National Criminal Justice Reference Service

ncjrs

This microfiche was produced from documents received for
inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise
control over the physical condition of the documents submitted,
the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on
this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.

1.0	45	2.8	2.5
	50	3.2	2.2
	56		
	63	3.6	
1.1		4.0	2.0
			1.8
1.25	1.4		1.6

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with
the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are
those of the author(s) and do not represent the official
position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

2/10/84

915164

THE URBAN INSTITUTE

91564

X
Neighborhood Team Policing in
Multnomah County, Oregon:
A Case Study

by

James Bell
Pamela Horst

December 1977

Contract Report 9-5054-13

THE URBAN INSTITUTE

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PREFACE

In 1975, the Office of Technology Transfer (OTT), part of the National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the United States Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), awarded grants to six demon-
stration sites to demonstrate the concept of "full service neighborhood team
policing." Generally speaking, this concept involves decentralizing police
work to the community level, where groups of 20 to 40 officers become famil-
iar with area residents and handle cases from start to finish. The assump-
tion is that the law enforcement officials can then prevent and control
crime better.

The sites LEAA chose for this demonstration were Boulder, Colorado;
Elizabeth, New Jersey; Hartford, Connecticut; Multnomah County, Oregon;
Santa Ana, California; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

In 1975, The Urban Institute received a grant to evaluate this project.
Between the last quarter of 1976 and the third quarter of 1977, the Insti-
tute visited the sites several times and evaluated their implementation of
team policing.

Eight separate reports document the evaluation. Six are case studies
of each site that describe background and setting, planning and implemen-
tation of team policing activities, and program results. The seventh
report describes how OTT designed and ran the team policing program, and
the last report summarizes evaluation findings for all sites.

The eight Urban Institute reports are:

● White, Thomas W. and Gillice, Robert A. Neighborhood Team Policing in Boulder, Colorado: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-11, December 1977.

● Regan, Katryna J. Neighborhood Team Policing in Elizabeth, New Jersey: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-12, December 1977.

● Bell, James and Horst, Pamela. Neighborhood Team Policing in Multnomah County, Oregon: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-13, December 1977.

● Regan, Katryna J. Neighborhood Team Policing in Hartford, Connecticut: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-14, December 1977.

● Bell, James and Horst, Pamela. Neighborhood Team Policing in Santa Ana, California: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-15, December 1977.

● White, Thomas W. Neighborhood Team Policing in Winston-Salem, North Carolina: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-16, December 1977.

● White, Thomas W.; Horst, Pamela; Regan, Katryna J.; Bell, James; and Waller, John D. Evaluation of LEAA's Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration: A Summary Report, Contract Report 5054-17, December 1977.

● Horst, Pamela. LEAA's Fielding of the Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration, Contract Report 5054-09, December 1977.

CONTENTS

FIGURES

I. INTRODUCTION

The Multnomah County Division of Public Safety (MCDPS) is responsible for a 375-square-mile area including the suburbs of Portland, Oregon. Planning for team policing in Multnomah began in 1972. In the summer of 1975, after considerable departmental reorganization, five patrol teams assumed responsibility for delivery of police services in the county. A detective unit formed the "sixth" team.

In terms of implementing the elements planned for the federal demonstration, Multnomah managed full implementation of 13 elements and partial implementation of 1 element (setting incentives compatible with team policing). Generally, the outcomes expected from the demonstration have yet to develop. Of the 11 outcomes tracked as part of the evaluation of the demonstration, the only prominent change that occurred was an increased number of arrests and prosecutions. After a slow start accompanied by an actual decline in arrests and prosecutions, the teams rallied in late 1975 and 1976 to produce rates of arrests and prosecutions that exceeded the pre-team policing rates.

In general, the implementation of team policing seemed to cause a temporary period of disruption within the MCDPS. And, part way through the demonstration, somewhat different operating methods for deputies, sergeants and lieutenants evolved. New functions for deputies in the field entailed:

- more discretion about how to handle preliminary investigations of non-serious crimes;

1

- more emphasis on arrests;

- more emphasis on traffic citations and the reappearance of traffic specialists in some teams (i.e., officers who contribute a disproportionately higher share of citations); and

- less emphasis on field stops.

New methods of operating increased the responsibilities of both sergeants and lieutenants. Sergeants supervised all field operations and lieutenants participated more in decision making directly related to the activities of their complements.

The adoption of team policing at the MCDPS was difficult for several reasons. For example, before the LEAA demonstration, the department's budget was extremely tight. Not only was the division unable to hire additional deputies or renew its fleet of patrol cars, but rumors of personnel cuts lowered department morale. Also, team policing implementation occurred immediately after two significant changes in division operations. First, the schedule was shifted to a four-day work week with ten-hour work days, and second, the detective and patrol functions were merged. Further, a sparsely populated, large jurisdiction like Multnomah County could not easily be partitioned into discrete neighborhoods.

In October 1977, after the LEAA demonstration ended, Sheriff Edgar Martin of the MCDPS expressed the following views about team policing:

> "Multnomah County made a commitment to what we believe is a five- to ten-year change process, intended to improve service delivery, improve management, improve the decision-making process, and to improve the department's involvement with the citizens of the community it serves. In choosing an organizational model to bring about this change process, we elected to utilize Neighborhood Team Policing because the concepts . . . generally fit our idea for a model for change . . . . Although we held high expectations for the development of this organizational change, we fully expected, and were not surprised at, the amount of disruption and frustration brought about by the implementation of neighborhood team policing. I am very pleased with the ability of our department members to cope with this highly structured and difficult environment."

So far, patrol officers do not see team policing as an effective vehicle for change in the department. In a January 1976 survey, 88 percent of respondents felt team policing had not "improved things" in the department; a year later their views had changed only one percentage point. When asked to explain their views, patrol officers in both surveys cited the following types of deficiencies:

- not enough equipment or personnel;
- poor morale;
- a communication gap between officers and supervisors;
- budget problems and inefficiency; and
- lax supervision and poor leadership.

However, two points should not be ignored. Team policing is not necessarily designed to effect factors such as budget, sufficiency of equipment and personnel. Therefore, the patrol officers' responses may simply reflect low morale. And although in the second survey, administered in March 1977, more respondents felt team policing had not improved the department markedly, only 3 percent wished to abandon the concept and return to the old system.

Ultimately, team policing implies changes in the way officers spend their time on duty. In Multnomah, where the program is still developing and the records system is undergoing a major overhaul, only a cursory analysis of the way team policing has affected the average patrol deputy's working day, can be completed.

An officer's day is composed of three main types of activities:

- housekeeping;
- general services to the public; and
- patrol.

The housekeeping class includes roll calls, equipment inspections, vehicle refueling, meetings and all other activities that support and prepare officers to provide general services and cruise on patrol. The general services to

the public class includes all types of calls for service from the community and most officer-initiated actions designed to maintain public safety such as traffic citations, field stops, follow-up investigations, crime prevention presentations and stakeouts. Patrol is another type of officer-initiated activity and is narrowly defined as time not spent in either of the other two main classes.

To date, the best evidence about changes in the officer's day can be gathered from the area of general services to the public. Table 1 shows the per-officer rate of six recorded classes of services (rows B through G) for the year before team policing (1974), the year it was implemented (1975), and the first full year of operation (1976). By the end of 1976, the table indicates that, each month, a typical Multnomah deputy assigned to the operations section was likely to:

- handle 16 percent more miscellaneous calls for service;
- conduct 25 percent fewer formal preliminary investigations;
- garner 26 percent more arrests;
- issue 10 percent more traffic citations;
- investigate 23 percent fewer traffic accidents; and
- stop 62 percent fewer vehicles and pedestrians because they seemed suspicious.

In addition, row A on the table shows that the total number of recorded service events (which includes all types of services listed on the table) increased by only one percentage point.

Miscellaneous calls for service and traffic accidents tend to vary regardless of police organizational configuration, so it is unlikely that team policing is associated with changes in services related to these events. For the other changes, investigations, arrests, traffic citations,

TABLE 1: AVERAGE PATROL OFFICER ACTIVITIES PER MONTH

Row	Activity	Pre-Team Policing 1974	Implementation 1975	First Year Operation 1976	Net Change 1974-1976
A	Total Reported Events Per Officer	700.0	63.3	70.7	+ .7%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	-10%	+12%	+ 1.0%
B	Miscellaneous Calls Per Deputy	33.9	35.2	39.2	+ 5.3%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	+ 4%	+11%	+16.0%
C	Crimes Investigated Per Deputy	15.2	13.4	11.0	- 3.8%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	-12%	-15%	-25.0%
D	Arrests Per Deputy	3.1	3.0	3.9	+ .8%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	- 3%	+30%	+26.0%
E	Traffic Cites Per Deputy	12.0	8.4	13.2	+ 1.2%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	-30%	+57%	+10.0%
F	Traffic Accidents Investigated Per Deputy	2.6	2.3	2.0	- .6%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	-12.0%	-13.0%	-23.0%
G	Field Stops Per Deputy	2.6	1.0	1.0	- 1.6%
	Percentage of Change Over Previous Year	—	-62.0%	—	-62.0%

Source: Operations Section Monthly Reports

and field stops, there seems to be a plausible link to team policing, but
a more detailed study would be required to explain the connection satisfac-
torily and analyze how housekeeping and patrol may have changed.

II. THE MULTNOMAH COUNTY
SETTING AND BACKGROUND

A. SETTING

Multnomah declares that it is the first county in the nation where a
sheriff has implemented team policing. The U.S. Bureau of Census Current
Population Report P25, Number 685 (dated April 1977) estimates a July 1975
population in Multnomah County as 530,412 citizens. The MCDPS serves the
approximately 180,000 people who reside in the suburbs of Portland or in
the surrounding farmland and wilderness area. Excepted from its jurisdiction
are the cities of Portland and Gresham, which have their their own police
departments.

Multnomah contains 2.84 square miles per deputy as compared to a range of
0.03 to 0.19 square miles in the five other demonstration sites. Although
Multnomah's deputies do not routinely patrol the remote sections of the juris-
diction, they must be deployed so that adequate coverage of emergency situa-
tions in those areas is always assured.

The advent of team policing meant major changes in the police organization,
with particular emphasis on reducing specialization. In the past, the sheer
size of the jurisdiction created problems in coordination, communications
and logistics for the police, and today, the agency still grapples with these
difficulties. Geography played a role in the way Multnomah handled at least

four team policing elements: maintenance of geographic integrity, deployment based on demand, interaction and information sharing, and foot patrol.

Because the division's mandate is to serve mostly unincorporated areas of the county, there are few recognizable neighborhoods. As a result, team area boundaries could not be set to encompass coherent communities which the residents perceived as neighborhoods. In short, the concept of neighborhood team policing is somewhat of a misnomer in Multnomah.

The MCDPS provides some uncommon services because of the character of the county. These include wilderness search and rescue, and a major warrants and extradition responsibility. In addition, crime and calls for police service are relatively low by urban standards.

B. SOURCES OF TEAM POLICING

A variety of forces gave impetus to the ultimate reorganization of the public safety division and the adoption of team policing. Multnomah County has been a leader in police department innovation for many years. As early as the 1960s, all new deputies were required to have a Bachelor's degree. A few years later, the division instituted a mandatory retirement policy, which resulted in a new generation of managers and supervisors. Moreover, six different sheriffs had administered the division in the previous ten years, a condition which accentuated the need for better coordination and tighter organization below the sheriff's level to help maintain stability.

During the spring and summer of 1974, the command staff of the Multnomah County Division of Public Safety, led by Sheriff Louis P. Rinehardt,

convened a series of seminars to explore existing problems and consider means by which they might be resolved. A wide assortment of problems were cited.

- The crime rate was rising.
- The overall clearance rate was only 17 percent.
- There were more calls for service from the public.
- The organization itself was judged stagnant and apathetic.
- There was internal pressure for job enrichment from deputies and managers.
- The vehicle fleet was old and worn.
- In spite of continuing pressure for a single modern facility, the MCDPS was still housed in two separate, outmoded facilities.
- There was a lack of coordination among separate sections.

The traditional response--increasing the number of personnel or purchasing new equipment and facilities--was not an alternative at that time, a period of budget austerity when staff cuts were in the offing. Given these circumstances, the command staff decided that the solution must be premised on existing resources "as the acquisition of substantial new resources was seen as extremely unlikely."[1] Additionally, the staff determined that the division needed operational coordination at a lower level of authority than the sheriff. A position of operations commander, responsible for patrol and investigations, staffed by a captain was envisioned. As a product of its deliberation, the command staff recommended an intensive consideration of available alternatives.

Captain Edgar Martin (who eventually became sheriff during the latter part of the team policing demonstration) was assigned to plan the reorganization and opted to form a planning task force. In the fall of 1974, six members

---

1. Neighborhood Team Policing: The Multnomah County Experience, Brown, Lee P., ed., second printing, December 1976, p. 12.

of the department representing different ranks and units were chosen to staff

the task force. Some members had served on a similar task force commis-

sioned by Sheriff Rinehardt's predecessor in 1972. That group produced a

plan for team policing but the plan was unexplainably pigeonholed by the ad-

ministration. The new effort was to be collaborative and, in order to devote

full time to this activity, task force members were relieved of all other

duties for a 30-day period and "charged with exploring the state-of-the-art

relative to the delivery of police service . . . ."[2] The task force was to

prepare a plan and recommendations for reorganization of the division.

> "The task force solicited as much input as possible from other members
> of the Department concerning their ideas for reorganization. All task
> force sessions were open to the Department members who wished to at-
> tend. Task force members were detailed to meet weekly with the other
> Departmental units both to solicit input and to help other members keep
> abreast of the progress of the task force. This point is important
> because the literature on team policing stresses the crucial importance
> of the planning process to the success of implementation."[3]

The task force produced a 55-page plan for implementing team policing.

It detailed goals and objectives, training, personnel, new job descriptions,

facility alternatives, criminal investigation, police/community relations

and the evaluation and implementation processes. The command staff approved

the concept of team policing in December of 1974. The task force plan was

used for the implementation of neighborhood team policing.

The plan was prepared before the department had contact with LEAA con-

cerning the neighborhood team policing demonstration. Thus, it is clear that

LEAA did not "transfer" team policing technology to Multnomah. That the

plan itself has a nearly point-by-point correspondence with the federal team

---

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

policing model founded on available documentary sources shows only that

Multnomah relied on those same sources, before they were forwarded by LEAA's

Office of Technology Transfer (OTT). The prescriptive package, the corner-

stone document among those forwarded later to candidate cities, is cited 14

times in the Multnomah plan. Unlike other demonstration sites, Multnomah

did not rely significantly upon visits to cities experimenting with team

policing to help formulate its own plans.

In January 1975, Lee P. Brown replaced Sheriff Rinehardt as the direc-

tor of public safety. Over the course of the next few months, Sheriff

Brown convened 16 planning task forces to consider how best to implement

team policing. More than 80 MCDPS members participated on these task forces

for periods ranging from two days to two weeks. Full-scale implementation

was scheduled for June 1975.

In March 1975, Dr. Brown issued a questionnaire to all departmental

personnel to elicit their views on team policing. Only 33 percent of the

department responded, despite Brown's statement that "this questionnaire is

very important and may be used . . . for recommendations related to depart-

mental changes." Fifty-eight percent responded that they thought team

policing should be implemented, while 42 percent opposed the idea. The un-

enthusiastic response and slim endorsement signalled substantial morale

problems in the implementation of team policing, problems reflected in the

general decline in productivity at the start of the demonstration.

New programs, like team policing, are usually initially implemented on

a trial basis. According to former Sheriff Brown, although team policing

was already established at a number of other departments, Multnomah was the

only one "to implement such a program department-wide without first imple-

menting it on a pilot or experimental basis in selected parts of a city."[4]

---

4. Ibid., p. 6.

C. IMPLEMENTATION

Multnomah planned to implement 18 of the 20 elements identified by The Urban Institute in a review of team policing literature. As mentioned previously, no pilot test was conducted. However, program implementation was preceded by a long planning period and the teams were set up in phases.

Five team areas were formally established in the spring of 1975. The largest covered 250 square miles, the smallest eight square miles. Shortly thereafter, teams composed of one lieutenant, two to five sergeants and fifteen to twenty deputies were trained and then deployed to the new areas. The teams ranged in size from team one with 18 members to team three with a complement of 27.

Initially, the combined effects of a new dispatch system, large jurisdiction and comparatively small team complements on each shift made it difficult for officers to deliver services solely in their own team area. Reportedly, as the demonstration progressed, the difficulty was ameliorated. A cursory analysis of dispatch records for October 1976 showed that teams required assistance from another team for only about 10 percent of the calls for service.

Preimplementation training was planned by a task force aided by consultants and consisted of week-long team building retreats. Six separate retreats were held in May, June and July—one for each of the five new patrol teams and one for the new detective team. In addition, numerous training seminars, meetings and task forces followed throughout the demonstration. According to deputies we polled, the training was not completely useful. When asked, about 60 percent responded that the training left them "poorly" or "very poorly" prepared to deal with team policing.

Thirteen of the 46 sergeants and deputies assigned to the old investigative division were reassigned to patrol to serve in a regular duty capacity on the teams. With the start of team policing, some new responsibility for follow-up investigation was added to patrol's existing responsibility for more preliminary investigations. Also, a case management system with a scoring sheet for prioritizing cases was instituted. Oftentimes, with support from nonteam sections, the teams worked to emphasize service to the community. Methods to accomplish this included:

- conducting business surveys to upgrade emergency telephone numbers;

- conducting premise security surveys of businesses and homes; and

- making presentations at area schools about shoplifting, traffic safety, marking property, registering bicycles and other topics.

Contact with the community was further encouraged through block meetings, appearances by the sheriff, and establishment of the storefront headquarters by the teams in their areas.

A system of Management-by-Objectives (MBO) was inaugurated with team policing in part to raise the level of involvement of line deputies, sergeants and lieutenants in division decision making. It is expected that the system will achieve its full potential in about five years.

D. DEPARTMENT RESOURCES

A five-member County Board of Supervisors sets the MCDPS budget. During the fiscal year 1975-1976, the board allocated $56.7 million for the operation of the agency. A summary of the budget history is shown in Table 2 below. While the budget grew 13 percent between fiscal year

1973-1974 and fiscal year 1975-1976, there were continuous fiscal problems.
On more than one occasion, MCDPS announced severe cuts in the number of allo-
cated positions and, while the announcements were retracted, they created
considerable apprehension about job security. It is quite likely the threats
contributed to a lowering in job satisfaction--a trend team policing was de-
signed to reverse. In addition, the threats to cut personnel occurred at
a time when agency officials, line officers and local experts agreed that
MCDPS needed more manpower, not less, to carry out its policing responsibil-
ities effectively.

TABLE 2: HISTORY OF ACTUAL AND PROJECTED EXPENDITURES AT MCDPS (LESS
COURTHOUSE JAIL AND ROCKY BUTTE JAIL)

ITEM	1975-1976[a] (estimated)	Fiscal Year 1974-1975	Fiscal Year 1973-1974
Personnel	$5,223,686[b]	$5,265,035[f]	$4,761,857[g]
Materials & Services	1,008,215[c]	747,732	565,190
Equipment & Capital	566,325[d]	37,267	41,459
Total[e]	$6,798,226	$6,050,034	$5,368,506[h]

a. Excludes personnel costs for River Patrol, Grants, Dep. Schleich, and additions as per budget office.
b. Includes $575,000 for overtime.
c. Includes $450,000 for motor pool.
d. Includes $520,000 federal grant for communication.
e. Includes grants.
f. Includes $538,154 for overtime.
g. Includes $317,676 for overtime.
h. Includes $92,950 for River Patrol.

Source: Richard Showalter, Fiscal Analyst, MCDPS

The department's complement remained stable during the demonstration
period at just under 300 members. In October 1974, nine months before the
start of team policing, MCDPS had 294 employees, ten of whom were assigned
to the county jail. By October 1976, 17 months after the start of the
demonstration, total agency strength was 290, but the group assigned to
the jail was reduced to four.

Table 3 shows the distribution of MCDPS employees by type for October
1974 and October 1976. While the total number of personnel remained almost
constant, the number of nonsworn positions increased and the number of sworn
positions decreased.[5]

TABLE 3: EMPLOYEES BY CLASSIFICATION, OCTOBER 1974 TO OCTOBER 1976[a]

Employee Classification	October 1974	October 1976	Percent Change
a. Sheriff	1	1	--
b. Captain	5	4	-20
c. Lieutenant	16	11	-31
d. Sergeant	48	46	- 4
e. Deputy Sheriff	162	154	- 5
f. Nonsworn	52	68	+30
TOTAL	284	284	

a. Excluding jail.

Source: MCDPS payroll rosters, October 1975 and October 1976.

Since 1959, Multnomah has had an established police union under the
auspices of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), AFL-CIO. The police union serves as sole bargaining agent for

5. Although the increase in nonsworn positions was tied to the civilian
employees training (CETA) program, the change is consistent with long-term
plans for MCDPS to expand its civilian staff.

"all non-supervisory sworn employees . . . . defined by Civil Service as Deputy Sheriff/Patrolmen, Scientific Investigators and Sergeants."[6] Other employees, including lieutenants, captains, inspectors, division chiefs and the sheriff are excluded from union membership.

Multnomah proposed a $174,000 grant budget to cover start-up and transition costs associated with team policing beginning on June 1, 1975. Officials report that the federal demonstration was attractive because it meant additional financial support—particularly in the area of training and technical assistance. They also report that deputies harbored some negative opinions about the demonstration grant. Specifically, some were disgruntled because they felt the grant funds could be more appropriately applied to critical shortages in facilities, equipment or manpower.

The proposed budget was equivalent to about 2 percent of division's expenditures for FY 1975-1976 when the bulk of the funds was applied. Officials report the funds were applied as proposed. Table 4 details the budget.

TABLE 4: DEMONSTRATION GRANT BUDGET

Direct Charges		
Personnel		$ 59,824
Facilities, Equipment and Supplies		17,380
Training and Contractual		80,510
Travel		8,000
Total Direct	$165,714	
Indirect Charges		8,286
Total	$174,000	

6. Agreement Between Multnomah County and Multnomah County Police Union Local 117, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 1975-1977.

The largest category of expenditures was for training and contractual technical assistance for the program. Specifically, the funds covered charges for officers' time in training, training facilities, and the salaries of organization development, management, evaluation and data systems analysis consultants.

The personnel funds went to pay the full-time, 18-month salaries and benefits of the project director and a project secretary. Funds earmarked for facilities, equipment and supplies covered part of the cost of rental and renovation of storefront facilities for the teams, office furniture and machines, consumable office supplies and printing and duplicating. The travel funds were used by division members for attendance at national and regional meetings to showcase the demonstration program.

Originally, the grant was expected to end December 1976, but an extension was instituted that carried the demonstration to the end of May 1977. However, no additional funds were allocated in conjunction with the extension.

E. CHANGING ORGANIZATION

MCDPS's organizational configuration changed considerably with the adoption of team policing. Between December 1974 and the end of the demonstration period, MCDPS changed from a traditional configuration with separate investigative and patrol divisions, to a team deployment with an operations section combining investigation and patrol under one commander. Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the differences in configuration between October 1974 and October 1976.

FIGURE 1: MCDPS, PRE-TEAM POLICING

Source: MCDPS
Payroll Rosters,
October 1974

Source: MCDPS Payroll Rosters,
October 1976

FIGURE 2: MCDPS TEAM POLICING ORGANIZATION

As part of the changeover, the investigative division was dissolved and a number of detectives were transferred to patrol where they assumed regular field responsibilities. The transfers increased by 23 percent the complement available to field patrol for team policing. However, many detectives resented the dissolution of their independent division and the transfers to patrol. They perceived these changes as diminishing the power and status of the department's detectives. About half of the former detective division remained to staff the "sixth" team--the detectives.

F. DATA AVAILABILITY AND METHODS

In developing the assessment of MCDPS's neighborhood team policing demonstration, The Urban Institute relied largely on interview findings and data gathered during four visits to the agency. In all, Urban Institute staff members spent a total of 20 man days on site in Multnomah.

The following data figured heavily in our evaluation:

- The Multnomah Neighborhood Team Policing Plan, November 1974

- The Multnomah Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration Proposal, March 1975

- Selected Department Directives; General Orders; Special Orders; Memoranda 1967-1976

- Selected Operations Division Directives; Special Orders; Memoranda 1973-1976

- Selected Team Directives; Special Orders; Memoranda 6/1975-1976

- Selected Operations Division Staff Meeting Minutes 1974-1976

- Operations Division Monthly Event Activity Reports 1973-1976

- Operations Division Monthly Traffic Enforcement Reports 1973-1976

- Radio Calls for Services Reports (newly automated)
  July 1976 to October 1976

- A sample of routine investigative reports written during the months
  of October 1974, 1975 and 1976

- Two waves of patrol officer surveys conducted January 1976 and
  March 1977

- One wave of a telephone survey of citizens administered in
  January 1976

- Neighborhood Team Policing: The Multnomah County Experience,
  Brown, Lee P., ed., second printing, December 1976

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

A. SUMMARY OF ELEMENTS

Team policing in Multnomah is examined here in light of the 20 elements
identified by The Urban Institute in the team policing literature sent to
the sites. Table 5 lists the elements and briefly answers the following
questions:

- Was the element operational prior to the team policing grant
  application?

- Was there a plan to implement the element during the demonstra-
  tion period?

- What was the source of the plan?

- Was the element implemented during the demonstration period?

- What are the post-grant plans for the element?

Multnomah's plan showed the intent to implement 18 of the 20 elements.
The element recommending emphasis on foot patrol is inapplicable in Multno-
mah because the geographic size of the team areas requires the use of patrol
vehicles to ensure coverage. Neither the proposal nor the plan mentioned
the intent to "increase team interaction and information sharing." Of the
18 elements Multnomah planned to operationalize, 13 were fully implemented;
1 was partly implemented; 2 were attempted but not successfully implemented;
and 2 were not attempted. A brief description of the experience with each
element is presented below.

Multnomah established five relatively low population density team areas
covering a total of 376 square miles, the largest of the demonstration sites.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF MCDPS EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

Element No. in Federal Model	Description of Elements In Federal or Local Team Policing Model	Was The Element Operational Prior To Team Policing Grant Application?	Was There A Plan to Implement The Element During The Demonstration Period?	What Was The Source Of The Plan?	Was The Element Implemented During The Demonstration Period?	What Are Plans For Post Grant Use Of Element?	Comments
1	Define Neighborhood Boundaries for Team Areas	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	County Divided into Five Areas
2	Establish Teams of 20 to 40 Personnel	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	
3	Teams Deliver Services in Neighborhood Only	No	Yes	Local Plan.	Yes	Continue	Hard To Implement
4	Training for Team Policing	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	Organizational Development Focus
5	Assign Detectives to Teams	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	New Rotation Policy Limits Long-Term Specialization
6	Detectives Train Team Officers	No	Yes	Local Plan	No	Not Applicable	
7	Team Officers Conduct A Degree of Investigation	Yes	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	Instituted Case Management System and Increased Patrol Follow-up Responsibility
8	Make Linkages With Social Services	Yes	Yes	Local Plan	No Change Over Prior Operations	Continue Previous Policy	
9	Make Systematic Referrals	Yes	Yes	Local Plan	No Change Over Prior Operations	Continue Previous Policy	
10	Emphasize Service Activities	Yes	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	

TABLE 5 CONTINUED: SUMMARY OF MCDPS EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

Element No. in Federal Model	Description of Elements In Federal or Local Team Policing Model	Was The Element Operational Prior To Team Policing Grant Application?	Was There A Plan to Implement The Element During The Demonstration Period?	What Was The Source Of The Plan?	Was The Element Implemented During The Demonstration Period?	What Are Plans For Post Grant Use Of Element?	Comments
11	Use Street Stops, Field Interrogations Sparingly	No	Yes	Proposal	Yes	Continue	Street Stops Declined, But No Mechanism Implemented
12	Emphasize Foot Patrol	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	No	Not Applicable	
13	Encourage Community Contacts	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	
14	Establish Continuity of Assignment to Teams	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	
15	Deploy Personnel Based On Crime and Service Demand	No	Yes	Local Plan	No, But Attempted	Continue	Geography Constrains Deployment by Demand
16	Decentralize Authority/ Accountability to Team Leader	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	
17	Eliminate Quasi-Military Style of Command	No	Yes	Proposal	Yes	Continue	
18	Use Participative Management to Set Objectives, Plan and Evaluate Team Performance	No	Yes	Local Plan	Yes	Continue	
19	Set Incentives Compatible With Team Policing	No	Yes	Local Plan	Partial	Continue	
20	Increase Team Interaction and Information Sharing	No	No	Not Applicable	No	Not Applicable	

With the exception of one team, staffed at the level of 18 officers, the team complements were within the suggested federal guidelines of 20 to 40. While the size of team areas initially created some difficulty in maintaining geographic integrity, the teams were able to answer calls in their assigned areas most of the time. The sheer need to maintain minimum coverage of extensive areas inhibited the effort to deploy men based on crime and service demand.

True to its tradition of emphasizing education, Multnomah provided an extensive organizational development of training program for team officers, managers and some training for others in the department. The training was provided by two organizational development consultants and featured retreats and process facilitation meetings. However, when polled, most deputies reported that training left them "poorly" or "very poorly" prepared to deal with the special problems of team policing.

Investigators were transferred to each team where they assumed all the responsibility of patrol sergeants and line officers. They did not retain their formal designation as investigators. While there is little evidence that the transferrees had much opportunity to train patrol in investigations, the newly formed detective team did provide formalized instruction in investigative techniques to team officers. Prior to team policing, patrol officers were already assigned substantial responsibility for preliminary investigations. Under team policing, follow-up responsibility for certain classes of crime was transferred to teams. However, the detective team retained follow-up responsibility for many major crimes and started a burglary tactical squad to track burglars rather than burglary cases. As a result, the opportunity for team follow-up activity was limited because

(a) the classes of crime for which they became responsible seldom warranted extensive case-by-case follow up, and (b) the burglary tactical squad took on a substantial portion of the case follow up for burglaries.

The teams originally planned to emphasize service activities, including community meetings, storefront activities, a school liaison program, and perhaps an expanded working relationship with other social service agencies. Despite this intent, the relationships with social service agencies and the volume of referrals did not change. Instead, it was discovered that the existing working relationships and level of referrals were sufficient. The teams made an effort to encourage community contacts, and the use of street stops and field interrogation declined when measured by the number of field contact reports.

The department made a major effort to eliminate the quasi-military style of command and to introduce participative management, principally through the inauguration of a Management-By-Objectives system. The sheriff provided strong support for the start-up of MBO which is said to have caused a much more strongly structured review of division activities and plans. It is expected to take five years to make MBO fully operational in the way originally envisioned during the planning of team policing. Although officers made some concrete gains—influence over assignments, schedules, call response policy, setting objectives, etc.—they perceived their ability to influence the work environment as limited.

Some moves were made to set incentives and rewards compatible with team policing. For deputies, the rewards were not monetary; for example, permission to attend special training seminars or workshops. For managers, the sheriff can grant merit pay increases for team policing performance.

Coupled with the move towards participative management, considerable authority and full accountability were transferred to team managers who in turn made much greater demands on their sergeants. Initially, the lieutenants assigned to manage the teams were singled out as undergoing the "greatest role change." Later, it was determined that sergeants were having difficulty with role identification. A task force reported that the sergeants were confused and ambivalent about their new role as team leaders. The task force went on to spell out the responsibilities of sergeants.

Multnomah established continuity of assignment. A comparison of payroll rosters shows that about 20 percent of the team deputies, 9 percent of the sergeants, and 2 of the five team lieutenants were reassigned between October 1975 and October 1976. Also, a new rotation policy designed to encourage team assignment and discourage long assignment to special sections was instituted in early 1977.

Multnomah did not state its intent to use team policing as a vehicle for increased interaction and information sharing among personnel. Comments from a variety of division members indicate that, in fact, coordination and communication within teams, among teams and other departmental units as well as outside agencies deteriorated around the start of team policing. In response to this finding, officials state that information sharing has been a traditional problem that exists because the division sections are scattered among three separate facilities.

Multnomah made one of the most ambitious attempts among the demonstration participants to implement team policing elements and, in large measure, they were successful. A chronology of some of the major

events that highlighted the transition to team policing and the OTT demonstration is provided in Figure 3 to help guide the reader through the implementation.

B. BOUNDARIES DEFINED FOR TEAM AREAS
(ELEMENT #1)

On May 10, 1975, three weeks before the commencement of the demonstration, former Sheriff Lee Brown issued general order #75-21 which defined the team boundaries and established patrol districts within boundaries. Five team areas were established within Multnomah County; team boundaries encompass primarily unincorporated areas and exclude from their coverage the two major cities in Multnomah County—Portland and Gresham. Later in May 1975 and again in June, the team boundaries were reconfigured slightly and minor adjustments were made in the district structure. After that time, the team boundaries and district structure remained stable throughout the demonstration period. Figure 4 presents a map of the team areas as configured after June 1975.

The total area covered by the five team areas is by far the largest territory encompassed by teams in the five demonstration sites. Also, the sizes of the team areas are diverse, ranging from team five which covers 250 square miles to team three which covers 8 square miles. The size of the team areas has important implications for deployment which will be discussed later. Also noteworthy is the fact that three of the areas contain two or more noncontiguous portions.

1974

SPRING: ADMINISTRATION IDENTIFIES PROBLEMS

- crime rate increase
- low clearances
- rising citizen demand for service
- declining officer job satisfaction
- apathetic organization

SUMMER:
FALL: ADMINISTRATION DECIDES TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR REORGANIZATION. OPERATIONS DIVISION CREATED

- recommends and plans for team policing

WINTER: ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF TO FOLLOW TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION

1975

JANUARY: L... BROWN CHOSEN SHERIFF

- MCDPS adopts 4-10 duty schedule

FEBRUARY: SPECIALISTS—MOSTLY DETECTIVES—BEGIN TRANSFER TO PATROL

FIRST EFFORT TO SEEK OTT TEAM POLICING FUNDING

MARCH: PSRI SITE ASSESSMENT

- very positive

SHERIFF POLLS PERSONNEL ABOUT TEAM POLICING IMPLEMENTATION

- very low response
- slight majority favorable

APRIL: TEAM PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT

- sheriff selects commander
- sheriff and staff select team managers
- sergeants choose assignments
- deputies choose assignments

TEAM POLICING TRAINING TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED

MAY: FINAL GEAR UP

TEAMS BEGIN ROTATION TO FINAL PRE-IMPLEMENTATION TRAINING RETREAT

- set-up work schedules
- eliminate roll call
- adjust call response procedures

JUNE: START OF OTT DEMONSTRATION
TEAMS START TO OPERATE IN AREAS

- set-up offices at operations headquarters
- start contact with community
- search for storefront locations
- start biweekly/monthly team meetings
- team managers join administrative staff meetings
- dispatch stacks calls
- equipment reallocated

JULY-
DECEMBER: INITIAL PROCEDURES ADJUSTED

- dispatchers no longer stack calls
- storefronts located
- team meetings rescheduled on need basis

STAFF ADJUSTED

- CSOs added to teams
- some teams experiment with investigation specialists
- deputies transferred among teams and between operations and other sections

MBO INITIATED

- sheriff outlines process, provides department policy
- teams react to policy, generate goals, objectives and activities
- administrative staff solidifies 1976 MBO standards

1976

JANUARY-
JUNE: MBO PROGRESSES

- oral quarterly reports

COUNTY CALLS FOR REDUCTION IN BUDGETED MCDPS POSITIONS

OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION REINSTITUTES SOME CONTROLS

- voluntary roll call
- official timekeeper

FIELD PERFORMANCE BEGINS TO IMPROVE

ADMINISTRATION MOVES MILES CLOSER TO OPERATIONS, BUT INTO SEPARATE FACILITY

JULY-
DECEMBER: SHERIFF BROWN REPLACED BY ASSISTANT MARTIN

OPERATIONS COMMANDER BECOMES ASSISTANT TO SHERIFF MARTIN

TEAM 3 COMMANDER MOVED TO ADMINISTRATION

MANDATORY ROLL CALL ABOLISHED THEN REINSTATED

EXTEND 1976 MBO TO JULY 1977

- to coincide with fiscal year
- rotation policy instituted
- procedures manual distributed

1977

JANUARY-
JUNE: TEAM 1 ESTABLISHES INDEPENDENT HEADQUARTERS IN AREA

DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM ENDS, MAY 31, 1977

FIGURE 3: CHRONOLOGY OF MULTNOMAH EXPERIENCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING

FIGURE 4:   TEAM AREA BOUNDARIES

The 1974 Multnomah neighborhood team policing plan describes how the team policing boundaries were defined.

> "We considered the approximate population by census tract, police work load, juvenile delinquency and a general examination of economic and social factors. These factors were also combined with an intuitive knowledge of the county supplied by members of the [planning] group and through discussions with other department members. Finally, we considered city limits, school districts, natural boundaries and total team area in making our determination of boundaries."[1]

The team area characteristics are shown on Table 6.

It is important to note, however, that the designated team areas do not constitute neighborhoods in the sense implied by the team policing literature. The residential and rural areas encompassed are simply too large and too indistinct to be construed as neighborhoods in the traditional sense. There are scattered enclaves within team areas, such as Erroll Heights in team four or Parkrose in team two, that constitute neighborhoods, but the term "neighborhood" is basically misapplied when associated with the Multnomah demonstration. Instead, the term "geographic" is considered a more appropriate program descriptor.

Team area one, located west of Portland, consists of five noncontiguous portions, including an island. The southern and western parts consist of farms, wilderness area, and the wealthy, relatively sparsely populated hillside suburbs of Portland. A number of industrial parks are located in the northern section. While the area covered by team one has the lowest crime rate, it has traditionally been staffed by two radio patrol cars because the distance between the northern and southern sections is so great. The result is that the rate

---

1. Multnomah County Department of Public Safety, Neighborhood Team Policing Proposal (hereafter referred to as local plan), p. 24, undated.

TABLE 6: TEAM AREA DATA

Team Area	Total Population per Square Mile	Population*		Area in Square Miles	Labor Force Composition**		Youths	1973 Juvenile Arrests	Number of Patrol Districts
AREA #1	350	1960	23,863	80	Blue Collar	38.4%	6,138	192	6
		1970	28,034		White Collar	78.1%			
					Unskilled	14.0%			
					Unemployed	6.9%			
AREA #2	915	1960	21,585	26	Blue Collar	54.5%	4,600	203	7
		1970	24,713		White Collar	57.9%			
					Unskilled	18.8%			
					Unemployed	6.5%			
AREA #3	5,936	1960	37,798	8	Blue Collar	41.8%	9,448	409	9
		1970	47,493		White Collar	58.1%			
					Unskilled	15.1%			
					Unemployed	5.0%			
AREA #4	3,442	1960	33,148	11	Blue Collar	63.7%	6,818	404	6
		1970	37,863		White Collar	47.3%			
					Unskilled	21.3%			
					Unemployed	6.4%			
AREA #5	172	1960	27,294	250	Blue Collar	64.0%	8,868	526	8
		1970	43,094		White Collar	52.3%			
					Unskilled	47.6%			
					Unemployed	6.0%			

*Approximated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1970, Census Tracts, Final Report PHC (1)-165 Portland, Oregon, Washington SMSA.

Source: MCDPS "Neighborhood Team Policing Plan."

of calls per officer is very low. Near the end of the demonstration, team one moved its headquarters to the area. The move eliminated the 18-mile drive from the main team headquarters located in the team five area.[2]

Team area two is the northernmost part of the relatively densely populated suburbs east of Portland. The team two area has industry and contains within its boundaries the Portland Port Authority and the Portland International Airport. While team area two includes a number of established residential areas, it is the least residential of the three team areas just east of Portland.

Team area three is in the heart of these suburbs. It is predominantly composed of residential housing and commercial establishments, and has the largest population of the five team areas.

Team area four is composed of three noncontiguous areas and contains a separate area called Erroll Heights which is regarded as a neighborhood and has a high demand for police service. As a result, a patrol car is always assigned to the area. At one time, it was thought to function as a "felon hangout," but today residents are working hard to improve the area.

Team area five is a 250-mile sector occupied principally by farmland and wilderness. It fronts along the Columbia River and the Columbia Gorge, and the eastern portion is occupied by national forest land. In the summer months, heavy recreational activity is centered in the team five area. The population density of this area is lowest of the five teams--172 people per square mile (versus 5,936 per square mile in area three)--but the population is concentrated on the western border adjacent to the team two, three and four areas. Additionally, area five contains the main operations headquarters building in which each team maintains a separate office.

2. Before team one established a more permanent headquarters, they had a storefront located in an "old west" park.

C. TEAM COMPLEMENTS ESTABLISHED
(ELEMENT #2)

In accordance with the local plan to establish teams for training and planning purposes, on April 24, 1975, Captain Pearce, commander of the operations division, issued special order #75-13 establishing the team assignments as shown below in Table 7.

TABLE 7: NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO TEAMS, APRIL 1975

TEAM:	1	2	3	4	5
Lt.	1	1	1	1	1
Sgt.	2	4	5	4	4
Deputies	15	20	21	21	19
Total	18	25	27	26	24
Source: Operations Division Special Order #75-13					

The implementation of team operations was a phased process. Each team, sequentially, participated in a one-week retreat and, upon its return, assumed responsibility for policing an assigned area. The implementation of teams was completed by July 14, 1975.

By October 1975, three months after the demonstration started, several adjustments in team staffing were made. While team one remained the same, team two lost two deputies, team three lost a sergeant and team four gained a sergeant and lost a deputy. Team five gained three deputies needed to staff the desk rotation at the operations division headquarters located in its area.

The team staffing process was started when the sheriff solicited departmental input. On March 18, 1975, Sheriff Brown issued a departmentwide memorandum asking for nominations for the five team leaders and the operations

division commander's post. Although Brown weighed other factors, he reported that the nominations represented an important factor in his choices. By April 10, 1975, after meeting with division staff, the sheriff announced the names of the team commanders and the team areas for which each would be responsible. Departmental sergeants were then allowed to rank their team assignment preferences. When necessary, competing preferences for first choice were resolved according to seniority. When sergeant assignments were published, officers were then allowed to rank their preferences for team assignments and conflicts were also resolved according to seniority.

During the period which bracketed the initiation of the demonstration, three organizational shifts occurred which were widely regarded as a sign that detective power and influence in the organization were diminishing. These shifts were carried out in the name of facilitating the institution of new technology—team policing—but were experienced as major power shifts within the organization.

On October 21, 1974, immediately before the formation of the planning task force, general order #74-34 created a single "field operations division" combining the old patrol and detective divisions under one structure. (One captain remained in charge of detectives, one in charge of patrol and one captain was placed in charge of field operations.) With this shift, the detective division lost its special status and visibility. In February and March of 1975, a substantial number of investigators were shifted from the detective to the patrol division, and some were assigned to regular patrol duty. Many investigators perceived this shift as a demotion. Finally, Captain Pearce, who had commanded the old patrol division, replaced Captain Martin as the commander of field operations.

D. FLEXIBLE BOUNDARIES: TEAMS DELIVER MOST SERVICES IN THEIR AREA (ELEMENT #3)

The Multnomah proposal states that "the responsibility of providing police service, both by time and area, will be left to the teams."[3] Further, the proposal states that,

> "team members are [to be] sent out of their team area only in emergencies . . . . special police units [will] inform themselves of team goals and, wherever possible, consult in advance with the team manager when they will be operating in the team area."

Multnomah made a strong effort at the beginning of the demonstration to honor team boundaries and to preserve geographic integrity, but according to officials, the effort proved counterproductive and a more flexible policy was adopted. One reason was that the size of the team areas was too large in relation to the available shift strength. The following example will illustrate the point. During the graveyard shift, team two was often staffed by two patrol officers. If they were summoned to attend to a priority call in the northwestern sector of their area and a second priority call occurred in the southeastern sector, available patrol officers from team area three were likely to be three to four times closer to the uncovered call. Thus, initial resistance to the violation of team boundaries waned as repeated instances of slow response to priority calls occurred. The flexible response was the formation of informal working arrangements between teams to occasionally cross boundaries to improve coverage.

The team working arrangements with the new regional dispatch center were unusual and bear brief mention.[4] Each team was allowed to develop

---

3. Multnomah County Sheriff's Office Demonstration Participation Proposal (hereafter referred to as Multnomah proposal), March 25, 1977, p. 25.
4. The Bureau of Emergency Communications, which was established in 1974 to serve all Multnomah County public safety communications needs, is a futuristic facility built into a small butte in an unincorporated area just east of Portland. The facility serves the Portland Police Department, MCDPS and all other public safety agencies in the county.

its own, idiosyncratic procedures with dispatch. This tactic led to variations in procedure such as the following.

- Some teams used call codes for individual officers, others for patrol cars.

- Teams developed different rules concerning the type of response calls which they would employ. For example, officers could choose between immediately appearing in person, scheduling a later visit or simply handling the matter by phone, depending on the seriousness of the call.

Because dispatch served the entire region, not just the team area, and since the organization was newly staffed by civilians, and dispatch procedures differed by team, there were some initial difficulties between regional dispatch and the MCDPS teams.

The opinions of deputies after six months of team policing were recorded and showed that 84 pecent of the respondents had problems with the work of the dispatchers. A year later, eighteen months into the program, a similar survey showed that 77 percent of the deputies polled still had some problems with dispatch.

The results from another question, however, showed that officers had perceived some improvement in dispatch (see Table 8). The percentage who thought dispatch performance improved during the last six months, rose from 7 percent on the first wave to 18 percent on the second. Relatedly, the percentage of officers who perceived a decline in the last six months dropped slightly and the percentage of those who felt performance remained the same dropped 8 percent. Apparently one of the reasons for the improvement was that some inter-team procedural uniformity was established part way through the demonstration. For example, dispatchers were no longer required to stack team calls. Finally, a sample of 620 dispatch cards for selected days during October 1976 showed that the teams required assistance from another team only about 10 percent of the time.

TABLE 8: QUALITY OF DISPATCH PERFORMANCE

Question: In the last six months has the performance of the dispatchers improved or declined?

Date	N	Percent Response			
		Improved	Remained the Same	Declined	Total
Wave One (1/76)	102	7%	50%	43%	100%
Wave Two (3/77)	71	18%	42%	40%	100%
Source: The Urban Institute Patrol Officer Survey, January 1976 and March 1977					

E. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING FOR DIVISION
MANAGEMENT AND THE TEAMS
(ELEMENT #4)

The basic intent to provide training for all management and the teams is expressed in the Multnomah plan and proposal. For managers, the training was to be "consistent with participatory management objectives." For the teams, "a training retreat . . . to develop team guidelines and objectives, develop a cohesive group and learn appropriate community organization skills and group dynamics" was envisioned.[5]

The team policing training started in the spring of 1975 when the division established a training task force staffed by the organizational development consultants, an internal training group, county training staff and an educational specialist from Portland State University. The mission of the task force was to solicit input from the department on training needs and to establish a basic team policing package which would "prepare . . . division members for the transition from the traditional organizational structure . . . to the neighborhood team model . . ."[6]

---

5. Multnomah proposal, p. 24.
6. Brown, op. cit., p. 20.

Before the inauguration of team policing, the task force conducted a series of meetings with deputies and managerial personnel to identify issues of concern about team policing—issues which the training should address. The following concerns surfaced during the meetings and were reported in the Multnomah Neighborhood Team Policing volume.

- Concerning participatory management: "Doubt was expressed by deputies that they would have real input and managers were concerned about having responsibility without authority."

- Concerning resistance to change:

  -- Too much change has already occurred in recent years because of high administrative turnover.

  -- Established personal relationships will be disrupted.

  -- Neighborhood team policing (NTP) funds could be spent on more necessary items like personnel and equipment.

  -- Officers are comfortable with traditional crime fighter role, suspicious of new and different responsibilities.

- Concerning the Training Group's credibility: Deputies question trainers, "What do you know about police work?"

- Concerning Training Group strategy: Need strategies to counter [negative] preconceptions about NTP and participatory management.

- Concerning Training Group functioning: Need "team building" within training unit.

- Concerning underlying theme of training sessions: Stress group dynamics and communications skills.

- Concerning [each] training session for the individual teams: Must consider personalities (particularly team manager and assistants), team size, demography of team area, and age and experience of members.

- Concerning post-implementation in-service training needs: Training sessions to identify areas where specific skill building is needed; e.g., follow-up investigation.[7]

---

7. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

This feedback indicated the need for a preliminary unstructured period of organizational development activities which would help to allay officers' anxieties about team policing and would help to initiate the team building process. The task force settled on the plan of holding six 4-day retreats, one for each neighborhood team and one for the detective team. The retreat scheduling and attendance record are shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9: PREIMPLEMENTATION TRAINING ATTENDANCE AND SCHEDULE

Team	Number of Attendees	Training Period (1975)
Team 1	26	May 19-22
Team 2	27	June 2-5
Team 3	28	June 9-12
Team 4	18	June 23-26
Team 5	24	June 7-10
Detective Team	32	July 14-17
Total	155	
Source: Operations Division Special Order, 75-18, May 1, 1975		

The retreats were held at Camp Menucha, a former estate situated on 60 wooded acres within easy driving distance of Portland. The retreat was operated by members of the training task force. The format of the retreat was unstructured, with ample time provided for participants to vent their feelings about team policing and ample free time for officers to begin to build personal relationships. The most structured activity was an attempt by each team to define its goals, objectives and activities.

The team one commander commented upon his experiences at Menucha. His description provides a more detailed flavor of the ambience of the retreat.

"In the weeks since Team One returned from Menucha I have observed indications of team strengths which I must attribute to the week we spent in training. It was apparent prior to Menucha that my team was suffering from a split between a disproportionate skewing of older officers in one faction and younger officers in the other, with virtually no middle experienced members to bridge the gap. A polarization was well under way. My goal for Menucha was to reverse this polarization. At the group meetings I attended with the Training Group, this goal was agreed upon. The setting at Menucha was ideal for the achievement of this goal . . . By the end of the training, a rather strong group bond had formed. This was apparent at the moment of adjourning when a certain amount of sentiment was expressed and there was a perceptible reluctance to break up. In these past few weeks this cohesiveness has not diminished, but has continued to manifest itself. Informal 'team meetings' occur almost daily over coffee in the field and at shift breaks at Operations Division Headquarters. These are quite spontaneous and seem to carry some of the momentum that was developed at Menucha. Personally, I feel my own position was enhanced by the week of training. Before Menucha, my contacts with team members were few and tenuous. Since then I have been drawn into the general group cohesiveness. Overall, I believe the training was essential to N.T.P. implementation and, looking back, I do not see how it could have been more effective."[8]

MCDPS managers (captains and lieutenants) participated in additional specialized training. In the fall of 1975, a three-day seminar was presented by a team policing training group that had worked in the same capacity with the Los Angeles Police Department. Conference objectives included the following:

"1. Develop a better understanding and stronger commitment to the new organization and management policy of team policing.

"2. Increase understanding of participative management, particularly as this theory applies to managing by objectives and managing through teams.

"3. Improve management skills required to implement a results-oriented team management system.

"4. Discuss problems encountered by team leaders and assist them in designing a series of action steps through which to improve the team policing management system."[9]

8. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
9. Ibid., p. 25.

Next, the Public Safety Research Institute (PSRI) conducted two 6-day seminars at Otter Crest. Forty-one MCDPS members, mostly key program people like team managers, attended the first seminar which was held October 12-17, 1975, while thirty-nine attended the second which was held from October 19-24. According to PSRI's assessment of the seminars, they focused on three different areas.

- First, participants discussed different techniques by which supervisors and top managers could facilitate change.

- Second, participants engaged in a force field analysis which called for outlining the driving and restraining forces associated with the implementation of team policing.

- Third, participants developed an inventory of problems associated with implementation to date. The inventory is appended as Figure 5 to illustrate the concerns surfacing early in the demonstration. It was produced by the members of the second seminar.

PSRI asked the participants to rate the training seminars on an ascending five-point scale of utility. Participant evaluations of the first seminar were favorable, as the examples below illustrate.

- In response to the question, "Did you learn new information about management?," the average rating was 4.5.

- In response to the question, "Did you learn new information about team policing?," the average rating was 3.8.

- In response to the question, "Did this program arouse a commitment to team policing from you?," the average rating was 3.6.

- In response to the question, "Will you support team policing any stronger (sic) as a result of this program?," the average rating was 3.8.

The ratings from the second seminar were considerably lower, with the score for the four questions above yielding a 4.6, 2.0, 2.4 and 2.6 average respectively. According to the PSRI evaluation report, "class II's attitude toward team policing was dramatically opposed to that of class I. Class II, although

PROBLEMS INVENTORY DEVELOPED BY THE PARTICIPANTS AT OTTER CREST

Inadequate planning and organizational development for:

    I.   Personnel
    II. Facilities and Equipment
    III. Budget

Resulted in the following problems:

I. **Personnel**

   A. **Action**

      1. Minor internal problems not handled
      2. Planning not made for communicating
      3. Planning broke down at service level
      4. Neighborhood Teams receive emphasis while others left out
      5. Shortage of trained personnel, resulting in need for overtime

   B. **Reaction**

      1. Poor morale
        a) not sure where we were going
        b) increased sick time
        c) increased non-productivity
        d) affects quality/quantity of work
        e) job frustration/dissatisfaction
      2. Poor services to the community

II. **Facilities and Equipment**

   A. **Facilities**

      1. Quality
      2. Size
      3. Location
      4. Parking

   B. **Equipment**

      1. Vehicles
        a) type of vehicles purchased
        b) team sergeants hide keys to assure vehicles for their team members
        c) long delays, unnecessary "loss" of vehicles due to scheduling prob-
          lems when transporting vehicles to motor pool for repair
      2. Office Equipment
        a) need for more
        b) in poor repair
      3. Phones
        a) need for more at Operations Division Headquarters
        b) need for recording device for teams at storefront

III. **Budget**

   A. **Restricted**

   B. **Process**

The above problems point to the following needs:

    1. Need to know how it (N.T.P.) affects every person.
    2. Need for uniformity in all units.
    3. Need for one-day seminar on records, radio, etc.
    4. Need recognition for other than N.T.P. units by Sheriff.
    5. Need to systematize M.B.O.
    6. Need to plan basic force.
      a) set plan guides
      b) monitor
    7. Need to involve all sections.
    8. Need to realize that everything done affects everyone.
    9. Need to receive input from all units.
    10. Need to utilize all resource people.

FIGURE 5: PROBLEMS INVENTORY DEVELOPED BY MULTNOMAH PARTICIPANTS
             AT OTTER CREST

---

obviously as intelligent, did not have the same level of commitment to team policing or the same amount of trust in the management of the MCDPS.[10]

Starting as early as December 1974, Multnomah sponsored a series of in-service training seminars on specific topics associated with the new responsibilities to be undertaken by the patrol. For example, sessions were devoted to case preparation, training in extradition, case monitoring, etc. In addition, the department issued a series of procedural memos on team policing operations-related topics such as: handling evidence, child abuse cases, juvenile court preliminary hearings, and press releases on routine cases.

Two "change process consultants," Maya Schrage and Barbara Bledsoe, were employed part time between November 1975 and the end of the demonstration. They worked with division task forces and other groups like the operations management team staff to frame the training for the teams, facilitate the training at the preimplementation retreats, and manage the ongoing change-over process to the team policing mode.

In addition to their responsibilities in conjunction with the main training events, the two process consultants "attended most management and operations staff meetings, team meetings, went on ridealongs, met individually with team, unit and section managers, talked with nonsworn employees, and generally made ourselves visible . . . with special focus on management and supervisory personnel." According to their report, they:

- helped identify alternatives for dealing with people and issues;

- acted as sounding boards for managers when they needed to vent frustration;

- gave feedback to managers regarding observed behavior of the managers and their teams;

---

10. "Evaluator Report: Multnomah County Sheriff Department Management Development Workshops," (undated), p. 2.

- suggested ways of improving inter-team and intra-division communication; and

- provided training in organizational development problem solving, decision making, and goal setting.[12]

An example of the results of these efforts was the formation of a "Sergeant/Supervisor Role Definition Task Force" in June 1976. Based on the consultants' observations that sergeants were undergoing role change difficulties because their duties were not well enough defined to assauge the competing demands of management and line personnel, the task force was formed to clarify the job. Reportedly, the product of the group's effort "resulted in a willingness of sergeants to enforce division policy [uniformly] in all teams."

As part of The Urban Institute's patrol officer survey administered in January 1976, deputies were asked to rate how well full service neighborhood team policing training prepared them to deal with the special problems encountered as part of a team.[13] The responses show that the majority felt team policing training left them "poorly" or "very poorly" prepared to deal with team policing (see Table 10). Thus, while a sizable amount of training was conducted, the effect, in the eyes of the deputies, was limited.

TABLE 10: DEPUTY OPINIONS: ADEQUACY OF TRAINING

Adequacy of Preparation	Percent of Responses (N=75)
Very Well Prepared	1%
Well Prepared	2%
Adequately Prepared	39%
Poorly Prepared	39%
Very Poorly Prepared	20%
Total	101%[a]

a. Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: The Urban Institute Patrol Officer Attitude Questionnaire, Wave One, January 1976, Question 16.

12. A Review: Management Process, Neighborhood Team Policing in Multnomah County, July 1977.
13. MCDPS officials content that The Urban Institute has imposed an unfair standard for evaluating training because we did not ask whether the retreat helped to establish cohesive teams.

F. SOME INVESTIGATORS REASSIGNED TO TEAMS AS
SUPERVISORS AND DEPUTIES
(ELEMENT #5)

Both the Multnomah proposal and plan indicate an intent to assign detectives to teams and, in fact, this intent was realized in March and April 1975 when a group of 13 sergeants and deputies, who had formerly been assigned as investigators, were transferred to patrol pending upcoming reassignment to the teams. These transfers caused the size of the central investigation unit to shrink by more than half to 26 members during the months just prior to the demonstration. Eventually the detectives assigned to patrol were distributed among the teams as follows:

TABLE 11: NUMBER OF INVESTIGATORS ASSIGNED TO TEAMS

	Team 1	Team 2	Team 3	Team 4	Team 5
Number of Investigators	2	1	4	2	4

Source: October 1974 and October 1975 payroll records.

Upon transfer to the teams, deputies assigned as investigators assumed the duties and responsibilities of their patrol counterparts—they were not designated as investigators or detectives. Along with the other officers in patrol, they performed and supervised their share of preliminary and follow-up investigations.

Apparently, the subsequent team investigative efforts were characterized by some confusion and lack of coordination. For example, no single team member had a grasp of the overall case responsibility among the team, nor was anyone on the team conducting crime analysis functions on an organized and routine basis. As a result, about one year into the demonstration, several

teams established a "90-day investigation specialist rotation" so that one member at all times had responsibility for an overview of team investigative activity. The order of the rotation was determined by a consensus of team members about who would do the best job. The result was that former investigators were not predominantly selected for the new specialist investigator position.

G. LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT REASSIGNED INVESTIGATORS HELPED TO TRAIN TEAM OFFICERS (ELEMENT #6)

The Multnomah proposal envisioned that reassigned investigators would "work with the patrol officers on a one-for-one basis to train them in investigative techniques."[14] More specifically, the plan stated that,

> "Detectives will be useful in assisting and training other team members in such skills as developing sources of information and proper case preparation. Additionally, investigative specialists will contribute skills in assessing crime patterns useful to team policing efforts."[15]

Although patrol officers did receive in-service training in investigations, it was not primarily through informal working relationships as envisioned. Although the evidence is not entirely clear, one reason for the apparent level of informal one-on-one investigative training seems to stem from the fact that there were relatively few follow-up investigations and, as a result, few on-the-spot opportunities for the training. For example, considering the relatively sparse distribution of former investigative personnel, the chance was slim that follow-up investigations would involve

14. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25f.
15. Local Plan, op. cit., p. 44.

the collaborative efforts of a former investigator and a team member without formal experience in an investigative unit.

At the Menucha retreat, the need for a formal in-service training program in investigative practice was clearly identified. According to an article the department published in Police Chief magazine, "the training unit was unable to provide an extensive program due to limited resources and decided to utilize department members who possessed investigative skills in specific areas to provide the training."[16] The program consisted of one 3-hour session per week over a thirteen-week period. "Presentations covered investigation of crimes against property and crimes against persons, including child abuse and neglect."[17] In addition, deputies who attended seminars on investigations functioned as trainers upon return in order to transfer newly gained expertise to other officers.

Division officials emphasized that the cross-training occurred in a less structured form than originally spelled out. They pointed out that assignment of former investigators to teams and the detective team itself provided the major source of guidance on all investigations.

H. TEAM OFFICERS CONDUCT A DEGREE OF INVESTIGATION (ELEMENT #7)

The Multnomah plan and proposal envisioned that officers would have responsibility for preliminary and follow-up investigations for certain classes of crimes. In June 1975, an operations section special order was issued which specified what types of crimes would be investigated by teams, and what types would remain the responsibility of the detective team.

16. Brown, op. cit., p. 26.
17. Ibid., p. 26.

Entitled "Functional Case Investigation Responsibilities of Neighborhood

Police Teams and the Support (Detective) Team," the special order specified

the following division of labor:

"● functional responsibility for follow-up investigation of homicide, rape, child abuse, checks and fraud, organized vehicle theft, and arson remains with the detective team;

"● functional responsibility for follow-up investigation of all other classes of crime belongs to the neighborhood teams;

"● detectives and scientific investigators will <u>always</u> and <u>immediately</u> be called out on homicides, questionable deaths and cases where a death in relation to a criminal act (with the exception of vehicle accidents) seems probable. In such cases, detectives will have full investigation responsibility;

"● regardless of follow-up responsibility, the neighborhood police teams will continue to conduct preliminary investigations except when detectives are called to the scene;

"● in cases where official follow-up responsibility belongs to detectives, the team officers may follow-up a preliminary investigation of leads directly to a conclusion or if, after consultation with the detective team manager, the case is assigned to a neighborhood team; and,

"● the teams may call on the detective team for assistance and advice and are encouraged to assign a team member to work with the detective team on cases of special interest for training purposes."[18]

In Multnomah, patrol officers had responsibilities for preliminary investigations long before the demonstration was initiated. They were responsible for crime scene search, interviewing witnesses and preparing preliminary reports. In addition, they exercised discretion about whether to call in the scientific investigations unit for further help in evidence handling. Thus, the introduction of team policing did not influence patrol officers' preliminary investigation responsibilities.

Figure 6 indicates that before the onset of team policing, the total number of preliminary investigations dropped fairly substantially over

18. Operations Division Special Order #75-35, June 1975.

MONTH

Source: Operations Division Monthly Activity Reports, March 1974-December 1976

FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS, 1974 TO 1976

previous levels. This drop caused concern because it was suspected that it meant that deputies sometimes engaged in the practice of "coding off" calls dispatched as criminal in nature (i.e., not submitting crime reports for the calls). The implication was that reported crime rates would drop as a result of changes in reporting practices and not due to an actual decrease in criminal activity. Alerted to this issue, the department commissioned an internal study which was conducted by the division's team policing project coordinator.

The study which compared the way criminal calls for service were classified by the dispatchers with the way officers coded criminal calls after preliminary investigation, found that the variance between a preimplementation team period and a post-implementation period was insignificant. The pre-period was April through June 1975 and the post-period was July through November of the same year."19

Figure 6 shows that the drop in preliminaries started before the sample pre-period. If the practice of coding off some dispatch calls was already entrenched, the samples selected for the division study are in essence both post-phenomena periods and could not be expected to show variance. For example, the announcement that team policing would be implemented, the re-assignment of investigators, the changeover to the 4-10 plan (four-day work week with ten-hour workdays), and the appointment of a new sheriff, each roughly coincide with the start of the decline in preliminaries. Thus, the in-house study shows only that the actual implementation of team policing did not change the way deputies investigated criminal calls.

A March 2, 1977 memorandum on the same subject, written by Sergeant Macil Flye, actually attributes the drop in investigations to the practice of coding off criminal complaints. Sergeant Flye called attention to the following:

"During my shift (A) on 14 February 1977, I overhead a patrol unit being dispatched on a theft call. The officer arrived on the scene and a short time later requested clearance for an information broadcast. He broadcast suspect, suspect vehicle, and information regarding the property taken. The officer then cleared the call with the administrative code of W-2 (person assisted).

"I contacted the officer and asked why he had not obtained a file number and written a crime report on the theft calls. He replied that it was just an information call, since the victim was not too concerned and that there was little chance of catching the suspects. He further stated that it was common practice not to write reports on minor thefts, car prowls and vandalisms as it just was extra paper work that does no one any good. He stated this practice had been the way officers had been doing it for the past two years.

"I have contacted several other officers and learned that coding off criminal calls is in fact a common practice throughout the Operations Section.

"I decided in order to determine the extent of the practice, I would audit the radio call cards for the month of January 1977 . . . . This study is not completed at this writing [but] . . . if in fact 50% of the number of coded off criminal calls are found not to be bonafide . . . the number of kissed off criminal calls projected over a one-year period will change the crime statistics considerably."19

Further evidence that could indicate that minor crimes are being coded off is provided by examining statistics for different classes of crimes from 1974 to 1977. The rate of major reported crimes like burglary and assault remained relatively stable, while the rate for more minor crimes like theft II and "other crimes" declined. Since minor crimes seem most likely to be coded off, the statistics may be an indication of the practice.

These are contending views about why the number of preliminary investigations declined during the months before the implementation. Thus, the lesson for those interested in team policing is that it may be accompanied by officer attempts to change the way crime-related calls for service are coded, which in turn could affect the data used to assess program performance.

19. Memorandum from Sergeant Macil L. Flye, team four, to Captain Paul J. Nagy, Commander, Operations Section, March 2, 1977.

Under team policing, officers did, in fact, conduct a degree of follow-up investigation, a departure from past practice. As Table 12 below indicates, the frequency of follow-up investigations was low. The low follow-up rate could be expected because of the types of crimes assigned to the teams and the fact that a screening system was implemented to sift out unpromising cases. The crimes assigned were mostly thefts which had been found to have low rates of follow-up. For example, The Urban Institute's evaluation of the Rochester system for managing criminal investigations for The Police Foundation found that:

- a very low percentage of burglaries and larcenies (thefts) are cleared by follow-up investigation; and,

- the units with highest success rates for burglary and larceny follow-up investigations were also most likely to screen out unpromising cases.

TABLE 12: FREQUENCY OF FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS FOR SELECTED CRIMES, OCTOBER 1976 (ALL TEAMS)

Crime Type	Total Preliminary Investigations	Total Follow-up Investigations	
		Percent	Number
Burglary	360	4%	15
Theft	255	3%	8
Assault	65	2%	1
Source: Operations Section Monthly Reports			

After team policing was introduced, Multnomah adopted a case screening and monitoring system. The screening system called for the assignment of points in relation to gravity of the offense, probability of solution, urgency for action and supervisory judgment. A total case score was derived and intended for use in deciding whether to follow-up the case (see Figure 7).

PRIORITY VARIABLES AND POINT ASSIGNMENT--MULTNOMAH CASE SCREENING SYSTEM

A. Gravity of Offense: Officer

.1 point - for violations/status offenses (e.g., juvenile curfew violation)
2 points - for victimless crime
3 points - for misdemeanor
4 points - for felony

4 POINTS POSSIBLE

B. Probability of Solution: Officer

FACTORS: suspect, witnesses, physical evidence and/or undeveloped leads.

1 point - for 1 factor
2 points - for 2 factors
3 points - for 3 factors
4 points - for 4 factors

4 POINTS POSSIBLE

C. Urgency for Action: Officer

4 points - for danger to others
3 points - for immediate action as required
2 points - for consideration of psychological impact on victim
1 point - for crime pattern/frequency of crime in a geographic area

10 POINTS POSSIBLE

D. Supervisory Judgment: Sergeant

FACTORS: department policy, totality of circumstances and investigator's caseload.

0-4 points - based on supervisor's decision

A. Gravity of Offense: _____
B. Probablity of Solution: _____
C. Urgency for Action: _____
D. Supervisory Judgment: _____

TOTAL

_____

Source: Brown, op. cit., pp. 50-54.

FIGURE 7: PRIORITY VARIABLES AND POINT ASSIGNMENT IN THE MULTNOMAH CASE SCREENING SYSTEM

The use of the case screening system resulted in the classification of the vast majority of cases as nonsolvable. Two factors created this result. First, there was often a delay in rating the case; during the lag time, many of the solvable cases were solved. In addition, as mentioned above, the types of crimes handled by patrol have typically a low solvability potential.

I. SOCIAL SERVICES AND SYSTEMATIC REFERRALS STEADY
(ELEMENTS #8 AND #9)

The proposal cited Multnomah's intent to pursue these elements. Task 29 in the proposal calls for development of "linkages with social service agencies. The purpose of this task will be to develop linkages with social service agencies. The objective here will be to bring to bear the total resources of the community in the cause of crime prevention."[20]

According to officials, the teams did not undertake any special activity in relation to establishing or improving linkages or in attempting to increase the volume of complaints handled by noncriminal referrals. There was also general consensus that referrals and relations with other social services were not a problem, so the teams' attention was focused in other areas.

The department does not maintain records on the volume of social service referrals. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether referral patterns and rates changed under team policing.

---

20. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25j.

J. SERVICE ACTIVITIES EMPHASIZED
(ELEMENT #10)

The Multnomah proposal mentions the establishment of a community service officer program where officers will be "responsible for performing non-law enforcement functions, with special emphasis on services to the victims of crime." The document states that,

> "officers will be operating in a service mediation role as contrasted to a legalistic one. Here, of course, we are referring to situations, e.g., service calls, where arrests may be made as an alternative to other means of resolving a situation. A decrease, if it does occur, however, would not be substantial since the department has a tradition of not using arrest as a means of resolving conflict situations. That is, the current philosophy of the department is to resolve problems by mediation rather than by arrest."[21]

Figure 8 illustrates that the number of miscellaneous service calls increased from 2,800 in March of 1974 to 3,950 in December of 1976. Miscellaneous service calls include such coding classifications as:

- advise citizen
- aid person
- alarm
- animal problem
- hazards
- missing persons
- police assistance

As part of the effort to emphasize services, Multnomah employed community service officers (CSOs), civilians who would be added to the team staffs. Community services officers were supposed to "organize and staff storefront offices on a regular basis, dispense crime prevention information, engage in community education activities, aid indigent crime victims in obtaining emergency assistance from various governmental and private service agencies and generally act as a liaison between volunteers from the community, citizen advisory groups and the neighborhood team."[22]

Below we present examples of the kinds of specific activities carried out by community services officers assigned to the teams.

---

21. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25c.
22. Brown, op. cit., p. 95.

Source: Operations (Patrol) Monthly Activity Reports

FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF MISCELLANEOUS CALLS FOR SERVICE IN
MULTNOMAH, 1974-1976

"Team 1. CSO is conducting business surveys in order to update
emergency telephone numbers. With the assistance of Crime Pre-
vention Unit personnel, premise security surveys are being con-
ducted combined with shoplifting presentations in the local schools.
Monthly statistics on all crimes are being compiled and maintained
for the Team 1 area.

"Team 2. Team 2 CSO has organized and staffed the storefront. A
map of the Team 2 area is pinned each month locating the occur-
rences of thefts, burglary, and robbery. A monthly statistical
report of all crimes is compiled, and Team 2 is presently conduct-
ing business surveys using personal contacts by deputy and team
CSO.

"Team 3. Public schools in the Team 3 area have been visited, and
their valuable property has been permanently engraved to discour-
age theft. Mass bicycle registrations have also been conducted at
each school. Residential burglary victims are personally contacted
to encourage the hosting of block meetings on crime prevention.
Residential burglaries are plotted on a Team 3 map, and a current
record of all team activity is being maintained.

"Team 4. CSO has organized and staffed both storefront locations
with volunteer labor trained in telephone answering, checking out
of property engravers, and meeting the public. Businesses in the
Team 4 area have been identified and the majority have been con-
tacted regarding problems and the listing of emergency telephone
numbers.

"Team 5. Team 5 CSO is soliciting block meetings in the community
by contacting victims and neighbors. The storefront office has been
organized and staffed. A list of emergency services referral has
been compiled as a quick reference for the road officers. Two maps
have been developed to reflect the burglaries and robberies in the
area on a given day of a particular month. A log book is kept below
each map containing such information as: date and time of occur-
rence, location, victim, property taken, weapons, suspects, M.O.,
and file number of each individual burglary and robbery."[23]

Multnomah teams also established a school liaison program which entailed

the assignment of several officers to liaison duty with the public school

system. Letters describing the availability of the officers were mailed to

each school in the jurisdiction. Liaison officers gave student talks on such

subjects as traffic safety and procedures for summoning the police.

23. Ibid., p. 96.

Multnomah teams also established a school liaison program which entailed the assignment of several officers to liaison duty with the public school system. Letters describing the availability of the officers were mailed to each school in the jurisdiction. Liaison officers gave student talks on such subjects as traffic safety and procedures for summoning the police.

In 1975, the department launched a major effort in the area of crime prevention. The crime prevention program, however, cannot be credited to the team policing demonstration since it was supported by a separate LEAA grant in the amount of approximately $200,000 a year over a three-year period. The program, however, can be regarded as complementary to the team policing demonstration.

A 1976 description of the crime prevention program prepared by Lt. Richard Piland listed the range of program activities.

"• Permanent public crime prevention display center operating as one of the boutiques in a Shopping Mall.

"• Residential burglary and theft prevention for householders through Block Meetings (500 per year).

"• Commercial burglary prevention for merchants through premise surveys.

"• Robbery prevention for merchants.

"• Shoplifting prevention for merchants.

"• Rape prevention for women's groups.

"• Specially tailored crime prevention programs for older Americans.

"• Consultation in the reduction of criminal opportunity through design of structure and space for architects, builders and planners (in 1975, this included a one day local seminar with Oscar Newman, author of Defensible Space).

"• Programs for grade school children in basic Crime Prevention theory and good citizenship.

"• Bicycle marking and registration.

"• Operation Alert—Notification to home owners of burglaries [occurring] in their area.

"• Six hundred electric engravers available for property identification.

"• Door-to-door property identification canvassing.

"• Property identification engraving service for shut-ins and handicapped people.

"• False Alarm Ordinance operation.

"• Mobile crime prevention display trailer.

"• Creation and maintenance of individual Home Alert Groups (permanent residential neighborhood groups for exchange of crime prevention information and formal relationship with the Sheriff's Office).

"• Crime prevention film and literature library (films loaned on request to any agency in Oregon).

"• Efforts toward state-wide crime prevention building code.

"• Crime prevention design consultation with local planning commission staff.

"• Residential premise surveys.

"• Monitoring of the lock, alarm and private security industry and information exchange with these groups (includes Alarm Information Sharing Group which meets periodically under the auspices of our Alarm Coordinator).

"• Crime prevention training for division personnel and outside agencies.

"• Crime prevention publicity and informational programs, including billboards, television and radio public service ads, posters, brochures and pamphlets.

"• Other miscellaneous crime prevention and community affairs services."[24]

The MCDPS believes its crime prevention program represents an exemplary model, and they have reported that the program has caused a decrease in residential burglary from an average of 2,259 crimes per month in 1973 to 1,665 a month for January through September 1976—a total decrease of 26.3 percent.[25]

24. Piland, Lt. Richard, "Crime Prevention at the County Level: Multnomah

25. Memorandum prepared by Richard Piland for the OLEC meeting, Cosmopolitan Airtel, October 22, 1976 (Exhibit #1).

K. STREET STOPS AND FIELD INTERROGATIONS USED SPARINGLY
(ELEMENT #11)

The Multnomah Proposal contains a brief expression of interest in this element. It says the department will attempt to "rely on information to control crime rather than on street stops and other patrol techniques that might jeopardize police/community relations."[26] No mention of this element appeared in the Multnomah plan.

Figure 9, which is based on operations section records, shows that, in fact, field contacts (street stops) did diminish during the demonstration period. The decline would have been greater were it not for the contribution of team four, whose street stop activity exceeded that of other teams. It is interesting to note, however, that street stops declined in the absence of any departmental order, directive or official change in procedure.

L. FOOT PATROL NOT APPROPRIATE
(ELEMENT #12)

Foot patrol is not mentioned in Multnomah's proposal or plan. The suburban character of the team areas, their size, and the fact that there is relatively light pedestrian traffic combine to render the concept of foot patrol inappropriate in Multnomah.

---

26. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25b.

NUMBER OF FIELD CONTACTS

500

400

300

200

100

0

NO DATA

NO DATA

NO DATA

↑
NTP
Started

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1973   1974   1975   1976

MONTHS

Source: Operations Section Monthly Traffic Enforcement Activity Report
March 1973-December 1976

FIGURE 10: NUMBER OF FIELD CONTACTS, 1973 TO 1976

M. COMMUNITY CONTACTS ENCOURAGED
(ELEMENT #13)

The Multnomah proposal and plan contain numerous references to encouraging community contacts. Typical is the following excerpt from the plan.

"Team members are required to make community/police interaction a concern of every team member. The team is to become oriented to the community by establishing and emphasizing positive working relations with the community through both formal and informal mechanisms. Formal mechanisms might include an advisory board and monthly community meetings. Informal mechanisms could be storefront headquarters and community services."[27]

At the heart of the effort was the block meeting program. From April 1974 through December 1976, more than 750 block meetings were conducted in the team areas. Total attendance exceeded 16,000. While the crime prevention unit scheduled and set up the meetings, team officers with "crime prevention certification" were often tapped as the principal speakers. The talks stressed three messages: "watch and report"; "secure your home"; and "mark your property." Suspicious circumstances warranting police report were described, different kinds of locks and security devices were explained, and the property marking program was also explained. A description of team policing was not generally included at the end of the presentations when given by team officers.

An option in the initial plan was to encourage a substantial number of community contacts through the establishment of storefront offices in some team areas. However, available evidence suggests this program did not produce the expected result. For example, team two opened its storefront office on a main street on November 12, 1975, but a report to the team manager shows

---

27. Local Plan, op. cit., p. 50.

that activity for the months of January and February was at a low level.

The report states:

"January—There were 4 telephone calls in the month of January with Monday, Jan. 26, 1976 being the most active. There were 3 calls on that date.

"There were 8 persons who stopped in at the Storefront in the month of January. Monday 1-19-76, Wed. 1-21-76 & Thurs. 1-22-76 were the busiest days with 2 drop ins on each day. Four (4) persons dropped in for the purpose of either picking up a State Accident Report or turning one in. Three (3) persons dropped in for informational purposes. One (1) person came in to pick up an Alarm Permit Application.

"There were 2 (two) property engravers checked out in January.

"February—There were 6 telephone calls in the month of February with Monday, Feb. 12, 1976 being the most active (two calls on that date).

"There were 10 (ten) persons who stopped in at the Storefront in the month of February. Monday Feb. 9, 1976 was the most active day, with 4 persons stopping in. There were 2 persons who stopped in to pick up State Accident Reports. There were 2 persons who stopped in to file a Crime Report. There was one (1) person who came in to pick up an Alarm Permit Application. There were four (4) persons who came in to obtain information, and there was one (1) person who came in to get his CB radio engraved with his ORDL.

"There were 4 (four) property engravers checked out in the month of February. There was no particular day that was heavier than any other in this category.

"In the months of January & February there was an average of 4 hours a day five days a week that the Storefront was opened and manned by volunteers from John Koroloff's Law Enforcement class at MHCC. With the hours that I was at the storefront the average open hours would be close to 6 hours a day. Often times the storefront was manned by more than one person. The reserves have been a tremendous help in keeping the storefront open and have assisted in opening the office for the MHCC students when they were scheduled to work."

According to MCDPS officials, team storefront offices, which were generally established at very low cost, serve another function because they provide a place for team officers to conduct routine business such as follow-up

telephone calls to victims of minor crimes. Since the storefronts also help

to publicize the division and its team program, plans call for retaining

offices in the team areas.

As part of the establishment of the MBO system, teams were required to

establish goals, objectives and supporting activity. Teams did develop goals

and objectives for community relations, as exemplified by the following excerpt

from the team one MBO statement.

"Goal 2: To increase agency-community involvement.

"Objective 2.1. To develop a formal community involvement program
by April 1, 1976.

"Activity 2.1.1. Make two grade school contacts per week.

2.1.2. Make two high school contacts per week.

2.1.3. Make two college contacts per week.

2.1.4. Make two business contacts per week.

2.1.5. Staff the field office (Alpenrose) at those times
when large numbers of people are present:

A. Christmas
B. Easter
C. July 4"[28]

An increase in public relations contacts by police in the line of duty

is traditionally seen as a vehicle for encouraging community contacts under

team policing. A precise estimate of the change in frequency of community

relations contacts is not available because this activity is not recorded

in the Multnomah department.

---

28. Team one, 1976 "Goals and Objectives," December 1975.

While the teams worked to build contact with the community through

various outreach activities, in fact, there may have been a net reduction

in face-to-face contact between deputies and the community. A few months

before the start of the team policing demonstration, the division began to

experiment with alternatives to in-person response to non-serious calls and

minor crime incidents. One alternative was to use centralized telephone re-

port takers to handle preliminary investigations of minor crimes like petty

thefts instead of having field officers appear in person. Additionally,

field officers could opt to telephone victims of non-serious crimes to con-

duct routine inquiries and preliminary investigations. Finally, letters were

sent out in lieu of in-person contacts to report back to citizens about the

status of follow-up investigations. These alternatives were not employed

without the consent of the citizens who initially lodged a report.

Officials at MCDPS were pleased to report that they did not detect a

negative citizen reaction. Referring to the absence of citizen complaints,

one official noted, "People seem to understand that it does not do much

good to send a deputy to every call if it can be handled by phone. When

someone specifies the desire to see a deputy, we always send one."[29]

N. SOME CHANGES IN TEAM ASSIGNMENTS
(ELEMENT #14)

Both the Multnomah proposal and plan mention the intent to establish

continuity of assignment. The proposal states that there will be a "high

degree of stability in assignments"[30] and that "personnel [will] remain

---

29. Interview, Captain Fred Pearce, Assistant Director, MCDPS,
March 1977.

30. Multnomah proposal, op. cit., p. 22.

assigned to the team for an extended period of time with consideration of the officers' team area preference.[31]

Although imprecise, there is evidence that turnover was relatively high before team policing was inaugurated. A review of the 1974 operations division orders reveals that approximately 45 percent deal with personnel transfers. During the team policing demonstration, this rate dropped to about 33 percent. A more precise estimate of turnover during the demonstration was achieved by comparing the October 1975 and October 1976 payroll rosters.

As Table 13 below indicates, the MCDPS achieved an 18.4 percent turnover rate for all personnel assigned to the patrol teams. The highest rate for the one-year period during the demonstration was among the team managers (lieutenants). Team leaders (sergeants) were least likely to be raessigned while about 20 percent of the deputies were reassigned.

Most of the team personnel we interviewed agreed that it was more difficult to transfer under team policing than it had been before the program. Near the end of the demonstration, the division took steps to formalize a new "rotation policy" for governing reassignments. The new policy is intended to limit the time MCDPS sworn personnel below the rank of lieutenant spend in specialized, nonteam positions. It is also intended to assure that an assignment to a team lasts at least one year.[32]

31. Ibid.
32. Operational Procedures, MCDPS, Procedure 188.000, Rotation Policy, undated.

TABLE 13: TEAM PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENTS (TURNOVER), OCTOBER 1975 TO OCTOBER 1976

Position/Rank	Number Assigned October 1975	Number Reassigned by October 1976	Percent Change (Turnover Rate)
Team Manager/Lt.	5	2	40.0%
Team Leader/Sgt.	23	2	8.6%
Team Member/Deputy	97	19	19.5%
All Team Personnel	125	23	18.4%
Source: Payroll Records, MCDPS			

O. TEAM AREA CHARACTER LIMITS DEPLOYMENT BASED ON
CRIME AND SERVICE DEMAND
(ELEMENT #15)

The Multnomah proposal expressed the intent to configure team boundaries and team strengths partly on the basis of crime and service demand. Radio call data, drawn from the months of August through November 1976, illustrate that, excluding team one, the average team work load is quite similar. Table 14 shows that the average number of calls per officer per month for team one was 13.5; the other teams varied from a low of 41.9 for team two to a high of 58.3 for team three.

TABLE 14: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CALLS AND AVERAGE CALLS PER OFFICER
PER MONTH, BY TEAM, AUGUST THROUGH NOVEMBER 1976

TEAM	NUMBER OF OFFICERS*	PERCENT OF CALLS	AVERAGE NUMBER OF CALLS PER OFFICER PER MONTH
1	16	3.4%	13.5
2	25	18.0%	41.9
3	29	28.0%	58.3
4	29	26.8%	53.8
5	33	23.7%	46.0
*October 1976 Payroll Records			
Source: Radio Call Reports, August Through November 1976, MCDPS			

The difference between the team one and team three calls-per-officer rates is partially explained by the special character of the two areas. The team one area is eighty square miles, contains five non-contiguous portions including an island and has 350 persons per square mile. The team three area is eight square miles, contiguous and has almost 6,000 persons per square mile.

These differences imply two different types of patrol duty. In team one, officers more often perform a necessary guardian function. Much patrol time is spent simply "checking out" the far reaches of the jurisdiction. Comparatively, in team three, where the area is small, contiguous and densely populated, responding to calls is a more predominate function.

P. DECENTRALIZE AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO LIEUTENANTS AND SERGEANTS (ELEMENT #16)

Team policing in Multnomah was accompanied by a pronounced shift in authority and accountability for patrol lieutenants and sergeants. Prior to the initiation of the program, lieutenants were in command of shifts governing the entire jurisdiction and sergeants supervised a portion of the shift's complement under immediate direction of the on-duty lieutenant. With team policing, lieutenants became managers responsible for one geographic area of the jurisdiction at all times, while sergeants took over the main responsibility for on-line direction of day-to-day operations. Apparently, the transition caused difficulties for both groups.

In the early part of the demonstration, the problems of team managers received the most attention and it was thought that they experienced the greatest role change. By the end of the demonstration, a special task force had been launched to help define the sergeants' new role.

1. LIEUTENANTS/TEAM MANAGERS

Both the Multnomah plan and proposal describe the intent to decentralize authority and accountability from the captain in charge of operations to the team managers. According to the plan,

> "The team manager is responsible for the delivery and quality of all police services in his area and is held accountable for the crime and conditions in the area on a 24-hour basis and is given broad authority to go with this responsibility."[33]

An article on "The Role of the Team Manager" that appeared in the July 1976 issue of Police Chief magazine asserted that, "The greatest role change was experienced by the lieutenants (the shift commanders) who would become managers of neighborhood teams."[34] The change revolved around new responsibilities for policy formulation, resource allocation, problem solving and supervision.

Prior to team policing, the policy formulation role of the shift commander was somewhat limited and subject to control from above. While "each shift commander had a voice in the staff process by which policy was formulated . . . differences had to be resolved at a higher level in order to achieve general uniformity."[35] During team policing, the principal focus was on developing the appropriate control mechanisms by which the policies would be implemented and maintained. However, "under NTP, many policy decisions are left to the team and team manager. Differences between teams are not only tolerated, but encouraged to the extent they enable each team

33. Local plan, op. cit., p. 17.
34. Brown, op. cit., p. 30.
35. Ibid.

to adapt its delivery of services according to the special needs of its constituent public."[36]

Prior to the demonstration, the captain in charge of operations was personally and solely responsible for the allocation of personnel and equipment. Under team policing, the responsibility was shared. The operations commander defined an overall budget and allocation of men and equipment to each team, "with the team manager then becoming responsible and indeed accountable for the use of his resources."[37]

Much of the responsibility for problem solving was also transferred to the teams. Before the demonstration, the captain was primarily tasked with identifying and resolving problems while shift commanders were confined to handling only those problems affecting their particular shift. "Now, the team manager is responsible and accountable for problems that arise in his area, regardless of the time of day they occur . . . . With a team of approximately twenty officers, the team manager is much more able to address issues and deploy his NTP resources to solve problems than a captain in charge of the entire patrol force was able to do prior to NTP."[38]

Because the span of control is considerably smaller, the team manager is better positioned to provide his men with supervisory guidance than was possible for the captain under the old structure. "Since the team manager has more opportunity to work on an ongoing basis with team members, it is now possible to apply more positive and supportive methods of performance modification than the somewhat punitive disciplinary approach that was associated with the traditional structure."[39]

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
39. Ibid., p. 31.

In addition to assuming increased responsibilities in the areas mentioned above, team managers were also responsible for liaison with other departmental units such as the detective team coordinator, with external agencies such as the courts and the district attorney's office and the formulation of team goals and objectives. During the early stages of the demonstration, however, there was considerable variation in how lieutenants viewed their new role as team managers. "This ranged from those at one end of the spectrum who resisted the new ideas and wanted to continue to receive and pass on highly controlled direction, to those who immediately felt they had been given almost total control over their own small police agencies . . ."[40] It was apparently the captain in charge of operations who assisted each team manager in understanding what [his] role should be and "assist[ed] each manager in making the adjustments he had to make to perform that role."[41]

2. SERGEANTS/TEAM LEADERS

In June 1976, a task force was formed to "explore and define the role of sergeant/supervisor."[42] The problem, as identified by the study group, was that sergeants were now forced to "ride the fence" between the managers who issue directives and line personnel who are ultimately expected to follow directives. The sergeants' dilemma was further exacerbated because the distinction between line and staff supervisory duty had not been carefully drawn.

In response to these issues, the task force formulated "Representative Examples of Work" and "Sergeant/Supervisor Criteria." The examples emphasized traditional supervisory activities like scheduling, roll call and inspection;

40. Ibid., p. 32.
41. Ibid.
42. Special Order 76-77, "Sergeant/Supervisor Role Definition Task Force."

activities like "training new officers, maintaining records, preparing reports, investigation of assigned cases" were also cited. Additionally, there were ten sergeant/supervisor criteria: five related to "knowledge" and five related to "skills and abilities." According to the reports of MCDPS officials, the problems of team sergeants were eased as a result of this classification exercise.

Q. ELIMINATE THE QUASI-MILITARY STYLE OF COMMAND (ELEMENT #17)

The Multnomah proposal contains a passage relevant to this element. It states that the project aims to "modify the orientation in management of the department from an authoritarian, legalistic and military style to a community-oriented participatory management style."[43]

According to officer testimony, the Multnomah department has traditionally been a relatively informal organization in which to work. Officers cite the comparatively loose dress code and regulations governing haircuts, as well as the common practice of "first naming" among officers of different rank. Nonetheless, Multnomah did take some specific actions with respect to this element during the demonstration.

Recognizing that the full-service model involves "deviating from the traditional authoritative model of management and supervision," Multnomah revised its organization chart at the beginning of team policing to reflect "the free communication flow of the department."[44] As can be seen by examining Figure 10, the organization chart which was constructed at the start of the demonstration is the opposite of the traditional vertical hierarchy. It implies special emphasis on the coordinative and deliberative activities of

43. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25a.
44. Brown, op. cit., p. 16.

the "management team" (center of chart), a group composed of those in charge of subunits depicted by the wedges on the chart. In addition, it was expected to convey the absence of strict hierarchy and the openness of lines of access and communication within the divison. By the end of the demonstration, this circular chart was replaced by a more traditional table of organization (see Figure 2).

In addition, in general order #76-21 issued in December 1976, the functional titles of some department staff underwent a shift from military to managerial nomenclature. Captains in charge of a section were to be called "commanders," lieutenants in charge of a "team or unit" were renamed "managers" and sergeants in charge of a detail or shift were renamed "supervisors."

Source: Brown, op. cit., p. 18.

FIGURE 10: MCDPS ORGANIZATION CHART, 1975

R. PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT USED TO SET OBJECTIVES, PLAN AND EVALUATE TEAM PERFORMANCE (ELEMENT #18)

The MCDPS team policing program featured institution of participative management. Officers were encouraged to voice their preferences about assignment to teams, the objectives of the teams, work scheduling and operating procedures. In addition, over 40 task forces were formed to study division problems and identify solutions. While officials are pleased with the progress made so far to open up channels of communication, survey results indicated that the officers still do not believe they have a major voice in their own affairs.

Both the Multnomah plan and proposal indicate the emphasis the department placed upon participative management. For example, the proposal states that

"At the heart of our team policing model is the notion of participation. That is, as an organization, we desire to break away from our reliance on traditional bureaucratic models. We intend to accomplish this by inviting team members to participate directly in decision making . . . . Conceptually, each team will consist of a cohesive group of officers working under professional supervision with consultation, participation and setting team objectives, quality in-service training, encouragement of suggestions, and permitting the exercise of professional discretion within necessary limits."[45]

Management-by-Objectives was one of the chief operational expressions of the participative management strategy. The department sees MBO as the means for practicing both participatory management and decentralization, while still maintaining standards of accountability. It should be mentioned that the former sheriff, Lee P. Brown, was strongly supportive of this particular component of team policing and, in the officers' eyes, is highly identified with the effort.

---

45. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 20.

On August 21, 1975, Brown issued a memorandum to all units inaugurating MBO. The memorandum explained the concept of the system and its application and provided examples of departmental goals, objectives and activities for the management sevices section. According to Brown,

"MBO is being implemented because at present we do not have means for either stating our goals and objectives or accurately measuring the degree to which we obtain them. As a result, any attempt to assess our operations is based upon no criteria at worst, and the wrong criteria at best."[46]

Brown stated that the MBO system would help the department to define its general problems and measure the effectiveness of solutions.

"It enables us to conduct a regular (annual) review of our Division, in the context of a changing environment; to examine the purpose and contribution to the total goals of the Division by each Unit; to establish priorities for action; to place responsibility to see that action is taken; and to operate in the participatory management mode."[47]

On September 18, 1975, Sheriff Brown issued a second memorandum outlining draft division of public safety goals and spelling out the responsibilities and scheduling associated with instituting MBO. Divisional goals included the following:

"1. To develop an effective, efficient and responsive management system.
"2. To increase agency-community involvement.
"3. To provide a more effective allocation of services to the community.
"4. To increase job satisfaction of all Division employees.
"5. To reduce the number of suppressible crimes."[48]

---

46. Memorandum on "Management by Objectives" from Lee P. Brown to all units, August 21, 1975, p. 1.
47. Ibid., p. 2.
48. Memorandum entitled "Divisional Goals" from Lee P. Brown to all units, dated September 18, 1975.

As a first step in the MBO process, Brown called for a critique of divisional goals by team and unit commanders. Most of the responses were relatively favorable: "I find that the mission statement is clear, concise, adequate and accurate. The statement of the goals to achieve this mission is realistic and challenging and workable."[49] Some responses, however, suggested variant wordings of goals, and several responses pictured goals as unfeasible or inapplicable as the following excerpts suggest:

- One memorandum commented on the feasibility of more effective allocation of service to the community. "In face of steadily diminishing personnel resources in a work environment that requires personnel to deliver services, it appears somewhat untimely to presently establish this goal."[50]

- Another memorandum cites the imperfect mesh between divisional goals and one segment of the department. "In my opinion some of the intricacies of jail operations do not contribute to the broad overall mission goals and that separate goals should be developed specifically for the Corrections section. For example, instead of community involvement and allocation of services to the community, the goal would be to increase services provided for police agencies and improve prisoner handling techniques."[51]

The next step in the implementation process called for each team and unit to "develop their own specific set of goals reflecting Divisional goals . . . . Each section, team or unit goal [should] be operationalized by the development of a set of quantifiable objectives and activities to meet those objectives."[52] Team goals, objectives and activities were to be drafted and submitted to Sheriff Brown by November 11, 1975. The sheriff emphasized that all members of the division be allowed the opportunity to contribute to this process. By November 28, 1975, section commanders were to develop quantifiable objectives

49. Memorandum from Sgt. Willison to Captain Rinehardt and Lieutenant Purcell, "Review of Division Special Order 75-141," October 1, 1975.
50. Memorandum from Lt. Stites to Captain Rinehardt, "Divisional Goals," September 21, 1975.
51. Memorandum from Lieutenant Senn to Sheriff Brown, "1976 Goals and Objectives," October 20, 1975.
52. Memorandum from Lee Brown, op. cit., September 18, 1975.

and submit them to the sheriff, whereupon team and unit managers were to meet with the management team to discuss the resulting MBO statements. While indications are the schedule slipped somewhat, by the end of 1975, teams were operating under approved MBO statements. Appendix B contains the initial MBO document prepared by team one.

According to several memoranda issued by Sheriff Brown, teams were required to report each quarter about progress toward objectives and activities listed in the MBO statements. The reports indicate that some activities were completed, some partially completed or not initiated, and a number of new activities were added. For example, team four's report submitted on November 30, 1976, shows:

- The team made one business contact and two grade school contacts per week and staffed the storefront at the scheduled hours, thus satisfying the activities fostering the team objective of increasing team members' involvement with the community.

- While the team did hold one meeting per month, as scheduled, attendance shifted from mandatory to voluntary "due to budgetary limitations and the loss of [a] training day."

- The team added a number of new activities, including developing "a program to monitor officer absence from duty . . . . absence review has been an ongoing program since January 1, 1976 and aids the team management in monitoring officers' sick time, and personal holidays . . . ."

Combined with decentralization, participative management involved more than contributing to unit goal setting and evaluation. It involved greater reliance on officer preference or actual control over how their work was accomplished. New under team policing was the chance to choose one's manager and beat (subject to resolution by seniority in case of competing selections). Under team policing, officers were chosen to participate on task forces and their preference was a more important factor in setting work schedules. Further, teams could partially define what types of calls were to be answered in person or handled by telephone or by telephone report takers.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Despite MBO and other gains cited above, many officers still do not be-
lieve they have a major voice in their own affairs. Based on a seven-question
"influence scale" (part of the patrol officer survey and included here as
Appendix C), about 40 percent of the officers feel their influence is basic-
ally small, about 40 percent feel they have a substantive influence, and
about 20 percent stand midpoint. The results were almost identical for the
two waves of the survey (see Table 15). In short, officers did not change
their sense of influence on the job between the seventh and twentieth month
of team policing.

MCDPS officials maintain that developing open lines of communication
for setting and achieving objectives consistent with administrative policy
is progressing on schedule. They estimate that about five years will be
needed to achieve full implementation of this element of team policing. Con-
fidence in progress to date is based on the assessment that managers and staff
are starting to think in MBO-like terms and that the time required to achieve
consensus has been cut. In the near future, they hope to develop productivity
indicators and link them to the annual budget through MBO.

TABLE 15: OFFICER PERCEPTION OF ON-THE-JOB INFLUENCE

Date of Survey	N	PERCENT RESPONSES					
		Small	Some-what Small	Medium	Some-what Great	Great	Total
Wave One January 1976	102	21	20	20	22	18	101%*
Wave Two March 1977	71	21	21	23	20	16	101%*
Change Between Waves	-31	0	+ 1	+ 3	- 2	- 2	0

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: Urban Institute Patrol Officer Surveys, Jan. 1976 and March 1977

S. INCENTIVES: COMMUNITY SERVICE PAY,
OVERTIME FOR TRAINING IN TEAM POLICING
(ELEMENT #19)

The opportunity for advancement and promotion was very limited during
the demonstration period and there were no promotions. Both the Multnomah
proposal and plan describe the intent to adjust incentives to make them com-
patible with team policing. The proposal states that a "new reward structure
will be developed,"[53] and the plan lists one of the team leader's duties
as evaluating "the team member's performance, using team goals and objectives
as evaluative criteria."[54]

Certain actions were initiated by the department to adjust the reward and
incentive structure. At the initiation of team policing, a new contract ad-
justment provided "salary incentives for the accumulation of volunteer hours
in the areas of additional education acquired, training sessions completed
and community service performed."[55] The two top certification levels required
40 and 60 hours respectively of volunteer work which could be satisfied by the
performance of community service activities—a requirement directly germane to
the team policing tenet of improving police/community relations.

Through the team policing grant, overtime pay supported neighborhood team
policing-related activities such as training. That this provision functioned
as an incentive is suggested by the January 1976 and March 1977 patrol survey
responses to the question: "Does overtime pay received by officers in your
police unit contribute to officer's overall satisfaction?" Positive responses
far outweighed the negative, as Table 16 suggests.

53. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25.
54. Local Plan, op. cit., p. 12.
55. Brown, op. cit., p. 97.

TABLE 16: DEPUTY OPINIONS: OVERTIME DOLLARS/JOB SATISFACTION

Question #6: "To what extent do overtime dollars received by officers in your police unit contribute to an officer's overall satisfaction?"

Contribution to Satisfaction	Percent of Responses	
	Wave One	Wave Two
Very Little	6%	3%
Little	2%	4%
Some	25%	25%
Large	42%	41%
Very Large	26%	27%
	101%*	100%
	(N=101)	(N=71)

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: The Urban Institute Patrol Officer Survey, January 1976 and March 1977

In the MBO writeups, almost all the teams referred to the general aim of instituting reward and evaluation procedures compatible with team policing; however, a detailed expression of the aim was only found in the MBO reports of the two teams which made attendance at special schools contingent upon demonstrated improvement in team policing skills.

Additionally, it was a matter of considerable importance to the department to develop a clear and equitably based reward structure, as budget cutbacks constricted advancement opportunities. Concern with the issue is reflected in the "bucket list," a compilation of pending issues for management consideration, which listed the following job incentive-related topics:

- career path development;
- managerial fringe benefits;
- awards program;
- personnel evaluation;
- merit rating
- degree requirement; and
- promotion potential[56]

---

56. "Bucket list," a compendium of current administrative issues supplied by Captain Pearce, current as of winter 1976-1977.

As indicated by survey responses taken in January 1976 and March 1977, the department was somewhat unsuccessful in developing a reward/incentive structure perceived as equitable. While the patrol officer survey does not contain a direct question concerning whether rewards and incentives were based on team policing criteria, it does inquire whether officers perceived that promotion was based on ability.

Table 17 shows that about two-thirds of the officers polled do not believe that promotions are based on ability. Additionally, the responses are very consistent for both waves, which indicates that officer perceptions of this subject were not altered as a result of their team policing experience.

TABLE 17: OFFICER PERCEPTION OF PROMOTION BASED ON ABILITY

Date	N	Percentage of Responses			Total
		Yes	?	No	
Wave One January 1976	102	8%	27%	66%	101%*
Wave Two March 1977	72	9%	22%	69%	100%
Change Between Waves	-30	+ 1%	- 5%	+ 3%	

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: The Urban Institute Patrol Officer Surveys, January 1976 and March 1977

Finally, the MCDPS has a very low attrition rate. Officials report that no more than 2 percent of the personnel resign per year and that most resignations are related to professional advancement. In essence, the typical resignation is to take another job in policing with some higher

level of responsibility than is currently available at the MCDPS. An officer
who resigned to become an FBI agent was cited as an example.

T. IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAMS SEEMS TO COMPLICATE INTERACTION
AND INFORMATION SHARING
(ELEMENT #20)

This element was not directly cited in the Multnomah proposal or plan.
However, since deputies report that communications, coordination and informa-
tion sharing lessened, especially around the start of team policing, the
Multnomah experience bears some mention.

Information sharing within teams was complicated by the institution of
the 4-10 plan a few months prior to the onset of the demonstration.[57] Under
the plan, each team is divided into two sections which each work four days of
the week. This schedule causes one overlapping day that can be used for
training, extended investigations, team meetings, etc. The sections were
further subdivided into shifts. A team of 24 officers, for example, was
broken into 2 sections and 4 shifts. As a result, each shift has an average
complement of three individuals who have an opportunity for close working
contact. Concern over the communications impact of this form of scheduling
was expressed in the March 19, 1975 operations staff meeting notes.

> "Captain Pearce stated that . . . there seemed to be a lack of
> communication between sections, and that they are not able to keep
> up with the activities taking place in their districts during their
> days off. The lieutenants are assigned to work out a method of im-
> proving communications."

---

57. The 4-10 plan refers to a four-day work week with ten-hour
workdays.

An effort to handle the section coordination problem is documented in
the minutes of a subsequent operations staff meeting on October 15, 1975.

> "Lieutenant Tillinghast indicated that his team is using a counter-
> part system [whereby] each section has a member who is his counter-
> part in the other section and he handles any of the man's cases
> while he's on his day off."

Team one does appear to represent an exception to the inter-section
communication problems. A May 18, 1976 report by Barbara Bledsoe, organi-
zation development consultant, indicates that "team 1 seems to be functioning
smoothly. Information is exchanged at section meetings. The team manager
and the sergeant meet together frequently. There is a great deal of informal
communication between team members."

When team policing was initiated, the practice of holding daily roll
call was discontinued. Team meetings, held approximately once a month,
were designed as a partial substitute. One problem with the new arrange-
ment was that team meetings were often attended only by team members on duty,
not by the full team complement.

As one byproduct of the suspension of roll call, crime-related information
flow from the field deteriorated. In a September 17, 1975 meeting, "Captain
Pearce . . . informed the team managers that there is still very little
information coming from the men for the Crime Bulletin," a daily summary
of crime-related events in the MCDPS jurisdication.

Early dissatisfaction with the new arrangements is reflected in the
September 24, 1975 staff meeting notes, where the reinstitution of "volun-
tary" roll call was discussed. "Lieutenant Skipper requested information
regarding the possibility of having briefings similar to the old style roll
calls. It was discussed . . . what type of materials would be used and

how they could be collected so that [the] person running these briefings didn't have to go to five or six locations each time. These things would be voluntary it was decided."

By October 1975, in special order 75-64, the department established weekly meetings for all teams to exchange information about operations. Further, in special order 76-25, issued on March 23, 1976, daily roll call briefings were instituted. In October of that year, special order 76-54 emphasized the nonvoluntary character of the meetings. "Attendance at the briefings is mandatory for all team patrol deputies."

In addition, by early 1977, most teams dropped the practice of holding routine monthly all-team meetings. As a team two memorandum states,

> "The present practice of having a team meeting once a month is terminated due to an apparent lack of interest. With minor exceptions, only on-duty personnel are attending. The new procedure will be to call a meeting whenever an issue needing consideration arises."

Division officials point to budget limitations as another reason why the frequency of team meetings was reduced. In essence, the department had come full circle back to the use of roll call as the principal means of information sharing.

It is the overwhelming consensus among officers that, under team policing, interaction and information sharing among teams and the detective division deteriorated. The minutes of a June 4, 1975 operations staff meeting describes one of the problems.

> "This item was brought forth by Lt. Sawyer regarding the [detective] support team. He presented several problems that he is experiencing or that the support team is experiencing. One of these problems is that his unit is not receiving all of the reports as they should be. Secondly, the uniform men are not completing their reports, that is, they are not indicating at the end of their reports who should do the follow-up and whether or not follow-up is actually necessary."

The May 18, 1976 staff meeting notes indicate a proposal to improve detective/team coordination.

> "Sergeant Fessler brought his proposal for a liaison program for special investigations unit and teams. Basically in his proposal he will assign one special investigation's person as liaison officer with each team. Hopefully, this will keep the information flow going between the teams and the special investigations unit and vice versa. This liaison officer will be a 24 hour consultant for that team, he will be the man that they will call if they have a need for a special investigation's person."

That problems persisted as indicated by the meeting notes from subsequent staff meetings which indicate, for example, that "items of found property are being left around Operations Division Headquarters (ODH), not properly tagged, marked and forwarded to property control" and that the detective division was not notified on one occasion when a stolen vehicle was recovered.

Other memoranda and minutes indicate a coordination problem between teams and outside agencies, particularly the district attorney's office and the court system. In a May 18, 1976 report by Barbara Bledsoe, the following problem was outlined:

> "The General Staff Meeting dealt primarily with the relationship of the District Attorney's office and the Division of Public Safety. Three deputy DA's attended. Both groups expressed concern for the lack of communication, example—the deputies don't know what happens to cases after suspects are arrested and booked and the DAs say they can never get in contact with deputies. Several suggestions were made and agreed to by both parties in an effort to improve communications. This includes being sure the Division complaint officer is kept informed of proceedings and the use of a 'PRIORITY' stamp on case reports where the deputy has a special interest or additional information."

The September 3, 1975 staff meeting also documented "problems with the juvenile service reports, late getting to court, etc. A copy of reports [isn't] being sent to JDH [Juvenile Detention Hall]."

Finally, the team organization is intended to facilitate the acquisition
and sharing of timely information about neighborhood problems. However, both
the January 1976 and March 1977 waves of the patrol officer survey indicate
this intent was not realized. In 1976, when asked whether "under the neigh-
borhood team policing program, officers [are] provided with more accurate
and timely information about area problems and criminal activities," 83 per-
cent of officers disagreed while only 18 percent agreed. In 1977, the re-
sponse was almost exactly the same, only 17 percent agreed.

IV. OUTCOMES

While MCDPS officials have favorably assessed the progress of team
policing in terms of a five- to ten-year change process, the plan and
proposal established Multnomah's aim to achieve some immediate progress
on desired outcomes. In the review of team policing theory, The Urban
Institute identified 11 outcomes expected to result from the implemen-
tation of team policing. The 11 outcomes are listed in Table 18, along
with a summary of the apparent results in Multnomah.

Nine of the 11 outcomes were stated as local objectives for the
Multnomah team policing program. Achievement of three of the nine
stated outcome objectives seemed plausible in terms of the character,
timing and magnitude of the MCDPS demonstration: increased productivity;
increased arrests and prosecutions; and increased officer job satisfac-
tion. To date, there is not enough evidence to show that the other six
expected outcomes have occurred.

There was a decline in general productivity at the beginning of
the demonstration. Following this initial decline, productivity in-
creased and the number of arrests and prosecutions rose. Even before
the start of team policing, citizen demand for routine services had been

TABLE 18: SUMMARY OF MCDPS EXPERIENCE WITH OUTCOME CHANGES

Outcome Change in Federal Team Policing Model	Was Element Stated As a Local Objectives	What Were The Types Of Measures For The Change Used In The Local Objective	Considering the Number, Timing and Magnitude Of The Implementation Changes, Is A Significant Outcome Change Plausible?	What Data Were Collected To Measure Change?	Do The Data Indicate A Change? What Direction?
1 Improve Police Community Relations	Yes	a. Survey of Citizen Fear of Crime b. Meeting Attendance c. Number of Citizen Volunteers d. Citizen Complaints e. Attacks on Police	Unlikely	• Fear Survey • Meeting Attendance • Reserve Strength • Citizen Complaints • Attacks on Police	No Change
2 Increase Officer Job Satisfaction	Yes	Patrol Officer Attitudes	Yes	Survey Response	No Change
3 Increase Productivity	Yes	Officer Attitudes, Citizen Attitudes, Crime, Output, etc.	Yes	Service, Crime, Traffic, Field Contact	Initial Decrease in Productivity Followed by Increase Toward End of Demonstration
4 Increase Flow of Crime-Related Information to the Police and Increase Reported Crime Rate	Yes	Crime Rate	No	Total Part I Crime, Citizen and Officer Survey Responses	No Change
5 Increase Quality and Quantity of Investigations, Increase Number of Criminals Apprehended and Prosecuted	Yes	Increased Arrests and Convictions	Yes	• Number of Investigators • Number of Arrests Per Investigation • Number of Cases Presented For Prosecution • Arrest and Prosecution Rate Reports	More Arrests and Prosecutions
6 Improved Police Services	Yes	Citizen and Officer Perceptions	No	Citizen and Officer Survey Responses	No Change
7 Improve Crime Prevention and Control	Yes	Meeting Attendance, Burglary Rate of "Households Attending Meetings"	No	Interviews	No Change
8 More Effective Law Enforcement	No	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
9 Decrease Crime Rates and Control Crime	Yes	Reduced Rate of Suppressible Crime, i.e., burglary, traffic, etc.	No	Burglary, Traffic Citations and Traffic Accident Rates	No Change
10 Decrease Citizen Fear	Yes	Survey of Citizens	No	Survey of Citizens	No Change
11 Improve Community Services	Not a Separate Objective	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

on the upswing. This trend continued during the demonstration and was
a contributing factor to the increase in general productivity. The
other plausible outcome, increased job satisfaction, did not occur.

A. LITTLE CHANGE IN POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS
(OUTCOME CHANGE #1)

In general, there was not a pressing need to improve police/community
relations in Multnomah because good relations already existed. Not surpris-
ingly, according to police officers, there was little change in the tenor of
police/community relations as a result of team policing.

Both the Multnomah plan and proposal mention the intent to improve
police/community relations as an integral part of the team policing effort.
The plan proposes using the following measures for detecting improvement:

> "1. survey of the fear of crime;
>
> "2. attendance at community meetings held by the police;
>
> "3. number of people involved in joint police community projects;
>
> "4. citizen complaints; and
> "5. attacks on police."[1]

The first measure, citizen fear, did not appear to decline during the
neighborhood team policing demonstration.

The second and third measures are somewhat interrelated. Assuming that
increased attendance at group meetings constituted a good effort, Multnomah
suggested it as an indicator of success.

---

1. Local Plan, op. cit., p. 53. Also, these measures are suggested in
the LEAA Team Policing Prescriptive Package.

The number of people attending different types of crime prevention unit meetings was examined for three successive years. The attendance findings are displayed on Table 19 and two facts are evident. Overall attendance declined from a monthly average in 1974-1975 of 25, to a monthly average of 19.2 in 1975-1976 and 18.9 in 1976-1977. For example, average attendance at block meetings declined over the three-year period from a high of 20 in 1974-1975 to 15 in 1975-1976 to 12.8 in 1976-1977. Similarly, average attendance at group meetings declined from 44 in 1974-1975 to 29 in 1976-1977.

The evidence seems to indicate that team policing did not stimulate crime prevention meeting attendance. However, another interpretation is that the monthly attendance dropped because earlier meetings successfully met citizen demand for crime prevention information. If this assumption were true, then the original meetings were successful.

As discussed elsewhere, Multnomah did implement a series of activities germane to this outcome, including the storefront operation, the crime prevention program, the school liaison effort, a media campaign to inform residents about team policing and an effort to encourage community-oriented individual officer contact.

The volume of citizen complaints, the fourth measure, did not change appreciably over the course of the demonstration year. And the fifth measure, number of attacks on police is usually so small that it is unreasonable to judge all but extreme fluctuations as significant. And there were none.

TABLE 19: ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS, 1974 TO 1977

Category	74-75 Grant Year	75-76 Grant Year	76-77* Grant Year	Grand Total
Number of Block Meetings Held (Including mobile trailer meetings)	220	269	132	621
Number of People Attending Block Meetings (Including mobile trailer meetings)	4,502	4,165	1,686	10,353
Number of Homes Receive Block Meeting Information (Including mobile trailer meetings)	1,526	2,729	1,257	5,512
Number of Group Meetings Held	110	126	55	291
Number of People Attending Group Meetings	3,738	3,356	1,593	8,687
Number of Rape Presentations Held	-	-	15	15
Number of People Attending Rape Presentations	-	-	537	537
Number of Mobile Trailer Block Meetings Held	-	-	4	4
Number of People Attending Trailer Block Meetings	-	-	88	88
Number of Hours Mobile Trailer on Display	-	-	242	242
TOTAL NUMBER OF MEETINGS HELD	330	394	202	926
TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE ATTENDING MEETINGS	8,240	7,598	3,816	19,654

*Nine months.

Source: Crime Prevention Monthly Reports

B. LOW JOB SATISFACTION: NO CHANGE AFTER TEAM POLICING
(OUTCOME CHANGE #2)

A higher level of officer job satisfaction was one of the central expecta-
tions in the Multnomah program. Multnomah believed that increased participation
would add interest, awareness and a growth opportunity to the job experience
of the deputies. As a result, they were expected to be less bored and more
satisfied and productive.

The Urban Institute's patrol officer survey was used to assess officer
job satisfaction. Two surveys, conducted during the seventh and twentieth
months of the program, show that officer job satisfaction was low throughout
the demonstration. Many measures of job satisfaction were obtained and none
showed a significant shift. Results for a direct measure of job satisfaction
from two waves of patrol officer survey are shown in Table 20.

TABLE 20: JOB SATISFACTION

Question: Which of these statements best tells how you feel about your job?

Response	Percent of Responses	
	Wave One	Wave Two
Completely Satisfied	2.9%	1.4%
Well Satisfied	35.3%	34.8%
Neutral	9.8%	20.3%
A Little Dissatisfied	30.4%	30.4%
Very Dissatisfied	21.6%	13.0%
Total	100% (N=101)	99.9%* (N=69)

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Note: Differences not statistically significant at the .05 level
with a chi-square test (probability is chi-square =.26).

Source: Urban Institute Patrol Officer Surveys, January 1976 (Wave One)
and March 1977 (Wave Two).

C. PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES: ATTRIBUTED MOSTLY TO
INCREASED CITIZEN DEMAND FOR POLICE SERVICES
(OUTCOME CHANGE #3)

The plan and the proposal contain broad references to increasing pro-
ductivity. The plan assigns responsibility for productivity to team managers
and offers a list of indicators that includes measures of crime reduction,
arrest and prosecution, community attitudes, general police service and job
satisfaction. This section includes a summary treatment of these indicators
as they relate to officer productivity. However, each is discussed in
greater detail as a separate outcome elsewhere in this chapter.

Between January 1974 and December 1976, there was a 13 percent net in-
crease in the productivity of MCDPS patrol as measured by the average number
of field service events per month. In 1974, the per month average which in-
cludes miscellaneous calls for service, crimes investigated, arrests, traffic
citations, traffic accident investigations and field stops was 6,436. By late
1976, 20 months into the demonstration, the average per month increased by 846
to 7,282.

We detected two important changes that seem to contribute to our under-
standing of this overall change. As shown in Table 21, the level of actual
demand for police service as measured by the number of miscellaneous calls
increased by 29 percent. This could indicate that the prime driving force
behind the net productivity increase was the community's increased demand
for services and not some independent action taken by the division as part
of team policing.

Nonetheless, the productivity findings also point out that, within the
context of increased citizen calls, there was a change in the division's use
of alternative procedures and activities in response to demand. Fewer crimes

TABLE 21: PATROL PRODUCTIVITY SERVICES PER MONTH, 1974 TO 1976

Year	Total Service Events Per Month	% Change	Miscel-laneous Calls Per Month	% Change	Crimes Inves-tigated Per Month	% Change	Arrests Per Month	% Change	Traffic Cita-tions Per Month	% Change	Traffic Acci-dent Investi-gations Per Month	% Change	Field Stops Per Month	% Change
1974	6,436	--	3,122	--	1,400	--	299	--	1,108	--	237	--	242	--
1975	6,206	- 4	3,452	+11	1,312	- 6	294	- 2	825	-25	221	- 7	102	-58
1976	7,282	+17	4,042	+17	1,17	10	397	+35	1,359	+65	206	- 7	104	+ 2
Net Change: 1974-1976	+ 846	+13	+ 920	+29	+ 22	-16	+ 98	+33	+ 251	+23	- 31	-13	-138	-57

Source: Operations Division Monthly Reports

were formally investigated, more arrests were made, more traffic citations were issued, and fewer field stops were undertaken.

In addition, the table contains data that indicate an initial overall slump in productivity around the start of team policing. The slump is evidenced by the data for 1975. The only increase was in the demand column, "Miscellaneous Calls Per month." For all other categories there was a net decrease during 1975.

In Multnomah, the agreed-upon explanation for the slump is that the initiation of team policing and the general climate of organizational change that surrounded the implementation temporarily disrupted operations and, as a consequence, service production.

It is also generally agreed that a somewhat different operating mode surfaced in the teams during 1976. For the deputies in the field, the new mode meant:

- more discretion about how to handle preliminary investigations of non-serious crimes;

- more emphasis on arrests;

- more emphasis on traffic citations and the reappearance of traffic specialists in some teams (i.e., officers who contribute a disproportionately high share of citations); and

- less emphasis on field stops.

D. UNCHANGED FLOW OF CRIME-RELATED INFORMATION TO THE POLICE AND REPORTED RATE OF CRIME (OUTCOME CHANGE #4)

The proposal and plan cite the aim of increasing the flow of crime-related information to the police, a shift expected to affect reported rates of crime. The proposal states:

"If we are successful, we expand an increase in [the] incidence of
reported crime . . . because an increase in the public's trust
of the department should result in greater willingness to report
crime to the department."[3]

Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data on Part I crime for Multnomah County
as a whole showed an increase of less than 5 percent from 1974 to 1975 and
essentially no change from 1975 to 1976. For the team areas during this
time, the best proxy for reported crime is the number of preliminary investi-
gations, which declined over the course of the demonstration. However, the
number of preliminaries when drawn from operations records does not reflect
the volume of initial investigations handled by telephone report takers. In
addition, the frequency of preliminaries imperfectly reflects reported crime
because of expanded field discretion about how to handle minor, non-serious
crimes.

There were some activities associated with team policing designed to
increase the flow of information from citizens. For example, the neighbor-
hood meetings stressed alertness to criminal activity and the need to re-
port all suspicious circumstances. However, evidence from the citizen sur-
vey indicates that the level of citizen cooperation with police was already
at a very high level. For example, in response to the question, "Do you
think residents in your neighborhood would usually, occasionally or seldom
report crimes they observe to the police?," 84 percent responded "usually."
Further, when asked "Do you think residents in your neighborhood would usu-
ally, occasionally or seldom help the police identify criminals?", 80 per-
cent responded citizens "usually" would. Since the level of cooperation is
already perceived to be at a very high level, only the most major of efforts

3. Multnomah proposal, op. cit., p. 25b-25c.

would be likely to increase that level, and other evidence suggests this is
unlikely. For example, The Urban Institute survey showed that 92 percent of
citizens in the team neighborhoods were not even aware that team policing
had been inaugurated, although the survey was administered 9 months after
the start of the demonstration, after the public relations efforts had
peaked.

Thus, while activities were initiated to help generate this outcome,
there is little evidence to suggest any increase in the proportion of crimes
actually reported. Given the initially high level of citizen cooperation
and the low recognition rate of the program, it is implausible to expect
a substantial increase in information flow to the police to be attributable
to this program.

E. INVESTIGATIONS QUANTITY DECLINED, QUALITY UNCHANGED (PART OF OUTCOME CHANGE #5)

The available evidence indicates that quantity of investigations per
patrol officer continued to decline under team policing. While the quantity
of investigations remained below predemonstration levels, the quality, as
measured by percentage of cases accepted for prosecution, initially dipped,
and then returned to the previous standard.

While the Multnomah proposal is silent on the issue, the team policing plan
does address this outcome. It states that decentralization to teams "repre-
sents a more flexible, effective and efficient means of investigating most
crimes. With increased training and authority to do so, uniformed officers
will conduct more thorough preliminary investigations [and] successfully
conclude more cases."[4]

4. Local Plan, op. cit., p. 43.

As mentioned earlier, the absolute number of preliminary investigations decreased under team policing. This decrease was due to a shift in classifying minor incidents as noncriminal and further to a generalized decline in productivity at the beginning of team policing, where all officer activity declined. Figure 11 shows the decline in the average number of preliminary investigations per deputy that occured from 1974 through 1976.

Data on a sample of 100 cases drawn from October 1976 showed that the number of follow-up reports for crimes investigated by teams was low, about 6 percent. Generally, this low rate could be expected considering the types of crimes (such as burglary and theft) assigned for full investigation by the teams.

A measure of the quality of investigations is the proportion of cases submitted by the department which was accepted for prosecution. Figure 12 illustrates the percentage of cases, felony and misdemeanor, accepted for prosecution from 1975 to 1976. The figures do not support the contention that the quality of investigations increased. If anything, the strong dip in percentage of cases accepted indicates an initial decline in the quality of case preparation under team policing, with a subsequent return to pre-demonstration levels.

F. MORE DEPUTIES, INCREASED NUMBER OF CRIMINALS APPREHENDED AND PROSECUTED (PART OF OUTCOME CHANGE #5)

After a slow start, arrests and prosecutions rose during the demonstration. Both Multnomah's plan and proposal list increased apprehension of criminals as a major objective. Both documents cite the number of arrests which passed

Source: Operations Section Monthly Activity Reports, March 1974-December 1976

FIGURE 11: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS PER PATROL DEPUTY, ALL TEAMS, 1974 TO 1976 (1974, N=92; 1975, N=98; 1976, N=103)

Start of
NTP

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1975   1976

MONTHS

Source: Operations Section Monthly Case Presentation Report

FIGURE 12:   PERCENTAGE OF CASES (FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR)
              ACCEPTED FOR PROSECUTION, 1975 TO 1976

the first judicial screening as an important measure. Multnomah hoped that
two strategies would contribute to increased arrests and convictions--the new
investigative procedures and the increased flow of information from citizens
to police.

As Figure 13 shows, the number of arrests dropped sharply for the month
when team policing was first implemented, but climbed gradually over the
course of the demonstration to levels higher than that of the pre-team
policing era. The initial decline is believed to be associated with lowered
officer productivity and uncoordinated operations which accompanied the in-
auguration of team policing.

The increase in arrests appears to be fairly equally spread among serious
and minor crimes. Figures 14 and 15, which plot total team arrests for
felonies and for misdemeanors, both illustrate a gradual rise. An analysis
of a sample of 100 major "papered" events--events for which reports were
written--drawn for October 1976, showed that roughly a third of the arrests
resulted from investigations (equally split between preliminaries and follow-
ups), one-third of the arrests were achieved through warrants and the remaining
third resulted from auto stops.

There is little evidence to support the notion that changed investigative
activity or increased information flow contributed to the increase in arrests.
As is shown above, while patrol assumed responsibility for follow-up investi-
gations in certain crime categories, the number of investigations remained
at a low level. A more plausible explanation for increasing arrests in 1976
lies in the fact that under team policing, approximately 10 percent more
deputies were assigned to field duty than under traditional operations prior
to team policing. There were simply more officers working to achieve arrests.
As Figure 16 shows, an increase in individual officer productivity contributed
to the increase in arrests.

Source: Operations Section Monthly Activity Reports

FIGURE 13: TOTAL ARRESTS (FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR) IN TEAM AREAS,
MARCH 1974 TO DECEMBER 1976

MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS

1974   1975   1976   1977

M O N T H

Source: Operations Section Monthly Activity Reports, March 1974–December 1976

FIGURE 14:   TOTAL TEAM MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, MARCH 1974 TO FEBRUARY 1977

FELONY ARRESTS

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2

1974   1975   1976   1977

M O N T H

104

Source: Operations Section Monthly Activity Reports, March 1974-December 1976

FIGURE 15:   TOTAL TEAM FELONY ARRESTS, MARCH 1974 TO FEBRUARY 1977

ARRESTS PER DEPUTY

5

4

3

2

1

0

Start of NTP

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1974   1975   1976

Source: Operations Section Monthly Activity Reports

FIGURE 16:   TOTAL ARRESTS PER DEPUTY, PER MONTH--MARCH 1974 TO DECEMBER 1976

The number of cases accepted for prosecution also increased during 1975 and 1976, as Figure 17 shows. As with arrests, the number of prosecutions increased for serious and minor crimes alike. The most obvious explanation for increased prosecutions lies in the increase in arrests during the latter part of 1975 and during 1976.

G. IMPROVED POLICE SERVICES IMPLAUSIBLE
## (OUTCOME CHANGE #6)

Improvement in police services is mentioned in three or four sections in the Multnomah plan and proposal. However, there is no mention of what might lead to such improvement. The plan includes three indicators of improved services, including:

"1. Satisfaction with services;

"2. Effectiveness in solving the problem for which action was taken; [and]

"3. Effective referrals to non-police agencies.

"The measurement of services must rely on citizen and officer perceptions of satisfaction as the department does not maintain data on the volume or [effectiveness] of referrals"

There are no available data for measuring police effectiveness in solving the "problem for which action was taken."

The patrol officer survey results indicate officer pessimism that team policing is an effective method for improving services. On both waves of the survey, a majority of officers did not agree with the idea that team policing is a better way to improve police services. The results are shown in Table 22.

Source: Operations Section Monthly Case Presentation Reports, January 1975 to December 1976

FIGURE 17:   NUMBER OF TEAM CASES ACCEPTED FOR PROSECUTION

TABLE 22: OFFICER OPINION OF TEAM POLICING'S EFFECT ON POLICE SERVICE

Question: The neighborhood police team program is a better way for
the police to try to improve the quality of police ser-
vices than any other method of I know to organize a police
department?

| Response | Percent Distribution of Responses | |
	Wave One (January 1976)	Wave Two (March 1977)
Strongly Agree	2.0%	0
Agree	10.9%	7.2%
Agree Somewhat	24.8%	17.4%
Disagree Somewhat	13.9%	8.7%
Disagree	24.8%	36.2%
Strongly Disagree	23.8%	30.4%
Total	100.2%* (N=101)	99.9%* (N=69)

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: Urban Institute Patrol Officer Surveys, January 1976 and
March 1977

The majority of citizens in Multnomah and the other demonstration sites
are satisfied with police service. In response to the question, "When you
think about all the police services in your neighborhood, would you say that,
in general, the police are doing a very good job, a good job, a not so good
job or a poor job?," the majority of citizens surveyed at the six demonstration
sites responded "very good" or "good" as shown in Table 23.

TABLE 23: CITIZEN OPINIONS: QUALITY OF POLICE SERVICE AT
DEMONSTRATION SITES

Quality of Service	Multnomah	Boulder	Elizabeth	Hartford	Santa Ana	Winston-Salem
Very Good	45%	55%	61%	41%	44%	38%
Good	23%	35%	17%	32%	33%	22%
Not So Good	16%	0	17%	18%	11%	22%
Poor	16%	10%	6%	9%	11%	17%
Total	100%	100%	101%*	100%	99%*	99%*

*Does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: The Urban Institute Citizen Survey, January 1976.

Several lines of evidence suggest the implausibility of expecting major
improvement in citizen satisfaction in Multnomah because of team policing.
Calls-for-service records for 1976 indicate that roughly 75 percent of all
police services concern noncriminal matters, service which falls into the
classification of "aid person," "animal problem," "police assistance," "traf-
fic problem," etc. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the imple-
mentation of team policing in Multnomah was designed in any way to directly
effect these services or the manner in which they were delivered. Further,
the low resident recognition rate of the team policing program makes it
unlikely that perceived improvement in services would be associated in
citizens' minds with team policing. That the quality of services did not

decline markedly is suggested by the fact that the volume of citizen com-
plaints about the police, according to Captain Pearce and Sheriff Martin,
did not increase during the demonstration period.

In summary, then, officers are not confident that team policing is a good
vehicle for improving services. While the citizen satisfaction data are in-
conclusive since they lack a comparative base, it would seem implausible to
expect major increases in citizen satisfaction since there has been no change
in the delivery of the overwhelming volume of routine services.

H. SUPPRESSIBLE CRIMES UNAFFECTED BY TEAM POLICING
(OUTCOME CHANGES #7 AND #9)

The Multnomah teams worked to suppress burglaries and traffic violations.
A decrease in residential burglaries, which had actually started before the
demonstration, continued. However, decline in total burglaries was almost
offset because the number of commercial burglaries had started climbing in 1973
and that trend continued during the demonstration.

Traffic citations dipped at the start of team policing, but rebounded
to exceed predemonstration levels by late 1976. The incidence of traffic
accidents dropped slightly, but no basis was identified to link the drop with
number of citations issued.

Both the Multnomah plan and proposal refer to the fact that team policing
will help increase officer effectiveness in controlling crime. Both documents
also speak of reducing the incidence of crime "through improved community in-
volvement and better utilization of department resources."[5] Elsewhere, the
proposal states:

---

5. Multnomah Proposal, op. cit., p. 25b.

"We expect an increase in the incidence of reported crime . . .
because an increase in the public's trust of the department should
result in greater willingness to report crime to the department.[6]

1. BURGLARIES

One of the five main MBO goals is to reduce suppressible crimes, specif-
ically burglary and traffic incidents. An examination of team MBO objectives
made it evident that the principal "suppressible" crime on which the depart-
ment decided to concentrate was burglaries. Team five's MBO statement is
typical of other teams in this context.

"GOAL 5: To reduce suppressible crime.

"OBJECTIVE 5.1.   To decrease the number of burglaries by 3%.

"ACTIVITY 5.1.1. Initiate one crime prevention meeting per month.
   "5.1.2. Initiate two business surveys per month.
   "5.1.3. Develop and maintain a file of emergency busi-
            ness numbers for all businesses in team area
   by May 1, 1976.
   "5.1.4. Make 10 business checks a day.
   "5.1.5. Make 10 residence checks a day."

As mentioned earlier, overall crime rates for the team areas are not
readily available from Multnomah. However, Figure 18 shows that during
1974-1975, the level of Part I crime in Multnomah County increased slightly,
but during 1975-1976, Figure 19 shows that the level of Part I crime re-
mained stable. This experience was typical of other jurisdictions with com-
parable populations.

The patrol officer survey indicates the belief that crime control has
deteriorated under team policing. Ninety percent of responding officers be-
lieved in January 1976 that their unit had done an "average" or "better" job
of controlling crime in the year before the survey was administered (during

---

6. Ibid., pp. 25-b-c.

112

Source: Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports,
        Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1974 and 1975

FIGURE 18:   MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON COMPARED TO 100 OTHER
             JURISDICTIONS WITH POPULATIONS OF 100,000 TO
             250,000: PERCENT CHANGE IN PART I CRIME FOR
             1974 TO 1975

Source: Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports,
        Federal Bureau of Investigation 1975; and Uniform
        Crime Reports Release (January-September 1976)
        issued by FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley and
        dated December 21, 1976

FIGURE 19:   MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON COMPARED TO 100
             JURISDICTIONS IN POPULATION GROUP 100,000 TO
             250,000: PERCENT CHANGE IN PART I CRIME,
             1975 TO 1976 (9-MONTH PERIODS)

113

the pre-team policing period.) However, only 57 percent of officers believed their unit was doing an average or better job at the time of the survey.

As described earlier, the department did launch a substantial crime prevention program focused on burglary. While team members participated, the effort was supported principally through a major crime prevention grant. In 1972, due to a steadily increasing burglary rate, the department adopted a Burglary Tactical Unit modeled after the Los Angeles Police Department. The unit used four full-time experienced investigators who worked undercover. They focused on field activities, pursuing suspects and information as the opportunity arose rather than operating by the traditional case assignment method. In July 1975, the unit was awarded a federal grant.

The plan states that "crime prevention will be enhanced by community/ police interaction—if the team gains the cooperation of the community through interaction, crime prevention becomes manageable." The 1976 team MBO statements stressed residential and commercial checks in conjunction with the crime prevention unit and the use of team area "block meetings" as strategies for reducing burglary.

Multnomah used crime reduction as the main criteria for judging the efficacy of prevention activities. For example, Multnomah tabulated the incidence of burglary at the residences of those who attended crime prevention meetings. They concluded that: "Householders attending block meetings are burglarized eight times less than those who do not attend." Conceivably, this type of evidence could support the contention that burglary prevention had an effect on the burglary rate if the analysis included the previous history of crime at that household. Had this information been available, one could assess whether the histories of meeting attendees were typical or atypical. For example, whether or not meetings attract an inordinate number of residents

who are already crime conscious and cautious about the security of their homes. Since previous history of crime at a household was not available, there was no hard evidence to support claims that crime prevention caused crime to decrease, and insufficient data to make a further assessment.

The average number of residential burglaries per month did, in fact, decline from 1973-1976; during this four-year period the number of burglaries in team areas declined from 224 (in 1973) to 201 (in 1974), to 188 (in 1975), to 165 (in 1976). However, during the same four-year period, the average number of commercial burglaries per month increased from 56 (in 1973), to 76 (in 1974), to 85 (in 1975) to 79 (in the first nine months of 1976). As a result, the overall average burglary rate declined by about 12 percent.

2. TRAFFIC CRIMES

Both team one and team five defined "traffic crimes" as one category of suppressible crimes. For example, team five's initial MBO contains the following section:

"GOAL 5:   To reduce suppressible crimes . . .

"OBJECTIVE 5.2.   To suppress traffic crimes.

"ACTIVITY 5.2.1. Use radar unit two days a week.
          "5.2.2. Notify road department of hazardous road conditions."

Table 24 shows that the number of citations issued during the demonstration period exhibited a rising trend in team areas one and five. The number of traffic accidents in each team area remained relatively stable, and the mix of accidents (minor, major, fatal) did not shift markedly. The accident frequency shows no strong association with level of enforcement activity.

With team one, there is evidence that a traffic specialization evolved over the course of the demonstration. As Table 25 illustrates, in September

TABLE 24: TOTAL NUMBER OF TRAFFIC CITATIONS AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, TEAMS ONE AND FIVE, AUGUST 1975 TO DECEMBER 1976

	TEAM 1		TEAM 5	
DATE	Number of Traffic Citations	Number of Accidents	Number of Traffic Citations	Number of Accidents
Aug. '75	84	16	91	40
Oct.	99	16	148	59
Dec.	152	15	131	58
Feb. '76	85	12	121	43
Apr.	121	15	148	41
June	167	15	233	62
Aug.	84	16	133	43
Oct.	141	18	145	53
Dec.	157	21	170	73

Source: Operations Sectious Monthly Traffic Enforcement Activity Reports, August 1975 to December 1976

TABLE 25: TEAM ONE TRAFFIC CITATION ACTIVITY

No. Citations Per Officer (N=15)	Percent of Officers (100%=15)					
	Sept. 1975	Dec. 1975	Mar. 1976	June 1976	Sept. 1976	Dec. 1976
Zero	--	--	13%	13%	27%	27%
1-10	73%	82%	60%	47%	47%	53%
11-20	27%	6%	20%	20%	13%	7%
21+	--	12%	7%	20%	13%	13%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: Operations Section Monthly Traffic Enforcement Activity Reports, September 1975 to December 1976

and December of 1975, all officers were responsible for some degree of cita-

tion activity, and no single officer contributed more than 20 citations in

September. By December 1976, however, more than a quarter of the officers

contributed no citations, while 13 percent of officers contributed more than

20 citations apiece. There is no evidence of specialization in team five.

An examination of citation activity for all teams from 1974 to 1976 reveals

a decline in activity surrounding the implementation of team policing. See

Figure 20. This decline is consistent with the drop in other police activ-

ities during that period, apparently associated with disrupted operations.

By the latter half of 1976, citation activity increased to exceed predemon-

stration levels.

In summary, patrol officers believed that effectiveness in crime control

declined under team policing. The department's efforts focused primarily

on two types of suppressible crimes: burglary and traffic crimes. The de-

partment attributes the decline in residential burglary to its crime preven-

tion program, an effort supported but not conceived or administered or funded

by teams. Commercial burglary increased during the demonstration while traffic

citations increased in the two team areas stressing this activity. There

was no apparent relationship between increased citations and the frequency

of traffic accidents.

L. CITIZEN FEAR OF CRIME UNCHANGED
(OUTCOME CHANGE #10)

In Multnomah, citizen perception of fear of crime was unaffected by team

policing. This could be expected considering that decreasing citizen fear

receives only brief comment in the plan and proposal. It is mentioned in

connection with the wider objective of improving community attitudes.

Source: Operations Section Monthly Traffic Enforcement
Activity Reports, March 1974-December 1976

FIGURE 20:   TOTAL NUMBER OF CITATIONS AND TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

According to division officials, citizen fear of crime was not regarded as a major issue by the department. Pooling of the responses to several questions on the citizen survey tended to support the concept that citizen fear was not a dominant problem in Multnomah. Behind Boulder, Multnomah ranks as the second safest demonstration area in the eyes of residents surveyed.

One factor which might power a decrease in citizen fear is the view that crime is decreasing. However, in January 1976, when asked whether "crime in your neighborhood has increased, decreased or remained about the same . . . within the past year," 31 percent of respondents felt crime increased, 12 percent felt it decreased and 49 percent felt it remained the same. Eight percent did not know. This finding is consistent with the actual reported crime rate trend which was stable and with the perceptions of citizens surveyed at the other demonstration sites. When asked "Within the past year, do you think your chances of being robbed or attacked in your neighborhood have gone up, gone down, or remained the same?," 25 percent estimated the chances had gone up, 10 percent said they had gone down and 54 percent said they had remained the same. Eleven percent did not know.

APPENDIX A

MANAGEMENT-BY-OBJECTIVES STATEMENT
OF TEAM ONE

NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM 1

Team #1 is charged with protecting the public, enforcing laws, apprehending violators of laws and providing citizen-requested police services. This is done by maintaining twenty-four hour patrol throughout the team zone both to respond to calls for service and to serve as a potential deterrent to illegal activities. In addition, traffic control, investigation of serious traffic accidents, traffic safety education, investigation of all reported juvenile offenses, reported runaways or missing persons calls and investigation of criminal cases in the team zone. In addition, the providing of complaint specialists for all the Neighborhood Teams except the Support Team, will be this team's responsibility.

A patrol officer must be proficient at a variety of tasks rather than skilled in a limited field. The officer responds to calls for police service, apprehends suspects for both criminal and traffic offenses, determines whether to release suspects with a warning or a citation or to arrest them, does preliminary and follow-up investigations, testifies in court, makes appropriate referrals to social service agencies, intercedes in family and neighborhood crisis situations and recovers stolen/lost property.

The patrol officer is the most visible representative of county government. It is to the officer that people turn in their most traumatic moments. The officer must be sensitive and understanding, but must maintain a high level of professionalism in order to insure that the best interests of both the individual and the community are furthered.

Goal 1: To develop an effective, efficient, and responsive management system.

Objective 1.1.   To obtain team participation and input by organizing the decision making process on the basis that the smallest unit should be approximately eight (8) persons in size for effective and efficient input and decision making.

Activity 1.1.1.   A survey will be conducted at the end of the 1976 year to determine what the team feeling is in regards to the effectiveness and responsiveness of the team management system. On a scale of excellent, good, fair and poor, the goal by December 31, 1976 will be an average rating of good by the team.

Goal 2: To increase agency-community involvement.

Objective 2.1   To develop a formal community involvement program by April 1, 1976.

Activity 2.1.1.   Make two grade school contacts per week.

2.1.2.   Make two high school contacts per week.

2.1.3.   Make two college contacts per week.

2.1.4.   Make two business contacts per week.

2.1.5.   Staff the field office (Alpenrose) at those times when large numbers of people are present:
A. Christmas
B. Easter
C. July 4th

Goal 3:   To provide a more effective allocation of services to the community.

Objective 3.1.   To complete an analysis of the team area by August 1, 1976.

Activity 3.1.1.   Devote a portion of each team meeting, beginning immediately, to getting member input.

3.1.2.   Analyze Officer's daily reports by March 1976.

3.1.3.   Survey citizen's groups by July 1, 1976.

Objective 3.2.   To base team operations on west side by June 1, 1976.

Activity 3.2.1.   Identify a suitable site by May 1, 1976.

Objective 3.3.   Improve game law enforcement expertise and delivery of members by September 1, 1976.

Activity 3.3.1.   Send six members to Game Law Enforcement School.

Objective 3.4.   To increase delivery of crime prevention methods by November 1, 1976.

Activity 3.4.1.   Send six members to Crime Prevention School.

Goal 4:   To increase job satisfaction of Division employees.

Objective 4.1.   To reward exemplary performance of members.

Activity 4.1.1.   Review each member's commendable performance records, sergeant and fellow members monthly.

Objective 4.2.   To encourage members to "self-actualize" by enriching Job challenge.

Activity 4.2.1.   Catalogue individuals' areas and levels of expertise by July 1, 1976, and to utilize members in their areas of expertise.

Goal 5:   To reduce the number of suppressible crimes.

Objective 5.1.   To increase the ratio of clearances to burglaries committed by the end of 1976.

Activity 5.1.1.   Assign the team intern to glean burglary/clearance statistics for Team #1 from records, to be completed by April 1, 1976.

5.1.2.   Make 30 house checks per week.

5.1.3.   Make 30 business checks per week.

5.1.4.   Make 1 contact with Dunthorpe Patrol per week.

5.1.5.   Maintain an up to date burglary pin map.

5.1.6.   Establish a business file of persons to contact when a burglar is believed inside.

5.1.7.   Initiate one business premise survey per week.

5.1.8.   Increase expertise through supervision and training in follow-up investigations.

Objective 5.2.   To provide crime prevention methods to constituents.

Activity 5.2.1.   Initiate one block meeting per month.

5.2.2.   Provide crime prevention training to all team members.

5.2.3.   Advise all burglary victims of crime prevention methods.

Objective 5.3.   To develop "crime watchers".

Activity 5.3.1.   Gain cooperation of delivery persons, i.e., milkmen, mailmen, newspaper persons, etc.

Objective 5.4.   To suppress traffic crimes.

Activity 5.4.1.   Work radar once a week per officer.

5.4.2.   Meet "Traffic Index".

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSE OPTIONS
USED TO ASSESS OFFICERS' PERCEPTIONS
OF INFLUENCE ON THE JOB

INFLUENCE

1 In general, how much say or influence do you feel you have on what goes on in your job?

(5) _____ a very great deal of influence
(4) _____ a great deal of influence
(3) _____ quite a bit of influence
(2) _____ some influence
(1) _____ little or no influence

2 Do you feel you can influence the decisions regarding things about which you are concerned?

(5) _____ I can influence them to a very great extent
(4) _____ to a considerable extent
(3) _____ to some extent
(2) _____ to a very little extent
(1) _____ I cannot influence them at all

3 Do your immediate supervisors ask your opinion when a problem comes up which involves your work?

(5) _____ they always ask my opinion
(4) _____ often ask
(3) _____ sometimes ask
(2) _____ seldom ask
(1) _____ they never ask my opinion

4 If you have a suggestion for improving the job or changing the set-up in some way, how easy is it for you to get your ideas across to the individuals involved?

(1) _____ it is difficult to get my ideas across
(2) _____ somewhat difficult
(3) _____ not too easy
(4) _____ fairly easy
(5) _____ it is easy to get my ideas across

5 How much influence do you have in planning what you will do and how you will go about it?

(5) _____ very large influence
(4) _____ large influence
(3) _____ some influence
(2) _____ little influence
(1) _____ very little influence

6 In general, how much do you participate in decisions affecting the carrying out of your work?

(5) _____ almost always
(4) _____ frequently
(3) _____ occasionally
(2) _____ a little
(1) _____ almost never

7 How often have you acted as a spokesman representing your district or a sub-group in your district?

(1) _____ never
(2) _____ very seldom
(3) _____ occasionally
(4) _____ often
(5) _____ quite often

END