


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A PRELIMINARY NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JOB OPPORTUNITES FOR ADJUDICATED DELINQUENTS: COMPLEXITIES AND COMPETITION

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SUBMITTED TO THE
U.S. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
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FOREWORD

The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention established an Assessment Center Program in 1976 to partially fulfill the mandate of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, as amended, to collect and synthesize knowledge and information from available literature on all aspects of juvenile delinquency.

This report provides insight into the critical area of employment opportunities for adjudicated delinquents in order to understand the scope and dimensions of the problem, to clarify the major issues and needs as they related to the juvenile justice system, and to recommend strategies for improving the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system in dealing with this problem.

The assessment efforts are not designed to be complete statements in a particular area. Rather, they are intended to reflect the state-of-knowledge at a particular time, including gaps in available information or understanding. Each successive assessment report then may provide more general insight on a cumulative basis when compared to other reports.

Due to differences in definitions and the lack of a readily available body of information, the assessment efforts have been difficult. In spite of such complexity, the persons who participated in the preparation of this report are to be commended for their contribution to the body of knowledge.

James C. Howell, Director
National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

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The principal writer for this volume is David J. Berkman. General design, management, and technical editing were provided by David J. Berkman and Charles P. Smith. In addition, Arthur Pearl provided assistance with the conceptualization and writing of the chapter on theories and perspectives on the causes and effects of youth unemployment. Robert Montilla provided general assistance with the development of the entire report, particularly in relation to unemployment programs and strategies targeting delinquent youth.

Administrative editing and production were done by Paula Emison, with the assistance of Colleen Cousins and Andrea Marrs.

In addition to the above individuals, appreciation is extended to the many librarians, researchers, statisticians, operational personnel, and others who provided substantial assistance or materials in the preparation of this volume.

PREFACE

As part of the Assessment Center Program of the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, topical centers were established to assess delinquency prevention (University of Washington), the juvenile justice system (American Justice Institute), and alternatives to the juvenile justice system (University of Chicago). In addition, a fourth assessment center was established at the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to integrate the work of the three topical centers.

This report, "A Preliminary National Assessment of Job Opportunities for Adjudicated Delinquents: Complexities and Competition," has been developed by the American Justice Institute.

Other work of the American Justice Institute as part of the National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center includes reports on classification and disposition of juveniles, the status offender, child abuse and neglect, the serious juvenile offender, the less-serious juvenile offender, juvenile advocacy, comparative costs of processing, 24-hour juvenile intake, handling juveniles with special problems, and the numbers and characteristics of juvenile offenders.

In spite of the limitations of these reports, each should be viewed as an appropriate beginning in the establishment of a better framework and baseline of information for understanding and action by policymakers, operational personnel, researchers, and the public on how the juvenile justice system can contribute to desired child development and control.

Charles P. Smith, Director
National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Section | Page |
|---|------|
| FOREWORD | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | iv |
| PREFACE | v |
| LIST OF FIGURES | xi |
| LIST OF TABLES | xii |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | xiii |
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| PURPOSE | 1 |
| APPROACH | 1 |
| ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT | 2 |
| II. THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT | 3 |
| INTRODUCTION | 3 |
| WHAT IS CAUSE--WHAT IS EFFECT? | 4 |
| POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES | 5 |
| SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES | 11 |
| Focusing on Society | 11 |
| The Issue of Race | 13 |
| Focusing on the Individual | 15 |
| EDUCATION AND TRAINING PERSPECTIVE | 17 |
| THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PERSPECTIVE | 19 |
| Focusing on Delinquency | 19 |
| Social Control | 23 |
| Delinquency as a Subculture | 24 |
| Psychological Theories of Delinquency | 25 |
| Biological Bases of Delinquent Behavior | 26 |
| Labeling Theory | 26 |

Preceding page blank

| Section | Page |
|---|------|
| THE UNEMPLOYMENT-JUVENILE DELINQUENT RELATIONSHIP | 27 |
| CONCLUSION | 30 |
| III. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY | 33 |
| INTRODUCTION | 33 |
| NONWHITE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT | 34 |
| The Location of Youth Unemployment | 41 |
| Youth Unemployment Compared to Adult Unemployment | 45 |
| Significant Changes in the Youth Population | 48 |
| Youth Unemployment Will Remain a Problem | 50 |
| TARGETING THE UNEMPLOYED ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT | 51 |
| Youth Unemployment and Juvenile Delinquency | 54 |
| Approaching the Youth Unemployment Problem More Broadly | 59 |
| IV. INTERVENTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS | 63 |
| DEVELOPING STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH UNEMPLOYED JUVENILE DELINQUENTS | 63 |
| THE HOWARD UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY APPRENTICE PROGRAM | 65 |
| A REVIEW OF MAJOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS | 66 |
| Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (CETA Title IV Amendments 1978) | 67 |
| Job Corps (CETA Title IV Amendments 1978) | 67 |
| Department of Education Training and Work Study Programs | 68 |
| Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC) (CETA Title VIII) | 69 |
| Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP) (CETA Title IV) | 69 |
| LEAA Projects | 70 |
| The Wildcat Experiment | 71 |
| FEDERAL PROGRAMS DIRECTED AT THE PRIVATE SECTOR | 72 |
| Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) | 72 |
| CETA On the Job Training Program (OJT) | 73 |
| WIN and Welfare Tax Credits | 74 |
| Minimum Wage Exceptions | 74 |
| GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND ITS SIDE EFFECTS ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT | 76 |
| Minimum Wage Laws | 76 |
| Unions | 77 |

| <u>Section</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| Davis-Bacon Act | 78 |
| Licensure | 79 |
| Legal and Illegal Immigration | 79 |
| Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment | 81 |
| V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 89 |
| <u>MAJOR FINDINGS ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT</u> | 89 |
| <u>RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT</u> | 91 |
| APPENDIXES | |
| A. NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER STAFF, ADVISORY COMMITTEE, AND PROGRAM MONITOR | 99 |
| B. REFERENCES | 103 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure | | Page |
|--------|---|------|
| 1 | UNEMPLOYMENT BY EDUCATION AND RACE AGES 16 TO 24 (OCTOBER 1976) | 21 |
| 2 | THE COMING CHALLENGE: POPULATION COMPARISON THROUGH 1990 | 35 |
| 3 | WHO'S LOSING GROUND? EMPLOYMENT/POPULATION RATIOS OVER 25 YEARS | 37 |
| 4 | THE LOCATION OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 1978 | 43 |
| 5 | THE IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION DENSITY IN RELATION TO THE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED YOUTH (16-24) 1978 | 45 |
| 6 | SELECTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES | 46 |
| 7 | TEENAGE UNEMPLOYMENT BY RACE AND ETHNICITY (1st QUARTER 1978) . | 47 |
| 8 | YOUTH TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS | 85 |
| 9 | YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVES: MAJOR COMPONENTS | 87 |

Preceding page blank

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | | Page |
|-------|---|------|
| 1 | UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRICE LEVEL CHANGES, U.S. 1947-1966 | 10 |
| 2 | UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRICE LEVEL CHANGES, U.S. 1967-1977 | 10 |
| 3 | COMPARISON OF YOUTH AND GENERAL UNEMPLOYMENT BY RACE (MALES) . | 39 |
| 4 | PERCENT UNEMPLOYED BY SEX, RACE, AND TYPE OF AREA--U.S. 1975, AGES 16 TO 19 | 41 |
| 5 | UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF THE POPULATION, BY AGE AND YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED (1964) | 47 |
| 6 | EMPLOYMENT STATUS FIRST-TIME COMMITMENTS TO CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, 1977 | 54 |
| 7 | EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF JUVENILES PROCESSED THROUGH JUVENILE COURTS IN SAMPLE JURISDICTIONS (1976) | 55 |
| 8 | RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELINQUENCY STATUS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF A COHORT OF MARION COUNTY (OREGON) YOUTH STUDIED OVER A 14-YEAR PERIOD (1964-1978) | 57 |
| 9 | RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELINQUENCY STATUS AND INVOLVEMENT IN ADULT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY FOR A COHORT OF MARION COUNTY (OREGON) YOUTH STUDIED OVER A 14-YEAR PERIOD (1964-1978) | 58 |
| 10 | DELINQUENCY CASE SERVICE OVERLAPS | 60 |
| 11 | PUBLIC SERVICE OVERLAPS BY FAMILIES OF CYA PAROLEES | 61 |
| 12 | YOUTH SHARE OF MAJOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING EXPENDITURES OUTLAYS (IN MILLIONS) | 83 |

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE

This preliminary report examines the significance of youth unemployment to juvenile delinquency. While not concentrating on the empirical basis of the relationship, the report presents and assesses the often divergent perspectives and resulting programs and policies dealing with the complex problems of youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency. The primary objective of the report is to assess the major issues, problems, and needs of youth with regard to employment and societal efforts to deal with escalating rates of both juvenile delinquency and youth unemployment. Programmatic strategies of government and the private sector are presented and discussed against the backdrop of multiple perspectives and a limited state-of-knowledge in order to better orient the reader toward an appreciation of the complexities of youth unemployment in general, and specifically in relation to developing programs and strategies which would assist in reversing the spiraling rates of youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency.

METHOD

The literature on juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment, and Federal, State, and private sector efforts having a relationship to unemployed adjudicated juvenile delinquents are reviewed. Programs and policies which effect youth unemployment both positively and negatively are assessed, and recommendations are provided to enhance their overall effectiveness or reduce their indirect negative consequences. During the course of the study, a major Federal study effort by the Vice President's Task Force on Employment was underway. Fortunately, this report was able to utilize some of the findings and recommendations as they became available. Furthermore, the report was able to incorporate some of the highlights of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education report. Therefore, the approach of the report remained flexible in order to be able to provide the reader with an orientation to youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency that was as current as possible.

Although the report was not able to fully explore all aspects of juvenile delinquency and youth unemployment, the approach provides a broad preliminary overview of the topic in an effort to identify and familiarize the reader with the major aspects and dimensions of the problem policymakers and program designers will need to consider in determining the role and responsibilities of the juvenile justice system with regard to youth unemployment, as well as the kinds of Federal and State resources needed to supplement community efforts to deal with the problem.

MAJOR FINDINGS ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

- The problem of youth unemployment is now recognized as a serious national problem; however, due to the lack of reliable data on the extent of the problem, and without a strong theoretical and methodological base for studying its causes, much of the literature is based on conjecture.
- The complexity of youth unemployment must be appreciated by considering it within the context of other social problems. This is especially important when juvenile delinquency is considered in relation to youth unemployment.
- The problem of juvenile delinquency within the context of youth unemployment must consider these perspectives: (1) an analysis of the unemployability of the delinquent; (2) an analysis of the special environmental conditions that breed unemployment and delinquency, and (3) the general economic policies and conditions that affect employment opportunities.
- Although research on the causal relationship of juvenile delinquency to unemployment has generally failed to indicate a strong relationship (after controlling for other variables), both problems tend to occur concurrently with other social problems. Therefore, lack of evidence supporting a causal relationship should not hinder the development of policies and programs which target both juvenile delinquency and youth unemployment.
- National rates of youth unemployment, while alarmingly high, tend to mask the vast differences among subgroups of youths (e.g., the greater unemployment among black, urban, and delinquent youth compared to national total rates).
- Unemployment of 16- to 24-year-olds has averaged five times that of the civilian labor force over 25 years old. While comprising 25 percent of the labor force, they represent 50 percent of total unemployment. Furthermore, nonwhite teenage unemployment is established conservatively to be three times that of white teenagers.

- According to some sources, the disparity between black and white youth regarding unemployment will continue into the 1990's.
- Arrests of youths for serious crimes continues to increase. Between 1968-1977, for example, arrests of youths for Part I crimes increased 25 percent, which was nearly three times the rate of growth for less-serious Part II offenses.
- Based on evidence from some studies, few youths are employed at time of arrest. For example, one source reported that over 87 percent of juveniles arrested who were not in school were unemployed. The California Youth Authority found over 44 percent of youths committed were unemployed.
- Significant changes are taking place with regard to adolescence. Having a job among teenagers appears to be important--often separating the "men from the boys, the women from the girls." Among urban and lower class youth, the period of adolescence appears to be shortening and in some cases disappearing.
- The next three decades ahead may be potentially better to deal with the problems of youth including unemployment due to a declining youth population; however, the problems that remain will be difficult, requiring major rethinking and radical social changes. Short of this, the disparities between affluent and disadvantaged youth will worsen.
- Efforts to deal with unemployment among delinquent youth will require careful conceptualization, planning, and coordination among decreasing community resources.
- Although there has been some effort to improve Federal coordination of youth targeted programs and policies, efforts of coordination need to reach the State and local levels before they can truly resolve the problems of fragmentation, overlap, and conflict.
- While the Federal government has offered numerous financial incentives to the private sector to assist with youth unemployment, there must be further recognition and subsequent revisions in their other policies (e.g., minimum wage laws, Wagner Act of 1935, Davis-Bacon act, licensure, and immigration practices) which have had a negative impact on the problem of youth unemployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

- Increase the use of minimum wage exemptions.
- Expand apprentice programs.
- Improve school, probation, and correctional job counseling and placement services.
- Offender licensing restrictions should be revised.

- Create job opportunities where unemployed youth are concentrated.
- Support relocation of youth to localities with job opportunities.
- Create informal helping networks.
- Encourage youth entrepreneurial programs.
- Provide grants to youth for career development.
- Establish a national youth service.
- Expand the use of community education-work councils.
- Change the basic structure of high schools to make them less alienating and more effective in preparing students to compete in the labor market.
- Develop better Federal coordination of programs targeting youth to reduce conflict and maximize the use of resources.

Youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency are complex social problems. Thinking in terms of simple monolithic solutions is not appropriate. Efforts to deal with either or both problems will require coordination, experimentation, and perseverance. And finally, it should be remembered that whatever strategies or programs taken in an effort to impact youth unemployment, and regardless of how much money is spent, the real success or failure will essentially be determined at the individual level of one person caring and relating with another. The personal commitment and ingenuity of youth workers, juvenile justice personnel, and employers who have to cope on a daily basis to deal with the many trials and tribulations of working with youth and making it a meaningful and rewarding experience for them, will be one of the major factors influencing a youth's ability to find a job, keep it, and achieve the personal satisfaction resulting from continued growth and development on the job as well as off.

I. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

Youth unemployment is recognized as a serious national problem. Although its relationship to juvenile delinquency has remained unclear in spite of all the research on the topic, juvenile justice system personnel and policymakers must continue to develop strategies and programs to serve the needs of adjudicated juvenile delinquents. In some cases, employment is perceived as the answer for much of the juvenile crime; in other cases, it is overlooked entirely. Furthermore, in spite of the large quantity of research in this area and the massive amounts of money spent, the confusion continues and fires the controversy regarding what to do.

This preliminary report examines youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency with the objectives of identifying and clarifying some of the major issues, problems, and needs of youth unemployment as it relates to dealing with juvenile delinquency. Therefore, this report will examine the significance of youth unemployment to juvenile delinquency and the special problems and needs of youths with a history of delinquency. In order to accomplish this, numerous perspectives on the problem will be reviewed. Programmatic strategies of government and the private sector will also be presented and discussed. The goal of the report is to assist in orientating the reader to the complexities of youth unemployment in general, and specifically in relation to developing programs and strategies.

APPROACH

This report reviews literature on juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment, and Federal and State policy and programs having a relationship to unemployed adjudicated juvenile delinquents. During the course of the study, a major Federal initiative was announced to deal with youth unemployment. Preliminary information obtained from the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment with regard to the extent of the problem, and Federal strategies for the 1980's are utilized throughout the report.

Although the report cannot fully explore all aspects related to juvenile delinquency and youth unemployment, it provides a preliminary overview of the

topic in an effort to provide major aspects and dimensions of the problem policymakers and program designers will need to consider in determining the role and responsibilities of the juvenile justice system with regard to youth unemployment.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

The report is subdivided into four chapters:

- Chapter II reviews major theories and perspectives on the causes and effects of youth unemployment as they relate to juvenile delinquents.
- Chapter III examines the data on youth unemployment and presents the major implications this data has with regard to juvenile delinquency.
- Chapter IV reviews government interventions and constraints with regard to youth unemployment. This chapter presents some of the major highlights of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment.
- Chapter V presents a summary of significant findings of the preliminary review and discusses strategies and changes in Federal policy which would have a significant impact on youth unemployment.

II. THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

Although high rates of youth unemployment have provided causes for social concern over the past 15 years, a general lack of adequate data as well as slow theoretical and methodological progress have combined to limit the usefulness of empirical research on the composition, causes, and possible cures for youth unemployment (U.S. Department of Labor, 1978b, p. 129). Lacking a strong theoretical, methodological, and statistical base, the causes of youth unemployment have generally been based on informed conjecture. Hedges, for example, attributes high youth joblessness to many factors:

Higher employment rates for youth are attributable to many factors, such as lack of work experience or provision of a "bridge" between school and work, inadequate entry skills and job counseling, the intermittent attachment of students to the labor force, and, in recent years, the influx of the maturing postwar "baby boom" generation (Hedges, p. 49).

An increased national concern about youth unemployment has intensified efforts to understand the nature and causes of the problem. More research and analysis of youth unemployment information has also tended to make clear that it is a complex social problem both in terms of its causes, as well as its solutions.

According to a recent Carnegie Council study on youth unemployment, public attention directed at the problem often fails to appreciate the many other and more serious related problems, thereby missing the required complexity of dealing with the problem:

Youth in America is not suffering from a single malady (unemployment), and no single patent medicine (full employment) will cure the many ills. We have instead a growth, more like a cancer, in our body politic--causes not fully known, cure not fully known. But it creates great pain in the suffering of ruined lives, crime, drug addiction, lost hopes, social fears, reduced productivity, raised social expenditures, and disdain for authority (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 11).

The complexity of youth unemployment with regard to its relationship to deeper social problems, both in terms of causing as well as being caused by other social problems, suggests that it will require small as well as large solutions.

The recognition of the fact that youth unemployment is a complex social problem requiring an understanding of other underlying problems and solutions at many levels and in many areas is a significant development. Essentially, it is an advancement in perspective, both broadening in terms of correlations and causes of the problem, as well as expanding the efforts for dealing with the problem. Therefore, recent changes in perspective have expanded the theoretical bases of empirical examinations of the problem. This may further lead to increased experimental or innovative efforts to deal with the problem in an attempt to test a broadened theoretical base.

WHAT IS CAUSE--WHAT IS EFFECT?

Social science is in a period of divergence. There is little agreement on any important issue. One major area of disagreement is the assignment of primary cause for social disruption. Is the problem in the individual? Or is it in the society? If it is in the individual, is it genetically determined, or is it caused by inhospitable environments? Is it a function of persons ill-prepared to function in society, or is the society unable to absorb its citizens?

Unfortunately, no definitive answer can be found to those questions given the information available. In making decisions, policymakers and agency personnel must often transcend available data. They must select from theory and evidence and extrapolate to reach some decisions. That process of differential decision-making, coupled with a nonstandardized analysis, only widens the gulf and makes decisions and policy often more difficult to defend. Until definitive experiments are conducted in which education, employment, and family and social conditions are systematically varied for different categories of persons, the situation will remain inconclusive. It is, however, possible to present the logic of different positions and the evidence that each draws upon.

The problem of the delinquent in the job market has three separate perspectives. These are: (1) an analysis of the unemployability of the delinquent; (2) an analysis of the special environmental conditions that breed unemployment and delinquency; and (3) the general economic policies and conditions that affect employment opportunities. The language and ideas used in these different perspectives not only prevent supportable conclusions, they make intelligible conversation difficult.

This section of the report will briefly present and discuss some of the major theories and perspectives on the causes and effects of youth unemployment in order to provide an orientation to the subsequent sections on the extent of the problem and its remedies and interventions. Although these perspectives and theories are not always easily separated, for the purposes of clarity they are divided into the following categories:

- political and economic
- sociological and psychological
- education and training
- juvenile delinquency.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

The arguments that attribute the problems of delinquency and employability to the political and economic malfunctioning of society differ in many ways. There is a conservative economic argument which is diametrically opposed to a liberal economic argument. There is a conservative political position that is countered by a radical political position. The argument is not necessarily compatible with any of the sociological or psychological theories, although efforts are made to paste and patch these different perspectives together. One problem that emerges in the area of policy is that government efforts which attempt to compromise the different positions satisfy no one and may cloud rather than clarify the problem.

The conservative economic argument is that many youth, particularly marginal and delinquency-prone youth, are unemployable because governmental regulations restrict economic growth and thus limit employment opportunities. One particular restriction that is emphasized is the minimum wage law. The idea is that minimum wage laws have made the hiring of youth with marginal skills uneconomic; and thus employers choose either to remain shorthanded or opt for some labor-saving machine or piece of equipment. This argument applies more to minority youth than to white youth because it is combined with a personal deficit thesis. Minority youth are alleged to suffer from some form of inferiority and thus offer less to the employer than does a person with better schooling and social attitudes (Williams, 1977; Phillips, Votey, and Maxwell). This argument is based on correlational data and convinces only those who were already

strongly predisposed to that line of reasoning. There are two major difficulties with the thesis. One is that there is no assurance that hardcore unemployable delinquent or delinquent-prone youth would be employed at any wage rate, and the second is that there is no reason to believe that such youth would work at depressed wage rates, particularly if the wages were insufficient to maintain even a marginal standard of living. It may be that white youth are willing to work at minimum wage levels because, for many of them, the work supplements benefits received at home, while truly poor youths choose not to work at minimum or lower wage levels. There is a third problem with the approach which attempts to increase employment by reducing the minimum wage. The jobs created in this process may be logistically outside of the range of travel for inner-city youths where unemployment and delinquency tend to concentrate.

The more politically conservative argument is that government spending and regulations impede economic growth, and that growth in government means loss in jobs in the private sector of the economy. This line of thinking appears to have led to various taxpayer revolts, and is perhaps most persuasively stated by Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman. The failure of government to achieve many of its advertised aims does not necessarily mean that the situation would be improved by lessening its influence. There are two sobering statistics that need to be considered before joining the current libertarian trend. One is that 500 of the largest private corporations (which continue to grow despite governmental interference) constituted almost 58 percent of all the economic activity in 1977, and these corporations hired less than 17 percent of the work force ("Fortune's 500"). The second problem is that a cutback in government would have the greatest immediate impact on inner-city minority youth. In 1975, more than one-quarter of black and other minority youths who worked in the inner city (where unemployment rates for such youth were 42.4 percent) worked for government. Only 7 percent of white youths in the suburbs (teenage unemployment rate of 17.8 percent) worked for government (Westcott, p. 5). Therefore, it is possible that calls for less government could lead to less unemployment among populations and areas where unemployment is already low, and conversely lead to higher unemployment among populations and areas where unemployment is exceedingly high.

Conservatives recognize that large corporations do not by themselves necessarily create new jobs. It is agreed, however, that these corporations stimulate the development of jobs in smaller establishments. That position appears

to be irrefutable. Small businesses have created much of the employment in the United States in the past quarter decade, but the jobs they have created may offer no solution to poverty, crime, or delinquency. According to Ginsberg, the private sector created 25 million new jobs and the government nine million new jobs between 1950 and 1977. But what kinds of jobs? Good or bad? "The private sector provided two-and-a-half more poor jobs as it did good ones" (Ginsberg, p. 45); whereas "two-thirds of the government jobs were good in terms of wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, job security and opportunities for advancement" (Ginsberg, p. 45). If conservative policies are established, the consequence will likely be that many more poor jobs will be created in the private sector at the expense of good jobs in government.

The liberal economic argument is that the economy needs stimulation and regulation, and that the invisible hand of the market cannot avoid either crashing into the rock of inflation or in being sucked into the whirlpool of rising unemployment. The liberals oppose the conservatives at every point. They often draw upon different sets of data, but even when looking at the same facts, they come up with different interpretations. The crux of the liberal argument is that, since 1932, when government acted to stimulate the economy, the average economic growth was higher, unemployment was lower, and inflation, when it existed, was due to conservative undermining of liberal programs (Keyserling, p. 36). The liberal thesis is that wages prior to taxation have not kept pace with production, prices, and profits, and this leads to softening in aggregate demand, which weakens the economy (Keyserling, p. 83). The major criticism of liberal policies is that they create "social programs" or make attempts at "social engineering," and that these have been tried and they have failed to improve the lot of the poor or other disadvantaged, while undermining the economy through inflation caused by public debt and excessive taxation. The liberals counter with their own data and analysis, concluding that the disadvantaged have benefited and the economy has been strengthened by their efforts, but unfortunately there has been insufficient debate in-depth to reach any conclusion based on logic or evidence.

The conservative political thesis is that the liberalism and its "do gooder" mentality has encouraged sloth and invited crime. Sloth is encouraged by subsidizing the unproductive through much too generous welfare, by "make-work, leaf-raking" governmental work, by trade unions who limit production and force wages up with their union shop and closed shop agreements, and by a decline of academic standards in liberal dominated educational institutions. Crime is encouraged

by a justice system that will not crack down on illegal behavior, and instead molly-coddles criminals and delinquent-prone youth with injudicious use of probation and an insistence upon restrictive due process and rules of evidence that make prosecution of wrongdoers almost impossible. Crime is further encouraged when the socially disadvantaged are stimulated by public opinion and social policy to believe that they do not have to obey the law (Banfield, p. 171).

Conservative political scientists and social planners believe that unemployment and delinquency would drop markedly if welfare rules were strictly enforced and if there was swift, certain, and severe punishment of offenders (Tullock; Ficker).

It is not easy to validate or disprove the conservative analysis. As Banfield points out, certain or swift punishment is virtually impossible. For the punishment to be certain, the crime must be solved. Most crimes today are not reported. Most reported crimes are not solved. And it is doubtful, even if the most arch of conservatives had his way, that every identified criminal would be convicted. The swiftness of punishment is also difficult to achieve. For swiftness to be truly functional, "the judges and jury would have to be on the scene or just off-stage at the time the action was being contemplated" (Banfield, p. 178). Banfield suggests that if crime is to be deterred, persons who are likely to commit serious crime should be incarcerated prior to the action (Banfield, pp. 182-184).

The conservative welfare argument is not easily demonstrated. Although much publicity is given to welfare "chislers," the incidence of such behavior appears to be small, and the efforts to experiment with guaranteed annual income do not seem to have resulted in a lessening of a desire to work. In fact, the guaranteed income argument draws some of its roots from the noted conservative, Milton Friedman, who saw the welfare problem as being more an expensive and cumbersome bureaucracy rather than a means by which individuals avoided work.

Radical thinkers operate with a similar logic to conservatives. They, too, believe criminality and delinquency are rational and occur as a result of a cost-benefit analysis; but whereas the conservative believes that the costs (consequences) of illegal behavior currently are too low and should be raised, the radical believes that the benefits for being law-abiding, particularly for the

poor and the oppressed minorities, are too low and need to be raised. The radical view of delinquency goes like this: youth comprise a subgroup, perhaps even a subculture, that tend to group together and influence each other. The influences generate and support social needs. Specific advertisements appeal to teenage consumers and thereby increase the number and cost of those needs. At an earlier time, youth could work part- or full-time to meet those needs; but with the loss of jobs and the increase in the cost of being a member of a youth group, crime becomes a logical alternative.

Greenberg presents quantitative data and analysis from an international perspective to support this thesis. Radicals believe that delinquent acts that do not necessarily produce an immediate economic gain are also rational. Vandalism in schools can be viewed as responses to "degradation ceremonies" (Greenberg, p. 60) as are those acts that are committed to maintain esteem with persons who are important to you. Greenberg concludes, "Any society that excluded juveniles from the world of work for long periods and imposed mandatory attendance at schools like ours would have a substantial amount of delinquency" (Greenberg, p. 72).

Therefore, from a political and economic perspective, delinquents, regardless of how they or their situation are understood, will continue to be in a difficult position if national unemployment remains high. In fact, it is distinctly possible that most of the delinquency problem would disappear if full employment for youth could somehow be achieved. The general state of the economy limits what can or cannot be done with any segment of the population. This effect holds most true for those segments of the population that are most severely affected by upward swings in rates of unemployment. For example, when unemployment increases among the general population, its effect is much greater for all youth and doubly so for inner-city minority youth (Pearl, Grant, and Wenk).

Unemployment is a troublesome economic condition, but so is inflation. The prevailing economic thinking is that there is a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. It is believed by most economists that when unemployment drops to a certain point (economists disagree about that point--some say 3 percent, some 4 percent, and some 6 percent), inflation begins to rise rapidly. This is known as the "Phillips relationship" and its existence, while accepted by most economists, is not accepted by all. Phillips came to his conclusion by studying British data from 1862 to 1958, and the thesis appears to apply in the

U.S. through the mid-60's. As Tables 1 and 2 (below) indicate, inflation was much higher in the years when unemployment dropped below 4 percent and was virtually nonexistent in the year when unemployment was higher than 5 percent.

TABLE 1
UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRICE LEVEL CHANGES, U.S. 1947-1966

| UNEMPLOYMENT (PERCENT) | NUMBER OF YEARS | AVERAGE PERCENT INCREASE ON WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX |
|---------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Less than 4.0 | 6 | 5.7 |
| 4.0 - 4.9 | 4 | 2.7 |
| 5.0 or more | 10 | 0.06 |

Source: Richard A. Lipsey and Peter O. Steiner. Economics. 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 773.

Even these figures do not tell the whole story, since there has been no year since 1969 where average unemployment dropped below 4 percent. It seems that with energy in the picture, unemployment raises with inflation, and not inversely. Economists have not as yet brought energy into their economic projections, and consequently may be working with obsolete ideas and theories.

TABLE 2
UNEMPLOYMENT AND PRICE LEVEL CHANGES, U.S. 1967-1977

| UNEMPLOYMENT (PERCENT) | NUMBER OF YEARS | AVERAGE PERCENT INCREASE ON WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX |
|---------------------------|-----------------|--|
| Less than 4.0 | 3 | 2.0 |
| 4.0 - 4.9 | 2 | 10.6 |
| 5.0 or more | 6 | 7.8 |

Source: Richard A. Lipsey and Peter O. Steiner. Economics. 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 773.

If economic policy continues to require high employment as a buffer to inflation, there may be no solution to either delinquency or youth unemployment. There is hope that economists and social planners may perceive that the tradeoff in the future is human energy in place of fossil fuels which conceivably could drive down both unemployment and inflation (Blake).

SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Focusing on Society

Given the complexity and difference of sociological perspectives on the problem of youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency, many observers nonetheless attempt to make sense out of conflicting theory and inconclusive evidence. Glaser provides a historical analysis. Glaser culls through nearly a century of research and focuses upon the most recent literature. Through the years, census tract studies have shown a positive correlation between crime and social and economic determination. Relative disparity appears to stimulate crime, e.g., there appears to be more crime in communities where there is a wide range in incomes than in communities that are relatively homogeneous economically. Similarly, crime rates appear to be high when whites have disproportionately more of the good jobs in an urban setting. He cites evidence to show that poverty and homicide correlate highly. In his review of the literature, Glaser concludes that when using area studies, "Whether the units of economical analysis are neighborhoods, cities, or states, both zero-order and multiple correlations between rates of delinquency or crime and indices of extreme poverty are quite high" (Glaser, p. 119).

When analyzing a different kind of study--those that rely upon questionnaires--the results are somewhat mixed. Some studies show no relationship between social class and reported delinquency. Glaser criticizes these on a methodological basis and suggests that adjustments must be made with the "traditional conclusion that the lowest socio-economic classes have delinquency rates greater than those of the upper classes" (Glaser, p. 124), by qualifying these conclusions by the type of crime. Poor people commit only those kinds of crimes that are within their means. Wealthy people have a monopoly on embezzlement

and other white-collar crimes. According to Glaser, these studies had significant methodological defects:

There are two methodological defects [in these studies]...these studies were done at only one school or pooled the responses from different schools [and] the classification of parental occupations is misleading as an index of socio-economic class (Glaser, p. 123).

...It should be stressed, however, that the contrasts between neighborhood admitted delinquency rates reported in these studies were not nearly as great as those indicated by police records (Glaser, p. 123).

[Other studies] showed that police were more inclined to arrest in poor than in middle class neighborhoods. Several [other] studies of middle and upper class delinquency [also] indicate the ease with which some affluent youth can "get away with" crime (Chambliss; Glaser, p. 123).

...most types of ordinary crimes are demonstrably perpetrated more often by poor than by affluent youth. Yet so-called white collar offenses certainly are committed most often by adults in high status occupations, since they have the most opportunity to engage in such crimes (Glaser, p. 124).

The relationship of delinquency to changes in the general economic picture was not clear in early studies, nor has it improved markedly with improved statistical techniques. The problem, to a large extent, is with the data. The current measurements of both delinquency and unemployment are imprecise. The measurements change in relation to specific contexts and periods of time. Thus, it is extremely difficult to accurately gauge a relationship between delinquency and a change in the economy. Glaser nonetheless feels that there is sufficient evidence for a tentative conclusion. He believes that the rise in violence in the 1960's was less a response to a life condition than to expectations.

To claim a full understanding of this upsurge in violent crime would be presumptuous, but it seems reasonable to infer that it was in large part a consequence of a growing concern of relatively deprivation among ghetto youths (Glaser, p. 130).

Glaser concludes that the decline in violence in the 1970's was the result of a reduction in inequality (Glaser, p. 130) and surmises that Latin youth may be at the stage that black youth were during the previous decade; however, race as a factor in understanding juvenile delinquency and the high rates of youth unemployment among minorities continues to be employed as explanation or causal factor.

The Issue of Race

One possible explanation of a situation where minorities are disproportionately unemployed and disproportionately adjudicated to be delinquent is that they have been victimized by discriminatory employment practices that lock them out, and a discriminatory justice system that locks them up. That certainly was a popular refrain throughout the 1960's. White racism was acknowledged by presidential commissions to be rampant in the U.S. (Kerner Report...). Little is heard about such racism today. Or, more accurately, perhaps no one is listening to such charges. Now the mood of the country is moving in the opposite direction. There is a clear and visible backlash. The once liberal academy is now not quite as liberal.

On campus and in Congress there is growing opposition to minority programs. It is increasingly argued that, since the billions of dollars spent on the disadvantaged did little good, isn't it sufficient proof that (a) problems aren't solved by throwing money at them, or (b) some people are beyond help?

The recent Supreme Court ruling in favor of Allan Bakke entering medical school is another indication of a weakening of support for minorities. Similar challenges of "affirmative action" are taking place in employment situations which could have direct bearing on the employment of minority and delinquent youth.

It would be tragic if, on the basis of current or past efforts, this nation would retreat from a thorough investigation of bias and discrimination. In many ways, this issue has never been fully addressed in its current context.

In the 1960's, the primary reaction of those accusing the nation of racism was to separate themselves from the majority. They enjoyed partial success--campuses had their black studies programs and ghettos their black businesses. The problem with these separatist ventures was that they were marginal to the systems from which they separated and whose support was necessary for their survival. It is not surprising, then, that many of these efforts were short-lived.

In the 1970's, the move to re-exclude minorities from permanent systems of society, particularly the university, was ostensibly not based on race, but rather on "standards." It was argued that blacks and other disadvantaged populations fail, not because of prejudice, but because they possess neither the

capacity nor the background to meet the requirements demanded by a technically advanced economy and its preparatory educational institutions. Therefore, an examination of modern racism requires an examination of standards. The issue now may not be as Bell described it--that this nation has progressed so much that it now can be called an equal opportunity society, for it may be too much or even unjust to try to become an equal result society. Instead, it may be that society assesses people on irrelevant and unfair criteria. The standards used may serve to camouflage racial bias, and in that way lower rather than raise the quality of our educational system through the maintenance of irrelevant standards. There may be two very severe flaws in current approaches to standards. The standards used may be generally inadequate, or they may be inadequate in certain situations or contexts. For example, the standards of the university may actually intensify mediocrity, which is not improved by its pomposity. It may be more true today than the 60 or 70 years ago when Thorsten Veblin reputedly said that a person who has earned a Ph.D suffers from "trained incapacity." The university may be producing generally inferior doctors, lawyers, engineers, and social scientists because these persons are solving yesterday's problems and are unprepared for those of today. The standards may be woefully obsolete. There is some reason to explore that possibility in face of the apparent inability of today's experts to solve the problems of inflation, unemployment, crime, energy, diseases associated with urban stress, and international relations.

The second line of investigation into the bias of standards should be their situation-specific nature. It is assumed that standards are neutral and generalizable. It may well prove to be that standards do not hold up within different settings or contexts. Persons who are substandard in a school situation may actually excel in a work situation where the skill is applied and utilized. Bias today may exist primarily on the artificiality of the situations to which standards are applied. This condition somehow remains outside the present debate and needs to be brought in (Pearl, 1964; Pearl and Riessman; Mischle).

The matter of bias has not been resolved. Discrimination in the workplace, in the justice system, and in schooling and other preparations for work need to be studied in their current contexts (Mischle) because neither the shrill rhetoric of those who charge injustice nor the disclaimers of those who insist there is no such thing have resolved the situation.

Focusing on the Individual

Freud and his followers hypothesized character and logical development that moved from undifferentiated and instinct-dominated "id" through an ability to protect self (ego) to a social conscience (super-ego). Persons with unstable family structures would likely be fixated at a pre-adult stage. Thus, youth from unstable home situations--poverty and minority--would operate on a "pleasure principle" and thus be unable to delay gratification to a greater extent than youth from less chaotic social situations who operate predominantly on the reality principle. Redl and Wineman, Siegman, Mischel, Sanford, and Grossbard provide both logic and evidence to indicate a relationship between delinquency and "egos" that are deficit to the extent that delay of gratification, impulse control, and social responsibility are adversely affected. Although studies appear to establish a relationship between antisocial behavior and ego strength, at least as reflected in measures of future orientation and social responsibility, the argument remains unconvincing. The studies are correlational. Causes and effect are left to interpretation. Therefore, it is not clear from such studies whether the delinquent has no future orientation or no future, whether the delinquent is antisocial, or whether the society is hostile to him or her. The most serious criticism of psychoanalytically derived theories is that treatment or solutions based on such theory seem to have had poor results (Kassbaum, Ward, and Wilner). The results of psychological treatment of delinquents may be more negative today than results based on such theories were a few decades ago, because the social context of delinquency may be changing. Growth in unemployment of youth in general, and specifically for minorities, may make treatment more difficult today than it was when youth employment was higher (see Feldman for a review of psychoanalytical interpretations of criminal behavior).

Another approach which places the responsibility of antisocial behavior, unemployability, and school failure on the individual points to the person whose inadequacy derived from inherited incapability. The logic of such thinking goes like this: the genetically inferior lack the ability to succeed in school and are only marginally employable in a technological society. In the absence of supportive environment, such persons are likely to become delinquents. Inherited predispositions to crime is not a new idea. The theme has been present throughout recorded history. Burt, whose work has been instrumental

in the renaissance of genetic interpretations of behavior, argued that heredity was of equal importance to environment in the cause of criminal behavior (Burt, p. 605). In recent years, the genetic argument has been resurrected to explain school failure and particularly the differential success of whites compared to blacks and other minorities (Jensen). The genetic inferiority argument is violently debated. There is no agreement on facts, and at present there is little social policy implication in the thesis other than a caveat not to educate persons beyond their capacity to learn; but since the essence of the debate is disagreement over how much persons can learn, the caveat is not particularly helpful. Still functioning as part of policy and social outlook is the environmental deficit thesis that undergirded so much of the "war on poverty." "Operation Headstart" and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act were designed to overcome early life deprivations of an impoverished language, lack of intellectual stimulation, dietary deficiencies, and an absence of books in the home. All of this allegedly ill-prepared a child for school, leading to school failures and marginal employability two decades later (Hunt; Deutsch). The logical consequence of this thesis is that youth who do not compensate for their early deficiencies become alienated in school and thus are difficult to employ; they are also likely to become delinquent. The thesis remains, but a decade and a half of emphasis on compensatory education has produced unspectacular results. Although children in many Headstart programs and a more recent companion program, Operation Follow-Through, are able to make substantial progress in academic achievement while in the programs, there is no evidence that such gains can be sustained throughout an academic career (Scheffli; Stearns; Barnow and Cain).

Behaviorists, especially those who follow B. F. Skinner, have also had an important influence on policy and understanding of the employment of delinquents. The mechanistic behaviorists believe that delinquency is solely the outcome of the environment. Accordingly, persons become delinquent when their behaviors are not treated appropriately or consistently in the environment. Delinquency occurs because it is rewarded, and desired behavior does not occur because it is not rewarded. The appropriate behavior can be shaped by organizing the environment so that there are clear contingencies for desired and undesired behavior. Unlike either the conservative or the radical, who believe that the criminals are rational and know what they are doing, the mechanistic

behaviorist argues that behavior is basically nonrational. To the behaviorists, it is not people who are good or bad, but environments that are good or bad. A typical behaviorist experiment goes like this: a token economy is established, youths receive points, poker chips (sometimes the economy is not token and youth receive money for acting appropriately) for meeting behavioral objectives. The environment is carefully ordered and persons are expected to perform specific acts at specific times for which they are rewarded. B. F. Skinner calls this a science of behavior. Students who learn to act right can cash in their tokens they receive for privileges. The behaviorists claim to have had considerable success with such programs. Phillips, Phillips, Fixsen, and Wolfe claim that one behavior-shaping program, i.e., Achievement Place, produced far fewer reinvolvements with crime after three years than occurred with control youths randomly assigned to probation or to a boy's school (a youth prison). There was markedly less recidivism, better school attendance, and better school achievement after two years in the behaviorist program than in either probation or the boy's school control groups. Similar claims of success have been made by Schwitzgebel and others. Behaviorists have also been highly criticized for their mechanistic understanding of people which tends to oversimplify the problem and the solution. They are also criticized for developing programs that artificially remove youths from society, thus not enabling them to be sustained in the natural environment. Behaviorists admit that the last consideration may be a problem. Wolfe, for example, a leader among behaviorists, admits that the positive effects may in effect be only transient.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING PERSPECTIVE

Many view schooling to be a cause of delinquency and also an influence on unemployment. Polk and Schaefer have identified a number of influences in the school which they believe lead to delinquency and school failure, and that in a credentialled society have an impact on opportunity for legitimate employment. Specifically mentioned as delinquency-producing are the following school practices: (1) belief in limited potential of disadvantaged pupils; (2) irrelevant instruction, inappropriate teaching methods, testing, grouping and "tracking," inadequate compensatory and remedial education, inferior teachers and facilities in low-income schools, and economic and social segregation (Polk and

Schaefer, pp. 185-209). To Polk and Schaefer and their co-workers, the school which encourages delinquency through demeaning and discouraging certain students continues the process once the student becomes a troublemaker in the school.

According to Polk and Schaefer, a student once identified as a problem is further jeopardized. The treatment such a student receives increases rather than decreases the likelihood of further trouble. Administrators and teachers tend to blame these students for every untoward incident in the school. Furthermore, once labeled as troublemakers, the label influences how such students behave and how others treat them. In the classroom, teachers most typically try to ignore such students. Which means, in effect, that teachers no longer try to teach them. Teachers frequently do little or nothing to utilize community resources to help. Such students tend to be shuffled off from one agency to another (Polk and Schaefer, pp. 221-235). Polk and Schaefer suggest that the processes that lead youth into delinquency are precisely those that lead them out of work opportunities and, in particular, he criticizes educational "tracking" which disqualifies "low track" youth from professional careers. Tracking thus restricts mobility or even the opportunity to work. When these impediments are added to juveniles with delinquency records, their prospects look extremely bleak (Polk and Schaefer). The basic criticism of the school as a major source of the problem comes from three diverse positions.

There are those who argue that the school is too marginal an institution to have any effect on employment or delinquency (Jenks, p. 265). There are those who insist that schools remain the single most important equalizer in human life and have been unfairly and irresponsibly savaged by the left and right (Ravitch). Finally, there are the traditionalists who believe that the problem has been fabricated by various forms of instigators and rabble-rousers who have stirred up students and thus have acted to distort what school is really for--the learning of the "three R's," the learning of appropriate manners and deportment, and the learning of patriotism (Rafferty).

Crime and unemployment appear to be linked to education. The nature of that relationship is not easily untangled, but some factors appear to hold up over time. Youth who do well in school are more likely to be employed, and youth who do well in school are also less likely to be delinquent. This relationship tends to be more marked for minority groups. It appears also that there are clear inequities in the job market. Whereas a nonwhite person

with one to three years of college is much better off in the job market than are minorities with less education, that same advantage does not continue when competing with whites. In 1976, the nonwhite with one to three years of college had a 23.2 percent unemployment rate, which was higher than the unemployment rate of whites with less than a high school education (see Figure 1, p. 21). Figure 1 indicates that:

- Unemployment rates are highest for high school dropouts, especially for nonwhites.
- Nonwhite youth unemployment rates are higher than those of whites for all comparable education categories except the college graduates group.
- In some cases, increasing levels of educational attainment result in lower rates of unemployment. This is true for whites, but for nonwhites the unemployment rate is actually slightly higher for those with one to three years of college than for those who are high school graduates.


Another significant aspect of the relationship of education and training to employment is educational effect of employment to adolescent development. Emerging theory concerning adolescent development has begun to recognize the importance of work in preparing adolescents for adulthood. Research has indicated that work has both a direct and indirect influence on adolescent development. However, it has been pointed out by Ingoldsby and Adams (p. 339) that, paradoxically, relatively few empirical, theoretical, or conceptual articles have appeared on this topic. Furthermore, the lack of research in this area leaves a great void in understanding work for pay as an important bridge between childhood and full adult status. More research is needed on the psychological consequences of early work experiences upon adolescent and adult development (Ingoldsby and Adams, p. 340).

THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PERSPECTIVE

Focusing on Delinquency

The notion that the delinquent is a different kind of person than the nondelinquent and that these characteristics would also affect his/her employability has a long history. The logic of the argument is that in a free society where everyone is treated equally or fairly much so, the differences with such

FIGURE 1
UNEMPLOYMENT BY EDUCATION AND RACE
AGES 16 TO 24
(OCTOBER 1976)



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment.
Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington,
D.C., 1979).

Figure constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Insti-
tute, 1980).

things as delinquency and unemployment must stem primarily from differences in the individual. Individual responsibility for behavior is deeply rooted in U.S. tradition and folklore, and it is also embedded in academic and applied psychology as discussed above. The perspective which focuses on delinquency and unemployment has resulted in divergent conclusions. Before presenting some of the major findings in this area, it would be useful to first present the conceptual and theoretical basis for the major perspectives on juvenile delinquency.

The National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention grant funded project) presented the relevant conceptual theories by classifying them into five subject areas:

- Social control theories: linking delinquency to a breakdown in adequate social controls.
- Subcultural theories: linking delinquency to the development and maintenance of delinquency subcultures.
- Psychological theories: linking delinquency to inadequacy of personality, attitudes, and character.
- Biological bases of delinquent behavior: linking delinquency to inadequacy of inherited or physiological incapacities.
- Labeling theory: linking delinquency to the negative effects of identifying a juvenile as a delinquent.

Social Control

There are three major social control perspectives of delinquent behavior: (1) control theories, (2) social structural disorganization, and (3) cultural disorganization. All three rest on the idea that "deregulation" and "mal-integration" are vital explanations of delinquent behavior, but each emphasizes different aspects of ineffective social control. "A society is integrated" to the extent that its members are morally bonded to each other through interaction, a commitment to common societal goals, and sharing a "collective conscience (or 'culture')" (National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, p. 13).

- Control theory asserts that delinquency occurs when an individual's moral bonds to the conventional order are weak, broken, or absent. While not limited to social class, it is obvious that much of the life of disadvantaged persons involves an absence of bonds to the conventional order.
- Social structural disorganization theory finds that the frustrated desire to conform to the conventional order causes nonconformity. "Ironically, this motive seems to be generated among individuals who aspire to conventional values but are denied the opportunity to acquire them" (National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, p. 14).

Aspects of all of the above sub-theories are indicated by:

- cultural exaggeration of the goal of pecuniary success
- class differential in access to legitimate means of achieving a good life
- aspirations unfulfilled generates stress, anxiety, and frustration
- in frustration, the goal of status is sublimated for the conventional goals which are denied.

Focusing on the social structure and changing the social conditions that create unequal opportunity has been and seems to be the most promising strategy of intervention. "For inequality of access to legitimate opportunities may be the consequence of class position, race, family socialization, school experience, employment opportunities, and community environment" (National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, p. 20). There is less hope that attempting to devalue cultural goals or to regulate people's aspirations would be successful.

Delinquency as a Subculture

A subculture is held to be delinquent if delinquent activities are essential requirements for the performance of the dominant roles among the peer group. Primary causal emphasis is placed on the social conditions that produce the criminal or delinquent. These social conditions include middle-class expectations for lower-class juveniles, opportunity structures, and cultural beliefs about the use of violence.

Subculture theory assumes that delinquency is the consequence of a conflict of conduct norms, e.g., the rules which govern specific life situations

of persons in one group may disagree with those of another group. While economic class is often the dividing line between social groups, in recent years the divisions are also seen occurring between teenage youth in all classes and parents regarding drug use, hair styles, dress, and sexual behavior.

The conflict of norms is often the product of the encounter between lower-class and middle-class expectations. Normative conflict can also exist absent any actual direct encounter between the classes, as, for example, a response to the general media (i.e., movies, magazines, newspaper).

The principle contrast of subcultural theory with other theories is that it does not conclude that a general reordering of the dominant social order is a necessary step for the prevention of delinquency. Rather, the position of subculturists is that contemporary social institutions have both functional and dysfunctional consequences. For example, middle-class schools may be quite functional for educating middle-class youth, but dysfunctional for lower classes in that they produce greater frustrations and consequently delinquent subcultures. This orientation, therefore, would support social action which ameliorates or compensates for the dysfunction rather than attempting to reorder the system itself.

From this perspective, insofar as employment is concerned, action planning should be concerned with initiating, expanding, and improving vocational training programs designed to provide jobs in the present economy.

Psychological Theories of Delinquency

Delinquent behavior as seen by psychological theory is the manifestation of processes which occur in the individual. Such theory need not be seen as an alternative to or in conflict with social control theory. Rather, it may be complementary to social control theories. For example, behavioral restrictions in schools may be interpreted differently by students with various psychological orientations.

An aspect of psychological theory is learning theory or operant conditioning. The basic learning theory premise is that rewarded behavior is learned easier than non-rewarded behavior. Some successes are reported in small and large group learning theory applications (e.g., token economy models in institutional programs). Applications to juvenile delinquents on probation who are in need of employment would tend to be individualized between a trained

probation officer and each client in a specialized caseload. Other psychological techniques may also be more appropriate in selected areas, such as in dealing with the juvenile's family or the organization of a vocational training group of juveniles who share a common, undesirable psychological characteristic.

Biological Bases of Delinquent Behavior

This approach is also oriented to the individual rather than social group. It is evident that there are probably delinquents and criminals whose behavior (e.g., violent behavior) is related to focal brain lesions deriving from viral encephalites, head injuries resulting in damage to the temporal lobe, tumors of the limbic system, and temporal lobe epilepsy.

The list of organic or biological based physical aberrations is lengthy. Many are responsive to treatment. Considerably more resources would be necessary to screen delinquents by various specialized medical examinations to identify brain dysfunctions by electroencephalograph, chromosomal analysis, and hormone analysis. This appears to be unwarranted, for although the knowledge obtained may be useful for special referrals, they would probably be relatively rare.

Labeling Theory

Most efforts to prevent delinquency are based on the premise that delinquency is derived from preexisting socioeconomic, psychological, or biological conditions in need of correction in order to halt further delinquency. Labeling theory instead focuses on the process by which individuals are defined as delinquents and such reactive factors as the youth's self-concept and the harmful impact of the juvenile justice system on many clients.

Sometimes chance is involved in situations which result in one juvenile being arrested and another escaping detention. If they are both from similar socioeconomic racial and religious backgrounds, and educational performance, for example, labeling theory may help explain the subsequent delinquency of one and the absence of further delinquency of the other. "The deviant is then the one to whom that label has been successfully applied" (National Task Force to Develop Standards and Goals for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, p. 135).

The process of labeling is viewed as a self-fulfilling one which can in many cases be avoided. A juvenile apprehended for a deviant act may interpret the response of society as confirming him as a "deviant," thus causing his continued deviant behavior. This is also referred to as "stigmatization."

Self-reporting of delinquent acts has been a major approach research on the prevalence and characteristics of deviant and non-deviant juveniles. It is often found that there is extensive (self-reported) deviance spread across class and racial subgroups, but that under certain conditions, one group (usually white students) are detected, arrested, and severely punished less than other groups. Labeling theory suggests that the labeling process can result not only from the police or the juvenile court, but also from the behavior of school teachers and administrators. Nominally the stigmatizing labels such as "disrespectful" and "tough guy" may be enough for some juveniles to lead them (without intervention) directly into more serious deviancy and delinquency.

Another connection is evident between labeling (self-image) and the experience of protracted unemployment. In another report by Llad Phillips, the experience of unemployment confirms both radical attitudes (paranoia) and self-depreciation (Phillips).

THE UNEMPLOYMENT-JUVENILE DELINQUENT RELATIONSHIP

One of the major impediments to research on the relationship of unemployment to juvenile delinquency is the difficulty in obtaining an adequate representation of juvenile delinquency. A predominant cause of this inadequacy is due to the wide disparity in the use of the juvenile delinquency label, since definitions of juvenile delinquency and their application vary widely. In spite of this methodological limitation, a number of researchers have attempted to examine the relationship of juvenile delinquency and unemployment. The following is a summary of research and findings in this area.*

*This summary is taken from Juvenile Delinquency, Work and Education, National Manpower Institute, Washington, D.C., August 1976, by Paul Barton. For a more detailed analysis of crime, economics, and unemployment research comparisons, see "Economic Factors in Crime and Delinquency: A Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence," Final report submitted to the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, September 15, 1975, by Robert W. Gillespie.

- Using time series arrest data for Boston, Cincinnati, and Chicago, Belton Fleisher found that the evidence suggests a rather important relationship between unemployment and delinquency, which is only slightly supported by U.S. trend data for younger youths and slightly more so for older youths. Fleisher estimates from the combined data that a 1-percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated, on the average, with an approximate .15-percent increase in the rate of delinquency (arrest rate) (Fleisher, p. 83).
- In an international study of the relationship of unemployment to crime and delinquency, Marcia Guttentag found juvenile crime to be related to industrialization and economic affluence, with noted exceptions in Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium. Accordingly, she states that, "When we turn to the evidence of the relationship between juvenile crime and male unemployment rates, the picture is unclear; studies lead to contradictory conclusions." She particularly points to the multiple sources of error in the statistics, the fact that many behaviors which are considered delinquency in the U.S. would not be crimes if committed by adults, such as truancy, running away, or, in the case of girls, precocious sexual behavior. (This double standard for youth is not found in most European countries.) Guttentag's review finds that "there is a considerable amount of data which appears to substantiate each divergent view" as to whether "high delinquency rates result from the limited opportunities, the frustration and despair of poverty, or...follow in the wake of industrialization, economic well being and high employment" (Guttentag, pp. 106-107).
- Guttentag cites the study by Bogen using Los Angeles Juvenile Court statistics from 1925 to 1941 in which he found a decline in boys' delinquency rates which coincided with a decline in business activity (Bogen).
- A study by Porterfield using cross-sectional data found an immense relationship between economic well-being and the juvenile crime rate. In the final analysis of the data, however, the conclusion was that social disorganization--not economic well-being--was the critical variable in the juvenile crime rate (Porterfield).
- A related study is that of Lander in Baltimore who hypothesized that the delinquency rate was not a matter of the economics of an area, but rather was a function of its anomic character. Using 1940 census tract data, Lander's hypothesis was confirmed: delinquency was fundamentally related only to anomic and not to the socioeconomic conditions of the area. A study by Bordua in 1959 is reported by Guttentag to have reached a similar conclusion (Lander; Bordua).
- A recent study by Phillips, Votey, and Maxwell concluded that "economic opportunity is a key factor in generating youthful crime and that, property weighted, participation rates may be a better measure of economic opportunity than simply unemployment rates." They found that in distinguishing between youth in the labor force and those not, the "latter group appears the most criminal." (Causal relationships

are difficult to infer from these findings. Could one as well say that those who commit crimes also do not work or look for work as frequently as those who do not commit crimes?) (Phillips, Votey, and Maxwell).

- Using 1960 Census Tract Data for Detroit (a cross-sectional study) Larry Singell finds no statistically significant relationships between unemployment and juvenile delinquency ("contacts" with the Youth Bureau of the Detroit Police Department) after controlling for differences among tracts in socioeconomic class.
- Singell also analyzes time series data for Detroit from 1950 to 1961, using police contacts and employment service estimates of city unemployment. While Singell estimates that a cut of 1 percent in the rate of unemployment would lead to a drop in delinquency rates of from one-fourth to one-sixth of 1 percent, the estimates are based on correlations which yielded r^2 in one case of only 4 percent and the other only 8 percent, which is a very slight shared variance (Singell).

These studies indicate that unemployment, either after controlling for socioeconomic class and anomie, bore no relationship, or that juvenile delinquency moved opposite to unemployment, advancing in good times and receding in bad. Some found delinquency rising with rising unemployment, although the degree of correlation was reported to be quite weak. None of the studies have a reliable measure of delinquency, and all seem based on arrests or "police contacts." Where relationships are demonstrated, none are terribly convincing in terms of the degree of association between the delinquency and some index of opportunity. Some are straight statistical exercises and some attempt theoretical explanations. Practically all wish they had better data (for example, the Singell study preferred youth unemployment data but it was not available for Detroit; the "police contact" data is recognized as weak, and Singell states that "anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of those [police] contacts may not lead to legal action").

The problems with utilizing these studies for policy development are many (see Tropp, pp. 24-27). Consider the following interpretation problems of data on the delinquency and employment relationship:

- The "collinearity" problem--in many cases it is likely that delinquency and unemployment are both effects of a third factor or accumulation of numerous factors, rather than one being cause and the other effect.

- The similarity problem--unemployment may be an effect as well as a cause of delinquency. Both factors may simultaneously determine one another.
- The subject nature of the effects of unemployment--the impact of unemployment on youth behavior will vary as to the interpretation given the unemployment by the youth. For some youths, being unemployed and out of school may have a dramatic impact on their self image and levels of frustration. For other youth, the period of unemployment may be perceived as temporary and natural.
- Aggregate unemployment data may mask differences among individuals--it is dangerous to try to draw conclusions or determine strategies for individuals from aggregate data. Vast differences between unemployed youth are often hidden by summary data or data which reports only selected variables.
- Unemployment rates may be an artifact of reporting systems--large numbers of unemployed youth are not actually in the labor force, therefore not identified as "unemployed" by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Levitan, pp. 22-23). In addition, delinquency rates are also effected by police and court actions.

Therefore, unemployment and delinquency studies have not been able to provide reliable and useable data for policymakers. As stated by Tropp, "The bottom line seems to be that, on balance, the evidence does not support the conclusion that unemployment is either robustly correlated with, or a major cause of, either property crime or violent crime, by either juveniles or adults, either at the point of first offense or after release from incarceration" (Tropp, p. 27). The best that can be said at this time is that although delinquency and unemployment may not be causally related or correlated, unemployment is among the many factors which, in combination, increase the likelihood of delinquency. It may not in many cases be a sufficient factor leading directly to delinquency. On the other hand, providing a meaningful opportunity for employment may resolve problems which either singularly or in combination lead to delinquency.

CONCLUSION

There are numerous perspectives on youth unemployment, each with their underlying assumptions, theory, and limited empirical evidence. In spite of their similarities or differences, it appears quite evident that singular efforts to combat youth unemployment or crime will be largely futile. The problems of youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency are complex, requiring

massive efforts to deal with related underlying social problems; however, it appears evident that although empirical research cannot clearly define the relationship between juvenile delinquency and unemployment, efforts to deal with one problem must include the other. Effective strategies and programs which deal with youth crime or youth unemployment must also consider major social, cultural, and political developments. Considering the complexity of these social problems, remedies or interventions would probably be effective for only a segment of the total youth population. Therefore, innovations and experiments should be tried along with analytic evaluations to provide information regarding what works, for whom, under what circumstances, and why or why not. This topic will be discussed in the following chapter.

III. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to get an accurate picture of the employment situation of youth are difficult. They are difficult for many reasons. First of all, many youth are either excluded from the data or included with numerous conditions. For example, U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics are usually compiled from contacts of the State department of employment by job seekers or those filing for unemployment insurance. Many youth fail to utilize State employment departments after learning that, except for seasonal projects, they have few listings for entry or trainee jobs for the unskilled. In addition, having not entered the labor market or having worked for limited periods such as part-time work after school, they do not qualify for unemployment insurance. In spite of these problems with estimates of youth unemployment it is conservatively acknowledged that more than 12 percent of all 16- to 24-year-olds in the U.S. labor force are unemployed. Furthermore, nearly one-half of the unemployed in the U.S. are in this age group (U.S. Congress, p. 1).

Estimates of unemployment among 16- to 19-year-olds appear worse. According to the Department of Labor, by midyear 1975 unemployment for 16- to 19-year-olds was 21.2 percent for males and 19.6 percent for females (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976, p. 52). An analysis of unemployment rates for this age group from 1948 to 1976 by Williams indicates that unemployment has generally continued to increase (Williams, 1977, p. 1). "In no year during 1948-76 did male or female teenage unemployment rates ever fall below the 7 percent level which was approached in 1953" (Williams, 1977, p. 1). Unemployment for 16- to 24-year-olds has averaged five times that of the civilian labor force over 25 years old. Even more dramatic is the fact that while youths (16 to 24) comprise 25 percent (22 million) of the labor force, they represent 50 percent of total unemployment (Williams, 1977, p. 2). Therefore, while estimates of youth unemployment probably tend to underestimate their rate of unemployment, it is still so high as to cause serious national concern. The problem of youth unemployment also becomes alarming considering that national rates of youth unemployment tend to mask vast differences among subgroups of youths (e.g., black and other minorities, urban, and delinquent youth) as well as the social and psychological costs of unemployment.

This chapter will examine youth unemployment by considering these disparities, the scope of the problem, and the major characteristics of unemployed youth from the perspective of juvenile delinquency and the juvenile justice system.

NONWHITE YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

An analysis of the racial composition of youth unemployment points out a great disparity between white and black unemployment. Black youths constitute a little over 11.5 percent of the 16 to 24 age civilian labor force. The unemployment rate for the entire 16 to 24 youth population (1975) was 17 percent; black youth unemployment was over 28 percent. About 365,000 black teenagers (16 to 19) or nearly 40 percent of the black labor force of that age are jobless (Williams, 1977, p. 2).


In 1978, a Congressional Budget Office report estimated that unemployment for nonwhite teenagers is almost three times the rate for white teenagers, and while white teenage unemployment has declined since the 1975 research, the rate for nonwhite teenagers has not declined at all (Williams, 1977, p. xiii). These statistics on racial disparity of black youth unemployment become even more significant considering that the nonwhite youth population is increasing at a faster rate than the white youth population (see Figure 2, p. 35).

According to the Carnegie Council, "the number of nonwhite youths potentially subject to some form of inequality of opportunity will rise from 15.8 percent of the population aged 16 to 21 in 1980 to 18.7 percent in 1990 and then stabilize at about that proportion" (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 3). The Hispanic youth population is also growing rapidly and will form a rising percentage of the total youth population.

The Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment has issued some recent data comparing the trend line of youth employment from 1954 to 1978 inclusive (see Figure 3, p. 37). This figure, entitled "Who's Losing Ground?", provides trend lines on the employment/population ratios from 1954 through 1978 of whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the age group 16 to 24 years. While both blacks and Hispanics have a lower employment/population ratio than whites, it is most significant that the proportion of black population employed has dropped steadily over the time period at about the same rate that the white employment population increased.


FIGURE 2

THE COMING CHALLENGE : POPULATION COMPARISONS THROUGH 1990



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference
on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

FIGURE 3
WHO'S LOSING GROUND?
EMPLOYMENT/POPULATION RATIOS OVER 25 YEARS



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment.
Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C.,
1979).

This figure would be considerably more dramatic if the trend lines were drawn for the age group of 16 to 19. By including the 20 to 25 age group, the disparity of change is considerably smoothed.

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A comparison of youth and general unemployment by race (Table 3, p. 39) for the period 1948 to 1978 by Williams (1978, p. 13) reveals some important points:

- For the years 1951-1954, the black 16 to 17 age group had an unemployment rate lower than white unemployment for the same age group.
- For black 18- to 19-year-olds, the unemployment rates for the same period were higher than those of their white counterparts.
- For blacks 20 to 24, their unemployment rate relative to that of whites has not changed significantly for the period 1948-1975. It has always been at least twice as high.

Hispanic youth, who are a composite of many diverse groups, have unemployment rates that are much larger than whites, but almost half the rates of black youth (see Figure 3, p. 37). However, there are substantial differences in unemployment within the groups of Spanish-origin youths. That unemployment rate for Puerto Rican youths tends to be quite close to that for black youths. While still higher than the average for all youths, the unemployment rate for Mexican-American youths seems to be much closer to the average for all youths. Spanish-origin youths, such as Cubans and Latin Americans, had an unemployment rate lower than the average for all youths. Some of the reasons for the above-average unemployment among most groups of Spanish-origin youths include educational disadvantages, language barriers, discrimination, location, and the fact that a significant number of Mexican-American youths are employed as migratory farmworkers--a sector of the economy that has high frictional and high seasonal employment.*

Another possible effect on Hispanic youth unemployment rates could be problems with data collection. Hispanic employment data is less reliable for a number of reasons:

- Hispanics were not a racial category for most basic employment data classifications until 1968.
- The demographic base is unstable due to the large number of unregistered aliens in the U.S. job market, and some ambiguities in defining Hispanics (e.g., by Spanish surname).

*See "A Profile of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force," by M. J. Newman.

TABLE 3

**Comparison of Youth and General Unemployment
by Race (Males)**

| Year | General | White 16-17 | Black 16-17 | B/W Ratio | White 18-19 | Black 18-19 | B/W Ratio | White 20-24 | Black 20-24 | B/W Ratio |
|--------|---------|----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1948 | 3.8 | 10.2 | 9.4 | .92 | 9.4 | 10.5 | 1.11 | 6.4 | 11.7 | 1.83 |
| 1949 | 5.9 | 13.4 | 15.8 | 1.18 | 14.2 | 17.1 | 1.20 | 9.8 | 15.8 | 1.61 |
| *1950 | 5.3 | 13.4 | 12.1 | .90 | 11.7 | 17.7 | 1.51 | 7.7 | 12.6 | 1.64 |
| 1951 | 3.3 | 9.5 | 8.7 | .92 | 6.7 | 9.6 | 1.43 | 3.6 | 6.7 | 1.86 |
| 1952 | 3.0 | 10.9 | 8.0 | .73 | 7.0 | 10.0 | 1.43 | 4.3 | 7.9 | 1.84 |
| 1953 | 2.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | .93 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 1.14 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 1.80 |
| 1954 | 5.5 | 14.0 | 13.4 | .96 | 13.0 | 14.7 | 1.13 | 9.8 | 16.9 | 1.72 |
| 1955 | 4.4 | 12.2 | 14.8 | 1.21 | 10.4 | 12.9 | 1.24 | 7.0 | 12.4 | 1.77 |
| *1956 | 4.1 | 11.2 | 15.7 | 1.40 | 9.7 | 14.9 | 1.54 | 6.1 | 12.0 | 1.97 |
| 1957 | 4.3 | 11.9 | 16.3 | 1.37 | 11.2 | 20.0 | 1.70 | 7.1 | 12.7 | 1.79 |
| 1958 | 6.8 | 14.9 | 27.1 | 1.81 | 16.5 | 26.7 | 1.62 | 11.7 | 19.5 | 1.66 |
| 1959 | 5.5 | 15.0 | 22.3 | 1.48 | 13.0 | 27.2 | 2.09 | 7.5 | 16.3 | 2.17 |
| 1960 | 5.5 | 14.6 | 22.7 | 1.55 | 13.5 | 25.1 | 1.86 | 8.3 | 13.1 | 1.58 |
| *1961 | 6.7 | 16.5 | 31.0 | 1.89 | 15.1 | 23.9 | 1.58 | 10.0 | 15.3 | 1.53 |
| 1962 | 5.5 | 15.1 | 21.9 | 1.45 | 12.7 | 21.8 | 1.72 | 8.0 | 14.6 | 1.83 |
| *1963 | 5.7 | 17.8 | 27.0 | 1.52 | 14.2 | 27.4 | 1.83 | 7.8 | 15.5 | 1.99 |
| 1964 | 5.2 | 16.1 | 25.9 | 1.61 | 13.4 | 23.1 | 1.72 | 7.4 | 12.6 | 1.70 |
| 1965 | 4.5 | 14.7 | 27.1 | 1.84 | 11.4 | 20.2 | 1.77 | 5.9 | 9.3 | 1.58 |
| 1966 | 3.8 | 12.5 | 22.5 | 1.80 | 8.9 | 20.5 | 2.30 | 4.1 | 7.9 | 1.93 |
| *1967 | 3.8 | 12.7 | 28.9 | 2.26 | 9.0 | 20.1 | 2.23 | 4.2 | 8.0 | 1.90 |
| *1968 | 3.6 | 12.3 | 26.6 | 2.16 | 8.2 | 19.0 | 2.31 | 4.6 | 8.3 | 1.80 |
| 1969 | 3.5 | 12.5 | 24.7 | 1.98 | 7.9 | 19.0 | 2.40 | 4.6 | 8.4 | 1.83 |
| 1970 | 4.9 | 15.7 | 27.8 | 1.77 | 12.0 | 23.1 | 1.93 | 7.8 | 12.6 | 1.62 |
| 1971 | 5.9 | 17.1 | 33.4 | 1.95 | 13.5 | 26.0 | 1.93 | 9.4 | 16.2 | 1.72 |
| 1972 | 5.6 | 16.4 | 35.1 | 2.14 | 12.4 | 26.2 | 2.11 | 8.5 | 14.7 | 1.73 |
| 1973 | 4.9 | 15.1 | 34.4 | 2.28 | 10.0 | 22.1 | 2.21 | 6.5 | 12.6 | 1.94 |
| *1974 | 5.6 | 16.2 | 39.0 | 2.41 | 11.5 | 26.6 | 2.31 | 7.8 | 15.4 | 1.97 |
| *1975 | 8.1 | 19.7 | 45.2 | 2.29 | 14.0 | 30.1 | 2.15 | 11.3 | 23.5 | 2.08 |
| *1976 | 7.0 | 19.7 | 40.6 | 2.06 | 15.5 | 35.5 | 2.29 | 10.9 | 22.4 | 2.05 |
| 1977 | 6.8 | 17.6 | 38.7 | 2.20 | 13.0 | 36.1 | 2.78 | 9.3 | 21.7 | 2.33 |
| **1978 | 6.6 | 19.4 | 50.4 | 2.59 | 13.0 | 32.2 | 2.47 | 10.0 | 22.5 | 2.25 |

*Shows change in the Federal minimum wage law.

**March 1978.

Source: Williams, W. E. "Government Sanctioned Restraints That Reduce Economic Opportunities for Minorities." Policy Review (July 1978):1-29.

The Location of Youth Unemployment

The growing black/white unemployment disparity is greatest for the 16- to 19-year-old age group, and is a factor in the development of a black youth subculture. Unemployment data underrepresent the seriousness of the youth unemployment rate in general, and the disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities specifically. There are two reasons for this: (1) the general problem of underreporting of unemployment in the 16- to 19-year-old age group, and (2) the higher concentration of unemployment in the urban area.

The Vice President's Task Force (see Figure 4, p. 43, on "The Location of Youth Unemployment"), using the "smoothed out" 16 to 24 year age range, shows the percent of unemployed blacks 16 to 24 is lowest in suburban areas (18.3 percent), next highest in non-metro areas (21.3 percent), and highest in urban areas (60.4 percent) (see Figure 5, p. 45). Therefore, teenage employment in the city is much higher than it is in the suburbs or rural areas, especially for the central city black. As Table 4 (below) shows, for 1975 the gap between black and white unemployment for teenage males is much greater in the inner city than it is in the suburbs or in rural areas. Unemployment for black females is more than twice that of white females regardless of location.


TABLE 4
PERCENT UNEMPLOYED BY SEX, RACE, AND TYPE OF AREA
U.S. 1975, AGES 16 to 19

| AREA | MALES | | | FEMALES | | |
|------------------------|-------|-------|------------|---------|-------|------------|
| | White | Black | Difference | White | Black | Difference |
| Central City | 21.4% | 44.9% | 23.5% | 19.0% | 40.4% | 21.4% |
| Suburbs | 18.9% | 35.1% | 16.2% | 16.6% | 41.9% | 25.3% |
| Non-Metropolitan Areas | 15.6% | 28.7% | 13.1% | 17.4% | 40.8% | 23.4% |

Source: Westcott, D. H. "Youth in the Labor Force: An Area Study." Monthly Labor Review (July 1976):3-9.


Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).

FIGURE 4
THE LOCATION OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
1978



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

FIGURE 5
THE IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION DENSITY IN RELATION TO THE NUMBER
OF UNEMPLOYED YOUTH (16-24)
1978



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).


Figure constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).

Youth Unemployment Compared to Adult Unemployment

According to the Vice President's Task Force, the total job gap for youth 16 to 19 was 6,273,000 in 1978. This figure may be better understood by knowing that the total number of youth employed (1977) was 7,610,000 (Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment, p. 191). As mentioned previously, these figures understate the problem by an unknown percentage of youth who have withdrawn from or never entered the "official employment market" (e.g., juveniles under 16 years of age). In addition, it is not to be assumed that youths are unemployed for as long as adults; in fact, many if not most unemployed youth have never been employed.

For example, adult employment (20 and over) was 6 million in 1977 (see Figure 6, p. 46). There are, however, two deflators and inflators of these figures: (1) the length of time unemployed, and (2) the number of "discouraged workers" (formerly unemployed who have withdrawn from the labor market) estimated at 975,000 by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1977. The median length of unemployment for adults in 1977 was "less than five weeks" (2,856,000), but over 1,900,000 were unemployed 15 weeks or more.

FIGURE 6



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

Thus, most unemployed adults become employed, usually before exhausting unemployment compensation benefits, whereas an unknown but high percentage of juveniles, particularly black and other disadvantaged ethnic groups, remain unemployed until they withdraw, return to school or to street crime.

Even in 1966 and 1967, when economic slack had been largely eliminated and labor markets were quite tight, teenage unemployment remained above the level of earlier prosperity periods. In 1967, persons aged 16 to 19 accounted for 8.5 percent of the labor force but for 28 percent of unemployment. However, unemployment rates reported for nonwhite teenagers were incredibly high, and their labor force participation rates were disturbingly low (Kalocheck, p. 2).

The substantial difference in unemployment rates between youth of different high school completion levels is presented in Table 5 (p. 47)--a difference which persists over their working life. It is unfortunate that such analysis could not be found for the 16- to 17-year-old population, or more current data located. It is known, however, that the 1963 employment rates were slightly less disparate between black and white, and about one-half the rate for blacks in 1978 (see Figure 7, p. 47).

TABLE 5

UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF THE
POPULATION, BY AGE AND YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED (1964)*

| YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED | 18-19 | 20-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | TOTAL 18 YEARS AND OLDER |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------------------|
| UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (PERCENT) | | | | | | |
| High School | | | | | | |
| 1-3 Years | 18.3 | 14.1 | 6.7 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 7.2 |
| 4 Years | 12.2 | 7.6 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 4.8 |
| LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES | | | | | | |
| High School | | | | | | |
| 1-3 Years | 45.5 | 59.4 | 64.4 | 69.9 | 71.9 | 60.8 |
| 4 Years | 56.1 | 70.3 | 62.0 | 66.3 | 73.7 | 63.8 |


*In the period this table covers, the general unemployment rate was 5.2 percent.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Educational Attainment of Workers, by Dennis F. Johnson. Special Labor Force Report 53. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 519.

Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).

FIGURE 7

TEENAGE UNEMPLOYMENT BY RACE AND ETHNICITY (1ST QUARTER 1978)



*HISPANIC INCLUDES PUERTO RICANS, MEXICAN AMERICANS, CUBANS, AND OTHERS OF HISPANIC DESCENT.

Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

Significant Changes in the Youth Population

It is important to note that significant changes are taking place among youth, and these changes may have some impact on youth unemployment and juvenile delinquency. It appears that previous conceptions of adolescence no longer hold true. The period of adolescence is shortening, and for some youth may have actually disappeared. According to a recent article describing the results of a three-year study on adolescence, Ianni found:

"Adolescence appears to be elastic, stretching out for some people but disappearing in a snap for others. The social policy behaves as if everybody has this marvelous period of searching and seeking for their identity. That impression is not true.

"Pregnancies and marriages among teenagers are one example of this rush to adulthood. So is crime. [In an earlier national study of safe schools, Ianni found the seventh grade the most violent of all.]

"So is employment. Having a job appears the most important distinction--greater even than marriage or babies--in separating the men from the boys, the women from the girls. But, among economic classes where adult responsibilities are assumed early, a work-study program that pays young people to stay in school is trying to create a childhood dependency that has long been passed.

"Adolescence passes faster in urban areas, girls may no longer be speeding towards adulthood several steps ahead of boys. In lower class families, kids take on adult responsibilities, or irresponsibilities, at a much earlier age. As young as 9 or 10 years of age they are functioning as adults in some areas" (Ianni).

Changes in the youth population will bring new problems, however. According to a Carnegie Council study, the youth population will be decreasing throughout most of the period from now to 2,000 (The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 1). This gradual decline should make it possible to devote more resources to the solution of what have been intractable youth problems. In order for improvement to come, certain continuing youth problems will need to be addressed. The Carnegie Council identifies the following problems in need of further attention:

- Substantial dropout rates from high school continue--23 percent overall, 35 percent for blacks, 45 percent for Hispanics.
- High school is an alienating experience for many young people; like a prison--albeit with open doors--for some.

- Nearly one-half of today's high school students do not consider the work in school hard enough.
- A sense of dependency is carried on too long; and with it, a sense of rebellion against authority.
- The transition into permanent jobs in the labor market is difficult for many youths.
- More than 50 percent of all arrests are of youth under 25, and nearly 25 percent of those arrested are juveniles (under 18).
- Pockets of high and prolonged unemployment exist and will not be eradicated without special efforts--nearly 50 percent of all unemployment is accounted for by persons 24 and younger; and some pockets of youth have unemployment rates of 60 percent and higher.
- Nearly 6 percent of youth seem to have opted out of education, the labor market, and other customary pursuits.
- The number of non-white youths potentially subject to some form of inequality of opportunity will rise from 15.8 percent of the population aged 16 to 21 in 1980, to 18.7 percent in 1990, and stabilize at about that proportion. This is a rise of nearly 20 percent in the share of the age cohort. Counting Hispanics, the "minority" portion of the total youth population will be at least 25 percent and possibly as high as 30 percent in 2000.
- Those who fall behind are by no means all members of disadvantaged minority groups. The unemployment rate among low-income white youths is as high as among low-income black youths, and the school dropout rate of low-income white youths is even higher than of low-income blacks. In terms of numbers, disadvantaged white youths far exceed disadvantaged minority youths (emphasis added) (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, pp. 1-2).

The Carnegie report further notes that the "...already advantaged advance; the less advantaged tend to fall further behind; and social cleavage widens and social unrest accelerates" (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 4). The danger exists of creating a "permanent underclass, a self-perpetuating culture of poverty, a substantial and continuing lumpen-proletariat in the home of opportunity where every man is the equal of every other man." And the report adds:

"We are in danger of creating a set of policies that provides a substantially free ride financially for many of the successful and permits, if it does not ensure, a bum's rush for the unsuccessful in the race for

life chances.... We are spending a great deal more to help low income youth enter college than we are spending to help low income youth who are in high school, or who graduate from high school but do not enter college, or who drop out of school. Thus, there is a problem of inequity--the need to redress the balance.

"The quality and nature of the treatment of youth is an incisive commentary on the society in its entirety--on the family, the schools, the economy, the government, the culture, the beliefs of people, their standards of conduct toward one another. In its youth a society can see itself in a huge but distorted mirror--as in a fun palace. The mirror of youth reflects back to our society a whole series of visions--some beautiful, some horrendous" (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 5).

Youth Unemployment Will Remain a Problem

The Carnegie report (pp. 6-7) points out the overlooked fact that over 10 million young persons (under 25) have been added to the labor force since 1960. This includes over 10 million adult women; and perhaps five million legal and illegal immigrants. Higher education is reported to have absorbed 7.6 million additional persons since 1960. "The absorptive capacity of the labor market and of higher education over the past 20 years has been enormous; without it, what has been a difficult situation (about 1.2 million youth in the 16- to 21-year-old group unemployed but not in school) would have been an intolerable one.

The distribution of youth population reveals that the youth population 16 to 21 unemployed, in institutions and discouraged ("on the street") was 12.8 percent of the total population in 1979. To apportion this analysis to the 16 to 19 age group cannot be done by simply deriving the two proportions 16 to 19 and 20 to 21. It is known, however, that the younger group would constitute a higher proportion of out of school, unemployed, and discouraged, whereas the higher age group (20 to 24) would include disproportionately more employed, in the military service, and more young women as homemakers. From this an extrapolation built on the equal distribution of two-thirds of the 16 to 21 total would indicate that the 16 to 19 age group constitutes between 8 and 10 percent of the total population in the categories of out of school, unemployed, discouraged, and under institutional care.

The unemployment rates for recent (1977) high school graduates not in college and school dropouts indicates that the unemployment rate for high

school graduates in 1977 for whites was 13.1 percent, and for blacks 41.8 percent (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 9). For drop-outs, the total unemployment in October 1977 was 31.2 percent. Finally, the Carnegie Council study concludes that youth unemployment will remain a serious social problem which must be approached broadly with consideration of other deeper social problems for, while unemployment causes social problems, social problems also cause unemployment:

The public attention directed at unemployment has obscured the many other more serious problems. Youth in America is not suffering from a single malady (unemployment) and no single patent medicine (full employment) will cure the many illnesses. We have instead a growth, more like a cancer in our body politic--causes not fully known, cure not fully known. But it creates great pain in the suffering of ruined lives, crime, drug addiction, lost hopes, social fears, reduced productivity, raised social expenditures, and disdain for authority (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 11).

Although unemployment among youth is a persistent complex problem, it may appear to be becoming a more manageable problem due to decreases in the numbers of youth now and projected for the future. However, as the Carnegie Council points out, the problems of youth are also now more intractable, for they involve more of the many facets of society requiring more kinds of solutions--more ingenuity, more determination and devotion, more understanding (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 11). Therefore, efforts to deal with youth unemployment will require better planning, coordination of effort, and utilization of innovative programs. Unemployment must be approached more broadly, taking into consideration other problems and the efforts of others to deal with them.

TARGETING THE UNEMPLOYED ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT

For the purposes of this report, the "unemployed juvenile delinquent" is a person adjudicated as delinquent by the juvenile court and in the age range of 16 through 19 years. It is recognized that there are many employed and unemployed youth (in the ages of 14 through 15) employed in the few jobs available which are outside the Federal and State minimum wage laws, or involved in illegal employment at below applicable minimum wages, or involved

in casual or intermittent employment (termed "secondary employment"* in this report).

This age range is appropriate because it corresponds to a commonly used breakdown in U.S. census and Department of Labor reporting. It includes 18- and 19-year-olds since, although adjudication of juveniles by the juvenile court is typically prior to the eighteenth birthday, juvenile court jurisdiction through correctional supervision often continues through ages 18 and 19. Most new crimes by persons 18 and over who are under juvenile court supervision will be prosecuted in (adult) criminal courts. By targeting only a portion of the caseload of the juvenile justice system, a technical but small overlap exists with the caseload of the criminal justice system. There are, however, more serious problems in doing otherwise.

Despite vast improvements in the information systems of criminal and juvenile justice systems, gross inadequacies limit the development of an estimate of (1) the number of adjudicated juvenile delinquents in the community, and (2) the proportion of these who are in need of employment. Even this data, if available, would be inefficient because there is also a need to know:

- the age, race, and sex of the juvenile
- their school status (e.g., full-time student, in continuation school, not in any school)
- their home situation (residing with parents or others, employment status of parents and siblings)
- the number with disabling physical and mental conditions.

Such data is often available through Department of Labor and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration projects, but as extensive as some of these may be, none of the project data can be adjusted to provide the total workload of the juvenile court. This is because of the planned and unplanned screening of candidates entering the programs.

In spite of the numerous problems related to determining the extent of juvenile delinquency, some estimates are available. They should be interpreted with a recognition of their limitations.

*This term is in general use by many groups and projects involved in training and employment development of disadvantaged persons.

The National Juvenile Justice System Assessment Center (NJJSAC), as part of a special request report for the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment, found the following with regard to the involvement of the youth population in juvenile delinquency:

- "• During the period between 1968 and 1977, the total percentage of juvenile population arrested for all crimes increased from 8.9% to 10.2% among juveniles 13 - 17 years of age. This represented an increase of 14% during this ten year period. In the same period juvenile arrest rates for Part I crimes increased 25% which was nearly three times the rate of growth for less serious Part II offenses which only increased 8.5%. Overall, trend data indicates that since 1974 the total percentage of juvenile population arrested for all crime categories has leveled off at about 10.2% of the total at-risk population in the United States.
- "• Juveniles under 18 in 1977 accounted for 24% of all arrests for all crimes; 46.2% of all arrests for property crimes; 21% of all arrests for violent crimes. The peak age in 1977 for juveniles arrests under 18 for all crimes was 17; for property crimes 13 - 14; for violent crimes 17; and for status offenses, 13 - 14.
- "• Between 1968 and 1977, the male/female ratio among all juveniles arrested under 18 has remained nearly constant, with 78.5% of all crimes being committed by males and 21.5% by females. During the same ten year period, however, female arrest rates for all crimes increased significantly greater than male arrest rates (37.4% compared to 22.9%). Female arrest rates for Part I offenses increased even more dramatically in comparison to male arrest rates for Part I crimes (97.4% compared to 28.2%). Variations did occur in 1977 among specific offense categories with 70.6% male arrests for property crimes; 89.4% male arrests for violent crimes; and 53.9% male arrests for status offense arrests.
- "• Between 1968 and 1977, the racial composition among juveniles under 18 who had been arrested for all crimes remained nearly constant with 76.6% of the juveniles being white; 22.5% black; and 0.9% Indian and Asian descent. Changes in arrest rates for all crimes during the same time period show that proportionately more white juveniles under 18 were being arrested for Part I and Part II offenses compared to black juveniles. Part I arrest rates among white juveniles increased 14.9% compared to 9.6% for black juveniles. Correspondingly, Part II arrest rates for white youth increased 9.9% while arrest rates for black youth decreased 4.6%.
- "• The racial composition of juveniles under 18 arrested in 1977 revealed that 70.4% of the juveniles arrested for property crimes were white; 48.2% were white among those arrested for violent crimes; and 82.7% were white that were arrested for status offense incidents" (Smith, Black, Campbell, and Rooney, pp. 4-5).

Youth Unemployment and Juvenile Delinquency

Statistical data on the employment status of juvenile delinquents is becoming more available. Some highlights of the data will be discussed. Table 6 (below) compares the employment status of youth 16 to 19 in the U.S. population for 1978, with the employment status of youth (adjudicated delinquents) admitted to the California Youth Authority. Data from this table indicate that persons committed to the Youth Authority for the first time in 1977 were less likely to be employed than were youth in general. Only 19.4 percent of those committed were working at the time of the commission of the offense which lead them to the Youth Authority, and 44.2 percent were unemployed. This compares to 37.4 percent working and 19.4 percent unemployed in the general population of youth between the age of 16 to 19. An even smaller percentage of juveniles processed by the juvenile courts in Nebraska and Tennessee were employed than was the case in California (Smith, Black, Campbell, and Rooney).

TABLE 6
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FIRST-TIME COMMITMENTS TO
CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, 1977

| EMPLOYMENT STATUS | PERCENT OF COMMITMENTS ¹ | PERCENT IN U.S. POPULATION ² (AGES 16 TO 19) |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| Not in Job Market | 36.4% | 44.8% |
| Unemployed | 44.2% | 17.8% |
| Employed | 19.4% | 37.4% |

Sources:

1. California. Department of the Youth Authority. A Comparison of Admission Characteristics of First Commitments. (Sacramento, CA: Department of the Youth Authority, May 1979), p. 11.
2. U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 398 and 401.

Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).

The NJJSAC, as part of a special request for the Vice President's Task Force, found that:

"Based on a sample of 12,842 juveniles processed through juvenile courts in two jurisdictions during 1976, 8.4% were employed at the time of arrest. Among the juveniles in the sample that were not attending school, nearly 87.0% were unemployed at the time of arrest" (Smith, Black, Campbell, and Rooney, p. 6) (see Table 7, below).

TABLE 7
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF JUVENILES PROCESSED
THROUGH JUVENILE COURTS IN SAMPLE JURISDICTIONS
(1976)

| EMPLOYMENT AND SCHOOL STATUS | STATE/JURISDICTION | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|---------|---|---------|------------------|---------|
| | NEBRASKA ¹ | | TENNESSEE (SHELBY JUVENILE COURT) ² | | TOTAL ALL SAMPLE | |
| | NUMBER | PERCENT | NUMBER | PERCENT | NUMBER | PERCENT |
| UNEMPLOYED, NOT IN SCHOOL | 450 | 11.1 | 1,379 | 15.7 | 1,829 | 14.2 |
| UNEMPLOYED, IN SCHOOL | 2,758 | 68.2 | 7,166 | 81.5 | 9,924 | 77.3 |
| EMPLOYED, NOT IN SCHOOL | 220 | 5.4 | 54 | 0.6 | 274 | 2.1 |
| EMPLOYED, IN SCHOOL | 617 | 15.3 | 198 | 2.3 | 815 | 6.3 |
| TOTAL | 4,045 | 100.0 | 8,797 | 100.0 | 12,842 | 100.0 |

Source: Smith, C. P.; Black, T. E.; Campbell, F.; and Rooney, T. Special Request for Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. U.S. Department of Justice Data. (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1979).

Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1979).

Unfortunately, very few longitudinal studies trace the relationship between delinquency and employment and relate these aspects of life to schooling, which is often seen as a key part of the solution to delinquency and unemployment. One longitudinal study that does address these issues is the Marion County (Oregon) Youth Study begun in 1964 and completed in 1978 (Oregon, Marion County). This study followed youth for 14 years and maintained records on a very large percentage of these youth over the 14-year

period. This study examined different routes youth took from adolescence through their third decade of life. At the beginning of the study when students were sophmores, they were classified according to various characteristics. One discrimination made was in delinquency status. Three groups of youth were identified: (a) those who never had been involved with juvenile authorities; (b) those who were not seriously involved in delinquent behavior (status offenses and minor youth crimes), and (c) serious delinquents (persons with more than one offense, at least one of which was a serious crime against persons or property). Five hundred forty-two (542) juveniles were followed for the 14-year period (239 nondelinquents, 258 non-serious delinquents, and 45 serious delinquents). It was found that delinquent and nondelinquent juveniles typically followed different routes during the years in which they completed high school and established themselves in the work world. The typical pattern of the serious delinquent was to leave school (without necessarily graduating), go to work, enter military service early (the Viet Nam war was in its period of escalation), or re-establish himself in the work world. There were two divergent variations on this pattern. Almost 10 percent of the serious delinquents returned to school in their mid-twenties. In addition, slightly more than 10 percent were neither going to school, working, or serving in the military services (a good portion of these were imprisoned). Youth who had not been delinquent had a much different pattern in their post-high school years. The typical nondelinquent either went immediately to college or went into the military and then returned to the work world. As they neared the age of 30, almost three-fourths of the nondelinquents were established in work, compared to slightly more than half of the serious delinquents. (For the final interview, 29 percent of the serious delinquents were not available, as compared to 15.1 percent of the nondelinquents.) The non-serious delinquent typical pattern was mixed somewhat, resembling the non-delinquent and serious delinquent regarding college, work, and military choices. Table 8 (p. 57) shows different responses at different periods of the youths' post-high school years. The differences between the groups could not have been accounted for by chance.

The kinds of work experience of serious delinquents differed from the nondelinquent. Ten years after the study, the delinquent was much more

likely to be unemployed than the nondelinquent or the non-serious delinquent. The delinquent was less likely to be an executive, professional, or administrator than was the non-serious delinquent or the nondelinquent. Conversely, the serious delinquent, after 10 years, was more likely to be an unskilled laborer or a machine operator than was the nondelinquent or non-serious delinquent.

TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELINQUENCY STATUS AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF A COHORT OF MARION COUNTY (OREGON) YOUTH STUDIED OVER A 14-YEAR PERIOD (1964-78)

| OCCUPATIONAL STATUS | YEARS AFTER STUDY BEGAN ⁴ | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|------|------|----------|------|------|----------|------|------|
| | 4th | | | 6th | | | 8th | | | 10th | | |
| | ND ¹ | NSD ² | SD ³ | ND | NSD | SD | ND | NSD | SD | ND | NSD | SD |
| UNEMPLOYED | 2.5 | 7.5 | 12.5 | -- | 1.0 | -- | 2.1 | 2.0 | 11.1 | 1.1 | 6.8 | 10.7 |
| HIGH EXECUTIVE, PROFESSIONAL | -- | -- | -- | 12.0 | 8.0 | -- | 2.1 | 0.5 | -- | 7.7 | 4.7 | -- |
| BUSINESS, MANAGERIAL | -- | -- | -- | 12.0 | 5.0 | -- | 6.9 | 4.9 | -- | 19.8 | 11.1 | 7.1 |
| ADMINISTRATIVE | 8.6 | 5.0 | 25.0 | 2.8 | 5.0 | -- | 6.9 | 7.4 | 2.8 | 20.3 | 15.8 | 7.1 |
| CLERICAL | 9.9 | 13.8 | -- | 7.4 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 19.6 | 16.3 | 5.6 | 10.4 | 10.0 | 7.1 |
| SKILLED MANUAL | 7.4 | 15.0 | 18.8 | 9.3 | 21.0 | 50.0 | 15.3 | 20.2 | 27.8 | 21.4 | 24.7 | 32.1 |
| MACHINE OPERATOR | 29.6 | 26.3 | 25.0 | 22.2 | 24.0 | 18.8 | 34.4 | 37.4 | 41.7 | 11.0 | 14.7 | 25.0 |
| UNSKILLED LABOR | 33.3 | 30.0 | 10.8 | 26.7 | 27.0 | 12.5 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 10.7 |
| FARMER | 8.6 | 2.5 | -- | 2.5 | -- | -- | 3.2 | 1.0 | -- | 3.8 | 3.2 | -- |
| $\chi^2 =$ | 19.70767 | | | 33.01031 | | | 26.59633 | | | 32.75362 | | |
| df = | 12 | | | 18 | | | 16 | | | 18 | | |
| p > = | .0728 | | | .0166 | | | .0462 | | | .0179 | | |

Note: Totals do not necessarily add to 100 percent since non-respondents are excluded.

¹Not delinquent
²Non-serious delinquent
³Serious delinquent
⁴See discussion on pp. 56-57 of text.

Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

In this study, delinquency is not only found to be related to future employment, but also to future involvements with crime. Only 13.3 percent of persons with serious delinquency backgrounds committed no adult crimes, compared to 46.3 percent of the non-serious delinquents and 71.6 percent of the nondelinquents (see Table 9, below).

TABLE 9
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELINQUENCY STATUS AND INVOLVEMENT IN ADULT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY FOR A COHORT OF MARION COUNTY (OREGON) YOUTH STUDIED OVER A 14-YEAR PERIOD (1964-1978)

| INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY | DELINQUENCY STATUS | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| | NOT DELINQUENT | NON-SERIOUS DELINQUENT | SERIOUS DELINQUENT |
| CRIMES BEFORE AGE 21 ONLY | 5.9 % | 17.1 % | 15.6 % |
| CRIMES AFTER AGE 21 ONLY | 10.0 % | 12.8 % | 11.1 % |
| BEFORE AND AFTER 21 | 7.5 % | 17.9 % | 55.6 % |
| ALCOHOL ONLY | 5.0 % | 5.9 % | 4.4 % |
| NO CRIMINAL OFFENSES | 71.6 % | 46.3 % | 13.3 % |

NOTE: $\chi^2 = 99.97102$
df = 12
p > .0001

Source: Oregon. Marion County. Marion County Youth Study 1964 to 1978. (Eugene, OR: University of Oregon, 1979; computer print-outs received by Arthur Pearl).

Table constructed by the NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER (Sacramento, CA: American Justice Institute, 1980).

Therefore, a relationship between delinquency and unemployment on a statistical basis, is evident to some researchers on both economic and sociological criteria. For example:

"We have reviewed the results of alternative efforts to estimate the relationship between unemployment and crime rates based upon seven types and nineteen distinct sets of sample data. Only in the use of state cross section data was there a complete absence of a significant statistical relationship, and only among the studies using city time series data was a consistently significant positive relationship reported. In a numerical sense, there is a dominance of

findings of significant positive relationship as predicted by the theory. This dominance combined with the variety of sample data and methods employed give strong support to the conclusion that the theoretical conclusion should not be rejected" (emphasis added) (Gillespie, p. 617).

Furthermore, it appears reasonable to conclude that juvenile delinquents constitute one of the most marginal elements of the youth unemployment pool. According to Conyers:

- They are unstable employee prospects; once employed they have difficulty conforming to an employer's standards.
- Employment for many juveniles has minimal economic advantage, since most are provided for under categorical aid programs (i.e., Aid to Families with Dependent Children); as delinquents their support may be assured under many delinquency programs designed to provide for their care and continuation in school or vocational training, halfway houses, foster homes, etc.
- Employment does not preclude the juvenile from continuing delinquent conduct.
- Poor employment experience compounds the social alienation of the juvenile involved making future satisfactory employment less likely to result (Conyers, p. 677).

Approaching the Youth Unemployment Problem More Broadly

An approach which attempts to consider solutions to youth problems within a broad context is illustrated by a California Youth Authority experimental study. It is presented here as suggestive of a reasonable approach to the problems of youth, including unemployment.

In 1966, the California Youth and Adult Corrections Agency hypothesized that there was a high proportion of delinquents concentrated in a small number of "disordered families." These were families which, as a whole, contributed an inordinant justice, mental health, welfare, and related social service demand on governmental services. These services involved extensive overlap between State and county functions. Data were assembled to examine this situation. Table 10 (p. 60) is a matrix of the overlaps found.

TABLE 10
DELINQUENCY CASE SERVICE OVERLAPS

| FUNCTION/AGENCY | STATE | COUNTY | OTHER AGENCIES |
|-----------------|------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| Delinquency | Youth Authority | Probation/Juvenile Court | Group houses, foster care |
| Crime | Department of Corrections | Probation, Criminal Courts, Jails, Work Release Centers | |
| Mental Health | State Hospitals | Community Mental Health Centers | After-care Facilities |
| Rehabilitation | Department of Rehabilitation | --- | |
| Welfare | --- | Welfare Departments | |
| Education | Special Schools | --- | School Districts |

Source: Richard A. McGee. The Organization of State Correctional Services in the Control and Treatment of Crime and Delinquency. (Sacramento, CA: Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, 1967), pp. 109.

To the extent that there was caseload overlap between the above agencies in serving various members of the same family, it was thought that greater efficiency in serving these joint caseloads could be achieved while, at the same time, a more comprehensive, consistent casework plan could be jointly devised to deal with the underlying social causes of the family's distress.

The study examined parole caseloads and it was revealed that 47 percent of the parolees' families were also involved in receiving casework or institutional care services from other State or county agencies. The study did not inquire about school problems or problems which were not being served or were served partially by private charitable organizations. The detail summary of overlaps found is shown in Table 11 (p. 61).

TABLE 11

PUBLIC SERVICE OVERLAPS BY FAMILIES OF CYA PAROLEES

| AGENCY IN ADDITION TO CYA PAROLEE | PERCENT RECEIVING SERVICES |
|---|----------------------------------|
| County Welfare | 26.9 |
| County Jail | 23.5 |
| State Department of Corrections | 6.9 |
| State Department of Mental Hygiene | 6.5 |
| State Department of Rehabilitation and Special State Schools | 3.8 |
| Note: Siblings also in CYA were not counted. | |

Source: Richard A. McGee. The Organization of State Correctional Services in the Control and Treatment of Crime and Delinquency.
(Sacramento, CA: Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, 1967), p. 110.

This study of service overlaps also included a study of the families of wards of the CYA. This examination revealed the following:

- 68 percent of the parents had less than a high school education.
- 65 percent were rated by parole agents as being in a below-average socio-economic level.
- 26 percent were receiving income from public assistance other than county welfare (disability compensation, unemployment compensation, private charities) (McGee, p. 110).

From this study, it would seem that for a major portion of delinquent youth, unemployment, school, and other social development problems are based in the family. Remedial education, vocational training, employment counseling, and job placement assistance efforts should include attention to the youths' family structure and family needs. The extensive overlap of governmental serving agencies suggests: (1) the need for service coordination, and (2) the utility of an independent service agency contracted to deliver a range of job counseling and job development services for referred delinquents and their families.

IV. INTERVENTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

Getting a job has long been a "prime" program objective of both clients and probation and parole supervisors in juvenile and adult community-based corrections. Unfortunately, getting a job for juvenile delinquents has been a difficult if not often impossible task. Much of the poor attitudes about parole or probation itself, about society, and about oneself (self-esteem), probably derive from the frustration in attempting to obtain and retain a job. These attitudes may also exist before the disappointment in job finding--related to previous experiences in school, seasonal or part-time jobs, and contacts with law enforcement agents and other authority figures.

It has been shown that juvenile unemployment is a symptom of basic problems which are complex and interrelated: ethnicity, socioeconomic class, family support, adequacy of schools, location, the existence of delinquency reinforcing peer groups and activities, and an insufficient number of jobs (Gillespie, p. 617). These basic problems added to a significant number of opportunity barriers or constraints (as discussed in the preceding chapter) tend to create a situation where youth in general and delinquent youth specifically are unable to effectively compete for limited jobs.

This chapter will examine government efforts to deal with youth unemployment. Some government efforts had some unintended consequences; others have had either limited or no success. A few actually show promise of success. Each will be described and discussed in terms of their impact on youth employment. In addition, the major findings and initiatives of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Unemployment will be presented.

DEVELOPING STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH UNEMPLOYED JUVENILE DELINQUENTS

It is regarded as a general weakness of the juvenile justice system that the system often intervenes excessively in some situations or too soon in others. More specifically, it is often argued that many first-time delinquent arrests could be handled more effectively informally by the juvenile court and by referring the youth to an appropriate community resource, and thereby avoiding the negative labeling effect. The counter argument would be that most first offenders (except for the most serious crimes) are already being handled informally or by non-labeling diversion projects prior to

official contact. A major point taken by the former position is that most delinquent behavior is "self-correcting" over time. By avoiding the negative stigma of official processing and by receiving appropriate services outside the system, most delinquents would eventually "straighten out."

Whatever extent youth unemployment causes delinquency, and to whatever extent adjudicated delinquents have a high and prolonged rate of unemployment, the "solution," in many cases, may not be the immediate provision of actual employment or even training for employment. As previously indicated, for some, the real need may be to continue in school, an approach which has two major target areas:

- Improve the schools: The secondary school systems, particularly those in the ghetto areas of large urban centers, may need to extensively be overhauled if not replaced with a more effective administration and teaching curriculum to meet the current educational-vocational needs of underprivileged children. It is a reasonable national objective to keep all children in school and out of the job marketplace until they achieve sufficient maturity and educational achievement to compete in the labor market. Arthur Pearl and Frank Reissman describe a need and methodology for preparing disadvantaged youth to compete adequately for the technical jobs of the post-industrial age (Pearl and Reissman).
- Help the parents: It is primarily an economic need that compels many juveniles to leave school. Whether their family structure consists of one or two parents, very often the school dropout has one or both parents unemployed; often they have siblings unemployed or marginally employed. In these cases, the school dropout may be coping with his or her immediate reality: the need for money. In such circumstances, the best social policy would be to facilitate the employment of the parents, thereby eliminating much of the need for employment of the youth.

This would, for some, still leave the problem of restriction of the secondary employment market. This market is made up of the occasional jobs that youth in school need: part-time work before or after school and on weekends. Some of these jobs have dried up as a result of increases in the minimum wage laws (Williams, 1978, p. 10), and others have been taken by older persons from the increasingly larger pool of unemployed. At the same time, some of these jobs have become unprofitable to the small businessman, apartment house owner, and such, who must absorb the effects of inflation by eschewing some of the services they were formerly able to purchase at the nominal

costs of casual, teenage labor. The Federal efforts to offer financial incentives to employers may assist with this problem.

While there are other patterns of deviance for non-disadvantaged youth, whether or not remaining in school eliminates their involvement in delinquency is unclear. Delinquent behavior of youth remaining in school is not as readily detected, particularly if they are white. Many believe that most deviance of this group is either (1) self-correcting, or (2) is eventually elevated to even less detectable offenses (e.g., white collar crimes, employee theft, fraud).

Much of the juvenile delinquency described above seems little affected by law enforcement or juvenile court involvement. One reaction to this is that the philosophy of the juvenile court must be modified so that punishment will be based on seriousness of the offense committed rather than on a court's view of the needs of the juvenile (Institute of Judicial Administration/American Bar Association). A contrasting view is that a great increase in several forms of "community absorption" (tolerance) of juvenile deviance will have the most favorable outcome. Some of the variations in community absorption are the neighborhood crisis centers on citizen dispute settlement "courts." In any event, many forms of delinquent conduct by being handled outside the juvenile justice system would also be called "learning to live with the problem because official action tends to aggravate rather than relieve the real problems" (Breed). Breed sees a variety of community classification decisions and actions as an aspect of the root social causes of crime and delinquency (e.g., classification for welfare, schools, classes, recreation groups, which extend social divisions).

Another way to examine the question of the best approaches to dealing with the problem is by considering the elements of "successful" social programs directed at employment problems of delinquent youth. A social program which appears to be successful in assisting delinquent youth with an unemployment opportunity is presented as an illustration of how theories and philosophies can be translated into social action.

THE HOWARD UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY APPRENTICE PROGRAM

A unique approach to the delinquency-employment issue was attempted at Howard University in Washington, D.C. This project, called the Howard

University Community Apprentice Program, employed delinquents in positions where there was likelihood of continued employment, and trained and educated them once they were employed. The theory in the Howard project dealt more with current gratification than future aspiration. Essentially, the Howard project attempted to provide its participants with feelings of competence, usefulness, and belonging in work and learning settings, at least to the extent to which these feelings can be duplicated as a result of delinquent behaviors.

The scope of the Community Apprentice Program was modest (10 students and a \$20,000 budget for its first phase). The project in no way addressed the complex problem of employment of delinquents. The project did provide evidence that training can be effective with marginal youth and youth considered intractable, when that training is provided within a meaningful context. This finding appears to have held up over time and in various settings (Pearl, 1964; Pearl, 1972; Pearl, Grant, and Wenk; Pearl and Riessman).

Despite its limited size, the Community Apprentice Program had national impact. The "New Careers" Scheuer amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act came from such projects, as did other manpower acts in the 1960's (Pearl and Riessman).

This "social program" approach could be helpful in future social planning. The Community Apprentice Program began small, and was clearly an experiment, and its results were used to influence social policy.

Given the present confusion and controversy regarding employment programs, it is essential that small experiments which are grounded in clearly articulated theory be conducted and the results intensively reviewed. Unless this is done, there is little hope for any convergence toward a consensus regarding social policy in this area. A systematic sorting out of the issues and a culling of information hopefully would lead efforts away from a generalized and undifferentiated attack on social programs. Furthermore, an orderly analysis could assist in distinguishing programs which work from those that do not.

A REVIEW OF MAJOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS

This section will highlight the general program configuration and indicate the number of juvenile and youth participants, annual appropriation,

and some indication of participant characteristics of some of the major Federal programs for unemployed youth. Several sources have been used to develop this summary. The primary one is the "Program Fact Sheet" developed by the Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor, April 1979. Other sources used will be indicated when appropriate.

Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (CETA Title IV Amendments 1978)

The core of this program is called "Youth Incentive Entitlement," which is articulated in the boldest statements ever made regarding youth's right to employment and right to receive training and assistance in order to obtain employment. In eight selected geographic areas, eligible youth 16 to 19 years are guaranteed a year-round job if he/she agrees to return to or remain in high school. Jobs are for up to 20 hours per week during the school year, and up to 40 hours during the summer months. Participants may be given career counseling, academic tutoring, and other services.

Project grants were made to eight prime sponsors (cities and counties over 100,000 population) to carry out the program from July 1978 to June 1980. There is an evaluation component in all the grants but there is little information available to date on the various projects' performances. This will be most important to examine. To what extent juvenile delinquent referrals were accepted and how they fared in this program should be a matter for special review. It is not known what records are being maintained to enable evaluation of delinquent status participants, so probably an inquiry should be made to assure maximum research benefit from these experimental projects insofar as its effect on delinquency prevention in two general cohort groups (1) the nondelinquent participants and (2) the delinquent participants, as well as the post-program employment history of both groups.

Job Corps (CETA Title IV Amendments 1978)

The Job Corps (JC) continues from its first authorization in 1965. It consists of 74 residential training centers in 33 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico for disadvantaged youth 16 to 21, inclusive. Enrollments may be up to two years.

Fiscal allocations for the Department of Education (DOE) allocation to the LEA's are indicated at nearly \$1.25 billion for FY 1980. The shift of DOE/LEA involvement from the previous to the new YEDPA programs would not seem to involve much difficulty. Five joint DHEW/DOL regional workshops on this topic were conducted between December 12, 1977 and January 20, 1978 to clarify these arrangements with LEA's.*

Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC) (CETA Title VIII)

Targeted on youth aged 16 to 23 who are unemployed and out of school and operated cooperatively by the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, and Interior. Conservation work includes improvement of vegetation and wildlife; development, rehabilitation, and maintenance of recreation facilities; natural disaster control and clean-up. July 1978 enrollments were 24,000, of which only 1,30 were non-white. The FY 1979 funding was \$216.4 million, of which 30 percent is for State conservation programs providing almost 6,600 openings. At proportional allocation the direct Federal costs of \$198.1 million provide 24,100 enrollments for a unit cost of \$8,220 per participant. Data on the proportional State costs was not available.

No evaluation reports were found for these programs. The same evaluation criteria as indicated for the other programs would be desirable in order to appraise the direct and/or indirect impact of this program on the unemployed delinquent population. (Indirect impact would be applicable only if delinquent status enrollments were not accepted. In this case, the program would at least direct 24,100 juveniles from other job training or employment opportunities, thereby reducing the competition of the delinquent for these other situations.)

Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP) (CETA Title IV)

Eligibility for enrollment is limited to 16- to 19-year-old unemployed youth. Preference is given to out of school youth who experience severe difficulties in finding employment. Enrollment is limited to 12 months.

*See U.S. Department of Labor. Employment and Training Administration. Office of Youth Programs. Report on Joint DHEW/DOL Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act Workshops. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

Employment is in community planned projects, organized by private non-profit organizations (YMCA, Red Cross), and other agencies sensitive to the needs of youth. FY 1978 funding was \$115 million, 75 percent to prime sponsors, 2 percent for Native American Youth, 2 percent for migrant and seasonal farm worker youth, and 21 percent for discretionary use of the Secretary of the Department of Labor.

LEAA Projects

Some action research projects targeted on the unemployed juvenile delinquent have been funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Project New Pride (Denver, Colorado) and the Providence Educational Center (St. Louis, Missouri) have been identified as exemplary projects, and are examples of effectiveness which both the local agencies and LEAA feel are worthy of emulation and replication.

In both cases, the project evaluations provide an indication that, while innovative efforts may succeed, the design characteristics may not be the primary reason. More likely, in fact, it is the unique leadership in combination with unique cooperation among key actors of the community and juvenile justice agencies which account for their highly regarded accomplishments. For this reason, therefore, much can be learned from the review of the project descriptions, but their widespread extension to other jurisdictions is of special concern. Project New Pride is in an early stage of replication in a number of other areas. Just what results from this commendable effort remains to be seen.

Project New Pride

The project is based in a private non-profit organization and receives client referrals only from the juvenile court. The project targets the "hard-core" delinquent as defined by prior arrests and the severity of the offenses.

The program is comprehensive, providing medical and psychological diagnosis, educational assistance (educational testing, remedial work, counseling and guidance), personal counseling, cultural education, recreation, and client advocacy, and employment services consisting of counseling, training, and job placement.

Performance of the program was most significant in the reduced rate of rearrest of the New Pride clients compared to the prior baseline experience of the juvenile probation service with like cases. Data on employment performance was not impressive, and was less so for the second year clients as compared to the first year clients. That 70 percent were placed in full- or part-time employment may be significant; however, 44 percent held such employment for 60 days or less, while 35 percent held their jobs for more than 65 days (27 percent were never employed) (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977). The replication of Project New Pride will be a major initiative of OJJDP for 1980. It is expected that approximately \$9 million will be allocated for this area.

Providence Educational Center

This exemplary project was designed to deal with the younger juvenile (12 to 16 years old) who had been charged with "stranger-to-stranger" crimes. Most were referred to the project by the juvenile court. Because of this, the project design emphasized educational development and "world of work" attitude and experience growth.

The program design is dynamic and continues to change but is not fundamentally oriented to the age group whose needs and interests incorporate employment (U.S. Department of Justice, 1975).

The Wildcat Experiment

This project was an employment program for an addict-criminal population. This adult client group was identified as follows:

About 90 percent of each group (controls and experimentals) were male, 60 percent were black, 30 percent were Hispanic, and 10 percent were white. On the average, they came to the program at age 31 with a police record of eight arrests and four convictions (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, p. 2).

The target experimentals were all referred by drug treatment agencies, but the characteristic of criminality was obviously also present. Such a client group is clearly "hardcore" and, not unexpectedly, the results of the four-year period were only "moderately encouraging":

[A]t the end of one year, 74 percent of experimentals and 30 percent of controls were working; at the end of three years, 49 percent of the

experimentals and 36 percent of controls were working (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, p. 3).

In the first year experimentals were significantly less likely to be arrested (19 percent) than were controls (31 percent). This difference diminished in the second year, however, and by the third year, a higher proportion of experimentals than controls were arrested (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, p. 3).

Employment was closely associated with low arrest rates; for both experimentals and controls, the three year arrest rate of sample members who were employed for more than 18 of the 36 months study period was less than half the rate of sample members employed for fewer than 18 of the 36 months (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, p. 4).

Numerous other factors in the evaluation of Wildcat produce, on balance, a relatively successful program which has been continued into an additional phase. It is likely that any similar effort with juvenile delinquents--more so those with drug and alcohol abuse problems--would be expected to do no better than Wildcat, and likely to do less well if past experiences in other projects involving youthful drug users is a guide.

In another vein, the action model of supportive work appears to be an excellent type of employment program, best suited for non-drug user clientele.

Wildcat also provides evidence from the criminal history of the adults served (comparing the criminal convictions of controls and experimentals) of the magnitude of crime prevention much more encouraging than employment performance.

FEDERAL PROGRAMS DIRECTED AT THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The Federal government has encouraged private sector involvement with the problem of youth unemployment through a number of financial incentives to employers. The following is a presentation of the highlights of some of the programs which foster private sector participation.

Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC)

This financial incentive for employers is part of the Revenue Act of 1979 and it can save a substantial amount of dollars to an employer who hires an eligible worker by reducing the employer's Federal income tax liability by \$3,000 for each eligible worker hired in his or her first year of employment,

and by \$1,500 in his or her second year. The tax credit accumulates from the first day of work with no minimum period of employment required. Furthermore, it is available for part-time as well as full-time workers in any profit-making firm. Eligibility with regard to youth includes:

- any 18- to 24-year-old from an economically disadvantaged family*
- any 16- to 18-year-old who is enrolled in any approved cooperative education program regardless of the economic status of the youth's family.

The advantage of TJTC for employers is that it requires minimum government involvement and paperwork, it provides tax credits for low skill jobs, and if eligible persons are hired in low turnover jobs, the long duration of tax credits subsidies (one year at 50 percent, a second year at 25 percent) can add up to a gross subsidy of \$4,500.

CETA On the Job Training Program (OJT)

Under this Federal program, Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) funds can be used to reimburse employers for on-the-job training (OJT) costs involved in training youth and other disadvantaged workers on a "hire first, train later" basis. CETA is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor utilizing \$11 billion which is distributed by formula to local and State government units called "prime sponsors." The intent of the program is to use OJT to help solve skill shortages in occupations where there is a good prospect that after the training period ends the trainee will be employed by the firm in a job that promises good earnings and steady employment for the future.

Eligibility of workers requires that they be (a) economically disadvantaged, and (b) unemployed, underemployed, or in school. Although OJT is not designed specifically for youth, approximately 50 percent of OJT placements are for persons under 25.

*Economically disadvantaged is defined as: individuals from families whose income in the past six months, immediately preceding the month of hire, annualized falls below 70 percent of the "lower living standard" devised by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since this standard is adjusted with respect to family size and local cost of living, it varies considerably from place to place. In larger urban areas, the lower living standard for a family of four ranges from \$10,280 to \$12,500. Thus, for families of four, 70 percent of the standard for a six-month period ranges from \$3,600 to \$4,430.

Employers have the incentive of being reimbursed 100 percent for the cost of providing support services to OJT trainees which can be delivered directly by the employer or through subcontract with local manpower or social service organizations. Furthermore, employers can be reimbursed for 50 percent of the employee's wages (exclusive of fringe benefits) for a standard period of time required for training for a given occupation or job. Major advantages of the OJT program are that it permits an employer to hire and train an eligible worker and get reimbursed 100 percent for the training and 50 percent for the wages paid during the training period. Also, reimbursements are paid on a regular basis, once a month or so, thus providing a cash-flow advantage.*

WIN and Welfare Tax Credits

Tax credits are available to firms which hire either participants in the Work Incentives (WIN) program or other recipients of welfare. The amount of these credits is identical to that of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit: 50 percent of wages up to \$6,000 in the first year and 25 percent in the second.

Minimum Wage Exceptions

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers can hire youth at less than minimum wage in cases when:

- youth 16 years and older are enrolled in State-certified vocational educational programs. In these cases wages can be 75 percent of the minimum wage.
- youth 16 years and older are full-time students working in retail businesses, farms, or ranches. In these cases the wage can be set at 85 percent of the minimum wage (mentally or physically handicapped persons may be hired for as little as 25 percent of the minimum wage).

Employers are informed of these incentives and encouraged and assisted by a number of private sector organizations. For example:

The Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (PPV) -- "A non-profit corporation (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) founded in 1978 out of the conviction that the economic and social well-being of our society

*For examples of CETA programs, see CETA Works: A Selection of Programs, National Association of Counties, Washington, D.C., 1979.

requires creative collaboration between the public and private sectors" (correspondence and brochures from PPV to the American Justice Institute, 1979). PPV is supported by foundation and Federal grants as well as through a number of Department of Labor projects. Their point of view strongly favors more program initiatives in the private sector. In addition, PPV is engaged in promoting "the establishment of Private Industry Councils (PIC's) as a way to build private sector participation in a program of hiring the nation's hard to employ."*

Work in America Institute, Inc. -- "A non-profit organization...to advance productivity and the quality of working life.... The Institute acts as a clearinghouse for information and as a source of assistance for all concerned with the world of work" (Work In America Institute, Inc.). Work in America advocates manpower programs based on five principles:

- Unsubsidized employment, mainly in the private sector.
- Contain risks but recognize that innovation always means risk.
- Recognize the force and temptation of the street environment and seek a counter-balance with strong incentives. Doing nothing is even riskier.
- Build new ideas on the foundations of existing agencies wherever possible.
- Involve unions when a program affects unionized workers.

In addition, they advocate a "strategy" for dealing with the ex-offender:

A multi-service organization should be devoted exclusively to serving ex-offenders. If ex-offenders mingle with the client population of other programs, they will lose out to less troublesome clients who do not suffer from correctional and criminal records.... The counselors and teachers have to be experienced in supporting the transition from street life to lawful activity and gainful employment.

*See "A Directory of Training and Employment Programs in the Private Sector Emphasis: Disadvantaged Youth," August 1979, and "Doing Well by Doing Good: A Business Guide to Financial Incentives and Other Resources for the Hiring of Youth," Fall 1979, Corporation for Public/Private Ventures, 1726 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

In addition, the transition service must target on employment and placement activities; otherwise, this hard-core group will remain unaffected by the services.

For ex-offenders age 20 and under, a major goal is to raise the clients' level of education to the point they are competitive in the job market. This is not to say that the transition service should be offered to all ex-offender clients who select themselves by walking in the door.

For young ex-offenders, education is vitally important. It provides competency based and life-survival skills...which are so important in finding and holding a job...basic education skills are necessary to perform a great many jobs or to obtain promotion beyond the entry-level, minimum wage job.... The program should encourage youths to come back for further educational training once they have mastered an entry-level job (Work in America Institute, pp. 52-53).

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND ITS SIDE EFFECTS ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Frequently labor unions can be heard to explain that "labor is not a commodity," however, the services of labor are exchanged on the market. They conform generally to the same laws of the marketplace as do commodities. For example, the law of supply and demand does impact the exchange of labor services. The higher the wages for labor, the lower the demand for labor, as well as the higher the wage for labor, the greater the amount of labor offered. Government efforts to control a part of the labor market for the benefit of one group often have negative effects for other groups. This section will present and discuss some of these policies and programs and point out their adverse impact on youth unemployment.

Minimum Wage Laws

Federal and State minimum wage laws is one of the best examples of governmental intervention into the free labor market. These laws are designed to set a legal minimum hourly wage to be paid for labor. In effect, the minimum wage law raises the hourly wage to a level higher than that which would have occurred with uncontrolled economic forces. As pointed out by Williams, (1977, p. 5), minimum wage laws impact hourly wages, not worker productivity. The imbalance between increased wages without increased worker productivity forces employers to make adjustments in their use of labor. Perhaps reducing the number of workers by adding more machinery or by demanding increased skills

thereby eliminating many entry-level employees. Therefore, those workers who retain their jobs clearly benefit by receiving a higher wage; however, those workers who are most disadvantaged in terms of marketable skills lose their jobs and their income (Phelps, pp. 64-66).

Williams points out that in the U.S. labor market, there are at least two segments that share the marginal worker characteristics of being most affected by minimum wage laws. The first group consists of youths. They are low-skilled mostly because of their age, immaturity, and lack of work experience. The second group, which contains members of the first group, are some ethnic groups such as blacks. The second group suffers as a result of racial discrimination and a number of other socioeconomic factors (Williams, 1977, p. 6).

While minimum wage laws do have negative effects for certain groups of workers, the effect is also due in part to other factors in tandem with minimum wage laws. With regard to youth unemployment, the increase in the relative size of the youth population, the increase in the proportion of youth enrolled in school, and the shift of employment out of agriculture have also added to the impact (U.S. Department of Labor, 1970, p. 187). In addition, factors such as child labor laws (which restrict hours of work), requirements for certification, and the attitudes and conduct of some youths have had a negative impact on youth employment (Williams, 1977, p. 8).

Unions

The rise of labor unions and their power to restrict competition has also disproportionately affected marginal labor such as youth. The Wagner Act of 1935 and its subsequent modifications have conferred upon unions extensive labor market monopoly powers (Williams, 1977, p. 13). Labor unions under the protection of law have the ability to influence wages and working conditions. A review of some of their historical practices would reveal how organized labor has been able to exclude certain groups from competition. Blacks and other minorities have been excluded from competing openly for jobs through such exclusionary union practices as union charter provisions (Williams, 1977, p. 14). Furthermore, labor unions have worked to advance the economic interests of their members through (1) restricting the supply of labor; (2) increasing the demand for the product its members produce; and

(3) the elimination of substitutes for its labor (Williams, 1977, p. 14).

The following union techniques serve the interests of their membership often at the expense of marginal workers:

- age and citizenship requirements of members
- lengthy apprenticeship requirements
- use of probationary union member status and work permits for seasonal and temporary jobs to protect senior members in slack periods from the job competition
- nepotistic rules whereby preference is given to relatives of union members
- member sponsorship requirements in some unions
- worker competency requirements
- racial discrimination (Williams, 1977, p. 14).

Although unions do serve labor and are not without a useful social purpose, their efforts to increase the advantage of their membership often has the unintended consequences of working to produce more marginal workers and restricting entry-level youth from job opportunities.

Davis-Bacon Act

The Davis-Bacon Act was enacted on March 31, 1931, for the purpose of protecting local wage rates on Federal construction from competition with lower wage non-local labor. The Act required that all workers on Federal construction projects were to be paid the prevailing local wage. This often meant the prevailing union wage. The Davis-Bacon Act had the objective of eliminating non-local and non-union contractors from underbidding competing local contractors in high wage and highly unionized areas.

The Davis-Bacon Act designed to protect local union contractors from "unfair" competition from the outside also tended to discourage contractors who generally paid less than the prevailing wage from bidding in an effort to avoid problems resulting from inflating their wages for Federal prospects and then having to deflate them at the termination of the project. An unintended consequence of the Act was that non-union contractors who generally hired more minority workers and youth were often eliminated from competition.

For example, a contractor employing many apprentice workers or minority workers for less than the prevailing wage found themselves unable to compete with contractors employing better skilled and higher paid workers.

Licensure

Certain occupations require licenses and certification. Government regulations specify certain requirements for a licensure or certification before entry into the occupation. Although these restrictions do serve often to protect consumers, they also limit entry into trades and hence reduce employment opportunities. Another effect is to increase the incomes of those licensed by restricting the labor market. Williams points out that licensure produces adverse effects that are mostly borne by youth, minorities, and other disadvantaged people (Williams, 1977, p. 16).

The large number of licensed occupations ranging from barbers to tree surgeons with their age and other restrictions reduce employment opportunities and limit the ability of youth and many disadvantaged persons from competition.

Legal and Illegal Immigration

Legal and illegal immigration often has a negative effect upon youth and minority employment prospects. It tends to limit their ability to compete for decent wages by expanding the labor pool at the entry or lower skill levels of competition.

Under current levels of immigration, a little over 200,000 were "lawfully admitted" to join the U.S. labor force. They account for as much as 100 percent of each year's new supply of entrants into "household worker" and "dressmaker-sewer" categories (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 111). There is no available total for the special, legal immigration of about one million Southeast Asians in 1979-80. There is little data on age groupings of immigrants; however, the information available on illegal immigration indicates that it is probably the tip of an even greater problem for youth seeking employment.

Illegal Immigrants

"Current efforts to estimate the number of undocumented alien residents of the United States may, like past attempts, be unable to overcome the

clandestine nature of unlawful entry, residency, and employment (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 113)

A majority, perhaps in the range of 60 to 70 percent. of the undocumented aliens in the United States are native of Mexico (about 90 percent of those apprehended are Mexicans, but this preponderance reflects the concentration of enforcement personnel near the United States-Mexican border). The non-Mexican share may be increasing, however, as patterns of illegal immigration become institutionalized. Sizeable numbers of undocumented aliens were born in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, Greece, India, Iran, Korea, Nigeria, and Thailand (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 114).

Most undocumented aliens are in the United States to obtain employment, and they are usually able to do so. The 1970 to 1976 average unemployment rate for the undocumented aliens surveyed in one study was approximately 10 percent. In view of the migratory nature of at least the Mexican portion of this interviewed population, this unemployment experience is evidence of remarkable job-finding success.

Undocumented aliens tend to be young men [of whom many] are supporting several dependents in their home country. Perhaps half are married, but they are infrequently accompanied by their families. Undocumented Mexican aliens generally have very little formal schooling or facility in English and few occupational skills. They are unlikely to stay in this country for a full year but may re-enter illegally several times. Undocumented aliens from other countries have more schooling and usually settle here more or less permanently (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 114).

Until the 1960's, undocumented aliens were associated primarily with farm employment. Now, however, it is unlikely that more than 20 percent are absorbed by the farm sector.... Undocumented aliens are currently found in all types of low-wage, nonfarm firms, with concentrations in apparel and textile manufacturing, food processing and preparation, and other services. A small minority are able to get better paying jobs in construction and durable goods and manufacturing (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 115).

Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment

As a result of the efforts of the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment and their findings which indicate a need for a national policy for the 1980's which recognizes the central importance of basic education to employment, a major education and employment initiative will be implemented. Expected to be fully implemented in 1982, the initiative plus current programs would provide almost \$6 billion for basic education, work experience, and training for an estimated three million youth. About half of those to be reached will be junior and senior high school students; the rest will be youth who are out of school, including dropouts and others who experience serious difficulty in finding and keeping jobs. At this time it is unknown if delinquent youth will be specifically targeted as part of the initiative.

The Task Force review consisted of four major elements:

- A major re-examination of the number of young people in need of employment, training, and education.
- An exhaustive review of existing efforts across the Federal government to determine what works and what does not.
- A careful analysis of proposals from the agencies and from outside groups such as business, labor, civil rights, State and local elected officials, community groups, and volunteer associations.
- Recommendations for new legislation early in the next Congressional session.

It is important to note that the Vice President's Task Force, in reviewing the national situation with regard to youth unemployment, arrived at seven basic principles upon which their recommendations are founded:

- "(1) The problem of youth unemployment will not disappear in the 1980s, but rather worsen in some communities and for some groups.
- (2) The lack of basic communication, comprehension and computational skills is the most serious barrier between these young people and successful entry into the labor market.
- (3) Basic skill efforts must be combined with the development of work experience opportunities to give youth a resume which reflects credible work experience and documents.

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- (4) The employment and education programs spurred by the federal government must have considerably less red tape and be less cumbersome to give youth easy access and allow for substantial flexibility at the local level.
- (5) We must place renewed emphasis on providing labor market information to young people, and to those teachers, parents, guidance counselors and others who assist them in making their career choices.
- (6) The problems are too large, too complex to be successfully addressed by any single institution. It is essential to have a partnership between the local government education and the business community.
- (7) Community-based and voluntary organizations must be involved in any effort to mount a youth employment program" (Office of Media Liaison, p. 3).

It is anticipated that the Vice President's Task Force will be making recommendations for significant improvements with regard to the coordination of Federal efforts targeted on youth unemployment. The NJJSAC has received some information developed by the Vice President's Task Force which is helpful in summarizing major past and present Federal employment and training allocations. Table 12 (p. 83) and Figure 8 (p. 85) present a summary of major employment and training expenditure outlays affecting youth by type of program. From the data, it appears that the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) will maintain its 1979 level in 1980 and the CETA II ABC program will increase by 60 million in 1980. Both programs are the largest (most expensive) Federal programs affecting youth. It is also evident that a significant increase in "Targeted Employment Tax Credits" and "Private Sector Initiative" indicates a recognition of the proper role of private enterprise in dealing with youth unemployment.

TABLE 12
YOUTH SHARE OF MAJOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING
EXPENDITURES OUTLAYS (IN MILLIONS)

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|--|------------------|------|------|
| Summer Employment Program | 670 ¹ | 681 | 545 |
| Job Corps | 280 | 326 | 404 |
| Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Acts (YEDPA) | 525 | 1186 | 1186 |
| Targeted Employment Tax Credit | -- | 70 | 240 |
| Private Sector Initiative ² | -- | 25 | 75 |
| Vocational-Technical Education Assistance ³ | 437 | 475 | 475 |
| College Work-Study | 413 | 480 | 533 |
| CETA II ABC ⁴ | 946 | 940 | 1000 |
| TOTAL ALL PROGRAMS | 3271 | 4232 | 4454 |

¹Includes 1977 carry-in as well as 1978 supplemental funds.


²Assumes 50 percent of outlays go to serve youth.

³Budget authority, not outlays. The Education Branch advises that irregularities in outlay patterns make these figures a better indicator of level of effort over time.

⁴Assumes 50 percent of outlays to to serve youth.

Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment. Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

FIGURE 8 YOUTH TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS



Source: Vice President's Task Force on Youth Employment: Conference on Employing Inner-City Youth. (Washington, D.C., 1979).

The Federal youth unemployment initiative proposed by the Carter Administration will begin to target through Federal coordination youth unemployment programs. The new programs are to be operated by the Departments of Labor and Education. Built on the experiences of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) enacted in 1977, the initiative is expected to attack the problem of youth unemployment in the 1980's on two fronts designed to dovetail the Department of Education and Department of Labor efforts. The Department of Education will focus on youth in school and the Department of Labor will focus on youth out of school. Youth unemployment will be approached on two fronts

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-85-

simultaneously: Employment Programs, and Basic Education and Skill Training. According to a White House Press Office release (Youth Employment Initiatives--Background Report), the two aspects of the youth employment initiatives are summarized in Figure 9 (p. 87).

The Youth Employment Initiative appears to begin to meet some of the major needs uncovered in this report. How well it can deal with the special needs of juvenile delinquents is impossible to determine at this point. The special incentive matching fund of the employment program component does take note of selected national priorities, i.e., jobs for juvenile offenders; however, details as to how much will be allocated for this group and how it will be implemented are unknown. The employment problems of juvenile offenders, although more severe and therefore often more difficult to resolve, do in many respects mirror those of other youth, especially black, urban, and out of school youth. The approach of the youth unemployment initiative would certainly affect many juvenile offenders. How many and how well remains to be seen. The real test may well be how successfully juvenile justice system programs are able to utilize these funds by either creating special programs targeting juvenile offenders or drawing upon the resources of other programs not necessarily targeting juvenile offenders, but certainly not excluding them, either.

FIGURE 9

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVES: MAJOR COMPONENTS

The Youth Employment Program

This program would be administered by the Department of Labor and contains a number of training and employment proposals. A total of \$300 million will be requested for 1981, with a goal of \$1 billion for 1982.

It would authorize:

- (1) The consolidation and block grant funding of three youth employment programs now functioning under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA)...which expires in 1980, and integration of the planning and administration of the summer program with the year-round effort.
- (2) A more targeted formula and supplemental assistance to concentrate funds most heavily in those rural and urban areas where the youth unemployment problems are most acute.
- (3) Emphasis on service to those most in need: disadvantaged and out-of-school youth.
- (4) Emphasis on establishing clear performance benchmarks for both participants and service providers so that youth acquire a record of demonstrated performance and useful skills.
- (5) Incentives to support (a) part time jobs for youth still in school; (b) specially designed education programs for drop-outs; and (c) school-based counseling on local labor market changes.
- (6) Special incentive matching funds to meet selected national priorities: jobs for teen parents, jobs for juvenile offenders, weatherization run by community groups and large-scale private sector programs.

Basic Education and Skill Training Program

These initiatives would be administered by the new Department of Education. They are designed to improve the quality of education for junior and senior high school students in poverty communities, with an emphasis on improving basic literacy and computation skills. A total of \$900 million in forward funding will be requested for 1981, with a goal of increasing to \$1 billion for 1982.

They would include the following:

A new program to be initially focused on the neediest junior and senior high students in about 3,000 high poverty/high unemployment urban and rural school districts. Approximately 1 million students will be served.

The program would concentrate on improving basic educational skills. It would include participation in work experience.

Schools would work with the Comprehensive Educational Training Act (CETA) system. Students would receive both private sector and public sector work experience and labor market information.

The program would include these features:

- Targeting on low achieving youth in poverty schools with some factor that takes into account limited English speaking ability students.
- Funding will be made available in school year 1980-81 to assist schools in the development of their programs.
- Schools would be required to involve the private sector, parents, teachers and community based groups in the development and implementation of their plans.
- Emphasis in planning on school-wide efforts designed to improve measured achievement and reduce dropout and absenteeism rates.
- Schools will be selected for program funding in school year 1981-82 based on the quality of their plans.
- Schools would receive three-year grants, and refunding would be contingent on successful improvements in student achievement and reduction in dropouts and absenteeism.
- A share of the resources will be directed through the vocational education system to the high priority districts and schools and matched with other vocational and educational resources.

Source: Office of Media Liaison. Youth Employment Initiative--Background Report. (Washington, D.C.: The White House Press Office, January 10, 1980).

V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter of the report will present major findings of the review of the literature and analysis of the data, and preliminary recommendations for dealing with the problem of youth unemployment. It should be noted that many of these recommendations do not deal specifically with adjudicated delinquents but rather with employment of youth in general. This is a result of the belief that in many ways employment problems of adjudicated delinquents do not differ so much in kind as in intensity from other youth.

MAJOR FINDINGS ON YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

- The problem of youth unemployment is now recognized as a serious national problem; however, due to the lack of reliable data on the extent of the problem, and without a strong theoretical and methodological base for studying its causes, much of the literature is based on conjecture.
- The complexity of youth unemployment must be appreciated by considering it within the context of other social problems. This is especially important when juvenile delinquency is considered in relation to youth unemployment.
- The problem of juvenile delinquency within the context of youth unemployment must consider these perspectives: (1) an analysis of the unemployment of the delinquent; (2) an analysis of the special environmental conditions that breed unemployment and delinquency, and (3) the general economic policies and conditions that affect employment opportunities.
- Although research on the causal relationship of juvenile delinquency to unemployment has generally failed to indicate a strong relationship (after controlling for other variables), both problems tend to occur concurrently with other social problems. Therefore, lack of evidence supporting a causal relationship should not hinder the development of policies and programs which target both juvenile delinquency and youth unemployment.
- National rates of youth unemployment, while alarmingly high, tend to mask the vast differences among subgroups of youths (e.g., the greater unemployment among black, urban, and delinquent youth compared to national total rates).
- Unemployment of 16- to 24-year-olds has averaged five times that of the civilian labor force over 25 years old. While comprising 25 percent of the labor force, they represent 50 percent of total unemployment (Williams, 1977, p. 2). Furthermore, non-white teenage unemployment is established conservatively to be three times that of white teenagers.

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- According to some sources (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education), the disparity between black and white youth regarding unemployment will continue into the 1990's.
- Arrests of youths for serious crimes continues to increase. Between 1968-1977, for example, arrests of youths for Part I crimes increased 25 percent, which was nearly three times the rate of growth for less-serious Part II offenses.
- Based on evidence from some studies, few youths are employed at time of arrest. For example, one sample showed that 87 percent of juveniles arrested who were not attending school were unemployed (Smith, Black, Campbell, and Rooney, p. 6). The California Youth Authority found over 44 percent of youths committed were unemployed (see Table 6, "Employment Status of First-Time Commitments to California Youth Authority, 1977," p. 54).
- Significant changes are taking place with regard to adolescence. Having a job among teenagers appears to be important--often separating the "men from the boys, the women from the girls." Among urban and lower class youth, the period of adolescence appears to be shortening and in some cases disappearing (Ianni).
- The next three decades ahead may be potentially better to deal with the problems of youth including unemployment due to a declining youth population; however, the problems that remain will be difficult, requiring major rethinking and radical social changes. Short of this, the disparities between affluent and disadvantaged youth will worsen (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, pp. 1-2).
- Efforts to deal with unemployment among delinquent youth will require careful conceptualization, planning, and coordination among decreasing community resources.
- Although there has been some effort to improve Federal coordination of youth targeted programs and policies (e.g., Recommendations of Vice President's Task Force, Interagency Task Force--see Office of Media Liaison), efforts of coordination need to reach the State and local levels before they can truly resolve the problems of fragmentation, overlap, and conflict.
- While the Federal government has offered numerous financial incentives to the private sector to assist with youth unemployment, there must be further recognition and subsequent revisions in their other policies (e.g., minimum wage laws, Wagner Act of 1935, Davis-Bacon Act, licensure, and immigration practices) which have had a negative impact on the problem of youth unemployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEALING WITH YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

Increase the use of minimum wage exemptions--Statutory subminimum wage provisions already exist to help ease problems of entry and re-entry into the labor market for those with impaired productivity. As reported by Tropp (p. 44), although an estimated 530,000 youth were certified under section 14 FLSA provisions in 1978, the statutory exemption is greatly under-utilized in comparison to its potential. This may be partly due to the lack of awareness of small entrepreneurs and unskilled workers, as well as to the recordkeeping costs imposed upon employers who seek certification to use it. Encouragement of employers' use of subminimum wage positions such as "learner," "intern," "student-learner," "apprentice" exemptions would provide a great flexibility for employers to hire youth lacking skills under the minimum wage. In addition to expanding the eligibility of minimum wage exemptions, the required paperwork and government involvement should be minimized to expediate certification so that employers can hire and use the exemptions quickly when it is required.

Expand apprentice programs--The DOL Apprenticeship Services Program spent \$33 million in FY 1978 to assist 220,000 minority youth in qualifying for and gaining entry into industry-sponsored and union-supported apprenticeship programs. In addition, the pre-apprenticeship training program expended an estimated \$38 million for 30,000 young teenagers in FY 1978. This program had the objective of preparing minority youth to enter the apprenticeship program using counseling, remedial education, and social services (Tropp, p. 46). Programs similar to the DOL Apprenticeship and Pre-Apprenticeship programs should be expanded to include more teenagers on a national basis.

Improve school, probation, and correctional job counseling and placement services--Counseling and job referral services could provide an important resource to youth. Unfortunately, school guidance and juvenile justice system counselors are often ill-equipped to help youth engage in career goal-setting or job decision-making. These services should be a significant part of high school and juvenile justice system counseling (e.g., probation and correctional institutional programs), and these counselors should be evaluated on

the basis of their ability to place their clients. According to Tropp, "Were we to require schools to do this for their students, and probation, parole, and pretrial service staffs to perform the same function for offenders, we would probably be investing in the single most useful measure directed at ameliorating unemployment which derives from problems of entry (teenagers generally) and re-entry (offenders and veterans), and patterns of voluntary turnover" (Tropp, p. 48).

Offender licensing restrictions should be revised--The many State statutes which restrict or prohibit the licensing of persons with arrest or conviction records for over 350 occupations are in need of revision. Unless the license restriction or prohibition can be justified, it should be either removed or loosened to allow for offenders to regain their right to qualify. The Federal government can influence State revisions of licensure laws through funding leverage. Employment-related grants to States can be used for this purpose. The Federal government could also:

- Generate test litigation against State and local licensing and alcohol/beverage control statutes which discriminate against offenders as a class.
- Propose Federal civil rights legislation making it illegal for an employer or a union to discriminate against an ex-offender solely on the basis of an arrest or conviction record, on the model of Hawaii's 1974 Fair Employment Practices Law amendments.
- Propose legislation tightly restraining Federal dissemination of arrest, detention, investigation, arraignment, and conviction records, providing that such records be sealed except for national security purposes, and providing that, where appropriate, they be expunged.
- Use the funding leverage of Federal grants to induce states to enact similar legislation.
- Prohibit Federal employment discrimination against offenders as a class, and
- Enforce, to the extent legally appropriate, civil rights legislation already on the books to protect the employment status of offenders (Tropp, p. 43).

Create job opportunities where unemployed youth are concentrated--As discussed in the preceding sections, unemployment among youth, especially minority youth, is a predominant urban problem. The Federal government should take steps to increase the aggregate number of job opportunities in inner cities. There are a number of ways the Federal government could encourage an increase of jobs in localities where unemployed youth are concentrated:

- The government could subsidize, guarantee, or provide low-cost insurance to firms as an incentive for them to remain in the central city. Alternatively, the government might act as reinsurer for private insurance companies which would otherwise be unwilling to insure business in central cities, or which would insure it only at prohibitively high cost.
- The government could subsidize, guarantee, or provide business renovation/modernization loans.
- On the model of the Canadian Local Initiatives Program and of the Chicago Alliance of Business Manpower Services, the government could subsidize new mixed public/private sector intermediary firms to do the entrepreneurial and promotional work involved in creating (1) new private-sector OJT slots and (2) new small businesses, including cooperative ventures run by ex-convicts.
- The intermediary firm could provide supplementary services such as remedial education, transportation, counselling, financial aid and access to day care and medical care. Firms that have provided OJT, such as Control Data Corporation, have found that supplementary services are essential for job retention.
- One analyst has suggested that the Federal government provide start-up loans, loan guarantees, and management assistance to ex-convicts motivated to establish new cooperative ventures involving 5 to 15 employees (Tropp, p. 49).

Support relocation of youth--Some localities have few job opportunities and expanding resources to create job opportunities in this area would be economically unfeasible. In these cases, it may be necessary to assist youth in relocating to areas where job opportunities exist. The model for this type of action has already been utilized in the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN), the Indian Mobility Program, and the use of Employment Services and Job Bank for CETA clients.

Create informal helping networks--Having someone available to help provide ideas, counsel, offer emotional support, and provide contacts for job opportunities is well known to everyone. The absence of informal assistance for disadvantaged youth in particular is likely to be a significant factor related to their inability to locate jobs. Federal, State, and local government can encourage the formation of volunteer advocates to work with youth on an individual basis to assist them in entering or re-entering the job market. Such programs to foster the creation and use of informal networks could follow the Big Brother or Volunteers in Probation (VIP) models. Governments funds should be made available to support transportation costs and other minor expenses involved in making this approach work.

This approach would provide the type of "handup" suggested by Reverend Sullivan:

"We must study strategies on how we can work together to help our youth, to give them not handouts but handups. As a boy in the hole cried out for a handup, let us declare an all-out war on youth unemployment and rally the nation to give handups to our young unemployed people" (Sullivan, p. 4).

Encourage youth entrepreneurial programs--One approach which creates youth business enterprises and which hires and trains "high-risk" youth (16 to 21) is the New Enterprises Program (NEP) operated by the Citizen Policy Center (Open Road). This program of youth entrepreneurship in the private sector starts labor intensive businesses which hire youth in areas where there is a substantial demand both for the businesses themselves and for skilled labor trained through the businesses. The New Enterprises Program combines the goals of profit-making and skill training in a supportive environment for youth. To date, NEP has placed 80 percent of its participants into high-paying jobs within the industry (see Leonardi). The model program should be expanded into many types of localities and enterprises, and evaluated for its services to employ as well as train youth who otherwise might have been excluded from entering certain occupations.

Provide grants to youth for career development--This approach was suggested by Ellen Russell Dunbar and it appears to offer a useful approach for some hard to employ youth (Dunbar, pp. 139-150). Under this program the government

would offer individual grants or stipends for the development of a career or occupation through education and job experience. Each grant would be based upon an individualized career development and stabilization plan which would last for three to six years. The plan would generally consist of three phases:

- Phase One--A planning and exploration period in which the grantee would acquire information and exposure to occupations which would assist in making an informed decision regarding a choice of occupation. The grant would cover subsistence as well as costs related to exploration, planning, and testing.
- Phase Two--The training or educational phase. The length of this phase will vary on the basis of occupation. The grant would go to the youth and not the education or training institution.
- Phase Three--This phase would provide the job experience with financial support. The money would be paid to the employer to cover the worker's salary. The Grant to Youth for Career Development would help prepare youth on the economic fringe for productive work and would continue to pay them for their work until the economy can absorb them.

Establish a national youth service--This program would provide opportunities for youth for at least a year upon leaving secondary or higher education to serve full-time in a national service program to meet the needs of the nation. This service would develop, find, and encourage a variety of opportunities for civilian service in the home, community, in national parks, in other parts of the country, and overseas. It would include all current government programs such as Vista, the Peace Corps, and the Young Adult Conservation Corps. The national service is not envisioned as a job training or work program for the unemployed, but as a supplement to or alternative to such programs. Participants would be entitled to post service educational or employment benefits similar to the GI Bill of Rights and the Peace Corps readjustment allowance.*

Expand the use of community education-work councils--The U.S. Department of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration, is experimenting with a program called Community Education-Work Councils based upon the ideas of Willard

*For more information, see Youth and the Needs of the Nation: Report of the Committee for the Study of National Service, The Potomac Institute, Washington, D.C., January 1979.

Wirtz (see Willard Wirtz, The Boundless Resource). These councils bring together school officials and representatives of employers, unions, and public agencies to coordinate programs for youth. The program is sponsored by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, the National Manpower Institute, the National Alliance of Businessmen, and the States of New Jersey and California. Thirty-two communities are provided funds to create these councils. Each council assesses the local situation, publicizes these conditions, encourages the improvement of youth education, training, and employment services, and implements their own improvement programs (Mahoney, p. 79). Recently, the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education recommended that community education-work councils be developed in every sizeable community.

Change the basic structure of high schools--The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, in their report, Giving Youth a Better Chance, notes that:

- High school is an alienating experience for many young people; like a prison--albeit with open doors--for some.
- Substantial drop-out rates from high school continue--23 percent, overall, 35 percent for blacks, 45 percent for Hispanics.
- Substantial numbers of high school graduates have deficiencies in language and numerical skills--estimated at 20 percent (Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, p. 1).

They therefore recommend:

- Make age 16 the age of free choice to leave school, take a job, enter the military service, enter other forms of service, continue in school, enter college, enter an apprenticeship. In particular, we see no clear need for compulsory attendance in school after age 16. At age 21, young persons should be as fully on their own as possible. Special help and the sense of dependency it fosters should not go on indefinitely.
- Change the basic structure of high schools by making them smaller or by creating diversity within them or both; by creating full-time specialty schools, particularly for the grades 11 and 12; by creating part-time specialty schools--one or two days a week per student on a rotating basis--by providing one or two days a week for education-related work and/or service.... We must find ways to break up the big, monolithic high school and its deadly weekly routine. We believe that instruction in basic skills and general knowledge can be concentrated without loss of achievement in three effectively used days per week.

- Create work and service opportunities for students through the facilities of the high schools, making performance part of the student record. We also favor a renewed emphasis on student out-of-class activities.
- Stop the tracking of students; all programs should be individualized programs.
- Put applied skill training in private shops (with the exception of clerical skills and home economics), when not moved to the post-secondary level. The basic vocational (and academic) skills for the high school to concentrate on are the skills of literacy and numeracy--and good work habits. Finance needy students through work-study programs and more effective efforts to place them in jobs.
- Create job preparation and placement centers in the high schools that will follow students for their first two years after graduation or other termination.
- Improve the capacity of secondary schools to teach basic skills by allocating more federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act to secondary schools. We strongly support the "Push for Excellence" program led by Reverend Jesse Jackson.
- Encourage earlier entry from high school into college and more programs combining the last year or two of high school with college.
- Experiment with vouchers and greater freedom of choice, particularly among *public* schools. Bureaucratic controls have not assured quality; competition to survive may (Carnegie Council for Policy Studies in Higher Education, pp. 22-24).

Develop better Federal coordination of programs targeting youth--The relationship of youth unemployment to many other serious problems has often been obscured. Youth in America is not suffering from a single malady (unemployment), therefore no single program will be able to resolve the problem. What is needed is a coordinated Federal effort to better deal with youth unemployment, as well as the many other social problems influencing unemployment and being influenced by it. An example of this approach is the newly formed Interagency Task Force on Youth under the leadership of OJJDP (Modzeleski). This task force includes representatives from the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Health, Education, and Welfare evolved in a response to a lack of coordination among Federal agencies in addressing the multi-service needs of youth. Recognizing that traditional educational and employment programs have not been responsive to the multi-faceted needs of youth, as well

as that Federal policies and funding mechanisms have tended to impose obstacles to the development of multi-service programs, the task force started to develop means of achieving better coordination and cooperation among Federal agencies. In addition, the task force has made youth unemployment a priority and is working to develop mechanisms to:

- ensure that Federal agencies explore possible linkages between programs
- work with Federal agencies to develop program models
- encourage agencies to share resources--such as dollars, staff, and technical assistance--to plan and implement programs
- promote the sharing of information between Federal, State, and local agencies
- develop strategies for leveraging funds
- establish methods for administering cooperative ventures (Modzeleski, pp. 15-16).

Efforts such as the Interagency Task Force should be continued and expanded. Whatever strategies or programs taken in an effort to impact youth unemployment and regardless of how much money spent, success or failure will essentially be determined at the individual level. The personal commitment and ingenuity of youth workers, juvenile justice personnel, and employers who cope on a daily basis dealing with the many trials and tribulations of working with youth, will be one of the major factors influencing a youth's ability to find a job, keep it, and achieve the personal satisfaction resulting from continued growth and development on the job as well as off.

APPENDIX A
NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER
STAFF, ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
AND PROGRAM MONITOR

NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT CENTER

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APPENDIX B
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