

S. HRG. 98-184

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

JANUARY 27, FEBRUARY 16, MARCH 2 AND 3, 1983

Serial No. J-98-2

Part 1

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ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Also present: Senators Specter, Biden, Metzenbaum, and Leahy.

Staff present: Duke Short, chief investigator; Bill Christensen, senior investigator; Allan Spence, investigator; Robert M. Reilley, investigator; and Mary Lynn Batson, investigative clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STROM THURMOND

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary begins a series of hearings in one of its traditional areas of oversight responsibility—organized crime in America.

Organized crime, at whatever level, or involving whatever activity, is the single most threat to the domestic security of our Nation. The effects of organized criminal activity reach many elements of our society which have generally been considered cornerstones of our Republic. Police, judges, legislators, businessmen, bankers, lawyers, and other respected professions have on occasion in American history been tainted by organized crime. True, the vast majority of people in these positions of authority are not in any way involved with organized crime. But the increase in publicized incidents of corruption are becoming too frequent for the American public to accept. Many people are starting to question the ability of the criminal justice system to deal effectively with these organized criminal elements.

Illegal drug and narcotics trafficking is one of the major criminal problems in the United States today involving organized crime. Nearly \$80 billion in drugs is being trafficked in this country each year. Highly organized criminals, whether operating domestically or overseas, profit immensely from illegal drug sales. Organized crime drug sales volume ranks ahead of every major American corporation except Exxon, and drug profits exceed those of every company in the entire United States.

Worldwide efforts are being made to eradicate this large-scale drug trafficking, but the potential profits are so large, and the criminal elements involved are so well-organized and financed, it has become extremely difficult for the designated enforcement

agencies to even keep up, let alone make a significant dent in illegal narcotics activity.

The Reagan administration, behind the leadership of Attorney General William French Smith, has committed a significant amount of resources to fighting illegal drug trafficking. In addition to giving the FBI new drug enforcement responsibilities, the Department of Justice has asked the Congress for an additional \$130 million to support the establishment of 12 regional task forces dedicated to illegal drug activity. This commitment should not be thwarted by the Congress. I hope the full request of \$130 million will be approved on a bipartisan basis.

It has been alleged by some that one of the problems in attacking organized crime, especially in the drug field, has been a lack of coordination among the various drug enforcement agencies. To some extent, that problem has been addressed by giving the FBI new drug enforcement authority. Renewed efforts, however, should be made to improve coordination and efficiency among our Federal law enforcement agencies, as well as State and local agencies.

The most recent seizure of \$350 million of narcotics in my own State of South Carolina was the result of a collective effort by Federal, State, and local law enforcement groups. This was reported to be the third largest cocaine seizure on the east coast. Such cooperation must continue.

Convictions of traditional organized crime figures have increased in recent years. In fiscal year 1980, there were 597 organized crime convictions reported by the Justice Department. In fiscal year 1982, that figure increased to 763. Increased convictions of known, organized crime members has had an impact on the La Cosa Nostra, but not necessarily on those groups who are outside the traditional crime family organizations.

Today in America, there is developing a new, and in many cases more vicious, breed of organized crime elements. In south Florida, Colombian and Cuban criminal elements are quickly becoming the chief importers of cocaine and marihuana to the United States. In various parts of the country, outlaw motorcycle gangs, once considered random groups who were just troublemakers and general law-breakers, have become a vast network of criminal elements, bent on distributing drugs, firearms, and other illegal contraband. Gangs, such as the Hells Angels, Pagans, Outlaws, and Bandidos, are totally outside the law, and engage in crimes such as murder, extortion, arson, theft, and prostitution. We will take an indepth view of these gangs at later hearings.

In other areas of the United States, small, but highly organized groups of Hispanics and Southeast Asians engage in criminal activity, and prey largely on their fellow countrymen as well as other citizens. Because of the nature of this "new breed" of criminal elements, it has been difficult for law enforcement agencies to penetrate them and gain the valuable information necessary for effective law enforcement. These groups are very secretive and suspicious of anyone who is not "one of them." Thus, many traditional law enforcement methods cannot be utilized.

The purpose of these hearings will not be to restate what most knowledgeable law enforcement officials already know—that organized crime is a major threat to the continued economic and social

welfare of our Nation—but to inform the American people of the magnitude and seriousness of this problem, as well as to determine what actions are being taken by law enforcement authorities to combat this situation. The citizens of this country must be made aware of the dimensions of the organized criminal activity and the efforts that are being made to combat it.

It should be made clear at the start, at least from the perspective of this Senator, that these hearings are not intended to be a criticism of past or current efforts by our law enforcement agencies. We know the size and extent of this problem taxes the limits of the personnel and resources of Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies. These oversight hearings should give a well-defined picture of what is now being done, and what further should be done to bring organized crime in America under control.

As we proceed with the hearings, I expect the committee will be given suggestions for legislative change, or even new legislation in the criminal law area. If possible, the committee should consider such proposed changes and the possibility of acting on them in this 98th Congress.

We welcome the witnesses to the hearing today and look forward to their testimony.

I received a letter this morning from the President of the United States, which I think it would be appropriate to read at this time [reading]:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 26, 1983.

DEAR STROM: I understand the Senate Judiciary Committee is beginning hearings on organized crime in America, for which I wish to commend you and your Committee. This Administration shares the concern of the Committee that organized criminal activity is a continuing threat to the domestic security of our nation. Illegal drug trafficking, gambling, extortion, pornography, fraud, and other crimes committed by highly-organized, well-financed criminal organizations, take a tremendous toll on the criminal justice system and its resources.

One area of organized criminal activity which has become extremely lucrative in recent years is the importation and sale of illegal drugs. The amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, amphetamines, and other illegal narcotics brought into this country reach into the billions of dollars in street value. In recognition of that fact, early in this Administration, we set up a Drug Task Force in South Florida to combat the widespread, flourishing, illegal drug trafficking, which has grown to dimensions well beyond the capabilities of state and local law enforcement. This effort was launched by targeting the resources and personnel of a wide range of Federal agencies, such as the FBI, DEA, U.S. Customs Service, and the Coast Guard, to collectively combat the flow of illegal drugs into South Florida. That effort has paid off. I have now called for the creation of 12 new task forces to expand Federal drug enforcement efforts nationwide.

I applaud the interest of the Committee in bringing the problem of organized crime to the attention of the public and addressing ways to combat it. My Administration looks forward to working with you and your Committee in finding ways to eradicate organized criminal activity in the United States.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN.

I would be glad to take an opening statement from Senator Metz-enbaum.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR METZENBAUM

Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to participate in these hearings with the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, and I commend you for holding the hearings.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think any of us in the U.S. Senate, the Congress, or the administration are prepared to say a word against the effort to drive out organized crime. But having said that, I am not certain that our words are supported by our actions. This administration in its budget cutting efforts has actually cut back on funds for the purpose of fighting organized crime. It has taken money from one Department to the other, and talked about making that a special effort to fight organized crime. And it has cut back on funds for the Drug Enforcement Agency and the IRS: funds that other agencies of government—and there are many—very much need to fight organized crime.

Now, this is sort of a hoopla hearing. But I am not certain that our words are going to mean much unless we put our actions behind our words. And while at the same time, we talk about fighting organized crime—and actually, it is my understanding that the statements of the witnesses today very much address themselves to the question of drugs—there are other kinds of organized crime, as well, that are a problem to the American people, beyond the question of the antidrug effort.

Having said that, I think it should be pointed out that there also is other crime the American people are concerned about, and that is street crime. And when this administration cuts back on so many of the human services programs that it forces people to go out and steal to feed their families, that is the kind of crime that we have to concern ourselves about as well. It does not call for the same kind of hoopla. It does not call for the same kind of interest. It gets a commentary on the TV once in a while. But the fact is that as more and more people are being forced into economic depression and oppression, they are forced to turn to crime in order to feed their families. Of course, these economic conditions do not justify such behavior.

But I would hope that in addition to the words that will be stated here today, that the funds will be provided by this administration to do the job that has to be done. And I have seen in the past 2 years that those funds have been cut, not increased. I would therefore very strongly hope that the witnesses today who are charged with the major responsibility in this particular area would speak to those who make policy at the White House, and see to it that adequate funding is provided to fight organized crime, but at the same time, I hope they would also speak up and point out that crime is bound to increase if people cannot feed their families.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania have an opening statement?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER

Senator SPECTER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think that these hearings on organized crime and drug trafficking are particularly timely, in light of the President's state of the Union speech on Tuesday, when he emphasized

the administration's direction in these two particular respects, and in light of the efforts of the administration in the last year, including the Special South Florida Task Force headed by the Vice President. The problem of drugs is really an overwhelming one in our society, and it affects so many aspects of the crime problem.

My own experience as district attorney of Philadelphia has shown me how much of violent crime, robberies and burglaries, is directly caused by a necessity to feed a drug habit, and that the tremendous availability of drugs in this country has infested and infected the young people, going down to the high schools, junior high schools and grade schools. There is a necessity for the kind of a war on organized crime and drug trafficking which the President has described.

I think that we have to support the administration, and I am prepared to vote for the resources necessary to do this job and to be sure that the FBI and the Department of Justice generally have the funds necessary to carry out this important task.

These hearings, too, I think are very important because they come right on the heels of a difference between the Congress and the administration on the crime package passed by the 97th Congress. While it was generally agreed that in the seven-part crime bill only one part, that establishing a Drug Coordinator, led to the veto by the President. This is a matter, Mr. Chairman, on which you and I and Senator Biden and others worked hard, where I talked personally to Attorney General Smith, FBI Director Webster, and others in an effort to try to resolve those differences. I think it is indispensable that we do resolve those differences and come to grips with the congressional sense and also the administration sense as to how we are going to coordinate this attack on drug trafficking. These hearings are extraordinarily important and particularly timely.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The ranking member of this committee is the able Senator from Delaware, who is participating fully in this matter, and I would now be pleased for him to make an opening statement if he has one.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDEN

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me compliment the chairman on recognizing the grave problem that this Nation faces with regard to organized crime and drug trafficking—which are sometimes interchangeable, as our distinguished witnesses know—and for convening these hearings in the first week of the new session. I commit to the chairman and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to continue to attempt to make all our efforts on this committee, which they were last year, bipartisan in nature. Legislation that was passed out of this committee in an attempt to deal with these issues last Congress had equal support on both sides of the aisle within this committee. Also, the President called for that kind of cooperation in his state of the Union message; and we have had it in this committee for the last 2 years.

I would like to welcome General Smith and Judge Webster, and look forward to hearing insights and opinions from them on how best to respond to the growing problem of crime and drug abuse.

We begin this hearing only 2 days after the President of the United States stated, and I quote:

The time has also come for major reform of our criminal justice statutes and acceleration of the drive against organized crime and drug trafficking. It is high time we make our cities safe again. This Administration hereby declares all-out war on big-time organized crime and drug traffickers, who are poisoning our young people.

Now, I have not been in the Senate—nor has anybody—as long as my distinguished chairman, but I have been here for 10 years, and I have heard four Presidents declare varying degrees of war on crime. I have heard from Democrats and Republicans who declared wars on crime. And I have found so far under four Presidents, that promise has turned out to be, although well-intended, oftentimes a fairly hollow promise. I believe it is a promise that only puts us in a position where the American public becomes more suspicious and disbelieving of their politicians' and their public officials' ability to really deal with what they continue to think is a major domestic problem facing them. If I can point out one polling fact, it is interesting to note that in spite of how bad the economy is, all the polls show that the No. 2 issue facing Americans, in their own minds, is crime. They are worried about street crime, as the Senator from Ohio mentioned. And yet, when asked in the polls if they think their Government can do anything about it, they only say "No." So, they are very concerned about it, but they doubt whether we can do much about it. And the fact of the matter is there is a new, multibillion dollar business that has grown up over the last decade that includes everything from guard dogs and locks to private police forces to lovely young middle-class mothers teaching their 12-year-old daughters to stand at firing ranges with .38-caliber pistols and learn how to shoot, in order to protect themselves.

What worries me most is that when we declare wars on crime, we raise expectations, which are not likely to be able to be fulfilled, and further increase the lack of confidence that already exists out there in the public. Now, I do not blame the public for not believing hollow promises we politicians—I include myself in that group—have made about the war on crime. If we are able to believe that an all-out war is about to be undertaken, I think it is very important in these hearings that we look at our plan, our troop strength, and our commanders. Two weeks ago, the President vetoed the only piece of crime-fighting legislation that has passed across his desk in the past 2 years. Those of us in Congress who have worked on this issue for some time thought we had put together a bipartisan package in a bipartisan manner that made some serious inroads, although would not win any wars—we did not declare any wars—but we believed it made genuine, legitimate inroads in the area—things like one person in charge of our drug policy; stiffer penalties for drug and organized crime offenders; assistance to State and local enforcement, and strengthening Federal laws to allow seizure and forfeiture of drug-trafficking assets, which I should note parenthetically, as I am sure the Director will testify, unless we can get their dollars, we are not going to get their organization. These provisions were all part of the crime bill

that the President vetoed because, as Senator Specter pointed out, he felt that it created an extra layer of bureaucracy and so on.

As I look today at the new plan the administration has for attacking organized crime and drug-trafficking, the irony of their proposal is very unsettling to me. The President stated that he opposed the provision of a Cabinet-level drug coordinator, because it would be ineffective and bureaucratic, and that is why he vetoed the bill. Let me quote from the budget request the Department of Justice submitted to Congress in November to fund the Drug and Organized Crime Task Forces that the Attorney General will discuss later today—and I quote from that proposal sent to us:

As the Cabinet officer with responsibility for task forces, the Attorney General must also have authority over the resources. Failure to provide this authority will weaken the Attorney General's ability to coordinate the activities of many organizations from the three Cabinet agencies comprising this effort. Finally, it is believed that the single appropriation will reduce competition among participating agencies and will facilitate the legislative oversight and review process.

Now, that is exactly the argument I made to the President in his office; that the Attorney General become the drug coordinator, having the authority over the drug enforcement effort. I was surprised to hear the Department of Justice recommending a veto offer stating they needed central control to run the new task forces.

I just finished reviewing the guidelines for our new task forces, and the central authority I thought we gave to the Attorney General to run these programs appears now to be once again, decision by committee. The guidelines proliferate the number of coordinating committees and councils and the layers of bureaucracy through which the Federal enforcement must wade to get quick and responsible decisions. I believe it now brings the total of Federal committees to five—five committees that will be directing our Federal drug and organized crime effort. The committee structure for the task force is even worse, in my view. Each task force will have three coordinating groups, referring, reviewing and suggesting policy. And I look to you, General, for an explanation today of this bureaucratic maze from my perspective, at least, that we seem to be creating, and an explanation of why it is necessary and how it will work.

I am also concerned about the resources allocated to this effort. The President has stated that the south Florida effort which I supported is serving as a model for the 12 new task forces, and it costs an estimated \$65 million the first year. We all know what you get when you divide 12 into \$127 million and it does not come out to \$65 million. And we are talking about 12 task forces that will be needed and only \$127 million for them. I will again look to the Attorney General for an explanation of the budget that was proposed for this year's program.

It has been disturbing to work on blocking budget cuts as a member of the Budget Committee, to law enforcement agencies and law enforcement programs offered by this administration. I have been hearing good rumors that the 1984 budget freeze is not going to apply to us, it is not going to apply to law enforcement—I have not heard that from you; I have heard that from other people, but I am anxious as a member of the Budget Committee to be able sit up

there and this year not have to fight to try to get more money in the budget, or prevent cuts, but to defend the increases that are coming. I hope you are going to be able to tell us that there will be increases to start this war on crime.

And last, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing me this much time—I believe there are a number of improvements that need to be made in the operational structure of the new task forces and in legislation to help reduce the profits of organized criminals. And I would hope that from this hearing we can again begin to build a record of a bipartisan coalition that will develop meaningful and well-thought-out ideas and programs that I do not promise are going to help win a war on crime. Let's try instead to win some battles. I want to win some battles.

I know our colleagues who are going to testify today are obviously interested in winning some battles. I think if we tell the folks we are going to win a war, they are going to be a little bit disappointed and they are not going to believe it. Let us just go out and win some battles. We need more troops, we need better plans, and we need more coordination, and that is where I would like to pursue my questions.

I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Does the distinguished Senator from Vermont have an opening statement?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make a couple of comments. I think like everybody else, nobody in the Congress disagrees that the drug problem in the United States is serious; it is. It also threatens the solution to many of our social and economic problems, which are also very great in this country. Also, nobody disagrees that the fight should be nonpartisan. I do not think the victims of drug-related crime or organized crime or any other kind of violent crime are selected because of their political background. And the abhorrence to crime is not something that is a hallmark of anybody, based on their own partisan background. Most Americans abhor crime, and all victims are the same, irrespective of their political backgrounds.

I happen to have looked at the aspect of rural America, because I come from the most rural State in the Union. Rural America has been badly hurt. The poor have been especially victimized by the growth of crime, as the skyrocketing crime rates in what we think of as bucolic rural America sometimes tends to be ignored. It is an area where crime is growing by leaps and bounds, where the old days of the unlocked doors—leave the kitchen door open when you are gone, so that the neighbors can come in and so on—that is long-gone, and people on lonely roads in beautiful rural America often live as much in fear as people in a crime-ridden inner city.

Having said that, I think that the fight against crime is not going to be won just by juggling organizational tables or rearranging enforcement personnel and sticking them basically with the same area. I have spent more than a third of my adult life in law enforcement. I have spent more years in law enforcement than in

any other career that I have had since reaching adult life. And I have listened to legislative bodies, whether State legislative bodies or congressional legislative bodies, announce these wars against crime and say, we are going to do something to stop crime; we are going to increase the penalties, or, we are going to make new penalties, or we are going to double the penalties, or whatever. Are you also going to give us the people necessary to go out and stop crime? Are you going to give us the tools necessary? No. We do not have the money for that. But we are certainly going to help you. We are going to pass resolutions that we are against crime and that we think crime is bad.

And I remember as a prosecutor, I always used to say:

Well, thank you very much. That is very kind. And I am so happy to have a sense of the legislature that you are against crime, but again, where is the manpower?

And I saw this last year. There was the career criminal bill. When it first came up here, there was an announcement that if somebody has committed enough felonies that the Federal Government would be willing to step in as a career criminal thing. And yet one of the reasons the White House gives for vetoing the crime package it passed here was because the Congress put in an amendment of mine, the fact that the local law enforcement ought to have a little say in that. The reason I did that is very simple. We had, in the Career Criminal Act, what could very well have just turned out to be a publicity boondoggle. Can you imagine the sheriff in some rural county calling up, Mr. Chairman, to the FBI and saying, you know, we think old Hector Smith has committed his fourth burglary of the general store. Would the FBI just get on down here and take care of Hector, because we are tied up with the county fair this month? Well, you are not going to see them. But you may well see them come running in if instead, Hector is involved in some kind of a very well-publicized crime.

I have no problem—in fact, I encourage having the Federal facilities available to the local and State law enforcement at their request for matters of major crime. But I do not want to hold out false hope that they are really there to help, when we have not added personnel, when we have made it something to be totally selective on the part of the Federal Government, and no help at the other end. Resources cost money, and in the end, the fight against crime is a matter of priority. We ought to set those out, and then make sure that the resources are there.

Organized crime is going to decline only when the State and national efforts are adequately funded and when, if we have a successful program, we can guarantee its continuity, and when we come to the conclusion that it is more important to pursue those who profit from social decay than it is to fund extravagant weapons system—that is another matter. And the administration is going to have to realize, in seeking bipartisan support for this, that it requires more than lip service.

When this committee gets together, with the disparate people on it, and passes good anticrime legislation, I think the people down at the other end at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue must realize that there is something in there if it can hold all the members of this committee together.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our witnesses today will be the Attorney General of the United States, the Hon. William French Smith, and the Director of the FBI, Judge Webster.

I request the distinguished witnesses to stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Attorney General SMITH. I do.

Mr. WEBSTER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Have a seat.

Mr. Attorney General, we will hear from you first. You may now proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Attorney General SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee and to address the most serious dimension of crime in America today.

I want to commend the committee for choosing to address the subject of organized crime. I welcome the public understanding that will flow from your scrutiny, and I look forward to your joining with us in developing the added tools necessary to combat the mob's power in this country. As you address this subject, I believe you will discover that the problem is horrifying. You will also discover, however, that the President has put together a program that can realistically attack it. As he said just 3 months ago, we have developed a national strategy to expose, prosecute, and ultimately cripple organized crime in America.

In my testimony, I will, first, outline for you the changing nature and power of organized crime today. Second, I will tell you what we have already accomplished in the fight against organized crime. Third, I will explain how much progress has already been made in implementing the President's new initiative against organized crime. And last, I will detail those provisions of the President's program that still await congressional action and deserve your attention as you grapple with the problem of organized crime. In addition, Judge Webster will offer his special perspective on organized crime as Director of the FBI. He will also explain how the FBI fights organized crime through its use of informants, undercover operations, and court-ordered electronic surveillance. Indeed, those techniques give us our best look at organized crime today—and have enabled us to make major progress in combating it.

In recent years, crime has become increasingly organized and sophisticated. And organized crime has become especially lucrative because of the enormous market for illicit drugs.

Large-scale drug dealers must organize their operations. They obtain the illicit substances, or the rights to the substances, overseas. Within our borders, the drug dealers have set up elaborate enterprises for cutting the pure imported drugs and distributing them over wide geographical areas. And the organization does not

stop there. Drug money is laundered through legitimate businesses set up as fronts for drug dealers. The profits are then plowed back into the drug business, just like a legitimate major enterprise. Increasingly, some of the profits are actually invested in legitimate businesses—including real estate in Florida, restaurants in California, and other businesses across the Nation.

The popular notion that La Cosa Nostra—or traditional organized crime—stays out of drugs is simply not true. Many of the syndicate's families have developed elaborate drug networks. Virtually every one of them is involved in drugs in one way or another.

But the problem of organized crime today is by no means limited to its traditional form. In the past two decades, we have witnessed the emergence of new organized criminal enterprises dealing in drugs and the other rackets traditionally controlled by the syndicate. Outlaw motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, and other emerging groups have entered the drug business, often in competition with traditional organized crime.

Over the past decade, some 800 outlaw motorcycle gangs have developed around the country and in foreign countries. Four principal gangs, however, together nearly cover the country: The Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. These gangs are as highly structured as traditional organized crime families. They have accumulated substantial wealth through a wide range of organized criminal activities, but their primary source of revenue is drug trafficking.

The second nontraditional organized criminal group is the prison gangs, which were first established as a result of associations developed in the California State Prison system over the past 20 years. Today, they operate both inside and outside prison. They remain predominantly a west coast phenomenon, but there is evidence that they are spreading. Gangs of former inmates, like the motorcycle gangs, have a Big Four—La Nuestra Familia, the Mexican Mafia, the Aryan Brotherhood, and the Black Guerilla Family.

There are also other emerging groups. There are Southeast Asian groups, the violent Colombian groups known as the Cocaine Cowboys, and other drug cartels.

We are speaking of organizations which operate through the indiscriminate use of violence and threats of violence. The magnitude of this problem is seldom realized. In one American city in the past 40 years, over 300 murders are attributed to the mob. Another city has seen 16 killings in the past 2 years. These executions, heinous in themselves, often endanger the lives of innocent bystanders as well.

The massive involvement of organized crime with drugs is only part of the problem. Organized crime is also heavily involved in pornography, gambling, prostitution, extortion, loansharking, fraud, and weapons trafficking. Successful labor racketeering prosecutions during the last two decades have also disclosed significant infiltration of legitimate businesses and labor unions by racketeers.

And most serious of all, we see public officials at all levels being corrupted by drug money. We have reports of rural sheriffs and police officers accepting payments of \$50,000 or more just to look the other way while traffickers make a single landing at a make-

shift airport. The dollar amounts involved are so great that bribery threatens the very foundation of law and law enforcement.

During the last 2 years we have recognized the full dimensions of the threat posed by organized crime and its involvement with drugs. We had, however, been operating at a considerable disadvantage. During the 4 years preceding my tenure, the number of FBI and DEA agents actually declined by more than 900—about a 10-percent cut in our manpower.

This administration did, however, craft and implement a series of initiatives to use our limited resources better—and in a more coordinated way—to fight organized crime and drug trafficking.

We reorganized the Drug Enforcement Administration. And for the first time, just 1 year ago, the FBI was brought fully into the fight against the No. 1 crime problem to complement the excellent work of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Thereby, we gained not only the FBI's resources, but also its years of experience in fighting organized crime. In January 1982, the FBI had less than 100 significant drug investigations underway. This January, the FBI has 1,115—nearly 12 times as many—and about one-third are joint investigations with the DEA.

We have scored dramatic successes against organized crime. Working with the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Forces, the FBI, other Federal, State, and local investigative agencies, and our U.S. attorneys, we have indicted and convicted numerous high-level members of syndicate families—in some cities including the top structure of organized crime families regarded as untouchable just a few short years ago.

During fiscal year 1981, there were 515 organized crime convictions. During fiscal year 1982, there were 763—nearly a 50-percent increase. And annualizing the number of convictions during the first 3 months of this fiscal year shows further increases. In total, there have been about 1,400 Federal organized crime convictions in just the last 2¼ years.

In the last year alone the list of most significant organized crime convictions is striking.

The boss of the New Orleans family was convicted in two bribery-conspiracy cases, during January 1982 in his hometown and April 1982 in Los Angeles. He was sentenced to serve 17 years.

In July 1982 the leader of the Cleveland syndicate was convicted of Federal racketeering charges and sentenced to 17 years. The No. 3 man received a sentence of 12 years in a related prosecution involving the bribery of a Federal employee in an effort to obtain confidential information from FBI files. A self-professed drug king for the Cleveland mob pleaded guilty to Federal narcotics and racketeering charges several months ago and received a 30-year sentence. He has since cooperated against his associates in narcotics trafficking and related acts of murder and violence.

The boss of the Philadelphia mob was convicted on firearms charges and jailed in August 1982 pending appeal. In February 1981 the No. 2 and 3 leaders of the Philadelphia syndicate had also been indicted on racketeering and conspiracy charges, but were murdered before the court process could be completed. One captain of the organization was ultimately convicted in June 1982 in that same case and received a 10-year sentence.

In September 1982 the No. 3 man in the Chicago syndicate was convicted in a case involving control of a major labor union. He was sentenced to 20 years.

Just last December, in Chicago, the president of the Teamsters' Union was convicted of attempting to bribe a U.S. Senator. One of his codefendants was a leader in that city's organized crime group. Another defendant was murdered just last week.

Most recently—just 3 days ago—the underboss of the Cleveland family was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise plus 23 other narcotics violations. In addition, three other organized crime figures were convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy, murder, and an assortment of narcotics violations.

By any measure, these cases represent outstanding successes. I am proud of all the dedicated investigators and prosecutors who labored long and hard to bring them about—often at great risk to their own lives. We fully expect these successes to continue. They do not begin, however, to exhaust the list of improvements made in Federal law enforcement.

Just over a year ago, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime made 64 different recommendations to improve Federal law enforcement. We have already implemented 75 percent of those recommendations. Indeed, the Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees that are now pulling together Federal, State, and local law enforcement efforts and resources—and have highlighted the urgency of the drug problem—were created as a result of the task force recommendations.

By achieving the amendment of the posse comitatus law, we have been able to utilize the military's resources—and its tracking and intelligence capabilities—in the fight against drug traffickers. Through amendments to the Tax Reform Act, crucial information is more readily available to law enforcement—and more tax cases are possible against drug dealers and organized crime.

Although organized crime—and especially organized drug trafficking—is our No. 1 domestic law enforcement problem, its reach is international. Foreign crime cartels are penetrating the U.S. market. The profits of organized crime are laundered and utilized beyond our borders. Drug trafficking begins with opium and cocoa cultivation thousands of miles from our shores. Typically, the processing of opium into heroin or cocoa into cocaine also takes place abroad before the refined drugs are smuggled into the United States for further processing and sale.

It is therefore critical that we establish close working relationships at the highest levels with the governments of drug source and drug transit countries. It is essential that we reemphasize on a continuing basis the concerns of the United States about the international drug problem and the importance to us of an effective international response. It is also important that we learn firsthand about the problems that confront foreign governments in dealing with crop eradication, crop substitution, and processing laboratories within their jurisdictions. Last, we must insure that our resources and personnel are being appropriately utilized in cooperation with foreign governments. My trip last fall to drug source and

transit countries in Asia and Europe helped to further all of these necessary goals.

In spite of all our new domestic and international efforts, in spite of a new intergovernmental and interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against drugs and organized crime, the problem remains a gigantic one. The profits of organized crime are so huge that we have been outmanned and outgunned in the battle.

It was for that reason that the President, working with all the affected agencies, put together his new eight-point initiative to challenge directly both organized crime and drug trafficking in America. Many of the components of that program are in fact already underway.

The first component of the President's program creates 12 new regional task forces to mount a coordinated attack by all the involved Federal agencies against organized drug trafficking. Building upon the reports from our Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees, the experience gained in coordinating the diverse agencies involved in the South Florida Task Force, and the successful involvement of the FBI with DEA, the task force concept was adopted. As a result of speedy congressional action, the task forces are already becoming operational. Guidelines jointly developed by all of the agencies involved have been issued. The organization of the task forces is in place. Personnel are being assigned. The selection of the first two major cases for the headquarters city of each task force has been nearly completed.

As I have said, these task forces improve upon our experience with the South Florida Task Force, and they recognize the increasing organized crime involvement in drug abuse. They will operate with the flexibility necessary to pursue organized drug syndicates wherever they operate. Under my direction, they will work closely with State and local law enforcement officials. Following the south Florida example, they will coordinate and utilize all the law enforcement resources of the Federal Government, including the FBI, DEA, IRS, ATF, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Coast Guard. In addition, in some regions, Department of Defense tracking and pursuit capability will be made available.

These task forces will allow us to mount an intensive and coordinated campaign against international and domestic drug cartels and other organized criminal enterprises. Thus, refining the south Florida model, they will target and pursue the organized criminal enterprises dealing in drugs.

Several points emphasize the significance of these new task forces to the fight against organized crime and drugs. This is the single largest Federal effort against drug trafficking ever assembled. By creating these task forces—and bringing the FBI into the battle—we will nearly double the Federal drug enforcement resources of only a year ago. They represent the first major infusion of new agents into the FBI and DEA in about a decade. The new task forces will complement the work of the Department's existing organized crime strike forces—which do not generally become involved in prosecuting drug cases—and they will utilize more agents and prosecutors than the strike forces. Unlike prior Federal drug efforts that focused on the street level, our task forces will concen-

trate upon destroying the top levels of organized drug trafficking. The task forces are a major new undertaking—and they have the resources to match the significance of the undertaking. By the end of summer, 1,600 new law enforcement personnel will have been brought into this battle.

As important as these new task forces will prove—and as central as drug trafficking is to organized crime today—they do not represent the totality of the President's new program. That program is as broad as organized crime today—and the other components of the program address the breadth of organized crime's activities in addition to drug trafficking.

The administration has launched a project that will enlist the nation's Governors in bringing about needed State and local criminal justice reforms. For example, without effective enforcement of local and State statutes against various kinds of racketeering, such as illegal gambling, vital sources of revenue for organized crime will never be fully dried up. The Governors' project will bring to the attention of the States the importance of such initiatives as well as eliciting the best ideas from our Nation's Governors. That interchange has, in fact, already begun.

All the diverse agencies and law enforcement bureaus of the Federal Government are now being brought together for the comprehensive attack on drug trafficking and organized crime under a Cabinet-level committee chaired by the Attorney General and a working group chaired by the Associate Attorney General. We will review interagency and intergovernmental cooperation in the struggle against organized crime and, when necessary, bring problems in these areas to the President's attention for a speedy resolution.

We have also established, through the Departments of Justice and Treasury, a National Center for State and Local Law Enforcement Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Ga. It has now begun to assist and train local law enforcement agents and officials in combating other kinds of organized crime such as arson, bombing, bribery, obstruction of justice, and contract fraud, as well as drug smuggling. During the pilot phase of this program, over 450 State and local officers from as far away as Anchorage have already received training. The evaluations they completed were extremely enthusiastic in supporting this type of training as an exceptionally valuable tool in fighting crime.

To insure continued improvement in our effort, the President has asked me to submit a yearly report on the status of the fight against organized crime and organized drug cartels. This requirement, although simple and inexpensive, will establish a formal mechanism through which we can take a yearly inventory of our efforts in this area and report to the Congress and the American people on our progress.

In addition, once again with speedy congressional action, new funds are being allocated to prison and jail facilities so that the mistake of releasing dangerous criminals because of overcrowded facilities will not occur.

As you can see, the President's new program to combat organized crime is well under way just 90 days after he proposed it. Nevertheless, essential components of that program await further action.

As you focus upon the problem of organized crime in America, I am certain that you and the American public will recognize the importance of speedy action on these other components of the program. Indeed, the menace of organized crime and drug trafficking is so serious that no stone should be left unturned.

As you recognize and demonstrate by these hearings, one of the most important weapons in the fight against organized crime is public scrutiny. No law enforcement effort can succeed in this area without the full involvement of the public, which can occur only if the people recognize the true nature and scope of the threat organized crime poses to their own well-being.

Accordingly, the President supports the creation of a National Organized Crime Commission composed of 15 distinguished Americans from diverse backgrounds and professions with practical experience in criminal justice and combating organized crime. The purpose of this Commission, which would continue for up to 3 years, is to undertake a region-by-region analysis of organized crime's influence, to assess the data it gathers, and to hold public hearings on its findings.

It is also essential to the fight against modern and sophisticated organized crime that the Congress enact reforms that would restore the balance between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness. The President has proposed significant changes in the criminal laws that would serve that end. It is time that they were seriously considered—and enacted. Reforms in the Federal criminal statutes dealing with bail, sentencing, criminal forfeiture, the exclusionary rule, and labor racketeering are essential in the fight against organized crime. The resources and sophistication of organized crime today will take advantage of any weakness in the law—and weaknesses in each of these areas have been clearly identified through difficult and costly experience.

For bail reform, we must authorize the pretrial detention of those defendants shown to be dangerous to the community, and reverse the current presumption in favor of bail pending appeal. Of special importance in the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, the courts should be specifically authorized to inquire into the source of bail, and they should refuse to accept money or property that will not reasonably insure a defendant's appearance at trial.

For sentencing reform, we should abolish the Parole Commission and establish a system of uniform, determinate sentencing; authorize government appeal of sentences, and restructure the entire range of criminal fines and prison terms. The process of parole has been too often abused, and the organized criminal has too often been the abuser.

Criminal forfeitures must be made available in all major drug trafficking cases. We must strengthen procedures for freezing forfeitable assets pending judicial action, expand the classes of property subject to forfeiture, and facilitate the administrative forfeiture of conveyances and other property in uncontested cases. We must provide specific authority for the forfeiture of the proceeds of an enterprise acquired or maintained in violation of the RICO statute.

The exclusionary rule has substantially hampered our law enforcement efforts. The suppression of evidence has freed the clearly guilty, diminished the public respect for the law, distorted the truth-finding process, chilled legitimate police conduct, and put a tremendous strain on the courts. A recent National Institute of Justice report found that when felony drug arrests were not prosecuted in California, 30 percent of the time it was for search and seizure reasons. It also found that to a substantial degree, individuals released because of search and seizure problems were those with serious criminal records who appeared to continue to be involved in crime after their release. It is time to bar the use of the exclusionary rule when a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith, reasonably believing his action to have been legal.

Our ability to fight labor racketeering can be improved through legislation in at least two respects. First, disqualifying crimes which prohibit those convicted from holding positions in labor unions and employee benefit plans should be brought into conformity with one another and expanded. The positions to which disqualification applies should be expanded, disqualification should become effective immediately upon conviction, and a violation of these statutes should be made a felony. Second, we recommend the enactment of a labor bribery statute that would impose felony penalties in cases involving corruption in labor-management relations and that would uniformly prohibit corrupt payments in all industries now covered by the Taft-Hartley Act and the Railway Labor Act. Recent convictions involving labor-management corruption on the waterfronts and in other industries have demonstrated the continuing need for Federal legislation to deter bribery and address the problem of the infiltration of labor organizations by organized crime. Labor organizations exist to benefit their members—and should not be allowed to serve the criminal interests of corrupt individuals.

We are supporting other anticrime legislative initiatives with particular relevance to drug trafficking and organized crime, which I will simply list: increasing Federal penalties for drug trafficking; easing the extradition process; making murder for hire a Federal offense; amending the Bank Secrecy Act and wiretap laws, and providing mandatory imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the commission of a Federal felony.

These reforms would not diminish the liberties of law-abiding Americans. They would, however, diminish the opportunity for organized crime to take liberties with law-abiding Americans.

I want to thank this committee again for inviting me here today. But more importantly, I want to thank you for your interest in this subject. I believe that what we do about organized crime today will have a very substantial impact on the lives of all Americans tomorrow. The President's new program—and the improvements already effected within the Government—give me great hope for the future.

As the President has said: "Our commitment to this program is unshakable—we intend to do what is necessary to end the drug menace and cripple organized crime." We believe that the program announced by the President will have exactly that effect. It is a comprehensive and carefully crafted national strategy that will co-

ordinate and improve the efforts of all law enforcement agencies in fighting the menace of organized crime and drug trafficking.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General, and you may be assured that your recommendations will be taken under advisement by the committee and given careful consideration.

You made some very fine recommendations. We will be introducing bills to accomplish some of these things now, and the others will be considered very carefully.

NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS ASSIGNED

I have some questions now that I would like to propound to you. First, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice is responsible for the prosecution of organized crime-related offenses. Would you tell the committee how many attorneys are assigned to that section?

Attorney General SMITH. Approximately 150, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you tell us the approximate extent of the organized crime caseload in the Department of Justice, and how many cases does each prosecutor assigned to that section handle per year?

Attorney General SMITH. Each attorney would, on the average, be assigned or be working on about five or six cases a year. These cases, however, are very complicated cases. They involve large numbers of individuals and usually result in indictments of multi-defendants, large numbers of defendants.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. Did you say there were 150 attorneys in the division?

Attorney General SMITH. Approximately.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Attorney General SMITH. In that area, we have pending about 600 investigations or cases that would ultimately result in indictments.

The CHAIRMAN. Since organized crime prosecution has become an important focus of the President's war on crime, do you anticipate directing additional resources to this effort?

Attorney General SMITH. Very much so. As I indicated in my statement, the major new drug enforcement initiative that was proposed by the President and has been funded by Congress will add substantially greater resources to not only the drug enforcement effort, but the organized crime effort as well, because they are so closely connected.

The CHAIRMAN. This committee recognizes the importance of a vigorous campaign to prosecute organized crime members and their associates. Would you tell us if the Department of Justice has plans, besides the establishment of the drug task forces, that will attack organized crime in areas not related to drug activity?

Attorney General SMITH. Would you repeat that question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you tell us if the Department of Justice has plans, besides the establishment of the drug task forces, that will attack organized crime in areas not related to drug activity?

Attorney General SMITH. Yes, indeed. In all of the other areas, we are continuously reevaluating and improving our efforts in these other areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the concentration be directed toward any particular area, or just in general?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, of course, our major effort at the present time is directed at our No. 1 crime problem which is drug trafficking in combination with organized crime.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that would cover labor racketeering and other forms of organized crime?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, to the extent that those resources are utilized for this purpose, of course, they also tend to free up other resources that can be used in areas such as labor racketeering and the other areas that I have mentioned in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been a number of figures quoted in various publications throughout the country, as well as by Government agencies, indicating the approximate dollar value that the LCN—that is, the La Cosa Nostra—derives from its illegal activities. Can you tell the committee with any certainty the total dollar amount that actually goes into the coffers of organized crime?

Attorney General SMITH. We cannot do that, Mr. Chairman, because any figure would be pure speculation. There is just absolutely no way to know or to even speculate with any degree of accuracy what those figures would be. Obviously, they are substantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us the total value of all assets seized by the Department of Justice in the past 2 years as a result of organized crime prosecutions?

Attorney General SMITH. That figure would be approximately \$400 million. However, it is not possible to break that down—well, I should not say it is not possible—I do not have the figure broken down insofar as it would be specifically related to organized crime. This is the total figure from all sources. I assume that we could obtain the figure insofar as it related specifically to organized crime, and if you would like that, we can certainly—

The CHAIRMAN. You can supply that for the record, if it is more convenient.

Attorney General SMITH. We could supply that for the record, if it is broken down that way. I am not sure that it is.¹

The CHAIRMAN. In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Included in that act is a section known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly known as RICO. This is certainly an important tool in prosecuting organized crime figures in groups.

Does the Department of Justice fully utilize the civil forfeiture provision of that statute, and is the Civil Division of the Department involved in this process?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, the civil forfeiture provision is primarily a private action. In other words, it is not primarily utilized by Government although, under that act, we do what we can to monitor cases, and we would have the authority, of course, to intervene in civil forfeiture proceedings. At the present time, or up to the present time, we have not yet done so. We are primarily con-

¹ Not available at press time.

cerned, of course, with criminal forfeiture, rather than civil forfeiture.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, would it be advisable to use the Civil Division in this area?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, to the extent that that could be effective, we would do so now. However, our primary avenue is criminal forfeiture, and we are recommending actually, as I indicated in my statement, that the criminal forfeiture provisions be expanded to permit additional resources and different types of resources to be subject to criminal forfeiture, and we hope that the Congress will see fit to enact those provisions. Those would be particularly helpful.

RICO STATUTE

The CHAIRMAN. Recently, the Department of Justice conducted a training seminar in Washington dealing with the civil forfeiture provisions of the RICO statute. Does the Department have any plans to continue training additional attorneys in the area of civil forfeiture so that this very important tool in the war on organized crime can be more effectively utilized?

Attorney General SMITH. Yes, although that program, of course, involved forfeitures of all kinds, criminal as well as civil.

CRIME FAMILY MEMBERS INDICTED

The CHAIRMAN. In recent months, there have been several significant prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice against important individuals in organized crime. An example of this is the multiple prosecutions of members of the Bonanno family in New York City. In another case, the majority of the organized crime family members in Milwaukee were indicted. The head of the organized crime family in New Orleans was investigated and successfully prosecuted. What impact will the successful prosecution of these individuals have on the ability of the LCN to continue its illegal activities?

Attorney General SMITH. A substantial effect in each case. It is akin to removing the chief executive officer of any enterprise. These are, in effect, highly disciplined, well-run organizations; I suppose you could put it that way. And whenever you eliminate a principal cog in that operation, you of course to that degree damage its effectiveness.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you found that successors were named to take over the activities of the heads of those organizations?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, in due course, of course, that happens. But that requires, in effect, breaking in new people and all of the problems that are involved with succession in any organization.

There is another advantage, of course, to getting at the highest levels of organized crime, and that is, as I indicated in my statement, that it breaks the myth that these people are untouchable and that they cannot be caught. They have been caught, and I enumerated, in addition to the ones that you have mentioned, a large number of figures in this category who have been indicted and convicted in the last couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. In the past, there has been some criticism directed toward the Department of Justice and also the Federal Bureau of Investigation, concerning the use of undercover agents, informants, and electronic surveillance. Unquestionably, these methods are essential in the investigation of organized crime cases, and any reduction in their use would greatly hamper the Department's effectiveness. Would you give me your thoughts on this matter?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, we just disagree with any such criticism. We think that these tools are absolutely essential to our law enforcement efforts. And I think it is safe to say that if those tools were not available, we would not have been able to do very much in achieving the indictments and the convictions that I have enumerated, along with a host of others.

These are essential law enforcement procedures, and we think that our law enforcement efforts would be severely crippled if we were not able to continue to utilize them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that they should be used to a greater extent than they are now?

Attorney General SMITH. We think they should be used to whatever extent is necessary under the circumstances.

LCN MEMBERS PROSECUTED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRADE

The CHAIRMAN. What evidence does the Department of Justice have to support the statement that the La Cosa Nostra is involved in drug trafficking, and can you cite specific cases where LCN members have been prosecuted as participants in the illicit drug trade?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, members have been indicted and convicted, at least within the last 20 years and probably before. I suppose the most famous case was Genovese in 1976-77—I guess that was back in the sixties, or sixties to seventies. He was the kingpin, and he was indicted and convicted for his activities with respect to drug trafficking. And of course, there have been a host of others since that time.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know, there was a popular myth that they did not engage in drug traffic.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, that myth is just not so.

The CHAIRMAN. So this has been dispelled by the actions taken.

Senator BIDEN. That was only Marlon Brando that did not get involved.

Attorney General SMITH. I cannot remember what family he belonged to.

Senator BIDEN. The Godfather.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell the committee how the determination was made to locate the proposed drug task forces in the areas which have been identified as core cities?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, the purpose of setting up those taskforces was to provide a degree of flexibility so that the resources would go where the problem was. And starting with our local Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees, together with the U.S. attorneys and the FBI and other investigative agencies, determinations were made as to where the problem was most severe and where the task forces should be concentrated, and it

was as a result of that effort and development of information and background that the particular site selections were made of the core cities.

The CHAIRMAN. Will transfers of experienced personnel to the task forces have an adverse impact on other activities of the Department?

Attorney General SMITH. These are new resources. We are adding approximately 1,600 additional prosecutors and additional investigators and support people, so that there should be—this is an added effort. It is not a transferred effort. Of course, we will have the usual start-up, organizational problems, but that should be minimal and of course is necessary to the effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, for the record, I would like to ask you this. Will the drug task forces be restricted to prosecuting only cases where drugs are the primary issue, or will the task forces have the authority to prosecute other violations that are discovered during the course of their investigation, even though those crimes do not directly involve drugs?

Attorney General SMITH. The primary thrust of these task forces, Mr. Chairman, is drug trafficking, and that will be the centerpiece of every case. Now, to the degree that investigations involved there turn up other violations, they presumably would be handled outside the task forces, but this would be a matter within the discretion of the U.S. attorney and the others investigating in this effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Such cases would be referred to the strike force or the U.S. attorneys.

Attorney General SMITH. If it is pure organized crime, then the strike forces, of course, would be the logical place.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The CHAIRMAN. Are additional changes needed in the Posse Comitatus Act to allow more active participation by the military in combatting the illegal drug trade?

Attorney General SMITH. We are very pleased with the way the act, as changed, is operating right now. We have our guideline arrangements with the Department of Defense, and we are very pleased with the cooperation that is existing there and the intelligence and the resources that we are able to utilize through that arrangement.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you found the Department of Defense cooperative, and has this given you extensive support in this program?

Attorney General SMITH. Very much so. We have no basis for any complaints in that respect.

APPROXIMATELY 800 OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement, I believe you mentioned that there are approximately 800 outlaw motorcycle gangs in the United States and foreign countries. You specifically identify the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. Will you tell the committee to what extent these gangs are involved in the trafficking and manufacturing of illicit drugs?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I think it is accurate to say that that is their principal activity, and has been, and to every indication, will continue to be.

MOTORCYCLE GANGS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, I was surprised to learn that in my own State, there are so many motorcycle gangs operating. Information has been furnished to me to show that, for instance, the following gangs are operating in my State, a small State: The Confederates, in Anderson, S.C.; the Custom Riders, Greenville, S.C.; Dixie Wheels, Central, S.C.; Ghost Riders, Myrtle Beach, S.C.; Hells Angels, Charleston, S.C.; Raiders, Rock Hill, S.C.; Rolling Thunder, Oconee, S.C.; Sundowners, Columbia, S.C.; Thunder Gods, Charleston, S.C.; Iron Barons—we understand they are maybe moving from Kentucky down that way—Pagans, in Aiken, where I happen to live. I really had not heard of all those motorcycle gangs down that way. Maybe I will have to be more careful in the future.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, there are a large number of them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we may have to hold some hearings and look into these motorcycle gangs in various parts of the country, including my own State.

Do you think that would be helpful?

Attorney General SMITH. I think whatever can be done in that respect is bound to be helpful.

Senator BIDEN. The chairman just admitted privately he used to ride a motorcycle, but he was not a member of a gang. [Laughter.]

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, we found the best way to handle motorcycle gangs in Vermont. It is called 30 degrees below zero. Somehow, the thrill of riding on a motorcycle at 50 miles an hour when it is 30 degrees below zero quickly diminishes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does the Department of Justice have any information suggesting an alliance between LCN members in the United States and Canadian LCN figures, and if so, what is the extent of this involvement?

Attorney General SMITH. The LCN in Canada is essentially based in Montreal, and we do have indications that there are connections between them.

The CHAIRMAN. That indicates there are connections?

Attorney General SMITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Into the New York families?

Attorney General SMITH. Perhaps Director Webster could better answer that.

Mr. WEBSTER. Primarily Buffalo.

Attorney General SMITH. Primarily Buffalo.

The CHAIRMAN. Primarily in the New York area. Does this relationship extend to other countries, and if so, can you identify those countries?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, of course, the principal connection is with Sicily, Italy, where so much of the heroin, particularly heroin from Southwest Asia, is processed and then shipped particularly to the Northeast part of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. We have thought about looking into that connection in Italy, and we have been assured that we can get cooperation from the Italian officials.

Attorney General SMITH. Yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, I spoke with the Prime Minister of Italy when he was here sometime back, and he indicated they would be pleased to cooperate with us.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I was in Rome a couple of months ago in connection with drugs, among other things, and I visited extensively with the Italian officials there, and they are extremely cooperative, very willing to help in this effort, and have been very successful themselves in dealing with this problem along with others, such as terrorism.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hatch has requested me to ask a few questions here, and I will proceed with those now.

The Attorney General's Task Force on Organized Crime found that criminals use FOIA to obtain information which they intend to use to evade criminal investigation or retaliate against informants. Is this finding applicable to organized crime, as well?

Attorney General SMITH. The answer to that question is yes. We have, of course, proposed changes in the Freedom of Information Act which we think are necessary, very much so, in terms of this kind of activity, and there were amendments made in that act that passed out of this committee, and we would certainly urge that the committee take another look and consider those changes in addition to those that were not included in that amendment but which we have proposed. There is no doubt about the fact that the Freedom of Information Act is a problem in this area.

When I was in Tokyo on this subject, talking to Japanese officials with respect to exchanging information with respect to Japanese organized crime groups, one of the stumbling blocks in connection with their giving us information on this subject was their concern over our Freedom of Information Act as it is now being applied.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The CHAIRMAN. Criminals often obtain confidential information through the Freedom of Information Act request by piecing together bits of information in the disclosed records with their own knowledge to reveal a likely informant or the status of an investigation. For instance, if they can learn the date that the FBI learned of a plan from an informant, they can figure out who the informant is, because they know when different individuals in the organization learned of the plan. This is the so-called mosaic effect whereby a single piece of information, like a date, can fit together with other information to form a complete picture. Would this mosaic effect be even greater with organized crime, which has an institutional memory, sophisticated recordkeeping, and in short, access to information processing capabilities?

Attorney General SMITH. My answer to that would be yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill, S. 1730, which protected any law enforcement records concerning an organized crime investigation for up to 8 years after

its creation from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Would this provide enough protection from Freedom of Information Act abuse by organized crime?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, it would certainly help, and we would certainly support any such change, in addition to others.

The CHAIRMAN. As I stated, we passed that bill, I believe, through the Senate, but it did not get through the House.

Attorney General SMITH. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. A 1982 Drug Enforcement Administration study revealed that 14 percent of DEA's investigations are aborted, significantly compromised, or reduced in scope due to Freedom of Information Act investigations. Does this study of 400 random investigations indicate a trend in organized crime to use the Freedom of Information Act even more extensively than in the past?

Attorney General SMITH. I am not familiar with that 14 percent figure, but I can certainly tell you that the Freedom of Information Act is used extensively in connection with drug enforcement efforts. If my memory serves me correctly, some 40 percent of the FOIA requests of DEA come from prisons or equivalent facilities, and an additional 20 percent, if my recollection is correct, come from those who are known to be part of the criminal community. That is a total of 60 percent of the requests under FOIA to the Drug Enforcement Administration. That certainly speaks to who is utilizing that act to accomplish the purposes that are indicated by that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you observed a decrease in the amount and quality of informant cooperation due to fear that confidentiality may be jeopardized by the Freedom of Information Act?

Attorney General SMITH. Perhaps Director Webster can answer that question better than I, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, we have, Mr. Chairman, and we find a disturbing tendency among some informants to shuffle the facts around so they are not so readily identifiable with the particular incident that they are telling us about. So we are not getting as straight information as we would like to have.

INFORMANTS RELUCTANT

The CHAIRMAN. So you are hampered in that respect because informants are reluctant to give you the full information you need?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And that further indicates a need for changes in the Freedom of Information Act; is that the way you see it?

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The GAO documented such an effect in their 1978 study. Is that effect growing with time?

Attorney General SMITH. I am not sure I understand that question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been a decrease in informants since then, or do you have any figures on that?

Mr. WEBSTER. We have made a concerted effort to increase the number of informants in this area against the resistance that we have encountered as a result of some of the things the chairman has been talking about, so that I cannot report for you that the

number of informants is down. It is increasing slowly as a result of a concerted effort on our part to overcome this, but we do not know the quality and quantity of the information we are losing because of the act.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the GAO document indicated that this was detrimental and that law enforcement is hampered by the situation as it exists now and that such a situation is increasing.

Mr. WEBSTER. I believe that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What more can Congress do to protect informants and investigations from being compromised by a Freedom of Information Act disclosure?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I think Congress can do that by adopting the amendments that we have proposed be made in the Freedom of Information Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will study those. I am wondering if either one of you have had a chance to study the compromise that was worked on by the distinguished Senator from Vermont and the distinguished Senator from Utah.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, those are changes that would be very, very welcome. We do not think they went far enough, but—

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think they go far enough?

Attorney General SMITH. We do not think they went far enough, but nevertheless, they were very beneficial changes, and ones that we would certainly support.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind furnishing to the committee any further suggestions on that point?

Attorney General SMITH. Will do.

Senator LEAHY. If the chairman would just yield a moment, I appreciate the comments of the Attorney General. Senator Hatch and I did work, as you know, very hard, with your cooperation and Senator Biden's cooperation, on getting that package together and on getting it out of our committee, as I recall, unanimously, and then getting it through the Senate. When we speak of it as being an improvement but not going far enough, I would simply remind the Attorney General that it is like the old Rogers and Hammerstein thing, "We have gone about as far as you can go," and there, we had gone as far as you can go, and I think the fact that we got it through the Senate but it did not go through the House should be at least a warning signal that if we are going to try again this year—and I do think there are some improvements that should be made, especially in the law enforcement areas and the Freedom of Information Act—that we not try to push too far, because then we destroy the coalition that got it through the Senate and almost make it impossible to go anywhere in the House. It may well be that the "half a loaf" syndrome may be a good one to be considered here.

I would point out, as I have privately to Judge Webster, that I have every intention of trying again to help, especially in these things about law enforcement. I should point out, it went through the committee, not through the Senate, but it went through the committee with some very good bipartisan support, and we will try again, but we are going to have to be very careful just how far we can push it.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, we will be very grateful for whatever we can obtain in that respect. However, we will keep pushing. Senator LEAHY. Won't we all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Attorney General, I may have some other questions to propound to you, if you could answer them for the record later. I do not want to take anymore time now.

I want to now turn to our distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I have to leave to go and open the Senate before he finishes, you understand I will come back as soon as I can.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should tell the Senator from Pennsylvania and the Senator from Vermont, after I finish my questions, I have questions from Senators Kennedy, Byrd, Metzenbaum. [Laughter.]

General, let me begin by saying that although I have been on occasion characterized—and in fact justifiably characterized—as a strident critic, I do not totally disagree with you. Your point of view on dealing with and focusing on the drug problem is one of the most welcomed things that has occurred in that area in the 10 years I have been in the Senate, and I have told you that, and I want to say that publicly. I do not doubt your intentions. I do not doubt the President's intentions. But I have doubts about the willingness to take what is a very difficult decision of either serving the bureaucratic framework or providing resources to do what I have no doubt you have every intention of doing.

I would point out one other thing. You got a lot of flack for going out of the country. I compliment you for going out of the country. You should have gone out of the country. You should do it again—because no matter how good Director Webster is and all his agents, no matter how good and how much you increase the number of Customs and DEA agents and so on, and all the potential help that is available in this country, unless we deal with the source, we are not going to get a handle on this problem. And this source, in almost all instances, is outside of this country.

So, for the purposes of my questioning, which obviously, I will not ask all my questions, because my colleagues would never get a chance to ask theirs—but what I would like to do is ask you about our base of knowledge; how much do we really know? There is a good deal of speculation—I believe some of it is speculation—about the detail of knowledge, the depth of the knowledge we have about organized crime and the actual link to drugs. There is no doubt that they are linked. But there is some doubt in my mind about just how much we know. And second, I would like then to go from there and discuss a little bit about the international aspects of this problem that you are very familiar with, and then move, if I have time, to my concerns about coordination or lack thereof, and lastly, availability of resources, if that is appropriate.

MAFIA-CONTROLLED HEROIN

My first question is how much of the current U.S. heroin trade is actually Mafia-controlled? According to your best information, how

do Mafia traffickers in the United States relate to the Sicilian organized crime drug traffickers? Are they, for heroin purposes, virtually fully integrated transatlantic organizations, or do the U.S. Mafia dealers have to arrange and negotiate heroin transactions with Italian organized crime suppliers?

I sit on the Intelligence Committee, as you know. My fellow on the Intelligence Committee has travelled throughout the world now with DEA and CIA, and we have been doing a lot of work, and I am a little uncertain as to where we stand there. I mean, how integrated are the Sicilian based organized crime families with American based, and how much of the heroin traffic do we believe emanates from that connection?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I think perhaps in terms of the specifics, Director Webster would be in a better position than I to answer that question. I can certainly say that our information is to the effect that whereas the Mafia in the past essentially bought their heroin here and distributed it, and was responsible for that part of it, now it has expanded into this supply from overseas and also the processing overseas. Exactly what the relationship is between Sicily and the domestic Mafia, perhaps Director Webster would know better.

Certainly, with the demise of the French Connection, the whole move has been to Sicily and the organizations that operate there. They, of course, process heroin from opium and opium derivatives that come primarily from Southwest Asia, the so-called Golden Crescent—Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. About perhaps—well, I have heard anywhere from 50 percent to 80 percent—of what passes through Sicily ends up in primarily the Northeastern part of the United States.

As far as the West is concerned, most of the heroin that is supplied to that area comes from Mexico—

Senator BIDEN. "The West" meaning the Western United States?

Attorney General SMITH. The Western United States.

The so-called Golden Triangle, which is Southeastern Asia—Burma, Thailand and Laos—supplies, according to most recent estimates, about 15 percent of the total amount of heroin used in the United States. That is a little outside your question, which deals with—

Senator BIDEN. No; it is relevant. And maybe, to again try to establish the base of knowledge to continue these hearings, Director Webster, if you could tell us, do we have a good fix on the operational relationship between organized crime families in Sicily and their counterparts in the United States; do we know how the structure functions?

Mr. WEBSTER. Senator, I think that we have an increasingly accurate fix, and one on which we have been concentrating heavily over the last couple of years. We have actually increased our representation in Rome, with the support of the Italian Government and the approval of the Ambassador, in order to increase that ongoing understanding. Recent investigations have been helpful to us. In November, I think you will recall a DEA investigation that came down and identified the players from three different LCN families in the New York area who were heavily involved in perhaps 15 percent of the heroin coming into the city of New York.

Clearly, that is the major route for heroin trafficking, and we are seeing LCN players identified in the effort. The Sailfish investigation, which was joint FBI and DEA, which followed just a few weeks after the earlier takedown, was further indication of that type of participation.

Now, I would not want to try to quantify it for you now or to outline the progress, because it has been hard fought to get where we are, and I would not want to be signalling things that at the present time are still in the investigative stage. But we are getting an increasingly better fix, and we are working on both sides of the ocean to do it.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I would respectfully request—and I understand your reluctance to give more detail now—what I would like to know, and if it cannot be done through this committee, I would invite you to do it through the Intelligence Committee—to give us the organizational chart and relationship as you believe it exists. My concern is that we do not know enough—and I am not saying you should know more, but I think it is very important that we know.

Mr. WEBSTER. I agree with you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator would yield just a moment, I am going to have to leave now to go and open the Senate. If you would just continue with your questions of the Attorney General, and we will have Judge Webster for questions right after him. The Attorney General is going to have to leave, I believe, at 12:15, so if we can concentrate on him, and if you do not finish before that, we will ask him to come back, but I hope we can finish with him. Excuse me.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. My colleagues, General, have questions for you as I do, and realistically, I do not see how we are possibly going to be able to get them done in the next 20 minutes. And although I know you have many things to do, and the chairman is reluctant to ask you to come back at another time, I suspect that is going to be unavoidable, if you are willing. But let me move on as rapidly as I can, so at least everybody gets a couple questions for the Attorney General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HELP

General, many organized crime groups have international origins and scope, such as the traditional Mafia and the Colombian drug traffickers. My question, General, is as head of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, you have been represented as the lead officer in the President's Cabinet on drug questions. What proposals do you have for the Department of State to help reach the overseas dimension of the organized crime trafficking problem?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, as you know, Don deCarlo is the Assistant Secretary for Narcotics Enforcement, and we have worked very closely with him—and he actually accompanied me on the recent trip that we took to visit these various source and transit countries. He has been very effective in this area, and he has worked very closely with us. We have worked together, really, in connection with developing and maintaining relationships with each of the countries that are involved with drugs.

Senator BIDEN. In the interest of time—and I am reluctant to short circuit your answer, but I will try to be more specific—I have no doubt the Director coordinates with you, just as with Falco, who I thought was equally as good and cooperated with the former Attorney General. The problem is I'm not sure they get to talk to the Secretary of State as much as they get to talk to you, in my humble opinion, and I suspect that they may very well tell you that, also. My concern is how do you as the coordinator tell deCarlo how you think they should go and direct it—how do you sit down, and have you sat down, with the Secretary of State and said, "Mr. Secretary, I need the following four things: I need"—blank, blank, blank, blank. Have you had an opportunity at any time in your tenure to sit with this Secretary of State or the last Secretary of State, and tell him what you believe State must be doing and how they must be changing their routine in order to help you in the effort to make a dent in drug trafficking? Have you had that occasion?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, actually, Senator Biden, that has not been necessary, because in those areas where we needed things done, we have been able to do it through the Assistant Secretary of State. I do know, for example—and to answer your question specifically, I have met with the Secretary of State and did so prior to undertaking this trip, and we discussed the various aspects of the trip, and he was just 100 percent cooperative with respect to it, and—

Senator BIDEN. Are there any specific proposals that the State Department, or readjustment by the State Department, that should be taking place, in your view? For example, deCarlo's budget is still under \$40 million, and as you accurately pointed out in a previous hearing, every \$1 spent abroad is worth \$10 spent here. Have you been able to encourage—or, do you think it is necessary to encourage—the State Department to increase deCarlo's scope; do you think that it is necessary to have the Secretary of State putting the arm on our allies to deal with offshore banking institutions, because they, in fact, are indirectly or directly controlled? And are there treaties or proposals that you have suggested that State should put on the front burner in order to help you and aid you in any way—are crop substitution proposals going to come from you?

Attorney General SMITH. I was going to say, there is a great deal that goes on in this area that just is not well-known—and some of it should not be. But we have worked very closely with the Department of State, in connection with what you just mentioned, crop substitution. We have an effort under way to cause other countries outside the United States, and the particular source countries, to contribute resources to undertake and support programs of crop substitution and crop eradication. And we have been really quite successful in a number of areas in accomplishing that.

We have worked very closely with them in the various problems that are involved. I would say—and this digresses a little bit—but one of the virtues of knowing what goes on in source and transit countries is to understand what their problems are, what they have to face in order to make the decisions that we would like to have them make, because if we understand what those problems are, we can better utilize our resources and people there to accomplish

that. Well, now, those relationships involve diplomatic relationships as well as DEA relationships, and it can only work effectively if everybody is working together, trying to accomplish the common goal, and I will certainly say that I have found nothing but cooperation on the part of the Department of State in doing that, and this trip was a very good example of the need for that, and the trip could not have been as successful as it was had we not had that kind of working together and cooperation.

Senator BIDEN. Well, in follow-on questions, I will explore—

Attorney General SMITH. I would like to say this, if I may.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Attorney General SMITH. The Department of State has a host of concerns and matters that it has to be involved with, with respect to each country, obviously, by definition. I think that we can play a role here by providing a focused attention on the drug problem, which is one of the purposes of the trip. In other words, being in the law enforcement end of things as distinguished from the diplomatic end, we can bring an emphasis and a focus, which perhaps could not be as effectively done by somebody who has an agenda which is far broader than the one that we have. But our relationships with foreign countries are, of course, primarily the responsibility of the Department of State, and therefore, it is very important that we work with them and that we have that kind of cooperation. And we have had it, and I really have no basis for any complaint or concern—

Senator BIDEN. You are satisfied with their recommendation for dollars for crop substitution in Pakistan, for example?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, of course, we would all like more resources.

HEROIN FROM ASIA

Senator BIDEN. Well, you have estimated, and everyone seems to estimate, that close to 60 percent of all the heroin that ends up in this country comes via Pakistan, Southwest Asia, as you pointed out. And also further, you are fully aware that unless excellent intelligence data is available to law enforcement agents in this country about what is happening in that region, that Director Webster's folks will be operating in the dark—if not total darkness, at least, in the shade. And you again are the lead officer, and I would like to know what steps have you taken or are you going to be recommending. I just was asked could I leave 5 or 10 minutes for everyone else, and I will stop with this question, and then I will yield until 12:15 to each of my colleagues; they can split the rest. I would like the record to note how generous I am.

But all kidding aside, what steps have you taken to direct the intelligence agencies and the Department of State to support the effort in this country? Are you able to direct that? Are you able to say, "CIA, I am not getting enough data from you"; "DEA, I want more information. It is not hard. My folks are having trouble here." Have you spoken to Casey about that—because your intelligence information is not good, period.

Attorney General SMITH. Yes; indeed, I have talked to Director Casey about it. I am not in a position to get into any detail with

respect to this, other than to say that our efforts around the world are coordinated. I am sure there are areas where there could be improvement, but nevertheless in terms—I think I could say generally—and this is a large statement, in a way—in terms of source countries and perhaps even transit countries, the problem is not so much lack of intelligence or lack of knowing what is going on. The essential problem is doing something about what we already know. That is certainly not as true in connection with the distribution network and some of the processing activities, although in terms of source countries, we know pretty well what is going on there. The problem is doing something about it.

But in terms of relationships with the intelligence community, those relationships are ongoing and certainly satisfactory.

Senator BIDEN. My last question. Let me go back to the example of crop eradication. If I understand how this coordination works, in Burma, in Southeast Asia where there is a whole lot of heroin, it looks like there is going to be an upsurge. Everyone is predicting that we had better start looking to the west coast now, not just for Mexican, but for Japanese, Chinese-controlled organized crime units that are, in fact, operating with product out of Southeast Asia. For example, the Burmese have requested money for eradication that has been held up by disagreements and a little bit of inertia within all administrations, and this one in particular. OMB does not want to spend more money. But the process, I am still a little confused. Do you sit down, since you are the lead officer—and obviously, it is not, nor should it be, the primary goal of the Secretary of State to figure how much is needed—do you sit down, and do you make an independent judgment as to how much money would be usefully spent in crop eradication, and then make a specific recommendation to either deCarlo or the Secretary of State, or does Mr. deCarlo at State make a recommendation, pass it on to you, and pass it on to the Secretary of State, to be determined by the Secretary of State how much he will request from OMB for his total operations? I mean, how does that mechanically work?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, when it comes to overall budget time, we do not deal in those specifics.

Senator BIDEN. You do deal in those specifics in terms of domestic operations; I mean, you do make specific recommendations in the war on drugs about how many U.S. attorneys you need, how many task forces you need. I mean, your people sit down and say, "This is specifically what we recommend, Mr. President."

I am curious about it. If we all acknowledge the international side is equally important, why isn't the leading officer, if not having the authority, at least in the position to say and give guidance and counsel to the Secretary of State and say, "Mr. Secretary, it is your own shop, but I can tell you, our own experts on drug matters tell us that if crop substitution occurred and cut down the flow of opium or poppy from Burma, in turn, it would cut down x amount of the heroin and in turn would help us in the following ways, and therefore, we respectfully suggest that what we need in terms of crop eradication is x million dollars." Why is it that the Attorney General—and I do not mean you, General, but I mean the Office of the Attorney General—why is it that we are so reluctant to do that—or, is there good reason not to do that?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, we may not be saying the same thing. I am saying that in our budget process, we would not be making—"we" being the Secretary of State, myself, and so on—would not be making determinations as to how much money should be spent for crop substitution, because if you take a country like Pakistan, a certain amount of flexibility is necessary in determining what money is going to be spent for crop substitution and what is going to be spent for other activities—crop eradication, or even working on the location and construction of processing laboratories—

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Attorney General SMITH [continuing]. Which, in terms of the overall picture, is more important than even crop substitution.

Senator BIDEN. Let us take that as an example, then. Who does make that specific recommendation?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, that decision would be made at certainly a lower level and it should be. It should be made by those people who are best able to exercise that kind of discretion, and it is the result, I am sure, of input from all of the necessary sources.

Senator BIDEN. But is that decision made by someone in State, or is that decision made by someone in the FBI, or is that decision made by someone in DEA, or someone in Justice? I am not trying to be picky with you, but it seems to me—

Attorney General SMITH. I think I would have to answer that by saying that I cannot answer the question without talking to the people who make those decisions and at what level. But it is very important that discretion exist in making those determinations, because you could make a determination this month that so much should go into crop substitution, and factors would change that next month.

Senator BIDEN. I agree. Just like in terms of crime in the streets in America, you make a determination that we are going to have "X" number of agents in Florida and "Y" number of agents in Chicago, and events change, and you have to adjust as the year goes on, like you did in November. But the point I would like to make, and I will pursue it when you come back—I now yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania—is that that specific decision as to whether or not you are going to attack laboratories or crops and how much money you are going to use to do that in Burma or Pakistan or Sicily or anyplace else in the world, is, I would respectfully suggest, equally and probably more important than whether or not you are going to suggest to Judge Webster that he get 20 or 50 or no more agents in the streets. You make that judgment. I believe the same person should be making at least the recommendation, so we have an overall, single drug plan in America as to how we are going to attack it.

I apologize, and I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Biden.

Mr. Attorney General, I hope you will have an opportunity to come back, because there are a tremendous number of questions. I have been here since 10 a.m. listening to your testimony, and will limit my questions to just a few minutes, to leave some time for Senator Leahy, and recognizing that you want to depart at 12:15.

NEW AGENTS

How many new agents will this \$130 million a year buy, Mr. Attorney General?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, the figure would be about 1,600 agents and prosecutors and some support personnel. Although there will not be such a thing as an "average task force," when they are fully manned, we would anticipate that there would be, perhaps, 100 new investigators, plus 20 prosecutors. Now, as I say, these are illusory to some extent, but that would give you some idea, plus support personnel.

Senator SPECTER. Now, are you saying 1,600 total?

Attorney General SMITH. 1,600 total, plus or minus.

Senator SPECTER. So there would be 100 investigators and 20 attorneys in each one of the 12 task forces, is that generally accurate?

Attorney General SMITH. On average, on average, yes.

Senator SPECTER. And are those investigators going to be in the FBI, or DEA, or where?

Attorney General SMITH. They are going to be FBI and DEA, and there will be some from Customs and perhaps some from IRS.

Senator SPECTER. Well, will they be concentrated under your control in the Department of Justice?

Attorney General SMITH. In effect.

Senator SPECTER. I would be interested to know where they are going to be because, as Senator Biden has pointed out, my sense is that they ought to be as much under one control as possible.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, each task force will have its coordinator, and that coordinator will have the responsibility for the operation of that task force in the same sense that the South Florida task force operated. It would be an entity under a coordinator.

Senator SPECTER. When your Deputy, Mr. Schmuts, provided a statement on December 9, he pointed out in an overview the various agencies that deal with the problem—Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, under the Treasury Department; Coast Guard, under the Department of Transportation—wouldn't it be useful if you, as the central officer responsible for drug enforcement, had the ability to make assignments and direction of that kind of personnel who are attacking the drug problem?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, actually, we are well along now toward setting up these 12 task forces. They are being done, patterned, roughly after the South Florida Task Force, but not exactly, because the situation is different, and so on. But the organization is not dissimilar. We expect that those task forces will operate every bit as efficiently as the South Florida Task Force did under the kind of organization that is being set up.

Senator SPECTER. Well, will you be the boss? Will the Vice President be the boss? Who is going to be the head of the task forces?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, it is primarily my responsibility, and it will be my responsibility with respect to setting these organizations up and how they operate. Each of the people who are involved, of course, will still—the Treasury people, the Customs people—will be Treasury people. They will not be Department of

Justice people. But we do not think that is significant, because the cooperative efforts that have existed so far, as illustrated by the actual operation of the South Florida Task Force, is such that we see no problems with it.

Senator SPECTER. When we discussed the issue of a Drug Coordinator in the meeting that we had with the President back on January 7, there was an analogy made to the Director of Central Intelligence, and I had hoped to discuss with you in some detail—and perhaps we can on your return—Executive Order 12-333 which was promulgated by the President on December 8, 1981. In that Executive order, there are extensive provisions about the Director of Central Intelligence and his authority to establish priorities and objectives and to levy tasks of the other departments—State, Department of Defense. What would be wrong with structuring a Drug Coordinator, perhaps the Attorney General himself, to exercise similar authority in the drug field?

Attorney General SMITH. We just do not think it is necessary. We think that—and I might say, that proposal that has been discussed here, the so-called drug czar proposal, is something that involves and would involve a significant restructuring of the executive branch, and there were never any hearings conducted on it. We never had any opportunity to make our views known on that. The first we learned about it was when it came out of conference, and so we have not had the occasion to discuss the pluses and minuses and how analogous it may be to the situation that you are referring to here. But as we see it, in order to accomplish the task that we have to accomplish, that kind of a structure is not necessary. It may have been 3 years ago; I do not know. I do not know what the circumstances were. But in putting together these task forces, we could not ask for better cooperation than we have had. Turf problems have been absolutely minimal, and we anticipate that these task forces are going to operate under the current arrangement without any additional bureaucracy, without any additional structure, and operate successfully.

Senator SPECTER. Have there been any turf problems with the functioning of the Director of Central Intelligence, as he has had this kind of authority over other departments?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I am just not in a position to comment on that.

Senator BIDEN. If the Senator will yield for ten seconds, since I did draft that bill, that is precisely what was intended, no more and no less authority over other agencies than the DCI had—

Senator SPECTER. My time is almost up.

I have one more question which I would like to ask you, and that is about another aspect of the crime package, and that is the career criminal bill, which you have testified on before. There had been a concern whether there was a constitutional problem were the Congress to grant additional authority for Federal prosecutions for career criminals, those who had been convicted of two or more robberies or burglaries, and were charged with a subsequent robbery or burglary with a firearm. I have pursued the matter with others in the Department, and I just wondered if you had any response whether we can work out that kind of a concern, so that when we make the grant of authority to the Federal prosecutor—although it

is not plenary or full and has to be shared with the local prosecutor—that we can come to some sort of an agreement on a structure which will accommodate the concerns of the National District Attorneys' Association, as well as the concerns of your Department.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, as you know, we do not favor a veto of State or local prosecutors over what Federal prosecutors can or cannot do. We are achieving what we think is a highly desirable result through our Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees that are designed, really, to accomplish the same thing. The purpose of those committees, which we have required our U.S. attorneys in each of the 94 districts to take the leadership in, is to pool all of the resources, Federal, State, and local, to determine priorities based upon the needs of that particular district, and even to cross-designate the prosecutors, which we are in fact doing. That program is very successful. It was particularly successful in Kansas City, successful in Los Angeles, in Little Rock, and in other areas. We do not see any need for that kind of a restriction. It is in fact being done. I must say I am a little surprised that it has not been done before, but it is being done now on the best possible basis, which is voluntary cooperation, rather than any legal requirement. And our experience with those coordinating committees so far has been very good. We think any provision such as this would interfere with that, and we do not see the need for it.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Attorney General, I do not favor it either. The original bill did not have it, and it was added only as a way of accommodating the National District Attorneys' Association. But I would be hopeful—

Attorney General SMITH. Of course, there are also possible Constitutional problems there, too, as you know.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

Senator SPECTER. What Constitutional problem do you see there, Mr. Attorney General?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, whether or not a Federal prosecutor can be, in effect, told what he can do or not do by State and local people. Now, I am not saying there is one; I am saying there is a possible one, and we have to look at that.

Senator SPECTER. Well, I would like to pursue this with you, perhaps when you return more, but I do hope that we can work out language which will be satisfactory to the Department of Justice, to you, and to the district attorneys, perhaps modeled along the coordinating councils, because I think the Congress would be prepared to accept anything which is agreeable to these two groups of prosecutors.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, let me say, as you know, there are many provisions in that bill which we are very strongly in favor of. If anything, we just do not think it goes far enough, but what is there—a good deal of what is there—we are very supportive of.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Attorney General.

Attorney General SMITH. And we certainly would be very happy to work with this committee in reenacting, or attempting to reenact, some of those provisions, and more, I hope.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you.

Senator Leahy?

Senator LEAHY. I might note, Senator Specter, that one of the first objections raised on the original thing was not by the NDA, but was by me. I was just concerned that local control might go by the board. I am not so concerned about a veto as much as I might be whether the local people get a chance to request when it is going to step in. I think there is the very real concern, and should be the real concern by every local prosecutor, that there is always the danger of the Feds stepping in on a grandstanding case, but not coming in on the things where the local authorities may well want them to.

Attorney General SMITH. Senator, on these career criminals, there are enough to go around, for both Federal and local.

Senator LEAHY. I well understand, but I also recall the old days when—

Senator BIDEN. There is not enough of the attorney general to go around. You had better grab him now. He is going to leave.

COMPLICATED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Senator LEAHY. You were speaking of the guidelines for the Drug Enforcement Task Forces, Mr. Attorney General, and I started looking down through this as you were testifying. It is about the most complicated organizational structure I have ever seen. I do not know whether that is done so that organized crime cannot figure out what it is we are doing. I certainly have a little trouble figuring it out myself.

Let us just glance down through what you have. Others could wonder whether the focus of prosecution will be the special agents in charge, or the U.S. attorneys, or the Organized Crime Strike Forces, or the Drug Enforcement Task Forces, or the Core City Advisory Committee, or the Drug Task Force Administrator, or the Working Group, or the liaisons to the Task Force Administrative Unit, or the Consolidated Administrative Office, or the Committee on Case Reporting and Tracking, the Task Force Advisory Committee, or the Task Force Coordination Group, or the Agency Task Force Coordinators, or the Assistant U.S. Attorney Task Force Coordinator, or the Core City District Drug Enforcement Coordination Group—and a number of other units. It is probably a good thing that we are having the break-up of AT&T. We are going to have a whole new telephone company just to connect the different groups.

Now, if you have all this, then you have got to have coordination among the DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, State and local enforcement officials, and then you have this following admonition in the guidelines: "Since there will be substantial significant drug enforcement work"—after reading the paper this morning, I think Mack Baldridge would have some fun with the language it starts out with—"Since there will be substantial significant drug enforcement work being conducted apart from the task force, it is important that the task force and nontask force elements maintain a coordinated and harmonious relationship," redundant though that might be. You get all of that put together, and might that admoni-

tion be a little bit more than a hope? Might we really be saying that perhaps we should go back to a drug czar idea?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, it is one thing doing something, and it is another thing writing down what you are doing. It is easy to pull out of that document, which is a lengthy document, all of these references. However, in fact, a large proportion of that has to do with the original setting up of these task forces, and the remainder has to do with what happens after they are set up.

In that entire document, there is no additional layer of bureaucracy such as we would have, presumably, if we had a drug czar. All of the people who make up the committees or the positions that you make reference to are people who are in effect on the firing line, doing the job. We have, in essence, these task forces, and we have a coordinator, and they work essentially under the U.S. attorney. But more than that, this is not an organization or a structure on paper. It is the result of an actual, effective working group. The South Florida Task Force is in essence what we are talking about here, with necessary differences because of the differences in locale and problems. But we have a real, live organization that we are patterning these on, and that real, live organization has been very successful in its operations. And I suspect that if we were to try to put on paper what we did in south Florida, we would come up with something that may be not too far different from this. You have an interest, I know—at least, I understand you do—with respect to bringing in State and local people in this effort. Several of those groups that you just mentioned are in there to accomplish that very purpose. The Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee—I suppose if you were to describe that, you could weave quite a tale. I have attended several of those meetings myself, and they are made up of representatives of all of the State, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies, and they are very effective. And they are not only effective in getting together; they are very effective in parceling out their various responsibilities of jobs. That is really what this is designed to accomplish.

Senator LEAHY. So we will be able to tell as we go along during the coming year how effective it has been by whether the flow of drugs is down, whether the availability—

Attorney General SMITH. Well, not necessarily, no. You will note, if you read all of that document—

Senator LEAHY. I did.

Attorney General SMITH [continuing]. That there is a structure in there, developed for the purpose of evaluating the success of the operation. But I want to hasten to add, it will not be measured by the flow of drugs. That may be one measure, but it is not the principal measure. This effort is not designed to interdict or to seize drugs, and if we do not seize any drugs, it will not necessarily mean that this will be a failure.

Senator LEAHY. What you want are convictions.

Attorney General SMITH. This effort is to go after the criminal syndicate structure and financial operation.

Senator LEAHY. In your testimony earlier today, you said that convictions of major crime figures are up substantially in the last year or so, is that correct?

Attorney General SMITH. Yes.

Senator LEAHY. Now, were those all convictions based on investigations and operations, indictments, and so on, that have come just in the last 2 years, or do some of them reflect cases that began, for example, with Attorney General Civiletti or Attorney General Bell?

Attorney General SMITH. No; the ones that I made reference to had to do with 1981 and 1982.

Senator LEAHY. But any number of convictions referred to in 1981 are those cases that began right in 1981, or did they begin in 1980, 1979?

Attorney General SMITH. I was going to say that the convictions were obtained in 1981, but I am sure that in a good many cases, they would be the result of investigations that had been going on possibly for many years. And I also want to say, too, that convictions in prior years were more impressive than I think the public generally understands. I think that what has been done in the organized crime area has been more substantial than has been generally recognized, and it certainly is true in this area, particularly, which involves very complicated and extensive cases, that convictions may very well be the result of investigations that have been going on for a long, long time.

Senator BIDEN. Pat, I do not want to cut you off, but we did promise the Attorney General he could leave 10 minutes ago.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I would be glad, if there are one or two more questions—

Senator BIDEN. If you have time—go ahead.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Senator LEAHY. I will have one for the record further on that reference to a GAO report.

I would like to ask the Attorney General, if I might, one question, and I am going to ask a similar one of Judge Webster later on. There have been efforts and statements made by the current administration that we should relax the exclusionary rule where police have acted wrongfully but in good faith because they misunderstood the governing law. Is relaxing the exclusionary rule in any way going to make the FBI, for example, General Smith, more effective, or can we assume that the FBI are well-trained enough to know the law?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, so often, the question of changing the exclusionary rule—that is, our proposal—is referred to as “the good faith exception.” It is not a good faith exception. It is a reasonable good faith exception. It is often criticized on the grounds that this puts a premium on ignorance. It does not, for the very simple reason that a reasonable good faith test is an objective test, not a subjective test, and that makes quite a difference. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, I find it very difficult to see how, if there is a reasonable good faith exception, there can possibly be any deterrent involved. And that is certainly true if you read the plethora of cases describing what is lawful and what is not lawful in the search and seizure area. There is nobody who could, in so many gray areas, make that kind of a determination. But I have yet to hear what I consider to be a sensi-

ble response in opposition to a reasonable good faith test. Of course, that also happens to be the law right now in the 5th and 11th circuits.

Senator LEAHY. Would you agree that the exclusionary rule has been a driving force in improving the training of our police forces, the control and training of law enforcement—that it has been certainly a significant factor in the training and improvement of law enforcement in this country?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, it may have been, Senator, but I think there are other remedies that would have been far better without the costs that the exclusionary rule has brought.

Senator LEAHY. So you would prefer that the exclusionary rule would never have been brought into effect in the first place?

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I do not know that I am prepared to say that. I just think that the costs of the exclusionary rule have been far greater than the benefits that it has brought over the years, particularly when there are other ways to get at the same problem.

Senator LEAHY. Such as?

Attorney General SMITH. Such as providing a remedy for those who are damaged against the entity that employs the officers involved. Another possibility is a remedy against the officer himself, although I think in my preference I would take the remedy against the entity because then that places upon the entity the burden of training and of responsibility for unlawful acts in that respect.

Senator LEAHY. I was going to say, going against the officer himself would be somewhat in conflict with Judge Webster's testimony which speaks of—as I read it this morning—changing the tort law somewhat.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, I am not advocating anything here. I am just explaining what they are.

Senator LEAHY. I understand. When you say "against the entity," that is the taxpayers of the particular community or State or—

Attorney General SMITH. Well, whatever the governmental agency is that is responsible for those officers. I am not advocating that; I am just saying that that is one of the alternatives.

Senator LEAHY. But you feel that whatever benefits might have been there by the exclusionary rule have been far outweighed by the disadvantages?

Attorney General SMITH. By the disadvantages. Indeed, I do. And I think that our proposal, which is the reasonable good faith approach, is certainly one that solves or eliminates most of the costs of the exclusionary rule as it now exists, and yet at the same time provides the necessary protection.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I realize that my time is up. I will have a number of questions to submit for the record, especially—

Senator BIDEN. Hopefully, Senator Leahy, we will be able to get the Attorney General back.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. General, on behalf of the chairman and myself, I would like to thank you for your time and sort of put you on notice that there is a possibility that we may ask you to come back, if it is possible, and also make one last statement. This so-called drug czar thing you keep hearing about and we keep talking about, you are

going to get a lot more chances to talk about it, and we are just trying to help you. You keep talking about additional layers of bureaucracy. I do not know how making you top dog and being able to call the decisions makes any additional layer of bureaucracy. All my bill says is you are the guy who can call the shots, and it is up to you to decide. No more bureaucracy. The same thing in place, but you are the boss.

But we will again have a chance to talk to you about that.

Attorney General SMITH. Well, and I hope that when we do, you will think about the possibility that if you do have a drug czar, then are we going to need a czar for organized crime, are we going to need a czar for pornography, are we going to need a czar for white-collar crime, and if so, how do you draw the line? How do you define a drug offense? What is a drug offense? Drugs involve a host of other offenses. You create all kinds of jurisdictional problems, and then with all those czars, you might need a czar to control the czars, and it goes on and on.

Senator BIDEN. Gee, that is not a bad idea. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much.

Attorney General SMITH. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Judge Webster, you have been patient. We are anxious to hear what you have to say, and then myself and Senator Leahy and whoever else may come up will have some questions. We are going to break at about 1 o'clock, because I understand the chairman has asked that you be available later this afternoon, so we will give you a chance to do some business downtown and maybe get some lunch.

So why don't you go forward, if you would like to now, with your statement, in whole or in part, any way you would like to proceed.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. WEBSTER. May I ask some advice from the Senator? I have an extensive statement, which I was prepared to read and am prepared to read, with one or two minor changes that I had intended to make in a couple places for clarity. It is available to go into the record as is. In it, I discuss in more detail than the Attorney General's statement some of the mechanisms by which various organized crime entities, not exclusively drug cartels, function; a discussion of some of our investigative efforts, and also some legislative recommendations. I am perfectly willing to submit it into the record, or I am prepared to read it, depending on the pleasure of the committee and the chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Well, we have all the time. Let me make a proposal. The Senator and I have read your statement, but a lot of the people who will be attempting to follow this may not have had a chance to. I would suggest, if it is divisible this way, that you at least outline for us how you believe the cartels function and then maybe we could submit the rest of the statement for the record, and Senator Leahy and I could proceed with questions, and the chairman, if he is able to come back—and he is very tied up on the floor.

If that is agreeable to you, and if that is convenient, do it that way—and if not, we can just put the whole statement in the record and we can go on from there, any way you want to do it—

Mr. WEBSTER. If I may have the whole statement in the record—

Senator BIDEN. Without objection, your full statement will appear.

Mr. WEBSTER. Then, I will try to do this. I do not have a summary statement, but as I go through it, I will try to keep it brief and to the points that you asked me to focus upon.

I think we should probably first define organized crime and know what we are talking about. We define it as organizations whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Although such organizations are involved in every conceivable type of crime, narcotics, and gambling are the major sources of revenue. I think it would be a mistake to consider these organizations as off and apart and doing their own thing. There are few businesses or industries in our community that are not affected by organized criminal enterprises. We know that it is costing the American people billions of dollars a year.

The badge of organized crime, as distinguished from various forms of white collar crime, is, I think, summarized in the term that I have used for a number of years, an effort to obtain an edge—not necessarily and most often to the contrary, a legitimate edge.

The hallmarks of organized crime are the use of intimidation, extortion, fear, and corruption, and corruption of public officials, who provide an early warning system for them. A major source of income for organized crime has been labor racketeering, the looting of union treasuries and pension funds, the corruption of union officials and officers into sweetheart contracts.

Another area that I would be prepared to discuss is the use of laundered money from illegal activities, such as narcotics, gambling, extortionate credit transactions, prostitution, child pornography, pouring those funds into legitimate enterprises, undercutting competition of other legitimate businessmen, by reducing the cost of doing business, and the corrupting and sometimes the busting out of those organizations. Sometimes those operate to create a monopolistic effect in certain industries where their influence is substantial.

Organized crime is not monolithic, and I have said that many times, nor is it synonymous with any particular group. There are many varieties and combinations of criminal groups that are properly included within our definition. There is, however, one criminal organization that is national in scope—the La Cosa Nostra, known also as the LCN—and referred to by some as the syndicate or the mob. The LCN has its roots in secret societies that developed centuries ago in Italy, and it began to take its present shape in this country in the early 1930's.

Today, the LCN consists of a confederation of 25 families—and that is families—each operating within similar organizational structures and using similar methods. Though each member is affiliated with a particular family, there is substantial evidence that all members recognize the authority of a national commission that

resolves interfamily jurisdictional grievances, decides major policy, and ratifies new bosses.

Each family has a formal structure that is veiled by secrecy and supported by loyalty and strict discipline based upon threats and violence. A boss heads each family. He is assisted by a sottocapo, or underboss, with a number of lieutenants or captains known as caporegime. The lowest members of the organization are soldati or soldiers, who are often referred to as buttonmen, "wise guys," good fellows, or made guys. Although a blood relationship often exists among members, this is not required or implied by the use of the term family.

Although the LCN is most heavily concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest, it has members and operations in most States. In total, we believe there are over 2,000 initiated members. These hardcore members are also known as made members or initiated members. To achieve a more accurate view of the influence of this group, the membership of 2,000 should be multiplied by 10 to take into account the additional people who are fully affiliated in their criminal enterprises and are known to us as associates.

The problem of organized crime in the eighties is by no means limited to the LCN. Other organized groups from varied geographic, ethnic, and racial backgrounds are involved in illegal activities. Like the LCN, these groups protect themselves with vows of secrecy and loyalty, enforcing their strict discipline by threats and violence. In the major organizations, the bonds are strengthened by ethnic and family ties.

These other groups include outlaw motorcycle gangs such as the Hell's Angels, the Bandidos, the Outlaws and the Pagans—who are known to us as the Big Four. In some regions, these ruthless gangs have established relationships with traditional organized crime families and are acting as enforcers.

We started investigating these groups in organized crime, and the implication of organized crime activity, in May 1981. The impetus for our investigation was an extensive study that our Criminal Investigative Division conducted, which revealed that the number of gangs, as well as the size of individual gangs, had grown significantly in the previous 10 years. I might say, parenthetically, that we got a good look at this during the extensive investigation of the assassination of Judge John Wood, when the role of the Bandidos became an important part of that investigation, and we broadened it to include a good, healthy look at the activities of the Bandidos.

In the process of their expansion, many have become widespread and even international. They have developed highly structured organizations.

I can, if you wish, pass over a more detailed explanation of the Big Four and will pass on to some other material.

Senator BIDEN. I think that would be appropriate.

[Whereupon, the chairman resumed the chair.]

Mr. WEBSTER. As diverse and numerous as these various groups are—and I mentioned the outlaw gangs, but we have others: ethnic groups, the Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, the Aryan Brotherhood, and the Black Guerrilla Family, which I think the Attorney General also referred to. Other emerging groups include some

that are ethnically oriented, such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triad societies, the Israeli Mafia, and others.

I think we are making measurable inroads against organized crime, and I am quite proud of our record during the past 2½ years. The guiding principle of our organized crime program is to reach beyond the streets, to reach those who exercise the real power and control, and in that, we have had significant successes.

We are emphasizing the long-term investigations, and the use of sensitive techniques, such as selected informants, undercover operations, and court-authorized wiretaps to reach the top people. The Attorney General emphasized, and I underscore again, the fact that the task forces that were recently announced and are in the process of development will not focus so much upon interdiction as upon these long-term investigations intended to get at the apparatus and destroy it.

In the last 2 years, we have convicted more than 1,200 individuals in organized crime investigations, including more than 350 LCN members and their associates. Currently, there are more than 300 LCN members and associates awaiting trial.

If I were to look at the statistics, Mr. Chairman, and try to say what is significant about the last few years, it is the increasing number of LCN members and associates who are being caught up in our investigation. There was a time when our organized crime statistics were, in my view, too loosely defined, and we were taking gamblers in bucket-shop operations and giving them a technical organized crime definition. Our focus now is on the top players, and we are achieving the successes I have described to you.

I could illustrate a couple of cases. I think the chairman or Senator Biden may have made reference this morning to the arrest and conviction of members of the Bonanno family and the New York trials in which Joe Pistone, our undercover agent, operated for a period of 6 years, undercover, under the name of Donnie Brasco. Through that investigation, we were able to track the interests of the Bonanno family, over into Milwaukee, down into Florida, the vending industry, the garbage industry, bottle shops, and so on. And Joe Pistone did an outstanding job, as did a number of other undercover agents who worked on that case. I met with them a couple of times in Florida and individually in Washington, to keep track and support and underscore that investigation. It was important not only as a case against that particular crime family, but also because of the important insights that it gave us in identifying the question that you asked me earlier—who are the players?

Much has been said about the use of our undercover agents. They are making important contributions. These are dangerous activities. They can only play so long before somebody asks them to engage in the kinds of violent activities that we do not permit our agents to engage in. A testing process is always going on. As a matter of fact, with Pistone, we went covert about the time that the family was getting ready to initiate Pistone into their organization. These are problems in management, but it is necessary that we have them. It is also necessary that we have protection for these, and that is one of the reasons I have supported the organized crime exemption for the Freedom of Information Act, and I was very pleased when Senator Leahy got behind that effort, because

we really must keep organized crime members from getting any indication of who our undercover operatives and our informants are. They play that game with the Freedom of Information Act. Even when they are not asking for the information, they will call someone and say, "I have got the file, and I have figured out who it is," or "I am going to get the file." And we, of course, immediately hear from a scared informant, wondering what is in our files that might expose him to risk or damage.

Brilab is another case where we used the undercover technique to reach into the hierarchy of organized crime. Our undercover agents were able to meet with Carlos Marcello, the boss of the New Orleans family, and another political figure, both of whom were interested in receiving kickbacks in connection with the award of a State employee's insurance contract. In July 1981, both were convicted on RICO-conspiracy charges. Marcello was later convicted on Federal charges as a result of his attempt to bribe a U.S. District Judge in Los Angeles who was presiding over an organized crime trial.

In the fall of 1980, a Federal trial involving most of the leaders of the Los Angeles LCN family provided rare public insight into organized crime. The trial was on racketeering charges alleging that the Los Angeles family was extorting or shaking down pornographers. Testimony by an LCN member who was a Government witness substantiated the existence and structure of the Los Angeles LCN family, as well as their involvement in bookmaking, loan sharking, extortion, labor racketeering, bribery, pornography, real estate and bank frauds, narcotics, and murder. The trial ended with the conviction of Los Angeles LCN boss Dominic Brooklier, three of his lieutenants and two other members on RICO charges involving murder and extortion.

The recent trial of Roy Lee Williams and others focused national attention on the relationship between labor racketeering and organized crime. Although electronic surveillance has been used in all the cases that I have mentioned, this case, known to us as Pendorf, is a classic example of the use of these and other intrusive techniques and their importance to our organized crime programs. As in all such cases, the investigation was closely monitored by us, by the Department of Justice, and the courts to insure full compliance with the rule of law.

During the course of our investigation, we intercepted conversations by court-authorized title III coverage that disclosed Allen Dorfman, Roy Lee Williams and others were conspiring to bribe former U.S. Senator Howard Cannon, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, in order to block legislation that would substantially deregulate the trucking industry. As you know, the trial ended last month with the conviction of Williams, who was president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; of Dorfman, business consultant who was recently murdered in Chicago; Joseph Lombardo, Chicago organized crime figure; Thomas F. O'Malley, employer trustee of the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund; and Andrew Massa, director of Labor Relations for the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund.

This was more than the conviction of those who would corrupt our labor unions. These individuals were convicted of wire fraud

and conspiracy to bribe a U.S. Senator in connection with legislation being considered by the Congress. In order to achieve their goals, those involved in organized crime are willing to corrupt the institutions sacred to our Nation. As we have seen, the Congress, State legislatures, and our courts are not immune from attempts to influence them by organized crime.

I could cite the threats on the lives of our judges, coming largely from drug cartels, and some of the successful efforts to interdict those threats, which is a matter of continuing concern.

During 1981 and 1982, the FBI's organized crime program achieved unprecedented successes against the No. 1 priority—the LCN. As a result of major investigations involving the leadership of organized crime, we have successfully indicted and/or convicted the bosses and hierarchy of many LCN families. We are currently investigating several other families, as well as the new leaders who have emerged to replace those convicted.

I am optimistic about achieving similar successes in these cases.

As I have already noted, organized crime is heavily involved in narcotics trafficking. In this area, too, we have scored significant successes. Our formal entry into the battle of narcotics—I am speaking of the FBI now—came 1 year ago, in January. Attorney General Smith directed the Drug Enforcement Administration to report to the Director of the FBI, and gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction in matters involving the Controlled Substances Act, the title 21 series. During the last year, FBI narcotics investigations have grown from less than 100 to more than 1,100. These are quality investigations because we managed those cases at headquarters, except cases for investigation, all of which must either involve organized crime, financial crimes, or public corruption cases. Three hundred of these 1,100 cases are being operated jointly between the DEA and the FBI. These figures do not include cases where illegal narcotics activity is only a small part of an investigation directed against other criminal activity. During fiscal year 1982, more than 600 persons were indicted and over 300 people were convicted as a result of FBI narcotics investigation, our first year in business.

I would like to give you the highlights of two cases that demonstrate our work against the twin scourges of narcotics and organized crime.

A New York case that we call Sailfish focused the efforts of the FBI and DEA on a large heroin trafficking operation involving several LCN families. In early December 1982, Federal arrest warrants were issued for 17 people, including members of the Gambino and Luchese families. All 17 were subsequently indicted on a variety of Federal charges.

Another case involved one of the largest marihuana smuggling operations in southern Florida. We developed evidence that Pee Wee Griffin, who is involved in stock car racing, and others in the auto and boat racing profession had organized and were transporting narcotics throughout the country. During the investigation, we seized 20 tons of marihuana and a 70-foot shrimping vessel valued at \$12 million. Additionally, assets valued at \$6.5 million were seized or frozen. To date, more than 60 people have been indicted on various Federal charges out of that one investigation.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken the time to discuss these cases because I want you to have a feel for the work that we are doing and the successes that we have achieved. I think our successes are a signal not that organized crime has been eliminated, but that members at all levels in criminal groups can no longer consider themselves protected by a code of secrecy. The sense of immunity, of respect, of protection that has been promised to the foot soldiers in these organizations is rapidly disappearing as we reach beyond the streets to the capos and others at the top. That, to me, is a favorable sign—a sign of a concerted, sustained effort.

But, we cannot do the job alone. You and your congressional colleagues are partners in this battle against organized crime. Congress has provided, and should continue to provide, the resources and statutory weapons that are necessary for us to effectively wage this battle.

A weapon that we and the Federal prosecutors have used with great success is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute. In many respects, the RICO statute is the most powerful Federal statute available to us. RICO's concept of a racketeering enterprise addresses the central problem of organized crime. RICO's stiff penalties have given us the needed muscle in organized crime cases. However, the statute could be improved with some adjustments to provisions concerning the forfeiture of assets. And we will be talking about that.

Court-authorized electronic surveillance in accordance with title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 is another legislative initiative that has provided us with the ability to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding organized crime. I recall during the Brilab investigations, two LCN figures talking over a court-authorized wiretap about some of the instances in the Abscam investigation, and they were saying "Those fellows should have been more careful." There is still a willingness to do business on the telephone, and we should be able to take advantage of that opportunity through court-authorized wiretaps. We now know the identities of most organized crime figures and the method and manner that they conduct business. But that legislation, we think, could also be improved. I understand that the Department of Justice is planning to submit proposals to amend title III to permit its emergency use in life-threatening situations and to broaden the range of crimes that it covers. I hope you will give that favorable consideration.

I would also like to express my gratitude to Congress for its recent revisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The change will provide and is already providing a more reasonable approach to gaining access to much-needed tax information concerning individuals involved in ongoing organized crime activity.

There are additional statutory tools we need. I would like to join the Attorney General in advocating that the 98th Congress consider modifications to the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, and enact permanent authority for undercover operations.

The Freedom of Information Act, as you know, imposes a duty on us to process records for release to any person who asks for them. Members of organized crime families, despite prior felony convic-

tions, are free to request FBI documents, and even if they weren't they could go through other processes to get them.

We have received requests from organized crime figures, and we are aware of their concerted efforts to identify informants.

It is safe to say, I think, that organized crime figures do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to identify a person who is a source of information. I have met with many of you to discuss needed changes in this law. The Department has submitted draft legislation that would permit us to deny felons access to our documents and take other steps to protect the identities of our confidential sources in this area.

Additionally, I would like to comment that there is an immediate need for you to consider an amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act to remove from our agents the specter of personal liability for actions taken while conducting difficult investigations. Our agents do need this protection if we expect the Federal criminal laws to be aggressively enforced.

As Congress has recognized, undercover operations pose unique problems that must be addressed by specific legislation. As early as 1978, the FBI was authorized by the Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, fiscal year 1979, to use appropriated funds to enter into leases, deposit appropriated funds and income from undercover operations in banks or other financial institutions, and use proceeds generated by undercover operations to offset necessary and reasonable expenses of the operation. In every succeeding year up to February 1, 1982, Congress has by authorization or continuing resolution extended these authorities.

Unfortunately, there have been lapses in the authorization process and consequently in our undercover authorities. The most serious of these extended from February to December 1982. Frankly, this put us in a terrific spot. We had operations in which we could not do these things; they were ongoing, with the people in place. We think there must be a better way to handle it.

It is clear that while convenient, yearly authorization bills are not the appropriate vehicle for these undercover authorities. Too much is at stake.

I recommend that the undercover authorities I have described be enacted into permanent law. The Department of Justice will be submitting appropriate legislation for consideration by the 98th Congress.

The war against narcotics and organized crime will not be easily won. It is a war that often requires great personal sacrifice. I recently visited with one of our undercover agents who was severely beaten and left for dead when his identity was discovered. He had been taken as a possible—they became suspicious of his intermediary and consequently suspicious of him, and worked both of them over viciously; our own agent had a pistol barrel thrust up his nose, his nose ripped out in the process, taken out in a truck for the purpose of dumping him. He was able to pull himself together enough to throw himself out of the truck at 50 miles an hour and conceal himself, and we got him back safely.

We are grateful that incidents like this are not frequent, but our agents understand the dangers involved in their work, and they go forward with the important work that you, the Congress, the Presi-

dent, and the American people have assigned them. They need some help, and they need some protection.

In closing, I want to thank the members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for allowing me to provide testimony on this important topic. Today's hearing, and your future hearings, will be of tremendous service to the American people. They will disclose the enormous influence of organized crime on American society, as well as the ruthlessness and violence associated with their activities.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal statement, and I would be very pleased to answer questions that you or other members of the committee might have for me.

[The following was received for the record:]



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Judiciary Committee, I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to discuss organized crime and our efforts against those who have formed enterprises to break our laws. These criminal groups have often been glamorized in books, movies and television. But in truth, they are purveyors of crime, violence, death and human misery.

Last fall, President Reagan announced a program to expose, prosecute and ultimately cripple organized crime in America. In describing the problem facing us, President Reagan said, "Today the power of organized crime reaches into every segment of our society...." As the Attorney General has indicated in his testimony before this Committee, organized criminal activity represents the most serious crime problem in America today.

Both the President and the Attorney General have given an idea of the magnitude of the problem. This morning, I would like to further define organized crime and give some examples of our work in this area. Finally, I will mention some law enforcement needs the Congress can address.

The FBI defines organized crime as criminal organizations whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Although such organizations are involved in every conceivable type of crime, narcotics and gambling are their major sources of revenue.

But the activities of organized crime are not limited to open acts of criminality. Today, there are few businesses or industries in our communities that are not affected by organized criminal enterprises. This brand of crime is costing the American people billions of dollars every year. Those engaged in organized crime are "no-holds-barred" competitors who seek an edge. They don't face the problems of legitimate business, and seldom, if ever, are they concerned about a marketable product, overhead, the availability of capital or profit margins. Instead--and this is their hallmark--they concentrate on intimidation, extortion, fear and the corruption of public officials.

As an example, a major source of income for organized crime has been labor racketeering. There are substantial indications that several union locals are under some degree of mob control. Union treasuries and pension funds have been looted. Corrupt union officials have entered into sweetheart contracts with management, effectively depriving union members of fair representation and giving some companies an advantage.

Still another edge comes from the practice of putting laundered funds from illegal activities into legitimate enterprises. This allows organized crime to undercut competition by reducing the cost of doing business. By such predatory tactics, organized crime enterprises have been successful in creating a monopolizing effect in some industries and driving legitimate competitors out of business.

We have learned that the term "organized crime" is not synonymous with any one group. Instead, many varieties and combinations of criminal groups are properly included within our definition.

La Cosa Nostra

There does exist, however, one criminal organization that is national in scope -- the La Cosa Nostra, also known as the LCN and referred to by some as the "syndicate" or the "mob."

The LCN has its roots in secret societies that developed centuries ago in Italy. The LCN began to take its present shape in this country in the early 1930's.

Today, the LCN consists of a confederation of 25 "families," each operating within similar organizational structures and using similar methods. Though each member is affiliated with a particular family, all members recognize that they are part of a national organization. There is substantial evidence of a "commission" that resolves inter-family jurisdictional grievances, decides major policy and ratifies new bosses.

Each family has a formal structure that is veiled by secrecy and supported by loyalty and strict discipline based on threats and violence. A boss heads each family. He is assisted by a "sottocapo," or underboss, with a number of lieutenants or captains known as "caporegime." The lowest members of the organization are "soldati" or soldiers who are often referred to as "button-men," "wise-guys," "good-fellows," or "made-guys." Although a blood relationship often exists among members, this is not required or implied by the use of the term "family."

Although the LCN is most heavily concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest, it has members and operations in most states. In total, there are over 2,000 initiated members. These hard-core members are also known as "made" members. To achieve a more accurate view of the influence of this group, the membership of 2,000 should be multiplied by ten to take into account the additional people who are fully affiliated in their criminal enterprises.

Other Organized Crime Groups

The problem of organized crime in the 80's is by no means limited to the LCN. Other organized groups from varied geographic, ethnic and racial backgrounds are involved in illegal activities. Like the LCN, these groups protect themselves with vows of secrecy and loyalty, enforcing their strict discipline

by threats and violence. In the major organizations, the bonds are strengthened by ethnic and family ties.

Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs

These other groups include outlaw motorcycle gangs such as the Hell's Angels, the Bandidos, the Outlaws and the Pagans -- known to us as the "Big Four" outlaw motorcycle gangs. In some regions these ruthless gangs have established relationships with traditional organized crime families and are acting as enforcers.

We began investigating the activities of motorcycle gangs in organized crime in May, 1981. The impetus for our investigations was an extensive study that our Criminal Investigative Division conducted. This study revealed that the number of gangs, as well as the size of individual gangs, had grown significantly in the previous ten years. In the process, many had become widespread and even international. Like the LCN, they have developed highly structured organizations. They use threats and violence to achieve their goals, and accumulate wealth through illegal crime activity including narcotics trafficking.

I would like to give you a brief outline of the "Big Four" outlaw motorcycle gangs:

Hells Angels

Of the hundreds of outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Hells Angels is the largest, most powerful and, reportedly, the wealthiest, not only here but internationally. Although estimates of its total membership vary among law enforcement, a realistic estimate of actual membership is approximately 2,000. However, like the LCN, they have thousands of probationary members and associates who assist them.

The single most important factor in the growth of the Hells Angels is their involvement in narcotics trafficking.

Outlaws

The Outlaws are the second most significant gang. They originated in Chicago approximately 20 years ago and now operate

primarily east of the Mississippi River and in Canada. During the last ten years they have experienced rapid growth by absorbing other gangs. Like the Hells Angels, narcotics trafficking is their primary criminal activity.

Bandidos

The Bandidos were organized in Texas during the mid-1960's. They have expanded outside of Texas and now have more than 30 chapters and a membership estimated at 1,000 plus numerous associates. The Bandidos are a well-organized criminal enterprise involved not only in narcotics trafficking, but also in prostitution, weapons trafficking and other criminal activity. The Bandido's motto is "We are the people our parents warned us about."

Pagans

Although they are the smallest of the Big Four, the Pagans have significant strength in the mid-Atlantic states. Over the years, this violence-prone gang has developed a sophisticated organization that controls a major drug network.

Additional Groups

I wish I could tell you that these gangs end the list. They do not. Organized crime in the United States includes highly organized and sophisticated narcotics cartels. In addition, there are prison-spawned gangs and ethnic organized crime groups.

The prison-spawned gangs developed inside the California State Prison System in the 1960's. They remain mostly a West Coast phenomenon and are quasi-military, violence-prone, highly structured criminal enterprises whose influence now extends well beyond prison walls. They engage in a wide range of criminal activities including narcotics and weapons trafficking, extortion, robbery, and murder. These gangs include the Mexican Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, the Aryan Brotherhood and the Black Guerrilla Family.

Other emerging groups include some that are ethnically oriented such as the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triad Societies, the Israeli Mafia and others.

As diverse and numerous as these groups are, I do not view our struggle against organized crime as a hopeless situation. We are making measurable inroads against organized crime. The guiding principle of our Organized Crime Program is to reach beyond the streets to those who exercise real power and control.

Because the leadership is well insulated, we are emphasizing long-term investigations and the use of sensitive techniques such as selected informants, undercover operations and court-authorized wiretaps to reach the top people. These techniques help us understand how these organizations work and who controls them. These techniques make it possible to penetrate the secrecy, loyalty and fear-induced silence that protect organized crime.

Our investigations are producing significant results. In the last two years, we have convicted more than 1,200 individuals in organized crime investigations, including more than 350 LCN members and their associates. Currently there are more than 300 LCN members and associates awaiting trial.

But as impressive as they are, numbers don't tell the full story. To demonstrate the magnitude of the problems and the dedication of our Agents, I want to discuss several cases.

A recent operation produced important racketeering convictions against organized crime figures in New York and indictments in other parts of the country. This investigation involved eight FBI undercover Agents, including one who spent more than six years undercover. You have seen stories about him in the newspapers. In his undercover role, he was known as "Donnie Brasco." His first introduction to organized crime family members was arranged by various informants who claimed to have worked with him before. They got him in the door. Then it

was up to him to establish his own reputation and work his way into the group's confidence. He was likeable, he had money and he was able to develop a rapport with family members. He knew when to walk away from certain conversations and he didn't press himself on anyone.

Later, we placed a second undercover Agent in a southern city as the operator of a nightclub. The focus of this investigation was on illegal gambling and police corruption. At the same time, "Donnie Brasco" let his criminal friends in New York know he had an associate who had a nightclub with a gambling operation in another city. This added to his credibility. He was soon asked by the New York people to oversee some important operations in this region too. Increasingly, he was viewed as one of the group's favored young associates. In time, there was talk of making him a member. This level of trust was unprecedented. It allowed us to learn a tremendous amount about the family and led to the convictions of Benjamin Ruggiero, a Capo in the New York Bonanno organized crime family and two of his soldiers.

Much has been written and said about our use of undercover Agents. These Agents and others are making significant contributions. The "Donnie Brasco" of this case is actually Special Agent Joe Pistone. I am sure that you can imagine the sacrifices that Joe and his family made as he led a dangerous double life for six years. I am pleased to tell you that Joe recently received the Attorney General's Distinguished Service Award.

BRILAB is another case where we used the undercover technique to reach into the hierarchy of organized crime. Our undercover Agents were able to meet with Carlos Marcello, the boss of the New Orleans family, and a political official who were interested in receiving kickbacks in connection with the award of a state employee's insurance contract. In July, 1981, both were convicted on RICO-conspiracy charges. Marcello was later

convicted on Federal charges as a result of his attempt to bribe a U.S. District Court Judge in Los Angeles who was presiding over an organized crime trial.

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figure; Thomas F. O'Malley, Employer Trustee of the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund; and Andrew G. Massa, Director of Labor Relations for the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund. But this was more than the conviction of those who would corrupt our labor unions. These individuals were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to bribe a United States Senator in connection with legislation being considered by the Congress. In order to achieve their goals, those involved in organized crime are willing to corrupt the institutions sacred to our Nation. As we have seen, the Congress, state legislatures, and our courts are not immune from attempts to influence them by organized crime.

During 1981 and 1982, the FBI's Organized Crime Program achieved unprecedented successes against the number one priority -- the LCN. As a result of major investigations involving the leadership of organized crime, we have successfully indicted and/or convicted the "bosses" and hierarchy of many LCN families. We are currently investigating several other families as well as the new leaders who have emerged to replace those convicted. We are optimistic about achieving similar success in these cases.

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But, we cannot do the job alone. You and your Congressional colleagues are partners in this battle against organized crime. Congress has provided, and should continue to provide, the resources and statutory weapons that are necessary for us to effectively wage this war.

A weapon that we and Federal prosecutors have used with great success is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations--or RICO--Statute. In many respects, this is the most powerful Federal statute available to us. RICO's concept of a "racketeering enterprise" addresses the central problem of organized crime. RICO's stiff penalties have given us the needed "muscle" in organized crime cases. However, the statute could be improved with some adjustments to provisions concerning the forfeiture of assets.

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I would also like to express my gratitude to Congress for its recent revision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The change will provide a more reasonable approach to gaining access to much needed tax information concerning individuals involved in ongoing organized crime activity.

There are additional statutory tools we need in order to be more effective. I want to join the Attorney General in advocating that the 98th Congress consider modifications to the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, and enact permanent authority for undercover operations.

The Freedom of Information Act, as you know, imposes a duty upon the FBI to process records for release to any person who asks for them. Members of organized crime families, despite prior felony convictions, are free to request FBI documents. We

have received requests from organized crime figures and are aware of their concerted efforts to identify informants.

It is safe to say that organized crime figures do not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to identify a person as a source of information. I have met with many of you to discuss needed changes in this law. The Department has submitted draft legislation that would permit us to deny felons access to our documents and take other steps to protect the identities of our confidential sources in this area.

Additionally, I would like to comment that there is an immediate need for you to consider an amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act to remove from our Agents the specter of personal liability for actions taken while conducting investigations. Our Agents need this protection if we expect the Federal criminal laws to be aggressively enforced.

As Congress has recognized, undercover operations pose unique problems that must be addressed by specific legislation. As early as 1978, the FBI was authorized by the Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, to use appropriated funds to enter into leases, deposit appropriated funds and income from undercover operations in banks or other financial institutions, and use proceeds generated by undercover operations to offset necessary and reasonable expenses of the operations. In every succeeding year up to February 1, 1982, Congress has, by Authorization Act or continuing resolution, extended these authorities.

Unfortunately, there have been lapses in the authorization process and consequently in our undercover authorities. The most serious to these extended from February to December, 1982.

It is clear that, while convenient, yearly authorization bills are not the appropriate vehicle for these undercover authorities. Too much is at stake.

I recommend that the undercover authorities I have

described be enacted into permanent law. In this regard, the Department of Justice will be submitting appropriate legislation for consideration by the 98th Congress.

My staff and I are available to work with you in addressing these needed amendments.

The war against narcotics and organized crime will not be easily won. It is a war that often requires great personal sacrifice. I recently visited one of our undercover Agents who was severely beaten and left for dead when his identity was discovered. We are grateful that incidents like this are not frequent. But our Agents understand the dangers involved in their work and yet they go forward with the important work that you--the Congress--the President and the American people have assigned them.

In closing, I want to thank the members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary for allowing me to provide testimony on this important topic. Today's hearing, and your future hearings, will be of tremendous service to the American public. They will disclose the enormous influence of organized crime on American society as well as the ruthlessness and violence associated with their activities.

I am now prepared to answer any questions that you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for a splendid statement, Mr. Director.

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you.

SPECIAL AGENT JOE PISTONE

The CHAIRMAN. I was very pleased to hear about agent Pistone and the fine service he rendered by infiltrating an organized crime family for 6 years.

Mr. WEBSTER. It gave me a great deal of pride, Mr. Chairman, to see the Attorney General give him the Distinguished Service Award.

The CHAIRMAN. It took a man of great courage and determination to undergo that. I wish you would express our appreciation to him on the part of this committee.

Mr. WEBSTER. I will, and he will be most grateful.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, by the way, that there is a contract on his life, too.

Mr. WEBSTER. We are taking steps to protect him.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume you will take every step to protect him that you can.

Mr. WEBSTER. We will, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If anything happens to him, I hope you will really pursue that matter to the fullest, and any cooperation we can give you, we will be pleased to do it.

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it suit you to go on about 30 more minutes, and maybe we can finish?

Mr. WEBSTER. I am at your service, sir.

PERCENTAGE OF RESOURCES DEDICATED TO ORGANIZED CRIME

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. What portion of the FBI's resources are dedicated to organized crime investigations and, in your opinion, does that figure represent sufficient resources to combat this problem?

Mr. WEBSTER. We have been committing between 16 and 19 percent of our resources in the last few years. With the additional drug responsibilities associated with organized crime, that figure has increased to roughly 20 to 21 percent. Congress has always been generous with us in assessing our organized crime needs in the line item budget process. We always can use the money that is given to us, and there is a big challenge out there. But I think that, in balance with other needs, that the figure is sufficient, taken with the new resources that the Congress has provided for the drug task forces, to provide an orderly use. If we need more, we will be asking for it in additional budgets--and every year, we have asked for additional funding for organized crime, and I think we have always gotten it.

The CHAIRMAN. You indicated that during 1981 and 1982, the FBI's organized crime program achieved unprecedented successes against the LCN. How many organized crime family members have been prosecuted in the last 4 years, and what are the principal types of violations with which they were charged?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, we have had over 2,500 convictions--2,507 convictions--from 1979 to 1982, and that included 494 LCN members and associates; 359 of that total were convicted within the past 2 years. They have been convicted on a wide variety of charges--gambling charges, extortion charges, Hobbs Act offenses, and more recently, the use of the RICO statute, which would take into account a number of State crimes committed by a racketeering enterprise. And they have also included convictions on labor racketeering.

TWENTY-FIVE "FAMILIES"

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, in your testimony, you stated that there are currently 25 LCN families operating within the United States. Previous statistics provided by the FBI indicated that there were 27 such families. What accounts for the difference in these figures?

Mr. WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, in my own published statements and testimony I have talked about approximately 25 families, and currently that is an accurate count. Two families that used to

appear in our records, one in Dallas and one in Rockford, are considered to be inactive at the present time, and we are just not counting them.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, in your testimony, you indicated that there is considerable evidence supporting the existence of an LCN commission which resolves interfamilial jurisdictional grievances and other LCN policy matters. Does the FBI have any information concerning the composition of the LCN Commission and the level of control it exerts over the families?

Mr. WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, we have pretty good information on the manner in which the commission functions. It is a high level—if Senator Biden will excuse me, it is like a DCI influence—

Senator BIDEN. We need to fight fire with fire, Judge.

Mr. WEBSTER. It consists of the five top New York LCN families and four other families from Buffalo, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Chicago. And it is used as a dispute resolution mechanism and also operates to approve new bosses and from time to time, establishes some overall policy. There was a hiring freeze, if you can believe that, for a number of years, during which they closed the books on members, and then they went to the commission for permission to open up the registers again. That is the kind of activity that takes place in the commission. It does not run the day-to-day operations, but it tends to keep the various family units in harmony with each other insofar as that is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What criteria is used to determine the composition of the commission?

Mr. WEBSTER. I am not sure that I have that information personally. I will supply it for the record if it is available. But those are the five major power families in New York, and the four cities that I mentioned have the most powerful out-State families.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

The FBI is not aware of the specific criteria used by the LCN to determine the composition of the commission. However, the commission was originally set up in 1931 and was probably based on the relative strength of the "families" at that time. The membership has changed constantly since that time reflecting changing power struggles and changing circumstances.

The current structure of the commission as identified by the FBI consists of nine LCN bosses, five in New York, and one each in Philadelphia, Buffalo, Detroit and Chicago. The strength of individual LCN bosses weighs heavily in favor of the New York families and the Chicago boss. In determining the commission structure, the FBI uses the expertise of certain agents to make expert observations based upon an abundance of raw data. This data is comprised of historical information, LCN member and associate informants, cooperating witnesses who were members or associates of the LCN, undercover agents who have infiltrated the LCN structure, and through well-placed electronic surveillances that have recorded conversations of LCN members and associates, including attendees of commission meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. If you would supply the information in closed session, then we will not print those names and that will be kept confidential.

I believe you stated in your testimony that the lowest members of the LCN organization are the soldiers or "made guys." How does someone become a made guy in the LCN, and is it true that in the past, a prospective member was required to commit a murder?

Mr. WEBSTER. The system has stayed about the same for a number of years. It is an initiation process. It requires a sponsorship. In the traditional LCN groups, members must be of Italian

extraction. They are sponsored and taken into membership through a formal initiation rite. It is my understanding that the requirement of committing a murder has been relaxed, although I believe the requirement is still that the person to be taken in must be a witness to a murder. There is a very formal ritual procedure. The importance of it is that the person being made or initiated understands that he is entering an organization which he will not leave alive.

INITIATION RITUAL

The CHAIRMAN. There is an initiation process, then?

Mr. WEBSTER. There is, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know what the ritual consists of?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, it is my understanding that it involves the taking of a number of oaths, the handling of religious articles which are burning, ending with a ceremonial kiss of the other members. It is designed to impress on the member the finality of the act that he has taken, that he has become part of something that he cannot leave.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, you indicated in your testimony that the LCN has over 2,000 initiated members, and 10 times that figure are considered associates. What exactly do you mean by an associate, and what functions do they perform?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, the associates are uninitiated. They have no stake in the direct fruits of the family partnership. They are allowed to engage in a variety of activities, often working very closely with initiated members, but they are not part of the family and have no financial interest. And the LCN group uses about a 10-to-1 formula of associates in this area. They will use associates to set up businesses or put them in place, and the associates will contribute to the profits through their activities but will not participate in a profit-sharing system.

The CHAIRMAN. When you use the word, "family," you do not mean blood relatives, or do you mean it is a family of criminals coming together to commit crimes?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. They may have ethnic characteristics, but we are not talking about blood relationship as such.

The CHAIRMAN. Do these associates operate as freely as made members in an organized crime group, and basically, do they enjoy the protection of the particular family they are working with?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, they do enjoy protection, but they do not enjoy as much protection as someone who is a made member. The initiation is a means of obtaining respect and protection. But they do look to the made members, who guide them, for a measure of protection, that amount of protection to be determined by the LCN family itself.

The CHAIRMAN. And the word, "made," as we use it here, made member, means one who has been initiated?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What advantages are there to being a made guy of an organized crime family, if associates can basically enjoy the

protection of the family—I believe you stated that they do not enjoy as much protection.

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct, not as much, and they—

The CHAIRMAN. It is the degree, more or less.

Mr. WEBSTER. And you do not have any interest in the profits that come from other sources of activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they paid a salary for each act, or a monthly salary, or on what basis are they compensated?

Mr. WEBSTER. Are you talking about the made members?

The CHAIRMAN. The associate members. How are they compensated?

Mr. WEBSTER. The associates. I think as a generalization, they are allowed to operate in their various illegal activities, and then a percentage or sharing of their activities goes to the LCN family, where it is redistributed to the made members under a given formula.

Senator BIDEN. Do you mean there is actually a formula for distribution?

Mr. WEBSTER. It is my understanding there is a formula for distribution, but it will change and vary with the families and is largely the decision of the hierarchy.

Senator BIDEN. Somewhat like law firms?

Mr. WEBSTER. Somewhat like law firms.

GAMBLING MAJOR SOURCE OF INCOME

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that narcotics and gambling are the major sources of the LCN's revenue. Of these two forms of criminal activity, which provides the greatest amount of revenue for their day-to-day operations?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, our analysis today is that gambling produces more dollars because all of the organized crime families, the LCN families, are engaged in gambling in one form or another. Narcotics is a more lucrative form of activity, but because the organizations are not as fully into narcotics as they are in gambling, I think it would be more accurate to say that there are larger dollar revenues from gambling today than narcotics, but that is changing.

The CHAIRMAN. What advantages are there in the LCN being involved in gambling and narcotics, as opposed to other illegal activities, such as loan sharking and pornography?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I do not think there are any real advantages. Those are just the principal sources of revenue. We find that loan sharking is a common offense that all of the families are involved in and often leads them into takeovers of legitimate business, when they put out loans that cannot be paid because of the extortionate terms, or usurious terms. They have developed a wedge into legitimate business. Pornography and other activities of organized crime are also lucrative. I think it is just a question of saying that there are no real advantages except how many dollars they produce.

SPORTING EVENTS

The CHAIRMAN. There have been some allegations recently, I believe, that the LCN attempts to fix sporting events, professional and collegiate. Do you have any information on that?

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, we have seen signs of that, Mr. Chairman. In the Boston College case, there were ties between those who were involved in that activity and associates of a New York LCN family.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your information indicate this is widespread, or is it a localized situation?

Mr. WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I am ready to draw a conclusion on that. In the last few years, we have had a good look at some of the incursions into the sporting industry and in collegiate activity, not just on the east coast, but also in the Southwest and the west coast. Invariably, I think we are going to find connections with people who are interested in this. I am not prepared to say, and certainly, I do not think it is true, that any collegiate sport or group is under the control of the LCN. But it is an obvious point of vulnerability, and we have seen signs that they take advantage of it.

We know that the commissioners of the various sports have watched this with great care and have gone to substantial lengths to be sure that their own security offices are in close touch with the FBI in watching for this type of incursion or penetration.

LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, you mentioned that there are few businesses or industries within our communities that are not affected by organized criminal enterprises. Would you provide us with examples of how organized crime infiltrates and controls legitimate businesses, and do they tend to favor certain types of legitimate businesses over others?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, the quickest generalization—and I would like maybe to supply this for the record—

The CHAIRMAN. That would be all right to supply that for the record.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

The following examples of organized crime infiltration of legitimate businesses are provided:

Information developed during an undercover operation revealed that Rudolph Orlandini, a general contractor and co-owner of Orlando Construction Company, had through a mutual agreement a business partner who was an alleged LCN member. Orlandini, who was seeking performance bonds from the undercover agents, related that he and his partner controlled a corrupt local politician in Union City, New Jersey, and were systemically funneling off monies from federally funded local construction projects. Investigation identified the funds as originating from the Economic Development Agency which is part of the United States Department of Commerce. Orlandini subsequently agreed to plead guilty and cooperate. His information resulted in the conviction of the Mayor of Union City, NJ, who was a senior State Senator; the former Deputy Police Chief; the Chief Housing Officer; the school board President; the City Architect; the Chief Housing Officer of an adjacent municipality; two members and an associate of an LCN family.

An investigation was instituted when an informant who later became a protected government witness, reported that he was making payoffs to Irving Cotler, a "bagman" for LCN dominated Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), Union City, New Jersey. He furnished monies to Cotler on behalf of the Special Commodities Division of T.I.M.E., D.C., Jackson, Michigan, and Helms Express, Irwin, Pennsylvania, so that these companies could haul special commodities at a cost saving by not complying with Teamster Union contracts. Electronic surveillance was instituted on Cotler's various trucking companies along with physical surveillance of Cotler to ascertain other companies making payments to Cotler for economically desirable labor peace and to establish regular contacts between Cotler and officials of the union. As a result of the above, search warrants were executed

on the offices of various national carriers wherein evidence of false billings and mail fraud were obtained. These billings were being used by companies to generate cash to make the kickback payments to Cotler. Because of the prosecutive liability of the executives of these carriers, reluctant witnesses were developed. Cotler and the President of Local 560, IBT, were convicted of RICO violations.

An FBI undercover operation was initiated which purported to distribute pornographic material in foreign countries. Eventually, members of the Los Angeles LCN family approached the undercover Agents and extortionately demanded payment to allow the undercover operation to continue to operate. Following meetings with the undercover Agents, the LCN members were paid by the undercover operatives. Subsequent to these payments a witness was developed who could testify concerning other LCN members involved. As a result of this investigation five LCN members were convicted of RICO violations.

Based upon information that organized crime money was being funneled through the F & A Cheese Corporation, extensive investigation determined LCN involvement was prevalent in F & A Cheese Corporation as well as several other companies. This investigation was conducted jointly with the Criminal Investigative Division of the Internal Revenue Service. Investigation documented an extortionate takeover of the Rogersville Cheese Factory, Inc., by Detroit LCN members. Subsequent profits were skimmed through phony commission payments to Gratiot Motor City Food Enterprises. This investigation resulted in guilty pleas by two LCN members.

Investigation was predicated upon information developed that the Cleveland LCN underboss, and several of his close associates, conducted a loanshark business. This investigation, which relied principally upon the analysis of bank records, identified over 25 loanshark victims, mostly owners of small business. The investigation indicated that the loanshark payments were laundered through a tavern and an appliance store owned by an LCN associate. By reviewing the daily teller activity of two bank branches, the pattern and method of repayment was revealed. Upon being subpoenaed before the Federal grand jury, several of the loanshark victims, when confronted with the physical evidence of their repayment, acknowledged their debts and fully cooperated. This investigation was conducted jointly with the Criminal Investigative Division, IRS. Two LCN associates have been convicted for RICO violations as a result of this investigation.

Based upon information received from the Nassau County, New York, Arson Squad that LCN associates were conducting an arson-for-profit bankruptcy scheme in the produce industry, an investigation was instituted. This investigation revealed the two LCN associates operated a scheme since 1970 wherein they would set up a large scale retail or wholesale produce business. After operating the business for a period of time to establish credit, they would purchase large amounts of produce and before this was paid for, they would suffer a fire or declare bankruptcy. In anticipation of the bankruptcy, they would remove the produce and company equipment and conceal this from the bankruptcy trustee. The scheme ran from 1970-1979, involved 12 businesses in three states and caused losses in excess of ten million dollars. In one of the businesses, they bribed a building inspector to allow them to stay in business. In addition, they paid off the President of a local union for the purpose of obtaining a "sweetheart" contract. The two LCN associates were convicted.

An investigation was based on information obtained from an electronic surveillance and four cooperating witnesses who eventually testified. This case involved the illegal infiltration and control of the Westchester Premier Theatre (WPT), a legitimate business located in Tarrytown, New York, by members of organized crime. Control was obtained through secret loans to the WPT that were made during the public sale of common stock to raise operating capital. This allowed the WPT to be used as a conduit to skim off large portions of the theatre's proceeds for personal enrichment and to repay the secret loans incurred during financially difficult times. Ten defendants were charged with a variety of violations that included securities fraud, bankruptcy fraud, obstruction of justice, and violations of the RICO Statute as a result of an investigation that utilized a number of wiretaps and consensual recordings. The first trial resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal, a mistrial, and service due to health, respectively for three defendants, and a hung jury for the remaining seven defendants. In the interim between the first and second trial, four of the defendants pled guilty to violations charged in the initial indictment. One defendant was severed from prosecution at this time. At the second trial, one defendant was acquitted and three defendants were convicted on all counts charged in the indictment. Six of the seven defendants have been sentenced; one defendant's conviction has been overturned. This ruling is now being appealed by the Government.

An investigation was predicated on the cooperation of government witnesses who were the former President, Bank of Bloomfield, Bloomfield, New Jersey; and the former President, State Bank of Chatham, Chatham, New Jersey. The investigation revealed an intricate web whereby an LCN associate through his position as business agent for Local 495, IBT, was instrumental in placing certificates of deposit at various lending institutions through the cooperation of the union's Secretary/Treasurer who had access to various union welfare funds. These deposited funds were used as a basis for securing bank loans for the union official, his family, and friends, along with private businesses in which he had an interest. These loans were often defaulted upon. Five individuals were ultimately convicted.

An investigation was predicated upon receipt of information from a cooperative FBI/IRS witness. He provided detailed information concerning the Boston LCN's takeover and control of a multimillion "bustout" bankruptcy fraud scheme in the Greater Boston, Massachusetts, area during 1973-1979. The investigation revealed a pattern of bankruptcy fraud, mail fraud, theft from interstate shipment, fraud by wire, arson and loansharking violations. The pattern of racketeering activity revolved around a "bustout" scheme (i.e. planned bankruptcies) of approximately 40 wholesale-retail discount companies. "Bustout" involves companies ordering merchandise in volume with no intention of paying. The merchandise is immediately funneled out at percentages under company wholesale cost to outlet stores who redistribute the merchandise into the stream of commerce. Credit is obtained by listing fraudulent credit references and by supplying false credit information to Dun and Bradstreet. The scheme continues until creditors petition the companies into bankruptcy leaving creditors with shell corporations fronted by "straws" or nonexistent persons and virtually no assets. These particular "bustouts" in a five year period defrauded creditors throughout the United States of millions of dollars through the described pattern. Investigation revealed the multimillion dollar scheme had been taken over and controlled by threats and the actual use of violence upon the "bustout" operators by associates of the Boston LCN boss. These LCN associates set up outlet stores which "purchased" goods from "bustouts" and then redistributed the merchandise through the outlets stores into the stream of commerce. Five of the independent "bustout" owners were developed as cooperative witnesses who worked undercover throughout the investigation utilizing body and telephone recording devices and who aided in securing search warrants during which hundreds of thousands of dollars in "bustout" merchandise and cash were recovered. Their testimony formed the basis for two RICO conspiracy indictments on the part of organized crime to take over and control a sophisticated scheme of bankruptcy fraud and to redistribute the "bustout" goods through legitimate discount merchandising businesses. Fourteen individuals have been convicted thus far.

The LCN tends to favor construction, vending, entertainment, transportation and carting businesses for infiltration.

Mr. WEBSTER. The quickest generalization is that there is a tendency to move heavily into cash-intensive industry, where there is a lot of cash flowing. In terms of using a legitimate business to launder money, we have the example of the Bonannos attempting to buy the Cadillac agency of Lou Peters up in Lodi, Calif. for that purpose; vending machines, restaurants, hotels—certainly, in gambling, where you have the opportunity to skim money, skim the proceeds, we see an ongoing effort by organized crime. We also see it in the transportation and carting industries, where the edge can be applied to either extort or bribe favors.

If I may, I will supply more detail for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be all right.

We have some information that they have taken over a lot of pizza parlors.

Mr. WEBSTER. That is true, that is true.

INFLUENCE IN UNION LOCALS

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony, you related that there are substantial indications that several union locals are under mob control. Can you tell the committee the specific types of labor

unions which the FBI has identified as being controlled by organized crime?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I think again, you will find that their interest in labor unions will coincide with their interest in cash-intensive organizations, or with organizations that can influence or intimidate employers that they are trying to take advantage of. Without saying that the particular unions are dominated and controlled by organized crime, we can say that we have identified organized crime contacts and influence in the International Longshoremen's Association, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Laborers International Union of North America, and the Hotel, Restaurant, and Bartender Employees' Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, do you have any suggestion as to what can be done to prevent the LCN from infiltrating such organizations?

Mr. WEBSTER. I think an aggressive interest in labor racketeering by the Congress; I think these hearings will be helpful. I think one thing, reaching for a quick type of legislative initiative that would be helpful to us is if the Congress would make as a national policy—the kind of policy that I understand was in effect in New York when we had those docking industry investigations in the *Unirac* case—when someone is convicted of violation of Federal laws with respect to breaches of trust or labor racketeering, that they forfeit their office and not stay on for years and years and years, waiting for the appeal process to take effect. That is one example.

But I think we have got to recognize that this has been going on for a long time, and to support and pursue wherever we can these investigations under the RICO statute. We saw what we could do in the *Unirac* case, where we had major convictions, over 100 convictions, all up and down the east coast. That took 20 field offices and over 100 agents working full-time, undercover agents, wiretaps, but we ultimately did succeed, ultimately were able to reach and convict Anthony Sciotto, and where we have that opportunity and can take the time that it takes—and it does take time—we will be in there.

SLAYING OF ALLEN DORFMAN

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, do you believe the recent convictions in the *Pendorf* case in Chicago will serve to diminish the influence of organized crime in other major labor unions in this country, and would you comment on how the gangland-style slaying of Allen Dorfman may be related to these convictions?

Mr. WEBSTER. I would certainly hope so, but I would have to say that this has been going on for a long time, and I am not sure that one conviction is going to have the desired effect. I think it clearly is having the desired effect of making legitimate labor union officials more cautious about dealings with those who were engaged in organized crime or who have organized crime connections. We have been sitting for years with pension funds as a kind of open season on pension funds; loans being made to support the kinds of industries that are attractive to organized crime. I would like to think that maybe there is going to be some shrinking down here, and I

would hope that there would be some deterrence in attempts to corrupt or influence our public officials, which was a part of the *Pendorf* case.

But frankly, Mr. Chairman, nothing in that case convinces me that it will have stopped or scared the organized crime element away from labor racketeering efforts.

We did see some real progress in the *Unirac* case, but we are also seeing that they are coming back again.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a general feeling that Dorfman was killed to keep him from talking. Would you care to comment on that gangland-style execution?

Mr. WEBSTER. Gangland executions are our most difficult crime. They use professionals, they pick their time and their place, and historically, we have not been successful in these investigations. This one offers us a substantially better chance than any I can remember to solve, and we intend to solve it if it is at all possible to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not ask you in the open session to go into any details, if it would deter your investigations.

Mr. WEBSTER. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I think that the assumptions that are being made today are rational ones. Dorfman had a good deal of information. He was facing very substantial prison terms, at the end of a life of luxury, and I think it would probably give those who were at the other end of his secrets substantial concern about whether he might at some point want to cooperate with the Government.

This is a good lesson, I think, to those who think that they can get along successfully with the more vicious organized crime elements. There is no sense of obligation or loyalty, but simply one of survival where outsiders are concerned—or even insiders who might become a problem to organized crime figures.

The CHAIRMAN. We may want to discuss the Dorfman case a little later in Executive Session.

In your testimony, Judge, you made reference to several cases in which the FBI has successfully infiltrated several major traditional organized crime families and reached their higher echelons. What effect do you believe this has had on the LCN and what has been their reaction to this infiltration?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, they are very security-conscious at the present time, and I think it is fair to say that many of the organizations have pulled in tighter rather than expanding or attempting to enlarge their organizations. They are going to rely more chiefly on the people who have been around and whose trustworthiness is already established, rather than to deal with new and untried people.

There is concern about effectiveness, but again, I come back to the fact that we are making strides; we are also—and I think this is perhaps more important than what I just said—we are demonstrating to the street soldier that the so-called protection and respect that he was guaranteed when he was initiated is not all that good if the top players can be taken out by the FBI. This is making some people more willing to cooperate with us when they are in trouble, rather than relying on the hierarchies of the LCN organizations to protect them as they did in the past. And when you look

across the country, you will see the Brooklier organization in Los Angeles, the head of the Kansas City family, Civella, Bonanno, Marcello, look at the New York cases of the Frank Tieri conviction, see indictments currently against major players in Miami and in the Great Lakes area, to mention only a few. And these are the top people. The entire Cleveland hierarchy has been taken out. Two days ago, the last underboss was convicted—a major achievement in that city. It will take them a while to recover. But more than that, it has raised the question: Can the hierarchy protect the soldier? I say it cannot anymore, and we are going to see and have already seen evidence of more information coming to us, more cooperation coming to us at the lower level, which we did not have before.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe special agent Wacks dealt with Carlos Marcello, did he not?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Directly.

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct. And we had two of them so close that he considered them nephews in his dealings with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, do you believe that any internal changes within the LCN over the past 20 years contributed to the Bureau's success in its investigations?

Mr. WEBSTER [pause]. No, Mr. Chairman, none occurs to me at the present time. If I think of anything, I would like permission to add it to the record.

I think some of our investigations are influencing them, in terms of their responses and their patterns and practices. But I think the disruption that has happened is causing some lack of momentum—rather, some inertia gaps—they are nervous, they are distrustful, and they are cooperating—some people in the organizations are now cooperating who would not otherwise. I think that has been the main thing, and it is not that they are changing, and it is affecting our ability to investigate them. I think they are changing because of our investigation of them.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

There have not been any internal changes within the LCN that contributed to our success. The FBI's accomplishments resulting from organized crime (OC) investigations are based upon several factors. As you know, the FBI has totally dedicated considerable manpower to OC investigations for several years. During this period of time the expertise of OC assigned agents has increased. This, coupled with an increased intelligence base, development of quality informants and cooperating witnesses, use of electronic surveillances through consensual monitoring and via court order, the enactment of the RICO statute, the Witness Security Program and the computerization of information in the Organized Crime Information System have all contributed to quality convictions. Our successes in overcoming the myths surrounding OC have become apparent to those individuals victimized by OC. These victims have, in turn, further assisted our endeavors.

MOTORCYCLE GANGS ACT AS ENFORCERS

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, you stated in your testimony here today that in some regions, outlaw motorcycle gangs have established relationships with traditional organized crime families and are acting as enforcers. Could you provide us with examples of this activity, and would you prefer to do that in executive session?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I can mention one case of record. The president of a local Hell's Angels chapter in New Haven, Conn. was convicted of extortion and Hobbs Act violations, and he was acting in conjunction with a member of a major New York LCN family.

We have seen other examples in Tampa, between the LCN and the outlaw motorcycle gang; in Youngstown, Ohio, between the LCN and the outlaw motorcycle gang; and in Pittsburgh, between the LCN and the Pagans. Jimmy Fratianno who is an LCN member and has been a Government witness who is under our witness protection program, has indicated that the LCN has utilized outlaw motorcycle gangs as enforcers. There is substantial evidence of this, and if I have more detail, I would be glad to present it to you in executive session.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

On April 8, 1983, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio returned guilty verdicts against all defendants in a major narcotics investigation wherein Angelo A. Lonardo, the underboss of the Cleveland LCN family, was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 103 years, with these sentences to run consecutively. Others sentenced included Kevin J. McTaggart, an associate of the Cleveland LCN family who acted as liaison between the family and the Cleveland Chapter of the Hells Angels. McTaggart received a life sentence as a result of his conviction for violation of Title 21, U.S. Code, Section 848, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and was also sentenced to an additional 194 years to run concurrently with his life sentence. These sentences of the defendants in this matter represent the heaviest sentences ever imposed on a group of defendants in the Northern District of Ohio. The relationship between McTaggart, the Cleveland LCN family and the Hells Angels was not fully established other than investigation determined that McTaggart associated with and dealt with both groups. Investigation to further define the LCN/Hells Angels relationship continues.

In an investigation by the Tampa Division concerning the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Outlaws Motorcycle Gang, seven subjects were indicted on narcotics related charges with six of the seven being members of the Outlaws. The seventh subject indicted and convicted was Anthony Scire, a Miami cocaine dealer with close associations to the New York Genovese family of the LCN. Scire and James Hawkins, an Outlaw member also sentenced in the investigation, have also been charged with the January 5, 1982, attempted murder of Maurice Gilbert of Miami. This matter has not yet been tried. The purpose and scope of the relationship between the New York LCN and the Outlaws Motorcycle Gang in Tampa has not been developed. Anthony Scire's relationship with both groups has been documented; however, investigation is continuing to reveal the circumstances under which the relationship was promulgated and the reasons for its existence to continue.

In August of 1981, the New Haven Division successfully obtained convictions of the President and two associates of the Bridgeport, Connecticut chapter of the Hells Angels on charges of engaging in extortionate credit transactions and conspiracy. This trial revealed an excellent example of the association between the Hells Angels and the LCN. Specifically, Francis Curcio, a member of the Genovese LCN family, utilized Danny Bifield, the Bridgeport Chapter Hells Angels President, and others as "muscle" in the collection of loan shark debts. Bifield was frequently characterized during the trial as "the most dangerous man in the State of Connecticut." Bifield was sentenced in February of 1982, to two 20 year consecutive sentences.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Judge, are these outlaw motorcycle groups generally acting independently of the LCN, or are they controlled by the LCN, in your opinion?

Mr. WEBSTER. In my opinion, they are still acting independently. We find no evidence that the outlaw gang is being treated as a subsidiary or controlled outlet for LCN. There are a lot of differences in personality, tradition, technique, a lot of oil and water. There is an accommodation for convenience here, in which the outlaw gangs who tend to deal more in the drug world and amphetamines and

drugs of that kind, are simply willing to hire out their propensity for violence, and LCN organizations have found occasion to use them for that purpose.

BATTLE AGAINST NARCOTICS

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, in your testimony, you have indicated that the FBI's formal entry into the battle against narcotics took place when your Agency was given concurrent jurisdiction with DEA. What role is the FBI currently playing in this area, and what long-range plans for the FBI do you foresee in connection with narcotics enforcement?

Mr. WEBSTER. The Attorney General's action culminated a careful study of potential of FBI/DEA alinement or realinement and the entry of the FBI into the drug arena. We have previously handled a few cases with organized crime implications through that type of jurisdiction—the *Bancoshares*, the *Black Tuna* cases in Florida, are examples of that.

I see the FBI as a part of our overall strategy moving into those areas we know best—organized crime, financial crime, and public corruption associated with drugs. I see us as supporting the DEA effort, with DEA as the lead Agency in the overall drug contest, supplying DEA with facilities that it did not have in the past—there are 100 DEA locations; there are 500 FBI locations throughout the country. In many cities, they are lucky if there are more than four DEA agents in town, and it takes more than that to run one title III court-authorized wiretap. We are now helping DEA put those wiretaps in place and operate them.

The combined resources have been working out very well, Mr. Chairman. We have trained about 300 FBI agents at the Glynco DEA Training Grounds. We are operating joint operations, as I mentioned earlier, there are 1,100 FBI investigations, and 300 of those are being run jointly with DEA. With the encouragement of the Attorney General, I have been increasing the professional standards of DEA, and the first class of DEA agents went through about a month ago, with the same qualifications that the FBI has consistently required for its agents.

The two organizations working together can have a combined impact and are having a combined impact on drug trafficking in this country. As Senator Biden and others mentioned earlier, that is only one-third, or at least one of three parts, of the struggle. DEA is continuing to work, and to a lesser extent, the FBI is continuing to work to encourage, where we have the opportunity to do so, a diminution in the source countries. That is primarily the responsibility of the State Department, and I think that all of us involved, the Attorney General, the President, and others, have encouraged a stricter and tougher policy in this area.

The Posse Comitatus Act was amended by the Congress, and that has had a marked impact upon the drug effort. For the first time now, we have the military willing to come in and give us an important hand at the middle level period, the interdiction stage, when the source materials come to this country. We still have some areas where it is not possible to engage in actual law enforcement work, but it gave me a boost the other day, when the Navy and the

U.S.S. *Mississippi* made its first interdiction, using Coast Guard sailors to go onboard and make the actual arrest, Coast Guard personnel. But they are in it. The Air Force is now providing important intelligence to DEA and the FBI. They have those balloons that can monitor the flights of planes into this country, and keeping track of the ships; the loan of AWACS, the loan of attack helicopters by the Defense Department, without demanding reimbursement.

These are steps that would have been hard to imagine 2 years ago or 3 years ago. I think we are going to see—and I cannot discuss this in open session, but there was a question asked about it—we are getting intelligence from our other intelligence agencies, relative to not only movement, but also to financial activities associated with major drug trafficking, and that is important to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, do I have the proper understanding of that arrangement that the Navy informs the Coast Guard, and they make the arrest?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct. But the Coast Guard, as you know, is burdened with a lack of resources. Most of their cutters are 25 years old or older; there are not enough of them; if a Coast Guard cutter takes a mother ship into tow, it opens up the whole harbor for everybody else to go in, because the Coast Guard is at that point tied up. It seems to us that there are a number of strategies—and they are being employed at the present time—where the Navy can help. The Navy can and will take a ship off the Coast Guard's hands and tow it, freeing the Coast Guard cutter to go after another ship. That is just an example.

We also have the problem of taking a new look at how much of this we have to take into custody and how much of it we have to bring ashore and tie up 20 percent of the DEA just taking custody of the drugs, and whether or not there may be other legal ways of destroying this material quickly, promptly, effectively, and still having the evidence for criminal prosecutions and not violating any international conventions.

We have got to keep looking for ways to make sensible use of our scarce resources, and the military has been most cooperative in that effort since the act was amended.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the Coast Guard has recently christened two new, 110-foot vessels to assist in this work?

Mr. WEBSTER. And that is very encouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. In the Florida Keys.

Judge, do you believe the use of the task force concept will have a significant impact on narcotics distribution in this country, as well as the amount of narcotics coming into this country?

Mr. WEBSTER. We have confidence that it will have. We have every expectation that it will be used effectively to address the problem of organized crime marketing and distribution of drugs in this country.

The interdiction effort is primarily focused in south Florida. There will be other areas, border areas, where interdiction is important, and it will be given greater emphasis, and there will be greater numbers of Customs officials involved in those exercises.

The main group of task forces, it seems to me, will be involved in long-term investigative work directed against organized crime.

The Attorney General outlined, generally, how those task forces will function. They are an enhancement of existing facilities, but they are not a new level or layer of bureaucracy. We are using the people in place. Investigations will continue to be conducted by FBI and DEA and Customs, to the extent that it falls within their jurisdiction—Customs is assisting DEA in certain follow-up investigations to develop greater information and effectiveness in interdiction.

The Core City U.S. Attorneys will coordinate those task forces, but the management will continue to be in the agencies who have the responsibility and the expertise. They will not be off doing something different, but will in fact be accountable for their drug enforcement efforts. I think you have given us the money, and it is important that we be able to demonstrate to you what those task forces have achieved. We hope that they will be working closely, rather than in a separatist vein, with the existing drug strategies that are already in place, and also permit us to identify not only drug work, but other forms of organized crime, and be able to deal with them as we find that involvement in the course of the task force investigation.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, I believe you have some charts showing the structure of organized crime elements. Do you wish to present those, or do you wish to put them in the record? How do you want to handle those?

Mr. WEBSTER. We have them here, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to put them in the record for you, or at least show you what they are, and let you decide whether you want to spend any time with them or not.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask a parliamentary question here, a scheduling question. I am anxious to see the charts, but I just want to make sure the chairman, after asking 45 minutes' worth of questions, is not going to tell the Judge he does not have to come back this afternoon. I have equally as many questions that I would like to insist upon asking. It is unusual to proceed this way, but as long as you assure me that the Judge will be back, and I will have at least 45 minutes for questions, I have no objection to doing anything else he wants to do. I will stay until midnight if we agree, but I do not want you to say, "So long, Judge," after the charts go down.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. We always treat you with equity and justice.

Senator BIDEN. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Judge, if you would like to present those charts and just explain briefly about them.

Mr. WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, in proceeding with the charts, since there will be other opportunities to go into more detail, then I will briefly just identify the charts, and they will be made a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It might be helpful, Judge, if you would turn them around a little more toward the television cameras.

Mr. WEBSTER. These charts were made to illustrate in a graphic sense the location and composition and organization of our major organized crime units. The map of the United States shows here, on the major cities, those circled in red are sites or locations of

headquarters cities for the major organized crime families. The ones in stars reflect members of the commissions. Here in the New York area, that actually reflects the five families in New York.

I cannot resist the opportunity to point out that I have given you in the course of my testimony examples of the top players in convictions in the last few years, in Los Angeles, in Kansas City—we have got pleas of guilty in the Denver family now—over here, we have got convictions in Chicago, of course, in New York, and indictments in Miami; important convictions in Cleveland. You have the conviction of Joe Bonanno, and in New Orleans, Marcello. They are there, but so are we.

This chart is a follow-up to what I have just said. These are a showing of indictments and convictions of bosses in LCN families. Those in red indicate family bosses convicted. Those in blue indicate family bosses indicted at the present time. As you can see, we have achieved successes in virtually every part of the country where the LCN families are headquartered and functioning.

Senator BIDEN. Judge, as you are going through that, it might be helpful if you could tell us how much you were able to accomplish in terms of forfeiture dollars in each of those cases—if you are going to go on through it. Otherwise, we will come back to that this afternoon.

Mr. WEBSTER. I will have to supply that for the record, because I just do not have those figures. Not all of them were convicted under charges under the RICO statute which would permit forfeiture. Some were gotten on Hobbs Act cases and other type situations.

This is—and this is not getting to be such a surprise anymore; I think this analysis has been pretty well laid out in many of the criminal trials in the LCN trial activity—the conventional hierarchy that I mentioned in my statement—the boss, the consigliere, or counselor, who is sort of staff friendly adviser; the underboss. Then it is organized sort of like a Roman legion, with the caporegimes, the captains of the units, with soldiers assigned to that particular captain. The activities of the soldiers in various areas are shown here on the chart—corruption of police and public officials; enforcing discipline over members and nonmember associates and fronts, by orders from the leadership; use of assault, mayhem, murder. Then, working through those, dealing with the associates or front organizations, and through that mechanism, getting into legitimate industry, meat distribution, waterfront activity, garbage disposal, vending machines, realty, liquor, bars and taverns, labor unions, restaurants, garment, and produce. I believe that I have testified in one way or another about all of that this morning—as well as the illegitimate activities of alcohol, narcotics, labor racketeering, gambling, numbers policy, dice games, bookmaking, loan sharking, and extortion.

Incidentally, in our more recent statistics, we have focused upon LCN organized crime activities rather than bucket-shop, gambling, and other minor figures, and there was a shrinking down of our inventory, but we now are dealing in the last 2 or 3 years with giving you figures of hard, thorough, organized crime cases.

The chairman mentioned the motorcycle gangs and their locations, and I have the Big Four to give you an idea of where they

are headquartered now. These show the locations of the Pagans motorcycle group, largely on the eastern seaboard, heavily concentrated in a number of cities in Pennsylvania, and Aiken being the one city in South Carolina where the Pagans are functioning. Another chapter is in Suffolk County.

The Outlaws are largely east of the Mississippi, include the Great Lakes area, headquartered in the Chicago/Gary area; that was the founding city, and I am not sure whether they maintain that as headquarters or not.

The Hell's Angels is the largest of the groups, with international connections, and several thousand members and participants, both on the west coast and on the east coast.

The Bandidos are in the South, with heavy concentration in the area of the States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico. As I mentioned, they are of tremendous interest to us in the investigation of the assassination of Judge John Wood and drug-related activities in the San Antonio area.

[The following was supplied for the record:]

The following LCN bosses have been convicted since 1979, of which Brooklier, Licavoli, Marcello, and Tieri were convicted under the RICO statute.

LCN boss/date of conviction or sentencing	LCN family/violation
Brooklier, Dominick Philip, Nov. 14, 1980.....	Los Angeles. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d). Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c).
Bufalino, Russel Alfred, Nov. 17, 1981	Pittston. Title 18, United States Code, Section 241. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503.
Bonanno, Joseph Sr.	Bonanno. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503.
Civella, Nicholas (deceased) 1979	Kansas City. Title 18, United States Code, Section 201.
Licavoli, James T., July 8, 1982.....	Cleveland. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962.
Marcello, Carlos Joseph, Aug. 3, 1981	New Orleans. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d). Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c).
Dec. 11, 1981	Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952.
Persico, Alphonse, May 1, 1980.....	Colombo. Title 18, United States Code, Section 892. Title 18, United States Code, Section 894.
Persico, Carmine John Jr., June 1981.....	Colombo. Parole violation.
Scarfo, Nicodemo Dominick, Apr. 9, 1981.....	Philadelphia. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1202.
Smaldone, Eugene "Checkers", Oct. 4, 1982	Denver. Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(h). Title 18, United States Code, Section 7206.
Tieri, Frank Alphonse, Nov. 21, 1980.....	Genovese. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962.


The predicate RICO violations involving Dominick Brooklier were extortion and obstruction of justice. No use was made of the forfeiture provisions as no assets could be identified in the context of the predicate violations nor the enterprise.

The predicate RICO violations involving James T. Licavoli were murders. No use was made of the forfeiture provisions due to the nature of the predicate violations.

The predicate RICO violations involving Carlos Marcello were bribes. No use was made of the forfeiture provisions as all the money identified was FBI bribe money.


The predicate RICO violations involving Frank Tieri were extortion and interstate transportation of stolen property. No use was made of the forfeiture provisions as no assets could be identified in the context of the predicate violations nor the enterprise.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OF
AN INDIVIDUAL LA COSA NOSTRA
'FAMILY'




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INDICTMENTS AND/OR CONVICTIONS OF LA COSA NOSTRA BOSSES



HELLS ANGELS



OUTLAWS



★ MOTHER CHAPTER

CONTINUED


1 OF 6

BANDIDOS

aka "Bandito Nation"



PAGANS



Senator BIDEN. Is there any ethnic connotation to that organization? They are called the Bandidos—

Mr. WEBSTER. I think it is more locale. I have met, actually, with one of the so-called old ladies who is now providing information to us, one of the young women who had been corrupted and taken over by this organization, and I did not get the impression—the answer is no, no ethnic connotation.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

ALLURE TO YOUNG WOMEN

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking about these women, it is our understanding that so long as they do not associate with any one man, they are called sheep; in other words, they go with all of them. Then, they call them old ladies when they settle down with one man. Is that your understanding?

Mr. WEBSTER. I think that is about correct, Mr. Chairman. It is a sad situation, because a lot of these are runaways, kids who have had problems in their homes, and they are taken over. They are attracted to this activity. I recently went through some photographs and evidence of an activity out of our Charlotte office. It is depressing to see what a group can do to the kind of people we think of as our children. I am glad to see that in some areas, we are beginning to rehabilitate some of the people who are involved in this, and they are cooperating. But the excitement, the allure, the opportunity to be involved and have somebody pay attention to them seems to be the main motivation. These young people are asked to engage in prostitution, are required to engage in it, seem to do so willingly, take an enormous amount of physical abuse, and it is a true subculture that our society has to pay some attention to at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe later, we will have some testimony along that line from some of these people.

Senator BIDEN. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator BIDEN. The Big Four—are any one of the so-called Big Four motorcycle gangs associated with any one of the organized crime families, or LCN?

Mr. WEBSTER. I think the correct answer would be that you can identify in particular—the Outlaws, for instance, I mentioned in my testimony this morning—who have had specific dealings with an LCN family, but are not considered to be LCN affiliates or subsidiaries or satellites.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the motto of that group you are speaking about now, the Bandidos, their motto is, "We are the people our parents warned us about."

Mr. WEBSTER. That is right. They, too, have initiation ceremonies, Mr. Chairman, that involve the most degrading of procedures—everything that we hold of value—cleanliness, decency, and so on—their initiation ceremony or rite is designed to go the other way and have someone prove that these values have no meaning to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your last chart now, Judge?

Mr. WEBSTER. I believe it is, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you very much. Now, could you come back at 3 o'clock to continue?

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So we are going to recess now until 3 o'clock.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m., this same day.]

[Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the committee reconvened, Hon. Strom Thurmond, chairman, presiding.]

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Webster, I have a 3 o'clock meeting, and I will be back in a little bit. Senator Biden is here.

[Whereupon, Senator Biden assumed the chair.]

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order.

Hello, Judge, I hope you got a chance to get some lunch.

Mr. WEBSTER. I did, thank you, Senator, and some other things.

Senator BIDEN. Good—do you ever miss the days on the Bench—you do not have to answer that question. You are still under oath. [Laughter.]

Judge, I thought that Senator Thurmond asked a very penetrating and comprehensive set of questions, and although I am going to try not to cover—although it is going to appear as though I am covering the same ground, I will attempt to get additional information or a slightly different perspective. And again, anything at all that you feel would be better handled in an executive session, or just by personally briefing me in private, or any other member who is interested, please do not hesitate to say so.

Second, I realize—I assume—you are in a spot not unlike many of your predecessors—there have not been that many, actually—and your counterparts in government, which is that you have got to play by the rules, and the rules are that you make your pitch for dollars to your boss, and your boss in turn makes it to the big boss, through OMB, and the decision is made, and your place is not, then, to come up here and undercut the team effort. So I am not going to be asking you if you need more. The only thing I would ask you to do is do not lay on what you do not need. I mean, do not exaggerate the other way—not that you ever have, but I do not expect you to say, "Yes, Joe, you are right." And I was surprised you mentioned what you did about the Coast Guard. You were very gracious. When the chairman pointed out there are two new cutters, I just watched you quietly swallow. There are two new cutters. There need to be 22 new cutters.

But at any rate, I really, as I hope you have figured out in the time that you have been in two administrations, I do not think there is ever anything that the FBI has felt really important that I have not, at a minimum, been a willing listener, and also, a strong advocate.

So the questions I will ask you will get into coordination questions, and in some instances, you may be the wrong person to ask, because the implication will be there is no coordination—the implication that I will be making—and the implication will also be that that is happening on your watch. Well, you pointed out you are the new guy in the game. You have been told you are in the business now. So I do not expect now, any miracles.

And last, by way of general comment, to put my questions in what I hope the context I wish them to be considered, I think that there is real progress being made. I think the coordinating effort is better now than it was yesterday, and better yesterday than it was 6 months ago, and better 6 months ago than it was 2 years ago, and so on. So I am not suggesting by my questions—and this is not a setup—I am not suggesting that there is not progress being made.

One of the problems that we have on the policymaking end of this arrangement in government is what are, the facts so we do not go off, like we have a tendency to do—Democrat and Republican—and really not had all our facts. So, I may ask you some dull questions, too, for the record.

OK, having said all that, that was more for my benefit than yours, really; I felt obliged to say it. Let me begin by pointing out that your request for legislation providing source immunity from civil suits by amending the Federal Torts Claims Act, I have an open mind to, personally. And I suspect there may be able to be a proposal worked out whereby we could get the civil liberties community, who are usually upset about those kinds of things, and the FBI, which has reason to be upset about those kinds of things—I believe we may be able to get people who represent those inclinations in the Congress together on a piece of legislation that would be, most of what you want—and this is not a gratuitous statement—that agents need more protection. That is why I was successful in being able to get through a couple of times additional protection for CIA agents. In this case, you are talking about civil liability, but it is not totally dissimilar.

The other point I would like to make, and there is a lot of discussion about is this so-called drug czar or drug coordinator. I plan on attempting to pursue that, hopefully, with the bipartisan support we had before, and maybe be able to work out something that can speak to some of the objections that the Attorney General and you and others have. But I would like to work with you on that. As you will recall from the last administration, I was not particularly happy with the last administration's efforts on forfeiture, and I was not particularly happy with the training that prosecutors and in some cases, agents, were getting with regard to RICO. Well, maybe at a minimum, even if I fail in this Cabinet-level drug effort, it will keep a lot of pressure on a lot of agencies, that I think we would both admit, at least in the past, has not been as well-coordinated as any of us would like it to be.

But let me get to some specific questions. In the past several years, you have been able to point to a number of individual cases in which the Bureau has succeeded in toppling what are considered major bosses in the traditional organized crime families. In 1980, you announced convictions of major bosses in 14 cities; in 1982, your conviction rate for organized crime members was up again for that year; you have cited much of that to us today. However, from the big picture, we are still talking about roughly 25—Mafia families—or, I guess we do not call it that anymore—

Mr. WEBSTER. The LCN.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, LCN—I always think of underdeveloped countries when I hear LCN—and they are clearly not underdeveloped—LCN families that were identified back, several decades ago,

and probably in this very room, by McClellan and Kefauver. And the earnings of organized crime groups are now in the billions of dollars, as you have pointed out, with expansion in the areas of racketeering, corruption, gambling, and prostitution. My question is, how much progress—and I realize it is difficult to quantify—but how much progress have we really made in dismantling or disrupting the organizational structure of these groups, notwithstanding the very significant work that has been done in the recent past? How would you characterize it, in terms of really dismantling—or, is it unreasonable to think that we can dismantle any portion of that group of 25 families?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, it is a question that we ask ourselves repeatedly, and we see varying results for varying periods of time. I think one of the interesting areas to watch is Cleveland, because as a result of these convictions, we really have convicted the ranking hierarchy of members.

We were similarly effective in Los Angeles in the *Brooklier* case, but there, I think there may be some fundamental differences—location and types of criminal activity.

I would not be happy trying to give you a good weather reading right now, because we are just now beginning to experience some of the benefits of having penetrated beyond the street level criminal apparatus into some of the hierarchy, and we are just now beginning to see the impact of that, not only on the internal shaking up of the organization, the confusion and special problems that they are having as an enterprise, but also we are beginning to see the benefit of new information coming to us as a result of people no longer having blind confidence in the infallibility of the management. From that, I expect to see additional investigations which will keep the hammer pounding on these organizations. They have a remarkable capacity for survival. They were designed to provide for succession, designation of new leadership. You saw some of the charts, and absent an internal civil war—which happens from time to time and has happened in two or three of the organizations in the past year or two—absent that, the organizations have the machinery for designating successors, promotions in place, and that kind of thing. So I do not expect to see organizations fold and then we say, "Well, that one is gone," any more than I can say we have taken care of the FALN. We could take all the top players out of the FALN and still have four or five bombs, courtesy of San Juan or wherever else the new players come from. One of the things I did not mention this morning—and it was an oversight on my part, because it was in my prepared statement, but we did not really discuss it—is some of the new things that we are using which are quantitatively superior to old techniques.

The Organized Crime Information System, which is now in place in the Bureau, is a computerized intelligence system which we did not have a few years ago. I think the first city to go on line with it was Detroit in 1980. I went out to Detroit in 1979, and they were punching in the first information going into the first city. We now have the OCIS, as we call it, in place and functional in 29 key cities in the United States. Each of those cities have the capability, under a secure, coded system, of punching into our intelligence space, gathering information not just in their city, but in other

cities and other activities relative to individual players, and adding information to that base which is available to other cities. We are getting hits, we are getting identifications, we are getting leads on contacts that we were not aware of, or that as individual cities, we were not aware of when we used old-line, serial documentation files, with people going through, page by page, looking for something that might be helpful. We can use that index across the range of problems, on an analytical basis, that is giving us a lot of leads into and information, both for intelligence and for criminal investigations.

Again, you say, "Well, where are we, in terms of organized crime?" I think we are giant steps ahead of where we were a few years ago. It is going up geometrically, I guess is the proper way of putting it.

Looking at the nature of the convictions, there were something like less than 100 LCN associates convicted in 1981. That is a nice number, but it was less than 100 of the total number. Now there were almost 300 people convicted who were LCN associates. So we are not just getting little, inconsequential people who might have a fly-by-night association with an LCN organization of some kind, but we are getting players.

In terms of the damage that these people do to our society, to businesses, the violence that they are responsible for, I do not know that we have a means yet of measuring what our impact is going to be as a result of these things. But I think we are in the right direction. I do not want to make a filibuster, but I think we are headed in the right direction and that we are doing the things that we told you 2 years ago we would be doing, when we asked for the money to do it.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that concerns me a little bit is that the last administration and this administration, we all have a tendency to take credit for things that may have occurred before. Much of what you have said here today were efforts started by you and the fellows sitting behind you, 2 and 3 years ago, and in some cases, 5 and 6 years ago—sometimes even a little longer, maybe, but for a long while. And what I am a little worried about is what I believe happened after the French Connection was cracked. After the French Connection was cracked, there was a perceptible, measurable decrease in the amount of heroin in the country, the price went up, O.D.'s were down, and addition—it was measurable, and it had an impact, and was a great success. And I think we—we at this end, anyway—tended to sit back a little bit and say, "We got that one knocked."

I think the thing that you are pointing out to us about organized crime syndicates is that you have to constantly eradicate them. I mean, even if you eradicated all 25 tomorrow, it may be another 2 or 3 years before they are able to get back, and I am worried that we make sure we understand this is a continuing process. And to that end, this leads me into the area that I think we at this end—and at times, we have asked the GAO, an independent outfit, to go in and give assessments, and hearings have been conducted—an area in which we have not had as much success and used the tool as well as it was thought that it could be used, the area of forfeiture.

Now, on the forfeiture side, the rationale—and I would like you to correct me if you disagree with this—I firmly believe to be true is that the forfeiture tool was designed to be able to cripple—not merely that the Government wanted their money or wanted a fine, but to cripple the organization. Now, there were some aspects to the forfeiture statute which we corrected, unfortunately, as part of that package that was vetoed. But we will be back, and we will correct it again and pass it. But from the time of the Kefauver investigations through Senator McClellan and Senator Thurmond, who has been here a long time, we decided that forfeiture was a very valuable tool. We have increased the use of forfeiture. But one of the things that I worry about is in Cleveland, for example, you have done a heck of a job, and you have knocked off—a poor choice of words—you have convicted some high-ranking members of the organization, and you probably have, at least temporarily, if not crippled, put a real kink in their style. But to what extent would it have made a difference if you were able to have had a significant impact on their asset base, those legitimate businesses that they pour that money into? Is money the thing that keeps the family going and together?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I think it unquestionably is. There may be some other emotional factors, but money is what it is all about. And I agree with you that forfeiture has an impact. It is my idea that in organized crime and in drugs, the players are looking for an edge, a competitive edge, in the drugs—of course, it is all illegal—but there are other legitimate enterprises, whether it is a casino or a restaurant or vending machines. They are looking for some way to have a competitive advantage over their competitors that does not have to be legal. So their objective is to wedge in more and more interests in various business enterprises. But forfeiture raises the cost of doing business for them, maybe puts them out of business. It certainly takes the edge away from them if that is part of the risk of doing business their way. And we have had, as you know, some difficulty in persuading the courts that RICO as drafted, the RICO forfeiture provision laws, were as broad as we thought Congress intended them to be. And there has been some whittling away at what we can seize. As I understand, there is no provision for a restraining order now to stop somebody from moving their assets around, pending the process of forfeiture, and if those assets move out of and away from the enterprise itself, that a number of courts have held that they have no authority to seize—no substitute assets—there has to be an exact tracing of illegal money and a seizure of that kind. I do not have all of those cases clearly out in front of me in my mind, but I do know that we saw a need to clarify congressional intent with respect to the scope of the seizure provisions, that they could be broadened to make the sting more than just that which we could identify as coming from an illegal source and going into an enterprise.

Senator BIDEN. As you know, we did that. Again, we passed it, and I suspect we will be able to pass it again, and it will be signed independently by the President.

But in the Cleveland case, do you have any estimate, or any of the people with you, or you could supply it for the record—it would be nice if you had it now, though—any estimate of the total assets

of that organization in dollars? I mean, do you have any notion of that?

Mr. WEBSTER. I am not able to suggest one, and I am under oath. [Conferring with staff.]

Senator BIDEN. The total assets of the Cleveland organization.

Mr. WEBSTER. May I supply that for the record?

Senator BIDEN. I would appreciate it if you could. I doubt whether you have a precise accounting by any stretch of the imagination—but I assume you have some sense of the size and scope of the assets they have available to them.

And along those lines, rather than pursue it now, what I would like to do—and I will submit these for your consideration—I would like to know—and the Cleveland case is sort of a case study. As to what your estimate of the total assets is; were the prosecutions RICO prosecutions? If so, were their forfeiture counts in the indictment? If so, what success have you had with the forfeiture counts and with forfeiture? I would like to talk about the percentage of total assets—and I will submit these in writing to you—of the organization that are likely to become part of the U.S. Treasury; and if forfeiture was not pursued, why was it not pursued—there may be good reasons for it; and if it was not pursued, is not possible that the assets are still intact, doesn't that provide the wherewithal to keep the organization intact from behind bars? We have been operating, as you well know—in the Senate back in 1970 or thereabouts the RICO statute was passed, the late sixties or early seventies—and we thought that was a super tool. And the super tool has not borne the fruit. Obviously, part of it is because we have not changed, and the courts have had a different interpretation.

But if we can get some hard facts on that, and I think an appropriate case study from our perspective, how useful it is or is not, would be the Cleveland case.

Mr. WEBSTER. I would be glad to supply it for the record. I am informed that the Cleveland case was a RICO murder and extortion was the basis for the investigation, and there were no assets in that case. But I will find out for certain and give you a report.

[The following was subsequently supplied for the record:]

Informant information has indicated that the Cleveland LCN has invested in vending companies, Las Vegas casinos, landfills, real estate, contracting firms, home builders, banks, and other enterprises. This information however has not had the specificity required to put a dollar value on these assets.

The prosecutions were not under the RICO Statute but rather were under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute. Using the forfeiture provisions of the CCE Statute, the following forfeitures were made during the most recent Cleveland LCN family prosecutions:

Item	Value
1. 1978 Cadillac and 1980 Jeep	\$20,000 (estimated).
2. 98-acre farm and house in Cambridge, Ohio	Purchase price in 1978 was \$50,000.
3. Jewelry.....	\$900,000 (estimated).

Efforts to forfeit Angelo Lonardo's house failed.

Other Cleveland LCN family prosecutions from 1978 through 1982 were based on murder and bribery. No forfeiture attempts were made as no assets could be identified in the context of the predicate violations nor the enterprise.

RICO STATUTE

Senator BIDEN. And you showed us a number of charts this morning with identification of organized crime families. If you could give us similar information, not with every one of them, but with some of them—you have had a good track record of people you have gotten at the top of the organizations lately. If RICO is useful but not as powerful a tool as we think, we had better be thinking of something else. But we are still operating under the assumption that if it were adjusted and pursued vigorously, it could really make an impact. Well, if we are wrong about that, we would really like to know.

Mr. WEBSTER. I think you are correct about that. We are very pleased to have RICO. I suppose my concern is that we use it carefully, because we are going to see, I think predictably, courts getting tough with us if we bring cases under RICO that really warrant the extra time, additional courtroom time, and so on, under the RICO statute. We just had an adverse decision a couple of days ago with the second circuit which denied us the use of RICO in terrorist cases. That is another subject. It is based on a statutory construction of what did the Congress intend, and we had thought we had found an enormously helpful new way to get at the real violence peddlers, particularly in the New York area and we tried a group of Croations under RICO as a criminal enterprise. We got a favorable ruling on that subject in the district court, but the second circuit held that they were violent, yes, but corrupt, no.

So we are beginning to see courts take a narrowing view of RICO. Of course, we had problems in the sixth circuit over whether the enterprise had to be legitimate or it could be legitimate, separate and distinction from—

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Mr. WEBSTER. That is straightened out.

Senator BIDEN. That is one of the things, I think, that we have been able to straighten out in legislation, although again, not pass.

BRUNO MURDER IN PHILADELPHIA

Let me be a little bit parochial for a minute and switch to my region of the country and a city that impacts significantly on my whole State, which is Philadelphia. In the Philadelphia area, there have been major changes in the structure of organized crime. Some argue that the 17 murders—believe it is 17—that followed the murder of Angelo Bruno represent a sign of real division and lack of central control of that Philadelphia-based LCN. Some law enforcement people have even suggested that during the past 2 years, they have learned more about organized crime activities in Philadelphia because of the feuding that has gone on.

I wonder if you are in a position to give me now, and if not, for the record, your assessment of what is happening in the Philadelphia area and why.

Mr. WEBSTER. What I say now can be supplemented by closed session or private briefing later on. I do not want to describe too much of it, and I do not know how much detail I actually—

Senator BIDEN. Fine.

Mr. WEBSTER. As you know, there have been some important deaths in the Philadelphia area, starting with the Bruno murder, I suppose, and then the Testa group in place and competing. It is not unlike the wars that are going on in St. Louis at the present time, and some of the internal struggles within the Bonanno family, in which a number of the players in the two factions—in fact, one faction just about wiped out the other faction within the Bonanno family, and that is one of the reasons we got Joe Pistone out of the investigation and went with the case.

There have also been some significant convictions there in Philadelphia. I never say the name right, but it is Monterano, is an outgrowth of the Limestone operation, in which we have looked at drug trafficking by Philadelphia LCN figures—I think I missed the point I was about to make—

Senator BIDEN. While you are thinking of that, let me pursue one other aspect of the Philadelphia situation—

Mr. WEBSTER. I was going to say that despite this breaking up and the feuding going on, and despite the inroads that we have made with convictions, we still find people who are potential victims; that is, organized crime associates who could be the next victim, who refuse to do anything about it, accept it as a way of life and an order of life, and want to live and die with class, as they say. I think that is an interesting phenomenon. We are getting both people who will cooperate and those who are sailing right on through, as if the old world were still around.

Senator BIDEN. Atlantic City.

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Atlantic City is assumed by many Delaware and southeastern Pennsylvania law enforcement officials to be primarily the province of Philadelphia, in terms of organized crime groups. Is that accurate?

Mr. WEBSTER. No; I do not think so. We are getting into areas where I probably should ask to have you briefed privately or in closed session.

Senator BIDEN. OK. I will ask the question for the record and we can put it in the executive session.

Mr. WEBSTER. There are people in Philadelphia who think so.

Senator BIDEN. Yes; I understand what you are saying. Because what confused me a bit was in your 12 regional groups you set up, you have Baltimore and Philadelphia, which make sense, it seems to me, but Atlantic City is not part of that task force, and I did not quite understand why—at least, that is how I have been briefed. But maybe you could for the record or in executive session tell me a little bit about that.

Mr. WEBSTER. That has something to do with it, yes.

Senator BIDEN. Speaking of charts, I had a chart—and I apologize for how rough it is, but we did not get the Attorney General's testimony until this morning—and I am a little confused about it. And although it is not totally your making, it does relate to your

responsibilities and the FBI. It is in the guidelines for the task forces—do you have that?

Mr. WEBSTER. I am familiar with it, but I did not bring it with me.

Senator BIDEN. Well, as I understand it, the way these task forces are going to be set up is, you have the U.S. attorney, district drug enforcement, task force attorney, core city task force coordinator, task force coordinating group—and you could have a strike force, also, within the same area.

My question is, What happens if you have an agent who, in fact, is out there, and the agent determines that he or she wants to proceed on a particular case, a particular individual? Do they have to go to the U.S. attorney, and then does the U.S. attorney get clearance from or make a recommendation to the district drug enforcement, and then do they have to go to the task force? Take me through a case, because you look at it and say, "Holy God, I do not understand how it works." Can you take me through what happens when one of your agents says, "I want to move on so-and-so." What does that person have to do?

Mr. WEBSTER. Before I do, if I could say what this process is all about. This process is intended to feed into the task force system significant, appropriate drug investigations with organized crime connotations. One purpose is to be able to demonstrate to you and to others that the additional funds were properly utilized for what they were said to be for, which was a significant drug investigation and prosecution.

There are presently out there more investigations that we could start and run as task force investigations than there are resources in the task forces. So that we are coming into this on a carefully modulated, ramp-up basis, to feed those in and to staff up the task forces with agents and prosecutors who have experience in this area.

FUNDS

Senator BIDEN. I do not suppose you would be willing to tell us how many are out there, ready to go, that you do not have the funds for—because I guarantee you I will move to get you the funds—but I guess you do not want to get in that spot, do you?

Mr. WEBSTER. You would do what on getting the funds?

Senator BIDEN. I guarantee you, the moment you tell me how many additional resources you need to move on what is out there, along with the Senator from South Carolina, I will introduce legislation the next day and probably get it passed through here to get you that additional money. But I guess you do not want to tell me how much additional money you would like to have.

Mr. WEBSTER. May I take your offer home with me and see what I can do at home?

Senator BIDEN. Yes, please do, because that is the whole point we have been trying to make. But anyway, go ahead.

Mr. WEBSTER. So, having that in mind, and having in mind, too, that there are other agencies involved—Customs and others—who may want to participate in this effort, we have to have a method by which these cases would first be accepted and then coordinated.

The Attorney General's view and mine is that the task force coordinator is kind of a surrogate for the U.S. attorney, who is the core city U.S. attorney. There is one core city U.S. attorney in each of these regions. We did not want them running investigations or running prosecutions, but coordinating them. So we did not want to set up an entire, new recordkeeping system of every kind of investigation that was out there, so we used the principle of nominating, knowing that that is where the resources are, so we are not going to have any problem getting people to present cases for acceptance by the task force because that is where the money is to run the investigations. So we do not think that that is a problem, but it provides a nominating system where we would nominate a case, and then, if this were in a core city, it would all be handled at the core city level; if it were not at core city, but at one of the other districts within the region, then the U.S. attorney would say, "I agree, that is a task force case." Now, before I go on—

Senator BIDEN. Why are you having to operate on such tenterhooks? Why do you have to be so sensitive—and I do not mean you, personally, but why is this chart set up to be—obviously, what you are explaining to me reflects a sensitivity of making sure you do not step on toes and/or outstrip resources.

Mr. WEBSTER. I suppose it is borne of a lot of considerations. The Department wants to keep a very tight control over the resources. They are finite, and we do not want to be dumping second-class cases into this effort or working things that are not in the category that we were talking about.

Now, what is a task force case? I think we did not really address that. I think that fundamentally—

Senator BIDEN. Something else, just keep in mind, we spent \$9 billion not to grow crops. We spend one-fifth of that—one-fifth—for the task forces, we are spending what—I became a lawyer because I was not bright enough to be a mathematician—but we spend a whole \$127 million. I do not know why the hell you guys do not ask for what you need. We will give you a couple of billion dollars. You think I am kidding; I am not. You can get through the U.S. Congress money that would double the funding, not merely of this task force, but of the entire Federal law enforcement effort in this country, which is totally \$2.5 billion if you count the judges.

But anyway, go ahead. That is our frustration. That is why I keep getting mad about this whole thing.

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, of course, you realize—and I am sure you do—that this task force is the first time we have had an infusion of new money, and it came at a time when there were substantial risks of whether we were busting the budget, and there were a lot of problems in the last special session. So we were very glad to have what we could get out of it, but we know that we are going to have to husband it and that we will be very accountable to you and to others as to how we use that money, because people will want to know that it was used wisely.

Senator BIDEN. By the way, just to put you at ease. I cannot think of a single U.S. Senator who is going to be calling you up and saying, "How did you spend that \$127 million?" They may call up in terms if they believe the money was spent in violation of civil liberties or civil rights; that is a different thing. But in terms of the

budgetary aspects of it, every one of us up here on this committee knows it is not a drop in the bucket. We do not even call up admirals to ask them why they have a cost overrun of \$2 billion on a ship, let alone are we going to call you up and call you on the carpet. So do not worry about us. I mean, be a little bit loose, seriously. If they are telling you downtown that,

One of the reasons you have got to be close to this is because you know how those guys are up there; they are really going to put you on the carpet and want to know exactly how you spent that money.

We trust your judgment. Do not worry about that. You have carte blanche from this side of the aisle, and I expect that if the Senator from South Carolina were here, he would say exactly the same thing. So anyway, let us move that one out of the way. Really and truly. I am not talking about civil liberties now; I am talking about the fiscal responsiveness of your expenditure of \$127 million.

Mr. WEBSTER. All right. Fair enough.

So what we do is the agent who is nominally a task force agent or will become a task force agent when his project is accepted brings the case to the U.S. attorney and says,

I think that is appropriate for task force, appropriate because it is going to involve a number of agencies; we are going to need the help of Customs, we are going to need some other things, we are going to need to work together.

Or it is going to involve a significant relationship to organized crime, and the strike force attorney or the U.S. attorney is going to have to be involved in this from an early stage, and there will be a grand jury, and it is a very appropriate case for a task force.

All right. He runs that one through the core city U.S. attorney's task force coordinator, down at the bottom of your chart.

Senator BIDEN. Right here, core city task force coordinator. All right.

Mr. WEBSTER. That is the simple mechanism, and if we were using a czar approach, I suppose that would be the end of it. What we have also done is built in the capability for agencies to participate collectively in discussions of what is appropriate, what kind of resources are going to be involved, and that is what those working groups are that you see. They are not going to move in a staff of people to be a working group. This is very much like the law enforcement coordinating committees out in the field. They come together when they are called together, to try to develop a better sense of cooperation. I have seen this level of cooperation go up, and I am sure you have, too. In the last year or 2, when people were putting out stories about, the other guy will not work with me, and they sit down together, they find that that makes a lot of difference.

Senator BIDEN. I am sure.

Mr. WEBSTER. So it is a vehicle for eliminating those rough spots, but it is not a management tool. The coordinator approves—

Senator BIDEN. The agent would go down to the core city—

Mr. WEBSTER. He says, OK. Task force, you are going to need x agents, and so on. It is a way of keeping track of what the task force has budgeted. From then on, it is managed by the investigative agency, and they are working with—

Senator BIDEN. When you say the investigative agency, what does that mean?

Mr. WEBSTER. FBI, DEA, if they brought it in; they are running it. That agent reports to his SAC, he ties it in with his other investigative effort. His time is allocated to the task force; the resources that are spent are allocated to the task force—when I say “he,” we are talking about as many as are in the team. There is a U.S. attorney or an assistant U.S. attorney who is assigned to the investigation. That means he is available to help advise on the need for wiretaps, the adequacy of the probable cause—the other range of things that would normally be done in a U.S. attorney’s office.

Senator BIDEN. What prevents the agent from going straight to the task force and bypassing all of this, if there is a task force in the region?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, that is the task force. You are looking at the task force.

Senator BIDEN. Excuse me. Did I say “task force”? I meant to say strike force. I beg your pardon.

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. What prevents the agent from going straight to the strike force?

Mr. WEBSTER. I suppose that nothing prevents him from going straight to the strike force, except that I believe the guideline provisions—they have a special section on the strike force—tie him into that operation. If he goes to the strike force attorney and wants to work the investigation that way, it is worked out of our organized crime funds. If he goes to the task force, it is funded out of task force funds.

Senator BIDEN. Will this allow sort of forum shopping?

Mr. WEBSTER. No, I do not think so, because the pressure is going to be to get access to the task force resources.

Senator BIDEN. I am not sure I object to the forum shopping, but one of the things in the GAO report was that, as related to the success of the strike forces, pointed out that there is some prosecution shopping, that if the U.S. attorney did not particularly like the candidate, that they would move on.

Mr. WEBSTER. That has occurred, and it has not necessarily been all bad, especially when convictions come out of that effort. But in this case, there is not going to be any competition between the strike force attorney and the task forces, because if the cases are worthy cases, we are going to want access to those resources. Otherwise, we are just digging into our organized crime budget.

Senator BIDEN. Now, you are going to have to sort of backfill a little bit here, aren’t you, in terms of personnel?

Mr. WEBSTER. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. I assume—and I am stating the obvious, but I should state it for the record, to make sure I am correct—as these task forces, in fact, are geared up and agents are moved into the task forces, those new positions that were mentioned by the Attorney General, I assume you are going to be finding those folks from existing stock, if you will—

Mr. WEBSTER. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. And then you are going to have to go in and fill in after. Now, can you tell us anything about your game plan and how you are going to proceed to do that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Webster, if you will excuse Senator Biden, if we could take a 2-minute recess, I need to take up an emergency matter with him.

Mr. WEBSTER. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[Short recess.]

Senator BIDEN. With regard to those new hires, how do you plan on proceeding?

Mr. WEBSTER. The Attorney General has just fixed the initial number of positions allocated to the Bureau and to DEA and to Customs and to the other agencies, as well as the number of prosecutors who will be assigned to task force work. From that we are now able, and we have been anticipating it somewhat, to phase this into our new class of instruction planning for the FBI Academy at Quantico. We will know how many additional new positions we can grant, that is, appointments we can make to the Bureau, to bring in new people through our regular recruiting process. They will fill in, as we do in the case of death or retirement or transfer, in appropriate places throughout the country, and these younger ones will now be taking the positions of the ones assigned to drugs. It will be a management/personnel flow process on reassignments with a minimum amount of transfers, but within a division, where people will be assigned and reassigned as necessary.

In our case, the FBI in the last year committed about 500 work years to drugs that we had not previously committed.

Senator BIDEN. Can I ask you about work years?

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Can you get 500 work years out of 350 people?

Mr. WEBSTER. No. It is more likely 500 work years out of about 1,100 people. I think it works the other way, depending upon how many people you are using. But in our case, the running of leads in outlying districts or divisions, when somebody is trying to check something out, there are usually substantially more people involved in the number of work years than there are work years. They are not working full-time in a particular program; they are being assigned to a number of things.

We had generated 500 work years in drugs with no additional resources. That is to say, we were asked to get into the drug business, we got into the drug business, a very substantial commitment with no resources. Most of those resources came out of the organized crime package program, and the resources that were made available to us by the Congress for organized crime work, and it is all organized crime related. But about 166 of those 500 positions came from other programs, because we could not maintain our organized crime program and use it exclusively for drugs.

We will expect under the guidelines to recapture those positions.

Senator BIDEN. In what areas did you most suffer?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, because the smaller programs would be destroyed if you took numbers out of those, they mostly came out of the two other largest-priority programs, white collar crime and for-

eign counter-intelligence. So particularly the foreign counter-intelligence has to be restored promptly.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Mr. WEBSTER. So that is part of the negotiated understanding with the Department, that as we get the additional positions, we will continue to maintain the level of drug commitment that we have, with the exception that we will recapture those 166 positions in the positions for which they were budgeted.

Senator BIDEN. I appreciate your going into that kind of detail because notwithstanding the fact that there was a loss of personnel during the last administration, the implication has been—not by you, but by others—that there has been a fairly steady increase here. And the fact of the matter is, although you have geared up to get into the drug business, other things have suffered, and now what we are talking about is essentially bringing you back, not a little more, but back to the spot where you should have been.

With regard to the amount of personnel, we are hearing now—and again, it is of no great secret to anyone that some of the people on my staff, usually through the staff, and I am sure on majority staff, on occasion have access to or are sought out by disgruntled personnel, and in many cases with justification, and in many cases not. But what we are hearing from folks—not a lot; I do not want to overexaggerate it—but we are hearing from some folks in the field that notwithstanding, because of the hollering that was going on by the Senator from South Carolina and myself and a dozen others about cutting agents in the last budget, and not just with FBI but DEA, that that was stopped, in effect, and in order to work with the same dollars and fewer resources, agents were doing their own typing that they did not do before, and are doing clerical things that they did not have to do before, things that support staff did before, followup work within the office. This was primarily DEA. First of all, is that correct, or is that just blarney, and if not, is it going to be rectified?

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I think we want to be sure, and I do not know the specifics of that as to DEA. I can certainly make it my business, and will, to find out. But we want to make the most effective use of fairly high-priced manpower, and FBI agents are about the equivalent of an Army colonel in compensation. We do not want them doing things that could be done more effectively by others, at less cost to the Government.

At the same time, I know the agents, and if they are on a hot investigation, they are going to do whatever it takes to keep that investigation going. There was a time, which has passed, I think, when we were all at short hooks on access to certain things, and DEA was having some experience and some problems with fuel and gasoline. I think we are past those problems.

Senator BIDEN. I just want you to know that as recently as the last couple of weeks, we still are being told that because of the pressure that was coming from this end, there was a judgment made that cuts of agents should be limited and that there however has resulted a shortage in support personnel in many offices, and the shortage in support personnel has allegedly resulted in agents spending a lot more time off the street than on the street, along

the lines you are saying, not the best use of their time. And I really would appreciate if you would follow up on that—

Mr. WEBSTER. I will follow up on that.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Because at first when I heard the last time about lack of funds for gasoline and transportation—we got that through a working agent—and my staff came to me with that and I said, "It must be someone who did not get a raise who is saying that," and that turned out to be, in some cases, true. So I really would appreciate it if you could follow that.

Mr. WEBSTER. I will follow through on that.

One of the additional benefits we are getting out of this package is a long overdue help on privacy on our radio circuitry. It is vital to the safety of the men. Anybody who had a Bearcat Scanner could listen to what the FBI was doing on a surveillance or a hostage situation or a drug investigation, and this will help us mightily.

It is always interesting to me to hear, when I go out in the field and visit with the agents and ask what they need, and next week, I am having a committee of street agents in to be sure I hear what the street agents' problems are, and not just through the bureaucratic system and chain of command. They usually are talking about the sorts of things that you have mentioned and this sort of thing. They want to do their jobs well, and they do not want to be encumbered by a lack of something they need. They are not hitting me for higher pay raises—even though they have earned them—they want the equipment to do their jobs.

Senator BIDEN. That has been my experience, and I think it is a mistake, by the way, for us to be freezing the wages, but that is another problem.

Mr. Chairman, I have several more questions, but if you have a question—

The CHAIRMAN. No. Go ahead.

Senator BIDEN. I am not sure you are the fellow to ask this question of. I will make it as a statement, and if you would like to comment on it, fine; for the record. One of the things that concerns me is—and again, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of this, because it is sometimes hard for us to get our fingers on the numbers here—but the chart that I have, which I will submit for the record, lists the following agencies: DEA, FBI, U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, Customs, Tobacco and Firearms, IRS, Coast Guard, INS, and Secret Service. And it takes the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, and it lists total personnel within those agencies, and then it lists percent of change from 1981 to 1983, either up or down. It lists you at 19,306 in 1981 and 19,048 in 1983—which does not include the task force additions. And then it lists the total, without giving all the numbers, and it suggests that the percent of change working in the agencies that would have some impact upon the drug question, and notes that you are half a percent below what you were in 1981. I am going to submit that for the record. As you pointed out, we have got the Coast Guard down almost 10 percent, in terms of personnel; I do not know what their overall funding number is. But you might, if you are willing, comment on how you think the numbers affect your overall effort. That is a very broad question, but the sense of what I have is that notwithstanding the fact that we

are talking a lot about it—and we are being better coordinated, and there is some progress being made—that we are just having people operate on too few resources.

And again, I want to put it in focus. To give you an example, there is no stronger defender of the national defense than the man sitting to my right and the Senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, of the Armed Services Committee—both of the Armed Services Committee. Sam Nunn has committed, and the Senator by his votes has committed—specifically—that we would be willing, in fact, if we were sure the money would go into this fight and into law enforcement agencies, to take a percentage out of the defense budget. And you do not have to take much out. And by the way, I think we need an increase in defense. You do not have to take much out to make a quantum change in this.

So I just wonder if you could give me—and again, it may be that I should just stop by in the middle of the night and get you on your stairway and ask you about it—but really and truly, I respect your judgment, and I would like your honest assessment of what kind of impact lack of increases had upon the effort. Maybe it does not. Maybe they are all clerks.

Mr. WEBSTER. Well, all favors are greatly received in this area, and you really have to take the graph back to 1976 and watch us go down 800 agents, and we are bottoming out.

Senator BIDEN. That is right, almost 900.

Mr. WEBSTER. The end figures—and I could point to a problem that I run into, and I will do it as briefly as I can—while it shows a slight decrease last year over the previous year, what that was was a reflection of the fact that we were never sufficiently funded for the positions we were granted.

Senator BIDEN. Right.

Mr. WEBSTER. There would be an uncontrollable increase in salary, an automatic cost-of-living increase, but no additional funds, and so you would take that out of existing payroll. So that is really saying, "You are authorized this many positions, but you have this fewer amount of dollars to pay for them." So it was an unrealistic figure that we tried to adjust. And I do believe we probably have a few more people onboard at this time than we had last year at this time. However, all favors are gratefully received.

Senator BIDEN. You fare better than most of the other agencies on this.

Mr. WEBSTER. We have to recognize that.

Senator BIDEN. And I am not suggesting you should not. I am suggesting that you should have fared better and that all the rest should have fared a lot better. I will pursue one last line of questioning, again relating to coordination. I, as you know, sit on the Intelligence Committee and have been on that committee since its inception. I

requested of the chairman, Senator Goldwater, before the recess an extensive hearing on drugs in closed session, having all the intelligence agencies coming up to testify, as you know. Obviously, it is not the appropriate place to go into the detail that was presented. But it is not inappropriate to say, and it is not a violation of any security interest or a violation or a breach of faith on my part to say what no one could fail to conclude from those hearings, and that is, the intelligence agencies, although increasing coordination have organized crime and drugs as low as they can go on the scope in terms of percentage of dollars that are committed to the effort from their perspective, the ability of you to access them, and their candid assessment of their desire to be involved in this ball game.

Mr. WEBSTER. We are getting more help, and it has been valuable help, particularly in international transactions, and I think that I cannot dispute what you have said. I think it is probably true, but there is a reason that probably needs to be said, and without saying who is right and who is wrong.

The intelligence community tends to want to shy away from supplying information which leads to criminal action and may implicate the source of that information.

Senator BIDEN. I agree, I agree.

Mr. WEBSTER. And it is a tough dilemma.

Senator BIDEN. It is a very, very tough dilemma, and it is one that they have resolved until recently, uniformly, on the side of protecting the source and the method. And that is what was the whole purpose of gray mail legislation, to get at some of that, and that is the reason why I have been harping for so long about the need for someone—someone—to be able to pass that.

I mean, it would be nice, I would respectfully suggest, Judge, if with certain information DEA is able to supply—because they do have some very, very good people around the world, whom I have had occasion to visit with on location—it would be very nice if their intelligence could be followed up and confirmed by, on occasion, dealing with NSA. Well, that is a major, major, major undertaking, and obviously, if Director Casey calls the final shot on that, of allocation of what is a limited resource, he is going to rightfully make the judgment that troop movements in El Salvador are more important than crop yields in Pakistan.

So again, not so much for comment, but to reiterate to you why I keep pressing this matter, is that it is a natural instinct of every agency to protect what their first instinct is and their first responsibility. And although you have additional cooperation from the Navy now, the Navy is not all that happy about the cooperation. They would just as soon not have it happen on their watches. They are not sitting back there saying, "God bless it, this is wonderful. Aren't we glad we are now in the business, and they passed Posse Comitatus, and the screen at Egland is available for us"—at least, they are not telling me that. They are cooperating. I understand that.

I guess I should end it here, because I am keeping you very long. My problem is even if you and the general are correct, that you are well on your way to coordinating this as well as any concentration of power in one person could produce, you are not going to be there forever, nor is the general going to be there forever. And the next

administration, whether it occurs in 2 years or 6 years, may have new players and new interests, and I guarantee you the turf wars will be back again. Wars may be an exaggeration.

So it is in that context that I want to pursue this. If I were out there, involved in any one of the agencies I just read off, and I were worried—which they probably all are—if I thought from any one of those agencies that Biden might be successful in this effort, I would rate the reason to be concerned, you having the least reason, moving on up the line to agencies I will not identify, because really, what I am talking about is moving more of it your way and the Justice Department's way. And I really think eventually someone in the administration—is going to have to do that.

I have a lot more that I had wanted to pursue with you, but I looked up, and it is 4:20 p.m., and you have been here all day. And if the chairman does not have anymore questions, unless there is something specific you think I should raise, I will submit the rest in writing.

I am not being gratuitous, and I want to say again for the record that I respect you and your agency very much, and I appreciate that every time I have ever asked you a question at any time, you have given me a candid answer. That is not to suggest that I am not going to try to use some of your candid answers against you in the sense of forcing you to take more money for various things that I am confident you need, even though you are not willing to argue that you do at this point.

Thanks an awful lot, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you.

Mr. Director, we want to take this opportunity to thank you for your presence and the splendid testimony that you have presented at this hearing. We feel it will be valuable to this committee and will be helpful in the fight that we are waging against crime.

We will also ask you to convey to the distinguished Attorney General our appreciation for his presence here, and the excellent testimony that he gave today.

You are now excused.

Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:39 a.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Staff present: Duke Short, chief investigator; William Christensen, senior investigator; Allan Spence, investigator; Robert M. Reiley, investigator; and Mary Lynn Batson, investigative clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STROM THURMOND

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today, the Judiciary Committee resumes its hearings on organized crime. Due to the deleterious effect of organized crime on the social fabric of the Nation and the extent of control it exercises over so many facets of society, this committee realizes that nothing except an in-depth inquiry can illustrate the danger of this enigmatic problem.

Several weeks ago at our first hearing, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI outlined programs and activities of the Department of Justice in dealing with organized crime from the Federal Government's position. Attorney General Smith and Director Webster illustrated before the committee the grim reality of organized crime and at the same time showed that there is light at the end of the tunnel.

The Reagan administration is making an all-out effort in the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking. This committee is cautious but optimistic that the war on organized crime will now become an offensive rather than a defensive battle. Success can only be obtained through a bipartisan effort of the Congress and the executive branch of Government working hand in hand. That effort, coupled with the hard work of the many dedicated State, Federal, and local law enforcement agencies, will send a message to the organized crime groups and the purveyors of drugs that the people of the United States will no longer tolerate the destructive efforts of their criminal behavior.

Under the rules of the Senate, this committee has jurisdiction over Federal criminal matters and the Justice Department. The proliferation of organized crime groups and the seeming resilience of their membership structures to law enforcement efforts raise questions concerning the adequacy of various Federal criminal laws. These include the racketeering statute, forfeiture provisions,

bail laws, and controlled substances offenses. During the course of these hearings, this committee will explore the need for legislative activity in these and other areas to make Federal criminal law a more effective tool against the mob. Furthermore, as part of our responsibility to oversee the operations of the Justice Department, we will be examining its efforts in this area, particularly its attempts to coordinate the fight against organized crime with the States.

We are pleased to have with us today Col. Justin Dintino, Executive Officer of the New Jersey State Police. Colonel Dintino has been a member of the New Jersey State Police since 1952 and has served in numerous assignments in the area of criminal investigations. Colonel Dintino, as intelligence bureau supervisor, was instrumental in the introduction of sophisticated organized crime analysis methods. The intelligence bureau under his direction created guidelines for public dissemination of domestic intelligence, which have been adopted by a number of law enforcement agencies throughout the country.

Colonel Dintino has received numerous commendations including one from Scotland Yard for his contributions to the professional development of criminal management functions. Under his command, the special staff section of the New Jersey State Police created the casino gambling bureau. This bureau was established with the cooperation of the Division of Gaming Enforcement in the State of New Jersey. As a result, over 100 State police personnel have been assigned to initiate in-depth investigations of prospective casino applicants.

Colonel Dintino has written several articles which have been printed in a variety of law enforcement publications on the subject of organized crime, and he was recently appointed a book reviewer for the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Colonel Dintino, we are pleased to have you with us today. We thank you for coming and we will now be glad to hear from you.

I will swear you in, sir, and your associate in the event he is going to have anything to say, if you will both hold up your hands.

The testimony you give in these hearings will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel DINTINO. I do, sir.

Mr. MARTENS. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF COL. JUSTIN J. DINTINO, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, ACCOMPANIED BY DETECTIVE SFC. FRED MARTENS, NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your kind remarks and I would like to introduce to my right Detective Sfc. Fred Martens. He is my administrative assistant and he also supervises the analytical unit of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau.

At this point, I would like to read my prepared statement.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation to testify before this distinguished committee on an issue that I believe is of national significance, organized crime. I personally support the objectives of this committee and others which seek to expose the nefarious activities of organized crime. I believe that the law enforcement commu-

nity has an obligation to educate society to the deleterious effect of organized crime and this committee is a viable forum to do just that.

I have been a member of the New Jersey State Police for 30 years, having served my last 15 in positions which supervised the operations of our intelligence bureau, organized crime and narcotic bureaus. In addition, I am currently the general chairman of the law enforcement intelligence unit and serve on the policy board of the Middle Atlantic Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network. In these positions, I have been afforded a unique opportunity to have access to intelligence data and investigative data delineating the scope and structure of organized crime in New Jersey and nationally as well. This access has permitted me to arrive at certain conclusions about the nature and dimensions of organized crime which is generally unavailable to the public.

Before I address the structure and dimensions of organized crime in New Jersey, I believe it is appropriate that I temper my testimony with several qualifications, all of which reflect on the quality of our organized crime program in New Jersey.

First, while I realized that New Jersey has over the years developed a national reputation as a State infested with organized crime, I believe that this perception is unwarranted today. It is unfortunate that when a State seeks to identify a problem, in this case organized crime, an unfavorable reputation is generated as your effectiveness increases. In our case, New Jersey had a terrible organized crime problem in the 1950's and 1960's. Through the foresight and courage of several attorney's general—Kugler, Hyland, Degnan, Zazzali, and most recently Attorney General Kimelman—and former Colonel Kelly and the present superintendent, Colonel Pagano, we were afforded the unique opportunity to ferret out organized crime regardless of where it led us politically. The seventies were years that demonstrated our success. The indictments of numerous traditional organized crime figures, the flight of several others to avoid testimony before our State Commission of Investigation and the convictions of corrupt political figures. Such a record is impressive, but it regrettably creates an unwarranted negative perception about the quality of life in New Jersey. Suffice it to say, New Jersey law enforcement has exercised the courage and determination to address a problem that is often hidden or ignored in other jurisdictions. The fact that I am permitted to testify and present data before this committee is yet another example of our sincerity and our commitment to address this problem.

Second, I would like to point out that while I shall focus on what we refer to as traditional organized crime, the Mafia or more appropriately Cosa Nostra, this is not to suggest that Italian Americans have a monopoly on organized crime. We have identified other ethnic groups who are equally as important in organized crime, and we should not minimize their significance. In some respects, we in law enforcement do a disservice to the public when we equate the Mafia to organized crime for there are many other criminal networks that are functioning void of the Mafia sanction that have or are engaged in far higher levels of internecine violence and are equally as deleterious to the social fabric of the com-

munity. Thus, while I shall address traditional organized crime, it must be pointed out that this only represents one dimension of the overall problem.

Third, let me indicate that the family members that will caption the structure of these various criminal networks represent those family leaders who were former bosses. That is, while I shall refer to the Genovese crime family as if Vito Genovese were the leader—he was deceased in 1969—this is only to maintain the traditional names for law enforcement purposes. Inasmuch as these families are referred to by their traditional names throughout the law enforcement community, renaming the families would only generate unnecessary confusion that would serve no useful purpose. Analogous to the corporation that retains its founder's name after his demise, we too shall accept the traditional names in the interest of clarity.

Fourth, let me assure this committee that the persons I have so structured in my forthcoming testimony have been identified and supported by, at the very least, two independent, reliable sources, inclusive of electronic surveillance data and the testimony of qualified informants in courts of law. We have been very careful in assuring the veracity of our sources and the validity of our data so as to minimize the use of questionable data or sources.

Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to introduce into the record a copy of our intelligence bureau manual which sets forth the criteria and guidelines in which we collect, store, and disseminate data. It explains our procedures in detail, and I think would further insure this committee that we have very restrictive guidelines in the intelligence gathering process.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be entered in the record at this point.

[The following was received for the record:]



**THE SCOPE—
FUNCTIONS
AND
OPERATIONS
DELINEATED**

I. INTRODUCTION

The topic of criminal intelligence systems has been the subject of intensive criticism during the past several years. Civil liberty organizations have challenged the right of law enforcement to identify and infiltrate groups engaged in organized criminal activity. This criticism has been primarily directed against intelligence gathering techniques involving "revolutionary" or "extremist" groups rather than those groups engaged in syndicated or predatory-type criminal conduct.

Legal criteria regarding the collection and maintenance of intelligence data on syndicated or predatory organized crime groups are virtually nonexistent. The judiciary, on a limited basis, has begun to examine this subject. In addition, several State and Federal legislative Commissions have shown an interest in domestic intelligence programs. The New Jersey State Police recognizes the necessity of maintaining the *delicate balance* between the needs of intelligence systems and the rights of the individual in a democratic society. Therefore, new guidelines and procedures have been formulated to accomplish these goals.

II. STATEMENT OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

- A. New Jersey Statute 53:2-1 empowers the Division of State Police to prevent crime, to pursue and apprehend offenders and to obtain legal evidence necessary to insure the conviction of such offenders in the courts.
- B. In order to fulfill this responsibility, the Division of State Police established an Intelligence Bureau designed to collect, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate intelligence data regarding organized criminal activity in the State of New Jersey and any organized criminal activity in other jurisdictions that may adversely affect the State of New Jersey.
- C. The mission of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau is to identify, reduce, control and prevent organized crime in the State of New Jersey.
- D. The primary goal of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau will be the development of strategic and tactical intelligence assessments designed to:
 1. Provide a descriptive analysis of organized crime systems operating in the State of New Jersey.
 2. Depict the capabilities of these organized crime systems and provide alternatives to reduce the effectiveness of these systems.
 3. Identify the major crime problems effecting the State of New Jersey and provide recommendations for remedial action.
 4. Assess the efforts of law enforcement in the control of organized crime in the State of New Jersey.
 5. Provide the operational units within the Division of State Police with the necessary data to investigate organized criminal activity.
 6. Identify those person(s) engaged in organized criminal activity in the State of New Jersey.

- E. In order to fulfill the aforementioned goals, the New Jersey State Police Organized Crime Intelligence Bureau is responsible for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and disseminating organized crime intelligence data on any and all person(s) and/or group(s) or organizations that engage in activities defined as "criminal" by Federal and State legislatures. Of primary significance will be organized criminal activity to include, but not limited to, the following crimes:
 1. Gambling
 2. Loansharking
 3. Narcotics
 4. Prostitution
 5. Bribery
 6. Extortion
 7. Conversion of Illegitimate Funds Into Legitimate Investment
 8. Trafficking in stolen property
 9. Counterfeiting
 10. Arson
 11. Homicide/Kidnapping
 12. Crimes designed to subvert the economic interests of the state, black market activity, etc.
 13. Labor Racketeering
- F. The Division of State Police recognizes the interaction that exists between organized crime and the government processes. Often, this interaction results in corrupt practices on the part of those holding public office. The Intelligence Bureau shall record and maintain intelligence data delineating any alliances between members of organized crime and those holding public office.
- G. The Division of State Police recognizes that members of organized crime engage in criminal practices designed to subvert the legitimate economic interests of the State and the United States. These practices often take the form of legitimate business interests of funding schemes to camouflage revenues obtained via illegal sources, counterfeiting of U.S. currency, stocks and bonds, trafficking in stolen stocks and bonds, and other methods designed to disguise or circumvent the economic interests of the government. Any and all intelligence data indicating the existence of such criminal activity that may have a deleterious effect upon the economy of the government will be recorded and maintained in the indices of the Intelligence Bureau.

- H. The Division of State Police recognizes that organized crime is not limited to syndicated criminal activities -- loansharking, gambling, prostitution and narcotics -- but also engages in such criminal activities commonly referred to as predatory-mercenary crime, such as burglaries, armed robberies, theft of stolen securities, hi-jackings, arsons, extortion, etc. The Intelligence Bureau shall develop intelligence data on those organized crime groups engaged in such criminal activities or who are suspected of engaging in such criminal activities.
- I. The Division of State Police recognizes that members of organized crime often employ violent techniques and/or threats of violence in the furtherance of their criminal activities. The Intelligence Bureau shall record and maintain in their indices, any and all criminal groups that are suspected or are known to engage in such practices in pursuit of economic gain.
- J. The Division of State Police recognizes the *delicate balance* between the individual rights of a citizen of the United States and the legitimate needs of law enforcement. In order to provide proper internal safeguards to ensure these rights are not violated nor the democratic processes subverted, the following practices are prohibited:
1. Intelligence data will not be collected by members of the Intelligence Bureau on any individual merely on the basis that such person supports unpopular causes.
 2. Intelligence data will not be collected by any member of the Intelligence Bureau on person(s) merely on the basis of ethnicity or race.
 3. Intelligence data will not be collected by members of the Intelligence Bureau on any individual merely on the basis of the individual's religious and/or political affiliations.
 4. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will engage in any illegal activities in the collection of intelligence data.
 5. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will employ or direct an individual to engage in the collection of intelligence data via illegal means.
 6. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will employ or utilize an individual as an "Agent provocateur."
 7. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will be used to collect intelligence data relating to the personal habits and/or predelections of any individual.
 8. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will provide confidential information to any person without the expressed permission of the Bureau Chief.
 9. No member of the Intelligence Bureau will use confidential data for political and/or economic purposes.

III. ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

- A. The Bureau Chief of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau shall be directly responsible to the Supervisor, Special Staff Section. The primary location of operation will be Division Headquarters, West Trenton, New Jersey. The Bureau Chief of the Intelligence Bureau will be responsible for the proper and efficient administration of personnel assigned to the Bureau. The Bureau Chief or his official designee can initiate an intelligence investigation on any and all persons who are engaged or alleged to be engaged in an organized criminal activity or any illegal activities. The Bureau Chief or his official designee can initiate strategic intelligence studies of major crime problems effecting the State of New Jersey.
- B. The Bureau Chief of the Intelligence Bureau will designate an Assistant Bureau Chief who will be responsible to the Bureau Chief.
- C. Within the Intelligence Bureau, the following units will be established:

1. **Administrative Unit:** This Unit Supervisor or his official designee will be responsible for maintaining the logistical needs of the Bureau. The Unit Supervisor will initiate State and Federal grants and be responsible for developing innovative methods to increase the administrative capabilities of the Bureau. Moreover, the Unit Supervisor will be responsible for the orderly and efficient operation of the clerical personnel assigned to the Bureau.

The Administrative Unit Supervisor will be responsible for the activities of the collator and personnel assigned to the telephone toll and inter-agency liaison functions of the Intelligence Bureau. The Unit Supervisor shall ensure that only bona-fide inquiries for information and telephone tolls are honored and that any information submitted to the Bureau are in accordance with the guidelines as established in this Manual. Moreover, the Unit Supervisor shall maintain an accounting of all intelligence data disseminated from the indices of the Bureau.

2. **Electronic Surveillance Unit:** The Unit Supervisor will be responsible for maintaining a record of all electronic surveillance initiated by the Division of State Police. The Electronic Surveillance Unit Supervisor or his designee will install all court-authorized and Department-approved electronic surveillance equipment for the Division of State Police upon receipt of authorization from a designated Superior Court Judge and/or Attorney General's Office. The Unit Supervisor will ensure that all electronic surveillance is properly terminated in accordance with the court order. It is the responsibility of the Unit Supervisor to maintain all equipment in working order.
3. **Analytical Unit:** The Analytical Unit Supervisor shall be responsible for formulating collection plans, preparing intelligence assessments, and undertaking various other crime control and/or crime control evaluation projects as directed by the Bureau Chief. Strategic and tactical intelligence assessments will be prepared

and/or reviewed by the Unit Supervisor. In addition, tactical intelligence data submitted to the Bureau will be reviewed and assessed by analysts prior to inclusion in the Bureau indices. The Analytical Unit Supervisor shall be responsible for the systematic auditing and if deemed appropriate, purging of intelligence data maintained in the Bureau files.

4. **Casino Intelligence Unit:** The Casino Intelligence Unit Supervisor shall be responsible for collecting intelligence on the casino industry and its ancillary services and organized crime in Atlantic County or any other jurisdiction which may affect the operations of the casino industry. The Unit Supervisor shall ensure that the policy guidelines as set forth in this Manual are adhered to. Periodically, the Unit Supervisor shall prepare intelligence assessments defining the scope and dimensions of organized crime in Atlantic City and its impact on the casino industry.
5. **Labor - Racketeering Unit:** The Unit Supervisor will be responsible for the collection of intelligence data related to the incursion of organized crime elements into organized labor within the State of New Jersey. The Unit Supervisor will be responsible for delineating any and all corrupt practices that exist between organized labor and organized crime elements and identifying those persons responsible for such corrupt practices. The Unit Supervisor will be called upon to periodically assess the scope of corrupt labor practices in the State of New Jersey and provide recommendations for remedial action.
6. **Regional Units:** The State of New Jersey will be geographically broken down into three regional sections:

North:	Passaic, Bergen, Hudson, Essex, Morris, Sussex, Hunterdon, Somerset and Warren Counties.
Central:	Union, Monmouth, Ocean, Mercer and Middlesex Counties.
South:	Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Burlington and Salem Counties.

The regional units will be responsible for the collection of raw intelligence data to be submitted to the Intelligence Bureau of the New Jersey State Police. The information and procedures utilized to collect this data will be in strict conformity with the provisions of the established policy guidelines. The Regional Unit Supervisor will insure that the personnel assigned this function are thoroughly familiar with the policy guidelines established in this operating procedure. Moreover, the Unit Supervisor will be called upon to periodically undertake tactical and strategic intelligence assessments, as determined by the Bureau Chief.

IV. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF PERSONNEL FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

- A. Selection of personnel for the Intelligence Bureau will be in accordance with the pre-established statutory law and/or Division procedure.
- B. Personnel assigned to the Intelligence Bureau must possess the following characteristics:
 1. Impeccable standards of honesty and integrity.
 2. A thorough understanding of the concepts of "organized crime", "intelligence" and "civil liberties".
 3. The capacity to think in a logical and rational manner and capable of approaching situations from broad and divergent perspectives.
 4. The ability to comprehend complex masses of data and communicating its contents to others.
- C. Personnel assigned to Supervisory positions within the Intelligence Bureau must demonstrate a thorough understanding of managerial techniques and principles and possess outstanding leadership qualities.
- D. In addition to the aforementioned qualities, personnel must fulfill any and all requirements as depicted in the job specification for the various positions.
- E. The Intelligence Bureau Chief will implement procedures to facilitate the career development of members of the Bureau.
- F. The Intelligence Bureau Chief will evaluate the criteria for selection on an annual basis. The Bureau Chief will ensure that the standards of selection are at least equal to those State Law enforcement agencies of comparable size.

V. ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

- A. The Bureau Chief is responsible for the proper and efficient administration of the Intelligence Bureau. It will be the responsibility of the Bureau Chief to insure that the procedures as contained in the policy guidelines are properly adhered to. The Bureau Chief will evaluate the intelligence process on a semi-annual basis to insure that any new legislative and/or judicial guidelines are being adhered to.
- B. Collection of Intelligence Data
 1. Personnel of the Intelligence Bureau will only gather information on any persons or groups as set forth in the goals and objectives.
 2. Electronic surveillance will only be conducted in accordance with the provisions of N.J. Statute 2A:156-A. The Unit Supervisor of the Electronic Surveillance Unit will be responsible for insuring that the statutory guidelines are adhered to. Any violations of

these guidelines will be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau Chief (See S.O.P. #270):

3. Photographic surveillance will not be conducted without the authorization of the Bureau Chief and/or his designee. Such authorization must meet the following criteria:
 - a. to identify any and all persons, either as members or associates of groups or criminal organizations, who are engaged in an illegal activity.
 - b. to provide evidence of any illegal activity involving criminal organizations and/or persons or members of these criminal organizations.
4. All photographic surveillance will be reviewed by the regional unit supervisor and the Bureau Chief to insure that person(s) not deemed to be part of any organized criminal conspiracy are not recorded and placed in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau. All photographs taken that do not meet the goals and objectives of this operating procedure shall be immediately destroyed. In the event it is determined that the photographs are in accordance with the provisions outlined, the intelligence officer shall attach a report identifying those person(s) in said photographs.
5. Personnel who are assigned the task of conducting "undercover" investigation into organized crime activity will be properly instructed as to the goal and objectives of the Intelligence Bureau.
6. All information received by personnel assigned to the Intelligence Bureau will be properly evaluated and the source of said information will be noted in the report. Such designations shall include "personal observations", "informant information", "media source" (and cite the name of the publication), etc. The information must be properly evaluated in accordance with the prescribed guidelines.
7. All investigative reports relating to organized crime investigations conducted by members of the New Jersey State Police will be maintained and properly indexed in the files of the Intelligence Bureau. Any intelligence reports, that relate to the goals and objectives of this Bureau, submitted by other bureaus and/or units within the New Jersey State Police will be maintained and indexed in the files of the Intelligence Bureau. This information will be evaluated by members of the Analytical Unit prior to inclusion in the files of the Bureau.
8. Attempts should be made to obtain investigative and intelligence reports from other Federal, State, County and Municipal law enforcement agencies engaged in organized crime enforcement. All reports will be evaluated as to their accuracy and reliability by members of the Analytical Unit prior to being incorporated into the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau.

C. Evaluation of Intelligence Data

1. All sources of information will be evaluated in accordance with the following guidelines.*

Definition

Completely reliable	refers to a source about whom there is no doubt of its authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. Information supplied if a person, in the past, has proved to be reliable in all instances.
Usually reliable	refers to a source about whom there may be some doubt as to its authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. However, information obtained from the source in the past has, in the majority of instances proved to be reliable.
Fairly reliable	refers to a source about whom there is usually some doubt as to its authenticity and trustworthiness. Information obtained from this source, in the past, has proved reliable in a moderate number of cases.**
Not usually reliable	refers to a source about whom there is doubt as to its authenticity and trustworthiness. Information supplied in the past, is not reliable although occasionally valid reports have been submitted.**
Reliability cannot be judged	refers to a source whose reliability has not been determined by either experience or investigation. No way of knowing its authenticity, trustworthiness or competency.**

2. All intelligence reports will indicate the source of information from which the data was obtained. The individual intelligence officer will evaluate the source of information as to its accuracy and validity.
3. Attempts will be made by the intelligence officer submitting the data to substantiate the information through other sources.
4. In the event the intelligence officer is unable to substantiate the data contained in the report, the individual(s), business(es) and/or corporation(s) will be indexed on a salmon-colored index card. The information contained on said report will be audited bi-annually by the Analytical Unit.

* There is no formula by which the elements of reliability can be properly weighed. A source informer, for example, may submit a long series of reports and still be no better than fairly reliable if his motivation is doubtful. In source evaluation, there is no substitute for the judgement of the intelligence officer.

** Information of this nature will be indexed on a salmon-colored index card. This information will not be disseminated.

D. Administrative Guidelines for Collator(s)

1. The Collator(s) will be directly responsible to the Supervisor, Administrative Unit.
2. The Collator(s) will be responsible for reviewing all incoming intelligence reports and indicating the information to be contained in the Bureau indices.
3. The Collator(s) will classify all intelligence data into the following subject categories.
 - a. Geographic Area
 - b. Type of Criminal Activity
 - c. Organized Crime Grouping
4. The Collator(s) will be responsible for maintaining a complete index on all incoming complaints and/or allegations from other agencies.
5. The Collator(s) will be responsible for designating what action should be taken with the various reports submitted to the Bureau.

E. Administrative Guidelines for the Analytical Unit

1. The Analytical Unit Supervisor will be responsible for reviewing all investigative and intelligence reports received by the Bureau. Any data deemed irrelevant or immaterial to the goals and objectives of the Bureau will be eliminated. Moreover, any information deemed to be "unreliable" will be deleted from the reports of the Bureau.
2. The Analytical Unit Supervisor will be responsible for strategic and tactical intelligence assessments. It will be the responsibility of the strategic analysts to develop, project and estimate patterns and trends of organized criminal activity in the State of New Jersey. The tactical analysts will be responsible for developing target investigation(s) with members of the regional intelligence and organized crime units.
3. On an annual basis, the Analytical Unit Supervisor will be responsible for conducting in-service training seminars for all members of the Intelligence Bureau. The following topics will be discussed at these seminars:
 - a. Judicial and Legislative criteria regarding domestic intelligence gathering techniques.
 - b. A general overview of organized crime in the State of New Jersey
 - c. Administrative guidelines as established by the Attorney General, Superintendent of State Police or the Bureau Chief.

VI. REPORTING PROCEDURES

- A. Personnel of the Intelligence Bureau will submit intelligence and investigative data on the following report forms:

State Police Report #382 (Yellow Sheet): General and Sensitive Intelligence data.

State Police Report #329 (Special Report): Organized Crime Complaints and Allegations. Any information of a complex nature obtained during a lengthy investigation. Any other correspondence between submitting officer and Division of State Police that does not relate to the intelligence function.

- B. The contents of the report should be objective, distinguishing reliable or verified data from opinion, inference or hearsay. The report should be arranged in a logical and concise manner.
- C. All names (relative to the goals and objectives of the Bureau) represented in the report will be *fully identified*, indicating the individuals full name, current address, full date of birth and criminal record number(s). Moreover, the individuals *association and relationship* with any organized crime group shall be depicted in the report.
- D. Ideally, all data contained in the intelligence report should be substantiated by other sources. In the event this criteria cannot be met, the intelligence officer should be reasonably sure of the validity of the data. This requirement should not be considered an investigation restraint but rather should be viewed as an impetus to professional investigation.
- E. Information obtained from an informant will be so indicated on the intelligence report. The intelligence officer will refer to the informant as per classification system established (see informant indexing system, Section X.)
- F. A weekly activity reporting system will be maintained for administrative purposes. The Bureau Chief will utilize the weekly report as a means of evaluating the performance of the personnel assigned to the task of collecting intelligence data. Each field intelligence officer and regional unit Supervisor will submit a weekly activity report.

The weekly activity report will reflect the following data:

1. Any interviews of criminal informants and/or other persons.
 2. Any information that can be utilized for tactical purposes and not incorporated in the intelligence report.
 3. Any raw intelligence data that may necessitate the need for further investigative efforts.
- G. The weekly activity report file shall be maintained for a period of six months wherein the reports will be microfilmed and sealed for administrative purposes. The Bureau Chief will maintain sole custody of the microfilm for a period of ten years at which time the microfilm will be

destroyed. At no time will any data contained in the weekly activity report be indexed or disseminated.

H. All intelligence reports that meet any one of the following criteria shall be classified "Sensitive Information - Authorized Access Only." The criteria shall be:

1. The physical and economic well-being of an informant or his family could be jeopardized if the information were to be released.
2. A pending investigation wherein the release of said data may jeopardize the investigation.
3. Any information extracted from electronic surveillance.
4. Information that could result, if *improperly* released, in political or economic extortion of an individual.
5. Any information of a restricted and/or confidential nature obtained from another agency.

I. Reports meeting the criteria established in Sub-Section IV.G., shall be maintained in the *sole custody* of the Intelligence Bureau Chief and shall not be disseminated without the expressed approval of the Bureau Chief. Access to said reports shall be limited to the Bureau Chief, Supervisor, Special Staff Section.

J. Intelligence reports that bear the designation "Sensitive Information - Authorized Access Only" will be typed either by the Intelligence Officer submitting said report or the official designee of the Bureau Chief. The report will be submitted *directly* to the Bureau Chief. At no time shall this type of report be submitted via normal channels.

VII. RECORDING AND STORAGE OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

A. Prior to any information being recorded and stored in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau, the information must be reviewed by the Analytical Unit.

B. The analyst reviewing the data must determine whether the goals and objectives of the Intelligence Bureau are being met, as set forth in Section I of this report. The Analytical Unit Supervisor will be responsible for deleting data determined not to be in the best interests of law enforcement and/or not in conformity with the goals and objectives of the Bureau. The Analytical Unit Supervisor and analyst will record his/her initials on the bottom of the report indicating his/her evaluation of the report.

C. All names of individuals, corporations and/or business (pertinent to the goals and objectives of the Bureau) contained in the Intelligence report shall be indexed in the master-file of the Intelligence Bureau. In the event the report is classified "Sensitive Information - Authorized Access Only", the names of the individuals, corporations, or businesses shall be contained in the Sensitive Information File, accessible only to the Bureau Chief and/or his official designee.

D. The master index card will provide the necessary data so as to provide positive identification of the individual contained in file. The index card shall contain an abstract as to the reason the individual has been placed in file. Each index card should provide sufficient data so that the individual engaged in or alleged to be engaged in a criminal activity will stand on its own and not with reference to other base data.

1. In the event the Intelligence Officer has obtained information about an individual and he/she lacks positive identifiers, the index card will reflect the alias known to the officer. Periodic attempts will be made by the Intelligence Officer to update the data.

E. The following criteria have been established to provide uniform guidelines relating to the type of information contained in the files of the Bureau. It must be recognized that the data must meet the goals and objectives of the Bureau:

1. Any information concerning the arrest, indictment or outstanding warrants for arrest of an individual. Any data relative to the arrest and/or indictment of an individual will be summarized in the Intelligence Officer's report with reference made to the general criminal history of the subject being indexed. The report should reflect the individual's S.B.I. and F.B.I. number and/or the investigation number of the investigating authority.
2. Any individual who has been identified as a perpetrator of a crime by a witness or competent evidence.
3. Any individual who threatens violent conduct affecting person and/or property.
4. Any individual wherein reasonable suspicion exists to believe the individual is engaged in or conspiring to engage in criminal activity.
5. Any information that depicts the extent or scope of criminal activity of an organized crime figure.
6. Any information concerning an individual's criminal activities that when properly analyzed would provide tactical and/or strategic intelligence.
7. Any information required to be maintained in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau as dictated by law or as established by the Superintendent of State Police or Attorney General.
8. Any information relating to the identity of a victim, witness or complainant to an organized criminal endeavor.
9. Any information that reflects social, political, business or professional associations of prominent organized crime figures. The Intelligence Officer submitting the report must reasonably *demonstrate* to the Bureau Chief that a potential for future criminal conduct exists.

- F. A suspense file will be maintained containing all information that has been purged from the master index file. This suspense file will retain the purged data for a ninety day period wherein an update must be submitted. In the event the report is not updated, the data will be eliminated from file and destroyed. It will be the responsibility of the Analytical Unit Supervisor to maintain this suspense file (see Section VIII.C-2).
- G. A file of those person(s) determined to be prominent leaders in an organized criminal conspiracy shall be maintained. This file will contain, a complete background on the individual, to include but not be limited to the following:
1. Full name
 2. Aliases
 4. Citizen or alien
 5. If alien, identifying number
 6. Full date of birth/Place of birth
 7. Social Security Number
 8. Height, weight, eye and hair color
 9. Any scars or tatoos
 10. Immediate family/relatives
 11. Schools attended
 12. Medical ailments/physical deformities
 13. Criminal Record Numbers and *Summary* of Criminal Activities
 14. Type of illegal activity engaged in
 15. Criminal Associates / Business Associates / Professional Associates / Social Associates
 16. Alliances with person(s) holding public office
 17. Legitimate interests
 18. Organized Crime Group affiliation
 19. Establishments frequented
- H. The Intelligence Bureau shall maintain a Research and Analysis File. This file will contain all data extracted from sources of mass media and must meet the goals and objectives of the Bureau. Since much of this data possesses elements of political and journalistic rhetoric, the following procedures will be adhered to:
1. Data extracted from mass media sources will be assigned to a Field Intelligence Officer and/or Analyst for further investigation. The Intelligence Officer/Analyst should attempt to verify the accuracy of the article.
 2. The Intelligence Officer/Analyst will submit an intelligence report indicating the facts concerning the validity of the article. A copy of the article will be attached to the Intelligence Officer's/Analyst's report.
 3. All names (pertinent to the goals and objectives of the Bureau) contained in the Intelligence Officer's/Analyst's report will be indexed into the master file of the Bureau. In the event the Intelligence Officer/Analyst uncovers information of a sensitive nature, said information will be submitted to the Bureau Chief and retained in the Sensitive Information File.

4. In the event information obtained via mass media sources is not assigned for further investigation, the article will be placed in the Research and Analysis File and utilized for the sole purpose of conducting future analytical studies. Names contained in said article *will not* be indexed in the master file of the Bureau.
- I. The Research and Analysis File will contain criminal history data of those persons deemed to meet the goals and objectives of the Bureau. This data *will only* be used for statistical research studies.

VIII. AUDITING AND PURGING OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

- A. The Intelligence Bureau Chief is responsible for insuring that the Bureau Files contain information that is in accordance with the goals and objectives.
- B. The Intelligence Bureau Chief is responsible for insuring that any administrative, judicial or legislative guidelines that are established either by the State Attorney General, the courts, or the Legislature relating to domestic intelligence operations are strictly adhered to by personnel assigned to the Bureau.
- C. In order to establish a systematic procedure for auditing and eliminating information from the files of the Intelligence Bureau, and yet maintain integrity in the system established, the following procedure has been developed:
1. On a daily basis, the analysts assigned to the Analytical Unit will review all reports to be recorded and filed in the files of the Intelligence Bureau. In the event the analyst determines the information contained therein is not in the best interests of law enforcement or is in disregard of the goals and objectives, the analyst shall consult with the Analytical Unit Supervisor and state such objections. The final determination will be made by the the Bureau Chief in collaboration with the Unit Supervisor.
 2. The files of the Intelligence Bureau will be audited on an annual basis by the Analytical Unit. Any information that has not been "updated" in a three year period will be purged from the master index file of the Intelligence Bureau. This information will be transferred into a suspense file wherein the Intelligence Officer who submitted the original report will be contacted and requested to provide an update of the information contained in the report. In the event the Intelligence Officer does not submit an update within a ninety day period, the report will be purged from the files of the Bureau. A record indicating the index numbers (only) will be maintained reflecting what report number(s) has been deleted from the system.
 3. A color-coded index card system will be employed. Beginning with each fiscal year, a new color code will be initiated utilizing a rotating system. A record shall be maintained indicating the year and color code designations. This system will facilitate the annual audit process.

4. The Intelligence Bureau will maintain a salmon-color-coded indexing system. This system will be utilized to record any data that meets any of the following criteria:
 - a. The data has been evaluated either as "usually not reliable" or "reliability cannot be judged".
 - b. The data cannot be substantiated via other sources however its use may prove fruitful in the future.
 - c. The data is not contained in the indices presently, but there is a *significant probability* that once a data base is established, comparisons and correlations can be made.
 - d. Person(s) arrested or indicted for a criminal offense (relative to the goals and objectives of the Bureau) and found not guilty, acquitted, or never resulting in trial. Under no conditions will this data be disseminated to person(s) internal or external to the New Jersey State Police.
5. Photographic surveillance photos will be maintained with the intelligence reports submitted. In the event the file is purged, all photographs relative to that particular file will also be eliminated.
6. The Sensitive Information File will be audited on an annual basis. The Bureau Chief will be responsible for designating a senior officer within the Intelligence Bureau to review, reevaluate, and/or eliminate any data that does not meet the criteria. In the event the senior officer recommends the information contained in the Sensitive Information File *declassified*, the data will be transferred to the master-index file and the procedure as established for auditing and purging of information will be followed.
7. The decision to eliminate intelligence data from the indices of the Bureau will be based upon the following considerations:
 - a. How often has data been requested on the subject in file?
 - b. How valid is the data?
 - c. Has the data been confirmed by other sources or is it unsubstantiated?
 - d. Does the data meet the goals and objectives of the Bureau?
 - e. Can the data be obtained from another source?
 - f. How long has the data remained in file?
 - g. Could the data be useful in the future?
8. Data will be purged from the indices of the Bureau when it has been determined by the Bureau Chief and/or his official designee

that one or all of the following conditions exist:

- a. The data is no longer *relevant* or necessary to the goals and objectives of the Bureau.
 - b. The data has become obsolete thus making it unreliable for present purposes and the utility of updating the data would be worthless.
 - c. The data cannot be utilized for any present and/or future strategic or tactical intelligence studies.
9. In the event there is a question as to the legality of retaining any intelligence information, the Attorney General's Office will be requested to render a legal opinion.

IX. DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

- A. In order to protect the Constitutional rights of those person(s) contained in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau, strict controls will be maintained in the dissemination of information contained in said files. The following procedure has been established in the dissemination of intelligence data.
 1. General Rules and Regulations - All members of the Division shall treat as confidential the business of the Division. They shall not impart information regarding departmental business to anyone except those for whom it is intended, or as may be directed by the Superintendent, or under due process of law. They shall not talk for publication, nor be interviewed, nor make public speeches on police business except by permission of the Superintendent.
 2. All requests for intelligence data will be entered on the subject's index card. The entry should reflect the agency making the request and the date of request. This procedure will facilitate the determination on whether to purge any information and aids in coordinating investigative efforts.
 3. Prior to the dissemination of any intelligence data the Bureau Chief will consider the following:
 - a. The accuracy and reliability of the data.
 - b. Whether the dissemination of the data would compromise the identity of a source of information.
 - c. The type of information being requested, *i.e.*, criminal history, general intelligence data, etc.
 - d. The requestor's right and need-to-know.

B. Inter-Departmental Control of Information

1. No information contained in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau will be disseminated to any person(s), bureau(s), or unit(s) within the New Jersey State Police without the expressed authorization of the Bureau Chief or his official designee.
2. All requests for information contained in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau will be made to the Bureau Chief or his official designee. The request either can be made telephonically or by written communication. The requesting agency must state the reason for said request and the nature of the investigation. The Bureau Chief or his official designee will be responsible for recording all requests for intelligence data in the dissemination log. The dissemination log shall contain the date of the request, to whom the data was transmitted, the nature of the investigation (right and need to know), and the date the request was honored. This dissemination log will be kept for a period of five years.

3. Any data disseminated will bear the following release inscriptions:

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS
NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE. IT
IS THE PROPERTY OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE AND
IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE
NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE OF YOUR AGENCY.

CONFIDENTIAL

ISSUED TO: _____
DATE: _____

THIS REPORT IS NOT TO BE COPIED OR GIVEN
TO ANY OTHER AGENCY. ITS CONTENTS ARE FOR
YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

4. Prior to the release of any data from the indices of the Bureau, contact must be made with the State Bureau of Identification to ascertain the accuracy of any criminal history data.

C. Dissemination to Law Enforcement Agencies External to the New Jersey State Police.

1. Information contained in the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau will not be disseminated, formally or informally, to any non-law enforcement agency or individual.
2. A request must be made to the Bureau Chief of the Intelligence Bureau or his official designee. The request can be made either telephonically or through written correspondence. In the event the request is made via oral communication, the receiving officer must confirm the authenticity of the requestor.

3. All written reports sent to the requestor will be addressed to his/her bureau commander, attention directed to the specific requestor. All written reports disseminated to other law enforcement agencies must bear the official release designation of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau. Moreover, a record will be maintained in the dissemination log indicating the date the request was made, the agency and/or individual making the request, the reason for the request or the nature of the investigation (right and need-to-know), the individual who honored the request, the date the information was transmitted and to whom the information was sent. This log will be retained for a five year period.
4. It is the responsibility of the individual disseminating the data to ascertain that the request for said data is for a *legitimate* law enforcement purpose. In the event it is found that the request was made for a non-law enforcement purpose, the individual to whom the request was made will *immediately* contact the Bureau Chief and advise him/her of same.
5. All written correspondence being disseminated will be prefaced with a letter on official State Police Stationary bearing the signature of the Bureau Chief.
6. At no time will any information contained in the "Sensitive Information - Authorized Access Only" File be disseminated without the *expressed* consent of the Bureau Chief.
7. A listing will be maintained of all law enforcement agencies within the State of New Jersey who are authorized to request information from the files of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau.

D. Dissemination of Intelligence Data Obtained Via Electronic Surveillance.

1. In accordance with the provisions of New Jersey Statute 2A:156-A, any information obtained via electronic surveillance can be disseminated to local and Federal law enforcement agencies in the State of New Jersey *providing* they possess a "need-to-know" and a "right-to-know". The Bureau Chief will insure that any information obtained via electronic surveillance and subsequently disseminated is in accordance with the Statute.
2. Information taken from electronic surveillance will be maintained in the Sensitive-Information file.
3. At no time will duplicate tape-recordings of electronic surveillance material be disseminated without the authorization of the Bureau Chief.
4. In the event information (via electronic surveillance) or recordings are provided to another law enforcement agency, the Bureau Chief will require the agency receiving the information to sign for the material. The Bureau Chief will also insure that the receiving

agency is cognizant of the fact that this information and/or recordings are not to be duplicated or given to another law enforcement or non-law enforcement agency without prior approval of the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Bureau Chief and/or the Superior Court who authorized the electronic interception of oral communications.

E. Dissemination of Photographic Surveillance Material

1. Surveillance photographs will only be disseminated with the expressed approval of the Bureau Chief. The Bureau Chief will insure that the dissemination of the photographs is in accordance with the legitimate needs of law enforcement and/or the goals and objectives as outlined in Section I.
2. Any surveillance photographs transmitted to any other bureau/unit within the State Police or law enforcement agencies external to the State Police will be accomplished in accordance with the procedures outlined in the dissemination procedure for intelligence data.

F. Dissemination of Intelligence Data obtained from Mass Media Sources.

1. Any information obtained from mass media sources, public commission hearings, etc. and that is public knowledge will not be disseminated without the approval of the Bureau Chief. The Bureau Chief, prior to disseminating such information, will insure that the data contained in the article, journal book, etc. is accurate and reliable.
2. Any information, hereafter referred to as Mass Media Information, that is disseminated by the Bureau Chief will bear the following inscription.

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM MASS MEDIA SOURCES. ANY CONCLUSIONS AND/OR INFERENCES DRAWN BY THE AUTHOR DOES NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU.

X. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- A. The following procedural guidelines have been designed to provide a basic and general description for the collection of intelligence data. These guidelines have taken into consideration the right of privacy and any other legal criteria afforded a citizen of the United States.
- B. Intelligence data can be garnered from the following sources of information:
 1. Telephone tolls of an individual suspected of committing an illegal act can be subpoenaed by law enforcement authorities upon the authorization of a court. Proper analysis can often aid in substantiating intelligence information.

2. Information obtained from reliable sources of information (informants). This information and the reliability of the informant must be carefully evaluated by the intelligence officer. In order to establish a consistent procedure in the utilization of criminal informant(s) the following procedure will be adhered to:
 - a. All criminal informants being utilized by members of the Intelligence Bureau must be approved by the Bureau Chief.
 - b. The Bureau Chief will maintain a master index system on all criminal informants. The Bureau Chief will be responsible for maintaining security over this file and under no circumstances will the contents of this file be divulged to any person(s) without the authorization of the Superintendent of State Police.
 - c. All criminal informants will be assigned a source identification number (as per Source Identification Card #SP-588C). Any information obtained from a criminal informant will be represented in the intelligence officer's report by the source identification number.
 - d. Any and all expenditures provided a criminal informant will be properly receipted for by the informant. Said expenditures will be recorded in the expense ledger. To avoid compromising the identity of a criminal informant, this data will be recorded utilizing the pre-designated coding system.
 - e. At no time will a criminal informant be employed as an agent provocateur or to commit any illegal activities under the guise of the New Jersey State Police. In the event an intelligence officer uncovers any information that indicates a criminal informant has been used for such purposes, the Bureau Chief will be notified immediately.
 - f. Prior to employing electronic surveillance with a criminal informant and/or any other person who voluntarily submits (consent taping), the Bureau Chief will be notified and approval will be obtained from the State Attorney General and/or a county prosecutor. A record will be maintained of all consent tapings *approved* or *disapproved* by the State Attorney General, County Prosecutor and/or Bureau Chief.
 - g. The Intelligence Officer shall document any and all meetings with a criminal informant and/or other persons providing information of a criminal nature.
 - h. The Intelligence Officer should attempt to substantiate any information obtained from a criminal informant through independent sources. The intelligence officer will indicate in his/her report the reliability of the informant and the validity and accuracy of the information.

3. Covert surveillances of social gatherings and events frequented by persons engaged in organized criminal activity often provide indicators of inter and intra-group associations. Any intelligence data obtained from covert surveillances should meet the following criteria:
 - a. The *relationship* between the subjects identified should be established.
 - b. The Intelligence Officer submitting a report wherein the data contained in said report reflects information obtained from secondary sources (i.e., motor vehicle registrations, telephone tolls, etc.) should ascertain the *relationship* between the individuals in question. The Intelligence Officer should be reasonably certain that the secondary data establishing a relationship between the primary subject is valid and accurate.
 - c. Intelligence data failing to meet the pre-established conditions *will be* submitted to the Bureau. This data, since its use can often provide a strategic linkage between those engaged in organized criminal activity and/or can be the basis for establishing a data base on a particular organized crime subject, will be indexed on a "salmon-color card" whereby it is used *only* for analysis purposes. This data will be audited on a biannual basis. This information *will not* be disseminated under any circumstances.
 - d. It must be recognized that the Division of State Police does not condone the *indiscriminate* use of covert surveillances of social, political and/or religious functions in the gathering of intelligence data. Often these functions are attended by person(s) exercising their legitimate constitutional rights. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Bureau Chief to insure that the rights of such persons are not violated.
4. Other sources of information available to law enforcement as described in New Jersey State Police manual *Sources of Information*. It should be recognized that under the *Privacy Act of 1974*, Federal agencies cannot disclose any information concerning an individual to another agency without first obtaining his/her consent. According to the Act, if a person voluntarily provides data to a government agency for the specific purposes of that agency, the information cannot be used for any other purpose. Two exceptions to this rule are (Justice Department, p.17):
 - a. When criminal misconduct is suspected in connection with the administration of the program.
 - b. When background or suitability investigations are being conducted on individuals being cleared for access to classified information, employment on contracts, or appointment to a position within an agency.

XI. SECURITY OF INTELLIGENCE DATA

- A. The Bureau Chief of the Intelligence Bureau will insure that all information contained in the indices of the Bureau is secure.
- B. Only members of the Intelligence Bureau will be admitted to the master index file of the Intelligence Bureau. The Bureau Chief or his official designee will maintain custody of all data contained in the "Sensitive Information" file.
- C. All authorized visitors, whether members of the State Police or members of other law enforcement or non-law enforcement agencies, will be required to register with the receptionist prior to gaining admittance to the Bureau. All authorized visitors will be escorted by a member of the Bureau.
- D. The files of the Intelligence Bureau will be secured at the termination of each duty day by the Bureau Chief and/or his official designee.
- E. The Intelligence Bureau, at the termination of each duty day, will be secured with activation of the burglar and fire alarm systems.

GLOSSARY

The following definitions have been provided for the sole purpose of this Manual.

Business Associate:	One who is engaged in a "legitimate" occupation with a member of organized crime.
Criminal Associate:	One who interacts on a voluntary basis with a member of an organized crime group in furtherance of illegal interests.
Criminal History Information:	Any arrest record information, non-conviction record information, conviction record information, and correctional and release information.
Criminal Informant:	Any individual providing information whose alliances with members and/or associates of organized criminal groups is such that his/her identity must remain confidential
Criminal Intelligence Information:	Information associated with an identifiable individual compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting an investigation of an individual relating to suspected criminal activity of an individual, or relating to the reliability of such information, including information derived from reports of informants, investigators, or from any type of surveillance.
Criminal Investigative Information:	Information associated with an identifiable individual compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific criminal act including information pertaining to that criminal act derived from reports of informants and investigators, or from any type of surveillance.
Final Intelligence Assessment:	A substantive review and analysis of all available data collected through both intelligence and investigative efforts which permits administrators to critically assess the impact of the enforcement action on the problem (as defined in the preliminary assessment).
Information or Data:	Written or oral reports or documents, short or long, telling of an event, or an activity.
Intelligence:	Information that has been processed - collected, evaluated, collated, analyzed and reported (Godfrey, p. xiii).
Intelligence Investigation:	The compilation of data wherein the immediate objective is not arrest and prosecution.
Interim Intelligence Assessment:	The third stage in the process which incorporates the investigative data being collected by the operational units into a conclusive statement about the criminal network, personality, or illicit market.
Legitimate Law Enforcement Purpose:	Any situation wherein a bona fide law enforcement agency's objective or intention is to develop criminal information for either tactical or strategic purposes.
Mass Media Source:	Any information obtained from sources of public communication.
Need-to-Know:	Any intelligence, criminal history or criminal investigative data requested by a bona fide law enforcement agency wherein said data is necessary to initiate, further or complete a criminal investigation.
Organized Crime:	A group of persons structured for the purpose of engaging in a continuing course of criminal activity for financial gain.

Organized Crime Intelligence System:	Any information system capable of collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing and disseminating data on organized criminal activity (as per definition of organized crime).
Preliminary Intelligence Assessment:	An initial statement about a specific criminal network or phenomenon which briefly assesses the need (or lack thereof) for further investigation.
Preliminary Intelligence Assessment:	The second state of the tactical assessment process which provides a description and understanding of a particular criminal network, personality, or illicit market and the desirability of initiating an investigation.
Primary Source of Information:	An individual from whom an original, direct or first hand fact is obtained.
Privacy:	The claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others (Westin, p. 7).
Professional Associate:	Those whose professional services are employed by a member of organized crime on a continuing basis in furtherance of illegal activity.
Prominent Organized Crime Figure:	An individual who is considered a controlling factor within an organized crime group.
Raw Data:	Information that has not been put through the intelligence process (Godfrey, p. xiii).
Relationship:	The manner in which one is dependent upon or relies upon another.
Right-to-Know:	Any agency and/or individual, who through legislative or court mandate has been given the authority to obtain any intelligence, criminal history or criminal investigative data.
Secondary Source of Information:	Any information derived from a source other than a primary source.
Social Associate:	One who interacts on voluntary basis with a member of an organized crime group.
Strategic Intelligence:	Intelligence that indicates significant patterns of activity that may become a major input to the planning and decision levels of the agency (Godfrey, p. xiii).
Strategic Intelligence Assessment:	A written report, discursive and conceptual, containing a hypothesis and complementary assumptions which enable the police administrator to anticipate future criminal problems, provides for a thorough understanding of an illegal market or criminal network, and/or evaluates a specific law enforcement policy or strategy.
Tactical Intelligence:	Intelligence that is immediately useful to the enforcement element of any agency.
Tactical Intelligence Assessment:	A written report assessing a particular criminal network, illicit market or organized criminal and ultimately recommends a specific operational response.

Colonel DINTINO. This is not to suggest, of course, that there will not be some disagreement between agencies. Clearly, such disagreement should be perceived as creating a healthy environment for critical and conflicting dialogs. I should point out that with the exception of the De Cavalcante crime family, I will only delineate the boss, underboss, and consigliere since most reside outside the State of New Jersey, and then immediately address the structure as it relates specifically to New Jersey. Moreover, it should be recognized that these structures are not all inclusive, but rather represent those which are most active in New Jersey. Certainly we could have included numerous other associates; however such an endeavor would have served no useful purpose at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, is there not a difference between a business associate and a criminal associate, and would you give the committee the definition of each at this point?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, in our intelligence guidelines, the definition of a business associate is one who is engaged in a legitimate occupation with a member of organized crime. The definition of a criminal associate is one who interacts on a voluntary basis with a member of an organized crime group in furtherance of illegal interests.

I might point out that the associates that are mentioned in the data that I am about to present are criminal associates.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Colonel DINTINO. Lastly, let me indicate that I must defer certain questions particularly with respect to the so-called Bruno or Philadelphia war because active investigations are being conducted which may be jeopardized if I were to unknowingly release confidential data. However, I will provide this committee with a general overview of several murders that were apparently a result of this internecine war. New Jersey, the most urbanized and densely populated State of the Nation, has eight organized crime families operating within its confines, one of which, the DeCavalcante family, is homegrown. Traditionally, I might add, there were only seven families operating in the State, but recently we have developed intelligence which suggests that there has been slight incursion by the Buffalino family from Pennsylvania. This has occurred through an ancillary casino industry and local 560 in Union City, N.J.

Subscribing to the structures as represented in the President's Task Force on Organized Crime in 1967, the position of boss, consigliere, caporegime, and soldier shall be referred to. Again, we must be careful not to become wedded to the title for, as we have found, it is not inconceivable for a soldier to exercise more power than that of a capo. Thus, individual skill and expertise can often overcome the symbolic positions a member is afforded. Similarly, a significant criminal associate may be more respected than a soldier merely because of his ability to make money or exercise power.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you put the whole thing back further so that the press could see it, if they wish to? Put the whole thing back. That's right.

All right. You may proceed.

BRUNO CRIME FAMILY

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, in introducing these two charts, one on the Bruno crime family and the other on the Bruno war, I will proceed with a brief statement on the Bruno crime family.

Perhaps it is appropriate to begin with the Bruno crime family, a family undergoing serious internal strife and turmoil reminiscent of the early days of organized crime in Chicago.

The Bruno crime family traditionally was the dominant family in Philadelphia and Atlantic City for the past several decades.

Under the leadership of Angelo Bruno, often referred to as the docile Don, a reputation which was based upon his dislike of violence, the family remained relatively peaceful for two decades.

While it controlled most of the illegal gambling and loansharking in Philadelphia, its influence in southern New Jersey, with the exception of Camden and to a lesser extent Atlantic City, was minimal.

Through Antonio Caponigro, Bruno's trusted confidant and emissary, Bruno had gambling and loansharking interests in Essex County, N.J. Ironically, it was this trusted confidant who aspired to Bruno's position and ultimately contracted Bruno's murder, only to be the victim of his own disloyalty.

Bruno's immediate underboss was the late Philip Testa, who ultimately severed his loyalty to Bruno and led what could be characterized as a dissident faction of which Nicodemo Scarfo was a member.

Today, this family is in tremendous turmoil and the structure as I shall delineate is continually subject to change. Many of the former caporegime have been retired out, and Scarfo is seeking to consolidate his power under a new cadre of loyal, younger, and more aggressive men.

This aggressive character of Scarfo is in complete contrast to that of Bruno, who even upon learning about a plot to assassinate him some 20 years ago, spared the life of the person who contracted the hit, Antonio Pollina.

If I may, I will quickly provide this committee with a general overview of the violence that occurred within what was once known as the Bruno crime family.

Again, I must avoid any details since many of the investigations into the murders are still pending.

First, let me say that contrary to popular belief, the war in Philadelphia was not a result of casino gaming in New Jersey. Our intelligence indicates that as early as 1975, there was a division within the Bruno family with the under boss, Philip Testa, subverting the authority of Bruno. Had it not been for Antonio Caponigro's desire to become the boss of the family, with I might add the unofficial sanction of the New York families, Bruno might still be active today, presuming he did not die of natural causes. I disagree with some of my colleagues and the media who are implying that casino gaming was directly responsible for this war.

The murders that occurred among the members of the Bruno crime family were the result of several separate but interrelated internal conspiracies, first, for acquiring control of the family, then to avenge the death of Bruno, and subsequently to consolidate the

power and authority under Philip Testa by eliminating those who were loyal to the late Angelo Bruno.

It is quite clear that the benefactor of this internal war has been Nicodemo Scarfo, who is now the boss of the Bruno crime family. How he arrived at this position is a classic example of what organizational theorists might label the "Peter Principle," only with a unique twist. Scarfo's control over this family once again demonstrated how often the right time and place are so critical to how one is promoted within an organization.

As I early implied, Antonio Caponigro, a trusted confidant, desired to become the boss. Sensitive to the division between Testa and Bruno and having received, we believe, the unofficial sanction of the Genovese crime family, Caponigro contracted the murder of Bruno. Caponigro was subsequently the victim of his own disloyalty and was murdered violently on the orders of the Genovese crime family, and apparently with the concurrence of Testa who was very closely aligned with the Genovese family. It was a classic example of Macavellian politics and was the genesis of the war which followed.

In an effort to consolidate his power, Testa eliminated several of the Bruno loyalists, only to fall prey to his own form of retaliation. In March 1981, Testa was murdered, and control of the family was assumed by Nicodemo Scarfo.

Scarfo, by and large, is an incompetent who was banished to Atlantic City by Bruno for his undisciplined use of violence. In 1963 Scarfo was arrested for the stabbing murder of William Dugan. This charge was downgraded to voluntary manslaughter. Scarfo was convicted and served 6 months of a 23-month sentence.

A codefendant in the Dugan homicide was Salvatore Merlino, Scarfo's underboss, who was later acquitted of the charges.

Scarfo is a hoodlum who tries to live up to the image of a 1920's gangster. Scarfo will resort to violence instantaneously. Upon the death of Testa, whom Scarfo admired because of Testa's proclivity of violence, Scarfo assumed control of the family, and it is quite apparent that his lack of any managerial skill, other than the indiscriminate use of violence and fear, has, in effect, diminished the stature and effectiveness of this family to maintain exclusive control in Atlantic City, N.J.

This demonstrates nothing more than organized crime under Scarfo lacks the organization it acquired under Bruno.

It is unlikely that Scarfo will ever exercise the control that Bruno had over the affairs of the family. Clearly, the incursion of several other families into Atlantic City demonstrates Scarfo's inability to retard the inevitable: Atlantic City becoming an open city in which no one family can exercise absolute control.

That concludes the summary on the Bruno family, and next I would like to move into the Gambino family and give a summary on that family.

GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY

The Gambino crime family has been divided into two separate networks, one which functions in south Jersey, void of any control by those in north Jersey and answerable directly to New York, and

a north Jersey element which too answers to New York, but is not part of the south Jersey network.

For purposes of testimony, I have separated the two.

The Gambino family, north Jersey faction, is involved in gambling, loansharking, narcotics, and traditional predatory crimes, such as auto theft and burglaries. Formerly under the control of Carlo Gambino's personal emissary, Joseph Paterno, this family was at one time very active in Essex County, but of late, its influence has waned.

In some respects this was the result of Paterno's flight to Florida to avoid testimony before our State commission of investigation.

Placed in charge was Anthony Carminati, a trusted but incompetent caporegime who is not respected by the Jersey Gambinos, particularly Frank Miceli and James Palmeri. These latter two soldiers have virtually ignored Carminati, and under the auspices of Robert Bisaccia, they have operated void of Carminati's influence or control.

While Carminati is theoretically the boss of the north Jersey network, it is Bisaccia, Palmieri, and Miceli who are most influential in the affairs of this faction.

The south Jersey faction is, on the other hand, primarily involved in the illegal alien trafficking and heroin importation. It is responsible directly to New York and is closely aligned with the Badalamenti and Inzerillo families in Sicily. Many of the members have been indicted and convicted of narcotics violations, and it is quite obvious that this faction has acquired significant holdings in the pizza industry.

Let me begin by structuring out this element and then the northern faction.

That concludes the summary on the Gambino family, and from there I would like to move to a summary on the Genovese crime family.

GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY

The New York-based Genovese crime family operates primarily in the northern and central sectors of New Jersey. Representing one of the largest and influential criminal organizations in the United States, as well as New Jersey, the Genovese family is involved in such illicit activities as narcotics, gambling, loansharking, prostitution, labor racketeering, extortion, collusive theft, money laundering, and infiltration of legitimate enterprise. This family has and continues to utilize violence as a method of enhancing and protecting its financial interests.

Since the death of the late Vito Genovese, the Genovese family has had a number of bosses, namely, Thomas Eboli, deceased; Gerardo Catena; and Frank Tieri, deceased. Philip Lombardo is the current boss of the Genovese family. Lombardo presently resides in Florida, and due to poor health, he is in semiretirement. Catena now serves as consigliere for the Genovese family.

Anthony Salerno, the Genovese family underboss, maintains a vast network of loanshark operations in both New York and northern New Jersey. Salerno's extensive loansharking network is a principal revenue producer for the Genovese organization.

Recently, intelligence indicates the Genovese caporegime Vincent Gigante is a major contender for the position of boss of the Genovese family, serving as acting boss during Lombardo's convalescence in Florida. Gigante possesses a history of violence and engages in racketeering on the Hudson County waterfront, through John Digilio, a soldier in the family.

Digilio has amassed one of the most intricate gambling, loan-sharking, and racketeering networks in New Jersey through the utilization of fear and violence. Moreover, he has managed to infiltrate numerous legitimate businesses in Hudson, Middlesex, and Bergen Counties.

That concludes the summary on the Genovese crime family, and from there I would like to move to the Luchese crime family.

LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY

The Luchese family is operating primarily in the northern section of the State and is active in the Atlantic, Bergen, Essex, Monmouth, Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Sussex, and Union Counties. Its criminal activities comprise illegal gambling, loansharking, narcotic trafficking, the takeover of legitimate businesses, fraud, cigarette smuggling, extortion, and, to a lesser extent, race fixing, arson, pornography, and stolen property.

The family is represented by a relatively small but powerful group of individuals. The principal caporegimes exerting influence in the State are Anthony Accetturo and Joseph Abate, and the most important soldier is Michael Taccetta.

While Anthony Accetturo departed New Jersey in 1971 and relocated to the State of Florida, he still exerts a significant amount of control over his illicit enterprises in New Jersey.

His cousin, Michael Tacceta, supervises his gambling, loansharking, and narcotics network. The Accetturo/Taccetta gambling network operates in Essex, Union, Morris, and Passaic Counties, and, on a smaller scale in Monmouth, Ocean, Bergen, and Sussex Counties.

Taccetta controls the most prominent illegal gaming operations in Essex County under the auspices of Accetturo. This operation has recently made considerable gains in Essex County in that Taccetta has partially absorbed the Essex territory previously controlled by Tino Fiumara of the Genovese family, who is presently incarcerated, and the territory once controlled by Pasquale Mortorano, an operative of the late Antonio Caponigro of the Bruno crime family.

Accetturo and Taccetta are also principal operatives in a multi-million dollar east coast narcotics distribution network which transports narcotics from South America and the Caribbean to Florida and ultimately to New Jersey and New York City.

Joseph Abate, another important Luchese family caporegime, is active in the Atlantic City area. Abate has been the subject of several inquiries involving organized crime activities since 1959 and is known to have contact with various organized crime figures from different families.

All three of the principal Luchese operatives in the State of New Jersey have exhibited an ability to operate in conjunction with or

at least coexist with the other organized crime families in the State. Anthony Accetturo has been able to maintain a close association with most of the families in the Northeast, including the Bruno, Decavalcante, Gambino, and Genovese crime families.

Taccetta has been successful in merging his gambling operations with those of other major organized crime groups, as in the case of the Decavalcante crime family and the Campisi and Denorscio groups.

Joseph Abate has also been able to maintain associations with several crime families, including the Bruno and Genovese crime families.

The Luchese family in New Jersey, as a whole, is not known for its violence. However, the Taccetta network is extremely aggressive and has resorted to violence to eliminate weaker competitors.

While the Luchese family is relatively small in number as compared to most of the other organized crime families in the State of New Jersey, it currently occupies a prominent position in north Jersey due to its lucrative and well organized gambling and narcotics networks. Currently the Accetturo/Taccetta gambling and narcotics networks are expanding and further growth of the Luchese family in New Jersey is expected.

That concludes the Luchese crime family, and from there I would like to move on to a summary of the Bonanno crime family.

BONANNO CRIME FAMILY

The original boss of the Bonanno crime family was Joseph Bonanno. Bonanno was one of the five original New York crime family leaders. In 1963, he began an international expansion of his activities. This planned expansion created problems with the five family structure.

In 1964, he was deported by Canadian authorities to the United States. In October of 1964, he was abducted and did not surface until 1966. Upon his return to the public view in 1966, he attempted to reexert his influence within the New York area. His attempt subsequently failed, and Bonanno was retired to Arizona.

The illicit enterprises which Bonanno abandoned in New York were, for the most part, assimilated into the enterprises of the Gambino network.

Bonanno's underboss at that time was Carmine Galente. Galente was serving a 20-year sentence on a narcotics conviction. In 1974, Galente was released from prison. For the next 5 years, he attempted to regain the enterprises which once belonged to the Bonanno family. His unsuccessful attempt ended in 1979 when he was murdered.

Upon the death of Galente, Phillip Rastelli assumed control of the family. Under the leadership of Rastelli, the Bonanno family is involved in various illicit activities. These activities are known to include narcotics, gambling, labor racketeering, extortion, and loansharking.

The Bonanno family activities in New Jersey are limited primarily to the northern counties. These illicit activities were controlled by Bonanno capo Joseph Zicarelli. Zicarelli's gambling network in the 1960's was the largest revenue producer in the area. He was

able to maintain his operations through his close alliance with several influential political figures. Zicarelli also exerted a significant amount of influence in several labor unions. Presently, Zicarelli is in poor health and is inactive. However, members of his family are still active in Hudson County, N.J.

In the central portion of the State, the Bonanno organization is involved in loansharking and gambling. In Middlesex County, members of the Bonanno organization interact closely with members of the Colombo family. The common bond between these two criminal groups is Roma Foods. Roma is the exclusive distributor for Grande Cheese Co., a Wisconsin-based firm that is operated by Joseph Bonanno.

Since the late 1970's, the Gambino crime family has exercised a significant degree of control over the Bonanno organization. For this reason, there has been very little involvement in New Jersey by the Bonannos, the exception to this, of course, being the Zicarelli group, which has been operating in the State for the past 20 years.

That concludes the Bonanno crime family, and I would like to move on to the Colombo crime family.

COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY

The original boss of the Colombo crime family was Joseph Profaci. Upon the death of Profaci from natural causes in 1962, his brother-in-law, Joseph Magliocco became boss of the family. After Magliocco's death from a heart attack in 1963, Joseph Colombo assumed control of the family. Under his leadership, the family expanded its control over bookmaking, loansharking, and corrupt labor unions. In 1971, Joseph Colombo had become one of the most powerful organized crime bosses in New York.

In June of 1971, Joseph Colombo was seriously wounded while attending a civil rights rally. This incident marked the beginning of a steady decline in power for the Colombo organization. In recent years, other crime families, most notably the Gambinos, have seized many of the Colombo holdings. The enormous amount of profit which was once generated by these and other illicit activities have been drastically reduced.

However, one faction of the Colombo family which has continued to prosper is the Profaci group in New Jersey. This centrally based network of criminals is headed by Salvatore Profaci, son of the late crime boss Joseph Profaci. Members of this group are involved in various illicit activities in numerous counties throughout the State. A large number of this group reside in Monmouth County. However, they concentrate their efforts on businesses located in the northern sectors of the State. This group's illicit activities are known to include gambling, loansharking, arson, extortion, and labor racketeering.

Salvatore Profaci is the most prominent organized crime figure in Middlesex County. He directs his operations from Roma Foods Enterprises, Inc., located in South Plainfield. He maintains a relationship with members of the Bruno, Bonanno, Genovese, and Zerilli crime families. Aside from his illicit undertakings, Profaci is involved in several legitimate businesses.

Profaci's cousin, Sal Curtis, represents the group's narcotics interests in Ocean County. In 1981, Curtis was the target of a State police narcotics investigation. The investigation was initiated at the Executive Escort Service, which is a front for narcotics, loansharking, and prostitution activities in Ocean County.

Profaci's illicit activities are not confined to the State of New Jersey. Roma Foods is currently known to be conducting business in 27 other States. His eventual goal is to monopolize the pizza and boxboard industries in the New Jersey and Pennsylvania areas. His group's loansharking activities are known to extend into areas of New York and Pennsylvania.

Salvatore Profaci is considered to be the heir apparent to the position of boss in the Colombo family. Profaci aspires to regain the power and prestige the family once held while his father was alive.

That concludes the Colombo family, and with that, I would like to move into the DeCavalcante family.

DE CAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY

The DeCavalcante crime family has the distinction of being the only family based in the State of New Jersey. Members of this family are primarily involved in gambling, narcotics distribution, loansharking, labor extortion, and political corruption. They control most illicit activities in Union County, and to a smaller extent the Port Elizabeth area, utilizing the city of Elizabeth as their headquarters.

The DeCavalcante crime family was organized by the late Nicholas Delmore. Subsequent to his death in 1964, Simone "Sam the Plumber" DeCavalcante assumed control of this family. DeCavalcante was quickly known as the model underworld boss, expanding the family's membership and influence.

He also projected an image of legitimacy to the public, making his suburban life style, legitimate business activities, politics, and charities as worthy of his time and energies as his criminal endeavors. In 1970, however, Sam DeCavalcante and 54 of his associates were indicted in Federal court. In 1971, DeCavalcante was sentenced to 5 years in prison, but was released 2 years later for his good behavior and failing health.

Sam DeCavalcante continued running his family after being released from prison. However, because of ill health, he has delegated authority to underboss John Riggi. DeCavalcante currently resides in Florida in semiretirement, traveling to New Jersey occasionally.

John Riggi is considered the acting boss of the DeCavalcante family operations in New Jersey. Riggi's primary function is to control labor racketeering in Union County through his affiliation with Local No. 394, International Association of Laborers and HOD Carriers.

The DeCavalcante family is considered a relatively small organized crime group with only 37 recognized "made members." Yet they are able to control and sustain several illicit enterprises in New Jersey. One of the caporegimes in the DeCavalcante family, Louis Larasso, controls illegal gambling in Union County and is involved in labor racketeering and extortion.

A recent investigation of Charles Majuri, a subordinate of Louis Larasso's, resulted in a State indictment of Majuri and implicated Larasso. Other principal members working directly for Larasso and Majuri are Joseph "Jo Jo" Ferrara, Anthony "Soft Shoe" Dimio, and Charles Stango, who was recently arrested for murder.

That concludes the DeCavalcante family, and from there, if I may, sir, I would like to move into some concluding statements.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just thinking if we could at this time go into some questions and then follow with your concluding remarks.

Colonel DINTINO. Sure.

EFFECT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, what effect have the right to privacy and the Freedom of Information Act had on the New Jersey State Police in terms of giving to and receiving information from other law enforcement agencies?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, the Freedom of Information Act has had a chilling effect on—

The CHAIRMAN. Has had what?

Colonel DINTINO. Has had a chilling effect on all law enforcement agencies that deal with Federal agencies. With one or two exceptions, to my knowledge, there are only a couple of States that have to deal with that problem. The States and local county agencies are concerned about the ability of convicted felons, organized crime members, terrorists being able to obtain information on themselves. They are concerned about the confidentiality of sources.

The CHAIRMAN. What effect, if any, has the Freedom of Information Act had on disclosing the identity of confidential informants?

Colonel DINTINO. I guess, Mr. Chairman, the best way to describe that is several years ago Joanne Chesimard who was imprisoned for the homicide of a New Jersey trooper. She escaped from the Clinton Reformatory in New Jersey. In her cell were several cartons of material and documents that she had obtained from the Federal Government that was information pertaining to her background.

We took those cartons of information and we analyzed them. I think maybe later we will send the results to you and maybe introduce it into the record. It clearly demonstrated that she was able to ascertain some of the sources of information that had been given to the Federal agencies, namely, the FBI in this case.

So I guess, in repeating the earlier question, we are concerned about organized crime members, terrorists, convicted felons being able to obtain this type of information because, while we cannot measure or gage it, I am sure there has been a number of instances where these types have determined who had divulged information concerning them, and as a result, took retaliatory action against that individual, including murder, beatings, or whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, these criminals are able to obtain information with regard to informants who helped to convict them?

Colonel DINTINO. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And as a result, in some cases they have taken retaliatory action?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes.

REINVESTMENT OF FUNDS

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, drug trafficking and gambling are among the most lucrative criminal enterprises in which organized crime is involved, I believe. Do you think that the illicit profits from these activities are primarily used to finance other criminal activities, or are these profits diverted into legitimate businesses?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, as far as drug activity and gambling, I agree that that is the No. 1 profitmaking enterprise of organized crime, and I would say that yes, they do reinvest it back into their illegal activities, and they do reinvest it or invest it in legitimate enterprises. They do both.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, are strong forfeiture provisions useful in preventing the misuse of these illegal profits?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, yes, organized crime's objective is making money. Any forfeiture legislation that would inhibit this capability would certainly be a benefit and reduce that criminal activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, have State lotteries and State-run offtrack betting in any way affected organized crime's activities in the area of illegal gambling?

Colonel DINTINO. I would say yes, but in a negative way. Since the introduction of the State lottery and offtrack betting in New York, I think it has been a proven factor that there has not been any reduction in organized crime and gambling. To the contrary, there has been an increase. What occurs when you legalize a form of gambling, is an untapped market of consumers who are available for organized crime to take advantage of. And they do.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are saying that when you legalize gambling, it has increased other gambling; is that right?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes; in other words, when you introduce gambling to an area that, say, has never had gambling before, you now develop a whole new group of individuals who start to gamble.

Now, as a result of that, while they may initially start out with the legal gambling, some of those will turn to the illegal gambling because maybe it offers them higher payments. There are no tax payments that have to be made. The illegal gambling will offer them credit. There are other inducements that organized crime can offer them that the States cannot.

ORGANIZED CRIME INCREASE IN ATLANTIC CITY

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, in 1976, New Jersey voters passed a referendum to allow casino gambling in Atlantic City, N.J. Has the New Jersey State Police observed any increase in organized crime activity in the State as a result of casino gaming being legalized?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes. Since the introduction of casino gaming in New Jersey, we have seen a definite increase in narcotics trafficking and use, loansharking, prostitution, and labor racketeering. I

guess the point I am making here is that possibly any State that would be considering casino legislation should look very closely at the law enforcement that is required and is needed to supervise or control that type of an industry. You must measure the cost-efficiency ratio. Perhaps I would suggest, since we just mentioned State lotteries, if any State was considering gaming that had no previous gambling, my recommendation would be to first start with a lottery because I think it is the most cost efficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, has casino gaming attracted other organized crime families to the State of New Jersey, other than those who have been traditionally present; and if so, can you identify those families for the committee?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to qualify that answer. Nicodemo Scarfo has been in Atlantic City since 1964 and has traditionally controlled the illicit activities. When casino gaming was being considered in the State of New Jersey, the division of State police predicted an increase in organized crime activities.

As a result, we developed what we consider a model legislation to minimize the intrusion of organized crime into the casino industry. We are aware of several other organized crime families now in the Atlantic City area, namely the Gambinos, the Genovese, Luchese, Buffalino, Volpe, and the Accardo family out of Chicago, DeCavalcante and Colombo.

They have not been able to acquire a significant interest in the ancillary services. The casino deals with approximately 250 vendors and we presently have nine casinos operating. You can quickly multiply the number of ancillary services that they have to deal with or we have to deal with in regulating them, and to date, we have identified approximately 12 that have been controlled or infiltrated by organized crime. All 12 are known to us.

There may be some that are not known to us, and we are taking action against those ancillary services, both through the division of gaming enforcement, who has taken regulatory action, and in some cases we have had applicants withdraw their application before the completion of our investigation; and through the division of State police and the division of criminal justice, we are conducting criminal investigations which hopefully will result in successful prosecutions.

VOLPE CRIME FAMILY OF CANADA

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, the committee has received information that the Volpe organized crime family from Canada has become active in the Atlantic City area. Can you tell the committee if this is, in fact, the case; and if so, to what extent is this group involved in Atlantic City?

Colonel DINTINO. The Volpe crime family from Canada has become extensively involved in the Atlantic City area in the purchase of real estate, both within Atlantic City and Atlantic County.

BAIL IS OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE CRIME

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, when organized crime figures are released on bail pending trial, sentencing or appeal, do they use this as an opportunity to continue their illegal business?

Colonel DINTINO. Most definitely. An organized crime criminal is a professional career criminal and will continue in his illicit activities despite the fact that he may face jail.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, when they are out on bail, they do not hesitate to continue their illegal business?

Colonel DINTINO. No. When you are talking about individuals who are never going to be respected citizens. They are committed to a life of crime forever and ever, and whether they are out on bail or whatever, that is no deterrent to them.

The CHAIRMAN. The only deterrent to them would be to incarcerate them then?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, is bail money considered a cost of doing business for these individuals?

Colonel DINTINO. Absolutely. It is considered another form of overhead in order to operate their illegal activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you favor bail laws which would authorize judges to incarcerate dangerous defendants prior to trial?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, provided the defendant has demonstrated a history of violent activity. Approximately 1 year ago a notorious Pagan member, Glen Turner, shot a New Jersey State Trooper, John Jacobs, in the face clearly with the intent to kill this trooper, and he fled. Subsequently he was apprehended a few weeks later in Pennsylvania. Bail was set at \$125,000, and I think everyone in the law enforcement community knew that he would not show up for trial because this individual was heavily involved in narcotics trafficking. He did not show up and he became a fugitive, and several months later, he was apprehended by the FBI.

The CHAIRMAN. And his bail was forfeited?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But that does not deter criminals from escaping when they are let out on bail because, I believe, as you said, it is just part of the cost of doing business in crime?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes. In fact, we have developed accurate information that the night that Turner shot Trooper Jacobs, that he was delivering a large amount of methamphetamine. He was considered a heavy trafficker in narcotics; \$125,000 to him would be like \$25 would be to me. It would be nothing as far as posting bail, one drug run.

The CHAIRMAN. There is so much profit in the drug traffic?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, enormous profits, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, can you comment on any successful accomplishments the New Jersey State Police has achieved through the use of undercover techniques?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes. I guess that the most successful accomplishments that I can recall are the Alpha project, which resulted in the arrest and incarceration of Tino Fiumara, who was the soldier of the Genovese family and controlled the waterfront; also

John DiGilio, another significant soldier in the Genovese family. He was arrested, and his case is still pending trial.

We had another case which we dubbed Omega, which involved Richie "The Boot" Boiardo, who is a capo in the Genovese family and controlled a group that was involved in loansharking, narcotics, labor, racketeering, and also skimming from a Las Vegas casino. In fact, in that particular case, it was the first time ever that a mob conspiracy charge was utilized.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you believe that the improvements you initiated within the State police concerning organized crime intelligence gathering and maintenance techniques increased your agency's effectiveness in organized crime investigations; and if so, how?

Colonel DINTINO. No question. My testimony before this congressional committee is but one example of our intelligence capabilities. Beyond this, we have developed a number of quality investigations that could only have occurred with an intelligence capability. Our guidelines serve as a model for other agencies, including Scotland Yard.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, the committee recognizes the importance of effective criminal intelligence operations in combating organized crime. What part does intelligence play in dealing with sophisticated crimes, such as those we are discussing today?

Colonel DINTINO. I think it is the only rational method of prioritizing where you are going to deploy your resources, through strategic and tactical assessments. The lack of intelligence results in inefficiency. We have fewer resources today due to budgets and whatnot, and we have to learn to do more with less. Intelligence teaches us to become proactive instead of reactive.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, to what extent is organized crime intelligence analysis a critical element in an intelligence program?

Colonel DINTINO. Analysis is the heart of the intelligence process. Without analysis, all you have is raw data. It is the analytical phase that makes meaning out of what is seemingly unrelated data.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, the investment of illicit profits of organized crime into legitimate business is very common today. In what types of businesses does organized crime invest in the State of New Jersey?

Colonel DINTINO. Organized crime invests in businesses that are cash oriented so that the potential for skimming and not paying taxes is present; also they invest their moneys for laundering purposes, and are interested in types of businesses where the potential for extortion exists and businesses where the opportunity for fraud are the greatest, such as bankruptcy frauds, arson, insurance frauds.

LABOR RACKETEERING

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, during your testimony, you mentioned that a number of organized crime figures are involved in labor racketeering. What types of labor unions are most affected by organized crime infiltration, and why are those particular unions selected as targets by organized crime?

Colonel DINTINO. Those labor unions that represent employees where in the event that they were to strike, they would have a devastating impact economically on the company. Organized crime also gets involved in representing employees that deal in cash services, and also public service unions that are critical to government.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in the early 1970's a group of Sicilian aliens associated with the Gambino LCN family moved into the area of southern New Jersey and opened a wholesale food distributorship, as well as a number of pizza shops. Were these legitimate businesses or fronts for criminal activities?

Colonel DINTINO. A close investigation of these Gambino pizza shops in southern New Jersey reveals that they were importing illegal aliens and utilizing this cheap employment within the pizza shops. They also were using the pizza shops as a front for international drug trafficking, and also some of these were later inducted into the Gambino crime family as members.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand that organized crime owns a number of pizza shops in this area. Do you know whether they are being used as fronts?

Colonel DINTINO. I would not know about Washington. But I do know that the Gambino pizza enterprise has spread down South as far as Virginia and could very well be in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we are going to take a break until 2:30. So if you will kindly come back then.

We will now stand in recess until then.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned for lunch, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Colonel Dintino, we will now resume the questioning.

Is there any indication that these illegal aliens will be used to replace retired or deceased members of organized crime families?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, sir. We have some indication that the Gambinos that have in the past opened their books to put illegal aliens as members into their organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you believe the organized crime families operating in New Jersey have always been involved in the distribution of narcotics, or is it a more recent phenomenon?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, some families have been involved in narcotics for a number of years. More recently, we find all families heavily involved in all types of narcotics trafficking, but in addition, we also find a number of new groups, organized crime groups, emerging in this area and becoming involved in narcotic trafficking.

NARCOTIC TRAFFICKING

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Dintino, have you noticed an increased degree of cooperation existing between outlaw motorcycle gang members and traditional LCN members in your area?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes; we have. In fact, in one instance, in the Philadelphia area, we have seen a member of organized crime use members of the Pagans as bodyguards, and we also have seen

where organized crime and the Pagans have become involved together in narcotic trafficking.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know which outlaw motorcycle gangs operate in New Jersey?

Colonel DINTINO. Pagans, the Breeds, the Wheels of Souls. The Wheels of Souls have the largest number, I believe about 200, and the Pagans next.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, what types of illegal activities have outlaw motorcycle gangs engaged in?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, they are involved in all types of illegal activities, but their principal source of illegal activity is narcotic trafficking.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any evidence that they have acted as enforcers of organized crime gangs or LCN members?

Colonel DINTINO. Would you repeat that question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any evidence or do you know of any information to indicate that they are acting as enforcers for organized crime gangs?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes; they have, yes. We have information that the Philadelphia crime family has utilized the Pagans as enforcers, and I know this has occurred nationally, as well, with other cycle gangs.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you noticed any rivalry between these motorcycle gangs and the LCN?

Colonel DINTINO. We have seen the start of a rivalry between the Philadelphia and the Pagans. Apparently there was a sit-down, and they resolved this dispute. But one thing that I think emerges loud and clear is that the Pagans, to me, forced the traditional organized crime family to back down. I see cycle gangs as becoming much stronger as time progresses.

The CHAIRMAN. Are motorcycle gangs much stronger than the La Cosa Nostra?

Colonel DINTINO. Well, I would not say at the present time, but I can see down the road the traditional organized crime families weakening and the cycle gangs, unless we get active in that area, are going to bypass organized crime as we now know it.

The CHAIRMAN. They are more violent?

Colonel DINTINO. I would say about the same.

PHILIP TESTA MURDER

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there were outlaw gang members involved in the murder of Philip Testa?

Colonel DINTINO. There were suspects, and I would say negative, that that was internal.

The CHAIRMAN. That what?

Colonel DINTINO. Initially they were suspected because there was a bombing, but no, I do not believe they were involved in the Testa homicide.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in addition to motorcycle gangs, have any other organized criminal groups come to your attention?

Colonel DINTINO. We have found that there are other nontraditional organized crime groups involved. For instance, we find organized crime groups and nonorganized crime groups involved in nar-

cotics trafficking. This is a criminal activity where the potential for profits are so enormous that it has attracted individuals from all walks of life. In other words, we see the emergence of a number of groups in organized crime that were heretofore unknown to us.

We have been successful and the Federal authorities have been successful in uncovering major conspiracies. When we see the individuals that are arrested, they are not the types that we see up here that we are familiar with. They could be rich, poor. They could be college individuals. They could be illiterates. They could be professional people.

I think the *Delorean* case is just an indication of who might become involved in narcotic trafficking.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you have a unit assigned to work outlaw motorcycle gang cases; and if so, how large is this unit?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, we have characterized outlaw motorcycle gangs as organized crime, so our entire intelligence bureau is committed to working outlaw motorcycle gangs, as well as other emerging new groups. We do not work exclusively on the traditional organized crime families.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, does law enforcement on the national level have the expertise and resources to investigate organized crime?

Colonel DINTINO. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Federal establishment has the expertise, but not the resources. I think on a national level, overall we lack the expertise and the resources to combat organized crime effectively. If I may qualify that somewhat, it is my belief that in order to effectively combat organized crime, that you cannot do it without an intelligence system, a first-rate intelligence system, with an analytical capability. And I see a number of agencies within the country that have not reached that level.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, do you find the multiregional projects to be an effective mechanism in addressing the multijurisdictional nature of organized crime?

Colonel DINTINO. Most definitely. They provide a viable mechanism to coordinate investigations of organized crime which transcends jurisdictional boundaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, after listening to your testimony, I get the feeling that the arrest and incarceration of organized criminals has little effect on the structure of organized crime. Do you believe that the New Jersey State Police has had an appreciable impact on organized crime; and if so, what is the basis of this belief?

Colonel DINTINO. Sir, I am aware of our accomplishments, and must admit that the continuity organized crime is afforded through its structure seriously challenges the attrition through arrest strategy. However, I have witnessed the maturing of our organized crime program and strongly believe that we have demonstrated a measurable impact on organized crime in New Jersey.

I state this because approximately 50 members and a number of significant associates have departed our State as a result of our intense law enforcement efforts. We have witnessed the indictment and convictions of very significant members of organized crime heretofore immune from arrest. We have identified a response to

predicted patterns of criminal behavior that has permitted us to prevent the intrusion of organized crime into the casino industry.

We have learned to use our limited resources in a more judicious and cost-efficient manner. We have witnessed organized crime become disorganized crime as exhibited by the Bruno war.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, could not be here, and he has some questions. Would you mind responding to those for the record?

Colonel DINTINO. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a closing statement that you wanted to make?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to proceed with that?

Colonel DINTINO. Yes.

Sir, I would like to conclude my testimony with several comments about the quality of both the Federal and the State efforts to control organized crime.

First, I concur with Attorney General Smith and Director Webster that law enforcement has proven that organized crime is no longer untouchable, and that we have undermined the mystique of "The Godfather" as protector of his minions.

The tools have been provided by the legislature and Congress, and we must now use these tools in an imaginative and innovative ways. I believe that the Bri-Lab and Omega investigations and the recent bribery/conspiracy conviction of Teamsters President Roy Williams demonstrates the effectiveness of such investigative tools when carefully and judiciously applied.

Second, we in New Jersey have been given a unique opportunity to ferret out organized crime. As I pointed out earlier, we have received bipartisan support which certainly represents a serious commitment on behalf of all the administrations. We are fortunate to have the support of our political leaders in the war against organized crime.

Third, let me suggest that traditional organized crime no longer enjoys the power it once did in New Jersey. I can say with certainty that the exclusive control that was once exercised by the Mafia of the illegal rackets in our urban areas has been significantly eroded, with perhaps the exceptions being the waterfront and the boxboard industry, and the consequence has been the emergency of more independent organizations that are supplying these illicit services.

Unfortunately, we can do little about the desire of the public to solicit the vices that organized crime seeks to provide. We can, however, insure that no one group or conglomeration of groups control these services. In this respect, I believe we have disorganized organized crime, but in no way have we eliminated the types of crime criminal networks are willing to provide.

Fourth, I believe that there exists an official recognition of organized crime that at one time was nonexistent, which has heightened society's perception of this problem and has resulted in the public demand for action on the part of our elected officials.

In New Jersey this is certainly the case, and I am confident that hearings such as this will dispell the perception among the disbe-

lievers that there is no such thing as organized crime of national scope.

Lastly, let me suggest that given our current economic conditions, the law enforcement community will have to accomplish more with less. This will necessitate the selective and judicious allocation of police resources, requiring a more professional approach to the management and investigative resources.

Intelligence represents the ultimate managerial tool in this war against organized crime, and I envision progressive police administrators relying more and more upon this vital tool. Hopefully, this will necessitate a reordering of priorities in our law enforcement agencies, providing intelligence units with the resources and analytical expertise that are so vitally needed.

I thank you, and I am prepared to answer any other questions you may have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, I think that is all, and I want to take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to you for coming here today and giving us this splendid testimony.

I also want to congratulate you for your long and capable experience in law enforcement and the great service that you render to your country in this respect. Thank you again for your presence.

Colonel DINTINO. Thank you, sir, for your kind remarks. I appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The family structure of organized crime in New Jersey follows:]

THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIMEIN NEW JERSEYBYLT. COLONEL JUSTIN J. DINTINOPREPARED FOR THEUNITED STATES SENATESENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEEFEBRUARY 16, 1983BRUNO CRIME FAMILY

PERHAPS IT IS APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN WITH THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" -- A "FAMILY" UNDERGOING SERIOUS INTERNAL STRIFE AND TURMOIL REMINISCENT OF THE EARLY DAYS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO.

THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" TRADITIONALLY WAS THE DOMINANT FAMILY IN PHILADELPHIA AND ATLANTIC CITY FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES. UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ANGELO BRUNO, OFTEN REFERRED TO AS THE "DOCILE DON" -- A REPUTATION WHICH WAS BASED UPON HIS DISLIKE OF VIOLENCE -- THE "FAMILY" REMAINED RELATIVELY PEACEFUL FOR TWO DECADES. WHILE IT CONTROLLED MOST ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN PHILADELPHIA, ITS INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CAMDEN AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, ATLANTIC CITY, WAS MINIMAL. THROUGH ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, BRUNO'S TRUSTED CONFIDANTE AND EMISSARY, BRUNO HAD GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" INTERESTS IN ESSEX COUNTY, NEW JERSEY. IRONICALLY, IT WAS THIS "TRUSTED CONFIDANTE" WHO ASPIRED TO BRUNO'S POSITION AND ULTIMATELY CONTRACTED BRUNO'S MURDER, ONLY TO BE THE VICTIM OF HIS OWN DISLOYALTY.

BRUNO'S IMMEDIATE "UNDERBOSS" WAS THE LATE PHILIP TESTA, WHO ULTIMATELY SEVERED HIS LOYALTY TO BRUNO AND LED WHAT COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS A "DISSIDENT FACTION" OF WHICH NICODEMO SCARFO WAS A MEMBER.

TODAY, THIS "FAMILY" IS IN TREMENDOUS TURMOIL AND THE STRUCTURE AS I SHALL DELINEATE IS CONTINUALLY SUBJECT TO CHANGE. MANY OF THE FORMER "CAPOREGIME" HAVE BEEN "RETIRED OUT" AND SCARFO IS SEEKING TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER UNDER A NEW CADRE OF LOYAL, YOUNGER, AND MORE AGGRESSIVE MEN. THIS AGGRESSIVE CHARACTER OF SCARFO IS IN COMPLETE CONTRAST TO THAT OF BRUNO, WHO EVEN UPON LEARNING ABOUT A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE HIM SOME TWENTY YEARS AGO, SPARED THE LIFE OF THE PERSON WHO CONTRACTED THE "HIT" -- ANTONIO POLLINA.

IF I MAY, I WILL QUICKLY PROVIDE THIS COMMITTEE WITH A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE VIOLENCE THAT HAS OCCURRED WITHIN WHAT WAS ONCE KNOWN AS THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." AGAIN, I MUST AVOID ANY DETAILS, SINCE MANY OF THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MURDERS ARE STILL ACTIVE.

FIRST, LET ME SAY THAT CONTRARY TO POPULAR BELIEF, THE "WAR" IN PHILADELPHIA WAS NOT A RESULT OF CASINO-GAMING IN NEW JERSEY. OUR INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT AS EARLY AS 1975, THERE WAS A DIVISION WITHIN THE "BRUNO FAMILY" WITH THE "UNDERBOSS," PHILIP TESTA SUBVERTING THE AUTHORITY OF BRUNO. HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S DESIRE TO BECOME THE "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY," WITH I MIGHT ADD, THE UNOFFICIAL SANCTION OF THE "NEW YORK FAMILIES," BRUNO WOULD STILL BE ACTIVE TODAY (PRESUMING HE DID NOT DIE OF NATURAL CAUSES), THUS, I DISAGREE WITH SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES AND THE MEDIA WHO ARE IMPLYING THAT CASINO GAMING WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS "WAR."

THE MURDERS THAT OCCURRED AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" WERE THE RESULT OF SEVERAL SEPARATE BUT INTER-RELATED INTERNAL CONSPIRACIES, FIRST FOR ACQUIRING CONTROL OF THE "FAMILY," THEN TO AVENGE THE DEATH OF BRUNO AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONSOLIDATE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY UNDER PHILIP TESTA BY ELIMINATING THOSE WHO WERE LOYAL TO THE LATE ANGELO BRUNO. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE BENEFACITOR OF THIS "INTERNAL WAR" HAS BEEN NICODEMO SCARFO WHO IS NOW THE "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HOW HE ARRIVED AT THIS POSITION IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL THEORISTS MIGHT LABEL THE "PETER PRINCIPLE" ONLY WITH A UNIQUE TWIST. SCARFO'S CONTROL OVER THIS "FAMILY" ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATED HOW OFTEN THE "RIGHT TIME AND PLACE" ARE SO CRITICAL TO HOW ONE IS PROMOTED WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION.

AS I EARLIER IMPLIED, ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, A TRUSTED CONFIDANTE DESIRED TO BECOME THE "BOSS." SENSITIVE TO THE DIVISION BETWEEN TESTA AND BRUNO, AND HAVING RECEIVED

(WE BELIEVE) THE UNOFFICIAL SANCTION OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," CAPONIGRO CONTRACTED THE MURDER OF BRUNO. CAPONIGRO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY THE VICTIM OF HIS OWN DISLOYALTY, AND WAS MURDERED VIOLENTLY ON THE ORDERS OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," AND APPARENTLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF TESTA, WHO WAS VERY CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE "GENOVESE FAMILY." IT WAS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF "MACAVELLIAN POLITICS" AND WAS THE GENESIS OF THE "WAR" WHICH FOLLOWED.


IN AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER, TESTA ELIMINATED SEVERAL OF THE "BRUNO LOYALISTS," ONLY TO FALL PREY TO HIS OWN FORM OF RETALIATION. IN MARCH 1981, TESTA WAS MURDERED AND CONTROL OF THE "FAMILY" WAS ASSUMED BY NICODEMO SCARFO.

SCARFO, BY IN LARGE, IS AN INCOMPETENT WHO WAS "BANISHED" TO ATLANTIC CITY BY BRUNO FOR HIS UNDISCIPLINED USE OF VIOLENCE. IN 1963, SCARFO WAS ARRESTED FOR THE STABBING MURDER OF WILLIAM DUGAN. THIS CHARGE WAS DOWNGRADED TO VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. SCARFO WAS CONVICTED AND SERVED SIX MONTHS OF A TWENTY-THREE MONTH SENTENCE. A CO-DEFENDANT IN THE DUGAN HOMICIDE WAS SALVATORE MERLINO, SCARFO'S "UNDERBOSS," WHO WAS LATER ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGES.

SCARFO IS A "HOODLUM" WHO TRIES TO LIVE-UP TO THE IMAGE OF A "TWENTIES GANGSTER," SCARFO WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE INSTANTANEOUSLY. UPON THE DEATH OF TESTA, WHO SCARFO ADMIRER BECAUSE OF TESTA'S PROCLIVITY OF VIOLENCE, SCARFO ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE "FAMILY," AND IT IS QUITE APPARENT THAT HIS LACK OF ANY MANAGERIAL SKILL, OTHER THAN THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF VIOLENCE AND FEAR, HAS IN EFFECT, DIMINISHED THE STATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS "FAMILY" TO MAINTAIN EXCLUSIVE CONTROL IN ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY. THIS DEMONSTRATES NOTHING MORE THAN ORGANIZED CRIME UNDER SCARFO LACKS THE ORGANIZATION THAT IT ACQUIRED UNDER BRUNO.

IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SCARFO WILL EVER EXERCISE THE CONTROL THAT BRUNO HAD OVER THE AFFAIRS OF THE "FAMILY." CLEARLY, THE INCURSION OF SEVERAL OTHER "FAMILIES" INTO ATLANTIC CITY DEMONSTRATES SCARFO'S INABILITY TO RETARD THE INEVITABLE -- ATLANTIC CITY BECOMING AN "OPEN CITY" IN WHICH NO ONE "FAMILY" CAN EXERCISE ABSOLUTE CONTROL.

BRUNO CRIME FAMILY



"BRUNO WAR"

ANGELO BRUNO MARCH 21, 1980

ANTONIO CAPONIGRO APRIL 18, 1980

ALFRED SALERNO APRIL 18, 1980

JOHN SIMONE SEPTEMBER 19, 1980

FRANK SINDONE OCTOBER 30, 1980

JOHN MC CULLOUGH DECEMBER 16, 1980

PHILIP TESTA MARCH 15, 1981

HARRY PEETROS MAY 26, 1981

CHELSAIS BOURAS MAY 27, 1981

JOHN CALABRESE OCTOBER 6, 1981

FRANK NARDUCCI JANUARY 7, 1982

PIETRO INZERILLO JANUARY 15, 1982

DOMINICK DE VITO FEBRUARY 25, 1982

ROCCO MARINUCCI MARCH 15, 1982

FRANK MONTE MAY 13, 1982

ROBERT HORNICKEL JANUARY 27, 1983

NICODEMO SCARFO
26 NORTH GEORGIA AVENUE
APARTMENT C-1
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 8, 1929
SBI# : 884103
FBI# : 532-250E
STATUS: "BOSS"

NICODEMO SCARFO IS THE "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." IN JULY 1963, SCARFO WAS ARRESTED FOR THE STABBING MURDER OF WILLIAM DUGAN. THIS CHARGE WAS DOWNGRADED TO VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. SCARFO WAS CONVICTED AND SERVED SIX MONTHS OF A TWENTY-THREE MONTH SENTENCE. A CO-DEPENDENT IN THE DUGAN HOMICIDE WAS SALVATORE MERLINO, SCARFO'S "UNDERBOSS," WHO WAS LATER ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGES.

IN 1971, SCARFO WAS SUBPOENAED BY THE NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. HE WAS GIVEN IMMUNITY, BUT REFUSED TO TESTIFY IN MATTERS CONCERNING ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY AREA. HE WAS INCARCERATED IN YARDVILLE PRISON, NEW JERSEY UNTIL JULY 7, 1973. UPON SCARFO'S RELEASE FROM YARDVILLE, HE ASSUMED A POSITION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA. IN 1975 A "FAMILY" FEUD DIVIDED THE "BRUNO FAMILY." PHIL TESTA, THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "FAMILY," LED THE REBEL FACTION. AFTER THE DEATH OF PHIL TESTA, SCARFO ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY."

SCARFO CURRENTLY CONTROLS GAMBLING, A "BOOKMAKING LAY-OFF AND LINE" SERVICE, "LOANSHARKING" AND THE PROCUREMENT OF ILLICIT PRECURSORS USED TO MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTE NARCOTICS. ADDITIONALLY, SCARFO IS STILL ACTIVE IN THE LABOR UNIONS AND THE INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES. HE OVERSEES THE ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITY IN SOUTH JERSEY AND PHILADELPHIA.

UNDER SCARFO'S DIRECTION, THE "MEMBERSHIP BOOKS" HAVE BEEN OPENED TO YOUNGER, MORE AGGRESSIVE MEN. SOURCES INDICATE THAT A NUMBER OF MEN WERE "MADE" DURING 1981 UNDER BOTH TESTA AND SCARFO. SCARFO IS CURRENTLY

IN THE PROCESS OF REALIGNING POWER WITHIN THE "FAMILY" AND HAS ELIMINATED THOSE WHO POSE A THREAT TO HIM.

ALTHOUGH, SCARFO AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAVE BEEN SUSPECTS IN SEVERAL MURDERS IN ATLANTIC CITY, NO CONVICTIONS WERE EVER OBTAINED. HE SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED CONVICTION IN THE MURDER OF VINCENT FALCONE, DESPITE TESTIMONY OF AN EYE WITNESS.

DURING 1981, SCARFO WAS CONVICTED ON ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A FELON. SCARFO WAS RELEASED ON BAIL UNDER THE CONDITION HE WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE WITH "KNOWN CRIMINALS." HE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH HIS PROBATION TERMS AND IS CURRENTLY SERVING TIME IN A FEDERAL PRISON IN LA TUNA, TEXAS. HIS APPEAL HAS SINCE BEEN DENIED.

CLEARLY, SCARFO'S LEGACY IS ONE OF BRUTE VIOLENCE AND THE EXERCISE OF POWER. HE SUBSCRIBES TO THE PHILOSOPHY THAT "POWER COMES FROM THE END OF THE GUN." THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT HIS ASCENSION TO THE "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY," ALTHOUGH HE IS LESS AUTONOMOUS THAN HIS PREDECESSORS, OWING QUALIFIED ALLEGIANCE TO THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," AND OTHER CRIME "FAMILIES" IN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA.

SALVATORE JOSEPH MERLINO
927 JACKSON STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JUNE 29, 1939
FBI : 46078G
AKA : "CHUCKY"
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

MERLINO IS THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." AS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF NICODEMO SCARFO, HE MADE REGULAR TRIPS TO ATLANTIC CITY TO SEE SCARFO. MERLINO CONTROLS THE ILLEGAL OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY AND PHILADELPHIA. WITH SCARFO'S RECENT INCARCERATION, MERLINO IS ACTING "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." MERLINO'S SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SALVATORE TESTA, LAWRENCE "YOGI" MERLINO (HIS BROTHER), ANTHONY FERRANTE AND FELIX BOCCHINO.

NICOLO PICCOLO
8206 SEAVIEW AVENUE
WILDWOOD CREST, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 10, 1905
FBI# : 4885439
AKA : "NICKY BUCK"
STATUS : "CONSIGLIERE"

NICOLO PICCOLO WAS RECENTLY ELEVATED TO THE POSITION OF "CONSIGLIERE" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." PICCOLO IS AN UNCLE OF NICODEMO SCARFO, THE "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" AND HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN A CLOSE ALLY OF BRUNO AND TESTA.

PETER F. CASELLA
734 SOUTH 9TH STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : AUGUST 28, 1907
FBI# : 784-604
AKA : "PIETRO CASELLA"
"PETER CASSELLA"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

PETER CASELLA IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND WAS PAROLED IN 1975 AFTER SERVING MORE THAN 15 YEARS IN PRISON ON A NARCOTICS CONVICTION.

IN APRIL, 1980, WHEN THE LATE PHILIP TESTA WAS ELEVATED TO SUCCEED ANGELO BRUNO; CASELLA, A LONGTIME MEMBER OF THE LOCAL "FAMILY," WAS "UNDERBOSS." CASELLA WAS ONE OF THE FEW OLDER MEMBERS WHO JOINED THE TESTA FACTION DURING THE "FEUD."

SINCE THE DEATH OF TESTA, CASELLA NO LONGER SERVES AS "UNDERBOSS" AND IS "MISSING."

JOSEPH CIANCAGLINI
732 SOUTH HUTCHINSON STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : DECEMBER 15, 1934
FBI : 959960D
AKA : "CHICKIE"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH CIANCAGLINI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE CONTROLS THE LARGEST GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATION IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. HE WAS A FORMER CHAUFFEUR AND BODYGUARD FOR THE LATE FRANK SINDONE, A MAJOR "LOANSHARK." CIANCAGLINI WAS INDUCTED INTO THE "BRUNO FAMILY" IN THE EARLY 1970'S AND WAS ACTIVE AS A GAMBLER AND "ENFORCER." HE IS SHOWN GREAT RESPECT BY "SOLDIERS" AND ASSOCIATES OF THE "FAMILY."

CIANCAGLINI WAS INVOLVED WITH TEAMSTERS LOCAL #107 IN THE LATE 1960'S. HE WAS AN ASSOCIATE OF EDWARD BATTISFORE, PRESIDENT OF UNION LOCAL #107, AND FRANK SHEERAN, THEN A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD. CIANCAGLINI ^{AND} SHEERAN WERE IMPLICATED IN THE MURDER OF ROBERT DEGEORGE, A UNION MEMBER WHO WAS RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND PLANNED TO "CLEAN UP" THE CORRUPT LOCAL #107.

SANTO IDONE
1136 44th AVENUE, NORTH EAST
ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA

DOB : FEBRUARY 16, 1920
AKA : "CHESTER SAM"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

SANTO IDONE IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS APPOINTED TO THIS POSITION AFTER THE DEATH OF JOSEPH RUGNETTA IN 1977. HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF "BRUNO" MEMBERS ANTONIO SCIGLITANO, ANTHONY DELLA IACONE AND JOSEPH SCALLEAT. IDONE WAS FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH JOSEPH "JOE CADILLAC" LANDMESSER, A GAMBLING AND SPORTS BETTING OPERATIVE FROM DELAWARE COUNTY.

ALFREDO J. IEZZI
1437 SOUTH BROAD STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : NOVEMBER 21, 1911
SBI : 216283
FBI : 1775388
AKA : "ALFRED IEZZI," "CHAZ MAHONEY"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

IEZZI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE OWNER OF SEVERAL TAVERNS IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.

IEZZI'S CRIMINAL RECORD CONSISTS OF AN ARREST FOR ASSAULT AND BATTERY. IEZZI IS ACTIVE IN "LOANSHARKING" AND GAMBLING ACTIVITIES.

JOSEPH LANCIANO
908 EAST PASSYUNK AVENUE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : FEBRUARY 18, 1906
SBI : 179034
FBI : 919119
AKA : JACK WILLIAMS
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH LANCIANO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." DURING THE MARCO REGINELLI REGIME AS "BOSS" OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN PHILADELPHIA, LANCIANO WAS A VERY ACTIVE AND VISIBLE "CAPOREGIME" IN THE FAMILY." SINCE THE DEMISE OF REGINELLI DURING THE 1950'S, LANCIANO WAS CONSIDERED A RETIRED "FAMILY" MEMBER. UNTIL THE DEATH OF ANGELO BRUNO, LANCIANO HAD NOT SURFACED AT ANY IMPORTANT MEETING OR FUNCTIONS INVOLVING THE FAMILY, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS.

LANCIANO IS A CLOSE CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF SALVATORE PASSALAQUA, WHO IS INVOLVED WITH GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY. PASSALAQUA HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THEFT, GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

RALPH ALBERT NAPOLI
38 STAG HOME TRAIL
FAIRFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 14, 1914
 SBI : 130167
 FBI : 301627C
 AKA : "FRANK ZARRO"
 "BLACKIE"
 STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

RALPH NAPOLI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS AN ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, PASQUALE MARTIRANO, THE LATE JOHN SIMONE, NICODEMO SCARFO AND ALBERT PONTANI. NAPOLI IS A KNOWN GAMBLER AND "LOANSHARK" IN THE NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AREA.

IN 1971, NAPOLI WAS ORDERED TO YARDVILLE CORRECTION CENTER ALONG WITH NICODEMO SCARFO AND THE LATE ANTHONY "LITTLE PUSSY" RUSSO FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BEFORE THE STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. HE WAS RELEASED SEVERAL YEARS LATER WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT HE WOULD NOT TESTIFY.

NAPOLI HAS ASSUMED PARTIAL CONTROL OF THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S ACTIVITIES.

NAPOLI HAS ARRESTS FOR "BOOKMAKING," MAINTAINING A GAMBLING RESORT, AND ASSAULT. HE ALSO HAS AN ARREST FOR CONTEMPT OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION.

HARRY RICCOBENE
728 CARPENTER STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JULY 27, 1910
 FBI : 470924
 AKA : "HUNCHBACK HARRY"
 STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

HARRY RICCOBENE IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE OPERATES BOTH GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" NETWORKS IN THE PHILADELPHIA AREA. RICCOBENE WAS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE LATE PHILIP TESTA, THE FORMER "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY." RICCOBENE AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN A POWER STRUGGLE WITH NICODEMO SCARFO, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SHOOTINGS.

RICCOBENE'S CLOSE ASSOCIATES INCLUDE FRANK TUMOLO, JOSEPH PEDULLA, VICTOR DELUCA, FELICE TUCCILLO, CHARLES "PINKY" COSTELLO, FRANK D'ALFONSO AND THE LATE STEVE BOURAS. ALONG WITH HIS HALF BROTHER, MARIO RICCOBENE, HARRY HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY. THE RICCOBENES ARE THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF NARCOTICS IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY AND ATLANTIC CITY.

HARRY RICCOBENE IS ALSO INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." HE ASSUMED THE "LOANSHARK" OPERATION OF THE LATE FRANK SINDONE. HE ALSO HANDLES THE "LOANSHARK" ACTIVITIES FOR FRANK D'ALFONSO.

RICCOBENE IS THE PRIMARY ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURE WHO INTERACTS WITH OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS, PARTICULARLY THE "PAGANS" FROM PENNSYLVANIA AND SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY.

RICCOBENE HAS AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL HISTORY WHICH INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR NARCOTICS, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN GOODS AND WEAPONS OFFENSES. IN FEBRUARY 1978, RICCOBENE WAS ARRESTED AT THE TYRONE DENITTIS ENTERTAINMENT CONSULTANT AGENCY FOR VIOLATING HIS PAROLE BECAUSE HE WAS ASSOCIATING WITH ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES, INCLUDING BRUNO AND MARIO RICCOBENE. ON MAY 6, 1978, RICCOBENE WAS RETURNED TO PRISON FOR VIOLATION OF PROBATION; HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED.

ON FEBRUARY 20, 1981, RICCOBENE WAS ARRESTED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND CHARGED WITH VARIOUS CRIMES UNDER THE R.I.C.O. (RACKETEERING INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION) STATUTE. HE WAS SENTENCED TO NINE YEARS IN PRISON AND FINED \$15,000.00 ON "RACKETEERING" CHARGES. HE IS NOW APPEALING THE CHARGES. RECENTLY RICCOBENE'S BAIL WAS REVOKED AS A RESULT OF AN ARREST FOR CARRYING A GUN WITHOUT A LICENSE.

SALVATORE A. TESTA
217 PORTER STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : APRIL 6, 1956
PPD# : 546068
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

SAL TESTA HAS RECENTLY BEEN ELEVATED TO THE POSITION OF "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO FAMILY." TESTA IS THE SON OF THE FORMER "BOSS" OF THE "PHILADELPHIA CRIME FAMILY," THE LATE PHILIP TESTA. SINCE HIS FATHER'S DEATH, TESTA HAS TAKEN OVER MUCH OF HIS FATHER'S "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITY AND HAS EARNED A REPUTATION AS A "GOOD MONEY MAKER."

IN JULY 1982, TESTA WAS SHOT BY JOSEPH PEDULLA AND VICTOR DELUCA IN RETALIATION FOR THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF HARRY RICCOBENE. DELUCA AND PEDULLA WERE CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND WEAPONS OFFENSES ON JANUARY 17, 1983.

TESTA'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SALVATORE AND LARRY MERLINO AND PHILIP LEONETTI.

JOSEPH ALTIMARI
32 BUCK HILL ROAD
HOLLAND, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : AUGUST 21, 1938
SBI# : 108225B
FBI# : 772410E
AKA : "JOEY A", HARRY VANDERGRIF
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH ALTIMARI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND CONTROLS GAMBLING NETWORKS IN PHILADELPHIA AND BUCKS COUNTY.

ALTIMARI'S INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDES NARCOTICS AND PROSTITUTION. IN THE EARLY PART OF 1981, HE ESTABLISHED TWO ESCORT SERVICES IN SOUTH JERSEY. TIGRESS ESCORT SERVICE OF MARGATE AND LUCKY LADY SERVICE OF PENNSAUKEN, WERE PROSTITUTION OPERATIONS DISGUISED AS LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES. THE OPERATOR OF LUCKY

LADY ESCORT SERVICE AND ALTIMARI WERE ARRESTED FOR PROSTITUTION IN BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA. IN ADDITION, INFORMATION INDICATES THAT PERMISSION FROM ALTIMARI WAS NEEDED TO OPEN AN ESCORT SERVICE IN ATLANTIC CITY. DURING THE SUMMER OF 1982, ALTIMARI WAS REGULARLY OBSERVED IN THE COMPANY OF NICK SCARFO, SAUL KANE, PHILIP LEONETTI, FRANK GERACE, LAWRENCE MERLINO AND THOMAS BATTLES.

ALTIMARI'S CRIMINAL RECORD IN NEW JERSEY REFLECTS AN ARREST FOR A COMMERCIAL SEX OFFENSE IN ATLANTIC CITY.

ROCCO AULETTO
706 KINGS HIGHWAY
HADDON HEIGHTS, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 23, 1909
SBI# : 34277
FBI# : 367633
AKA : "ROXY ALLEN"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROCCO AULETTO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." AULETTO HAS OPERATED A LARGE SCALE "BOOKMAKING" AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATION IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY FOR MANY YEARS.

SINCE 1967, ROCCO AULETTO HAS MAINTAINED A RELATIONSHIP WITH MEMBERS OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." IN DECEMBER OF 1967, AULETTO WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF "LOTTERY" PARAPHERNALIA ALONG WITH ANTHONY IEZZI. AULETTO'S PRIMARY ILLICIT ENDEAVORS INCLUDE "LOTTERY" AND "BOOKMAKING" IN CAMDEN COUNTY. IN 1981, AULETTO WAS INVOLVED IN A COUNTERFEIT FOOD STAMP OPERATION.

AULETTO HAS ARRESTS FOR ROBBERY, COUNTERFEITING AND SELLING GAS RATION STAMPS, "BOOKMAKING," "LOTTERY," AND STOLEN PROPERTY. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE FRANK D'ALFONSO, DANIEL GIAQUINTO AND ROCCO SCAFIDI.

JOSEPH ANTHONY BELLINA
801 NORTH 6TH STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 17, 1909
SBI# : 78158
FBI# : 112616
AKA : "HAPPY," JOSEPH BELLINO,
JOSEPH BELLINA, JOSEPH BELLINE
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH BELLINA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS AN OPERATIVE IN THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S GAMBLING NETWORK. IN 1977, HE WAS INVOLVED IN A THEFT OPERATION LOCATED IN JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY.

BELLINA POSSESSES A LENGTHY CRIMINAL RECORD WITH ARRESTS FOR BURGLARY, EXTORTION, GAMBLING, ROBBERY AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

FELIX J. BOCCHINO
3101 SOUTH BROAD STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
25 SOUTH 3rd. AVENUE
LONGPORT, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 6, 1918
SBI : 389330
AKA : "TOM MIX"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FELIX BOCCHINO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY," IS A GAMBLING OPERATIVE. IN 1973, HE AND ANTHONY FERRANTE WERE INVOLVED IN A SYSTEMATIC BETTING PROCEDURE AT GARDEN STATE RACETRACK WITH OTHER GAMBLING OPERATIVES SUCH AS ALBERT PONTANI, DOMINIC IAVARONE AND SALVATORE SPARACIO.

ON APRIL 23, 1976, AN F.B.I. RAID ON ONE OF THE LARGEST "CRAP" GAMES ON THE EAST COAST IDENTIFIED BOCCHINO AS ONE OF THE CONTROLLERS FOR THE BRUNO GAMBLING NETWORK. IN JANUARY 1981, HE WAS SUBPOENAED BEFORE THE GRAND JURY IN PHILADELPHIA TO GIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE MURDER OF ANGELO BRUNO. BOCCHINO WAS ALSO QUESTIONED ABOUT THE MURDERS OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES ANTHONY CAPONIGRO AND FRANK SINDONE.

BOCCHINO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE CHARLES WARRINGTON, ANTHONY GREGORIO, JOHN GRANDE, CARL IPPOLITO AND ALBERT PONTANI.

JOHN ANTHONY CAPPELLO, JR.
2934 SOUTH JUNIPER STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : APRIL 3, 1911
FBI# : 5057620
AKA : "JACK CAPELO"
STATUS : "SOLDIER"

CAPPELLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE BROTHER - IN - LAW OF FORMER FAMILY "UNDERBOSS" PETER F. CASELLA. CAPPELLO IS MOST ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND HAS ALIGNED HIMSELF WITH NICODEMO SCARFO, "BOSS" OF THIS "FAMILY."

CAPELLO IS A KNOWN GAMBLER AND HAS SEVENTEEN ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING VIOLATIONS.

ANGELO A. CIFELLI
225 ADAMS STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 30, 1926
SBI# : 397634
FBI# : 252531A
AKA : "O'DRUL," "SKINNY O'DROUL"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANGELO A. CIFELLI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." IN NOVEMBER OF 1970, CIFELLI WAS ARRESTED WITH THIRTY OTHERS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY TO CONDUCT INTERSTATE GAMBLING OPERATIONS.

CIFELLI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOHN MACCHIAVERNA AND FRANCIS "PEPSI" MARINCOLA, BOTH KNOWN "BOOKMAKERS."

NICHOLAS ALFRED CIFELLI
342 NEW YORK AVENUE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 23, 1922
SBI# : 455569
FBI# : 325552B
AKA : "TURK"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

NICHOLAS CIFELLI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING" AND WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, A "BRUNO" "CAP-OREGIME."

CHARLES IGNAZIO COSTELLO
947 SOUTHARD STREET
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 4, 1910
SBI# : 42459
FBI# : 365088
AKA : CALEGLO CASTELLI, "PINKY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

CHARLES COSTELLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE OCCUPIED THE POSITION OF "ACTING CAPOREGIME" PRIOR TO ANGELO BRUNO'S DEATH. A COUSIN OF THE LATE BRUNO AND THE LATE JOHN SIMONE, COSTELLO CONTROLLED AND MAINTAINED VARIOUS ILLICIT GAMBLING OPERATIONS IN THE TRENTON, NEW JERSEY AREA. DURING THE EARLY 1970'S COSTELLO AND SIMONE CONTROLLED THE LARGEST BLACK ILLICIT GAMBLING OPERATION IN THE CITY OF TRENTON. SINCE THE DEATH OF ANGELO BRUNO, COSTELLO IS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT AND HAS BEEN SPENDING MUCH OF HIS TIME IN FLORIDA.

COSTELLO IS THE PRESIDENT OF J.C. VENDING MACHINES, INC., LOCATED IN TRENTON, NEW JERSEY. IN 1969, COSTELLO WAS ARRESTED WITH THREE OTHERS, AND CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY AND MAINTAINING AN ILLEGAL LOTTERY ON THE PREMISES OF THE J.C. VENDING COMPANY. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD ALSO REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR EXTORTION, IRS VIOLATIONS AND RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

COSTELLO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE FRANK D'ALFONSO, MICHAEL GRASSO, CARL IPPOLITO, ANGELO VIZZINI, JOSEPH INDELICATO, AGOSTINO AMATO, ALFREDO FELICE, JOSEPH NICHOLAS FARINELLA, AND SAM DECAVALCANTE.

JOSEPH JAMES COSTELLO
31 DARRAH LANE
LAWRENCEVILLE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 18, 1932
SBI : 656753
AKA : "CUS" GENARO BOCCIA
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH JAMES COSTELLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE SON OF CHARLES "PINKY" COSTELLO, ANOTHER "BRUNO FAMILY" MEMBER.

JOSEPH COSTELLO IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND THE FINANCING OF NARCOTICS OPERATIONS. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR HOMICIDE, GAMBLING AND WEAPONS VIOLATIONS. IN 1961, COSTELLO SHOT AND KILLED JOHN MATTHEWS AT THE OFFICES OF THE J.C. VENDING MACHINE COMPANY IN TRENTON. HE PLED GUILTY TO A WEAPON OFFENSE AND RECEIVED A TWELVE MONTH SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND A \$750 FINE. IN 1979, COSTELLO, HIS BROTHER CHARLES, AND MICHAEL SACCO, WERE ARRESTED FOR OPERATING AN ILLEGAL LOTTERY AT THE ITALIAN-AMERICAN SOCIAL CLUB IN TRENTON.

COSTELLO AND HIS BROTHER CHARLES, JR., OPERATE THE J.C. VENDING MACHINE CO., INC., LOCATED AT 947 SOUTHARD STREET, IN TRENTON. THIS BUSINESS IS OWNED BY THEIR FATHER, CHARLES "PINKY" COSTELLO.

RECENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT COSTELLO MAINTAINS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH VARIOUS BLACK GAMBLING AND NARCOTICS OPERATIVES IN TRENTON.

DOMINICK DINORSCIO
200 NESBIT TERRACE
IRVINGTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 16, 1910
SBI : 15672
FBI : 199069
AKA : DOMINICO DINORSIA, DOMINIC DINORSIA, DOMINICK DINORSIA, THOMAS DINORSICIO, TOMMY ADAMS, BUCK THOMAS, THOMAS CARRO, "COWBOY", DOM DINORSCIO, "FATS"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

DOMINICK DINORSCIO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE OPERATES IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND SERVED AS THE ACTING "CAPOREGIME" FOR THE "FAMILY," AFTER THE DEATH OF ANTONIO CAPONIGRO. HOWEVER, HE WAS REPLACED BY RALPH NAPOLI IN 1980, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT GENERATING ENOUGH REVENUE FOR THE "FAMILY."

DINORSCIO'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," "HI-JACKING" AND "FENCING." HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR BURGLARY, LARCENY, ROBBERY,

ATROCIOUS ASSAULT AND BATTERY, GAMBLING, WEAPONS OFFENSES, ASSAULT AND BATTERY OF A POLICE OFFICER, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, ATTEMPTED AUTO THEFT AND ATTEMPTED MURDER.

DINORSCIO WAS INVOLVED IN A BANK FRAUD SCHEME AT THE BANK OF BLOOMFIELD, DURING 1975. THIS SCHEME ALSO INVOLVED ANGELO BRUNO, SAM DECAVALCANTE AND ANTHONY PROVENZANO. THE LOSSES IN THIS CASE WERE ESTIMATED AT OVER \$500,000.

DINORSCIO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES HAVE INCLUDED THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, SAM DECAVALCANTE, JOHN RIGGI, JOSEPH PATERNO, MICHAEL TACCETTA AND PETER CASELLA.

GENNARO ALBERT ESPOSITO
40 TALLOWOAN DRIVE
MEDFORD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 28, 1941
PHILA. PD# : 301-739
AKA : "JERRY"
STATUS : "SOLDIER"

GENNARO ESPOSITO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." ESPOSITO AND HIS BROTHER MICHAEL ESPOSITO OPERATE A GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARK" BUSINESS FROM THE J & M BAR, WHICH THEY OWN. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE DOMINIC MASSARO AND MARIO DIPRIMIO.

ANTHONY VITO FERRANTE
21 SOUTH MONROE AVENUE
MARGATE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 8, 1920
SBI# : 856980
FBI# : 576857B
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY FERRANTE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS AN OPERATIVE IN THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S GAMBLING NETWORK IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY. HOWEVER, AS A RESULT OF HIS COMPLICITY IN A BRIBERY INVESTIGATION, HE WAS ORDERED TO SOUTH JERSEY, WHERE HE HAS BEEN SINCE THE EARLY SEVENTIES. FERRANTE'S

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "BOOKMAKING" AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS SCHEMES. HE HAS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, ASSAULT AND BATTERY, BRIBERY AND STOLEN PROPERTY.

FERRANTE'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, THE LATE ALFRED SALERNO, DOMINICK DINORSCIO, NICODEMO SCARFO, THE LATE FRANK MONTE, LAWRENCE MERLINO, PHILIP LEONETTI, THE LATE JOHN SIMONE AND JOHN JANUSKA.

JOHN JOSEPH GIRGENTI
1001 CITY LINE AVENUE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JUNE 14, 1932
SBI# : 9544B
FBI# : 758354D
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN GIRGENTI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HIS FATHER, JOSEPH GIRGENTI, WAS ALSO A "SOLDIER" IN THIS "FAMILY." JOSEPH GIRGENTI WAS ACTIVE IN GAMBLING OPERATIONS IN TRENTON IN 1973, BUT HAS SINCE RETIRED FROM THIS ACTIVITY. JOHN GIRGENTI WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE AND GODSON OF ANGELO BRUNO, THE LATE "BOSS" OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." GIRGENTI'S PRIMARY INVOLVEMENT IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IS GAMBLING. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT HE AND DOMINIC NOLE OF PENNSAUKEN, CONTROL ILLEGAL LOTTERY ACTIVITY WITHIN THE SPANISH COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH JERSEY. IN SEPTEMBER, 1982, GIRGENTI WAS ARRESTED ON GAMBLING CHARGES.

PHILIP LEONETTI
16th AVENUE & BEACH
LONGPORT, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 3, 1953
SBI : 325950A
FBI : 689819J3
AKA : "CRAZY PHIL"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PHILIP LEONETTI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE CONFIDANTE AND "ENFORCER" FOR HIS UNCLE, NICODEMO SCARFO, THE CURRENT "BOSS" OF THE FAMILY." HIS

OTHER ASSOCIATES INCLUDE LAWRENCE MERLINO, SALVATORE TESTA, FRANK GERACE, NICHOLAS VIRGILIO AND ALBERT "REDS" PONTANI.

LEONETTI HAS BEEN IMPLICATED IN SEVERAL VIOLENT CRIMES. HE WAS THE PRIME SUSPECT IN THE MURDERS OF GUY CURCIONE, LOUIS DEMARCO AND GUISEPPE LEVA. ON DECEMBER 16, 1979, THE BODY OF VINCENT FALCONE WAS FOUND INSIDE THE TRUNK OF HIS CAR IN MARGATE, NEW JERSEY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, PHILIP LEONETTI, NICODEMO SCARFO AND LAWRENCE MERLINO WERE ARRESTED AS A RESULT OF THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH SALERNO, WHO ASSISTED IN DISPOSING ^{OF} THE BODY. HOWEVER, THE SUBSEQUENT TRIAL RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTALS OF ALL THREE DEFENDANTS.

LEONETTI'S OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND NARCOTICS. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT LEONETTI AND LAWRENCE MERLINO CONTROL THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS FOR SCARFO. THEY ALSO CONTROL THE MAJORITY OF COCAINE TRAFFIC IN ATLANTIC CITY AND ARE ASSOCIATED WITH FRANK D'ALFONSO, A PRIMARY SOURCE OF PHENYL-2-PROPANONE (P2P), A CHEMICAL PRECURSOR FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE, IN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA.

LEONETTI IS THE PRESIDENT OF SCARF, INCORPORATED, A CONCRETE COMPANY, WHICH REPRESENTS SCARFO'S MOST VISIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN A LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. DURING JULY OF 1982, LEONETTI WAS CALLED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION, REGARDING ORGANIZED CRIME AND LOCAL #54, THE UNION WHICH REPRESENTS SOME 10,000 CASINO EMPLOYEES IN ATLANTIC CITY. LEONETTI REFUSED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS AND TOOK THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AT LEAST SIXTEEN TIMES.

MORE RECENTLY, LEONETTI AND ATTORNEY ROBERT SIMONE VISITED SCARFO AT LA TUNA FEDERAL PRISON, DURING AUGUST OF 1982. PRISON OFFICIALS DID NOT ALLOW LEONETTI TO DIRECTLY MEET WITH SCARFO.

JOSEPH MARIO LICATA
2 TIMBER COURT
FLORHAM PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 21, 1941
SBI : 783458
FBI : 881522E
AKA : "SCOOPS"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH LICATA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN THE CITY OF NEWARK AND PREVIOUSLY OPERATED WITH THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO.

LICATA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR: GAMBLING, ASSAULT AND BATTERY, ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL AND HIT AND RUN.

PASQUALE ANTHONY MARTIRANO
821 CRANFORD AVENUE
WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 16, 1929
SBI : 594281
FBI : 395943D
AKA : "PATTY SPECKS," "PATRICK"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PASQUALE MARTIRANO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN "BOOKMAKING," "LOTTERY" AND "LOANSHARKING." HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS SEVERAL ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING.

A FIRST COUSIN TO "GENOVESE FAMILY SOLDIER" TINO FIUMARA, MARTIRANO'S RELATIONSHIP WITH FIUMARA HAS BEEN STRAINED SINCE THE MID-1970'S OWING TO MARTIRANO'S UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT IN ESSEX COUNTY. FIUMARA ULTIMATELY ACQUIRED CONTROL OF THE ESSEX COUNTY PIERS.

AS A RESULT OF THE NUMEROUS HIGH LEVEL EXECUTIONS SUSTAINED BY THE "BRUNO FAMILY," LAW ENFORCEMENT'S INTENSE SCRUTINY OF THESE MURDERS, AND THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF HIS ILLICIT INTERESTS IN ESSEX COUNTY, MARTIRANO MOVED TO FLORIDA IN 1981.

CONTINUED

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ANTHONY IGNATIO MARTORANO
8 HOLDEN LANE
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 27, 1927
FBI : 676737A
AKA : "RAYMOND MARTORANO," "LONG JOHN"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY "LONG JOHN" MARTORANO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS ONE OF THE LATE ANGELO BRUNO'S CLOSEST FRIENDS AND BUSINESS ADVISORS. BRUNO OFTEN UTILIZED MARTORANO AS A CHAUFFEUR AND BODYGUARD.

"RAY" MARTORANO HAS AN EXTENSIVE HISTORY AS A CONVICTED NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTOR. IN 1955, HE WAS CONVICTED FOR HEROIN DISTRIBUTION AND IN 1978 HE WAS IDENTIFIED IN AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION AS BEING A MANUFACTURER OF METHAMPHETAMINE. SINCE 1978, IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT MARTORANO WAS NOT ONLY MANUFACTURING "METH," BUT WAS ALSO CONTROLLING THE IMPORTATION OF P2P, PHENYL-2-PROPANONE, A CHEMICAL PRECURSOR FOR THE PRODUCTION OF THE DRUG. BY CONTROLLING THE AVAILABILITY OF P2P, MARTORANO VIRTUALLY CONTROLLED THE "METH" MARKET (I.E., PRODUCTION, SUPPLY, PRICE, AVAILABILITY, ETC.). IN MAY OF 1982, MARTORANO AND THIRTY-SEVEN OTHER CONSPIRATORS WERE INDICTED FOR THESE ILLICIT ACTIVITIES. IN JULY 1982, MARTORANO BEGAN SERVING A TEN YEAR SENTENCE IN FEDERAL PRISON AS A RESULT OF THESE CHARGES.

MARTORANO IS ALSO INVOLVED WITH MEMBERS OF THE "VOLPE CRIME FAMILY," (CANADA) IN LARGE NARCOTICS TRANSACTIONS.

AFTER THE LEGALIZATION OF CASINO GAMING IN ATLANTIC CITY, MARTORANO BEGAN TO EXHIBIT AN INCREASED INTEREST IN "FAMILY" ACTIVITIES THERE. HE QUICKLY ALIGNED HIMSELF WITH NICODEMO SCARFO, WHO IS PRESENTLY THE "BOSS" IN THE "BRUNO FAMILY." HE BECAME A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ALBERT DAIDONE, THE VICE PRESIDENT OF ATLANTIC CITY LOCAL 54, HOTEL, BARTENDERS AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION. DAIDONE AND MARTORANO WERE EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE IN ATLANTIC CITY.

MOREOVER, DAIDONE AND MARTORANO WERE INDICTED FOR THEIR COMPLICITY IN THE MURDER OF LABOR BOSS JOHN MCCULLOUGH (ROOFERS UNION). IT IS OF INTEREST TO NOTE THAT MARTORANO HAS SERVED AS THE "BRUNO FAMILY" LIAISON WITH LOCAL 170, CONTROLLED BY THE LATE JOSEPH MCGREAL, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-NAMED LOCAL 33, CONTROLLED BY RALPH NATALE, AND IS NOW LOCAL 54, CONTROLLED BY FRANK GERACE.

FRANK MARTUCCI
429 SANFORD AVENUE
HILLSIDE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 16, 1925
SBI# : 390367
FBI# : 949858C
AKA : "REETS," "SKEETS"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

FRANK MARTUCCI IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS A MAJOR OPERATIVE IN THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S GAMBLING NETWORK IN THE "DOWN NECK" SECTION OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. HE WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN "LOAN-SHARKING."

MARTUCCI'S CRIMINAL RECORD INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING. IN 1971, HE WAS SENTENCED TO A STATE PRISON FOR GAMBLING. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GIUSEPPE SABATO, JOSEPH ZICCARIELLI, LOUIS GATTO, ANDREW GERARD, THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, PASQUALE MARTIRANO, RALPH NAPOLI AND TINO FIUMARA.

AUGUSTINE MAZZIO
MUNN AVENUE AND KAY DRIVE
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 13, 1918
FBI# : 5087432
AKA : "GUSSY GIDDENS"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

AUGUSTINE MAZZIO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." MAZZIO OPERATES A LUCRATIVE ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARK" OPERATION ON THE WATERFRONT IN PHILADELPHIA. HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE ILLEGAL GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," EXTORTION, AND BRIBERY. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR "BOOTLEGGING," ILLEGAL GAMBLING, CONSPIRACY AND BRIBERY.

DURING 1980, MAZZIO, HIS NEPHEW LEON MAZZIO AND TWO OTHERS, WERE ARRESTED FOR BRIBING A POLICE OFFICER, IN RETURN FOR PROTECTION OF MAZZIO'S GAMBLING OPERATION. MAZZIO WAS ALSO ARRESTED FOR BRIBING AN UNDERCOVER F.B.I. AGENT, IN AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN F.B.I. FILES ON HIMSELF AND OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES. IN 1981, MAZZIO WAS SENTENCED TO TWO YEARS IN PRISON AND FINED \$10,000. HE IS CURRENTLY FREE ON BAIL PENDING AN APPEAL.

MAZZIO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GUISEPPE (JOSEPH) AND ROSARIO GAMBINO, BOTH OF WHO ARE "CAPOREGIMES" IN THE "GAMBINO FAMILY"; RALPH NATALE, INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING," ALBERT ESPOSITO, INVOLVED IN GAMBLING; AND ANGELO MANERCHIA, INVOLVED IN MAZZIO'S GAMBLING OPERATION.

LAWRENCE MERLINO
28 NORTH GEORGIA AVENUE
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 18, 1946
SBI : 909456A
FBI : 154546Y7
AKA : "YOGI"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

LAWRENCE MERLINO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE OPERATES WITHIN NICODEMO SCARFO'S CRIMINAL NETWORK AND IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN A COCAINE DISTRIBUTION OPERATION. MERLINO HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS AN ASSOCIATE OF PHILIP LEONETTI, NICHOLAS VIRGILIO, THE LATE FRANK SINDONE, SALVATORE TESTA AND SAUL KANE.

MERLINO HAS A PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE AND HAS BEEN IMPLICATED IN SEVEN MURDERS IN THE PHILADELPHIA AND ATLANTIC CITY AREA. IN DECEMBER OF 1979, MERLINO WAS ARRESTED FOR THE MURDER OF VINCENT FALCONE IN MARGATE, NEW JERSEY. ALTHOUGH HE HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, ALONG WITH NICODEMO SCARFO AND PHILIP LEONETTI, BY JOSEPH SALERNO OF BRIGANTINE, ALL WERE ACQUITTED OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THEM.

IN ADDITION TO THEIR CRIMINAL ALLIANCE, MERLINO AND SCARFO SHARE A BUSINESS INTEREST IN NAT-NAT, INCORPORATED, 28 NORTH GEORGIA AVENUE, ATLANTIC CITY. THE DOCUMENTED PRESIDENT OF THE FIRM IS LARRY'S BROTHER, SALVATORE MERLINO.

ALTHOUGH ONLY THE TWO BROTHERS ARE LISTED AS THE OWNERS OF THE FIRM, SCARF, INCORPORATED UTILIZES THE SAME ADDRESS AS NAT-NAT INCORPORATED.

FRANK NARDUCCI, JR.
2500 GARNET STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JULY 28, 1953
AKA : "FRANNY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK NARDUCCI, JR. IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE BECAME A "MADE" MEMBER IN 1980, UNDER PHILIP TESTA'S REIGN AS "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY." NARDUCCI IS THE SON OF THE LATE, FRANK NARDUCCI, SR., A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY."

NARDUCCI WAS ARRESTED IN OCTOBER, 1982, FOR CARRYING A HANDGUN IN PHILADELPHIA. THE HANDGUN WAS REGISTERED TO HENRY MERLINO, A COUSIN OF SALVATORE "CHICKIE" MERLINO AND LARRY "YOGI" MERLINO. FRANK NARDUCCI, JR. HAS ASSUMED CONTROL OF HIS FATHER'S ILLEGAL GAMBLING, NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND "LOANSHARK" NETWORK. NARDUCCI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SALVATORE TESTA, SALVATORE MERLINO AND LAWRENCE MERLINO.

ALBERT PONTANI
180 ESTATES BOULEVARD
APARTMENT 23
HAMILTON TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 9, 1937
SBI# : 292143
FBI# : 3087706
AKA : "REDS"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ALBERT PONTANI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." PONTANI'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND NARCOTICS. HIS SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, FRANK D'ALFONSO, FELIX "BUCKY" TUCCILLO, CHARLES "CHICKIE" WARRINGTON, HARRY AND MARIO RICCOBENE, NICHOLAS VIRGILIO AND PHILIP LEONETTI. PONTANI WAS SPONSORED OR "MADE" INTO THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" BY NICODEMO SCARFO.

PONTANI HAS EVOLVED FROM RELATIVE OBSCURITY TO A MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN THE TRENTON AREA SINCE THE MURDER OF ANGELO BRUNO AND MAJOR REORGANIZATION OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY." PONTANI HAS ASSUMED A POSITION SIMILAR TO THAT FORMERLY HELD BY "BRUNO FAMILY" GAMBLING OPERATIVE CARL "PAPPY" IPPOLITO. PONTANI AND HIS ASSOCIATE FELICE "BUCKY" TUCCILLO MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARK" OPERATION IN TRENTON. THESE ILLICIT ENTERPRISES ARE OPERATED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF "BRUNO FAMILY ASSOCIATE," FRANK D'ALFONSO.

PONTANI IS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE WHOLESALE PURCHASE OF NARCOTICS WITH ROBERT BISACCIA.

PONTANI HAS AN ARREST RECORD FROM 1942 FOR VIOLATIONS INCLUDING KIDNAPPING, GAMBLING, BURGLARY, ASSAULT AND STOLEN PROPERTY.

MICHAEL BENJAMIN RICCIARDI, JR.
11 HOMESTEAD AVENUE
EAST HANOVER, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 24, 1933
SBI# : 574753
FBI# : 97534D
AKA : "MICKEY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

MICHAEL B. RICCIARDI, JR., IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES WHICH HE CONDUCTS FROM THE A. & M. DISTRIBUTORS, LOCATED AT 1074 SOUTH OLDEN AVENUE, IN NEWARK. RICCIARDI AND TWO OTHERS WERE INDICTED IN DECEMBER OF 1973 AND CHARGED WITH UTILIZING THREATS OF VIOLENCE IN A SCHEME TO COLLECT USURIOUS LOANS FROM THE OWNERS OF A TEXTILE FIRM.

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE FRANK PERRONE, RALPH NAPOLI, JOSEPH PATERNO, ROBERT BISACCIA, ANTHONY ACCETTURO AND JOHN RIGGI.

ANTHONY A. ROSSANO
294 ST. JAMES PLACE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JUNE 17, 1923
FBI# : 289335B
AKA : "CHAZ," "PRETTY BOY"
STATUS : "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY ROSSANO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HIS INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDES "LOANSHARKING" AND GAMBLING. IN 1980, THE F.B.I. ARRESTED ROSSANO AND NARDUCCI FOR OFFICIAL CORRUPTION AND GAMBLING. ROSSANO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS NUMEROUS GAMBLING ARRESTS DATING BACK TO 1945. IN 1981, HE WAS SENTENCED TO TWO YEARS IN FEDERAL PRISON FOR A CORRUPTION CONVICTION. PRIOR TO THEIR DEATH, ROSSANO WAS ASSOCIATED WITH PHILIP TESTA AND FRANK NARDUCCI.

ROCCO SCAFIDI
319 RUDDERAW AVENUE
MAPLE SHADE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 15, 1913
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROCCO SCAFIDI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HIS PRIMARY ILLICIT ACTIVITY IS GAMBLING. SCAFIDI IS THE NEPHEW OF JOSEPH SCAFIDI, AN ELDERLY RETIRED "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY."

SCAFIDI ASSOCIATE JOSEPH GALANTI WAS ARRESTED BY FEDERAL AUTHORITIES FOR POSSESSION OF \$1.2 MILLION WORTH OF COUNTERFEIT FOOD STAMPS. THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT SCAFIDI WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE COUNTERFEIT OPERATION.

SCAFIDI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE DANIEL GIAQUINTO, JOSEPH GALATI, ROSARIO AND GUISEPPE GAMBINO, THE LATE PHILIP TESTA, THE LATE FRANK SINDONE AND ROCCO AULETTO.

JOSEPH ALBERT SODANO
10 FORD LANE
ROSELAND, NEW JERSEY

DOB : April 22, 1937
SBI# : 497900
FBI# : 883580B
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH SODANO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE BRUNO CRIME FAMILY, HAS A CRIMINAL RECORD FOR "BOOKMAKING," "LOTTERY," AND ROBBERY. MOREOVER, HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND WAS CONSIDERED AN "ENFORCER" FOR ANTHONY ACCETTURO, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." SODANO WAS ALSO A SUSPECT IN TWO MURDERS. HE WAS ARRESTED DURING JUNE, 1977, BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENTS.

OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, SODANO ALIGNED HIMSELF WITH THE "BRUNO FAMILY" WHEREUPON HE CONDUCTED GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY, FOR ANTONIO CAPONIGRO. CURRENTLY, SODANO IS SUBORDINATE TO "CAPOREGIME" RALPH "BLACKIE" NAPOLI, WHO HAS ASSUMED THE NORTHERN NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO.

PASQUALE SPIRATO
624 LAFAYETTE AVENUE
TRENTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 26, 1939
SBI : 567007
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PASQUALE SPIRATO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS ARRESTS FOR ASSAULT AND GAMBLING. HE WAS ARRESTED IN OCTOBER, 1972 IN A GAMBLING RAID, WHILE WORKING FOR ANGELO ZEPPADORO'S OPERATION IN TRENTON.

ON FEBRUARY 20, 1981, SPIRATO WAS ARRESTED BY THE F.B.I. AND CHARGED WITH VARIOUS CRIMES UNDER THE R.I.C.O. (RACKETEERING INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATION) STATUTE. THE INDICTMENT STATED THAT HE AND NINE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY" HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME, PRIMARILY "LOANSHARKING," EXTORTION AND GAMBLING.

IN JUNE, 1982, SPIRATO WAS CONVICTED ON "RACKETEERING" CHARGES AND SENTENCED TO EIGHT YEARS IN PRISON AND A \$10,000.00 FINE. HE WAS RELEASED ON BAIL AND IS CURRENTLY PENDING APPEAL.

JOHN CARLYLE BERKERY
22 CHURCH ROAD
ELKINS PARK, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : MARCH 19, 1934
SBI : 588628
FBI : 498296A
AKA : JOHN C. BERK
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

JOHN BERKERY IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, BERKERY HAS BEEN CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERAL "HIGH RANKING BRUNO FAMILY MEMBERS" INCLUDING: PHILIP TESTA, FRANK SINDONE, FRANK NARDUCCI, ANGELO BRUNO, SAL TESTA AND RAYMOND MARTORANO.

JOHN BERKERY IS THE MOST AFFLUENT AND SUCCESSFUL MEMBER OF THE ORIGINAL "K & A GANG," A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS KNOWN FOR THEIR EXPERTISE IN BURGLARIES, GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." ALONG WITH ANOTHER "K & A" MEMBER, ROY STOCKER, BERKERY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR VARIOUS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES FOR THE "FAMILY," INCLUDING "LOANSHARKING," "HIJACKING," "ENFORCING," MAJOR THEFTS, UNION EXTORTION AND "FENCING." IN 1971, BERKERY WAS RELOCATED TO ATLANTIC CITY TO RUN A "SHYLOCKING" OPERATION FOR THE LATE FRANK SINDONE WHILE NICK SCARFO WAS SERVING A PRISON SENTENCE.

BERKERY'S CRIMINAL CAREER BEGAN WITH SEVERAL CONVICTIONS ON CHARGES OF BURGLARY, LARCENY AND RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS. HE IS ALSO KNOWN, HOWEVER, FOR HIS HISTORY OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING MURDER. IN 1972, HE WAS ARRESTED FOR ATROCIOUS ASSAULT FOR "PISTOL BEATING" A CONNECTICUT MAN. IN THE LATE 1970'S, BERKERY OPERATED A "LOANSHARK" OPERATION IN NORTHEAST PHILADELPHIA.

IN 1982, BERKERY WAS INDICTED WITH ANTHONY "LONG JOHN" MARTORANO FOR METHAMPHETAMINE PRODUCTION. HE IS CURRENTLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

EDWARD J. CASALE
9508 ATLANTIC AVENUE
UNIT #5
MARGATE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 24, 1945
AKA : "RICKY"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

EDWARD CASALE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." NICODEMO SCARFO, "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY," UTILIZES EDWARD CASALE AS AN "ENFORCER," BODYGUARD AND DRIVER. CASALE IS A MEMBER OF ROOFERS UNION, LOCAL #30 AND HAS SUPPLIED PAROLEES WITH FRAUDULENT PAYCHECKS FROM LOCAL #30 TO SATISFY THEIR WORK RELEASE PROGRAM. HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH GEORGE AND RONALD KOWNACKI WHO ARE INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS AND "FENCING."

ALBERT DAIDONE
4727 SPRINGFIELD AVENUE
PENNSAUKEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 25, 1942
FBI# : 1831289
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ALBERT DAIDONE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." DAIDONE HAS SERVED AS THE BUSINESS AGENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF LOCAL #54, THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS UNION, BASED IN ATLANTIC CITY. LOCAL #54 REPRESENTS MORE THAN 10,000 NON-CASINO WORKERS IN CASINO/HOTELS OF ATLANTIC CITY, AND HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL EXPLOITATION AND ORGANIZED CRIME INFLUENCE. DAIDONE WAS REMOVED FROM OFFICE IN SEPTEMBER OF 1982, FOLLOWING HIS INDICTMENT ON MURDER AND FEDERAL EXTORTION CHARGES. HE IS CURRENTLY BEING HELD, WITHOUT BAIL, AT HOLMSBURG PRISON IN CONNECTION WITH THESE CHARGES.

IN AUGUST OF 1982, DAIDONE AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATE, RAYMOND "LONG JOHN" MARTORANO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BRUNO FAMILY" WERE IDENTIFIED BY WILLIARD E. MORAN, THE CONVICTED MURDERER OF JOHN J. MC CULLOUGH, AS THE INDIVIDUALS WHO HIRED HIM TO KILL MC CULLOUGH, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILADELPHIA ROOFERS UNION, LOCAL #30. THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICTED ON THIS CHARGE.

DAIDONE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDING EMBEZZLEMENT, "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND NARCOTICS.

DAIDONE'S ASSOCIATES HAVE INCLUDED THE LATE ANGELO BRUNO, THE LATE PHILIP TESTA, FRANK GERACE, ANTHONY "TONY DALE" AGNELLINO, FRANK VADINO, MICHAEL MARRONE, THE LATE FELIX BOCCHICCHIO, LARRY SMITH AND FRANK SHEERAN.

FRANK D'ALFONSO
SOUTH 9TH STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : SEPTEMBER 25, 1929
FBI : 208966E
AKA : "FRANKIE FLOWERS"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

FRANK D'ALFONSO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE AND MAJOR GAMBLING FIGURE IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY."

AFTER ANGELO BRUNO'S DEATH IN MARCH, 1980, THERE WAS SPECULATION SURROUNDING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY." D'ALFONSO WAS SEEN MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF SEVERAL ORGANIZED CRIME "FAMILIES" AFTER THE BRUNO MURDER, THUS CREATING A LIAISON BETWEEN SEVERAL "FAMILIES." D'ALFONSO IS CONSIDERED A GOOD MEDIATOR AND DIPLOMAT. HOWEVER, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE "BRUNO FAMILY" FELL TO NICKY SCARFO.

SINCE BRUNO'S DEATH, D'ALFONSO HAS INCREASED HIS CONTROL OVER GAMBLING OPERATIONS. HE CURRENTLY OVERSEES SEVERAL OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THAT OF ALBERT PONTANI, A TRENTON BASED OPERATIVE. HE IS INVOLVED IN A "SPORTS BETTING-LAY-OFF" AND "BOOKMAKING" OPERATION IN PHILADELPHIA AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH ROCCO AULETTO WHO OVERSEES A LARGE GAMBLING OPERATION IN SOUTH JERSEY. HE CURRENTLY ACTS AS A "LIAISON" BETWEEN SEVERAL ORGANIZED CRIME "FAMILIES."

VICTOR DELUCA
APARTMENT 412
3700 SHEAF LANE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : MARCH 21, 1938
SBI# : 599513A
FBI# : 242468F
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

VICTOR DELUCA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS ACTED AS A "CONTRACT MURDERER" FOR SEVERAL "FAMILY HITS." DELUCA AND JOSEPH PEDULLA WERE RECENTLY CONVICTED OF SHOOTING SALVATORE TESTA, A "BRUNO FAMILY CAPOREGIME," IN RETALIATION FOR THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF HARRY RICCOBENE.

DELUCA IS ALSO INVOLVED IN "BOOKMAKING," "LOANSHARKING" AND NARCOTICS. HE HAS RECENTLY ENGAGED IN NARCOTICS TRANSACTIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE "PAGAN MOTORCYCLE CLUB."

DELUCA HAS AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD WHICH INCLUDES NUMEROUS ARRESTS FOR LARCENY, RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, VEHICLE THEFT, GAMBLING, WEAPONS OFFENSES AND VARIOUS DRUG CHARGES. HIS SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE HARRY AND MARIO RICCOBENE, FRANK D'ALFONSO AND JOSEPH PEDULLA.

JAMES DINATALE
SPRUCE AVENUE
CARDIFF, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 3, 1914
AKA : "JIMMY THE BRUTE"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

JAMES DINATALE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." DURING THE VINCENT FALCONE MURDER INVESTIGATION, IT WAS LEARNED THAT NICK SCARFO HAD ESTABLISHED A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH DINATALE.

DINATALE'S INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDES "LOANSHARKING" AND GAMBLING. HE FINANCES ILLEGAL "LOTTERY" OPERATIONS IN THE SPANISH COMMUNITIES LOCATED IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY. HIS LEGITIMATE BUSINESS VENTURES HAVE ALSO BEEN CONNECTED WITH ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN THE ATLANTIC COUNTY AREA.

NATALE'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, PHILIP LEONETTI, LAWRENCE MERLINO, THE LATE ANGELO BRUNO AND THE LATE PHILIP TESTA.

FRANK GERACE
904 OAK AVENUE
LINWOOD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 23, 1939
AKA : "PERCY"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

FRANK GERACE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE BECAME THE PRESIDENT OF POWERFUL LOCAL 54, HOTEL, RESTAURANT, CAFETERIA, AND BARTENDER'S UNION, IN 1979 WITH THE HELP OF NICK SCARFO. IN A POSITION OF POWER AT LOCAL 54, GERACE HAS APPOINTED SCARFO ASSOCIATES TO UNION POSITIONS. AS AN OPERATIVE OF SCARFO'S, GERACE HAS EXERTED CONSIDERABLE CONTROL OVER UNION ACTIVITIES AND VARIOUS ANCILLARY SERVICES. IN JULY, 1982, GERACE FAILED TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE DIVISION OF GAMING ENFORCEMENT REGARDING UNION OFFICIALS' ASSOCIATION WITH ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES.

GERACE'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, PHILIP LEONETTI, LAWRENCE MERLINO, FRANK LENTINO, ALBERT DAIDONE, AND THE LATE ROBERT LUMIO.

JOHN CHARLES JANUSKA
31 ALBERT TERRACE
BLOOMFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 4, 1943
SBI# : 659465
FBI# : 905080D
AKA : "HUDDY," JOHNNY MONDAY, JOHN
NEWARK, JOHN JANUS
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

JOHN JANUSKA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "LOANSHARKING," EXTORTION, GAMBLING, AND "HIJACKING." JANUSKA WAS AN OPERATIVE FOR THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO'S GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS. HE WAS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE LATE CAPONIGRO, THE LATE ALFRED SALERNO AND ANTHONY FERRANTE.

IN THE SEVENTIES, JANUSKA CONTROLLED A "SPORTS BOOKMAKING" NETWORK WHICH INCLUDED OPERATIONS IN PASSAIC, BERGEN, HUDSON AND OCEAN COUNTIES. HE NOW HAS A GAMBLING OPERATION IN BERGEN COUNTY AND IN NEW YORK CITY. SINCE THE MURDER OF CAPONIGRO, JANUSKA HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN NORTH JERSEY WITH THE SANCTION OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY."

JANUSKA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, FRAUD, STOLEN PROPERTY, BURGLARY AND EXTORTION.

SAUL KANE
111 SOUTH MADISON AVENUE
MARGATE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 17, 1934
SBI : 334653A
FBI : 496226C
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

SAUL KANE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DISCLOSES THAT HE IS A TRUSTED OPERATIVE OF NICODEMO SCARFO. KANE HAS ARRANGED BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES AND PERSONS WITH BACKGROUNDS THAT COULD WITHSTAND LAW ENFORCEMENT SCRUTINY. HE HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFILTRATE THE CASINO INDUSTRY THROUGH JANITORIAL SERVICES. KANE IS CURRENTLY SELF-EMPLOYED AS A DISTRIBUTOR OF CHEMICAL PRODUCTS TO VARIOUS JANITORIAL FIRMS.

KANE'S CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR FRAUD, WEAPONS AND GAMBLING. IN THE LATE SEVENTIES, HE WAS CONVICTED OF AN EXTORTION ATTEMPT. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, CHARLES WARRINGTON, SALVATORE MERLINO, PHILIP LEONETTI AND LAWRENCE MERLINO.

FRANK G. LENTINO
1413 CEDAR DRIVE
MAYS LANDING, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY, 1911
SBI : 203394
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

FRANK LENTINO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A BUSINESS AGENT FOR LOCAL 54, HOTEL, RESTAURANT, AND BARTENDER'S UNION. LENTINO OBTAINED THE POSITION THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATE, NICODEMO SCARFO.

LENTINO'S CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS AN ARREST FOR ARMED ROBBERY. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, PHILIP LEONETTI, ALBERT DAIDONE AND FRANK GERACE.

RALPH SAMUEL NATALE
5112 WESTWOOD LANE
PENNSAUKEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 6, 1931
FBI# : 729621N10
AKA : "NATALA"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

RALPH NATALE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A FORMER OFFICIAL OF BARTENDERS, HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL #170 IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY. IN 1979, NATALE WAS CONVICTED OF SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTING COCAINE IN FLORIDA. HE WAS INCARCERATED IN FEDERAL PRISON.

NATALE'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "ARSON FOR PROFIT." IN 1977, HE AND CHARLES ALLEN WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARSONS OF LIBRA DESIGNS INC., IN PENNSAUKEN, NEW JERSEY AND A & C COLD CUTS IN OAKLYN, NEW JERSEY. ADDITIONALLY HE WAS INVOLVED IN A FRAUD OF AN EQUIPMENT LEASING COMPANY.

NATALE'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE CHARLES ALLEN, RAYMOND MARTORANO, ALBERT DAIDONE, FRANK GERACE, FRANK VADINO, AND THE LATE FELIX BOCCHICCIO.

MARIO RICCOBENE, JR.
1823 HULSEMAN STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : JULY 29, 1932
SBI# : 266817
FBI# : 628733B
AKA : "SONNY"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

MARIO RICCOBENE IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE STEP-BROTHER AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF HARRY RICCOBENE, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "FAMILY." RICCOBENE WAS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ANGELO BRUNO, PHILIP TESTA AND FRANK SINDONE, ALL DECEASED. RICCOBENE IS A "LOANSHARK" AND GAMBLING OPERATIVE.

MARIO AND HARRY RICCOBENE ARE INVOLVED IN "BOOKMAKING" AND NARCOTICS ACTIVITY. THEY ARE MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF NARCOTICS INTO SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY AND ATLANTIC CITY. RICCOBENE OFTEN INTERACTS WITH THE OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS, PARTICULARLY THE "PAGANS," FROM SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY.

ON FEBRUARY 20, 1981, RICCOBENE WAS ARRESTED BY THE F.B.I. AND CHARGED WITH VARIOUS CRIMES UNDER THE R.I.C.O. (FEDERAL RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION) STATUTE. THE INDICTMENT STATED THAT HE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE BUSINESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME, PRIMARILY "LOANSHARKING," EXTORTION AND GAMBLING.

IN JUNE, 1982, MARIO RICCOBENE WAS CONVICTED ON RACKETEERING CHARGES AND SENTENCED TO FOUR AND ONE HALF YEARS IN PRISON AND A \$10,000 FINE. HE IS CURRENTLY RELEASED ON BAIL PENDING AN APPEAL.

ROY STOCKER
439 TOWNSHIP LINE ROAD
ELKINS PARK, PENNSYLVANIA

DOB : FEBRUARY 11, 1925
SBI# : 513060
FBI# : 433495B
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ROY STOCKER IS CONSIDERED TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES SUCH AS FRANK SINDONE, CHARLES COSTELLO, AND JOHN BERKERY.

STOCKER'S PRIMARY ILLICIT ACTIVITY IS NARCOTICS, MORE SPECIFICALLY METHAMPHETAMINE. IN RECENT YEARS, HE HAS BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SEVERAL CLANDESTINE METHAMPHETAMINE LABS IN SOUTH JERSEY. HIS BROTHER, EARL STOCKER, IS A RETIRED CHEMIST WHO ESTABLISHED A CLANDESTINE "METH" LAB IN MEDFORD, NEW JERSEY. HIS NEPHEW, JOHN STOCKER, WAS INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. IN 1981, JOHN BERKERY AND ANTHONY MARTORANO WERE SUPPLYING PHENYL-2-PROPANONE (P-2-P), A KEY INGREDIENT IN THE MANUFACTURE OF "METH," TO ILLICIT "METH" LABS.

STOCKER'S LENGTHY CRIMINAL RECORD, WHICH DATES BACK TO 1954, REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR BURGLARY, LARCENY, STOLEN PROPERTY AND VEHICLE, FORGERY AND COUNTERFEITING, ASSAULT, GAMBLING, PROSTITUTION AND ARSON. IN 1975, HE WAS INCARCERATED IN TRENTON STATE PRISON FOR AN ARSON CONVICTION AND WAS PAROLED IN 1977.

NICHOLAS VIRGILIO
2516 ARTIC AVENUE
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 12, 1927
SBI : 16070A
FBI : 192102A
AKA : "NICK THE BLADE"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

NICHOLAS VIRGILIO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY." VIRGILIO HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS. IN 1952, HE PLED GUILTY TO THE STABBING DEATH OF A YOUNG MAN IN A PHILADELPHIA TAVERN. HE WAS GIVEN A SENTENCE OF THREE TO TEN YEARS AND INCARCERATED IN THE PHILADELPHIA CITY PRISON. IN 1971, HE WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER IN THE SHOOTING DEATH OF AN ATLANTIC CITY MAN IN FULL VIEW OF TWO ATLANTIC CITY POLICE OFFICERS. HE WAS SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON FOR A TERM OF TWELVE TO FIFTEEN YEARS AND WAS PAROLED AFTER BEING IMPRISONED APPROXIMATELY SIX YEARS.

VIRGILIO WAS INCARCERATED AGAIN IN 1978 FOR A PAROLE VIOLATION (AS A RESULT OF A THREAT-TO-KILL CHARGE IN WOODBURY, NEW JERSEY). HIS PAROLE WAS REVOKED AND HE SERVED APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AT THE TRENTON STATE PRISON.

VIRGILIO HAS BEEN A SUSPECT IN NUMEROUS HOMICIDES IN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA, INCLUDING THE 1978, SLAYING OF JUDGE EDWIN HELFANT. HE HAS ALSO HAD SEVERAL GAMBLING ARRESTS IN NEW JERSEY.

HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICODEMO SCARFO, PHILIP LEONETTI, LAWRENCE MERLINO AND SAUL KANE.


GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY

THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" HAS BEEN DIVIDED INTO TWO SEPARATE NETWORKS -- ONE WHICH FUNCTIONS IN SOUTH JERSEY VOID OF ANY CONTROL BY THOSE IN NORTH JERSEY AND ANSWERABLE DIRECTLY TO NEW YORK, AND THE NORTH JERSEY ELEMENT WHICH TOO ANSWERS TO NEW YORK BUT IS NOT PART OF THE SOUTH JERSEY NETWORK. FOR PURPOSES OF TESTIMONY, I HAVE SEPARATED THE TWO.

THE "GAMBINO FAMILY," NORTH JERSEY FACTION IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," NARCOTICS AND TRADITIONAL PREDATORY CRIMES SUCH AS AUTO-THEFT AND BURGLARIES. FORMERLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF CARLO GAMBINO'S PERSONAL EMISSARY, JOSEPH PATERNO, THIS "FAMILY" WAS AT ONE TIME VERY ACTIVE IN ESSEX COUNTY, BUT OF LATE, ITS INFLUENCE HAS WANED. IN SOME RESPECTS, THIS WAS A RESULT OF PATERNO'S FLIGHT TO FLORIDA TO AVOID TESTIMONY BEFORE OUR STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. PLACED IN CHARGE WAS ANTHONY CARMINATI, A TRUSTED BUT INCOMPETENT "CAPO-REGIME" WHO IS NOT RESPECTED BY THE JERSEY "GAMBINO'S," PARTICULARLY FRANK MICELI AND JAMES PALMIERI. THESE LATTER TWO "SOLDIERS" HAVE VIRTUALLY IGNORED CARMINATI, AND UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ROBERT BISACCIA, THEY HAVE OPERATED VOID OF CARMINATI'S INFLUENCE OR CONTROL. WHILE CARMINATI IS THEORETICALLY THE "BOSS" OF THE NORTH JERSEY NETWORK, IT IS BISACCIA, PALMIERI, AND MICELI WHO ARE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE AFFAIRS OF THIS FACTION.

THE SOUTH JERSEY FACTION, IS ON THE OTHER HAND, PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL ALIEN TRAFFICKING AND HEROIN IMPORTATION. IT IS RESPONSIBLE DIRECTLY TO NEW YORK AND IS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE BADALAMENTI AND INZERILLO "FAMILIES" IN SICILY. MANY OF THE MEMBERS HAVE BEEN INDICTED AND CONVICTED OF NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS, AND IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THIS FACTION HAS ACQUIRED SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS IN THE PIZZA INDUSTRY. LET ME BEGIN BY STRUCTURING OUT THIS ELEMENT AND THEN THE NORTHERN FACTION.

GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY



PAUL CONSTANTINE CASTELLANO
1737 E. 23rd STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

99 BUTTONWOOD ROAD
STATEN ISLAND
RICHMOND COUNTY, NEW YORK

DOB : JUNE 26, 1915
POB : NEW YORK
FBI# : 824437
STATUS: "BOSS"

CASTELLANO, ASSUMED THE ROLE OF "BOSS" OF THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" UPON THE DEATH OF CARLO GAMBINO. THE "GAMBINO FAMILY," IS ONE OF THE MORE DOMINANT CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. MOREOVER, CASTELLANO ALSO YIELDS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE "COLOMBO" AND "BONANNO CRIME FAMILIES."

CASTELLANO IS KNOWN TO BE ACTIVE IN COUNTERFEITING AND "LABOR RACKETEERING." CASTELLANO'S INFLUENCE HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO ANCILLARY SERVICES IN THE ATLANTIC CITY CASINOS.

JOSEPH NICHOLAS GALLO
31-85 CRESCENT STREET
LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : JANUARY 8, 1912
POB : SCRANTON, PANNSYLVANIA
SS# : 066-14-4071
FBI# : 2444809
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

GALLO IS THE "CONSIGLIERE" FOR THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." IN THE 1950'S, GALLO CONTROLLED THE NEW YORK CITY GAMBLING OPERATIONS FOR CARLO GAMBINO. HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE "LABOR RACKETEERING," EXTORTION AND "LOANSHARKING." HE HAS ALSO PERFORMED "CONTRACT KILLINGS" FOR THE "GAMBINO FAMILY."

AGNELLO JOSEPH DELLACROCE
597 FINGERBOARD ROAD
STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : MARCH 15, 1914
FBI# : 327320
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

AGNELLO DELLACROCE IS THE "UNDERBOSS" FOR THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." DELLACROCE, A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE UNDERWORLD FIGURE, JOSEPH "BAYONNE JOE" ZICARELLI OF THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY," HAS BEEN A HIGH-RANKING MEMBER OF THE "GAMBINO" ORGANIZATION SINCE 1970 AND IS AN EXTREMELY POWERFUL INDIVIDUAL WITHIN THE NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY INFRASTRUCTURE. DELLACROCE'S PROCLIVITY TOWARDS VIOLENCE MANIFESTED ITSELF IN 1972 WITH THE MURDER OF CARLO LOMBARDI. HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1979 FOR THE MURDER OF CHARLES CALISI, A GOVERNMENT INFORMANT. DELLACROCE ALSO ORDERED THE MURDER OF "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY BOSS" CARMINE GALANTE. DELLACROCE WAS OBSERVED WITH "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY" MEMBERS JOHN STANFA (CURRENTLY IN FEDERAL PRISON) AND ANTONIO CAPONIGRO (DECEASED) SHORTLY AFTER BRUNO'S DEATH.

GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY
SOUTH

JOHN GAMBINO
8698 26TH AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : AUGUST 22, 1940
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOHN GAMBINO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ALSO INVOLVED IN HEROIN TRAFFICKING AND WAS RECENTLY (FEBRUARY, 1982) INDICTED IN ITALY ON COUNTS OF CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT INTO THE UNITED STATES.

ANTONIO INZERILLO
3 CONROW ROAD
DELRAN TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 8, 1929
FBI : 723997D
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

ANTONIO INZERILLO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." ON FEBRUARY 2, 1982, HIS WIFE, ANNA INZERILLO NEE GAMBINO, REPORTED HIM AS MISSING. HE HAS NOT BEEN SEEN OR HEARD FROM SINCE OCTOBER 19, 1981. INZERILLO'S DISAPPEARANCE IS LINKED TO HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRAFFICKING. HIS BROTHER, PIETRO INZERILLO (DOB: 6/6/14), IS A DOCUMENTED INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER.

DOMENICO ADAMITA
203 DORCAS COURT
MT. LAUREL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 15, 1929
POB : ITALY
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

DOMENICO ADAMITA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." ADAMITA WAS INDICTED IN ITALY, IN FEBRUARY, 1982, AND CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS AND MANUFACTURE HEROIN. HE IS CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY IN ITALY.

EMANUEL ADAMITA
203 DORCAS COURT
MT. LAUREL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 6, 1934
AKA : "MANNY" "THE ENGINEER"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ADAMITA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS INDICTED AND CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS PRESENTLY IN CUSTODY IN PALERMO, ITALY.

ANTONIO BUSCETTA
MILLSIDE MANOR APARTMENTS
APT. 81-C, ROUTE #130
DELRAN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 13, 1950
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

BUSCETTA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY."
HE IS AN ASSOCIATE OF ROSARIO GAMBINO AND THE SON OF
TOMMASO BUSCETTA. HE IS KNOWN TO BE OPERATING A CHAIN
OF PIZZA SHOPS IN THE AREA OF VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA.
HIS FATHER, TOMMASO, IS A HIGH-RANKING MEMBER OF THE
"BADALAMENTI CRIMINAL NETWORK" IN SICILY AND A KNOWN
INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRAFFICKER. TOMMASO BUSCETTA IS
ALSO WANTED IN ITALY FOR THE MURDER OF SEVEN POLICE
OFFICERS.

NICOLA GIUSEPPE GALLINA
24625 JOHNSTON AVENUE
EAST DETROIT, MICHIGAN
52 JUNIPER COURT
DEPTFORD TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 13, 1950
SBI : 616602A
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

NICOLA GIUSEPPE GALLINA, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO
CRIME FAMILY," RESIDED IN NEW JERSEY DURING THE 1970'S.
HE RETURNED TO MICHIGAN IN 1978. GALLINA WAS AN ORIGINAL
OFFICER IN SOLLENA, INC. WITH SALVATORE SOLLENA, A DOCUMENTED
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER.

SALVATORE GALLINA
57-67 74TH STREET
ELMHURST, NEW YORK

DOB : AUGUST 13, 1944
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

GALLINA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY."
HE IS CONSIDERED A CLASS I NARCOTICS VIOLATOR AND WAS
INVOLVED IN THE SMUGGLING OF 16 KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN, SEIZED
AT JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) AIRPORT ON AUGUST 13, 1979. HE
WAS RECENTLY INDICTED IN ITALY ON COUNTS OF CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN,

AND EXPORT IT INTO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS PRESENTLY A
FUGITIVE FROM ITALIAN AUTHORITIES AND WANTED ON WARRANTS
ISSUED IN NEW YORK.

EMANUEL S. GAMBINO
7 BOXLEY COURT
SICKLERVILLE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 28, 1945
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

EMANUEL GAMBINO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME
FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

ERASMO GAMBINO
16 HOLDEN AVENUE
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 26, 1947
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ERASMO GAMBINO IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO
CRIME FAMILY." ERASMO IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING WITHIN NEW JERSEY. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES
INCLUDE GIUSEPPE GAMBINO, ROSARIO GAMBINO AND ANTHONY
INZERILLO.

GIUSEPPE GAMBINO
6 CARLTON ROAD
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 9, 1946
SBI# : 721004A
FBI# : 96703J9
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

GIUSEPPE GAMBINO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME
FAMILY." HE IS ALSO EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AS EVIDENCED BY HIS ARREST IN MARCH,
1980, ON HEROIN TRAFFICKING CHARGES. HE WAS ACQUITTED OF
THIS CHARGE IN JANUARY 1983. HE HAS AGAIN BEEN INDICTED
IN ITALY ON COUNTS OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS
INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT INTO THE
UNITED STATES.

ROSARIO GAMBINO
5 LOGAN DRIVE
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 12, 1942
FBI# : 224487E
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROSARIO GAMBINO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1980 BY UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN CONNECTION WITH HEROIN SMUGGLING AND WAS INDICTED IN ITALY FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT TO THE UNITED STATES.

FRANCESCO INZERILLO
1951 7TH STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : FEBRUARY 15, 1955
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

INZERILLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS EXTENSIVELY ACTIVE IN THE TRAFFICKING OF HEROIN. HE WAS INVOLVED IN A CONSPIRACY WHICH LED TO THE SEIZURE OF MORE THAN 60 KGS. OF HEROIN.

IN FEBRUARY, 1982, FRANCESCO INZERILLO WAS INDICTED IN ITALY FOR CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY IN UCCIARDONE PRISON, PALERMO, ITALY.

GUISEPPE INZERILLO
335 NORTH HAMPTON DRIVE
WILLINGBORO, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 4, 1922
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

GUISEPPE INZERILLO, IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF HEROIN AND WAS INDICTED IN ITALY, IN FEBRUARY, 1982, FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, THE MANUFACTURE OF HEROIN, AND THE EXPORT OF HEROIN INTO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS CURRENTLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

PIETRO INZERILLO
6 HOLDEN ROAD
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 6, 1914
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PIETRO INZERILLO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," IS EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF HEROIN AND HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED BY THE UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS A CLASS I NARCOTICS VIOLATOR.

PIETRO, HAS BECOME A MORE SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUAL WITHIN THE HIERARCHY OF THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY FACTION OF THE "GAMBINO FAMILY," SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF HIS BROTHER, ANTONIO, IN OCTOBER, 1981. ANTONIO WAS CONSIDERED THE "BOSS" OF THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY "GAMBINOS." SOURCE INFORMATION REVEALED THAT ANTONIO WAS AN IMPORTANT "LINK" BETWEEN ITALY AND NEW YORK.

ROSARIO INZERILLO
335 NORTH HAMPTON DRIVE
WILLINGBORO, NEW JERSEY
VIASCALE CARINI 2
PALERMO, ITALY

DOB : OCTOBER 14, 1951
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROSARIO INZERILLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" AND A KNOWN HEROIN TRAFFICKER. HE IS THE BROTHER OF THE LATE SALVATORE AND PIETRO INZERILLO, BOTH OF WHOM WERE EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

IN FEBRUARY 1982, ROSARIO INZERILLO WAS INDICTED IN ITALY ON ONE COUNT OF CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS CURRENTLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

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SALVATORE INZERILLO
712 DIANE AVENUE
CINNAMINSON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 2, 1943
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

SALVATORE INZERILLO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," IS EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF HEROIN.

IN FEBRUARY 1982, SALVATORE INZERILLO WAS INDICTED IN ITALY FOR THE IMPORT OF DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE OF HEROIN AND EXPORTATION OF HEROIN TO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS PRESENTLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

FORTUNATO INZONE
43 SQUAW BROOK ROAD
NORTH Haledon, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 24, 1942
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FORTUNATO INZONE, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," IS ACTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRAFFICKING. HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE SHIPMENT OF 17 KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN FROM ITALY TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS HEROIN WAS SEIZED AT JOHN F. KENNEDY AIRPORT ON AUGUST 13, 1979, AS WAS ANOTHER SHIPMENT OF 9 KILOGRAMS ON AUGUST 28, 1979.

INZONE WAS INDICTED BY THE TRIBUNAL OF PALERMO IN FEBRUARY 1982, ON ONE COUNT OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT DRUGS INTO ITALY, MANUFACTURE HEROIN AND EXPORT IT TO THE UNITED STATES. HE IS PRESENTLY A FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.

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CHARLES NOTO
7511 SEAVIEW AVENUE
WILDWOOD CREST, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE, 1910
FBI# : 1893129
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

CHARLES NOTO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE POSSESSES AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD WHICH INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS, INTERSTATE THEFT, AND THE RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY. NOTO WAS ALSO LINKED TO A "BOOKMAKING" AND "LOTTERY" OPERATION IN THE WILDWOOD, NEW JERSEY AREA BETWEEN 1950 AND 1955.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT NOTO IS A NEGOTIATOR FOR THE "GAMBINO FAMILY" IN NEW YORK, AND A REPRESENTATIVE FOR GAMBINO INVESTMENTS IN THE CAPE MAY COUNTY AREA. IN THIS CAPACITY, NOTO HAS BEEN ASSOCIATING WITH MEMBERS OF BOTH THE "BRUNO" AND "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILIES."

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NOTO IS CURRENTLY "INACTIVE" BUT STILL REPORTS DIRECTLY TO NEW YORK.

MICHAEL PIANCONE
323 TRAILVIEW ROAD
ENCINITAS, CALIFORNIA

DOB : JULY 20, 1940
FBI# : 162295M7
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PIANCONE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." DURING 1971, PIANCONE BECAME INVOLVED IN AN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING NETWORK AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER TRAFFICKERS SUCH AS TOMASO BUSCETTA. IN JUNE 1981, PIANCONE AND SALVATORE SOLLENA WERE ARRESTED FOR CONSPIRACY TO DISTRIBUTE NARCOTICS.

FRANCESCO RAPPA
114-16 25th STREET
FLUSHING QUEENS, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 2, 1942
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANCESCO RAPPA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." IN 1971, HE WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF 86 KILOS OF HEROIN WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM GIROLAMO D'ANNA, A MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICER FROM ITALY.

FILIPPO RICUPA
223 SUYDOM STREET
APARTMENT 1
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : JUNE 10, 1947
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

RICUPA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" AND IS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRAFFICKING. ON FEBRUARY 13, 1980, RICUPA MET WITH FOUR MEMBERS OF THE "SICILIAN MAFIA" IN PALERMO TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF 40.6/KGS. OF HEROIN TO NEW YORK CITY VIA MILAN. RICUPA WAS INDICTED IN ITALY IN FEBRUARY, 1982, FOR CONSPIRACY TO TRAFFIC HEROIN AND IS CURRENTLY A FUGITIVE.

NICHOLAS JOSEPH RUSSO
860 LOWER FERRY ROAD
APARTMENT 3 K
EWING TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 28, 1910
SBI# : 70481
FBI# : 561533
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

NICHOLAS RUSSO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH FARINELLA, DOMINICK IAVARONE, CHARLES COSTELLO, FELIX TUCCILLO, ANTHONY TASSONE, THE LATE JOHN SIMONE AND ALBERT PONTANI. RUSSO IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN TRENTON AND WAS PREVIOUSLY A PARTNER IN A GAMBLING OPERATION WITH CARL IPPOLITO. RUSSO WAS ALSO INDICTED IN 1964 FOR THE MURDER OF A BROOKLYN FLORIST.

IN 1971, RUSSO WAS INCARCERATED AT YARDVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER WITH NICODEMO SCARFO, GERARDO CATENA, RALPH NAPOLI, ANGELO BRUNO AND JOHN LARDIERE FOR REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BEFORE THE NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. RUSSO WAS RELEASED IN 1973.

CLAUDIO SANTINI
101 VILLAGE OF PINE RUN
BLACKWOOD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 21, 1949
SBI : 696628A
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

CLAUDIO SANTINI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" AND IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS. HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH DORTHY GANELLE, A KNOWN NARCOTICS DEALER AND SALVATORE SOLLENA, AN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKER.

FARO SOLLENA
244 SMITH STREET
PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 23, 1918
FBI : 256978L9
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FARO SOLLENA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY."

GIUSEPPE SOLLENA
19 HAWTHORNE DRIVE
DEPTFORD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 1, 1928
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

GIUSEPPE SOLLENA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY."

MATTEO SOLLENA
115 DIANE AVENUE
DELRAN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 19, 1946
SBI : 581560A
FBI : 582584J5
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

MATTEO SOLLENA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." IN MAY 1980, MATTEO AND SALVATORE SOLLENA WERE INDICTED IN ITALY FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND BELONGING TO A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION. THE SOLLENAS' NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES ARE RELATED TO THE "GAMBINO CRIMINAL NETWORK" AND THE "BADALAMENTI FAMILY," A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION BASED IN SICILY, ITALY.

SOLLENA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARREST FOR WEAPONS OFFENSE, FORGERY/COUNTERFEITING, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION VIOLATIONS AND OBSTRUCTING THE POLICE.

SALVATORE SOLLENA
52 JUNIPER COURT
DEPTFORD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 18, 1948
SBI# : 347519A
FBI# : 146232H
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

SALVATORE SOLLENA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." SOLLENA IS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL HEROIN TRAFFICKING FROM ITALY TO THE UNITED STATES. IN MAY, 1980, HE WAS CONVICTED IN ITALY FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND BELONGING TO A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION. SOLLENA WAS ALSO ARRESTED FOR CONSPIRING TO DISTRIBUTE HEROIN IN JUNE 1981. HE WAS INDICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CURRENCY AND INCOME TAX LAW IN MAY, 1982.

GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY

NORTH

ANTHONY CARMINATI
1431 14TH STREET
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 1, 1912
SBI# : 57917
FBI# : 1947698
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

ANTHONY CARMINATI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF THE LARGEST WHOLE-SALERS OF HEROIN IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA IN THE 1950'S. IN 1957 HE WAS CONVICTED OF SELLING HEROIN AND RECEIVED A TEN YEAR FEDERAL PRISON SENTENCE. CARMINATI SUBSEQUENTLY BECAME A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES JOSEPH PAGANO AND VINCENZO MAURO.

CARMINATI WAS ARRESTED IN 1975 REGARDING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR "LOANSHARKING" OPERATION. ON APRIL 22, 1977, CARMINATI AND SALVATORE BADALAMENTI WERE SENTENCED TO 3½ - 5 YEARS IN PRISON ON CONSPIRACY CHARGES EMANATING FROM ATTEMPTS TO BRIBE A BERGEN COUNTY FREEHOLDER, GERALD CALABRESE. WHILE CARMINATI WAS THE HEIR TO JOSEPH PATERNO'S CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES IN NORTH JERSEY, HE WAS AN INEFFECTUAL LEADER WHO NEVER WAS ABLE TO GAIN THE RESPECT NOR INFLUENCE THAT PATERNO HAD ACQUIRED.

JAMES FAILLA
275 EVERGREEN AVENUE
STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : JANUARY 22, 1919
SBI# : 514541
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

FAILLA, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," WAS INVOLVED IN THE THEFT OF OVER ONE MILLION DOLLARS IN SECURITIES FROM THE BROKERAGE FIRM OF MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER, AND SMITH. MOREOVER, HE PERFORMED THE DUTIES OF CHAUFFEUR-BODYGUARD FOR THE LATE CRIME "BOSS," CARLO GAMBINO, DURING THE EARLY 1970'S. FAILLA IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

JOSEPH D. PATERNO
6475 ALLISON ROAD
MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA

DOB : AUGUST 5, 1923
SBI# : 332478
FBI# : 4386478
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH PATERNO, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES EMILIO DELIO, LOU "BOBBY" MANNA, ANTHONY CARMINATI, JAMES PALMIERI, FRANK MICELI AND HOWARD GARFINKEL INVOLVED IN SUCH ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AS "SHYLOCKING" AND THE HANDLING OF STOLEN BONDS AND COUNTERFEIT MONEY. HE HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN "HIJACKING," LARCENY OF HEAVY DUTY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, ARMED ROBBERIES, LOTTERY, NARCOTICS, EXTORTION, HOMICIDE, ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND "STRONG-ARM ENFORCEMENT." IN 1974, PATERNO DEPARTED TO FLORIDA TO AVOID TESTIFYING BEFORE THE STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. HE IS AN ADEPT "MONEY MOVER" WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH SOPHISTICATED FRAUDS AND TRADITIONAL SYNDICATED CRIMES. HE HAS USED FRANK MICELI AND FRANK BASTO AS "ENFORCERS" AND HIS COMPLICITY IN SEVERAL HOMICIDES HAS BEEN WELL-DOCUMENTED.

FRANK PERRONE
349 EAST 18TH STREET
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 21, 1909
SBI# : 763665 (NC)
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

FRANK PERRONE IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE, "SHYLOCKING" AND GAMBLING. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES LOUIS GATTO, ANTHONY ACCARDI, ANTHONY "TUMAC" ACCETTURO, JOSEPH PATERNO, AND ANTHONY CARMINATI. PERRONE'S ARREST RECORD REFLECTS AN ARREST FOR GAMBLING. CONSIDERED A "LOANSHARK'S LOANSHARK," PERRONE HAS MAINTAINED A RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE IN NEW JERSEY, AND IS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT IN FLORIDA.

FRANK ANTHONY BASTO
34 BRIGHTON AVENUE
BELLEVILLE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 13, 1937
SBI# : 474348
FBI# : 657263B
AKA : FRANK MUCCIONE, FRANK BOSSILIO,
FRANK MUCCIARONE, "THE BEAR"

STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK BASTO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY." BASTO'S CRIMINAL SKILLS WERE AT ONE TIME UTILIZED BY THE LATE PETER LAPLACA OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." BASTO A KNOWN "ENFORCER" IS INVOLVED IN "HI-JACKING," STOCK THEFTS AND FINANCING NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. HE HAS AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD DATING BACK TO 1954. HE WAS A PARTNER IN A LARGE SCALE BURGLARY "RING" AND WAS INVOLVED IN ARSONS AND ARMED ROBBERY. BASTO AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATE, FRANK MICELI, HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN A NUMBER OF HOMICIDES IN NORTH JERSEY. HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF JOSEPH PATERNO AND ANTHONY CARMINATI, AND IS CONSIDERED A VERY ADEPT "CONTRACT KILLER."

ROBERT EMIL BISACCIA
35 MIDLAND AVENUE
MAPLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 17, 1937
SBI : 570668
FBI : 28346D
AKA : "CABERT" "KABERT" "KAVERT"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROBERT BISACCIA, A GAMBINO "SOLDIER", IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH GENOVESE "CAPO" ANGELO SICA. BISACCIA IS KNOWN TO CONTROL A LARGE GAMBLING OPERATION IN MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY. HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE NARCOTICS, BANK ROBBERY AND BURGLARY. HE HAS ASSUMED THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF PATERNO'S NETWORK IN NEW JERSEY, REPLACING ANTHONY CARMINATI. FRANK MICELI AND FRANK BASTO ARE AMONG HIS MOST TRUSTED CONFIDANTES.

JOSEPH COVELLO
25 COTTAGE PLACE
BELLEVILLE, NEW JERSEY

HEMISPHERE CONDOMINIUMS
ROOM #21P
1950 SOUTH OCEAN DRIVE
HALLENDALE, FLORIDA

DOB : MAY 9, 1924
SBI# : 321519
FBI# : 4161567
AKA : "DEMUS"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

COVELLO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," IS INVOLVED IN ILLICIT GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS. HE HAS SERVED TIME IN BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AS A RESULT OF GAMBLING CONVICTIONS. HE COMMUTES BETWEEN FLORIDA AND NEW JERSEY ON ORDERS OF HIS "BOSS," JOE PATERNO.

FRANK FERRO
1219 EAST 12TH STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 29, 1930
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK FERRO IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY."

HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE PARTICIPATED WITH THE FALCONE BROTHERS IN A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD VALLEY TEA CO-OP. HE IS ALSO KNOWN TO BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF ILLEGAL ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES.

FERRO IS THE SON-IN-LAW OF "CAPOREGIME" PAUL GAMBINO, THE BROTHER OF THE LATE "CRIME BOSS," CARLO GAMBINO.

FRANK J. MICELI
14 JAN COURT
ELMWOOD PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 26, 1934
SBI# : 707148
FBI# : 349870
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK MICELI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY," AND WAS CONSIDERED JOE PATERNO'S "RIGHT HAND MAN." THE SUBJECT'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE MURDER, "FENCING," BRIBERY, "LOAN-

SHARKING," NARCOTICS AND ILLICIT GAMBLING. HE WAS INDICTED WITH CARLO GAMBINO ON APRIL 29, 1970, BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY ON CHARGES OF PLOTTING TO "HIJACK" AN ARMORED CAR CARRYING BETWEEN THREE TO SIX MILLION DOLLARS. MICELI WAS SENTENCED ON MARCH 15, 1971, TO TEN YEARS AT LEWISBURG FEDERAL PENITENTIARY. MICELI WAS RELEASED FROM LEWISBURG ON MARCH 30, 1973.

SINCE THEN, MICELI HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN A LARGE-SCALE "LOANSHARKING" OPERATION IN PASSAIC, BERGEN AND ESSEX COUNTIES. HE WAS INVOLVED WITH GREG DEPALMA, OF THE NOW DEFUNCT WESTCHESTER PREMIER THEATRE, AND IS A KNOWN ASSOCIATE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER ANTHONY DELUTRO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO FAMILY." HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO AVOID INCARCERATION FOR HIS "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES BY ACCENTING HIS CURRENT PHYSICAL AILMENT -- MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS. HE IS AN EXPERIENCED "CONTRACT KILLER" WHO HAS COMMITTED A NUMBER OF MURDERS ON BEHALF OF JOSEPH PATERNO. HE WAS PERSONALLY AFFRONTED WHEN HE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT TO ANTHONY CARMINATI, UPON THE DEPARTURE OF PATERNO TO FLORIDA. HE HELD AN INTENSE DISRESPECT AND DISLOYALTY TO CARMINATI, WHOM HE CONSIDERED INCOMPETENT, "OLD FASHIONED," AND LACKING BASIC INTELLIGENCE.

JAMES P. PALMIERI
137 BLOOMFIELD AVENUE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 19, 1917
SBI# : 170156
FBI# : 1141543
AKA : JIMMY HIGGINS
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PALMIERI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH "GAMBINO CAPOREGIME" JOSEPH PATERNO. HE IS A KNOWN "ENFORCER" IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY AND IS ENGAGED IN "SHYLOCKING," NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND GAMBLING.

PALMIERI'S PROCLIVITY TOWARDS VIOLENCE HAS BEEN WELL DOCUMENTED. HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SEVERAL HOMICIDES INCLUDING THE MURDERS OF "GENOVESE BOSS" THOMAS EBOLI IN 1972 AND ANGELO CHIEPPA, RUGGERIO BOIARDO'S "BODYGUARD," IN 1973.

PALMIERI WAS CONSIDERED THE "HEIR" TO JOSEPH PATERNO'S INTERESTS UPON THE DEPARTURE OF PATERNO TO FLORIDA. HOWEVER, ANTHONY CARMINATI WAS SELECTED TO FILL THIS VOID, CAUSING MUCH DISSENSION AMONG MICELI, BASTO, AND PALMIERI. PALMIERI VOICED HIS DISPLEASURE OVER REPORTING TO CARMINATI, WHOM HE FELT WAS SENILE AND AN INCOMPETENT WHO ONLY ACQUIRED THE POSITION BE- CAUSE OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE "OLD MAN" -- CARLO GAMBINO.

GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY

THE NEW YORK BASED "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" OPERATES PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS OF NEW JERSEY. REPRESENTING ONE OF THE LARGEST AND MOST INFLUENTIAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS NEW JERSEY, THE "GENOVESE FAMILY" IS INVOLVED IN SUCH ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AS NARCOTICS, GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," PROSTITUTION, "LABOR RACKETEERING," EXTORTION, COLLUSIVE THEFT, "MONEY LAUNDERING" AND INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISE. THIS "FAMILY" HAS AND CONTINUES TO UTILIZE VIOLENCE AS A METHOD OF ENHANCING AND PROTECTING ITS FINANCIAL INTERESTS.


SINCE THE DEATH OF THE LATE VITO GENOVESE, THE "GENOVESE FAMILY" HAS HAD A NUMBER OF "BOSSSES," NAMELY THOMAS EBOLI (DECEASED), GERARDO CATENA, AND FRANK TIERI (DECEASED). PHILIP LOMBARDO IS THE CURRENT "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY." LOMBARDO PRESENTLY RESIDES IN FLORIDA, AND DUE TO POOR HEALTH, HE IS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT. CATENA NOW SERVES AS "CONSIGLIERE" FOR THE "GENOVESE FAMILY."

ANTHONY SALERNO, THE "GENOVESE FAMILY UNDERBOSS," MAINTAINS A VAST NETWORK OF "LOANSHARK" OPERATIONS IN BOTH NEW YORK AND NORTHERN NEW JERSEY. SALERNO'S EXTENSIVE "LOANSHARKING" NETWORK IS A PRINCIPAL REVENUE PRODUCING FOR THE GENOVESE ORGANIZATION.

RECENTLY, INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT "GENOVESE CAPOREGIME" VINCENT GIGANTE IS A MAJOR CONTENDER FOR THE POSITION OF "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY," SERVING AS "ACTING BOSS" DURING LOMBARDO'S CONVALESCENCE IN FLORIDA. GIGANTE POSSESSES A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AND ENGAGES IN "RACKETEERING" ON THE HUDSON COUNTY WATERFRONT, THROUGH JOHN DIGILIO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "FAMILY." DIGILIO HAS

AMASSED ONE OF THE MOST INTRICATE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING"
AND "RACKETEERING" NETWORKS IN NEW JERSEY THROUGH THE
UTILIZATION OF FEAR AND VIOLENCE. MOREOVER, HE HAS MANAGED
TO INFILTRATE NUMEROUS LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES IN HUDSON,
MIDDLESEX AND BERGEN COUNTIES.

GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY



PHILIP LOMBARDO
324 AUDOBON ROAD
ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY

3001 SOUTH OCEAN DRIVE
APARTMENT 1G
HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA

DOB : OCTOBER 5, 1908
SBI# : 469810
FBI# : 201426
AKA : "COCKEYE PHIL"
"BENNY THE SQUINT"
"BEN PURPIN"
"BEN GROSSO"
"BENNY DEMAIO"
STATUS: RETIRED "BOSS"

PHILIP LOMBARDO IS THE SEMI-RETIRED "BOSS" OF THE NEW YORK BASED "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." LOMBARDO EXERCISED SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE IN THIS "FAMILY" IN THE 1970'S. DUE TO A RECENT SURGE OF INFLUENCE EXERTED BY HIGH RANKING "GENOVESE" MEMBER VINCENT GIGANTE, LOMBARDO HAS RETIRED TO FLORIDA.

LOMBARDO'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND NARCOTICS. HOWEVER, LOMBARDO'S CRIMINAL RECORD ALSO REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ARMED ROBBERY, EXTORTION, CONSPIRACY AND POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE. HE RECENTLY TOOK PART IN A CONSPIRACY INVOLVING THE TRANSPORTATION AND MARKETING OF FRAUDULENT "DESIGNER JEANS."

LOMBARDO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE THE LATE MEYER LANSKY, GERARDO CATENA, ANGELO SICA, JOSEPH SABATO AND ANTHONY SALERNO.

VINCENT GIGANTE
5 ARROW ROAD
OLD TAPPAN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 29, 1929
SBI# : 180245A
FBI# : 5020214
AKA : "THE CHIN"
STATUS: ACTING "BOSS"

VINCENT GIGANTE IS THE ACTING "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." AT THE TIME OF FRANK TIERI'S (FORMER "BOSS" OF "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY") DEATH, GIGANTE SERVED ON A THREE MEMBER COMMISSION WITH ANTHONY SALERNO AND LOUIS MANNA. THIS COMMISSION OVERSAW THE ACTIVITIES OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY."

GIGANTE IS CURRENTLY THE PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR OF "GENOVESE FAMILY SOLDIER" JOHN DIGILIO, AN INFLUENTIAL NEW JERSEY OPERATIVE. THROUGH THE ACTIVITIES OF DIGILIO, THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION" CONTINUES TO EXERT SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OVER NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT LABOR UNIONS AND RELATED ENTERPRISES. GIGANTE HAS EXHIBITED A PROPENSITY TOWARD VIOLENCE AND HAS BEEN IMPLICATED IN A NUMBER OF HOMICIDES.

GIGANTE'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR AUTO THEFT, NARCOTICS, ARSON, GAMBLING AND BRIBERY. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE VINCENT LANDOLFI, VENERO MANGANO AND GERARDO CATENA.

GERARDO CATENA
2100 COCONUT ROAD
BOCA RATON, FLORIDA

DOB : JANUARY 8, 1902
SBI# : 12676
FBI# : 144036
AKA : "JERRY ALLEN"
"JERRY CUTANA"
"GERARDO VITO"
"RULLO"
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

A FORMER ACTING "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," GERARDO CATENA CURRENTLY HOLDS THE POSITION OF "CONSIGLIERE" WITHIN THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION." ALTHOUGH CATENA PRESENTLY RESIDES IN FLORIDA, HIS FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN NEW JERSEY REMAIN EXTENSIVE.

DURING 1951, CATENA APPEARED BEFORE THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE WHERE HE ADMITTED AN ATTEMPT TO BRIBE A JUROR IN A MURDER TRIAL. IN MARCH 1970, CATENA WAS INCARCERATED AT YARDVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BEFORE THE NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION. ALTHOUGH CATENA MAINTAINED HIS SILENCE, HE WAS RELEASED AFTER SERVING A TERM OF FOUR YEARS.

CATENA'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "LABOR RACKETEERING," GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND "MONEY LAUNDERING." HIS ASSOCIATES ARE THE LATE MEYER LANSKY, VINCENT GIGANTE, ANGELO SICA, SAM DECAVALCANTE, RUGGIERO BOIARDO AND ANTHONY PROVENZANO.

ANTHONY SALERNO
OLD ROCK CITY ROAD
RED BROOK, NEW YORK

DOB : AUGUST 15, 1911
FBI# : 4817958
AKA : "TONY PALERMO"
"FAT TONY"
"ANTHONY RUSSO"
"ANTHONY ORR"
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

ANTHONY SALERNO IS THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF FRANK "FUNZI" TIERI, FORMER "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY"; SALERNO, VINCENT GIGANTE AND LOUIS MANNA ACTED AS A THREE MAN COMMISSION OVERSEEING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION."

SALERNO'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." DURING 1973, SALERNO WAS INDICTED ON ELEVEN COUNTS OF "LOANSHARKING" AND A CHARGE OF CRIMINAL SOLICITATION. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT HIS ENTIRE OPERATION INCLUDED APPROXIMATELY \$80 MILLION IN OUTSTANDING LOANS. IN 1975-1976, SALERNO WAS INDICTED WITH HIS BROTHER, CIRINO, FOR CONDUCTING A \$10 MILLION GAMBLING OPERATION.

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GERARDO CATENA, GUISEPPE SABATO AND JOHN DIGILIO.

RUGGIERO BOIARDO, SR.
328 BEAUFORT AVENUE
LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 8, 1890
SBI# : 33969
FBI# : 330595
AKA : "THE BOOT"
"DIAMOND RICHIE"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

RUGGIERO BOIARDO, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," IS THE LEADER OF ONE OF THE LARGEST ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY. BOIARDO REMAINS WELL INSULATED FROM THE DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES OF HIS ILLICIT OPERATION THROUGH GENOVESE OPERATIVES SUCH AS ANGELO SICA AND ANDREW GERARDO. THE BOIARDO NETWORK HAS BECOME A CONGLOMERATE OF ILLICIT ENTERPRISES (I.E., GAMBLING, STOLEN PROPERTY, "LOANSHARKING," "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS),

OPERATING PRIMARILY IN THE ESSEX COUNTY AREA OF NEW JERSEY AND IN CARIBBEAN ISLAND GAMBLING CASINOS. BOIARDO WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE "SKIMMING" OF REVENUES FROM LAS VEGAS GAMBLING CASINOS. BOIARDO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SANCTIONING OF SEVERAL MURDERS INCLUDING THE HOMICIDE OF ANGELO CHIEPPA, A CASINO MANAGEMENT EXPERT AND BOIARDO CONFIDANTE.

DURING THE 1960'S, BOIARDO AND HIS OPERATIVES (INCLUDING HIS SON, "TONY BOY," A DECEASED MEMBER OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY"), WERE PART OF A CORRUPTION CONSPIRACY INVOLVING NEWARK MAYOR HUGH ADDONIZIO. IN 1980, BOIARDO WAS ARRESTED AS A RESULT OF "OPERATION OMEGA," A NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE UNDERCOVER OPERATION. HE WAS SEVERED FROM THE TRIAL DUE TO HIS AGE AND HEALTH.

BOIARDO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GERARDO CATENA, EUGENE CATENA, DANIEL CECERE AND THE LATE JOHN AND ANTHONY RUSSO. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, TAX VIOLATIONS AND WEAPON OFFENSES.

LOUIS GATTO
38 DEWEY AVENUE
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 2, 1916
SBI# : 183997
FBI# : 2084089
AKA : "STREAKY"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

IN 1979, UPON THE DEATH OF PETER LAPLACA, LOUIS GATTO ASSUMED THE POSITION OF "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." GATTO CONTROLS GAMBLING IN TWO NORTH JERSEY COUNTIES FOR THE "GENOVESE FAMILY," VIA HIS SON-IN-LAW, ALAN WOLSHONAK GRECCO. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ERNEST PALMIERI, GUISEPPE SABATO, JOSEPH PECORA, THOMAS PECORA AND MICHAEL BORELLI.

IN ADDITION TO HIS GAMBLING INTERESTS, GATTO IS INVOLVED IN MEDIATING INTER-FAMILY DISPUTES AND IS OVERSEEING THE ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY TINO FIUMARA, PRIOR TO HIS INCARCERATION.

GATTO WAS ALSO INVOLVED WITH ERNEST PALMIERI, THE FORMER BUSINESS AGENT FOR LOCAL #945. GATTO MEETS REGULARLY WITH OTHER UNION OFFICIALS SUCH AS JOSEPH PECORA AND THOMAS PECORA OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL #863 AND STEPHEN WILSON, BUSINESS AGENT FOR LOCAL #69, BARTENDER'S UNION.

IN PURSUING HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, GATTO DOES NOT HESITATE TO UTILIZE VIOLENT MEANS. HE FREQUENTLY EMPLOYS THE "STRONG-ARM" SERVICES OF SEVERAL OF HIS OPERATIVES.

GATTO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ERNEST PALMIERI, GUISEPPE SABATO, JOSEPH PECORA, THOMAS PECORA, MICHAEL BORELLI AND STEVEN MAZZOLA.

MATTHEW IANNIELLO
123 WEST 49TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

DOB : JUNE 18, 1920
FBI : 890429H
AKA : "MATTY THE HORSE"
"BIG SIXTEEN"
"MATTHEW IANELLO"
"MATTY FILIPPUCI"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

MATTHEW IANNIELLO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," NARCOTICS AND THE INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. IANNIELLO'S AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INTERESTS INCLUDE HOTELS, GAMBLING ESTABLISHMENTS AND VENDING MACHINE COMPANIES. DURING 1975, IANNIELLO'S PRIMARY SOURCE OF INCOME WAS DERIVED FROM MORE THAN EIGHTY TAVERNS AND RESTAURANTS LOCATED IN NEW YORK. HE IS REGARDED AS A SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF REVENUE FOR THE "GENOVESE FAMILY." IANNIELLO WAS CONVICTED IN 1971 FOR FAILING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS BEFORE A MANHATTAN GRAND JURY INVESTIGATING POLICE CORRUPTION.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT "GENOVESE FAMILY SOLDIER" ANTHONY PROVENZANO CONDUCTED "LABOR RACKETEERING" ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF IANNIELLO. MOREOVER, IANNIELLO EXERTS INFLUENCE IN THE NEW JERSEY SOLID WASTE INDUSTRY THROUGH FIORILLIO BROTHERS CARTING OF NEW JERSEY, INCORPORATED.

IANNIELLO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICHOLAS MARENGELLO, VINCENT GIGANTE, AND ANTHONY SALERNO. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR NARCOTICS AND EXTORTION.

VENERO MANGANO
2 CHARLTON STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 7, 1921
FBI : 760014
AKA : "BENNY EGGS"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

VENERO MANGANO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF ALPHONSO "FUNZI" TIERI, MANGANO SERVED AS HIS ADVISOR AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE.

CURRENTLY, MANGANO IS QUITE ACTIVE IN ILLEGAL OPERATIONS ON THE NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT. MANGANO RECEIVES REGULAR PAYMENTS FROM WATERFRONT-RELATED BUSINESSES. MANGANO ALSO PROVIDES USURIOUS LOANS TO ANTHONY GALLAGHER, A DIGILIO OPERATIVE WHO SERVES AS A "FRONT" FOR MANGANO AND DIGILIO IN PORT-RELATED BUSINESS INVESTMENTS.

MANGANO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE VINCENT GIGANTE, MARIO GIGANTE, JOHN BARBATO, JOHN DIGILIO AND THE LATE PASQUALE MACCHIOLE.

LOUIS MANNA
158 RIDGE ROAD
NORTH ARLINGTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : January 2, 1929
SBI# : 420428
FBI# : 649163
AKA : "BOBBY MANNA"
"ANTHONY MANNA"
"JOE LUPO"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

LOUIS MANNA IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD WHICH INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR "LOANSHARKING," DANGEROUS WEAPONS, GAMBLING, CONSPIRACY AND LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS.

LOUIS MANNA IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING," BUT ALSO IS INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING, "STRONG-ARM" ENFORCEMENT AND BURGLARY ACTIVITIES.

IN THE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES, MANNA CONTROLLED GAMBLING AND "SHYLOCKING" OPERATIONS IN JERSEY CITY FOR JIMMY NAPOLI. IN PURSUING THESE ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, MANNA ENGAGED IN CORRUPT AND VIOLENT PRACTICES. HE WAS A MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE MURDER OF SALVATORE MAFETTI AND WAS ALSO IMPLICATED IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ANTHONY STROLLO.

MANNA CURRENTLY SERVES AS A CONDUIT TO VINCENT GIGANTE, A "CAPO" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY."

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JAMES NAPOLI, THE LATE ANGELO DECARLO, EMILIO DELEO, THE LATE THOMAS EBOLI, ANTHONY GARAFOLA, THE LATE ANTHONY RUSSO AND JOSEPH ZICARELLI.

JAMES NAPOLI
216 EAST 31st STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : NOVEMBER 4, 1911
FBI# : 1953027
AKA : "VINCENT NAPOLI"
"JAMES KNAPP"
"JIMMY BLUE EYES"
"JIMMY NAPP"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JAMES NAPOLI, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN NEW YORK CITY, HUDSON COUNTY, AND PORTIONS OF BERGEN COUNTY. A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE THOMAS EBOLI AND LOUIS MANNA, NAPOLI WAS A PRINCIPAL GAMBLING OPERATIVE IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY. MOREOVER, NAPOLI SERVED AS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF USURIOUS LOANS FOR PARTICIPANTS OF ILLEGAL CARD AND DICE GAMES CONDUCTED BY THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION."

IN 1973, NAPOLI WAS SUBPOENAED TO APPEAR BEFORE A NEW YORK GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME'S INFILTRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS.

DURING 1974, NAPOLI WAS SENTENCED TO SIX MONTHS IN PRISON AND A \$1,000 FINE FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT BEFORE A MANHATTAN GRAND JURY THAT WAS INVESTIGATING THE "FIXING" OF BOXING MATCHES AT MADISON SQUARE GARDEN. NAPOLI WAS ALSO CONVICTED FOR PAYING \$500 TO A PRISON OFFICIAL TO OBTAIN SPECIAL TREATMENT, WHILE HE WAS SERVING A PRISON TERM FOR A CONTEMPT CONVICTION.

NAPOLI'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR PERJURY, GAMBLING, AND BRIBERY. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH ZICARELLI, GUISEPPE SABATO, AND RUGGIERIO BOIARDO.

GUISEPPE SABATO
2352 LINWOOD AVENUE
APARTMENT 1D
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 5, 1907
SBI# : 101588
FBI# : 1259885
AKA : "PEPE"
"CHARLES MARTUCCI"
"PEPE SABATO"
"JOSEPH MARINO"
"JOE MARTUCCI"
"JOSEPH SABATO"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

GUISEPPE SABATO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." A TRUSTED ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE THOMAS EBOLI, SABATO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING ILLICIT DICE AND "MONTE" CARD GAMES IN BERGEN AND HUDSON COUNTIES.

DURING THE 1970'S, SABATO SUPERVISED THE ACTIVITIES OF "GENOVESE" MEMBERS PETER LAPLACA, LOUIS GATTO, AND TINO FIUMARA.

SABATO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS AN ARREST FOR GAMBLING. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY PROVENZANO, GERARDO CATENA AND ANTHONY SALERNO.

ANDREW GERARDO
224 LAUREL AVENUE
LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 9, 1930
SBI# : 457433
FBI# : 765142B
AKA : "ANDY GERARD"
STATUS: ACTING "CAPOREGIME"

ANDREW GERARDO IS AN ACTING "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE CONTROLLED GAMBLING IN ESSEX COUNTY FOR THE AGED RUGGIERO BOIARDO IN THE MID-1970'S. DUE TO BOIARDO'S AGE (92) AND HIS RETIREMENT, GERARDO HAS ASSUMED CONTROL OF MANY OF BOIARDO'S OPERATIONS. THROUGH THE 1970'S, GERARDO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDED THE LATE ANTHONY AND JOHN RUSSO, THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, JOSEPH PATERNO, ANTHONY ACCETTURO, EMILIO DELEO AND ANGELO SICA.

GERARDO'S CRIMINAL RECORD INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR WEAPON OFFENSES, GAMBLING, CONSPIRACY, ASSAULT AND ATTEMPTED FRAUD. HE WAS IMPLICATED IN THE MURDER OF ANGELO CHIEPPA, A BODYGUARD AND "FRONT" MAN FOR BOIARDO. GERARDO IS ALSO INVOLVED IN UNION ACTIVITIES.

IN 1980, GERARDO WAS CONVICTED AS A RESULT OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE" OPERATION OMEGA," WHICH INVESTIGATED SEVERAL HIGH-LEVEL NORTH JERSEY ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES SUCH AS ANGELO SICA, THOMAS DEPHILLIPS, JAMES MONTEMARANO AND ANTHONY LARDIERE. GERARDO WAS FOUND GUILTY OF LOTTERY, "BOOKMAKING," AND ATTEMPTED FRAUD.

NICHOLAS BUFANIA
1342 EVERETT CIRCLE
UNION, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 23, 1916
SBI# : 127795
FBI# : 817875
AKA : "JOE BONES," "JOE GENT", NICK
BIOFF, SALVATORE MARTINO
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

NICHOLAS BUFANIA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." BUFANIA, A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF GENOVESE "CONSIGLIERE" GERARDO CATENA, HAS HELD SEVERAL POSITIONS RELATED TO THE NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT. HE HAS BEEN UTILIZED AS A "STRONG

ARM" AND GAMBLING OPERATIVE ON THE WATERFRONT FOR CATENA. AS A RESULT OF BUFANIA'S CRIMINAL RECORD AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, HE HAS BEEN DENIED A WORK LICENSE BY THE WATERFRONT COMMISSION. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, ASSAULT AND BATTERY, MURDER AND LARCENY.

BUFANIA'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GERARDO CATENA AND CARMINE TOTO.

VINCENT JAMES CALABRESE
495 LAKE STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 19, 1948
SBI# : 21655
FBI# : 1664241
AKA : "JIMO"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

VINCENT CALABRESE, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE RUGGERIO "TONY BOY" BOIARDO. CALABRESE IS CONSIDERED PART OF THE BOIARDO GROUP WITHIN THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" AS WELL AS BURGLARY AND NATIONAL AUTO THEFT.

CALABRESE'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ASSAULT, ROBBERY, BURGLARY, FRAUD, WEAPON OFFENSES, PERJURY AND GAMBLING. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE EMILIO DELIO, JOSEPH DAMIANO AND THOMAS SPERDUTO.

ANTHONY CAMPISI
13 LAUREL PLACE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 13, 1920
SBI# : 226131
FBI# : 2779587
AKA : "NA-NA"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY CAMPISI, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," WAS THE LEADER OF THE NOTORIOUS "CAMPISI CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION." HE HAS AN EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD, WHICH INCLUDES CONVICTIONS FOR GAMBLING AND FORGERY. IN

1975, CAMPISI WAS GIVEN A TEN YEAR SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY AND COMPLICITY IN THE MURDER OF CANDIDO TRUEBA.

CAMPISI ENGAGED IN VARIOUS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDING GAMBLING, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ARMED ROBBERY AND HOMICIDE. THE "CAMPISI ORGANIZATION'S" PROPENSITY TO UTILIZE VIOLENCE FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF BOTH PERSONAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS IS WELL DOCUMENTED.

CAMPISI'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE MICHAEL TACCETTA, ANTHONY ACCETTURO, JOSEPH INSABELLA AND ANTHONY SPERANAZA.

DANIEL CECERE
8 CLEARVIEW TERRACE
WEST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 4, 1918
SBI# : 168783
FBI# : 1721939
AKA : "LAY LAY"
"BIG RED"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

DANIEL CECERE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" AND AN OPERATIVE OF RUGGERIO BOIARDO. HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

DURING THE 1950'S AND 1960'S, CECERE WAS INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING" UNDER THE AUSPICES OF DECEASED "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBER ANGELO "GYP" DECARLO CECERE'S OPERATION INCLUDED PORTIONS OF ESSEX, UNION AND MORRIS COUNTIES IN NEW JERSEY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, CECERE CONDUCTED A GAMBLING OPERATION FOR BOIARDO. IN AUGUST 1969, CECERE WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH ANGELO DECARLO, PETER LANDUSCO AND JOSEPH POLVERINO ON "LOANSHARKING" CHARGES.

CECERE MAINTAINED AN ASSOCIATION WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF A NEW JERSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT DURING THE 1970'S. AS A RESULT OF A PROBE OF THAT POLICE DEPARTMENT, SEVERAL POLICE OFFICERS WERE INDICTED FOR EXTORTION, PERJURY AND PROTECTING ORGANIZED CRIMINALS.

CECERE'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE "GENOVESE" MEMBERS, ANGELO SICA, EMILIO DELIO AND THOMAS DEPHILLIPS. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR STOLEN PROPERTY, GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

MICHAEL JOSEPH COPPOLA
152 POLK AVENUE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 18, 1946
SBI# : 269501A
FBI# : 643392L11
AKA : "MICHAEL FILMA"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

MICHAEL COPPOLA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" AND IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF "GENOVESE" MEMBER TINO FIUMARA. COPPOLA AND FIUMARA HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING," GAMBLING, "HIJACKING," EXTORTION AND "LABOR RACKETEERING" IN THE NEWARK AREA.

COPPOLA POSSESSES A PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN SEVERAL MURDERS. DURING 1974, COPPOLA AND FIUMARA WERE INVOLVED IN THE MURDER OF ROBERT HARRIS, THE PRINCIPAL BLACK GAMBLING OPERATIVE IN PATERSON, NEW JERSEY.

AS A RESULT OF "PROJECT ALPHA," A JOINT UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN 1977 BY THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, IT WAS REVEALED THAT COPPOLA WAS INVOLVED IN A FRAUDULENT CONSPIRACY TO PROFIT FROM A SERIES OF OVERCHARGES AND "KICKBACKS." COPPOLA, ALONG WITH FIUMARA, LAWRENCE RICCI AND GERARDO COPPOLA, WERE CONVICTED IN 1980 OF EXTORTING THE OWNER OF THE BELLA VITA RESTAURANT,

LOCATED IN PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS. MOREOVER, COPPOLA AND FIUMARA WERE CONVICTED IN 1980 OF "LABOR RACKETEERING." CURRENTLY, COPPOLA IS SERVING A THIRTEEN YEAR SENTENCE IN FEDERAL PRISON FOR HIS ROLE IN THE BELLA VITA EXTORTION. HE WAS ALSO SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS (RUNNING CONCURRENTLY) FOR HIS "LABOR RACKETEERING" CONVICTIONS.

COPPOLA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ANTI-TRUST VIOLATIONS, GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND EXTORTION. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE RAYMOND TANGO, TINO FIUMARA, CHARLES STANGO, LOUIS GATTO AND MICHAEL BORELLI..

EMILIO DELIO
186755 NORTH BAY ROAD
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DOB : DECEMBER 22, 1913
SBI# : 23845
FBI# : 295285
AKA : "THE COUNT"
STATUS: "SOLIDER"

EMILIO DELIO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, EXTORTION, BURGLARY, "LOANSHARKING" AND "HIJACKING."

DURING THE 1960'S AND 1970'S, DELIO WAS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT GAMBLING OPERATIVES IN NEW JERSEY. HE WAS ARRESTED DURING JULY 1970 ALONG WITH "GENOVESE SOLDIER" ANTHONY DEVINGO FOR CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE GAMBLING LAWS IN ESSEX COUNTY. DELIO WAS AGAIN ARRESTED FOR SIMILAR VIOLATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1970. DELIO WAS INDICTED IN 1976 WITH DENNIS PRENTO ON CHARGES OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND EXTORTION. THE INDICTMENT CHARGED THAT DELIO AND PRENTO EXTORTED ARTHUR CARULLO AND ATTEMPTED TO MURDER HIM TO COLLECT MORE THAN \$150,000.00 IN LIFE INSURANCE.

THOMAS DEPHILLIPS
9 FAIRWAY AVENUE
BELLEVILLE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 17, 1927
SBI# : 402372
FBI# : 794672-A
AKA : "PEE WEE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

THOMAS DEPHILLIPS IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES. IN 1976, DURING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF JOSEPH IPPOLITO, IT WAS REVEALED THAT DEPHILLIPS WAS CONTROLLING GAMBLING OPERATIONS IN ESSEX

COUNTY. THIS INVESTIGATION LED TO THE INDICTMENT OF DEPHILLIPS. THE TRIAL, LATER REFERRED TO AS THE "GREAT MOB TRIAL," RESULTED IN THE 1979 CONVICTION OF DEPHILLIPS FOR "BOOKMAKING." HE WAS SENTENCED TO FOUR AND A HALF TO SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT, PLUS A ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR FINE. DEPHILLIPS ALSO PLEADED GUILTY FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH DEFENDANTS IMPLICATED DURING "OPERATION OMEGA," A NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE UNDERCOVER OPERATION.

DEPHILLIPS' CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE RALPH RUSSO, ANTHONY DEVINGO, ANDREW GERARDO, JOSEPH CARRINO, TINO FIUMARA, MICHAEL TACCETTA, GERALD DELUCA AND JOSPEH IPPOLITO.

ANTONIO DEVINGO
150 PASSAIC AVENUE
ROSELAND, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 26, 1929
SBI# : 501179
FBI# : 71040C
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTONIO DEVINGO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS PRIMARY CRIMINAL ENDEAVORS ARE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," "HIJACKING," AND "FENCING," ALTHOUGH HE IS ALSO INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS.

DEVINGO CONTROLS GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS IN PARTS OF NEWARK. HE REGULARLY ATTENDS A NEWARK DICE GAME WHICH IS RUN BY ANDREW GERARDO AND MICHAEL TACCETTA. DEVINGO IS ALSO INVOLVED IN RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY WHICH HE FREQUENTLY "PURCHASES" FROM LOCAL DRUG ADDICTS IN EXCHANGE FOR NARCOTICS.

IN 1980, DEVINGO, ANDREW GERARDO, JAMES MONTEMARANO AND ANGELO SICA WERE ARRESTED BY THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE FOR THEIR ILLICIT ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE DISCLOSED IN "OPERATION OMEGA." HE WAS CONVICTED OF GAMBLING AND ATTEMPTED FRAUD.

DEVINGO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE THE LATE JOHN AND ANTHONY RUSSO, ANDREW GERARDO, THOMAS DEPHILLIPS AND EMILIO DELEO.

JOHN JOSEPH DIGILIO
4 WINCHESTER LANE
HOLMDEL TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 5, 1932
SBI# : 431470
FBI# : 967626A
AKA : "BIG JOHN", "JOHNNIE DEE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN DIGILIO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, WHICH INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," NARCOTICS AND "LABOR RACKETEERING" ARE CENTERED IN THE HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY AREA. HOWEVER, AN EXPANSION INTO BERGEN COUNTY HAS BEEN ACTUATED SINCE THE INCARCERATION OF "GENOVESE FAMILY SOLDIER," TINO FIUMARA. IN RECENT YEARS, DIGILIO HAS ALSO EXPANDED HIS GAMBLING INTERESTS TO INCLUDE OCEAN AND ATLANTIC COUNTIES.

DIGILIO, WHO HAS A PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, ONCE SERVED AS AN "ENFORCER" FOR ORGANIZED CRIME LEADER, JOSEPH ZICARELLI. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOHN DEFAZIO, LOUIS MANNA, RICHARD DESCISCIO, NICHOLAS DIPRIMO AND JOSEPH LASCALA.

DIGILIO EXERTS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OVER HUDSON COUNTY WATERFRONT PORTS THROUGH LEGITIMATE OPERATIVES ("FRONTS"). HIS INFLUENCE IN THE AREAS OF SOLID AND TOXIC WASTE HAVE ALSO BEEN DOCUMENTED.

DIGILIO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR EXTORTION, "LOANSHARKING," WEAPON OFFENSES AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY. HE IS CONSIDERED AN EXTREMELY VIOLENT PERSON WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN A NUMBER OF MURDERS IN NORTH JERSEY.

DOMINICK DIQUARTO
100 WALL STREET
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 23, 1922
FBI# : 110556-B
AKA : DOMINICK CASSAZA
"DOM THE SOLDIER"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

DOMINICK DIQUARTO IS A "SOLDIER" FOR THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOAN-SHARKING," PRIMARILY IN LOWER MANHATTAN. ADDITIONALLY, DIQUARTO WAS A SUSPECT IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF HUGH GILLEN WHO WAS TO BE A WITNESS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AT DIQUARTO'S TRIAL FOR FEDERAL TAX VIOLATIONS IN FLORIDA.

DIQUARTO WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE THOMAS EBOLI WHO SENT DIQUARTO TO FLORIDA TO OVERSEE GAMBLING OPERATIONS FOR THE EBOLI FACTION OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY" DURING THE 1960'S. HOWEVER, DIQUARTO RETURNED TO NEW JERSEY IN 1969 AND WAS SUBPOENAED BEFORE THE NEW JERSEY STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION IN 1970.

JOSEPH MICHAEL DOTO, JR.
1020 DEARBORN ROAD
PALISADES PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 25, 1933
SBI# : 569247A
FBI# : 716372N5
AKA : "JOE ADONIS, JR."
"LITTLE JOEY"
"JOEY A"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH DOTO, JR. IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." DOTO, JR., CONTROLS A "LOANSHARKING" GAMBLING, AND "HIJACKING" OPERATION IN BERGEN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY. HE IS THE SON OF THE LATE JOSEPH ADONIS, A "CRIME LORD" IN THE THIRTIES AND FORTIES.

DOTO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR BANK ROBBERY, FRAUD AND AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. IN 1975, DOTO WAS CHARGED WITH BRIBERY, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND CONSPIRACY AS THE RESULT OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF ANTHONY CARMINATI.

DOTO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE TINO FIUMARA, MICHAEL BORELLI, MICHAEL COPPOLA, AND ANTHONY CARMINATI.

TINO FIUMARA
265 BROOKSIDE PLACE
WYCKOFF, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 11, 1941
SBI# : 599129
FBI# : 467158D
AKA : "GEORGE GRECCO"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

TINO FIUMARA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY CENTERED ON THE NORTH JERSEY WATERFRONT WHERE HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING," GAMBLING, EXTORTION AND "LABOR RACKETEERING." FIUMARA HAS BEEN IMPLICATED IN NUMEROUS MURDERS, INCLUDING THE 1968 TRIPLE MURDER OF PETER MARTELLO, PATSY COLLUCCI AND NICHOLAS COLLUCCI. HE MURDERED ROBERT HARRIS, A BLACK GAMBLING OPERATIVE FROM PATERSON, NEW JERSEY, IN 1974, BUT WAS ABLE TO AVOID PROSECUTION.

IN 1979, FIUMARA WAS CONVICTED AND GIVEN A TWENTY YEAR SENTENCE FOR HIS ROLE IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXORT A ONE QUARTER INTEREST IN THE BELLA VITA RESTORANTE IN PARSIPPANY-TROY HILLS. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED OF "RACKETEERING," EXORTION AND CONSPIRACY INVOLVING THE CONTROL OF THE WATERFRONT IN PORTS NEWARK AND ELIZABETH.

FIUMARA EXERTED INFLUENCE OVER VARIOUS UNION LOCALS THROUGH HIS ASSOCIATION WITH NUMEROUS UNION OFFICIALS INCLUDING ERNEST PALMIERI, VINCENT COLUCCI AND CAROL GARDNER. IT WAS THROUGH PALMIERI, THAT FIUMARA WAS ABLE TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE SOLID WASTE INDUSTRY IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY. FIUMARA IS A CALLOUS KILLER WHO HAS RESORTED TO VIOLENCE WITH LITTLE PROVOCATION. THE MURDER OF RICHARD SANTOS, THE "GODFATHER" OF HIS CHILD ATTESTS TO FIUMARA'S TOTAL DISREGARD FOR "KINSHIP LOYALTIES."

FIUMARA'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE MICHAEL COPPOLA, LOUIS MANNA, JOHN DIGILIO, LOUIS LARASSO, LOUIS GATTO, MICHAEL BORELLI AND PETER GRECCO.

ANTHONY GIACOLONE
53 JAMES COURT
BLOOMFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 3, 1936
SBI# : 572395
FBI# : 76741D
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY GIACOLONE, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" UNDER RUGGERIO "THE BOOT" BOIARDO, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "GENOVESE ORGANIZATION." DURING 1976, GIACALONE WAS INVOLVED IN A RE-ORGANIZATION OF BOIARDO'S GAMBLING OPERATIONS. HE BECAME A PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER FOR ANGELO SICA'S GAMBLING OPERATION. HE ALSO IS INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF HEROIN FROM THAILAND.

GIACALONE'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH QUATROCHI, ANTHONY DEPASQUE AND DANIEL CECERE.

JOSEPH LASCALA
32 PARK ROAD
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 23, 1931
SBI : 791745
FBI : 113060D
AKA : "PEPI LASCALA"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH LASCALA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." LASCALA CONTROLS THE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN BAYONNE AND JERSEY CITY FOR "GENOVESE FAMILY SOLDIER" JOHN DIGILIO. SERVING AS DIGILIO'S PRIMARY CONTROLLER AND MEDIATOR, LASCALA REGULARLY ACCOMPANIES DIGILIO.

WHEN DIGILIO WAS IMPRISONED IN 1981, LASCALA OVERSAW HIS OPERATIONS AND WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSMITTING MESSAGES AND MONEY FROM DIGILIO (AND HIS OPERATIVES) TO VINCENT GIGANTE, THE "BOSS" OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." LASCALA CONTINUED TO FUNCTION AS A COURIER AFTER DIGILIO WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON.

LASCALA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR TRANSPORTING STOLEN PROPERTY AND GAMBLING. HE ALSO HAS A REPUTATION FOR UTILIZING VIOLENCE. IN 1971, LASCALA WAS THE PRIME SUSPECT IN THE HOMICIDE OF JOSEPH LUCIGNANO, A JOSEPH ZICARELLI ASSOCIATE.

JOHN MARRONE
402 CASTLETON AVENUE
STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : JUNE 7, 1935
SBI : 344088A
AKA : "MOOSE"
"PEE WEE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN MARRONE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF "GENOVESE SOLDIER" JOHN DIGILIO. HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "LOANSHARKING," GAMBLING AND EXTORTION.

IN 1974, MARRONE WAS SENTENCED IN FEDERAL COURT TO FOUR YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR USING EXTORTIONATE MEANS TO COLLECT AN EXTENSION OF CREDIT. PRIOR TO THIS CONVICTION, MARRONE CONDUCTED A "LOANSHARK" OPERATION BASED IN ESSEX COUNTY AND EXTENDING INTO PORTIONS OF HUDSON COUNTY. DURING 1978, MARRONE SUPERVISED THE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES AT THE FORKED RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FOR DIGILIO. MARRONE CURRENTLY OPERATES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF "GENOVESE CAPOREGIME" VENERO MANGANO.

MARRONE HAS A PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE AND HAS BEEN UTILIZED AS AN "ENFORCER" BY DIGILIO. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR STOLEN PROPERTY, POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON AND THREATENING THE LIFE OF A POLICE OFFICER. MARRONE IS AN ASSOCIATE OF NICHOLAS FURINA, RICHARD DESCISCIO AND GEORGE WEINGARTNER.

SALVATORE DOMINIC NAPURANO
252 ELMWOOD DRIVE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 1, 1932
SBI# : 414579
FBI# : 476521B
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

NAPURANO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." ALTHOUGH HE PRIMARILY WORKS FOR EMILIO "THE COUNT" DELIO IN HIS GAMBLING OPERATION, HE IS ALSO FAMILIAR WITH OTHER CRIMINAL GROUPS IN THE NEWARK AREA.

JOSEPH PECORA, SR.
L/K/A 9 MAYBAUM AVENUE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 19, 1905
SBI# : 67600
FBI# : 1038202
AKA : "JOE PECK"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH PECORA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" AND THE SECRETARY/TREASURER OF LOCAL #863 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF HIGH RANKING "GENOVESE" MEMBER GERARDO CATENA, PECORA WAS ARRESTED AND CONVICTED FOR CONSPIRING TO ARRANGE A "LABOR PAYOFF." PECORA'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE TEAMSTERS ORGANIZATION IS FURTHER ENHANCED THROUGH A POSITION HE HOLDS WITHIN JOINT COUNCIL 73 OF THE TEAMSTERS. PECORA'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY PROVENZANO, THE LATE SALVATORE BRIGUGLIO AND CARMEN BATTAGLIA.

THOMAS PECORA
17TH GREEN CONDOMINIUMS
HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA

DOB : FEBRUARY 12, 1908
SBI# : 12134
FBI# : 110271
AKA : GAETANO PECORA, TIMMY MURPHY,
JOSEPH PECORA
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

THOMAS PECORA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY" AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RUGGERIO BOIARDO AND

GERARDO CATENA. HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "LABOR RACKETEERING," EXTORTION, GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

PECORA WAS INVOLVED WITH EUGENE CATENA, GERARDO'S BROTHER, IN A CONSPIRACY TO FORCE A & P SUPERMARKETS TO CARRY A PRODUCT MANUFACTURED BY ALL PURPOSE CHEMICAL COMPANY OF EAST ORANGE, AN ENTERPRISE OWNED BY PECORA. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONSPIRACY, TWO EMPLOYEES OF A & P WERE MURDERED AND NUMEROUS A & P STORES IN THE NEW YORK AREA WERE DESTROYED BY FIRE. PECORA, A FORMER CHAUFFEUR AND BODYGUARD FOR GERARDO CATENA, WAS SUBPOENAED BEFORE A UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. ALTHOUGH PECORA TOOK THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ON SIXTY-ONE OCCASIONS, THE COMMITTEE CONTINUED TO INVESTIGATE THE MARKETING PRACTICES OF ALL PURPOSE CHEMICAL COMPANY.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED, THAT PECORA WAS AN OFFICIAL OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL #97 MAINTENANCE DIVISION DURING THE 1960'S.

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SAMUEL DECAVALCANTE, JOHN TAURORA AND ANDREW GERARDO. PECORA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR LARCENY, EXTORTION, GAMBLING AND CONSPIRACY.

LOUIS PERCELLO
1509 PARK AVENUE
ASBURY PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 2, 1921
SBI# : 76735
FBI# : 677992
AKA : "LUCKY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

LOUIS PERCELLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CONSIDERED A MAJOR ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURE IN THE MONMOUTH COUNTY SHORE AREA WHERE HE CONTROLLED A "BOOKMAKING" OPERATION WITH ROSARIO "BABE" MIRAGLIA AND SANTO PERROTTO. PERCELLO AND MIRAGLIA WERE ARRESTED ON OCTOBER 8, 1979, FOR THEIR PART IN THIS GAMBLING OPERATION. IN APRIL, 1980, PERCELLO WAS SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS IN PRISON.

IN ADDITION TO SANTO PERROTTO AND ROSARIO MIRAGLIA, PERCELLO HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES AS THE LATE ANGELO DECARLO, AND ANTHONY RUSSO (DECEASED).

DAVID PETILLO
501 NORTH LAKESHORE DRIVE
BRICK TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 11, 1908
FBI# : 360387
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

DAVID PETILLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE PROSTITUTION, NARCOTICS, GAMBLING, PORNOGRAPHY, EXTORTION AND "LOANSHARKING." HE CONDUCTS THESE ACTIVITIES IN THE MONMOUTH COUNTY AREA.

DURING THE 1920'S, PETILLO OPERATED A PROSTITUTION OPERATION FOR CHARLES "LUCKY" LUCIANO. HE WAS ARRESTED AND CONVICTED FOR THIS OPERATION AND SENTENCED TO A TWENTY YEAR PRISON TERM. PETILLO HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE THE EARLY PART OF 1982. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE CHARLES POMARO, JOSEPH LAVALLE AND MICHAEL PETRILLO.

JOSEPH POLVERINO
12 CAMPBELL ROAD
WEST CALDWELL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 25, 1914
SBI# : 100910
FBI# : 1267519
AKA : "INDIAN BLACKIE", JOSEPH LONGO
"INDIAN JOE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH POLVERINO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" WITHIN THE RUGGIERO BOIARDO FACTION OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY."

POLVERINO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REVEALS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND EXTORTION. IN 1969, POLVERINO WAS ARRESTED WITH ANGELO DECARLO, DANIEL CECERE AND PETER LANDUSCO FOR CONSPIRING TO MAKE USURIOUS LOANS. HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH JERRY MALANGA, MIKE BORELLI, JOSEPH DOTO, JR., GARY LATAWIEC, TINO FIUMARA, JOHN DIGILIO AND RUGGIERO BOIARDO.

ANTHONY PROVENZANO
634 PALM DRIVE
HALLENDALE, FLORIDA

DOB : MAY 7, 1917
SBI# : 591867
FBI# : 253282D
AKA : "TONY PRO"
"ANTHONY PROVIZANO"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY PROVENZANO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN EXTORTION, "LOAN-SHARKING" AND "LABOR RACKETEERING." A FORMER HIGH-RANKING AND INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, PROVENZANO WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE JAMES HOFFA DURING THE EARLY 1960'S. PROVENZANO WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL #560 IN UNION CITY DURING THE 1950'S. HIS LOCAL PRESIDENCY PROVIDED THE BASE FROM WHICH HE WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE 100,000 MEMBER TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL 73 OF NEW JERSEY AND THIRTEENTH VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

IN 1963, PROVENZANO WAS CONVICTED OF EXTORTING \$17,000 FROM A TRANSPORTATION COMPANY PRESIDENT TO ASSURE "LABOR PEACE." AFTER AN UNSUCCESSFUL THREE YEAR APPEAL OF THIS CONVICTION, HE SERVED FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEARS IN PRISON AND WAS REMOVED FROM HIS UNION POSTS. PROVENZANO'S BROTHER, SALVATORE, SUCCEEDED HIM IN ALL THREE TEAMSTER POSITIONS. ANTHONY CONTINUED TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE TEAMSTERS ORGANIZATION THROUGH SALVATORE. PROVENZANO'S PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE IS WELL-DOCUMENTED. IN MAY, 1963, WALTER

GLOCKNER, A TEAMSTERS SHOP STEWARD WHO OPPOSED ANTHONY PROVENZANO'S LEADERSHIP, WAS FATALLY SHOT AS HE LEFT HIS NEW JERSEY HOME. ALTHOUGH PROVENZANO DENIED ANY PART OF GLOCKNER'S MURDER, HE (PROVENZANO) REMAINS A PRIME SUSPECT.

DURING 1975, TEAMSTERS INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT JAMES HOFFA DISAPPEARED. PROVENZANO AND FORMER "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBERS SALVATORE BRIGUGLIO AND THOMAS PRINCIPE WERE PRIMARY SUSPECTS IN HOFFA'S DISAPPEARANCE. SUBSEQUENTLY, PROVENZANO AND HAROLD KONIGSBERG STOOD TRIAL FOR THE MURDER OF ANTHONY CASTELLITO, A FORMER TEAMSTERS UNION SECRETARY/TREASURER. PROVENZANO AND KONIGSBERG, A "CONTRACT MURDERER," WERE SENTENCED IN 1978 TO LIFE IN PRISON FOR CASTELLITO'S MURDER.

IN 1979, PROVENZANO WAS FOUND GUILTY OF FEDERAL "RACKETEERING" CHARGES INVOLVING THE SALE OF "LABOR PEACE" ON THE NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT AND TRUCKING INDUSTRIES. PROVENZANO'S OPERATION INCLUDED THE UTILIZATION OF "GHOST EMPLOYEES" TO FRAUDULENTLY EXTRACT THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS FROM AFFILIATES OF SEATRAN LINE, INCORPORATED, A MAJOR SHIPPING ENTERPRISE. CURRENTLY, ANTHONY'S BROTHER, SALVATORE, SERVES AS THE PRESIDENT OF LOCAL #560.

PROVENZANO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR BRIBERY AND EXTORTION. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GERARDO CATENA, JOHN DIGILIO, VINCENT GIGANTE AND MATTHEW IANNIELLO.

THOMAS ROCCO
1803 LANE MILLS ROAD
LAKEWOOD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 9, 1910
SBI# : 973629
FBI# : 41458A
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

THOMAS ROCCO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL RECORD INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR "BOOK-MAKING," ILLEGAL LOTTERY, FRAUDULENT CHECKS AND ATTEMPTING TO SELL A STOLEN \$1 MILLION TREASURY NOTE. ALTHOUGH HE IS

CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING," ROCCO'S PRIMARY INTEREST IS NARCOTICS. HE IS THE PRINCIPAL SUPPLIER OF P2P, THE MAIN PRECURSOR OF METHAMPHETAMINE, FOR A LARGE MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION NETWORK IN ATLANTIC COUNTY.

IN JUNE 1982, ROCCO AND "GENOVESE FAMILY" OPERATIVE, ALBERT BAIOTTO WERE INDICTED FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTICS NAMELY METHAMPHETAMINE.

ROCCO'S OTHER CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE NICK SCARFO, PATRICK MEROLA, DAVID GOORLAND, THE LATE ANTHONY RUSSO AND JOHN CALABRESE.

ANGELO SICA
81 COBANE TERRACE
WEST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 31, 1919
SBI# : 259569
FBI# : 1627244
AKA : ANGELO LANDI
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANGELO SICA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS PRIMARY CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS WHICH HE CONTROLS FOR GENOVESE "CAPOREGIME" RUGGIERO BOIARDO. HOWEVER, SICA HAS "HIDDEN" INTERESTS IN NUMEROUS LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES.

SICA'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE THE LATE ANGELO DECARLO, EMILIO DELIO, DANIEL CECERE, SAM DECAVALCANTE AND GERARDO CATENA. ADDITIONALLY, SICA IS CLOSELY AFFILIATED WITH JOHN WADEMAN, A "LOANSHARK" AND NARCOTICS DEALER, WHO SERVES AS A "FRONT" FOR HIM.

SICA'S CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR INTERNAL REVENUE VIOLATIONS, GAMBLING, AND ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECKS. AS A RESULT OF THE 1979 NEW JERSEY POLICE "OPERATION OMEGA," SICA WAS FOUND GUILTY OF OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, GAMBLING AND "RACKETEERING."

ALBERT PHILIP BAIOTTO
219 SEAGULL DRIVE
CARDIFF, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 30, 1922
SBI# : 341984A
FBI# : 4512520
AKA : "BIG AL"
"JOSEPH BIAOTTO"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ALBERT BAIOTTO, A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "BRUNO" AND "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILIES," IS INVOLVED IN THE MANUFACTURE AND WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY. HE WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN AN ILLICIT GAMBLING OPERATION IN THE OCEAN COUNTY AREA. IN 1972, BAIOTTO WAS ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF APPROXIMATELY \$1 MILLION IN STOLEN SECURITIES. A FEDERAL GRAND JURY INDICTED BAIOTTO FOR THE THEFT AND DISPOSAL OF ASSORTED STOCKS AND BONDS. ADDITIONALLY, BAIOTTO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR A STOLEN VEHICLE, FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES AND NARCOTICS.

MORE RECENTLY, AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE DISCLOSED THAT BAIOTTO SHARED A PARTNERSHIP IN A METHAMPHETAMINE ENTERPRISE WITH "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBER, THOMAS ROCCO. IN JUNE, 1982, ROCCO AND BAIOTTO WERE INDICTED FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THIS CONSPIRACY.

BAIOTTO'S OTHER ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTON NELSON, SAL "CURTIS" PROFACI AND JAMES MARO.

MICHAEL ANTHONY BORELLI, JR.
477 PALISADES AVENUE
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 12, 1937
SBI# : 610928
FBI# : 102521D
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

MICHAEL BORELLI IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." SINCE THE INCARCERATION OF TINO FIUMARA, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE FAMILY," BORELLI HAS ASSUMED PARTIAL SUPERVISION OF FIUMARA'S CRIMINAL NETWORK.

BORELLI'S RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE SUPERVISION OF FIUMARA'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ON THE NEW JERSEY WATERFRONT. THESE ACTIVITIES CONSIST OF GAMBLING, NARCOTICS, EXTORTION, "LABOR RACKETEERING," "LOANSHARKING" AND COLLUSIVE THEFT. PRIOR TO FIUMARA'S IMPRISONMENT, BORELLI AND FIUMARA PERFORMED SEVERAL MURDERS FOR VARIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS.

BORELLI'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR LARCENY, NARCOTICS, ROBBERY, ASSAULT, STOLEN PROPERTY, EMBEZZLEMENT, WEAPONS OFFENSES AND STOLEN VEHICLE. HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE RAYMOND SUAREZ, PETER GRECCO, MICHAEL COPPOLA AND JAMES BONILLO.

RICHARD DESCISCIO
508 KENNEDY BOULEVARD
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 14, 1942
SBI# : 656574
FBI# : 766894C
AKA : "BOCCI"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

RICHARD DESCISCIO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING" AND COLLUSIVE THEFT. OPERATING UNDER THE AUSPICES OF "GENOVESE SOLDIER" JOHN DIGILIO, DESCISCIO FREQUENTLY VISITED DIGILIO DURING HIS INCARCERATION AT LEXINGTON FEDERAL PRISON. DESCISCIO ALSO SERVES AS A COURIER BETWEEN DIGILIO AND "GENOVESE CAPOREGIME" VENERO MANGANO. DESCISCIO HAS A PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE AND WAS A PRIME SUSPECT IN THE MURDERS OF FRANK CHIN AND RICHARD SANTOS.

HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ARSON AND STOLEN PROPERTY. DESCISCIO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH LASCALA, GEORGE WEINGARTNER AND ANTHONY GALLAGHER.

NICHOLAS FURINA
126 WEST 25TH STREET
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 20, 1931
SBI# : 423268
FBI# : 112756E
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

NICHOLAS FURINA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF "GENOVESE SOLDIER" JOHN DIGILIO AND HAS ACTED AS AN "ENFORCER" FOR HIM. FURINA'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING" AND "LABOR RACKETEERING." DURING THE EARLY 1970'S FURINA AND DIGILIO OPERATIVE, JOHN SACHS (DECEASED) MAINTAINED A "LOANSHARK" OPERATION AT THE PORT TERMINAL TAVERN IN BAYONNE.

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY GALLAGHER, GEORGE WEINGARTNER AND RICHARD DESCISCIO. FURINA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING.

ANTHONY GALLAGHER
77 WEST 36TH STREET
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 26, 1931
FBI# : 784682P11
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ANTHONY GALLAGHER IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." GALLAGHER PRIMARILY SERVES AS A "FRONT" FOR "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBERS SUCH AS JOHN DIGILIO AND VENERO MANGANO. HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE COLLUSIVE THEFT, EXTORTION, "LABOR RACKETEERING," TAX VIOLATIONS AND CORRUPTION RELATIVE TO THE WATERFRONT PORTS OF HUDSON COUNTY.

HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS AN ARREST FOR FORGERY. GALLAGHER'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH LASCALA, RICHARD DESCISCIO AND GEORGE WEINGARTNER.

PHILIP BERNARD MOSCATO
3415 WILLOW WOOD ROAD
LAUDERHILL, FLORIDA

DOB : JULY 21, 1934
SBI# : 549313
FBI# : 731854C
AKA : "BROTHER"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE.

PHILIP MOSCATO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN HUDSON AND BERGEN COUNTIES. MOSCATO, SERVING AS A "FRONT" FOR ORGANIZED CRIME OPERATIVES, HAS PURCHASED NUMEROUS RESTAURANTS, TAVERNS, RACEHORSES AND REAL ESTATE PARCELS FOR "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBERS. A LARGE SOLID WASTE DUMP, OWNED BY MOSCATO AND LOCATED IN JERSEY CITY, HAS BEEN UTILIZED BY ORGANIZED CRIME OPERATIVES TO DISPOSE OF MURDER VICTIMS.

MOSCATO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY PROVENZANO, SPEDITO DELUCA, JOSEPH ZICARELLI, JOHN DIGILIO AND LOUIS MANNA.

ERNEST P. PALMIERI
55 HARDWICK LANE
WAYNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 18, 1919
SBI# : 412903
FBI# : 484590A
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ERNEST PALMIERI IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." A FORMER BUSINESS AGENT FOR TEAMSTERS LOCAL 945 OF WEST PATERSON, PALMIERI IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND EXTORTION. AS AN OFFICIAL WITH LOCAL 945, PALMIERI DIRECTED THE WASTE DISPOSAL SECTION OF THE UNION. "GENOVESE FAMILY" MEMBERS LOUIS GATTO, PETER LAPLACA AND TINO FIUMARA EXERTED INFLUENCE OVER LOCAL 945 AND THE SOLID WASTE INDUSTRY IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY THROUGH PALMIERI.

PALMIERI WAS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE LATE GEORGE FRANCONERO, A FORMER ATTORNEY FOR LOCAL 945. FRANCONERO WAS MURDERED "GANGLAND STYLE" IN MARCH 1981. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL 945 RESULTED IN THE CONVICTION OF PALMIERI, SMITH AND CARIELLO ON BANK AND UNION PENSION FRAUDS. HE WAS REMOVED FROM HIS UNION POSITION AS A RESULT OF HIS FEDERAL CONVICTION.

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE TINO FIUMARA, LOUIS GATTO, MICHAEL BORELLI, PETER GRECCO AND ANTHONY PROVENZANO.

NUNZIO PROVENZANO
315 EAST FAIRVIEW AVENUE
SOUTH PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 24, 1923
SBI# : 100934A
FBI# : 30809E
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

NUNZIO PROVENZANO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." PROVENZANO, THE BROTHER OF "GENOVESE" OPERATIVES ANTHONY AND SALVATORE PROVENZANO, IS A FORMER SECRETARY/TREASURER AND PRESIDENT OF TEAMSTER LOCAL 560 IN UNION CITY. PROVENZANO IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING." DESPITE HIS LONG TERM INCARCERATION, "GENOVESE FAMILY" SOLDIER" ANTHONY PROVENZANO CONTINUED TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER LOCAL 560 THROUGH NUNZIO AND SALVATORE.

NUNZIO PROVENZANO WAS INDICTED IN 1981 BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY FOR ACCEPTING MORE THAN \$187,000 IN BRIBES FROM FOUR TRUCKING FIRMS FOR ASSURANCE OF "LABOR PEACE." PROVENZANO EVENTUALLY RECEIVED A TEN YEAR PRISON SENTENCE FOR HIS ROLE IN THIS CONSPIRACY.

FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ARE CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO SEVER THE PROVENZANOS AND THEIR OPERATIVES FROM LOCAL 560 BY INVOKING CIVIL PROVISIONS CONTAINED WITHIN THE FEDERAL R.I.C.O. (RACKETEERING INFLUENCE AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION) STATUTE.

NUNZIO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE STEPHEN AND THOMAS ANDRETTA, GABRIEL BRIGUGLIO AND JOSEPH PECORA, SR.

SALVATORE PROVENZANO
172 PINE STREET
HACKENSACK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL, 1921
AKA : SAM PROVENZANO
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

SALVATORE PROVENZANO, THE BROTHER OF ANTHONY AND NUNZIO PROVENZANO, IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE BRIBERY, EXTORTION AND "LABOR RACKETEERING" RELATIVE TO HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF TEAMSTER'S LOCAL 560 LOCATED IN UNION CITY. DURING 1971, SALVATORE WAS ARRESTED FOR CONSPIRING TO COUNTERFEIT \$250,000 WORTH OF POSTAGE STAMPS AND FOOD COUPONS.

ANTHONY PROVENZANO, A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GENOVESE FAMILY" AND A FORMER PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 560 WAS CONVICTED OF EXTORTION AND REMOVED FROM HIS TEAMSTER POST DURING THE EARLY 1960'S. ANTHONY CONTINUED TO EXERT INFLUENCE OVER THE LOCAL THROUGH SALVATORE.

SALVATORE'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE TEAMSTERS ORGANIZATION IS FURTHER ENHANCED THROUGH HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF JOINT COUNCIL 73, A POLICY MAKING BODY FOR NORTHERN NEW JERSEY TEAMSTER LOCALS AND AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

SALVATORE AND NUNZIO PROVENZANO WERE INDICTED IN 1981 BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY FOR ACCEPTING MORE THAN \$187,000 IN BRIBES FROM FOUR TRUCKING FIRMS FOR ASSURANCE OF "LABOR PEACE." NUNZIO WAS FOUND GUILTY, WHEREAS SALVATORE WAS FOUND "NOT GUILTY." SALVATORE'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH PECORA, SR., GERARDO CATENA, AND MICHAEL SCIARRA.

GEORGE WEINGARTNER
247 AVENUE B
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 16, 1931
SBI# : 547284A
AKA : "GOOFE"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

GEORGE WEINGARTNER, FORMERLY A BAYONNE POLICE OFFICER, IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH JOHN DIGILIO AND WHILE EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, WEINGARTNER ACTED AS AN "INFORMANT" FOR DIGILIO BY INFORMING HIM WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT WAS INVESTIGATING DIGILIO'S OPERATIVES.

IN 1980, WEINGARTNER WAS INDICTED IN FEDERAL COURT FOR POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY AND CONSPIRACY, AS A RESULT OF AN UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS BUREAU. HE WAS ALSO UNDER INDICTMENT IN 1980 FOR THE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. WEINGARTNER'S RECORD ALSO REFLECTS ONE EARLIER INDICTMENT (1974) FOR CONSPIRACY, WHICH RESULTED IN HIS DISMISSAL FROM THE BAYONNE POLICE DEPARTMENT.

DURING NOVEMBER 1981, WEINGARTNER WAS EVICTED FROM THE FEDERAL COURTROOM BECAUSE HE THREATENED GOVERNMENT WITNESS RALPH ORLANDINI, WHEN ORLANDINI WAS TESTIFYING IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. MUSTO, ET.AL.

WEINGARTNER OWNS THE "TRUCK HAVEN RESTAURANT" IN KEARNEY. THIS ESTABLISHMENT, IS USED BY WEINGARTNER TO FACILITATE HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND TO MEET WITH HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES.

OTHER CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES OF WEINGARTNER INCLUDE FRANK DANIELLO, RICHARD DESCISCIO AND ANTHONY GALLAGHER.

LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY

THE "LUCHESE FAMILY" IS OPERATING PRIMARILY IN THE NORTHERN SECTION OF THE STATE AND IS ACTIVE IN THE ATLANTIC, BERGEN, ESSEX, MONMOUTH, MORRIS, OCEAN, PASSAIC, SUSSEX, AND UNION COUNTIES. ITS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES COMPRISE ILLEGAL GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, THE TAKEOVER OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES, FRAUD, CIGARETTE SMUGGLING, EXTORTION AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, "RACE-FIXING," ARSON, PORNOGRAPHY AND STOLEN PROPERTY.

THE "FAMILY" IS REPRESENTED BY A RELATIVELY SMALL BUT POWERFUL GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS. THE PRINCIPAL "CAPOREGIMES" EXERTING INFLUENCE IN THE STATE ARE ANTHONY ACCETTURO AND JOSEPH ABATE, AND THE MOST IMPORTANT "SOLDIER" IS MICHAEL TACCETTA.

WHILE ANTHONY ACCETTURO DEPARTED NEW JERSEY IN 1971, AND RELOCATED TO THE STATE OF FLORIDA, HE STILL EXERTS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF CONTROL OVER HIS ILLICIT ENTERPRISES IN NEW JERSEY. HIS COUSIN, MICHAEL TACCETTA SUPERVISES HIS GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," AND NARCOTICS NETWORK. THE ACCETTURO/TACCETTA GAMBLING NETWORK OPERATES IN ESSEX, UNION, MORRIS AND PASSAIC COUNTIES, AND ON A SMALLER SCALE, IN MONMOUTH, OCEAN, BERGEN AND SUSSEX COUNTIES. TACCETTA CONTROLS THE MOST PROMINENT ILLEGAL GAMBLING OPERATION IN ESSEX COUNTY, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ACCETTURO. THIS OPERATION HAS RECENTLY MADE CONSIDERABLE GAINS IN ESSEX COUNTY, IN THAT TACCETTA HAS PARTIALLY ABSORBED THE ESSEX TERRITORY PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY TINO FIUMARA OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY," WHO IS PRESENTLY INCARCERATED, AND THE TERRITORY ONCE CONTROLLED BY PASQUALE MARTORANO, AN OPERATIVE OF THE LATE ANTONIO CAPONIGRO, OF THE "BRUNO CRIME FAMILY."

ACCETTURO AND TACCETTA ARE ALSO PRINCIPAL OPERATIVES IN A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR EAST COAST NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION

NETWORK, WHICH TRANSPORTS NARCOTICS FROM SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, TO FLORIDA, AND ULTIMATELY TO NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK CITY.


JOSEPH ABATE, ANOTHER IMPORTANT "LUCHESE FAMILY" "CAPOREGIME," IS ACTIVE IN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA. ABATE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEVERAL INQUIRIES INVOLVING ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES SINCE 1959 AND IS KNOWN TO HAVE CONTACT WITH VARIOUS ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES FROM DIFFERENT "FAMILIES."

ALL THREE OF THE PRINCIPAL "LUCHESE" OPERATIVES IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAVE EXHIBITED AN ABILITY TO OPERATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH, OR AT LEAST CO-EXIST WITH, THE OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME "FAMILIES" IN THE STATE. ANTHONY ACCETTURO HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH MOST OF THE "FAMILIES" IN THE NORTHEAST, INCLUDING THE "BRUNO, DECAVALCANTE, GAMBINO AND GENOVESE CRIME FAMILIES." TACCETTA HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MERGING HIS GAMBLING OPERATIONS WITH THOSE OF OTHER MAJOR ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY" AND THE "CAMPISI" AND "DENORSICIO GROUPS." JOSEPH ABATE HAS ALSO BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH SEVERAL CRIME "FAMILIES," INCLUDING THE "BRUNO AND GENOVESE CRIME FAMILIES."

THE "LUCHESE FAMILY" IN NEW JERSEY, AS A WHOLE, IS NOT KNOWN FOR ITS VIOLENCE. HOWEVER, THE TACCETTA NETWORK IS EXTREMELY AGGRESSIVE AND HAS RESORTED TO VIOLENCE TO ELIMINATE WEAKER COMPETITORS.

WHILE THE "LUCHESE FAMILY" IS RELATIVELY SMALL IN NUMBER, AS COMPARED TO MOST OF THE OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME "FAMILIES" IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IT CURRENTLY OCCUPIES A PROMINENT POSITION IN NORTH JERSEY, DUE TO ITS LUCRATIVE AND WELL-ORGANIZED GAMBLING AND NARCOTICS NETWORKS. CURRENTLY, THE ACCETTURO/TACCETTA GAMBLING AND NARCOTICS NETWORKS ARE EXPANDING AND FURTHER GROWTH OF THE "LUCHESE FAMILY" IN NEW JERSEY IS EXPECTED.

LUCHESSE CRIME FAMILY



ANTONIO CORALLO
5 GREEN VALE LANE
SYOSSETT, NEW YORK

DOB : FEBRUARY 12, 1913
FBI : 269969
AKA : "TONY DUCKS," TONY CORALLO,
ANTONIA GRENO, ANTONIO COVELLO
TONY FRANCO
STATUS: "BOSS"

ANTONIO CORALLO IS THE "BOSS" OF THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." CORALLO'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, EXTORTION, "LOANSHARKING," AND FINANCING NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. CORALLO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS CONVICTIONS FOR BRIBERY AND EXTORTION. IN 1981, HE WAS NAMED AS AN UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE FBI PROBE, "OPERATION LILREX," WHICH DELVED INTO ORGANIZED CRIME "PAYOFFS" FOR LIQUOR LICENSES AND LABOR PEACE, AND ALSO EXPLORED ORGANIZED CRIME INVOLVEMENT WITH THE TAMPERING OF RACE HORSES AT HARNESS TRACKS IN NEW YORK CITY.

CORALLO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JAMES FALCO, SAMUEL CAVALIERI, JAMES VINTALORO, JOHN MASIELLO, THE LATE ANTHONY DILORENZO.

SALVATORE T. SANTORO
90 CITY ISLAND AVENUE
BRONX, NEW YORK

DOB : NOVEMBER 18, 1915
FBI# : 838426
AKA : "TOM MIX," ARTHUR ROCCO,
SALVATORE SANTORA
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

SALVATORE SANTORO IS THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY."

SANTORO IS A MAJOR NARCOTICS IMPORTER AND DISTRIBUTOR. HE HAS TWO CONVICTIONS FOR NARCOTIC RELATED CRIMES AND RECEIVED A 20 YEAR PRISON SENTENCE. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD ALSO REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GRAND LARCENY.

HIS ASSOCIATES HAVE INCLUDED PHILIP LOMBARDO , "BOSS IN THE "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILY," AND JOHN ORMENTO, A MEMBER OF THE "GENOVESE FAMILY" AND THE "PURPLE GANG" NARCOTICS NETWORK IN NEW YORK CITY.

CHRISTOPHER FURNARI
66 ADAMS COURT
STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : APRIL 30, 1924
FBI : 3254123
AKA : CRISTY TICK, SKIPPER, TICK,
CHRISTY
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

CHRISTOPHER FURNARI IS THE "CONSIGLIERE" OF THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY," AND IS BEING GROOMED TO SUCCEED ANTONIO CORALLO AS "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY."

FURNARI'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE FINANCING NARCOTIC ACTIVITIES, GAMBLING, "HIJACKING" AND "LOANSHARKING." RECENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT FURNARI IS INVOLVED IN A CANADIAN GAMBLING OPERATION. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ASSAULT AND ROBBERY, FELONIOUS ASSAULT, RAPE, SODOMY AND VIOLATION OF PAROLE.

ASSOCIATES OF FURNARI INCLUDE LOUIS FOCERI, PAUL VARIO SR., CHARLES ALAIMO, A MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER, AND FRANK CAGGIANO.

JOSEPH ABATE
8905 ATLANTIC CITY AVENUE
MARGATE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 8, 1902
SBI# : 124599
FBI# : 1228812
AKA : GIUSEPPE ABATER, JOSEPH PERNATO,
JOSEPH PIGNATI, JOSEPH MASSEI
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH ABATE IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN THE ATLANTIC CITY AREA.

ABATE'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE VINCENT CRAPORATTA, AN OPERATIVE IN THE "TACCETTA GAMBLING NETWORK"; JOSEPH ZICARELLI, A "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY CAPOREGIME"; ANTHONY ACCETTURO, HIS COUSIN; LEONARD PIZZOLATO AND CARMINE ACCARDI.

ABATE'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS IN THE 1930'S AND 1940'S FOR TAX REVENUE, LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS AND CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT. ABATE WAS ARRESTED IN 1977 IN CONNECTION WITH AN ARSON.

ABATE IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERAL CRIME "FAMILIES," INCLUDING THE "BRUNO" AND "GENOVESE CRIME FAMILIES." THESE ASSOCIATIONS ALLOW ABATE TO ACT AS A "CONSIGLIERE" OR MEDIATOR IN THE TERRITORIAL "SQUABBLES" OVER ATLANTIC CITY.

ANTHONY ACCETTURO
5000 GRANT STREET
HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA

DOB : OCTOBER 18, 1938
SBI : 531853
FBI : 938611C
AKA : TUMAC, ANTHONY TORRO, TONY TOMEY
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

ANTHONY ACCETTURO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." PRIOR TO HIS MOVE TO FLORIDA TO AVOID A STATE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION, ACCETTURO CONTROLLED NARCOTICS, "LOANSHARKING," AND EXTORTION IN NORTH JERSEY.

ACCETTURO'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN NEW JERSEY INCLUDE GAMBLING, NARCOTICS, EXTORTION AND "RACE-FIXING." HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR LARCENY AND GAMBLING. WHILE IN FLORIDA, ACCETTURO HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN EXTORTION, "LOANSHARKING," GAMBLING, STOLEN CREDIT CARDS AND "RACE-FIXING."

ALTHOUGH ACCETTURO DEPARTED NEW JERSEY A DECADE AGO, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF CONTROL OVER HIS ILLICIT OPERATIONS IN NEW JERSEY THROUGH HIS COUSIN, MICHAEL TACCETTA. ACCETTURO AND TACCETTA ARE KEY OPERATIVES IN AN EAST COAST NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION NETWORK. INFORMATION INDICATES ACCETTURO HAS BEEN SUPPLYING COCAINE TO OCEAN, ATLANTIC AND ESSEX COUNTIES, IN NEW JERSEY.

ACCETTURO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: JOSEPH ABATE, MICHAEL AND MARTIN TACCETTA, JOSEPH IPPOLITO, JR., ANTHONY RICCARDI, GERALD NAVE, GERALD DELUCA, ANTHONY ACCARDI, SAM DECAVALCANTE AND THOMAS CAMPISI.

VINCENT DINAPOLI
3144 SPENCER DRIVE
BRONX, NEW YORK

DOB : JUNE 21, 1937
FBI# : 201533J8
AKA : VINCENT D'NAPOLI
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

VINCENT DINAPOLI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION, "RACKETEERING" AND EXTORTION. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE "PURPLE GANG" NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION NETWORK IN NEW YORK CITY. DINAPOLI'S CRIMINAL HISTORY INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, CONSPIRACY AND GRAND LARCENY. IN 1981, HE WAS INDICTED FOR EXTORTION AND "LABOR RACKETEERING" AS A RESULT OF AN F.B.I. UNDERCOVER OPERATION. DINAPOLI WAS CHARGED WITH REQUIRING "PAYOFFS" IN ORDER TO PERMIT CONTRACTORS TO USE NON-UNION WORKERS ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK CITY.

DINAPOLI'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE CHARLES INDIVIGLIA, ANGELO MAMONE AND VITO GIORDANO, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER AND MEMBER OF THE "PURPLE GANG."

PAUL VARIO, SR.
9512 FLATLANDS AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : JULY 10, 1914
FBI : 516930
AKA : BAGGIE, PAUL DEAVANZO, GEORGE DEAVANZO, BIG PAUL
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

PAUL VARIO, SR., CURRENTLY SERVES AS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOANSHARKING," BRIBERY, STOLEN PROPERTY, NARCOTICS, AND EXTORTION. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, RAPE, "LOANSHARKING," BURGLARY, LARCENY AND OPERATING AN UNREGISTERED STILL.

ARMAND CASORIA
2416 ROSSETT STREET
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 29, 1919
FBI# : 3025201
AKA : "ARMANDO"
"ARMAND CORRAD"
"ROBERT ARMAND"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ARMAND CASORIA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A MAJOR FINANCIER OF HEROIN SHIPMENTS AND IS ALSO INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD INCLUDES ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING. CASORIA'S BASE OF OPERATION IS PLEASANT AVENUE, LOCATED IN EAST HARLEM, NEW YORK CITY.

CASORIA'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE VINCENT PACELLI, SR., JOHN SALZANO, ARNOLD SQUITIERI AND CARMINE CAIANO. CASORIA REPORTEDLY FINANCES THE NARCOTICS NETWORKS OF CARMELLO SANSONE, GEORGE ANGELETT AND JOSEPH MAGNANO.

MICHAEL J. PERNA
73 PLENCE DRIVE
IRVINGTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 28, 1942
SBI : 818392
FBI : 776807E
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

MICHAEL PERNA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY" AND A HIGH-RANKING MEMBER OF THE "TACCETTA GROUP." HE IS THE PRINCIPAL CONTROLLER FOR THE TACCETTA GAMBLING OPERATION.

PERNA'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY ACCETTURO, MICHAEL RYAN, ROBERT CARAVAGGIO, RALPH DELUCA, GERALD DELUCA AND ROBERT SPAGNOLA.

PERNA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVERAL "MOB" MURDERS CARRIED OUT FOR THE "TACCETTA GROUP," AND IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD DISCLOSES ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING AND STOLEN VEHICLES.

LEONARD PIZZOLATO
6 WESTBROOK DRIVE
CALDWELL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 25, 1904
FBI : 0650438
AKA : "PILATTO," "LENNY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

LEONARD PIZZOLATO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." IN THE EARLY 1970's, PIZZOLATO CONTROLLED ANTHONY ACCETTURO'S GAMBLING OPERATION.

PIZZOLATO WAS THE PRESIDENT OF DIZNEY STUDIOS, AN IRVINGTON STUDIO WHICH MADE AND DISTRIBUTED PORNOGRAPHIC MOVIES.

PIZZOLATO'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH ABATE, MICHAEL AND MARTIN TACCETTA, ANTONIO "TOTO" MINORE, AN ALLEGED "HITMAN", AND JOHN RUGGIRELLO.

THOMAS ANGELO RICCIARDI
293 VERMONT AVENUE
LAKEWOOD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 25, 1952
SBI# : 250075A
FBI# : 759596H
AKA : "TOMMY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

THOMAS RICCIARDI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING," EXTORTION, GAMBLING AND NARCOTICS, AND HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, ASSAULT WHILE ARMED, ROBBERY AND EXTORTION. RICCIARDI IS INVOLVED IN THE "TACCETTA GAMBLING NETWORK." HE OPERATES IN THE VAILSBURG SECTION OF NEWARK AND IS A PRIME SUSPECT IN SEVERAL NEWARK AREA HOMICIDES. RICCIARDI IS ALSO A "COURIER" IN THE "ACCETTURO/TACCETTA NARCOTICS NETWORK."

RICCIARDI IS THE FIRST COUSIN AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BOTH MICHAEL AND MARTIN TACCETTA. HIS OTHER ASSOCIATES INCLUDE GERALD NAVE, ALSO A RELATIVE, CHARLES MAJURI AND JOSEPH IPPOLITO, JR.

ANGELO TACCETTA
2816 ALLEN AVENUE
UNION, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 18, 1921
SBI : 269544
FBI : 2447806
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANGELO TACCETTA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE FATHER OF MICHAEL AND MARTIN TACCETTA, EACH OF WHOM HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

ANGELO TACCETTA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS SEVERAL ARRESTS RELATED TO GAMBLING. IN 1975, HE ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE GAMBLING OPERATION OF THE "CAMPISI CRIME GROUP," IN THE NEWARK AREA. ANGELO TACCETTA'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY ACCETTURO AND ROBERT CARAVAGGIO.

MICHAEL TACCETTA
10 ROLLING HILLS DRIVE
CHATHAM, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 16, 1947
SBI : 945782A
FBI : 713876H
AKA : "MAD DOG"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

MICHAEL TACCETTA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY" AND CONTROLS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE ILLICIT GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK CITY. TACCETTA IS CAPABLE OF UTILIZING VIOLENCE AND IS SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING SEVERAL MURDERS RELATIVE TO HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES. HE IS ALSO INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING," "RACE-FIXING," SMUGGLING OF UNTAXED CIGARETTES AND A MAJOR NARCOTICS NETWORK. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, LARCENY AND EXTORTION.

ASIDE FROM HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES, TACCETTA OPERATES FOUR LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES, WHICH HE UTILIZES TO "LAUNDER" FUNDS FROM HIS VARIOUS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES. MICHAEL TACCETTA'S CLOSE ASSOCIATES INCLUDE ANTHONY ACCETTURO, TINO FIUMARA, ANTHONY BRESCIA, ROBERT CARAVAGGIO, MICHAEL PERNA, ROBERT SPAGNOLA, CARMINE ACCARDI, GERALD COHEN, AND DANIEL AND THOMAS RICCIARDI (TACCETTA'S COUSINS).

CARMINE ACCARDI
209 ROSELAND AVENUE
ESSEX FALLS, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 1939 OR FEBRUARY 1939
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

CARMINE ACCARDI IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS EXTENSIVELY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND IS THE EUROPEAN COCAINE CONTACT FOR THE MICHAEL TACCETTA NETWORK. HE IS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS.

ACCARDI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH ABATE, MICHAEL TACCETTA, GERALD DELUCA, ALFONSO CATALDO AND ANTHONY BRESCIA.

ROBERT CARAVAGGIO
55 TROCHA ROAD
LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 26, 1939
SBI# : 906322
FBI# : 362630C
AKA : "BUCKY JONES, JR."
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ROBERT CARAVAGGIO, JR. IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY" AND AN OPERATIVE IN THE MICHAEL TACCETTA GAMBLING NETWORK. HE MAINTAINS A LARGE-SCALE "LOAN-SHARKING" NETWORK IN THE MORRIS COUNTY AREA AND OPERATES AS A "BOOKMAKER" AND "LOANSHARK" IN ESSEX COUNTY. CARAVAGGIO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR WEAPON OFFENSES, "BOOK-MAKING," "LOANSHARKING" AND CONSPIRACY.

CARAVAGGIO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE MICHAEL AND MARTIN TACCETTA, GIACOMO DINORSCIO, VICTOR CANTILLO.

VINCENT JAMES CRAPAROTTA
668 PRINCESS COURT
TOMS RIVER, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 24, 1927
SBI# : 447906
FBI# : 308914C
AKA : "JIMMY SINATRA"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

VINCENT CRAPAROTTA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." CRAPAROTTA'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." HE HAS BEEN A PROMINENT GAMBLING OPERATIVE IN OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY, FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS. CRAPAROTTA IS CURRENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES IN OCEAN COUNTY, FOR THE "TACCETTA GAMBLING NETWORK."

CRAPAROTTA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR "BOOKMAKING," EXTORTION AND CONSPIRACY. IN 1970, HE WAS CONVICTED ON "BOOKMAKING" CHARGES AND WAS SENTENCED TO TWO TO THREE YEARS IN PRISON AND FINED \$13,000. IN 1971, CRAPAROTTA WAS INDICTED WITH EIGHT OTHERS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE \$500,000 ROBBERY OF THE FAIRMONT HOTEL IN LAKEWOOD, NEW JERSEY. HE WAS CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY, AND WITH AIDING AND ABETTING THE ROBBERY. IN 1973, HE WAS INDICTED ON EXTORTION AND CONSPIRACY CHARGES, ALONG WITH EIGHT OTHER ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES, INCLUDING THE LATE FRANK TIERI, JOHN DIGILIO AND ANTHONY ACCETTURO. ALSO IN 1973, CRAPAROTTA WAS INDICTED BY A FEDERAL GRAND JURY, IN CONNECTION WITH A CONSPIRACY TO FORGE SIGNATURES ON STOLEN UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS.

CRAPAROTTA'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE MICHAEL TACCETTA, MICHAEL PERNA, JOSEPH ABATE, GAETANO "CORKY" VASTOLA AND NICHOLAS VALVANO.

ROBERT SPAGNOLA
163 SUNRISE PARKWAY
MOUNTAINSIDE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 16, 1947
SBI# : 220047A
FBI# : 71142P3
AKA : "BOBBY SPAGS"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

ROBERT SPAGNOLA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." AS A MEMBER OF THE TACCETTA CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION, HE IS INVOLVED IN CIGARETTE SMUGGLING AND NARCOTICS AND THE SPORTS GAMBLING OPERATION WHICH HE CONTROLS FOR MICHAEL TACCETTA. SPAGNOLA WAS CONVICTED OF OPERATING AN ILLEGAL LOTTERY IN JULY, 1980.

SPAGNOLA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS, FLIGHT-ESCAPE, GAMBLING AND OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE. HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOSEPH IPPOLITO, MICHAEL PERNA, THOMAS RICCIARDI, MICHAEL RYAN AND GERALD DELUCA.

MARTIN R. TACCETTA
10 ELLERY STREET
IRVINGTON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 21, 1954
SBI# : 165492A
FBI# : 447371A
AKA : "MARTY"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

MARTIN TACCETTA IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "LUCHESE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS, GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING." TACCETTA WAS INVOLVED IN SEVERAL HOMICIDES AND HAS BEEN UTILIZED AS A "STRONG-ARM" TO COLLECT "SHYLOANS."

TACCETTA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR STOLEN PROPERTY, WEAPON OFFENSES, GAMBLING, HOMICIDE, ASSAULT, EXTORTION AND ARMED ROBBERY. TACCETTA WAS INCARCERATED DURING 1979-80 ON AN EXTORTION CONVICTION.

MARTIN TACCETTA'S CLOSE ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: ANTHONY ACCETTURO, THOMAS AND DANIEL RICCIARDI, ROBERT CARAVAGGIO AND RANDY DELUCA.

BONANNO CRIME FAMILY

THE ORIGINAL "BOSS" OF THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY" WAS JOSEPH BONANNO. BONANNO WAS ONE OF THE FIVE ORIGINAL NEW YORK "CRIME FAMILY" LEADERS. IN 1963, HE BEGAN AN INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION OF HIS ACTIVITIES. THIS PLANNED EXPANSION CREATED PROBLEMS WITHIN THE "FIVE-FAMILY" STRUCTURE. IN 1964, HE WAS DEPORTED BY CANADIAN AUTHORITIES TO THE UNITED STATES. IN OCTOBER OF 1964, HE WAS ABDUCTED AND DID NOT SURFACE UNTIL 1966. UPON HIS RETURN TO THE PUBLIC VIEW IN 1966, HE ATTEMPTED TO RE-EXERT HIS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE NEW YORK AREA. HIS ATTEMPT SUBSEQUENTLY FAILED AND BONANNO WAS "RETIRED" TO ARIZONA. THE ILLICIT ENTERPRISES WHICH BONANNO ABANDONED IN NEW YORK WERE FOR THE MOST PART ASSIMILATED INTO THE ENTERPRISES OF THE "GAMBINO NETWORK." BONANNOS "UNDERBOSS" AT THAT TIME WAS CARMINE GALENTE. GALENTE WAS SERVING A TWENTY YEAR SENTENCE ON A NARCOTICS CONVICTION. IN 1974, GALENTE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON. FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, HE ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN THE ENTERPRISES WHICH ONCE BELONGED TO THE "BONANNO FAMILY." HIS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT ENDED IN 1979 WHEN HE WAS MURDERED. UPON THE DEATH OF GALENTE, PHILLIP RASTELLI ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE "FAMILY." UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF RASTELLI, THE "BONANNO FAMILY" IS INVOLVED IN VARIOUS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES. THESE ACTIVITIES


ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE NARCOTICS, GAMBLING, "LABOR RACKETEERING," EXTORTION AND "LOANSHARKING,"

THE "BONANNO FAMILY" ACTIVITIES IN NEW JERSEY ARE LIMITED PRIMARILY TO THE NORTHERN COUNTIES. THESE ILLICIT ACTIVITIES WERE CONTROLLED BY "BONANNO CAPO" JOSEPH ZICARELLI. ZICARELLI'S GAMBLING NETWORK IN THE SIXTIES WAS THE LARGEST REVENUE PRODUCER IN THE AREA. HE WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN HIS OPERATIONS DUE TO HIS CLOSE ALLIANCE WITH SEVERAL INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL FIGURES. ZICARELLI ALSO EXERTED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE IN SEVERAL LABOR UNIONS. PRESENTLY, ZICARELLI IS IN POOR HEALTH AND IS INACTIVE; HOWEVER, MEMBERS OF HIS "FAMILY" ARE STILL ACTIVE IN HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.

IN THE CENTRAL PORTION OF THE STATE, THE BONANNO ORGANIZATION IS INVOLVED IN "LOANSHARKING" AND "GAMBLING." IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY, MEMBERS OF THE BONANNO ORGANIZATION INTERACT CLOSELY WITH MEMBERS OF THE "COLOMBO FAMILY." THE COMMON BOND BETWEEN THESE TWO CRIMINAL GROUPS IS ROMA FOODS. ROMA IS THE EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTOR FOR GRANDE CHEESE COMPANY, A WISCONSIN-BASED FIRM THAT IS OPERATED BY JOSEPH BONANNO.

SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, THE "GAMBINO CRIME FAMILY" HAS EXERCISED A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE BONANNO ORGANIZATION. FOR THIS REASON, THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE INVOLVEMENT IN NEW JERSEY BY THE BONANNOS. THE EXCEPTION TO THIS OF COURSE BEING THE ZICARELLI GROUP, WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATING IN THE STATE FOR THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

BONANNO CRIME FAMILY



CONTINUED

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PHILIP RASTELLI
9720 57th AVENUE
QUEENS, NEW YORK

DOB : JANUARY 31, 1918
FBI : 1200987
STATUS: "BOSS"

PHILIP RASTELLI IS CURRENTLY THE "BOSS" OF THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE ASSUMED LEADERSHIP OF THIS CRIMINAL GROUP UPON THE DEATH OF CARMINE GALANTE IN 1979. FIVE YEARS EARLIER, RASTELLI HAD SERVED AS ACTING "BOSS" WHILE GALANTE WAS IN PRISON. IN 1971, WHILE STILL A "CAPO" IN THE "BONANNO FAMILY," RASTELLI SERVED 30 DAYS FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM A NASSAU COUNTY GRAND JURY. IN 1972, HE AND FOUR OF HIS ASSOCIATES WERE CONVICTED OF "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITY. WHILE APPEALING THE CONVICTION, HE WAS INDICTED ON CHARGES OF OPERATING AN EXTORTION AND "PROTECTION RACKET" INVOLVING MOBILE LUNCH WAGONS. IN 1977, HE WAS SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS IN PRISON.

THE "BONANNO FAMILY," UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF RASTELLI, IS KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN SUCH ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AS NARCOTICS, GAMBLING, "LABOR RACKETEERING," "SHYLOCKING," "HIJACKING," AND EXTORTION.

STEFANO CANNONE
224 ELIZABETH STREET
NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

DOB : APRIL 8, 1913
FBI# : 583480
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

STEFANO CANNONE IS A "CONSIGLIERE" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ALSO ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ILLICIT GAMBLING OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY. CANNONE IS ASSOCIATED WITH JOSEPH DI PALERMO, A MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER.

SALVATORE CATALANO
69TH STREET
QUEENS, NEW YORK

DOB : FEBRUARY 24, 1941
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

SALVATORE CATALANO IS CURRENTLY THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." CATALANO WAS INDUCTED INTO THE "BONANNO FAMILY" JUST PRIOR TO THE DEATH OF CARMINE GALANTE. AFTER GALANTE'S DEATH, CATALANO ROSE QUICKLY THROUGH THE "FAMILY" RANKS. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON AND POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY. HIS OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE GAMBLING, NARCOTICS, AND "SHYLOCKING."

SALVATORE FERRUGIA
8414 250TH STREET
QUEENS, NEW YORK

DOB : FEBRUARY 20, 1913
FBI# : 447871
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

SALVATORE FERRUGIA IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CURRENTLY THE ACTING "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY" WHILE PHILIP RASTELLI IS INCARCERATED. FERRUGIA IS VERY INFLUENTIAL IN GAMBLING OPERATIONS ON LONG ISLAND AND IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN "BOOKMAKING" ACTIVITIES IN JAMAICA, NEW YORK.

FERRUGIA HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN "RACE-FIXING" AT AQUEDUCT RACEWAY AS WELL AS "HIJACKING" ACTIVITIES AT JFK AIRPORT.

ANTHONY RIELA
7 BENVENUE AVENUE
WEST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 5, 1896
SBI# : 511559
FBI# : 796624C
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

ANTHONY RIELA IS A "CAPOREGIME" FOR THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." IN THE 1930'S, ANTHONY RIELA WAS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "ENFORCEMENT" ACTIVITIES IN THE NEWARK AREA. DUE TO HIS ADVANCED AGE, HE IS NOW RELEGATED TO THE ROLE OF ADVISOR FOR "FAMILY" BUSINESS.

ANTHONY RIELA'S CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATED HE HAS AN ARREST FOR PROMOTING PROSTITUTION. HE WAS ALSO A MURDER SUSPECT IN A 1944 DOUBLE HOMICIDE.

JOSEPH ZICARELLI
551 BRANDON PLACE
CLIFFSIDE PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER 9, 1912
FBI# : 1107492
SBI# : 142776
AKA : "BAYONNE JOE"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH ZICARELLI IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE ONCE MAINTAINED AN EXTENSIVE ILLICIT GAMBLING NETWORK THROUGHOUT HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS. HIS NETWORK HAD BEEN AFFORDED A HIGH DEGREE OF IMMUNIZATION FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFERENCE THROUGH THE SELECTIVE UTILIZATION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION.

ZICARELLI ESTABLISHED HIS GAMBLING NETWORK IN 1951 AT WHICH TIME HE ALIGNED HIMSELF WITH JOSEPH BONNANO, "BOSS" OF THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." ALSO, HE BEGAN TO DEVELOP A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH SAM DECAVALCANTE.

BY THE 1960'S, ZICARELLI'S GAMBLING NETWORK EXTENDED THROUGHOUT HUDSON COUNTY AND INTO PARTS OF NEW YORK CITY. WITH OTHER NETWORKS, ZICARELLI RELIED ON A CORRUPT POLITICAL NETWORK TO MINIMIZE THE DEGREE OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE HE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN HIS ILLICIT OPERATION. A SMALL PORTION OF HIS GAMBLING PROFITS WERE SURRENDERED TO CORRUPT OFFICIALS AS A FORM OF "PROTECTION PAYMENTS." A MORE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF THE ILLICIT MONEY WAS RECHANNELED INTO USURIOUS LOANS.

JOSEPH ZICARELLI'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDED "SHYLOCKING," "LABOR RACKETEERING," "HIJACKING," NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND EXTORTION. HIS EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE TEAMSTERS UNION TENDS TO FACILITATE HIS "LABOR RACKETEERING" ACTIVITIES.

ZICARELLI'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS GAMBLING ARRESTS AND CORRUPTION CHARGES FOR WHICH HE RECEIVED A TEN YEAR SENTENCE. HE IS PRESENTLY SEMI-RETIRED IN FLORIDA AND HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE TO GAIN BACK THE TERRITORY HE ONCE CONTROLLED.

JOHN CALTAGIRONE
470 BLOOMFIELD AVENUE
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 12, 1928
SBI# : 394964
FBI# : 4287111
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN CALTAGIRONE IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A CLOSE SOCIAL AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF JOSEPH ZICARELLI. HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE SERVED AS AN "ENFORCER" FOR ZICARELLI. HE HAS ALSO BEEN USED BY ZICARELLI AS A "FRONT" FOR VARIOUS BUSINESS INVESTMENTS.

CALTAGIRONE'S CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATES HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FOR AUTO THEFT AND FRAUD.

SPEDITO FRANK DELUCA
11 WEST 53RD STREET
BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 23, 1915
FBI# : 4268862
SBI# : 336454
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK SPEDITO DELUCA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY."

DELUCA WAS INDICTED IN 1971 ALONG WITH JOSEPH ZICARELLI AND FRANK MALLAMACI FOR CONSPIRACY AND BRIBERY OF A WEST NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY MAYOR AND A HUDSON COUNTY DETECTIVE. HE IS A LONG-TIME ASSOCIATE OF ZICARELLI'S AND IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING OPERATIONS FOR ZICARELLI.

DELUCA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR OPERATING AN ILLEGAL STILL, ASSAULT, AND VIOLATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE PHILIP MOSCATO, LOUIS MANNA AND JIMMY NAPOLI.

ANTHONY BRUNO INDELICATO
1530 PALISADE AVENUE
FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 4, 1947
FBI# : 177139L11
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY INDELICATO IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "BONANNO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF CARMINE ZECCARDI, SON OF THE LATE "GENOVESE CAPO," ELI ZECCARDI. INDELICATO IS A HIGH LEVEL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER WHO HAS PERFORMED CONTRACT KILLINGS FOR THE "BONANNO FAMILY."

COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY

THE ORIGINAL "BOSS" OF THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY" WAS JOSEPH PROFACI. UPON THE DEATH OF PROFACI, FROM NATURAL CAUSES IN 1962, HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW, JOSEPH MAGLIOCCO BECAME "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY." AFTER MAGLIOCCO'S DEATH FROM A HEART ATTACK IN 1963, JOSEPH COLOMBO ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE "FAMILY." UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, THE "FAMILY" EXPANDED ITS CONTROL OVER "BOOKMAKING," "LOANSHARKING" AND CORRUPT LABOR UNIONS. IN 1971, JOSEPH COLOMBO HAD BECOME ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL ORGANIZED CRIME "BOSSSES" IN NEW YORK.

IN JUNE OF 1971, JOSEPH COLOMBO WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED WHILE ATTENDING A CIVIL RIGHTS RALLY. THIS INCIDENT MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A STEADY DECLINE IN POWER FOR THE COLOMBO ORGANIZATION. IN RECENT YEARS, OTHER "CRIME FAMILIES," MOST NOTABLY THE "GAMBINOS," HAVE SEIZED MANY OF THE "COLOMBO" HOLDINGS. THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF PROFIT WHICH WAS ONCE GENERATED BY THESE AND OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED..

HOWEVER, ONE FACTION OF THE "COLOMBO FAMILY" WHICH HAS CONTINUED TO PROSPER IS THE PROFACI GROUP IN NEW JERSEY. THIS CENTRALLY-BASED NETWORK OF CRIMINALS IS HEADED BY SALVATORE PROFACI, SON OF THE LATE CRIME "BOSS" JOSEPH PROFACI. MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP ARE INVOLVED IN VARIOUS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN NUMEROUS COUNTIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE. A LARGE NUMBER OF THIS GROUP RESIDE IN MONMOUTH COUNTY, HOWEVER, THEY CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON BUSINESSES LOCATED IN THE NORTHERN SECTORS OF THE STATE. THIS GROUPS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE GAMBLING, "LOAN-SHARKING," ARSON, EXTORTION, AND "LABOR RACKETEERING."

SALVATORE PROFACI IS THE MOST PROMINENT ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURE IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY. HE DIRECTS HIS OPERATIONS FROM ROMA FOODS ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, LOCATED IN SOUTH PLAINFIELD. HE MAINTAINS A RELATIONSHIP WITH


MEMBERS OF THE BRUNO, BONANNO, GENOVESE AND ZERILLI CRIME "FAMILIES." ASIDE FROM HIS ILLICIT UNDERTAKINGS, PROFACI IS INVOLVED IN SEVERAL LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES.

PROFACI'S COUSIN, SAL CURTIS, REPRESENTS THE GROUPS NARCOTICS INTERESTS IN OCEAN COUNTY. IN 1981, CURTIS WAS THE TARGET OF A STATE POLICE NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION. THE INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED AT THE EXECUTIVE ESCORT SERVICE WHICH IS A "FRONT" FOR NARCOTICS, "LOANSHARKING," AND PROSTITUTION ACTIVITIES IN OCEAN COUNTY.

PROFACI'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE NOT CONFINED TO THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. ROMA FOODS IS CURRENTLY KNOWN TO BE CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN TWENTY-SEVEN OTHER STATES. HIS EVENTUAL GOAL IS TO MONOPOLIZE THE PIZZA AND BOXBOARD INDUSTRIES IN THE NEW JERSEY AND PENNSYLVANIA AREAS. HIS GROUPS "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES IS KNOWN TO EXTEND INTO AREAS OF NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA.

SALVATORE PROFACI IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE HEIR APPARENT TO THE POSITION OF "BOSS" IN THE "COLOMBO FAMILY." PROFACI ASPIRES TO REGAIN THE POWER AND PRESTIGE THE "FAMILY" ONCE HELD WHILE HIS FATHER WAS ALIVE.

COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY



CARMINE PERSICO
144 SUNSET DRIVE
LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : AUGUST 8, 1933
FBI# : 113241B
AKA : "THE SMAKE"
STATUS: "BOSS" (INCARCERATED)

CARMINE PERSICO IS CURRENTLY THE "BOSS" OF THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HE ACQUIRED THIS POSITION UPON THE DEATH OF JOSEPH COLOMBO, SR., IN MAY OF 1978. HE HAD BEEN SERVING AS INTERIM HEAD OF THE "FAMILY" SINCE THE SHOOTING OF COLOMBO AT THE ITALIAN-AMERICAN DAY RALLY IN 1971.

CARMINE PERSICO'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE "HIJACKING," CAR THEFTS, "LOANSHARKING," CREDIT CARD "SCHEMES," "BOOK-MAKING," ILLEGAL LOTTERIES AND "LABOR RACKETEERING." HE IS ALSO KNOWN TO HAVE EXERTED HIS INFLUENCE ON THE NEW YORK WASTE FRONT THROUGH ANTHONY SCOTTO. PERSICO'S CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATES HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR RAPE, "HIJACKING," MURDER, POSSESSION OF A GUN (TWICE) DISORDERLY CONDUCT (THREE TIMES) AND ASSAULT (FOUR TIMES).

IN JANUARY OF 1972, PERSICO BEGAN SERVING A 14 YEAR PRISON SENTENCE FOR A 1961 "HIJACKING" CONVICTION. THROUGH EVASIVE LEGAL MANEUVERS HE AND HIS BODYGUARD, HUGH MCINTOSH, MANAGED TO AVOID IMPRISONMENT FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS. DESPITE HIS INCARCERATION PERSICO CONTINUED TO DIRECT THE "FAMILY'S" ILLICIT ACTIVITIES. IT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD IN TIME THAT THE "COLOMBO FAMILY" BEGAN IMPORTING CRIMINALS FROM SICILY INTO ITS MEMBERSHIP. IN DECEMBER OF 1979, AFTER SERVING NEARLY 8 YEARS, CARMINE PERSICO WAS RELEASED FROM FEDERAL PRISON. TWO YEARS LATER, IN NOVEMBER OF 1980, HE WAS INDICTED FOR ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE AN INTERNAL REVENUE AGENT. HE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED ON CONSPIRACY CHARGES AND IN 1981 BEGAN SERVING A FIVE YEAR PRISON SENTENCE.

ALPHONSE PERSICO
1409 BATH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

DOB : DECEMBER 26, 1929
FBI# : 2637292A
AKA : "ALLIE BOY"
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

ALPHONSE PERSICO IS CURRENTLY THE "CONSIGLIERE" FOR THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE BROTHER OF CARMINE PERSICO, WHO IS PRESENTLY "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY." DURING THE 1970'S, ALPHONSE FUNCTIONED AS HEAD OF THIS CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION WHILE CARMINE WAS INCARCERATED IN A FEDERAL PENITENTIARY.

ALPHONSE IS INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS FROM FLORIDA TO NEW JERSEY. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATES HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1951 FOR FELONIOUS ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER. HE PLEADED GUILTY TO SECOND DEGREE MURDER, FOR WHICH HE WAS SENTENCED 20 YEARS TO LIFE. IN 1979, HE WAS ARRESTED FOR "LOANSHARKING" AND EXTORTION. HE AND CO-DEFENDANT, MICHAEL BALINO, WERE FOUND GUILTY OF LENDING \$10,000 TO JOSEPH CANTALUPO AND ILLEGALLY CHARGING HIM INTEREST OF 2 PERCENT WEEKLY. IN JUNE OF 1980, A WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR HIS ARREST WHEN HE FAILED TO APPEAR FOR A PRE-SENTENCING HEARING CONCERNING THE "LOANSHARK" CONVICTIONS. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN INCARCERATED FOR THIS CONVICTION.

THOMAS DI BELLA
18 ADLAI CIRCLE
ELTONVILLE, STATEN ISLAND

DOB : NOVEMBER 29, 1905
FBI# : 2682197
STATUS: ACTING "CONSIGLIERE"

THOMAS DI BELLA IS CURRENTLY ACTING AS "CONSIGLIERE" FOR THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY," WHILE ALPHONSE PERSICO IS INCARCERATED. HE ACTED AS "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY," FOR A SHORT TIME IN 1971, AFTER JOSEPH COLOMBO WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.

DI BELLA'S ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE "LOANSHARKING" AND NARCOTICS. HE WAS ARRESTED IN MAY OF 1981, WHILE MEETING WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" TO DISCUSS THE FAMILY'S NARCOTIC INTERESTS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

JOHN FRANZESE
47 SHRUBHOLLOW ROAD
HERRICKS, NEW YORK

DOB : DECEMBER 6, 1918
FBI# : 3400301
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS"

JOHN FRANZESE IS CURRENTLY THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE PORNOGRAPHY INDUSTRY. OTHER ILLICIT ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING, PROSTITUTION, MURDER, "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND BANK ROBBERY. HE HAS ALSO UTILIZED HIS POWER AS A "LOAN-SHARK" TO INFILTRATE NUMEROUS BUSINESSES IN NASSAU AND SUFFOLK COUNTIES OF NEW YORK.

UNTIL 1967, FRANZESE HAD BEEN ARRESTED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BUT WAS ABLE TO AVOID PROSECUTION. HOWEVER, IN MARCH OF 1967, HE WAS CONVICTED OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT BANK ROBBERY AND WAS SENTENCED TO 50 YEARS IN FEDERAL PRISON. HE SERVED ONLY 11 YEARS OF HIS SENTENCE AND WAS RELEASED IN NOVEMBER OF 1978.

JERRY LANGELLA
48 GOLD AVENUE
STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : DECEMBER 30, 1938
FBI# : 966088D
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JERRY LANGELLA IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CURRENTLY THE ACTING "BOSS" OF THE "FAMILY" WHILE "BOSS" CARMINE PERSICO AND "UNDERBOSS" JOHN FRANZESE ARE INCARCERATED.

LANGELLA WAS ARRESTED IN MAY OF 1981 WHILE MEETING WITH HIGH RANKING MEMBERS OF THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" TO DISCUSS THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS FROM FLORIDA.

SALVATORE J. PROFACI
6 GALEWOOD DRIVE
HOLMDEL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 16, 1936
FBI : 754737J11
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

SALVATORE PROFACI IS THE SON OF THE LATE JOSEPH PROFACI, LEADER OF ONE OF THE ORIGINAL FIVE NEW YORK "ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES." IN 1977, SALVATORE WAS ELEVATED TO THE POSITION OF "CAPOREGIME" WITHIN THE "COLOMBO FAMILY" AND PLACED IN CHARGE OF "FAMILY" OPERATIONS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. THE "PROFACI CRIMINAL GROUP" ACTIVITIES ARE KNOWN TO INCLUDE "LOANSHARKING," ARSON, EXTORTION, INFILTRATION INTO LEGITIMATE BUSINESS AND "LABOR RACKETEERING."

ASIDE FROM HIS ROLE WITHIN THE "COLOMBO FAMILY," PROFACI IS CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH MEMBERS OF THE "ZERILLI CRIME FAMILY" IN DETROIT.

JOSEPH LEONE
170 GREENWOOD LOOP ROAD
BRICKTOWN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 13, 1919
FBI# : 423537
SBI# : 293162
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH LEONE IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HE WORKS CLOSELY WITH SALVATORE PROFACI AS AN "ENFORCER" AND COLLECTOR OF "LOANSHARK" DEBTS. LEONE'S CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATES ARRESTS FOR ASSAULT AND BATTERY, MATERIAL WITNESS OF A MURDER, POSSESSION OF LOTTERY SLIPS, AND PASSING BAD CHECKS.

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SALVATORE LOMBARDINO
25 BARRY DRIVE
WEST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 11, 1931
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

SALVATORE LOMBARDINO IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY."

HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS IN THE PROFACI GROUP. HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS AN ARREST IN 1980, FOR POSSESSION OF UNTAXED CIGARETTES.

LOUIS PIANCONE
3 EAST BROOK DRIVE
HOLMDEL, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JANUARY 1, 1929
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

LOUIS PIANCONE IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." LOUIS HAS A YOUNGER BROTHER, MICHAEL, WHO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "GAMBINO FAMILY."

JAMES RANDAZZO
686 NORTH 7TH STREET
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JUNE 3, 1946
FBI# : 721366F
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JAMES RANDAZZO IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ASSAULT AND BATTERY, MURDER, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, CARRYING A CONCEALED DEADLY WEAPON, ATROCIOUS ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER, RESISTING ARREST, BREAKING AND ENTERING, LARCENY AND POSSESSION OF UNTAXED CIGARETTES. HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES FOR SALVATORE PROFACI.

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GUS SPATAFORA
17 NORTHWOOD ROAD
WAYSIDE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 13, 1936
FBI# : 838098G
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

GUS SPATAFORA IS CURRENTLY A "SOLDIER" IN THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY." HIS BROTHER FRANK SPATAFORA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "LUCCHESI FAMILY." SPATAFORA WAS VERY ACTIVE WITH JAMES RANDAZZO AND SALVATORE LOMBARDINO IN SALVATORE PROFACI'S "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS. SPATAFORA'S CRIMINAL RECORD INDICATES HE WAS ARRESTED IN 1966 ON CHARGES OF BRIBERY AND "KICKBACKS."

DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY

THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY" HAS THE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE ONLY "FAMILY" BASED IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. THE MEMBERS OF THIS "FAMILY" ARE PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN GAMBLING, NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION, "LOANSHARKING," LABOR EXTORTION AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION. THEY CONTROL MOST ILLICIT ACTIVITIES IN UNION COUNTY AND TO A SMALLER EXTENT THE PORT ELIZABETH AREA, UTILIZING THE CITY OF ELIZABETH AS THEIR HEADQUARTERS.

THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY" WAS ORGANIZED BY THE LATE NICHOLAS DELMORE. SUBSEQUENT TO HIS DEATH IN 1964, SIMONE "SAM THE PLUMBER" DECAVALCANTE ASSUMED CONTROL OF THIS "FAMILY." DECAVALCANTE WAS QUICKLY KNOWN AS THE "MODEL UNDERWORLD BOSS," EXPANDING THE "FAMILY'S" MEMBERSHIP AND INFLUENCE. HE ALSO PROJECTED AN IMAGE OF LEGITIMACY TO THE PUBLIC, MAKING HIS SUBURBAN LIFE STYLE, LEGITIMATE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES, POLITICS AND CHARITIES AS WORTHY OF HIS TIME AND ENERGIES AS HIS CRIMINAL ENDEAVORS. IN 1970 HOWEVER, SAM DECAVALCANTE AND FIFTY-FOUR OF HIS ASSOCIATES WERE INDICTED IN FEDERAL COURT. IN 1971, DECAVALCANTE WAS SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS IN PRISON BUT WAS RELEASED TWO YEARS LATER FOR HIS GOOD BEHAVIOR AND FAILING HEALTH.

SAM DECAVALCANTE CONTINUED RUNNING HIS "FAMILY" AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM PRISON; HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF ILL-HEALTH, HE HAS DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO "UNDERBOSS" JOHN RIGGI. DECAVALCANTE CURRENTLY RESIDES IN FLORIDA IN SEMI-RETIREMENT, TRAVELING TO NEW JERSEY OCCASIONALLY.

JOHN RIGGI IS CONSIDERED THE "ACTING BOSS" OF "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" OPERATIONS IN NEW JERSEY. RIGGI'S PRIMARY FUNCTION IS TO CONTROL "LABOR RACKETEERING" IN UNION COUNTY THROUGH HIS AFFILIATION WITH LOCAL #394, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LABORERS AND HOD CARRIERS.

THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" IS CONSIDERED A RELATIVELY SMALL ORGANIZED CRIME GROUP, WITH ONLY THIRTY-SEVEN RECOGNIZED "MADE MEMBERS;" YET, THEY ARE ABLE TO CONTROL AND SUSTAIN SEVERAL ILLICIT ENTERPRISES IN NEW JERSEY. ONE OF THE "CAPOREGIMES" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY," LOUIS LARASSO, CONTROLS ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN UNION COUNTY AND IS INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND EXTORTION. A RECENT INVESTIGATION OF CHARLES MAJURI, (A SUBORDINATE OF LOUIS LARASSO'S), RESULTED IN A STATE INDICTMENT OF MAJURI AND IMPLICATED LARASSO. OTHER PRINCIPAL MEMBERS WORKING DIRECTLY FOR LARASSO AND MAJURI ARE JOSEPH "JO JO" FERRARA, ANTHONY "SOFT SHOE" DIMAIO AND CHARLES STANGO (WHO WAS RECENTLY ARRESTED FOR MURDER).

DeCAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY

BOSS

SIMONE DeCAVALCANTE

UNDERBOSS

JOHN RIGGI

CAPOREGIMES

CONSIGLIERES

STEVE VITABILE

FRANK MAJURI
(RETIRED)

NEW YORK

NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH GIACOBBE

ROBERT DiBERNARDO

VINCENT J. ROTONDO

JAMES PALERMO

LOUIS LARASSO

PAOLO FARINA

FRANK COCCHIARO

NEW YORK

SOLDIERS

LOUIS TELESE RUDOLPH FARONE
ANTHONY CARUSO UMBERTO GALLO
PIETRO GALLETTA ANGELO GALLO
DOMINICK RIZZO JOSEPH MIRANDA
ANTHONY STAITI JOHN LAMELA

CARMELO COCCHIARO

CONNECTICUT

SOLDIERS

ANTHONY LA SELVA
THOMAS LA SELVA

NEW JERSEY

SOLDIERS

GAETANO VASTOLA VINCENT RIGGI
CHARLES MAJURI JOHN RIGGI, JR.
ROBERT OCCHIPINTI EMANUEL RIGGI
JOSEPH FERRARA JOSEPH COLLETTI
SALVATORE TIMPANI FRANK NIGRO
JOHN GIORDANO JOSEPH LA SALA
SALVATORE CATERNICCHIO

SIMONE DECAVALCANTE
5601 COLLINS AVENUE
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DOB : MAY 1, 1912
SBI# : 139860
FBI# : 1670728
AKA : SIMONE RUSSO
"MUSTACHE SAM"
"THE COUNT"
"SAM THE PLUMBER"
STATUS: "BOSS"

SIMONE DECAVALCANTE IS THE "BOSS" OF THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY," WHICH IS THE ONLY ORGANIZED CRIME GROUP BASED ENTIRELY WITHIN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. ALTHOUGH DECAVALCANTE CURRENTLY RESIDES IN FLORIDA, HE MAINTAINS HIS HIGH STATUS AND RECEIVES TEN PERCENT OF ALL MONEY COLLECTED BY HIS "FAMILY" MEMBERS.

DECAVALCANTE'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE FORGERY, LOTTERY, TAX EVASION, CONSPIRACY, PORNOGRAPHY AND EXTORTION. IN 1971, HE WAS SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS IN FEDERAL PRISON FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT IN A TWENTY MILLION DOLLAR PER YEAR GAMBLING OPERATION.

DECAVALCANTE'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE INCLUDES SEVERAL LABOR UNIONS. JOHN RIGGI, DECAVALCANTE'S "UNDERBOSS" IS THE REGISTERED BUSINESS AGENT FOR LOCAL #394, INTERNATIONAL HOD CARRIERS. DECAVALCANTE IS ALSO INVOLVED WITH LOCAL #526 VIA SAMUEL CAIVANO.

JOHN RIGGI
1115 WEST HENRY STREET
LINDEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 1, 1925
SBI : 359718
FBI : 979891
AKA : GIOVANNI RIGGI
JOHN MICHAEL RIGGI
STATUS: "UNDERBOSS" (ACTING BOSS)

JOHN RIGGI IS THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS OVERSEEN THIS "FAMILY" SINCE SAM DECAVALCANTE MOVED TO FLORIDA TO RESIDE IN SEMI-RETIREMENT.

THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF DECAVALCANTE, RIGGI WAS APPOINTED BUSINESS AGENT OF LOCAL 394, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LABORERS AND HOD CARRIERS. SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT, RIGGI HAS DEVELOPED A POWER BASE EXTENDING THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY. IN HIS CAPACITY AS BUSINESS AGENT, RIGGI HAS CONTINUED TO EXERCISE HIS AUTHORITY AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN HIS PRIMARY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, "LABOR RACKETEERING."

RIGGI'S ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SAMUEL CAIVANO, FRANK MAJURI, LOUIS LARASSO AND JOHN T. GREGORIO.

STEVEN VITABILE
44 JACCI COURT
MENLO PARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER, 1935
STATUS: "CONSIGLIERE"

STEVE VITABILE IS THE "CONSIGLIERE" FOR THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF JOHN RIGGI AND ACTS AS SAM DECAVALCANTE'S CHAUFFEUR WHEN THE LATTER HAS OCCASION TO BE IN NEW JERSEY. VITABILE IS THE BUSINESS PARTNER OF "FAMILY CAPOREGIME," LOUIS LARASSO AND IS EMPLOYED AS CORPORATE SECRETARY/TREASURER FOR VAL SAND AND FILL COMPANY.

FRANK MAJURI
635 ERCAMA STREET
LINDEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 18, 1908
SBI# : 96262
FBI# : 1102386
AKA : FRANK MAJURI, FRANK MAIURI,
FRANK GALIANO, "BIG FRANK"
STATUS: RETIRED "CONSIGLIERE"

FRANK MAJURI IS A RETIRED "CONSIGLIERE" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS PREVIOUSLY AN "UNDERBOSS" IN CHARGE OF GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" FOR THE "FAMILY." WHILE SAM DECAVALCANTE WAS ACTIVE IN THE "FAMILY" OPERATIONS, HE CONSIDERED MAJURI THE "EQUAL" OF CURRENT ACTING "BOSS" JOHN RIGGI. WHEN MAJURI'S CAPACITY CHANGED TO AN ADVISORY POSITION IN THE "FAMILY," HIS SON CHARLES TOOK OVER AS SUPERVISOR OF GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITIES.

MAJURI'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR: CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY, ILLEGAL LIQUOR MANUFACTURING, "BOOKMAKING," AND LABOR AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS. MAJURI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: SAM DECAVALCANTE, LOUIS LARASSO, ROBERT OCCHIPINTI, FRANK COCCHIARO, JOSEPH SFERRA, JOHN RIGGI, EMANUEL RIGGI AND MICHAEL CASTORO.

FRANK COCCHIARO
7545 BOUNTY ROAD
NORTH BAY VILLAGE, FLORIDA

DOB : OCTOBER 29, 1920
SBI : 35934A
FBI : 4694212
AKA : "FRANK COCCHIARO"
"FRANK CACCIATORE"
"BIG FRANK"
"SAM COCCHIAIRO"
"FRANK COCH"
"THOMAS LETTER"
"FRANK CONDI"
"SAM ANTHONY"

STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

FRANK COCCHIARO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE SERVED AS DECAVALCANTE'S "ENFORCER" IN MATTERS REQUIRING THE THREAT OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, SUCH AS "LABOR RACKETEERING."

COCCHIARO NOW CONDUCTS HIS ACTIVITIES IN FLORIDA FOR THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY." ON FEBRUARY 1, 1979, COCCHIARO WAS ARRESTED IN DADE COUNTY FOR CONSPIRACY TO DISTRIBUTE NARCOTICS. ADDITIONALLY ON MARCH 29, 1982, COCCHIARO WAS SENTENCED TO TWO CONSECUTIVE FIVE YEAR TERMS FOR CONSPIRACY AND MAIL FRAUD.

COCCHIARO'S KNOWN CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: LOUIS IPPOLITO, SAM DECAVALCANTE, FRANK MAJURI, ROBERT OCCHIPINTI, GAETANO VASTOLA, LOUIS LARASSO, AND DOMINICK SCIALO.

HIS CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR: FRAUD, TRANSPORTING STOLEN PROPERTY, BURGLARY, LARCENY, ROBBERY, FORGERY, NARCOTICS, ASSAULT AND CONTEMPT OF COURT.

ROBERT DIBERNARDO
1101 HARBOR ROAD
HEWLETT HARBOR
LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : MAY 13, 1937
LEIU# : 3073
AKA : ROBERT BERNARDO, ROBER FERRI,
FRANK FERRI, ROBERT DIBERANARDA,
"DEBE," "DEEBEE"
STATUS : "CAPOREGIME"

ROBERT DIBERNARDO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE VICE PRESIDENT OF STAR DISTRIBUTION LTD., A NEW YORK FIRM SPECIALIZING IN THE PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PORNOGRAPHIC LITERATURE. IN 1970 STAR DISTRIBUTORS WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION INTO PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS ORGANIZED CRIME AFFILIATIONS. ON JUNE 12, 1981, DIBERNARDO WAS ONE OF FORTY-FOUR PORNOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTORS INDICTED AS A RESULT OF "OPERATION MIPORN," (AN FBI INVESTIGATION THAT BEGAN IN MIAMI IN 1978 AND SPREAD TO NEW YORK, LOS ANGELES AND SEVERAL OTHER CITIES.) DIBERNARDO AND HIS PARTNER, THEODORE "TEDDY" ROTHSTEIN OF OCEANSIDE, LONG ISLAND, WERE CONVICTED IN MIAMI FEDERAL COURT OF SHIPPING OBSCENE FILMS FROM THEIR NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS ACROSS STATE LINE.

DIBERNARDO HAS TWO PREVIOUS ARRESTS FOR OBSCENITY IN NEW YORK. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: SAM DECAVALCANTE, ETTORE ZAPPI, GAETANO VASTOLA, FRANK COCCHIARO, JOSEPH BROCCINI, NATHAN GRAMA, MARTIN HADAS AND MICHAEL THEVIS.

PAOLO PAUL FARINA
105 ASH STREET
CARTERET, NEW JERSEY

DOB : JULY 2, 1926
AKA : "PAUL FARINA"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

PAUL FARINA IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ACTIVE IN "LABOR RACKETEERING" IN THE UNION AND MIDDLESEX COUNTY AREAS. HE IS A MEMBER OF LOCAL 394, (HOD CARRIERS), IN ELIZABETH WHERE "FAMILY UNDERBOSS," JOHN RIGGI, IS THE BUSINESS AGENT.

FARINA'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: SAM DECAVALCANTE
JOHN RIGGI, FRANK MAJURI, JOSEPH LOLORDO, SALVATORE CATERNICCHIO
AND PIETRO GALLETTA.

JOSEPH GIACOBBE
21-14 47TH STREET
LONG ISLAND CITY, NEW YORK

DOB : JULY 2, 1923
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

JOSEPH GIACOBBE IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN NEW YORK

IN ADDITION TO JOHN RIGGI, GIACOBBE'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE VINCENT ROTUNDO, ROBERT DIBERNARDO, RUDOLPH FARONE, FRANK MAJURI, FRANK COCCHIARO AND LOUIS LARASSO.

LOUIS LARASSO
2711 BRADBURY AVENUE
LINDEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : NOVEMBER 13, 1926
SBI : 261743
FBI : 745765C
AKA : LUCIANO LARASSO, LUCIANO LARASO,
LUCIANO LORESCO, "FAT LOU"
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

LOUIS LARASSO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN GAMBLING, "LABOR RACKETEERING" AND EXTORTION AND SERVES AS JOHN RIGGI'S ("FAMILY UNDERBOSS") PRINCIPAL CONFIDANT.

LOUIS LARASSO HAS AN EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND IN ORGANIZED CRIME. HE ATTENDED AND WAS ARRESTED AT THE NOW FAMOUS APPALACHIN MEETING OF TOP ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS IN 1957. LARASSO PRESENTLY CONTROLS ALL GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" ACTIVITY IN UNION COUNTY FOR THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY."

HIS ASSOCIATES INCLUDE, "FAMILY UNDERBOSS," JOHN RIGGI, AND "SOLDIER" JOSEPH MERLO.

GIROLAMO PALERMO
136 CHESTNUT STREET
ISLAND HEIGHTS, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 16, 1938
AKA : JIMMY PALERMO, GERALD JAMES
PALAMERA, JEROME JAMES PALERMO
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

GIROLAMO PALERMO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE
CRIME FAMILY." HE CONTROLS THE SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY GAMBLING
OPERATION FOR THE "FAMILY." PALERMO ALSO SERVES AS DECAVALCANTE'S
"BODYGUARD," WHEN DECAVALCANTE IS IN NEW JERSEY.

PALERMO IS ALSO VERY ACTIVE IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN
UNION COUNTY AND IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH JOHN RIGGI.

VINCENT J. ROTONDO
2356 ROYCE STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 14, 1930
STATUS: "CAPOREGIME"

VINCENT ROTONDO IS A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE
CRIME FAMILY." HE OVERSEES THE "FAMILY'S" NEW YORK OPERATIONS
AND REPORTS DIRECTLY TO JOHN RIGGI, "UNDERBOSS" OF THE "FAMILY."

AS AN ORGANIZER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, VINCENT ROTONDO IS IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION
TO PURSUE "LABOR RACKETEERING" ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF THE
"DECAVALCANTE FAMILY." ROTONDO IS ALSO INVOLVED IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIALS.

ANTHONY CARUSO
239 PARK STREET
MANHATTAN, NEW YORK

DOB : AUGUST 19, 1896 or 1898
FBI# : 1065429
AKA : "TONY RUSSO"
"THOMAS COSTA"
"THE FOX"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY CARUSO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME
FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK
CITY.

CARUSO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE CHARLES DESALVO,
JOHN BROCCO, ARTHUR ESPOSITO, ANTHONY GALLO, ANTHONY BARRACATA
AND EDUARDO ARONICA.

SALVATORE CATERNICCHIO
441 VALLEY ROAD
CLARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 24, 1904
OR JANUARY 2, 1904
SBI : 99312
FBI : 3926472
AKA : "SKINNY SAL"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

SALVATORE CATERNICCHIO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE
CRIME FAMILY." AS A MEMBER OF HOD CARRIERS, LOCAL 394 IN
UNION, NEW JERSEY, CATERNICCHIO IS INVOLVED IN EXTORTING
ITALIAN IMMIGRANTS WHO WORK FOR LOCAL 394.

CATERNICCHIO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JEROME
PALERMO, LOUIS LARASSO, CHARLES MAJURI, JOSEPH FERRARA AND
JOSEPH COLLETTI.

CARMELO COCCHIARO
25-30 78TH STREET
JACKSON HEIGHTS, NEW YORK

DOB : FEBRUARY 19, 1935
FBI# : 226730D
AKA : "CARMINE COCCHIARO"
"CARMEL"
"MELIO"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

CARMELO COCCHIARO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE
CRIME FAMILY." HE WORKED AS A LABORER FOR LOCAL #394,
HOD CARRIERS IN ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY. THIS UNION IS
CONTROLLED BY THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" THROUGH SEVERAL
UNION OFFICIALS WHO ARE "MEMBERS" OF THE "FAMILY."

COCCHIARO IS ALSO THE BROTHER OF A "DECAVALCANTE
CAPOREGIME," FRANK "CONDI" COCCHIARO, WHO NOW RESIDES IN
THE STATE OF FLORIDA. CARMELO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES
INCLUDE SAM DECAVALCANTE, JOHN RIGGI, JOSEPH SILVESTER,
JOSEPH SILVESTRI, AND "DECAVALCANTE MEMBERS" WORKING
FOR LOCAL #394.

JOSEPH COLLETTI
1570 FRANKLIN STREET
CLARK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 28, 1930
AKA : "JAKE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH COLLETTI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS AN OFFICIAL IN LOCAL 394, HOD CARRIERS IN ELIZABETH. HIS PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL "FAMILY" ACTIVITIES INCLUDES GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING."

RUDOLPH FARONE
1697 EAST 52nd STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 11, 1928
FBI# : 106192A
AKA : "RUDY", "TOOTSIE"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

RUDOLPH FARONE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN "BOOKMAKING," LOANSHARKING" AND NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTION AND HIS CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR BURGLARY, GAMBLING AND ASSAULT.

FARONE IS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN THE STATES OF UTAH AND CALIFORNIA.

FARONE'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE LOUIS LARASSO, FRANK COCCHIARO, ROBERT OCCHIPINTI, UMBERTO GALLO, AND JEROME DAGOTI.

JOSEPH ANTHONY FERRARA
332 SOUTH STREET
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 31, 1938
SBI# : 132792A
FBI# : 164460H
AKA : "JO JO"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH "JO JO" FERRARA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF "UNDERBOSS" JOHN RIGGI AND ROBERT "BASILE" OCCHIPINTI, A HIGH-RANKING "FAMILY" MEMBER CURRENTLY RESIDING IN FLORIDA. FERRARA'S PRIMARY CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES INCLUDE GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN UNION COUNTY.

FROM APPROXIMATELY OCTOBER 1979 TO JULY 22, 1981, FERRARA WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF KIT ENTERPRISES. LOCATED IN ELIZABETH THIS FIRM IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRANSPORT AND DISPOSAL OF TOXIC CHEMICAL WASTES. DURING HIS EMPLOYMENT AT KIT, FERRARA ACTED AS A CONDUIT BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS.

PIETRO GALLETTA
41 WEST FARMS LANE
COMMACK, NEW YORK

DOB : APRIL 24, 1896
AKA : "PIETRO GALLO"
"GUISEPPE GALLETTA"
"PETE GALLETTA"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

PIETRO GALLETTA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN "FAMILY" GAMBLING OPERATIONS IN NEW YORK. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS A MEMBER OF THE HOD CARRIERS LOCAL #394, ELIZABETH, WHICH IS DOMINATED BY SEVERAL "MEMBERS" OF THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY."

ANGELO GALLO
311 6TH AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : JULY 20, 1921 or JULY 21, 1933
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANGELO GALLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE OPERATES AS A "LOANSHARK" AT HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (NORTH EAST MARINE TERMINAL) ON BEHALF OF THE "FAMILY." HIS BROTHER UMBERTO IS ALSO A "SOLDIER" IN THE NEW YORK FACTION OF THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY."

GALLO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE RUDOLPH FARONE, FRANK COCCHIARO, LOUIS LARASSO, LOUIS TELESE, ANTHONY GRILLO AND STEVE CIRILLO.

UMBERTO GALLO
511 CARROLL STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : NOVEMBER 5, 1926
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

UMBERTO GALLO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED WITH "SHYLOCKING" IN BROOKLYN. HIS SON, UMBERTO, JR., IS A NARCOTICS DISTRIBUTOR IN BROOKLYN.

GALLO'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE FRANK COCCHIARO, LOUIS TELESE, RUDOLPH FARONE, ANTHONY GRILLO, ALFRED CIMEI, PHILIP ARCURI AND LOUIS LARASSO. HIS BROTHER ANGELO IS ALSO A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY."

JOHN ANGELO GIORDANO
4 ROSEVILLE LANE
ALLENTOWN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 17, 1910
SBI : 14794
FBI : 918684
AKA : "TRACEY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN GIORDANO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY." HE HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH SAM DECAVALCANTE, "FAMILY BOSS," FOR FORTY YEARS. DURING THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES, GIORDANO CONTROLLED THE DECAVALCANTE "BOOKMAKING" OPERATION IN THE TRENTON AREA IN COOPERATION WITH "BRUNO FAMILY" OPERATIVES, JOHN SIMONE AND CHARLES COSTELLO.

GIORDANO'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR: GRAND LARCENY, AUTO LARCENY, ROBBERY, RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, "LOTTERY" AND DISORDERLY PERSON. HE WAS CONVICTED IN 1969, AND SERVED A PRISON SENTENCE FOR POSSESSION OF "LOTTERY SLIPS."

JOHN LAMELA
RIDGE ROAD
MARLBORO, NEW YORK

DOB : November 15, 1908
FBI# : 904110
AKA : JOHN LONELLO, JOHN LONELO,
JOHN LOVELLO, JOHN RAMELLA,
GIOVANNI LAMELA
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN LAMELA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY," AND IS INVOLVED IN GAMBLING AND NARCOTICS. HE IS THE OWNER OF LAMELA SANITATION DISPOSAL SERVICE LOCATED IN MARLBORO, NEW YORK.

LAMELA'S CRIMINAL RECORD REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR ROBBERY AND ALCOHOL AND TAX VIOLATIONS. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SIMONE DECAVALCANTE, LOUIS LARASSO, GAETANO VASTOLA AND JOSEPH SFERRA.

JOSEPH F. LASALA
14 SOUTH 7TH STREET
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY

DOB : APRIL 22, 1932
SBI# : 33521D
AKA : JOSEPH LASALLE
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH LASALA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." IN 1981, HE WAS THE PRESIDENT OF LOCAL #394, LABORERS AND HOD CARRIERS UNION IN ELIZABETH.

LASALA CONDUCTS A GAMBLING OPERATION IN THE LINDEN AREA.

ANTHONY ROSARIO LASELVA
150 SEYMOUR STREET
WATERBURY, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

DOB : MAY 28, 1920
FBI# : 282622E
AKA : ROSARIO ANTHONY LASELVA,
RAYMOND LASELVA
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY LASELVA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE CONNECTICUT FACTION OF THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." LASELVA AND HIS BROTHER THOMAS CONTROL "BOOKMAKING," "SPORTS BETTING," AND "LOANSHARKING" IN THE WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT AREA.

HIS SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE HIS BROTHERS THOMAS AND JOSEPH AND THE LATE MICHAEL PUGLIA.

THOMAS G. LASELVA
175 MONROE STREET
WATERBURY, NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

DOB : FEBRUARY 2, 1911
FBI# : 386767
AKA : KAY LASELVA, GEORGE LONGO, TOMMY
LASELVA
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

THOMAS LASELVA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." LASELVA AND HIS BROTHER ANTHONY CONTROL 'BOOKMAKING', 'SPORTS BETTING,' AND 'LOANSHARKING' IN THE WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT AREA. HE ALSO CONTROLS LARGE 'BOOK-MAKING' OPERATIONS IN BRIDGEPORT AND HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT. LASELVA ALSO OPERATES A "LOANSHARKING" OPERATION IN WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT.

HIS SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE HIS BROTHERS ANTHONY AND JOSEPH LASELVA, MICHAEL AUILANTE, ROBERT APPICELLO, DOMINIC CONSTANTINO, WILLIAM SASSO AND CAESAR TELESKA.

CHARLES N. MAJURI
625 SOUTH BROAD STREET
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY

DOB : DECEMBER 29, 1940
SBI : 865697
FBI : 469374F
AKA : CHARLIE MAJURI
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

CHARLES MAJURI, (SON OF RETIRED "UNDERBOSS" FRANK MAJURI), IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." SINCE THE LATE 1960's, MAJURI HAS CONTROLLED THE UNION COUNTY GAMBLING OPERATION FOR THE "FAMILY" UNDER THE DIRECTION OF "CAPOREGIME," LOUIS LARASSO.

MAJURI'S CRIMINAL HISTORY REFLECTS ARRESTS FOR GAMBLING, LARCENY AND STOLEN PROPERTY. IN 1970, HE AND OTHER "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY" MEMBERS WERE INDICTED ON CHARGES OF "LOANSHARKING" AND THE USE OF VIOLENCE IN COLLECTING THESE LOANS. HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE JOHN RIGGI, JOSEPH FERRARA, MICHAEL MANDAGLIO, JEROME PALERMO, MICHAEL TACCETTA, LOUIS LARASSO AND ROBERT BISACCIA.

JOSEPH A. MIRANDA
VOLPE LANE
MARLBORO, NEW YORK

DOB : DECEMBER 7, 1923
AKA : JOSEPH MIRANDO
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOSEPH MIRANDA IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS INVOLVED IN NEW YORK GAMBLING AND "LOAN-SHARKING" OPERATIONS.

FRANK SALVATORE NIGRO
1341 SILVERTON ROAD
TOMS RIVER, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 3, 1942
SBI : 641037
FBI : 156613L10
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

FRANK NIGRO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE FAMILY." HE IS ACTIVE IN GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" IN THE NEW JERSEY SHORE AREA. NIGRO IS CURRENTLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF ROBERT OCCHIPINTI, A "FAMILY CAPOREGIME." IN ADDITION TO OCCHIPINTI, NIGRO IS ASSOCIATED WITH SAM DECAVALCANTE, JOHN RIGGI, LOUIS LARASSO AND JOSEPH FERRARA.

ROBERT BASILE OCCHIPINTI
15 HARBOUR WAY
MONMOUTH BEACH, NEW JERSEY

DOB : FEBRUARY 15, 1920
SBI : 136356A
FBI : 222049H
AKA : ROBERT SIMONE OCCHIPINTI, BOBBY BASILE,
"BOBBY BEAR"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ROBERT OCCHIPINTI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." OCCHIPINTI'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES HAVE INCLUDED "SHYLOCKING," "LABOR RACKETEERING," GAMBLING AND SMUGGLING.

IN 1980, OCCHIPINTI WAS INDICTED BY THE STATE GRAND JURY FOR OFFERING FALSE TESTIMONY IN 1978, WHEN HE DENIED KNOWING THE LATE ANTHONY "LITTLE PUSSY" RUSSO. HE IS CURRENTLY RESIDING IN FLORIDA AS A RESULT OF THE INDICTMENT.

IN ADDITION TO SAM DECAVALCANTE, OCCHIPINTI'S CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: FRANK COCCHIARO, FRANK MAJURI, LOUIS LARASSO, FRANK NIGRO, JOSEPH IPPOLITO, JOSEPH COVELLO, THE LATE ANTHONY RUSSO AND ANTHONY COSTANZA.

EMANUEL RIGGI
571 DARVIN BOULEVARD
EDISON, NEW JERSEY

DOB : OCTOBER, 1947
AKA : MANNY RIGGI
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

EMANUEL RIGGI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY" AND THE SON OF "UNDERBOSS" JOHN RIGGI. EMANUEL RIGGI'S PRIMARY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IS CONTROL OF "LABOR RACKETEERING" IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY THROUGH HIS POSITION AS CONTROLLER OF BUILDING LABORERS OF NEW JERSEY. HE IS ALSO A KNOWN "LOANSHARK."

JOHN RIGGI, JR.
130 WILLOW AVENUE
NORTH PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH, 1954
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

JOHN RIGGI, JR. IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS THE SON OF "DECAVALCANTE BOSS" JOHN RIGGI, AND THE SON-IN-LAW OF LOUIS LARASSO, A "CAPOREGIME" IN THE "FAMILY." RIGGI, JR. CONTROLS THE ILLEGAL LOTTERY ACTIVITY IN NORTH PLAINFIELD.

VINCENT J. RIGGI
1115 WEST HENRY STREET
LINDEN, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MARCH 27, 1951
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

VINCENT RIGGI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS ACTIVE IN THE FAMILY'S ILLEGAL LOTTERY OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, RIGGI AND HIS FATHER, JOHN, THE "UNDERBOSS" OF THIS "FAMILY," ARE INVOLVED IN "LABOR RACKETEERING" ACTIVITIES.

DOMINICK RIZZO
54 PACIFIC AVENUE
DEER PARK, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

DOB : NOVEMBER 5, 1927
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

RIZZO IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS A GAMBLING OPERATIVE ON LONG ISLAND FOR THE NEW YORK FACTION OF THE "FAMILY." HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH "FAMILY UNDERBOSS" JOHN RIGGI AND "CAPOREGIME" LOUIS LARASSO.

ANTHONY ROCCO STAITI
2080 EAST 53rd STREET
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : SEPTEMBER 10, 1920
FBI# : 470567F
AKA : "ANTONIO STAITI"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

ANTHONY STAITI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE WORKS IN THE "DECAVALCANTE" DOMINATED LOCAL #394, HOD CARRIERS IN ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY.

STAITI'S KNOWN CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE: FRANK MAJURI, JOSEPH COLLETTI AND GIACOMO COLLETTI.

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LOUIS TELESE
285 3rd AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

DOB : DECEMBER 4, 1926
FBI# : 369276A
AKA : LOUIS FELESE
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

LOUIS TELESE IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ROBBERIES AND HAS A KNOWN PROCLIVITY TOWARD VIOLENCE.

HIS CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INCLUDE SALVATORE MAIORANA, UMBERTO GALLO, VINCENT DEPIPPA, RUDOLPH FARONE AND NICHOLAS DECIO.

SALVATORE TIMPANI
36 3rd AVENUE
NEPTUNE, NEW JERSEY

DOB : SEPTEMBER 24, 1943
SBI# : 417128A
AKA : "LITTLE SAL," "SAL THE BARBER"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

SAL TIMPANI IS A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE WAS GIVEN THIS POSITION DUE TO HIS MONEY-MAKING POTENTIAL AS A KEY GAMBLING OPERATIVE IN THE JERSEY SHORE AREA.

GAETANO VASTOLA
50 MOUNTAINSIDE DRIVE
COLTS NECK, NEW JERSEY

DOB : MAY 20, 1928
FBI : 4586221
LEIU : 3390
AKA : GENE VASTOLA
"CORKY"
"SONNY"
STATUS: "SOLDIER"

"CORKY" VASTOLA, PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE "COLOMBO CRIME FAMILY" IS NOW A "SOLDIER" IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH JOHN RIGGI, THE ACTING "BOSS" IN THE "FAMILY."

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IN 1968, VASTOLA WAS CONVICTED ON EXTORTION CHARGES WHEN HE WAS A CO-DEFENDANT WITH SAM DECAVALCANTE AND DANIEL ANNUNZIATA. VASTOLA ALSO HAS ARRESTS FOR FELONY, RAPE, LARCENY, CONSPIRACY, FORGERY, BURGLARY AND GRAND LARCENY.

IN ADDITION TO HIS OCCUPATION AS A TALENT AGENT FOR MECCA ARTISTS IN NEW YORK, VASTOLA IS INVOLVED IN THE NEW YORK CITY CARPET UNIONS, WHERE HE EXERTS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE AND IS SUSPECTED OF EXTORTION AND "LABOR RACKETEERING."

PELLIGRINO WILLIAM DIZENZO
200 ORCHARD HILL
STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT

DOB : JUNE 15, 1918
FBI# : 256363B
AKA : "BILLY DEE"
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

PELLIGRINO DIZENZO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF THE CONNECTICUT FACTION OF THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HIS PRIMARY CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARE: "FENCING" AND ARSON.

JOSEPH MERLO
439 SPENCER STREET
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY

DOB : AUGUST 7, 1930
STATUS: ASSOCIATE

JOSEPH MERLO IS A SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE IN THE "DECAVALCANTE CRIME FAMILY." HIS ILLICIT ACTIVITIES ARE MAINLY FOCUSED ON THE "FAMILY" GAMBLING AND "LOANSHARKING" OPERATIONS.

CLOSING REMARKS

I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MY TESTIMONY WITH SEVERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE QUALITY OF BOTH THE FEDERAL AND STATE EFFORTS TO CONTROL ORGANIZED CRIME.

FIRST, I CONCUR WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH AND DIRECTOR WEBSTER THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT HAS PROVEN THAT ORGANIZED CRIME IS NO LONGER "UNTOUCHABLE" AND THAT WE HAVE UNDERMINED THE MYSTIQUE OF THE "GODFATHER" AS PROTECTOR OF HIS MINIONS. THE TOOLS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND CONGRESS AND WE MUST NOW USE THESE "TOOLS" IN IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE WAYS. I BELIEVE THAT THE "BRI-LAB AND OMEGA INVESTIGATIONS" AND THE RECENT BRIBERY/CONSPIRACY CONVICTION OF TEAMSTER'S PRESIDENT ROY WILLIAMS DEMONSTRATES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH INVESTIGATIVE "TOOLS" WHEN CAREFULLY AND JUDICIOUSLY APPLIED.

SECOND, WE IN NEW JERSEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO FERRET OUT ORGANIZED CRIME. AS I POINTED OUT EARLIER, WE HAVE RECEIVED BI-PARTISAN SUPPORT WHICH CERTAINLY REPRESENTS A SERIOUS COMMITMENT ON BEHALF OF ALL THE ADMINISTRATIONS. WE ARE FORTUNATE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF OUR POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE "WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME."

THIRD, LET ME SUGGEST THAT TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME NO LONGER ENJOYS THE POWER IT ONCE DID IN NEW JERSEY. I CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL

THAT WAS ONCE EXERCISED BY THE "MAFIA" OVER THE ILLEGAL "RACKETS" IN OUR URBAN AREAS HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY ERRODED, (WITH PERHAPS THE EXCEPTIONS BEING THE "WATER-FRONT," AND THE BOXBOARD INDUSTRY) AND THE CONSEQUENCE HAS BEEN THE EMERGENCE OF MORE INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE SUPPLYING THESE ILLICIT SERVICES. UNFORTUNATELY, WE CAN DO LITTLE ABOUT THE DESIRE OF THE PUBLIC TO SOLICIT THE VICES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME SEEKS TO PROVIDE. WE CAN, HOWEVER, ENSURE THAT NO ONE GROUP OR CONGLOMERATION OF GROUPS CONTROL THESE SERVICES. IN THIS RESPECT, I BELIEVE WE HAVE DISORGANIZED ORGANIZED CRIME, BUT IN NO WAY HAVE WE ELIMINATED THE TYPES OF CRIME CRIMINAL NETWORKS ARE WILLING TO PROVIDE.

FOURTH, I BELIEVE THAT THERE EXISTS AN OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF ORGANIZED CRIME THAT AT ONE TIME WAS NON-EXISTENT, WHICH HAS HEIGHTENED SOCIETIES PERCEPTION OF THIS PROBLEM AND HAS RESULTED IN A PUBLIC DEMAND FOR ACTION ON THE PART OF OUR ELECTED OFFICIALS. IN NEW JERSEY, THIS IS CERTAINLY THE CASE, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT HEARINGS SUCH AS THIS, WILL DISPEL THE PERCEPTION AMONG THE "DISBELIEVERS" THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ORGANIZED CRIME OF A NATIONAL SCOPE.

LASTLY, LET ME SUGGEST THAT GIVEN OUR CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY WILL HAVE TO ACCOMPLISH "MORE WITH LESS." THIS WILL NECESSITATE THE SELECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS ALLOCATION OF POLICE RESOURCES, REQUIRING A MORE PROFESSIONAL APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES. INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTS THE ULTIMATE MANAGERIAL TOOL IN THIS "WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME," AND I ENVISION PROGRESSIVE POLICE ADMINISTRATORS RELYING MORE AND MORE UPON THIS VITAL TOOL. HOPEFULLY, THIS WILL NECESSITATE A RE-ORDERING OF PRIORITIES IN OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE UNITS WITH THE RESOURCES AND ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE THAT ARE SO VITALLY NEEDED.

I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE, MR. CHAIRMAN.

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Also present: Senator Grassley.

Staff present: Duke Short, chief investigator; William Christensen, senior investigator; Allan Spence, investigator; Robert M. Reiley, investigator; and Mary Lynn Batson, investigative clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STROM THURMOND

The CHAIRMAN. The Judiciary Committee will come to order.

Today, the Senate Judiciary Committee will resume its hearings on organized criminal groups in America. In this hearing, the committee will be focusing on the dangerous outlaw motorcycle gangs which are now recognized as being an extremely violent and disruptive force in American society.

These outlaw motorcycle gangs are regularly involved in murder, rape, assault, burglary, narcotics distribution, prostitution, weapons offenses, and intimidation of citizens and witnesses, to name but a few. In addition, some of these gangs have formed alliances with traditional Mafia families and have acted as enforcers for these families.

Outlaw motorcycle gangs will do virtually anything to make money, most people feel, and will use any means or methods they can think of to establish control over an area. These gangs have been responsible for countless bombings and execution-style slayings of rival gang members and members of their own organizations who have interfered with the criminal activity of the gang.

We find that the majority of the larger outlaw gangs are using a portion of their profits from criminal activity to invest in legal business, such as mobile catering companies, motorcycle repair shops, massage parlors, investment firms, apartment houses, resort hotels, bars, ice cream shops, and private residences. I understand that a great many of them, too, have invested in pizza parlors.

Mr. Stephen E. Higgins, Acting Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and Mr. Phillip McGuire, the Assistant Director of Criminal Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, are with us today to explain the extent of the problems caused by these gangs and how the Bureau is dealing with this dangerous segment of our society.

Is Mr. Higgins here?

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. McGuire here?

Mr. MCGUIRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Owen here?

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Cooper here?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Robinson here?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Mr. Bertolani—how do you pronounce that?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Bertolani.

The CHAIRMAN. Will all of you stand up and hold up your hands?

[The witnesses stood and raised their hands.]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes.

Mr. MCGUIRE. Yes, sir.

Mr. OWEN. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Higgins, I believe you have an opening statement you are going to make. You may now proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN E. HIGGINS, ACTING DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS**

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Chairman Thurmond, and I have a more lengthy statement which I will introduce for the record. What I would do now is briefly summarize it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Your entire statement will go in the record.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you.

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the issue of organized crime in America. The forces of traditional organized crime can be characterized as waging a secret war on our Nation. Through the provision of illicit goods and services, they have entrenched themselves in our society. From that base, they have moved to involve themselves in legitimate enterprises.

Although they have always used violence and the threat of violence to support their unwanted presence, organized crime has for too long benefited from what can only be termed "good public relations."

We have all heard the term "victimless crime" applied to prostitution, gambling, or narcotics use. This is the insidious packaging of organized crime, concealing the great wealth stolen from our society and the human misery caused by organized crime behind the illusion that organized crime somehow delivers desired services which would otherwise be unavailable.

However, we can show organized crime in its true light in hearings such as these. The victim of these so-called victimless crimes is American society. Billions of dollars a year are bled from the econ-

omy by narcotics trafficking alone. Untold millions more are lost to other illicit activities. We can only speculate on the exact degree to which the Nation would benefit if that money was put back into legitimate channels, but we know that it would be substantial.

The war with organized crime is not just a war of economic ideas and perceptions; it is a war in which the enemy uses violence and terror to obtain what it cannot buy. We are rightly concerned about the random violence and criminality that threatens our citizens, but we must recognize that the violence of organized crime is not random or purposeless. Organized crime systematically uses violence to achieve control in those areas of legitimate society into which it cannot buy or corrupt its way.

No matter how sophisticated the criminal schemes of these crime cartels become, behind them will always be the gun and the bomb. Whatever the method, organized crime has one goal, to enrich itself by whatever means are available. To accomplish that goal, it not only seeks control of illegal enterprises, but it also seeks to extend its control to legitimate businesses and labor organizations.

The Nation's law enforcement agencies face a twofold challenge as we battle this enemy. Those of us in law enforcement are aware that every action we take will be measured not only for its impact on crime, but also for its implications on the rights and freedoms of the honest citizens on whose behalf the war on crime is fought.

For that reason, too, hearings such as these are important. Not only must the mystique be stripped from organized crime, but also the operations of the Nation's law enforcement bodies must be seen and understood by the public we represent.

I have until this point spoken of organized crime as if it were one body, which, of course, it is not. Organized crime in America is made up of a number of groups of varying size, scope, and in various stages of development. ATF's presentation to this committee will focus primarily on one of the most rapidly developing and coalescing types of organized crime groups, the outlaw motorcycle gangs. I should add here that these gangs have no relationship to the thousands of legitimate motorcycle owners in this country.

However, I would like to briefly touch upon the various criminal organizations which we are aware of, some of the traits which these groups have in common, and some of the activities in which they are involved.

Judge Webster spoke to you last month of La Cosa Nostra, the LCN. I agree with his description of this old and deeply entrenched crime cartel, but would add a qualification. While LCN is our most dangerous criminal enemy in terms of the degree to which it has embedded itself in the legitimate fabric of our society, it is no longer the only serious organized criminal threat.

As the country may find itself beset by a variety of guerrilla bands which may occasionally fight among themselves and occasionally form alliances, so the United States is beset by a multitude of criminal bands.

A renewed campaign against organized crime must certainly include greater efforts against LCN, but it must also include more action against the other groups. If we do not do this, our successes against LCN will only create opportunities for these other groups.

In the early 1950's, the Federal Government viewed the LCN as a series of similar regional gangs who were not coordinated on a national scale. The intrusion of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the New York State Police at a famous barbecue in upstate New York helped burst the bubble of that misconception, but that misconception gave LCN time to get its organization in place. Hopefully, we will be able to learn from that experience in addressing the new groups that are now trying to develop national organizations.

Principal among these groups are the outlaw motorcycle gangs, which control a significant portion of the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamines. Mr. Phillip McGuire, ATF's Assistant Director for Criminal Enforcement, will present to you an overview of these groups and you will have an opportunity to discuss their activities with special agents who penetrated one of the principal gangs. We will also provide for you examples of the terrifying implements of violence employed by the gangs.

There are other groups that deserve attention. The four prison gangs—EME, or the Mexican Mafia; La Nuestra Familia; the Aryan Brotherhood; and the Black Guerrilla Family—continue to grow. They are a particular nightmare because they are spawned, nurtured, and spread by our prison systems. They may well be the criminal gangs best described as having nothing to lose.

Those of us in the Federal law enforcement community have a special concern with these prison gangs that our Federal system might inadvertently facilitate the movement of these gangs out of the Western and Southwestern States where they are currently the strongest.

The seeds of other new criminal organizations have also found their way to the United States from other countries. The dregs of the Cuban prisons and narcotics entrepreneurs from a variety of South American nations are trying to root themselves in America.

The Vice President's task force is now engaged in a struggle with these elements in South Florida, a struggle which recently claimed the life of ATF Special Agent Ariel Rios, and resulted in the serious injury of ATF Special Agent Alex D'Atri.

The potential for what now appear as numerous warring factions to coalesce is only too clear if we look back on the development of LCN and, as you will see, the history of the outlaw motorcycle gangs. Yet, as diverse as they sound, it can be argued that all of these segments of organized crime in America have much in common.

They are largely formed around an ethnic base, and while accommodations have been made among the groups, ultimately the core of each group adheres to a sense of cultural or racial brotherhood. Most adhere to bizarre initiation rituals and oaths, including the commission of felonious acts by prospective members. This type of screening hampers law enforcement attempts to penetrate organized crime groups and promotes loyalty within the groups. Nevertheless, an informant can occasionally be developed. While not entirely a myth, "omerta" is not as absolute as it was once thought to be.

Finally, since organized criminal group leaders exercise absolute control over their organization, the identification and apprehension

of these principles can at least temporarily disrupt the activities of the gangs. By moving decisively during this period of disruption, law enforcement can severely damage and perhaps permanently destroy the organization.

I would agree with Judge Webster in that the situation with regard to organized crime is not hopeless. I would like to suggest that law enforcement is winning an increasing number of victories. The current level of cooperation among law enforcement agencies is unprecedented. We have learned to share the results of our efforts, particularly in wielding the power of the RICO statute. Thus, an ATF arson case, an FBI extortion investigation, and a DEA narcotics case may be fused with great success.

The head of the Philadelphia LCN family is currently imprisoned on ATF firearms charges because of the cooperation between numerous law enforcement agencies. The battle against organized crime is not the special province of any of us. It is the responsibility of all of us working together.

The explosives laws passed in 1970 were used successfully by ATF special agents to implement a national arson program. Focused on organized crime, the white-collar criminal, and the professional arsonist, that law, used by combined Federal-local task forces, has aborted some \$116.5 million in fraudulent insurance claims in the past 3 fiscal years.

The Congress recently passed, and the President signed, an amendment to the explosives laws that gives ATF even clearer jurisdiction to attack the use of arson by the professional criminal and the mobster. ATF has been able, in conjunction with U.S. attorneys, to use the dangerous special offenders classification under title 18 to insure that the professional criminal receives a sentence commensurate with his violent potential.

Thus, a member of the Genovese LCN family in Newark, N.J., received a 7-year sentence for conviction on a Federal firearms charge that itself provided only a maximum 2-year penalty. Examples such as this are proof that law enforcement is making progress.

In summary, I believe that ATF and the law enforcement community have learned a good deal about the manner in which organized criminal elements evolve and develop. We must utilize this knowledge to totally eradicate new organized crime factions as they emerge.

I will be happy at this point to answer any questions you might have.

MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF ILLICIT DRUGS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Director Higgins, in your testimony today you mentioned that the outlaw motorcycle gangs control a significant portion of the international distribution and domestic manufacture of illicit drugs. Do you believe that this is done in conjunction with traditional organized criminal groups, such as the LCN, La Cosa Nostra, or do you feel that the outlaw motorcycle gangs are cornering the market on their own?

METHAMPHETAMINE

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, I think there is a substantial deal of evidence which would suggest that the gangs themselves are very deeply and very significantly involved in the illegal manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs, and I think that is principally methamphetamine.

The CHAIRMAN. In the manufacture as well as distribution, you say?

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. We base that on a variety of sources of information from our undercover agents, from informant information, and from the seizures that are made by various drug law enforcement agencies and ATF.

In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, we have reason to believe that in those particular areas there is an association between the traditional LCN members and the outlaw gangs for particular traffic in that area. In other areas of the country, however, it appears that the outlaw gangs operate independently of other organized crime groups and may, in fact, have cornered the market.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, do you see the outlaw motorcycle gangs and the LCN opposing each other for control of illegal enterprises?

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, I do not want to characterize the relationships between the more traditional groups, such as LCN, and the outlaw gangs as being smooth necessarily, but I do not think we have been able to find any examples where they are in open conflict anywhere.

In fact, in some areas both groups appear, on the other hand, to benefit from mutual cooperation. Where that cooperation takes place, and I think Pennsylvania and New Jersey are good examples, it is generally the outlaw gangs who are performing tasks for the established groups. Usually, those are rather low-level assignments, such as strong-arm enforcement, bodyguards, and things of that type.

DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDERS

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, in your testimony I believe you mentioned the dangerous special offenders' classification under title 18 of the United States Code. Do you feel this classification and subsequent prosecution has had an effect on reducing organized criminal activity?

Mr. HIGGINS. I think based on our limited experience to date with that act, I would have to say that there has already been some fairly significant impact, and I believe the potential of that legislation is even greater. In my opening statement, I referred to the fact that there is one organized crime leader in New Jersey who is doing an additional 7 years as a dangerous offender, and he was convicted of a crime which would ordinarily have carried only a maximum 2-year penalty.

I think when you put someone away like that under the act, you do a couple of things. One, you take them out of business for a considerable period of time, and that impacts on the activities of the organization. I think, more importantly, you send a message that

possession of a gun by a felon is a very distinct liability. So, we think it is effective and can be even more so.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, since organized crime prosecution has become an important focus of the President's war on crime, do you anticipate directing additional resources to this area?

Mr. HIGGINS. Organized crime has actually been for a good number of years one of our Bureau's highest priorities, and that is true across all of our program areas, from alcohol, tobacco, and firearms through explosives. Therefore, we have always directed considerable resources anyway toward organized crime.

Additionally, we have requested for 1984 over \$7 million and an additional 100 staff years specifically in support of the Attorney General's organized crime and drug enforcement program. You may also be aware, as I mentioned in the testimony, that we are actively participating in the south Florida task force, and we plan also in the very near future to be actively involved in fighting organized crime in those 12 new task force areas. So, we are putting right now a fair share of resources in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms is responsible for many important areas of law enforcement. How much emphasis is placed on the organized crime program, and do the current and anticipated future funding levels provide sufficient resources to carry out your law enforcement mission?

Mr. HIGGINS. Well, as I actually stated earlier, we do place these investigations in our highest priority. For the benefit of the committee, I might just quickly describe what we define as organized crime, because when we get into the statistics, I think it is important to realize what it is we are talking about.

Basically, we see organized crime as having the following attributes. One is that it is self-perpetuating; two, that it is a structured, disciplined association of individuals or groups who combine together; three, that they are combined together for the purpose of monetary or financial gain, wholly or in part by illegal means; finally, that they protect their activities through a pattern of graft, corruption and threats of violence. So, that is a fairly strict interpretation of organized crime.

Within that, then, we have identified certain groups. Statistically, during the past 2 fiscal years, we have initiated investigations on approximately 2,752 suspects under our organized crime program, meeting that definition.

In fiscal 1981, which are the last complete statistics we have available, we recommended some 3,076 firearms and explosive violators for prosecution. Of that number, approximately one-third of those people were members of organized criminal groups.

You might also be interested to know that of those over 3,000 that we recommended prosecution on, some 81.8 percent of those people had prior criminal records. So, we are going against those people who have a propensity for violence and crime.

On your last question with respect to whether we have sufficient resources, I cannot help but remark that our resources this year looked a whole lot better than they did last year. But those of you who are familiar with what we went through last year would understand what I meant by that.

Obviously, I am not going to tell you that we could not impact organized crime more if we had additional resources. I would not mean it and you would not believe me if I told you that. But I think that the Bureau has to support the administration and the Department's desire to reduce the Federal deficit above our parochial views. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for us to request any additional resources.

What we have been trying to do in the past, and I think what we should be doing in the future, in attacking the organized criminal is to make sure that we do so in the most effective way possible, and really what that means is conducting only the most significant investigations and using people who are adequately supported and well-trained. So, we are trying to do the best we can with what we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you able to accomplish your mission with the resources you have?

Mr. HIGGINS. I guess no one in a law enforcement agency is ever totally satisfied that they are completely accomplishing their mission and are probably always looking for additional resources. But I think in terms of what we have identified as our high priorities, in view of the administration's other priorities—I am giving you a bureaucratic answer to say that we are doing the best we can with what we have, and I cannot ask for more.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, we will not press you any further on that.

Now, Director Higgins, would you give the committee your views on the Freedom of Information Act in regard to your organized crime investigations? Specifically, do you feel that your investigations are hampered because of the ability of the targets of the investigations to get information from your agency?

Mr. HIGGINS. I think it is fair to say that it does hamper us, and I am not talking about the volume of workload that is involved because I think we should not look at that as an imposition.

But I think it hampers us in at least two ways. First, we have noticed lately an increasing reluctance by various informants and even other State and local law enforcement agencies to provide us information when they realize that when that investigation is closed, somewhere down the line we may be releasing that investigation.

Even though we blank out and delete any identifying information of informants and other agencies, if you send in enough freedom of information requests, you can sometimes piece together the identity of those informants.

Beyond that, I think that it affects us from the standpoint of when we release those things ultimately—and I have seen some cases where we will have multiple requests from one organized crime member and his associates, and I am sure what they are doing is taking that information and putting it together.

Given those groups' demonstrated propensity to take care of those people who have been witnesses against them and who have informed on them, I think you can understand the reluctance of people to furnish information, even though we do everything we can to insure that their names will not be released.

It also puts a lot of pressure, I think, on personnel within the agency to be sure that they are very, very careful in screening

these requests, because you make one mistake and it could be fatal in this particular area. So, yes, we think it does hamper us somewhat.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, how would you rate the outlaw motorcycle gangs' intelligence networks with those of law enforcement agencies?

Mr. HIGGINS. I think the techniques used by the gangs to gather intelligence at this point, anyway, are not nearly as sophisticated or as thorough as the techniques used by law enforcement agencies. Primarily, they are using extortion and carnal bribes, and occasionally they will have one of the women go undercover in either a police agency or in a utilities company so they can get information that they would not otherwise be privy to. I have even heard of a case now where they are putting some of their intelligence information on the home computer, so I guess the home computer is truly the man of the year.

But I think that the important thing for us is not so much how sophisticated these techniques are, but I think the very fact that they gather intelligence information demonstrates the extent of their organization, and it also demonstrates the extent to which they will go to protect their illegal activities.

What I would like to suggest is that you have some witnesses who will be testifying either this afternoon or tomorrow that I think are much more familiar with specific intelligence networks, and I would suggest maybe you would ask them that question, too, for some specific examples.

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, in the past there has been some criticism directed toward Federal law enforcement agencies concerning the use of undercover agents, informants, and electronic surveillance. Unquestionably, these methods are essential in the investigation of outlaw motorcycle gangs and organized crime in general. I would think that any reduction in their use would greatly hamper ATF's effectiveness. Will you give me your thoughts on this subject?

Mr. HIGGINS. Senator, I would agree with you very, very much. At the outset, I would simply say that the use of undercover agents, informants, and electronic surveillance is, and has always been, a very effective tool of good law enforcement.

They are essential in investigating sophisticated organized criminal groups, and as I am sure you are aware, the use of these tools helps us keep these criminal groups off balance and under constant pressure.

I think the criticism that is directed toward Federal law enforcement agencies regarding the techniques generally pertains to the misuse of the techniques and not to their use. And I would like to assure you and the members of the committee that ATF has in the past, and will in the future, take every step possible to insure that we use these investigative techniques properly and responsibly, and that they are under control by the agency. But we do think they are very, very valuable.

ILLEGAL FIREARMS TRADE

The CHAIRMAN. Director Higgins, ATF is an excellent and capable organization and one that has, through the years, provided a great service to our Nation. We must not, however, let our guard down. The illegal trade in firearms that goes on in all segments of organized crime poses a great threat to the lives of our citizens and our law enforcement officers.

Now, Director Higgins, this committee will, at a future date, be introducing legislative changes designed to assist you in your efforts. In this regard, I wonder if you favor expansion of the range of crimes covered by title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, and if there are any legislative recommendations you might offer that would aid ATF in its efforts to combat organized crime.

Mr. HIGGINS. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I appreciate your kind words about the organization. I share those, but I have been said to be prejudiced about that.

Yes, we do favor expansion of that particular act, and what I would suggest is that we work with your committee staff members and provide our help in making some suggestions and recommendations on how that might be done, if that is acceptable.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would be very happy to receive those and you can get those to us.

Mr. HIGGINS. All right.

[The prepared statement of Stephen E. Higgins follows plus answers to questions submitted by Senator Biden:]

STATEMENT

OF

STEPHEN E. HIGGINS
ACTING DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

Chairman Thurmond, members of the Committee. It is with great pleasure that I come before the committee today to discuss the issue of organized crime in America. We in Government frequently use the word "war" in describing our efforts to deal with the criminal menace to our society; but I wonder if the American people are fully aware of how very little hyperbole is involved in that use? It is through hearings such as these that the public is informed. Accordingly, all of us in the law enforcement community welcome this opportunity to speak about the principal enemy--organized crime.

The forces of organized crime can be characterized as waging a secret war on our nation. Through the provision of illicit goods and services, they have entrenched themselves in our society. From that base, they have moved to involve themselves in legitimate enterprises.

Although they have always used violence and the threat of violence to support their unwanted presence, organized crime has, for too long, benefited from what can only be termed "good public relations."

How often have all of us heard the term "victimless crime" applied to prostitution, gambling, or narcotics use? This is the insidious "packaging" of organized crime--concealing the great wealth stolen from our society, and the human misery caused by organized crime--behind a facade that organized crime somehow delivers to the people some desired services denied them by Government.

We must focus the light of truth on organized crime in hearings such as these. There is a victim of these so-called "victimless crimes" and that victim is American society. How many billion dollars a year is bled from the economy by narcotics trafficking alone? Think of the construction, jobs and services which could be provided if that money remained in legitimate channels.

Nor is the war with organized crime just a war of ideas and perceptions, it is a war in which the enemy uses violence and terror to obtain what it cannot buy. We are rightly concerned about the random violence and criminality that threatens our citizens; but we must recognize that the violence of organized crime is not random or purposeless. Organized crime uses violence to achieve control in those areas of legitimate society into which it cannot buy or corrupt its way. And no matter how complicated the criminal schemes of these crime cartels become, behind them will always be the gun and the bomb.

Whatever the method, organized crime has one goal--to plunder our nation's economy. To accomplish that goal, it not only seeks control of illegal enterprises, but it also seeks to extend its control to legitimate businesses and labor organizations.

It is difficult to ascertain the greater threat--the persistent bleeding of our free enterprise system, or the hidden power exercised through the participation in otherwise legitimate business and labor organizations.

The nation's law enforcement agencies, our frontline troops, must meet a two-fold responsibility as we battle this enemy. Those of us in law enforcement are aware daily, that every action we take will be measured not only for its impact on crime, but equally for its implications for the rights and freedoms of the honest citizens on whose behalf the war on crime is fought. For that reason too, hearings

such as these are important. Not only must the veil of secrecy be stripped from organized crime; but also the operations of the nation's law enforcement bodies must be seen and understood by the public we represent.

I have, until this point, spoken of organized crime as if it were one body, which of course it is not. Organized crime in America is made up of a number of groups of varying size, scope, and in various stages of development. ATF's presentation to this committee will focus primarily on one of the most rapidly developing and coalescing type of organized crime groups, the outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Before doing so, however, I would like to briefly touch upon the various criminal organizations we are aware of; some of the common factors between these groups, and some of the activity by the groups we have noted.

Judge Webster spoke to you last month of La Cosa Nostra (LCN). I would not add greatly to his description of this long established and deeply entrenched crime cartel, except to propose some cautionary words. LCN may well be our most dangerous criminal enemy, in terms of the degree to which it has embedded itself into the legitimate fabric of our society; but LCN is not the synonym for organized crime it once was. As a country may find itself beset by a variety of guerrilla bands, which may occasionally fight among themselves and occasionally form alliances, so the United States is confronted by a multitude of criminal bands. A renewed campaign against organized crime must include not only greater efforts against LCN, but it must also include more action against the other groups. If we do not do this, our successes against LCN will only create opportunities for these other groups.

In the early 1950's, the Federal Government viewed LCN as a series of similar, regional gangs which were not coordinated on a national scale. The intrusion of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the New York State Police

at a famous barbeque in upstate New York helped burst the bubble of that misconception. But that misconception gave LCN time to get its organization in place. Hopefully, we will be able to learn from that experience in addressing the new groups that are now trying to implement national organizations.

Principal among these other groups are the outlaw motorcycle gangs. Mr. Phillip McGuire, ATF's Assistant Director for Criminal Enforcement, will present to you an overview of these groups, and you will have an opportunity to discuss their activity with special agents who penetrated one of the principal gangs. We will also provide for you examples of the terrifying implements of violence employed by the gangs. Finally, you will have an opportunity to question people involved with the gangs as members and victims. You will even hear how one gang, the Hell's Angels, was moved to copy the LCN structure described in the best selling novel, "The Godfather."

We are aware, in gearing up our involvement in the 12 Presidential task forces, that, in addition to the international flow of narcotics, there is a booming domestic industry in illegally manufactured and distributed methamphetamine. The outlaw motorcycle gangs control a significant portion of that market. The involvement of the gangs in firearms and explosives offenses is a continuing problem with which this agency has struggled for over a decade.

There are other groups that deserve attention. The four prison gangs, EME (the Mexican Mafia), La Nuestra Familia, the Aryan Brotherhood, and Black Guerrilla family continue to grow. They are a particular nightmare because they are spawned, nurtured, and spread by our prison systems. They may well be the criminal gangs best described as having nothing to lose. Those of us in the Federal law enforcement

community have a special concern with the prison gangs--that our Federal system might be a carrier for these gangs out of the western and southwestern States, where they are currently strongest.

The seeds of new criminal organizations have also found their way to our shores. The dregs of the Cuban prisons and narcotics entrepreneurs from a variety of South American nations are trying to root themselves in America. The Vice President's Task Force is now engaged in a struggle with that group in South Florida--a struggle which recently claimed the life of ATF Special Agent Ariel Rios and resulted in the serious injury of ATF Special Agent Alex D'Atri. The potential for what now appear as numerous warring factions to coalesce is only too clear if we look back on the development of LCN and, as you will see, the history of the outlaw motorcycle gangs.

As divergent as they sound, it can be argued that all these segments of organized crime in America have much in common. They are largely formed around an ethnic base. While accommodations have been made between groups, ultimately the core of each group adheres to a sense of cultural or racial superiority.

Most adhere to bizarre initiation rituals and oaths, including the commission of felonious acts by prospective members. This screening is a bane to law enforcement attempts to penetrate organized crime groups and promotes loyalty within the group. Nevertheless, where apprehension is made for violent acts committed by lower level or prospective members of an organization, occasionally an informant can be developed. While not entirely a myth, "omerta" is not as absolute as it was once thought to be. Increasingly, the punishment meted out by criminal organizations for a member being apprehended is assassination.

Finally, although they exist in a free society, the

leadership of organized crime groups are despots. The identification and apprehension of the principal leaders of such groups can severely damage the organization.

I would agree with Judge Webster, that the situation with regard to organized crime is not hopeless. I'd like to propose that law enforcement is winning an increasing number of victories.

The current level of cooperation among law enforcement agencies is unprecedented. We have learned to share the results of our individual efforts, particularly in wielding the power of the RICO statute. Thus, an ATF arson case, an FBI extortion investigation, and a DEA narcotics case may be fused with great success.

The head of the Philadelphia LCN family is currently imprisoned on ATF firearms charges, because of the cooperation between numerous law enforcement agencies. The battle against organized crime is not the special province of any of us; it is the responsibility of all of us working together.

The explosives laws passed in 1970 were used successfully by ATF special agents to implement a national arson program. Focused on organized crime, the white collar criminal, and the professional arsonist, that law (used by combined Federal and local task forces) has aborted some \$116.5 million in fraudulent insurance claims in the past 3 fiscal years. Congress recently passed, and the President signed, an amendment to the explosive laws that gives ATF even clearer jurisdiction to attack the use of arson by the professional criminal and the mobster.

ATF has been able, in conjunction with the U.S. attorneys, to use the Dangerous Special Offenders (DSO) classification under Title 18 to ensure that the professional criminal receives a sentence commensurate with his violent potential. Thus, a member of the Genovese LCN family in Newark, New Jersey, received a 7-year sentence for a conviction on a Federal firearms charge that, itself, provided only a maximum 2-year penalty.

In closing, I would take this opportunity to outline for you some of the kinds of cases ATF has developed under the authority granted to us. I believe these cases illustrate both the violence involved and the fact that the war on organized crime and the national focus on violent crime are not unrelated.

Los Angeles, CA:

ATF conducted an extensive surveillance of an individual identified by law enforcement authorities as the founder of the "Black Guerrilla Family," a black prison gang responsible for numerous acts of violence within the California prison system. This surveillance was based upon information that the subject was involved in the sale of narcotics and was believed to be carrying a firearm at all times. Surveillance resulted in the recovery of two stolen firearms, as well as stolen Government checks and narcotics from the suspect's residence. This established a basis for revocation of the subject's parole. He was ultimately convicted of Federal firearms violations and sentenced to prison.

Wilmington, DE:

An outlaw motorcycle gang member was sentenced to 59 years in prison, following conviction for violations of the Gun Control Act. The suspect, a convicted felon, had purchased firearms from a local firearms dealer in the Wilmington area for use by himself and other outlaw motorcycle gang members.

Atlanta, GA:

On March 17, 1982, two union officials were arrested for their roles in the June 24, 1980, bombing at SCA Services, Inc., a disposal company, in College Park, Georgia. The bombing caused \$4,000 in damages to SCA garbage trucks.

The union officials were charged in Federal court with ATF explosives charges and conspiracy. The arrests were the result of a joint ATF, Clayton County Sheriff's Office, and Georgia State Police investigation.

Miami, FL:

ATF agents penetrated the Charles Long organization in the Miami area. Long was a DEA Class I violator dealing in Quaaludes, cocaine, and marijuana. The agents purchased machineguns and Quaaludes directly from Long, and machineguns from an unscrupulous firearms dealer to whom Long introduced them. As a result of this investigation, Long received a 15-year prison sentence, and the firearms dealer received a 5-year sentence.

Miami, FL/Chicago, IL:

A member of the Giancana organized crime family and five other persons were arrested in Miami and Chicago following an ATF and DEA undercover investigation in which agents purchased narcotics and silencers from the subjects. At the time of the arrest, agents seized 5 handguns, 2 machineguns, and 51 silencers. The principal subject entered a plea of guilty to all charges and was sentenced to 26 years. His confederates received commensurate sentences. In addition, this investigation led to the source of the silencers, a Chicago policeman, who has since been arrested and convicted. The silencer factory was seized. This portion of the investigation has led ATF into an extensive investigation of Chicago area organized crime.

Boston, MA:

On November 13, 1982, ATF Boston assisted the Massachusetts State Police in the execution of a search warrant at the residence of an associate of the Anguilo LCN family. Seized were five firearms, two fitted with silencers; partially com-

pleted silencers; assorted tools and components; silencer plants; a publication entitled, "Home Workshop Silencers I"; and a quantity of cocaine. This case is pending trial.

St. Louis, MO:

On October 20, 1982, a suspect was found guilty of conspiracy in U.S. District Court, Little Rock, Arkansas. The conviction is the result of his indictment on March 23, 1982, for the organized crime, revenge car bombing of an official of Laborers Local Union #42. The victim was severely injured, losing both legs in the blast.

Indicted along with the principal on March 23, 1982, was the former Chief of Police of the St. George, Missouri, Police Department. The indictments and conviction were the result of a joint investigation by ATF, FBI, and the St. Louis County Police Department of a series of organized crime bombings in the St. Louis area.

Omaha, NE:

A joint investigation by ATF, DEA, and numerous State and local agencies resulted in the execution of nine Federal search warrants and 10 Federal arrest warrants on members of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. Agents seized 55 firearms, narcotics, a human skull, and finger. The suspects have been charged with attempting to dominate the area's methamphetamine distribution through the use of violence.

Six of the persons arrested have been convicted of Federal firearms violations; three are fugitives.

Newark, NJ:

A four-time convicted felon, and member of the Genovese crime family, was sentenced to 7-years imprisonment for violation of the Gun Control Act.

Sentenced under the provisions of the Dangerous Special Offenders Act, this subject was a business agent for a union at the time of this investigation.

ATF, the FBI, and the Labor Department cooperated in this investigation.

New York, NY:

ATF agents and New York City Police Officers culminated a 7-month undercover investigation by conducting a series of raids in that area. Arrest warrants were issued for 47 persons, 40 of whom were known members of New York organized crime families. Nineteen suspects were charged with Federal firearms and explosives violations. These charges resulted from ATF's undercover purchase of nine machineguns; 75 firearms silencers; and a fully assembled bomb, as well as narcotics and other contraband. In addition, State charges for murder, robbery, and kidnapping were filed as a result of this investigation.

Rochester, NY:

The city of Rochester was plagued with a series of bombings and other violent acts, as two opposing organized crime groups engaged in "mob warfare" over the control of illegal gambling operations. Death, injury, and property damage lay in the aftermath of this menacing criminal feud. For approximately 2 years, ATF spearheaded an extensive investigation (in conjunction with State/local authorities and the Department of Justice Organized Crime Strike Force Office) directed toward the crime and violence perpetrated by the opposing groups. The investigation culminated in the arrest and conviction of seven principal organized crime figures for violations of the Explosives Control Act. The defendants were sentenced to a cumulative total of 137 years in prison.

Since the prosecution and conviction of the defendants, the mob violence in Rochester has ceased.

Asheville, NC/Chicago, IL:

Three armed members of the Outlaws Motorcycle Gang kidnapped a woman and her boyfriend in Asheville, North Carolina. The boyfriend was murdered and the female was taken to Chicago where she was "sold" to local members of the Outlaws.

A joint investigation by ATF, the FBI, INS, the RCMP, and local officials led to the conviction of five gang members (including the president of the Montreal Chapter of the Outlaws) on kidnapping, conspiracy, firearms, and Mann Act violations.

Cleveland, OH:

On November 23, 1982, the president of the Cleveland Hell's Angels was indicted for numerous violations of the Federal firearms laws by a Federal grand jury in Cleveland, Ohio.

This subject was previously convicted of burglary and has a multiple arrest record for violent criminal acts (including kidnapping, rape, assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault on a police officer).

Harrisburg/Pittsburgh/Scranton, PA:

ATF special agents and postal inspectors arrested four members of the Pagans motorcycle gang in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The four suspects were charged by a Federal grand jury in a 15-count indictment for violations of the Federal explosives laws, mail fraud, perjury, and conspiracy.

The arrests of these suspects culminated a 2-year joint investigation by ATF and the Postal Inspection Service into the bombing of the Paxton Plaza Building in Harrisburg on October 6, 1978. Six separate dynamite bombs detonated, causing extensive damage, and four unexploded bombs were

rendered safe by military Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel.

Numerous interviews, financial examinations, and collateral investigations developed sufficient evidence to confront the owner, who admitted that he had hired the motorcycle gang members to bomb his building in an insurance fraud scheme.

The owner and his attorney plead guilty to violations of the Federal explosives laws and mail fraud, and were sentenced to serve 40 months and 12 months, respectively.

Two of the Pagans received 3-year sentences as a result of their cooperation with ATF.

That cooperation resulted in the conviction of Allan Morrow, the self-professed "Prince of Porn" on charges resulting from three arsons he caused to be committed and firearms offenses. Morrow was sentenced to 6-years imprisonment.

Philadelphia, PA:

Almost 2 years after a successful ATF prosecution of an organized crime associate in a firearms conspiracy case, he contacted the ATF special agent who prepared that case and offered to turn informant. This informant confessed to being a contract killer for a ranking member of the Philadelphia LCN family. The informant implicated the LCN figure and others in three homicides. ATF, assisted by the Pennsylvania State Police, exhumed two of the hidden corpses in rural Pennsylvania and determined that the third had previously been found in New Jersey. The informant and the LCN figure were indicted for civil rights violations in connection with these murders. This was apparently the first use of these statutes to bring an organized crime contract killing before a Federal court. The informant pled guilty, but the LCN figure was assassinated

before his trial, in one of sixteen such unsolved, organized crime killings in the Philadelphia area in 2 years.

In addition to the above, the informant provided information concerning the Philadelphia LCN family and their associates relating to over 200 burglaries, 28 armed robberies, arson, firearms violations, and illegal drug manufacturing. The U.S. Attorney for the Eastern Judicial District of Pennsylvania designated ATF agents as Racketeering Investigators under the RICO statutes. An additional 10 defendants were convicted in Federal court on RICO, interstate theft, and narcotics charges.

Charleston, SC:

A member of the Hell's Angels, sought by ATF for Federal firearms violations, and by State officials for homicide, was murdered in gang-related violence.

Columbia, SC:

In January 1982 ATF, participating in a joint task force, executed a search warrant at the Sundowner's Motorcycle Gang Clubhouse in Columbia, SC. Fourteen firearms and assorted narcotic drugs were seized. Approximately 40 members and associates were arrested on State and Federal charges.

Rockhill, SC:

On July 28, 1982, ATF, DEA, and the State Law Enforcement Division executed search warrants at the home of the South Carolina Hell's Angel president and a mini warehouse rented by the gang. Twelve conventional weapons, three machineguns, a silencer, two bombs constructed of plastic explosives, and over 40 other assorted explosive items were seized. The club president was subsequently convicted of assaulting a Federal agent. His case for firearms and explosives possession is pending.

Manassas, VA:

ATF agents served a Federal search warrant on the residence of a female who had purchased 17 handguns from various firearms dealers in Northern Virginia, using an assumed name and a fictitious driver's license. She agreed to cooperate, and stated that she had purchased the weapons on behalf of a firearms ring operating in the Bronx section of New York City. This investigation led to the arrest of the person who transported weapons to the firearms ring and the ring leader, a major narcotics trafficker with documented ties to organized crime elements in New York. This narcotics trafficker was convicted on two counts of GCA violations. He was sentenced to serve 4 years in prison.

Burlington, VT:

On March 12, 1982, a Federal jury in Burlington, Vermont, returned guilty verdicts against six suspects for numerous violations of the Federal firearms laws. This investigation was initiated as a result of a request for assistance by the Vermont State Police, as the suspects were allegedly major dealers in stolen firearms. ATF agents purchased 13 firearms from the defendants, including two unregistered machineguns. Firearms officers from the Quebec Provincial Police, Canada, testified in the ATF case. Canadian officials have stated that the assistance rendered by ATF provided valuable leads to illegal firearms trafficking in Canada. The U.S. attorney stated that this investigation resulted in the arrest and conviction of the largest gunrunning ring in the northeastern United States.

Tacoma, WA:

As a result of an extensive 18-month investigation by ATF in Tacoma, Washington, a major organized crime operation was successfully curtailed with the arrest of 15 prominent

individuals. Among those arrested were: the Sheriff of Pierce County (Tacoma); two acknowledged organized crime bosses in Tacoma; the chief lieutenant for that organization; and five organized crime associates.

The investigation was initiated by ATF after information was received implicating organized crime figures in a scheme to monopolize the liquor business in the Pierce County area by threats and acts of arson. At one point in the investigation, a Washington State Liquor Control Agent was gunned down by two men outside of his Tacoma home. Severely wounded, the agent nonetheless survived and was able to give ATF special agents valuable leads regarding the attempted murder by the two gunmen. ATF subsequently recovered a sawed-off shotgun in Missouri that was later positively identified as one of the weapons used in the attempted murder. ATF special agents were also successful in identifying the two gunmen, who ultimately confessed that they had been hired by a member of the organized crime operation.

After a 5-month trial, 13 defendants were convicted on charges relating to a conspiracy to violate the Federal racketeering laws (RICO), pertaining to arson, murder, extortion, and gambling violations.

On July 11, 1979, a Federal judge in Seattle, Washington, sentenced the defendant to a cumulative total of 170 years in prison, in addition to fines totaling \$393,000, for their role in these crimes.

Racine, WI:

On September 29, 1980, a firebombing of a residence occurred in the above city. Two small children were hospitalized as a result. Investigation by ATF revealed that the owner of the property had engaged in an argument the same night with certain members of the High Riders Motorcycle Gang.

Further investigation revealed that one of the gang members was employed part time at a local body repair shop where a type of lacquer thinner is used. Lacquer thinner, of the same type, was used in the firebombing. During the investigation of this particular gang member, various associates were interviewed. One of these was a former girlfriend who agreed to cooperate and implicated her former boyfriend in testimony before a Federal grand jury.

Shortly after testifying, the former girlfriend was physically assaulted by the suspect, due to her cooperation with authorities. She suffered a fracture to the arm, leg, and skull. Despite this beating, she continued cooperating. On March 26, 1981, the gang member was convicted of the firebombing and of the assault. He received a 20-year sentence.

Milwaukee, WI:

On October 15, 1982, in the Eastern Judicial District of Wisconsin, three suspects pled guilty to Federal charges in their attempt to destroy property by means of an explosive device. The three defendants were previously indicted on July 7, 1982, and the indictments culminated a 2-year joint investigation by ATF and the FBI into the activities of Local 139, Operating Engineers Union, and the attempted bombing on April 21, 1982, of a crane belonging to a nonunion marine contractor in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

As we respond to the President's call for a new campaign on organized crime, I believe we are all aware of how vital it is that we build upon the gains we have made. We must increase the pressure on organized crime in all its forms. That the motive of these cartels is profit, and not politics, does not lessen their frightening incursion into our free society. There can be no more important mission for Government than the protection of that society.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS,
Washington, D.C., May 13, 1983.

Hon. STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your inquiry on behalf of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., who is requesting additional data pertaining to our testimony on organized crime.

We are happy to enclose For the Record the answers to Senator Biden's questions. If we may be of further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely yours,

STEPHEN E. HIGGINS,
Director.

Enclosures.

BUDGET QUESTIONS

Question. Commissioner, looking at the workyears your agency devotes to criminal enforcement activities it would appear that you have been on a real decline the last few years. When this administration first took office there were serious discussions of eliminating the entire agency. I understand in 1982 you lost almost 700 people who left the agency fearing a major RIF. Your criminal enforcement division will have 600 fewer workyears devoted to law enforcement that it did in 1979. That is a reduction of 25 percent.

Answer. The Bureau has experienced a steady decline in personnel, since 1979. We lost 765 employees in 1982, including the loss of 163 journeymen agents. Since 1979 Criminal Enforcement has experienced a 461 work year reduction; 4 in 1980, 111 in 1981, and 346 in 1982. Based on the projected workyears through 1984, Criminal Enforcement will be experiencing a total reduction of 600 workyears from 1979 through 1984. This is an approximate reduction of 25 percent.

Question. What has been the impact on morale in the field?

Answer. Morale suffered in 1982 with the employees facing on the one hand the possible dissolution of the Bureau and on the other RIF's due to a reduced funding level. Throughout that period, performance remained at a remarkably high level despite the uncertainty. Specific criminal investigations already underway during this time did not suffer. However, the loss of journeyman agents and lowered morale did reduce the total number of violations identified and investigations conducted. Since the time of those problems, agent morale has been constantly improving. With the appointment of a new Assistant Director (Criminal Enforcement), agents realize that we have new opportunities with new direction. A recent vacancy announcement resulted in 43 highly qualified special agents applying for a Headquarters' position. This would not have resulted in any increase in pay for many of the applicants and would have resulted in a financial hardship for all. We feel that this commitment is an excellent measure of the faith special agents have in the future of the Bureau and of their desire to be a part of it. We expect this improvement to continue.

Question. Is it true that you have lost many of your better agents to other law enforcement agencies during this period?

Answer. While it is true the Bureau lost good agents during the 1982 period of uncertainty, we would not characterize them as better than agents that remained. Those that left the Bureau were our younger agents with several years on-the-job experience. The Bureau suffers the consequences whenever we lose an agent, especially when that agent is at the journeymen working grade level, which all these agents were.

Question. Is it true that staffing shortages in the field resulted in agents having to do their own typing and filing in field offices?

Answer. Yes, it is true that the loss of clerical employees did result in the necessity of some agents in the field typing and filing their own correspondence. We have currently hired 44 clerical employees and are in the process of interviewing to fill other badly needed clerical vacancies.

Question. It is my understanding that you are still trying to recover from the 700 who left last year. Are you now rehiring or hiring new people?

Answer. Yes, the Bureau has been granted sufficient resources and personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1983 to hire 80 agents and about 180 to 200 support personnel. Both new applicants and former agent employees are being interviewed for employ-

ment. We are also placing 100 temporaries in areas where clerical vacancies are especially critical.

Question. Have you found that former employees with experience and previous training are now willing to come back to the Bureau?

Answer. A few former employees have made known their availability to be re-hired and some already have been re-hired. However, the number indicating a desire to return is small.

Question. How long does it take you to hire, train an agent and put him on the street?

Answer. The normal progression for a newly hired "trainee" agent to the journeyman working experience level varies from 3 to 4 years—depending upon their educational and prior work experience background. For a new "trainee" agent with a minimum educational and work background, hired at the GS-1811-5 grade level, it takes 3 years before being eligible for the GS-1811-11 journeyman grade level.

Question. Is your organized crime division a separate line item in your budget? I ask that because it seems to fall within the entire law enforcement sub-total figures?

Answer. The Bureau does not have an organized Crime Division. We did have an Organized Crime Branch in the Criminal Enforcement's Headquarter's function before April 3, 1983. With the reorganization of Criminal Enforcement's Headquarters function, that Branch was redesignated the Special Programs Branch. The Bureau's budget does not identify the organized crime investigative activity as a separate line item. With organized crime involved in all four of our enforcement responsibilities, alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives, we cannot separate it out with the preciseness required for the budgeting process. However, it is reflected in the budget under each law enforcement activity and narratively commented upon where appropriate.

Question. What has been the workyears devoted to this activity in the last 5 years?

Answer. Over the last 5 years, these Bureau devoted the following manyears (work years) in investigating organized crime.

Fiscal year:	Man-years
1978	87.4
1979	197.7
1980	365.6
1981	287.5
1982	201.6
Total	1,139.8

Question. Your agency has been recognized over the course of time to have developed a good working relationship with State and local law enforcement. Have you found that budget cuts have reduced your ability to work as closely with these agencies as you have in the past? I am most concerned about the help you give them in arson cases which often are the result of organized crime activities.

Answer. The primary thrust of each of the Bureau's law enforcement missions is to provide meaningful assistance to State and local enforcement agencies in the fight against crime and violence. This assistance is manifested through investigative activities, technical and forensic assistance and training programs. Indeed, an excellent working relationship between our special agents and the State/local departments has resulted from this assistance inasmuch as it is within that framework of coordinated, cooperative efforts that these joint endeavors have the greatest potential for success.

Budget restrictions and limitations have a direct effect upon our ability to provide assistance to State/local agencies in each of our program areas, and perhaps recent reductions in our arson enforcement program are indicative of the impact created by such changes. For example, in fiscal year 1980, ATF initiated 667 arson investigations, and during that same time, 303 defendants were recommended for prosecution. We would also note that \$54 million in fraudulent insurance claims (or potential claims) associated with these investigations were aborted because of our investigative efforts.

In fiscal year 1981, as budget restrictions reduced our arson efforts, only 409 arson investigations were initiated; 286 defendants were recommended for prosecution; and \$27 million in fraudulent insurance claims (or potential claims) were aborted. In fiscal year 1982, the number of arson investigations further decreased to 283 for that period. The statistics for the number of defendants for fiscal year 1982 have not

yet been tabulated; however, we anticipate that a further decline occurred during that time.

In fiscal year 1983, ATF's overall budget was restored to an adequate level and we have already observed a positive effect upon our arson investigative efforts. For example, the number of arson investigations initiated in the first 6 months of fiscal year 1983 increased 43 percent over the number initiated during the first 6 months of the previous year. Accordingly, we are confident that with the improved budget authorization, we will once again be capable of providing meaningful assistance to State/local agencies in their efforts to reduce crime and violence.

Question. Generally, would you like to be able to devote more resources to the organized crime area? How would you use additional resources in this area?

Answer. In so far as possible, we direct whatever resources are available to organized crime investigations. For example, ATF currently participates in 11 multi-agency task forces focused on outlaw motorcycle gangs. While we could certainly utilize additional resources, we also recognize our responsibility to ensure the maximum effectiveness from the resources we now have.

Question. What advantage does your agency have in infiltrating or working undercover against organized crime, particularly motorcycle gangs, that may not be available to other Federal agencies?

Answer. ATF has several significant advantages in working undercover investigations. The first is that this agency has an unparalleled record of cooperation with, and commitment to, working with State and local agencies. One of the benefits of this record is the willingness of those agencies to provide information to ATF and to share informants with us. In terms of targeting, and achieving entry, in undercover operations this is a major plus. Unfortunately, we are aware that, in spite of this record of mutual support, there is a growing concern on the part of State and local agencies about sharing information with ATF because of the possibility of eventual disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

The second is that this agency is the most experienced agency in the use of consensual electronic surveillance. ATF does not have wiretap authority for firearms trafficking cases, which does inhibit our ability to pursue certain of these cases, however the Bureau is the largest user of consensual electronic surveillance of the Federal agencies.

The last is that, particularly with the outlaw motorcycle gang members, career criminals are vulnerable to our firearms and explosives jurisdiction. The bottom line in any investigation is successful prosecution and, as was cited in our testimony, there have been instances where juries did not convict defendants in complex RICO cases, but did return guilty verdicts on the same defendants charged with substantive firearms violations.

TASK FORCE INVOLVEMENT AND COORDINATION

Question. In fiscal year 1984 you will devote 80-100 workyears to the organized crime task forces. Can you tell us how many workyears you expect to devote this year since the budget material I have received from the Justice Department simply lumps all of the Treasury agencies together?

Answer. It is difficult to estimate fiscal year 1983 workyears with any degree of certainty, because that total will be influenced by numerous factors which are not within ATF's control. Our best estimate at this point is that we will devote 32-38 workyears to the drug enforcement task forces in fiscal year 1983.

Question. Are your agents already working task force cases?

Answer. As of today, ATF has only 12 permanently assigned task force positions—one in each of the 12 core cities. The "coordinators" are not working on task force cases at this time. There are, however, several ongoing ATF investigations throughout the country which have been nominated for approval as task force cases. Approval from the Department of Justice is anticipated within a matter of days. So we do have agents working on investigations that soon will become task force cases.

Question. How do you feel about the Justice Department controlling the budget of yours and other Treasury agencies participating in the Task Force?

Answer. Obviously, we would prefer to have the funds for task force participation in our own budget and under our own control—as they will be beginning with fiscal year 1984. Having the Department of Justice control the funds has necessitated the institution of some rather cumbersome administrative procedures regarding reimbursement. However, the reason for having the Department of Justice control the funds this year was to avoid causing each of the five participating agencies to prepare and submit supplemental budget requests. Our experience with requesting

budget supplementals convinced us that it would be more expeditious to have one agency obtain the funds for all participants.

Question. Have your received specific instructions or guidelines as to what your agencies' function will be in the overall task force strategy?

Answer. A formal document, entitled "Guidelines for the Drug Enforcement Task Force," has been approved by the Attorney General and distributed to all participating agencies. While the specific functions of the participating investigative agencies may vary somewhat in order to better utilize each agency's unique expertise and jurisdictional capabilities, all agencies must operate within the published guidelines.

Question. Does your agency currently work under the same guidelines as Justice agencies when working undercover cases?

Answer. Basically, yes. Although internal controls and guidelines may vary somewhat from agency to agency, all Federal Enforcement agencies are bound by common constitutional restrictions and constraints.

Question. Do you believe there is adequate law enforcement training for Federal, State and local police on the activities of motorcycle gangs? Is training in this area something that the Federal Government should be doing a better job in if adequate resources were available?

Answer. As the motorcycle gangs have expanded their criminal operations the need for law enforcement training, and coordination of information, concerning their activities has also grown.

Currently there are a number of annual regional law enforcement conferences, hosted by State and local agencies, devoted to the activity of the outlaw motorcycle gangs. Additionally, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, has developed a block of instruction on the gangs which is part of the basic Criminal Investigator's School.

In general, the most complete knowledge concerning a chapter of any gang will be found at the State and local level. The Federal agencies have had to play catch up for a number of years. However, because of the national jurisdiction of the Federal agencies, they are better equipped to collect information from a variety of locations and establish an overview of the gangs. ATF, for example, has produced identification books on the Hell's Angels, Bandidos and Pagans which include the input of a number of localities. Copies of these publications were provided to the Committee Staff during the preparation for our testimony.

There exist excellent facilities, such as the FLETC, which are open, as resources are available, to State and local law enforcement personnel. ATF, again, has been very active in these areas and has conducted advanced arson and undercover investigation programs at FLETC. A balance is necessary, given budgetary constraints, between making training available to outside agencies and ensuring appropriate training for Federal personnel. However, there is no question that, where Federal training is available to outside law enforcement agencies, in addition to the skills taught, there are dividends achieved in increased cooperation and in exchange of information among the participating agencies.

DRUGS

Question. At the Federal level many of us have been saying the way to really dismantle or damage traditional organized crime and drug traffickers is to forfeit the assets of the organization in addition to criminal convictions. From your experience, would criminal convictions and the forfeiture of assets to top motorcycle gang leaders do serious damage to the organization?

Answer. There is no question that the combination of criminal penalties and civil forfeiture are potentially the most effective weapons against any organized crime group, including the motorcycle gangs. Unfortunately, due to several factors, the operating word is "potentially":

1. ATF has only limited seizure authority. Although the Bureau has made effective use of the criminal sections of the RICO statute, it should be understood that violations of neither the firearms nor the explosives statutes are RICO predicate offenses. Federal arson violations, which comes from the explosives laws, are RICO predicates only under the list of State statutes.

Where the conduct of an ATF investigation develops sufficient evidence of other violations to support a RICO indictment, this agency has been aggressive in pursuing the larger violation. However, once sufficient evidence to support the criminal indictment has been obtained, there is a question as to whether resources can be maintained on the investigation in order to gather evidence for a forfeiture. Under

the press of other substantive criminal violations which require attention, there are management problems for ATF in pursuing subsequent forfeiture actions.

2. The Federal agency with a clear mandate to pursue the assets of organized crime, the Internal Revenue Service, has been hampered in its cooperation with the law enforcement community by the disclosure restrictions which have been placed on that agency.

3. The imposition of fines as part of the sentencing process is under utilized. Particularly in multi-defendant cases, assessment of fines and court costs could both produce revenues to support the criminal justice system and provide a drain on the assets of organized crime. Additionally, attention seems warranted to the concept of establishing fines commensurate with the profits from an offense and of linking the payment of such fines to the possibility of probation and parole.

Question. Have there been any forfeiture cases brought in any of these cases you have mentioned?

Answer. As noted above, given ATF's limited statutory seizure authority and limited access to the RICO statute, ATF initiated no significant forfeiture cases related to the criminal assets of the organized crime groups noted in the cases mentioned in our testimony. This is not to say that we have not diligently pursued forfeiture of the firearms and explosives of these criminals, and the vehicles used to transport them.

This agency has also made referrals to IRS whenever evidence of significant assets has been uncovered. However, we would not, under current law, be made aware of the result obtained because of these referrals.

Question. You mentioned a laboratory in Central, Ohio, that was capable of producing 14 million dollars of illegal drugs a month.

What is the profit monthly on an operation like that? How are these drugs distributed across the country? Are other motorcycle gangs or traditional organized crime families involved? Where are these gangs laundering this money?

Answer. Although ATF is aware of numerous lab seizures, and has assisted the Drug Enforcement Administration and local narcotics agencies in the investigation and seizure of clandestine laboratories, questions concerning the profits from such laboratories are really outside the expertise of ATF and should be directed to DEA. Violations of laws, enforced by this agency, by criminals involved in illegal narcotics operations, receive a high priority. In conducting these investigations we have learned of associations between separate gangs and between gangs and LCN groups. These associations relate not only to narcotics but to prostitution, loan sharking, arson and labor racketeering. The testimony of Butch and Betty Darlene Callahan before the Committee supported the existence of these connections.

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS (ATF)

Question. On page 5-6 of your statement you briefly described four "criminal gangs" which are "spawned, nurtured, and spread by our prison systems."

What criminal activities have those groups engaged in while in prison? What procedures have you established to communicate information concerning illegal activities by groups in prisons to the Bureau of Prisons and to the U.S. Parole Commission? Specifically, what steps have been taken to prevent the prison gangs from spreading outside the Federal prisons in the Western and Southwestern States where you say they are currently the strongest? What further steps do you propose?

Answer. The prison gangs do not operate only within the walls of our prisons but across those walls, almost as if they did not exist. There is a plot line, common to crime stories, of the criminals who plan an offense in prison and then carry it out when they are released. The prison gangs are the realization of that cliché. However, with regard to the prison gangs the story is cyclical and continuing.

Orders are given in prison for robberies, narcotics transactions, and murders. These orders are given to members who joined the gang in prison and who are being or have been released. Discipline is easy to maintain for the gangs because of the nature of the membership, hardened, recidivist criminals. If a member on the street fails to obey orders, the criminal justice system will deliver him back to the gang eventually. Similarly, orders from the street can go back into the prison, commanding the execution, for example, of a suspected informant.

The prison gangs have been a phenomenon of the State correctional institutions rather than the Federal, but the concern should exist that as the activities of members of the gangs result in Federal convictions the prison gangs may be spread.

ATF obviously makes the background of defendants known to the Federal probation officer at the time a presentence report is prepared; however, we cannot know-

ledgably address the activities of the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission with regard to that information.

Question. On page 4 of your statement you note that La Cosa Nostra is a well-coordinated national organization and that "new groups are now trying to implement national organizations".

Please elaborate on that point. Specifically, how does a local gang develop a national organization?

Accompanying your statement is an impressive description of over 20 cases successfully brought by ATF and other law enforcement agencies. What impact did those cases have on nationwide organized crime groups?

In the course of deciding the amount of law enforcement resources to devote to a particular case, how much consideration is given to the possible impact of the case on a nationwide group? How is the impact determined?

Answer. There should be no mystery to how what started as local gangs have expanded into national organizations. The dynamics of that growth are much like that of a successful small business.

The development of the outlaw motorcycle gangs, described by Mr. Phillip McGuire in his testimony before the Committee, provides a typical example as does the history of "Butch," the former Hell's Angel who testified.

What begins as a local gang in the course of its activity gains and loses members. Some of the members who move on form the nucleus of similar gangs in new areas. Contact between the new group and old may well be maintained. As an original group obtains notoriety or success, other similar groups may imitate it and eventually seek to join with it. Within the dynamics of these original gangs, local and eventually regional leadership develops. That leadership may choose to direct expansion into new areas which bring the group into association or competition with other gangs in the new area.

In the process of this expansion, conflicts develop which serve to unify the group and test the leadership. At this point, what began as a local gang, has arrived at the point of being a national organization. This is the point at which the major outlaw motorcycle gangs now stand. There is, of course, another step or two which may or may not be taken. The first of these is to attempt to resolve conflicts through treaty and division of territory. The second is actual confederation.

Measuring the effect of any case or cases on major organized crime group is going to be difficult to assess. The cases cited certainly impacted on the violent activity, or on the profit making ability of the group whose members were convicted in those cases. Certain of them resulted in dislocation of the group from an area where they were active.

As noted to the Committee, the code of "omerta" has been broken with increasing frequency which is an excellent sign that law enforcement agencies are being more effective in pressuring criminal organizations. Some of the cases cited have opened new avenues of investigation which are currently being followed.

Certainly ATF's highest priority is given to organized crime cases, and we allot our resources by determining the highest impact we can have on the most serious crime problems in each of our districts, but ATF has neither the mandate nor the intelligence staff to evaluate on our own the overall impact of the cases produced by all agencies on a major criminal organization.

QUESTIONS FOR SPECIAL AGENTS

Based on your direct exposure and involvement with motorcycle gangs I would like to pursue some questions about the interworking of these organizations.

Question. How difficult do you believe it is for federal agencies to penetrate these gangs?

Answer. I believe that the best answer is that it is a difficult, but not an impossible task. The degree of difficulty in the penetration of outlaw motorcycle gangs is the same for local, State, and Federal agencies. However, Federal agencies have the resources, flexibility, and geographical jurisdiction that can make their effort more productive.

Most difficulties in the penetration of outlaw motorcycle gangs can be minimized or overcome if the law enforcement agency involved is willing to make a good faith commitment to make the penetration, select the right personnel for the job, provide additional specialized training (i.e., narcotics, weapons, motorcycle), provide adequate technical support, plan for those "inherent" problems that can be anticipated, and provide sufficient time in which to conduct the investigation so that the penetration is not pressured or prematurely terminated.

Question. Do you believe State or local police have any better success in getting in undercover with these gangs?

Answer. No. But only because as I previously stated they lack the resources, flexibility, and geographical jurisdiction.

Question. What do you believe is the best law enforcement tool in going after these groups?

Answer. Let me answer in this manner. I believe that because of the broad geographical areas covered by the outlaw motorcycle gangs, their mobility, and the broad spectrum of criminal activity in which they are engaged a combined State, local, and Federal task force is the best and most effective approach we can take.

Equally true is the fact that the degree of success can almost be predicted by the number of investigative tools utilized in the effort. Probably the two most valuable investigative tools that Federal agencies have available to them are undercover penetration and electronic surveillance (including Title III wiretaps). However, we cannot overlook any of the investigative approaches, techniques, or tools that can be utilized in combatting a problem as large and diverse as the outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Question. What did you find gang members were most concerned about law enforcement being able to do? For example, a former gang member told me they had no fear of State and local police but were concerned about wiretaps done by Federal agencies. Did you find that to be the case?

Answer. What I have learned is that the outlaw motorcycle gangs basically have no real fear of uniformed police or conventional police methods. What outlaw motorcycle gangs appear to fear the most about law enforcement is their ability to work collectively in task force efforts, their ability to develop inside informants, their ability to successfully penetrate outlaw motorcycle gangs through undercover activities, and the utilization of conspiracy of career criminal statutes.

The concern that outlaw motorcycle gangs have expressed about the utilization of wiretaps by law enforcement have basically been dealt with through use of coded conversations, limited telephone activity, and the utilization of pay telephones. Most outlaw motorcycle gangs no longer utilize the telephone as a means of communication when conducting criminal activity.

Question. Did you ever witness or hear first hand about retaliation against police officers or prosecutors by these groups?

Answer. I am aware of three incidents in which local law enforcement officers became the target of attempts by outlaw motorcycle gangs to kill or injure them because the officers were involved in investigations of members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. One attempt involved the arrest of two members of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club who were conducting a surveillance of the residence of an investigator for the San Diego County District Attorney's Office. Found in the possession of the two persons arrested were firearms and silencers, binoculars, and descriptive data on the investigator. A second attempt involved the explosion of a pressure activated bomb under the vehicle of a San Jose, CA. Police Sergeant when he attempted to back his vehicle from the driveway of his residence enroute to work. Investigation of this incident revealed that the bomb had been planted by a member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. A third attempt involved the remote control detonation of a bomb approximately two feet from the driver's door of a vehicle of a Solano County, CA, narcotics inspector when he attempted to enter his vehicle enroute to testify in a court proceeding against members of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. Investigation of this incident revealed that the bomb had been planted by a member of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. Fortunately, no one was killed in any of these incidents, and only the officer in the third incident was injured. Unfortunately, his injuries have caused him to retire on disability due to a loss of hearing ability.

Question. What kind of money are the groups you penetrated really making?

Answer. During my undercover penetration activities I did not really become aware of the amount of monies being made by members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. It has been since that time in subsequent investigations that I have ascertained that amounts in the millions of dollars are being made by outlaw motorcycle gangs through the illegal distribution of controlled substances. My comments are based upon investigative activity in which I have been involved, interviews with witnesses, information provided by confidential informants who are or have been part of these illegal operations, and cooperation by seizures of monies, controlled substances, and laboratories from local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies.

Question. Are they truly reinvesting their profits or do they store a great deal of cash for parties, bail money, fines, motorcycles, etc.?

Answer. It is true that a great deal of the monies made by outlaw motorcycle gangs is expended on "the finer things in life," bail, attorney fees, vehicles, and op-

erating expenses. However, based upon investigative information from confidential informants a lot of the monies are either stored in cash amounts, being invested in unrecorded real estate transactions, or invested in commercial businesses.

Question. Did your involvement with these gangs ever bring you in contact with traditional organized crime members? If yes, can you explain the type of activity, the number of people you met and their hierarchy in organized families?

Answer. No. Although I was aware that the former president of the San Jose, CA, chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club had organized crime connections, I did not have an opportunity to work my way into a situation to meet with any of these people.

Question. Was your undercover work coordinated with any other federal, state or local agency that was investigating this gang?

Answer. All of my undercover activity was generally worked independent of local, State, and other Federal agencies. However, I constantly made referrals of violations of law outside the jurisdiction of ATF to the proper agency and worked with that agency to assure a successful conclusion.

Question. Was there ever an occasion where you were arrested or interrogated by federal or state police who did not know you were a law enforcement officer?

Answer. I was stopped, interrogated, and searched on several occasions by local and State law enforcement agencies while I worked undercover as an outlaw motorcycle rider. None of these officers ever knew my true identity or that I was a law enforcement officer.

Question. Was your life ever threatened or endangered while a member of these gangs?

Answer. On at least two occasions while working undercover among the outlaw motorcycle clubs I received threats from members or associates of these clubs. One occasion was the receipt of threats via several different sources that members and or associates of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club were attempting to locate me and a confidential informant after we had successfully made criminal cases against several members and associates. A second occasion was the direct confrontation by members of an outlaw motorcycle club who had received "information" from an associate that I might be a law enforcement officer or an informant. The first situation was resolved after the informant and I both moved from the area, the conviction of several persons involved in the investigation, and with the passing of time. The second situation was resolved at the "street level" after the person who made the accusation was unable to provide sufficient "proof."

Question. How successful do you believe federal agencies can be in trying to break up these gangs?

Answer. I believe that a combined effort by federal agencies, which would include local and state agencies, could be extremely effectual in combatting criminal activity involved in by the outlaw motorcycle clubs. I question whether or not these motorcycle clubs could be "broken up." However, I do believe that through a systematic concerted effort by local, State, and Federal agencies working in a task force effort the operations of outlaw motorcycle clubs who are currently engaged in major criminal activity can be disrupted and significantly reduced.

Question. Are motorcycle gangs something that are beyond the capability of state and local police and require a major commitment of resources by the federal government?

Answer. Yes. Because of the limited resources, flexibility, and geographical jurisdiction of most local and state law enforcement agencies they have not been able to deal effectively with the major outlaw motorcycle clubs, who have seemingly unlimited resources, are engaged in a wide variety of criminal activity, and whose organizations and activities often cover the entire United States—or as in the case of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club a greater portion of the western world.

Question. Do you believe the FBI has had much success in penetrating or investigating these groups?

Answer. Historically the FBI has not had much of an interest in the investigation of the criminal activities of outlaw motorcycle gangs as a criminal problem, and until recently have not had enforcement jurisdiction of the type of laws that are most frequently violated by members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. The laws most frequently violated by the outlaw motorcycle clubs are those relating to the illegal use and possession of firearms and explosives and the illegal importation, distribution, manufacture, and possession of controlled substances. More recently the FBI has identified the outlaw motorcycle clubs as an organized crime problem and have placed emphasis on the investigation of their activities. Additionally, the FBI now has concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA over the Federal controlled substances laws.

Question. Are joint federal, state and local task force programs the most effective means to coordinate law enforcement investigations of motorcycle gangs?

Answer. I believe that the answers to this question has already been provided in my response to the previous questions. However, for the record may I state that I believe the coordinated local, State and Federal task force approach to the problem of outlaw motorcycle clubs is the only effective way to handle this problem. If local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies continue to attack this problem independent of each other it will not only be here for ever, but will continue to grow and flourish in the same manner that traditional organized crime did until it was "officially recognized" as a genuine criminal threat to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, our next witness is Mr. Phillip C. McGuire, Assistant Director for Criminal Enforcement, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Now, Mr. McGuire, you have already been sworn.

Mr. MCGUIRE. Yes, sir, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you may proceed now with your statement. I have another engagement between 1:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. and I will leave, but you go ahead and make your statement and I will be back to propound some questions to you as soon as I can.

In the meantime, if some other Senator comes in, you can let him propound the questions to save time.

TESTIMONY OF PHILLIP C. MCGUIRE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, ACCOMPANIED BY EDWARD M. OWEN, JR., CHIEF, FIREARMS TECHNOLOGY BRANCH, AND RALPH E. COOPER, EXPLOSIVES ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

Mr. MCGUIRE. Thank you very much, Senator. With your permission, I will submit for the record a more lengthy statement and summarize my statement as well.

Mr. SHORT [presiding]. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. MCGUIRE. I appreciate very much, the opportunity to be here and address you, Senator, on what I consider to be one of the most significant organized criminal threats to this country today.

I believe the external trappings of these gangs are well documented. This afternoon, two of our most experienced agents in gang investigations will be here before you and I invite you to discuss with them the specifics of gang membership.

The hell-raising outlaw straddling a modified Harley-Davidson motorcycle is a stereotype; a stereotype much like the white-tied, black-shirted Mafioso. There is truth in this stereotype, but there is also an element of deceit. We are surely deceived when we look at the stereotype and believe our preconceptions about the lack of sophistication of these people.

For over a decade, ATF has been involved in criminal investigations of outlaw motorcycle gang members. We have tracked the increasing sophistication of their criminal activities and have noted no lessening of their propensity for violence. Outlaw motorcyclists have made the grade in big-time crime.

In general, the history of the outlaw motorcyclist is well documented. The Market Street Commandos and the POBOB's appeared in California shortly after World War II. They came to na-

tional attention in 1947 when they turned the American Motorcycle Association-sponsored hill climb in Hollister, Calif., into a week-long brawl. The Hollister hill climb culminated with the outlaw bikers converging on the city jail and releasing two members who had been incarcerated.

In 1950, in Fontana, Calif., members of the POBOB's, under the leadership of Otto Friedli, formed a new gang. Taking the name of a bomber from World War II, the Hell's Angels were born. The Angels' mother chapter was eventually located in San Bernardino, where it remained until the mid-1960's. At that time, Ralph Hubert (Sonny) Barger, president of the Oakland Hell's Angels, became the national president and the mother chapter was moved at that time to Oakland. Barger and Oakland remain the center of the Hell's Angels at this time.

I might add, Senator, that ATF has a long history of dealing with Sonny Barger. He has been the subject of our investigations going back well over 10 years, and we have been successful in some of those prosecutions, bringing him to indictment.

In 1959, in nearby Prince Georges County, Md., the Pagans were established under the presidency of Lou Dolkin. The Pagans' structure is slightly different from that of the other gangs in that it does not have a geographically fixed mother chapter. The Pagans' organization is headed by a mother club made up of from 13 to 18 members that are drawn in from the different other clubs in the region. The current president is Paul (Ooch) Ferry of Long Island, N.Y.

Also in 1959, which seems to be a banner year for outlaw motorcycle gangs, the Outlaws' mother chapter was formed in Chicago, Ill., under John Davis. The current president is Harry (Stairway Harry) Henderson. The Outlaws are now the largest gang in the country, and in 1977 the Outlaws went international when they absorbed the Satan Choice motorcycle gang in Canada.

In 1966, saw the birth of the Bandidos in the southwestern part of the United States. They were formed under Donald Chambers in Houston, Tex., and while Chambers is in the penitentiary at this time for a double homicide, Alvin Frankes is believed to be running this gang. The gang is primarily located in Corpus Christi, Tex.

These four gangs now comprise the big four of the outlaw motorcycle gangs. There are some 800 to 1,000 smaller gangs around the country, but I might add that 25 of these gangs have members in 5 States or more.

The years from 1947 to 1967 might be termed formative years for these gangs. They spawned imitators. Major clubs absorbed smaller ones or pushed them aside, and roaming members of chapters called Nomads carried the seeds of new chapters and formulated gang alliances. Formal organization structures were put in place and leaders evolved in the outlaw motorcycle gangs.

But while the gangs were even then capable of significant criminal activity, there was certainly a lack of focus to that activity. The gangs were dangerous. Outbreaks of violence occurred around the country, but they were sporadic and they were isolated. Overall, the gangs were primarily a headache for law enforcement up through those years.

By the early 1970's, however, a major change was being observed by law enforcement nationally. Whatever else the era of the 1960's changed in America, it changed the gangs. As the drug subculture evolved in this country, the outlaw motorcycle gangs became involved first as participants and increasingly as suppliers. The motorcycle gangs were definitely drawn into this subculture.

Antisocial enclaves became big business operations. New members and associates came into the orbit of the gangs, including large numbers of young women who accepted the designation of "property."

In learning the narcotics business, the gangs became sophisticated in turning other criminal enterprises into profitmakers. Chart I, to my immediate left, shows the established criminal enterprises in which the gangs play a significant role. As you will see, they are clearly diversified and lucrative.

The large-scale involvement of the gangs in the illegal manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine is well documented. One illicit laboratory in central Ohio reportedly produced \$14 million of methamphetamine in 1 month, and the distribution network spread out through Ohio, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and all the way to California.

[Whereupon, Senator Grassley assumed the chair.]

Mr. McGuire. Chart II shows the geographical involvement of the gangs in the operation of topless bars. This move into retail liquor establishments is the second most common enterprise that we have observed. With the related sex-oriented business of massage parlors, these gangs have converted their female associates into moneymakers.

Women around the country who were formerly associated with these gangs and who have made their escape have told us that they must bring home from \$100 to \$200 a night to their old man from prostitution and drug sales. A gang member may have between one and five of these "old ladies," as they are termed, at any given time.

The bars and parlors are fronts for prostitution, and the property is moved from State to State, often sold from member to member for cash or in expiation of a debt owed between members.

Skirmishes over territory have turned into wars for the control of narcotics distribution. The Filthy Few of the Hell's Angels and the "SS" of the Outlaws have become the Murder Incorporated of the 1980's.

I would like at this point to emphasize certain points about the motorcycle gangs. First, in spite of their freewheeling exterior, they are a highly developed organization. Chart III shows a comparison between LCN structure and that of the gangs. You will learn more from witnesses tomorrow as to how they went about doing that and what caused them to do that.

The major gangs have formal charters and bylaws. The Hell's Angels, USA, are currently incorporated in the State of California, and at one time the Bandidos were incorporated in the State of Texas as a nonprofit organization.

Second, they are national organizations. Chart V shows the location of chapters of the major gangs across the country. The members, I might add, are not juvenile delinquents. More than half of

the outlaw gangs investigated by ATF are over 35 years of age, and the four different presidents—Sonny Barger is 42, Harry (Stairway Harry) Henderson is 38, Alvin Frankes is 44, and Paul Ferry is 43. They are mature, chronologically, and they are well experienced within the criminal justice system.

Third, many smaller gangs operate in the sphere of the big four. Chart VI shows the association and territorial disputes between the clubs. We are aware that this pattern is constantly changing as some of the smaller clubs are assimilated into the larger clubs; others are simply forced out of operation.

Of the four major clubs that you are looking at, the Outlaws and the Bandidos appear to be the most closely allied with each other and, as a matter of fact, refer to each other as sister organizations.

Fourth, there is a growing association between the LCN figures and outlaw motorcycle gang members. The motorcycle in the driveway may well stand beside a luxury automobile, and I would point out that ATF has seized more than one Cadillac El Dorado from outlaw motorcycle gang members.

The colors hang in the closet next to designer suits—to be taken out only on the traditional runs, that I would term even now a nostalgia event.

I have included in my total submission to you a list of examples of gang activity and ATF involvement that I believe supports what I have said today. Again, I invite you to discuss these particular issues with the special agents who will be testifying later this afternoon and the witnesses that have been made available for tomorrow.

I noted earlier that ATF has actively been involved in investigating criminal activity by motorcycle gang members for over a decade now. We have had formal enforcement programs almost since the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the explosives control statutes in 1970. I believe that this was the intent of Congress in passing these statutes, and I can think of no better utilization of the laws than against the violent outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Since 1972, ATF has investigated over 7,000 suspects who were gang members or associates. That figure is roughly equivalent to our best estimate of the total number of outlaw motorcycle gang members in the United States today. These individuals, supported by probably 4,000 male hangers-on and 8,000 female associates, are, if nothing else, the largest criminal organization in this country today.

The Federal firearms and explosives laws are, without a doubt, one of the most effective tools in attacking the criminal activity of the gangs. As an example, I point out to you that in a recent investigation of the Pagan motorcycle gang, 150 members of the gang were, in fact, subjects of our investigation. And out of the 150, 120 of these were vulnerable to ATF jurisdiction because, in fact, they were convicted felons and so many of these gang members do, in fact, carry firearms.

There is no question about their propensity for violence. In addition to that, they have a propensity to deal for profit in stolen firearms, automatic weapons, and other gangster-type weapons.

In the past 2 years, we have investigated 44 explosives incidents involving the outlaw gangs. Since 1978, members of over 200 gangs have been investigated by ATF as suspects in explosives violations.

A good example to point out the effectiveness of the firearms laws, as I see it, is that in 1978 ATF, DEA, the FBI and State and local enforcement agencies in the bay area of California initiated an investigation of the Hell's Angels outlaw motorcycle gang. As a result of that investigation, in June 1979, 33 members of this organization were indicted on RICO charges and substantive charges prepared by ATF on firearms violations.

There is no question but that the RICO charges are extremely valuable to all of law enforcement, but one thing about RICO charges is they are extremely complicated and sometimes confusing for juries to understand.

After two very lengthy trials in San Francisco, we had two hung juries and only one conviction on the RICO charge. However, we did come away with 16 convictions for Federal firearms charges on cases prepared by ATF. Of those 16, the sentences ranged up to incarceration for 10 years.

The goal of ATF, formalized in our national investigative strategy, the crime impact program, is the suppression of significant criminal activity through the application of the statutes given to us to enforce. Traditionally, we have maintained an exceptionally high conviction rate. In 1981, we submitted criminal cases involving 3,291 suspects. The most recent data indicates that 81 percent of those were accepted for prosecution, and of those prosecuted already, 95 percent of those have resulted in successful prosecution.

I think that this effectiveness is important in challenging the violence of organized crime generally and that of the motorcycle gangs, in particular. It is important not only that we attack the criminality of the gangs, but that we succeed.

As far as they have come, the gangs have not successfully emulated Marlon Brando's change in roles from the outlaw motorcycle gang member in "The Wild Ones" to the LCN don in "The Godfather," but they are moving rapidly in that direction.

I appreciate very much the opportunity to be here and I would be pleased to be responsive to any questions that you might have.

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you very much for your testimony. I am very much interested in this hearing because I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedures, Senate Judiciary Committee. Obviously, how the law is being enforced is of very much interest to me.

The first question I have is a very general one, but I think it is one that we ought to have for further clarification from you. At this point, I do not believe anybody has given a definition of "organized crime." Can you do that in the context of the testimony you have given and as it relates to motorcycle gangs?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir, I can.

Senator GRASSLEY. Has someone already offered that definition?

Mr. McGUIRE. Director Higgins has.

Senator GRASSLEY. Is there a dollar limit?

Mr. McGUIRE. No, sir, there is no dollar limit. Responding to the issue of the dollar limit, ATF's interest in organized crime is more directly related to the violence and the misuse of firearms and ex-

plosives, and we really do not have the ability or the jurisdiction that would capture their financial involvement.

GREAT DEMAND FOR AMPHETAMINES

Senator GRASSLEY. You mentioned, and before you Mr. Higgins, also, stated that specific types of drugs such as amphetamines are manufactured by gangs. My question is, What makes these specific drugs attractive as moneymakers to the gangs?

Mr. McGUIRE. First of all, unfortunately, there is a tremendous demand for these drugs; specifically, methamphetamine. The makeup of the outlaw motorcycle gangs—while they are international in nature, they have the ability and they have the technology to manufacture the methamphetamines at tremendous profits, and manufacture them inside the United States, without the necessity of illegal importation, whereas most of the cocaine and heroin come in on the international market and are more tightly controlled by the more traditional LCN.

Senator GRASSLEY. I am aware that in Florida drug dealers have organized to such heights as even owning banking operations to launder their profits. Do you have any evidence that motorcycle gangs have reached that level of sophistication as well?

Mr. McGUIRE. Mr. Grassley, the agents who will be testifying later this afternoon have specific information relative to the wealth of some of the outlaw motorcycle gang members and what they have done to try to get this money into more legitimate channels, once derived from the illicit narcotics traffic.

Senator GRASSLEY. Senator Thurmond has questions that he will ask for himself, so I am going to call a recess of the hearing until he comes back at approximately 2:30.

[Whereupon, the committee stood in recess from 1:50 p.m. to 2:33 p.m.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, I notice you brought some charts here.

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind explaining those charts to us?

Mr. McGUIRE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Take these colored charts.

Mr. McGUIRE. OK. The colored charts represent the different organizations around the country. The Pagans, in the upper left-hand corner. Those are the colors of the organization, which was started in 1959 here in nearby Prince Georges County.

The top right, the Bandidos, were originally begun down in the Houston area and are currently centered in Corpus Christi; they pretty well control the southwest part of the United States.

On the lower left side, the Outlaws are centered in the Chicago area. They happen to be the largest organization in the United States. And then, in the lower right, are the Hell's Angels' colors. They, for your information, have a copyright on their colors. They are the oldest of the organizations and are now centered in Oakland, Calif.

As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be the closest relationship between the Bandidos and the Outlaws. They sometimes tattoo

themselves with each other's colors or identify themselves as sister organizations.

The colors on the extreme right are the colors usually worn by the old ladies or property of the outlaw motorcycle gangs—the women.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, do you want to explain this other chart?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir. The one on the bottom on the right side is the Bandidos' old ladies' colors. The others are either the member, on the upper right side, and those kind of in the middle are the probationary Outlaws, or probationary members who have yet to make their bones with the Outlaws. And then the one on the upper left is the property of the Outlaws.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you told for the record what these terms mean, like "old lady," and things like that?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, I could, Senator. I think it would be better if we waited for the witnesses who will follow me, who have direct experience relating to these.

PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, Mr. McGuire, in your testimony I believe you stated that for over a decade, the ATF has been involved in criminal investigations of outlaw motorcycle gang members and that ATF has tracked the increasing sophistication of their criminal activities, but has noted no lessening of their propensity for violence.

You go further to state that outlaw motorcyclists have made the grade in bigtime crime. In your opinion, would you consider outlaw motorcycle groups to be as powerful as the LCN?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, in terms of numbers, I would definitely say yes, and also in terms of the propensity for violence, I would say yes. In terms of wealth and their ability to penetrate legitimate society, I do not think they have at this time, and part of the reason is their inability to work with each other as the LCN has been able to do.

The four gangs remain just that—very parochial in their dealings with each other. It is actually to our advantage that that is the case, and would indicate that now is the time for us to attack them.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, do you consider outlaw motorcyclists to be more violent than the LCN?

Mr. McGUIRE. Definitely, I do. If you look at the roots of these gangs and their antisocial attitudes and the enclaves that they came out of years ago, there is no question that they have a tremendous propensity for violence. That has never lessened and that is really the leverage that they have used in many areas to get a hold of the criminal organizations in the past.

Paradoxically, though, I might point that the work that we have done in Rochester, New York, St. Louis, and Philadelphia indicates that the mob has certainly not become a pacifist organization and that they are constantly warring with each other as well and blowing each other up.

The CHAIRMAN. If these motorcycle gangs did not war with each other, would they be more powerful?

Mr. McGuire. There is no question about it. That is the one thing, perhaps, that we have to our advantage at this time, and that is the reason I feel like the time is right and we must not wait any longer before we attack them while they are warring with each other.

HIT MEN AND ENFORCERS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, does ATF have any evidence of traditional organized criminal groups using outlaw motorcycle gang members as hit men or enforcers?

Mr. McGuire. Yes, sir, we know for a fact that outlaw motorcyclists have performed bombings and arsons for the more traditional organized crime groups. Additionally, at the time of the death of Phil Testa up in the Philadelphia area and when Nicodemo Scarfo took over the organized crime family there, there was certainly evidence that the Pagans were involved in the death of Phil Testa.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, the outlaw motorcycle gangs comprise the largest criminal group in the United States today and are the best armed. Why are they not taking over control of all LCN enterprises?

Mr. McGuire. Well, as I mentioned earlier, the gangs do not really have the national cooperation that the LCN does. There are instances, such as that noted in information filed just this week by the U.S. attorney in Chicago, where the Outlaws committed bombings against the more traditional LCN businesses to gain a greater share of the prostitution in the Chicago area.

They probably lack the ambition or desire to challenge the LCN at this time, but that does not mean that they will not be better prepared in the future. And if all of the different gangs in the United States ever got together, I think that they could probably take on the LCN.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, you mentioned in your testimony that outlaw motorcycle gangs are extremely violent and very territorial, and skirmishes over territory have turned into wars for the control of narcotics distribution.

Traditionally, it has been assumed that organized criminal groups, such as the LCN, have controlled narcotics distribution. Does ATF have any information that would lead one to believe that the outlaw motorcycle gangs and the LCN are cooperating in this effort?

Mr. McGuire. Yes, sir, it does seem that they cooperate. The gangs created a niche in the drug trade when they became involved in the illegal manufacture and distribution of methamphetamines. Also, there is evidence that they acquire the precursor chemicals for the manufacture of these drugs oftentimes from the more traditional LCN members.

There are, conversely, instances where they have warred over specific territories. But, generally, their role has predominantly been in the methamphetamines, and they also do acquire the hard narcotics that must be imported internationally from the more traditional LCN.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, how does ATF become involved in the investigation of narcotics traffickers, and what will be ATF's role in the new drug task forces?

Mr. McGuire. Well, I really think I can answer both questions like this, Senator: In every instance when you are dealing with narcotics violators or outlaw motorcycle gangs, they have to have guns to protect their territory; to protect their contraband; and to protect themselves from rip-offs of each other, either ripping off the contraband or ripping off the money; and, unfortunately, as offensive weapons against law enforcement officers.

There is no question but that they are vulnerable to ATF jurisdiction. A large percentage of them are convicted felons, and because of the specific statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms by convicted felons, we feel that it gives us ample opportunity to attack both narcotics violators and outlaw motorcycle gangs, which sometimes are one and the same.

FILTHY FEW AND THE SS GROUPS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, in your testimony you refer to the Filthy Few and SS as being the Murder Incorporated of the 1980's. What are these groups, and what significance do they play in the outlaw motorcycle gangs' organizational structure?

Mr. McGuire. Apparently, the Filthy Few first started as a clique in California within the Hell's Angels. Originally, the designation did not apply to enforcers. However, the term is now commonly used by law enforcement and gang members to indicate that they are the hit men and strong-arm enforcers of the Hell's Angels. There are other cliques within the Hell's Angels such as the Evil Squad.

The SS plays that role within the Outlaws. Now, I should make the point that while they do play the role of the enforcer and oftentimes the hit men within these outlaw motorcycle gangs, that does not mean that the other members are not called upon from time to time to make their bones by killing someone.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that the Nomads act as enforcers as well?

Mr. McGuire. Oftentimes they do, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, you state that more than half of the outlaw motorcycle gang suspects investigated by ATF are over 35 years old and that they are not juvenile delinquent types. By this, do you suggest that the outlaw motorcycle gangs are not actively recruiting young people?

Mr. McGuire. No, sir, I did not mean to imply that. They are recruiting people and they do recruit younger people. If you look at the total growth of the organizations around the country, you can see that they do have a recruitment program. However, they do not recruit people who would fall into the category of a juvenile delinquent.

MERGING OF GANGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, you testified that in February 1982, a motorcycle gang called the Brothers motorcycle gang met with the Hell's Angels in California and turned in their existing

colors for the Hell's Angels' colors, meaning they quit their gang and joined the Hell's Angels. How common is it for one group to join a larger one, and do you see this type of activity increasing?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, the practice by large groups of absorbing smaller gangs varies according to the gang. It appears that the Pagans seem to prefer absorption of the smaller clubs rather than alliance. The Outlaws, as I noted, became international when they absorbed a major Canadian gang.

The Hell's Angels have both absorbed smaller gangs and formed alliances with the other gangs as they have seen fit. As major gangs expand in power and wealth, I believe even more smaller gangs will seek alignment with the bigger gangs.

Mr. SHORT. That would be the top four gangs you were referring to primarily?

Mr. McGUIRE. Absolutely. I see them only as getting larger as they become more powerful.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, you mentioned that the major gangs have adopted formal charters and guidelines. Tell me what these charters mandate, and how effectively are their guidelines enforced?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir. The charters and rules for all the gangs are very similar. They may require ownership of a certain size and make of a motorcycle. They spell out the structure of the organization and detail the responsibilities of the different officers and members.

They also spell out the penalties for infractions of the club's rules, which we understand include such things as burning off of club tattoos and also assassination. While we have provided your staff with information on the gangs and we have also provided some sample constitutions that were actually taken from these gangs, I think that the witnesses that will be appearing before this committee tomorrow can point out the effectiveness of these charters and how they carry out the penalties for infractions.

LISTED AS A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. You state that the Bandidos motorcycle gang is listed as a nonprofit organization in Texas. Do they actually meet the requirements for a nonprofit organization, and are local and State authorities in Texas aware of this information?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, first of all, to answer the last part of your question first, yes, the State and local authorities are aware of this. It appears that they may have done this at that time in an effort to put an aura of legitimacy on the club.

However, in more recent years, they have let this incorporation lapse because law enforcement is using the RICO statutes and they feel that this is an assist to law enforcement in proving the racketeering-influenced organization, and also helps in proving conspiracy cases when you bring the group together under a title of incorporation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that they did that in California and also Washington State. Is that correct?

Mr. McGUIRE. To my knowledge, they have in California. The Hell's Angels, USA, it is my understanding, is still incorporated in the State of California.

GANGS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, I notice from your listing of the outlaw motorcycle gangs that most of the major gangs have chapters in my State of South Carolina. Are these gangs involved in any international operations regarding drug trafficking or other illegal activities?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, the president of the Hell's Angels in South Carolina was convicted of assaulting an undercover DEA agent, and we have made seizures of machine guns and silencers from gang members in your State. There is evidence not so much of international trafficking as to the traffic in domestically produced and distributed methamphetamines.

Also, there is no question but that women from the gangs have been placed in bars in your State to work as prostitutes.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the prostitutes?

Mr. McGUIRE. The old ladies of the outlaw motorcycle gangs have been placed in bars and massage parlors to work as prostitutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, you also stated that in January 1982, 40 members of the Sundowners motorcycle gang were arrested in Columbia, S.C. Has this, in effect, eliminated this gang from South Carolina, or do you believe they will be back?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, there is evidence that gangs tend to leave those areas where they are felt most unwelcome. Many of the charges in the particular case that we brought to your attention have not been tried yet, so I think the telling will be in what the results of the prosecution are.

I might add one interesting point of the case that came out of South Carolina. They had fully automatic machine guns; they had all other types of firearms, and they had narcotics and they also had bombs similar to those that we will be displaying for you later.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, in your testimony you mention a crime impact program developed by ATF. How does this program work?

Mr. McGUIRE. Well, in an effort to develop a national investigative strategy for criminal enforcement, we decided that we must come up with a process so that we could best utilize our resources. The first step in that is to assess the crime problem, to look at the individual problem within different geographical areas.

While we have an office in Columbia, S.C., and have an office in San Francisco, Calif., we recognize the fact that the crime problems, while similar, are also different. The best thing that we could do would be to look at the crime problem in each of the areas without consideration as to our jurisdiction.

But then the next thing is to look at the crime problem and the criminals and determine what is their vulnerability to ATF. The next step would be to establish objectives, determine what it is we are going to try to do, and define the strategies as to how we go about doing it.

We testified before the President's hearing on violent crime a little over 1 year ago, you will recall, and brought to the attention of that group this crime impact program. We feel that that was the precursor of the law enforcement coordinating committees that the current Attorney General has established within the Justice Department, which bring together all facets of law enforcement, both State and local, dealing with the U.S. attorney to come up with an effective plan to fight crime in each one of the judicial districts.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McGuire, if the Federal firearms and explosives laws are, as you state, among the most effective tools in attacking the criminal activity of outlaw gangs, are there any other laws which you feel should be instituted to help ATF eliminate these types of organizations?

Mr. McGuire. Yes, sir, there are. I would suggest that your committee look into the possibility of allowing the designation of certain firearms and destructive device trafficking charges—the designation of those crimes to be included in title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act to allow for authorization and monitoring of electronic wire taps by the courts.

We would be more than pleased to work with your committee in identifying what I feel like is the need for that; also, in the area of RICO, to include certain firearms and explosives offenses as predicate offenses under the RICO statutes; also, under title XVIII, section 1114, to include the ATF special agents in those Federal agents protected under the Federal homicide and assault statutes.

And then lastly, I know there is some activity regarding raising the authority of the agencies to deal with administrative forfeiture of property. While it does not affect ATF that greatly because of our close working relationship with DEA and Customs, I feel that raising the authority to administratively forfeit seized property would greatly assist those agencies in the interest of law enforcement, and also would cut down on some of the work of the courts.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is very nice of you to offer to work with the committee on recommendations, and you could also work with the committee on any other recommendations that you feel would be helpful in our work. We would appreciate it.

Mr. McGuire. I appreciate that very much.



KILLED IN BOMBING ATTEMPT

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I believe in April 1977, a member of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club was killed in an attempt to place a bomb under the hood of a car belonging to a known associate of a Cleveland organized crime family.


We have some pictures here and, without objection, we will put those into evidence.

[The following were received for the record.]







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
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


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
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The CHAIRMAN. Do you have charters of the Bandidos or any other motorcycle gangs?

Mr. McGUIRE. I am sorry, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any copies of charters of the Bandidos or other motorcycle gangs?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you provide those to the committee? We would like to have them.

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been said that the Bandidos have offered honorary membership to some of the members of the LCN. Is that true?

Mr. McGUIRE. I do not know that of my own knowledge, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the nature of the honor would be.

Mr. McGUIRE. Nor do I, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if you knew what they had to do to receive an honorary certificate or whatever it is.

Mr. McGUIRE. I do not imagine that they would be offering an honorary certificate to any of us.

WEAPONS AND BOMBS

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that allegedly occurred in the State of Washington.

Now, I see that you have set out quite a display of weapons here. Would you tell the committee the significance of this display?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir, we have a display of firearms, destructive devices, and bombs.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you want to step over to each one and briefly explain them?

Mr. McGUIRE. What I would prefer to do, Senator, is I have two people here from my office, Mr. Ed Owen, who is Chief of our Firearms Technology Branch, and Mr. Ralph Cooper from our Explosives Technology Branch. They have both been sworn and I would like to give them an opportunity to explain these weapons to you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, just have them come around, then, and explain the weapons.

Mr. McGUIRE. This is Mr. Ralph Cooper, who is one of the foremost experts in the country.

TESTIMONY OF RALPH E. COOPER

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper, we are glad to have you, and if you will just go ahead and explain some of the weapons that you have there.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Senator. These three displays that we have in front of you are three different incidents involving explosive-activated devices. The first device we have is a clockwork-delayed device.

The CHAIRMAN. Is what?

CLOCKWORK-DELAYED BOMB

Mr. COOPER. A clockwork-delayed explosive bomb, Senator, which was used in a labor-oriented bombing. It is very similar to the

types of clockwork-delayed devices which are used by organized crime and have been used by outlaw motorcycle gangs.

It uses a simple mechanical clock that can be purchased anywhere, a six-volt lantern battery, and a quantity of dynamite in conjunction with some boosters. This particular device was in a coal mine situation, so the individual used what materials were available and the materials were dynamite and boosters which would be similar to those used in a coal mining operation.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the same type of material is used in coal mines to dynamite away the soil or the rocks, or whatever is necessary to get to the coal?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, sir, in underground coal mining or surface coal mining; that is correct.

This particular device was placed within a briefcase. In other words, it was a booby-trapped-type of device and the individual was unaware that there was a bomb inside the briefcase. It was placed at the entrance to the office of the coal mining company. When he arrived, the briefcase was there. He jarred it or picked it up and the device went off, or the time was at the particular time to detonate when he arrived; we do not know exactly which. But the device did detonate and an individual was killed.

This type of configuration—the clockwork delay with the battery, with the explosives and the blasting cap—is very common and the materials are readily available.

The CHAIRMAN. All of that could be put in a small briefcase, could it not?

Mr. COOPER. Yes; it could be transported and put together very easily. As you can see, the individual used alligator clips, which means that the device probably was preassembled; all you would have to do would be to connect the alligator clips to the hands of the clock. What that does is when the clock comes around and makes contact with the two alligator clips, it completes an electrical circuit that fires the device.

So, this device with the alligator clips was probably preassembled. The individual went to the target, he set up the device and left, very simply and very easily.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

RADIO-CONTROLLED DEVICE

Mr. COOPER. This case is an organized crime-related case involving a radio-controlled device, and we have an example of a working model radio-controlled device which I will show you in a second.

This uses a readily available transmitting and receiving device which is used by hobbyists for radio-controlled aircraft. It uses a standard servo motor which is a part of the system, and the servo motor operates the control surfaces on the hobby aircraft—the rudder or the landing gear. Some of these aircraft are very sophisticated; the landing gear will retract.

This particular transmitter was used in the Cleveland, Ohio, area. It is operated remotely and I will show you in a minute the operating device. You place the device with the explosive in the car and this gives you a command detonation capability, and at your

particular whim you can initiate the device. This is most effective when you establish a pattern.

The CHAIRMAN. Instead of going off at a certain time, you can make it go off anytime you want to.

Mr. COOPER. That is correct. Right here, Senator, we have an example of a device very much like that. Here is a receiver and a servo mechanism. In this case, we have a microswitch which operates in the same way as the device on the board. We have a power supply and we use a flashbulb instead of an explosive charge.

Here is the transmitter, which is not modified at all. The device is not modified, other than you will take a microswitch and insert it in close proximity to the servo. I will demonstrate for you, if you like.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. COOPER. We are going to turn on the power supply. That is exactly how simply it operates, and this explosive charge will then detonate and kill or injure or produce property damage. These are available at any hobby shop for about \$100.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of shop?

Mr. COOPER. A hobby shop.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

PIPE BOMBS

Mr. COOPER. Now, the other board we have is representative of pipe bombs. These would seem sophisticated in that they use electrical components; they use radio-controlled components. But they are not necessarily sophisticated.

The individual groups may have a person who is electronically capable or somebody who has used explosives in prior military experience. They may have associate members who are in the industry itself and these materials would be available to them.

To go from the electronic devices to pipe bombs, this is a representative sample of different types of pipe bombs that have been encountered. They go from very simple copper tubes that are pinched at both ends and filled with matchheads, any type of powder, or anything that will burn and produce a gas volume inside a closed space. When the gas volume gets to the point where it overcomes the resistance of the container, you have an explosion; that is basically what happens.

Here we have some simple pipe bombs. We have a clockwork delay very similar to this sample here, which is external. They can also be internal; all of the electrical components can be put inside. So, if you came up on this, all you would see would be a pipe that has two end caps with no holes and you would not know that there were electronic components inside.

So, they can be very sinister and they are all designed to produce death, property damage, or personal injury. That is their main purpose. They have no socially redeeming purpose; they are only designed as weapons.

This is a technique where they will score the pipe and produce a shrapnel effect, similar to some of the grenades I will show you in a minute. They also have external fragmentation. These are babes which have been epoxied to the outside of the pipe. This contains a

high explosive other than smokeless powder or black powder or matchheads. You can also manufacture your own explosive material, and I will talk about that in a second.

But this is just an example of different types of pipe bombs. They are not sophisticated.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the one with the bebes calculated to kill or just injure people?

Mr. COOPER. Well, this would be calculated to produce a larger pattern of fragmentation than just the pipe itself. So, this would probably, in close proximity, have a better chance of killing an individual than, let us say, just a simple length of pipe which was closed at both ends.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, does that produce fragments?

Mr. COOPER. The pipe itself would produce fragments and the bebes would be projected at high velocity. If I can use an example from the military, Senator, this particular grenade and most of the military grenades which are used in combat are made out of a casing of bebes or small, serrated, notched wire wraps.

It is an encasement of bebes, and the same effect on this high-explosive grenade is duplicated by this pipe bomb, in that when it goes off, it produces a uniform pattern. So, that would be basically a similarity with the military.

GRENADES

Now that I am over here at the table, let me go through some of the different items that I brought. In the military, we have a representative of three types of grenades. These grenades are associated with organized crime and, as Mr. Bertolani will testify to later, have been associated with motorcycle gangs.

They are the old type of pineapple grenade which John Wayne used in World War II—the pineapple type which is now not produced. There are some in the inventory, but they are not manufactured by the military at this time.

The M-26 is a standard grenade, which is the type that most of the troops are issued. A newer type is the M-67, which is another type of grenade which is designed to be thrown farther. It is much easier to handle; it is smaller and it is, in many cases, more lethal. So, these are three types of grenades.

PLASTIC BOMB

We also have some military explosives: the famous C-4, which I am sure everybody has heard about—a plastic explosive. This happens to be a block which is exactly identical to the type that would be produced by the military. It has everything in it except the explosive ingredient, so this is exactly the same type of configuration that a demolition block would look like. It has an adhesive back so it can adhere to certain things, like bridges and fortifications, and is used for military demolition.

This is available and has been purchased undercover. It is available through other sources to criminal elements. The National Guard uses this material, if one is involved with the National Guard or other types of areas like that. So, this is available and has been part of the types of material used by the military.

TNT

This is a TNT demolition block, another type of military explosive. This is a hand grenade simulator; these are used in training to simulate the effects of a hand grenade. They are not as lethal as a hand grenade, but they still are an explosive.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, are those available to the public or were those made especially for these gangs?

Mr. COOPER. No, Senator, these are not available to the public. Military explosives are strictly controlled by the military, but there are ways of getting them through contacts in the military.

The CHAIRMAN. Those others are not military?

Mr. COOPER. These are commercial. These are all military items here; I have tried to segregate the military items from the commercial materials.

DYNAMITE

In the commercial materials, we have dynamite, which is probably, except for the smokeless powders and black powders, one of the most common materials used.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the strength of that piece of dynamite you have got there?

Mr. COOPER. This is just a dummy cartridge, but this type of cartridge would be anywhere from 40 to 60 percent of strength; this would be a 40- or 60-percent cartridge.

Another example of a different type as far as the configuration is this basic dynamite cartridge. These are commercial blasting caps.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that dynamite have a fuse or do you have to attach a fuse?

Mr. COOPER. It has no fuse. Dynamite must be initiated by a blasting cap. A blasting cap is either electrically initiated, in this case using a power source—you hook the lead wires up to the battery or other power source. This would be inserted into the dynamite and that would cause it to explode.

The other way of doing it is with a safety fuse.

The CHAIRMAN. When you insert that into the dynamite, do you bore a hole in there, or how do you keep it from cracking open?

Mr. COOPER. Well, there is a special tool, Senator. I did not bring one with me, but it is a pleyer-type tool. You push that into the dynamite cartridge, then you would insert the blasting cap into that hole that is made.

Now, this can be purchased. There are restrictions, obviously, on purchasing dynamite, but it is purchased and it is used, as I said, in many explosive devices. We have examples of dynamite in two of the examples that we brought.

We have another explosive material which is called detonating cord, which looks like fuse, but it is, in fact, a high explosive which is used to replace a safety fuse and also electric blasting caps. So, that gives you an overview of some of the materials.

MOLOTOV COCKTAIL

The last thing I would like to show you, Senator, is an incendiary device which is associated with the motorcycle gangs. This is kind

of a unique incendiary device in that there is a type of Molotov cocktail which is called a self-igniting Molotov cocktail, which has an outside shield of an improvised mixture of specific chemicals.

In this case, they have taken certain other chemicals and put them inside the bottle. When one chemical comes in contact with the others it spontaneously ignites and it will, in fact, ignite the liquid inside the container.

So, they could place this inside a door in their clubhouse or some other area, or they could throw it and as soon as the chemicals come in contact with one another, they would ignite. This is an example of one actual device.

ANTITANK ROCKET

Now, the last military item is the light antitank rocket. This is a shoulder-fired rocket which is used by the military and has been associated with one incident involving organized crime motorcycle activities. It is fired from the shoulder at the tank. It is an anti-tank device. It fires your rocket, which is basically a shape charge; it fires up to 1,000 yards. This was fired, I believe, through someone's bedroom.

It is lethal and it will penetrate approximately 12 inches of steel.

The CHAIRMAN. That explodes upon contact?

Mr. COOPER. That is correct, Senator; it explodes upon contact. When it hits the tip, there is a signal which is sent back to a fuse and this ignites the charge. This is an example of an Army device which has been associated with these types of groups.

Mr. McGUIRE. Senator Thurmond, if you have no further questions of Mr. Cooper, Mr. Owen—

HOMEMADE SHOTGUN

The CHAIRMAN. What about these guns right here? Is that a sawed-off shotgun next to that antitank weapon?

Mr. McGUIRE. Mr. Owen.

Mr. OWEN. Senator, we have a sample of weapons that are commonly encountered with outlaw motorcycle gangs. A very common weapon is a typical sporting shotgun.

The CHAIRMAN. What gage is that?

Mr. OWEN. This is 12-gage.

The CHAIRMAN. Twelve-gage.

Mr. OWEN. It has had the barrel shortened with a hacksaw.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is that a regular gun that was just cut off?

Mr. OWEN. This was originally a typical sporting shotgun.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be safe for anybody to fire it now?

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you can take a regular gun and saw it off at both ends like that and it would still be safe?

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. The primary advantage to a criminal for shortening the length of it is concealability; it is very easily concealed under a sport coat.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are more sure of your target than you would be with a pistol.

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. One of the weapons particularly popular with outlaw motorcycle gangs is this type of disguised firearm.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see that one. What size weapon is that?

Mr. OWEN. This is a home-made shotgun constructed out of a conventional automotive lug wrench. It has had an extension added to it. This piece is pulled straight out. A 410-gage shotgun shell is placed—

The CHAIRMAN. 410?

Mr. OWEN. A 410-gage shotgun shell. This is slipped back in.

The CHAIRMAN. You just ram it back?

Mr. OWEN. It is jammed together and it fires.

The CHAIRMAN. You have got a pin back here.

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, a firing pin in the rear of it. Any type of disguised firearm seems to be particularly popular with groups like the Hell's Angels.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a home-made thing, is it not?

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir, it is. A law enforcement officer who encountered this would have really no suspicion that this was anything but an automotive tool.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would the blacksmith or whoever made this thing have an idea of what it would be used for?

Mr. OWEN. I would think anybody who would have constructed this would have to know exactly what this would be used for from the fact that it is a specific sized tube and it does have a fixed firing tube that would serve no other purpose than to initiate a shotgun shell.

AUTOMATIC HANDGUNS

Other type of guns that are particularly popular with outlaw motorcycle gangs are certain hand guns which can be very simply converted to automatic weapons. Two examples of weapons which started out as semiautomatic pistols and, through very simple modifications, have been modified to fire as machineguns—this is a weapon which was produced in Atlanta, Ga., which can be modified into a machinegun in about a minute. It requires the use of some very simple tools.

SILENCER

The CHAIRMAN. What is that piece there?

Mr. OWEN. The attachment to it is a sound suppressor, or silencer. All of these particular pistols were manufactured with barrels adapted to accept sound suppressors.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it against the law now to manufacture those?

Mr. OWEN. It would be against the law to manufacture these unless the manufacturer were properly licensed and registered each of these items with ATF.

The CHAIRMAN. If that gun was fired, what noise would it make?

Mr. OWEN. With the suppressor attached, it is not completely silent, but the noise is such that if you were standing on an average street corner with normal background traffic, you would not notice the sound of the weapon.

Some of the most effective silent weapons that seem to be very popular with groups like the Hell's Angels for assassinations are .22-caliber pistols which have home-made silencers adapted to them. If this particular pistol is fired outdoors with its suppressor

attached, it would have a sound very much like a wooden screen door slamming shut. It is such an everyday noise that your mind would basically ignore it. It significantly changes the sound.

The CHAIRMAN. What size is that?

Mr. OWEN. Twenty-two caliber.

This is a smaller version of the pistol I just showed you, which has also been converted to fire fully automatically and it is adapted to take a sound suppressor. This particular pistol, as agent Bertolani will mention later, was very popular with the Hell's Angels in the San Francisco area. It has also been converted to fire in a fully automatic mode.

The CHAIRMAN. They were legal at one time?

Mr. OWEN. These were originally legal firearms.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they outlawed them, and when they outlawed them, did they require them to be turned in, those who had them?

Mr. OWEN. No, sir. The scope of the ATF ruling was such that any manufacturer, after the effective date of the ruling, would have to treat them as machineguns.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. OWEN. This is just a small example of some of the types of firearms that are particularly popular with the Hell's Angels and other outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Did you have something else now, Mr. McGuire?

Mr. McGUIRE. Yes, sir, I would like to introduce you at this time, Senator Thurmond, to two of ATF's most experienced agents in the investigation of outlaw motorcycle gangs.

William Bertolani is currently a supervisor for ATF in California. He has been with ATF for over 20 years and he has acted as an undercover agent in gang investigations for several years. Also, he played a very significant role in the RICO investigation of the Hell's Angels in San Francisco in 1979 through 1981. Special agent Bertolani continues to be actively involved in the investigations of the Hell's Angels.

Les Robinson, who has been in law enforcement for over 22 years, 13 with ATF, is also currently a supervisor with ATF. He has penetrated the gangs in an undercover capacity to the degree that the Hell's Angels were wanting him to become a member. He can explain the initiation rites and rituals that would preclude any Federal law enforcement officer from, in fact, joining the gangs.

Both of these agents have lectured extensively before State and local law enforcement groups. I feel like they have a great deal to offer to you, Senator, and I would make them available to you for questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Are you Mr. Bertolani?

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BERTOLANI, SPECIAL AGENT, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS; AND LESTER ROBINSON, SPECIAL AGENT

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been involved in the investigation of a number of outlaw gangs, I believe. Will you tell us which you consider to have the greater propensity for violence?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Based upon my experience and knowledge of outlaw motorcycle gangs and conversations with local and State agencies specializing in this investigative activity, we believe collectively that the Hell's Angels motorcycle club is by far the most dangerous outlaw motorcycle gang in the United States and poses the greatest propensity for violence.

During the period from about 1970 to the present time, the Hell's Angels outlaw motorcycle gang in California—there are several chapters they have there—are responsible for at least 36 known homicides. That is only the northern California chapters.

Most of these killings have been perpetrated by the use of firearms. Other indications of their propensity for violence are the continuing wars with the Outlaw motorcycle gang itself and the Mongols motorcycle gang in southern California. These wars have been going on for several years and have caused the lives of several individuals in both the gangs.

The CHAIRMAN. Agent Bertolani, your appearance indicates a clean-cut young man. How did you alter your appearance and infiltrate the Hell's Angels? How did you manage to do that?

Mr. BERTOLANI. During the period from about 1973 to 1976, I worked undercover as an associate to members and associates of other outlaw motorcycle gangs, including the Hell's Angels, the Barhoppers, the Misfits, and the Sundowners.

It is quite a transition from an agent to an outlaw motorcycle rider. You have got to do such things as grow long hair and a beard to alter your appearance, establish a new identity, and dress in a manner consistent with their appearance; adopt a pattern of speech and manner consistent with outlaw motorcycle riders. Hardest of all, you have got to learn to ride a motorcycle and maintain it.

IDENTITY OF LEADER

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that during your investigation of the Hell's Angels, you gained certain knowledge of the leaders of this gang. Will you tell us about these individuals and the lifestyles they lead?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes. I would like to identify about five of these people, the first being Ralph Hubert Barger, also known as "Sonny" or "Chief." He was born in 1938; he is not a youngster. He lives in an average home in a working class area of Oakland, Calif., with his wife Sharon.

Except for the fact that he is a Hell's Angel and has frequent visitors on motorcycles wearing colors, he would appear outwardly to be another average American. He tries to maintain a low profile and not draw a lot of attention to himself unnecessarily.

Barger most recently worked in a health studio in Oakland, and his wife Sharon works in another health studio. Barger's criminal record includes a 1963 conviction for narcotics, a 1966 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, a 1973 conviction for narcotics, a 1973 conviction for false imprisonment and possession of firearms,

and he was also tried in a RICO trial in 1979. It was a hung jury and the charges were dismissed.

Barger is suspected of having been involved in several homicides. Barger joined the Oakland chapter of the Hell's Angels in about 1957. One year later, he became the president of that chapter. In the 1960's, the control of the Hell's Angels moved from San Bernardino, Calif., to Oakland, Calif., under the direction of Ralph Barger.

The title "mother chapter," which they call their headquarters—they deny having a headquarters; they call it a mother chapter. Barger, as president of the mother chapter, makes general policy decisions, provides direction, and grants charters for new chapters. Barger is a natural-born leader; he is rather dynamic. He controls the Hell's Angels motorcycle club through his sphere of influence, backed by his reputation of a person who knows how to get things done and is not afraid to do them.

The second person I would like to draw your attention to is James Ezekiel Brandes. Brandes is a member of the Hell's Angel motorcycle club and has been for several years. He also lives in a modest home in the east hills of Oakland, Calif., except his home is a little different. It is encompassed by a high cyclone fence, with barbed wire around above that.

Brandes is probably one of the five most powerful members in the organization in California. He has been identified previously by law enforcement as being a hit-type individual or enforcer. Brandes' record goes back for many years: in 1965, for forgery; in 1965, again, for second-degree burglary; in 1969, for forgery. In 1969, Mr. Brandes got tired of prison and escaped. He was caught and returned to prison again.

In 1971, he was convicted for possession of narcotics; in 1972, convicted for narcotics. In 1978, he was arrested for conspiracy to commit murder and possession of drugs. Brandes has been implicated in at least four to five homicides; he has been convicted on none of those.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. BERTOLANI. He has not been convicted on any of those homicides which he was alleged to be involved in.

Another prominent figure is Kenneth J. Owen. Mr. Owen was just released from Federal prison. He was sentenced to 5 years in Federal prison for a Federal firearms violation. He lives in Oakland, Calif., in the east hills in a modest home, except it is located in a compound with four other residences, occupied by members of the Hell's Angels.

They call it "the compound on the hill" in Oakland. It has a high cyclone fence around it, topped with barbed wire, and a security sound system. Mr. Owen, in 1963, was arrested for exhibiting false identification; in 1966, for first-degree burglary; in 1977, for possession of firearms by a felon. In 1978, he, along with Brandes, was arrested for conspiracy to commit murder and possession of narcotics.

I would like to address you to Manuel Rubio, probably the most enterprising individual in the organization. He is a former member now. Manuel Rubio was born in 1937. He has several holdings of property in Oakland, Calif. He was so successful in the metham-

phetamine business that he had to find an outlet for his money. He has been in several businesses, and in 1980, just before being sentenced to prison for a RICO violation, sold one of those businesses for \$6 million.

Rubio's record is all misdemeanor; he has no felony convictions, or had none until that time.

Another prominent member of the club is Sergey Clement Walton.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. How many of those do you have?

Mr. BERTOLANI. I have the last one, Walton.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Well, just go ahead. I thought if you had a good many, I would just put them in the record.

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes, this is the last one.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like for them to be in the record.

Mr. BERTOLANI. Okay. Sergey Clement Walton also lives in the east hills of Oakland, Calif., in a more than modest home. He has several cars—Corvettes, Camaros. He has antique cars in his collection. He has very large property holdings and unrecorded transactions in Oakland, Calif.

Walton acted as president for the chapter in the absence of Sonny Barger when Barger served 4 years in the State prison. Walton's record includes auto theft in 1965, possession of narcotics in 1972, possession of dangerous drugs in 1973.

Those are probably the most prominent people in the organization. Walton is probably the second largest manufacturer of methamphetamine in the chapter.

WITNESS INTIMIDATION

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bertolani, have you ever witnessed or have evidence to suggest that the Hell's Angels have used violence to intimidate witnesses, informers, or law enforcement officers?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes. There have been several instances in which members and associates of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club have used violence—I have a laryngitis problem—on potential witnesses, informers, and law enforcement officers.

Among these, we would like to draw your attention to the 1965 homicide of a member, Gary Kefauver. Kefauver was a member in good standing of the Oakland chapter. He was accused by other members of having furnished information to police on a nonclub-related matter. They felt this was a weakness, confronted him with it, tricked him into putting on a pair of thumb cuffs to restrain him, and then assassinated him. They took his body and dumped it in the countryside. They disposed of a member that easily.

In 1977, a lady by the name of Margo Compton, who had been an associate of the Nomad chapter of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club, was subsequently forced into prostitution at a nude encounter parlor known as the Love Nest in San Francisco, Calif. After receiving assurances of personal safety from local and State law enforcement, Compton provided testimony in the criminal trial of a Nomad member, Otis (Buck) Garrett, and his associates on charges resulting from prostitution.

Months after having been relocated in the State of Oregon, Compton, her two twin daughters, and a male neighbor were shot to death. Compton is believed to have been killed by members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club from Oakland, Calif.

Another instance of intimidation or attempted homicide of a law enforcement officer was in 1978, when Inspector William Zerbe of the Solano County Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, who had been investigating the activities of the Hell's Angels, left his residence to go to court to testify in a matter involving the Hell's Angels.

Inspector Zerbe was leery of a bombing involving a law enforcement officer in San Jose, Calif., which had been suspected to have been perpetuated by the Hell's Angels. He checked his car each morning before he entered it. On this particular morning, he checked his car for obvious explosive devices and found none.

When Inspector Zerbe got to the door of his vehicle, a bomb was detonated about 2 to 3 feet behind him, where it was hidden in a bed of ivy. Inspector Zerbe has been forced to retire. He lost 90 percent of his hearing in one ear and 40 percent in the other. This bombing was believed to have been committed by James Ezekiel Brandes, a member of the Oakland chapter.

Mr. SHORT. Have you been able to establish any connection between the LCN and the Hell's Angels in your section of the country?

Mr. BERTOLANI. In northern California, the only connection we know that exists or we can identify was that one between Filmore Cross, the former president of the San Jose chapter and Angelo Marino, an operator of California Cheese. Angelo Marino's ties are to Joseph Cerrito and his LCN family, and to James Frattiano.

LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES

Mr. SHORT. How much money would you estimate is made by the Hell's Angels organization, and is this money used to infiltrate and buy into legitimate businesses?

Mr. BERTOLANI. From the several investigations that I have been involved in, it would be safe to say that the Hell's Angels motorcycle club's drug operation has produced revenues in the millions and probably the billions. Although it would be almost impossible to determine the exact amount of moneys made through illegal activities engaged in by the members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club, we have learned from our investigation that the primary source of income for the Hell's Angels is the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine.

A prime example of this are the activities of the previously cited Manuel Rubio. He started off as a motorcycle rider in 1973. He opened a body shop, investing \$200,000 in that. He later invested money in a motorcycle shop, sold both of those, and began Siesta Catering in 1976 as a small catering company.

After a pattern of intimidation through bombings and fire bombings, he operated the business until about 1980, at which time he sold it for about \$6 million. Since that time, the partners in that business, Jake Sanchez, an associate, and Johnny Angel, another member, have gone into the same catering business, except at West Sacramento, Calif.

Other indications of the large amounts of moneys being made are the lucrative lifestyles that are inconsistent with the apparent income of these people, who hold some menial jobs and some have no jobs at all. Yet, they live in more than modest homes, drive brand new cars and brand new Harley-Davidsons, and wear more than high-style clothing for that type of individual.

Mr. SHORT. Does the IRS look at those people at all? Do you pass all information on to Internal Revenue?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Yes; we have talked to IRS. In fact, in 1978 and 1979, IRS was looking into them, but dropped their probe at that time because the RICO investigation took over from where they had begun.

METHAMPHETAMINE ENTREPRENEURS

Mr. SHORT. What is the extent of the Hell's Angels' involvement in the manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, especially in your part of the country?

Mr. BERTOLANI. The Hell's Angels motorcycle club is probably singularly the largest organization involved in drug trafficking in northern California. Although they have always been involved with drugs to some degree, the large-scale distribution of drugs did not begin until about 1967. This is the time of the hippie and the flower child and Haight-Asbury, and the distribution of acid that was produced by Augustus Stanley Housely, the acid king; this was their beginning.

Other drugs they distributed were marihuana, heroin, cocaine, seconal, PCP, amphetamines, and then into the methamphetamines. In the 1970's, they found a gold mine; they found a chemist who worked in an oil company in Richmond, Calif. They recruited him and he began to cook methamphetamine full time. He also taught most of the members of the Oakland chapter and other chapters how to produce methamphetamine.

From that time on, the Oakland chapter and the Hell's Angels, in general, became big entrepreneurs in the production of methamphetamine. An indication of how much money was made is that an enterprise between four members between 1976 and 1979 made approximately \$6 million at wholesale from the production of methamphetamine.

Today, we believe in northern California, based upon intelligence and informers available, that there are at least 12 methamphetamine operations by the Hell's Angels.

HELL'S ANGELS

Mr. SHORT. Do you find motorcycle gangs to be involved in international drug trafficking? Could you comment on that, if you have information pertaining to that, please?

Mr. BERTOLANI. One of the common characteristics of an outlaw motorcycle gang is a high degree of mobility, and the Hell's Angels motorcycle club is no exception. Having some 51 chapters located throughout 10 countries in the world, they frequently travel between these chapters in pursuit of their motorcycle club activities and the distribution of narcotics and the obtaining of chemicals for the production of narcotics.

We also have information that they have sent technicians to other chapters to show them how to produce methamphetamines throughout the world.

Mr. SHORT. Throughout the world?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Throughout the world.

Mr. SHORT. You have got quite a display of weapons and we have been told how they are used. How heavily are the members of the Hell's Angels involved in firearms and explosives trafficking?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Our investigation of the Hell's Angels indicates they are extensively involved in trafficking of firearms and explosives, not only as a matter of additional revenue, but as a matter of protection for their operation as a motorcycle club and their drug operation.

Countless seizures have been made of firearms and explosives from the members and their associations. Illustrations are, in 1978, a silencer factory was seized from an associate of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club. Seized were several silencers, pamphlets, and materials on the production of silencers, methamphetamine, and other weapons.

In 1979, a search warrant at Kenny Owen's residence revealed several machineguns and a silencer. In 1979, the arrest of Brandes and Walton from the RICO charges that had been brought against them resulted in the seizure of two machineguns that are described on the table in the display, and three handgrenades that are exactly as displayed on the table.

Mr. SHORT. That is the MAC-10's you are referring to up here?

Mr. BERTOLANI. MAC-10's and MAC-11's, yes.

In 1981, agents from the San Francisco district followed a shipment of firearms from Oakland, Calif., to Sturgis, S. Dak. These were to be delivered to members of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club at that location, who were to use them in a confrontation with the Outlaws motorcycle club, whom they believed to be in attendance at the Black Hills national run at that location.

Mr. SHORT. Let me interrupt you. Sturgis, S. Dak., is considered a national run by a number of the outlaw gangs; is that correct?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Sturgis, S. Dak., is probably the largest in the Nation, an open run for most motorcycle riders, and many outlaw motorcycle gangs do attend.

Seldom is a member or associate of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club arrested or a search conducted of that person's residence where a firearm is not seized; it is very rare. Some of the bylaws of some of the chapters have it mandatory, or did have it mandatory until law enforcement caught on to it, that all members of the chapter possess firearms or have them under their control.

SUNDOWNERS

Mr. SHORT. Tell us about the Sundowners motorcycle club. I understand you investigated that organization. The chairman referred earlier to the membership in South Carolina. Could you tell us about your investigation and how powerful you consider the club to be?

Mr. BERTOLANI. The Sundowners motorcycle club is a small organization homing out of Ogden, Utah. Over the past several years, it

has grown to have four States in its jurisdiction: Utah, California, South Carolina, and Florida. The Hell's Angels motorcycle club is a prime associate of this club and they have been seen to interact on many occasions.

In 1976, I had occasion to go to Salt Lake City and to Ogden, Utah, to work undercover among the Sundowners. It was said that they had a stash of weapons which the agency had no way to get to except undercover. I worked there for a period of time and met some of the members. I obtained the necessary evidence for a search warrant, and the case concluded on the execution of a search warrant on a firearms stash.

The Sundowners is a growing organization. It is going through the growing pains that the Hell's Angels did years ago. They still have a lot of rowdiness left in them, but they are becoming more sophisticated and larger in the scope of their operation. As I said, they are very close to the Hell's Angels motorcycle club. It would not surprise me if someday they were absorbed.

Mr. SHORT. By the Hell's Angels?

Mr. BERTOLANI. By the Hell's Angels.

Mr. SHORT. From your experience, which of the investigative techniques available to law enforcement is the most effective in dealing with the criminal activity engaged in by members of the Hell's Angels?

Mr. BERTOLANI. Because of the vast terrain covered by these organizations and the multitude of violations involved, the task force of combining agencies of the Federal Government and the local and State agencies seems to be the best way to handle this. You have enough manpower, in combination; you have the jurisdiction, in total, covered. There is a complete coverage of the intelligence available to work on these people.

The task force definitely proves out time after time, in San Diego, Calif., and in San Francisco, Calif. Now, at Sacramento, Calif., there is a task force working. It proves to be the best available law enforcement tool.

INFILTRATION OF GANG

Mr. SHORT. It sounds like you have done a good job. I am sure the chairman extends his congratulations for the hard work you have done.

Let me ask you, Agent Robinson, based on your 20 years of experience with outlaw gangs, how hard is it for a law enforcement officer to infiltrate an outlaw gang, and what is the primary reason for this?

Mr. ROBINSON. Let me try to explain it to you this way. Agent Bertolani has addressed some of that and the problems of dressing like an outlaw motorcycle gang member. You can put on a red bandana and climb onto a big Harley that was recently modified and ride off into the sunset, and never be able to talk to an outlaw motorcycle club member.

It takes a lot of preparation, a lot of background, a lot of intelligence-gathering, before an agent can even think about trying to associate with these types of members. They are well organized and well insulated. You just do not walk up and talk to one of them.

Especially, you do not walk up and talk to them about any illegal activities.

One of the basic problems faced by law enforcement and one of the things they have had trouble with in the past is that there is such a difference between an outlaw motorcycle club member and a law enforcement officer that it becomes very distasteful for them to even think about going in the direction of associating with them.

One thing that would be typical to display this is that if you will notice on the colors displayed on the chart up there, some of them show a little patch that shows "1 percent" on those jackets. That means to them that they are the 1 percent of society that never will conform; they are total rebels to the laws and to the morals of society.

Because of that patch so well displayed on their jacket, it becomes offensive to a law enforcement officer who has his badge which he does not want to dishonor. That is one of the basic differences and problems in associating undercover or developing intelligence information within these gangs.

Mr. SHORT. Have you ever successfully infiltrated any of the outlaw gangs, and if you have, could you provide us some details concerning your experiences while serving as an agent in an undercover capacity?

Mr. ROBINSON. Personally, I would like to consider it successful because I am here to testify about it today. The successful operation of it can be judged, I suppose, by some of the activities that I was able to get involved in in an investigative manner in an undercover approach.

This all started in about 1969, shortly after I had joined ATF. ATF directed me to develop an undercover identity to see if there was any chance that an undercover operation could be successful.

Mr. SHORT. What was your location at that time?

Mr. ROBINSON. That was in Sacramento, Calif.

In 1970, I started associating with and tried to develop numerous informants, both witting and unwitting. From that period of time until approximately 1975, I had worked on numerous clubs in that undercover capacity.

Mr. SHORT. Now, by worked on, you are referring to investigating rather than attempting to infiltrate, or was this in an undercover capacity?

Mr. ROBINSON. It was in an undercover capacity.

The investigation developed to the point where, between 1971 and 1972, I started to associate with officers of the hierarchy of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club. Many of these officers were, as I indicated, very much business-minded, but to conduct any illegal activities required introductions primarily from either an informant or some other source of credibility to them.

Some of these investigations resulted in the following incidents occurring and some of the following cases being made. At one time, I was at Sonny Barger's residence, and at that residence an informant and I were fronted with half a pound of heroin; that meant that they gave us half a pound of heroin, to pay them later for the value of it. The value at that time amounted to about \$5,500.

The narcotics were immediately turned over to DEA for their continued investigation of this matter. Fortunately, they assisted

us in the investigation and we wound up making several payments on that debt.

Mr. SHORT. They provided the buy money for the investigation?

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

At one time, it was indicated that the money had to go somewhere else. The treasurer of the Oakland chapter of the Hell's Angels was collecting the debt. So, it is my belief that the drugs and the money were club money and club dope.

At another time, John Palomar's wife, or old lady, Dee, came to me and an informant and said that the Richmond chapter of the Hell's Angels had been cut off from narcotics in Oakland and they were looking for another source of narcotics. In other words, they were putting out a feeler to see if there was anything other than the Oakland chapter of the Hell's Angels which they could obtain narcotics from.

Another incident involved Theodore DeWilde, who was the president of the Nomad chapter of the Hell's Angels.

Mr. SHORT. Let me interrupt you and go back just a minute, Agent Robinson, if I could. You got into Sonny Barger's house in an undercover capacity. Yet, it is extremely difficult to get involved with these people. Now, if we are not disclosing investigative techniques, exactly how did you make the contacts and infiltrate the organization to that point?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, it kind of goes back quite a ways; like I say, the establishment of an identity first.

Mr. SHORT. Right. You did not have to commit any illegal activities, crimes, and so forth, in order to be known to them, or did you just pretend to—

Mr. ROBINSON. I committed no illegal acts. The introduction was made by an informant and the introduction was sufficient enough to withstand their scrutiny.

Mr. SHORT. I understand. Go ahead, please.

Mr. ROBINSON. As I was saying, Theodore DeWilde at one time sold me a machinegun and a bomb. The bomb was constructed, in his words, at the club house of the Hell's Angels. The bomb was a hand grenade encased in dynamite, and around the dynamite was wrapped strips of metal for a shrapnel effect.

At that trial in Federal court, the judge announced that DeWilde had, in his opinion, set in motion a course of potential death and destruction and he found him guilty.

On another occasion—

Mr. SHORT. What was the sentence in that particular case, do you recall?

Mr. ROBINSON. I do not recall the exact sentence, but he went on an appeal bond and, to my knowledge, he has never been seen or heard of since then.

On another occasion, the Misfits' president and vice president came to an informant and myself and explained they had a little problem with the Hell's Angels. It seemed as though one of their members had used, as they put it, some narcotics that belonged to the Hell's Angels. To add to his problems, he got caught with the narcotics and he had to use the Hell's Angels bondsman.

He had gotten himself into such a jam that he got worried about this and he took off and skipped out of town from the bondsman

used by the Hell's Angels. The president of the Misfits advised that he kind of would like to have things smoothed over with the Hell's Angels because they came into his house one night and put a gun to his head and took his TV and car, and he was afraid they were going to come back and take out more for the debt.

The examples of incidents like this go on considerably. Another example involving the use of explosives occurred when an informant and myself were approached by some associates of the Hell's Angels, and they explained that they were going to go rip off a bunker for some dynamite and wanted to know if I would like to come along.

I advised them that I did not particularly want to get involved in the burglary, but if they were there, they could pick up a couple of cases for me. What eventually happened is I learned the location of where this bunker was and the theft was going to take place, and agents from ATF arrested three Hell's Angels associates with three-and-a-half tons of explosives and 7 miles' worth of det cord.

At another time while we were speaking with Anita Walton, who was at that time married to Sergey Walton, whom Agent Bertolani referred to earlier, she advised that she was ready to get rid of a stash that the Hell's Angels had—a stash of firearms—and she wanted to know if we were interested in buying them. I told her that we would look at it and see what we could offer on it.

Another agent verified that she had gone to get a four-wheel drive vehicle. She explained it was in the mountains and it would be hard to get to. A day or two later, she came back and advised that Sonny Barger had told her not to move the stash; that there was a gun in there that he did not want out. So, those guns were never purchased.

Mr. SHORT. If you have other examples, you can just put those in the record, if you would.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you.

SLANG TERMINOLOGY

Mr. SHORT. Let me address this to both of you at the table. We will have some former members tomorrow, but could you define the terms "old lady," "mama," "sheep," and some of the more common terms used by the outlaw motorcycle gangs?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, some of these terminologies change from club to club. Traditionally, an old lady is the property of a certain member of the club, or belongs to that member. A mama is the property of the club entirely. Of course, the distinction between the two is fairly obvious.

Mr. SHORT. You are talking primarily about sexual use by the entire club as opposed to limiting a woman to one individual, as an old lady would be if she belonged to one biker?

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

You referred to the term "sheep." I have not been involved in anything that would give me knowledge as to what that term is used for.

Mr. BERTOLANI. I believe that is an eastern term. I have not heard it on the west coast.

Mr. SHORT. Thank you. How successful are outlaw gangs in acquiring intelligence materials on law enforcement agencies, and basically how do they go about obtaining this information?

Mr. ROBINSON. The accumulation of this information sometimes becomes quite a mystery because it is not widely broadcast how they do come across it. The fact is that they have a lot of information at times. One example is the security officer that had a search warrant served on his residence; that was James Brandes, a member of the Hell's Angels.

At his residence, he had a file which identified informants and undercover officers and agents. I know that my photograph was in the file, and I believe that Agent Bertolani's photograph was in the file. Our physical descriptions were in the file, and I observed that my post of duty was noted and where I worked at that time.

Mr. SHORT. Have there been threats on either of your lives?

Mr. ROBINSON. No.

Mr. BERTOLANI. I received an indirect threat; it was both myself and the informer. I had moved at about that time, and so did my informer.

INFORMANTS' IDENTITY

Mr. SHORT. What about the informants in both cases. Was their identity ever obtained?

Mr. BERTOLANI. No. Mine is still healthy.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mine was placed under the witness protection program.

Mr. SHORT. These people are involved in a lot of different activities and they are becoming legitimate business people. How do the outlaw gang members hide their true identity from the law enforcement agencies?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, first, frequently, more times than not, the members call each other by nicknames; you know, "bear," "dirt," "broke dick," and all kinds of names. Then, on top of that, I have talked with members about outlaw gangs that have expressed that they have inside sources that can obtain documents for them which would alter their identity from their true identity into a false identity.

INSIDE SOURCES

Mr. SHORT. Do you have indications that they have infiltrated police departments, State governments, and so forth?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, the problem I have with saying that I have anything firm in that way is I cannot name any department or any source. I only know the information they have supplied to me that there were available documents which could alter my identity or change the identity of—

Mr. SHORT. They make the claim that they can obtain information from official sources?

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. So they appear sincere in these claims.

Mr. ROBINSON. They seem serious about it, yes.

Mr. SHORT. Do they actually obtain those documents?

Mr. ROBINSON. I have seen that during search warrants, and so forth, they have come up with altered and forged documents.

Mr. SHORT. And were those actual, legitimate documents that had been forged, or were they counterfeit-type documents?

Mr. ROBINSON. They were legitimate documents.

Mr. SHORT. Do you think the leaders of these outlaw gangs are capable of planning and executing complicated operations? You have observed them from their own environment. Do you think that they are much more intelligent than the general public perceives them to be?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, if I understand the general public's view of outlaw motorcycle riders, I believe they only see what appears in the newspapers or seeing them drive by on the highway. I do not think they really know too much about what they are doing or their capabilities, other than they look quite frightening. Because they look so frightening, they probably look not too intelligent.

I do not know that that is the general view of the public, but what is happening within these motorcycle gangs is that they are becoming more and more sophisticated in their operations, and they are becoming more and more financially stable, in my view, in their ability to handle illegal traffic, and now starting to become involved in legal business operations.

Mr. SHORT. From the testimony presented, it would appear that there is reason for the public to have the perception that the motorcycle gangs are frightening. If they as stated have such a propensity for violence that they will kill at the slightest drop of a hat, I would think there is need for concern.

Mr. ROBINSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Agent Robinson, based upon your experience as an undercover officer, can you give the committee the reason you believe that outlaw motorcycle gang members become so heavily involved with weapons and explosives?

Mr. ROBINSON. There are numerous reasons that that occurs, and a lot of that has been testified to previously. That includes the protection of territorial rights by these clubs; the protection of narcotics that they traffic in or any other illegal activities that they are involved in require a degree of strength and backing, and the backing has to be in the form of firearms or explosives. Idle threats are quickly determined in disputes between outlaw motorcycle members.

In addition to that, there is always talk, and there are incidents, of wars between clubs. For that reason, each club must be prepared to stand its ground.

The CHAIRMAN. In your undercover investigations, did you observe any alliances being formed between large outlaw motorcycle gangs and smaller ones?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes. That is a typical situation in the area that I came from and in the investigations that I was involved in. For example, many of the smaller clubs in the area of a large, powerful club operate almost under the sanction of the bigger club. At times, those smaller clubs can derive benefits from doing what the larger club has dictated to them.

Eventually, they might even have a desire to join or form a chapter of the main, stronger club. Some examples of that have been

testified to here, also. I know that the Losers motorcycle club in Monterey County traveled extensively with the Hell's Angels, and I have had information recently that they are now a chapter of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club.

The CHAIRMAN. Agent Robinson, can you tell the committee which group you consider to be the most dangerous of the outlaw motorcycle gangs, and why?

MOST DANGEROUS CLUB

Mr. ROBINSON. I feel that the Hell's Angels motorcycle club—and this is a personal opinion—is the most dangerous because it has a history dating back over 30 years. That club has survived under a lot of investigation, and they have survived under conditions of wars and truces between motorcycle clubs.

The Hell's Angels themselves have been identified pretty much by other outlaw motorcycle clubs as a type of club which they are emulating. In other words, they were not only first, but a lot of the things that the Hell's Angels are doing, other clubs are copying. For that reason, I think they have a vast influence across the country.

TERRITORIAL RIGHTS

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered on these different motorcycle gangs, where they are in the same city—you do have some in the same city, do you not, or several gangs in the same city?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Up in New Jersey, I believe, was one place you had several gangs in the same place. You said that in South Carolina, you have several different gangs. Are any of them in the same city, the same territory?

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes; they are.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do they compete with each other in the same place, or do they divide up the city and grant territory to different ones?

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, the distinction between a club being in the same city is whether it is a major club or it is a smaller, minor club, or an affiliate or associate of—

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. ROBINSON. Whether it is an affiliate or an associate of the major club.

If it is a competitor to that major club, they do not last in the same city very long together. That has been our experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean they shoot each other up, or what happens?

Mr. ROBINSON. They, pretty soon, establish territorial rights to that city.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what are those territorial rights for, to run lotteries and gambling and prostitution, and so forth, or is to rob people, or does it include everything?

Mr. ROBINSON. It includes a wide variety of activities, as was testified to earlier, the largest, of course, being the trafficking in narcotics.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking if they would divide the city up for all purposes or just certain specified purposes under an agreement between the gangs.

Mr. ROBINSON. If a territory were to be divided, all activity in that territory would be exclusively under the rights of that major club. If another club infringed on those rights, whether it was in narcotics traffic or any other illegal operation, there would be an immediate need for a challenge between the clubs to reinforce that this territory belongs to the major club.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, tomorrow, I believe we have some members and former members of some of the motorcycle gangs who are going to testify. At that time, we hope to bring out some testimony that will be of interest to the public and will be helpful in these organized crime hearings.

I want to take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Director, and all the agents here today and those witnesses who testified and the others who are present, for your cooperation, and express our appreciation to you. What you have done here today, I think, can be very important to the public good. We thank you very much.

I would like to also thank Special Agent Glenn E. Brazil for the assistance he provided the committee in the way of intelligence data, photographs, and other material. Special Agent Brazil is currently assigned as the organized crime strike force representative in New Orleans, La., and is the motorcycle gang coordinator for the New Orleans district which encompasses Louisiana and Arkansas.

Agent Brazil, you are to be commended for your fine work, and we do appreciate your assistance, as well as all the other agents and employees of ATF.

We are going to adjourn now, and the next hearing on organized crime will be tomorrow when we will have some witnesses that I think will be of great interest. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Phillip McGuire follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP MCGUIRE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

Chairman Thurmond, members of the Committee. I thank you for this opportunity to address you on one of the most significant organized criminal threats to our country today - the outlaw motorcycle gangs.

I believe the external trappings of these gangs are well documented. This afternoon, two of our most experienced special agents in gang investigations will be here before this committee; tomorrow, former gang members and associates will be before you. I invite you to discuss with them the specifics of gang membership.

The hell-raising outlaw, straddling a modified Harley-Davidson motorcycle, is a stereotype; a stereotype much like the black-shirted, white tie-wearing Mafioso. There's truth in the stereotype; but there is also an element of deceit. We are surely deceived when we look at the stereotype and believe our preconceptions about the lack of sophistication of such people.

For over a decade, ATF has been involved in criminal investigations of outlaw motorcycle gang members. We have tracked the increasing sophistication of their criminal activities, and have noted no lessening of their propensity for violence. Outlaw motorcyclists have made the grade in big time crime.

In general, the history of outlaw motorcyclists is well documented, the Market Street Commandos and the POBOB's (Pissed Off Bastards of Bloomington) appeared in California shortly after World War II. They came to national attention in 1947, when they turned the American Motorcycle Association-sponsored hill climb in Hollister, California, into a week-long brawl. The Hollister hill climb culminated with the outlaw bikers converging on the city jail and releasing two of their members who had been arrested.

In 1950, in Fontana, California, members of the POBOB's,

under the leadership of Otto Friedli, formed a new gang. Taking the name of a World War II bomber, the Hell's Angels were born. The Angels' "mother chapter" eventually located in San Bernadino, where it remained until the mid 1960's. At that time, Ralph Hubert (Sonny) Barger, president of the Oakland Hell's Angels, became the national president and the "mother chapter" was moved to Oakland. Barger and Oakland remain the center of the Hell's Angels.

In 1959, in Prince George's County, Maryland, the Pagans were established under the presidency of Lou Dolkin. The Pagan structure is slightly different from that of other gangs in that it does not have a geographically fixed "mother chapter." The Pagans' organization is headed by a "mother club" of 13 to 18 members who come from various chapters. The current president is Paul (Ooch) Ferry of Long Island, New York.

Also in 1959, the Outlaws "mother chapter" was formed in Chicago, Illinois, under John Davis. The current president is Harry (Stairway Harry) Henderson. The Outlaws are now the largest gang in the country. In 1977, the Outlaws absorbed the Satan Choice motorcycle gang in Canada.

1966 saw the birth of the Bandidos. They were formed under Donald Chambers in Houston, Texas, and are now centered in Corpus Christi. Chambers is in the penitentiary for a double homicide and Alvin Chester Frankes is believed to be running the gang.

These four gangs comprise the "big four" of the outlaw motorcycle gangs. There are some 800 to 1,000 smaller gangs, 25 of which have chapters in five or more States.

The years 1947 to 1967 might be termed the formative years for the gangs. They spawned imitators; major clubs absorbed smaller ones - or pushed them aside; roaming members of chapters called "Nomads" carried the seeds of new chapters and formulated gang alliances. Formal organizational structures were put in place; leaders developed.

But, while the gangs were, even then, capable of significant criminal activity, there was a certain lack of focus to that activity. The gangs were certainly dangerous, but outbreaks of violent activity were sporadic and isolated. Overall, the gangs were primarily a headache for local law enforcement agencies.

By the early 1970's, however, a major change was being observed by the law enforcement community. Whatever else the era of the late 1960's changed in America, it changed the gangs. A drug subculture evolved in this country. First as participants, and increasingly as suppliers, the motorcycle gangs were drawn into this subculture.

Anti-social enclaves became big business operations. New members and associates came into the orbit of the gangs, including large numbers of young women who accepted the designation of "property." In learning the narcotics business, the gangs became sophisticated in turning other criminal enterprises into profitmakers.

Chart I shows the established criminal enterprises in which the gangs play a significant role. They are clearly diversified and lucrative. The large-scale involvement of the gangs in the illegal manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine is well documented. One illicit laboratory in Central, Ohio, was capable of producing \$14,000,000 worth of illegal drugs each month. The distribution network connected to that laboratory ran throughout Ohio into California, West Virginia, New York and New Jersey.

Chart II shows the geographical involvement of the gangs in the operation of topless bars. This move into retail liquor establishments is the second most common enterprise we have observed. With the related sex-oriented business of massage parlors, the gangs have converted their female associates into moneymakers. Women who were formerly associated with the gangs have told us that they must bring home between \$100 and \$200 a night to their "old man" from prostitution

and drug sales. A gang member may have between one and five "old ladies," as they are termed, at any given time. The bars and parlors are fronts for prostitution and the "property" is moved from State to State, often sold for cash or in expiation of a debt to another member.

Skirmishes over territory have turned into wars for the control of narcotics distribution. The "Filthy Few" of the Hell's Angels and "SS" of the Outlaws are the "murder incorporated" of the 1980's.

I would like, at this point, to emphasize certain points about the outlaw motorcycle gangs:

First, in spite of their freewheeling exterior, they are highly developed organizations. Chart III shows a comparison between LCN structure and that of the gangs, while chart IV shows the organization of a typical chapter. The major gangs have formal charters and bylaws. The Bandidos are actually incorporated in Texas as a nonprofit organization.

Second, they are national organizations. Chart V shows the location of chapters of the major gangs across the country. The members are not juvenile delinquents. More than half of the outlaw motorcycle gang suspects investigated by ATF are over 35 years old. The presidents of the gangs, Sonny Barger (42), Harry Henderson (38), Alvin Franks (44), Paul Ferry (43), are mature and well experienced with the criminal justice system.

Third, many smaller gangs operate in the sphere of one of the big four. Chart VI shows the associations and territorial disputes between the clubs. We are aware that this pattern of alliances is shifting constantly, particularly as the "big four" attempt to expand the scope of their organizations.

Fourth, there are growing associations between traditional LCN figures and outlaw motorcycle gang members. The motorcycle in the driveway may stand next to a luxury automobile. The "colors" hang in the closet next to designer suits - to be taken out only on the traditional "runs" that I would term, even now, nostalgia events.

Senators, I have included in this submission a list of examples of gang activity that I believe supports what I have said today. Again, I invite you to discuss this activity with the later witnesses who have observed it and participated in it.

I noted earlier that ATF has actively been involved in investigating criminal activity by motorcycle gang members for over a decade. We have had formal enforcement projects directed at continuing violent criminal activity by the gangs almost from the dates of passage of the 1968 gun control and 1970 explosive control statutes. In 1981, the FBI also instituted a formal enforcement program aimed at the outlaw gangs. We welcome the increased investigative resources and attention this action by the FBI has brought to bear on the increasing size and criminality of the gangs.

Since 1972, we have investigated over 7,000 suspects who were gang members or associates. That figure is roughly equivalent to our best estimate of the number of hardcore outlaw motorcyclists in the United States today. Supported by an estimated 4,000 male hangers-on and perhaps 8,000 female associates, the gangs are, if nothing else, the largest criminal organizations in the country. They are also the best armed.

The Federal firearms and explosives laws are among the most effective tools in attacking the criminal activity of the gangs. Of 150 members of the Pagans investigated recently, 120 had prior felony convictions prohibiting the possession of firearms. Overall, about 20 percent of the membership

of the "big four" is similarly vulnerable to prosecution for such offenses. Additionally, the propensity of the gangs to traffic in stolen firearms, automatic weapons or other "gangster" type weapons has led to successful prosecutions.

In the past 2 years, we have investigated 44 explosives incidents involving the outlaw gangs alone. Since 1978, members of almost 200 different gangs have been suspects in investigations of explosives violations.

How effective these laws are may be illustrated by the following:

In 1978, a joint ATF, DEA and FBI investigation of the Hell's Angels was begun in northern California.

In June of 1979, 33 members of the gang were indicted under the RICO statute, and for substantive firearms and narcotics charges.

After two separate trials, only one conviction was obtained on the RICO charges. All other RICO counts resulted in hung juries. However, 16 of the defendants were convicted on the ATF-prepared firearms charges, and received sentences ranging up to 10 years' incarceration.


The goal of ATF, formalized in our national investigative strategy, the Crime Impact Program, is the suppression of significant criminal activity through the application of the statutes given to us to enforce. Traditionally, we have maintained an exceptionally high conviction rate, on felony charges. We

submitted criminal cases on 3,291 suspects in 1981, 2,677 of which were accepted for prosecution. Of these cases 1,187 were heard by the end of the fiscal year, resulting in 1,129 convictions.

This kind of effectiveness is important in challenging the violence of organized crime generally, and that of the motorcycle gangs in particular. It is important not only that we attack the criminality of the gangs, but that we succeed. As far as they have come, the gangs have not successfully emulated Marlon Brando's change in roles from outlaw motorcyclist in "The Wild Ones" to LCN don in "The Godfather," but they are moving rapidly in that direction.

Thank you for this opportunity, and I would be pleased to answer your questions.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES MOTORCYCLE GANGS




**MOTORCYCLE GANG INVOLVEMENT IN
RETAIL LIQUOR ESTABLISHMENTS BY CITY
(OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, PROVIDING DANCERS)**




SIMILARITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE


**TYPICAL ORGANIZED
CRIME FAMILY**



**TYPICAL MAJOR MOTORCYCLE
GANG CHAPTER**



PHYSICAL MAKEUP OF A TYPICAL
MOTORCYCLE GANG



[illegible]

**ASSOCIATIONS/TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
INVOLVING THE FOUR MAJOR MOTORCYCLE GANGS**

ASSOCIATIONS (SOCIAL AND/OR CRIMINAL)	HELL'S ANGELS	OUTLAWS	BANDIDOS	PAGANS
	GALLOPING GOOSE EL FORESTEROS DEVIL'S DISCIPLES BROTHERS SUNDOWNERS MOUNTAIN MEN GHOST RIDERS BARHOPPERS ARGONAUTS DIRTY DOZEN RAVENS SADISTICS DIABLOS SONS OF HAWAII INVADERS OUTSIDERS	BANDIDOS CHOSEN FEW SCORPIONS GRIM REAPERS MONGOLS PHANTOMS IRON BARONS HIGH RIDERS DRIFTERS BREED AMERICAN BREED CONFEDERATE ANGELS HELL'S HENCHMEN HUNS D.C. EAGLES SATAN'S SIDEKICKS VAGABONDS GYPSY JOKERS DIABLO LOBOS	OUTLAWS CONQUISTADORS SCORPIONS ROGUES BENGALS LEGACY LAS AGUILAS ROAD JESTERS SAN JACINTO HIGH RIDERS HESSIANS IRON HORSEMEN TRAMPS	KNIGHTS OF STEEL HUKS SEEKERS
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES	OUTLAWS PAGANS BREED MONGOLS SONS OF SILENCE	HELL'S ANGELS PAGANS RENEGADES IRON HORSEMEN HEAVEN'S DISCIPLES INVADERS SONS OF SILENCE GALLOPING GOOSE EL FORESTEROS WARLOCKS SUNDOWNERS CHAIN DRIVEN COWBOYS GHOST RIDERS	PAGANS GHOST RIDERS BANSHEES	BANDIDOS OUTLAWS HELL'S ANGELS WARLOCKS INVADERS AVENGERS SAINTS PHANTOMS BREED RENEGADES GRIM REAPERS BARBARIANS DIABLOS

Hell's Angels

500 - 600 patch-wearing members

33 U.S. chapters in 10 States and 18 foreign chapters.

California National Headquarters
(13 Chapters)

Alaska (3)

Connecticut (1)

Massachusetts (3)

Minnesota (1)

Nebraska (1)

New York (5)

North Carolina (3)

Ohio (2)

South Carolina (1)

Hell's Angels

Chapters Outside the United States

CANADA - 2

AUSTRALIA - 3

ENGLAND - 7

FRANCE - 1

GERMANY - 1

HOLLAND - 1

SWITZERLAND - 1

NEW ZEALAND - 1

AUSTRIA - 1

Bandidos

450 - 500 patch-wearing members

31 chapters in 10 States

Texas - National Headquarters
(13 Chapters)

Alabama	(1)
Arkansas	(2)
Colorado	(1)
Louisiana	(2)
Mississippi	(2)
New Mexico	(1)
Oklahoma	(1)
South Dakota	(1)
Washington	(6)

1 NOMAD Chapter

Outlaws

1,000 - 1,500 patch-wearing members

25 chapters in the United States in 13 States, 6 chapters
in Canada

Illinois
(2 Chapters)

National Headquarters

Florida	(4)
Georgia	(1)
Indiana	(2)
Kentucky	(1)
Michigan	(1)
North Carolina	(2)
Oklahoma	(1)
Ohio	(3)
Pennsylvania	(2)
Tennessee	(4)
Wisconsin	(1)
New York	(1)

Pagans

400 - 500 patch-wearing members

Approximately 40 chapters in at least 10 States

New York (National President)
(4 Chapters)

Delaware	(3)
Florida	(2)
Maryland	(2)
New Jersey	(3)
Ohio	(1)
Virginia	(4)
West Virginia	(2)
Pennsylvania	(14)
Georgia/South Carolina	(1)

Alabama

In February 1982, Devil's Disciples and Bandidos met in Mobile and settled the disputes that had caused violence between the gangs. The Disciples have been placing their women in go-go clubs in Birmingham, allegedly through threatening club owners with a machinegun.

Alaska

In December 1982, members of the Brothers Motorcycle Club, Fairbanks, met with the Hell's Angels in California, and turned in their existing "colors" for Hell's Angels "colors."

Bandido dancers work in topless bars associated with the Brothers.

Arizona

In September 1980, the former president of the Florida Outlaws Motorcycle Club was paroled from prison and moved to Tucson. He was followed to Tucson by other Outlaws and began to supply prostitutes to topless bars in that city.

This subject was arrested and convicted by ATF in 1981. A former "old lady" testified that she was bought in Florida for \$5,000 by this individual.

In May 1982, the Mongols established a Tucson chapter. War broke out, over control of prostitution in part of the area, between the Mongols and an existing Dirty Dozen Chapter. The Mongols (see California) formed an alliance with the Outlaws. While serving as bodyguards for the wife of the former Outlaws president (convicted by ATF in 1981), armed members of the Mongols were stopped by police in November 1982.

The Mongol - Dirty Dozen conflict has apparently moved the Dozen into an alliance with the Hell's Angels. Several ranking members of the Dirty Dozen have been convicted of methamphetamine trafficking.

There is evidence of a connection between Dirty Dozen members and LCN figures in Phoenix, relating to massage parlors and strong arm violence.

Arkansas

In Little Rock in 1980, blank birth certificates, presigned and certified by a deputy sheriff, were recovered from the Bandidos.

Bandidos in Little Rock are providing topless dancers to at least two locations in that city.

During 1982, ATF assisted the Arkansas State Police Department in the execution of a search warrant at a Bandido's residence in Fort Smith. Five members of the Outlaws were discovered at that residence, including the president of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma chapter.

California

In September 1982, five members of the Hell's Angels were indicted in a 13-count indictment as a result of a Federal - State task force investigation. The Mongols and the Hell's Angels had been battling over the right to wear the word "California" on their colors. The indictment included 3 RICO counts and 10 substantive violations of the Gun Control Act and explosives laws.

In March 1981, the number two man in the Hell's Angels escaped from custody in San Francisco, where he was incarcerated as the result of an ATF case. A deputy sheriff has been charged with assisting in that escape. The escapee was rearrested in May 1981 by ATF. At the time of his arrest, four firearms, including three machineguns, and a pound of methamphetamine were recovered.

The Losers Motorcycle Club of California has been rechartered as a Hell's Angels chapter.

The Hell's Angels in northern California have become involved in the catering business, and the 18,000-member national Modified Motorcycle Association was conceived, and is controlled, by the Hell's Angels.

Colorado

In January 1983, members of the Sundowners from Denver were stopped in Wyoming. A mobile drug laboratory, 42 pounds of methamphetamine and a large weapons cache were recovered.

Bandidos of the Denver chapter are involved in supplying women to topless bars in Denver and Colorado Springs.

Connecticut

The Bridgeport chapter of the Hell's Angels was established in 1978, supplanting the Huns Motorcycle Club. Members are associated with LCN figures as strong arm enforcers related to vending machine and loan shark operations. Hell's Angels are believed to be involved in a 1981 LCN hit.

Florida

The Pagans, Hell's Angels and Outlaws are all active in Florida.

In 1979, three Hell's Angels were assassinated by members of the Outlaws.

The Outlaws provide women for topless bars in Orange County, Florida, and other areas in the State.

Hell's Angels are involved in cocaine transportation to New York.

In 1979, Detroit Outlaws were hired to collect an illegal debt by Palm Beach LCN figures.

Georgia

Outlaws from the Atlanta chapter are currently involved in providing go-go dancers to clubs in the Atlanta area.

In January 1983, ATF agents learned that the Outlaws had been observing the ATF parking lot and had identified the Government-owned vehicles used by ATF.

Illinois

In October 1981, John C. (Burrito) Klimes of the Outlaws was killed by a bomb placed in his truck. Klimes had been involved in supplying women to work as nude dancers in LCN-connected clubs.

Information that thwarted an ATF undercover investigation was obtained for the Outlaws by a female associate through her employment in a telephone company.

Outlaws activity in prostitution and narcotics is coordinated with the LCN in the Chicago area.

Indiana

In August 1982, a northwest Indiana chapter of the Outlaws was formed. They came into conflict with a gang known as the Invaders. Outlaw "old ladies" began replacing Invader "old ladies" in LCN-connected bars in Gary. Also in 1982, three Invaders were shot during an ambush as part of this struggle.

Members of the Invaders have been identified as involved in committing arsons for hire.

Kentucky

The Outlaws in Louisville are providing women to work the area known as the Seventh Street Strip.

Louisiana

Members of the Galloping Gooses are involved in the French Quarter of New Orleans. These locations are part of the Colacurcio organization of Seattle. The Gooses are closely allied with the Hell's Angels.

Maine

Iron Horseman members are closely associated with LCN-connected pornography operations in Maine.

The Mountainmen are involved in methamphetamine trafficking between Maine and Vermont. The Mountainmen are associated with the Massachusetts-based Hell's Angels in this traffic.

Massachusetts

There are three Hell's Angels chapters in Massachusetts. One, the Lee chapter, was formed from a chapter of the Warlocks.

The Hell's Angels were involved in the forcible takeover of a Marlboro, Massachusetts, company that was subsequently stripped of its assets.

The Angels are involved with providing women performers to the topless go-go bars in the North Shore area. They also provided security for a recent concert on Boston Common.

Michigan

For the past 8 years, the Outlaw Motorcycle Club Federation has been in operation in Detroit. The Federation is headed by the Outlaws and consists of most of the white outlaw gangs in the metropolitan area.

The Outlaws are involved in a number of legal liquor businesses, massage parlors and talent agencies in Detroit.

Missouri

Two females were held by the Grim Readers Motorcycle Club at the Shawnee National Forest from May 23-25, 1981. They were repeatedly raped by members of the gang and were guarded by the gang's female associates. Over 100 of the gang members camped in the forest, and the victims stated almost all of them were armed.

Nebraska

In 1981, as a result of an ATF, DEA, State and local investigation into attempts by the Hell's Angels in Iowa and Nebraska to monopolize the methamphetamine trade in Omaha, 10 search warrants were executed. Fifty-seven firearms, drugs, and a human finger and skull were recovered. Ten gang members and associates were arrested. One, the wife of a member, was murdered in 1982.

There is information that Omaha Hell's Angels have been involved as strong arms for a union in the Omaha area.

New Jersey

Numerous ATF investigations have been conducted in New Jersey, as a result of illegal acts by members of the Pagans Motorcycle Club, traditional organized crime, and the associations between them. An investigation initiated in October 1982 culminated in the seizure of handgrenades, firearms, an anti-tank weapon, and a large quantity of narcotics. In March 1982, a Pagan member was arrested for shooting a State trooper after a routine traffic stop. After posting a large bail, he fled New Jersey. He was subsequently arrested in Virginia in the possession of firearms, blasting caps, explosives, and a large supply of methamphetamine. On numerous occasions, members of the Pagan Motorcycle Club have been observed in the company of LCN members, with the bikers acting as bodyguards.

New York

Members of the Hell's Angels and Pagans have been observed in the company of known LCN figures.

The Hell's Angels in upstate New York allegedly operate safe houses where Canadian gang members on the run are provided new ID's and placed in U.S. chapters. The same service operates in reverse for U.S. members.

North Carolina

Since July 1979, at least eight murders of known motorcycle gang members have occurred in the Charlotte area. In September 1982, a Hell's Angel chapter president and member were found shot to death and stuffed in the trunk of a car. There have been several bombings of motorcycle gang hangouts attributed to rival gangs. In February 1982, a member of the Outlaws was seriously injured as he attempted to set off a bomb at a Hell's Angels hangout.

Recently, a close female associate of the Outlaws was discovered to be working in the intelligence division of one of the State's major police departments. She has been dismissed.

In July 1981, the Hell's Angels had their "World Run" at Kerr Lake, which was attended by 300 - 400 members and associates.

New Mexico

A twin engine Cessna crashed in Tucumcari, New Mexico, in late 1979, killing the pilot and passenger, both known members of the Bandido Motorcycle Club. Three weapons and a small amount of cocaine were found. Documentation that the plane had flown into Mexico was also found. The Bandidos have members and associates who are pilots, and several are thought to be engaged in smuggling firearms and narcotics. Earlier this same year, ATF seized 140 pounds of dynamite and a machinegun, and arrested Bandidos in Albuquerque.

Ohio

In February 1982, a L.A.W. rocket was fired into the Outlaws clubhouse in Youngstown. The Hell's Angels are suspected of firing the rocket.

In April 1977, a member of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club was killed in an attempt to place a bomb under the hood of a car belonging to a known associate of a Cleveland organized crime family.

In January 1983, the president of the Cleveland Hell's Angels pled guilty to an ATF charge stemming from his illegal purchase of firearms.

Oklahoma

In January 1982, a search warrant was executed in Oklahoma City at an Outlaw Motorcycle Club residence. Five people

were arrested and approximately \$20,000 cash, 433 grams of methamphetamine, drug supplies, and over 500 Quaaludes were seized. This operation reportedly was earning \$20,000 a week. In January 1983, a member of the Family Motorcycle Club, Elk, Oklahoma, pled guilty to interstate transportation of stolen firearms.

Pennsylvania

In September 1982, another Pagan from the Kane, Pennsylvania chapter was arrested in Rochester, New York, for possessing dynamite and detonation cord which he stated was to be used against another Pagan member.

Traditional organized crime members have frequently used outlaw biker gang members for protection, extortion and intimidation. In 1976, a pornography king pin and LCN associate in the Scranton area employed Pagan members from Philadelphia to muscle out some competition. Approximately eight Pagans with trained attack dogs laid siege to an adult book store and pumped carbon monoxide into the building. Motorcycle gang members, particularly the Pagans, are used extensively as guards and couriers for area crime families and narcotics traffickers.

South Carolina

In January 1982, 14 firearms and assorted narcotics were seized and 40 bikers and associates were arrested when a search warrant was executed at the clubhouse for the Sun-downer's Motorcycle Club in Columbia, South Carolina.

In July 1982, search warrants were executed at the home of South Carolina Hell's Angels president and a mini warehouse rented by the gang. Twelve conventional firearms, three machineguns, a silencer, two C-4 bombs and other explosives were seized.

South Dakota

The former national president of the Bandidos manages a bar in Rapid City. Bandido "old ladies" dance nude in two clubs there.

In August 1981, the president of the Nomad Chapter of the Bandidos, a convicted felon, was arrested by ATF in Rapid City for violations of the Gun Control Act.

In the 1940's, motorcycle racing was done at an organized event like that held today in the Black Hills of South Dakota. The races are held each August in Sturgis, South Dakota, and became known as the Sturgis Classic. The week-long event has become a "run" for many motorcycle gangs, including the Bandidos. This past August, nearly 40,000 motorcyclists attended the Sturgis Classic. It is estimated that 5,500 to 6,000 of these were members of motorcycle gangs. There were 1,370 arrests for various violations. Sixty-seven firearms were confiscated and 15 stolen motorcycles were recovered. ATF made three criminal cases for violation of the Federal firearms laws. Many of the bikers attend the Sturgis Classic not to participate in the races, but to party.

Tennessee

Members of the Memphis chapter of the Iron Horsemen Motorcycle Club, and possibly Bandido gang members, furnish nude dancers to at least six topless bars in Memphis.

Texas

Texas is the strong hold of the Bandido Motorcycle Club, with the national headquarters and approximately 14 chapters in the State. In 1973, its founding president and two other Bandidos were convicted of making two victims dig their own graves, shooting them, and setting their bodies on fire.

In February 1978, articles of Incorporation were filed by the Bandidos with the Secretary of State for the State of Texas, to establish the Bandidos as a nonprofit organization.

In April 1981, members of the Bandidos reportedly met with three members of the Compadres Motorcycle Club and told them to disband the Compadres.

The Bandidos own numerous bars in the State. They manage many others, work as bouncers, and furnish topless and nude dancers. In May 1981, one Bandido and his wife sold a nude modeling studio in Austin, Texas. This same month, San Antonio police officers arrested the wife of a Bandido national officer and another female for public intoxication. A revolver, two shotguns and a rifle were found in their van. Five days later, the president of the Corpus Christi chapter, a convicted felon, was arrested for carrying two handguns. Three days later, a Bandido was fatally shot at his residence in Highlands, Texas.

Virginia

In May 1976, approximately 100 members of the Pagans motorcycle gang attended a bluegrass festival in Clarke County. Several of the citizens were assaulted and some of the campsites were damaged. In January 1979, two Pagans fatally shot a Garrett County Deputy during the burglary of a local business. In May 1980, two Pagans burglarized a business in Shenandoah County. In July 1981, a large group of Hell's Angels rented several rooms at a motel in Winchester, with their advance reservations made under the name, Universal Life Church.

On July 4, 1981, 200 members of Warlock's Motorcycle Club met at the local clubhouse in Fredrick County. Members from six States attended.

In August 1981, a Pagan, who had several felony convictions and was an escapee from Maryland where he was serving 40 years for murder, was captured in Shenandoah County.

In August 1982, three members of the Cutlaws reportedly ambushed a car occupied by five members and "old ladies" of a rival gang near Roanoke. Virginia State Police recovered 98 spent cartridges. This ambush resulted in one being fatally wounded, two suffering serious injuries, and two others receiving superficial gunshot wounds.

In January 1981, six members of the Invaders Motorcycle Club were found murdered. Each had been shot at close range between the eyes, reportedly by a rival gang. Fifteen firearms belonging to the victims were found in the house.

Washington

In August 1981, the Kirkland, Washington Police Department arrested a Bandido member for assault with a deadly weapon. The subject produced a Bandido identification card of a recently murdered Bandido. He was bonded out by fellow members before his true identity was discovered. It was later learned that the subject was a Bandido from Texas. Bikers, particularly Bandidos, work at numerous bars owned and operated by a reputed organized crime group, and their "old ladies" live in these bars.

West Virginia

In October 1982, State Police and DEA executed a search warrant at the residence of a Pagan chapter president. They seized a PCP lab and arrested two Pagan members.

Wisconsin

In January 1981, a Federal witness was brutally assaulted by a prime suspect in a Milwaukee arson where two teenagers were hospitalized for smoke inhalation. Also in January 1981, a member of the Heaven's Devil Motorcycle Club was drinking in a gang bar when the door opened and unknown members of the Outlaws shot him with a shotgun.

Introduction

of

Firearms and Explosives Technology Presentation

Mr. Chairman, Senators, on the table are examples of the kinds of weapons which the outlaw motorcycle gangs have armed themselves and which they have, all too frequently used employed. In order to demonstrate these firearms and explosive items, I would like to introduce Mr. Edward Owen, Chief of ATF's Firearms Technology Branch and Mr. Ralph Cooper, an Explosives Enforcement Officer from our Explosives Technology Branch. I am submitting, for the record, copies of statements of qualifications of these gentlemen as expert witnesses.

As noted earlier, the war on organized crime is never separable from law enforcement's efforts to curb violent crime. What you see displayed before you has no conceivable legitimate purpose.

With your permission, I will have Mr. Owen and Mr. Cooper answer your questions about these items and, I invite you to more closely examine them.

Introduction

of

Special Agents

William J. Bertolani Jr.

and

Les Robinson

Senators, I would like to introduce you to two of ATF's most experienced agents in the investigation of Outlaw Motorcycle gangs.

William Bertolani is currently the Resident Agent in Charge of our Sacramento, California, criminal enforcement office. He has been with ATF for over 20 years. He has acted as an undercover agent in gang investigations and was significantly involved in the RICO 1979-1981 investigation of the Hell's Angels.

Agent Bertolani continues to be actively involved in investigations of the Hell's Angels.

Les Robinson is a Group Supervisor in our Birmingham, Alabama office. He has been a law enforcement officer for 22 years, 13 with ATF.

Agent Robinson has also penetrated the gangs in an undercover capacity. His acceptance by the Hell's Angels was such that they sought to sponsor him as a member. As he can explain to you the initiation rituals that preclude that level of penetration into the gangs. Agent Robinson was also a participant in the RICO prosecution of the Hell's Angels.

Both of these agents have lectured extensively before law enforcement groups on gang operations, and I invite your questions of them.

ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Grassley.

Staff present: Duke Short, chief investigator; William Christensen, senior investigator; Allan Spence and Robert M. Reilly, investigators; Mary Lynn Batson, investigative clerk; and Lynda Nersesian, counsel, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. We will clear the room to bring in the witness, then you can come back after we have brought the witness in.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken to clear the hearing room and bring in the witness.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STROM THURMOND

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Yesterday, in our organized crime hearing, we focused on outlaw motorcycle gangs.

We received testimony from agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which linked outlaw motorcycle gangs and the La Cosa Nostra.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testimony also disclosed the gang's propensity for violence as well as their total disregard for human dignity and the rights of others.

Outlaw motorcycle gangs such as the Pagans, Hells Angels, Outlaws, and the Bandidos are involved in murder, drug distribution, prostitution, rape, theft, and extortion.

We were told of the criminal activities and the lifestyles of the gang members as seen from the standpoint of law enforcement authorities.

Today, we will hear from individuals who have actually been outlaw motorcycle gang members and participated in these activities.

They will tell their stories and disclose some of the inner workings of the gangs. We will also hear from an individual who was the victim of one gang's brutal assault.

The distinguished Senator from Iowa may have a statement he may wish to make at this time.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRASSLEY

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your work in this area, and for bringing the issue of organized crime before the Judiciary Committee and the Congress.

I had an opportunity as a Member of the House of Representatives to touch on the problems of motorcycle gangs as they related to food stamps and welfare fraud. And I believe that motorcycle gangs are now moving away from the traditional stereotype, disruptive, black leather jacketed outlaw approach to the more sophisticated computerized level of organized crime.

Their threats to the ultimate objectives of an orderly community have become more easily attainable I am sad to say. I am glad that we are progressing as we are in these specific areas to bring to the public's attention the problems of motorcycle gangs and organized crime.

One area I am especially interested in, Mr. Chairman, is the area of their activity with child pornography. So, I hope to participate in these proceedings to expand upon my interest in that area. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to have order. That includes everybody.

Our first witness this morning is "Butch." Butch is a federally protected witness, and in order to protect his safety, no information concerning his present residence or identity is being provided.

We appreciate the cooperation of the Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals' Service in making this witness available.

Accompanying Butch this morning is strike force attorney David O. Bauer of the Cleveland, Ohio, Strike Force.

Mr. Bauer has been involved in significant prosecutions of the Hell's Angels and has been responsible for assisting Butch in presenting testimony as a Government witness.

Due to pending cases in which Butch is scheduled to testify, I will ask Mr. Bauer to advise the committee should any questions arise that may not be appropriate for the witness to answer.

Now, Butch, will be sworn at this time. Just raise your hand and be sworn.

The evidence that you give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

BUTCH. Yes.

[Witness introductions made by Andrew L. Vita, special agent in charge, Organized Crime Branch, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vita, would you stand and be sworn.

The testimony that you give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. VITA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any remarks you want to make at this time about the witness?

Mr. VITA. Yes, Senator, I would like to briefly describe Butch's background for you.

Butch is a 43-year-old member of the Cleveland, Ohio, chapter of the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang. He has been a member of that gang for 14 years.

He was a founding member of the Bandido motorcycle gang in Texas in 1966. In 1967, he left the Bandidos and went into the Rod Benders motorcycle gang in Florida. From there he went to the Reapers motorcycle gang in Houston, Tex., and then back to the Bandidos, where he eventually took charge of their Nomad chapter.

He left the Bandidos and rejoined the Hell's Angels in late 1967.

In 1968, he helped reestablish the Cleveland Hell's Angels chapter. In 1969, he became vice president of that chapter. In 1970, he was the club's sergeant at arms, remaining in that position until 1971, when he pled guilty to manslaughter charges.

He was sentenced to a workhouse in Warrenville Heights, Ohio, until his release in 1972. From 1972 until 1981, Butch was actively involved in national runs and other membership affiliations of the Hell's Angels.

Butch can explain how one becomes a member and the significance of colors. He can give detailed accounts of crimes committed by motorcycle clubs. He can testify as to the function of old ladies, prospects, and hang arounds.

He can tell of territorial disputes as well as social and business affiliations with other biker gangs and organized crime. According to Butch the book, "The Godfather," was used to reorganize the Hell's Angels along the lines of traditional organized crime.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

It is necessary for me to go now and open the Senate, I am going to request that the distinguished Senator from Iowa preside until I return.

Senator, if you would come and take the chair.

Senator GRASSLEY [presiding]. Thank you.

As a member of this committee, I want to thank you very much for your willingness to come and testify, because this is a very important hearing, and the solutions to some of these problems are very important for an orderly society.

TESTIMONY OF "BUTCH," FORMER MEMBER OF HELL'S ANGELS, BANDIDOS, ROD BENDERS, AND THE REAPERS OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS, ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID BAUER, ASSISTANT STRIKE FORCE ATTORNEY, CLEVELAND, OHIO

Senator GRASSLEY. I have several questions.

As a member of the Hell's Angels, did you observe any association by the gang with members of any labor unions?

And, if so, what was the extent of that association?

BUTCH. In 1978 or 1979, we all got letters from a union official, from a local and that said that we had been working iron—we had been iron working for 2, 3 years, something like that.

And we were sent down to Pittsburgh, and we all got journeyman ironworkers' cards. And we went to work on a nuclear powerplant.

There was four of us who got cards. Three of us went to work up on the plant, and then there was another card given out in Erie.

JOURNEYMAN'S CARDS ISSUED

Senator GRASSLEY. Where did you get the journeyman's card?

BUTCH. From the business agent in Pittsburgh. Local—I think it is 818, and we got the letter from the president of local No. 17 in Cleveland, Iron Workers Local No. 17, from Robert Columbo.

Senator GRASSLEY. Was there any security clearance necessary for working at the atomic plant and how did you get that if there was?

BUTCH. There was nothing. We just got our card. We got our journeymen cards, 2 days later we were up on the tower working, making scale.

Senator GRASSLEY. How long were you working there?

BUTCH. I worked there about a month, a little over a month. The others worked there until the end of the season and then worked there when it opened up again.

Senator GRASSLEY. Did you do anything of a criminal nature while you were working there?

BUTCH. I did not, but the club did something.

Senator GRASSLEY. What did the club do?

BUTCH. That I do not know, I was not involved in it, but I know there was something done, because the cards were granted to us for that as a favor.

Senator GRASSLEY. Why were you given the journeyman's card?

BUTCH. For whatever favor was done for them by the Hell's Angels, for that local there. I know there was something done.

Senator GRASSLEY. But you stated you did not know what that was?

BUTCH. I did not know.

Senator GRASSLEY. Are you aware of any counterfeiting operation with regard to those journeymen's cards?

BUTCH. No.

Mr. SHORT. These were authentic cards, then, they were not counterfeit cards?

BUTCH. Oh, no, these were actual cards. We had to go there and take a little test that we knew all the answers to, and then they asked which kind of card—the answers were furnished to us by the B.A. there.

Senator GRASSLEY. Who furnished the answers?

BUTCH. The business agent there in Pittsburgh.

Senator GRASSLEY. We would like to take the names of those individuals involved in closed session at a later time.

BUTCH. All right.

USED TO INTIMIDATE

Senator GRASSLEY. My next question is, Have the Hell's Angels been used by any labor unions to neutralize any labor grievances?

BUTCH. Yes. All of us that held cards at that time—there was about seven or eight people there, Hell's Angels in Cleveland held cards, and there was a strike going on. There was a nonunion job in Geneva, Ohio.

There was a nonunion job at the fairgrounds out in Geneva, Ohio, Geneva-on-the-Lake. And they were having a big Johnny Cash concert out there, and we were told to go out there and stand near the gate up close to where all the nonunion were trying to work over there and scream and holler at them.

And anything that arose, they would just—the union officials would point us out and say, "Hey, you just go tell the Hell's Angels if you got anything to say."

And everybody was carrying signs up and down the street, blocking the street. So, it was over in about an hour or two.

They signed an agreement that they would go with the union.

CONTRACT KILLINGS

Senator GRASSLEY. Did the Hell's Angels ever commit any acts of violence on behalf of any traditional organized crime families?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Could you elaborate?

BUTCH. Well, in 1977—I know they were taking contracts from the Mafia from different factions. There was an Italian faction that was working the Longshoremen and things like that. There was a war going on between them and the Italian faction there in Cleveland.

I know that they were taking contracts, hits, for the Irish faction side of it.

And in 1977, one of the members, a Hell's Angels member, he was also an intelligence officer there, which I will get into later, he was setting a bomb on a car that belonged to one of the Italian guys, and the bomb blew up and he was killed.

And at that time, the president—we had a meeting and the president was elected to go talk to the Italian faction and tell them that this guy was not in the club at the time that he was killed and tried to keep out of it, because we did not want to get between the two factions or whatever. And then things were stopped for a couple of years.

And it started up again later. The association—as far as contracts—

Senator GRASSLEY. How many contract killings were conducted or carried out?

BUTCH. A couple that I know of. Just a couple that I know of, that I am aware of.

Senator GRASSLEY. At least?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. At least two. Was that on behalf of the Mafia against the Irish?

BUTCH. No; the other way.

Senator GRASSLEY. The other way?

BUTCH. The Irish against—Stanley Green's faction against the Nardi faction.

NO MONEY PROBLEMS

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the role of the intelligence officer in the Hell's Angels and what type of intelligence information do the Hell's Angels maintain?

BUTCH. The intelligence officer was established back in 1974—1973—and it was an office to gather all the information they could on the Outlaws, Pagans, any club in the United States, any police officer, any newsmen, anybody that the Hell's Angels had a grudge

against, and they gathered it up from all the different people they know.

The Hell's Angels know a lot of people. They call them spies. They bring them information on this or that, and they collect all their addresses and everything. And they have a saying in the Hell's Angels that came out in the paper a long time ago, about 1971 or so, that "A Hell's Angel has a memory like an elephant. He never forgets."

And that is quite a common saying now, so if they have a grievance with somebody, it never ends. Someday—they keep a record of everyone.

They keep a record of a person, of families, the whole smear, addresses, types of cars, what girls they used to go with or whatever, bike clubs.

The intelligence officer goes to different towns. He is supplied with money from the treasury for that specific reason, from a T.C.B. fund, which is taking care of business. That's the phrase for T.C.B.

And the money—there is—everyone is assessed so much money for this T.C.B. fund, and then from this T.C.B. fund, the intelligence officer goes to different towns with another member of the club, either his assistant—or he will send two people from security or whatever, but he is in charge of all the information gathering. They will go rent cars, fly on planes, whatever, motel rooms, whatever, to watch specific clubs in towns like Chicago, Detroit, Dayton, Florida, whatever, and gather information on them for a hit in the future.

Senator GRASSLEY. How much money are they assessed?

BUTCH. Assessed?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

BUTCH. At times we have been assessed \$200, sometimes we have been assessed \$500 for the T.C.B. fund.

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the primary source for these funds?

BUTCH. The primary source?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

BUTCH. You mean from all the members?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

BUTCH. Drugs, burglaries, whatever they can get their hands on, whatever is convenient at the time to get that kind of money.

Senator GRASSLEY. And that assessment went into this common fund from which the intelligence operation was supported?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Is that in addition to dues that every member pays?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. So, you have regular dues plus special assessments?

BUTCH. Yes. And at different times there was—

Senator GRASSLEY. What are the dues?

BUTCH. Dues? Dues are \$20 a week.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you know the net worth of individual chapters, how much money they might have, everything that would make up what we would generally call a net worth?

BUTCH. That is usually pretty well guarded between charters. They do not let each other know in case something comes up, one charter is not assessed more than another charter, so everybody kind of plays it poor, which normally every charter—every member places a low profile on money, because money always puts everybody out on front street. They have big money.

Senator GRASSLEY. So, there is no problem with money, it is just a question of how much effort they have to go to to get it from each member?

BUTCH. Right.

Senator GRASSLEY. You are saying it is not voluntarily given up by individual members.

BUTCH. There are several millionaires in the club.

Senator GRASSLEY. Several millionaires in the club?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you know who the millionaires might be? Can you supply those names?

BUTCH. Let me clarify that. All right?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes.

BUTCH. Now, to say that I know for a fact that there are millionaires, that is a saying in the club. Everyone is proud—these three members that I will name, all right? There is one in New York, Howie; another one in Cleveland, Andy; another one in Oakland, Calif., Mike.

And everyone is always—they call them the millionaires. They are there to back any play that is really heavy, any kind of really heavy trials that come down or anything. They always feel that they can fall back on them.

Senator GRASSLEY. Are these millionaires involved in legitimate business?

BUTCH. No; they made most of their money from drugs.

Senator GRASSLEY. But they do not have a legitimate business that fronts or covers up—

BUTCH. Yes; they have got fronts. Mike owns Primo's Restaurant out in Oakland. And Andy owns a little bar there in Cleveland, a couple of bars. And Howie just—he stays way back—New York don't flaunt their money at all.

Senator GRASSLEY. How were the funds financed for the Omaha Rico trial?

BUTCH. Each member, in 1981, at a U.S.A. run, which is an annual thing each year, that it is mandatory for each member to go to, each member was assessed \$250 to pay to Omaha for the trials there, for the Rico trial. Nationally. Just in the United States, not in Europe or Australia.

Senator GRASSLEY. And the same question with regard to the Barger trial.

BUTCH. In the Barger trial, each person was assessed I think it was \$100 the first time, but then once they got to selling the T-shirts and the bumper stickers and all that, it was a full-page ad taken out in a motorcycle magazine called, Easy Rider, did not cost us anything, and all the moneys from that went into that fund there, which caused a lot of trouble in the club, because they wanted a counting of how much money it was, but Oakland would not tell them, which I assume—from what I have gathered from a

lot of hearsay and talk and everything that it was quite a lot of money.

They were taking bags each day from the post office to Oakland.

Senator GRASSLEY. Where did they take the money?

BUTCH. To Oakland. Oakland has charge of that completely.

Senator GRASSLEY. Who was it turned over to?

BUTCH. Sisco.

USE OF COMPUTERS

Senator GRASSLEY. Is it true that they are beginning to store intelligence information on computer tapes? If so, what have you personally observed concerning the gang's use of computers for that purpose.

BUTCH. Over the years, all that information that people were gathering up, it was always on little pieces of paper, on the back of cards, or whatever, and they tried to keep it all together and it just got all out of hand.

In 1980, there is a member in Cleveland who had a motorcycle shop. He had a computer in it. So, it was brought to church one night, meeting, that the club should fund for the tape.

Senator GRASSLEY. By church you mean a meeting of the club?

BUTCH. Yes, church. That is what they call a meeting, church.

Senator GRASSLEY. The term is—

BUTCH. Church, which is every week and it is mandatory. So, funds were taken out of the treasury and paid for a tape for the computer, to put all this information into a computer, which covered all the little pieces of paper and everything, centralized everything, plus what members had rolled their bones and where they had rolled their bones. All the information, every bit of information.

Senator GRASSLEY. What does the term roll their bones mean?

BUTCH. Well, a new member, when he joins the club, he has 6 months, in which to roll his bones, to kill someone. Once he gets his patch—he gets his patch, and then he has to roll his bones within 6 months. If he doesn't roll his bones within 6 months, he loses his patch. He has to kill someone.

The person he kills is someone that the intelligence will set up with security, and they will set up the hit for him, and then he will be taken to that place, to where—

INITIATION PROCESS

Senator GRASSLEY. At this point it might be a good opportunity to tell us about the initiation process, and continuing on then with the total induction into the Hell's Angels.

BUTCH. All right. First, it is a hang around. Someone that comes around the club and wants to join the club must have a good motorcycle, Harley-Davidson, be white, and be 21 or older.

When he first comes around the club, there is a lot of mud checking. He has to fight a lot of people. A lot of people jump on him. They jump on him in twos, threes.

Then after a period of time, which depends on the person, it may be 3 months, it may be 1 year or 2 years. He can become a hang

around—well, let's say 3 months, 6 months or a year, something like that.

We will have a vote and it has to be a 100-percent vote that he is allowed to be a hang around. And a hang around is allowed to come into the clubhouse and hang around the outside of the clubhouse. They do that to keep everybody else away because a lot of people believe that the Hell's Angels are giants and they have got everything together.

They keep everybody an arm's length away from us, so that they do not really understand that we are just people or whatever, keep them in awe.

And then he becomes a hang around and he can come into the clubhouse and he can do flunky work. And he hangs around for no set period of time. It depends on the person. Then he becomes a prospect.

And he can be brought up for prospect three times if—if he's voted down three different times, well, then they run him off. They beat him up, take his motorcycle, and run him away.

The same way if he is a hang around, if he does not go through the mud check or whatever, they beat him up, take his motorcycle, whatever, take his old lady, and run him off.

Then, as a prospect, he is just a general flunky. He does the moving, does everything, cleaning bikes, working on bikes. He is on 24-hour call. There is always a watch at the clubhouse. He stands watch upstairs.

He is armed with—there are carbines—shotguns. There are twilight scopes. There are scanners, everything, they have a security room at the top of the clubhouse, and he sits there at night from 12 o'clock until daylight. That is the rule there. Some places it is all night and they change prospects.

Then in one instance where a prospect was down in a bar and got into a fight, and the guy took a shot at him and shot him through the side right here. [Indicating.]

He was ordered to either get this guy or do something to him or lose his patch, because he was losing face, the club would be losing face if he did not do something to this guy.

And being a prospect can carry on—some people are prospects for 5 years. Some people 6 months—I think was the shortest period I ever heard, but normally it is 1½ to 2 years.

They have to go on all the runs. At the runs they build the fire, they carry all the firewood. They work 24 hours a day. They are just flunkies until they get their patch.

KILL OR BE KILLED

Senator GRASSLEY. It is at that point where, in order to become a full-fledged member, they have to have committed a murder?

BUTCH. Now, they are told that after they get their patch. They are voted on, 100 percent, and then they are pulled into the clubhouse and told that they have been voted on, now they are a member, and then their sponsor will explain to them that they have to come up with so much money for a bond fund, which is \$500. Then they will have to—and they have to roll their bones. They will have to kill someone.

If they renege on that, then they are killed.

Senator GRASSLEY. You say if a person does not commit a murder, then he is killed?

BUTCH. Yes; because then he knows, he knows too much.

Senator GRASSLEY. How formal or ceremonial is the initiation process?

BUTCH. Well; there is usually a big party, a lot of drinking, fighting. It has toned down from the years before. In the years before, it used to be pretty wild.

Not really, because he is brought in and everybody gives him a hug, gives him his patch, because by then everybody knows each other pretty well.

Senator GRASSLEY. When is he awarded his colors?

BUTCH. When everyone feels that he is ready. When it is a 100-percent vote.

Senator GRASSLEY. That has to be done in at least three times or he is out?

BUTCH. Right and it has to be a 100-percent vote.

Senator GRASSLEY. You said that present initiation is different than in the past. Does that mean that the personal degrading of the individual is no longer a part of the ceremony?

BUTCH. Yes; they feel that they have grown out of that. It used to be that everybody would urinate on him, and everybody would throw grease on them, things like that. And then they would have to do things to women.

Senator GRASSLEY. Are there women members?

BUTCH. No.

OWN MARRIAGE CEREMONY

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, you used the term "old ladies," how does that fit into the total overall picture?

BUTCH. They have their own marriage ceremony. There are a lot of people that have these religious diplomas from the Universal Life Church or something like that, and they perform a ceremony, we have the marriage ceremony in the club.

We have weddings, and mostly it is reserved for somebody that has been with an old lady for 3, 4, 5 years, something like that.

Senator GRASSLEY. What is the name of the church that you gave?

BUTCH. I think it is the Universal Life Church.

Senator GRASSLEY. How does that relate to the marriage ceremony, or how did you use that term?

BUTCH. A lot of members have that certificate from that church, that says that they are a reverend of that church. There are a few members who are deacons in that church and it was used a few times that I know of to get in jails, to see people, and things like that.

DIFFERENT RULES FOR WOMEN

Senator GRASSLEY. How close to the clubhouse are the women that you refer to, whether they are married or unmarried?

BUTCH. How close are they?

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes; physically how close are they to the clubhouse and the activities of the club?

BUTCH. It is a whole different set of rules for the women. They are allowed in the clubhouse all the time. They pick up runaways and pull them in.

They are allowed in the clubhouse all the time. There are people that pick up girls on the street, hitchhikers, things like that, bring them in, keep them around the clubhouse a couple of days. Everybody uses or abuses them, then they run them off. Some that are older they turn out.

Senator GRASSLEY. What do you mean by turn out?

BUTCH. Turn out—prostitution. Tell them to go down to Charlotte or whatever and work down there in the massage parlors.

In Charleston, they got a topless place down there where all their old ladies work down there. Some people have two or three old ladies.

In California, there is a lot of prostitution. New York, all the old ladies up there work in topless bars, sell drugs. It is about the same criteria for everybody all the way across.

Senator GRASSLEY. The money comes back to the gang member or to him as an individual?

BUTCH. Yes; all of it. Then he provides for her.

HELP OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Senator GRASSLEY. In your experience as a Hell's Angel, were you aware of any public officials that they were able to contact in order to obtain information not normally available to the public?

BUTCH. Yes; police officers in a couple of towns that provided a lot of information, movements of clubs—

Senator GRASSLEY. What position within the towns? Are we talking about elected public officials, appointed public officials?

BUTCH. Yes.

Senator GRASSLEY. Or just public employees?

BUTCH. Yes; the chiefs of police. Police officials.

Senator GRASSLEY. We want to take names in closed session, but we would like to have you state the extent to which—let me turn it over to Senator Thurmond here and then I will finish my question from here.

We would like to have a delineation, the extent—not the names now, we will have that in closed session, but the positions, elected, appointed or an employee relationship, as you said, a police officer, and to what extent elected officials would be involved from the standpoint of the question I asked.

BUTCH. No elected officials that I know of, but numerous police officers and police chiefs and things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have firsthand information about these police officials?

BUTCH. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Without divulging the names of the policemen, could you tell us just what they did to cooperate with or assist the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. Yes; there was a telephone installed in a clubhouse, and one police official had this number, and it was call forwarding.

This phone was installed in the closet upstairs. No one was supposed to touch it. It was for the specific phone calls from this one police official that he would call in case there was any word that he had to give us on indictments or anything that pertained to any club member.

It was a call forwarding type thing, that you called it and then it went on out to someone else's house, to the president's house. He had the number and another policeman had the number.

Then I had seen a lot of reports during the RICO trial out in California and Oakland. I read—there was two possibly three different times during that trial, the RICO trial, there was folders maybe half an inch thick, that came back from Oakland that they—I heard the price was \$100,000 that they had to give for this.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon?

BUTCH. They had to give \$100,000. That is what I had heard, that they had to give for this report, and this report on the front of it had "Confidential" "Secret" "For official eyes only," and all that stamped all over the front of it.

It pertained to all the—it was a report that they had in California on the bike clubs out there. A lot of it was true and a lot of it was not.

There were some parts in there that interested the club a lot, like parts pertaining to drug deals and things like that that members usually do outside, after church, after the meetings and all, they will go outside and arrange drug deals together on the sidewalk, where they will just whisper together, because they are afraid that the clubhouses are bugged by law enforcement or whatever.

That statement right there kind of got everybody shook that they knew that one member was talking somewhere, because that was a true statement.

But a lot of it was true and a lot of it was not true. It was more or less—it was not to the point.

Then another incident, in Florida, where we went down to investigate the killing of two Hell's Angels and an ex-Hell's Angel—

The CHAIRMAN. The killing of who? Could you move the microphone a little closer to you please?

BUTCH. Two Hell's Angels and an ex-Hell's Angel back in 1974. The club sent me down there to investigate it, me and another member from New York City.

We went down there and investigated it and we were met by a policeman, and taken and shown everything that they had on the case, shown all the autopsys, and we were guarded by policemen.

We were shown files on all the outlaw motorcycle riders there. We read all their files and was given their addresses and things.

Then they helped us lease a car and helped us in the investigation. After the investigation—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, are you saying to the committee that a policeman in Ohio cooperated with the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you spoke about—

BUTCH. Quite a few.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. \$100,000 passing. Where was that?

BUTCH. That was in California for those confidential files. These files were from California and they were prepared by some committee out there to investigate motorcycle gangs and it pertained to that RICO trial and all. It pertained to Hell's Angels and all the different clubs that were out there.

They had patches and pictures and things in it and it had all the information that they knew about these different clubs and where they were from and things like that and the information that they had on them.

It all pertained to that trial, the RICO trial, and the money was taken from Oakland from the T-shirt sales and the bumper sticker sales money, and it was paid for that. That was just one of them. I had seen another one.

The CHAIRMAN. Who supplied that money? The Hell's Angels supplied the money?

BUTCH. During the RICO trial, they had a full-page ad in a motorcycle magazine that said, "Free Sonny Barger." And they sold T-shirts with just handcuffs and hands on it, and they sold bumper stickers, things like that. And people sent—motorcycle clubs all over the country, all over the world, sent money to Oakland to this box, and that is where they got all their money for that defense fund there. It was lots of money.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the money turned over to? You do not have to call the names right at the moment.

BUTCH. I do not know who they turned it over to, but it was a requirement for each member—it was hand delivered—it was flown back East and hand delivered, and everyone was to read it and pass it on to New York City for them to read.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa wants to ask you a question.

Senator GRASSLEY. You raised the point a second time now about a magazine. Are these magazines some sort of a front for the illegitimate operations of club members in any way or are these otherwise perfectly legitimate operations?

BUTCH. Not that I am aware of that they are any kind of crooked thing. It is one that is read by all bike clubs.

Senator GRASSLEY. How could you get a free ad in the magazine?

BUTCH. Well; there was a Hell's Angel that worked there on the staff at that time, and California has got—they stand close to those people.

Senator GRASSLEY. Would the gang have had enough power to place a Hell's Angels member on the staff of the magazine?

BUTCH. Oh, without a doubt.

Senator GRASSLEY. Wouldn't that be some indication that the magazine then might be a front?

BUTCH. I could not say truthfully that I know for sure that they muscled him in there for that job, but I know that he did work there for a long time and that we could get special rates or just any kind of article that we wanted printed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me continue with some questions I have. What police officer met you in Florida? Not by name, but what position did he hold? And I would like to know if that police officer was aware of the Hell's Angels' criminal activities?

BUTCH. He was a high-ranking police official.

The CHAIRMAN. A high-ranking police official?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We may have to go into executive session and ask the name of this individual. We will not ask you to reveal his name at this time.

Now, would you like to go on and tell us more about the investigation in Florida, and just exactly what transpired there?

BUTCH. There were two members that had—one that quit the club, maybe 3 or 4 years before. This was in 1974. He quit maybe in 1972, something like that and went down there.

His name was Oskie. And then there was another named Shakey that went down there and they were from the Lowell, Mass., chapter.

Well, two members from the Lowell, Mass., chapter, were sent down there to—there was a new thing that came out that all ex-Hell's Angels had to have their tattoos covered completely, which, at that time, they blacked them out with a complete black mark over the whole thing. And they were sent down to make sure that they had their tattoo's covered.

They did not take their patches down or anything. They went in regular street clothes. They call it incog. They went down incog, and while they were there they were in a motorcycle shop, and the Outlaws from this town—the Outlaw motorcycle gang came there on them while they were in this motorcycle shop.

Mr. SHORT. Is that the name of the gang, the Outlaws?

BUTCH. Yes. I had known these same people. They used to be in another club called the Crosses—the Iron Crosses from Florida, and I met them way back in 1965 or 1966 in Daytona at runs when I was in the Bandidos and the Reapers. That is one of the reasons I was sent down there, too.

And I went down to investigate it. We were met at the plane by a couple of detectives, taken to the police station—oh, these two people were found—the two members that had gone down to investigate—to get their tattoos and get them covered up, they were found shot in the back of the head with a shotgun and one ex-member was found, and they were all in a pond, some kind of rock pit that is just outside of town.

And we saw all the autopses and all the reports and things like that, and we went and talked to the Outlaws. We set up a meeting with them, and then we went and talked to the guy that owned the motorcycle shop.

We talked to approximately 30 people down there. A lot of people in New York City knew—there are a lot of old ladies that go down there and live for a while, and there are a lot of drug dealers that they know down there, that Howie knew.

So, we talked to about 30 people and we went to some bars and things like that. All the time, we were covered by the policemen. There was a policeman following us around covering us.

Mr. SHORT. Providing protection?

BUTCH. Yes. At the meeting with the Outlaws, they came with about 15 people. They had people there in the restaurant before that was dressed incog themselves with guns and things.

POLICE PROTECTION

The CHAIRMAN. Are you stating that the police were giving protection for the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. YES.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the Hell's Angels armed at that time?

BUTCH. No; not at that time. We got guns the next day.

The CHAIRMAN. How were they dressed? In Hell's Angels clothing or—

BUTCH. No, they were dressed incog. The policemen were dressed in regular clothes and they were blending in in the background.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the police dressed in their uniforms or did they have on street clothes?

BUTCH. Street clothes.

The CHAIRMAN. How were the Hell's Angels dressed?

BUTCH. We were dressed in our colors. We had our patches on and everything.

The CHAIRMAN. And you also had on your Hell's Angels uniform?

BUTCH. Yes. The police were stationed around our hotel, so nobody could come there and bomb us at the motel or anything like that.

And after we were down there for about 10 days, and we met with the Outlaws, and, Nolan, he was the president of the Outlaws, they did not have anything to do with it. We did not know whether or not they had done it or whether—at that time there was a belief that maybe the police had done it and they were just trying to start a friction between us, trying to start something. That is what we were there to determine.

After 10 days or so we found out that—after talking to many people—that the Outlaws had done it. And they had done it in their clubhouse on a ruse that they were going to take them over there and cover their tattoos or something like that. And they took them out and shot them in the head.

So, we left there and Howie went back to New York, and I went back to Cleveland, and we reported back that the Outlaws had done it.

So, then we had a big officers meeting and they declared all-out war on the Outlaws, and that was in 1974. The officers meeting was held in Cleveland.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the nature of these meetings? Were they formal meetings?

BUTCH. They have an officers meeting every 3 months. An officers meeting is all the east coast and there is usually a west coast representative there. But they have officers meetings in California and they have them in the East.

There is an east coast and west coast, and Omaha is the borderline.

WAR BETWEEN GANGS

The CHAIRMAN. Everything east of Omaha went on to the east coast, and west of that went on to the west coast.

BUTCH. Yes. The meeting was held in Cleveland and they decided all right they were going to have all-out war against the Outlaws.

And the war—there was a lot of bombings, a lot of shooting, and a lot of killings. And the war is still going on. It was a cold war there for about a year, but then—

The CHAIRMAN. How many people were killed during that year?

BUTCH. There were at least 15 that I know of right offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. You said about 15 people killed?

BUTCH. Outlaws. There was other people killed along that same time.

The CHAIRMAN. How many Hell's Angels were killed during this time?

BUTCH. Hell's Angels? Five or six that I am personally aware of.

The CHAIRMAN. Five or six Hell's Angels were killed?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What brought on this killing? Was it a dispute about the removing of tattoos? Explain that if you will.

BUTCH. No, what brought it on was two members went down to cover up two ex-members' tattoos, down in Florida, and the Outlaws in Florida killed them, killed the two members and one of the ex-members. Took them out and blew their heads off.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think they did that?

BUTCH. Well, the reason they did it was because one of those Outlaws got into—Whiskey George is one of the Hell's Angels who was killed, and one of the Outlaws, his name was Lucifer, he got into Whiskey George's face there and Whiskey George, he would not stand for it, and they started a little fight or something, and he got shot in the leg, and then from there, after they shot him in the leg, they figured they might as well kill him and hide the bodies.

The CHAIRMAN. How do they cover their tattoos?

BUTCH. They—the tattoos were started to be covered at this motorcycle shop, and the guy had taken some ink and some needles and had covered up the H and the E. And when the bodies were found, there was—the L-L and I think the S was covered. There were three or four letters covered.

All Hell's Angels have a tattoo. It is mandatory. Nine days after you get your patch, you must have your Hell's Angels tattoo.

The CHAIRMAN. Ninety days after you get your patch, you have to have—

BUTCH. Nine days.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine days after you get your patch, you have to have a tattoo of the words "Hell's Angels."

BUTCH. Hell's Angels, the death head, a skull with wings.

The CHAIRMAN. Is all that tattooed, the entire picture?

BUTCH. Yes; the whole thing. The emblem, the MC, and the bottom rocker, whatever State you're from. Some people have a full tattoo on their back, but it is required that every member have the tattoo on their body somewhere.

Some people have it on their back, on their shoulder. Some people have it high on their arms, some low on their arms.

The CHAIRMAN. You can have it on the arm or the back?

BUTCH. Yes. It is up to the person wherever they want to put it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when they are covered—

BUTCH. Back in 1974, back in those times, it was blacked out completely. The whole thing was blacked out. I personally took one member from Oakland that used to be an Ohio member down to a

tattoo shop on orders from Sonny from California to take him out and cover his tattoo.

FLORIDA POLICEMAN PROTECTS HELL'S ANGELS

The CHAIRMAN. Let's go back to the Florida situation. As I understand it, the Hell's Angels received protection from the police in Florida?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And a high ranking police officer there was the one who did the negotiating with the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. He still—

The CHAIRMAN. Is he still a policeman down there?

BUTCH. Yes. I'm pretty sure. I could not say right now. I do not know about right now, but I know he was.

The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?

BUTCH. That was in 1974.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how did you make contact with this policeman?

BUTCH. The president of the New York City chapter made contact with him. His name is Sandy Alexander.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Sandy Alexander have control of other policemen and give them directions?

BUTCH. Not that I am aware of. I know there was a police chief and two or three detectives that were with us constantly during that thing down there.

The CHAIRMAN. The police chief where?

BUTCH. In Florida.

The CHAIRMAN. Other policemen were in constant contact with the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that for the purpose of protecting the Hell's Angels or was that for some other purpose?

BUTCH. We were using them for protection, yes. They were protecting us in case anything broke out between us and the Outlaws, because we were in the Outlaw territory, and in case anything broke out between us and the Outlaws at the meeting or if they tried to sneak in on us at the motel or anything like that they were protecting us.

They helped us lease a car. He helped us—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, were they acting in good faith from the standpoint of law enforcement or did they do this because of some arrangement made with the Hell's Angels to give them special protection or sums of money or some other purpose?

BUTCH. I do not know if there was any money that changed hands. I know that the guy—I know in 1978 and 1979, I know the guy was still giving information to Sandy in New York City, dealing with the Outlaws. How big the club was and whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. The same high-ranking police officer?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He was still furnishing information to the president of the Hell's Angels in New York City?

BUTCH. Yes. He would call him for any information he needed about Florida.

CLEVELAND POLICEMAN SET UP HOUSE BURGLARIES

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we better not go into that name in open session, I think. Now, going back to the Ohio situation, would you tell us just what protection was received there from the police.

BUTCH. Well, I know that—there is a member in Cleveland that has been—he considers himself quite the cat burglar and everything and he has grown up in a certain part of time, and he has known these police officers on the police force there for a long time.

And they set up different house burglaries for him and they have stolen—over the years they have stolen a lot of riding lawn mowers and things like that. House burglaries were Tommy's—Tommy and a couple of other people are freaks behind diamonds and stuff and they go for diamonds.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what year was that or what period of time?

BUTCH. This has been going on, I know, from 1969 on up until 1981 it was going on. It is still going on.

The CHAIRMAN. From 1969 to 1981?

BUTCH. Yes. Tommy is—

The CHAIRMAN. The police would set up the situation so that the Hell's Angels could make robberies and so forth?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who the police were? We do not want to take that in open session. I just want to know if you know who they were?

BUTCH. I do not know their names, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they protect the Hell's Angels for any other purpose besides robberies?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What about prostitution, for instance?

BUTCH. No; that is not a big thing there in Cleveland. That is maybe just one or two members' old ladies.

MONEY TO BUY WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. What did they protect the Hell's Angels against besides robberies? Anything else?

BUTCH. We were always informed of warrants or things like that. We always knew if there—if anybody's house was going to get broken into or if they were looking for someone, things like that.

There was one police officer—the club furnished him with money to give to a witness in a rape case. And he passed the money on—

The CHAIRMAN. Who furnished the money and gave it to whom?

BUTCH. The Hell's Angels gave this policeman the money to give to this witness to buy this witness off in this rape case.

The CHAIRMAN. The Hell's Angels gave the money to a police officer to give to a witness to buy him off in a rape case?

BUTCH. Yes; to buy this girl off.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that of your own accord or you are just—

BUTCH. Yes. He pled guilty to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Who pled guilty?

BUTCH. The police officer.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been sentenced, I presume.

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other instances in Cleveland that you want to tell us about?

BUTCH. There is a police official there that for years, it started around 1975, when the war got thick with the Outlaws, and he gave us information toward Outlaw movements, what had happened outside of town. Whether or not they were coming from like Chicago, coming through town. He gave us information on indictments and things like that. He had this special number hooked up in the clubhouse, too. He was one of the ones with the number.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he was compensated for that?

BUTCH. I could not say that for a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the police officer?

BUTCH. Yes. I know him. I know him well.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else in Ohio that you should bring out?

BUTCH. There is a town on a lake outside of Cleveland there that we go to to party all the time over the years. And on certain holidays there are a lot of people out there, a lot of bike riders out there.

This police official let us have a free reign as far as beating up people. We beat up a lot of people out there on the street, in the bars and everything else. They would just turn their backs and walk away.

There was one incidence where there was a guy out there with a Hell's Angels—a phoney Hell's Angel patch, and they just stood by and watched us all go over and beat him up and take the patch away from him.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you beat him up for?

BUTCH. For having this phoney Hell's Angels patch. There have been incidences where people with tattoos, phoney Hell's Angels tattoos—have had them cut off their arms, had the whole tattoo just removed by knife.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, if they had a tattoo, they would just take a knife and cut enough flesh off to get rid of the tattoo?

BUTCH. Yes. That has happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what town it was or what community it was?

BUTCH. Yes, I know—that has happened a couple of times, I think once in Omaha, once out in Los Angeles, Cleveland.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to tell us in open session or wait until executive session to tell us what town that was?

Mr. BAUER. Senator, I think the witness would prefer to go into executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all right. Now, let him go ahead. Anything else in Ohio that you would like to tell us about?

BUTCH. This guy with this phoney patch—this town—we had a free hand out there. We could do anything, that included drugs out in the open. We could—

The CHAIRMAN. Did the police know you were distributing drugs?

BUTCH. Yes; well I don't know if they knew, they just—they never bothered us. They just stayed away from us completely.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the police just left you alone?

BUTCH. The town was ours. We controlled the street. If people were racing up and down the street, we would kind of—we would stop them for this privilege of taking the town. They would let us have the town for stopping people. We more or less governed the town when these holidays—

The CHAIRMAN. The Hell's Angels more or less governed the town?

BUTCH. Yes. The Hell's Angels do not allow anybody to wear Hell's Angels, period. They do not allow any club or anybody to have a Hell's Angels patch, or the death head with the skull or anything pertaining to Hell's Angels. No one is allowed to have it except the Hell's Angels. Nothing similar to it either.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any other place in Ohio where you had such privileges as that with police protection?

BUTCH. Not that I can think of right away, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You were speaking about cutting the tattoos off of people's arms. Did that include the backs too?

BUTCH. Yes. Well, I do not know of any instance where it was on the back. The colors, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They would take enough flesh off with the tattoo to remove it and what did they do with those?

BUTCH. Just showed them around. A lot of people just more or less canned it and showed it around, showed it off. I know one guy, he kept one for a couple of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they take them back to the club and show them to the members?

BUTCH. Yes; there was quite—it was considered quite a trophy. That was only cuttings on the arms. I never heard of anyone getting their back cut off, although I did cut an Outlaw.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include cutting trophies off of Outlaws as well as other people who—

BUTCH. Yes; I was in Memphis in 1976-77, and I was in a tattoo shop getting a tattoo on my arm, and a lot of Outlaws walked in and one of the Outlaws had, Outlaws, Memphis, on his back with their center logo, and I put 80 stitches in his back with a big X through it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that ever reported to the police or did they ever do anything about it?

BUTCH. They tried to catch me, but I got out of town.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you did that yourself?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What size piece of flesh did you cut off of him?

BUTCH. I did not cut it off of him. I just put a great big X in it. It has been in magazines.

The CHAIRMAN. You put a big X on him just to mark it out?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you do that? What was the purpose?

BUTCH. I made him an X member. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have order. Now, is there anything else about the California situation that you would like to go into, concerning the police, or any tie between the Hell's Angels and the police out there?

BUTCH. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else that could be of help to us in law enforcement?

[No response.]

SECURITY FOR ROCK CONCERTS

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you whether it is true or not that the Hell's Angels provided security for entertainers at rock concerts?

BUTCH. Yes; they do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did they do that? Were the Hell's Angels paid for this protection, or are they interested in some of the entertainers? What is the reason for that?

BUTCH. There are three entertainers who have Hell's Angels on the payroll. There is one that has had two of them as bodyguards and there is another one that works for him.

There are three all together that travel with him all the time.

The other two—one has—this other band that has a Hell's Angel that works for them too. He travels with them. And, plus, they also regulate who works for them.

And then there is another entertainer that at each concert, whenever he is in a town where there is a chapter of Hell's Angels, there is an open invitation for him to come out and come behind the stage and everything. And usually they go to a motel and do drugs.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they get out of giving protection to these rock concert entertainers? Do they get money? Do they get sex or just what do they get?

BUTCH. They get—the one entertainer that has the three working for him is furnished with drugs. They also have his concessions. These are Oakland members. They have his T-shirt concessions and things like that, and they travel around with four or five girls that set up these booths, at these different concerts selling T-shirts, different paraphernalia from the concert, posters, things like that, which a piece of the proceeds goes back to the Oakland chapter from these members.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage?

BUTCH. I do not know the percentage. I just know that a piece of it goes back to the thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they sell anything else?

BUTCH. There is an open invitation to any chapter of the Hell's Angels that want to throw like a rock concert—they have to pay the chapters in California \$50,000 to have one of these entertainers to appear at one of their concerts.

Say, if Cleveland wanted to throw a concert, they would have to pay Oakland or Richmond—

The CHAIRMAN. Pay who?

BUTCH. Pay Oakland, Calif., chapter of the Hell's Angels, or Richmond, Calif., Hell's Angels \$50,000 in order to throw that concert.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would they have to pay them? To give them protection?

BUTCH. No; they just—

The CHAIRMAN. Are they tied in with them?

BUTCH. It is more like a tribute to them.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you just paid them a tribute, because if you did not pay it, the Hell's Angels would give them trouble?

BUTCH. They would not let these other chapters use these different bands for these concerts.

KILLING AT ROLLING STONES CONCERT

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any Hell's Angels that have turned against a rock star?

BUTCH. Yes. There is one incident that I am aware of, that happened over a killing at a concert. And this one band—the club felt that the band did not stand behind them, they had hired them to do security for them—

The CHAIRMAN. When you speak of a band, what do you mean by a band?

BUTCH. This rock band, this one specific rock band that I am talking about. They had thrown a concert and someone was killed there. Well, they felt that this rock band should have stayed behind them and said that they had hired them for security around the bandstand, or whatever, but they did not. They just left.

And it has always been a thorn in the side of Oakland and a lot of the chapters and a lot of the clubs. So, there has always been more or less an open contract, an open contract on this band, and this person.

And there have been two attempts that I know of that failed.

The CHAIRMAN. Two attempts at what?

BUTCH. To kill him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they ever kill him?

BUTCH. No. But they will someday.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a target?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not ask you his name in public, but I may ask you in executive session, unless you want to disclose his name now.

BUTCH. It is Mick Jagger of the Rolling Stones. It is from the Altamont thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You might tell us more about the attempts on his life.

BUTCH. I was in this town where this chapter is in New York, in the city, and this had been discussed many times about killing him, killing the band for that. And people want to do it to get in the good graces of California. Whoever does it, it is quite a trophy for them or whatever. There is a lot of hate there, too, to the extent that no Hell's Angel will listen to Mick Jagger's music.

Well, one attempt was made where they sent a member with a gun and a silencer to a hotel, and he stalked that hotel for a long time, but they did not show up.

Then the next attempt was a few years later, somewhere around 1979, where—1979 or 1980, when they were in New York City for a concert. They had some place near water, and I was told that they took—they were explaining to me how they did it, they had swam over and checked the place out. It was some house near water or

something, and they were going to put a bomb up underneath it. And they were going to blow up the whole band and everybody at the party.

And they were crossing there, and they had a pontoon boat, a little rubber raft thing with plastic explosives in it, and they lost it in the water.

That is how it had come up, because they had gotten in trouble with some intelligence officers in Cleveland and all because they had lost some—they had lost a big amount of plastics for T.C.B. It was a large amount of plastics.

And they had described to me how much trouble they had gone to to set this all up and everything, but they had failed. But they swore they would still do it, they would get him sooner or later.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he under any protection now, do you know?

BUTCH. No; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What steps are undertaken by the Hell's Angels before they go on a run?

BUTCH. Well, that is the job of security and it is usually—that is a member or two members from each chapter—runs were held in Cody, Wyo., and runs were held near Yankton, Wyo. Runs were held down in North Carolina.

I had been on a couple of those runs as run committee. Two members are usually sent out from each chapter to go out as a run committee, and that is to help with the food and all, to secure the area and everything.

And intelligence sends out—security sends out two people and they go with—they take all the electronic equipment out. They take boobytraps—they have had boobytraps around the camp. They have had shotgun mikes. Like, you just point it at a car that is sitting way away and listen to whatever somebody was saying, point it at their face.

They have twilight scopes, where they can see in the dark by starlight. They have FM radios that—they have their own crystals installed in them. In fact, they sent to Washington and got a chart of all the FM frequencies and then from that chart they could figure out which Government agency is on which frequency, and they got frequencies that would fit in between where no one is using these different frequencies so they are all on their own channel.

And they set up—first, the run committee and the security people set up and secured the whole area for a good mile all the way around it, from the highest point or whatever. They set up different command posts all the way around it, which may be six or seven that are manned by prospects when they get there. It is manned by a member and a prospect all the way around.

And they are all equipped with guns, silencers and they are all in touch with each other through radios. They use CB's around from those command posts, and they have a car running up and down the road.

Then when each pack leaves from their home place or whatever, sometimes, two or three chapters will get together, say, in Cleveland, and ride out to Yankton or ride out to Cody or whatever.

There will be—whoever is up front will have one of the FM radios. Somebody in the back will have a mobile FM. And then

there will be a chase car. And the chase car will have automatic weapons in it, and it will be a fast car following the pack. And there is usually a van.

They carry—usually up under the van or the chase car they will have plates welded up under it for boxes to be installed to carry plastics, to carry grenades, to carry any kind of weaponry, and they set up the whole secure area there. And they guard the packs going out.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wouldn't automobiles be a better method of transportation to accomplish their goals rather than motorcycles?

BUTCH. Well, that is probably in the future, because they are down to only about one or two runs a year now. Because of the war—the war stopped a lot of their freedom of moving around on bikes and everything which contributed to a lot of them cleaning up. They are not the same as they used to be, greasy, dirty, long hair, and everything else. It is not uncommon to see somebody with a three-piece suit now.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they are converting from a situation where they had a more significant appearance to the public to a situation now where they have become more secretive and organized for operations?

BUTCH. They became secret and organized way back, 8 or 9 years ago. They have perfected it over the years. They have perfected their killing skills. They have perfected their intelligence. They have perfected everything.

That is all they have spent, their time—it is a constant thing. Each church—it is a constant thing. Somebody has a new idea of how to perfect security, or how to bug a telephone better, or how to bug somebody.

For instance, they bought two dozen of those little \$6 bugging devices where you set them down, they have a long wire on them, and you turn your radio on to channel—FM on 93.

Or they would go into motorcycle shops that were frequented by Outlaws and they let it be known that they were Hell's Angels by wearing their patches in there, and they would leave these things on the counter or around close to wherever the clerk or whatever, and then they would go outside and listen to what he had to say, so that they could figure, you know, like—once they had a made a phone call and there was a couple of Outlaws on their way down there, you know, to find out about it or whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the goal in life of the Hell's Angels? Is it chiefly to rob, to obtain money without working? Or is it chiefly for thrills? Is it chiefly to conduct prostitution, or chiefly for sex? What is their goal in life? Why do they exist?

BUTCH. Well, they exist—they celebrate March 1947, as their anniversary date. Up until—

The CHAIRMAN. They celebrate that date you say?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the date they were inaugurated?

BUTCH. Yes. It is an old club. In the early sixties, 1959 or so, a lot of things were changed, and there was a new patch drawn up. And they started out in the brotherhood thing, something that spoke to a lot of people all across the country, a lot of bike riders and everything. It did not have anything to fall back on, just a big pack.

That went on, up until around the early seventies, and that changed when the war started and all the killing—it started with the Breed war, where there was a big fight there in Cleveland, and there was 25 Hell's Angels and 208 Breed, and they all got in a hall, and 4 Breed were stabbed to death. One Hell's Angel was stabbed to death. Twenty-eight Breed were stabbed, cut to pieces and went to hospitals and things. I was stabbed four times.

Supposedly there were seven Breed killed there, but after that things—that war there was what really started it. We declared war on the Breed and there was a lot of—that is where intelligence and all of that kind of started to originate.

And they started setting up intelligence, security, hits, and we stopped that club. There are very few, but they do not show themselves at runs or anything like that anymore. There are no chapters in Cleveland, there are no chapters in Ohio, there are no chapters in Pennsylvania.

And then the Outlaw war came along. And then it was perfected more and more then. And it kind of got away from the brotherhood thing. It was killings. Every church—people were being brought up for not going out and doing their thing. No T.C.B.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you say about church?

BUTCH. At church, people—church is what you call the weekly meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. You call these meetings church?

BUTCH. Yes, sir. And there was always somebody on the carpet for not going and T.C.B.-ing. Intelligence had all the records on who would go out and do different things. They were brought up on—

The CHAIRMAN. Were they directed as to what they were to do?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There were assignments?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Could they refuse those assignments or ask to swap for some other assignment or did they have to carry out the assignment?

BUTCH. They had to have a good reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Or carry it out?

BUTCH. Yes. And the killings just kind of got out of hand. There was women and children killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Women and children were killed?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why were they killed? Why would they kill women and children?

BUTCH. They were killed by—along with Outlaws.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these women accidentally or intentionally killed?

Mr. BAUER. Senator, there is pending litigation in Cleveland.

The CHAIRMAN. We will withdraw that question. Now, what is the difference between membership recruitment techniques used by the Hell's Angels as opposed to the Outlaws?

BUTCH. Would you repeat that, please.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the recruitment techniques—

BUTCH. I am very familiar with the Outlaws. I have traveled a lot, spent time with them. They are known to go into a town where

there is a small club there and force them to put on the Outlaw patch. Tell them, "Either you are going to be an Outlaw or you are going to be nothing." And they will force that patch on to them.

As for the Hell's Angels, they wait for the different clubs to come to them and work at it from there. A club will come and it has to be sponsored. If it is in a State where a charter is, that charter can allow them to have a charter and establish a charter in another town in their own State.

But if it is from another State where there is no charter, well then the whole east coast would have to vote on it and the west coast at a U.S.A. run. They have to come as prospects.

The whole charter would drop their patch, and get a patch that just has a bottom rocker that says the town and they will be prospects—

The CHAIRMAN. The Outlaws are more selective? They would choose their members?

BUTCH. No; the Hell's Angels are more selective.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what effect has the RICO statute had on deterring the illegal activities of the motorcycle gangs?

BUTCH. RICO is the one thing which everyone is scared of. That is the one law that scares all of the charters; the whole club as a whole is afraid of it, because they feel that if the charter goes down, the rest of them will all be indicted too and that—there has been a lot of talk over the last 3, 4, 5 years—well, even before Oakland's RICO, they were scared of conspiracies.

And members have told—been told to straighten up and try to get their taxes paid, try to get some kind of phoney paperwork set up so that they can prove they were working or something.

And there are even incidents where companies have been paid to pay their income tax and things like that.

And RICO—since—there has been a couple of motorcycle gangs that have been convicted of RICO which has scared them a lot. I believe the Confederate Angels out of Richmond, and then there are other incidents where clubs have been convicted of it. It is the only law that they are really afraid of.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you—

BUTCH. They receive a lot of legal advice on how to avoid prosecution under RICO. There is a lawyer there that advises them in Cleveland about getting their taxes straightened up, getting this and getting that—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Hell's Angels have a regularly full-time employed lawyer or consultant lawyer in these different places like Florida, Ohio, California, and other places?

BUTCH. They have had the same lawyer all during the trial in California, and that trial went on for 8 months. And, then, when RICO hit Omaha, each member was assessed so much money, \$250, to send out there.

He moved there to—Hell's Angels from each charter had to go there at separate times, but there was always two Hell's Angels from different charters that would go there and act as his bodyguard, chauffeur, whatever, do anything that he wanted done and make sure that the Outlaws did not hit him, because Omaha was close to Minnesota, and that is where there is a big stronghold of Outlaws.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

They did not want the Outlaws killing him, so that they may lose that case there in Omaha.

The CHAIRMAN. What type of criminal activity is the Hell's Angels chapter in South Carolina, formerly known as the Tribulators, engaged in?

BUTCH. They deal in drugs, women, weapons—

The CHAIRMAN. When you say women, what do you mean? Prostitution?

BUTCH. Yes; prostitution, topless dancing. They have a place there—it does not belong to them, but it belongs to this woman that they are really close with.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you go on and tell us about the Charleston situation, that happens to be in my State, and I am very interested in it.

BUTCH. They have girls—there is a place called the Joker in Charleston. It is a topless place, dance girls. And a lot of their old ladies work there. I think each one of them has an old lady working there, some of them have two.

They meet a lot of the airmen in there from the bases around there, and their old ladies sell a lot of drugs, they do the dancing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is that an entertainment place, a prostitution place, or just what is it?

BUTCH. It is a topless place.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it also prostitution?

BUTCH. Yes. The old ladies turn tricks out there, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you call it? Turning tricks?

BUTCH. Yes; turning tricks, that is prostitution. They deal in arms through the club. It is a known fact all through the clubs that we can get arms from down there. There are .45's, grenades, things like that we can get from them, any kind of military weaponry.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are military weapons?

BUTCH. Yes; there and in Charlotte, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do they get that from?

BUTCH. I could not tell you exactly, but know they come from there, but I do not know exactly the persons they get them from.

The CHAIRMAN. These are the same weapons used by the armed services?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these weapons stolen from the armed services? How do they get them?

BUTCH. I presume so, yes. It is the same in Charlotte. In Charlotte, N.C., the Cleveland charter got three LAW's rockets from them, that they had gotten from military personnel down there.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Hell's Angels involved in child pornography in any way?

BUTCH. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grassley was especially interested. Could you tell us just how you got your bones? Do you actually have to kill someone to get your bones?

BUTCH. Yes, sir. I got mine from the Polish Women's Hall, from that fight with the Breed. They considered that bones for the

first—there was only about six of us—six or seven of us that was involved in that, and that dates back to 1971. We started the bones thing around 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the first time you killed somebody?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1971?

BUTCH. Yes. He had a knife, holding it down at my heart and I stabbed him.

The CHAIRMAN. Explain that.

BUTCH. Well, when the fight broke out, I started just punching people and there was about—these Breed—that club was not a very big club, and they did not have a lot of older members, but the older members—I mean, it did have a lot of older members. They were like 35, 30, like that and they had been riding together for quite a while.

Well, for that year before that—they started around 1970—they started just building up their numbers real big. They came to Cleveland. They put patches on just about every little Honda rider. They had kids all over town.

And we had heard about it, and the policeman had told us about, and we had been putting on this bike show there. Two years prior to that we had helped put on this bike show, and we had bikes in there and we were there.

We were going to hit them. We found out that they were all meeting up at this place outside of town. We sent some people out there that we knew and what the meeting was all about is they said they were going to come there to that hall and they were not going to leave until all the Hell's Angels were down.

And they were just pushing these—egging these young kids on. All these kids were more or less like—they were from 18, 19, 20, like that. And, so, I sent two girls over there, and they found out where the officers were all staying in this one apartment, and I reported back and we decided we—we considered going over there and just throwing grenades in the window and just blowing out all the officers and nip it in the bud, but then we said, "No, we don't want to do nothing like that. The police know that they're going to come to that hall. They are not going to let nothing get off."

So, we went to the hall. We walked in the hall and we were there maybe an hour and here they came, about 208 of them came marching in the doors and they all came in and everybody was shoulder to shoulder and a fight got off.

When the fight got off, I started punching people. I kept hitting this one kid. I hit him once, and I went to somebody else, and out of the corner of my eye I could see he didn't go down, and I turned around and hit him again, and I noticed his eyes were rolling back, and I looked up over his head and there was an arm coming down with a knife in it and he stuck me in the chest.

And he dropped the kid. And it was this guy about 35, bald, and he was grinning, and he grabbed me by the shoulder with his left hand and he had a knife pulling down in my chest over my heart, and his feet were almost off the floor, and he was pulling up on me, he was grinning at me.

So, I pulled my knife and I hit him, and I killed him and that is the first person I ever killed. Then the fight went on, and I got stabbed again.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that?

BUTCH. That was the Polish Women's Hall in 1971, March 7, 1971, in Cleveland, Ohio.

And I went on and got stabbed again, and I got stabbed in the back and I woke up on the floor with my knife sticking in some guy.

I spent—they filed four murder charges on us, first-degree murder, six cuttings and one riot, and we spent 10 months in jail, 2 years' probation for manslaughter.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel has some questions.

Mr. SHORT. Did you kill other people after that one murder?

BUTCH. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. How many total murders have you committed?

BUTCH. One other one.

Mr. SHORT. Two total?

BUTCH. The one in the hall was self-defense I felt, but anyway, then there was one more. They got on my case at church in 1974.

Mr. SHORT. Who are they?

BUTCH. Intelligence and the president. They started screaming that I had not done anything—me and another member—that we had not done anything toward the Outlaws.

And I was pretty fired up about Florida at any rate, and they—intelligence—they told me, they said I was just going to have to do something, and I said, "All right." Well, I was ready to do something.

So, they just told me to just wait and intelligence and security would set something up. So, in a few days they came back and said, "Here's a shotgun, cut it down." And I cut down the shotgun.

Mr. SHORT. You sawed it off?

BUTCH. Yes; cut down the barrel, cut down the stock. And then we went to—and waited for a couple more days. They said they would come by and pick me up. They had all the information and the place. It was supposed to be an Outlaw meeting.

They came by and picked me up—I was sitting in the front seat and one guy had a machinegun, sitting in the back seat. And the guy had a .45 that was driving. I never really thought it would go down.

When we drove down there, they had already set it up and made the runs on it, I guess, and checked it all out, and they had a car stashed down there, another car.

We drove down there and it all just took place, just like that. They drove straight to it, and there was a bunch of people standing outside and it was dark and we pulled up and stopped, and the machinegun opened up, and I started shooting.

I shot a window out, I shot a bike, I shot up the driveway, and I hit somebody, which is more or less why I am sitting here, because it turned out to be a 17-year-old kid, and that was the only other killing I ever did.

Mr. SHORT. So, you were arrested and convicted for that?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are serving time for that now?

BUTCH. Yes; it was an unsolved murder until I confessed to it.
Mr. SHORT. Just to clarify one point, the police in Florida were perfectly well aware that you were there for criminal purposes and that you had a criminal background because you belonged to the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. Oh, yes.

Mr. SHORT. There was no misconception on their part that you were trying to do good in any way?

BUTCH. No; we were there to investigate—find out who killed them, find out as much as we could on the Outlaws.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything else that you want to say to us?

[No response.]

REASON FOR EXISTING

The CHAIRMAN. I am not too sure when I asked you the purpose of the Hell's Angels, just why do they exist? What was your answer? Could you make a very brief answer? Is it to rob people so you will not have to work? Is it for prostitution so you do not have to work? Is it to commit other illegal activities so you do not have to work? Is it a challenge to you to do something and try to get away with it? What is the purpose of the Hell's Angels? Why did you join the Hell's Angels?

BUTCH. I joined because of a brotherhood, and I thought it was a good idea. There are always a lot of theories. Everyone had different theories about it. It was all the same thing, we were all one family, one big brotherhood, we would all stay together. Our kids would be Hell's Angels and this and that.

There are some members that are 60-something years old and their kids are Hell's Angels now. You know, it was something that we would all grow old and be proud of—and our brotherhood, but after we got into the war and then after the senseless killing of women and children, numerous times, women getting killed and everything, it just kind of tore at the whole, and then people got into drugs really heavy and the dealing of drugs. They accumulated big money.

They had different ideas. After the "Godfather" movie and everything, it kind of evolved all into just one big organization for profit.

They got away from the brotherhood, the whole thing of it, and now it is nothing to kill anybody. There is no fist fighting anymore. If you are in a bar or something like that and some drunk jumps on you or something like that or you get mad at somebody, they do not like, they used to just fist fight with him.

They will just wait—push him off or something and then wait and shoot him. It is killing now. It is not fist fighting. All the honor, all the dignity has gone out of it, and everyone knows, but everyone just keeps holding on hoping for a better day, which the better day just keeps getting worse and worse and worse.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you more or less joined from a fraternal standpoint or brotherly standpoint?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As time went on, the Hell's Angels began to commit violence, they became engaged in robberies, prostitution, and other illegal activities. Have you abandoned the Hell's Angels now?

BUTCH. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely?

BUTCH. Oh, yes, completely.

The CHAIRMAN. For life?

BUTCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You never intend to participate in any activities again sponsored by them?

BUTCH. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony. Now, we will have to clear the room for the next witness.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken to clear the room to bring in the next witness.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Vita, I understand you have a memorandum of evidence and aggravation of sentence which was prepared for Mr. Dan Webb, U.S. attorney, Northern District of Illinois, by Mr. Richard L. Miller, Jr., assistant U.S. attorney.

Mr. Miller, I understand, successfully prosecuted the case involving the kidnaping of Ms. Betty Darlene Callahan. Mr. Vita, can you tell me briefly what this document contains and the reason it was prepared?

Mr. VITA. Yes, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can limit that to about 3 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF ANDY VITA

Mr. VITA. Senator, I would like to submit for the record a memorandum provided by the U.S. attorney's office in Chicago, Ill., to the U.S. district court.

The memorandum provides evidence arguing for aggravation of sentence for members of the Outlaws motorcycle gang, convicted as the result of the kidnaping of Betty Darlene Callahan.

This memorandum sets out a series of criminal acts, including narcotics dealings and murders as well as evidence of connections to traditional organized crime and the gathering of weapons by the Outlaws.

It further addresses attempted intimidation of the Government witnesses by the gang, including procurement of hit contracts.

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise the court of the serious criminal nature of the defendants who had been convicted on charges brought by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the U.S. attorney's office of the Northern Judicial District of Illinois.

Some of the evidence concerning the Outlaws contained in this document is that they are an international organization with chapters in the United States and Canada.

Their income in Chicago and North Carolina is derived primarily from narcotics and prostitution. In Chicago, they are allied with traditional organized crime and prostitution-run nightclubs and bars.

One item, Senator, that I would like to highlight as an example of witness intimidation, as documented, including an attempt to procure a hit contract on Ms. Callahan at the very time that she was part of the witness protection program.

Undercover ATF agents made contact with the Outlaws. The agents pretended to be hit men in order to thwart an attack on the witness and gain evidence against the gang.

The Government attorney documents show how the Outlaws were able to pierce the security of the telephone company billing system, and determine that the telephone number given to them by the agents posing as hit men was really an undercover telephone billed to the U.S. Government.

Senator, I have some remarks on the background of the witness that I would like to read into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. VITA. Ms. Callahan is a 25-year-old female who was formerly addicted to narcotics and worked as a prostitute in North Carolina.

In December 1981, she was kidnaped at gunpoint by members of the Outlaws motorcycle gang. She was told that her boyfriend owed the Outlaws \$1,500 for drugs.

She was then given the opportunity to take her chances and receive the same consideration as her boyfriend, who was later murdered, or work as a prostitute for members of the Outlaws.

Fearing for her life, she went with the Outlaws from North Carolina to Chicago. She was held captive for 44 days, during which time she was forced to engage in a variety of sexual acts with various members of the Outlaws motorcycle gang and one of their old ladies.

During that time, she also observed narcotics and various conventional and automatic firearms in the Outlaws' possession.

She was left alone at a motel and telephoned her mother and authorities who rescued her.

Ms. Callahan testified for the State and for ATF, and is currently in the witness security program.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Government's memorandum of evidence in aggravation of sentence, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, will be placed in the record in its entirety.

[Whereupon, the material referred to above appears as follows:].

IN THE
United States District Court
 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
 EASTERN DIVISION

No. 82 CR 308

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THOMAS STIMAC, also known as Westside Tommy,
ROBERT GEORGE BURROUGHS, also known as Snoopy,
ALLAN RAY HATTAWAY, also known as Red, Ron Miller,
MARTY CURRAN, also known as Scarface, and
GARY MILLER,

Defendants.

Honorable **Marvin E. Aspen**, District Judge.

**GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF EVIDENCE IN
 AGGRAVATION OF SENTENCE**

DAN K. WEBB,
*United States Attorney,
 Northern District of Illinois.*

RICHARD L. MILLER, JR.,
Assistant United States Attorney.

WILLIAM R. COULSON,
*Assistant United States Attorney,
 Of Counsel.*

4. Count Four charged defendants Allan Ray Hattaway and Gary Miller with transporting Ms. Callahan for purposes of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C.

~~§2421.~~

5. Counts Five and Six charged defendant Marty Curran with transporting Ms. Callahan for purposes of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2421.

6. Count Seven charged Stimac with using various firearms in committing the foregoing felonies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1).

7. Counts Nine, Eleven and Twelve charged defendants Curran, Hattaway and Miller respectively with the use of a firearm in committing the foregoing felonies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(2).

On November 5, 1982, following a day and a half of deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts as follows:

1. Thomas Stimac, also known as Westside Tommy, guilty as charged (Counts One, Two, Three and Seven).

2. Robert George Burroughs, also known as Snoopy, guilty as charged (Count Three).

3. Allan Ray Hattaway, also known as Red and Ron Miller, guilty as charged (Counts One, Two, Three, Four and Eleven).

4. Marty Curran, also known as Searface, guilty as charged in Counts One, Two, Three, Six and Nine; not guilty as charged in Count Five.^{2/}

5. Gary Miller, guilty as charged (Counts One, Two, Three, Four and Twelve).

Following the polling and discharge of the jury, the Court entered judgment on the verdicts. At the same time the Court remanded the defendants to the custody of the U.S. Marshal, setting bond at one million dollars cash bond each.

^{2/} On motion of defendant Curran, the Court set aside the jury's verdict on Count Six.

II. GOVERNMENT'S SENTENCING RECOMMENDATION

Defendants Stimac, Curran, Miller and Hattaway have been found guilty of one of the gravest crimes punishable under federal law, namely, the unlawful abduction and holding of a person. The gravity of this offense may be measured by the severity of the penalty it carries — life imprisonment.

All of the defendants have been found guilty of the serious offense of conspiring to transport a woman for purposes of prostitution.

Based solely on the evidence admitted in this case, the Government submits that each of these defendants should be sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration. To that end, the Government urges that the following sentences be imposed:

1. Thomas Stimac should be sentenced to ~~no less than thirty years~~ imprisonment. Because of Stimac's central role in the conspiracy here and the criminal power which he commanded, including a life or death decision as to Ms. Callahan, the Government submits that a life sentence is appropriate. Stimac is an extremely intelligent and extremely dangerous man.

2. Allan Ray Hattaway should be imprisoned for life. Hattaway has perpetrated several vicious criminal acts with absolutely no remorse. He has effected these criminal acts in a calculated, detached manner. Hattaway has demonstrated absolutely no regard for human life.

3. Gary Miller should be imprisoned for life. Miller was a willing participant with Hattaway in the vicious criminal activity for which he was convicted. Miller's moral depravity is exceeded only by the calculating manner by which he operated. Miller was a major drug dealer who had no regard for human life. The murders of Tommy Forester and Lonnie Gamboa were merely "business decisions" made by Miller in the ordinary course of his unlawful activities. Forester and Gamboa had become liabilities to Miller, Hattaway and Stimac. Miller willingly participated without reservation in the elimination of these liabilities.

4. Martin Curran should be imprisoned for no less than twenty years. Curran knowingly discharged Stimac's orders. His blind devotion to Stimac and the Outlaws' criminal enterprise renders Curran a substantial risk to society. Curran is a veritable powder keg waiting to be lit.

5. Robert George Burroughs should be sentenced to five years imprisonment. Burroughs deserves the maximum sentence which can be imposed against him. As a Canadian citizen who has frequently come into this country, Burroughs has all too often occasioned his stays in this country with unlawful activities. Burroughs' disregard for the liberties and protections afforded to others should be severely punished.

Aside from the facts of this case, when evidence "concerning the background, character and conduct" of each defendant is considered (18 U.S.C. §3577), it is plain that the ends of justice will be served only by sentencing each defendant to a substantial period of federal incarceration. As the following background and character evidence demonstrates, the events relating to Ms. Callahan involved only one frame of defendants' ongoing pattern of criminal activities — activities which have involved over the years organized drug trafficking, prostitution and murder.

III. DEFENDANTS' ASSOCIATIONS WITH AN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE: THE OUTLAWS MOTORCYCLE GANG

The relationships between the defendants which gave rise to the unlawful abduction, transportation and holding for which they have been convicted arise out of each defendant's direct or indirect association with an organized criminal enterprise known as the Outlaws Motorcycle Club.^{3/}

^{3/} It cannot be gainsaid "that membership in and ties to professional criminal groups are material facts that should be considered in sentencing". *United States v. Fatico*, 579 F.2d 707, 710 (2d Cir. 1978). In *United States v. Fatico*, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (S.D. N.Y. 1977) the Court observed that "criminal associations enhance dangers to society and require a sentence predicated primarily on incapacitation and general deterrence. See A.L. 1, Model Penal Code, §7.03, A.B.A. Proj. on Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 86 (1968)."

The Outlaw Motorcycle Club is an international organization with club chapters located in the United States and Canada. Twenty-five chapters are located in the United States and six in Canada.^{4/}

The Outlaws organization is structured on a local, regional and national level. Members pay dues to the local, regional and national entities.^{5/}

The Outlaws are the Eastern United States counterpart to the Hells Angels. There are approximately 1500 to 2000 active members of the Outlaws. (Exh. 6, 7).

The Outlaws "mother chapter" or national chapter location is Chicago which is the city from which the Outlaws first originated. (Exh. 6, 7, 11). Most of the national officers are from Chicago. (Exh. 7, 11).

The Chicago and North Carolina Outlaws income is derived primarily from narcotics distribution and prostitution. (Exh. 10-15, 24, 36, 42, 47, 49).

In Chicago, as early as 1977, the Outlaws entered into a loose alliance with ranking members of other known organized criminal groups who controlled prostitution activities in Chicago. (Exh. 21). Based on that alliance the Outlaws have supplied women who work in certain nite clubs and bars. (Exh. 21; 24, p. 147-49).

The Outlaws manufacture in clandestine drug laboratories in Canada bootlegged "Canadian Blue" valium. (Exh. 14). Canadian Blues are distributed throughout the United States by the Outlaws. (Exh. 12, 14, 51, 31).

Prior to his arrest defendant Thomas Stimac, known as Westside Tommy, was a member of the national ruling board of the Outlaws. (Exh. 19, 20). Prior to assuming national power and control, Stimac was President of the Chicago Chapter of the Outlaws. (Exh. 10, 19).

^{4/} A list of Club Chapters seized during a federal search is attached as Exhibit 4 of the Appendix.

^{5/} A copy of an Outlaws Chapter Bylaws seized during a federal search is attached as Exhibit 5.

CONTINUED

5 OF 6

Evidence secured during the federal search of Stimac's Hinsdale house reflects that Stimac has substantial contacts throughout the United States and Canada with known members of motorcycle gangs including the Hells Angels and Banditos of Texas. Many of these associates are convicted felons.^{6/}

As of his arrest, Robert George Burroughs, known as Snoopy, was the main overseer of the Outlaw's Canadian Chapters. (Exh. 19). Burroughs has unlawfully entered the United States several times over the period 1977 to March 23, 1982. (Exh. 7, 10). He has been a frequent visitor to Chicago and was known in North Carolina where he attended a national Outlaw meeting with defendant Marty Curran. (Exh. 10).

This national meeting occurred at the Charlotte, North Carolina Clubhouse in approximately early June 1979. About one month later, on July 4, 1979, five members of the Charlotte Outlaws were shot and killed while sleeping in the Clubhouse. (Exh. 10).

Defendant Martin Curran also known as Scarface, has been a active member of the Chicago Outlaws. (Exh. 19; 25). Curran was a close associate of the Joliet Chapter of the Outlaws as well as the Outlaws' Milwaukee chapter. (Exh. 25, 68).

At the time of his arrest Curran was responsible for overseeing the operations of the Northern Indiana probationary chapter house. (Exh. 24, p. 154; 25). This "probate house" was located at a farm outside Michigan City, Indiana, known as the Flats. (Exh. 30). The Flats has become an active chapter of the Outlaws. (Exh. 30).

Defendant Gary Miller is not a member of the Outlaws. His involvement, however, arises out of his activities as a supplier of cocaine and marijuana.^{7/} Gary

^{6/} Among the evidence seized are Stimac's telephone directories which detail Stimac's substantial contacts. See Government Exhibits 7-2. Moreover, Stimac's long-distance telephone records evidence Stimac's constant communication with members of the Outlaws throughout the country.

^{7/} Miller's pervasive drug dealing activities are set forth at pp. 10-12, 46-48.

Miller was a "business associate" of defendant Allan Ray Hattaway and Paul Wilson Bare.^{8/}

Lastly, defendant Allan Ray Hattaway, also known as Red and Ron Miller, was a close associate of Stimac, Gary Miller and Paul Wilson Bare. Hattaway engaged in unlawful activities on behalf of the Outlaws, the Hells Angels and others. (Exh. 24, 14, 15, 31-33).

Among Hattaway's admitted activities for the Outlaws were drug-running, collecting money on drug debts and performing murders for the Outlaws. (Exh. id.). Hattaway wore a \$20,000 diamond and gold Outlaw ring which signified his status as a "hit man" for the Outlaws. (Exh. 25, 31, 49, 45, 14).

IV. THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE UNLAWFUL ABDUCTION, TRANSPORTATION AND HOLDING

The circumstances which gave rise to the December 12, 1981 abduction and transportation of Ms. Callahan have their origin in the course of several criminal activities among these defendants. In some instances these criminal activities antedate the December 12 abduction by as much as three and four years.

A. Pre-1981 Events

As early as 1978 Stimac and a Chicago Outlaw associate named LeRoy Gurican transported methamphetamine, known as crank, from Chicago to North Carolina. (Exh. 10). During this same period of time Stimac transported three North Carolina prostitutes to Chicago to work in bars. (Exh. 10).

Hattaway's association with Stimac and LeRoy Gurican existed as of early 1980. In 1980, Hattaway and Gurican were present at a bar in Salisbury, North Carolina, during which a man was shot to death following an altercation with Hattaway, Gurican and other Outlaws. (Exh. 10).

^{8/} Paul Wilson Bare's involvement is set forth at pp. 15-17, 24-26.

In the summer of 1980, Hattaway resided in Salisbury, North Carolina with Miss Charlene Hall. (Exh. 36). According to Ms. Hall, Hattaway was a cocaine dealer who made frequent trips to Florida and Tennessee. (Exh. 36). Hattaway purchased the cocaine for others who were the source of money. (Exh. 24, 31, 36).

In the fall of 1980, Hattaway and Hall moved to Laurel Springs, North Carolina where they resided near Paul Wilson Bare. Hattaway knew Bare prior to their move. (Exh. 36). At all times that Hall lived with him, Hattaway was heavily armed. (Exh. 36).

B. 1981 Pre-Abduction Events

During 1981, the defendants relationships with each other were extensive.

1. Leroy Gurican's Trial and Imprisonment

In June 1981 Leroy Gurican was sentenced to prison. Stimac provided Gurican with money for his legal fees and restitution. (Exh. 10, 36).

On more than one occasion in June 1981 Stimac travelled to Salisbury, North Carolina to meet with Gurican. (Exh. 36). Charlene Hall met Stimac who used the name Tom Treiten and in fact lied to Hall regarding his real name. (Exh. 36). During this first meeting, Stimac purchased cocaine. (Exh. 36).

After Gurican was sentenced Stimac and defendant Marty Curran made another trip to North Carolina. During this trip Stimac visited Gurican using the name Tom Treiten. (Exh. 40). Charlene Hall and a woman named Linda Townsend met with Stimac and Curran. During this visit Stimac and Curran gave Townsend 1,000 bootlegged Canadian Blues, which Townsend was to smuggle in to prison for Gurican. (Exh. 36). On August 8, 1981, Townsend with her minor daughter visited Gurican in prison. Townsend's daughter placed a bag of Canadian Blues in a trash can. The container in which the Blues were stored was delivered to Gurican. (Exh. 39).

During his June trip, Stimac asked Hall to come back to Chicago and work for him. (Exh. 36). Stimac told Hall that he owned a bar, which was untrue. (Exh. 36). Sometime in July 1981, Hall was asked to fly to Atlanta to meet with Hattaway and Stimac. (Exh. 36).

2. The Garth/Bogges Connection

In the Summer of 1981, Hattaway, Gary Miller, Stimac and Curran were associates of Clayton Bogges and Garth Bluxom. Both Bogges and Garth resided in Asheville, North Carolina. (Exh. 41, 42).

Bogges and Garth were involved in distributing cocaine in significant amounts. (Exh. 41, 42).

Bogges arrived in Asheville in early spring 1981 from Marathon, Florida, where he was involved in drug distribution. By the summer of 1981 Bogges had reached an agreement whereby defendant Gary Miller agreed to distribute drugs for Bogges. (Exh. 41, 49).

Bogges accompanied Hattaway on a trip to Chicago during the summer. They transported a kilo of cocaine to Stimac and Curran which they had purchased through Garth. (Exh. 41, 49).

During this visit to Chicago, Hattaway told Bogges that Hattaway, Stimac and Curran were going to meet with members of the Mafia. (Exh. 41, 49). At all times that Bogges was with him, Hattaway was armed. On one occasion Hattaway was carrying \$100,000. (Exh. 41).

In the Summer of 1981, following Gurican's imprisonment, Hattaway began living with Garth and his girl friend, Sally Broughton. (Exh. 42). At this same time, Hattaway befriended a young man named Ed Sawyer who was a friend of Garth. (Exh. 47).

During this period Garth was unemployed. His sole source of income was dealing in drugs. (Exh. 42, 47).

Aside from his acquaintance with Hattaway, Garth was an associate of Stimac and Gary Miller, as well as two other men — Tommy Forester and Lonnie Gamboa, who were not only close personal friends of each other and Garth but also drug dealers in Asheville. (Exh. 42; 24, p. 25-26; 31).

In the summer of 1981, Hattaway introduced Garth to Paul Wilson Bare. Miss Broughton was present when Hattaway told Garth that Bare was known as "Papa Bare" to his friends. Hattaway told Garth that Bare was a major drug dealer who could provide Garth with marijuana to sell. Broughton accompanied Garth and Hattaway to Paul Wilson Bare's home, which was adjacent to his junkyard located in rural North Carolina near Laurel Springs, approximately 5 miles from the Ore Knob Mineshaft. (Exh. 42).

During the summer of 1981, Stimac visited with Garth and Hattaway on at least two occasions. (Exh. 42, 47). Moreover, there were several telephone conversations between them which were placed over several different telephone lines.^{9/}

In July 1981, Garth requested Ed Sawyer to bring to Atlanta, Georgia, certain drug cutting equipment which Garth had left behind in Asheville. Sawyer's airline ticket was purchased and waiting for him at the Asheville airport. When Sawyer arrived in Atlanta he was met by Garth who took him to the LaQuinta Inn. (Exh. 47, 48).

When he arrived at the motel Sawyer met Stimac and Hattaway. (Exh. 47, 48). In Sawyer's presence, Garth, Stimac and Hattaway cut two kilo's of cocaine, with a street value of approximately \$500,000. The records of the LaQuinta reflect that Stimac registered on July 18 for one night and for four guests (two rooms) and that he used the name Tom Treiten and a false Illinois address. (Exh. 50).

3. Labor Day 1981

On Labor Day Weekend 1981, Stimac and Toni Summers drove to Asheville and stayed three days at Garth's residence. (Exh. 42-48). Miss Sally Broughton, Garth's girlfriend who lived with him, was told that Stimac made the trip to North Carolina to resolve a dispute over drugs and money which had arisen between Gary Miller and Hattaway. The money involved was Stimac's. (Exh. 42, 43).

^{9/} Messages were taken by Miss Broughton, Ed Sawyer and Anna Hensley, a next door neighbor to Garth. (Exh. 42, 45, 47).

One night during their stay, Stimac, Summers, Miss Broughton and Garth went to Gary Miller's house. After Stimac and Garth talked to Miller, they proceeded to the Oyster Lounge Bar in Asheville. (Exh. 42-44).

At the Oyster Lounge Bar that evening, Garth became involved in an argument with a man, Dr. Hal Lyles, who was an acquaintance of Garth and Tom Forester. Miss Broughton left the bar when the argument began. (Exh. 42-44).

Jay Fagel, a close acquaintance of Tom Forester who testified at trial, recalled being present with Forester at this argument. Fagel attempted to intercede in the argument when he was told by the defendant Stimac to stay out of the argument. (Exh. 33, 34).

When Fagel returned to his seat at the bar he was told by Tom Forester that he had just confronted "Westside Tommy", who Forester knew. (Exh. 33, 34).

At or shortly after the time Stimac made his Labor Day visit, bootlegged Candian Blue valium surfaced on the Asheville drug market. Among those who received large quantities for distribution were Garth, Tommy Forester and Lonnie Gamboa. (Exh. 42, 47, 31, 29, 14, 51).

Also about the same time that Stimac made his visit to Asheville, Hattaway had over \$40,000 in his possession which he claimed was money relating to his collecting activities for the Chicago Outlaws.^{10/}

4. The Aborted Drug Transactions

Following Stimac's Labor Day visit and prior to November 7, 1981, Hattaway and Miller attempted several buys of cocaine in Florida.

^{10/} On one occasion Hattaway had Anna Hensley and Sally Broughton count his money which totalled over \$30,000. (Exh. 42, 45). On one occasion Ms. Callahan assisted Hattaway in counting over \$40,000. (Exh. 24, p. 28-37, 99).

In September 1981, Garth accompanied by Ed Sawyer and a woman, travelled to Florida to purchase cocaine. Garth failed to purchase all the cocaine for which he was given money from Stimac. (Exh. 47, 29, 31). Thereafter Garth had several telephone calls with Stimac regarding paying him back. (Exh. 42). The amount owed was approximately \$20,000. (Exh. 43).

During the same period of time, Clayton Boggess was present at a discussion between Hattaway and Miller regarding Garth. Both Hattaway and Miller discussed killing Garth who they suspected was providing information to the police. (Exh. 41).

During September 1981 Hattaway in the presence of Miss Callahan asked Forester to go to Florida and attempt to purchase cocaine. Hattaway stated that Garth had botched a deal for Hattaway's people in Chicago. (Exh. 29).

On September 28, 1981, defendant Burroughs entered the United States destined for Chicago. (Exh. 52).

Miss Callahan was present when Hattaway told Forester that if money was needed to finance any drug transactions, Hattaway could get the money from "Westside" who was the head of the Chicago Outlaws. (Exh. 24, p. 99; 32).

In September 1981, Miss Callahan was living with Forester and a woman named Brenda Tweed. Miss Tweed advises that Hattaway gave Forester money on several occasions to purchase cocaine in Florida. She escorted Forester on two occasions. (Exh. 32).

On one occasion in October 1981, in the presence of Tweed and Callahan, Hattaway threatened to kill Forester. (Exh. 32, 29). Hattaway claimed that Forester was a police informant and could not be trusted. (Exh. 32, 29).

Shortly before November 7, 1981, Forester, Gamboa and Miller went to Florida to purchase cocaine. They returned to Asheville around October 25. (Exh. 31, 49).

5. The November 7, 1981 Shoot-Out

On November 7, 1981, a major gun battle occurred at the house of Gary Miller. Inside the house were Gary Miller, Hattaway and Miller's family. (Exh. 53).

Outside the house were Boggess and a man named James Anthony. Despite the exchange of over 100 rounds of ammunition fired by various weapons, no one was killed. In responding to the incident, the County Sheriff's Department seized over 50 weapons from Miller's house, \$12,000 in cash and cocaine with a street value of approximately \$250,000 (Exh. 53).

Aside from arresting Gary Miller, the police also arrested Lonnie Gamboa at a motel immediately adjacent to Miller's home. (Exh. 53).

Following the November 7 shoot out, Hattaway disappeared from Asheville until approximately December 12, 1981.

On December 1, Toni Summers, defendant Stimac's wife, rented a room for someone for two days at the Chalet Best Western Motel, Lyons, Illinois. The car which Miss Summers' registered to the room was registered to defendant Hattaway. (Exh. 54).

C. The Abduction Period Events

1. The December 12, 1981 Abduction

On Saturday evening, December 12, 1981, defendants Hattaway and Gary Miller went to an Asheville bar known as Sarge's Lounge, which was owned by Paul Harris, known as "Sarge". (Exh. 55, 56). Sarge had arranged for Hattaway and Miller to use a van that evening belonging to a plumber named Danny Roberts. (Exh. 55, 56).

Roberts was an acquaintance of Hattaway and Miller. On a previous occasion Roberts had been at Miller's house at which time Miller showed him a plastic bag of white powder which Miller stated contained \$500,000 of pure cocaine. On this same occasion, Miller asked Roberts to prepare a hollow plastic pipe in which Miller could secretly store cocaine. (Exh. 55).

Roberts accompanied Miller and Hattaway on the evening of December 12, 1981, to the house of Jay Fagel, who was a friend of Tom Forester. (Exh. 55, 56). On the way to Fagel's house, Miller complained that Forester had taken a suitcase containing six pounds of cocaine for which Miller and Hattaway were looking. (Exh. 55).

Upon arriving at Fagel's house Hattaway and Miller drew their guns. Roberts was present when Hattaway cocked his handgun, pointed it at Fagel's head and asked Fagel where Tom Forester was. (Exh. 55-59; 33-35).

Fagel told Hattaway and Miller that Forester was at the In-Town Motel in Asheville. At that point, Hattaway told Fagel that he was going with them. (Exh. id.).

Fagel said he could not go because he could not leave his nine year old son behind at his house unattended. Miller shouted at Fagel claiming he had let Forester take the suitcase. At that point, in the presence of Roberts, Miller and Hattaway exerted physical pressure on Fagel, telling him that he and his son were going with them. (Exh. 55, 56, 33-35). Before they left the house, Gary Miller patted down Fagel to be sure he did not have a gun. (Exh. 33-35).

Leaving the Fagel house, Roberts, the Fagels, Miller and Hattaway proceeded to Sarge's Bar, where Roberts departed telling Miller he did not want any part of what was about to happen. (Exh. 55, 56).

After leaving Roberts, they went to the In Town Motel. As Miller and Hattaway approached Forester's room they had their guns drawn. (Exh. 24, 33-35, 58, 59). Forester refused to open the door despite the knocks on the door. (Exh. 33-35, 24).

As they stood outside the room Miss Betty Darlene Callahan approached them with food from the restaurant next door. (Exh. 24, 35, 59). Miller grabbed Ms. Callahan by the arm at which time Forester opened the motel door. Hattaway then forced their entry into the room. (Exh. 24, 35, 59).

Miller sat Callahan in a chair and told her to keep her mouth shut. At this point he ripped the phone off the wall. (Exh. 24, 35). Hattaway asked Forester for money which Forester owed him for drugs. (Exh. 24, 35). Forester attempted to offer an explanation when Miller struck him on the left ear with his gun, drawing blood. (Exh. 24, 35).

Hattaway, in Fagel's presence, said that he was going to take Forester to the Outlaw clubhouse and that Ms. Callahan would be taken "up North" to pay off Forester's debt. (Exh. 33).

Hattaway ordered Forester and Callahan to remove their clothes so that he might search them. (Exh. 24, 35). Miller proceeded to toss the room looking for weapons, money and drugs. (Exh. 24, 35).

During this search, Miller ordered Fagel to sit down. Prior to entering the room Miller told Fagel that he and Hattaway had a "back-up" watching them who was their "insurance policy" if anything went wrong. (Exh. 33). While they were at the In-Town, an Asheville police officer responded to a call by the motel manager. Miller advised the officer that everything was okay. After the police officer left, Hattaway and Miller ordered everyone into their van. (Exh. 24, 35).

Upon entering the van Miller and Hattaway told the Fagels, Callahan and Forester to keep their mouths shut and do as they were told. Miller drove while Hattaway sat with his gun drawn and pointed at Forester. (Exh. 24, 35).

They proceeded to the Starlite Drive-In theater where they sat for several minutes with Hattaway while Miller left to get his car. As they sat there Fagel recalls Forester asking Hattaway "Did you talk to Lonnie" to which Hattaway replied "I stuck my hand out to help you and you tried to cut it off." (Exh. 33, 34).

Shortly after arriving Miller drove his Chrysler Cordoba car next to the van. Hattaway with his gun drawn on Forester put Callahan and Forester in the Cordoba. (Exh. 24, 35). Once inside the car, Callahan and Forester were bound and tied together. (Exh. 24).

Before leaving the drive-in Miller told Fagel and his son that the Asheville police had seen them and that Fagel should not tell anyone what happened. (Exh. 24, 35). Hattaway told Fagel that if he went to the police, they would find Fagel and his son and kill both of them. (Exh. 24). As a result of these threats Fagel did not go to the police. (Exh. 35).

Before they left, Hattaway told Fagel to collect certain personal affects of Forester, including his car, and take them to a certain person. (Exh. 33).

2. The Trip to Paul Bare's Junkyard

Miller, Hattaway, Forester and Callahan left the Asheville drive-in at approximately 10 p.m. Saturday, December 12, 1981. They drove into Tennessee and then back into North Carolina before finally stopping at their ultimate destination, the home and adjacent junkyard of Paul Wilson Bare. During the trip Forester and Callahan were tied. Hattaway and Miller held guns on them as they drove. (Exh. 24).

During the trip Hattaway and Miller told Callahan and Forester to do as they were told or else they would be killed. (Exh. 24). Callahan and Forester were told that in the event a cop pulled them over they were to say nothing. If they tried anything, they and the cop would be killed. (Exh. 24).

During the trip, Hattaway said that Callahan and Forester were both going to work off Forester's drug debt. (Exh. 24). Hattaway said he would take Callahan to his people in Chicago where she would work as a prostitute. Forester was told that he would have to work out an arrangement to save himself, possibly working on boats which imported marijuana or robbing a bank. (Exh. 24).

3. Paul Bare's Junkyard

Miller, Hattaway, Forester and Callahan arrived at Paul Bare's junkyard in rural Northern North Carolina at approximately 2 a.m. Sunday, December 13. (Exh. 24). As the car pulled in Bare came out of his house and talked to Hattaway. (Exh. 24).

They drove from the house to a barn in back of the house. Bare went into the barn and returned with strips of cloth which were used to blindfold and gag Forester and Callahan who were then placed in a wrecking truck owned by Bare. Before Forester was gagged he told Callahan to do as told because he feared that Hattaway and Miller would kill him. (Exh. 24).

Bare, Hattaway and Miller then transported Forester and Callahan, telling them they were going to some housing projects where Forester and Callahan would meet with people to work out a deal to live. (Exh. 24).

The trip in the truck took no more than ten minutes during which they travelled over dirt roads. Hattaway and Bare took Forester from the truck leaving behind Miller and Callahan. (Exh. 24).

Miller and Callahan were alone for twenty minutes. During this period Miller told Callahan that if Forester worked out an arrangement he would live, if not, he would die. (Exh. 24). Miller stated that Forester's chances of living or dying were 50/50. (Exh. 24). Miller told Callahan she could stay with Forester and take her chances, "if he lives, you live, but if he dies, you die." (Exh. 24).

Miller told Callahan that she could take her chances on her own by going to Chicago and working as a prostitute for Hattaway's Outlaw friends. (Exh. 24). At that point Miller asked Callahan if she wanted to go to Chicago. Blindfolded and gagged, Callahan nodded yes. (Exh. 24).

Miller then sexually molested Callahan. (Exh. 24).

Within twenty minutes of leaving the truck with Forester, Hattaway and Bare returned without him. (Exh. 24). Miller told Hattaway that Callahan had decided to take her chances on her own and go to Chicago. (Exh. 24).

Hattaway talked to Bare following which they returned to Bare's junkyard. Nothing was said regarding Forester. (Exh. 24).

Unknown to Callahan, Hattaway and Bare had taken Forester to the opening of the Ore Knob Mine, an abandoned Civil War mineshaft. (Exh. 17, 78, 79, 60). Forester was thrown down the mineshaft alive by Hattaway, falling over 250 feet to his death. (Exh. 17, 78, 79, 60).

Before Hattaway threw Forester into the mineshaft, Forester's left ear was cut off completely. (Exh. 60). A lifelong resident in the area near the Ore Knob mine who was watching a television show at 2:30 a.m. that day recalled hearing a screaming noise which lasted five minutes. The noise was so unusual the resident awakened another resident of the house who also heard the noise. (Exh. 61).

When the defendants arrived back at Bare's junkyard, Bare and Hattaway had another discussion during which Bare told Hattaway to take Callahan to Chicago to work off Forester's debt. (Exh. 24).

At approximately 5 a.m. Sunday December 13, 1981, Hattaway and Miller began their trip to Chicago with Callahan.

4. The Trip to Chicago

Miller and Hattaway drove all day Sunday arriving in Chicago at approximately 9 p.m. (Exh. 24).

During the trip Miller sexually assaulted Callahan. (Exh. 62). Both Miller and Hattaway consumed cocaine and Canadian Blue valium. (Exh. 24). Throughout the trip both men remained armed with firearms. (Exh. 24).

Prior to arriving in Chicago, Hattaway told Callahan that he was going to take her to the Outlaws in Chicago, and he named Stimac and Curran. (Exh. 24).

Hattaway told Callahan that she would become an "Outlaw Old Lady" and that she was to do what she was told. (Exh. 24).

Hattaway told Callahan that he might keep her as his Old Lady in which case she would work as a prostitute for him and give him all her money. (Exh. 24).

Hattaway told Callahan that he might sell her to Stimac. (Exh. 24).

During the trip to Chicago Hattaway told her that his people in Chicago would not tolerate any "fuck-ups", he said that the "people" in Chicago were not just "Outlaws" but also included the "mob". (Exh. 29). Hattaway told Callahan that "these people will put you in a dempsy dumpster" if she failed to do as told. (Exh. 29).

5. Sullivan's Motel

Upon arriving in Chicago, Hattaway and Miller drove Callahan immediately to Sullivan's Motel. Records of the motel and telephone company reflect that within one half hour of arriving Hattaway called Stimac. (Exh. 62, 24).

On that same day, December 13, 1981, Mrs. Tom Stimac, also known as Toni Summers, secured a lease on an apartment in Glendale Heights, Illinois. (Exh. 63-64). This apartment was subsequently used to keep Callahan during the period December 29-30. (Exh. 24). In securing the apartment Summers gave a false identification and place of employment (Exh. 63-64), as well as a false reason for needing the apartment. (Exh. 63-64).

While they stayed at Sullivan's, Hattaway and Miller left Callahan unattended for one hour. Before they left they took the phone apart so that it was inoperative. (Exh. 24).

Miller told Callahan that "it goes without saying you don't leave this room." Hattaway followed "if you do leave, it doesn't matter where you go, we will find you. We got people all over the United States". (Exh. 24).

Aside from the foregoing warning, Callahan, like Jay Fagel, was victimized by threats regarding her family. (Exh. 24). During the trip to Chicago, Hattaway and Miller told Callahan not to try to run for if she did they would kill her mother and sister, both of whom resided in Asheville, North Carolina. (Exh. 24).

Telephone records reflect that on December 13 several calls were made between Stimac's Hinsdale house and the Outlaw Probate house known as the Flats. (Exh. 65). Ms. Callahan was subsequently taken to the Flats where she was kept for two extended periods of time. (Exh. 24).

On Monday night, December 14, Curran came to Sullivan's where Callahan had been kept all day. Curran was armed with a .357 magnum firearm. At Hattaway's direction, Callahan engaged in oral sex with Curran. (Exh. 24). Telephone records reflect that on the evening of December 14, 1981, there was a long distance call between Garth and Stimac's Hinsdale house. (Exh. 65).

6. The Chalet Motel

After spending two nights at Sullivan's holding Callahan, Hattaway and Miller changed motels, checking into the Chalet Motel in Lyons, where they held Callahan Tuesday night. (Exh. 24).

While they were at the Chalet, Stimac visited. (Exh. 24). Stimac was told that Callahan would prostitute for him and at Hattaway's order Callahan removed her clothes and turned around so that Stimac could inspect her. (Exh. 24). Following his inspection, Stimac told Callahan to go into the bathroom and shut the door so that he and Hattaway could talk. (Exh. 24).

On Wednesday, December 16, 1981, Stimac came to the Chalet with defendant Burroughs, both men carried firearms. Hattaway gave Stimac \$100 and told Callahan to go with Stimac. (Exh. 24).

Stimac took Callahan to his car where he introduced her to Burroughs. While they were in the car Stimac asked Callahan the type of sex acts in which she would engage. (Exh. 24).

7. The LaGrange Motel

Instead of taking Callahan that night to Stimac's home in Hinsdale, Callahan was taken to the LaGrange Motel. (Exh. 24). She stayed the night of December 16 with Burroughs. (Exh. 24).

Telephone records reflect several calls between the Hinsdale house and the Flats immediately prior to the taking of Callahan to the LaGrange Motel. (Exh. 65).

During the evening of December 16 Burroughs told Callahan that she would work either for him or Stimac as a prostitute. (Exh. 24, 25). Burroughs said that she would be an Outlaw Old Lady for him or Stimac and that all her money would be given over to them. (Exh. 24, 25). In turn they would protect her. (Exh. 25).

During the evening Burroughs told Callahan how to knife fight. He gave Callahan Canadian Blue valium and ordered her to engage in sexual activities. (Exh. 24). Burroughs told Callahan he was remaining in the United States because he had been caught bringing pot from Canada. He stated that he had been recently shot which was in fact true. (Exh. 25).

8. The Hinsdale House Meeting

The following day Callahan was taken to Stimac's home in Hinsdale, Illinois. There she met for the first time Toni Summers. (Exh. 24).

Summers was introduced by Stimac as his Old Lady. During the evening Summers told Callahan that she worked as a prostitute out of the Club Algiers in Lyons, Illinois. (Exh. 24, 25).

Summers told Callahan what the financial arrangements were with the Club Algiers. Summers stated that she could make arrangements for Callahan to work out of Club Algiers. (Exh. 24, 25).

Before Summers left for work that night, she showed Callahan the Hinsdale house belonging to Stimac. There was one room referred to as the office which Summers, Stimac and Curran told Callahan not to enter. This room contained a safe among other things. (Exh. 24, 25).

During the course of showing Callahan the house, Summers pointed out an oil painting to Callahan of a dead biker named "Burrito". Callahan was told that Burrito or John Klimes was an Outlaw who had been blown-up by a bomb which was planted in his car. A photo of the Burrito oil painting is attached. (Exh. 25).

After Summers left the house for work, Curran, who resided in Stimac's house with Burroughs, ordered Callahan to Stimac's bedroom. At Stimac's direction Callahan engaged in oral sex for Stimac, after which he gave her cocaine. (Exh. 24). Callahan did not spend the night at the Hinsdale house. She was taken instead by Curran to an Outlaw Probate house known as the Flats, located near Michigan City, Indiana. (Exh. 24).

Prior to leaving, Callahan, Curran, Stimac and Burroughs discussed how Callahan would prostitute for them. Stimac asked Callahan if she would work as a dancer in one of the Chicago area clubs. Stimac told Callahan that he, Curran and Burroughs would make arrangements to get Callahan on the "circuits". (Exh. 24).

Stimac told Callahan that Chicago prostitution was controlled by the mob. Stimac said he had the necessary connections to place her on the circuits. (Exh. 29).

Stimac stated that Callahan would turn her money over to them. They would provide protection for her. (Exh. 24, 25). Stimac said that Callahan could not prostitute until she had an "identification" and that they would obtain one for her. (Exh. 24, 25).

Stimac told Callahan that she was no longer to go by the name Darlene Callahan and she was not to tell anyone she was from Asheville, North Carolina. (Exh. 24, 25). Her new name was Julie Alvarado and to cover for her southern accent she was to say she was from Knoxville, Tennessee. (Exh. 24, 25).

To that end, Curran handed Callahan a Wisconsin driver's license and a social security card, both issued to Julie Alvarado. These cards had been stolen one year prior from the real Julie Alvarado at a bar in Milwaukee frequented by Outlaws. (Exh. 24, 25).

Stimac, Curran and Burroughs told Callahan she was not to use the telephone at any time. (Exh. 24, 25).

Following this discussion Curran and Callahan drove to the Flats where Callahan was kept for approximately five days. (Exh. 24, 25).

9. The Flats: December 18-23, 1981

During the entire five days at the Flats Callahan went no where and spoke only to the members of the Outlaws who were there. Curran told her not to tell them who she was or where she was from. (Exh. 24).

While at the Flats, Curran used narcotics and gave Canadian Blues to Callahan. (Exh. 24). Curran also shot various weapons, including a machine gun. (Exh. 24). At one point, Curran shot a rifle inside the house. (Exh. 24).

Callahan asked Curran if she could call her mother and advise her that she was okay. Curran did not let her make any calls. (Exh. 24).

While they were at the Flats Curran telephoned Stimac each day. (Exh. 24; 65). Telephone records reflect these calls. (Exh. 65).

On December 23, 1981, Curran took Callahan back to the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 24).

10. Return to Asheville of Miller and Hattaway

Miller and Hattaway left Chicago on December 17 and arrived back in Asheville on Friday December 18, 1981. (Exh. 55, 56). That evening Danny Roberts met them at Sarge's Bar. (Exh. 55, 56).

In the back room of the bar Roberts gave Hattaway Tom Forester's gun which Hattaway had requested Roberts to get from Jay Fagel. Roberts commented to Hattaway that he liked the gun to which Hattaway replied that he could have it when Hattaway was finished using it. (Exh. 55, 56).

That same evening Miller showed Roberts plastic explosives which Miller had in the trunk of his Cordoba. (Exh. 55, 56). Miller also had a large quantity of ammunition. (Exh. 55, 56).

On a previous occasion Miller had attempted to sell Roberts an automatic machine gun from a large quantity of machine guns smuggled by Miller. (Exh. 55, 56).

11. Lonnie Gamboa

Lonnie Gamboa and Tom Forrester were close friends. Both collaborated in the sale of drugs. (Exh. 24, 31). Gamboa and Forester both knew Garth, Hattaway and Miller. (Exh. 42, 45).

Forester had Stimac's telephone number in his wallet the night he was murdered. (Exh. 24, 69, 74). Forester had identified Stimac to Jay Fagel. (Exh. 33, 34). Gamboa's telephone number and name were entered several times in Stimac's various telephone address books. (Exh. 70). Moreover Gamboa and Forester both knew Paul Wilson Bare. Bare participated in the murder of each man. (Exh. 24, 16, 18).^{11/}

Stimac knew Paul Wilson Bare. Bare's telephone number was entered several times in Stimac's address directories. (Exh. 70). Paul Wilson Bare's business card was found locked in Stimac's office safe on March 23, 1982, during the federal search of Stimac's Hinsdale house. (Exh. 70).

12. Lonnie Gamboa's Drug Debts

Prior to the November 7, 1981 shoot-out, Hattaway and Miller delivered to Gamboa approximately 5000 Candian Blue valiums. (Exh. 31, 16, 14). Hattaway told Gamboa, in the presence of his wife Sharon Gamboa, that the Blues came from his "people" in Chicago by way of Canada. (Exh. 31, 16, 14).

On several occasions prior to November 6, Hattaway asked Gamboa to accompany him to Chicago to meet Hattaway's Outlaw "brothers". (Exh. 31). Hattaway would often boast in the presence of Sharon Gamboa that he was hired to kill people for the Outlaws. (Exh. 31).

^{11/} On June 7, 1982, Paul Wilson Bare was found by a jury to be guilty in the first degree of murdering Lonnie Gamboa.

On November 6, 1981, Gamboa paid Gary Miller \$5000 for cocaine. In late October Miller and others purchased a large quantity of cocaine in Florida. (Exh. 31, 49).

Following the shoot-out on November 7, Hattaway did not call on Gamboa until approximately December 21, 1981. (Exh. 31, 16). On that date Gamboa, Hattaway, Gary Miller and JoJo Vines met. Vines was a government informant who at the time had been working at Sarge's Bar. (Exh. 17, 16).

In Vines presence, Hattaway told Gamboa that his people were out \$380,000, and that Gamboa's portion was \$120,000. (Exh. 16-18, 31). Gamboa told Hattaway that he only owed him \$30,000. (Exh. 16-18, 31).

Hattaway stated that the drugs had been delivered but the money had not been brought back. Gamboa responded that he knew where they could pick up at least 5000 of the Canadian Blues. (Exh. 16-18, 31).

Hattaway asked for all of Gamboa's money and property. Gamboa agreed to sign over two acres of property which he owned. (Exh. 16-18, 31).

At that point Gamboa, Hattaway and Vines picked up the Canadian Blues and proceeded to Gamboa's house. (Exh. 16-18, 31). In the presence of Gamboa's wife Hattaway repeated his statement that "his people" wanted their money for the valium. (Exh. 16-18, 31).^{12/}

In the presence of Vines, Gamboa stated that he was not giving information to the police. Gamboa told Hattaway that Miller was informing. (Exh. 22).

^{12/} Immediately before his murder, Gamboa told a close friend that Hattaway and Miller had threatened to kill him. Gamboa stated that the threat arose out of money owed by Gamboa to Hattaway for Canadian Blues which Hattaway had received from his motorcycle gang. (Exh. 51).

Immidately prior to the November 7 shoot-out, Hattaway and Miller stated in the presence of a Government witness that they were going to kill Gamboa if he failed to pay on his drug debt. (Exh. 49).

While transporting Ms. Callahan to Chicago, Hattaway stated that Gamboa owed them money and that he was the "next one to see". Hattaway further stated that Gamboa had been talking to the police too much. (Exh. 28).

In fact Gamboa had made arrangements as of December 22 to cooperate with Buncombe County Sheriff's Deputy Donnie Cole regarding the drug smuggling ring of which Gamboa was a part. (Exh. 53). Cole had made plans to meet with Gamboa on December 22. (Exh. 53).

13. Gamboa's Murder: December 23, 1981

On December 23, 1981, Hattaway and Miller asked Vines to pick-up Gamboa and meet them at a bar. When they arrived in the parking lot, Miller walked up to Vines car and pulled a gun on Gamboa. (Exh. 16).

Hattaway immediately joined and pulled his gun. Miller told Vines to tape Gamboa's hands together. Miller then placed Gamboa in the trunk of a black Monte Carlo car parked nearby. (Exh. 16).

Miller told Vines to go with Hattaway who drove the Monte Carlo. Miller followed in his Cordoba. (Exh. 16). In the backseat of the Monte Carlo was a machine gun which was used by Hattaway. (Exh. 16).

The cars proceeded to Paul Bare's junkyard, arriving around 3:30 p.m. Gamboa was taken out of the trunk, and handcuffed. In the woods behind Bare's house, Miller handcuffed Gamboa to a tree where he remained in extremely cold weather for approximately six hours. (Exh. 16).

At approximately 9:30 p.m. Gamboa was taken into Bare's barn. Gary Miller asked Gamboa where his list was of people to whom Gamboa had sold drugs. Gamboa stated it was in his wallet. (Exh. 16). At that point Gamboa's wallet was searched and the lists seized by Miller. (Exh. 16).

Miller then asked Gamboa if he could tell them where any of the remaining missing drugs were located. Gamboa said that he could find over 50 pounds of marijuana. (Exh. 16). Hattaway, Bare and Miller talked among themselves and then decided to allow Gamboa to call his wife and instruct her to deliver the marijuana to a designated spot. (Exh. 16).

Gamboa's wife received the call and in fact delivered that night two garbage cans of marijuana as directed. (Exh. 16, 31).

At approximately 11:30 p.m. that evening, Bare told Gamboa they were going to take him to visit someone. (Exh. 16). Gamboa was blindfolded and put in a truck with Bare, Miller and Vines. Hattaway followed in a car. (Exh. 16).

After driving five minutes Gamboa was taken from the truck and walked to the site of the Ore Knob mineshaft. There with guns pointed on Vines, Gary Miller instructed Vines to push Gamboa into the open mine shaft. (Exh. 16).

After Gamboa was pushed into the shaft, Miller stated that twenty-two people have been murdered at that site. (Exh. 16).

Later that evening Hattaway stated "Gamboa went in a lot easier than the guy that went two weeks before, he had to fight him." (Exh. 16, 17).

Subsequent to Gamboa's murder, Vines was told that he had been "accepted" as a member of the "family". (Exh. 16). Hattaway told Vines that he was a hitman for the Outlaws and that he dealt drugs and collected money for the Outlaws. (Exh. 16, 14).

Hattaway told Vines that he was a courier of Canadian Blues for the Outlaws and that the Blues were made in Canada. (Exh. 14). On the night Gamboa was murdered Hattaway told Vines that they would be going to Chicago the next day. (Exh. 14, 18). Although Hattaway did not mention the names of his Chicago "people", Vines saw Stimac at Sarge's Bar in the late summer of 1981. (Exh. 14, 15).

14. Hinsdale House: December 27

During the Christmas holiday Callahan was held by Stimac, Curran and Burroughs at the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 24).

On one occasion Stimac took Callahan and Summers to the Sybaris-Inn Motel where Callahan was directed to engage in sexual acts with Summers and Stimac. Photographs of these activities were seized in the March search of the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 24).

On approximately December 27, Callahan was present at the Hinsdale house in the evening when she was confronted by Stimac, Burroughs and Curran, all of whom were bearing firearms. Stimac was dressed in a flack jacket and held an AR .15 semi-automatic rifle. (Exh. 24). Burroughs and Curran held shotguns. (Exh. 24).

Callahan was told to go with Summers to the Glendale Heights apartment which had been leased on December 13. Summers told Callahan that someone had threatened to kill Stimac. (Exh. 24).

Callahan was taken to the Glendale Heights apartment where she remained until approximately December 30 when Curran picked her up. (Exh. 24).

On December 30, 1981, telephone records reflect a seventeen minute call between Garth and Stimac's Hinsdale house. (Exh. 65). Those same records reflect several phone calls between the Hinsdale house and the Flats on December 31 and January 1. (Exh. 65). On January 3, Curran took Callahan to yet another location, Stimac's Plainfield Road house in Indian Head Park, Illinois, the so-called "Ponderosa". (Exh. 24).

15. Miller's Arrest and Callahan's Calls

On Monday night, January 4, 1982, Gary Miller, in the company of JoJo Vines, was arrested by the Asheville Police. (Exh. 14, 18).

Miller was charged with kidnapping Callahan and Forester. (Exh. 73, 74). On Tuesday January 5, 1982, Miller was released on bond. (Exh. 73, 74).

On that same day, Stimac came to the Ponderosa with Burroughs to talk with Curran. (Exh. 24). Following a private discussion with Curran, Stimac in the presence of Curran, Burroughs and Callahan, told Callahan that Gary Miller had been arrested by the Asheville Police. (Exh. 24).

Stimac told Curran to take Callahan to a phone booth to make a call to the Asheville Police which could not be traced. (Exh. 24). Stimac told Callahan to tell the Asheville Police that she had not been kidnapped and that she and her boyfriend had a fight over which they broke up. (Exh. 24). Stimac told Callahan to sound

convincing. (Exh. 24). On Thursday January 7, 1981, Callahan finally was able to reach Detective Will Annerino of the Asheville Police who taped the conversation. (Exh. 24). Curran stood next to Callahan at the Oasis pay phone and shared the ear receiver, instructing Callahan regarding her answers to Annerino's questions. (Exh. 24).

Annerino told Callahan that he wanted to see her that Saturday and that the Asheville Police would make arrangements to return her home — if she was truly free to come home. (Exh. 24). Annerino asked Callahan if Forester was dead. (Exh. 24).

16. Location of the Ore Knob Mineshaft

By January 6, JoJo Vines' information regarding the Gamboa murder had led law enforcement officials to the discovery of the Ore Knob Mineshaft. By Thursday January 7, 1982, the area around the shaft was secured by 24 hour police guard. (Exh. 78).

By Friday January 8, 1982, the news media throughout North Carolina publicized the recovery events which were unfolding at the Ore Knob mine. (Exh. 75).

On January 10, 1982, Callahan was taken to the Flats again by Curran. (Exh. 24). She was held there until January 17, 1982, when Curran took her back to the Ponderosa. (Exh. 24).

As of January 10, 1982, Hattaway checked into a motel in Panama City Beach, Florida under the alias name Don Pruitt. (Exh. 125). Stimac had Hattaway's Panama City Beach telephone number on pieces of paper which he secured in his office safe. (Exh. 70).

As of January 12, 1982, Gary Miller fled Asheville, forfeiting the bond he posted and failing to appear at a court hearing on that date. (Exh. 73).

As of January 10, 1982, Toni Summers left Chicago, returning to her mother's home in Iowa. Before Summers left for Iowa she telephoned her mother during which Summers stated she was contemplating suicide. After she arrived home, Summers told her mother that she might be arrested if she went back to Chicago. (Exh. 76).

Summers confided in her fifteen year old sister that she was afraid that something would happen to her similar to what happened to Burrito because "as a bikers old Lady she knew too much." (Exh. 77).

17. Decision to Enter Ore Knob Mine

As of January 15, 1982, the publicity surrounding the Ore Knob mine shaft and the disappearance of Callahan and Forester had reached the level of a daily media event in the press and on television and radio throughout the area of North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. (Exh. 75). The press had publicized the fact that the U.S. Department of Mines had advised against going down the mineshaft because of the dangers of a cave-in. (Exh. 75).

The prosecuting county attorney for Asheville disclosed in the press that without any evidence of a body he had no case. (Exh. 75).

On January 15, the federal government withdrew from the efforts to descend into the mine. (Exh. 75).

On Monday January 18, 1982, the press publicized that a man had volunteered to enter the mineshaft and that as soon as all the legal waivers had been signed he would make an effort. (Exh. 74, 75).

On Monday January 18, telephone records reflect four separate phone calls between Garth and Stimac's Hinsdale house including one nineteen minute call to a pay phone near Stimac's house. (Exh. 65). On Tuesday January 19, there was another call between Garth and Stimac's house. (Exh. 65).

On Thursday January 21, it was publicized that the mine would be entered on Monday January 25. On the same date there was an eleven minute telephone call between Stimac's house and the Flats. (Exh. 65). The next day, Miss Callahan was taken from the Plainfield Road house to the Skyline Motel in Lyons where she was kept until Monday January 25, 1982. (Exh. 24).

On Sunday January 24, 1982, Garth Bluxom was found dead, the victim of an overdose of nitrous oxide.^{13/}

18. Recovery of the Bodies of Forester and Gamboa

On Monday January 25, at approximately 3:30 p.m. Chicago time, and after two unsuccessful descents into the mine shaft, the body of Lonnie Gamboa was found and retrieved from 250 feet down in the mineshaft. (Exh. 78, 79). Approximately two hours later Forester's body was found and retrieved wearing the same clothing as he was wearing on December 12. (Exh. 78, 79).

At approximately 11 a.m. that day Callahan was taken by Curran to Nick's Bar in Lyons. Before proceeding immediately to Nick's Bar, Curran drove around for two hours. (Exh. 24). At approximately 1 p.m. they entered the bar. (Exh. 24).

Stimac and Burroughs joined them during which Stimac and Curran talked and made several phone calls from a pay phone. (Exh. 24, 25).

At approximately 5 p.m. Curran took Callahan to the Brookfield Motel. (Exh. 24). He gave her \$15.00 and told her she could leave her room to go to the restaurant next door for food. (Exh. 24). Curran told Callahan he would be gone on business that night to Milwaukee. (Exh. 24).

After Curran left, Callahan called her mother in North Carolina who advised of the recovery of Forester's body along with Gamboa. (Exh. 24).

Following her discussions with her mother, Ms. Callahan called the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Exh. 24).

^{13/} Although Bluxom's death appears not to be a homicide, Garth purchased several guns for his protection shortly before he died. (Exh. 42). In addition, he talked frequently with Stimac during his last days regarding a \$20,000 drug debt he owed to Stimac. (Exh. 42). In February 1982, Stimac tried to collect this debt from Ms. Broughton while he was making a trip down south. (Exh. 43). Shortly before Christmas Garth made a cash payment to Gary Miller on his drug debt. (Exh. 42, 43).

D. The Post Abduction Events

1. Miller and Hattaway

On February 23, 1972, Miller forfeited \$23,000 in bond which he had posted incident to his arrest for kidnapping. (Exh. 53).

On April 4, 1982, Hattaway's car was found abandoned in the panhandle area of Florida. (Exh. 81). The car had been completely destroyed by fire. (Exh. 81).

On June 9, 1982, acting on a tip, police went to a trailer court in Fairview, North Carolina, looking for Gary Miller. (Exh. 73). A shoot-out occurred as a result of which a friend of Miller was arrested. Two police officers were shot during this aborted arrest attempt, one of whom lost his eyesight. (Exh. 73).

On June 10, 1982, Paul Wilson Bare was found guilty by an Ash County North Carolina jury of first degree murder for the homicide of Lonnie Gamboa. (Exh. 73).

On June 11, 1982, Gary Miller was found and arrested in Caldwell County North Carolina. (Exh. 73). Miller's appearance had changed considerably during the months of his flight from prosecution. (Exh. 73).

On June 11, 1982, Hattaway surrendered to law enforcement authorities in Johnson City, Tennessee. (Exh. 73). At the time Hattaway was the subject of a five state manhunt, including media publicity. (Exh. 73).

2. Curran and Burroughs

On February 25, 1982, at 3:00 a.m., Burroughs and Curran were arrested by the Indian Head Park Police, charging them with unlawful use of weapons. (Exh. 83, 84). At that time both men were carrying the firearms which they used during the course of holding Ms. Callahan. (Exh. 83, 84). Curran carried a Colt .357 magnum revolver and Burroughs possessed a .22 magnum revolver in his boot which was loaded with nine rounds of ammunition. (Exh. 83, 84).

On March 21, 1982, Government agents commenced surveillance of Stimac's Hinsdale house. Curran, Burroughs and Stimac were observed at approximately 2:15 a.m. on March 23, arriving at the Hinsdale House. They unloaded from an auto van a garbage can with a liner which they took into the residence. (Exh. 85).

In the late afternoon of March 23, a federal search warrant was executed at the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 85). Burroughs was present throughout the search. (Exh. 85). As the agents were leaving, INS Agent Steven Henderson told Burroughs that he would see him at his civil deportation hearing scheduled for April 15, 1982. Burroughs responded that "he would not bet on it". (Exh. 52).

On April 8, Burroughs and Curran gave handwriting exemplars and fingerprints pursuant to grand jury subpoenas. (Exh. 85).

On April 15, Burroughs failed to attend the INS deportation hearing. (Exh. 52). Stimac had posted \$5000 cash bond for Burroughs in that proceeding. (Exh. 52). Burroughs returned to Canada where he was ultimately arrested in July 1982. (Exh. 52).

At the time Burroughs left the United States the unlawful use of weapon charge was still pending against him. (Exh. 52).

3. Stimac

Subsequent to Ms. Callahan's release Stimac made at least one trip to the South. (Exh. 42).

On March 23, 1982, Stimac's Hinsdale house was searched.^{14/} During the search Stimac approached his house in his auto and upon spotting law enforcement officers he sped away contrary to the requests of the law enforcement officials standing watch outside. (Exh. 85).

^{14/} See Section V below regarding the evidence uncovered during that search.

Stimac was pursued by two ATF agents who commandeered his car by the roadway. (Exh. 85). At that point Stimac reached toward his glove compartment. Before he could open it the Agents issued several warnings. Upon securing Stimac, the agents discovered on the car floor a clip loaded with ammunition for a pistol. (Exh. 85).

On March 23, Stimac was served a grand jury subpoena for an April 8 grand jury appearance. At that time Stimac was advised that the Government was seeking to serve Toni Summers to appear before the same Grand Jury. (Exh. 85).

As of March 23, Summers had been in Iowa over two and one half months since leaving Chicago on January 8. (Exh. 76, 77, 86). Summers had made commitments through the end of April to dance in certain Iowa nightclubs. (Exh. 86). On March 28, 1982, Stimac purchased a one way airline ticket for "Ms. R. Nelson" which was used by Summers on March 29 when she flew from Des Moines to Chicago. (Exh. 87). The ticket was purchased by Stimac and was refundable only to Stimac. (Exh. 87).

On April 1, 1982, Summers appeared in Lake County State Court seeking dissolution of her ten year marriage to David Nelson. (Exh. 88). Summers had filed for divorce in 1980. In February 1982, her divorce action was dismissed for want of prosecution. (Exh. 88). On April 1, the dismissal order was vacated. Summers attempted to expunge the February 4 order. (Exh. 88).

The Court granted Summers petition for divorce based on her representations which falsely claimed she had resided for 90 days prior to the proceeding in Lake County and that the marriage with Nelson had not bore children. (Exh. 88).

On the same day, April 1, 1982, Stimac and Summers applied for a marriage license in DuPage County. They were married by a Judge the next day. (Exh. 89).

In April, 1982, Stimac and Summers returned to Iowa to obtain her pearl handled gun which she had while Ms. Callahan was held by the defendants and which Summers could not carry during her plane trip to Chicago. (Exh. 76).

V. Federal Search of the Hinsdale House

On March 23, 1982, pursuant to a federal search warrant, law enforcement agents searched the Hinsdale house in which Stimac, Burroughs and Curran resided.

Several items of evidence implicating Stimac, Curran and Burroughs in the charges here were seized from various areas of the Hinsdale house.

In addition, evidence was seized which bears unfavorably on the character of these defendants, which evidence is relevant to this sentencing proceeding.

A. Prostitution Notes

During the search ATF Agent Richard Paul found in the so-called "Office" of the Hinsdale home notes which detailed various "Things To ¹ Do-or Check". These notes are attached as Exhibit 1 in the Appendix.

The notes were printed by Burroughs and include specific instructions to Stimac. Among the things "to do" are notes regarding the promotion of prostitution activities.

In the notes Stimac is told to "check out their connections" of an exisiting "Fashion Show," including the following instructions:

"Dream Girl Fashions

- 1) Who are these jerks-what connection
- 2) No heavybacking - Lets take over
- 3) Send cunt for job interview to find out pay + other details + find out where these people put on their shows - maybe they go out of business or we give better cunts at better rate
- 4) Maybe use cunts for new escort service also
- 5) Maybe use at Private Party's Stages, etc., with couple whores thrown in to fuck + suck for \$
- 6) Maybe idea for Area Around Flats

- 7) Check with Larry the Printer others to see if we are stepping on toes
- 8) Least we will get to meet more cunts even the ugly ones (Pussy is Pussy)" (Exhibit 1).

B. Club Algiers Photos

Toni Summers engaged in prostitution activities at the Club Algiers in Lyons (Exh. 24, 25).

Sherry Holzworth, who lived with Stimac and who testified at trial, has observed prostitution at Club Algiers while she worked there. (Exh. 23).

Stimac asked Ms. Callahan if she would work as a prostitute in a club. (Exh. 24).

During the period 1981-82, every Tuesday night was pay night for the girls who worked at Club Algiers. Stimac would routinely come to the Club on Tuesday nights. Stimac routinely had at least one girl working at the Club. (Exh. 90).

Several witnesses for the Government indicate that during the period 1981-82 Stimac supplied the girls at Club Algiers with cocaine. (Exh. 90, 11).

Seized from Stimac's Hinsdale house were various photos of several girls who worked at the Club Algiers and a photo of the Algiers' owner Johnny Merola. (Exh. 91). Several of the photos were taken in the back rooms of the Algiers. (Exh. 91).

Aside from the foregoing photos several other photos were seized from Stimac's office which depict various young women and girls engaging in sexual activities for and with Stimac. Government Exhibit 91.

C. "Mob" Connections

During the trip to Chicago Ms. Callahan was told that the Outlaws were connected to the mob. (Exh. 29). Likewise Clayton Boggess was told that Stimac, Curran and Hattaway met with members of the "Mafia". (Exh. 41).

The Chicago Outlaws contacts with organized crime families date back to 1977. Stimac and Curran have connections with those families. (Exh. 24, 92).

A highly reliable Government informant advises that Stimac has connections to certain members of organized crime. (Exh. 92).

Aside from the foregoing, Stimac was viewed within the Outlaws as a source of information regarding the "mafia". Exhibit 93 in the Appendix is a letter seized from Stimac's Office safe. The letter is addressed to Stimac from a Milwaukee Outlaw and seeks information as to whether a certain person is a member of the mafia and his status.

D. Disguise Kit

Locked in Stimac's office safe was an attache case containing various cosmetics, ski caps with nylon stockings in-sewn and various other items necessary to change or conceal a person's identity. Government Exhibit 70.

The paraphernalia within the attache case are not unlike that which is a tool of trade for a home burglar, a robber or a hitman.

Complementing this disguise kit is the fact that the "To Do" notes seized from the Hinsdale office, detail a methodical plan to start a company called "Westside Security" which would install electronic home burglary systems. (Exh. 1).

E. Weapons

Several weapons were seized from Stimac's Hinsdale house including one semi-automatic military-type rifle, two shotguns, a rifle, handguns and buck knives. (Exh. 70).

In addition, the agents seized brass knuckles and various handcuffs. (Exh. 70).

Several thousand rounds of ammunition were found including bullets which had been modified through the insertion of a substance within the tip of the bullet. (Exh. 70).

Also secured from the Hinsdale residence were notes for manufacturing a pipe bomb. (Exh. 94).

VI. Other Evidence Bearing on Defendants' Character

In addition to the foregoing evidence there exists other facts and circumstances which reflect adversely on defendants and which underscore the violent world in which defendants existed and their individual propensities toward violence.

A. August 1981 Murder of Debra Elmhorst

In 1981 Debra Elmhorst lived with Stimac at his Hinsdale house. (Exh. 95). She had worked in the past for Stimac and is depicted in the photographs seized from Stimac's house. (Exh. 91).

On the night of August 6, 1981, Maureen Jurjovec, who also resided with Stimac and who worked at the Club Algiers and Club Taray, took Debbie Elmhorst to the Thatcher Forest Preserve in Cook County. (Exh. 95, 98).

Jurjovec and Elmhorst were accompanied by two bikers, Jocko Rey and Stop Gozdecki. (Exh. 95, 96). That night at the forest preserve, Jocko Rey in the presence of Jurovec and Gozdecki shot and killed Debra Elmhorst. (Exh. 95, 96).

On August 15, 1981, Cook County Sheriff's Police Homicide Detective John Reed attempted to interview Stimac and Jurjovec at the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 96). While waiting outside, Detectives Reed and Betz heard what sounded like gun shots coming from within the house. Stimac told them that everything was okay and that they would talk to Detective Reed in the presence of Stimac's attorney. (Exh. 96).

The following day Stimac and Jurjovec, accompanied by Stimac's attorney, met with Detective Reed (Exh. 95). Jurjovec evidenced signs of having been beaten. Detective Reed was advised that Stimac beat Jurjovec because she had accidentally fired a gun while Reed was waiting outside the house to interview them. (Exh. 95).

Following the police interview Stimac sent Jurjovec to live with John Klimes, also known as Burrito. (Exh. 96, 98). On October 8, 1981, John Klimes was murdered through the deployment of an explosive device which destroyed Klimes Blazer van auto and killed him instantly. (Exh. 97).^{15/}

At the commencement of Klimes murder investigation, Stimac, Curran, Burroughs and others assisted law enforcement agents. Their assistance pointed toward Jocko Rey as the alleged perpetrator of the Klimes bombing. (Exh. 98).

Rey's motive allegedly was to kill Jurjovec who was a witness in the Elmhorst murder. (Exh. 98). However, based on all the facts available to the Government that theory was not viable.

Sometime prior to the March 23, 1982 federal search of Stimac's Hinsdale house and subsequent to Klimes murder, Jocko Rey visited Stimac at the Hinsdale house. (Exh. 2). Stimac made notes regarding Rey's visit which he locked in his office safe.

Those notes are as follows:

Jocky Ray stopped here at 1:00 a.m. Sun Morning wanted to talk to me in private (said he was scared, but asked if he could come inside + talk,) I figure that he want's to do one of 2 things, eather he made a deal with REED to get me to say something to fuck myself. or try to work a deal out with me to stay out of jail (he said he was scaired for his life mentioned (Outlaws) just the name - did not say any names!

His lawyer's name is Brady

I told him 4 times that we might be, were on audio-vido (Fed's) He agreeded but still wanted to talk? I told him to have Brady contact Vishey

Look's like Reed really want's me bad

Jocko said the same thing

Your Brother West Side

^{15/} Photos of the bombing are attached as Exhibit 97.

On May 1, 1982, Jocko Rey was found dead in an auto located in a parking lot in Elk Grove Township. He died from gun shots to the head. (Exh. 120).

Jocko Rey left a suicide note in which he admitted that "the whole incident that happen the night Debbie died was planned. But not the part about Debbie...dieing. and I was not the one that did the planning, Frank Gozdecke + Morine J. were the one's that did the planning, they knew I was drunk enough to go along with anything, which meant searing Debbie into not going back to Tom to tell him that Frank and Mo were going to leave for California that month." (Exh. 3).

In his note to his father Jocko Rey told of his fears from the Outlaws for the Klimes murder, a murder which he did not commit, stating:

"The other thing I have on my mind is John Klimes death. I think someone wanted John out of the way maybe he was gaining to much power in the Outlaws for that someone to stand for it. So this person or persons saw a perfect setup to kill John and blame it on me. Because Mo was staying with him and it would look like I did it. I found out from Frank that he had talked with mo and said the night before John died two guys claiming to be my friends came into the Micheals Magic touch and started to harrass her, so who ever killed John it must have been those to guys. I myself don't even know where John lives until I read it in the newspaper after he died.

So you see if I go to prison I will be killed anyway by the Outlaws because they think I killed or had him killed. (John klimes or Burrito as he was known) and if I don't go to prison I'll be hunted by them and Debbie's family so it is useless to go on kidding myself any longer."

B. John Klimes Murder

On October 8, 1981, at approximately 10:50 p.m. John "Burrito" Klimes was murdered by an explosive device which was placed under the front seat of his Blazer auto van. (Exh. 97).

The explosion occurred at the intersection of First Avenue and the Santa Fe Railroad tracks in McCook, Illinois. Exh. 97).

Klimes was travelling to meet Stimac at the Showcase Lounge at First Avenue and Ogden in Lyons. (Exh. 97, 98). Stimac called Klimes at 10:30 p.m. to find out when he was leaving his home to drive to the Showcase. (Exh. 98). At 10:50 p.m. Klimes was murdered by someone who knew the route he would take and the exact time he would be travelling on that route. (Exh. 97).

Although Klimes was an "Outlaw Brother" of Stimac, Klimes had created problems for himself and the Chicago Outlaws. (Exh. 102, 103).

On May 30, 1981, three black males were shot in front of the Outlaw Clubhouse on Roosevelt Road in Chicago. (Exh. 102, 126). One of the victims died as a result of the shooting. (Exh. 101).

Klimes was at the Clubhouse that night on "guard duty". In the presence of a government witness John Klimes went outside the clubhouse and shot the three black males. (Exh. 102). As the police arrived Klimes fled the scene, taking refuge with Outlaws in Tennessee where he remained for at least two months. (Exh. 102, 100). At the time of his death Klimes was a subject of the May 30 homicide investigation.

Two weeks before Klimes October 8 death, he told two close friends who were not affiliated with the Outlaws, that he was in jeopardy. Klimes stated that it was not safe to be seen with him. (Exh. 99, 100). Klimes stated that he had "one or two weeks to live". (Exh. 99, 100).

Before his murder, John Klimes was heavily involved in providing girls who danced in various Chicago area night clubs. (Exh. 99, 103). Because of his involvement he had created irreconcilable conflicts within the Outlaws. (Exh. 103). Before he died, Klimes attempted to withdraw from the Outlaws. Stimac would not let him withdraw. (Exh. 103). On an occasion shortly before his death, Stimac beat severely Klimes at the Chicago clubhouse. The beating arose out of club business. (Exh. 103).

Based on information imparted to the Government by several potential witnesses, John Klimes was killed by a bomb made by the Outlaws. (Exh. 103, 104).

A government witness who was a member of the Outlaws was present during conversations regarding the bomb which killed Burrito. The bomb was prepared in Florida by a biker named Arab who is a demolitions expert. (Exh. 104).

The bomb was transported to Chicago by a former Chicago Outlaw named Vulture. (Exh. 104).

After the murder Stimac took over Burrito's operations. (Exh. 103, 105).^{16/}

C. Kimberly Kalas Murder

On July 27, 1982, Kimberly Kalas, a seventeen year old dancer at the Club Algiers was found murdered in Black Partridge Forest Preserve which is five miles southwest of Stimac's Hinsdale house. (Exh. 106, 107).

Based on all available evidence, Kalas' time of death was sometime around 5 a.m. The cause of death was strangulation and the infliction of knife wounds. (Exh. 106, 107).

Approximately two weeks before her death, Kalas started dancing at the Club Algiers. (Exh. 108). At the time she told her mother she was trying to raise money to help bond a friend out of jail. (Exh. 108).

Kalas obtained the Algiers job through a girl named Candy Gillespie, who was a companion of Guy Merola. (Exh. 108, 109). Gillespie was an acquaintance of Stimac, Curran and Burroughs. (Exh. 24, 109).

^{16/} A biker named David Bedalow told the McCook Police on October 13, 1981, that the man who killed Klimes had been in their police station the morning after his death and that the police had let him walk away. Stimac and Burroughs were the only people who visited the police regarding Klimes death. (Exh. 111). Bedalow was called before the Grand Jury but refused to testify. (Exh. 111). Among Stimac's notes seized from the Hinsdale office was a note regarding Bedalow, which indicated that Bedalow had been called by the Grand Jury. Stimac's note indicates that he was going to talk to the head of Bedalow's motorcycle gang. (Exh. 112).

During Ms. Callahan's abduction Curran took Callahan to meet Gillespie. Curran stated that he wanted Callahan to meet Gillespie so that Callahan would be more at ease around biker "Old Ladies". (Exh. 29).

One week before her murder, Kalas was rooming with Candy Gillespie at the Presidential Motel in Lyons, a motel frequented by Stimac and Burroughs. (Exh. 110).

Prior to living at the Presidential, Kimberly Kalas lived during May and June 1981, with a girl named Evonne Herbie, who also worked at one time in the Club Algiers. Seized from Stimac's Hinsdale house is a photo of Herbie at the Club Algiers. (Exh. 91). Prior to her death Kalas had mentioned from time to time that she knew Stimac. (Exh. 108).

In the early hours of July 27, 1982, Kalas went to Mr. C's night club in Cicero. While at Mr. C's at approximately 3:30 a.m., Kalas told a government witness that she had arrangements to meet Stimac and he would take her home. (Exh. 114). Based on information provided by this witness, Kalas was asked to work as a prostitute for the Outlaws. (Exh. 114). Stimac was a frequent visitor to Mr. C's and knew the owner. (Exh. 115, 116).

Kimberly Kalas was not sexually assaulted and there is no evidence of a struggle. She knew her assailants. (Exh. 106, 107). Before she died she was slowly strangled and superficial knife wounds were inflicted common to the modus operandi used in obtaining information from a potential victim. (Exh. 106, 107).

Based on information provided by a government witness, Kalas had been telling friends and acquaintances that she was going to be a witness for the government in this case. (Exh. 117).

D. Witness Intimidation

On June 25, 1982, Judy Ebner, a former dancer at the Club Algiers and Michael's Magic Touch, called the FBI on its hot line asking for help. Ebner stated that the Outlaws had beaten her and had threatened to kill her. (Exh. 118).

Through the investigative work of Special Agents Tom Conway and Al Mitchell, Ms. Ebner was located. On Monday June 28, 1982, Ms. Ebner told the Special Agents that two Outlaws, Chris Carlson and James Werdeniuk had visited her apartment, where they beat her and physically destroyed her possessions using a buck knife. Ebner advised that Werdeniuk is an "enforcer" for the Chicago Outlaws. (Exh. 118).

Ebner was a former "Old Lady" of Marty Curran and knows Stimac and Burroughs. (Exh. 119). Carlson is an Outlaw associate of Stimac who watched Miss Callahan from time-to-time. (Exh. 24). Carlson always carried a buck knife. (Exh. 24).

Werdeniuk is known as Weird. He met Ms. Callahan once in the presence of Allan Ray Hattaway. (Exh. 24, 25).

Following her initial discussion with the FBI, Ebner met Carlson and Werdeniuk again. Thereafter she advised the FBI that Werdeniuk and Carlson visited her but that she consented to the assault on her and that her furniture was cut up because of a dispute she had with them. (Exh. 119).

Charlene Hall was a witness in this case on behalf of the Government. Following her testimony she returned to her mother's home in North Carolina where she is presently residing. (Exh. 10).

Subsequent to her return, Linda Townsend, who was an acquaintance of Stimac and Hattaway, made threats regarding Ms. Hall. Specifically, Townsend threatened that Ms. Hall would be harmed if she continued to cooperate with the Government. (Exh. 10).

Aside from the foregoing threats, both JoJo Vines and Darlene Callahan were enrolled into the witness protection program because of threats on their lives.

Vines was the subject of a \$50,000 hit contract. (Exh. 78).

E. Attempted Procurement of a "Hit Contract" on the Government's Main Witness

In August 1982, Ms. Betty Darlene Callahan was the subject of an attempted procurement of a hit contract by defendant Gary Miller. At the time Ms. Callahan was enrolled in the federal witness protection program. (Exh. 121).

In August 1982, Miller approached Clifford Haller, an inmate at the federal Metropolitan Correctional Center, regarding obtaining a "hit man" to murder Ms. Callahan and JoJo Vines, another federally protected witness in this case. Miller told Haller that he knew where Ms. Callahan was located and that there would be no problems in doing the job once a contract killer was hired. (Exh. 121). On August 18, 1982, Haller contacted the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding this threat on Ms. Callahan. On August 23 Haller was interviewed by ATF Special Agents Richard Paul and John Malone. (Exh. 121). Based on their interview of Haller, Special Agents Paul and Malone in consultation with the U.S. Attorney's office concluded that the threat against Callahan should be seriously regarded. (Exh. 121).

By August 26, 1982, arrangements had been made whereby an ATF Special Agent from Cleveland, Ohio, would pose as a contract killer. An undercover telephone number was created through which Miller could reach the putative hit man. (Exh. 121). On August 31, 1982, Haller gave Gary Miller the hit man's Cleveland telephone number. (Exh. 121).

On September 3, 1982, Haller advised ATF Special Agents Paul and Malone that Miller had attempted to contact the hit man but was unsuccessful. Miller told Haller that his sister-in-law worked for the telephone company in North Carolina and that she determined that the billing address for the hit man's telephone came back to the federal government. (Exh. 121).

Miller further stated that he had his wife call the number given to Miller to determine who it was.

On February 8, 1982, Southern Bell Telephone Company of North Carolina advised ATF that in fact a telephone call had been made from the home of Miller's father to the Cleveland, Ohio undercover number on September 1, 1982. In-

addition, ATF was advised that a relative of Gary Miller was in fact an office employee of Southern Bell in August and September of 1982. (Exh. 122).^{16/}

VII. OTHER MATTERS

A. Thomas Stimac

At the time of his arrest in April 1982, Stimac owned the home at 11415 Plainfield Road, Indian Head Park, Illinois and had the possessory interest in the house located on 91st Street, Hinsdale, Illinois. From time to time Stimac demonstrated the ability to put together substantial sums of money in short periods of time.

The evidence reflects that Stimac has been dealing drugs since at least 1977. The evidence further reflects that Stimac has not been employed at any time in the last two years.

Consistent with his activities as a major drug dealer, the last United States income tax return filed by Stimac was for tax year 1976.

B. Robert George Burroughs

Burroughs involvement in this case evidences the fact that he, like Stimac, is an extremely intelligent man who has held no lawful employment over the past two years.

The evidence reflects that Burroughs was one of the main sources of Canadian Blue valium.

Burroughs criminal record reflects that over a period dating from 1968 to 1979, Burroughs has consistently been involved in transporting drugs, transporting firearms and has engaged in crimes of moral turpitude.

^{16/} In 1979 Miller was charged in Madison County, North Carolina with misdemeanor larceny along with a young man named Larry Duxtater who became an informant during that proceeding. Duxtater advised that Miller was a major participant in a drug ring in which Duxtater assisted. Duxtater had asked for protection from Miller and had volunteered his cooperation with the law. In March 1980, shortly after Duxtater agreed to cooperate, he disappeared. Duxtater has not been seen or heard from by anyone, including his family.

C. Allan Ray Hattaway

Allan Ray Hattaway frequently stated that he was a "hit man" and that he had murdered. Hattaway stated to several different witnesses that he has murdered by means of throwing others into the Ore Knob mine and disposing of bodies in wood chippers.

Aside from having two murder warrants pending against him for the murder of Gamboa and Forester, Hattaway is the subject of a Madison County North Carolina homicide investigation involving a man named Charles Tweed. Tweed was shot by a high powered rifle as he was leaving his house.

D. Marty Curran

Marty Curran's criminal record evidences that he is capable of extreme violence. Over the period 1976 through 1982, Curran's record reflects repeated encounters with the law arising out of his unlawful possession of firearms and his propensities toward violence.

The Government's evidence reflects that Curran is a man who is blindly devoted to the Outlaws' organization. The Outlaws is an organization whose basic tenants include the advocacy of physical violence and the abdication of membership in a lawful society.

E. Gary Miller

Gary Miller has admitted to several Government witnesses that he was the major cocaine and marijuana dealer in western North Carolina.

The Government's evidence reflects that he has from time to time possessed substantial sums of cocaine. Moreover, a witness has turned over "business records" which reflect that in a mere six month period Miller's participation in dealing marijuana resulted in revenues of \$971,400. Miller's cocaine trafficking during this period was even more lucrative. Moreover, Miller also distributed methamphetamine (crank) and Canadian Blues. (Exh. 59).

CONCLUSION

The Government respectfully submits that each of the defendants has demonstrated that singularly each is a danger to society. When it is considered that these defendants are significant participants in a sinister criminal association, it is plain that these men pose a substantial risk to a free and lawful society.

Accordingly, the Government urges that the defendants be imprisoned for a substantial period of time.

Respectfully submitted,

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TESTIMONY OF MS. CALLAHAN

The CHAIRMAN. Would the witness raise your hand.

The testimony you give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Ms. CALLAHAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Callahan, was the reputation of the Outlaws' motorcycle gang known to you at the time you were kidnaped? What was the extent of that knowledge?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was aware of what the Outlaws were, that they were a motorcycle gang. I knew that they were a national organization, that they had chapters all over the United States and that they were involved in illegal activities such as drugs, theft, counterfeiting, numerous activities such as that.

KIDNAPED IN ASHEVILLE, N.C.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you living when you were kidnaped?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Asheville, N.C.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Outlaws motorcycle gang operate in that city?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I am not quite positive if there was a chapter. There were Outlaws living there, but I don't think they had a chapter there.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you kidnaped?

Ms. CALLAHAN. In Asheville, N.C.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to tell us now just what happened to you from the time you were kidnaped on?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Briefly?

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell your own story in your own words of what happened to you from the time you were kidnaped.

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was living with Tommy Forrester, and he had been purchasing drugs and borrowing money from Allen Ray Hattaway who was a member of the Outlaws motorcycle gang. He also bought quantities of drugs for Gary Miller, who was also convicted.

Tommy owed both of them a sum of money that he had told me was \$1,500. He had Allen Ray Hattaway's motorcycle. The reason he told me he had the motorcycle was over a debt.

I had went next door to get something to eat. When I returned to the motel where Tommy and I were living, there were three guys at the door. I knew all three. One was Gary Miller, one was Allen Ray Hattaway, and one was Jay Fagel.

I sensed something was wrong and it was too late for me to run, so they busted in the door, went in the room, they pistol whipped my boyfriend, searched both of us.

They had Mr. Fagel who was the third man. But he was there unwillingly. They had his 8-year-old son in the truck outside.

They had told Mr. Fagel that if he tried to call the police or do anything that they would kill his 8-year-old son. So, Mr. Fagel was going along with them.

Then later we got into the truck. We went to a drive-in where Mr. Fagel and his son got out and they departed. Tommy and I were then transferred into a Cordoba.

From there, we went into Tennessee, cut back into North Carolina. We ended up at Paul Thayer's house, which is in Boone, N.C., somewhere in that area.

At that point they said that we were going to, both of us, talk to some people about seeing if Tommy and I both could live, if we could work out an arrangement to where we could live.

They blindfolded both of us and gagged us, put us in a truck. Took us up a dirt road. At that point, they said that Tommy was going in to talk to some people and see if he could work out an arrangement to where he could live. Then I would go next.

So, Tommy got out of the truck with Allen Ray Hattaway and Paul Wilson and I stayed in the truck with Gary Miller.

The CHAIRMAN. Tommy is your boyfriend?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Tommy was my boyfriend. That was the last time that I saw Tommy. While they were gone, Gary Miller asked me if I would rather stay and take my chances with Tommy. He explained to me—he said, "If you stay, it's 50-50. If Tommy lives, you live. If he dies, you die, or you can go to Chicago on your own." So, I said, "I'll go to Chicago."

Earlier Tommy had said to me, he had said, "No matter what happens, you do what you have to do to stay alive, because I'm a dead man. They're going to kill me anyway." There wasn't nothing he could do.

So, when they said, "Make a choice," I said, "I'll go to Chicago." At that point we left and went to Chicago.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they say why they were taking you to Chicago?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was to work as a prostitute to pay off the money that Tommy owed them.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Ms. CALLAHAN. We arrived in Chicago late on a Sunday night. We checked into a motel where 1 day or 2 days later, I met a guy by the name of Marty. At the time I didn't know his name. His name now is Martin Curren.

I met him. I was told to engage in sex with him, which I did. At this time, he showed me—he had a .357 revolver. At all times they all had guns.

Later on he left, then a couple of days later I met Westside, who is Thomas Stimac.

I was, at that point—we were in a different motel. Allen Ray Hattaway instructed me to come over, strip off, and turn around so that Mr. Stimac could view me, which I did as I was told. When they told me to go back to the bathroom, I did. They talked. I did not hear what they were talking about.

The next day, Mr. Stimac returned to pick me up. When I got in the car with him, there was another guy by the name Snoopy. I got in the car with them. They then dropped me and Snoopy off at a motel. I stayed there that night with Snoopy.

Then we were picked up the next day by Westside. We went to his house in Hinsdale, which was a very nice residential house. There I met his old lady, Tony Summers. Then later on Mr. Curren returned.

He picked me up, took me to a place over in Indiana, which they referred to as the Flats. There at that place we stayed for 5 days. It

was a probationary house. These were guys that wore T-shirts that said "Probate Outlaws." They were becoming members of the Outlaws, but they had to go through a probationary period.

Marty was overseer. He had to see that they did everything right before they were granted the colors.

So, that is where I went. I stayed there for 5 days. While I was there, they had what appeared to me to be machineguns, AR-15 model type guns.

They went out and target practiced. They target practiced inside the house. They drank. They had cocaine. They had Canadian blues, various narcotics, marihuana.

After that, I returned to the Hinsdale house, to Mr. Stimac's house in Hinsdale. I stayed there until Christmas night, when I went to Mr. Stimac's mother's house, where we were having Christmas dinner.

They all had their guns with them and their colors on that night.

We had dinner there. She showed us Christmas cards that her son had sent that had an insignia of the Outlaws on the front of the Christmas card, and had a saying inside, I do not really recall. It was some kind of vulgar statement.

From there we went over to another women by the name of Ma Burrito who was the mother of John Klines, referred to as Burrito. I was told at that point that Burrito had a girl friend that had witnessed a murder, and they had wanted her dead because she was going to testify against the people that had murdered the girl.

So, she and Burrito were supposed to be going to a party, and she had declined at the last minute, and Burrito was driving the truck, which blew up and he was dead.

From there I then was left with Mr. Stimac where we went to an X-rated motel where various things happen.

Mr. SHORT. You are referring to sexual activities here rather than illegal activities at the motel?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Sexual and illegal—

The CHAIRMAN. Just carry on. I have got to leave and vote. Mr. Short will continue the questioning.

Ms. CALLAHAN. Sexual and illegal.

Mr. SHORT. I am referring here to drugs, specifically.

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes; the use of drugs.

After we left the motel, we went back to the Hinsdale house. Then within a couple of days, everybody came and said that there was something going down. Marty and Snoopy had what appeared to be automatic weapons.

Mr. SHORT. Did you know what they were referring to at that time?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Only what Ms. Summers told me.

Mr. SHORT. What did she tell you?

Ms. CALLAHAN. She told me that there had been a threat on Westside's life, and Westside had on his bulletproof vest, and the other two were carrying automatics or what I thought were automatics, then they all had their pistols.

They said we were going to have to get out, because something was coming down. At that point, I left with Ms. Summers to another apartment.

Then later on, Marty came, picked me up at that apartment. We went back to the Hinsdale house. At the Hinsdale house a couple of days later another guy came over and wired Westside's car with an alarm system.

At that point, Marty said that we were going over to Westside's other house, which he had another house in Indian Head Park, and we were going to be staying there and watching the house for a few days.

We went to that house. On the day that we went to that house, he told me—he and Westside said that I was to make a call to North Carolina to the police and I was to tell them that I hadn't been kidnaped, that nobody had bothered me, that I was there on my own free will. I was not to tell them where I was at. I was supposed to try and find out who they were holding for kidnaping me.

Although they knew it was Gary Miller, I was supposed to try and get the cops to tell me, but I was not to mention Gary's name.

So, I went and I made the call. The first call I did not get through. It was the next day before I got through which was, I believe, the 7th.

Mr. SHORT. Did you have free access to the telephone at that time or was someone watching you?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was told to never use the phone, never answer it, never touch it. I made the call. Mr. Curren stood beside me, listened in. I had done as I was told on the phone.

All the time I wanted to try and say, you know, "I have been kidnaped, help me," but what can I do when there is a guy standing beside me, 6'4" with a .357.

So, the only chance I had was—the officer asked me if I had ever been referred by any other name as Darlene, and I said, "No." At the time I knew he was looking for the name Rose. I had on occasions worked as a CI.

Mr. SHORT. Would you explain CI?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Confidential informant. I had used the name of Rose, well that was the only thing I felt I could grasp upon was to say, "No, I had no other name."

Well, then the call was made. I was supposed to call back. I went to call back. I got cut off when I called back, and Marty made a remark that he was tired of putting money in and trying to call the police down there.

He later told me they were only holding Gary Miller for questioning and that he had been released and for me not to worry about it.

We went back to the Indian Head Park house, stayed there until the end of January, I think the 22d, something like that, when he took me to a motel. He left me. Told me he would be back in a couple of hours.

Up to this point I had not been left alone, except on occasion when I first arrived in Chicago. He said he would be back in a couple of hours, so I sat there. He never returned. Well, the next morning about 10 o'clock, I get a phone call and he says, "Oh, are you still there?" I said, "Yes." He said, "I will be by in a few minutes."

So, he came by and he acted sort of mad that I was still there. Then he took me and got me something to eat, dropped me back off

at the motel and again he said he would be back in a couple of hours.

He did not return until the next morning when he picked me up, which was the 25th, on Monday.

We then circled around. I did not know exactly where we were, but from the direction we were taking, I knew we were going in circles.

We ended up at a bar, and he got about \$40 in quarters and he was putting them in the phone booth. Well, he kept placing long distance calls, using the change.

Then Westside and Snoopy came in. Well, both of them, they did not even pay me any attention at all. It was just like I was not there. They talked with Marty, and it seemed like they were in conversation about something important and they walked to where I could not hear.

Then Marty come back and got me, took me to another motel and said he had rented the room for 1 week. He dropped me off. That time he gave me some money. I believe now it was \$20 he gave me.

He said, "When you get hungry, go next door and get you something to eat. I have got to go up to Milwaukee and make a delivery. When I get back, I'll see you." So, I said, "OK."

So, after he left, I waited about an hour. All this time they had kept telling me I—they would let me call my mother. I kept saying, "My mother is going to be worried about me. I would just like to call and let her know I'm alive."

They had kept saying, "Yes, we'll let you call," but everytime I would ask, they would put it off and say, "Well it has to be made from a pay phone." There was always an excuse.

So, I said, "Well, he's gone, I'm going to call my mother anyway."

So, I went. I called my—first of all, I called Gary Miller, because he had given me his number and said that if I ever had any questions to call him. So, I called. Gary's wife said he was down the road.

So, I hung up. I called my mother, because—the reason I called Gary first of all was I did not want to do anything that would make him mad at me. I did not want him to kill me.

Mr. SHORT. Did you feel any sympathy for the gang at that time? Did you sympathize with any of their activities up to that point?

Ms. CALLAHAN. No; I hadn't sympathized. I just wanted to stay alive. I called my mother and at this point, I did not know Tommy was dead. I thought Tommy was still alive.

My mother said did I know that Tommy was dead, that they were pulling his body up out of the mine, and I said, "No." When she said that, it was just like, you know, there was no use anymore, so I just called the FBI.

Mr. SHORT. You called the FBI after your mother had informed you that your boyfriend had been killed. Where did they actually find the body? Do you know?

[No response.]

Mr. SHORT. Just take a few minutes to compose yourself. It is all right.

Ms. CALLAHAN. In Ash County, N.C. It is close to North Wilksboro. It is in North Carolina. That is where they—they found the body at the bottom of the mine.

Mr. SHORT. At the bottom of a mine shaft. Now, had he been killed ahead of time or do you know what actually transpired?

Ms. CALLAHAN. From what I had been told from the autopsy reports, he was pushed in alive.

Mr. SHORT. He was thrown in the mine shaft alive?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. During this time, I understand, you thought that he was still alive and you were waiting on him to come and rescue you. Is that correct?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was hoping so, yes.

Mr. SHORT. After you contacted the FBI, what transpired? Did the agents come over and pick you up then?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Well, I talked with the FBI and they sent the Brookfield Police to pick me up. I did not call the local police, because when I was at Mr. Stimac's house one afternoon, he had got dressed up in a suit—see, Mr. Stimac does not look like a typical biker. He does not have the long hair and the beard and all that. He is very well dressed.

If he had on a suit and he was sitting right there, he would go along. He was all dressed up and made the comment that he was going out to dinner with the chief of police of Lyons, which is a suburb of Chicago.

Mr. SHORT. Did he indicate whether that was a legitimate visit with the chief of police or did he indicate that there was some ulterior motive behind his visit?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I don't know.

Mr. SHORT. So, you do not know if the chief of police was involved in any way in any form of illegal activity?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I just know he was going out to dinner with him. But that was enough for me. I did not want to talk to any policeman that he had anything to do with, so I called the FBI.

Then they told me that the local police would be picking me up, and I told them about what I had heard about him having dinner with the chief of police, and they said not to worry, that they had ordered them to pick me up, so they would take very good care of me.

I stayed in their custody until Thursday, when an FBI agent from North Carolina and Captain Beaver, who was with the Asheville Police Department came to pick me up, because I would not talk to any of those officers. I did not know them. I did not trust them. I told them that I would not talk to anyone unless I knew them.

They waited until the officers from North Carolina arrived there and when I gave them the statement.

At that time, I was very afraid. I would not tell them their names. I told them I did not really know who it was that had kidnapped me.

After I returned to North Carolina and visited with my family and got over it a little bit more, I later gave a statement in which I gave a full account.

I returned to where I grew up which is Maggie Valley, N.C., and stayed for 1 month. During that time I thought about it, and there were rumors spread around, threats against my life.

I decided that my life was already on the line. They were going to kill me because they knew I knew too much. So, I said, "Well, all I can do is hope for the best," and go to the law and hope that the law can help me.

So, at that point—I had met Mr. Miller previously and he had asked me if I would testify in the grand jury. I told him that I would have to have time to think about it, that it was a big step.

So, at that point, I called up Mr. Miller and said, "I'm ready to testify. I will testify for you." At that point he got me into the grand jury maybe 1 week later. I testified at the grand jury and then the last of April, he got me into the witness program.

Mr. SHORT. Were the individuals convicted that you testified against?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes; they were.

Mr. SHORT. Do you know the sentence that they received?

Ms. CALLAHAN. They are due to be sentenced next week.

Mr. SHORT. Are they incarcerated at this time or are they out on parole? Do you know?

Ms. CALLAHAN. They are incarcerated.

Mr. SHORT. So, you are presently in the witness protection program, because you were a victim of the Outlaw motorcycle gang?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHORT. You were a prostitute in North Carolina—you were told that you were going to be taken to Chicago for the purpose of prostitution. Did you turn out while in Chicago? Did you become involved in prostitution when you got to Chicago?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Well, see, when I got to Chicago, I had no ID, because they had left everything at home—you know, in our motel room.

Well, Mr. Stimac and Marty talked to me and they said had I ever danced, because most of the biker girls they danced and work as a prostitute both. I said, "No," that I had never danced.

They said, "Well, would you mind dancing?" Well, at this point I was trying to please them. I wanted to live.

Mr. SHORT. You had an option?

Ms. CALLAHAN. No; I did not have an option. They did not ask me. I just said, "Well, I would rather not dance," you know, like that. I did not say, "I won't dance." I just said I'd rather not dance.

So, they said, "Well, we will see what we can do. We can probably get you in on the circuits." Westside said he would check out a couple of places.

Mr. SHORT. Did you know at that time what the circuit meant?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Would you explain to the committee what was meant by circuit.

Ms. CALLAHAN. The circuit is hotels and houses across the country which are owned and operated by the Mafia, where prostitutes work out of.

The house normally gets 40 to 50 percent of the girls' money. That is what a circuit is.

Mr. SHORT. You never actually entered the circuit. Is that correct?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I had worked—I worked one hotel that was run by the circuit, yes.

Mr. SHORT. But not in Chicago, or was that in Chicago?

Ms. CALLAHAN. No; it wasn't in Chicago.

Mr. SHORT. Where was the location of the hotel?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Wichita, Kans.

Mr. SHORT. Go ahead. I interrupted you at the point where you were discussing the circuit.

Ms. CALLAHAN. I did not have any identification, so Marty had gotten some ID and he gave it to me and it said, Julianne Alverado. He told me that I was to carry this ID. If we were stopped, I would show it to the police and tell them that that was who I was.

He said that I was to use that until he could line up a better ID.

At a later point he did take me to another guy's house where the guy had some blank Texas driver's licenses, and the guy was going to have somebody fill in the typing and all the print and make out new ID for me, fake ID.

Mr. Stimac and Marty both told me that when they got me the ID, then I would be put in the circuit, so in case I was arrested, I would have ID to where they couldn't run a check on me.

I am not aware if they were aware that I had been fingerprinted at the time. I never told them. Part of me, I hoped—I kept thinking if I do get busted with this fake ID, then they will fingerprint me and find out who I really am. I just kept hoping for that and that never happened.

So, Westside, he told me—he said that when I went to work all my money—I wouldn't get to keep anything, that I have to give him all of it, and that if I needed anything, he would buy it, like clothing, anything like that, that he would look after me.

Well, I didn't make any objections. I didn't ask any questions. Allen Ray Hattaway had already told me that—on the way up, he said, "I'm taking you and leaving you with some friends." They were with Outlaws.

He said, "When, I leave you there, don't ask no questions. Keep your mouth shut and do as you're told and you'll stay alive."

He said, "If you try to make any trouble, you'll end up in a Dempster Dumpster. I am not just talking about Outlaws. I'm talking about the mob."

So, I never asked questions. I just did what they told me.

Mr. SHORT. You were not personally aware of any connection between the Outlaws and the Mafia other than just what you had been told. Is that right?

Ms. CALLAHAN. By anyone?

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

Ms. CALLAHAN. Just other than the things I had been told. I had never seen anybody meet with—

Mr. SHORT. You did not observe any meetings between known Mafia figures and Outlaw motorcycle gang members?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I wouldn't have known them if I had.

Mr. SHORT. During this time, were you ever physically abused or threatened—

Ms. CALLAHAN. When they came to the motel, Tommy and I both were physically removed from the motel. I didn't want to go. I knew that—I was hoping that I would not be dead, but I was afraid that I was going to be killed.

So, yes, I was.

Mr. SHORT. But later on, when you arrived in Chicago, was there any physical abuse at that time?

Ms. CALLAHAN. There was always the presence of the gun. Then there was sexual abuse.

Mr. SHORT. Now, this took place then with a number of individuals. I believe Mr. Vita stated in his opening remarks that you were forced to engage in a variety of sexual activities with various members of the Outlaws as well as one of their old ladies. This occurred while in Chicago. Is that correct?

Ms. CALLAHAN. While in Chicago and on the way to Chicago.

Mr. SHORT. When you first arrived in Chicago, they left you alone at one point. Why didn't you try to escape then?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Because Allen Ray Hattaway said, "If you try to run or get to the police, we will find you no matter where you are. If you do get away, and the police hide you out, we'll kill your mother and we'll kill your sister." He said, "We'll kill Tommy." I did not want anybody else getting killed. I was not going to endanger anybody else's life.

As they left, Gary Miller looked at me and he said, "It goes without saying, you don't leave this room." Well, they had took the piece off the phone, so I never tried to leave. I never even tried to look out the window. Where would I have went to? Sure, I could have called the police. What was I going to do and then my mother and sister would be blown away. I did not want that.

Mr. SHORT. Have there been any attempts on your life? Any actual attempts that you are aware of?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I have been told, subsequent to this trial, that, yes, there have been attempts made on my life, and there have been contracts took out on my life.

Mr. SHORT. You are in danger at this time?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes; they would like to see me dead.

Mr. SHORT. Just to clarify one point, you mentioned the Flats. What are the Flats?

Ms. CALLAHAN. It is a house in Michigan City, Ind. At the time I was there, it was a probate group of bikers that were becoming Outlaws, members of the Outlaws.

Mr. SHORT. Approximately how many probate members were there?

Ms. CALLAHAN. About 12. They did not have their colors and they wore T-shirts that said, "God Forgives, Outlaws Don't." Things of that nature, but they did not have the leather and the skull, like you see over there. [Indicating.]

Mr. SHORT. The red cross bones and skull?

Ms. CALLAHAN. That is correct.

Mr. SHORT. Did it have the other insignia or just—

Ms. CALLAHAN. You don't have a picture of the—yes, the one up there. [Indicating.]

They said, "Property of the Outlaws," and then the Probationary Outlaws.

Mr. SHORT. Were you ever awarded any colors at all?

Ms. CALLAHAN. No, sir.

Mr. SHORT. This house then was used for probationary members. Is that correct?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Was it in a vicinity where it could be seen by others, or was it in a remote location?

Ms. CALLAHAN. It was in a remote location.

Mr. SHORT. Did anything of particular significance happen while you were at that location?

Ms. CALLAHAN. While I was there, the guys, they had those guns that looked like AR-15's, automatic-type weapons. They went out and target practiced on some silos there.

There was the use of cocaine, marihuana. They had a refrigerator with beer. They had their own well-stocked bar, which you paid so much for a drink. You could buy food there.

There was one other girl there with me at the time. Her name was Kevvy. She looked about 15 years old, 15-16 years old. She was the girlfriend of one of the guys. To me she appeared to come from a well-off family. She did not appear to be poor. She was not ignorant.

She was, I believe, taken advantage of by these guys. She enjoyed going out and getting high, which they furnished her with.

The last time I saw Kevvy, she was still with the guy. I do not know where she is at at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know her name?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Just Kevvy.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have to give it in public, but we would like to get her name in executive session if you really know her real name.

Ms. CALLAHAN. That is all I know is her first name.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Ms. CALLAHAN. While I was—

The CHAIRMAN. You said this girl was only 15 years old?

Ms. CALLAHAN. She appeared to me to be 15-16 years old.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had she been there? How old was she when she came with the gang?

Ms. CALLAHAN. She had only been there for about 6 months. I met another young girl, which I believe at the time she was 16 maybe 17. I do not recall her name. She did say she was from Louisville. She was dancing in Chicago at the Club Algiers, and she was living with an Outlaw by the name of Hitler.

She also was, as I said, very young, and appeared to be well-educated, not from a poor family. At the Flats, I also met a guy by the name of—what I knew him by was Fabe. I later learned his name was Fabian. He told me that he was going to law school to be a lawyer, which I later found out he was, but while he was—while I was there, in my presence, I saw him do cocaine. I saw him with his colors on, by that I mean the jacket that said, "Chicago Outlaws."

He seemed to me to be like the lawyer to the whole bunch. He advised them on numerous things. When they had a little problem, he would tell them what was best to do, things of that nature.

Also at the Flats, while I was there, the men were inside one night and there were some rats, some field mice running around, and they got out the gun and target practiced inside the house, shooting at these rats.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any effort made at any time to take pictures of you, especially if you were undressed?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes, sir, there were.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they do with those pictures? What was the purpose of taking them. Did Mr. Stimac take these pictures?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes, Mr. Stimac.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consent to it?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I did not say, yes, and I did not say, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You were afraid not to go along?

Ms. CALLAHAN. I was afraid I would end up dead and I wanted to stay alive, so I did what they told me. Mr. Stimac took the pictures at the Sybaris Motel on Christmas night, the 25th, until early morning of the 26th.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the purpose of taking those pictures? What did they do with those pictures?

Ms. CALLAHAN. Mr. Stimac would take the pictures of various women and sell them.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is he now?

Ms. CALLAHAN. He is in jail, awaiting sentencing.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just received a letter here from the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club, 525 Manning Street, Charleston, S.C., dated March 2, 1983, enclosing a clipping from the News and Courier dated Thursday, February 24, 1983.

The heading of the clipping is, "Alleged Outlaw Bikers Grilled by Lawmakers," the first paragraph of which reads, "The Senate Committee sought information in vain, Wednesday, from two reputed members of what Senator Strom Thurmond contends is an Outlaw motorcycle group with operations in Aiken."

I think that hearing was before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate under the Government Operations Committee. However, along with that clipping came this letter [reading]:

Senator Strom Thurmond: Sir, this letter is being sent to you concerning the article that appeared in the Post-Courier newspaper, Thursday, February 24th.

The article written by reporter, Mary Glass, titled, "Alleged Outlaw Bikers Grilled by Lawmakers" is the one we are talking about. The Thunderguards of Charleston were named along with the Hell's Angels of Charleston as being on the list of reputed dangerous motorcycle gangs.

We think it is slanderous to us and our reputation to be named as such especially when there is nothing on record to justify our name being included on such a list. We have been operating in the Charleston area for 7 years and have never been on the outside of the law. There is no record of us being involved in any unlawful activities. All of the members work every day on legal jobs and the club is our hobby and past time. There is a long list of community activities that we are a part of, but we don't think it is necessary to go into that right now.

We believe our name was included because we are active in the area and not because we are dangerous or a gang.

Since this article with information from you and FBI has been made public with our name included, we feel it is no more than right for you to issue another statement clearing our name from any wrongdoing and removing our name from your list and your investigation.

We cannot afford to sit around and wait for something to happen. Therefore, we are taking steps to do our part to make sure that this article has not and will not tarnish our name and our standing in this community.

We shall carry on our activities and await your reply. Respectfully, Gregory C. Sumpter, of the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club.

What the article referred to was the result of a hearing by another committee. However, I want to say to these people we expect to investigate, any illegal activities of motorcycle gangs regardless of who they are or where they are or where they are located—and there will be no intimidation of me so far as I am concerned. I expect to bring out the facts for the good of the public and for the Congress.

If there has been any error made in any way against any people, that can be corrected. I do not think there has been any error made by this committee and I am not familiar with what went on in the other committee.

Is there anything else you want to tell the committee before we excuse you?

Ms. CALLAHAN. No, sir, I would just like to thank Mr. Miller. If it wasn't for him, I would not be here, because I did not have the nerve to get up here before and I would like to thank you for your patience.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we want to express our appreciation for your appearance here and telling us your story. Thank you very much.

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You are now excused. Mr. Miller, I want to thank you for accompanying her. We appreciate that.

Now, we will clear the room for the next witness.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken to clear the room and bring in the next witness.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. If you will stand and be sworn.

The testimony you give in this hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. OPIE. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES OPIE AND MS. BARBARA OPIE

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witnesses are James and Barbara Opie. Barbara Opie is a former "old lady" of several Outlaw motorcycle gang members who associated with the Bannees, Conquistadors, and Bandidos motorcycle gangs.

Barbara's father was a member of both the Conquistadors and later the Bandidos motorcycle gangs and had old ladies working as prostitutes in Texas.

Barbara started using drugs on her 11th birthday. As an old lady, Barbara worked as a topless and nude dancer. She accompanied the gangs on group runs in various parts of the country.

The first man she was an old lady for is serving time in prison for rape. The second man she was an old lady for, James Opie, was a past officer of the Shreveport, La., chapter of the Bandidos motorcycle gang and operated a topless bar in Texas.

James and Barbara are now married and have become very active in the church, speaking out against the biker life and drugs. We want to welcome you here and thank you for your appearance.

Mr. Opie, would you just tell us the story of how you first got connected with these gangs and from then on, just bring us up to date as briefly as you can.

Mr. OPIE. OK, my brother was in the service. When he got back from Vietnam, he bought a bike and got involved in a small bike group over by Fort Hood. This is while he was still in the service. This is my identical twin brother.

Then he met some bikers in San Antonio that later became the Bandidos, a different bike club, and at this time, he had never met a Bandido, but he came back to Louisiana on vacation from time to time from Fort Hood.

I eventually bought a bike. When he got out of the service, we just started riding around together. I was working at Western Electric, and I met a former Bandido who was out there who had been a member of the Shreveport chapter 4 years prior to this, and I started hanging out with him.

I ended up riding to Houston with him to talk to the Bandidos down there to see about starting another chapter in Shreveport.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to bring us up to date?

Mr. SHORT. Basically, as to your duties as president of the Shreveport chapter.

Mr. OPIE. Well, for about the first 2 years I was a Bandido, I wasn't a president. I wasn't really even an officer. I think I became vice president and then David Wall got out of prison, and he took over the chapter, and later on he became a national officer, and I became president of our chapter.

As far as the Bandido organization, at that point in time, the president was just in charge of—he appointed his own officers, as far as sergeant at arms, secretary, treasurer. He was in charge of meetings, when you had a meeting, and he had the last say as far as your chapters goes.

We worked pretty much on a vote. I'm talking about my chapter. I can tell you exactly what we did in my chapter, and we nearly always worked on a vote of the membership to see what we wanted to do, but when I was president, I always had the last word on anything.

I had to make decisions on what to do in certain areas like if somebody went to jail or something, it was pretty much left up to me to tell everybody what to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Opie, how does a person become a national officer in the Bandidos? Are the officers elected?

Mr. OPIE. They are not elected. The only time I ever remember us having an election is when our national president got convicted of murder and then we had—his vice president became president and we had one election to see who we wanted for national president—other than that the national president, well, he appoints who he wants as his national officers as far as secretary and treasurer and sergeant at arms.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he elected by the rest of the members?

Mr. OPIE. Once we had a national officer—the whole time I was in there there is no election. He is just it.

The CHAIRMAN. How does he first get in? What does he do to get in to start with?

Mr. OPIE. Well, the whole time I was in there there was only two and after Don Chambers went to prison, then the national vice president just immediately became president and he was appointed by Don Chambers, so nobody really disputed it.

A couple of years later or so, we had an election, because somebody wanted this guy or that. Somebody wanted to be president, so they put in their bid and got some support from this chapter and that chapter.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as president of your chapter, what were your duties and responsibilities?

Mr. OPIE. Principally, just to make fast decisions on what to do in certain cases, and to give pretty much—just be a boss. Unless we were in a meeting where we were discussing something, what I said went. If I told somebody to do something, we did it right there. If we were out on the street or out on a run or if I told the members of my chapter that we needed to do something in certain circumstances then that's what we did. I had the last word on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Opie, while a member of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, were there any wars or territorial disputes with other gangs and, if so, would you please explain?

Mr. OPIE. Well, to answer it right off the bat, yes, they were continually in wars with other gangs. But when I first became a Bandido, we were what we call—we were partying with the Pagans. We were on friendly terms with them and they were in Houston.

And then something came down in Houston. Usually it broke out, just like Butch had said earlier, just—you get in fight, two different clubs get in a fight, in a bar, bragging about their club or something, and the next thing you know we were at war with the Pagans.

And, so, they moved out of Houston and moved back into what we considered their area over on the east coast.

And since the time I've been in, we have been at war with the Outlaws and then about the time I was getting out, we were friendly with the Outlaws. We would party with the Outlaws, and the same with the Hell's Angels. On and off, depending on one stupid incident or somebody that was drunk started a fight with another club or something and you end up with a war.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it jealousy between two gangs or among gangs where more than one gang operated in the city for instance?

Mr. OPIE. If they were in what we considered our cities, like in the south, or we were in their's we were there as guests. You did not start a chapter. You didn't try to crank up your group in their territory. There was a definite animosity toward that kind of stuff.

Like, if I went to California to party with them, that would be fine. But if I ever was to try to start a Bandido chapter in their area, it could get real sticky. The same with them when they came into what we considered our areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the country divided into territories and was it understood that one gang would have this State or so many States, and other gangs other areas?

Mr. OPIE. I don't ever remember us having—we would party with the Pagans and the Angels and the national officers got together. But I don't ever remember them having a meeting that says, "Look, here's how we're going to divide this up."

As far as the major organizations, the major clubs getting together and sitting down and saying—it just so happened that the Bandidos happened to be in the south according to your map—you've got that chart up there, and that's where they started and the Hell's Angels started and they just sort of grew up over there.

But there was never any meeting that I can ever think of where Outlaw national officers got together with the different clubs and said, "This is ours, let's divide this all up and we'll do it."

They just decided that they were going to grow up in that area and they were going to keep it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever involved in any arsons or bombings for the members of the Bandidos?

Mr. OPIE. I firebombed another little club once that came over and shot my house up, and then I set one bomb on a go-go joint, but it never went off.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever served time in prison?

Mr. OPIE. No, sir.

CONTRACT MURDERS

The CHAIRMAN. Were you ever involved in any way in any contract murders while a member of the Bandidos?

Mr. OPIE. Yes; I was arrested in 1972 on a first-degree murder charge and later released as a material witness, but the murder itself was a contract murder.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Opie, I understand that while a Bandido, you owned a club where Bandido old ladies worked as nude dancers. Where did the money these women earned go and what was it used for?

Mr. OPIE. First of all, I would like to clear that up. I never owned a club. I ran a club for another Bandido who owned a business. The Bandidos, as an organization, did not own any clubs when I was in.

One Bandido who owned a novelty company—and he owned that business and a couple of bars in Corpus Christi. Now, I managed a bar for him. And as far as the other party—the other question about the Bandido old ladies, yes, we worked them. That was part of the idea of making the club work, so we could work our gals and make money within our own organization.

The CHAIRMAN. Did prostitution activities go on there?

Mr. OPIE. If they went on there, it was strictly against our rules and regulations of the club. If any of the gals that danced for us—it was a topless club. It wasn't a nude club. And if any of the gals in there—we had strict regulations. We gave every girl a sheet of our rules for working in our club and if they were caught in soliciting for prostitution, we would fire them.

If they were caught by us. I'm not going to say that they never did it. And I'm not going to say they didn't because I don't know. If I didn't catch them, I wouldn't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Opie, how heavily were Bandido motorcycle gang members involved in the retail liquor business while you were a member?

Mr. OPIE. Very little. I only knew one person that was, in Corpus Christi, the man we ran the bars for when I was a Bandido. Now, I have been out for nearly 5 years now. But when I was working,

there was just one person who owned retail liquor businesses, such as clubs.

The CHAIRMAN. How many old ladies did you have as a Bandido and what was expected of them?

Mr. OPIE. Generally, I just had one. At one point, when I lived in El Paso, I had as many as three. They were expected to go to work and bring me home their money.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by work?

Mr. OPIE. Go to work in the clubs where I set it up for them to work. I only ran one. I was only in the retail business for about the last year that I was in the club. I used to just take a gal and I would work her in a club or I would work with a club owner like I did in El Paso, and I would make an agreement with him to work girls and I would get girls for him.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what part did illicit drugs play in a biker's way of life?

Mr. OPIE. Well, myself, personally, I was always doing drugs. There wasn't a day that went by that I didn't do drugs. It is just a part of the way of life.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of the business?

Mr. OPIE. No. When I was in—now, I am sure there were bikers selling drugs, Bandidos selling drugs, but as far as me having any knowledge of any wholesale production or distribution on an organized level, you know, there might be a Bandido in this town that would be dealing a little bit of drugs or one over here, and I would get some drugs from him, some marihuana, something like that.

But as far as just wholesale organized operations of drug sales or production, I knew of none as a Bandido on any large scale.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in your business, did you sell or distribute drugs?

Mr. OPIE. Alcohol. Only alcohol.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what part did guns and explosives play in the biker way of life?

Mr. OPIE. Well, being at war all the time, you had to keep yourself armed, because—well, we just—

The CHAIRMAN. When you say at war, do you mean with other gangs?

Mr. OPIE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at war with anybody else or just with motorcycle gangs?

Mr. OPIE. I personally was at war myself and my chapter, not as the Bandido motorcycle gang, but myself, personally, I took on a grudge against some nightclub owners in Bolger City. But I never did it as a club, a Bandido thing. They wouldn't let us in their clubs, and so I just—because we always got in the clubs and tore them up and stuff.

The CHAIRMAN. You had guns and explosives?

Mr. OPIE. I always had guns, but not much explosives, maybe in the way of a firebomb, and one time I got some dynamite and built a bomb that didn't go off.

The CHAIRMAN. Which law enforcement group did you fear the most as a Bandido gang member?

Mr. OPIE. I didn't fear any law enforcement at all until I started making big money, and then the people that were involved in

money were the ones I feared because it seemed like to me they always got the—when the cook got so rich and so greedy that he kept stashing that cash back—we started making big money in Corpus Christi then. That was starting to be a fear that IRS or whoever it was that checked out all your income.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Opie, do you consider the outlaw motorcycle gangs to be a threat to our society?

Mr. OPIE. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are you no longer involved in the Bandidos?

Mr. OPIE. Because in May of 1978 I gave my life to the Lord, Jesus Christ and walked away from it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I would like to ask Mrs. Opie a few questions. Mrs. Opie, how and when did you become associated with the Bandidos?

Mrs. OPIE. The first time I met my father I was—now, you read on there that my father was a member of the Bandidos motorcycle gang and he was, but I was given up for adoption at birth, and my grandparents raised me. My grandfather was a psychiatrist and my grandmother was a housewife.

And I was raised by them until the time that they were both deceased. I was 11 years old. And when I was 12 years old I went to find my real father.

And when I met him, the day I met him, he pulled up in a car, and he had five women in the car with him, and he wasn't wearing a motorcycle jacket or anything. He was wearing a suit. And I found out he was a Bandido and he was also a pimp and that these were women that worked for him as prostitutes. And that was the first time I was ever involved with a motorcycle gang.

Off and on after that, I stayed with my real dad for 2 weeks, and he got arrested in Lubbock, and I was arrested also there for possession of marihuana. He handed me his marihuana and told me to take it, because he knew that he would be thrown in prison if he was caught with it.

And, so, I took it and they found it and I received a probated sentence.

My family that was—that remained from my adopted family did not know what to do with me. They did not know quite how to deal with me, because I had become so involved in drugs that they stuck me in mental hospitals and they hired a psychiatrist—

The CHAIRMAN. Which family are you talking about?

Mrs. OPIE. My aunts and uncles who are essentially my brothers and sisters. They did not know what to do with me, so they tried to help me the only way they knew how, and that was through psychiatric help and treatment.

But by the time I was 16 I was in a half-way house and it wasn't working. I just could not seem to stay away from doing drugs. I ran away from the half-way house with a guy that belonged to a small motorcycle gang in Houston and he did not want to work, and I remembered that my dad's old ladies would go to work, and they earned a lot of money, I told him, "Well, I remember how my dad made a birth certificate, so I'll make a birth certificate."

You just take white paper ink, and you blot out all the dates and you run it through a copying machine a couple of times, so it

comes out looking blank and you type in what you want, and then you run it through a couple more times so it looks original.

And, so, I made me a birth certificate, because I was only 16 and I went and started working as a stripper in Houston, and I made a whole lot of money, and that satisfied my husband. He was my husband. We had gotten married.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as a stripper, did you strip completely or just partially?

Mrs. OPIE. Completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mrs. OPIE. We got married because his dad said I could not stay there unless we were married. So, we got married and it did not work out and I left and I was living in an apartment and a girl came, and she was staying with me and her—the boyfriend that she had left to come stay with me was crazy. He was an ex-convict.

He came and kicked in my apartment door and he tore up my whole apartment, and, so, I went down to a bar where I knew the Bandidos hanged out at. Because I remembered my dad was a Bandido. Maybe I could find one of them that would help me.

And there was a Bandido prospect in that bar that said he would come stay with me and he would help me, and he came and he stayed over at the house and he told me to tell everybody that I was his old lady.

And, so, I did. You know, that seemed safe. I knew that that guy would never come back if he knew that there were Bandidos staying with me.

So, he stayed with me and I met another guy that was a Bandido. He wasn't a prospect. And he was the kind of guy that parents don't ever want their daughters to meet.

And he was really good looking and he wore all kinds of diamonds and he drove a big car and he was a Bandido, and he just sort of—I was swept off my feet by him, and I went ahead with him, which got me in trouble. I didn't get in real big trouble with the president who had the guy that was a prospect. I didn't get in real big trouble, but they got mad at me because I went and left their prospect and went with another Bandido member.

But I stayed with him and he committed some aggravated rapes in San Antonio, which he is serving time for right now. And they let him out on bail in San Antonio, and we went back to Houston and the policemen surrounded the house one night and they kicked in the door.

They came running in. They took him to jail and Jim, who was called Clumsey then, came into town the next day and he told me we would go visit Chilite in jail and then he would take me back to El Paso with him.

So, I said, "Fine." By then I was scared to death of Chilite. He just scared me after I saw what happened to the girls.

So, I went with Jim to El Paso after I saw Chilite and he said it was OK. And so I was with Jim from then on.

PROPERTY COLORS

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the property colors which some old ladies wear and did you ever wear them?

Mrs. OPIE. Yes, sir, I am familiar with them and yes, sir, I did wear them. His chapter—the old ladies weren't allowed property colors or property belts. They got property belts also that aren't just the patch, but there is a belt also that you can wear.

I had a property belt, and then when I was Chilite's old lady, there was another old lady there that was his wife, and she had the property colors.

When she ran away from him and left, she left, ran off and left with a sugar daddy, I inherited the property colors. So, yes, I know what they are.

It just signifies that you're the property—instead of a second old lady or something, you are property of that specific Bandido and the other Bandidos cannot misuse you sexually or physically, because you are property.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your property colors—the other Bandidos will leave you alone because that signifies that you belong to one man?

Mrs. OPIE. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Opie, does a biker usually have more than one old lady?

Mrs. OPIE. It depends. There are some bikers that have as many as five and then there are some that restrict themselves to just one.

It is hard to say. It is hard to categorize, because so many guys are different. There a lot of them that just do not get serious and they will keep a lot of them to keep a lot of money coming in.

Then there are some that will get kind of serious and just have one. Because obviously, if you are really serious about each other or you really like each other, another woman just does not fit in well.

But if it is just a guy who just does not really care about the girls, he will usually have more than one.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Opie, were you ever required to act as a prostitute while you were an old lady for the Bandidos?

Mrs. OPIE. My first old man I turned tricks for, but it was not anything like—I did not go stay in a hotel and you know—I had specific sugar daddies that just really liked me and I liked them and I would sleep with them for money.

But after I became his old lady, I never tricked. He would not allow me to turn tricks.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you required to make a certain amount of money while working as a nude dancer?

Mrs. OPIE. When I was a nude dancer for my first old man in Houston, I had to make \$150 every night. When I became Jim's old lady and I was not a nude dancer and I was not prostituting, the amount fell to \$50 a night as a topless dancer, but, yes, I was required to make a certain amount of money.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the girls who were dancing in the club with you also Bandido old ladies, and, if so, where did the money they earned go? Where did your money go that you earned?

Mrs. OPIE. Every bit of money that I ever earned went directly to my old man. The money that the other girls—some of the girls were Bandido old ladies and some of them weren't.

The club in Houston was a mixture of different women. Almost all the women, though, regardless of whether they were biker old ladies or not, they gave all their money to some man.

I never knew a girl in one of those bars that did not give her money, all of it, to some man, whether he was a biker or whether he was there or—

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do with your money?

Mrs. OPIE. I gave it all to the man who was protecting me and taking care of me.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you did not earn the required amount?

Mrs. OPIE. I always did. I just did not ever want to take that chance.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you had not earned the amount they expected you to, then what would have happened?

Mrs. OPIE. I would have probably got beat up. Not by Jim so much. See, Jim and I kind of fell in love and I don't think he would have hurt me.

The first old man that I had, he beat me up on other occasions, so I know that it would not have been any different. I would have gotten beat up.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the first Bandido you were an old lady for is in prison on charges of aggravated rape. What kind of individual was he and how did he treat you?

Mrs. OPIE. That is the fellow I told you about, Chilite. They called him Chilite the Fox, just because in slang terms Fox was just somebody that was really good looking and really smooth talking.

And at first he just sort of swept me off my feet. And at that point, I became probably addicted to drugs. I had always messed around with drugs and I always used—especially LSD frequently—but I became addicted to a drug called THC that was just really heavily trafficked around Houston.

And he held me in sort of a fear type pattern. He was OK. He could do all the drugs that he wanted to and he was fine until he started drinking. And when he would start drinking he would just go completely crazy.

And when we were at work, the girls, and we saw that he had come into the club, if he started drinking, we would become terrified, because he would just commit terrible acts of violence when he was drinking.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, his liquor and his drugs would not mix?

Mrs. OPIE. Well, his problem was just plain liquor. Even if he was not doing drugs, just when he drank. And I knew a couple of Bandidos that were that way. Just as soon as they started drinking, you just needed to find a place to get away from them.

And he threw an ashtray at me one time from across the room. I was so loaded I couldn't even move, I was just sitting there. And he threw an ashtray at me because I wasn't up making sure that the other guys had plenty of stuff to drink, and he broke my front tooth. And it was only because he was drinking.

That is the kind of guy he was. He was all right at first, and then we kind of got into a trap and we became held there by fear.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the THC you are referring to a derivative of marihuana?

Mrs. OPIE. It is a derivative of marihuana and I do not know what chemical additives it has in it. But it is so strong and it is a hallucinogen, although it is not as strong as LSD.

It is a mind-altering drug and it causes extreme states of anxiety. You get real paranoid and you become afraid and you want to isolate yourself.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you become Mr. Opie's old lady?

Mrs. OPIE. When Chilite went to jail—after they came and arrested him again in Houston—because I guess he had jumped bond—Jim came to town and he told me that I would go with him. He would call me his old lady and I could work in El Paso and nobody would bother me, and so I said all right.

I was in that type of lifestyle because I wanted to be. I was never forced into anything. And I had options. I really did. I always had a good option and a secure option background that I could fall back on. He did not force me to go with him. I wanted to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how is it that you are no longer an old lady for the Bandidos?

Mrs. OPIE. Well, I realized that I was on a road that I could not get off of myself. I was either going to end up overdosing myself with drugs, which I had tried to do on several occasions, just take so much that I would never come back down, or I was going nowhere. I would either get killed somehow, because I was always in trouble for my mouth.

I have always thought that I was intelligent and I never failed to let anybody know and it usually got me in pretty big trouble around some of those guys, so I would have either been dead or killed myself and I did not have a way out.

And, like Jim, I met Jesus as my personal savior and everything just changed. My whole life has changed. I have had a new start. I have had a new beginning, and I am no longer bound by anything. I am just free, not free in the term of a hippy-type free. I feel a peace inside myself that I do not have to look for anything to fulfill any desires in my heart because the Lord has fulfilled all those desires.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Opie, do you consider the Outlaw motorcycle gang members a threat to our society and could you explain why you do?

Mrs. OPIE. I feel that they are, because there are children being born into that type of situation, and I feel that it is detrimental, that there should not be children born in that type of situation, but I also am very much against an abortion-type situation also.

I feel that our society has basically degenerated so far, that there are so many things that threaten the American home, that threaten the American family, and Bandido motorcycle gangs, or Pagan motorcycle gangs, or Outlaws, or Hell's Angels are only a part of the things that threaten our society.

But, yes, I do think that they do.

The CHAIRMAN. Aside from the danger to children, do you consider their use of drugs, and violence a threat to our society?

Mrs. OPIE. I feel like most of the teenagers that become involved with them come somewhat from the same type of background that I do. They are runaways from home. Their home life was not a life that they felt secure in.

They were unhappy, whether they were physically abused or not. I was never physically abused as a child. I had everything that money could buy, because my father was very wealthy in Houston.

I feel like kids that grow up—

The CHAIRMAN. When you speak about your father, are you speaking about your—

Mrs. OPIE. My psychiatrist—my grandfather that raised me, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that your grandfather raised you?

Mrs. OPIE. Yes. I feel like teenagers when they're lonely and they're lost and they're looking for someone to care for them, they will accept it from whatever point of view it comes in. All these big boom growths of these satanic churches and the Jim Jones thing, the Bandido motorcycle gangs, the other motorcycle gangs, there are kids out there and they are lonely and they are hurting and they are turning toward something that will give them security.

And they will turn toward motorcycle gangs for security; they see those guys as being really strong, as being able to protect them, and they will turn toward—especially a female, because they see it as a different type of lifestyle and an exciting type of lifestyle and they do not realize at all what they are getting involved in, until they become so involved with drugs that they don't care.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want to express my appreciation to both of you, Mr. and Mrs. Opie, and I want to congratulate you for changing your lifestyle. I believe you are now good church members. Is that right?

Mrs. OPIE. And when we talk about the church, we do not mean a meeting of some Bandido or Hell's Angels gang meeting, we mean a real church to worship Jesus.

The CHAIRMAN. What church do you belong to?

Mrs. OPIE. We belong to Broadmore Assembly of God in Shreveport, La.

The CHAIRMAN. We commend you for your change of lifestyle. You have two children now?

Mrs. OPIE. Two little girls.

The CHAIRMAN. We know that you are bringing them up in the right way.

Mrs. OPIE. Yes, sir, we will.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again for your appearance here and the contribution that you made to this hearing.

Mr. OPIE. Could I just say one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. OPIE. As Allan Spence had told me when he called me on the phone that one of the main purposes of this whole thing is to warn the American people what is going on and what they are facing with that, and I would just like to make one statement for the record that the whole time I was a Bandido I never worked and I think it only fair to tell the American people that they are supporting every Outlaw motorcycle gang. It is their money that is keeping them in business.

I never worked. I made my money off of the American people. And legitimate business is what I am talking about.

And if the American people continue to support alcohol, topless dancing, prostitution, then it is going to be next to impossible for these fellows to stop these organizations, because that is where the

money is coming from. It is coming straight from the American people in a willing—I mean they are willing to get out and give it to them.

Everybody that graces the door of a topless club can almost bet he is putting dollars in some biker's pocket.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the members of these motorcycle gangs are really parasites on society. Is that what you mean?

Mr. OPIE. Absolutely. And the reason I wanted to say is because I believe that most Americans do not realize what that money is going to. Everyone who ever left my bar left as dopey as anybody I ever saw on drugs and we had his money. His family did not get it. We got it.

And they need to know, the unsuspecting ones that are going in there for entertainment and stuff—and that may be their reason, but they can just about bet that everytime they grace a topless bar or massage parlor and other legal businesses such as that—pornography that is legal in some places—they can just about bet that they are putting some money in some Outlaw's pocket. They are putting it in big.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Anything else that you would like to say, Mrs. Opie?

Mrs. OPIE. No. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you again for your appearance. I believe that completes the witnesses today and the committee now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the committee meeting was adjourned.]

[Letter from Chairman Strom Thurmond was subsequently supplied for the record.]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C., March 23, 1983.

Mr. GREGORY C. SUMPTER,
Thunderguards Motorcycle Club,
Charleston, S.C.

DEAR MR. SUMPTER: After receiving your letter of March 3, 1983, in which you claimed that the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club had been incorrectly included on a list of "dangerous motorcycle gangs" in the United States, I immediately instructed the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee to conduct a full, thorough, and complete investigation to determine if the list was in error.

My staff has completed that investigation, and it concludes that your organization was incorrectly included on the Government's list of "dangerous motorcycle gangs." The information I now have concludes that your club has not been engaged in illegal activities and as such, constitutes no danger to the Charleston community. Based on that information, I instructed federal law enforcement officials to begin an immediate inquiry to determine if your organization had been incorrectly included on the list of "dangerous motorcycle gangs." As you may know, that list was compiled by federal law enforcement officials. In my letter, I specifically asked that the name of the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club be removed from that list unless the Government could provide firm evidence contrary to the findings of the Judiciary Committee's own investigation.

I took those steps to ensure that your organization is publicly and formally exonerated, and that the name of the Thunderguards Motorcycle Club be removed from any list, internal memoranda, and any and all other documents related to outlaw "dangerous motorcycle clubs."

I also asked that federal law enforcement officials take immediate steps to ensure that mistakes like this one never occur again. I have been told by federal law enforcement officials that your organization was incorrectly included on the list of "dangerous motorcycle gangs," and they have also informed me that they have removed the club's name from that list.

I appreciate your taking the time to write me on this important issue since the purpose of the organized crime hearings now before the Judiciary Committee is to obtain the truth. In this matter, I was happy to be of assistance, and I am including this letter and information I have from federal law enforcement officials, which fully exonerates the Thunderguards, in the official record of proceedings of the Judiciary Committee's ongoing hearings on organized crime.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee.

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