


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United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C. 20531

9/19/83



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

PEMP-0

27 JAN 1983

REFERENCES FOR ARMY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

TAB	DOCUMENT	PURPOSE
A	Army Regulation 190-31	Provides general policy guidance..
B	DA Pamphlet 190-31	Specific instructions for setting up installation crime prevention programs
C	DA Circular 190-82-1	Designates annual crime prevention campaigns
D	Technical Letter, Child Abuse	Gives specific guidance for this campaign
E	Technical Letter, Robbery	Gives specific instructions for this campaign.

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MILITARY POLICE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

Effective 1 February 1982

This revision reflects added terms and definitions, and a more explicit definition of the Department of the Army Crime Prevention Program. This regulation may be supplemented at the major command level. HQDA agencies and major Army commands will furnish one copy of each supplement to HQDA(DAPE-HRE), WASH DC 20310.

Interim changes to this regulation are not official unless they are authenticated by The Adjutant General. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

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**1. Purpose.** This regulation prescribes policies and responsibilities for the DA Crime Prevention Program.

**2. Applicability.** *a.* This regulation applies to all elements of the Active Army and the US Army Reserve. It does not apply to the Army National Guard.

*b.* Requirements in this regulation may be waived by major Army command (MACOM) commanders when they determine that a requirement is not contributing to the program objective, or when more effective methods are developed locally.

**3. Objective.** The DA Crime Prevention Program should provide a secure environment; Service members and their families, Government employees, and the public should be able to

live and work in it. This goal can be achieved by orienting individuals, Army leadership, and Army law enforcement activities toward crime prevention.

**4. Concept.** *a.* Crime prevention is a command responsibility. A successful program needs continuing command emphasis; criminal activity should not be allowed to detract from mission accomplishment.

*b.* An effective crime prevention program will help maximize the security of a military community in peace and war. Its goals are similar to (and support those of) the installation physical security (PS) and operational security (OPSEC) programs. Methods used to identify and analyze crime problems are similar to those used in PS and OPSEC threat assessments; these programs complement each other.

\*This regulation supersedes AR 190-31, 18 August 1977.

*c.* The DA Crime Prevention Program is designed to reduce crime by—

(1) Stimulating appropriate crime prevention attitudes, procedures, and behavior.

(2) Protecting potential victims or property from criminal acts by anticipating crime possibilities and eliminating or reducing opportunities for the acts to occur.

(3) Discouraging potential offenders from committing criminal acts.

**5. Explanation of terms.** *a. Crime analysis.* The process used to determine the essential features of a criminal act. It is a mandatory part of any crime prevention program.

*b. Crime prevention inspection.* An on-site evaluation of the crime prevention program of a unit, section, office, or other facility.

*c. Crime prevention.* The anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk, and initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. Crime prevention is a direct crime control method that applies to before-the-fact efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect potential human victims, and prevent property loss.

*d. Crime prevention campaign.* A program designed to deal with the control or prevention of specific types of crime based on patterns of occurrence, offenders, and victims.

*e. Crime risk management.* The development of systematic approaches to reduce crime risks.

*f. Physical security.* Protective measures designed to safeguard personnel; prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, theft, waste, and fraud.

**6. Required references.**

*a.* AR 190-13 (The Army Physical Security Program). Cited in paragraph 8b.

*b.* AR 190-51 (Security of Army Property at Unit and Installation Level). Cited in paragraph 8b.

**7. Responsibilities.** *a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).* The DCSPER will—

(1) Develop policy and procedures concerning the DA Crime Prevention Program.

(2) Analyze criminal information developed by Staff agencies and MACOMs to determine which crimes should be subjects of special crime prevention campaigns.

(3) Publish specific subjects, themes, and crime prevention campaign dates.

(4) Publish supporting material to assist in implementing the DA Crime Prevention Program.

(5) Coordinate with other agencies to insure maximum use of civilian crime prevention programs and materials.

(6) Announce crime prevention campaigns each year to highlight certain crime areas for intensified public awareness efforts at MACOM and installation levels. When feasible, DA campaigns will coincide with national civilian crime prevention campaigns.

*b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG).* The DCSLOG will insure that applicable portions of the DA Crime Prevention Program become integral parts of logistics policy.

*c. The Adjutant General (TAG).* TAG will—

(1) Integrate basic tenets of the DA Crime Prevention Program into the CONUS dependent education program and the Army Community Services Program.

(2) Insure that special TAG programs (such as "The Family Advocacy Program") are made part of the DA Crime Prevention Program.

*d. Chief of Engineers (COE).* The COE will—

(1) Insure that crime prevention principles are made part of the management and operation of Army-controlled housing and construction projects.

(2) Provide technical assistance to other agencies in dealing with changes in physical environment to promote crime prevention.

*e. Chief of Public Affairs (CPA).* The CPA will prepare supporting crime prevention mate-

rials for use in the command information program.

*f. Comptroller of the Army (COA).* The COA will insure that crime prevention is considered for patrons of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES). The COA also will insure that AAFES supports the DA Crime Prevention Program.

*g. Commanders of MACOMs.* MACOM commanders will—

(1) Conduct continuing crime analysis as the crime prevention program basis.

(2) Establish and monitor crime prevention programs within their commands. MACOM commanders may modify and supplement the DA-announced crime prevention campaigns. (*Note:* This regulation is intended to allow installation commanders the maximum degree of freedom in developing local crime prevention programs.)

(3) Conduct a continuing review and analysis of subordinate command crime prevention programs.

(4) Insure that crime prevention theories and practices are made part of all phases of the command law enforcement program.

*h. Installation and activity commanders.* These commands will—

(1) Establish, publish, and implement crime prevention programs within their commands or installations. Tenant activity crime prevention programs will be coordinated with the host installation commander. These programs will contain provisions to establish and publish crime prevention themes to support DA and MACOM campaigns. Themes for local campaigns also will be made part of installation programs. Law enforcement statistical analysis of crime trends will be reviewed to identify particular themes for installation programs. Installation commanders may modify DA crime prevention campaigns based on local estimates of crime problems. Campaigns also may be modified to allow participation in crime prevention campaigns sponsored by the local civilian community.

(2) Conduct crime prevention inspections to

evaluate installation, unit, and activity involvement in crime prevention programs.

(3) Designate frequency, form, and type of crime prevention inspections. At least one crime prevention inspection per year is recommended.

(4) Appoint, in writing, a crime prevention officer to manage the installation crime prevention program. The installation crime prevention officer normally will be assigned to the law enforcement activity, office of the provost marshal, or installation security office.

(5) Insure that unit crime prevention officers (E6 or above) have been designated in writing at all levels of command down to and including battalion-sized units, separate detachments, and activities. Duties of the crime prevention officer will include, but are not limited to the following:

(a) Conduct announced or unannounced crime prevention inspections of unit areas using a locally developed checklist.

(b) Insure electrostatic markers are made available to unit personnel for marking Government and personal property for identification.

(c) Develop crime prevention themes for local command information programs.

(6) Establish an installation crime prevention council. This council will be chaired by a member of the installation command element, with the provost marshal, or security officer serving as the coordinator. In addition to representatives of major units, the council should include delegates from the installation staff, and from tenant or attached activities. Suggested topics for crime prevention council discussion include, but should not be limited to the following:

(a) Crime trends and conditions conducive to crime.

(b) Effectiveness of existing crime prevention programs.

(c) Ways of increasing the effectiveness of programs.

(d) Findings of physical security and crime prevention inspections, and corrective actions taken.

(e) Financial impact of crime and preventive measures.

**8. Program support.** *a.* Crime prevention is a primary mission of Army law enforcement elements. Law enforcement personnel are uniquely qualified to provide technical assistance to the commander. It is a primary task for military police (MP), military police investigators (MPI), and special agents of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).

(1) In crime investigation, merely to identify the perpetrators is not enough. Underlying conditions that contributed to the crime must be identified and corrective action started.

(2) Assignment as crime prevention managers is a natural progression for physical security specialists and military police investigators. Only the most experienced MPs with extensive experience in physical security or MP investigations will be assigned as crime prevention specialists.

*b.* Physical security is a law enforcement function that supports the crime prevention effort. Physical security surveys and inspections (AR 190-13) can provide data for crime prevention councils and officers. Specific guidance on protection of property is contained in AR 190-51. Effective physical security must be made part of the command's crime prevention programs.

*c.* USACIDC conducts crime prevention surveys as an integral part of the DA Crime Pre-

vention Program. This helps commanders deter crime by identifying crime-conducive conditions, discovering criminal activities, and formulating recommendations.

*d.* Civilian police agencies are valuable sources of information. They can furnish detailed information on the following:

(1) Local trouble spots.

(2) Conduct of military personnel in the civilian community.

(3) Vice or narcotic operations that may contribute to the military crime potential and adversely affect attitudes of the civilian population.

*e.* Morale and welfare agencies may be productive sources of crime prevention information and program assistance.

**9. Training.** *a.* Objectives of the DA Crime Prevention Program can be reached without formal training. Skills that are not included in physical security or MPI duties may be developed (and training received) through crime prevention courses given by civilian agencies. Maximum use should be made of these courses.

*b.* The command information program is an excellent way to disseminate crime prevention information.

The proponent agency of this regulation is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to HQDA(DAPE-HRE), WASH DC 20310.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:

ROBERT M. JOYCE  
Brigadier General, United States Army  
The Adjutant General

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Department of the Army  
Pamphlet 190-31

Military Police

# CRIME PREVENTION HANDBOOK

Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
15 November 1982

15 November 1982

DA Pam 190-31

## FOREWORD

In producing this manual, little totally new material was developed. Wherever possible, existing publications were modified to include military terminology and conditions found on Army installations.

Uncopyrighted material produced under grants by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was adapted for use as chapters 2 and 5, and sections IV and VI of chapter 3.

Material developed by the Texas Crime Prevention Institute, Southwest Texas State University was used as the basis for sections II, III, and VII of chapter 3.

Section VIII, chapter 3, was developed in part from material produced by the Advertising Council, Inc. for the National Crime Prevention Coalition.

Section V, chapter 4 was developed from material provided by the Insurance Information Institute.

Section VI, chapter 4 was adapted from material prepared by Ft. Richardson, Texas Police Department.

The cooperation of these agencies in the development of this handbook is gratefully acknowledged.

*This pamphlet contains copyright material.*

Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
Washington, DC  
15 November 1982

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
PAMPHLET 190-31

Military Police

**Crime Prevention Handbook**

**Interim changes.** Interim changes to this pamphlet are not official unless they are authenticated by the Adjutant General. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

**Suggested improvements.** The proponent of this pamphlet is the Military Police Operations Agency. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms) directly to HQDA(PEMP-O), WASH DC 20310.

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## Chapter 1 The Installation Crime Prevention Program

### Section I General Information

#### 1-1. Purpose

This pamphlet provides guidance on planning, organizing, directing, and controlling installation crime prevention programs which are required by AR 190-31 (The DA Crime Prevention Program). It provides guidance on developing an installation program, crime analysis to identify crimes which crimes should be addressed, command and individual countermeasures for particular crimes, and program evaluation procedures.

#### 1-2. Applicability

This pamphlet applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. It is intended primarily for full time crime prevention managers at installation level, but information in chapter 4, Community Crime Prevention Programs, will be useful to unit crime prevention officers who perform these functions on an additional duty basis.

#### 1-3. References

Required references are listed below.

- a. AR 190-31, The DA Crime Prevention Program.
- b. FM 19-30, Physical Security.
- c. DA Pam 108-1, Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related Audio-Visual Aids.

#### 1-4. How to use this handbook

- a. *Step 1.* Read section II, chapter 1, for guidance on organizing an installation program.
- b. *Step 2.* Conduct an analysis of the installation crime information to identify crimes that should be targeted. See chapter 2 for instructions.
- c. *Step 3.* Identify in appendix A the countermeasures that are appropriate for the targeted crime.
- d. *Step 4.* Implement the appropriate command countermeasures. They are described in chapter 3.
- e. *Step 5.* Implement the appropriate community countermeasures. They are described in chapter 4.
- f. *Step 6.* Evaluate the program. Procedures are contained in chapter 5.

### Section II Installation Crime Prevention Programs

#### 1-5. Why crime prevention

- a. In the past few years, the Army has shifted an

increasingly larger percentage of its manpower from combat service support activities to combat organizations. This change means that fewer military police are available to support a larger number of units. To meet this challenge, it is necessary to reevaluate the way we do business, and emphasize those programs or procedures that have the greatest impact on our installation crime rates. Crime prevention is one program that can have a major impact on installation crime rates at a relatively minor cost in both dollars and manpower. It takes less effort to discourage a criminal from perpetrating a crime or to teach a soldier to avoid becoming a victim than it does to investigate a crime, identify the offender, prosecute him, and punish him for the crime. In addition, a pro-active approach to law enforcement can help maintain the high quality of service life which can improve retention of first term soldiers.

b. The Army is a large organization which performs a variety of activities in many different environments. Crimes which are major problems on one installation may be totally absent from others. For example, most troop centered installations have a significant number of robberies while most depots have none. Because of this, any rigid, centrally controlled program, no matter how carefully thought out, is bound to be inappropriate in many locations. Therefore, Department of Army has elected to provide only the most general guidance, and to allow commanders to develop crime prevention programs that address their local problems.

#### 1-6. Crime prevention councils

a. The installation is the smallest practical level for implementing crime prevention programs. If crime prevention programs are developed and implemented at a lower level, then crime is often not eliminated but is merely displaced from units with good programs to units which have less effective programs. Also, crime does not effect personnel only when they are in their place of duty. In many cases, a company commander's troops are victimized in post recreation areas, off of the installation, and in other areas over which he has little control. Unit commanders are responsible for implementing many anti-crime measures, but the selection of overall program goals, identification of appropriate countermeasures, and quality control should be done at installation level.

b. Crime prevention must always be recognized as a "commander's program" rather than as a "military police program". Although military law enforcement

agencies have the expertise to analyze data, identify major problem areas, and develop list of possible countermeasures, they should perform these functions in support of an installation crime prevention council that is appointed by the installation commander and composed of representatives of all of the installation's major organizations and activities. The advantages of using this type of system are—

(1) It provides representatives of all major segments of the post population with a forum where they can identify crime problems which are of the greatest concern to them.

(2) It allows the representatives of all major commands to review the options that are available to counter a crime and to select the level of resource commitment that is compatible with their missions and internal priorities.

(3) It helps ensure that the resources of the entire community are mobilized to attack the problem rather than only those of the military police.

(4) Once crimes are targeted and countermeasures are identified, it is easier to obtain the support of the whole population if their representatives are instrumental in the development of the program.

**1-7. Crime prevention officers**

a. The installation crime prevention officer, who is normally a senior NCO or junior officer who has a solid background as a military police investigator or physical security inspector, supports the installation council by performing a crime data analysis to identify problem areas, by drafting programs for the council's consideration, by inspecting the implementation of council mandated measures, and by coordinating the efforts of unit/activity crime prevention officers in the implementation of the installation crime prevention program.

b. As a member of the provost marshal's staff, the installation crime prevention officer develops the law enforcement section of the installation crime prevention program, develops and maintains the written installation crime prevention plan, and coordinates crime prevention programs with civilian police agencies and community groups.

c. Crime prevention officers are also appointed in each organization down to battalion level. At this level, written crime prevention plans are not required. The crime prevention officers serve as their organization's focal point for coordinating installation crime prevention plans, and they supervise the implementation of the installation program within their organizations.

**1-8. Crime prevention program development**

a. The starting point for the development of an installation crime prevention program must be a thorough analysis by the installation crime prevention officer of the criminal activity on the installation to identify sig-

nificant crime problems which are susceptible to crime prevention efforts. Crimes which are most susceptible to crime prevention measures are those for which high probability of reoccurrence exists. Crimes like murder normally are not repetitive and are poor candidates for inclusion in the crime prevention program. Since it is seldom practical to attack all crime problems simultaneously, they should be prioritized based on their impact on the command's ability to perform its mission, and the impact on the installation's personnel. Next, the whole range of countermeasures that can be used to combat each problem must be identified. Annex A identifies by offense, programs which have been used successfully in the past to counter specific crime problems. Chapter 3 and 4 contain discussions of the strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of the countermeasures listed in the annex.

b. Once a prioritized list of crime problems and possible countermeasures has been developed by the installation crime prevention officer, they should be presented to the installation crime prevention council for action. The council should decide which crimes will be addressed, and which countermeasures will be employed for each crime. The council must then identify specific objectives for their anti-crime campaigns. Objectives must identify—

- (1) What crime will be reduced.
- (2) What target population will be addressed.
- (3) Specific changes and behavior on the part of the victims or perpetrators that will be encouraged.
- (4) What actions the command must take to reduce the opportunity for the crime to occur.

c. Once objectives have been clearly defined, specific areas of responsibility should be assigned to each council member based on their organization's primary area of responsibility, and major milestones should be identified for the development of the campaign against each targeted crime.

**1-9. DA campaigns**

In addition to the ongoing installation crime prevention effort which is locally developed, Department of the Army sponsors three campaigns each year to address crime problems which are having a significant impact on the Army as a whole. Dates for each campaign are published annually in a Department of the Army circular; however, these dates may be changed to take advantage of publicity generated by campaigns in the local civilian community. Because many crime problems transcend installation boundaries, it is essential that every effort be made to coordinate the installation program with that of the local civilian community to the maximum extent possible.

**CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT CYCLE**




Figure 1-1



15 November 1982

**1-10. Training**

The prerequisite skills for successful performance as an installation crime prevention officer are best developed through on-the-job experience as the supervisor of military police investigations or physical security inspections. More important than any technical skill is the cultivation of a frame of mind which instinctively examines each case or extend to determine not only what occurred, but also how the crime could have been prevented. Technical skills, like crime data analysis, which may not have been developed as an MPI or physical security supervisor are presented in courses taught by several civilian agencies. These classes should be utilized to the extent possible. Annex B contains addresses and points of contacts for approved civilian courses.

**1-11. Civilian crime prevention organizations**

There are many civilian crime prevention organizations at the national, state and local levels. Many of these organizations have produced crime prevention material including posters, radio spots, and leaflets. When the material and programs sponsored by civilian agencies can support Army crime prevention efforts, they should be used. The Army is a member of the National Crime Prevention Coalition, and actively encourages the use of their material. However, whenever material from a source outside of DOD is used, a copyright release must first be obtained. Normally, it is necessary to get a release for each separate item that is used. If there is any doubt as to the necessity of securing a copyright release, the crime prevention officer should refer the matter to the local Staff Judge Advocate General (JAG).

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## Chapter 2 Crime Analysis

**2-1. General**

*a.* Crime analysis is a system for identifying trends and patterns where they may exist. It is a routine, ongoing function for the installation crime prevention officer, and is the solid foundation upon which the installation crime prevention program is based. An effective crime analysis will establish—

- (1) Which crimes are having a significant impact on the installation.
- (2) What segment of the population is being victimized.
- (3) Who the perpetrators are.
- (4) The most common times of occurrence.
- (5) The areas which experience the highest number of incidents.
- (6) Offense unique information such as, types of weapons that are commonly employed or victims' actions that contributed to the occurrence of the particular offense.

*b.* With this type of information, specific countermeasures can be developed to reduce the opportunity for a crime to occur, or to remove the incentives for perpetrators. Without an effectiveness crime analysis, crime prevention programs can become unfocused; "broad brush" countermeasures can be implemented, and meaningful results lost.

*c.* While a professional analysis of crime data is absolutely essential, a very elaborate system is not necessary. Civilian studies indicate that police agencies which serve populations of less than 200,000 do not require automatic data processing equipment to maintain an effective crime analysis program. When the scope of the analysis is narrowed to produce only data to support crime prevention programs, rather than to support open investigations, the process is greatly simplified since the requirement to maintain files on known offenders, stolen vehicles, and stolen property is eliminated. In the near future, a separate pamphlet will be published containing procedures for risk analysis, allocation of resources based on offense data, and crime analysis in support of investigations.

**2-2. Sources of Information**

*a.* The basic source for identifying types of crime that warrant examination is the Law Enforcement and Discipline Report (DA Form 2819) for the installation. The information in this report can be used to plot the amount and the seasonal variations for each major type of crime. This will tell little about the conditions that are pro-

ducing the crime, or countermeasures, but as is useful because it identifies crime which can be eliminated from detailed analysis since they are not occurring frequently enough to have a major impact on the installation.

*b.* The Law Enforcement and Discipline Report will tell which major category of crime should be targeted, but it will not tell what specific type of crime is causing the most problems. For example, it may indicate that robbery is a problem, but it will not discriminate between robbery of commercial establishments, such as post exchanges, banks, or commissaries; and muggings of individuals. Since countermeasures for these two types of robbery are different, it is necessary to collect additional data. The best sources for this data are military police reports (MPR) and CID reports of investigation (ROI). If there are fewer than 200 cases for the past year for a particular type of crime, all of them should be examined. For bigger annual case loads, a random sample which is large enough to give results of plus or minus 5 percent accuracy should be examined. Annex B is a table which identifies the number cases that should be reviewed for various total case loads.

*c.* For any crime, there are certain general factors that should be identified. These are—

(1) *Types of victims.* It is absolutely essential to determine as precisely as possible, the segment of a post population that is being victimized. Junior soldiers live in different areas than do officers and senior NCOs. They patronize different clubs, and for the most part, work in different areas. Information programs must use different approaches and different publicity vehicles to get the same message to different portions of the population. If the specific population segment that is being victimized is not identified, it is possible expend a very large amount of resources and not have any significant impact on the targeted crime, because the message is not getting to the people who need to put it into action.

(2) *Perpetrators.* As with the victim profile, data on perpetrators is essential to insure the countermeasures are targeted against the correct population group to discourage offenses. For example, it will do little good control entrance of civilians onto an installation as a measure to reduce auto thefts, because most of the on-post auto thefts are committed by junior enlisted personnel who have legitimate reasons for entering the installation. The more specific a profile of a typical offender is, the easier it will be design a program to discourage the offense.

(3) *Geographical Data.* From a legal standpoint, a

precise location of a crime by the investigator is mandatory, and MPR and ROI normally contain a street address or description like, "In a parking lot on the east side of building 1409." While this type of description fulfills the requirements for identifying the location of the incident in court, it does not help the crime prevention officer as much as the description of the area which includes information about the type of activity that normally takes the place at that location. For example, a description like, "In a parking lot on the east side of the NCO club (building 1401)," or, "In a parking lot on the east side of building 1408, a troop billets for Company A 15th Cav), is much more useful. This type of information may help to develop a list of very specific types of areas where a particular type of crime is occurring and make it easier for the provost marshal to provide intensive military police support in these areas. For example, if there has been a rash of incidents in which cars are broken into and tape decks were stolen, it helps to know that 90 percent occurred in parking areas by troop billets, rather than near service areas or places of duty. If there were an unlimited number of military police, we could cover every area, but since the number of MP's in the Army is actually going down, we need to insure that they spend the greatest amount of time in the areas where most of the crime is occurring.

(4) *Chronological Data.* As with geographical data, the more specific the time of occurrence pattern is for a crime, the easier it is to apply sufficient resources to effect the crime rate significantly. For each crime that is having a significant impact, the crime prevention officer should determine—

- (a) Major seasonal variations.
- (b) Monthly variations. Is there a concentration of crimes immediately before or after pay day?
- (c) Is there a concentration of incidents on weekends. Each day represents about 14.25 percent of the week. Concentrations of crime higher than that for any particular day may be significant.
- (d) Time of day. Is there a particular time period that accounts for a disproportionate share of the incidents?

d. In addition to the factors that should be examined for all crimes, there are "crime specific" factors which are useful in analyzing specific offenses. These are—

- (1) *Housebreaking/Burglary.*
  - (a) Type of building that was attacked, i.e., family housing unit; troop barracks, PX, etc.
  - (b) Occupied or unoccupied.
  - (c) Point of entry—door, window, etc.
  - (d) Method of entry—unsecured door, forced door, forced window, etc.
  - (e) What property was stolen; was it marked?
- (2) *Robbery.*
  - (a) Number of perpetrators.
  - (b) Method of operation of perpetrators.

- (c) Type weapon employed.
- (d) Type robbery—was it a street mugging, residential robbery, or robbery of a commercial establishment.

- (e) Was the victim injured?
- (f) Actions by the victim that contributed to his being targeted.

(3) *Larceny.*

- (a) Type of property taken.
  - (b) Was it secured or unsecured?
  - (c) Method of operation of the perpetrator.
- (4) *Auto Theft.*
- (a) Type vehicle stolen—POV, automobile, motorcycle, etc.
  - (b) Secured or unsecured.
  - (c) Recovered or not recovered, and area where the vehicle was recovered.
  - (d) Was the vehicle stripped of parts?
  - (e) Method of operation of the perpetrator.

(5) *Forgery.*

- (a) What type document was forged?
- (b) How was the document obtained?
- (c) Type of identification used in passing the forged document.
- (d) Con games/techniques employed.

(6) *Rape and Sex Offenses.*

- (a) Perpetrator method of operation.
- (b) Relationship of the victim and perpetrator (blood relatives, acquaintances, strangers).
- (c) Degree of force used.

(7) *Aggravated Assault/Murder.*

- (a) Relationship of victim and perpetrator.
- (b) Motivation.
- (c) Weapon used.

e. Crime prevention officers who have attempted to use MPR's and ROI's as a sole source of data know that in many cases the required information is not contained in sufficient detail to be useful. To correct this situation, investigators and inspectors must be trained to recognize conditions which contributed to the occurrence of the crime as well as the information needed to identify and prosecute the offender. As a minimum, crime prevention officers should insure that all law enforcement personnel know the general and crime specific factors which are required to analyze each type of crime, and he should provide feedback through the law enforcement operations staff when reports are received which do not contain the required information. If this is done, high quality data can be collected without generating additional reports to collect crime information for analysis.

f. Military police reports and reports of investigation are not the only sources of information on which to base an installation crime prevention program. Physical security inspection results, summaries of common deficiencies noted by the Inspector General, data from

the Judge Advocate General Claims section, and information summaries from reports of survey on lost government material can all produce worthwhile information on conditions that lead to the commission of crimes. The installation crime prevention officer should either review these documents or arrange for personnel in the approving agency for the reports to provide specific information on crime conducive conditions as it surfaces in the reports. In this last case, the crime prevention officer must insure that the reviewing authority understands what information is of value.

### 2-3. Analysis of individual crimes

a. *Crime analysis is most effective when applied to the class of criminal offenses where a high probability of recurrence exists.*

(1) Single incident type crimes do not lend themselves to analysis. Most crimes against persons do not usually benefit from analysis, with the notable exceptions of rape, robbery, and related combinations of offenses (such as kidnap-rape, robbery-attempted murder, burglary-rape, burglary-robbery-kidnap). Analyzing the isolated criminal offenses has some value, such as gaining knowledge of where these offenses are most likely to reoccur. However, this knowledge is usually difficult to utilize effectively for preventive purposes.

(2) For almost all crimes there are universal factors available for analysis. The availability of these factors varies greatly between crime types and specific reported offenses.

(3) In addition to the universal factors, there is an almost infinite number of factors that may be considered specific to a particular crime class or type. These crime-specific factors are data elements that are usually recorded during the reporting of a particular type of offense and are used for analysis purposes.

b. *Crime-specific factors provide information which can be used by the analyst to connect crimes with similar characteristics.* Information regarding physical evidence may have considerable value in the analysis of several crime types, such as burglary and auto theft. Thus, the suitability of different crimes to analysis is dependent upon the seven universal factors, specific MO factors, and physical evidence. With these considerations in mind the different crime types and classifications will be examined in order to determine their applicability to analysis.

c. *House breaking/burglary analysis.* Although housebreaking/burglary are two of the most difficult crimes to prevent, they are the most suitable for analysis. The typical housebreaker or burglar establishes an MO pattern based upon successful past offenses. Usually a burglar will continue to commit similar crimes until he is either apprehended or for some other reason ceases to commit burglaries. The universal and crime specific informational factors previously presented are depicted

in figure 2-1 for a typical housebreaking or burglary case in which the criminal offender succeeds in completing the crime unapprehended.

(1) The available information evaluation must consider the specificity, accuracy, and value of the information received.

(2) The analysis of housebreaking/burglaries should be systematically directed toward examining the following factors:

- (a) Geographic factors.
- (b) Property loss descriptions.
- (c) Specific MO factors.
- (d) Victim target descriptors.
- (e) Physical evidence factors.
- (f) Time factors.
- (g) Suspect descriptors.
- (h) Suspect vehicle descriptors.


(3) In this listing, the informational factors are presented in order of relative importance. It should be emphasized that the above listing is for analysis purposes. The ordering of a listing for investigative solutions would be very different.

d. *Commercial housebreaking analysis.* The analysis of commercial housebreaking is in many respects easier than that of residential housebreaking/burglaries. More pertinent information is available to the analyst in analyzing commercial housebreaking. Commercial housebreakings are more specialized and will exhibit more specific MO characteristics. The analyst normally has more specific information regarding point and method of entry, victim target description, and property loss description. The time factors for commercial housebreaking may be of less value in commercial housebreaking analysis than in residential burglary analysis since most commercial housebreakings occur at night or during weekends.

(1) The commercial housebreaker is generally more mobile than the residential burglar. An analysis of commercial housebreaking is not as restricted in geographical area as an analysis of residential burglaries. The commercial burglar may travel a considerable distance to attack a particular type of business. The residential burglar, however, is less discriminating because he has a greater number of potential targets. Figure 2-2 depicts the availability and informational value of the universal and crime-specific factors for a commercial housebreaking case.


(2) A comparison of this figure with that for residential burglary will reveal certain differences. The analysis of commercial housebreaking should be systematically directed toward examining the following listing of information factors:

- (a) Victim target descriptors.
- (b) Specific MO factors.
- (c) Geographic factors.
- (d) Property loss descriptors.



- = High Availability (75%-100%)
- - - - = Relative Availability (25%-75%)
- - - - = Low Availability (0%-25%)

Figure 2-1: Burglary/Residential Housebreaking



- = High Availability (75%-100%)
- - - - = Relative Availability (25%-75%)
- - - - = Low Availability (0%-25%)

Figure 2-2: Commercial Housebreaking

- (e) Physical evidence factors.
- (f) Suspect descriptors.
- (g) Suspect vehicle descriptors.
- (h) Time factors.

(3) The commercial housebreaker may be a juvenile criminal, an addict, or a professional. Each of these types provides a different set of factors to analyze. The above listing is a composite of the three types.

e. *Robbery.* Robberies are well suited to analysis. This class of criminal offenders is usually likely to operate in a given geographical area. The commercial robber generally seeks a sizeable amount of cash, while targets of the street robber frequently include credit cards, checks, and other valuables in addition to cash.

(1) The presence of physical evidence is more probable in street robberies than in commercial robbery because the criminal offender frequently discards such evidence as purses and wallets after completing the offense. The mugger frequently utilizes surprise as part of his MO in order to reduce his chances of apprehension by physical identification.

(2) The probability of universal and crime specific informational factors for a typical robbery offense is depicted in figure 2-3. The analysis of these crimes should be primarily concerned with systematic examination of cases according to the following listing:

- (a) Geographic factors.
- (b) Victim target descriptors.
- (c) Time factors.
- (d) Suspect descriptors.
- (e) Property loss descriptors.
- (f) Specific MO factors.
- (g) Physical evidence factors.
- (h) Suspect vehicle descriptors.

f. *Auto larceny analysis.* Auto theft is probably the best suited crime for analysis. The analyst frequently has more information available on any given auto theft than any other crime. Although suspect descriptive information is usually lacking in auto larceny cases, the greater availability of crime specific information makes auto theft extremely receptive to analysis.

(1) Auto theft offenders include joy-riders, professional care dismantlers, and wholesalers of stolen vehicles. In many cases, until apprehended, all of these offenders will establish and maintain a particular MO.

(2) Helpful elements in analyzing auto theft cases are the availability of information, the presence of physical evidence, and the ability of the stolen property to be traced. The probability of universal and crime specific informational factors for a typical reported auto theft case is depicted in figure 2-4.

(3) Of special importance in this figure are the geographic factors, suspect vehicle descriptors, and property loss descriptors. In analyzing an auto theft, the analyst usually has information concerning two geographic locations for analysis (location stolen and lo-

cation recovered). Also, the suspect vehicle descriptors, property loss descriptors, and victim target descriptors are all the same. This greatly augments the analysis of auto thefts. In the following listing of general priorities, the suspect vehicle descriptors, property loss descriptors, and victim target descriptors should be considered of equal importance:

- (a) Geographic factors.
- (b) Victim target descriptors.
- (c) Suspect vehicle descriptors.
- (d) Property loss descriptors.
- (e) Specific MO factors.
- (f) Time factors.
- (g) Physical evidence factors.
- (h) Suspect descriptors.

(4) In an examination of specific MO factors in auto theft, the analyst will place emphasis on the condition of the vehicle when recovered. Factors of primary importance in analyzing auto theft cases are the recovery location, make and model, and the degree of strip-page of the stolen auto.

g. *Larceny and theft analysis.* Theft reports of a general nature are not usually well suited to analysis. Some benefits are derived from analyzing larceny offenses when specific factors are selected; auto accession thefts, for example, can be specifically analyzed.

(1) The problem encountered in attempting to analyze general theft cases result from the large volume of reported offenses, the large number of possible crime types, and the many possible MO patterns. In order to analyze theft cases, the analysis operation must first restrict the number of cases and crime classification to a workable level. This may be done by classifying general theft cases into special categories and analyzing them by considering only special MO factors. Logical subclassifications include thefts from autos, thefts of auto accessories, bicycle thefts, shipping dock thefts, tool and equipment thefts, etc.

(2) Many of the general theft cases received by the crime prevention section will be helpful in analyzing other crime types. For example, an increasing trend in automobile parts thefts may have common perpetrators involved in auto theft and stripping.

(3) Due to the great number of possible crimes encompassed in the UCMJ article, a listing of informational factors and their values is difficult to construct. The following listing represents a more general set of analysis priorities than those previously presented, and may be useful in considering general theft analysis:

- (a) Property loss descriptors.
- (b) Victim target descriptors.
- (c) Geographic factors.
- (d) Specific MO factors.
- (e) Time factors.
- (f) Suspect descriptors.




Figure 2-3: Robbery




Figure 2-4: Auto Theft

- (g) Suspect vehicle descriptors.
- (h) Physical evidence factors.

(4) When particular patterns appear, the analysis section can undertake specific in-depth analysis programs.

*h. Rape and sex crime analysis.* Rape and sex crimes fall into two distinct categories: those in which the criminal offender is known to the victim, and those in which he is unknown (stranger-to-stranger). Those cases in which the offender is known to the victim are of limited informational value to the analyst. The in-depth analysis of rape and sex crimes should be restricted to those cases in which there is no apparent relationship between the suspect and victim. Rape and sex offenses in which the victim knows the suspect are often crimes of opportunity. Usually a particular MO is not established by these offenders. On the other hand, the rapist or sex offender committing crimes of the "stranger-to-stranger" type will usually provide definite MO patterns, making his crimes well suited to analysis. The burglary with rape motive, for example, is particularly well suited to analysis, as is the kidnapper-child molester. The advantages to analyzing rape and sex offenses of the stranger-to-stranger types lies in the seriousness of the crime, its relative rareness, and the availability of information for a particular offense or body of offenses.

(1) The probability of universal and crime specific informational factors for a typical reported rape or sex offense of the stranger-to-stranger type depicted in figure 2-5. As can be seen, the "property loss factor" has been changed due to its lack of applicability.

(2) As with robbery, the suspect descriptive factors are of primary concern to the analyst in examining rape and sex offenses. The victim descriptive factors are also of importance in analyzing rape and sex offenses; in many cases, the perpetrator will restrict his attacks to victims of a certain age, a particular race, or particular occupation grouping. The analysis of rape and sex crimes should consider examining cases according to the following listing based on information availability and value:

- (a) Crime type and classification.
- (b) Suspect descriptors.
- (c) Specific MO factors.
- (d) Victim target descriptors.
- (e) Geographic factors.
- (f) Time factors.
- (g) Suspect vehicle descriptors.
- (h) Victim-suspect relationship.
- (i) Physical evidence factors.

*i. Forgery and fraud analysis.* Forgeries and fraud cases can provide correlative information on other reported criminal information on other reported criminal offenses such as burglary and strong-armed robbery. The analysis of forgeries is also aided by the fact that

most forgers are repeaters who have established definite MO patterns.

(1) Although forgery and fraud offenses are difficult to prevent or suppress, these are crimes that can be solved if available information is effectively utilized. Analysis of forgery and fraud cases can generate information that is disseminated to area merchants in the form of "Check Warning Bulletins". The use of these bulletins can enhance community relations.

(2) The principal problem encountered in analyzing forgery and fraud cases is the temporal availability of information. In some cases a delay of between three or four days to several months occurs between the time the offense was committed and the time it was reported.

*j. Assault and murder analysis.* Most criminal offenses constituting assault and murder do not lend themselves to analysis. The comparative rarity of these crimes involving complete strangers makes it difficult to plot and predict assaults and murders. To effectively predict assaults and murders, a tremendous amount of time and research will be necessary.

**2-9. Detail procedures for crime analysis**

*a.* In organizing the flow of information within a provost marshal's office to facilitate analysis in support of crime prevention efforts, the crime prevention officer should provide the administrative section with a list of offenses which lend themselves to analysis and which are capable of being suppressed by effective crime prevention programs. When final action on an MPR or ROI covering one of these offenses has been taken, it should be forwarded to the crime prevention officer for review.

*b.* The crime prevention officer, using preprinted worksheet containing the factors which are of particular interest for that offense, should record the specific crime factors. If some of the information is not available, he should contact the investigator who prepared the final report and secure the information while it is still clear in his mind. The period covered by each worksheet will depend on the volume of cases at the particular installation. For a crime like robbery that has a low incidence rate on most installations, one worksheet will suffice for the entire calendar year. For a more frequent crime, such as larceny, it may be necessary to use a different worksheet for each month or quarter and to use a summary sheet to keep track of the data from all of the reporting periods in the year.

*c.* The data collection sheets give specific information on individual types of crime. This together with general crime trends which are identified by comparing the data from DA Form 2819 for the current period to earlier periods; and the geographic data from the crime occurrence map gives most of the information that is required to develop tightly targeted crime prevention programs. While this system does require additional forms

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


Figure 2-5: Rape/Sex Offenses

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(the data collection sheets and crime occurrence map) to be developed for use within the crime prevention section, it does not increase the workload of either patrols or investigators, since they prepare only the MPRs and ROI which are required for other purposes.

d. In addition to the information recorded in the forms, hand written notes should be kept on items or trends that become apparent to the analyst as he reviews cases. For example, as a result of reading the cases on robbery to extract information for his collection form, the analyst may notice that a high proportion of the victims were attacked while crossing an unlighted athletic field near a troop billet area. This should be recorded so that it may be used in publicity campaigns and also so that it may be passed along to patrols who routinely patrol the troop billet areas.

e. Geographic analysis. A geographic analysis is performed to determine information not available in the original data element source (a crime report for example). When a pin is used to indicate a crime location on a map, the relationship to other reported crimes of the same type becomes apparent to the analyst. Geographic analysis is normally performed by mapping.

f. Mapping analysis techniques involve the use of a map to depict the actual geographical relationships between particular criminal events according to prescribed data elements. A pin map displaying the actual locations of burglaries over a period of time is an example of such a technique.

g. In selecting a mapping technique several different things must be considered. These include the number of data elements that are to be recorded in the mapping, the temporal considerations that must be met, the retrievability of stored data, and the number of maps to be maintained.

h. The number of data elements to be recorded on a map can dictate the technique to be utilized. For example, if the case number is to be recorded in conjunction with the location of offense, a dot (color-coded, self-adhesive paper disks) map or flag pin map can be utilized, whereas a typical color-coded pin map cannot. If particular MO factors are to be recorded, various color-coded and marked pins can be utilized for identifying specific MO patterns.

i. In addition, the length of time a particular map or set of maps is maintained should be considered. No set rules have been established regarding map maintenance time; however, a number of agencies with operating crime analysis systems were surveyed. Generally, the maps are maintained either for a one to three month period, or two maps were maintained for each crime type (one on a weekly or monthly basis and the other

on a year to date or quarterly basis). This decision should be based on the volume of criminal types for the area to be mapped, physical space limitations, the specific mapping technique adopted, and the number of maps to be maintained.

j. Stored map data should be easily retrievable for use in comparisons of data. Pin maps can be recorded by the photographic means. The use of two slides projectors to superimpose one figure over another is one effective method data retrieval. The use of color-coded paper dots placed on acetate overlays covering area maps facilitates the retrieval of recorded data.

k. The number of maps to be maintained must be based on physical space limitations, staffing of the crime prevention section, the types of crimes selected for analysis, and the maintenance period for each map. The agencies surveyed maintained from 18 maps to 3 maps. There are five crime types suited to geographical analysis (burglary, robbery, housebreaking, auto theft, and sex crimes).

l. The number of maps to be maintained by the crime prevention section can be reduced by utilizing one map to record more than one crime type. For example, housebreaking and burglaries can be placed on the same map by using different colored pins for each type of crime. The incorporation of numbered pins of different colors can be used to designate the type of premise attacked. Auto theft and recovery maps may be kept on the same map with recorded information on thefts of vehicle parts.

m. The number of maps maintained should reflect the needs of the agency according to the volume of reported crimes and the different data elements or informational factors to be recorded. Thus, the more detailed the analysis, the more maps required. The actual number of maps to be maintained must be left to the discretion of the individual agency; however, a starting point for this decision might be to consider keeping one map for each of the crime classifications for the present period, on a weekly or monthly basis, and either keep the previous period recorded map or maintain a year-to-date activity map.

n. Periodically, a summary of the information that has been collected, plus the crime prevention officer's comments including trends, countermeasures, and operational changes which may have an impact on the crime rate should be provided to the provost marshal, local CID commander, and the installation crime prevention council. Whether this is done monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually will depend on the volume of reported crime and the preference of the local provost marshal.

### Chapter 3 Command/Law Enforcement Countermeasures

#### 3-1. Introduction

a. This chapter discusses actions that commanders and/or provost marshals can take to reduce crime on Army installations. In many cases the actions described have applications other than strictly crime prevention. However, only the crime prevention aspects are discussed.

b. Most of the "hard data" available on the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in reducing crime come from studies conducted by civilians. While most of the findings of this type of study are applicable to crime prevention programs on Army installations, differences in population, degree of control that can be exercised by the authorities, and other environmental factors, may dictate that the civilian recommendation be modified prior to implementation on military installations.

#### Section I Crime Hot Lines

##### 3-2. Introduction to hot lines

A crime hot line is a dedicated crime reporting telephone number located at the military police/security desk. This program would allow anyone in the community to make an immediate report of any crime or suspicious activity he observes. An effective crime reporting program would be a deterrent to crime and enhance law enforcement responses to such incidents.

##### 3-3. Considerations

Considerations in implementing a crime reporting program would include the following:

a. Personnel reporting incidents should be allowed to remain anonymous if they desire, and this fact should be publicized. Some individuals will report their observations only if they know they can remain anonymous. If deemed feasible, neighborhood watch blocks could be provided designated block numbers that could be used when reporting crimes or other suspicious activities. This system would allow neighborhood blocks to receive feedback on the disposition of the reported incident.

b. The dedicated phone number used should be easy to remember. This could include a number where extension digits are all the same, in ascending or descending order, or spell out a word such as 4357 (HELP). Sticker labels listing the number could be placed on the

phone with other emergency numbers for quick reference.

c. The program should be well publicized.

d. Members on the installation should be educated on the desired procedures for reporting of incidents.

e. Each call should be documented and records maintained concerning results of these calls to evaluate the effectiveness of the program.

#### Section II Security Lighting

##### 3-4. Introduction to lighting

The idea that lighting can provide improved protection for people and facilities is as old as civilization. Over the years, protective lighting evolved from candle and wood power to more sophisticated gas lights, with the first systems installed by the early 1800's. Finally, with the perfection and expanded use of electricity, the first electric filament street lights began appearing during the 1870's, increasing visibility and providing communities with a feeling of security.

a. As military policemen you are aware of the effect that lighting has in reducing criminal opportunity. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that a variety of studies and experiments have recently been conducted that have documented this fact. For example, in December, 1973, in response to national appeals for energy conservation a small town in Indiana turned off its street lights. An immediate outbreak of vandalism and petty thefts occurred. The outbreak peaked with four firms in a commercial district being burglarized in a single evening. As a result, the conservationists' ideas were replaced by the realities of the community with public demand forcing a return to the properly lit streets.

b. This example is extreme. However, experience has shown the close relationship between illumination and crime. In fact, installation of improved, brighter street lighting in a number of cities has resulted in the following reported effects:

- (1) St. Louis, Missouri ..... A 40 percent reduction in stranger crime; a 29 percent drop in auto theft; and, a 13 percent reduction in commercial burglaries.
- (2) New York, New York ..... A 50 to 80 percent decrease in vandalism.  
(Public Parks)
- (3) Detroit, Michigan ..... A 55 percent decrease in street crimes.

- (4) Washington, DC ----- A 25 percent decrease in robbery, compared with an 8 percent decrease city-wide.
- (5) Chicago, Illinois ----- An 85 percent decrease in robbery; a 10 percent decline in auto theft; and, a 30 percent reduction in purse snatching.

c. It is because of this clear relationship that street lighting intensity has been increased in many communities well above standards required for traffic safety. Street lights, however, are not the only type of lighting important to crime prevention and security. Other types of illuminating devices such as flood lights, search lights, and fresnel units can also be used to increase security around homes, businesses and industrial complexes.

d. The selection, installation and maintenance of outdoor lighting is a facilities engineer function. However, the engineers are primarily concerned with the cost/effectiveness of lighting systems, energy conservation, and the elimination of safety hazards. As an installation crime prevention officer, you view lighting from a different perspective. It is up to you to convince the commander that in some applications, it is worthwhile to add more lighting than has been employed in the past. To do this you must understand lighting terminology, techniques, and equipment. Some of the more common terms and techniques are explained below.

### 3-5. Transitional lighting

a. Good lighting is the single most cost effective deterrent to crime, but what is *good* lighting? Ideally, a good lighting system would be reproduced daylight. Realistically, however, the system must furnish a high level of visibility and at the same time a low level of glare. One of the most critical problems that needs to be considered is that the evenness of outdoor light is more important than an absolute level. Too much lighting can actually be a hazard in itself. If the resultant glare or brightness makes visibility difficult, outdoor evening activity areas, such as a tennis court or playgrounds, can be hazardous because of the difficulty of seeing clearly into the surrounding area. When an individual leaves a brightly lighted area such as this and walks into a dark area their vision is momentarily reduced and their vulnerability is increased. The opportunity for criminal attack is more of a likelihood when a situation like this exists.

b. Transitional lighting can be effectively used to minimize this hazard. Transitional lighting merely provides a gradual light level change from a brightly lighted area to a dark area. A lower light level can be employed adjacent to the bright area and this would help to provide a safe transition.

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### 3-6. Understanding lighting technology: A definition of terms

a. Lighting technology involves a whole new language. Generally, the terms, definitions and discussions that appear in most texts are designed for the lighting engineer who has a strong foundation in the jargon and specifics of this subject. The terms presented below provide a point of departure that you may draw from in developing a better understanding of the subject. Some of the basic lighting terms that you, as a crime prevention officer, should be familiar with include:

(1) *Watt*: A term used to measure the amount of electrical energy consumed.

(2) *Lumen*: The lamps (light bulbs) used in various lighting equipment are rated in lumens. The lumen is frequently used as a term to express the output of a light source. Lumen is actually an expression of a light's efficiency as measured by lumens per watt.

(3) *Foot Candle*: This is another unit of illumination. It is defined as the illumination on a surface one square foot in area on which is uniformly distributed one lumen of light.

(4) *Coverage Factor*: The coverage factor is the minimum number of directions from which a point or area should be lighted depending upon the use of the area. For example, a coverage factor of two is required for parking areas and for protective lighting to reduce the effect of shadows between automobiles, piles of materials and similar bulky objects.

(5) *Quality of Lighting*: This term refers to the distribution of brightness and color rendition in a particular area. The term is generally used to describe how light can favorably contribute to visual performance, visual comfort, ease of scene, safety and aesthetics for specific tasks.

(6) *Reflector*: A device used to redirect the light by the process of reflection.

(7) *Refractor*: A glass band, globe or bowl designed to control the direction of the light by means of prisms.

(8) *Luminaire*: A complete lighting device consisting of a light source, together with its globe, reflector, refractor, and housing. The post, pole, or bracket is not considered a part of the luminaire.

(9) *Visual Factors*: The ease with which objects are seen is largely dependent upon four visual factors. These factors play an important part when the planning of effective security lighting is considered. These visual factors are—

(a) *Size*—larger objects are more readily seen and reflect a greater amount of light.

(b) *Brightness*—bright or light colored surfaces reflect more light than dark or tarnished reflector surface.

(c) *Contrast* is important in that an object placed against a strongly contrasting background will seem to

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reflect more light to the eye than when the object and the background are alike.

(d) Time is critical because it requires less time to see accurately under good illumination than it does with poor lighting.

### 3-7. General types of outside security lighting

a. There are four general types of outside security lighting. These are: continuous lighting; emergency lighting; movable lighting; and, stand-by lighting. Each is described briefly below.

b. Continuous lighting, the most familiar type of outdoor security lighting, can be designed to provide two specific results: greater projection or controlled lighting. The glare method of continuous lighting originated in prisons and correctional institutions where it is still used to illuminate walls and outside barriers. It has been described by some security experts as "a barrier of light" and is particularly effective for lighting boundaries around a facility and approaches to the site. This technique is normally used when the glare of lights directed across an area will not interfere with adjacent properties. The utility behind this method is that a potential intruder has difficulty seeing inside an area protected by such a "barrier"; thus, the lighting method creates a strong visual and psychological deterrent. Generally, flood lights are used in this way because the beam, although easy to direct, produces a great deal of glare that a possible intruder must face.

c. The controlled lighting approach is the second type of continuous lighting. It is generally employed in situations where due to surrounding property owners, nearby highways, or other limitations, it is necessary for the light to be more precisely focused. For example, the controlled lighting method would be used when the width of the lighted strip outside of an area must be controlled and adjusted to fit a particular need, such as illuminating a wide strip inside a fence and a narrow strip outside, or the lighting of a wall or roof. One of the most popular methods of controlled lighting for industrial and commercial use is the "surface method". This method provides for the complete illumination of a particular area or structure within a defined site; not only are the perimeters of the property lighted, but so are the various parking areas, storage lots, and other locations that require improved security. Another advantage of the surface method is that the lighting units are directed at a building rather than away from it so that its appearance is enhanced at night. This same principle is used in some locations to illuminate the front and surroundings of residential sites.

d. A second type of outside security lighting is stand-by lighting. Stand-by lighting systems generally consist of continuous systems but are designed for reserve or stand-by use, or to supplement continuous systems. These systems are engaged either automatically or manually

when the continuous system is inoperative or the need for additional lighting arises. A stand-by system can be most useful to light selectively a particular portion of a site should prowlers or intruders be suspected, or to light an area merely useful at a construction site.

e. A third type of system uses moveable lighting hardware. This system is manually operated and usually is made up of moveable search or flood lights that can be located in selected or special locations which will only require lighting for a temporary period. The moveable system can also be used to supplement continuous or stand-by lighting. This type of system would be particularly useful at a construction site.

f. The fourth system is emergency lighting. Emergency lights may duplicate any or all of the other three types of lighting. Generally, the emergency lighting system is used in times of power failure or other emergencies when other systems are inoperative. The unique feature of the emergency system is that it is based on an alternative power source such as a gas powered generator or batteries.

### 3-8 General types of lighting sources

a. Listed below are the general lighting sources that are mostly used in providing indoor or outdoor lighting. Their characteristics are described and their lumen output is summarized in the chart at the end of this section. The lighting sources discussed are: incandescent, mercury vapor, fluorescent, metal halide, and sodium vapor.

b. Incandescent lighting systems have low initial cost and provide good color rendition. However, incandescent lamps are relatively short in rated life (500-10,000 hours) and low in lamp efficiency (17-23 LPW) when compared to other lighting sources.

c. Mercury vapor lamps emit a purplish white color, caused by an electric current passing through a tube of conducting and luminous gas. This type of light is generally considered more efficient than the incandescent lamp and is widespread use as exterior lighting. Approximately 75 percent of all street lighting is mercury vapor. Because mercury lamps have a long life (24,000 hours) and good lumen maintenance characteristics, they are widely used in applications where long burning hours are customary. Good color rendition is provided and the lumen per watt is 45-63.

d. Metal halide is similar in physical appearance to mercury vapor, but provides a light source of higher luminous efficiency and better color rendition. The rated life hours is short when compared to the 24,000 of mercury lamps. Used in applications where color rendition is of primary importance and generally where the burning hours per year are low. Rated at 80-100 LPW.

e. Fluorescent lights provides good color rendition, high lamp efficiency (67-83 LPW) as well as long life (12,000-20,000 hours). However, their long length, rel-



ative to their small diameter, causes luminaires to have very wide horizontal beam spreads. Fluorescent lamps are temperature sensitive and low ambient temperatures can decrease the efficiency. Fluorescent lights cannot project light over long distances and thus are not desirable as flood type lights. This type of light is very commonly used for office and indoor business lighting.

f. High pressure sodium vapor is a relatively new light source which was introduced in 1965 and is rapidly gaining acceptance for exterior lighting of parking areas, roadways and buildings and industrial and commercial interior installations. Constructed on the same principle as mercury vapor lamps but emit a golden-white to light pink color. Provides high lumen efficiency (100-140) and provides relatively good color rendition. Lamp life expected is up to 24,000 hours. Maintenance of light output is good and average about 90 percent throughout its rated life.

g. Low pressure sodium vapor is similar in principles of operation to other types of vapor lights but provides a much higher lumen per watt ratio (135-180). Color emitted is a golden-yellow or amber and is within a very narrow band of yellow wave-length. This monochromatic emission occurs within the most sensitive portion of human eye response and thus provides good visual ability. However, this narrow band width also is responsible for very poor color rendition. LPSV lights have about 95 percent lumen maintenance throughout their rated life. The higher wattage LPSV lamps increase to about 40' in length and thus reduces optical control. LPSV will normally restrike within a few seconds should there be a momentary power loss. Average lamp life is 18,000 hours.

### 3-9. Guidelines to recommending a lighting system

a. The location of lights, the direction of beams, and the types of general and back up systems that you may recommend will depend upon a number of variables. These include such things as the size of the area to be secured, the amount of light needed to adequately protect the facility, the nature of other protective systems that the facility may already be using, and the type and nature of the facility to be protected, i.e., warehouse, retail outlet, commercial facility or residential site.

b. When traffic safety is considered, approximately one to two foot candles is a typical light level for high traffic streets and interchanges, while a level of .4 foot candles is typical for residential streets. Crime deterrent lighting, by comparison, usually approaches the 100 foot candle level, while moonlit streets are at the .02 foot candle level.

### 3-10. Types of lighting equipment

a. Four types of lighting equipment generally used

or associated with security lighting are: flood lights, street lights, fresnel units and search lights.

b. Floodlights can be used to accommodate most outdoor security lighting needs, including the illumination of boundaries, fences, and buildings and for the emphasis of vital areas or particular buildings. The floodlight is so versatile because it is designed to form a beam that can be projected to a distant point or used to highlight a particular area. The beam width available in flood lights are roughly classified as narrow, medium and wide. These widths may also be obtained in a variety of sizes and types of lamps.

c. The incandescent floodlight is commonly used in all types of security situations—commercial, industrial and residential. The other type of lamp—the gaseous discharge lamp—may consist of either mercury or sodium vapor. It should be pointed out that, in the main, the use of gaseous discharge lamps for protective lighting may be somewhat limited due to the fact that they require a period of two to five minutes to warm up to their full light output. In addition, if a voltage interruption occurs while they are operating the gaseous types require a slightly longer period to re-light.

d. Street lights have received the most widespread notoriety for their value in reducing crime. Generally, street lights are rated by the size of the lamp and the characteristics of the light distributed. More specifically, there are four types of lighting units that are utilized in street lighting. The most common and oldest is the incandescent lamp. Although it is the least expensive in terms of purchase, it is the most expensive to operate in terms of energy consumed and the number needed. As such, incandescent lighting is generally recognized as the least efficient and economical type of street lighting for use today.

e. The second type of lighting unit that, as a recently developed system has been acclaimed by some police officials as "the best source available" is the high intensity sodium vapor lamp. This lamp produces more lumens per watt than most other types, is brighter, cheaper to maintain, and the color rendition is close to that of natural daylight—a point that should be considered strongly in traffic control lighting and also in crime situations.

f. The third and fourth types of devices commonly used for street lighting are the mercury vapor and metal halide lamps. Both are bright and emit a good color rendition. They are not as efficient as the newer high intensity sodium vapor lights. In addition, they are more expensive to operate than sodium vapor lights and do not produce as many lumens of light per watt.

g. There are a number of street lighting systems and varieties that must be considered when recommending the adoption of street lighting as a crime prevention technique within a community. Placement and quality of lighting equipment depends in a large part on char-

acteristics and needs of the areas to be served. For example, lighting that might be sufficient for a low-crime suburban area might not be adequate in a high-crime, inner city area. In addition, the value and effectiveness of an approved lighting program should not be judged only on the basis of measurable crime reduction. If streets and parks are more secure and inviting, they can help bring people together, enhance the community, and foster a sense of mutual independence and participation. Based on these arguments the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals developed the following recommendation on street lighting programs for high crime areas,

"... units of local government (should) consider the establishment of approved street lighting programs in high crime areas. The needs and wishes of the community should be a determining factor from the outset and public officials should carefully evaluate the experience of other jurisdictions before initiating their own program."

h. When discussing the type of street lighting system that a community should adopt, a crime prevention officer must keep a number of factors in mind. That is, the kind of light source and wattage needed to light a particular street depends on such variables as the height and placement of existing light poles, the amount of reflection offered by surrounding surfaces, and potential glare, among others. In addition, cost factors for installation and maintenance are also important. Finally, the nature of the community should be assessed—residential versus commercial versus industrial. Remember, realistically, few cities will have the resources to become involved in a total re-lighting program.

i. For the most part, critical areas of the city should be lighted, or old light sources should be replaced. It will be your responsibility to identify these areas after analysis of sites, crime statistics and other factors that you feel are pertinent to the question of security and the reduction of criminal opportunity.

j. Fresnel units are another type of lighting device that can be used in crime prevention. These units which offer a glaretype security, deliver fan shaped beams of light that are approximately 180 degrees in the horizontal and 15 to 30 degrees in the vertical. The application of this type of unit is limited to areas where the resulting "objectionable" glare will not disturb neighborhood activities. Thus, the fresnel unit is usually restricted to industrial sites and commercial establishments that do not abut residential areas.

k. Although offering more limited opportunities for application, search lights also provide a type of crime

related lighting system. Search lights are generally of an incandescent light bulb type and are designed for simplicity and dependability. These lights commonly range from 12 to 24 inches in diameter, with a direct, but restricted beam. Power generally ranges from 250 watts to 3,000 watts.

### 3-11. Automatic lighting control

a. Two basic means of automatic light control used to regulate the hours of operation are the *timer* and *photoelectric cell*. A timer is essentially an electric clock which operates a set of contacts through a preset turn on/turn off cycle. Some timers can be multiprogrammed to turn a light off and on numerous times within a 24 hour period. Timers are versatile in that they can also be used to operate other appliances such as a radio or television. Portable timers will cost between 5-15 dollars. The built in type with more sophisticated programming and more capabilities cost considerably more.

b. The photoelectric cell is widely used to control outside lighting and also building exterior lighting. With the photocell, the amount of light falling on the cell determines the light is off or on. The photocell works on current and resistance principles. If there is a low light level hitting the photocell the resistance of the cell is lowered and current will flow to energize the light. As the light level increases the resistance also increases and cuts off the current and turns to light off. The advantage of the photocell over the timer is that the photocell automatically compensates for the change in times of sunset and sunrise. Photocells are built in as a component of many outdoor light fixtures or can be easily added to the fixture. One photocell can be used to control a number of lights or each light may be equipped with photocell. For residential lighting, photocell units can also be supplied with the fixture or it can be added to an existing fixture.

### 3-12. Lighting and the energy crisis

a. Other than street lighting, no statistical accounts have been made as to the effect various types of lighting discussed above have on reducing crime. While the nation is facing an energy crisis and conservation recommendations have been common, there is a critical question to homeowners, industrialists, and businessmen as to whether or not it is cost-effective to reduce security lighting. The example presented at the outset of this discussion concerning the experience in a small Indiana town is instructive. Patently, lighting is a critical and needed security device both in a residential area and among businesses. Thus, as a crime prevention officer, it will not be difficult for you to explain and have strong support for the continued use of private security lighting systems.

b. Publicity supported systems, however, may be questioned in light of the current crisis. Generally "street

lights" utilize about .7 percent of the electrical energy generated in this nation. The public's return for this consumption of now scarce energy is a general feeling that street lights have a deterrent effect on street crimes. This effect is somewhat sustained by research conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the fact that various communities which have installed improved street lighting in certain areas have reported reductions in the rate of street crime. Thus, it is the judgement of LEAA that any American community is justified in not taking any action toward reducing street lighting if it so chooses.

c. Moreover, the use of security lighting as a crime deterrent has been supported, although in a limited fashion, through research and is accepted by the federal government as a viable tool in assisting a community in its fight against crime. As a crime prevention officer, it will be your duty to inform your installation commander and facility engineer of the value of improved lighting. In fact, more and more police officials are beginning to see the need to assign high priority to improved lighting as a valuable and necessary technique to reduce criminal opportunity.

### Section III Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### 3-13. Introduction

Crime prevention practitioners are recognizing the importance of considering design and physical planning in the reduction of crime. Crime prevention officers have an opportunity to influence the design of major facilities through the Installation Planning Board. However, to be effective, he must understand a number of concepts on the relationship between the physical design of buildings and crime occurrences. These include the concepts of: territoriality; natural surveillance; and defensible space. Each is reviewed below.

#### 3-14. Territoriality

Historically, the single family home on its own piece of land, somewhat isolated from its neighbors (but often by as little as a few feet) has been considered to be the family's "territory." The single-family home sits on a piece of land buffered from neighbors and the public street by intervening grounds. At times, a buffer is reinforced by symbolic shrubs or fences. The positioning of lights in windows which look out upon the buffering grounds also act to reinforce the claim.

a. Unfortunately, as the population has grown and the need for housing has increased, the trend toward the development of single-family units has been paralleled, if not outstripped, by the development of row-houses, apartment buildings, and various high-rise structures. Architects, planners, and designers involved

in developing these structures have not paid a great deal of attention to crime control or the need for an individual or family group to identify with its home in a manner that might affect crime. As a result, most families living in an apartment building consider the space outside their apartment unit door to be distinctly public; in effect, they relegate responsibility for all activity outside the immediate confines of their apartment to the public authorities. A question is whether environmental design can be employed to extend the boundaries of these private realms; to subdivide public space outside quarters so that more of the common space comes under the influence and responsibility of the resident.

b. Through extensive research and the examination of efficiently functioning housing developments, a number of mechanisms were identified that might be used in the design process, or be added to a facility after the fact, that would promote the residents of multi-family dwellings to identify more with the ground or area around their immediate home site and to assume responsibility for its protection. Presented below is a brief discussion of a number of the mechanisms.

(1) *The Site Design.* If the grounds around a set of quarters can be directly identified with a particular building and if the residents of that building take a personal interest in the use or upkeep of that area, they will play a role in protecting it. Through proper site design, a recreational area adjoining a building may be used as a buffer zone by providing play equipment for young children and seating areas for adults. The fact that children play and adults sit in these areas serves to increase the residents' concern with the activity taking place there. Strangers are usually recognized and their activity comes under observation and immediate questioning.

(2) *Street Design.* Research has shown that by the placement, enclosure or re-routing of streets and traffic, the nature of a particular area can be changed and the crime rate reduced. For example, a particular one or two block portion of a street might be closed to vehicular traffic and play equipment and seats added. In a number of areas where this technique has been used, it was found that the residents claim that their street is now used very differently; children play in the central roadways; almost everyone claims to know or at least recognize people up and down the block; and strangers on the street are greeted by questioning glances. Similar approaches involve re-routing traffic during particular times of the day or week and, where space is available, designing a play and communal area.

(3) *Symbolic Barriers.* Other types of barriers that planners and designers use in laying out an area include: open gateways, light standards, low walls, plantings and so on. These are symbolic barriers. Both physical and symbolic barriers serve the same purpose—to inform

an individual that he is passing from a public to a private space. Symbolic barriers have, traditionally been identified by residents as boundary lines that define areas of comparative safety.

There are many places that warrant the use of symbolic barriers. These included *transition points* between a public street and the semi-public grounds of a building, or between the lobby of a building and the corridor or hallways on particular floors of that building.

(4) *Internal Design.* Although economics may sometimes enter the picture, the interior of buildings may be designed for specific groupings of apartment units and shared entrances that cause the residents of these apartments to develop a concern for the space immediately adjacent to their dwelling. For example, on each floor of an apartment building, two to four families might be required to share a common corridor area. The apartment doors would be grouped around that common corridor and access to elevators or stairs might be screened by a glazed partition. The net effect would be that the residents of the floor would adopt the corridor as a collective extension of their dwelling unit and would take an increased interest in its maintenance, and use.

(5) *Locating Facilities and Amenities.* The location of particular facilities such as play and sitting areas, washer/dryer facilities, etc., will tend to give an area a high intensity of use and also support the idea of "territoriality." That is, the presence of residents involved in various activities (i.e. children at play, people chatting or engaged in other types of activities) for casual surveillance by concerned members of the family and screens out possible intruders.

(6) *The Significance of Numbers.* Research has indicated that reducing the number of apartment units grouped together to share a collectively defined area, and limiting the number of buildings that comprise a housing project, are extremely important factors in the successful creation of an environment that residents will help to protect. Research has documented the fact that housing projects comprised of fewer high-rise buildings (two to four) have lower crime rates than projects containing larger number of buildings. Based on this finding, it is argued that there appears to be much less freedom of movement in the public spaces of the smaller high-rise projects. Unlike buildings and large developments, every building of a small grouping usually has an entrance directly off a public street. They more closely resemble middle income high-rise developments and look more private.

c. As a crime prevention officer you may not be in a position to directly employ these techniques. However, your familiarity with these approaches and the value of their use in the crime prevention process are important elements in your arsenal of tools to create

public involvement in reducing crime. In particular, the purpose of outlining these tools is not to equip you to be a "designer", but rather to equip you to communicate with those who are involved in that profession. The discussion that follows will further enhance your ability to converse with designers.

#### 3-15. Natural surveillance

a. Experience has shown that the ability to observe criminal activity may not be adequate to stimulate an observer to respond with assistance to the person or property being victimized. The decision to act depends upon the presence of motivational conditions, including:

(1) The degree to which the observer has developed a sense of personal and property rights that are being violated by the criminal act.

(2) The degree to which the observer feels that the event is within his area of influence.

(3) The observer's ability to clearly identify whether the act is unusual for the particular area.

(4) The observer's identification with either the victim or the property being vandalized.

(5) The degree to which the observer believes he can effectively alter the course of events he is observing.

b. Based on these conditions, a number of mechanisms have been identified that can be utilized in the design of the grounds and internal areas of apartment units, housing developments and other residential areas to facilitate natural monitoring of activities taking place. By providing opportunities for surveillance through the positioning of apartment windows in relation to stairs, corridors and the outside, continual natural observation will be maintained and crime will be deterred. If such steps are taken the security of observed areas will be understood by the potential criminal which will make him think twice before committing a crime.

c. The first of these natural surveillance mechanisms involves the positioning of service areas and access paths leading to apartment buildings to facilitate surveillance by residents and authorities. For example, buildings might be designed so that their entries face and are within 50 feet of a street; well-lit paths lead to the front door or lobby areas; and the lobby area is arranged to afford good visibility from the street. Other related steps focus on the strategic placement of windows and fire stairwells; the lighting of lobbies and mailbox areas so they can be easily viewed from the street; and the design of elevator waiting areas on each floor so that they can also be seen from the street level. Research has proven that if steps like these are taken residents will be more likely to become involved with protecting the facility; military police patrols will be in a better position to observe what is going on; and criminals will be discouraged from vandalizing the site.

d. A second technique that might be employed to

increase surveillance is to design facilities so people within them will naturally view commonly used paths, entries, play and seating areas during their normal household activities. This concept also focuses on the strategic placement of windows, lighting and open areas so that natural surveillance by residents is improved.

e. Another mechanism involves the subdivision of housing areas into small, recognizable and identifiable groupings that improve visual surveillance possibilities. Research discovered that in some housing developments where the surveillance of the activity of one's neighbors outside their apartments was possible, residents were found to be very familiar with everyone's comings and goings and, occasionally, somewhat critical; but the overall effect was to cement collective identity and responsibility through social pressure.

### 3-16. Modifying existing environments

a. Research has also investigated techniques that might be used to modify and, thus, make more secure, existing housing areas. The methods explained below may require alteration or adaptation to the particular situation on your installation. The various modifications that may be made or recommended are presented in the following listing:

- (1) Widening major pathways and using colored decorative paving.
- (2) Differentiating small private areas (front lawns) outside each dwelling unit from the public path with low, symbolic walls.
- (3) The addition of public seating in the center of public paths located at distances far enough from private dwelling units to eliminate conflicts of use, but close enough to be under constant surveillance by residents.
- (4) Designing play areas as an integral part of open space.
- (5) Adding new and decorative lighting to highlight the various pathways and recreation areas at night and also to extend the residents' surveillance potential and feeling of security.
- (6) Where large central court areas exist, adding recreational facilities, seating capacity and pathway networks that add to the interest and usability of the areas.
- (7) The redesignation of parking and play areas around buildings to create the illusion that the buildings are grouped where natural opportunities exist.
- (8) Modification of building entrances to create breezeways into building courts and to accommodate a telephone intercom for opening entry doors to the lobby.
- (9) Providing video surveillance of public grounds and central paths by security of public monitors.
- (10) The installation of audio surveillance capabilities in elevators and at the doors of residences.

b. In summary, "defensible space" is a term for a range of security measures that combine to bring an

environment more under the control of its residents. A defensible space is a living residential environmental that can be used by inhabitants for the enhancement of their lives, while providing security for their families, neighbors, and friends. This concept has been proven to be of value through many years of extensive study. The physical mechanisms suggested to create safety and improve upkeep (as part of the defensible space concept) are 'self-help' tools wherein design catalyzes the natural impulses of residents, rather than forcing them to surrender their shared social responsibilities to any formal authority.

### 3-17. Crime prevention through environmental design

a. The model for crime prevention through environmental design is based on the theory that action must be taken to counter crime before it occurs.

b. The critical element in this model is the environmental engineering component, which provides both direct and indirect controls against criminal activity by reducing the opportunity for crime through science and technology and the use of various urban planning and design techniques. As a crime prevention officer you will be interested in the specifics that the model offers in terms of what environmental engineering actually is and how it can serve your purposes. With this information, you will be in a position to understand and respond to questions and discussions on how urban design and planning can have an impact on the criminal element of your installation.

### 3-18. The environmental influence on criminal behavior

a. The basic theory that supports crime prevention through environmental design is that urban environments can influence criminal behavior in two ways. First, the physical surroundings in which people live have an effect on each individual. These physical characteristics include noise, pollution, overcrowding and the existence and un-monitored spreading of refuse and other unsightly wastes. The second element that must be dealt with in the environmental engineering formula concerns the social characteristic of the community that provide individuals with social relationships to which they must respond. That is, such characteristics as alienation, loneliness, anxiety, and dehumanization are seen as keys to criminal behavior.

b. In terms of these environmental characteristics buildings are all too often constructed so as to be dangerous, with corridors and passageways hidden from public view. Elevators, basements and storage and washroom areas are also fraught with danger due to their design. And, various large-scaled housing developments are not secure in that they are often isolated from the main flow of traffic, both human and auto-

mobile, and, as such, are closed to public use and public view.

g. With regard to altering the social characteristics of the community and their relationship to criminal behavior, behavior is future oriented, not past oriented. A man steals so he can have a car or money in the future, not because in the past he experienced psychic trauma or a broken home or poverty or delinquent associates. Criminal behavior can be explained directly in terms of the consequences of behavior, and not indirectly in terms of noncriminal variables such as poverty, race, or social class. Criminal behavior is, therefore, viewed as a problem to be dealt with, and not symptomatic of other problems—i.e. poverty, mental conflict, class conflict, unemployment, or undereducation. To change criminal behavior we must deal directly with criminal behavior by removing the environmental reinforcement which maintains the behavior. The approach advocated is to change the environment to which the individual responds.

### 3-19. Action approaches to crime prevention through physical planning

a. Thus far, the focus has been on what architects, planners, and other non-police professionals can do in terms of various physical planning strategies to reduce criminal opportunity. As an experienced military police officer you have long recognized that certain physical conditions can contribute to the rate and nature of crime. As a matter of course you have also developed a capability to identify high crime risk locations by noting such factors as poor lighting and weak points of entry as potential crime targets. The critical job for you as a crime prevention officer is to identify some specific areas concerning physical planning and design that you can respond to and take action against on your installation.

b. Attempting to reduce crime or the fear of crime by regulating physical environments is easier said than done. In fact, although crime prevention can be built into almost every aspect of community planning, it is often ignored for a number of reasons. For example, fragmentation of responsible agencies is a key problem. In addition, crime has historically been looked upon as the exclusive responsibility of the military police, not of those in charge of education, housing or health and welfare. Yet, with your understanding of crime prevention combined with the knowledge that design techniques can change the opportunity for criminal behavior, you will be able to talk the language of the planner and designer and to advise them from a police perspective.

c. It is notable that a number of civilian police agencies have become involved in the physical planning process and have achieved notable results from their work. For example, the Fremont, California Police Department has been involved in a planning process

and maintains that law enforcement should become an integral part of the master plan or comprehensive plan review in order to screen all redevelopment plans for safety and crime hazards. Working with other units of municipal government as well as architects and designers, the department drew up a set of model guidelines for the evaluation of projects. The model included evaluation criteria dealing with such objects as the accessibility of buildings to patrol units; traffic flow and off-street parking provisions and the location and regulation of cul-de-sacs, playgrounds, common greens, fences and security entrances. In addition, working with such agencies as the American Institute of Architects, American Institute of Planners, National Public Works Association, Association of Public Utilities, and others, the department identified a number of subjects that are of specific concern to the police officer and that should be considered in the design and planning stage of urban development. As a result of these efforts, the following list of design concerns was developed by the department:

- (1) *Set Backs of Buildings*: Front, side, and rear.
  - (2) *Wall Construction (interior and exterior)*: industrial, commercial and residential.
  - (3) *Door Construction (set backs and security)*: industrial, commercial, and residential, including carports, garages and sliding glass doors.
  - (4) *Windows and Skylights*: Set backs, heights (from ground) show window display, and the type frame or pane.
  - (5) *Stairs* (stairwells and staircases).
  - (6) *Balconies*.
  - (7) *Utility Boxes*.
  - (8) *Fences, Walls, Hedges, and Screens*: Set backs, heights and louvers.
  - (9) *Parking*: public and private.
  - (10) *Lighting*: industrial, commercial and residential.
  - (11) *Streets, Sidewalks and Walkways*: location, slopes, curvature, grades and length of block.
  - (12) *Alleys*: blind and through alleys.
  - (13) *Visibility of Valuables*: people, safes, cash registers and personal property.
  - (14) *Signs*: street signs and signals, traffic signs and signals and advertising signs.
  - (15) *Accessibility* (approach, entrance and exit). pedestrian, vehicular, services, residential, commercial and industrial.
  - (16) *Public Utilities and Easements*: gas, water, telephone and electrical.
  - (17) *Public Areas and Facilities*: public restrooms, parks, bus stops and shelters, playgrounds, recreation halls and so on.
  - (18) *Street Trees and Shrubbery*: types, heights and location.
- d. Equipped with this information it will be your

responsibility to initiate action on your installation to start the ball rolling toward improving the security aspects of the community physical planning process. There is a probability that the work and recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards may help you in your efforts to get involved in the design process. More specifically, the Commission noted:

"Every police agency should participate with local planning agencies and organizations, public and private, in community physical planning that affects the rate or nature of crime or the fear of crime."

e. The future role of the military police in crime prevention through physical planning will depend on your initiative. The perspectives and knowledge of what is happening in this field, combined with a working knowledge of the language and your position as a crime prevention officer should equip you to "sell" this approach as part of your overall program. In this regard, it is important to point out that when you approach planners, designers and others who represent professions other than crime prevention, do not be shocked if many of the representatives of these groups indicate that they had not been aware of the relationships and causal factors which exist between urban planning design and crime. Remember, they deal in concepts, approaches and ideas that heretofore have not involved the realities that law enforcement officers face.

#### Section IV Specialized Patrol Tactics, Decoys, and Surveillance

##### 3-20. Specialized patrol operations

a. Specialized patrol operations employ a variety of tactics in attempting to control identified crime problems. The most common include—

- (1) uniformed tactical patrol;
- (2) decoy operations;
- (3) suspect and area surveillance.

b. This section discusses these tactics in terms of their target crimes, operation requirements and characteristics, and established or perceived levels of effectiveness.

c. The appropriateness of a given tactic depends upon the characteristics of a particular crime problem. Selection of specialized patrol tactics should be made on the basis of a careful and continuous analysis of crime problems. Most crimes can be addressed by more than one tactic. Several tactics might be tried in an effort to find the best one, and it is quite possible that the most effective approach to a given crime problem will include the combination of several tactics. For example, highly visible saturation patrol might be used against street robbery in a particular area with decoy teams deployed

in adjacent areas to make apprehensions for the crimes displaced as a result of the saturation patrol.

##### 3-21. Uniformed tactical patrol

a. Uniformed tactical patrol is the most traditional and one of the most widely used forms of specialized patrol. It is a fairly simple, straightforward approach to specialized patrol which involves the same procedures and techniques used by MP's on general patrol when they are not handling calls for services. These include: constant visible movement throughout an area to generate a sense of police presence; careful observation of street activity; vehicle and pedestrian stops; citizen contacts, etc. The principal differences between these two types of patrol is that uniformed tactical patrol employs these tactics in an intense, concentrated fashion. MP's are relieved of the responsibility for responding to routine calls for services so that they can devote their full time and attention to patrol, thus intensifying its impact. In addition, uniformed tactical operations typically deploy a number of military police in particular target areas, thereby greatly increasing the level of patrol in these areas.

b. Uniformed tactical patrol can be used to control virtually any type of suppressible crime, i.e., crimes which can be viewed from locations where the police have a legitimate right to be and can, therefore be, potentially affected by police operations. These suppressible crimes include: street robbery; purse snatches; vehicle theft; burglary; and housebreaking, etc. Uniformed tactical patrol can also have an impact on other types of crime as officers develop information on the whereabouts, activities, vehicles and associates of suspects through observation, field interrogations, and citizen contacts.

c. The primary purpose of uniformed tactical patrol is deterrence. The use of this tactic is based on the assumption that highly visible, active patrol will deter potential offenders. By increasing the perceived probability of apprehension, conspicuous patrol is thought to reduce the likelihood that crimes will occur and, should deterrence fail, heightened patrol coverage is believed to increase the probability of the immediate apprehension of the suspects.

d. Uniformed tactical patrol is frequently used to saturate an area which is experiencing a particularly serious crime problem. Although it has been widely used for years, saturation patrol has never been clearly and adequately defined. Exactly what level and intensity of patrol constitutes saturation has never been determined, nor have the effects of different levels of patrol been clearly established. It is thus extremely difficult to prescribe the level of uniformed tactical patrol which should be used to disrupt a crime pattern in a particular area. This should be determined through an analysis of the size and characteristics of the area of

concentration of each potential target crime pattern, coupled with an assessment of manpower availability.

e. Some patterns can be effectively handled by very small increases in the level of patrol. For example, in Portland, Oregon, Operation CRIMP (Crime Reduction Involving Many People) had a significant impact on street robberies and assaults in the city's skid row area by initiating two two-officer uniformed foot beats in the area. This was sufficient to saturate the primary locations of the target crimes during the high crime hours, and it led to a substantial reduction in these crimes with little apparent spillover into adjacent areas. Other departments have used saturation patrol on a much larger scale. For example, in the mid-1950's, the New York City Police Department attempted to saturate an entire precinct by assigning well over 200 additional officers to the precinct's patrol force. Foot beats covering extremely small areas were arranged in straight lines so that an officer could keep the entire street area of his beat in view at all times. The four-month experiment led to a dramatic reduction in crime in the precinct. Compared with the same period in the previous year, street muggings fell by 89.9%, burglaries where entry was made from the front of the building dropped by 78%, and so on. The only crime category which was not affected was the relatively private crime of murder. Since crime displacement was not examined in the experiment, its true impact remains unknown. However, the experiment does strongly suggest that massive additions of police manpower can have a substantial effect on crime. The problem is that most departments do not have the wherewithal to conduct even a limited version of this experiment.

f. In short, the amount of resources required for saturation patrol can vary tremendously, and there is no definite way of determining how much additional patrol is needed. This can best be decided on a problem-by-problem basis, using experience and evaluations of past efforts as a guide. As a general rule, the augmentation of patrol should be sufficient to affect rather quickly the perceptions of would-be offenders concerning the level of police activity in a particular area. It appears to be essential for such a strategy to be effective that sufficient resources be applied in a limited area to ensure a true 'saturation' effect.

g. Uniformed tactical patrol operations can make use of various modes of transportation. Patrol cars are most often used; however, foot patrol can be effective in congested service districts, and motor bikes have been used to good advantage in high density residential areas. Visibility, mobility and access to citizens should guide the choice of appropriate modes of transportation.

h. Some specialized units deploy military police in unmarked police cars. This is done in an effort to strike a balance between overt and covert patrol, hopefully gaining many of the advantages of both. Unmarked cars

may also be readily available since in many departments investigators work primarily during the day, which leaves their vehicles free for specialized patrol on the evening and early morning watches. This approach has serious drawbacks. First, unmarked MP cars are somewhat less visible than marked cars, yet they are still easily recognizable as police vehicles to large segments of the public, especially when the MP's in them are in uniform. Second, use of these cars in uniformed tactical patrol could lead to the sacrifice of some of the deterrent effects of high visibility without realizing the apprehension benefits of truly covert patrol.

i. There are several patrol techniques which have been tried to increase the visibility of uniformed patrol and enhance the sense of police omnipresence. Tandem patrol uses two marked patrol cars which follow each other at intervals of one-half to several blocks. Two units can also patrol in a parallel street one block over or in an alley. Another approach combined foot and vehicle patrol in an effort to increase visibility. Officers park their marked cars in conspicuous locations in high crime areas; then are transported to other high crime areas where they patrol on foot. The frequent repetition of this procedure is seen as a way of multiplying patrol visibility.

j. Unless a target area is more or less completely saturated, as in the New York experiment, MP patrols should move in a random, unpredictable pattern. This will make it difficult for potential offenders to plan their crimes on the basis of observation of patrol activities. One department found that its uniformed tactical patrol operation was actually helping burglars to commit break-ins. Interviews with confessed burglars indicated that they were aware that visible patrol units passed through the neighborhoods at fairly regular intervals and they planned their crimes accordingly.

k. In addition to increasing the level and visibility of patrol in high crime areas, uniformed tactical patrol operations often employ aggressive patrol tactics involving frequent vehicle and pedestrian stops. Military police stop, question, and perhaps search a citizen when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the citizen may have committed, may be committing, or may be about to commit a crime. Since the concept of "reasonable suspicion" is somewhat vague, MP's have a considerable amount of discretion in conducting field interrogations. Field interrogations that do not result in either immediate arrest of the citizen or in alleviation of the MP's suspicions are usually documented in field interrogation reports. Field interrogations serve to generate information about the activities of probable suspects and, more importantly for deterrence, they make the suspects aware that the police know of their presence in a given area, regard them as suspicious, and are watching them closely. This is expected to reduce

the likelihood that they will commit crimes, at least in the area in which the tactical force is working.

*l.* The extensive use of field interrogations is often highly controversial. Tactical units which emphasize field interrogations have been accused of being "storm troopers" who constantly harass citizens and abuse their rights. And, in fact, there is sometimes a certain amount of truth to the allegations of harassment, especially when the activities of a particular type or group of suspects are being closely monitored. Not surprisingly, individuals who are stopped and questioned frequently are likely to complain, particularly if they have reason to be concerned about close police scrutiny. However, a recent study of field interrogations in San Diego found that, at least when conducted at moderate levels, FI activities do not have a major effect on police community relations. The majority of citizens in all three study areas accept Field Interrogations as legitimate and properly conducted police activity and the majority of all citizens who were the subjects of FI contacts felt that the contact was justified and properly conducted. The study also found that the suspension of field interrogations in a particular area was associated with a significant increase in the level of suppressible crime in that area, and that the resumption of field interrogations in the area was associated with a significant decline in the amount of suppressible crime.

*m.* The results of the San Diego study provide confirmation for the widely-held belief that field interrogations can have an important deterrent effect on suppressible crime without doing irreparable damage to police/community relations.

*n.* The potentially negative impact of field interrogations on certain segments of the community can be held to a minimum if the interrogations are conducted in a professional manner. Citizens should be informed of the reasons why they are being stopped. They should be detained for as little time as possible, and they should not be subjected to verbal or physical abuse. There is also no need to stop "everything that moves". Attention should be focused on specific individuals which analysis indicates are likely suspects in target crimes.

*o.* While experience and a limited amount of research indicate that uniformed tactical patrol can have a positive impact on the level of suppressible crime in areas in which it is used, the overall effectiveness of this tactic is a controversial and much-debated issue. The principal concern is that rather than reducing crime, uniformed tactical patrol may simply lead to its displacement from one area to another or from one time period to another.

*p.* In conducting uniformed tactical patrol, a provost marshal activity should carefully monitor crime trends for indications of possible displacement effects. This is an important aspect of evaluating the impact of tactical operations, and it will provide information to guide future deployment and tactical decisions.

### 3-22. Decoy operations

*a.* Decoy operations can be used effectively against crimes for which military police can convincingly pose as likely "victims". Decoys are frequently used to combat street robberies, purse-snatches, rapes, prostitution, and thefts from vehicles. The primary purpose of decoy operations is to make apprehensions for targeted crimes; however, by publicizing the use of decoys, they can also have a deterrent effect, since would-be offenders can never be certain whether or not prospective victims are MP's.

*b.* The basic elements of this tactic are fairly straightforward. The fundamental idea is to attract an offender to a prepared "victim". To conduct a decoy operation, a specialized patrol unit simply disguises an MP to resemble a likely victim of a target crime and places him or her in a location where the crime is particularly prevalent. The decoy is watched closely by several back-up personnel and, when a "hit" occurs, the back-ups move in to apprehend the suspect. However, while the basic concept is simple, considerable care should be taken in initiating and conducting decoy operations. Unless they are carefully planned and properly carried out, decoy operations can have serious implications for citizen and military police safety, police/community relations and the productivity of specialized patrol. The following observations should help a department to use decoys in a safe, legal, and effective manner.

*c.* The type of decoy to be used should be determined by an analysis of the characteristics of victims of target crimes. The size, race, dress, demeanor, and apparent age and sex of a decoy should closely resemble that of previous victims. Age can be simulated by the use of make-up.

*d.* In selecting a decoy, it is important to consider an MP's inherent ability as an actor. If a decoy is to pose as a derelict, he must not only look the part, but must also convincingly act like a derelict, possibly for extended periods of time. Considerable skill at role-playing is required to do this effectively.

*e.* In general, a decoy should try to act like a potential victim and present an attractive crime target without being too obvious about it. Overacting can arouse the suspicions of potential offenders. Also, the display of large amounts of cash or expensive jewelry or camera equipment, or the use of decoys who appear to be "falling down drunk", although not illegal, can provide arrested suspects with the opportunity to use the defense of entrapment.

*f.* Back-up MP's should also be either disguised or concealed so that they are able to stay close to the decoy without being recognized as police. They should develop techniques for constantly watching the decoy without giving the appearance of doing so. Considerable care should be devoted to disguises and role playing. Many criminals are quite adept at identifying po-

lice, and once a decoy or back-up MP is "made", the operations is effectively over and the effort put into it is wasted.

*g.* The particular areas in which decoy operations might be effectively used should be identified on the basis of crime analysis. In selecting the exact location to set up a decoy operation, a decoy team should look for places which appear advantageous from a potential offender's point of view, while at the same time provide back-up officers with the opportunity to observe the decoy in an unobtrusive manner and with the ability to assume immediate control of the situation when a "hit" occurs. It is also useful to attempt to determine if there are likely suspects in the area before setting up. If the decoy will be moving through an area, back-up MP's should know his or her planned route of travel and a system of signals should be worked out for communicating any changes in the planned route without using a radio. In all cases, local patrol supervisors should be informed before decoy operations are undertaken in their area of responsibility.

*h.* The number of back-up police used in decoy operations varies. The amount of back-up support provided to a decoy should be determined by the danger potentially involved in a particular operation, the number of suspects who might be involved in a "hit". The overriding concern is that there be sufficient back-up support to protect the decoy and insure that arrests are made safely with a minimum use of force.

*i.* Communications between back-up personnel and the decoy are often strictly visual, with reliance placed on prearranged signals to indicate when a "hit" has taken place or when there is a change in plans. It is possible to use a small pocket transmitter and a portable receiver to maintain unobtrusive verbal communication with the decoy. This equipment can transmit over a distance useful if the decoy will be out of sight of the back-up officers during any part of the operation.

*j.* Back-up MP's should attempt to stay as close as possible to the decoy without interfering with the operation. It is often useful to place at least one back-up person in an unmarked car which is not identifiable as a police vehicle. This will facilitate pursuit should a suspect manage to evade officers deployed on foot. It is also important to develop procedures for reacting to a "hit" on a back-up MP rather than the decoy. While unusual, this has occurred in decoy operations.

*k.* Operational guidelines for handling arrests should be clearly established before decoy operations are undertaken. Participating MP's should be instructed to wait until a crime has been committed before moving in to make an arrest. A suspect cannot be convicted for a crime they thought he was about to commit. MP's should also avoid making arrests for minor offenses which might occur in their presence. This will serve to blow their cover and defeat the purpose of the opera-

tion. Uniformed military police can be called in to handle minor incidents.

*l.* A major problem in making arrests in decoy operations or in taking any form of overt police action is the identification of members of the decoy team as military police. It can be extremely difficult to convince suspects, citizens, and even other MP's that a person who appears to be a derelict, prostitute, or an elderly lady is actually an MP. On occasion, identification problems have led to one MP attempting to apprehend another. Some civilian departments have sought to avoid this problem by using uniformed police hidden in cars or van as a back-up team. This facilitates the arrest process, but it can jeopardize the covert nature of the operation and greatly reduce operational flexibility. A more promising approach is the use of headbands, armbands, baseball caps, or jackets which identify team members as military police. These should be put on before an overt police action is taken. Color codes which are changed periodically can be used to avoid the use of identifying garments by individuals seeking to impersonate police.

*m.* Decoy operations have yet to be examined by systematic research. However, many departments which use decoys have found the tactic to be extremely effective in making high quality arrests for target crimes. For example, decoy operations conducted by Atlanta's Anti-Robbery Unit resulted in 85 arrests during the first six months of 1976, with a conviction rate of between 99 and 100%; and in 1974, decoy teams in New York City's Street Crime Unit made 2,120 arrests for the target crimes of robbery and grand larceny from persons with a conviction rate of approximately 90%. The major doubt about the effectiveness of decoy operations concerns their productivity in terms of arrests per officer days. It has been argued that, while decoy operations do lead to high quality arrests, the time and effort that is devoted on the average to each arrest is more than most departments can afford and that manpower might be used more productively in other ways.

### 3-23. Area surveillance

*a.* Covert patrol and surveillance of high crime areas can be used to make apprehensions for crime problems for which: there are no suspects who warrant personal surveillance; the suspects are too numerous to permit personal surveillance; decoys would be inappropriate; and there are too many potential targets to conduct either physical or electronic stake-outs. Examples of these types of problems would be a rash of residential burglaries or auto thefts in a particular area.

*b.* This tactic simply involves the covert patrol of a particular area and the observation of suspicious or unusual activities and occurrences which might indicate the likelihood of a crime occurrence. Suspicious individuals are not stopped, but are watched until they

either commit an offense or the officers' suspicions are removed.

c. A list of the various techniques which can be employed in area surveillance is virtually endless. The following are some which have been effectively used by specialized patrol units:

- (1) Mingling with citizens at the scene of a crime in order to pick up information on possible suspects.
- (2) Rooftop surveillance of a shopping center parking lot to locate larcenies from vehicles.
- (3) Surveillance of a housing project by posing as maintenance workers.
- (4) Following likely crime victims such as elderly citizens leaving a bank.
- (5) Surveillance of residential areas by placing officers on garbage trucks or on top of telephone poles posing as repairmen.
- (6) Surveillance of rooftops for unusual activity by officers in aircraft or on high buildings. Binoculars are used to facilitate surveillance, and rooftops are marked so that street units can be dispatched to check out suspicious circumstances.

d. As in all types of plain or old clothes patrol, care should be taken to insure that area surveillance is truly covert. Rental vehicles, which can be changed frequently, provide an excellent, though expensive, means of covert transportation.

e. Police on covert patrol should be dressed to fit in with the environment in which they are working, and they should have apparently legitimate, non-police-related reasons for being where they are. Several specialized units have found that surveillance teams composed of one male and one female officer can work in many situations without arousing suspicion. An apparently married or romantically involved couple lingering in a park, meandering slowly down the street, or sitting together in a parked car would generally appear less suspicious than two male military police doing the same things. Finally, it should be noted that in some small, tightly-knit neighborhoods where residents know each other well, covert surveillance may be difficult, if not impossible, since the presence of any stranger arouses immediate curiosity and suspicion.

### 3-24. Summary

a. These tactics represent the basic approaches which specialized patrol operations normally take in attempting to control suppressible crime. Some of the tactics, such as uniformed tactical patrol, are directed primarily at crime deterrence, while other, such as decoy operations and suspect surveillance, are employed to achieve apprehensions for target crimes. The tactics are most commonly used independently of one another; however, there are some indications that the combined use of several tactics in an integrated operation might be an effective way of coping with particular types of crime

problems. Especially promising is the coordinated use of highly visible and covert patrol. A visible patrol force could be deployed to a particular area to deter crime there and direct it toward other areas in which MP's using covert, apprehension-oriented tactics are working. To date, efforts to direct criminal activity to areas or targets where MP's are set up to make apprehensions have only been tried on a sporadic basis. However, this would appear to be a promising approach to crime control and warrants greater attention in the future. It can be viewed as the creative use of crime displacement

b. Many of the tactics discussed in this section could not be effectively undertaken by MP patrols which simultaneously have the responsibility of handling routine calls for service. It is obvious that the effectiveness of decoy operations, physical stake-outs, and suspect surveillance would be utterly destroyed if the MP's had to interrupt these activities to handle calls for service. It is also generally unwise to have MP's in civilian clothes respond to calls for service.

c. The importance of crime analysis in identifying crime problems and suggesting appropriate tactics deserves repetition. Specialized patrol units should be deployed to address clearly identified crime patterns, and they should choose their tactics on the basis of an analysis of these patterns and a comprehensive knowledge of the area of occurrence. The nature and characteristics of a particular crime pattern should be the driving force behind the selection of tactics. None of the tactics of specialized patrol can be effectively used unless crime patterns have been identified and analyzed.

## Section V Publicity Campaigns

### 3-25. PAO assistance

a. Public Information Campaigns are an essential part of every crime prevention effort. The installation PAO can provide assistance in:

- (1) Informing the public of the magnitude of the local crime problem.
- (2) Disseminating information on crime circumstances.
- (3) Generating the interest and enthusiasm necessary to initiate and sustain community crime prevention programs.

b. The Public Affairs Officer should be a member of the installation crime prevention council, and must be involved from the start in planning crime prevention efforts.

### 3-26. Media

a. At installation level there are many information vehicles available to carry our message to the public, including:

- (1) Radio

- (2) Closed Circuit Television
- (3) Installation and Unit Newspapers
- (4) Posters and Leaflets
- (5) Commanders calls and similar meetings

b. Not all media are equally effective in reaching a particular segment of the post population. To insure that the media campaign is effective, the crime prevention officer must identify the segment of the population that needs to receive the information, and the exact message that is to be communicated. The more specific the target-audience, the more effective the media campaign will be. The crime prevention officer should work with the PAO to determine these factors.

c. Whatever media is used, it is important to provide coordinated input to PAO well in advance of the desired publicity campaign date to allow for writing, or rewriting, and publication. For material to be published in a magazine, a minimum lead time of six months is normally required. For post newspapers, a week lead time may be sufficient. The crime prevention officer should check with PAO to determine the correct lead times for local publications.

d. In addition to locally produced material, Department of the Army produces posters, leaflets, and other material in support of the DA Crime Prevention Campaigns. This material, which is listed in DA Pam 310-1, may be ordered through normal publications channels.

e. When addressing civic groups or school audiences, 16mm films are often more effective than straight lectures, because of the use of animation and other special techniques to clearly illustrate critical points. Several Army films are available. They are listed in DA Pam 108-1, and may be secured through the local Training Aid Support Office (TASO). A large number of commercial films are also available.

## Section VI Residential Security Surveys

### 3-27. The residential security survey as a crime prevention tool

a. A residential survey is not a substitute for an aggressive neighborhood watch (section II, ch 4). It supplements these efforts, and should be established after Neighborhood Watch and Operation ID are established.

b. The security survey is the primary tool used in crime prevention to recognize, appraise and anticipate potential loss in residential areas. It is often defined as the backbone of a local crime prevention program. In practice, it combines the security experience, training and education of the local crime prevention officer and focuses it on a single element—the analysis of a residential facility.

c. The inherent value of the survey has been proven by nearly 300 civilian police departments across the country that have established crime prevention bureaus or units. An even broader endorsement of the survey technique, however, was provided by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which stated that, "Every police agency should conduct, upon request, security inspections of businesses and residences and recommend measures to avoid being victimized by crime."

d. In short, the security survey is the tool by which crime prevention officers inform a homeowner of the particular areas in which his home is susceptible to criminal victimization together with steps that can be taken to reduce and minimize that potential. Further, the survey is a tangible document that reflects the efforts of the military police not only to be responsive to community needs, but to get the community more directly involved in the criminal justice process.

### 3-28. The security survey: a definition

a. A security survey is an indepth on-site examination of a physical facility and its surrounding property. The survey is conducted to determine a residence's security status; to identify deficiencies or security risks; to define the protection needed; and to make recommendations to minimize criminal opportunity. Because of several common characteristics, one expert has likened the security survey to the traditional criminal investigation. This comparison hinges primarily on the facts that both techniques are systematic in nature; are aimed at identifying the method of a criminal act; and, are, in effect, more an art than a science. It should be recognized, however, that the survey has two other advantages. First, it can be undertaken prior to the commission of a crime; and, second, it can offer protection against rather than just remedial action after criminal victimization.

b. Crime prevention surveying is simply an extension of the type of police work that you have been trained to perform. The main difference is "sequence", or the time in the law enforcement process in which you become involved. Investigating crimes has most likely been part of your job—the crime prevention survey will allow you to investigate potential crime sites before the law has been violated.

### 3-29. The crime prevention survey: a process of investigation

a. An important factor in understanding the residential security survey is that it must be considered as an ongoing process. That is, while a particular survey will result in specific recommendations; each survey, cumulatively, will provide a foundation for future action. In combination, these surveys will provide the data base that can be used in the analysis of the community's crime problems and, thereby, guide action toward the

resolution or reduction of the problem on a community-wide basis.

b. As a starting point five steps must be used in carrying out the actual survey; while four additional steps must be remembered afterward. These are as follows:

(1) The overall environment (i.e., neighborhood, block, etc.) must be analyzed.

(2) The general vulnerability of the premises must be assessed.

(3) The specific points of vulnerability must be defined.

(4) Specific security procedures must be recommended.

(5) Recommendations must include specific remedial hardware.

(6) Implementation of the recommendations must be urged.

(7) Follow up must be provided to insure that recommendations have been implemented.

(8) Crime statistics must be kept to evaluate the effect of the survey and the implementation of recommendations.

(9) A second survey of premises must be conducted if statistical analysis indicates no alteration in criminal activity in the areas surveyed.

c. The essence of this process is the continued involvement and participation of the police with the community. It must be stressed that once a crime prevention officer has completed a survey, the job is not finished. In fact, if you assume this posture, you may later learn that the recommendations were not implemented and that your work was done in vain. This can easily lead to a loss of community-wide public confidence in the programs. Similarly, even in those cases when your recommendations are implemented, additional crime might be experienced. Your attention to this fact coupled with immediate follow-up will also be essential to avoid losing the confidence you gained from the original survey. Through prompt action you will be in a position to propose additional tactics that may become the final step needed to substantially reduce criminal opportunity. In short, the security survey process is not a "one shot" operation and it is not to be looked upon as a simple, straightforward task. Rather, it is a continuing, difficult, rigorous, yet effective, approach to reducing crime that has heretofore not been systematically applied by police agencies in this country.

### 3-30. The role of the police in implementing crime reduction programs through security surveys

a. At a minimum, there are two ways that you can encourage people to improve their personal security. First you can organize, conduct and participate in broad-based public information, and education program that make use of such media as radio, television, and the

press. Second, you can organize, undertake and follow up on a series of "person to person" security surveys. Clearly, both of these techniques have their advantages. However, the security survey has a unique quality that does not exist in the public education program and that provides an added incentive on the part of citizens to implement your recommendations—that being the personal relationships and respect established during the actual survey by a crime prevention officer.

b. For example, picture yourself as a homeowner listening to someone on television recommending that you improve your security by installing better locks or alarm systems. If you are the average citizen, and if you listen at all, you might ask yourself such questions as: How unsecure am I? Are the locks that I have on my doors adequate? If they are inadequate, what kind of locks should I install? Do I really need an alarm system? What can the military police do for me in terms of making recommendations about security? In short, you would be aware of the possible need for improved security, but you would not know enough of the specifics to warrant real action. Because home security is a complicated matter requiring careful analysis and the installation of carefully tailored systems, implementation must be approached in a personal way. Certainly, public education programs can assist in some aspects of crime prevention (i.e. prevention against bunco schemes, auto theft, personal protection, etc.) but they are not as effective in causing improved security as is personal contact.

c. Moreover, for the first time, police are placed in a position where they can actually provide a different kind of advice or service that can be offered in an environment where a crisis has not yet occurred—a truly unique opportunity for crime prevention officers.

### 3-31. Preparing to conduct the survey

a. Developing a Perspective.

(1) To develop a proper perspective and understanding of the types of crimes that you will most frequently be attempting to reduce (i.e. burglaries and larcenies) a review of the cases of fellow officers as well as your own should be studied to enable you to get a broader feel for the actual conditions in your area.

(2) During this review process, pay particular attention to photographs in the files. Study crime scenes in an effort to identify the type of security device that was defeated. In particular, where a door was used as a point of entry, note if it was of adequate construction; if the door frame was broken or separated; if hardware such as strike plates and door trim was inadequate; and so on. In addition, review photos to determine if lock cylinders were pulled or if door chains fastened to trim molding were simply pulled away to permit easy entrance. If you do not have access to photographs of the crime scenes it would be preferable to visit as many

crime scenes as possible. While doing so, photograph security risks you can study later and use as examples in future presentations to community groups.

(3) Moreover, by becoming familiar with the modus operandi of persons committing such crimes as burglary and larceny you will be better equipped to understand potential risk situations and to point them out to potential victims. You may be quite surprised that many of the cases you have investigated were invited by some obvious crime risk hazard that was overlooked by a resident. You may also be surprised to notice that many additional crime risks existed at a particular crime scene that a burglar could have exploited. Such vulnerability might be an indication of other crime targets within the community that you should pay particular attention to in your survey work.

b. The Crime Prevention Officer as a Statistician.

(1) To be an effective security surveyor, it will be necessary to develop an intimate knowledge of the crime factors in your community. You will not have to become a statistician, but the more you know and understand about the crime problem, the methods by which crimes in your community take place, and the security devices and systems that were defeated in the process, the better you will be equipped to analyze the potential crime for risk loss in surveying a home.

(2) In addition to the general types of crimes that occur in your community, it will be necessary to develop an understanding of the details of particular types of offenses. For example, with regard to residential house-breaking you should be familiar with the types of burglaries and approaches used in particular sections of the community.

(3) On the surface, it might appear as if this would be a monumental task. However, in terms of house-breakings, for example, you might pull the files for the last quarter and carry out the following steps:

(a) Tally the number of times entry was made through the front door, rear door or through a window.

(b) Identify the approach used for entry; i.e. through brute force either by kicking the lock or throwing a shoulder through the door, jimmying, etc.

(c) When entry was made through a window, determine how often the window was broken, removed, or a mechanism was used to force the latch.

(d) Attempt to determine whether security devices were used in residences such as alarms, special lighting or other systems.

(e) Identify the general escape route of the burglar; i.e., down a back alley, through a school yard, and so on.

(4) In developing an understanding of the modus operandi of crimes, statistics that illustrate exactly what is happening in your community will be a valuable tool. Not only will you be able to use this information in

explaining crime risks while you are surveying the site, but it will be invaluable in making public presentations.

c. Only when you have developed the ability to visualize the potential for criminal activity will you have become an effective crime scene surveyor. This ability is the part of the process that was referred to earlier as an art. Nonetheless, it is important that when you arrive on a survey site, you are prepared to give a property owner sound advice on the type of security precautions he should consider.

d. In summary, to be a good crime prevention surveyor you will have to be a good investigator. You must understand the criminal's method of operation and the limitations of standard security devices. In addition, you must be knowledgeable about the type of security hardware necessary to provide various degrees of protection. Specific information on conducting surveys is contained in FM 19-30, Physical Security.

## Section VII Juvenile Crime Prevention

### 3-32. Police juvenile operations

a. Law enforcement has long recognized the importance of establishing personal contact with youth. This need was first met with the "Officer Friendly" concept. The goal of this concept was to enhance the image of police among younger children and attempt to negate the unfavorable image other segments of society provided children. While this concept has merit, law enforcement has, to a great extent, failed to follow up the program with positive measures of interaction as the children mature. Virtually all contact between youth and law enforcement is negative once the youth reaches the teenage years.

b. Crime prevention officers can have an impact on juvenile crime by establishing a positive interaction with juveniles. Many areas suffer a high crime rate of which over 50 percent is attributable to juveniles. Nationally it is known that youth 17 and under (who make up just 16 percent of the population) commit 42 percent of the crimes that cause injury or loss of property. As the punitive aspects of juvenile justice system today are of questionable value, it is logical that crime prevention officers should develop programs aimed at juvenile crime.

c. Crime prevention officers must consider that the basic problem in establishing any effective juvenile crime prevention program is the destruction of preconceived ideas by both the youth and law enforcement personnel. This obstacle can only be overcome by the building of an honest rapport with individual youths. Just as a crime prevention officer must sell crime prevention procedures to the general public, he must also sell himself and his program to the youth.

d. One method of establishing the needed rapport

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with youth reverts to a similar system used in the "Officer Friendly" concept. Classroom presentations in high schools and junior high schools can be used to destroy the preconceived ideas held by youth regarding police and law enforcement in general. Once an MP enters the classroom he discovers that the majority of students obtain their ideas of police one of two ways: (1) from television that portrays every officer as the "Adam 12" variety or as slow-witted morons, or; (2) from their peers at school which relate every negative aspect of law enforcement. However the students gain their information, it seldom resembles fact and must be changed in order to effectively establish a juvenile crime prevention program.

e. In making classroom presentation for crime prevention purposes, the crime prevention officer must display honesty at all times. When confronted by uncomfortable questions, the MP should render the law enforcement point of view and make a truthful explanation. Obviously, some answers will not always be well received but will establish the credibility of your presentation. Further, when making these presentations, many areas dealing with specific areas of crime prevention arise, such as rape prevention, engraving of property, residential and apartment security, vehicle theft and burglary prevention, etc.

f. The importance of crime prevention officers combating juvenile crime in the school atmosphere might best be shown in the following statement and questions raised by Alan R. Coffey in his book, *Juvenile Crime: Treatment and Rehabilitation*,

"The American school system is without doubt the most influential institution impinging upon child socialization outside the family itself. Indeed, many consider it quite possible that the school is increasingly replacing much of the family socialization process.

Implications of the position clearly raise the question of responsibility for youth socialization. In other words, is the school more responsible for permitting 'delinquent socialization' than the family is? Given the reality of the other theoretical causes of delinquency, is the family really responsible for any societal efforts to socialize adolescents?

Indeed, is it possible that virtually all causes of delinquency are potentially correctable within the school's sphere of influence?"

With these questions in mind, the crime prevention officer can find no more logical environment to begin his efforts.

g. In dealing with the schools, the crime prevention officer can establish many positive contacts with individuals inside the school system that will prove to be of great value. Individuals such as administrators, counselors and faculty members offer the crime prevention officer assistance in many different ways. Perhaps the most valuable assistance is in the area of establishing a specific juvenile crime prevention program based on peer influence.

h. A crime prevention program aimed at peer influ-

ence is essential to a crime prevention unit. Peer influence is directly related to the Determinism Theory of Delinquency Causation. The Determinism Theory, simply stated, holds that delinquency occurs as a result of external influences on youth. While attempting to control all external influence on youth is an impossible task, the control of peer influence is possible and perhaps the most important external influence to be controlled.

### 3-33. Peer Influence Crime Prevention Program

a. The Peer Influence Crime Prevention Program can be established after the crime prevention officer establishes himself in the junior and senior high schools as described earlier. The basic concept of the program is the negation of undesirable peer influence on predelinquent youth and the establishment of a positive peer influence.

b. The Peer Influence Program functions inside the school district. A problem youth is detected at the junior high school level by the youth's teacher, counselor or the crime prevention officer. Once the student has been detected and it is believed that the youth could be served by Peer Influence Program, the youth's counselor calls the youth in for a conference. During the conference, the counselor attempts to determine the basic problem experienced by the youth and has the youth complete an application for admittance into the Peer Influence Program. The application has an interest survey attached which the youth completes and a parental consent form.

c. Upon completion of the application and conference, the junior high school counselor contacts the youth's parent or guardian and explains the program. If the parent agrees to allow the youth to participate, his application is sent to the parent for his signature.

d. When the completed application is returned to the junior high school counselor it is forwarded to a senior high school counselor for matching. The senior high school receives the application and reviews it. If necessary, the senior high school counselor may contact the junior high school counselor personally to discuss the youth in more detail. The high school counselor then selects a suitable senior high school student who has been accepted for Peer Influence Program and matches the student with the junior high school youth.

e. Once the match has been made, the senior high school student is given a briefing on his or her junior high school friend by the crime prevention officer. The senior youth is instructed to contact the junior youth, preferably at the junior youth's home and introduce himself both to the youth and to the youth's parent or guardian. After the initial contact has been made, the senior youth is instructed to plan activities with the junior youth and spend as much time as possible with the junior youth.

f. Each senior youth that volunteers completes an

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application giving personal background information and references that are thoroughly checked by the crime prevention officer. The youth's academic record is examined but prime consideration is given to citizenship factors rather than grades. Each applicant should be personally interviewed by the crime prevention officer.

g. When a senior youth is selected for Peer Influence Program, the youth is given a basic outline to follow. They are warned not to "preach" to the junior youth, but lead the youth by allowing him to observe the senior youth's actions at different activities. The senior youth must devote the necessary amount of time to the junior youth which will limit his opportunity to continue the negative associations held in the past.

h. While the Peer Influence Program is simplistic in nature, results can be remarkable. During a three-year period in the City of Irving, Texas, approximately six hundred students participated in the program. From this number, seven arrests were made from the group with one juvenile accounting for four of the seven arrests. As approximately 30 percent of the juveniles participating were legally adjudicated delinquent, the recidivism rate was officially established as 0.1 percent.

i. While juveniles adjudicated delinquent can participate in the program, the crime prevention officer should concentrate his efforts on those juveniles identified as pre-delinquent by counselors or faculty members. Again, the personal contact of the crime prevention officer and the members of the school is essential to the success of the program and a personal rapport should be cultivated and maintained.

j. Operationally, the Peer Influence Program can be administered by the collective efforts of school personnel and military police who are committed to the program. Once the program is established it will probably not require the services of an MP on a full time basis (depending on the number of students involved), but constant contact is necessary and the more time which can be devoted, more success will be apt to follow.

### 3-34. Crime prevention presentatives for elementary and junior high schools

a. As the traditional American family structure has experienced a significant decline over the recent years, more and more emphasis is being placed on the schools to provide guidance for the child. As crime prevention officers who frequently invited to speak to students, you can play an important role in assisting the school to provide this guidance. To stress the importance of the above statement, many experts in child behavior believe that the school is second only to the family in molding a child's socialization and behavior. Many people feel that the school is increasingly replacing much of the family socialization process. For this reason, the schools are the most logical environment to begin a juvenile crime prevention program.

b. Crime prevention officers can have an impact on the most common types of juvenile crime by preparing specific lectures for particular grade levels in the elementary and junior high schools. Classes discussing shoplifting, vandalism and bicycle theft are well received by the students and have a wide-reaching effect on the community as a whole due to the children relaying the information to their parents.

c. A number of films are currently on the market that greatly assist in making crime prevention presentations in the classroom. In addition to specifically addressing juvenile crimes, the films directly relate to the peer influence causation of crime.

### 3-35. Overview of some selected juvenile crime prevention programs

a. In addition to the programs described above, there are listed below a variety of other juvenile programs. You will notice that some of the programs are designed to offer activities for the juvenile while at the same time attempt to provide one or more of the following: positive peer influence, education, police/juvenile cooperation, and a better understanding of law enforcement and military police duties. One of the programs deals with the enforcement aspect, with the goal being truancy reduction. Also mentioned are programs designed for child safety and victimization reduction.

b. Police explorer programs.

(1) Explorer programs are run in conjunction with the Boy Scouts of America and a sponsoring police agency. The programs offer a wide range of flexibility in that they may be structured along the lines of a police cadet program with all activities centered around law enforcement training. This type of explorer program usually seeks juveniles who have an active interest in pursuing a law enforcement career. Being an explorer in this type program will offer the student the opportunity to view the duties of a police officer and also take part in minor police activities—such as traffic direction, observation riding in patrol cars. The selection and training of the students for this type of program is strictly dependent upon the sponsoring agency.

(2) Other police sponsored explorer programs may be designed to provide the members with other non-police activities, such as hiking, camping and canoeing. At the same time, this type of program will offer the student the chance to meet with police officers and learn more about police functions, though this is a secondary purpose. Selection for this program would not be as stringent as the above mentioned program. A local council office of the Boy Scouts can provide additional information on this program.

c. The Alateen program is run in cooperation with the Alcoholics Anonymous organization. The intended purpose of this program is to provide assistance for a child's emotional needs if he or she is faced with family



problems caused by alcoholism of one or both parents. Your local chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous can provide more information on this program.

d. Various cities have successfully adopted "Truancy Enforcement Programs" which focus attention on identifying and apprehending those youths who are on unexcused absence from school. The primary goal behind this program was to prevent or reduce the incidence of daytime residential burglary. The San Angelo, Texas, Truancy Enforcement Program selected a target area in an effort to see how effective the program would be in reducing daytime burglaries. The initial evaluation of the program showed positive results. The San Angelo Program utilizes uniformed crime prevention officers in marked police cars patrolling around the school and known hangouts. All street personnel in the patrol division are also encouraged to check school age individuals. Those students under 17 years of age who are suspected of truancy are taken to the school office while those over 17 years of age are detained only long enough to obtain their name and other identifying information, which is then turned into the school office. The assistant principal in charge of attendance completes the investigation and takes the appropriate action. The action varies, depending on the circumstances, but can include counseling with the student, the teacher and the parents, or in extreme cases, suspension for a short period.

e. The emphasis behind these programs is to inform the youth of the facts of the law. It was shown that many of the problems with the youthful offenders may be eliminated if they were presenting the facts of the law to which they are subject. The courses can be adapted to fit the needs and desires of the individual school system and, of course, the extent of the areas covered will be dependent on the commitment and availability of the local military police officers. Various civilian school districts have incorporated these law enforcement courses as part of their regular curriculum.

f. The National Youth Project Using Mini-bikes is a delinquency prevention and diversion program run in conjunction with the YMCA. The main goal of the program is to give troubled youth an interest and hobby that might keep them off the streets and out of trouble. The program works with junior high age youth, 11-15 years of age, of which 75 percent must be referrals, especially from the Juvenile Justice System. Mini-bikes are used as an effective "now" tool to quickly establish trusting rapport between the alienated youth and the youth worker. Among the objectives of the program are:

—the strengthening of the ego structure in each youth participant through development of competence in safety and riding skills, sense of belonging, a feeling of self worth and decision making power and knowledge that someone cares;

—to increase diversion from the Juvenile Justice System;

—to serve as a catalyst to develop a genuine community collaboration and partnership with the police, juvenile authorities, schools, etc.; and,

—to develop and strengthen family communication and relationship between the youths in the program and their families.

The program has been funded in part by LEAA and The Honda Motor Company. Additional details may be obtained from the local YMCA.

g. Criminal Victimization Reduction. Programs designed toward this goal normally are structured to reduce the possibility of a child becoming a victim of a child molester. Most commonly officers give a verbal presentation to groups of children use visual aids which will help to act as a positive reinforcement to learning. Some effective methods have been the use of "talking traffic lights", "talking bicycles", "talking motorcycles". These above items are usually equipped with a tape recorded message which can be controlled by the officer conducting the program. The "talking traffic light" utilizes a full size traffic light which flashes red or green lights according to the type of person which is being described.

### 3-36. Vandalism

a. Unlike their 5th century predecessors, the vandals of today often attack their own territory. School vandalism—the illegal and deliberate destruction of school property—is committed by students themselves. They break so many windows that in large districts the funds spent annually on replacing broken windows could pay for a new school; they destroy school bus seats, to the tune of \$3 million every year; and they commit enough arson to account for 40 percent of all vandalism costs.

b. School vandalism outranks all other assaults on private and public property. At the end of the 1973 school year, the average cost of damages from vandalism was estimated at \$63,031 per school district. That figure could pay the salaries of eight reading specialists or finance a school breakfast program for 133 children for one year. A typical school's chances of being vandalized in a month are greater than one in four and the average cost of each act of vandalism is \$81. Yet, these figures do not include the hidden costs of school vandalism: increased expenses for fencing, intrusion and fire detectors, special lighting, emergency communications equipment, and vandal-resistant windows. And every dollar spent in replacing a window or installing an alarm cannot be spent on education.

c. School vandalism can also have enormous social costs. The impact of an 89 cent can of spray paint used to cover a wall with racial epithets far exceeds the monetary cost of removing the paint. An abusive word scrawled across a hallway wall can destroy student morale, disrupt intergroup relations, undermine the authority of an administration, or even close the school. Incidents with high social costs damage the educational

process as much as those with high monetary costs. Today's vandal, though perhaps more destructive in monetary terms than his 5th century namesake, is no hardened, war-scarred veteran. Instead of grizzled whiskers, he sports peach fuzz. He is almost literally "the boy next door." The "typical vandal," in fact, differs quite dramatically from the "typical juvenile delinquent."

d. It is significant that vandals fall into a well-defined and relatively narrow age-group. What we are dealing with is the early adolescent male who is highly subject to group pressures and transitory impulses. It is not at all unusual for adolescents to act out whatever is controlling them at the moment—rage, boredom, pent-up energy, or the sheer joy of "wreckreation." And while there are conditions that may predispose or provoke a youth toward vandalism, the problem seems to be almost human nature. Few among us have never written on a sidewalk or scrawled initials on a school desk. Vandalism, it must be remembered, cuts across all strata of society, all geographic regions, and all racial lines.

e. The causes of vandalism remain obscure. Though research addressing the "why" of vandalism is growing, it has to date yielded no clear-cut answers. Among the motivating factors often cited are: anger, frustration, hostility, bitterness, alienation, futility, inequality, restricted opportunity, emotional pain, failure, prejudice, revenge, and need for attention. Although much of the research is convincing, the fact remains that many vandals do not appear to be among the most angry, frustrated, hostile, alienated or needy youth. And only a small fraction of the youngsters who do fall into that category actually commit acts of vandalism. So, while most experts agree that vandalism is not totally "senseless," they do not claim to fully understand its causes. In fact, vandalism is often poorly understood by vandals themselves, many of whom report that they "don't know why" they did it. Many others, according to case reports, offer the unsolicited observation that destruction is "fun." Still others express "satisfaction" and "exhilaration." Few consider themselves criminals. For the time being, we can conclude only that motives for vandalism are diverse. But, the "whys" notwithstanding, the vandal profile suggests that our task is, in large part, to anticipate and redirect the impulses of young teenage boys.

f. Schools are by no means the helpless victims of early adolescence. Many school factors most of which are amenable to change influence the amount of vandalism that schools experience. The following characteristics are typical of schools that suffer high property damage or loss.

(1) Poor communication between faculty and administration. Vandalism is higher when the principal fails to define policy or makes policy decisions unilaterally.

(2) Hostility and authoritarian attitudes on the part of teachers toward students. In response to such attitudes, students often "take it out" on the school.

(3) Impersonality. Limited contact between teachers and students reduces student involvement with the school and increases the likelihood of vandalism.

(4) Extreme competition for leadership status. Schools characterized by intense competition for leadership positions suffer greater property damage and loss.

(5) A low degree of student identification with teachers. When the students "do not value their teachers" opinions of them, the chances of vandalism are increased.

(6) Student over-emphasis on grades. Schools at which students strive to get good grades experience more vandalism.

(7) Lack of support from parents. Parents of students in high-damage schools express less favorable attitudes toward their schools than do other parents.

(8) A high residential concentration around the school. If the school is close to the student's homes, it is a convenient target for vandalism.

(9) The use of grades as a disciplinary tool.

(10) A high enrollment. In larger schools where there is more to destroy, property damage is greater. This correlation between school size and vandalism prevails regardless of whether the school is located in an urban, suburban, or rural setting.

(11) Inconsistent or lax rule enforcement, classroom control, and non-classroom supervision. When rules are well understood by students and consistently and firmly enforced by teachers and administrators, fewer offenses occur.

### 3-37. Vandalism prevention

a. *General information.* If the special problems of early adolescence—often intensified by social or personal pressures—interact with school conditions to produce vandalism, then preventive measures must address these two factors: the nature of the child and the nature of the school. Furthermore, prevention must include both physical and human responses. At present most vandalism prevention or reduction programs rely on physical security: bigger and better electronic alarm systems, patrol guards, dogs, tamperproof locks, and window grills. These techniques help, but they address only 20 percent of the problem—those incidents involving breakage (which usually occur during non-school hours, in the absence of witnesses). They have little effect on the day-to-day "trashing" of the school or on the disruptive acts aimed at the school's routine (bomb threats, the setting of fires, and false fire alarms) that are committed during school hours. The most sophisticated physical and electronic barriers are not sufficient to keep vandals from what they consider an attractive target. In fact, it has been argued that alarms and armed

guards, besides lowering student and staff morale, often themselves become a challenge, inviting rather than deterring vandals. Vandalism prevention, then, requires not a narrow or piecemeal approach, but a varied and comprehensive effort that includes both physical and human components geared to the school's specific problems. Furthermore, an effective long-term program must involve the community—parents, neighbors, police and civic groups as well as students, teachers, and school administrators.

*b. Schools are an easy target for vandals.* Most are public, secular, and often unoccupied. Most will remain public and secular, but they need not remain unoccupied—or unprotected, or unobserved. Following are techniques that have made some schools less vulnerable to vandals. These are especially effective against problems occurring during non-school hours.

(1) *Occupy the school.*

(a) *Employ a custodial force around the clock.* In most schools the entire custodial force works at one time, leaving the school empty at night. As an alternative, custodians can be assigned staggered shifts, so that the school is occupied around the clock. Twenty-four hour custodians are particularly appropriate in schools suffering sporadic property damage which demands more than a roving patrol but less than permanent security guards.

(b) *Invite police to use the school buildings at night.* Police can be issued keys to the schools in their patrol areas, so that they can use school offices to write their reports. This places a police officer in the school when it might otherwise be unoccupied—and it places a police car in front of the school.

(c) *Bring the community into the school.* The school is an excellent place for recreational programs, health clinics, adult education classes, counseling centers, community gatherings, and Boy Scout, Girl Scout, and PTA meetings. The presence of people in the school building not only reduces the opportunity for vandalism, but also stimulates community and student interest in the school.

(2) *Watch the School.*

(a) *Use school neighbors as "eyes and ears."* Ask nearby homeowners to watch the school and report suspicious activities. Emphasize careful observation and rapid reporting but discourage direct involvement in any situation observed. Such programs work best if they are organized but based on informal involvement; if they are accompanied by overall involvement of parents and community with the school; and if they offer some sort of prestige to participants.

(b) *Employ roving patrols.* A uniformed patrol, used in lieu of or in conjunction with an alarm system, can deter vandalism. The individuals who patrol should establish rapport with neighborhood youth and open

communication with community leaders. They should also vary their patrol patterns.

(c) *Hire student patrols during the summer and on weekends.* The school district or community can provide its youth with part-time or summer employment and at the same time curb vandalism by paying students to patrol the school grounds during weekends, holidays, and summer vacation. These students should be paid an adequate wage and considered an integral part of the school's security force.

(3) *Control access to the school.* Install an alarm system. Alarms are the most expensive vandalism control measure a school can employ. And while they can detect vandals, they cannot apprehend; they can merely signal the monitor, who may be miles away. They can be, however, an efficient deterrent and should be considered as part of any comprehensive plan to control vandalism. If alarm systems are linked with a surveillance camera, chances of apprehending intruders are greatly increased.

(4) *Design the school with vandalism prevention in mind.*

(a) *Limit ground-to-roof access.* Eliminate low overhanging roofs; avoid unnecessary exterior fixtures; near buildings, plant trees which cannot be climbed; consider raising as much of the school plant as possible from ground level.

(b) *Build the school at some distance from residential areas.* While the school should be located near the homes of most of those it serves, it will suffer less property damage if there is a buffer zone between it and surrounding residential areas.

(c) *Design the school with plenty of "defensible space,"* so that the normal flow of school traffic allows continuing, casual surveillance of the premises.

(d) *Use vandal-resistant surfaces.* Use harder surfaces in damage-prone areas; on walls use epoxy paint or glazed tile that is easily and inexpensively replaced or repaired; use small wall panels and keep replacement panels in stock; place permanent signs, building names, and decorative hardware at a level that cannot be reached from the ground.

(e) *Plan windows carefully.* Avoid windows that are vulnerably placed; use small panes of glass to simplify replacement; use thick tempered glass, thick acrylic, or plexiglass for windows in heavily travelled or hangout areas; avoid useless windows in student stores, administrative offices, and industrial arts storage areas.

(f) *Plan entries with multiple use in mind.* Install flexible internal gates to block off specific areas or corridors when necessary; provide separate exterior entries for community use and student use; inside the building, create areas for informal gathering near entrances and exits by installing soft drink machines and/or benches.

(g) *Locate or relocate playgrounds and access roads to provide better surveillance by roving patrols.*

(h) *Consider outdoor lighting.* Opinion on this issue is divided. Many schools report a decline in vandalism after installing hardened exterior night lighting. Others report that elimination of all night lighting reduces vandalism, presumably because young adolescents are afraid of the dark. If lighting is used, it should be directed away from windows to keep vandals from seeing the process of destruction or its outcome.

(i) *Channel graffiti.* Graffiti artists will usually select light, smooth surfaces rather than dark, rough surfaces. Therefore, school officials can channel graffiti onto one or two walls designed to withstand such treatment. Most walls can be painted by students or maintenance staff at regular—but not too frequent—intervals. Or one wall can be officially designated a "legitimate" graffiti wall, though this approach removes some of the challenge inherent in informal graffiti.

*c. Making the target less attractive.*

(1) *The school is not only an easy target but also an attractive target for vandalism.* It represents enforced learning, discipline, and mandatory attendance to students who are, simply by virtue of their age, rejecting adult standards and striving to achieve independence from adult control. Students are additionally provoked if the school functions in an impersonal, undemocratic, repressive, or manipulative manner, further increasing the likelihood of vandalism.

Also, our list of characteristics associated with vandals and vandalized schools indicates that property damage and loss are higher when competition for rewards is intense, availability of rewards is limited, and distribution of rewards is unfair.

(2) *All of this suggests that school policy and atmosphere have a direct bearing on school vandalism.* Below are changes in school governance that can help remove the features that make a school an attractive target for vandals. These procedures, especially in combination, have proven effective against all forms of vandalism, including those which most commonly occur while school is in session.

*d. Revise the Curriculum.*

(1) *Alternative schools.* Though originally designed to perform educational functions, alternative schools have proven effective in reducing school violence and vandalism. They provide an option to students who are not benefiting from the regular academic classroom. These schools, operated within or alongside the traditional school, are usually characterized by low student-teacher ratios, small classes, intense individual counseling, and extensive use of the community as a learning resource. They offer an alternative to suspension, personalize the learning environment, and provide success experiences to students who have in the past performed poorly.

(2) *Law-related education and police-school liaison*

*programs.* In many communities, the police department has assigned school resource or liaison officers to local junior and senior high schools. These officers may on occasion assume policing duties, but their primary function is to counsel students and teach law-related courses. These activities acquaint students with the positive role that law plays in our society, and personalize the relationship between the "cop on the beat" and the "kid on the corner".

(3) *Action learning.* This term refers to apprenticeship programs as well as training in practical aspects of adult life. The former allow students academic credit for community work, such as tutoring, assisting physicians, lawyers, or other professionals. The latter provides instruction in skills such as checkbook balancing, comparative shopping, and applying for a job. Both address the boredom and frustration that are believed to be linked to truancy, violence, and vandalism.

(4) *Reward distribution.* The school's reward structure is related to school crime. Although the school may offer attractive incentives to achieve, most students receive very little in the way of rewards. Many of those who lose out still care about the competition. They become frustrated and they vent their anger on the apparent source of their problems—the school. It should be possible to spread the rewards around without compromising performance standards—perhaps by recognizing improvement as well as achievement, or by acknowledging forms of achievement other than scholastic, athletic, and social.

*e. Change administrative policy and organizational structure.*

(1) *Leadership.* According to the National Institute of Education's Safe School Study, the leadership of the principal is a critical factor in reducing or preventing school crime. Strong principals who are visible, available, and responsive to students and staff appear to be most successful in eliminating violence and vandalism. Those who are less successful are often described as "unavailable and ineffective."

(2) *Discipline.* The Safe School Study also found that the exercise of discipline, through clear enunciation and even-handed enforcement of rules, is associated with a low incidence of school crime.

(3) *Mini-schools.* To increase the likelihood that students will find school a fulfilling experience, many districts are establishing mini-schools—schools small enough to allow the individual student to feel significant. Similarly, several large schools are currently functioning on a "house" basis: the school is divided programmatically into several smaller units with which students can more easily identify.

*f. Involve the students.*

(1) *Vandalism fund.* This procedure utilizes peer pressure to the school's advantage. The community or school district puts aside a certain amount of money

and announces that the fund will be used to cover the costs of vandalism. Any money left over reverts to the students to be used as they choose. This plan works because it educates students about the costs of vandalism, allows them to see the positive results of curbing property damage, and, most important, gives them full responsibility for the problem.

(2) *School security advisory council.* Several school districts have established voluntary student security advisory councils which conduct workshops and small group discussions focusing on vandalism and violence prevention. These committees increase awareness of the school's problems, generate recommendations for action, and give students an opportunity to participate in school decision-making.

(3) *Students teaching students.* Older students can be helpful in influencing younger students. In several communities, junior and senior high school students visit fourth and sixth grade classrooms, where they show a film about vandalism and then lead a discussion on the causes and consequences of vandalism.

(4) *School beautification projects.* These projects involve students in the care of the school building and grounds in an attempt to increase their pride in the responsibility for the school. The more effective projects are selected by students themselves, continue throughout the school year, and focus on marginal students rather than school leaders.

*g. Involve the parents.*

(1) *"Open door" policy.* An open door policy allows parents to go directly to their child's classroom whenever they wish without securing a visitor's permit from the office. This simple policy offers parents concrete evidence that they are indeed welcome at school.

(2) *Parents as classroom and administrative aides.* In some schools parents are serving on anti truancy committees along with teachers and students. They visit youngsters and their families in an effort to resolve truancy problems. In other schools parents are serving as hall monitors, supervising extracurricular activities, and helping out in the classrooms.

(3) *Parents as an educational resource.* Parents are also the school's best source of guest speakers and contacts for work-study or apprenticeship programs.

(4) *Faculty men's clubs.* Some school districts have initiated faculty men's clubs to acquaint fathers with the male teaching staff and to encourage them to assume more responsibility for their children's progress in school.

*h. Involve the community.*

(1) *Vandalism forum.* In one community, students and law enforcement, school district, and city personnel sponsor day-long forums on vandalism. The forums introduce citizens to the causes and costs of vandalism and give them an opportunity to voice their concerns and initiate preventive programs.

(2) *Police-community and university sponsored*

*programs.* Police departments can initiate public relations programs within schools and youth-serving agencies. In addition, they can enlist the help of youth in preventing vandalism through police-sponsored groups such as The Police Youth Service Corps, which recruits adolescents from high-crime areas to work as public safety aides. Similarly, law students from neighboring universities can be brought into the schools at minimal or no cost to discuss the legal implications of vandalism.

**3-38. Picking up the pieces**

The preventive measures listed on the preceding pages can, of course, function as part of a long-range proactive response plan. But they do not address the question of immediate response. What should the school do, right away, about 20 broken windows, a cherry bomb in the toilet, or recurring racial graffiti on the wall?

a. Repair the damage immediately. Quick repair keeps perpetrators from admiring their handiwork, retards the epidemic effect of vandalism, and minimizes any social impact the act may have.

b. Initiate formal recordkeeping procedures and make sure they are followed. Schools faced with serious problems should begin recording all acts of vandalism. They should also consult law enforcement personnel about when police should and should not be called.

c. Work with the courts. When a school begins to have problems, it should work with the juvenile justice system so that the two institutions can coordinate their efforts with regard to school-age offenders.

d. Begin an incident analysis. Careful recordkeeping should allow a school to plot the incidence of vandalism to find out precisely where and when each type of offense is occurring. For example, using incident analysis, the National Institute for Education's Safe School Study found that: fire and bomb threats most often occur on Tuesdays; school property offenses tend to occur with greater frequency toward the end of each semester, especially in November and December; break-ins and school property offenses occur most often on Weekends and Mondays. This kind of information is invaluable in planning a vandalism reduction and prevention plan.

e. Consider restitution. Restitution is a set of legal and administrative procedures through which the school receives payment from vandals for damages they cause. While it seems reasonable to require payment for damages, restitution does not appear to be worth the effort. In the first place, most vandals are not caught. In the Los Angeles School District, which has an aggressive restitution program, only 30 percent of the offenders are ever identified. From this 30 percent, most restitution is paid before matters get to court. Going through lengthy legal processes to obtain the rest is simply not cost-effective. However, a parent faced with the possibility of a court case may make a greater effort to keep his or her child out of trouble.

**3-39. Conclusion**

The goal of crime prevention is to reduce crime through public awareness and education. The skills crime prevention officers acquire can eventually benefit all segments of our communities. It is logical then for crime prevention officers to attack one of the major crime problems in our society: juvenile delinquency. Efforts of crime prevention units will certainly be lacking if the juvenile crime problem is not given a high priority and juvenile crime programs are not established.

**Section VIII  
Fraud**

**3-40. Fraud against the Government**

There are two types of fraud that can be affected by crime prevention efforts. These are fraud against the US Government and fraud against individual people in the Army. Since the countermeasures for each of these categories of fraud are different, they will be discussed separately.

a. Fraud of this type is a loss to the Army due to manipulation of systems from within with criminal intent. Typical examples of fraud are—

(1) The diversion or theft of government property by falsification of documents such as purchase orders, shipping documents, etc.

(2) False claims for TDY pay, for reimbursement for losses due to movement of household goods, or false claims for reimbursement for material reported as stolen.

(3) Overcharging or underproducing on contracts with the Army.

(4) Bribery.

(5) Kickback to secure purchase orders.

(6) Use of one's official position for personal gain.

This list is not all inclusive. There are many more ways to defraud the Government.

b. Some of the factors that make it easy to perpetrate a fraud are:

(1) Lack of independent verification of records, transactions, and reports.

(2) Lack of adequate supervision.

(3) Unrealistic budgeting and acquisition requirements.

(4) Failure to correct deficiencies identified by existing systems.

(5) Concentration, at the operational level, of responsibility and authority for an entire process in one individual.

c. For most Army material control systems, there are built in measures to discourage fraud. These are routinely examined by the Inspector General and other command inspectors. A crime prevention officer's main function is to encourage the reporting of fraud by in-

sureing that the community understands what type of activities should be reported, and by making sure that the Defense fraud hotline numbers are posted in work areas where personnel are in a position to detect fraud. These numbers are—

CONUS: 800-424-9090 (toll free)

Washington, DC: 693-5080

AUTOVON: 223-5080

In addition, the measures described in section IX, employee thefts, should be implemented.

**3-41. Fraud against individuals**

The second type of fraud is "con games" or consumer fraud. This crime is perpetrated by professional con men, unscrupulous businesses, and amateurs who think they see a chance to make a fast buck. Most of the time the operator offers a "something for nothing" deal. By the time the victim realizes that he has been left holding the bag, the con man is long gone. Frequently, the victim is so embarrassed that he has been taken that he does not report the crime. The only way that a crime prevention officer can help prevent this crime is to publicize the common "con games" and illegal business practices and encourage victims to report them. When a case of fraud occurs, the specific "con" technique that was employed should be advertised widely to prevent others from being fooled by the same ploy. Some of the more common "cons" are—

a. *Repair fraud.* Repair frauds are simple to execute but difficult to detect. Some crooked repair people don't fix the problem but charge you anyway. Some use inferior parts. Others charge you for work that you didn't expect or need. Some even do "insurance" work—they'll repair one thing, but make sure that something else will soon go wrong. How can you protect yourself from repair fraud?

(1) Shop around. Ask friends, neighbors, or co-workers for references. When you find repair people you trust, stick with them.

(2) Don't try to diagnose the problem yourself unless you're an expert. The mechanic may take your advice, even if it's wrong. If you do know exactly what the problem is, don't tell the mechanics. Wait and see if their recommendations agree with your diagnosis. That way you'll know whether needless repairs are suggested.

(3) Try to get several detailed written estimates before any work is done. Compare job descriptions and materials to be used. Be sure to ask if there is a charge for an estimate.

(4) Ask for the old parts to make sure that replacements were really installed.

(5) Make sure you get a guarantee on any work that's done.

(6) Before you pay, make sure that work was done.

Take your car for a test drive. Plug in the refrigerator. Test the TV.

(7) Some state laws require auto repair firms and other kinds of professional services to be licensed or certified. Ask your local Consumer Affairs Office about the law in your state and what specific protection it gives.

*b. Home improvement fraud.* Home repairs and improvements can be costly. So watch out if somebody offers to do an expensive job for an unusually low price. Or if a firm offers to make a "free" inspection. Or if the workers just "happened to be in the neighborhood." These are the favorite tricks of dishonest home repair firms. Some offer a price you just cannot resist. Once you sign the contract, you learn why. They never deliver the service. Others send door-to-door inspectors to do free roof, termite, or furnace inspections. You can bet these free inspections will turn up plenty of expensive repairs. Some fly-by-night companies will offer to do the work on the spot. When they leave, you may be left with a large bill and a faulty repair job. To avoid home improvement and repair frauds, try the following:

(1) Always get several estimates for every repair job, and compare prices and terms. Check to see if there is a charge for estimates.

(2) Ask your friends for recommendations. Or ask the firm for references and check them.

(3) Check the identification for all inspectors.

(4) Call the local Consumer Affairs Office or Better Business Bureau to check the company's reputation before you authorize any work.

(5) Be suspicious of high-pressure sales tactics.

(6) Pay by check, never with cash. Arrange to make payments in installments: one-third at the beginning of the job, one-third when the work is nearly completed, and one-third after the job is done.

*c. Land fraud.*

(1) Real estate can be a great investment. The enterprising real estate salesperson knows how anxious you are to find just the right property, especially for an investment or retirement home. A nice, warm climate? Not too crowded? A new development. Some dishonest agents will promise you anything—swimming pool, country club, private lake—to get your name on the contract. Even if the sales agents promise you luxury, they may not guarantee the basics, like water, energy sources, and sewage disposal.

(2) Most land developers offering 50 or more lots (of less than 5 acres each) for sale or lease through the mails or by interstate commerce are required by law to file a Statement of Record with the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. This document tells you almost everything you need to know about your future home: legal title, facilities available in the area such as schools and transportation, availability of utilities and water, plans for sewage disposal, and local

regulations and development plans. All this information must be given to you in a property report prepared by the developer. Always ask to see this report before you sign anything.

(3) If the developer doesn't give you a copy of the property report for the lot you're considering, you can obtain it from HUD for a \$2.50 fee. Write to—

Department of Housing and Urban Development  
Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration  
451 Seventh Street, S.W.  
Washington, DC 20410

*d. Door-to-door sales.*

(1) "Small monthly payments": used to disguise the total cost of the item, which is usually outrageous. The vacuum cleaner you buy for "only" \$10 a month for 4 years will cost you \$480.

(2) "Nothing like it in the stores!" True. The vacuum cleaners in the stores are probably of better quality and come with a better warranty.

(3) "Won't find this price anywhere." True. The prices in the stores are probably lower.

(4) "Easy credit!" True. They don't care what your credit rating looks like. Once you sign for the purchase, paying for it is your problem. Be wary of "low monthly payments." Find out the total amount you'll pay over the life of the loan. Then subtract the actual cost of the item itself. The difference is you will pay in interest. Your bank, credit union, or local legal aid society can tell you if the interest rate is fair.

(5) Watch for these words and be firm if the salesperson pressures you to buy. If you do get trapped, you're protected by a Federal Trade Commission regulation. Whenever you make a purchase in your home totaling \$25 or more, the salesperson must give you a written contract and two Notice of Cancellation Forms. You have three days to change your mind and use one of these forms to cancel your contract.

*e. Charity fraud.* Charity fraud does a lot of harm. The swindler takes advantage of people's good will and takes their cash, money that was meant for people in need. You can make sure that any money you give gets into the right hands. Remember these pointers when somebody asks you for a donation:

(1) Ask for identification, the organization, the solicitor. Find out what the purpose of the charity is and how funds are used. Ask if contributions are tax deductible. If you are not satisfied with the answers, don't give. You can also check out the charity with the National Information Bureau (212-532-8595) or the Philanthropic Advisory Service (202-862-1230). They can tell you whether the organization is a legitimate charity.

(2) Give to charities that you know. Check out the ones you have never heard of before, or others whose names are similar to well known charity.

(3) Don't fall for high-pressure tactics. If solicitors won't take no for an answer, give it to them anyway, but don't give them your money.

(4) Be suspicious of charities that only accept cash. And always send a check made out to the organization not to an individual.

(5) If a solicitor reaches you by telephone, offer to mail your donation. Shady solicitors usually want to collect quickly.

*f. Self improvement fraud.*

(1) The ads can look pretty tempting:

"Miracle reducing plan"

"Look like a model in only 5 days"

"Learn to speak Spanish while you sleep"

"You can have a new, dynamic personality"

Con artists know that everyone wants to look better, feel better, be a better person. Selling worthless plans and cures is one of the easiest ways for them to make a quick buck.

(2) What can you do? Be careful! Read the small print. Know what the product contains. You should check with your doctor before you embark on any diet or exercise programs.

*g. Medical and health fraud.* Most of us do not know much about medicine, that's why we go to doctors. It is also why we fall for miracle cures and other phony health products and services. Patent medicines. Health spas. Mail-in lab tests. All these should be warning signs for the potential consumer. A laboratory in Texas advertised nationally that it had perfected a fail-safe urine test for cancer. More than 15,000 tests were made at \$10 each before authorities stopped this fraudulent outfit.

*h. Unsolicited merchandise.* Coney con artists will send you a gift in the mail, a tie, a good luck charm, a key chain. You didn't order it. What do you do? If you are the kind of person they are looking for, you will feel guilty and pay for it. But you don't have to.

(1) If you haven't opened the package, mark it "return to sender." The post office will send it back, at no charge to you.

(2) If you open the package and don't like what you find, throw it away.

(3) If you open the package and like what you find, keep it, free. This is a rare instance where the rule of "finders, keepers" applies unconditionally.

(4) Whatever you do, don't pay for it. Look at your gift as an honest-to-goodness way of getting something for nothing. And don't get conned if the giver follows up with a phone call or visit—by law the gift is yours to keep.

*i. Mail fraud.*

(1) *The contest winner.* YOU'VE WON. This beautiful brand-name sewing machine is yours for a song. To claim your prize, come to our store and select one

of three attractive cabinets for your new machine. Bring this letter with you and go home with a new sewing machine for next to nothing. Treat an offer like this carefully. Shop around before you claim your prize. Chances are the cost of the cabinet will be more than the machine and cabinet are worth.

(2) *The missing heirs.* You have just received a very official looking document. The sender is looking for the rightful heirs to the estate of someone with your last name. It could be you. To find out, just send \$10 for more information. Let's face it. There may be thousands of people with your last name, and letters like these are often mailed nationwide. Even if there really were an unclaimed estate, it is highly unlikely that you would be an heir. So save your money. Why help a swindler get rich?

(3) *These are just two examples of mail fraud.* Many of the other frauds described in this section can be handled through the mail. When they are, the US Postal Service can launch a full-scale investigation. If you think you have been cheated in a mail fraud scheme:

(a) Save all letters, including envelopes.

(b) See if your neighbors or business associates received the same material.

(c) Contact your local postmaster, who can direct you to your regional Postal Inspector's Office.

**3-42. To help people avoid being taken, recommend that they:**

a. Don't believe something for nothing offers. You get what you pay for.

b. Be suspicious of high-pressure sales efforts.

c. Take your time. Think about the deal before you part with your money.

d. Get all agreements in writing. Insist that agreements are made in "plain English" not "legalese."

e. Read all contracts and agreements before signing. Have a lawyer examine all major contracts.

f. Compare services, prices, and credit offers before agreeing to a deal. Ask friends what their experiences have been with the firm or service in question.

g. Check the firm's reputation with your Consumer Affairs Office or local Better Business Bureau.

**Section IX  
Internal Thefts**

**3-43. Employee thefts**

a. Thefts by employees are a major problem in most large organizations. It is estimated that a third of all business bankruptcies are a result of thefts. Of course, in the Army there is no danger of the organization going out of business, but waste and internal thefts can divert significant amounts of critical resources from mission essential activities. Unlike many businesses, the Army

has recognized that internal losses can be a problem, and most areas have adequate controls mandated by regulation. As crime prevention officers we should monitor reports of survey, physical security inspection reports, and results of crime prevention inspections to insure that control measures are being followed. When it is apparent that the correct measures are not being followed, the problem must be identified for the senior commander's action.

b. Research has shown that the "atmosphere" of an organization is just as important as management controls and physical security in preventing employee thefts. To control this problem, the following items are essential:

(1) Employees, both civilians and soldiers, must believe they are part of a thoroughly professional organization that expects superior performance from all its members. When second rate work is accepted, the lax attitude carries over into property control procedures and losses increase. Standards must be high, but fair.

(2) Leadership must set the example. If leaders, supervisors, and managers take advantage of their positions to use government material or services for their own benefit, even in very minor ways, their employees will also feel justified in diverting Army resources to their own use.

(3) The organization must show a genuine concern for the problems of its personnel. If an employee feels he has been treated unfairly, it is easy for him to justify to himself stealing from the organization. He believes that he is only taking what he would be getting if the organization was fair.

(4) The organization must take appropriate disciplinary and/or administrative actions in case of thefts. There can be no acceptable level of internal thefts. If employees believe that an activity considers a certain level of loss to be acceptable, then internal theft will grow very rapidly. Everyone will consider the material he takes to be within the "10 percent" that the activity "expects" to lose.

(5) Policies on internal thefts must be enforced. Frequently, a thief is a long-term employee whose honesty has always been above question. In these cases, the temptation is very strong to let the offender go with a "slap-on-the-wrist". However, this is a clear signal to all other employees that diversion of Army resource for personal use is alright with the management. If an employee chooses to steal and is caught, he should be prosecuted.

(6) Publicity campaigns employing posters and other media should be used to disseminate command policies

on internal theft. Crime hot lines are also useful in increasing the reporting of employee thefts.

## Section X Arson

### 3-44. Arson on military installations

a. On military installations there is little incentive for professional arsonist to operate since the buildings are owned by the Government and insurance fraud in collusion with the property owner is not possible. However, arson still can be a problem. In the civilian community most deliberate fires are not set for profit. They are set to "get even" with the property owner or just for the excitement of watching something burn. Military installations are susceptible to this type of crime. On many Army posts there are large numbers of empty, wooden structures that are ideal targets for revenge seekers or vandals.

b. Arson is an easy crime to perpetrate, and it is relatively difficult to collect the information needed to convict an arsonist. However, this does not mean we are helpless in combating this crime. Several major cities, including Seattle, Denver, Houston, and Philadelphia, have developed successful programs to reduce the number of arsons. Some of the successful, proactive measures that have been developed are:

(1) Secure or dispose of materials that could be used to start fires. Ensure the regulations on storage of gasoline, paint, and solvents are enforced. Paint lockers should be locked.

(2) Enforce command policies on the police of the post. Remove piles of trash, scrap lumber and other material that burns easily.

(3) Empty buildings, especially empty wooden structures, should be secured and posted as off-limits areas.

(4) Patrol areas susceptible to arson.

(5) Encourage participation in neighborhood watch, taxi patrols and other community programs that increase surveillance.

(6) Encourage reporting of suspicious activities through the establishment of crime hot lines.

(7) Establish a close working relationship between fire fighters and law enforcement personnel to insure fires of suspicious origin are reported and thoroughly investigated.

(8) Offer rewards for information leading to the apprehension of the arsonist if there is an outbreak of arson.

## Chapter 4 Community Crime Prevention Programs

### Section I Army Neighborhood Watch

#### 4-1. General

Neighborhood Watch is an organized network of citizens interacting with other neighbors and the police in preventing and detecting crime in their neighborhood. Law enforcement efforts to reduce crime cannot be effectively accomplished without the support and cooperation of all citizens. A strong community involvement with neighbors helping themselves and other neighbors in becoming more alert to activities in the neighborhood, protecting their property and reporting suspicious activities is essential to an effective crime prevention program.

#### 4-2. Objectives

The Army neighborhood watch program is designed to encourage Army service members and their families to actively participate in protecting their own property and the property of their neighbors, joining community crime prevention programs and reporting suspicious activities to the military police. The program is designed to develop the following:

a. Awareness of community crime trends and prevention efforts.

b. Knowledge of quarters security procedures.

c. A cooperative system of surveillance over each neighbor's property.

d. Accurate observation and reporting of suspicious activities.

e. Establishing reliable two-way information links between the community and military police.

#### 4-3. Background

a. Most neighbors know the routines of the other families that live near them. They know what type cars are normally parked in the neighborhood, and when the different families are on vacation or out of the area for some other reason. Neighbors are in a very good position to recognize burglars and other intruders. Also, residents are in a good position to recognize safety hazards and crime conducive conditions near their homes.

b. To capitalize on these advantages, neighborhood watch programs organize blocks in family housing areas, or floors in troop billets, and to improve police-community interaction, and to disseminate information on the crime problem and countermeasures.

#### 4-4. Block clubs

a. *Block Clubs.* Block clubs are the basic components of an installation-wide neighborhood watch program. The geographical size of a "block club" may vary widely depending on population density and the nature of the terrain. The key factor is that the terrain organized into a single block club should promote a feeling of unity and mutual assistance. In a troop billet area, block clubs could be organized along company lines, by individual barracks or even by floor. In family housing areas, a block club could cover one high rise apartment building, one block, or one or more streets that are so situated that the residents identify themselves as a subcommunity within the housing area.

b. *Organization.* Organization of a block club can be initiated by individual residents, community service organizations, or the military police. Frequently existing organizations, like the Parent-Teachers Association, have established contacts within the community and can sponsor the organization of block clubs. Regardless of the approach used to organize the installation, every family or resident in the area must be contacted and encouraged to attend a block club meeting.

c. *Initial meetings.* At initial block meetings, a block captain and deputy block captain should be elected. These individuals serve as "spark plugs" to sustain interest in their geographic area, and also to represent their block club at district meetings. The effectiveness of the presentation at the initial block club meeting is critical. A representative of the provost marshal should explain the crime problem on the installation, and clearly outline the functions of a block club, and how it can affect the crime problem. The main objective should be to generate enthusiasm and build a foundation upon which an effective neighborhood watch can be built. Use of 16mm films, television tapes, or other audiovisual programs can generate interest. Association with programs in the civilian community may also help to generate interest.

d. *The functions of a block club should be clearly identified.* These are—

(1) To serve as the "eyes and ears" of the police.

(2) To encourage the implementation of individual countermeasures, such as marking personal property.

(3) To disseminate crime prevention information.

(4) To improve police-community relations.

e. *Block club districts.* Block club districts should be organized as an intermediate link between individual block clubs and the installation crime prevention coun-

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
**BLOCK CLUB ORGANIZATION**

Figure 4-1

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cil. These districts should cover at least one housing area and should be composed of the block captains and deputies from each block club in the district's area. District leaders should be elected from the block captains and should serve as members of the installation crime prevention council. The primary functions of districts are to transmit information from the installation crime prevention council to the block clubs and to develop incentive awards to recognize effective participation by the clubs.

*f. Maintaining interest.* Maintaining interest in neighborhood watch programs is a major problem. Typically, a particular incident generates the level of interest required to initially organize a system of block clubs and districts, but as the particular problem is overcome, interest wanes and the clubs gradually dissipate. A review of programs that have maintained their effectiveness for extended periods indicates that successful programs have the following characteristics:

- (1) A formal organization with elected block captains and district leaders.
- (2) Block clubs address a wide range of problems.
- (3) An incentive award program to recognize individuals and clubs that participate effectively.
- (4) Use of periodic workshops to train leaders on various aspects of crime prevention.
- (5) Clear cut, attainable objectives. The members need to see accomplishments.
- (6) Active support by the local police.

*g. Block club operations.* Block clubs may become "umbrella" organizations that conduct the entire range of community crime prevention programs including foot and mobile patrols. However, each of these programs will be discussed in a separate section. In its most basic form, block clubs disseminate information on residential security and report suspicious activity in their neighborhood. Neighborhood watch block members should exchange names, addresses, and telephone numbers to enhance communication among the neighbors. They must collectively learn how to recognize and report suspicious activities, and what to do if they become a victim of crime.

**4-5. Suspicious activities**

Some activities that block club members should be alert for, and when observed, report to the military police are:

- a. A stranger entering a neighbor's house when it is unoccupied.
- b. Someone screaming.
- c. Offers of merchandise at ridiculously low prices (it could be stolen).
- d. Persons entering or leaving a place of business after duty hours.
- e. The sound of breaking glass or explosions.
- f. Persons going door to door and then going into a back or side yard, or trying a door to see if it is locked.

g. Persons loitering around schools, parks, secluded areas or in the neighborhood.

h. A person carrying property at an unusual hour or in an unusual place.

i. A person exhibiting unusual mental or physical symptoms who may be in need of medical help.

j. Vehicles being loaded with valuables when parked by a closed business or untended residence.

k. Business transactions conducted from a vehicle.

**4-6. Army neighborhood watch meetings**

a. The initial neighborhood block meeting should be attended by a provost marshal representative to explain the concepts of crime prevention in neighborhood watch programs. The meeting should be publicized with hand-out invitations announcing time, location and purpose of the meeting. If possible, the meeting should be held in the neighborhood such as the training room in the troop billets or a residence in family quarters. In addition to explaining the program concepts, the initial meeting could include the following:

(1) Installation and community criminal statistics concerning the nature and volume of housebreakings, larcenies and other crimes.

(2) Exchange of names and telephone numbers if applicable, of attendees. This information should also be placed on a neighborhood block sheet which is a geographical diagram of the block showing the location of each room, apartment and/or building address number in the block. The names and phone numbers of participants would be added to the address number of each residence drawn on the diagram. This block sheet should be distributed to the block members at a subsequent meeting.

(3) Determination of the second meeting date and location.

b. Other neighborhood block agenda items and activities for subsequent meetings could include the following:

(1) Discussion on residential security procedures and conduct of quarters security inspections.

(2) Army Operation Identification marking and recording of personal property.

(3) Observing and reporting of suspicious activities.

(4) Other crime prevention measures and procedures being implemented at the installation such as rape prevention, drug abuse, and citizen escort patrols.

(5) Fire prevention, personal safety and other related activities.

**Section II****Army Operation Identification****4-7. Background**

Operation Identification, which entails marking of property to make it identifiable and traceable to its

owner if lost or stolen, was initiated by the Monterey Park, California Police Department in 1963, and has been adopted by more than 80 percent of the police departments in the US. Operation Identification is a low cost, highly effective crime prevention program. However, its success is contingent upon the willingness of individuals and communities to actively participate in marking and identifying their personal property.

#### 4-8. Objectives

a. The Army Operation Identification program is designed to encourage Army service members and their families to mark their personal pilferable property with a standard Army-wide owner applied number. This numbering system would permit positive identification of the property and determining the location of the owner in the event of theft or loss.

b. The principal advantages of Army Operation Identification are theft deterrence and recovery of personal property. Marked stolen property is more difficult to dispose of, and illegal possession can result in prosecution of a thief. Recovered lost or stolen property can only be returned if there is some means of identifying and locating the rightful owner.

#### 4-9. Methods of identifying property

a. Various methods of establishing positive identification and ownership of property in the event of loss are available for individuals. Each method has advantages and limitations, and a combination of these methods would be required to ensure identification of all high value personal property.

(1) Inscribing the owner applied number with an etching or engraving tool. This method would allow the recovering agency to visually identify the number inscribed on the property for notification of the owner and subsequent return of the property. Electrostatic markers are available for use at no cost to the individual. However, some personnel are reluctant to use this method since it can mar the property. The inscription should be made in a location that can be readily seen by the recovering agency but which would not deface the appearance or reduce the value of the property. Some high value personal items such as coins, jewelry, and silver cannot be inscribed with an owner number applied number. Another method of identifying these items would be required.

(2) Using invisible fluorescent ink, powder, or paste to mark the property. This method of marking can be quickly detected by the agency recovering the property with the use of an ultraviolet light and will not mar the property. However, the fluorescent markings and ultraviolet light are an additional cost, and many agencies do not have ultraviolet lights to inspect recovered property.

(3) Using a laser photographic process to identify

diamonds. Every diamond emits a unique reflection when penetrated by a low-level laser light. A laser photographic process to record a diamond's pattern of light reflection on film has been developed. Gem Print Ltd., 29 East Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60602, is the sole distributor of this system in the United States and several jewelers throughout the country have the laser photographic equipment available. To register a diamond, two photographs are taken. One is provided to the owner and the other to the Gem Print central registry. If a diamond is lost or stolen, the recovering agency can take the diamond to a jeweler that maintains the laser photographic equipment for print. This photograph would then be forwarded to the Gem Print registry for owner identification.

(4) Photographing the personal item. Individuals can photograph personal high value items that cannot be engraved. Although the agency recovering the lost or stolen items could not identify the owner, use of a photograph could assist in verifying ownership if the recovery of the item is known. In addition, a photograph would assist in submitting claims against the Government and/or private insurance companies as appropriate.

b. Personnel who participate in marking of their property should be furnished a DA Label 167, Warning Army Operation Identification, which they can display in a conspicuous location announcing that the property in the area of building has been marked for identification and can be traced by law enforcement agencies (See figure 4-2).

#### 4-10. Recording of personal property

Individuals should record identifying data such as brand name, model, serial number, and value of the personal items, even if they use other methods of identifying property. This information would assist in determining what items may be lost, stolen, or damaged through fire, explosion, or other hazard. This information can also be used in claims against the government and/or private insurance companies as appropriate. DA Form 4986, Personal Property Record, can be used to perform this function.


#### 4-11. Property identification numbering

a. There are various types of owner applied numbering systems utilized to mark personal high value items. Criteria that should be considered in determining which owner applied numbering system to incorporate include:

(1) Uniqueness, where no two people have the same identifier.

(2) Permanence, so the owner applied number will not change.

(3) Ubiquity, so an identifying number is available to any individual who desires one.



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FIGURE 4-2

4-5



(4) Availability, where the identifying number can be easily obtained and remembered.

(5) Indispensable, so there are incentives requiring an individual to have the number.

(6) Privacy, so the number is not a means of infringing upon an individual's right to privacy.

(7) Uniformity, so the owner applied number would be readily recognized by law enforcement agencies who handle or come into contact with the recovered property.

(8) Traceability, so the property owner can be identified and located.

b. The most commonly used owner applied numbering systems include—

(1) Driver's license number with the issuing state abbreviation prefix.

(2) Social security number.

(3) Personal numbers assigned to individuals by a local law enforcement agency.

(4) Personal numbers with the marking agency's National Crime Information Center originating agency identification number.

(5) A private numbering system maintained by a commercial organization.

#### 4-12. Standard Army numbering system

To ensure all property identification numbering criteria are met, the standard US Army-wide owner applied numbering system is designated as the service member's social security number with "USA" prefix. Upon recovery of lost or stolen property by other military or civilian law enforcement agencies, the "USA" prefix owner applied number would alert the recovering agency that the property belongs to a member of the US Army. The recovering agency can then contact the nearest Army installation provost marshal/security office concerning the property and owner applied number inscribed. The service number can then be identified and located through the Army worldwide locator system. Since this locator system lists only social security numbers and locations of active Army service members, family members should use the service member's social security number with USA prefix in marking their personal items.

#### 4-13. Identifying and locating owners of recovered property

a. The installation provost marshal/security officer should be the initiator of tracer actions to identify and locate the owner of recovered personal property marked with the standard Army Operation Identification numbering system. Continuous liaison should be maintained with local civilian law enforcement agencies and other military installations to ensure they are cognizant of the standard Army owner applied numbering system and will contact the provost marshal/security office upon

recovery of private property marked with this system. Provost marshal/security officers should readily accept custody of the private property if the recovering agency is willing to release the property and it is not required as evidence for criminal prosecution.

b. Upon notification of recovered property and the inscribed Army standard owner applied number, the provost marshal/security officer should contact the servicing military personnel office (MILPO) for assistance in determining the name and location of the property owner through the use of the Army worldwide locator microfiche.

c. If the owner applied social security number is not listed on the Army worldwide locator microfiche and the servicing MILPO is unable to provide the requested information, the provost marshal/security office should contact the USA Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, AUTOVON 699-4211, for assistance. Provost marshal/security offices desiring to submit a written request should forward it to: USA Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, ATTN: PCRE-RF-L, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46249.

d. In the event the owner applied number cannot be identified by either the servicing MILPO or the USA Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center, the Reserve Component Personnel Administration Center (RCPAC), St. Louis, Missouri, AUTOVON 693-7777, should be contacted for assistance. The RCPAC retains files on separated, retired, and Reserve Component Army members. Written request should be forwarded to: Commander, Reserve Component Personnel Administration Center, ATTN: AGUZ-PSD, 9700 Page Blvd, St. Louis, Missouri 63132.

e. Upon receipt of verification concerning the name and location of the service member associated with the owner applied number inscribed on the property, the provost marshal/security office should notify the service member in writing that the property has been recovered. The notification should ascertain if the recovered property belongs to the service member, if the service member ever reported the property as lost or stolen, and if a claim was submitted to the Staff Judge Advocate claims service for loss or theft of the property. Notification should also state where the property is located and a point of contact that the owner can deal with for the return of the property. If the property is to be retained as evidence for legal proceedings, the owner should be informed that the property will be returned upon completion of the proceedings. A copy of this letter should be provided to the US Army Claims Service, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755. The US Army Claims Service will advise the provost marshal/security office if a claim was or was not submitted.

f. In the event the owner cannot be located, recovered property in the custody of provost marshal/security offices should be disposed of in accordance with AR 190-

22, and paragraph 56, Chapter 6 of DOD 4160.21-M, Defense Disposal Manual.

#### 4-14. Use of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

a. Stolen articles may be entered into the NCIC file if a theft report has been made, the item is valued at \$500 or more, and it has a unique manufacturer's assigned serial number and/or owner applied number.

b. Entering stolen personal property items meeting the above criteria into the NCIC or other police information systems as outlined in AR 190-27 is encouraged.

### Section III Neighborhood Walks

#### 4-15. Concept

While most people are unwilling to participate more actively than as observers in a neighborhood watch, there are some individuals who want to become more actively involved in securing their neighborhoods. For this segment of the population, the organization of "Neighborhood Walks" provides a welcome opportunity to make a more active contribution. The basic idea is simple. Residents patrol on foot through their own neighborhoods to observe and report crime. In practice it is a little more complicated, but neighborhood walks can have a dramatic impact on the crime rate, so the effort expended is worthwhile. The points that must be considered are—

a. *Patrol Composition.* Both adults and teenage children can volunteer to participate in neighborhood walks. However, there should be at least one adult in each party. In each patrol group there should be at least two people. Groups of four or six individuals are desirable since by their numbers alone they discourage attacks on the walkers. Larger groups are also more fun, and this is important when volunteers are providing the manpower.

b. *Times/Patrol Duration.* As with other crime prevention programs, maintaining a high level of interest can be a problem. A very successful program in Philadelphia schedules groups for one two-hour patrol per month. More frequent tours caused high drop out rates among participants. Neighborhood walks should be conducted only during those time periods when the crime rate is the highest. Normally there are not enough volunteers to conduct walks at times other than peak crime periods.

c. *Functions.* Members of neighborhood walk groups must understand that they are to observe only, and not actively intervene in criminal acts. Participants and the Government are legally liable for their actions during walks. When a crime or suspicious activity is spotted, the neighborhood walkers should report it to the police.

In Philadelphia, the walkers are equipped with freon driven horns. When a crime is spotted, they activate their horn, and go to the nearest house to call the police. When they hear the walker's horn, residents in the immediate area turn on all of their lights and sound their own horns. The noise and increased lighting invariably causes the criminal to flee.

d. *Neighborhood escorts.* In addition to observing and reporting criminal activity, neighborhood patrols can escort children and older persons between community service facilities and residences, and request that owners secure property when they find it unsecured; for example, when there are unsecured bicycles parked on a front lawn.

#### 4-16. Vigilantism

While active community participation is essential, vigilantism must be discouraged at all costs. Both formal law codes and US common law offer few protections for private citizens who take the law into their own hands. Block captains and installation crime prevention officers must be alert for indications that neighborhood patrols are doing more than observing and take swift remedial action when required. Of course, all non-police participants must be prohibited from carrying weapons of any type while engaged in crime prevention programs. Experience in neighborhoods which have much higher violent crime rates than are found on Army installations has demonstrated that passive devices like freon driven horns or whistles were adequate to discourage attacks. These devices, plus the assignment of 4 to 6 individuals to a neighborhood patrol, provide sufficient protection.

### Section IV Mobile Patrols

#### 4-17. Concept

Some communities with high street crime rates have been successful in organizing private citizens into mobile patrol programs. Like neighborhood foot patrols, these mobile patrols serve as the "eyes and ears" of the police, but do not actively intervene when they spot a crime in progress.

a. In a typical program, block captains or police crime prevention officers assign specific patrol areas to each private mobile patrol. In addition, each patrol receives training on the functions of the patrol, communications procedures, and emergency actions. Normally, patrols are instructed to blow their auto horns steadily when they observe a crime in progress. This is usually sufficient to drive off the criminal.

b. Most private citizen patrols use citizens band (CB) radios as direct communications links with the supporting police department. Installation CB radio clubs

are often willing to sponsor anti-crime patrols under police supervision. Commercial taxi companies which operate on military installations are also excellent candidates for organization into patrols. The cab drivers normally cover most of the high crime rate areas on the installation. Because of the frequency with which they cover them, they are familiar with the routine conditions in each area, and are quick to spot suspicious activity.

c. The Government will not provide gasoline for private vehicles employed on anti-crime patrols, but often it may provide magnetic signs which are affixed to the side of the vehicle and identify it as part of the police sponsored neighborhood patrol program. As in the case of foot patrols, the installation crime prevention officer must be alert for signs of vigilantism, and must take positive action to discourage it if it appears.

## Section V Project Lock

### 4-18. The problem

a. Nearly a million automobiles are stolen in the United States every year. The total value of cars stolen is around the billion dollar mark, making auto theft the nation's costliest crime involving property. Of even greater importance is the social impact of auto theft. For a growing number of young people each year, car-stealing represents the first step toward a life of crime.

b. Police agencies have been diligent in the apprehension of auto thieves and the recovery of stolen vehicles, but the auto theft problem seems to be more amenable to improvement through prevention than through punishment. Barring strict security, auto theft is one of the easier crimes to commit. All vehicles left unattended are vulnerable, and widespread prevention by police surveillance is a physical impossibility.

c. The problem has grown to serious proportion despite determined law enforcement because motorists continue to be negligent or unaware of their responsibility. As long as people invite theft by leaving their cars unlocked or with the key in the ignition—auto thefts will continue to climb. Almost half of all stolen cars each year had been left with keys in the ignition and nine out of ten had been left unlocked.

d. If a significant reduction is to be made, it must be the motorists themselves who make it. Widespread adoption of accepted and effective prevention practices by motorists presents the most logical and immediate improvement to this growing problem.

### 4-19. Origin

a. In 1963 a broad information campaign lasting several months was conducted by the Boston police department with the assistance of the National Automobile

Theft Bureau and the Insurance Information Institute. Since then, more than 525 Lock Your Car campaigns have been held in about 400 communities in 49 states.

b. In the months following campaigns in such cities as Denver, Chicago, Atlanta, San Francisco, significant reductions in the number of auto thefts (from 9 to 54 percent) have been recorded. Undoubtedly, the Lock Your Car Campaigns contributed to reducing auto theft statistics.

### 4-20. Purpose

"Project Lock" is designed to permit sponsoring groups to conduct one day or one week "Lock Your Car" campaigns. Its purpose is two-fold:

a. To alert the public to the importance of locking cars and removing keys as a deterrent to auto theft.

b. To contribute to the welfare of youth by preventing the commission of a first crime.

### 4-21. Materials

This section contains the following samples of materials that can be ordered without charge from The Insurance Information Institute (III), 10 William Street, New York, NY 10038.

a. Windshield Flyer

b. Identifying insignia to be worn by inspectors

c. Tally card for noting cars left with keys in ignition and/or unlocked.

### 4-22. Length of campaign

One day to one week.

### 4-23. Procedure

a. *Considerations.* Groups considering sponsorship of this campaign should consider installation areas known to have car theft problems. The provost marshal should assign patrolmen to accompany the teams on inspection day. Usually, the routes of the teams can be arranged to fit the regular patrols of the military policemen. If uniformed policemen will not be available, the *campaign should not be held.*

b. *Community Orientation.* If the commander desires, a "community orientation" meeting might be held a month or so in advance of the campaign. This would be more desirable for a week-long rather than a day-long campaign. If such a meeting is planned, the provost marshal should issue invitations to representatives of the installation crime prevention council, service clubs, women's clubs, P.T.A., high schools, and churches.

(1) The meeting should be opened with an introduction of the installation commander. After appropriate comments, the commander would read a proclamation setting the date for "Lock Your Car" Week.

(2) If possible a representative of the National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB) should be asked to

address the meeting. Arrangements may be made through the I.I.I. An alternative would be to have the provost marshal review national and local trends in auto thefts stressing the importance of the forthcoming campaign. In conclusion, a representative of the sponsoring group might review the schedule of activities for the campaign.

c. *Program Activities.* If the campaign is to be conducted in one day, a "kick off" breakfast might be substituted for the orientation meeting although the program and attendance might be similar. If a week-long campaign is planned and the orientation meeting was held, the "kick off" breakfast might have a simpler program with attendance limited to the sponsoring group, and police representatives. An alternative to the breakfast would be a luncheon at which results to the moment are reported. Whether the campaign will last a week or a day, the general activities will be similar.

#### (1) Distribution of Windshield Flyers.

(a) With the assistance of the military police the installation should be zoned, according to the established MP patrol areas where possible. The size and number of the zones will depend upon the number of policemen and number of volunteer personnel that will be available. However, the zones should cover most of the post service areas, troop billet areas, and family housing areas.

(b) The inspection teams, composed of a uniformed patrolman and 3-5 sponsoring group members, cover their assigned zones placing flyers under the windshield wipers of all cars found to have keys in the ignition or to be unlocked. Under no circumstances should the flyers be placed inside the cars, even through open windows.

(c) The teams should leave from a central point at a designated time.

(d) It is suggested that flyers be ordered from I.I.I. early enough to allow a local printer to inscribe overleaf a statement such as "This public service is provided as a courtesy of the military police."

(e) The tally cards should be used to record the number of cars inspected, the number unlocked and the number with keys in the ignition.

(2) *School Program.* A poster contest for art students might be sponsored by the crime prevention group. It should be announced at least a month prior to the campaign to allow placement of entries in public in advance of the date. The awards should be presented by the provost marshal in an office ceremony. The ceremony might take place at noon on the campaign day or mid-week if the campaign is longer.

(3) *Public Addresses.* Close to or during the campaign date, addresses by crime prevention professionals should be scheduled on the program of service clubs, women's clubs, P.T.A. and other civic groups.

(4) *Press, Radio, T.V. Coverage.* Well in advance of the campaign the public affairs officer should be

visited by the provost marshal and the other sponsors to develop comprehensive internal information programs in support of the installation's "Project Lock." Plans for the public affairs program should include advance publicity for the campaign, coverage of events during the campaign, and "wrap up" coverage following its completion.

(5) *Campaign operation.* During the inspection day or days, findings on how many cars were unlocked and how many had keys in the ignition should be reported regularly to a headquarters (preferably to the military police).

### 4-24. Conclusion

"Project Lock" has been outlined to provide basic suggestions for a "Lock Your Car" day or week. No procedure can be designed to fit all needs or circumstances and variations often will be desirable. However, if the suggestions and materials contained in this section are utilized, "Project Lock" will not be difficult to organize and conduct. It provides better publicity opportunities than most public service projects. It presents an opportunity for active participation by a number of crime prevention groups. It has been field tested and found to be an outstanding success.

## Section VI HELPING HAND

### 4-25. Concept

HELPING HAND is an organized program through which volunteers are available to assist children who encounter difficulties while they are enroute to and from school. The sign of an upraised HAND in a window facing the street indicates the home of a HELPING HAND. School children are instructed to call on the HELPING HAND whenever they need help in incidents such as: a stranger trying to entice them into a car; a stranger exposing himself; being attacked by an animal or another student; or in the event of a serious storm. The HELPING HAND is a picture of a HAND in white with a red background (see figure 4-3).

### 4-26. Safety features

The HELPING HAND program offers four safety features:

a. It gives the children a silent escort to and from school.

b. When a potential child molester sees the HAND he knows what it means and will no longer feel free to attempt to molest a child in the area.

c. Stray animals can be reported to the proper authorities for pick-up and removal from the area.

d. Proper safety precautions can be taken by the children during a storm.




FIGURE 4-3

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The program is for emergencies only and the children are told not to stop for a drink of water or to use the bathroom.

**4-27. Volunteer duties**

What Does the HELPING HAND Volunteer Do?

*a.* The HELPING HAND volunteer is at home when children are going to and from school, generally from 7:30 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. She does not have to remain at home during school hours.

*b.* The volunteer must be capable of remaining calm during an emergency. When a child enlists the aid of the HELPING HAND, he is relying on her to remain calm; her effectiveness is lessened if she is excitable.

*c.* The volunteer will be asked to place the sign of the HELPING HAND in a window facing the street. This indicates to children that they may seek help at that home. The sign remains in the window at all times during the school year.

**4-28. Organizing the HELPING HAND**

The HELPING HAND program is organized under the guidance of a coordinator for a particular area such as an elementary school zone. The coordinator must be of sound character and must be able to keep confidential much of the information she/he receives in the course of her/his duties. Activities will include—

*a.* Consulting with the school principal on the locations of possible trouble spots where HELPING HANDS are most needed.

*b.* Study the entire zone thoroughly, both first hand and on maps, and become especially familiar with possible trouble spots.

*c.* Keep a list of streets and block numbers.

*d.* Compile a list of persons she knows personally who might be willing to serve as HELPING HANDS. Contact them and explain the program, and ask for their help. They may be able to suggest other persons who might become HELPING HANDS. Each person recommended must be well known to the person making the recommendation. HELPING HANDS do not have to be members of the PTA or have children in school; they may be retired people or grandparents. They must be reliable, capable of remaining calm in an emergency, and at home during the hours of 7:30 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. to 4:00 P.M., when children are going to and from school.

*e.* The crime prevention officer must keep a list of all names submitted and persons who recommended them. A good candidate is a person who has been recommended by three people. The coordinator may use her own judgment in selecting HELPING HANDS, but should never select a name at random.

*f.* Coordinators will instruct each volunteer to be-

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come familiar with locations of other HELPING HAND homes in the vicinity.

*g.* With assistants, coordinators will distribute the HELPING HAND window signs to volunteers and their instructions. Each HELPING HAND will be asked to sign for the materials. The sign will be surrendered to the principal of the school issuing the sign, if and when the HELPING HAND is no longer able to be a volunteer. The sign will carry the name of the school, school telephone number, the provost marshal's telephone number, and the signature of the HELPING HAND volunteer.

*h.* On or before the date of distribution of signs to the volunteers, an explanation of the program is to be given to each child in the school to take home for the parents to read.

*i.* The coordinator will be available to answer questions of HELPING HANDS and will keep records on HELPING HAND volunteers up to date and will seek to replace any who leave the program.

*j.* At the beginning of each new school year, the coordinator will check with volunteers to find out if they plan to continue in the program. She will check each home to see that those which are supposed to have signs do have them; she also will check homes of former HELPING HANDS to be sure that unauthorized signs are not displayed.

*k.* If the coordinator should resign for any reason, all records should be placed with the crime prevention officer until a new coordinator is chosen.

**4-29. What do HELPING HAND volunteers look for?**

*a.* Automobiles traveling at slow speeds, especially during the time when children are on the way to and from school or in areas where children congregate.

*b.* Occupied automobiles which are parked, especially during the times when children are on the way to and from school or in areas where children congregate.

*c.* A person loitering around secluded areas where children are likely to pass.

*d.* A person loitering around school grounds watching youngsters play.

*e.* Men or women who stop children and talk to them while they are enroute to and from school or while at play. Most degenerates are males; however, there are a few females who fit this same category.

**4-30. Instructions for HELPING HAND Volunteers**

*a.* If you should observe any of these conditions, get the license number of the automobile. If at all possible, get a physical description of the subject; approximate age, height, weight, color of hair and eyes, and description of clothing worn. If the person really looks suspicious call the MP's at once giving your name and address and a description of the car and subject.

*b.* Always remember that there is the possibility that

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this can be a parent waiting for their child, but there is no harm done in taking note of a situation such as this. In the event that something does happen, you may be apply to supply the MP's with all the information they need to apprehend a sex offender.

c. If a child comes to your house with information that someone has approached him or her, or tried to get the child to come to his car, or has exposed himself to the child, it is important that you do not become excited. Any alarm, excitement, or fear expressed by you will be transmitted to the child.

d. Get as much information as you can from the child. If the child can point out a subject or automobile to you, verify the make, model, and color of the car and be sure to get the LICENSE NUMBER.

e. CALL THE POLICE. Their phone number is listed on the back of the window sign. After the MP's have been called, attempt to contact the child's parents. If contact is made, it is most important that you remain calm and be very factual about what has happened. Be sure that you do not overdramatize the occurrence. Advise the arriving police officer whether you were able to make contact with the parent.

f. In the event of an animal bite or attack, notify the parents by phone if possible. Remind them that the bite should be reported to the proper authorities, and they should seek attention by a physician, since rabies shots may be needed.

g. Should a storm develop, the child should be kept at the home of the HELPING HAND Volunteer until the immediate danger of the storm has passed. Attempt to contact the child's home by phone to report his whereabouts.

h. The HELPING HAND Volunteer will not—  
 (1) Give a child food or drink.  
 (2) Give a child any type medicine.  
 (3) Will not apply anything to a laceration or abrasion.  
 (4) Transport a child in their personal car.

i. Any aid given to a child must be reported to the coordinator. She needs to know where and what type trouble the children are having so preventive measures can be taken.

#### 4-31. Ten rules of safety for all parents

Children have a naturally friendly attitude and a curious nature. As parents, therefore, we are confronted with

the dual responsibility of not only teaching our children respect for adults, but also of teaching them to avoid situations that may harm them.

a. Your child's safety is mainly your responsibility. Impress the importance of the child's obeying your instructions.

b. Do not be withdrawn from your child, encourage him or her to tell you about his friends and where he plays.

c. Know who you employ as a baby-sitter. Make sure they are reliable and old enough to understand their responsibility. Do not hesitate to ask for references.

d. Be aware that it is not only the stranger that can molest children. Instruct your child to report any unusual advances *no matter who* makes the advances.

e. Instruct your child *never* to accept rides with strangers. Remember this also applies to young teenagers that hitchhike. You can never be sure of the person that offers them a ride.

f. Your child should be accompanied by a friend if going any distance from your home. Children should not play at new construction sites, in the street, or near abandoned ice boxes.

g. Dress your children adequately, particularly girls. What may be appropriate for a movie queen is often not correct for a young girl or teenager.

h. Permit your children to invite their friends to your house. Provide adequate supervision . . . especially for teenage parties. Remember a 21 year old, although an adult, may not be adequate supervision for a teenage party.

i. Teach your children that traffic laws are for their protection as well as others: Bicycles and cars must be handled safely. The misuse of either can cause the loss of a life, perhaps your child's.

j. Respect for authority—children must be instructed that laws are made to protect all people. It is not smart to violate the law, it is wrong. You can best do this by setting a good example. Remember policemen are friends of you and your children . . . not your enemy.

k. ALWAYS REMEMBER . . . help yourself and your children, by helping your police. The police want to aid and assist you, if you have any questions ask . . . don't be sorry later.

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## Chapter 5 Evaluation

### Section I Background & Limitations

#### 5-1. General

a. Evaluations of installation crime prevention programs (see fig. 5-1) do not have to employ control groups, exceptionally tight control of all variables, and elaborate statistical analysis to produce worthwhile results. Most often the resources to conduct a formal evaluation that will stand up to rigorous academic scrutiny are not available. In addition, there are several inherent difficulties in the collection of data on crime prevention programs that make it difficult to determine with a one hundred percent accuracy that a particular reduction in the crime rate was a result of a particular crime prevention measure, unless a very elaborate analysis and control system are employed. These are—

- (1) Difficulty in controlling variables
- (2) Displacement effect
- (3) Unreported crime

#### 5-2. Difficulty in controlling variables

a. In its simplest form, the type of evaluation most commonly used in academic or scientific settings seeks to determine the relationship between two variables. By varying the independent variable (for example, the dosage of a drug), the effect on the dependent variable (for example, pulse rate) is determined, while all other variables (like food intake) are held constant.

b. Although more complex in form, the same model can be used in evaluations of complex programs. Experimental and control groups can be selected. The "treatment" can be administered by the researchers or by those taught by the researchers. The results can be analyzed for their statistical significance. However, since crime prevention programs deal with human subjects, certain complications arise. The degree of success may have nothing to do with the efficacy of the program, but only with the way it was introduced or with the personal predilections of the groups involved. There is no "standard" population; human beings are not standardized as mice are for laboratory purposes. A program found successful in one city may be a failure in another.

c. These considerations also apply in the evaluation of crime control programs. This evaluation is further complicated by another problem. The people whose behavior is to be modified, i.e., the offenders, cannot be "treated" directly or separated into experimental and control groups; they will not stand up and be counted.

Although public health programs often encounter this problem, they often deal with physical cause-and-effect links between treatment and improvement. The same is not true for crime control programs. The effectiveness of these programs is normally determined by looking at statistics of reported crime and arrests, which are more indirect indicators.

d. In a crime control program, it may be impossible to classify variables as dependent and independent; they may all affect and be affected by each other. Furthermore, because of the difficulty in determining why people behave the way they do, a number of intervening and antecedent variables may go unnoticed. Police programs designed to reduce crime may have their most direct effect on the behavior of the general public toward the police, which in turn affects the crime rate.

e. Evaluations are not necessarily restricted to the analysis of objective crime data; they can also include subjective considerations and perceptions. These subjective evaluations can be of significant benefit in augmenting the statistical analyses of the results of the program. They are especially helpful in assessing why and how a program worked, and whether a statistical outcome is actually evidence that the program was successful. Interviews of participating agency personnel and residents of the area in which the program is run are usually used to supply this information. They can give the evaluator new insight into the actual program operation.

#### 5-3. Displacement effects

a. In many cases where crime reductions have been measured and attributed to programs, it is unclear whether there has been an actual reduction in crime or whether the crime has been displaced. The amount of displacement depends to an extent on the characteristics of the offender. An opportunistic offender can be pictured as having a relatively elastic demand: if the risk is too high, he will forgo the crime. An addict offender is typically pictured as having a relatively inelastic demand for the product because of his inelastic demand for drugs: despite the risks, he needs the product.

b. Deterrents may have little effect on perpetrators of "expressive" crimes, that is, crimes in which the perpetrator is emotionally involved and is expressing these emotions. Most assaults and homicides fit this category. On the other hand, deterrents may have a strong effect on "instrumental" crimes, those which are seen by the offender only as a means to an end (usually

## CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM EVALUATION




Figure 5-1

money). If alternative avenues to the same end are made more attractive by comparison, the offender may well be deterred. Deterrence may produce a diversion to legal alternatives to crime; it also may cause displacement to illegal alternatives.

(1) *Displacement to other crimes.* There is no immutable law that says that a burglar cannot hold up a liquor store and a robber cannot burglarize a warehouse. If a specific crime or set of crimes is the target of a crime control program, offenders may decide to avoid the target crimes and ply their trade in other ways. Some offenders will be deterred from all crime if their crime specialty is the object of a crime control program, but the extent of this deterrence should not be overestimated. The statutory categories of crime should not be confused with categories which serve to classify offenders.

In some cases the result of the displacement of offenders to other crimes is beneficial. If the targeted crimes are more serious than the ones to which offenders are diverted, the net effect of the program may be reduced danger to society. Of course, the converse may also be true; closing off the vulnerable and more easily protected targets of crime may cause an offender to commit more serious crimes, with a net increase in the danger to society.

In some instances the individual effect may be substantial but the overall effect may be negligible. Protecting a small fraction of premises against burglary will reduce the number of crimes committed against them, but the burglary rate against unprotected premises may go up.

(2) *Displacement to other tactics and targets.* Offenders can change their manner of committing a crime when a new program is established to counter their activity. One example of this took place in 1969 in a section of the Bronx, which was having a rapid increase in outdoor crime. The crimes took place primarily in the evening hours when people were returning from work. The program instituted by the police consisted of intensive sweeps of randomly selected city blocks, coupled with plainclothes police officers patrolling the streets. It succeeded in reducing the number of offenses committed during the evening hours, but at the expense of increasing the number taking place in the late afternoon when patrolmen were taking their lunch hours or were occupied with school crossings or a change of shifts.

(3) *Displacement to other areas.* The most frequently discussed type of crime displacement is from one area to another. For instance, it has been cynically suggested that the goal of the New York subway police is to chase crime up "into the streets, where it belongs." More seriously, some recent police helicopter program evaluations have been questioned because they did not take possible area displacements into consideration.

c. One type of boundary which is of interest with

regard to crime displacement is the jurisdictional boundary between the installation and surrounding cities. It has been conjectured that the crime reduction experienced in some central cities has been at the expense of the surrounding suburbs, which have experienced increased crime rates.

(1) An initial study of crime displacement was performed for the Washington, DC area. It concluded that, although the decrease in Washington's crime rate was concurrent with an increase in the suburban crime rate, "there is no evidence that the reduction in reported crime in DC has resulted in a corresponding crime increase in the nearby suburbs."

(2) The area displacement effect can be measured with some degree of reliability. Three zones can be defined for the purposes of the measurement: the area containing the crime control program (Zone I), a border around this area (Zone II), and the area chosen as the control area (Zone III). The width of the border may depend upon the type of program implemented. If the program involves police helicopters, a quarter-mile wide border may be necessary; for a patrol car, one or two blocks may suffice.

(3) Crime rates before program initiation should be determined, for all three zones. If Zone II records a greater increase in crime than Zone III, while Zone I's crime rate decreases, then the increase in Zone II can be attributed to two factors: the general increase in crime rate, represented by Zone III's increase; and the increase caused by a displacement of crime from Zone I. A displacement of this type does not mean that the program is ineffective. It may suggest that the program should be expanded.

### 5-4. Unreported crime

a. Crime statistics are based on crimes reported to the police. It is well known that many crimes go unreported. Victimization studies (undertaken by the President's Crime Commission in 1967 and by LEAA in 1971) can determine the extent of unreported crime and its change from year to year, by area of the country, by types of crime, and by the reasons for failure to report them. But these victimization studies are best suited to determining long-term effects. They are not well suited to most crime control program evaluations, in which short-term changes must be assessed.

b. The amount of unreported crime is important, but not in most cases for planning and evaluating crime control programs affecting police activity. The extent of unreported crime is of little significance unless it is affected by the program. If crime reporting is encouraged by a program, the reported crime rate may increase despite the program's effectiveness; if it is discouraged, the program's effectiveness may be exaggerated.

c. Paradoxically, a lowered reported crime rate may

be the direct result of an increased actual crime rate. Taking reports from victims of crime occupies a substantial amount of a patrolman's time. Many of these crimes are minor and have no potential for solution. In an effort to increase the police department's time on patrol, the police chief may stop the practice of sending a patrolman out to get reports from the victim of a minor crime. This requires the victim to travel to the police station to report the crime. If the crime is minor or is seen by the victim to be unsolvable, or if the theft is not covered by insurance, the victim may decide not to inconvenience himself by going to the police station to report the crime. As a result, the number of crimes reported to the police may drop. Conversely, an actual decrease in crime due to the increased effectiveness of the police may produce an increase in the reported crime rate.

#### 5-5. Crime "rates"

a. It has been pointed out by many observers that the crime rates, as presently calculated, do not reflect the true situation. The rape rate, for example, should be calculated by dividing the annual number of rape cases by the number of women, since they are the population at risk. One would expect that the rate of occurrence of commercial burglaries would be less in a residential area than a commercial area, when calculated on the basis of "per thousand people"; yet these rates should be obtained by dividing the number of cases by the number of commercial establishments (the population at risk) in each area.

b. The victim or target is only one aspect of the crime. The offender can also be calculated into the rate. For example, the potential offenders in stranger-to-stranger crimes are usually considered to be males between 16 and 25. Thus, one would expect fewer of these crimes in a city full of pensioners and retirees than in a city of the same population but with a higher proportion of young men.

c. This latter fact is of minor importance in evaluating crime control programs, since the age distribution of people in a city or a section of a city does not normally change greatly over the evaluation period. However, the former factor (i.e., population at risk of becoming victimized) can be misleading if it is not taken into account. If possible, crime rates in experimental and control areas should be compared to the population which risks becoming victims of the target crimes.

## Section II Measures of Effectiveness

### 5-6. General

a. The goals of the program determine the criteria which are used to measure its effectiveness. These goals

and criteria should not be seen as confining; the evaluator should be amenable to broadening the criteria, especially if the program to be evaluated is a new one. For example, the program might be beneficial in some unforeseen way, wholly outside the original criteria. Conversely, the program may be an overall failure but a success according to the evaluation. For example, it may be that the specified measures were the wrong ones to use for the program or should not have been used alone.

b. Clearly, programs aimed at controlling crime should not be evaluated solely for their effect on crime. Most programs cannot, by their very nature, focus on one specific objective alone. They normally are multifaceted in their effect and should be evaluated with respect to all of their facets.

Similarly, the measures of effectiveness discussed in this section may not be adequate for every crime control program, but they comprise some of the more useful measures that can be employed.

c. This section concentrates on the two evaluation types, called "internal" and "external" evaluations, respectively. The words "internal" and "external" refer to whether the evaluation is conducted of the program's inner workings and logic, or whether it is conducted of the external effect of the program, which does not depend on program type. An internal evaluation of a crime control program involving the use of, for example, new police patrol techniques would include the analysis of police response time and how it was effective in controlling crime, or why it was successful in one area and not in another. The external evaluation would focus only on the effectiveness of the program in reducing crime rates or solving crimes, not on how or why or the conditions under which the results were achieved.

d. Evaluating *how well* a program achieved its goals is not the only purpose of an evaluation; how and why the results were achieved are of equal importance. External measures relate to the former evaluation; internal measures are concerned with the latter. Two examples will further serve to highlight the differences between these measures.

e. Many crime control programs are dependent on good community relations in order to achieve their goals. In these cases a public affairs campaign is often instituted concurrent with the crime control program. The success of the Public Affairs campaign should not be interpreted as success for the program. It may be a necessary part of the program, but it does not substitute for the results of the program in controlling crime. Testimonials from people involved in the program should also be considered only as supplementary to the evaluation based on external measures.

f. A study undertaken for the President's Crime Commission showed that, for certain types of incidents, the probability of arrest increased as the response time de-

creased. As a result of this finding many police departments purchased new equipment or tried novel techniques to reduce response time, without first determining whether their workloads included enough of the type for which quick response is useful. If this measure (response time) is to be employed, it should be recognized as an internal measure and not substituted for the external evaluation.

### 5-7. Internal measures

a. *Introduction.* Each program will have its own internal measures of effectiveness, based on the logical elements of which it is constituted. This section covers only the external measures of effectiveness which are common to most crime control program evaluations. The measures covered include the crime rate, clearance rate, arrest rate, crime seriousness index, and consideration of the fear of crime.

b. *Crime rate.* The crime rate, the number of a specified type of crime committed per resident in a specified time period, is normally considered to be a measure of deterrence. If the crime rate decreases, it is presumed that potential offenders have modified their behavior to some extent and have committed fewer crimes. This is based on the supposition that the program has made the target crimes unattractive: by increasing the actual risk of apprehension, or by increasing the *perceived* risk of apprehension; by reducing the expected return from the crime (or the *perceived* return); or by making alternative forms of behavior more attractive than the target group of offenses.

(1) These deterrent effects employ different means for their accomplishment. Most crime control programs are police-oriented and concentrate on the risk-related aspects of deterrence. Victim-oriented programs focus on reducing the expected return. Many social and recreational programs deal with making alternatives more attractive. Regardless of the orientation of the programs, their deterrent effects are determined by measuring reported crime rates.

(2) Reported crime rates can be changed by a number of factors, some of which are misleading. The public may feel that the police are becoming less effective in dealing with crimes and, therefore, report them less often. Conversely, if the public perceives that the police are becoming more effective, they may begin to report crimes that previously would have gone unreported. Another apparent crime rate reduction may be due to the police not recording crimes that have been reported to them. Displacement effects, which can produce misleading crime rate reductions, were discussed earlier.

(3) There may also be an actual reduction in crime due to the deterrent effect of a program. In some cases the reduction in crime can be attributed to psychological deterrence. That is, the police department may have instituted some change (say, painting all police cars

canary yellow) that a change has been made in pre-existing patterns of operation may cause a change in the behavior patterns of potential offenders. This type of deterrence is rarely long-lived.

(4) On the other hand, there may have been a change instituted by the police that *has* had the desired effect of increasing the actual risk of apprehension and, therefore, reducing the number of target offenses. An example of this is the police-operated burglar alarms of commercial establishments in the experimental program was increased almost tenfold, compared to the (non-alarmed) control establishments. There was one capture in 36 control-group burglaries (2.8%), while there were twelve captures in 46 experimental-group burglaries (26%). Crime displacements, to other crimes, tactics, targets, and areas, reduced the actual effectiveness of the program, but this example shows that a significant change can be made in the *actual* risk of apprehension. Preliminary results indicate that the rate of increase of commercial burglaries has been decreased from about 15% per year to about 0%, at the expense of a greater increase in residential burglaries.

(5) It is difficult but useful to distinguish between actual deterrence (due to an actual increase in risk) and deterrence that is purely psychological in nature (due to a perceived increase in risk). If it is suspected that part of the deterrent effect may be transient, a long-term study would be of benefit. In this way the "half-life" of the psychological deterrence can be gauged, which can give some indication of the extent to which resources should be committed to the program.

(6) Some forms of psychological deterrence are almost entirely counterproductive. They may appear effective to those who would not commit crime and ineffective to those who are "in the business" and study the presumed deterrent more closely. A tear gas pen, for example, may give a person a sense of security that is entirely without foundation, and may be dangerous to him if he actually attempts to use it when faced with an assailant.

(7) One investigator has pointed out that for a given criminal situation non-delinquents perceive a higher risk of apprehension than do delinquents; in all probability the delinquents have a more realistic assessment of the situation. A purely psychological deterrent may have the unfortunate effect of making only a cosmetic improvement. This gives the general population the impression that there has been a change for the better, while in reality the situation may not have changed, or may have changed for the worse because of the division of resources to a nonexistent solution.

(8) The crime rate can be used as a measure of effectiveness. However, the evaluator should delve into the determination of the crime rate to see if any change in the rate reflects a change in reporting procedures, deterrent effect (with tangible evidence).

15 November 1982

*c. Clearance rate.* Clearance rate is normally considered to be a measure of the ability of police to solve crimes. A cleared crime is one in which the police have identified the offender and have sufficient evidence to arrest him. The clearance rate is the percentage of total crimes that were cleared.

(1) This measure of effectiveness should be used with care. A decreasing clearance rate may not mean that a police department is becoming less effective, and an increasing clearance rate may not mean that it is becoming more effective. This is due to a number of factors, chief among them the public's conception of the role of the police with respect to crime and the present method of collecting crime data.

(2) Often overlooked in discussion about crime is the role of the public in assisting the police. Police rely on community support to legitimize their authority as well as to help them carry out their work. If a segment of the community becomes alienated from the police (for whatever reason) and offers them little assistance in pursuing offenders, crime rates in these areas may rise. However, it is not only alienation of community groups that reduces the ability of the police to deal with crime; the profit motive is also to blame. Many owners of stores which have been robbed refuse to give their clerks time off (with pay) to aid the police in their investigation. They absorb the loss of a robbery easily (it rarely comes close to the amount lost from shoplifting, employee theft, and damaged goods) and are unwilling to increase it by assisting the police. They may feel that the prospect of apprehending the offender are too slim; they may be afraid of retribution if the offender discovers their assistance; or he may be afraid that their insurance will be cancelled.

(3) If a police department begins a drive to increase its clearance rate, the increase may be forthcoming without any real change in police effectiveness. A survey of three cities' police departments found that arrests for felonies were not made by the police in about 43% of the cases in which there was probable cause, while the police were accompanied by observers. Making arrests in all such instances would inflate the clearance rate quite easily. However, it should be noted that the police officer has a great deal of discretion in the exercise of his power of arrest. He may feel that the arrest charges will not hold up. One measure of the arrest quality is the percentage of arrests which lead to prosecutions.

(4) In sum, clearance rate can be a useful measure for determining the effectiveness of crime control programs. Its utility can be increased by careful selection and specification of the crime categories which are studied, by determining the manner in which the crimes were cleared, and by determining if there has been a change in where the police "draw the line" in the exercise of their discretion.

*d. Arrest rate.* Another measure of effectiveness that is often used as a determinant of crime control effectiveness is the arrest rate, calculated either per police officer or per resident for a specified time period. Most of the considerations concerning clearance rate, discussed above, also apply to arrest rate. It is distinguished from clearance rate, however, by an additional factor: it is not related to the total number of offenses. For example, the number of arrests for drug violations has risen considerably over the past few years. This increase, however, is indicative of the extent of the problem, not of the effectiveness of the solution. It has been described how drug arrests may be traded off against arrests for other offenses, and vice versa, especially when informal arrest quotas are established. The use of arrest rate by itself, therefore, does not appear to be appropriate as a measure of the effectiveness for most crime control programs.

*e. Crime seriousness index.* Among the many criticisms of crime statistics is the contention that, even if the data were reliable and complete, we would still have only a count of the number of incidents without an indication of their relative seriousness. The "crime seriousness index" was proposed to include some of the major disutilities of crime typically committed by juveniles. Crimes are weighted according to the degree and nature of injury to the victims: whether they were intimidated and the nature of the intimidation, whether premises were forcibly entered, and the kind and value of property stolen. The weights were determined by requesting a sample of people to estimate the relative seriousness of various crimes.

(1) All of the factors used to determine the weights are (or should be) included in offense reports. It would not be very difficult to calculate an incident seriousness score based on these reports, either for a specific evaluation or as a matter of course. Use of the seriousness index has also been proposed to measure the relative performance of law enforcement agencies.

(2) The crime seriousness index is not the ultimate weighting scheme. The seriousness appears to be calculated more from the viewpoint of the offender and the event than from the viewpoint of the victim or society. For example, most people would consider the murder of a robbery victim by his assailant to be more serious than the murder of one spouse by the other. With regard to property loss, there is a difference between the loss suffered by an individual who is insured and one who is not covered.

(3) The loss relative to the individual's income is also an important factor; the theft of a \$100 television from a low-income family may have much greater impact than the theft of \$10,000 of jewels from a wealthy family. Perhaps a better index of the relative value of property loss to the victim would be the value of the loss in relation to the amount of the individual's dis-

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cretionary income (that is, income not used for the basic necessities of life). Of course, such information is not available on police crime reports.

*f. Fear of crime.* It has been pointed out that the perceived risk of crime is greater than the actual risk of crime, and that this perceived risk does not seem to be correlated with the actual crime rate. Unless the public feels safer in proportion to its increased actual safety, the full potential of the improvements will not have been reached. Therefore, the goal of a crime control program can be broadened to include not only improved public safety (deterrence) and effectiveness (clearance rate), and reduced crime impact (seriousness), but improved, more accurate, public perceptions of safety as well.

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(1) measurements of perceived safety can be both direct and indirect. Public opinion surveys with regard to perceptions about crime and safety have been made frequently. It is also possible to gauge the effect of this fear using indirect measures by observing what people do rather than what they say. The number of patrons of movie theaters and restaurants at night, or other observations of this type of activity could be used to gauge the fear of crime.

(2) A reliable measure of the public's perception of public safety has not been developed yet. Additional research is being done and needs to be done before this type of measure of effectiveness can be used with confidence.

**Appendix A  
Offense—Countermeasure Matrix**

OFFENSES	COMMAND/LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERMEASURES.										COMMUNITY PROGRAMS.				
	Crime Hot Lines	Lighting	Environmental Changes	Patrol/Surveillance/Decoys	Publicity Campaigns	Residential Security Survey	Juvenile Programs	Fraud Programs	Employee Thefts	Arson Programs	Neighborhood Watch	Operation Identification	Neighborhood Walks/Escorts	Mobile Patrols	Project Lock
Arson	X			X	X				X		X		X		
Auto Theft	X	X			X						X		X	X	X
Burglary/Housebreaking	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X	
Employee Thefts	X				X			X			X				
Fraud	X				X		X								
Larceny	X		X					X			X				
Rape	X	X	X	X	X	X					X		X	X	
Robbery	X	X	X	X	X	X					X		X	X	
Juvenile Delinquency	X			X	X		X				X		X	X	
Vandalism	X	X		X	X		X				X		X	X	

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**Appendix B  
DA Approved Crime Prevention Courses**

I. Course Title: Basic Crime Prevention Theory and Practice

Course Length: Two weeks

\$560 per student (includes tuition and quarters)

Institution: National Crime Prevention Institute  
Shelby Campus  
University of Louisville  
Louisville, KY 40292  
(502) 588-6987

II. Course Title: Basic Crime Prevention

Course Length: Two weeks

Course Cost: \$500 per student (Includes tuition, quarters and mess).

Texas Crime Prevention University  
Southwest Texas State University  
San Marcos, TX 78666  
(512) 392-0166

Course content at both schools is roughly the same. Course selection should be based on the total cost of tuition plus travel cost.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

E. C. MEYER  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:

ROBERT M. JOYCE  
Major General, United States Army  
The Adjutant General

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CIRCULAR }  
No. 190-82-1)

HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, DC, 15 June 1982

Expires 30 September 1983

MILITARY POLICE  
DA CRIME PREVENTION CAMPAIGNS

*This circular applies to the Active Army, the National Guard (ARNG), and the US Army Reserve (USAR).*

*Interim changes to this circular are not official unless authenticated by The Adjutant General. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates unless sooner superseded or rescinded.*

C

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**1. Purpose.** *a.* This circular establishes general guidance for the conduct of periodic crime prevention campaigns and themes in support of the Army Crime Prevention Program.

*b.* The periodic campaigns are designed to highlight specific crime areas for broad based, intensified, short term public awareness efforts by MACOM and installation crime prevention personnel.

**2. General.** *a.* Crime prevention programs cannot work without an informed and motivated public. All crime prevention programs require some degree of community involvement.

*b.* Command information is used to "market" crime prevention. The campaigns are designed to overcome apathy and ignorance; change attitudes, opinions, and behavior; and to get people actively involved in self-protection. Participation can take the form of program volunteers, changes in personal behavior, and/or overall awareness of the magnitude of the local crime problem.

*c.* It is the responsibility of law enforcement to

reach all members of the military community with information concerning crime problems and the techniques which they can use to reduce opportunities for criminal victimization.

**3. Command information campaigns and themes.** *a.* The overall campaign themes are preselected by Headquarters, Department of the Army, based on worldwide analysis of crime data, field input, and coordination with national civilian crime prevention agencies.

*b.* The themes have Army-wide application and are intended to highlight problem areas for high impact, command information efforts designed to create a specific awareness of a crime problem and to motivate service members to participate in program activities.

*c.* MACOMs/installations are free to alter the designated campaigns based on local estimates of the installation crime problem and analysis of crime data.

*d.* The information and general material

\*This circular supersedes DA CIR 190-81-1, August 1981.

provided by Department of the Army through command channels are intended as general supporting guides for local efforts. The development of specialized material and enlargement of the overall theme is the responsibility of the MACOM/installation.

e. The campaigns and themes will make maximum use of crime prevention materials, themes, and practices developed by the civilian sector. Particular emphasis will be placed on the crime prevention research, procedures, and techniques developed by, for, or sponsored by the Department of Justice. MACOM and installation commanders are encouraged to participate in local civilian community crime prevention campaigns.

**4. Program implementation.** a. Local programs in support of campaign themes should be adjusted to reach individual soldiers, dependents, civilian employees, units, and activities through a variety of approaches such as:

- (1) Teaching and counseling services.
- (2) Media campaigns.
- (3) Organized training.
- (4) Inspections.

b. The crime prevention objective is the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. The ultimate goal of both the periodic campaigns and the DA Crime Prevention Program is to stimulate appropriate crime prevention attitudes and behavior on the part of all members of the military community.

c. The media and crime prevention council will be the major command information link with the military community. Crime prevention messages on radio, television, and in local newspapers will enable campaign material to be disseminated to large numbers of people in a short period of time. The media can also be used to target messages to specific groups.

d. Printed materials, such as brochures, flyers, booklets, etc., have a variety of effective uses in a crime prevention command information program.

e. Outdoor advertising can be extremely effective in building awareness and reminding the

community to take crime prevention actions. Other advertising, such as bumper stickers, posters, T-shirts, keyrings, etc., are additional ways of keeping crime prevention in the public eye.

f. All advertising should be uncluttered, simple, and concise. The material should be designed to capture the public's attention, to give some information about the problems addressed, and to facilitate followup with direct inquiries to a specific crime prevention section.

g. While it is difficult and costly to determine the effects of command information efforts, it is possible to determine what materials community members respond to best. It is easy to monitor which materials are moving people to call for information or for service. The media materials and brochures are important in generating awareness and interest but the personal contacts necessary for an effective crime prevention program to be implemented must not be overlooked.

**5. Department of the Army crime prevention campaigns.** a. DA Campaigns:

- (1) January 1983—Army Crime Watch/Operation ID
- (2) April 1983—Juvenile Delinquency/Child Abuse Prevention
- (3) September 1983—Employee Theft Prevention

b. Crime prevention related dates. The following nationally recognized dates provide excellent opportunities for MACOM/installation crime prevention personnel to conduct command information campaigns:

- (1) Law Day—1 May 1983.
- (2) National Police Week—begins on Sunday of the week in which 15 May falls.
- (3) National Police Officer Memorial Day—15 May 1983.
- (4) Crime Prevention Week—6-12 February 1983.
- (5) National Burglary Prevention Month—June 1983.

**6. National Crime Prevention Coalition.** The

Army is a participating member of the National Crime Prevention Coalition and as such is supporting and participating in the ongoing "Take a Bite out of Crime" Campaign. Materials in support of

this campaign will be distributed through command and public affairs channels. MACOM and installations are urged to fully utilize the campaigns and its themes.

Cir 190-82-1

[PEMP-0]

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

ROBERT M. JOYCE  
*Brigadier General, United States Army*  
*The Adjutant General*

E. C. MEYER  
*General, United States Army*  
*Chief of Staff*

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D



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

18 JAN 1983

PEMP-0

SUBJECT: Child Abuse Prevention Campaign (April 1983)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Child abuse is major problem in the United States. It is estimated that two million children are abused and neglected annually, and 2,000 die as a result. In 1981, there were 304 child abuse cases reported to the Army Crime Records Center. This is only the tip of the iceberg. Experts, both in and out of the service, agree that child abuse is one of the most under-reported crimes. It is difficult to detect because:

a. Most victims are pre-school age children and infants who are isolated from public view.

b. Most people, including, unfortunately, many doctors, do not recognize the difference between accidental and intentionally inflicted injuries.

c. People do not like to admit that this type of crime happens in their neighborhoods. There are a number of myths and misconceptions which make people believe that abuse cannot be occurring. Some of these myths are examined in Incl 1.

2. Child abuse usually develops in families that are under a high level of stress. Typically, abusive behavior, both physical and sexual, starts at a low level and, over time, escalates in both intensity and frequency. Law enforcement can do little to eliminate the social and environmental factors that produce the stress and isolation that are conducive to child abuse. The only way to prevent the crime and protect children from serious injury or death, is to detect the problem in its early stages, so that the escalating cycle of abuse can be broken before it becomes life threatening. To do this, we can take the lead in making the public aware of the scope of the problem and the indicators of abuse. Also, we can work closely with the other agencies which play a role in combating the problem. Incls 2 and 3 contain information on indicators of abuse and characteristics of abusive parents.

3. To assist in getting the message out to the general public, DA has produced a poster (DA Poster 190-24, Incl 4), and the Chief of Public Affairs will be providing articles in "Commander's Call" and news stories for installation papers through the ARNews wire service.

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4. Child abuse of any type is a crime. Incidents of abuse must always be reported to the military police/CID, and must always be fully investigated and documented. Child protection case management teams (CPCMT) at installation level are tasked with coordinating treatment to restore abusive families to a healthy state, and to coordinate with civilian social work services to protect the child. However, CPCMT involvement does not eliminate the requirement for a complete criminal investigation. Even if a commander decides not to prosecute based on a CPCMT recommendation that the perpetrator be allowed to participate in a rehabilitation program, the case must still be documented by the police. In many cases, it is the involvement of the military police which motivates the abusive parents to cooperate with treatment efforts. Also, if rehabilitative efforts fail, the commander may choose to prosecute, so the evidence must be collected and safeguarded right from the start.

5. Most child abuse cases are not prosecuted as criminal offenses. Many families may be restored to a healthy state. To ensure the safety of the children involved, the military police must be represented on the CPCMT, and should cooperate fully with their efforts. One method of developing an informal network between the various organizations which collectively respond to the child abuse problem is to sponsor a seminar at installation level which covers the subject from the law enforcement, JAG, medical, and Army community services (ACS) perspectives. This will ensure that each organization has a grasp of the entire response system, and just as importantly, will get working level personnel from all of the agencies together so they can establish the informal links that are essential for any response system to function effectively. Incl 5 is a facilitator's guide for an installation child abuse seminar. It will be provided to each military community by direct mail to provost marshals and ACS activities.

6. The technical aspects of a child abuse investigation are somewhat different than other physical or sexual assault cases because of the age and status of the victim. Incl 6 contains "Child Abuse and Neglect Guidelines" and notes on interviewing child victims which were developed by the Michigan State Police. They may be helpful for MP investigators and CID special agents. Information on discriminating between accidental and intentionally inflicted injuries is contained in the installation seminar guide. However, in serious cases when local personnel are not able to establish the cause of an injury, it may be useful to call in a forensic pathologist for assistance. Dr. (MAJ) Ronald Reeves of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington, DC is normally available as a consultant in such cases. His AUTOVON number is 291-2361 or commercial (202) 576-2361.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

THOMAS A. MAC DONNELL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Office of Army  
Law Enforcement

6 Incl  
as

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DISTRIBUTION:

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

US ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY, ATTN: AEAPM

COMMANDERS

US ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND, ATTN: DRCSS

US ARMY COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND, ATTN: CC-IS

MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, ATTN: MT-SS

US ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

US ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, ATTN: DCSOPS-LE

US ARMY HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND, ATTN: HSSE-L

US ARMY FORCES COMMAND, ATTN: AFPM

US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, ATTN: ATPL-LM

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, ATTN: IACSO

US ARMY JAPAN, ATTN: AJPM

EIGHTH US ARMY, ATTN: PMJ

US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND, ATTN: APPM

US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ATTN: PMZ-A

SUPERINTENDENT, US MILITARY ACADEMY, ATTN: PM

COMMANDANT, US ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL

Misconceptions About Child Abuse

1. Myth: People who abuse children are insane.

Fact: Although a small percentage of child abusers may be mentally unbalanced, the overwhelming majority are sane. They are relatively "normal" people who are under intolerable stress and react to it by taking it out on their kids. Most child abusers can establish a normal, loving parent-child relationship if they receive professional help.

2. Myth: Abuse cannot be taking place, because the child's brothers and sisters are never injured (or sexually assaulted).

Fact: It is very common for abusive parents (both physically and sexually abusive) to abuse only one child in a multi-child family. However, if that child leaves (is killed, put in a foster home, etc.), frequently, the next child in line will start to suffer abuse.

3. Myth: Live-in boyfriends and step-parents are the most common abusers.

Fact: Most abusers (both physical and sexual) are natural parents. Of the 1981 Army cases, 66 percent of the physical abuse perpetrators were natural parents. There were twice as many natural parents cited for sexual abuse as were boyfriends or step-parents.

4. Myth: "Dirty Old Men" offering candy to children pose the biggest sexual assault threat to children.

Fact: In 76 percent of the Army cases, the perpetrator of a sexual assault on a child was a parent, babysitter, or "friend of the family." In only 24 percent was a stranger involved. Most of the "stranger involved" incidents were "indecent exposures" rather than rapes.

5. Myth: Abuse only occurs in "low income" families.

Fact: Abuse can and does occur in families throughout the whole social and economic spectrum.

6. Myth: If we ignore the problem, it will get better.

Fact: Typically, child abuse incidents become more violent and more frequent the longer it continues.

7. Myth: Teenagers and pre-teens who are starting to rebel against parental authority are the most likely child abuse victims.

Fact: Younger children (pre-schoolers) are the largest "at risk" population. Army data for the 1978 through 1980 indicated that 53 percent of the victims were less than three years old; 75 percent were under seven; all of the fatalities were under three years of age.

8. Myth: Most young children do not tell the truth about sexual assaults.

Fact: Although young children often lack the vocabulary to describe exactly what occurred, they almost never lie about sexual assault incidents.

9. Myth: It is very hard to prove that a physical abuse injury is not accidental.

Fact: Forensic pathology has developed to the point that intentional injuries can be discriminated from accidental injuries with a high degree of certainty.

## PHYSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT

### PHYSICAL ABUSE

#### Physical Indicators

Unexplained bruises and welts  
-on face, lips, mouth  
-on torso, back, buttocks,  
-in various stages of healing  
-clustered, forming regular patterns  
-reflecting shape of article used to  
-inflict (electric cord, belt buckle  
-on several different body surface areas  
-regularly appear after absence,  
weekend or vacation  
Unexplained burns:  
-cigar, cigarette burns, especially on  
soles, palms, back or buttocks  
-immersion burns (sock-like, glove like,  
doughnut shaped on buttocks or genitalia)  
-patterned like electric burner, iron, etc.  
-rope burns on arms, legs, neck or torso  
Unexplained fractures:  
-to skull, nose, facial structure  
-in various stages of healing  
-multiple or spiral fractures  
Unexplained lacerations or abrasions:  
-to mouth, lips, gums, eyes  
-to external genitalia

#### Behavioral Indicators

Wary of adult contacts  
Apprehensive when other children cry  
Behavioral extremes:  
-aggressiveness, or withdrawal  
Frightened of parents afraid to go home  
Reports injury by parents

### PHYSICAL NEGLECT

Consistent hunger, poor hygiene, inappropriate dress  
Consistent lack of supervision especially in dangerous activities or long periods  
Unattended physical problems or medical Needs  
Abandonment

Begging, Stealing Food  
Extended Stays at School (early arrival and late departure)  
Constant fatigue  
Listlessness or falling asleep in class  
Alcohol or drug abuse  
Delinquency (e.g. thefts)  
States there is no caretaker

### SEXUAL ABUSE

Difficulty in walking or sitting  
Torn, stained or bloody underclothing  
Pain or itching in genital area  
Bruises or Bleeding in external genitalia, vaginal or anal areas

Unwilling to change for gym or participate in P.E. class  
Withdrawal, fantasy or infantile behavior  
Bizarre, sophisticated, or unusual sexual behavior or knowledge

EMOTIONAL  
MAL TREATMENT

Veneral disease, especially in pre-teens pregnancy

Speech disorders

Lags in physical development

Failure-to-thrive

Poor peer relationships  
Delinquent or run away  
Reports sexual assault by caretaker

Habit disorders (sucking biting, rocking, etc.)  
Conduct disorders (anti-social, destructive, etc.)  
Neurotic traits (sleep disorders, inhibition of play  
Psychoneurotic reactions (hysteria, obsession, compulsion, phobias, hypochondria)  
Behavior extremes:  
-compliant, passive  
-agressive, demanding  
Overly adaptive behavior:  
-inappropriately adult  
-inappropriately infant  
Developmental lags (mental, emotional)  
Attempted suicide

INDICATORS OF ABUSTIVE PARENTS

The behavior and attitudes of the parents, their own life histories, even the condition of their home, can offer valuable clues to the presence of child abuse and neglect.

Characteristics of Abusive Parents

These parents:

- . seem unconcerned about the child
- . see the child as "bad", "evil", a "monster" or "witch"
- . offer illogical, unconvincing, contradictory explanations or have no explanaton for the child's injury
- . attempt to conceal the child's injury or to protect the identity of person(s) responsible
- . routinely employ harsh, unreasonable discipline which is inappropriate to child's age, transgressions, and condition
- . were often abused as children
- . were expected to meet high demands of their parents
- . were unable to depend on their parents for love and nurturance
- . cannot provide emotionally for themselves as adults
- . expect their children to fill their emotional void
- . have poor impluse control
- . expect rejection
- . have low self-esteem
- . are emotonally immature
- . are isolated, have no support system
- . marry a spouse who is not emotionally supportive and who passively supports the abuse.



**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

### Characteristics of Sexually Abusive Parents

#### These parents:

- . have low self-esteem
- . had emotional needs which were not met by their parents
- . have inadequate coping skills
- . may have experienced the loss of their spouse through death or divorce
- . may be experiencing over-crowding in their home
- . may have marital problems causing one spouse to seek physical affection from a child rather than the other spouse (a situation the "denying" husband or wife might find acceptable)
- . may abuse alcohol
- . lack social and emotional contacts outside the family
- . are geographically isolated
- . have cultural standards which determine the degree of acceptable body contact.

#### The adult male:

- . is often a rigid disciplinarian
- . is passive outside the home
- . does not usually have a police record nor is he known to be involved in any public disturbance
- . does not engage in social activities outside the home
- . is jealous and protective of the child
- . often initiates sexual contact with the child by hugging and kissing which tends to develop over time into more caressing, genital-genital and oral-genital contacts

#### The mother

- . is frequently cognizant of the sexual abuse but subconsciously denies it
- . may hesitate reporting for fear of destroying the marriage and being left on her own
- . may see sexual activity within the family as preferable to extra-marital affairs

### COMMON STATEMENTS/EXPLANATIONS

"I've waited all this time to have a baby, and when she was born, she never did anything for me."

"When she cried, it meant she didn't love me."

"He falls down stairs over toys. I remember two or three times just last week."

"He bruises easily."

"He fell down a lot and bruised himself."

"When I saw he was not feeling well I gave him an aspirin like before."

"I couldn't wake him for breakfast."

"I had to wait for my husband to come home."

"We couldn't get the car started."

"He fell down, cried a little, but was okay after that."

"After falling he ate a good meal, so I thought he was okay."

"I had to force him into the tub."

"He always had the colic."

"Heard you had a good hospital, that's why we drove 50 miles."

"We heard you had a good doctor."

"We tried calling our regular doctor, but he didn't answer the phone."

"When our doctor heard who wanted him, he wouldn't come."

! may feel that the sexual activity between the husband and daughter is a relief from her wifely sexual responsibilities and will make certain that time is available for the two to be alone

- . often feels a mixture of guilt and jealousy toward her daughter

#### Characteristics of Neglectful Parents

These parents:

- . may have a chaotic home life
- . may live in unsafe conditions (no food; garbage and excrement in living areas; exposed wiring; drugs and poisons kept within the reach of children)
- . may abuse drugs or alcohol
- . may be mentally retarded, have low I.Q., or have a flat personality
- . may be impulsive individuals who seek immediate gratification without regard to long-term consequences
- . may be motivated and employed but unable to find or afford child care
- . generally have not experienced success
- . had emotional needs which were not met by their parents
- . have low self-esteem
- . have little motivation or skill to effect changes in their lives
- . tend to be passive

CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION SEMINAR

Audience: DOD schools staff, Army community service personnel, military police, medical personnel, and commanders.


DISCUSSION

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IT SHOULDN'T HURT  
TO BE A KID

IF YOU SUSPECT  
CHILD ABUSE,  
REPORT IT

CALL



PREFACE

This document was developed by a task force composed of representatives from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, the Chief of Public Affairs, The Surgeon General, The Judge Advocate General, The Adjutant General, and the Office of Army Law Enforcement. It is not intended to be a lesson plan which can be read verbatim, but to be a guide which identifies the various topics that should be covered in an installation seminar on child abuse and the depth to which each should be discussed. It is expected that the subject area experts at each installation will modify the basic information in the guide to incorporate statistics on the local problem, information on health and social services available in the area, legal requirement of the local jurisdiction, and the particular service delivery system that is being employed on the installation.

The seminar's goal is to develop the skills required to recognize the gross physical and behavioral indicators of both physical and sexual abuse and neglect; and, just as important, to help develop a network of concerned individuals in all of the agencies which have a role in the child abuse detection, investigation, treatment, and rehabilitation cycle, who are capable of providing fast, professional support for effected families. The target audience is: unit commanders, community service administrators and volunteers, dependent school faculty and staff, medical personnel, military police, and other installation personnel who are exposed to children and families under stress. Since one of the objectives of the seminar is to build networks, each session should contain a cross-section of the installation law enforcement, social

(2) Specific injuries associated with abuse (wrap around injuries, burn patterns; etc.)

b. Emotional/behavioral indicators

IV. Legal Aspects

JAG

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a. Jurisdiction

b. Reporting Laws

V. Family Advocacy Program

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a. Objective of program

b. How it works

c. MP/ACS/medal relationships

VI. Summary

Provost Marshal

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service, and medical personnel, as well as, representatives of the general population (e.g., unit commanders).

The literature on child abuse and neglect is growing rapidly. Individuals or agencies who need additional information on a particular aspect of the problem are encouraged to contact the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, P.O. Box 1182, Washington, DC 20013.

#### MODULE I: Introduction

Discussion Leader: Provost Marshal

#### National Statistics:

In the United States an estimated 1,000,000 children are abused and neglected each year. Approximately 2,000 die: that's six a day...one child every four hours dies as a result of abuse and neglect.

As shocking and as heinous as this is, it is only the tip of the iceberg. Most abusive parents were themselves abused as kids. As high as 80% of the prison inmates in America were abused as children. Each generation passes on a legacy of pain and misery to the next. Society pays not only for the lost potential of the immediate victims, but the high indirect cost of crime perpetrated by these abused children after they become warped adults. As we will see later, once child abuse starts, it gets inexorably worse. The only way to break out of the vicious cycle, and free not only current victims, but also children yet unborn from abuse and neglect is to identify abused kids early on and treat both them and the abusive parents to repair the physical and psychological damage.

Our objective today is to learn how to recognize children who are abused and/or neglected, what programs the Army has for dealing with the problem, and the legal protection provided to you by the State child abuse reporting law and Army regulations.

Lets start by taking a look at some non-technical definitions so that we all understand the basic types of child abuse.

#### WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE?

A broad spectrum of abuse and neglect situations exists. Some forms are easily recognized and are treatable; others, such as emotional abuse, are only now being defined and recognized. Basically four forms of child abuse exist.

#### PHYSICAL ABUSE

A basic definition of physical abuse is the nonaccidental injury of a child. A couple of guidelines to follow in determining nonaccidental injuries are:

Any injury that requires medical treatment is outside the range of normal correctives measures.

Any punishment that involves hitting with a closed fist or instrument, kicking, inflicting burns, or throwing the child obviously represents child abuse.

#### PHYSICAL NEGLECT

Physical neglect is defined as failure to provide the necessities of life for a child. This includes the lack of medical care, inadequate nourishment, inappropriate clothing, lack of supervision, and inadequate housing.

#### SEXUAL ABUSE

Sexual abuse is the exploitation of a child for the sexual gratification of an adult. It may include acts of rape, incest, fondling of the genitals, or exhibitionism.

#### EMOTIONAL ABUSE/NEGLECT

Emotional abuse is excessive, aggressive, or unreasonable parental behavior that places demands upon a child to perform beyond his or her capabilities. Sometimes emotional abuse is not what a parent does but what the parent doesn't do. Children who receive no love, no care, no support and no guidance will carry those scars into adulthood.

Child abuse is not usually a single physical attack or a single act of deprivation or molestation. Child abuse is usually a pattern of behavior. It takes place over a period of time, and its effects are cumulative. The longer child abuse continues, the more serious it becomes and the more serious is the injury to the child.

Child abuse is a particularly difficult problem to correct, because often the victims are trapped in an environment which offers very little exposure to the public. Most child abuse fatalities occur among children under seven years of age. The main reason is not that these children are physically frail (although that is certainly a factor) but that there is no way for them to escape the constantly escalating cycle of abusive behavior. In addition to the isolation of the victims, child abuse goes unreported because people do not like to

admit that a problem like a child abuse can exist in their neighborhood. It is so repugnant that it is easier to pretend the problem doesn't exist than it is to respond to it. However, we should never delude ourselves that if we look the other way that the problem will eventually take care of itself. Case after case has demonstrated that without outside intervention, child abuse becomes progressively worse.

The first step in eliminating child abuse in military families is to admit that we have a problem. Later Mr/Dr/Ms \_\_\_\_\_ will talk about social factors which promote abuse and I do not want to steal his/her thunder, but I must say that many conditions which are unavoidable in service life are textbook situations for bringing out abusive tendencies in parents, and abuse does occur. More than a thousand physical abuse, sexual abuse, and child neglect cases are reported by military hospitals each year. If civilian data is an indicator, this is only the tip of the iceberg. Child abuse is a grossly under reported crime. As a corporate body, we are not doing a very good job of identifying abuse during the earlier stages. For example, in serious physical abuse cases which were investigated by the Criminal Investigations Command in 1980, more than 50 percent were reported by hospitals who received the injured child in the emergency room. Only 12 percent of the cases were reported by neighbors, and unbelievably, a mere 3% were reported by schools, nurseries and day care centers. If we are to make progress, we have to do a better job of recognizing the symptoms of abuse and getting the family into a treatment program before the problem becomes life threatening for the children. This is not a pleasant job, but if we can mobilize the resources of the hospital, ACS, military police, and schools, and if we work together, we can make a big difference. We can break the chain of abuse and free, not only the

children who are suffering today, but victims in generations as yet unborn.

Now Dr/Mr/Ms \_\_\_\_\_ will give us an overview of the social conditions and stress which is likely to cause child abuse.



## Module II: Social Factors/Offender Profiles

Discussion Leader: HSC

There are a certain percentage of abusive parents who are mentally ill, but these are in the minority. Most are reacting to an intolerable level of stress. Typically, abusive parents are isolated from the community, and under pressure from internal family problems. Often, conditions which are a common part of Army life directly contribute to abusive behavior; take, for example, the case of a spouse of a young enlisted person stationed overseas (or of a non-us spouse in the States). Often they are isolated because they have just moved into a new area. Local customs are unfamiliar, which inhibits their desire to get out and meet people. The service member may be away from home for extended periods on field duty. Even if the spouse wanted to get out more, financial restraints could keep her locked in as effectively as a prison door. If the young spouse happens to be immature, and comes from a family which used physical punishment to discipline children, she could respond to the severe pressure of her environment by becoming an abusive parent.

This type of abusive parent does not really want to destroy the child. After an incident occurs, they may truly regret that it happened, and be guilt ridden because they hurt their child. However, they do also blame the child, because they have unreasonably high expectations for his conduct. Without intervention it is likely that the problem will not only continue, but grow worse.

The following is a list of characteristics based on a composite of many cases. This list is not exhaustive; many more indicators exist than can be included. Neither does the presence of a single or even several indicators prove that maltreatment exists.

### Characteristics of Abusive Parents

These parents:

- o Seem unconcerned about the child.
- o See the child as "bad," evil," a "monster" or "witch".
- o Offer illogical, unconvincing, contradictory explanations or have no explanation of the child's injury.
- o Attempt to conceal the child's injury or to protect the identity of person(s) responsible.
- o Routinely employ harsh, unreasonable discipline which is inappropriate to child's age, transgressions, and condition.
- o Were often abused as children.
- o Were expected to meet high demands of their parents.

- o Were unable to depend on their parents for love and nurturance.
- o Cannot provide emotionally for themselves as adults.
- o Expect their children to fill their emotional void.
- o Have poor impulse control.
- o Expect rejection.
- o Have low self-esteem.
- o Are emotionally immature.
- o Are isolated, have no support system.
- o Marry a spouse who is not emotionally supportive and who passively supports the abuse.

#### Characteristics of Neglectful Parents

These parents:

- o May have a chaotic home life.

- o May live in unsafe conditions (no food; garbage and excrement in living areas; exposed wiring; drugs and poisons kept within the reach of children).
- o May abuse drugs or alcohol.
- o May be mentally retarded, have low I.Q., or have a flat personality.
- o May be impulsive individuals who seek immediate gratification without regard to long-term consequences.
- o May be motivated and employed but unable to find or afford child care.
- o Generally have not experienced success.
- o Have emotional needs which are not met by their parents.
- o Have low self-esteem.
- o Have little motivation or skill to effect changes in their lives.
- o Tend to be passive.

#### Characteristics of Sexually Abusive Parents

The most typical type of reported intrafamilial sexual abuse occurs between an adult male, either the father or the mother's sexual partner, and a female child living in the same house.

These parents:

- o Have low self-esteem.
- o Had emotional needs which were not met by their parents.
- o Have inadequate coping skills.
- o May have experienced the loss their spouse through death or divorce.
- o May be experiencing over-crowding in their home.
- o May have marital problems causing one spouse to seek physical affection from a child rather than the other spouse (a situation the "denying" husband or wife might find acceptable).
- o May abuse alcohol.
- o Lack social and emotional contacts outside the family.
- o Are geographically isolated.

- o Have cultural standards which determine the degree of acceptable body contact.

The adult male:

- o Is often rigid disciplinarian.
- o Is passive outside the home.
- o Does not usually have a police record nor is he known to be involved in any public disturbance.
- o Does not engage in social activities outside the home.
- o Is jealous and protective of the child.
- o Often initiates sexual contact with the child by hugging and kissing which tends to develop over time into more caressing, genital-genital and oral-genital contacts.

The mother:

- o Is frequently cognizant of the sexual abuse but subconsciously denies it.

- o May hesitate reporting for fear of destroying the marriage and being left on her own.
- o May see sexual activity within the family as preferable to extra-marital affairs.
- o May feel that the sexual activity between the husband and daughter is a relief from her wifely sexual responsibilities and will make certain that time is available for the two to be alone.
- o Often feels a mixture of guilt and jealousy toward her daughter.

### MODULE III: Indicators of Child Abuse

Discussion Leader: HSC

We have identified conditions which contribute to child abuse and the characteristics of abusive parents. Now we come to the heart of the seminar - how to identify child victims so that we can intervene before the situation becomes life threatening or permanent damage is done. Let's start by examining the indicators of physical abuse.

The first point that we need to make is that the victim rarely reports physical abuse. Children seem to instinctively feel that injuries inflicted by their parents are something to be ashamed of. The children often think that they are the blame for the situation, rather than the abusive parent. If an abused child is questioned about his injuries, he will normally be evasive, and offer the same improbable stories that he has heard his parents use. This behavior is in sharp contrast to the way that a normal child acts after he has received an accidental injury. If a kid, for example, breaks his arm playing baseball, the next day, he will give a detailed description of how he did it to every kid in the neighborhood, plus to any adult who will listen to him. In contrast, an analysis of the calendar year 1980 physical abuse cases in the Army Crime Record Center revealed that none of the victims had voluntarily reported the crime.

### IDENTIFICATION OF CHILD ABUSE

Contrary to popular opinion, child abuse can generally be recognized. In fact, most cases of child abuse are easily recognized and proven. There are some basic concepts required in evaluating the injuries or illnesses that a child abuse case might present in light of their cause. However, most of these can be easily understood. The most important factor in recognizing child abuse is the "implausible story concept". This simply means the explanation given by the guardian or parent is totally inconsistent with the cause or the pattern of injuries present. An example would be a parent or guardian saying that the cigarette burns on the soles of a 3-month old child were self-inflicted. This is obviously absurd for several reasons. First, a three month old child would not have access to cigarettes and more importantly would be totally incapable of lighting a cigarette and inflicting the injury upon himself. This is a very basic explanation of what we more commonly refer to in medicine as a lack of neuromuscular development. Another important aspect is that children generally do not do things intentionally to harm themselves. Most children do not like to hurt. Therefore when a parent tells you that a child intentionally climbed into a tub of scalding water and sat there until he sustained third degree burns, this is an implausible story. In the last one to two years, the area of Forensic Pediatrics and Pediatric Pathology has developed to the stage where the total analysis of the pattern of injuries sustained by any infant or small child can generally be interpreted with a high degree of precision. Certain types of injuries are specific and some cases diagnostic as child abuse. Unfortunately, the medical profession as a whole has not kept abreast of these new developments in the interpretations of patterns and types of injuries in child abuse cases. However, even a non-professional, non-medical individual should be able to

recognize child abuse, since generally all that is required is common sense. The second important requirement for the recognition of child abuse is that of suspicion. There are some health professionals who feel that this is not a good attribute for a doctor but without a high index of suspicion, many cases of subtle child abuse will go totally undetected. This is extremely tragic since child abuse must be identified in the early stages if proper intervention and protection of that child is to be a success. Therefore, any child with a suspicious, unusual or serious injury, and certainly any child with a pattern of injuries should be evaluated for child abuse. Any child or infant that dies must be thoroughly evaluated and examined by a competent forensic pathologist unless there is absolute documentation of some known medical cause to justify the death. There is never an exception to this rule. It is not uncommon at all to see a child fatality to be identified as a Sudden Infant Death (SID) merely because there were no external signs of trauma. First of all, a SIDS death is a diagnosis of exclusion. It can only be made by doing a complete autopsy and ruling out all other causes of death. More importantly, 30 to 40 percent of all children who die of blunt force injuries to the abdomen will not have any external evidence of injury. Also a child could be poisoned or accidentally obtain poison and this could only be determined by an autopsy. A child's life is too valuable not to insist upon an explanation as to the cause of death. It is never justified to make any assumptions when a death occurs in a child. In fact, the autopsy on an infant or child is much more extensive and the time consuming than an autopsy on any adult homicide.

Most children and all infants are totally dependent upon the welfare, love and protection that adults should and must provide. This is one of the main reasons children are frequently abused. They are generally weak, fragile and

totally defenseless and make good targets for overbearing, frustrated and just mean individuals. The child is than unable in many cases to call for help, much less defend himself.

#### PHYSICAL INDICATORS OF ABUSE

##### General Comments

The most important concept to understand in evaluating the injuries sustained by a small child, is that injuries that are accidental are usually obvious. The parents or guardians usually offer a plausible explanation and appear to be genuinely concerned about their child's well being. Also, parents who are not responsible for the injuries will usually be responsive to any questions you might have regarding the injuries. In contrast, parents who are abusers are reluctant to discuss anything regarding the child's well being. Abusers also tend to be in a hurry and seem not to be concerned about the child's well being. Abusers also do not seek immediate medical attention when a person of normal intelligence would understand that immediate medical attention is required. This is exactly opposite to the reaction of normal parents who frequently seek medical attention for conditions which do not require medical treatment.

Any child who has more than one injury should be evaluated for child abuse. Any child with only one injury that is serious certainly must be evaluated to rule out child abuse unless a valid explanation for the injury exists. One of the main criteria for distinguishing accidental injuries from those intentionally inflicted is that serious accidental injuries do not usually occur on a regular basis. A child with serious injuries that

obviously occurred weeks apart is probably the victim of abuse and not accidental injuries. Also abuse should be suspected when any young infant is presented with even one (and certainly with more than one) serious injury. There are several main types of injuries that are seen quite readily that help to distinguish abused children from those that may have accidentally sustained injuries. The first category are those of bruises and welts.

##### BRUISES AND WELTS

Children of all ages above one year of age commonly have one or two small bruises on their knees, forehead and possibly on their elbows. However, bruises to other portions of the body, especially those areas of the body that are protected like the underarm area and the genital area, are characteristics of child abuse. Bruises on any infant, especially facial bruises, should be highly suspect. Bruises of the back side of the child's body is very characteristic of abuse. Clustered bruises indicate repeated contact with the hand or an instrument. Another form of abuse that must be recognized is when any child, and particularly infants, have bruises in various stages of healing, this is a classifical indication of child abuse. It should be noted whether the bruises are extensive and if they cover a large portion of the body. Specifically note if the bruises are of different colors which indicates they are of different ages and occurred at different periods of time. Also one should be alert for a pattern shown on a bruise which could represent a particular instrument, such as a belt buckle, a wire, a straight edge, or a coat hanger. It is very common for children to be whipped with an electrical cord. Again the key in deciding if abuse is occurring is whether or not the bruises or welts can be explained by the story given by the

guardian or parent. This interpretation must be put in perspective from the child's chronological age, neurological and mental development. Only when this is done, can you accept the parents explanation. Even when an explanation is given that seems to explain the pattern of injury, it is very unusual for a small infant or a small child to have a large number of bruises or serious injuries that are self-inflicted. Therefore, if there is any question whatsoever regarding injuries of this type, an expert in the interpretation of the pattern of injuries seen in child abuse should certainly be contacted immediately.

Bruises are the most common evidence of physical abuse and they can be distinguished from those accidentally acquired. The shape and size of the bruises may indicate the instrument used. The favorite whipping weapon is the folded electrical extension cord. It leaves a classical U-shape mark. Whippings with a strap or belt leaves band like marks the size of the object employed. At times the buckle end of the belt is used, leaving a clear buckle shape on the child. Severe blows with the hand may result in a hand print which may later produce parallel bruises. If a child is struggling, the abuser may have to grab the child forcefully in order to hold him while he is being whipped or beaten. This results in thumb or finger shaped bruises on the arms or extremities being held.

Bruises in unusual locations should immediately arouse suspicion of abuse. Most accidentally acquired bruises as noted above occur on the front or sides of the legs, or on the knees, elbows, and the outer surfaces of the arms or the forehead. Bruises of the neck are rarely accidental and generally indicate that the child was being choked. Bruises of the ears are generally inflicted by someone else by twisting or pulling on the child's ear. Bruises

about the eye may be caused by direct blows. Also bruises and lacerations of the gums and inner surfaces of the lips are the results of direct blows. Most characteristic is the presence of bruising of the external genitalia which is diagnostic for child abuse. More importantly, if a child has bruises of both the external genitalia and the mouth, sexual abuse of the child should also be considered.

#### BURNS

Burns constitute another common injury seen in child abuse. In this particular form of abuse, the parents usually give a most unplausible and changing account of how the accident occurred. Two common types of burns are notoriously indicative of child abuse: the cigarette burn and the immersion burn. Cigarette burns are usually found on the soles of the feet or the palms of the hand and on areas not seen when the child is fully clothed. These types of injuries are never accidental, especially when there are multiple injuries. In the early stages of healing, cigarette burns are easily diagnosed by their round shape and appearance. However, when the burns become infected, which they generally do without proper treatment, they then resemble lesions other than burns. When cigarette burns heal, they generally leave rounded scars that closely resemble healed, deep-seated, impetiginous lesions.

Immersion burns are very common form of abuse of children and small infants. These burns are the result of the child or small infant being forcibly dunked into a tub or vessel of hot liquid. This generally results in the classical "stocking" burns on the arms of legs and the burning of the buttocks and genitalia. Another indication is a "doughnut" pattern in which the tips of the buttocks are not burned even though the skin higher up is.

This form of inflicted injury is extremely easy to diagnose and also to prove as being an inflicted injury. It is easy to prove because there is no other possible explanation as to how a child could have sustained such an injury accidentally. The unburned area is present because the buttocks of the child was forcibly held on the bottom of the tub which is not as hot as the surrounding liquid. The area pressed against the bottom of the tub has a shorter exposure time than the rest of the skin to the hot liquid. Therefore this area is not burned as severely (or at all) as the surrounding tissues. There is also a conspicuous absence of splash marks which are normally present accidental scalding burns. Also immersion burns are typically symmetrical in nature. Even more typical is the fact that there are sharp lines of demarcation between the burned area and that area this is spared. The most common explanation given by parents is that the child accidentally stepped into the scalding water and proceeded to sit down into the tub and sustained the injuries that are seen. This is a totally implausible story for a number of reasons. First, a child who is old enough to climb into a tub unassisted, will never intentionally climb into water that he knows is hot and uncomfortable and hurts him. He may get one toe into the water but he will immediately remove it. Once the child realizes the water is hot, he will not continue to climb into the tub of water. If such a child has made a jumping entry into the tub and is unable to stop before he is completely in the water, then there will be multiple splash marks with burnings on all parts of his body including the hands and feet indicating that he was splashing around trying frantically to get out of the uncomfortable hurting situation.

Another common form of burn injury seen but rarely identified is that of rope burns which indicate that the child has been confined and forcibly restrained. This is generally seen around the wrist and the ankles.

Depending on the age of the lesion and the length of time of confinement or restraint, different types of lesions will be seen. Early lesions will show little blisters with fluid resembling second degree burns. If the lesion is chronic and old, then there may be scarring with hyper and hypo-pigmentation.

A very common form of injury seen frequently today is that of dry burns indicating that a child has been forced to sit on a hot surface or has had a hot instrument applied to this skin. This is commonly done with irons, matches, electrical heaters, the hot plates on the stove and with other equally dangerous instruments. Again, common sense enables an individual to conclude if these injuries are accidental or inflicted. One reminder, is that children never intentionally inflict injuries upon themselves!!

#### LACERATIONS AND ABRASION

Lacerations of the lip, eye or any portion of the infant's face (tears in the gum tissue may have been caused by forced feeding), or lacerations or abrasions of the external genitalia are almost always inflicted by someone else. As previously mentioned when you have both bruises, tears or abrasions involving both the external genitalia and the mouth, then sexual abuse of this child must also be ruled out.

#### BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OF ABUSED CHILDREN

Children who are abused physically or emotionally display certain types of behavior. Many of these are common to all children at one time or another, but when they are present in sufficient number and strength to characterize a child's overall manner, they may indicate abuse. More than simple reactions



to abuse itself, these behaviors reflect a child's response to the dynamics of the family and especially to disturbed parent-child interactions. They are the mechanisms for survival in a world where children are either unable to fulfill certain basic needs at all or can fulfill them only by denying, suppressing, or exaggerating important parts of themselves.

These features are frequently learned in infancy where these behaviors become a child's "mode of operation" and enables them to cope with the world at large. Some of the behaviors that characterize abused children include those children who are passive and who have undemanding behaviors aims at maintaining a low profile and avoiding any possible confrontation with a parent which could lead to abuse. The second form is that child who becomes extremely aggressive, demanding and sometimes hyperactive. This is caused by the child's repeated frustrations of getting basic needs met. Another form is that of role-reversal behavior or extremely dependant behavior in response to parental emotional and even physical needs. One last form is that of lagging in development. This may mean physical as well as mental lagging.

Some abused children live in an uncertain environment where requirements for behavior are inconsistent and unclear. In some families, abuse is common and severe enough to be emotionally and physically harmful. Frequently discipline is meted out indiscriminately in response to the parents needs and feelings at the moment rather than to punish a child for transgressing clear limits. Children may receive some love, affection and security from their parents but are also often frustrated in an attempt to fulfill their parents needs. This inconsistently creates anger and frustration in a child which is frequently expressed indirectly by the parents.

## NEGLECT

Deliberate child neglect must be distinguished from failure, because of ignorance or poverty, to provide the child's necessities of life, such as proper food, clothing, housing and medical attention. Neglect is generally manifested by excessively poor skin hygiene, persistent severe diaper rash, prolonged cradle cap, malnutrition or failure to thrive. The child may be inappropriately dressed for the weather and the clothing may be excessively dirty and in disrepair. The neglected infant or young child may be passive, withdrawn apathetic, almost expressionless and rarely smiling. He may be listless and tired and remain quiet for long periods of time. On the other hand he may be apprehensive, anxious, and fearful of strangers.

Neglectful parents often feed infants irregularly and inadequately which leads to malnutrition and failure to thrive and not uncommonly to starvation. It is unusual for a child over one year of age to die of starvation, since children 1 1/2 to 2 years of age can usually get out and find food for themselves. However, starvation does occur at all ages. It has been estimated that up to 50 percent of all infants who have the syndrome of failure to thrive are really the victims of neglect due to environmental deprivation. These children show a rapid recovery when admitted to a hospital and are fed well and are given tender loving care.

Some of the common forms of neglect include:

1. abandonment
2. lack of supervision

3. lack of adequate clothing and good hygiene

4. lack of medical or dental care

5. lack of adequate education

6. lack of adequate nutrition

7. lack of adequate shelter

Abandonment may include any child who is left totally alone or left with other individuals with the parents never intending to return. Factors that must be considered in the determination of abandonment include the child's age, the parents whereabouts, the parent's intentions and the length of time left alone. Many of these same considerations apply to the lack of supervision. An unsupervised child is one who is left alone for long periods of time or left alone when engaged in dangerous activities. This might also include a child or children left in the care of other children too young to protect them. The lack of adequate clothing and good hygiene generally refers to a child who is dressed inappropriately or inadequately for the weather or in such a way that he suffers persistent illnesses like pneumonia, frost bite, or sunburn that are associated with excessive exposure. The child might also suffer from severe diaper rash or other persistent disorders from improper hygiene and he might also be chronically dirty or unbathed. Lack of medical or dental care applies to any child who needs medical or dental care but who has parents or guardians who fail to fulfill their responsibilities in obtaining this care for the child. These children may have teeth that are rotting or may have other physical pain or discomfort which could be relieved

by proper medical attention. Also lack of proper immunization against disabling illnesses is seen as a form of neglect. One unique aspect of this form of neglect, and a factor to be considered, is the religious practices of the parents. Also community standards and practices must be taken into consideration. Lack of adequate education generally refers to a child who is chronically absent from school or skips classes. Some children stay home to care for younger siblings or even parents. Also the child may be frequently ill. It is also important to determine if the parents are aware that the child is not attending school. Lack of adequate nutrition is when the child lacks sufficient quantities or qualities of food and constantly complains of hunger and may beg for food. These children may suffer from severe malnutrition and have developmental lags. Lack of adequate shelter may occur when the child is exposed to structurally unsafe housing or exposed wiring. Also if there is inadequate or unsafe heating, unsanitary housing conditions, poor lighting or poor ventilation.

One of the most tragic aspects of the evaluation of neglect of children is the fact that this is probably the most common form of abuse seen today. It is also the least frequently recognized and identified form of child abuse today. Even more unacceptable is the fact that many so called experts in the field of pediatrics and forensic pediatrics feel that neglect in itself is not as harmful as are children who are beaten. However, it should only be noted that many children die each year from neglect, the most common form being starvation. Starvation, when it is the result of neglect is a homicide and in many cases can be shown to be premeditated.

MENTAL ABUSE

Mental abuse consists of continually scapegoating, picking on, criticizing and denigration of a child, thereby instilling attitudes of worthlessness, inferiority, resentment, hostility, and hopelessness. There children's spirits may become crushed and they may become withdrawn, detached, lonely, and forever lacking the ability to form warm attachments and friendships. Under the repeated tongue lashings and criticisms of the parents, the hostility and resentment of the child may flare up in self defense. Mental abuse also includes abandonment of children in public places, locking them in cellars, closets, attics or small rooms or in other words terrorizing them. It also includes ignoring the child, as if he did not exist, and failing to afford the warm affectionate support the child deserves.

#### SEXUAL ABUSE

Sexual misuse and abuse of children is probable the most common form of abuse of child today. It is certainly more common than generally accepted, and is greatly under reported and is difficult to prove. The victim is, usually a girl and the perpetrator is usually the father or substitute father (step-father or boyfriend). Such abnormal relationships take many forms including exposure of genitalia, fondling the child's genitalia, masturbation, oral-genital sexual practices, sodomy and true intercourse. The child may show evidence of vulvitis, vaginitis, or venereal disease. Venereal disease in a prepubertal child is always highly suggestive of child abuse.

Sexual abuse of children is almost always done with a knowledge and consent (or lack of intervention of) of the mother. In many cases, the mother is willing to sacrifice her daughter in order to keep the boyfriend or husband or in order to avoid the duties and responsibilities of a wife. Another

extremely important facet of this bazaar and distasteful form of abuse is the fact that children of all ages are involved. This concept is hard for most people to accept but it is a well known and documented fact that children as young as 1 or 2 months old have been raped. Also sexual abuse, although it is more prevalent in females does occur in young males. Women as well as men can also be the abuser. The most common form of abuse is father-daughter incest. This is the most commonly reported type. Mother-son, mother-daughter and father-son incest are believed to be more rare although they all exist. Sexual activities between age-peers (brothers and sisters; or cousins) are also prevalent although this is probably the least reported type. This latter form is not considered to generally be as serious as the more common father-daughter type of incest.

For obvious reasons, incest is rarely reported until a crisis occurs. This usually occurs when the father or step-father or live in boyfriend turns his affection towards a younger sister instead of the older daughter previously abused. The older child will many times seek assistance, not for herself, but in order to protect her younger sibling.

#### PHYSICAL INDICATORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN

1. Pain, itching and bleeding in genital area.
2. Torn or stained clothing especially underwear.
3. Genital, anal, or oral bruises.
4. Genital, anal or oral bleeding.

5. Swollen or red cervix, vulva or perinum.

6. Seman on genitals or clothing.

7. Venereal disease-oral or genital.

#### MODULE: IV

#### LEGAL ISSUES

Discussion Leader: SJA

During this module we will discuss two issues which have a direct bearing on how child abuse cases are managed and reported. These are jurisdiction and state reporting requirements. We will start with jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the authority, power, or right to act. When used in connection with land areas, jurisdiction means the authority to legislate within those areas. Where the United States exercises federal jurisdiction over particular land areas, such as military installations, it has the authority and power to enact general legislation applying within those lands.

The fact that the United States has legislative jurisdiction over a particular area does not mean that it has actually legislated within that area. It means merely that the United States has the authority to do so. In fact, with regard to many legal subjects, the federal government has not established a comprehensive legislative scheme for land areas under federal jurisdiction. As will be discussed more fully below, the subject of child maltreatment is one such legal area in which Congress has not established a comprehensive federal scheme.

## TYPES OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

There are varying degrees of legislative authority that may be exercised by the United States over land areas. Simply because the federal government has jurisdiction over an area does not necessarily mean that its power is complete in all respects or that state legislative authority is totally excluded. Various combinations or divisions of federal and state legislative authority are possible. To determine the exact type of legislative jurisdiction possessed by the United States over a land area, it is necessary to examine the specific transaction by which the jurisdiction was acquired. Normally, in a land transfer involving the United States, the documents of transfer (that is, deed, cession of land by the state, etc.) will establish the jurisdiction scheme to exist following the transfer.

The following are types of legislative jurisdictions:

- o Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction exists in situations in which the federal government has received, by whatever method, all of the authority of the state to legislate within the land area in question. Normally, no reservation is made by the state except the right to serve civil or criminal process on the federal area. Such legal process usually concerns crimes or actions that occurred outside the federal property on state lands, but the individuals involved are later located in the federal area. The state may also exercise other authority over the property in question if applicable federal statutes permit it to do so.

- o Concurrent Jurisdiction exists in situations where, in granting to the United States authority which would otherwise amount to exclusive legislative jurisdiction over an area, the state has reserved to itself the right to exercise, concurrently with the United States, all of the same authority.
- o Proprietary Jurisdiction exists in situations where the federal government has acquired some degree of ownership or right to use an area in the state, but has not obtained any legislative authority. It should be remembered, however, that the United States, by virtue of its powers under the constitution, may have some legislative authority over an area even though it has only a proprietary interest in that area. Also, when the United States acquires an interest in an area, even if only proprietary, it has immunities not possessed by ordinary landholders. For example, a state may not impose its regulatory power on the federal government, nor may the state tax Federal land.

On Fort \_\_\_\_\_, we have \_\_\_\_\_ jurisdiction.

Note to Discussion Leader: If on an exclusive Federal jurisdiction, omit Part B. If on concurrent or proprietary installation, omit Part A.

A. RESPONDING TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN AREAS OF EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Theoretically, in an area of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction, state civil laws have no operation or effect. Service delivery may not use state child protection laws, procedures, or resources. The military is sole responsible for managin cases of child maltreatment.

However, in the case of child maltreatment reporting and case management a cooperative approach between military and civilian professionals and agencies is preferrable, and as the following discussion demonstrates, there are precedents for such a cooperative approach.

#### "MODIFIED" EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Federal law has no specific child protection provisions or procedures.

Applicable military regulations provide guidance only as to personnel responsibilities and general policy considerations in the areas of child neglect and abuse. These regulations contain very little regarding detailed procedures for use in cases of child maltreatment. For example, specific authority for personnel to take protective action in maltreatment cases, if necessary, is not given. Normally, state law sets forth comprehensive procedures for dealing with child maltreatment and suspected maltreatment cases, and that law often affords immunity to authorized professionals, such as doctors and police officers, who, in good faith, take an abused or neglected child into protective custody. Frequently, state law also provides for and requires involvement bt the local department of social services, and sets forth express authority to use protective custody in certain cases of suspected abuse or neglect.

Because no adequate or specific federal procedures currently exist or apply in child maltreatment cases occurring on federal land, it is beneficial for the military community to utilize state laws, procedures, and resources. The legal question which then arises is whether state laws regarding child maltreatment may be applied to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The interaction between state and federal authorities in child maltreatment matters is handled on a installation-by-installation basis. The determining factors are the willingness of the local county child protection agency to accept and process cases occurring on the federal installation and, or course, the desire of the installation to seek state assistance. Legal justification for such action does exist, and the following discussion presents the arguments supporting application of state child protection laws to land areas of exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Such a situation will be characterized as the "modified" exclusive Federal jurisdiction situation.

#### Statutory and Legal Justifications for Modified Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

As stated earlier, when the land in question is under exclusive federal jurisdiction, state civil laws normally are not applicable. The United States has legislative authority in that situation. Frequently, federal statutes will adopt or apply state rules of law for such areas, or an exclusively federal law will be enacted. However, in many important legal areas, congress has neither enacted comprehensive civil statutes nor specifically adopted a state civil law. Those areas where federal legislation is lacking include domestic

relations matters and matters between parent and child. The area of child maltreatment also appears to be an area without specific federal legislation.

An examination of federal law reveals that congress has determined not to assert jurisdiction in the area of child maltreatment. The only federal legislation in this area is the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (enacted in 1974, amended in 1978). While congress could legislate in the area of child maltreatment on federal lands, it has not done so.

Whenever there is an absence of specific congressional statutory action, it must then be decided what laws do apply to the federal lands in question. The Supreme Court, when confronted with this issue in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885), stated that when ever political or legislative jurisdiction is transferred, the laws of that country which were intended for the protection of private rights apply until changed or replaced by the new government. Subsequent court decisions have reaffirmed that position, in general, state and civil laws existing when the United States acquires exclusive jurisdiction automatically apply to the area in question as long as they do not conflict with existing federal laws and until Congress passes laws inconsistent with the state law.

However, in the area of child maltreatment, there is frequently no adequate or specific state law on the subject which existed at the time of acquisition of the federal lands in question. Effective regulation against child maltreatment requires procedures which are appropriate in light of contemporary problems and family pressures. The absence of such a state law at the time of

the land acquisitions in question would, theoretically, mean that child maltreatment is simply unregulated in those areas. That situation is usually undesirable and unacceptable. Fortunately, there are precedents which allow current state child protection laws to be properly applied to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. For example, in 1963 the United States Supreme Court, in Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, held that the current state law may be applied in a federally unregulated land area of exclusive United States jurisdiction if some form of state regulation of the subject existed at the time of acquisition of the land by the United States, although the state laws applicable to the subject may have changed since the land was transferred. That decision is in support of the argument that currently existing state child protection laws could be applied to an otherwise unregulated area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.

A second justification for applying state law deals with the nature of the "federal enclave." Early court decisions viewed the federal installation as an entity totally separate and apart from the state in which it was located, in order to preclude any exercise of legislative authority by the state over the enclave. Most of the early cases dealt primarily with state regulatory type legislation which impacted directly upon the federal government and its operations. In what appears to have been the first case before the United States Supreme Court involving state law which did not impact the federal government adversely, the Court in Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953), specifically rejected the concept of a "state within a state" and noted that the federal enclave continued to be a part of the state within which it was located. The court noted that the fiction of a "state within a

state" can have no validity to prevent the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so long as there is no interference with jurisdiction asserted by the federal government. A federal military reservation may be considered part of the state in which it is located. Consequently, state child protection laws may be applied to installations of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction. Not only is there no interference with federal assertion of jurisdiction, but such action is in furtherance of a clear federal policy expressed in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.

The third justification is perhaps the strongest and most persuasive. Because child protection legislation confers a benefit on abused and neglected children, the cases dealing with rights of federal enclave residents to benefits of state law are relevant. The leading case in this area is Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the State of Maryland would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if it denied state voting rights to Maryland domiciliaries living on the grounds of the National Institute of Health, a federal enclave. The right to vote was considered the citizen's link to his laws and government, and protective of all fundamental rights and privileges. Evans raises the question of whether a state can deny benefits to residents of a Federal enclave without violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given that the Supreme Court in Howard v. Commissioners rejected the "fiction of a state within a state" (a holding reaffirmed in Evans), a state legislative scheme which denies benefits to enclave residents residing within the state would be subject to question.

Several state courts have acknowledged the right of federal enclave residents to benefits conferred under state law by holding that enclave residents are residents of the city, county, and state in which the installation is located. The courts have relied upon the rationale of Howard v. Commissioners, where the concept of the federal installation being a "state within a state" was rejected. The exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction issue was resolved by relying upon the lack of interference with federal assertion of jurisdiction in the applicable areas, as would be the situation in the area of child maltreatment.

The Supreme Court of Colorado in County of Arapahoe v. Dunoho, 144 Colo. 321, 356 P 2d 267 (1960), upheld the right of an enclave resident to benefits under a state law which provided for payment of relief benefits to residents "in the country." While noting that relief benefits were paid for in part with federal funds, the court held that, in view of the fact that exclusive legislative jurisdiction does not operate as an absolute prohibition against state laws but has for its purpose protection of federal sovereignty, exclusive jurisdiction did not prohibit application of state law in that case. In fact, the relief benefits in question were required by federal law, and paying such benefits was not, therefore, considered an act undermining Federal sovereignty. Such reasoning would apply equally well to the area of child maltreatment wherein the federal government provides financial support to the states to carry out appropriate child protection functions.

Other states, notably New Jersey, have acknowledged the right of enclave residents to benefits under state law where no specific residency requirements



exist in the statute conferring the benefit. The New Jersey Superior Court has considered the applicability and enforceability of state law in areas of exclusive Federal legislative jurisdiction, and in Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington v. McCorkel, 237 A 2d 640 (1968), determined that children residing at Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base, both exclusive federal jurisdiction installations, were entitled to benefits provided by the New Jersey Bureau of Children's Services. The bureau was required to provide care, custody, maintenance, and protection for children found to be dependent and neglected. In reaching its decision the court followed the reasoning of Howard v. Commissioners, and concluded that the term "exclusive jurisdiction" did not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of legislative authority by the state. The court determined that the state jurisdiction exists so long as its exercise does not interfere with the jurisdiction asserted by the federal government. Notably, the court specifically stated that the federal government had not asserted jurisdiction in child abuse matters, and in fact had provided federal funding to New Jersey to enable it to deal with the problem through its agencies. The same court also ruled in State in Interest of D.B.S., 349 A 2d 105 (1975), that the State of New Jersey had an obligation to protect and rehabilitate a juvenile who, although housed on land ceded to the federal government, is still a member of the social community of New Jersey.

Responding to Child Abuse and Neglect Under  
"Modified" Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction

A cooperative effort between state and military child protection agencies is considered to be the most desirable and effective approach for service

delivery to abusive and neglectful families. However, some individuals may not think that such cooperation is possible in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction; they assert that state law cannot apply in such areas. The statutory and legal precedents given above present strong legal justification to the contrary. The Supreme Court's determination in Howard v. Commissioners that a federal installation is part of the state in which it is located would seem to dictate that a child present on the installation is "in the state" for purposes of the child protection laws. Therefore, in the absence of any jurisdictional impediment, a child on the installation is entitled to the protection of state law. Because the exercise of state law in this area does not interfere with any federal assertion of jurisdiction, and in fact is quite consistent with expressed congressional policy, there appears to be no jurisdictional impediment. Moreover, case precedents would seem to support a federal enclave resident's entitlement to the benefits of state law. An enclave resident is considered to be a resident of the state, and a denial of benefits to child residents of the federal enclave would, therefore, contradict the equal protection mandate of the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, it can be concluded that state child protection laws may be applied to a military installation comprised of land areas with exclusive federal jurisdiction.

B. RESPONDING TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT WITH STATE CONTROL

Where the jurisdiction scheme of the installation permits and the installation's command desires, it may be preferable to establish a cooperative effort for child protective service delivery in which the state has primary responsibility. Military treatment resources are utilized to the maximum extent

possible; however, control of the case rests with the state child protection agency.

#### Summary of Jurisdictional Issues

Normally, state child protection laws and procedures establish a total system designed to meet any problem arising from reports of known or suspected child maltreatment. Access to a court or judge is possible, when necessary, to encourage case management decisions. Available military resources may be used by the state as appropriate and desired at any stage. In that manner, the military does not abandon the case, which, of course, involves military personnel and on-post residents. However, current military procedures do not provide the options available in most state systems. Therefore, case responsibility should be assigned to the state agency, and military resources should be called upon to facilitate treatment and ease the burden resulting from the addition of military cases to the agency's overall workload.

A formal agreement between state and military authorities should be executed. Such an agreement sets forth basic principles and establishes ground rules and treatment responsibilities. The agreement also serves as a document of record for future references by succeeding military commands and agency personnel.

The matter of jurisdiction is not particularly significant under the third case management plan discussed above. All that is required is a jurisdictional scheme that gives the state some degree of authority to act in child maltreatment cases occurring within the federal land area. Details may then

be worked out by mutual arrangement. However, if the arguments regarding "modified" exclusive federal jurisdiction are accepted, state involvement is permissible in any child maltreatment case occurring on a federal installation.

#### Mandatory Reporting--Civil and Criminal Penalties

All states include in their child protection laws a provision requiring mandatory reporting by certain professionals in cases where there is cause to suspect that a child coming before them is an abused or neglected child. Such reports are normally filed with a local child protection agency or a statewide central registry. A great many of the states having mandatory reporting requirements also impose a criminal penalty for a "knowing" and/or "willful" failure to report. Such a failure to report generally constitutes a misdemeanor. Additionally, a small number of states having mandatory reporting requirements also provide that any person required to report in cases of suspected child abuse or neglect who knowingly and/or willfully fails to do so is civilly liable for injuries and damages proximately caused by their failure to report. Therefore, applying state child protection laws at a federal military installation would, theoretically, obligate certain military personnel (law enforcement and hospital personnel primarily) to comply with state reporting requirements. In theory, it would also subject them to penalties for a willful failure to do so. The question then arises regarding to what extent military personnel are in fact subject to either civil or criminal penalties for violations of state reporting laws.

## Philosophy

Military personnel will make any reports required either by state law or military regulations. Most states accept initial reports orally by telephone and have established statewide central registries to facilitate case reporting. The benefits to be gained by the military installation in using a state system and resources far outweigh any accompanying burdens and so compliance with state law is advantageous. It is especially important that a local policy be developed which spells out the cooperative military/civilian approach. Moreover, a willful failure to report is normally required in order to support civil or criminal liability; following a command determination and decision to use state law on post, it is expected that such willful noncompliance with reporting requirements would not occur. Therefore, the civil and criminal penalty aspects of state law, as they relate to mandatory reporting of child maltreatment, should never be at issue with regard to military personnel acting on post. However, if the question does arise, it must be analyzed separately with regard to its civil and criminal aspects.

## Basic Legal Concepts--Criminal Penalties

State criminal laws normally extend throughout land areas in which the United States has only a proprietorial interest, areas under concurrent federal jurisdiction, and areas under partial jurisdiction to the extent covered by a reservation of state authority. Federal criminal law, as such, applies within exclusive jurisdiction areas, those under concurrent jurisdiction, and those under partial jurisdiction to the extent not precluded by a reservation of

state authority. In contrast to the situation prevailing with respect to civil law, congress has enacted a comprehensive body of criminal law applying on lands within the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States. Most major crimes within such areas are covered by individual provisions of Title 18, United States Code. For the most part, minor federal offenses are not provided for in specific terms. Instead, congress has adopted the provisions of state law as federal substantive law through the Assimilative Crimes Act (18 U.S. Code, section 13). This statute provides that whoever within or upon areas under exclusive or concurrent Federal jurisdiction is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any act of congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the surrounding state, territory, possession, or district in which such a place is situated, then that person is guilty of a like offense and is subject to a like punishment as a matter of Federal law.

It must be emphasized that prosecutions under the Assimilative Crimes Act are not to enforce the state law, but to enforce federal criminal law, the details of which have been adopted by reference. The Act operates only where no federal statute defines a certain offense or provides for its punishment and the state has done so. Also, some provisions of state criminal law cannot be adopted as federal criminal law within exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction areas, usually because of express limitations or terminology in the state statute. Sometimes it is obvious by the very nature of the state law that it cannot be applied, such as where the law provides for the crime of defacing state buildings or property. Finally, state law which is contrary to federal policies or regulations is not adopted under the Assimilative Crimes Act.

The so-called "federal supremacy" doctrine must also be considered. It is derived from the supremacy clause of the Constitution and protects the federal government from burdensome state regulation. That doctrine underlies existing principles of law regarding the amenability of military personnel to state criminal law and prosecutions. As a rule, military personnel are not subject to the criminal sanctions of a state for acts done within the scope of their duties. If a service member is held by state authorities for trial for an act committed while in federal service and pursuant to such service, the service member can apply for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The writ will be denied, however, upon a showing by the state prosecutor that unreasonable force was used in discharging duties; that the acts complained of were done wantonly or with criminal intent; or that the act, in the case of an officer, was manifestly beyond the scope of authority. In the case of a service member who alleges he or she was only following orders, relief will be denied if it is shown that the order was clearly illegal on its face. This immunity of military personnel from state prosecution is, therefore, not absolute. The reasonableness of the conduct will be examined to determine whether the acts were done in good faith, within the scope of duty, and without criminal intent. The writ of habeas corpus will be granted and summary judgment rendered for the defendant, so long as he or she did no more than was necessary and proper under the circumstances.

If a federal officer or service member should fail in the application for a writ of habeas corpus, he or she can apply for removal of the pending suit to federal district court. If successful, the suit would then be tried in federal court. The basis for removal, under a federal statute, is that the

act complained of was done pursuant to duty or a law of the United States.

The general purpose of the removal statute is to protect the federal government from harassment by unsympathetic state courts and legislatures. Anyone who seeks removal of a suit to federal court must show that violation of state law was justified or required by federal duty. Where the violation arises out of acts done under law or federal authority, removal is mandatory under the removal statute (28 U.S. Code, sections 1442, 1442a).

#### Mandatory Reporting and Military Personnel--Criminal Penalties

In light of the foregoing basic principles, conclusions may now be drawn as to the criminal liability of military personnel who willfully or knowingly violate state child maltreatment reporting laws. The Assimilative Crimes Act operates where there is no federal statute defining a certain offense and the state has done so. As that would be the situation for mandatory reporting of child maltreatment (federal law does not set forth specific child protection procedures), it appears that the Assimilative Crimes Act results in adoption of reporting statutes as federal law for purposes of application to military installations of exclusive or concurrent federal legislative jurisdiction. Such a result would not be inconsistent with federal policies (for example, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act mentioned previously). Consequently, it follows that a state could request a Federal prosecution for a willful violation of a state child maltreatment reporting statute.

A second approach is possible. If previous arguments as to "modified" exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction are accepted, state child protection laws can be applied in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. (In the other jurisdictional situations, state law already applies to varying degrees.) Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction scheme, state child protection laws, including mandatory case reporting, can apply on post. It follows then that the state could attempt to prosecute for violations of that law. The option of the officer or service member in question to seek a writ of habeas corpus or removal to federal district court would not appear to apply because of the failure to report would have been done with criminal intent (remember, the violation, by definition, must have been knowing or willful) and, under the circumstances, could probably not be justified as reasonable and within the scope of duty. Therefore, it appears that a state criminal prosecution is also possible for a willful or knowing violation of a state child maltreatment reporting statute.

#### Basic Legal Concepts--Civil Liability

As may be the case with regard to criminal penalties, in the area of civil liability courts also review acts of military personnel in order to determine whether they were acting within the scope of their authority or powers, or if they were acting under federal law. If the review finds they were so acting, the court will generally grant immunity for such acts. Even allegations of malice on the part of a federal officer carrying out his duties have been held to be insufficient to make him liable for his acts as long as the acts are within the scope of authority. Through the years, the immunity granted has been broadened by the courts, both in terms of persons protected by the doc-

trine and in the definitions of the terms "scope of authority" and "under color of law." Persons acting within the scope of their authority or under color of law are protected under present law so long as their acts can be said to be within the "outer perimeter" of their line of duty or scope of authority. Thus, absolute immunity will be granted a federal officer or service member who acts within the broad general outline of authority so long as the Constitution is not violated.

Military personnel facing litigation for civil damages in a state court for an act done within the scope of their duty may have the lawsuit removed to a federal district court in the same manner as those facing criminal prosecution in a state court. After removal of the case, it is then tried in federal court.

With regard to civil damages, the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S. Code, section 2671-2680) should also be mentioned. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for liability of the United States for claims for money damages, for property damage, or for injury or death caused by the negligence of government employees acting within the scope of their duties. Essentially, because of this Act, the government is liable for the acts of its employees in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual would be in similar circumstances, but with some exceptions.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, military personnel injured "incident to service" are excluded as claimants or litigants. However, spouses and dependents of service members are not affected by the "incident to service" rule. That is so even if they are using military benefits because of their sponsor's

military status. Consequently, dependent personnel injured by government negligence may claim or sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Under this Act, the issue of negligence is determined in accordance with the principles of law of the state where the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred. Also, the presence of the Federal Tort Claims Act allowing recovery against the United States for the negligence of its employees provides substantial protection for the government employee or service member being sued. The opportunity to sue the United States, with its large financial resources, is normally more attractive to the injured party than a suit against the individual. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that a judgment against the government will bar a subsequent suit against the individual. However, in theory, it should be assumed that government employees and officers are individually liable for their acts. That liability may be particularly significant where action under the Federal Tort Claims Act is prohibited (for example, by the exceptions for intentional injuries such as assault, batter, or false imprisonment).

Finally, the presence of a statute or regulation governing the questioned activity may also be significant. Compliance with mandatory requirements of a statute or regulation will protect the government and the employee. By contrast, if a Federal employee has violated a mandatory provision, the government has been held liable.

Mandatory Reporting and Military  
Personnel--Civil Liability

These principles of law regarding civil liability of government employees, including military personnel, are well established. However, their application and analysis in relationship to child maltreatment reporting statutes is uncertain, primarily because at this time it is a novel question and no guidance on the specific point exists. Essentially, it is an area subject to individual judgment and decision by the person making the analysis. Incidentally, the same is actually true for the criminal liability issues as well.

In any event, the individual being sued must have at least been negligent in his or her actions (either in not reporting the case or in treating the child at the time) before civil liability for injuries could result. In general, "negligence" is the failure to act with due care of a reasonable prudent person in the circumstances. Liability also results from intentional conduct, but it is assumed that intentional injuries would never be inflicted by military personnel involved in a case. However, intentional non-reporting (which is required for liability by the few statutes in this area) could occur with injuries proximately resulting therefrom. Negligence is also required when the lawsuit involves the Federal government (that is, is based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act).

Most probably, an intentional or negligent failure to report a case of child maltreatment would not be considered to fall within the "scope of duty" of the individual in question, particularly where such a report would otherwise be indicated in the situation. Therefore, "line of duty" immunity is unlikely. (However, the mere presence of that issue in the case would probably result in the case being tried in federal rather than state court.) Also, failure to

report a suspected case of child maltreatment under circumstances warranting such a report and appropriate follow-up action would not seem to be reasonable and, therefore, could be considered negligent. Moreover, the existence of a reporting statute is relevant. A willful or knowing noncompliance with such a requirement (with resultant injuries) alone could constitute negligence. At the least, it would be evidence or an indication of negligence.

In this area, perhaps the best approach to take is to avoid the issue of liability entirely by always acting reasonably under the circumstances and by making all required reports when warranted. Otherwise a possibility of civil liability exists for any injuries or deaths proximately caused by the failure to report.

#### Summary of Reporting Issues

Applying state child protection laws to a military installation affords the protections, benefits, and resources of the state system to the installation's residents. In theory, it will (and equitably so) also bind them to its burdens and obligations. However, as a practical matter, that should pose no problem to the military personnel involved in case identification and processing. It must be expected that such personnel will act responsibly and will perform their duties diligently and with reason and due care, including making required reports when warranted. In that eventuality, the military community can only benefit from application of state child protection laws on post.

Note to Discussion Leader: Conclude the presentation by briefing the audience on the provisions of the reporting law for the state in which your installation is located. All 50 states have child abuse reporting laws. Emphasize the duty that each person has to report and the protection from civil liability afforded under the law.

MODULE V: FAMILY ADVOCACY PROGRAM AND REPORTING

DISCUSSION LEADER: ACS

I REPORTING

Child Abuse and Neglect Requirements

A report of suspected child abuse or neglect is not an accusation. It is a request for an investigation and a request for the process of help to begin. We have long since realized that child abuse is a complex problem and have gone past the early approach of seeking out the villain. The purpose of reporting is to protect the child and where appropriate to offer the necessary services to help parents be better parents.

Each of the 50 states has a child abuse and neglect reporting statute that requires specified categories of people (usually professionals who work with children) to report child abuse and neglect. AR 608-1 requires military and civilian members of the installation community and requires installation physicians, nurses, social workers, and other medical personnel, school officials, and child care/development personnel to report all incidents of suspected child maltreatment to the military police and encourage reporting to the point of contact designated at their medical treatment facility.

Recently, media coverage of child maltreatment has become more sophisticated, so more people in communities everywhere know about this problem ... more is known about what child abuse is, its causes, services available and how to report it.

Difficulties Encountered

Though we are all concerned about protecting children from harm, difficulties and conflicting feelings may arise when one considers reporting child abuse or neglect:

One of the biggest obstacles is often personal feelings. Some people just do not want to get involved. Others view child rearing as a private family matter and believe that the discipline and care of children is totally up to the members of that family. Generally, once it is understood that involvement is required and that child abuse and neglect differs from acceptable childrearing practices, reluctance to become involved is reduced.

It has been pointed out that the better acquainted we are with people, the more we accept their behavior, and the harder it is for us to admit that they may have a problem. This is true in cases of suspected child abuse and neglect. It may be very difficult for a soldier to admit that the child of a fellow serviceman or of a neighbor has been abused or neglected. This is a natural feeling, but it must be overcome. The law does not exempt children of our friends and acquaintances from its protection.



We may also not feel certain that child abuse has really occurred - most states require the reporting of suspected child abuse and neglect; no state requires the reporter to have proof that abuse or neglect has occurred before reporting. The intent of the law is clear: incidents are to be reported as soon as they are noticed - a report of suspected child abuse and neglect states that a child may be an abused child. Proving the case is properly left in the hands of trained investigators.

#### Confidentiality

Another concern is the service member's career. We are afraid that the service member's career will be damaged by a report of child abuse. Army policy clearly states that "Entry into a Family Advocacy Program" in and of itself, is not to be used as a basis for punitive action." The program philosophy is to be helpful and provides the services that will help the family function in a healthy way when possible.

Persons who provide statements in connection with a particular case of suspected child abuse and neglect can request that their identity be kept confidential.

#### Immunity

There is a provision for immunity in state child protection statutes assuring that any person who makes a report of child abuse "in good faith" is immune to liability.

#### Appropriate Discipline vs Abuse

In deciding whether to report child abuse, we must frequently struggle to distinguish the fine line between discipline and abuse. Some may feel that acting-out teenagers deserve whatever they get. Still others are convinced that excessive discipline is nothing but assault and should be so treated. There is no easy answer as to where discipline ends and abuse begins. In attempting to resolve the dilemma, questions like these can be helpful:

- o Is the purpose of the discipline to correct the child's behavior, or primarily to punish or hurt?
- o Is the discipline appropriate to the child's age?
- o Is the discipline appropriate to the child's condition?
- o When physical force is used as a disciplinary measure, is the force applied in a safe location (i.e., buttocks) or an unsafe location (i.e., head)?

## II What Happens When Child Abuse is Reported?

If suspected child abuse or neglect is reported, an investigation and an appropriate plan of services for the child and the family will be made. On the other hand, if the incident is not reported, and an investigation is never made we have lost a chance to help the child and the family. We have also lost the chance to intervene and break the cycle that may be repeated in the next generation. Children live what they learn. If a child experiences violence in the family, then violence is more likely to be seen later in life

as an acceptable way for adults to solve problems. We know that violence is a learned behavior and that is most often learned at home.

In the Army, cases of child abuse and neglect that are positively identified are sent to the Central Registry so that information can later be used in diagnosing child abuse. When an initial report is made, the Central Registry is queried. Knowing whether child abuse has occurred before is useful information in making an effective intervention and assessing the level of danger to the child. Data from the Central Registry also lets us know how much abuse occurs, so that we may request the appropriate resources.

It is important to remember that the purpose of reporting is to protect the child, not to punish the perpetrator. As victims of child abuse are usually not capable of seeking help and protecting themselves, reports of child abuse are our best leverage for helping the child. The abuse and neglect of children cannot be stopped unless it is reported.

## III How Does the Army Respond to Child Abuse

ACS is responsible for organizing and managing the installation response to Child Protective Services. Child Protective Services are included in the Family Advocacy Program which, in accordance with the DOD Directive 6400.1, mandates the services to:

- o Support activities that contribute to a healthy family life.

- o Provide a program for the prevention, identification, evaluation, treatment, follow-up and reporting of child abuse and neglect and spouse abuse.

- o Cooperate with responsible civil authorities to address the problems of child abuse and neglect and spouse abuse and in reporting cases as required by state law.

- o Service families living off the installation.

It is anticipated that AR 608-1, Army Community Service Regulation which outlines the Army Family Advocacy Program will be published and distributed no later than February 1983. It contains guidelines for spouse as well as child abuse.

The regulation specifies that a Family Advocacy Program Coordinator in ACS is to be responsible for developing community education and prevention programs, coordinating civilian and military resources, and working with the installation commander to develop needed services. The coordinator also develops and publicizes reporting procedures to let the Army community know what child abuse is, how it is reported and available services.

Treatment services are provided by a multi-disciplinary Case Management Team in the medical treatment facility. The treatment team determines if child maltreatment has occurred, develops a treatment plan and makes appropriate treatment service referrals. The development and delivery of Family Advocacy services is a shared responsibility - shared with almost every discipline on the installation - and shared with the community when services are available

and accessible. ACS is responsible for overall coordination, community education and prevention; the medical treatment facility is responsible for medical and clinical treatment services. The staff Judge Advocate provides legal assistance; the Military Police must investigate; the chaplain must participate; and the installation commander must assure services are in place.

#### Services

Proactive and preventive services to alleviate stress, to improve family functioning, and to support families undergoing the kinds of stresses which could trigger abusive or neglectful behavior are available as well as services such as foster care that treat or prevent recurrence of abuse and neglect. Child abuse is a community problem and must be addressed as such so that families may be brought into the main stream of Army life through a community network of services that sustain and reach out to the family. (Each installation should replace Section III with a Section III that summarizes the specific installation response to child and abuse and neglect and details community and installation services available.)

SUMMARY

Discussion Leader: Provost Marshal

Today, we have tried to give you an appreciation for the scope of the child abuse problem nation-wide and in the Army, and the knowledge to recognize abuse or neglected children, so that we can intervene as early as possible. The temptation is very strong to look the other way when we encounter indicators of child abuse. However, I hope that everyone realizes that ignoring the problem is tantamount to condemning a significant number of children to a life of chronic neglect and abuse. We must have the morale courage to refer cases for evaluation, and when required, to take positive action to treat the family, and protect the child from further injury.

If we work together we can make progress towards eliminating child abuse on Army posts. If we ignore the problem we, and our children, will continue to pay the price for generation after generation.

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT GUIDELINES  
FOR  
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

ABUSE INDICATORS

Recognizing Physical Abuse

- . Injuries on several surface areas of the body
- . Injuries in various stages of healing
- . Complications arising from old injuries
- . Wrap-around injuries
- . Nonaccidental bruising patterns
- . The shape of an instrument imprinted on the skin
- . Cigar and cigarette burns
- . Burns that have a glove or sock-like appearance

When the Parent:

- . Presents an explanation of the injury inconsistent with the appearance of the injury
- . Is evasive or vague
- . Presents a contradictory history
- . Gives a history of repeated injury
- . Is reluctant to give information
- . Projects cause of injury onto a sibling or third party
- . Verbal threats against the child
- . Has unrealistic expectations of the child
- . Is psychotic or psychopathic
- . Personally misusing drugs or alcohol

When the Child:

- . Has an unexplained injury
- . Is unusually fearful, non-spontaneous, refuses to speak in front of parents
- . Overly eager to please adults
- . Shows evidence of overall poor health
- . Has injuries that are not mentioned in history

NEGLECT INDICATORS

Living Conditions

- . Should consider the child's complete environment and make a particular effort to avoid associating low income as being synonymous with neglect.
- . Unsanitary conditions, such as human and animal waste on the floors, are indicative of neglect.
- . Lack of heat in the house during winter months is neglect
- . Danger of fire from open heating units such as baskets of burning wood or coal should be considered as unsafe conditions.
- . Children sleeping on cold floors or in beds that are dirty, soiled, and

wet with human waste are neglected.

Infestation of rodents (rats and mice) demonstrates neglected homes.

#### Health Hazards

- Malnutrition of children is indicated by them being underweight and small in stature.
- Although this failure to thrive and grow can be due to a number of medical conditions, most neglected children will appear obviously undernourished.
- When undernourishment is considered in light of the environment, it indicates parental neglect.
- Should also be aware of the condition of the food in the house. Usually there will not be any food for the children to eat, and what food there is will be spoiled.
- Medical care provided to the children is an important factor to consider.
- The child's failing to thrive may be due to a legitimate medical condition that a doctor is attempting to cure.
- Neglected children will not be receiving doctor's care.

#### Emotional Hazards

- Children may suffer emotional abuse through continual exposure to vice conditions in their home environments. Emotional damage may also arise from extremes of treatment, such as verbal harassment or total indifference.

## CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE Investigative Techniques

### INTERVIEWING THE CHILD

Usually, only one person should interview the victim when the child is of an older age.

Very young children may need an older person they are "close" to for reassurance. They probably will talk first about the incident(s) under such conditions.

When interviewing the preschool child who has been the victim of incest, take special note of the mother's attitude about both the incident and her child. Be careful - she might change and could later turn against the child.

If the mother appears supportive, use her to make the child feel less guilty during the interview.

### ESTABLISHING RAPPORT

Before beginning the interview attempt to place the child at ease.

Try to help the victim to relax and reassure him/her that you really do care about them.

Talk about their feelings which might include - fears, sadness, confusion may also include shame and guilt.

With smaller children, avoid taking notes. Younger children are easily distracted and you will lose contact.

A tape recorder could be frightening to a younger child and should be hidden whenever possible. Another approach is to make the recording a game, showing the child how their voice is being recorded.

Teenagers will probably react very negatively towards an attempt to hide a tape recorder.

### QUESTIONING THE CHILD

With younger children the interview will have to move quickly without appearing to do so.

Approaching the child slowly, patiently and calmly has a positive effect.

Keep questions as short as possible.

Position yourself at their level.

Be informal and natural. Let the child know that it isn't easy to talk about sex. Don't condemn the sex act.

## INTERVIEWING CHILD VICTIMS

### GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM PERSONNEL

#### Background Information

The following issues affect the child's ability to give a history of sexual assault and influence the cooperativeness of victim and family.

#### I. Child's Developmental Level

A child's cognitive, emotional and social growth occurs in sequential phases of increasingly complex levels of development. Progression occurs with mastery of one state leading to concentration on the next.

Cognitive - Preconceptual, concrete, intuitive thinking in the young child gradually develops toward comprehension of abstract concepts. Time and space begin as personalized notions and gradually are identified as logical and ordered concepts.

Emotional - The young child perceives her/himself egocentrically with little ability to identify her/himself in a context. She is dependent on the family to meet all needs and invests adults with total authority. The child often reflects the emotional responses of the parents. She gradually shifts to greater reliance on peer relationships and emotional commitments to people outside the family.

Behavioral. The young child is spontaneous, outgoing and explosive with few internal controls and only a tentative awareness of external limits. She has a short attention span. A child most often expresses feelings through behavior rather than verbally. As the child grows, she develops internal controls and establishes a sense of identity and independence. Peers and other adults have increasing influence on behavior.

#### II. Sexual Assault

Characteristics of the assault affect the child's emotional perception of the event and to a great extent determine the response. The closeness of the child's relationship to the offender, the duration of the offense, the amount of secrecy surrounding the assault, and the degree of violence are the factors which have the greatest impact on the child's reaction. The child may very well have ambivalent feelings toward the offender or be dependent on him for other needs.

#### III. Response to Child

The child is fearful of the consequences of reporting a sexual assault. The response of the family support system and official agencies will directly affect the resolution of the psychological trauma and her/his cooperativeness as a witness. The child fears she will be disbelieved or blamed for the assault and almost always is hesitant about reporting.

## Interviewing Child Victims

### I. Preparing for Interview

Prior to interviewing the child, obtain relevant information from parent/guardian, and if applicable, Child Protective Services caseworker, physician, and/or Sexual Assault Center/Rape Relief counselor.

- A. Explain your role and procedures to above personnel, and enlist their cooperation.
- B. Determine child's general developmental status; age; grade; siblings; family composition; capabilities; ability to write, read, count, ride a bike, tell time, remember events; any unusual problems; physical, intellectual, behavioral, knowledge of anatomy and sexual behavior, family terminology for genital areas.
- C. Review circumstances of assault (as reported already by child to other person); what, where, when, by whom, and to whom reported; exact words of child; other persons told by child; how many have interviewed child; child's reaction to assault; how child feels about it and what, if any, behavioral signs of distress (nightmares, withdrawal, regression, acting out) have occurred.
- D. Determine what reactions and changes the child has been exposed to following revelation of the assault(s): believing; supportive; blaming; angry; ambivalent; parents getting a divorce; move to a new home.

### II. Beginning the Interview

- A. Setting - The more comfortable for the child, the more information she is likely to share.
  1. Flexibility - A child likes to move around the room, explore and touch, sit on the floor or adult's lap.
  2. Activity - Playing or coloring occupy child's physical needs and allows her/him to talk with less guardedness.
  3. Privacy - Interruptions distract an already short attention span, divert focus of interview, and make self-conscious or apprehensive child withdraw.
  4. Support - If the child wishes a parent or other person present, it should be allowed. A frightened or insecure child will not give a complete statement.
- B. Establishing a Relationship
  1. Introduction - Name, brief and simple explanation of role, and purpose: "I am the lawyer (or legal person) on your side; my job is to talk to children about these things because we want them to

- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did he ever touch you? Where?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Where did he put his finger?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Have you ever seen him with his clothes off?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did you ever see his penis (thing, pee pee, weiner) get get big?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did anything every come out of it?"

Once basic information is elicited, ask specifically about other types of sexual contact.

- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did he ever put it into your mouth?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did he ever make you touch him on his penis?"

Child's response here will probably not be elaborate. Most children know the offender and can name him, although in some cases the child may not understand relationship to self or family. Ascertain from other sources what is the exact nature/extent of the relationship.

### 3. WHEN

The response to this question will depend on child's ability, how recently assault happened, lapse between last incident and report, number of assaults (children will tend to confuse or mix separate incidents). If the child is under six, information about time is unlikely to be reliable. An older child can often narrow down dates and times using recognized events or associating assault with other incidents.

- \_\_\_\_\_ "Was it before your birthday, the weekend, Valentine's Day?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Was it nighttime or daytime?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did it happen after dinner, 'Happy Days', your brother's bedtime?"

### 4. WHERE

The assault usually occurs in the child's and/or offender's home. Information about which room, where other family members were, where child was before assault may be learned.

### 5. COERCION

What kind of force, threat, enticement, pressure was used to insure cooperation and secrecy?

- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did he tell you not to tell?" What did he say?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did he say something bad would happen or you would get in trouble if you told?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "Did the man say it was a secret?"

### C. Assessing credibility and competency

1. Does child described acts or experience to which she would not have normally been exposed? (Average child is not familiar with erection or ejaculation until adolescence at the earliest.)

stop happening."

2. General exchange - Ask about name (1st name), age, grade, school and teacher's name, siblings, family composition, pets, friends, activities, favorite games/TV shows. (It often helps to share personal information when appropriate, e.g. children, pets.)
3. Assess level of sophistication and ability to understand concepts. Does child read, write, count, tell time; know colors or shapes, know the day or date; know birthdate; remember past events (breakfast, yesterday, last year); understand before and after, know about money; assume responsibilities (goes around neighborhood alone, stays at home alone, makes dinner, etc.)

### III. Obtaining History of Sexual Assault

#### A. Preliminaries

1. Use language appropriate to child's level; be sure child understands words. (Watch for signs of confusion, blankness or embarrassment; be careful with words like incident, occur, penetration, prior, ejaculation, etc.)
2. Do not ask WHY questions ("Why did you go to the house?" "Why didn't you tell?") They tend to sound accusatory.
3. Never threaten or try to force a reluctant child to talk. Pressure causes a child to clam up and may further traumatize her/him.
4. Be aware that the child who has been instructed or threatened not to tell by the offender (ESPECIALLY if a parent) will be very reluctant and full of anxiety (you will usually notice a change in the child while talking about the assault). The fears often need to be allayed.
  - \_\_\_\_\_ "It's not bad to tell what happened."
  - \_\_\_\_\_ "You won't get in trouble."
  - \_\_\_\_\_ "You can help your dad by telling what happened."
  - \_\_\_\_\_ "It wasn't your fault."
  - \_\_\_\_\_ "You're not to blame."
5. Interviewer's affective response should be consonant with child's perception of assault (e.g. don't emphasize jail for the offender if the child has expressed positive feelings toward him).
6. Ask direct, simple questions as open-ended as allowed by child's level of comprehension and ability to talk about the assault.

#### B. Statement

##### 1. WHAT

- \_\_\_\_\_ "Can you tell me what happened?"
- \_\_\_\_\_ "I need to know what the man did."

2. Does child describe circumstances and characteristics typical of sexual assault situation? ("He told me that it was our secret"; "He said I couldn't go out if I didn't do it"; "He told me it was sex education".)
3. How and under what circumstances did child tell? What were exact words?
4. How many times has child given the history and how consistent is it regarding the basic facts of the assault (note times, dates, circumstances, sequence of events, etc.)?
5. How much spontaneous information can the child provide? How much prompting is required?
6. Can the child define difference between truth and a lie? (This question is not actually very useful with young children because they learn this by rote but may not understand the concepts.)

#### IV. Closing the Interview

- A. Praise/thank child for information/cooperation.
- B. Provide information
  1. Child - Do not extract promises from child regarding testifying. Most children cannot project themselves into an unknown situation and predict how they will behave. Questions about testifying in court or undue emphasis on trial will have little meaning and often frightens the child (causing nightmares and apprehension).
  2. Parent - Provide simple, straightforward information about what will happen next in the criminal justice system and approximately when, the likelihood of trial, etc.
- C. Enlist cooperation - Let them know who to contact for status reports or in an emergency, express appreciation and understanding for the effort they are making by reporting and following through on process.
- D. Answer questions, solicit responses.

E





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

29 JAN 1982

PEMP-0

SUBJECT: Robbery Prevention Campaign, April 1982

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. In April 1982, Department of the Army is sponsoring a Robbery Prevention Campaign. While all types of robbery are of concern, special emphasis is being placed on reducing street robberies of junior enlisted personnel since this type of crime makes up the overwhelming majority of reported robbery cases. An analysis of Army robbery data for CY 80 is attached (Incl 1). While the patterns are clear for Army-wide victim and perpetrator profiles, as well as most frequent locations where the crimes occur, there were very great differences between rates at different types of installations. Because of this, each installation should review its robbery statistics and identify the magnitude of the problem locally prior to deciding how actively to push the robbery campaign.

2. Attached is a list of robbery countermeasures (Incl 2) that can be taken by individuals or implemented by commanders and provost marshals to reduce robberies. In addition, the Army Crime Watch Program, which encourages the reporting of suspicious activity around family housing and troop barracks areas, directly supports anti-robbery efforts.

3. To support the campaign, DA has produced four posters which are directed toward junior enlisted personnel. They will be distributed via pinpoint distribution to all company level units, with supplemental distribution to each installation provost marshal. The posters should be placed in troop billets, day rooms, service clubs, bowling alleys, and other facilities that service junior enlisted personnel. The posters are not appropriate for offices or facilities that are frequented primarily by civilian and senior military personnel. In addition to the posters, the command information system is producing material to support the campaign. A list of command information items is attached at Incl 3. Provost marshals should coordinate with installation public affairs officers to ensure that the material is fully utilized.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

THOMAS A. MAC DONNELL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief, Office of Army  
Law Enforcement

3 Incl  
as

29 JAN 1982

PEMP-0  
SUBJECT: Robbery Prevention Campaign, April 1982

DISTRIBUTION

✓ COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY, ATTN: AEAPM

COMMANDERS

- ✓ US ARMY MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT AND READINESS COMMAND, ATTN: DRCSS
- ✓ US ARMY COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND, ATTN: CC-IS
- ✓ MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, ATTN: MT-SS
- ✓ US ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND
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- ✓ US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ATTN: PMZ-A
- ✓ SUPERINTENDENT, US MILITARY ACADEMY, ATTN: PM
- ✓ COMMANDANT, US ARMY MILITARY POLICE SCHOOL

## Analysis of 1980 Robbery Cases

1. Purpose: To identify the essential features of the crime of robbery as it occurs on military installations or as it affects military personnel in the civilian community.

### 2. Methodology.

a. CY 80 was selected as the base year for data collection because it is the most recent year for which data is complete.

b. Civilian statistics were ignored because differences between population and environments in the Army and that of the nation as a whole cast doubt on the validity of applying conclusions based on civilian data to Army installations.

c. The Army Crime, Confinement, and Discipline Report was examined to determine rates per thousand and seasonal variations.

d. The Law Enforcement and Discipline Reports (DA Form 2819) for each month in 1980 were examined for each MACOM and each CONUS installation to identify the total number of robbery cases, and installations which have large numbers of robberies.

e. A random sample of 1980 Reports of Investigation (ROI) on robbery cases was examined to develop detailed information on victims, perpetrators, and related facts. The size of the sample (200 of 1138 total cases) should give data of  $\pm 5$  percent accuracy.

### 3. Findings.

a. Frequency and seasonal variations. Robbery occurs at an average quarterly rate of .385 incidents per thousand population. This is greater than the rates for murder, rape, use/possession of narcotics, sale of narcotics, and sale of dangerous drugs. The quarterly robbery rate varies from .31 to .44 with the summer being the peak period.

b. Posts with large populations of junior enlisted personnel have the greatest number of robberies. Depots and headquarters installations with very low populations of junior grade troops have few, if any, cases.

c. In the overwhelming majority (94.7 percent) of the off-post robberies, the victims are non-DOD connected civilians who are robbed by GIs. In the few off-post cases where military personnel are the victims, the profiles are very similar to on-post cases.

d. On-post robbery is primarily a crime against junior enlisted personnel. They were the victims in 90.05 percent of the cases. Other victims were: NCO (E6-E9) - 2.2 percent, officers - 0.5 percent, civilian employees - 1.1 percent, dependents - 5 percent, and other civilians - 1.1 percent. Most of the dependent victims were teenagers. They fit the pattern for lower grade EM.

e. Most on-post robberies occur in post service areas (28.3 percent), company areas (26.9 percent), or enroute between these areas (33.8 percent). The remaining cases occur in parking lots (8.3 percent) and other areas (2.7 percent) including family housing, training areas, etc.

f. As might be expected, over three-quarters (76.8 percent) of on-post robberies occur during the late night and early morning hours (2000-0200). The bulk of the other cases (15.1 percent) occur in the early evening hours (1700-2000). Only a small percent (8.1 percent) occur during duty hours. In 94.5 percent of the cases, the victim was alone and in 77.2 percent of the cases he was attacked by more than one robber who employed strong arm tactics (69.3 percent). Knives were used in 14.5 percent of the cases and firearms in 8.1 percent. Weapons were likely to have been employed when a robber operated alone, or when there was more than one victim. Most robbers (over 90 percent) were young males and likely to be in the Army.

## I. Countermeasures - Potential Victims

1. Over 90 percent of the robbery victims in 1980 were attacked while traveling alone. This, plus the fact that most incidents involved at least two perpetrators, makes it clear that robbers place a high priority on achieving odds of two to one or better. Since most robbers depend on strong arm tactics rather than a weapon to force the victim to surrender his property, they usually cannot risk attacking on a one-to-one basis. A potential victim can, by traveling with a buddy, reduce the odds to the point that he is no longer an acceptable target.

2. While alcohol is rarely mentioned in reports of investigation as a contributing factor, the large number of robberies occurring late at night and involving young enlisted men who had recently left clubs, bowling alleys, and other recreational facilities which serve beer, suggests consumption of alcohol played a small part in the victim being targeted. This assumption is strengthened by the results of civilian studies that established robbers unconsciously monitor the "body language" of potential victims and select those who show signs of physical weakness or mal-coordination. Often the degree of impairment is so slight that only careful analysis of films will show any deviation from normal behavior. "He just looked like an easy mark," is a typical robber's assessment. If this is true, the consumption of moderate amounts of alcohol could produce changes that signal to a potential robber that the person is "an easy mark." Limiting consumption, especially when a soldier is alone in a recreational facility may help him avoid being targeted by robbers.

3. As might be expected, robbers most frequently operated in poorly lighted areas near recreational facilities, troop billets, and routes between these areas. Unlighted parade and athletic fields appear to be especially dangerous. Troops can greatly reduce their chances of being robbed by sticking to well lighted streets when on foot, and taking advantage of public transportation, such as post shuttle buses, when it is available.

4. Perpetrators frequently snare their victims by offering a ride their billet areas. Troops should avoid accepting rides from groups of strangers, especially late at night.

5. Most robberies on military installations are perpetrated by servicemen. They frequent the same recreational facilities as their victims. A soldier who broadcasts the fact that he is carrying a substantial sum of money is asking for trouble. Soldiers can minimize their attractiveness as a robbery victim by carrying only the amount of cash that they will reasonably need for the evening and by using travelers checks when large sums must be carried.

## II. Law Enforcement/Command Countermeasures.

1. Provost marshals and commanders can interrupt the sequence of events that leads to the commission of a robbery by either protecting the victim or intercepting the potential perpetrators. One of the most effective ways to improve security is to increase the level of lighting in high probability areas, especially around recreation areas, troop billets, and the roads between them. Studies conducted in Kansas City, Missouri, and Washington D.C. indicate that street crime could be reduced as much as 60 percent by improving street lighting alone. Of course, increasing lighting may conflict with the goals of the

installation energy conservation program, so a careful reconnaissance should be conducted to ensure that the most dangerous areas receive the highest priority for lighting.

2. In addition to improving lighting, it may be worthwhile to conduct surveillance of high risk areas during critical time periods. The New York City Street Crime Unit has been able to reduce muggings significantly by employing plain clothes personnel to observe street activity and apprehend muggers in the act. Since robbers usually do not work alone, surveillance personnel should be especially alert for small groups (2-5 persons) who are loitering in areas where robberies have occurred in the past. If lighting is poor, night vision devices may be useful in this role.

3. Increased patrolling along critical routes will reduce robberies, provided the frequency is high enough. Civilian studies have shown that the effectiveness of patrol as a crime deterrence measure declines very rapidly as the length of time between passes at a particular point increases. In addition, motor patrols appear to be less effective than either foot patrols or patrols on bicycles, primarily because of the amount of warning that they provide when approaching a crime scene.

4. In addition to improving control in high risk areas, commanders can further reduce the opportunity for robbery by arranging for post transportation to provide shuttle bus service between recreation areas and troop billets. If this option is selected, time schedules should be examined to ensure there is adequate coverage during the critical 2000 to 0200 hours period when most robberies occur.

5. Finally, commanders should publicize robbery threat and countermeasure information in areas which service junior enlisted personnel, e.g., service clubs, day rooms, etc., and should integrate this information into the command information program when robbery statistics indicate additional emphasis is warranted.

List of Publicity, Media

I. DA Posters

DA Poster 190-17

"When You Step Out"

DA Poster 190-18

"3 Ways Not to Get Mugged"

DA Poster 190-15

"Three Strikes and You're Out"

DA Poster 190-16

"A Short Cut Could Leave You Short on Cash"

II. Command Information

"DA Scene"

"Commanders Call"

III. General News

Articles for Installation Newspapers from AR News

Radio Spots for Installation Stations from AFIS

CONTACT YOUR LOCAL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

**END**