


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
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Managing Criminal Investigations in
(Santa Monica, California:
A Case Study

By

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PREFACE

In 1976 the Office of Technology Transfer, part of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, awarded grants to five police departments to test a process for managing criminal investigations. Generally speaking, this concept involves augmentation of patrol role; reassignment/decentralization of detectives; case screening; police/prosecutor relations and monitoring investigations.

The sites chosen for this test were Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery County, Maryland; Rochester, New York; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Santa Monica, California.

In late 1976, The Urban Institute received a grant to evaluate this project. During 1977 and 1978, Urban Institute staff visited the sites numerous times and evaluated their managing criminal investigations programs.

An individual case study has been prepared describing the background setting, planning, implementation and results of the managing criminal investigations program at each site.

MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS IN SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA:
A CASE STUDY

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. SUMMARY OF THE PROGRAM
- B. MAJOR RESULTS

II. BACKGROUND AND SETTING

- A. THE CITY AND DEPARTMENT
- B. INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU PRIOR TO MCI
- C. DATA AVAILABILITY

III. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM

- A. CHRONOLOGY OF THE MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
FIELD TEST IN SANTA MONICA
- B. PLANNING FOR MCI
- C. IMPLEMENTATION

IV. OUTCOMES OF THE SANTA MONICA MCI PROGRAM

- A. ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU
- B. CASELOAD AND ASSIGNMENT
- C. COMPARATIVE CLEARANCE RATES AND COUNTS
- D. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON PROSECUTION FILING RATES
- E. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON ARREST RATES
- F. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON THE COSTS OF OPERATION
- G. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON PUBLIC RELATIONS
- H. MCI AND THE CONVICTION RATE

V. THE INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU AFTER MCI

- A. ORGANIZATION
- B. CASE FLOW AND DECISION POINTS
- C. MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND MONITORING

APPENDIX A

LIST OF TABLES

	PAGE
I-1 CHRONOLOGY OF MCI IN SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA	I-4
II-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT	II-4
IV-1 CASELOAD BEFORE AND AFTER CASE SCREENING	IV-3
IV-2 PERCENT OF CRIMES CLEARED, NUMBER OF CRIMES CLEARED	IV-4
IV-3 PROSECUTOR CASE ACCEPTANCE RATES	IV-4
IV-4 RATIO OF ARRESTS TO REPORTED CRIMES	IV-6
IV-5 PROSECUTION CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST 100 PERSONS BOOKED FOR PART I CRIMES, 1976-1978	IV-12
IV-5 THREE YEAR CONVICTION RATES	IV-13

LIST OF FIGURES

I-1 SUMMARY OF THE SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MCI PROGRAM	I-6
II-1 BUREAUS OF THE SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT	II-3
II-2 INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU PRIOR TO MCI	II-7
III-1 SANTA MONICA MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM MODEL	III-6
III-2 MCI CASE FLOW	III-12
III-3 INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU DURING MCI	III-16
III-4 MCI MONITORING SYSTEM	III-19
IV-1 ALL PART I CRIMES	IV-7
IV-2 BURGLARY	IV-8
IV-3 ROBBERY	IV-9
V-1 POST-MCI ORGANIZATION CHART	

I. INTRODUCTION

A. SUMMARY OF THE PROGRAM

Within the national Managing Criminal Investigations Project, wide latitude was given to the participant police agencies in regard to specific objectives and the methods by which the objectives would be achieved.

An overriding concern of the Santa Monica MCI program was to remove the investigation of crimes away from an assembly-line process in which each crime was nominally investigated the same way to a system in which specific improvements could be made in clearance rates, the number of cases accepted for prosecution, and the conviction rate.

The Santa Monica Police Department determined early on that its effort would be put into those areas of the investigative process in which a strong degree of control could be exercised.

Specifically, this meant that six areas would be stressed:

- the information taken on the crime report by the patrol officer (incident report);
- the separation of those cases in which a solution was likely from those cases in which a solution was unlikely;
- a reorganization of the Investigations Bureau;
- the methods of investigation which would be used;
- the selection of those cases sent to the prosecutor;
- a monitoring system which would allow for both case-tracking and performance measures.

The incident report was altered so that the patrol officer's initial investigation would determine (1) if a subsequent investigation would take place, and (2) if a case had a reasonable expectation for solution (meaning an identification of a suspect). Specific information requirements were made mandatory (if they existed) for each report. The patrol officer was therefore expected to make the initial investigation.

After the patrol officer had made the initial investigation by filling out the incident report, a determination had to be made as to whether an individual case warranted further investigation. This process of "case screening" was used by Santa Monica to filter out those cases which had little or no probability of being successfully concluded (solved). The investigators went from a system in which each case of a particular type (burglary or robbery, for instance) was given to an investigator to a system in which only "good" cases were investigated, that is, one that had a high probability of solution.

Prior to the MCI program, each investigator who was new to the Investigations Bureau started with the investigation of petty thefts (less than \$50 in value). This type of investigation was regarded as the lowest rung on the investigative ladder with homicide as the top. All the training was "on-the-job" in the initial stages of learning to be an investigator. While formal training was offered to seasoned investigators, the new investigator was left largely to his own devices or to imitating the sometimes idiosyncratic methods of an older detective to learn his trade. The net result was that investigative quality varied considerably depending on the nature of the crime and who had trained each detective.

Under the Santa Monica concept of MCI, there was an attempt to standardize both the training of the individual investigator and the

investigative product. The initial training of new investigators was changed by sending them to classes for new investigators run by the Los Angeles Police Department. Likewise the more experienced investigators were sent to state-approved classes for police officers.

Moreover, a standardized checklist had to be completed before a case could be submitted to the prosecutor's office. The checklist was, in effect, a group of evidentiary requirements which made for a sound prosecution.

Previous to the establishment of the MCI program in the Santa Monica Police Department, the normal sequence in the investigative chain was to submit each case to the prosecution once the individual investigator had determined that his investigation was complete. For most cases there was no formal system of case review before a case was submitted to the prosecutor.

An integral part of the MCI program was a formal system of pre-prosecution case review by the Investigations Bureau supervisory personnel. No longer was submission to the prosecutor's office an automatic event; on the contrary, standards for case submission to the prosecutor's office were based on prosecutorial standards rather than on police department standards. The shift from department to prosecutorial standards represented a major change in perspective within the Santa Monica Police Department.

The last component to be implemented was a formal monitoring system which had two purposes: first, it followed the path of each case that came into the Investigations Bureau; second, it produced performance measures by which both individual investigators and the Department could be judged. The monitoring system was used as a feedback mechanism and served both to monitor the program and to suggest areas where new program elements might be needed.

A chronology of MCI in Santa Monica is contained in Table I-1.

TABLE I-1: CHRONOLOGY OF MCI IN SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

1974	Civilians replace sworn officers in positions where applicable, i.e., dispatchers, jailers, etc.
June 1976	SMPD receives a Request for Proposal (RFP) from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to field test the Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) grant.
July 1976	SMPD submits a proposal on the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test to LEAA.
September 1976	LEAA awards the SMPD the MCI grant for \$135,000 to be funded over an 18 month period.
October - November 1976	Program design formulated that planned how changes in the investigative process were to be carried out by the SMPD over the life of the grant.
November 1976	Program design presented in a conference, held in Washington, D.C., of the five cities in the MCI Field Test.
October - December 1976	Program integrated into the Department as a whole program rather than as an "add-on" which would disappear after the termination of the grant.
	Project Director and staff chosen for the MCI program.
January - March 1977	The following major elements were installed? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the development of case decision (solvability factors) • citizen information bulletins • prosecution filing check list • meetings with prosecutor's staff • computerized tracking system (within department)
April - June 1977	The remainder of the essential elements were put in place. These included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • computerized tracking system (prosecution) • computerized officer performance reports • Management Information System (MIS)

TABLE I-1: CHRONOLOGY OF MCI IN SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
(continued)

June 30, 1978	MCI grant completion date.
Latter Part 1978	District Attorney's Office required that each case brought to his office for consideration have a "follow-up" investigation.

A summary of the MCI program is shown in Figure I-1. In the first column are the planned events and expected results. The arrows indicate causal links assumed by the planners. In the second column are the measures used for deciding if the planned events happened. The last two columns indicate whether the planned event occurred during the MCI grant period and what happened after the grant period. Essentially, all of the planned program elements were implemented while half of the expected results were realized. Many of the program elements were discontinued after the grant period and the output measures took an unfavorable turn.


B. MAJOR RESULTS

(1) Was the Productivity of the Investigations Bureau Increased? Yes.

One of the most beneficial results of Santa Monica's experience with MCI was an improved productivity which was achieved with fewer investigators.

The major reasons for this improvement lay in the following:

- considerably more information was presented on the new incident reports;
- the case screening system gave only "promising" cases to the investigators;
- a standardized investigative method proved to be more effective than the personal approach used before MCI;



9-1

FIGURE I-1: SUMMARY OF THE SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MCI PROGRAM

- supervisory review reduced the number of investigative errors in those cases sent to the prosecutor;
- the monitoring system reviewed the progress of each case every ten days. The ten-day review process required that a supervisor approve further investigation after each 10-day segment. If a case was not approved for further investigation, it was closed out. The case could be reopened if new information or evidence was introduced.

The net result of the MCI system was to separate those cases with a reasonable probability for success from those cases where there existed little or no probability for success. Once a case was investigated, it moved through the system in a prescribed manner with time constraints placed on how long a case was allowed to remain open.

(2) Were There Improvements in the Bureau's Operation?

Based on the subjective judgment of the Bureau Commander during the grant period, several improvements in the overall operation occurred. Basically, the operation was improved because a fixed system was imposed on Bureau operations. The system that had existed previously was highly individualistic and relied on the singular abilities of each investigator. The MCI program set standards by which most varieties of crime could be judged for solution and further set up those criteria which would allow the individual investigators to know if the prosecutor would accept a case or reject it.

The Bureau Commander also felt that for the first time he, "knew what his investigators were doing." By this he meant that he had measures which he could use to judge both the individual investigator's performance as well as the Bureau's performance as a whole.

Before the grant the Bureau Commander only knew when something went wrong; after the grant was in place, he had the ability to know not only

when things were going "right," but to what degree they were right (or wrong) as well.

(3) Was the Clearance Rate Improved? Maybe yes.

Overall, the clearance rate was 20% for 1977 Part I UCR crimes--the highest that the Santa Monica Police Department had achieved in the previous ten years. However, the clearance rates in some years were close to 20 percent. Many different factors could have contributed to the clearance rate besides the MCI program.

(4) Did the Prosecutor's Office Accept a Higher Percentage of Cases? Yes.

Since one of the original elements of the program was to adopt prosecutorial standards for the submission of cases, a higher acceptance rate was expected. This is, in fact, what did occur; an added bonus was that the time from the occurrence of the crime to the filing with the prosecutor was reduced. The filing rate was 98% for the year 1977, the first year of the MCI program. This figure had not been greater than 91% in the preceeding three years.

(5) Were Arrest Rates Improved? No.

The arrest rates remained relatively stable over a three year period from 1975 through 1977. The ratio of arrests to crimes for the year 1977 was .14 (14 arrests for each 100 crimes). This was slightly lower than the ratio for the previous two years. As stated earlier in this section, the relationship between arrests and the MCI program were weak. Had the program taken place in an isolated area, it may have had a positive effect on both arrests and therefore crime, but as it was, the effects of the MCI program on the arrest rate were trivial, if they existed at all.

(6) Was There Satisfaction Among the Investigators and Administration with the MCI Program? Generally, Yes.

The Chief of Police and the Investigations Bureau Commander both felt that the MCI program had improved the performance of the Investigations Bureau. From the management point of view the MCI program proved itself to be successful with respect to its original objectives. Initially, there was resistance on the part of the investigators to the MCI program. While a resistance to change is expected in any organization, the investigators originally saw the program as an incursion to their independence. Investigators in the Santa Monica Police Department enjoyed a large amount of freedom from supervisory control with loose criteria for performance evaluation. The establishment of objective criteria (cases per week, investigative check-lists, deadlines, and prosecutorial acceptance rates) caused several long-time investigators to ask for transfers to patrol.

After the program had been in place for several months, however, those investigators who remained in the Bureau generally were willing to testify both to their personal satisfaction with the MCI program and to the program's usefulness in the investigation process. The investigators complained, in fact, after some components of the program had to be dropped at the end of the grant period.

While the program worked smoothly during the grant period, it was sufficiently complex that many components of the program fell into disuse after the original MCI staff had transferred to other sections within the police department. Some pre-MCI policies were re-instituted at the end of the grant which left in question many of the positive aspects of the MCI program. The reason for this reversion to the pre-grant policies appears to lie in the difficulty in transferring in toto a complex technology to naive personnel.

(7) Is The Santa Monica MCI Concept Transferrable to Other Police Agencies? Maybe.

The Santa Monica program was designed as a managerial package rather than as a series of techniques to be added to the normal flow of the investigation process. The approach that Santa Monica took was:

- collect relevant data about the operation of the Investigations Bureau;
- choose points of intervention in which improvement seem likely;
- make the intervention;
- test the intervention through the monitoring system;
- accept or reject the intervention based on performance criteria.

At the heart of the approach taken by the SMPD was the monitoring system. The monitoring system used a complex tracking method which traced the flow of each case from its entry into the Investigations Bureau until its final disposition in the courts. As mentioned earlier, the monitoring system gave detailed information about the productivity of the investigator working a case as well as information about the case itself.

The monitoring system was not used as a tool for crime analysis; its functions were only those of a transaction trace (what happened to the case as it moved through the Bureau) and a device to measure individual productivity. The requirements for this kind of monitoring were stringent. Data had to be entered into the system on a regular basis, with computer forms filled out by the investigators themselves.

The only way that this system could be transferrable to other agencies would be through the acceptance of the discipline (at all levels within an agency) that the Santa Monica approach imposed. The concept cannot be

accepted on a piecemeal basis because the structural components were highly interrelated.

Thus, if a police agency were to have any success with the Santa Monica program, a heavy investment in planning would be necessary. On the other hand, because the system is a "top-down" method (i.e., the structure of the program involved all levels of the agency), the probability for success is higher than a system added piecemeal to an investigations operation.

II. BACKGROUND AND SETTING

A. THE CITY AND DEPARTMENT

The city of Santa Monica is a Southern California beach city and has a population of approximately 93,000 and has an area of 8.3 square miles. It is surrounded by the city of Los Angeles and is a residential suburb of the Los Angeles Metropolitan area. Santa Monica has some light industry, but once was a center of the pre-World War II aircraft industry. Douglas Aircraft (now McDonnell-Douglas) started in Santa Monica, and Clover Field was one of Charles Lindberg's testing areas prior to his flight across the Atlantic. Because there was not enough available land in Santa Monica to meet the war's production needs, Douglas Aircraft moved its main production to an adjacent Southern California area. One of the first "tenants" of the older Douglas hanger area was the Air Force's Research and Development Project, later to be called Project Rand and then the Rand Corporation. The Rand Corporation and Systems Development Corporation (a Rand offshoot) as well as many smaller "think tanks" remain in Santa Monica.


Santa Monica shares most of the characteristics of other beach cities in Los Angeles County: the population is roughly 90% White with Black and Latin populations of 3% and 7% respectively. On a busy summer day the beaches may attract as many as 200,000 people. The transient population is quite young with a high percentage of teenagers. The resident population is approximately 80% renters, and while Santa Monica once had a disproportionately high number of elderly people, their numbers have shrunk over the past decade.

To the north of Santa Monica lies Pacific Palisades, a Los Angeles suburb which is a high income area with predominantly single-family dwellings. To the south lies another Los Angeles suburb called Venice. Venice is somewhat unusual in that it has large minority populations for a Los Angeles Beach city. Venice crime rates are high and spill across the border into Santa Monica.

Santa Monica is also the western terminus for the Santa Monica Freeway which allows easy access to other parts of the Los Angeles Metropolitan area. The proximity to the freeway allows the random "hit" of burglary and robbery to be high.

The Chief of Police during the MCI grant was George P. Tielsch. Tielsch came to the Santa Monica Police Department in 1974 from Seattle, Washington where he was Chief of Police. Chief Tielsch held the position of chief for five years before leaving in January 1979 to become Chief of Police in Anaheim, California.

The Santa Monica Police Department is organized into four administrative Bureaus: Administrative Services, Operations, Investigations, and Technical Services. The organization is shown below in Figure II-1. The four Bureaus are fairly straightforward in their duties. Administrative Services oversees departmental personnel activities, relations with other departments in the city government, and the planning and budgeting functions; Operations is the uniformed officer component which comprises the day-to-day operations of the Department in keeping order and apprehending criminals; the Investigations Bureau investigates crimes, gathers information, performs special investigations not necessarily of a criminal nature (licenses, and the like), and works with those juveniles who have run afoul of the law; Technical Services is chiefly concerned with recordkeeping, stenographic services, and maintenance of the police station and the fleet of police cars.



POSITIONS - CLASSES

1 POLICE CHIEF	1 JUNIOR CLERK	11 PARKING CHECKERS	1 YOUTH SERVICES COUNSELOR
4 POLICE CAPTAINS	1 SECRETARY TO POLICE CHIEF	4 PARKING STRUCTURE ATNDS.	1 SR. ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICER
4 POLICE LIEUTENANTS	1 SECRETARY	9 COMMUNICATION OPERATORS II	5 ANIMAL CONTROL OFFICERS
21 POLICE SERGEANTS	1 PRINCIPAL CLERK	8 JAILERS	26 CROSSING GUARDS (As needed)
99 POLICE OFFICERS	13 STENOGRAPHERS	1 CUSTODIAN I	18 CADETS (Part time)
2 POLICEMEN	10 INTERMEDIATE CLERKS	1 STOREKEEPER	
1 SR. I.D. TECHNICIAN	3 TELEPHONE OPERATORS I	1 WAREHOUSE WORKER	
6 I.D. TECHNICIANS	1 PARKING SUPERVISOR	1 SENIOR CLERK	

FIGURE II-1
Bureaus of the Santa Monica Police Department

Each Bureau has a Captain as its commander. Captain is the highest civil service rank in the Santa Monica Police Department; the Chief of Police serves at the discretion of the City Manager who is in turn responsible to the City Council.

As the description above would indicate, the Santa Monica Police Department falls heir to the problems and crime rates of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area. Table II-1 shows selected crime rates over a four-year period.

TABLE II-1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE
SANTA MONICA POLICE
DEPARTMENT

	UCR Part 1	Burglary	Robbery	All Other Part I
1975	8,344 (100%)	2,092 (25%)	330 (4%)	5922 (71%)
1976	8,287 (100%)	2,077 (25%)	433 (5%)	5777 (70%)
1977	8,730 (100%)	2,340 (27%)	445 (5%)	5945 (68%)
1978	8,586 (100%)	2,254 (26%)	487 (6%)	5845 (68%)

	Total Budget	# Officers	# Civilians	% Sworn	% Investi- gators	Part I offenses per Officer	Part I arrests per Offense	Part I clear- ance per Officer	Part I clear- ance per Arrest
1975	\$4.7 m	133	60	69%	26%	.09	.14	11.68	1.36
1976	\$5.0 m	134	73	65%	26%	.09	.14	11.29	1.26
1977	\$5.2 m	133	75	64%	26%	.09	.14	13.31	1.52
1978	\$5.3 m	131	77	63%	21%	.09	.14	12.41	1.54

As shown in Table II-1, Santa Monica has sustained generally rising crime rates with roughly the same number of sworn personnel. In order to augment the sworn force, there has been a policy of replacing sworn officers with civilians where applicable. Thus dispatchers, jailers, and matrons are now civilians. This policy has been in effect since 1974 and has continued to put more officers in the field.

Concurrent with "civilianization" was the growing awareness that other methods would have to be found to either allow police officers to become more efficient or to alter the various operations within the Department in a way that would allow higher productivity. The two most likely candidates for change were Operations and Investigations.

The Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test thus came at a time when systematic changes were considered as necessary (1976). The MCI Field Test allowed a program to be implemented in a systematic fashion, while at the same time providing enough money to make changes which were outside the reach of the Police Department's annual budget.

B. INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU PRIOR TO MCI


Prior to the MCI program (and after), the Investigations Bureau was one of the four bureaus in the Santa Monica Police Department, the other three being the Administrative Services, Operations, and the Technical Services. The staffing of the Investigations Bureau prior to MCI was comprised of one Captain as Bureau Commander, one Lieutenant as Executive Officer, two Sergeants, and thirty Officers who acted as the Investigators. In the Santa Monica Police Department, there is no special rank or pay differential for Investigators.

The primary organization function of the Investigations Bureau is the identification and prosecution of the perpetrator(s) for a given crime or set of crimes. Most of the other functions are ancillary to this primary function. Such things as background checks for prospective employees while falling outside the general purview of criminal investigation, do, nonetheless, require investigative skills and therefore fall quite naturally into the general tasks in the Bureau. The Investigative Bureau also provides information to patrol regarding wanted suspects, crime trends, and potential areas which might be crime-prone.

As Figure II-2 shows for the Investigations Bureau, it was organized along the lines of being "crime specific," that is, an investigator is assigned to work certain types of crime: burglary, robbery, etc., rather than being a generalist. The assignment is further assigned by geographic area. Hence, each case is assigned by crime and by district to an investigator, the exception being burglary which is assigned on the basis of "odd or even" addresses to prevent workload imbalances.

The work that the investigators do can be considered a "second order" level of operation, the "first order" being normally the work of the patrolman in the field. The investigator has traditionally been thought of as an elite officer whose expertise is honed by years of experience and by meriting assignment to the Investigations Bureau from Patrol.

While the detective mystique has not disappeared from the role of the investigator, in recent years the role has changed considerably. Probably the basis of the change was rooted in the changing role of the police officer, the requirements for evidence in prosecution, and in the highly mobile nature of today's criminal element which has afforded the investigator less opportunity to know the criminals he investigates.



II-7

FIGURE II-2
Investigations Bureau Prior to MCI

All cases of a non-trivial nature were sent to the Investigations Bureau from Operations by way of Technical Services, if typing was required. By 1975, there were approximately 8,300 UCR Part I crimes sent to the Investigations Bureau. In addition to the UCR Part I crimes, approximately 3,000 other cases were sent to the Bureau which required some action by an investigator. During 1975, there were 330 robberies and 2,100 burglaries.

Prior to MCI the Santa Monica Police Department had a policy of "working" each non-trivial case that was forwarded to the Investigations Bureau. "Working" a case meant that even in those cases where there was no evidence, contact was made with the victim, if for nothing more than for the sake of good public relations.

An informal screening system occurred with each Investigator separating those cases in which a clearance seemed likely from those cases in which a clearance was unlikely. The separation was made on a purely subjective basis. All cases, regardless of their probability to be solved, became part of the "caseload," which in some cases reached as many as fifty separate crimes. Although the likelihood for clearance was quite low in those cases which were not solved in the first week, many investigators would not close out unpromising cases, often keeping the cases for several months, and in one case for as long as two years.

1. THE ROUTINE

The work of the Investigator in the Santa Monica Police Department like many other police departments is mostly routine: forms are filled out, legal requirements satisfied, and routine checks for critical information in the crime reports are maintained. As mentioned above, prior to the establishment of the MCI program, virtually every case which came across an investigator's

desk had to somehow be "worked"; that is, checked for details with respect to finding or identifying a suspect in the crime. If a suspect had been identified, then evidence had to be culled which would allow the case to be filed with the prosecutor's office.

The routine is broken only when an exceptional case occurs which demands more than the normal effort put forth for a case. In Santa Monica, a non-routine case would be murder, a robbery or burglary of large worth or great violence, or a crime which might otherwise attract media attention.

The routine and the non-routine cases are differentiated not by method by which an officer investigates a case, but rather by the amount of time which is devoted to each case, routine investigation might take anywhere from a few minutes to two hours. The non-routine case might take forty hours or more.¹

2. THE INVESTIGATOR'S TRAINING

One of the more difficult problems encountered in any police department is the question of specialization which takes place in the investigative function. While the same principles of investigation are consistent regardless of the crime, many crimes require special information and techniques. One example is that of forgery and bad checks; considerable training is required that enables the investigator to become familiar with the techniques used in check-cashing schemes. Other crimes also have their peculiarities and special techniques, and thus, it is beneficial to a department to have investigators skilled at solving a given type of crime.

At the same time there are other pressures within a department which are cause for the generalist officer and investigator. Among these are the

¹. Based on selected non-routine cases for 1977.

desire to give younger officers a "chance" at many positions within the department other than standard patrol duties. It is also a method of removing the so-called "dead wood" from positions that become institutionalized.

Officers who change rank or positions also leave vacancies through the normal process of attrition and promotion.

Within the Santa Monica Police Department, those officers who score high on the Sergeant's examination are those who are considered for replacement at the vacant investigator positions. Thus, the selection as an investigator is regarded as something of a reward for a high score on the examination. The selection process presents problems as well as benefits. While a high standard is maintained for investigators, the time that a new investigator might have at his position is limited by the time that it takes for him to succeed to the rank of Sergeant. There was, therefore, a tendency to have a high turn-over rate among the younger officers.

The policy in the Santa Monica Investigations Bureau has generally evolved in such a way that the positions of burglary, auto theft, and robbery investigator are generally given to the younger officers who score high on the Sergeant's examination. The positions of homicide/assault, forgery, bad checks, warrants, and juveniles are generally retained by seasoned investigators.

C. DATA AVAILABILITY

The Santa Monica Police Department had only limited data available prior to the advent of the MCI program. The data that were maintained were predominantly that of crime records kept as a standard practice by police agencies throughout the United States. These records included:

- Incident Reports filed by crime type (burglary, robbery, etc.) and then later collated according to the numerical order in which the event occurred. During 1978, the incident reports were filed only by numerical sequence.
- Criminal Histories. These reports are made for each person arrested by the Santa Monica Police Department for a felony. The reports record such items as each time a person has had contact with the Department, what the disposition of the arrest was, what the disposition of the prosecutor's office was, and the disposition of the courts. The criminal history reports also include the Federal and State criminal histories as a supplement.
- Index Card File. This file is a large, manually operated file which cross-references booking numbers with incident report numbers. The file is an alphabetical listing of all those people who have come into contact with the Santa Monica Police Department and who have an official record.
- Personnel Rosters. These are standard organizational rosters which show where the various sworn and non-sworn personnel are placed within the organization. These files are useful to trace the flow of personnel throughout the department.
- Investigations Bureau Case Logs. The case logs show the day that a particular case entered the Bureau for disposition, whether a suspect was in custody, which investigator was assigned to a particular case, and whether a follow-up report was made on the original report. All those transactions were accompanied by the dates of occurrence.
- Bookings. Those people arrested who require incarceration are listing on "booking sheets" (sometimes called a "blotter"). These records show the arrestees name, the offense, the booking number, date of incarceration, and a reference number if the person had been arrested before at the Santa Monica Police Department.
- Monthly and Annual Uniform Crime Reports. These reports are made on forms which are standardized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These reports include the number of crimes, the percentage solved ("cleared"), and the value of property stolen.

The data availability changed once the MCI program went into effect. The monitoring element set up a data collection system which allowed a great deal of information to be derived about the relevant parts of the program.

The monitoring system traced each case that came into the Investigations Bureau through its final disposition. Among those data elements collected were:

- Identification data including suspect's name (if available), victim's name, what types of evidence were collected, what the disposition of the case was in the Investigations Bureau and how long the case took to go through the Bureau.
- Performance Data. These data included all information about the performance of the individual investigator. Such items as how long the investigator worked on a particular case, the average time taken for all those cases worked by a particular investigator, and within a given time frame what cases remained "open" (that is, no disposition had yet been made) and which had been "closed" (either nothing more could be done or the case was "filed" with the prosecutor).
- Prosecution Data. This part of the data collection system traced each case through the Prosecutor's office to determine what became of those cases that were accepted for prosecution.

III. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM

A. CHRONOLOGY OF THE MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS FIELD TEST IN SANTA MONICA

Late in June 1976, the Santa Monica Police Department received a Request for Proposal (RFP) from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The RFP sought to test the results of several years of research that had been done on the investigative process at various institutions.¹

Prior to the RFP, the Santa Monica Police Department had been contacted by LEAA consultant Jack Kenney about the possibility of entering into a grant which would seek to streamline the investigative process.

Towards the end of July 1976 the Santa Monica Police Department sent a proposal on the Managing Criminal Investigation Field Test to LEAA for consideration. The proposal was successful and in September 1976, LEAA awarded the Santa Monica Police Department the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test grant for \$135,000 to be funded over an eighteen month period.

During October and November of 1976 a Program Design was formulated. The Program Design was a planning document on what and how changes in the investigative process were to be carried out in the Santa Monica Police Department over the life of the grant.

The Program Design was prepared for a conference held in Washington, D.C. at the end of November 1976. The conference was the first meeting of the five grant cities in the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test. The conference was held under the direction of the University Research Corporation

1. Among these were the Rand Corporation, the Stanford Research Institute, and the Police Foundation.

who was given the responsibility for training and methods development for the five grant police departments.

From September 1976 through December 1976, Santa Monica developed the basic components which were to become the foundation for the program. These components were comprised of (1) the case screening system, (2) a shift of personnel, (3) the initiation of a major crimes unit, (4) establishing a new police-prosecutor working relationship, and (5) the beginning of the monitoring system.

The basic components were accompanied by technical innovations which facilitated the operation of the program.

The most far-reaching and difficult of the innovations was the design of a new crime report. The main object of the new crime report was to assemble and organize pertinent information about any given case so that a quick review would predict with a reasonable degree of probability whether or not a case could be "solved." "Solved" in this case means that the perpetrator(s) are able to be identified, and some official action taken. A secondary object was to develop a chain of responsibility which would filter out mistakes made in the reporting procedure. By requiring supervisors to "sign-off" on the reports, responsibility was placed on the supervisors to see that reports were correctly filled before submission to the Investigation Bureau.

A second innovation was the development of a computerized monitoring system in which optical scanning was used to record the data. Optical scanning is a technique in which typewritten materials are recorded on magnetic tape for use on a computer. The information is then analyzed for management reports and the monitoring of each case.

These two technical innovations, while not objectives in themselves, served to radically alter the development of the Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test.

During the last three months of 1976, the major intent was to lay a foundation on which the full program would rest. An important managerial impetus during this period was a series of senior staff meetings which lent the authority of the Chief's office to the program. The program was integrated into the department as a whole rather than as an "add on" which would disappear after the termination of the grant.

A project director was chosen who had previously directed a planning and research grant for the Department. He had as his staff a research analyst and a secretary. The Managing Criminal Investigations (MCI) staff was given a separate office and integrated into the Investigations Bureau. Also serving as a resource to the MCI staff was the Department's systems analyst who was to do the necessary computer programming.

During the first quarter of 1977, the major parts of the program which were installed were:

- the development of case decision criteria (solvability factors)
- citizen information bulletins
- prosecution filing check list
- meetings with prosecutor's staff
- computerized tracking system (within department)

The program elements listed above were essentially refinements of the original program design.

By the second quarter of 1977, the remainder of the essential elements were in place. These included:

- Computerized Tracking System (prosecution)
- Computerized officer performance reports
- Management Information System (MIS)

These last elements served as part of the monitoring system, but in fact later became much more; they allowed experimentation to test which configurations worked more efficiently in regard to case clearances and costs of operation.

The grant ended in September 1978. At this time the grant had been in effect for twenty-one months (this time period included a three-month extension). By this time, several major changes had occurred within the program:

- Captain Robert Morgan had retired (March 1978) and gone into private business.
- Lt. Billy King had been rotated back to patrol and had no more association with the MCI program.
- The Investigations Bureau now had two Lieutenants rather than one; one lieutenant was responsible for crimes against property, the other for crimes against persons.
- The monitoring component was sharply curtailed. Whereas the monitoring component had once given ten-day reports on each individual investigator's caseload, the caseload after September 1978 was only given once a month. In addition, all cases were not tracked, only those which were assigned to a specific investigator were put into the computer.
- The Major Crimes Detail which, during the grant period had been responsible for fifty or more clearances a month (chiefly in burglaries), was used as a robbery suppression unit which had little or no effect.

By September, much of the original MCI program had been dismantled and there was a general drift toward the policies that existed prior to the MCI grant. The two changes which remained intact were the new incident report

(which restructured information pertinent to the crime or event) and the case screening system which separated the cases which had a high probability for solution from those that had little or no probability for solution. These two changes had become institutionalized to the point that their continuance seems assured.

B. PLANNING FOR MCI

As mentioned earlier, the MCI Field Test was regarded not only as a method of improvement, but also as an agent of reorganization. The underlying theme in accepting the grant was that the Investigations Bureau would require rather profound changes if improvements were to be made. Figure III-1 is a model of the Santa Monica MCI program.

At the onset of the program, Chief Tielsch made it clear that he expected many changes to be made in the Investigations Bureau in order for improvement to be made. The new Bureau commander was selected, Robert Morgan, to take the place of Clarence Hansen, who was close to retirement. Captain Morgan had been the Investigations Bureau commander four years previous to the grant, and therefore understood the investigative function of the Department as well as its problems.

The Project Director, Lieutenant Billy T. King, was chosen both for his administrative experience with a grant and his background in research-oriented police work. Lieutenant King was the Project Director for a previous planning and research grant which had been quite successful. In the MCI grant Lieutenant King was given a staff of a research analyst and a secretary. The MCI staff was attached to the Investigations Bureau as a new entity and worked directly under the supervision of Captain Morgan.




FIGURE III-1
SANTA MONICA MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
PROGRAM MODEL

A trip to Washington, D.C. was sponsored by LEAA at the end of November 1976. All of the grant city police departments in the national program attended the conference which was intended to set forth the philosophy, goals, and the methods which were to be used in the program. The principal administrative staffs from each grant police agency attended and sought to establish the "ground rules" for the grant with the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, that part of LEAA which sponsored the national Managing Criminal Investigations Field Test.

The general attitude on the part of the Santa Monica Police Department was one of experimentation with the suggested techniques. While the goals of the national program were oriented towards higher arrest rates and more convictions, Santa Monica's emphasis was more oriented towards internal efficiencies and managerial control. Thus, the techniques which were found to work in a relatively short period of time would be kept while the others would be discarded. Although the attitude was very pragmatic, the staff realized that some trends became apparent only after long periods of time. The monitoring system that was devised was to collect and process data that would allow serious, long-term research into the mechanisms and behavior of the Investigations Bureau. Relative to the other components, the monitoring was by far the most sophisticated and research-oriented.

While the major components of the grant were prescribed by LEAA, the implementation was left to the discretion of the Santa Monica Police Department. It was felt by the staff that the method in which the grant was implemented was critical to its success. It was felt at the onset of the program that a harshly imposed system would meet resistance from both the detectives and the supervisors; hence, an approach was initiated which served to educate line personnel in the MCI concept. Feedback was encouraged

into how the program was being accepted, difficulties in implementation, and areas for improvement.

During the first three months of the grant, several meetings per week were held among the staff. Methods of operation, personnel, and technical problems were the topics of discussion. The staff sought consensus views on how the program should be implemented with the understanding that mistakes would be made and that revisions would be necessary as the grant progressed.

Once the bulk of the program was in place, the meetings became less frequent. During the last half year, staff meetings were used as a basis for information dissemination than program planning.

Santa Monica had both an advantage and disadvantage in the size of its investigations bureau. The advantage lay in the relative logistical ease with which new assignments or structural reorganization could take place. The reordering of investigators would not require a great amount of time nor money to effect.

The disadvantage lay in that if mistakes were made, even the movement of a few investigators could have a disastrous result on the performance of the Bureau.

Since changes were to be made, the real question became what sort of changes and how were they to be implemented? As the starting point, the Bureau commander, Captain Robert Morgan organized a task force composed of the Project Manager, Lieutenant Billy King, the Bureau Lieutenant, Michael McClary and others in supervisory or technical positions.

The task force felt that as a starting point the recommendations of the "Rand Report" should be tried first to see if they worked.¹ Among the recommendations from the Rand Report were:

1. See Greenwood, Chaiken, and Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1977, pp. 237 ff.

- incorporating prosecutorial standards for evidence in the investigation cases
- separating the "promising" cases from unpromising cases for investigation
- incorporating a "strike force" for non-routine investigations
- reallocation of investigative resources

The methods by which these recommendations were implemented was to restructure the whole of the Investigations Bureau. A "Case Screening" Officer (CSO) was established whose job it was to separate the promising cases from the unpromising cases. The separation of cases was enhanced considerably by a revision in the standard Department incident report form. The revision of this form will be discussed in a later section. The CSO also made the tentative assignment of cases to individual investigators.

The second revision was in the area of the investigative process itself. The Rand Report made a strong case for submitting only those crimes to the prosecutor where there was "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." In terms of the investigative process, a check-list was devised which corresponded to the needs of the prosecutor. Before a felony case was "filed" with the prosecutor, the check-list was to be submitted to a reviewing supervisor.

In addition, a single officer became responsible for virtually all the cases submitted to the prosecutor's office. The exceptions were those cases in which specialized knowledge was required. It was felt that using a single officer had the advantage of not tying up several investigators at the same time. Once the standards of the prosecutor's office were known, a single officer would be more likely to develop a "feel" for what would be rejected and what would not.

The formation of a "strikeforce" and reallocation of investigative resources were related. The staff knew that fewer cases would be reaching the individual investigators because of case screening. It was not known, however, how many fewer cases and what types of crimes (robbery, burglary, etc.) would be filtered out in the case screening process. A decision was made to reduce the burglary investigators by 2, the juvenile investigators by 1, and robbery investigators by 1, and the general investigators by 2. These investigators were then incorporated into the strike force which was to be used for "proactive" or non-routine cases. Examples of this usage might be a notorious crime or a rash of burglaries whose modus operandi (MO) was similar.

The change in organizational structure is shown in Figures II-2 and III-3. The total complement of investigative officers and support in staff showed virtually no change before and during the MCI grant. The reduction in investigative positions was taken up by the addition of the MCI staff for the duration of the grant. After the grant was finished, however, there was a reduction of four people in overall staffing: from 40 to 36. The point will be viewed more thoroughly under the section on costs.

C. IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the MCI program was accomplished in five steps. These steps were made at different times during the grant and appear here in chronological order.

1. NEW REPORT FORM AND TRAINING

One of the major changes that was made by the Santa Monica Police

Department was in its Crime Report form. The form that was used before the MCI grant was a standard form which was a facsimile of a State (California) form recommended for municipal police departments by the California Attorney General's Office.

Although the information contained in the State form was both pertinent and comprehensive, it was organized in a fashion which took a great deal of time to extract the important data. LEAA recommended several other formats: among them, the one used by the Rochester, New York Police Department. This was the one adopted by the Santa Monica MCI staff; it was chosen because of its simplicity and its ability to quickly organize pertinent information.

The purpose of the form change was to tell quickly if a case had a high probability for a successful investigation or not. The two forms, old and new, are both shown in Appendix A.

2. CASE SCREENING

The second instrument of change was case screening. The MCI case flow is illustrated in Figure III-2. As mentioned previously, prior to the MCI program each new case was automatically directed to an investigator regardless of the merits of the case. Each morning the individual investigator would leaf through the new arrivals directed to him and screen those cases himself on the basis of available clues, evidence, and witnesses. Those cases which had a high probability for success (based on each investigator's subjective determination) were investigated first, while the others were relegated to lesser priorities.

Each case, however, required some "follow-up" action, that is, some form of mandatory investigation, regardless of how minimal it was. The net result was a system whereby the investigator made a thorough investigation on some, and little or no investigation on others, while having




FIGURE III-2: MCI CASE FLOW

responsibility for all. It was, in short, a system which "robbed Peter to pay Paul." The time spent in selecting the cases and then in writing "follow-ups" on the worthless cases was time that was unavailable for the cases which had a high probability for a successful solution. "Case screening" sought to eliminate those cases from the investigator's workload which had little or no probability for success. Eliminating the cases before the investigator ever saw them gave the investigator that time which was previously spent in screening cases himself and in doing futile follow-ups.

An experienced officer would make a determination of whether each case should be investigated or not. The case screening system was used in previous research to determine which cases were likely to be solved given specific data.¹

The system functioned on the basis of the new crime report (Form 3.1.1 NEW, see Appendix) which specified the pertinent data required for a successful solution to a crime. A successful solution was defined as the identification of the perpetrator(s) of a specific crime.

The new crime report and the case screening system represented a decision process which formalized a previously informal system. In the crime report the critical data were required of the reporting officer if they existed. Furthermore, the data were organized in a way that made an evaluation of the case's merits quite simple. In addition, everything that was to appear in the narrative was summarized on the face sheet.

The case screening officer separated on the basis of previously defined criteria the "workable" cases from the "non-workable." As will be shown later in the evaluation, the process allowed more than half of the cases

1. Greenberg, Bernard, The Oakland Police Department Weighted Solvability Factors, SRI, 1975.

received by the Investigations Bureau to be suspended--i.e., not investigated unless further pertinent information was received about the case.

3. ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING

The organizational restructuring that took place was based on anticipated changes. The anticipated changes were:


- Case screening would reduce the caseload thereby requiring fewer officers, particularly in burglary.
- Those officers who were displaced by the case screening system would be more useful in a new Major Crimes Unit. The new unit would concentrate its efforts on the solution of crimes designated by the Bureau commander (these might include a series of crimes with similar characteristics or on a particular problem).
- To retain more control over the investigators and their work, the supervisors (Sergeant and Lieutenants) would review cases before the cases were given to the investigator and after the investigation had been completed.

Eventually, two divisions were set up where previously one had existed. The two divisions were "Crimes Against Persons" and "Crimes Against Property." The changes are reflected in the charts showing the organization of the I.B. before, during, and after the MCI program had been implemented.

4. CASE PREPARATION

Although it has been suggested that much of what the investigator does is routine and administrative, there exists great differences in the strategies of investigation. The strategy is contingent on the relationship that exists between the police agency and the prosecutor's office. One strategy is to gather a great number of facts about a case and then to "dump" the case on the prosecutor, requiring his office to sort and sift the evidence to determine if a good case exists. This strategy is employed (often at the request of the prosecutor!) when the investigative resources

POLICE - INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU



III-15

FIGURE III-3
Investigations Bureau During MCI

of the police agency are meager or unskilled. It is employed by the police agency when the agency does not want the responsibility for not taking a case to court. The implication in this strategy is that police agency did all they could but that it was the fault of the prosecutor if the perpetrator(s) of a crime were not brought to justice. In short, it is a strategy of passing-the-buck.

A second strategy is to take only those cases to the prosecutor which the agency feels has a reasonable change for successful prosecution. In this strategy the police agency performs the investigation to the best of its ability and then selects the cases which look promising to take to the prosecutor. This strategy is the normal and most often used one in the United States and assumes a competence on both sides.

A new strategy which has gained strength in increasing numbers of agencies is an outgrowth of the second strategy. This strategy is to assume that the police and prosecutor should act in concert since they are essentially parts of the same process. In this mode, the standards that will and will not be accepted by the prosecutor are made explicit between the police and the prosecutor's office, rather than having them be assumed as in the second strategy.

The Santa Monica Police Department sought to establish the third strategy through a series of conferences with the prosecutor's office. The prerequisites for "filing" a case (that is, accepting a case for prosecution) were worked out with the understanding that cases would not be submitted to the prosecutor's office unless the standards were met. Obviously, honest differences existed in interpreting the standards. In these instances, police-prosecutor conferences were held to settle the matter. While the rhetoric of the grant termed this phrase "police-prosecutor relations," the aim was to enhance the quality of the cases sent to the prosecutor.

The quality of a case was enhanced by using a checklist which had to be filled out before a case was submitted to the prosecutor. The checklist corresponded identically to a list given by the Rand Corporation in their report on the Criminal Investigation Process.¹ The list consisted of thirty-nine of the most frequently asked questions of various phases of the investigation process.

5. THE MONITORING SYSTEM

The most sophisticated part of the MCI program was the monitoring system (see Figure III-4). As envisioned by the Santa Monica Police Department, the monitoring system would be much more than a method of following cases; it would be used as a management information system (MIS) for the Investigations Bureau and would measure productivity as well as tracing cases.

The purpose of the monitoring system was to follow the progress of each case through the Investigations Bureau to its final disposition in the court. Virtually every action taken on each case was recorded. Included were the results of case screening, actions taken on the case by the investigator, how long it took to move through the Bureau, what actions were taken by the prosecutor and by the courts.

In addition to being a case tracking system, the monitoring system also showed productivity work imbalances, clearance rates, prosecution rates, and a ten-day inventory of active cases. The system allowed for continual updating so that every ten days a new series of inventory reports were generated.

1. Greenwood, et.al., The Criminal Investigation Process, Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977.




FIGURE III-4
MCI Monitoring System

The monitoring system had two separate components which were complementary to each other: The Case Management and Prosecution Management Systems. Case Management followed the course of the case from its entry into the Investigations Bureau until its advancement to the Prosecutor. All those case which did not merit advancement to the Prosecutor were included in the system as well. The Prosecution Management System took all those cases which were forwarded to the Prosecutor and traced each case through the Prosecutor's office and the Courts.

The data were recovered for the monitoring system by using Case Management and Prosecution Management forms (See Appendix A) which were filled in by the investigators and checked by the supervisors. The information from these forms was transferred to special Optical Character forms (See Appendix A) by the MCI secretary. The MCI secretary utilized an OCR (Optical Character Readable) "element" in her typewriter to fill in these forms. They were then sent to a private data processing company which "read" the forms and the information was transferred to magnetic computer tape. The company also produced the Case Management part of the reports. The tapes were used for producing the Prosecution Management reports and for further research into the mechanisms of the investigative process.

IV. OUTCOMES OF THE SANTA MONICA MCI PROGRAM

Several areas were analyzed in order to: (1) determine if the MCI program achieved its stated objectives; (2) determine what second-order effects the program had on the Investigations Bureau and on the Department as a whole; (3) determine what future impact the program might have on the Investigations Bureau and the Department as a whole.

The areas analyzed were:

- Investigations Bureau Organization
- Caseload and Assignment
- Crimes, Clearances, and Arrests
- Prosecutor Filing Rates
- Conviction Rates
- Costs of Operation
- Effect on Public Relations

A. ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU

Since one of the components of the MCI Program was to reassign the investigators to non-traditional tasks, the implication was that the original complement of investigators could be reduced. How and in what way the restructuring would take place was left up to the individual departments participating in the MCI Field Test. Based on the Rand Report and the success of the Long Beach (California) Police Department's Suppression of Burglary unit, the Santa Monica Police Department decided to restructure in two ways:

- form a major crimes unit
- experiment with a reduction in the number of Investigators working at traditional tasks

Figures II-2 and III-3 show a "before and after" look at the reorganization that took place in the Bureau with the advent of MCI. The organizational changes presumed changes in the caseload as a result of case screening. Although it was not known before the changes were made what reduction in caseload would occur, the assumption was that at least half of the burglary cases would be screened out. Thus, the changes in staffing took place on the basis of anticipated caseload reduction. Other staffing changes were made on the basis of policy decisions about the relative effectiveness of the units.

The case in point is that of the Narcotics section of the Investigations Bureau. Narcotics investigation had ceased being as important as it had been in previous years because of more lenient laws passed in regard to sentencing. In addition, there had been an increased reliance by local agencies on federal and state agencies for the more serious narcotics trafficking.

The decision to form a Major Crimes Unit and reduce the number of officers working on the traditional task of the Investigator proved to be a conservative guess in regard to the amount of case screening that would take place as we shall see in the next section.

B. CASELOAD AND ASSIGNMENT

Although the staffing changes were based on anticipated caseload reduction, the 50% reduction appeared to be a conservative estimate once case screening had been initiated. During 1977, the first full year of MCI,

72% of the UCR Part I crimes had been screened out, that is, unlikely to produce a clearance. Of this, 67% of the burglaries were screened out and 63% of the robberies were screened out.

While the case screening concept was the basis for a reduction in personnel at some of the positions in the Bureau, it did not necessarily allow more time in the investigation of individual cases, on the average. In the instance of burglaries, the anticipated reduction in caseload did not occur.

TABLE IV-1: CASELOAD BEFORE AND AFTER CASE SCREENING

		1975	1976	1977 (MCI)	1978 (After Grant Termination)
(Average new cases per week per Investigator)	Robbery	1.27	1.67	1.51	1.53
	Burglary	10.06	10.00	13.19	12.82

C. COMPARATIVE CLEARANCE RATES AND COUNTS

One of the most commonly used measures of police productivity is the clearance rate. Although the Rand Report found clearance rates suspect as a performance measure, its widespread usage offers a comparative if inaccurate yardstick. During the year of 1977, the Investigations Bureau posted a marginal increase in the UCR Part I crimes that were cleared.¹

An interesting situation occurred in the case of the burglary clearance rates. One of the hypotheses of the MCI program was that the increased time to devote to cases because of the reduced workload would result in higher clearance rates. Yet in the case of burglary for 1977, a higher

1. The Santa Monica Police Department conforms to the FBI definition of cleared, i.e., case is closed by arrest or exceptionally cleared.

workload led to a higher clearance rate. The explanation for this may lay in the higher quality, screened cases that comprised the workload. In any case, during the MCI program, the clearance rates for robbery and burglary were the highest achieved by the Santa Monica Police Department since 1953.

TABLE IV-2: PERCENT OF CRIMES CLEARED, NUMBER OF CRIMES CLEARED

	1975 % #	1976 % #	1977 (MCI) % #	1978 (After Grant Termination) % #
Robbery	20% (65)	23% (99)	27% (118)	21% (103)
Burglary	15% (316)	12% (254)	21% (488)	17% (426)
UCR Part I	19% (1553)	18% (1501)	20% (1770)	19% (1626)

D. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON PROSECUTION FILING RATES

Another goal of the MCI Program was to increase the number of UCR Part I cases accepted for prosecution. The following table shows the acceptance rates for all felonies and misdemeanors by the prosecutor's office for the years 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978.

TABLE IV-3: PROSECUTOR CASE ACCEPTANCE RATES

	1975 % N=778	1976 % N=654	1977 (MCI) % N=590	1978 (After Grant Termination) % N=524
All Arrest Dispositions	91%	91%	98%	92%
Felonies	31%	34%	28%	27%
Misdemeanors	60%	57%	70%	65%

Source: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, State of California and Santa Monica Police Department Records

The effects of MCI on the filing rates were clearly improved over the previous two years. Although the rates improved, the number of cases for which complaints were requested diminished over the four year period. There are two explanations for the decreased number of cases over the four year period. First, the Los Angeles County Prosecutor's Office had increasingly stringent policies regarding the cases which it would accept for prosecution. This was caused in part by new determinate sentencing laws which tightened the requirements for evidence. Second, after the inception of the MCI program in the Santa Monica Police Department, the Investigations Bureau no longer sent those cases to the prosecutor which had a high probability for denial.

In effect, the Investigations Bureau was screening out its own cases a second time. In this screening process, the cases which lacked evidentiary merit were never sent to the prosecutor's office for consideration. The overall effect was to increase the quality of the cases sent to the prosecutor's office with a resultant higher filing rate.

E. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON ARREST RATES

One of the specific goals of the MCI program was to increase clearances by arrest or more simply put, to increase arrest rates. The hypothesis was that the higher the quality the investigation, the more likely there would be an arrest. In the case of the Santa Monica Police Department, less than 5% of the arrests for UCR Part I crimes are made by the Investigations Bureau. Since the predominant number of arrests made by the Department are on-scene arrests, even a large improvement in the number of arrests by the Investigations Bureau would not significantly affect the arrest to offense ratios.

TABLE IV-4: RATIO OF ARRESTS TO REPORTED CRIMES

	1975	1976	1977 (MCI)	1978 (Post MCI)
UCR Part I	.14	.14	.14	.12
Robbery	.23	.32	.25	.32
Burglary	.16	.16	.14	.13

Plots of the monthly data used to compute the arrest ratios are shown in Figures IV-1, IV-2, and IV-3 for all Part I crimes, burglary and robbery.

Except for the ratios in robbery, the changes have been marginal. The wider fluctuations in robbery ratios throughout the year may be in part seasonal. It is important to note that in each of the years there has been a successively greater number of crimes committed (Part I) so that the later ratios include a larger number of arrests.




F. THE EFFECTS OF MCI ON THE COSTS OF OPERATION

One of the more serious questions in the study was how much the MCI program would cost after the termination of the grant. While the performance measures were in general positive, a pressing question was whether the improved performance was worth the increased costs. Shown below are the increased costs to the Santa Monica Police Department for the continuation of the MCI program.




1 Analyst	\$1200/month
1 Stenographer	350/month
Computer Cost	148/month
Outside Services	<u>125/month</u>
	\$1823/month increase

IV-7
ALL PART I CRIMES

FIGURE IV-1






IV-8
BURGLARY
FIGURE IV-2



IV-9
ROBBERY

FIGURE IV-3



IV-10

Balanced against these increased costs were the reduction in sworn officers in the Bureau:

$$3 \text{ X Officers} = 3 \text{ X } \$1600/\text{month (minimum)}$$

$$= \$4800/\text{month (minimum)}$$

The increased costs are more than justified by the continuation of the MCI program when looked at from a cost-effectiveness standpoint. Everything else being equal, the Investigations Bureau achieved a marked increase in efficiency by adhering to the MCI program.

G. THE EFFECT OF MCI ON PUBLIC RELATIONS

One of the concerns of the Santa Monica Police Department was what the effect would be of MCI on public relations. Rather than following the policy of telephoning each victim of a Part I crime as has been the practice prior to the MCI program, a brochure was sent to them which gave them their case number and told them what was being done on the case, i.e., whether or not it would be given a follow-up investigation or not.

After one full year of operation, no complaints had been received by the Department. Rather than leave the issue alone with the assumption that "no news was good news" in the case of receiving no complaints, a random sample of one hundred victims of crime were called by telephone and asked a series of questions regarding their service by the Santa Monica Police Department (see Appendix A).

The results were quite positive. Fully 87% of the victims were either "Satisfied" or "Extremely Satisfied" by the services rendered them. When questioned further, 71% said that they preferred to be contacted by mail

because they then had some record of the services rendered. In addition, they had a source of information for their insurance company, should one be required.

Since most of the victims were burglarized, their most immediate concern was getting their property back, although only 12% expected to get anything back.

Contrary to the fears of the Administration, the system of sending brochures to the victims appears to have been a public relations improvement rather than causing harm.

While there were no specific complaints that would cause any changes in the present system of sending brochures to the victims of crimes, there was a general concern that the victim of a crime is generally the forgotten element in the legal process. Several victims mentioned that they had heard about a program of the Santa Monica Police Department in which police officers went from door to door in a neighborhood, showing the residents how to prevent easy entry into a house or apartment. This program was done as a research project by two Santa Monica Police Officers and has not been instituted as a regular program. The community relations division of the Santa Monica Police Department does much the same thing, but does not go door to door. The information bulletin tells the victim whom to contact in the Department for burglary prevention checks and other crime prevention measures. In addition, a new crime prevention specialist has been added to the Community Relations staff to meet the increased demands for information by the community-at-large.

H. MCI AND THE CONVICTION RATE

Another primary goal of the MCI program was to improve the conviction rate for those cases submitted to the prosecutor. Of the MCI goals, police investigators had perhaps the least control over whether this goal would be achieved. The goal was established because it was believed that the improved method of collecting evidence and the rigorous screening that preceded the submission of cases to the prosecutor's office would tend to lead to more convictions.

On the other hand, an investigator has no control over the skills of the prosecutor; while the investigator can offer some assistance to the prosecutor, in the end, obtaining the conviction rests with the prosecutor.

Table IV-5 shows the disposition of a sample of cases for one year preceeding the MCI program and two years during the program.

TABLE IV-5: PROSECUTION CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRST 100 PERSONS BOOKED FOR PART I CRIMES, 1976-1978

	TOTAL	SENT TO PROSECUTOR		DIS-MISSED		NOT GUILTY		GUILTY		REJ/REF		CHARGES REDUCED		RE-LEASED		DON'T KNOW	
		DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA	DA	CA
1976	100	33	35	6	8	0	0	14	16	2	0	9	8	0	2	2	1
1977	100	13	38	1	4	0	1	11	30	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
1978	100	3	44	1	12	1	1	1	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Table IV-6 shows the results of the conviction rates for the two years preceeding the MCI program.

TABLE IV-6: THREE YEAR CONVICTION RATES
(All Felonies and Misdemeanors)

	1975 N=915	1976 N=749	1977 (MCI) N=752	3-Year Average
Percent	66%	71%	75%	71%

It is not possible to tell from the above information what the contribution of the MCI program was to the conviction rate; at the very least it did not hinder the conviction rate.

When the prosecutors were asked if they felt that the quality of the cases had improved due in part to the MCI program, the majority of them felt that the structure of the evidence had greatly improved, which in turn improved the quality of the officers' testimony as well.

V. THE INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU AFTER MCI

The MCI grant funding ended in June 1978, and in its wake, there were several changes made in the Investigations Bureau. This section deals with what happened after the grant had ended and why the modifications were made.


A. ORGANIZATION

The Investigations Bureau was divided into two divisions (see Figure V-1), one for crimes against persons, the other for crimes against property. The divisions were each headed by a Lieutenant, with the Lieutenant who heads the Crimes Against Property division assuming the responsibilities of the MCI functions.

These changes were made for several reasons. The Lieutenant who headed the MCI project from its inception, Billy T. King, was moved back to Operations for career advancement reasons. Captain Robert Morgan, the Bureau commander, retired from the Department and took a position with a private security firm. In addition, the secretary for the project from its inception also resigned. In short, virtually each member of the original project staff had either transferred to another part of the Department or had left the Department completely. The only member of the original grant staff was the Research Analyst; the Case Screening Officer was also retained, and although he was not part of the original grant staff, he was well-seasoned in the MCI program.

The loss of many of the key members of the MCI and Bureau meant that a "re-building" program would be necessary. The new Bureau commander,

POLICE - INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU



V-2

FIGURE V-1
Post-MCI Organization Chart

Captain Eugene McCarthy opted for a system in which the two Lieutenants in the Bureau would each learn the MCI system, trading positions after a six-month period. A new secretary for the MCI staff was hired, and the program was generally structured in the same fashion as it was during the grant period.

The total number of people in the Bureau was 36, 4 less than the Bureau had prior to the MCI grant. The Major Crimes Section was retained, although its function has been altered; Major Crimes is now used for robbery suppression and as auxiliary help for specific crimes designated by the Captain.

B. CASE FLOW AND DECISION POINTS

The case flow and decision points remained essentially the same in the post-MCI grant period. The CSO continued to separate the cases into the workable and non-workable cases. Thus, the case load reflected no changes save those which were caused by the general crime trends in the City of Santa Monica.

The Lieutenants maintained operational control over each case flowing into and out of the two pools of investigators. The system still acts as a case quality control process which allows only the high-probability-for-conviction cases to be filed with the prosecutor.

The police-prosecutor relationship changed considerably. During the latter part of 1978, the District Attorney's office required that each case brought to his office for consideration have a "follow-up" investigation. A "follow-up" investigation, as the name implies, was the investigation done after the initial investigation by the patrol officer.

This requirement tended to thwart the purpose of the new incident report and caused much redundant work to be done by the investigator. The prosecutor's office, in effect, eliminated a major benefit of the MCI program by having the investigator write a separate report.

C. MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND MONITORING

The area which experienced the most change in the post-grant period was that of monitoring. The MCI grant provided funds for processing the OCR Case Management and Prosecution Management sheets. In this system, each case which entered the Bureau was tracked until its ultimate disposition within the courts. Without grant funds, the cost of processing was such that only those cases which were sent to an investigator were tracked; the cases which were not assigned were never recorded.

In addition, the ten-day case review was allowed to lapse. Since the end of the grant, the review occurs only once a month. It was felt that the Lieutenants could exercise sufficient control over their divisions to make periodic checks for late or forgotten cases. To date, there has been little slippage in this area. A cadet is used to determine the productivity measures on a monthly basis. The productivity measures include:

- Cases (as a percentage) cleared per month
- Cases filed per month
- Caseload (total cases assigned)
- Average time spent per case

Six months after the termination of the grant, there was a general decline in several productivity measures, including the clearance rates, the acceptance rate by the prosecutor, and the ratio of UCR Part I arrests

to crimes. Moreover, these declines occurred during a period of slight reduction (2%) in overall UCR Part I crimes.

The reasons for the decline probably arise from a constellation of events rather than from any singular cause. A major contributor to the decline was probably the lack of managerial experience in a new methodology that was incurred when the original grant staff and Captain Morgan left.

A vacuum occurred that was filled by a supervisorial staff whose sentiments and training made the continuance of the original MCI program unlikely. There was a strong tendency towards "business as usual," a return to the operation of the Bureau as it had been before the advent of the MCI program.

To be specific, the monitoring of the cases as they passed through the supervisors became lax and cursory. Where previously a strict adherence to a ten-day case review occurred, there was a return to keeping the cases a longer, if unspecified, period of time. This was in part caused by the loss of funds which allowed that particular component of the monitoring system to lapse.

The Major Crimes detail was responsible for fifty to sixty clearances a month during 1977; after the grant had ended, Major Crimes was used more for "robbery suppression" or special details. Its original intent was that of "working" specific and known criminals in order to catch them in the commission of a crime. The process of keeping a criminal (or criminals) under surveillance until he committed a crime took a great deal of manpower, but it proved to be quite effective.

A rash of robberies spurred the new Investigations Bureau commander to put the Major Crimes unit in the field during those hours when a robbery

was liable to occur. This policy was not successful, however, in that it was based on a quick response after the robbery had occurred; the response time and manpower were not sufficient to make this tactic work. Thus a tool which had once been used to capture criminals with some success was used relatively unproductively.

The District Attorney's insistence on a supplemental investigation for each case submitted to his office placed an additional burden on the individual investigator. This practice has led to an overall increase in the total amount of time required for the disposition of cases through the Investigations Bureau. The increase in the amount investigation has made it necessary to add another man to the Burglary unit.

Generally, there has been a drift towards the pre-MCI period in terms of investigational processes and policies. It seems unlikely that there will be a return to the MCI model unless there is a strong policy change by the Chief of Police. At the time of this writing, Chief George B. Tielsch had just accepted the position of Chief of Police for Anaheim, California. Unless the new chief revises the current Investigations Bureau structure, the only segments that are likely to remain are the case screening and the new report form. It is unlikely that these devices, in and of themselves, will be enough to sustain the MCI model.

APPENDIX A

Appendix
Santa Monica Citizen Survey

1. When you realized a crime had been committed in your _____, who did you first call?
 1. police
 5. other (specify) _____
 8. DK
 9. NA
2. After the police were called was the second contact you had with them a patrol officer or detective (uniformed or plainclothes)?
 1. patrol or uniform officer came to scene
 2. detective or plainclothes investigator
 5. other _____
 8. DK
 9. NA
3. What information did the police give you at that time?

4. Have you heard from the police since then?
 1. yes
 2. no.....skip to #11
 8. DK.....skip to #11
 9. NA.....skip to #11
5. (If yes) How many contacts (mail, phone, personal) were there? _____
6. How did they contact you?
 1. phone.....go to 7
 2. mail.....go to 7
 3. personal; visit
 8. DK.....go to 7
 9. NA
 0. Inappropriate

- 6a. (if In-person) Could the information been effectively taken over the phone?
1. yes
 2. no (probe: Why? _____)
 8. DK
 9. NA
 0. Inappropriate

7. Who initiated the contact?

1. respondent
2. police
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

8. Did a uniformed officer or a detective contact you?

1. Uniformed officer
2. Detective
3. Other
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

9. Had that same person contacted you before?

1. yes
2. no
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

10. What additional information did the police give you?
- _____
- _____

11. After the police first contacted you, were you asked to answer mostly the same questions when you heard from them again, or were these questions mostly different?

1. Mostly the same
3. Some the same, some different
4. Mostly different
8. DK
9. NA

12. Was the property stolen from you covered by insurance?

1. yes
2. no.....skip to #15
8. DK.....skip to #15
9. NA.....skip to #15

13. (If yes) Would you have called the police if this property had not been covered by insurance?

1. yes
5. no
8. DK
9. NA
0. Inappropriate

14. When you called the police about the recent burglary in your home, what results did you expect?
- _____
- _____

15. How do you feel about the service you have received from the police? Would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied?

If satisfied: Would you say you are extremely satisfied, satisfied, or somewhat satisfied?

If dissatisfied: Would you say you are extremely dissatisfied, dissatisfied, or somewhat dissatisfied?

1. Extremely satisfied
2. Satisfied
3. Somewhat satisfied
4. Unsure; don't know
5. Somewhat dissatisfied
6. Dissatisfied
7. Extremely dissatisfied
9. NA

16. Would you be willing to assist the police in investigating your case if needed by

a. going to a police lineup? 1. yes 2. no
(If no, why not?)

b. answering questions from the prosecutor out of court? 1. yes 2. no
(If no, why not?)

c. appearing in court? 1. yes 2. no
(If no, why not?)

17. Do you know the final status of your case?

18. Do you want to know about the final action of your case?

19. How long have you lived at this address?

1. less than 1 year
2. 1-2 years
3. 3-5 years
4. more than 3 years
8. DK
9. NA

20. As of your last birthday, how old are you?

_____ (code exact number of years)

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!!!!!!!!!!!!

SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Check (✓) if Priority		CRIME REPORT		Steno. Initials	Dr. No.				
1. Date & Time Rptd. to P.D.		2. Classification		3. Rpt. Dist. Crime Occd.	4. Day of Wk. Crime Occd.				
5. Date & Time Crime Occurred		6. Location of Occurrence		7. No. of Recorder	8. EAP				
9. Victim's Name (Firm name if business)		10. Residence Address (Firm address if Business)		Zip	Res. Phone				
1.		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
11. Victim's Name (Firm Name if Business)		12. Residence Address (Firm Address if Business)		Zip	Res. Phone				
2.		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
13. Person Reporting Crime to Police Dept.		14. Complete Residence Address		Zip	Res. Phone				
		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
15. Person Who Secured Premises or Vehicle		16. Complete Residence Address		Zip	Res. Phone				
		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
17. Witness(es): Name		18. Complete Residence Address		Zip	Res. Phone				
1.		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
19.		20. Complete Residence Address		Zip	Res. Phone				
2.		Business Address		Bus. Phone 0800-1700					
21. Victim's Occupation Sex Race Age		22. Investigative Bureau or Units Notified (Bureau of Unit and Person Contacted)			23. Street Lights				
1.					Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>				
24.		25. Evidence Tagged? (Yes or No) — if yes, Locker number or Person Released To							
2.									
26. Type of Premises		27. Instrument, Weapon, Force or Means Used		28. Point Where Entrance Made					
29. Method Used to Gain Entrance		30. Were Occupants Present or Absent?		31. Vehicle Locked	32. TT YES NO				
				Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>					
33. Type of Property Taken		34. Exact Location of Property on Premises			Form #26 made <input type="checkbox"/>				
					Form #38 made <input type="checkbox"/>				
35. Victim's Vehicle — Year, make, type, color, license number		36. Amount of Loss							
37. Suspect's vehicle — Year, make, type, color, license number and any other identifying features									
38. Trademarks of Suspect(s) (Unusual Feature of Crime That is most Apt to recur from Crime to Crime)									
39.	Sex	Race	Age	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	Compl.	Clothing
Susp.									
No. 1	Name and Address. Identifying marks and characteristics. (If arrested, suspect's full name, booking number and age only.)								
40.	Sex	Race	Age	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	Compl.	Clothing
Susp.									
No. 2	Name and Address. Identifying marks and characteristics. (If arrested, suspect's full name, booking number and age only.)								

SANTA MONICA POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME REPORT

1. Check (✓) if Priority										2. Steno Initials										3. DR. NO.														
4. Classification															5. Location of Occurrence																			
6. Time of Occurrence					M		D		Y		Time		7. When Reported		M		D		Y		Time		8. Day of Wk. Occrd.					9. Rpt. Dist. Crime Occrd.						
10. Victims Name (Last, First) or Firm Name															11. Victims Address (House number, Street Name)															12. Residence Phone Day Night				
13. Victims Sex					14. Race					15. Age					16. Victims Occupation					17. Victims place of employ or School Name										18. Business Phone Day Night				
Indicate with proper code in boxes provided persons relationship to investigation: W-1 witness W-2 witness, R/P reporting party, etc.																																		
19. WAS THERE A WITNESS TO THE CRIME? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "A"																																		
20. Name															21. Res. Address										22. Information Provided									
23.					24. Res. Phone					25. Bus. Phone					26. Bus. Address																			
27. Name															28. Res. Address										29. Information Provided									
30.					31. Res. Phone					32. Bus. Phone					33. Bus. Address																			
34. IF ARREST IS MADE NAME ARRESTEE(S) IN NARRATIVE IF NONE PLACE AN X IN BOX "B"																																		
35. CAN A SUSPECT BE NAMED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "C"																																		
36. Suspect #1										37. Suspect #2										38. Suspect #3														
39. CAN A SUSPECT BE LOCATED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "D"																																		
40. Suspect #1 may be located at										41. Suspect #2 may be located at										42. Suspect #3 may be located at														
43. CAN A SUSPECT BE DESCRIBED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "E"																																		
44. Suspect #1 Description										45. Suspect #2 Description										46. Suspect #3 Description														
47. CAN A SUSPECT BE IDENTIFIED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "F"																																		
48. CAN THE SUSPECT VEHICLE BE IDENTIFIED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "G"																																		
49. License Number					State					50. Model/Make					51. Year					52. Type					53. Color Top/Bottom					54. Identifying Characteristics				
55. WAS THERE A MAJOR INJURY FOR RAPE VICTIM INVOLVED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "H"																																		
56. Where Hospitalized					57. Attending Physician					58. Date/Time					59. EAP #					60. Nature of Injury														
61. IF THE STOLEN PROPERTY IS TRACEABLE INDICATE IN THE NARRATIVE IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "I"																																		
62. Type of Property Taken																																		
63. Exact Location of Property on Premises															64. Property Report Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>					65. Amount of Loss														
66. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT M.O. PRESENT? IF YES DESCRIBE IN NARRATIVE IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "J"																																		
67. Trademarks of Suspect(s) (Unusual Feature of Crime that is most apt to recur from crime to crime)																																		
68. Type of Premises					69. Method to Gain Entry					70. Point of Entry					71. Type of Weapon, Instrument or force																			
72. Were Occupants Present or Absent? Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>					73. Premises Locked Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>					74. TT Yes No					75. TT Yes No																			
76. Inv. Bur. or Units Notified & Persons Contacted										Form #26 made <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>					Form #38 made <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>					Serial # Items <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>														
																				Inscribed Items <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>														
77. IS THERE SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PRESENT? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "K"																																		
78. Evidence Tagged? (Yes or No) If yes, Locker # or Person Released To																																		
79. I.D. Tech Involved Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>					80. HAS AN EVIDENCE TECHNICIAN BEEN CALLED? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "L"																													
81. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT REASON TO BELIEVE THAT CRIME MAY BE SOLVED WITH A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF INVESTIGATIVE EFFORT? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "M"																																		
82. WAS THERE A DEFINITE LIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR ANYONE EXCEPT THE SUSPECT TO COMMIT THE CRIME? IF NO PLACE AN X IN BOX "N"																																		
83. Is one or more of the Solvability Factors Present in this Report? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Office Review)															<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Follow Up) <input type="checkbox"/> No (Office Review)					84. Inv. Bureau Screening <input type="checkbox"/> Concur Recommend.														
85. Supervisor Review <input type="checkbox"/> Concur <input type="checkbox"/> Close <input type="checkbox"/> O/R <input type="checkbox"/> Follow Up															Date & Time Signed Reviewer																			
86. Supervisor Approving															Serial No.																			
87. Officer(s) Reporting															Serial No.																			

DR. NO.

3.1 Rev. 1-77

INTERVIEWS

1. Victim, initial report
2. Victim, follow up report
3. Witness, initial report
4. Witness, follow up report
5. Suspect, initial report
6. Suspect, follow up report

[illegible]

OFFENSE

7. Is there a verbatim report of the offense?
8. Is there a verbatim report of the force used?
9. What was the physical harm to the victim?
10. Is there a detailed description of the property taken?
11. What was the method of suspects escape?
12. What type of vehicle was used by suspect?
13. What type of weapon was used by suspect?
14. If gun was used, was it loaded?
15. If gun was used, when was it acquired?
16. Where is the location of the weapon now?

[illegible]

SUSPECT

17. Was S under the influence of alcohol or drugs?
18. What are the details of S's defense?
19. What is S's economic status?
20. Was S advised of constitutional rights?
21. If multiple aspects, what is their relationship?
22. Is there evidence of prior offenses by Susp.?
23. Is there evidence of Susp. motives?
24. Is there evidence of past psychiatric treatment of Susp.?
25. What is susp. parole or probation status?
26. Does Susp. have an alcohol or drug abuse history?
27. Where is Susp. employed?
28. Does susp. have a history of violence?

[illegible]

VICTIM/WITNESSES

29. What is the relationship between S and V ?
30. What is the credibility of the Woman
31. Can the Wit. make a contribution to the case prosecution?
32. Were mug shots shown to Vic. or Wit.?
33. If shown, are the procedures and results adequately described?
34. Was a line-up conducted?

35. If conducted, are the procedures and results adequately described?
36. Was an effort made to lift fingerprints at the scene?
37. If made, were usable fingerprints obtained?
38. Were photos taken at the crime scene?
39. Is the exact location from where the photos and prints taken given?
40. Did Vic. verify his statements in the crime report?
41. Did Vic. have improper motives in reporting the offense?

YES	NO	DNA	COMMENTS

ARREST

42. What was the legal basis for search and seizure?
43. How was the location of evidence learned?
44. How was the location of Susp. learned?
45. How was the arrest of Susp. made?

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

VICTIM	Victim's Address				Res. Bus.		CR#	J#	FBI#	CII#	I.D.#
	Date & Time Occurred		Location Occurred		Other I.D.#s				Priors		
SUSPECT	Suspect's Name (Last, First)				Booking #		INVESTIGATOR'S CHECK LIST				
	AKAs										
	Address										
	Sex	Descent	DOB	Height	Weight	Hair	Eyes	TELETYPES		SOURCE CHECKS	
	Physical Oddities						CII		SMPD Records/Wants		
	Suspect Vehicle				Stored	Rel. Date	FBI		Pawns		
	Oper. Lic. #				Soc. Sec. #		AWWS		F.I.s		
	Date & Time Arrested				Location Arrested		NCIC		Crime Logs		
	Charge				Arrested By		AWDI		MO. Check/Maps		
	COURT	Filing/Who		Charge	Date	Dispo		DMV Veh. 10-29		Mug Photos	
Arraigned Date		Court Division		Bail		DMV Veh. 10-28		Known Offenders			
Prelim Date		Court Division		Dispo		DMV Veh. to Suspect		Parole			
Juv. Dispo		Court Division		Dispo		DMV Lic. Phy. Data		Probation			
Trial Date		Court Dept.				DOJ Firearms		Other Depts.			
INV. & RPTS.	Follow up Rpt./Date Made						DOJ Stolen Articles		ID/Prints Photos		
	Investigator						DOJ Other		ID Tech. Reports		
MISC. COMMENTS							APB		CONTACTS		
							TT Other		Visit Crime Scene		
							TT Canceled		Contact Victim		
							Misc./Daily Bulletin		Contact Witness/es		
							Property Held		Interrogate Suspect/s		
						Property Reviewed		Informants			
Appendix 4						Property Released		Line-up on suspects			



CITY OF
SANTA MONICA
CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

PAGE OF DOCUMENT NO.	DATE TYPED YY JJ
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CASE MANAGEMENT -- (2/77)

1. D.R. NO.	2. D.R. DATE YY JJ	3. NEW CASE	4. DATA UPDATE	5. VICTIM'S NAME	6. OFFENSE
7. DATE OF REPORT YY JJ	8. CASE SCREENING 1. ACTION PENDING 2. REF. FOR INVEST. 3. UNFOUNDED	9. TO PROSECUTION 1. OTHER AGENCY	10. RECLASSIFIED TO	11. DATE ASSIGNED YY JJ	12. DATE CLEARED-SUSPENDED YY JJ
13. INVESTIGATING OFFICER	14. WHO MADE ARREST	15. I.D. TECHNICIAN	16. LAB ANALYSIS	17. PHYSICAL EVIDENCE	18. CASE CLEARED BY: 1. ARREST 2. EXCEPTION 3. UNFOUNDED
19. TYPE OF CLEARANCE	20. 1. ADULT 2. JUVENILE	21. PROPERTY CLAIMED VALUE	22. PROPERTY VALUE CHANGED TO	23. VALUE PROPERTY RECOVERED	24. DATE PROP. RELEASED YY JJ
TYPE "X" HERE IF DATA IN THIS BLOCK IS INVALID					

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