

STREET COPS vs. MANAGEMENT COPS;

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE PRECINCT

Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni
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THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of the social organization of two police precincts in New York City, and how that organization relates police work to the community and to central police headquarters. The researchers spent eighteen months working in the two precints and covering all major aspects of police work. This field study utilized ethnographic methods for data gathering. Events within the precinct were the unit for observation and analysis, so that social action and behavior were the basis for event analysis. The data are presented in a series of events which took place during those eighteen months and which are analyzed in terms of consequences for task performance, social relations and individual stress. Participants in the event were identified and interviewed through network analysis and the analytic results are presented in the form of a model of the social organization of the precinct, and in a series of maxims or rules which make up The Cop's Code.

The study describes the emergence and the functioning of two competing and sometimes conflicting cultures within the Department. A conception of the "good old days" is the organizing ethos for "Street Cop Culture", which organizes individual officers and precinct social networks into a social system. This nostalgic sense of what the old days were like in the Department may or may not be an accurate interpretation of the past, but it represents the way street cops believe the Department should be today. It is the values of this culture, operationalized in a series of maxims guiding behavior, which form the group reference for precinct level officers. Interviews and behavioral analysis in the precincts indicate the belief that a number of social and political forces have weakened the "good old days" culture, so that the organic structure of the Department is disintegrating. All of these forces have contributed to the developement of a new headquarters level "Management Cop Culture", so that what was once a family is now a factory. This new Management Cop Culture is bureaucratically juxtaposed to the precinct level Street Cop Culture. Unlike other bureaucratic systems in which the upper echelon of the hierarchy is recruited from different socio-economic and educational levels than the lower ranks, managers at all levels in the Department began as cops, since there is no lateral entry. Not only the the values, say the cops, but the real loyalties of the bosses are not to the men, but to the social and political networks which make up the Management Cop Culture. While there is some uneasy accomodation between these two cultures, they are increasingly in conflict and this conflict serves to isolate the precinct level from the headquarters level. The result is disaffection, strong stress reaction, increasing attrition and growing problems with integrity. This in tern reinforces the resistence of the Stree Cop Culture to attempts by headquarters managers to produce organizational change, and, instead, the social organization of the precinct becomes the major reference structure for the men.

The precinct social organization model which takes its values from Street Cop Culture is described in a model containing four major structures which socialize officers into that organization, relate them to each other and to headquarters. These structures are operationalized in the social organization of the day-to-day life of the precinct and adjusted to local conditions through the three social processes of sorting, territoriality and rule making and rule breaking. Officers learn the culture and organize their behavior in terms of a Cop's Code of rules. These rules are presented in terms of two sets of maxims, one of which explains how to relate to peers and the "job", and the other which describes how to deal with the bosses.

While the ethnographic methodology of the study was designed for problem finding rather than problem solving, two sets of recommendations did emerge. One set describes how the social organization of the precinct can become a valuable resource in police administration, if it is understood and appreciated by managers. The other is a recommendation for decentralization of planning and evaluation functions to external interface level at the precinct, and a specific model for how such a precinct level planning and evaluation unit should be developed and articulated at headquarters.

THE POLICE COMMISSIONER ISSUED THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE TO THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS:

> "Tomorrow evening at approximately 2000 hours, Haley's Comet will be visible in this area, an event which occurs only once every 75 years. Have the men assemble in front of the station house in uniform and I will explain this rare phenomenon to them. In case of rain we will not be able to see anything, so assemble the men in the sitting room and I will show them films of it."

THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS DIRECTED THE AREA COMMANDER:

> "By order of the Police Commissioner: Tomorrow at 2000 hours Haley's Comet will appear above the station house. If it rains, fall the men out in uniform and then march to the sitting room where the rare phenomenon will take place, something which occurs only once every 75 years."

THE AREA COMMANDER ORDERED THE PRECINCT COMMANDING OFFICER:

> "By order of the Police Commissioner in uniform at 2000 hours tomorrow evening the phenomenal Halley's Comet will appear in the sitting room. In case of rain in front of the station house, the Police Commissioner will give another order, something which occurs once every 75 years."

THE PRECINCT COMMANDING OFFICER ISSUED THE FOLLOWING ORDER TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIEUTENENT"

> "Tomorrow at 2000 hours, the Police Commissioner will appear in front of the station house with Halley's Comet, something which happens every 75 years. If it rains, the Police Commissioner will order the Comet into the sitting room."

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIEUTENENT MADE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT AT ROLL CALL:

> " When it rains tomorrow at 2000 hours, the phenomenal 75 year old Chief Halley, accompanied by the Police Commissioner will drive his Comet through the station house in uniform."

AN HOUR LATER ONE OF THE COPS ASKED THE SERGEANT FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE LIEUTENENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT AT ROLL CALL AND THE SERGEANT SAID:

> "Chief Halley, the new Area Commander, is going to test a new RMP here tomorrow, if it doesn't rain".

A SHORT TIME LATER, A P.A.A. ASKED THE COP IF HE KNEW WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN TOMORROW, THE COP SAID:

> "Forget it, you civilians can't get anything straight anyway".

Anonymous Graffiti from the NYCPD

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

A. General Introduction

Policing, at every level, is dependent on decision making. Management functions in police administration include the need to make decisions and the power to do so. Whether the issue is recruiting minority personnel or handling family disputes, both present police administrators and patrol officers with decision making situations. There are a number of new approaches and technologies for improving decision making; while experts may disagree on which is best suited to problem-solving, all agree that problem identification and some means of data seeking are essential to all of them. Both problem identification and data seeking have been the subject of a variety of approaches in police administration. At one time or another, authoritarian, intuitive, rational, empirical, pragmatic and consensual modes have been tried individually and collectively and each has its adherents. Reduced to its essentials, however, the conflict over how best to identify organizational or managerial problems and to seek data necessary for problem solving and decision making, represents a tension between those who look to the "folklore" of the profession and those who propose "scientific" or "rational" solutions to management problems. Actually, each of these methods may be a perfectly valid technique for informing problem solvers and policy makers but each also has its limitations. The experiential empiricism of the conventional folk-wisdom or "war stories" of practice provide an existential mode of problem-identification, at least of those practical problems of day-to-day policing; but it does not provide a means of systematic data seeking or of generalizing beyond individual experience. Many established procedures and practices in policing thereby escape serious questioning. Routine data gathering methods including activity logs, arrest and crime coding sheets and statistics on response time, provide standardized means of gathering data. Nevertheless, field personnel frequently complain that the data and the findings derived from them lack relevance to the problems they face. As a result, many practitioners fail to use any research-generated data for improving practice or setting policy. This apparent contradiction has perplexed those central headquarters-based administrators who are proposing rational decision making models to solve policing problems and has hindered the task and reduced the success of both policy makers and practioners.

William James once said that whenever there is a contradiction, it results from the fact that the parties to the dispute have failed to make relevant distictions. Perhaps this is the case here; perhaps police administrators have for the most part stressed problem-solving without first developing a mode of problem-finding. Perhaps we have failed to see the logic of learning to ask relevant questions before seeking appropriate answers. Some issues in policing are plain to see; others are less obvious. Some are continuous; others are transient or peculiar to localities. One thing does seem obvious: no matter how sophisticated the management system or decision making technology, it stands little chance of producing a meaningful impact on the "job" of policing if those using it are not aware of the technical, structural and behavioral problems which plague police officers and their immediate supervisors.

Two findings are relevant here: 1) One of the most persistent problems in organizational decision making is the dilution or distortion of policy directives as they move from central headquarters to the field. The experience is the same in governmental, industrial, or military organizations: field units spend a great deal of time interpreting and re-interpreting directives from headquarters, usually to the detriment of their efficiency and morale. 2) A number of studies have indicated that an individual's first loyalty is to his immediate organizational unity; the degree to which he sees that unit as representing the total organization is the most important factor in his acceptance of policy and decision making by the leadership. While these two sets of findings may seem somewhat in contrast,

they underwrite the importance of understanding the place of the informal organization and the relationships on which it is based. This understanding is crucial for effective management and leadership and for improving employee efficiency and morale.

Police departments in major urban centers are now characterized by increasing demands for better educated personnel who come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. Such personnel bring new life-patterns and values to police work. At the same time, issues such as increased use of female officers at all levels of police work and greater civilian and community involvement, promise to produce even greater demands for changes in the structure of police organization. These demands operate within a climate of increasing concern with questions of job security and job satisfaction, corruption and ethics, and rapid social and technological change. These issues combine to produce major questions concerning organizational patterns designed to maximize efficient and effective police work. While these problems persist in all police work, they are fast becoming critical issues in urban policing.

Organization and Social Controls in the Urban Police Precinct

While urban police departments have been growing in size and complexity, there has also been a growth of concern over the apparent discrepancy between the job of policing and the organization of the police function on the one hand, and the culture and interests of individual localities and specific communities on the other. Thus, despite consistent evidence that more socialization and thus more influence on operational decision making takes place in the peer-mediated social systems of the precinct and its sub-units, we know little about how such systems intersect with the formal organization of the police department or how they might be used to improve the policing function. Because we have been concerned with management, and have viewed police organizations as analogues of government and business management systems, we have until recently largely ignored the issue of the social organization of the police. The issue of social organization is crucial if increased efficiency of leadership and improved morale of field personnel is to be achieved.

The analogy with business and government tells us something about how police departments resemble business and government structures, but virtually nothing about how they are organized to facilitate the police officer's day-to-day interface with citizens, with peers and supervisors; nor do they describe the functions of the organization in seeking the values and goals which make policing a unique and distinct institution. As a result, today we have very little reliable knowledge about how urban policing units might be organized to facilitate effective job performance or of how the many facilitative, extra-organizational "learning" systems which make up the totality of "on-the-job-learning" in police work intersect with the formal organization of urban police departments. Yet we need only to look at current trends in policing, including increasing emphasis on a service model, demand for improved community relations and citizen involvement, human relations, ethical awareness workshops, and decentralization of authority and control—to realize that police administrators are beginning to sense that the informal social systems that are operative within every precinct or policing unit may also be among the primary facilitators of effective policing. Many of these administrators, however, continue to propose the adoption of new human relations approaches, integrity programs and personnel or career path structures in a conceptual vacuum. Specifically, they sense in a basic, experiential, "gut reaction" way that informal social systems in the precinct are important, but they do not possess a clear and comprehensive understanding of what it is that makes the informal social networks so critical to policing and how these informal systems operate. As they attempt to develop new programs aimed at reducing the discrepancy between "downtown", and the police officer's precinct subculture, they seem compelled to take these new programs and somehow force them into the existing formal organizational structure of the department. The existing structure eventually corrupts the functions leading to frustration for the administrator and usually increasing alienation and cynicism for the officers.

In the introduction to his participant-observation study of police in Philadelphia, Jonathan Rubinstein makes the point that most studies of police report on "organization and administration instead of describing what the men do. . .". While both management systems and organizational structure are important and worthwhile things to study, whether considered individually or jointly, they fail to provide systematic data on how the individual officers relate to each other and to the organization. Thus, research has failed to look at the social organization of the police precinct as the natural, social as well as administrative setting within which bonds among policemen, linkages between the police and the community and socialization into the job occur.

One of the most common findings in organizational research is that it is the immediate work or peer group and not the larger organization or society which controls and motivates the individual's behavior. Yet, despite these findings, organizational theory in police work continues to develop from and re-inform a concern with administration and management at the central headquarter's level. As a result, there are few descriptions or analyses of the behavioral, social and administrative structures of the police precinct, and how these structures combine to form this major organizational unit in urban police work. How the precinct operates as a working social-administrative unit is critical to understanding the way in which it resembles or differs from similar organizational units in other sectors of society.

A number of studies of police work have cited both the absence and importance of reliable data on the specific organizational climate which surrounds the police function and how that climate is developed and modified within the social system of the precinct. Our own experience in organizational studies in criminal justice and educational systems convinced us that research on the police precinct as a social system would be an important step in relating existing research on individual role performance and organizational management functions. It would also provide a new and needed dimension for policy and decision making in police work. Early in September, 1976, with financial support from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, we decided that we would undertake a long-term field study of police precincts and that we would begin by looking at how precincts are organized as social systems—groups of people working together. It is upon this project which we are reporting.

B. Objectives of This Research and Relationship To Long Term Goals

Specifically, our objectives for the proposed research were:

1. to provide an ethnographic description of the social organization of the police precinct and how it functions as a social system to produce social controls over its members;

2. using techniques of the field anthropologist, to observe, document, and analyze the patterns of social relationships which structure behavior in precincts and which define its relationships with (a) headquarters, and (b) the community;

3. using the techniques of network analysis, to develop a preliminary model or models of the social organization of the precinct which grows out of analyses of social action within the organization rather than one that is deduced from its external relations;

4. once the model was developed, to use it to examine the following questions:

(a) What are the patterns of social relationships in the police precinct, between

the police precinct and headquarters, and between the precinct and the community? Here our interest was in the forms of linkage and the types of social bonding within and between such networks.

(b) What holds social networks together in the precinct? Here our interest was in values, conventions and the ethics which provide the cultural meaning for social behavior in the precinct.

(c) How are the various types of social networks or groups organized behaviorally within the precinct? Our interest here was in how members are socialized and how social controls operate within various source networks.

(d) What is the code of rules for various networks and how do these combine to form a comprehensive code for members of the precinct community? Here we looked at the socialization process by which officers learn the rules, differentials among ranks and roles, various racial and ethnic groups and individuals with different educational and experiential levels.

Research program impact on police administration and management

The distinction we have drawn between our approach and most previous police research is critical in assessing the results and benefits of this study. Police precincts have generally been viewed as a sub-set of the formal organization of police departments—that is, as a social unit which has been deliberately designed and constructed to achieve a set of specified goals. This approach views precincts as rationally designed and constructed formal organizations with a hierarchy of organizational positions which can be diagrammed and then, perhaps, changed by recasting the organization chart. Our approach, on the other hand, has been to view precincts as social organizations, contrived by a particular occupational culture, responsive to socio-cultural change and susceptible to study as social systems. We attempted to learn the rules which structure and motivate behavior in precints by observing how people behave in them and toward them. This emphasis on rules and a code of rules as the behavioral structure of a social system is, we feel, the key to understanding how the precinct is organized and how it relates individuals and groups within it to each other and to the outside world.

Essentially, our purpose in this research was to study the police precinct as a social system which operates according to an observable and describable code of rules. In the sense that we use the notion of "rules" here, we are describing a control mechanism, one which regulates and regularizes social relationships between the precinct and the outside world as well as within it. It is this code of rules which develops informally within the precinct to which the new officer is socialized and which sets the standards for behavior among the officers in the precinct. It also establishes who is an insider and who is an outsider, a critical factor in the success or failure of attempts to introduce new personnel and programs. Taken as a totality, these rules form a shared code of behavior which members of the precinct learn as members of informal social networks. The code is manifest in their behavior and performance since it defines the equation through which they perceive the objective world and allows them to make socially acceptable decisions about how to behave. Since we believe that this code is the key to understanding how the social system of the precinct operates, the central question of the research was "What is the code of rules which makes the precinct a social system and how does the precinct culture prepare its members to play this game?" Since we spent eighteen months continuously observing, documenting and analyzing the behavior which results from these rules, we were able not only to define the social structure of the precinct, but are in a position, we believe, to make recommendations on how the rules can be changed and on how changing the rules can lead to changing how the game is played.

We expect four major contributions to theory and methodology in law enforcement to

emerge from this study:

(1) The direction of recent growth in organizational theory has moved from an earlier concentration on formal bureaucratic analysis to a concern for informal, dynamic aspects of organizational climate, organizational diagnosis, and organizational development. Our research so far convinces us that understanding the social organization of work groups in occupational and administrative settings is the important first step toward developing a theory and a method for applying this new knowledge to police work.

(2) From a policy and decision-making point of view, understanding the social and administrative functions of the precinct organization is essential to the development of policy and administrative procedures for evaluating, planning and managing police work in large urban areas.

(3) We also look upon this research as a means of refining and further developing field research methods in criminal justice systems in general and in the police system in particular. We expect that much of the specific findings of our study, particularly the structure of rules which determine social-behavioral networks, bonds among personnel, forms of social linkages and social relations sets will be generalizable to a variety of police systems. In addition, it should be possible for other researchers to replicate this study in other sites to validate and refine the methods and the results.

(4) Finally, we believe that we have developed sufficient data on the structure and function of the precinct level of organization in police work to permit us to make specific recommendations on (a) developing, modifying or transforming the social organization of the precinct as a means of improving efficiency, morale and effectiveness at the precinct level, (b) improving understanding and communications between the precinct and headquarters.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Police Work

Empowered to take lives, exposed to danger, in contact with deviants, the police (unlike more prosaic occupational groups) are fascinating to the public. Somehow entwined with the "crime rate," they are also of continuing interest to government. And during the last decade, because of both factors, they have been diligently studied by social scientists, who rode in their squad cars, took their life histories, gave them questionnaires and personality tests. Much of this research took place in cities, where crime rates are higher, where the poor and minorities painfully rub up against authority, and where the job is allegedly more glamorous. From this recent research is emerging a portrait of the "occupational culture" of the urban police.

A pervasive myth, encouraged by the mass media (and the police themselves) is that the police spend the majority of their time investigating crimes. In fact, the police spend most of their time resolving conflicts, maintaining and restoring order and providing social services. Charles Silberman is very specific:

> They rush accident victims to the hospital; bring alcoholics indoors on a winter's night; break into a locked house or apartment to see whether an elderly occupant is alive or well; persuade a mentally ill person who has barricaded himself in his apartment to return to the hospital; administer emergency first aid to a heart attack victim while waiting for the ambulance to come. Police also get cats down from trees, chauffeur dignitaries around town, rescue the drowning, talk suicidal people out of killing themselves, direct traffic, and provide advice and help to the sick and elderly, as well as to otherwise healthy people who simply cannot cope with some pressing problem.

McNamara, 1967; Wilson, 1968; Bittner, 1970, and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1968 all agree with Silberman on this point.

Despite being part of a semi-military, bureaucratic organization, the average patrolman exercises wide discretion in carrying out these functions. Who to stop? Who to arrest? How to elicit and record information? How to settle a family dispute? These are all questions which detailed police manuals do not answer. Discretion, says Wilson, is inevitable:

> . . .discretion is inevitable—partly because it is impossible to observe every public infraction, partly because many laws require interpretation before they can be applied at all, partly because the police can sometimes get information about serious crimes by overlooking minor crimes, and partly because the police believe that public opinion would not tolerate a policy of full enforcement of all laws all the time.

Wilson goes on to say that this discretion is exercised in "an emotional, apprehensive and

perhaps hostile environment." He sums up the role of the patrolman as follows:

> In sum, the order-maintenance function of the patrolman defines his role and that role, which is unlike that of any other occupation, can be described as one in which sub-professionals, working alone, exercise wide discretion in matters of utmost importance (life and death, honor and dishonor) in an environment that is apprehensive and perhaps hostile.

This emphasis on discretion leads a number of researchers to emphasize the artistry of police work. In Police, Streetcorner Politicians, William Muir made an in-depth study of the life histories and daily decisions of 28 young policemen in Oakland, California. He stresses the complexity of the job, the ambiguity of choices, the necessity for wisdeom. Muir describes great successes and great blunders and speculates on why certain personalities can successfully cope with certain police tasks and why others fail. Wilson and Silberman also stress artistry, perhaps not going so far as Muir in suggesting the ideal patrolman should be a "philosopher-king" and have a "tragic vision" of life.

Peter Manning, however, finds a patrolman's job more prosaic. "They do engage in chases, in gunfights, in careful sleuthing. But these are rare events. Most police work resembles any other kind of work: it is boring, tiresome, sometimes dirty, sometimes technically demanding, but it is rarely dangerous." Manning cites evidence that mining, agriculture and construction are more dangerous than police work. Rubinstein, however, stresses that the constant threat of danger unique to policing, is anxiety-producing.

There are other characteristics of the police culture that crop up repeatedly in the literature. Kenneth Fortier stresses "personal isolationism, group coalescence and defensiveness," in "The Police Culture — Its Effect on Sound Community Relations." "One of the first things that the new officer does is to promptly lose his nonpolice friends and acquaintances." He learns that only other policemen can understand him and that he must stick with the group (see also, Wilson, 1968; Skolnick, 1966; and Rubinstein, 1972). He tends to be hypersensitive to even constructive criticism. Fortier disagrees with those who stress the tedium of much police work. "Police work tends to engulf the new officer, to assume primary importance in his life style." Wilson, after closely observing police in several large cities, concludes:

> . . .in the big cities. . .police work is much of the time boring, monotonous, messy routine occasionally interrupted by intense hostility, physical danger and social conflict.

Chief of the New Haven Police from 1968-1970, James Ahern in Police in Trouble corroborates Wilson and offers a particularly grim view of the occupational culture. Cops are constantly bored, looking for diversion, amusing themselves in destructive ways and hiding from their supervisors. He is a clerk in a squad car, unable to follow up cases, and getting no credit for helping solve crimes. He is frustrated by the courts and by the vice laws that no one believes in. He recycles the same drunks and juveniles. Becoming trapped in police work, he aspires to "day work" or detective work. His circle of friends shrinks and his marriage is strained. There is a debate then as to how demanding, exciting and rewarding police work is. There is also a debate as to how demanding, exciting and rewarding police work could be. Could it and should it become a profession? Or is it just a job?

Much of the literature on police culture involves a series of assertions, observation

or impressions backed up with a few examples. Jonathan Rubinstein's City Police is a pioneer work systematically describing "policemen at work." Rubinstein first covered the Philadelphia police for the Evening Bulletin and then spent a year in the force. City Police is a masterful description of the informal organization, the subculture, and how it interacts with the formal bureaucratic structure. Rubinstein describes police training and socialization, how a squad works, how sergeants and squads interact (how he informally controls and motivates; how they informally cooperate and resist), how dispatchers and patrolmen jockey. "Informal compromises . . .are made daily, in every district . . .which help the department carry on without disruptions, internal upheavals and unpleasant revelations."

Rubinstein emphasizes the importance of "territorial knowledge" and the more slow, haphazard but crucial knowledge of people in a sector; he respects the "reliable intuitions developed during a career devoted to assessing the behavior and motives of people," and he gives specific examples of how this information influences decisions.

While admitting the "solidarity policemen feel for each other," Rubinstein emphasizes that "the relationship among colleagues in a squad are anything but harmonious and trusting."

> No squad is a cohesive unit whose members openly discuss their work and experiences. While most men willingly acknowledge and frequently stress their dependence on each other, no patrolman tries to disguise the secretive nature of much that he knows. A policeman's information is his private stock, which nobody else may presume to make claims on, unless invited to share.

A rookie's "access to what is going on is carefully regulated." Rubinstein describes the formation of cliques and coalitions, how simmering tensions and conflicts are neutralized.

City Police is a fascinating portrait of life from the "bottom up." Rubinstein offers no recipe for reform, sweeping remedies or alternatives. Having spent a year on the force, he seems sympathetic to the ambiguities and difficulties of police work and to La Rochefoucauld's maxim, "Tout comprendre, tout pardonner." He is certainly skeptical of police training and of formal rules and formal ranks as motivators. The subculture of the squad seems to exist in total isolation from the formal organization. Supervisors have limited real power and must depend upon the cooperation of subordinates. The sergeant seems to be key to the hierarchy, the motivator and morale-builder. (See also Muir, 1977). Rubinstein offers superb description and analysis, but little application, criticism or advice. Generally flattering to the police, the book is far from Ahern's picture of monotony broken by frustration.

The only counterpart to Rubinstein's vivid portrait of patrolmen at the precinct level is Arthur Niederhoffer's Behind the Shield. A patrolman himself, instructor at the New York City Police Academy, and now sociologist, Niederhoffer uses New York for his laboratory. Emphasizing the "dilemma of choosing between the professional ideal of police work he has learned at the Academy and the pragmatic precinct approach," Niederhoffer claims the new recruit is indoctrinated in a "get tough" ideology. Starting at the bottom as foot patrolman, he must learn a new jargon and rituals. He must quickly learn "that one of the important arts he must master is the sense of when to take action and, perhaps more important, when not to. An officer who brings too many trivial cases into the station is considered incompetent, but an officer who brings in too few is considered a shirker." After five years the patrolman, "fed up with this basic job of all police systems, seeks to escape from foot patrol duty, either becoming sergeant or detective." Detectives are

the upper class of the police society and haughtily guard their special status and privileges. Many patrolmen believe that you must have a "rabbi" to become a detective.

Another method of advancement, encouraging cynicism, is cited by McNamara in "Uncertainties in Police Work." "If you want to get 'out of the bag' and into the 'bureau' shoot somebody."

Related to this, there is a literature on the special problems of minority police. Alex Nicholas in Black in Blue suggests that "Negro policemen seem to be alienated from his neighbors and friends."(sic) He is accepted by the middle class but rejected by lower class blacks and white Southern migrants. Angela Taylor in "Women Police Officers" describes the special problems of women in the New York force.

An aspect of occupational culture that naturally is stressed by popular writers is vice and corruption. Robert Williams, Vice Squad (New York, 1973) examines squads concerned with enforcing unenforceable laws: laws against gambling, prostitutes, liquor, narcotics, pornography, laws intended to eliminate immoral behavior. He concludes: "It is American society, which wants to indulge itself, but keep its morality intact, that must bear the ultimate responsibility for police corruption." Leonard Shelter's On the Pad gives William Phillips' account of a cop on the take, and is an indictment of the New York City police force.

B. Modal Police Personality

Social scientists and police administrators, of course, hope to "prove" what kind of person makes the best policeman; then personnel procedures can be devised that will encourage such people to become policemen. There is a good deal of speculation on the modal police personality and typical values and political beliefs. Says Jerome Skolnick, "The policeman's culture is that of the masculine working man. It is of the docks, the barracks, the battlefield . . ." Skolnick goes on to offer a political profile of the policeman "as a conservative, perhaps reactionary person of lower-class or lower-middle class origin, often a supporter of radical right causes, often prejudiced and repressive, often extremely ambivalent about the rights of others."

Cynicism comes easily, says Silberman. As one officer told him, "I got to know all the assholes in this neighborhood." Skepticism is required. Jonathan Rubinstein writes, "An officer may begin his career by accepting as truth whatever he is told, but his experiences quickly encourage caution." Disillusion comes early. A veteran cop tells Silberman:

> "'The whole job is a joke,' a veteran cop told me. 'You start out with delusions of grandeur—how you're gonna save the world. But you find out soon enough that nobody cares. The people in the suburbs don't care as long as you keep it confined to the city, and the judges don't care as long as their dockets are current.'"

Cynical, authoritarian, conforming, prejudiced, lower middle-class, often brutal--the picture offered in both the popular press and the scientific literature is not attractive. There naturally is a debate as to whether the job creates the mentality or whether certain mentalities are attracted to the job. Some writers are understanding and forgiving. Others are outraged at supposed police malfeasance and brutality.

An interesting explanation of cynicism and anomie, an explanation that is also revealing about occupational culture, is found in Arthur Niederhoffer's Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society. Niederhoffer claims that there is a serious class conflict between "lower-class conservatives and upwardly mobile middle-class radicals." The few middle class members want more education, more professionalism, and more status. The more numerous lower class members doubt the need for more education and more civil rights. The working class patrolman reacts with "resentment." There is a large literature on whether policing is a profession, whether it should be, and what kind of training or education makes the best policeman.

Anyone hazarding generalizations about the personalities of 400,000 American policemen is bound to be challenged on grounds of inconclusive evidence. Harry W. More, Jr., in The American Police, surveyed the large literature on the police personality, and concluded:

> We began with the assumption that policemen are very unusual people, set apart from the rest of the population by virtue of their authoritarian mentality. Now it looks like policemen may be rather ordinary people, not greatly unlike other Middle-Americans. We cannot even be sure there is a thing as a police personality, however loosely we define it.

C. Change and Reform

There are a number of social scientists who are willing to say how police service can be improved and crime reduced. Some concentrate on the quality of the police. Others would improve the training, still others the organization. Some blame the crime problem on an unjust society. Silberman asserts there is no variable — more technology, more men on patrol, etc. — that has proved itself capable of cutting crime. "The uncomfortable fact is that the police simply do not know what to do to reduce crime." Silberman lists suggestions for improvement but implies that at best improvement will be marginal until society is changed. Some call for scientific management. Richard Larson, in Urban Patrol Analysis, would use operations research so that patrol cars are dispatched in a rational manner and response time is cut. Some blame the courts and judges. Others concentrate on unenforceable vice laws. For our purposes, let us look first at the literature on reorganization, and then look at the literature on scientific management.

D. Organizational Change

There is a large literature on organizational change. A number of writers (Silberman, Manning, Wilson) insist the police should openly admit that much of their time is spent maintaining order and providing services, rather than enforcing laws and chasing criminals, and reorganize accordingly.

> What is called for, then is a new organizational pattern that will provide a domestic unit (as is now being tried in New York City) a juvenile unit, and a drunk unit with a detoxification center, all with a peace-keeping orientation and peace-keeping functions. Only a felony squad and perhaps a riot squad should be used to enforce the law.

The 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice was also quite critical of the organizational focus of police work being almost entirely on the apprehension and prosecution of criminals.

Along with a new organizational pattern and a splitting up of functions, there seems wide-spread sentiment that the police somehow decentralize--they should minimize military organization, get closer to the community and give more responsibility to the one with the most discretion and territorial knowledge--the patrolman.

Gans claims that historically most police departments have adhered to the classical or quasi-military model; that most social scientists feel a decentralized organizational model is more effective because it involves employees in decision-making, goal setting and communicating. Sandler and Mintz are representative when they argue that the militaristic approach alienates the police and the community. It encourages a we-they feeling between administrators and patrolmen. It prevents the flow of information and sabotages programs at the level of execution. It fosters an authoritarian attitude towards the public. Gans claims, however, that most police administrators have rejected the social scientists' advice.

Silberman has guarded faith in the team policing approach:

> A more promising innovation is so-called "neighborhood" or "team" policing, a shorthand term for a variety of approaches which involve turning over responsibility for a particular neighborhood to a team of patrol officers, detectives and other specialists, and supervisors, usually with the rank of lieutenant. One or another variant of team policing has been tried in New York City; Los Angeles; Syracuse and Albany, New York; Dayton, Ohio; St. Petersburg, Florida; and Oxnard, California.

Of course, allowing an officer to become too familiar with a territory increases the risk of corruption, as Manning points out.

There seems agreement that the success of the police depends to a large degree on the energy, competence and dedication of individual patrolmen, and yet existing organizational structures do not reward or recognize their achievement. There are a number of proposals to make the patrolman's job more attractive and his advancement rational and just. Manning, Angell, Bittner and others object to measuring performance by arrests. Rewards should be allocated "for keeping the peace rather than law enforcement." A patrolman should be able to follow a case through. At present, he merely collects a little information and then hands the problem over to a detective, who gets status and glory (Silberman, 1978).

Angell stresses that police generalists (patrolmen) should be considered as important as police specialists (detectives). Angell, whose democratic model of police organization has been influential and even implemented in some cities, has, however, been criticized. Lawrence Sherman, in "Middle Management and Police Democratization," claims that democratization and team policing cannot work if power and authority are suddenly given to sergeants, and patrolmen and management (lieutenants and captains) are bypassed and slighted.

Angell has recently updated his democratic model and admits that "major resistance will start with management and specialized officers." Vaguely he recommends that police executives use more sophisticated "change strategies." There is a debate about what kind of organization is best. But there is also a debate (at least in New York City) as to what kind of organization exists.

McNamara, 1967, claims that the New York City Department "has the characteristics of

a punishment-centered bureaucracy." In general, "the use of negative sanctions and the threat or fear of their use pervades the day-to-day operation of the department." Many patrolmen find the files unfair and the tests dumb. However, Niederhoffer in the same year, talking about the same department, came to quite a different conclusion:

> Along with the shift from the ideal of a tough cop to that of the social scientist police officer, has gone a parallel shift within the organization from the authoritarian pattern of discipline under which patrolmen trembled, to a less punitive one. Techniques of persuasion, manipulation, and conference are now the rule.

Albert Reiss, in The Police and the Public, questions the McNamara, Silberman, Manning model for reorganization and decentralizing. He is skeptical about decentralization and local control.

> These administrative assumptions are open to question. The population in an area is often so large that no officer can know more than a very small proportion of its member, even granting he is able to get in contact with them. And then, the high rate of mobility in urban populations—at least 1 in 5 changes his place of residence each year—similarly renders such knowledge less useful.
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> It is extremely doubtful, for instance, that local precinct police would have protected the interests of Negroes as they moved into areas formerly segregated on the basis of race. Yet it was possible for centralized police commands to protect the interests of those who led in the racial desegregation of housing.

In summary, despite the dissenting voices of Niederhoffer and Reiss, there seems wide-spread agreement in the literature on police organizations that the classical or quasi-military model predominates; and that it should somehow be changed and become more decentralized, more humane and more "employee-centered." Of course, much of this is merely theoretical advice borrowed from the "human relations" school of management. Exactly how to change specific departments without alienating people and creating new problems is advice rarely offered. Evaluating patrolmen by arrests and tickets is clearly unsatisfactory. But neither is there a magic way to measure their ability to settle disputes and placate communities. There is a possibility that there is some reason and some wisdom behind police managers' refusal to embrace the social scientists.

E. Management Science

In addition to the literature on reorganization, there is a growing literature on how to bring management science and techniques of operations research and systems analysis (techniques developed and used by the military and business) to bear on police departments. The general purpose of these techniques is to improve decision-making and to allocate resources in a rational, cost-effective way. As Gaines and Ricks point out:

> The emphasis in this approach is the quantification of activities, analysis and reaction to present and future problems. This philosophy is greatly dependent upon the development of information technology.

"Basically," say the authors, "the range of activities in systems management encompasses

planning, programming and budgeting." Probably the best-known and most controversial example of the application of management science to police activities is the Kansas City experiment which tried to determine whether preventive patrol makes a difference. In one sector, patrols stayed the same; in another it was increased; in another it was eliminated. After a year, reported the evaluators,

> no substantial differences among the three areas were observed in criminal activity, amount of reported crime, rate of victimization as revealed in the follow-up survey, level of citizen fear, or degree of citizen satisfaction with police.

However, many have warned that sweeping conclusions should not be drawn from the study. As Wilson sanely observes:

> The experiment does not show that the police make no difference and it does not show that adding more police is useless in preventing crime. All it shows is that changes in the amount of random preventive patrol in marked cars does not, by itself, seem to affect, over one year's time in Kansas City, how much crime occurs or how safe citizens feel.

The Kansas City experiment has gained the most notoriety. But as Robert Vernon notes in Systems Analysis in Contemporary Police Management, scientific management can be applied to more prosaic decisions, such as what kind of patrol car to buy. Says Vernon,

> The possibilities of the application of the systems analysis approach in police work are practically limitless. Deployment of manpower, purchase and utilization of equipment, and design of overall programs and procedures are just a few of the obvious general applications.

Vernon gives a specific example of how systems analysis was applied to the task of choosing the best alternative to reduce police response time. Vernon's premise, which seems typical of many advocates of scientific management, is that in modern, complex organizations with much specialization, no one man can "have an intuitive grasp of all the information required for selecting the best way," and furthermore, that in a government agency like the police, "there is no built in mechanism . . .that requires optimization like those inherent in private enterprise."

Operations Research has received the imprimatur of a Presidential Commission.

> As an important mechanism for innovation within police agencies, it is urged that police departments of 1,000 or more employees establish an operations research group comprising professionally trained scientists, mathematicians and engineers, including at least one person with a broad statistics background, and at least one person with electronics competence.

Scientific management, like decentralization and employee-centered management, is a concept borrowed from business and the military. How applicable it will be to police departments remains to be proved. Preserving order, providing social services and catching

criminals in Harlem may not be the same thing as plotting the most effective way to sink German submarines. Picking the right squad car is one kind of decision. Vernon is balanced enough to admit that, "Decisions at high levels of the hierarchy within an organization often deal with intangibles and involve quality judgments." Construction of models and listing the alternatives may not automatically lead to the best decision.

In sum, attempting to look at police organization and develop a model for change may be hindered rather than helped by attempts to analogize the specific organizational constraints and requirements for police work with any social structure, no matter how many points of similarity appear on the surface. Police work differs from other social and managerial control systems because the police function is unique. The police literature we have here reviewed indicates the difficulty of applying principles of management science or constructs of group behavior directly to police organization. Thus, what we have proposed to do is look at the police organization without pre-established theoretical or ideological positions in order to discover what the organizational imperatives unique to police work at the precinct or delivery level are. We think, however, that while a theory of the social organization of police work should emerge from our observations and interviewing, it should be considered within the framework of existing theoretical constructs on organizations. To that end, we feel it important to review the literature on organizational change as a background both to some of the analyses we will present and, perhaps even more pertinently, to the recommendations we present based on this study. Here again, however, since most of these analyses have arisen in conjunction with analyses of business or government structures, their direct applicability to police work is yet to be established. It seems to us that rather than review that literature here, we might best review the organizational change literature at those points in our analyses where we feel the conceptual and explanatory power of these formulations apply (or in some cases fail to apply) to the social organization of police work.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

A. Methodology

The methodology employed in this study grows out of a distinctive theoretical framework which is essential to the rationale of the methods we have used. Each of the techniques grows out of a conceptual framework developed from existing theory and has associated with it a methodological rationale and a mode of analysis. This framework is based on three premises which we have developed as a result of our experience in a number of field studies in the criminal justice and educational systems over the past several years:*

(1) We proceed from the assumption that while social action programs in the criminal justice system and in the community operate in the real world and thus cannot be manipulated in order to satisfy the cannons of controlled experimentation, it is possible to be just as empirical in field research as in experimental approaches—if the objectives of the research are clearly stated and if the methods for the collection of qualitative data are subjected to the same scrutiny and standardization as methods used in quantitative analysis.

(2) We have developed a firm commitment to institutional as well as to individual behavior modification as the basis for sustained and meaningful change in society.

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* Kinship and Social Control in an Organized Crime Family (Russell Sage Foundation), Reported in (1) "Mafia and the Web of Kinship," The Public Interest, No. 22, Winter, 1971; (2) "Formal and Social Organization in an Organized Crime 'Family': A Case Study," University of Florida Law Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Fall, 1971; and A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime (New York: Russell Sage-Basic Books, 1972).

Ethnic Succession and Network Formation in Organized Crime (National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice), Reported in (1) "Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime," Summary Report, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U. S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C., 1973; (2) "New Mafia: Black, Hispanic and Italian Styles," Society, Vol. II, No. 3, March/April, 1974; and (3) Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

Community-Correction Transition (Criminal Justice Coordinating Council of the City of New York), Reported in (1) "Attitudes Towards the Relationship Among Stress Relief, Advertising and Youthful Drug Abuse in Two Recent Field Studies," in Drug Use in America by National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (March 1974); and (2) "A Self-Study Approach to Youthful Drug Abuse," Youth and Society, December, 1971.

Community Attitudes Towards Organized Crime (Criminal Justice Coordinating Council of the City of New York), Reported in Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, "Community Crime Control and Organized Crime," in R.A.J. Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, The Criminal Society: Readings in Organized Crime and Corruption (New York: New American Library, Fall 1976 (Forthcoming).

(3) Based on our experience in the criminal justice system as well as observation of a wide variety of social and educational reform programs, we are certain that unless such programs are developed from and re-inform some body of theory, they inevitably fail to become institutionalized and so do not produce lasting change.

Our theoretical orientation in field research studies has centered on the assumption that organized social groups which persist over time are social systems which have the character and permanence of social institutions. Our usage of the term social institution, however, deviates somewhat from the usual view which we characterize as excessively static and structural. Institutions, in our usage, are not fixed, monolithic structures nor are they transmitted across generations as structures. Institutions, for us, are the behavioral patterns, learned or first established by people seeking to maximize their shared values. What becomes institutionalized in this process is not a structure in the usual sense--a box containing action as it were--but a code of rules governing social action as a means of converting human energy and intelligence into a defined pattern of behaviors which are productively efficient in maximizing social and individual gains.

We have assumed that this theoretical orientation goes somewhat beyond the general position of functionalism in that we see the need for identifying some structure of action rather than the usual organizational structure in order to analyze social action. Thus, while we reject the usual view of structuralists which looks to such positional elements in a social system as "status" or "organization" for structure, we find our structure in the code of rules which illuminates every social system and structures every institution. A social system or an institution is, in short, a code of behavior, a structured set of rules of the game which regularize all social action in terms of probabilities flowing from particular social relationships. Our primary research strategy is to gather data on social relations in increasingly larger organizational units by using the traditional anthropological techniques of participant observation, and dealing with field work in organizational settings in precisely the same fashion as we would in any piece of field research. It is important to indicate here that our contacts and the field work in general grow out of natural social settings.

In both the "new field work" in sociology and the "new ethnography" in anthropology there is now a strong emphasis on letting categories of observation emerge from the field work experience. This does not mean however, that one goes into the field "as a camera" and records all that is to be seen. That is of course impossible as well as inefficient. One always goes into the field looking for something and using prior knowledge and experience as a guide. In our scheme of observation which we call "situational analysis," we take prior observations and "concepts" into the field with us and use them as guidelines for observation. We do not pre-plan and pre-build an elaborate conceptual framework into which we force all of the observations. To say this differently, we do not build a series of theoretical and conceptual boxes and take these into the field and fill them with appropriate pieces of action; rather,

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* Social Organization of the High School (Ford Foundation and National Institute of Education) Reported in "Social Organization Study Program: An Interim Report," Council on Anthropology and Education Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 2, May, 1974; and Anthropological Studies of Education: The IX International Conference of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. (The Hague, Mouton, 1976).

Case Studies in School Crime and Violence (National Institute of Education), Reported in Safe Schools-Violent Schools.

we go out and observe the social action and then build the boxes in the field using conceptual materials which were already a part of our repertoire. In this fashion, we feel, we are documenting and eventually analyzing on-going social systems.

It is at this point—looking at policing units as social systems--that we think our study and the field research techniques upon which it is based can be most useful in police management and organizational decision making because they do not assume any pre-existing structure and can be used as a means for generating the data for a reconnection between policing environments and organizational structure and functions in police work. This is also, we think, one of the major reasons for the growing movement to apply the techniques and conceptual methods of field research to criminal justice research. We believe that this study and a better understanding of the uses of field research techniques in the study of police systems may help provide better data on how the police organization actually functions, as well as serving as a tool for developing models for organizational change, if desired, in the department. Police work, whether it occurs in formal or informal settings, tends not to repeat laboratory models--if, indeed, they will submit, in some of their respects, to satisfactory models at all. There are moments of action and response, fluid and sometimes nonverbal as well as routine moments and inactivity. And although their caprice can be overstated or overdramatized, the events of day-to-day policing do manage to trouble even the most precise comprehensive research strategies, as anyone who has attempted observational studies of police work will attest. Nonetheless, conventional research and evaluation procedures in police work continue to exploit arbitrary environments, statistical measures, and "problems" in seeking data about what goes on in police/citizen, police/police, police/supervisor encounters and in building knowledge of policing process and structure. Anthropology offers considerable expertise in traditional organization or systems research in this regard. One distinction of anthropological inquiry is that it describes "natural" environments and "ground-level" behavior. The descriptive activity of anthropology—which is called ethnography—concerns "actual" behavior or what people are observed to do, not simply "normative" behavior or what people say they are doing or what they claim ought to be done. The confusion between normative and actual behavior is an important one in traditional police research and practice. In a sense, the problem of relevance in law enforcement practice may be viewed as a failure to recognize the inconsistencies, contradictions, and paradoxes police confront daily in trying to make sense of differences between actual and normative behavior. Further, the tendency of traditional police research to generalize and attempt applications of findings from questionnaire responses or departmental statistics to "natural" environments and "real" behavior is much less a tendency of the past than much of the current technically impressive research methodology and sophisticated analyses of data would have us believe.

One of the results of this new set of concerns has been the growing interest in what has frequently been called "the anthropological approach" in systems research. While research in police systems has always been more closely attuned to the social sciences than other areas of hardware research because of our increased concern with management and organization in police work, there is a newly developing interest in anthropology here as well. This new interest, however, has led to problems caused by the differences in research style which characterize the quantitative research modes which have been the bases of much police research and the somewhat different climate which surrounds the qualitative style of most anthropological research. In large measure, this results from the nature of anthropological inquiry itself which is holistic, situational, descriptive, and generally designed to result in a statement of system characteristics rather than of the inevitable association of the elements within the system. Eventually we may produce a typology of systems, but any generalizations which can inform practice are dependent upon the analyst's or practitioner's ability to identify his operational system with one of the model system types. Much of the existing research which informs police management and organization grows out of

a tradition of research which was (narrowly) deductive and purported to present inter-relationships among elements of a system which were conceptually independent of any given situation. Consequently police administrators have come to expect statements of law-like regularities from research. Such statements do not emerge from ethnographic field studies and techniques, and standards of application and operational utility for qualitative data are only slowly beginning to be developed and accepted.

All research technologies share certain steps which are indispensible to inquiry in empirical science:

(1) the possession of some prior picture or conceptual scheme of the world under study;

(2) the asking of questions of the empirical world and the conversion of the question into researchable problems;

(3) the determination of the data to be sought to supply answers to those questions and the means to be employed in getting those data;

(4) the systematic search for the relations between the data;

(5) a system of interpretation of the findings;

(6) the use of concepts to group data and establish patterns of relationships and to provide summations of the interpretation of the findings.

In the conventional logico-deductive scheme which organizes most quantitative research designs, the researcher characteristically begins with an existing theory which he uses to divide an articulated problem into dependent and independent variables. Having done this he then proceeds to develop strategies and instruments, attempting to control and uncover relationships between (and among) the naturally occurring variables through the design. Analytic processes are generally performed after the data are in and usually follow a pattern which was part of the original design. Once the research steps are complete, the researcher then returns to the theory to interpret his results and, hopefully, modifies that theory as a result of his new findings.

There is, of course, nothing wrong with this approach so long as the researcher is already aware of the important variables in the problem he is studying. But in applied professional fields such as policing there is some question as to whether the prior picture of the world from which we derive questions, frame hypotheses and identify variables is, in fact, really representative of the empirical world of practice we are proposing to explain or improve or change through research. Many of the concepts and much of the theory we have adopted and adapted from the behavioral and social disciplines was first developed in the study of business or government organizations which may or may not be analogues of police organizations. Similarly, the meaning and function of the concepts may or may not be the same in policing. In this study, we start from the assumption that the test of the empirical world begins in the empirical world itself since operational reality exists there. Thus, field research has as its preferred style immersion in the field under study but always with a healthy and central respect for theory and methods. In field research, the emphasis, however, is on allowing the design of the research to remain somewhat flexible and subject to change throughout the work. This is principally due to an approach which sees the substance of the field as continuously emerging rather than fixed and finite. Field researchers tend to be methodological pragmatists, seeing each method's capabilities and limitations and learning through on-site experience which to use to obtain adequate answers to posed questions. It is this approach which gives the impression of a lack

of rigor in field research. In most research, the rigor is equated with fixed adherence to a rigid and pre-planned set of methods. But methods are, after all, merely instruments designed to identify and analyze the illusive character of the empirical world and as such, their value exists only in their suitability in enabling this task to be done. Allowing skepticism or even new data to dictate changes in fixed procedures can be a very rigorous procedure, since it is done in an attempt to be absolutely faithful to the reality under observation.

There is also an important difference in the way in which most field researchers view the relationship between theory and research. While we agree that the development of theory should always involve a process of research validation, we tend to see theory as emerging from (rather than imposed on) the social field under study so that theory is sometimes developed during (not before) the process of research. As a result, concepts and categories often emerge during the course of field research rather than in the planning stages of the research. The important point here, is the use of the field as the basis for theoretical, methodological and even operational development rather than dependence on abstracted models or existing theoretical positions. Our approach in this study has been to look at the social field under study as a system of implicit rules learned and shared by the members of the social system and used by them in perceiving the objective world--that is selecting certain things as significant, ignoring other things, and making socially and culturally acceptable decision (in terms of that system) about their own behavior. The fieldworker's role is to learn the code by examining the "native's" application of the rules.

None of this should be construed to suggest that field research methodology is a substitute for other methodological approaches in the study of police operation and organization. Rather, we would argue that the continuing debate between those who maintain that a "hard-headed" view of research requires turning to the social and behavioral sciences for theory which will inform practice and those "soft-hearted" romantics who insist that scientific comprehension destroys the rich variety of qualitatively-colored experience through its preference for mere quantitativeness, is an insoluable and useless argument. It is our view that a theory of practice is neither the vindication of theories derived in isolation from actual practice nor the continuation of the folk lore-based common sense of practice. Rather it is the result of a continuing dialogue between discipline-based concepts and theory and emergent theory grounded in continuous and long term exposure to the world of practice in a fashion which improves both the techniques of practice and the knowledge base in the disciplines. What field research techniques and anthropological inquiry offers to police administrators is an opportunity and a means to (a) examine one's own command structure in an informed and consistent manner, and (b) a technology for identifying actual problems in the particular site under study rather than deducing them from some superimposed abstract model.

The data upon which this study is built derives from a long-term field study of two police precincts using the approach we have just described. Specifically, we wanted to look at a precinct as a social unit which operates according to an observable code of rules which control and regularize behavior among the officers. Control systems of this sort begin with values which define what is "good" and what is "bad", what is expected and what is condemned, what is allowed, and what is not allowed. Ultimately, however, social behavior in the precinct is guided by specific social rules which attempt to operationalize these values and apply them to everyday situations. Thus, while values give us some general sense of what is expected, it is the social rule which states what actions will be approved and which will be condemned by other members of that social system. We felt that we could define the optimal social and behavioral structure for the precinct by observing, recording and analyzing these rules.

B. The Research Plan

To carry out the proposed research, we planned to select one New York City police precinct for an in-depth field study over a period of 18 months. During the last six months we planned to look at a number of other precincts as well in order to develop some insight into the generalizability of our major findings. Our field experience convinced us that a comparative study of two precincts would better serve this objective. As a result we spent 15 months studying one precinct and three months studying a second precinct.

Throughout the 18 months of field work, a member of our research team worked with the various units operating inside the precinct and with patrol and other operational units who daily police the community, observing daily behavior and interaction. We used a number of established anthropological techniques in the field; participant observation or becoming (as much as possible given the researcher's civilian status) a member of the precinct community and observing on a daily basis what takes place, event analysis and network charting or observing some incident in the precinct--whether it was a critical incident or routine--tracing the networks of individuals involved in the incident, and then developing descriptions of how the incident is perceived by and affects as many of the individuals involved as could be interviewed.

We planned to generate models of social control and behavior in the precinct, between the precinct and other policing units and between the precinct and the community by using techniques of event and network analysis as part of the overall approach of situational analysis we described earlier.

This use of event and network analysis is based upon the analysis of three major behavioral components: (1) the social-behavioral field, (2) person-to-person contracts, and (3) social relations sets. Essentially, this means that in the first few months of field work we map the behavioral environment of the precinct and conduct preliminary interviews with a sample of precinct members. It was during this period that initial contacts were made which paved the way gradually to acceptance by the officers of us as individuals as well as the overall purpose of our study. We were, in effect, sponsored in the precinct by those officers we had first established contact with and through whose networks of informal social relations we were gradually introduced into the social system. Our daily field presence also involved doing actual functional work such as working full 8-hour shifts in the complaint room taking reports, as well as riding as observers in radio cars during duty tours. The initial contacts and introduction into the working life of the precinct allowed us to develop sequential sampling procedures for further interviews and to develop site-specific strategies for data collection and preliminary analyses. It was also from these preliminary observations and interviews that we were able to develop an index of events and activities which allowed us to focus on and select those planned and unplanned events in the formal organization and in informal networks which we felt were relevant to understanding social relationships, social controls and shared meanings and understandings among precinct members. We then developed a purposive sample of events and activities and of precinct members who formed informal networks surrounding and resulting from these events which, considered in their totality, described the social system of the precinct. It is important here to indicate that both events and networks have a specific meaning in the context of Situational Analysis.

C. Event Analysis

Events may be of many types. The simplest type of events are those which are based upon a single property or characteristic of social action at a particular time or in a particular place. Thus, the roll call for a particular tour or a single officer's daily tour while of quite different time spans would each form a "single event" easily

located in time and place which would be available for intensive analysis. A more complex configuration of such simple events can be built up in two ways. First, the single property--a duty tour for example--could be observed with a number of different units over the 18 month period of field observation. A second type of event analysis results from taking a number of properties or characteristics of an occupational or social action in the precinct and observing them at the same time in the same place, to look at relationships among them. An example of this type of event would be to observe the interaction, spatial patterns, networks of officers involved and normative patterns just before roll call, and describe and analyze the event as a totality. In both cases we are observing and recording processes and practices, the networks of persons involved in the events, the physical territories of persons participating and their spatial relationships; we are developing a preliminary code of rules which describes the normative patterns of interaction growing out of the event. We feel that this type of event-generated observation and analysis allow us to describe ground-level behavior which reports what people are actually doing rather than what they say they are doing or what they claim or believe ought to be done. This also allowed us to distinguish analytically actual behavior from normative behavior. From such information it was possible to deduce certain underlying properties of the precinct social system we were examining. Thus, much that we observed was dependent on the culture or climate of the system and was in effect (in the language of experimental research) the reporting of the operation of dependent variables. Following the event, however, we interviewed a sample of the members of the networks associated with each event and from these verbal reports begin to identify possible dissonance between observed behavior and participants' perceptions as well as the range in variation among categories of respondents. This technique is called Rashomon and has been used in a number of studies.*

Events were identified for sampling from a number of sources. From our experience with precinct operations we were able to identify functions and roles as well as specific objectives which allowed us to pre-plan the identification and selection of activities within the precinct. The initial interviews with precinct personnel were another source which produced an index of planned events and cues as to possible unplanned events in time samples throughout the 18 months of field work. Finally, of course, unplanned events naturally occurred throughout the time we were in the precinct which were important for analysis. In addition to describing and analyzing the specific action which takes place in such events, we also chart the "network" of persons associated with the event which then allows us to interview network participants and to further analyze the patterns of social control and action associated with them.

D. Network Analysis

It was in 1940 that Radcliffe-Brown talked of social structure as "a complex network of social relations."+ This rather metaphorical use of the term "network" introduced it, perhaps for the first time, into anthropological terminology, but it was not until Barnes in 1954 presented a paper which used the notion of "network" to help elucidate his study of class, kinship and friendship in the Norwegian community of

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* For a description of the uses of this technique see the Introduction to Oscar Lewis, Five Families, and Francis A. J. Ianni, Culture, System and Behavior (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1967). Also, for a description of its use by the proposer, see Francis A. J. Ianni, A Family Business (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 203-214.

+ A.R. Radcliffe "On Social Structure" Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, (see bibliography), Vol. 70, 1940, pp. 1-12.

Bremnes* that "network" began to be a significant anthropological term.

Barnes described his vision of a network as follows:

> Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of other people, some of whom are directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not . . .I find it convenient to talk of a social field of this kind as a network. The image I have is of a net of points some of which are joined by lines. The points of the images are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other.

Thus we can represent a network by a diagram, a map, in which each person in a social field is represented by a point, and in which lines are drawn between points to indicate when two people are in one way or another interacting with one another. Thus a very simple network might be mapped as follows:



Figure 1

Here, G directly interacts with C, E, and F, but not with A, B, or D. A directly interacts with B, C, D, and E, but not with F or G. Of course network maps may become much more complex than this one, a fact which prompted Barnes to point out that when the lines crisscross one another often, the "resulting pattern looks slightly like an untidy net and is appropriately called a network."

Barnes himself has described a variety of quite general uses for network analysis:

> The notion of network has been developed in social anthropology to analyze and describe those social processes involving links across, rather than within, group and category limits. The interpersonal links that arise out of common group membership are as much part of the total social network as are those that link persons in different groups, and an analysis of action in terms of a network should reveal, among other things, the boundaries and internal structure of groups. While there are other ways of discovering groups, the network concept is indispensable in discussing those situations where, for example, the individual is involved in "interpersonal relations which cut right across the boundaries of village, sub-caste and lineage" (Srinivas and Beteille, 1964, p. 166). It is appropriate when enduring groups such as parties and factions have not formed, and where individuals are con-

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* J.A. Barnes, "Networks and Political Process" in R. Schwartz, Local Level Politics, Chicago, Aldine, 1968, pp. 107-130.

tinually required to make choices about whom they should look to for leadership, help, information, and guidance. It helps to identify who are leaders and who are followers, or to demonstrate that there is no enduring pattern of leadership.

Moreover, according to Barnes, network analysis is "concerned with choice in social action," with "the problems of why in a specified context a man chooses one course of action rather than another, why and when and how he selects one contact out of many possible and appeals to one principle rather than to others."*

In summary, then, our research plan of action was:

(1) To obtain an overview and descriptive baseline data and to identify the actors, processes and activities in the precinct: During the first weeks of field work we attempted to map the behavioral environment of the precinct and conduct preliminary interviews with a sample of officers in the precinct and at various supervisory or command levels. These data allowed us to establish sequential sampling procedures for further interviews and for the development of site-specific strategies for data collection and preliminary analyses.

(2) From these preliminary observations and interviews, we then developed an index of events and activities during the first months of field work which allowed us to focus on those planned and unplanned events and activities in the precinct which we felt were relevant to social relationships within that precinct. This allowed us to develop a purposive sample of such events and activities which were observed and analyzed using the techniques of event and network analysis.

The research plan was to sample sequentially a variety of events throughout the year which when considered in their totality give a full description of the on-site operation of the precinct and of specific precinct activities. Thus, we were observing and analyzing leadership behavior, patrol performance, control strategies, social and occupational processes and interactions, officer/officer transactions, supervisor/officer transactions, administrative-organizational systems processes and to the extent that they were observable within the precinct, headquarters and community influences on personnel, practices and attitudes.

(3) There were a number of specific techniques within the generic technique of participant observation, which we applied to the precinct observation level of analysis and which, based on our experience in the precinct, we feel relate to the social organization of the precinct. One technique we used with considerable success was that of following an officer or team throughout the day. This involved riding as an observer in radio cars on full tours as well as working and observing in specialized activities such as anti-crime units, warrant-serving units, detective squad, community relations, etc. While the experience of the officers we were following and observing were the primary foci of observation, their social interaction, patterns of approach and avoidance, and other transactional processes involving other police and civilians were also available for observation through this process.

(4) Prolonged observation of a single team or special unit for an extended period was also an important technique here. Our previous police research experience, the fact that we were able, due to prior contact, to establish the critically important social acceptance within the precinct which permitted at least a minimum degree of unobtrusive-

* Barnes, 1968, pp. 126-127.

ness, were of particular importance here. Observing the social and behavioral dynamics of single units within the precinct provided the continuity of social action which sporadic or sequential observation in a number of units or precincts would not have. It is, of course, this type of in-depth qualitative study which distinguishes ethnographic approaches to field study from sample-oriented survey techniques.

The variety of interactive combinations of occupational and social action in precincts in organizations as large and complex as the New York Police Department offered an opportunity to comment on a variety of situations, modes of work performance, age and sex differences and poly-ethnic diversity. While it was not, of course, possible to observe every possible permutation, the presence of two experienced observers in this study at a variety of work and social functions on a daily basis for 18 months provided an opportunity for the gathering of observational data and interview material which would otherwise have been impossible.

(5) From these data, we planned to analyze three major aspects of the model networks in order to describe the precinct in terms of (1) the social behavioral field, (2) person-to-person contacts, and (3) social relation sets. Thus, we expected that at the completion of the study, we would have important findings concerning types of networks within the precinct and between the precinct and (a) other command levels, (b) the forms of linkages and bonds which tie individuals together and finally, (c) a model of the total social structure of the precinct to which we would proceed to address the questions described above.

E. Analysis of Data

Since the basic research design of the fieldwork portion of this study was based upon anthropological techniques, data analyses were an integral part (rather than a later stage) of the continuous methodology. The process was one of sequential analysis of data. The analyses took place in three stages:

(1) the selection and definition of events, concepts and indices. Here the first stage of the analysis began in (a) seeking out those events and activities for observation which promised to yield the greatest understanding of the social and occupational significance of precinct organization and (b) looking for items which may serve as useful indicators of the more difficult question of how such events or activities are organized into the on-going life of the precinct. The simple analytic conclusion of this stage of sequential analysis is that a given phenomenon exists or that two phenomena were observed to be related in one instance; the conclusion says nothing about the frequency or distribution of the observed phenomenon.

(2) the check on the frequency and distribution of phenomena. In this second stage of sequential analysis, the field team had gathered many provisional problems, events, concepts and indicators and the analytic problem now was one of determining which of these was worth pursuing as major foci for study. This was done through comparative analysis of the data both during and after the field research. Thus the fieldworker determined if the events that prompted the development of these provisional indicators were typical and widespread in the precinct and how these events were distributed among categories of people and organizational sub-units.

(3) the construction of models of structures and codes of rules defining the socio-cultural context of precinct structure and organization. The final stage of analysis consisted of incorporating individual findings into a generalized model (or models) of the social organization of the precinct and the codes of rules which were identified in step two of the sequential analysis scheme.

F. Validity and Reliability in Interviewing

It is generally assumed that the problem of validity is greater in interviewing than it is in participant-observation because the data are one step removed and one is "observing" through the eyes and perception of other individuals. In this study validity checks on interview information came from a process in which we measured the internal consistency of interview data and sought verification of information through other sources wherever possible. And, since we were also involved in the process of observation, some of the data could also be checked against our own observations.

The question is one which is common to field work studies but is obviously more pronounced where one is observing behavior that actors may want kept secret. Our solution was to establish a standardized system of assessing both the validity of the data which we were recording and the reliability of the individuals from whom we were gathering the data. Our problem was a dual one: how to assess the reliability of the source of a particular piece of data and how much validity to assign to the information itself. The two questions are, of course, interrelated but actually are separable. An individual informant who has always proved reliable in the past may provide information which he is passing on from someone else and about which the analyst must make a separate judgment; an informant who is unreliable may pass on a piece of information which can be checked against factual data such as departmental records (which may or may not be accessible to the researchers). Because we felt that the questions of informant reliability and data validity had to be looked at separately, we set up a two-dimensional system for assessing data.

Following our earlier assumption that the closer the field worker is to the data the more certain he is of what he is seeing and hearing, where one of us was actually participating in the action being observed, we assigned the highest validity score to those data gathered. Where we were not involved as direct participants, we assigned lower validity scores to data gathered by interviewing informants and coded interview materials into one of three categories according to how carefully we were able to check the data. Data which could be checked against standard, available documented sources--complaint reports, precinct statistics and so on---received the highest rating. Where the data could not be checked but was corroborated by more than one informant, either spontaneously or as a result of our checking information from one source against later interviews with other informants, we assigned the second highest score, and where the data came from one source only, we assigned the lowest score.

Since we were constantly comparing data as they were gathered, we also began building up a profile of how reliable our major informants were. Here again we assigned the informants to categories: "always reliable" where information from that source was consistently accurate in terms of factual checks or subsequent interviewing, "usually reliable" where the data usually but not always checked out, "reliability unknown" where we had been unable to check and "unreliable" where later checking indicated that the individual seldom seemed to provide accurate information. The following table indicate the reliability-validity coding scheme which was applied to all data used in analyses for the study.

TABLE

VALIDITY SCORE	RELIABILITY SCORE
A. Data gathered through observation with direct participation.	1. Informant always reliable.
B. Data gathered through observation but not as direct participant.	2. Informant usually reliable.
C. Interview data checked against documentary or other factual source.	3. Reliability of informant unknown.

TABLE continued

VALIDITY SCORE	RELIABILITY SCORE
D. Interview data corroborated by one or more additional informants.	4. Informant unreliable.
E. Interview data from a single informant.	

Once we had assigned both a reliability score and a validity score to interview data we combined the two into an index number and used only those units of data which had a reliability-validity index of D-2 or above for analysis and summary reporting.

Since our interest was in finding and describing the networks and rules by which members organize their universe and behavior, our problem in analyzing the field data was one of formulating both networks and behavior. Our approach was essentially that of developing a natural history of the areas of behavior in which we were interested; what is generic about the behavior of members of these networks in these areas and how did they explain this regularity. Since we were continuously coding observational and interview data into categories for analysis and constantly comparing the behaviors we sorted into a particular category, we began formulating tentative networks from the very beginning of the research. As new data came in we re-examined networks when we were satisfied that our formulation of a particular network or set of behaviors was sufficient to allow us to make the judgments and perform the acts in the way which members of a network would consider appropriate, we added the rule to our code of rules along with any exceptions we noted.

CHAPTER IV

SITE CHARACTERISTICS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELD DATA

In this chapter, we present the characteristics of the two precinct-communities in which we observed and interviewed. In order to comprehend these precincts, however, it is first necessary to place them within the context of (a) how we came to select the particular precincts we studied and (b) the history and organization of the New York City Police Department.

A. The Selection of Field Sites

Choosing field sites for study and analysis is dependent on a number of vicissitudes of the problem under investigation. In our case we were interested in precinct-level behavior but knew, from our prior experience with the Department, that approval for all aspects of the study was conditional upon official headquarters acceptance of the research. We also knew that it would be necessary to establish ourselves with the precinct officers with whom we would be interacting on a daily basis and that while headquarters approval was a necessary condition, it would not necessarily help and quite possibly might hinder our acceptance at the precinct level. Our first experiences with getting official approval were indicative of the alternate communication structures and their lines of communication which we found to be operative. Once the study had been approved by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, we began the process of getting formal New York City Police Department (NYPD) approval for the study and for the selection of the precincts in which we would work. We prepared the necessary project description and the letter requesting the permission of the Department to begin the study. In the NYPD, all such requests must be directed to the Police Commissioner (PC) who must sign off for each such study. After a number of weeks of waiting, we received a telephone message informing us that the Commissioner did not feel that the study should be carried out in the Department. When we learned that this was to be the decision, we tried the "informal" process of contacting a number of ranking police officials whom we knew from our previous involvement with the Department; they contacted the PC's staff and in a sense "vouched" for us. This approach finally resulted in our being given approval to set up the study. We were assigned a project monitor in the Office of Programs and Policies and informed that we should coordinate the selection of the precincts with the Office of Field Services which had direct operational control over the precincts. At no point did we ever receive written permission to carry out the study.

The task of selecting the precinct field site for study was conditioned by the fact that we were interested in discovering basic patterns of social relationships in a precinct no matter where it might be located physically. We had already spent a great deal of time trying to decide whether or not it was possible to describe and select a "typical" precinct in which we could discover "typical" or basic patterns of relationship. First we had to define "typical". Each of the various police officers we talked to would provide an equally valid, but different set of characteristics for a typical precinct. Important characteristics such as the type and level of crime activity, the socio-economic status of the community served, demography, ethnic composition of precinct personnel, length of tenure of the commanding officer, and precinct size, were discussed in terms of their relative significance in relation to a description of a typical urban police precinct. Finally after much heated debate, we decided that for the purposes of our research, the search for a "typical" precinct was a fruitless one. Although we determined that we could not and need not search for several "typical" or ideal-type precincts, we did feel that it would be profitable to select two precincts which would give us some necessary variety, while avoiding obviously extreme situations, by using a set of rather intuitive criteria for selecting the field sites.

Once we had developed the criteria for the original field site, we faced the problem of gaining the acceptance of the police authorities responsible for that precinct. We began the first actual field encounter which would establish our project and perhaps even more important, ourselves, with those police officials responsible for day-to-day operations. Specifically, we had to arrange meetings first with the Chief of Field Services, then with various Borough Commanders and the Commanding Officer of the first precinct in which we would be conducting our study. As it turned out, the Department had a number of precincts which the Commissioner felt would be suitable for study and we used those recommendations in arriving at a final decision.

There is a growing body of field research literature on problems of entry (or access) and maintenance of a credible field presence in any organization over an extended period of time. In studies of police organization, this literature most frequently points up the problems engendered by the very strongly felt insider-outsider dichotomy among police personnel. The very fact that police personnel refer to everyone not a "sworn member" of the Department as a civilian has been pointed to as a very obvious indication of inhospitality toward outsiders. Further, the folklore of research in policing also suggests that being an "academic" outsider adds considerably to suspicion and "close mouthedness". Perhaps one of the most important lessons we have learned in field research in an organizational or institutional setting is that the management-level personnel who agree to the study will usually be cooperative in direct proportion to how far removed the research is from their daily operations. Simply stated, studying "down" in the organizational hierarchy seems more welcome than studying "up". Obviously, management has some vested interest in what a study might be able to tell them about those who work for them, but much less interest in having you tell them (or anyone else) about what they are doing. So, while we had been given an official go-ahead by the Police Commissioner, we knew that this approval simply permitted us to enter the system and would have very little to do with our eventual acceptance at the precinct level. In fact, we have found in other field research experience that while some systems might open up to a researcher who comes with the blessings of the "boss", there are probably even more systems in which that fact will cause problems of access. A general rule of thumb, in our experience is that the greater the distance, in terms of organizational size and complexity between the approving boss and the locus of study, the greater the level of suspicion and resistance encountered.

Because of our previous experience in the NYPD, we were aware of the level of suspicion that anyone coming out to the field from central headquarters carried with them along with official approval. So, rather than emphasizing our "connections" with headquarters, we preferred to let a very thorough and straight-forward explanation of our objectives and research agenda, as well as our familiarity with police culture from our research experience in the Department, pave the way for our initial on-site acceptance. Again, because of earlier experiences in the Department, we knew that a phone call to the officers who had to work with us in the field from officers and superiors in the Department who had credibility (either because they knew each other personally or because their similar positions and/or ranks in the system established a mutual understanding of the possible problem(s) or threat(s) that we and/or our study might pose) would be very helpful in paving the way. Consequently, for this original introduction into the field and at several other critical times throughout the life of the study, we were, in a sense, personally vouched for by someone in the system. In all cases, interestingly, our professional or formal credentials (degrees, previous research, publications, etc.) were not the key to opening doors. Instead, the personal trust and camaraderie between fellow officers, one of whom was willing to put that trust on the line to vouch for us was crucial. It was a lesson we were to learn over and over again in this particular system and will be discussed in more detail in various sections of the study. The importance of this form of social bonding among police officers is well established in research on policing (Rubenstein, 1973; Niederhoffer, 1967) but its salience and persistence in the New York Police Department, at least in the precincts we studied, is of major im-

portance and seems particularly related to the social history and organization of that Department.

B. A Social History of the NYPD*

The history of the New York Police Department can be described as one in which the search for identity as an organization was and continues to be the major organizational ethic. It is, of course, also the history of the role ambiguity inherent in the process of law enforcement in a democratic society and the lot of those individuals whose occupational role is to variously enforce, ignore, or interpret that process in a heavily populated, culturally heterogeneous city. The New York City police officer's "duty" evolved in the early seventeenth century where he was essentially a night watchman for the West India Company's interests and thereby a protector of the interests of those in power. That role, like the Department itself, progressed in size, scope of responsibility, power, and authority as it attached itself more or less successfully to the careers of various political administrations in the city. It is of no little consequence to the current status and operations of the Department that its history and therefore its tradition was one directly responsive to the power play of a highly ethnicized political tradition and its various uses and misuses of "the law", rather than to the persistent enforcement of some independent legal code. Throughout this history, the search for identity has been associated with distinguishing between policemen or sworn law officers and everyone else, and establishing the social bond among officers which would maintain the insiders-outsiders bonding. As early as November 19, 1643, the ordinance of the Director and Council of New Netherland (New York) establishing the Burgher Guard indicated the importance of the social bond among police officers in the priority for its code of conduct:

1. If any one, on the Burgher Guard, take the name of God in vain, he shall forfeit for the first offence ten stivers; for the second, twenty stivers: and for the third time, twenty stivers.

2. Whosoever on the Burgher Guard speaks ill of a comrade shall forfeit thirty stivers.

3. Whosoever comes fuddled or intoxicated on guard, shall, for each offence, pay twenty stivers; whosoever is absent from his watch without lawful reason shall forfeit fifty stivers.

4. After the watch is duly performed and daylight is come and the reveille beaten, whosoever discharges his gun or musket without orders of his Corporal shall pay one guilder.

By 1786, one captain and 28 men in civilian clothes "policed" a population of over 25,000 by working only nights and receiving fees for various activities including receiving a portion of fines collected on violations, since it was recognized that "rewards are necessary to stimulate activity." By 1820 a stylized leather hat and a 33 inch club was the uniform of the day. The Municipal Police Act of 1844 abolished the night watch and gave the mayor the authority to recruit 200 men to police the city 24 hours a day. At that time, the superintendent or chief's salary was $1250 a year while the patrolman earned $500. The Act also prescribed an official uniform, a single breasted blue frock coat with M.P. (Municipal Police) initials on the collar. A reorganization in 1846 increased the department size to 800 patrolmen but now they wore no uniforms, only a copper star shield on their left breast. In 1853 requirements for joining the force were citizenship, ability to read and write, and knowledge of the first four rules of arithmetic. A doctor's certificate vouched for physical fitness and a selection committee consisted of the mayor, recorder, and city judge. Perhaps a predecessor to the current labor-management relationship between line officers and their superiors or "Bosses" can be found in an incident that occurred when the chief ordered his men to buy uniforms copied after

* This history is based on Gerald Astor's, The New York City Cops. An informal History, Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1971.

the British police uniform. The men refused and the Inspector finally said that if they did not accept the uniform they would be dropped. Finally, the men accepted. If stylized differences are the "stuff" of social distinctions, then the first uniform consisting of a blue coat with velvet collar and nine black buttons (later replaced by brass buttons) succeeded for the first time in visibly separating the cop from the citizenry.

By the end of the century, New York City encompassed the five boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island. A new rule was added to the books at this time forbidding any member of the force to accept gifts or rewards except for "extraordinary service rendered." The accepting of gifts or rewards by the police is also a part of the history of political corruption in many major urban cities but once again is particularly important in New York City where the scandals of one administration are usually mirrored and highlighted by the subsequent reform politics of the next city administration. Police corruption seems always to have been a major issue. In 1894 concern over police corruption led to hearings of the Lexow Committee, focusing on the police monitoring of city elections. In addition, probes into police activities led quickly to charges against all ranks for allowing the operation of brothels, gambling houses, and games. From that time on, popular opinion always accepted, even if it did not condone, the notion of a police "pad" or systematic payoff by illegal entrepreneurs.

While politicization of the Department has been one of the factors leading to corruption, other problems of urban policing have also been important. The problem of changing or varying public attitudes towards the enforcement of many laws, particularly those which regulate conduct for citizens in general, means that police have greater social as well as individual discretion on whether to enforce or ignore those laws. Such discretion is an open invitation to bribery and graft. Today gambling and narcotics as well as violations of building or traffic codes are areas where the lack of strong social condemnation permits discretion. Here again, however, the history of the Department indicates a long standing rather than recent problem. As long ago as the turn of the century, then Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt (whose desk is still used by the present Commissioner), wrote home several months after taking office, "I have now run up against an ugly snag, the Sunday Excise Law. It is altogether too strict; but I have no honorable alternative save to enforce it."

By the early 1900's, most of the major organizational ethics identifying the police role, and defining insiders, outsiders and bonding officers to each other, had already been established in the New York Police Department. In addition to the distinctive uniform and the shield, the responsibility as protector of the political establishment, the discrepancy between public manners and morals and the consequent discretion for law enforcement, a number of other organizational ethics were obvious at that time and in subsequent decades.

In many ways, the urban centers of the turn of the century were the new frontier of America and the same lawlessness seemed to pervade the emerging cities. But, given the size of New York City, the possibilities of an underclass of criminals organized to prey on city dwellers was obvious in the report that thieves could spirit a horse and wagon off the streets and into a stable, clip the mane, dock the tail, bleach the hair, paint the wagon, and sell the rig within hours in much the same manner that police report today that youths can steal and completely strip down a car in 10 to 15 minutes or can transform a stolen car for resale within 12 hours of stealing it. The emergence of this criminal class, in constant oppositional existence to the police, served to solidify the department by providing it with a visible "enemy".*

* Cf. Bion, W. R., Experiences in Groups and other Papers, London, Tavistock, 1961.

The existence of this underclass or "underworld" also helps to explain the perception of danger and the ever present threat of death which many police officers report as a major source of the sense of mutuality among officers. The designation of the law enforcement role which requires the policeman whether on duty or off, whether assigned to the street or to headquarters, always to carry his gun and to be prepared to use it is the symbolic representation of this designation. As early as the turn of the century, the importance of the right to bear arms as a sign of the policing role was illustrated when an officer on departmental trial for recklessly firing his pistol on the street, was fined 30 days pay by then Chief Devery for "not hitting anybody." As there had been concern about the gunslinging marshalls and sheriffs of the Western frontier who began to abuse the powers of their sanctioned use of arms, the concerns with police brutality began to be more vocal in urban areas. The relationship between this concern and corruption are best exemplified in the person of Detective Johnny Broderick, the colorful New York City policeman who was the model for the movie image of the "tough cop" portrayed by actor Edward G. Robinson in the 1936 film "Bullets or Ballots." Broderick's origins as a youth growing up on East 25th Street around 1900, attending parochial school until he had to quit at the age of 12 to support his mother, serving a brief period in the navy, and then joining the New York Fire Department until entering the Police Department in 1923, reads like the biography of many present day New York City police officers. Fortunately he found a "rabbi" or "hook" (a sponsor) early in his police career, enabling him in only five years to attain the rank of first grade detective. An interesting controversy appropriate to his "tough cop" legend is the disagreement over whether he carried a gun or just used his bare fists. The image of Broderick, unarmed, slugging it out with hoodlums, despite the Department's rule that a police officer must carry his gun 24 hours a day, is a popular but questionable one. Certainly the heroic picture of Broderick rushing in alone to capture armed hoodlums and escaped prisoners would seem at odds with the picture of the same Broderick under suspicion of payoffs by communist fur workers to keep away during labor trouble. Actually the two images are not mutually exclusive but rather illustrate the problem of police discretion in law enforcement and the relationship between excesses in application of legitimate police power and corruption. One probably apocryphal tale about Broderick has him knock out "Legs" Diamond with a left hook, carry him out of the movie theatre where the notorious racketeer was apparently peacefully watching the show, and dump him in the garbage can. When asked why he didn't arrest Diamond, Broderick is supposed to have shaken his head and said, "He'd only get a mouth piece to spring him." This attitude is contemporary with today's police attitudes towards the courts; the police maintain that the bad guys are favored in court. The reaction of the Department in Broderick's day, in the face of public and press criticism of excessive gun play in the streets and the consequent danger of innocent citizens led Commissioner Mulrooney to say before the PBA, "I do not want you to have any hesitancy if you come upon a man who is a criminal or a racketeer and you have reason to believe he is armed. I want you to pull first and give it to him if he makes any attempt to get you. Do not be the last to draw." Brokerick, was eventually dumped back into uniform and reassigned to Queens because the press was asking questions about his Cadillac, monogrammed silk underwear, and lavish style of living on a $3,000-4,000 a year salary.

Public concern in the second and third decades of the 20th century seems to have focused more on police brutality than on corruption and graft. One explanation for this change is increased control and discipline within the Department, set by the higher command as a result of the case of a Lieutenant whose publicized involvement with vice, graft and politics cost Tammany Hall the mayoralty election of 1913. The new reform mayor picked a Yale educated commissioner, Arthur Woods, to "reform" the Department. Woods focused on improving police officer training and instituted a hard line on graft. But his career terminated with that of Mayor Mitchell when the Tammany candidate won the next election. Another reason for the changing concerns, however, may well have been that graft has been virtually institutionalized in the Department. This has been true since the turn of the century when Police Chief Bill Devey managed to organize the Department so that graft flowed directly from the streets to the top.

Prohibition was another focus of politics and graft within the police department. In 1919 the number of drinking establishments rose from 15,000 legal places to 32,000 illegal places after the Eighteenth Amendment was passed. Conditions worsened until 1929 when Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt began an investigation into crime and city government in New York City under the leadership of Democrat Samuel Seabury. Evidence of police involvement in shakedowns, phony arrests, and kickbacks resulting in the suspension of 28 officers ranging from patrolman to Deputy Inspector was heard. Commissioner Valentine under Mayor LaGuardia attempted to do something about outside political influences on the Department but even though he and the mayor worked together, they were able to do little to combat a now-established system. In each instance the ethical problems were compounded by the ambiguity of the public--and the police--concept of morality.

During the forties, gambler Harry Gross handed the police 1 million dollars to protect a 26 million dollar gambling business. A grand jury investigation resulted; many officers were tried and there were several suicides, numerous resignations, and a public hue and cry over police corruption. At the same time, Deputy Chief Louis Goldberg of the Brooklyn Morals Squad was broken to Captain by Commissioner Francis Adams because he attempted to close church run gambling games. There is a certain humor to the editorial in the New York Herald Tribune relating the two incidents which commented, "Being practical about bingo, all the law should do is draw a distinction between church bingo and Harry Gross corrupting hundreds of cops." This contradistinction is still present in the controversy over the illegality of the ghetto numbers game as contrasted to the government sponsored lottery and off-track betting.

With increased specialization of units within the Department, specifically in the areas of so called "vice" crimes, (gambling, narcotics, prostitution) came the increased possibility (and opportunity) for corruption of police officers on an even larger scale. "Vice" crimes are those areas of criminal activity that are frequently referred to as "victimless" crimes, willingly entered into by the public, and therefore allowing an easy rationalization for compromise on the part of officers who find themselves having to enforce laws that many people do not really want enforced. The same ambiguity surrounds the occasional scandals involving payoffs by merchants or hotel and restaurant owners willing to pay for special treatment.

The importance of understanding corruption as a social bonding force in the New York Police Department is especially related to the Knapp Commission report on police corruption in 1972. The Commission, set up to investigate allegations of widespread and systematic corruption and graft in the Department, marks a turning point in the history of police corruption and a change in its bonding mechanism as well. Specifically, the Commission reported that "in the five plainclothes divisions where our investigations were concentrated, we found a strikingly standardized pattern of corruption. Plainclothesmen, participating in what is known in police parlance as a "pad" collected regular bi-weekly or monthly payments amounting to as much as $3500 from each of the gambling establishments in the area under their jurisdiction and divided the take in equal shares. The monthly share per man (called the "nut") ranged from $300 and $400 in mid-town Manhattan to $1500 in Harlem. Where supervisors were involved they received a share and a half. . ." (Knapp Commission, 1972, p. 1-2). Elsewhere, the report distinguished between those officers who took bribes from gambling as part of the organized pad, and were known as "grass eaters," and those who as individuals took bribes to protect narcotics dealers and were known as "meat eaters." The Commissions description of narcotics bribery indicates its individualized rather than collective character; "corruption in narcotics enforcement lacked the organization of the gambling pads, but individual payment. . .known as scores . . .were commonly received and could be staggering in amount . . .these scores were either kept by the individual officer or shared with a partner and, perhaps, a superior officer. They ranged from minor shakedowns to payments of many thousands of dollars, the largest narcotics payoff uncovered in our investigation having been $80,000." (The Knapp Commission, p. 1-2).

These distinctions indicate more than the obvious existence of organized graft in the Department prior to 1972. They also reveal the degree of internal acceptance of the graft eminating from the less socially disapproved vice of gambling as contrasted to the more socially condemned narcotics trade. Most important, most officers, even those not involved in the pad, accepted its existence as part of the system and would not report those officers involved. Here again, the report itself is quite explicit:

> "Grass eaters" are the heart of the problem. Their great numbers tend to make corruption "respectable." They also tend to encourage the code of silence that brands anyone who exposes corruption a traitor. At the time our investigation began, any policeman violating the code did so at his own peril. The result was described in our interim report: "The rookie who comes into the Department is faced with the situation where it is easier for him to become corrupt than to remain honest."

There seems little question that systematic graft-taking as a source of corruption has largely disappeared from the Department. In the aftermath of the Knapp Commission Report, however, there is a legacy of collective guilt on the part of many officers, and in the Department's own self-image, which has yet to disappear. At the same time, there are nostalgic references to the "good old days" of policing some of which are rather explicit about the benefits of graft not only as a source of money with which to buy information from informants, but also as a fringe benefit of an otherwise thankless, low-paying and high-risk job. The very obvious self-consciousness of the Department and individual officers over the question of integrity does, however, serve to bind officers together. Even with that guilt, the other legacy of the "good old days" is the social disapproval which attaches to the officer who reports any wrong doing on the part of his comrades.

While the social history of the Department indicates its para-military organizational form, it is also important to keep in mind that it is part of the highly ethnicized civil service system in New York City. Perhaps uniquely among major urban centers, New York's civil service unions have tended to combine trade union power with ethnic power. Thus, for example, in the New York Police Department there are a number of ethnic associations—the Emerald Society for Irish officers, the Shomrim Society for Jewish officer, the Columbian Society for Italian officers, the Guardian's for Black officers, among others—which serve to add additional sources of ethnic bonding within the Department. The Patrolmans Benevolent Association (PBA) and the various superior officer associations were traditionally and still are, largely dominated by Irish-American officers. Despite these ethnic sub-divisions, the labor management aspect of policing increasingly seems to coalesce officers of all ranks against the city administration. Even this seemingly recent development however is really not that new to the Department. As early as 1909, the PBA protested the fact that a bill to institute 8 hour shifts failed to pass. The men turned on Captains and other ranking officers for their failure to support PBA demands. Their tactics seem strangely contemporary; the uniformed force went on a one day enforcement blitz, enforcing all laws, even shuting down saloons on Sunday.

Still another part of the social history of the NYPD which shapes the departmental ethos has to do with the mandate of the police to handle disturbances of the peace, events readily susceptible to a variety of definitions of "disturbance" and "peace". Here again various definitions have been more a response to political exigencies than to clearly mandated rules and procedures. Major "disturbance" problems began for the department with the Depression of 1929 when the police were positioned between the desperation of the unemployed and the employers' demands for order. This departmental function led to cries of police brutality from the former and police inefficiency from the latter. These same accusations have been repeated throughout departmental history when police have

been directed to "maintain the peace." Racial tensions, for example, have often caused such problems in the past and are still one of the most sensitive political aspects of policing. The Department maintains a "Sensitive Location File" intended to "apprise members on the force of the need for a guarded attitude when responding to situations emanating inside, or in the vicinity thereof." Muslim mosques, Jewish synagogues, and black and Puerto Rican nationalist headquarters are the sorts of locations to which this caution applies.

The balance between community relations and maintaining law and order becomes a juggling act of masterly proportion on which many precinct commanding officers' careers have risen or fallen. A report issued after an investigation surrounding a riot that broke out in Harlem in 1935 because of a disturbance in a Kress store noted "widespread hostility" on the part of the law-abiding element "among the colored people toward the police is proof positive there is something wrong in the attitude of the officers toward the people, whom they are there to serve and to aid, not to brow-beat." The problem is that the "proof positive" can be looked at from two different points of view.

The police-minority group relationship worsened dramatically with the shooting of a 15-year-old black youth, James Powell, by Lt. Thomas Gilligan, in 1964, which resulted in a large-scale demonstration and an attack on the 28th precinct in Harlem, with violence rapidly spreading to other large black ghettos in the city. The year 1967 saw another riot in the Puerto Rican section. The 1968 violence following the assasination of Dr. Martin Luther King resulted in 400 arrests albeit with no fatalities and no shots fired by police. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) uncharacteristically praised the police for their restraint but a number of business men sued the city claiming the police had not adequately protected their property. Again, the ambiguity of the position the police find themselves in while doing their "job" . . ., and again their question, "whose peace and what kind of order?"

Finally, there is the history of the various investigatory commissions that ultimately did little to improve or even to change policing but rather served to exchange one political party's influences and priorities for another. The recent history of the NYPD has increasingly focused on the issue of "professionalization." Unfortunately, this period of seeking sophistication in management systems and technology coincides with a decreasing municipal budget and increasing community cries for accountability to their local needs. The result is a constant and continuous tension between such desirable goals as efficiency (in cost terms) and effectiveness (in human and even mission terms); between increased standards of education for police and increased cries of discrimination from minority recruits. These tensions are basically value judgments involving choices and priorities.

All of these currents of the social history of the Department combine to produce an organizational ethos charactorized by a sense of the distinctiveness of the police role and structured by the social bond among officers. The distinctive uniform, the shield the night stick and the gun are visible symbols. The perceived existence of a criminal class as a common enemy and the discretionary authority to enforce certain laws are invisable, but are an integral part of the policing power wherever it occurs. Those characteristics of large urban police departments, such as politicization, differential enforcement resulting from the complexity of size and scale, and the conflict between interpersonal relationships and the impersonality of complex bureaucratic organizations, seem to be most characteristic of the social history of the NYPD. These forces which mold and shape the individual officer's relationships to the Department and to his "brother" officers are also visible in the organization of the Department.

C. The Organizational Structure

Like most police departments throughout the world, the organizational structure of the NYPD is para-military. The reason most frequently cited by police administrators is that there is a functional similarity with military organizations—in both cases involving a uniformed force bearing arms and requiring a strict emphasis on discipline and command distinction based on a hierarchy of ranks, in order to insure task performance. The degree of layering in the rank structure in any police department is generally a function of size and the vast majority of departments throughout the country in small suburban or rural areas consist of a chief and perhaps seven or eight men. In larger departments, the military command structure of increasing authority and rank from sergeant to lieutenant to captain is most common. Unlike the military, however, once the police officer moves from patrolman to sergeant he has made the transition to a "boss"; since there is no lateral entry into police work everyone starts as a patrolman and there is no officer caste as in the military.

Promotion up to and including Captain is achieved through a competitive civil service examination given periodically by the Department. Promotions above Captain result from appointment by the Police Commissioner and continue at his (or his successor's) pleasure. Thus, while there is a structured line of promotion upwards by appointment from Captain to Deputy Inspector to Inspector to Deputy Chief to Assistant Chief and from there to the three-star "Super Chiefs" who command the five major bureaus (Field Services, Detectives, Organized Crime Control, Personnel and Inspectional Services) and the four star Chief of Operations, (the highest uniformed rank), it is possible, but not usual, for the Commissioner to jump someone one or more ranks in these appointed grades. While an officer may be removed from one of these appointed ranks which are colloquially and generically called "captains with friends" at any time by the Police Commissioner, the officer retains his civil service rank of Captain.

According to the New York City Charter, all power resides in the Police Commissioner and flows downward from there. However, practice demands some degree of decentralization which is as variable as the dictates of command or leadership style, City Hall or community pressure. Consequently, the structure of power and authority is not as neat as an organizational chart of the NYPD would have one believe. Perhaps the Department is most like the classical civil service bureaucracy in the manner in which "reform" commissioners, "progressive" commissioners, "conservative" commissioners, and even civilian commissioners may come and go but at the operational level, "nothing much changes" because "the system" is insulated against administrative innovation.

1. Police Headquarters

The Police Commissioner is the head of the Department and is appointed by the mayor for a term of five years. Directly beneath the PC are seven Deputy Commissioners; the First Deputy Commissioner becomes the acting head of the Department in the PC's absence; the others are the Deputy Commissioners for Administration, Community Affairs, Trials, Public Information, Criminal Justice and Legal Matters. While the Deputy Commissioners are "civilian" roles, the Commissioner and the First Deputy have usually been policemen who have come up through the ranks of the Department. The PC, the deputies, the Chief of Operations, the Bureau chiefs and their staffs (approximately 4400 sworn members) comprise Police Headquarters, located in the downtown civic center area, close to City Hall and the Mayor's office. It is variously referred to as "downtown", "headquarters", or by its official address, 1 Police Plaza.

2. The Borough or Area Command Level

The field units of the Department, which report through the Chief of Field Services, are organized by geographical location in the five boroughs. The Borough or Area Command level is responsible for maintaining police services for an entire borough and is in direct

line of command over the constituent precincts which are in its geographical area.

Because of their size the boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn have two Borough (called area) Commands, one for north and one for south area precincts contained in those boroughs. The commander of a borough is usually an Assistant Chief, but occasionally someone with the rank of Inspector or Deputy Chief may function in that capacity on a temporary basis. The borough office which is always physically located in one of its precinct station houses is administratively sub-divided into several sections which include specialized units. These are responsible for the entire borough rather than a specific precinct area. Administrative control over groups of precincts within an Area or Borough Command is in the hands of one of several Zone Inspectors. Each Zone Inspector is usually responsible for two or three precincts. All precinct paper work such as crime and personnel activity statistics and reports are channeled through the borough to headquarter units. Similarly, directives from headquarter units are passed down through the borough level to the precinct. There seems to be a great variability of style among borough chiefs; and while the folklore of the job suggests that a precinct commander's life can be made easier or more difficult by the character or "style" of the borough commander, the life of the individual officer on patrol at a precinct seems little affected by that level of command.

3. The Precinct

The city and its five boroughs are divided into 73 patrol precincts responsible for police service and protection of approximately 319.8 square miles and a population of approximately 8 million people. The "job" of policing is the responsibility of approximately 25,000 men and women, the majority of whom are assigned to the Field Service Bureau which is responsible for coordinating police patrol throughout the city, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Additional officers work in specialized, citywide units such as Traffic, Special Operations, Detective Bureau, Organized Crime Control and Inspectional Services.

The 73 precincts into which the city is divided operate out of precinct station houses which serve as the direct service-delivery field commands to which the police men and women are assigned. Each precinct encompasses a geographical area which is sub-divided into geographically defined radio patrol car sectors with a letter designation Sector a (Adam), b (boy), c (Charlie), and so on which are then further divided into smaller foot and scooter patrol posts. The number and the size of the sectors is based upon the maximum number of radio cars that have been assigned to that precinct, which is related to the work distributior as determined by the percentage of crimes and calls placed for service in that precinct.

Radio cars patrol with two officers,* referred to as a team or partners who, if they ride together regularly, become steady partners. Police officers may also be assigned to foot patrol, which usually extends for several blocks along a major avenue or business street.

One officer quite aptly summed up the differences among precincts in New York City by saying, "Precincts are like women, essentially they all work the same. Some of the external goodies might make one more attractive than the other . . .but only in the beginning . . .because once you have been there any length of time . . .they all look alike."

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* Towards the conclusion of our study, a new program was introduced whereby one man or "solo" cars would patrol in selected precincts.

Precinct operations occur at the level of direct interface with the surrounding community. The precinct and the men who work inside in various staff positions and those who on foot, in radio cars, or in unmarked cars patrol the area for which that precinct is responsible. They visibly represent the job of policing to most of the citizens of New York City. Within a precinct, personnel are divided in several different ways: formally, by function and rank hierarchy as represented by the formal organization chart*, and informally by affiliations, connections, by shared characteristics such as ethnicity, and by amount of time on the job.

A working day for the precinct is a 24-hour day, 7-days per week with no holidays. The working hours of officers assigned to the precinct are based on an 8-hour day, broken into three segments or "tours of duty": 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. (the day tour or 8 x 4); 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. (4 x 12); and 12 p.m. to 8 a.m. (12 x 8 or the late tour). The precinct is a self-sustaining unit of operation under the command of the precinct Commanding Officer (or CO) who usually holds the rank of Captain, although recently there has been talk of returning to a previous system of placing Deputy Inspectors in command of certain high activity precincts. Precincts throughout the city have been classified by headquarters according to activity level, (high, medium, or low). The designation is based on a number of characteristics such as the number of complaints handled by the precinct, type of usual crime activity, (whether violent or less violent) and certain less easily measured characteristics such as the presence of minority groups or particularly influential citizen groups or citizens in the precinct community.

Allocation of personnel to each precinct is based on an equation related to the number of calls for service, the number of crimes reported, the number of crimes compared to population and any unusual conditions in the area. While the precinct's primary policing responsibility is to the geographical community it serves, and, therefore, manpower is deployed based on the commanding officer's judgment of community crime and crime prevention priorities, occasionally precinct personnel will be pulled out of the precinct and sent to special city-wide details, such as parade duty, riots, strikes, or for special events such as the Democratic National Convention or the presence in town of prominent national and international political figures.

While the number of police officers in a precinct varies with its size and activity level, most NYPD precincts have about 250 men assigned to them. The precinct CO relies on two levels of supervision between himself and the patrol force. Most face-to-face supervision is the responsibility of the lieutenants and sergeants assigned to that precinct. Immediately beneath the CO is the executive officer, also a captain who, while not responsible for setting command policy, assumes the responsibility of command for an 8-hour period worked usually opposite the CO, i.e., the executive officer will work 4 x 12 and the CO will work a 8 x 4.

The police officers+ or cops (a designation that is acceptable for them to use with each other, but must be used carefully by an outsider) are assigned to a particular squad, usually containing six or eight men, and the squads work according to a "chart" or duty schedule. Based on this chart, each squad works a certain tour for 4 or 5 consecutive days, then gets two days off, and comes back to work another tour. Thus, a police officer might work 4 days of 8 x 4's, take two days off, and come back to work 4 days of 4 x 12's, take his days off, and come back to 5 days of 12 x 8's. Over the years, the issue of such working hours and having to adjust physically, mentally and socially to working different times of the day and night has been pointed to by the officers and their union leaders as a cause of low morale, excessive stress, and marital problems. Patrol sergeants are responsible for the supervision on a day-to-day basis of several squads of officers, and they in turn are responsible to the several lieutenants assigned to the precinct.

* See Appendix A .

\+ See Appendix B for rules and regulations affecting police officers.

While a precinct station house is the police equivalent of a military "outpost" or field unit, it is also a unit in the bureaucracy and, in keeping with the nature of bureaucracy, there is paper work, and increasingly more paper work. This requires a precinct office staff, or "the palace guard", as they are referred to more or less affectionately by patrol officers who are responsible for preparing and forwarding all reports and communications between the precinct and other administrative levels. These staff positions are under the direct supervision of the administrative lieutenant (who is sometimes a sergeant) who reports directly to the CO. Included in the precinct staff are officers responsible for roll call or the assignment of officers to radio car, foot or scooter patrol as well as seeing to it that officers are aware of days they are scheduled to be in court (court days); the "time-records man", a key position responsible for recording time worked, over-time, sick time, etc., and the planning and statistical officer, who keeps the precinct's activity records for arrests and summons, and plots patterns of crime activity in the area. Usually, civilian employees are assigned to work as assistants in these various areas. Specialists such as Highway Safety, Crime Prevention, Warrants, and Community Relations officers also work out of the precinct house.

While most officers are assigned to a sector or geographical patrol post, specialized patrol activity is conducted by units such as anti-crime and "conditions" teams. These officers work out of uniform and in unmarked cars patroling the streets of the community looking for specific street crimes or handling certain conditions (such as prostitution, burglaries) which have gotten out of hand and which the CO has decided needed special attention. These officers are not responsible for handling calls coming over the car radio, as are the officers assigned to radio cars. A radio car team* is normally assigned a single sector; however, depending on the number of cars working that tour, the team might have the added responsibility of another sector and on rare occasions for three sectors.

At any time during the day or night, the precinct will have five or six radio cars with two officers patroling a particular sector or sectors plus several unmarked cars with anti-crime officers. In addition, a conditions unit might be "sitting on" a location watching for drug sales, burglaries, or prostitutes. During any tour there will also be a patrol sergeant assigned to supervise the men as they respond to radio runs or walk their foot posts, noting response time, (the amount of time it takes from when the call is dispatched by the central dispatcher to a radio car and when that officer calls back to the dispatcher indicating that the call has been handled in some fashion) and verifying their physical presence on post. The type of "job" or call given out by the central dispatcher over the car radio is coded to a number designation and the responses or dispositions are similarly numerically coded. In some cases a radio car is not allowed to respond to a particular job without a supervisor or higher ranking officer present, such as on a bomb threat or entering a licensed premise. Officers are assigned meal breaks before they "turn out," or leave the station house to take their assigned post. Meals are staggered so that there is never a time when no car is patroling the streets. Strict regulations cover the taking of meal breaks, including not being able to leave the precinct boundaries.

When the police officer arrives at the station house, he will usually go directly to his locker and change into his uniform. The officers working that particular tour then gather in the muster room for roll call and assignments and occasionally some words of praise or disapproval from the CO or information on some current situation affecting the command. Sometimes, depending on the feelings of the CO towards inspection, the officers will be inspected for proper uniform, personal appearance, proper equipment, etc., and then

* See Appendix C for Patrol Duties and Responsibilities.

will be "turned out," or begin their tour of duty. Most precincts in the city "turn out" squads on the half hour and then on the hour, to insure constant coverage on the street. Otherwise all of the patrol officers from the previous tour would be off of the street a few moments before the end of the tour, and the outgoing platoon would not be out in the streets until several moments after the hour. At the start of every tour, each officer begins a new activity log for the day in his memo book, a leather bound book which he must carry at all times. In this book he records the complete activity of that tour including assignments received, activities performed, absences from post and the time of completion of his tour. This record is critical in terms of recalling occurances at a later date for court appearances, departmental complaints, etc. At some time during the tour, the sergeant on patrol will initial one of the pages which serves as proof that the officer was actually out on the street working.

Because of the presence of large numbers of police officers working out of uniform as street crime units not necessarily assigned to that precinct and therefore unfamiliar to the uniformed officers, it was necessary to devise some identifying symbol for safety in responding to radio runs. For this reason a city-wide "color of the day" is selected and is exhibited as a colored headband which will vary from day to day. This color designation is also used when calling into various departmental offices to identify the caller as someone in the Department. The desk lieutenant (Lieutenants are usually called "Lou" and Sergeants "Sarge") is the officer responsible for the precinct during the tour that he is working. Thus, while the precinct commanding officer has command responsibility for the precinct 24 hours a day, even when he is not at the precinct, the desk lieutenant, who sits behind the stationhouse desk on the main floor, is operationally responsible for all activity outside and inside the station house during his tour. While the officers working any particular tour are usually assigned by the roll call officer to the same radio car, partner, foot or scooter post, unusual conditions at the beginning or during the tour might necessitate a change in their regular assignment. Such decisions are the responsibility of the desk lieutenant. He also maintains the precinct record on individuals arrested, stolen property returned or released, and signs off on any reports prepared by the complaint room or by officers during their tour.

The use of civilians for certain jobs in the Department is not new, but increased financial restrictions and a freeze on hiring of new officers has necessitated a very controversial push to "civilianize" many jobs traditionally held by police officers. Usually civilians can be found working in the 124 room, manning the T.S. (telephone switchboard), and otherwise assisting several of the precinct staff officers.

Perhaps one of the most significant changes in policing, along with radio communication to police cars, has been the notion of the police specialist and specialty squads, but to date the patrol precinct is still the most basic unit of policing and the patrol officer still the final link in whatever process begins with management theory and policy and ends with two officers riding through the street in a radio car. Although the Police Commissioner has ultimate authority over the Department, and superior officers have various levels or degrees of authority dependent on their rank, function and position in the hierarchy, the uniformed police officer is the most visible symbol of the Department and consequently he must, whether he aspires to or not, symbolize the effectiveness, efficiency, and ultimately the morality of the entire Department.

D. Entry Into The Field Sites

At our first meeting with the Deputy Chief of Field Services, to whom we had been directed by our project monitor for selecting the precincts in which we would carry out the study, we described the nature of the study and the general characteristics we were hoping to find in the study precinct. After considerable discussion, including the pros and cons of selecting one of three precincts that the PC had suggested where there were special problems of interest to the Department, it was decided that the Deputy Chief of Field Services would

contact each of the borough or area commanders, inform him of the study and then arrange for us to meet with them individually to discuss the possibilities of specific precincts under their command. We decided to begin this process in the Bronx because there were a number of precincts there which met our requirements.

We were fortunate in that the first Borough Commander with whom we spoke was enthusiastic and quite interested, even encouraging, about our doing the study in "his" borough. Whether this was a function of the objective merits of the study, of his having advanced degrees and a familiarity with research on policing and with some of our previous research, or his reputation as an innovative and "academically oriented" police administrator with a number of publications on policing, or some combination of the three, his response was highly supportive. His approval allowed us to move rather easily and quickly to the next level, that of a particular precinct. We mentioned the two precincts in which we were interested and he said that one of these would be ideal in his judgement and that the CO was a "good man" who had worked with him at the borough level. This precinct, which was one of the higher activity level precincts in the city seemed ideal to us as well. We had decided, after talking with the Deputy Chief of Field Services, that a busy precinct would offer us a vantage point for the widest range of events, operational conditions and diversity of personnel. The Borough Commander called the CO, explained who we were and the purpose of the study and sent us on our way to the precinct. While we were concerned that we were going to be perceived as having been "shoved down a commanding officer's throat" once the call had gone out that the Borough Commander wanted us there, our subsequent experience with the CO of that precinct convinces us that if he had not wanted us there he might have welcomed us out of courtesy to his superior officer, but we would not have stayed for very long. In any case, we went over to the station house, met the CO and, after a discussion of the reasons for the study and specifics on how we intended to operate in his command, he quite agreeably turned us over to his Administrative Lieutenant.

We had decided in advance that the division of labor on the study would be dictated by the desirability of having one of us in continuous presence as a functioning member of the precinct staff. We felt that this meant that one of us, specifically Reuss-Ianni, should take some role in the precinct which could be carried out by a civilian and which would actually contribute to the work of the precinct, at least in the initial stages of the study. Once having established a presence there, Reuss-Ianni could gradually begin to accompany officers on a variety of patrol tasks as well as become involved in other aspects of the life of the precinct. While at no time did we attempt to disguise why we were in the precinct or what our objectives were, we felt that Reuss-Ianni's continuous presence there, working regular shifts and all tours, would be the best means of establishing the familiarity and rapport necessary for the study. Later, as she became better accepted, she could gradually introduce Ianni into the system both in social and precinct activities. In addition, Ianni would maintain the necessary contacts and activities at the borough and headquarters levels. We felt that this division of labor both insured that one of us would have a functional presence in the life of the precinct and that such a presence would not suffer the possible contamination of relating to extra-precinct levels of police administration. We explained all of this to the Administrative Lieutenant as we had to the CO.

After some consultation with the Administrative Lieutenant, we decided that it would be best if Reuss-Ianni began working in the section of the precinct that takes calls from complaintants and records officers' complaint reports. This office, located on the first floor and very much in the middle of precinct activity, would be a good vantage point from which to familiarize ourselves with precinct activities and, more importantly, provide the opportunity for Reuss-Ianni to be visible to the officers. The office is known as the complaint room or the 124 room, and is very much at the hub of station house activity since it also contains telephones from which the officers can make private calls rather than paying for the use of the pay phone. The 124 room is staffed for the most part by civilians and occasionally a police officer assigned to restricted duty. Our first day in the field was delayed by a week or so because in the fall of 1976, police officers were demonstrating and

threatening strikes and job actions over contract negotiations with the city. It was suggested to us by the Administrative Lieutenant that we hold off a few days until things quieted down and he would have more time to introduce us around the station house. Finally, on October 13, 1976, we began observations in the Bronx Precinct.

Our intention had been that Reuss-Ianni would spend a few weeks in each of the inside duty offices before going out with the patrol force and consequently this had been the agreement with the commanding officer. Two fortuitous circumstances developed early in our field presence that changed this intention. Through a research project conducted with the NYPD the previous year, Reuss-Ianni had come to know well several officers in various precincts throughout the city. A few days after beginning work at the precinct, Reuss-Ianni was approached by two officers, a steady radio car team, who suggested that when she was ready, she could begin riding with them. Apparently, one of the officers with whom she had ridden on the previous project, had worked closely with these two officers and had phoned them saying that Reuss-Ianni was "o.k." and as they told her, "that we take care of you and see that you get what you need." These officers were also helpful in answering questions that were raised immediately upon our being visible at the precinct, but which many of the officers were hesitant to ask us directly. This "vouching" on the part of one officer towards another officer was invaluable to us not only in this critical beginning phase of our presence at the precinct, but throughout the study. Fortunately also for us, this team was well respected in the precinct since being associated with "nuts" (an officer or team considered different or unusual) could have been disasterous.

The other fortuitous circumstance was, simply, that the precinct commanding officer felt comfortable enough with his own control of precinct activity that he allowed us a great deal of latitude and flexibility in movement and in fact signed a memo allowing us access to any activity within the boundaries of the precinct. We had initially signed the required departmental "save-harmless" release regarding any injuries incurred while at the precinct.

E. The Bronx Precinct Community

During the 15 months we were in the Bronx precinct community, we became accustomed to its visible representation of the social and physical decay that characterizes the South Bronx. Housing in the area was rapidly disappearing either through abandonment or as a result of the escalating and virtually institutionalized process in which slumlords or tenants torched tenements to make the area "The Arson Capitol of the World." The men of the Bronx precinct we worked in recognized this decline and often expressed the certainty that this precinct would follow the pattern of the precinct to the South which had been one of the most active in the city widely known as "Fort Apache" because it was virtually under siege from a hostile community. A few years later it was dubed "The Little House on the Prairie"because its community was now leveled by arson and heavily depopulated. This section of the Bronx had once included a section referred to as the "Park Avenue of the Bronx". By the time we had arrived there in 1976, the social and physical decay of the neighborhood was such that some of the officers had coined their own affectionate epithet for the precinct community—"Jungle Habitat." For the cops who work in this type of precinct, generically referred to as a "shit" house or "garbage" house, a tour of duty includes debris littered streets and hallways, burned out hulks of buildings where emergency calls invariably come from the top floor when the elevator is broken, hostile faces, jeering kids, high crime, violence, no place to eat, and no where to "let down" and relax in security, except in the station house.

While statistics can never describe a precinct-community adequately, they can at least set proportions and limits. The 1970 census described this precinct-community as a 1.95 square mile area comprised of 60,414 whites (45.5%), 34,883 blacks (25.8%), 33,698 Hispanics (25.4%), with 3,005 (3.3%) "others", usually orientals or Indians. By the year 1977, the population estimate had changed dramatically to 8% white, 40% black, 50% Hispanic, and 2% other. Policing this area is the responsibility of approximately 270 police officers,

15 detectives, 18 sergeants, 6 lieutenants, and 2 captains.

For many of the cops, coming to work in this precinct means driving in from upstate, usually a 90-minute drive, although any cop will swear he lives only 45-minutes away--even if the travel time is closer to two hours. One of the good things about working here is the station house's ready access to highways out of the city. Commuting distance, toll expenses, and parking facilities close to the station house are part of the reward/punishment system perceived by cops to be part of administrative control. Although parking here is convenient and adjacent to the station house, a cop on occasion returned to his car at the end of the day, and found his tires slashed or removed by local youth who have the reputation of being able to remove or "strip" any part of a car parked on the street in the time it takes the driver to get out and lock the doors. Car pools are very common, alleviating some of the financial burden in gas and tolls and some of the exhaustion of a day or night tour either too hectic or too slow.

The physical geography of the community is a map of debris, of burned-out apartments, of empty, gutted buildings that landlords have abandoned but where squatters, frequently entire families live, often without lights or water or sanitation, of lots behind buildings that are piled high with garbage thrown out of windows. Even copper pipes in carefully boarded-up buildings are easy pickings once the building is set afire and the fire department has to break in to put out the flames. It is a community where being inside is no safer than being outside since frequently people living in the same building will break into their neighbors' apartments and move stereos and TV's into their own apartments, and muggers and rapists unscrew hallway bulbs and wait for the very old or the very young to come home. Smoking pot openly on streets, passing a joint back and forth while sitting on a park bench, or just leaning against a building hanging out and drinking beer is the norm. In short, this precinct, this community is everything the stereotype of a poverty-level black and Hispanic community implies, including the few who care about their community, their building, or just their own apartment and the many who don't seem to care anymore, if external signs can be read as internal motives. The cops who work in this precinct have read the external signs of the people who live and work here, placed them in comparative context to their own values and mores, and interpreted them to mean at best a lack of caring about themselves, their families, their children, their homes, even their futures, and at worst open and active hostility toward each other, towards the system that provides for many of them, and to anyone who ventures into their neighborhood from outside. While one may agree or disagree with the cop's reading of the external signs, their perceptions eloquently describe what they feel it means to work here as a police officer. More specifically, it speaks to the question: what is the import for the job of a police officer of being assigned to a precinct which is located in a community that is relatively speaking dirtier, poorer, more hostile, more violent than other precincts to which he might have been assigned, or to which he had once been assigned, or to which friends might currently be assigned? It is in many respects like an outpost fort, and so its members must relate to the surrounding community like an army of occupation.

Frequently, especially in the early days of our presence at the precinct, one of us would be taken on a "sight-seeing tour" (not because we had asked, in fact after introducing ourselves and the project we would always add that they should just go about their business as though we weren't there) . . .buildings were pointed out that as recently as 10 years before had been carefully landscaped with small bridges crossing ponds and ducks in the courtyards, where now there was just dirt and a broken cement hole filled with broken bottles. Sometimes we were taken into large apartment buildings with barely visible remnants of mosaic tiled floors, floor-to-ceiling mirrors and art nouveau decorations on the ceilings. "This place is a gold mine for an antique store," one officer commented as he pointed out glass door knobs and stained glass windows on the landings. It wasn't at all unusual, we found, for some of the few remaining decorations to be lovingly unscrewed or otherwise removed cleaned up, and presented to a wife or girlfriend as a gift by one of the officers. When this was done in our presence there was never any attempt to disguise or explain away the

action. It was treated as though any reasonable person would understand that such objects were no longer appreciated or valued and deserved a better fate and location. Interestingly, such removals were done quite openly in front of other officers and usually even when patrol sergeants were present, but never during our observations when a lieutenant was on the scene.

The most immediate environment for those officers who work inside the station house building is the old three-storied stone building itself. Inside, other than the detention cell, a large cage located in the detective's office or squad room, the three floors are comprised of various sized offices, one small room with a TV, large table, and well worn sofa set aside as the lunch room, and a musty basement with a ping pong table and some gym equipment purchased by the precinct club with funds from various social events held during the year. While most of the men quickly adjust to these rather grim, colorless rooms, occasionally one of the men, usually a younger one or one who has recently been transferred from a newer station house, will comment on the conditions of their working space:

> "They talk about taking pride in ourselves, in what we are, ha! They should visit us down here some time, why the hell do they expect me to care about keeping my uniform clean or my shoes polished if they stick me in this filthy hole?" or, "They want me to show respect, how about showing respect for me . . .give me a clean locker room."

Another cop commented on the differences of assignment, noting that cops at the 13th precinct, for example, have the Police Academy in the same building and can use the basketball courts, the gym and its equipment, and the pool whenever they want. One constantly recurring theme heard was that the Department should provide the gym equipment at the station houses because as more and more restrictions are introduced on the use of guns, many officers feel that increased emphasis should be placed on physical conditioning in the Department:

> "They make such a big deal about the firearm cycle (officers of all ranks must qualify at the range twice a year, once at the indoor range and again at the outdoor range), when I don't ever plan to use my gun again ("unless," he added, "someone is pointing one at me or my partner."), but we all (other cops) could use some physical exercise and I sure as hell am not going to do it on my own time . . .or pay to go to some gym . . .some guys have such bellies they could get in real trouble . . .I don't even mean running to catch some nut . . .I mean running away!"

Some of the older cops would then chime in on the use of the night stick:

> "In the old days we really used these bats, but these young guys don't know there is a real art to using them . . .there should be retraining in using them right."

Some of the cops especially the younger ones when we discussed physical exercise, felt that it was each guy's responsibility to take care of himself, and in almost all of the cases where they brought it up, their appearance suggested that they did take care to keep in shape. A few of the older cops added jokingly that they expected their younger partners to handle the chases. One lieutenant mentioned:

> "The department used to care about being overweight, in fact, you could be passed over on a promotion if you were . . . now, the department is just interested in covering themselves in court cases on discrimination . . .and since they couldn't prove that being overweight affected how you did your job . . .now they don't give a damn about that either."

There is an old stove and an even older refrigerator in the basement and occasionally, especially on a late tour or early Sunday morning, some of the guys get together, buy groceries and cook up breakfast for the others who are working. While most of them like this and many commented that they missed it since the cops who used to do it regularly weren't around anymore, it's a tricky business since it means bending the regulations a little. Often it would depend on what bosses (supervisors) were around or what the chances are of a Zone Inspector or someone from the borough stopping in. One of the very real problems to which this "bending of the rules and regulations" is a response is the fact that there are few restaurants in the area and even fewer that are open during the late tour hours, 11:30 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. Departmental regulations governing meals while working require that you are not to leave the boundaries of the precinct. This is, in fact, enforced rather loosely, but the point is that the restriction is always there if someone wants to crack down. On several occasions we heard the rules and procedures guide explained as "containing and covering every possible situation for controlling us but saying nothing about what the hell we are supposed to really be doing out there", or, on occasion, "If they want to get us on something, you can be sure it's either in there somewhere now or they will issue an order putting it in and covering themselves."

By and large the patrol officers at this precinct also see themselves as an occupying army and frequently have used this expression as a short-hand explanation of what they feel they are doing. The predominately white patrol force continually comments with amazement at the dirt, the litter on the streets and in the hallways, elevators and entrances of buildings. What makes this perception even more entrenched is the interesting fact that quite a few of the officers, particularly those of Irish or Italian ancestry, were actually brought up in this same neighborhood. "We lived right in that building," one of the officers pointed out as we were riding by one night, "and we were poor, probably poorer than the people here now because my father was too proud to accept public assistance. . .we didn't have bikes (he points to the several bikes lying on the pavement in front of the entrance doors) and my grandmother who lived with us was outside here sweeping the front steps every morning; now these people moved in and it looks like a pigsty." Another officer commented, "shit, they don't have to work, can't they at least keep things clean." But perhaps the most important personal effect of this level of perception of the community was the frequent mention of how ridiculous it was for the Department to stress dress and appearance in such an environment:

> They* are always hassling us about keeping our hats on and shirts buttoned and then they send us out to muck our way through garbage, broken bottles, and piss . . .and I'm not even talking about alleyways, I'm talking about inside buildings . . .and duck bricks and bottles heaved from those buildings (the officer pointed them out as we drove by). All they care about is that someone might take a picture of one of us with our hats off and our collars open and it would look bad for them.+

Much has been written about police prejudice, usually painting a picture of cops as products of lower class, immigrant Irish and Italian families with the attendant conservatism, racial biases, and pointing out that such prejudice comes to the job with the cop as part

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* "They" always means police bosses or superiors and usually includes everyone outside the precinct including borough headquarters and central headquarters—anyone who doesn't work in the streets.

+ Such an incident actually occurred in a Bronx Precinct. A documentary had been filmed at a precinct showing police operations in the street and in the station house. The documentary was very realistic showing a homicide and including street language by

of this background and upbringing. While this may be so, we found during our time in this precinct that it is just as obvious thay many of the cops' attitudes toward minorities and the poor grow out of their immediate occupational experiences. One frequent and often rhetorical question asked of us by cops was how we explained that when his family lived in the neighborhood and they were poor, the streets, houses, and apartments were clean and now with blacks and Puerto Ricans living in them there is garbage and filth all around? While a significant number immediately answer their own questions by saying that all blacks and Puerto Ricans are dirty, others were equally vehement about a "system" that "allows people and whole families to stay on the dole generation after generation" or that "the papers don't yell when sanitation men get caught sleeping in the trucks or leave more garbage around than they pick up," and complain about landlords who "live on Park Avenue and only come around here in their Cadillacs to pick up the rents." But what bothers officers the most are the children. Any number of times when responding with a radio car team on a family dispute where at 11 or 12 at night sleepy-eyed kids stand around watching their mother and their father cursing, swinging, and abusing each other. Invariably, as we are riding down in the elevator, the cops will comment that "those poor kids don't have a chance. The cops frequently reminisced that 10 years ago this was one of the quietest precincts in the Bronx, recalling how not too much earlier there were two radio cars covering the whole precinct, one had the north section and other the south. Now 10 years later, we were told by the precinct commander, that even this precinct has seen its peak in terms of crime activity, and the wave of decay, arson, assault, poverty, and despair have swept over us and moved even further north. At best what is left is a holding action . . .there is little talk of rebuilding or even restoring. Although President Carter's South Bronx Redevelopment Project has become a big political plum, its promise is earmarked for an area further to the south. The reaction to the news of the President's South Bronx Project, when it was first publicized, was "they better station tanks around the area; it will go the way of all other great projects to restore blocks or buildings or neighborhoods. A lot of planners get the money, a couple of people get a better apartment for a few weeks, but then the scum bags come back in and within a few months the burnings and strippings and abandonment will start." And, one cop added resignedly, "who will be the fall guys . . .we will, because we are the only ones that are out here 24 hours a day that these people can turn to."

During the 15 months we studied this precinct, Reuss-Ianni worked continuous tours, day, night and late tours both in precinct staff offices and on patrol. She spent time as well with the various special details that work out of the precinct, anti-crime, conditions units, warrants and the precinct detective squad. Although she spent time talking with officers who had steady foot posts and those on scooter patrol, our feeling was that the discomfort engendered by intensive observation of such patrols would not make it worth the effort, so we relied on direct interviews of those officers and stories of their activities brought back to the station house. Where ever the Borough Commander agreed, Reuss-Ianni and/or Ianni attended borough meetings with the commanding officer or the executive officer although this occurred at irregular intervals since there were three different borough commanders during those 15 months.

After we had been in the Bronx precinct for 12 months we decided, in agreement with the project monitor from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the NYPD monitor that we should spend a shorter period of time in another precinct which would offer some comparison to the Bronx precinct. Since our request came just at the time of a

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the police as well as the citizens. During the first showing of the film on television, the Borough Commander (a new Borough Commander with a reputation for being a "spit and polish" military type had replaced the academically oriented one we had first dealt with) called the station house and "read the riot act" because some of the offices appeared without hats and ties and had their shirts unbuttoned.

change in the Police Commission and therefore a change in the command of various administrative offices which had to approve our request, the system held true to its bureaucratic ideal. A change in top level personnel means that the system in effect stops and everyone scrambles to justify their holding on to what they have; consequently we spent about three more months at the Bronx precinct waiting for official approval for our move to a second precinct. We began working in the second precinct on March 7, 1978.

F. The Manhattan Precinct Community

When we mentioned the name of the precinct in Manhattan where we planned to conduct the second phase of our study to several of the cops in the Bronx precinct, one laughed and said, "If I got transferred there, I would think I had died and gone to heaven." This was a fairly typical example of how cops from the Bronx viewed the difference between their precinct and the one in Manhattan to which we moved. Everything that was missing for working in the Bronx was present in abundance in Manhattan--at least in their perception. One sergeant commented (with nods of agreement from those standing around) that if he were at that precinct, "I would be getting a divorce for sure." There was another side to the obvious advantages of working in an area renowned for young, good-looking women, excellent restaurants, and future civilian job possibilities through connections made in the area. Some cops said that in such a politically important area (because of its wealth and the influential people who lived and/or worked there) "the bosses are always breathing down your neck . . .at least here (at the Bronx Precinct) they know you are busy and let you alone"; and from one cop who had worked in a similar Manhattan precinct . . ."There is no camaraderie in those places . . .you have to look out for yourself . . .no one will back you up there," and "it's actually more dangerous there because you get sloppy . . . things don't happen all the time so you forget to look over your shoulder, you forget to look out for your partner . . .and that's when you get hurt."

The "goodies" the cops refer to "over there" don't adequately describe the glamour and wealth that reside in this 1.26 sq. mile area of East Side townhouses, embassies, and high-rise apartments protected by 24-hour doormen and closed circuit TV monitored hallways and elevators. The safety of its population of 147,000residents is the responsibility of approximately 236 police officers, 11 detectives,17 sergeants, 4 lieutenants and 2 captains. The community has approximately 93% white, 1% black and 4% Hispanic residents. While the cops who don't work there see the glamour of a population comprised of airline stewardesses, wealthy and bored divorcees, expensive dogs, and businessmen with "big bucks," the ones who work in this command more often speak of "the lack of respect by these people who treat you like you are some kind of lackey, who don't want their neighbors to see you come in because it is bad for their reputation" or "bad for business." While an assignment to guard a consulate used to be an unwanted assignment given to junior men, today there is an embassy detail worked by cops who are willing to exchange the routine and boredom of standing outside the door of a consulate for days on end, for regular working hours and thereby not having to work the dreaded "round-the-clock." During the day the many boutiques and restaurants are filled with shoppers from around the world and the streets are usually so packed with cars and taxi cabs that the cops say you get around better on foot, and "God help someone who had to get to a hospital quickly," although there are several hospitals within the boundaries of the precinct.

"Burglar alarms are our biggest headache," said one cop who has spent many years at this command. "Almost every other call is an unfounded burglar alarm . . .the alarm companies find it cheaper to have us respond than to fix the damn things." The time spent unnecessarily by radio cars responding to alarms that went off by accident because of malfunctions, or just because an employee forgets to turn it off before he opens the store in the morning became so costly in terms of man-hours that one officer with previous experience in installing burglar alarms spends his whole tour checking out repeated unfounded occurrences and contacting the owner of the business and/or the alarm company to politely suggest that they had better do something to repair their system. This is apparently not a unique police pro-

blem in major urban areas, and in some cities police departments have begun charging store owners for the equivalent response time of officers.

Many of the cops assigned here complain, sometimes bitterly, about the "crap we have to take from people who think they are better than we are . . .and we have to take it because you know damn well they will be on the phone to someone at City Hall who they are friends with and we'll get a complaint." One cop went so far as to suggest (with colleagues signaling a nodding agreement) that this command should be "considered high hazard" because of the trouble a guy can get into just for not watching his language. Another cop who happened to have spent a few years at the Bronx precinct added another perspective when he commented that "at least over there if a guy gives you trouble you can tell him where to go and you won't get any flack over it from him or the bosses . . .because they understand that kind of language . . .over here, you have to learn a completely new language."

A sergeant told us "the boss (the precinct commanding officer) here has to spend much of his time massaging the important people in the community, he has to be a real diplomat because they sure know how to use their phones and who to call to get action." Another cop embellished this theme with "and here they don't just call the precinct when they want some action or have some complaint . . .they write a dear Abe (the mayor) or dear Mike (PC) . . .and they can get away with it."

Physically, the station house itself is not much newer than the one in the Bronx, but the precinct club has been able to set up a very elaborately equipped gym in the basement for the officers and the eating room has a pool table and color television. While the Bronx station house is home, a place of refuge from the dirt and community resentment perceived just outside the door and consequently a place always filled with officers on and off duty (unless someone from the borough command happens to be visiting), in Manhattan there is much more on the outside to interest a cop and consequently much less hanging around inside the station house. Even eating is a matter of personal finances and having to choose among some of the finest, albeit expensive restaurants in the world.

A good deal of the police job here has to do with making certain that an individual is covered for insurance purposes when a theft or burglary has occurred, or with increasing frequency, when someone's car is stolen or vandalized. Some of the cops told us that there is an increase in crime in that area because the "mutts from up north or from the Bronx have heard about the good pickings here," and much of the time spent by anti-crime teams is spent watching for and then following groups of black or Hispanic kids that wander the streets "until they get on the subway and get out of here or cross over into the next precinct and become their problem." "Black and Hispanic youth are unusual enough in this neighborhood to stand out and they usually are only here to cause trouble," one anti-crime cop told us. On a particularly quiet night, even cars with groups of blacks or Hispanics might be followed until they cross out of the precinct boundaries.

A frequent complaint among the cops here is the problem of parking space for the cars they drive into work. There used to be a parking lot around the corner where they could park, but construction was started a few years ago (and stopped unfinished) . . .so now it is first come first served along several of the streets around the station house . . .still not enough to accommodate all of the cars. Free parking and convenient parking have come to be expected as a job benefit by cops and it becomes the basis of hard feelings because there is always another precinct that is pointed out as having convenient and readily available parking.

Another frequently heard complaint is "Around here, appearance is important to the bosses," "You better have your shoes shined and your hat on when you get out of your car"; but from our observations during the several months we spent there, this concern seemed to be

more in theory than in fact, and physical appearance was more directly related to a guy wanting "to look sharp for the girls around here" than for the bosses. We were told by several of the men that there were more divorced cops at this precinct than any other in the city. We did attempt to verify this, but the implication was that the temptations abounding in these few miles of blocks were formidable. Certainly, there were more than a few occasions when riding with officers that they made new contacts just by pulling up alongside an attractive girl and suggesting that they get together later; asking and more often than not getting phone numbers and addresses. "Girls think we are safe" was a common explanation of their success with women. One cop and his partner seem to agree that airline stewardesses were particularly attracted to cops because "they run into trouble often with kooks that they meet on planes or just hanging around in bars when they are in town, and they like the fact that we carry guns. They know even if they can't reach us, they can usually get one of our buddies who might be working when they need some help quick and quiet."

"Discount buying" is one of the advantages of getting to know some of the shopkeepers, especially in an area where most of the cops said that they couldn't afford to buy the things in those stores even when they were on sale. Despite departmental "integrity" programs and strict regulations, free meals and drinks in local establishments are a common occurrence. "One hand washes the other" is a commonly heard expression regarding such matters. "Downtown doesn't really care about little stuff like free eats or drinks," one cop told us, "as long as it's kept quiet so that they aren't embarrassed." He went on to explain, "They are usually just interested in catching us in the big stuff, and they have been pretty successful in controlling that only because they have made it so that no one trusts the next guy . . .and you can't get very big on your own." In fact, only several weeks after we arrived there, we were told by three different cops that we shouldn't use the phone on the corner, or the phone in the muster room . . .the implication was that both phones were bugged by headquarters, a reputation that probably goes back to the time of the Knapp Commission investigation when several precinct phones had apparently been monitored.

Community relations at the Manhattan Precinct is a full-time job for one officer and a continuous headache for the precinct commanding officer. "The only time you get a big turnout at community meetings," we were told, "is over an issue like prostitutes hanging out in a certain area," or "a bar or a club that plays music too loud, or kids hanging around." Cops were resentful of the fact that "many people who have been robbed or whose apartments have been burglarized don't really even want the police to do anything . . .many even refuse to take the time to go to court when a suspect is caught, because it's all insured so they don't really give a damn . . .all they want is a complaint number for their insurance."

On the other hand, because of the power and position of many people residing in the precinct, even relatively minor occurrences will be given special treatment, for example, assigning a detective to go to a home and speak personally with the complainant even on a relatively minor incident. "Not that it means anything," one detective explained, "but they expect this kind of treatment because of who they are . . .not because they see it on the police shows on TV . . .and we give it to them because of the trouble they can cause us."

CHAPTER V

THE FIELD DATA: I
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, SOCIAL BONDING, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRESS

A. Introduction

During the 18 months of the study, we spent a total of 168 eight hour tours of duty in both precincts. Of these 168 tours, 120 were in the Bronx precinct and the remaining 48 were in the Manhattan Precinct. The tours of duty in both precincts included working in the 124 or complaint room, with the precinct investigation unit (PIU) and with community relations units inside the station house. In addition, we had an opportunity to observe on full tours of duty on radio motor patrols, with anti-crime and conditions units, and with the detective and warrant squads. Throughout the study we also maintained contact and carried out interviews with the Commanding Officers of both precincts as well as other administrative personnel at both the precinct and area or borough command levels. At various times during the study we also interviewed personnel at police headquarters as well as a number of former officers of the Department. In total, we were in some contact with 310 police officers of all ranks, either presently in or formerly associated with the two precincts. The degree of contact varied from casual conversations, either on duty or in the various formal or informal social gatherings held by the precincts throughout that time, to extensive and continuous contact with officers of various ranks in each of the precincts. We rode, for example, with many of the radio car teams in both precincts but spent far more time with a smaller number of teams because we wanted to observe some continuity of police work. Observations were carried out during all tours and on weekends and holidays as well as during the week.

As a result of these observations and interviews, we gathered over 1500 pages of field data as well as a considerable volume of archival and documentary material. Presenting these data in some form which is both faithful to the field situation and indicative of the social organization of the precinct is a problem which confronts all field studies. As we explained in the chapter on methodology, we elected to use events as the focal point for observation and interviewing since we wanted to look at the social action which generates and displays that social organization rather than to deal with more static notions such as roles and statuses. We have also elected to follow that same strategy in presenting our data by using events as the bases for analysis and reporting.

B. Major Orienting Analytic Themes from the Research: Street Cop Culture vs. Management Cop Culture

Our interest in defining the social organization of the precinct was in terms of a subset of questions which we felt could be answered once we had developed a model of how the precinct was organized as a social system and described how that social system related to headquarters and the community. Specifically, we wanted to know how social bonding takes place within the precinct and what values and informal rules organize individual and interpersonal relationships. Further, we were interested in how individuals coming into the precinct are socialized into the various networks which make up the social system and learn the values and the rules which inform behavior. From our analyses we have developed a major orienting theme which we believe provides a framework for the events and analyses which follow and which also describes what we consider to be the major theoretical contribution of this research project.

In the previous chapter, we outlined the culture history of the New York Police Department and indicated the importance of the Knapp Commission Report on Corruption as a turning point in the organizational history of the Department. While it is improbable that

any single event or report could transform an organization as large and complex as the NYPD, most of the police officers and supervisors with whom we worked during the study usually describe the time period of the Commission and its hearings as the line of demarcation between the present reality of the policeman's job and "the good old days" of what that job used to be like.

"The good old days" or before the Knapp Commission Report changed everything" are the phrases we most frequently heard used to describe what the police job was like in "better" days. It describes an organizational environment in which the Police Department was integrated into the political system and where police were a valued force for that power base. Their work was also valued by the middle class communities of the city they aspired to join. Everybody, say the cops, knew who were the good guys and who were the bad guys, and the political structure and the community they represented agreed with the definitions. Being a policeman was something special; a cop put his life on the line and people appreciated and respected his willingness to do so. As a result, policemen were allowed to do their jobs without too many questions or too much interference from outside the Department. Not only the street cops, but everyone in the Department was socialized to this ethos. Since there is no lateral entry into the Department, everyone began his career as a cop and, they believed, everyone from the Chiefs on down accepted the values of loyalty, privilege, and the importance of keeping Department business inside the Department. One monolithic culture permeated the Department.

The police career path began with being a "good cop" who would then move to higher command positions or, in many cases, choose to remain within the same precinct, in the same assignment throughout that career. Success was based upon some combination of ability, luck, political, ethnic or family connections or having some "sponsorship" in the authority structure of the Department. Even for those who made it to the top, retirement frequently meant a job such as director of security for a large corporation where you could use your experience as a policeman to recognize the bad guys and use your connections in the Department to help when necessary.

This conception of "the good old days" is the organizing ethos for what we have come to call the "Street Cop Culture" which, as we hope to show, is what organizes individual officers and precinct social networks into a social system. It is important to point out here, that this nostalgic sense of what the good old days were like in the Department may or may not be an accurate interpretation of the past. Many of the officers who spoke most longingly for those days were recently appointed and not even in the Department during most of "those days". In fact, the universality and persistence of this ethos is strangely reminiscent of the Cargo Cult movements which sprang up in Oceania and particularly in New Guinea in reaction to the sudden impact of modern civilization on their Stone Age peoples. Faced with an awesome new technology, the tribal groups developed a new mythology about the "good old days" of their ancestors where things were even better than what the colonizers brought with them. Indeed, the fact that the stories about the good old days of policing were in many cases learned from "old timers" or in growing up in a police family, give them the power as well as the unquestioning acceptance that goes with legend. Again, we do not know if the Department was ever really like all of this, but we do know that most of the officers we talked to in both precincts believed that it was and that life and work was better for cops then than it is now. Thus, we are proposing that the good old days ethos also represents the way they believe it should be today.

One of the ways in which the street cop culture is unified throughout the field units of the Department is in the "in-joke" humor which they share. Looked at in this way, these jokes serve two functions. First, they indicate where there is sufficient tension in the system to make joking remarks meaningful for everyone within that system. They also tell us that the perceptions included in the jokes are representative of what the members of that system believe and so serve to confirm data from the interviews and observations One joke which we heard in both precincts and which eventually appeared in a lampoon issue of the Department's newsletter "Spring 3100", which is written by police officers for police

officers,makes the point of the new Management Cop Culture in justaposition to the good old days. The following defintion appears in a list of "Management Concepts", to be memorized for the Departmental Promotional Exam.

Unity of Command

> Formerly called "sticking together", this precept attempts to remedy shortcomings of sense impressions by recommending that officers accept one agreed upon version of an occurence. It simplifies reports to superiors and grand juries and precludes the position called "left hanging". Origin: By the first two cavemen who had to answer to a third caveman.

Because this ethos was universal throughout the Department, we were told, there was one culture which everyone whether in the street or in headquarters shared. But, they add, a number of social and political forces have weakened that culture and so the organic structure of the Department is disintegrating. What was once a family is now a factory. One major force was the increasing emphasis on professionalization and the subsequent attempts to improve policing through better social science education and management training. A major step here was the introduction of the Law Enforcement Education Program, LEEP, which made money available for educational advancement. Whatever else it did, it allowed police officers to prepare for careers outside of the Department. At the same time, the changing political structure of the city introduced an escalating competition for scarce resources which has had the effect of pitting agency against agency in securing jobs and fiscal allocations. Political leadership has become increasingly management oriented as the financial excesses of the old clubhouse days very nearly bankrupted the city. For the Police Department as well as other city agencies, this meant greater emphasis on accountability and productivity with results which could be quantified and measured in a cost-effective model. The new politics also included those minority groups who were essentially disenfranchised in the old days. Ever since the Civil Rights Movement, there has been growing political sensitivity about relationships with minority groups which holds the Department accountable not only for providing adequate police service to those groups, but for affirmative action in seeking minority recruits. All of these forces have contributed to the development of a new headquarters Management Cop Culture which is bureaucratically juxtaposed to the precinct Street Cop Culture. This new Management Cop Culture, say the cops, is positively oriented towards public administration and looks to scientific management and its associated technologies for guidance on how to run the Department. Despite their new training and orientation, however, they must continue to justify their positions within the Department not by their new expertise or specialization, but because they used to be cops. Departmental regulations require that they continue to display the two most important symbols of the old culture, the shield and gun. Unlike other bureaucratic systems in which the upper echelon of the hierarchy is recruited from different socio-economic and educational levels than the lower ranks, managers at all levels in the NYPD come from the same socio-economic and work experience groups as the "workers" or cops. But, the cops maintain, their bosses have forgotten about being cops and are now professional managers. Since our study concentrated at the precinct level, we cannot explicate the values of the new management culture with the same certainty as we can at the precinct level. From what we did see and hear, however, it would seem that they are essentially those found in any managerial network in a bureaucracy and are, as we shall see in the events, often antithetical to the values of precinct Street Cop Culture.

Not only the bosses'values, but their real loyalties are not to the men but to the social and political networks which make up the Management Cop Culture. The bosses, say the cops, "would give us up in a moment, if necessary, to save their own careers and they think we'll put up with anything because of the pension".Career paths here begin when they are first assigned to headquarters and careers in administration in the Department or after retirement in business or industry are what this new breed of police administrators aspire to today.

While there is some uneasy accommodation between these two cultures, they are increasingly in conflict and this conflict serves to isolate the precinct Street Cop

Culture from the "downtown" Management Cop Culture. The result is disaffection, strong stress reactions, increased attrition and increasing problems with integrity. This, in turn reinforces the resistance of the Street Cop Culture to attempts by headquarters managers to produce organizational change. Instead, the social organization of the precinct becomes the major reference structure for the men. Most of the officers with whom we worked see the destruction of the Street Cop Culture as an inevitable outcome of this conflict and, with obvious resignation, say that this is what the bosses want anyway because then they can more easily deal with cops as individuals rather than a more unified system.

In this chapter we present two events which we selected because they presented an opportunity for focalized, event-generated observation, interviewing and analysis and which illustrate the social and behavioral results of the conflict between precinct level culture and headquarters management culture and the organizational stress which results. Both events were fairly dramatic; one involved the trial of an officer for beating and causing the death of a prisoner; the other involved reactions to the suicide of an officer under investigation for illegal activity. Here again, we feel that it is important to point out that it is not so much the drama of the events but the immediate reaction and verbal associations made by the members of the precinct who were related in some fashion to the event which is important. We have also attempted to use these two events to illustrate the types of data and analyses upon which the model of the social organization of the precinct is based. Thus, while the model and the analyses of organizational stress were derived from a much wider range of events and data, we feel these two events to be especially illustrative of our 18 months of field experience. In the next chapter we present two additional events which we feel are illustrative in the same sense, of the social networks and codes of rules which we found to be operative in that social organization. Obviously, however, there is some overlap among the four events since social organization, organizational stress, social networks and rules, while they may be analytically separable, are operationally interactive.

C. Event 1. The Trial

In the summer of 1975, a 25 year old male Hispanic was arrested in his apartment by Michael Kelly, a New York City police officer, charged with assault and robbery, and brought into the Bronx precinct station house. Some hours later he was removed by ambulance from the station house and taken to a nearby hospital, where he died 5 hours later of a ruptured spleen. The police officer who had arrested this man was subsequently charged with murder and two years later, after being dismissed from the Department, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and sentenced to four years in prison. He was the first on-duty NYPD officer to be tried for the murder of a prisoner while in police custody.

Headlines in the New York Post, November 7, 1977, read in bold black type, "Killer Cop Jury Torn By Strife." The story at one level seemed quite straightforward. Police officers were led to the door of an apartment in the Bronx by a burglary suspect. When the police knocked at the apartment door, shots were fired through the door from the apartment. Several officers broke through the door and Officer Kelly wrestled with the suspect in an effort to restrain him. The suspect was then questioned in the apartment as to the whereabouts of the gun that had been used to fire at the police through the door. Present in the apartment were the suspect's wife who was eight months pregnant, another woman, the patrol sergeant and several officers including officer Kelly. The suspect was removed to the station house under arrest. The allegations were that the arresting officer had beaten the suspect while in the apartment and subsequently beat him further in the second floor squad room of the precinct. The prisoner died in the hospital several hours later.

We selected this event for analysis because in one sense it represents an almost classic case of the street cop culture in conflict with the management cop culture or of conflicting operational codes or rules. It pitted cop against cop in order to fix the blame for the death of the prisoner. Seven cops eventually testified against Kelly admitting that they had lied during the initial grand jury investigation, allegedly to protect him, explaining that it was an accepted practice to commit perjury to help a fellow officer. At the trial,

six officers including the patrol sergeant testified that they had seen Kelly kick and beat the suspect in the apartment, in the squad room and in the bathroom of the station house. Kelly, on the other hand, claimed that he had been made the scapegoat for fellow cops who had been permitted to "make deals" to save their jobs and pensions and he insisted that the other officers had a hand in the beating of the suspect. In his final presentations to the jury the defense attorney, a well-known criminal lawyer who had successfully defended another officer charged with homicide in an earlier case, portrayed Kelly as a courageous officer, a "Jack Armstrong," an all-American boy, a "Mr. Applepie and football," while the prosecution claimed the officer had "acted with completely depraved indifference to human life."

Although the actual arrest and subsequent death occurred prior to our presence in the Bronx precinct, the trial took place during the study. The elements of conflict that surrounded the case and the reaction of the precinct officers during the several weeks of the trial provided us with an ideal opportunity to observe and discuss the social organization of the precinct in its complex interaction with the formal organization of policing, the community and the larger society. While it was a unique event, it did expose the reality of these conflicts in the day-to-day work of policing, since a number of officers commented to us and among themselves "it could have happened to any one of us."

In their broadest aspects, the "facts" of the event were as presented in the newsmedia. There were, however, symbolic conflicts in the interpretation of these facts. To the Hispanic community, the victim, regardless of his notoriety as a drug dealer, was one of their own and at issue was the poverty and powerlessness of urban ghetto life, "the man," police brutality and prejudice. To police headquarters and the political administration it served, there was all of the anxiety of media exposure of a distasteful trial during a mayoral election year, pressure from "downtown," and questions of responsibility and accountability to the community and to the men of the Department. For the cops in the Bronx precinct, there were also issues in conflict; loyalty and commaraderie; "them against us," with them including police headquarters, the "bosses" and City Hall as well as the community; the accountability and loyalty of supervisors; questions of discretion in police work; job-related stress and tension and "Monday morning quarterbacking" by everyone else. While the event was unique, the conflicts and issues it exposed were integral to the daily experiences of the precinct.

1. The Media

Newspaper coverage of the trial was extensive and dramatic. On November 7, 1977, in the New York Post the headline "Killer Cop Jury Torn By Strife" had been preceeded by a lengthy story entitled "Cops Beat Prisoners, A Detective Admits at Kelly's Murder Trial." Such headlines caused obvious and widespread anger at the station house during the trial, although it was a restrained almost resigned affect. "You never hear anything good about us," one officer said, "I guess it doesn't sell papers because it isn't sensational." Another cop pointed out that when regular "citizens" are involved in wrongdoings . . . they "don't put that person's job title up front." Another commented, "we are all different, only when something bad is reported, it's bad for all of us . . .the same thing happened during the Knapp Commission days, when the amount of money cops were taking was reported all over the place . . .even my wife looked at me funny . . .like she thought I had been holding out on her all those years . . .and I have a neighbor who still asks me where I have it hidden." He laughed and added, "I'd like to belt him, but sure as anything the papers would report that a cop had belted his neighbor."

Many of the officers saw a direct relationship between poor press and headquarters response, "even headquarters thinks we're all alike" was the topic of discussion one evening while Reuss-Ianni was riding with two black officers on patrol. "If something happen in Brooklyn, sure enough an order will come down to every command in the city even if the situation barely could ever apply in the Bronx." His partner added "yeah, it's like they always want to be sure they have covered themselves, like in the Patrol Guide . . .it's there

even if everyone knows that it is being done everywhere, but it's there just in case they want to get you." This sense of headquarters "always out to screw you while protecting their own ass" was probably the most frequently heard gripe during the year and a half of the study, and with little difference except on particulars between the Bronx and Manhattan precincts.

Concern over the exploitation of the police by reporters was often cited as a major reason for "turning off" to all "civilians" In many cases this included the researchers, at least until Reuss-Ianni came to be accepted in the precinct. Again unless an officer in the precinct (or some previous partner) could vouch for us, each new personal encounter was guarded. One night, for example, Reuss-Ianni was riding with a radio car team who were not usually partners. One of the team was an officer with whom she had ridden before; the other officer was just filling in while his regular partner was out sick. The new officer said right "up front" that he wasn't going to talk to Reuss-Ianni and wouldn't even have let her ride if this had been his car, but he had respected the wishes of the officer who knew her and had decided not to make an issue of her presence for the tour. Several hours into the tour, probably because he began to see the other officer felt comfortable and was being relatively open and frank in his discussion of various topics, he finally told the story of a previous experience with a female reporter, and how it had led him to vow never to allow any civilian to ride with him. It seems the Department had approved a female reporter to ride in the precinct, and she had been placed in the radio car with him and his partner. He went on to explain that the three of them had gotten on very well and by the end of the week they felt comfortable enough to really begin to talk to her about what they felt was pretty private stuff . . ."we trusted her," he emphasized. The last tour they rode with her, she came with a camera and said that she wanted to get some good shots of them in action, and even offered to take some "funny" ones that she would give them to take home to their families. They were "goofing around," the officer continued and in that mood she said, "why don't you two hold hands on the dashboard ... .just for laughs." "Of course," he said, "when the article came out, there was a picture of the two of us, like two fags holding hands and we never heard from her again, and we didn't get any of the other 'funny' pictures she had promised us!"

Whenever they complained about negative press, officers would add, "and the Police Commissioner never comes out to defend us or explain our side of the story." One officer added, "It's like if he throws us to the wolves he'll come out looking like Mr. Clean," leading another officer to repeat the frequent refrain, "you don't get your nose dirty working in the office (headquarters)." A third officer added with a knowing motion towards "downtown," "yeah, and those guys sitting up there with their stars and three piece business suits, you know what they were doing when they were out here on the streets."

2. The Code

One of the major issues that came up in the trial, and in discussions both in the static house and in the bars off-duty cops frequented nearby, was "the cop code" of not informing on a brother officer. It had been reported at the trial that "it is a well known fact that cops will lie to protect or cover for one another." It was this code of silence which was said to have led the several officers who were witnesses to the events in the apartment and the interrogation in the station house to deny to a grand jury having witnessed Kelly brutalizing the suspect, only to recant their testimony at the trial. Again, regardless of their motives in changing their testimony, this code and the repercussions of their having violated it or "turned-around" are important to understanding the bonds among officers in the street cop culture.

The patrol sergeant, who responded to the reported burglary in the apartment that night, testified at the trial that it is common practice among police officers to "lie to grand juries" to help a fellow officer. He admitted that he had lied to a grand jury when he denied that he had not seen Kelly beat the prisoner and added that he had lied on other

occasions to cover up for fellow officers. Many officers acknowledged to us a long, established tradition "in the Department" for "covering" for another's actions in case a fellow officer is in trouble or "gets caught." The tradition, always described as "in the old days," held that a "good guy," no matter what the pressure, stuck by his colleagues. The folklore suggests that it almost invariably worked because "if everyone sticks to the same story . . .they can't break you because you know you can trust everyone else to say the same thing." But we were told over and over again (the assertion always illustrated with examples of actual experience), that in reaction to the Knapp Commission findings about corruption, the Department has instituted an internal security system that "destroys trust and undermines your faith in fellow cops." The NYPD Internal Affairs Division (IAD) is the internal security system designed, say the cops, to protect the Department and the Police Commissioner from embarrassing revelations. The IAD has, as part of its ongoing investigative network throughout the Department, a group of regular officers assigned as "field associates" and placed "under cover" in field units, such as patrol precincts, without the knowledge of the unit. These officers perform duties as would any regularly assigned officer, but in addition, they are responsible for reporting back to internal affairs any infraction of the rules by personnel. According to the precinct cop's perceptions, such cops are "turnarounds," or cops who got "jammed up," through some offense and who have accepted this type of assignment in exchange for other disciplinary measures. "They're controlled down town," said one supervisor in the precinct, "even the CO (of the precinct) doesn't know who they are." While ranking officers will usually agree, they also maintain that some of the officers who accept such assignments are recruited directly from the police academy before (it is assumed) they develop loyalties to the "cop culture." The cops' bemused response is "Bullshit, there haven't been any Academy classes coming out for years." Others suggest that cops accepting such assignments are "mavericks who just can't fit in with the guys." One field training officer told the story . . ."Nowadays you walk into the lunch room and the conversations just aren't what you used to hear in the old days . . .or two guys are talking to each other and just stop talking when someone else comes in. Guys just don't trust the other guys the way they used to. Plus there is always the possibility that a field associate is around, in fact, they told us directly that those guys would be around. I had a guy that I was training. This guy thought he was Adam-12 . . .he was really gung-ho with his gun and his importance. He was so bad that I wrote him up, and I sure as Hell think twice before doing something like that to a guy. I found out later that this guy became a field associate."

While the original intention of the field associate system was to seek out graft and corruption in the field (a task which seems to have been accomplished with some success) the side effect, say the cops in the precinct, is "you can't trust anybody anymore because IAD has to get on the sheet too soif they can't find anybody taking big stuff, they'll turn you in for getting a second cup of coffee free on a meal break." The effects of this internal "spy" system, say the cops, is that while it provides some departmental benefits in funneling information on such "petty and minor" incidents as knocking off extra time from the job, "cooping" (sleeping during duty tours), "discount shopping" on getting free meals, it has also had a devastating effect on morale and motivation among the men.

3. Loyalty and Mutual Dependence

While there were no issues specifically involving field associates or IAD in the Kelly case, there was frequent informal discussion during the trial by officers in the precinct questioning the reason that Kelly's fellow officers had "ratted" on him and were testifying for the prosecution. The story in the precinct was that the officers had each made a deal with the prosecution. While they were collectively exempted from prosecution, each, it was said, got something special as well. One cop had been laid off as a result of the budget cuts but was called back before a number of other laid-off cops ("jumped up the list") who had seniority; the patrol sergeant had been ready to retire and was allowed to do so with his full pension, and a Detective who had testified was going to "go out on three-quarters"

pay for a job-related disability. Whatever the reality of these rumors, which were told as absolute fact, via the grapevine, they indicated how important it was to explain away the defections from the code on the basis of some strong pressure or personal gain. It was the strength of the bond among "brother officers," a pattern of mutual dependence with the strength and character of kinship reaching out to the "police family" which had been threatened and, regardless of the objective guilt or innocence of Kelly, it was necessary to explain away the disloyalty of the "turnarounds." This social bond has its origins in street cop culture; the ethic of unquestioning support of fellow officers based on the shared dangers of the job. It has grown, however, to include the notion of shared guilt when procedures or even laws have to be "bent a little" in order to accomplish some aspect of social or collective "good." The "turnaround" cops in the Kelly case brought into question not only their own character and motivation but the strength of group loyalty and the salience of mutual trust. To a working cop in the street, we were told, this further eroded the certainty of support he could expect of his partner and other officers who are "out there." Cops would now be less willing to take chances and face danger, lacking the certainty that other cops would risk their lives for them; it also meant you would have to "go by the book" and so from the cop's perspective reduce patrol effectiveness. The term which is used to describe this mutual dependence is "backing up"; at one level this means physically arriving on the scene although the job has been assigned to another car in order to lend extra support; but "backing up" has a shared, more figurative meaning, at the level of group and individual support no matter what the situation or what might be at stake. Throughout the study we were told by officers in both precincts that "guys won't back you up, anymore" but more often in the Manhattan precinct, for reasons that will be discussed in a later section. The Kelly trial produced constant and widespread discussion of "backing up" in the Bronx. Such discussions always included agreement on numerous examples of how the job has changed in the last 10 years because you "don't know who you can trust anymore," so, increasingly, you trust fewer and fewer. One officer summed it up by stating, "now I feel I can only count on my partner, a couple of the guys in the car pool, and that's it. I don't even talk much about my business anymore while I'm riding home (in a car pool)". Another officer with over 20 years on the job said that when he first came on the job, he felt that the whole department was a family and that there was mutual support among all of the officers regardless of rank if "anything heavy came down . . .from outside or even from downtown." "Then," he went on, "it got to where I felt that only this precinct was a home and the family was here, and you just didn't have much to do with guys you don't know from other precincts; now there are only a handful of guys here that I will talk to, even guys I have known since I've been on the job because I just don't know who I can trust anymore. Now I have to be concerned for my family, for my wife, my kids and my pension."

Conversation with and among officers were filled with references to this "change" in the department. Usually, after commenting on the change, came some variant of the phrase "so the hell with the job, I'll put my time in, take my pension and run." While we heard these comments most frequently and most forcefully during the trial, it was a frequent comment throughout the study: "Now, I just put in my 8 hours, take off my uniform and go home, and that's what they've made this job." Some cops suggested that the Department was probably quite pleased with such attitudes and perhaps even fostered them because "it's the enthusiastic cop . . .the go-getter that might get into the kind of situation that the Department doesn't want to hear about any more . . .that might cause eyebrows to be raised at City Hall, or community groups to phone some politician." Another older officer added, "Hell, they are talking about us not having to wear our guns all the time, but you can be damn sure it isn't because they see it as a problem for us . . .it's because they have counted up the number of off-duty shooting incidents, and don't like the results for the image of the job."

While there was general condemnation and much open scorn expressed during the trial for the turnaround cops, a number of cops confided that they "could understand" how it could happen nowadays. Several officers, in fact, expressed open if guarded concern, even pity for these officers because they had been threatened with losing their pensions "and that's all we have left in this shit job." They also pointed out that they really "lean on you"

when they question an officer who will not testify; "not only threats but treating you like a suspect and not even letting you go the bathroom alone." "The way this job is going," said one cop, "a smart guy has to look out for himself, even if it also means that he can't look out for the next guy."

Despite these expressions of understanding, the turnaround cops were placed under strong social pressure from other precinct officers. When they returned from court they had to walk the gauntlet of cops standing outside the station house. It was not uncommon for one of the cops to spit contemptuously as they walked by. While no one spoke to them as they walked into the station house, nothing threatening was said, although there were dire predictions about what would happen to them, or to their lockers, and many rumors that they would, of course, have to be transferred immediately for their own protection. None of this actually came true, and the turnarounds remained at their regular jobs in the precinct. This was explained by some cops as the result of the fact that shortly after the trial, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Kelly had come into the station house and told the officers that if they gave the turnarounds who testified against Kelly any trouble, he (the ADA) would personally see to it that they would be brought up on charges.

One Officer who told us that he had been present during this incident said "there is all this bullshit in the court and in the papers now about Kelly killing this guy because he's Puerto Rican. When they were bringing him (the Hispanic suspect) out Kelly was yelling 'you son-of-a-bitch, you'll never shoot at another cop again'". We heard from several other officers that this was the real issue and that if the man arrested had been white or black, the attitude would have been the same. One night while talking to a group of officers after working a 4 x 12 tour, one officer with over 18 years on the job summed up the traditional feeling of mutual protection. "In the old days, you just didn't get away with killing a cop . . .like now. Even if the courts had been turnstyles, sending guys out as fast as we send them in, the scumbag who shot at a cop wouldn't get a second chance. Even before he got to the station house, the guys would have gotten a piece of him. I remember their taking one guy up to the roof, holding him over the edge by his feet and telling him with very few words that he would never shoot at another cop."

While the code was expected to cover this case, there were things about Kelly and about the incident that confused its application and indicated some of the conditional aspects of the code itself. Officer Kelly had a mixed personal appeal and reputation among the cops at the precinct. Although he had been at the precinct only four months before the incident occurred, he was well known there because he had come in as a trainee several years earlier before going to another precinct for his first assignment. Several of the officers who remember him from those days told us that he was always a trouble maker, and "a crazy" who could always be counted on to find trouble. To other cops in the precinct, however, especially to the younger ones, he was a real "cop's cop." What they meant, they explained, was that he embodied everything that a "real" cop should be: he was tough, good looking, played around with women, hung out with other cops at cop-bars and hangouts, was aggressive in policing and "wouldn't hesitate to jump in to help another cop." Regardless of personal attitudes toward him, however, there was always a big show of solidarity with officers rushing over to him, crowding around him, slapping him on the back, and offering encouragement when he stopped by the station house at the end of the day at court. He, in turn, was always jovial and confident on these occasions. Even Reuss-Ianni, by now accepted within the precinct, was an outsider during these ceremonial re-affirmations of group identification. During one such occasion, an older officer who had been telling her about some of Kelly's "crazy" behavior, got called into one of the back rooms by a group of four younger officers and told that he shouldn't be telling her such negative things about Kelly. When he returned he said that he told them that she was alright and that he could tell her anything he wanted. Their reply had been that "only cops understand cops" and that he was taking a chance when he so openly criticized Kelly. Later, when we asked some of the cops we knew well why there

hadn't been the expected retribution and more bad feelings towards the "turnaround" cops still at the precinct, they reported that it was because so many of the guys had negative feelings about Kelly, that he was known to be "a brute", and that some of the officers felt that he had been wrong to bring "this kind of publicity down on us". One officer said that he blamed Kelly for the problem because the "turnarounds" had merely been unfortunate to have been caught by a system that "once it decides it wants to get you, can get you." But group loyalty is increasingly questioned because whereas "in the old days," the system would have been there to protect you against the outside, nowadays we were told, "your on your own".

4. The Organization and the Individual

While the Kelly trial had a tendency to fit all of the cops in the precinct into "loyal" and "turnaround" categories, the event also brought other dimensions of how officers are sorted—by themselves as well as by other officers—into distinctive groupings. We found, in both precincts, that the important dimensions of sorting tend to be age and length of service, ethnicity, specialized expertise, whether a cop is connected to some powerbase (has a "hook" or "rabbi") and, sex. The distinctions on length of service and age are generally quite straightforward in setting up a series from "rookie" to "old timer." There are other age-graded distinctions as well. Some Police Academy classes, for example, have had a reputation for being full of "crazies" while others are known for having a good group spirit. Within the precinct these distinctions account for differential assignment and respect. Race and ethnicity, however, have some important and yet confusing effects on sorting in the precinct.

An article in The New York Times of November 6, 1977 noted that "The Kelly case, in which the officer is white and the suspect a Puerto Rican, was one of a number in recent years to raise the issue of alleged fatal police brutality by white officers against black or Hispanic people, and the first of those to result in conviction." The issue of minority relations in the life of the precinct, however, is as much a question of the social organization of the precinct as it is the relationship between white cops and black or Hispanic citizens. Police officers of all ranks but especially at the higher ranks are overwhelmingly white and are still predominantly Irish or Italian. There are, of course, numbers of Jewish or German-American police officers as well as a scattering of other ethnicities, but the Irish and Italians are significantly larger groups. In the post Civil Rights Movement era, the Department has attempted to significantly increase its recruitment among black and Hispanic minorities. While this affirmative action is taken seriously at headquarters, it tends to be less than popular out in the field. With increased emphasis on professionalism throughout the policing community and according to younger cops, resulting higher educational standards, minority recruitment, is counter-productive because it requires the acceptance of officers with lower educational credentials. It is not the lower educational standards that the older cops complain about, however, but rather their contention that minority recruitment means accepting officers with prior criminal records. And, it is quickly pointed out, what might go down on one's record as a misdemeanor, frequently was plea-bargained down from a felony. Occasionally, some cops will complain about the lowered height requirements which are usually associated with Puerto Rican recruitment. Often, however, this is said humorously in the presence of a shorter Irish or Italian cop.

Ethnic sorting shapes some of an officer's personal experience in the precinct but there is a more important relationship with how networks are formed and how these networks relate to the power and authority structure. The NYPD has a long and interesting history of the power and influence of various ethnic and religious associations. While Irish Catholic power is still believed to control the authority structure of the Department, Italians have been increasing in power both because of number and upward mobility in the Department. Currently, for example, the president of the Patrolman's Benevolent Association, traditionally an Irish position, is an Italian-American. There is a very rich and irreverent vocabulary employed in the constant banter among cops about each others ethnic heritage. While it may be argued that the frequency and sharpness of the ethnic insults be-

speak deeper levels of hostility, our sense after several years of close social and working relationships with officers is that humor and commaraderie are more important motives. The racial and ethnic epithets are obviously and openly hostile, however, when an officer deviates from the conventions of cop culture and, in losing his group identification, becomes a "Nigger" or a "Jew bastard". This hostility also occurs when power cliques in the precinct or in the Department are being discussed.

Here again the distinctions between the older officers who were actually in the Department in the good old days and the younger officers are apparent. Whenever there is a discussion of "hooks" or connections, the older officers always cite ethnic networks within the Department as "taking care of their own." One older cop at the precinct told us, for example, "it used to be if you wanted something, you went to a Holy Name breakfast, you talked to someone, and he said, 'okay, we'll take care of it' and a couple of weeks later you got a telephone message on a 90 day transfer and that got extended and extended and pretty soon everybody forgot you were there or where you should be and there you were." He went on to add, "and it used to be if you got into trouble or you got brought up on charges, if you had the right connections, the right rabbi, something could be done about it." For younger cops, however, ethnicity seems less important than job-related linkages. These are formed while classmates at the Police Academy, while working together in a precinct, particularly in the first assignment out of the Academy, and while working as partners at some time in their career. When a new Police Commissioner was appointed during the study, we were told to observe who the new Chiefs would bring with them to their assignments and note in how many cases the staff officers selected by the new Chiefs had worked with them in the old days when they were sergeants or lieutenants together.

In 1971 a Career Path Program was developed by the Department with the intention of eliminating the "hook" or "rabbi" system, and introducing a "sound and comprehensive personnel management system for the assignment and advancement of officers." It prescribed a "career path" for officers to insure that an officer's career would include assignment to a variety of precincts of both high and low activity levels, to specialized units, and to investigative units. It stated that advancement would be based on a variety of experiences. Each officer with whom we spoke, in both precincts, was both critical and skeptical about this Career Path Program. Due to the 1976 fiscal crisis in the city and the subsequent layoffs of police officers, movement to any new assignment was slowed down and virtually stopped so any Career Path became frozen as well. There were none with whom we spoke, however, who believed that the "hook" or "contract" wasn't still at work in preferential assignments. One officer in the Bronx precinct, who had applied for a transfer to a specialized street crime unit, had gone through all the proper procedures, had been called in for an interview, but when he checked back to see what was happening, was told by one of the officers in that unit "if you could just have someone call over for you." One night while riding with an anti-crime team, the officers stopped to talk with another radio car about a former team mate who had just been transferred to a "better" street crime detail working city-wide. The anti-crime officers were joking and laughing about how this officer had been one of the least effective team members but his "next door neighbor is a good friend of the clerical man in the unit." Of course we were aware that we were listening to the stories of those left behind by someone who had found his way to a better assignment. In addition, we were told by many superior officers that cops are chronic complainers, particularly against "the system," yet the belief persists almost universally among the cops with whom we spoke that connections are what gets one ahead.

With the exception of ethnic or racial joking patterns, we found little significant inter-ethnic or racial tension or conflict in the social organization of either precinct. Groups of cops standing together for roll call or leaving the station house at the end of a tour would just as frequently as not be racially mixed. There were, however, very few selected radio car teams which were interracial in either precinct. Working together in the same radio car also helps to insure that officers leave work at the same time. Since black

and Hispanic officers more often lived in the city while white officers commuted to the suburbs, they seldom shared a car pool and infrequently mixed socially outside of work. There was, however, some interracial and interethnic socializing outside of work in the Bronx precinct. There was an observable pattern of Hispanic and white officers socializing more commonly than black and white officers and black and Hispanic cops socializing more frequently than white and Hispanic cops.

There are task-related factors which seem to increase interracial mixing both at work and in social relations outside the job. In small closely knit units such as anti-crime or conditions units, social activities and parties usually included all members of the unit regardless of race or ethnicity. Generally, then, while cops seemed to restrict their socializing to "their own kind," the collective cop culture and the task organization which sets them off as cops seemed to be more effective than the divisive nature of ethnic sorting.

A more complex picture, however, emerges at the level of the interraction between the police precinct and the precinct community where there are large minority populations. In the Bronx precinct, for example, the population is predominantly Hispanic and, to a lesser extent, black, and lower class. Most of the officers and virtually all of the bosses in the precinct, however, are white. Certainly, as we pointed out earlier, the army of occupation character of their presence and the prejudices which they brought with them to the job are operative in creating mutual antagonism. What seemed most important, however, was that we found very little evidence during interviews with community members, of any strong feeling that black or Hispanic cops or superior officers would provide better service or be any better received. Many of the people with whom we spoke, while pointing out that a Hispanic officer would at least be able to understand the language, insisted that "a cop is a cop" and did not see that color or language made much difference. In our experience, we saw an important difference between incidents or arrests on the street and the much more frequent job of rendering service or assistance in response to a complaint or emergency. The Bronx radio cars were most frequently dispatched to quell a family dispute or to take someone to a hospital because of the long delays experienced in awaiting a "bus" or ambulance. Here we saw virtually no difference in the professional conduct of officers in the Bronx precinct and in the Manhattan precinct despite the great difference in the ethnic and socio-economic status of the surrounding community. Where street arrests were concerned, however, the distrust and suspicion of the white cops for the black and Hispanic population was evident. Not only would a cop be more likely to view someone as being suspicious—such as someone walking down the street carrying a television set—in the Bronx; they were also more concerned with the potential reaction of community members to an arrest than was true in Manhattan. This attitude, however, seemed no different among the black and Hispanic officers than the white officers in the Bronx. Here again it seems that the interface between the job of policing and the characteristics, real or perceived, of the surrounding community are most important. Many of the black and Hispanic officers said openly that they were "cops first," concerned with their own careers and interested in seeking transfers out of the precinct and into better assignments rather than with any sense of staying behind to police co-ethnics. When the Department offered Spanish language training to Hispanic officers, many of the Hispanic cops we knew in the Bronx precinct steered clear of such specialization since, as one of them said, "I don't want to get stuck in a shit house my whole career just because I'm Puerto Rican and that happens to be the kind of precinct most Puerto Ricans live in now." Another Hispanic cop whose appearance and surname permitted him to be taken as Italian, commented that "it's worse out there for me if the people think I am one of them . . .then I am supposed to give them the benefit of the doubt . . .but it never seems to work the other way, if I need their help . . .they still can't see beyond my uniform." Occasionally, we even heard antagonism toward co-ethnics such as "Hell, I got a job, I'm not like them even though I started out with the same strikes against me, and I don't want them to think that I am like one of them."

5. The Sorting of Female Officers

While there are only a few hundred females in the NYPD and none were permanently assigned to either of the precincts studied, one group of female officers did come into the Bronx precinct for three months as part of a program for reintegrating rehired officers. There were some immediate problems such as having to set up separate locker and toilet facilities for the "girls." Possibly because everyone knew that this was not a permanent assignment, there was not much antagonism exhibited towards the policewomen but some of the anti-feminist aspects of cop culture which we had observed in an earlier study emerged. There was much joking about guys riding with one or two of the more attractive females, especially on the late tour, but the most frequent comments were "they have to be kidding, expecting us to ride with girls in a place like this," or "they should be home having babies," and "a mother shouldn't be carrying a gun." There were frequent allusions to fooling around with the "girls" and this was accentuated because one of the policewomen there had married a cop that she had worked with in a former precinct. Both officers had been married before they met and both divorced their respective mates to marry each other. Comments on the topic of how and where they "got to know each other" were anything but subtle. On the other hand, one female in the Bronx precinct was relatively well accepted by the men, to the point where several men didn't object too strenuously to working with her. She was quite small and by no means the most attractive female in the group. What she did possess, was a quick sense of humor and the ability to trade vulgarities with the men as well as the kind of quick-witted repartee that is a cops stock in trade perfected over long, often uneventful hours of riding with a partner. She was also quite bright and it seemed that she had somehow decided that the way to play the game was to truly become one of the boys, and in so doing found some measure of success, certainly more than the other female officers there at the time. But generally, the issue of female officers is one on which most police officers we talked to were in agreement: you couldn't depend on them because they weren't men.

On the other hand, the female officers, at least those who want to be on the streets in uniform and believe that they can handle the job as well as any man, complain that the real problem is in the men's head—in old-fashioned, traditional notions and stereotypes of female personalities and types. One female officer reported an incident in a precinct where she was working a foot post when truckers began setting up picket lines. She radioed into the station house to report this and to call for barricades. The CO responded by sending out a lieutenant and four male officers with the barricades and she was told to return to the station house. When she stormed into the CO's office demanding to know why she had been "taken off post," he replied that he didn't want to endanger her and also that he was afraid that if the strikers started heckling her, the male officers would feel they had to come to her defense and that would escalate the situation possibly to the danger point. She was angry and frustrated at this "put down". "The guys blame us because they think they will get involved with us sexually if we are partners, or that it will give them trouble at home with their wives, not really so much that physically we won't be able to back them up . . .so they are blaming us for something that's in their own heads." Unfortunately, the occasional stories of female officers who haven't been able to "stand up" under certain situations, such as the female radio team that was supposed to have locked themselves in their radio car and phoned for a back up when a psycho approached them, become the measure of police woman performance, and consequently added to the store of folklore in the department about poor female performance, Several of the men admitted to a similar fear as that expressed by an officer who said, "I have enough problems explaining what I am doing when I get home late. Having to explain a female partner would really make my life hell."

Generally, we found that most cops with whom we talked accept the use of female officers for work involving youth or sexual abuse cases, in decoy operations or for inside clerical work. There continues to be mixed feelings about whether a female presence in uniform escalates or de-escalates tense situations; whether males will back down in a confrontation with a female cop because "you don't push women around," or whether a male's pride will be hurt, especially in front of other men, if a female officer attempts to control him. A cop in the Bronx precinct responded to the issue by saying "You think these animals out here, if they are cornered, are going to stop and say gee, she is a lady . . .they don't treat their own women like that, and if they want to get away, they'll blow her away as quickly as a guy. Pity the poor guy that is her partner when a girl gets hurt out there . . .he won't be able to live it down with the guys . . .that he couldn't protect here, so its unfair for them (downtown) to set us up like that."

All of these issues involving minority recruitment, community relations and women on patrol are invariably attributed to the calousness and lack of involvement and distance from the "real job of policing" on the part of "them," the central headquarter's personnel. One officer, commenting on what he and others considered the failure of the Department to "back up" the precinct during the initial investigation and subsequent trial in the Kelly case summed it up: "the real problem is that the bosses aren't cops anymore, they are looking above them to the politicians because that's where they see their future, not down here on the streets where the job is. Decisions aren't made based on policing or even on crime conditions, but on political considerations; that's why they are pushing recruitment of minorities . . .even if they have criminal records or are female or even fags."

6. The Politics of Supervision

The attitude of the precinct officers toward "downtown" management cop culture corresponds roughly to their general attitude toward bosses or supervisors. All other factors being equal, the greater the supervisory distance, both in rank and geography between the officer and the supervisor, the greater the feeling of distrust and alienation. While this is not uncommon in other organizations, there are some particularly difficult aspects of supervison in the Department. The immediate supervisor in the incident which led to the Kelly trial was the patrol sergeant who was responsible for the area in which the event took place. Following the general rule we have just outlined, patrol sergeants are generally perceived as "closest and most likely to understand us" by most precinct cops. But here an organizational problem intervenes. Although each sergeant is responsible for evaluating a specific group of officers on a continuous basis, he may, in fact, not always actually work with those men. This is a result of the unionization process which involves separate unions for patrolmen (the PBA), Sergeants (The Sergeants Benevolent Association), Lieutenants (The Lieutenants Benevolent Association), Detectives (The Detectives Endowment Association) and Captains and above (The Captains Endowment Association). Since each union is individually responsible for labor negotiations involving its own clientele, the work hour and tour "charts" negotiated by the PBA for cops does not coincide with that negotiated by the SBA for Sergeants. The unions have been criticized for looking out for the best interests of their membership, in some cases at the expense of the best interests of the organization as a whole. The Department has long been aware of this problem in terms of asking supervisors to evaluate men with whom they are working but it has been impossible to rationalize the tour of duty charts for the separate unions.

The number of sergeants supervising patrol activity on a particular tour is a function of the total number of sergeants working at that time. If two sergeants are working that tour, they divide the precinct in half. If only one is working, he is responsible for all patrol activity.* Basically, the patrol sergeant is responsible for street level supervision of all patrol activity. This involves assuring that all officers are on their assigned foot posts, and, particularly with the increased use of radio motor patrols, monitoring and occasionally checking on how assignments or "jobs" are handled by the radio car team. In some cases, there are calls for service that a radio car cannot respond to without a supervisor's presence, such as an incident in a licensed premise or bar, a kidnapping, or a missing child. As a result of this arrangement, there is a discontinuity of responsibility and authority.

* (See Appendix C for duties of patrol sergeant.)

The patrol sergeant can make it rough during a particular tour for the men who are working that tour but except in smaller details where he is directly responsible for a handful of men, he has little opportunity to reward good performance. On the other hand, those for whom he is responsible on a particular tour can make life difficult for him or actually make him look bad to his immediate supervisors. For this reason, we were told a sergeant must play "a juggling game" which involves protecting himself while not earning the enmity of the men whom he must supervise during any given tour. This role ambiguity helps to explain the cops definition of a good patrol sergeant as "a guy who leaves you alone until you ask for his help," and of a bad one as "one who is always breathing down your back, showing up at the scene and taking over for effect," or "always looking to catch you up short." "It's okay if he looks for you once on a tour to give you a scratch (initial your memo book) but when you know he is out there looking for you . . .then that's out and out harassment . . .then they are treating you like school kids and they deserve it if you act like a school kid."

There are a number of ways to "handle" difficult sergeants. Officers can for example legitimately call the sergeant to respond on any run and keep him running from one end of the precinct to another. The sergeant's driver or chauffeur plays a key role in the game because frequently the cops rely on him to make certain that the sergeant isn't at the wrong place at the right time. One night while riding with a sergeant who was known to be particularly "straight," a "run" or job for one of the sectors directed the sector patrol car to a burglary in progress. The sergeant told his driver to respond to that run because, he explained, he wanted to check out response time and see how much investigation would take place. When we arrived at the location, the sergeant went into the building (which was partially burned and abandoned) and we remained outside with the driver and the officers in another radio car who had backed up on the run. The officers were laughing with the sergeant's driver because he had taken the long way around, giving the sector car enough time to get there. The sergeant's driver had apparently been paying close attention to where the sector cars were. In this case it was lucky for the sector car team that he did, because they had been in another part of the precinct. The sergeant's driver had called into central that he would be responding to the call, so the assigned sector car knew that they had to get to their assigned location quickly.

Another factor which cops said influences the complex relationship between a sergeant and his men is the relative youth of many sergeants. Years ago, they say, the sergeant was a "tough oldtimer with lots of years on the books." Today, with more frequent sergeants exams and larger lists, the sergeant is often an age-mate of the younger cops. There is still, however, the para-military censure of fraternization. In one of the precincts, a sergeant who happened to be on the precinct football team was reprimanded by the CO for getting "too chummy" with the cops. He was known to drink and socialize with them during off hours and was told this would weaken his authority. At the behavioral level of analysis of the authority structure, the question becomes, to whom does a sergeant owe his greatest loyalties? When we asked this question of every sergeant whom we observed, the response usually began with, "to the boss," or precinct commanding officer. As we probed for details and examples, however, it became immediately apparent that the reality was much more complex. What we found was that the sergeant usually made spur-of-the-moment decisions that seemed to reflect more on the personalities involved in an incident than any hard and fast supervisory priorities or policies. Although, because of different working charts, the sergeant and the cops don't always work the same tours, it doesn't take very long for the sergeant (or for anyone new to the precinct) to discover who are workers and who are shirkers. The sergeant knows which officers he can "give a little on," because he can be sure that if trouble comes, they will take the brunt and not make him look bad. Similarly, the men are capable of doing much of their own supervision over their colleagues. "If a guy or a team don't hold up their end, it just means extra work for the rest of us out there," one officer explained. He spoke during a tour when his team was working in a sector next to a team that was known to be lazy and prone to taking care of "personal business" while on duty. "It isn't the matter of making the command look bad," the officer went

on to explain. "Most of us stopped caring about the job a long time ago, but it means extra work for us and if wind of this gets out, then the bosses will be breathing down our backs as well." His partner explained, "all of us can have an off night, or problems at home that just slow us down, it's understandable because it can happen to any of us and probably has on several occasions, but these guys are just goof-offs." Asked directly if they had ever reported the irresponsible team, one officer said "No, we don't really have to, they get the message when no one backs them up or when the rest of us slow down in responding to our calls and they have to pick up the slack for us." Another cop said, "that's the sergeant's job, if he can't find the guys who aren't working, what's he earning his salary for anyway?" Perhaps because of the higher risks of violence in the Bronx precinct, the threat of not backing up a radio car on certain runs seemed a more serious recourse than it would have been in the Manhattan precinct where such runs or situations were less frequent. In terms of such peer monitoring if was interesting that in the Manhattan precinct, during a discussion of the same topic, one of the officers said, "don't let them fool you with this talk of a cop being loyal to another cop; if you get one of these guys mad at you, they would just as soon drop a letter on you, or let on to one of the bosses that they should keep an eye on you."

There was little sympathy among the men, during Kelly's trial, for the patrol sergeant, who, it was argued, should have kept the situation from escalating. There was real concern, however, for the commanding officer of the precinct and the affect that this trial would have on his career. Although he had not been at the precinct when the incident had occurred, the feeling was that he might suffer for the much repeated "blood on the squad room floor" quote from the trial proceedings or just from the adverse publicity. Comments suggesting that "downtown is just concerned with the bad press and public image that this kind of a trial creates, not whether someone is hurt" were frequently heard at the time. There was also mention made by some of the officers that if trouble was made for those "turnarounds" still at the precinct, then the Captain would get blamed for not being able to control his men, especially, again, if any of it got to the press.

The confusion surrounding the decision of the jury in the Kelly trial points up the glaring ambiguities inherent in the public definition or perception of the police role as well as in any commonly accepted standard of "good" or even simply "proper" police action. Kelly was indicted on charges of second degree murder and first degree manslaughter. In charging the jury, the judge said that two lesser charges could be considered. One was second degree manslaughter, carrying a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. The other was criminally negligent homicide which carries a maximum sentence of 4 years. The jury voted to find Kelly guilty of the least serious charge. The confusion was a result of the fact that although the homicide charge resulted in the lesser of the possible sentences, it was in fact still a charge of murder. The jurors maintained that they thought the charge of criminally negligent homicide was a lesser count of manslaughter while it was in fact a lesser count of murder. When the jurors realized this, they were dismayed because as the jury foreman said in his affidavit. "If we had known that the charge came under the heading of murder, I'm sure we would have rendered a different verdict. At no time during these deliberations did I think that he was guilty of any degree of murder. Both the judge and the Assistant District Attorney who tried the case argued that a mistrial would be inappropriate. As the judge pronounced sentence, Mr. Kelly said, "I'm guilty of nothing. I was a police officer of the City of New York performing my duty." The sentence imposed an indeterminate term of up to four years. A spokesman for the Police Department said there would be no comment from Commissioner Codd "because it's not our position to comment. A conviction speaks for itself."

7. Analysis of the Event

There is a good deal to be learned about precinct organization and social behavior from the events surrounding the Kelly trial. It provides a descriptive basis for looking at how the precinct is organized to produce and facilitate police work. In addition, howeve

it also shows the management level as it is perceived at the precinct level and how the two levels were in conflict. In most organizational analyses there is an analytically posed opposition between what we have called elsewhere bureaucratic and organic forms of organization. This is most frequently expressed as the difference between "formal" and "informal" structures of organization. Essentially, formal organization refers to what the organizational chart depicts; hierarchical lines of role relationships and lines of authority in the organization. Informal organization, on the other hand, is used to describe all those patterns, particularly of social relationships of people in the organization which are "unwritten" and cannot be shown on the organization chart. Our contention has been that work in general and police work in particular can only be understood by looking at both forms of behavior--bureaucratic and organic or formal and "informal"--simultaneously. It is important to point out that the difference between bureaucratic and organic forms of organization is a conceptual and not an empirical difference. With regard to any particular interaction among people that one observes, one can not say thatit is a bureaucratic or organic, formal or informal interaction. In a precinct, for example, everyone's behavior is constantly influenced by rules and other bureaucratic constraints regardless of rank or assignment. Simultaneously, everyone's behavior is constantly influenced by the demands of relationships with the people--cops or civilians--with whom they are interacting. One might say, for example, that the content of a particular interaction between two people in the precinct is more influenced by their relative bureaucratic status (they are acting like a "boss" in relation to a lower-ranking policeman) or that the interaction is more influenced by the organic relationship between the two (a sergeant may be talking to a patrolman who was a former partner). The difference, however, is one of degree. Both the bureaucratic and the organic, the formal and the "informal" dimension must be taken into account in understanding any empirical interaction between or among people.

One thing the Kelly case does is to illustrate the process of sorting or group identification which emerges in the precinct social organization as a result of the trial. In a classical bureaucracy, individuals and groups identify with the values of the total organization. Much of the organizational literature* in recent years, however, indicates that the individual workers identification is much more frequently with the smaller more immediate working group to whom he is organically related. The literature on occupational culture also points to the varying group loyalties associated with sub-units within an overall system and indicates how group values and behaviors within these sub-units determine individual values and mold behavior. Within a precinct, there are a number of dimensions by which sub-units are formed. The basic distinction is between those working on the street or outside the station house and those who are assigned inside jobs. Being inside has always been considered a plus and generally believed to require a "hook" or connection. Both the outside patrol units and the inside staff are further subdivided into work groups or units. These divisions set up functional subunits which form the largest collective for immediate sorting and group identification within the precinct. Thus, an officer will identify himself as being in anti-crime or a community relations officer or in a particular patrol squad. Within these units and among them, there are other dimension of sorting such as age and length of service, ethnicity, sex, length of time in the precinct, and whether or not the cop is connected to some power base. It is this process of sorting which establishes the various networks within the precinct and which forms the behavioral units which socialize the newcomer into the precinct. All of these networks are loosely coupled into the precinct social organization and generally share an identification with the Bronx precinct and the street cop culture.

What the Kelly trial did was to disrupt the social organization of the precinct, threaten the street cop culture, and reaffirm to the cops in the precinct that there was an opposing headquarters management cop culture which had sided with its allies in the political system to come down hard on one of them. In addition, headquarters had been able to disrupt the

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* This literature and its relation to precinct social organization are discussed in Chapter VII.

traditional loyalty system by turning cop against cop at the trial. Ultimately, this was taken to mean that the old values would not long survive and so, group identification suffered and police officers emphasized the increasing importance of individual rather than group goals. This, say the cops, is what is happening over and over again as "downtown" tries to make points with the political system and it will eventually mean that the precinct level cop culture will disappear. In the old days when the cop culture was the Departmental culture none of this would have happened, say the cops. Either the incident would have been taken care of "in-house" and would never have reached public attention or if it had reached the press, a consistent story would have been told by all the officers involved, in order to protect Kelly and ultimately themselves.

While it sounds as if the officers are excusing cover-up tactics, they assign a different level of interpretation for such behavior. What they are describing is an organic, almost kinship like, relationship which makes all cops "brother officers," with all of the sense of dependent relationships that term implies. Being able to depend on a brother officer in operational situations fraught with real or perceived danger does not, we were told, require or allow stopping to think whether the officer in danger is in the right or in the wrong. "Things happen too fast out there and so you do for that guy what you would want him to do for you." As a result Kelly's reaction to the suspect's shooting through the door was taken by many cops to represent his loyalty to the protection of all cops. Unless everyone in the system insures that every potential cop killer knows that he will be dealt with by the police, regardless of what the court system may eventually do for him, no officer is safe. This same ethic becomes generalized in street cop culture to cover all incidents of real or perceived danger to fellow officers, whether it comes from criminals, the public or the Department.

This sense of interdependency serves to produce an organizational self-image which excludes anyone who is not a sworn member of the Department from inclusion within that identification. Part of what made for this differentiation did include the risks and dangers perceived as part of the job of policing that was not in the experience of non-cops. But other aspects of it had more to do with job conditions such as irregular hours and days off and the officers authorization for the discretionary use of force. That discretionary power, symbolized by the gun and the shield, represented the Department on the street in confrontation with crime and disorder, but once again came back into the station house and even central headquarters. Not all officers, of course, are in jobs which involve those risks, but the ethic is supposed to include all cops.

Where does the police officer learn this view of the job of policing and the cop culture that surrounds it? We were told repeatedly that it doesn't happen in the Police Academy and that you can't learn it from books or criminal justice courses. You learn it from your own street experience, as an apprentice to officers already on the job and from working with a peer structure of working cops. The lessons are constantly reinforced by the war stories and experiences of other officers and through the traditions of police practice which developed in these networks. As the officer is socialized into the precinct social structure and into one of its sub-units, the job comes to be governed by a series of conventions or mutual understandings among the officers. Kelly violated those conventions by exposing himself and other officers to unnecessary risks by his "crazy" (non-conventional) behavior. Kelly had already been sorted and labeled as a maverick and so his behavior was not unexpected. In addition, the officers who testified against him violated those conventions by breaking the bonds of loyalty, secrecy and mutual protection. Their behavior could not be explained within the context of the traditional cop culture and so they had to be viewed as under pressure from "outside" forces from downtown. This describes a different, non-peer structure which encompasses the power relationships or formal authority structure from headquarters. Headquarters thus becomes inter-organizationally segregated and their behavior must be explained by the fact that they do not accept the values of the street cop culture because they have assumed a different set of values. Since everyone at headquarters began as a cop, then their defection must also be explained by self-interest or

having forgotten or refusing to remember the risks inherent in policing and their requirement of a system of mutual dependence. The fact that some headquarters level police officers were never actually on the street and were assigned clerical and other inside jobs directly from the Academy adds to this rationalization which was widespread in both precincts.

Not only during the Kelly trial but throughout our experience in both precincts, we found compelling evidence that precinct level cops not only feel isolated from those working at headquarters or even at the borough level but feel that such officers, regardless of rank, work within an entirely different and frequently antagonistic policing system. "Not only are they not real cops, anymore," but they say, "they spend more time policing us then they do policing the city." On the side of the headquarters management cop culture is the fact that as former cops they know enough about cop culture to be able to determine where the points of vulnerability and possible malfaesance occur.

The distinction between the precinct level street cop culture and the headquarters level management cop culture is of more than passing academic interest. The two cultures no longer share a common vocabulary, a common set of work experiences and increasingly have different objectives. The unifying ethic which promised that "the Department took care of its own" which was the moral for so many of the stories that we heard about the good old days, is now reinterpreted as "the brass takes care of itself." As a result two important changes in the pattern of social relationships have developed in the precinct level street cop culture. On the one hand, the cops at the precinct seem increasingly to emphasize individual over organizational or even reference-group ends. We heard many cops say during the time of the trial that you can trust your partner, some of the guys in your squad, and a few of the guys you've worked with for a long time, and that's it. Similarly they are saying that given this new job context their only responsibility is to themselves and their families since "I can't count on anyone else anymore, and that means no one should count on me either." The second point is that while there was considerable, almost ritualistic social ostracizing of the turnaround officers, there was also public as well as private sympathy expressed for them by the cops. They were concerned with preserving their pensions and their jobs and understandably had to give in to the threats against their security from downtown.

While we found these two distinct cultures to be fairly obvious in the social organization of the Department, it is important to point out that there is no neat distinction between everyone in the precinct being part of the street cop culture and everyone at headquarters being part of the management cop culture. In our contacts at police headquarters we met a number of officers of all ranks who understood and even appreciated the realities of both cultures. In the precincts, we also found that there were administrative officers who could function in both cultures as well as some who were believed by the cops to be unable to ever function successfully "out from behind their desks." At both headquarters and precinct levels there are informal communications structures which tie the two cultures together under certain circumstances. A cop or a supervisor at the precinct level will usually, when he needs some information from headquarters which is important to him, contact a former partner or academy classmate to obtain the necessary information or favor informally. Similarly, a headquarters based officer wanting to know what's happening in the field or needing some favor "out there" will activate his own informal communication network to obtain that information or favor.

In a classical management-worker relationship, one of the important forces is usually the workers union. Here again, the NYPD has certain unique characteristics which make classical labor-management principles uncertain for application. While the PBA is the chief bargaining agent for police officers, there are as we pointed out earlier similar organizations for sergeants, for lieutenants and for captains and above. Each association has its own groups interests at heart, sometimes in competition with the other organizations. Thus, the usual recourse of striking is problematic. While police officers are enjoined from

striking by New York State's Taylor Law, which covers all municipal unions, officers have gone on "job actions" which have all the characteristics of a classical strike. Not only do the various superior officer organizations not go out on sympathy "job actions" in support of the officers, they are often put in the position of being used as strike breakers. In addition, the strength of the street cop culture is such that despite growing pressure for professional union leadership, the head of the PBA and his staff are all elected from among working cops. This point is not lost on management cop culture.

In summary, social relations within the precinct are organized by four structures or domains which organize distinctive areas of learning or socialization to both formal rules and conventions. The first of these is the social learning structure which organizes how the new officer learns the culture and its precinct-specific conventions. Associated with this structure are the authority-power structure which socializes him to the discipline, authority and power of the Department and the peer-group structure which orients him to either the street cop culture or the management cop culture. Finally, there are cross-peer group structures which relate individuals in each of the cultures to each other for mutual benefit.

D. Event 2. The Suicide

As we indicated earlier, the social organization of the Manhattan precinct did not differ significantly from that of the Bronx precinct and both share the precinct level street cop culture. There are, however, some differences which come from the characteristics of the community in which the precincts are located. These differences based on territoriality do influence behavior within the structures of that social organization. The event itself tells us a little more about the nature of internal controls and about the conventions concerning gift taking and its relation to corruption and the nature of the headquarters management culture integrity system as it is viewed in the precinct. It also points up career path issues and problems in a system where everyone at the lowest level of rank is a "cop", but not everyone does the same job. The suicide also serves to organize a good deal of information on how the organizational structure of policing produces job stress on cops.

At about noon, one spring day in 1978, we learned from someone at the area level that one of the officers in the Manhattan precinct had just committed suicide. Our first impression was that the suicide had taken place in the station house itself. Since Reuss-Ianni was at that time working downstairs in the complaint room, but on that day not scheduled to be there until a later tour, we decided that she would go into work earlier to observe what we thought would be considerable activity at the precinct in reaction to the suicide. When she walked into the precinct, she was surprised to find that the officers and civilians working downstairs were talking and behaving as usual and that there seemed to be nothing unusual going on either there or elsewhere in the station house. Her immediate impression was that no one must know about the suicide, or that perhaps our information about its occurance had been incorrect. She phoned the officer who had given us the information and was told that in fact the suicide had occurred in another borough when the officer was off-duty. Apparently, the officer had killed himself after other officers had attempted to arrest him in connection with a departmental investigation into certain illegal activities with which he was supposedly involved.

1. Fellow Officers

After more than 2 hours of waiting, watching and listening to the various activities and conversations throughout the building, Reuss-Ianni finally asked one of the officers if he had heard anything about one of their officers committing suicide. His response was casual: "sure," he said, "we heard about it early this morning, they came in to look in his locker, but I don't even know who the guy is." She indicated her surprise at the apparent lack of concern of other precinct personnel as well as himself, to which he replied, "listen, it would be like my hearing about a cop at another precinct committing suicide . . .it's too

bad, but it doesn't mean anything to me, he's the one who got himself jammed up." Throughout the rest of the tour, I spoke with various officers and occasionally one came up and asked if I had heard what had happened. Almost unanimously, however, the officers said that they couldn't place the cop's face, that he was a young guy who hadn't been there too long. The only thing that several of the officers mentioned recalling about him was that he wore dark glasses and some officers suggested that he had a drinking problem and used the glasses to hide red eyes. What was surprising to us throughout our observations and discussions surrounding this event was the decidedly casual, almost disinterested attitude on the part of most of the officers with whom we talked. The lack of comment on the part of the officers at the precinct towards this incident, explained as "he's not really one of us," was striking, particularly when compared with an incident that occurred earlier in the year involving the on-duty killing of two officers from another precinct. In that case, the lack of comment was explained almost unanimously as a result of the incident being too close to the fear most officers, especially those working in uniform or on the streets, live with. As one officer explained it, they "have to remove themselves from it and so in a sense act as though it didn't really happen." The reaction on the part of the precinct officers to the cop who committed suicide is similar to the incident involving Officer Kelly in the Bronx because both men were considered by other officers to be different for some reason, and so outside the "brotherhood."

This is in opposition to the literature on police culture which suggests that all cops are brothers and will invariably band together in mutual support. The image suggested in the literature is a true image, we believe, when viewed from outside the Department. As it was explained to us by one of the officers several days after the suicide, "cops are very sensitive towards criticism by outsiders because they feel that anyone on the outside can't possibly understand the job, the pressures or a cop's reactions and attitudes, so there is almost a feeling that the worst cop is still 'closer' than a civilian." He went on, "for that reason, a cop will keep silent before he will criticize one of his own in front of an outsider." Another officer explained, "cops are very suspicious, I know that's almost a charicature you would find in books on police, but those authors usually mean suspicious of outsiders. Hell, cops are even more suspicious of each other, they are always looking out for the guy who acts a little different, more so in recent years because of field associates but also because they just don't know where to place a guy who might well, like drink on his own, whereas a guy who drinks socially with the other guys is regular. Or a guy who is married and will still go bouncing after work is okay, but not the guy who is married and is living with another girl and tries to keep it quiet."

2. Salary and Career

When mention was made of the illegal activity for which the officer was being picked up, the discussion usually turned first to the topic of salary. Generally, opinion was not in favor of this officer's supplementing his salary through illegal activities because, "he was a single guy, if he had been married with a couple of kids to support, it might have been different." Other officers mentioned that if he had been around in the old days it would have been difficult to make the transition from the extra money readily available "on the side," to living on one's take home pay. The suggestion was that this involvement might have been understandable in response to what in effect would be less "take home pay since the goodies weren't considered extras but became part of what a guy depended on every two weeks."

On pay day, every other Thursday, there is always much talk about how much one really takes home after deductions and there is much comparing of overtime earned for that period. While the comparisons of overtime accrued through arrests and/or court appearances is the subject of much good natured joking and some less good natured jealousy, it is usually not hostile because there is a feeling among the officer who work the streets that "anything extra you can get is okay because at least you are out there where you are more liable to get hurt or in trouble than a guy working in a clerical office or downtown." The good

natured tone is completely lost, however, when the officers talk about the pay difference of approximately $2500.00 per year between themselves and the police officers who have been awarded a gold shield for Detective Specialist designation. Whatever the original intention of confering gold shield status to an officer (police officers wear silver or "white" shield), and apparently it was to reward superior performance by uniformed officers thus motivating them to remain in precinct assignments, its existence today causes serious morale problems and divisive internal competition and jealousy within the precinct. In both precincts that we worked, the explanation and the reaction was essentially the same; that "downtown gave out those gold shields to have a handy pool of strike breakers and to keep us cops divided." Another officer added in the same conversation, "yep, divide and conquer, that includes the use of field associates." This notion of an intentional departmental system of keeping the police officers divided among themselves because the Department fears any show of their united strength could be interpreted as paranoia on the officers part. However, it was a pervasive enough theme in our conversations that we feel it has to be considered as another factor in the understanding of an officer's perception of the job. It was occasionally mentioned in connection with the variety of details available as a possible assigrment to a police officer. "There are too many details that guys don't want to give up, cuz they can work out of uniform, or work steady tours, or weekends off, so there is no way we can all unite even though it would give us much more power." Another officer added laughingly, "Hell, we could take over the city if we could all get it together for once." He went on to say, "anytime anyone suggests that we unite on something like a strike or a demonstration or making a boss that's being a prick look bad, I suddenly find out how many guys have cripples in their families." (The implication here is that there are special extenuating circumstances and not just his own comfort at stake.)

Officers have also expressed similar problems with PBA business relating to the system of special details possible at the police officer level. They have suggested to us at various times that uniformed cops on the street "always get the raw deal in contract negotiations because there are more guys in the PBA that work inside or on special details". "What do they care or know about our problems" was the rhetorical question posed.

When the gold shield was originally distributed, it was at the discretion of the precinct commanding officer as a reward for those police officers who were doing an outstanding job. The intention was that it would be rotated among officers as the Detective Specialists would move up the career path ladder and out of the precinct. Gold shields were assigned to all precincts and did not go with the individual once he left the precinct for another assignment or rank. According to the folklore of the job, the C.O.'s gave them to "pets," or honored "contracts," and to those officers who held precinct staff positions that were frequently looked down upon by the patrol force, such as community relations and crime prevention officers. "These officers didn't do anything different after they got the shields than before they had been awarded to them, except they now get $2500.00 more a year for doing it." Another group of officers receiving gold shields were designated Field Training Officers with the responsibility of training officers who were just out of the academy. However, for the past several years, because of the fiscal crisis in the city, there have been no new officers out of the academy. The situation therefore exists where for example, two radio car partners do the same work and work the same hours, yet one might have the gold shield as a designated field training specialist with the attendant increase in pay and status. None of the officers at either precinct believed that there was ever any standard established for awarding the shields. They believe that it was based on favoritism or "contacts." Similarly, the impression is that once someone has the gold shield, no one will try to make him look bad, or take it away from him, because "no one wants to take money out of a guy's pocket."

Another area of resentment regarding the shield is that the precinct investigating units (PIU's or detective squads working out of the precinct) usually have some "white" shield police officer investigators assigned to them. Therefore those officers are

working next to and usually on the same cases as (gold shield) detectives,* while in the same precinct, there are gold shield detective specialist designation: cops working at jobs that have nothing to do with investigations, such as community relations and crime prevention. This has caused serious morale problems in the detective squads where the explanation for the gold shield system is that "Murphy (former Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy) hated detectives and wanted to lower their prestige, so he created the gold shield detective specialists, or "funny badges", for cops."

At issue also is the reality that at a time of diminishing budgets, there are fewer and fewer career possibilities within the Department for earning a higher salary. Even the controversial connection between officer's arrest activity and overtime payments ("collars for dollars") is losing its attractiveness as more efficient court processing systems eliminate much of the "overtime" that officers spent in that process. In the year that we were in the Bronx precinct, a question heard regularly as the officers left the station house at the beginning of their tour was, "who's looking?" (that is, who wants to make an arrest on this tour). This became a more anxious question of "who wants one?" asked by cops trying to "give away" an arrest to another radio car team or to anti-crime. Increasingly we heard that in lieu of money made through overtime, cops were taking on full time, off-duty jobs to supplement their take home pay, which meant that they were actively looking to avoid making arrests that might tie them up after work or on a day off that was now committed to another job, or even making them too tired by overworking during their tour.

An alternative career path is opened by taking and passing examinations which, because of the current fiscal situation in the city has not been a viable option from the vantage point of many of the officers with whom we spoke. There are officers (and we spoke with many of them) who enjoy being cops, enjoy a footpost or a radio car seat and even enjoy an established routine year after year working with the same guys in the same precinct. Over and over again, we heard officers lament the fact that in order to bring home more money, they would have to take an exam and become "a supervisor." Officers frequently expressed the feeling that "doing what I am doing now (uniformed radio patrol) and what I know I am good at is a dead end, there's nothing to be made in overtime anymore, the best I can hope for is a detail where my hours might be better, but it won't bring any more money home."

One officer in Manhattan was quite direct saying, "there won't be any raises for the next couple of years, no shields available, and you are going to find more guys starting to go back to the old ways." This officer went on to say that several years ago he had made $25,000 during one year including overtime but, "now when you make an arrest that involves overtime, they treat you like you are crooked to be doing it." He concluded with "the hell with them, if they don't want arrests, I won't give them to them. I'll just get a job on the outside and make my extra money there." In the same vein, another officer commented that "there's nothing in it for me to make arrests or show any special activity because it won't get me anywhere anyway. Passing exams is the only way to get anywhere in this job anymore," and he added, "not like in the old days. In the old days you wanted to show activity, you wanted to get ahead because it meant you could get yourself into a good house, and being in a good house meant that it was a place where you could make extra bucks. Now it doesn't much matter where they send you, except you can still probably make a little better money in overtime in Manhattan, but that probably won't last for long." A cop standing with the group commented, "but who wants to get their names on that list" (a list the Department keeps of top overtime earners for the year) "they treat you like you're on the 10 most wanted list. You get into trouble anyway if you make too much overtime, because the boss (the C.O.) gets heat from the Borough." "Don't make waves, that should be the motto of this job now," another cop added, "if they notice you, no matter what the reason, good or bad, its got to be bad for you sooner or later, so your best bet is to just

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* Detectives were awarded gold shields as part of the promotion to the Detective Bureau.

lay low, go about your business, don't bother anyone, put in your time and then get the hell out."

A young cop in the Manhattan precinct said that the "old timers didn't have the skills outside the job to turn to, so they kept quiet and kept working," but he suggested that the younger officers coming into the Department over the last 10 years or so have more career potential and possibilities outside, and that "the Department better watch out that it doesn't lose a lot of good, young officers because it doesn't have anything to offer them anymore." He went on, "for the old timers, this job is their only career, but I'm getting a degree in public administration and so I'll have something to turn to when I get out of here, or if things get too bad, I can just pack it in early."

3. Job Stress

The day after the suicide, a group of officers was standing in the hall discussing the possibility that the officer who had killed himself had a drinking problem. The topic became generalized to the problem of drinkers on the job and one of the officers commented that "if you are a drinker, they'll just steer clear of you as long as you don't step out of line too badly." Another officer suggested, "there must have been something else wrong with the guy for him to go off the deep end like that. He kept so much to himself around here, only a few or the guys even recognized him. The worst that could have happened to him, even if the Department had him on those charges, was that he would lose his pension and anyway, I don't think he had a family to support."

The NYPD has an alcoholism counseling section and more recently a Departmental Psychological Services Unit, although usually these services come into play only after the fact and frequently only after a very serious incident affecting the officer's performance on the job or injury to a citizen. The alcoholism counseling program has been under the control (many officers would say "domination") of an Irish, Roman Catholic Monseigneur, who holds the honorary rank of Inspector. Many officers who have come in contact with him describe him as having become more an inspector in bearing and attitude towards the men than a priest-counselor. However, if we hadn't been aware of the existence of these units before the study, we would not have learned of their existence through discussions with precinct cops. There was never any reference to officers turning there for help or advice on problems, although we were privy to many conversations on personal and job related problems. At one point in the study, we intentionally began asking about these units as resources available to the men, and found it difficult to get beyond some very colorful, always pejorative language about their usefulness.

The dominant theme in discussions of these services was "don't get involved because if you do, it will mark you for the rest of your career." Throughout the 18 months of the study, we spoke with 9 officers who had any extensive involvement with either alcoholism counseling or psychological services. Two officers had gone voluntarily, 1 to counseling and the other to the psychological services unit. The cop involved in alcoholism counseling felt that he had been helped considerably by going there and added that he hadn't had a drink since that time. He also said that he didn't feel that his connection with that program had hurt him or would hurt him in his career, but felt that it might jeopardize some career possibilities outside of this job once it were known that he had once had a drinking problem. "Hell," one officer said to us during a discussion, "drinking is an occupational hazard on this job and most of the guys, even the desk lieutenants, will cover for a guy who comes in a little under the weather to do a tour. Anyway the Church (the Monseigneur) still has a lot of pull with the top brass, although not so much as in the old days." Other officers have told us, "The same officers go back regularly to the farm to dry out." (The Department runs a treatment facility outside of the city where officers go, or more frequent are sent, to dry out and get counseling services). "The problem with them is they start preaching the evils of drinking and can really drive you nuts with their superior attitude."

The reaction of the 7 officers who had been sent by the Department to psychological services was unanimously hostile. All of these officers had subsequently been placed on restricted duty and all had elaborate stories to tell of how "the job had screwed" them. In three of the cases, marital problems had deteriorated to such a point that the officers had threatened their wives with guns. In all of these cases, the wives had called the Department and reported their husbands. In another case, the officer had voluntarily turned in his guns because, as he told us, "I was afraid that I couldn't control myself and the damn gun is so convenient." This particular officer had been on restricted duty for over a year, had subsequently been divorced from his wife and was living with a girlfriend. He wanted his gun back and wanted to be put on regular duty again.* This officer told us that he had even paid for his own psychiatrist who had several months earlier written a letter on his behalf saying that in his professional estimation this officer was fit to be returned to full duty. But time had passed and nothing had happened and the officer was getting more and more frustrated. He said that he intended shortly to get a lawyer and put in for three-quarters (medical disability pension), arguing that if the Department didn't think he was fit to perform active duty, then they were saying that he was psychologically disabled, so he should be pensioned out on a disability. He added "and I could sure prove that it was job related." One afternoon, when I stopped to ask him if he had heard anything about his situation, he laughed and said that he had had some luck, It seems that he had heard informally from "downtown" that they were going to move on his case. However, shortly after this, he said, an article in the newspaper appeared reporting that a police officer on restricted duty had been recently reassigned on his psychiatrist's advice. He had been given back his guns and a few days later had shot his neighbor during a quarrel. The officer shrugged his shoulders and said that this would put his case back six months, because, "there is no way this Department is going to take a chance on looking bad in the press. They could give a shit about me or any guy as an individual. They are going to protect themselves."

The other problem mentioned simultaneously in this context is that although the Department maintains that referrals to alcoholism and psychiatric units are kept confidential, apparently no one believes this. Several officers have told us stories of cops who went to apply to other places for jobs and "somehow the new job finds out that we have been to 'psych' services and that kills it." For the cop, this means a breach of trust and is one more indication that headquarters doesn't care about cops as individuals; the response from the bosses is usually, "cops are chronic complainers and paranoid about everything."

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* The importance of the gun as a symbol of the officers authority is evident in fact that restricted duty cops are referred to as being assigned to the "bow and arrow" or "rubber gun" squad. During 1977, about 100 officers, we were told, were forced to work without guns on non-patrol assignments. Their weapons were removed because they were found to be suffering from psychiatric problems and considered potentially dangerous. These officers were identified through an "early warning system" used to seek out violence prone or unstable officers. Since 1973, when the system was instituted in the Department, records of poor performance or seemingly abnormal behavior are re-evaluated and officers who are suspected of having difficulties are referred to psychological services. Commanding officers may refer officers to the psychologist for a variety of reasons such as chronic sickness, disciplinary problems, alcholism or frequent civilian complaints or charges of brutality.

4. Integrity and Ethical Awareness

The officer who committed suicide was allegedly involved in some illegal activity. Many cops we talked to claimed that a cop who gets involved in making money illegally usually does so because he has bills to pay. We soon realized that the expression "in the old days" which prefaced many discussions during our 18 months in the field was not a generalized nostalgia for the past, but referred to a specific point in time. The old day, when we heard it used in this context, meant very specifically the days before the Knapp Commission investigation into police corruption. The majority of the officers with whom we spoke, including officers of supervisory position, felt that much of the current organization and administration of the Department was in direct reaction to the Commissions' findings on types of corrupt activity and areas in policing particularly conducive to corruption possibilities. Many of the cops we talked to in the Manhattan precinct, as we had previously heard in the Bronx, commented that "the cure was worse than the illness." A typical comment in this case by an officer who had been on the job long before the Knapp Commission was, "what has happened to this job in terms of effective policing and organization is a result of the bosses and downtown being scared shitless of us being caught off base . . .the only problem is that they have made the new rules and only we (cops on patrol) have to live with them."

After the Knapp Commission Report, the Department instituted a program called Ethical Awareness Workshops, which runs in cycles throughout the year and which all officers are expected to attend at some time. The workshops are run by police officers assigned to that unit. Outsiders (including us) are strictly forbidden to attend since the officers who run the program feel that the officers attending the workshop should feel completely free and confident in discussing their problems and airing their complaints. A weekly summary of general areas of discussions and issues arising in the workshop sessions is passed up through the system to the higher ranking officers for their information. While a few officers in discussing this program with us claimed that the sessions are monitored to collect information to use against the cops, the vast majority view it simply as "R and R" (rest and relaxation). One cop added, "so it lets the bosses downtown think they know something about what is going on out in the streets." More vehemence could be detected however, whenever officers talked about the final day of the 3 day cycle, when the program calls for a ranking officer to be present "to field any questions that the officers might have on issues that had arisen during the other days of the workshop." "What kind of fools do they take us for?" one officer complained. "It's a lot of crap having one of the bosses stand in front of us and talk about integrity. Who are they trying to fool? They were there while the money was changing hands, only now the system has changed, so its to their advantage not to take anything anymore. But we're still out there, why do they expect us to be any different than they were?" Another officer suggested, "who are they trying to kid? All of a sudden they are so clean. They were involved up to their necks. How else do you think they know where to look for us and what to look for. Because they were doing the same things. Why do you think they have tightened up so much on us? Because they know how easy it is out there."

In both precincts, it was obvious both from observation and from interviews with the officers that it was still possible for an individual officer or a team to become involved in those activities generically referred to a "corrupt practices." What the Department has managed to do, however, is to make organized corruption very difficult and, perhaps, more importantly, to make institutionalized corruption even less likely. The officer who committed suicide as well as a number of others who were charged with corruption or illegal activities acted as individuals. This does not, however, mean that the amount of corruption or illegal activity has decreased significantly but rather that the systematic corruption is no longer supported by the system. In 1979, for example, it was reported that there had been significant increases in the number of complaints of corruption against police officers. A police department spokesman said that this could be the result of better detec-

tion or could represent an actual increase but probably was a result of a greater willingness on the part of cops as well as civilians to turn in cops. Similarly, in the years following the Knapp Commission Report, there was a significant decrease in the number of complaints against officers for taking bribes related to gambling which, as we indicated earlier, was a highly organized form of graft; but there was an equally significant increase in the number of officers reported as being involved in the more individually oriented taking of bribes from narcotics sources.

While we were never privy to actual instances of such conduct on the part of officers at either precinct, what we did observe (and we feel that the openness with which it was done in our presence speaks for the informal level of acceptance of such practices), with some frequency, were activities that might more correctly be referred to as infractions of departmental rules and procedures and"stealing time from the job." This means such activities as taking care of personal shopping or personal business while working, stopping in at a friendly social club or bar or restaurant for a free drink, a free meal, and discounts on items. While we found little difference between the two precincts in terms of frequency or type of activity involved, what seemed to make the difference in the two precincts was what was available in the different communities. A girlfriend in the Bronx might be a local girl working in one of the clubs, while in Manhattan she might be an airline stewardess. Stopping in for a drink in the Bronx might mean dropping by a neighborhood social club, while in Manhattan it might mean a French restaurant shortly before opening hours. Discount shopping in the Bronx might mean a better price on a car battery or free fruit from the Bronx Terminal Market at 4 a.m. in the morning; in Manhattan it could be a discount on an imported leather coat.

There is sufficient secrecy displayed in many of these activities to indicate that the officers do feel a degree of caution because "someone may be watching." This caution, however, has a gaming quality to it. Almost immediately after turning out for the tour, the first question asked, even before "where shall we go for coffee" is, "who's got the desk?" Cops are very conscious of which bosses are working or if, "the old man (the C.O.) is in." Extra precautions can also be taken to virtually insure safety, unless, as is frequently suggested, "they are out to get us," and then "there is no way we're going to hide." In one case, where one of us was riding with a radio car team at night, the team stopped in for a lengthy drink and some socializing in a bar. To cover themselves in case anyone was "watching," they put in a "pick-up" (an incident discovered by the team as they are cruising along the streets, rather than being assigned to them over the car radio from communications) on a "dispute in progress," and so logged themselves into the central dispatch system as "out" handling a legitimate incident. Usually, word will get out at the precinct if someone from IAD is watching the precinct, or "sitting on" a particular spot such as a social club frequented by the officers from that precinct. We had, of course, no way of verifying how correct such rumors were, but they occurred with some frequency.

In general, the officers with whom we spoke seemed to feel that the Department's concern with integrity and control of corruption was essentially a "knee-jerk" reaction which increased following any media attention or widely publicized scandal. Most frequently, it was described as a "cover your ass" principal where so long as you are quiet and relatively circumspect about your "personal business," you are not likely to get into trouble. When, however, the Department needs to offer up "a victim because the papers or City Hall are howlir for somebody's blood, then watch out, there's nowhere to hide."

5. An Analysis of the Event

Although we were in the Manhattan precinct for only about one-third of the amount of time we spent in the Bronx, familiarity with precinct level activity gained in the Bronx made both our introduction into the precinct and our understanding of its social organization much easier. In fact, some of the cops we worked with in the Bronx informally contacted officers in the Manhattan precinct to vouch for us which again made introduction

easier. We had been told in the Bronx and by some police administrators with whom we discussed the choice of the Manhattan precinct that the two precincts would be "as different as night and day." We found, however, that the universality of street cop culture at the precinct level was such that while there were some differences between the two precincts, they were more in form than in substance. There was more emphasis on personal appearance and proper uniform attire in Manhattan where, for example, we observed that officers almost always followed Department regulations and put their hats on when leaving their radio cars. Cops in both precincts explained this difference by the fact that "in an active precinct you don't have time to worry about your hat and the bosses are more concerned with response time then they are with what you look like when you get there" or "Since the bosses are always looking to catch you up short, they can get you in the Bronx for slowing down on the job but in Manhattan where there is so little real activity, they go after you on anything they can." We had been prepared by the Bronx cops for a "quiet, spit-and-polish" house in Manhattan where the guys "don't do anything but cruise around those clean streets looking at girls." We found, in fact, that the station house was just as physically rundown as the one in the Bronx and that the sector cars seemed almost as busy as in the Bronx at least in terms of number of runs. However, by and large the radio runs were less frequently for violent activities and in a surprising number of cases were "unfounded" burglar alarms. The characteristics of the area also made for differences in the sense of territoriality which integrated police officers into the community. The hospitality of the surrounding area provided more and better opportunities for "discount shopping" and for gratuitous meals and drinks. There is also a different view of social distance here where the rich and powerful live as contrasted to the poverty level areas of the Bronx precinct. The cops feel just as alienated from the community here as they do in the Bronx, but for different reasons; "They treat us like servants or like we aren't even there. Businessmen don't like us around where people can see us when we have to take reports on a burglary or a hold-up because they think it discourages customers." There also seem to be more individualism and less close social bonding here than we found in the Bronx where the station house offered a place of refuge from an environment perceived as hostile. A cop who had worked in both Boroughs in similar types of precincts summed it up: "In Manhattan they don't say thank you officer because they think they are too good for you; in the Bronx they don't say thank you either, but there they might curse at you as well. It's all the same to me, I do my job and treat them both the same."

The role of the Internal Affairs Division in the investigation leading to the suicide was frequently cited by cops who were quite outspoken about this kind of activity as being just another proof that management cop culture is out to get them. The cops agree that IAD has a legitimate role in ferreting out corruption but they also believe that they go about it the wrong way. Since IAD is viewed in the precincts as part of "downtown" and so responsive to management cop culture the feeling is that they have to "get on the sheet: too" and produce results for the bosses regardless of what it does to individual lives or careers. Further, IAD uses "field associates" or cops who the men believe are for the most part cops who have gotten into trouble and so are susceptible to being pressured into "spying" on their fellow officers in order to escape punishment for their own misdeeds. The fact that the cops know that some field associates went straight into those assignments from the Academy doesn't ease the bitterness, since the perception here is that anybody who accepts a job "ratting" on brother officers has to be a maverick. It is not, say the cops, that they believe that wrongdoing should go unpunished, but rather that the matter should be turned over to the precinct commander so that the social control within the precinct can deal with the matter. Instead, the information is sent downtown, often with the commanding officer being unaware of the investigation and like the cops "reading about it in the Daily News along with everybody else."*

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* Several months after we left the precinct, newspaper accounts reported that there had been at least one field associate present in this precinct. As a result of information he supplied, a number of cops were disciplined by headquarters for not responding to radio calls, drinking while on duty and accepting free meals from local restaurants.

Considered together with the case of Officer Kelly, the events surrounding the suicide point to one major consequence of the separation and conflict inherent in the two culture organizational structure. The seeming disinterest on the part of Manhattan precinct officers over the troubles and subsequent suicide of a brother officer are, we believe, an example of what the cops mean when they say that the "management types" downtown are out to "treat us like workers so that they can be like managers and get control over us as individuals." Just as officers were willing to testify against Kelly in the Bronx precinct, so officers here indicated little active concern and were quick to indicate that "nobody here hardly knew him." Both Kelly and the officer who committed suicide were described as "mavericks," guys who were relatively new to the precinct and who had not as yet been accepted into the precinct social organization. While Kelly was better known in the Bronx precinct than the officer who committed suicide was in the Manhattan precinct, both were described as deviant from the norm in some fashion. Kelly was a "crazy" who was known to be unpredictable and prone to violence and drinking, while the officer who committed suicide was described as a "loner" who just didn't fit in with any of the established social networks in the precinct. In the good old days this would not have mattered and the protective web of relationships would have reached out to embrace them as well because, say the cops, "downtown was still looking out for us." What the cops are saying is that in the old days the game was to protect the individual officer because he was part of the system, but today the new game is to find some way to identify him and then get him out.

Ever since the Knapp Commission report there has been a great deal of emphasis and Departmental time spent on the development and implementation of integrity and ethical awareness programs. In both precincts, we found that most of the officers with whom we spoke did not feel any ownership or real involvement with these programs, but spoke of them as a joke. The programs had been developed and carried out by management types at headquarters in response to external pressures and for political expediency, and the pressure came from people who know virtually nothing about the problems of the street cop. At the same time that they complain about this lack of awareness, however, the street cops also maintain that these same officers and bosses who are pushing these programs were part of the good old days when not only free meals but institutionalized payoffs were accepted and that even if they were not personally involved, they were part of the system and "weren't blowing the whistle on anybody." There is also a sense that cops are being singled out unfairly in a governmental and even societal system where small favors and gifts are not unknown. One story we heard on several occasions was used to illustrate the point. It seems that a police officer was invited to lunch by lawyers from the Knapp Commission on their expense account who then proceeded to question him on how widespread the practice of accepting free lunches was in his precinct. The integrity programs are viewed as an imposed ethic from "downtown" which has little or no meaning in the social context of the precinct. Even the workshops which they are required to attend on integrity and ethics are viewed suspiciously as a mechanism by which individual officers will be pressured into turning in fellow officers or reporting on games going on outside.

While the Department has been successful in eliminating large-scale system wide organized pads, it has been less successful in combating institutionalized but individualized problems with integrity. There is considerable "stealing of Department time" by officers as well as discount shopping, and acceptance of free meals carried out in many cases in much the same way that a worker will get as much as he can from a large annonymous corporate employer. In fact, some cops become minor culture heros to their peers because of the impunity with which they "work the system to their advantage," without getting caught.

Despite the apparent disinterest in the officer who committed suicide, there were a number of comments which, while they did not condone his illegal activity, did express understanding of his looking for extra money. The rationale here says that since there is little chance of vertical movement or substantial salary increases in the Department, cops are increasingly having to moonlight in other jobs during off-duty hours in order to make ends meet. Here again, the educational programs designed to improve police performance are said to provide better competing career opportunities instead and we were told by a number of officers that they were more committed to their outside jobs which they saw as eventually leading someplace. One of the most frequently cited examples of how the new politics has changed the police career is described in this event in the attitudes towards the gold shield. On numerous occasions we were told that some officer, in the estimation of his peers, should have been awarded the gold shield because of his performance. Now, however, gold shields have to be parceled out to blacks, hispanics, women, as well as to people who are well connected, and as one cop said, "I guess they are going to have to save some for the fags when they officially bring them in to." In addition to its affect on productivity, there are important implications for stress which result. The cop cultures humerous view of life inside in "cushy" details indicates some of the tension as well as some of the envies for the street cop. In the following item reported in the lampoon issue of Spring 3100, both headquarters details, Detective Specialist designations and civilians are commented upon.

No Soft Detail

A tough day at 1 Police Plaza occurred recently that illustrates the hazards of non-patrol duties. It began when Det. Specialist Alan Whock caught his tie in his model 5000 Electric Wizard typewriter. As the berserk machine rolled up his tie and drew Whock in to its clutches, the specialist managed to cut his tie off (he had already been struck in the face by several capital letters) before losing consciousness. As he jumped back, however, he inadvertently tipped over a 32 pot coffee urn which hit two civilian employees and began dissolving the accumulated wax on the office floor. Attracted by the screams of the scalded civilians, Chief of Borough Reconnaisance Ernest Qualm stepped from his office. In an attempt to guard his leader from slipping in the coffee-wax mixture, Det. Whock launched himself at the Chief. As the two tumbled across desks they dislodged several lamps whose exposed wires made contact with the liquid, shorting out the Headquarters complex and leaving 911 out of service for 9 and 1/2 hours. Fortunately, the only permanent damage was to the office spider plant which suffered severe trauma due to the shouting and screaming. It has since perished.

One of the major results of the loss of a unifying culture in the Department is the increasing evidence of organizational stress which affects police behavior. Police work has always been considered a high stress occupation with factors such as danger, violence and authority causing serious problems for health and effectiveness. Here, the old ethos demanded that the major symptoms of stress which were said to be drinking and marital problems be kept inside the department and the officer was protected by giving him some non-sensitive assignment until he straightened out or retired. Today, say the cops, those jobs are held by civilians and the management culture is more interested in early identification and weeding out potentially "embarrassing" officers.

As the unifying culture dissolves and the two cultures are increasingly in conflict, there are also organizational control and role pressures which add to that stress load, often at an unconscious—for both the individual and the organization—level. Today, the NYPD has many of the organizational stress characteristics of any city agency in a time of financial crisis but there are some which are peculiar to the police function. Organizations provide a behavioral home for the people who work in them, shaping their self-images, career goals and aspirations, their work and how it is organized and other factors which affect the constructive or destructive results of stress. Organizations also can become stress provoking when some significant segment feels manipulated by forces beyond their control or by contradictory goals or when they think that their work role

or status is demeaning or has been demeaned by others. Organizationally generated stress is increased when some group or groups feel that they are being pitted against each other or that some members of the organization are "spying" on others. Even promotional and reward systems such as the gold shield designation among police officers inevitably means that for each person promoted or rewarded a number are left behind or ignored and can be stress producing. This presents a particular problem among police where the selection and training process and the close bonds among officers produces a cohort system against which one can measure his progress, adding to feelings of alienation from the group, depression and lowered self-esteem when one is passed over. Finally, there is the problem of the management of stress. Frequently, people in any line of work that requires face-to-face contact with troublesome or irate clients have difficulty managing their own hostile reactions. Policemen have this frequent provocation to anger and aggression complicated by the added stress of continuous exposure to real and perceived danger as a constant aspect of their job. All of this is made more complex by the policemans discretionary authority to use force. It is this latter threat which is most disturbing to police management and the recent escalation of interest on stress in police work is oriented towards identifying and neutralizing potentially violent officers who are dangerous when under stress. Here again, the precinct cop see a self-serving management culture which is more interested in avoiding the public and political repercussions of an incident in which a cop kills or injures someone than they are in organizing police work to reduce dysfunctional organizational stress.

CHAPTER VI

THE FIELD DATA: II. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, DECISION-MAKING SYSTEMS, RULE MAKING AND RULE BREAKING

A. Introduction

In this chapter we present two additional events which we found useful in organizing our data on decision making processes at the precinct level and between the precinct and headquarters and which, we believe, also add some important individual insights into how street cop culture is organized and the code of rules which empowers it. The first of these events was an attempt on the part of the management cop culture at headquarters to implement a Management-By-Objectives (MBO) program throughout the Department. The origins of this program were actually external to the Department in that the city administration had decided to institute such programs in all city agencies as part of a master plan for increasing productivity and accountability. We were at the precinct when the memorandum mandating the program was first issued and were able to follow it through to its final dimise. In addition, we were able to study it up to the next level of the Borough Command since Reuss-Ianni was permitted to attend planning meetings. While we were not able to follow it up to the headquarters level with the same degree of involvement as we had with lower echelons, we did discuss its intended and actual consequences with a number of ranking management and planning officers at that level.

Shortly before the issuance of the memo implementing the MBO program, a dramatic and unexpected event took place which permitted us to observe decision making at the local level and management response and directives resulting from this emergency and their effect on precinct operations and reactions. In July of 1977, there was a black-out in New York City which resulted in widespread looting and destruction of property in the Bronx precinct and throughout the city. Here again, we were present during the entire event and were able to monitor decision making processes and resultant activity at the local level as well as observe what the precinct level personnel understood they were being told to do and not do by headquarters in reaction to the crises. Because the events did take place within the same general time period and since they rather nicely show an unexpected crisis and the reaction to it, in contrast to a rationally designed planning program and the reaction to it, we intend to present the two events and then analyze them together.

In describing both events, we have once again been faithful to the observations and inteviews which grew out of the networks of individuals directly involved in the events. We have, also, once again, included information which, while it came from the same networks, goes beyond the events themselves to describe those aspects of precinct social organization and street cop culture which give it meaning. Considered together, the events describe the street cops perception of management cop cultures' failure to understand police work as it currently exists and how, as allies of the political system, management cops are involved in making political rather than police decisions. There are a number of other organizational points inherent in these two events. One is an apt demonstration of what takes place when organizational members feel that authority and responsibility are not coincident in the same roles. They also indicate the importance of understanding police work as what cops actually do on the job rather than what they say they do or what a distanced administrative structure believes they should be doing. We have also taken some pains to point out the constraints that the organizational structure of the Department places on various work functions within the precinct and some of the maneuvering and behaviors, both functional and dysfunctional, which cops resort to when they feel the need to rationalize departmental policies to fit local conditions. Another important point that is made here is the coexistence of formal rules and informal rules and conventions which establish behavioral limits that tell the members of the precinct what they can and cannot get away with, based on who happens to be

in charge and what the immediate environmental pressures are. Finally, particularly in the black-out, there is vivid demonstration of what happens in police work when there is a fragmentation of norms and values in the Department, in the community or in society.

B. Event 3. Management-By-Objectives Plan

In November of 1977, a departmental memo "came down" to all Area and Specialized Unit Commanders from the Chief of Field Services. The memo outlined a "Field Services Bureau Agency Plan Supplement" which was intended to implement a management plan concept mandated for all city agencies by the new Mayor. Specifically, the memo called for the various Departmental units including precincts to "develop specific objectives or standards within which to measure command performance in priority areas of concern." While the memo indicated that the development of objectives and standards was the responsibility of each command, it contained a "Management Improvement Program Format (which is helpful in establishing programs with specific objectives, milestones and delineation of responsibility) designed to assist a command in reaching its Management Plan Objectives or in achieving improvement in a separate area of command concern through the conduct of specifically programmed activities."

When the Commanding Officer of the Bronx precinct told us of this order, he suggested that it might be an opportunity for us since he understood our interest in studying the impact of departmental planning and decision making on precinct level operations. Compliance with this order, he indicated, would necessitate a thorough evaluation and analysis of current precinct activity with projections for future activity. It would also involve several meetings of precinct-based units in order to get the input of those officers actually involved in meeting that objective. Most interesting for our purposes, however, would be the testing of a basic principal of public administration: that policy made at the higher levels of an organization will be effective only if each successively lower level complies with that policy and/or is capable of carrying it out. Simply put, it was our impression from previous experience with the Department, that if an administrative order doesn't obtain the cooperation of the patrol force, it cannot succeed. And further, that the patrol force will understand and interpret any such order not in terms of some accepted generalized departmental goals or policies, but rather in terms of their social environment and particularly in terms of the anticipated or perceived reactions of fellow officers who constitute their reference group.

While each Command was to establish its own objectives there were broad objectives established on a Department-wide basis and these were defined in the memo as "Bureau-wide priority objectives related to reducing and controlling serious crime, increasing community involvement in crime prevention and other programs, improving police-community relations, reducing administrative costs and maintaining the climate of integrity at a high level." "When the (Area and Special Command level) objectives are developed," continued the memo, "Field Services Bureau will have at every level of command, standards against which progress and accomplishment may be measured in reference to Bureau-wide priorities." Attached to the memo was a listing of the responsibilities for various command levels and charts listing a series of performance indicators for the various priority areas. Objectives were to be established by estimating (on a quarterly basis) the number of complaints for burglary, for example, which would be reported in the next year in comparison to the number reported the previous year and a precinct's performance would then be measured by comparing the actual number of complaints reported with what had been projected.

The Commanding Officer delegated responsibility for setting up the new program to a lieutenant who had at one time been assigned to a planning and evaluation unit. The previous year he had attended a 3 day course on planning and evaluation offered to all sergeants and lieutenants by the American Management Association. The planning process described in that course, the lieutenant told us, was very similar to that outlined in the memo and differed "only in terminology." "I never really understood what they were trying to teach us," he added, "but then nobody else in the course did either." He had called over to the Borough Command office and asked if it would be possible to set up a refresher course since he didn't see how precinct personnel assigned to carry out the planning process outlined in the memo could handle it without special instruction. The Borough Command's response was "handle it as best you can." This he suggested, reinforced his opinion that, since a new Police Commissioner was going to take over in the next few months, the new plan probably wouldn't survive that change in administration anyway. When he called into the Field Services Bureau to ask about some specifics of the plan, he was told not to worry about specifics since precinct commanding officers' wouldn't be held accountable for the success of the plan and would not be evaluated on its outcome. This conversation, he said, added to what he had already seen and heard convinced him that they were involved in another "exercise in futility." Just another example of "someone downtown coming up with an idea of how to keep the guys in the field busy and at the same time justify their own existence."

1. The Number Game

The lieutenant pointed out that one immediate problem with complying with the request was that "they" were "asking for numbers, exact figures, not even ratio's". They were, he said, back to playing "the same old numbers game," with the result that precincts in each borough would be placed in competition to rank first, second, third, etc., in this numbers game. He shook his head and pointed out that although all the recent literature in the field of policing and police management indicated that numbers are not a reliable indicator of performance, "the system" keeps justifying and accounting for activity on the basis of "meaningless numbers."

A confounding problem in organizing a response to this request was the fact that on January 3, 1978, all precincts in the Bronx would be changing their boundaries to conform to those of the Community Boards. This change was mandated by the New York City Charter which was adopted by the voters of New York City on November 4, 1975. Referred to as "coterminality," it provides for many of the cities "essential" services to have similar or coterminous boundaries. As a result of coterminality, most Bronx precincts would be losing area on some boundary and adding area on others. In the precinct where we were working, it would mean losing some of the "quieter" areas and gaining more troublesome or "busier" areas. The lieutenant was also concerned about producing figures that would accurately reflect the conditions in the precinct after the change in boundaries, which if it were to be done correctly, he explained, would mean getting activity reports on those sectors currently in the adjoining precinct but which would, after the beginning of the New Year, become part of this precinct. When he posed this problem to the borough office, there was much discussion back and forth about what figures "to go with," and when he talked to us about it, a final decision still had not been made. The Bronx was the first borough in which coterminality was to be established with each of the other four boroughs implementing it at six month intervals.

Other officers in addition to the lieutenant ridiculed the notion of using numbers to measure performance. Their arguments were quite similar and put forth in almost the same logic. On the average, they maintained, according to the New York State Annual Crime Report, someone is murdered every 5 hours and 25 minutes in New York City, someone is robbed every 6 minutes, assaulted every 12 minutes and raped every 2 hours and 35 minutes. What, they ask, do these numbers tell us about the performance of the New York City Police Department? Nothing, they reply. They only tell us about the performance of crooks. In that same year, officers in the Department made 237,311 arrests, up 2.7% from the previous year. What do these numbers tell us about the performance of the New York City Police Department? Again, the answer is "nothing." If we assume that the job of the police is to prevent crime, then they argue these statistics tell us only of his failures. Since there are no figures on crimes that didn't occur because uniformed officers are patrolling the streets, then all

crime statistics can do is to count police failures.

Concern over police accountability and crime statistics is also a problem for police management, particularly in relation to deployment of manpower. The recent financial crises in New York City have added to the concern and confounded it because, as a result of first massive lay-offs and subsequent hiring freezes, the size of the patrol force dropped by an estimated 5000 between 1975 and 1977. The idea that there is a relationship between the number of police working the streets and the number of crimes committed as well as the number of complaints of crimes which will be made, is not only part of the forklore of policing but has been used as a budgetary argument by the Department as well. Yet we are also told that the job of policing increasingly is not limited to making arrests and taking complaints. To the detriment of any neat cost-benefit analysis, it includes public relations and any number of other service activities such as taking people to hospitals, giving directions, traffic control, utility problems, landlord-tenant disputes, and, a particular problem in New York City, guarding visiting dignitaries. Here again this problem is one which is well known to police administrators but, in the absence of any method for establishing comprehensive performance standards, or even any generally accepted indicators of performance, the numerical rate of increase or decrease in crime statistics over the previous year is continuously employed as a measure of the improvement or decline in a Department's or precinct's performance. *

2. Objective Setting

The Field Services memo had been quite explicit in directing that "the objective setting process must begin at the precinct level." At first, this seemed a clear acceptance of the importance of local decision making and the setting of authority and responsibility at the same level. As we followed through the actual process, however, a very different picture emerged.

The assigned Lieutenant began the process by calling in groups of precinct officers who had specific responsibility for certain performance indicators which had been outlined in the memo. Those 14 performance indicators had been described under three major headings:

I Serious Crime Complaints

- Robbery
- Burglary
- Grand Larceny Auto

II Community Participation

- Operation Identification
- Blockwatchers
- Precinct Community Councils
- Auxiliary Police
- Patrol Man Hours

III Administration and Support

- New Arrest Overtime Costs

* Shortly after the completion of the study, a major confrontation over the crime statistics released by the Transit Police (a separate municipal police force which patrols subways and other transportation systems) took place because the Transit Police Chief (a former Chief in the Police Department) was reporting only "open cases"; crimes where an arrest had not yet been made, rather than totals including "cleared" cases.

III Administration and Support continued

- Civilian Complaints
- Corruption Complaints
- Warrants executed
- Department motor vehicle/scooter Accidents

In these meetings, the characteristics to be considered in quantifying each of the performance indicators were discussed and, in some cases, additional meetings were held to work out details of some indicators. In other areas, the lieutenant gathered the necessary statistics for the indicators without further meetings. We attended meetings of the performance indicator areas and then interviewed officers involved concerning those "real job" factors which they felt were important considerations for each of the three performance indicator areas in the Bronx precinct.

a) Serious Crime Complaints

In the Bronx precinct, for the fiscal year 1977, there were 2009 robberies, 4807 burglaries and 1053 stolen cars (grand larceny auto or GLA) reported. These crimes are viewed as serious crimes according to the memo and it is the responsibility of the precinct commanding officer to deploy manpower to have the maximum influence on the incidence of such crimes as well as other precinct conditions which he may view as priority "problem areas." In the Bronx precinct, the Commanding Officer had organized his patrol force to produce these results in several ways. The regular, uniformed foot and radio motor patrol officers worked in shifts designed to insure that at least the minimum manning level set by the Borough Command was on patrol at any given time. For radio motor patrols, for example, this meant that there would be 7 cars working on every weekday from midnight until 8 A.M. (12 x 8). Numbers are also set for other tours. On weekends, one additional car was added on the midnight tour. In addition to the radio motor patrol cars, there are also specialized teams, working under the direct supervision of a sergeant, which do not respond to radio calls but perform some specific policing function. One such unit is Anti-Crime which has some 20 to 24 officers assigned to it who work out of uniform. Their vehicles are unmarked and include taxicabs, vans and, occasionally, even a borrowed postal truck. The anti-crime unit has a different shift or tour pattern than regular patrol officers. They usually work either a 10 A.M. to 6 P.M. (10 x 6) or 4 P.M. to midnight (4 x 12) shift five days each week with weekends off. Their tours consist of driving throughout the precinct, giving special attention to commercial areas, and seeking out criminal activity such as muggings or robberies which occur on the streets. Frequently, they will "spot someone who looks dirty" and follow them until they either leave the precinct boundaries, or the officers decide that they are relatively "clean, at least for tonight."

The conditions team is another special unit which is deployed to deal with particular problems or "conditions" which may exist in a precinct. In the Bronx precinct, for example, there were two conditions units, one for burglaries and another for narcotics street sales. Both teams usually worked out of uniform. The narcotics condition team might send some officers with binoculars to spot the street action either from abandoned apartments or rooftops that overlook high drug-sale activity streets or popular drug hangouts. The remainder of the team would be waiting in cars or vans parked near the observation site waiting for word from the spotters of some suspicious activity. The spotters would radio to the officers waiting below telling them when they could move in and make an arrest.

While any detail with fixed, regular weekday hours is considered preferable to "working round the clock and in uniform," anti-crime has something of an elitist sense about itself, according to both anti-crime officers and regular patrol officers. Anti-crime officers, we learned in working with them, tend to see themselves as specialists in comparison to the uniformed officers who are the generalists and must respond to service calls as well as

crime complaints. Most of the anti-crime officers with whom we spoke said that they didn't want to waste their time on "shit calls like the uniformed guys have to handle" and claim that they are being justifiably rewarded for having "shown a lot of activity" while they were in uniform. Since the only activity that such a unit can show is arrests, making "collars" becomes the "job" of these officers. While quotas are vehemently denied at every level of police supervision, the officers told us quite openly that they must meet certain quotas. For anti-crime in the Bronx, this has come to mean about 4 arrests per man per month, and "getting on the sheet for the month" is serious business, "if you want to keep a good detail." Since anti-crime units work as teams, the officers informally divide up arrests. If 2 of the officers have made arrests for the month and another one of the team members has none for that month, they will see to it that the officer with no arrest gets credit for the next arrest. Considerable hostility is generated by an officer who steps out of line by trying to "hog" arrests and isn't willing to share the work with his colleagues Other officers will gleefully await their chance to get back at the officer who does so. One well known "hog," for example, left his portable radio in a restaurant and was understandably quite upset when he discovered it missing since he was responsible for this $900 piece of departmental equipment. His fellow officers arranged with the restaurant owner to hide the radio for a few hours to "put some manners" on him.

Whenever we spoke with officers about numbers or quotas, the usual response was that you tried to keep the monthly averages about the same from one month to the next, because as one officer explained, "if you show a large increase in arrests during one month, then for sure, the next month the boss is going to want to see you do the same or better." Another officer mimicked one of the bosses: "Don't tell me what you did last month, tell me what you are doing for me this month." "Yeh," his teammate added, "and if you didn't get on the 'sheet' for this month, nobody wants to hear about the great arrest you made last month . . .that's gone forever." Consequently, one developes the sense, from watching such teams and listening to the cops talk, that what is at stake for the cops isn't the issue of crime in the community and the prevention of that crime. The organization of policing seems almost inevitably to create a system where the goal is numbers. As in the case of anti-crime, the numbers of arrests is viewed almost as an end in itself. Units such as anti-crime and conditions, whose primary objective is to make arrests and whose sole accountability to the system is based on numbers of arrests, are critical to that numbers game. Officers on patrol find making arrests both non-rewarding and problematic since an arrest might involve going to court with all of the attendant frustration. The attitude we heard expressed by patrol officers towards arrests is "we'll take them only if we have to." "It's not like arresting these mutts is doing anything to prevent crime. The people around here know that, only they blame us for it instead of the judges and courts," another officer explained to us. "So if there is nothing personally in it for us to make arrests, and it doesn't even keep them off the streets, then you can be damn sure they aren't paying me enough to do anything more." According to officers in the precinct, the only thing that really discourages crime in the precinct is lack of people and businesses as targets, although with coterminality the assumption is that the number of complaints will increase since the areas that will be added to the total precinct are currently the busier sectors of another precinct. What can the police officers actually do to prevent crimes from occurring and making neighborhoods or communities safe? The cops told us, "nothing we do out here can prevent these mutts from committing crimes because they just aren't afraid of us anymore."

Universally, we heard from the cops in both precincts that the problem with rising crime rates was in the courts and in the attitude of a public that "was more concerned about the crooks rights than the victim." Stories of officers making arrests, often at risk to their own lives, only to find those arrested back on the streets a few days later were common and told with as much resignation as resentment. "No one wants us to make arrests, it seems," one young officer told us, "they tell us it costs the department money for overtime, and that it fills up the court calendar." He shrugged his shoulders and laughed, "so I really don't understand what they want from us anymore." His partner continued, "with all the restrictions they place on us, it's worth your career to use your gun or put a little muscle on a guy who would just as soon blow you away. We're always the chump, at the disadvantage, nobody else out there backs us up anymore. It's every man for himself."

Another officer said to us that the only street activity the Department was really interested in was having officers serve motor vehicle violation summons because, he explained, "it means money for the city, so we're really paying our own way." Summonses or "tickets," are usually given for two types of motor vehicle infractions, those having to do with parking illegally (parkers), and those for violations involving someone driving incorrectly or failing to obey street signs (movers). In the Bronx precinct, there is a civilian employee assigned to maintain records of summons activity. He complained that "the Police Department is also working for the transit company" since he has to keep a separate account of summonses issued to gypsy cabs working out of bus stops. He explained that the precinct issues approximately 10,000 summonses a year and that "the bosses are always asking for more summons activity at roll call from the men." Many of the officers with whom we spoke hate to give out summonses because they feel that it is demeaning for them, especially now that there are meter maids who do the same job. They also have pointed out that one of the reasons that the public feels such resentment towards cops is because most citizens only come into contact with cops when they get a ticket. We did, however, meet a few cops that seemed to have a personal vendetta against certain companies or businesses and satisfied it by giving tickets to cars associated with those businesses. There is, for example, a gypsy cab headquarters (a store front) on one of the main thoroughfares, and one officer complained that invariably the gypsy cabs are parked three cars deep into the streets. He gives them tickets every chance he gets, he explained, "because they are taking away business from legitimate cabs, and guys who had to work hard to raise money to buy their own medallians legitimately." Another officer regularly tickets ambulances parked in front of a store front "Ambulance Service," that the officer explained to us "is just a front for medicaid fraud. The doctors claim the cost of an ambulance and the service is there just in case anyone bothers to check up on them." The officer pointed out a single dilapidated ambulance parked at the corner in front of a fire hydrant, with several tickets stuck under the windshield wiper. Another officer told us that he refuses to give out tickets and lets his partner cover for him by writing extra tickets because "I'm just sick and tired of seeing those used car lots with cars double and triple parked into the street, and we're told not to touch them because they pay taxes to the city, while the poor people who live here can't park their own cars on the streets." We were told that at one time, the used car lot owners got together and said they were going to take their business out of the Bronx if the cops didn't stop ticketing their cars, "so" the officer concluded, "downtown got the word out, hands off." The C.O. regularly assigns several officers specifically as "summons men", but it was not unusual to hear an officer go up to the desk lieutenant at the beginning of a tour and tell him that if he lets him work with so-and-so, or puts him in a car instead of on foot post, that "I'll give you some movers". A similar attitude and deployment of manpower in the direction of summons activity was present in the Manhattan precinct. The highway safety officer responsible for summons activity there said that he usually figures "1 mover to every 6 accidents occurring in the precinct." He continued, "you are always in competition with your last year's figures and, of course, with the other precincts in your area, because that's what the boss will get pressure about from the borough." When we asked him about the value of such activity, his response was, "after all, how can you tell if a man is producing unless you can count up something on paper. It's a way of showing that he is doing some work." Another officer commented that "a former Captain here made (D.I.) Deputy Inspector on the basis of his summons productivity." The cops in the Bronx apparently had worked out their own system of meeting their"summons quotas" by getting rid of or "dumping" their tickets on derelict cars, cars that had been abandoned or just dumped along the street. "After all," one of the officers told us, "it isn't our responsibility if they pay or don't, we just have to empty these summons books." His partner added, "You won't believe this, but

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they found a derelict car that had been issued a couple of hundred summons by the same guys."

"Garbage calls," one officer was saying on an evening tour, "that's all we get anymore. These people use us like we are taxi cabs, and the job doesn't even want us to take care of business out there like we used to do." This officer was expressing an attitude toward the objectives of police work that we heard over and over again in both precincts. The implication was that while there was as much if not more criminal activity going on in the streets as ever, the police's job was being re-directed more and more towards service activity, such as responding on ambulance cases, mediating in family disputes or tenant-landlord quarrels, public utility problems, fires and traffic control. An officer with 19 years of service, who had worked in several of the boroughs of the city complained "it used to be if you had a foot post, you knew how to keep that post clean, and the people in the community didn't complain about how you did it, they were just happy that they could walk down the streets safely. Then they started yelling police brutality and so we got the screws put to us. Now the people are yelling that they want to be able to walk down the streets safely, but how can they when the courts turn crooks back out in one day or when we aren't allowed to use our guns to hold on to some guy." He went on, "don't talk to me about increases or decreases in criminal activity on these streets. If this job wanted to see a decrease, it could be done in no time, like we used to handle things in the old days. Believe me, that's the only way those dirtbags learn a lesson."

b) Community Participation

While the Field Services Bureau Plan described Community Participation as a Departmental priority in the memo of November 17, 1977, many of the precinct officers with whom we spoke didn't rate any of the performance indicators under this item as being of much worth or importance to policing. Anything that involved community members in precinct operations was viewed with suspicion and antagonism summed up as "they ought to keep the hell out of our business, they just get in our way." While organizing such programs as Operation Identification, Blockwatchers, the Precinct Community Council and the Auxiliary Police was the responsibility of several precinct staff officers, most officers saw it as a waste of time that didn't involve them and decidedly not "real police work." Although such activity preceeded largely unnoticed by the patrol force, occasionally we would hear complaints such as "the A.P.'s (auxiliary police) working out of the Central Park precinct get issued better cars then we get for regular patrol." The Bronx precinct however did have a civilian that had attached himself to the precinct many years earlier and still spends much time in the station house helping with community and precinct activities, such as parties for the local kids at Christmas or Thanksgiving and occasionally raising money in the business community for some piece of equipment that the precinct might need. It seemed that his obvious respect and affection for the men had won the hearts of many of the officers who normally had little good to say for any "civilian." Most civilians who like to hang around or associate with cops—derisively called "police buffs"—however, are considered ludicrous.

"Cops don't like civilians," was a comment that we heard many times at both precincts, "and especially they don't like them inside the station house where they get to know a cop's business." We were to hear many stories justifying the cops dislike of civilians and we attempted to come up with some priority listing by regularity of complaints against civilians. The major complaints seemed to revolve around 4 issues: (1) civilians replacing cops in traditional cop jobs, (2) civilians don't understand a cop's job and would be telling tales outside the station house without really understanding what had happened, (3) civilians wouldn't have the same sense of loyalty to cops as other cops and (4) that this was just a job for a civilian and not a career. Sometimes the expression of the "we-they" attitude could be very poignant; once at a precinct farewell party for a retiring cop, the retiree was overcome with emotion at the moment he was asked to speak and could only blurt out "Only a cop understands what it is to be a cop."

There have been numerous memos, increasing over the last few years, from various command levels advising precinct C.O.'s on how to deal with "tensions between police and civilian personnel." At the precinct level, the problem mentioned most frequently was that civilians were replacing officers in jobs reserved for officers who "had done their time on the streets" or "are burned-out." One cop described this as "retired at full pay." Civilian competency or incompetency is not really the issue, although this is always questioned or described in a colorful if derogatory manner. Unfortunately, for the civilians who bear the brunt of the resentment, the employee relations section apparently has not resolved the problem of what to do with officers who have in reality "done their time on the streets," have spent years working round-the-clock, and yet don't want to retire. It is a problem for those officers who hold inside jobs because they are temporarily or permanently put on restricted duty as well.

While there was almost universal hostility towards civilians in "cops' jobs," the intensity of feelings expressed by the officers with whom we spoke about the three other common complaints about civilians varied; but the fact remains that there is enough concern surrounding each of them to cause continuous and increasing tension between civilians and cops. The cops didn't like the idea that topics of conversation or police activity become known to the general public. While we have mentioned earlier in this report that it is frequently said that cops are closed mouthed and suspicious, in fact, we found that in informal conversations around the station house or out on patrol, there isn't much that cops won't talk about. "If another cop hears me say I was out of my sector or stopped in for coffee he knows the job and the dozen legitimate reasons for why we might do this but a civilian just hears goofing off and he's got no reason to protect me" explained one officer. Some officers even felt that civilians were "all alike" in being anti-cop and that civilian employees feel more akin to and thus more loyalty towards a civilian arrested and brought into the station house than they would toward the cop who had made the arrest. In the informal system of relationships among fellow officers, it is much easier for a cop to "get back" at another cop for a real or supposed wrong within that system. Since the civilian is outside the system it is impossible to use its social sanctions against them. There were a number of instances where civilian employees did lodge complaints against precinct cops, and inevitably the cops sided with the officer or officers and showed obvious resentment against the civilian complaintant. At such times, officers often said that civilian employees are there just for a short period of time and have no real vested interest in their own success and "don't give a shit if they mess up a cop's career either." The fact that civilians have holidays off while police officers don't, creates additional hostility since days off, particularly at holiday periods when working means that an officer won't be with his family, are an important issue of work conditions. Officers also complained that civilians are not as dependent on their jobs as cops are. On several occasions we heard civilians at both precincts say in front of officers that they wouldn't mind losing their job with the Department since they would do just as well on unemployment. The officers response was usually that some of their fellow officers who had been laid off for budgetary reasons and were "on welfare" might like to have those jobs. Departmental supervisors of civilians also express dismay at their lack of actual control or their ability to reprimand civilians, since as one supervisor explained to us, "the Department wants this civilianization, so we have to make it work down here but we can't lean on them to get the work out or we get hell from downtown. They don't want to hear our problems, they just tell us to make it work. "Another supervisor added, they keep the best civilians, and the prettiest, downtown."

While for the most part, civilian employees we observed or worked with kept to themselves, there were civilians, in both precincts who seemed to have become fairly well accepted by the officers. The closestrelationship involved two male civilian employees who were able to exchange social banter with the cops, talking about female conquests or sports, but, as one officer explained, still "minding their own business, not ours." In both cases, the civilians also prided themselves, as they explained it to us, in "covering" from some of the cops who might otherwise had gotten into trouble. There are also social class and ethnic tensions involved. Much of the recent hiring of civilians has come

through federally funded CETA programs and is viewed by many cops we talked to as "Federal give-away programs for those people who can't find work for themselves" and as evidence of the lack of respect and appreciation for police work "downtown" since, the "job is suggesting that these civilians who were unemployed and supposedly are hard-core unemployable can do what we have been doing at least as well as we were doing it."

c) Administration and Support

Earlier we pointed out that w th the exception of special units such as anti-crime where high arrest rates lead to increased chances of being kept in this special detail with its better working hours and conditions, most patrol cops feel that a high arrest rate is not helpful to their careers. There is, in fact, even some feeling that a high arrest rate can be detrimental to one's career since this could suggest to your superiors that, in a period of financial crisis you are "hungry for overtime." A number of cops said that the prevailing work ethic now is "don't get involved unless you absolutely have to", or "it's as bad to do too much as to do too little." Since currently one of the major concerns of police management is cost effectiveness and the reduction of non-productive time such as sick leave, there is also increasing scrutiny here.

1. Sick Report

The managerial attitude toward the use of sick leave is one factor which clearly differentiates not only precincts but sometimes work units within precincts as well. It is very much a function of the relationship between the supervisor and his men. Generally, however, in the Bronx Precinct there was a somewhat more relaxed attitude towards the use of sick leave than we found in the Manhattan precinct; but even here there has been considerable tightening up. "It used to be that you could get emergency days off if you had something important to do, or even if you just felt plain shitty or down on that day, but it's getting so hard to get an okay for an emergency day that I just call in sick now and then they can't say no." Departmental regulations which are enforced at this precinct, however, make this a risky undertaking. If you are ill, you are supposed to be at home and there are supervisory officers whose task it is to check to make sure that officers on sick report are, in fact, at home. Towards the end of the study, the Department instituted a new procedure for reporting sick. Previously, officers reported directly to the Sick Desk which then called into the precinct to inform them that the officer would not be reporting in for work. The officer had to have a police surgeon okay his coming back to work. As the sergeant explained, the officer would usually go to his own physician, then call the surgeon who would simply "rubber stamp" him back to work. The idea behind this new procedure was to eliminate the need for going to the surgeon on sickness of a minor nature. It would allow the precinct administrative officer to call the officer when he first reports sick and ask him if he wanted to put himself back without seeing a surgeon. The sergeant, however, has had two problems with the program. At the administrative level he said that he hadn't been able to get any of the desk lieutenents to phone to a cop who reports sick. He has met with them but he feels that they won't use the system for two reasons; because he is "just a sergeant and so they don't like me telling them to do anything since they are lieutenents" and "those guys never want to try anything anyway.' He also was getting poor cooperation from the men whom he personally had phoned back. He said of 20 calls he had made, only one had accepted this method of returning to work. His explanation for this was that when he would call officers who had just reported sick, they would ask if this was some new department policy to save money. When the sergeant said yes, that this was the intention, he said the response was, "well, screw them, why should I save them money, I'm going to the surgeon and I'll take a few days." He also complained about the system of sick time allowed. There is a list maintained by the medical section of officers who are classified as "chronic sick." An officer is considered chronic sick if he reports sick more than four times in one year, regardless of the amount of time taken for each sick report. He suggested that being on the chronic sick list is detrimental to movement into any good

detail or special assignment, but in a regular patrol assignment, it isn't any real problem to be on that list. He went on to explain that he thinks such a system is a poor one because if the officer feels sick and takes off one day, since he knows that that sick report will count towards chronic sick time, then he is going to take a few extra days anyway. It isn't any worse for him if he takes 1 day or 4 days, it all counts as one time in terms of the chronic sick report list.

According to Departmental records, on an average day, approximately 1450 officers or about 5.6% of the force call in sick. Police officers are allowed unlimited sick leave and over the past two years, the average sick leave for each officer has nearly doubled, from 10 in 1975 to nearly 18 in 1977.

2. Civilian Complaints and Corruption Complaints

Although the vast majority of civilian complaints against police officers are not substantiated in the investigation which must be conducted of each such complaint, the existence of a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) is a source of great resentment to the police officers we interviewed. This same feeling is apparently wide spread in the Department, and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association spent almost 1 million dollars in 1966 on a publicity drive aimed at defeating the election initiative setting up the CCRB. Here again, the basic issue was that only cops really understand cops jobs and that civilians might well be biased against policemen and could not therefore render a fair judgement. Mayor John Lindsey wanted to create a review board which would be composed of civilians as well as police officials. The police and the PBA eventually won out. The initiative was defeated and today the CCRB is completely staffed by police departmental personnel. Attitudes towards civilian complaints and the review process, however, are still strong: "anyone can drop a letter on me or phone in a complaint and it will be given to the sergeant for investigation no matter how stupid it sounds and they've got to investigate. If the Department is so concerned about efficiency and saving money, how come every idiot who gets his jollies writing letters gets to have his say at our expense. Every complaint, no matter how it is decided goes into our record." Other officers complained that the process denied them their civil rights because the civilian making the complaint is not required to appear at the hearing while the officer must appear. Once, when Reuss-Ianni was riding in a radio car on an evening tour, a complaint was phoned in against the officers in the car for having a female civilian riding with them. While there was a certain amount of humor associated with the incident, one of the officers said, "it's always the same old shit, for all they knew you were some street walker we arrested or one of your kids was lost and we were helping to find him, but some guy just got a parking ticket, and has it in for cops and saw a chance to give us some trouble. Everybody knows, we're the real second class citizens." Actually, it seems from our interviews, that the police did not so much resent the decisions of the CCRB which frequently resolved the cases in their favor. Rather they resented the fact that the Department seemed to be encouraging civilians to bring complaints against cops. We frequently heard officers comment, "it's as though they (the Department) can come up smelling like a rose if they can just make the cops on the street smell like horseshit." Of 2,409 cases submitted to the Board during 1977, 73.3% were unsubstantiated; 11.6% were substantiated and 15.1% were classified as other dispositions. Of the unsubstantiated cases, 41.8% were totally unsubstantiated; investigation indicated insufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the allegation. 31.5% were unsubstantiated due to the complaintant being uncooperative, unavailable or withdrawing the complaint. Of the substantiated cases, 68.6% involved excessive use of force, 25.7% were for abuse of authority and 4.5% for discourtesy.

The Bronx precinct had show a significant increase in civilian complaints according to comparative statistics among all precincts. When we spoke with the C.O. about this,

he began by explaining that one of his problems in terms of investigating such complaints is that if the complaint is submitted directly to the Department, rather than to the precinct, he has no way of finding out which officer is involved. He also pointed out that all complaints received about officers working in that precinct are counted towards the precinct total. Unfortunately for the reputation of the precinct, this also includes officers working out of details that aren't the responsibility of this precinct's supervisors, but work out of city-wide or borough level commands which are temporarily working within the boundaries of the precinct. Thus a precinct with a sports stadium to which men are assigned from commands all over the city is responsible for and must include in their total, complaints received by any officer assigned during that event.

Actually, say the cops, the problem is that no one really knows what the number of civilian complaints really says about police activity. One view is that civilian complaints are legitimate complaints of police misconduct and if substantiated should result in some disciplinary measures against the officer. A more prevalent view among the police officers we spoke with was that in order to accomplish legitimate policing ends an officer must be aggressive, even at times taking measures that might be "less than gentlemanly." A supervisor much respected in the field, by the men as well as other supervisors, explained to us that his problem as a supervisor is that he wants officers working for him who take initiative and are aggressive and yet those are the very officers who he admits it is difficult to control with "child-like" restrictions, or "pages of rules and procedures." Another supervisor explained that an officer who receives three or more complaints involving force or abuse has his record forwarded to the Personnel Evaluation Section of the Personnel Bureau "and they don't know that you can't always reason with the kinds of people we see here." Officers who receive excessive numbers of complaints may be referred to the Psychological Services Unit for evaluation. This supervisor felt that such a Departmental policy serves to discourage superior police performance and instead encourages a behavioral pattern of "do enough to get by but not enough to get noticed." We attended a meeting scheduled by the Borough Commander to discuss the objectives arrived at by the precinct in response to the M.B.O. memo. At one point, the Commanding Officer of the Bronx precinct explained that realistically, given an increase in the size of the precinct boundaries with the introduction of co-terminality, he would have to project an increase in civilian complaints. He was advised to try to keep the projected increase as low as possible because "how is it going to look if it seems we are encouraging civilian complaints?"

As with civilian complaints, corruption complaints although presented as a Field Services Bureau priority, were viewed by precinct personnel as being a headquarters rather than a precinct problem. One officer explained, "downtown sees civilian complaints and corruption complaints as a negative reflection on how we are doing our job out here. If I get a complaint, I see it is a result of my getting through to one of those mutts out there and because I'm making it hot for him, he wants to get back at me. It's a sad comment on what has happened to this job", he concluded, "that the Department is taking his side against us." Another officer in the same context commented, "I know what my job is out here. The Department is supposed to have trained me to do a job. I can't help it if some of the people out there don't like the way I'm doing it. If those guys sitting in offices downtown need to justify their existency by making it rougher for us out here, they have to live with it." He concluded in much the same vein as the previous officer, "I'd just like to see one of those numbers counters or letter writers come out here for a couple of tours on a hot summer night and see what language he has to use to keep these animals in line." It is possible that in the past the threat of complaints worried the officers, Our impression over the 18 months of field observation was that for the most part the officers response was "what more can they do to us." Particularly in the Bronx, the officers were suggesting that the worst that might happen would be that they would be transferred to another precinct. "One house is like any other", one officer commented, "the job stinks wherever you are, the only thing that makes it worth it are

some of the guys you get to work with." Another officer remarked, "What are they going to do to me, transfer me to a worse precinct? Where could they find someplace worse than the South Bronx unless they sent me to Puerto Rico or Africa?"

3. Warrants

The lieutenant met at some length with the unit responsible for the execution of warrants in the precinct in order to discuss how to set numerical objectives for warrant execution. There are two officers regularly assigned to work the warrants unit on a Monday through Friday 7:30 x 3:30 tour. The officers use their own car and are not reimbursed for gas or mileage. From this meeting it was determined that a number of factors impact negatively on the success of warrant service in that particular command. Serving a warrant means finding the individual; that is the first difficulty. In such a high crime, low economic level community there is frequent relocation of residence. Among Puerto Ricans, it is not uncommon to take a mothers name and/or a fathers name which adds to the difficulty of tracing an individual. The high incidence of buildings destroyed by arson makes it difficult to attempt to trace someone through neighbors, relatives or friends. Building superintendents seldom know or care to know who or where their tenants are, and they are not especially interested in being cooperative to local police. When the precinct turned in its projected activities for warrant execution, they projected a goal of 289 warrants for FY 1978 representing a 28% increase over the 225 warrants executed in FY 1977. There were no forms, however, that indicated how this was to be accomplished; whether through increased manpower, more effective use of current manpower levels or more or less supervision.

While the formal discussion of "what to do with the warrants squad" recognized and documented some of the problems inherent in the system of warrant execution, many more problems existed at the precinct level. They were dismissed without discussion because "those problems are out of our control and the Department doesn't want to hear about what we can't do, even if there is a legitimate explanation. It will sound like we are trying to make excuses." It was suggested that these issues be brought up more informally when the precinct C.O. met with the Borough Commander in order to come up with the specific precinct objectives, i.e. numbers.

Within the informal precinct social organization, the two officers responsible for warrant execution are generally viewed by other officers as having "a good thing." They chose their own working hours which have recently been steady 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. Monday through Friday. When asked why they chose those hours, the response was that they tried working nights and weekends and didn't have any more success at finding people. They also argued that there is more chance of getting someone early in the morning when they might still be sleeping. By noon, one officer told me, "there isn't much chance of finding someone where they are supposed to be or where we could get them." Another frequently voiced complaint was that the forms sent from the courts include descriptive information on the person wanted and a place for a picture which is sometimes included but usually is not. "It is very difficult to find a guy if you don't have a picture and the description says a black male 35 years old, afro, no visible scars on face or body", one of the officers told us with a shrug. "It's an impossible job in a place like this," another officer said, "it just gets hopeless when they keep dumping the warrants on us day after day, we have to log them in which means hours of paperwork before we can even go out looking." Apparently until recently the postal department used to help in locating addresses, especially for changes of address. But with budgetary restrictions, the local post office has been reluctant to take their own time to assist the officers. While the officers persisted in their search for wanted individuals, it was obvious that morale in terms of immediate job satisfaction on this detail was low. Another officer in the Bronx precinct commented about the warrants officers; "they may have it easy in terms of hours and days off and being able to work out of uniform with little supervision, but it costs them

out of their paychecks, since they can't make any night differential working steady days, so they pay for it in a sense." One of the warrant officers told us, "The C.O. pretty much leaves us alone as long as our numbers don't come up too bad in comparison with other commands, and when he can, if there is extra manpower available occasionally he'll slip us a couple of extra men to bring our numbers up."

When we asked those officers responsible whether they felt that the 28% increase in warrants executed as projected by the precinct C.O. was realistic, one of them shrugged and said, "if he gives us more men, then we can get it for him, if he doesn't, then there's no way we can deliver on that number."

In the end the cops were right. When the new police commissioner came into office one of the early casualties was the Management-By-Objectives plan. When we discussed this with one of the administrative officers in the Bronx precinct, he said, "one of the things you learn if you've been around enough corners on this job is to develop the art of patience: in fact, there is a rule of thumb that says that if they don't get back to you on some directive in two months, you can put in the waste basket because they've either reorganized the office it came out of, transferred the guy who came up with the idea in the first place or changed Chiefs. But it isn't gone forever. In a few years someone will dust it off and it will be reborn as a new idea from some forward thinker in the job."

C. Event 4. The Black-Out

On July 13, 1977 at 9:35 pm, lights went out throughout the city of New York as a result of a massive power failure. Almost immediately looting broke out sporadically in various parts of the city but was particularly widespread in the Bronx. Reuss-Ianni was working a 4 PM to midnight tour in the Bronx precinct and decided to continue working through the duration of the black-out to help out in what was felt to be an "emergency situation" for the police, and to observe activity in the stationhouse and in the community. Looting continued throughout the night and into the next day. By the time it was brought under control, loses to businesses as a result of looting and property damage was estimated to be in the 135 million dollar range. For weeks afterwards there was a continuing debate comparing this blackout with one that had occured 12 years earlier also affecting New York City. During that blackout there had been virtually no looting and citizens throughout the city had turned to help each other out wherever they could. Social scientists, the media and public officials found a variety of causes for the looting, ranging from the frustrations caused by inflation and unemployment in the ghetto, to the cynicism and loss of morality in the after math of Watergate. The looting also raised a significant public debate over the proper use of police in protecting private property and combating widespread public disorder.

As the precinct commanding officer was on his summer vacation and the executive captain was not working that tour (both arrived at the precinct later that night), the desk lieutenent had the immediate responsibility for responding to the crisis. An emergency generator was brought out and connected to restore lighting and to maintain radio contact, and radio cars were rushed to major road intersections to control traffic since traffic lights were inoperative. Thirty-eight police officers were on duty at the time of the blackout. Riot helmets were passed out immediately to the officers. Within a half hour of the blackout, officers from other commands began reporting to the stationhouse. The Department wide emergency plan calls for all officers, including those off-duty, to report to the precinct nearest to wherever they happen to be at the time of the emergency. The emergency generator broke down after about 10 minutes of use and the precinct was again plunged into darkness until someone found a few candles in one of the offices. As the candles burned lower, a civilian who had been a "friend" of the precinct for many years and who frequently helped out in community affairs activities woke up the owner of a hardware store and brought in several cases of candles which kept the station house illuminated until a new generator was brought in at about 2:30 the next morning.

1. The Response

As dozens of police from other precincts poured into the station house, the supervisors were having more and more trouble organizing and utilizing the increasing manpower. "It's not just enough to have the men", a lieutenent explained, "what we don't have is enough portable radios or radio cars to go around, so the extra manpower is useless and most of them are just in the way". Other problems emerged almost immediately. The officers reporting in for emergency duty, most of whom were in civilian clothes were carrying their off-duty guns rather than their regulation service weapons. There was also concern that if they were put out in the street without uniforms carrying only their shields as identification, there was the risk of injury to personnel since for the most part the cops from other commands were unknown to the precinct personnel. As officers working in the radio cars began reporting back on the largescale and spreading looting activity on the streets, officers standing round the desk began asking what

"the bosses" wanted them to do about the looters. The bosses, however, were apparently waiting to get some instructions or directions from a higher command level. Out on the streets the patrol force was also asking what to do and were told to hold tight and wait for further orders. One officer coming in was complaining that they weren't getting any instructions over the car radio from communications on who to arrest or what types of locations to cover and he added, "they're crazy if they think I'm going to break my neck stopping these mutts and then get word from downtown to cool it because they don't have the balls downtown to let us do our job'. After the first few hours of uncertainty, word came down from the Borough that there should be no attempt to use force to stop the looting and that the protection of human life and not private property was paramount.

As the looting spread and some of the stores were set afire, the situation became "a nightmare for any supervisor", according to one of the patrol sergeants. "In the first place", he said, "I know how my men feel when we have to pass around the word to just take it easy and not let the situation escalate till we have a full scale riot. Downtown doesn't want any newspaper pictures of cops clubbing looters, and I know the guys are itching to break out the baseball bats". "Our other problem", the commanding officer explained to us later, "was to balance making arrests with depleting manpower on the streets since the booking process takes time". Another frequently heard complaint was that the cops who had come into the precinct from other commands because this happened to be the command nearest to them, were not only of no use, but actually got in the way. "Extra manpower is useless, unless they come with equipment: one of the lieutenents explained as things began to quiet down during the late morning hours. Another cop laughed as he told the story of watching one of the "Manhattan guys trying to do the paperwork on an arrest. Those spit-and-polish fags from Manhattan don't know how to do real police work, because they've never had to do anything but give out parking tickets". Similar comments were heard frequently in days after the blackout, as the officers began to exchange stories about their experiences during those hours of chaos.

Once the precinct officers had received the word from their supervisors that this was a "hands of situation", that arrest should only be made if it was unavoidable, the men appeared to relax, although there was considerable grumbling about appeasement and comparison of the situation to the Harlem riots. Several hours into the blackout, the level of tension began to lift and it became apparent that some of the officers were almost settling into the carnivallike spirit that was moving from street to street with the crowd. It had been apparent from quite early on in the emergency that looters weren't especially interested in hasseling the police but were concentrating on "the pickings". There was some random violence as one officer was shot through the thigh and a brick was thrown through a radio car window, but by and large the officers with whom we spoke later in reviewing the event didn't feel that there was really any attempt at "getting back at the cops" on the part of the crowds or even individual looters. One officer came into the stration house about 1:30 a.m., and said, "there is something all wrong about my trying to break up fights between looters arguing over who got the TV first. I don't even know whose side I'm on anymore".

While most store fronts and used car lots were broken into during the early hours of the blackout, there were some store owners who lived close enough to their businesses to come in and stand guard. Officers returning to the station house were commenting that they were more nervous about the store owners using guns against the looters or anybody they might mistake for looters then they were afraid of the looters causing violence. "So far the looters aren't using weapons or even being that aggressive", one officer reported early into the hours of the blackout, "It seems the feeling is that there is enough to go around for everybody". "The real problem", another officer explained several days after the incident, "was that very early on, the people out on the streets realized that we weren't going to do anything. Sure, some of our guys got even with some of these street mutts that have been giving them trouble over the

summer, but the guys (the cops) were generally careful because they were afraid that there were cops from other commands around that they didn't know and even some bosses out of uniform from other commands who might see something and turn in a report".

For some of the cops, the evenings happening was a stroke of luck. Anti-crime cops, for example, gleefully claimed that they were "making enough collars (that night) to make their quotas for the whole month". Others were already counting up their overtime hours as tours were held over for 4 hours. Some of the officers lost the extra pay they would make in overtime as they sat around in the upstairs rooms playing cards, waiting to see if they would be kept over. As the long night ended and daylight clearly displayed the massive distruction of whole business sections in the precinct, another reaction began to set in among the officers with whom we spoke. As we rode with officers over the next few days listening to their stories of the events of that night and the next morning, what began to emerge was a quite clear sense of resentment felt by the cops, not specifically towards the looters, but to the "system". The similarity of conclusions drawn about the event by many of the officers with whom we spoke was striking. "What the hell is my responsibility in all of this mess", was a typical rhetorical question posed over and over again in the following days by the officers who had worked that night. "They tell us it's okay for some guy on welfare to loot a store, but we're supposed to give out summonses to some hard-working guy pushing a hot dog cart because he hasn't bought a license from the city. At least he is working". "It's a joke," his partner added, "I'm supposed to break my ass to protect a guys property, and then the next day the guy calls into the captain and says to let the neighborhood bums take whatever is left because his insurance will cover the whole thing anyway".

During the long, dark night hours of looting, frantic storeowners and businessmen called into the precinct demanding protection for their property. By the next morning, however, many of those same store owners came to realize that their insurances would cover any loss. Days later, women and children could be seen picking over the remains in burned-out food stores or clothing stores as radio cars cruised by without stopping. "They talk about pride in our job, in our profession", one cop said with a laugh, "how the hell do those guys sitting up on the 13th floor at headquarters think we feel out here with these animals walking all over us. The whole thing made us look like fools. They're laughing at us, and we're supposed to sit back and take it". "Enforcing the law, that's a joke", one of the officers exclaimed, "I don't think what we are doing anymore has anything to do with the law, it has to do with politics and elections". As we rode around the precinct at daybreak the next morning, the looting was still going on. Cops were standing on street corners next to stores that had been looted and were watching the crowds of looters move from one store to the next. They were still under instructions to not provoke the looters. By now the frustration and resentment was beginning to show along with exhaustion after 12 hours of working. During this time few officers took a meal break. We saw a few officers standing outside an appliance store that was being looted simply reach out with their nightsticks and break the picture tubes on the TV's that were being carried past them.

Many of the cops with whom we spoke were alternately enraged and then increasingly resigned to the numerous journalistic and sociological analyses and interpretations of the events during the blackout. "Those professors who are writing about the looting being caused by resentment against the system, or that they were stealing only essentials like food and diapers. Hell, they were running by me all night carrying stereos, tape-decks and booze. I can't ever afford a tape-deck." Another officer commented that he was glad to see that everyone was getting ripped-off equally. "None of that soul brother shit we saw during the race riots. This time they were looting and stealing from blacks, from Puerto Ricans and the Jews ...it was real equality".

2. Analysis of the Two Events

The Department's experience in attempting to implement the Management by Objectives program indicates once again the problems of the descrepancy between management cop culture and street cop culture but there are some important particulars here. While we must assume that headquarters was well intentioned and intended the MBO program to improve efficiency and add accountability at the precinct level, it just as obviously was intended to establish more control over precinct operations. At the precinct level, supervisors as well as street cops ridiculed as well as resented the fact that they were being asked to come up with "numbers", which were meaningless in terms of actual precinct level police work. They were also pointing out that "they set the priorities that say what's important and we have to give them specifics of how we're going to make those priorities work out here, even if all their priorities don't apply there." Another frequent complaint was "as usual, they're living in the ivory tower at 1 Police Plaza dreaming up grand schemes without any real idea of what life is like out here today on the streets." We heard many stories and actually observed situations in which numbers were made up for various projected activities in an empirical equation which said "promise enough to keep them satisfied, but not so much that you can't live up to what you've projected". To illustrate the descrepancy between what the management-By-Objectives program intended and what actually occured, however, we present below an analysis of intended and actual behavior in three areas: the purpose and philosophy of management by objectives; the development of borough and precinct level numerical performance indicators and objective setting at the borough level.

A. The Purpose and Philosophy of Management by Objectives

1. What was intended: The management plan described in the memo specifically called for "an objective based management system, designed to develop specific objectives or standards with which to measure command performance in priority areas of concern; and a management improvement program format designed to assist a command in reaching its Management Plan Objectives through the conduct of specifically programmed activities." Further, that "each command is concentrating its activity under this program on problems it has identified".

2. What actually took place: At both the borough and precinct level meetings which we observed describing the implementation plans, and in interviews with precinct personnel assigned the responsibility of collecting the data and following through on the request, the major problem areas identified immediately were:

(a) local command priorities had been set at headquarters and there was a strong feeling that they were not necessarily the priorities or areas of concern appropriate to their precinct. Priorities had not, as might be sensed from the language of the memo, been developed at the local level and passed upward but had been "mandated" from above;

(b) the fourteen priority areas had been defined by headquarters so the reaction was that now not only was it necessary to gather statistics in these mandated areas (some of which were not problems to the command), but areas that were continuous problems locally still must be dealt with at the precinct level.

(c) the evaluation and accountability system to be implemented was based upon numbers of complaints, recorded warrants executed, RMP accidents, etc. in the previous year and a projection of the number for the following year, broken down further into monthly and quarterly projections. The reaction of precinct personnel was that this type of accountability system, while admitedly simplifying the monitoring process ("for those people sitting behind desks downtown"), would be of no help "to us" in identifying or resolving specific problems; in addition it offered no systematic way, of picking up patterns to account for problems encountered in attempting to achieve

those objectives. In fact, it was further noted that this would result in a kind of "contest atmosphere" among the various Bronx precincts with the probable results of a monthly or quarterly listing of precincts by rank representing which command came out closest to their projections, second closest, etc. Thus, there was a feeling that precincts would be judged on how closely they approximated the numerical objectives which the precinct had committed itself to without consideration of any special problems, characteristics or changing circumstances of the precinct.

B. The Development of Borough and Precinct Level Numerical Performance Indicators

1. What was intended: As described in the memo, "quantification of performance indicators into objectives must involve an analytical process of factors impacting on the performance indicator in question, as well as the programs, resources and activities that may be utilized in order to achieve the objectives. The objective setting process must begin at the precinct level". The memo concluded with the expectation that "the Supplement Objectives when coupled with other bureau-wide objectives contained in the existing Management Plans will result in a more comprehensive, integrated, coordinated approach towards common priority goals".

2. What actually took place: A careful reading of the above quote would suggest that each precinct should identify those factors which would be important in facilitating or impeding attainment of the performance indicator objectives. In actuality, what occured at the precinct was that meetings were set up with personnel involved in several of the performance indicator areas and an outline was developed listing pros (those precinct operations or conditions that favorably affected the achievement of the performance indicator) and cons (those precinct operations or conditions that adversely affected the achievement of the performance indicator). In all of the areas discussed, it was found that a significant number of the factors affecting performance in those areas were actually out of the control of precinct personnel (but not necessarily out of the control of the Department). An example was the Warrants Unit not getting adequate (or frequently even correct) physical identifications or addresses on the warrant forms, or infrequently receiving photos of the individuals to be "picked-up". Such "out of our control" factors, even when the precinct personnel directly involved with the accomplishment of that performance indicator argued that these were exactly the problem areas affecting any improvement of performance, were dismissed with the response, "we understand what you are saying, but 'they' will say we are just giving them execuses... so we'll have to do the best we can." Thus, the effect was, once again, as we learned in discussions with the various units after the meetings, that the real message never gets sent up through the system, because everyone is too busy trying to read and interpret what the rest of the system wants to hear and not necessarily what they should be hearing. We were told by one ranking officer "in this job, they slay the bearer of bad tidings".

(a) What was actually done at the precinct to arrive at a specific number objective, was to take the current number of robberies, civilian complaints, warrants executed, etc., and develop projected percentage increases or decreases which were felt to be achievable and acceptable to "upstairs". Next, to present the requested numerical standard based on that percentage increase. What the precinct personnel felt would have been more meaningful as a measure of evaluation for them would have been objectives based on some ratio of, for example, civilian complaints to number of arrests made in the precinct, or number of radio runs..."but, we never had any input into the format for objective setting anyway".

(b) In the Bronx, the projected co-terminality plan was to be affected within the next two months. As a result, the precinct personnel were, of course, aware that the sector changes involved would, to a greater or lesser degree, affect all of their statistics and consequently affect objectives for each of the performance indicators.

The Bronx precinct made an effort to get information on new sectors from the two adjoining precincts and to calculate, as best they could, statistics based on which area would be gained and which lost. When several other precincts complained to the Borough of the difficulty of adjusting statistics to take the co-terminality changes into account, given the short period of time to get their results in, Borough personnel indicated that precincts could turn in projections based on current boundaries. This was a message immediately interpreted at the precinct as "whose-ever baby this thing was at headquarters isn't going to be around long anyway to see it through."

C. Objective Setting at the Borough

1. What was intended: According to the memo, the Area Commander should be certain in setting objectives that "those objectives should be difficult to achieve but achievable, and that they should be based upon a thorough review of precinct conditions, available resources and alternative programmatic approaches." Also, that in the Objective Setting Conference with the precinct commanders, that the objectives should be "realistic, tough but attainable', and finally suggested that this "conference should be communicative, not threatening".

2. What actually took place: At the meeting of the Borough Commander and several precinct commanders the C.O.'s were told to keep numbers at a level which would definitely be attainable. According to these instructions, if the precinct commander felt that he could, for example, reduce robbery complaints by 20%, then he should only project a reduction of 12%. However, in the area of civilian complaints and radio car accidents, all precinct commanders were told to lower their projections regardless of their explanations or justifications (i.e., increased manpower at risk with the additional sectors, higher crime activity areas to be included with the new sectors, etc), because even if they knew they were going to be high, to report significantly higher levels of civilian complaints would look like, "we" aren't concerned with community relations" or, in the case of RMP accidents, "we don't care about the well-being of the men". And, wearily, "I know they don't want to hear that". In later discussions the feeling was that the Borough Commander was "looking over his shoulder" to superiors at headquarters at the expense of the reality of local precinct conditions.

(a) There was considerable commentary as each precinct commander presented his objectives which was, in effect, the exercise of peer pressure on those commanders who were projecting very favorable objectives. Comments, such as "Hey, don't make the rest of us look like we aren't doing anything", or "where are you stealing the men to do that", although said in a joking tone, these quips suggested in their consistency and frequency an obvious message to those present.

(b) When the precinct commander responsible for the Yankee Stadium area mentioned special circumstances such as the large number of civilian complaints over which his command had no control, he was told to reduce his estimates. When he protested further, he was told in a manner that terminated further discussion "don't worry, we'll handle any problems at the Borough level".

(c) In a number of cases where precinct commanders had questions and in some cases where the Borough Commander himself seemed uncertain, someone was sent out to call the Field Services Bureau for clarification. In several of these cases the person called reported that they would have to find the answer themselves and get back to the Borough with a reply.

The Management-By-Objectives event was a management planning approach

imported from governmental and business sector applications and so, one might argue that there was a lack of fit which led to the problems of implementation. Emergency services during a black-out however, while not an everyday event, certainly represents a class of events which are legitimate and expectable in police work. Yet what we find is that the same disruptive differentiation between street cop culture and management cop culture is operative here. Our observations and interviewing led us to conclude that there was a plan to cover this type of emergency which was quickly put into operation. Then, however, when changing situations on the local scene required adjustments to the overall plan, no one at the local level was empowered or willing to propose adjustments in the absence of direct covering orders from a higher authority. This is not meant to suggest any unwillingness or inability of the supervisory personnel at the precinct level to respond competently and quickly to changing emergencies, but rather that there is the ever present concern with "getting burned for acting independently" in any system where authority and responsibility are not equated. One long time ranking officer who had commanded several precincts as well as holding headquarters positions said "if everything turns out alright and nobody gets hurt and if the newspapers don't make you out to be some kind of a Clint Eastwood character who overreacted, then you get public praise from the mayor and the P.C. who point you out as one of the best of the 'finest'. But if something does go wrong, especially if the media picks it up, then they don't want to know you or what you might have accomplished in the past, they'll burn you for not having followed procedures".

What also seemed obvious during the black-out was that the structural organization of the precinct is such that the emergency introduction of new personnel created, at least initially, more chaos than constructive input. To some extent this is explainable, by equipment problems but it also represents a measure of the social cohesiveness of the precinct street cop culture and its suspicion of management cop culture. One of the reasons why it was difficult to establish mixed work teams of precinct and non-precinct personnel was the suspicion voiced by many officers that they didn't know personnel from other commands and therefore had no reason to trust them. They might be field associates, or they might be bosses from another precinct, or even headquarters. But fundamentally the problem was that they were not known and so although they were cops, they didn't know what to expect from them nor could you depend on them the way you could in the old days.

Finally, the black-out brought into critical focus the problems of police work in an environment in which social norms and social controls are varied for essentially political reasons. The street cop is placed in a double bind. On the one hand, no matter how justified the political motivation, the officer who sees his job as enforcing the law is placed under the stress which results when an organization presents its members with contradictory goals or purposes. On the other hand, the street cop who has to remain in that community after the emergency often feels he is held powerless but nevertheless accountable in immediate situations where he must be the decision maker.

There is the quality of a game in the present relationship between street cop culture and management cop culture. Thus, the headquarters-managers can mandate MBO or any planning model but they can't make street cop-workers treat the new program seriously or honestly. The street cops, on the other hand, can and do fight back with the traditional weapons of alienated employees--foot draggin, sabatoge and stealing company time. If the managers do not have the power to require serious acceptance of the planning model, neither do the workers have the power to outwit what the managers want altogether. What occurs is described by cops as everything from a charade to a race between a three legged horse and a crippled kangaroo, but in any event, all a game. When their perception that not even headquarters took MBO seriously and that

"everybody knew" that it was an "exercise", what happens is predictable. The response is a further attempt to maneauver for position in the contest. Dumping tickers, passing around collars to whoever needs "to get on the sheet", breaking the picture tube on a stolen TV set are means of circumventing the formal rules of the game. Attitudes such as "you want numbers, we'll give you numbers; you want to treat us like kids, try to catch us or, why should we make you look good," clearly denote that while most of them know they cannot possibly win the game, they want to seek some small victory on the way down.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this final chapter, we want to first bring together the diverse strands of our analyses of the events and the social action we observed in the various networks into a conclusive statement on what we found to be the socio-cultural organization of the police precinct. In doing so, our plan is first to describe the cultural context within which the precinct organizes its social relations and then to describe that social organization as a systematic set of relationships which are not as informal as the term "informal organization" would lead one to believe. Specifically, we want to describe a set of emergent structures which organize social behavior and, most importantly we believe, to describe the code of rules to which the officer is socialized and which are then internalized and guide his decision making and place limits on his "discretion". From here we proceed to describe what we think are the important implications of these findings for the criminal justice system in general and police administration in particular. Finally, we present a number of recommendations which emerge from the study. One set of recommendations describe how an understanding and appreciation of the social organization of the precinct can lead to making better use of that social organization for policework and suggest some important steps which can be taken to improve efficiency, effectiveness and morale in the precinct. We also present a major recommendation for re-connecting headquarters and precinct level operations and a model of how this might be done.

A. The Two Cultures of Policing

Early in the 20th century, the German sociologist, Max Weber, analyzed the characteristics of bureaucracy with such precision that his formulations have influenced all thought and empirical investigation of the topic ever since. Weber approached bureaucracy as one form of institutionalizing authority relations, which he contrasted to traditional authority represented by feudal society, and charismatic authority, represented by any great leader who commands a following by the strength of his personality rather than by a set of rules or a set of traditions. Weber saw that the bureaucratic form of organization was becoming increasingly dominant in industrialized and industrializing societies. Traditional authority works for the lifetime of the charismatic leader, but it can rarely be passed on.

The counterpart of Weber's theory of bureaucracy can be found in the work of the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, who emphasized an organic model for explaining and analyzing social organization. Durkheim and his followers saw society as being analogous to a biological cell which has differentiated parts, complexly inter-related. This model is much more similar to that of the family than to that of the factory. The emphasis is on the complex inter-relationships rather than on division and specialization.

Weber's and Durkheim's models are not really opposing or competing bodies of theory. Weber recognizes the existence of traditional authority, and Durkheim's model recognizes the differentiation of functions, although it emphasizes the inter-relationships. Both schools address themselves to the distinction between bureaucratic and organic forms of organization. In our study of police precincts, we recognized the importance of each model to the understanding of behavior; and through an examination of discrete episodes of behavior, we attempted to disentangle the aspects of behavior that were attributable to bureaucratic influences and those attributable to organic relations.

Weber and Durkheim were writing about forms of organization of whole societies and of society in general. One development of modern sociology has been the study of

"organizations," that is real, discrete, bounded entities such as businesses, governments, or governmental subdivisions, schools, hospitals, and so on. Organizational theory has had particular concerns with the distinction between bureaucratic and organic forms of organization.

One way in which the difference between bureaucratic and organic can be seen to be expressed in organizational theory is in the disputes between the scientific management and human relations school. It should be noted that the writers of these two schools were not strictly social analysts, but were trying to provide prescriptions for better practice. Therefore, the difference between the language of scientific management and the language of human relations is a difference in policy as much as it is a difference in conception.

There also exists a more analytically posed opposition in organizational theory between bureaucratic and organic forms of organization. This is usually expressed as the difference between formal and informal organization. "Formal organization" refers to the formal organization chart specifying the relations of people in the organization, which are not written down or described by the formal organization chart. A number of management theorists recommend beginning from the organization chart and proceeding deductively in the analysis of organizational behavior to determine patterns of informal structures in an organization. (Blau, 1974) We have proceeded in a different fashion by looking at those "informal structures" first. In doing so, we found that the formal bureaucratic structure which emenated from headquarters coexisted with rather than contained the local precinct street culture. From what we were told, this separation of structure was not always characteristic of the NYPD. Most of the cops we talked to were convinced that "before the Knapp Commission" the Department was cohesive organizational home for a commonly shared ethos which we came to call street cop culture. This ethos unified the Department at all levels through a "code" of shared understandings and conventions of behavior which were mutually binding on all officers from the top brass down to the newest recruits in the process of being socialized into that system. As a result, the Department was well integrated with and accomodated to a political organization which valued them and the ethos. Because of their solidarity and their integration into the political system, the Department was, by and large, left to run its own affiars. The results were predictable from what we know about organizational climate in general and political structures in particular. The mutuality and interdependence cloaked by the secrecy which develops in such closed-system organizations, produced both organizationally positive and socially negative results. The mutual dependence provided a morale and esprit de corps; this same mutuality and the secrecy it produced led to the institutionalization of widespread organized graft and corruption in the Department. While even the police emphasize the role of the Knapp Commission Report on Corruption in bringing an end to the organic pattern of relationships which this shared ethos provided for the Department, there were other equally important pressures from both inside and outside the Department. Externally, a changing political system characterized by increasing attention to the rights of disenfranchized minorities and a spreading financial and social accountability, led to increasing scrutiny of a number of factors that would eventually have produced the same results. Thus, as social mobility resulting from higher salaries allowed officers to purchase homes outside the city proper, social bonds were increasingly restricted to work time and were diminished in extra-work settings. The educational level of officers in the Department rose along with that of the general population but also as the result of special governmental programs designed to improve police performance through education. An unanticipated result here was making available alternate job possibilities outside of the Department which could lead to alternate careers. In the good old days of the single culture ethos, the Department was sexually and ethnically homogenious since while there were a few women and some minority policeofficers, their number

and their token acceptance, for the most part, kept them outside the social bonds which organized the Department. Pressures for minority recruitment and redress of past discrimination led to new criteria for promotional advancement which further erroded the sense of solidarity supported by the similarity of socio-economic, cultural, religious and ethnic backgrounds.

This street cop culture still exists and we found that it is this culture which gives salience and meaning to the social organization of the precinct. There is, however, a competing ethos which has developed in the Department concentrated at the headquarters level which finds its salience and meaning not in policework but rather in scientific management and public administration. This management cop culture seeks to maximize those bureaucratic benefits which come from efficient organization, rational decision making, cost-effective procedures and objective accountability at all levels of policing. As is true in all classical bureaucracies, the model proposed by this ethos would do away with the organic and therefore non-rational bonds among people as the basis for organization and decision making. There should be a "consistent system of abstract rules" and Departmental operations should consist of the application of these rules to particular cases. The Departmental structure should be hierachically organized so that each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one with authority and consequent power distributed in the same fashion. Employment and advancement should be based on merit and not on personal characteristics or relationships. It is the individual's office or role in the organizational chart rather than personal relationships and informal networks which define what the job expects of the individual and what the individual can contribute to the organization. Since it's origins were in the business and industrial sector, it is not surprising that what has resulted is the gradual emergence of a Departmental structure which now, for better or worse, has a classical managers-and-workers structure. What is, we argue even more important is that each of these functionally defined groupings has its own distinctive culture and, while there are mediating points between the two, they are increasingly coming into competition.

At an abstract level, both cultures share the mission goal of the organization which is to combat crime and insure a safe and secure city. Where they differ is on the definitions of these abstract concepts and in the more concrete questions of the means by which such goals can be achieved. The street cop culture sees local response as being more important than preplanned and "packaged" solutions to problems which may or may not ever come up in the day-to-day work of policing. The street cop's standard for performance is the concept of "the professional " cop. In this context professionalism refers to on-the-job experience, and a street sense which permits him to recognize people and situations which are "dirty" and require police intervention. While planning is not eschewed, it is this reactive "gut-level" ability to recognize, identify, and respond in the field, rather than the internalization of some standardized set of procedures which characterizes "good police work." Decision making thus takes place on a personal and immediate basis. Relationships among officers are structured in such a way that they are mutually supportive and their common interests bind them into a cohesive brotherhood which personalize task performance as well as social relationships. Command relationships, therefore, are formed in the same way and the individual's loyalty to his working peers and immediate supervisors are part of the same social bond which incorporates him and his organizational unit into larger organizational structures. Since our study concentrated at the precinct level we did not systematically trace the social networks upon which the study is based beyond that level. From what we did hear and see within the precincts, however, it seems that the street cop's identification and sense of social integration do not go beyond that level, except where such outside forces intervene in his or his precinct's functioning.

Management cop culture is concerned with the problem of crime on a system-wide or

city-wide rather than localized level. It is not that management cops are unconcerned with crime at the local level, but rather their sense of territoriality encompasses all of the city and so they are placed in the position of having to allocate resources throughout the system based upon some set of priorities. These priorities must be weighed and established within a set of political, social and economic constraints and must be justifiable within each of these contexts as well as within the policing context. Thus, enforcement of marijuana laws or, as we saw during the black-out the protection of property, must be considered by them within these various contexts as part of the decision making process. Law enforcement is not the immediate day-to-day interaction with a local community that the street cop sees. Rather it is a carefully planned, well-designed and efficiently implemented program in which the individual officer and the unit which is his reference group are impersonal variables to be considered.

Herbert Simon whose organizational theory has been influential in the development of management concepts, maintains that decisions are made on either valuative or factual premises. Given values and information, he claims, individuals will more likely reach decisions based on values. Whether he is in the street cop or the management cop culture, the individuals identification with groups or task units focuses decision making on particular goals and behaviors. His group identification requires that he select only such alternatives nominally open to him that will also fit with the behaviors he expects from other members of his group. In addition, however, there are organization-wide values which are meant to influence decisions. The congruency of group (by which we mean precinct level) and organizational (by which we mean Departmental) influences is especially pertinent in looking at precinct level vs. headquarters level influences on behavior. While either may influence the individual through his set of values or through his information, our observations convinced us that at this point in time it is the precinct level or street cop culture values which determine the day-to-day activity of policing. Since these values underwrite and inform the social organization of the precinct, they act as a determinent for behavior and even for the unconscious dispositions and attitudes of its members.

We have characterized this relationship between the two cultures as gaming, not because we think it is trivial, since we feel that the future character of the Department depends on who, if anyone, wins, but because so much of the response at the precinct level is to see in what way they can maneuver around, outwit, or nullify the moves of the others.

B. A Social Organization Model of the Precinct

While street cop culture provides the values and so the ends towards which officers individually and in task groups strive, the generalized meaning of that culture must operate through some specific structures. In formal organizational analysis an organization chart describes graphically the hierachical arrangement of roles and relationships as well as the prescribed channels of communication for information flow throughout the organization. There are no standardized graphics for presenting the "informal" social organization with the same degree of symbolic, if not actual, clarity. Kinship charts which look very much like organizational charts are the closest approximation but not only are they restricted in use to kinship relationships, they also tend to describe formal patterns of relationship and cannot describe the more social relationships among kin. One reason for the absence of any accepted schematic for organic social organization is the recency of interest in this area but just as important is the fact that there has been little attempt to describe those structures through which social relationships are organized. In a number of earlier studies, we have developed a tentative model for describing social organization

(those patterns of behavior through which individuals relate in an organizational context) which we have further refined in looking at the police precinct organization. In this model, the major functions which structure social relations in the precinct are organized into four major structural domains. Each of these structures organizes a distinctive area of enculturation (learning the culture) and socialization (learning rules of conduct) for both the formal and informal rules which guide individual and collective behavior.

1. The Socialization Structure. This domain organizes the system through which an officer learns from others in the precinct what the job is all about in that command. He learns, for example, what the various supervisors are like and how to work with them. He learns what is acceptable and what not acceptable behavior. In addition to learning the values of the culture, he is at the same time being socialized to preferred modes of behavior in the process which is generally called "learning the system". He also learns how to evaluate his fellow officers within the definitions established by those values.

2. The Authority-Power Structure. This domain organizes the authority and power of various administrative levels from headquarters and interviewing levels through the chain of command into and throughout the precinct. An important element here is the difference between the power or authority derived from the legitimate position of rank and therefore the authority structure of the system, and the power which an individual may hold regardless of rank as a result of "being in the right place in the right time" or "being well connected". Operationally, this means that there are several, frequently competing, authority-power systems or networks which can be called into operation in decision making.

3. The Peer Group Structure. This domain concerns the enculturation of culturally sanctioned and socially acceptable maxims or rules for peer mediated behavior in street cop culture in general and in the specific variance of that culture found in different task groups or units within the precinct. Thus, while the values and behaviors particular to street cop culture are shared to some extent by all police officers (including many management cops), they differ among and between ranks, organizational levels, ethnic, sex and religious lines, and job experience.

4. Cross-Group Structures. This domain includes the enculturation of behavior codes for interaction between the precinct and other departmental levels which includes definitions of mediator roles and communication styles. Socialization within this area defines how supervisors relate to the men and how the men in turn relate to several levels of supervisory personnel; it considers the relative rights and responsibilities of each and includes some of the concern such as the men's respect for the authority of the supervisor, how it is to be expressed and how the supervisors relate to their men. The entire system of evaluations is affected by these interactions. Of considerable importance, but often ignored, is the process of mediation between the two networks. Mediator roles can be quite formal as in the case of the PBA representative, personnel officers or official departmental grievence channels. Many unformalized roles, however, emerge in the pattern of relationships established in the precinct. The "rabbi" or "hook", for example, can relate a high ranking officer at headquarters with a street cop who might have been partners at one time.

While these structures organize or contain varieties of social action, they are most visible in the major processes by which the four structures are operationalized in the social organization of the day-to-day life of the precinct and which adjust the structures to changing demographic, political, social and economic conditions. These processes appeared with such regularity and persistence in our research, that we believe them to be basic for organizing social interaction within and across each of the four major structures in the precinct.

a) Sorting. The first of these is the process of sorting in which individuals classify themselves and each other according to a set of culturally defined labels. While the specific labels may differ somewhat from precinct to precinct, the process of sorting is fundamental throughout precincts in defining the patterns of social relationships and work relationships. Police officers sort each other and they are sorted by supervisors and other administrators. The fact that there seems to be a discrepency between the sorting carried out in street cop culture and that which is part of management cop culture can be at the heart of some of the tensions and conflicts between these two cultures. The street cop who "cheats a little" on his time may be viewed as "getting back at the system" by his precinct peers, but he is a malingerer to management. Similarly, the precinct C.O. who informally deals with such behavior may be considered a "good boss" by his men but a poor supervisor by his superiors. Changes in the sorting process over time usually indicate positive or negative interpretations of the authority-power, the peer group or the cross-group structures, by modifying the pattern of social contact within a particular precinct. What sorting does in organizational terms, is to establish for each officer categories of generalized "others" based upon what you can expect from them and how they will interact with you in given situations. Thus, you can "depend on an officer in your squad under most circumstances but usually more than you can an officer from another precinct and in both cases more than you could a civilian.

b) Territoriality. This process includes the formal and informal relationship between environment and behavior within the precinct and between the precinct and other environments. There are obvious relationships between space and behavior within the precinct such as the difference in behavior observable in the locker room or in the vicinity of the front desk. Similarly, as we saw in the contrast between the Bronx and Manhattan precincts, the characteristics of a precinct community may distinguish a range of individual and collective behaviors. What is more important, however, is what we know from contingency theory about the relationship between organizational behavior and environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) Organizations are affected by their environment in many ways but possibly most importantly in the characteristic way in which effective decision making depends on the level in the organization at which decisions are made, and how the most effective level is dependent on the fit between the environment and the decision to be made. This suggests that in diverse and rapidly changing environments, a condition which characterizes "discretionary" occupational cultures such as policing, it is necessary for many decisions to be made at relatively low administrative or command levels because of the need for immediate response. Different kinds of decisions are appropriate to different levels. Policy decisions involving police organization and control, for example, need to be made fairly high up. In day-to-day policework, however, responsiveness to the immediate territorial and behavioral environment and situation is more crucial, demanding more flexible parameters, and so decisions are more appropriately made at lower levels. In such cases, the relative importance of each decision--that is its potential "organizational cost"--is assumed to be much less.

Within the Department and even within the precinct, territoriality conceived of in the psycho-social sense that we are using it here, may also be seen to affect the attitudes and actions of different sub-units within the organization. Thus, sub-unit specialization may be required to deal with the varying deamnds and requirements of the organization's environment. This same specialization, however, means that each unit and level will have a different approach to issues that arise. It is important to keep in mind that this is not only a matter of sub-group loyalties, although these are important as we pointed out earlier. It is also a matter of the kind of environment which the different sub-units are in the habit of responding to and the information which they have about the dependence of their portion of the organization on the whole.

Applying these coneepts of organization and environment to the distinctions we have pointed out between street cop culture and management cop culture adds some further details to the factors which underwrite the problem of Departmental organization. There are a number of pragmatic and historical reasons for the many conflicts between the two cultures. Under the old system, idealized in street cop culture, precinct policing was a localized and relatively autonomous process with considerable command discretion by the C.O. rather like the local school with a principal in charge. The precinct dealt with local people and as long as there were no major distrubances which attracted attention to it, they were left pretty much to themselves. Certainly they had obligations to headquarters and presumably through headquarters to the political system, but generally, they were well integrated into their territory. Since there was much less mobility from precinct to precinct, this sense of ownership of "turf" increased over time. Under the new system, the management cop culture centralized much of the decision making power of the Department and consequently, at least in the view of the street cop, took away much of the discretionary decision making power at the interface between the precinct and its community. In addition, they increased the number of activities for which both the individual officer and the precinct were "responsible" through the establishement of standardized reporting and accountability systems. Under the assumption that "familiarity breeds corruption", assignment of commanding officers to precincts were frequently changed and men were also transfered with greater frequency. The new management cop culture thus represents a loss of local autonomy because it imposes tighter external supervision over more areas of activity.

c) Rule Making and Rule Breaking. This process serves as another means of organizing behavior within and between the four major structures. In the precinct there is a continual proliferation of rules and precedures. There is also, however, differential enforcement of rules. The differences may lie across categories, such as supervisors or men, between different individual enforcers or offenders, over time, and in different places. All of the component factors which cause rules to be made in particular situations and to be variously enforced depending on personnel or circumstances, provide indicators of the social organization of the precinct.

Collectively, these processes which mould and channel behavior within the four structures we have identified are expressed in the form of behavioral expectations and conventions which set the limits for approved behavior in the precinct. We have come to call this loose collection of understandings the "cops code". By this code we mean a charter for action, a set of shared understandings which, while not written or codified, are understood by all members of the precinct and limit the degrees of variability of behavior permissible for individuals. Such limitations are the price one pays for group membership. It is the charter which provides the "formal" component in what is usually considered the "informal" system of social organization in the precinct. A senior officer, for example, will allow certain degrees of freedom for a more junior partner's behavior on patrol before invoking the charter to describe (and sanction) the expected behavior in either the socialization structure or in the authority-power structure or, in some cases, in both. Similarly, a boss will allow variability in a police officers behavior until the variation exceeds the limits established by the code's definition of officer behavior or before he invokes the code's sanctions. Invocation, by the way, is used just as frequently (and possibly more frequently) by a lower person or group to a higher person or group as a means of redressing some perceived wrong which exceeds the limits established by the code. Also, our research experience confirms the cop's belief that supervisors are usually reluctant to make decisions or absolute rules which might set a fixed pattern of enforcement. This reluctance to impose specific rules means that much of the daily life of the precinct proceeds from the shared understandings of the code rather than from specific rules. The process of invocation of the code comes to represent the major social control mechanism within the precinct.

This "cop's code", while it is always described as "informal" is as we have pointed out above is also "formal" in that while it is not written, it is understood by everyone. Similarly, the behavioral guides which are part of it are often as closely linked to the formal structure of the Department as they are to the informal social system of the precinct. Actually, what the cop's code does is to link the formal and informal structures by allowing degrees of freedom within which the officer does have discretion. In this sense, the formal aspect of the code ties back in through the authority power structure to the management cop culture so that breaking one of the formal Departmental rules means that "they can get you". But the cops code also contains conventions and shared understandings of acceptable behavior. Violating one of these rules, which reach through the peer group structure and socialization structure into the street cop culture, will mean social criticism and sanctions because "you're not behaving like one of us".

The cop's code is the principal social control mechanism within the precinct social organization and it not only shapes their behavior but also distinguishes or sorts the "good" cop from the "bad" cop. In the sense that we use it here, controls within this social system begin with values but ultimately they become internalized as maxims which carry with them sets of sanctions or unfortunate results when they are not followed. We extracted a set of maxim or injunctions from our observations and interviewing in both precincts which form such a code. Once we had developed our version of the cop's code, we "said them back" to cops in both precincts and elsewhere in the Department to see if our list was recognizable to them. In the process of so doing, we discovered that there are really two sets of maxims which make up the cop's code. One regulates relationships in the peer group and relates street cops to each other. The other set of maxims, which we believe is becoming increasingly powerful and pertinent as a result of the tension between the two cultures relates street cops to bosses. Before describing these codes, it may be worth while to look quickly at codes of rules described by other investigators of police culture.

A number of researchers and writers have described specific aspects of the "informal" cops code of conduct. Westerly (1953), for example, indicates that the code forbids police from informing against fellow officers. This "code of secrecy" is also described by Stoddard (1968), Reiss (1968) and Savitz (1970). Skolnick (1966) suggests that danger, and the requirements that officers use authority against civilians contributes to a sense of solidarity which makes them isolated and dependent on each other. This interdependence provides the basis for a code which is characterized by suspiciousness, clannishness and secrecy. Rubinstein (1973) presents a number of maxims which he saw in operation in Philadelphia. These center around aspects of the cops job. Thus, in exercising authority the cop learns to assess the physical attributes of the person or persons he is attempting to police. Since he must be in control of the situation, he learns how to "bullshit" to avoid using force. A good cop always wins and must learn to control his fears by looking for signs of danger and learn quickness, resolution and decisiveness which urge him forward when others withdraw. He must show courage in the face of danger or potential danger and a distinction is made between a cop who is willing to use force and one who is eager to use force. An officer unwilling to use force is viewed as a danger to everyone who works with him. Manning (1977) points out that because of discretion, the code is made up of rules which are usually site-specifc. He sees a general cynicism about rules which come from above and sees the "cover your ass" perspective as particularly important.

C. The Cop's Code

We found that the cop's code which responds to street cop culture in defining relationships with other cops contains the following maxims:

a. Watch out for your partner first and then the rest of the guys working that tour. This rule is fundamental and expresses both the strong sense of dependency and mutuality and the sorting that takes place even among peers. "Watching out" means looking out for the interests of as well as the physical safety of the other guy.

b. Don't give up another cop. This is an injunction to secrecy which is based on social bonding and might better include "and then he won't give you up". Here again we see the importance of sorting since there are situations in which, as in the case of Officer Kelly and the officer who committes suicide, being a cop doesn't necessarily mean "being one of us".

c. Show balls. This enjoins the individual to be a man and not to back down, particularly in front of civilians. Once you're gotten yourself into a "situation" take control and see it through.

d. Be aggressive when you have to, but don't be too eager. This is related to the previous maxim but has a somewhat different connotation. Oldtimers will tell new men that when a "situation" develops get on it but don't be too eager and go looking for trouble. If you get a radio run on a "crime in progress" for example, it will probably end up being a "past" crime, by the time you get there.

e. Don't get involved in anything in another guy's sector. This outgrowth of territoriality now means that you shouldn't interfere in another man's work space because he is accountable and must live with the consequences. In the old days, we are told, this meant don't muscle in on someone else's action.

f. Hold up your end of the work. Here the cop is told that if he slacks off unreasonably or too frequently, somebody else has to take up that slack.

g. If you get caught off base, don't implicate anybody else. This is an extension of both the "don't give up another cop" and "show balls" maxims. Getting caught off base, which can range from being out of your sector to more serious or even illegal activities, is likely to bring down trouble or attention on the entire group so that anyone who is caught should take his punishment and not implicate others.

h. Make sure the other guys know if another cop is dangerous or "crazy". This means that while you would not give such a person up to the bosses, you should let other cops who might be working with and so depending on him know what to expect.

i. Don't trust a new guy until you have checked him out. Because the social bonds are so strong and because of the increasing suspicion about field associates, it is necessary to use the grapevine to find out who and what a newcomer is.

j. Don't tell anybody else more than they have to know, it could be bad for you and it could be bad for them. Generally this means not to volunteer information because you may involve someone else when they don't want to be.

k. Don't talk too much or too little. Both are suspicious. What this means is that following the norm is important. Someone who talks too much is known as a "big mouth" and may be covering up and someone who talks too little may be afraid to say too much about himself.

l. Don't leave work for the next tour. This covers a number of possibilities, leaving the car without gas or not making out a complaint report or anything else that means the next tour has to clean up after you.

There are other less pervasive maxims such as "always take the same vacation days as your partner" since if you don't, he might get stuck working with someone who is probably only available because no one else wants to work with him. There are also job or situation specific maxims as well, but those listed above were found in both precincts and were recognized by everyone with whom we spoke.

There is also a Cop's Code which contains the maxims concerning relationships with management cop culture through the authority-power structure.

a. Protect your ass. An implicit assumption here is "if the system wants to get you it will", and so the prudent officer makes certain that he is covered. This injunction is indicative of the individualism and isolation felt by street cops but the attitude and its behavioral consequences are just as pervasive among headquarters cops. Traditionally we were told, when one culture unified the Department, the system protected the individual; now its every man for himself.

b. Don't make waves. Here again the maxim advises that the officer not be a "troublemaker" in the bosses' eyes but it also says "don't mess with the system". Being a troublemaker means that supervisors pay more attention to you and consequently you bring unnecessary attention to what your peers might be doing as well. Asking too many questions about procedures or making too many suggestions about how the system might be improved also brings too much attention from the bosses.

c. Don't give them too much activity. If you are "too eager" and increase your productivity in a given month, says this maxim, you bring unnecessary pressure and attention not only to yourself but to your peers as well. Next month "they" will expect you to do even better than you did this month and they will also question why your peers aren't giving them as much as you are able to produce. In the old days, increased productivity could mean favorable attention which might lead to a detectives shield or at least a few days off from your C.O. Now, because of the financial crisis, there is no possibility of advancement anyway.

d. Keep out of the way of any boss from outside your precinct. In the day-to-day life and work of the precinct, the officer comes to an accomodation with the precinct bosses in terms of what they expect and what they will tolerate and so he knows the limits placed on his behavior. Any boss from outside the precinct is an unknown authority figure who might turn you into a command level outside the precinct. This removes control from the organic relationships within the precinct to the unknown and impersonal control of the Departmental authority structure.

e. Don't seek favors just for yourself. Here again, the solidarity of street cop culture tells the officer to look out for his peers in relating to the bosses. This is most frequently expressed in terms of not "sucking up to the old man" (the C.O.) or to the administrative lieutenent whose roles in the precinct are more directly related to the individual officer rather than supervisory to him as a member of a work group. The desk lieutenent and patrol sergeants on your tour, however, are directly related to on-going work conditions and keeping them happy hopefully will keep them "off everybody's back" during that tour.

f. Don't take on the patrol sergeant by yourself. Since the patrol sergeant is in direct supervisory control of the officer and his peers in the task group, the immediacy of the relationship means that his working relationship with the men sets the tone for that tour. Applying pressures against a patrol sergeant in retaliation for a real or perceived wrong, will only work if all your peers cooperate.

g. Know your bosses. One of the first questions an officer asks when he "turns out" is "who's working and who has the desk?" He is asking here what bosses are around on that tour and specifically who has the desk. Knowing the bosses means that you can adjust your expectations for the tour to what you know about their expectations.

h. Don't do the bosses work for them. In operational terms this means that if an officer knows that a peer is shirking his duty or involved in misconduct, it is not his responsibility to tell a boss about it. While the sense of mutual protection is one source for this attitude, it is sometimes expressed as "the boss gets paid for doing that".

i. Don't trust bosses to look out for your interests. This maxim represents the street cops view of life at the top. The management cop, it is supposed, finds it just as necessary or expedient to "protect his ass" from his superiors as the cop does. If he has to choose between you and his career "he's going to make the same decision you would". A number of officers attributed this to the fact that once they officer "climbs up the ladder he holds on for dear life", particularly at ranks above captain which are appointive. It is interesting also that these same cops felt that while in the private sector a manger has the option to leave and find another job if there is some disagreement with his superior, this option is not as easily available in the Department, because "he is stuck in this job just as we are".

Figure 1 which follows is a schematic representation of this model of precinct social organization.

Figure I: The Social Organization of the Precinct



This figure displays the relationships among the various structures and processes which form the social organization of the precinct. The two cultures—Management Cop Culture and Street Cop Culture—interact in the precinct through the four structures. The Authority-Power Structure is activated only from the Management Cop Culture to the Street Cop Culture and is the channel through which policy directives and procedures flow downward. The Peer Group Structure and the Socialization Structure do not connect the two cultures as each socializes its membership to a different set of values or ethos. The Cross Group Structure is the avenue through which the two cultures communicate informally. The processes of sorting, territoriality and rule making and rule breaking operationalize the social action within each of the four structures and in doing so adjusts each to the local precinct environment and is expressed in the form of behavioral expectations or "rules" which set the limits of acceptable behavior which are expressed in The Cop's Code. Since the Peer Structure and the Socialization Structure do not interrelate the Street Cop Culture with the Management Cop Culture, the processes are culture-specific in these two structures and, as a result, the Cop's Code is sub-divided into one set of maxims which tell the officer how to behave towards and with peers and another which tells him how to behave towards and with management or bosses.

D. Issues for Reconnecting Precinct and Headquarter's Culture

The emergence of a precinct social organization model envalued by street cop culture and translated empirically into the cops code is of more than academic interest. It points to what happens in organizations in general and in police organizations in particular when management culture attempts to provoke chance rather than negotiate it. First of all, well intentioned but eager police managers have sought to intervene in police work through replacement, rather than adaptation. In the replacement method, we attempt to replace inefficient or outmoded techniques with new, more efficient ones. The great technological advances resulting from the scientific and engineering discoveries that have revolutionized agriculture, industry, and medicine provide outstanding examples of this technique. The second technique, adaptation, is more gradual and involves redefining or modifying existing practices. Certainly, there are technological advances that can replace outmoded approaches to policing. Generally, however, we should assume that the major changes needed to produce more effective police work require attitudinal and behavioral changes both in the precinct and at higher administration levels as well. This means changing the system rather than attempting to change individuals as the only effective means of institutionalizing changes. If relatively permanent (structural) changes are brought about, police officer perspectives on policing must also be changed (1) to introduce appropriate change in attitudes as well as behavior and (2) to maintain support for the changes once they are introduced. Often, we speak of the need to achieve a certain "climate" of sentiment and opinion in order to produce change. Such changes in attitudes are essential but they will not be sustained unless the new ideas or techniques are incorporated in the value systems of the Department, or become items on the agendas of both precinct and headquarter levels.

Sometimes the erroneous replacement approach can be seen in programs which attempt to directly impact the individual, to alter his attitudes and behaviors. Thus, programs such as "ethical awareness" fail because they do not build opportunities for change in the groups, structures and systems which influence and support the behavior of the individuals who are members. The individual may be motivated to change his behavior but he is unable to find the necessary reinforcement in his reference group.

A second major cause of failure is a simplistic notion of planning, a conception that concentrates on the "predict and prepare" model. The predict and prepare model starts with the assumption that the main role of planning is to guess or predict the nature (or as we saw in the events surrounding the MBO program, the number) of future events and to prepare to cope with them. At worst, this form of planning takes current and past trends, scotch-tapes them together and comes up with a possible future.

At best, this planning method can provide us with reasonable forecasts of future trends, based on clear understanding of the laws as well as the patterns and facts of past and current processes. But the method does not begin to deal with the real goal of planning: designing a desired future state. Predict and prepare is a trap for the planner: it allows him no space to design and create his own models.

Yet the value of planning does not necessarily lie in the plans it produces, but in the planning process. Process is the most important product of planning: for effective and efficient police work, this process must be a process that enlists precinct level involvement and support. Planning here cannot be done for the precinct; it must be done with the precinct.

Adaptive planning implies flexibility in program design. Only the flexible plan can deal adequately with unexpected environmental changes. Adaptive planning implies an adaptive organizational structure: a structure that is geared to rapid change. Most important is the ability of this structure to disconnect from other organizational structures and chart its own course. If administrative procedures and elaborate predictions are emphasized, the organization is quickly buried in red tape. Where change and stability are in conflict, the adaptive organization--and the adaptive planner--opts for change, using techniques of intervention as a strategy for change.

The third prevalent mistake is that of emphasizing either broad-scale involvement or tight coordination at each other's expense. There are excellent historical examples of this error. One was prohibition. The Prohibition movement recognized the difficulty of getting masses of people to abstain from alcohol and sought to simplify its task by drying up the sources of alcohol without attacking the social behavior alcohol supported. As a result of this disregard for the public, prohibition succeeded legally but failed socially. The impact of prohibition was far too narrow and rigid to be successful as social intervention. This rigidity was a result of "management" which was highly structured and well-coordinated, but which had no actual roots within the general public.

An example of the opposite error is seen today in the ecology movement. This group faces the complex social task of changing the consumption and living patterns of the nation. Unlike the prohibitionists, however, the ecology activists have formed a broad-based movement within society and have substantially ignored the need for management and coordination. This has resulted in an overwhelming lack of focus, discipline, and follow-through, with environmental groups frequently working against each other as they pursue conflicting goals. Thus despite, and because of, the millions of people involved in ecology activities, pollution continues largely unabated.

Where the prohibition movement was lacking in public participation, the ecology movement is lacking in structured planning and evaluation. The problem is to bridge the gap between a narrow, disciplined operation and a broad-scale but ineffective one. In the case of policing, two different processes are involved: developing joint planning structures capable of implementation, and actually implementing the program with the help of these structures. Both these steps are complex, and success in completing them would depend on a careful use of planning and evaluation designed both to involve and to coordinate a planning capability at the local level. The rigor of contemporary planning and evaluation techniques is attractive to any program manager, but such techniques are effective only when they can be combined with an operating local interface level orientation. All of the errors we have discussed illuminate the basic and crippling dichotomy of the two cultures of policing.

During the course of the study, we met with the head of the office of management analysis in the Department in an attempt to obtain Departmental approval for an observational study of how policies and decisions flow downward and how requests move through the system. In the course of the conversation while attempting to demonstrate the importance of such a study, we described to him, in much the same manner as we describe it earlier in this report, the empirical reality of the futile attempt by management to implement, for example, the management by objectives program. After first indicating that he had not been responsible for or involved in designing or implementing that program, he then went on to point out that the Department knew all along that the MBO program would not be accepted in the field. We asked why, if "the Department" knew that, they went ahead and tried it anyway. He went on to describe quite accurately

the negative attitudes held by street cops towards plans eminating from headquarters as well as pointing out that there would have been some incremental gains from the program.

There is an important reason why we include this story. As so often happens in studying organizations which have conflicting or competing interest groups within them, we came away with the distinct impression that what the two cultures of policing say about each other is by and large true. At first, this seemed quite discouraging since, if it did in fact represent the empirical reality then how could the results of our study do anymore than reinforce what each knows about the other. Unwilling to assume that it's only benefit would be the more academic one of problem finding, we saw his challange as essentially one which asked "what is this all going to do for us, since we already know most of what you are going to tell us?". For whatever reason, we never received permission for the communications study at the central headquarters level. Consequently, whatever recommendations we do make must be viewed as eminating specifically from the context of precinct level operations. As such, they are not informed by any intimate knowledge of the problems or functioning of the higher echelons of the command structure, except to the extent that we heard about management cop culture out in the precincts. With this caution, however, there are specific recommendations which we do make based upon our precinct level experience and what we know from research on organizational behavior. Research on bureaucratic organizations repeatedly reveals that the intentions of personnel often diverge from those which are formally stated for the organization. Subordinates develop notions of their responsibilities to conform with what they are willing to do. These conceptions may or may not come close to the objectives that those responsible for management had in mind. For the individual this can mean achieving a degree of freedom and autonomy but at the expense of both accountability and the proper function of the system. When the goals of a system are not owned by the people responsible for maintaining the functioning of the systems program, the system is in trouble. The result is that no one really knows what is supposed to be happening in the system, much less what is actually happening.

This principle, which can be stated as "individuals seek to maintain themselves as individuals", may be translated into two maxims. The first is that people are not really committed to decisions they feel they have no part in making. A second principal is that subordinates attempt to liberate themselves as much as possible from organizational controls. They strive to maintain and even assert their autonomy by hoarding information, supplying inaccurate data, and generally providing only half-hearted cooperation. We believe that what we learned about the social organization of the precinct, the street cop culture in which it finds its values, and the cop's code which operationalizes it, allows us to make some specific recommendations on how understanding and reinforcing the positive aspects of that level of organization can improve both policing and managerial responsibility.

Most of the officers--whether street cops or management cops--described a police department organizational setting in which the upper echelons of administration controlled the setting of objectives, with little or no consideration given either to the demands of the environment or to the recommendations from the field even when they asked for them. The direction of recent organizational research clearly indicates that the interface between the operational environment and its contingencies should lead to the key strategic question, "what business are we in"? (Laerence and Lorsch, 1967). This same literature stresses that organizational controls originating from superiors and conveyed downward to subordinates should be accompanied by a meaningful upward flow of influence and communication. When control is one-way there tends to

be token compliance to the "letter of the law," emphasis on the short over the long run, hiding of infractions of rules, and reduction in subordinate creativity. Accordingly, organizations should seek to open, on a permanent basis, the avenues of communication between levels of administration by which feelings are expressed, openness is encouraged, information is transferred and the system is changed. In general, communications will be improved and increased, while at the same time enhancing the personnels' sense of participation.

An important point related to the facilitation of information is how it is used. Information forms a basis for analysis which, in turn, provides a basis for evaluation and decision-making. It is important that information be used in this manner, and not for the control of personnel. Real emphasis must be placed on the objective of using evaluation as a means for improving methods and principles, not as a monitoring mechanism. Proper use of evaluation keeps necessary information flowing from persons who would otherwise feel threatened and obstruct analysis.

Essentially, based on our precinct-level experience and what we know from the organizational literature, there seems little question of the critical relevence and importance of a recommendation for decentralization as the major practice-oriented outcome of this study. Such recommendations, however, are increasingly commonplace in studies of organization in general and of major-urban-area police systems in particular. Such a recommendation, however, suffers from its generality and lack of specificity leading to a police practitioner response of naivete' on the part of the researchers. Pragmatically, it also means that the management culture either ignores or subverts such recommendations by delegating inconsequential areas or functions over which it doesn't really have effective control in the first place. We wish to avoid these possiblities by specifically recommending that program planning and evaluation be decentralized through the specific mechanism of setting up precinct level planning units coordinated with central planning. In explicating this recommendation, we will, of necessity, be able to say little about how such units might intersect with borough and headquarters level planning and evaluation operations because our research was restricted to the precinct level.

E. Recommendations

When we undertook this study of the social organization of the police precinct, we indicated that there were a number of policy and decision-making implications which we expected to emerge from the research. We also said that the ethnographic methodology which we have used was designed for problem-finding rather than problem-solving but that having identified some important problems, we might be able to make some recommendations which would inform policy and decision-making in the Department. As a result of the research, we feel confident in making recommendations at two levels. First, there is much that can be done to sustain and improve the morale, efficiency and effectiveness at the precinct level of policing. At the same time it is essential to develop a strategy for the re-connection of the precinct level street cop culture with the essentially headquarters centered management cop culture. Finally, we propose a specific model for planning, evaluation and management in police work which we believe will effect that re-connection.

1. A Precinct Social Organization System for Optimal Efficiency and Effectiveness.

Consistent with our model of the social system of the precinct and with the personnel performance requirements of policework, is the formulation of the optimal social system designed to maximize efficiency and effectiveness without adversely

affecting morale at the precinct level. Some planned change, for example, might provide the highest value in terms of efficiency and effectiveness but would be inconsistent with discipline and the policing function requirements. Conversely, optimizing policy and authority structure requirements could place undue stress on personnel systems unless adaptations to the social organization of the precinct are included to reduce stress and other dysfunctional social and psychological problems.

We are convinced that this study supplies ample evidence that while the precinct level of organization provides the police officer with his major work and social reference group, the growing alienation between the street cop culture which surrounds the precinct social organization and the management cop culture which is viewed as hostile and competitive, is eroding both the effectiveness and efficiency of the precinct. The results are group alienation and individual stress. We believe that this is indicative of more than just an isolated series of personnel problems, but represents an articulated and widespread malaise requiring immediate attention and treatment. We use the term "treatment" purposely because there is, within management science, a literature and a perspective which deal with such interorganizational conflicts and the dysfunctional behavior which results. What this line of research and writing describes is an increasing movement away from the managerial notion of an organization as a mechanism designed primarily for task performance while regarding human needs for satisfaction and defense against anxiety primarily as constraints on task performance. Under this earlier view, the organizations aim was to achieve optimum satisfaction of both task and socio-individual needs. The formal aspects of organization, such as what we have called the authority-power structure, were believed to be consciously designed for the coordination of task performance. The coordination of the social and psychological needs of personnel were "informally" attended to through a variety of personnel management techniques designed to insure optimal conditions for task performance. A more recent conception which is consistent with our formulation of social organization, attempts to incorporate the intra-psychic aspects of organizational behavior into both planning and management. This view would see police work as requiring task organization, sentient organization and some mechanism for regulating the relationships between the two as coordinant rather than separable. By "sentient" we mean a group structure with which the police officer can identify and with which he feels affectively involved. An effective sentient system relates the members of an organization to each other and to the organization in ways that are supportive rather than antagonistic to task performance. As we have shown in this research, the "formal organization" of the bureaucratic authority structure can be viewed as conscious and task oriented. Sentient systems on the other hand are described as "informal" because they are largely unconscious and seldom explicitly displayed. The most effective organization is one where the task and sentient systems are coincident. This, for instance, is likely to be the natural case for a family business (Ianni, 1972). More pertinently, this would seem to have been the case in the good old days of the single culture police department and, if we are right that the nostalgia for those days implicit in street cop culture represents what cops believe should be true today, underwrites the importance of bringing task performance and sentient systems into some common focus. Such organizations, however, usually require conditions of stability and equilibrium of environment to be effective. They are usually not successful at coping with fluxuating or rapidly changing environments which is obviously the case in large urban police departments today. Consequently, we should expect that task and sentient systems will not coincide perfectly and that the real problem is to find a means of reconnection, whereby the boundaries between them can be more satisfactorally and successfully mediated.

Individuals contribute overtly and consciously to organizational tasks by carrying out their rationally defined goals within the groups defined orgranization of task. Unconsciously, however, they project into and out of the group, their assumptions about themselves, about one another, about the organization and about the environment. In this way, the group may be said to behave "as if" it had made certain assumptions about itself, and so it invades the personal boundaries of the individuals who are part of it. Many police officers told us that they feel that they are viewed by "the bosses" as either "malingerers or fakers" who must be constantly watched and controlled to avoid misbehavior. This is internalized as a presumption that what the Department wants is to make sure that they are accountable in terms of physical presence for a full 8 hour tour without too much concern for their own social and individual (sentient) work-related needs. Finally, recent developments in ego psychology and object relations theory which focus on the mediation between the environment and the inner world of the individual, present an interesting analogy for consideration. For the individual, the ego is considered an executive faculty which mediates his inner life and his external reality. By extension, we might say that the analogous executive faculty in groups is leadership. Thus, how the precinct or sub-unit leadership as well as the management cop culture defines the external reality of policing is critical to how each member of the Department will come to define it. The paradox is that mutually dependent as they are, the individual and the group are nontheless distinct. Bringing them together productively and satisfactorily is the purpose of optimizing the social organization of the precinct.

Based on our study, we recommend that the precinct level of organization and specifically the precinct commanding officer should be given the responsibility and the commensurate authority to provide full opportunity and capability for meeting the following five essential requirements for optimizing morale, efficiency and effectiveness among precinct personnel.

1.A Precinct personnel system must be responsive to a hierarchy of individual and group needs which include social and psychological needs. This requirement indicates that a planned social system for a precinct must provide for a variety of needs for individuals and for groups as well which should be under the administrative control of the precinct leadership. While certain of these needs can only be met through personnel systems development over time, some are responsive to immediate treatment through organizational design or re-design. The two most important needs which are responsive to design and planning and which have important effects on personnel morale and effectiveness are, (1) the need for a task environment that provides incentives for performance based on rewards available for good or superior performance, and (2) the need for prestige and self-esteem derived from membership in a task group or environment. The immediate precinct level organization must have at its disposal a mechanism for immediately translating superior performance into rewards that have value to the officer. For the most part, officers view Departmental rewards as not connected to what they do on the job, but to an external, for the most part arbitrary system of promotional exams. The precinct commanding officer currently has the authority to reward a very productive officer by taking him out of uniform and placing him on some precinct detail. This has worked as an incentive, and morale booster. However, the role of the radio and/or foot patrolman is such a key one in policing that the organization should also be able to provide rewards and incentives for "good" men to stay in uniform on the streets. Here, consideration should be given to providing some form of hardship pay to individual officers according to their job in the precinct, or perhaps to entire precincts, according to the activity base of the community that they are policing.

While the job itself may be presumed to have a certain degree of personal value to an officer, including a measure of self-esteem and pride, improving working conditions and the work place is important in this regard. We frequently rode with officers who provided their own tires for the radio cars and even did some minor maintenance on their own. Many cars are in such poor condition that they also adversely affect response time. The Department had initiated a system of "curbside" repairs which was useful and well received. More effort should be put into this program, even at a time of Department-wide cut-backs. The precinct station houses themselves, at least the two in which we worked, require considerable upgrading also. While it is not financially feasible to replace them, refurbishing them would provide a better habitat and, we believe, better morale. Physical fitness is important, yet most of the gymnasium and physical fitness equipment is supplied by the men themselves as a contribution through the precinct social clubs. During our study, even this source was in jeopardy when it was determined that the profits from the sale of soda from a machine paid for by the club was inappropriate despite the fact that the soda was sold by cops, to cops. Departmental funds should underwrite physical fitness as a requirement for police work.

2. Any social system is structured to provide a social order which establishes a division of labor, a system of social stratification consistent with that division of labor, and the allocation of resources within that system which are perceived as functional rather than dysfunctional to the maintenance of social order within the group. A precinct viewed as a social system must provide for the division of labor consistent with discipline and policing requirements which is not dysfunctional for morale, effectiveness, and retention requirements. The situation created by the awarding of gold shields to Detective Specialists has to be dealt with in the manner that apparently most of the officers in the Department are in agreement with, albeit those in authority are hesitant to enact, since it means that some officers would lose money. Its impact at the precinct is devastating to morale. There is a major area of research on human organization which indicates that social stratification (or sorting) is most effective and acceptable to the membership of an organization where it is clearly related to obvious distinctions in dividing responsibility and authority within the division of labor. That is to say, that within social organization there is a high level of agreement with the boundaries established for social classes (including agreement on the distribution of rewards associated with membership in the various classes) if it can be demonstrated that these class distinctions are validated by the assignment of differential responsibility within the organization. It is also important in considering planned precinct social systems and particularly important in dealing with the question of rank classes. Given consistency in the assignment of responsibility, authority and rewards within the broad social classes within the precinct, the social system should be less subject to social and personal stress pressures.

3. Any social system is a collective of both individuals and groups. Individuals within these groups respond more to peer pressures and evaluations within these groups than they do with larger social entitites. It is at this point that the social system of the precinct as both a social community and a task group is most readily and positively amenable to constructive organization design. We know from our research that officers respond to immediate group pressures with greater certainty than they do to larger collectives. Thus, organizational design, combined with personnel systems design, provides an opportunity for establishing functional task-oriented organizational groups which need not be in conflict with either the administrative hierarchy or the satisfaction of needs requirements of that social system. These factors should be considered in personnel evaluation which should be

operative and meaningful at the precinct level. This would mean, for example, that the immediate supervisor should have much to say in evaluating members of his task group. Conversely, there should be more functional accountability for work performance by subordinates at the patrol sergeant level enabling him to reward superior performance as well as to document poor performance. This better integration of accountability might, we believe, lead to an increased willingness on the part of street cops to call discrepant and abberant behavior to the attention of their immediate supervisor.

4. A social system must provide individuals and groups within it with mechanisms for security against behavioral and social threats which result from system-wide and social change. It is important in considering the optimal administrative organization for precinct level personnel systems to consider that technological change, e.g. use of one-man radio cars, and social change, e.g. differential social conditions at the precinct as the result of recruitment of minority group members or female officers, will inevitably affect the quality of life and the task environment at the precinct. Consequently, consideration must be given to the impact of such potential change on precinct personnel. These changes are sometimes dramatic as in increasing civilianization or introduction of femalepolice officers into patrol functions, or they may simply reflect changing personnel systems characteristics. As a result of the sorts of considerations outlined above, effective management and organization design for a precinct should be based upon a planned social organization which is above all consistent with the enforcement and community service requirements of a particular precinct in a particular community. That is to say, fewer "across the board directives" should be imposed on precincts without an opportunity for some reaction on their part, before the change is put into effect.

5. The precinct social system must be capable of rendering its own sanctions as well as rewards to its membership and both must be rationally distributed through an equation which is understandable to all members. As we pointed out in the first requirement, it is essential that the individual officer perceive some connection between his performance and his rewards. Even in an organization where diminishing resources might justify diminishing career possibilities or rewards, the precinct commanding officer should be given the authority to reward superior performance, as he was once, by giving days off, for example. Similarly, sanctions for inadequate performance should be at the disposal of the precinct commanding officer, since he is also responsible for adequate performance. If personnel view sanctions as ultimately being connected to a higher authority and therefore out of the hands of their supervisor, the result will be less control on his part over his men. There may be some merit with resultant improvement in efficiency and morale at the local level, if the inspectional function of the Department has less to do with investigation and punishment and more with evaluation of the effectiveness of certain departmental policies and procedures at the precinct level.

2. A Precinct Level Planning Model.

Earlier in this chapter, we indicated that while decentralization was an obvious high priority for the Department, many studies make such a recommendation without specifying a mechanism for bringing it about. As we indicated, the result is often either no decentralization or the delegation of unessential and largely unwanted functions to lower levels of administration. The major recommendation growing out of this study is for a specific model for decentralizing the planning function as a first step in the re-connection of management cop culture and street cop culture.

Planning is at the heart of the management function and is essential to the efficient and effective operation of policework. As we have shown, there is virtually no planning at the precinct level where the "planning officer" actually is a conduit for statistical information requested by higher administrative levels. As a result, precincts appear to be reactive to whatever situations develop within their boundaries. In actuality, precinct territoriality provides both the precinct and the Department with an excellent opportunity for organizational intelligence based on the intimate knowledge which the street cop has with his territory. Conversely, much of the policy and decision making at higher levels of administration are perceived by precinct level personnel as arbitrary and unrelated to local needs and conditions. This in no way diminishes the importance of retaining major responsibility for policy planning and decision making at the central headquarters level, but rather is intended to supplement that capability.

Each precinct should have as an integral staff unit for administration and operations a Planning-Evaluation Unit which would be charged with planning and evaluating precinct level operations within the policy guidelines of the Department and in coordination with Borough and central headquarters planning operations. The unit, which would be staffed by officers trained in planning and evaluation techniques, would also be responsible for evaluation of programs and procedures and for providing the precinct Commanding Officer and his administrative staff with the relevant Departmental guidelines within which operations are carried out. The Planning Unit would be directly responsible to the precinct C but would maintain its relationships through the chain of command to Borough and planning and evaluation units at headquarters in much the same way that other specialized operational units do at the present time. Officers who receive specialized training in planning and evaluation would have job mobility among these levels and this would; hopefully, encourage headquarters level personnel to spend more time in the precincts. The basis of centralized planning and evaluation has always been thought of as a stream of good information from the policy environment to the planning unit. Good information is typified by relevance, currency, accuracy, use of correlative forms integrating vital parameters, and an organized format that encourages use. In police work, however, such integrated information is contextual and likely to be individualized from locale to locale. And, in the absence of decentralized precinct level planning capabilities, is fugitive.

The affect of this potential poverty of information for centralized planning from what we saw in the precincts is to place severe limitations on the scope and curability of any attempted policy decisions. Such plans are necessarily limited to the broad scale strategic level with only tentative durability. The result, as we have seen, is an absence of any real control or coordination. The many manuevers by precinct level personnel which we have documented in this study indicate how little actual administrative control and coordination exist in the face of the schism between police management and police workers.

The solution to this problem is, we argue, to shift the focus of the central planning units from programming operational details at the external interface of the precinct-community enviroment to developing the methodologies for the local, decentralized precinct planning units we propose. This narrows the sphere of information relevant to the central unit to the internal interface, where contextual detail can be somewhat controlled and policies of varied scope and durability implemented.

Decisions are action determinants which are designed to further in some way the attainment of system goals. Better decisions are those which result in greater objective

attainment. After a careful exploration of alternative methodologies, it is probable that there would be only one best choice for a given locale. However, different people possessing identical information on the potential of the alternatives would very often differ in their final selections. Each different decision (or even an identical decision) represents a different conception of program goals and criteria. A difficult problem arises in bringing about a joint agreement to insure the most effective implementation. Establishing a planning capability at the precinct level would provide a source of information for decision making which is at the interface of police work with the community. It would provide as well, organizational validity for management projections which were so obviously lacking in the Department's attempt to impose a management by objectives program.

Clearly, if headquarters continues to solicit data from people who are unwilling to surrender it, the data supplied will be of questionable value. Information transfer becomes a motivational problem, and it becomes important to find ways to get personnel to yield their information and generally to gain their autonomy. This returns to our emphasis on the need for two-way communications, on the need for personnel to share the system's objectives, and on the need to involve-actually-all personnel affected by program policies. Decisions are made by people possessing the information, and the present day realities of policing require that decision-making become a decentralized process. Instead of being preoccupied with identifying the decision-makers according to whom has "legitimate" authority, emphasis is placed on the best possible decision. Decision-making requires adequate information, and all too often those in authority simply lack the quantity and quality of information required.

In criticisms specifically directed at this type of decision-making, it is pointed out that provincial, narrow perspectives characterize lower level officials and that they lack the insight and competence to do analysis; to the extent possible, the decision-process should bypass lower-level personnel. This view of the capabilities of precinct personnel is overly pessimistic in our experience. Personnel at different levels of the organization often possess experience and knowledge that will make them indispensible in the planning of system changes related to their territorial interface. People on the whole are far more intelligent than they are usually given credit. Superiors may view subordinates as lazy, irresponsible, materialistic, dependent, and requiring close supervision. When such assumptions are made, in accordance with the pygmallion effect, the subordinates tend to conform to expectations. But, when adults are treated as intelligent, responsible ambitious, creative, growing, and goal-achieving, they will usually respond to these higher expectations.

There are, of course, a number of potential problems in such a decentralized structure. Police officers working in such units would initially at least, be suspect as agents of the management culture or investigators in an evaluation sense. Such officers working "inside" would be in danger of becoming isolated and insulated from street cops and, expectedly, would see occupational advancement and mobility as moving to headquarter level positions. We believe that all of these potential problems are solvable by thoughful personnel planning but, more importantly, we think that despite these shortcomings, the benefits far outweigh the problems of organizing such a system. If properly organized and maintained, a planning capability which coordinates and integrates planning and evaluation at individual command levels would go a long way to bringing the two cultures of policing into productive coordination, and might be a first step in validating decentralization of other functions.

Appendix A.

PATROL PRECINCT ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX B

NYPD RULES AND REGULATIONS

PERFORMANCE ON DUTY

1. Perform all duties as directed by competent authority.
2. Remain on post until properly relieved, except for:
   a. Police necessity
   b. Personal necessity
   c. Meal period.

NOTE

Notify telephone switchboard operator and if possible, make entry in ACTIVITY LOG (PD 112-145) before leaving post. Make entry upon return to post and notify telephone switchboard operator.

3. Take meal period in the station house, a bona fide restaurant or department vehicle.
4. Make entries in department records in black or blue ink. Ball point pen may be used.
5. Make accurate, concise entries in department records in chronological order, without delay.
6. Sign department reports or forms with full first name, middle initial and surname.
7. Make corrections on department records by drawing an ink line through incorrect matter. Enter correction immediately above and initial change.
8. Use numerals when entering dates on department forms, i.e., 1/5/72 for January 5, 1972.
9. Use abbreviation "Do" for ditto.
10. Start serial numbers with one (1) at beginning of each year for official forms or reports, unless otherwise specified.
11. Wear general purpose helmet at own discretion or when supervisor believes safety is endangered or conditions warrant.

PROHIBITED CONDUCT

1. Consuming intoxicants while in uniform.
2. Entering premises serving intoxicants, except for meal or performance of duty.
3. Carrying a package, umbrella, cane, etc., while in uniform, except in performance of duty.
4. Recommending use of any particular business, professional or commercial service to any person except when transacting personal affairs.
5. Steering business, professional or commercial persons to a prospective client who might require services except when transacting personal affairs.
6. Consenting to payment by anyone to regain lost or stolen property or advising such payment.
7. Riding in any vehicle, other than a department vehicle to which assigned, while in uniform, except when authorized or in an emergency (unmarked and private vehicles).
8. Using department logo unless specifically authorized by Police Commissioner.
9. Make false official statements.

COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS

1. Be familiar with contents of Patrol Guide and revise as directed.
2. Obey lawful orders and instructions of superiors.
3. Be punctual when reporting for duty.
4. Be governed by orders affecting another rank when temporarily assigned to perform the duties of that rank, except as otherwise indicated.
5. Maintain a current NYS drivers license and notify C.O. with pertinent details when license is suspended revoked or not renewed.

FITNESS FOR DUTY

1. Be fit for duty at all times, except when on sick report.
2. Do not consume intoxicants to the extent that makes a member unfit for duty.

PUBLIC CONTACT

1. Give name and shield number to anyone requesting them.
2. Be courteous and respectful.
3. Avoid conflict with department policy when lecturing, giving speeches or submitting articles for publication. Questions concerning fees received will be resolved by Commanding Officer, Personnel Bureau.

PROHIBITED CONDUCT

1. Associating with any person or organization: knowingly
   a. Advocating hatred, prejudice or oppression of any racial or religious group.
   b. Disseminating defamatory material
   c. Reasonably believed to be engaging in, likely to engage in, or to have engaged in criminal activities
   d. Preventing or interfering with performance of police duty.
2. Divulging or discussing official department business.
3. Engaging in conduct prejudicial to good order, efficiency or discipline of the Department.
4. Making recommendation for or concerning any person or premises to any government agency in connection with issuance, revocation or suspension of any license or permit, except when required in performance of duty.
5. Campaigning for candidate for public office or being member of political club.
6. Being a candidate for election or serving as member of a School Board, if School District is located within City of New York. (See Section 2103-a, Education Law.)
7. Accepting additional position of "public trust or civil emolument" without retiring or resigning his position in the Police Department except as specifically provided in Section 433, New York City Charter concerning leave of absence without pay.
8. Smoking in public view while in uniform.
9. Occupying seat in a public conveyance, while in uniform, to exclusion of paying passenger.
10. Using personal card describing police business, address, telephone number or title except as authorized by Department Manual.
11. Rendering any service for private interest which interferes with proper performance of duty.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE

1. Be neat and clean.
2. Keep uniforms clean, well pressed and in good repair.
3. Keep uniform securely buttoned.
4. Wear cap squarely on head, with center of visor directly over nose. Members may remove their uniform caps while inside R.M.P.
5. Prevent non-uniform articles from showing above uniform collar.
6. Have hair tapered to general shape of head and not reaching collar.
7. Keep sideburns closely trimmed and not extending below bottom of ear lobe. (Gross muttonchops are not permitted.)
8. Have mustaches neatly trimmed, not extending beyond, nor drooping below corners of mouth.
9. Do not grow beards, goatees, etc., except when approved by commanding officer due to nature of member's assignment or when required due to a medical problem and with written approval of Chief Surgeon.
10. Do not wear earrings or other adornments, while performing duty in uniform.

FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

PROHIBITED ACTS

1. Using confidential official information to advance financial interest of self or another.
2. Becoming interested, directly or indirectly, in any manner except by operation of law, in any business dealing with City.
3. Engaging, or rendering a service, in any financial, commercial or private interest which is directly or indirectly in conflict with official duties.
4. Purchasing real or other property belonging to City which is offered for sale at public auction, etc., by any agency of the City of New York. (Section 1106 of the New York City Charter). Violation subjects member to fine, suspension or dismissal and member may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.
5. Soliciting or publishing advertisements or booster lists in connection with any publication of any organization of Department, or whose name or literature indicates an affiliation with this Department, without permission of the Commanding Officer, Inspectional Services Bureau.
6. Authorizing use of photograph in uniform or mentioning rank, title or membership in Department for commercial advertisement.
7. Accepting testimonial award, gift, loan or thing of value to defray or reimburse any fine or penalty, or reward for police service except:
   a. Award from City of New York Employees' Suggestion Board
   b. Award of departmental recognition
   c. Award to a member of officer's family for a brave or meritorious act, from a metropolitan newspaper.
8. Purchase or acquire property of another, without approval of commanding officer, knowing or having reason to know, that such property was held in custody of this Department.
9. Soliciting, contributing or paying, directly or indirectly, or otherwise aid another to solicit, contribute or pay any money or other valuable thing which will be used in connection with a matter affecting the Department or any person connected with it, without the permission of the Chief of Inspectional Services.

RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Reside within City of New York or Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Putnam, Nassau or Suffolk Counties.
2. Provide commanding officer with telephone number for emergency notifications.
3. Notify commanding officer when residence, social condition or telephone number is changed.

VACATION POLICY

1. Accrue vacation at rate of 2¼ days each month after first three (3) years of service.
   a. Accrue vacation at rate of 1 2/3 days each month during first three (3) years of service
   b. Probationary members are not permitted to take vacation while in training at Police Academy
      1) After assignment to permanent command probationer permitted to take vacation in excess of 12% limitation, but not in conjunction with next vacation allowance.
2. Grant vacations according to seniority in rank and by squad assignment.
3. Precinct staff select vacations separately from other members of command. The 12% limitation should be adhered to, if possible.
4. Traffic police officers assigned to patrol precincts select vacations separately from other precinct personnel.
5. Police officers (F) assigned to matron duty select vacations separately.
6. Vacations within units other than field services are granted at discretion of commanding officer. The 12% limitation should be adhered to, if possible.
7. Take vacations in one period or two approximate equal periods. Lieutenants, sergeants and detectives may take vacations consisting of one complete set of tours and two others of approximately equal periods.
8. Excusal periods immediately prior to, occurring within and immediately following vacation are integral part of vacation.
9. Start vacation at beginning of a set of tours and consisting of complete set, if possible.
10. Prepare annual vacation lists prior to January 1st to permit commencement of vacations on January 1st.
11. Individual vacation days may be taken during January or February of succeeding year.
    a. May select individual days when making regular vacation selection. Individual days not selected with regular vacation pick, may be selected at later date subject to exigencies of the service.
    b. Only 2% of field services personnel may take individual vacation days at one time.
    c. Police officers MAY NOT select more than one of the following holidays as an individual vacation day, i.e., Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day or New Year's Day.
12. Take vacations at time convenient to Department.
13. Not more than 12% of field service personnel will be on vacation at one time.
14. Enter vacation selections in diary.

15. Change in vacation selection is permitted to fill a vacant period or by mutual consent between members, only with permission of commanding officer.
16. A police officer will retain original vacation selection if transferred. Supervisory officers may retain original selections if efficiency of command is not impaired.
17. Executive officer and administrative lieutenant are not permitted to take vacations at same time as precinct commander.
18. Apply for vacation allowance, lost during preceding year due to sick leave, ~~within thirty (30) days~~ upon return to duty.
19. Vacation granted in excess of accrued yearly allowance will result in reduction of vacation allowance in the following year.

AUTHORIZED LEAVE

1. Prepare APPLICATION FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE (PD 433-041) and submit to commanding officer or supervisory head, for approval, at least five (5) days before leave commences except in emergency.
2. Leaves may be terminated at discretion of Police Commissioner.
3. Member who is granted extended leave of absence without pay must take all accrued leave prior to start of leave of absence.
4. Leave without pay for thirty (30) or more consecutive days during a year, except military leave, will reduce authorized vacation by 1/12th for each thirty (30) consecutive days of absence.
5. Member returning from leave without pay for one year or more may not be granted unaccrued vacation until member performs active duty for a minimum of three (3) months, unless otherwise authorized by law.
6. Member of the Department applying for any extended leave, i.e. educational leave with or without pay, hardship leave, etc. is required to communicate with the military and extended leave desk for instructions

COURTESIES

1. Tender and return hand salute as prescribed by U.S. Army regulations.
2. Salute:
   a. Police Commissioner or deputy commissioners in civilian clothes
   b. Supervisory officer in uniform
   c. United States flag as it passes.
3. Salute flag when national anthem is played. If flag not visible, face band, etc. and salute.
4. Supervisory officers return salutes promptly.
5. Salute is not required at large assemblages except when addressed by or addressing supervisory officer. Salute not required if it interferes with police duty.

6. Remove hat and stand at attention in office of Police Commissioner, deputy commissioner or member above rank of lieutenant.
7. Order "Attention" when member above rank of captain enters room unless otherwise directed.
8. Place U.S. flag at half-mast as indicated below, when a member of the service dies:
   a. Lieutenant, sergeant, police officer — on department building where assigned on day of funeral.
   b. Captain — on department building where assigned from time of death to sunset, day of funeral.
   c. Deputy inspectors or inspectors — on department buildings within his command from time of death to sunset, day of funeral; flag at Police Headquarters will fly at half-staff on day of funeral.
   d. Member killed in line of duty — on department building where member assigned from time of death to ten days after death; flag will fly at half-mast on all department buildings on day of the funeral.
   e. Other members, Police Commissioner or a deputy commissioner — as directed by the Police Commissioner or Chief of Operations.

USE OF FIREARMS

In addition to Penal Law restrictions on the use of deadly physical force (See Article 35.00, P.L.), members of the service will adhere to the following guidelines concerning the use of firearms:

1. Use all reasonable means before utilizing firearm when effecting arrest for or preventing or terminating, a felony or defending self or another.
2. Do not fire warning shots.
3. Do not discharge firearm to summon assistance, except when safety is endangered.
4. Do not discharge firearm from or at moving vehicle unless occupants are using deadly physical force against officer or another, by means other than vehicle.
5. Do not discharge firearm at dogs or other animals unless there is no other way to bring animal under control.
6. Do not discharge firearm if innocent persons may be endangered.

NOTE

The above guidelines are not meant to restrict a member in the performance of his lawful duty, but are intended to reduce shooting incidents and consequently protect life and property. In every case, department policy requires only the minimum amount of force be used consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX C

PATROL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

COMMANDING OFFICER

1. Command a precinct or similar unit.
2. Responsible for:
   a. Proper performance of functions designated for command.
   b. Efficiency and discipline of personnel under his command
   c. Informing members of command of current directives and orders
   d. Serviceability, proper care and use of equipment assigned to his command.
3. Instruct and frequently test the knowledge of members of command in their duties and responsibilities.
4. Investigate and report on police conditions and activities.
5. Examine all books and records of command.
6. Make frequent personal inspections of the uniforms, equipment and general appearance of members of the service at outgoing roll calls and while on patrol.
7. Delegate administrative tasks as follows:
   a. Assign ranking officers within command to perform tasks normally reserved specifically for commanders, e.g., the preparation, signing and forwarding of required reports, forms and communications, etc.
   b. Assign competent members of his command to read, analyze and report on, either verbally or in writing, any voluminous communications directed to the commanding officer
   c. Assign ranking officer to inspect station house daily to ensure security, cleanliness and orderly condition.
8. Inspect station house or department facility periodically to insure cleanliness, orderly condition and that assigned equipment is accounted for and in good condition.
9. Designate manner in which members of command proceed to assignments, e.g., R.M.P. car, public transportation, etc.
10. Review activity of members of command each month.
11. Investigate a report of neglect of duty by subordinates.
12. Assign police officer proportionately to squads according to the needs of command. Members having special qualifications are to be assigned to permit the greatest use of abilities.
13. Assign personnel to specific patrol and staff functions.
14. Assign precinct police officer to cover traffic posts when traffic conditions require such assignments.
15. Provide formal orientation program for newly assigned lieutenants, sergeants and police officers on two consecutive day tours including interviews, introductions, and various precinct conditions, problems, boundaries, crime statistics, etc.
16. Maintain record of members who volunteer for anti-crime duty and make assignments accordingly.

COMMANDING OFFICER

17. Ensure that gasoline is dispensed by, or under direct supervision of a member of the service possessing Certificate of Fitness.
18. Maintain patrol by a supervising officer in a radio equipped department automobile.
19. Use a radio motor patrol car when on patrol, when presence is required at the scene of an emergency or when traveling within the city.
20. Maintain as much personal contact as possible with business, civic, fraternal, religious, political, recreational, charitable, youth and poverty corporation groups, local radio stations, local newspapers and other groups or media with community influence and interests to keep abreast of community tensions and trends.
21. Assign competent member to attend scheduled local planning boards, local school boards and local poverty corporation meetings as well as meetings of other groups for information purposes to facilitate planning of innovative procedures and programs as assessments of information require, to obtain an insight of developing tensions or trends.
22. Make entry in Command Log when reporting on and off duty, or when leaving for patrol, emergencies, etc. Designate manner of patrol, and car number when applicable.
23. Utilize resources of command to cope efficently with existent problems and accomplish mission of command.
24. Perform duty in uniform whenever practical.
25. Administer command discipline.
26. Cooperate with other units and agencies to accomplish mission of the command.
27. Investigate any request by a subordinate to purchase property of another which has, at any time, been held in custody of this department, to prevent a conflict of interest with member's official duties.
28. Notify Commanding Officer, Department Advocate's Office and request removal proceedings be commenced when member of the service fails to perform assigned duties due to inaptitude, incompetency or lack of capacity.
29. Observe special patrolmen on duty within precinct and report any misconduct to Commanding Officer, License Division.
30. Inspect uniform, shield, cap device and identification card of special patrolmen during March and September.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

1. Assume command and perform functions of the commanding officer during his absence. (During absence of 24 hours or more, sign routine communications and reports.)
2. Make entry in Command Log when reporting on and off duty, or when leaving and returning to station house for any reason.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

3. May use RMP on patrol to respond to emergencies or travelling within the city.
4. Supervise performance of administrative functions in the command.
5. Be designated "in command" in the absence of the commanding officer.
6. Study deployment of resources of command and recommend, where appropriate, more effective deployment to commanding officer.
7. Coordinate anti crime program.
8. Evaluate training, planning and personnel functions and needs of the command and make recommendations to the commanding officer.
9. Inspect uniforms, equipment, and general appearance of members of the command frequently.
10. Inspect ACTIVITY LOGS of Lieutenant-Operations Officers at least once each month.
11. Supervise the investigation of communications and preparation and forwarding of written reports.
12. Perform duty under the chart, or as directed by the borough commander and perform functions of "duty captain" when directed.
13. Do not overlap commanding officer's tour by more than two (2) hours when performing duty on the "open day."
14. Do not perform the same duty as the precinct commander if both are working the same tour. (One will perform patrol duty and conduct field inspections, etc.)
15. Conduct investigations as directed by commanding officer or other competent authority.
16. Insure that station house is kept in a clean, orderly condition, all equipment is accounted for and in good condition, and personnel are performing necessary police duty.
17. Represent the commanding officer at community meetings of concern to command when designated.
18. Perform duty in uniform, when practical.

LIEUTENANT – OPERATIONS COORDINATOR

1. Perform duty in uniform as staff officer assisting the precinct commander in administrative matters.
2. Act as precinct Civil Defense Coordinator.
3. Do not perform patrol duty, nor be assigned to desk duty.
4. Review and supervise the maintenance of records and files of command.
5. Coordinate the safety, crime prevention, and enforcement programs of command.
6. Supervise the precinct clerical staff and insure that they are in proper uniform and performing a necessary police function.
7. Supervise and administer the precinct Civil Defense Program including Rescue Service Volunteers and Auxiliary Police Units.

LIEUTENANT – OPERATIONS COORDINATOR

8. Insure civil defense supplies and equipment are used properly.
9. Keep precinct commander apprised of all civil defense activities.
10. Enter in Command Log the time arriving and leaving the station house and the reason.
11. Perform tours as designated by the precinct commander.
12. Interview civilians and representatives of civic organizations in the absence of the commanding/executive officer.
13. Represent the commanding officer, when designated, at civic and fraternal meetings within command.
14. Coordinate the human relations program of the precinct by maintaining close liaison with the Borough Community Affairs Coordinator and the Commanding Officer, Community Affairs Division.
15. Review all orders and prepare summaries of pertinent information for presentation to members of the command at unit training or roll call instruction.
16. Prepare written instructions for sergeants and police officers.
17. Supervise the maintenance of the precinct library.
18. Supplement instructions of station house officer in the absence of the commanding officer, to outgoing platoons.
19. Keep sergeants informed of precinct conditions.
20. Relay instructions of commanding officer to members of command.
21. Supervise the civilian cleaners.
22. Supervise the election details.
23. Apportion communications equally among sergeants for investigation.
24. Check police officer's ACTIVITY REPORTS.
25. Inspect ACTIVITY LOGS of all sergeants assigned to command at least once a month.
26. Check property voucher books and property on hand.
27. Make Command Log entry of daily inspection of station house for cleanliness, security, safety hazards and condition of equipment.
28. Notify Borough or Bureau Safety Coordinator of hazards which are not readily corrected by command personnel.
29. Review COMPLAINT REPORTS and consult with planning officer, Neighborhood Police Team Commander and Crime Analysis Section to determine priority locations relative to crime conditions within command.
30. Recommend re-deployment of personnel, if necessary, to precinct commander, executive officer or operations lieutenant.
31. Notify members of command, through station house officer, of scheduled court and other agency appearances and other related notifications.

LIEUTENANT – OPERATIONS COORDINATOR

32. Insure the proper maintenance of the Subpoena Receipt Book.
33. Ascertain that a current list of restaurants willing to accept monthly payments for meals provided for prisoners is maintained at the desk including time restaurant is open and cost of meals.

LIEUTENANT OPERATIONS OFFICER

1. Supervise, in uniform, all operations within precinct during tour of duty including station house base.
2. Direct and instruct patrol sergeants and the Neighborhood Police Team Commander in the performance of their duties particularly regarding the prompt return of R.M.P. units on assignment to patrol.
3. Respond to and direct police activities at serious crimes and emergencies.
4. Refer to patrol sergeants and Neighborhood Police Team Commander for correction, field conditions requiring police attention.
5. Cause necessary changes or adjustments in roll call at beginning of tour.
6. Conduct roll call and direct patrol sergeant to inspect uniforms and equipment of outgoing platoon and instruct members of platoon relative to precinct conditions.
7. Supervise sergeants and police officers frequently, and at irregular intervals in the field and station house.
8. Insure that COMPLAINT REPORTS are accurate and complete.
9. May assign sergeant to telephone switchboard duty for a period not to exceed two (2) hours at irregular intervals.
10. Inspect precinct records and apprise station house officer of errors, omissions or improper entries.
11. Obtain pertinent precinct statistics and confer with precinct commander, executive officer, lieutenant-operations coordinator and planning officer on any trends observed or other matters of importance.
12. Sign Command Log at beginning and end of tour.
13. Investigate discrepancies reported by station house officer.
14. Advise commanding/executive officer of matters of importance, unusual arrests or occurrences and important messages or conditions requiring his attention.
15. Evaluate continuously, the effectiveness of assignments.
16. Report changes of assignments to telephone switchboard operator and the station house officer.
17. Sign the Command Log and notify the Communications Division dispatcher when leaving the station house for patrol and upon returning from patrol.
18. Schedule meals for supervisory officers assigned to the platoon so that a supervisor is on duty at all times.
19. Maintain ACTIVITY LOG.
20. Investigate and report on injuries to members of the service and damage to department property as required.

SERGEANT PATROL SUPERVISOR

1. Supervise police operations in a specific area within command.
2. Responsible for assigned sector on a 24 hour basis concerning:
   a. Incidents
   b. Crime problems
   c. Community trends, tensions etc.
3. Confer frequently with commanding officer, lieutenant-operations officer, lieutenant-operations coordinator and planning officer, regarding conditions in command and the performance of assigned members.
4. Inform sector police officers of orders and instructions concerning the operation of the sector.
5. Be cognizant of crimes and other conditions within the command.
6. Provide assistance to residents and business people within the sector community.
7. Visit civic and community organizations to discuss related matters.
8. Conduct investigations and submit necessary reports as required.
9. Maintain ACTIVITY LOG.
10. Patrol assigned area, in an R.M.P. car while in uniform and equipped with portable radio.
11. Inspect the outgoing platoon and vehicles assigned.
12. Visit:
    a. Subordinates assigned to foot or radio motor patrol frequently during the tour
    b. Members of the service assigned to hospital or special posts at least once each tour
    c. Courts located within assigned patrol area, when in session to observe performance of members if a ranking officer is not assigned.
13. Indicate visits to members under supervision by signing their ACTIVITY LOG.
14. Supervise performance of duty and test knowledge of subordinates of precinct and post conditions.
15. Insure that radio messages directed to assigned area are acknowledged by available RMP crew.
16. Supervise, where appropriate, performance of patrol by radio emergency patrol crew assigned to precinct.
17. Direct RMP units to resume patrol when their services are no longer required.
18. Report derelictions of duty to commanding officer.
19. Relieve the station house officer for meal, when designated.
20. Inform the telephone switchboard operator of the location where meal will be taken.
21. Keep the station house officer informed of current matters of importance.
22. Sign the Return Roll Call at end of the tour.

SERGEANT PATROL SUPERVISOR

23. Direct members of the service on scooter patrol to report to station house officer for reassignment when weather or road surface conditions make scooter operation dangerous.
24. Review POLICE OFFICER'S ACTIVITY REPORTS, make required entries and deliver to commanding officer within seven (7) days following recording month.
25. Represent commanding officer at community meetings when designated.
26. Continuously evaluate police officers under direct supervision.
27. Inspect all traffic signs and stanchions daily and ascertain that officers concerned report damaged equipment.

SUPERVISOR ANTI–CRIME PATROL

1. Confer with Crime Analysis Officer and uniformed supervisors on patrol to identify locations of high crime within the command.
2. Examine COMPLAINT REPORTS and ARREST REPORTS to establish times and locations of violent street crimes and burglaries.
3. Inspect members for proper equipment.
4. Supervise members' performance.
5. Apprise uniformed supervisors on patrol of anti-crime activity locations for information of members on patrol.

STATION HOUSE OFFICER

1. Perform duty in uniform, within the station house.
2. Visit all areas of the station house during the tour and inspect equipment necessary for field operations, assure that personnel are performing a necessary police function and direct operations of:
   a. Station house clerk
   b. Telephone switchboard operator
   c. Attendant
   d. Station house security police officer
   e. Gas dispenser
   f. Member of department assigned as patrolwagon operator
   g. Member assigned to matron or other duty within station house
   h. Civilian personnel assigned to command and other members as designated by lieutenant-operations officer or higher authority.
3. Process arrests.
4. Inspect POLICE OFFICER'S ACTIVITY LOG.
5. Certify to accuracy and completeness of entries in Command Log regarding vouchered property.
6. Safeguard key for, and contents of, the property locker.
7. Reassign members of the command when reporting from other assignments and notify lieutenant operations officer and patrol sergeant of reassignment.

STATION HOUSE OFFICER

8. Do not assign attendant or matron any duty requiring them to leave cell block while prisoners lodged therein.
9. Maintain the Command Log.
10. Interview visitors entering station house.
11. Operate base radio.
12. Maintain Telephone Record.
13. Monitor teletype for messages affecting command.
14. Examine and sign forms and reports as required.
15. Supervise issuance of summons books.
16. Process summonses issued during previous tour.
17. Process applications for bail and personal recognizance.
18. Supervise entries on PRISON ROSTER (PD 244-145).
19. Arrange meals and other reliefs for personnel assigned to duty in station house.
20. Check the return roll call.
21. Examine roll call and change assignments with concurrence of the lieutenant operations officer and neighborhood police team commander.
22. Make required notifications to members of the department assigned or residing within the command.
23. Transmit orders and instructions as required.
24. Check on repair and distribution of field equipment, i.e., barriers, portable radios and emergency equipment and make entries in pertinent records.
25. Forward reports to departmental units and outside agencies as required.
26. Supervise distribution of paychecks (make required entry in Command Log).
27. Notify commanding officer and advise lieutenant operations officer and neighborhood police team commander of matters of importance such as unusual arrests or occurrences and important messages or conditions requiring their attention.
28. Sign the Command Log at the beginning and end of tour.
29. Certify entries in T.S. record by signing at the fourth hour and at the end of tour.
30. Examine forms and reports prepared during previous 24 hours and process as required, when on duty with 1st Platoon.
31. Safeguard and/or distribute portable radios giving priority to nature of officer's assignment.
32. Have barriers assigned to precinct counted each tour and make entries in Barrier Record Book.
33. Insure proper display of U.S. flag.
34. Prohibit persons from entering behind desk except the following when performing official duties:
   a. Members of the department
   b. Judicial officers
   c. Medical Examiner, or assistant
   d. Corporation Counsel, or assistant
   e. Controller, or assistant
   f. District Attorney, or assistant

STATION HOUSE OFFICER

35. Accept service of civil process for member of command and notify member concerned.

PRECINCT PLANNING OFFICER

1. Perform duty in uniform, when practical, as member of the precinct administrative staff.
2. Conduct planning activities of the command under the direction of the commanding officer.
3. Maintain liaison with Operations Division, and other planning officers.
4. Maintain records and prepare reports relating to planning activities.
5. Develop innovative plans in the areas of crime prevention, traffic, patrol and investigative techniques, community affairs and other operating functions of the command.
6. Devise methods for measurement of performance.
7. Conduct analyses of operations, including workload, functions, allocation and utilization of personnel and other resources.
8. Make recommendations concerning use of available resources to achieve objectives.
9. Study specific problems peculiar to the command, such as crime patterns and incidence, personnel activity, prisoners in a hospital, and method or type of patrol technique employed.
10. Prepare projections of future resource requirements, make recommendations for revision of post or sector boundaries, and changes in allocation or utilization of patrol resources.
11. Study and update existing disorder, disaster or other plans affecting the command.
12. Identify need for new plans.
13. Study and document changing conditions within the command and determine impact on police services.
14. Make estimates of the command situation and provide the commander with information on how significant factors will affect the situation.
15. Participate in development and/or evaluation of pilot projects.
16. Develop local procedures to facilitate the introduction of new department-wide procedures.
17. Collect, collate, evaluate and then disseminate information within the command and with higher, lower and parallel commands.
18. Represent precinct commander, when designated, at community meetings.
19. Coordinate and evaluate operations of the crime prevention officer.
20. Establish ringing schedule for patrol services.

ANTI-CRIME PATROL POLICE OFFICER

1. Perform duty in civilian clothes
2. Maintain daily record of activity in ACTIVITY LOG (PD 112-145).
3. Study and analyze precinct crime statistics and reports.
4. Patrol within confines of precinct giving special attention to locations prone to violent street crimes and burglaries.
5. Inform radio dispatcher when responding to, or present at the scene of a police incident and include description of clothing worn, vehicle used, etc.
6. Wear appropriate identification when present at scene of a police incident (head band, shield, color of day, etc.) If appropriate, properly identify self prior to taking any police action.
7. Conduct short term investigations, not to exceed two (2) hours, within precinct boundaries, directly related to street crimes or burglaries except when precinct commanding officer/executive officer extends such time.
8. Do not conduct line-up or show photographs without permission of detective/P.I.U. supervisor.

POLICE OFFICER

1. Perform duty in uniform as indicated on Roll Call or as directed by competent authority.
2. Proceed to post, sector or assignment as directed by commanding officer.
3. Comply with meal and post relieving points as directed by commanding officer.
4. Be aware of, and inspect, post or sector for conditions requiring police attention.
5. Report immediately to the station house officer any unusual crime, occurrence or condition.
6. Report conditions not requiring immediate attention to the station house clerk.
7. Render all necessary police service in his assigned area and as otherwise directed.
8. Familiarize self with the everyday routine of people residing, doing business or frequenting post or sector.
9. Investigate suspicious conditions and circumstances on the post.
10. Give attention to crime hazards.
11. Signal the station house as indicated by roll call:
    a. When assigned to the station house post, report to the station house officer.
    b. When assigned to school or church crossing, signal before and after crossing
    c. Do not signal when assigned to a traffic post.
12. Keep telephone switchboard operator informed of police services rendered.
13. Report police services rendered in another precinct to station house officer of that precinct.
14. Submit POLICE OFFICER'S ACTIVITY REPORT (PD439-144) to the designated sergeant by third day of month for previous month. Submit REPORT prior to leave, or if not possible, without delay upon return to duty if scheduled for vacation or other leave.
15. Call the station house officer when detained at court or elsewhere and unable to return to the station house to sign the Return Roll Call at end of tour.
16. Maintain ACTIVITY LOG.
17. Preserve completed ACTIVITY LOGS and produce them as required by competent authority.
18. Monitor portable radio.

RADIO MOTOR PATROL OPERATOR

1. Exchange assignments every four hours with the recorder of the radio motor patrol car.
2. Operate car for the entire tour when assigned as driver of ranking officer.
   a. Monitor radio messages directed to assigned area when supervisor is out of car.
3. Permit only members of the service performing related police duty to enter or ride in a radio motor patrol car on patrol.
4. Respond to messages of serious police emergency within five blocks of location even if message is directed to another car, regardless of sector, precinct and borough boundaries.
5. Do not carry electric blasting caps in vehicles or transmit within 150 feet of any electric blasting operation.
6. Monitor radio when recorder is assigned to a school or church crossing.
   a. Pick up recorder and respond to assignment when directed by radio dispatcher.
7. Leave radio on and have the car ready for instant use when car is being cleaned or supplied with fuel. Do not put car out of service if fuel is to be obtained in assigned command.
8. Avoid remaining in areas where radio reception is poor.
9. Proceed to an emergency scene with due caution. (Do not use the siren unnecessarily; approach the scene of a reported crime quietly.)
10. Take R.M.P. car out of assigned sector when:
    a. Directed by competent authority, or
    b. Answering an emergency call, or
    c. Servicing, repairing or cleaning required, with permission of station house officer.
11. Constantly patrol assigned sector.
12. Do not unnecessarily leave the car unattended; REMOVE keys and LOCK car when answering call. DO NOT LEAVE PORTABLE RADIO IN CAR.
13. Position car at scene of an emergency to avoid obstructing, or being blocked by, emergency apparatus.
14. Sign return roll call at end of tour.
15. Perform the duties of recorder when none is assigned.
16. Inspect the car when reporting for duty. (See Inspection of Department Vehicles each tour by RMP operator).
17. Make ACTIVITY LOG entry of findings, speedometer reading and amount of gasoline in the tank as registered by the indicator.
18. Notify the station house officer when a car requires speedometer repairs or other repairs or replacement of parts or accessories, including tires and tubes.
19. Operate car in manner to avoid injury to person or damage to property.
20. Drive at slow rate of speed except under exceptional circumstances or extreme emergency.
21. Operate RMP car only when assigned and when qualified by the Department to operate the vehicle to which assigned.
22. Take care of car and accessories, equipment and tools assigned.
23. Cooperate with other operators of same car to which assigned in care and maintenance, particularly cleaning, washing and keeping the car in proper operating condition.

24. Make minor repairs to car when possible.
25. Enter appointment for preventive maintenance on sticker affixed to vehicle.
26. Deliver car for regular preventive maintenance inspection as scheduled on sticker affixed to vehicle.
27. Do not push or tow another vehicle with R.M.P. car.

RADIO MOTOR PATROL RECORDER

1. Ride in the front seat of the radio motor patrol car, except when transporting prisoner, psycho, etc.
2. Operate the radio.
3. Record in ACTIVITY LOG, radio messages directed to car, including time, location of call, and type of case. Enter disposition of each call and time of completion.
4. Transmit disposition or interim disposition to radio dispatcher immediately upon completion of assignment and before leaving the scene of assignment.
   a. Transmit interim disposition to radio dispatcher if required to proceed to another location in connection with current assignment
   b. Notify station house officer of disposition of assignments originating in station house or other important assignments or of an unusual nature.
5. Notify the radio dispatcher if undue delay is encountered in response to a radio message.
6. Obtain a portable radio, if available, from the station house officer.
7. Cover school crossings when required.
8. Prepare all necessary reports and records connected with police action taken jointly with operator, while assigned as recorder.
9. Signal station house and comply with instructions of station house officer if radio station becomes inoperative.
10. Obtain permission from radio dispatcher to place RMP auto out of service for minor repairs.
11. Notify radio dispatcher of all assignments including pickup assignments, not emanating from Communications Division. Give location and nature of assignment.
12. Carry duplicate set of keys for vehicle to which assigned during the entire tour of duty.

MOTOR SCOOTER OPERATOR

1. Operate scooter at a slow, safe rate of speed.
   a. Three-wheel scooters may be operated on all tours at speeds not exceeding twenty M.P.H.
2. Operate scooter with headlight on at all times.
3. Report to station house by signal box each hour or during emergencies as directed by commanding officer.
4. Do not use scooter to pursue motor vehicles nor be assigned to expressways or parkways.
5. Check road conditions of entire post and make ACTIVITY LOG entry immediately after arrival.
6. Request reassignment when original assignment is hazardous due to spillout from trucks, construction or other poor road surface conditions.
7. Do not perform scooter duty when:
   a. Rain, snow, sleet, heavy fog, or any precipitation causes ground to become slippery. Three-wheel scooters may be used in moderate rain and fog.

MOTOR SCOOTER OPERATOR

b. Patches of snow or ice remain from previous storm
c. High winds interfere with control of scooter
d. Temperature falls below 32 degrees F, 0 degrees C (except three-wheel scooter).

6. Receive refresher training in motor scooter operation when member:
   a. Has been involved in scooter accident
   b. Has not operated a department scooter within six (6) months period and is being considered for assignment to operate scooters.
   c. Has performed scooter duty for one (1) year period without attending refresher training course.
7. Inspect scooter to insure it is in serviceable condition and enter in ACTIVITY LOG findings, speedometer reading and amount of gasoline in tank.
8. Operate scooter only when assigned, properly licensed and designated as qualified Department Scooter Operator.
9. Monitor portable radio.
10. Wear helmet and goggles:
    a. Goggles are not required when operating three-wheel scooter
11. Wear reflective belt during hours of darkness.
12. Obey traffic control devices. Siren and roof lights installed on three wheel scooters will be operated when necessary.
13. Use extreme caution when approaching intersection or making turns.
14. Do not respond to radio runs unless specifically directed by radio dispatcher.

CRIME PREVENTION OFFICER

1. Cooperate with precinct planning officer, training officer, neighborhood police team members and the auxiliary patrol force in determining local crime prevention needs and methods of controlling crime.
2. Evaluate crime patterns and institute crime prevention programs relative to specific crimes.
3. Establish rapport with local community to implement innovative crime prevention programs tailored to specific needs.
4. Conduct public education programs on crime prevention via various community group meetings.
5. Give direction and guidance to cooperative neighborhood crime prevention undertakings.
6. Inspect premises and make recommendations concerning physical security.
7. Investigate selected crimes against property, evaluate current security measures and recommend new procedures to owners or residents.
8. Investigate selected crimes against the person, interview victims and institute individual and community education programs to prevent recurrence.
9. Refer complex cases which require special investigative effort to the Crime Prevention Squad.

APPENDIX D. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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