

**TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MOSCOW AND
ITS SUBCONTRACTORS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
**TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MOSCOW AND ITS
SUBCONTRACTORS**

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TERRORISM: THE ROLE OF MOSCOW AND ITS SUBCONTRACTORS

FRIDAY, JUNE 26, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 2228, Everette McKinley Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jeremiah Denton (chairman) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milling, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. At this point, I normally welcome my senatorial colleagues; but the Senate did not close down until early this morning and many of them are gone for the weekend. We had the indiscretion to schedule a hearing on a Friday when hardly anybody is here.

Senator East has, in his anticipated absence, submitted questions which we will ask later. The others are otherwise occupied this morning.

I think it is very unfortunate for them that they are absent, because we have, in my opinion, one of the most qualified witnesses on terrorism that we have had to date, Mr. Robert Moss. I would like to welcome him. He is over here from the United Kingdom.

I will make my opening statement, and then I will ask for his.

Today this subcommittee continues its study of the roots of international terrorism by taking a closer look at the role of the Soviet Union and its subcontractors.

To that end, we have as our witness Mr. Robert Moss. Mr. Moss is an internationally syndicated columnist with the London Daily Telegraph and a recognized world authority on terrorism and espionage. He is the former editor of the London Economist's Intelligence Bulletin, Foreign Report, and writes for many U.S. publications, including Commentary, the New York Times Magazine, New Republic, National Review, and Saturday Review.

He has written or edited six nonfiction books, including "Urban Guerrillas," a pioneering study of terrorist techniques published in 1972. This book is still used as a basic text of NATO defense academics.

Mr. Moss is coauthor of the novel, "The Spike," a best seller about Soviet disinformation. His solo novel, "Death Beam," which

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also involves the KGB's covert operations, will be published by Crown in October.

Born in Australia, Mr. Moss lectured in history at the Australian National University and was at that time the youngest university professor in Australia before joining the staff of the London Economist in 1970.

For several years, Mr. Moss was the Economist's chief foreign policy writer before taking over the editorship of Foreign Report in 1974. He edited that publication for 6 years and established a remarkable track record in successfully predicting international crises and exposing Soviet covert activities.

He has received a number of journalistic awards. He lectures on terrorism and Soviet strategy at the Royal College of Defense Studies at London and at the NATO Defense College in Rome.

On four occasions, he has addressed the headquarters staff of NATO in Brussels on Soviet intelligence operations.

He is a much sought-after lecturer by American groups and was the keynote speaker at this year's annual conference of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith.

Mr. Moss was one of the first journalists to focus attention on the question of Soviet involvement in international terrorism which he has studied in the course of his travels in some 35 countries. He has had access to the testimony of many intelligence defectors from the Soviet bloc and has consulted senior intelligence and security officials in many Western countries.

His speech to the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism in July 1979, which disclosed details of the training of Palestinian terrorists in Soviet camps, made international headlines.

Mr. Moss' effectiveness can be gaged from the vehemence of the frequent attacks that are made on him in the Soviet media. Tass put out a major attack on him on June 20, after he agreed to testify before this subcommittee, calling him the occult mastermind of the campaign of disinformation against the Soviet Union.

Welcome, Mr. Moss.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT MOSS, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST,
LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH**

Mr. Moss. Thank you, sir.

It is a pleasure to give testimony before this committee. I can think of few more important tasks than the exposure to the Western public of the covert operations of the Soviet Union, which is the main strategic enemy of our free societies, so I am delighted to be here.

I also had the pleasure of attending part of your testimony yesterday from Turkish experts on terrorism. The question was raised in that earlier hearing of possible links between the would-be assassin of the Pope, Mehmet Ali Agca, and foreign intelligence organizations.

I think I may be able to contribute a detail or two to the discussion of the near assassination of the Pope, and it might be a suitable point at which to begin this testimony by way of taking us into the thick of these problems.

BULGARIAN LINK

Agca, as you were told yesterday, was in Bulgaria which as your Turkish experts commented is a very strange place for a man represented by part of the media as a rightwing extremist to go—a most unusual place of sanctuary and support for a rightwing terrorist. Bulgaria is one of the most Stalinist satellites of the Soviet Union.

I have learned from security sources in Rome that, while in Bulgaria, Mehmet Ali Agca acquired the gun that he used in his attempt on the life of the pontiff and fake passports that he used to travel to Italy. That is according to his own confession, as made to Italian police interrogators.

So far as I know, the Italian authorities have not seen fit to publicly disclose this information on an official basis as yet; but I believe that it can be easily verified.

That is one element in the complicated picture of Ali Agca.

We know from your Turkish witnesses and from other sources about the deep involvement of the Bulgarians as a surrogate—or, as I rather prefer to say, a subcontractor—of the Soviet Union in the Middle East area in general.

We know about the arms smuggling from Bulgaria to Turkish extremists. We know about other contacts between the Bulgarian secret services and Turkish extremists. We know now, according to Agca's own statement, that he received a gun—in his own words, from Turkish nationalists—in Sofia, Bulgaria.

This is not a liberal democratic society like the United States. Terrorists do not simply walk back and forth over the heavily protected borders of a State like Bulgaria, toting guns and anything else they may need for their operations.

There is reason to believe that at the very least the Bulgarian authorities were in a position to monitor the activities of the so-called rightwing extremist if, indeed, they were not actively in collusion with him.

I would readily admit that what I have said does not constitute hard evidence of a Bulgarian role in the attempt on the life of the Pope. That is not what I am saying. I will discuss the question of what is evidence and what is not hard evidence in such hearings later on.

What I am saying is that this is a question that deserves and merits full investigation and discussion. I regard the alacrity with which some commentators were willing to shrug off the whole question of the assassination attempt as the work of rightwing extremists, as an example of a reluctance to inform the public adequately on an area of jugular concern.

So there is the Bulgarian connection. I have some other details to offer to these hearings on Mehmet Ali Agca.

AGCA IN PLO CAMPS

I have learned from Middle East sources, which I have been unable in my own view to satisfactorily verify, but I have heard these particular reports from more than one source in that area and, therefore, I think they are worthy of systematic investiga-

tion—that Agca has received training in more than one Palestinian camp in the Middle East.

I have learned, according to one account, that he arrived in Beirut in the summer of 1977 from Syria, and Syria has a big part to play in this whole picture of Turkish terrorism. He went to a Palestinian camp 30 miles south of Beirut where, according to someone else who attended the camp at the time, he received military instruction.

I have also been told that he was spotted at the Hamouriya camp in Syria in 1979. The Hamouriya camp has been a place where many Turks have been trained by the PLO. In fact, in September 1979, according to published intelligence reports, there were 130 Turks at that one camp of Hamouriya in Syria, south of Damascus.

I might add at this point that according to security sources I consider reliable, some 400 Turks received training in Palestinian camps in the year 1980.

Then there have been more recent reports of the man being spotted in Tunisia en route to Italy and in Libya at the Ras al-Hillal camp.

I am not offering those reports to you as evidence that I view with the same degree of certainty as the evidence of the Bulgarian connection. However, I would put it to you that these are reports, traces, and identifications that are part of the picture and deserve to be looked at.

All of this is by way of introduction.

I would like to pose perhaps a somewhat philosophic question, or at least a sociological question, before I get on with other case histories that may teach us something about Soviet and Soviet-surrogate involvement in international terrorism.

PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE

I would like to ask the question: Why some people, among commentators and those of political influence, seem to be almost biologically reluctant to study the problem? I am not asking that everybody should automatically agree with the proposition that the Soviet Union is heavily involved in international terrorism. I am saying that the web of connections and ramifications is now so large that to ignore it is to ignore an area of great danger for all Western societies.

I would like to ask this question: Why do some people, almost as a reflex, prefer to brush aside such evidence and traces as do come to light from time to time? I would like to suggest that there are several reasons, perhaps, that explain that reluctance, which some have called a conspiracy of silence. I am not going to go that far. I prefer to regard it as a visceral reluctance to consider inconvenient facts.

The first problem is simply the problem of evidence. It is hard to prove some suppositions and some identifications and some allegations that surface when these matters are discussed.

Why is it so hard to prove them? For a start, the Soviet Union is not the United States. You cannot file a legal proceeding under a Freedom of Information Act in Moscow and get the KGB to deliver up its secret archives to the Western media.

For that reason, it is simply much harder for journalists to get the kind of documentary evidence on any aspect of Soviet activities—not just support for terrorism—that so readily seems to come to hand in a town like Washington.

I would suggest that the difficulty of documentation should not be accepted as an excuse for avoiding the problem, particularly as the Soviet Union in my opinion, and in the opinion of other analysts today, is a strategic enemy of the United States and the NATO alliance. In fact, it is the main strategic enemy. Its activities should be regarded with the proportionate degree of seriousness.

So there is an evidential problem. I admit that. I am going to try in the remainder of my remarks to offer such evidence as seems to me to be reasonably well substantiated.

However, I admit there is always going to be an evidential problem in trying to report on the activities of a totalitarian police state.

DEFINITIONS

A second factor is, I think, confusion about definitions. It is sometimes said that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. I don't accept that throwaway line, because I believe that terrorism can be used as an objective technical term to be applied to groups using certain methods, regardless of whether any of us happen to approve of their causes or disapprove of their causes.

By my definition, a terrorist is a person who targets for murder or other acts of violence innocent civilians—men, women, and children—for political purposes.

The Soviets do not like to talk about supporting terrorist movements. Obviously not. That is an embarrassing fact, and one that they quite clearly do not wish to admit.

They talk about supporting liberation movements. Indeed, those who studied the resolutions of the 26th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union earlier this year will be aware that that Congress formally committed Moscow yet again to the support of the cause of national liberation around the world.

What are these national liberation groups that the Soviet Union publicly says it supports? I would contend that many of them practice terrorist methods, according to the definition that I just offered you, and should therefore be reasonably and objectively described as terrorist groups.

People may or may not happen to approve of the stated objectives—for example, of the Palestine Liberation Organization—but they should be able to agree that by my definition the PLO is a terrorist movement using terrorist techniques. It deserves to be treated as such and ostracized from Western support and consideration for that reason.

There are other so-called national liberation movements that fall into that category.

Of course, if we rely upon rhetorical and emotional language, talking about freedom fighters and guerrillas and liberation movements, without reference to their methods, we can end up in a situation where the Soviets can say: We don't support terrorists. We support liberation movements.

There are those who have fallen victim to the Soviets' colonization of the political lexicon who may go along with them and say no, indeed, they do not support terrorists. Psychologically, such people are associating terrorists only with some fringe Western groups. But the PLO is terrorist. The IRA, in my view, whether or not people happen to agree with its republican ideals, is a terrorist organization using terrorist methods. That is my second point.

Unless we get over the confusion of definitions, we are going to have great difficulty in talking reasonably about the very real and serious problem of terrorism.

I would suggest to you that there are other reasons for the reluctance to consider the dossier on Soviet involvement in these matters.

ROLE OF SURROGATES

There is a failure in many quarters to understand the role of the surrogate, the subcontractor, the middleman—all useful words—in these affairs.

The Soviet Union deals with many terrorist groups indirectly via satellite states like Bulgaria, East Germany, Cuba—all Soviet satellites. The Hungarians have a role, and the Czechs have a role. Moscow deals with terrorist groups via subcontractors that are slightly further removed—the radical Arab States like Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and so on.

The Soviet Union is in a position to influence the policies of those states and has a large advisory presence in the intelligence and military level in those states. It is, therefore, indissolubly linked to the terrorist policies of those states, in my view.

I think it is, again, a great confusion to make statements or write articles suggesting that it is very easy to distinguish the Soviet role from, say, the Libyan or Syrian role. It is not that easy to draw that dividing line when you know the depth of Soviet penetration and involvement in such countries.

In many of these respects, I regard them as subcontractors of the Soviet Union. Among the most important subcontractors, I would list an organization, the PLO, which plays an intermediary role for the Soviets in their dealings with terrorists from all over the world and in other matters as well.

I wish to talk very specifically in a moment about the axis relationship between Moscow and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

I apologize for these somewhat philosophical remarks by way of preface to the rest of what I am going to say.

ILLUSIONS ABOUT MOSCOW

But, I think it is also important to mention that there is a problem of simple, straightforward wishful thinking when we study the reluctance of some people to talk and report on these issues.

Wishful thinking in the sense that there are many among us who would like to believe that the leaders of a country like the Soviet Union are inspired by the same liberal hopes and fears as our own leaders.

I would like to be able to believe that détente is alive and well, and that the Soviet Union, in faithful accordance with its public propaganda, is indeed a peace-loving nation. But the evidence all points the other way.

There are people who wish to ignore not only Soviet involvement in terrorism but other unpalatable and inconvenient facts about the Soviet Union of today—for example, the extent to which the Soviets rely upon racist propaganda to mobilize public support in the absence of the original appeal of communism.

The Soviet Union is one of the most systematically anti-Semitic countries in the world today, for example, and is using anti-Semitic themes, reminiscent of Goebbels, in Poland in an attempt to discredit the heroic Polish Solidarity movement.

Wishful thinking and the hope that all will be sweetness and light and that we can go back to sleep and not worry about a strategic enemy fully as dangerous, in my view, as Hitler's Germany is a reason why some people prefer not to look at facts that shatter cherished assumptions.

In the late 1930's, in the days of the Hitler-Stalin pact, Communists talked about premature anti-Fascists. There were times when it was premature to be anti-Fascist, because the Soviet Union was allied at that moment with Hitler.

There will always be premature anti-Fascists. There will be premature anti-Communists, but we do need to take a more serious view of our interests and our options and the facts of life as they confront us.

Having said that, let me turn to the question of why the Soviet Union should be involved in international terrorism. Then I will go through a few case histories from various parts of the world.

SOVIET STRATEGY

There is a strategy involved. I think if we want to know what the Soviet strategy is, we have really some very good recent sources. I would like to mention the testimony of one recent Soviet intelligence defector.

He has disclosed, for example, that back in 1954, the 10th department of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, drew up a plan to threaten Western access to Middle East oil. It was a plan that would involve penetration of the Arab world and alliances with radical Arab movements. It was a plan that was, according to the defector, submitted to the Politburo more than a quarter of a century ago, in 1954, and was approved by the Politburo.

I believe, and I know professional analysts who also believe, that that plan has guided Soviet strategy in the Middle East over the last quarter of a century. It was a backdrop to the Soviet dalliance with Nasser in Egypt. It is part of the backdrop to intimate relationship that exists today between the Soviets and terrorist states, like Syria, Libya, and South Yemen, and the PLO.

Terrorism in the Middle East is intimately involved with Soviet strategy for the Gulf and Soviet strategy to bring about revolution among the conservative monarchies of the Arabian peninsula. I think that that is an element in the picture that should not be ignored.

ACTIVE MEASURES

Second, I would contend that the Soviets have a generalized interest in making life difficult for us in Western countries—a general interest in disruption.

The Soviets use the term "active measures" to define a whole range of subversive techniques, including disinformation, inspiring riots and demonstrations, inspiring racial trouble where they can, and terrorism. I think that we should look at terrorism in the context of a possible range of instruments that the Soviets are using.

EXECUTIVE ACTION

Third, I think we should at least consider the possibility that activities by terrorist groups not overtly connected with Moscow may be used as a cover for what the Soviets call executive action. In other words, for assassinations of targets of interest to them rather than the terrorist group that supposedly carries out the operation.

WAR PLANNING

Finally, the Soviets rate terrorism very highly in their overall planning for war or for hotting up the confrontation between East and West.

Again, a detailed picture has been built up from recent Soviet intelligence defectors of the so-called Spetsnaz units—special designation units. Spetsnaz is the Russian abbreviation for the term "special designation units," a kind of Soviet Green Beret outfit but very much larger. It is responsible to the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence service.

These elements in the Soviet Armed Forces train for special operations and include the highly secretive so-called staff companies which are trained for the assassination of political and military leaders in the West in collusion with sleeper terrorist agents and existing terrorist networks.

I may come back to this point later on.

For the moment, I would simply say that the Soviet Union rates sabotage and terrorism very highly in its overall planning for war or for the disruption of a mobilization by NATO forces. Existing terrorist networks should be looked at also in the context of such contingency planning by the Soviets.

Let me take, one by one, the Soviet subcontractors who are working most assiduously in support of international terrorism today.

EAST GERMAN ROLE

I think it might be interesting to start with the East German service about which surprisingly little is published with any frequency in the West. The so-called main administration for espionage, or HVA, of the East German Ministry of State Security, the MFS, is headed by Gen. Markus Wolf who has been in that job for about 30 years.

That is not the least of his distinctions. He is an extremely efficient and capable operator. The HVA is probably the most professional of the Soviet satellite services and has been delegated,

according to Western intelligence and security sources with a high degree of responsibility for liaison with terrorist groups.

Department K of the HVA specializes in forging documents and passports. The HVA has been active in disinformation campaigns against leading Western politicians and journalists who are disliked by the Soviets. It is also active, according to my sources, in supplying false documentation to terrorist groups.

I do not think it is entirely coincidence that this police state, East Germany, has been a favorite transit point for Palestinian commando teams en route to operations in West Germany and Scandinavia.

As I said of the Bulgarians earlier, a totalitarian police state is not ignorant about the movement of foreign terrorists who cross at the borders. At the very least, it can be assumed that there is tolerance or a blind eye being turned by the Communist authorities to these groups.

The East Germans provide rest and recreation and medical attention to terrorist leaders. Leila Kahled, the famous Palestinian hijacker, was in East Berlin last year receiving medical treatment for a social disease. There have been reports that George Habbash, the leader of the PFLP, is on his way back to East Berlin to receive treatment for stomach cancer.

Again, these are signs of direct collusion. This cannot be shrugged off. You don't provide medical help for an identified terrorist leader in a country like East Germany unless you are doing rather more than mildly tolerating his activities.

SOVIET BLOC LINKS TO NEO-NAZIS

I would like to mention that the East Germans play a special role in a very interesting and particularly murky area. You know that we hear all this stuff about rightwing and leftwing terrorists. We heard it in the case of Agca. The picture gets very confused indeed.

I like the concept that in dealing with such matters, we should not think of rightwing and leftwing as extremes on a single pole or a single spectrum. We should think of the whole thing as a circle, in which the extremes meet at one point—right and left extremes.

In this area of intercrossing and overlapping between rightist and leftist violence, the East Germans are there and are highly active. The East Germans have had a direct part in fomenting neo-Nazi acts of violence in recent years. They had a number of assets in doing that.

First of all, the East German service after the last war recruited some former Gestapo and SS officers. Second, the East Germans had access to the central archives of the Nazi security apparatus which were captured by a special Soviet intelligence team headed by General Serov at the end of the war and taken off to Moscow where they have been used ever since as a central archive used for blackmailing Germans and used also for taking over some former Nazi networks.

When you take a case like the notorious attack at the Oktoberfest in Munich last year or like the attack on the Paris synagogue last October, you find according to the West German authorities

and police spokesmen evidence of PLO and Libyan connections—Libyan in particular in the case of the bombing of the Paris synagogue last October.

There is the possibility of an East German connection there too, for the simple reason, as I will mention in more detail later, that the East Germans are highly active in Tripoli in supervising the Libyan intelligence service.

Why should the East Germans encourage neo-Nazi violence? Ladislav Bittman, the former deputy chief of the Czech disinformation department, has provided a very plausible answer from an impeccable source. He has pointed out that the Soviet bloc has an interest in weakening and discrediting governmental institutions in the West. Fomenting acts of neo-Nazi violence that may make it seem that nazism is alive and well in West Germany and is somehow tolerated by the West German State is a good way of bringing the institutions of the Federal Republic under attack from many sides and into disrepute.

I will not belabor that point now. That is one of the explanations that the Czech defector Bittman has given for this phenomenon.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT

The Cubans may not be the most professional surrogate of the Soviet Union, but they are the most omnipresent. Almost wherever we look, in considering the international terrorist scene, we find the hand of the Cubans.

There are two Cuban organizations which are especially active. One is the Cuban Secret Service, the Direccion General de Inteligencia, the DGI, and the other is the parallel Departamento de America, the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, which takes special responsibility for subversive and sabotage operations in the Western Hemisphere, including disinformation as well as terrorism.

The head of the Departamento de America is Manuel Pineiro Losada, former head of the DGI. There seems to be a lot of cross-fertilization between the DGI and America's Department in this area.

CUBAN-BACKED TERROR IN UNITED STATES

There is plenty of evidence of a Cuban role over the past years in the United States, as well as in areas farther afield. Some of you may remember back to the time of the Statue of Liberty bomb plot in 1965 when Robert Collier and others were arrested after being found in possession of dynamite and blasting caps with which they intended to blow up the Statue of Liberty.

It was learned that they had received the explosives from two girls from Quebec, members of the Quebec terrorist organization, the FLQ, one of whom was an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa. That is a case on the public record of direct Cuban involvement in a planned terrorist attack in the United States.

The Cubans do not really bother to conceal the fact that they support the most violent Puerto Rican groups, which are also active in bombing campaigns in this country.

After two leaders of the FALN who were arrested in the fifties for plotting the murder of President Truman were released from jail in October 1979, they were received in Havana on the invitation of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

Cuba is a very touchy subject in the United States; I am well aware of that. There is a great disinclination in some quarters to recognize the fact that the Cubans are not independent operators. They are not only closely alined with the Soviet Union, but they are so closely controlled in intelligence matters that the DGI really deserves to be looked at as the Spanish-speaking department of the Soviet KGB.

After all, KGB liaison officers sit in its headquarters. Its activities have been very closely supervised since the great sorting out in Havana that went on at the end of the 1960's when Alexander Soldatov, now the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut, was assigned to Havana to make sure that the Cubans toed the Soviet line in all respects. They have tended to toe the Soviet line in all respects ever since.

When we talk about Cuba, we are also talking about the Soviet Union. There may be some degree of autonomy. Some things may be done which the Soviets do not specifically authorize, but the connection is so intimate that I do not think that Cuban and Soviet involvement can be regarded in isolation from each other.

CASTRO IN MONIMBÓ

There is a very interesting report about what the Cubans have in mind for us in this respect in the next year or two. In a little town called Monimbó in Nicaragua, in July 1980, during the festivities to celebrate the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, there was a private and secret meeting of revolutionaries from Central America together with some U.S. residents who came down there. This gathering included Fidel Castro and Manuel Piñero, head of the Americas Department. It included Dudley Thompson, then the Minister of National Security from Jamaica. It included the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Haiti and other activists in this part of the world.

At this meeting, according to a source who was present, Castro boasted that his agents in the United States were so industrious and well-placed that they had the capacity to create race riots at a moment of his choosing—race riots on a scale that he said would make the Miami troubles look like a sunshower.

Is that just braggadocio; is that just hollow boasting? Or is that a serious statement of intention?

I don't know the answer to that, but when it comes to looking at the possible trends of violence in the world over the next couple of years, one thing I would predict with reasonable confidence is that there will be an upsurge of terrorism in the United States, because the United States seems to me to be not only a primary target for groups from all over the world but to be curiously vulnerable because of the internal security situation in this country at the moment.

CUBAN LINK WITH "CARLOS"

I won't try to give an exhaustive dossier of Cuban links with terrorist movements in other parts of the world. It would be worth recalling one case that has long been on the public record but remains one of the irrefutable and most revealing cases of Soviet or Soviet-surrogate involvement with a terrorist group. This was the connection established between the notorious Venezuelan-born terrorist Carlos and Cuban intelligence officers in Paris operating under diplomatic cover back in 1974.

You may remember that the French deported three Cuban spies operating under Embassy cover because of their direct role in supporting and supplying Carlos' terrorist organization in Paris. This, as I say, is one story and one established fact among many.

TESTIMONY OF AN ETA PRISONER

One other established fact worth mentioning may be that early last year in January 1980, the Spanish authorities arrested a Basque ETA terrorist on his way into Spain from Algeria who confessed. I think this received no attention in the American media and only limited attention in the European media.

The ETA prisoner confessed that he had been trained in an Algerian camp under the supervision of Cuban instructors. He also mentioned that amongst the other foreign trainees at that camp in Algeria were members of the Irish Republican Army.

That is one story among many of the widespread presence of Cuban instructors in terrorist training camps throughout the Middle East, as well as in Cuba itself.

Let me move on to the category of subcontractors who stand at a slightly more distant remove from the Soviets than satellite countries, like Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the others that are actively engaged in providing arms, sanctuary, infrastructure, documentation, and in some cases operational intelligence for terrorist groups.

THE MOSCOW-PLO AXIS

Let me move on to the radical Arab States. First of all, let me talk about the relationship which is absolutely central: The alliance between Moscow and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This is at the very center of Soviet strategy in the Middle East, as well as at the very center of the terrorist picture in general. PLO spokesmen make relatively little secret today of their close dependence on the Soviets. The head of the PLO's Moscow office, Mohammed ash-Sha'ir, has publicly boasted in February last, that hundreds of PLO officers have graduated from Soviet military academies and that 2,000 Palestinian so-called students are currently in the Soviet Union.

Ash-Sha'ir, I might add, himself occupies a singularly curiously privileged position in Moscow. Most foreign ambassadors in Moscow have to get explicit consent from the Soviet foreign ministry, for example, before they travel beyond a relatively narrow radius around Moscow. Ash-Sha'ir appears to travel completely at will. Recently, for example, he turned up in Yerevan, the capital of

Soviet Armenia, which is a very interesting visit, given the miraculous resurgence of Armenian terrorism outside the Soviet Union in recent years.

PLO TRAINING IN SOVIET UNION

The total numbers of Palestinians who have been trained in Soviet-bloc camps cannot be precisely gaged. West European intelligence sources currently estimate that between 2,000 and 3,000 Palestinians have received military training in the Soviet Union over the past 2 years.

There are many dozens of training establishments in the Soviet bloc for the Palestinians. Some of the biggest are the military academy at Sanprobal, Simferopol in the Crimea, the military academy at Odessa, a large camp outside Moscow where one of the Palestinians involved in the massacre of Israeli civilians at Hebron last year was trained according to his own confession, and so on.

One defector to whom I have had access has stated that the Odessa higher infantry school was a place where Soviet officers were trained until 1965 when the intake from Arab and African groups became so large that the Russian officers themselves had to be moved on to another place—to Kiev—so that the entire facility could be given over to training these Third World terrorists.

As I say, I think there is very little secret today about the extent of these training activities for the PLO. There is hardly less secrecy about the flow of arms from the Soviet bloc to the PLO, mostly delivered via Syria, South Yemen, and Cuba.

SOVIET ARMS FOR PLO

That flow of arms includes T-34 tanks, mostly supplied by the Hungarians, who also supply training in armored warfare to the Palestinians; Sagger antitank missiles; recoilless guns; RPG-7's; and field artillery, as well as the more routine range of infantry and guerrilla weapons and explosives.

One West European intelligence estimate now current is that some 100 Palestinians have been trained in the use and maintenance of armored vehicles in Hungary alone over the past year. The arms flow, I think, is well established too.

More important, perhaps, to our discussions today is the fact that the PLO and the Soviets operate in close collusion when it comes to the PLO making any major choice of policy or tactics. The most important relationship is the one between Alexander Soldatov, the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut, and Yasser Arafat. According to defectors and prisoners from the PLO, they meet, on average about once a week. In other words, the Soviets are constantly consulted.

The Soviets, in summary, are providing the materiel and the infrastructure for PLO terrorism.

It is harder, I admit, to prove that the KGB and the military intelligence organization, the GRU, provide operational intelligence and targeting for PLO terrorist operations.

I can reflect the testimony of recent defectors who have talked about the role of the military intelligence service in particular in these matters.

THE GRU'S SECOND DIRECTION

There is a secret department of the GRU at its headquarters by the old Khodinsk Field or Moscow's central airport called the Second Direction, the most secretive of all the secret departments of the GRU. The Second Direction is specifically concerned with liaison with foreign terrorist groups and with the selection of terrorist groups for training and with the recruitment of Soviet agent terrorists amongst the so-called liberation organizations.

I regard this as a firsthand clue to the possible extent of direct Soviet collusion in these matters.

One defector has also commented that the PLO is the favorite child of the GRU and the KGB.

The PLO serves as a Soviet surrogate in a number of important areas. One, as I mentioned briefly, is the training of terrorists from a wide variety of Western and Third World countries.

PLO ESPIONAGE IN PAKISTAN

Another area which I think has received no attention at all is the related espionage role that the PLO appears to be playing. Rather quietly and discretely, the Pakistanis kicked out a Palestinian last year, called Zaydan Awni Mahmoud. He was attending a pilot's training course in Pakistan, and he was found to be in possession of classified documents from the Pakistani Army and to be maintaining contact with Soviet diplomats identified as intelligence officers. He was a member of Fatak, Yasser Arafat's PLO organization.

That was an interesting case. It suggests a role that the PLO may play with the Soviets beyond simply the terrorist training function and matters related closely to that.

PLO AS MOSCOW'S ARAB SPOKESMAN

The PLO, of course, also functions as a spokesman on behalf of Soviet foreign policy within the Middle East and the Arab world.

At the 1979 Nonaligned Summit Meeting in Havana, Yasser Arafat was notably active in support of a Cuban proposal to declare the Soviet Union a natural ally of the nonaligned countries. Again, the PLO played a leading role in watering down the draft resolution of the Arab summit conference and Saudi Arabia criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The PLO's worldwide activities extend to providing a military mission in Managua, Nicaragua, to train guerrillas and local security forces.

The most important of all its subcontracting missions for Moscow, I would suggest, is to sow instability in the oil-rich Arab Gulf.

SUBVERSION IN THE GULF

The PLO was deeply involved in training Iranian revolutionaries prior to the overthrow of the Shah. The PLO has even been accused in some reports of a role in the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in November 1979.

Six weeks prior to the Embassy occupation on October 12, a high-level PLO mission, including Abu Jihad and the PLO's chief of special operations, Abu Walid, visited Teheran and reportedly advised Ayatollah Khomeini to take a tougher stand against the United States.

Evidence of connections between radical Palestinian groups and upheavals in other parts of the Gulf is coming to light. I think the fact that the revolutionaries who mounted the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 had been trained at a PFLP training camp at Lahej in South Yemen was indicative of a potential future vanguard role for Palestinian groups in promoting a widespread revolutionary process.

Let me move from the PLO to some of the other radical states whose relationship to the Soviet Union is again sometimes confused or simply not understood. I might offer one item of new information by way of preface to what I have to say—in particular, about Libya, Syria, and South Yemen.

LIBYAN-SYRIAN TERROR PACT

Early this year, at the end of January and beginning of February, there was an interesting meeting in London between a Libyan and a Syrian. The Syrian was Brig. Gen. Ali Haydar who commands the Syrian special units responsible for commando operations against the enemies of the Assad regime at home and abroad.

General Haydar met a Libyan, whose name is Said Qadaf ad-Dam. The Libyan is identified as the leader of the Green Brigades. These units carry out the mission of attacking the opponents of the Libyan regime wherever they are to be found.

According to security sources in Europe, these two gentlemen agreed that they should collaborate in the future in hunting down the enemies of their regimes around the world.

So perhaps it was not entirely coincidental that a few weeks after this London meeting on March 17, Arab gunmen arrived at the home of Issam al-Attar, a leader of the Syrian wing of the Moslem Brotherhood, at Aachen in West Germany. The Moslem Brotherhood is really part of the backbone of Syrian armed opposition to the Assad regime, which faces a great domestic movement of protest. Issam al-Attar is one of its leaders in exile.

His wife had the misfortune to open the door and was shot dead. Issam al-Attar himself survived, as he had survived two previous attacks organized by Syrian teams.

The gunmen escaped, but they were identified by local security officials as a mixed team of Syrians and Libyans. This appears to be the first identified case of these two Arab secret services working together on a joint international terrorist operation.

Of course, Qadhafi's interests are not confined to attacking Libyans who live around the world. His revolutionary enthusiasm knows almost no bounds, and his largesse to international terrorist movements knows almost no limits either.

In fact, looking at Libya today, you might say, I think with accuracy, that this is the perfect terrorist state—the perfect exam-

ple of what a terrorist state is—a state that conducts terrorist operations as an integral part of its foreign policy.

Now there may be newspaper commentators who want to write pieces saying that despite all this, Qadhafi is a friend of the United States and the Western World. I would suggest that, on the contrary, his regime must be ostracized as completely as possible as part of the punishment for what it is routinely doing.

TERRORIST TRAINING IN LIBYA

We got some interesting leads on that when terrorists were put on trial in Tunisia last year. They confessed that they had been trained in Libyan camps under the guidance of Palestinian, Cuban, and Soviet advisors. This, again, I think was an item that was not reported in major American newspapers. It did receive some coverage in the European press and, particularly, in the Italian press and in the Egyptian press.

I think it was one of those cases that was somehow neglected by major news organs in the United States. It is one of those cases that makes me wonder whether we cannot possibly do more in the media to inform the public about what is really going on in these areas.

These Tunisian prisoners described how they had been in contact at Libyan camps with terrorist recruits from the IRA, the Basque ETA organization, the Italian Red Brigades, West Germany's Baader-Meinhof underground, and with revolutionaries from Greece and Turkey. That gives us a pretty good thumbnail sketch of how far Qadhafi's revolutionary appetites extend.

The prisoners also revealed that special training for radical Libyans plotting the overthrow of President Sadat is being provided on board Soviet naval vessels anchored off Tobruk in Libya.

There are, in fact, some 20 terrorist training bases in Libya today, ranging from Tripoli to al-Bayda to Tobruk. The largest single category of recruits appears to consist of Palestinians from George Habbash's PFLP. Supervision of these foreign terrorists is the responsibility of the so-called Liaison Office in Tripoli, headed by Ramadan Abdullah.

All right. Let me take the question: The Libyans are doing this but where is the hand of the Soviets, if it is there at all?

THE MOSCOW-TRIPOLI AXIS

I would contend that Soviet complicity in Qadhafi's terrorist training program is very easily established for three critical reasons.

The first is that the Soviets are continuing vast arms deliveries to Libya, despite the fact that Qadhafi fairly publicly is supplying weapons to many international terrorist groups. If the Soviets wished to disassociate themselves from Qadhafi's terrorist support activities, they would stop those arms deliveries.

Instead, Soviet arms deliveries have helped Libya to develop a force of 2,000 medium tanks which make it the 10th largest armored force in the world. That is not the kind of connection that the Soviet Union could possibly sustain with Libya if it had any

serious interest in disassociating itself from Qadhafi's international terrorism or in curbing that international terrorism.

A second reason why I think the link between the Soviets and the Libyans should be seen as indissoluble in this connection is that Soviet as well as Cuban instructors are in the Libyan camps where terrorists are being trained. That was part of the testimony of those prisoners on trial in Tunisia last year. This was reported in L'Europeo magazine in Milan, for example, in some detail.

I am sorry, to repeat myself, that that story, of fairly unique importance, was not more widely picked up.

Third, East German security advisers from the Ministry of State security are attached to the headquarters of Qadhafi's intelligence service. There is no way that they can profess, or that their Soviet masters and sponsors can profess, not to know precisely what is going on.

SOVIET COMMISSARS IN SYRIA

Those are reasons for linking the Soviets to Libyan terrorism. Similar reasons apply when we turn our attention to the case of Syria. There are an estimated 4,000 Soviet military personnel in Syria today. Syria is again a pampered recipient of huge quantities of Soviet weaponry.

One of the most interesting developments is that a special team of political commissars from the main political administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, headed by General Yepishev, arrived in Damascus earlier this year and has been fanned out to be attached to Syrian Armed Forces units at all levels to provide guidance for the Syrian Armed Forces and to check on the political loyalties of members of the Syrian Armed Forces. In short, the Soviets know perfectly well what is going on in Syria.

When we look at the training of terrorists from all over the world at a camp like Hamouriya, which I mentioned several times, we cannot disassociate that from the complicity and most certainly the knowledge and tolerance of the Soviet Union.

I would like to mention a third Arab State. I cannot go through the whole classification; I do not think that is necessary anyway.

BASES IN SOUTH YEMEN

A third country I would like to mention that I left out of my written testimony is South Yemen. South Yemen is probably the closest thing to an orthodox Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in the Arab world. It is bound to Moscow by defense and friendship treaties. It provides the Russians with a kind of enormous land-based aircraft carrier at the back door of Saudi Arabia and the oil fields of the Gulf.

South Yemen plays host to an estimated 5,000 advisors and military personnel in Russia, East Germany, and Cuba and to important Soviet air and naval bases at Aden, Socotra, and in the Hadramaut Mountains. It is also a primary terrorist training center and a launching pad for international terrorist operations.

One of the revolutionary Iranian groups that helped to destabilize the Shah's regime had its headquarters and its bank accounts in Aden. The extremists who mounted the assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979 were part of a broader attempt

to overthrow the conservative Saudi monarchy and had been trained, in some of their cases, at the camp at Lahej in South Yemen under the supervision of the East German and Cuban advisers.

Here is another Soviet subcontractor, South Yemen, whose links with the Soviets are again incontestably established.

Let me move from this chronicle of governmental and PLO involvement in international terrorism, abetted and in some cases I suspect encouraged, by the Soviet Union to the question of likely trends in the terrorist scene over the next year or two and briefly to the question of necessary responses to the upsurge in international political violence.

I would suggest that there are some areas where we can expect intensified trouble. The first is the probability of increased terrorist activity in North America, particularly in the United States.

TARGETING THE UNITED STATES

I talked to one police official in a major American city recently. He should obviously remain nameless. He said that if he were an international terrorist, the ideal place for him to operate would be the United States. I was startled, and I asked him what he meant. He gave me an account of how the resources required to monitor extremist violence-prone activities have been eroded and the legal and other constraints under which he felt that he and his colleagues were forced to operate.

There have been reports of efforts by radical Palestinians to establish a network of three-man cells in this country that could be used for future terrorist operations in the event of an intensified Middle East crisis.

There are the Cuban infrastructures which Castro was boasting about in Monimbó, Nicaragua. There is the stuff of greater violence here.

I might add that there have been reports of the training of some Americans, particularly American Indians with whom the PLO has sought a special relationship in camps in the Middle East in Lebanon, and Syria.

A second trend that I would draw to your attention is the probability that the terrorists will be little by little better armed. Thriller writers make hay out of plots involving nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups and such scenarios of course have to be taken with the utmost seriousness because the unthinkable can indeed happen.

THE IDEAL TERRORIST WEAPON

When I talk about the improvement of the arsenal in the hands of terrorists, however, I am thinking of easier things to acquire—things that could also be devastating if used on a systematic scale.

For example, the hand-held SAM-7 rocket is to my mind an ideal terrorist weapon—a heat-seeking rocket that can bring down planes or helicopters flying relatively high or relatively low.

PFLP terrorists in Italy have been found in possession of SAM-7 rockets. SAM-7's were used in the course of the civil war in Zimbabwe to bring down two civilian airliners. That, as far as I know,

is the only occasion when SAM-7 rockets have been used successfully in a guerrilla or terrorist operation.

I suspect that the SAM-7's which, of course, are obtainable from Libya as well as from any of the other countries that I have mentioned, will probably turn up in the hands of more groups around the world in the coming years.

ATTACKS ON ENERGY FACILITIES

Third, there is reason—and I am reflecting the comments of security officials in a number of Western countries in saying this—to fear the targeting of energy installations on a greater scale in the next few years. There are some fairly obvious reasons for that.

The first is that many of our energy installations are relatively unprotected. I am not just thinking of nuclear powerplants which, of course, attract a great deal of political emotion and animus for reasons unrelated to the terrorist problem we are discussing. I am thinking of simple electrical powerplants and powerlines and facilities of that kind which in many cases are protected, if at all, by just a few strands of wire.

There is reason to believe that some special assault teams of the PLO have been gathering in operational intelligence on such power installations in the United States, as well as in Western Europe.

I would recall the episode, I believe in 1979, when Palestinian hit teams attempted to blow up the large fuel depots in West Berlin.

That was an interesting operation, because it led some Western intelligence analysts to speculate that this may have been one of the occasions on which the Soviets were directly involved in targeting the object of a terrorist attack.

There was a great deal of commotion in the Soviet media and in the Soviet-influenced media at the time about the election of deputies from West Berlin to the European Parliament. The Soviets were saying that this should not be done.

For a terrorist attack of major proportions to have taken place in West Berlin at that time might have served as some form of punishment. That is purely speculative.

In any event, the fuel depots were targeted. The West German authorities were able to intercept the Palestinian hit teams through prior intelligence—through a tip-off—and they prevented the attack. I think that more attacks against that kind of target are in the cards.

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

Finally, we must accept that terrorists are as much influenced by fashion as anybody else, and perhaps more so since by definition they are publicity seekers on a grand scale. Attempts on the life of the Pope, as well as the U.S. President in the course of 1981, will obviously encourage terrorist organizations and isolated individuals to look to other prominent citizens as potential targets.

RESPONSE

Let me draw back now, sir, from this general survey and comment briefly, if I may, on the questions of response.

I would suggest, as a rule of thumb, that there are two indispensable tactics to be adopted in any adequate response to international terrorism.

The first tactic I would describe as penetration and preemption. The second I would define as taking away the bases and depriving the groups of governmental support which they currently enjoy.

Neither of these is easy, but let me try to explain what I mean.

PENETRATION AND PREEMPTION

The range of targets for a terrorist organization in a free, liberal, democratic society is almost endless. To attempt the static defense of every possible target is probably going to be a fairly profitless exercise. You cannot protect every target. You cannot protect every individual who may be a target. You cannot protect every installation. You can do something about the most obvious and the most important. You cannot imagine for a moment that if your society faces a concerted terrorist campaign, that you can mount static defense of every likely target.

Those governments and security services and intelligence services that have scored best in the war against terrorism, like the Israelis are those who have succeeded in obtaining prior knowledge of the plans and operations of the terrorist groups that are fighting against them.

That requires a climate and a legal framework for intelligence that permits the recruitment of informers and agents inside revolutionary and violence-prone organizations and thereby allows the society itself to have the foreknowledge with which to move to preempt and to forestall the terrorist operations before they take place.

If the climate of intelligence and the legal framework that permit that kind of operation does not exist, the society will remain enormously vulnerable to small terrorist groups that may reflect no considerable body of public opinion.

CUTTING OFF STATE SUPPORT

The second thing that has to be done is to identify those governments that support and sustain international terrorism. To use a phrase that Yasser Arafat likes to use about the United States, you have to strike at the head of the snake. That is how he describes the United States. I am using the phrase, of course, in a different sense.

In dealing with terrorism, to strike at the head of the snake means that you have to identify the states that support the terrorists—and take action to deter them.

That means looking realistically and coldly at such inconvenient facts as I have been trying to summarize for you on the role of the Soviet regime or Qadhafi's regime or the PLO and to deal with that.

You might ask: What am I proposing by way of counteraction? The first thing is exposure. Public exposure in itself is a very severe penalty for those like the Soviets who exploit and abet international terrorism, because they have a lot of other irons in

the fire. They have political connections which they do not wish to jeopardize.

EXPOSURE

They do not wish those who support their policy goals in Western countries and in political parties to be conscious of their involvement with terrorist groups. That would be terribly embarrassing and would cost them support. They do not want surviving illusions of détente to be shattered. They do not want the peace lobbies, which help them and which in some cases are encouraged by them in Western Europe, to be undermined by such unpalatable facts.

Therefore, the Soviets reflect a great deal of pain in their public comments when some of these inconvenient facts are presented to Western public opinion. That is why your subcommittee, Senator Denton, has come under such virulent and vitreous attack in the Soviet media. That is an accolade. It shows you are having some effect.

That is why an individual writer or commentator, like myself, comes so frequently under attack, both in the Soviet media and in radical publications, which in some cases are influenced by the Soviets or the Cubans or other Soviet surrogates.

The Soviets are great specialists at character assassination and smear campaigns. When seriously challenged with serious exposure, they tend to pull out all the stops to mobilize all their assets to minimize the damage.

In other words, their behavior pattern reflects the fact that exposure in itself is a very effective and serious form of punishment.

I think we begin there. We begin by making it possible for Western public opinion and non-Communist public opinion in general to know such facts. Sometimes we are helped in that enterprise by the media and sometimes we are not.

I enjoy the cut and thrust of debate, and I engage in rather a lot of it in many forums in my life. I enjoy going on TV or on the lecture platform with somebody who disagrees bitterly with me and having it out with him.

What I do not enjoy or understand or readily tolerate, as a writer and commentator myself, is any form of conspiracy of silence to simply exclude from consideration inconvenient facts. Let us have the facts to begin with; let us have the allegations; let us debate from that basis. Let us not screen them out and ignore them, or else the whole tempo and tenor of our discussions is going to be floating free from real life and will be irrelevant to real life. We might also succeed in leaving the public in the kind of ignorance from which we could otherwise rescue it.

I am sorry for that somewhat impassioned appeal, but I think that exposure, as I say, is where we begin.

VISA RESTRICTIONS

There may be other penalties, of course, which we can impose on those governments which systematically support international terrorism. We should not be overready, for example, to issue visas to

traveling diplomats or officials from a state like Libya who wish to come to the United States or other Western countries and who have been established to be personally involved in terrorist supervision or planning. I can think of one or two individuals who have not been excluded, despite the existence of such evidence. I think that is one thing that should be looked at.

We should at the very least make every possible effort to ostracize those in the international community who systematically support terrorist activities to shut them out and to close our doors to them.

There may be other forms of governmental pressures which can be brought to bear on some of the states that I have mentioned. Not being a U.S. citizen, I leave it to Americans to discuss what pressures their Government might or might not be able to bring to bear. I think there are probably others.

I think, Senator Denton, that that rounds up what I had hoped to say to you in this opening statement. Of course, I would be delighted to receive your questions.

Senator DENTON. Thank you. That was not only extremely comprehensive, Mr. Moss, but articulate enough to serve as a most invaluable part of the record of this subcommittee's hearings.

I must note my own personal agreement with your No. 1 solution of how to deal effectively with terrorism, namely the embarrassment of public exposure of the sources of it, to the degree that the Soviet Union is involved with that.

Having had to deal with their surrogates, I am aware personally of how sensitive they are to that kind of exposure. I must say that I am also painfully aware from personal experience of how contemptuous they were, in my personal experience in discussions with their political and military leaders, of the likelihood that such exposure would take place with respect to their many devious and tragically threatening-to-our-security motives and moves.

Perhaps the best way to start the questioning is to state my own personal belief that communism and the Soviet Union are not perhaps the main threat to the overall survival of the United States. I believe this country and Western society's freedom in general has the strength to survive that.

In perspective, it may be our own internal weaknesses, quite apart from communism, which we must be most aware of as a primary threat.

I do not want to try to paint the picture that we are looking under every rock for a Communist or that the Soviet Union is 9 feet tall, relative to our 2 feet tall.

I would like to proceed, as I have said many times in this subcommittee, in parallel with the voice of freedom, namely the media of the free world, who in their liberality should be the most vocal in exposing that which is true fact and significantly threatening with the proper proportion.

I would like to kick off the questioning by mentioning that the New York Times' magazine section recently had an article of some length. I believe it was entitled, "The Qaddafi Connection." It was authored by Seymour Hersh who is not exactly right of Genghis Khan, nor were you nor was Claire Sterling nor was Arnaud de Borchgrave nor were so many of the authors who are now seeing

that there is significance and, therefore, are giving proportionate attention to this subject.

As you probably know, Mr. Hersh's article dealt with thousands of devices. I believe they were time-delay fuses which were ordered by Mr. Qaddafi with the purported intent of clearing mines left from World War II.

When it became evident to Kevin Mulcahy, the informer who was involved in this up to his ears until his conscience grabbed him, he was appalled at the number of these things and realized that they had nothing whatever to do with clearing landmines. He was further terrified by the thought that they were ordering statuettes in which to implant these explosives and which would be detonated by fuses.

Sometimes we take an attitude, which at this point I think has become unfortunate with respect to not only the security of this country but the continued march of civilization.

There is no other way to stop this other than by public exposure, which is exactly what you mentioned as your No. 1 method, the sanctions you mentioned and where they are likely to prove effective.

The pitiless spotlight of publicity is now on our pages regarding some remarks by aides of Secretary of State Haig, occupying many, many column inches. Yet there seems to be a shortage of column inches on the subject of the significance of the energy target, which situation I hope clears up reasonably shortly.

In your written testimony, you mentioned three-man cells. You indicated that these three-man cells were more or less aimed at prospective future attacks on energy installations. Is that so?

Mr. Moss. This is a report that I have received, Senator. I believe this to be the case.

Senator DENTON. In a larger context, since this is such a proportionately important subject, I would point again to a situation regarding the intentions and capabilities of terrorism and a traditional aim of Communist-oriented terrorism with respect to the Mideast.

I will quote rather briefly from Claire Sterling's book. She is talking about Sheikh Yamani who was in captivity during the time in which the oil ministers were seized. She is going into the speculation about the orientation of Carlos and whether or not he is a Marxist or a Maoist or just exactly what he is.

It concludes with a statement that I think is somewhat significant. She says:

Sheikh Yamani who talked with him for hours while in captivity, felt that Carlos had "started out doing everything on Moscow's orders, but then began to exceed them." Yamani did not believe he was a "convinced Communist" or even that he cared particularly about the Palestine Resistance. "Carlos doesn't really believe in the Palestinian cause, except as a way of spreading international revolution," Yamani said. Doubtless, he meant the Maoist Permanent Revolution, favored by the New Left to the Kremlin's chagrin.

But there was nothing so newfangled about Carlos. In the interview, at the end of the seventies, he was still talking pretty much like the orthodox Communist of the sixties. "We are not going to take part in the dispute between the two Communist superpowers," he said flatly. "The only war that counts is the one between socialism and capitalism."

The Palestinians had their uses in that war, he explained, because the homeland they hankered after happened to float on a boundless bed of oil. Thanks to the Palestine Resistance, therefore, "we have the possibility of blowing up all the oil

fields in the Arabian Gulf, from Kuwait to Oman, in Saudi Arabia and Khuzestan, maybe even in Venezuela. Petroleum is the weapon that can inflict the mortal wound on American imperialism."

Boris Ponomarev, directing the Kremlin's international Communist affairs, could hardly ask for more.

That is the statement of intent from Carlos' point of view.

More recently, we have Qaddafi in Syria. We have Arafat boasting, after having denied Begin's charge that there were surface-to-air missiles in Syria supplied by Libya, then Arafat cleared that up by boasting that, yes, they were there and they had been there.

Then we had Naif Hawatmeh, who you are probably familiar with, say:

Oil supplies to the capitalist West will be brought to a halt if the Israeli enemy attempts PLO destruction. The Mideast oil wells will go up in flames. This is not a hollow threat. It will be translated into action by all freedom strugglers in the Middle East, not only Palestinians.

We had this going on with the charges that there are 4,000 to 5,000 Soviet officers in Syria. That got one sentence in the media, as I recall, whereas we have had hundreds of column inches about the 15 or so advisers from the United States who happen to be in El Salvador.

It seems to me remarkable.

I believe we are getting beyond threats, to the posturing of forces, which will enable them to approach doing what they have said that they intend to do in the Middle East.

On Sunday, April 26, 1981, FBI Director William Webster was interviewed on Meet the Press. On that occasion, he was asked if there was any evidence that any of the terrorism in the United States is directed, influenced, or financed by the Soviet Union or any of its satellite states. He replied that there is no real evidence of Soviet-sponsored terrorism within the United States.

In light of what you have said and written here today with respect to the FALN and its relationship to the Cuban DGI, the Soviet service, would you regard the conclusion drawn by the Director to be consistent with the evidence?

Mr. Moss. I think, Senator, if I followed the quotation in detail, that the Director failed to answer the second part of the question that was put to him.

He made a comment about Soviet involvement in terrorism in the United States. I believe he was also asked about Soviet satellite involvement.

In any case, if we make that distinction and turn to the question of Soviet satellite involvement, there is such evidence. It is on the public record. I quoted some of it in my own oral testimony.

CUBAN-SPONSORED VIOLENCE IN UNITED STATES

For example, there is the Statue of Liberty conspiracy to bomb the Statue of Liberty in 1965.

There was another case back in 1962 when two Cuban spies operating under diplomatic cover at the United Nations were expelled from this country and declared persona non grata because of their part in another bomb conspiracy.

The public, open involvement of the Cuban authorities with the Puerto Rican extremist movement and their involvement with

FALN and Puerto Rican Socialist Party leaders who were responsible for a bombing campaign in this country.

All of this, as I say, is not cloak and dagger stuff extracted from some archive that nobody can look at. These are all cases that are in the press files.

A statement like the statement that the Soviet Union and its satellites are not involved in terrorism in the United States, so far as we can prove, is inaccurate.

As I say, I think the Director simply failed to answer the second part of the question, which involves satellite involvement.

Again, once you start discussing this whole question, you get back to some of the confusions about which I complained earlier on. You will have people who will not make the association mentally between Cuba and the Soviet Union. They will say, yes, the Cubans are doing that; but that does not prove that the Russians have a hand in it.

SOVIET CONTROL OF DGI

There is a very simple rejoinder to that statement. If people do not want to take the word of an individual writer or commentator, they can turn to the defectors from the Cuban intelligence service who have said on the public record, as Paraza said on the TV film made by CBC recently, that the Soviet Union is in control of the Cuban DGI. It has liaison staff at its headquarters. The Cuban intelligence services operate under direct Soviet supervision.

Indeed, West European security sources have reported that the Soviets created a special budget which has been made available to the Cuban DGI for international espionage and terrorist operations. That has been published in Europe.

I think there is indeed a good deal of evidence of Cuban involvement with terrorism in this country, and that brings in the Soviets.

You might like me just to comment a little on some of your earlier observations, if I may.

Senator DENTON. That was going to be my next question—to ask you to pursue some of those things, yes, sir.

Mr. Moss. I would be delighted to do so.

You mentioned two very intriguing characters—Naif Hawatmeh and Carlos. You speculated, I think along correct lines, about their leanings and connections.

NAIF HAWATMEH'S THREAT TO OIL SUPPLY

Naif Hawatmeh has the distinction of being the leader of the most openly Marxist-Leninist wing of the Palestinian movement. His movement, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, espouses an open Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Hawatmeh is a frequent visitor to Moscow. He had close connections with the Soviets long before the PLO was allowed to open its office in Moscow in the mid-1970's, following Yasser Arafat's famous 1974 visit and the strategic decision of the Soviet Union to rely more heavily on the PLO as a surrogate in the Middle East.

Hawatmeh is the Russians' man in the Palestinian movement, probably beyond any other single Palestinian leader.

When Hawatmeh makes a threat to sabotage oil facilities throughout the Gulf, that is a threat which I believe is made with the tolerance, and perhaps with the prior knowledge, of his Soviet controllers.

I regard that man as a Russian agent of influence within the Palestinian movement. As I say, he openly espouses Marxism-Leninism in its Soviet form.

To have him making those threats about sabotaging oil facilities in the context of the overall Soviet strategy of denial of basic energy resources to the West, on which I commented earlier, is very revealing indeed. It is a detail that certainly deserves more prominence in the debate about these matters than it has so far received.

ANTECEDENTS OF CARLOS

Carlos, of course, rejoices in the original name of Ilych Ramirez Sanchez. He is called Ilych in honor of Lenin, because his father was a member and organizer, as I understand it, of the Venezuelan Communist Party.

The father's political views are not necessarily inherited. The fact that the father was an orthodox Communist does not make Carlos an orthodox Communist today.

However, I would add a second detail, which is that he was, of course, a student at the Patrice Lumumba University in the Soviet Union, which is used as a catchment area for recruiting Third World students for Soviet operations. It is a place where the KGB is thick on the ground, according to a former professor at the Patrice Lumumba University, who now lives in Western Europe.

PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY

At least 40 percent of the faculty of Patrice Lumumba University are from the KGB. It is a place where people from the Third World who may be of use in some way—perhaps as espionage agents, political agents of influence, or for other roles—are selected for training and final recruitment.

This is not to prove that Carlos was one of those who was finally recruited while in Moscow, although the circumstances of his departure after his supposed expulsion from the Patrice Lumumba University are very confused and murky.

It has been suggested, certainly by West European and Israeli experts, that Carlos was indeed selected from the Patrice Lumumba University, formally recruited by the KGB, and that his expulsion from the university was, in fact, a cover for the recruitment process that was taking place. That would be standard operational style for the Soviets.

As I say, I am not in a position to say that this is an authentic account of what happened. The connections are very deep, however.

I might mention that very recently, there have been reports that Carlos has been working in the service of the Syrian foreign intelligence organization which appears to be directed by Brig. Gen. Mohammed al-Khouli who seems to be in charge with Rifaat Assad, President Assad's brother, of international terrorist operations.

This is a report which, again, I cannot personally confirm, not being privy unfortunately to the complete archives of the Western secret services or to the archives of the KGB, which would tell us even more. However, it is an interesting report.

I would make one general comment on Carlos. I suspect that despite his very illustrious—from the revolutionary terrorist point of view—involvement in some major terrorist operations, the mystique of the man far exceeds the importance of the man himself. It is the structure of support around Carlos that should really concern us, rather than this somewhat romantic antihero that he has been built into.

I might just add at this stage one final observation on your own comments.

U.S. TERRORISTS IN MIDEAST CAMPS

You raised again the question of possible attacks on energy installations in the United States. I neglected to say earlier on that the Basque terrorist prisoner arrested in Spain last year, also alleged that at the same camp in Algeria where he had been trained, he had met Americans, particularly American Indians who were undergoing training. Here is a case that is now on the public record of the alleged training of U.S. citizens in Middle Eastern—or, in this case, North African—terrorist training facilities.

Senator DENTON. We have found increasingly large numbers of minihandbooks on urban guerrilla warfare in the Continental United States. Would you explain in more detail the way the Cuban DGI operates in the Western Hemisphere with particular focus on their activities, or apparently projected activities, in the United States?

Mr. Moss. The Cubans are the Russians' main surrogate for the whole range of covert operations in the Western Hemisphere.

CUBA'S ROLE IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

In the case of Latin America, the reason is obvious. The Cubans speak Spanish. In the case of the United States, the reason is very intriguing. The reason is that the Soviets have consciously built on the romantic enthusiasm for the Cuban revolution that persists in radical, and even in some liberal, circles in this country.

The Soviets have also built on the persistent failure of people on the liberal left in the United States to acknowledge the intimacy of the bond between Havana and Moscow.

How else can an identified Cuban intelligence officer make a speech in praise of a prominent American journalist, as one did a couple of years ago—Teofilo Acosta Rodriguez—without the press saying, this is strange.

If the head of the CIA's covert action department, if it still has one, were to make such a speech in praise of an American reporter and if the station chief of a West European intelligence service or the intelligence service of a rightwing government were to make such a speech, your media would be full of articles bemoaning the efforts by sinister intelligence lobbies to gain control of the public mind.

Yet when Teofilo Acosta, a couple of years ago now, made a speech in praise of a prominent American journalist, there was no uproar. I will not name the journalist, even though he is dead; because I do not believe he was a Cuban agent and do not want anybody to suggest that that is the purpose of these remarks. But the fact that the Cuban's speech did not elicit a sense of shock and scandal, reflects a very curious mental elision.

That mental elision consists in the refusal to recognize the nature of Cuba, not as a romantic dream of the 1950's but as a totalitarian police state which deals with its opponents fully as ruthlessly as any other regime in Latin America, and probably even more so.

Witness the stories of Huber Matos and his confinement in a coffin-like box for a whole year. And witness the link between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

As I say, the Soviets have built upon this persisting romantic notion of Cuba as the land of happy, bearded revolutionaries who chop sugarcane and smoke cigars and drink rum and are not really up to their necks in the more serious and sinister worldwide activities that I am trying to define.

Having built on that failure of understanding, the Soviets have succeeded via the Cubans and are continuing to succeed today in a number of covert operations which range from efforts to influence the American media to efforts to influence the American Congress to support facilities for terrorist outfits in the Western Hemisphere and in the United States.

I find it surprising that more has not been published on the structure of the organizations primarily responsible for these Cuban activities. As I mentioned earlier, there is the DGI, headed by Mendez Cominches, and the Americas Department, headed by Pineiro Losada.

JULIAN RIZO

One of the most interesting Cubans that I have come across in this connection was, in fact, the former station chief of the DGI under United Nations cover in New York. That is Julian Rizo, who is now in effect the Cuban proconsul and viceroy in Granada and has been attributed some measure of responsibility for the successful coup in Granada to turn that small island into another base area for the Cubans in the Caribbean.

I could go into yet more detail on these matters if you wish me to pursue them. As I say, I think there is no question in the mind of any serious analyst of this aspect of the problem that the Cubans are the principal Soviet surrogate in the United States.

I might mention by way of qualification that the East Germans also appear to be increasingly active in the United States, particularly, interestingly enough, in making camouflaged overtures to rightwing lobbies in the effort to use rightwing covers as well as left wing covers.

I would suggest very strongly, Senator, that in considering the span of Soviet covert operations, we must never lose sight of the fact that it is not just groups on the so-called left that may serve as fronts or vehicles to Soviet covert activities. Indeed, they have a very clear interest in infiltrating and manipulating groups on the

so-called right as well, particularly when it comes to covert propaganda activities. Because if they appear to come from an impeccable conservative source, hostile to the Soviet Union, they may be fed into the public mind even faster than if they come from an openly leftist-inclined group.

I would like to stress the need for balance in any discussion of that area.

Senator DENTON. Turning to the Spetsnaz forces, with special emphasis on the network of sleepers held in reserve for a major crisis, would you explain that in more detail?

SOVIET SPETSNAZ FORCES

Mr. Moss. The Spetsnaz forces of the Soviet Union might be regarded in some respects as their answer or equivalent to the Green Berets. The so-called special designation troops are organized to undertake sabotage and terrorist operations behind enemy lines. Their exercises are conducted with an awesomely ruthless degree of realism. They go to the extent of torturing each other if they fall captive to another team in an exercise.

In other words, these are very tough characters indeed—these Spetsnaz forces.

There are Spetsnaz units attached to all 16 military districts of the Soviet Union to the Soviet fleets and to the 4 Soviet Army groups in Eastern Europe. They are under the general direction of the third department of the GRU, the Soviet Military Intelligence Organization. They include, as I mentioned briefly, highly secretive units known only as staff companies that are trained to operate abroad in civilian clothes or in Western uniforms in collusion with local terrorist networks.

In these exercises which they have held, they practice the linkups that might be made in real life with sleeper networks in the West. I will say in a moment more about what I mean by sleeper networks.

These are the forces that would be used to sow disruption and carry out sabotage operations and possibly also to carry out the assassination of political and military leaders in the event of war or possibly in a confrontation short of war.

SOVIET SABOTAGE NETWORK IN FRANCE

We know a little more than this about the Soviets' planning for sabotage and terrorist operations from recent espionage cases. There was one in France. This story becomes particularly relevant now that a Communist has been appointed as Minister of Transport in France. It is a story which curiously, again, has escaped the attention of the media in considering what it may mean to have a Communist minister of transport.

A few years ago, I believe in 1978, the French security service arrested the members of an espionage network headed by a Russian illegal called Serge Fabiev and controlled by a Soviet spy based in Geneva under, I believe, United Nations cover or ILO cover, called Gregory Myagkov.

This network was discovered to have drawn up the most detailed conceivable plans of basic communications in France, by which I

mean railways, as well as other forms of communication, and also of powerlines and electrical generating facilities.

The suspicion of the French security authorities was that this kind of information had been assembled as operational intelligence for sabotage that might be carried out by the Spetsnaz teams in France in the event of military hostilities between East and West or even in the event of the need in the Soviet view to disrupt French mobilization.

Similar information has been provided in Britain by Oleg Lyalin, a former of the KGB's department V, which handles wet operations, including assassinations.

There is a considerable dossier in the public, or at least the semipublic, record now on Soviet preparations to use terrorist methods in a military confrontation, or a near-war situation which, again I would say, is very germane to our general consideration of terrorism because it may help to explain some aspects of Soviet motivation.

Senator DENTON. I believe you mentioned in your statement that the numbers of the Spetsnaz personnel are incomparably more numerous than those in our Green Berets.

Mr. Moss. I do not know, Senator, what the current establishment of the Green Berets is. The most reliable estimate I have heard on the number of Spetsnaz forces runs to in excess of 30,000. I would doubt that the Green Berets have manpower levels comparable to that in these times.

Senator DENTON. I am told that we have in the Green Berets six groups of about 800 men.

You have in your prepared text stated that the staff companies of the GRU Spetsnaz forces are trained to operate abroad in civilian clothes or Western uniforms in collusion with local terrorist networks.

Yesterday, a Turkish witness testified that firearms of apparent Western manufacture are being counterfeited at least in Bulgaria.

In your view, is this effort to camouflage terrorist activity part of an overall plan which permits the Soviets to disclaim any role in terrorist activity and to some degree mask the situation by putting blame on the United States or its allies as the sources of the weapons used?

FALSE FLAG OPERATIONS

Mr. Moss. This could all be viewed under the category of what the experts call false flag operations. In other words, carrying out a covert operation under the flag or the label of a different country or a different interest from what you really represent.

Soviet bloc secret services devote a great deal of attention in their training courses to false flag operations.

A recent Polish defector, for example, has said that the false flag emphasis was very strong indeed; and that his own service had members who were trained to impersonate CIA and other Western intelligence operatives in making recruitment pictures to individuals in the West.

When you get weapons that are altered and serial numbers on weapons that are altered to make them appear to not merely be of Western manufacture but to pertain to specific Western organiza-

tions, such as the Italian police, you get a possible case of a false flag operation in the terrorist connection—an effort to make investigators link the terrorist operation to a group that is radically different from the group that actually carried it out.

This is par for the course. This is part of standard operational style of the Soviet bloc services in these respects. It is not a far-fetched or irrelevant analogy to compare it to the very intensive forgery campaign, which the Soviet Union is constantly maintaining.

The most proficient forgers are probably the East Germans who have several forgery factories in East Berlin. They are run by Department K of the HVA, which was recently commended by Gen. Markus Wolf, the East German spy chief, for its proficiency in producing false documents to embarrass Western politicians and other Western leaders and to divide them.

The habits of duplicity, deception, and camouflage are very strongly ingrained in the style of these Soviet-bloc services.

Senator DENTON. Have you heard of Sun-Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher?

Mr. Moss. I have, indeed.

Senator DENTON. I wonder if you share my fascination with him and with the American and general Western incapacity to think in the terms which underly the philosophy and tactics used by those who would destroy our free civilization?

I believe it is fundamental to the beginning of understanding for us to note what he has said, because I believe his words and his dicta are still studied in the Communist nations.

He wrote 25 centuries ago, as you know, a book called the "Art of War." That is 25 centuries ago. He generally relies upon historical constancy of human nature to bring about the downfall of an enemy.

As I said to start with, we do not need the enemy all the time. We have other enemies—ourselves, to a degree.

He describes the techniques to be used to humble a hostile power. Fighting is the crudest form of making war upon an enemy, although it has its place. Break the will of the enemy to fight, and you accomplish the true objective to war.

Sun-Tzu tells us to cover with ridicule the enemy's traditions. Involve his leaders in criminal enterprises, and then turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Exploit and aggravate the inherent frictions within the enemy country. Agitate the young against the old. Prevail if possible without armed conflict.

The supreme excellence, states Sun-Tzu, is not to win 100 victories and 100 battles. The supreme excellence is to subjugate the armies of your enemies without ever having to fight them.

The author of this book on Sun-Tzu, who is an acquaintance and a friend of mine, goes on to say: Our constitutional democracy is an ideal crucible in which to test the theories of Sun-Tzu. Our society offers all of the mechanisms for orderly change. Communist societies seek only to preserve the status quo. Today, Sun-Tzu remains required reading in the military and political schools of those who would humble and destroy us.

I know you would not have expected a question like that, but do you have any feeling that that is sort of the context in which

terrorism and all of the other activities necessary to bring about what they want is sort of important?

Mr. Moss. I think Sun-Tzu defined a strategy for overcoming your enemies more effectively and more succinctly than it has ever been put in those 25 centuries since.

His remarks are certainly appreciated in Moscow, even though he was Chinese. His remarks used to hang, I have been told, on the wall of the office of General Wolf in East Berlin. I do not know whether they still hang there, but I know that they are studied in KGB training courses.

THE KGB'S SERVICE A

That general approach, I believe, informs the overall direction of what the Soviets call active measures, which is the special concern of what is now called Service A of the KGB and which includes many techniques of psychological warfare and subversion that stop short of terrorism but are undoubtedly more effective.

Discredit your enemies and divide them and make them look ridiculous. These are good propositions for anybody engaged in a contest with another organization or another country.

The way that the operation is carried out in detail is something that perhaps would take us too far away from the more narrow subject of terrorism on which I am here to testify.

I might mention that in the effort to break down the operational capacities of American intelligence, which is after all the frontline defense against these terrorist groups, as well as against conventional spies and agents of influence, these techniques have been applied repeatedly.

PHILIP AGEE

You have only to look at the continuing career and connections of a man like the CIA defector, Philip Agee, to realize how the advice to expose and cover with ridicule has been carried out in practice.

A former CIA officer who has had more than 30 established meetings in his time in London alone with the local station chief of the Cuban DGI, the Cuban intelligence service, devotes himself exclusively to attacking his former employers in the CIA and is still quoted on matters as important as the debate on El Salvador by people in the Western media who are unsuspecting of the real nature of his connections and political allegiances.

His continued acceptance as a reasonable source by opinion formers in the West is a remarkable example of the success of what we might now regard as the Sun-Tzu technique.

I think you were completely on target in quoting the Chinese philosopher of war in this connection.

Senator DENTON. Proceeding to the more particular, in what way do terrorist groups that do not have overt links with Moscow provide cover for Soviet executive action operations? What are those executive action operations and how are they utilized?

SOVIET EXECUTIVE ACTION

Mr. Moss. Executive action is an official euphemism used in Moscow for the liquidation of opponents abroad.

I admit immediately that I have no hard evidence—no evidence in any legal sense—of the recent usage of a terrorist group overtly unconnected with the Soviet Union for the elimination of an enemy of the Soviets themselves.

However, I inserted this in my prepared text as an area of interest and a suitable subject for continued attention and, indeed, investigation.

I think my remarks on the curious connections of the would-be assassin of the Pope may provide us with one such case for very serious investigation indeed.

I would point out that when you look at the history of Soviet executive action, you will find that at certain points in the history of the Communist regime in Moscow, it has been willing to reach out and assassinate its enemies abroad.

I am not suggesting that in recent years this has been part of the Soviet practice, although there is some reason to believe it has been part of Bulgarian practice—witness the famous poison umbrella case. This involved the murder of a Bulgarian emigre broadcaster working for the BBC in London, Georgé Markov.

However, we know from the period of the 1950's about KGB hit teams that were sent out to assassinate Ukranian exiles. We know also that under Soviet law, it is possible to sentence to death in secrecy a Russian citizen—or former Russian citizen—living abroad and legally to execute that sentence in some foreign country.

In other words, under Soviet law, you can pass a death ruling on a former Soviet citizen living abroad which it is legally permissible to carry out.

In the view of some Western analysts, many such sentences are on file in safe places in Moscow for possible execution at some point in the future. Hopefully, they will never be executed.

It's an interesting legal situation that the administrative law of the Soviet Union and other bloc countries suggests that their regimes regard themselves as having the right to sentence in absentia to death or to lesser punishments emigres from those countries who are living elsewhere in the world.

That is another context in which this question should be considered.

I want to be very straightforward and also very careful in drawing the lines between what can be established and what cannot be established. I do not believe it can be established at this stage that the Soviets are using terrorist teams for executive action purposes of their own.

However, the case of Mehmet Ali Agca has yet to be plumbed to its depth. I think it is important to keep a watchful eye on that particular case.

Senator DENTON. In your prepared statement, you indicate that the Libyan liaison office based in Tripoli supervises foreign terrorists. As you may know, Ahmed al-Shahati of that office has visited this country on a number of occasions, touring various cities and

being feted by former President Carter's brother, Billy, his mother, and sister.

Indeed, Mr. Shahati was in this country only recently as an emissary of Colonel Qaddafi, regarding normalization of relations between the United States and Libya.

Is it true that free access of terrorists to Western countries and their allies has contributed to the problems of international terrorism? If so, what restrictions should cooperating nations place on such travel with respect to visas?

As you may know, there have been suggestions regarding sanctions, in terms of airline travel, if the country has been noted as being a terroristic originator, and so forth.

RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL

Mr. Moss. I think it is entirely reasonable to suggest that Western countries might consider agreeing to draw up a blacklist of individuals identified with terrorist organizations who will be excluded from civilized countries that are fighting terrorism.

My understanding is that information was available to U.S. authorities on Ahmed al-Shahati's personal involvement with Libya's terrorist activities around the world.

If I am correct in believing that such information existed in documented form, then I would tend to feel that this is a case where it is probably unfortunate to confer some degree of legitimacy or tolerance on the man by admitting him to the country.

Again, I am not a U.S. citizen; and I am not prepared, and I do not believe it would be proper for me to comment on changes in U.S. legislation.

As a general rule, applicable to all Western democracies, I think it should be possible to form some kind of agreement that the civilized community will exclude and ban from their shores where possible identified accomplices, supervisors, and members of terrorist networks who are operating against the free world in general.

I think the policy on visas should be reconsidered.

Of course, this does not take account of hitmen who float in and out of countries under false identity papers. Dealing with them, can only depend upon acquiring better operational intelligence with which to counter the terrorist movement.

Senator DENTON. The Turkish authorities yesterday who have great familiarity with Agca indicated that they were quite certain that the man was not some kind of a nut. He was, indeed, a coldly calculating individual.

In your studies of Soviet use of executive action—again, not to imply that there is any direct connection between these two—have you found any evidence that the KGB would use mentally deranged persons to carry out the action involved? For example, Leon Trotsky was murdered in Mexico by an individual who was first thought to be demented but was later determined to be an NKVD agent.

MURDER OF TROTSKY

Mr. Moss. Not only was the assassin of Trotsky found to be that, Senator, but he was later awarded, I believe, the Order of Lenin and finished his life peacefully in Moscow.

Ramón Mercader the killer, certainly finished his life peacefully in Moscow and certainly received a very high Soviet award for his enterprise in Mexico City.

It is worth reminding ourselves historically that the origin of the Soviet state, as Solzhenitsyn is always trying to remind the West without always finding a hearing, was founded on institutional terror. It showed no reluctance to use terror against its enemies abroad in various phases of its regime.

I would say from the official Soviet viewpoint that the choice of whether or not to use such techniques is a question of tactics, not a question of overall philosophy or morality. I do not believe that our moral scruples or philosophic positions are shared by a totalitarian regime like that of the Soviet Union.

I cannot go further today on the Agca case. I was fascinated to find that your Turkish experts who testified yesterday shared my suspicions and were able to contribute some important details to the study of the case.

I was also amazed to find no report of their testimony in the major American newspapers this morning. They had said that the man was a cold and calculating killer. They had pointed to the Bulgarian connection, although they had not mentioned the details of the gun and the passport that I mentioned today.

They had said that in their view, his activity was linked to what they called a grand design. This seemed to me to be very close to an allegation from Turkish experts with very good official access that the Soviet bloc was involved.

I thought that that was a spectacularly interesting allegation, whether or not it could be confirmed or fleshed out at this point. I was surprised to find a certain lassitude on the part of my media colleagues in responding to that particular allegation.

I cannot, as I say, personally go beyond the reports I have given you on the Bulgarian visit and on the time in training camps in the Middle East. I would just reiterate that when you look at those particular Palestinian training camps, you again find the Soviet connection through the multiple links that I described earlier on.

Senator DENTON. You have mentioned and Sun-Tzu has mentioned efforts to penetrate and affect opinion in the country and political attitudes in the country.

I have not read this yet, but it is an issue of a magazine called "Rights." The issue is devoted to "Special Report: The Ghost Returns." The picture on the front page is of Joe McCarthy. This thing is published by what in more liberal days would be called a Communist front organization, entitled the "National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee," founded in 1951.

I think Sun-Tzu would be amazed at the degree of detail in this issue of some 25 pages which is devoted to castigation of and tactics to undermine this particular subcommittee.

It is really a remarkably sophisticated document.

It goes through all the bills introduced on civil rights, on the Constitution, the draft, education, and family. It identifies the originators of the bill. It covers the features of the bills in great detail. It identifies the committees and talks in detail about each man on the committee and how to get at them, as it were. It ends up with a sample letter to senators and congressmen, just a sample of which I will read.

To the Honorable So and So:

Dear So and So:

Among the many alarming actions of the Reagan Administration, the encouragement of new congressional inquisitorial committees and the proposal to remove the present restrictions on intelligence activities of the CIA, FBI, and related security agencies are the ones I find the most shocking and repugnant.

After the disgrace of the McCarthy period and years of dismal disclosures brought to light by the Rockefeller Commission, on which ironically President Reagan sat as a member, it seems to me that the Constitution not only requires that the police powers of the State be limited. Our history and our common sense dictate that this should be.

We must not allow the political fashions of the moment to trample the wisdom historically embodied in the Constitution.

It ends up with:

I also urge you to oppose and restrain inquisitorial committees, such as the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, and the proposed House Committee on Internal Security, and H.R. 48. Very truly yours.

It has related readings. It is remarkably rhetorically presented. I can use it, as I say, to advance my own knowledge about what goes on here on the Hill.

In your view, how pervasive is the use of journalistic cover, including so-called stringers, by hostile intelligence services to further the gathering of intelligence for terrorist groups?

Mr. Moss. If I may, before responding to that question, I would like to comment on your observations.

Senator DENTON. Surely.

ATTACKS ON SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Moss. I am not familiar with this particular group which is attacking your subcommittee, and I cannot comment on that. However, I would like to recall the advice of Lenin which was that if you label something effectively, you do not have to argue with it. That is the device that is followed by Soviet propagandists and disinformers in their operations today.

The label, McCarthyism, is a scary one. We should all be frightened of any revival of that phenomenon.

If I may make a personal statement by way of introduction, I may say that as your committee staff knows, I expressed some initial hesitation myself about appearing before this subcommittee because, I suppose, some of the labels being applied to you had impressed even me—despite all the time that I spend studying such propaganda campaigns.

I followed the course of the hearings, and I found that far from being a witch hunt, which I had been warned about by liberal friends of mine—I do not regard myself as a conservative, and I listen carefully to what my liberal friends, as well as my conservative friends, may have to say—I found them to be sober. I found

that people were not being falsely identified and held up to vilification.

LEFTWING M'CARTHYISM

This led me to consider a very interesting phenomenon of our times, which is that while the left screams McCarthyite any time anybody stands up and presumes to say that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian dictatorship which uses unusual methods in pursuit of its foreign policies, leftists themselves are the most assiduous users and exploiters of classical McCarthyite techniques of smear and innuendo.

It is very interesting. As soon as somebody presumes to attack the Soviet Union, he will be reviled as a reactionary, a McCarthyite, a CIA pawn, or another nice epithet of that kind. I have had to withstand a lot of this myself. So have those of my journalistic colleagues who have had the courage to pursue some of these themes.

I know colleagues of mine who, like myself, have been the subject not only of KGB, or Cuban-sponsored character assassination campaigns, but of death threats and other forms of intimidation.

Interestingly enough, the physical threats that I have received have generally emanated from extreme rightists, neo-Nazi groups, because of my views on the Middle East, and for other reasons.

It is not always easy. I think that the amount of resources expended on trying to silence the discussion of these matters reflects just how important that discussion is and just how little of it there has been in recent years.

JOURNALISTIC COVER FOR KGB

Let me turn to your specific question about the use of journalistic cover.

The Soviets themselves, of course, use journalistic cover for their own operations abroad. The Novosti Agency probably deserves to be regarded as an integral department of the Moscow Center of the KGB. The proportion of KGB people working under Novosti cover is over 90 percent.

A very high proportion of Soviet journalists, or so-called journalists serving abroad are either identified by Western security experts as either members of the KGB or, to a far lesser extent, the GRU or as co-optees—people who are used to make contacts with the media and other people of influence and access in Western societies and, of course, can cover themselves as journalists.

We had a very important French case not long ago involving the Soviet manipulation of journalists. This was the case of Pierre-Charles Pathé, son of the founder of the modern cinema industry in France who was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment by the French court of state security for having served 20 years as a disinformation agent of the KGB under the direct control of three successive KGB offices, one of whom used UNESCO cover and one of whom, if I am not mistaken, used journalistic cover.

If I am mistaken in that case, there have been so many cases of Soviet alleged journalists and diplomats who have been expelled

and declared persona non grata in Western countries that it is not difficult to prove this part of my statement.

VULNERABILITY OF MEDIA

Why should we assume that any section of society is somehow miraculously immune to penetration and manipulation by the secret services of the Soviet state. After all, there has been a lot of fairly excited press comment over recent allegations about penetration of the British security service and other European intelligence services. Some reports may be accurate, and others are inaccurate.

It has been readily accepted that Western secret services themselves have been vulnerable to Soviet penetration, so why should a nonprofessional and nonofficial element in society somehow have miraculous immunity?

In fact, Canadian cases, which I think will be ventilated in the 90-minute CBC film that has been made, include the use of journalistic cover by KGB operatives there. A technician, I believe, working for CBC in Canada was, in fact, an illegal Soviet agent, a colonel in the KGB. I think that that is now on the public record.

There are many cases to be considered.

It would be wildly irrelevant to these hearings and certainly counterproductive to proceed from these general propositions to say that media in the West and Third World countries is crawling with Soviet operatives. Of course it is not.

However, journalistic cover is extremely useful to secret services in any part of the world. Journalists have a great deal of access. I, myself, have received approaches from at least 12 different secret services in the course of my career. Contrary to what some of my leftist detractors would like to say upon occasion, I have responded to none of them favorably.

I think any foreign correspondent and any prominent journalist will receive such approaches. The approaches, of course, do not merely include: Come and have a drink with Oleg, and we will exchange views about the world. They will include the formation of a character assessment. This is routinely done every time a Soviet meets with a Westerner. He has to produce a personality profile, study the vulnerabilities of the individual, and look for possibilities of recruitment through those vulnerabilities.

There have been reports that one journalist recruited by the Soviets in a Western country not far removed from this one was, among other things, preparing personality profiles on colleagues in the press corps who might be approached. Pathé was doing that in France.

There is a lot to be studied there. I think in your question you also asked about the use of journalistic cover in relation to terrorist operations. I cannot instantly think of anything of interest that I could contribute on that.

However, there are radical publications and fringe publications—not the mainstream press—whose members are closely associated with governments or organizations that support terrorism and may at the very least be a source of information and perhaps couriers of information for such terrorist interests.

Interestingly enough, one of the publications in which I was recently most viciously attacked was an Italian publication which is, in effect, the organ of the Red Brigades. That's a cheerful bit of news to wake up to.

Senator DENTON. I would like to identify with your views about the penetrability of the media.

I have said this before, but I cannot say it too often in my position. I do not view them as any more or less penetrable than the military or our intelligence services.

As you have said, I do not see them as miraculously immune as a profession, either from penetration or persuasions.

As I have said before, I believe that our principal hope is that since journalists are after the truth and since when they find it to the degree that you have about the subjects, they find that truth beautiful and they begin expounding like fountains on it.

I would like to, in a balanced manner, see that take place to a greater degree than the fun and games which we have been engaged in since, say, the late sixties when the exacerbation of the media versus the establishment split and became disastrous.

Not only media people who have been exposed to what you have been exposed to, but people like Eldridge Cleaver become extremely articulate when they see what really exists over there instead of what they have been imagining to exist. They cease criticizing our system as much as they did and stop equating the Soviet Union and the United States as simply two superpowers who are obviously engaged in these nasty little machinations.

The truth is shockingly different, as you know.

From your perspective, have you perceived differences between the way in which the United States and Western-bloc intelligence services operate, as opposed to the way the Soviet intelligence services and their proxies or subcontractors services operate? Would you explain that some more?

What in your view is the role of effective and timely intelligence in combating terrorism, both domestically and internationally, having said it is our first line of defense in this area?

KGB VERSUS CIA

Mr. Moss. I think that is an extremely important question, Senator. One of the problems of understanding that I have not really mentioned with any seriousness so far that afflicts this kind of discussion is the sheer difficulty for people living in a Western country, however well-informed, to make the leap of imagination that is required to understand how the leadership of an alien totalitarian society actually thinks and plans.

A lot of psychological transference goes on. People tend to attribute their own impressions and beliefs to people who are, in fact, totally different in a totally different context, which is why the evidence of defectors and dissident emigres from the Soviet Union is so precious and important.

They throw at least a narrow beam of light into the great dark cavern of the Soviet police state, which is very difficult to know even for those who live in Moscow, perhaps especially for those from the West who live in Moscow who are cocooned in a KGB-

controlled area of life which does not allow them a great deal of access to the way that real Russians live and feel.

When you ask this question about what is the difference between the KGB and the CIA or other Western services, there are so many differences one hardly knows where to begin.

LIMITED ACCOUNTABILITY OF KGB

The KGB is answerable to the Soviet Communist Party. Its operations are conducted in consultation with the International Department of the Central Committee, whose Secretary is Boris Ponomarev, who has been important in Soviet life since the 1930's. In fact, he wrote some of the press editorials that coincided with Stalin's great purge of 1937. Ponomarev may be assumed to know what he is doing.

The KGB is answerable, as I say, to the party. That means to the self-appointed group of old men in a hurry who guide the destinies of the Soviet Union. It is not answerable to the Soviet people. It is not answerable to the 13-some million members of the Soviet Communist Party—not even to them. It is not restricted or spied upon or exposed or commented upon by the Soviet media, which is totally state controlled. It does not operate under any legal restrictions of any consequence whatsoever in any of its operations. It is accountable to the narrow party leadership and to itself.

SCALE OF KGB OPERATIONS

In the scale of its operations, the Soviet KGB alone is probably conducting as many or more covert operations abroad today as all Western secret services combined. That is not even taking account of the GRU, the military intelligence, whose initials are less well known and which is less commented upon and studied.

The GRU is as active in foreign intelligence operations as the KGB, particularly in the area of science and technology and in the areas of industrial espionage. It has a huge budget which comes directly from the military industrial commission of the Soviet Union which coordinates the spending plans of the 11 ministries in the Soviet Union which are responsible for defense construction.

The GRU has a huge budget and operates in a very large scale yet again. Compared to this, we have a situation of remaining confusion in the United States of efforts to rebuild the intelligence community after a period of witch hunting.

This is the context in which the word, I think, can reasonably be used. It is witch hunting against the CIA and the intelligence community in this country, where there are still many legal, budgetary, and political inhibitions about regarding American intelligence which is after all the frontline for this country in the continuous war with the KGB.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF CIA

As I say, there is a problem of understanding in all of this. I was on a program recently with a journalist who did not share all of my views on these things. He kept saying: "Isn't the CIA just as bad as the KGB."

I said to him finally in exasperation, "You have done many, many exposés in your career of the CIA." He said, "Yes; this is necessary." I said, "I don't object to that in a democracy. It is important to debate these matters, although you should also bear in mind that you cannot have a secret service if it doesn't have any secrecy." But I said, "I am curious, since we don't share the same perspective but are able to have a civilized conversation together, to know how many exposés you have done or have attempted to do on the KGB or the Cuban DGI, as a self-styled specialist in intelligence operations."

He said, "How many exposés have you done on the CIA?" I told him. I listed a number of major ones. I was, I think, the first journalist to publish the fact that the CIA was understating the true figures on Soviet military spending by a factor of 50 percent, which got me into trouble with a number of people in Washington and led, I think, to some investigation of my sources.

I gave him a list of articles that I had published which were critical of the CIA.

And I said to him, "Now I have answered your question, which was your reply to my question. Now can I have the answer to my question?"

He looked terribly embarrassed. He had nothing to say. He had spent many years as a specialist in intelligence, specializing in the CIA. He had never touched the enemy of the CIA.

You cannot inform Western public opinion or have a meaningful debate in the public context about intelligence matters without looking at what an intelligence service is designed to do.

The first thing of all that an intelligence service is designed to do is to forewarn your society of possible attacks on it from abroad.

At the extreme, you should be able to forewarn your leaders if another country is going to make war on you. That is the first and overriding concern of intelligence.

To debate intelligence matters, as has happened often in public forums in this country, without discussing the KGB, the main enemy of the United States, is like watching the game on TV at the weekend under unusual circumstances.

You see one team running around with the ball and going through all sorts of gesticulations. The ball is going up in the air, and then it is going down here and back there. There are no hands sometimes. You cannot understand what is going on, because there is only one team being shown on the screen. The other team has been miraculously erased.

Imagine watching a big game on TV in which only one team was depicted, trying to get the ball somewhere. You can't understand it for a moment.

That, I am afraid, is the way that the discussion of intelligence matters is often conducted in this country and in other Western countries.

You debate what your own institutions are doing or not doing and is the CIA as wicked as it is made out to be and should it be rebuilt. But you omit the reason for the existence in the first place of such an organization, which is its enemy—your enemy in this case—predominantly the KGB.

That is why I said your request for some comparison between the climate and conditions in which the Soviet services operate and the CIA and other Western services operate is absolutely crucial.

In talking about response to terrorism, espionage, and covert action, in general, is the real starting point. This is where you begin.

Unless you can make those people who form and shape opinion understand the very simple point that you have to look at both sides, no illumination or education is possible.

Senator DENTON. Mr. Moss, to me it is remarkable the clarity of view and the depth of understanding which you have achieved without having lived in that system.

I would like to report that the principal reason for my being here in the Senate—my own motivation for being here—is to help our people, for purposes of survival, understand not what terrorism, to the degree it is originated in the Soviet Union or not, is affecting the world but the difference between the United States of America and other free worlds and the situation which exists in totalitarian communism in which I did live.

Terrorism, as a domestic tool of control, is so stark and so all-pervading that if one of these goodwilled, of which there are 99.999 percent, liberal journalists who are in my view misled, were to be exposed to that for 10 days they would indeed become messianic.

They would not eat much; they would not get overweight. They would not drink much. They would spend the rest of their lives trying to articulate that which I am constrained from too often and too intensely. There is nothing more self-denying of human rights and nothing more horrifying than to see the rule of terrorism within a totalitarian state.

I want to thank you for the expression of respect you mentioned. I know how significant that was. I know you would not have come over here to testify were you not to have subjected us to a litmus test. I know how much in demand you are. I know how intellectually honest you are.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I deeply appreciate that conclusion. In return, I would say that I have never heard, in my opinion, a more valuable piece of testimony. I intend to submit in the Congressional Record your printed statement. After we get the transcript, I would like to offer that for submission also.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moss follows:]

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MOSS

According to security sources in Rome, Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turkish extremist who tried to assassinate the Pope, has made a remarkable statement to his Italian police interrogators about the time that he spent in Eastern Europe before his attack on the Pontiff. I am reliably informed that Agca has confessed that he acquired both the gun that he used in the assassination attempt and the false passport that enabled him to travel to Italy in Sofia, Bulgaria. He has claimed that 'Turkish nationalists' based in Bulgaria were the source of the weapon and the forged documents. Though the Italian authorities have so far refrained from making any official statement on this part of Agca's confession, I believe that it can easily be verified.

The apparent Bulgarian connection with the would-be killer of the Pope raises deeply disturbing questions. Bulgaria is a totalitarian police state where the activities of foreign visitors are closely monitored by the secret police. The fact that Agca was permitted not merely to transit Bulgaria but (by his own account) to spend several weeks there, to hold meetings with other Turkish extremists, and to leave the country with a gun, suggests -- at the very least -- that the Bulgarian authorities were willing to turn a blind eye to the activities of a man who has been widely, and misleadingly, described in the western media as a 'right-wing fanatic.'

But Agca's visit to Sofia should also be considered against the backdrop of established Bulgarian links with the terrorist movement in Turkey and the Middle East, and of the involvement of the Bulgarian secret police in assassination attempts against emigre dissidents in Western Europe. According to West European press reports, a former Turkish Army lieutenant called Muzaffer Cengil -- now under arrest -- has confessed that during the time that he was a key organizer of a revolutionary terrorist group called Dev-Sol, he maintained close contact with a Bulgarian intelligence officer operating under cover as a cultural attache at the Bulgarian consulate in Istanbul. The Bulgarian's name was Rusi Barov. According to Cengil's testimony, his Bulgarian contact revealed to him that the Soviets -- both directly and via subcontractors like the Bulgarian service and the PLO -- are heavily engaged in channeling covert support to Turkey's

revolutionary underground. This first-hand account is confirmed by the evidence collected by the Turkish security authorities of the Bulgarian role in organizing a massive arms-smuggling operation for the benefit of left-wing terrorists in Turkey.

This does not add up, of course, to hard evidence of Bulgarian complicity in any attempt on the life of a Polish-born Pope. It does serve to focus attention on the broader question of Soviet Bloc involvement in international terrorism, which has excited a heated debate. I am in a position to offer fresh evidence on this theme, including the testimony of recent Soviet intelligence defectors. But I would like to comment, at the outset, on the almost visceral reluctance of some western opinion-makers to study or report such evidence. There seem to me to be three main reasons why some commentators continue to express skepticism about the Soviet role in international terrorism:

The first is CONFUSION OVER DEFINITIONS. The Soviets are fairly open about their support for some terrorist organizations, but they do not describe them as 'terrorist.' They call them 'liberation movements.' Indeed, it should be noted that the 26th Congress of the CPSU earlier this year reaffirmed the 'invariable adherence' of the Soviet Communist Party to 'the cause of the peoples' social and national liberation and its solidarity with liberation movements. Such movements include the PLO and revolutionary groups throughout the Third World. If we accept, as a working definition, that a terrorist organization is one that targets innocent civilians -- men, women and children -- for political ends, then a movement like the PLO can be accurately described as 'terrorist.' We are not obliged to adopt the Soviet lexicon, or the notion that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'

The second problem is FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE OF THE SURROGATE, OR SUBCONTRACTOR. The Soviets are cautious about direct dealings with revolutionary terrorist groups from Western countries. For one thing, evidence of KGB involvement would not help Moscow in its 'peace offensive' and other political and diplomatic initiatives. However, support for such groups is provided on a generous scale by governments and movements that are subject to a high degree of Soviet

control. Moscow's most important subcontractors in this area, apart from the East European satellites, are Cuba; radical Arab regimes like Libya, Syria and South Yemen; and the PLO.

Finally, there is THE PROBLEM OF WISHFUL THINKING. Those who cling to the illusions of a one-sided detente or like to imagine that the leaders of a totalitarian state are peace-loving men of goodwill who share our liberal aspirations are bound to have great difficulty in acknowledging facts that suggest the full ruthlessness of the Soviet design. They will be reluctant to recognize that terrorism has its place in a larger Soviet strategy.

A fascinating insight into the shape of that larger strategy has been provided by a recent Soviet intelligence defector who has disclosed that as early as 1954, the Tenth Department of the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) prepared a plan to interrupt the flow of oil to the West from the Middle East. The plan was formally approved by the Politburo and provided the framework for subsequent Soviet efforts to infiltrate the Arab world -- first by cultivating a special relationship with Egypt and later (when that ploy failed) by the search for other regional surrogates, including the PLO. Today, in fact, the PLO might be viewed as part of the revolutionary vanguard in the Gulf area, and as a Trojan horse within the territory of the conservative Arabian regimes that have been bankrolling it.

It is an arresting thought that, more than quarter of a century ago, the Soviets had already drawn up elaborate plans to challenge Western access to the energy reserves of the Gulf as a key element in a strategy of encirclement. The intimacy of Soviet involvement with the PLO today (and the PLO is described by the same defector as 'the favorite child of the KGB and GRU') is partly inspired by these calculations. Another recent Soviet intelligence defector, Vladimir Korolyuk, a major in the KGB who formerly operated under cover as an interpreter at the arms talks in Vienna, has claimed that the Politburo took the decision last year to intensify support for Third World revolutionary movements as part of a more determined Soviet offensive in areas that are not covered by the NATO pact. We can see the fruits of that approach in Central America as well as in the Middle East and Africa, where both Morocco and Zaire are likely to become the targets for renewed Soviet-backed attacks.

But the Soviet stake in terrorism is not confined to movements that have some chance of bringing about revolution in their own countries or of threatening Western access to vital reserves of energy or weakening of Western societies. Ladislav Bittman, the former deputy chief of the disinformation department of the Czech secret service, has described, for example, how the Soviet Bloc has sponsored neo-Nazi outrages in West Germany in an effort to discredit West German democratic institutions -- one of many examples of the unholy alliance between Red Terror and Black that I will tackle in more detail later on. The Soviets have also been ready to abet acts of terrorism designed to punish Western governments for pursuing specific policies. This seems to me a realistic interpretation of what happened in Austria in 1973, when a team of PLO terrorists seized a trainload of Soviet Jewish refugees near Vienna. The terrorists had crossed the Czech border fully armed. Given the high security that is maintained along that frontier, it is inconceivable -- to all of the Western security experts with whom I have talked -- that the Czech authorities were not fully apprised of what was going on. It is a plausible supposition that the Czech authorities colluded with the PLO terrorists as part of a Soviet-sponsored attempt to pressure the Austrian government into ceasing to provide aid for Jewish refugees from the USSR.

Terrorist groups that do not have overt links with Moscow may provide a cover for Soviet 'executive action' operations.

One final motive for Soviet involvement in international terrorism that is rarely discussed is the crucial role of terrorism in Moscow's war planning -- and contingency plans for an East-West confrontation short of war. The Russians' answer to the Green Berets are the Spetsnaz (or 'Special Designation') forces attached to the 16 Military Districts of the USSR, the four Soviet Fleets, and the four Soviet Army Groups in Eastern Europe. The Spetsnaz forces are under the general direction of the Third Department of the GRU. They include highly secret units -- known only as 'staff companies' -- that are trained to operate abroad in civilian clothes or Western uniforms in collusion with local terrorist networks. The members of these 'staff companies' are given special training to carry out the assassination of political

and military leaders in the West, according to first-hand information from a recent defector. They would rely heavily on established networks of agent-terrorists, including networks of 'sleepers' held in reserve for a major crisis -- for example the need to disrupt the mobilization of NATO forces. Evidence of the thoroughness of Moscow's collection of operational intelligence for sabotage in Western countries has come from Oleg Lyalin, a former member of the KGB's Department V whose defection led to the expulsion of 105 Soviet spies from Britain in 1971.

THE GRU CONTRIBUTION

Training of terrorists in the Soviet Union is the special responsibility of the Soviet Military Intelligence service, the GRU. Since the initials GRU are less well-known than those of its sister-service, the KGB, its role in the recruitment, training and orchestration of international terrorists is frequently underrated. On the sixth floor of the GRU's nine-story headquarters building beside the old Khodinsk field at Moscow's Central Airport are the offices of the most secretive of all its departments: the so-called 'Second Direction.' The special task of the Second Direction is to recruit and supervise networks of agent-terrorists in Western and Third World countries in parallel with the activities of the KGB. General oversight of this area belongs to the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, whose direct links with revolutionary terrorists in El Salvador has been detailed in captured documents released by the U.S. State Department.

EAST BERLIN

Among the many auxiliary services of the KGB, the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung (HVA) -- or 'Main Administration for Espionage' -- the foreign intelligence directorate of the Ministry of State Security (MFS) is perhaps the most active and proficient. The role of East Berlin in the world terrorist network came sharply into focus after the Israelis arrested a Greek Cypriot, Panaviotis Paschalis, in 1973 on charges of identifying and photographing targets for terrorist attack. In subsequent press disclosures, it was learned that, in the guise of a 'stringer' for East German TV, Paschalis had traveled about inside Israel, photographing defense installations and power plants. His material was sent, in the guise of TV footage, to East Berlin via Cyprus.

Security sources in West Germany claim that the East German service maintains a centralized data bank for terrorist groups, and that Department 'K' of the HVA, which runs several forgery factories, turns out beautifully-produced false passports and identification papers that are made available to terrorists as well as undercover agents.

The Soviets have delegated to the HVA much of the responsibility for routine supervision of Quaddafi's secret service and its offshoot, the Liaison Office in Tripoli, which handles relations with foreign terrorist groups.

RED TERROR AND BLACK

A speciality of the East German service is the covert incitement of acts of political violence by right-wing extremists and neo-Nazi groups. The head of the HVA, General Markus Wolf, has some important assets in this field.

The HVA not only recruited some former SS and Gestapo officers after the war, it was able to draw on the archives of the Reich Security Headquarters (RSHA) which were seized and removed from Berlin in 1945 by a special Soviet team headed by General Serov, who later became deputy chairman of the KGB and, finally, head of the GRU. These files were used to blackmail former Nazi officials and, in some cases, to assume occult control of 'Odessa'-type networks in order to sow confusion and disruption. The unholy alliance of the swastika and the Red Star that resulted is one of the most bizarre elements in the present-day pattern of international terrorism. It is revealing to note that French policy investigators have linked the bombing of a Paris synagogue last October -- in which three people died and 33 were injured -- to Libyan intelligence, which operates under close East German supervision.

THE CUBAN CONTRIBUTION

While the East Germans may be the most efficient of the KGB's subcontractors, the Cubans are the most omnipresent. Cuba's Direccian General de Inteligencia (DGI) provided the support facilities for the operations of the notorious Venezuelan-born terrorist 'Carlos,' in London and Paris. The DGI also provides advisers in terrorist training camps ranging from Algeria to South Yemen. The parallel Departamento de America of the Cuban Communist Party -- headed by Manuel Pineiro

Losada, former DGI chief -- is active throughout the western hemisphere: orchestrating the flow of military supplies to El Salvador's guerrillas; recruiting terrorists from all over Latin America for training inside Cuba (more than 800 have gone from Colombia alone to date); plotting terrorism and other covert operations against the 'main enemy' -- the United States -- itself.

Nicaragua -- which has admitted advisers from the PLO as well as Cuba -- was the scene of a remarkable secret gathering last summer at which Fidel Castro outlined his plans for revolutionary upheavals in Central America and even in the United States. The occasion was the anniversary celebrations for the Sandinista victory. But the public was not admitted to the secret meeting at a little town called Monimbo last July at which Castro addressed a carefully-selected audience of Central American revolutionaries and Cuban agents from the United States. Among those present: Manuel Pineiro, the Cuban master of subversion in the Western hemisphere; Dudley Thompson, who at the time was Minister of National Security in Jamaica; Rene Theodor, the Secretary-General of the Cuban Communist Party; and revolutionary organizers from Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico.

According to reliable Western intelligence sources, Castro boasted to this assembly that Cuba would not only spread revolution throughout Central America but had developed the capacity to ignite a race war in the United States. He described with relish the race riots that had shaken Miami, Orlando and other U.S. cities that spring, claiming that Cuba's network of undercover operatives in the United States was so extensive that 'we can make the Miami upheavals look like a sunshower.' This theme was elaborated by Manuel Pineiro at a follow-up conference -- again held in conditions of deepest secrecy -- in Caracas last August, at which the chief of the Departamento de America told a group that included leaders of the terrorist Puerto Rican group, the FALN, that 'the U.S. authorities cannot begin to imagine the capabilities we have in their country.'

Among the likely trends in international terrorism over the coming year is an increasing shift in emphasis from Western Europe to the United States and Latin America, in which the Cubans have readied themselves to play the key organizational role. In the case of the United States, the Cubans have not only supplied weapons

and guerrilla training for the FALN and some black power groups, but for young middle-class extremists who were brought to Cuba under the auspices of the Venceremos Brigades.

MOSCOW AND THE PLO

PLO spokesmen make little secret today of their close dependence on the Soviets. The head of the PLO's Moscow office, Mohammed ash-Sha'ir, publicly boasted last February that hundreds of PLO officers have graduated from Soviet military academies and that 2,000 Palestinian 'students' are currently in the USSR. (Al-Safir, Beirut, February 17, 1981). It is notable that ash-Sha'ir himself enjoys a privileged status in Moscow. For example, while foreign ambassadors require prior permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to travel outside a radius of 110 km from Moscow, the PLO representative travels freely. One of his recent ports of call was Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia -- a significant stop-off point considering the close ties between the PLO and members of extremist Turkish Armenian groups, who receive training at Palestinian camps like Hamouriya, south of Damascus in Syria.

Western intelligence sources estimate that 2,000-3,000 Palestinians have received military and guerrilla training at Soviet Bloc camps over the past two years. Training establishments for PLO recruits inside the USSR include the Sanprobal academy, near Simferopol in the Crimea; the Frunze academy; the camp at Skhodnya, outside Moscow (where Adnan Jaber, one of the Palestinians involved in the massacre of Jews at Hebron on May 2, 1980, was trained); and the Odessa higher infantry school. (Prior to 1965, the Odessa academy provided courses for regular Soviet army officers as well as a 'faculty' for recruits from African and Arab 'liberation movements'; but in that year, the intake of foreigners rose to such proportions that Russian trainees were transferred to Kiev and the academy was entirely given over to non-Russians.)

The flow of arms from the Soviet Bloc to the PLO -- mostly delivered via Syria, South Yemen and Cuba -- includes T-34 tanks (supplied by Hungary) recoilless guns, 'Sagger' anti-tank missiles, RPG-7s and field artillery as well as infantry weapons and explosives. The Hungarians have been delegated the task of training Palestinians

in armored warfare as well as supplying tanks. A West European intelligence estimate is that some 100 Palestinians have been trained in the use and maintenance of armored vehicles in Hungary over the past year.

There is abundant evidence that the PLO leadership consults the Soviets over all major decisions on policy and tactics. Yasser Arafat meets frequently -- on average, once a week -- with the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut, Alexander Soldatov.

The Soviet Union provides the material and infrastructure for PLO terrorism -- including medical care, false documentation, and safe transit for terrorist squads en route to attack targets in Western Europe. East Berlin has been a favored way-station for Palestinian hit-teams en route to the Federal Republic and Scandinavia. Leila Kahled, the notorious hijacker, received medical treatment there last year.

While it is harder to prove that the KGB and GRU provide operational intelligence for PLO terrorist operations -- or help to define the targets -- Western security sources report some degree of liaison between Soviet agents and Palestinian operatives in West European capitals. Direct involvement by Cuban DGI operatives working under diplomatic cover was proven by French security in the investigation of the network set up by 'Carlos' and the PFLP in Paris in 1974.

The web of Soviet links with the PLO and with the radical Arab regimes that provide it with base facilities are sufficient to demonstrate that, in its training program for terrorists from many Western and Third World countries, the PLO is functioning as a subcontractor for Russia. In 1980, according to a recent West European estimate, the PLO provided military training for 400 trainee terrorists from Turkey alone.

But the PLO functions as a Soviet surrogate in other, equally important areas. In 1980, the Pakistani authorities discreetly deported a Palestinian called Zaydan Awni Mahmoud before he completed a pilot's training course. He was found in possession of classified contact with Soviet diplomats identified as intelligence officers.

The PLO also functions as a spokesman on behalf of Soviet foreign policy within the Arab world. At the 1979 'Non-Aligned' summit meeting in Havana, Yasser Arafat was notably active in support of the Cuban proposal to declare the Soviet Union a 'natural ally' of the 'non-aligned' countries. Again, the PLO played a leading role in watering down the draft resolution of the Arab summit conference in Saudi Arabia that criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The PLO's worldwide activities extend to providing a military mission in Managua, Nicaragua, to train guerrillas and local security forces.

But the most important of all its surrogate missions for Moscow may be to sow instability in the oil-rich Gulf. The PLO was deeply involved in training Iranian revolutionaries prior to the overthrow of the Shah. The PLO has even been suspected of a role in the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in November 1979. Six weeks prior to the Embassy occupation, on October 12, a high-level PLO mission including Abu Jihad and the chief of 'special operations,' Abu Walid, visited Teheran and reportedly advised Ayatollah Khomeini to take a tougher stand against the United States.

LIBYAN-SYRIAN TERROR PACT

An ominous recent development in the international terrorist scene is the emergence of a working alliance between the Libyan and Syrian secret services. According to West European security sources, they are now actively collaborating in a campaign to liquidate enemies of the two radical Arab regimes who are living abroad.

In mid-January, Brigadier-General Ali Haydar, the chief of the Syrian commando squads, arrived in London on a six-week visit. Haydar reports to Rifaat Assad, the brother of the Syrian President, and to Brig-General Mohammed al-Khouli, the highly active chief of Syrian foreign intelligence operations. While in London, Haydar is reliably reported to have had discussions with Said Qadaf ad-Dam, the leader of the Libyan 'Green Brigades!'

A few weeks after their planning session, on March 17, gunmen arrived at the home of Issam al-Attar, a leader of the Syrian wing of the Moslem Brotherhood, at Aachen in West German. The Moslem Brotherhood currently provides the backbone of the resistance to the Assad

regime inside Syria, and has carried out attacks on Soviet advisers there as well as on local officials. The wife of Issam al-Attar, Binan, opened the door to the would-be assassins, and was shot dead on the spot. The gunmen have identified the killers as a mixed team of Syrians and Libyans. This appears to be the first case of the two Arab secret services working together on a joint terrorist operation.

Issam al-Attar had been the target for earlier murder attempts. In July, 1980, Syrian gunmen made a botched attempt to kill him. In December 1980, the West German authorities intercepted another Syrian hit-team and summarily deported its members. Similar attempts have been made on the lives of other exiled leaders of the Syrian opposition. On July 21, 1980, one of the chiefs of the National Front for the Liberation of Syria, Salad ad-Din al-Bittar was murdered at the entrance to his office in Paris.

The assassination campaign by Colonel Qaddafi's agents against opponents of the Libyan regime is even more notorious, following a series of murders over the past year and the expulsion of Libyan 'diplomats' from a number of Western countries. The victims included a journalist, Mohammed Mustafa Ramadan, employed by the Arab department of the BBC in London.

TERRORIST BASES IN LIBYA

Qaddafi's Libya has earned the description of the ultimate terrorist state. Qaddafi's largesse for international terrorists is seemingly endless. Terrorists who were put on trial in Tunisia in 1980 confessed that they had received military instruction at Libyan camps under the guidance of Palestinian, Cuban, and Soviet advisers. The prisoners also described how they had been in contact in Libya with terrorist recruits from the IRA, the Basque ETA organization, the Italian Red Brigades, West Germany's Baader-Meinhof underground and with revolutionaries from Greece and Turkey. It was revealed that special training for radical Egyptians plotting against President Sadat is provided on board Soviet naval vessels, moored off Tobruk.

There are some 20 terrorist training bases in Libya ranging from Tripoli to al-Bayda to Tobruk. The largest single category of recruits consists of Palestinians from George Habbash's PFLP. Supervision of

foreign terrorists is the responsibility of the so-called Liaison Office in Tripoli, headed by Ramadan Abdullah.

Soviet complicity in Qaddafi's terrorist training program is easily established, because:

1. The Soviets continue vast arms deliveries to Libya, despite the fact that Qaddafi is supplying weapons to many international terrorist groups. Soviet arms deliveries have helped Libya to develop a force of 2,000 medium tanks, giving Qaddafi the 10th largest armored force in the world.
2. The presence of Soviet, as well as Cuban, instructors in the Libyan camps was confirmed by the statements of the terrorists on trial in Tunisia last year (and reported, inter alia, in L'Europeo (Milan) April 1, 1980).
3. East German advisers are attached to Qaddafi's intelligence service.

The Soviets continue massive arms shipments to radical Arab regimes like those of Syria, Libya and South Yemen despite their systematic support for terrorism against fellow-Arabs as well as against Israel and Western targets. Furthermore, the large-scale presence of Soviet and Soviet Bloc advisers in these countries -- and at some of the terrorist camps -- makes Moscow's complicity even more obvious. In Syria, for example, a team of political commissars from General Yepishev's Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces has been deployed to operate beside the commanders of army units at all levels.

CONCLUSIONS

Without a clear and realistic picture of the support infrastructure for international terrorism, there is little prospect that Western governments will be able to adopt an effective response. The Soviet Union actively sustains that infrastructure. To deal effectively with terrorism, it will be necessary to deter its governmental sponsors through the embarrassment of public exposure and possibly also through sanctions where they are likely to prove effective. Even more indispensable is an intelligence network that

is capable of monitoring and penetrating terrorist groups in order to gain foreknowledge of their plans. Static defense is not an adequate option, given the huge array of possible terrorist targets. The danger has been made graphic by recent reports that the PLO has been seeking to establish a network of three-man cells of 'sleepers' in the United States who could be mobilized -- in particular, to attack energy installations -- in the event of a hotting-up of the Middle East crisis.

CONCLUSION

Senator DENTON. We had questions from Senator East. They have been answered, in effect.

I would indicate that the record will remain open for 10 days if you would consider answering written questions which we may think of.

I want to thank all for their attention and their patience.

The hearing is adjourned.

Mr. Moss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the hearing adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

END