


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External effects of a

CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

In The Hague

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EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF A CRIME PREVENTION
PROGRAM IN THE HAGUE

Experiences and opinions of the inhabitants:
with a comparison of the effects
of similar programs in the Netherlands

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the experiment

In 1978 the prosecutors general of The Netherlands have agreed upon a series of local experiments with alternative methods of crime control. These experiments are to be carried out by local police forces under the joint responsibility of the local prosecutor, the chief of police and the major (the so-called triangle platform). The RDC has been invited to guide these experiments and to evaluate them.

The RDC has presented a list of proposals for crime control experiments to several "triangle platforms". The discussions on these proposals have resulted into the implementation of seven different projects in 1980 and 1981. The majority of these projects can be characterized as crime prevention programs. The basic concept behind most of these programs is a combination of face to face crime prevention instruction and foot patrol.

Organizationally unrelated to these projects the municipal police force of The Hague decided in 1977 to carry out a crime control experiment of its own. Since the RDC was invited to assist in the design and evaluation of this project too it could serve as a "try out" for the other experiments. The experiences gained in The Hague have been used to improve the design of similar programs to be implemented in Amsterdam and Hoogeveen in 1980. Discussions have been organized between the police officers involved in the Amsterdam project and their colleagues of the The Hague police, who had personal experience with a similar program.

In this article we will report the key findings of the evaluation of the The Hague program. In the last paragraph a brief comparison of these results with the preliminary findings concerning the second-generation programs implemented in Amsterdam and Hoogeveen will be given. This comparison has yielded strong indications that the adaptations in the program's design induced by the findings in The Hague have indeed produced much better results. In a historical perspective these more favorable results can be seen as an off-shoot

of the pilot program of The Hague.

1.2. What effects are to be expected?

This report is part of the full report on the 'Moerwijk' project of the Hague Municipal Police^{x)}. It deals with the question of what external effects the various approaches developed by the burglary control team between March 1979 and October 1979 had. In order to enable this section of the report to be read independently, the objectives and activities of the burglary control team are briefly summarized in the present introduction.

The main object facing the team was to control and reduce break and enter in private dwelling in Moerwijk and to remove the feelings of insecurity felt by the local residents with regard to that crime. A secondary object was to improve relations with the local residents.

The means chosen to achieve these aims was the formation of a team assigned the following duties: intensive patrolling on foot and by bicycle, providing information on crime prevention (both by patrolling officers and on 'community evenings' etc) and receiving, dealing with and settling reports of burglary.

The team consisted of a Judicial Branch sergeant (the team coordinator), two detectives and eight Uniformed Branch constables. In some of its work the team was assisted by an information officer and by the Moerwijk home-beat officer.

When the project was started, the hope was expressed that the work of the team would soon result in a drop in the number of burglaries (particularly by opportunity thieves). Such a drop would have to be achieved through intensive patrolling and more effective use of anti-intruder devices by local residents. Publicity given to the project - made inevitable by the publication of an article on the district in a local newspaper - may also have played a part by deterring potential offenders. The

x) Een onderzoek naar de bestrijding van diefstal door middel van braak, Gemeentepolitie van 's-Gravenhage, maart 1981.

special way in which reports of burglary were dealt with and settled was not expected to have any immediate effect on break and enter. After all, any deterrent effect produced by increased likelihood of detection would only emerge after some time. The effect of using anti-intruder devices may be expected to become apparent both in the short term and the long term. In order to identify the long-term effects, it was agreed that additional figures might possibly be obtained at a later date, e.g. in January 1981. Only the short-term effects are discussed in the present report.

Besides the overall effect of the team's work on break and enter, the existence of the team may have had an effect on the feelings of insecurity already felt by local residents. On 25 January 1979, a local newspaper distributed from door to door contained a disturbing article reporting the fact that the inhabitants of Moerwijk felt threatened by the high number of break and enters in their area. For instance, the article described how some local residents were endeavouring to protect themselves against intruders by keeping a number of milk bottles behind their front door. Although the article greatly exaggerated the seriousness of the situation, it is certain that when the project began, feelings of insecurity with regard to burglary had reached an unprecedentedly high level. It is highly probable that the appearance of the article stimulated such feelings. During the preparatory discussions, it was stated that it was not expected that the frequently deep-rooted ideas that people had about crime would be easily influenced in a short space of time. However, it might be possible to do something about the extreme anxiety of the local residents and their correspondingly extreme security measures.

The various activities of the team may have had further independent effects, such as:

- 1) increasing the willingness of the local residents to report burglary, as a result of improved accessibility to the police (receiving of reports by the team) and of goodwill created;

- 2) improving the opinion of local residents regarding the effectiveness and the performance of the police;
- 3) increasing the use of normal anti-intruder measures;
- 4) increasing the solution rates for burglary.

Finally, account must be taken of possible side effects, such as the deflection of burglary to other districts. Another side effect might be that patrolling and/or the publicity surrounding the team might lead to a drop in other types of crime. The same might also be true as regards increased willingness to report crimes.

The following diagram summarizes the tasks of the team and the external effects anticipated at the time of its formation.

Figure 1. Anticipated effects of the 'Moerwijk' burglary control team




Figure 1 shows that a one-to-one relationship was not assumed to exist between the various duties of the team and the possible effects. In particular, the improved relations

between the police and the public pursued may be promoted through all three tasks. It will not be possible either to ascribe any drop in burglary to any one of the tasks in particular. It has to be regarded as a result of the combination of all three tasks. From the scientific point of view, such uncertainty with regard to the precise effects of the various tasks is without doubt a serious drawback in the approach chosen. The supervisory committee felt, however, that in the present circumstances any attempt to experiment in a laboratory-like manner with new types of approach within a police force was infeasible. The new approach should be both meaningful and practicable from the point of view of the police officers involved.

Many participating police officers will fail to see the value of an experiment in which their customary procedure is only slightly changed. Moreover, a slight change in the customary procedure may evoke reactions from the public to which the police will wish, and frequently will have to, respond by adapting the procedure they follow in some other area. In our view, all this means that, in mounting police experiments, the police must be offered a more or less complete set of tasks which appeal to them and in which allowance has been made for interactions in their relations with the public. Our research strategy implies the repeated implementation of similar "package-programs" with small adaptations in various cities. We hope the possession of large data acts on a series of similar but distinct experiments will enable us to conclude upon the value of its main components in the end.

1.2. How were the anticipated effects measured?

The data on the effects of the burglary ^{control} team were obtained mainly through the surveys which were conducted among the local residents of Moerwijk and of a control district (Rustenburg/Oostbroek) before and after the experiment. The pre-experiment figures were obtained between 24 January and 16 February 1979 and involved 826 respondents from Moerwijk and 300 respondents from Rustenburg/Oostbroek. (1)

1) NIPO, A-392, Slachtofferenquêtes, The Hague, 13 February 1980 (2 parts).

NIPO, A-824, Slachtofferenquêtes, The Hague, 3 July 1980.

Additional surveys were made involving 880 respondents from other parts of The Hague. The post-experiment figures were obtained in the period from 21 January 1980 to 13 February 1980, when use was made of 749 questionnaires in Moerwijk and 654 in Rustenburg/Oostbroek. The results of a partly identical survey involving 397 respondents in The Hague were also available.

As regards the anticipated direct effects, the level of preventive measures taken and the increase in willingness to inform the police were measured by means of specific questions in both the pre- and the post-experiment surveys. Relations with the public and acquaintance with the team were raised for the first time in the second survey. The effect of higher solution rates was studied by analysing the data that the police themselves are accustomed to collect. (1) The anticipated indirect effects of the lower crime figures were examined both on the basis of the survey findings and with the aid of the official police figures. Finally in both surveys fear of crime was dealt with.

1.3. Structure of the report

The burglary^{control} team's arrival on the scene can only be expected to have had visible effects on the local residents in so far as they noticed something of the team's activities. For this reason, Chapter 2 first provides a synopsis of the external contacts which the team had and then examines the extent and type of the impression the team made on the local residents of Moerwijk. Chapter 3 deals with the anticipated direct effects of the various acti-

1) The data taken from the administrative statistics of the Force itself were collected and analysed for the purpose of evaluating the external effects by R.J.M. de Graaf and E. Koppelaar of the Policy Development Department.

vities of the team on the local residents' willingness to inform the police and willingness to take preventive measures, and also with the effects on the local residents' opinion of the police. At the close of the chapter, the developments in the solution rates are discussed.

Chapter 4 deals with the overall effect of the team's activities on the development of the figures for burglary and other offences, and on feelings of insecurity. The final verdict^{control} of the local residents with regard to the burglary/team is also discussed in that chapter.

Chapter 5 contains a brief summary and evaluation of the external effects of the experiment that have been established and a discussion on the findings of similar programs in Amsterdam and Hoogeveen.

2. ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF BURGLARY CONTROL TEAM

2.1. The inhabitants of Moerwijk, Rustenburg and The Hague

Before dealing with the extent to which the inhabitants of Moerwijk and the control district Rustenburg/Oostbroek were aware of the existence of the burglary control team, we shall first provide a sketch of the population of these districts.

In 1979, Moerwijk had some 19,000 inhabitants, Rustenburg some 16,000. The population of Moerwijk differs markedly from that of The Hague in two respects. Moerwijk's inhabitants include a large percentage of old people and a relatively small percentage of the more well-to-do professional and managerial classes.

All in all, Moerwijk may be classed, from the point of view of its population as a lower-middle/class district with a high proportion of elderly. Rustenburg/Oostbroek presents much the same profile, but has a less pronounced over-representation of elderly. The district itself may be classed as a typical residential area with very few offices or workshops. The housing consists mainly of post-war 'portiekwoningen', i.e. blocks of flats with a limited number of storeys and a central communal garden. (tenement-house).

2.2.1. Providing information and advice to the public

Before attempting to establish the percentage of the inhabitants who came to know of the existence of the team in some way or other, we shall first summarize that part of the team's work that concerned the supplying of information to the public. Here, a distinction will be made between the exchange of information at macro level (municipal authorities etc.), at meso level (district organizations, associations, shopkeepers) and at micro level (individual citizens).

At macro level

The Moerwijk home-beat officer and an officer responsible for several districts hold consultations at regular intervals. The burglary control team also participated in these discussions. In addition, the team was free to establish contact with various local authority departments such as Public Works, Building and Housing Inspection, and Housing. In the majority of cases, it was a question of passing on suggestions relating to crime prevention measures.

At meso level

At the onset of the project one of the detectives visited all shopkeepers in the neighbourhood and gave them advice on crime prevention. The project was introduced to the public at a meeting held in the Moerwijk local community centre, run by the W.O.M. (Wijk-Organ-Moerwijk). Close consultation was maintained with the W.O.M. throughout the duration of the project. The team appointed two of their members to represent them in such consultation. In conjunction with the W.O.M., three meetings were organized to provide information on burglary and burglary prevention. Leaflets etc. on burglary prevention were available at the community centre and at the local library. In addition, in collaboration with an ironmonger's shop

that sells crime prevention articles, the team twice occupied a stall at a 'braderie' (a festive street market, usually organized by the local shopkeepers).

At micro level

As stated earlier, the team directed their efforts at patrolling as far as possible on foot or by bicycle in view of the greater opportunities for contact with the local residents. Of the 228 patrols carried out by the members of the team, 54% took place on foot in conjunction with the use of a police car, 10% on foot in conjunction with the use of a bicycle, 10% by bicycle and 10% by police car. (1)

In a total of 218 man hours (2.1% of the total time-spensure by the team) the patrolling officers provided information in some form or other.

The information provided related mainly to the technical state of locks (52%), while the information focussed also on open windows or doors (22%). In 57% of the cases an information leaflet was issued. Information was also given to all persons reporting burglary or attempted burglary.

During the summer months the local paper carried an announcement that cards were available for informing the team when people would be away from home. The team kept an especially close eye on the addresses brought to their attention by this means. They received 144 such cards. In many cases the team personally visited the senders of these cards in order to find out where keys would be available and what security measures were practiced.

In addition to the permanent manning of their office by one of their members, the team introduced a special consulting hour for the local residents. Only sporadic use was made of this opportunity, however, probably because knowledge of it was not widespread enough.

1) These figures are taken from the structured patrol records kept by the members of the team for the purpose of the investigation.

As a result of notified crimes or tip-offs the team carried out several investigation in the neighbourhood related to matters of break of enter. In all, 87 man hours (1.0% of the total time-spensure of the team) were involved, and some 50 private individuals were contacted. A total of 131 (2.8%) man hours were spent receiving reports of crime, 89 of which other than at the police station. In all, over 50 different reports of crime were received (not only break and enter).

In the last stage of the project the team listed the weak points in the district which would be susceptible to burglary because of the features or lay-out of the buildings. In this end, one resident in each block of dwellings was consulted.

2.2.2. Actual awareness of the existence of the burglary control team

In the January 1980 survey, carried out three months after the conclusion of the experiment, respondents were asked whether they were aware of the fact that a burglary control team had been operating in Moerwijk. Of those questioned in Moerwijk itself, 41% replied in the affirmative. In the control district the figure was 17%. Such results show clearly that the burglary control team was recognized as such by only a minority of the local residents.

This does not necessarily mean that the other residents noticed nothing of the activities of the team. Noticable is furthermore the fairly high percentage of residents in Rustenburg/Oostbroek (control district) who had heard about the Moerwijk team. In the survey, respondents were also asked how they had come to know of the team's existence (see Table 3).

Table 3. Way in which respondents learned of the existence of the burglary control team

	Moerwijk		Rustenburg/Oostbroek	
	N	%	N	%
Local paper 'Moerwijk'	147	47.9	6	5.3
Haagsche Courant	64	20.8	56	49.6
Extra notice in 'Posthoorn'	51	16.6	22	19.5
Contact with the police	7	2.3	5	4.4
Publicity evening or 'braderie' stall	29	9.4	1	0.9
Neighbours	25	8.1	11	9.7
Family/acquaintances	3	1.0	3	2.7
Leaflet	4	1.3	-	-
Other	14	4.6	4	3.5
Can't remember	5	1.6	3	2.7
No reply	3	1.0	7	6.2
Total number of replies	352	114.7	118	104.4
Total number of respondents	307	100.0	113	100.0

Table 3 shows that the team chiefly became known through the media. The inhabitants of Rustenburg read the articles on the team in the Haagsche Courant and the Posthoorn.

The percentage of Moerwijkers on the other hand that came to know the team through personal contact does appear to us to be strikingly low (some 5%, or some 1.000 inhabitants). Even so, most of these contacts were made at the public information evenings and at the 'braderie' stalls. Evidently, only about a hundred local residents first came into contact with the team when information on crime prevention was distributed from door to door. This finding is broadly in keeping with the finding referred to in the previous section that information was given by officers on patrol in some 200 cases. It is most likely that the small percentage of local residents who said they had learned about the team through a leaflet were referring to the information leaflets containing advice on crime prevention in connection with holiday absence. These leaflets were not systematically distributed by the team throughout the neighbourhood, but were issued on request.

From the foregoing it is evident that the team did not succeed in 'covering' the whole district by far by means of supplying crime-prevention information.

As already stated, 41% of the Moerwijkers knew about the burglary control team. That does not mean, however, that they had a correct notion of the duties of the team.

First of all, it could be seen from the replies that a quarter of the Moerwijkers who said they knew the team had in fact no idea of the duties of the team. This means that the percentage of persons knowing about the team was not in fact approximately 40%, but approximately 30%. It is also noticeable that a quarter gave as a task patrolling the neighbourhood in police cars.

Motorized patrol was emphatically not a part of the team's duties. In practice, however, as has been stated, a fair amount of use was made of cars. As might be expected, such a practice was responsible for the local residents gaining an idea of the team that was not fully in keeping with the aims of the project.

The comparison with Rustenburg/Oostbroek shows that the Moerwijkers who knew the team more often had a correct understanding of the main duties of the team. Moreover, the limited amount of detective work done by the team - which, according to the exit interviews the members of the team themselves regarded as most important - were almost unnoticed by the local residents.

2.3. Awareness of existence of the team according to sex, age and social class.

The team, or at least its existence, was known to about 40% of the Moerwijkers. It is interesting to know whether this level of acquaintance was equally great among the various population groups. It turns out, in fact, that 46.7% of the men and 41.6% of the women knew the team.⁽¹⁾ The difference can most probably be accounted for by the slightly wider circulation of newspapers etc. among the men.

Furthermore, acquaintance with the team was highest among the 40 - 65 age group (50.9%) and lowest among the

¹⁾ In these analyses, the percentage of all local residents who knew the team is 44.2%, since the category 'No reply' has been omitted.

under 25 age group (36.2%).

The differences in the level of acquaintance were also noticeable within the social classes. The team was known to 40% and 47% of the upper-middle and lower-middle classes respectively, but to only 25% of the working class.

The relatively low level of acquaintance with the team in the case of women, young people and, in particular, unskilled persons is entirely in keeping with what has already been found elsewhere with regard to mass media familiarization of the various population groups with the holding of crime prevention campaigns.⁽¹⁾ There it has also been shown that young people in large cities and unskilled workers - two population groups with relatively high victimization risks - are least affected by crime prevention publicity. It has now further been established, therefore, that this also holds true with regard to information and advice given by the police personally.

¹⁾ J.J.M. van Dijk and C.H.D. Steinmetz, Crime Prevention, An evaluation of the National publicity campaigns, Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, October 1980; The unequal distribution of mass media messages seems to be a general rule (P. Tichenor a.o., Mass media Flow and Differential Growth in Knowledge, Public Opinion Quarter, 1970, p. 159.

3. THE DIRECT EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE BURGLARY TEAM

3.1. Public willingness to report crime

R.D.C. victim surveys have revealed that people's willingness to report minor offences to the police has declined since 1973, particularly in the major population centres. One of the secondary aims of the burglary control team was to stimulate such willingness. No deliberate publicity campaign was mounted, but rather an attempt was made to bring about a marked improvement in the assistance given to persons reporting crime. To this end, a member of the team was present at all times between 8 a.m. and 11 p.m. (including week-ends) to receive reports of crime. Persons making such reports were kept informed of further developments in investigations and, in the case of burglary, visited in their homes to discuss further the reported burglary and ways of preventing any re-occurrence.

Since no explicit appeal was made to the local residents to report crime, no sudden marked increase in such reporting was likely. Nevertheless, the improved assistance offered, along with the higher profile of the police in the neighbourhood and the general publicity, may well have had a favourable effect - even in the short term - on willingness to report crime.

Where the presence of the team had a positive influence on willingness to report crime, we may expect to find that victims who knew the team would reveal a higher reporting rate than victims who did not. In Moerwijk, this was in fact true in the case of burglary, although the numbers involved were very small. The same differences were encountered in the case of bicycle theft, pocket-picking etc. The percentage of persons reporting crime was always higher among those who knew the team than among those who did not. In the case of offences against property as a whole, 74% of the 47 victims who knew the team reported the offences concerned, as against 56% of those who did not know the

team ($\chi^2 = 3.77; df=1; p < 0.06$). In the case of crimes of violence no differences were found. In the control district Rustenburg/Oostbroek, such differences were totally absent.

Such data provide a preliminary indication that the team had a favourable effect on the local residents' willingness to report burglary and other offences against property.

The 1979 reporting rates for crimes against property as a whole (including burglary) and for crimes of violence in Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek were then compared with the 1978 figures to see if there had been any increase. The relevant data are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Percentage of victims who reported crimes against property or crimes of violence to the police in 1978 and 1979 in the districts Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek

	Moerwijk		Rustenburg/Oostbroek	
	1978	1979	1978	1979
Crimes against property	55.6% N = 99	64.2% N = 109	75.0% N = 32	71.8% N = 71
Crimes of violence	16.7% N = 138	18.6% N = 129	11.1% N = 54	19.4% N = 124
Overall reporting rate (based on 10 offences, incl. 'hit-and-run' cases, excluding crimes of violence in the home)	32.9% N = 237	39.5% N = 238	34.9% N = 86	38.5% N = 195

Table 5 provides an indication that willingness to report crimes against property increased in Moerwijk, but not in Rustenburg/Oostbroek. The likelihood that the rise in the reporting rate for all offences in Moerwijk is due to a chance finding is less than 15% ($\chi^2 = 2.22$; $df=1$; $p < 0.15$). Statistically, such a rise is not significant. However, the rise established in the case of Moerwijk gains significance by the fact that, compared with 1978, there was probably a drop, but certainly no rise, in 1979 in willingness to report crimes against property both in the control district and in The Hague as a whole (figures for The Hague: 62.5% in 1978 and 55.6% in 1979). (1)

Where there is an increase in the willingness of the public to report crime, the result is always an increase in the number of less serious offences with which the police are confronted, since then offences which previously went unreported owing to their relatively non-serious nature are then reported. The analyses carried out on official police reports on burglaries committed in Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek reveal a sharp rise in both districts in the number of attempts to burglarize dwellings recorded by the police. This finding, therefore, is also in keeping with the assumption that there was an increase in willingness to report crime in Moerwijk, even though there was also a similar increase in the number of such attempts in the control district.

1) These percentages were calculated on a basis of N = 136 and N = 124 victims of crimes against property respectively.

3.2. Public willingness to take precautionary measures

One of the special duties of the team was to inform the public about burglary precautionary measures (and, where appropriate, measures to prevent other forms of crime against property). This information was given both to groups of local residents at local community meetings etc. and to private individuals.

In the second survey, respondents who knew the team were asked whether they had begun to take burglary precautionary measures as a result of the team's activities. Of the 40% of local residents who said they knew the team, 20% replied that they had been persuaded to implement such crime prevention devices. In other words, as a result of the team, 8% of the inhabitants of Moerwijk took steps or additional steps to prevent burglary.

In both surveys, respondents were asked what preventive measures they were accustomed to take with regard to each type of offence. An attempt was then made to ascertain whether those who knew the team evinced greater willingness to take preventive measures than those who did not. Table 6 sets out the relevant data with regard to burglary.

Table 6. No. of burglary precautionary measures claimed to be normally taken in Moerwijk in 1979, broken down according to respondents' acquaintance or non-acquaintance with the burglary team

Acquaintance with the team	no measures	one measure	two or more measures	total
Yes	20 (6.6)	128 (42.1)	156 (53.3)	304 (44.1)
No	41 (10.9) ^{x)}	175 (45.3)	169 (43.8) ^{xx)}	386 (55.9)

x) ($\chi^2 = 3.48$; $df=1$; $p < .06$)

xx) ($\chi^2 = 3.75$; $df=1$; $p < .05$)

Table 6 shows that those persons who knew the team were significantly more willing to take precautionary measures than those who did not. In Rustenburg/Oostbroek any such difference was entirely absent. In Rustenburg/Oostbroek it was even the case that those who knew the team took relatively few measures. Nevertheless both results do indicate that contact with the team did result in increased willingness to apply precautionary measures. The data on measures taken when going on holiday point to the same conclusion. In the case of Moerwijk, 46% of those who knew the team claimed to take two or more preventive measures, as against 40% of those who did not know the team.

As was established with regard to willingness to report crime, it seems that as regards willingness to apply precautionary measures too, the influence of the team was not confined to the offence of burglary. The Moerwijkers who knew the team also take significantly more measures to prevent bicycle theft, moped theft and car theft. No such correlation exists in the case of Rustenburg/Oostbroek.

Finally, an attempt was made to ascertain whether willingness to take precautionary measures in Moerwijk and in the control district had reached a higher level in 1979 than in 1978 (Table 7).

Table 7. Willingness to take burglary precautionary measures in Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek in 1978 and 1979

	Moerwijk		Rustenburg/Oostbroek	
	1978	1979	1978	1979
No measures	50 (6.1)	66 (8.9)	26 (8.7)	45 (6.9)
One measure	288 (35.2)	321 (43.3)	153 (51.2)	266 (40.9)
Two or more measures	480 (58.7)	355 (47.8)	120 (40.1)	339 (52.2)
Total	818 (100%)	742 (100%)	299 (100%)	650 (100%)

The results show that, contrary to expectation, average willingness to apply measures in Moerwijk actually dropped. In Rustenburg/Oostbroek such willingness increased. No simple explanation is available. If one looks at the various measures referred to in the survey, it is clear that in Moerwijk there was a decline particularly in the use of extra locks and bolts and the securing of doors and windows. The data on willingness to apply precautionary measures when going on holiday and with regard to other forms of crime against property reveal the same picture. The results indicate that in Moerwijk willingness to take precautionary measures declined generally. In the control district, willingness to apply precautionary measures either rose or remained the same.

It is noticeable that in 1978 the willingness to take preventive measures was considerably greater in Moerwijk than in Rustenburg. Comparison with the 1978 data for The Hague as a whole reveals that Rustenburg showed an average willingness to take precautionary measures, while willingness in Moerwijk was exceptionally great (the percentage of persons who took two or more burglary prevention measures in The Hague in 1978 was also 40). Such a high level of willingness may be ascribed in part to the relatively small number of young people in Moerwijk, since they are, generally less willing to apply precautionary measures. We take the view, however, that the high level of willingness found in Moerwijk in 1978 is partly the result of the extreme feelings of insecurity which were present in the district at the time of the survey. The disturbing article on the subject in the weekly 'De Posthoorn' must also be borne in mind. It is likely that, partly as a result of this article on crime in Moerwijk, many local residents became temporarily more willing to apply precautionary measures (or at least claimed to be so). This anxiety effect will have gradually died away in the course of 1979, with the result that the average level of willingness to apply precautionary measures, as measured at the beginning of

1980, was lower. It is most probable, therefore, that the positive effect generated by the information and advice given by the burglary team was more than offset as people began to forget their earlier fears. On balance then, the average level of willingness dropped.

In short, the overall decline in the neighbourhood of the willingness to take preventive measures is interpreted by us not as an effect of the burglary team (which has reinforced this willingness among those who knew about the team) but as an effect of an external factor. Whether this interpretation is justified will be discussed again on the basis of the findings of two similar programs in the last paragraph.

3.3. The local residents' opinion of the police

One of the secondary aims of the project was to improve relations with the public. By improving these relations it was hoped to secure more public cooperation with the police (higher reporting rates etc.). The first survey contained hardly any questions relating to the performance of the police. Comparison between opinions of the police before and after the experiment was only possible in one respect, viz. the way in which reports of crime were dealt with.

The reason for this was that in the regular RDC national victim survey, which was used as a measure before the experiment, persons who had reported an offence to the police were always asked whether they were satisfied with the way the police responded. The number of respondents to whom this question could be put was small. Of the 77 persons who reported an offence to the police in Moerwijk in 1978, 51 (66%) were satisfied with the way the police dealt with the information they received. In 1979, 68 of the 93 persons who reported an offence (73%) were satisfied. In the control district, the figure was 60% in both years (N = 30 and N = 73). These

figures may indicate that the involvement of the burglary control team with receiving reports of burglary etc. led to a somewhat more positive opinion of police work. That apart, the relevant data show that the number of satisfied reporters of offences among the Moerwijkers who knew the team was only marginally higher than among those, who did not know the team.

In the second survey, respondents were asked several questions about their opinion of the police. In order to trace possible effects of the setting up of the burglary control team an interesting question was whether those who knew the team had a different opinion of the police compared to other Moerwijkers. In addition, a comparison was made with the opinion of the Rustenburgers.

In the survey, respondents were asked whether they had had any form of contact with the police in the preceding year. Those who replied affirmatively were then asked several questions about what they thought of their most recent contact with the police. The analyses reveal that only just over a hundred respondents from Moerwijk had contact with the police in Moerwijk in 1979, and just over 60 Rustenburgers with the police in Rustenburg. Those who knew the team had a slightly higher opinion of such contacts than the others. However, in view of the small numbers involved the differences are too marginal to be regarded as an indication of the affect, that the team had been winning goodwill from the public.

Comparison of the opinions of all Moerwijkers (including those who did not know the team) with the opinions of the Rustenburgers on their recent contacts with the police is based on larger numbers of respondents and, in addition, reveals more differences. It turns out that of the Moerwijkers who had had recent contact with the police, 71% thought that the police had been helpful, as against 60% in Rustenburg. 17% of the Moerwijkers felt that their contact had been unsatisfactory, while in Rustenburg the proportion was 26% (N = 116 and N = 61). Generally speaking, we may conclude that the local residents of Moerwijk had a higher opinion of police-public contact than those of Rustenburg. The difference indicates, we believe, that the arrival of the burglary control team was well received by the inhabitants of Moerwijk.

3.4. The development of the clearancerates

The team also tried to solve the burglaries reported in Moerwijk. Using administrative data from the police, an attempt was made to gain some idea of how successful they were in this.

The clearance rate was calculated by comparing the number of official police reports on unsolved burglaries - recorded on what are known as 'burglary cards' - with the number of reports or notifications of burglary, as recorded by the C.I.D.'s Technical and Identification Division (T.O.H.D. - Technische Opsporings- en Herkenning Dienst). The latter figure also included notifications which were not made the subject of official police reports.

Table 9 shows the data calculated in this way with regard to burglary in dwellings.

Table 9. No. of burglaries in dwellings reported to the police and the no. of unsolved cases in Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek in the years 1976-1979 on the base of police administrative

	1976		1977		1978		1979	
	reported	solved (%)						
Moerwijk	79	40 (50.6)	86	12 (13.9)	114	38 (33.3)	69	8 (11.6)
Rustenburg/ Oostbroek	43	29 (67.4)	88	12 (13.6)	57	27 (47.4)	110	22 (20.0)

Table 9 reveals considerable fluctuation in the clearance rates. There is no doubt that this can be put down in part to the small numbers involved.

There is also the consideration that sometimes a gang of criminals is arrested that confesses to a series of burglaries. This happened, for example, in 1976 in both the districts. With regard to the solution rates for 1979, it should also be noted that data ceased to be collected in mid December 1979: No allowance is made therefore for cases solved after that date.

The approximate clearance rates shown here can only provide a rough indication of success in the solving of cases. Consideration must also be given to the fact, for instance, that in the course of 1979, as we have already seen, the number of notifications of attempted burglary rose relatively steeply. It is obvious that attempted crime is more difficult to solve than actual crime. However, none of this alters the fact that the available evidence affords few grounds for believing that the activities of the burglary control team in the field of criminal investigation resulted in increased effectiveness in investigating burglaries committed in Moerwijk.

4. THE INDIRECT EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE BURGLARY CONTROL TEAM

4.1. Effects on the crime rate

One of the main aims of the project was improved control of the offence 'break and enter in a private dwelling'. Of the various means employed for this purpose, those that may in principle be expected to have a short-term positive effect on crime control are patrol on foot and by bicycle and the provision of information and advice on crime prevention. The same is true of the publicity which surrounded the setting up of the burglary control team. As already stated, the criminal investigation activities of the team were probably not very effective, with the result that we may expect to see little change here.

In police literature it is generally assumed that preventive measures and the like may be especially effective in combatting what is referred to as 'opportunity crime' (crime committed by non professionals). This raises the initial question of the extent to which the burglaries committed in Moerwijk can be placed in the category 'opportunity crime'.

In the analysis of the data relating to those persons who were suspected of having committed burglary in Moerwijk or Rustenburg/Oostbroek since 1976 it is noticeable that a relatively small number of suspects were involved in a large number of burglaries.

In the years 1976-1979, some 11 suspects were involved in a total of 109 burglaries which became the subject of official police reports. The average age of this group of suspects was 22.

In addition, there was a much larger group comprising some 134 suspects who were involved in 152 burglaries in these four years. The average age of this group was 19. The group included quite a number of 17 and 18 year olds.

Such data on the perpetrators would suggest that about half the burglaries in this part of The Hague are committed by young opportunity criminals. The other half would appear to be accounted for by criminals who operate more professionally or at any rate in a more organized manner. The latter group will probably have paid but scant attention to the slightly higher patrol frequency or to increased use of anti-intruder devices. It is quite possible, however, that, as a result of the publicity given to the burglary control team, this group will have temporarily selected targets in other districts or in other surrounding cities.

The development in the burglary figures was measured first of all on the basis of the victim-surveys. Table 10 shows the development of the victim rates in Moerwijk, Rustenburg/Oostbroek, The Hague and the Netherlands in 1978 and 1979.

Table 10. Proportion of persons over 15 years of age who were burglary victims in Moerwijk, Rustenburg/Oostbroek, The Hague and the Netherlands in 1978 and 1979 on the base of victim-surveys

	Moerwijk	Rustenburg/Oostbroek	The Hague	The Netherlands
1978	1.9 N = 826	1.5 N = 300	1.3 N = 1,002	1.2 N = 9,999
1979	1.8 N = 749	1.4 N = 654	2.2 N = 782	1.7 N = 10,002

Table 10 shows that the victim rates for Moerwijk and for Rustenburg/Oostbroek remained the same or dropped slightly, while in both The Hague and the rest of the Netherlands the burglary victim rates rose - quite significantly in the case of the Netherlands as a whole

($\chi^2 = 8.73$; $df=1$; $p < 0.01$). These figures are survey estimates. No hard conclusions can be warranted. The development in the break and enters was also studied, however, using police administrative data on the reporting of burglary. Table 11 sets out the relevant data.

Table 11. Development in the no. of reported burglaries in dwellings in Moerwijk (M) and Rustenburg/Oostbroek (R) in the years 1976-1979 on the base of police administrative data

	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
M	79 (22.7)	86 (24.7)	114 (32.8)	69 (19.8)	348 (100.0)
R	43 (14.5)	88 (29.5)	57 (19.1)	110 (36.9)	298 (100.0)

Table 11 shows that the number of reports of burglary in Moerwijk dropped in 1979, while there was actually a rise in Rustenburg/Oostbroek. We have already established that it was precisely in Moerwijk that willingness to report crime probably increased, and at any rate did not decline. This means that the drop in the number of burglaries recorded must be the result of a true drop in the number of burglaries committed. In Rustenburg/Oostbroek the number of burglaries recorded rose, while there is nothing to indicate an increase in willingness to report crime (Table 5), with the result that we are forced to conclude that the rise was a true one. The survey results further revealed that both throughout The Hague and in the Netherlands at large there was also a rise in the number of burglaries committed. Taken

together, then, the survey findings and the administrative data clearly indicate that the number of burglaries in Moerwijk declined during the time the burglary control team existed, whereas elsewhere the incidence of burglary actually rose.

The surveys also included questions relating to other types of offence. The overall crime rate can be expressed as the percentage of respondents who were the victims of one or other offence. In 1978 and 1979, the total victim rates for Moerwijk were 23% and 25% respectively, those for Rustenburg/Oostbroek were 24% in both years, and those for The Hague 30% and 28.5%. In the country as a whole, the overall rate rose from 19% to 23%. These figures provide no evidence that the burglary team had any deterrent effect with regard to other types of crime.

If the deterrent effect which the team had with regard to burglary was the result of the patrols it carried out, we might expect to find that other types of offence would also show a drop, or at any rate no rise. No such general suppressive effect however could be found. This may indicate that the deterrent effect must rather be sought in the information and advice given on crime prevention or in the publicity surrounding the team, which after all were both specifically concerned with burglary.

4.2. Effects on fear of crime

In a way we would be deceiving ourselves if we were to expect that the often deep-seated feelings of insecurity that exist with regard to crime could be removed at short notice by anything that the police might do. However, when the project began, a very high percentage of the inhabitants of Moerwijk were apprehensive about the risk of being burgled. We shall now consider whether, despite this, some things may have changed in this respect.

In order to gain some idea of the extent to which the subject of crime occupies people, respondents were asked in the surveys whether they had spoken to anyone recently on this subject. It transpired that both in Moerwijk and in Rustenburg/Oostbroek the percentage of people who had had such conversations had risen slightly (from 22% to 28% in Moerwijk and from 22% to 26% in Rustenburg/Oostbroek). There seemed to be a shift in the type of crime discussed. In 1978, 33% of Moerwijkers' conversations were about burglary (N = 183), while in 1979 the figure was only 21% (N = 209).

Such a difference may indicate that the special concern about burglary which was the subject of the Posthoorn article referred to earlier died down again in the course of 1979. The replies given to the question of how often respondents considered the possibility that they themselves might become victims of an offence also point on the one hand to increased fear with regard to crime in general and on the other to a drop in fear with regard to burglary. The number of Moerwijkers who frequently consider this possibility has in fact risen slightly. In 1978, however, 26% thought about burglary (N = 361), while in 1979 the figure was only 17% (N = 341). These findings are an indication, therefore, that in the case of the inhabitants of Moerwijk who were concerned about crime, burglary receded from the forefront of attention.

The surveys included five questions about fear of crime in general. Respondents were divided into three groups according to the replies they gave to these questions (not afraid, a little afraid, (very) afraid). The first survey revealed that 18.4% of the Moerwijkers fell into the category '(very) afraid' (N = 826). The percentages for Rustenburg/Oostbroek and The Hague were 10.3 and 16.1 (N = 300 and N = 1,002).

Clearly, then, feelings of insecurity were more widespread in Moerwijk than elsewhere. For 1979, figures are

only available for Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek.

In Moerwijk, the percentage of '(very) afraid's' remained exactly the same (18.4%; N = 749), while Rustenburg/Oostbroek showed a rise from 10.3 up to 18.8% (N=654). No clear conclusion can be drawn from this, of course. The setting up of the burglary team may, however, have helped to prevent any further rise in feelings of insecurity in Moerwijk.¹⁾

In order to examine the tenability of the above hypothesis, a look was taken to see whether those persons who knew the team evinced fewer feelings of insecurity than the others. The differences proved to be marginal and, in the case of some of the questions, even to go the other way. However, previous RDC research has adequately demonstrated that feelings of insecurity are highly correlated with age and sex. For that reason, the relationship between knowledge of the team and feelings of insecurity was studied separately in relation to the various age groups. The results are shown in Table 12.

1) The belief referred to elsewhere in this report that in 1978 Moerwijk experienced an upsurge of feelings of insecurity with regard to burglary which then gradually died away finds some support in the findings as to the strength of feelings of insecurity experienced in 1978 and 1979. In 1978 the feelings of insecurity in Moerwijk were much higher than in Rustenburg, while in 1979 the extreme insecurity feelings were both in Moerwijk and Rustenburg at the same level.

Table 12. Extent of fear of crime for the Moerwijkers who knew and Moerwijkers who did not know the burglary control team, according to age and sex

age	Males				Females			
	55 and under		Over 55		55 and under		Over 55	
knowing the team	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Not afraid	49%	55%	38%	35%	21%	29%	16%	17%
A little afraid	51%	38%	50%	58%	49%	43%	43%	57%
(Very) afraid	-	7%	12%	7%	30%	28%	41%	26%
	N=59	N=76	N=104	N=110	N=76	N=80	N=68	N=122

Table 12 reveals some interesting facts. In the case of the males, those who knew of the team's existence experienced roughly just as many - or fewer - feelings of insecurity as the rest. In the case of four out of the five questions relating to fear, those who knew the team revealed fewer feelings of insecurity. In the case of the (older) women, however, we see a clear inverted relationship between knowledge of the team and feelings of insecurity, in the sense that fear was greater where there was awareness of the team. It seems that the older female inhabitants of Moerwijk often regarded the establishment of the team as a confirmation of their suspicion that the district was unsafe. In this respect, then, the setting up of the team evidently had an adverse effect.

In the case of the male inhabitants and, in particular, the young people, on the other hand, the team probably helped to remove the exceptional fear of burglary and other forms of crime. The setting up of the team probably gave a reassuring feeling that something was now being done about the situation.

4.3. The local residents' opinion of the burglary control team

Over 40% of the Moerwijkers and 20% of the Rustenburgers indicated that they knew the team. These persons were asked a few questions concerning their opinion of the team.

Firstly, they were asked how they thought the team had discharged their duties. The majority of the inhabitants of both districts preferred to make no comment. Of those who did comment, nearly all expressed a favourable opinion. Only 5% rated the team's performance as 'poor' or 'not good'.

As already related in Chapter 2, those who said they knew the team were further asked to say what they thought the specific tasks of the team had been. In the analysis, a look was taken to see how those persons who mentioned specific duties rated the team (Table 14).

Table 14. Rating of the burglary team's performance of duties by respondents in Moerwijk who ascribed specific tasks to the team

	Uniformed patrol of district on foot		Patrol of district in police car		Giving information and advice to public		Warning residents about habits likely to attract criminals		Keeping an eye on homes when asked to do so	
Very good/good	26	35.1%	39	51.3%	54	52.9%	16	40.0%	9	37.5%
Moderately good	2	2.7%	1	1.3%	5	4.9%	-	-	-	-
Fair/Poor	3	4.1%	4	5.3%	1	1.0%	-	-	-	-
No opinion/no reply	43	58.1%	32	42.1%	42	41.2%	24	60.0%	15	62.5%
Total	74	100.0%	76	100.0%	102	100.0%	40	100.0%	24	100.0%

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The most noticeable finding in Table 14 is the relatively unfavourable opinion of slow patrolling. It is noticeable because the presence of foot patrol. This meant that the frequency of patrols in the district was more than doubled. Evidently, the greatly increased police presence in the neighbourhood was still not enough to reassure the inhabitants in this respect.

Finally, the respondents were asked whether they thought it desirable that the burglary control team should be made permanent. An affirmative answer was received from 77% of the Moerwijkers and 56% of the Rustenburgers. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the setting up of such teams would be greatly appreciated by local residents: as far as Moerwijk is concerned, the burglary control team must stay.

5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The burglary control team of two detectives and eight constables of the Hague Municipal Police Force which operated in Moerwijk in 1979 directed its efforts mainly at patrol on foot and by bicycle, the provision of information and advice on crime prevention, and dealing with and settling reports of burglary originating in the district.

The direct and indirect short-term effects of these activities on the inhabitants of Moerwijk were investigated by means of surveys carried out in Moerwijk and in the control district Rustenburg/Oostbroek before and after the experiment with the team in 1979. In addition, several data bases held by the Hague Municipal Police were analysed.

As far as the direct, external effects are concerned, attention was given to four different possible effects. Each of these effects will be described briefly. Then the more indirect possible effects on the development of crime and feelings of insecurity will be examined. Prior to this, however, we shall first consider the extent to which the activities of the team affected the inhabitants.

Forty per cent of the Moerwijkers knew of the burglary team's existence in January 1980. Roughly a third of the Moerwijkers were aware of the special duties of the team.

On the other hand, the work of the team evidently went practically unnoticed by some two thirds of the inhabitants. The percentage of inhabitants who knew about the team is fairly low, particularly if one considers that the setting up of the team received quite a lot of publicity - not intentional, but enforced by the appearance of a disturbing article in a local newspaper distributed from door to door. Such a low percentage means that the effects that the team had on the whole

community may also have fallen far short of all they might have been. Where definite effects are found, we might seem justified in assuming that a team that managed to cover larger areas of a district - by working more intensively or for longer hours - might produce more tangible results. The fact that the experiment was limited to the offence of burglary also affected results: a team commissioned to deal with more forms of crime might possibly be more effective. Such a conclusion receives support from the finding that even in the case of the present organizational approach, many of the external effects extended to other types of offence.

5.1. Four direct effects

5.1.1. Willingness to report crime

The results show that the Moerwijkers who knew the burglary control team and had been victims of a crime against property more often reported such crime to the police than the others. Moreover, the percentage of all victims in Moerwijk who reported crime was slightly higher in 1979 than in 1978, while the reporting rates for Rustenburg/Oostbroek and the rest of The Hague remained the same. Although small figures are involved,

the available data do indicate that the existence of the team had a stimulating effect on willingness to report crime. Such a stimulus would not appear to have been restricted to the offence of burglary but to have extended to all crimes against property.

5.1.2. Willingness to apply precautionary measures

On average, the Moerwijkers who knew the team claimed more often than the others that they were in the habit of taking specific steps to prevent burglary and various other types of crime against property. In 1978, at the time of the first survey, the average 'prevention level'

in Moerwijk was much higher than in Rustenburg/Oostbroek. Oddly enough, however, it actually dropped slightly in 1979. The explanation for such a drop probably lies in the fact that it was precisely at the time of the first survey that a sort of collective panic broke out in the district with regard to the high number of break and enters. It is likely that, as a result of the emotions generated and the way in which the weekly 'De Posthoorn' cashed in on the situation, the level of alleged willingness to take preventive measures in the district rose sharply for a time. In the course of 1979, this emotional involvement on the part of many Moerwijkers with the offence of burglary probably died down again, with the result that the average willingness to take preventive measures also fell.

These findings suggest that information and advice on crime prevention given by a team of police officers personally exerts a favourable influence on the people's willingness to take such measures. It remains to be seen from the results of comparable projects carried out by the police forces of Amsterdam and Hoogeveen whether such a conclusion -with all its implications for policy development- is correct or not.

5.1.3. Public goodwill towards by the police

Sections of the public had contact with the team through reporting crime or when communicating information; apart from that, they may have observed the extra patrols.

The question now is whether such contacts resulted in a more favourable opinion of the police. The results show that the inhabitants of Moerwijk who reported an offence in 1979 were slightly more satisfied with the way the matter was settled than those who did so in 1978, while in Rustenburg/Oostbroek there was no difference. In general terms, too, it turns out that the Moerwijkers who had contact with the police in 1979 held a somewhat more favourable opinion of them than the Rustenburgers (for example, the police were judged to be more helpful). On the other hand, the findings show that the number of times the police was seen in Moerwijk was scarcely, if at all, greater than in the case of Rustenburg/Oostbroek. Such findings may indicate that the team's duties relating to criminal investigation and the provision of information and advice were successfully put across to the public, while this was scarcely, if at all, true with regard to their slow patrolling.

5.1.4. Clearance rates

According to police statistics, there was actually a drop, not a rise, in 1979, as compared with previous years, in the percentage of reported burglaries that could be solved. The drop may have been the result of the increased willingness to report crime. The police figures show, in fact, that the number of attempted crimes reported rose relatively sharply.

5.2. Indirect effects

5.2.1. Victimization and registered crime rates

Of all the indirect short-term effects, the effect on the crime rate is, of course, the most relevant. The surveys show that in 1979 the incidence of burglary (for our present purposes, the victim rates) in Moerwijk and Rustenburg/Oostbroek remained the same or dropped slightly, while elsewhere in The Hague and in the rest of the Netherlands sharp rises occurred. Records of the number of crimes coming to the knowledge of the police

reveal a sharp drop in the number of burglaries in Moerwijk, and rises in the case of Rustenburg/Oostbroek, the rest of The Hague and the rest of the Netherlands. In Moerwijk, people's willingness to report crime, would appear to have increased slightly; this was not the case elsewhere. The available data would appear to indicate, therefore, that the activities of the burglary control team resulted in a drop in the incidence of burglary, at any rate in the short term. The surveys show no indication of a drop or levelling off in the case of other forms of crime in Moerwijk.

The drop in the incidence of burglary may, in principle, be a result of any of a number of the team's duties or of any combination of these. In view of the other findings, however, the possible causes are limited. If the drop resulted from the more widespread use of precautionary measures, we would expect to find a drop in the overall level of crime against property. However, the surveys do not appear to indicate any such drop, with the result that this factor would not seem to have been a major one. By the same argument, it is improbable that the extra patrols were responsible for the drop. In our view, the most likely cause of the drop was the publicity given to the team's efforts to concentrate more on burglary. Certain potential criminals will have been deterred by such publicity. Police data provide no evidence for any increase in burglary in surrounding districts. There is some indication, however, that the level of burglary began to rise again in 1980, after the disbanding of the team. At present, it is still not possible to say whether the team's work in giving information and advice and the resulting rise in the level of actual crime prevention will have made a more lasting contribution to burglary control.

5.2.2. Feelings of insecurity

There is no indication that feelings of insecurity in Moerwijk altered in any way during 1979. In Rustenburg/Oostbroek such feelings increased. More detailed figures show that the existence of the team in general and the extra patrols in particular certainly did not stop the development of feelings of insecurity among the female inhabitants of the district and, more particularly, among the older female population. It would seem that the setting up of a special burglary control team had rather the effect of strengthening the feelings of insecurity felt by this section of the population. Particularly in the case of the male inhabitants under 55, however, the team does appear to have moderated somewhat concern about the rise in crime.

5.2.3. Public relations

The Moerwijkers who knew the team were asked what they thought of it. Many of these respondents were unwilling or unable to give any judgement as to how far the team succeeded in discharging its duties. Of those who did respond, the overwhelming majority expressed a decidedly favourable opinion. Significantly, it was precisely the team's duties of patrolling on foot and by bicycle which scored relatively bad in their replies. Some inhabitants had evidently expected better results from these patrols. The question whether the burglary control team should be made permanent was answered unanimously: 77% of those who knew about the team thought that it should stay.

The experiment with a "burglary control team" was unprecedented in the Netherlands. In part on the basis of the above discussed findings a new design for such a program has been developed by the RDC. This design has been implemented by means of an experiment by the municipal police forces of Amsterdam and Hoogeveen. In the next paragraph we will compare the external effects of the latter programs with the above discussed effects and try to formulate some preliminary conclusions concerning the validity of the design.

5.2.4. Comparison with similar projects in the Netherlands

The design of the The Hague program seemed to have had the following shortcoming. The team's impact on the perceptions and attitudes of the neighbourhood is probably marginal. The main reason for this marginal influence is the weakness of the stimuli foot patrol and face to face instruction about crime prevention. Stronger stimuli could possibly be administered by eliminating the team's investigation task altogether and by limiting its use of police cars more strictly. An advise would in general be to select a somewhat smaller neighbourhood, to develop more detailed guidelines for the team's activities and to organize more extensive training of the police officers. Enlarging the scope of the program to other crimes besides burglary was on the other hand a conclusion drawn by the Moerwijk police team members.

In Amsterdam the municipal police agreed upon a replication of the The Hague experiment. All of the above mentioned suggestions were incorporated in the design. In 1980 a team of eight patrol officers, a senior officer and a detective covered a neighbourhood of 0.9 km² and about 10,000 inhabitants by means of foot- and bicycle patrol and various kinds of crime prevention instructions on property crimes. The selected neighbourhood was Osdorp.

The employment of this special team implied no extension of available manpower but only a reassignment.

The experiment in Hoogeveen cannot be characterized as a replication of the The Hague experiment. It consisted of an increased effort by a special team to patrol high crime areas in the city (by car- and foot patrol). Disconnected from this team the force appointed a full time crime prevention instructor. The city of Hoogeveen consists of 35,000 inhabitants.

Both the Amsterdam and the Hoogeveen experiment have been evaluated by means of population surveys before and after the experiment. In Amsterdam a control neighbourhood has been interviewed as well.

The results of the Amsterdam police experiment were superior to those of both "The Hague" and "Hoogeveen" experiment. In Osdorp (Amsterdam) 66% of the inhabitants said to be aware of the special efforts of the police (44% in The Hague, 54% in Hoogeveen). More than half of the latter Amsterdam respondents had become personally acquainted with the team and only one quarter was familiar with the team by means of media reports. Both The Hague and Hoogeveen have shown an opposite result (mainly media mediated awareness of the team). As a result of the face to face contacts, the Amsterdam project has been particularly successful in reaching the female, the elderly and low socio-economic status groups in the district. Foot and bicycle patrol seem to be the main contributors to this achievement.

The public willingness to report crimes has increased significantly during the Amsterdam/Osdorp project in the experimental neighbourhood and not in the control area (especially crimes of violence). The results in Hoogeveen are less positive. The non-integrated efforts of more surveillance and crime prevention instruction appear to have had no impact at all in this respect.

The findings in Hoogeveen show a significant increase of the willingness to apply more than two precautionary measures in order to prevent break and enter in private dwellings. In Amsterdam/Osdorp the percentage of persons who take no measure at all has decreased significantly. The latter impact is probably due to the personal contacts of the team with elderly and the lower social class. The Hoogeveen results are according to the analysis largely media-mediated. These results support the prior interpretation of the results of the police experiment in The Hague. The applicationlevel of precautionary measures in order to prevent other types of crime has not been influenced markedly in neither The Hague nor Hoogeveen. The marginal influence on the applicationlevel of these precautionary measures is probably the result of less concrete availability of crime prevention devices for other crimes than break and enter.

The general opinions on the police of the inhabitants of both Amsterdam/Osdorp and Hoogeveen show significant increases after the programs. Foot patrol and crime prevention instruction in Amsterdam and crime prevention instruction in Hoogeveen are in particular welcomed. Improvements of police-community relations can apparently be achieved both by a media-mediated approach and a direct approach of the public by the police.

Two indirect effects have been distinguished in this report, the effects on crime rates and the effects on feelings of insecurity. In order to finish this summary with the good news, we will discuss the crime rates first. Neither in Amsterdam/Osdorp nor in Hoogeveen significant decreases of victimization rates (or registered crime rates) in comparison to the control areas have been ascertained. These present police-experiments apparently do not bring about observable decreases of actual crime rates on the short run. The small decrease that has been observed after the The Hague experiment should probably be interpreted as an effect of the large media coverage of the experiment. This media coverage could have deterred local gangs or recidivists from "scoring" in this particular neighbourhood during the experiment.



In all three cities the crime consciousness of the target population has been raised (more conversations on the subject crime). However only the Amsterdam/Osdorp program has been succesfull in reducing the feelings of insecurity significantly. The percentage of respondents in Amsterdam/Osdorp who stated to feel safe in their neighbourhood showed a remarkable significant 10% rise ($X^2=35$; $df=1$; $p 0,001$), while the control neighbourhood showed stable percentages. Again, these findings suggest a high impact of the Amsterdam police experiment due to its higher and more concrete visibility for females, elderly and the lower social class.

To sum up, the Amsterdam program, consisting of foot and bicycle patrol combined with (face to face) crime prevention instruction reached large sections of all population groups in the neighbourhood. This impact has resulted in an increased willingness to report crimes to the police, an increased willingness to apply at least one anti-burglary device, and a much better judgement on general police performance. The program has also been succesfull in reducing feelings of insecurity. No immediate reduction of crime rates have been found however^{x)} The increased willingness to report crimes to the police and especially the increased prevention-mindedness of the neighbourhood however will probably have enlarged the controllability of local crime in the long run.

The The Hague and Hoogeveen programs have consisted of a more global effort to increase neighbourhood surveillance by car or foot patrol, together with the introduction of crime prevention instruction. Both programs seem to have reached their target-groups mainly by means of media-reports, which has severely limited their impact among females, the elderly and persons with a low socio-economic status. As

x) This result is in an entire agreement with the outcomes of the Newark Foot Patrol. (George L. Kelling e.a., The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, Police Foundation, Washington, USA, 1981).

a consequence of this they have^{been} less succesfull in increasing the willingness to report crimes, to apply crime prevention techniques and not succesfull at all in reducing feelings of insecurity. Like the more concentrated program of the Amsterdam/Osdorp experiment they too have been effective in improving crime consciousness and the general image of the police. Presumably because of its extra-ordinary press coverage the The Hague program has also been instrumental in reducing (temporarily) local burglary rates.



END