BOSTON IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD: LATENT POLITICAL CONFLICT BECOMES BLATANT

by Susan L. Greenblatt

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ed perceptive analyses of Boston's political structure.

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To: Anne Heinz
From: Susan Greenblatt

Below are some corrections that should be inserted on my urban profile.

p. 4 line 12 separated from should be is connected to
p. 5. 2nd line from bottom should read:
constituents. The boss was responsible for rewarding his constituents with patronage positions and helping them out in times of crisis.

p. 8 l. 4 courts should be county

p. 8 second line from bottom to elect should be from electing

p. 9 l. 18 1948 should be 1950

p. 11 last line should be cials, and in the U.S. ...

p. 32 4th and 5th lines from bottom - remove parentheses

p. 33. l. 4 should be (ABCD), and Logue

p. 34 6 lines from bottom - should start a new paragraph

p. 43 l. 9 state authorities and local authorities

p. 47 3rd and 4th lines from bottom-- No more than 4% of the Boston Police Department was black should be changed to There were very few blacks in the Boston Police Department.

p. 52 l. 6 same paragraph as previous sentence

p. 56 l. 4 new paragraph

p. 68 l. 2 inter-racial interactions should be inter-racial confrontations

p. 68 l. 11 the city's other

Boston is a city rich in its cultural diversity and its contributions to American history. Both of these characteristics have led to much publicity for the city. From the pre-revolutionary times to the present, Boston has been a newsworthy city. Although much of the news Boston has engendered has been positive, it has also been responsible for events underscoring an element of internal conflict that has existed since the middle of the nineteenth century.

Much of this conflict has occurred among members of various ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups who have vied for control of the city. The image of the "proper Bostonian" brings to mind a conservative Boston Yankee with familial ties to the banking and business communities that dominate the city's economy. The Boston "pol," on the other hand, connotes the old-time Irish politician who maintains his political status by engaging in corrupt activities and handing out jobs and other political favors to his constituents. The stereotypical characters who have filled these positions in fictional accounts of Boston's political history may have been somewhat exaggerated, but on the whole, they are accurate portrayals of those who have had a major impact on Boston both historically and contemporarily.

The political history of the city in the period 1948 to 1978 reveals many recurring patterns of conflict between the Yankees and the Irish as well as the additional conflicts engendered by the relatively recent arrival of racial minority groups in substantial numbers. Unable to gain political leverage through elected office, minority groups in the city have used the court system to attack racial segregation in the public schools. The 1970's have witnessed racial conflicts in Boston between blacks and Irish that recall the earlier conflicts between the Yankees and the Irish.

Attempts at reforming the political structure have occurred sporadically throughout the period, but even these reforms have been oriented to the sharp fragmentation of Boston's population along racial and ethnic lines. Some mayors have also attempted to professionalize individual departments of the city government. These attempts have been short-lived and often marked by increased conflict both within the departments and among the various factions in the general population. This paper will describe the major political events and sociological trends that took place during the post-World War II period in Boston as well as the concomitant effects on the development of the criminal justice system.

Politics and Demography Intertwined

Boston's population has undergone a shift similar to many older industrial cities. Following a brief period of growth after World War II, the city's population entered a course of decline that has persisted from the mid-1950's until the present (see Table 1).

Boston accounts for only a small proportion of the population of its surrounding standard metropolitan statistical area. While Boston's population began decreasing following 1950, the population of the suburbs began to grow.

During the same period, the proportion of racial minority group members in the central city increased substantially. In 1950, blacks comprised only about 5% of the city's total population; in 1960 they comprised 9% of the city's population; and in 1970 blacks accounted for 16.3% of the city's population. Blacks have been concentrated mostly in the Roxbury section of the city with a smaller concentration in the South End and parts of the Dorchester section. More recently blacks have moved into the formerly Jewish section of Mattapan in the southern part of the city and Jamaica Plain, which had long been predominantly Irish. Other areas of the city such as East Boston, Charlestown, Hyde Park, South Boston, the North End, Allston-Brighton, and West Roxbury have remained overwhelmingly white and, with the possible exception of

TABLE 1

Boston's Population

Year	Total	% Black
1945	766,386	
1950	801,444	5%
1955	724,702	
1960	697,197	9.1
1965	616,326	
1970	641,071	16.3
1975	637,986	

Sources: U.S. Census 1950, 1960, 1970

Massachusetts State Census: 1945, 1955, 1965, 1975



Allston-Brighton, have remained areas that are dominated by either those of Irish or of Italian heritage.

The geography of Boston has contributed to the ethnic and racial segregation that continues to exist in residential areas. Boston is a small city geographically; it is only 47 square miles. Its physical growth ended in the early part of the 20th century with the annexation of Hyde Park in 1911 (Harrison, 1934). Several of its residential neighborhoods are physically isolated from the largest portion of the city. For example, Charlestown is separated from the rest of the city by a river; East Boston is separated from the city by a tunnel; and South Boston is a peninsula that extends into Boston Harbor.

Several political analysts have noted that Boston's neighborhoods have retained ethnic identities unmatched in most urban neighborhoods both in this country and abroad. Political scientist Edward Litt (1965) has noted that the sense of community that exists in South Boston and Dorchester is preserved by family ties and is surpassed only in London's East End. More recently, Neil Pierce (1976) has noted that South Boston is probably the most ethnically isolated community in America.

The ethnic and racial separatism of the city dates back into the early part of the city's history. Boston created separate schools for its "colored" children in 1789. This separatism was challenged unsuccessfully in the courts in 1849. The Massachusetts state legislature outlawed separate public schools in 1854.

Ethnic cleavages among whites date back to the middle of the 19th century when Irish immigrants started pouring into the city to flee from the potato famine in Ireland. As Irish immigration increased, the Yankee Protestants who had controlled Boston for so long with no challenges from other groups began to feel threatened by the numerical strength of the Irish Catholics. In 1847, the city of Boston had a population of 260,000, including 5,000 Irish. By 1857, the Irish population had grown to 50,000 of the city's total population of 310,000 and they accounted for more than a third of the city's registered voters (Dineen, 1949:14). By 1863, a state legislative committee urged that a metropolitan form of government be adopted for Boston in an attempt to weaken the political influence of the Irish immigrants (Schrag, 1967; Lupo, 1977; Tyack, 1974).

The Yankees were unable to dilute the power of the Irish in Boston, however. By the 1880's the Irish had gained enough strength to elect the first Irish mayor of Boston. In addition, the ward system of politics began flourishing in the late 1800's. Under this system, the ward boss reigned over the decisions affecting all his constituents with patronage positions and helping them out in times of crisis.

Unable to curtail the power of the Irish bosses within the wards themselves, the Yankees turned to two other mechanisms designed to curtail their influence on a city-wide basis. They continued to press for state legislation which would restrict the politicians in Boston from governing their own city. For example, in 1885, the state legislature awarded the power to appoint the Boston Police Commissioner to the governor of Massachusetts. Later, the governor also gained the authority to appoint all of the members of the Boston Finance Commission, a body which was established to monitor the city's fiscal affairs. Similarly, the state has gained control of liquor licenses and zoning as well as appointments to the Metropolitan District Commission, which is responsible for waterways, roads, and recreation facilities in the Boston area. More recently the state government has obtained control of the mass transit system which serves the Boston metropolitan area. The courts and the prisons are also under state control. Although the Penal Commissioner for the city of Boston is responsible for the House of Corrections at Deer Island, ultimate authority for this institution rests with the state Commissioner of Corrections.

Historians and political analysts have noted that moves such as these have enabled the Yankees, who along with representatives of rural areas still controlled the

state house, to retain control of the city's governance. Indeed, it was not until 1948 that the Democrats won control of the state House of Representatives and had half of the seats in the Senate and 1958 when they won control of both houses. This marked the end of the Republican Yankees' ability to control Boston from the state house. The city's more recent problems in the legislature may be characterized by city-suburban conflicts, with suburban legislators trying to keep the state's financial contributions to the city down. Boston's representatives to the legislature have contended that suburbanites work in the city and reap the benefits of its cultural resources but are unwilling to help pay the bill for these benefits (Meyerson and Banfield, 1966).

Indeed, the state's influence in the governance has been so strong that it has led two well-known political scientists to make the following comment on the situation:

> Massachusetts meddles in the affairs of its cities more, probably, than does any other state. ...its interference in local matters is more extensive and persistent than that of most, or perhaps all of the others.... Boston is the most interfered-with city in Massachusetts and probably the most interfered with in the United States (Meyerson and Banfield, 1966:11)

The legislature's failure to assess the three municipalities besides Boston which comprise Suffolk County for their share of the county's operating costs is an

example of Boston's inability to fare well in the legislature. Although Boston's mayor and city council are solely responsible for operating the courts and correctional facilities, the other three cities in the courts legally avail themselves of the services provided without contributing toward the operating costs of these institutions.

The second mechanism the Yankee reformers used to minimize the influence of the immigrants was to restructure the city government and the election system. In 1906, a 9 member city council elected at-large was established. Elections became non-partisan, and the finance commission was established. In an attempt to curtail patronage appointments, the state civil service commission was given oversight on all mayoral appointments.

The system of election prevented the immigrants from winning enough votes on a city-wide basis to be elected. In 1924, a referendum returned the election of city councillors to a district basis and expanded the council to 22 members. This reform lasted until 1951, when city council elections once more became at-large and the number of councillors was reduced from 22 to 9. The structure of the council from 1924 on has allowed the Irish to maintain their strong control of the city council and prevented newer minority groups to elect representatives to the council.

The first part of the twentieth century witnessed a fragmentation among the Irish immigrants themselves. Powerful ward bosses such as Martin Lomasney, John F. Fitzgerald, and James Michael Curley battled each other for control. As newer immigrant groups gained substantially in numbers, they too began to challenge the Irish bosses. This was particularly true of the Italian immigrants. However, the Irish have clearly dominated the political structure of the city until the present. Although some Italians have won election to the city council, only one black has served on that body. A black has recently been elected to the School Committee as well, but these 2 elections may be viewed as anomalies on the Boston political scene.

James Michael Curley: The End of an Era

James Michael Curley faced his "last hurrah" in the immediate post-World War II period. His political career had started in 1899 as a member of Boston's Common Council and ended in 1948 when he finished his fourth term as Boston's mayor. (The discussion of Curley and the political structure of the city during his time relies heavily on Joseph F. Dineen's The Purple Shamrock (1949))

When Curley entered politics as a member of the Common Council in 1899, the Irish had outnumbered the Brahmins in the city's population for the first time in history. At that time, the city had a bicameral legislative body: the Common Council was the lower chamber consisting of three

representatives of each of the city's 25 wards, and the Board of Aldermen was the upper chamber with nine members. Both of these units were extremely weak in their ability to govern the city. They had no power to veto or repeal actions of the mayor. The only real power these two bodies had was to jointly approve the annual budget and extra appropriations.

According to Dineen, the chief function of the Common Council was to "exercise a power of suggestion directing the consideration of aldermen and mayor to things it felt ought to be done." (1949:25) The Council was viewed as a debating society where those members who proved themselves to be good public speakers would be groomed for positions on the Board of Aldermen. The only additional power the Aldermen had was to screen the suggestions from the Council to the Mayor. The real importance of the members of these two bodies lay in the relationship to their constituents. Each councilman and alderman became a source of assistance for individual citizens.

Curley's entry onto this political scene started with a battle with the previous ward boss in ward 17. After emerging as victorious, Curley went to New York City to study the Tammany Hall system and returned to Boston to remodel his ward after Tammany Hall. He quickly gained a reputation as a champion of the poor and under-privileged.

In 1914, Curley began his first term as mayor of Boston. His campaign had attacked the ward boss system, despite the fact that he himself had been a ward boss. He promised to rid Boston of its political machine. Naturally, this resulted in a great hostility between Curley and the ward bosses in the city. Upon his election, Curley immediately fired 600 city employees who had voted for his opponent, thereby terminating the patronage positions formerly available to the ward bosses.

Curley himself began to fulfill the function that the ward bosses had previously played. He invited citizens to come to see him at city hall; thus he became the ward boss for the entire city. Citizens availed themselves of this opportunity and a new form of politics labelled "Curleyism" was born in Boston.

The ward bosses and the business community were able to jointly defeat Curley's bid for a second term as mayor. The bosses wanted someone in city hall that they could control. Business was angry at Curley's expenditures for construction which had resulted in increased business taxes.

Curley's political career continued to rise and fall. He served as mayor for three additional terms beginning in 1922, 1930, and 1945. He served as governor of Massachusetts from 1935-1936, when for the first time in Massachusetts history there was a full slate of Democratic officials in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1943-1945

(Dineen, 1949).

Throughout his career, Curley was a very controversial figure. Indeed, he is probably one of the most studied political figures in this country, for his style of governing has given him the label of a political Robin Hood. At the same time, many viewed him as extremely corrupt, and his political popularity was far from constant.

Boston was facing an economic slump following World War II, and Curley was returned to the office of mayor in 1946, because he had a reputation as a builder, employer, and spender. Curley defeated his closest rival for election by a margin of 2-1, despite the fact that he was to go on trial soon on the charges of using the mail. to defraud and conspiracy to use the mails to defraud.

Shortly after his election, Curley's trial began in Washington D.C. The circumstances surrounding both the charge and the trial were highly irregular. According to the prosecutor in the case, there was no document sent through the mails with Curley's signature on it that had resulted in fraud. Curley had given his permission to use his name on a letterhead as had several other prominent businessmen who were not even indicted. Curley was convicted and sentenced; he appealed the case, but the conviction was upheld.

Curley spent five months in a federal prison. During this period, the Massachusetts state legislature passed a law enabling Curley to retain his office and his salary. John Hynes, who had served as city clerk, was named the acting mayor by the legislature. The legislation also stated that Hynes would have lifetime tenure in the office of city clerk as long as he did not run for elective office. This act was a clear attempt on the part of the legislature to eradicate any political ambitions Hynes might have had.

Two days after President Truman commuted Curley's sentence, he was back in city hall. For the rest of his term of office, Curley and his style of politics remained the central issue in Boston politics. The operation of the city's assessing department exemplifies what critics pointed to as corruption in his administration. Every year those with political connections were able to have their property tax assessments reduced. This practice resulted not only in an enormous financial loss to the city's revenues, but the actions of the assessment department also served as a deterrent to the development of the downtown area. Those who otherwise would have considered investing in the area feared to do so because of the tax situation. They knew that the assessing department would have to be paid off in order to keep their taxes fair. As a result, there was very little development in

the area during Curley's term in office. The first major office building erected in downtown Boston following World War II was the John Hancock building. It was anticipated that the tax assessment of the building would be $6.5 million. The actual assessment was $24 million. The Hancock Company went to court and had its assessment lowered to $21.9 million.

The granting of tax abatements flourished "secretly" during Curley's last year in office. No one knew who received the abatements, but they amounted to 11.6% of the total tax levy for the city (McQuade, 1967:263).

By the end of Curley's term, reformers in Boston were determined that "Curleyism" would flourish no longer. They proposed that the city charter be changed so that the city would have a city manager style of government with the city council acting as a board of directors. Under this plan, one member of the city council would serve as a ceremonial mayor. The city manager would be hired jointly by the city council and school committee. This form of government was proposed in order to attract honest and talented officials to serve the city.

Recognizing that this charter reform would sharply curtail his political power, Curley proposed an alternative set of changes to the city charter. Under his plan, the city would hold both a preliminary and a general election. The 2 top vote-getters in the preliminary election for mayor would run against each other for mayor. The winner in the 1949 election would serve a two-year term so that the new charter could be implemented in 1951. In addition, the 22 member ward council would be replaced by a nine member council elected at-large. The power of the council would be increased by enabling a two-thirds vote to override the mayor's veto on anything except loans and expenditures. Terms for school committee members were to be reduced from four years to two years.

Curley's "reforms" were favored by the electorate over the city manager/council form of government by a 2 to 1 margin in an election which had a record turn-out of voters. Curley himself, however, lost the election. He was defeated by John Hynes, the city clerk who had served as acting mayor when Curley was in prison. A pro-Hynes coalition had formed when Hynes was appointed acting mayor. This coalition viewed Curley as corrupt and a bad influence on what happened in the city. Several Boston Brahmins were among the members of this pro-Hynes, anti-Curley coalition, for they viewed Curley as a wastrel who was detrimental to the business interests of the city (interview with Joseph Slavet, Feb. 26, 1980).

Curley ran for mayor again in 1951 and 1955. Both times he was defeated by Hynes. Despite these defeats and the numerous other defeats that Curley had suffered earlier, it is generally acknowledged that he served as

as the central figure in Boston politics in the twentieth century.

The Hynes Administration: The City Begins to Awaken

John Hynes began his term of office as mayor of Boston in 1950. His ability to defeat Curley served as the impetus for a group of reformers to campaign for a "New Boston." The New Boston Committee (NBC) was headed by Jerome Rappaport, a young idealistic Harvard Law School graduate. The NBC was determined that the new charter and the new mayor would bring a new style of politics to Boston.

Those in favor of Curley and his style of politics, however, were determined to continue fighting for survival. They established the All Boston Committee (ABC) in response to the NBC and charged that the NBC advocated machine rule. In the 1951 election, the first held under the new city charter, both groups sponsored a slate of candidates. The NBC won a majority of seats on both the city council (5 out of 9) and the school committee (4 out of 5).

Hynes' defeat of Curley recorded the largest margin of victory in Boston's history. The election symbolized the strange turns that Boston politics often take. After Hynes won 53% of the vote in the preliminary election, Curley decided to leave his name on the ballot for the general election, but announced that he would not actively solicit votes. Thus, the preliminary election in

actuality determined who would be mayor. The final election resulted in 154,521 votes for Hynes and 75,990 for Curley.

The public's enthrallment with the NBC and those it had helped to elect was very short-lived. Internal friction arose within the NBC, and the leader of the movement, Jerome Rappaport, soon gave up his idealism, first to become a lawyer specializing in tax abatement cases and later to become a real estate developer involved in urban renewal projects.

Once the forces of reform had emerged victorious over "Curleyism," the predominant issue to surface during Hynes' tenure in office, 1950-59, revolved around the local economy. The practices of the city's assessing department had resulted in a loss of a large amount of revenue for the city through phony tax abatements and the resultant discouragement of construction in the downtown area. The value of tax-exempt property in the city had increased substantially. In 1951, Boston had nearly $400 million less in taxable property than it had in 1930; 40% of its total real property value was tax-exempt (Wood, 1959:72). The city postponed expenditures for capital improvements, but overall expenditures continued to increase nonetheless.

The tax assessment situation had been an issue in the 1949 election campaign and continued to be an issue

addressed by the Boston Finance Commission and the Boston Municipal Research Bureau during Hynes' term. In 1954, The Boston Finance Commission accused Hynes of failing to keep his campaign promises to change the abatement practices and using old tricks to cut the city's tax rate by ninety cents. The Finance Commission charged that the city inflated property valuations to keep the tax rate down and to give abatements to favored individuals, usually business owners (Bergenheim; 1950, 1954). This practice was one that Hynes himself had sharply criticized in his first mayoral campaign in 1949. Furthermore the city would overestimate its revenues every year in order to keep the tax rate down; then it would face a deficit.

Many property owners appealed what they considered to be overvaluation of their property to the State Appellate Tax Board. Abatements for the years 1949 and before were so high that Boston had to go to the state legislature for approval to obtain a loan to cover these abatements (Bergenheim; 1951).

The Boston Municipal Research Bureau (BMRB), following a study of Boston's abatement practices, called for "a scientific valuation of all real estate in the city." (Bergenheim; 1952). While the mayor approved of this suggestion, the city council refused to appropriate the necessary funds to start the program (Bergenheim; 1953).

As the criticism of Boston's fiscal affairs mounted,

Hynes' relationship with business and civic leaders began to deteriorate. Hynes responded by establishing a committee on municipal finances in 1954 (interview with Joseph Slavet; Feb. 26, 1980). This committee sponsored a number of surveys of city departments, including the police, the library, and the fire departments, in an attempt to identify means to reduce expenses. Evidently this committee did not have much of an impact, because the financial woes of the city peaked in 1956. Boston had accumulated a deficit of $45 million, or more than one-fourth of its estimated revenues for that year. The state government intervened to help Boston out of its financial plight. John Powers, president of the state senate and a mayoral aspirant himself, along with the Boston Municipal Research Bureau and a group of business and civic leaders drafted and secured passage of the Funding Act of 1957. This legislation enabled the city to convert short-term notes into long-term bonds; it also provided safeguards to prevent recurrence of this problem and to stabilize the financial situation. The act required that annual revenue deficits be raised in the succeeding year, that revenue estimates not exceed actual receipts for the prior year, and that a realistic reserve be allocated to cover abated taxes. At the same time, Hynes publicly announced his intentions of cutting payrolls, restricting capital improvements, carrying out assessment equalization,

and initiating studies on staffing (Slavet; 1977).

Hynes attempted to restructure the relationship between business and government through urban redevelopment. Although several of the projects he initiated did not come to fruition until he had left office, he clearly was the moving force behind them. Hynes' main interest was in the physical renewal of the city utilizing federal funds available from the urban renewal legislation of 1949. His administration started planning for the demolition of Scollay Square, a less than reputable section of the city with its bars and burlesque houses, and the construction of Government Center in its place. He intended that Government Center would have not only a high concentration of government offices but also a substantial representation of businesses to signify the positive relationship between these two sectors.

The largest development that he undertook was the West End redevelopment. This project ultimately resulted in a great deal of criticism both within the city and from professional planners elsewhere. Tenements on forty-one acres which had housed 9,000 residents were demolished to erect luxury high-rise apartment buildings. The physical renewal of the area clearly outweighed the need for housing for the 9,000 displaced citizens. Virtually no assistance was offered to relocate these people. Furthermore, as social planner Herbert Gans (1966) has noted,

the West End was not the worst slum in the city but was selected for demolition because it offered the best site for luxury housing.

The third major project that Hynes initiated was the Prudential Center complex. The history of the planning for this project reveals business' fears of becoming involved in the politics of Boston, particularly its real estate taxation procedures. In 1951, it was learned that the Boston and Albany Railroad Company wanted to dispose of 28 1/2 acres in a very desirable Boston location. Hynes worked closely with a leading real estate executive to get the Prudential Insurance Company to purchase and develop the land as its northeast home office. In 1957, after several years of behind-the-scenes negotiations, the Prudential Company not only purchased the site for its own northeast home office, but also decided to develop the entire tract which would be operated by the company itself.

The question of tax assessment still loomed large. The mayor continued in an effort to reach a tax formula that would be acceptable to Prudential. In 1958, the mayor and Prudential reached an agreement that the assessment would not exceed 20% of its actual gross revenues and that a graduated scale of assessment would be utilized during the seven year construction period. However, this agreement was an informal arrangement and was in no way legally binding. The agreement itself was controversial,

for many believed that it was unconstitutional and that Prudential should receive no special tax incentives. As the time for construction grew nearer, Prudential exhibited signs of trepidation, aware of the fact that the tax agreement was extremely weak. It was not until a new mayor took office that state legislation was passed allowing for a special tax formula for property built upon blighted land. This resulted in a binding tax agreement between the city and Prudential (Hynes; 1970).

If the area of urban renewal showed signs of awakening in Boston during Hynes' administration, the police department did not. Although the Boston Police Department was one of the first established in the country, attempts to modernize its organization and performance had been minimal at best. The reason for this lack of progress lay partially with the appointment procedure for the police commissioner. Police commissioners were appointed for a 7 year term by the governor of Massachusetts. None of the police commissioners were individuals who had experience in law enforcement; rather they were politically ambitious individuals who saw this position as a stepping stone for their own political careers. In fact, they viewed themselves as state officials not subject to municipal authority. This problem was further compounded by the length of the term of office. Since the police commissioners were appointed for 7 year terms but the governors served only 2 year terms, the commissioners often found themselves with obligations to no one. This resulted in the police department operating as a nearly autonomous entity (Reppetto; 1970).

Perhaps the lack of accountability explains why the police department had long been considered technically backwards and at the same time expensive to operate. As far back as 1934, it was recognized that the city of Boston had a higher number of policemen for the size of its population and paid a greater amount per capita for its police services than any other city in the country (Harrison; 1934).

Another historical factor that had held back progress in the police department was the strike of 1919. In that year, three-fourths of Boston's police force joined a newly formed union. The police commissioner at that time refused to recognize the union, forbade the patrolmen to join it, and suspended a number of policemen who had joined. In protest of this measure, three-fourths of the force went out on strike. On orders from the governor of Massachusetts, all strikers were fired and the union was destroyed (Fogelson, 1977). The need to recruit and train an entirely new police force served as an obstacle in the path of progress.

Another factor that characterized the political nature of the police force was its control by the Irish.

According to Robert Fogelson (1977), the Irish had a "stranglehold" on the police force through World War II. The Irish used their political influence to exclude other groups from gaining entry to the force. The police department continued to be a "politically sensitive place" because it offered a large source of patronage positions (interview with Joseph Slavet, Feb. 26, 1980).

A major source of controversy concerning the police department has been its highly decentralized organization. The police department had 17 precincts operating in the city and they operated relatively independent of central authority. Each precinct stationhouse not only apprehended offenders but also conducted its own criminal investigations, crime prevention, and special services (Harrison; 1934). The decentralized nature of the department was blamed in part for the high cost of police services.

In 1949, the Boston Finance Commission had hired Bruce Smith, an expert in police affairs to conduct a survey of Boston police operations.

Smith's findings are very similar to those reported by Harrison in 1934. Smith found the record of the Boston Police Department "confusing," but "superior to that of most large American cities" in its acquisition of equipment and manpower (p. 2). The per capita expenditures for police in Boston were still the highest in the nation

in 1947 as was the ratio of police employees to the total population of the city. Despite his earlier praise of Boston's ability to acquire manpower, Smith went on to criticize the way in which large numbers of Boston police officers were detailed to ceremonial tasks such as attending funerals.

Smith also noted that the department was decentralized to a degree not found elsewhere. There were 27 units within the department including the 17 precincts. In addition to the tasks performed at the precinct level that Harrison had found more than a decade earlier, Smith stated that the decentralized units were responsible for juvenile delinquents and the temporary custody of suspects prior to trial. Patrol cars were placed on the streets not only by the bureau of criminal investigation but also by the traffic division and the rackets and vice squad. In short, many of the units within the department duplicated the activities of other units.

One of the major recommendations of the survey was that the organizational schemat of the department be simplified and that the precincts be reduced from 17 to 12. Rank and file members of the police department joined with several politicians to block the implementation of this proposal (Fogelson, 1977). Hynes himself did not push for implementation of the survey's recommendations, because he had enjoyed the political support of the police.

Throughout Hynes' administration, the Boston Police Department retained its reputation as an overstaffed department which failed to keep up with modern technology.

In 1957, the governor appointed a new police commissioner for Boston. Leo J. Sullivan, the newly appointed commissioner, had previously served as Suffolk County Register of Deeds. In an editorial published at the time of Sullivan's appointment, the Boston Daily Globe noted that the responsibilities of police forces had increased enormously in modern times and required that the position of police commissioner not be used as a "political springboard." (Sept. 6, 1957). Despite the recognition by the press that the job was an extremely demanding one, the governor failed to appoint an individual with expertise in police work.

Innovations in the department initiated under Sullivan included the establishment of a Central Complaint and Records Bureau, which consolidated the Criminal records and Identification Section of the Bureau of Operations. A statistical section was established and IBM equipment was installed in an effort to obtain uniform reporting (Boston Police Department Annual Report,1958).

Police and politics once more appeared to be enmeshed as the mayoral election campaign of 1959 unfurled. John Hynes decided not to run in 1959 for a third term as mayor. The two winners of the preliminary mayoral election that

year were John F. Collins and John E. Powers. Collins had finished a poor second in the preliminary election and was not expected to have a chance to win in the general election. Collins served as a City Councillor from 1955 to 1957 when he resigned to become Register of Probate for the county, a position with little public visibility. He had been crippled by polio and some believed that he would not be able to govern the city from a wheelchair.

Powers was the better known of the two contenders; he had served as President of the Massachusetts senate and had run for mayor in an earlier election and lost. Powers had more money to spend on his campaign than Collins, and he had the support of all the major political leaders in the area, including then U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy.

Collins used a play on Powers' name for his main theme in the election campaign. According to Collins, Powers stood for "power politics," a brand of politics not concerned with the common people but allied with the interests of business. For example, Collins claimed that Powers had protected the interests of insurance companies in his role as state senate president (Levin,1960). Collins went so far as to hold an essay contest on the definition of "power politics." Collins also took a very strong stand favoring the establishment of a sales tax as a partial solution to the cities financial problems. Powers was very much against the sales tax; this was the only

substantive issue on which Powers disagreed with Collins.

Until just a few days before the election, Powers was expected to win the election. And then an event took place which was credited with causing a change in the election's outcome. On Friday, October 30, 1959, Internal Revenue Agents raided two sites in East Boston, smashing a book-making syndicate which allegedly did more than one-half million dollars of business weekly (Levin, 1960). A television news broadcast reporting the raid showed film of the bookie establishment, which included a campaign poster for Powers. Collins accused Powers of being affiliated with those arrested during the raid (interview with George Merry, Feb. 19, 1980). In an election that was clearly considered an upset, Collins defeated Powers.

Murray B. Levin's interpretation of the election is that Powers lost because he was stereotyped as a corrupt politician and that Collins was viewed as "the lesser of two evils" (1960:28). Levin concluded:

> When cynicism and disgust with professional politicians is widespread, the candidate who is less well-known and who has held public office for a shorter period is less likely to be stereotyped as a politician in the worst sense of the word. Mr. Collins doubtlessly profited from his relative anonymity and capitalized on Senator Powers' reputation as a politician by depicting the election as a contest between David and Goliath, between the power politicians and the victimized masses (1960:36).

The IRS raids on East Boston also had an effect on the police department. The bookie joint was "in the shadow" of the East Boston police precinct and the implication was that the police knew about the gambling but ignored it (Boston Daily Globe, 11/2/59). Police Commissioner Sullivan established a rackets squad to stamp out organized gambling, with a focus on East Boston. Also, police personnel in the East Boston precinct were transferred.

The Collins Administration: Increased Urban Renewal and Interracial Tensions

John Collins started his term as mayor in a time of continuing economic problems. Although his predecessor had begun several urban redevelopment projects, they had not yet made an impact on the city's economy. At the time of his election, Boston paid more per capita for its services than any other major city in the country. The real estate tax, $101.20 per $1,000 of assessed valuation, was the highest of any city in the country and double that of New York and Chicago. The city's waterfront and downtown areas contributed little in the way of either taxes or employment (McQuade, 1966).

At about the same time, a group of leading Boston businessmen, mostly Brahmin bankers, started meeting in an attempt to keep the city from going bankrupt. Known as "The vault," the group met regularly in one of the

city's largest and most influential banks. It is often reported that this group started meeting at Collins' behest to establish a coordinating committee for the city. This committee not only served to support Collins' effort to revitalize the city's economy, but it also served as the mechanism for allowing the Boston Brahmins to once more have a say in Boston affairs. This renewed relationship between the head of city government and the business elite was seen as a necessary first step in revitalizing Boston. The failure of Boston's economy in the initial post-World War II period had been blamed in part on Curley's inability to get along with the business elite.

Over the years of Collins' administration, "The vault" became so influential that it has been referred to as the "political directorate of Boston." It has been asserted that Collins became the puppet of the business leaders and he simply carried out their will (interview with John Grady, Jan. 11, 1980). One writer has noted that Collins' relationship with the business community was so strong that he was known as the Chamber of Commerce mayor (Schrag, 1967:24).

Collins' major impact on the city was to continue and to improve upon the urban redevelopment that Hynes had started. Soon after his election, Collins brought Edward Logue to Boston to direct the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), an agency established by the state to manage the city's urban renewal effort. Previously, Logue had successfully directed New Haven's urban redevelopment effort in its downtown area. There was some resentment in the city, especially among members of the BRA board who were against his appointment, that an outsider had been brought in to direct this effort at a salary greater than that of either the mayor or the governor. But when the federal government called Logue's plan for Boston "the most imaginative of all" and earmarked $31 million for Boston, the board acquiesced, giving Logue all the power he needed (The Economist, Mar. 11, 1961).

Logue brought in a large number of outsiders to work as planners at the BRA, thus eliminating a large number of jobs for native Bostonians. It was the intent of Collins and Logue to continue to utilize the Housing Act of 1949 to bring in federal funds for renewal. Once more there was an effort to develop a "new Boston," this time in terms of revitalizing the city's economy through physical redevelopment. According to Stephan Thernstrom, Logue's very presence in Boston, which had long resisted efforts at change, "was vital proof that the local climate had grown more receptive to innovation." (1969:48)

Logue's approach to urban renewal was more sensitive to the human and cultural aspects of the issue than the previous administration's had been. Logue started a family and business relocation program in order to avoid the

adverse affects of urban renewal that had occurred under Hynes. Secondly, Logue was aware of the historical value of much of Boston's architecture and worked to preserve these landmarks instead of tearing them down (The Economist; Mar. 11, 1961).

By the end of 1960, Logue had drafted a six-year $90 million urban renewal plan for Boston. Boston had moved from seventeenth to fourth in the list of urban renewal grants awarded by the federal government (Thernstrom, 1969,6). Under this plan, the federal government would contribute $60 million, while Boston's $30 million share would come in the form of municipal improvements and schools which the city would have had to pay for anyway (The Economist, 3/11/61).

Logue's success was also due in part to the state legislature, which passed several bills enabling Boston to continue on the path of redevelopment. Some analysts have contended that Collins' defeat of John Powers in the mayoral election hurt Boston in the legislature, since Powers was president of the state senate. Nonetheless, the legislature passed bills that authorized the construction of four state buildings costing $50 million (in Government Center) and urban renewal legislation that enabled Boston to consummate a tax agreement with the Prudential Insurance Company, finally clearing the way for construction of the Prudential Center (Rudsten, 1973).

In 1961, the city established a new organization to serve as the social planning counterpart to the BRA's physical planning for Boston. Eventually known as Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), Logue was appointed as the mayor's liaison with the organization. ABCD received funding from the Permanent Charities Fund, a local Boston charity, as well as from the Ford Foundation. The major goals of ABCD were to resolve the problems of urban renewal, to develop the opportunities it created, and to work on the human side of urban renewal using citizen participation as a mechanism to accomplish this end (Thernstrom, 1969).

The Collins administration also witnessed important changes in the criminal justice system of the city. In 1960, the mayor created the Youth Activities Board (YAB). The YAB was based on the street-worker model of delinquency prevention. Street-workers contacted delinquency-prone youths, made referrals to agencies, and recommended new programs. The YAB was a small operation: it had a staff of 9 and an annual budget of $60,000 (Thernstrom, 1969).

If the change in the city's attempt to deal with delinquency was small, the attention paid to the police department during the Collins administration was great. Shortly after he took office, Collins asked Police Commissioner Leo Sullivan to cut the budget of the department; Sullivan refused. Collins then approached the state

legislature to give control of the police department budget to the mayor; the legislature refused (Rudsten, 1973).

Although the legislature refused Collins' request at the outset, it was later embarrassed into acceding to his request. A series of events surrounding a book making establishment which masqueraded as a key shop resulted in more public scrutiny of the police department and the eventual resignation of the commissioner under pressure. Although complaints had repeatedly been made to the Boston Police Department about this "key shop" the department took little action. The state police intervened several times and sent letters to Commissioner Sullivan on their findings. Sullivan replied that he had found no evidence of illegal behavior. In June of 1961, CBS television began filming the comings and goings at the bookie establishment. Among the numerous people filmed were 10 Boston police officers, including one detective from central headquarters. These officers were presumably involved in placing bets and collecting pay-offs (Fogelson, 1977). CBS turned its evidence over to the U.S. Justice Department. In September, 1961, IRS agents raided the bookie joint; the state police followed suit in October, 1961. On November 30, 1961, CBS-TV broadcast nationally a documentary of its findings entitled "Biography of a Bookie Joint."

Commissioner Sullivan's major response to the raids and the documentary was to demote some high-ranking police officers to lower positions on the force. He contended that the Boston Police Department did not have sufficient manpower to deal effectively with bookmaking, which was a misdemeanor.

State officials, however, viewed the raids with much more seriousness. Following the airing of "Biography of a Bookie Joint," Massachusetts Governor John Volpe called for the resignation of Police Commissioner Sullivan and requested that Quinn Tamm, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), do a survey of the Boston Police Department. Volpe also asked the legislature to return control of the police department to the city.

In April, 1962 the state legislature passed a bill which returned the power to appoint the police commissioner to the mayor of Boston. For more than three-quarters of a century, the governor had controlled this appointment, and most governors had used this authority to reward their political allies. Now that the appointment power was to be returned to the mayor, the Republican governor took actions to insure that the mayor (who was inevitably a Democrat even though the city had non-partisan elections) would not do the same. Before signing the bill, the governor returned it to the legislature with a proposed

amendment requiring that police commissioners be trained as police officers and have had some experience in law enforcement. The bill also gave the mayor control over the budget of the department. Immediately following passage of the legislation, Collins appointed Edmund L. McNamara as police commissioner. McNamara, who had previously served as the FBI's liaison with the Boston Police Department, became the first career law enforcement officer to hold the position of Boston Police Commissioner in the 20th century.

Collins had considered appointing a commissioner from the ranks, but he had done so in several other city departments and had not been satisfied with the results. His internal appointments in other departments brought with them to their new offices personal alliances that they had developed over the years as well as personal conflicts (Reppetto, 1970).

The results of the IACP report, popularly known as the Tamm Report, also received much publicity. The report was prefaced with the commentary that earlier surveys had recommended that the Boston Police Department implement modern police techniques, but that the department had failed to do so. The report contended that police officials had been unwilling to modernize and that the citizenry failed to demand superior police practices. With the appointment of a new police commissioner under local control, Tamm suggested that it was now possible to initiate substantial improvements in the department (IACP,1962).

As had previous reports, the Tamm Report noted the unusually high per capita cost for police services in Boston. Again the high number of police personnel was cited as one reason for the unusually high cost of running the department. The need for a large force, according to Tamm, was based on the misuse of police personnel. Tamm noted that the police force spent much of its time "running errands" rather than protecting life and property and solving crime. Among the errands that Tamm referred to were the provision of ambulance service, taking the census, and serving as school crossing guards.

The report recommended numerous steps to modernize and upgrade the police department. Many of the recommendations were the same as those that had been made in earlier studies of the department. The report recommended major improvements in records management. Although the department had altered its record-keeping system in 1958 under Commissioner Sullivan, the report contended that the improvements were only tokens to satisfy outsiders. A reduction in the number of police stations to six plus headquarters was also proposed. The survey recommended improved police training, the creation of a planning unit, the centralization of criminal investigations and traffic functions, and the creation of a Bureau of Inspectional

Services. The report recommended a reduction in the size of the force and at the same time supported an increase in police salaries, since officers would be expected to take on more responsible tasks.

The Boston Municipal Research Bureau (March, 1963) reported that the police department had responded with "unusual vigor" to the Tamm report recommendations. Commissioner McNamara had already reorganized the division into four major bureaus, each headed by a superintendent who reported directly to the Commissioner. The inspection function, which the Tamm Report had stressed, was expanded to full bureau status (Hebert, 1978:98). The main function of this bureau was to keep a watch over the rank and file members of the force (Fogelson, 1977:179). By the time the report had been delivered, one station house had already been closed (BMRB, March, 1963) and by the middle of the decade 3 more of Boston's remaining precincts had been closed, all in middle class areas (Reppetto, 1970).

By 1964, McNamara reported that he had encountered local opposition to the implementation of the survey's recommendations. Citizens and businesses feared that the closing of precinct stations would result in an inferior quality of police service. The opposition to closing precinct stations was so strong that McNamara was forced to shelve his plans to close additional precinct stations (Fogelson, 1977). Members of the force, not surprisingly,

were opposed to the recommendation that the force be reduced in size (Hebert, 1978;98).

The opposition from the public, municipal officials, and department personnel placed an obstacle in the path of McNamara's efforts at reform. Possibly in an effort to adopt reforms without appearing controversial, McNamara turned to the area of computers and technology (Hebert, 1978:98).

In 1958, the FBI had refused to accept the accuracy of the police department's crime statistics. Literally hundreds of different forms were involved and manual compilation was necessary. Until 1964, the department refused to buy more sophisticated computer equipment; at that time McNamara agreed to purchase an IBM 360 computer. In 1965, the department received the city's approval to purchase the computer (Hebert, 1978:98-99).

The establishment of the federal Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA, the forerunner of LEAA) in 1965 facilitated the Boston Police Department's attempt to improve its record-keeping and reporting system. One of the first grants disbursed by this office was a grant to the Boston Police Department for technical assistance in the design of an integrated information system. The plan for the new system was completed in mid-1967 and focused on a combination of a computer-assisted dispatching system and a management information system (Hebert, 1978:99).

Other innovations introduced into the police department under Commissioner McNamara included the expansion of training of police recruits from 8 weeks to 13 weeks. In 1963, a Tactical Patrol Force was created, a reform that was very popular in police departments at that time. These forces were highly mobile squads designed to control riots and other disturbances. This function encroached upon the precincts' historic role of maintaining order (Fogelson, 1977). In 1966 a community relations program was established as well as a community service officer.

Another change in the police department involved the relationship between rank and file members and administrators. In 1965, all municipal employees except police officers had successfully lobbied for state legislation which allowed them to participate in collective bargaining. In the same year a small group of Boston Patrolmen organized to form the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association (BPPA). Less than a year after its organization, the BPPA had gained the right for Boston patrolmen to participate in collective bargaining also. The BPPA won the right to represent the patrolmen at the bargaining table. Shortly thereafter, with the assistance of a mediator from the state labor relations commission, the city and the BPPA reached an agreement giving the BPPA a formal grievance procedure and a dues check-off (Fogelson, 1977).

The police department was not the only city agency

to receive greater public attention during the Collins administration. The public school system and the body which controlled it, the school committee, came into the public's eye in the early 1960's and has stayed there ever since. The increased attention paid to the schools was due to the increased black population in the city, much of it newly arrived from the South (Thernstrom, 1969), and the election of Louise Day Hicks to the school committee in 1961. Hicks was from South Boston and the daughter of a judge well known to the Irish citizens of the city. This factor undoubtedly helped her to capture most of the Irish vote in the city. And although Collins was to be reelected in 1963 to the position of mayor, having successfully brought a billion dollar urban renewal program to the city with the help of planner Logue and having made the city attractive to industry (Healey, 11/4/63), Hicks received more votes for reelection than Collins. Her ability to win 69% of the vote that year was based on her strong advocacy of neighborhood schools. Perhaps this indicates that neighborhood/ethnic solidarity was more important to the voters of Boston than financial solvency for the city.

In 1963 and 1964, leaders of the black community began to organize protests against the school committee. Several "freedom days" were held when a majority of black children in the public schools boycotted classes. It is interesting to note that leadership in the black community was so weak

at that time that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People leadership had to be pressured into organizing the school boycotts (Schrag, 1967).

In 1963, leaders of the Boston chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) approached the school committee with a list of grievances concerning the schools. After much negotiating, the school committee agreed to study most of the demands listed by the NAACP. One demand, however, the school committee refused to deal with. The NAACP wanted the school committee to admit that the schools were racially segregated. The school committee refused and negotiations between the two sides broke down. More school boycotts and protest marches to the state house ensued.

In April, 1965 a blue ribbon advisory panel appointed by the governor and headed by Owen Kiernan released its report on the Boston Public Schools. The key finding of the Kiernan Report was that 45 of Boston's 200 schools were "predominantly Negro." The report concluded that racial segregation was harmful to both black and white children and that transporting children to alleviate this segregation would solve the problem.

The school committee immediately voted to reject the findings of the report. The state legislature, on the other hand, acted on the findings of the report. In the summer of 1965, it passed the Racial Imbalance Act, which declared that any public school with a student body in excess of 50 per cent nonwhite students was racially imbalanced and in violation of the law. The act required school departments to submit school census data by race on an annual basis to the state department of education. School systems not in compliance with the law were subject to the loss of state funds for education.

This act paved the way for increased conflict between state and local authorities in Boston, this time the Boston School Committee. Several years were to pass before the state was to confront the city on this issue, allowing time for the black community to increase in size and in the strength of its leadership and for a new mayor to take office in Boston. The time that elapsed in enforcing the law also allowed Louise Day Hicks to win her third consecutive election to the school committee and to continue to build her political constituency. The pro-Hicks element and the growing contingency of blacks who were calling for improved educational opportunity for their children led to an increase in the political fragmentation that already existed in the city.

Prior to the mayoral election of 1967, however, interracial conflict was to surface in yet another area. Mothers for Adequate Welfare, a group of blacks protesting the welfare situation in Boston, staged a protest demonstration in the Roxbury welfare office on June 2, 1967. The

protestors chained the doors of the office, locking in the welfare workers. A welfare worker suffered a heart seizure, and police attempting to get her out of the office clashed with the protestors. The fighting that ensued spread into the streets of black Roxbury, and looting and fires occurred for 3 days, when the situation was finally quelled. Police Commissioner McNamara directed the police operations from central headquarters. After being shot at by snipers, police officers fired their guns above the heads of the protestors. Although no deaths occurred, about 100 arrests were made, among them Thomas Atkins, vice chairman of the Boston NAACP.

The result of this riot was an intensified hostility between the black community and the police. The Boston Police Department was noted for its lack of minority members, and the alleged brutality that the police demonstrated during their attempt to control the riot served as a detriment to the police-minority relations that already existed.

The Massachusetts Council of Churches' Commission on Church and Race charged that the police had escalated the riot with their own actions. Mayor Collins immediately denied this allegation and stated that the police had de-escalated the conflict (Globe, June 6, 1967). Collins' major response to the riot was to appoint a committee to conduct a probe of the welfare system (Globe, June 5, 1967).

Although smaller and resulting in less physical violence than urban riots in other cities during the 1960's,

the riot of 1967 and the increased tensions between whites and blacks in Boston were to play a role in the mayoral election campaign of 1967. Running in the preliminary mayoral election were Louise Day Hicks, Kevin H. White, the Secretary of State for Massachusetts, and Edward Logue, the Director of the BRA who had successfully campaigned for large amounts of federal aid for Boston's urban renewal program. Although Logue had the support of Mayor Collins and the business community, his lack of support among lower-income groups led to his defeat in the preliminary election.

White was a relative unknown but offered liberals and blacks an alternative to the conservative Louise Day Hicks. Her stance on the Racial Imbalance Act, which she vowed to fight all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, endeared her to working class whites who adamantly opposed busing for the purpose of desegregation of public schools. White was considered to be a moderate on racial issues, but he opposed busing for young elementary school children.

White also promised an innovation in the structure of city government that would in fact build on the neighborhood solidarity that already existed in Boston. Promising to bring the city government closer to the people, White said that he would establish neighborhood aid centers to coordinate community projects and to serve as grievance centers and a link of communication between the people and

city hall.

Issues concerning the criminal justice system, particularly the police department, also surfaced in this campaign. Hicks, a "law and order" candidate, favored putting foot patrolmen back on the beat, assigning police to subway trains, and using helicopters as "watchdogs in the sky." (Lupo, 1967). But perhaps the most controversial stand Hicks took concerning the police, and the reason some cited for her defeat, was her announced plan to give police officers an increase in salary. According to Hicks, federal money was forthcoming that could be used to give Boston police officers raises. In the beginning of November, just prior to the election, it became known that federal funds could not be used for this purpose (Healy, 1967).

White also addressed problems in the police department. He supported more patrolmen on foot or on motor scooters, neighborhood substations, and the creation of the position of community service officers who would be in close contact with the citizens of the neighborhood (Healy, 1967). Furthermore, White promised to re-open police stations that had been closed earlier in the Collins administration (Reppetto, 1970).

The Boston Globe, for the first time in 71 years, broke its tradition of not endorsing political candidates. In 1967, it endorsed Kevin White for mayor, stating:

> There is a principle at stake in this election. In a city which once led the nation in public education and in calling for the end of slavery, it is now the principle of equal treatment for all people.
>
> And because principle rather than politics dictates its decision, the Globe today departs from its tradition and endorses Kevin H. White for mayor, and hopes that Boston voters will support him. (Nov. 6, 1967)

Kevin White defeated Louise Day Hicks by 12,000 votes. The city also elected its first black city councillor, Thomas J. Atkins, vice chairman of the NAACP. Despite these indications that the city did not want to become the site of increased racial strife, inter-racial relations were to deteriorate over the next decade. Racial tensions and school desegregation proved to be the issues to dominate White's term of office.

The White Administration: A City in Turmoil

One of White's first concerns after his election was to increase the minority community's confidence in the effectiveness and fairness of the police department. Although McNamara had instituted minor reforms in the department, White doubted his ability to respond to the racial issue. One example of the department's lack of sensitivity to the minority community was the fact that in 1967, no more than 4% of the Boston Police Department was black (Fogelson, 1977:248). When it became known that White favored McNamara's resignation, McNamara responded by

asserting his intention of remaining on the job. White had no authority to remove him, because former Mayor Collins had appointed McNamara to a second five year term in 1967 (Albert, n.d.; Howitt, 1976).

This initial negative interaction between White and McNamara was to set the tone for their relationship for the remainder of McNamara's tenure in office. White continued on an antagonistic course with McNamara by following up on one of his campaign promises: he reopened one old police station that McNamara had closed as well as another new station (Repetto, 1970). In July of 1968, White reorganized the Boston Police Department on his own, creating the position of superintendent-in-chief and appointing William Taylor, who was known to be sympathetic to White's own views. White also introduced a community relations division and appointed a black officer as its head (Randall, 1978).

In the meantime, the BPPA was increasing its political strength and became a force to be reckoned with in the course of implementing any changes in the department. The BPPA had made impressive gains for its members during negotiations for its first contract, which was signed in March, 1968, shortly after White had taken office. Although it had failed to obtain the salary it was demanding, the BPPA did obtain a smaller salary increase with a wage reopener later that year, 12 paid holidays, time and a half for all overtime, binding grievance arbitration, and a very strong union-rights clause. For the first time in the history of the department, officers required to work hours other than their regular shift were to be paid time and a half, resulting in a stabilization of working hours (Albert, n.d.). The first week after the contract was signed, membership in the BPPA, which was limited to patrolmen, jumped by 1,000 members (Randall, 1978).

White, along with many of those who had previously conducted studies of the Boston Police Department, believed that officers were overburdened with non-police type duties. He wanted to hire civilians as traffic directors so that officers could be released for law enforcement tasks. The BPPA opposed this move, fearing that hiring civilians would undermine their newly gained wage structure and demean their positions. They argued further that replacing police officers with civilians as traffic directors would deprive the downtown area of police protection and would cause merchants to move out (Randall, 1978).

In order to obtain funds to hire the civilians, White needed the approval of the city council, adding another political body to the already conflict-ridden situation. The council defeated White's request to hire civilians but authorized hiring additional police officers. The council was accused of playing White off against McNamara.

Following this defeat in city council, White appointed

a task force to study the police department's recruitment, training, and deployment patterns. Selected to co-chair the task force were Daniel Finn, Director of the Mayor's Office of Public Service, and Superintendent-in-Chief of the Boston Police Department, William Taylor. The task force released its findings in 1969. It called for the implementation of a new communications system; removing the tasks of census-taking, licensing, and providing ambulance services from the police department; and hiring civilians for the department. White immediately announced the deployment of 165 officers to patrol duty, assuming that their previously assigned duties had already been taken over by civilians (Randall, 1978). City Council finally acquiesced and approved White's request for funds to hire civilians.

The top command of the department opposed the task force's recommendations on the grounds that its own input had been ignored (Reppetto, 1970). The BPPA viewed White's task force as an attempt to quash the union itself. In the fall of 1969, the BPPA filed a grievance, which was dropped in 1970 (Randall, 1978).

By 1970, White had decided to run for governor of Massachusetts. In order to gain the support of the BPPA and other police associations across the state, White offered Boston patrolmen a generous salary increase (Howitt, 1976). Despite White's attempt to win the support of

police associations, he was unsuccessful in his bid to become governor.

In 1971, a court decision was handed down which was to have a major impact on the way the police department selected its recruits. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, several blacks and Puerto Ricans had filed suit against the Boston Police Department, charging that the entrance requirement for patrolmen discriminated against minorities and therefore violated the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Testimony by a police department superintendent of personnel and training indicated that there was no correlation between scores on the entrance examinations and on-the-job performance. As a result, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered that the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission design a job-related, non-discriminatory exam (Fogelson, 1977).

The next significant development in the police department was the expiration of Commissioner McNamara's tenure. Although the mayor credited McNamara with establishing "the first phase of the most modern communications system in the nation," the mayor said it was time for a new approach and a new set of priorities (Pillsbury, 1972). In November, 1972, Robert diGrazia was sworn in as Police Commissioner for Boston. DiGrazia had previously served as superintendent of the St. Louis County Police Department and had a reputation as a reformer. At the swearing-in

ceremony, White noted that there might be important changes in both the procedures and the personnel under diGrazia (Cowen, 1972).

Upon his appointment, diGrazia hired 4 civilian aides to assist in his effort to reform the police department.

One of diGrazia's appointments was Mark Furstenberg, a former associate director of the Police Foundation, which was viewed as a reform-oriented organization. DiGrazia expected Furstenberg to revitalize the planning and research division of the police department (Fogelson, 1977).

The appointment of individuals who were not only civilians but also outsiders to the city resulted in an immediate negative response from several groups. Police department members and union officials interpreted the move as a lack of confidence in the department. City council members were extremely vocal about the high salaries these aides were to receive (Albert, n.d.).

About six months after diGrazia took office, his administrative staff presented him with suggestions for modernizing the department. One suggestion that diGrazia favored was the implementation of a computer-assisted dispatching system. Eleven firms submitted bids to establish this system and in January, 1975, phase one of the development of the system began. A grant of more than $400,000 had been obtained from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to carry out this work. Phase two

was to begin in 1976 and a follow-up grant of $250,000 was approved by LEAA. The BPPA, however, pressured city council to reject the grant. City council acquiesced to this pressure, claiming that the funds would be used for civilians and consultants for projects of questionable benefit. Thus the development of the computer-assisted dispatch system was forestalled by the BPPA and city council (Hebert, 1978a).

DiGrazia also began the reorganization of assignments of sworn personnel in order to provide more officers for street patrol and to develop new district boundaries. DiGrazia hired a consultant to carry out the task. In September, 1973, new assignments were given out. Two days after the plan was implemented, the BPPA filed a grievance with the city's Office of Labor Relations. It charged that diGrazia's plan violated their contract because the Labor-Management Committee of the association had not been consulted. The Office of Labor Relations ruled that the BPPA had failed to prove its accusation and dismissed the case. In this instance, diGrazia was able to follow through with the implementation of his plan (Hebert, 1978b).

The pattern of conflict-ridden relations between the BPPA and diGrazia that began early in diGrazia's administration was to continue throughout his entire administration. The BPPA filed grievances and court cases against diGrazia on a wide variety of issues. One challenged diGrazia's authority to allow a Harvard student to ride

in a patrol car while others dealt with diGrazia's right to discipline police officers or conduct inquiries into their behavior. Still others dealt with operational and structural innovations diGrazia attempted to institute.

Despite the tensions that existed in the department, diGrazia prevailed in a large number of cases and was capable of introducing new structures and programs to the department. He centralized authority in six district commanders who were given the freedom to choose their own subordinates. He established a 911 emergency telephone number and a Special Investigation Unit to monitor the performance of patrolmen. He created an anti-crime unit, a "Maximum Patrol and Response Plan," which increased the number of patrol cars, and a "walk and talk" policy," where one patrolman remained in the car to communicate by radio with his partner walking the beat (Albert, n.d.).

While diGrazia was having his conflicts with the BPPA, the Boston School Committee was becoming involved in a number of court cases charging that the schools were deliberately segregated by race. The Massachusetts Department of Education contended that the Boston schools had failed to comply with the Racial Imbalance Act and therefore were not entitled to state aid for education. The state court hearing the case found Boston guilty of the charge but at the same time ruled that state aid must be disbursed to Boston. The state Commissioner of Education was

charged with designing a desegregation plan for the city.

During the same period, leaders of the Boston chapter of the NAACP initiated a case against the Boston School Committee on behalf of all black children in the school system. Morgan v. Hennigan charged that all black children had been denied equal protection under the law through the intentional racial segregation of the public schools. Additional charges included the segregation of faculty and discrimination in allocating resources.

In June, 1974, Federal Court Judge W. Arthur Garrity handed down his ruling, declaring that the Boston School Committee was guilty of the numerous charges of segregation and discrimination. He ordered the defendants to take affirmative steps to reverse the consequences of their unconstitutional conduct.

The school committee immediately announced its intention of appealing the order. Although the school committee and anti-busing groups in the city have appealed many of Judge Garrity's rulings over the years, the Circuit Court of Appeals has always upheld his orders, and the U.S. Supreme Court has always refused to hear the case. Thus school desegregation was implemented in Boston, although it erupted in numerous interracial clashes.

In September, 1974, the first phase of school desegregation took place. The entire city was not included in this phase, since there had been no time to draw up a plan.

The plan previously designed by the state Commissioner of Education was used for the first year, although several large areas of the city were not included in that plan. That first year, as in years to come, much of the violence surrounding school desegregation took place in South Boston. This tightly knit community was adamantly opposed to having blacks bused into "their" schools. The first weeks of school that year witnessed school boycotts by white students in South Boston and stonings of buses transporting black students. Large numbers of police were stationed at South Boston High School in an effort to avert increased violence.

In the meantime, Louise Day Hicks, who had since been elected to the city council, had organized a group of anti-busing citizens into a group called ROAR (Restore Our Alienated Rights). ROAR made known its sentiments by organizing protest marches and school boycotts and holding press conferences.

The tensions increased in South Boston during the first weeks of school. The mayor made a speech claiming that his only responsibility as mayor was public safety. His advice to those who disagreed with the court order was to express their disagreement without committing violent acts. Furthermore, he blamed the school committee for not taking enough responsibility for the situation. The school committee responded by asking the judge to name the mayor as a co-defendant in the case. The judge agreed.

Mayor White's response to the school committee's handling of the school desegregation problem was to attempt to gain control of the school department by a referendum vote. On the ballot in November, 1974, was a question which, if passed, would have restructured the school committee and would have given the mayor the power to appoint the school superintendent. The voters defeated the question, indicating that they were satisfied with the current structure of the school committee. They also voted down changing the city council election from at-large to district representation.

A stabbing at South Boston High School in December, 1974 resulted in the closing of the school for several weeks. When the school re-opened after Christmas vacation, increased police protection was present inside the school on a daily basis. The following school year, the plaintiffs in the case asked Judge Garrity to close South Boston High School, claiming that black students at the school were harassed by white students, faculty, and police troops alike. After holding hearings and visiting the school, Judge Garrity found that the plaintiffs' charges were true. He put the school under federal court receivership and removed the school's administrative staff.

The night the order was handed down, the NAACP office was firebombed. White students at South Boston High School walked out of classes while politicians such as Louise

Day Hicks publicly aired their hostile reactions to the order. The following spring, a new headmaster was chosen for South Boston High School. Jerome Winegar from Minnesota was given the task of restructuring the school in a community that was hostile to his arrival and with the outright resistance of school committee members.

There have been occasional interracial conflicts both at South Boston High School and in other areas of the city since the court's receivership order was handed down. In the spring of 1976, a group of white youths who had come to City Hall Plaza to protest school desegregation attacked a black passerby. Two weeks later a group of black youths attacked a white man driving through their neighborhood.

These attacks resulted in a "Procession against Violence," promulgated by political, civic, and religious leaders. The march attracted 50,000 people including the mayor and both U.S. Senators from Massachusetts. Prominent anti-busing leaders refused to participate.

More recently, Boston seems to have settled into a period in which the peace is sporadically interrupted by inter-racial conflicts. The leadership of the city responds by sending increased police protection into the area of conflict until the situation appears peaceful. On occassion, study groups or blue ribbon panels are appointed to make recommendations for inter-racial harmony. These groups usually conclude that the political, civic, and business

leaders in the city have failed to shoulder the responsibility for improving interracial relations. The federal court continues to compensate for the school system's failures by maintaining an active role in the operation of public schools.

The problem school desegregation created for the police department as well as the continuing conflicts among the various political leaders in the city seemingly took a toll on Police Commissioner diGrazia. In October, 1976, four years after his appointment, diGrazia announced his resignation. Although he claimed he resigned because the salary he received as Police Commissioner was inadequate, there was much speculation that his departure was caused by the difficult times he had endured during his 4 years in Boston and a recent rift that had occurred in his relationship with the mayor. Just prior to diGrazia's resignation, White had refused to acknowledge whether he would appoint diGrazia to a second five year term. The failure to commit himself to diGrazia's reappointment was seemingly an effort on the mayor's part to obtain more control over the Commissioner. DiGrazia was noted for behaving more independently than other city department heads, who had no fixed term of office and therefore were more dependent on the mayor. One local political commentator speculated that the rift between White and diGrazia derived from their similar personal characteristics and diGrazia's development

of a constituency in the city, especially among Italian-Americans and liberals (Rogers, 1976). DiGrazia himself had noted that his way of operating the police department did not fit into Boston's style of politics.

If diGrazia's stay in Boston was eventful, his leave-taking was just as noticeable. Several days before he actually left his position, a study conducted by the Special Investigation Unit released allegations of gross incompetence and corruption in police district one. Top ranking officials in the district were accused of improper relations with organized crime figures in the area.

The newly appointed Police Commissioner Joseph Jordan, formerly Superintendent-in-Chief and the first Boston Police Commissioner to rise through departmental ranks, was left holding the ball amid speculation that he might disband the Special Investigation Unit. He quickly eradicated this speculation by directing the unit's head to continue with investigations into the department. And although Jordan's relationships with the mayor and the BPPA have been less stormy than his predecessor's, he has continued the reforms that diGrazia instituted. His status as an insider has evidently resulted in improved relations with the BPPA and the ability to institute reforms.

The police department and the school desegregation issue have received the most attention during White's administration, but two other areas have also reflected

Boston's style of governance. The Suffolk County Jail, which is under the ultimate jurisdiction of the mayor and the Boston City Council, was the subject of another court case which was initiated on behalf of the jail's inmates. The inmates claimed that conditions at the jail violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Federal Court Judge W. Arthur Garrity ruled in 1973 that as a facility for pre-trial detention, the jail infringed upon the inmates' most basic liberties and their right to due process. Inadequate facilities and programs were cited in the ruling. Although, the judge noted that the defendants in the case had attempted to make improvements at the jail, he stated that the constitutional requirements could not be satisfied without the construction of a new jail and the addition of staff (Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 1973). By 1978, the city council had refused to appropriate funds for a new jail. Judge garrity then accepted the city's plan to renovate the facility. The case is still in process.

The other area that reflects the nature of governance in Boston is public housing. In 1977, Suffolk Superior Court Judge Paul G. Garrity appointed a master to oversee the clean-up of public housing units operated by the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) for 50,000 tenants. Garrity also ordered federal and state agencies to release the funds

they had withheld from the BHA because of its poor management (Boston Globe, June 1, 1977). The court has continued its jurisdiction in this case also.

Despite the overwhelming problems that have been exposed during White's tenure as mayor, he has successfully campaigned for re-election to the office of mayor three times. His continued success has been attributed in part to the urban renewal programs that have flourished during his administration. Although the state government has obstructed several major development projects planned for the city, White has successfully pushed through a number of projects that have contributed to stabilization of the city's economy. Continuing along the same lines as his two immediate predecessors, White has vigorously supported the development of the downtown Faneuil Hall-Quincy Market area and the waterfront. Clearly these achievements have won support from the local business community and the admiration of planners and developers across the country.

He has also been credited with establishing a political machine stronger than other mayors in Boston's history. His attempt to make use of strong neighborhood loyalties by establishing Little City Halls (the neighborhood aid centers promised in his first campaign) has served him well. He has used the patronage positions available to him to develop a strong base of support throughout the city, among the Irish and racial minorities alike.

At the end of 1978, Boston's prospects were different from those of other cities in the country. Its economy, boosted by major developments in the downtown area, continued on the upward trend that it had started on since the initiation of urban renewal. Its mayor had been in office longer than most large city mayors across the country, and he had built up what was considered a strong political machine. White's ability to govern effectively, however, was hampered by the strong inter-racial tensions and conflicts prominent in the city. Three of the city's major institutions, the schools, the jail, and public housing, remained under the control of the court system.

Conclusions

Boston is a city where politics continues to reign supreme. Attention to contemporary urban problems, especially crime, has been minimal in the post-World War II period. Solutions to the city's problems have been initiated by oppressed groups taking their claims against the city government to the court system. Intervention by state government has also been prominent. The unavoidable conclusion is that Boston politicians have failed to take responsibility for the institutions they are charged with running.

The historical precedent for this situation is strong. The early conflicts that arose between the Protestant Yankees and the Irish Catholic immigrants resulted in a city

bereft of legitimate authority over its own institutions. Beginning in the latter part of the 19th century, the state government gained control over many local Boston institutions. Although Boston has long had a strong mayor-weak council form of government, the number of areas in which the mayor could exert legitimate authority was small.

Boston mayors in the post-World War II period have done little to regain control over local institutions. Indeed, it appears that Boston's mayors have thrived on their lack of control and have been content to leave the governance of the city to the state and the courts. The Boston Police Department was returned to local control only after corruption in the department received national attention. Even then Mayor Collins' interest was in gaining control over the department's budget and not the Commissioner. Mayor White has perhaps been the exception to this trend with his unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the school department and his interest in the operation of the police department.

The overall picture of Boston presents a city which is dominated by conflict and adversarial relations. Conflict abounds at a variety of levels and in a number of substantive areas. Inter-ethnic and inter-racial conflicts have been most notable in the struggle surrounding the school system. However, the conflict surrounding the public housing authority and the jail also reflects inter-racial conflict as well as social class conflict. Public officials have done little or nothing to intervene in these situations. In the instance of school desegregation, the mayor, the city council, and the school committee have all opposed "forced busing." They have attempted to use the issue for their own political benefit, leaving the responsibility for desegregating the schools in the hands of the federal judge.

At present, the governance of Boston is not much different than it was earlier in the century, with the exception of court control over the three institutions mentioned. The major exception to this pattern of non-governance is the area of urban renewal and development. In this one area, the three most recent mayors of Boston have taken aggressive roles. Beginning with John Hynes and increasing under John Collins, mayors and the business elite of the city have cooperated to redevelop the city's physical appearance and bolster its once sagging economy. Kevin White has continued in this pattern, and some believe that "The Vault" established under Collins still exists for the purpose of making economic decisions for the city.

Crime has not been a prominent issue in the city in the post-World War II period. There have been occasional scandals and charges of corruption in the police department and sheriff's department. The structure of the court system is established by the state legislature and has remained

remarkably stable throughout the period. The district attorney's office is a quiet place where one man held the position of district attorney from 1952 until 1978. Through 1978, the positions of assistant district attorneys were part-time and considered to be political plums for lawyers who were in private practice. The office has been notable for its lack of action.

The police department is the one area of the criminal justice system where there has been some attempt at professionalization, but even there politics has prevailed. Several studies of the police department conducted in the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's emphasized the backward nature of the department and its misuse of personnel. The studies were commissioned by outsiders, however, not by the police department or the political structure of the city. The first 2 studies resulted in no response on the part of the department. The study in 1958 resulted in an attempt to initiate reforms, but the negative responses from police personnel, politicians, and the public stymied the reform effort.

Mayor White's appointment of Robert diGrazia as Police Commissioner in 1972 signified a new era in the Boston Police Department. DiGrazia clearly belonged to a camp of professional, reform-minded police administrators. The growing strength and militancy of the BPPA acted as a constant thorn in diGrazia's side. With every reform or

change he made, the BPPA filed a grievance or initiated a court suit. DiGrazia prevailed over the BPPA in most instances. However, he did not prevail over the mayor. Amid speculation that White was jealous of diGrazia's independence and popularity in the city in late 1976, White refused to state that he would reappoint diGrazia to a second 5-year term. Claiming that his salary was too low, diGrazia left his position. Analysis of the situation reveals that diGrazia was pushed out jointly by the mayor and the BPPA. Modernization of the police department was to continue under Joseph Jordan, but the leadership style became less aggressive and commanded less publicity. Boston politics was not ready for an aggressive, outspoken reformer to take the helm of its police department.

Boston's current political structure is dominated by a mayor who has built his strength on Boston's historical neighborhood solidarity. Mayor White's reopening of several precinct police stations and his establishment of Little City Halls have added to the city's decentralized structure and fed into the existing fragmentation of the city. His stance on the school desegregation issue was an attempt to please both anti-busing groups and pro-desegregation groups. He claimed he was against forced busing but in favor of school desegregation. This stance has served him well in terms of getting votes and achieving reelection. His ability to govern the city, however, has

suffered under this political strategy.

White's responses to the violent inter-racial interactions that have taken place in the city reflect Boston's long history of a local government with little substance. Just as the city council has been content with its continuing status as a debating society, the mayor of Boston has been content to engage in symbolic marches protesting violence and the appointment of blue-ribbon advisory panels.

The cooperation and professionalism that have been generated surrounding the issue of urban development have not been forthcoming in the administration of the city's institutions, including its criminal justice system. The few public institutions that had remained under the city's authority were taken over by the court system. The recurrent pattern of conflict that has been highly visible in Boston since the middle of the 19th century has rendered the city incapable of governing itself.

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