

MF-1

Police Department Policies and Patrol Officer Satisfaction: Case Studies of Six Police Departments

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

ABSTRACT

The current research assesses the relationship between the policy structures of six police departments--Atlanta, Denver, Montgomery County (Maryland), New Orleans, Portland and San Diego--and patrol officer satisfaction with department operations. A 27-item survey covering respondents' experience, aspirations, working conditions, demographic characteristics and satisfaction with job and department operations was administered to a total of 849 patrol officers. Results from this survey and detailed case studies in ten policy areas suggest that patrol officer satisfaction is greatest in those departments where the role of the patrol officer is defined by a high degree of autonomy, where procedures governing advancement and discipline encourage equal application, and where patrol officers are given wide opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their jobs. At least four other factors in the occupational environment of the patrol officer are potentially important determinants of patrol officer satisfaction with department operations: administrators' management styles, department history and culture, support from city hall, and police officer association representation.

This report also contains four appendices. The first reviews the job satisfaction and police literature, with particular reference to this study. Other appendices include the responses by the police chiefs in the selected sites to the research findings, the questions used in the police officer opinion survey, and the frequency distributions of their responses.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Introduction

The past decade has seen a proliferation of new police management practices and deployment procedures. While the attitudes of patrol officers toward these initiatives have been the subject of increasing concern within the law enforcement community, the literature in the field includes few systematic attempts to assess the relationship between department policies and patrol officer satisfaction. The present study was designed to explore this relationship through an analysis of the policy structures of six departments and a survey of patrol officer satisfaction with department operations.

Scope and Purpose of the Research

The body of literature regarding police officer attitudes toward their work suggests three important dimensions for characterizing variations in police department policy and patrol officer satisfaction: autonomy, fairness and participation. In this study it was hypothesized that satisfaction would be greatest where the role of the patrol officer was defined by a high degree of autonomy, where procedures governing advancement and discipline encouraged equal application and where patrol officers were given opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their jobs.

Ten policy areas were selected for detailed study:

- Management of the role of the patrol officer,
- Patrol officer input in decision-making,
- Police officer association input in decision-making,
- Promotion,
- Investigative assignment selection,
- Transfer,
- Discipline,
- Shift assignment,
- One- v. two-officer patrol units, and
- Education.

To varying degrees, nine of these areas reflect the management paradigms of participation, fairness and autonomy. The tenth--education--was included because of its potentially important implications for patrol officer satisfaction. All ten areas offered sufficient variation to permit the study to document a range of experience. Each also has department-wide application and is, to a large extent, under the control of police administrators and thus subject to manipulation by upper management.

A panel of eight police administrators and association leaders and twelve researchers participated in the selection of six departments. To provide the study with a range of management practice in each policy area, respondents were asked to nominate large- and medium-sized departments that represented extremes in management philosophy. Other selection criteria included geographic and socio-economic comparability among sites classified at either end of the management continuum, and the willingness of departments to participate in the study.

Among the sites selected, the management policies in Montgomery County (Maryland), Portland and San Diego were reputed to offer a high degree of autonomy, participation and regard for equality of application. In contrast, Atlanta, Denver and New Orleans appeared to emphasize more centralized, discretionary decision-making.

Survey Procedures and Results

A 27-item survey was administered to a total of 849 officers representing between 20 and 53 percent of the total patrol officer population in each department. The instrument covered respondents' experience, aspirations, working conditions, demographic characteristics and satisfaction with job and department operations.

The survey results, arrayed in Figure I, revealed a wide distribution in the level of patrol officer satisfaction across the six departments under study. On a scale between 0 and 10, representing "Very Dissatisfied" to "Very Satisfied," the median level of satisfaction with department operations varied from 1.5 in Atlanta to 7.0 in Portland. Between these two extremes fell Montgomery County with a median value of 2.0; New Orleans, 3.0; Denver, 3.5; and San Diego, 5.0.

The Relationship Between Policy and Satisfaction

To document the policies and practices in the departments under study, structured interviews were conducted with a sample of officers and command personnel at each site. These interviews, together with the survey results, on-site observation and reviews of policy manuals and memoranda, produced detailed case studies of the formal policies and informal practices in each of the ten areas of interest.

In each policy area, departments were arrayed on a continuum reflecting degrees of emphasis on participation, procedural equity, autonomy and reward for advanced education. Summarized briefly below are those aspects of policy and practice described by these continua that appear to explain differences among departments in patrol officer satisfaction with department operations.

- Management of the Role of the Patrol Officer

  Across the six departments studied there was wide variation in the degree to which the role of the patrol officer

FIGURE 1

Distribution of Satisfaction With Department Operations by Police Department



Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

extended beyond routine patrol and response to calls for service. At one end of the continuum, the patrol officer as "manager" of his district was provided extensive autonomy and flexibility in establishing district-specific law enforcement strategies. Relatively close supervision and the constant demand of calls for service characterized the opposite end of this continuum. This variation in autonomy and participation (which derived both from manpower shortages and relative emphases on centralized decision-making) was generally consistent with differences in reported levels of satisfaction with department operations.

- Patrol Officer Input in Decision-making

  This policy continuum ranged from aggressive efforts to encourage patrol officer input in the development of department policy to the absence of mechanisms to communicate directly with the administration. Between these two extremes were nominal means of participation that were not perceived as providing real opportunities to influence policy. Both interview and survey results offered substantial evidence that the availability of avenues for participation combined with a demonstrated commitment to those avenues by administrators contributed to levels of expressed satisfaction with department operations.

- Police Officer Association Input in Decision-making

  The variation in the degree of police officer association influence formed a striking continuum. Among the six cities were those with single employee organizations representing a substantial majority of patrol officers and possessing defined opportunities for formal and informal participation. Multiple organizations with non-representative memberships and limited influence on administrative decisions defined the opposite end of this continuum. These differences reflected the degree of unity among the rank-and-file and the extent to which the association was perceived as an advocate of the concerns of its members, and were associated with variations in reported satisfaction with department operations.

- Promotion

  The range of policy options in this area is largely defined by the degree of objectivity embodied in the criteria governing promotion. Across the six sites, this continuum began with the completely objective criterion of a written exam and proceeded to systems providing administrators with relatively wide latitude to promote those they believed most qualified. While this continuum posits subjective criteria as a source of dissatisfaction, the survey and interview results suggested that advancement opportunities and perceptions regarding the qualifications of those promoted were

more closely related to patrol officer satisfaction than the nature of the promotional criteria. Officers could see relatively wide opportunities for promotion in a subjective system and did not necessarily consider such a system unfair if those promoted were viewed as highly qualified for advancement.

- Investigative Assignment Selection

  The criteria and procedures for selecting officers for investigative assignments also varied from well-specified to highly informal. Formalized selection procedures were generally associated with partially objective criteria, a vacancy posting requirement and perceived fairness. In departments where standards were not made explicit, selection was seen as highly subject to political favoritism, sometimes at the expense of officer qualifications. At the same time, opportunities for selection were believed to be denied to qualified officers who were not well-connected. While perceived fairness was not necessarily associated with satisfaction, perceptions of political favoritism in the selection of investigators were related to dissatisfaction to the extent that preferential treatment reflected a broader cultural tradition.

- Transfer

  The policies and practices governing self-initiated transfers from one patrol area to another were quite similar across departments, all relying generally on "swaps" arranged in order to maintain existing manpower levels. Denied consideration of transfer requests for "just cause" and the processing of requests in order of receipt are two practices which distinguished this continuum, reflecting a general management orientation towards the accommodation of individual rather than organizational preferences. Similarly, the absence of these practices was generally consistent with perceptions of limited opportunities for transfer, political favoritism in allocating those opportunities, and disaffection with department operations.

- Discipline

  While the chief had final authority to administer discipline in each of the study sites, opportunities to participate in the development of disciplinary policy, provisions for peer review and procedures to safeguard the rights of the accused were the variable elements among departments in this policy area. At one end of the spectrum, authority to recommend punishment rested with a trial board, including one officer of the same rank as the accused. Administrative discretion was limited by requiring the chief to state in writing his reasons for increasing penalties recommended by the board. At the other end, the chief exercised exclusive disciplinary power in the absence of a formal hearing. At the mid-point

were formal review boards without patrol officer representation. Like investigative assignment selection, perceived fairness in discipline did not necessarily translate into satisfaction. In departments defined by a history of political favoritism, however, perceptions of politics in selection were associated with dissatisfaction.

- Shift Assignment

  Shift assignment policies did not emerge as an important source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction within any of the departments studied. Officers in departments that selected permanent shifts according to seniority tended to appreciate the application of the single standard. Officers subject to rotating shifts also believed that fairness prevailed as junior officers were not consistently burdened with the "graveyard" shift. Patrol officer participation in the development of shift assignment policy was evident in both satisfied and dissatisfied departments.

- One- Versus Two-Officer Patrol Units

  Among the six departments were examples of the exclusive use of one-man units as well as a mix of one- and two-officer units assigned to reflect demand or differences in patrol functions. While earlier literature has reported consistent opposition to one-man cars from patrol officers, the current survey findings suggest a much more positive consensus among the rank-and-file. Very few agreed that two-officer units were essential in all areas at all times. The preferred policy emphasized individual choice and a mix of one- and two-man patrol units deployed in response to changing crime conditions across districts and over time.

- Education

  This continuum was based on the degree to which advanced education was rewarded. Policies ranged from rewards of promotion, special assignments and pay to the absence of any formal incentives. The relationship between variations in incentives and degrees of satisfaction was largely a function of the educational profiles of the departments studied--with more (or fewer) incentives related to greater (or lesser) proportions of highly-educated patrol officers. As a result, among departments with few incentives, policy change might produce differences in satisfaction based on levels of educational attainment. While more educated officers might perceive a fairer system, the less educated would be more inclined to view these rewards as an artificial measure of performance. Viewing only educational achievement apart from the issue of incentives, the survey results showed a slight positive correlation between current education level and satisfaction.

In order to examine the relationship between satisfaction and these observed variations in policy and practice, ordinal values were assigned to denote the position of each department in each policy area. These formed the basis for a single overall ranking (from 1 to 6) which reflected the extent to which autonomy, fairness, participation and rewards for advanced education were manifested in the policy structures of the six departments.

While our findings show that policy affects satisfaction, it is important to note the absence of any simple causal relationship. With only six cities, our information on policy was necessarily derived largely from case study observations. Moreover, numerous individual differences are reflected in the responses to the satisfaction survey. While we removed the effects of some of these differences, others must be relegated to the class of unexplained variance.

Finally, it is clear that other factors in the occupational environment of the patrol officers are potentially important determinants of policy and patrol officer attitudes toward their departments. The case study results have suggested at least four sources of environmental support to the position of the patrol officer that serve to confound direct associations between policy and satisfaction:

- Administrators' management styles defined by expressions of trust in their patrol officers' judgment and responsiveness to their opinions;
- Department history and culture manifested in the extent of political favoritism and hierarchical management;
- Support from city hall expressed through salaries and wages, working conditions and affirmative action policies; and
- Police officer association representation as it influences those conditions outlined above.

Research Agenda

The present research has attempted to provide police administrators with an understanding of the common aspects of management policy and practice that appear to be related to patrol officer satisfaction. The available evidence supports the conclusion that the policies extant in the six departments studied have a significant bearing on patrol officer satisfaction. Yet, given the absence of experimental conditions and the inclusion of only six sites, the generalizability of this finding has yet to be tested. This suggests the need for longitudinal study of the process of policy development and change over time. Another important area for future research inquiry lies in the translation of present findings into the domain of job performance. While the relationship between satisfaction and performance is undeniably complex and fraught with difficulty in the development of adequate performance measures, the question is one of central importance

to police management. Other areas for future research suggested by the findings of the current study include:

- Policy implementation,
- Policy descriptions,
- Mediating factors,
- External consequences of dissatisfaction,
- Perceptions of policy and internal relations, and
- Methodology.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When we began this project in September 1977, we realized that a study of patrol officer perceptions of department operations would make the task of gaining access to six police departments a difficult one. We feel both gratitude and respect for the six police chiefs--George Napper of the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services, Arthur Dill of the Denver Police Department, Robert di Grazia of the Montgomery County Department of Police, Bruce Baker of the Portland Bureau of Police and William Kolender of the San Diego Police Department--who opened up their departments for our research. Their cooperation and candor throughout the course of the study testify to their very real concern for the well-being of their officers.

During the past two years, we have benefited from many acts of kindness and generous gifts of time and knowledge. We particularly wish to thank Director Mike Edwards in Atlanta, Lieutenant George Buzick in Denver, Captain Tom McDonald in Montgomery County, Lieutenant John Hughes in New Orleans, Deputy Chief James Brouillette in Portland and Ms. Cindy Bennett in San Diego for their assistance as liaisons to the study. They facilitated the data collection effort and made themselves available to answer our many questions. Though too numerous to mention by name, we very much wish to express our appreciation to all of the patrol officers, police association presidents, sergeants, patrol commanders and administrators in the six study sites whose willingness to offer their insights into the operations of their departments made this study possible.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, the innovation in police management has included a variety of techniques and strategies with potentially important implications for patrol officer job satisfaction. While most of these management tools have been designed ultimately to increase police effectiveness, some, such as directed patrol and educational incentives, have at least an implied objective of improved officer satisfaction. Others, like one-man cars and promotional oral boards, appear to have created some dissatisfaction among patrol officers. Despite the attention paid by the law enforcement community to the attitudes of patrol officers towards these initiatives, there have been few systematic attempts to assess the relationship between alternative policy options and patrol officer satisfaction across departments. The research in this area, for the most part, has consisted of program evaluations in a single department. Thus, while we know how some officers feel about some policies, we have a limited understanding of the extent to which differences in policy are associated with interdepartmental differences in patrol officer satisfaction.

1.1 Scope and Purpose of the Research

The current research is designed to explore the relationship between the policy structure of police departments and patrol officer satisfaction with department operations. Through extensive field interviews and observations, the study has documented the policy structures of six departments: Atlanta, Denver, Montgomery County (Maryland), New Orleans, Portland and San Diego. These departments were selected to represent a spectrum of experience in ten policy areas ranging from assignment and promotional mechanisms to disciplinary procedures and participatory management policies. At the same time, patrol officer satisfaction was measured through a survey administered to a sample of officers in each of the six departments. The result is a non-statistical, qualitative analysis of the differences in formal policy and informal practice.

While it is not the purpose of this study to explore all potential sources of patrol officer satisfaction with department operations, it is important, at the outset, to recognize that satisfaction does not bear a simple cause-effect relationship to the policies under study. A variety of institutional, contextual and individual factors obviously must be considered. Figure 1.1 presents a highly simplified model of the system of relationships which mediate the process by which policy can affect satisfaction. The model is oversimplified--both in that it is an abstraction from a complex reality and, perhaps more seriously, in that it does not take account of simultaneity and feedback. It does, however, identify the principle factors which must be considered in attempting to trace the effects of policy variations on patrol officer satisfaction.

The most obvious feature of the model is the distinction between policy and its implementation. It is a truism in program evaluation that there is a wide disparity between policy and implementation (Rossi, 1978). It would be naive to expect, for example, that a strictly merit promotion system would affect an officer's work situation, much less his satisfaction if no promotions have occurred in a five-year period. In a similar fashion, a highly fair personnel policy can be non-functional if there are factors in the objective situation which militate against fairness. For example, promotion by objective examination, while impartial and impersonal, may inadequately reflect subtle interpersonal factors which can affect performance.

A somewhat more difficult problem for this study lies in the realm of individual differences. Satisfaction is a joint product of objective and personal factors. Desires and expectations may not be in consonance with a realistic assessment of the job situation or even with each other. So, for example, officers having little leadership potential can desire promotion even if they know they do not merit it. In addition, they may easily be blind to their own shortcomings. Systems where desires and expectations are not consonant with reality can exhibit high levels of dissatisfaction no matter how enlightened are policy and administration. Somewhat more seriously, an impartial policy can be perceived as unfair by those who derived or expected to derive advantage from a previous policy which was less balanced. Affirmative action, community control, and the Miranda decision are three areas where policy changes, regardless of their merits or equity, had the effect of reducing advantages held by certain groups of officers or indeed officers in general. Change may help some people and harm others. In the case of affirmative action an increase in overall system equity in the long term appears to result in a decrease in perceived personal equity for some in the short term.

Factors outside of the police department also affect satisfaction. It is not unusual to find that system improvements often accompany (and perhaps are caused by) a worsening of extra-system realities. It is not our purpose to

FIGURE 1.1

Policy and Satisfaction Linkages



investigate the causal connections between changes in crime rate and sentencing practices and the reform of personnel practices. It is, however, worth noting that they may offset one another. A hostile environment can offset the most enlightened system or a beneficial environment may offset an archaic or corrupt one. Lastly, a number of other factors such as salary levels, inflation, adequacy of equipment, and climate, all have effects which disturb the relationship being studied. These factors are discussed in subsequent chapters to the extent that they aid both in defining important differences across the six departments and in interpreting the relationship between policy and satisfaction within individual departments.

1.2 The Policies Selected for Study

Given the large number of policies available for study, four major factors guided our initial selection of policy variables. First, we wanted to consider policy areas that were characterized by a range of policy options so that we could examine the implications of different alternatives for satisfaction. Second, we wanted to include policy areas that were, to some extent, under the control of police administrators and thus subject to change through policy. Third, we wanted to examine policies that had department-wide application in order to eliminate the need to consider intra-departmental variations. And, finally, we wanted to select areas of policy that the police literature identified as potentially important sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. These policies, we found, were largely defined along three dimensions:

- participation, or the extent to which patrol officers are provided opportunities to share in policy decisions that affect their jobs.
- fairness, or the extent to which procedures governing the distribution of rewards and punishment provide for equal application; and
- autonomy, or the extent to which patrol officers are given freedom, independence and discretion in scheduling and carrying out their work assignments;

The following ten policy areas were selected for study according to these criteria and the views of a group of 25 geographically distributed police officers who included administrators, police association leaders and members of the rank-and-file:

- Management of the role of the patrol officer,
- Patrol officer input in decision-making,

- Police officer association input in decision-making,
- Promotion,
- Investigative assignment selection,
- Transfer,
- Discipline,
- Shift assignment,
- One- versus two-officer patrol units, and
- Education.

The dimensions of participation, fairness and autonomy are reflected to varying degrees in nine of these ten policy areas. The tenth, education, has been included in the study because of its potentially important implications for patrol officer satisfaction. Educational policies are assessed in terms of the extent to which officers are rewarded for advanced education.

1.3 Site Selection

Tne research design was structured to provide maximum information about the relationship between the management paradigms of participation, fairness and autonomy, as reflected in formal and informal department policy, and patrol officer satisfaction. It was hypothesized that satisfaction would be greatest where the role of the patrol officer was defined by a high degree of autonomy, where procedures governing advancement and discipline encouraged equal application, and where patrol officers were given opportunities for participation in decisions affecting their jobs. Three departments were selected which appeared to represent this pole of the management continuum. As a comparison group, three departments were sought where patrol officer autonomy was limited in favor of close supervision, where management was permitted to exercise broad discretionary power in the distribution of non-monetary rewards and punishment, and where few opportunities for participation were available.

Identification of the six departments representing the extremes in management philosophy was based on the combined perceptions of a panel of eight police administrators and association leaders and twelve researchers in the field. Respondents were asked to consider 39 medium- and large-sized police departments (those serving populations of between 300,000 and 1,000,000) and to nominate those whose national reputations placed them on either end of the

continuum defined by the management strategies outlined above. After these subjective nominations were completely recorded, they were compared with a number of policy measures associated with mobility, choice over working hours, education, management seminars, and other techniques to facilitate officer participation, which were collected by telephone from each department.

Departments which were not nominated by the panel as representing either end of the management spectrum, or for which there were conflicting indicators of management philosophy, were successively eliminated until only the least ambiguously classified departments remained. At this stage, the group of potential candidates exceeded the six which would ultimately be required to allow for attrition of non-cooperative departments, and to permit a partial matching of cities on regional and socio-economic variables.

Interest in participation was initially solicited by letter and follow-up telephone call to the chiefs of ten candidate departments. Two refused to participate at that point. The project director visited the other eight departments and met with each chief and members of his staff to explain the purpose of the study, solicit final cooperation and develop preliminary data collection plans. Two other departments refused to participate after this visit. All four departments cited the competing resource demands of on-going research as their reason for refusal. While we have no way to verify whether these other studies were the real reasons for refusal, readers should be aware of the possibility that refusals were biased in ways which tended to exclude departments with serious political or labor/management problems--departments whose administrators might have had reason to fear the results of a study of patrol officer perceptions of department operations. Since this research is primarily concerned with one precisely-defined aspect of management variability, the exclusion of problem departments reduced a potential extraneous source of variation, and probably slightly enhanced the ability of the researchers to concentrate on the questions of interest, free from distraction by idiosyncratic administrative problems.

Table 1.1 shows the geographic and managerial stratification of the six police departments which eventually participated in the study. Montgomery County (Maryland), Portland and San Diego were reputed to offer a high degree of officer input in decision-making, to make personnel decisions with a high regard for officer qualifications, and to grant substantial latitude to individual patrol officers. The three contrasting departments--Atlanta, Denver and New Orleans--appeared to have more centralized decision-making, to permit a greater degree of discretion in decisions affecting advancement and discipline, and to emphasize supervision over patrol officer autonomy.

TABLE 1.1

Participating Police Departments

	West	South
Participatory	San Diego Portland	Montgomery County (Md.)
Centralized	Denver	Atlanta New Orleans

Table 1.2 displays several key characteristics of these communities and their respective police departments. All of these jurisdictions share the sunbelt traits of growing populations, relatively low unemployment and a transition to more developed economies. These factors may influence the general level of worker satisfaction; they certainly influence the kinds of alternative employment which are available to dissatisfied police officers. Maintaining approximate geographic comparability between the two representative groups should thus have suppressed some of the potential extraneous variation due to environmental differences.

1.4 Data Sources and Data Collection

In addition to the data collected for site selection purposes, information about the six departments was drawn from three sources: a survey, formal documentation and interviews. A 27-item survey was employed to determine officer experience and aspirations, working conditions, and respondent demographics. (See Appendix III.) The survey was largely administered during the roll call period where all officers on duty at the time of the administration were invited to participate. In a few instances, however, when manpower shortages were extremely acute, officers were called in individually to complete the survey. Officers working on all three major shifts were represented. In most cases, patrol areas (districts, divisions, precincts, or zones) selected for study represented the highest and lowest hazard (measured by crime rate, assaults on officers, and calls for service) in each city. (Portland, with only three precincts, and San Diego, whose divisions are heterogeneous, were exceptions.) In administering the survey, the researchers provided an introductory briefing explaining the purpose of the study, assuring the respondents' anonymity, and giving instructions for completing the form. Most officers completed the survey in fifteen to twenty minutes and more than 99 percent returned a completed instrument.[1] The number of respondents and the proportion of the total patrol officer population surveyed in each department are shown in Table 1.3.

[1] The frequency distributions or medians for most of the items in the survey have been included as Appendix IV.

TABLE 1.2

Characteristics of Participating Sites

PORTLAND

- estimated population: 384,500
- crime index: 95.76 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 7.7%
- median income: $9,789
- % below poverty: 8.1%
- total sworn personnel: 840
  - % female: 19.4%
  - % minority: 4.6%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $14,060-18,845
- total department budget: $25,058,195

SAN DIEGO

- estimated population: 824,000
- crime index: 79.41 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 10.8%
- median income: $10,159
- % below poverty: 9.3%
- total sworn personnel: 1,104
  - % female: 7.2%
  - % minority: 13.1%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $13,236-17,556
- total department budget: $36,314,802

DENVER

- estimated population: 516,100
- crime index: 104.51 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 29%
- median income: $9,650
- % below poverty: 9.4%
- total sworn personnel: 1376
  - % female: 4.9%
  - % minority: 19.5%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $15,880-18,552
- total department budget: $30,836,100

NEW ORLEANS

- estimated population: 600,000
- crime index: 66.50 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 45.4%
- median income: $7,442
- % below poverty: 21.6%
- total sworn personnel: 1,464
  - % female: 3.6%
  - % minority: 12.8%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $12,228-12,228
- total department budget: $39,800,000

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

- estimated population: 600,000
- crime index: 41.0 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 10.8%
- median income: $16,708
- % below poverty: 3.0%
- total sworn personnel: 732
  - % female: 4.8%
  - % minority: 5.3%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $13,254-23,449
- total department budget: $29,296,823

ATLANTA

- estimated population: 500,000
- crime index: 91.2 per 1,000 pop.
- % minority: 51.4%
- median income: $8,398
- % below poverty: 5.9%
- total sworn personnel: 1,047
  - % female: 8.7%
  - % minority: 33.7%
- min-max base patrol officer salary: $11,510-14,539
- total department budget: $28,012,000

TABLE 1.3

Sample Size and Percentage of Total Patrol Officer Population* Surveyed by Department

Department	Sample Size	Percentage of Total Patrol Officer Population
Atlanta	131	20
Denver	138	20
Montgomery County	98	21
New Orleans	138	26
Portland	161	53
San Diego	183	36

*Patrol officers assigned to patrol areas.

Information about department policy intentions and implementation procedures was drawn from department policy manuals and formal memoranda, interviews and items on the patrol officer opinion survey. Policy manuals--rules and procedures, operations manuals, standard operating procedures, etc.--were the source of formal policy statements. The information generated by these sources was contrasted with that obtained through interviews where respondents were asked to describe how policies "actually" operated in their departments.

Certain survey items were intended to provide indirect checks on the actual degree of autonomy, patrol officer perceptions of promotional opportunities, and the extent to which patrol officers believed they influenced policy decisions. Additional verification was provided by Question 12 of the survey instrument, which asked respondents to nominate and comment on the three policy areas which, for each patrol officer, represented the most important sources of dissatisfaction.

Table 1.4 lists the number of interviewees at each site by departmental position. Patrol officers were selected at random by the researchers from the day and evening rosters in the patrol areas surveyed earlier. Officers with less than 12 months experience with the department were excluded from selection. In all cases, the sergeants interviewed were the supervisors of the patrol officers who were in the interview and survey samples. Interview notes permit matching of officers to supervisors. Commanding officers are likewise matched to officers in surveyed/interviewed patrol areas. Figure 1.1 shows the schedule of data collection. In two of the departments, major external events occurred after the survey was administered but immediately

preceding the interview phase. These events--a police strike in New Orleans and the departure of the chief in Montgomery County--are likely to have significantly influenced the attitudes and feelings expressed by the interview respondents.

TABLE 1.4

Number of Interviews at Each Site by Position

Position	Number
Patrol officer	16-20
Sergeant	10-12
Commanding officer	2-4
Chief of patrol and/or chief of operations	1-2
Director of personnel	1
Director of training	1
Supervisor in the detective division	1
President of the police officer association	1-2
Chief	1
TOTAL	34-44

FIGURE 1.2

Data Collection Schedule



1.5 Limitations

While the preceding discussion implicitly defines the boundaries of this study, it is well to list explicitly some of the questions which necessarily remain outside that boundary. Some of these limitations are imposed by the kinds of data which were available. Others are inherent in the logic which directed the study.

Satisfaction. When we speak of the level of satisfaction with a department, we create a statistical fiction which attempts to summarize diverse affective responses. Individuals will express levels of satisfaction substantially above or below the level attributed to the group. Such dispersion comes from many sources. No two individuals employ identical definitions of satisfaction, much less have the same concept of what "4.0" means on such a scale. Thus, even if it made sense to imagine that all members of a group of officers were "equally" satisfied, we would not expect all of them to provide the same response on a questionnaire.

In addition to differences in expression, our data reflect genuine differences in individual satisfaction, traceable to everything from childhood career aspirations to yesterday's dinner menu. Some of these differences are therefore at least partially measurable through analytic techniques. Others are not so systematically related, and must be relegated, at least for the purposes of this study, to the class of unexplained variance.

Departments. This study concerns only six of the 39 medium- and large-sized police departments in the United States, and the data reflect them only at a single instant in their histories. Not only are the other 33 departments different from the six we studied, but even these six are probably different now from what they were at the time of data collection. Indeed, in one of the departments a complete change of administration occurred even as our study was in progress, with effects that are apparent in the data. Because this study represents the first measurement of its kind, we cannot tell how much of the observed satisfaction level in any particular department is transient and how much represents a stable underlying reality.

The departments were specifically chosen to represent a diversity of management policy and style. A consequence of this choice is that these particular six departments are not a random sample from the total pool of departments, and their characteristics almost certainly differ, at least in detail, from those of the population of departments. In particular, since the selection mechanism concentrated on policy extremes, the range of policies and attitudes reflected by departments in this study is probably greater than that which would have occurred in a random sample, and "average" departments--those lying near the center of the distribution--are probably under-represented.

Policy. The study attempts to compare several policy areas among the departments and to relate differences in policy to differences in how satisfied employees are with their jobs and their departments. Our classification of policies comes from a series of interviews conducted with officers at all levels of the department. While this procedure provided us with a range of perceptions of how policies were implemented, we must be continually aware of the possible differences between perceived and actual policy. There is almost certain to be a delay between the time a policy is changed and the time those changes are experienced. During this time, depending on the department's social context, perceptions may be either more or less favorable than actual policy. Since satisfaction is at least partly a response to perceived, rather than actual, policy, the information gathered by our interviews presumably is relevant to predicting employee satisfaction. A change in policy which is not reflected in a change in perception, however, may have less than the anticipated effect on satisfaction.

Use of the policy classifications as explanatory of satisfaction introduces further conceptual ambiguities. A department's policy configuration derives from factors both internal and external to the department: the political context of the municipal government, prevailing local economic conditions, the personalities of key administrators, the evolutionary history of labor-management settlements over the last generation, and so on. Many of these same factors which shape policy also influence the satisfaction expressed by patrol officers working in these environments. Therefore, the mere association of policy differences with satisfaction differences falls short of establishing full causal links between the two domains. In particular, it is highly

unlikely that if San Diego, for example, adopted the policies of Denver, but retained the environment of San Diego, that the distribution of satisfaction scores in the two cities would coalesce.

This problem of spurious correlations is particularly acute because the study is limited to a single temporal cross-section of six departments. Either longitudinal variation or a substantially larger number of observation units would permit the introduction of statistical controls to test the competing claims of other possible antecedent variables. The best information short of a fully randomized experimental design would come from a longitudinal study sufficiently extensive to include actual changes in policy, and to study their possible causes and effects. Perhaps the preliminary measurement of the present research can provide the impetus for such a study.

1.6 Organization of This Report

In the four chapters which follow, the ten policy areas studied are organized under the management paradigms of participation, procedural equity (fairness), participation, and education, with reference to the literature and implementation practices in the six study sites. At the end of each discussion, each policy area is summarized in tables in which the departments are arrayed along a policy continuum. A description of the major sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in each department which places those polices within the larger organization context forms the substance of Chapter 6. The study concludes with a final chapter which describes the policy options and other environmental factors that appear to be associated with patrol officer satisfaction in an effort to suggest areas of needed organizational change.

Four appendices related to the research or summarizing its findings are placed at the end of the study. Appendix I contains a literature review of the important and relevant work in the job satisfaction and police fields, and it is followed by a bibliography of the literature. Appendix II contains the responses to the research findings by the police chiefs of the selected sites. The 27-item police officer opinion survey forms the third appendix. Finally, the quantitative results of the survey are summarized in frequency distributions along with four figures which present a measurement of police officer satisfaction based on an 11-point Likert scale.

CHAPTER 2: PARTICIPATION

2.1 Management of the Role of the Patrol Officer

Recent efforts to improve the productivity of the patrol function have included a number of alternatives to random patrol. Police departments have experimented with these alternatives under the assumption that planned activities which address specific law enforcement problems would represent a more effective use of patrol resources. The redefinition of the role of the patrol officer under "directed" patrol includes responsibility for analyzing conditions on his beat and developing strategies to deal with them. At the same time, the patrol supervisor becomes less concerned with rule enforcement and more involved in strategy-planning with his officers (Boydstun and Sherry, 1975; Kansas City Police Department, 1975; New Haven Police Department, 1975; Gay et al., 1977a).

While the major objective of directed patrol has been enhanced effectiveness, the implementation of these programs may have potentially important implications for patrol officer satisfaction. There is at least some evidence in the literature that two aspects of directed patrol are associated with improved satisfaction. The first is increased opportunities for input in decisions that patrol officers appear to believe they are in the best position to make (Gay et al., 1977b; Rubinstein, 1973; Alex, 1976); the second is freedom from close supervision (Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1973; Alex, 1976).

Within this context, this policy refers to institutionalized efforts of departments to expand the role of the patrol officer beyond the scope of responding to calls for service and performing random patrol. The two dimensions of the patrol role which define differences across departments include:

- participation, or the extent to which patrol officers are provided opportunities to share in establishing patrol procedures; and
- autonomy, or the extent to which patrol officers are given freedom, independence and discretion in scheduling and carrying out their work assignments.

Among the six departments studied, three have established formal and informal means of expanding the role of the patrol officer beyond routine patrol. The remaining three sites have no such mechanisms and manpower shortages in two of these departments have constrained even routine patrol activities. Table 2.2 (at the conclusion of this section) summarizes the position of each department on a continuum that represents the highest to lowest extent of participation and autonomy. The policies and practices in each department are described in further detail below.

Portland. In contrast to the typical quasi-military model, where decisions move down the chain of command, the Portland Bureau of Police manages its patrol operations, to a large extent, from the bottom up. The focus of those operations is on the patrol officer as manager of his district rather than the captain as manager of his precinct. It is the patrol officer, assigned in most cases to a permanent district, who decides how to provide police services in that district. While the patrol role is not documented in formal policy and is mentioned only in federal grant applications, in practice, it has translated into a high degree of patrol officer participation and autonomy.

The interviews we conducted with officers of all ranks have produced a striking consistency in the characterization of the role of the patrol officer. A patrol officer described it this way:

> The command doesn't interfere with patrol officers in street decisions. They set up guidelines and officers can work alone within them. Patrol officers are allowed and encouraged to make their own decisions. The command backs you up if you make an honest mistake. They'll tell you where you went wrong but they won't sit on you.

When we asked one sergeant why he believed the level of patrol officer satisfaction with department operations appeared to be so high in Portland, he commented:

> If a patrol officer has an idea, and it is presented logically to the lieutenant, most will say 'Try it out.' Everybody in the bureau doesn't need overnight success. They're willing to take risks, make mistakes and have some successes. This develops high morale, good esprit. No procedure is cast in stone; most procedures are open for negotiation.

The chief, in answer to the same question, responded:

> I see the patrol officer as knowing far more than I could ever know about what's going on in that district and I think he ought to tell me what he wants to do rather than me telling him what I want him to do.

The wide latitude patrol officers have in managing their districts extends to all types of police functions. They are able to set up special anti-crime operations, conduct follow-up investigations and involve themselves in community programs--whatever the conditions in their districts suggest.

This range of activities, and the bureau's commitment to encouraging patrol officer participation, has important consequences for the role of the patrol sergeant. In most police departments, the sergeant stands between management and the rank-and-file; it is his responsibility to tell his officers what to do and how to do it according to the policy guidelines of the department. In Portland, the sergeant is primarily a resource facilitator, providing the patrol officer with the manpower, equipment and crime analytic support he needs to conduct special operations in his district. He is also responsible for assisting the patrol officer in developing his operational plans.

As such, sergeants do not typically respond to calls in Portland, an approach they tend to justify in the name of non-interference. As shown in Table 2.1, our survey data bear this out. Of the patrol officers responding, 50 percent reported that their first-line supervisors observed their performance on patrol either once a week or not at all. This level of supervisory presence is similar to that in San Diego and Montgomery County, departments that have also expanded the patrol role. Patrol sergeants are considerably more visible on the street, however, in Atlanta and New Orleans where the role of the patrol officer is far more narrow in scope.

The autonomy permitted officers in Portland is apparently not experienced without some disadvantages. The criticism of bureau management we heard most often was the inadequacy of supervision on the street, although patrol officers admitted that this was preferable to "hovering." The sergeants' "hands-off policy" was also a concern expressed by the chief who indicated that he would like to see a better balance between patrol officer autonomy and supervisor availability.

It is important to note that the successful implementation of Portland's management model appears to be dependent on the presence of at least four conditions which are also controlled, albeit less easily, by police policy:

- Top management's trust in the judgment of patrol officers: The statements above are typical of those that indicated

TABLE 2.1

Number of Times a Week Respondents are Observed by Immediate Supervisor in the Performance of Duty by Police Department

	Portland	San Diego	Montgomery County	Denver	Atlanta	New Orleans
None or Once	50%	51%	50%	41%	30%	7%
Two or Three	28	24	23	24	17	18
Four or More	22	24	27	36	52	74
	100%	99%	100%	101%	99%	99%
	(151)	(175)	(95)	(134)	(122)	(132)

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

that patrol officers were trusted to make their own decisions and their own mistakes without the fear of serious repercussions.

- Highly-motivated patrol officers: Patrol officers, for the most part, seemed to place a high value on the degree of participation that defined their role, reflected in the degree to which officers appeared to take advantage of the opportunities for participation on the district level.

- Mid-management's non-interference, if not support, in the operation of the model: Some of the mid-managers we interviewed reported that while they did not entirely approve of the degree of patrol officer decision-making and discretion, they saw the system as well-embedded in the management structure of the bureau.

- Sufficient uncommitted patrol time: Patrol officers indicated that manpower was adequate to handle both the volume of calls for service and the activities implied by their expanded role.

As discussed below, the more limited operation of a similar program in San Diego appears to be related to the absence of these conditions.

San Diego. Many of the concepts defining the patrol role in Portland were originally drawn from those incorporated into San Diego's Community Profile Project, implemented in 1973

> as an attempt to improve police patrol practices by (1) increasing the individual patrol officer's awareness and understanding of the community the officer services, and (2) making officer response to area problems more effective through the development of new officer-initiated patrol strategies (Boydstun and Sherry, 1975).

In initiating the project in one of three patrol divisions, department administrators hoped that:

- The Profile-trained officers would make a more systematic and thorough attempt to gain knowledge of the beat and community.

- The Profile-trained patrol officers would show a greater level of job satisfaction as a result of the new dimensions of their patrol work.

- The training and 'Profiling work' of the officers would result in a change in their attitudes about the community and their perceptions of their role as police officers accountable to the community.

- The 'Profiling work' of the officers would show a better utilization of time than the 'aimless' routine of traditional preventive patrol.

- The Profile-trained officers would more frequently utilize social service agencies and other community resources as appropriate alternatives for dealing with problems encountered on the beat (Boydstun and Sherry, 1975).

In essence, the program was intended initially, to facilitate crime prevention, detection and apprehension efforts and secondly, to increase patrol officer job satisfaction through more effective use of community resources.

Demonstrated success with the experimental program encouraged administrators to implement the concept on a department-wide basis in 1975. Currently called Community-Oriented Policing (COP), the program appears to have fallen short of expectations in recent years for a number of reasons:

- The department is experiencing an exceedingly high turnover rate (i.e., an average of 20 per month between October 1978 and February 1979), attributed by many to the attraction of higher salaries in surrounding police departments. This appears to have two major implications for COP:

  --Manpower shortages have reduced considerably the amount of time available for COP activities. Thus, according to officers of all ranks, plans for the execution of special operations are more often rejected than not.

  --The concept of permanent beats is somewhat diluted in practice because as officers leave the department (and their beats) others must be moved around to replace them.

- While administrators in San Diego appear extremely supportive of the program, they do not seem to have been as successful as those in Portland in eliciting the support (or, at least, minimizing the opposition) of mid-management for the program. Most of the patrol officers as well as the administrators we interviewed contended that many supervisors were still engaged in a "numbers game." To the extent that patrol officers spent their time attending community meetings, they were less able to meet their supervisors' performance standards, expressed largely through the quantity of citations, field interrogations, arrests and clearances.

- There also seems to be less enthusiasm for the program among patrol officers in San Diego. Some reported that they did not believe COP was "real police work." And according to one member of the administration, "Many officers tend to gang up in coffee shops or hospitals and shoot the breeze with their buddies in their free time rather than do proactive work."

In short, the successful implementation of COP seems to be inhibited by limits on the amount of uncommitted patrol time and the inconsistency between the signals sent to patrol officers by administrators (emphasizing quality measures of performance) and those communicated by mid-management (emphasizing quantity measures of performance).

Despite these obstacles, and their apparent implications for the nature of the patrol role, COP is operational in San Diego. There are a number of supervisors who endorse the program and do not penalize their officers for devoting time to COP activities. There are slow periods on certain beats and at certain times of the day when patrol officers feel they have the time to do proactive policing. And, there are many patrol officers who find the time to engage in COP because their experience with the program has demonstrated its benefits, some of which reportedly include: information leading to case solution they might not otherwise have obtained, improved police-community relations, and the delivery of social services to members of the community (e.g., the elderly) who have few other means of gaining access.

In addition, patrol officers in San Diego seemed to believe that the department gave them wide latitude to perform their patrol responsibilities. While the obstacles to full implementation of COP appear to have placed limits on the degree to which patrol officers participate in developing beat-specific patrol strategies, their sense of their own autonomy remains high. We frequently heard comments like, "As long as you do a good job and don't get complaints, they leave you alone." Patrol officers consistently reported that "freedom" was one of their most valued commodities, freedom that appears to express itself in the absence of constant supervision. As Table 2.1 shows, the degree of close supervision is relatively low, with 51 percent of the survey respondents reporting that their performance was observed either once a week or not at all. The tension, however, created by the desires for both autonomy and supervisory assistance on certain calls evident in Portland is also present in San Diego. Most of the patrol officers we interviewed expressed resentment of what sergeants claimed was the massive amount of paperwork that kept them behind their desks during most of their working day.

Montgomery County. In September 1976, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice awarded a grant to the Montgomery County

Department of Police for their participation in a five-site field test of the Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) Program. Under MCI, the role of the patrol officer is generally defined to include a more comprehensive initial investigation, one that focuses on the detection of "solvability factors" (i.e., elements of information available during the initial investigation, such as the victim's description of the suspect or the suspect's vehicle, that can predictably lead to case solution). In the Silver Spring district of Montgomery County where MCI has been implemented, the role of the patrol officer has been expanded even further: patrol officers are also responsible for handling continuing investigations in those cases where there is a high potential for solution. A six-month evaluation of the MCI program in Silver Spring has demonstrated that 29 percent of assigned cases included patrol involvement compared to .4 percent in the control district (MacFarlane, 1978). Most of the investigations conducted by patrol officers or patrol/investigative teams involved assault and burglary cases.

The role of the patrol officer in Silver Spring offers only limited opportunities for participation in investigative decision-making. Patrol officers are required to recommend whether a case should be assigned for continuing investigation which is based on their assessment of the quality of the leads available during the initial investigation. The final decision, however, is made by higher ranking police personnel.

Across the two patrol districts that have been included in the current research--Silver Spring and Bethesda--patrol officers indicated that they had no opportunities for participation in patrol decision-making, which for them meant procedures for handling calls. On the other hand, most officers appeared to share the view that the department did not limit their autonomy. One patrol officer represented common opinion when he said, "Management lets you do your job." Like sergeants in Portland and San Diego, those in Montgomery County reportedly do not closely supervise: 50 percent of our survey respondents indicated that their sergeants observed their performance on patrol only once a week or not at all. In contrast to patrol officers in Portland and San Diego, however, officers in Montgomery County did not appear to be critical of the extent of sergeant availability. In fact, among the six departments under study, the supervision style of sergeants seemed to be the most highly regarded by patrol officers in Montgomery County.

Denver, Atlanta and New Orleans. There are at present no formal policies or informal practices in these three departments aimed at expanding the role of the patrol officer beyond routine patrol activities. Additionally, in Atlanta and New Orleans, patrol officers frequently complained that their job included little or no time for patrol, that manpower shortages often required them to respond to one call after another. The problem of inadequate manpower to handle the volume of calls for service appears to be particularly acute in New Orleans. Permanent zone assignments within districts are impossible because there are so few units available at any given time that officers must

respond to calls throughout their district.[1] The degree to which sergeants observe their officers' performance is also the highest in these two departments; 52 percent of the officers in Atlanta and 74 percent in New Orleans reported being observed four or more times a week.

While uncommitted patrol time is also unstructured in Denver, there seems to be considerably more time available for routine patrol activities. When Denver patrol officers were asked what they liked about their jobs, their responses were generally similar to those of officers in Portland, San Diego and Montgomery County who described their freedom, autonomy and the sense that they were their own bosses. In contrast, this response was offered infrequently in Atlanta and New Orleans. In addition, the performance of patrol officers is reportedly less frequently observed by supervisors in Denver; only 36 percent of the respondents indicated that they saw their sergeants on the street four or more times a week. Like patrol officers in Atlanta and New Orleans, however, many officers in Denver noted their desire to participate in establishing procedures for handling calls, a function that was absent from their role.

[1]The New Orleans Police Department is currently in the process of designing a program for managing the calls for service demand.

TABLE 2.2

Policies and Practices Defining the Role of the Patrol Officer

	Portland	San Diego	Montgomery County	Denver	Atlanta	New Orleans
Established Program	District Manager	Community-Oriented Policing	Managing Criminal Investigations	None	None	None
Role Involves Development of Beat-Specific Law Enforcement Strategies	Yes	When call for service demand and supervisors permit	No	No	No	No
Investigative Functions as Part of Established Role	Yes	No	Yes (in Silver Spring district)	No	No	No
Freedom from Close Supervision	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Permanent Beat Assignments	Yes	Yes	Rotation every six months	Yes	Yes	No
Perceived Practice	General patrol guidelines provide officers with wide latitude in handling district operations Freedom from close supervision	Manpower shortage and "numbers game" played by mid-management are obstacles to proactive policing Freedom from close supervision	Follow-up investigations increase interest, challenge of patrol function Freedom from close supervision	Freedom from close supervision	Manpower shortage leaves little time for routine patrol	Manpower shortage leaves little time for routine patrol

2.2 Patrol Officer Input in Decision-Making

Although a range of participative management techniques has been developed during the past twenty years, few of the methods which have proven successful for private business and industry have been incorporated into police administration textbooks. The relatively slow transformation in police agencies is no doubt a function of the centralized, quasi-military management structure, characterized by a system of strict subordination, rigid chains of command, high levels of accountability by command, and a decided absence of any formal provision for consultation between ranks (Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1973).

A recent examination of disciplinary practices in 17 law enforcement agencies by the International Association of Chiefs of Police discovered few techniques which actually work to solicit officer input. As their report observed:

> An analysis of management practices in these agencies indicates that traditional practices such as the 'open door policy' and the 'suggestion box' are wholly inadequate. Instead, management should actively seek officer input through an established procedure whereby meetings are held and documentation is maintained, and/or through an informal system designed to enable lower echelon personnel to meet with top management in a very personable and human manner, possibly during off-duty hours away from the headquarters facility. Only a few examples of such procedures were noted in the agencies studied (1977).

The IACP study described four distinct approaches to increasing officer participation which were considered workable by the departments experimenting with them:

- management appointment of separate work groups, consisting of officers of several different ranks, to research and draft new policies;

- creation of an informal task force, composed of only patrol officers, to serve as a sounding board for all proposed policies, as well as a mechanism for obtaining patrol officer feedback on various policies and procedures;

- development of a formally structured mechanism which permits officers to submit memoranda suggesting new policies or revisions in current general orders (if the recommendation is considered worthy of further consideration, the initiator works with the administration in that effort); and

- an informal procedure by which the chief, during off-duty hours and in civilian clothes, travels to the homes of officers and meets with their families.

Although these approaches may be used in some modified or combined form, each demonstrates that top management has an interest in the opinions and preferences of patrol officers. This, according to the authors of the study, ultimately generates greater support among the rank-and-file for administrative decisions and policies.

In the absence of many institutionalized mechanisms for patrol officer participation, there is little empirical evidence establishing the relationship between participative management and patrol officer satisfaction. What evidence exists--primarily through evaluations of directed patrol and team policing programs--is inconsistent (Gay et al., 1977a and b). Studies in other occupations, however, have demonstrated a positive relationship between participation and satisfaction under certain circumstances. According to Lawler,

> The finding that participation strongly affects autonomy satisfaction leads to the prediction that only people who have strong needs for autonomy will respond with increased satisfaction to a power-equalization leadership style. Several studies support this view. In an indirect test, Trow (1957) found that subjects with a strong need for independence expressed lower satisfaction than other subjects with roles in which they were made highly dependent on others (1973).

The policies and practices providing for patrol officer participation in the six departments under study fall on a fairly clear continuum ranging from aggressive efforts to facilitate communication to highly centralized "chain of command" decision-making. The key elements of policy that describe that continuum are displayed in Table 2.3 at the conclusion of this section.

Portland. The chief in Portland appears to have successfully communicated to many patrol officers that they can make a valuable contribution to the development of policy. The officers we interviewed offered several examples of policy changes that were precipitated by the suggestions of patrol officers. One officer told us, for example, that he suggested that some officers be assigned to come in one hour early so that the street would be covered during the changeover from one shift to the next. Not only did the bureau accept his recommendation, but the officer received a commendation from the mayor under Portland's Employee Suggestion Program which provides cash awards to city employees who have submitted the best recommendations for policy change over the past year. The policy, which is still in force, has reportedly saved the city a considerable amount in overtime.

On the other hand, it appears that many patrol officers do not feel the department has gone far enough in efforts to solicit patrol officer opinion. Thirty-five percent of the survey respondents selected "extent to which patrol officers influence decisions that affect their jobs" as one of three sources of dissatisfaction. Comments accompanying their selections indicated, however, that many of these officers objected to what they believed to be their immediate supervisors' unwillingness to discuss proposed policy changes with officers.

There are several mechanisms operating in Portland that appear to offer patrol officers wide opportunities for participation in decision-making. In addition to the district manager concept which permits patrol officers to establish patrol procedures and objectives, patrol officers can register their opinions in any one of the following ways:

- Direct communication with the chief

Patrol officers in Portland do not have to rely on the chain of command to submit recommendations for policy or procedural changes to administrators. They can write directly to the chief or take advantage of his open door policy which provides the first available opening to any officer asking to see him. When asked how patrol officers typically use his open door policy, the chief responded, "A lot of times it's over something where they feel somebody has cut them off in communication. They know how I feel about that--if something is directed to me through channels it had better get here."

- Review committees

Policy issues under consideration by the administration that directly affect patrol officers are first studied by one of three standing committees responsible for offering recommendations to the chief. These committees--safety, automobile and uniform--are composed largely of patrol officers. The safety committee has been established both by general order and by the formal agreement between the City of Portland and the Portland Police Association.

The general order states that:

> The health, safety, and well being of Bureau personnel will be best assured by utilizing the experience and constructive suggestions of all. To this end, two Portland Police Bureau Safety Committees [one for sworn and one for non-sworn personnel] will provide a representative means for every employee to participate in planning and decision making in matters concerning members' health and safety.

According to the labor-management agreement, the safety committee for sworn personnel is composed of six individuals, three appointed by management and three by labor. One of the more recent studies of this committee resulted in recommendations against carrying oxygen in patrol cars, given the potential hazards.

The automobile and uniform committees appear to be particularly successful. The chief in Portland described his reason for establishing them:

> [The automobile committee is] the most perfect example you could give of why you should let patrol officers pick what kinds of cars they drive because they're going to pick the best kind of car--the best designed, the safest for them. I would say altogether they probably saved us about $360,000 over the years in maintenance and resale value of the cars and the fact they're just good cars. And, who knows better what to pick than the guy who has to drive it....The uniform committee was picked for the same reason; the people that wear uniforms ought to decide what kind they're going to wear.

Although the committee structure appears to have created a sense of openness and mutual trust between administrative staff and patrol officers, there are still times when those recommendations cannot be accepted. One such case involved a safety committee study of the feasibility of 9mm pistols. According to the chief,

> They spent a lot of time on it and they really did do a great job, one of the better studies that I've seen. I can certainly empathize with their disappointment. They thought that they had made such an irrefutable case that, when they presented their study, I would just sign off on it and it would go. It didn't, but not through any fault of their own. I don't know if we adequately transmitted that; it was just pure finances. It would have meant an investment that we couldn't afford at that time. So we tried to do the next best thing which was to let them decide on what kind of ammunition would be carried in the guns that we do have.

Since the officer's view is necessarily narrower than that of the top brass, decisions must sometimes be made which supercede the committee's view. It is here where officers' trust in the system and the real sense of participation can be eroded. For example, one officer we interviewed who was a member of another unsuccessful committee concluded from his experience "that there is the appearance of input, but no real input." Ultimately, however, the sense of trust among patrol officers that things do not happen arbitrarily, appears to have demonstrated that the committee structure can withstand occasional "defeats" by the bureaucracy.

Opposition to the committee structure in Portland is most apparent among mid-management. The chief is well aware that some "don't think that's the way to run a railroad." A few of the supervisors we interviewed confirmed the chief's view; they made it clear that if they were chief, they wouldn't have committees running things. Like the district manager concept, however, the committee structure seems to work in Portland because, while the entire command does not support it, they have not subverted its implementation.

- <u>Other mechanisms to solicit patrol officer reactions to policies under consideration</u>

The administration in Portland continually informs patrol officers of the policy directions in which the bureau is headed so that they have an opportunity to make a contribution. The chief distributes a monthly newsletter to patrol officers describing what he is doing and where the bureau is going. The chief invites comments on the issues that he raises in the newsletter by encouraging officers to write to him, a member of his staff or the appropriate review committee. The chief also distributes an initial draft of each major policy to all first-line supervisors in the bureau to give them and their officers an opportunity to comment. In addition, patrol officers are periodically surveyed about issues of specific interest to them. These mechanisms, particularly the chief's newsletter, were extremely well-received by most of the officers we interviewed because they provided them with the sense that the administration was sincerely interested in involving them in the policy planning efforts of the bureau.

<u>San Diego</u>. When the current chief was appointed from within the ranks to his present position four years ago, the San Diego Police Department was defined by a highly centralized management structure. During his administration, he has moved the department into an increasingly participative mode reflected in his "open management" philosophy.

> The Administration of the San Diego Police Department subscribes to an 'open management' philosophy.

> Open management is defined as the utilization of the full scope of management options of style of decision making, depending upon the situation and the urgency.
>
> Management style types which the department utilizes include, but are not limited to, participatory management, 'testing,' consulting and telling. All are appropriate under correct conditions. As a basic philosophy, those persons who will be impacted by a decision should be consulted prior to the implementation of that decision, unless there are over-riding reasons which preclude that option.

Consistent with this policy, the chief has implemented a wide range of mechanisms designed to bring the rank-and-file into the decision-making process:

- The chief and assistant chief have an open-door policy where officers can make appointments to discuss issues of concern to them.
- The "Ask Your Chief" form, the written alternative, invites officers to submit questions or recommendations to the chief, assistant chief or any one of the deputy chiefs; any signed form receives a written response.
- The responsibilities of the chief's special assistant, a former police captain, include serving as a liaison between the concerns of police officers and members of the administration.
- There is a suggestion box in each command.
- The chief makes and distributes video tapes to inform officers of special policy initiatives or to comment on issues of wide concern that have come to his attention.
- Police officer advisory committees are created from time to time to study particular issues of shared importance to management and the rank-and-file.
- Surveys are occasionally conducted although the administration generally avoids this method because it creates expectations that can not always be fulfilled.

In addition to these more typical mechanisms to solicit patrol officer opinion, the department offers Team Building Workshops which are intended to give all police officers and supervisors within a specific unit an opportunity

to confront and resolve interpersonal and procedural problems in their work environment. These workshops represent one of the foundations of the department's humanistic approach to police management. This approach, based on organization development theory, places an emphasis on human values in organizations by providing opportunities for employees:

- to function as human beings rather than as resources in the productive process; and
- to influence the way in which they relate to work, the organization and the environment (Margiules and Raia, 1972).

Team Building Workshops are conducted by the chief's special assistant at a unit's request. The workshops follow a seven-step process which begins with the recognition of need, and ends with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the process six months or a year later. Intermediate steps involve the design and conduct of a one- or three-day workshop based on the findings of interviews with each member of the unit; these interviews focus on problems in communication, policy, procedure and/or role definitions. The outcome of the workshop is an action plan and the assignment of responsibility for carrying out that plan.

While all the patrol officers we interviewed agreed that the extent of patrol officer participation had improved considerably under the current chief, our interviews produced a range of opinions reflecting the degree to which they believed the administration had actually opened the decision-making process up to the officer on the street.

A number of the patrol officers found the administration to be reasonably responsive to the recommendations for change offered by patrol officers and cited examples: the removal of the hat requirement and the regulation requiring a tie to be worn with short sleeve shirts, the placement of light bars on cars and air conditioners inside. More importantly, these officers described an environment in the department which placed a value on the opinions of patrol officers that was not apparent in other departments with which they were familiar with. The environment they described, reflecting the notions of humanism, is similar to the one portrayed by the chief when we asked him what he thought it was about the way the department operated that accounted for the reported satisfaction among many of the patrol officers we surveyed.

> I think it's because we care. We haven't gotten a lot of things but they know we are concerned; that we try to get their input, we treat them as human beings, we're not out to get them, we support them to the wall when they're right and hold them accountable when they're wrong--that probably

> causes more problems. Before you can be responsive to the community and do all the things you have to do there from the standpoint of treating people as human beings, you've got to start here.

The majority of officers we interviewed, however, shared the view that far more "lip service" was paid to the emphasis on patrol officer input than they believed there was in reality. As one officer put it, "The department goes overboard in getting our input but then they do what they want." These perceptions suggest that what is missing in San Diego is not mechanisms for soliciting patrol officer opinion, but rather, a sense of trust in the administration's commitment to patrol officer participation. Our interviews in San Diego generated some measure of uncertainty about the department's commitment to the whole notion of humanism, of which participation is only one dimension.

While the chief himself seems to be increasingly winning the respect and trust of his officers, there are three factors that appear to account for this uncertainty:

- Many patrol officers we interviewed did not share the same high opinion of the rest of top management. They saw them as insulating the chief from "what's really going on in the field" and subverting many of his policy intentions.
- They also sensed that many of the notions supported by the chief--humanism and Community-Oriented Policing among them--were not filtering down to the operational level, thereby reinforcing their mistrust of many members in mid-management.
- On a more specific level, some officers felt that the "lip service" paid to input was reflected in what they considered to be broken promises by the administration. The only example of this that we could find, however, was a perceived promise of shotguns in patrol cars which these officers had yet to see put into operation after several years of assurances.[2]

Montgomery County. When the former chief arrived in Montgomery County in 1976, he found few vehicles for patrol officer input in decision-making:

[2] Shotguns were installed in patrol cars in June 1979, three months after our interviews were conducted.

- occasional surveys,
- a procedure for submitting written recommendations for policy change to the chief, and
- field recommendation committees in each division and district which were somewhat less than fully operational.

One of his first major initiatives was the revision of the Comprehensive Manual which includes a formal department policy on officer participation:

> It is the policy of the Department to encourage its personnel to take an active role in the management process. This recognizes the fact that those persons most directly affected by management's policies are often in the best position to participate in their development and evaluation.

Within this context, the Manual establishes a procedure for "any member of the department [to] recommend a revision of policies and procedures contained in the directive system." The procedure bypasses the chain of command in favor of direct written communication between the officer and the Research and Development Division (RDD). Under the former administration, most proposed directives were discussed at roll call to give officers an opportunity to offer recommendations for change before the final draft was prepared. Most recently, the department's proposed Career Development Program, discussed in Chapter 3, generated an estimated 550 memoranda from officers of all ranks.

In an effort to rejuvenate the field recommendation committees, the former chief also included a formal policy defining their structure and functions: "Field Recommendation Committees provide a means by which employees of the Department can examine existing policy and operations, suggest improvements, introduce innovative views and discuss issues facing the Department." The major responsibility of the committees, generally composed of patrol officers, police service aides and administrative staff, was the review of all policy directives before promulgation. On occasion, they also assisted the Research and Development Division in designing specific programs. Officers from the Bethesda and Silver Spring districts were assigned to work with RDD on the Career Development package.

It does not appear that these efforts of the former administration have provided patrol officers with any sense of their ability to affect management policy. In fact, when asked to describe the mechanisms available to provide input, very few patrol officers mentioned these mechanisms. Discussions of the nature of patrol officer participation in the development of department policy consistently focused on one issue: the insensitivity of the former

administration to the concerns and preferences of patrol officers. The former chief's public statements about the high degree of incompetence among patrol officers, discussed in Chapter 6, appear to have translated into the belief that he had little regard for their opinion.

It is important to note here that most of the members of management we interviewed, while expressing little confidence in the former chief as an administrator, agreed that he "did as much as anyone could to get input" from patrol officers. The difficulty in recruiting officers to volunteer to serve on field recommendation committees, however, was viewed by them as an indication of an absence of interest in participation. While this may be true, findings across the departments under study seem to suggest that interest in participation (as well as the level of perceived input) is less related to the number and type of mechanisms available than the extent to which patrol officers trust their chief's general commitment to following their recommendations. In Montgomery County and in New Orleans, discussed below, the apparent disinterest in participation reported by management may be largely a function of the perceived futility of their efforts.

Another factor that seems to be related to the perceived level of input is whether or not patrol officers are able to influence the decisions they feel they are in the best position to make. Across each of the six departments, the most frequently reported areas of desired participation were procedures for handling calls, uniforms and equipment. In Montgomery County, New Orleans, Denver and Atlanta--departments where participation was perceived to be low--patrol officers have little or no opportunities for input in these areas. At the same time, perceptions of a relatively high degree of participation in Portland are associated with their involvement in these types of decisions.

New Orleans. The notion of patrol officer input in decision-making had little practical meaning in New Orleans before the appointment of the current chief in mid-1978. During the previous seven-year period, the department was led by two brothers, described by those who served under their consecutive administrations as autocratic. While the Department Manual contains a 1974 order "establish[ing] a procedure for the forwarding of recommendations and/or suggestions for changing and/or implementing Department Regulations" through the chain of command, it received little attention. Over the past year, the chief has attempted to create a more participative atmosphere in the department through the following initiatives:

- Like the former chief in Montgomery County, the chief soon issued an order announcing plans to revise the Department Manual. This order included a request for suggestions from any member of the department to be sent directly to the Research and Development Section "without going through the chain of command."

- An ad hoc committee has been set up, composed largely of patrol officers and sergeants, to revise the disciplinary code. Copies of the code proposed by this committee have been distributed to patrol officers for their review and comments prior to the preparation of the final draft. Other committees, chaired by patrol officers, will eventually handle the remaining aspects of the directive system: overall policy guidelines and standard operating procedures.

- The chief has established a patrol officer advisory committee whose members meet with him almost weekly to discuss issues of concern to patrol officers and to offer recommendations for change. The committee includes a representative from each of the patrol districts and other specialized units elected by their peers. Two changes in policy effected through this committee were most frequently reported: patrol officers are no longer required to wear their hats and they are now permitted to write reports in coffee shops.

- The chief holds an open session every Wednesday afternoon in his office where patrol officers are invited to offer suggestions and air grievances.

In addition, each district has recently been given the opportunity to vote on moving to a system of fixed watches or preserving the existing monthly rotation system. Four of the six patrol districts chose to continue rotating.

Despite these options, patrol officers in New Orleans saw themselves as having little say in the operation of their department. The most visible mechanism to solicit officer input--the patrol officer advisory committee--was viewed by most as "a sham," "a ploy," "a bunch of bull." Our interviews with patrol officers frequently produced comments like: "He just uses it to get good ideas" and "He doesn't take suggestions he doesn't like."

There are several factors that seem to explain the apparent lack of trust in the sincerity of the chief's efforts to bring patrol officers into the decision-making process:

- Police administrators brought in from other cities, as this chief was, seem to be traditionally treated with immediate suspicion. He has not been in office long enough to make a final assessment of his perceived sensitivity to the concerns of patrol officers.

- After a long history of involvement in a strict hierarchical structure, patrol officers may approach invitations for participation with skepticism. Many higher ranking officers in New Orleans described their sense of apathy among patrol officers in response to the management styles of previous administrators. The consequence, they reported, was that officers did not take advantage of the opportunities they had for participation.

- The recent strike in New Orleans produced none of the desired outcomes that precipitated the police action--a labor-management contract, an increase in salary and a return of sick leave benefits. While the mayor is held largely responsible for this, it is evident that the chief's credibility has also suffered.

- The areas of policy development in which patrol officers seemed to be most interested--procedures for handling calls, uniforms and equipment--have been largely unaddressed by the chief during the time he has been in office.

Atlanta. Prior to the current administration, the only mechanisms for patrol officers to register their opinions were occasional surveys. The present chief has so far made only a limited attempt to expand those opportunities but agrees he has not gone far enough:

> We've not done all we can in terms of allowing for the kind of input that we will have from the people in the field. We have a suggestion box and I read through those every Tuesday. The people who sign them get direct responses. For those who don't, we have a newsletter and we use that to indicate suggestions that were made and responses from the office. My position is that we have a great number of very bright, articulate, well-educated people out in the field and not to use those qualities is not using the resources that exist.

In addition, the department recently distributed the initial draft of the revised discipline policy to each command for review.

The patrol officers we interviewed had virtually no sense of any ability to contribute to policy development. The only suggestion directed to and implemented by the chief that patrol officers could identify was the removal of the hat requirement. In addition, many patrol officers reported that while they saw their sergeants as "the key to input," they did not believe that supervisors' suggestions were taken any more seriously in headquarters.

Denver. In contrast to the formal mechanisms for soliciting officer opinion in the other departments, those in Denver reflect management's respect for the "chain of command." According to Denver's Operations Manual:

> (1) Members who wish to make suggestions for the improvement of service shall have the privilege of communicating through the official channels in writing to the Chief of Police. Suggestions may also be made to the City Suggestion Program or directly to the Staff Inspection and the Research and Development Bureaus.
>
> (2) All requests, complaints, suggestions or reports of occurrences or irregularities regarding policies, procedures, or assignments of the police department shall be directed through channels as follows:
>
> a. Every member of the police department shall direct all requests, complaints, reports or suggestions to their immediate supervisor in writing....
>
> b. It shall be the duty of all members of the department receiving such communications from a subordinate to make answer in writing as soon as practical and in any case not longer than five (5) days after receipt of such communication.
>
> c. Any member receiving a reply from their immediate supervisor in answer to such communication that is not satisfactory, may direct a communication to the officer next higher in rank in their division. Such communication shall include a copy of the communication to their immediate supervisor and a copy of their reply.
>
> d. Such communication may be carried as far as the Office of the Manager of Safety so long as each succeeding level of command with the division has been given written notice and a reply returned.

In addition to this procedure, opportunities for patrol officer participation appear to be limited to periodic surveys although shift assignment policy was the only survey subject we identified through interviews.

While officers of all ranks tended to agree that patrol officer input in decision-making was extremely limited, and even discouraged, a sizeable minority, patrol officers among them, expressed support for this approach to police management. One sergeant described how things worked in Denver and his feelings about the system:

> If a guy has a suggestion, he has to put it in writing. Then it goes to the captain who can do what he wants with it. Police departments are not god-damned democracies. This is a para-military organization.

A patrol officer offered a similar opinion:

> The people 'upstairs' have a better view of things even though some gripe that they forget what it's like to be on the street. We're never asked about anything and that's the way it should be. But if a guy has a gripe he should be able to make suggestions.

The majority of officers, however, saw themselves as powerless in the face of an extremely cliquish, highly centralized and well-entrenched management structure that offered little promise of becoming more participatory. These officers indicated that few, if any, officers submitted recommendations for change because of their conviction that "they would go nowhere." As in Atlanta, the perceptions of officers in Denver seemed only to be reinforced by the sense that their sergeants' opportunities to influence policy were equally limited.

TABLE 2.3

Policies and Practices Providing for Patrol Officer Input in Decision-Making

	Portland	San Diego	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Atlanta	Denver
Formal Policy on Patrol Officer Participation	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Communication Between Patrol Officers and the Chief	Open door policy Direct written communication Chief's monthly newsletter	Open door policy Ask Your Chief form Video tapes to announce special policy initiatives	None	Open door policy	Chief's newsletter	Written communication through the chain of command
Communication with Administrative Staff	Direct written communication with the Research and Planning Division	Contact with the special assistant to the chief	Direct written communication with the Research and Planning Division	Direct written communication with the Research and Development Section	None	Direct written communication with the Research and Development Bureau
Patrol Officer Advisory Committees	Standing committees: safety, automobile, uniform	Occasional ad hoc committees	Field recommendation committee in each command	Patrol officer advisory committee Ad hoc committee to revise discipline policy	None	None
Patrol Officer Review of Proposed Policy	Proposed policies distributed to each command	None	Proposed policies distributed to each command	Proposed discipline policy distributed to each command	Proposed discipline policy distributed to each command	None
Suggestion Box in Each Command	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Occasional Surveys	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Team Building Workshops	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Percentage of Respondents Who Selected "Extent to Which Patrol Officers Influence Policy Decisions" as 1 of 3 Sources of Dissatisfaction	35%	29%	29%	25%	22%	31%
Perceived Practice	Belief that administration values their opinion Many examples offered of patrol officer recommendations translated into policy Some felt the department had not gone far enough to solicit patrol officer opinion	Department merely pays "lip service" to notion of participation although it has improved under current administration Some considered the department to be reasonably responsive to patrol officer recommendations	Former administration demonstrated a disregard for their opinions and preferances	Mistrust of the chief's recent efforts to solicit patrol officer opinion	No opportunities to influence policy	No opportunities to influence policy Some felt this was an appropriate police management strategy

2.3 Police Officer Association Input in Decision-Making

Patrol officers have been somewhat more successful in influencing management policy through the union movement than through internal procedures. In the era of militancy in the late sixties, police associations in many cities were able to improve considerably the salaries, benefits and working conditions of the rank-and-file through collective bargaining. Gammage and Sachs observe that:

> As civil service and merit systems represent earlier attempts to solve problems stemming from the growth and inefficiency of municipalities, now public agencies, police administrators, and policemen appear to be increasingly turning to collective bargaining as a means of removing the roots of police dissatisfaction (1972).

One of the key outcomes of the proliferation of police associations has been the movement away from traditional unilateral decision-making by management toward a system of shared authority and participation in setting department policies. As Juris and Feuille note, collective bargaining provides status and equality in a manner unlike any other form of labor-management interaction:

> The union's certification as the exclusive representative of a police bargaining unit, and the institutionalization of the collective bargaining process with its negotiating teams, lists of demand, timetables and deadlines, and attendant publicity, add a more concrete and visible procedure to the less visible union-management interaction processes which previously existed. Further, in most cases, the end result of the collective bargaining process is a written agreement which visibly confirms the union's role as an equal with management in the determination of a wide variety of employment conditions (1973).

In effect, collective bargaining has forced management to consider the potential consequences of proposed decisions for patrol officer opinion (Slichter et al., 1960). Police associations have limited management discretion, fostered the development of management by policy, and protected employees against arbitrary or inconsistent treatment. The narrowing of management discretion--which proportionately broadens patrol officer input in the organization--has come about through contract language, contract administration and grievance arbitration. In general, police agencies are experiencing a higher level of cooperation between management and line staff and a decline in relationships of intense conflict (Juris and Feuille, 1973; Slichter et al., 1960).

While officers working in states where there are collective bargaining laws have been relatively well-rewarded over the past decade, officers unprotected by contracts have been less fortunate. The police associations in the six departments under study represent the range of experience along the dimension of participation. The differences in the nature of the relationship between the police officer associations and management, defined both formally and informally, are expressed through the following issues:

- the number of police officer associations in each city,
- the proportion of eligible members who belong,
- the released time arrangements of the association presidents,
- the relationship between association presidents and their police chiefs,
- the presence or absence of a formal labor-management agreement (and the areas of participation defined by that agreement), and
- areas of informal association participation.

These issues combine to capture the degree of police officer association input in decision-making. The experience of the six study sites in this area of policy is summarized in Table 2.4 at the end of this chapter.

Portland. The Portland Police Association (PPA), representing police officers, detectives and sergeants, has a membership of 675, or 97 percent of the officers in these ranks. The president of the PPA conducts association business on a full-time basis under an arrangement where the city is reimbursed for his time from membership dues. The PPA president's access to the chief in Portland is unlimited; they keep in frequent telephone contact as well. Their relationship is one of apparent professional equality.

The relationship between the PPA president and the Portland chief is merely a reflection of the high degree of professionalism characterizing police labor-management relations in Portland, professionalism that is expressed through varied opportunities for association participation in bureau decision-making. The formal vehicle for participation is the Labor Agreement between the City of Portland and the Portland Police Association. This two-year contract not only recognizes the PPA as the exclusive bargaining agent for the member ranks, but also documents a wide range of benefits and working conditions such as grievance and arbitration procedures, overtime compensation, requirements for advance notice in change of shift or days off, and maternity leave benefits. Also included in the agreement is the Portland Police Officers' Bill of Rights which defines a series of mechanisms to safeguard the rights of members in the event of an internal affairs investigation.

In addition, the Labor Agreement covers a number of negotiated items relevant to the policy areas addressed in the current research. Through this contract, the PPA has participated in establishing:

- the safety committee, "a Standing Committee of six (6) persons, three (3) appointed by each party, to confer on a regular basis, on city time, with a view to maintaining safe equipment and working conditions;"
- permissible types of punishment in disciplinary cases (e.g., written reprimand, suspension, etc.);
- seniority policies governing shifts as well as days off, vacations and holidays; and
- education incentive pay (i.e., eligibility, amount, approved courses).

Informally, the PPA is also highly involved in bureau decision-making. Any major change in directives is discussed with association representatives before it is promulgated. In addition, administrators confer with the PPA concerning disciplinary actions in more serious cases so that the association has an opportunity to enforce consistency in punishment. The chief in Portland sees this as an important contribution of police officer associations:

> The unions have removed a lot of the arbitrariness of many chiefs who could become pretty autocratic and dictatorial. Many times the chief is in the same position as the head of the Roman Legion when they gave him his triumph in Rome. They hold the wreath over him. The priest keeps whispering in his ear, 'Thou art immortal.' Chiefs get a lot of deference from the public and get somewhat arbitrary in disciplinary matters: 'You have displeased so I'll chop your head off.' And I think the unions have corrected that so that there is due process and you can't really knock that.

San Diego. All ranks in the department, police officer through deputy chief, are represented by the San Diego Police Officers Association (POA) in negotiations with the city. Membership is approximately 1,060, or 96 percent of the police personnel.

San Diego is very similar to Portland along most of the dimensions of participation defined above. The president of the POA is on a full-time leave of absence from the department; his salary is covered by association membership dues. The same professional equality characterizing the relationship between the association president and the chief in Portland is evident in San Diego. Both leaders appear to be extremely supportive of each other and there is little sense of an adversarial quality to their relationship; the association seems to view city hall as a greater adversary in labor-management relations.

Like Portland, patrol officers in San Diego work under a well-defined contract, or Memorandum of Understanding, between the City of San Diego and the POA. The contract, which must be extended each year by both parties, covers many of the benefits and working conditions found in Portland's Labor Agreement. It also reflects the same high degree of association participation in decisions governing department operations. The provisions pertaining to the policy areas under study cover:

- POA review of "proposed written departmental procedures in advance of publication [in order to] render comments as may be appropriate;"
- management's obligation to "meet and consult" with the POA regarding criteria for special assignments "prior to application of such criteria;"
- an education incentive plan (i.e., requalification requirements/procedures, course options); and
- a tuition refund plan (i.e., eligibility, amount).

In addition, the Memorandum of Understanding contains the Police Bill of Rights which not only specifies the rights of officers under investigation, but also defines acceptable forms of punitive action.

Unlike the association in Portland, the POA is not consulted informally on disciplinary actions. The president, however, has been given the opportunity to insure consistency in the application of subjective promotional criteria. He served as an observer of the department's first "promotability" process, discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.

Montgomery County. The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an international organization, is the exclusive representative of police officers in Montgomery County. The president of the FOP local, whose membership includes 600 sworn officers, or 83 percent of those in the department, is assigned to a 40-hour week in the Bethesda district but is permitted to conduct FOP business during half of his working hours. Requests for administrative leave are granted by his supervisor on an "as-needed" basis.

The FOP president's release time arrangement is only one indicator of the ways in which labor-management relations in Montgomery County have not yet matched the degree of professionalism (and association participation) seen in Portland and San Diego. Montgomery County patrol officers are not covered by a contract, but rather by a non-binding position paper signed by both parties. This position paper, which specifies a number of benefits and working conditions, is considerably less comprehensive than Portland's and San Diego's contracts. This is reflected in more limited opportunities for formal association participation in areas of policy addressed by this research. According to Position Paper #2,

- The recommendations of the Task Force assessing the performance evaluation systems within the county "shall be given to representatives of the unit for review and comment." (Performance evaluations represent a major promotional criterion.)
- Lists of eligible promotional candidates "shall remain in effect for a maximum of three years."
- "...accused officers will have the right to challenge for cause any member of the trial board."

Montgomery County also has a Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights which specifies a wide range of procedural safeguards, including permissible types of punishment.

The FOP president's relationship to the former chief was far more deferential than that in Portland and San Diego. While meetings between the leaders of labor and management usually occurred more often than the requirement of once a month specified in the position paper, the president of the FOP admitted that the administration demonstrated little commitment to either accepting his recommendations or providing reasons why they were rejected.

Denver. There are two police associations in Denver whose members include officers of all ranks. The Police Protective Association (PPA), with 1,360 members, represents 99 percent of the sworn personnel; the Denver Police

Union (DPU) has a membership of 750, or 55 percent. While the president of the PPA, by choice, conducts association business on his own time, the DPU's president has been granted one day of leave per week from his regular patrol assignment to handle union activities.

Consistent with the low level of individual patrol officer input, the police associations in Denver appear to have extremely limited opportunities for participation in policy development. Neither association has a contract with the city, or any other formal agreement, although the DPU has recently retained two consultants to develop a collective bargaining package which the union intends to present to the city council. While the presidents of both associations described their access to the top brass as relatively unlimited, there was little evidence of their ability to influence broad policy issues even informally. The associations have submitted a number of proposals for policy change to the administration which have consistently been rejected. One such proposal, for a revision of the disciplinary process, is discussed in Chapter 3. Representatives of the police associations, as well as most of the officers we interviewed, viewed the administration as having a staunch commitment to the status quo, to not "rocking the boat." And this commitment was perceived to translate into a relative disregard for the opinions and preferences of the rank-and-file.

New Orleans. The impact of New Orleans' two employee organizations--the Police Association of New Orleans (PANO) and an FOP local--on management policy is equally limited. The two previous chiefs were well known for their anti-union sentiments; during their administrations the associations were little more than fraternal organizations. While the FOP, representing 700 sworn officers (48%), appears to have made little attempt to improve its status, PANO's affiliation with the Teamsters in 1978 and the recent police strike were largely efforts to force the city and the current, potentially more sympathetic administration to recognize the police association as a bargaining agent for its 1,077 members (73%). Ironically, these efforts appear to have failed in large part because of the mayor and chief's avowed opposition to Teamster involvement in police labor relations in New Orleans. While the association has not yet achieved any formal recognition nor any discernible opportunity to influence policy, there is recent evidence of more open communication between the leaders of management and labor. And should PANO decide to disaffiliate with the Teamsters, an issue that appears to be currently under consideration, that communication may continue to improve.

Atlanta. The three associations in Atlanta--the Police Benevolent Association, the Afro-American Patrolmen's League and an FOP local--are in very much the same position as those in New Orleans: they have no formal agreement with the city and little ability to influence policy informally. And, the salaries of their members as well as other benefits are similarly unimpressive. The leaders of the three organizations recently joined forces to submit a set of 11 demands to Atlanta's public safety commissioner including dental insurance

a time-and-a-half provision for overtime and "a decent salary raise." The nature of the city's response to these demands should determine the likelihood of future job actions or even Teamster affiliation. In the meantime, the associations are trying to build up their memberships which have dwindled over the past few years through their ineffectiveness. The FOP, the largest association, currently has approximately 625 mostly white members, or 45 percent of all ranks. The number of associations, and the ineffective size and racial composition of their membership reflect at present a lack of unity among the rank-and-file in the department. The other two employee associations have less than 50 members each.

TABLE 2.4

Policies and Practices Providing for Police Officer Association Input in Decision-Making

	Portland	San Diego	Montgomery County	Denver	New Orleans	Atlanta
Police Officer Associations	Portland Police Association	San Diego Police Police Officers Association	Fraternal Order of Police	Police Protective Association Denver Police Union	Police Association of New Orleans Fraternal Order of Police	Fraternal Order of Police Police Benevolent Association Afro-American Patrolman's League
Eligible Ranks	Patrol Officer Detective Sergeant	All sworn personnel	All sworn personnel	All sworn personnel	All sworn personnel	FOP: all sworn personnel ABA: all sworn personnel AAPL: all black officers
Membership Size	675 (97%)	1,060 (96%)	600 (83%)	PPA: 1,360 (99%) DPU: 750 (52%)	PANO: 1,077 (73%) FOP: 700 (48%)	FOP: 625 (45%) PBA: less than 50 AAPL: less than 50
Association President's Released Time Arrangement	Full-time	Full-time	Half-time	PPA: None DPU: 1 day/week	None	None
Formal Agreement	Labor Agreement (binding)	Memorandum of Understanding (binding)	Position Paper (non-binding)	None	None	None
Areas of Formal Participation	Establishment of safety committee; selection of 3 of 6 members Definition of permissible types of punishment Development of seniority policies governing shift assignments Design of education incentive pay program Bill of rights	Review of proposed department procedures Definition of permissible types of punishment Participation in setting special assignment criteria Design of education incentive pay program Design of tuition refund plan Bill of Rights	Review of performance evaluation findings Establishment of 3 year ceiling on promotional lists Provision for accused officers to challenge for cause any member of the trial board Definition of permissible types of punishment Bill of Rights	None	None	None
Areas of Informal Participation	Review of proposed changes in directives Consultation with administrators on proposed disciplinary actions in serious cases	Observer of first promotability process	None	None	None	None

CHAPTER 3: PROCEDURAL EQUITY

3.1 Promotion

Promotion policies and practices as a source of police dissatisfaction are well-documented in the literature along two dimensions. The first is the introduction of subjective promotional criteria in recent years, such as oral boards, performance evaluations and promotability estimates (Shimberg and di Grazia, 1974; IACP, 1973; Piliavin et al., 1976). From management's perspective, these criteria are more job-related than the traditional written exam and better able to detect leadership potential. From the patrol officer's point of view, however, they reduce a candidate's control over his chances for promotion and invite favoritism. The second aspect of the promotion system that has been subject to criticism by patrol officers is the limitations on opportunities. The majority of officers will never be promoted (Niederhoffer, 1967; Wilson, 1969; Reiss, 1971; President's Commission, 1967) and those who are often wait close to ten years or more for their first promotion. This can be particularly frustrating in police agencies where advancement through the ranks is the only means of increasing status and pay.

While promotional criteria are grounded in policy, promotional opportunities are often determined by a number of other factors that are outside the control of police administrators. Police departments may have a policy of administering the process every year or two but court challenges, for example, may create delays. In addition, the attrition rate in the department is likely to influence considerably the number of promotions made each year.

Given the focus of this research on organizational characteristics subject to policy change, we have assessed the site departments solely on the basis of their promotional criteria defined in terms of:

- fairness, or the extent to which criteria governing promotion to first-line supervisor provide for equal application.

In light of the evidence supporting promotional opportunities as a source of patrol officer dissatisfaction, however, we have included this issue in the discussion of perceived practice in each department. Our research has

indicated that advancement opportunities are somewhat more closely related to patrol officer satisfaction than the nature of the promotional criteria, and that officers can consider themselves to have relatively wide opportunities for promotion in a relatively subjective system.

An initial indication of the degree of variation in perceived promotional opportunity is found in Table 3.1, which describes the expectations of the survey respondents expressing a desire for promotion. The data arrayed in this table demonstrate that in Portland, 79 percent of the respondents who indicated they wanted to be promoted, expected to be promoted within five years. In San Diego, 73 percent of the officers desiring promotion fall into this category. The opposite end of the continuum is represented by Atlanta and Montgomery County, where, respectively, 35 and 25 percent of these officers expected that they would be promoted.

A summary of the promotion policies and practices in the six departments appears in Table 3.4 at the conclusion of this section.

New Orleans. The requirements for promotion to sergeant in New Orleans are defined primarily by a single objective criterion--a written exam. An officer is required to have three years of experience to take the exam and his final eligibility ranking is determined by a 60/40 percent combination of his exam score and his time in grade. In an apparent effort to build up his officers' trust in his administration, the new chief plans to leave the promotional criteria largely unaltered for the present. The only change he has initiated is a one year cutback on the service time requirement for those officers with a college degree. He explained his support for the current promotional criteria in these terms:

> We'll be moving to [subjective promotional criteria]. Right now I'm trying to keep it as objective as I can to convey to them the system is going to be fair. I think to introduce something subjective at this point would increase their distrust of the system. So I want to convince them first we're going to be fair with whatever we do.

While many of the officers we interviewed perceived the system to be fair, they, more than officers in the other departments, reported that the system did not necessarily pinpoint those who would make the best sergeants. Many indicated the need for a greater emphasis on past performance although few expressed confidence in the objectivity of the command staff.

The major complaint we heard in interviews with patrol officers concerned the infrequency of exams. The sergeants' exam has not been given since 1976,

primarily because the civil service staff is not large enough to write and administer the exam more often. Officers, however, have been promoted from that list in small numbers through the present. The chief is planning to address this problem in the following way:

> The personnel board has a small staff. I told the mayor at the last budget hearing that I would be willing to give money out of my budget for them to hire more people to administer this test at least once a year for all ranks. I think it should be every year. The list should die within a year's time so that those new folks coming along won't have to wait all those years till the list expires. The long range plans are for a promotional list that has a life duration of one year with a new test to be given each year.

Many of the patrol officers we interviewed expressed high expectations for the promotion system the new administration was putting together. These expectations seem to be reflected in the survey respondents' own expectations for promotion. As shown in Table 3.1, 60 percent of the officers who indicated a desire for promotion reportedly felt that they would be promoted in five years. New Orleans ranks third on this dimension, lower only than Portland and San Diego.

Portland. Patrol officers in Portland with a minimum of three years of service are eligible to compete on a written exam which is given every two years. Those passing the exam, which represents 60 percent of an officer's final score, are then required to be interviewed by an oral board. The board's rating contributes another 30 percent to the score. Seniority credits, accumulated at the rate of one point per year for a maximum of 10 points after 10 years, make up the remaining 10 percent. Veterans are eligible for additional points.

Most of the officers we interviewed considered the promotion system to be extremely fair, a reflection of their perceptions of the operation of the sergeant's oral board. There are a number of factors that appear to account for a general confidence among patrol officers in the board's exercise of their discretion:

- The board members--including a supervisor from another agency, a personnel director from industry and a member of Portland's civil service board--are selected by the civil service board without any input from the chief or his staff. Unlike officers in Denver, patrol officers in Portland did not seem to believe that the administration had in any way influenced the recommendations of the boards.

TABLE 3.1

Percentage of Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for Promotion Within Five Years and Also Expected to be Promoted

Atlanta	35%
Denver	50
Montgomery County	25
New Orleans	60
Portland	79
San Diego	73

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978. (Atlanta, N=85; Denver, N=95; Montgomery County, N=54; New Orleans, N=68; Portland, N=39; San Diego, N=100)

TABLE 3.2

Percentage of Total Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for Promotion

Atlanta	68%
Denver	70
Montgomery County	55
New Orleans	51
Portland	25
San Diego	56

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978. (Atlanta, N=125; Denver, N=136; Montgomery County, N=98; New Orleans, N=133; Portland, N=157; San Diego, N=178)

- The major types of favoritism reportedly shown by oral boards--preferences given to educated, minority and female officers--are less potentially problematic in Portland. Bureau officers are not only highly educated but it appears to be well-accepted among patrol officers that a college degree is a de facto requirement for promotion to sergeant. In addition, while there is some belief among patrol officers that preference is given to minorities and women by the oral board, this is not viewed as occurring without high regard, in most cases, for the officers' qualifications.

- Most patrol officers were reportedly impressed by the quality of officers that have been promoted to sergeant under this system in recent years.

A number of officers, however, questioned the fairness of the system because of the composition of the board. These patrol officers felt that without police experience the members could not make informed assessments of the supervisory potential of police officers. This, they claimed, gave the good "bullshitters" an edge over those with less impressive verbal skills.

The opportunities for promotion were considered to be excellent in Portland. It is the only department where officers consistently reported that "If you want to be promoted, you can." Perceived opportunity appears to be a function not only of the fact that the test is given regularly--every two years--but that a relatively small proportion of officers want to be promoted. According to Table 3.2, only 25 percent of the survey respondents reported that they would like to be promoted in five years. These percentages range between 51 and 70 in the other five departments under study. These findings, in addition to the relatively high proportion of Portland officers who desired no advancement, 23 percent (Table 3.3), may suggest that the importance placed on the role of the patrol officer in Portland has removed some of the pressure for promotion that is typically seen in more hierarchically-oriented police departments.

Denver. The criteria for promotion to sergeant are very similar to those in Portland: officers who have at least four years of experience must take a written exam and be interviewed by an oral board, whose members are selected by the city's civil service commission. Additional points are awarded for seniority. In contrast to Portland, however, the oral interview in Denver carries more weight than the written exam although the percentage distribution has varied in the past. In addition, patrol officers in Denver perceive the system to be subject to favoritism and limited in opportunities.

Promotions, like other personnel policies involving administrative discretion--investigative assignment selection, transfers and discipline--are based,

according to most of the Denver officers we interviewed, on "who you know, not what you know." The exercise of this discretion has two major expressions:

- While some viewed the oral board as fair, others reportedly believed that the use of local representatives on certain boards precluded their impartiality. These officers questioned the influence of the administration on the board's decisions and felt that the weight carried by the oral interview was intended to insure that administrators could promote their loyal supporters.

- Many patrol officers expressed their belief that favoritism was fostered through the chief's option to let a certified list die at the end of one year or extend it for another year. According to these officers, the chief promoted candidates from the list until he reached one he didn't want to promote, then let the list die, and resumed promotions after the next certified list was issued. The chief is currently being sued by one of the local police associations for this practice. One major consequence of the list not being extended is that officers can "die" on several lists, each time requiring them to take the exam in order to reestablish their eligibility.

Despite these perceived obstacles to promotion, Table 3.1 shows that 50 percent of the survey respondents who expressed a desire for promotion expected to be promoted within five years. As shown in Table 3.2, the two departments that operate closest to the quasi-military model, Denver and Atlanta, include a relatively high percentage of officers with aspirations to become supervisors--70 and 68 percent, respectively. In Portland, however, where rank is less of an indicator of status and responsibility, relatively few patrol officers appear to have focused their careers on the chain of command.

San Diego. A higher degree of subjectivity has recently been introduced into the promotion system in San Diego; this appears to have created a division in patrol officer opinion between those who see the new system as being considerably less fair and those who view it as better able to pinpoint leadership potential.

In the past, there were four basic requirements for promotion to sergeant:

- 30 college units;
- four years of experience;
- a written exam; and

- an interview by an oral board, composed of a member of the civil service commission, a representative of a "community" organization, and one or two police officers from nearby agencies.

As is common practice in many departments, an officer's placement on the eligibility list was determined by his combined exam and oral interview score, carried out to a 100th of a point. And unless there was a compelling reason to pass over a particular officer, candidates were promoted in order until the list "died" after two years. Under this system, patrol officers could predict with reasonable accuracy their chances for promotion. Most of the officers we interviewed agreed that system was not only fair but provided those who wanted to be promoted with wide opportunities for advancement.

In 1978, the civil service commission (CSC) enforced a major change in the department's promotion process in response to their concern that the existing system promoted only those who could pass a test and talk their way through an oral interview. In an effort to increase the emphasis placed on past performance, the CSC decided to provide the chief with an eligibility list in alphabetical order and give him the authority to promote those whom he believed were most qualified. The chief responded to this mandate by authorizing the development of a "promotability" process whereby a board of four to five high ranking members of police management would interview the officers on the list and evaluate their leadership potential according to ten criteria.[1]

Officers objected so strongly to the absence of a rating on the eligibility list during the first promotability process that the second time around the list was divided into groups of officers having the same combined written test/oral interview scores rounded down to the nearest whole number. (For example, all officers scoring between 88.00 and 88.99 were in the same group.) Under this system, the promotability board was required to interview any three groups for each available position. This meant that two openings for sergeant were necessary to permit the promotability board a choice from among six of the seven groups that appeared on the second eligibility list.

The administrative discretion that now defines this promotion system is obviously considerable. Roughly half of the patrol officers and sergeants we interviewed viewed the process as highly unfair, a mechanism both to reward the chief's "fair-haired boys" and to preserve federal affirmative action funding through the promotion, in some cases, of allegedly unqualified minorities

[1]The ten equally weighted criteria include: commitment, adoption and maintenance of standards and controls, decision-making, leadership, interpersonal sensitivity, reliability, professional job knowledge, social and community awareness, communication, training and development.

and women. Interestingly, most of the officers opposed to the new system were assigned to the Northern division. In contrast to those working out of the Central division, located in the same building as headquarters staff, Northern officers are far removed from day-to-day contact with those having power over career advancement decisions.

On the other hand, there were at least as many officers of all ranks who felt that the promotability process would make an important contribution to improving the quality of supervision, something they believed was sorely needed. Most agreed, including many of those who saw the system as unfair, that the officers promoted to sergeant during the most recent process were highly qualified.

The resistance among patrol officers to the promotability process has been subject to different interpretations by members of the administration. The chief saw it as having created a serious morale problem, one that he may handle by returning to a system that is perceived to be more objective:

> The promotability board has created a lot of morale problems and insecurity. In the attempt of government to choose the best people they have forgotten the positions that exist within an organization like this. Policemen have a very sensitive justice thing and if they don't feel it's just, then you're in trouble, no matter how just it may be in our minds. If there exists a problem in their minds, whether it's real or unreal, we've got to deal with it. We haven't dealt with it really.[2]

Another high ranking administrator, however, viewed the opposition as a temporary problem, a predictable response to the implementation of fundamental change:

> I think we had to change and we could expect the kind of reaction we got. Sometimes when we make major changes like this, I think part of our job is to brace ourselves because we're going to get a blast. You have to say in the long run it's worth it, that we're going to get the kind of people that we really need in supervision.

[2]The chief has revised the promotion process, in response to his concern, since our interviews in San Diego were conducted. In the future, promotional candidates will receive a combined score based on the written exam, oral interview and promotability interview.

Whatever the accurate interpretation of the officers' response, it still appears that patrol officers in San Diego see wide opportunities for promotion relative to each of the other departments. Among the 56 percent of the survey respondents who indicated a desire for promotion, 73 percent expected to be promoted within five years. This represents 41 percent of the total respondent group. If these numbers are at all representative of patrol officers in general, then the virtual impossibility of these expectations being met is likely to create considerable frustration over the next five years, regardless of the nature of the promotion system.

Montgomery County. In addition to the revision of the directive system, the former administration also initiated the development of a Career Development Program intended to establish well-defined guidelines for advancement in the department. As the promotional criteria under the former chief's proposed program were the subject of considerable controversy, the program had not yet been implemented when he left the department in early 1979. During his administration, no sergeants exams were given; in fact, there have been no exams since 1975. While the former chief defended the absence of promotions, arguing that the department was already "top-heavy," many of the officers we interviewed of all ranks suggested that he put a freeze on promotions until passage of his own career development package.

The lack of promotional opportunities in the department is apparently a major source of frustration among patrol officers. When we asked how their promotion system operated, most patrol officers responded with comments like, "There is no promotional system in this department." The survey findings appear to support this opinion. Among the 55 percent of the respondents indicating a desire for promotion within five years are only 25 percent who expect to be promoted. As shown in Table 3.3, 68 percent who want to advance within five years expect to remain in their current rank. Of the six respondent groups under study, Montgomery County's reported the lowest expectations for advancement.

Patrol officers also described the last operational promotion system as highly unfair. In the past, promotion to sergeant was based on a written exam and supervisor's ratings, each carrying equal weight in determining an officer's final score. Most objected to what they believed to be the inconsistency in the way different sergeants interpreted the performance criteria and the tendency among some sergeants to use the evaluation process to increase their friends' chances for promotion. The conviction of many officers that the promotion system was structured to promote "friends of the administration" was only reinforced by the fact that the exams were not returned to patrol officers so they could verify their scores.

Atlanta. During the long history of political favoritism that has defined the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services, the promotion system has played an

TABLE 3.3

Percentage of Total Respondents Who Expected to be a Patrol Officer in Five Years According to Their Desires by Police Department

Desire in Five Years	Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
Patrol officer	3%	10%	12%	6%	23%	3%
Special assignment	1	0	9	1	1	3
Investigative assignment	4	1	6	1	1	3
Promotion	32	24	38	16	3	7
To be out of the department	4	5	4	3	1	2
	44% (55)	40% (54)	69% (68)	27% (36)	29% (46)	18% (32)

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

important part. Until the mid-seventies, there was very little in the way of a formal promotion system. While exams were administered on occasion, promotions were reportedly given to those who were "recommended to the chief." One sergeant we interviewed, for example, reported that he had taken two exams, scored well, but was never promoted until he was assigned to the mayor's office several years after his last exam. Within a year he received his sergeant's stripes without ever taking another test.

In 1974, the first black commissioner of public safety, responsible for both the police and fire services, was appointed. He expressed a commitment to standardizing the promotion system and to improving the promotional opportunities of black police officers who represented more than 30 percent of the force but were notably underrepresented among the supervisory ranks. Two sergeants exams were given during his administration, one in 1974 and one in 1975. Other promotional criteria included:

- two years of experience (reduced from five years under previous administrations in order to increase the pool of eligible black officers),
- an oral interview, and
- ratings by supervisors.

Officers also received additional points for college credits: two points for an Associates degree, four points for a Bachelors, five for a Masters and six for a Ph.D. Under this system, seven black officers were promoted to sergeant in 1974 and 21 in 1975.

In 1977, it was revealed that the commissioner had leaked the 1975 exam questions to several black officers who were among the 21 promoted that year. The commissioner was forced to submit his resignation and most of the implicated officers were either fired or demoted; some were exonerated and permitted to remain in rank. The mayor has since appointed a new commissioner, also black, who has not yet had the opportunity to implement his own promotion process because of a suit filed by one of the local police associations to invalidate the 1975 exam. While the suit is tied up in federal court, there is a freeze on promotions; none have been made since 1975.

In the absence of any promotion system at this point, all of the patrol officers we interviewed expected little change in the nature of future promotion processes. These officers held the firm conviction that the only way anyone in the department would ever get promoted was by "knowing the right people," or "playing up to the brass." According to the officers of all ranks we interviewed, this system damaged the quality of first-line

supervision as the promotional criteria placed a higher premium on loyalty than performance. In addition, promotions were kept out of the reach of those officers who objected to playing the game by these rules. While most indicated they believed that the current administrators were men of integrity who had a sincere interest in standardizing the system, they saw the forces working against change--primarily, tradition and the mayor's influence in the department--as highly inhibiting factors.

There may be some evidence that the unpredictable nature of the promotion system has affected patrol officer expectations for promotion. According to Table,3.1, only 35 percent of the survey respondents who indicated a desire for promotion in Atlanta expect to be promoted, as opposed to 79 percent in Portland. It should be noted, however, that another potentially important contributor to this disparity is the considerably higher proportion of patrol officers who appear to desire promotion in Atlanta, 68 percent, relative to Portland at 25 percent.

TABLE 3.4

Promotion Policies and Practices

	New Orleans	Portland	Denver	San Diego	Montgomery County	Atlanta
Service Time Requirement	3 years (2 with college degree)	3 years	4 years	4 years	No	No
Written Exam	60% of final score	60% of final score	Less than 50% of initial score	50% of initial score	Promotion	Promotion
Oral Interview	None	30% of final score	More than 50% of initial score	50% of initial score	System	System
Seniority Credits	40% of final score	10% of final score	Added to initial score	None	at	at
Composition of Oral Board	N/A	2 local civilians, 1 police supervisor from outside agency	Varies with each promotion process	2 local civilians, 1 or 2 police supervisors from outside agency	Present	Present
Additional Criteria	None	None	None	30 college units; promotability interview by 4-5 high ranking officers		
Year of Last Sergeants Exam	1976	1978	1977	1977	1975	1975
Percentage of Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for Promotion Within 5 Years and Also Expected to be Promoted	60%	79%	50%	73%	25%	35%
Percentage of Respondents Who Selected "Promotional Opportunities" as 1 of 3 Sources of Dissatisfaction	38%	20%	48%	27%	72%	56%
Major Sources of Dissatisfaction	Infrequency of exams	Involvement of civilians on oral boards	Perceived impartiality of local oral boards Perceived political favoritism in chief's exercise of option to let promotional list "die" after 1 year or to extend it for a second	Subjectivity of promotion process	Absence of promotions	Absence of promotions Perceptions of politics in promotions

3.2 Investigative Assignment Selection

The process by which detectives are selected from the patrol officer ranks has traditionally been considered a political one, dependent on a "rabbi" or "hook" working behind the scenes on an officer's behalf (Muir, 1977; Saunders, 1970; Ahern, 1972; Radano, 1968; Rubinstein, 1973). The political nature of the process is often seen as sacrificing officer qualifications by placing a higher value on loyalty. In recent years, many police departments have established written procedures and criteria in an attempt to standardize the process and give greater attention to merit. Others have not altered traditional practice.

The six departments under study represent the range of variation from highly-defined procedures and criteria to none at all. These policies and practices can thus be assessed in terms of:

- fairness, or the extent to which procedures and criteria surrounding investigative assignment selection provide for equal application.

Opportunities for selection are not discussed here because the question of availability is not at issue. In each of the departments under study, patrol officers are regularly selected for investigative assignments. Thus, any examination of investigative assignment oportunities must be limited to individual officers' view of their own chances for investigative assignment selection. This view is reflected in Table 3.5 for the survey respondents in the six sites. Among the patrol officers who expressed a desire for an investigative assignment, those in Portland had the highest expectations: 87 percent expected to be selected within five years. These findings contrast sharply with those found in Atlanta, where not one of the officers indicating a desire for selection expected to be chosen. In between are San Diego at 61 percent, New Orleans at 55 percent and Denver at 50 percent, where reported expectations are relatively high, and Montgomery County at 25 percent, where they are relatively low.

TABLE 3.5

Percentage of Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for an Investigative Assignment Within Five Years and Also Expected to be Selected

Atlanta	0%
Denver	50
Montgomery County	25
New Orleans	55
Portland	87
San Diego	61

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978. (Atlanta, N=5; Denver, N=6; Montgomery County, N=8; New Orleans, N=11; Portland, N=39; San Diego, N=31).

TABLE 3.6

Percentage of Total Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for an Investigative Assignment Within Five Years

Atlanta	4%
Denver	4
Montgomery County	8
New Orleans	8
Portland	25
San Diego	17

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978. (Atlanta, N=125; Denver, N=136; Montgomery CountyN=98; New Orleans, N=133; Portland, N=157; San Diego, N=178).

As shown in Table 3.6, Portland and Atlanta also represent the extremes with respect to the percentage of total respondents desiring an investigative assignment: 25 percent versus 4 percent, respectively. This disparity appears to reflect the enhanced role of the detective in the organizational structure in Portland: detectives are promoted through the civil service system according to the same procedures that govern promotion to sergeants. They also receive the same salary.

Table 3.7 (at the conclusion of this section) summarizes for each department the procedures and criteria governing investigative assignment selection. Each department's position on this continuum is described below.

Portland. Unlike the other five departments, general and specialized investigators in Portland are selected according to different procedures and occupy different positions in the organizational structure. Detectives, those officers handle juvenile felony, auto theft, burglary, homicide, robbery, fraud, fencing and sex crime investigations, are appointed through the civil service system and are equal to sergeants in pay and status. Patrol officers are selected in narcotics and vice cases by the commanders of the Special Investigations Division, and in intelligence cases by the Technical Support Division.

More specifically, the detective selection procedure is the same as that for promotion to sergeant and, until recently, the same exam was given for both positions. Like promotion to sergeant, detective selection requires three years of experience and is based on a written exam, weighted 60 percent; an oral interview, weighted 30 percent; and seniority ratings, representing the final 10 percent of a candidate's score. The same point system for veterans preference applies. The civil service board in Portland has produced a "Summary of Required Knowledges, Skills and Personal Characteristics," a comprehensive list of fifteen areas of knowledge (e.g., laws, bureau policies, human behavior, theories, court procedures), seven skills (e.g., analyzing information, observation, written communication), 19 physical capabilities (e.g., trigger pull, hurdling, auditory acuity, lifting) and nine "other characteristics" (e.g., willingness to work overtime and to use deadly force when required) which provide the basis for the written and oral exams, given annually. The oral board is composed of a police supervisor from an outside agency, a local civilian and an officer from the bureau who may be a patrol officer.

Selections for specialized investigative assignments, on the other hand, are made by the ranking officers of each unit often after the members of the unit have had an opportunity to review the requests and recommend preferred candidates. All openings for these positions must be posted and those interested for consideration are required to submit a standardized form and a resume. The position announcements for these assignments include a job description, a listing of mandatory and desirable qualifications, and application instructions.

Both procedures were perceived to be extremely fair by most of the officers we interviewed because, despite the discretion built into the system, the bureau's commitment to selecting the best qualified was largely unquestioned. While these officers agreed that it was important "to know someone" and that openings were sometimes filled before they were posted, they did not see the political component of the process as compromising qualification criteria. The president of the PPA supported this view, adding that he "would raise hell" if he thought decisions were being made at the expense of officer quality.

The definition of fairness implied by the perceptions of Portland officers is an interesting one. At least some officers in the other five departments saw similar selection criteria--the combination of "connections" and qualifications--as unfair because opportunities for advancement were denied to those qualified officers who were not well-connected. This ethic is noticeably absent in Portland. What is apparent throughout the Portland Bureau of Police, and generally missing in the other departments, is the sense that the most capable officers will most often be recognized because they are not merely those who satisfy established selection or promotion criteria, but are also sufficiently aggressive to win that recognition.

Montgomery County. Under the former administration, the procedure for selecting officers for investigative assignments became considerably more explicit in an attempt to move away from the "old buddy" system of the past. While the future of the procedure is uncertain, given the recent change in administrations, the system operating during the period of our research compares very favorably to the specialized investigative process in Portland.

Vacancies in the Investigative Services Bureau (ISB) were also required to be posted. The job descriptions specified minimum qualifications (including three years of police experience, proven investigative ability and certain personal characteristics such as good moral character and calm under stressful situations) as well as the method of candidate selection. Officers interested in these positions, which carried no increase in salary, were asked to submit a memorandum to ISB that covered:

- the applicant's present rank and position,
- his career history,
- his involvement in specialized training,
- a statement addressing his interest in the position, and
- an endorsement from his supervisor.

Each applicant was interviewed by an oral board composed of three high ranking members of ISB and the Education and Training Division. For some positions, a written test was required.

Officers reported in our interviews that openings were not always advertised and that it was important to "know someone" in ISB to be selected. Nonetheless, most of the officers in Montgomery County, like those in Portland, agreed that the system was basically fair because the qualifications of the applicants were the overriding selection criterion. However, there was not the same degree of certainty and consistency in this perception among patrol officers and sergeants in Montgomery County as seen in Portland. This disparity may largely reflect differences in the general sense of trust patrol officers and sergeants expressed in top management. While most of the officers in Montgomery County believed that the selection process gave the "appearance of legitimacy," their lack of confidence in the chief seemed to leave them with some measure of doubt.

San Diego. Both the criteria and procedure governing selection for investigative assignments are specified in some detail in the department's policy manual referred to as the "Yellow Sheets." The general requirements for assignment to the Investigations Bureau include:

- 30 college units,
- three years of experience,
- demonstrated ability to function as a "self-starter,"
- proven investigative abilities, and
- a recommendation from the candidate's commanding officer based on "overall police experience, ability, oral and written expression, aggressiveness, alertness, judgment, resourcefulness, integrity, motivation, and appearance."

The formal investigative selection procedure is equally well-defined. Officers interested in one of these assignments, which do not represent an increase in salary, are required to submit a standardized form to their commanding officers once a year. Each candidate is interviewed by his commanding officer and the names of those recommended for further consideration are submitted to the chief of detectives. (Those rejected at this point must be given an explanation "so steps to overcome deficiencies may be taken by the candidate.") The list of recommended candidates is then reduced by a board of high ranking officers in the Investigations Bureau on the basis of the officers' applications and their commanding officers' recommendations. (Again, those not selected must "be advised of the reasons.") A panel of

investigative supervisors interviews the remaining candidates and ranks them on one or more lists for juvenile, vice, narcotics or general investigative assignments according to individual qualifications. Vacancies are filled as needed by the chief of detectives from the four eligibility lists which remain valid for a period of one year. While undefined by formal policy, officers reported that each eligibility list is partitioned into three categories--"definitely, maybe, and no way"--and selections are made from the top category, in any order, until it is exhausted.

Our interviews produced the same division in opinion, along the fairness dimension, that was generated by similar questions about the promotion system. More than half of the patrol officers and a number of sergeants questioned the fairness of the process, some more vigorously than others, for one or more of the following reasons:

- The subjective selection criteria as well as the chief's formal authority "to transfer personnel to any specialized unit even though they may not meet all general or specific requirements" meant that the command staff could essentially choose whomever they wanted.

- Becoming a detective was too dependent on being "well-known" to the investigative brass who served on the interview committees. Patrol officers in the Northern division, particularly, saw this as placing them at a considerable disadvantage.

- The virtual impossibility of "living down past mistakes" in the department resulted in officers being "labelled" or "stigmatized" and thus cut off from any serious consideration. Some officers claimed that "if they didn't want you" the committee would fabricate reasons for rejection, such as insufficient experience, that were too difficult to refute formally.

- Minorities and women were all too frequently selected over equally qualified white male officers in order to maintain federal affirmative action funding.

On the other hand, most of the officers we interviewed at all ranks expressed confidence in the investigative selection procedure as a function of the generally high quality of the officers selected. While most of these officers also noted the emphasis on "personalities" in the process, their definition of fairness, similar to that of officers in Portland and many in Montgomery County, focused on the decision-makers' concern for officer quality. The possibility that certain well-qualified officers may have more limited opportunities for selection was, for them, a less important criterion in assessing fairness.

Denver. The Operations Manual in Denver gives the chief authority to appoint detectives from among the first grade patrolmen and policewomen ranks, "each of whom shall perform such duties so long as his or her services are satisfactory to the Chief of Police and the latter shall see fit to continue such assignment." The procedure for selecting detectives, positions which represent an additional $194 in pay, is subjective on two levels: in the districts where original eligibility lists are developed by ranking officers, and in the Investigations and Delinquency Control Divisions where the command staff is responsible for making the final selections.

On the district level, officers who wish to be considered are required to file a request with their commanding officers. Every six months the chiefs of the investigative divisions request from each patrol unit a list of the patrol officers considered to represent the eight percent most qualified to be detectives. While the precise method by which an officer's name is placed on one of these lists may vary from one patrol district to another, the officers who receive the widest support from the largest number of sergeants and lieutenants in their district (and, in some cases, their commanding officer) become eligible for consideration.

Virtually all captains and sergeants as well as about half of the patrol officers we interviewed considered the procedure to be fair at this level because they felt the most productive officers were generally recognized. The remaining patrol officers, however, considered it objectionable that in order to be selected, an officer had to "make the right connections" or, according to one patrol officer, "go up to every sergeant and tell him how wonderful you are." They viewed the system as discriminating against qualified officers who refused to "play up to the brass."

The lists submitted to the Investigative and Delinquency Control Divisions become the general basis for selecting officers for temporary investigative assignments. Those completing this initial training period are eligible for a permanent assignment. The administrative discretion in the system is manifested in the following ways:

- While the names on the lists are ranked according to the preferences of each unit's supervisors, the divisions are not required to make temporary assignments in that order. An officer's "Performance Record," a two-year background summary covering arrests, court appearances, efficiency ratings, commendations and complaints, to report writing, is also considered.

- The divisions are not required to take an equal number from each list so that some can be exhausted while others are ignored.

- Officers can be selected for some temporary vice assignments without appearing on any list.

The wide discretion at this level in the selection process in Denver was seen by most of the district supervisors and patrol officers as making investigative assignments open only to those officers who "knew the right people." Some officers expressed their belief in the presence of outside political influences on the selection process. Some questioned whether those selected were among the most deserving. The perceived importance placed on outside as well as inside political connections in Denver was seen by many as diminishing the general quality of investigative personnel.

New Orleans. There are no written policies governing the procedure for assignment to the two investigative bureaus in New Orleans--the Detective Division, which handles general investigations, and the Special Investigations Division, which is in charge of vice, narcotics, juvenile and intelligence cases. According to the chief of detectives, officers are selected for these assignments by the commanders of each division based on a recommendation from the supervisors of the unit of interest (e.g., robbery, vice, etc.) and a demonstrated record of high quality arrests, connections with the criminal element in the city (e.g., fences, informants, etc.) and report writing ability. In addition, assignment to the intelligence unit requires an endorsement from the officers in the unit because of their particularly close working relationship. Investigative assignments in New Orleans are not subject to additional pay.

The perceptions of the selection process among the officers we interviewed varied according to the extent to which they believed that decisions based on "knowing the right people" were also made with a concern for officer quality. Some reported they felt the system was fair because of the importance placed on past performance. Others felt personal friendships played a greater role in the selection process. Many, however, shared the opinion that while the officers selected were probably qualified, other equally qualified officers were denied opportunities for investigative assignments because they were not members of the "right clique." For these officers, the system was not fair because a proven record of performance was not the only selection criterion.

Atlanta. Investigators in Atlanta, whose salaries represent an 8.5 percent increase over those of patrol officers, are assigned to one of two investigative divisions,; the Detective Section which handles general and juvenile investigations or the Special Investigations Section which is responsible for investigations dealing with narcotics, vice, intelligence, white collar and organized crime. Consistent with the department's political tradition, the selection criteria and procedures governing these assignments are undefined; investigators are selected by the chief and serve at his pleasure.

There was virtually no disagreement among the officers we interviewed that these assignments were at times made in return for political favors, such as loyalty to the administration or contributions to political campaigns, without sufficient regard for officer qualifications. And despite what many believed to be the good intentions of the current administrators, few expected that the political tradition would be broken.

TABLE 3.7

Investigative Assignment Selection Policies and Practices

	Portland	Montgomery County	San Diego	Denver	New Orleans	Atlanta
Criteria for Selection	Detectives: 3 years of service Written exam (60%) Oral interview (30%) Seniority credits (10%) Criteria for selection of specialized investigators vary according to position but generally include: 3 years of service Supervisor's endorsement Proven investigative ability Written and oral communication skills Specific personal characteristics Good record of performance	Vary according to position but generally include: 3 years of service Proven investigative ability Written and oral communication skills Supervisor's endorsement Specific personal characteristics Good record of performance Statement of interest Oral interview Written exam (depending on position)	30 college units 3 years of service Ability to function as a "self-starter" Proven investigative ability Commanding officer's endorsement	Good record of performance Written communication skills Unit command's endorsement	Undefined	Undefined
Responsibility for Selection	Detectives: Oral board which may include a patrol officer Specialized investigators: Ranking officers of each unit after, in many cases, peer review of applications	Oral board composed of ranking officers in the Investigative Services Bureau and other members of the administrative staff	Oral board composed of ranking officers makes initial selection decisions Final selection decisions are made by a panel of supervisors from the specialized units	Supervisors of each unit select initial 3% who are recommended to Investigations Division Chief of investigations with approval of chief of police makes final selection decisions from among those completing temporary assignment	Ranking officers in the Detective and Special Investigations Divisions Applications to the intelligence unit are endorsed by members of the unit	Ranking officers in the Detective and Special Investigations Sections with approval of chief
Vacancy Posting Requirement	Yes (for specialized investigative assignments)	Yes	No	No	No	No
Percentage of Respondents Who Expressed a Desire for an Investigative Assignment Within Five Years and Also Expected to be Selected	87%	25%	61%	50%	55%	0%
Perceived Practice	High regard for officer qualifications despite advantages of having "connections" in specialized units Openings sometimes filled before posted	High regard for officer qualifications despite advantages of having "connections" Openings not always advertised	High regard for officer qualifications despite importance of being "well-known" to investigative brass Some qualified officers are denied consideration	Those selected on the district level usually qualified although some objections to perceived need to "play up to the brass" Highly political on the Investigations Division level Some qualified officers are denied consideration	Importance of "connections" Mixed opinion regarding concern for officer qualifications Some qualified officers are denied consideration	Importance of "connections" at the expense of officer qualifications

3.3 Transfer

The police literature on transfer policy is almost exclusively devoted to involuntary transfers. Case studies have suggested that the exercise of this management prerogative for disciplinary or other reasons can represent a source of frustration among patrol officers when these actions are seen as capricious and unjustified (Rubinstein, 1973; Bloch and Specht, 1973; Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Juris and Feuille, 1973). The current discussion, however, focuses on policies and practices governing self-initiated transfers from one patrol area to another.

Much of the formal and informal process by which patrol officers request and receive inter-area transfers is strikingly similar across the six departments under study. Under formal policy, a voluntary transfer request is initiated through the officer's completion of a standard form. The request requires the approval of each level in the chain of command and the patrol division chief (as well as the chief in two departments). The commander of the requested patrol area is also required to approve the request but this practice is documented in formal policy in only two departments. Informally, transfers are highly dependent on the presence of a "swap" so that manpower levels in each patrol area can be maintained. The transfer process is consistently described as "horsetrading," whereby the patrol commanders' objective is to transfer in at least as capable an officer as the one who is transferring out.

The existing differences in the process, however, offer evidence of considerable interdepartmental variation along the dimension of:

- fairness, or the extent to which procedures governing self-initiated transfers provide for equal application.

It should be noted that transfer opportunities appear to be highly related to perceived fairness. In those departments where there is limited availability of inter-area transfers--Montgomery County, Denver, New Orleans and Atlanta--favoritism is, at least, more visible. In Portland and San Diego, however, where transfers across districts are frequent events, the value placed on merit is considered to be relatively high. At the conclusion of this section,

Table 3.8 displays the continuum of policies and practices observed at the six sites. Due to the similarity in transfer policies, the position of each department is necessarily based largely on judgments regarding varying levels of perceived practice. In fact, two groups rather than a single continuum would probably best describe the six departments in this policy area.

Portland. Inter-precinct transfers and transfers to special assignments are covered under the same policy. The only distinction in the formal procedure is that openings for routine patrol assignments are exempt from the posting requirement. Any patrol officer wishing a transfer to another precinct may request one, whether a specific vacancy exists or not. The process is initiated upon his completion of the appropriate portion of a standard form which requires his:

- name and rank,
- present precinct and time in present precinct,
- date of appointment, and
- requested precinct and shift.

Under written policy, the form is submitted to the officer's immediate supervisor, who recommends approval or disapproval and forwards it to the commanding officer of the requested precinct, who does the same. The completed form is then sent to the chief of the patrol division responsible for the final decision. Transfers across precincts are "based upon the required personnel strength at the units involved...and on the chronological order in which their approved requests were received in the Personnel Division." In addition, "applicants...may be removed from consideration for just cause," examples of which include sick time abuse, poor disciplinary records, chronic tardiness and unsatisfactory personnel evaluations.

The informal process described by the officers we interviewed has filled in additional details. Transfers are usually dependent on a "swap" which is usually arranged by the officers. The exchanges, however, are approved by the chief of the patrol division and the precinct commanders, who reportedly "play a management game to get the best people." As each precinct captain attempts to determine the reputations of officers requesting transfer to his command, primarily through his lieutenants and sergeants, officers reported that it "helps to know someone" in the precinct of choice.

Despite management's prerogative to reject transfer requests for "just cause," the bureau seems to take the position, expressed by one commander, that "an officer will work better in a district he wants to work in." Most

of the patrol officers we interviewed shared the opinion that transfers were "pretty automatic as long as the C.O. wants you" and that "if the C.O. doesn't want a guy, he's better off not being there." The process was perceived to be fair because any qualified officer could readily transfer. Implicit in this sense of fairness is the trust, evident in attitudes towards other personnel practices in Portland, that decisions are not made arbitrarily or on purely personal grounds.

San Diego. The formal transfer procedure in San Diego is very similar to that in Portland, although San Diego's is not documented in written policy; rather, it is defined on the standard request form. The procedure involves the submission of a formal request (including reasons for the request) to the officer's sergeant who in turn recommends approval or disapproval to his commanding officer. If he concurs, approval of the commander of the requested district and the chief of patrol is solicited. Approved transfers occur in the order in which they are requested.

As in Portland, most officers in San Diego indicated that "the department likes men to work where they'll be happy," and as long as an officer can find a swap, it is relatively easy to transfer. Some officers, however, described an informal arrangement that often preceded the formal request procedure. As one put it, first "you lobby with the lieutenant or captain of the district you want to go to," and then the respective commanding officers "work out a mutual trade." It was under these circumstances that the transfer process was seen by some as a "personality contest" that rewarded officers who were not necessarily better qualified but more "well-known." While there is evidence of this informal arrangement in Portland, the difference in San Diego seems to be the view that management can less often be trusted to make personnel decisions primarily on the basis of merit.

Montgomery County. The department's transfer policy is defined in a 1977 memorandum from the chief which states that

> any member of the department desiring a transfer from one unit to another or from one geographical location to another should submit their request in duplicate to the Director of Police via the chain of command. The request should reflect the reason for the requested transfer as well as the member's qualifications making him eligible for duty at the new location....The original will be retained at headquarters for one year and then, if the request has not been honored, returned to the employee with a note, 'This is being returned due to the expiration date. If you are still interested, please resubmit.'

In practice, transfers require a swap, most often arranged by the officer requesting the transfer with the approval of both commanding officers. In

addition, district vacancies are subject to the same posting requirement as openings for special assignments.

We had some difficulty in capturing the informal transfer process in Montgomery County because of the limited experience most of the officers we interviewed had with transfers. Many patrol officers reported they had never transferred. Some supervisors indicated they had not received a transfer request in more than a year. As Montgomery County includes four cities covering over 493 square miles, officers tend to work in the district in which they live. Thus, the most commonly perceived problem with transfers was that the delay could be considerable because it was just too difficult to find a swap. Some officers, however, did suggest that the involvement of the administration in the process added some difficulty in trasnferring. In their desire to "put people where they want them to go," certain officers could more easily receive transfers while others had to wait.

Denver. According to the department's Operations Manual, "in order to receive a transfer of assignment, an officer must first initiate a request for transfer, DPD #49, which will be processed through the chain of command to their Division Chief." In practice, this policy translates into the requirement that an officer wishing to transfer find a swap and obtain approval from both commanding officers for the exchange. Most of the officers we interviewed in Denver described the process as one of "bartering" or "horsetrading," in which commanding officers "try to get a better guy than they give up."

While this procedure is very similar to the one found in both Portland and San Diego, the essential difference is merely a reflection of a basic difference in the management orientation in Portland and San Diego to that operating in Denver. In Portland, and San Diego to a somewhat lesser extent, management appears to have demonstrated a sincere interest in accommodating the preferences of patrol officers, even at the expense of their own authority or convenience. No such orientation exists in Denver. Accordingly, Denver's formal transfer policy states that, "although the officer's preferences and wishes will be considered, the primary consideration in making the transfer will be for the good of the department."

The organizational, rather than individual, emphasis in the department's transfer policy appears to be associated with perceptions of favoritism in the consideration of transfer requests. The belief that transfers were granted based on "personalities" or "connections" rather than qualifications was reasonably widespread. One commander suggested that transfers should be "blind" to eliminate this favoritism, even though he acknowledged his own discretion would be diminished. Many officers also shared the view that commanding officers would turn down transfer requests of qualified officers if the proposed swap were not considered to represent at least an even trade.

In addition, Denver officers reported that a swap was difficult to find if the supervisors in the district from which an officer wanted to transfer from had acquired an unfavorable reputation. Under these circumstances, the waiting period could be lengthy. Officers requesting transfers in Portland and San Diego benefit from the apparent absence of any patrol districts with reputedly undesirable command staff.

New Orleans. While the formal transfer policy has remained unaltered since 1971, informal practice is perceived to have changed considerably under the current administration. Department regulations specify that

> employees desiring transfers shall prepare requests on NOPD Form 14-R; transfer requests shall be forwarded through normal administrative channels with appropriate endorsements thereon....Transfers of employees within the department shall be directed by the Superintendent.

Under previous administrations, transfers were reportedly granted through one of two means: an officer could have a local politician or businessman "facilitate" the request, or he could arrange a swap that was acceptable to both commanding officers. In either case, while the process was considered to be highly political, transfers were regularly granted. Over the past year the current administration appears to have become unresponsive to outside political influences in transfer decisions, but also to have taken much of the discretion over transfers out of the hands of district commanders. Swaps are now arranged through the chief's office. For most of the district officers we interviewed, this meant that the officers who had transfer requests approved were not necessarily those officers who were most qualified, but rather, those who "knew someone" in headquarters as well as in the requested district. As in Montgomery County, officers in New Orleans indicated that, as a result, they saw few transfers across districts.

In addition, patrol officers working in the city's more hazardous districts described themselves as having virtually no chance for inter-district mobility because of the impossibility of finding a swap. According to one patrol officer we interviewed, "Once you're in, you can't get out." While these patrol officers attributed their more limited transfer opportunities to the crime conditions in their district, the chief defined the problem in different terms:

> There are some districts here that are totally undesirable, and if we let everyone who wanted out, there would be nobody in these districts. But, again, that's just a symptom of something that's wrong with the district. Certain commanders have tough districts but they don't have any problem with employee turnover because everyone wants to work there, because of the leadership there. I think the district problem is one of leadership.

New Orleans seems to share with Denver the difficulty of making transfers at least potentially accessible to all officers as a function of the quality of district management.

Atlanta. Like the other departments under study, the written transfer policy in Atlanta requires an officer to submit his request "through the chain of command" to the commander of the patrol division and to the commander of the zone to which he would like to be transferred. Informally, the department's transfer process also compares with those in other sites with respect to the requirement of a swap and the "horsetrading" nature of the process. The major distinguishing characteristic of the transfer process in Atlanta is the involvement of an affirmative action officer whose responsibilities include the maintenance of racial balance within each unit in the department. The transfer request form requires each officer to specify his race so that transfer decisions can be made in conformity with affirmative action guidelines. Until recently, any swap had to include officers of the same race, which only reduced transfer opportunities. Now that an acceptable balance has been achieved, transfers by race appear to be less essential, although the affirmative action officer continues to monitor the distribution of black and white officers within units.

Most of the officers we interviewed, largely patrol officers and sergeants, shared the view that inter-zone transfers were highly infrequent and available to only those few officers who were sufficiently well-connected to the brass in the requested zone that the commanding officer would be willing to arrange the swap. In the absence of these contacts, the most an officer could hope for was a long wait; the greater likelihood, however, was a rejected request.

TABLE 3.8

Self-Initiated Transfer Policies and Practices

	Portland	San Diego	Montgomery County	Denver	New Orleans	Atlanta
Required Approval of Transfer Requests	Chain of command through chief of patrol division Commander of requested precinct	Chain of command through chief of patrol division Commander of requested division	Chain of command through chief of police Commander of requested district	Chain of command through chief of patrol division Commander of requested district	Chain of command through chief of police Commander of requested district	Chain of command through chief of patrol division Commander of requested zone Affirmative action officer
Requests Required to be Processed in Order of Receipt	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Requests Removed from Consideration for "Just Cause"	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Informal Elements of Process	Swap Horsetrading	Swap Horsetrading	Swap Horsetrading	Swap Horsetrading	Swap Horsetrading	Swap (sometimes with officer of same race) Horsetrading
Primary Considerations in Approving Transfers	Officer preferences	Officer preferences	Mixed opinion	Management preferences	Management preferences	Management preferences Racial balance
Perceived Practice	Officers can transfer relatively easily	Officers can transfer relatively easily Some indication of preferential treatment of officers who are "well known"	Few opportunities for transfer because of the difficulty in finding a swap	Transfers dependent on "connections" in requested district	Transfers dependent on "connections" in both the requested district and in headquarters	Transfers dependent on "connections" in requested zone

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3.4 Discipline

In 1977, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) completed a two-year study in 17 police agencies intended "to identify... those conditions which are perceived to have a positive or negative effect on police discipline." The findings suggest a number of policy-related factors that are associated with perceived fairness. Some of these include:

- documented procedural safeguards during internal investigations,
- the right to a hearing (before a board or a single hearing officer),
- peer participation on hearing boards,
- the opportunity for the accused to challenge one or more members of the hearing board,
- police association involvement in reviewing disciplinary decisions, and
- the solicitation of officer input regarding rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures.

These factors define differences in the disciplinary procedures across the six departments under study and permit comparison in terms of:

- fairness, or the extent to which procedures governing the administration of discipline provide for equal application; and
- participation, or the extent to which patrol officers are provided opportunities to share in decisions involving disciplinary procedures and actions.

Table 3.9 arrays each department on a continuum that represents the variation in disciplinary policies and practices along these dimensions.

Montgomery County. Discipline policy for Montgomery County is largely defined in the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights, applicable to all law enforcement agencies in the State of Maryland. Additional regulations appear in the department's Comprehensive Manual and Position Paper #2, the formal agreement between the FOP and Montgomery County. Of the six departments under study, Montgomery County has the most specific discipline policy as far as police officer protections are concerned. There are several aspects of the policy that distinguish it from most of the others:

- the partition of offenses into two classes according to seriousness;
- district authority, within limits, to suspend and fine officers;
- peer participation on administrative hearing boards (the hearing board in Portland may or may not include a peer of the accused);
- the right of accused officers to challenge for cause any member of the hearing board (a similar policy exists in Portland);
- the obligation of the hearing board and the chief to consider the past performance of officers in assessing penalties (Denver has a similar, though somewhat less forceful, policy);
- procedural safeguards for officers under investigation (Portland and San Diego officers are also protected by a bill of rights); and
- the requirement that the chief specify the reason for increasing penalties recommended by the hearing board.

More specifically, the department's Manual makes a distinction, albeit in a non-specific way, between "serious allegations of misconduct" and "minor complaints of misconduct" for the purpose of setting general penalty guidelines. Serious complaints are defined only through examples such as physical brutality, expressed racial prejudice, misappropriation of funds, or untruthful statements. These violations carry penalties which include suspension, loss of pay, or, according to the Bill of Rights, "other similar actions which would be considered a punitive measure." Minor complaints are defined in the Manual only as "allegations, which if sustained, would be appropriately disciplined through the imposition of summary punishment," representing a maximum of three days suspension without pay or a fine of not more than $150.00. Authority to administer summary punishment rests with district commanders, making Montgomery County the only department of the six where commanding officers can assess penalties greater than a written reprimand. Thus, the

chief's role in the disciplinary process is limited to cases where the officer refuses summary punishment (i.e., disputes the charges) and those where serious misconduct is alleged.

According to the Bill of Rights, all cases that go beyond the district level are heard by a hearing board which has authority only to determine guilt or innocence and recommend punishment where charges have been sustained. The chief has final authority to impose punishment. If an officer refuses summary punishment "the Chief may convene a one-member or more hearing board and the hearing board shall have only the authority to recommend the sanctions...for summary punishment." In more serious cases, a three-member hearing board is convened which must include at least one officer of the same rank as the accused. When the accused is a patrol officer, the board is likely to be composed of a captain selected by the chief, and a patrol officer and sergeant selected by the commanding officer of a district other than the one to which the accused is assigned. Position Paper #2 gives accused officers "the right to challenge for cause any member of the trial board."

Under the Bill of Rights, the hearing board's recommendations to the chief as well as the chief's final assessment of penalties, must "consider the law enforcement officer's past job performance" as well as the evidence submitted in the case. This evidence is obtained through an investigation which must be conducted according to guidelines intended to safeguard the rights of the accused. And "before the Chief may increase the recommended penalty of the hearing board he personally shall permit the law enforcement officer to be heard and shall state the reason for increasing the recommended penalty."

Consistent with these safeguards, most of the officers we interviewed perceived a high degree of consistency in discipline, at both the district and headquarters levels. All of the officers who reported having been disciplined shared the view that they had been treated fairly. In addition, two officers indicated they had served on trial boards and were extremely impressed by the seriousness with which the ranking members of the board had taken their responsibility and the impartiality they had demonstrated.

The only criticisms of the way in which discipline was administered were directed at district supervisors. A few patrol officers objected to the tendency of some sergeants to "harass" officers they did not like by "getting [them] on little things," recommending them for summary punishment for "petty" violations. While this view was a minority one, given district authority to impose penalties without formally charging an officer, it is not unlikely that the discipline process might be used in this way on occasion.

Portland. Discipline policy is relatively well-specified in the bureau's general orders and in the PPA's formal agreement with the City of Portland.

According to general orders, disciplinary cases can be handled in one of two ways: the chief has the option of hearing the case himself or selecting a discipline committee of five officers, one of which may be a patrol officer. The accused has "the right to disqualify any two members of the Committee" and "the Chief of Police may concur in, modify, or disregard the Committee's recommendations." Precinct commanders have no formal authority to assess penalties except "appropriate corrective action short of written reprimand." All other acceptable forms of punishment--specified in the Labor Agreement as "written reprimand, suspension [for a maximum of 30 days], or in lieu thereof, reduction in pay by one step, appropriate extra duty, or loss of vacation time"--must be approved by the chief. Portland is the only department in this study where punitive transfers are not permitted, according to both written policy and the perceptions of officers expressed in interviews.

As mentioned earlier, the Portland Police Association (PPA) has played a major role in the creation and implementation of discipline policy. The Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Labor Agreement in 1975 through the efforts of the association. In addition, PPA representatives confer with administrators informally on proposed disciplinary actions in serious cases.

The officers we interviewed considered punishment for similar offenses to be highly consistent within the patrol officer rank. Some, including patrol officers, commented on the tendency toward leniency in punishment. In addition, there was little evidence of disparities in standards across the three patrol precincts; officers were not seen as having a higher probability of being formally charged in one precinct than another.

At the same time, however, our interviews generated a shared belief among most patrol officers that discipline was biased in favor of superior officers. Requests for illustrative cases almost exclusively centered around one captain who wrecked a car, left the scene of the mishap (hit-and-run), and received only ten days suspension. The common perception was that if a patrol officer had done that, he probably would have been fired. The chief's explanation for his decision in this case offers an interesting contrast in perspectives because it highlights the difficulty even an apparently well-intentioned administrator has in gaining his officers' trust.

> It is true that the captain was suspended ten days. He also was not allowed to have a personal car for six months. The captain had some problems at that time and the issue was: do you try to salvage someone who has made a great contribution to the bureau--because he was one of our outstanding people--or do you just bucket him? And, of course, my option is always to salvage, if we possibly can, because of our investment and the productivity of the person. I could probably sit down and if I gave it a little thought I could come up

> with half a dozen patrol officers that we have treated much more leniently for much more severe offenses in another effort to salvage. And, yet, they aren't as visible as one captain.

This issue appears to be only one example of many we found across the departments where patrol officer perceptions of widespread inequities seemed to be traceable to a few isolated incidents, incidents that became well-known throughout the department and served to define the level of perceived fairness.

San Diego. The disciplinary code in San Diego is a general one that applies to all city agencies. Under that code, the chief has authority to suspend officers (for a maximum of 30 days at one time or 90 days during a calendar year); the chief of the patrol division can issue written reprimands while patrol supervisory authority is limited to warnings. Other forms of permissible punishment documented in the POA's Memorandum of Understanding with the City of San Diego--reduction in salary and punitive transfers--are not covered by the code, but they fall, informally, under the chief's authority. Nonpaid extra duty as a form of discipline is specifically prohibited by the city code. The rank-and-file contract also contains the Police Bill of Rights which defines a range of procedural safeguards.

According to the department's Staff Reporting Manual, disciplinary cases are heard informally by the commanding officer of the accused who recommends punishment to the chief (or deputy chief for written reprimands). The officers we interviewed reported that these recommendations are often "rubber stamped." The city disciplinary code requires the chief to interview an officer recommended for suspension to inform him of the charges against him and to give him an opportunity to respond to those charges either orally or in writing.

For most of the officers we interviewed, this system worked well; they saw relative consistency across districts in the likelihood of being brought up on charges and in the penalties assessed. Some patrol officers, however, disagreed. Within this group, there was a range of opinion with respect to how inconsistencies manifested themselves. There were those who viewed sergeants as having different standards, some more willing to turn to the disciplinary process to deal with problem officers and others more likely to resolve problems informally before filing charges; those who felt that certain sergeants "played favorites," letting the infractions of some officers "slip by" while using the disciplinary process to "burn" others; and those who believed that penalties recommended by division commanders were based on how they or their lieutenants felt about the officer rather than the circumstances of the case. While the majority of officers perceived discipline to be fair, it would be unreasonable to assume, given the discretion inherent in the system, that there were no inconsistencies. Our interviews suggest, however, that they were not considered to be widespread.

New Orleans. The period of transition that is currently characterizing the New Orleans Police Department is very much reflected in the disciplinary process. However, unlike other areas of policy such as participation and promotion where the intentions of the chief have not fully filtered down to the district level, recent alterations in discipline procedure seem to have had a positive impact on perceptions.

While the disciplinary code is in the process of revision by an ad-hoc committee of officers, the existing policy has not been inconsistent with any of the changes the chief has made because of its non-specific nature. The policy gives the chief authority to discipline through suspensions without pay, reductions in pay, fines and "any other proper methods of discipline." In contrast to each of the departments except Montgomery County, district supervisors in New Orleans have authority to issue written reprimands with the approval of their immediate superior. They may also issue verbal reprimands and "counsel."

Under the past two administrations, there appeared to be substantial inequities in the administration of discipline. At the district level, patrol officers reported that the chances of being formally charged depended on who an officer's supervisor was and how much he liked the officer. Discipline administered by the chief was based almost entirely on the findings of the investigation report and the officer's reputation in headquarters. As there was no administrative hearing, the accused was never permitted to present his case. Most of the officers we interviewed had the sense that "guilty until proven innocent" was the operating principle. Between the previous two administrators, one was described as "too severe," and the other "too inconsistent."

Changes in the process over the past year have occurred on the administrative level. The chief has eliminated the 120-day suspensions of the past with the imposition of a 30-day ceiling. He has abolished the punitive transfer policy and has replaced it with district supervisor responsibility for correcting personnel problems in their commands. Most importantly, he has initiated a hearing procedure. According to the chief,

> Now I hear every case and the person is fully apprised of the significance of the hearing, the violations and the behavior that constitutes the violations way ahead of time so he can prepare a defense. When he comes to the office he's again apprised orally of the violation of the rule, and then he's allowed to explain in his own terms why he did what he did and offer mitigating circumstances. Many times these mitigating circumstances have a bearing on the decision.

While inconsistencies are still perceived to exist in the districts, and almost no patrol officers we interviewed were aware that they could no

longer be transferred for "screwing up," many officers of all ranks reported that the disciplinary actions that have come out of the chief's office have been extremely fair. Sergeants we spoke to who had participated in a disciplinary hearing to bring charges against one of their officers were impressed by the chief's impartiality as well as the obvious difference between his style and that of past administrators. Some officers, on the other hand, remained unconvinced of the basic fairness of the system in the absence of a trial board. Given the reputation the chief seems to be acquiring in this area, however, it may only be a matter of time before many of the skeptics are persuaded by what appears to be an increasing number of supporters of the present disciplinary process.

Atlanta. Like the other departments, the discipline policy in Atlanta gives final authority for discipline to the chief executive who, in this case, is the commissioner of public safety. Under the Procedural Guide, all officers brought up on formal charges come before an administrative hearing panel selected by the commissioner or the chief and composed of four deputy directors or their designees. The panel only has authority to make recommendations for punishment; the commissioner is not obligated to accept them. There is no authority on the zone level to administer punishment, which can include suspension, transfer, reduction in pay, written reprimand, or other forms deemed appropriate by the commissioner.

Prior to the period that we conducted our interviews, the new commissioner and chief had not yet been involved in the disciplinary process to any visible extent so that the perceptions offered by police officers refer to previous administrations. The process was seen as highly inconsistent by virtually every officer we interviewed, including top management. Most of the criticism was directed at the administrative level. The shared perception of the Atlanta officers was captured by a supervisor who commented, "As long as the commissioner can veto the recommendations of the panel, there will be inconsistencies." While officers agreed that panel recommendations for punishment were frequently overridden by the commissioner in an inconsistent way, there were differences of opinion about the precise patterns of favoritism. Most white officers indicated they believed that the process was biased in favor of blacks. The example most frequently cited by these officers, including members of the current administration, was that if a white officer was heard to use a racial slur, he would "get screwed," but if a black officer did the same, it would be overlooked. Some black officers held the view that the process was biased in favor of white officers. Some patrol officers perceived supervisors consistently being "let off easy," and others considered punishment to be simply dependent on the strength of an officer's connections in headquarters regardless of race or rank.

Denver. Formally, Denver's Operations Manual gives final authority for discipline to the chief who may subject an officer to a "reduction in grade, fine and suspension for a violation of [the written] rules and regulations."

He is also required to approve any written reprimand issued by a district commander. The chief is limited in his authority to suspend without pay to ten days; requests for more lengthy suspensions must be approved by the city's manager of safety in response to

> a written specification of charges and a written report setting forth in summary, the evidence of and reasons for such charges [and] the disciplinary record of the person charged [and] a showing that the member of the classified service affected thereby was advised of the intention to initiate disciplinary action and that such classified service member was given an opportunity to make a statement after the charges against him were read and explained.

In the absence of a formal hearing, the penalties assessed by the chief are based largely on the information included in the investigation report which is prepared by the supervisor responsible for filing the charges or a supervisor in the Staff Inspections Bureau (SIB) in more serious cases. The report includes, in addition to the evidence sustaining the allegation, the superior's recommendation for disciplinary action as well as "a brief summary of any prior disciplinary actions of which the accused has been subject, and of any exceptional performance of duty for which they [sic] have been commended." Before the report reaches the chief, it is forwarded to the district commander and the patrol division chief both of whom "either approve or make a specific [sic] supporting the alternate recommendation," and finally, the commanding officer of SIB responsible for determining:

> whether recommended disciplinary action is consistent and equitable with action taken by the department in similar cases, bearing in mind both the nature of the violation and the performance record of the individual involved.

The perceptions of almost every district officer we interviewed in Denver--including commanders, sergeants and patrol officers--were at variance with the protection implicit in this regulation. One patrol officer captured the shared view when he said, "Nobody knows what to expect when they screw up." In addition to the general sense that the chief demonstrated a disregard for precedent, many officers reported that those who were believed to be disloyal were "burned," while supporters of the administration were "allowed to atone." Some also indicated a belief that supervisors tended to be treated more leniently than patrol officers.

Not only was the severity of punishment seen as highly inconsistent, but also the likelihood of being formally charged. While most of the complaints regarding district discipline practices were similar to those heard in other

departments--different sergeants applying different standards and individual sergeants enforcing regulations based on personal feelings about individual officers--the most common perception emphasized the differences in standards across patrol districts. The notion of four separate, independently functioning districts represented a major theme in our interviews with Denver officers, a theme that had implications not only for discipline, but for a wide range of practices such as personal appearance enforcement, beat assignments, choice over one- or two-man car assignments, accommodations for officers attending school and the role of seniority.

The officers' dissatisfaction with perceived inconsistencies was only reinforced by what they believed to be top management's insensitivity to their desire for a more standardized disciplinary process on both the district and administrative levels. For these officers, this insensitivity has been manifested through the administration's rejection of the recommendations of the IACP in response to their 1977 study of Denver's disciplinary process. The prototype system developed for Denver, one of the 17 site departments, included a trial board of seven supervisors in the rank of lieutenant and above. The board would be selected from among a list of 15 names drawn at random by the accused officer. Management and the accused would then each eliminate two names until there were seven remaining.

The administration's expressed explanation for the rejection of these recommendations is that a city charter change would be required to transfer authority for discipline from the chief to a trial board. Acknowledging this fact, the Police Protective Association prepared a formal proposal for revisions in the disciplinary process that required no charter amendments. The PPA proposed that the trial board merely make recommendations for punishment to the chief which he could then accept or reject, a process similar to the one found in Portland, Montgomery County and Atlanta. This proposal has so far also been rejected by the top brass.

TABLE 3.9

Discipline Policies and Practices

	Montgomery County	Portland	San Diego	New Orleans	Atlanta	Denver
Police Officer Bill of Rights	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Final Authority for Discipline	Chief	Chief	Chief	Chief	Commissioner of public safety	Chief except in cases involving more than 10 days suspension
Hearing Mechanism	3 member hearing board including one officer of same rank as accused; board determines guilt or innocence and recommends punishment to chief	Chief or 3 member hearing board which may include a patrol officer; board determines guilt or innocence and recommends punishment to chief	Commanding officer of accused (and chief in cases where suspension is recommended); commanding officer determines guilt or innocence and recommends punishment to chief	Chief	4 member hearing board; board determines guilt or innocence and recommends punishment to chief and commissioner	No hearing
Right of Accused to Eliminate Members of Hearing Board	Any member for cause	Any 2 members	N/A	N/A	None	N/A
Obligation of Chief to Follow Recommendations of Hearing Board	Must state reason for increasing hearing board's recommended penalties in writing	None	None	None	None	None
District Authority for Discipline	Maximum of 3 days suspension or $150 fine	None	None	Written reprimands with approval of immediate superior	None	None
Patrol Officer Participation	None	Police association consults with administrators on proposed disciplinary actions in serious cases	None	Committee to revise discipline policy; patrol officer review of proposed policy	Patrol officer review of revised discipline policy	None
Perceived Consistency in Penalties Assessed	Relatively consistent	Relatively consistent	Relatively consistent	Relatively consistent	Relatively inconsistent due to commissioner's disregard for board recommendations	Relatively inconsistent due to chief's disregard for precedent
Perceived Consistency in Likelihood of Being Formally Charged	Relatively consistent	Relatively consistent	Relatively consistent	Relatively inconsistent within and across districts	Relatively inconsistent within and across districts	Relatively inconsistent within and across districts

CHAPTER 4: AUTONOMY

4.1 Shift Assignment

There is almost an unlimited range of shift assignment configurations across police departments. The major distinguishing feature is the frequency of rotation, although there are additional options within the basic alternative between permanent and rotating shifts. For example, under a system of permanent shifts, patrol officers may select their preferences according to seniority or supervisors may have discretion to assign officers to shifts in order to distribute "experience" around the clock. Under a rotating plan, officers may change shifts every three months, every month, every week or some other period of time.

The degree of choice involved in selecting permanent shifts by seniority as opposed to permanent shifts assigned by supervisors or rotating shifts (where no one gets to choose) suggests that shift assignment policies can be defined in terms of:

- autonomy, or the extent to which patrol officers are given freedom to choose their working hours; and
- fairness, or the extent to which criteria and procedures governing shift assignment provide for equal application.

There is little evidence in the literature to suggest whether permanent shifts by seniority are considered more or less fair than rotating shifts; however, our research has indicated that there is no discernible difference because of the varying definitions that apply. Officers in departments that select permanent shifts according to seniority consider the system to be fair because one standard operates. Officers who rotate also believe that fairness prevails because junior officers are not left with the "graveyard" shift.

In addition, in four of the six departments, patrol officers have, to varying degrees, provided input into the establishment of their shift assignment policies. Thus, this policy continuum also reflects the dimension of:

- participation, or the extent to which patrol officers are provided opportunities to share in developing shift assignment policies.

Table 4.1 at the end of this section summarizes the policies and practices of each department that reflect these dimensions of shift assignment.

Portland. Of the six departments under study, Portland is the only one where the shift assignment policy is formalized. The policy does not appear in the general orders but rather in the Labor Agreement between the PPA and the City of Portland. According to this contract, shifts are fixed and shift changes are governed by seniority. The police association appears to have played a major role in protecting the seniority privileges of officers in shift assignments under conditions of voluntary or involuntary transfer:

- If an officer transfers to another assignment voluntarily, he must be given his shift preference "at the first opening or within ninety days from the date of written request, whichever occurs first" if there is an officer on that shift with less seniority.
- If the transfer is involuntary, his seniority rights must be accommodated within thirty days.

While other contingencies are not explicitly specified in the agreement, management has agreed informally that:

- If an officer wants to change shifts in his current assignment, his seniority privileges must be recognized within thirty days.
- If there is no one with less seniority on the desired shift, an officer can only change shifts when an opening becomes available.

Virtually all of the officers we interviewed agreed that there was no arrangement that was more advantageous to their health, the regularity of their family lives and their ability to become familiar with conditions in their districts.

Denver. The written policy on shift rotation in Denver's Operations Manual specifies that:

> Shifts will generally extend to a one month period. Personnel will generally progress from the third shift to the second

shift, to the first shift, to the third shift, etc., or static shifts at the discretion of the District Commander.

Informally, however, the department operates on a very different basis. For the last several years, patrol officers have "voted details" in each district every six months, with preferences given according to seniority. If an officer is transferred voluntarily or involuntarily to another district, and he is not assigned to the detail of his choice, he can not "bump" an officer with less seniority off that detail, as in Portland, but must wait until the end of that six-month period to vote for his preference.

This system continues to operate contrary to written policy because officers have stated their preference for permanent shifts through periodic surveys. Like officers in Portland, those in Denver cite the advantages of steady shifts in terms of their health, the time they are able to spend with their families and their understanding of the districts they serve.

New Orleans. In the absence of any policy formalizing the existing monthly shift rotation system, the chief recently offered patrol officers in each district the option of steady watches selected according to seniority. While the chief had hoped that officers would vote for steady hours in order to increase opportunities for advanced education, those in four of the six districts chose to continue rotating. The officers we interviewed in these districts offered three major reasons for their decision:

- monotony of steady hours,
- opposition to change, and
- inequity involved in assigning younger officers to the morning shift on a full-time basis.

In the two districts that voted for change, the watches have been reestablished based on the preferences of those with the most seniority. Officers wishing to change shifts within these districts or those transferring in from rotating districts can exercise their seniority rights and "bump off" a more junior officer.

Atlanta. Officers in Atlanta are assigned to permanent shifts although under the Procedural Guide these assignments are "set by the Unit/Squad Commander." By virtue of that authority, zone supervisors can move officers from one shift to another to meet changing demands for service and can approve or disapprove formal requests for changes in shift.

In each of the zones but one, the procedure for changing shifts within the same zone is reportedly very similar to that for self-initiated transfers in Atlanta. An officer desiring to change his shift is required to complete a standard form which must be approved by his sergeant and commanding officer. Approval appears to be highly dependent on a swap with an officer of the same race (more so than with transfers) and, according to most of the officers we interviewed, on "how much your sergeant and C.O. likes you." Seniority plays a role of varying importance depending on the zone although most shared the belief that it was not important enough. In contrast, officers assigned to one of Atlanta's patrol zones indicated that the command staff had recently established a shift assignment policy based on a combination of seniority and performance. While swapping by race is still often necessary, seniority, rather than "personality", governs the approval of requests for shift changes. In each of the zones, however, the practice of assigning a portion of the black and female "rookies" to the day shift to improve the balance in the distribution of black and female officers apparently places some limitations on any existing seniority privileges of white male officers.

Montgomery County. The most demanding rotation plan, undocumented in policy, is in Montgomery County where officers rotate shifts every week. The strain is somewhat reduced, however, through a ten-hour, four-day work week which gives officers three days off before they have to change their working hours. While the officers we interviewed agreed that the frequent change was tough on their systems, and many preferred semi-monthly or monthly rotations, most were opposed to permanent shifts for the following reasons:

- officers assigned to the evening shift would make most of the arrests and thus receive most of the court overtime;
- officers in the Silver Spring district, operating under the MCI program, would have fewer opportunities to conduct follow-up investigations if they were permanently assigned to the evening or morning shift; and
- officers were simply used to the system.

In 1978, the department surveyed officers regarding their preferences between the current system and steady shifts. In the Silver Spring district, approximately 70 percent voted for the rotation system; in Bethesda, there was a 50-50 split. Based on our interviews, however, a choice between weekly and semi-monthly rotations may well have resulted in a vote for change.

San Diego. Officers in San Diego rotate shifts every three months although the policy is not a formal one. In 1975, the department experimented with steady shifts based on seniority but the patrol commanders objected to having all of the "rookie" officers on the morning shift. In an attempt to distribute experienced officers more evenly over the three shifts, the

department returned to the rotation system. Most of the older patrol officers we interviewed expressed their preference for steady shifts based on seniority but, interestingly, shared the belief that the current arrangement was more equitable. No one we talked with was particularly opposed to rotating. These officers, like those in New Orleans and Montgomery County, agreed that it was part of the job and something to which they just became accustomed.

TABLE 4.1

Shift Assignment Policies and Practices

	Portland	Denver	New Orleans	Atlanta	Montgomery County	San Diego
Shift Assignment Plan	Permanent shifts by seniority	Semi-annual selection of steady shifts by seniority	2 districts: permanent shifts by seniority 4 districts: monthly rotation	4 zones: permanent shifts at discretion of patrol supervisors 1 zone: permament shifts by seniority	Weekly rotation surrounding 4 day, 10 hour work week	Rotation every 3 months
Shift Change Procedure	Seniority rights accommodated: - within 90 days for voluntary transfer - within 30 days for involuntary transfer and shift change within current assignment	Under normal circumstances, shifts are only changed during voting period	Seniority rights accommodated as soon as possible in 2 districts with permanent shifts	Often dependent on a swap with an officer of the same race and the approval of the officer's supervisors	N/A	N/A
Patrol Officer Participation	Seniority policy negotiated by Portland Police Association and City of Portland	Policy established through survey of patrol officers	Each patrol district has voted to establish its own policy	None	Patrol officer preference for weekly rotation over permanent shift assignments established through survey	None
Percentage of Respondents Who Selected "How Frequently Shifts Rotate" as 1 of 3 Sources of Dissatisfaction	1%	7%	8%	8%	23%	6%
Perceived Practice	Fair because one standard operates	Fair because one standard operates	Fair because district preferences accomodated	Unfair because supervisory discretion encourages favoritism	Fair because all officers work "graveyard" shift	Fair because all officers work "graveyard" shift

4.2 One- Versus Two-Officer Patrol Units

Most of the literature on police attitudes towards one-man cars places management and labor on strictly opposite sides of the issue. Management is portrayed as supportive of a mix of one- and two-officer units assigned to reflect variations in hazard across districts or over time. In contrast, the rank-and-file is seen as staunchly opposed to one-man cars in the name of officer safety. Most of the studies which offer this characterization were conducted in the early seventies when financial constraints began to force many urban police departments to deploy one-officer units for the first time. Police unions made them a highly visible issue because one-man cars were an almost ideal symbol of management's insensitivity to the working cop. Resistance was also due in part to the simple fact that they represented a fundamental change from the way things had always been done.

Now that one-man cars have become routine practice in most large police departments, the positions of management and labor may no longer be at such variance. The findings in the current research clearly suggest that much of the gap has been closed by the rank-and-file. While most patrol officers across the six departments identified distinct disadvantages of one-man cars (primarily in terms of an officer's sense of security and the tendency of single officers to pass up some potentially dangerous situations which they would have confronted with a partner), very few agreed that two officer units were essential in all areas of the city and during all hours of the day. The most common perception among patrol officers was that police effectiveness suffered when certain districts--some at all hours and others during high crime periods--were not patrolled by a two-officer unit.

Within each department we found a range of opinions that not only reflected varying assessments of one-man cars as a law enforcement strategy but also individual officer preferences. Some felt more secure with a partner, valued the company of another officer and generally believed they did better police work in a two-man car. Others, however, preferred the freedom and solitude that patrolling alone afforded them.

These perceptions suggest that we cannot rely on the literature to define our policy continuum. At least in these six departments, the optimal strategy is

not all two-man cars, but rather, a combination of one- and two-man cars which is sensitive to both crime conditions and officer preferences. This policy continuum can thus be defined in terms of:

- autonomy, or the extent to which patrol officers are given the freedom to choose a one- or two-man car within the context of a deployment plan that recognizes changing crime conditions.

The position of each department on this continuum is summarized in Table 4.3 at the conclusion of this chapter.

Denver. While unwritten, Denver's policy on the distribution of one- and two-officer units is tied to its shift rotation policy. Both reflect a sensitivity to the hours of the day when crime and the demand for police service are greatest. Unlike most police departments where the three major shifts are changed at 8 a.m., 4 p.m. and midnight, the changeover in Denver is at 11 a.m., 7 p.m. and 3 a.m. with a relief squad reporting to work at 10 a.m., 6 p.m. and 2 a.m. By increasing its manpower on the evening shift (6 or 7 p.m. to 2 or 3 a.m.), the department has eliminated the problem of reduced manpower between midnight and 2 a.m., the final high crime hours. Consistent with this practice, most of the officers on the day and morning shifts are assigned to one-officer units while most of the units deployed in the evening are manned by two officers. While this practice is in force in each of the patrol districts, there is some inter-district variation in the percentage of one- and two-officer units on each shift depending on crime conditions. According to the data arrayed in Table 4.2, the majority of officers we surveyed--56 percent--were assigned to two-man units; 39 percent reported that they rode alone. Interviews with officers indicated that they were generally able to choose whether or not they wanted a partner and who that partner would be.

The support for the department policy among the officers we interviewed was reportedly high. Supervisors and patrol officers agreed that two-man cars were deployed during the hours when conditions were most hazardous and that during the rest of the day one-officer units were adequate.

Portland. According to Portland's Police Manual,

> One man patrols will be utilized with these exceptions:
>
> 1. Cars assigned to patrol the area covered by districts 560, 570, 580, 620, 630, 840, 860 and beat districts 849 and 869.
>
> 2. Training districts to which a probationary officer is assigned. Based on frequent evaluation of their progress, probationary officers may be utilized increasingly in one-man patrols during their last months of probation.

TABLE 4.2

Percentage of Respondents Per Type of Patrol Unit by Police Department

	Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
One-man unit	92%	39%	100%	31%	58%	63%
Two-man unit	7	56	0	55	30	22
Both	0	2	0	12	9	3
Other	2	3	0	1	3	12
	101% (131)	100% (138)	100% (98)	99% (138)	100% (161)	100% (183)

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

3. A shortage of vehicles.

4. When two officers are required to handle a special problem area. Continuation of two-officer patrols based on a specific problem for more than one week will require written notification to and approval by the Deputy Chief, Patrol Branch.

Under this policy, the number of officers per patrol unit depends largely on the hazard rating of a district. Approximately 30 percent of the districts are authorized to have two-officer units on this basis although officers report that a current shortage of cars has brought the figure up to around 50 percent. Our survey data reveal that 30 percent of the respondents were reportedly patrolling in a two-man car, 58 percent in a one-man car, and 9 percent in both.

While most officers are assigned to a permanent district, partners in two-officer units ride together only three days a week. In an effort to provide the citizens of each district with "familiar faces" on a seven day basis, partners take different days off and are replaced during those four days with a relief officer. As long as officers are "producing," supervisors try to accommodate preferences for one- or two-officer units as well as for partners.

While most of the district personnel we interviewed thought that the department policy was "OK," the majority of the supervisors and patrol officers stated a preference for two-man cars. They argued that two-officer units were more aggressive in that they were more willing to take risks because they felt more secure. The officers who felt that one-officer units were more effective offered a variety of reasons:

- a single officer is less distracted and is more likely to analyze a situation before moving in;
- a single officer is likely to get more information from members of the criminal element as it is easier to talk to one officer;
- a single officer has more freedom to work on the days he feels motivated and to "lay back" on other days; and
- a single officer tends to do more follow up on cases.

These officers saw the disadvantage of "peer pressure" as more compelling than the security of a partner.

New Orleans. In contrast to the other departments which deploy both one- and two-officer units, New Orleans makes a functional distinction between them. Department regulations specify that:

1. To assure the safety of the lone officer in a one-man car operation, the Communications Clerk shall:

   a. Screen all incoming calls for police services and make certain sufficient information is obtained on all calls so that one-man units are only dispatched on "Cold Calls" and on items where a one-man unit will suffice.

   b. When necessary to dispatch one-man units on a "Hot Call," two units shall be dispatched and every effort shall be made to assure their simultaneous arrival.

In practice, the mix of one-and two-officer units varies according to shift. During the day shift, which runs from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., the majority of cars are manned by one officer; during the evening shift, 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., the increase in manpower translates into a higher percentage of two-officer units; and during the morning shift, 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., most of the officers ride alone. According to our survey, the distribution of one- and two-officer units in New Orleans is similar to that in Denver: 55 percent of the respondents in New Orleans reported that they were currently patrolling in a two-man car compared with 56 percent in Denver; the percentage of officers assigned to one-man units was 31 and 39, respectively.

There appears to be considerable variation in the operation of this policy across districts. In some districts no permanent car assignments exist so that partners can vary from day to day or week to week. In other districts, car assignments are more or less fixed. Here, officers offered mixed opinions as to whether or not they could choose between a one- or two-man car and, in the latter case, who their partner would be. Given the functional distinction between the units, more aggressive officers tend to prefer a partner.

The current chief is not satisfied with the practice of dispatching two-officer units to "hot calls" and limiting the responsibilities of one officer units to "cold calls" or those of a non-emergency nature. The major difficulty he sees is in evaluating performance where responsibilities differ. His preference is the arrangement operating in Portland where one- and two-officer units are assigned on the basis of an analysis of crime conditions in each zone. It appears that the department will soon be moving in that direction.

Montgomery County. The exclusive operation of one-officer units in Montgomery County is not governed by formal policy. While there was some difference of opinion among supervisors about the effectiveness of this practice, most of the patrol officers we interviewed were enthusiastically supportive of

one-man cars. They described the advantages in terms of their freedom to patrol as they wished. "You're your own man" and "There are days when you just don't feel like working," were typical comments on this issue. This perspective on one-man cars is particularly interesting because it lies in considerable contrast to the opinions of officers in San Diego discussed below.

San Diego. Most of the patrol cars in San Diego are manned by a single officer, a practice necessitated by a shortage of manpower rather than established by formal policy. The exceptions are largely field training/probationary officer teams and partners assigned to city ambulances which operate as regular patrol units when they are not performing this additional emergency service function. According to our survey, the distribution of one- and two-officer units is similar to that in Portland: 63 percent of the officers in San Diego indicated that they were currently patrolling alone compared to 58 percent in Portland; 22 percent reported being assigned to a two-officer unit in San Diego against 30 percent in Portland. The important distinction between these two departments, however, is that the distribution of one- and two-officer units in Portland reflects differences in district crime conditions; in San Diego it does not.

Patrol officers in San Diego perceived the city's unwillingness to provide the department with sufficient manpower to field two-man cars as a major source of dissatisfaction and indicative of the city's basic disregard for officer safety. Almost all of the officers we interviewed, including supervisors, shared the view that under the present arrangement "the quality of work suffered" because officers were "passing up things they shouldn't be." Most felt particularly strongly that there were certain high crime areas of the city where the quality of police service was seriously affected by the absence of two-officer units.

Atlanta. Like Montgomery County and San Diego, the one-man car policy in Atlanta is undocumented. While one-man cars are generally supported in Montgomery County because of the nature of crime conditions, in Atlanta as in San Diego, many of the officers we interviewed questioned the effectiveness of this practice.

According to officers of all ranks, one-man cars appear to serve two functions for management: first, they expand patrol coverage in the presence of a shortage of manpower; and second, they minimize potential racial tensions that might emerge between "mixed partners." Most of the district personnel we interviewed, however, expressed the view that the operation of one-man cars in certain areas of the city created a "psychological safety factor" that was damaging to the patrol function. These officers noted that a single officer in a patrol car was less likely to be aggressive and more likely to overlook activities on the street. While many acknowledged the freedom that a one-man car afforded, the common perception was reflected in the comments of one patrol officer who said, "You can do what you want but you don't do it as well."

The majority of captains, sergeants and patrol officers we interviewed stated a preference for two-man patrol units at least in certain areas. The patrol officers in this group, by and large, qualified this preference with the condition that they be permitted to choose their partners. Though some believed that race might become an issue in two-man cars, the vast majority felt that these problems would be minimal. The perceived difficulty of matching personalities was seen as one that transcended race.

TABLE 4.3

One and Two Officer Unit Assignment Policies and Practices

	Denver	Portland	New Orleans	Montgomery County	San Diego	Atlanta
Deployment Plan	Mix of one- and two-man cars deployed according to shift Day shift: approx. 65% one-man cars Evening shift: all two-man cars Morning shift: approx. 85% one-man cars	Mix of one- and two-man cars according to district crime conditions Approx. 30% of the districts are authorized for two-man cars; due to a shortage of cars, approx. 50% of the districts are patrolled by two-officer units	Mix of one- and two-man cars deployed according to patrol function and shift One-man cars respond to "cold" calls Two-man cars respond to "hot" calls Day shift: majority one-man cars Evening shift: majority two-man cars Morning shift: majority one-man cars	Exclusive operation of one-man cars	Primarily one-man cars; exceptions are field training/probationary officer teams and ambulance units	Exclusive operation of one-man cars
Percentage of Respondents Assigned to One/ Two-Man Cars	39/56%	58/30%	31/55%	100/0%	63/22%	92/7%
Percentage of Respondents Who Selected "One-Man Cars" as 1 of 3 Sources of Dissatisfaction	5%	24%	15%	7%	56%	15%
Perceived Practice	Two-man cars are deployed during hours of the day when conditions are most hazardous	Police effectiveness and officer security would be improved through the deployment of additional two-man cars	Some objections to one-man cars at night	Preference for freedom of one-man cars	Operation of one-man cars is a reflection of city and department's lack of concern for officer safety	Police effectiveness and officer security would be improved through the deployment of two-man cars in certain areas of the city

CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION

Education policies appear as the last of the ten policy chapters because they have been assessed in somewhat different terms than the previous nine areas. While the literature is far from consistent on this issue, it appears that satisfaction among educated patrol officers is related to the degree to which their department rewards them in terms of promotions, special assignments and pay (Tenney, 1971; Pomerenke, 1966; Sterling, 1972). There is also evidence to suggest, however, that to the extent that educated patrol officers are given preferences, officers without advanced education can resent the greater emphasis placed on classroom knowledge than street experience (Trojanowicz and Nicholson, 1976).

Departments have been placed on this policy continuum according to the degree to which education policies provide rewards for advanced education. The current educational levels of the six respondent groups as well as the percentage of officers currently attending school appear in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Table 5.3 at the conclusion of this chapter summarizes these data as well as the incentives and rewards for advanced education offered in each of the departments studied.

San Diego. While patrol officers in the San Diego Police Department are not required to obtain an advanced degree, higher education is encouraged through a tuition refund plan and a rather complex educational pay incentive program which are both defined in the Memorandum of Understanding between the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Officers Association. The tuition refund plan reimburses eligible employees for tuition and fees up to a limit of $175 per year. Eligibility is dependent on coursework which relates to the applicant's present position or enhances career advancement potential within the City of San Diego. Under the educational pay program, officers must obtain an Intermediate Police Officer Standards and Training (P.O.S.T.) Certificate to receive the minimum incentive increase of approximately $50 per month. The requirements for this statewide certificate can be satisfied in any one of the following ways:

TABLE 5.1

Current Education Level of Respondents by Police Department

	Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
Didn't complete high school	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%
Completed high school	24	16	3	17	5	1
Some college courses	38	44	31	56	22	44
Associates degree	17	23	26	11	23	31
Four-year college degree	12	9	23	4	27	9
Some graduate courses	6	5	13	9	21	12
Graduate degree	3	2	3	1	3	4
	100% (123)	100% (135)	100% (97)	99% (133)	101% (153)	101% (170)

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

TABLE 5.2

Percentage of Respondents Currently Attending School by Police Department

	Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
Yes	26%	12%	59%	13%	17%	27%
No	74	88	41	87	83	73
	100% (126)	100% (136)	100% (98)	100% (135)	100% (156)	100% (180)

Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

- 2 years of police experience and a Bachelors degree,
- 4 years and an Associates degree,
- 4 years and 45 units of training (where 20 hours of training equal 1 unit) and 45 college credits,
- 6 years and 30 units of training and 30 credits, or
- 9 years and 15 units of training and 15 credits.

An Advanced Certificate is also awarded, entitling an officer to an increase of approximately $65 per month, by completing one of the following sets of requirements:

- 4 years and a Masters degree,
- 6 years and a Bachelors degree,
- 9 years and an Associates degree,
- 9 years and 45 units of training and 45 credits, or
- 12 years and 30 units of training and 30 credits.

In addition, department policy as well as the POA contract with the City of San Diego specifies requalification requirements that officers must satisfy in order to continue receiving benefits. To requalify, officers holding an Intermediate Certificate must complete one of the following options every two years. (Option A must be selected at least once in every four years):

A. Three semester units or four quarter units of college work in law enforcement, law and justice, or a related field.

B. Participation in at least 50 hours of community action programs.

C. Completion of a special program initiated by the officer or department, designed to improve the officer's capabilities, or to benefit the department or community. Such a program must require off-duty involvement or research, for which the officer is not otherwise compensated.

D. Completion of 50 hours of P.O.S.T. approved courses.

E. Participation in a formal program to maintain proficiency in a foreign language.

For officers with an Advanced Certificate, requalification is every three years and Option A must be completed at least once in every six years.

Beyond these incentive plans, the needs of officers attending school are accommodated largely by the three-month rotation which is somewhat consistent with the academic calendar. In cases where it is not, officers may have split days off (e.g., Tuesday and Thursday) or may be forced to use vacation days to finish the quarter. A permanent evening shift assignment is also possible on occasion as additional manpower is required during these hours.

Advanced education is required for promotion to police agent, detective and sergeant. The rank of agent was established in 1978 to reward certain officers who preferred to remain in a non-supervisory position. The position carries a five percent pay increase and officers must complete 60 units or an Associates degree to be eligible. Interestingly, the educational requirement for promotion to sergeant (as well as to detective) is only 30 units which has suggested to some that there is a greater emphasis placed on education in the patrol ranks than among supervisors. There was less agreement among the officers we interviewed in San Diego than in Portland that promotion to mid-management was dependent on the possession of a college degree. Many officers shared the view that, while education was certainly of importance to the promotability board, "being known" carried more weight. The officers felt that advanced education was probably of the greatest advantage to those who did not have an established reputation among management.

Portland. The bureau's demands for an educated police department formally begin at the entry level rank where officers are required to obtain an Associates degree within five years of appointment. Our survey findings suggest, however, that the satisfaction of this requirement prior to appointment may also be stressed through the bureau's hiring practices: 66 percent of the respondents indicated that they had completed at least an Associates degree before joining the department; 41 percent entered the department with at least a Bachelors degree (see Appendix IV).

Education beyond the minimum requirement is encouraged through an educational incentive program which is defined in the PPA's contract with the City of Portland:

> Eligibility: In order to qualify for the Education Incentive Program, an officer must either (a) have completed eighteen (18) months of service as a sworn member of the Portland Bureau of Police and attained a minimum of two (2) years approved college credit (90 quarter hours or 60 semester hours), or (b) have completed five (5) years of service.

> Incentive Pay: Upon verification of successful completion of three (3) hours of approved college credit, an eligible officer shall be entitled to a lump sum incentive premium of $240.00. Each officer will be eligible to receive payment under this program for no more than nine (9) credit hours in any given school quarter, nor more than eighteen (18) credit hours during the term of this Contract.

According to this agreement, an officer is not eligible for compensation until he has both obtained an Associates degree and completed a minimum of eighteen months of service.

Officers in the bureau are further assisted in their efforts to achieve higher education through an informal bureau policy which encourages commanders to do whatever they can to accommodate the needs of officers attending school. While flexibility is somewhat limited by the PPA contract which requires shifts and days off to be determined by seniority, officers can usually split their days off, given the preference for non-working weekends. Steady shifts are also supportive of advanced education.

There are no additional formal requirements for promotion to detective or to supervisory ranks, although most of those we interviewed acknowledged that it was "almost mandatory" for an officer to have a four-year degree if he wanted to advance beyond detective/sergeant or lieutenant. Most patrol officers assumed that even if a candidate without a B.A. managed to score well on the promotional exam, he would probably be graded down by the oral board. Much of this shared perception seems related to the fact that most of those in the rank of lieutenant and above have advanced degrees. Of the three deputy chiefs, for example, two have their Masters and one is an attorney.

The danger of frustrated expectations for advancement, raised by the literature on higher education in policing, does not appear to be evident in the Portland Bureau of Police. The value the bureau places on the role of the patrol officer, as well as the equality in status and pay between detectives and sergeants, seems to account for our survey findings that only 25 percent of the patrol officer respondents expressed a desire for promotion within five years, a considerably smaller proportion than that in the other departments under study. The only criticism we heard of the bureau's emphasis on education came from some older officers who were appointed before these formal and informal requirements were imposed. Most, however, viewed their education in much the same way as they did their salaries and their intolerance for corruption--as something that made their department just a cut above the rest.

Montgomery County. In contrast to Portland, an Associates degree is a condition of employment in Montgomery County. Since the requirement has only been in effect for a few years, however, only 26 percent of the Montgomery County patrol officers we surveyed reported that they had obtained at least an Associates degree prior to appointment (see Appendix IV).

Other educational policies operating in the department appear to have had a major impact on college enrollment. Most of the officers we interviewed agreed, as did those in Portland, that without advanced education, an officer was not likely to be promoted. The emphasis that the department has placed on education was clear to them through the operation of two programs. First of all, the department until recently offered a salary differential to officers with advanced education at the rate of 5 percent for 30 credit hours, 10 percent for an Associates degree, 15 percent for a Bachelors degree and 20 percent for a Masters degree or above. Financial constraints forced the county to discontinue the plan for any officers appointed after September 1977, although those officers who were involved in the program prior to that date continue to receive benefits. Secondly, the University of Maryland offers courses in law enforcement, criminal justice and related fields leading to a Bachelors degree at the department's training academy. Through both day and evening sessions, the weekly rotation system does not interfere with college attendance. The patrol officers we interviewed indicated that the additional salary and the convenience of attending classes at the academy motivated many officers to enroll in degree programs because, according to one officer, they "didn't want to be left behind." Among the patrol officers we surveyed in Montgomery County, 59 percent were currently attending school--between two to five times more than those furthering their education in each of the other five departments.

The educational achievements of the Montgomery County patrol officers seem to have created considerable frustration in an apparently classic way. Many, including 55 percent of our survey respondents, entered college hoping to advance, yet there have been no promotional exams since 1975. Of the six respondent groups under study, Montgomery County's reportedly had the lowest expectations for promotion: only 25 percent of those who indicated a desire for promotion in five years expected to be promoted. In all of the other departments except Atlanta, where promotional opportunities are similarly low, the expectations of the respondent groups were two to three times higher.

Atlanta. The nature of the education policy in Atlanta appears to be changing under the current administration. Previously, the department provided a one-step pay increase to officers who completed their Associates degree and a two-step pay increase to those with a Bachelors degree. While this policy is still in force, many indicated that the city was about to abolish the incentive pay plan as one of several items cut from the budget. In addition, officers with advanced education received extra points--one for each year of completed education beyond high school--on the 1974 and 1975

promotional exams. While it appears that these incentives have been associated with some increases in educational achievement--23 percent of our survey respondents reportedly obtained an Associates, Bachelors, or graduate degree since joining the department--most of the officers we interviewed shared the view that patrol officers have not been motivated to return to school because of the role that politics has played in promotions.

These officers see the current administration, however, as placing a greater value on education in promotion. According to the chief, this is likely to be the case, although his education policy has not yet been defined:

> What we are concerned about is that people have a commitment to enhancing their professional level. They can do that by taking courses or getting degrees. They can also do it through various training programs either sponsored by the bureau or by outside agencies. A long-range plan, something that has not been approved, might require officers at given levels to attain a certain educational level and/or certain kinds of equivalent training.

For the present, it appears that commanders will continue, as they have in the past, to make efforts to adjust days off and shifts to meet the needs of officers attending school.

New Orleans. Prior to the appointment of the present chief, there were no formal policies in New Orleans to encourage education among patrol officers. While some commanders would rearrange days off or assign officers permanently to the evening shift, few attended college in the absence of any rewards for higher education. According to our survey respondents, only 25 percent in New Orleans indicated that they had obtained an advanced degree and only 13 percent were currently attending school. Respondents in Denver and Atlanta were only slightly more well-educated with 39 and 38 percent, respectively, reporting that they had an advanced degree and 12 and 26 percent, respectively, indicating that they were currently enrolled in school.

Under the current administration, the importance of education is beginning to be felt. Most of the officers agreed that promotion to lieutenant and above was soon likely to require a college degree. At this point, patrol officers with a four year degree will be permitted to take future promotional exams for sergeant after only two years of service rather than the three required for other officers. The chief has also encouraged patrol officers to switch from monthly rotations to steady shifts so that work and school can be more easily managed. The fact that only two of the six districts voted to do so may suggest that financial or other tangible rewards will be required to alter the educational profile of department personnel. While many officers

we interviewed supported the direction that the chief was taking, others expressed an opposing view that was shared by some officers in each of the departments but, particularly, by those in New Orleans, Atlanta and Denver--"education doesn't make a guy a better cop" or "common sense doesn't come from reading books."

Denver. In contrast to the other departments, Denver offers no educational incentives. The Operations Manual, however, contains a policy on adjustments in shift assignments for officers in school.

> To encourage officers of this department to avail themselves of formal education, supervisors and command officers are instructed to adjust shift assignments on a seniority basis for officers who enroll at college. These shift assignment adjustments are to be made as equitable as possible with the needs of the police service taken into consideration.

Patrol personnel of all ranks reported that, while some supervisors made these adjustments in shift assignments, others did not and that the variation was considerable across districts.

The opinions of the officers we interviewed in Denver on the value the department placed on education were strikingly similar. Those expressed by a patrol officer and captain, respectively, are illustrative: "The department could care less if you go to school," and "Preference should not be given to a guy with a degree in promotions; if he's smart he'll prove himself." The consistent view, shared also by administrators, was that education offered no advantages to an officer in Denver.

TABLE 5.3

Education Policies and Practices

	San Diego	Portland	Montgomery County	Atlanta	New Orleans	Denver
Requirements for Appointment	None	Associates degree or must be obtained within 5 years	Associates degree	None	None	None
Requirements for Promotion	60 units for police agent 30 units for sergeant and detective	De facto college degree requirement for promotion to lieutenant	De facto college degree requirement for promotion to lieutenant	None	None	None
Incentives	Tuition refund: maximum of $175 per year for tuition, fees, textbooks and supplies Salary differential: Intermediate P.O.S.T. differential of approximately $50 per month after completion of a B.A. and 2 years of service, an A.A. and 4 years of service, or any one of a number of other options; Advanced P.O.S.T. differential of approximately $64 per month after completion of an M.A. and 4 years of service, a B.A. and 6 years of service, or any one of a number of other options; requalification requirements to continue receiving benefits	Maximum of 9 credit hours per quarter (or 18 credit hours over 2 year period) after completion of educational requirements and 18 months of service	Differential of 5% for 30 credit hours, 10% for an A.A., 15% for a B.A., and 20% for an M.A. for officers involved in program prior to September 1977	Differential of one step for an A.A. and two steps for a B.A.	Cut back in promotional service time requirement from 3 years to 2	None
Accommodations for College Attendance	Three-month rotation combined with split days off or permanent shift assignments; officers may also be forced to use vacation days	Permanent shifts and split days off	Availability of day and evening courses at the local training academy	Permanent shifts and split days off	Permanent shifts (in 2 districts) and split days off	Adjustments in shift assignments on seniority basis although supervisors perceived to vary in their willingness to make adjustments
Rewards for Advanced Education	Tuition Salary differential Promotion and investigative assignment selection although education beyond requirement is not perceived as essential	Tuition Perceived advantage in promotion to sergeant and detective	Salary differential for officers involved in incentive program prior to September 1977	Salary differential	None at present although officers with advanced education are likely to have an advantage in promotions in the future	None
Percentage of Respondents Who Have Obtained At Least an Associates Degree	56%	74%	65%	38%	25%	39%

CHAPTER 6: POLICY AND SATISFACTION

One of the first lessons of organizational study is that formally stated policies may have little or nothing to do with what actually goes on. When changing circumstances require adaptation, the delay in formalizing new procedures may keep them out of phase with reality. Conversely, attempts to force a change in behavior by writing memos only sometimes produce actions in conformity to the written word.

By the same token, traditional perceptions may also misrepresent reality. In any group, normative statements become commonly accepted. For example, most Americans think of the mother-father-children nuclear family as a cultural norm. According to recent estimates, only a minority of people live in such "normal" households. Likewise, the police culture in any large city department can be expected to have evolved a set of traditional perceptions which reflect an amalgam of facts, hopes and frustrations accumulated over a generation of officers.

In the preceding four chapters we reported the formally stated policies of the six departments studied and, through interviews with officers of all ranks, the underlying practices by which departments actually managed their affairs. These data were analyzed to provide a description of each city's characteristics in the ten key policy areas. In these ten areas we attempted to place departments along continua representing idealized scales of participatory decision-making, procedural equity, autonomy and rewards for advanced education. Thus, for example, the disciplinary procedures of Montgomery County were contrasted with those in Denver. In the former department, authority for recommending punishment rests with a review board on which one officer of the same rank as the accused sits. In the latter, the chief exercises exclusive disciplinary power in the absence of a formal hearing. Intermediate between these two poles is Atlanta, where an accused officer is permitted a hearing by a board composed of supervisory personnel.

In this chapter we will explore the relationship between reported levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and the policy structures under which patrol officers operate. The discussion will be derived from a qualitative analysis of the major sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in each of the departments studied which is drawn from our interview and survey results.

MAJOR SOURCES OF SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION IN EACH DEPARTMENT

Through our interviews in each site as well as responses to the open-ended survey questions, we discovered a number of shared perceptions among major segments of the respondent groups which appeared to represent important sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. The site profiles in this section are thus intended to provide a description of the police environment from the perspective of the patrol officer in an effort to account for the relative levels of satisfaction across the six respondent groups.

While the perceptions we have gathered may only provide a glimpse of the "real" workings of each department, we were struck by the consistency of accounts from one patrol officer to the next. A department reported by its officers as being political was reported by just about everybody we interviewed as being political. By the same token, a non-political department was perceived that way by just about everybody we interviewed. Different officers would often use the same turn of phrase to describe a particular condition. For example, in San Diego, the officers who get ahead were characterized as "fair-haired boys." In New Orleans, they are referred to as members of "the right clique." The narrative that follows might be different in detail if other researchers had done this study, but we believe the general picture we portray of each department would remain, for the most part, intact. Stated another way, patrol officers, working in the department described, would recognize it as their own.

Portland. There are a number of factors that distinguish department operations in Portland from those in each of the other five cities. While our interviews with officers captured differences in policy implementation, the responses to the open-ended survey questions provided us with a sharper understanding of those broader organizational differences that appear to be of importance to patrol officers. Questions on the survey which asked patrol officers to identify and comment on their major sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction were followed by a more general one, asking them to "comment on other aspects of the way your department operates that affect how you feel about your job." In Portland, unlike the other five departments, most of the officers who responded to this question used the opportunity to make a positive comment about the department in general or a specific aspect of department operations.

These comments, supported by interview and other survey findings, tend to focus on the Portland officers' pride in their department relative to the rest of the law enforcement community, and on their pride in their own positions within the organizational structure. There are seven factors that appear to define patrol officers' view of department operations:

- Minimum of political favoritism,
- Intolerance for corruption,

- Educated and competent personnel,
- Autonomy afforded patrol officers,
- Respect between patrol officers and the chief,
- A strong police association, and
- Relatively high salaries.

At the most basic level, officers in Portland see their department as a highly professional one relative to other law enforcement agencies. We frequently heard comments like, "I feel that our department operates in a professional manner and is one of the best in the county." That sense of professionalism is reflected in several aspects of department operations.

Most importantly for Portland patrol officers, there is an ethic of honesty and sincerity that pervades the department. The comments of two officers represented common opinion:

> The fairness and honesty of the department gives me pride in it.
>
> The department is open and honest which allows the street officer to respect his own position when dealing with the public.

This ethic is expressed through the absence of political favoritism at the expense of officer qualifications and an intolerance for corruption. When we asked Portland officers what it was about the way their department operated that seemed to them to account for the high level of reported satisfaction, these two factors were frequently cited.

Patrol officers shared the belief that personnel decisions, such as those involving promotions, special assignments and transfers, were based primarily on merit despite the presence of subjective criteria. Further, the acknowledgment that "connections" were important in special assignment selection and transfers did not alter their view that those who succeeded were generally the most capable officers. There was, in other words, a relatively high degree of trust that management decisions were not made arbitrarily or solely on the basis of personal considerations.

In addition, department personnel seem to place an equally high value on the absence of corruption. According to one officer, for example, "The department operates without any corruption that I know of and that makes me feel good." Many officers told us that they felt "proud to be part of a department that [was] free from corruption."

The honesty and fairness that officers perceived in the organization was consistent with a high degree of respect for the competence of department personnel, particularly fellow officers. Those we interviewed described the "fellowship" and "comradery" among officers with similar values about police work. Portland officers seemed to credit the department for attracting higher educated officers who wanted to work, who could be trusted in dangerous situations, and who considered the quality of their work to be as important as the quantity.

Patrol officers' obvious pride in their department is only reinforced by their own role in the organization. In Portland, the weight of authority and responsibility for the quality of police services has been shifted from the top to the bottom of the organizational structure. Patrol operations function under the assumption that the patrol officer is, for both logical and practical reasons, in the best position to make decisions regarding his own district. The Portland Bureau of Police has restructured the role of the patrol officer--and hence the definition of roles throughout the agency--so that the patrol officer has the responsibility and authority to determine the scope and nature of his own district operations. For example, traffic citation standards have been removed in favor of patrol officer responsibility for assessing the traffic problems in his district and handling those problems in a way he considers to be most responsive.

While it appears that this role has created pressures for activity that some officers have found difficult to handle, for the most part, Portland officers appear to value their autonomy. The survey findings demonstrate, for example, that more respondents (27%) identified "autonomy of work" as a major source of satisfaction than any other. Narrative responses indicated that officers viewed their autonomy as the consequence of department practice rather than as a responsibility merely inherent in their role. One officer reported for instance, "I appreciate the discretion the department allows us. They recognize it as part of the job."

In addition to the "district manager" concept, there are a number of other mechanisms designed to reinforce the importance of the patrol officer in the organization. One of those mechanisms is a monthly newsletter by the chief which comments on directions the bureau is taking and invites officers to respond to the policy issues raised. Another is the chief's open-door policy by mea of which officers are encouraged to discuss anything from career options to problems with supervisors. A third mechanism is a well-established committee structure that enables patrol officers to advise the chief on such issues as what cars to buy, uniforms to wear and the kinds of ammunition to carry. These mechanisms--and more importantly, the administration's demonstrated willingness to implement officers' suggestions--testify to the chief's belief in the talent within the patrol officer ranks. They also reflect the prevailing attitude that the patrol officer can and must be trusted. And, for the most part, that trust seems to be returned in kind. Among patrol officers we interviewed, there appears to be enormous respect for the integrity of the chief.

These officers and many of those we surveyed attributed their sense that the department was "interested in the officer as an individual" to the actions of the chief over the past five years. During his tenure, the management structure of the department has moved from a typically quasi-military model to one that encourages patrol officers to express their opinions and to rely on their own judgment in making decisions on the street. Comments offered by two survey respondents captured many officers' perceptions of the chief:

> This department is fairly mellow and not militaristic. The chief emphasizes good police work rather than silly military formalities.
>
> I can't complain too much. Our department is attempting to be as progressive as possible and still think about the street officer. The chief has been very essential in bringing about many changes.

The perceived sensitivity of the chief to the opinions and preferences of patrol officers is combined with, according to one officer, "a strong police association that acts as an officer advocate." Representatives of the Portland Police Association not only review and comment on major policy changes proposed by the bureau but they are also consulted by members of top management on more serious disciplinary actions. In addition, the association's contract with the city provides for what Portland officers consider to be relatively high salaries (estimated at more than $20,000) and a wide range of benefits and prescribed working conditions.

While Portland officers appear to very much enjoy their work and to value the organizational structure in which they operate, there are some policy-related areas of discontent. Probably the most important is the department's prohibition against most forms of off-duty employment (teaching is the primary exception) in the name of professionalism. Forty-eight percent of the survey respondents in Portland selected "off-duty employment" as one of three major sources of dissatisfaction. Many officers, including 24 percent of the survey respondents, also objected to the use of one-man cars in certain districts and at certain times of the day. These officers shared the belief that the security provided by a partner increased their effectiveness. In addition, 35 percent of the respondents were reportedly dissatisfied with "the extent to which patrol officers influence policy decisions that affect their jobs." Many of these officers, however, objected to what they saw as the unwillingness of their supervisors, rather than the administration, to inform them of policy changes prior to implementation.

San Diego. In each of the other five departments, the majority of patrol officers were reportedly either satisfied or dissatisfied; perceptions of department operations also tended to be commonly shared. In San Diego, however, the median level of satisfaction at the midpoint on the scale, 5.0,

is consistent with both a divergence of opinion about certain important issues and the presence of distinctly satisfying and dissatisfing aspects of department operations. Within this context, there appear to be eight issues that define patrol officers' view of their job environment:

- Salaries,
- Working conditions,
- Affirmative action practices,
- Community-oriented policing,
- Mid-management,
- Political favoritism,
- Absence of close supervision, and
- Respect for fellow officers.

Probably the most salient issue in San Diego is the perceived insensitivity of the mayor and the city council to the needs of patrol officers. This insensitivity is expressed, in part, through the officer's salary package; many objected to the fact that their pay "was not even close to that of other major cities," particularly Los Angeles, where officers receive between $400 and $500 more per month. The relatively high rate of attrition the department is currently experiencing is attributed by many to the attraction of better paying jobs in law enforcement in nearby departments.

The manpower shortage resulting from attrition has necessitated the operation of primarily one-man cars which the officers believed was a reflection of the city's lack of concern for their safety. Our survey revealed the issue of one-man cars to be the most common source of dissatisfaction: 56 percent of the responding officers identified one-man cars as one of three policy-related sources of dissatisfaction and accompanied their selection with comments like:

> The city uses one-officer cars to cover up the fact that we are shorthanded.
>
> An officer should not have to die because the department says it's cheaper to have one-man cars.
>
> They couldn't care less about the officers' safety. They only care about money.
>
> We haven't got the men to do the job right.

San Diego patrol officers also cited high turnover and inadequate manpower as two factors inhibiting the performance of the department's Community-Oriented Policing (COP) Program. High turnover has diminished the officers' ability to maintain permanent beat assignments and thereby familiarize themselves with the resource base in their areas; inadequate manpower has reduced the time available for COP activities.

In addition, perceptions of an unsupportive city administration are reinforced by a belief among some officers that promotions and special assignments are given to members of minority groups and women over at least equally qualified non-minority officers because of the city's commitment to maintaining the flow of federal affirmative action dollars. These officers view the department's efforts to "bend over backwards for minority groups" as reducing the predictability of their own chances for advancement in the department.

The community service orientation of the administration, reflected in the COP Program, is one area where patrol officer opinion diverges. The chief seems committed to perserving the public's favorable image of the police through close contact with the media and patrol officer involvement in community activities. There are many officers who appear to support this approach. One officer commented, for example, "Good p.r. practices keep the public's image of officers high." Another added, "The COP program is very positive and is the type of program that enables me to interact with the community the way I want to." At the same time, many other officers expressed their belief that the department pandered to the public at the officers' expense. According to one officer, "The administration does not back up its officers and is much too p.r. minded. They go out of their way to show the public that they will burn a patrolman if he makes a mistake." Others admitted that they were not interested in COP because it was not "real police work."

This view of Community-Oriented Policing appears to be reinforced by a number of patrol supervisors who are equally unsupportive of the program. Many patrol officers indicated that the limited operation of COP was not only a function of the manpower shortage but also the quantity performance standards set by their supervisors. And to the extent that they played a "numbers game," officers felt pressured to spend their time building their daily activity counts. In contrast to the administration's community service orientation, one officer reported, "Supervisors in the department are very 'productivity'-oriented, which takes much of the enjoyment out of the job. I feel I'm forced to write tickets for things I don't always want to."

The importance of "being known" is another major theme in San Diego. Many patrol officers indicated that in order to advance in the department, they had to make themselves highly visible to members of top management. Frustration over this unwritten requirement for advancement was expressed particularly by officers assigned to the Northern division who felt that officers working out the Central division, located in the same building as headquarters staff, were in a better position to establish the right "connections."

The recent implementation of the promotability process, which provides for wide administrative discretion, was seen as further reducing the advancement opportunities of those who "don't know the right people." We frequently heard comments from patrol officers like:

> If you're not a favorite to someone on the board, you're out of luck.
>
> Promotability is used by the administration to promote those that the administration wants to promote (the fair-haired and minorities) over the best qualified.

From the perspective of these patrol officers, the process is highly unpredictable and heightens the importance of developing "contacts" with decision-makers.

There is a distinct opposing view on this issue, however. Other officers shared the belief that the quality of those promoted to sergeant had increased since the promotability process was initiated. These officers considered subjectivity to be a small price to pay for improvements in first-line supervision. In addition, it is inevitable that the promotional opportunities of many officers have been increased under the current system.

The differences in opinion concerning the department's community relations efforts and the value of the promotion process appear to be a reflection of differing attitudes toward the chief. Some officers seemed to be developing increasing confidence in the chief, seeing him as someone who is willing to take decisive action, capable of selling himself to the public, creating a positive image of patrol officers in the media and demonstrating an interest in their professional development. Others, however, expressed their mistrust. According to one officer, for example, "I am unhappy with the administration. They tend to forget about the beat cop. They say they don't but it's not really in their hearts."

Finally, there are two issues that appear to represent positive perceptions of department operations among many patrol officers. First of all, officers indicated that they enjoyed "the freedom to work without being overly supervised." Secondly, they expressed their respect for fellow officers, describing them as "some of the best in police work."

Denver. The current chief and his appointed division chiefs entered the department together in the 1950's, moved up the ranks at the same pace, and--from the patrol officers' perspective--have run the department for the past seven years in much the same way as it was managed when they were rookies. As one officer put it, "The total picture at this point is poor. The 'powers that be' are anti-change, with the attitude that what worked 20 years ago should work now." This view of department operations is reflected in five issues:

- Political favoritism based on loyalty to the administration,
- Disparities in district operations,
- Absence of patrol officer participation in decision-making,
- Promotional opportunities limited by the longevity of top management, and
- Absence of educational incentives and rewards.

Patrol officers perceived strong loyalty among the top brass and expressed their belief that the demand for loyalty among subordinates had important implications for many personnel decisions, particularly those involving advancement and discipline. More specifically, politics in promotions reportedly expresses itself in two ways. The first involves the perceived impartiality of the oral board. During the last promotion process, "the oral was used in such a way as to weigh more than the written. In other words, they could choose who they wanted to promote, not who was best qualified." The second concerns the chief's prerogative to let the promotion list die at the end of the year or to extend it for another year. Many patrol officers shared the view that the chief promoted off the list until he reached an officer he didn't like. Then he allegedly let the list die, waiting to resume promotions until a new list became available.

The chief also has the authority to appoint all detectives who serve at his pleasure. Many officers felt that in the absence of any well-established criteria for selection, the chief and the chief of detectives put greater emphasis on friendships and outside political influence than past performance in making appointments. The more than four hundred detective and technician positions under the control of the chief were seen as highly political appointments. Many officers objected to the consequences of this system for the officer who didn't want to play the game by these rules. One patrol officer commented, for example, "Favoritism has always bothered me. A good cop always loses 'cause it's not his nature."

The common belief that "it's not what you do, it's who you know at all levels" applies particularly to perceptions of discipline. On the administrative level, the chief also has complete authority to administer discipline. Since 1978, officers have had no formal hearing; they are permitted only to make a statement on their own behalf before the chief imposes punishment. Patrol officers perceived considerable inconsistency in the severity of punishment depending "on where you work, who you are, what rank you are." Forty-six percent of the officers responding to our survey reported discipline as one of the three major sources of their dissatisfaction. Denver officers' frustration over the issue of discipline appears to be reinforced by the IACP's study of the disciplinary process in Denver which recommended that a

trial board be selected jointly by management and the accused officer. Despite the IACP recommendation, the chief and his top brass rejected the prototype in favor of unilateral decision-making by the chief.

Similar dissatisfaction was reported on the district level where the shared view was that "every district station disciplines its officers differently." A more general criticism of the department, however, was patrol officers' sense that each of the four patrol districts operated independently with its own standards in a number of areas, including transfers, beat assignments, car assignments, personal appearance, seniority, and most importantly, discipline. Officers felt that the probability of being brought up on disciplinary charges was determined by who their commanding officer was.

Another issue of importance to patrol officers is the department's centralized management structure which provides no real opportunities for officers to participate in decision-making at any level. Among the patrol officer respondents, 31 percent selected "the extent to which patrol officers influence decisions that affect their jobs" as one of three sources of dissatisfaction. The attitude of the department toward the officer was one that made many feel like "a number" rather than an individual. The comments of these officers are representative:

> Patrolmen (street cops) have the most important job yet we are given no freedom to express feelings.
>
> Patrolmen are never asked about policy changes. Patrolmen are made to feel they are the lowest form of life in the department and should do as they're told and not ask questions.
>
> I feel excluded from the decision-making process. I feel all my supervisor wants me to do is show up for work and answer calls.

Like Montgomery County, Denver has no formal mechanisms for direct communication between patrol officers and the chief. The only mechanism for officer input is a policy defining a cumbersome procedure for submitting recommendations to the chief through the chain of command. This procedure is rarely, if ever, followed because of the perceived futility of the effort and the perceived importance of not "creating any waves." As a result, many patrol officers shared the view that the administration placed little value on their opinions.

There is an apparent belief among officers that the only way to influence policy is by breaking into a management position. The satisfaction survey indicated that 70 percent of the respondents desired a promotion, higher than that in any other department in the study. Yet opportunities for promotion were seen as limited by the longevity of those at the top. Comments like,

"There are too many officers past retirement which affects younger officers' chances for advancement," were frequently heard. Like discipline, limited opportunities for promotion were reportedly a major source of dissatisfaction among nearly half (48%) of the survey respondents.

Many of those who expressed frustration with promotional opportunities were officers with advanced education. The department offers no educational incentives or rewards and some officers reported their feeling that education might even be a liability. Twenty-one percent of the respondents indicated that the department's attitude toward education was, for them, a major source of dissatisfaction. These officers shared the view that "Education [was] not given credit or value."

New Orleans. There are eight issues that appear to define the patrol officer's view of department operations in New Orleans:

- Traditions of:
  - autocratic and hierarchical management,
  - anti-union sentiments among top management, and
  - political favoritism in decision-making,
- A new chief's attempts at change,
- The failure of a recent strike,
- Inadequate salaries,
- A shortage of manpower,
- Political favoritism,
- Infrequent promotional exams, and
- Poor quality supervision.

The arrival of the current chief in New Orleans in 1978 represented a major departure in management style and approach from past administrations. During the previous seven year period, the department was run consecutively by two brothers under the typical quasi-military model, in which the patrol officer was relegated to a position at the "bottom" of the organization. Furthermore, the strong anti-union sentiments of the chiefs restricted the ability of the officers to raise their salaries to a level commensurate with officers in cities with strong union representation. As shown in Table 1.2, the base patrol officer salary in New Orleans, which does not increase with automatic step raises, is close to that in Atlanta ($12,228 and $11,510, respectively) where the police associations are also without influence.

The political history of the New Orleans Police Department has not only permitted the exchange of personal favors among department personnel, but also influence from the outside. Decisions regarding transfers and special assignments have been made in return for loyalty or in response to requests from local politicians. Disciplinary actions have been highly inconsistent and the severity of punishment has often been more dependent on the strength of an officer's connections in headquarters than the nature of the offense. Politics was also prevalent in the promotion system, where previous chiefs reportedly used the "rule of three" to pass over officers who had become active in one of the police associations.

Over the past year, the new chief has made some attempts to provide for greater participation and fair treatment for the patrol officer. The chief eliminated the "rule of three," established a patrol officer advisory committee and an open-door policy, reduced the service time requirement for promotion to sergeant from three years to two for those with college degrees, imposed consistency on the disciplinary process, gave patrol officers the opportunity to move from monthly rotations to steady shifts, and eliminated the requirement that patrol officers wear their hats on duty. He is also in the process of revising the written directives system with patrol officer input, developing plans for more frequent promotional examinations and streamlining the field reporting form. All these changes, which seemed to create a new sense of fairness and hope among patrol officers, were perceived by some as a reflection of the chief's efforts to compensate for the traditions of favoritism and autocratic management which had defined department operations prior to his arrival. As one officer put it, "I think that conditions are improving. The new superintendent is sincerely trying to work with the men to improve conditions."

This growing sense of hope may have been a precipitating factor in the police strike during the 1979 Mardi Gras. The striking officers cited three objectives in initiating the job action: higher salaries, formal recognition of one of the two police officer associations through a contract with the city, and a return of recently reduced sick leave benefits. Acting in the apparently mistaken belief that the Teamsters would bring sufficient strength, the police officer association joined the Teamsters Union prior to the strike. Since the chief and the mayor maintained that they would not sign a contract as long as this affiliation continued, the strike produced none of the desired outcomes, except possibly to generate among the officers a sense of unity that was previously absent.

The strike's failure to effect any substantive changes appears to have raised suspicions about the sincerity of the chief's expressed commitment to improving patrol officer's salaries and working conditions. Officers strongly objected to the need to work overtime or take on a second job to meet their financial responsibilities. Many complained that the department did not provide "enough overtime to compensate for the small pay." Financial constraints have also created a manpower shortage which forces units to respond to calls for service throughout their district, precluding any sort of permanent zone assignments.

Other perceived problems in the department have also been unaddressed as yet by the current administration. Patrol officers reported that politics still govern transfers to other districts and specialized units. We frequently heard comments like:

> If you know the right people you can transfer.
>
> To get a transfer one should be judged on his record not who he knows.
>
> If you know someone, it's easy to move on to a better place.

Unless an officer is part of the "headquarters crowd," he is considered to have few opportunities for mobility. Infrequent promotional exams also appear to have limited advancement opportunities.

Finally, patrol officers seemed to perceive inadequacies in the quality of supervision. Many officers felt there was "too much supervision in certain areas." Others shared the view that "ranking officers [were] not educated in how to motivate people. People are different and are motivated by different things. They treat us like we are only numbers." Most importantly, a common perception among officers was that "some rank use their position to get back or make it rough for you if you don't agree with them." They described an atmosphere in the department that militated against the expression of opinions because of the potential consequences.

Montgomery County. In February 1979, the chief was removed from office by a newly-elected county executive who had expressed concern throughout his campaign over what he saw as the chief's damaging effect on morale in the department. The low level of satisfaction reported by patrol officers in our survey, conducted two months before the chief's departure, appears to corroborate the county executive's concern. In interviews conducted three weeks after the chief left the department, officers expressed relief over the action of the county executive and described two major contributors to their dissatisfaction with the administration:

- The absence of promotions, and
- The perceived insensitivity of the chief to their opinions and preferences.

One of the major initiatives of the former administration was the establishment of a Career Development Program intended to restructure the promotion procedures and criteria, primarily in response to identified inequities and

inconsistent practices related to advancement. A long-range career development plan was developed which contained over twenty recommendations for changes in personnel practices. Among the most salient recommendations were:

- assign all job classes to the salary grades proposed in the new salary plan to ensure equal pay for equal work;
- award service increments above the mid-point of the salary range only on the basis of outstanding performance or specific major accomplishments;
- explore the possibility of allowing sworn employees to perform in nonsworn job classes without benefit reduction or loss of status;
- establish a new promotional selection process based upon the new job classification plan, with separate eligibility lists for each job class; and
- establish new job classes and position assignments which provide continuous career progress opportunities.

While the proposed career development program was being developed, the former chief put a freeze on promotions. In fact, there have been no promotional exams for sergeant in the department since 1975. The existing promotional list was discarded because cheating was discovered on the last exam. Some officers resented the fact that they were penalized for the mistakes of a few. According to one officer, "It was alleged that some persons cheated on that exam. They found certain persons guilty and they did away with the whole test. This, in effect, said every police officer in the department cheated on this exam." Other officers saw the absence of promotions as the chief's attempt to save money until officers could be promoted according to the new guidelines. Officers' frustration over the absence of opportunities for mobility was reinforced by the civilianization of some top positions. Seventy-two percent of the survey respondents in Montgomery County identified promotional opportunities as one of three major policy-related sources of dissatisfaction. There was no higher consensus reported on any of 14 possible issues in any of the other departments under study. We frequently heard comments like:

> I have nothing to look forward to.
>
> There is no future within this department.
>
> It doesn't look like I will ever have a chance to supervise.
>
> There is no incentive or goal for officers to achieve.

The high level of dissatisfaction with the state of the promotion system must be viewed in terms of the emphasis placed on education in the department. The Montgomery County Department of Police requires an Associates degree for appointment and further encourages advanced education by offering both day and evening classes (to accommodate the weekly rotation of shifts) at the local training academy through the University of Maryland. As a result of the department's efforts to bring college courses to the officers, an extremely high percentage are involved in degree programs. Among the respondents to our survey, 59 percent are currently attending school. This represents more than twice the percentage in any of the other departments, which range from 12 percent in Denver to 27 percent in San Diego.

While the controversy over the career development program and the resulting freeze on promotions left patrol officers with a sense of the chief's insensitivity to their most important shared concern, their mistrust was only intensified by a number of public statements in which the chief referred to the high degree of incompetence among police personnel. From the chief's perspective, these statements were intended to attract the attention of the law enforcement community to what he saw as some of the inadequacies in policing. From the patrol officers' point of view, however, he was "hanging out our dirty laundry," "grandstanding," "publicity seeking" and merely confirming their suspicions of his basic disrespect for the officers on the street.

Among the patrol officers we surveyed and interviewed, most seemed to feel that the chief did not demonstrate concern for their interests which some attributed to the fact that he was not a career police officer. Many officers shared the view that "the administration treat[ed] officers with little respect and like children." For these officers, this was reflected in what they saw as the chief's tendency to solicit patrol officer opinion and then reject it, and to value "the citizen's word rather than have faith in what officers say." One officer captured the range of patrol officer opinion when he commented,

> At the present, patrol officers have absolutely no say as to how we as a work force will function. We are supposed to be the 'backbone of the department' but in reality we are taken for granted. Instead of a 'backbone,' we have become a vestigial organ. We are subject to the whims of administrative types who have little or no practical experience, including the chief. He may say that he takes into consideration our suggestions but in fact what we suggest, complain about, goes in one ear and out the other. No one takes us seriously and really considers our opinions and feelings.

In many respects, the Montgomery County patrol officer works within a department policy structure comparable to that in Portland or San Diego. The patrol officer is given a great deal of autonomy in the field through the absence of close supervision and one-man cars, the latter of which was preferred by most of the officers we interviewed. Moreover, the patrol officers perceived the system as relatively free from politics with respect to decisions regarding transfers, special assignments and discipline. In addition, the Montgomery County patrol officer operates in an environment which enjoys low population density, low crime rates, and a highly stable and affluent community lacking in complex policing problems. Patrol officers expressed satisfaction with their four-day work week, take-home cars assigned by seniority, and their salaries which are the highest of the six departments.

The history of the former chief's influence on the department illustrates the ability of an administrator to neutralize the effects of what appears to be a supportive policy structure. While the absence of promotions over the past four years seems to be an important contributor to the reportedly low levels of satisfaction, the sense of autonomy and fairness expressed by patrol officers in Montgomery County seems to be associated with relatively high levels of satisfaction in Portland and San Diego. Now that the chief has been removed, it would not be surprising to find very different results from the satisfaction survey, as interviews subsequent to the chief's departure have suggested.

Atlanta. The histories of the Atlanta and New Orleans Police Departments share many important characteristics. Both departments are defined by a long tradition of political favoritism, centralized management and police association impotence. These traditions and the resulting mistrust felt by patrol officers are major obstacles for the recently appointed chiefs in these departments, both of whom have a reputation for integrity and "progressive" management. The distinguishing difference between the two administrations is that the chief in Atlanta does not appear to have moved as quickly to effect change. Thus, the perceptions revealed through our interviews and survey focused almost exclusively on the department's past history. There are eight issues which appear to define patrol officer perceptions of department operations:

- Inadequate salaries and benefits,
- A tradition of political favoritism,
- The absence of promotional opportunities,
- Insufficient recognition of seniority,

- Racial tensions,
- Manpower shortages,
- Management's insensitivity to patrol officers, and
- The mayor's influence in the department.

Of the six departments under study, officers in Atlanta have the lowest salaries and least impressive benefits. As shown in Table 1.2, the maximum base salary in Atlanta is $14,539 in contrast to $23,449 in Montgomery County. In addition, officers in Atlanta do not receive time-and-a-half for overtime nor does the city pay for their police automobile, hospitalization or dental insurance. While the three police associations have made various demands for improvement, the disunity among the rank-and-file appears to have limited their effectiveness in winning support from city hall.

Internally, politics, promotional opportunities and race seemed to dominate our conversations with patrol officers. For many years, the civil service system was often ignored in promotions. While officers indicated that tests were given from time to time, many promotions were reportedly based on a "recommendation to the chief." Some older supervisors we interviewed admitted they had received their stripes this way. When the first black commissioner of public safety was appointed in 1974, the promotion system was standardized with well-defined criteria and regular exams. Four years later, however, the commissioner was forced to resign over a highly-publicized cheating scandal involving other black officers, leaving many officers with the belief that "political and racial considerations outweigh merit in promotions." While the promotional process is tied up in court over the incident, officers in the department see themselves without any standardized system and have few expectations of one ever being implemented.

Politics appears to pervade not only promotions but all types of personnel decisions such as those involving transfers, and investigative and shift assignments. In the absence of any well-defined policies, patrol officers see mobility and rewards as highly dependent on "knowing the right people," sometimes regardless of officer qualifications. Many officers expressed a desire for greater seniority privileges as a means of eliminating some of the favoritism in decision-making.

Much of the favoritism in the department is viewed in terms of race. For the most part, white officers shared the perception that black officers were given preferential treatment. The reverse was less often the case. This may be a function of the fact that approximately 70 percent of the patrol officers are white and nine of the fourteen highest ranking administrators, as well as the commissioner of public safety, are black.

The issue of race has influenced policy implementation in other ways. All transfers and changes in shift assignments, for example, must be approved by an affirmative action officer responsible for maintaining racial balance across units and shifts. Officers requesting these changes in assignment are required to indicate their race on the standard form and approval is often dependent on "swap" with an officer of the same race. The department also has an informal practice of one-man patrol, which not only serves to expand patrol coverage in the face of a shortage of manpower, but also represents an apparent effort to minimize the potential for racial tensions in the department. While some of the officers we interviewed indicated that a two-man car policy would create racial problems, others disagreed. These officers indicated, however, that they would prefer to ride with partners only if they could choose them.

The legacy of past administrations has created considerable frustration among patrol officers in Atlanta. A number of comments provided by officers in interviews and in response to open-ended survey questions captured that frustration. According to one officer, for example, "The department has been in turmoil for approximately five years--morale is at an all time low. I am completely discouraged about the entire operation." Another officer offered some specifics:

> This department has no reason for anything--promotions, hiring, etc. There is at present no means for promotion. The entire department seems confused about what to do. It appears there is no communication between management and the rank-and-file. No one knows what to expect.

The sense of distance between the administration and the officer on the street, reported by many patrol officers, seems to have translated into a shared belief in the department's insensitivity to their concerns and basic disrespect for their position. Some representative comments include:

> We are treated as non-professionals and as if we are stupid.
>
> No one takes beat officers' suggestions seriously. Policy is made by upper brass behind desks not out on the street with the men.
>
> I do not feel we have the backing of the hierarchy of the police department. They do not stand behind us.
>
> There is just a general lack of caring about the police officers.

While the patrol officers we interviewed perceived the present commissioner and chief to be, for the most part, well-intentioned, few expressed any expectations of great change under this administration. Many officers considered the department to be heavily influenced by the mayor who was seen as reinforcing traditions at the root of their frustration. Others merely believed that the problems in the department were so well-embedded as to be almost irreversible.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis suggests that there is a relationship between the policy structures of police departments and patrol officer satisfaction with department operations. Given the limitations of a six-site comparison and the fact that the respondent group in only one depatment is reportedly satisfied, however, this conclusion must be considered extremely tentative. In addition, the findings indicate the presence of a number of other factors in the occupational environment of the patrol officer that can weaken or strengthen the relationship between policy and satisfaction. This concluding chapter is intended to summarize the policy options associated with patrol officer satisfaction and some of the other organizational/environmental factors that appear to explain differences in reported satisfaction across the six departments. The final section offers a discussion of the implications of the current findings for future research.

7.1 Policy Options and Satisfaction

The findings of this research have suggested a number of policy options in each of the ten areas that appear to be associated with patrol officer satisfaction. While these policies are structured to provide for patrol officer participation, fairness, autonomy and rewards for education, it is apparent that perceived practice is consistent with reality only when grounded in certain basic management assumptions, which are defined for each policy area below. In the absence of these assumptions, there is likely to be a wide gap between policy intentions and perceived practice.

<u>Management of the Role of the Patrol Officer</u>

- Patrol officer responsibility for beat operations combined with a redefinition of the role of the sergeant as resource facilitator and supervisor of operational planning efforts

- Patrol guidelines that provide patrol officers with some flexibility in establishing procedures for handling calls
- Freedom from close supervision balanced by sergeant availability
- Permanent beat assignments

Management Assumptions:

- A patrol officer should function more effectively if he is involved in decisions that affect his patrol operations
- The judgment of patrol officers should be trusted and human error should be tolerated
- Quality as well as quantity measures of performance should be emphasized
- Adequate blocks of uncommitted patrol time should be made available for non-routine patrol functions

Patrol Officer Input in Decision-Making

- Direct communication between the chief and patrol officers:
  - written communication that bypasses the chain of command; assured written response
  - open door policy
  - informal contact with patrol officers in station houses and during patrol
  - monthly newsletter from the chief addressing issues of immediate or future concern to patrol officers; a mechanism for officers to respond to issues raised
- Distribution of the initial draft of major policy changes to each command for review; a mechanism for officers to register their opinions
- Review committees that permit patrol officers to study and advise the administration on policy issues of particular relevance to them (e.g., uniforms, equipment, etc.)

Management Assumptions:

- The opinions of patrol officers should be valued and reflected in policies that affect them

- Mechanisms for patrol officer participation in management decision-making should be installed first on the district level

Police Officer Association Input in Decision-Making

- Review and comment on proposed policy initiatives
- Consultation on proposed disciplinary actions in serious cases

Management Assumptions:

- The opinions of association representatives should be valued and reflected in policies that affect patrol officers

Promotion

- written exam weighted more than 50 percent
- oral interview weighted less than 50 percent
- oral board selected by an outside agency, such as the city civil service commission, without administrative input
- seniority credits

While this arrangement is associated with perceived fairness, we found that patrol officers across the six departments recognize that an emphasis on objective criteria reduces the ability of the system to pinpoint the best leadership potential. At the same time, our findings in San Diego suggest that a primarily subjective system can be viewed with considerable mistrust. That mistrust, however, must be examined against patrol officer perceptions of relatively wide promotional opportunities and a high regard for the officers promoted under this system. Given this point of view, it is important that the implementation of subjective criteria be grounded in the following management assumptions:

- Criteria should be well-defined and patrol officers should be made fully aware of the nature of and rationale for those criteria

- Officer qualifications should not be compromised because of personal considerations
- Patrol officers or police association representatives should be permitted to observe the process

Under these assumptions, mistrust should diminish as the perceived quality of first-line supervision improves.

Investigative Assignment Selection

- Well-defined criteria and procedures
- Patrol officer participation on oral boards
- Posting of job announcements for vacancies
- Police officer association participation in the development of selection criteria

Management Assumptions:

- Officer qualifications should not be compromised because of personal considerations
- Candidates should be evaluated by their peers
- Patrol officers should be given an equal opportunity for selection
- The opinions of association representatives should be valued and reflected in policies that affect patrol officers

Transfer

- Denial of consideration of transfer requests only for "just cause"
- Requests processed in order of receipt

Management Assumptions:

- A patrol officer should function more effectively if he is he is working in the district of his choice
- Officer qualifications should not be compromised because of personal considerations

Discipline

- Peer participation on administrative hearing boards
- Right of the accused to eliminate members of the hearing board
- Written statement by the chief specifying the reasons for increasing penalties recommended by the hearing board
- Consultation with the police officer association regarding proposed disciplinary actions in serious cases
- Patrol officer participation in the development or revision of discipline policy
- Police Officer Bill of Rights defining the rights of officers under investigation and permissible forms of punishment
- Prohibition against punitive transfers

Management Assumptions:

- A balance should be achieved between respect for precedent and consideration of individual circumstances
- Violators of department regulations should be judged by their peers
- The opinions of patrol officers should be valued and reflected in policies that affect them

Shift Assignment

- Permanent shifts selected by seniority

- Accommodation of seniority privileges in cases of voluntary and involuntary transfers

- Patrol officer participation in the selection of an alternative shift assignment plan

Management Assumptions:

- Shift assignments should be made in a standardized way

- The opinions of patrol officers should be valued and reflected in policies that affect them

One- Versus Two-Officer Patrol Units

- A mix of one- and two-man patrol units that reflects changing crime conditions across districts and over time

Management Assumptions:

- A patrol officer should function more effectively if he is patrolling in the type of unit he prefers

Education

- Rewards for advanced education through salary differentials, tuition refunds and/or advancement opportunities

- Accommodations for college attendence through adjustments in shift assignments and days off

Management Assumptions:

- Advanced education should be encouraged

7.2 Occupational Environment and Satisfaction

While the findings suggest that there is a relationship between policies that provide for participation, fairness, autonomy and satisfaction, the actual degree of participation, fairness and autonomy is only partially explained by the policy structure. This section describes the major organizational/environmental factors that also appear to influence the nature and extent of these three dimensions as well as the level of satisfaction.

Administrators' Management Styles

The comments offered by the patrol officers we interviewed and surveyed suggest that much of what defines an officer's satisfaction with department operations is a function of the respect administrators are perceived to demonstrate for the judgment and opinions of patrol officers. This respect appears to express itself not only through policy but also through administrators' management styles and orientations.

Trust in Officers' Judgment. Patrol officer satisfaction appears to be related not only to a role that provides for relatively wide discretion in handling patrol operations in a defined area of responsibility, but also to the way in which administrators respond to the inevitable mistakes that are made in the exercise of that discretion.

One of the most important assumptions underlying the role of the patrol officer in Portland is that if risk-taking is encouraged, human error must be tolerated. Most of the patrol officers we interviewed confirmed that they were permitted to make mistakes without fear of serious repercussions. These officers shared the view of one who commented, "The administration backs us well which makes it easier to work." In the other five departments (although opinion appears to be mixed in San Diego), officers felt that administrators were all too frequently willing to respect a complainant's word over their own and to expose an officer to intense criticism in the press in order to maintain community support. This left many with the belief that "The department doesn't back up its officers."

Responsiveness to Officers' Opinions. Satisfaction seems to be associated not merely with the presence of mechanisms providing for patrol officer participation but also with administrators' demonstrated willingness to follow officers' recommendations. While there are clearly times when these recommendations cannot be accepted, in departments where the opinions of patrol officers are frequently solicited but infrequently translated into policy, officers tended to believe that only "lip service" was paid to the notion of patrol officer participation. In these departments (as well as in those where there are few or no avenues for participation), patrol officers shared the view that their opinions were not valued by administrators. At the same time, there are many types of decisions, such as those involving uniforms, equipment, field reporting forms and procedures for handling calls, that these officers felt they were in the best position to make.

The chief in Portland seems to have established a reputation among many officers as someone who listens and is responsive to their expressed concerns. This reputation seems to be a function of not only the actual degree of patrol officer input in decision-making, but also the extent of the chief's

contact with patrol officers over the past five years, particularly during his first year in office. The Portland chief spent the majority of his weekends that first year in the station houses and in patrol cars, informally talking with officers about department operations. These conversations produced a number of recommendations for change that were followed at that time, including the elimination of certain field reports that the officers believed to be unnecessary, the removal of the hat requirement, the liberalization of hair regulations, the selection of a holster that officers considered to be more safe than the one previously in use, and the elimination of a policy prohibiting officers from speaking in public (e.g., to the press, their sons' cub scout troops, etc.) without the chief's approval. In addition, the chief created formal mechanisms for direct communication with patrol officers: an open door policy (which gives an officer asking to see him the first available opening) and a monthly newsletter. He also responds to any written communications. This contact with patrol officers, which has diminished somewhat in recent years, appears to have removed much of the suspicion and mistrust that typically surrounds the chief's position.

Department History and Culture

Over time, police departments develop a culture of norms, values and customs that can have a significant influence on patrol officer satisfaction. In the six departments under study, cultural traditions vary considerably along two important dimensions: the degree of political favoritism and the extent of hierarchical management.

Political Favoritism. The value that patrol officers place on fairness in the distribution of rewards and punishment is well-documented in the police literature. Officers tend to support those policies, such as objective promotional criteria and seniority privileges, that limit the discretion of decision-makers who might be more influenced by personal than merit considerations.

In the six study sites, fairness is also a common theme. In departments where officers were largely dissatisfied, there was a shared perception that personnel decisions were influenced by race, rank, friendships and local politicians, sometimes at the expense of officer qualifications. Patrol officers in these departments objected not only to the advancement of less deserving officers but also the inability of well-qualified officers to get ahead because they didn't know the "right people." Satisfaction, on the other hand, seems to be associated with the belief that the most capable officers will succeed.

There is a rather predictable relationship between the policy structures of these departments and, at least, perceived fairness. In Portland and

Montgomery County, the two departments where political favoritism is considered to play a relatively small role, there are a number of policies that limit the discretion of administrators. In Denver, New Orleans and Atlanta, however, perceptions of political favoritism are consistent with a policy structure that generally provides management with wide latitude in making personnel decisions. (In San Diego, the relationship between the nature of policy and perceived fairness is not as obvious because opinion is distinctly mixed in most areas of policy.) Satisfaction, in other words, seems to be in part explained by the combined and mutually reinforcing influence of policy and culture.

Hierarchical Management. During the years that the Portland and San Diego chiefs have been in office, the management structures of those departments have been altered considerably. Many of the characteristics of the earlier quasi-military structure--strict subordination, rigid chains of command, and the absence of any formal provisions for consultation between ranks--are largely gone. The cultural traditions of these departments are clearly becoming ones that encourage patrol officers to express their feelings and opinions, to participate in management decision-making and to take greater responsibility for patrol operations. This environment seems to be one that cultivates and reinforces patrol officer satisfaction. In contrast, the Denver, New Orleans and Atlanta Police Departments are defined by long, and as yet unbroken, traditions of hierarchical management which militate against individuation and initiative.

Support from City Hall

Patrol officer satisfaction seems to be, in part, a function of the extent to which officers perceive how not only management but also the mayor and city council value their worth. While the support provided by city government is basically financial in nature, it is more specifically expressed through salaries and wages, working conditions and affirmative action policies. In the departments where perceptions of an unsupportive city administration appear to be a major source of dissatisfaction--Atlanta, New Orleans and San Diego--all three dimensions are present.

Salaries and Wages. Typically in police departments, patrol officers view salary and wage issues in relative terms where other departments or other municipal workers represent the points of reference. In the six departments under study, frequent comparisons were made. Officers in Portland, for example, considered themselves to be well-compensated relative to those in Seattle; San Diego officers felt that their salaries should be increased to a level closer to that in Los Angeles. New Orleans and Atlanta officers complained about the fact that their salaries were among the lowest of the major cities and did not include other types of compensation, such as shift differentials and longevity pay, found in departments of similar size.

Perceptions of relative compensation were defined in terms of the extent of the city's willingness to recognize the contribution of the police to the public's safety and well-being.

Working Conditions. The operation of one-man cars, necessitated by a shortage of manpower, was considered to be a reflection of the city's lack of concern for officer safety. Patrol officers in these departments felt that police budget allocations for personal services were based on political considerations without sufficient regard for either their security or effectiveness.

Affirmative Action Practices. Many white male patrol officers strongly objected to what they saw as the preferential treatment of minorities and women in appointment and promotion. For these officers, affirmative action in hiring meant that the city was willing to lower both physical and intelligence standards in order to maintain the flow of federal funds. Preferential treatment of minorities and women in promotions was seen as reverse discrimination, a practice that reduced the predictability of their chances for promotion and diminished the quality of supervision.

Police Officer Association Representation

Police officer association input has been considered largely as a policy area, measured along the dimension of participation in management decision-making. The policy continuum varied from traditional unilateral decision-making by management to association participation in setting department policies. It would not be accurate to view the present state of the relationship between management and labor as solely a function of policy. State collective bargaining laws, for example, also provide a context in which the relationship between management and labor is formed. Police officers working in departments with contracts have generally done better than those working without contracts.

In addition, many of the policies that have resulted in higher levels of participation, fairness and autonomy (and presumably higher levels of satisfaction with department operations) have been initiated by police officer associations. In Portland and San Diego, particularly, much of the pressure for change has come through union advocacy. The efforts of the police officer associations in these cities have resulted in attractive compensation plans, improved working conditions and a wide range of benefits--educational incentive programs, tuition refund plans, police officer bills of rights, prohibitions against punitive transfers, grievance procedures, and seniority privileges in shift assignments, vacations and days off.

7.3 Research Agenda

We began this study as part of an attempt to further our understanding of how police attitudes affected their performance and how police managers might adopt or change policies to develop more positive attitudes which, in turn perhaps, might facilitate better performance. The data we developed have illuminated parts of this question, left other parts unanswered, and raised new areas of inquiry which now emerge as promising future research topics. Additionally, the process of gathering and analyzing the data has deepened our understanding of some of the methodological problems raised by the research. In this section, we outline several of the implications of our results for how and where more research should be conducted.

Relationship Between Attitudes and Behavior

The fundamental assumption that improving police officer satisfaction will improve job performance remains one supported more by conventional wisdom than by hard empirical evidence. Reliably ascertaining the relationship between the two domains is both conceptually and technically complex because of the diversity of behavior included under the heading of performance. Measures ranging from ability to deal with the public (e.g., citizen complaints) to aberrant behavior under stress (e.g., firearms discharge) reflect relevant peformance dimensions along with the more familiar criminal justice system measures of clearance rates, arrest rates, and so forth. Some areas of job performance are more likely to be influenced by satisfaction than others, and there may be differential relationships between subareas of satisfaction and specific policies. Officers can articulate specific areas with which they are satisfied or dissatisfied, and can often provide direct confirmation of their perceptions of the role of management policy in fostering the unsatisfactory conditions they experience.

Longitudinal Studies

One would like to conclude that a police department which adopted the cluster of management policies and styles associated with participation, fairness and autonomy would experience an increase in satisfaction. Our actual evidence supports the somewhat weaker conclusion that departments which already have such policies are more satisfied. Only by actually observing change can we substantiate the inferential leap from synchronous differences among departments to changes over time within one department.

Our study can only suggest some of the barriers to policy change--the elements in the cultural tradition of a department which cause things to be done as

they always have been, individual traits of the key actors, and the environmental context of local government--which might interfere with or prevent adoption of alternative management strategies. We have not examined the process by which a policy comes to be institutionalized or subverted, the adaptive behaviors which determine how the policy will be implemented once adopted, and the internal and external forces which might cause a policy to be abandoned after many years.

Policy Implementation

In drawing practical applications of theoretical findings, one of the major recurrent areas of uncertainty is the fidelity of correspondence between an abstract policy concept and what actually happens. The formally articulated policies of an organization provide only partial information about the applications of that policy to individual cases. How a formal policy comes to be implemented depends on the establishment of an unwritten consensus among groups affected by the policy. Conflicts created by the policy come to be resolved in stable or unstable ways depending on the relative goals and powers of the actors involved. Whether a policy can be implemented at all depends not only on a police department's internal management, but also on the external constraints imposed on it by availability of funds, community attitudes and problems, and the organizational position of the police among city agencies. Understanding these questions of implementation is crucial to constructing realistic, credible guides to making the theoretical results practically useful.

Policy Descriptions

Our analysis deliberately avoided geographical representation in order to enhance the range of policy structures that could be considered. By doing so we were able to gather data at considerably greater depth than would have otherwise been possible, and to identify a set of significant attributes of policy which appear to influence job satisfaction. A simple description is needed of how police departments throughout the country solve the problems posed by these policy choices. In order to prepare a coherent national strategy for improving police management policy, we need a clear national picture of how widespread are the management practices which lead to police officer dissatisfaction.

For such a study, breadth of coverage is more valuable than depth. The present research has characterized a small number of police departments on a large number of dimensions. To capitalize on the information so generated we now need to apply a small number of measurements to a large number of

departments. Clearly foremost in such a characterization is the description of promotion policies. Every department must somehow resolve the conflict between the desire for objectivity and the need to recognize intangible leadership qualities in making promotions. Solutions to this dilemma range from total reliance on formal testing to unreviewed political appointment, with oral interviews and written evaluations occupying an intermediate position. Because promotion policies tend to be better documented than those in many other areas, simply collecting all written policy on promotions in departments would go a long way toward providing a useful characterization.

The second policy area for which collection of documentation is needed concerns the mechanisms by which officers are located in time and space. Shift allocation strategies and rules represent one of the most immediate physical and psychological ways in which police policy impinges on the daily life of officers, and an area where management policy can either increase or decrease employee feelings of participation, fairness and autonomy. Handling requests for transfer plays a similar, although perhaps less pervasive, role in shaping the way officers feel toward their jobs and their departments, and provides supplemental evidence to characterize management practices and assumptions.

Mediating Factors

While police management policies seem to explain a significant portion of the observed differences in officer job satisfaction, there are clearly many other, possibly more important, factors also influencing satisfaction. Police managers may have no control over many of these factors and may be able to deal with others only indirectly, as by recruitment and screening policy. These other sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction can materially influence the effects of department policy. For example, educated officers are likely to take a very different view of the implementation of advanced education requirements or education-based salary differentials than are undereducated officers, who are likely to feel themselves injured by the change. A study of the interactions between department-level and individual characteristics would provide the basis for an empirical understanding of these effects.

External Consequences of Dissatisfaction

Employee job satisfaction probably produces effects outside the scope of job competence. Stress-related factors of police work have been linked to incidence of coronary attack, hypertension, family instability and psychiatric disorder. The way police are treated by their employer influences the way in which the community in turn responds to police actions and the attitudes it will adopt toward law and the criminal justice system. Public perceptions of

whether policing is a good job will influence the department's ability to recruit new officers and may be especially critical to finding qualified women and members of minority groups, who may need to overcome substantial exclusionary prejudices.

Perceptions of Policy and Internal Relations

We have been careful to distinguish between perceived and implemented policy. Officers' reports of management actions were sometimes in conflict with what appeared to be the actual policies and with the reports of other officers in the same department. Even when management implements a favorable policy, it is unlikely to contribute much to satisfaction until officers have had time to learn how the new policy will work. There are measures a department may wish to take to accelerate this process, but these same measures, if pursued with insufficient sensitivity, may impede, rather than advance, the flow of information. It does not appear customary for managers to seek feedback in order to determine whether officers understand the policies under which they work. Inclusion of this topic in a future study might show an efficient means for increasing the effect of policies already in place.

Methodology

By far the most difficult and rewarding task in conducting this study was the attempt to produce a quantitative typology of policy and to relate expressed individual feelings to the social structure in which the individuals worked. Such bi-level designs are relatively uncommon in the social research literature and analytic methods for them are still in a state of development. Further work on methods of characterizing the social context of organizations will make a definite contribution to our ability to understand them. Better theoretical models of the nexus between the individual and the abstract rules of his group are a crucial element in understanding how to change those rules to improve job satisfaction and performance.

APPENDIX I

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

This study of the relationship between the policy structure of police departments and patrol officer satisfaction has its theoretical and empirical grounding in two bodies of literature: the general job satisfaction literature and the police literature. The job satisfaction literature is useful because the three dimensions that appear, to a large extent, to define the policies selected for study--specifically, autonomy, fairness and participation--are compatible with three major paradigms in the general literature:

- Work Itself/Job Design Theory which addresses the concept of autonomy;
- Equity and Expectancy Theory which speaks directly to the issue of fairness; and
- Management Theory which focuses on the implications of worker participation.

This literature review is organized around these three paradigms in order to demonstrate how the notions of autonomy, fairness and participation define the relationship between policy and job satisfaction. We have excluded the fourth major paradigm in the literature--the Human Relations School--from this review. The Human Relations literature, which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal factors as determinants of work behavior, is referenced to the extent that the early research into productivity provides the basis for later inquiry into the causes of job satisfaction, or where certain factors are identified as influencing productivity and satisfaction simultaneously.

We have also excluded literature which deals strictly with the relationship between organizational variables and behavior as well as literature dealing with theories of human motivation. In general, these theories are focused on behavioral outcomes and are closely related to the research into productivity referenced above. However, some researchers have attributed satisfaction change to factors which are believed to motivate behavior, thereby suggesting that there is a certain linkage between motivation and satisfaction. This survey addresses the theories of motivation that are important to understanding the causes, nature and consequences of police job satisfaction.

There is a range of inferential and empirical findings in the police literature that pertain to the relationship between policies--as expressed through the dimensions of autonomy, participation and fairness--and patrol officer satisfaction. There are many different aspects of work environment with the potential to influence satisfaction. This review covers various techniques and strategies used to implement policy directives intended to influence the level of job satisfaction, particularly within the patrol officer function.

Our review, therefore, is not limited to the ten policy areas under study but rather explores any policy variables which help to explain the relationship between the dimensions of autonomy, participation and fairness, and of patrol officer satisfaction. The three paradigms available in the general job satisfaction literature provide us with a convenient and effective organizing principle.

Dimensions of the Concept of Job Satisfaction

A major problem in theoretical and empirical discussions of job satisfaction is the failure of the theorist/researcher to define terms adequately. This ambiguity is noted by Schwab and Cummings (1970) who state in a review of the literature that "there are few commonly defined constructs across various theories." Indeed, explicit definitions are rare. In reviewing the literature, a reader may get the impression that the terminology itself is considered so self-explanatory that no definition is needed. Thus, the meaning of "job satisfaction" becomes a task of reader inference. The situation has been virtually unchanged since 1955 when Brayfield and Crockett (1955) noted: "Definitions are conspicuous by their absence in most current work in this area."

In an attempt to be more explicit, Vroom (1964) stated in his well-known Work and Motivation:

> The terms job satisfaction and job attitudes are typically used interchangeably. Both refer to affective orientations on the part of individuals toward work roles which they are presently occupying. Positive attitudes toward the job are conceptually equivalent to job satisfaction and negative attitudes toward the job are equivalent to job dissatisfaction (1964).

The absence of shared definitions requires each individual researcher to develop his own notion of job satisfaction. Most researchers work with some form of multidimensional concept because individuals may be satisfied with certain aspects of their jobs but dissatisfied with other aspects. Questions such as "Are you satisfied with your present job?" are difficult to interpret because the answer depends on the varying weights that people give to different aspects of their jobs. In other words,

> ...a job is not an entity but an abstraction referring to a combination of tasks performed by an individual in a certain physical and social context for financial [and other] remuneration [and therefore] overall job satisfaction is the sum of the evaluations of the discriminable elements of which the job is composed (Locke, 1969).

Within the general job satisfaction literature there are three paradigms which capture the important dimensions of work and which provide a useful framework for analyzing elements of the patrol officer's job which may be related to satisfaction. These include the Work Itself/Job Design school of thought, Equity and Expectancy theory and Management Theory. Within the Work Itself/Job Design context we will consider the elements of work, the relationships among them and their ultimate relationship to job satisfaction. By considering Equity and Expectancy theory within the job environment, we are able to analyze the relationship between systems of reward (and, conversely, punishment), the worker's perceptions of equitable treatment, and their relationship to job satisfaction. Management Theory offers management strategies which limit or encourage worker participation in decision-making and the effects of participation on worker satisfaction.

It is important to note, however, that no single dimension of the work environment is regarded as the sole determinant of job satisfaction. Satisfaction is frequently attributed to a combination of characteristics of both the job and the environment. Generally, the literature confirms that characteristics of the job itself, the working environment and the management style all influence the level of satisfaction. Although we discuss each category discretely in order to analyze adequately the theories along each dimension, the reader should bear in mind that only the cumulative effect of these characteristics--and how they cluster with each other--truly explains the dynamic interactions necessary to promote job satisfaction.

Work Itself/Job Design Theories

Theorists of the Work Itself School view satisfaction as a function of the needs of the individual and the job's ability to fulfill those needs. The literature reflects an increasing awareness of the complex interrelationships between a wide variety of aspects of the job and the individual's unique values, expectations, desires and motivations.

Hackman and Lawler (1971) have made a number of advances over previous work by introducing a more rigorous assessment of the characteristics of jobs and their ability to fulfill certain employee goals. Hackman and Lawler's work also accords greater attention to the role of individual differences in employee values regarding the attainment of higher order goals and the influence of these differences on job satisfaction. The researchers identified job conditions that must exist before employees will be motivated and satisfied:

- a feeling of being personally responsible for an identifiable and meaningful part of the work,

- intrinsically meaningful or worthwhile outcomes, and
- feedback about accomplishments.

In addition, the authors described the following four core dimensions as related to satisfaction and performance: variety, autonomy, task identity and feedback. Two additional dimensions--level of dealing with people and friendship opportunities--were also assessed but did not produce major findings.

Data on a large number of dependent measures were also gathered, including questionnaire items for workers regarding:

- perceived work motivation,
- job involvement,
- general job satisfaction, and
- satisfaction with specific aspects of the job.

Hackman and Lawler (1971) hypothesized that satisfaction should be highest when all four of the core dimensions are present, and that the relationship between job characteristics and the dependent measures should be influenced by the individual differences among employees in their desire for higher order need satisfaction. Both hypotheses were confirmed; the relationship between job characteristics on the four core dimensions was shown to be considerably stronger for workers in the top third of the distribution of need-strength scores than for workers in the bottom third. Hackman and Lawler (1971) note that these results do not shed light on the appropriate techniques for increasing the satisfaction of workers who do not have strong desires for higher order need fulfillment on the job.

A number of problems are inherent in the work of Hackman and Lawler. For instance, the correlational nature of the data limits the strength of the causal inferences that can be drawn from the data. Further, employees self-select themselves into job positions of different types and this self-selection may have an influence on both job satisfaction and desires for higher order need satisfaction.

The work of Hackman and Lawler (1971) was refined and expanded by Hackman and Oldham (1977), and Hackman and Suttle (1977). This model defined five core job characteristics:

- Skill variety--the degree to which a job requires a variety of activities that involve the use of a number of different skills and talents;
- Task identity--the degree to which the job requires completion of a whole and identifiable piece of work--that is, doing a job from beginning to end with a visible outcome;
- Task significance--the degree to which the job has a substantial impact on the lives or work of other people, whether in the immediate organization or in the external environment;
- Feedback--the degree to which the individual obtains direct and clear information about the effectiveness of his performance in carrying out the work activities required by the job; and
- Autonomy--the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, independence and discretion to the individual in scheduling the work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out (Hackman and Suttle, 1977).

Although these characteristics, like the four core dimensions identified by Hackman and Lawler, are related to the satisfaction of higher order needs, they form the basis of the work design/job enrichment movement which has attempted to restructure jobs so that they offer the elements desired by workers. In this approach, management increases the scope of a worker's control and responsibility and provides the opportunity for advancement and recognition.

However, it has also been hypothesized that as a job is increasingly enriched, the worker may experience role ambiguity and resulting feelings of anxiety and tension. At least one study (Baehr et al., 1976) found the opposite to be true--that role ambiguity was less stressful for those workers whose jobs provided a high degree of autonomy. Hackman and Suttle (1977) assert that in jobs where autonomy is high, employees are more likely to develop a sense of personal responsibility for the work product. Workers find they must rely on their own resources and that they must make independent decisions and bear the consequences for them.

The importance of job enrichment as a mechanism which allows management to structure jobs so that higher order needs, such as achievement and growth, are attainable cannot be ignored. However, efforts of this nature will result in satisfaction only to the extent that workers value higher order needs. The flaws in the job enrichment philosophy have been enumerated by Reif and Luthans (1974) who stressed three major problems:

- some workers fail to find satisfaction in the workplace regardless of the type of job they hold,
- some workers prefer boring or unpleasant jobs with good social interaction to enriched jobs with reduced opportunities for social interaction, and
- some workers react to job enrichment efforts with feelings of inadequacy and fear of failure.

These authors note that some of those involved in implementing job enrichment programs "seem to have a limited understanding of the concept, are unsure of how or where to apply it, and have only a vague notion of what to expect from it or how to evaluate it." This shortcoming may, of course, be one of execution rather than a flaw in the actual concept of job enrichment.

The Police and the Job Itself

There is limited research-based literature bearing on the possible relationship between the job properties associated with policing and the degree of job satisfaction reported by patrol officers. It is interesting to consider the core dimensions or job characteristics described earlier within the context of the specific aspects of police work which may operate as the major determinants of job satisfaction.

In a study prepared by the Police Foundation on the nature and determinants of job satisfaction among police officers in Dallas (Piliavin et al., 1976), nine indicators of satisfaction were developed. Responses to 62 items ranging broadly over various aspects of police work were factor analyzed using a principal components procedure. Each of the resulting factors pertained to satisfaction with a specific facet of police work. Items retained on these job facet satisfaction factors had loadings of .40 or above; nine factors explained 58 percent of the total variance. The factors and their means are as follows:

Satisfaction Factors	Mean Score
Satisfaction with immediate supervisor	4.48
Satisfaction with police work roles	5.08
Satisfaction with promotion opportunities	3.19
Satisfaction with top management	3.11
Satisfaction with departmental recognition of accomplishments	3.75
Satisfaction with job security	4.06
Satisfaction with pay	2.95
Satisfaction with job autonomy	4.75
Satisfaction with personal advancement	3.85

Job facets which led to the greatest respondent satisfaction dealt with the content of police work (satisfaction with work roles) and the circumstances under which work roles are performed (satisfaction with immediate supervisors and with job autonomy). Those accounting for the smallest degree of variance in satisfaction concerned pay, practices of top management, and promotion opportunities. With the exception of top management practices, these findings are generally consistent with job satisfaction research on other occupations and other police organizations. Although the findings from this one study are not necessarily generalizable, the study has demonstrated that attitudinal variables of the type defined can influence police job satisfaction.

What is perhaps more surprising given the prima facie difficulties of the police task is the degree to which police officers are, indeed, satisfied with their jobs. With Wilson (1968) and perhaps Niederhoffer (1969) standing as notable exceptions, researchers have found that, in general, police officers are reportedly "more satisfied than dissatisfied" with their jobs (Biderman et al., 1967; Sterling and Watson, 1970; Lefkowitz, 1971; Van Maanen, 1977; Black and Reiss, 1971). While many studies point to the dissatisfaction patrol officers express toward particular aspects of the organization, or dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of respect and support from the public, city hall or management (Skolnick, 1966; Manning, 1977), when it comes to characteristics of the job itself, most patrol officers appear relatively satisfied and stress their attraction for the outdoor, non-routine, exciting, and socially significant task properties (Van Maanen, 1974; Muir, 1977; Sterling and Watson, 1970).

This is not to say, however, that all or even most patrol officers are fully satisfied with all aspects of their task. Indeed, this is probably not the case since indicators of general satisfaction typically mask specific areas of police discontent. For instance, much has been written about the tedious, boring quality of routine patrol, the degrading dirty-work assignments and other onerous duties (Rubinstein, 1973; Westley, 1963; Niederhoffer, 1969; Van Maanen, 1974; Radano, 1968). However, if we examine each of the previously delineated core dimensions separately, this apparent paradox in the literature becomes somewhat easier to comprehend.

Taking the patrol officer's job as a representative case (although, as we shall see, it is perhaps not as representative as is often thought), skill variety is apparently quite high. Many observers of the police have noted the almost infinite number of tasks a patrol officer is called upon to perform. As Wilson (1968) and others have noted, few other occupations in contemporary society demand so much from their practitioners. While it has been demonstrated that patrol officers dislike many of their functions, such as family quarrels, juvenile disputes and traffic and guard duty, the variety of tasks performed by a patrol officer is typically high.

Task significance can also be quite high. Police work involves its practitioners in situations of high personal and social consequence. Although dramatic life and death circumstances may be relatively few and far between, there is little argument regarding the visibility, salience and crucial importance of the police role in the community. To the general public, any meeting with the police is, in Goffman's (1961) nicely turned phrase, an "encounter of significance."

Task identity is, however, another matter. Many researchers have concluded that the disjointed, fragmented and somewhat artificial division of labor in police agencies is a frequent source of irritation to patrol officers. For example, the formal responsibilities of an officer who is dispatched by radio to "meet complainant" are usually fulfilled upon filing a complaint report rather than upon addressing or resolving the complaint itself (Muir, 1977; Manning, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973). Specialization limits task identity

> by fragmenting their decision-making process and distributing it among various groups in different roles....It may also restrict professional autonomy by instituting procedures for the review of decisions. The detective division of many police departments, for example, restricts the autonomy of line officers in both of these ways by giving the detective jurisdiction over all subsequent investigation as well as authority to review line officers' decisions.
>
> Specialization within the police bureaucracy may limit professional autonomy in another way. It does not so much limit the exercise of discretion, as it limits the ideal that the professional serve the client. For example, the development of a special 'human-relations' staff will remove an important function from the domain of the line worker, thus restricting the professionalization of his work (Reiss, 1971).

Autonomy presents something of an analytic and organizational dilemma. It has often been suggested that patrol officers (and other police personnel) represent little more than bureaucratic functionaries whose actions are fully prescribed by carefully constructed rules and regulations which are enforced through the various legal and departmental sanctions available to management. Patrol officers themselves often see their role as greatly constrained by the various audiences to whom they must orient their actions (Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969; Cain, 1973; Muir, 1977). Yet, most police observers report that even in the most legalistic and control-centered departments, patrol officers have great discretion in the field (Banton, 1964; Wilson, 1968; Goldstein, 1960). As Clark and Sykes (1974) argue, the bureaucratic potential of the police organization is invariably neutralized by virtue of the isolation of patrol units in the field. If autonomy is defined only from the standpoint of the patrol officer's isolation from direct supervision (Sterling and

Watson, 1970; President's Commission, 1967; Muir, 1977; Daley, 1973), it seems clear that the patrol officer enjoys a relatively great deal of autonomy.

Finally, feedback from the job, like task identity, appears to be somewhat low for patrol officers. Policing is an occupation where the practical worth of one's work is very difficult to judge (Wilson, 1975). It is often difficult for patrol officers ever to assess the impact of their policing activities or the patterns of reported or unreported crime in their sector (Van Maanen, 1974). Consider too, that from the police officer's perspective most encounters with the public remain ambiguous or unresolved for he can never be sure of the effects (if any) of his intervention (Clark, 1965; Clark and Sykes, 1974; Cruse and Rubin, 1973). As with most public sector jobs, it is very hard for any police officer to know how well he is doing in regard to the stated goals of the organization (Bittner, 1970). This is no doubt a matter of some consternation for many police officers, but it is one tied inherently to the nature of the patrol task itself.

All too often police researchers have merely clustered the subjects of their studies by job title, and in doing so have missed many of the striking differences in the nature and variety of police tasks performed. Indeed, job titles *per se* may tell us little about the specific tasks performed by any particular officer. Sander's participant observation work (1977) shows, for instance, some very real differences in the predictability and type of work pursued by detectives, especially in the burglary and juvenile divisions of a small- to medium-sized police department. Further, it is clear from his work that these differences may well be related to important variations in the satisfaction a given detective can derive from his work.

Even distinctions in task responsibility less formal than assignment to a functional division may be quite important. Muir (1977), Cain (1973) and Banton (1964) point to vast qualitative differences in the tasks performed by urban, suburban and rural patrol officers--differences that are also found, to some degree, within any one large police agency. Within the same department, Van Maanen (1972) found, for instance, greater job satisfaction expressed by young inner-city patrolmen than by those assigned to suburban and rural districts. Policing in the central city may be more law enforcement-oriented and simply more exciting than policing in the surrounding suburbs and rural areas.

Hall and Engel (1974) note that occupational control, or autonomy, can be considered on two levels--the individual and the collective or organizational level. Thus, it is important to observe the collective type of control that can be exercised over the patrol officer. By and large, a patrol officer's work is defined in terms of his squad and immediate sergeant (Rubinstein, 1973; Van Maanen, 1974). Sergeants have considerable formal and informal power over the fate of patrol officers under them.

Most police experts agree that supervision of the rank-and-file in the line of duty is necessary; there are too many opportunities to succumb to the temptations of their work environment (Sherman, 1973; Daley, 1971; Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1973; Rubinstein, 1973; Stahl and Staufenberger, 1974; Stoddard, 1968). However, the line between too much and too little supervision is often a thin one and each extreme has implications for patrol officer attitudes. In interpreting interviews with 42 white New York City police officers, Alex (1976) observed that: "Nothing is more destructive of initiative and morale than excess supervision from above which appears unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious." According to Alex, close supervision communicates to the rank-and-file that they are being treated like "errant school boys," and that they are not trusted by their superiors to carry out even routine police business. Alex also reports that the perception of being overly supervised can lead to discontent, sagging morale and feelings of ineffectiveness.

Finally, the importance of the degree of freedom and independence a patrol officer has in carrying out his work assignments and structuring his own identity on patrol is best reflected in one of the most emotional of management issues: the number of officers assigned to a squad car. "Management wants the freedom to assign one-man cars and two-man cars on the basis of the perception of the data on crime by areas and shifts; the unions want to maximize patrolman safety under street conditions they perceive as tantamount to wartime" (Juris and Feuille, 1973). Unions in at least 10 of the 22 cities studied by Juris and Feuille have objected to the use of one-man cars, and in one large city police management did not institute one-man cars for fear of a police walk-out. At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that one-man cars may produce greater job satisfaction. Muir (1977) has found that one-man cars, as used in the west coast town of "Laconia," provide officers better opportunities to strike up conversations with people on their beats and hence to know them better, subsequently raising positive feelings about this aspect of their work.

In sum, taking into account the diversity of organizational contexts in which police work is carried out, the job properties associated historically with the patrol function present a mixed picture in regard to their ability to provide intrinsic job satisfaction for patrol officers. While the relatively high levels of variety, significance and autonomy of the patrol task perhaps contribute to satisfaction, the relatively low levels of identity and feedback may detract from it. It seems, therefore, that only by examining the specific job properties themselves, as they are shaped in a concrete organizational context, and then relating these properties to job satisfaction, can a reasonably coherent picture be gained regarding a patrol officer's affective response to his occupation.

Equity and Expectancy Theories

Literature in this area generally asserts that attitudes towards work are influenced by elements of the environment in which the work is conducted as well as by the characteristics of the job itself. Facets of the work environment that are believed to have an impact on job satisfaction represent more than the physical and social surroundings. Management policies affecting the system of rewards, for example, influence the environment in which work is performed and are believed to contribute to job satisfaction. Equally important, however, is the outcome of the policies as they are actually implemented. The attitudes of employees towards their jobs are closely related to their perceptions concerning the extent to which they are treated fairly in decisions regarding rewards, promotions and assignments. Fairness, or equity, as a dimension of job satisfaction is explored in the literature focusing on the relationship between rewards and satisfaction, an important component of research in this area for many years.

The Human Rewards School, a major paradigm in the job satisfaction literature, is grounded in the work of Frederick Taylor, whose scientific management theory rests on the assumption that man is a rational-economic being. Taylor suggests that satisfaction reflects the rewards a worker receives and that changes in rewards result in comparable changes in the level of satisfaction (Ewen et al., 1966; Behling et al., 1968; Hulin and Smith, 1967; Graen, 1968). More recent research, however, suggests that this relationship is oversimplified. Researchers have continued to explore the impact of rewards on attitudes, focusing largely on pay as a determinant of satisfaction, but sometimes expanding the concept of rewards to include non-economic compensation such as desirable assignments or promotions.

The Expectancy Theory of motivation asserts that behavior results from a person's desire to obtain external goals. Based on Expectancy theory, Porter and Lawler (1968) developed a model which suggests that previously learned experiences give rise to future expectations. In terms of the work environment, the authors propose that performance which leads to rewards that provide satisfaction will motivate future performance in the expectation of receiving additional rewards and an increased sense of satisfaction. Focusing more on attitudes and less on the motivational/behavioral aspects, Lawler (1973) identified four theoretical approaches to satisfaction, three of which have particular relevance for this discussion: Fulfillment, Discrepancy and Equity theories.

Fulfillment theory asserts that satisfaction is measured by determining the extent to which a given outcome or group of outcomes is received. To assess overall satisfaction, one measures each facet of a job which is believed to contribute to satisfaction. These measures are combined to determine the "extent of fulfillment" the worker receives from his job. Fulfillment theorists disagree, however, on whether the facets being measured should be

weighted by individual, since research has indicated that the value of any given facet can vary according to the importance the individual attaches to particular job factors. It may not be enough to determine whether or not a worker is fulfilled in certain facets of his work without determining whether those facets contribute to his personal sense of satisfaction.

Discrepancy theory ultimately attempts to address the failure of Fulfillment theory to account for individual variance. Proponents of this school suggest that satisfaction should be measured by the differences between actual outcomes that are received and another outcome level, i.e., what a person wants to receive, feels he should receive, or expects to receive. Dissatisfaction is thought to occur when the actual outcome is less than the comparison outcome level. Locke (1969) modified this concept and stressed that it is the perception of discrepancy that is significant rather than the level of actual discrepancy. "Job satisfaction and dissatisfaction are a function of the perceived relationship between what one wants from one's job and what one perceives it is offering" (Locke, 1969). Discrepancy theory further acknowledges that a person may feel that he is being fairly rewarded--that is, that outcomes received are in line with what he feels he should receive--but there may be a discrepancy between this and what he wants on a long-term basis. This creates the potential for dissatisfaction. As is the case with Fulfillment theory, there is a controversy among proponents of Discrepancy theory as to whether individual factors should be weighted according to their degree of importance to obtain an overall level of satisfaction.

Equity theory describes satisfaction in terms of a person's perceived input-outcome balance, a related component of basic expectancy concepts. Satisfaction results when a person assesses his rewards as equitable by this input-outcome balance. Dissatisfaction results both from under-reward and over-reward, according to this theory. Individuals develop their perceptions of the fairness of their input-income balance by comparing their situation to that of others, a component of Equity theory not present in Discrepancy theory.

In general, these theories point out the differences in the way people assess the degree of fairness in their job situation. The system of distributing rewards (or, conversely, punishment) will create satisfaction or dissatisfaction among individuals for different reasons. Although the level of fairness is an important component of satisfaction, it is crucial to remember the importance of each individual's values. Discussing promotions, Locke (1969) states:

> While equity (however defined) is one factor that influences a person's value standards concerning desired number of promotions, again it is not the only factor. It is easily conceivable that an employee could appraise the promotion system in his company as fair and yet still be dissatisfied with his chances for promotion simply because there were none

> ....Alternatively, an individual might view the promotion system in his firm as unfair and still be personally satisfied with it, because he does not desire to be promoted.

The Police and Notions of Equity

Theories which relate equity and expectancy in the police work environment speak most directly to the perceptions officers develop regarding the system of punishments and rewards in the organization. Reward structure refers to the relationships between efforts and payoffs; effort, performance and reward follow each other in that order (Ulberg and Cizanckas, 1974). As these researchers have observed, a consistently rewarded patrol officer, one who receives valued rewards, will continue to perform in ways that achieve that kind of reward. Within police organizations, the relationship between equity and satisfaction expresses itself in five primary areas:

- job security/wages,
- promotions,
- discipline,
- transfers/shift assignment/special assignment selection, and
- education/professionalism.

Each is reviewed separately in the following sections.

Job Security/Wages. Lutz and Morgan (1974) highlight the importance of maintaining a triangular relationship in the work environment among:

- the duties and responsibilities of rank and position,
- the standards or qualifications required to fill them, and
- where employment conditions are substantially the same, the salaries paid.

Position classification in the police structure facilitates the attainment and maintenance of this relationship among duties, qualifications and pay. Accordingly, employee attitude surveys have repeatedly shown that "fair pay for work done" is the most important factor contributing to employee satisfaction.

The police profession has moved up the socio-economic ladder from its earlier days as a little-respected, lower- and working-class job to its present status as a somewhat solid middle-class profession (Niederhoffer, 1978; Muir, 1977; Van Maanen, 1973). Many researchers note that the police assess their salaries against those of other public service workers, that a sense of "parity" is an important determinant of satisfaction. Police/fire parity is one of the principal issues in police bargaining (Juris and Feuille, 1973). Also sensitive in the eyes of some policemen are the salaries of sanitation workers (Alex, 1976).

Most police unions bargain over wages, although in some municipalities wages are determined by the conditions of a city charter. Consider the 1971 case in New York City where a "pay-ratio" dispute involving patrolmen, sergeants, firefighters, and fire lieutenants led to a one-week job action (Juris and Feuille, 1973). Another heated issue in wage bargaining in some departments concerns pay steps and salary differentials among ranks. Problems here are seen to arise because the "average police officer usually achieves the maximum salary grade in only 3 to 5 years after joining the department" (President's Commission, 1967). "Most proposals for change in the delivery of police services have suggested that this range be increased so that a man might develop a career in patrol without having to seek promotion to supervisor or investigator only to get a raise" (Juris and Feuille, 1973). As will be noted later, this situation not only heightens officers' frustration regarding the issue of pay differentials, but creates a struggle for promotion which challenges the fairness inherent in the relationship between promotions and qualifications or standards (President's Commission, 1967).

Promotions. Along with the basic rank structure, the police service has borrowed the standard promotional system from the armed forces. However, since the patrol officer classification may involve a variety of assignments which differ substantially in qualification requirements, complexity, hazard and the degree of skill required, the rank and pay of officers performing substantially different duties, with different qualifications, may very well be at the same level. Further, if the less taxing assignments are chosen by those with most seniority (e.g., the day shift), less experienced officers may end up performing more demanding duties. Under these circumstances, the system loses its rational and inherent fairness (Lutz and Morgan, 1974).

As the California Department of Justice (1978) noted during their symposium on police recruitment problems, the entire system of police advancement is ultimately tied to promotion to management. Unfortunately, the only way for a patrol officer in many departments to increase his salary is to take the promotional examination. "It makes no difference whether the man has the capacity, temperament, or interest for leadership, supervision, or management... the education, training, skills and experience acquired in the technical field are almost totally ignored in the present scheme of things..." (California Department of Justice, 1978).

Due to the structure of most police departments, the opportunities for upward mobility are often limited. The majority of patrol officers will remain at the bottom of the police hierarchy for their entire career (Niederhoffer, 1967; Wilson, 1969; Reiss, 1971; President's Commission, 1967). Even the minority who are successful often wait a long time for promotion, relative to most other jobs. This is perhaps not only frustrating to the bright, young police officer, but it may also be disadvantageous to the department because an organization that does not detect and reward potential may find it difficult to attract high potential employees.

In 1970, the Educational Testing Service examined procedures used by the New York City Department of Personnel in promoting police officers to sergeant, lieutenant and captain (Educational Testing Service, 1970). In 1973, the Police Foundation and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) jointly conducted a study of police personnel practices in 493 jurisdictions (Stahl and Staufenberger, 1974). The two studies found that promotion procedures consist of various combinations of the following elements: a written exam (most often prepared by civil service agencies), seniority, performance evaluations, estimates of promotability, education, and an oral interview. The studies found that tests for promotion are seldom based on thorough job analyses and thus are not always relevant.

Standardized competitive examinations and a promotion system based on seniority can further frustrate ambitions of patrol officers to work their way up through the police hierarchy in many departments (Niederhoffer, 1967; Toch, 1975; Van Maanen, 1974). Especially for bright, young patrol officers, this rigidity in the police structure can be very frustrating (Braden, 1970; Locke and Smith, 1970; Sterling and Watson, 1970; Drodge, 1973; Walker, 1969; Kinton, 1975). The opinions of patrol officers are often given little weight; it is often difficult, if not impossible, for them to become involved in department decision-making and they must wait years for the promotion that allow them rank and privilege. Job dissatisfaction may stem from administrative policies and procedures that lower level officers have had no voice in forming (Fosdick, 1969).

One of the severest criticisms of police promotion policies is their dependence on the civil service system (President's Commission, 1967). Experts in the field charge that this system inhibits rapid promotion of the deserving, recognition of potential, separation and dismissal of non-performers, the hiring of minority officers and provides for locked-in security of the lazy (Greenberg, 1972; Ahern, 1972; Bordua, 1967; Daley, 1973; Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1973).

Civil service exams typically do not measure a police officer's ability to do the job he is applying for. They do not evaluate attitudes, perceptive abilities or interpersonal skills. They reveal little about an officer's

ability to relate to subordinates. This last leadership quality is especially important in selecting persons for leadership positions. Maximizing police potential, in terms of management, depends not only on the degree of supervision but equally on the quality of supervision. If a superior officer cannot command the respect of his men, his orders will not be taken seriously (Greenberg, 1972; Muir, 1977; Bordua, 1967).

The introduction of the oral board is a response to the failure of the promotion system to capture job-related characteristics not readily assessed by a written test. As Shimberg and diGrazia (1974) note, however, the subjective nature of the oral board raises fear in candidates that they may be downgraded for characteristics like race, religion, appearance or other traits that have nothing to do with competence. The oral board may heighten the candidates' fear that preferential treatment may result in their losing control of their chances for promotion.

Policy suggestions aimed at increasing both the predictability and inherent fairness in the system have included:

- early detection of potential and placement in appropriate command positions,
- selection for special assignments solely on the basis of merit,
- participation, at all levels, in the decision-making process, and
- development of management's confidence and trust in the rank-and-file (Greenberg, 1972; Stahl and Staufenberger, 1974).

These recommendations appear to take cognizance of the assertion that patrol officers become alienated from the bureaucracy when rewards are few, rank is determined by outdated and arbitrary practices, and formal signs and symbols of the organization--such as a sergeant's stripes--seem to count for more than intelligence or initiative (Manning, 1977).

Discipline. In 1974, the IACP began a two-year study of police discipline in 17 agencies to isolate the determinants of effective discipline management. Three approaches were used:

- a two-part legal analysis of rules and procedures and inputs of local community groups and officials,

- an administrative analysis of the roles of actors in the system and of the disciplinary process, and
- a questionnaire administered to 2,165 police officers to assess their perceptions of existing practices.

Officers' perceptions were solicited regarding the fairness of fourteen rules of conduct. One of the major conclusions drawn from the study was:

> Written rules of conduct directed toward on-duty operational and performance standards are generally perceived as fair and reasonable and therefore acceptable to the officers. Written rules which address personal and off-duty behavior are considered unfair and unreasonable by a large number of officers. A similar conclusion is drawn respecting the enforcement of rules. Officers object to the enforcement of rules which affect their off-duty and personal life but generally support the enforcement of rules which relate to on-duty conduct and performance standards. Those officers who disagree with enforcement practices gave as their reason for disagreeing the belief that enforcement action is inconsistent (double standard) (Executive Summary).

Problems most often arise when a double standard of intra-departmental justice becomes evident. "Too often misconduct by mid-management or top level administrators is perceived to be treated less severely than would similar actions by patrol officers" (Daley, 1971). Also, the IACP study suggests that patrol officers may feel that misconduct in detective units is treated less strictly than in their own cases, because detectives have greater latitude and autonomy than do patrol officers and are less likely to be exposed.

Job dissatisfaction may result when commanders or supervisory officers are perceived as subverting department policies and procedures. The authors of the IACP study observed:

> Disciplinary actions taken by the first-line supervisors are frequently inconsistent. If, for example, one sergeant is lackadaisical in enforcing a particular regulation, while another enforces it rigorously, employees may view discipline as being arbitrary and inconsistent. Such a condition often produced morale problems (1976).

Available disciplinary actions extend from suspending an officer, temporarily relieving him from duty, formally filing charges to a change in shift assignment, denial of favors (such as time off) and general bureaucratic harassment (Tifft, 1975; Cain, 1973). This range gives some supervisors considerable

authority over the rank-and-file. The plethora of rules and regulations in police departments creates a situation in which superiors can exercise authority capriciously (Rubinstein, 1973; Weisart, 1974; Ahern, 1972). The IACP study finds that corrective measures such as mandatory special training courses are seldom considered as official sanctions, and that such measures might put the police disciplinary system in a more positive light.

Nonetheless, the best designed rules and the most efficient operational system will be ineffective if expected compliance and subsequent management action are not predictable and uniform. The IACP study noted further:

> Another significant observation made by researchers during this study was the desire by the rank and file members to belong to a police department whose 'house was in order.' As stated previously, police officers feel secure when expectations are ordered and predictable. But when management is viewed as inconsistent or fails to follow established procedures, the rank and file feel a violation of good faith has occurred (Executive Summary).

According to Caplan and Wilson (1974), morale suffers when officers perceive that misconduct is tolerated, that officials look the other way in "special circumstances", and when disciplinary restraints are applied indiscriminately or only under outside pressure. To be effective, the disciplinary system must be fair and its procedures clearly established and uniformly applied.

Particularly in response to abuses both within the departments and by the public, constraints on disciplining officers have taken the form of a "Patrol Officer Bill of Rights," commonly negotiated by police officer associations in order to assure the fairness and efficacy of department policies. Appellate review of disciplinary actions is no longer adamantly resisted by police executives (Fosdick, 1969).

Police union efforts have also been directed at "regularizing discipline procedures, minimizing ad hoc decision making on punishment and eliminating certain kinds of punishment such as working days off, long suspensions with no right of appeal, and the use of penalty tours" (Juris and Feuille, 1973). The civil rights of officers have also become a visible topic during bargaining. The IACP study (1976) finds that review of discipline cases "whether by an internal or external review body is generally viewed negatively by most officers" and that officers "in departments which permit peer representatives during hearings view the process less negatively."

Although no definitive quantitative research exists regarding how regular work day disciplinary situations affect the rank-and-file, the IACP study,

Niederhoffer's (1967) survey of 220 New York policemen, and other descriptive case studies (e.g., Rubinstein, 1973; Westley, 1970; Reiss, 1971) clearly suggest that discipline is and has been an important focus of patrol officer job dissatisfaction.

Transfers/Shift Assignment/Special Assignment Selection. Because assignments to and transfers from district commands are often dictated by the needs of the department rather than the wishes of individual officers, officers who find little justification for a move or feel disconnected by separation from their partners can become extremely frustrated (Rubinstein, 1973; Bloch and Specht, 1973; Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Daley, 1971). Transfers have reportedly been used as a form of discipline or an indication of displeasure (Juris and Feuille, 1973; Rubinstein, 1973; Ahern, 1972). While there have been attempts by unions to regulate the conditions under which disciplinary transfers can be made, management has resisted, contending that transfers are at times necessary. For instance, "they cite the case of the man who may be on the take but against whom they cannot get conclusive proof" (Juris and Feuille, 1973). In such a case, superiors might transfer an officer to break up the situation. Contract language often specifies that a transferred officer must, on request, be given a specific reason in writing. The purpose of the clause is obviously to eliminate capricious behavior (Juris and Feuille, 1973).

Another aspect of assignment which has been linked to police discontent has been rotation. Brunner (1976), for example, in a survey of police officers in the Midwest, found that officers strongly prefer permanent shifts to rotating shifts and day hours to evening hours. He reports that officers on rotating shifts are more dissatisfied with their jobs than are officers on steady tours. Police unions have "pushed for the increased use of seniority in determining job and shift assignments, have objected to the introduction of fourth shifts during high crime hours, and have opposed changes in the shift starting times" (Juris and Feuille, 1973; Gammage and Sachs, 1972; Bent, 1974). Shift changes can become a source of police dissatisfaction when officers perceive that management wants to retain the ability to move officers freely from one shift to another. Administrators claim they need this prerogative to supplement shifts at critical times.

Departments have traditionally deployed officers in three shifts of approximately eight hours each. However, some departments have attempted to assign the patrol force on the basis of crime patterns and other district needs. Studies have shown that calls for service are most frequent between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m. In many departments this period falls between two shifts and leads to an excess of manpower before 6 p.m. and after 2 a.m., and too little between 6 p.m. to 2 a.m. (see, for example, Webster, 1970, 1973; Pate, 1976). Some departments have attempted to establish a fourth shift between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m. This fourth shift has been an issue of contention between police administrators and rank-and-file unions because of complaints of inadequate compensation during these high crime hours.

According to Juris and Feuille (1973), seniority is often used as a decision variable in job and shift assignments. Seniority is seen by the patrol officer--and in the private sector--as a hedge against favoritism, while management views it as an infringement on their rights. The issue becomes one of assigning the most senior qualified man versus the best qualified man, regardless of seniority (Juris and Feuille, 1973). However, management also views seniority privileges as one of the few rewards departments can distribute. In some departments, "the more senior officers [are permitted] to select the easier, safer, and less bothersome assignments--without loss of pay." In other departments, "this seniority privilege system even applies to shift selection and results in green crews on duty during highest crime periods" (Ahern, 1972; see, also, Juris and Feuille, 1973; and Greenberg, 1972).

Finally, special assignments are sometimes awarded by superior officers to those policemen they favor (Manning, 1977; Muir, 1977; Saunders, 1970). Police departments are only beginning to establish written procedures and criteria governing assignments; traditionally, the process has been characterized by political favortism. Selection for special assignments is, in some departments, dependent on a "rabbi" or a "hook" who works on a patrol officer's behalf behind the scenes (Ahern, 1972; Radano, 1968; Rubinstein, 1973). As such, it becomes apparent that selection for the most desireable assignments is not always based on performance criteria. Such a realization may be expected to trigger dissatisfaction among police officers who feel they are denied opportunities for these assignments because they don't have the right "connections."

Niederhoffer (1969) reports that once a patrolman has had five years on the force, he begins looking for a "good detail." When rumors of impending transfers circulate, he begins to arrange "contacts with rabbis." In his study of cynicism, 40% of the patrol officers reported that special assignments depend on "who you know" and not on merit, despite protests to the contrary by top officials in the department. In a 1976 study of police attitudes, using Niederhoffer's instrument, researchers queried 740 police officers on their perceptions of the objectivity, or lack thereof, in the selection process for transfer to specialized assignments (Wilt and Bannon, 1976). Forty-seven percent of the respondents selected a moderately negative response: "Are being handled as capably as you could expect in a large civil service organization." However, Wilt and Bannon (1976) point out that such assignments are sometimes subject to contract provisions between a police association and a department, and a negative response may also be "a reflection on the efficiency [sic] of the respondents' union" (Wilt and Bannon, 1976). Nonetheless, there is little in the literature on special assignments or related topics to suggests that officers perceive the system to be equitable.

Education/Professionalism. As noted in a 1974 Police Foundation study (Ladinsky et al.), demands for professionalization of the police achieved unparalleled momentum in the 1960's. The movement received the attention

of numerous researchers (Saunders, 1970; Bittner, 1970; Clark, 1970; Locke and Smith, 1970; Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1970; Germann, 1971; Ahern, 1972) and was a prominent reform incorporated into the recommendations of three presidential commission reports: The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967; Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969. As Goldstein (1969) has noted, every improvement in policing from modernization of equipment to increased pay and better management techniques was considered to be a contribution to professionalism. But, according to Wilensky (1964), there are two primary elements. The professional:

- believes his colleagues are the most important people to judge his qualifications and performance; and
- regards autonomy, expert service and colleague recognition to be more salient than promotion, income and supervisory evaluation.

In the 1976 Dallas study (Piliavin et al.) professional orientation was found to be one of the most significant contributors to job satisfaction, and professional orientation for police was believed to include the achievement of higher education.

The hypothesized relationship between performance, professionalism and education is contradictory in the literature. White (1972) notes that the implicit assumption that professionalism will lead to better performance among the police is made because, first, there are no criteria for what would count as better performance of police tasks; and second, very little is known about the behaviors that professionalism has or has not produced. White contends that the thesis of professionalism is probably most appropriate to research within the framework of the effects on police corruption, although little literature is available to explore this contention.

Weiner (1974) reported in a study of the consequences of higher education that, "The educational level of the police does not affect their attitudes." He studied 396 officers within a single department employing a questionnaire that contained four attitude tests. As Parker et al. (1976) note, Weiner would have been more accurate to state that the data reported in his study suggest that higher education has only a very modest impact on the attitudes of police personnel. Even this statement, however, may be controversial, as there are data to support the contention that a college education has little or no effect on attitudes (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969). Weiner (1974) further notes that an additional variable may imitate the effects of college education among full-time policemen: simply that they are full-time policemen. There is strong evidence that the value of education as it relates to changing attitudes may be neutralized by the realities of the police role as it is

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constituted. For example, Chevigny writes, "Police attitudes are deeply rooted in the requirements of the job and of society. Education alone cannot change them" (1969). (This notation is supported, at least implicitly, by Niederhoffer, 1967; Wilson, 1968; and Skolnick, 1966.) Education seems unable to change attitudes which have their origin in the police role (see Piliavin, 1973).

Nonetheless, the goal of higher education for police has been avidly pursued by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in the report of its 1965 Advisory Committee. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) gave unqualified support to higher education for police, and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 initiated a flow of millions of dollars into the universities and colleges for higher education for police. The clear premise of these efforts is that greater exposure to higher education will lead to improved standards of performance. As noted, these premises have not been proven conclusively. Given the absence of empirical research, the relationship between education and performance (or "professionalism") should be regarded as an interesting, yet untested, one.

Many police who obtain increased education expect perhaps that they should be given expanded opportunities for promotion or other special considerations. Sterling (1972), for example, in a study comparing police officers with a high school education with those who had attended college, found that college men have significantly higher aspirations, and believe that their education is not useful preparation for their careers as police officers. Tenney (1971), in a survey of law enforcement graduates, found that these officers feel they had not received adequate recognition by their departments for their increased levels of education. Pomerenke (1966) also found that high attrition rates among college educated police officers are often due to the perceived lack of career mobility.

Trojanowicz and Nicholson (1976) conducted 60 interviews with college educated police officers and concluded that increased education is perceived as leading to increased rejection by their peers. Officers also reported that increased levels of education were not adequately rewarded or accounted for in their departments, and that police departments should have some mechanism to reward officers for advanced education, such as increased opportunities for mobility, special assignments or increased pay.

Denyer et al. (1975) have suggested that higher education as well as a patrol officer training raise aspirations to a higher point than can be satisfied by actual police work. On-the-job experience confirms the gap between an officer's aspirations and his actual achievements. The sense of unfairness this inevitably creates is suggested by Locke (1969) and other proponents of the Discrepancy theory described earlier: frustration with the difference

between what one wants (or expects) to receive and actual outcomes. In addition, the usual sources of support that are drawn on to alleviate the resulting discontent--such as family, friends and community--are made less available because of the erratic nature of the police role. Sterling (1972) contends that the problem of unmet promotional aspirations is particularly acute for officers who attend college and that this may explain why some police agencies experience difficulty in retaining college men in their ranks.

Management Theories

According to one school of thought, the philosophy and style of management in an organization can have a strong influence on the level of satisfaction among employees. One of the important determinants of job satisfaction is the degree of participation by workers in the decision-making process. Hackman and Suttle (1977) discuss the rationale for worker participation:

> In theory, participation releases creative energies and provides workers with a sense of accomplishment. Thus, it strengthens the expectancy relationship, enhances the work environment, and harnesses the energies of the informal group to work toward management's objectives. Furthermore, it is consistent with the American ideas of equality, democracy, and individual dignity. As such it offers a morally attractive solution to many of the problems of industrial life--a solution that becomes increasingly attractive as society becomes increasingly equalitarian and abandons authoritarian leadership styles (Hackman and Suttle, 1977).

Participation is a multi-dimensional concept and can include worker involvement of varying intensity in the decision-making process. Typically, management prescribes the nature and scope of employee participation. Participation in decision-making may be defined as involvement in the process of determining outcomes and/or influencing the results of the process. Hackman and Suttle (1977) identify three types of processes and assess them in light of both low and high subordinate influence:

Process	Subordinate Influence	
	Low	High
Direction	Boss makes decisions ignoring subordinates' preferences completely	Boss makes the kinds of decisions he thinks subordinates would want him to make (he follows the Gallup Polls)
Consultation	Boss meets with subordinates, asks for their agreement on a course of action, but makes it clear by his tone of voice that he will accept no disagreement	Boss acts as chairman of the meeting, but gives no indication of his preference
Delegation	Subordinate is formally free to make any decision he wants but from prior experience he knows that he will be punished if he deviates from the boss's preference	Subordinate is completely free to make decision on his own without guidance

Management theory which incorporates the notion of participation and its impact on satisfaction has its foundation in the work of Douglas McGregor. McGregor's "Theory X" and "Theory Y" (1960) emphasize the importance of the assumptions about human behavior which underlie managerial action.

The "Theory X" assumptions about man include:

- the average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can;
- because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed and threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives; and
- the average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, and wants security above all.

These assumptions, according to McGregor, lead to "hard" management practices--coercion is used to obtain desired behavior; tight control is maintained. This, he contends, only succeeds in restricting productive output and causes antagonism between manager and worker.

In contrast, under "Theory Y", it is assumed that:

- the expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest;
- man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed;
- the average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility; and
- the most significant reward that can be offered is the satisfaction of the individual's self-actualizing needs.

Thus, as McGregor sees it, job satisfaction is not based primarily upon economic rewards, but rather, on the assumptions under which people are managed. McGregor concludes that supportive employer/employee relationships will lead to happy and productive employees.

Hodgetts (1975) notes that McGregor has been criticized on many fronts. Critics assert that "Theory Y" is overly idealistic (many workers clearly like security and shun responsibility), and that the theory overlooks the fact that workers satisfy many of their higher level needs outside of the workplace. The theory is also criticized because it neglects many causes of conflict and dissatisfaction that are totally independent of the adequacy of the jobs in satisfying higher order needs. McGregor bases much of his work upon Maslow's motivational theory, and Maslow (1965) notes just how shaky this is as a final foundation.

Although McGregor's theories have been widely criticized, Likert's (1961) work relies on that of McGregor and expands "Theory X" and "Theory Y" into four systems of management:

- System 1: Exploitative-Authoritative. In this system management makes most of the decisions. Little trust exists between management and workers and management employs threats and coercion as a tool for encouraging work. This system is quite comparable to McGregor's "Theory X."

- System 2: Benevolent-Authoritative. Management allows some decision-making at lower levels in this system but acts in a condescending manner toward subordinates. Management uses rewards as an incentive for work more frequently in this system than in System 1.

- System 3: Consultative. In this system management has more trust in subordinates and allows increased decision-making by lower levels of the system. Two way communication is common and workers feel that they have some say in the operation of the organization.

- System 4: Participative. This system involves highly decentralized decision-making within the organization. Workers receive a great deal of trust from management and the atmosphere of the workplace is likely to be quite friendly. This system is comparable to McGregor's "Theory Y."

In his classic New Patterns of Management, Likert (1961) describes the four systems in detail and compares them along more than 40 dimensions. Likert collected a great deal of data which tend to support the value of the participative approach (System 4). For example, Likert presents evidence which indicates that clerical supervisors are more productive in departments which employ relatively loose, rather than close, supervision; railroad maintenance-of-way crews are more productive when foremen are helpful and nonpunitive than when they are critical and punitive; and workers in a service operation are more productive in departments allowing workers the freedom to set their own pace. Likert concludes that:

> ....supervisors whose units have a relatively poor production record tend to concentrate on keeping their subordinates busily engaged in going through a specified work cycle in a prescribed way.

While in contrast,

> ....supervisors with the best records of performance focus their primary attention on the human aspects of their subordinates' problems and on endeavoring to build effective work groups with high performance goals (1961).

Likert's unidimensional approach has been subject to criticism recently because of its inability to adequately account for the many dimensions on which management can and should vary. Recent theorists, such as Reddin (1970), have stressed the fact that different leadership styles and management approaches are appropriate for different situations, tasks and types of workers.

In circumstances where a participative style of leadership is appropriate and feasible, considering the needs and capabilities of both managers and subordinates, workers are allowed to share in decisions that affect their behavior and environment. Greiner (1973) studied the views of 157 managers toward participative leadership through their rating of certain leadership characteristics as they related to participation. Ten elements of participation were rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 defined as low participation and 7 as high participation. The results, shown in the following table, indicate that participation in decision-making is clearly the most highly regarded dimension.

Rank	Characteristic	Average Scale Rating*
1	Gives subordinates a share in decision-making.	6.08
2	Keeps subordinates informed of the true situation, good or bad, under all circumstances	5.69
3	Stays aware of the state of the organization's morale and does everything possible to make it high	5.45
4	Is easily approachable	5.38
5	Counsels, trains and develops subordinates	5.34
6	Communicates effectively with subordinates	5.22
7	Shows thoughtfulness and consideration of others	5.19
8	Is willing to make changes in ways of doing things . . .	4.96
9	Is willing to support subordinates even when they make mistakes.	4.92
10	Expresses appreciation when a subordinate does a good job	4.80

*1 equals low participation and 7 equals high participation.

Empirical research in private industry has demonstrated that there are several benefits of participative management. In one study by Likert (1961), the effects of hierarchical and participative styles of management were compared. The study indicated that participative techniques result in significant increases in the following areas: the degree of satisfaction with the supervisor's ability to represent employee needs; the extent to which managers were perceived to be "employee oriented"; and the extent to which employees felt responsibility to get their work done. The research also concluded that although administrators using hierarchical styles of management may realize short term successes in productivity, "this increase is obtained...at a cost to the human assets of the organization" (Likert, 1961). The researchers included in their definition of costs such things as: increased hostilities, a greater reliance on authority, decreased loyalty, reduced motivation to produce, together with increased motivation to restrict production and increased turnover.

Management by Objectives (MBO) is a philosophy of management which most directly stresses the participation of workers in managerial decisions. Under MBO, employees and supervisors jointly identify and agree upon goals they will seek to achieve over a specified period of time (Webber, 1975). The theory upon which MBO is based suggests that workers will work harder to achieve objectives that they helped to define and which are appropriate for them. MBO is founded on several assumptions, including:

- Most people possess higher level needs for power, autonomy, competence, achievement and creativity that increasingly are motivating those who have satisfied their physiological and security needs.

- People will work harder, satisfy their higher needs, manifest greater commitment, and perform better if they determine their own objectives. Most particularly, employees with high needs for achievement will set explicit, moderately risky and challenging objectives that may very well surpass what higher management would set for them. (Webber, 1975).

One means of increasing involvement and participation for employees is bargaining. Bargaining, whether implicit or explicit, is a form of participation with important consequences for job satisfaction. Participation through bargaining involves more than individual goal setting; Hackman and Suttle (1977) specifically suggest that workers tend to accept decisions concerning promotion and job assignments more easily if their peers have taken part in the decision process. Lawler also discusses a democratic style of leadership which facilitates participation. Democratic management is characterized by a "reduction in the power differential between superiors and subordinates" (Lawler, 1973).

The dimension of participation is related to both equity and autonomy. Participation in decision-making tends to increase the degree of confidence in the decisions and to give workers a greater sense of control over their jobs. As Hackman and Suttle (1977) state: "Participative decisions are considered more equitable just because the workers have been involved in making them." Lawler (1973) asserts that workers who are strongly independent will respond favorably to participation in decision-making since their needs are satisfied through this involvement.

> Several studies have shown that when participation and democratic management are practiced, absenteeism and turnover rates are lower. A relationship between participation and absenteeism and turnover would be expected because of the strong relationship between satisfaction and turnover. Wickert (1951) compared attitudes of telephone operators and

> service representatives who quit with those who stayed. Those who remained were significantly more likely to report that they had chances to make decisions on their jobs and that they were making an important contribution to the company's success. Other studies (for example, Ross and Zander, 1957) comparing employees who quit with those who stayed found that those who stayed felt that they had more autonomy and that they were kept better informed about what went on in the organization.
>
> The finding that participation strongly affects autonomy satisfaction leads to the prediction that only people who have strong needs for autonomy will respond with increased satisfaction to a power-equalization leadership style. Several studies support this view. In an indirect test, Trow (1957) found that subjects with a strong need for independence expressed lower satisfaction than other subjects with roles in which they were made highly dependent on others (Lawler, 1973).

Participative management has been shown to be related rather clearly to increased satisfaction, both on its own merits and through its effect on workers' perceptions of both equity and autonomy.

The Police and Participation in Decision-Making

Although a considerable body of contemporary management techniques has been developed over the past twenty years, few of the methods which have proven successful for private business and industry have been incorporated into police administration textbooks. The slow transformation in police agencies is no doubt due to the centralized, quasi-military police structure--characterized by strict subordination, rigid chains of command, high levels of accountability by command, and a decided lack of any formal provision for consultation between ranks. In such a system, change is a slow and highly bureaucratic process (Niederhoffer and Blumberg, 1973).

Moreover, there is little empirical research which examines the effectiveness of personnel management systems in police organizations, with the possible exception of some research on specific phases of police personnel practice such as police selection. The International Personnel Management Association--which conducts special professional activities for police personnel administrators--reported knowledge of only nine articles which described research pertinent to police personnel administration since January 1955. The vast bulk of the literature has been confined to descriptions of police personnel practices, prescriptions and opinions. In general, advances in the methodology of public personnel administration are conspicuously small as reflected in the literature (Gallas, 1974).

There may be several reasons for the apparent lack of activity relevant to developing management styles which encourage input into planning and decision-making and create the necessary mechanisms for patrol officer participation in the police organization. One clear problem arises from the striking contrast between the traditional quasi-military police organization and decentralized organizations that shorten the distance between the individual patrol officer and the top brass. As the International Association of Chiefs of Police observe:

> ....the most dominant influence (on the lack of participation-oriented management styles) may be the organizational structure itself and the traditional militaristic mode of operation. By reviewing the principles it is not difficult to determine that little, if any, room is left for entertaining ideas of subordinates and apprising employees of work plans. Traditional assumptions about decision-making and use of employees do not provide the opportunity for obtaining such input (1977).

In fact, much of the present management literature emphasizes the quasi-military nature of police-command relations. The traditional approach to police management is based on a view advanced by sociologist Max Weber:

> Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization, that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining and is in this sense formally the most rationally known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability (1947).

The assumptions underlying the military model of organization can readily be compared to those upon which Likert's (1961) Exploitative-Authoritative management system and McGregor's "Theory X" are based. Since police organizations are rooted in the military model, they share some of the same characteristics of the traditional military organization. A disciplined force and well-defined hierarchy of authority have been a dominant influence in the development of styles of management for police departments (Manning, 1977; Muir, 1977; IACP, 1976). However, since police departments are considered "quasi-military"--primarily because their roles and responsibilities differ from those of the military--they exhibit some important differences from military organizations. In fact, there is sufficient flexibility within police organizations to permit considerable variation from Likert's unidimensional approach, so generalizations become difficult and not particularly helpful. What is important, however, is the variety of organizational arrangements in police departments and their implications for patrol officer participation in the management of the organization.

Unfortunately, in its examination of disciplinary practices in 17 law enforcement agencies, the IACP (1977) discovered very few techniques which actually work to solicit officer input. When officers were asked to respond to the statement, "Officers feel free to suggest new or revised written directives to superiors," only 49 percent gave a positive response, 17 percent were uncertain, and 34 percent responded negatively. In most departments surveyed (10 of 16 agencies), fewer than 50 percent of the respondents answered this item positively. This finding tends to support the view that law enforcement agencies do not typically provide adequate mechanisms for rank-and-file participation in decision-making. As the IACP observed:

> An analysis of management practices in these agencies indicates that traditional practices such as the 'open door policy' and the 'suggestion box' are wholly inadequate. Instead, management should actively seek officer input through an established procedure whereby meetings are held and documentation is maintained, and/or through an informal system designed to enable lower echelon personnel to meet with top management in a very personable and human manner, possibly during off-duty hours away from the headquarters facility. Only a few examples of such procedures were noted in the agencies studied (1977).

The IACP noted four distinct approaches to increasing officer participation which were considered workable by the departments experimenting with them. These included:

- management appointment of separate work groups, consisting of officers of several different ranks, to research and draft new policies;
- constituting an informal task force, consisting of only patrolmen, as a sounding board for all new policies, as well as a feedback device for ascertaining employee perception of various policies or procedures;
- developing a formally structured mechanism which permits officers to submit memoranda suggesting new policies or revisions in current general orders (if the idea is considered worthy of further development, the suggestor works with the administration in developing the idea fully); and
- an extremely informal procedure by which the chief, during off-duty hours and in civilian clothes, travels to officers' homes and meets with the entire family.

Although these approaches may be used in some modified or combined form, they each demonstrate that the top level management has an interest in patrol

officers' needs and preferences. According to the IACP, this ultimately instills greater support for administrative decisions and policies among the rank-and-file.

Some police agencies are beginning to move toward group-oriented decision-making and supervision through the use of the team concept (Sherman et al., 1973). The assumption that management views interactions between the manager and the subordinate in terms of the subordinate's background values and expectations is analogous to Likert's participative management system. Reams et al. describe what is necessary to achieve a System Four orientation:

> When top management continues to make general policy decisions, and transmit those decisions to the 'team' for more specific interpretation and application, a System Three management is in operation. To move beyond this to System Four a mechanism must also exist to permit those teams to have substantial input into the policies as well as the methods of their application. To accomplish this, Likert suggests a linking pin system in which work group teams at all levels of the organization are connected vertically and horizontally through overlapping team membership (1975).

One of the most direct responses to the need for more group-oriented decision-making within police departments was the development of "team-policing" strategies. Perhaps the most striking feature of team policing is the diversity of approaches that have been developed to translate the basic concept into practice. In the abstract, the notion implies that certain patrol officers are to be assigned permanently to a team which is responsible for all police services in a small geographic area. These officers are thought to be able to develop more information on the social and crime-related characteristics of the neighborhood than would be the case if assigned traditionally. In theory, each team should develop its own patterns of work to meet the idiosyncratic demands of the particular area. Each team should do most of its own follow-up and investigative work, handle all calls in the neighborhood, meet frequently to exchange information, and attempt to serve as liaisons between the citizens of the sector and the various social service agencies located in the larger community. Finally, some proponents of the concept suggest that periodic meetings between members of the police team and the residents of the neighborhood should also be held (Bloch and Specht, 1973).

In practice, however, there has been great variety in the way team policing has been implemented across departments. Gay et al. (1977b), after examining some 14 programs, suggest there have been at least four general approaches ranging from the limited "basic patrol" plan (involving essentially only the permanent assignment of men to a given sector) to a "full service" plan (involving virtually all of the above team policing features). Gay et al. also suggest, however, that there has been very little commonality across the

various programs. To make matters even more confusing, attempts to evaluate the effects of these programs also vary widely--both methodologically and substantively. The case study approaches are, for example, insightful as to the general problems encountered when implementing programs, but they are rather silent as to the possible general impact of certain elements of team policing across departments. Sherman et al. (1973) state that the key implementation difficulties are: sabotage from the middle management ranks who feel threatened at the loss of authority implied by the participative management aspects of the team policing concept; the concrete and perhaps insurmountable difficulties involved in dispatching incoming requests for service from one neighborhood to only those team policing units assigned to that neighborhood; and the potential decline of morale in the remainder of the department through the creation of "elitest" team policing divisions or squads. As useful as those observations are, however, they tell us little about the overall impact which can be expected to result from any given team policing program.

A few quantitative evaluations of team policing provide little additional information primarily because they are non-comparable studies of single departments. However, some findings have emerged. It seems, for example, that the more extensive programs are preferred by officers participating in them and that these officers tend to develop somewhat more favorable views toward the citizens in their neighborhoods (Gay et al., 1977b). As far as job satisfaction is concerned, the findings are mixed. In New York City, patrol officer satisfaction apparently declined after a team policing program was attempted, while in Charlotte, North Carolina, satisfaction appparently increased (Gay et al., 1977b). In Cincinnati, however, where the most extensive evaluation and reporting has occurred, no effects on the satisfaction of the officers involved could be detected (Schwartz et al., 1975; Fishgrund, 1977). In police organizations, team policing represents perhaps the most systematic attempt to redesign jobs which may provide more meaningful work for patrol officers because of its reliance on the officer's participation in determining his own patterns of work within assigned areas.

On a broader level, Juris and Feuille (1973) recognize an increase in patrol officer dissatisfaction not associated with specific operating styles of departments or policing strategies, but to four general cultural and environmental trends which have increasingly affected police:

- a hostile work environment,
- greater demands on the police for the control of crime,
- relatively low economic rewards, and
- a poor internal work environment characterized by inadequate supervision and demeaning treatment by superior officers.

Along with the perceived success of other groups in achieving goals by becoming more demanding and militant in their behavior, Juris and Feuille hypothesize that these factors may account for the emergence of group cohesion among the police and overt expressions of police militancy over the past decade. Niederhoffer (1957), Bordua (1967), and Skolnick (1969) have also observed the high degree of solidarity or cohesiveness among police officers who perceive themselves as being faced with a common external challenge. Although militancy may take many forms, the most visible and widespread has been the emergence of police officer associations. Gammage and Sachs observe that

> .... the relative decline in police salaries in relationship to other occupations, loss of status and prestige, the increased difficulty of police tasks attributed to social phenomena and liberal politics are causes of police unrest. These phenomena also represent needs to be fulfilled by police organizations--problems to be solved by collective bargaining. As civil service and merit systems represent earlier attempts to solve problems stemming from the growth and inefficiency of municipalities, now public agencies, police administrators, and policemen appear to be increasingly turning to collective bargaining as a means of removing the roots of police dissatisfaction (1972).

One of the key outcomes of the proliferation of police unions has been a movement away from traditional unilateral decision-making toward a system of shared authority and participation in setting department policies. As Juris and Feuille (1973) note, collective bargaining provides status and equality in a manner unlike any other form of labor-management interaction:

> The union's certification as the exclusive representative of a police bargaining unit, and the institutionalization of the collective bargaining process with its negotiating teams, lists of demand, timetables and deadlines, and attendant publicity, add a more concrete and visible procedure to the less visible union-management interaction processes which previously existed. Further, in most cases, the end result of the collective bargaining process is a written agreement which visibly confirms the union's role as an equal with management in the determination of a wide variety of employment conditions (1973).

Halpern (1974) has distinguished between militant and conventional tactics and goals. These distinctions describe four possible types of police employee associations. Although the categories are not mutually exclusive, the distinctions help to explain what is likely to happen within the organization if a major new policy issue emerges or a rival faction appears:

1. Conventional tactics. Employee organizations are committed to pursue goals and resolve disputes through maneuvering and bargaining within the department and through established negotiating procedures.

2. Militant tactics. Police organizations are inclined to pursue their goals through actions outside the department and its established procedures. Criticizing department policies and officials in the media, organizing public demonstrations, striking or threatening to strike, all are examples of militant tactics.

3. Conventional goals. Employee organizations concentrate on tangible and divisible goals such as better salaries, health benefits and pensions, and the resolution of employee grievances, management complaints, and disciplinary investigations.

4. Militant goals. Employee organizations seek to increase and formalize their participation in the formulation of agency policy beyond monetary matters and individual job grievances (Halpern, 1974).

The strength and stability of police organizations may depend upon the delivery of divisible and tangible benefits more than any other characteristic. The work of Olson (1965), Salisbury (1969), and Clark and Wilson (1961) provide some support for this contention. Olson suggests that groups based on individualized, material incentives are more easily organized and maintained. Salisbury implies that organizations built on material benefits are more stable than those based on what he calls expressive actions in which the group's actions "give expression to the interest or values of a person." Clark and Wilson note that groups that organize members on the basis of the "intrinsic worth or dignity of the ends" of the organization are inclined to be weak and unstable. For police groups, salary and fringe benefits and the ability to bargain for favorable outcomes in disciplinary, disability, transfer and job grievance procedures are likely to contribute more to organizational strength than such intangible and nondivisible goals as influencing the curriculum at the police academy, the educational requirements for appointment to patrol officer, the method for collecting crime data, or the program for improving police-community relations. The younger, more professionally-oriented patrol officer organizations often pursue nonmaterial goals and suffer for that in terms of their strength and stability (Halpern, 1974).

Police chiefs now must contend with employee organizations in determining a range of policies. Although it is easy to characterize the adversarial nature of the relationship between police associations and department administrators, it remains uncertain as to how the experience has affected the individual patrol officer in his struggle for greater participation in the

decision-making process. Halpern (1974) observes that although the process has clearly been opened up to input from line officers, the closed nature of the police system has been fostered and strengthened by a combination of the commitment to professionalize American police and the success of efforts to organize them. This is troublesome to critics of the independence with which police agencies operate because professionalization gives the police a credible justification for their closed system, and unionization gives them organizational and political leverage which may virtually heighten the lack of accountability among police organizations.

Nonetheless, whether union influence is weak or strong, it has had the effect of forcing management to consider the potential consequences of proposed decisions for the patrol officer and, at times, to adjust those decisions based on officer concerns (Slichter et al., 1960). The unions have limited management discretion, fostered the development of management by policy, and protected employees against arbitrary or inconsistent treatment. The narrowing of management discretion--which proportionately broadens patrol officer input in the organization--has come about through contract language, contract administration and grievance arbitration. In general, police agencies are experiencing a higher level of cooperation between management and line staff and a decline in relationships of intense conflict (Juris and Feuille, 1973; Slichter et al., 1960).

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APPENDIX II

THE CHIEFS' RESPONSES TO THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

W. H. McNICHOLS, JR.
Mayor

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER

DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY

DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE ADMINISTRATION BLDG.
1331 CHEROKEE STREET
DENVER, COLORADO 80204
PHONE (303) 534-2424

October 10, 1979

Ms. Ilene Greenberg
ABT Associates Inc.
55 Wheeler Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Ms. Greenberg:

I am in receipt of your research report entitled, "Police Policies and Patrol Officer Satisfaction with Department Operations." At the outset, I would like to commend you and Bradford Smith for pulling together a reasonably comprehensive data base from six police departments which provide our profession added insight to the perceptions of police patrol personnel.

I found the 10 policy areas selected to serve as the basis for determining a relationship to patrol officer job satisfaction interesting, realistic and, in the case of Denver personnel responses, educational to me as the Chief Executive. I must also admit that I have been conducting informal discussions with our command officers and our employee representative organizations regarding every one of these issues over the past two years. It is obvious from your findings that not all of our humble attempts to resolve some of the negative feelings of our personnel have been successful. One thing your analysis will do is encourage us to rededicate our administrative efforts toward improvements in some of these policy areas.

I believe it is important for the readers of this report to cautiously realize that employee perceptions of the sources of job frustration are attitudinal, subjective, and do not always reflect reality. In some of these policy areas, the City Charter, Civil Service procedures, and the law restrict police department management from initiating quick and simple solutions to problems complicated by the force of formal authority and tradition. On the other hand, research which documents employee perceptions of management policies bring home to administrators the real thinking which may be occurring within the organization. From this perspective, this study will be most beneficial to us and I trust equally helpful to other police organizations who have not been subjected to this level of internal scrutiny.

Secondly, I must propose another qualification to these findings, and I do so not from a "defensive" point of view, but for the purpose of adding an environmental dimension to the readers' understanding of the Denver community. During the

DPD 59A

first 10 months of 1978 (prior to and during which time our department was surveyed), a relatively small group of vociferous citizens successfully placed a referendum on the November ballot which would have created a "Citizens Review Commission" for the purpose of taking-over and actually administering the day to day operations of the police department. This issue was a matter of frequent and heated public debate. The personnel of our department were temporarily subjected to undeserved and unreasonable public criticism by the proponents of this referendum. As you probably would have anticipated, when the citizens at large went to the polls, they defeated the measure overwhelmingly. Nevertheless, our personnel went through a period of several months wondering if the community really respected and valued the police services they work so hard to provide. Unfortunately, your survey was conducted in the middle of considerable campaign rhetoric and undoubtedly some of our employees were frustrated by this intervening variable to your research.

Personally, I don't believe the absence of the police commission issue would have changed the nature of the patrol officers responses to your interviews, but it sure could have increased the level of intensity of their feelings.

In summary, I am pleased we were allowed to participate in the study, and I sincerely hope the final product will result in a major contribution to the literature of American Police Management.

Sincerely,

Arthur G. Dill

ARTHUR G. DILL
Chief of Police

9535 Duffer Way
Gaithersburg, Md. 20760
October 12, 1979

Ms. Ilene Greenberg
Abt Associates Inc.
55 Wheeler St.
Cambridge, Ma. 02138

Dear Ilene:

This study relating to department policies and officer satisfaction provides important information for people who may be concerned with improving the operation of police departments. I have grave concern though that the study simply has not gone far enough and therefore can be grossly misleading.

First let me emphasize that as the "former chief" of Montgomery County I find it very difficult not to be defensive of my role as depicted in this study. Knowing all the factors that were brought into play to provide the atmosphere into which you and Brad Smith found yourselves, I find myself being critical of the report.

In Chapter 13 you refer to "findings indicate a number of other factors that can weaken or strengthen the relationship between policy and satisfaction". From my experience I can only heartily agree with this statement.

Because of the highly sensitive implications to be drawn from this subject. I believe this study as it presently stands cannot decipher all of these factors. As far as I am concerned the remedy appears to be a more thorough and

encompassing study undertaken to study all the factors which might influence satisfaction.

Believe me also, when I say, without being facetious, that the Montgomery County Department of Police would be a good laboratory for the next important and absolutely necessary study.

Sincerely,

R.J. di Grazia

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

ERNEST N. MORIAL
MAYOR

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

P. O. Box 51480
New Orleans, La. 70151

"to protect and to serve"

JAMES C. PARSONS
SUPERINTENDENT

October 11, 1979

Ms. Ilene Greenberg and
Mr. Brad Smith
ABT Associates Inc.
55 Wheeler Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Ilene and Brad:

I have reviewed the draft of your study on job satisfaction and wish to commend both of you for an excellent piece of research. Your findings in the case of New Orleans were absolutely correct with the two exceptions I mentioned to Ilene over the telephone. In the near future, we will be forwarding to you a white paper report outlining our plan to address the issues contained in your report.

Additionally, I have personal knowledge of the other departments which were subjects of your research and upon reflection my opinion is that you also hit the mark there.

In the near future, we would be pleased to have you reevaluate our department in an effort to determine if our strategies to increase autonomy, participation and procedural equity are successful. A follow on study of these same departments, especially Denver, New Orleans and Atlanta, would be beneficial to police administrators. I am certain Lee Brown in Atlanta will be implementing many programs designed to address these same issues.

I was having extreme difficulty forcing new programs through the traditional chain of command. Long ingrained philosophies of management worked in opposition to participation by subordinate personnel. We have created an Office of Special Projects staffed by partolmen project directors who design and assist in implementation of projects at the lowest level in the organization. This has enabled us to reduce the time

required for program implementation and has addressed the issues of autonomy and participation.

Again, accept my compliments for a research project well done and I look forward to working with you in the near future.

Yours truly,

JAMES C. PARSONS
Superintendent of Police

JCP/gf

THE CITY OF
PORTLAND
OREGON

BUREAU OF POLICE
CHARLES JORDAN
COMMISSIONER
B. R. BAKER
CHIEF OF POLICE
222 S.W. PINE
PORTLAND, OR. 97204

October 5, 1979

Ilene Greenberg
ABT Associates, Inc.
55 Wheeler Street
Cambridge, MASS 02138

Dear Ilene:

The purpose of this letter is to give you permission to use the name of the Portland Police Bureau in your report, "Police Policies and Patrol Officer Satisfaction With Department Operations," contract #J-LEAA-025-77.

I also wish to thank you for allowing me to read your draft. In my opinion, and not just because we ended up looking good, you have done an excellent job.

Very truly yours,

Bruce

B. R. BAKER
Chief of Police

BRB/cht

THE CITY OF
SAN DIEGO

POLICE DEPARTMENT • 801 WEST MARKET STREET • SAN DIEGO • CALIFORNIA 92101
(714) 236-6566

OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF POLICE

IN REPLYING
PLEASE GIVE
OUR REF. NO.

15.05

October 16, 1979

Ms. Ilene Greenberg
Abt Associates Inc.
55 Wheeler Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Ms. Greenberg:

Thank you for sending us a draft copy of the Police Policies and Patrol Officer Satisfaction report. Your study provided us with some enlightenment about our own department, as well as some insight into the operations of the other five participating police departments.

We are still reviewing your report and intend to develop a plan using the information provided to improve San Diego Police Department management practices and policies.

It has been a pleasure working with Abt Associates, and we are certainly impressed with the quality of your product. Needless to say, we authorize publication of this report.

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to participate in this project.

Sincerely,

W. B. Kolender
Chief of Police

APPENDIX III

POLICE OFFICER OPINION SURVEY

OMB No. 043-578008

This report is authorized by law (42-3742) which provides for programs of research to develop new or improved approaches, techniques, systems, equipment and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice. While you are not required to respond, your cooperation is needed to make the results of this survey comprehensive, accurate and timely.

POLICE OFFICER OPINION SURVEY

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is interested in how you feel about your job so that future department policies can be made more responsive to the needs of police officers. The content of this questionnaire has been reviewed by various police union leaders across the country including the President of the International Conference of Police Associations. Do not include your name on this form--your answers are completely anonymous. In addition, no one in your department will see any responses to this questionnaire.

1. Number of years performing routine or specialized patrol. _____years

2. To what area or district of the city/county are you currently assigned?

_____

3. Are you currently assigned to patrol duty?

▱ Yes

▱ No

4. Place an "X" anywhere on the line below that best describes how hazardous you feel your current assignment is relative to all other assignments in your department.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Least Hazardous — Most Hazardous

5. Are you currently patrolling (CHECK ONE):

▱ In a one-person car

▱ In a two-person car

▱ Other (specify):_____

6. Place an "X" anywhere on the line below that best describes how you have felt about your job over the last month.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very Dissatisfied — Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied — Very Satisfied

7. Approximately how many hours during your shift are you in face-to-face contact with other police officers? (If you work with a partner, you would most likely be in face-to-face contact with other police officers during your entire shift.)

_____ hours/shift

8. Approximately how many different times a shift are you in face-to-face contact with your immediate supervisor?

_____ times/shift

9. Approximately how many times a week does your immediate supervisor observe your performance on patrol?

_____ times/week

10. Approximately how many times a month do you spend an hour or more of off-duty time with other police officers in your department?

_____ times/month

11. Approximately how many times a month do you spend an hour or more of off-duty time with your immediate supervisor?

_____ times/month

12. The following is a list of areas that may be covered by policy in your department. Select the <u>three</u> that are the most important sources of <u>dissatisfaction</u> for <u>you</u> as a police officer. Describe your attitude towards each of the three policies/practices you have selected. (It is not so important to describe how these policies/practices operate in your department as it is to describe how they affect you and your job as a police officer.) Then, describe changes in these policies/practices you would recommend to increase <u>your</u> job satisfaction. Use the back of this page to continue any of your answers for which not enough space has been provided.

<u>POLICIES/PRACTICES</u>

A. The extent to which advanced education for patrol officers is encouraged

B. The amount and kind of training in supervision skills given to first-line supervisors

C. Off-duty employment

D. Training for patrol officers

E. The extent to which patrol officers influence policy decisions that affect their jobs

F. Promotional opportunities

G. Department regulation of sexual behavior and/or <u>off-duty</u> use of alcohol

H. The extent to which patrol officers can choose how and/or where they work

I. How frequently you rotate shifts

J. One-person cars

K. The extent to which police management trusts patrol officers

L. Discipline

M. Political favoritism

N. Overtime

O. Other (specify):_____

_____

Policy/Practice #1 (specify):_____

_____

Attitude toward existing condition:_____

_____

Recommended changes:_____

_____

_____

Policy/Practice #2 (specify):_____

_____

Attitude toward existing condition:_____

_____

Recommended changes:_____

_____

_____

Policy/Practice #3:_____

_____

Attitude toward existing condition:_____

_____

Recommended changes:_____

_____

_____

13. Describe the two <u>most</u> satisfactory aspects of your job.

1. _____

_____

2. _____

_____

14. Comment on other aspects of the way your department operates that affect how you feel about your job.

_____

_____

15. Place an "X" <u>anywhere</u> on the line below that best describes how satisfied you are with <u>the way your department operates</u>.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very Dissatisfied — Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied — Very Satisfied

16. Age.

- ☐ 21-23
- ☐ 24-26
- ☐ 27-29
- ☐ 30-32
- ☐ 33-35
- ☐ 36-38
- ☐ 39-41
- ☐ 42-44
- ☐ 45-47
- ☐ 48-50
- ☐ 51-53
- ☐ 54-56
- ☐ 57-59
- ☐ 60 +

17. Age at appointment.

- ☐ 21-23
- ☐ 24-26
- ☐ 27-29
- ☐ 30-32
- ☐ 33-35
- ☐ 36 +

18. Number of years employed in this department.

- ☐ 1-3
- ☐ 4-6
- ☐ 7-9
- ☐ 10-12
- ☐ 13-15
- ☐ 16-18
- ☐ 19-21
- ☐ 22-24
- ☐ 25-27
- ☐ 28-30
- ☐ 30 +

19. Sex.

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

20. Racial background.

☐ White ☐ Black ☐ Other (specify)_____

21. Ethnic background.

☐ Not of hispanic origin

☐ Of hispanic origin

22. Before you joined the department, what was the highest level of formal education you had completed? That is, when you became a police officer, was your education: (CHECK ONE)

☐ Did not complete high school

☐ High school equivalency diploma (G.E.D.)

☐ High school diploma

☐ Technical school diploma after high school

☐ Some college courses, but did not graduate

☐ Associate degree (two year college)

☐ Four year college

☐ Some graduate courses without degree

☐ Graduate degree, e.g., Master's degree

23. Since joining the department, how much additional formal education have you had? That is, after you became a police officer, have you: (CHECK ONE)

☐ Had no additional formal education

☐ Taken some technical school courses, but have not graduated

☐ Taken some additional college courses, but have not graduated

☐ Graduated from technical school

☐ Graduated from two year college

☐ Graduated from four year college

☐ Taken some graduate college courses, but have not received a degree

☐ Obtained a graduate degree

24. Do you currently attend school/university?

☐ Yes

☐ No

25. Five years from now what would you like your rank in the police department to be? (CHECK ONE)

☐ Police officer on patrol

☐ Police officer in a specialized unit

☐ Detective

☐ Sergeant

☐ Lieutenant

☐ Captain

☐ Major or Deputy Chief

☐ Retired

☐ Employed in another job

☐ Other (specify):_____

26. Five years from now what do you realistically expect your rank in the police department to be? (CHECK ONE)

☐ Police officer on patrol

☐ Police officer in a specialized unit

☐ Detective

☐ Sergeant

☐ Lieutenant

☐ Captain

☐ Major or Deputy Chief

☐ Retired

☐ Employed in another job

☐ Other (specify):_____

27. To which of the following police organizations do you belong? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)

☐ FOP

☐ Local Police Association

☐ Other (please specify): _____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION

APPENDIX IV

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR THE POLICE OFFICER OPINION SURVEY BY POLICE DEPARTMENT

TABLE A

TABLE A

Frequency Distribution for the Police Officer Opinion Survey by Police Department

Question	Total	Police Department: Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	849	131	138	98	138	161	183
5. Are you currently patrolling:							
In a one-person car	62%	92%	39%	100%	31%	58%	63%
In a two-person car	30	7	56	0	55	30	22
Both one and two-person cars	5	0	2	0	12	9	3
Others	4	2	3	0	1	3	12
	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(849)	(131)	(138)	(98)	(138)	(161)	(183)
7. Approximately how many hours during your shift are you in face-to-face contact with other police officers?							
An hour or less	26%	38%	20%	29%	15%	27%	31%
Two hours	24	32	20	37	17	30	16
3 to 7 hours	22	22	20	34	25	17	16
8 or more hours	28	8	41	1	43	26	37
	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%
	(814)	(129)	(138)	(98)	(137)	(157)	(155)
8. Approximately how many different times a shift are you in face-to-face contact with your immediate supervisor?							
None	5%	2%	7%	3%	1%	5%	10%
Once	33	37	30	34	12	32	49
Twice	33	34	34	38	25	38	29
Three or more	29	26	28	25	62	25	12
	100%	99%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(841)	(129)	(137)	(98)	(137)	(159)	(181)
9. Approximately how many times a week does your immediate supervisor observe your performance on patrol?							
None	18%	13	19%	20%	3%	24%	27%
Once	20	17	22	30	4	26	24
Two or three	23	17	24	23	18	28	24
Four or five	21	27	17	14	39	12	17
Six or more	17	25	19	13	35	10	7
	99%	99%	101%	100%	99%	100%	99%
	(809)	(122)	(134)	(95)	(132)	(151)	(175)
10. Approximately how many times a month do you spend one hour or more of off-duty time with other police officers in your department?							
None	20%	24%	30%	12%	21%	13%	20%
Once	13	19	9	10	5	15	18
Two or three	20	17	23	18	18	20	23
Four or five	20	26	17	22	16	27	15
Six or more	26	14	21	37	40	25	24
	99%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%
	(839)	(128)	(138)	(97)	(136)	(158)	(180)

TABLE A continued

Frequency Distribution for the Police Officer Opinion Survey by Police Department

Question	Total	Police Department: Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
11. Approximately how many times a month do you spend one hour or more of off-duty time with your immediate supervisor?							
None	81%	84%	92%	76%	77%	73%	83%
Once	9	8	4	7	10	15	10
Two or more	10	8	4	17	13	12	7
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(844)	(130)	(138)	(98)	(137)	(158)	(183)
12. Percentage of patrol officers responding to this question that selected each of the following policies as one of the three most important sources of their own dissatisfaction as a police officer							
Number of Respondents:	(795)	(116)	(134)	(96)	(126)	(153)	(170)
A. The extent to which advanced education for patrol officers is encouraged.	12%	8%	21%	14%	17%	8%	8%
B. The amount and kind of training in supervision skills given to first-line supervisors.	11%	11%	18%	11%	4%	15%	5%

C. Off-duty employment.	20%	22%	1%	22%	14%	48%	12%
D. Training for patrol officers.	17%	8%	9%	14%	21%	25%	20%
E. The extent to which patrol officers influence policy decisions that affect their jobs.	28%	22%	31%	29%	25%	35%	24%
F. Promotional opportunities.	41%	56%	48%	72%	38%	20%	27%
G. Departmental regulation of sexual behavior and/or off-duty use of alcohol.	3%	3%	1%	3%	4%	6%	3%
H. The extent to which patrol officers can choose how and/or where they work.	15%	17%	13%	10%	23%	8%	16%
I. How frequently shifts rotate.	8%	8%	7%	23%	8%	1%	6%
J. One-person cars.	23%	15%	5%	7%	15%	24%	56%
K. The extent to which police management trusts patrol officers	20%	6%	21%	24%	24%	22%	24%
L. Discipline.	20%	16%	46%	16%	14%	18%	9%
M. Political favoritism.	22%	35%	29%	7%	29%	11%	22%
N. Overtime.	10%	16%	3%	5%	29%	5%	6%

TABLE A continued

Frequency Distribution for the Police Officer Opinion Survey by Police Department

Question	Total	Police Department: Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
13. Percentage of patrol officers responding to this question that selected each of the following aspects of the job as one of the two most important sources of their own satisfaction as a police officer							
Number of Respondents:	(751)	(106)	(129)	(91)	(124)	(146)	(155)
A. Meeting people	8%	8%	7%	5%	10%	10%	7%
B. Helping people	28%	38%	23%	23%	33%	24%	26%
C. Obtaining convictions	12%	14%	7%	18%	10%	12%	15%
D. Hours worked	5%	4%	5%	19%	6%	2%	3%
E. Rapport with fellow officers	9%	3%	3%	12%	8%	12%	15%
F. Pride in work	9%	8%	10%	8%	8%	9%	8%
G. Autonomy of work	18%	13%	20%	14%	12%	27%	19%
H. Excitement, variety, and challenge of police work	12%	4%	10%	12%	15%	16%	14%
I. Job security	6%	3%	11%	4%	4%	5%	6%

16. Age.

21-23	6%	2%	4%	1%	16%	3%	8%
24-26	16	17	8	8	25	15	20
27-29	24	32	23	23	21	29	19
30-32	24	24	28	32	18	19	26
33-35	14	11	20	20	7	15	15
Over 35	15	14	16	16	12	19	13
	99%	99%	99%	100%	99%	100%	101%
	(840)	(127)	(137)	(97)	(136)	(160)	(183)

17. Age at appointment.

Under 24	48%	58%	46%	54%	60%	39%	40%
24-26	31	29	31	34	28	32	31
Over 26	21	13	22	12	12	28	30
	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%	101%
	(840)	(126)	(138)	(97)	(136)	(160)	(183)

18. Number of years employed in this department.

Less than 4 years	31%	10%	17%	13%	48%	41%	44%
4-6 years	32	55	30	28	25	29	30
7-9 years	20	24	31	30	7	16	17
Over 9 years	16	11	23	29	20	14	9
	99%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(805)	(120)	(132)	(95)	(128)	(150)	(180)

19. Sex.

Male	93%	94%	95%	95%	94%	91%	91%
Female	7	6	5	5	6	9	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(816)	(123)	(134)	(94)	(128)	(156)	(181)

TABLE A continued

Frequency Distribution for the Police Officer Opinion Survey by Police Department

Question	Total	Police Department: Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
20/21. Racial and ethnic background.							
White	87%	80%	83%	96%	80%	97%	86%
Black	5	13	6	1	11	0	4
Hispanic	7	7	10	3	8	3	8
Other	1	9	2	0	1	0	2
	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	101%
	(702)	(91)	(123)	(92)	(101)	(133)	(162)
22. Highest level of formal education completed before joining the department.							
Didn't complete high school	-*	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%
Completed high school	30%	41	37	40	43	16	15
Some college courses	38	37	38	33	41	28	45
Associates degree	15	10	18	15	8	15	22
Four year college	11	10	5	9	4	27	10
Some graduate courses	4	1	0	2	2	12	5
Graduate degree	1	1	0	0	1	2	3
	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	101%
	(837)	(126)	(138)	(98)	(136)	(158)	(181)

23. Additional formal education completed since joining the department

None	35%	46%	42%	14%	47%	31%	27%
Some college courses	39	32	37	38	39	38	47
Associate degree	10	10	9	14	4	13	12
Four year college	5	5	6	18	2	4	2
Some graduate courses	9	6	5	12	8	13	9
Graduate degree	2	2	2	3	1	1	2
	100%	101%	101%	99%	101%	100%	99%
	(826)	(126)	(136)	(98)	(134)	(156)	(176)

22/23. Current level of education

Didn't complete high school	-*	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%
Completed high school	11%	24	16	3	17	5	1
Some college courses	39	38	44	31	56	22	44
Associates degree	22	17	23	26	11	23	31
Four year college	14	12	9	23	4	27	9
Some graduate courses	11	6	5	13	9	21	12
Graduate degree	2	3	2	3	1	3	4
	99%	100%	100%	100%	99%	101%	101%
	(825)	(125)	(136)	(98)	(134)	(156)	(176)

24. Do you currently attend school/ university?

Yes	24%	26%	12%	59%	13%	17%	27%
No	76	74	88	41	87	83	73
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(831)	(126)	(136)	(98)	(135)	(156)	(180)

TABLE A continued

Frequency Distribution for the Police Officer Opinion Survey by Police Department

Question	Total	Police Department: Atlanta	Denver	Montgomery County	New Orleans	Portland	San Diego
25. Five years from now what would you like your rank in the police department to be?							
Police officer on patrol	11%	3%	10%	13%	6%	28%	4%
Police officer in a specialized unit	9	1	3	11	10	15	12
Detective	12	4	4	8	8	26	18
Sergeant	33	27	51	40	22	21	40
Lieutenant	16	24	18	16	24	5	14
Captain or higher rank	6	21	3	3	6	0	4
No longer in department	13	20	10	9	24	6	8
	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	101%	100%
	(816)	(126)	(135)	(95)	(133)	(151)	(176)
26. Five years from now what do you realistically expect you rank in the police department to be?							
Police officer on patrol	37%	46%	41%	74%	30%	28%	19%
Police officer in a specialized unit	10	1	10	5	12	16	13
Detective	12	8	7	2	5	26	15
Sergeant	26	19	30	13	26	21	41
Lieutenant	3	3	5	2	6	1	3
Captain or higher rank	1	3	0	0	2	0	1
No longer in department	11	19	6	3	22	6	8
	100%	99%	99%	99%	101%	100%	100%
	(819)	(125)	(136)	(94)	(133)	(156)	(175)

27. To which of the following police organizations do you belong?

Belong to local organization	84%	50%	99%	88%	81%	88%	95%
Don't belong to local organization	16	50	1	12	19	12	5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(818)	(125)	(136)	(96)	(133)	(153)	(175)

*Less than .5 percent.

FIGURE IV-1

QUESTION 1 — Number of Years Performing Routine or Specialized Patrol by Police Department



Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

FIGURE IV-2

QUESTION 4 – Perceived Hazardousness of Current Assignment by Police Department



Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

FIGURE IV-3

QUESTION 6—Satisfaction With Job Over the Last Month by Police Department



Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

FIGURE IV-4

QUESTION 15—Satisfaction With Department Operations by Police Department



Source: Police Officer Opinion Survey, 1978.

END