

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

6-8-83

Federal Probation

87793-
87801

DECEMBER 1982

Federal Probation is published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and is edited by the Probation Division of the Administrative Office.

All phases of preventive and correctional activities in delinquency and crime come within the fields of interest of FEDERAL PROBATION. The Quarterly wishes to share with its readers all constructively worthwhile points of view and welcomes the contributions of those engaged in the study of juvenile and adult offenders. Federal, state, and local organizations, institutions, and agencies—both public and private—are invited to submit any significant experience and findings related to the prevention and control of delinquency and crime.

Manuscripts (in duplicate), editorial matters, books, and communications should be addressed to FEDERAL PROBATION, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C. 20544.

Subscriptions may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at an annual rate of $9.00 (domestic) and $11.25 (foreign). Single copies are available at $3.50 (domestic) and $4.40 (foreign).

Permission to quote is granted on condition that appropriate credit is given to the author and the Quarterly. Information regarding the reprinting of articles may be obtained by writing to the Editors.

FEDERAL PROBATION QUARTERLY
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C. 20544

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Federal Probation

A JOURNAL OF CORRECTIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE

Published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

VOLUME XXXXVI DECEMBER 1982 NUMBER 4

This Issue in Brief

Shadows of Substance: Organized Crime Reconsidered.—Authors Martens and Longfellow discuss contemporary perceptions of organized crime and how they affect public policy. Arguing that organized crime is neither parasitic nor exclusively functional to the maintenance of the social order, they suggest that organized crime must be perceived as a process. At historical times, organized crime is functional and at other times it is exploitive. The authors assert that contemporary research is empirically weak, ethnically biased, and inappropriately focused by a poor data collection methodology.

Organized Crime, RICO, and the Media: What We Think We Know.—RICO was legislated to combat Mafia-style organized crime. Authors Wynn and Anderson maintain, however, that the precise Congressional target is unclear. RICO provides a formal notion of organized crime whose key is the proof of a "pattern of racketeering activity." But this means only the commission of two predicate offenses within a 10-year period. One result is a body of cases whose only common denominator is unfettered prosecutorial discretion. In addition, Federal jurisdiction and surveillance powers are greatly increased.

Adolphe Quetelet: At the Beginning. —Professor Sawyer F. Sylvester of Bates College reveals that an empirical approach to the study of crime can be found in the history of criminology as early as 1831 in the writings of the Belgian statistician, Adolphe Quetelet. In his work, *Research on the Propensity for Crime at Different Ages,* Quetelet makes use of government statistics of crime to determine the influence of such things as education, climate, race, sex, and age on the incidence of criminal behavior. He not only establishes relationships between these factors and crime but, in so doing, develops a methodology for the social sciences which is still largely valid.

Behavioral Objectives in Probation and Parole: A New Approach to Staff Accountability.—Many probation and parole agencies have initiated programs of risk and needs assessments for clients in an effort to manage caseloads more effectively,

CONTENTS

Departments:

reports Dr. Alvin Cohn of Administration of Justice Services. By taking such programming one step further, namely by developing behaviorally anchored objectives, workers can maximize available resources in directing clients toward realistic and relevant outcomes, he states. Workers can thus be held accountable in the delivery of specific services.

The Use of "Third Sector" Organizations as Vehicles for Community Service Under a Condition of Probation.—The increasing use of community service as a condition of probation has provided probation officers with improved opportunities to use such assignments as a way of teaching responsible citizenship as well as achieving community improvement. This article, by Deputy Chief Probation Officer Jack Cocks of the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles, reflects some of the recent developments in formalizing service programs in public benefit "third sector" organizations designed to carry out new strategies of networking.

Not Without the Tools: The Task of Probation in the Eighties.—Traditionally, the role of the probation officer has been viewed as dichotomous with supervision involving maintaining surveillance and helping the clientele. This dilemma is likely to remain with us in the next decade as the field of probation faces the challenge of stiffer sentencing policies. Authors Marshall and Vito outline some of the difficulties to be faced by probation officers and suggest some methods of dealing with them.

Inside Supervision: A Thematic Analysis of Interviews With Probationers.—This article by Dr. John J. Gibbs of Rutgers University contains an analysis of taperecorded and transcribed interviews with 57 probationers in two New Jersey counties. The interviews were structured to elicit the clients' perceptions of probation and to explore their concerns. Each subject was asked to describe his probation experience, and to respond to an orally administered Self-Anchoring Striving Scale, a measure of satisfaction.

Writing for the Reader.—Nancy Hoffman and Glen Plutschak of the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation discuss the pitfalls of the bureaucratic style of writing often developed by criminal justice professionals. Such writing is generally characterized by poor organization, extremely long sentences, over-used jargon and unnecessarily complex words. The results are documents which are difficult to read. The authors stress the importance of writing readable communications which are clear, concise, and to the point.

The Male Batterer: A Model Treatment Program for the Courts.—Authors Dreas, Ignatov, and Brennan examine the male batterer from the perspective of court-ordered treatment. A 30-week group treatment program is described in which various aspects of domestic violence are considered, with the ultimate goal being cessation of abusive behavior. Specific steps taken regarding program development and implementation are presented and a description of additional adjunct services is also provided.

Issues in Planning Jail Mental Health Services.—One impact of deinstitutionalization of state mental hospitals noted by many authors is an increased need for mental health services in local jails. Given current fiscal constraints and community attitudes, program development in the 3,493 jails in the United States is often very difficult. In this article, Messrs. McCarty, Steadman, and Morrissey assess the range and structure of mental health services in a national sample of 43 jails.

Victim Offender Reconciliation: An Incarceration Substitute?—Howard Zehr and Mark Umbreit describe the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP) operated by PACT in Indiana. The program allows for a face-to-face meeting between victim and offender in which facts and feelings are discussed and a restitution contract agreed upon. Trained community volunteers serve as mediators. VORP can serve as a partial or total substitute for jail or prison incarceration. Eighty-six percent of all cases represent felony offenses, with burglary and theft being the most common.

87793

Shadows of Substance: Organized Crime Reconsidered

BY FREDERICK T. MARTENS AND COLLEEN MILLER-LONGFELLOW*

ORGANIZED CRIME, a criminological phenomenon, remains more elusive today than when it was first introduced in the 1920's by the late criminologist Edwin Sutherland. It has been defined and refined by a number of scholars, law enforcement officials, and journalists all of whom have generally equated organized crime with Italian-Americans and more specifically, the Mafia and La Costra Nostra. This convenient method of describing organized crime has resulted in a mystique which fails to adequately address the more significant issues—those which are essentially matters of public policy. If, as history has proven, organized crime is an integral part of American society, providing disenfranchised minorities with a stake in the system, what should the public policy toward organized crime be? If organized crime represents the "queer ladder of social mobility," is not the answer to organized crime control that of ethnic/racial assimilation? And if ethnicity only represents a convenient way of explaining organized crime, but bears little resemblance to the "real" world of organized crime, what do we replace this image with which is consistent with the "real" world of organized crime?

If the last decade has taught us nothing more, we have developed a greater sensitivity towards and appreciation of the phenomenon of organized crime. Yet, we remain fixated to simplistic explanations which either describe organized crime as a "parasite which fattens on human weakness" or an institution symbiotically related to the larger society, drawing its strength and resources from a communal commitment to organized crime. Clearly, neither description is true or false; both represent diabolically opposed reflections of the researchers' reality. The ambiguity which characterizes contemporary explanations of organized crime has in many respects contributed to the confusion which has enveloped what can best be characterized as an "ill-defined" public policy.

Organized Crime: Fact or Fancy?

While the concept of organized crime emanated out of the Chicago School of Sociology in the late 1920's, it was not until the seventies that this concept has been critically evaluated and critiqued by a number of scholars (Abadinsky, 1981). Cressey, Salerno, Blakey, and Kwitny represent that school of thought which perceives organized crime as a close-knit criminal conspiracy, designed to subvert the economic and political order (Cressey, 1969; Salerno, 1969; Kwitny, 1979; Blakey, 1980). Conversely, Hawkins, Smith, and Homer basically argue that the reality of organized crime could be characterized as a social system of interlocking interpersonal relationships void of any definitive structure, central control, or definable chain of command (Hawkins, 1969; Smith, 1975). Contrary to the arguments of the so-called "traditionalists" (Cressey, Salerno, Blakey and Kwitny), Hawkins, Smith, and Homer are implicitly suggesting that the traditionalist's view of organized crime is far too static and ordered.

While we are cognizant of the arguments which transcend the entire spectrum of organized crime theory, the evidential data seemingly supports the findings of the "traditionalists" in one sense: There exists a national criminal organization which has a ritual for admittance that only a select number of persons of Italian ethnicity are permitted to partake in it (Voltz, 1960; Zeigler, 1970). As to whether this organization is as rigidly structured as Cressey, *et al.*, suggest remains open to considerable debate, as are other issues (e.g., the extent of violence, its revenue-generating capabilities, etc.) which are often propagated. The preponderance of evidence demonstrates a national organization of career criminals, commonly referred to as the "Mafia" or "La Cosa Nostra." As for the inconsistencies which occasionally surface when information is made public (via courtroom or legislative testimony), it is obvious that court testimony is not necessarily designed to elicit the *whole truth* (due to evidential considerations) and legislative commissions are often more intent on gaining public exposure by highlighting the more exotic nuances. Understandably (yet

---

*Mr. Martens is an adjunct professor of sociology and criminology at Upsala College, Wirths Campus, Sussex, New Jersey. Ms. Longfellow is an intelligence research analyst for the New Jersey State Police.

regretfully), researchers have been unable to gain access to the types of data which would permit them to gain a more comprehensive insight into the social dynamics of criminal syndicates, and, unfortunately, the pedestrian quality of the "research" available has done little to encourage confidence in the public policies that have emerged. As for implications of what is being written with respect to organized crime, it seems apparent that the research findings are as schizophrenic as is public opinion. For example, there can be little doubt but that organized crime, regardless of its "moral" and "criminal" connotations, provides a source of income for some persons who have been denied access to legitimate opportunities. And it is equally obvious that organized crime has taken advantage of the very persons that it professes to protect.

Yet, these descriptions are far too static and fail to describe organized crime as a process. Fundamental to our understanding of organized crime is the concept of process and unless we are capable of understanding organized crime as a *process*—both functional and dysfunctional—we are at a loss in explaining what it is that law enforcement or the criminal justice system is seeking to control or as some have optimistically suggested, eliminate.

For our purposes, it may be appropriate to visually depict the two dominant modes of thought which reflect contemporary explanations of organized crime.

MODEL A = PARASITIC



MODEL B = SYMBIOTIC



Institutions in American Society:

1 = Family
2 = Religion
3 = Education
4 = Occupation
5 = Organized Crime

Model "A" essentially describes organized crime as parasitic, extracting from society and providing nothing in return. The "B" model accepts organized crime as an institution in American society, symbiotically related to the other institutions in the larger society. The public policy implications are equally as dichotomous. For model "A" suggests that arresting and incarcerating those who comprise this parasite will eliminate organized crime; whereas the "B" model implies that by expanding legitimate opportunities, people will opt to pursue careers in the licit economy. Both make conflicting presumptions about human nature, and neither completely describes the reality of organized crime.

For our purposes, we would graphically characterize organized crime in this matter:



MODEL C = Functionally-Exploitive

Essentially, model "C" (or what we shall label functionally-exploitive) describes organized crime as a process, at times functionally related to the community, and at other times, exploitive of the community. When functionally related, organized crime is investing in the community which employs its services; and when purely exploitive, the community receives no benefits in return for the monies exacted. In pragmatic terms, the "bookmaker" while deriving an income from the community, may also be reinvesting in the development of the community by renovating properties, employing youngsters in family-owned businesses, contributing to a political campaign, or simply giving birthday parties for the children of the neighborhood. This is analogous in some respect to the corporation which provides monies to civic affairs, creates foundations for scientific research, or contributes to charitable and political organizations. While the corporation may be deriving profits from the community, it is also returning a portion of the profit to the community.

However, organized crime by definition, represents the power to exploit; to take monies from the community and provide no *real* return. That is, it is important to recognize when the community no longer benefits from the residual effects of organized crime. It is under this condition that organized crime becomes an exploitive monopoly, insensitive to the economic interests of the larger community. And it is an appreciation for this condition that law enforcement must be capable of identifying if it is to develop a rational and cost-efficient approach to the control (vis-a-vis, eradication) of organized crime.

Ethnic Succession and Organized Crime

The principal theme of most organized crime research focuses on Bell's and Ianni's concept of ethnic succession in organized crime (Bell, 1953; Ianni, 1974). To Bell this was labelled "the queer ladder of social mobility," whereas Ianni sought to describe this process as "...a functional part of the American social system, (which) ... successive waves of immigrants and migrants have found (as) an available means of economic and social mobility. ..." The history of organized crime, at least as it has been reported in the media, appears to replicate the history of professional boxing. That is, Irish, Jews, Italians, and more recently Blacks and Hispanics have travelled through the chairs of ethnic succession in professional boxing, and "conventional wisdom" strongly indicates that a similar process has occurred in organized crime. Clearly, O'Banion, Siegel, Moran, Lansky, Costello, Luciano, and Bonanno are all indicative of an apparent succession of organized crime from one ethnic group to another. Or are they?

Fundamentally, our argument with the ethnic succession thesis is twofold. First, it is questionable whether any of these ethnic groups ever removed themselves from the "rackets" and secondly, it is now apparent that our perception of ethnicity in organized crime has been skewed by law enforcement and the media's portrayal of organized crime as an ethnic conspiracy. Let us address each point separately.

Our first concern addresses the issue of ethnic assimilation. Bell and Ianni strongly suggest that those involved in organized crime seek to gain respectability through legitimate business and in so doing, eventually forsake the "ways" of the past. Furthermore, once achieving legitimate status, there is little need to engage in syndicated crime, for the returns are greater and risks fewer in the legitmate marketplace.

While we find little quarrel with the logic of this argument, the evidence is inconclusive. We still find Irish and Jewish rackets in some of our Northeastern urban centers such as in New York, Philadelphia, Jersey City, Newark, and Boston; whereas in other regions of the country, indigenous groups characterize organized crime. It appears presumptive at this time to argue the ethnic succession thesis given the shallow and sparse research which has been conducted into illicit markets. While we agree that ethnicity plays an important role in organized crime, we are skeptical whether "succession theory" adequately explains the evolution of organized crime.

The second issue—how the perception of organized crime has been skewed by the media—may provide some insight into our skepticism. For while we do not dispute the reality of organized crime, the notion of clearly defined phases of ethnic succession is too neatly packaged, suggesting that the thesis may be made to order vis-a-vis reflecting "reality." In this respect, it is important to recognize the role of the media.

The process of marketing an image is the principal product of the media. In order to accomplish this goal, it must take what is often a complex phenomenon and translate it into simplicity. Since the police are the primary source of information about organized crime, the media (and researchers) must often rely upon the police for information. Assuming that the investigation of organized crime is often the result of happenstance (as opposed to thoughtful planning), or when intelligence systems are used, the police are sufficiently aware to know what produces headlines (and conversely, what doesn't). It is therefore fashionable to investigate Italian-American organized crime for it is certainly more appealing and has proven to be financially rewarding (e.g., movies, books, etc.). Thus it is not inconceivable and is certainly rational for the police to focus upon that type of crime which will attract media attention. Stories about the Mafia are more "newsworthy" than are stories about illicit markets. The "Mafia" provides an identification which most members of society have been sensitized to recognize and respond to. We have not found a comparable buzzword for other ethnic groups which will neatly conjure up an image of organized crime. Hence, while "researchers" are cognizant of the dangers in using the media as a primary source of data, they are also realistic enough to know that other sources of information are extremely difficult to cultivate, and the return is not immediate. Unfortunately, there are few researchers (e.g., Reuter, Rubinstein, Ianni, Chambliss, Lewis) or investigative reporters who are willing to expend the time, energy, or frustration in gathering primary information, hence they are dependent solely on law enforcement sources.

The significance of this should not be underestimated. Inasmuch as the police (much like the media) will often pursue the course of least resistance, the data it collects or the investigations pursued are likely to represent those cases which are most vulnerable to criminal prosecution. While this should not be perceived as an inherent deficiency in police investigation, it does reflect upon the type of data collected by the police. In essence, we are suggesting that the data collected is inherently biased toward that which is most accessible to the police. Assuming this to be a valid criticism of the data collection effort, the ethnic succession process is understandable, particularly as police departments undergo ethnic transitions. For as new ethnic groups are recruited into police departments, their sources of information are often analogous to the changing ethnicity in the department. Thus, we would suggest that the notion of ethnic succession in organized crime is directly related to the ethnic transition process in police departments, creating an image of organized crime which is inherently biased toward that information which is readily available or accessible to the police.

If in fact there is an ethnic succession process as Bell, Ianni, and others subscribe to, then how does one explain the findings of Haller who has meticulously weaved a pattern of Black organized crime existing in the urban centers as early as the 1920's (Haller, 1976)? Yet it was not until 1974, that a book devoted specifically to Black organized crime emerged (Ianni, 1974). Moreover, while several journalists and researchers have reconstructed Jewish organized crime, and have written about Chinese criminal organizations, the Columbian and Mexican Mafias, and Greek organized crime, (Fried 1980; Lewis, 1980) there has been no serious research effort undertaken to assess whether these so-called "ethnic-conspiracies" are merely ways of applying negative stigmas to nonconforming ethnic groups, or whether they are in fact, distinct forms of organized crime. Clearly, the sparcity of empirical research, the difficulty in obtaining primary data, and the inescapable failure of methodological rigor has seriously distorted societal perceptions of organized crime, and, perhaps more importantly, have led to some ill-conceived public policies.

Blacks and Organized Crime

Perhaps our fascination with Italian-American organized crime has in many respects jaded our perspective, inasmuch as it has created what appears to represent the only model of organized crime. That is, the structure, roles and status attributed to the "Mafia" or "La Costa Nostra" are indicative of one unique type of organized crime; it is not characteristic of all organized crime. Moreover, while the success of Italian-American organized crime is often attributed to the relatively homogeneous kinship relationships which characterize the traditional "organized crime family," we must be careful to avoid assigning a "cause and effect" relationship to this relationship. Said differently, kinship relationships are undoubtedly important to the stability of interpersonal activities in organized crime; however, the lack of such relationships or a different mode of kinship relationships will not necessarily undermine the ability of others to organize crime.

For example, Ianni in his research of Black organized crime, concluded "what could serve to strengthen the organization of Black organized crime networks, and, more important, bring them together under one code of behavior, however, is Black militancy" (Ianni, 1974). Clearly, Ianni recognized a new model of organized crime, one which manifested itself in a paramilitary structure, supported by a religious or sociopolitical ideology, and content with remaining culturally exclusive. Our research has uncovered yet another model, derived in large part from the rural southern culture in which the extended family formed the basis of unification.

Our initial inquiry, which is based on numerous interviews and document research, has provided another piece of evidence in support of Haller's contention: Blacks have been capable of organizing crime for several decades. The "family" we examined has been involved in organized crime for several decades, and possesses characteristics which are in many ways, reflected in Ianni's research of Italian-American organized crime. For example, we found that the agrarian values of hard work and individual responsibility were apparent; education (primarily private as opposed to public) was considered crucial to the success of the children; an adherence to traditional Christian values; and a general disassociation from other Blacks of conflicting values. The individuals studied were either predominately migrants to the north from the south or their parents chose to relocate to the north at a very early age in their lives. Cultural assimilation was an obvious characteristic which distinguished this model from the more militant model, which subscribes to cultural exclusion. The criminal organization was structured along traditional kinship patterns, often that of extended family being given greater authority and corresponding status. The open display of wealth was frowned upon and there existed a commitment to the economic, political and social interests of the indigenous community. The leader of the network often disassociated himself from the "other blacks," whom he perceived as lazy, dishonest, and always attempting to "get something for nothing." He prided himself on working long hours, his unique compatibility with other ethnic groups, and a desire to see his children profit from the toils of his work. It might also be pointed out that his early childhood was in a predominately Italian-American neighborhood. The significance of course, is that the family's attachment to agrarian values were reinforced by the community, which happened to be first and second generation Italians who emigrated from a rural culture.

Essentially, our findings suggest that extended family kinship ties do exist among Black organized crime, and that this "family" had been involved in organizing crime for several decades.

The Bankruptcy of Economic Deprivation Theory

A popular explanation of or for organized crime emanated from the liberal era of the sixties, in which opportunity theory transcended virtually all other theories of crime. Fundamentally, it was argued that the lack of legitimate opportunities was the principal cause of crime. This implicitly suggests that given a choice, legitimate opportunities vis-a-vis crime, the individual would opt for "legitimacy." Unfortunately, this rather simple and idealistic answer fails to recognize the variety or complexity of motivations which characterize human behavior. For example, if lack of opportunity, or more appropriately economic deprivation was the reason for individuals entering a career in crime, how does one explain the median income of Italian-Americans equalling or exceeding that of the dominant socioeconomic class—the WASPS—during a critical time in the evolution of Italian-American organized crime (Sowell, 1978)? Furthermore, if relative poverty was the primary reason for entering a career in crime, how does one explain the *fact* that most members of minority communities have struggled to remain legitimate members of society, despite the overwhelming odds against them? Ironically, organized crime today is comprised of middle and upper socioeconomic professionals, descendants of the aristocracy and well-to-do of Third World nations, and persons who have attained the economic success they strived for; yet they have opted to seek even more. The answer, we believe, lies not in explaining organized crime as an aberrant response to economic deprivation, but rather its genesis lies in an excessive appetite for material success which is never fulfilled. Simply, the acquisition of power and wealth feeds upon the frailties of human behavior, seldom satisfying the thirst for greater fame, recognition, and wealth. Hence, while we, too, believe that organized crime may represent a "queer ladder of social mobility," it is not limited to the "poor and powerless." The "rich and the powerful" are equally represented in organized crime, and it is this recognition which must be explored if we are to refine our knowledge of organized crime.

Violence and Corruption

In any discussion of organized crime, the central features which emerge (particularly in understanding how legitimate business is infiltrated, or should we say, how organized crime is invited in), is the interaction of violence and corruption. The 1967 Task Force Report on Organized Crime addressed these issues, and again, in 1976, the issue of corruption was a major feature of the Task Force's recommendations.

Fundamental to acquiring control of a competitive illicit market is the ability and capacity of a criminal organization to apply the sanction of fear—fear of arrest, imprisonment, or physical harm—upon competitive criminal organizations. The reason for this is quite obvious. Given the absence of legal recourse in order to acquire control, a criminal organization must opt for extralegal methods of sanctioning those who do not adhere to the rules. While violence is an acceptable method in the criminal subculture, the use of corrupt public officials is generally more efficient and effective. That is, eliminating competitive advantage through the use of the state is more subtle, and therefore is less likely to draw attention to organized crime. Moreover, as organized criminals adopt the values of middle- and upper-class socioeconomic classes, resorting to personal physical violence is less acceptable. Replicating the ways of the "upperworld," organized criminals will engage in a form of "lobbying"; corruption represents, in this case, an extension of the "lobbying" system. It is appropriate that we address several important elements of the corruption and violence process.

First, the traditonal views of corruption is one-dimensional. That is, organized criminals are perceived as the "corrupter" and the government official is usually depicted as the "corrupted." Thus, it is not unusual to find such statements as "organized crime seeks to corrupt public officials," or "the public official was corrupted by organized crime," both of which suggest that the organized criminal is the "offender" and the public official is the "victim." It may be more appropriate to again recognize that when organized crime is found to exist in a particular area, it is often a corrupt public official who has "extorted" the career criminal and, in essence, permitted the criminal to operate void of government intervention. Thus, we must be careful to recognize the interaction which exists between the "upperworld" and the "underworld," realizing that it is often an interactive process of negotiation and compromise which ultimately determines who will be granted an exclusive franchise.

Secondly, the "takeover" of a legitimate business by organized crime may in fact be an "invitation." That is, when organized criminals are perceived as infiltrating a business, again the "offender" is the organized criminal and the "victim" is the "legitimate" businessman. Seldom are the more serious and critical questions asked. For instance, why is it that certain legitimate businesses are more likely to rely upon financing from illegitimate sources? It would appear that the question of "legitimate" business infiltration could best be understood in terms of the types of businesses that legitimate sources of capital are willing to invest in vis-a-vis, why organized criminals are more prone to infiltrate certain businesses.

Thirdly, the use of violence in organized crime is often sensationalized so as to minimize a coherent and serious treatment of its dimensions. Said differently, we know little about when violence is used and even less about its effect on controlling an illegal market. In one of the few studies that addressed this issue, we found that being suspected of informing to the police was a primary motive for a relatively large number of homicides (Martens, 1974). Seldom was murder used to mediate a dispute wherein an employee of a criminal organization was suspected of "cheating" or to eliminate a competitive organization. As a rule, the use of violence adheres to a more parochial interest: that of maintaining internal security. Again, this is not to suggest that intercompetitive acts of violence do not exist; only that they are not as prevalent as is often suggested.

Lastly, it is important that we recognize that while the act of violence represents the ultimate sanction, it is in fact the fear of violence that deserves special treatment. For the actual act of violence is not necessary in acquiring control of an illicit market; rather it is the fear of punishment which may create an environment conducive to exclusive control. In this respect the mass media plays a central, if not critical role. For the manner in which the mass media has chosen to sensationalize the "gangland murder" has created an image of swift and certain punishment to anyone who attempts to "buck the organization." The invincibility of the "mob" as represented by the inability of the police to successfully investigate "mob violence" only serves to enhance the power and prestige of the criminal organization. In essence, the treatment of violence by the media in the long term serves the interests of organized crime, providing a tacit message to any prospective victim, customer or witness.

Conclusion

Public perceptions of organized crime are in need of serious redefinition. Significant discrepancies exist between what is presented by "researchers," journalists, and law enforcement officials who, despite their well-intentioned beliefs, are often victims of ideological commitments. The issues raised provide justified skepticism regarding what are responsible public policies in the "war against organized crime." If the police are to be effective, this "war" as it has been so conveniently named, must be logically conceived, thoughtfully executed, and critically analyzed. This can only occur when our knowledge of organized crime is sufficiently expanded to understand just what it is we are attempting to control or, as some have optimistically suggested, eliminate. Acquiring this knowledge will be difficult, yet not insurmountable. Certainly, it is clear from the critical void in the empirical research that the discrepancies which do exist are significant enough to warrant a more refined and intense commitment to the systematic study of organized crime.

REFERENCES

Abadinsky, H., *Organized Crime*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1981.

Bell, D., Crime As An American Way Of Life. *Antioch Review*, 1953, 13:2.

Blakey, R. and Billings, R., *The Plot To Kill The President*. New York: Times Book, 1980.

Cressey, D., *Theft Of A Nation*. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

Fried, A., *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster*. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1980.

Haller, M., *History of Organized Crime: 1920-1945*. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

Hawkins, Gordon, God And The Mafia. *The Public Interest*, 1969, 14:24-51.

Ianni, F., *Black Mafia*. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1975.

Kwitny, J., *Vicious Circles*. New York: Norton, 1979.

Lewis, G., Social Groupings In Organized Crime. *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 1980, 1:2.

Martens, F., A Study of Organized Crime Violence Among Syndicated Criminal Groups In The State of New Jersey (Master's Thesis, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1974).

Robertson, F., *Triangle of Death: The Inside Story of the Triads, The Chinese Mafia*. London: Routledge & Kegan, 1977.

Salerno, R. and Thompkins, J., *The Crime Confederation*. New York: Doubleday, 1969.

Sowell, T., *American Ethnic Groups*. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1978.

Smith, D. Jr., *The Mafia Mystique*. New York: Basic Books, 1975.

Voltz, J. and Bridge, P., *The Mafia Talks*. Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, 1969.

Zeiger, H., *Sam The Plumber*. New York: New American Library, 1979.

87794

END