otherwise retaliate against the populace, law enforcement had pretty much been a

matter of informal self-help. Now, the force was established over strong objections that it portended the creation of a police state. Setting a pattern that has continued to the present, the police straightaway got into trouble by trying to enforce a new state prohibition law against German beer houses. A sympathetic judge soon declared the law unconstitutional, and the police suffered more than the beer house proprietors. The police captaincy changed hands seven times in the first 7 years, and the police force was even abolished for a month in 1855-56.

Indianapolis has since become a transportation center, first for railroad transport and then for the automobile industry. It was the nation's leading producer of cars until assembly-line production superceded it in Detroit, and its status inspired the auto racing tradition there, led by the Indianapolis 500. It has been a major manufacturing center (its Chamber of Commerce having been founded in the 1880s) and a center of labor union activity until political conservation swept the State in the 1940s. The Republican Party and the Socialist Party were founded there, the latter by Indianapolis native Eugene V. Debs who in turn founded the International Workers of the World in Chicago. An Indianapolis lawyer, Benjamin Harrison, was elected President in 1888. On the other hand, the first national presidential convention of the Greenback Party, a populist group, had been held in Indianapolis 12 years earlier. Irish Democrats came to dominate local politics in the 1890s, and a couple of Indianapolis Democrats have become National Chairpersons. Although Indiana had contributed more Union Soldiers to the Civil War effort per capita than any state except Delaware, Confederate ties were also strong in the State. Vice and corruption have recurrently proven to be major civic problems in Indianapolis, although the bulk of the

populace has generally been described as quiet, honest, and independent, with strong neighborhood organizations. Indianapolis, then, has consistently been a study in political contrast.

It has also had its day -- especially between 1871 and 1921 -- as the greatest cultural and literary center outside New York City. It was the home of Booth Tarkington, Hoagy Carmichael, and James Whitcomb Riley, among others, and more recently of Kurt Vonnegut. Previously, one of its earliest settlers, Harriet Beecher Stowe, wife of a prominent Indianapolis clergyman, had written Uncle Tom's Cabin there.

In recent years, conservatism has dominated Indianapolis politics. In the 1920s, the Klan dominated everything including the police in the City. Conservatism was driven into temporary decline as a Klan-connected Mayor, Republican John Duvall, was turned in by an embittered Klan convict -- serving a life term for murdering his young wife -- convicted of a misdemeanor, and driven from office. Indiana Governor Paul V. McNutt dominated state politics as of 1932, and he was a leading but unsuccessful candidate to succeed Roosevelt as President in 1940.

During World War II, war production -- especially of transportation equipment -- boomed in Indianapolis, as such firms as Bridgeport Brass, Ford, Chrysler, RCA, and Western Electric came there. Republicans dominated the State General Assembly, elected a Governor in 1944 and a Mayor of Indianapolis, John Tyndall, in 1945. The General Assembly gained national prominence by pointedly rejecting the New Deal. They first denounced the principle of federal aid, rejecting its acceptance as the War closed (although they then passed resolutions calling for aid for hospitals, flood control, and soil conservation). Republicans temporarily

lost control of the State between 1949 and 1951, and then passed a law requiring county welfare records to be open to public inspection, in blatant violation of the federal Social Security Act (which may have induced a subsequent amendment to the federal law). Reflecting the continued climate in Indianapolis itself, the John Birch Society was formed there in 1958, and Indianapolis politics was said to be dominated by the Executive Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce, William Henry Book, a determined opponent of federal dependence and of following "the road to Socialism."

The context in which to place governmental responses to crime in Indianapolis from 1948 to 1978 can be summarized thus. A strong belief in law and order was tempered by a suspicion of big government, and a tradition of neighborhood autonomy that kept law enforcement at arms length. Given civic pride in the national leadership of the City in transportation, the bulk of publicly visible law enforcment activity was devoted to traffic control. Otherwise, activity was limited to dealing with fringe elements in the city -- minor prostitutes and gamblers, and black youth. The police in particular were periodically subject to allegations of brutality, of taking bribes, and of theft, and indeed such stories had received big press coverage as recently as 1947 (see, e.g., Indianapolis Star, April 6, 1947: 1; June 21, 1947: 12; July 30, 1947: 3; and October 1, 1947: 1).

The dependent variable in the Governmental Responses to Crime Project is trends in Index offenses known to the police. This Urban Profile describes the context of the politics of governmental responses to crime as the context appears relevant to the crime trends. Each major section

of the Profile covers a mayoral term. Within each term, the crime trends are first described, followed by an account of the politics of governmental response.

As will become apparent, the bulk of the anlaysis in this Profile is an attempt to account for shifts in police activity. Quite simply, the production of Index offense trends is itself a police activity, and the explanation of the trends essentially entails interpreting the politics of policing. It also happens that whenever crime trends have become a major political issue in Indianapolis, the police have either created the issue or become the major object of media attention, or in most cases, both. Press coverage of other criminal justice agencies pales by comparison to coverage of the Indianapolis Police Department. As other agencies, other political figures, and the urban ecology of Indianapolis become relevant to accounting for police behavior, they, too, are described. Here, then, is the Urban Profile of governmental responses to crime in Indianapolis, 1948-78.

MAYORS FEENEY, BAYT, AND EMHARDT: 1948-52

Crime Rate Trends

UCR data provided by the GRC Office show that little of consequence happened to police offenses known rates for robbery, burglary, larceny or auto theft during the period. Among the 10 cities in the GRC Project, the rates for Indianapolis fell in the middle. Increases and decreases in rates were small and followed no consistent pattern. Here in post-war Indianapolis was a period of stability.

There are two sides to this inquiry about the impact of governmental responses on crime rates. One is to isolate responses that led or follow rate changes. The other, applicable here, is to describe governmental responses that had no significant impact on crime rates.

What negligible change there was with a small, 1-year increase in robbery and larceny rates. Otherwise, the period is a study in how to maintain the status quo.

Politics of Governmental Response

Mayor Al Feeney took office on January 1, 1948 (Indianapolis Star, January 2, 1948: 1). He was a Democrat who succeeded a Republican Mayor. The recurrent significance of a change of party for criminal justice in Indianapolis has been a change in the leadership of the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD). Until the 1970 Uni-Gov Law, the Mayor formally had the power to hire and fire Chiefs and other high officers, subject to approval by a Board of Public Safety, themselves Mayoral appointees.

Mayor Feeney had been Superintendent of the State Police. He had compaigned for quality law enforcement (Dortch, January 9, 1980), and

made a point of a nonpartisan appointment of chief. The new chief, Edward Rouls, a career police officer, happened to be a Republican (Indianapolis Police Department Personnel Office, 1979). Together, Feeney and Rouls engineered a major shake-up of the IPD hierarchy (Indianapolis Star, January 2, 1948: sec. 2, p. 1).

Chief Rouls announced a "war on crime" early in the year (Indianapolis Star, January 10, 1948: 4). Mayor Feeney warned police against slacking off (Indianapolis Star, June 30, 1948: 4) and warned rookies particularly to enforce the law (Indianapolis Star, June 30, 1948: 11). But it is important to note that a "war on crime" had peculiar meaning in Indianapolis at the time, one which had little to do with Index Offenses. Essentially, a "war on crime" meant: (a) a crackdown on vice, especially by juveniles, and (b) heavier traffic enforcement, especially against speeders. Thus, the major crime problems of 1948 were young "hoodlums," especially curfew violators, who hung out at "gambling establishments" like the pinball machines at the bus station (e.g. Indianapolis News, January 23, 1948: sec. 2 p. 3), and a "soaring" traffic accident rate (Indianapolis Star, December 2, 1948: 1, no surprise as cars and gas became available after World War II).

How to deal with juveniles was a recurrent concern. The Juvenile Aid Division (JAD) was first given greater autonomy (Indianapolis News, January 22, 1948: sec. II, p. 1), with greater emphasis on social work (Indianapolis News, January 2, 1948: 1) in consultation with community action groups (Hartman, December 15, 1979), and then expanded to include more policewomen (Indianapolis News, November 27, 1950: 1) after a shake-up by Feeney's successor, Mayor Bayt (Indianapolis Star, November

23, 1950: 20), and after a community group, the Citizens' Child Welfare Committee, had protested law quality officers' being assigned there (Indianapolis News, November 21, 1950: 1). In 1951, the JAD received backing for (Indianapolis Star, February 24, 1951: 1) and then funding for a building of its own on the Near Northside (Indianapolis Star, October 2, 1951: 1). If this had any impact on offense rates, it was delayed until 1953 (see below).

It is ironic that while juvenile arrests fell and then rose, the arrest trends had no apparent effect on offenses known rates. The autonomous, social work oriented JAD of 1948-49 was apparently attributable to the informal approach of that unit (Indianapolis News, September 15, 1948: 1, and January 4, 1950: 1; Indianapolis Star, January 14, 1948: 1, December 30, 1948: 1, and January 5, 1950: 26). Other officers had taken large groups of "hoodlums" into custody in the first half of 1949, notably for gaming and disorderly conduct (e.g. Indianapolis News, January 22, 1949), with no impact on JAD arrests. The Indianapolis News (January 7, 1950: 1, March 8, 1950: 1) eventually began to give publicity to frustrated IPD officers outside the JAD. But it was not until Mayor Feeney died, in November of 1950, that the forces against a lenient JAD prevailed, when as noted above, the new Mayor Phillip Bayt, changed appointments in and expanded the JAD. By the beginning of 1951, the JAD began to acknowledge that it had a delinquency problem (Indianapolis News, January 8, 1951: 1). Again, a striking feature of all these changes in juvenile enforcement practice is that they had no visible impact on reports of major crimes. As Dortch (January,9, 1980) reports, vice operations in Indianapolis have traditionally

been "penny ante" stuff. Tied as they were to vice operations, juvenile arrests amounted to major concern over little -- teenage drinking, gambling, and loitering. The major impact of such police activity, as we shall see below, has been periodically to involve them in corruption charges.

The same applies to traffic crackdowns. The Traffic Division periodically invented new kinds of campaigns, like that on drivers who failed to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians while turning at intersections (Indianapolis News, February 1, 1950: 1). But speeding was the recurrent pretext for campaigns, as in the summer of 1950 (e.g. Indianapolis News, June 7, 1950: 1), especially after radar was introduced in the spring of 1951 (Indianapolis News, May 2, 1951: 1). This obviously had no more effect on major crime reports than vice operations. Meanwhile, the "fix" was notorious, especially in traffic court (Dortch, January 9, 1980), although the newspapers ignored the issue during this period.

There were other innovations with no demonstrable impact on crime. A 20-man Homicide Squad was created (Indianapolis News, January 22, 1948: 1),. More officers were put on foot patrol (Indiapapolis News, February 6, 1948, sec. II, p. 1). Walkie-talkies were introduced (Indianapolis News, August 24, 1948: 1). Patrol officers were given tear gas to subdue drunks (Indianapolis News, May 14, 1948: 22). The power of sergeants was consolidated by stripping corporals of their rank (Indianapolis News, January 7, 1948: 19). None of these changes had an impact on Index Offense rates, either.

Mayor Feeney set a standard for personal control of the IPD that lasted at least until the appointment of Mayor-Elect Alex Clark's choice for Chief, John Ambuhl, in December 1951 (Indianapolis Star, December 13, 1951: 1). In fact, it became apparent to some, such as business leaders, that Feeney was loath to delegate any authority in his administration (Dortch, January 9, 1980). Chief Rouls resigned as the result of a feud with Mayor Bayt over who controlled the IPD (Indianapolis Star, March 23, 1951: 1), and was replaced by an Acting Chief, Rauls's Democratic second-in-command, John O'Neal, when Bayt failed to find a suitably tractable replacement (Indianapolis Star, July 1, 1951, sec. II, p. 1).

The slight increase in larceny and robbery rates in 1949 coincided with the replacement (by election) of a Republican prosecutor, Judson Stark, with a Democrat, George Dailey (Indianapolis News, December 30, 1948: 1). Here is a sign of what subsequently emerges as a pattern. When a new Prosecutor, especially one of the same party as the Mayor, takes office announcing reform, police show a tendency to respond to the amenability of the Prosecutor by referring more serious cases for him (sorry, never "her") to handle. Thus, in 1949, IPD officers may well have felt there was more point in taking action against street crime, accepting more reports and making more arrests. This response is capable of generating temporary spurts in crime rates.

IPD work during this period was, in Reiss's (1971) terms, overwhelmingly "proactive." In the most visible areas of enforcement -- against , juvenile status offenses and traffic violations -- the police found their own offenses. Herein lies another reason for changes in police practice to have little impact on Index Offense trends. Nationally, the move toward using offense reports as the basis of crime statistics (gotten underway by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1927; National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931: 10) coincided with a trend toward reactive enforcement (Monkkonen, 1977). The trend may be attributed to several factors: growing bureaucratic conservatism by police officers who become less willing to accept sole political responsibility for decisions to arrest; technological advances, notably the squad car and police radio, which facilitated response to citizen complaints; and a growing willingness by citizens to refer their complaints to police. As Black and Reiss (1970) and Black's (1970) studies indicate, it has become attractive and expedient for police to rest their enforcement decisions on the wishes of complainants.

Characteristically, Index Offenses are reported reactively. In effect, the size of our official crime problem rests on the propensity of citizens to complain to police, and of police to accept the reports (Pepinsky, 1980: 94-167). It follows that the ability of the police to change Index Offense trends rests on their capacity to change the pattern of their interaction with citizen complainants.

It will be interesting to see whether Indianapolis is something of an anachronism in these early years as compared to the other cities in the GRC Project. The IPD had borrowed technology, such as the squad car

and radio, unavailable to nineteenth-century American police. But by devoting its mobility so heavily to traffic enforcement, the IPD in effect did from cars what earlier American police had done on foot -- performed what Wilson (1968) has called an "order maintenance" function.

The same can be said of vice and juvenile enforcement. Here, too, IPD activity was in one respect "modern," for it had developed specialized units. On the other hand, the activity consisted of officers maintaining order on the streets.

As we shall see below, it was not until the mid-1960s that the IPD was reorganized, as by eliminating the separate traffic division and making a point of establishing closer police-community relations, to convert to a predominately reactive force.

What predisposed IPD to such a conservative, proactive orientation during the Feeney-Bayt-Emhardt Mayoral term? It was consistent with the overall conservatism of the ethos in the city. Although Democrats, Feeney and Bayt (Emhardt was just a two-month caretaker) placed a high priority on getting along with the business community. They resisted solicitation of federal funds, and placed the greatest hope for urban development in attracting private investment. Like the proactivity of the police, the fiscal conservatism of city administration remained characteristic of Indianapolis until the mid-1960s. New Deal and Fair Deal politics were anathema (see Dortch, January 9, 1980).

It may be hypothesized that a condition necessary to institutionalizing reactive police work is citizen acceptance of the need for government intervention in community affairs. Do families need the police to stop their fights? Do residents need police protection against the

pranks of neighborhood children? Is it natural to call the police when medical emergencies arise? Or do residents pride themselves on their ability to handle their problems privately? Citizen propensity to call the police for service transcends matters of crime. Citizens who think of calling in officials in blue when they have a neighborhood, family, or logistic problem can be expected to be more likely to think of calling the police when they come home and find the door open, or when they are intimidated into giving pocket money to someone on the street, or when a fight breaks out. The more that citizens accept the need for official help with their problems, the more rewarding it will be for police to respond to citizen complaints when they do arise, and the more complaints the police will have to handle. As symbiotic ties between citizen complainants and the police grow, the police will have less time and need to initiate law enforcement activity elsewhere.

To a remarkable extent, the IPD circa 1950 remained marginal to community life in Indianapolis. It was tolerable for the police to isolate fringe elements who apparently acted outside the confines of respectable communities. They could take on prostitutes, bookies, and street corner youth. And where penalties were low and "the fix" was available, those who were circulating in cars on public streets were also acceptable targets of law enforcement activity. But by and large, crime was not a matter of concern to ordinary citizens at home or at work, and the police lacked community support for aggressive response to Index Offenses. The need for big government was not sufficiently acknowledged to concede support for serious police efforts to control serious crime.

MAYOR CLARK: 1952-55

Crime Rate Trends

Index Offense trends assume interesting patterns during this period. They generally increased from 1951-52. They generally decreased in 1952-53.

From 1953-54:

* Murder and non-negligent manslaughter increased, matched almost exactly by a decrease in reported aggravated assault.
* Forcible rape decreased.
* Burglary, robbery, and auto theft increased somewhat.
* Larceny of over $50 and total larceny decreased.

From 1954-55:

* Murder and non-negligent manslaughter remained steady.
* Rape increased negligibly.
* Robbery declined dramatically.
* Larceny of over $50 increased (according to IPD figures, which apparently differ from UCR figures on the GRC Project's tape).
* Other trends continued.

To summarize, total larceny (and according to the GRC Project's UCR figures, larceny of over $50, too) and aggravated assault declined steadily from 1952; burglary and auto theft increased steadily from 1953; after all rates had increased from 1951-52 and declined the following year (according to IPD figures); murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and larceny of over $50 escalated.

The Politics of Governmental Response

"Republicans swept to victory in municipal elections over Indiana in apparent repudiation of the Truman regime" (Indianapolis Star, November 7, 1951: 1). This was the explanation for the election of Alex M. Clark, a Municipal Court Judge, over Acting Mayor and former City Controller (and Secret Service Agent) Phillip L. Bayt. It was not so much that Bayt and Clark differed on local issues. Democrats had been as confirmed fiscal conservatives as Republicans. The trouble was that the National Democratic Chairperson, an Indianapolis native, Frank McKinney, had come to campaign on Bayt's behalf, and thus had become symbolically linked to the Truman Administration. Although it was recognized that Bayt and Clark were equally qualified to be Mayor, Clark's election was held to be a "Victory for Freedom" -- a repudiation of the New Deal and the Fair Deal and a sign that the citizens of Indianapolis would overwhelmingly vote for a Republican President the following year (Indianapolis Star, November 7, 1951: 1).

Just as the choice of a Republican Mayor was more symbol than substance, so the character of governmental responses to crime changed little as Clark entered office at the beginning of 1952. Clark had appointed a Republican, John Ambuhl, as Chief of Police (Indianapolis Star, December 13, 1951: 1). Thus, Indianapolis had a regular, as opposed to acting, Chief for the first time in half a year. Clark and Ambuhl soon arranged to rotate inspectors, apparently for the sake of securing greater control over IPD activities (Indianapolis Star, March 15, 1952: 14; Indianapolis News, March 14, 1952: 1). But these changes initially appeared not to result in any substantial change in proactive IPD activity.

Traffic (e.g., Indianapolis News, May 23, 1952: 1) and gambling (Indianapolis Star, December 19, 1952: 1) enforcement remained the most visible IPD activities, so much so that the word "crackdown" in traffic enforcement was said to have become meaningless and the emphasis on gambling came under fire. Juveniles remained a leading target; they were arrested more, and now arrests moved from exclusively status violations (notably liquor violations) to burglary (Indianapolis News, January 11, 1952: 21, and March 10, 1952: 1).

Now that the Mayor, his new Chief Ambuhl, and the Prosecutor, Fairchild, all belonged to the same party, the times were right to expose the failure of the previous Democratic Administration to have managed the police department properly. The effort to discredit the Democrats, even further than the Mayoral election had done, was to get out of hand.

The effort began in Clark and Ambuhl's first month in office. They had Robert Liese, a veteran police officer, arrested for robbery after the police allegedly found his house full of stolen property (Indianapolis News, January 11, 1952: 1; Indianapolis Star, January 12, 1952: 1, and January 13, 1952: 1). It was charged that Bayt's Acting Chief for the last half of 1951, John O'Neal, had covered up the activities of a burglary ring in the IPD, and O'Neal, among others, was suspended. (He was to die within two months; Indianapolis Star, March 4, 1952.)

Prosecutor Fairchild promised to broaden the investigation of unlawful activity by IPD officers (Indianapolis News, January 12, 1952: 9). After one more shot at the previous administration, suspending and later firing Charles Jewell for insubordination and "conduct unbecoming of an officer" (prowling a lover's lane) the preceding fall (Indianapolis News,

February 27, 1952: 1; Indianapolis Star, February 28, 1952: 3, and June 19, 1952: 23), the momentum began to draw even present police activities into question. The police were accused of ignoring their traffic control duties to watch a high school basketball game (Indianapolis News, March 1, 1952: 1). Charges of police taking payoffs began to arise (Indianapolis News, April 4, 1952: 1; Indianapolis Star, May 7, 1952: 12). The police began to come under court criticism (Indianapolis Star, June 27, 1952: 3). A citizen won a $500 judgement for having been assaulted by a police sergeant (Indianapolis News, May 24, 1952: 1).

Although the courts backed up Sergeant Wurz by convicting three surviving youths of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest (Indianapolis News, Blue Streak Edition, August 4, 1952: 1), it did not help the police image that Sergeant Wurz, in civilian clothes at the time, had shot and killed the fourth youth, Richard Weeks, 19 years old (Indianapolis Star, July 19, 1952: 1), and that one of the youths was a Marine Corpsman. Meanwhile, the case of Emmett Johns, 17, who allegedly had shot and killed Patrolman John L. Sullivan in the latter's home on July 23, was settled by imposing a fine (Indianapolis Star, August 8, 1952: 8).

As the November 1952 election approached (when Republican Fairchild was to be re-elected Prosecutor on Eisenhower's coattails), police politics became more heated. Just as Jacques Durham, who had been fired two years previously over alleged involvement in a burglary ring, was about to seek reinstatement, the IPD arranged to arrest him on narcotics charges (Indianapolis News, October 13, 1952: 19). As Durham's suit for reinstatement came before the Appellate Court, Prosecutor Fairchild

was forced to say he would look into Durham's charges that the IPD had conspired with an ex-convict, James Connor, to fabricate the original charges against him (Indianapolis News, October 14, 1952: 1; Indianapolis Star, October 9, 1952: 9). This led to a call for a grand jury to probe IPD complicity in making Durham a scapegoat for their own problems (Indianapolis Star, October 17, 1952: 19). But the Appellate Court upheld Durham's dismissal (Indianapolis News, October 24, 1952: 20; Indianapolis Star, October 24, 1952: 15).

As the balance of power shifted further toward the Republicans after Fairchild's November re-election, Municipal Court Judge Scott McDonald was forced to answer charges against the integrity of his court that had been made to the Marion County Crime Commission by Chief Ambuhl, charges which apparently fell into obscurity immediately thereafter (Indianapolis News, November 11, 1952: 19). But in the climate of charge and countercharge, Chief of Detectives (and former IPD Chief) Howard Sanders suspended Sergeant Mark Zeronik, on bribery charges (Indianapolis News, December 10, 1951: 1). Sanders was immediately forced to resign for causing such embarrassment (Indianapolis News, December 11, 1952: 1). But Prosecutor Fairchild was forced to take action to protect his own reputation. He immediately convened a grand jury to hear charges against Zeronik (Indianapolis Star, December 11, 1952: 15, December 13, 1952: 8, December 16, 1952: 26). Determined not to have an aura of tolerance of impropriety surround the start of his new term, Fairchild saw to it that the grand jury returned a felony indictment against Zeronik the day before the expiration of Fairchild's old term (Indianapolis News, December 30, 1952: 1; Indianapolis Star,

December 31, 1952: 21). This allowed the Republican Prosecutor to start his new term with a free hand. Accordingly, the Zeronik proceedings slowed down considerably. Zeronik's case was venued to Hamilton County on June 29, 1953 (Indianapolis Star, June 30, 1953: 5). He was finally acquitted and reinstated on the force on April 22, 1954 (Indianapolis News, April 22, 1954: 2; Indianapolis Star, April 23, 1954: 37). Meanwhile, the original Republican target, Robert Liese, was convicted of robbery in short order (Indianapolis Star, May 21, 1953: 2).

What effect did the political maneuvers have on Index Offense rates? While it is possible that citizens of Indianapolis somehow began a rampage of violence against one another in 1952, there is no apparent reason for such a dramatic change in the character of the citizenry. Another explanation, of a change in reporting behavior, seems more plausible. The potential for change in reporting behavior is revealed by IPD figures for unfounding, which first became available in 1953. Between 1953 and 1956, IPD acknowledged "unfounding" 10 to 14 percent of robberies officers bothered to report, and to unfounding 18 percent of murders and non-negligent manslaughter reported in 1954.

As the GRC's UCR figures show, although increases in murder and robbery received the greatest media attention (Indianapolis Star, December 19, 1952: 1) Index Offense rates increased in other categories, too, particularly so for larceny. A greater force must have been at work than an attempt to show that the citizens of Indianapolis were worse robbers and killers than the police. Recall, in the discussion of the 1948-52 period, it was hypothesized that at the onset of a period

when both the Mayor and the Prosecutor were Republican, the Mayor's police would find the prosecutorial climate more conducive to vigorous law enforcement. There would be more point in reporting offenses and trying to follow up complaints with arrests. The pattern that emerged to some extent when a Democratic Prosecutor joined forces with a Democratic Mayor in 1949 emerged more dramatically when a Republican Mayor joined forces with a Republican Prosecutor in 1952.

By 1953, the situation had changed. As crime rates had risen in 1952, the IPD had fallen into disrepute. Caution was the order of the new year. An innovation was introduced to show that the police were disciplined and accountable to the public: the monthly activity report, the first of which was released to the press by Mayor Clark in March (Indianapolis News, March 21, 1953: 11; Indianapolis Star, March 22, 1953: Sec. II, p. 2). If the police had been criticized for allowing crime to rise in 1952, that mistake was not to be repeated in 1953. The first activity report routed a trend that was to be continued throughout the year: crime rates generally declined.

Small in number and negligible in change, the oscillating trends in rapes, and murders and non-negligent manslaughter in the succeeding years of Mayor Clark's term can best be treated as statistical accidents.

Although we do not have figures to prove the point, it was likely that the number of cars per capita continued to increase in these years after World War II, and hence the steady increase in auto thefts would be attributable to having more autos at risk. This explanation of shifts in auto theft rates has been inferred elsewhere (Wilkins, 1964).

The discrepancy between grand larceny rates in UCR and IPD figures for 1954-55 is probably attributable to routine F.B.I. adjustments in the figures they receive. Whenever F.B.I. statisticians believe that police figures are implausible, given past experience in the jurisdiction or current experience in comparable jurisdictions, they change them (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967: 211; Weinraub, 1967). Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, IPD figures are probably more reliable than those of the F.B.I.

Thus, we have a picture, from 1953-55, of burglaries steadily increasing, of grand larceny dropping and then rising, and of robbery rising and then falling, while overall, larceny reports decreased. Absent court data and with only sketchy reports of arrest trend data for this period, an analysis of this pattern of shifts is of necessity highly speculative. But if one notes (a) that an increase in juvenile arrests was again reported in 1954 (Indianapolis Star, April 27, 1954: 11); that as he was appointed Inspector in March 1953, Noel A. Jones made burglary enforcement a high priority (Indianapolis Star, November 28, 1954: sec. II, p. 1); and that juveniles in particular had been the target of burglary enforcement since 1952, a hypothesis emerges. It may well be that the fluctuations among these property offenses were the result of early experiments, using juveniles as targets, with the politics of reactive enforcement. If offense reporting as a basis for arrest performance was to be stressed, then petty property offenses might just as well be ignored -- hence, the steady drop in minor larceny reports taken. Still, in part, an option remained as to how severely to stigmatize young offenders, and second thoughts about leniency

might have led the police to experiment with reporting and then charging what might have been called robberies as grand larceny, emphasizing the amount stolen instead of the use of force. Insofar as offense reports were a pretext for juvenile arrests, this could account for the decline in robbery accompanied by the increase in grand larceny from 1954-55; after the previous rises in robbery and decline in grand larceny. Meanwhile, the steady emphasis on burglary enforcement would have led not only to increased arrest of juveniles, but to an emphasis on reporting burglaries for follow-up.

What, finally, of the steady 1953-55 decline in aggravated assault? Since 1952, stories of alleged corruption and police brutality, to the level of police shootings, had continued unabated. By 1955, one Detective Sergeant, Cecil London, became so aggravated by the situation that he risked and suffered IPD censure for giving a series of stories on police corruption and brutality to the Indianapolis Star (March 5, 1955: 1, and March 9, 1955: 13) and News (March 8, 1955: 1, and March 9, 1955: 1). One can infer that in the prevailing ethos at the IPD, life was cheap. It has repeatedly been found, as by LaFave (1962), Skolnick (1966: /71), and Pepinsky(1976b), that one effect of life -- especially that of minority group members -- being cheap to police is that they will fail to report or arrest for assaults. As IPD officers continued under a cloud for misconduct, and as they apparently took out some of their frustration on the person of citizens, they could be expected not to bother to report assault, or to report aggravated assault -- if at all -- as simple assault, in a growing number of cases.

In sum, with the exception of auto theft trends, Index Offense trends during the period are plausibly attributable to the politics of governmental response. Most importantly, for a general theory of governmental response in Indianapolis, rates climbed temporarily as a form of Hawthorne Effect, at the onset of the coincidence of the Mayor and Prosecutor belonging to the same political party.

MAYORS BAYT AND BOSWELL: 1956-59

Crime Trends

As in 1952-55, the Ns for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, and for forcible rape are too small to make year-by-year comparisons meaningful.

Auto theft has a unique trend, swinging down from an all-time high in 1956 to the bottom of a valley in 1959, the downward trend shifting to a minimal level in 1958-59.

In every Index category (including rape and murder/non-negligent manslaughter) except auto theft, rates rose in 1957-58, sharply for robbery, and to all-time highs for burglary and grand larceny. For all categories except murder/non-negligent manslaughter and rape, which remained about the same, rates fell the following year -- down to below 1957 levels for robbery and aggravated assault, and down to an all-time low for grand larceny.

In the first two years of the period, robbery first went back up to its 1953 level and then leveled off, while burglary went up in the first year and then dropped sharply almost to its 1953 level. Both grand larceny and total larceny shifted the opposite way, dropping the first year and then climbing the second to an all-time high (after which total larceny declined sharply and steadily).

Aggravated assault continued its steady downward trend the first two years of the period.

IPD arrest figures for four of these categories -- robbery, burglary, auto theft and total larceny -- are available for the period. It is interesting to note that in each of these categories, when offense rates jumped

sharply upward, arrests for adults (but not necessarily juveniles) also climbed. Thus, the number of larceny arrests for adults increased by a factor of 1.84 from 1955-56, as the number of offenses reported climbed by a factor of 1.2. From 1957-58, the number of burglary arrests for adults jumped by a factor of 2.13, while the offense reports factor was 1.24. For robbery for the same period, the arrest factor was 1.31, the offenses known factor 1.46.

In the anomalous case of auto theft, both juvenile and adult arrests increased with offense reports from 1955-56, but juvenile arrests in this category, which were approximately double those for adults, were the ones which continued to run parallel to offense trends the following three years (while adult arrests bottomed out in 1957).

The Politics of Governmental Response

Once again, auto theft trends appear to operate independently of governmental response. Now that it can be seen that auto theft trends ran parallel with juvenile arrests, a competing hypothesis emerges to that of the trends being affected by cars at risk. The trend could also be affected by offenders at risk, notably youths approaching sixteen -- anxious to avail themselves of their new power to drive -- who without cars of their own would be particularly tempted to go joyriding. Note that as the rates first dropped in 1957, it was a time when adolescents -- children as old as fourteen -- were beginning to be children of the World War II baby slump, those conceived after the U.S. entered the War in December 1941. Whether it is a matter of cars at risk or offenders at risk, auto theft patterns are shaped neither by criminal justice control nor by the politics of police reporting.

With the Mayoral incumbency of Democrat Phil Bayt and his appointment of Frank A. Mueller as IPD Chief in 1956, enforcement priorities were to begin to change toward reactive enforcement. The change was gradual, as traffic, gambling and juvenile enforcement continued to receive emphasis. No noticeable change appeared in IPD crime figures for the first year of the new administration. But in 1957, a number of changes took place.

For one, Chief Mueller visited the Ksnsas City Police Department in January, and came away impressed with their system of one-man patrol in squad cars. He recommended a changeover to that system to the Public Safety Board, including the installation of three-way radios in squad cars so that officers could communicate among cars directly (Indianapolis News, January 29, 1957: 15). The installation of the new radios was completed by August, and two-way radios were also installed on traffic division motorcycles so that motorcycle officers could relieve officers in cars of the duty of responding to traffic accident calls. The one-man-per-car system was set to be instituted in October, accompanied by a shift to smaller patrol districts, and by appointment of sergeants -- one for each quarter of the city -- to be on the streets to monitor the new patrol system. Under the new system, officers were under strict orders not to respond to violence calls until a back-up officer arrived (Indianapolis Star, August 14, 1957: 1).

Meanwhile, in June, what was termed an "'efficiency' shakeup" took place (Indianapolis News, June 17, 1957: 19). Noel A. Jones, the "strict disciplinarian" (Indianapolis Star, March 6, 1958: 1) who as head of the Detective Division had stressed burglary enforcement for several years (Indianapolis Star, November 28, 1954: sec. II, p.1), became head of the Uniformed Patrol Division. He was replaced in the Detective Division by

Robert E. Reilly, who was to become Chief upon Mueller's retirement in 1958 (Indianapolis Star, December 7, 1958: 1). The following year, Jones (who himself was later, in 1964, to become Chief; Indianapolis News, January 7, 1964: 1), was temporarily to retake acting control of the Detective Division during a prolonged illness of Reilly's (Indianapolis Star, March 10, 1958: 1). In the Bayt Administration, then, Mueller, Jones and Reilly formed a troika to help shift the emphasis of IPD enforcement toward responding to citizen complaints.

Accordingly, as IPD figures show, the number of police dispatches jumped dramatically first in 1957 (from 740,000 to almost 900,000), and then again in 1958 (to over one million). Unfounding of robbery, burglary, larceny and aggravated assault reports declined dramatically (robbery in 1958, from 32 to 3; burglary in 1957, from 115 to 48; larceny in 1957, from 374 to 155; and aggravated assault from 1956-58, from 15 to 7 to 0).

As noted above, these changes had only a limited effect on offense reporting and arrest (of adults in particular) in 1957. It was only larceny reports (and concomitantly, adult larceny arrests) that climbed dramatically, and IPD figures indicate that most of the increase was attributable to more reports of theft of auto accessories (from 36 reports, one of them unfounded, in 1956, to 1020 reports, one of them unfounded, in 1957) and bicycle theft (from 1141 reports to 1465 reports, none unfounded either year). Indications are that most of the auto accessory thefts -- petty larceny -- were of hubcaps (Indianapolis Star, December 12, 1957: 3), and that the grand larceny increase was attributable to the bike theft reports being taken.

There are no explicit data on why the effect of the organizational changes was initially limited to larceny reports. It does not seem clear that the larceny changes were reporting artifacts, for otherwise one would have expected a corresponding increase in auto theft reports, which as we have seen, declined. One may surmise that patrol officers, under the gun for fuller reporting, selected offenses that would be reported most concisely -- that would require the least "paperwork." In the cases of stealing hubcaps and bicycles, the only relevant information needed for reports is (a) a description of one kind of property taken (especially simple for hubcaps), (b) the location of the missing property immediately before it was taken, and (c) the time it was found to be missing. Consider the greater detail required for some other kinds of reports. In the case of robbery, there is an assailant and possibly a weapon to be described, plus a victim-offender interaction and perhaps an inventory of diverse kinds of property taken. Burglary reports entail a description of signs of forcible entry or an explanation of the absence thereof, and again perhaps an inventory of perhaps various and diverse kinds of property taken. Aggravated assault requires a description of the assailant, a description of weapons used, and an account of an interaction that must take account of any victim precipitation. And of course, for all these offenses, time and location must be described just as in simple larceny reports.

Further support for this hypothesis is indicated by the fact that increases in other larceny categories -- pick-pocketing, purse-snatching, shoplifting and thefts from autos -- did not show such dramatic increases.

The general increases across offense categories in 1958 are a slight variant on those of 1949 and 1952. Our figures indicate that in every

election since 1946, the candidate who had gotten the most votes for Prosecutor in the May primary had won election the following November. Bayt did both in 1958. He won handsomely, with more than 56 percent of the vote, in November. By early in the year it must have been apparent to the police that he, their friend, was on the verge of taking over management of cases for which they made arrests.

According to Dortch (January 18, 1980), Bayt's problem was this. At this time (and indeed until the Uni-GovLaw went into effect in 1970), full-term Indianapolis Mayors were prohibited by law from seeking re-election. Thus, Bayt knew he would be out of office by 1960. He had already shown his willingness to resign from the office after losing the 1951 election (for which he had been eligible since he had served as acting Mayor for only a year after Feeney's death). He did not want to take any unnecessary chances on being cast out of politics. Therefore, without leaving the Mayor's Office, he sought the Prosecutor's job before expiration of his term.

He was close to two other people who figured in the anticipated shift: Chief Mueller, and Charles Boswell, who had been Democratic Chairperson when Bayt had run for Mayor in 1955. As must have been rumored among the police, upon Bayt's election to the Prosecutor's Office, Mueller, like Bayt, both lawyer and veteran law enforcement officer, was to resign to become Bayt's Deputy. Boswell, as head of the City Council, was to replace Bayt as Mayor upon the latter's resignation.

Here was a synergy between the reorganization of the IPD and anticipation of a close working relationship between the police and the Prosecutor. It accelerated the Hawthorne Effect that previously had only occurred once the Prosecutor and Mayor of the same party had actually taken office. The fact

that it was the Mayor and IPD Chief who anticipated controlling the Prosecutor's Office must have contributed to the synergy, for in anticipation of the May primary and November election, they had an investment in showing their strength in promoting law and order before Bayt could assume the new office.

Thus it was that the characteristic, temporary spurt in offense reporting occurred in 1958, not 1959.

By the time Boswell and Bayt assumed their new offices, support for law enforcement had become taken for granted. As already mentioned, the new Chief, Robert E. Reilly, had already been an important part of the established order in the IPD. The excitement was over, routine settled in, and offense rates dropped off the year after their dramatic climb.

Although an old pattern had reasserted itself, a fundamental change had begun to take place. While the IPD continued to devote inordinate resources to traffic, gambling and juvenile enforcement, the modern version of police professionalism had begun to take hold. Communications technology specifically designed to promote response to citizen complaints had been introduced. Reorganization of the Patrol and Detective Divisions, with an emphasis on "discipline," had accompanied the shift in technology. A process that in the history of American policing has proved irreversible had been set in force. The balance had begun to shift away from proactive enforcement, but it would be some years before reactive enforcement gained clear predominance.

It is interesting to note that this shift coincided with national attention toward professionalizing, and hence increasing, police reporting of offenses. This attention began with scholarly commentary in the mid-fifties,

and resulted in revision of UCR procedures in 1958 (Pepinsky, 1976a). The influence of the national law enforcement climate is revealed by Chief Mueller's 1957 trip to Kansas City, the findings from which became a force for obtaining necessary appropriations from a fiscally conservative city for the shift to one-man patrol. Indianapolis had lost some of its independence from the forces shaping law enforcement nationwide. It was eventually to lose most when resistance, still unwavering at this point, gave way to accepting federal funding.

MAYORS BOSWELL AND LOSCHE: 1960-1963

Crime Trends

Again, the numbers of murders and non-negligent manslaughters each year were too small to make fluctuations of less than ten each year -- both in offenses reported and arrests -- significant.

The same can be said of rape until 1962, when reported rapes nearly doubled -- with 30 percent more arrests per inhabitants. From 1962-63, the reporting rate jumped another 25 percent, equalling the increase in arrests.

Auto theft rates climbed back up to 1957 levels from 1959-60, to an all-time high in 1961, and up another 50 percent the following year. From 1962-63, however, auto theft rates declined a couple of percentage points. Joyriding continued to predominate heavily in this category, both in offenses reported (as indicated by vehicles recovered) and in arrests. This was mostly a juvenile offense, with juvenile arrests increasing about 40 percent in the first year of the period (through November, December figures unavailable), five percent from 1960-61, about 10 percent from 1961-62, and declining by more than 20 percent the following year.

During the first two years of the period -- 1959-61 -- both in offenses reported and in arrests, robbery and burglary trends were inversely related to those in larceny. From 1959-60, robbery increased back to between 1957 and 1958 levels, and burglary to an all-time high. Robbery arrest rates through November were up over 20 percent, for burglary a couple of percentage points. Meanwhile, grand and petty larceny rates dropped to an all-time low (except bicycle thefts, which climbed to an all-time high), while arrests through November held steady. The following

year, offense rates for both categories of larceny dropped further, while burglary held steady and robbery climbed to an all-time high. Arrest trends went in the opposite direction: up 15 percent for larceny, down almost 30 percent for robbery and almost 10 percent for burglary.

Meanwhile, offense rates for aggravated assault climbed back up about to the 1958 level in 1960, and down to an all-time low the following year. (Arrest figures for this period are unavailable.)

For all but murder and non-negligent manslaughter, and auto theft, 1962 was a year of dramatic increases in offense reporting. Rape increases have already been noted. Grand larceny rates were up over 400 percent (arrests up 75 percent), total larceny up over 300 percent (arrests up to 25 percent more for juveniles than adults). Aggravated assault rates were up about 50 percent (arrests -- over 10 percent). Burglary rates jumped about 40 percent (but arrests were down about 10 percent, mostly a decline in adult arrests). Robbery went up another 20 percent, the total increase attributable to muggings, for commercial robbery reports declined somewhat (while robbery arrests were down about 30 percent, more so for juveniles than for adults).

These increases generally continued, but were leveling off, the last year of the period. Grand larceny was up by around 15 percent (arrests off 25 percent), total larceny up more than 25 percent (arrests for juveniles up 30 percent, for adults off around ten percent). Aggravated assault held steady (but arrests were up another 10 percent).

The Politics of Governmental Response

By 1960, it was clear that Chief Reilly wanted to build up the IPD considerably. This was a difficult feat to manage in as fiscally conservative

a city as Indianapolis. It required that a need be shown for IPD services. It required that Reilly demonstrate the IPD's capacity to manage its budget professionally. Without foreseeing the consequences, Reilly was more than ever inclined to lock the police and the citizenry into a symbiotic relationship, in which police funding rested primarily on data about reactive police work.

Reilly argued, first before the Board of Public Safety, that the IPD faced a new problem, "modern" crime, in "the growing City of Indianapolis" (Indianapolis News, Feburary 9, 1960: 1).

If population estimates in the Vital Statistics from the Indiana State Board of Health are to be believed, Indianapolis had grown during the preceding year. Reilly cited the impact of annexation. This perhaps accounts for the figures. While they indicate that population growth in the City had generally been quite slow -- a fraction of a percent each year, the population between 1959 and 1960 climbed just over 11,000, or 2.4% (comparable to the rate of growth in Third World countries embarking on industrialization). Of course controlling for population growth of this magnitude has minimal effect on crime rate trends (i.e., the percentage change in rates is 98 percent of the percentage change in incidence). But apparently annexation was salient to people in Indianapolis, and so was even minimal growth in an essentially static city.

To meet this new crime problem, Reilly asked that the authorized strength of his force be increased by almost 200 to 1,000. The strength of fiscal conservatism showed itself when first the Board (Indianapolis News, February 9, 1960: 1), and then Reilly himself and the City Council (Indianapolis News, August 16, 1960), shifted to authorizing the hiring of

35 recruits for 1961, into a force that was already 40 under authorized strength.

In the course of his lobbying, however, Reilly had made claims that must have come back to haunt him thereafter. He congratulated the IPD on having made considerable progress in crime control, noting that Index rates had declined 19 percent in 1959 (Indianapolis News, January 6, 1960; 1). He argued that an extra 175 recruits to the force should be put on foot patrol in high crime neighborhoods to fight crime even more effectively (Indianapolis Star, February 10, 1960: 21). In so doing, he really opened the IPD to political heat, for he implied that the IPD could be held accountable for preventing the occurrence of crime.

Herman Hoglebogle, a News columnist styled a "crusader for civic progress," noted with alarm that a rash of holdups, burglaries and thefts had occurred over the first weekend in the New Year, which he said should be "cause for alarm" among the police and the Safety Board. Reilly responded by announcing that police officers, statisticians and radio operators would band together to evaluate crime data, and redraw district lines to concentrate the greatest strength in areas with the highest risk of street crime. In addition, two more roving squads of police were put on the streets at night to catch burglars (Indianapolis News, January 6, 1960: 1).

Once the police anywhere accept this kind of responsibility, they catch themselves in a vicious circle. If Index Offense rates are to decline, and clearance rates by arrest to increase, the police need to be selective about which offenses they report. When, on the other hand, they claim responsibility for accomplishing the result by more vigorous law enforcement,

they set up the expectation that citizen complaints will be taken more seriously. They are under pressure to take complainants seriously by reporting their complaints as the most serious plausible offenses. This increases crime rates, and is likely to make clearance rates impossible to maintain. By conventional interpretation of crime statistics, it turns out that police appear to do better when they try less. They are then tempted to claim that the success is because they have tried harder, be held to the standard of their rhetoric, and fail by trying harder in fact.

If IPD were getting locked into a modern American vicious circle, they had not yet entirely abandoned their past practices or reputation. Traffic crackdowns were still emphasized (e.g., one in 1960 netted 310 arrests in a 24-hour period; Indianapolis Star, July 6, 1960: 1). They were still known for failure of discipline (e.g., Indianapolis Star, July 6, 1960: 21), and for maltreatment of black citizens (Indianapolis Star, July 1, 1960: 9). It was not so much that they left stigmas of the past behind them; they simply began to acquire a new liability.

Reilly's initial failure to increase the size of the IPD must have been a bit discouraging. But hope springs eternal. Starting officer salaries had held steady for several years at $4800, substantially below the national average for cities of Indianapolis' size. The Project for the following year, led by Fraternal Order of Police President, Patrolman Raymond J. Strattan, was to increase the salaries. The initial request was for a $500 increase (Indianapolis Star, January 19, 1960: 27), and by the end of the summer, a $200 increase was finally pushed through the City Council instead (Journal of the Common Council, August 6, 1962: 399).

Meanwhile, Reilly made valiant attempts to show how well the police could respond to the crime problem. Through 1961, the effort remained mostly proactive, as other special squads were established to do what they could on the streets to catch burglars (Indianapolis News, May 17, 1961: 15), "rapists, muggers and other hoodlums" (Indianapolis Star, June 17, 1961: 1, 14), and car thieves (Indianapolis News, June 21, 1961: 22). A key element of the strategy was for these special squads to arrest any "suspicious persons" they encountered on the streets. Public sympathy for police efforts mounted. The Indianapolis Star (June 17, 1961: 10) editorialized: "Our Streets Must Be Safe." Some City Council members introduced three ordinances: one to make "lurking in a suspicious place" a misdemeanor, a second to authorize police to break up public meetings, and a third requiring persons to participate in Civil Defense alerts. This was a little strong for other Council members and Mayor Boswell, and the proposal was shelved (Indianapolis Star, June 20, 1961: 1, 10).

As indicated above, the campaign did initially boost not only reports of burglary and robbery (as in Mayor Clark's term, at the expense of larceny reports, except bicycle theft in 1960), and arrest rates by inhabitants, especially for robbery, climbed, too (though not as fast as offense rates). But as we have seen in earlier campaigns, bursts of activity are shortlived. (This is the rule with police campaigns everywhere; Pepinsky, 1978.) While the pattern of police reporting continued to an extent (as reflected in unfounding of robbery and burglary reports, by this time virtually non-existent), arrest performance fell off dramatically in 1961. One can speculate that the police were discouraged to see that a number of those arrested for burglary and robbery had cases dismissed. They turned

to less prestigious arrests, for example, larceny. To maintain the credibility of the police demand for more funds, something had to be added to the use of special squads. The addition was foreshadowed, in the summer of 1961, by minimal press coverage of Chief Reilly's call on citizens to help the police by reporting any suspicious car or person they saw (Indianapolis News, July 10, 1961: 10). A major escalation of the shift toward reactive enforcement was imminent.

The following winter, the shift was announced by the Indianapolis Star (March 11, 1962: Sec. I, pp. 1, 10) with a banner headline. The first sentence of the lead story was: "The biggest offensive against crime in Indianapolis police history, bringing most of the enforcement weapons to bear on sidewalk violence, will begin here today." The offensive was directed at "muggers, purse grabbers and other sidewalk terrorists." Public Safety Board President, Dr. David A. Silver, and Mayor Boswell jointly announced the campaign. Although falling off, arrest performance across all offenses had been sufficiently sustained for Silver to boast that the clearance rate by arrest in 1961, 46 percent, was four percent higher than the avergge of 1959 and 1960, and eight percent higher than 1958. Silver singled out two IPD leaders for credit: Former Chief Mueller, now on the Safety Board, for having introduced one-man patrol, and Inspector Daniel T. Veza (later to become Chief), for having introduced dogs.

The campaign coincided with antoher request for increased salaries (Indianapolis News, March 13, 1962: 1), which was to lead to another request for increased salaries (Indianapolis News, March 13, 1962: 1), which was to lead to another $200 increase for entering patrol officers for 1963 (Journal of the Common Council, August 26, 1963: 465).

One aspect of the offensive was a carryover from the past. A raft of new special squads were put onto the streets, with special instructions that members of "any suspicious gangs" be "scrutinized and picked up for any kind of traffic or municipal violation" (Indianapolis News, March 12, 1962: 1). At the same time, the News was carrying a box on page 1 each day, showing offenses reported for the preceding day, under the heading: "Police Activity." Attacks on women on the street, mostly involving purse snatching, were of special concern in the press (Indianapolis News, March 12, 1961: 18, March 14, 1962: 30, and April 16, 1962: 22). As the rhetoric about the crime problem grew more dramatic, the rhetoric about police response was bound to do so, too.

As the campaign opened, it was left to former Chief Mueller to announce the new move, with assurance of Reilly's backing. A front-page headline in the Indianapolis News (March 13, 1962: 1) read: "If You Smell a Rat, Call Police." Mueller coined two maxims: "Help police and help yourselves," and "You have to be your brother's keeper." He urged citizens to "report anything suspicious," and encouraged them to use call boxes if they were out on the street. Again, a point was made of introducing the kind of communications technology that would make the police more responsive to citizens' complaints -- receivers for foot patrol officers to be dispatched to complainants (the outgrowth of nationwide experimentation; Indianapolis News, March 15, 1962: 1), and the purchase of seven tape recorders to facilitate checks on the accuracy of dispatches following citizen calls (Indianapolis News, May 22, 1962: 2). (The latter move apparently had the unforeseen effect of making dispatchers selective about recording dispatches at all, for IPD data show that dispatchers

acknowledged making more than 25 percent fewer dispatches in 1962 than in 1961.)

Apparently, the police were overwhelmed by their own success. We have seen that crime reporting rates skyrocketed in 1962. Arrest performance could not begin to keep up with the demand. Officers made some attempt to increase arrests for larceny and aggravated assault, but they gave up on burglary and robbery. The police generally retreated into old-fashioned harassment of juveniles, as when Chief Reilly announced that all curfew violators (those under 18 out after 11:00 p.m.) would be taken into custody and either sent home or taken to the Juvenile Center (Indianapolis News, April 3, 1962: 1); followed by publicity that seven curfew violators were picked up on April 8 alone (Indianapolis News, April 9, 1962: 21). Mayor Boswell tried to shift the onus of responsibility to others, in a letter to the Indianapolis News (May 15, 1962: 30), in which he exhorted the media to pay as much attention to the disposition of "dangerous offenders" -- those released on bond, on parole, from Juvenile Court and from the Indiana Boys School -- as to publicizing street crime itself.

Regardless of second thoughts among those involved with law enforcement, the alarm over street crime the police had set off had spread too far to be stopped. On June 30, 1962, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce President John Burkhart announced formation of a new department to monitor law enforcement. It had been funded for ten years by 25 "leading businesses" in the city. Leading businesspersons and professionals would work to foster cooperation among the police, the courts and corrections for the sake of stopping street crime. The new unit was modeled on the Chamber of Commerce's

Safety Unit, established in 1940, which was credited with having "fought consistently for more effective traffic law enforcement." The influence of the Chamber of Commerce was manifest. Mayor Boswell, Prosecutor Bayt and all the Criminal Court Judges "hailed" the move (Indianapolis Star, July 1, 1962: sec. I, pp. 1, 18). The influence of business interests on police activity had already been made clear by repeated IPD traffic crackdowns for twenty years. Rates at which citizen complaints were reported could never return to pre-1962 levels.

The IPD moved out of its old building into the new City-County Building in July 1962 (Indianapolis News, July 21, 1962: 13). With that move came a new radio communications system to accompany the tape recorders. Civilian operators fed color-coded complaint cards through a conveyor to police dispatchers, who by inserting the cards into slots opened the circuits for numbered lights -- one for each squad car on patrol -- to show that it was out of service. Requests for advice and information were fed from the operators directly to the lieutenant on duty. The IPD was proud of its new system, and had it touted in the press (Indianapolis News, October 31, 1962: 23; and Indianapolis Star Magazine, April 7, 1963: 38-41). In addition to the tape-recorded monitoring of calls, either a loss of records during the move or the use of the lieutenant to give information and advice could have helped to lower the recorded number of dispatches for the year so considerably.

In August 1962, Boswell resigned to become Postmaster for Indianapolis. He was succeeded by Albert H. Losche, a largely ceremonial figure (Hartman, January 9, 1980) who lost his chance to run for election to Mayor in his own right once it was discovered that he once had been a Klan member (Dortch,

January 24, 1980). With this Mayor and a Republican Prosecutor (Noble Pearcy, who assumed office in 1962), city leaders did not have noticeable influence over IPD activities during the last year of the period. However, some outsiders managed to stir up excitement.

They were a set of consultants from Indiana University's Department of Police Administration (now the Department of Forensic Studies), headed by Robert P. Shumate. They were hired to survey the department and recommend administrative changes for better law enforcement. They first made news in April 1963, recommending that two Deputy Chief positions be created -- one for Investigation and the other for Operations (so that, for the first time, someone would have unified command of all uniformed personnel). The Mayor, Chief Jones and the Board of Public Safety concurred with the recommendation. Noel A. Jones was appointed Deputy Chief of Investigations, and Daniel T. Veza Deputy Chief of Operations (Indianapolis Star, April 30, 1963: 1).

The consultants studied crime report data for 135 days, and recommended more concentrated patrol in some areas. Accordingly, Deputy Chief Veza ordered seven more district cars onto the street in June (Indianapolis News, June 5, 1963: 36). For the first time, districts were divided into zones, and for any district car out of service, a back-up unit was designated to take calls. A 22-car mobile unit was put into service at night (Indianapolis News, June 10, 1963: 34).

Thirty top-ranking officers were given a 1½ hour course on the city's "Negro civil rights problem" (Indianapolis News, June 22, 1963: 1).

The consultants also recommended pay raises -- $200 for beginning

patrol officers and as much as $5000 for the Chief. Losche abandoned his own plan and agreed to push this one (Indianapolis News, July 8, 1963: 1). This pressure from outsiders rubbed the City Council the wrong way. They rejected the plan, instead gave beginning officers $200 more and ranking officers $300 more, and claimed to have saved the city $90,000 (Indianapolis News, August 17, 1963: 1). A proposal for an ordinance to pay the consultants $7,275 to oversee implementation of their recommendations got shelved later in the fall for lack of City Council support (Indianapolis News, November 18, 1963: 21).

The consultants nonetheless accomplished one major organizational change -- a significant break with the IPD's proactive past. Upon their recommendation, the Traffic Division was incorporated into the Uniform Division (Indianapolis Star, July 2, 1963: 1), and within a few months, the number of officers assigned to traffic duty cut by 80 percent (Indianapolis News, February 14, 1964: 1). With the backing of city officials, a new provision was to be pushed through the General Assembly in a year, one that allowed officers to give summonses to traffic violators instead of arresting them (Indianapolis Star, Feburary 4, 1965: 22). This was to give vice enforcement all the more prominence as a traditional IPD activity.

As the term ended, the inertia of the shift toward reactive enforcement carried Index Rates generally higher, but Index offense arrest performance declined. The political conservatism of the City militated against budgeting for major changes in the IPD, as reflected by the City Council's rejection of the IU consultants. There were hints, too, that the IPD might not have changed as much as its leaders had claimed.

Major gambling raids continued (July 9, 1963: 17), and even Prosecutor Pearcy got into the act, setting up an undercover unit of his own, six strong, with no IPD contact, "to stamp out gambling and prostitution" (Indianapolis News, October 8, 1963: 1).

The resurrection of the proactive stance heralded bad trouble for the IPD. In December, as Mayor-Elect Barton was interviewing candidates to take over for Chief Reilly (who announced impending retirement to take on a private security job), the U.S. Attorney in Indianapolis, Richard P. Stein, told him that more than 40 IPD officers had been implicated in possible bribery. Their names had come up in a federal grand jury investigation of a large numbers operation which Secret Service Agents had raided the preceding May. Stein was not yet ready to give Barton names, and Barton announced his intention to delay appointment of a new Chief until he knew who had been implicated in the investigation (Indianapolis Star, December 24, 1963: 1). Thus, the IPD ended the Boswell-Losche term under a cloud.

MAYOR BARTON: 1964-67

Crime Trends

Auto theft rates increased throughout the period, by over ten percent the first two years, almost leveling off in 1966, skyrocketing upward by 40 percent in 1967. Arrest trends lagged behind by a year, leveling off in 1967 after an initial burst (37 percent increase in 1964 predominantly in arrests of juveniles, after which adults steadily became a larger proportion of those arrested).

Aggravated assault jumped upward, by 27 percent, in 1964, and then leveled off for the remainder of the period. Arrest figures, up five percent in 1964, are only available for this year.

Note, though: The IPD Juvenile Branch began keeping arrest figures for juveniles in three violent aategories--murder and non-negligent manslaughter (four arrests each in 1966 and 1967), rape (nine in 1966, 22 in 1967), and aggravated assault (60 in 1966, 66 in 1967)--in 1966. In compensation, perhaps, arrests of juveniles for sex offenses dropped from 68 to 17 in 1966, and climbed back to 36 in 1967.

Robbery was the other Index Offense that showed a big gain in 1964. Offenses and arrests dropped off a bit in 1965, and climbed back up to slightly higher levels than 1964 in 1966. Offenses barely dropped in 1967, but thanks mainly to juvenile arrests (which more than doubled), arrests overall climbed more than 35 percent that year.

Burglary rates edged almost geometrically upward every year, from a four percent increase in 1964 to a 22 percent increase in 1967. Arrest increases begain in 1965 and peaked in 1966 at 25 percent, dropping

back to a nine percent increase in 1967. Juvenile arrests led upward and downward arrest trends.

IPD arrest and offense for grand larceny exist only for 1963-64, when offenses rose minimally, and arrests increased by ten percent. The GRC's F.B.I. figures indicate that grand larceny trends paralleled total larceny trends for the remainder of the period. Total larceny offenses rose slightly in 1964, declined by 13 percent in 1965, leveled off in 1966, and rose by 11 percent in 1967. Thus, 1967 rates were a percentage point ahead of 1964 rates. Juveniles led the ten percent increase in total larceny arrests in 1964, after which adults became a steadily larger proportion of those arrested, as arrests leveled off in 1965, jumped by almost 40 percent in 1966, and by another 20 percent in 1967.

Rape reports and arrests held steady in 1964 (the only year arrest figures are available). Then the reports moved up by 50 percent in 1966, dropped back off by 22 percent in 1966, and climbed back up by twelve percent in 1967.

Murder and non-negligent manslaughter rates continued to jump around negligibly until 1967, when they climbed over 50 percent (to 58) in number for the first time. This in itself might not be remarkable, but if one looks ahead to the first year of Mayor Lugar's term, 1968, when the figure jumped to 77, 1967 becomes the first of two years of a trend in which the number of offenses almost doubled.

In sum, rape, robbery and larceny oscillated around all-time high levels, aggravated assault reached a plateau in 1964, auto theft lurched upward to an all-time high in 1967, and murder and non-negligent manslaughter showed its first propensity to increase even in incidence since the beginning of this study (1948). With oscillations in all known categories,

arrests ended the period with increases, which more than kept pace with offense increases for robbery, burglary and larceny, and fell behind for auto theft. Shifting patterns of arresting jubeniles led trends in burglary and robbery, while those of adults led larceny and auto theft.

The Politics of Governmental Response

The first year of John J. Barton's term was a rough one for the IPD. Mayor Barton found out that Deputy Chief Noel (for having been born on Christmas) A. Jones was not on U.S. Attorney Stein's list of bribery suspects, and with Board of Public Safety ratification, named Jones Chief on January 7. Barton announced that Jones would work closely with him for the first couple of months, "until things are straightened out," and then take on more autonomy. Barton had been Superintendent of the Indiana State Police, and hence had the credentials to take an active role in IPD management (Indianapolis News, January 7, 1964: 1).

For a few weeks, the IPD put on a brave face. Stein shared information about his investigation with Prosecutor Pearcy and Jones, for whom he declared "a lot of respect." Stein was only interested in prosecuting the numbers racketeers himself, and announced his intention of turning over the bribery material to local authorities once his grand jury, which was to reconvene on January 20-27, had finished its inquiry. Stein revealed that publicity about his investigation had prompted hundreds of "tips,"many anonymous, that IPD bribery was widespread (Indianapolis News, January 9, 1964: 38).

Meanwhile, Chief Jones again stressed the discipline for which he had been known for over a decade. Among other things, officers were

expected to make vice arrests, (Indianapolis News, January 10, 1964: 1). This both revealed that the IPD was not free of its proactive past, and appeared to be a response to allegations that officers took pay not to make vice arrests.

By the end of the month, it was reported that IPD morale was way up under Jones's Leadership, noting that Jones demanded hard work but rewarded merit. There were just a few grumbles from oldtimers who had gotten used to an easy work life (Indianapolis News, January 25: 13). A crackdown on vice, resulting in a number of convictions -- especially for gambling, prostitution and liquor violations -- was played up (Indianapolis News, January 30, 1964: 57). A month later, just before the worst news about the bribery charges was to break, page-one publicity was given for a concerted attempt to wipe out gambling at a high school basketball tournament (Indianapolis News, February 27, 1964: 1).

Formal bribery charges were imminent. Pearcy had convened a Marion County grand jury to hear the evidence that Stein had presented to him. Information about the charges began to trickle out. U.S. Secret Service Agents had raided the house of Isaac (Tuffy) Mitchell the preceding May. Based on evidence gathered there, Mitchell had been convicted and sentenced to federal prison for running what was said to have been a $1,000,000 numbers operation. One of the items found in the raid was an adding machine tape with 24 last names on it, 23 of them corresponding to names of IPD officers, with amounts from $10 to $100 after the names. Granted immunity under a state law on gambling investigations, an aide of Mitchell's, himself convicted in federal court and serving a five-year prison term, Van Wert Mullins, became the star grand jury witness

(Indianapolis News, March 18, 1964: 1, and March 30, 1964: 1).

Chief Jones now had the names of 27 officers who might be indicted, and word that the grand jury report would be released on March 31. He tried to prepare as best he could. Four of the 27, two captains, a lieutenant and a sergeant, had at least 20 years of service on the force and were thus eligible to retire on a pension, were allowed to do so by the Board of Public Safety on that day (Indianapolis News, March 31, 1964: 1). Jones ordered all 27 to assemble in the training school auditorium. In the afternoon, 23 indictments were issued, 22 of them of police officers -- including two captains, seven lieutenants, ten sergeants and three patrol officers. Each of the 22 was charged with two counts of accepting bribes, a felony with a maximum sentence of 2-14 years and a $2,000 fine. The 23rd indictee was not named; charged with only one count of bribery, that person was not pursued. (It is tempting to speculate whether this person might have been a former high police official who, by political consensus, was allowed to depart quietly.) Chief Jones went immediately to the auditorium, dismissed five of the 27 officers, and placed the remaining 22 under arrest. They were booked at jail and released on bond (Indianapolis News Blue Streak Edition, March 31, 1964: 1).

Two other officers were apparently allowed to retire. The rest were suspended, and formal hearings on their cases before the Board of Public Safety delayed (Indianapolis News Blue Streak Edition, April 13, 1964: 1). Pearcy announced that trials would begin "shortly" (Indianapolis News, April 6, 1964: 23), and that the police/gambling

probe would be extended (Indianapolis News, April 1, 1964: 1).

In point of fact, the probe was never extended, only two trials were held, and they were delayed considerably. Mullins did go back before a grand jury of Pearcy's, but nothing came of it. It was announced that Sergeant Jack R. Herman would be the first tried, beginning on September 8 (Indianapolis Star, August 29, 1964: 1,6). Herman was charged with two counts of having accepted $10 bribes (Indianapolis News, September 29, 1964: 1), and on the strength of Mullin's testimony was convicted, and sentenced to 2-14 years to prison with a $1,000 fine. Herman announced that he would appeal,,and Pearcy promised to move quickly to two other trials. In Pearcy's words, the conviction was "a black day" for the IPD, of which "good will come." He added, "This very trial will make law enforcement in the future much better." (Indianapolis News, October 3, 1964: 1, and October 26, 1964: 21).

Pearcy's euphoria aside, the next trial did not occur until the following January. Lt. David S. Jeter, accused of taking $100 in bribes, was acquitted. He was immediately reinstated with back pay. For the moment, while expressing disappointment, Pearcy announced that the third trial, of Sgt. William Hyneman, would begin in two days (Indianapolis News, January 29, 1965: 1).

Accounts of what followed gave insight as to what had already occurred (see, e.g., Indianapolis Star, February 16, 1965: 1, 11, October 23, 1965: 1, 8, and October 28, 1965: 39) The prosecution was defeated by a turn of events at Jeter's trial. As the judge before whom the original grand jury had convened, Eugene M. Fife, Jr.,

had automatically become the trial judge. Both before the grand jury and in Sgt. Herman's trial, Judge Fife had granted Mullins immunity under the state's gambling investigation law. Thus, Mullins was compelled to testify despite his raising objections that his testimony would incriminate him. But some time after the Herman trial, Fife changed his mind. The state statute, he ruled, applied only to prosecution for gambling and not for bribery. Thus Mullins was denied immunity at the Jeter trial and refused to testify. Without Mullins' testimony, Pearcy had no case. His only chance was to get the prosecution before another Judge, and hope for a favorable interpretation of the immunity statute. Shortly after the Jeter trial, he announced that Hyneman would not be tried after all, and that the remaining 20 indictments were all dismissed. Thus, the 15 officers remaining on the force, all except the unfortunate Sgt. Herman (who when last heard from had appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court and remained free on bond), were reinstated. Pearcy then convened a grand jury before Judge Saul I. Rabb. But in October, Rabb agreed with Fife's reinterpretation of the law, refused to grant Mullins immunity, upheld Mullins's right not to testify before the new grand jury, and Pearcy abandoned his effort entirely.

The long term impact of the bribery charges cannot be overstated. As we will see during Lugar's second term, when another police corruption scandal broke, Pearcy's legacy of inability to prosecute and convict IPD officers so stymied him that he badly lost re-election to Jamed Kelley in 1974. As we shall see below in the account of Richard Lugar's election as Mayor in 1967, the scandal cast a shadow over the picture of Democrats'

ability to govern the City, so that to this day, Barton is the last of his party to be elected Mayor. The scandal also played a significant role in costing Chief Jones his job early in 1967.

Jones had been selected to be a strong Chief, but the scandal cost him power. During the scandal, in 1964, he began a squabble with Arthur J. Sullivan, President of the Public Safety Board, that was never to let up. Jones interpreted the 1935 Merit Law to give him exclusive power to promote IPD officers, in consultation with a Merit Board of four captains. He held that he needed only to notify the Board of his promotions for their records. Sullivan, on the other hand, interpreted the Law to give the Board the power of ratification over promotions. Thus, as Mayor Barton tried unsuccessfully to mediate, Jones began treating promotions as accomplished over Board objections (Indiana polis News, April 22, 1964: 1, and June 29, 1964: 1). Had the prestige of the IPD not been at such an ebb, Jones might have carried the day. But increasingly, Barton took sides with Sullivan and in a final episode over high level promotions, demanded and received Jones's resignation. Harking back to the precedent set by Acting Mayor Bayt in 1951, Barton merely allowed Deputy Chief Daniel T. Veza to succeed Jones as Acting Chief by default (Indianapolis News, January 4, 1967: 1, Blue Streak Edition, January 4, 1967: 1, and January 5, 1964: 41).

A further impact of the scandal was generally to call into question the conduct of IPD officers toward citizens. In the wake of the indictments, Director of Public Safety Frank Meech recommended, and Jones implemented, a decision to consolidate internal investigation and training

under someone of higher rank than captain. Accordingly, Orville Gleich was appointed Inspector of a new Inspection and Training Unit. Again, too, IU consultants' recommendations were cited as further authority for the change (Indianapolis News, April 3, 1964: 1, and April 20, 1964: 17). A Public Relations Unit, headed first by Det. Sgt. Frank Spallina, was formed to improve the image of the department (Indianapolis News, March 24, 1964: 1). With local civil rights leaders participating, all officers were required to attend an eight week human relations training course, by order of Capt. Charles W. Limeler, Director of Personnel and Training (Indianapolis News, April 6, 1964: 23). Det. Sgt. Coates, a 17-year veteran black officer, was formally appointed by Chief Jones to serve as liaison to the Mayor's Human Rights Commission (Indianapolis News, March 20, 1964: 9). The Indianapolis News ran an exposé of slow response time by IPD patrol officers, prompting announcement of a new emergency number by which citizens could call dispatchers directly, bypassing civilian operators. At the same time, it was announced that the radio system would be split in two, one for the East Side and one for the West (Indianapolis News, June 16, 1964: 1). Over strenuous IPD objections, the City Council seriously considered repealing the ordinance prohibiting "disorderly houses," a prime basis for IPD vice arrests. Republican Council Member Richard C. Kuykendall went so far as to charge that the ordinance was probably unconstitutional (Indianapolis Star, November 18, 1964: 25). Charges of police harassment of blacks mounted coincident with the rise of the bribery charges (Indianapolis News, February 26, 1964: 1), and the NAACP became an active critic (Indianapolis Star, March 1, 1964: 19). Twenty-three black ministers were even moved to

explicit denial that there was a correlation between their drive for civil rights and IPD crackdowns on vice (Indianapolis Star, March 18, 1964: 20). Although backed by the Indianapolis Merchants Association, Chief Jones was forced to cut a request for authorization to increase the strength of IPD from 50 to 25 for the 1965 budget, and the City Council finally authorized an addition of 15 (Indianapolis Star, August 30, 1965: sec. II, p. 1).

A recurrent irony of the history of funding American police is that it fares better the worse the police seem to be doing. Indianapolis was no exception. As the bribery scandal dragged on in 1965, a poor police image was blamed for difficulty in recruiting enough even to build the IPD up to authorized strength. (Indianapolis News, August 13, 1965: 1). Convinced that the force was in a bad way, the City Council finally came through with major new funding. It not only increased starting salaries by another $200, but increased the authorized strength of IPD by a full one hundred (Journal of the Common Council, August 31, 1965: 576). Frustrated by continuing recruiting failures (Indianapolis News, May 12, 1967: 23), the Council thereafter declined to increase the strength further, but increased starting salaries by another $225 in 1966 (Journal of the Common Council, August 1, 1966: 491), and by a whopping (for Indianapolis) $1,225 in 1967, to $7,000 (Journal of the Common Council, August 28, 1967: 609). Still, by 1967, resignations and retirements proliferated, causing President Sullivan of the Board of Public Safety to term the IPD situation "critical" (Indianapolis Star, March 15, 1967: 19). The only Index Offense campaign announced during the period was against steadily increasing auto theft (Indianapolis Star, April 20, 1966: 12).

The unsteady increase in reporting Index Offenses and making arrests for them during the period was both a reflection of low morale and a tribute to the depth of the IPD's conversion to reactive enforcement. The unsteadiness indicated that IPD leadership was incapable of sustaining any campaigns. The overall longterm increases, on the other hand, indicated that reactive enforcement had become firmly entrenched as a measure of police performance, and Chief Jones's recognized talent for imposing discipline may have been critical in keeping the performance from falling apart completely. By 1967, then, the IPD was more than ever committed to what we know as modern policing. Pressures to re-emphasize traffic enforcement were resisted by Jones (Indianapolis News, January 11, 1966: 16). The proportion of juvenile arrests was falling off. Only vice enforcement retained high priority. Continued efforts were made to strengthen auto and foot patrol in high crime areas (Indianapolis Star, June 23, 1966: 32). In a last major effort at restoring police legitimacy, a "Crime Alert" program was begun in 1967, involving not only increased patrols, but a series of meetings to educate the public on helping the police to help them (Indianapolis Star, May 25, 1967: 63). This last burst of activity seemingly helped to increase most categories of offense reporting and arrests in 1967.

Finally, and to the considerable credit of Indianapolis, police-community relations remained sufficiently cool that Indianapolis suffered none of the race riots prevalent elsewhere, thanks to community organization leaders in the Community Action Program (Indianapolis Star, August 16, 1966: 4), black leaders, and the business community (Dortch, January 24, 1980), backed strongly by Chiefs Jones and Veza. Embattled though they were, the IPD made sincere efforts to regain the respect of their community.

MAYOR LUGAR: 1968-1971

Crime Trends

Trends in Index Offense incidence and arrests for this period can best be described as on a rollercoaster. Every category rose during 1968. Available figures for all but two categories, burglary offenses and total larceny offenses and arrests (grand larceny figures alone are not available from IPD), dropped or held steady in 1969. All categories but murder and non-negligent manslaughter rose in 1970. For all but marginal increases for both robbery offenses and arrests, figures dropped again in 1971.

It is better to speak in terms of trends in incidence than in rates for this period. Normally, from one year to the next, the distinction has minimal significance. During this period in Indianapolis, however, the Uni-Gov Law went into effect. Taking the change into account, Indianapolis population estimates from Vital Statistics, Indiana State Board of Health, show a population of 519,200 in 1968, 725,100 in 1969, and 743,200 in 1970, before again leveling off. The problem with using these estimates to compute IPD rates is that the territory patrolled by the IPD was only minimally extended beyond the old city limits. Thus, incidence becomes the more reliable index of trends.

IPD figures for murder and non-negligent manslaughter show that the incidence rose by nearly a third in 1968, dropped 15 percent in 1969, rose more than seven percent further in 1970, and held steady (increased from 60 to 61) in 1971. Arrest figures for the offense are available only for 1970-71, when the number of arrests dropped from 55 to 45 (including five juveniles).

Rape offenses reported climbed 50 percent in 1968, declined 11 percent in 1969, and slightly declined (four percent) in 1971. Arrests, available for 1970-71, declined by almost 30 percent.

The reported incidence of robbery climbed 55 percent in 1968, declined 12 percent in 1969, went up 25 percent in 1969, and marginally increased in 1971. Arrests were up 40 percent in 1968, down 12 percent in 1969, up 69 percent in 1970, and just barely increased (2 percent) in 1971.

The incidence of burglary was an anomaly, for the trend shifted slowly but steadily upward from 1967-70, from an increase of 4 percent in 1968, to 10 percent in 1969, to fifteen percent in 1970, followed by an 8 percent decline in 1971. Arrests were up 5 percent in 1968, up 57 percent in 1970, and down 11 percent in 1971.

Larceny offenses were up 18 percent in 1968, up nine percent in 1969, up 16 percent in 1970, and down eight percent in 1971. Larceny arrests were up five percent in 1968, up just a percent (though down eight percent for juveniles) in 1969, up 28 percent in 1969, and down 11 percent in 1971.

Aggravated assault incidence rose 75 percent in 1968, remained practically unchanged in 1969, rose 40 percent in 1970, and dropped 23 percent in 1971. Arrests, available only for 1970-71, declined 34 percent the last year of the period.

The rollercoaster pattern aside, one further pattern in arrest figures deserves mention. In all known cases, the proportion of juveniles arrested increased in 1968, and declined steadily thereafter.

The Politics of Governmental Response

After twelve years, a Republican, Richard Lugar, finally became Mayor again. Chief Daniel Veza wanted mightily to remain in office, but it soon became clear that the new Mayor was to name his own Chief. His second day in office, Lugar made it known that he held the Chief responsible for clearing up crime, especially rising house burglaries. The Chief would be replaced if he did not "do the job" (Indianapolis Star, January 3, 1968: 1, 15). Anxious to please, Veza set up a tactical unit of overtime volunteers to patrol high burglary areas. The unit was called the "Task Force" (Indianapolis Star, January 5, 1968: 10). Although the problem of dealing with credit card thefts was conceded to be unmanageable (Indianapolis News, January 11, 1968: 1), Veza generally made a point of appearing tough on street crime. He called on citizens to report anything suspicious and to cooperate in prosecution, and pledged that crime reporting by the IPD would be "honest." He held that the police would be successful in fighting crime so long as they maintained "superior manpower and firepower" (Indianapolis News, January 11, 1968: 27). But by late January, Lugar and the Board of Public Safety had begun interviewing applicants for Chief (including Veza) from among those ranking lieutenant and above. By the beginning of March, Winston Churchill, who had just been promoted to lieutenant in early January, had been named Chief, and the top ranks had been reshuffled (Indianapolis Star, March 5, 1968: 12).

By now, the politics of appointment and promotion in the IPD had become manifest. Under Democrats, not only party affiliation but being Irish and Catholic was said to be a general requirement for high rank. In 1968, Republicans were just as anxious to have their day. Nine of the top 13 ranking officers became Republican, and two of the four Democrats apparently maintained their positions because they were black. Since Captain had become a permanent rank, high ranking Democrats at least retained this status, so that by 1970, although nine Democratic holdovers remained, the ten new captains were all Republican. The rank of inspector was changed to a permanent rank of major in 1969, and by the following year all 13 at that rank were Republican. Although those at all permanent ranks were supposedly picked by merit, it essentially remained open to the Chief, answerable to the Mayor, to pick anyone off the promotion list of those who had passed the written test, so that written score was scarcely determinative of promotion. An indication of just how topheavy the force became when Democrats were demoted to Captain was that by 1970, the average age of IPD officers was 54 (Indianapolis Star, May 10, 1970: sec. II, p. 6). Essentially, then, the department was run to suit the political needs of the Mayor.

Here again was a stiuation in which the Mayor and Prosecutor's Offices newly belonged in the hands of the same party. As usual, crime rates shot up. The new war on crime was not limited to full crime reporting. An emphasis was placed on arresting "hoodlums" to rid the streets of offenders. The Task Force was especially notorious for stopping and arresting "suspicious persons" with impunity. The problem was that the bulk of this energy was expended in the black

high-crime areas on the Near Northside. From the outset of Lugar's first term,civil rights activists, such as Sam Jones, Executive Director of the Indianapolis Urban League, were up in arms over harassment of and brutality against blacks. But the IPD persisted. Noted the Star, ". . . the war is on and they (the hoodlums) are the targets" (Indianapolis Star, January 25, 1968: 30).

Chief Churchill was young and aggressive. Beyond rearranging the upper ranks to consolidate his control, he instituted a series of changes to spruce up the image of the department. Law enforcement was to be "selective . . . especially in traffic." A raft of new cars were leased, and their color changed to powder blue and white (Indianapolis News, March 15, 1968: 40). He expanded the controversial Internal Security Unit to gather intelligence on political dissidents, proclaiming it necessary to keep the unit's activities a secret, but making it plain that its work would no longer be limited to gathering information on labor troubles (Indianapolis News, March 19, 1968: 12). Ten K-9 units (dogs) were added to the beefed-up enforcement on the Near Northside (Indianapolis News, June 4, 1968: 4). Nearly a third of the IPD officers were reassigned in the first few months of Churchill's tenure. "Needless paperwork," the filing of daily reports by patrol officers, was eliminated. Considerable lip service was paid to community relations, with an emphasis on citizen contact. The Star heralded these months as the "greatest period of change in more than a decade," apparently harking back to Chief Mueller's shift to one-person cars (Indianapolis Star, July 14, 1968: sec. II, p. 8). Twenty women were placed in squad cars for the first

time, but only to handle minor, non-violent matters, "making it possible for more men to concentrate on crime" (Indianapolis News, July 30, 1968: 1). Complaints of racial bias and brutality persisted, as by Donald W. Bundles, Indianapolis Chair of the Congress on Racial Equality (Indianapolis News, July 16, 1968: 2).

By the fall, public relations officer, Captain Frank Spallina, was able to announce, too, that the IPD had shed itself of a main non-crime fighting function. The Fire Department would now answer first aid calls (Indianapolis Star, September 11, 1968: 11).

By now, the IPD were caught on the horns of a basic, recurrent dilemma of modern policing. Their energy paid off in considerably higher crime rates. That is, by trying to show citizens how responsive they were to crime, they produced official evidence that the crime problem was getting worse. At first, Mayor Lugar tried to explain the increase away as a statistical artifact, arguing that the IPD had merely corrected previous "irregularities" in crime reporting. The IPD force, now grown to over 1,000, had become "rigorous" in its crime reporting. He cited one example of prior practice in particular to illustrate the point that the police formerly had been remiss both in reporting offenses and in inflating their clearance rate. As he told it, not long before his administration, one suspect had been persuaded to "clear" fifty offenses, though many of them had never been reported in the first place. Now, Lugar hoped only for more "rapport" between the police and courts (Indianapolis News, December 10, 1968: 25).

A problem with this approach is that the police also vitally depend on the credibility of Index trends when they go down, a trend

which usually coincides with higher clearance rates, to show that they are succeeding in crime control. The police have lost a powerful political weapon if the public comes to believe that crime statistics are susceptible to manipulation for political purposes. Thus, about a month after Lugar's explanation, the approach to the figures was shifted, and Major Spallina expressed "alarm" over the 15 percent rise of Index crime in 1968, requiring "redeployment" of forces (Indianapolis News, January 9, 1969: 2).

Although the Star questioned the priorities, 50 more officers were assigned to "high crime areas" (Indianapolis News, January 24, 1969: 30), supplemented by a "Mobile Reserve Force" of selected police veterans (Indianapolis Star, January 25, 1969: 25). Roll calls for outlying districts began to be moved to the field (Indianapolis Star, January 31, 1969: 1).

The IPD gained an added incentive to show that it could reduce crime throughout the city. The Uni-Gov Law, consolidating city and county government, was passed by the General Assembly in March 1969, and signed by the Governor. It was to go into effect on January 1, 1970 (Indianapolis Star, March 6, 1969: 1). The Law created a new position, that of Director of Public Safety, who was appointed and could be fired at will by the Mayor. The Director presided over a Department of Public Safety with four other members, two hired and fired by the Mayor, and the other two hired and fired by the new City-County Council. This group of five, a majority of whom served at the Mayor's pleasure, set police policy, entered into contracts, and appointed the Chief and Deputy Chiefs. The Chief in turn appointed

a Board of Captains, and together with them made all other promotions (in the old manner) off test lists, from applicants who had held immediately lower rank for at least three years. A new Community Relations Office, headed by a lawyer, was to investigate civilian complaints. Of crucial political significance was that the Department of Public Safety was to coordinate Sheriff and police activities. Its authority over the Sheriff was limited by the fact that he would still be elected in his own right and have control over his own promotions, and that the boundaries of police and sheriff's service districts would be reset, if at all, by the City-County Council. Initially, the IPD service boundaries would remain unchanged, but it was hoped that they might soon be expanded (Indianapolis Star, March 16, 1968: sec. II, p. 4). The coordination of Sheriff and police activities has remained a sore point down to the present, as we shall see. To make part of this long story short, the IPD service district was only once expanded, in 1970, to include a heavily industrial area of six square miles with a population of less than 5,000 (Indianapolis News, February 3, 1970: 29), and attempts of the IPD to get the Sheriff to take over the City Lockup never succeeded.

The point remains that the IPD had an investment in showing that it was capable of relieving the Sheriff of law enforcement duties. In addition, they gained one other major incentive for a show of good performance. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, full of funds to aid in law enforcement development, had been created by the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In another major step toward joining the ranks of modern, big-city law enforcement, the IPD began accepting federal funds in 1969. The The 1969 amount, $33,121.55, received through the State Planning Agency, was a small but significant beginning at dependence on federal priorities. It paid 60 percent of the salary of a newly hired Legal Adviser, Roy F. Jones (a 1969 Indiana University Law graduate who prepared himself with a course at Northwestern), while the remainder went for equipment: cameras, photo equipment, recorders, a mobile van for recruiting and public relations, and technical and surveillance equipment (Indianapolis News, January 26, 1970: 4).

For further flash, Lt. Eugene Gallagher (destined to become Chief in 1976), head of data processing, announced that a new IBM 360 Model 40 computer was to be rented and in operation by the end of the year. It would be used to consolidate fire, police, and Sheriff's records. It would replace a smaller unit currently used to file city crime statistics, and stolen auto and license plate lists. Within three years, routine dispatch was to be by computer, and within five years, all cars were to be equipped with teletype terminals (Indianapolis Star, February 16, 1969: sec. II, p. 1). The transition was not to prove nearly so smooth or thorough (e.g., by January 1970, the new computer only handled stolen auto and license plate lists Indianapolis News, January 26, 1970: 4). Meanwhile, during a State Planning Agency-sponsored seminar he was attending with Prosecutor Pearcy, Chief Churchill was moved to hail the advent of the computer as "revolutionary" (Indianapolis Star, April 2, 1969: 9).

An arrest warrant squad was created as a mark of further modernization (Indianapolis Star, March 30, 1969: 14).

The capacity of the IPD to manipulate crime statistics at will was not to come to light in the press until 1976 (discussed below under Hudnut's term), but there is some indication of how control was consolidated over Index trends in 1969. The Planning and Research Branch was assigned the task of compiling daily crime reports, supposedly to facilitate continual shift of patrol allocation to high crime areas, and they immediately reported a significant drop in crime in the most notorious area, Edward Sector, or the Near Northside (Indianapolis Star, April 5, 1969: 25).

Juvenile enforcement had lost its glamor. The Juvenile Branch had lost 16 officers in the past decade, and Captain Edward Clause announced that their investigative activities would henceforth be confined to the most serious crimes. Other detectives, too, reported limits on their ability to investigate less serious cases (Indianapolis Star, June 1, 1969: sec. II, pp. 1, 10).

Racial tensions came to a head with two straight nights of looting and sniping in June on the Near Northside. The second night, one officer received a minor head wound from a sniper, and the police made 82 arrests. Thus, the IPD got off lightly in racial violence compared to other large cities in the late 1960s, but it was clear that racial tensions remained (Indianapolis News, June 7, 1969: 3). The ten police assigned to meet with ten black activists in a "Confrontation Lab" abandoned the project two days early (Indianapolis Star, June 13, 1969: 13). By the fall Chief Churchill felt able to

announce more concentrated patrol coverage of the Near Northside by overlapping adjoining sectors. According to the Chief, the move was directed to "the ultimate end -- elimination of crime" (Indianapolis News, November 20, 1969: 1).

When it was clear that there was a sustained drop in reported crime, Churchill attributed it to another innovation of his: allowing patrol officers to take their squad cars home (Indianapolis Star, October 7, 1969: 12). Just after the municipal election, the ground had been laid for prospective City-County Council Majority leader, Republican Beurt R. SerVaas, to announce a plan to eliminate the Sheriff's law enforcement function except for security divisions to patrol parks and public buildings. Sheriff Eads declined comment (Indianapolis Star, November 9, 1969: sec. II, p. 18).

Now, the IPD was riding high. Under closer press scrutiny probably because he had sought so much self-serving publicity, Churchill was asked about corruption. Formerly, he reported corruption was rampant. Officers used to bid for high-paying districts. When he had become Chief, he was told that the position was worth $60-70,000. His first week in office, a gambler had come in and dropped $250 on his desk, only to retrieve the money and turn tail when the Chief pulled out a tape recorder and asked him to state his intentions for posterity. But currently, claimed the Chief, there were at most small-scale takes by officers, and as soon as bribery was discovered, the officers were subject to immediate firing. (Parenthetically, if such firings had taken place, they had been kept out of the press.) No one was immune from vice arrests any longer.

He nonetheless acknowledged, "This is one of the most difficult things to change. There are those, in and out of the department, who just can't believe that the police can no longer be bought off" (Indianapolis Star, May 10, 1970: sec. II, p. 1). Little did the Chief realize that the Star would not let the matter drop. As we shall see, a major investigative series on police corruption would cost Churchill his job in less than four years.

The political vulnerability of the IPD was also heightened by the mounting feud between them and the Sheriff, who scarcely wanted to relinquish his law enforcement powers. The fight was only beginning. Mayor Lugar made a vain attempt to smooth relations between Churchill and Sheriff Lee Eads, when he appeared before the Safety Board and reported that police and sheriff's deputies would get equal pay and equal pensions, and that there was plenty of work for all (Indianapolis News, January 15, 1970: 37).

Now that Churchill could reiterate that crime was under control because of the take-home car program (Indianpolis News, January 26, 1970: 4), attention shifted away from discipline over Index crime reporting and investigation. Aggravated assault, robberies "and things of that nature" were in hand, and the Chief announced a new priority: narcotics. He requested assistance of consultants from Indiana University's Institute for Research in Public Safety and from the International Association of Chiefs of Police to get "the entire picture" on the new problem (Indianapolis News, March 21, 1970: 21). (Ironically, six years later, in a major review series on the growth of street crime since 1960, IPD sources were to lay the bulk of rising

crime in the 1960s on the increasing use of narcotics; see, e.g., Indianapolis News, May 25, 1976.) In this era of optimism on IPD change and expansion, the Indiana University Department of Police Administration proposed spending $64,000 to study the "needs and functions" of the IPD were it to be made countywide (Indianapolis News, March 26, 1970: 28), but the proposal apparently was not funded.

Other priorities of 1970 were traffic (Indianapolis News, Blue Streak Edition, April 26, 1970: 21), vice (Indianapolis News, April 28, 1970: 1), and walking larceny beats. Thanks to $90,000 from LEAA, all 700 patrol officers were to be equipped with walkie-talkies (Indianapolis News, May 11, 1970: 41). But the major law enforcement news continued to surround efforts at drug enforcement, as in the federal, state and local "Joint Enforcement Team," represented from the IPD by Lt. Dora Ward of the Juvenile Branch, which gave high school drug users immunity from arrest in return for cooperation in getting suppliers (Indianapolis News, November 18, 1970: 75).

Hints of scandal continued to nag Churchill. After some gambling investigation reports disappeared, allegations of mishandling of a homicide investigation into the death of a newsboy arose, and a Detective was indicted for letting a person in his custody on bad check charges escape from the County Jail, Churchill rotated some lieutenants and the heads of all the following branches: juvenile, central records, burglary and larceny, homicide and robbery, special investigations and field investigations (Indianapolis News, October 14, 1970: 1). He resisted a program without glamor, the patrol of

federal housing projects as requested by Indianapolis Housing Authority Director Carl C. Beck, by obtaining Lt. Douglas D. Lawrence's estimate that the assignment would require an additional $850,483. As the News noted with some jaundice, the estimate included patrol of a project not yet completed or occupied (Indianapolis News, December 10, 1971: 41).

Having relaxed discipline in the compilation of crime statistics, the IPD was once again "alarmed" to discover that Index crime had climbed 16 percent in 1969. Now, narcotics use and street crime suddenly became inseparable in the eyes of officials. Perhaps, too, Indianapolis was just caught up in a national trend among big cities. With crime perhaps moving from the inner city to the suburbs (note well: Vietnam veterans were later reported to have brought narcotics to the white middle class about this time; Indianapolis News, May 25, 1976: 4), patrol reallocation might be needed. Then, in addition, it was claimed that the IPD also suffered from a lack of personnel. Finally, and opening the door to widespread questioning of the impact of federal funding and new programs, Public Safety Director Alan Kimbell attributed some of the rise to "a new crime reporting process involving use of a computer," the system having been introduced on the new computer the preceding July. One final problem cited was that the work week had been reduced from 12 hours to 40, reducing the number of officers on street patrol at any given time (Indianapolis Star, January 27, 1971: 1).

The timing of the annual figures on the crime rise was inconvenient. Kimbell, Churchill and three Deputy Chiefs were just sitting down

with the Director of Indiana University's Institute for Research in Public Safety, Kent Joscelyn, to compile a "shopping list" of planned LEAA applications for a total of $1.3 million. It was announced, too, that word was pending on a $509,000 Department of Transportation grant application to "revamp" the Traffic Branch. In a reversal of a change instituted in 1964, Traffic was again to become a Division, and its head, Major George Pollard, made a Deputy Chief with a pay increase of $3,000 with 30 new radar cars at his disposal (Indianapolis Star, January 29, 1971: 29). The Traffic changes did indeed come to pass (Indianapolis Star, December 19, 1971: sec. II, pp. 1, 19).

As crime once again increased, and as resistance mounted to having the IPD service district extended to the county line, the police began to come under criticism from which they would not recover for the rest of the period of this study. A split developed between Public Safety Director Kimbell and the IPD. On the IPD side, there were complaints about a lack of personnel. Churchill wanted extra personnel to send to the Narcotics Branch. There had been 804 officers in 1968 and now there were 1184, which would prove to be a peak level. But noting the shortened work week, Deputy Chief of Operations Raymond Strattan claimed that he needed 94 more officers to patrol the streets adequately. Deputy Chief of Traffic Pollard, noting that there were only 24 motorcycles on the streets at a time, said that he needed 76 more officers. Relating lack of personnel to the rise in crime, Strattan held, "I feel that the criminals know we're short of men."

Kimbell openly disagreed. He noted that the number of officers assigned to the street, 568, had increased by only one since 1968. The problem, then, was not an overall shortage, but a misallocation of personnel. In a retreat from Chief Mueller's change in the late 1950s, 150 patrol cars now contained two officers apiece. The Investigation Division had lost personnel. Part of the problem was that federally funded community relations programs, such as "Officer Friendly" with 30 officers assigned, had drawn from traditional law enforcement resources. The biggest part of the problem, though, was the propensity of officers who managed to get assigned to Headquarters to stay there, even when civilians were hired to replace them (Indianapolis Star, March 14, 1971: sec. I, pp. 1, 10).

A week later, Kimbell went further. He asked the City-County Council to fund an efficiency study for the 1972 budget, particularly to see whether private firms could not replace many of the technical support officers to leave them free to fight crime. One example Kimbell cited, and Churchill defended as a money saving measure, was that six officers including a couple of lieutenants were assigned permanently to the Arsenal Branch. The sole responsibility of the Arsenal Branch was to repack cartridges used in police training. Kimbell further accused Deputy Chief Strattan of rehiring incompetent, retired officers to work as dispatchers. Kimbell argued that older officers should either hit the streets or retire (Indianapolis Star, March 21, 1971: sec. I, p. 19).

In addition, hints of scandal began to surface. A sergeant and patrol officer in the Vice Squad were found to be working part-time in a pawn shop owned by someone who had been indicted for commercial theft of an outboard motor. The sergeant defended himself, noting that he had made several burglary arrests while working at the pawn shop. On the other hand, he recently had headed the Central Sector detective detail assigned to check pawn shops for stolen goods. Chief Churchill defended the officers, saying that they themselves would have been indicted had they been guilty of any wrongdoing. Kimbell, seated next to Churchill at a public gathering, called this a "clear case of impropriety."

It appeared that an antagonistic Sheriff Eads had created the embarassment. The indictment had come out of a Sheriff's investigation (Indianapolis Star, March 21, 1971: sec. I, p. 1).

Further points were scored for the Sheriff's side when Elinor Ostrom and Roger Parks of Indiana University published the results of an Indianapolis police services study. They found that smaller departments enjoyed greater community support and provided services at a lower cost per capita. This implied that extension of the IPD service district would be a mistake. At best, the IPD should merely provide special services to outlying districts, but leave routine patrol to smaller departments (Indianapolis News, October 29, 1971: 37).

As the year progressed, the News joined the Star in criticizing IPD officer allocation, asserting that three of ten officers had desk jobs. Churchill responded, "There may be some room for change, but I haven't determined what it's going to be." And then he returned to

the classic fallback position: "We must be doing something right" because Index rates had declined seven percent in the first ten months of 1971 over 1970 (Indianapolis News, November 30, 1971: 1). Shortly thereafter, the Star explicitly blamed federal funding for mis-allocation of personnel, noting that five times as many officers were assigned to community relations programs as the total number assigned in Investigations to homicide, robbery and aggravated assault. The quality of work performed by five formerly retired police dispatchers was again questioned. Still, it looked as though the IPD might have won a skirmish, for it was announced that the Sheriff would take over the City Lockup on January 5, 1972 (Indianapolis Star, December 19, 1971: sec. II, pp. 1, 19). As it turned out, Sheriff Eads got angrier at the IPD and backed out of the deal (Indianapolis Star, February 27, 1972: sec. II, p. 8).

Churchill also came under fire for inflating IPD clearance figures. He had claimed a 40.7 percent clearance rate in March. In October, Kimbell reported the clearance rate to be 24 percent. It turned out that Churchill's figure was for all offenses while Kimbell's was for Index offenses, but in publishing the discrepancy the Star implied criticism of Churchill (Indianapolis Star, October 24, 1971: sec. II, p. 14).

Churchill made some effort at reallocation, reassigning 30 officers with an emphasis on fighting narcotics, pornography and numbers operations. A full-time robbery investigation team was assigned to the late shift with five more officers assigned, after Deputy Chief of Investigations Ralph Lumpkin acknowledged that a Northside

architect who had been robbed had been unable to talk to investigators the night of the attack because none were available (Indianapolis News, September 1, 1971: 1). This gesture by the Chief apparently did little to stem the criticism.

The one clear success of the IPD was the steady decline in auto thefts after 1968. Some years later, Lt. Donald Campbell of the Auto Theft Branch was to acknowledge that auto makers deserved the bulk of the credit for this decline, for steering wheel locks had been introduced in 1969 cars. This apparently was an adequate deterrent to many young joyriders (Indianapolis News, May 31, 1976: 6).

Under the Uni-Gov Law, Mayors were for the first time permitted to run for re-election. Lugar did so, and was handily re-elected. Still, police performance, which was to become commonly acknowledged as the worst feature of his two-term administration (Indianapolis News, July 15, 1976: 11), was scarcely a campaign asset. The progress the IPD had made since 1968 in becoming a modern, reactive department had proved to be a two-edged sword. Initially, the press was inclined to take its claims to professionalization and progress in the fight against crime at face value. The IPD drew further attention to itself by touting new, federally funded programs. With Uni-Gov, it appeared that the IPD might expand to take over law enforcement functions from the Sheriff. But as the Sheriff mounted opposition to the takeover, and as crime rates rose and fell on a roller coaster, skepticism of IPD claims to progress rose to politically significant proportions. By 1971, the reputation of the IPD had fallen almost to 1967 levels. The reputation was to fall much further in Lugar's second term.

MAYOR LUGAR'S SECOND TERM: 1972-1975

Crime Trends

Let those who have held that the validity of police murder/non-negligent manslaughter figures can safely be presumed take note. The IPD figures for this period (and the ensuing one, as we shall see) are patently suspect.

It can be assumed that most of the homicides in Indianapolis occur in fights among acquaintances. The rare homicide in apparent course of a felony, like rape murder or robbery murder, makes such big news that it causes a shift in investigative assignments. Recall, for example, that the head of the Homicide and Robbery Branch was changed in 1970 after the unsolved murder of a newsboy (Indianapolis News, October 14, 1970: 1). The reported annual rate, generally less than two per 10,000, also suggests that homicide is an unusually rare matter of heated interaction among acquaintances. The IPD has also recently acknowledged that there is no gang problem in Indianapolis like that of other big cities (Indianapolis Star, May 1, 1976: 6), and available juvenile arrest data, for 1974 and 1975, show only three juveniles arrested each year (of 76 and 97 total arrests). Under these circumstances, the odds of a single homicide by more than one person are very low.

Nonetheless, every year since 1972, the IPD has reported more arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter than offenses, and considerably more arrests than cases cleared. Sixty-six of the offenses were reported in 1972, 65 cleared, with 72 arrests. In 1973, 71 offenses

were reported, 66 cleared, with 91 arrests. In 1974, 73 offenses were reported, and 76 arrests. This year, more offenses were also cleared -- 74 -- than reported, and the clearance rate reported by the IPD, higher still than the ratio of 74 to 73, was 105.5%! In 1975, 95 offenses were reported, 65 clearances, and 97 arrests. At least this is the case for the initial figures. In 1976, the IPD revised the 1975 offense figure to 99 and the arrest figure to 92, which would make 1975 an aberrant year in which arrests were outnumbered by offenses.

To summarize, whatever one makes of the figures, they indicate that murder offenses and arrests jumped to an all-time high in 1975. As described in the next section, they returned to "normal" levels in 1976.

Rape offense figures climbed slowly but steadily throughout the period. Rape arrests rose in 1972, declined the following two years, and rose to the 1972 level in 1975.

There is a general pattern for the other Index offenses (including total rather than grand larceny, for the IPD provides no breakdown). Offense rates and arrests declined markedly in 1972 (except auto theft arrests, which remained steady). Offense trend started to swing upward in 1973 (non-residential burglaries down substantially, robbery and auto theft barely down, larceny up six percent, residential burglary up 17 percent carrying total burglary up 11 percent, and aggravated assault up 18 percent). Meanwhile, arrests declined even more markedly than in 1972: 47 percent for robbery, 23 percent for burglary, 22 percent for aggravated assault, 19 percent for auto theft, and four percent for larceny.

In 1974, all figures climbed except auto theft arrests (down another 12 percent). Robbery stood out, with a 73 percent increase in offense rates and a 107 percent increase in arrests! Burglary followed with a 15 percent increase in offense rates, and a 52 percent increase in arrests. Larceny offenses were up 12 percent, arrests 17 percent. Aggravated assault rates were up only three percent, arrests up eight percent. Auto theft rates were up nine percent.

Except for minor declines in arrests for auto theft (seven percent), larceny (five percent) and burglary (one percent), all the figures climbed again in 1975. Robbery again led the field, with a 32 percent increase in offense rates and an 18 percent increase in arrests. Larceny was up 29 percent, aggravated assault 26 percent (arrests up eight percent), burglary up 16 percent, and auto theft up just four percent. Juvenile arrests led all trends for this year, both up and down.

In sum, for these offenses, the big jump in offenses and arrests came in 1974 and began to level off in 1975, with robbery the stellar performer in increases both years.

The Politics of Governmental Response

The murder/non-negligent manslaughter figures for this period present a fascinating study in the politics of crime reporting. To come out as they did, arrest and clearance figures must have been compiled by different sources using different standards.

Here is an explanation from an April 18, 1980 conversation with persons in the Planning and Inspection Branch:

1. It does happen that accomplices to murder -- e.g., a friend who encourages another to shoot someone in a bar -- get arrested, making it

possible to have more persons arrested than clearances or offenses reported.

2. Sometimes, as when there proves to be insufficient evidence for prosecution, an arrest may remain on the books while a clearance is eliminated, making arrests outnumber clearances more so than the phenomenon of multiple offenders in single cases alone.

3. Sometimes, as when there proves to be insufficient evidence to prosecute, perhaps because a homicide is deemed justifiable, a clearance "by exceptional means" may be recorded even though the offense report is unfounded, contributing to clearances outnumbering offenses.

4. Clearances of offenses reported the preceding year are not carried back, making it possible to have more clearances than offenses reported in any given year.

This shows that all things are possible. For example, the clearance rate in 1974 could have been as high as it was because: (a) some cases reported in 1974 and then unfounded were cleared by exceptional means, making the number of clearances that year (74) higher than the number of offenses reported (73) while (b) there were other clearances in 1974 of offenses reported in preceding years which were not included in the 74 clearances figures, but were added to the 74 figure merely for purposes of raising the total ratio of clearances to the 73 offenses reported in 1974 to 105.5 percent. To accomplish this feat, the total number of clearances would have had to have been 78.

Without major detective work going through incident reports and matching them to the figures given, it is impossible to pin down exactly what happened. But there is enough circumstantial evidence to point at least to the political forces that helped to shape the figures.

1. A murder arrest redounds to the considerable credit of the arresting officer. High arrest figures also redound to the credit of the police administration. Hence, all incentives in the IPD pointed in the direction of allowing arrests to remain on the books regardless of whether evidence proves sufficient to proceed with prosecution.

2. As we have seen, clearance rates had become a bone of contention in Indianapolis. It was in the interest of the police administration to keep clearances high, and in the case of murder/non-negligent manslaughter this translated into pressure on the Homicide and Robbery Branch to maximize clearances. For example, they were led to tout a high robbery clearance rate for the period December 26, 1971 to January 22, 1972 (Indianapolis News, February 11, 1972: 31). Here, too, incentives in the IPD pointed to allowing clearances to remain on the books regardless of sufficiency of evidence to prosecute.

3. Recall Lugar had commented on a failure of rapport between the police and the courts as early as 1968 (Indianapolis News, December 10, 1968: 25). The Prosecutor's Office was under pressure because of inordinate felony case backlogs in Municipal Court. Hence, they were increasingly inclined to throw out cases brought to court by the IPD. In early 1973, Chief Trial Deputy Laroy K. New introduced a reform that both initially (Indianapolis Star, January 23, 1973: 21) and subsequently (Indianapolis Star, September 4, 1973: 1) upset the police. The afternoon or morning after a felony arrest, defendants would be taken directly to the Criminal (felony) Court for arraignment. Commissioner Ralph N. May either set a trial date, set the defendant free while giving the IPD "reasonable time" to build a case, or dismissed the charges outright. Homicide and sex crime

cases were excepted from the new procedure, but the mood of the Prosecutor suggeststhat homicide cases may well have begun to be dismissed with regularity, too.

4. The Planning and Research Branch was given the rssponsibility of compiling offenses known figures in so rigorous a way as to keep reported crime rates down. The Planning and Research Branch had been compiling daily crime reports since 1969 (Indianapolis Star, April, 5, 1969: 25). They now acknowledge that reports are sometimes unfounded when there is a failure to prosecute, perhaps because a homicide is determined to have been justifiable. Incidentally, this practice has manifest legitimacy in England, where the Home Office has reported "unfounding"14 percent of murder reports because of failures to convict suspects of that offense (Gibson and Klein, 1961).

Hence, arresting officers are prone to inflate arrest figures, which departmental statisticians have no mandate to correct; detectives are prone to inflate clearance figures, which statisticians also have no mandate to correct; and statisticians deflate the incidence of offenses resting on the authority of prosecutorial decisions.

During Hudnut's first term, the press began to catch on to the games the IPD played with crime statistics, as we shall see in the next section of this profile. During Lugar's second term, the only question raised was of the IPD's 1973 claim to having only 1.7 officers per thousand inhabitants. This figure was based on the total population, 741,000, of Indianapolis, although the IPD patrolled only 90 square miles of Indianapolis with a population in 1970 of 490,442 (Indianapolis News, April 13, 1973: 5). Although murder/non-negligent manslaughter discrepancies were blatant,

no one paid much attention to these particular figures, probably because the murder/non-negligent manalaughter rate in Indianapolis was relatively low to begin with. Concern was focused more on burglary and robbery.

On the other hand, as these figures indicate, murder/non-negligent manslaughter is a particularly apt place to study the politics of crime counting precisely because the figures are relatively small, and the clearance rate unusually high. It is here that discrepancies most readily become apparent.

In matters of counting crime, the IPD had gotten themselves trapped into a major bind of modern policing. As reported earlier for Lugar's first term, Chief Churchill had actually felt impelled to buy into the hope that the police could eliminate crime. This was a reflection of the national mood that led to passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and was followed by a massive infusion of federal funding into local policing. The transition to massive federal funding was so rapid that no one had a chance to work out the kind of independen accounting methods that had been developed for private enterprise in in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929. The police were thrust into an enormous conflict of interest: to hold themselves accountable to figures they themselves produced. On the one hand, they were pressed to shape these figures to make themselves look good. On the other hand, their success in this effort depended on the belief that their figures were sacred indicators of the "true" state of the crime problem. This kind of situation is bound to produce cognitive dissonance among the police. Like any workers, the police badly want to believe that they are doing a good job (Pepinsky, 1975). They can scarcely acknowledge even to

themselves that their crime figures are manipulated for political purposes.

This was reflected in the response of one of the officers during the April 18, 1980, conversation with Planning and Inspection. This young officer had noticed the oddity of the murder/non-negligent manslaughter figures himself: "I thought the figures were strange, too, until my sergeant explained them to me." He seemed to be reassuring himself as he struggled to reassure his interviewer. Once the figures had been explained, he could cease worrying over whether they were valid indicators of the crime problem. This left him free to interpret offense trends as though they were pure reflections of citizen behavior, in the manner of Chief Churchill's attributing the drop in crime in 1969 to the institution of the take-home car program (Indianapolis Star, October 7, 1969: 7).

This same resolution of cognitive dissonance also leaves the police vulnerable to an outside audience. Were they able to remain self-critical, they might readjust figures to eliminate obvious discrepancies. As it is, obvious discrepancies remain for outsiders to criticize.

Although IPD crime figures in particular were not subjected to public criticism before 1975, the general propensity of the IPD to oversell its capabilities got itself into considerable political difficulty during this period. The run of events was strikingly similar to that described by Lemert (1972) under the heading, "Paranoia and the dynamics of exclusion." The press had bought the idea that the IPD could make dramatic gains in controlling crime. After crime rates had again risen in 1970, press skepticism of IPD capabilities had passed a point of no return. The more

the press criticized the IPD, the more secretive and protective about its activities the IPD became in response. The more secretive and protective the IPD became, the more suspect they appeared to the press.

At the outset of his second term,Mayor Lugar tried to give the IPD a respite by replacing the openly critical Alan Kimbell with a new Director of Public Safety, William Leak. Noting the new appointment in passing, the News opened the year with a new barrage of criticism against allocation of $975,926 in federal funds, from 1969-71, to pay for performance of community relations rather than patrol functions (Indianapolis News, January 20, 1972: 1). The Star picked up the theme several weeks later, and ran a weeklong, front page series on the bureaucratic inefficiency and political machinations of the IPD (Indianapolis Star, Febuuary 9-16, 1972: 1). In the February 14 story, the Star even questioned the expense of Churchill's most vaunted program, take-home cars. The following day, the Star published acknowledgements by Lugar and Churchill that the Star's series might have pointed to some serious problems, accompanied by a notation that Sheriff Eads was mad at the IPD and wanted to minimize interaction. At the same time, the Star confessed that some high ranking IPD officers were disgruntled at its "meddling."

The situation grew worse instead of better. The IPD and the Sheriff made a vain attempt at a liaison, Deputy Chief of Investigations Ralph Lumpkin for the IPD and Lt. Col. Billie G. Romeril for the Sheriff, as it became known that the two agencies were investigating each other's activities (Indianapolis Star, June 15, 1973: 45). Press relations worsened when News reporter-photographer Phillip Allen was struck and

carted off to jail for failing to desist in taking pictures of an IPD arrest at a rock concert. The reporter was released from jail by Deputy Mayor John Wells and driven back to the Convention Center, site of the arrest, by Public Safety Director Leak, who commented merely that reporters should have more readily visible identification (Indianapolis News, July 13, 1972: 1; Indianapolis Star, July 13, 1972: 1). The police got more bad publicity when an officer who "reportedly" was trying to shoot a vicious dog with a shotgun killed a 13-year-old girl instead, and the IPD simply ruled the death "accidental" (Indianapolis Star, July 15, 1972: 5).

Churchill had become determined not to admit departmental wrongdoing in the face of outside attack. When a patrol officer was indicted by a federal grand jury for brutality in the apprehension of an 18-year-old for burglary, the Chief refused to suspend him because there was no evidence of violation of departmental regulations, and because of a presumption of innocence until guilt had been proven at trial (Indianapolis News, January 26, 1973: 5). When another 20-year-old went with his lawyer and a witness, a woman companion in his car, to allege that the police had beaten him and set a police dog loose on him, the Chief refused to take action, citing "too many discrepancies" in the complaint. The only discrepancy he described in his statement to the press was that there was no evidence of a pistol having been drawn, let alone of a pistol whipping, even though no allegations of a pistol-whipping had appeared in any prior allegations of the complainant. The press was openly skeptical, but was not permitted to ask questions. The Chief had had his public relations officer hand out his three-page statement with a note

attached, asking the press to accept the statement and announcing that the Chief would not be available for interview (Indianapolis Star, February 3, 1973: 1, 8).

The former Public Safety Director, Alan Kimbell, had not been silenced either. He had been elected to the City-County Council, and now headed a study commission to explore ways to coordinate the funding and activities of the IPD and the Sheriff (Indianapolis Star, March 18, 1973: sec. II, pp. 3, 7).

Churchill reluctantly made a gesture in the direction of officer reallocation. At first, he had it announced that reallocation would be delayed until after the Memorial Day Indianapolis 500 (Indianapolis Star, July 13, 1973: 19). Then, announcing a minor shift of assignments among officers already on patrol, he tried to save face by attributing the shift not to outside criticism, but to his own alarm and anger over a 14.5 percent increase in Index crime in May 1973 vs. May 1972 -- to his own determination to "get tough." He also ordered narcotics officers to raise robbery, larceny and burglary clearances (Indianapolis Star, June 14, 1973: 1).

As the isolation of the IPD progressed, Captain William Owens of the Narcotics Branch got into an open debate with Judge Harold Fields of the Juvenile Court. Owens accused the court of too much leniency on drug defendants, and Fields responded that his court was plagued with unprepared cases brought by IPD officers (as by failing to obtain lab tests, not getting witnesses to the court, and in general showing insufficient evidence in their reports; Indianapolis Star, June 28, 1973: 1). As to adult courts, Deputy Chief of Operations George Pollard ordered his officers not to accept plea bargains without his consent after losing a plea bargaining case (Indianapolis News, August 3, 1973: 2).

The IPD recieved a temporary morale boost in the summer of 1973 when it received an $868,000 grant from the Criminal Justice Planning Agency for a "Crime Impact Program." Captain John J. Kestler, a graduate of the F.B.I. Academy, was named to head the Program, which was to go into operation in several months. He was to be assigned a sergeant with a college degree. The Program was aimed at commercial burglaries. The grant would pay for two small helicopters and ten cars "equipped with sophisticated equipment." It would also pay to equip select businesses in high burglary areas with alarms that included rooftop lights for the helicopters to spot (Indianapolis Star, June 28, 1973: 1). Glamorous as the program was, it was not to bring the IPD any subsequent favorable publicity.

Instead, embarrassments of the IPD continued to dominate the news. Narcotics officers paid con-men $8,000 for a bag of nothing and got away (Indianapolis News, July 27, 1973: 1). Soon thereafter, the News ran a headline: "Police Have Problems in 'Dog' Days." The loss of the money, rising crime, Sheriff Eads's request for a higher budget because he, too, had rising crime with a larger area to patrol than the IPD, IPD's dismissal of a woman's rape complaint during which she pointed out a house in which a 15-year-old girl was soon thereafter found raped and murdered, and a drop in drunk driving arrests were all cited in the article. With tongue in cheek, the News connected the problems of the IPD locally to the problems of Nixon and Agnew nationally (Indianapolis News, August 17, 1973: 2).

Chief Churchill expressed concern over press leaks in a high-level IPD meeting, but even this leaked out and was reported iconoclastically

(Indianapolis Star, August 12, 1973: sec. II, p. 10).

The Sheriff and the IPD continued to try to humiliate each other. The IPD sent Sheriff's Deputies to take a larceny report at the Indiana National Bank Tower in the IPD service district on the pretext that the complainant was a bank guard and bank guards were deputized by the Sheriff (Indianapolis Star, October 28, 1973: sec. III, p. 6). The Sheriff retaliated by sending investigators to Mary Martin's brothel in the IPD service district and getting Prosecutor Noble Pearcy to open a grand jury inquiry into possible IPD misconduct there (Indianapolis News, December 12, 1973: 1). Rather than returning indictments, the grand jury concluded its investigation with a report recommending consolidation of the IPD and the Sheriff's Department, including a recommendation -- to which Sheriff Eads paid lip service but with which he never complied -- that he take over all jail responsibilities (Indianapolis News, December 13, 1973: 41; Indianapolis Star, December 19, 1973: 1, 10). Soon thereafter, Churchill tried to reassert the IPD's superiority by announcing that by the end of 1974, terminals linked to his computer would link the operations of the Airport Police, the Sheriff, and the Lawrence, Speedway and Beech Grove Police Departments. The Municipal Court was to have a terminal for other records, notably those of traffic arrests (Indianapolis News, December 29, 1973: 1).

The year 1974 proved disastrous both for the IPD and for Prosecutor Pearcy, who opened the year a runaway favorite for re-election against Democrat James Kelley (Indianapolis Star, February 10, 1974: sec. II, p. 4). On February 24, 1974, the Star began an investigative report on IPD corruption that was to continue on its front page practically every

day until the beginning of July, and sporadically thereafter through September. Three reporters, Richard E. Cady, William E. Anderson and Harley R. Brice, had begun the investigation the preceding summer, aided by information from as many as 45 disgruntled IPD officers. If morale was low, charged the Star, it was largely because honest IPD officers knew that corruption was rampant, and that neither the Chief nor the Prosecutor could be trusted to do anything about it. Payoffs, case fixing and shakedowns were said to be a routine part of vice enforcement, and allegations extended to the skimming of police charity funds and to association with known burglars and a fence.

Within a month of the onset of the Star series, Lugar fired Churchill as Chief and Leak as Public Safety Director. Lugar's new appointment as Chief was Kenneth Hale, a former federal law enforcement officer and currently head of a local criminal justice program. The appointment of an outside Chief with at least five years' law enforcement experience plus prior administrative responsibilities had been newly allowed by the Uni-Gov Law. To Lugar's further embarrassment, he overlooked another Uni-Gov innovation, that the Chief must be appointed by the Public Safety Director. Since Leak had been fired, there was no Public Safety Director. Leak refused to sign a pre-dated letter of appointment. Outraged at the lack of confidence the outside appointment reflected on the IPD, FOP counsel John C. Ruckelshaus threatened to file suit to void the appointment of Hale. In a flurry of activity, Hale was sworn in as Chief on the morning of March 15, following which Lugar appointed Deputy Director of Public Safety David A. Russell Acting Director, who in turn appointed Hale Chief, which was followed by a second swearing-in ceremony the afternoon of March 15 (Indianapolis Star, March 15, 1974: 1, 17, and March 17, 1974: 1).

The Star series put the Prosecutor in a bind. Recall that he had been embarrassed to discover the futility of prosecuting IPD officers for accepting bribes in 1964-65. Furthermore, the IPD informants distrusted Pearcy so that they refused to provide evidence to a grand jury, and the Star reporters refused to divulge their sources to the grand jury. In exasperation, Pearcy had his grand jury return indictments at the beginning of September, not merely against three officers (one retired), but against two of the reporters, for conspiring to bribe a police officer. The Star, the Indianapolis Bar, the journalistic world, and even the federal government were outraged over Pearcy's interference with freedom of the press and the indictments were eventually dismissed (Indianapolis Star, September 5-18, 12-13, 26 and 28, 1974: 1). In the furor, Pearcy lost the November election to Kelley by a two-to-one margin (Indianapolis Star, November 6, 1974: 1).

Prosecutor Kelley was to rediscover the futility of pursuing police corruption that Pearcy had experienced a decade earlier. After some fruitless attempts to get corruption investigations underway his first year in office (e.g., Indianapolis Star, May 10, 1975: 1), and setting up a "Strike Force" the following year (Indianapolis Star, March 17, 1976: 1), he finally obtained bribery indictments against two IPD officers (Indianapolis News, July 26, 1976: 1), but was never able to obtain convictions. Instead, he and his office were subject to IPD and FOP charges of their own possible corruption (e.g., Indianapolis Star, August 14, 1976: 1; Indianapolis News, February 4, 1977: 1), and Kelley was deterred from even running for re-election.

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The new Chief tried mightily to improve the image of the IPD. He promptly obtained major grants from the Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Commission, including $123,300 for continuation of Youth Services Bureau (Indianapolis Star, April 28, 1974: sec. II, p. 5). He set up a new liaison with the Sheriff and reported "extraordinary progress" in solving problems between the two departments (Indianapolis News, May 8, 1974: 1). He thoroughly reorganized the administrative structure of the IPD: (a) once again downgrading Traffic to a Branch in the Operations Division, (b) creating a Service Division to include communications, management of the property room, identification and records and data processing, (c) establishing a Quality Control Branch to report directly to him, (d) moving the Vice Squad from Investigations to Operations, (e) eliminating "penalty posts" which previously had included the City Lockup, and (f) adopting the evaluation system designed by the Ohio State Patrol (Indianapolis News, June 8, 1974: 19). He put 30 of 44 recruits on the streets, and increased the number of officers on the streets in all to 672 (Indianapolis News, July 2, 1974: 41). When a Major in charge of the Finance Branch was indicted for alleged theft of $5,900 in police auction receipts, Hale promptly removed him from Finance and demoted him to the rank of Patrolman (although this officer was returned to the Finance Branch within a year; Indianapolis News, May 16, 1975: 3). He had the Mayor order that officers who lived outside the City could no longer take home squad cars. For this, and for allegations that he picked on patrol officers instead of corrupt superiors, he was rewarded by a work slowdown in arrests (Indianapolis Star, July 31, 1974: 1; Indianapolis News, August 3, 1974: 1). And throughout the first half of the year,

reported Chief Municipal Court Prosecutor Hymen Cohen, hundreds of charges were dismissed because IPD officers failed to appear (Indianapolis News, August 21, 1974: 1).

In one shrewd move, Hale put Winston Churchill, now a Major, in charge of "Operation Crunch," redeploying 55 officers into high crime areas to make arrests in what Churchill called "the biggest single assault by the Indianapolis police" against "robberies, beatings, muggings and other crimes against persons" (Indianapolis News, September 26, 1974: 29). The results of this effort were reflected in the dramatic increases in offenses reported and arrests made for Index crimes, in 1974 more so than in 1975, and in robbery particularly. When turned loose to vent their frustrations on citizen suspects, IPD officers were capable of responding with a vengeance. One outcome of this burst of energy was the shooting of fleeing felons, never prohibited by IPD regulations, as in the killing of an unarmed burglary suspect just after "OperationCrunch" began (Indianapolis News, November 28, 1974: 1).

Still, Chief Hale had a way of alienating officers by the kind of decisive action he took. This included the humiliation of a couple of Churchill's former Deputy Chiefs and some Branch heads. Among them, four majors, three captains and three lieutenants, accompanied by just one sergeant and one patrol officer, were assigned to work for Indianapolis Housing Authority Director Carl Beck, to patrol federal housing projects. When Hale discovered that these persons were sitting in offices from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, he ordered them into cars to ride through the projects and take their own reports, in five teams

covering two projects apiece, one half of each team working the previous 10-6 hours, the other working 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. (Indianapolis News, January 17, 1975: 13).

Despite Hale's efforts at reform, press criticism of him and the IPD continued through 1975. It was noted that a citizens' committee member had resigned when told that he could not nominate any officers for IPD awards except those on an approved list, which notably excluded "corruption fighters" James Brewer and Joseph Grissom (Indianapolis Star, February 9, 1975: sec. II, p. 8). Brewer had testified that he had seen a police Major take money from a gambler in the City Lockup. Hale had suspended Brewer for insubordination, and then rescinded the suspension. Brewer sued the City, and on the week of June 16 settled the suit for $3,100. Following the settlement, News reporters went to talk the matter over with the Mayor, who kicked his office door shut on them (Indianapolis News, June 20, 1975: 4). It also made the news that officers had initially told a rape complainant that she was lying, following which a detective had visited her in the hospital, apologized, and taken a report. She told reporters that her attacker had continued to bother her by calling and visiting, that when she called for help no officer came, that she had moved, gotten an unlisted number that the attacker had discovered, and that she sat up nights holding a shotgun to protect her daughter. She had complained of lack of IPD protection to the Lieutenant in charge of the "Truth Squad," who had promised to investigate the matter but had not taken action (Indianapolis Star, March 25, 1975: 1, 6). The State was moved to intervene to help take the politics out of promotions, as Lugar and Hale attended Governor

Bowen's signing of Senate Bill 439 mandating that at least half the total score of candidates for promotion to sergeant and lieutenant would be taken from the written examination. The law also established standards for officer discipline (Indianapolis Star, April 3, 1975: 7, and May 6, 1975: 12). Maintenance of IPD intelligence files was criticized, and Lugar was held responsible (Indianapolis News, June 2, 1975: 7). After Prosecutor Kelley, with whom the IPD obviously had bad relations, declined to prosecute in a case in which an off-duty IPD officer had made an arrest outside the IPD service district, Lugar, Hale and Sheriff Broderick signed an agreement giving IPD officers special but limited deputy powers (Indianapolis Star, June 19, 1975: 20). Another fleeing burglary suspect carrying two t.v. sets from a store, was shot and critically wounded by four shotgun blasts and a .38 round (Indianapolis Star, September 9, 1975: 1, 6). A low robbery clearance rate was criticized, and robbery detectives blamed the Chief for non-crime fighting priorities. Narcotics detectives complained that pressure to go after "Mr. Big" forced them to leave the street junkie free to "beat, rob and rape citizens" (Indianapolis News, December 26, 1975: 1). Officers' cynical remarks about the personal qualities of high ranking superiors made the news (Indianapolis Star, October 26, 1975: sec. II, p. 12). A staff meeting of Hale's also received publicity, for discussion of how to keep the press out of the IPD. One Deputy Chief was said to have proposed a 30-day news blackout (Indianapolis News, November 7, 1975: 5).

Republican William Hudnut was elected Mayor in November (while Richard Lugar was elected U.S. Senator). As a candidate, Hudnut quoted a highly placed IPD source: "Corruption is not the issue; inefficiency is."

Hudnut supported maintenance of the controversial departmental rule permitting fleeing felons to be shot. He wanted the IPD increased by 60 from 1084 (although this was not to be), more officers on the street, and better community relations. Most importantly, he traced the IPD morale problem to their having an outside Chief, and announced his inclination to promote a new Chief from within IPD ranks (Indianapolis News, August 1, 1975: 21). After the election, he tried to use the opportunity for a fresh start to improve his office's relations with the IPD. He offered to turn all his investigative data over to the Mayor-Elect, to help ensure that new appointments at high levels would not prove embarrassing (Indianapolis News, November 21, 1975: 35). He began having bi-weekly meetings with the outgoing Chief to air grievances directly and privately rather than to the press, although the Star still noted the IPD charge that the Prosecutor failed to proceed with cases where conviction was likely and Kelley's countercharge that IPD officers prepared cases poorly (Indianapolis Star, December 10, 1975: 21).

And so Lugar's Mayoralty ended with hope for improvement in a generally dismal image of the IPD and of its coordination with the Prosecutor and courts. The bad press was not due to the liberality of City newspapers. For example, during this period, the Star carried the "Crime Alert" IPD phone number on its front page daily. One senses instead a frustration in the press over the incapacity of the IPD to get tough on crime. It would probably not have led to unfavorable reaction if IPD officers had killed even more fleeing felons. Rather, unfavorable reaction was centered on how incapable the IPD was of fulfilling a "law and order" function. It is ironic that in the politics of governmental

response during this period in Indianapolis, the most vocal criticism came from ardent defenders of a conventional police function in the community.

MAYOR HUDNUT: 1976-78

Crime Trends

The strange case of murder/non-negligent manslaughter continued during the final period of this study. In 1976, 67 offenses were reported, 62 clearances and 77 arrests. In 1977, 81 offenses were reported, 63 clearances and 82 arrests (revised to 83 in 1978 reports). In 1978, 76 offenses were reported, 65 clearances, and 95 arrests.

Rape reports remained essentially steady from 1975 through 1978, while rape arrests declined 36 percent in 1976, rose 18 percent in 1977, and dropped three percent in 1978.

Another unusual pattern was shown in aggravated assault. On the one hand, reports climbed 22 percent in 1976, fell 10 percent in 1977, and increased by 11 percent (almost back to 1976 levels) in 1978. On the other hand, arrests in 1976 increased by five percent (to 416), and then fell drastically: 26 percent in 1977 and 69 percent (to 93) in 1978.

Of the remaining Index Offenses, only total larceny figures increased at all during the period in 1977, arrests by four or five percent, and in 1978, both offenses by three percent and arrests by 27 percent. The biggest declines for this period, both for arrests and offenses, were for robbery and burglary. In the three years respectively, robbery offenses fell by 23 percent, nine percent and eight percent, arrests by 10 percent, 12 percent and 13 percent. For burglaries, offenses fell 15 percent, 16 percent and one percent; arrests fell 15 percent, four percent and six percent. Larceny offenses were down a percent in 1976 and 12 percent in 1977, while larceny arrests were initially reported down by

11 percent in 1976, and then dropped further when, in 1977, the arrest figure was dropped from 2312 to 2282. Auto theft showed small declines throughout the period: offenses by three percent, six percent and two percent, arrests by eight percent, three percent and five percent. Again, juvenile arrests generally led the total trends in all categories.

The Politics of Governmental Response

Mayor Hudnut sought to improve the IPD image by bringing previously unknown figures to high ranks: Dr. Murrill Lowry to Director of Public Safety, Eugene Gallagher (whose name had only once before appeared in the press, as a Lieutenant announcing plans for the new computer in 1969; Indianapolis Star, March 16, 1969: sec. II, p. 1) to Chief, and J(oseph) Glen McAtee to Deputy Chief of Operations (Indianapolis Star, January 2, 1976: 1, 6). Jack Cottey was made Deputy Chief of Investigations (Indianapolis Star, February 3, 1976: 17).

The extremely bad weather gave the IPD and the Sheriff a respite -- a honeymoon period for IPD reorganization -- as few calls for service were received (Indianapolis Star, January 26, 1976: 21).

A series of organizational changes were announced during the first few months of the new administration. Morale and rising crime were cited as the biggest reasons for change. To improve morale, Gallagher made work on the fourth or Tactical Shift -- 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. -- voluntary instead of having all patrol officers rotate it after having finished a rotation of 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. (Indianapolis Star, January 2, 1976: 1,6). Deputy Chief put detectives from robbery and burglary into the Narcotics Branch to facilitate coordination of investigative activity, claiming that several arrests and recovery of stolen property

the first week of the change showed it was "beginning to pay off" (Indianapolis Star, February 3, 1976: 17). Cottey also blamed the public for increases in theft, noting that residents' failure to follow a business lead in protecting property (installing alarms, putting receipts into night depositories) had led burglars to shift from commercial to residential theft, and that consumer fads -- for stereos in 1965, for wide-tread belted tires in 1968, for eight-track cartridge tape decks in 1970, for ten-speed bikes in 1973, and now for CB radios -- had created opportunity for thieves (Indianapolis News, May 18, 1976: 1).

In other changes, a Concerned Neighbors Crime Watch Program was established -- a News "Major Public Service Project" -- and reserve police officers were more heavily utilized in patrol (Indianapolis News, June 1, 1976: 5). The greatest innovation in the IPD was set in motion by Chief Gallagher on March 18, 1976. Four of 16 high-level reassignments were made in anticipation of instituting an experimental team policing program. Lt. George Derrickson was transferred from direction of the "Crime Impact Program" to plan for the new program in anticipation of heading it (Indianapolis Star, March 19, 1976: 37).

The project was begun on June 20, as part of the Concerned Neighborhood Crime Watch Program. The Team was responsible for Adam Sector, a V-shaped sector on the North Side extending from twenty blocks north of the center to the IPD service district boundary, with a mixed population of 93,000. The unit initially consisted of 45 patrol officers, seven sergeants, ten detectives, one other lieutenant, and two secretaries, organized into five shifts. All the patrol officers were volunteers. Lt. Derrickson reported directly to Deputy Chief McAtee. The key element of this innovation is that for the first time in IPD history, detectives

and patrol officers were placed under unified command (Indianapolis News, June 17, 1976: 1).

Beginning in November, news stories began appearing every month or so touting the success of the program. In Adam Sector in October 1976, Index crime was down 28 percent over the preceding year (Indianapolis News, November 18, 1976: 1). It was down 22 percent over the first eleven months of 1976 (December 8, 1976: 1). Index crime declined every month over the preceding year there from July 1976 through January 1977 (Indianapolis News, February 16, 1977: 53).

By the end of February, plans were announced to extend team policing to two other sectors in two months (Indianapolis News, February 22, 1977: 1). Then, following shortly on the news that Index crime was down 21 percent in Adam Sector for the period July 1, 1976, through March 31, 1977, and that the clearance rate was 32 percent, double that of the other sectors (Indianapolis News, April 14, 1977: 27); Mayor Hudnut proclaimed that team policing would be extended to all eight IPD sectors and the tactical force, totalling 60 percent of IPD officers, on May 15, 1977 (Indianapolis News, April 29, 1977: 1).

So far, so good. Apart from loud complaints from the gay community over IPD harrassment, with Gay People's Union Ombudsman Mike Sedberry unable to see Gallagher (Indianapolis Star, August 1, 1976: sec. IV, p. 3) and failure to solve a series of gay murders (Indianapolis News, November 9, 1976: 1, 16), the IPD came through 1976 with a picture of success. Mayor Hudnut met with IPD rank-and-file officers and proclaimed that morale was high (Indianapolis News, July 15, 1977: 11). Crime was down all over the City, and Hudnut attributed the decrease not

only to declining unemployment, but to better law enforcement and to widespread participation in the Concerned Neighbors Crime Watch Program, although Lorna Spearman, Crime Watch Coordinator, announced that the Program was not to be fully launched -- with block meetings in Adam Sector -- until the fall (Indianapolis News, September 13, 1976: 13). Hudnut and Gallagher made further strides by holding daylong "gap raps" with IPD officers and selected, volunteer high school students at the training academy (Indianapolis News, November 22, 1976: 31).

However, as the year closed, the Star offered the first sign that the IPD would soon fall from grace. For the first time, the Star began to question IPD crime statistics. It noted that total Ineex crime reported to the F.B.I. had actually icnreased by 11 percent in the first 11 months of the year (from 44,003 to 45,492), but that IPD's report of a 5.9 percent decline had been based on subsequent unfounding of offense reports. The unfounding rate had been 5.4 percent in 1971. By 1975, it had climbed to 12.9 percent. In the first 11 months of 1976, the unfounding had risen further, to 19.8 percent. Gallagher admitted that reports had been reclassified, leaving the offenses at the Index level marked "unfounded," and attributed the change to the analysis of an employee hired in October 1975, who was "doing a more thorough job." The major portion of the unfounding occurred with reports initially labeled "burglary-unknown." Previously, these had been reclassified haphazardly either as "burglary-day" or "burglary-night," which Gallagher noted was an important but misleading factor in "evaluating special programs." That is, if officers did not report whether burglaries had occurred during the day or at night, they were not counted as burglaries

at all. Gallagher also claimed that the computer programming made it "easier" just to subtract out ambiguous reports and to report the net figures alone (Indianapolis Star, December 17, 1976: 1, 15).

Except for the few months of continued success of team policing, and a sharp (35 percent) decline in crime in the first three weeks of January due to even worse weather than in 1976 (Indianapolis Star, January 23, 1977: sec. IV, p. 6), both the reputation and the morale of the IPD declined in 1977.

Prosecutor Kelley asked Hudnut to intercede in his "war" with the IPD. The Chief had written an open letter to Kelley charging him with being "soft on criminals and hard on police." Kelley countered that he had been eminently fair to police on the issue of corruption, having investigated and closed more than 100 cases without any indictments. Furthermore, as to being soft on criminals, Kelley charged that of the merely 14.9 percent of reported robberies and burglaries resulting in arrest, only 4.9 percent were cccompanied by sufficient evidence to warrant filing charges. In turn, Hudnut accused Kelley of demoralizing the police, although he promised to try to heal the rift (Indianapolis Star, ebruary 3, 1977: 1, 20). Kelley then refused an FOP demand that he get a special prosecutor to investigate not only police corruption but also prosecutorial misconduct, and cited as a success his figures showing that his conviction rate for felonies had increased from 66 percent when he entered office to 85 percent (Indianapolis Star, February 5, 1976: 1, 6).

For the IPD, Deputy Chief McAtee disclaimed responsibility for crime control. "Additional police won't stop crime." Instead, citizens

have to "get involved" (Indianapolis News, March 2, 1976: 1, 14). A half year later, the Chief picked up the theme about the fruitlessness of having more police fight crime. Although the number of police on the street would not be reduced, deteriorating economic conditions and a failure to increase federal revenue sharing might require police layoffs from a force now down to 1069. This came after a vain protest by officers of the City-County Council's salary offer for the coming year. Officers had left their patrol cars abandoned on the streets, and the Council simply retaliated by eliminating the take-home car program entirely (Indianapolis News, November 16, 1977: 24). Other than the extension of team policing, the only significant innovation in IPD operations in 1977 -- to get police "involved" with citizens -- was to give all patrol officers walkie-talkies (Indianapolis Star, December 15, 1979: 79).

A blizzard in February 1978 (Indianapolis Star, Febraary 5, 1978: Sec VA, p. 1) helped to reduce burglary rates, which were down 20.6 percent that month and 17.9 percent overall for January and February combined (Indianapolis Star, February 12, 1978: sec. III, p. 4). Otherwise, the blizzard was a bad omen. The police received little press coverage in 1978, most of it unfavorable.

First, the police were criticized for hanging onto gun registration records even though they were required by State law to destroy them (Indianapolis Star, July 12, 1978: 11, and July 16, 1978: sec. V, p. 5).

Then, despite Gallagher's continued claims that the 14-month-old experiment in team policing was a success, officers reported it a failure. They noted that the crime rate had not changed dramatically, and that the

reorganization had caused a breakdown in communications, both within sectors and citywide, due primarily to the elimination of roll calls. The system also promoted buckpassing on who was responsible for reporting and investigating crime across sectors. For his part, Gallagher acknowledged a decline in police morale, but attributed it to a recent disciplinary crackdown and to the loneliness and boredom of beat patrol (Indianapolis Star, July 23, 1978: sec. III, pp. 1, 2). Unrelenting in its attack, the same day as its critique of team policing, the Star exposed another feature of IPD crime reporting. The report began:

> City police may be in for a bit of a surprise later this year when their annual game of "make the statistics look good" begins with teens admitting to hundreds of crimes at a time in order to boost the crimes-solved rate.

The "surprise" was due from the Prosecutor, who was convinced that the police exchanged confessions for promises of light sentences, for example in the case of one youth who, the preceding week, had admitted to committing 30 crimes, followed by detectives' claim that his gang was responsible for at least 250 crimes on the Near Northside. Kelley promised to look closely at such cases in deciding on sentence recommendations, and suggested that youths be given lie detector tests of their confessions. Lt. Derrickson, still heading the team policing program, responded that the tests would be illegal, at which Kelley expressed surprise, asserting that the tests had been regularly administered in the past (Indianapolis Star, July 23, 1978: sec. V, p. 5).

As in the past when under attack, the IPD reverted to tradition, announcing a vice crackdown in City parks on "panhandlers, pushers, drunks, homosexuals and drug users" (Indianapolis News, August 8, 1978: 1).

The Star carried on its attack. It reported that IPD morale was as low as ever because of (a) weak leadership, (b) failure to do anything about the problems of team policing, and (c) the "limbo status" of police promotions, although some "upper brass" had recently gotten title changes "that look like promotions but have nothing to do with merit" (Indianapolis Star, October 1, 1978: 5). And in a parting shot for the year, the Star staff reported:

> When we last left the weekly thriller "Police Statistics," a couple of patrolmen told stories of how crime that really happened never made their way into the log book.

The rest of the story was connected to a 1978 innovation earlier announced by Gallagher -- of taking "unattended house" reports to protect vacationers (Indianapolis News, April 5, 1978: 54). It seemed that some vacationers had returned to find $4,000 missing from their house. In what the Star staff reported as "how to make a felony a misdemeanor," the supervisor allegedly instructed an officer to report the incident as a case of malicious trespass (Indianapolis Star, December 3, 1978: sec. V, p. 5)..

But the period of this study closed on a note of hope. Republican Prosecutor-Elect Stephen Goldsmith announced his intention to resume the practice -- abandoned for more than three years -- of having four IPD detectives assigned to his investigative staff (Indianapolis Star, December 13, 1978: 8). Perhaps the IPD would fare better in the coming year.

CONCLUSION

Indianapolis provides a fascinating case study of how the politics of governmental response can affect police-produced crime rates. As the study begins in 1948, a primarily proactive police department is unable to have much impact on essentially reactive Index crime rates. It takes a substantial store of responses to citizen complaints to make crime rates go up or down in a major way. It is not until 1956 that a reform Chief, Frank Mueller, conscious of national trends toward "professional," reactive enforcement, shifts departmental emphases in a big way by shifting patrol to one-person cars.

A reactive department becomes a publicly visible department. As it moves aggressively for public support and expanded resources, it also becomes vulnerable to public attack. Outsiders, in the case of Indianapolis notably the Prosecutor and the press, are liable to become antagonists. The Prosedutor becomes an antagonist in response to police scapegoating -- that if reported crime is not being eliminated, in fact is rising during a period of geeater response to citizen complaints, it is the fault of the Prosecutor for not obtaining as many convictions and harsh sentences as he might given increasing arrests. The police fail to note that as arrest patterns shift, and as the number of questionable arrests inevitably increases with rapidly increasing numbers, prosecution, conviction and incarceration rates are bound to fall. On the other hand, especially in as fiscally conservative a city as Indianapolis, the press looks harder at an agency that is asking for dramatically increased funding. Perhaps, too, as their sense of power increases with the greater business generated

from the citizenry, police officers are inclined to become more reckless about supplementing niggardly incomes with graft.

In any event, corruption scandals of unprecedented proportions arise. Corruption scandals arise precisely once every ten years during this study -- in 1954, 1964 and 1974 -- but the 1954 scandal pales by comparison to its successor. Scandal is followed by a noticeable decline in police morale, making the police vulnerable to further attacks. The police counter with a show of reform and professionalization, which causes strains among those in the ranks who have come to rely on maintenance of the status quo. At first, the press and the Prosecutor embrace the reform. But in its eagerness to compensate for past blemishes on its reputation, the police department so aggrandizes its new accomplishments that it invites renewed scrutiny of and skepticism about its activities.

By 1970, the IPD has two more strikes against it. It has made an enemy of the Sheriff, with whom it is enjoined to cooperate under Uni-Gov. And it has all too readily accepted large amounts of federal funding in a city in which federal dependence has traditionally been anathema both to Democrats and to Republicans. It begins to appear that the newly funded changes are outpacing the capacity of an entrenched bureaucracy for rational management of change. The morale of the rank-and-file drops even further than before, and in substantial numbers they themselves speak to the press of graft and corruption. Another scandal erupts.

Among IPD ranks, and to outsiders as well, the status quo is intolerable. And yet among IPD ranks, too, change is more frightening still. When an outsider is made Chief, he lacks the departmental support he needs to make a convincing show of reform. The only hope for meaningful reform that

remains is to return the control of the department to insiders.

By now, the transition to modern, reactive enforcement is well enough along that the police appreciate the power of Index crime statistics. To show improvement, offenses known must go down while arrests and clearances go up. For awhile, the police enjoy a renewal of public support as they make these trends occur. But the legacy of public skepticism of police accomplishments remains too high, the continued problem of managing dramatic change in an entrenched bureaucracy too strong, for support to endure. Unaccustomed departmental procedures soon lead to a drop in morale among the rank-and-file. The problem becomes worse as the leadership becomes defensive of its innovations and refuses to modify them. Arrest performance drops off. The drop in crime is too dramatic to be believed, and the press begins to find obvious absurdities in police statistical procedures. Police morale and reputation return to low levels, and because of the transition to reactive enforcement, the problem is more intractable than ever, for (a) the police have more public visibility and (b) are more thoroughly dependent on community support than they were when the bulk of their enforcement was directed against speeders, petty gamblers, prostitutes and poor juveniles.

This is a sad story, but it offers a number of lessons to criminal justice planners. It is a liability for the police to pretend that they can prevent street crime. Indeed, in Indianapolis, the factors responsible for credible drops in crime were outside of police control, like the drop in the pool of offenders available for joyriding in the 1950s, or the introduction of steering-column locks on cars and of night depositories in the 1960s.

It is a liability for the police to emphasize proactive enforcement, particularly vice enforcement. In so doing, they become especially vulnerable to charges of corruption. It is a liability for the police to expand their services or their resources quickly. Morale suffers when change occurs rapidly in a bureaucracy. New services cannot be managed or integrated into an existing structure. A department that gets more resources is held more closely accountable for how those resources are used.

It is a liability for the police to hold their crime control performance superior to that of other agencies. When the police in Indianapolis took on Prosecutors and the Sheriff, they were able to hurt the latters' reputations, but their own reputation suffered, too, when these other entrenched bureaucracies fought back.

It is a liability for the police to control the compilation of crime statistics. It was long ago learned that the reputation for integrity of private business claims to accomplishment hung on the use of independent auditors of corporate accounts. As matters stand, it is all too manifest that the figures the police present may be altered to serve their own interests. The organization is too large to prevent skeptical investigators from uncovering questionable statistical procedures, and the IPD itself is too new at the game of presenting politically significant Index crime data to cover obvious absurdities. Once the credibility of police statistics is impeached, the police are hard put to gain recognition for accomplishments no matter what the figures show. In fact, the IPD proved to be like the boy who cried "Wolf!" too often, and by the end of the period of this study they were hard put to get much press coverage at all, let alone favorable coverage.

Insofar as these liabilities are generalizable to urban policing throughout the country, one might well counsel the person politically accountable for appointment of a Chief to select someone of simple integrity and small ambition. The Chief would do well to not to try departmental reorganization or instituting new programs, nor to make any claims to capacity to control crime. Vice enforcement could be left to a Vice Squad, allowing the unit to die a slow and natural death of attrition. That is, no new officers would be assigned to the unit, and incumbents permitted transfer at their initiative. While low visibility meetings might be held with representatives of other criminal justice agencies, meetings to air grievances and coordinate activity, police leadership would be discouraged from actively minding the business of the other agencies, let alone subjecting them to public criticism.

As to compiling measures of police performance, the objective would be to put this task in the hands of as politically independent an accounting firm as possible. (Concededly, political independence in American society is easier to aspire to than to achieve. Americans lack the traditions of, for example, a British Civil Service or a Swedish Ombudsman. Political independence is remarkably foreign to American culture.) Although such a firm might conduct victimization surveys, since the criminal justice system is incapable of meaningful crime control, crime data should not be taken to be measures of police performance. Rather, especially in a City like Indianapolis with well established neighborhood and business organizations, emphasis might be put on developing measures of citizen satisfaction with the assistance they receive when they call the police for help, recognizing that most of these calls have nothing to do with law enforcement.

In turn, patrol allocation could better be based on demand for service than on crimes reported.

Such brief observations aside, let us return to the key research question in the Governmental Responses to Crime Project, of which this Urban Profile is a part. The question is, what connections are there between the politics of governmental response and trends in Index offenses known to the police in an urban environment? In a city like Indianapolis where an elected Mayor effectively controls the selection of police administrators, four general propositions emerge:

1. Index offense rates rise during the first year of any period in which the Offices of Mayor and Prosecutor fall under the control of the same political party.

2. Index offense rates decline the year following police "alarm" over increasing crime rates.

3. Index offense rates either rise or fall dramatically, especially at the outset, in an area covered by a new, well publicized, law enforcement program. Dramatic declines are particularly to be expected when the program is funded from outside and subject to evaluation by the grantor, as with the Concerned Neighbors Crime Watch Program in Indianapolis in 1976.

4. Predominance of reactive enforcement is a necessary condition of dramatic changes in Index offense rates, and shifts toward reactive enforcement require that police leadership be attentive to developments in policing nationwide.

Connections between Index offense trends and governmental response become far more straightforward when one proceeds from the assumption that

the immediate producers of the trends are the police rather than the offenders. One need not then make tenuous assumptions about how nearly valid Index rates are as measures of "true" crime. "Crime" is not simply an offender's behavior anyway, no matter how measured. As reflected by IPD murder/non-negligent manslaughter figures for 1972-78, "crime" is a characteristic ascribed by an observer to behavior, as in deciding whether a killing is justifiable. To call behavior a "crime" says less about the behavior than about the judgment that the behavior calls for criminal justice intervention. The definition of behavior as "crime" is an inescapably political matter.

Once Index offense trends are assumed to be police rather than offender behavior, it remains open to consider the possible role that citizen behavior plays in shaping police response. For example, as we have seen, it appears most parsimonious to attribute shifts in the propensity of police to report auto theft in the mid-1950s to a growing scarcity in the supply of youths available to drive cars. But the assumption that it is police behavior that is to be explained allows one to ignore citizen behavior under the many circumstances in which still more parsimonious explanations present themselves, such as the pressure to make team policing and the Concerned Neighbors Crime Watch Program appear effective in reducing burglary and robbery.

To analyze Index trends as police behavior does not detract from the political and scientific significance of the analysis. Results are relevant to funding and organizational decisions for the criminal justice system. Findings from such analysis may be tied back to citizen behavior, as by examining connections between Index trends and fear of crime.

The loss implicit in such a choice of such analysis is that there is no guarantee that once one had found ways for governmental response to yield declines in Index rates, one has found a way to make citizens safer from violence and predation, nor even that declines in Index rates can be presumed desirable. But happily, this loss would be a gain for the enterprise of critical inquiry.

From a methodological standpoint, it has proved serendipitous that the Governmental Responses to Crime Project has provided the means to match governmental data with historical analysis of newspaper reports and with interview data from "knowledgeables" and criminal justice functionaries. This triangulation has revealed otherwise unascertainable relationships between the politics of governmental response and Index offense trends. It should prove even more fruitful as comparisons among Indianapolis, the other Project cities, and national data become available.

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