

"TAKING A BITE OUT OF CRIME":
THE IMPACT OF A MASS MEDIA
CRIME PREVENTION CAMPAIGN

Volume I: The Narrative Report

University of Denver
Center for Mass Communications
Research and Policy

"TAKING A BITE OUT OF CRIME": THE IMPACT OF A MASS MEDIA CRIME PREVENTION CAMPAIGN

(Volume I: The Narrative Report)

by

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Abstract

This report addresses: (1) The impact of the Take a Bite Out of Crime national media campaign on citizen perceptions, attitudes and behaviors regarding crime prevention; and (2) How the findings from that evaluation may be applied toward strategies for subsequent communication efforts aimed at increasing citizen participation in crime prevention activities.

Recent studies of the impact of public information campaigns indicate they may have greater efficacy than the research of earlier decades had suggested. A previous study of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign's first phase suggested it was having modest levels of public impact. The present research provided a more elaborate design for investigating that campaign's impact two years after its inception.

The design included a national probability sample survey of 1,200 adults to determine overall citizen response to the campaign, and a three-city panel survey of 426 adults to assess changes in citizen crime prevention orientations as a function of exposure to the campaign over a two-year span.

The results of the surveys were analyzed in the context of citizens' general dispositions toward crime and its prevention, including their concern about crime; their beliefs and attitudes regarding crime prevention techniques; and their patterns of crime prevention activities.

Over half of the national sample said they had seen or heard at least one of the Take a Bite Out of Crime public service advertisements as of late 1981. Most of those people also indicated that they were favorably impressed by the ads, and a substantial portion reported that the ads had influenced some of their views and actions concerning crime prevention.

The findings suggest that the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on their taking of specific preventative actions.

Individuals exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases over those not exposed in how much they thought they knew about crime prevention; how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were; and how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime. The PSAs also appeared to have a strong impact on the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens. Exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized in televised PSAs. Particularly noteworthy were campaign-related increases in neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts.

While the campaign appeared to have significant effects on prevention orientations and activities for the sample as a whole, the distribution of those effects was by no means uniform across population subgroups. While in many instances the campaign seemed more effective among individuals already more competent in terms of prevention, it also appeared to stimulate substantial changes among less competent citizen subgroups as well.

In general, the rather scattershot nature of the campaign's dissemination appears to have resulted in a wide range of effects across an even wider range of people. Such differences in impact result from a host of interacting personal dispositions and social and environmental factors.

Based upon the research, several key issues need to be taken account of in designing subsequent communication strategies aimed at citizen-based crime prevention efforts. These include: (1) The salience of crime as an issue on the public agenda; (2) The importance of community-based prevention efforts; (3) The perplexing role of fear arousal in determining campaign effectiveness; (4) The role of formative research in campaign design; (5) The problem of audience targeting; and (6) The potential for the neglect of the elderly as an audience of such campaigns.

Insofar as the future progress of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign in particular is concerned, its sponsors and producers would do well to continue several things that appear to have been effective within the confines of public service advertising. Techniques are also needed which will keep the campaign--and the issue of crime prevention--fresh in the eyes of past and future audiences. More specific campaign goals need to be formulated as to what kinds of changes are optimal among particular citizen groups, and data-based criteria need to be established to determine the relative success of the campaign in meeting those goals.

Acknowledgements

Many conscientious individuals proved indispensable in the carrying out of this project. The authors particularly benefited from the numerous and productive insights provided by the members of the advisory group established to provide counsel on various phases of the study. The group consisted of Ms. Lynn Dixon, Office of Policy and Management, OJARS; Mr. Mac Gray, National Council on Crime and Delinquency; and Dr. Wesley Skogan, Department of Political Science and Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. A fourth member of the group, Dr. Paul Lavrakas, Medill School of Journalism and the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University, expended a special effort to share with us his extensive expertise in citizen-based crime prevention efforts.

We are also indebted for the additional consulting assistance ably provided by Dr. Jack McLeod, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison, and by Ms. Jenny Liu on computer programming issues. Ms. Elinor Hangley of The Advertising Council was most helpful in sharing her insights as campaign director with us, as was Mr. Scott Rossborough of Dancer Fitzgerald Sample, responsible for the creative portion of the media campaign.

Dr. Irving Crespi and his staff at The Roper Organization proved exceptionally capable in carrying out the survey field work, often under rather demanding conditions. We are of course immensely grateful to the more than 2,000 citizens who took the time and energy to serve as survey respondents, and who taught us so much about themselves.

The particularly conscientious monitoring of the project by Drs. Bernard Auchter, Lois Mock, and Fred Heinzelmann of the Community Crime Prevention Division, National Institute of Justice, is much appreciated. Their constructive reviews of our work and feedback over the length of the project, as well as their support and patience, were most welcome and productive.

Catherine Helmick and Kathy Bedell were very helpful as part-time student assistants on the project. We are especially grateful for the excellent secretarial and clerical support provided by Betty Whitmore and JoAnn Swierenga.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Citizen involvement in crime prevention activities has emerged as a critical issue in recent years as it has become more clear that such actions can play a key role in controlling the level of crime. As such, numerous efforts have been aimed at encouraging citizen participation in activities aimed at reducing their own risk of victimization, and those of others as well. One highly prominent effort has been the three-year-old "Take a Bite Out of Crime" national public information campaign, produced under the sponsorship of the Crime Prevention Coalition, with the cooperation of The Advertising Council.

This report addresses: (1) the impact of the Take a Bite Out of Crime national media campaign on citizen perceptions, attitudes and behaviors regarding crime prevention; and (2) the application of the findings of that evaluation toward strategies for subsequent communication efforts aimed at increasing citizen participation in crime prevention activities.

The study builds in part from a previous work carried out within a few months of the beginning of the campaign and reported in Public Communication and the Prevention of Crime: Evaluations and Strategies, funded under National Institute of Justice Grant No. 78NIAX0105.

Such research on crime prevention campaign effectiveness is important not only in its own right, but also in terms of being both complementary and supplemental to critical public policy research efforts concerned with such allied topics as citizens' fear of crime (cf. Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) and factors impinging upon citizen involvement in anti-crime behaviors

(cf. Lavrakas, 1980; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981). The research should also prove useful in facilitating key recommendations of Phase One of the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, notably including:

> "The Attorney General should exercise leadership in informing the American public about the extent of violent crime." (Recommendation 12); and
>
> "The Attorney General should direct responsible officials in appropriate branches of the Department of Justice to give priority to testing systematically programs to reduce violent crime and to inform state and local law enforcement officials and the public about effective programs." (Recommendation 15).

This investigation follows the overall pattern of the first study in that we will examine what kinds of people were exposed to the campaign materials; what uses they made of them; and what effects resulted.

More specifically, the approach is one of: (1) explicitly identifying meaningful patterns of exposure and attention to the campaign; (2) linking these exposure and attention patterns to relevant antecedent factors, including extensive demographic, sociological and psychological characteristics of audience members, as well as their orientations toward crime and crime prevention and relevant communication behaviors; and (3) examining the possible effects of the campaign both in and of themselves and as functions of their interactions with antecedent factors. The findings then serve as a basis for recommending strategies for subsequent crime prevention information campaigns.

The report begins with an overview of the uses of public service advertising campaigns to promote changes in citizen perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. The effectiveness of such campaigns is examined, particularly in the context of what is known about effects of media on individuals overall. The Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign is then described in detail, followed by a summary of the previous evaluations of it and a research plan for the present undertaking.

The research methodology for evaluating the campaign involved both a national probability sample of citizens to determine overall reactions to the campaign, and a three-city panel sample to measure changes in individuals as a consequence of the campaign. These are detailed in Chapter 3.

In order to provide a context for citizen reactions to the campaign, an examination of public orientations toward crime and its preventions, based upon the national sample survey, is presented in Chapter 4. As will be seen, such orientations are indeed complex, and the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens depends upon a milieu of interacting personal, social and environmental factors.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign after two years serves as the focus of Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, the national sample data are considered, and it will be seen that not only were over half of U.S. adults exposed to the media campaign, but also that substantial portions of people reacted favorably to it and reported that it had influenced their views and actions concerning crime prevention. The panel survey evaluation presented in Chapter 6 strongly supports the national survey findings and suggests that the campaign had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on the taking of specific preventative actions.

Finally, Chapter 7 considers the above findings in terms of what they have taught us about the efficacy of crime prevention information efforts in general, and suggests strategies for subsequent campaigns and for the future conduct of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign in particular.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Dr. Garrett J. O'Keefe, co-principal investigator, had overall responsibility for the study. In addition to managing the technical part of the project, he was responsible for developing and implementing the research design, measurement instruments, data analysis, and the writing of this report.

Dr. Harold Mendelsohn, co-principal investigator, actively participated in all research phases of the project. In addition, he was responsible for the writing of Chapter 4 of this report, dealing with citizen orientations toward crime and its prevention.

Dr. H. T. Spetnagel served as project manager in dealing with the business part of the study, and assisted in various substantive aspects of the project as well.

Kathaleen Reid-Nash, M.A., served as the principal research assistant on the project, with the major responsibility of assisting in data analysis for the length of the study. Acting as research assistants on various phases of the project were Elise Henry, M.A., Beth Rosenzweig, M.A., Catherine Helmick, and Kathy Bedell. Providing excellent secretarial support were Betty Whitmore and JoAnn Swierenga.

In addition to the project management group and staff, an advisory group was established to provide advice and counsel on critical phases of the study. The group consisted of: Ms. Lynn Dixon, Office of Policy and Management, OJARS; Mr. Mac Gray, National Council on Crime and Delinquency; Dr. Paul Lavrakas, Medill School of Journalism and the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University; and Dr. Wesley Skogan, Department of Political Science and Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. Additional consulting assistance was provided by Dr. Jack McLeod, School of Journalism and Mass

Communication, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ms. Jenny Liu also served as a consultant on computer programming. Ms. Elinor Hangley of The Advertising Council was particularly helpful in sharing her insights as campaign director with us.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Public information campaigns form a unique content area in American mass communications systems, and public service advertisements are typically their dominant form (Paisley, 1981). Public service advertisements or announcements (PSAs) are promotional materials which address problems assumed to be of general concern to citizens at large. PSAs typically attempt to increase public awareness of such problems and their possible solutions, and in many instances also try to affect public beliefs, attitudes, motivations and behaviors concerning them. Most PSAs emanate from non-profit or governmental organizations, and these usually receive gratis placement in broadcast and print media. The Advertising Council serves as something of a clearing house for many national public service ad campaigns, and enlists the services of major advertising companies to produce and distribute the ads while charging sponsoring groups for production costs only.

Those PSAs warranting free media placement are ordinarily relegated to status behind regular paid ads and are apt to appear only as space or time become available. Most televised PSAs, for example, run during the least watched viewing periods, while newspaper PSAs are rarely seen on the more heavily traveled pages. Competition between PSA sponsors for media placement is heavy, and many of the ads fail to be disseminated at all.

The ads of course reflect the individual concerns of their sponsors. Content analyses of televised PSAs in the early 1970s indicated that nearly half of them dealt with health or personal safety topics, including alcohol and drug abuse, medical check-ups and care, traffic safety, nutrition and the like

(Hanneman, McEwen and Coyne, 1973; Paletz, Pearson and Willis, 1977). Other ads were distributed over such subject areas as environmental concerns, community services, educational and occupational opportunities, and crime prevention.

THE TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME CAMPAIGN

The specific campaign under study is the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime public service advertising campaign, produced under the sponsorship of the Crime Prevention Coalition. The campaign has been running since December 1980, and has attained, by the Advertising Council's standards, an unusually high degree of gratis placement in the nation's media channels. The campaign is aimed at promoting citizen involvement in crime prevention efforts, mainly through increased burglary self-protection, and, most notably, through neighborhood cooperative efforts among citizens.

More specifically the campaign has four major objectives:

1) To change unwarranted feelings about crime and the criminal justice system, particularly those feelings of frustration and hopelessness.
2) To generate an individual sense of responsibility among citizens.
3) To encourage citizens, working within their communities and with local law enforcement, to take collective crime prevention action.
4) To enhance existing crime prevention programs at local, state and national levels.

Campaign Sponsorship

The Campaign is sponsored by the Crime Prevention Coalition--a group of 37 national non-profit membership organizations and 11 Federal agencies. The

Coalition's role is to provide overall guidance to the Campaign and to help promote it nationwide. The Coalition represents a partnership of business, labor, law enforcement, government and citizen groups in a common effort to prevent crime. It includes groups such as the National Association of Attorneys General, the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Association of Counties, and the Insurance Information Institute.

The Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics (OJARS) of the Department of Justice is the convener of the Coalition, coordinates the overall effort and is the principal source of funds. Under a grant from OJARS, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) provides Secretariat services to the Coalition.

The media portion of the campaign is under the auspices of The Advertising Council, Inc., a private, non-profit organization which conducts public service advertising in the public interest. Other Ad Council campaigns have included the American Red Cross, the United Negro College Fund, the JOBS program of the National Alliance of Businessmen, and the Smokey the Bear forest fire prevention program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. All Ad Council Campaigns are non-partisan politically, non-sectarian and non-commercial.

Development

Initial impetus for a national campaign came from discussions beginning in late 1977 between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (under the leadership of then director Clarence Kelly) and The Advertising Council. These discussions soon expanded to include the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, The National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the AFL-CIO.

LEAA (now OJARS) submitted a formal proposal to The Avertising Council in March of 1978, asking the Council to take on a major national media campaign on

crime prevention. This proposal spelled out the basic strategy: high quality public service advertising complemented by a comprehensive fulfillment effort of written materials, training and technical assistance. From the outset, it was clear that advertising alone would not be enough. Increased awareness would have to be matched by assistance to translate awareness into action.

Another basic element of the strategy was that the campaign would be a cooperative undertaking, sponsored by national organizations committed to crime prevention and wanting to participate. LEAA would provide the bulk of the funding, matched in part by funds donated by NCCD.

The Advertising Council, after rigorous screening, accepted the proposal in the Fall of 1978. Over the next 12 months a major effort was committed to developing campaign themes, objectives and materials. Two groups were formed to help with this process: a Response Management Group composed of representatives of such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Association of Retired Persons and the General Federation of Women's Clubs; and a Technical Working Group composed of state and local crime prevention practitioners. In addition, the volunteer advertising agency conducted field research.

The campaign was officially launched in early 1980, with the release of the first phase of public service advertising.

Campaign Strategy

The centerpiece of the campaign is a nationwide, multi-media effort that features a trench-coated, animated dog named McGruff. McGruff's job is to educate people about what they can do--from simple, common-sense steps like locking doors and windows to ways to watch out for neighbors. Public service ads produced by The Advertising Council appear on radio and TV, on outdoor

boards, on buses and subways, and in newspapers and magazines. The goal is that in time McGruff will be to crime prevention what Smokey the Bear has been to forest fire prevention--a widely recognized, popular symbol around which a wide range of state and local prevention activities can coalesce.

The campaign makes no claims that crime will be eradicated, only that some crimes can be prevented if more people get involved. Thus, the slogan is "Take a Bite Out of Crime."

The media advertising part of the campaign is complemented by support activities designed to provide more in-depth information and assistance. Printed materials are available consisting of a general booklet, "Take a Bite Out of Crime" (available in English and Spanish) and ten booklets on special topics such as rural crime, sexual assault, street crime, and senior citizens. In addition, training and technical assistance are provided by NCCD to help groups and businesses develop or improve their own crime prevention programs.

State and local agencies are encouraged to adapt the campaign to their own needs and activities. Campaign materials, the dog symbol and the "Take a Bite Out of Crime" slogan, may all be tailored to fit local programs. In California, for example, McGruff has been incorporated into a comprehensive state crime prevention program in the Attorney General's office. Local law enforcement agencies, such as the Portland Police Department, are also using the campaign to bolster their own efforts.

Involvement of corporate America is another key element of the campaign strategy. The nation's businesses and industries offer a promising avenue for educating employees and customers about crime prevention--both in the office and at home. Special ads have been prepared for the business press, and a business program development guide published. So far, these guides have been distributed to over 700 companies, and several large firms have initiated crime

prevention programs--companies such as SCM, New Jersey Bell, and Kansas City Power and Light.

Funding

The campaign depends heavily on volunteer resources. All creative work was donated by the volunteer ad agency (Dancer Fitzgerald Sample). All time and space were contributed as a public service by the media. Much of the promotional effort was through the volunteer work of criminal justice professionals and citizen and community leaders alike.

Federal funds have been used to pay for out-of-pocket production costs, development and distribution of booklets, and training and technical assistance support. Total annual federal costs have run about $1 million.

While Federal funds are necessary to sustain the campaign, the long-term goal is for the campaign to be increasingly independent of Federal financial support. In this regard, two strategies are being pursued. First, private corporations and foundations are being contacted not only as potential participants in the campaign, but also as potential contributors. Secondly, a licensing program has been established to oversee the commercial use of McGruff. Agreements have already been entered into with a leading toy manufacturer and a publishing house. Revenues from the licensing program may eventually underwrite a significant portion of the campaign costs, as is the case with the Smokey the Bear effort.

Impact

As of July 1981, media response to the campaign had been excellent. More than $100 million of documented time and space has been donated to date, making McGruff one of the most popular Ad Council campaigns.

About 1,000,000 booklets had been distributed free-of-charge in response to the ads. Another 250,000 had been distributed through the Government Printing Office. More than 100 requests had been received for negatives to use in reprinting the booklets locally. The Department of the Army printed 300,000 McGruff booklets for use in their programs.

A host of national, state and local programs have either been enhanced or initiated as a result of campaign activities. For example, New Jersey Bell has developed an employee training program; Arizona has launched a new statewide effort; and the Birmingham, Alabama, Police Department developed a local crime prevention awareness effort. At the national level, organizations like SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives) and the Insurance Information Institute have made crime prevention a priority. The response of law enforcement, business and citizen groups indicate the importance of the topic and the interest in the approach being used.

The Present Study

The study reported here was conducted following the first three phases of the campaign. The first phase focused on offering audiences tips about protecting homes and property. The second and third phases emphasized the importance of observing and reporting suspected criminal behavior and organizing neighborhood and local groups in support of various community crime prevention activities.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

While public service-oriented media campaign effects research has a long tradition going back to now-classic field studies of the 1940s and early 1950s, the area went through a period of relative dormancy until fairly recently. At least partly at the root of that dormant period in the late 1950s and 1960s were inferences from the previous research that media campaigns were apt to have few if any effects, and when they did occur they were likely to be among particular segments of the population who were primarily seeking reinforcement of their already existing attitudes and behaviors (cf. Star and Hughes, 1950; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947; Klapper, 1960). Such "limited effects" hypotheses were by no means peculiar to campaign research; indeed, early studies of media effects on such diverse activities as childhood socialization, aggressive behavior, and voting behavior generally reached the same kinds of conclusions.

However, research endeavors into these same areas over the past decade have led to substantially revised conceptions of the kinds of effects media are capable of having on individual and social behavior. Perhaps the two most notable examples have involved: (1) examinations of the effects of violent media portrayals on the aggressive behavior of audience members; and (2) the effects of political media content, especially during election campaigns, on citizens' political cognitions, attitudes and behaviors. In both instances, while the gravity and extent of the media influences are open to argument, the empirical evidence is clearly supportive of the media having the potential for doing more than simply reinforcing a psychological status quo among audience members.

The increased potential for media influence in contemporary society should not seem overly surprising. While the underlying social processes remain

largely open to inquiry, it is clear that mass media have taken a far more visible role as sources of information, and perhaps influence as well. The predominance and immediacy of television undeniably plays a part in all this, but also important are changes in the social and political structure of the society itself. For various reasons, social and political institutions and processes are not as stable as they appear to have been in the 1940s and 1950s. Greater geographic mobility, the changing makeup and role of family, and a lessening of the impact of traditional social ties and values, to name a few things, have perhaps led to somewhat greater reliance on more "impersonal" sources of information and influence, such as mass media.

Previous Campaign Research

While research on the persuasive effects of public information campaigns was in the forefront of the media studies of three decades ago, there have been only few and widely scattered efforts in recent years. Considering the enormous financial and time commitments given PSAs by both their producers and exhibitors, surprisingly little is known about who attends to them and even less about their possible influences. Our own previous study of PSA audiences (O'Keefe, Mendelsohn and Liu, 1981) indicated that PSAs have an attentive audience including good numbers of persons who believe them, find them helpful, and take certain kinds of actions as a result of having seen them. The makeup of the overall PSA audience varied at least in part with the medium on which the ads are presented. Those persons most regularly viewing television were the most likely to attend to televised PSAs. However, demographic and psychological factors to some extent discriminated among levels of PSA attendance. Women, for example, reported being more attentive to televised PSAs regardless of the extent of their exposure to television or their attention to product

commercials. They also tended to find PSAs more helpful. The data failed to reveal any consistent relationship between trust in people or government and orientations toward televised PSAs.

Well-planned and executed public information campaigns including PSAs as a main component often seem capable of triggering responses from at least some members of their target audiences. Two traditional indicators of such responses have been the volume of requests received for more information concerning an issue and the increase in financial contributions to sponsoring groups. Several successful national campaigns over the years based largely upon television PSAs have generated information requests numbering in the thousands per week over the short run, and even local campaign efforts can result in hundreds of such requests weekly. Of course, whether the recipients of that information are making use of it in any meaningful way is a largely unanswered question. However, the few rigorous empirical evaluations that have been carried out of the more consequential effects of such campaigns generally suggest minimal influences due to media components by themselves. It appears particularly difficult to effect change in such deep-rooted behavioral patterns as alcohol and drug abuse and cigarette smoking (Hanneman and McEwen, 1973; Schmeling and Wotring, 1976, 1980; O'Keefe, 1971; Atkin, 1979), although such attempts are not always fruitless (MacAlister, et al, 1980). Campaigns may enjoy more limited success in terms of increasing knowledge about some topics (Salcedo, Read, Evans and Kong, 1974) and attitude change may result under some conditions (Mendelsohn, 1973), particularly if non-media supports such as interpersonal communication channels are operative (Douglas, Westley and Chaffee, 1970).

However, Maccoby and Solomon (1981) present rather striking data illustrating the impact of PSAs combined with other media contents on knowledge

of and behavioral change concerning heart disease risk factors, regardless of interpersonal communication. They also point to the importance of considering the characteristics of community social structure in planning successful campaigns. Moreover, our own previous research on the early stage of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, indicates that the campaign had some success in generating concern among citizens about crime prevention, and in increasing the dispositions of those exposed to it to carry out more prevention-related activities. Concern about both crime and its prevention was particularly heightened among those who initially saw themselves more at risk from crime, including members of lower and working-to-middle class groups. Increased preventive activity was not necessarily greater among such individuals, however; those more inclined to act were found more among middle-income working class persons, particularly those with children in the home. Exposure to the ad in general was associated with greater likelihood of individuals seeing their neighborhoods as dangerous, and their property being more vulnerable.

General Perspectives From Media Effects Research

One difficulty found throughout both the earlier and more recent research on campaigns has been the lack of consistent conceptual or theoretical perspectives to guide problem development and design. While a full exploration of this issue is somewhat beyond the scope of the task at hand, it may be useful to consider some of the underlying issues from the point of view of their possible impact on media campaign policy decisions.

The intellectual history of the study of media effects in general over the decades may be seen as a conflict between two basic approaches to the study of human behavior: (1) the more psychologically based stimulus-response learning model of behavior; and (2) the more psychologically based functionalist model

of behavior. The learning model posits a much greater likelihood of media influence on individual behavior, assuming that messages are able to reach audiences with a fair amount of efficiency, that audiences attend to them, and that situational factors are present which allow the argued-for behavioral changes to occur. In the extreme, this behavioristic model sees audience members as rather helpless in refuting the power of media messages, especially when it is contrasted with the more sanguine functionalist approach.

Under this latter model, the media are seen as but one element in the totality of an individual's environment, and audience members are "free" to choose media messages in the service of their own goals and needs. Thus persuasive messages are less likely to have the desired influences on people. Rather, audience members' own previous psychological and social backgrounds; their basic predispositions vis a vis a given topic; their existing beliefs, attitudes and behaviors; are apt to interfere with the ability of a message to bring about meaningful changes. In the extreme, the functionalist view suggests that audiences are "all powerful" in their transactions with media, and are able to determine for themselves what they will or will not do with any and all media messages.

Obviously, pushing either of these two approaches to their limits in terms of either audience or media possessing ultimate power over the other is quite inappropriate to seeking an understanding of what media can do and how. Several decades of research on media effects have taught us that neither perspective is anything near being wholly warranted. However, it is important from a more pragmatic policy-related point of view to consider how often one or the other approach is implicitly assumed in the planning stages of public information dissemination efforts. On the one hand, one may hear arguments that any media usage is "money down the drain" because it is assumed to be

ineffectual. On the other, media dissemination may be highly advocated with the expectation that miraculous changes among audiences in the desired ways will occur overnight. A far more productive approach would be to do a step-by-step analysis of the issues to be communicated and the goals to be reached with the target audiences, and then determine what media dissemination can and cannot do, and if need be, how to best use the media.

As more data-centered evaluative studies continue to contradict the earlier limited effects-related hypotheses, more elaborate models will surely be developed. And, they are likely to be based upon assumptions that it is critical to investigate the contingencies under which different media messages result in different effects for different kinds of people under different circumstances and at different points in time. That is, media effects are unlikely to be found en masse, or to be attributable to any one set of factors. Rather, it may be more important to determine which factors are most operative in given communication situations involving given audiences.

The report on the previous study provided a rather extensive overview of many of the basic concepts which have been dealt with in campaign-related communication effects research over the years, including audience predispositions, selective exposure, reinforcement versus conversion effects, the use of fear appeals, the role of opinion leadership in information dissemination, and the like. Rather than repeat that effort here, we will deal with such topics as they become important in our reporting and interpretation of results later in this report.

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS MCGRUFF CAMPAIGN RESEARCH

The previous research focused on the opening four-month stage of the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign. Two separate audience

surveys were used to both evaluate the impact of the first stage of the campaign and to gather other appropriate data concerning crime prevention. One survey, conducted several months after the start of the campaign, was based on a national sample of adults and had the primary purpose of describing the scope of public exposure to the campaign and reactions to it by various kinds of individuals. The other survey entailed use of a two-stage panel design with a smaller and less generalizable sample, with interviews being conducted both prior to and several months after the campaign's onset. The main goal of the panel study was to obtain more objective and exacting measures of campaign exposure patterns and effects under an at least somewhat controlled situation.

The findings from the national and panel samples largely suggest that the campaign reached sizeable proportions of citizens (30% nationwide) in its opening stage, and that it had various kinds of effects on at least some of them. It seems clear from both sets of analyses that reported exposure to the McGruff advertisement was likelier among those persons who perceived themselves as being more "crime prone," particularly those from among lower socio-economic cohorts. Those exposed also appeared to be a group which ordinarily is relatively less concerned about crime prevention as a subject of interest. Thus, many of those reached seem to compose one justifiable target for such a campaign. Nationally, those reporting exposure were likelier to be males and younger persons, and individuals more attentive to public service advertisements overall. In the urban area panel samples, these characteristics were not as strongly apparent.

The campaign appeared most effective in generating concern about crime prevention, and in increasing the dispositions of those exposed to carry out more prevention-related activities. Concern about both crime and its prevention was particularly heightened among those who initially saw themselves

more at risk from crime, including members of lower and working-to-middle class groups. Increased preventive activity was not necessarily greater among such individuals, however; those more inclined to act were found more among middle-income working class persons, particularly among those with children in the home. Exposure to the ad was also associated with greater likelihood of persons seeing their neighborhoods as dangerous and their property as being more vulnerable to criminal activity.

Exposure to the early stages of the campaign did not appear influential in terms of affecting: (1) respondents' sense of personal responsibility for helping prevent crime; (2) their self-confidence about protecting themselves; (3) what they thought they knew overall about prevention techniques (although many noted having learned specific things about prevention); (4) how effective they thought specific prevention actions might be in preventing crime; or (5) their propensity to implement household security devices.

The research also suggested that citizens reporting exposure to the early stage McGruff campaign were somewhat different in makeup from those individuals who reported being more exposed to crime prevention messages overall. Those reporting more general exposure to prevention materials were marked primarily by greater overall media exposure, particularly PSAs and crime content, and they did not differ from those less exposed in terms of sex, age or education. Speculation was offered as to whether content, format or placement characteristics of the Take a Bite Out of Crime messages may have made them more amenable to the young, male and lesser educated. For example, the dog character may have been somewhat male-oriented or "macho" and/or the cartoon format may have appealed more to younger and lesser educated persons.

It was also found that persons who said they paid more <u>attention</u> to crime prevention messages included older persons, women, and those seeing themselves

more crime-prone. Thus, while exposure to such messages appears largely incidental and at any rate based primarily on media orientations, those individuals who pay the closest attention to such messages appear to compose a credible target audience for the content of such materials. The suggestion was offered that there may be a fair amount of inefficiency in crime prevention efforts if a main goal is to reach those audiences with the greatest need for such information, and who would apparently pay greater attention to it. To the extent that those most exposed differ from those most attentive, "waste" may exist within the diffusion process. It appears quite critical to audience "targeting" or "marketing" strategies to take into account such motivational constructs as citizens' perceived need for information about a topic.

Communication effects may in many ways be seen as resulting from interactions between audience motivations and exposure and attention patterns. As the case was particularly made here, those respondents affected by the campaign were likelier to have seen themselves as being in greater need of crime prevention information, as well as having some prior expectation that the campaign would have an influence on them.

The data summarized above are difficult to assess in terms of any absolute standard as to whether the campaign "succeeded" or not. Such decisions must rest in part on criteria established by the campaign producers and sponsors. (It should be noted, however, that the lack of consistent and formative research on such public service campaigns over the years, particularly in the crime prevention realm, serves as a rationale for our research efforts, which may well become a baseline for subsequent research.) But, surely the rate of reported exposure after only a few months, and the statistically significant yet at best modestly robust campaign effects found, are indicators of a noteworthy degree of success by any standard of public communication. What is

more important from both a theoretical and policy-making perspective is that the campaign did appear to reach respectable portions of the public across wide ranges of social and economic strata, the above-reported fluctuations between social groups notwithstanding. And, equally important in of themselves, are those between-group variations in exposure and influence, for they form a basis for more effective future prevention campaign strategies, designs and tactics, as denoted in the Phase One final report.

MCGRUFF AFTER TWO YEARS: A RESEARCH PLAN

The present research is aimed at: (1) examining the effectiveness of the two-year-old Take a Bite Out of Crime media campaign, and (2) applying the findings thereof toward strategies for more productive communication efforts directed at citizen crime prevention activities.

This investigation will follow the overall pattern of the first in that we will basically study what kinds of people were exposed to the campaign materials; what uses they made of them; and what results obtained.

Background

The data gathering for the present research effort was fielded approximately two years after the onset of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign. During the year and a half following the previous survey field work, the campaign moved through several successive stages, each with somewhat differing components and goals. Generally, the first stage was primarily concerned with disseminating messages emphasizing what individuals could do to protect their own property from criminal victimization. The second stage of the campaign focused more upon what citizens could do to protect their

neighbors' property and homes, and the third stage centered upon citizen use of community organizations to help prevent crime. A continuing theme in all phases has been emphasis on the McGruff character as a national symbol of crime prevention.

Given these developments, the present evaluative research effort aims to: (1) examine citizen exposure and reaction patterns to the various stages of the campaign over a two-year period; (2) investigate changes over time within specific citizen groups both previously exposed and unexposed to the campaign's initial stage; (3) generate and clarify hypotheses concerning the effects and consequences of broad-based long-term crime prevention campaigns on citizens; and (4) elaborate upon policies and strategies for the development of more effective subsequent public crime prevention campaigns.

Design Considerations

The general design utilized consisted of two parts: (1) a national survey sample of U.S. adults, primarily aimed at investigating the overall impact of the campaign; and (2) a longitudinal sample survey based upon re-interviews with a substantial portion of the respondents included in the Phase One panel survey, for the purpose of tracing changes in campaign exposure and reaction patterns. These designs are elaborated on in the methodology chapter.

Such longitudinal analyses allow many noteworthy conceptual and methodological additions to our previous work. For example, it will be possible to trace whether campaign effects on the group exposed a year and a half prior had deteriorated over the span, or whether perhaps subsequent repeated exposure to the campaign had intensified the nature of its influence. And, estimations can be made of what time points those previously unexposed picked up on the campaign (if at all), and how they responded as compared to

the group exposed earlier. Moreover, comparisons between the initial national sample and the new sample will allow for comprehensive trend analyses of citizen crime and crime prevention orientations, as well as attendant communication patterns.

Key Problem Areas

In addition, the project addresses several important issues left largely unexplained by the previous short-term study, including, for example:

1. A closer examination of the disparity between audiences for the early McGruff campaign and those of crime prevention messages in general, with focus upon whether this difference has continued over the subsequent course of the campaign. Could the McGruff campaign be consistently reaching groups relatively unexposed to other prevention campaign efforts, and if so, why? What would such a finding portend for future targeting of this particular campaign and other efforts?

2. Of what consequence is repeated exposure to the campaign, and what is the relationship between repeated exposure and degree of attention to various campaign components? We might expect, for example, that attention to specific messages would slacken off with repeated exposure over time, and we need to consider the impact of this on overall campaign effectiveness.

3. In the early stages, campaign exposure was found related to increased concern over crime and interest in prevention among the exposed sample overall, and particularly among those who initially saw themselves more at risk. However, preventive action-taking was likelier among more middle-income persons with perceptions of lesser risk. Thus we have the distinct possibility of the early campaign stimulating more concern or perhaps fear without concurrent action-taking among one subgroup, while motivating more action among another

subgroup. We will examine more closely the interactive factors underlying this difference and whether the successive stages of the campaign may have narrowed the gap between disposition and behavior across subgroups. It may be that greater emphasis on specific action-taking for specific subgroups in later campaign stages helped to narrow the gap between dispositions and behavior across various audiences.

4. Similarly, despite the previous findings just summarized, the campaign appeared ineffective in heightening among citizens a sense of personal responsibility for crime prevention, self confidence in protecting themselves, perceived prevention knowledge, or perceived effectiveness of prevention actions. We will therefore examine more specifically how these attitudes relate to concern or fear over crime, and to prevention activity, and examine the possible influence of successive campaign stages on those relationships.

Overall, the study provides a critical time-process dimension to ongoing prevention campaign scrutiny, and when incorporated with the previous work will allow replication of earlier findings, enhancing their reliability and potential for inference-building.

Generally, we will study what kinds of people were exposed to the campaign materials, what uses they made of them, and what results were obtained. The findings will serve as a basis for enhancing our campaign strategy recommendations.

The overall approach is one of: (1) more explicitly and definitively identifying meaningful patterns of exposure and attention to the campaign; (2) linking these exposure and attention patterns to relevant antecedent factors, including extensive demographic, sociological and psychological characteristics of audience members, as well as their orientations toward crime (e.g. fear) and crime prevention and relevant communication behaviors; and

(3) examining the possible effects and consequences of the campaign messages both in of themselves and as functions of their interactions with antecedent factors.

Our approach rests on an assumption that investigations of prevention campaigns, or of any purposive communication phenomenon, toward policy-related ends will be most productive in an explanatory way if it entails more than either: (1) only basic descriptions of audience types and functional requisites as related to campaign exposure; or (2) only possible outcomes of such exposure in terms of direct effects. Rather, at a minimum such research should include an interactive process approach containing all such components. The inclusion of such as assumption at the onset of the research should maximize the potential for developing fruitful models and hypotheses directed at crime prevention campaign strategies.

THE MCGRUFF CAMPAIGN AND CITIZEN PREVENTION COMPETENCE

The campaign in general, and the public service advertisements in particular, presented citizens with a rather diversified range of appeals, content areas, media formats, and suggestions for actions. Here, we will consider those crime prevention orientations and behaviors which the campaign would seem to have had the greatest potential for influencing during its first two years.

In the most general terms, we view the campaign as having been largely concerned with effecting increased citizen competence in helping to reduce crime. The term "prevention competence" serves as an organizing rubric encompassing several kinds of orientations and behaviors through which citizens may demonstrate their ability in the crime prevention arena. Prevention

competence is likely to increase among citizens to the extent that they:

(1) Are more fully aware of effective prevention techniques;

(2) Hold positive attitudes about the effectiveness of citizen-initiated prevention activities, and about their own responsibility for getting involved in prevention;

(3) Feel capable about carrying out actions themselves to reduce their chances of victimization;

(4) Are concerned about protecting themselves and others from crime; and

(5) Actually engage in actions aimed at reducing crime.

Thus prevention competence includes the same general constellation of dependent variables often found in communication effects and persuasion studies. With varying degrees of conceptual sophistication, persuasion is usually apt to be seen as at least a four-step process involving: (1) the building of awareness or knowledge; (2) the inducement of attitude change; (3) motivating individuals toward behavior by generating interest or concern; and (4) finally effecting behavioral change (cf. McGuire, 1969; Percy and Rossiter, 1980; Cialdini et al, 1981; Solomon, 1981).

While this sequence of potential campaign-induced events has a nice logic about it, rarely can even well-designed and carefully targeted media campaigns be expected to successfully induce changes on their own along all of the above dimensions. For one thing, the degree to which persuasion may occur is highly dependent upon existing audience dispositions concerning the topic or issue at hand. Some issues are simply more change-resistant than are others. And, when media campaigns in of themselves are effective to any degree, it is likelier to be in terms of providing increased knowledge or, perhaps, in changing attitudes. As Bandura (1977) has cogently theorized and as Farquhar et al (1977), Maccoby and Solomon (1981), and McAlister et al (1980) have

demonstrated empirically, people are more likely to act on information acquired from mass media sources when appropriate social and environmental supports are present. There are indeed several ambiguities and problems in interpreting the specific types of changes, and the processes underlying them, which may be influenced at least in part by public information campaigns.

Moreover, it is also possible that media messages may induce action-taking without necessarily effecting congruent cognitive or attitudinal changes. This would seem particularly true of actions requiring little rationalization, cost of effect (Ray, 1973).

It is also important to note that the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, particularly insofar as the PSAs are concerned, was aimed at "the public" in a highly diversified manner. A reasonable possibility exists that the campaign would have scattershot influences on various types of people depending upon their already existing orientations toward crime and prevention--perhaps simply informing some, changing selected attitudes in others, making still others more concerned, and perhaps triggering some into action. For example, if a particular citizen is already concerned about crime, and already feels that self-prevention techniques may be effective, the campaign may have provided information about specific prevention techniques and how to use them, prompting "action."

The primary purpose of the present research is to provide empirically based recommendations aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of public communications aimed at encouraging citizen crime prevention efforts. As such, the findings from the research described above are integrated into reasoned recommendations for effective communication strategies in subsequent crime prevention efforts.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The nature of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign presents several obstacles to well-controlled evaluation of its effects on citizens. The campaign in total incorporates the more obvious media campaign utilizing public service advertisements, and perhaps less obvious but potentially equally important community projects in hundreds of locales all over the U.S. The localized projects are highly diversified and dependent upon individual community needs and resources. The media campaign serves as something of an umbrella for these, providing a shared identity and rationale. Our concern in this study at this point is almost exclusively with the impact on the public-at-large of the media campaign. Nationwide, the public service advertisements were, as of November 1981, by far the most visible aspect of the campaign, and the aspect of it with the greatest potential for impact on citizens overall as of that time. (Only seven percent of respondents in the national sample, and 13 percent of the campaign-exposed respondents, were aware of community-based crime prevention activities based upon the campaign.)

The public service advertisement format renders placement of specific ads within specific locales over the country quite haphazard and dependent upon the willingness of media outlets to incorporate them as space and time permit. Moreover, the design of the campaign made no allowance for attempted dissemination of the PSAs in particular communities while withholding the messages from others, making classic "treatment versus control community" field experiment controls impossible. Thus our overall research effort is based upon the "next best" design options available: (1) The use of a national sample survey to determine the reach or penetration of the campaign over the nation as

a whole and within various kinds of citizen subgroups; and to examine citizen self-evaluations of the impact and effectiveness of the campaign; and (2) The incorporation of a panel survey in which respondents interviewed in 1979 prior to the campaign's release would be reinterviewed in 1981, for the purpose of examining changes in their crime prevention orientations and attempting to trace those to exposure to the campaign.

It is important to note that while such sample surveys have proven to be valid indicators of public opinion and behavior over the decades, the data are necessarily based upon individuals' self-reports of their own cognitions, attitudes and behaviors, and not upon more "objective" criteria.

THE 1981 NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY

The national sample design called for personal interviews to be completed with a probability sample of 1,200 persons aged 18 and over. On the basis of previous experience, reliability of performance and cost effectiveness, the Roper Organization was contracted to perform the sampling and field work, utilizing a questionnaire instrument designed by the Center for Mass Communication Research and Policy staff. Study Director for the Roper Organization was Dr. Irving Crespi.

Questionnaire Development. Questionnaire items were designed by the authors on the basis of their meeting the national sample research goals, their compatibility with the concurrent panel sample survey, and their compatibility with items used in the previous study. Initial drafts of the questionnaire were reviewed by NIJ staff and consultants to the project as well, which contributed to their improvement. The final draft was submitted to the Roper Organization in mid-October 1981. A listing of items by conceptual areas appears in Appendix A.

Roper conducted the pretesting October 23-25 in the New York metropolitan area, and some further minor revisions were made in the questionnaire.

Sampling. The population examined included national civilian non-institutionalized U.S. residents over age 17. A one-call quasi-probability sample design was employed, based upon Roper's master national probability sample of interviewing areas. The design exactly matched that of the 1980 national sample survey. The sample goal was 1,200 completed interviews.

At the first selection stage, 100 counties were chosen at random proportionate to population after all the counties in the nation had been stratified by population size within geographic regions.

At the second stage, cities and towns within the sample counties were drawn at random proportionate to population. Four blocks or segments were then drawn within each location. Where block statistics were available, blocks were drawn within the cities and towns at random proportionate to population. Where no block statistics were available, blocks or rural route segments were drawn at random.

A specific method of proceeding from the starting household was prescribed at the block (or route) level. Quotas for sex and age levels, as well as for employed women, were imposed in order to assure proper representation.

Interviewing Recruitment and Supervision. Interviewing was conducted by Roper's national staff of regularly employed personnel. The interviewers had extensive experience in administering both attitudinal and behavioral questions on a wide range of topics, including social issues and communication behavior. Their work was consistently monitored by the home office staff and regional managers. In addition, a sample of their work was systematically validated.

An interviewer's manual was prepared reviewing sampling procedures and providing special instructions where needed for the proper administration of

the questionnaire. Regional supervisors maintained close telephone contact to resolve any sampling or interviewing problems that arose in the course of the survey. Supervisors also provided weekly reports and field progress and completion rates.

Field Work. Interviewing was conducted during the period November 2 to 17, 1981. A total of 1,188 interviews were completed. The average time per interview was approximately 45 minutes. A demographic breakdown of the sample appears in Table 3-1, along with that of the 1980 sample. The two are highly comparable.

Analysis Preparation. The Roper Organization submitted data tapes from the survey, as well as their own marginal tabulations based on the data, to the Center's staff in early January 1982. The tapes were processed on the University of Denver Computing Center's Burroughs 6800 computer, and minor editing procedures were carried out to assure maximum utility of the data. All analyses presented and referred to below were carried out by CMCRP staff, typically using standard Statistical Package for the Social Sciences library programs.

Statistical Techniques. Most of the analyses presented in this report are based upon cross tabulations and correlations. The reliance upon cross tabulations is in keeping with the primarily descriptive theme of this report; that of delineating patterns of exposure and response to the Advertising Council crime prevention campaign as well as providing an overview of communication orientations of crime prevention-relevant social groups, and posing inferences more directly testable through the panel study analyses to follow. However, in many instances the task was an exploratory one in the sense of attempting to analyze numerous sets of variables in terms of their relative impacts upon prevention-related communication behavior. Thus,

multivariate correlational analyses were incorporated into several phases of the investigation. The appropriateness of such techniques, including multiple regression analysis, given the limitations of the data used below has been the source of some debate. Our view generally follows that of many social scientists who argue that the advantage in explanatory power and efficiency to be gained by use of such techniques override the theoretical risks involved of not always meeting some of the more stringent mathematical assumptions of the models. In any case, we have used the techniques here as primarily exploratory devices for the purposes of providing a clearer perspective on the relative power of prediction of rather complex sets of variables.

General Plan for Analysis. The overall strategy involved first identifying specific indicators of public reaction to the campaign, including simple measures of exposure and respondent self-reports of campaign effects. Then, emphasis turned to identifying the make-up of the exposed audiences in terms of their media patterns, demographics, psychological attributes, crime orientations and other relevant factors. The characteristics of individuals reporting having been affected by the campaign were then identified. More general profiles concerning crime prevention-related communication behaviors were also presented.

THE 1979-81 PANEL SAMPLE SURVEYS

Panel surveys, which involve interviewing the same respondents at more than one point in time, offer a primary advantage of allowing measurement of change over time in key variables of concern. In this case, application of a panel design allowed for measurement of respondents prior to the onset of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, and then re-measurement of those same respondents after the campaign had been fielded for some time. By asking

respondents in the second round of interviews whether they recalled having seen the campaign, the respondents can be divided into "campaign exposed" and "unexposed" groups. The two groups can then be compared in terms of the amount of change exhibited in the dependent variables of concern, e.g. crime prevention knowledge, attitudes, preventative behaviors, etc. The effectiveness of the campaign can then be empirically demonstrated by how much the exposed group has changed as compared with the unexposed group.

However, the process becomes somewhat more complicated if one assumes that other things in addition to the campaign may well have been going on "out there" which also could have brought about changes in the dependent variables. Especially problematical are events which may interact with the campaign to produce change when the campaign acting alone may not have. For example, persons who were criminally victimized during the course of the study may well pay greater attention to the campaign, and the combination of victimization and campaign exposure may produce much greater effects than the campaign alone would have. It becomes important therefore to attempt to at least analytically control for other factors or variables such as victimization which may be influencing changes in respondent orientations toward crime and crime prevention.

Thus panel designs are somewhat flawed in the ability to remove interactive "threats" to the external validity of the inferences based on them, most notably test interaction, when used in rigorous testing of hypotheses (cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 1979). However, they can be quite appropriate, as our previous research has demonstrated, in pointing to general trends insofar as campaign exposure and effectiveness are concerned. This is particularly true given the added advantage of comparing the

campaign-related changes found in the panel with respondents' own self-reports and interpretations from the national sample.

Panel designs can never provide a "perfect" picture of communication influences, but when used with the proper limitations in mind they can far surpass simple one-time survey designs in ferreting out objective indicators of communication induced changes.

It should also be noted that the main function of most panel designs, including this one, is to allow study of causal relationships among variables of interest, and not necessarily to allow clear generalizations of descriptive data from the samples to the populations from which they were drawn. That is, panel designs typically allow for inferences to be drawn about which factors may be influencing which others. But they are usually less useful in describing "how many" persons in any given population are doing this, that, or the other. Thus the design used here limits the sample to persons in three urban areas, chosen not so much for how well they represent other urban areas, but more for the sake of their ability to represent a wide range of variability in factors of concern to us. The national sample component of this study, on the other hand, provides more appropriate descriptive indicators of the impact of the McGruff campaign on U.S. society.

Our objective here was to provide a panel survey design which would maximize our ability to measure the influence of the McGruff campaign on a host of citizen orientations toward crime and crime prevention over a two-year period. In the previously reported study of this campaign, a probability sample of 1,049 adults was interviewed in the cities of Buffalo, Denver and Milwaukee in September of 1979, approximately three months prior to the beginning of campaign media placement. Approximately half of those were re-interviewed in April of 1980 in order to assess the impact of the campaign's

earliest stage. The general plan for the current study was to attempt to re-interview as many as possible of the original 1,049 respondents after a two-year period to examine the longer term effectiveness of the McGruff campaign.

The 1979 Survey

The original 1979 design called for personal interviews to be conducted with a probability sample of 1,050 persons over age 17 drawn proportionately from three U.S. metropolitan areas.

On the basis of previous experience, reliability of performance and cost effectiveness, Research Services, Inc. was contracted to perform the sampling and field work, utilizing a questionnaire developed by the Center for Mass Communication Research and Policy staff. Study Director for Research Services was John Emery, president of the organization, assisted by Ruby Standage as Field Director.

Questionnaire Development. Questionnaire items were developed by the authors according to the criteria of their assisting in meeting the research goals envisioned for the panel survey phase of the study; their compatibility with the concurrent 1980 national sample study; and their comparability with previous crime prevention-related survey efforts. Initial drafts of the questionnaire were reviewed by the LEAA project monitors. The final draft of the first wave survey questionnaire was pretested by Research Services in Denver during the first week of September 1979. Three experienced interviewers conducted ten pretest interviews each, for a total of 30. The interviewers were debriefed by Research Services and CMCRP staff members, and some further relatively minor modifications were made in the instrument. A listing of items by conceptual areas appears in Appendix A.

Sampling. The population examined included civilian non-institutional persons aged 18 and over, residing in the Buffalo, Denver and Milwaukee metropolitan areas. The three locales were chosen to provide diversity in regional characteristics and crime rate profiles, while assuring an adequate media mix for an at least potentially moderate distribution of the initial McGruff campaign materials. (It should be noted that at the time of site selection, and indeed throughout the project, there was no way of determining which locales across the country might have greater or lesser access to the campaign. Because of the reliance upon gratis placement public service advertisements. It was also impossible to determine precisely when the campaign might have peak play periods in various parts of the country.)

A goal was to have a final sample size of 650-750 for the 1979 panel waves. In order to accomplish that, while allowing for mortality within the panel, a sample size of 1,050 was specified for the first wave of interviews, including 350 completed interviews in each of the three communities. Sampling points within each community were determined by drawing addresses from the telephone directory by a systematic random sampling procedure, offering a representative cross section of each community approximately proportionate to population density. At each so-designated sampling point, interviewers were instructed to start next door to the address listed and move clockwise around the block or area until one interview was completed. Interviewing hours were varied to help achieve proper representation of employed and unemployed men and women.

Interviewing Recruitment and Supervision. Interviewing was conducted by Research Services' own trained interviewing staff in Denver, and by the experienced staffs of affiliated survey research firms in Buffalo and Milwaukee. Each interviewer received written instructions for potential

problem areas, and participated in an extensive pre-field work training session. The training sessions in Denver were held a few days prior to those in the other locales, and were attended by the CMCRP Project Director to help assure clarity of instructions. Interviewers' work in each community was consistently monitored by field supervisors, and Research Services and CMCRP staff maintained close telephone contact with all field supervisors to resolve any sampling or interviewing problems that arose during the course of the survey. A validation check was made on ten percent of the completed interviews.

Field Work. Interviewing for the first wave of the survey was conducted in respondents' homes during September 7 to 23, 1979, with the prevention campaign having been projected to begin September 24. A total of 1,049 usable interviews were completed. Interviews were attempted at 1,477 households, yielding a response rate of 71 percent. The first wave sample is described demographically in Table 3-2.

The 1981 Survey

The basic plan for the 1981 panel study was to re-interview by telephone as many as possible of the 1,049 respondents originally interviewed in 1979. A minimum working number of completions was set at 500, taking into account both what could be optimistically expected in the way of recontacting individuals after two years, and the necessity of having adequate numbers of both campaign exposed and unexposed respondents for analytic purposes. (A minimum of 200 respondents in the exposed group was deemed neccessary.) Field work was subcontracted to the Roper Organization, on the basis of cost effectiveness and their excellent performance on the previous national sample survey.

Questionnaire Development. The questionnaire exclusively included items which had been asked of respondents in the first wave of interviews, and which had proven most productive in subsequent analyses. A few minor format changes were made in some items in order to better accommodate interviewing by phone. Initial drafts of the questionnaire were reviewed by NIJ staff and project consultants, and the final draft was pretested by the Roper Organization October 23 to 25 in the New York metropolitan area.

Sampling. Roper was provided with a list of 900 names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the previously interviewed respondents. One hundred and forty-nine of the original respondent pool were eliminated either because a phone number was not included on the previous questionnaire, or because it was known that they had moved prior to the April 1980 wave of interviews. Roper was instructed to complete as many interviews as possible out of that group, up to a maximum number of 700. A maximum of four call-backs were to be used to reach not-at-home or difficult-to-reach respondents. At each number the designated repondent was asked for by full name, and was further validated by identifying the respondent as being within the correct age range.

Field Work. Interviews were carried out from November 2 to 13, with average interviewing time being 25 minutes. A total of 426 usable interviews were registered as being completed by Roper.

While the final sample size fell below the desired goal, happily the proportion of campaign-exposed respondents nearly matched that of the national sample--with almost half of the panel exposed. We therefore ended up with two nearly equal-sized subgroups, with 204 respondents in the campaign-exposed group and 222 in the unexposed segment, meeting our requirements for analytical comparisons.

The reasons for nonresponses appear in Table 3-3, with refusals (135, or 15 percent) the most frequent reason, closely followed by wrong numbers (144, or 13 percent). (Roper made an extraordinary effort to recapture such individuals, using supervisors to recontact initial refusers and checking telephone company information operators for updated numbers. The figures above represent those unable to be interviewed even after those procedures were followed.)

Analysis Preparation

Roper submitted the data to CMCRP in tape form, along with their own marginal tabulations. The data were processed on the University of Denver Computing Center's Burroughs 6800 computer, and minor editing procedures were carried out to assure maximum utility of the data. All analyses presented and referred to below were carried out by CMCRP staff, typically using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences library programs.

Statistical Techniques

Most of the analyses presented within this report are aimed at taking maximum advantage of the two-wave quasi-experimental panel design for inference-building purposes. In several instances multivariate correlational analyses were incorporated following the rationale noted previously.

General Plan for Analysis

The advantages of the panel field design utilized here were first put to use to find out which respondent dispositions prior to the campaign were most associated with subsequent campaign exposure. Pre-to-post change score

measures were then used as relatively objective indicators of campaign effects. Respondents' self-reports as to whether they recalled having been exposed to the advertisements served as the basis for separating the sample into an experimental group (those exposed) and a control group (those unexposed). After the investigation of selectivity factors in exposure to the ad, potential effects of that exposure in terms of changes in crime prevention, crime, and general psychological orientations were studied by means of both simple group comparison tests and more stringent multivariate control procedures using regressed change scores. Thereafter, analyses focused on specific types of campaign effects within various kinds of audiences, with an eye toward subsequently integrating the respondent typologies identified here with those noted in the national sample, and arriving at reasoned communication strategies for targeting crime prevention information to the public.

CHAPTER 4

CRIME PREVENTION IDEOLOGIES, BELIEFS, CONCERNS AND ACTIONS

Crime prevention information campaigns obviously work within a milieu of pre-existing citizen perceptions, attitudes, values and behaviors concerning crime and related issues. The purpose of the discussion below is to present an overview of such general citizen orientations toward crime and prevention, based upon data from the 1981 national sample survey.

While the findings will doubtlessly be beneficial to those more concerned with the more theoretical development of crime prevention concepts (cf. Lavrakas, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), the chapter is primarily intended to provide a context in which the ensuing evaluation of the McGruff campaign can be viewed.

CITIZENS AND CRIME: SOME GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

Without doubt, "crime" in its multiplicity of aspects represents a "very serious problem" indeed for 85 percent American adults who were sampled nationwide in the 1981 University of Denver survey. Overall, respondents in the sample characterized crime as being a serious matter. Only 14 percent described the issue of crime as being "moderately" serious in the very least. No one characterized crime as a matter to be taken lightly.

In the views of the majority (59 percent), "crime" is considered to be so severe that its true seriousness was being underplayed by the American press and the mass media. A third of the 1981 sample believed that newspaper and television representations of the severity of crime are more or less realistic,

and no more than 4 percent considered the media's crime presentations to reflect exaggerations of reality.

If Americans agree that "crime" is a phenomenon of serious consequence, there is very little consensus--other than on meting out severe punishments--among the citizenry regarding what ought be done to eliminate it, control it, or prevent it.

Many "crime prevention" voices of authority offer varieties of "informational" treatments and cures regarding the ills of crime without much authoritative empiricism to back them up. Often, action demands are made upon citizens without much thought given over to their feasibility, practicality or efficacy.*

One major theme serves as an overall organizing principle for the varieties of "crime prevention actions" citizens are currently being asked to take. The proposition asserts that vis-a-vis the police, (1) the ordinary citizen must take on an equal (if not principal) share of the responsibility for his/her protection against crime, and (2) once citizens do take on that responsibility, crime victimization will be reduced substantially.

Most American adults (59 percent) are willing to acknowledge that at the very least the public shares equal responsibility with the police for preventing crimes. A fourth of the sample in 1981 believed that citizens actually have more responsibility on this score, while an important one in ten (12%) averred that the ordinary citizen should have less responsibility than the police. For this latter subgroup, the prevention of crime is primarily the responsibility of the police, and ordinary citizens are relatively less responsible in this regard. These people ordinarily view the call for citizens

*See, Mendelsohn, H. and D. Wilson, Working Paper, "A Content Analysis of Mass Communication Output, Designed to Motivate Public Interest/Participation in Crime Prevention Activity", December 1978. LEAA Grant 78-NI-Axon.

to engage in crime prevention activity as a failure of the State to protect its citizens. Efforts on behalf of crime prevention, they may argue, should be directed to improving the law enforcement/justice system in general, rather than on demanding that citizens themselves assume the burdens of protecting their persons, their loved ones, their property and their neighborhoods from the dangers of crime.

The existence of even a relatively small subgroup of the population that opposes the thesis of significant individual responsibility for protection against crime represents an important barrier to communicators in the business of promoting just such a theme. Here, the problem is two-fold. Not only is 12% of the public primed to turn a deaf ear to promotional calls to individual protection action-taking, but this subgroup undoubtedly represents the core of an actual/potential active opposition to the very concept of individual responsibility as well.

Table 4-1 indicates that age, sex, and occupation appear to be important demographic characteristics that may affect opinions regarding the equal sharing of police-citizen responsibility for crime prevention.

As age increases, so does the belief in the equal sharing of the responsibility for preventing crimes.

Females are more likely than males to support this position.

Persons in prestigious occupations are less likely to support the position.

With regard to the thesis that individual citizens have a greater responsibility for crime prevention than do the police, we note that:

- The elderly are least apt to endorse the notion.
- Males are more likely than females to support it, as are Caucasians vis-a-vis members of minorities.

- Executives, administrators and professionals, as compared to persons in other occupations, are likelier to believe that individual citizens are more responsible than the police for preventing crimes.

Additional "up-scale" socio-economic factors influence opinions regarding greater citizen responsibility as well. For example, the concept is likelier to be endorsed by persons who consider themselves to belong to the upper/upper middle social class; by individuals in the $20,000-$30,000 income bracket; and by persons who have had some college training.

Place of residence (city size and geographic location) also affects endorsement of the idea of greater individual citizen responsibility for crime prevention.

Individuals residing in and around smaller cities (50,000-250,000) as well as central-area residents of middle-sized cities (250,000-1 million) are more likely to agree with the idea of individual responsibility.

The same holds true for West Coast inhabitants.

Those who oppose the notion of substantial individual responsibility for protection against crime are likelier to be:

- Members of racial/ethnic minorities
- Persons in prestigious occupations
- College graduates
- Self-identified members of the middle and working classes
- Inhabitants of the South Atlantic region
- Residents of metropolitan (1 million plus) areas as well as of small cities of 10,000-50,000 populations.

Communicators should consider the "opposition" to their appeals for individual crime prevention action-taking to be made up of a duality of skepticism--one that has it roots primarily among big-city "street-wise" blue

collar racial and ethnic minorities, and the other mainly among a more worldly and well-off subgroup who are more or less used to purchasing whatever services they may require for their well-being. As a consequence, the latter are relieved of a great deal of responsibilities that call for specific individualized "work" actions on their part.

It would appear that crime prevention messages that are directed to these subgroups which call for substantial individual input of energy, skill, time, and often money, must first convince these potential targets of the efficacy of individualized action-taking in actually reducing crime.

Mere claims of efficacy simply will not do here. Proofs of claimed efficacy might begin to break down the skepticism.

Americans are not altogether convinced that high citizen involvement in crime prevention activity--by itself--necessarily will result in a substantial reduction in the crime rate overall. Roughly half of the 1981 national sample believed that crime could be reduced "a great deal" via the active involvement of ordinary citizens protecting themselves. The remainder (52 percent) were generally less sanguine. Among the more skeptical, 8% believed that individual action-taking on the part of citizens would affect the overall crime rate "hardly at all."

Perceptions of the efficacy of citizen participation play important roles in the public's beliefs regarding the responsibility of citizens vis-a-vis the police in curbing neighborhood crime.

The data in Table 4-2 show a clear, positive relationship between optimistic perceptions of efficacy and the belief that citizens have a greater responsibility than do the police for preventing crimes. Equally clear is the exact reverse relationship where, as pessimism regarding the efficacy of

citizen activity grows, so does the belief that citizens bear less of a responsibility for their protection than does the police.

That Americans are not altogether persuaded that individual citizen action-taking is universally effective in helping to reduce crime is evidenced in Table 4-3.

Where there is overwhelming public support for the alleged deterrent power of severe punishment for criminals, there is a division of opinion regarding the unequivocal efficacy of individual citizen action-taking. Half of the 1981 sample believe that such participation by ordinary citizens can indeed result in significant reductions in crime, while the remaining half either sees such citizen participation as being just partially successful, and few see it as successful at all.

Respondents in the 1981 national study were asked to rank their perceptions of how effective the four popularly discussed "remedies" might be in reducing crimes with the results reported in Table 4-4. Of particular interest here is the fact that the efficacy of individual citizen action-taking is considered with some skepticism by the American public as a whole.

No more than 12 percent would think of such activity as the "most effective" of four posited possibilities. Indeed, three times as many individuals perceive citizen involvement to be the "least effective" of the alternatives offered as compared to those favoring citizen participation in crime prevention as "most effective."

Table 4-5 indicates that considerable differences separate those individuals who are most sanguine about citizen-action efficacy from those who are most skeptical.

Where optimism about the efficacy of citizen participation is inversely related to age, the skeptical subgroup is relatively unaffected by age.

Members of minorities are far more likely to question the efficacy of citizen action-taking than are their ethnic majority counterparts. Race and ethnicity do not influence optimistic perceptions of citizen participation in crime prevention.

Persons working in prestigious occupations are most apt to consider the efficacy of citizen involvement in crime prevention in a positive light. The reverse is true for skilled workers and those in service and protective occupations.

Skepticism regarding citizen activity is inversely affected by educational achievement--the lower the level of educational achievement, the greater the skepticism. In contrast, there is a tendency for optimism to increase with educational achievement. College graduates are the most sanguine about what individuals can achieve in the realm of crime prevention, while persons without a college education are the least optimistic.

Not surprisingly, persons earning $20,000 and more annually are most apt to look upon the efficacy of citizen participation in a positive manner, while those earning less than $20,000 a year are most apt to consider the efficacy of individual crime prevention activity in a negative vein.

Geographically, the most optimistic respondents are to be found on the Pacific coast. They are the least likely to reside in very small towns (below 10,000 population).

Skepticism regarding the efficacy of individual citizen action-taking in crime prevention is influenced by a variety of related experiences and beliefs.

Overall, 35 percent of the 1981 sample rated citizen action-taking as relatively ineffectual:

- 44 percent of the residents who considered their neighborhoods to be "very dangerous" labeled citizen involvement in countering crime the least effective of the four options posed.
- 42 percent of the respondents who see themselves as the least vulnerable to crime believe citizen action-taking is relatively ineffective.
- 42 percent of the respondents claiming to pay no attention or very little attention to crime news on TV, see citizen action as relatively impotent in curbing crime.
- 41 percent of those who manifest the highest crime fatalism orientation label citizen participation as the least effective of the four crime prevention means posed.
- 40 percent of the individuals reporting they worry about crime a "great deal" view citizen action-take as the least effective of the options put before them.

From the perspective of communicators who attempt to persuade large numbers of citizens to engage in recommended crime prevention actions, the task of first convincing them that those actions actually will work is formidable indeed. Here, for starters, the "worriers" must first be calmed; the disinterested and unconcerned, aroused; and those experiencing realistic danger, provided with guarantees of efficacy.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the ideology of individual citizen participation is its effect on citizens' crime prevention action-taking. Hypothetically, we would expect that citizens who do not consider it their

particular obligation to protect themselves against crime would be rather inactive with regard to such behavior.

The data in Table 4-6 add substance to the hypothesis.

Not only do people who consider citizens' responsibility vis-a-vis the police to be minor actually refrain much more than others from engaging in any crime prevention activity, they also admit to doing less than well when they do take part in such activity.

On the other hand, those who believe that citizens carry even a heavier responsibility than do the police are likely to be the most actively involved in crime prevention overall and to consider their actions to be effective as well.

Further, these data suggest that "apathy" cannot satisfactorily explain why close to a fifth of the adult population readily admits to a total lack of engagement in any crime prevention activity at all. For many of these particular individuals, their absence from such activity stems more from their disbeliefs regarding individual citizen responsibilities and the effectiveness of citizen participation in crime prevention than they may from disinterest or laziness or lack of concern.

This significant subgroup probably cannot be propelled into taking crime prevention actions by simple persuasion alone. Before they will follow any advice regarding what they, qua individuals, ought to do, these skeptics first must be convinced that (1) it really is their obligation to take on the proposed task and (2) that the suggested actions will produce a realizable benefit.

The predispositional beliefs systems undergirding citizens' involvement (and lack of it) in crime prevention cover a wide-ranging complex of

ideologies, attitudes, concerns, values, and opinions regarding the possible crime prevention roles of both individual citizens and social institutions.

Consider Table 4-7. Several matters of interest stand out in this table.

First, none of the groups/institutions rated in the 1981 national sample is considered to be truly outstanding in its efforts against crime. At best, the police and citizens residing in respondents' neighborhoods receive the highest grades from just 1 to 1.5 respondents among every ten who were interviewed. In the ratings accorded the media, volunteer organizations, local elected officials, and particularly local courts, ratings of "poor" performances outweighed those citations of "outstanding"--by ratios of as much as 10 or 7 to 1 in two of the five cases.

Secondly, one is struck by the relatively high proportions of respondents in Table 4-7 who were unable to make any assessments at all of any of the groups/institutions other than the local police. When we see "no opinions" measuring anywhere from 11 percent to well over a third of the responses, we know that the phenomenon under scrutiny has as not yet crystallized in the minds of the public. In other words, as of the Fall of 1981 the American public was not altogether clear about its assessments of the local crime prevention performances of individual citizens, local media, local volunteer groups, locally elected officials and the courts. Nor is it evident that the public was fully aware of explicit standards by which they could make such judgments intelligently. Respondents were particularly vague about evaluating the crime prevention work of local voluntary organizations. They were most articulate in their assessments of local police work in crime prevention.

With regard to the public's satisfaction with their police, it is interesting to note that a substantial 4 in 10 Americans currently believe that their local police are doing something less than a satisfactory job in crime

prevention. In other words, the local police are not altogether esteemed with regard to their performance in protecting citizens against the threat of crime. Such public uneasiness is bound to have negative effects on how citizens react to the police as credible sources of crime prevention information as well as on their attitudes regarding police vs. citizen responsibility for crime prevention.

Americans continue to express a highly critical opinion of their local elected officials' performance on behalf of crime prevention. They reserve their most negative assessment for the local courts. To what extent the dissatisfactions with local politicians and courts are simply residual outputs from the public's disenchantment with "government" overall deserves detailed exploration in studies of the influence of ideologies on citizen civic behavior overall.

In this study we can point only to a clue that stems from the responses to this item posed in the 1981 University of Denver national survey:

"How much of the time do you think you can trust the local government here to do what is best for the people?"

- 38 percent of the sample replied, "just about always; most of the time";
- 41 percent answered, "some of the time";
- 16 percent responded with, "hardly ever at all"; and
- 4 percent could not offer any opinion.

The data show a direct positive relationship between general trust in local government and favorable assessments of the performance of local elected officials.

Case in point: Where 46 percent of those expressing high trust in local government generally claim their local officials are doing a good to very good

job of helping to prevent neighborhood crimes, 40 percent assess their local politicians as doing just a "fair" job; with the remaining 13 percent calling the crime prevention performances of their local officials "poor." In other words, as people's trust in local government overall increases, so do their positive assessments of their locally elected civic servants' performances in helping to prevent neighborhood crimes.

Worth noting additionally are the tendencies for many respondents to give favorable and unfavorable assessments simultaneously to the crime prevention activities of pairs of community groups and institutions.

Here, we note that among the respondents who express positive assessments ("very good" or "good") of various crime prevention efforts,

- 76 percent believe that both the courts and the media are doing a good job.
- 72 percent believe that both the courts and local groups and organizations are performing well.
- 71 percent consider the crime prevention efforts of both the local groups and organizations plus the local media in a favorable light.
- 74 percent perceive the crime prevention activities of both their local police and of local citizen residents to be meritorious.

At the same time, among respondents who reacted unfavorably,

- 75 percent see both their local elected officials and their police as being ineffectual in their crime prevention efforts.
- 61 percent are critical of both local elected officials and local groups and organizations.

Overall, for a majority of Americans today, "government" represents less than a steadfastly, trustworthy and effective source of information and social policy. This skepticism on the part of large segments of the public

undoubtedly can serve to influence their interest in and reactions to government originated persuasive efforts on behalf of crime prevention in a negative way.

The public's perceptions of how well various local groups/institutions are doing vis-a-vis crime prevention are products of both predisposing beliefs and experiences as well as encounters with various sources of information.

Tables 4-8 through 4-12 show how (1) victimization, (2) perceptions of neighborhood crime danger, (3) perceived vulnerability, (4) worry about crime, and (5) fatalistic orientations to crime affect citizens' ratings of the crime prevention performances of six different neighborhood groups and institutions.

Persons who either have not encountered any crimes or who have done so only in a minor way are most apt to be generous in their appraisals of the crime prevention efforts of their neighbors. Additionally, this subgroup as compared to the total sample is more apt to be praiseworthy of the crime prevention activities performed by local officials; by the local media; and by the local courts.

They are far likelier as well to consider the crime prevention efforts of local groups to be "fair."

At the same time, persons experiencing relatively high victimization are most apt to be critical of the crime prevention activities of their local courts as well as those of local organizations.

Where non-victims (or low intensity victims) appear to consider their good fortune to have resulted in some part from their neighbors' zeal in crime prevention, high victimization individuals seem to place at least some part of their misfortune on the "failures" of their local courts--failures that allegedly resulted in particular perpetrators not having been deterred in the first place.

As compared to the total sample, persons living in neighborhoods they consider to be highly dangerous are most apt to be critical of both local elected officials and the local courts. Additionally, they are likelier to find fault with the crime prevention activities of the local police, their neighbors and local groups and organizations.

Interestingly, they are likelier to praise the crime prevention activities of the local media. Praise for police efforts on behalf of crime prevention is most apt to come from residents of relatively "safe" neighborhoods. As a matter of fact, these residents are likelier to award high grades to the crime prevention efforts of their neighbors, local elected officials, the courts and local organizations as well.

People who claim to worry a great deal about crime most often find fault with the crime prevention performances of locally elected officials as well as with the efforts of the local courts and police. On the positive side, intense worriers are most apt to find favor with the work that local media do vis-a-vis crime prevention. They are also most likely to consider the efforts of their neighbors to fall into the "fair" rubric.

Persons who worry very little (or not at all) about crime are more likely overall to see the crime prevention work of various community entities in a positive light. This holds particularly true for their favorable assessments of the crime prevention efforts of their neighbors, the local courts, and local elected officials.

Among persons who believe in the near-absolute inevitability of crime, criticisms of the crime prevention efforts of local elected officials as well as of the local courts is the highest. At the same time, these individuals are most likely to praise the work of local media.

By way of contrast, praise for the crime prevention accomplishments of local organizations is particularly high among those who are least fatalistic with regard to crime.

THE ROLE OF PERSONAL BELIEFS AND CONCERNS

In addition to the influences that ideological beliefs regarding crime may have on public reactions to crime prevention information, we would expect that various related personal concerns and beliefs would play important roles here as well. In particular, we would expect self-beliefs and concerns about crime as well as those touching on individuals' skill and competence to actually implement suggested crime prevention actions would merit particular attention.

Worry about Crime

Responses to two items in the 1981 national survey formed an index of "Worry about Crime Victimization." The questions asked:

> "Is having your residence burglarized or broken into something that you worry about a great deal, or something that you worry about somewhat, or something that you hardly worry about at all?"
>
> "Is being attacked or robbed something that you worry about a great deal, or something that you worry about somewhat, or something that you hardly worry about at all?"

Respondents were classified into three subgroups:

- Those who scored high ("worry a great deal") on crime victimization worry - 17 percent
- Those who fell into the moderate ("worry somewhat") worry category - 45 percent

- Those who scored low ("hardly worry") in regard to worry about being victimized by criminals - 38 percent

Table 4-13 indicates that on the matter of high worry,

- The younger the age of individuals, the likelier were they to worry a great deal about the prospect of victimization.
- As compared to males, females were twice as likely to be heavy worriers.
- Members of minorities rather than majority members were most likely to be classified in the "high worry" rubric.
- Individuals in white collar jobs were more likelier than occupants of other work categories to be concerned in the extreme.
- Social class status (self-ascribed) was inversely related to high concern--the higher the social class, the less was the likelihood of intense worry.
- The greater the number of children in their households, the greater was the likelihood that respondents would be intensely concerned about possible crime victimization.
- Residents of households with four or more children were the likeliest of all to fall into the "high worry" rubric.
- Renters, residents of multiple family dwellings, and residents of working class/poor neighborhoods were somewhat more likely than their opposites to be classified as intense worriers.
- Residents of urban centers with populations of 250,000 and more were likelier to be greatly concerned about the prospect of victimization.

Those individuals who were relatively unconcerned about falling victim to crime were apt to be:

- Males
- In the skilled, service and protective trades
- Less than fully high-school educated
- Residents of the East South Central states
- Residents of rural communities.

Up-scale socio-economic factors such as (1) holding prestigious jobs, (2) having a college degree, (3) earning $30,000 or more annually, and (4) membership in the upper/upper middle social class all disproportionately affect moderate concern with the prospect of victimization. Additionally, residents of smaller cities (10,000-50,000 population) as well as of suburbs in the 250,000-1 million metro area class are more apt than residents of other-sized locales to be moderately worried about possible crime victimization.

Worry about the prospect of experiencing victimization itself appears to be an output from specific predisposing crime related experiences and beliefs (Table 4-14).

Thus, we see that persons who take crime very seriously are four times as likely to worry intensely about it as are those who believe crime is of moderate import. Further, those worrying more about the prospects of victimization are likelier to have endured a high degree of actual victimization (either personally or vicariously); they are more apt to believe that the neighborhoods they live in are very dangerous (13 percent of the intense worriers claim their law-abiding neighbors are few in number as compared to 7 percent of the moderate worriers and 3 percent of the non-worriers with a similar claim); they are more likely to believe themselves to be highly vulnerable to crime attacks.

At the same time, persons who are relatively unworried about potential victimization are most likely to live in neighborhoods they believe to be relatively safe from the hazards of crime.

By considerable margins, those whose concerns are relatively low also are more likely to have experienced no or low victimization; they are more likely to believe that crime is not to be taken all that seriously; and they are more apt to feel moderately vulnerable to crime themselves.

Fatalistic beliefs concerning the inevitability of crime generally do not influence worry about prospective crime victimization.

The data in Table 4-15 indicate that a good deal of the "worry" people express in regard to crime victimization could be based on feelings of personal incompetence vis-a-vis self-protection. It appears that these individuals worry intensely about becoming victims of crime mainly because they believe they lack the skill and power to prevent it.

Persons who claim an inability to control their lives are likelier to worry intensely about the possibilities of victimization than are those who feel they are able to control their lives--at least to a fair degree. A similar relationship emerges from the data regarding feelings of confidence about protecting one's self against crime. Those who lack confidence in their ability are twice as likely, as are confident respondents, to express the highest level of concern about the prospect of being victimized.

Contrariwise, individuals who manifest the greatest self-confidence as well as the greatest self-autonomy are more likely to be only mildly--rather than intensely--concerned about possible victimization.

Overall, then, we note that our "worry" about crime victimization often goes hand in hand with beliefs regarding real dangers and our personal competence with regard to overcoming them. Our concerns about becoming victims

of crimes appear to be rooted not so much in our fantasies about crime that we may encounter, for example, in the media; but rather, they likely stem more from what appears to be very solid "realities" to an important degree . . . realities that have to do with what our status in society happens to be, the kinds of neighborhoods we live in, our past experiences with crime, and our self-estimations regarding how competent we are to actually protect ourselves from the threats of victimization.

That "worry" about becoming victims to crime probably reflects considerably more than a manifestation of some sort of groundless "hysteria" or neurotic "free floating anxiety" is evidenced in Table 4-16.

Were "intense worry" about crime victimization to be considered a manifestation mainly of neurotic anxiety, classical clinical theory would have us expect a relatively high level of functional immobility among the intensely concerned. In other words, we should expect less individual activity as anxiety increases.

Table 4-16 indicates just the contrary. Here, it appears that with regard to specific citizen action-taking overall--contacting the police, joining neighborhood crime prevention groups and discussing crime matters with others--the greater the degree of worry about victimization, the greater is the likelihood of action-taking in each case.

Moreover, the intensely-worried are likelier than non-worriers to endorse the proposition of citizens having even more responsibility than the police for their personal safety and well-being.

What seems to be happening is that intense worriers apparently try to overcome their concerns by doing those ameliorating things which best fit in with their perceived competence--by keeping as well informed about crime prevention as everyone else and by actually outperforming others in specific

crime prevention actions they consider as falling within the bounds of their skills and resources.

That "worry about crime victimization" appears to motivate rather than inhibit certain kinds of specific crime prevention activity is of considerable importance for communications strategy-building in crime prevention efforts across the board.

WHAT THE PUBLIC WORRIES ABOUT WHEN IT WORRIES ABOUT CRIME VICTIMIZATION

Although the 1981 national survey "Crime worry" index focuses on the prospect of personal victimization, the "worry about crime" manifested by various publics in the 1981 national study is multi-dimensional.

Important to note are two key public concerns--the one regarding the safety of self versus others, community and society; the alternate, concerns regarding the ability to protect one's self effectively against criminal activity.

To the question, "Would you say that you personally are more concerned about crime because of the effect it might have on you as an individual or are you more concerned about it because of the effect it has on society?" a majority of 58% pointed to the latter as the focus of their "crime worry."

Clearly, the public divides its concerns between what crime can do to both self and others. Table 4-17 shows that as compared to all those in the 1981 sample who responded to the question, persons who expressed more concern about self than society were likely to be younger (below 35); blacks and other minority members; white collar workers; residents of households that are comprised of three children; and metropolitan suburbanites as well as inhabitants of cities between 50,000 and 250,000 in population.

Persons who claim greater concern over the more abstract effects of crime upon others--that is, upon society--are likelier to be found among the elderly (65 and over) who are generally the most fatalistic about the inevitability of crime to begin with (by a margin of 39 percent to 29 percent for the total sample).

Inhabitants of the Rocky Mountain region are more apt than those living in other sections of the USA to show more concern about the effects of crime on society rather than on self.

Ordinarily it would be expected that persons who say they worry a great deal about possible victimization in general would be nearly totally concerned about the effects of crime upon the self. Not so. When compared to the responding sample as a whole, intense worriers are more likely to worry about the effects of crime on them personally by a ratio of 52 percent to 42 percent; nevertheless, nearly half of the subgroup are almost equally concerned about how crime impacts on others.

In other words, when people say they are highly concerned about the prospect of being criminally attacked, robbed or burglarized, their concern is not exclusively focused on the harm and injuries they alone may suffer. Rather, their concern may cover a considerably wider spectrum which includes the safety of loved ones, community and ultimately, even of society.

What strongly concerns people who worry about self more than others is their perceived weakness: their inability to protect themselves (Table 4-18).

Respondents in the 1981 national survey were asked, "Compared to most other people would you say you are more concerned about protecting yourself

from crime, about as concerned as others, or less concerned than others are?" with the following results:

More concerned	- 23%
Less concerned	- 6%
Equally concerned	- 70%
No opinion	- 1%

High concern about self-protection goes hand-in-hand with high concern about victimization, so that where overall a fourth of the sample manifests such latter uneasiness, 45 percent of those who worry a great deal about victimization (as compared to 22 percent who worry moderately and 15 percent who remain relatively unconcerned) also worry a great deal about self-protection.

Particularly high concern about one's self-protection capability (manifested by 23 percent of the total 1981 national sample) was voiced by:

- Blacks and other ethnics - 39%
- Heads of households comprised of four or more children - 39%
- Residents of upper class neighborhoods - 33%
- Inhabitants of the West South Central states - 37%
- Residents of suburbs near middle-sized cities - 36%

Relative lack of concern with preventing criminal victimization of the self (6 percent of the total sample) was relatively unaffected by demography. It was influenced somewhat disproportionately by:

- Persons living in the Northeastern section of the country - 11%
- Residents of metropolitan suburban areas - 12%

Table 4-19 indicates that there are strong "reality" reasons for much of the high concern about protecting the self from crime. Note that persons living in neighborhoods they believe to be highly dangerous, people who see

themselves as highly vulnerable to crime victimization, and respondents who previously have experienced a relatively high degree of personal or vicarious victimization are more likely to be particularly concerned about the matter of self-protection.

Without any equivocation whatever, high concern regarding self-protection (as contrasted to low or no concern) is a key factor in individuals (1) believing in the efficacy of individual action--taking on behalf of crime prevention (Table 4-20) as well as in (2) individuals engaging in a wide array of recommended crime prevention actions (Tables 4-21, 4-22).

Tables 4-20, 4-21 and 4-22 suggest that in the face of relatively weak concern regarding the protection of self, there will be relatively little interest or trust in knowledge about, or active participation in, crime prevention overall.

The reverse hold true, of course, across the board for those whose concerns about self-protection are the strongest. The stronger the concern regarding self-protection, the greater is the personal involvement in a multiplicity of crime prevention activities.

As compared to individuals who are relatively unconcerned about caring for themselves to prevent possible victimization, those who are strongly concerned are far more likely:

- To devote a lot of attention to television news about crime;
- To give a great deal of attention to crime prevention information in the media;
- To believe--probably as a consequence of their relatively higher overall exposure to media crime fare--that they are very well informed about crime prevention;

- To accept the proposition that individuals can help reduce the crime rate substantially.

In the area of specific crime prevention action-taking, again, as compared to the relatively unconcerned, highly concerned individuals are far more apt:

- To regularly observe street activities from their homes;
- To habitually lock home doors and windows--when at home or away even for a short time;
- To install special locks in residence doors/windows;
- To possess guns and other personal security devices.

Curiously, the following actions appear to remain unaffected by degree of concern about self-protection:

- Inviting the police to conduct a home security check;
- Using anti-theft stickers;
- Installing burglar alarms;
- Purchasing theft insurance.

Worry about crime is far from being one-dimensional. It is both realistic and to some degree fanciful. It focuses on both the self and upon what might happen to others.

A good deal of the worry about self stems from perceptions of lack of actual skill in regard to fending off crimes. These particular persons will require heavy doses of assurance before they take certain recommended actions that are directed to the public at large; particularly actions that are complex or which may be hazardous.

On the other hand, it would appear that the self-confident upper-scale subgroups in the population whose personal at-risk status is relatively low, as well as the elderly who shrug away their concerns with a fatalistic orientation, might be directed more effectively into crime prevention actions that are

more community-oriented and less focused on personal action-taking. Note that fully 63 percent of the individuals proclaiming they rarely or never worry about the prospects of becoming victim of crime say they are more concerned about the effects of crime on society than about its possible effects on them as individuals.

An important contributor to this syndrome of less-self-worry-more-societal-concern is the fact that substantial majorities of this particular subgroup have already taken the key personal protection actions that crime prevention experts have been promoting for some time. It could very well be that the taking of these crime prevention actions eventually contribute to the sense of self-assurance that characterizes the subgroup which worries more about others than they do about self.

	Concerned more about the effects of crime upon: (n = 989)	
	Society (58%)	Self (42%)
Had local police do security check of home (114)	66%	34%
Installed outdoor lights for security (506)	62%	38%
Have dog at least partly for security (421)	60%	40%
Had property engraved with ID (219)	59%	41%
Bought theft insurance (390)	57%	43%
Personal security devices (358)	57%	43%
Installed special window/door locks (519)	56%	44%
Installed peephole, window in door (239)	56%	44%
Placed anti-theft stickers on entrance (123)	56%	44%
Installed burglar alarm system (70)	55%	45%
Did none of these (193)	54%	46%

What seems to emerge as a basis for a future crime prevention mass communication's strategy is a fundamental two-pronged approach in which one set

of messages is designed to provide concerned individuals with effective crime prevention skills vis-a-vis the self and in which another set of messages is designed primarily to motivate relatively unconcerned and fatalistically oriented individuals to participate in crime prevention activities that will benefit the community and society directly and themselves indirectly.

A strategy that simultaneously calls for both types of actions to be taken by the same individuals with equal vigor and enthusiasm can be categorized as wasteful, because targets at best will be more disposed to engaging in one or the other, but not necessarily, the two on an equal basis.

The Varying Influences of Neighborhoods

"Neighborhood" is a key variable in how the public perceives crime, its possible dangers, and whether and how it can be prevented, controlled or eliminated. And rightly so, "neighborhood" is a focus of much of the public communication effort that is designed to help prevent "street" (i.e. neighborhood) crime . . . be it in urging us to "keep an eye" on our neighbors' property and goods, or to be on the alert regarding the intrusion of suspicious-appearing strangers or to join in the prevention activities of neighborhood "patrols", "watches" and sundry additional crime prevention groups.

Still, all neighborhoods are not alike; nor are all "neighbors". In point of fact, "neighborhoods" for many Americans are seen to represent the very root causes of their apprehensions and negative experiences vis-a-vis crime--and not the instrumental vehicles for its effective prevention. For these subgroups, messages that promote "neighborly" interdependent actions must ring particularly hollow and perhaps even ludicrous in some cases . . . cases where

"neighbors" are seen realistically to be the very perpetrators of crime--not its enemy.

If one fact stands out starkly from the 1981 national study, it is this paradox, the "better" the neighborhood people live in the less concern there is about crime generally, but the greater is their involvement in varieties of crime prevention activities. Put another way, people who might benefit most from taking certain recommended crime prevention actions that often require social cooperation are no more likely than others to engage in such actions due, at least in part, to the social disorganization of their neighborhoods to begin with. Social disorganization in these situations serves simultaneously to contribute to crime and to inhibit its prevention through intense community efforts.

The data from the 1981 national survey offer few surprises on the matter of neighborhood evaluation and crime prevention orientation.

Overall, the large majority of Americans sampled (60 percent) asserted a high degree of satisfaction with their neighborhoods. ("Generally speaking, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not at all satisfied with this neighborhood?") Four in ten respondents manifested dissatisfactions of one sort or another with their immediate residential environment (of these 5 percent voiced total dissatisfaction).

High satisfaction with one's neighborhood (60 percent totally) is influenced by:

1. Age. The older people are, the greater is their expressed satisfaction with their neighborhoods:

Below 25 years	- 52%
25 - 34 years	- 53%
35 - 54 years	- 60%
55 - 64 years	- 69%
65 and over	- 73%

2. Educational achievement. As educational achievement increases, so does expressed satisfaction with neighborhoods:

Less than high school graduate	- 57%
High school graduate	- 59%
Some college	- 63%
College graduate	- 64%

3. Social class. Persons earning $30,000 yearly and over (67 percent) as well as persons who identify themselves as members of the upper and middle classes (67 percent) are more likely to voice satisfaction with the immediate locales of their residences. Similar assessments are reported by residents of upper class (80 percent) and middle class (71 percent) neighborhoods.

4. Habitat.

   A. Home owners (70 percent) and single family house dwellers (67 percent) are likelier to claim they are satisfied with their neighborhoods. The same holds true for long-term (13 years or more) residents of a particular neighborhood (69 percent).

   B. Residents of suburbs surrounding middle-sized cities (74 percent) and citizens of the West North Central region (76 percent) are the likeliest to manifest a high degree of satisfaction with the neighborhoods they live in.

In contrast, <u>dissatisfaction</u> with neighborhood (40 percent totally) is most apt to be reported by:

- Blacks and other minority members - 56 percent
- Persons who work in blue collar jobs (50 percent) and who identify themselves as "working class" or "poor" people (49 percent).
- Renters (59 percent). Occupants of multiple family dwellings (62 percent); and recent arrivals (52 percent) who live in current

neighborhoods for less than a year in working class neighborhoods (52 percent).

- Household members who share their residences with three children - 46 percent.
- Residents in the Middle Atlantic states (50 percent) as well as persons living in the central cities of large metropolitan regions (65 percent).

Although the existence of crime--actually and potentially--is not the only criterion by which residents judge the desirability of their neighborhoods, crime nevertheless does play an important role in neighborhood assessment. Here we note, for example, that the more crime victimization people have experienced, the likelier are they to register dissatisfaction with their neighborhoods--32 percent among low or no victimization respondents; 43 percent among moderate victimization respondents; and 46 percent among interviewees who had experienced a relatively high degree of victimization either directly or vicariously during the year prior to the interviews.

Again, where six in ten respondents (59 percent) who perceived their vulnerability to crime to be relatively low or non-existent expressed satisfaction with their neighborhoods, approximately the same proportion of respondents (55 percent) who believed themselves to be highly vulnerable to crime victimization manifested displeasure with their neighborhood.

Finally, we note that as neighborhoods are increasingly judged to be dangerous from the stand point of crime, they increasingly are assessed to be unsatisfactory as places to inhabit . . . 21 percent who say their neighborhoods are relatively safe from crime are not satisfied with them; 38 percent who consider the neighborhoods they live in to be somewhat hazardous claim to

be dissatisfied; and fully 69 percent who believe their neighborhoods to be dangerous express dissatisfaction with those very neighborhoods.

This latter sub-group comprises some 12 percent of the total 1981 sample, and once again reflects an important sub-target that is highly unlikely to engage themselves in crime prevention activities that call for "neighborly" interactions of any sort on the basis of simply being requested to do so in a public communications campaign.

Satisfaction with neighborhood is derived at least in part from (1) whether one's neighbors are perceived to be self-centered or other-directed and (2) whether one's neighbors are perceived to be law-abiding.

Overall, 55 percent of the 1981 sample believed their neighbors to be concerned about others sharing the same neighborhood. The remaining 45 percent perceived their neighbors mostly as "people who go their own way". Accordingly, where 72 percent of the residents of "altruistic" neighborhoods voiced satisfaction with those very locales, 53 percent of the respondents residing in the more "self-centered" neighborhoods reported dissatisfaction with them.

In terms of the overall 1981 sample, 35 percent claimed to reside in locales where "practically all" the neighbors consistently obey the law; 52 percent reported that "most" of their neighbors usually obey the law; and 6 percent complained that "only a few" of their neighbors could be classified as being consistently law-abiding. Among residents of neighborhoods where most or all fellow-residents are perceived to be consistently law abiding, satisfaction with neighborhood was expressed by substantial majorities of 55 percent and 81 percent respectively. In distinct contrast, 86 percent of the respondents who claimed to live among an actual minority of law-abiding neighbors voiced dissatisfaction with their neighborhoods.

Let us return to the matter of perceived neighborhood danger.

Overall, 24 percent of the total 1981 sample was classified as residing in "highly dangerous" neighborhoods; 47 percent in "moderately dangerous" neighborhoods, and the remaining 29 percent was categorized as residing in "relatively safe" neighborhoods.

The influence of perceived neighborhood danger is generally noteworthy in its effects upon specific public's crime prevention orientations and behaviors.

Consider the following:

1. The more dangerous the neighborhood is perceived to be, the more "serious" overall is crime perceived to be. (Highly dangerous neighborhood - 93 percent; moderately dangerous neighborhood - 85 percent; safe neighborhood - 79 percent.)
2. The more hazardous the neighborhood, the more apt are people to be concerned about personal victimization. (Highly dangerous neighborhood - 46 percent; moderately dangerous neighborhood - 41 percent; safe neighborhood - 39 percent.) Inversely, the safer one's neighborhood is considered to be, the lesser is the concern about potential victimization. (Safe neighborhood - 60 percent are less concerned; moderately dangerous neighborhood - 58 percent are less concerned; highly dangerous neighborhood - 53 percent are less concerned.)
3. Perceived neighborhood danger affects people's self-perceptions regarding control over one's life. The 1981 data indicate that as a perceived neighborhood danger increases, the reported ability to guide one's life independently diminishes. (Safe neighborhood - 38 percent; moderately dangerous neighborhood - 30 percent; highly dangerous neighborhood - 24 percent.)

4. Residents of "highly dangerous" (34 percent) versus "safe" neighborhoods (21 percent) are likelier to show high concern regarding their ability to protect themselves against crime. Further, residents of "highly dangerous neighborhoods" are twice as likely (19 percent) as are "safe" neighborhood inhabitants (9 percent) to express a lack of confidence in their ability to protect themselves against crime.

The influence of perceptions of neighborhood danger on specific crime prevention behaviors is by no means clear-cut. For example, in regard to contacting the police we note a strong positive relationship between perceived danger and action. Here, 25 percent of the residents of "safe" neighborhoods report having contacted the police in the year prior to the 1981 interviews as compared to 28 percent of the "moderately dangerous" and 35 percent of the "highly dangerous" neighborhood residents who claim to have contacted the police during the same period.

Similarly, persons who live in highly dangerous neighborhoods (40 percent) are nearly four times as likely to practice avoidance of danger spots as are "safe" area residents (11 percent).

Additionally, residents of high hazard areas (24 percent) are nearly three times as likely as compared to residents of "safe" neighborhoods (9 percent) to discuss crime in general with their relatives, friends and neighbors.

Curiously, perceived neighborhood danger is inversely related to "keeping a watchful eye" on neighbors' homes and belongings. The safer the neighborhood, the likelier are people to keep watch on behalf of their neighbors. ("Safe" neighborhood - 47 percent; "moderately dangerous" neighborhood - 43 percent; "highly dangerous" neighborhood - 40 percent.)

Actions that remain relatively unrelated to perceived neighborhood danger follow:

	Perceived Danger of Neighborhood		
	High (n = 271)	Moderate (n = 540)	Low (Safe) (n = 335)
Observe street activity for suspicious behavior	84%	81%	82%
Act as crime prevention opinion leader	22%	20%	19%
Belong to neighborhood crime prevention group	13%	12%	12%

Membership in Crime Prevention Groups

The latter datum is most interesting. In effect it tells us that although ostensibly residents of highly dangerous neighborhoods have the most to gain from concerted community anti-crime action, they are no more impelled to join in with their neighbors than are their relatively "safer" counterparts.

From another perspective, it appears that by itself the perception of the high threat of crime is not powerful enough to motivate people to join in communal crime prevention efforts. Indeed, living in hazardous environments may serve more to curtail than to accelerate such activity.

Totally, 12 percent of the adults sampled claim memberships in some formal neighborhood group or organization that is involved in crime prevention.

Again, we note that membership in such groups and organizations is disproportionately high among "up-scale" sub-populations as contrasted to persons occupying niches in the bottom half of the socio-economic ladder.

Thus, we find that 19 percent among college graduates as compared to 6% among those with less than a full high school education claim memberships in neighborhood crime prevention groups and organizations.

Additional comparisons worth noting:

- Membership among persons in prestigious occupations - 20%; among skilled/unskilled workers - 10%.
- Membership among individuals describing themselves as belonging to the upper/middle social classes - 19%; among persons identifying themselves as "working class" members - 10%.
- Memberships among persons earning $20,000-$29,999 annually - 16%; among those earning less than $20,000 - 9%.
- Membership among residents of "upper-class" neighborhoods - 22%; among residents of "working class" neighborhoods - 10%.

Residents of middle-sized cities (250,000-1 million population) and those living in the South Atlantic region (24 percent and 17 percent respectively) are the most likely to join neighborhood crime prevention groups.

Not surprising are the relationships that were found to exist between joining neighborhood crime prevention groups and respondents' experience with (1) victimization (2) perceived vulnerability and (3) worry about crime. In each instance, as the following figures show, increases in the experience foster increases in the frequency of membership.

	Membership in Neighborhood Crime Prevention Groups (Total = 12%)		
	Low	Moderate	High
Victimization experience	8%	13%	16%
Perceived vulnerability	9%	11%	17%
Worry about crime	9%	13%	16%

However, the three factors above appear to be relatively weak as singular motivators by themselves. All we can speculate is that victimization, vulnerability, and concern contribute somewhat--though not critically--to impelling

people to join neighborhood crime prevention groups, and that without them, such membership is likely to fall minutely below average.

One important factor that appears to intervene between membership in crime prevention organizations, respondents' characteristics and their crime-related concerns and experience is their belief in the efficacy of such groups.

Seven of every ten Americans simply do not believe that neighborhood groups and organizations are very effective vehicles for preventing crime.

"How effective do you think neighborhood (crime prevention) groups are in helping to reduce crime?"

Very effective	- 30%
Somewhat effective	- 52%
Hardly effective at all	- 10%
No opinion	- 7%

As we see from the following, optimism-pessimism regarding the effectiveness of neighborhood crime prevention groups is powerful indeed in affecting membership.

	Belong to neighborhood crime prevention groups (12%)
In regard to preventing crime, neighborhood groups are:	
Very effective (356)	20%
Somewhat effective (612)	12%
Hardly effective at all (117)	2%

Again, communicators are faced with considerable prior public skepticism to overcome before substantial proportions beyond the current 1 in 10 actually adopt suggestions for joining in with their neighbors in formalized crime prevention groups. Given the current climate of relative skepticism, not much progress can be expected on this front in the near future unless, of course,

communicators diligently begin at once the difficult task of first convincing a fairly skeptical public to surrender their doubts. Only after that is accomplished can suggesting increases in membership in neighborhood crime fighting groups begin to take on an aspect of "reasonableness". Theoretically, one could increase current memberships in neighborhood crime prevention groups more than one and a half fold by convincing those who now believe such prevention efforts to be only partially consequential to consider the same efforts as being in fact potentially highly effective.

A key differentiation between the sub-groups who believe neighborhood organizations to be "very effective" against crime and those who consider them to be just partially effective is the relatively high degree to which the former sub-group perceives individual citizen actions to be important in fighting crime.

Those who consider neighborhood groups to be highly effective are the most likely to give high consideration to a variety of crime prevention actions that involve citizens qua individuals.

Consider the crime prevention efforts of neighborhood groups to be:

	Very effective (30%)	Somewhat effective (52%)
Compared to the police, individual citizens have more responsibility for crime prevention	40%	50%
If ordinary citizens took more precautions, crime would be reduced a great deal	44%	49%
Respondent feels "very confident" about his/her ability to protect self against crime	41%	47%
Respondent feels he/she is doing a "good job" as an individual in preventing crime	44%	26%

Being socially integrated into one's neighborhood also plays an important role in whether he or she considers joining a neighborhood crime prevention organization. Here we find that two-and-one-half times the respondents who claim to know most of their neighbors (14 percent) as compared to those acknowledging familiarity with "hardly any" (6 percent) of their neighbors claim membership in neighborhood crime-prevention organizations.

One apparently important factor that influences such a disparity between socially integrated residents and those who are not is the former's proportionately greater belief in the effectiveness of neighborhood groups to actually prevent crimes--39 percent among those residents in the neighborhoods that are socially integrated versus 28 percent among those that are not integrated.

On the matter of persuading increased numbers to join neighborhood groups communicators will encounter a circularity that presents very serious barriers to be overcome. Thus far, large numbers of people living in "better" (i.e. low crime) neighborhoods to begin with either have formed crime prevention groups or joined already established groups together with people they previously have known and respected. They have done so in the strong belief-among others-that such actions can be effective. The continued low crime conditions of their neighborhoods--whether they are consequences of these activities or not--serve to reenforce beliefs in the efficacy of neighborhood crime prevention groups, and continue to contribute to the motivations that underpin membership.

At the same time many residents of socially disorganized (i.e. high crime) neighborhoods--in particular those who are isolated from their neighbors by distrust and suspicion--see no way in which they can band together with "strangers" in activities that merely promise to reduce crime. The continued high crime rates in socially disorganized areas can serve to reenforce the fatalistic notion that nothing can curb crime--including

concerted "neighborhood" activity. And so these particular types of residents tend to shy away from forming (almost an impossibility for these people) or joining already-formed neighborhood crime groups that are comprised of persons they do not know or respect.

From the standpoint of public communications efforts that seek to increase membership in neighborhood crime prevention groups a two-fold effort appears to be worth contemplating.

1. A strategy that aims at the formation of such groups primarily among upper and middle-class civic-minded "cosmopolitan" groups to be supplemented by messages designed to direct more cosmopolitans into already-formed neighborhood anti-crime organizations.
2. Efforts that instruct already-established church, fraternal, and civic group opinion-leaders serving socially disorganized areas to incorporate crime prevention components into their on-going larger programs to be complemented by efforts designed to increase local neighborhood membership in these already-established-and accepted-"organic" groups and organizations.

Crime Prevention Know-How and Competence

Most Americans (68%) believe that their knowledge about what to do to lessen the possibility of their falling victim to crime represents less than an integrated solidly grounded body of substantial information, 23% believe they are very knowledgeable in this regard, and 8% admit to not knowing much at all about warding off the prospects of falling victim to criminal activity.

The "partially knowledgeable" majority (68%) are more apt to be younger, residents of households with three or four children, occupants of multiple

dwellings, citizens of the North Central states, and residents of metropolitan suburbs (Table 4-23).

Persons believing themselves to be nearly expert with regard to preventing crimes (23 percent) are more likely to be males; in prestigeful occupations; college graduates; affluent and upper SES; inhabitants of the West South Central region; and residents of middle-sized cities.

The subgroup that considers itself to be relatively uninformed about crime prevention (8 percent) is represented disproportionately by the elderly; the least well-educated; the least well-off financially; and by citizens from the East South Central region of the U.S.

In short, where the self-ascribed "informed" fit in characteristically with the classic "cosmopolitan" profile, the "uninformed" represent the equally-classic "parochial" hardest-to-reach "peripheral" targets.

Information campaigns designed to "educate" the public as a whole about crime prevention will be most effective in mainly reaching the cosmopolitans initially and least effective in reaching the parochials last--if ever.

Of considerable potential is that rather substantial two-thirds who remain in the middle of the knowledge spectrum. What a communications target they represent!

Although two-thirds of the adults sampled in the 1981 national survey describe themselves as being only partially informed about what to do in order to protect themselves against possible victimization, considerably less than a third (29 percent) expressed a "great" need to know more about it than they already did. Forty-one percent said they had a "small" need for additional crime prevention information, and 29 percent reported having hardly any need at all for such knowledge.

Table 4-24 presents data on the relationships between knowledge held and knowledge needed.

Current high levels of crime prevention knowledge do not influence how much knowledge respondents would like to have. At the same time moderately informed persons are most likely to look towards moderate amounts of further information; and the presently relatively uninformed are most likely not to seek out any such information in the future.

What should not be overlooked is the fact that six of every ten persons who admit they lack crime prevention knowledge now recognize their shortcoming and presumably would be attentive to such information were it to come their way. The same holds true for two-thirds of those who consider themselves currently to be well-informed and for three-fourths of the individuals who believe that at this time their knowledge level in regard to self-protection is fragmentary.

In short, despite the crime prevention information-giving efforts of the past, substantial majorities of Americans still believe they ought to know more about self-protection than they did in the Fall of 1981.

Blacks and other members of racial/ethnic minorities as well as heads of households with four or more children are most likely to express a high need for crime prevention information (Table 4-25). The same holds true for metro central city residents and inhabitants of the South Central region.

Additionally, females, white collar workers, persons earning less than $20,000 annually, renters, residents of working class/poor neighborhoods and persons living on the Pacific coast plus residents of middle-sized cities are all likelier to see themselves needing a high degree of crime prevention information.

Mountain states residents are most likely to report they require a moderate degree of crime prevention information.

Persons either in skilled/service jobs or on the more prestigious occupations are likelier to seek moderate levels of crime prevention information. The same holds true for those earning between $20,000 and $30,000 annually and for residents of metropolitan and middle-sized suburbs.

The elderly and inhabitants of the West North Central region are the least likely to acknowledge they require much information about crime prevention.

Further, disproportionate representation of executives/professionals, the affluent, and residents of smaller cities and their environs appears within this rubric.

In addition to these demographic influences, several experiental and perceptual factors affect expressed requirements for crime prevention information.

For example, where overall 29 percent of the 1981 national sample cites a high need for such information, 57 percent of the individuals who worry intensively about the possibility of being victimized say they need a lot of crime prevention information. More than half of the residents (52 percent) who believe their neighborhoods to be highly dangerous are cognizant of a very strong need for crime prevention information. A similar case in point is made up of the more than 4 in every 10 (43 percent) who believe themselves to be highly vulnerable to victimization.

In contrast are the 48 percent of those who worry little, if at all, about possible victimization and who say they need very little or no information whatever about self-protection--as compared to 29 percent totally. Four in ten (43 percent) respondents who see their neighborhoods as relatively safe from crime also visualize very little or no need for further information about

self-protection. Finally, individuals who have had no or very little victimization experience are less apt to feel a need for further crime prevention information by 37 percent to 29 percent overall.

In sum, people who see themselves in some actual or potential danger and whose levels of knowledge are low are highly sensitized to their need for information on how to reduce or eliminate crime hazards. The reverse holds true for individuals whose experiences, previously acquired knowledge, and perceptions appear to spell their relative safety out of harm's way. Of course, cutting across these two subgroups is the one major factor of socio-economic status (SES). The higher the SES, the more likely is the individual not to encounter actual and potential crime activity; the likelier he or she to be knowledgeable about what to do for protection; to actually have implemented certain effective actions; and to be relatively unconcerned about the prospect of future victimization. As a consequence, merely absorbing additional crime prevention "facts" for these particular respondents no doubt would represent an exercise in unrewarding redundancy.

Need for Crime Prevention Information and Media Usage

With the exception of magazines, the more cognizant people are of their need for further crime prevention information, the likelier they are to pay a great deal of attention to crime news in each of the media (Table 4-26).

Even in their informal conversations with people they know or are related to, the individuals whose need for crime prevention information is strong are most likely to be highly attentive to crime news.

The reverse pattern exists among those acknowledging a rather low need or no need at all for crime prevention information.

The people manifesting the least interest in acquiring information regarding self-protection are the least likely to interest themselves in news about crime--no matter the source.

The conclusion is warranted that a good portion of the motivations for directing one's attention to news about crime is instrumental in nature. After all, where does one turn to for authoritative information about what to do to protect oneself against crime? No systematic authorative body of knowledge is readily and conveniently available to the public. Consequently, the public turns to the most consistent source of materials relating to crime that is available--the media. And whether literally or via analog and metaphor, the news about crime that is reported in the media (particularly on TV) as well as in face to face exchanges and gossip serves as an instructor of sorts to those who acknowledge a need to know about how best to prevent crimes. The media, it turns out, are peculiarly suited as vehicles for the effective dissemination of crime prevention information. For one thing, they have a "built-in" eager, attentive and potentially receptive audience of sizable dimension out there already as witnessed, for example, by the inordinately high level awareness that the McGruff campaign achieved in its initial phases.

Two major sources afford large numbers of American's news about crime--the media and face-to-face informal conversation.

With the exception of crime news that appears in magazines--as Table 4-27A indicates--majorities of the adult population sampled claim to pay at least a modicum of attention to the crime news that is disseminated in each--in telecasts, radio broadcasts, in newspapers and in word-of-mouth exchanges. By far television news about crime appears to garner the highest degree of attention from the largest single proportion (40 percent) of the 1981 sample. Interesting to note is the finding that a fourth of those respondents claim to

devote a high level of attention to the crime news that pops up in informal conversations--equalling the same proportion that says it focuses a similarly high degree of attention on radio broadcasts of crime news.

The data in Table 4-27A merit further attention, for they clearly challenge the popular notion that the seemingly high degree of attention that we Americans appear to give to news about crime is somehow exaggerated and even unrealistic--as some researchers of the University of Pennsylvania school of thought have recently been suggesting. The data point to an alternate interpretation.

Clearly, attention to news about crime reflects a linear relationship to realities of (1) actual direct and/or vicarious experience with victimization and (2) concerns about potential victimization that may grow out of residing in dangerous neighborhoods. Concern about possible victimization is the major factor that appears to sensitize mostly vulnerable individuals to attend news about crime. And here the media as well as people perform the classic Lasswellian "surveillance" function--of warning message recipients of impending threats to personal and community stability. One suspects that unrealistic fantasy and neurotic anxiety play relatively negligible roles in these cases. Nor--given the linear relationships between high victimization and high attention to crime news--can one seriously accept the "reverse" proposition that "unrealistic" or "exaggerated" treatment by the media cause undue or "unrealistic" concern about crime among the public.

As noted earlier, nearly six in every ten (59 percent) adults interviewed in 1981 believed that "crime is more serious than the newspapers and TV say." Only a handful (4 percent) thought the media exaggerated the realities of crime incidence, while a third (35 percent) thought that the media's treatment of the incidence of crime was more or less accurate.

Table 4-27B is revealing in that it points to the relative influence of non-media phenomena on public perceptions of the actual seriousness of crime vis-a-vis the media's treatment of crime.

Here we note that persons who believe that the realities of crime are more serious than the media make them out to be are considerably more apt to find roots for their belief in their places of residence; in their concerns regarding the potentialities of being victimized; and in their informal gossiping than they are either by focusing their attention on crime news generally in the media or in their frequent attendance to televised crime fiction.

Compared to the sample as a whole, neither do heavy viewers of television crime dramas believe that "real" crime is more serious than is conveyed in the media nor do infrequent viewers consider "real" crime to be less serious than do the media present it to be. In short, heavy exposure to crime fiction on TV does not affect viewers' beliefs in the seriousness of crime.

Not only do determined prevention information seekers frequently turn to TV news for the information they need, they are also likelier to view televised crime dramas as well (Table 4-27).

Compared to their distributions in the sample, frequent viewers of television crime dramas are more apt to be:

- Young people below the age of 25 - 23%
- Caucasians - 48%
- Persons with less than a completed high school education - 25%
- Persons in unskilled/skilled occupations - 23%
- Persons earning less than $10,000 annually - 25%
- Residents of households with 3 children - 23%

Although victimization experience and perceived vulnerability do not influence frequency of viewing crime fiction programming, residence in dangerous neighborhoods (23 percent) and worry about being victimized (23 percent) do.

On the opposite, rare and non-viewing end of the TV crime drama exposure spectrum we find disproportionately large sub-groups that are made up of:

- Old persons aged 65 and over - 61%
- College graduates - 59%
- People in prestigious occupations - 59%
- Middle class persons (self-designated) - 50%

Overall, six in ten respondents considered TV dramas as projecting at least a partially "accurate picture of crime in America" (11 percent believed that crime programs offer a "very accurate" representation of reality.) Twenty-nine percent considered TV crime dramas skeptically--as not presenting crime in this land accurately.

Whether one believes that TV dramas offer accurate expositions of crime or not depends among other factors upon the frequency with which people view such fare as the following figures show. Frequent viewers are most apt to believe that crime dramas present very accurate portrayals, while rare or non-viewers are most likely to hold an opinion that focuses on estimates of inaccuracy in TV crime dramas.

Portrayals of crime in TV crime dramas are:

	Watch televised crime dramas		
	Very often (197)	Sometimes (416)	Hardly ever (428)
Very accurate	23%	10%	9%
Somewhat accurate	54%	65%	49%
Not accurate	23%	25%	43%

Of course, one must keep in mind the possibility that perceptions of accuracy may serve as motivations for either viewing or not viewing crime dramas in the first place, and that these outcomes are simply reflections of reenforced prior attitudes.

Frequent viewers of TV crime dramas differ from their less frequent viewing counterparts on a number of dimensions that are important to involving citizens in crime prevention activities.

- For example, frequent viewers are likelier to feel they have a great deal of control over the things that affect their lives.

  Frequent viewers - 36%
  Occasional viewers - 27%
  Rare viewers - 32%

- Frequent viewers of TV crime dramas are more apt to believe that individual citizens can do things that will help to reduce crimes substantially.

  Frequent viewers - 53%
  Occasional viewers - 46%
  Rare viewers - 46%

- Frequent viewers are more likely to be highly confident about their own ability to protect themselves against crime.

  Frequent viewers - 44%
  Occasional viewers - 30%
  Rare viewers - 30%

- Frequent viewers of TV crime shows are likelier to consider themselves as being well informed in regard to what to do in order to prevent crimes.

  Frequent viewers - 53%
  Occasional viewers - 46%
  Rare viewers - 46%

- Frequent viewers are likelier to be asked their ideas about crime prevention. They are more apt to be opinion leaders on the matter of crime prevention.

  Frequent viewers - 28%
  Occasional viewers - 18%
  Rare viewers - 19%

What is most paradoxical is that for perhaps the large majority of Americans who view TV crime dramas, these entertainment programs appear not so much to be, as some have argued, "schools" which "teach" the commission of crime, but rather, these shows appear to function as sources of information regarding the prevention of crimes. In particular, persons who acknowledge a great need for information about how best to protect oneself from the threats of crime are the most frequent viewers of television crime fiction. It may be--always considering the reverse possibility that a primary rationale for doing so for this particular subgroup is their relatively high belief that the dramatized portrayals of crime in its various facets (including the strategies of prevention) are indeed accurate representations of reality.

Individuals who are relatively disinterested in viewing crime dramas on TV are more apt to be disinterested in the acquisition of knowledge about crime prevention as well. One important element in this mix is the proportionately

higher degree of skepticism this subgroup manifests regarding the accuracy of such fictionalized portrayals.

Exposure to Explicit Crime Prevention Information and Action

Asked to indicate how often they had encountered specific crime prevention information in the mass media--other than that contained in the McGruff campaign--during the twelve months preceeding the interviews--

- 25% of the 1981 sample said they had come across such information "frequently".
- 57% claimed exposure to crime prevention information "occasionally".
- 15% said they had not encountered such information at all.
- 4% could not recall having seen or heard any such information during the period specified.

In other words, where a fourth of the 1981 sample appeared to encounter substantial amounts of specific crime prevention information in the media during a one year period prior to this study, a countervailing fifth either did not come across such materials at all or else they could not recall having done so. The majority (57 percent) were aware of encountering crime prevention information only on occasion--that is to say, irregularly and perhaps, haphazardly.

A number of facts emerging from the 1981 study suggest that high frequency encounters with crime prevention information is more likely to reflect certain sensitivities and the needs of certain media audiences than it is of sheer volume of materials that is made available by the media--that is to say, that for those who are frequently aware of crime prevention information, such information appears to serve a variety of instrumental needs. Thirty-five percent of those acknowledging a "great need" for information about preventing

crime encountered such information. In contrast, 24 percent of those with a "small need" and 18 percent with "no need" said they were frequently exposed to crime prevention information in the media. Additionally, persons who were frequently exposed to crime prevention messages appear to seek out such information; pay attention to it and put it to use more so than the population as a whole.

Note the following:

Where overall 25 percent of the 1981 sample encountered crime prevention information "frequently":

- 53 percent of the people who claimed they usually pay "a lot of attention" to such information claimed frequent encounters with such material in the media.
- 42 percent of those who say they "often" discuss crime with others reported coming across crime prevention information "frequently".
- 40 percent of the crime prevention opinion leaders in the sample reported frequent exposure to crime prevention information.
- 33 percent of those respondents who reflected a relatively high degree of concern regarding their personal protection claimed a similar high degree of awareness of crime prevention information in the media.

Interestingly, we observe in the following data that in each of twelve separate crime prevention actions a linear relationship occurs between the claimed frequency of exposure to crime prevention information and reported participation in that particular action.

Exposed to crime prevention information in the media during 12-month period:

	Total (1,188)	Often (293)	Occasionally (674)	Never (179)
Installed special locks	44%	48%	45%	38%
Installed outdoor lights	43%	50%	44%	30%
Kept dog for security	35%	38%	36%	35%
Purchased theft insurance	33%	44%	32%	9%
Owned gun, other personal security devices	30%	39%	28%	23%
Contacted police	29%	36%	27%	24%
Installed entry door peep hole	20%	24%	20%	15%
Had property engraved with ID	18%	24%	18%	12%
Joined neighborhood crime prevention group	12%	20%	10%	8%
Had police do home security check	10%	18%	8%	4%
Used anti-theft stickers	10%	15%	10%	3%
Installed burglar alarm	6%	9%	5%	4%

The data suggest that although crime prevention information by itself may not "cause" crime prevention action-taking, nevertheless without such information available, current action-taking by the public would no doubt be substantially diminished.

The data discussed in this section carry with them two important implications for future mass communications strategies.

First, there is no one consistent day-to-day easily available source that various publics with various needs can go to for accurate and reliable information regarding crime prevention.

One source that currently is attempting to fill this vacuum is precisely the one that the public is showing considerable ambivalence, and even hostility, towards--"government." Moreover, the crime prevention information various agencies of government ordinarily trys to disseminate is sporadic,

diffuse, often speculative and contradictory, and it rarely appears in the television and newspaper formats most information seekers are accustomed to.

Second, the media appear to include "prevention" information in their news and entertainment materials quite casually and residually--without design or emphasis.

What might happen if the TV and newspaper media were to be persuaded to voluntarily feature prevention information in their various news slots with some regularity? What might happen if writers and producers of TV crime dramas such as Hill Street Blues were to be persuaded to occasionally "weave in" specific high-priority crime prevention information into their presentations?

No sudden miracles of massive public action-taking on behalf of crime prevention would occur. But one would expect considerable information gain to take place among significant information-needy target groups within relatively short periods of time.

Whether such information gain would automatically translate itself into significant action-taking is open to question. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to reach--as many as is possible--those individuals who acknowledge their strong need for crime prevention information.

People's Sources of Information

In addition to the formal media as sources of information, we have been instructed that informal exchanges of crime related news and information serve as vehicles for learning about crime prevention for the majority of Americans as well.

	Discuss crime in general with neighbors, friends, family and others	Discuss crime prevention with neighbors, friends, family and others
Very often	14%	12%
Some of the time	56%	47%
Rarely or never	29%	39%
Can't tell	1%	1%

As a matter of fact, the more frequently individuals talk to each other about crime in general, the likelier are they to exchange views about how it may be prevented.

	Discuss crime in general		
	Very often (171)	Some of the time (656)	Rarely or never (343)
Discuss crime prevention:			
Very often	51%	7%	3%
Some of the time	40%	68%	14%
Rarely or never	9%	25%	83%

Although it is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of these informal exchanges as to their accuracy and persuasiveness, a number of findings from the 1981 survey suggest that the more people simply talk crime over among themselves, the likelier they are to engage in recommended crime prevention actions both generally and specifically. A point deserving serious consideration by those involved in developing sound strategies for public communication on behalf of crime prevention.

In this regard, we note that fully 9 of every 10 respondents who said they frequently talk to others about crime and its prevention report taking some actions to protect themselves against crime. In comparison, 86% of the "occasional" crime discussants and 73 percent of the "rare" and non-discussants

reported that they generally engage in some crime prevention actions of some sort.

Two examples of specific action-taking follow.

Where 38 percent of the individuals in the "frequent" crime discussion category claimed they had contacted the police in the year preceeding the interviews, 33 percent of those in the "occasional" and 17 percent of those in the "rare/never" crime discussion rubics claimed they had taken similar actions.

Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, memberships in neighborhood crime groups is related positively to the amount of conversation about crime people say they engage in--the more talk the greater is the likelihood of joining up.

Claimed membership in neighborhood crime prevention organizations was 12% totally.

Among "frequent" crime discussants it was 20 percent; among "occasional" crime discussants - 13 percent; among "rare/non" discussants it was 6 percent.

In the absence of a systematic, formalized, authoritative, and readily accessible crime prevention information environment, people often turn to those individuals who they believe to be the best informed on the subject--to the crime prevention opinion leaders.

Crime Prevention Opinion Leaders

Nationally, a fifth of the 1981 sample (19 percent) qualified as crime prevention opinion leaders on the basis of their responses to the question, "Are you more likely or less likely to be asked for your ideas and opinion's about what to do to prevent crimes in this neighborhood?"

- 40 percent indicated they were "less likely" to be asked about their ideas and opinions regarding crime prevention.
- 34 percent perceived themselves as neither opinion "leaders" nor "followers".
- 7 percent were unable to classify themselves as either of the two.

The fact that one in five Americans serve as self-perceived sources of crime prevention information today is highly encouraging . . . provided of course that the "information" these "leaders" are disseminating is accurate and effective.

Important to note is the fact crime prevention opinion leaders are substantially more likely to serve as local sources of news information and ideas about both crime and crime prevention regardless of how "effective" they are--as the following figures show:

	Crime Prevention Opinion		
	Total	Leaders	Followers
Discuss crime in general:			
Very often	14%	29%	13%
Sometimes	56%	57%	54%
Hardly at all	29%	14%	36%
Make it a point to join together with neighbors to discuss crime prevention	49%	63%	36%
Exchange ideas about "what citizens can do to prevent crime":			
Very often	12%	33%	6%
Sometimes	47%	51%	41%
Hardly ever at all	39%	16%	53%

Characteristically, crime prevention opinion "leaders" are considerably more neighborhood oriented than are their "follower" counterparts:

	Crime Prevention Opinion		
	Total	Leaders	Followers
Opinion leaders are more likely to know most of their neighbors	46%	48%	41%
They are more apt to:			
Believe neighborhood groups can be "very effective" in helping to reduce crime	30%	51%	27%
Have been or are members of neighborhood crime prevention groups	12%	24%	8%
Observe street activity from where they reside, "usually"	82%	91%	77%
Maintain a helpful watch on their neighbors' property and possessions "always"	43%	57%	40%
They are likelier to be opinion leaders with regard to neighborhood matters in general	19%	88%	8%

Likelier to fall into the crime prevention opinion leader classification (19 percent totally) are:

- Males (24%)
- Persons aged 35-54 (25%)
- Persons with "some college" education (25%)
- Individuals from the upper/middle social classes (self-designated) (27%)
- People who earn $20,000 or more (27%)
- Residents of upper class neighborhoods (25%)

Overall the "cosmopolitan" and "up-scale" characteristics that classically have distinguished opinion leaders from the population as a whole apply to crime prevention opinion leaders as well . . . with one overriding critical difference: The more experience with victimization people have had, the

likelier are they to fall into the crime prevention opinion leader rubric. Here we note that where totally 19 percent of the national 1981 sample qualified as crime prevention opinion leaders, 14 percent of the low victimization sub-group, 20 percent of the moderate victimization sub-group and 28 percent of the high victimization sub-group were classified as such. Thus, it appears that either direct or indirect first-hand experience with crime victimization serves to enhance the perceived "expertise" of general opinion leaders, and victimization experience apparently contributes to their further acceptability as crime prevention opinion leaders.

As opinion leaders regarding the prevention of crime, individuals draw on the media for their expertise as well as on their backgrounds and victimization experience. In this regard we note that crime prevention opinion leaders considerably beyond their distribution in the population--are far more likely to give a great deal of attention to news about crimes:

A. In magazines - 34%
B. In conversations - 27%
C. On radio - 27%
D. On TV - 26%
E. In newspapers - 26%

Additionally, crime prevention opinion leaders (28 percent) are likelier to be frequent viewers of television crime drama viewers.

The data on crime prevention opinion leadership are important to bear in mind in developing future strategies for public communications on behalf of crime prevention. For here is an important message dissemination resource that has the potentiality of reaching hard-to-reach targets that may be by-passed by the media in the classical "two-step" flow process from the media to the opinion leaders to the opinion followers.

Here we must recognize that the information needs of opinion leaders differ from those of the public as a whole. For one, they need materials that can be passed on to others readily and with effect. Similarly, crime prevention opinion leaders should be looked upon as integral components of all public communications campaigns and as such require "special" training and deployment through various communities. Special efforts must be made (1) to sustain and enlarge the current cadres of crime prevention opinion leaders and (2) to provide those opinion leaders with information materials that will strengthen their statuses and sustain their acceptance as crime prevention "authorities" among their followers.

Information, Belief and Action

The appropriate cliche to introduce the upcoming discussion is that "knowledge is power." Let us see. If knowledge about crime prevention does not necessarily cause action-taking directly, it can be expected to contribute to people's sense of competence in regard to self protection. In other words, where many of the recommended crime prevention actions that are being directed nowadays to various publics require varieties of prior skill and adequate resources, to an important degree perceptions of self-competence are based on prior knowledge about what to do in order to protect one's self against crime effectively.

Table 4-28 clearly demonstrates the confidence-building function of crime prevention information. Twice as many individuals who consider themselves to be well informed about crime prevention as compared to the sample as a whole believe themselves to be particularly able to protect themselves against crimes.

By way of comparision, vis-a-vis the total sample, four times as many of the "uninformed" manifest a lack of confidence in their ability to protect themselves.

Overall, then, the more knowledgeable people are about protecting themselves and their loved ones against crime, the likelier they are to have confidence in their own ability to do so effectively. To an important degree in this situation, "knowledge" does indeed appear to be transformed into "power" . . . psychological power.

As noted previously, when respondents were asked "How confident do you feel that you as an individual can do things to help protect yourself from crime?"

- 32% of the 1981 national sample answered "very confident"
- 56% replied, "somewhat confident"
- 11% said, "not very confident at all."

Not surprisingly, high confidence in one's ability to protect one's self decreases with age--the older beyond the age of 34 one becomes, the less self-confidence one manifests (Table 4-29). Again, not unexpectedly, compared to females, males are nearly twice as as likely to feel quite capable of protecting themselves against crime. Disproportionate numbers of persons engaged in skilled/service work, and persons earning $30,000 and over annually express particular high trust in their ability. Overall, higher SES individuals tend to bunch up in the high confidence end of the spectrum where, in contrast to the 32 percent of the total sample expressing high self-confidence, 37% of the college graduates; 37 percent of those identifying themselves as upper/upper middle class members; and 37 percent of the residents of upper/middle class neighborhoods manifest a relatively high degree of confidence regarding their ability to protect themselves.

In other words, there are indications that persons in the higher SES categories are somewhat more likely than lower SES individuals to express feelings of self-confidence in regard to self-protection skills. Of course, what may be operating here is the fact that higher SES individuals generally have access to more information by virtue of their higher educational achievement, and they can afford to avail themselves more readily of certain prevention devices and services (e.g. burglar alarm systems and theft insurance) by virtue of their greater affluence to begin with.

Overall, residents of middle-sized cities and of the states making up the West South Central region are likelier to manifest a high degree of self-confidence.

On the opposite, negative end of the self-confidence spectrum we are most apt to find, again, not surprisingly: (1) elderly persons and (2) individuals who live in the inner sections of our largest urban centers.

Between the two poles of high and low manifestations of self-confidence are the majority of Americans who feel neither too positively nor too negatively about themselves as having the necessary skills for warding off the threats of crime. They are ambivalent with regard to how well they as individuals can manage in undertaking their own protection. This poses a most serious problem for advocates of crime prevention to try to resolve.

In this somewhat ambiguous circumstance, we see disproportionate distributions of persons approaching retirement (55-64 yrs.), white collar personnel, individuals living alone, residents of both smaller cities (10,000 - 50,000) and of the suburbs touching middle-sized cities (250,000 - 1 million) and citizens of the East South Central portion of the USA--all of whom show some capacity to try to protect themselves, but also harbor some doubts at the same time.

Table 4-30 shows how crime related experiences and belief regarding one's safety affect feelings of self-confidence.

Here we note that as direct/vicarious victimization experience increases, so does the expression of high self-confidence. This is as if to say that the "survivors" of criminal incidents--wherein they (or someone they know) actually may have thwarted a crime or at least emerged from such an incident relatively unscathed--are the likeliest to consider themselves to be very competent in protecting themselves from danger.

Coincidentally, as the perceived dangers of the neighborhoods respondents live in subsides, belief in one's ability to ward off the dangers of crime grows in strength.

What we see overall is that on the one hand, degrees of self-confidence are rooted in one's own (or that of significant to others) previous experience in overcoming a threat as well as in the perceptions of how safe the environment resided in may be.

One conclusion that presents itself is that the presence or lack of confidence in one's ability to prevent crimes stems from certain specific realities of who people are, where they live, and their survival experiences vis-a-vis crimes in which they and/or persons close to them were involved. The possibility that lack of confidence here is merely an outcropping from some general neurotic trait or that it is a fanciful consequence of too much exposure to "unrealistic" televised crime dramas is not borne out by the data.

If anything, to cite just one illustrative finding, frequent exposure to televised crime dramas is far likelier than either occasional or infrequent exposure to such fare to be positively related to feelings of high competence among audiences by respective margins of 44 percent to 30 percent

to 30 percent. Whether high self-confidence precedes frequent exposure to crime dramas or the other way around cannot be resolved with the data at hand.

What is of interest is the possibility that certain types of dramatized messages regarding the protection of self against crime are getting through to particular audiences in either building or reenforcing their sense of competence.

This is extremely important in developing communications strategies aimed at persuading people to act in recommended ways that supposedly will result in the reduction or elimination of street crimes in the USA. For one thing, the placement of crime prevention PSAs <u>within</u> crime dramas seems worth thinking about, given the circumstances.

Table 4-31 indicates that the more confidence people feel about their ability to ward off the dangers of crime, the more "control" over their lives in general do they claim to have. Here we note that nearly twice the proportions of the "very confident" versus the "not very confident" claim a high degree of self-reliance overall. In contrast, three times as many individuals who <u>lack</u> self-confidence, as compared to those expressing confidence, admit to having just the most minute general control over their lives.

Overall, we have seen the distributions for the ability to control one's life as being similar to those for confidence in one's ability to protect one's self against crimes.

However, where demographic characteristics influence confidence in one's self-protection capabilities importantly, they do not affect control over one's life (i.e. independence) to any significant degree. Rather, as Table 4-32 shows, high independence is affected (but not very strongly) by, for example, (1) general anomie--the higher the anomie the lower is the ability to implement a great deal of "self"-control; by (2) personal/vicarious crime victimization--

the less experience one has as a crime victim, the likelier is the individual to claim high personal independence; by (3) the "safety" of the environment in which one lives--the more dangerous one's neighborhood is believed to be, the less sovereignty over one's personal destiny is proclaimed.

In a similar vein we note that persons who see themselves as relatively highly vulnerable to crime victimization in general are less apt to claim a high degree of independence with regard to controlling their personal lives.

Finally, it appears that people who worry the least about possibly enduring some crime victimization are the most likely to assert the strongest control over their personal affairs.

These and additional beliefs regarding self-competence vis-a-vis protection against criminal activity can be expected to come into play in the crime protection actions various publics either engage in or not. Consider the following:

- Persons who feel relatively incompetent are likelier to be concerned about the effects of crime upon self (55 percent).
- Those who manifest a high degree of self-confidence (67 percent) are three times as likely as those who lack self confidence (22 percent) to believe strongly in the efficacy of individual citizen action-taking in actually reducing the incidence of crime.

  Conversely, persons who feel themselves to be relatively incompetent are most likely to be skeptical about the efficacy of citizen participation in crime prevention by a margin of 31 percent to 4 percent among those who are "very" confident.
- The "very" confident are twice as likely as the "not very" confident (41 percent to 21 percent) to accept the proposition that

neighborhood citizen's crime-fighting groups and organizations are "very" effective in reducing neighborhood crime.

  On the other hand, those who lack self-confidence are twice as apt to reject the thesis when compared to the highly confident respondents (22 percent to 11 percent).
- Perhaps the most important finding here relates to the differential in interest in <u>crime prevention</u> that confident vs. non-confident individuals express.

Fifty-two percent of the "very" confident as compared to 41% of respondents lacking confidence claim to have developed recently a <u>high</u> degree of interest in crime prevention.

The relationship between feelings of self-confidence and engaging in specific crime prevention behaviors is not at all linear. At times, the relationship is a positive one; in some instances, it is an inverse one; and in other situations, no relationship is obtained. In other words, whether the feelings of competence to deal with crime dangers will or will not enter into taking specific crime prevention depends a good deal, among other factors, on "what it takes" to carry out those particular actions; whether it takes know-how and knowledge mostly; whether it takes just simple routine habit; whether it takes a risky investment of money; and so on.

Here are some actions to which positive self-competence feelings are importantly related:

- Contacted the police in past year to report a crime or suspicious activity (29%):

<u>Very confident</u>	<u>Somewhat confident</u>	<u>Not very confident</u>
29%	59%	12%

- Observed street activity in front of residence, "usually" (82%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
84%	84%	69%

- Discussed crime prevention matters with others "very often" (14%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
19%	9%	8%

- Belonged to a community improvement group or organization (n = 43% of all 523 respondents who belong to a club/organization):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
50%	40%	43%

- Had been (or is) a member of a neighborhood citizen crime prevention group or organization (12%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
19%	9%	10%

- Had personal property engraved with ID (18%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
24%	17%	10%

- Used anti theft stickers (10%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
14%	9%	5%

- Had local police do home security check (13%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
13%	8%	5%

- Installed outdoor security lights (43%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
48%	40%	41%

- Kept pet dog at least partially for security (35%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
37%	36%	27%

- Purchased theft insurance (33%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
35%	33%	27%

- Owned guns, other personal security devices (30%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
42%	27%	14%

- Have taken none of the ten actions asked in Q. 83 (including the above latter six) (15%):

Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not very confident
10%	14%	24%

These actions also appear to be affected by a very positive belief in one's ability to protect one's self and loved ones:

	Feel Very Confident	Feel Somewhat Confident	Do Not Feel Very Confident
Always leave indoor lights on when out of home (52%)	58%	49%	55%
Always stop deliveries when away from home for long periods (46%)	50%	45%	46%

	Feel Very Confident	Feel Somewhat Confident	Do Not Feel Very Confident
Always take some protection along when going out (16%)	23%	13%	12%
Always join neighbors in crime prevention activities (10%)	14%	7%	12%
Always keep helpful watch on neighbors and their property (43%)	51%	42%	33%

The following indicate an inverse relationship between feeling competent to take crime prevention actions and taking specific actions repeatedly:

	Feel Very Confident	Feel Somewhat Confident	Do Not Feel Very Confident
Always lock doors even when leaving for short time (72%)	70%	73%	77%
Always keep doors locked even when home (61%)	59%	59%	76%
Always lock windows/screen, even when leaving home for short time (63%)	65%	61%	70%
Always leave outdoor lights on when away from home at night (41%)	42%	40%	47%
Always go out at night accompanied by someone (18%)	16%	18%	29%
At night, always goes out by car instead of walking (38%)	37%	38%	49%
At night, always avoids certain places (23%)	22%	22%	28%

Relatively unaffected by respondent's feelings of confidence in their ability to protect themselves are the following actions:

	Feel Very Confident	Feel Somewhat Confident	Do Not Feel Very Confident
Install special door/window locks (44%)	42%	44%	46%
Install peep-holes in entry doors (20%)	21%	20%	20%
Install burglar alarms (6%)	9%	5%	4%
When away from home for any length, notify police to keep special watch on home (11%)	13%	9%	14%
When away from home, use timer device to turn on lights/radio (18%)	19%	17%	21%

TAKING CRIME PREVENTION ACTION

The 1981 national survey asked respondents whether or not they had taken any of ten popularly recommended crime prevention actions and to indicate which pairs of recommendations they believed to be "most" and "least" effective as deterrents.

Here are the rank orders of responses to the questions:

Actions Taken (1,188)	Believed to be Most Effective in Protecting Self Against Crime (1,188)	Believed to be Least Effective in Protecting Self Against Crime (1,188)
1. Installed special locks - 44%	1. Special locks - 48%	1. Anti-theft stickers - 41%
2. Installed outdoor lights - 43%	2. Burglar alarms - 36%	2. Theft insurance - 40%
3. Kept dog at least partly for security - 35%	3. Watchdog - 26%	3. Engrave property with I.D. - 29%
4. Purchased theft insurance - 33%	4. Outdoor lights - 22%	4. Guns; other personal security devices - 17%
5. Owned gun, other personal security devices - 35%	5. Guns, other personal security devices - 18%	5. Peep hole in entry door - 16%
6. Installed peep hole in entry door - 20%	6. Property engraved with ID - 15%	6. Police check of home - 15%
7. Had property engraved with ID - 18%	7. Police check of home - 12%	7. Watchdog - 10%
8. Had police do home security check - 10%	8. Peep hole in entry door - 8%	8. Outdoor lights - 5%
9. Used anti-theft stickers - 10%	9. Theft insurance - 5%	9. Special locks - 4%
10. Installed burglar alarm - 6%	10. Anti-theft stickers - 2%	10. Burglar alarms - 3%
Did none of these - 15%	Did none of these - 4%;	No opinion - 9%

Several important considerations in regard to attempting to persuade people to take popularly recommended crime prevention actions emerge from the data.

Item. Although more than eight of every ten Americans claim to have taken at least one of the ten commonly recommended actions, not one of the listed ten

has been undertaken by a majority of the public. As a matter of fact, by the Fall of 1981, five of the ten actions that were studied each had been claimed by considerably fewer than a fourth of the sample.

There is indeed a long way to go in persuading majorities of the American public to engage in significant crime prevention behaviors.

Item. By far the most common action claimed by the public is the installation of special locks in their homes. Special locks are the one device that on a net basis is believed to constitute the most effective crime deterrent of the ten posed.

Although belief in the effectiveness of locks appears to be a prime motivator for installing them, it is not the only factor operating in the decision to do so. Special locks are relatively expensive, and clearly, economically "up-scale" individuals are more readily able than others to afford their installation in the home (see Table 4-33).

In attempting to persuade even more people to install special locks in their homes, communicators should bear in mind that their potential targets are the more than half of all the households in the USA that may not currently be equipped with them. Included are households in which residents hold mostly positive attitudes regarding the deterrent powers of special locks. Still, many of these persons may believe they simply cannot afford the expense of installing such costly equipment.

Item. The role of costs as factors in actually deterring certain crime prevention actions on the part of the public is further illustrated by the data regarding home burglar alarm systems.

Despite the fact that next to locks, burglar alarms are considered to provide a very high degree of protection, more than nine in every ten Americans (who are not executives/professionals residing in upper class neighborhoods--

see Table 4-33) have not as of Fall 1981 installed costly burglar alarm systems in their homes, and until those costs are substantially reduced, they are unlikely to do so in the near future.

Item. Installing outdoor lights around the home is as popular an affluent "middle-class" crime prevention activity as putting in special locks.

Effectiveness of outdoor lights as a means for protecting oneself against crime is relatively weak as an influence here, though. Outdoor lights no doubt are seen to function as decorative property accoutrements as well as affording protection, and in these dual functions they can be viewed by landlords as prudent "home improvement" investments in general. (A fifth of the 1981 sample claim they have installed outdoor lights despite their personal belief that outdoor lights are among the least effective means for combatting crime.)

Item. For the lower-middle and working class 35-54 aged householder with several children all residing where pets are permitted, keeping a dog at least partially for protection is a particularly popular crime prevention activity.

Here too, effectiveness against crime appears not to be the major reason for keeping a dog--the major motivation most likely resting on the animal's principal role as a family pet. (Seventeen percent of the respondents who include dogs among their assessments of the least effective means of anti-crime protection nevertheless claim to own dogs at least partially for the purpose of security.)

Item: Beliefs regarding the relative ineffectiveness of such relatively unpopular anti-crime measures as installing entry-door peep holes; "ID-ing" personal property; inviting the police to conduct home security checks; and displaying anti-theft stickers appear to be prime inhibitors in their implementation by large numbers of people. Skepticism in these instances tends to be associated with inaction within the skeptical target.

What is interesting to note in this particular discussion is the differential relationships that people's beliefs about the deterrent effectiveness of various crime prevention actions have on the taking of those actions.

For example, efficacy beliefs appear to be highly correlated with the possession of firearms and other personal protection devices, with 65% of those believing guns to be among the most effective of deterrents, claiming to own weapons and other personal protection items.

Less positive, but relatively strong are the relationships between efficacy beliefs and reported implementation of the following: 56 percent of the individuals who consider theft insurance to be the most effective say they purchase it; 56 percent of those who endorse watchdogs as the most effective against crime claim ownership of one; 53 percent of those considering outdoor lights to be best for preventing crime report that they have installed such devices; and 52% of the householders who cite them as most effective against crime claim to have availed themselves of special locks for their homes.

Overall, then, we note that the possession of weapons is based firmly on beliefs in their effectiveness in rendering protection. In regard to purchasing theft insurance, keeping watchdogs, installing outdoor lights and making use of special locks--beliefs in their high efficacy as instruments for the protection of self and loved ones are very important motivating influences in roughly a little more than half the cases in each respective instance. For the remainder, high belief in the efficacy of the device or action in each respective case does not necessarily translate itself into that particular crime prevention behavior. Instead, we note a certain tendency for many individuals to turn to what seem to be functionally equivalent complements to or even substitutes for those devices and activities they consider to be relatively ineffectual.

Where 35 percent totally claim ownership of a dog, 47 percent of the individuals who believe weapons and other personal protection devices to be most effective keep a watchdog; where 43 percent totally possess outdoor home lighting, 52% of those considering "ID-ing" personal property to be a most effective crime deterrent report their homes to be equipped with such aids against crime; persons who consider entry-door peep holes as particularly effective against crime are three times likelier than the population as a whole (61 percent to 18 percent) to report they've had personal property "ID'd."

Tables 4-34 and 4-35 show certain apparent incongruities between how various publics evaluate the crime reducing effectiveness of different actions and their associations with behavior.

For example, people who believe outdoor lights are among the most effective means for fighting crime, are least likely to keep a watchdog. Similarly, vis-a-vis the population in general, people who believe in the high effectiveness of theft insurance are relatively unlikely prospects for owning a watchdog or even for installing outdoor lighting around the home.

Among those who do not consider given crime prevention actions to be effective, we find in a number of instances where individuals are unconvinced of the effectiveness of one particular action, turning to another more or less as a substitute. Examples: Persons who criticize anti-theft stickers are most likely to ID their personal property instead; individuals who consider keeping a watchdog and equipping their homes with special locks as relatively ineffectual in warding off crime are more apt than the public as a whole to buy theft insurance; householders who are unconvinced of the power of burglar alarms to curb crime are most likely to keep firearms and other devices for self protection; those who fail to see the effectiveness of special locks are most apt to install outdoor lights.

In considering strategies for persuading people to engage in various recommended crime prevention actions, it should be clear by now that simply demanding that such actions be taken will not produce large-scale compliance. So many factors of demography, social situations, perceptions, beliefs and ideology, and self-assessments of competence as well as evaluations of action-efficacy enter into the motivation to take a specific crime prevention action, that making a demand for any sort of action-taking by the public should be approached with the greatest possible care and precision.

Simply "shotgunning" out a barrage of unrelated or infeasible demands in the hope that something will "hit" someone by chance is not a prudent course to pursue under any circumstance. What usually happens as a consequence of such a wasteful strategy is that very little or nothing at all happens in the way of significant public action-taking. What ordinarily happens in these cases is the unmotivated segments of the target audience either equal or outnumber those who may be motivated, thereby neutralizing any "effects" that might be generated.

So far, we have noted that perceptions of high efficacy for certain standardly recommended crime prevention actions either may serve to impel those specific actions, or else they may motivate actions that are perceived to be functionally equivalent.

On the other hand, where there is lack of confidence in the efficacy of specific unpopular actions, "substitute" actions are frequently adapted rather than no crime protection actions at all. As a consequence, communicators might do well to consider clustering small, functionally equivalent actions together into meaningful behavioral "bundles" from which message recipients can draw two or three related recommendations out of, say, a bundle of four or five and still maintain some confidence in the overall effectiveness of that particular

package. Such clustering that offers perceived functionally equivalent choices appears to have a considerably greater chance for success than the customary grab-bag catalogues that willy-nilly seek to promote varied and unrelated separate actions of varying potentials for being effective against crime.

More specific attention ought to be paid to those "dual-purpose" actions that benefit the action-taker in ways other than just providing protection against crime hazards. The case of "outdoor lighting" is striking. Outdoor lighting adds to the beauty of the home, and it increases the value of property in addition to affording protection. Further, every advertisement and sales-person involved in promoting outdoor lighting as beautifiers and as investments is simultaneously promoting crime prevention, and every resulting purchase of outdoor lighting becomes yet another important anti-crime action on the part of the public whether it consciously realizes it or not.

The lesson should be clear.

The ten demands that have been discussed are more or less one-time actions that do not require continued repetition either daily or monthly, or even quarterly. Once one has installed a special lock, one need not do it again for a very long time indeed. However, in order to achieve the protection effect of various devices such as locks, one must develop the habit of actually using them on a daily basis. Fortunately, nearly nine in every ten Americans queried in 1981 claimed that they do keep their home windows and doors locked "most of the time or always"; 12% admitted to being negligent in this regard (Table 4-36).

In contrast, very few Americans appear to regularly either join in with their neighbors to discuss crime prevention, or to try to do something about preventing crime, or to notify the police to keep an eye on their residences while they are away from home for extended time periods.

Although a good portion of contemporary crime prevention propaganda is devoted to the sixteen "helpful hints" asked about, a glance at Table 4-36 should foster the conclusion that the various actions presented call for a diversity of strategies rather than just one all-encompassing monolithic mass communication plan.

The great majorities who repeatedly lock doors and windows and keep them locked; who leave indoor lights on when away from home; and who ask neighbors for their surveillance during lengthy absences from home need not be "converted" to these actions. They have been converted earlier on, and persuasion efforts directed to them should be of the reenforcement kind designed to keep them doing what they do habitually.

By way of contrast special persuasive efforts must be focused on trying to shift relatively small numbers of relatively motivated persons out from the "occasionally-do" column into the "regularly-do" column as they pertain to: using a vehicle instead of walking alone after dark; leaving outdoor lights on when away from residence at nights; stopping home deliveries while away from home during lengthy time periods. Here the strategy calls more for crystallization-canalization techniques for directing already-present dispositions to act than it does either for reenforcement or conversion efforts.

The remaining eight actions present considerable difficulty for the communicator. Here, in each case at least two-thirds (and in four of them, at least three-fourths) of the public either are unconcerned about, or are situationally prevented from, or refuse to engage in on a consistent basis in either: going out at night only in the company of others (are "others" available "always"?); or avoiding certain neighborhood places after dark (can this "always" be done given certain urgencies to hurry?); or keeping a helpful watch on neighbors (can this be done on an "always" basis given the attention

pressures of one's own and one's family's requirements?); or leaving home with some protective devices (can everyone be counted on to round up firearms, canes, hat pins, whistles and the like literally each and every single time one leaves his/her premises no matter the environment and the purpose of leaving.)

The high consistency repeated locking of doors ("always," 72%) is influenced by:

- Old age--65 and over - 81%
- Worry about possible victimization; as worry increases the locking of doors is claimed to be repeated more regularly:

	Always lock doors (72%)
Worry about the prospect of victimization	
High (n = 205)	81%
Moderate (n = 529)	78%
Low (n = 446)	61%

- And by perceptions of crime hazard in the neighborhoods lived in; as neighborhoods are increasingly believed to be dangerous, the habit of locking one's doors is repeated more often.

	Always lock doors (72%)
Danger of crime in neighborhood is believed to be	
High (276)	76%
Moderate (554)	73%
Low (350)	67%

Locking windows regularly, day in and day out ("always," 63%) is affected by:

- Old age--65 plus - 78%.
- City size--by residents of mid-sized cities with populations between 250,000 to 1 million - 73%.

- By belief in the crime danger of the neighborhood of which one is a resident; as the belief in neighborhood hazard increases, so does the regularity with which respondents claim they lock their windows.

	Always lock windows (63%)
Danger of crime in neighborhood is believed to be	
High (277)	72%
Moderate (537)	63%
Low (349)	56%

- And by worry about possible victimization; the more intense the worry, the greater is the regularity which windows are reported to be kept locked.

	Always lock windows (63%)
Worry about the prospect of victimization	
High (203)	74%
Moderate (528)	66%
Low (446)	55%

On the "never" end of the repeat action scale we find that the two extremes "never notify police" and "never use a timer device when away from home" remain largely unaffected by the demographic characteristics of the public.

Experience with victimization, or rather the absence of such experience, is the one factor that does influence inaction in each of the two extremes discussed:

	Never notifies police (76%)	Never uses timer device (70%)
Personal/vicarious victimization experience:		
High (334)	72%	66%
Moderate (434)	72%	66%
Low (409)	83%	77%

In addition, worrying about the possibility of becoming a victim of crime inversely affects never letting the police know about trips away from home beforehand in the following linear manner:

Worry about the prospect of victimization	Never notifies police of a long absence from home (76%)
High (202)	66%
Moderate (527)	77%
Low (446)	83%

A fatalistic orientation to the inevitability of crime--no matter what is done to try to prevent it--affects inaction in regard to timer devices linearally: the more fatalistic an individual is in thinking nothing can really be done to prevent crime, the less likely is one ever to make use of a timer device for protection.

Fatalistic orientation to the inevitability of crime:	Never uses a timer device (70%)
High (341)	75%
Moderate (658)	69%
Low (170)	63%

A highly probable reason for much of either the motivation or the reluctance to participate in the most commonly suggested repeat crime prevention actions being discussed, again reflect the public's beliefs in the efficacy of each of the actions authorities ordinarily recommend. Simply put, the more individuals believe in the anti-crime effectiveness of a particular suggested action, the more likely are they to commence that behavior and then to repeat it as necessary. Of course, the reverse applies to those recommended actions people believe to be relatively ineffectual in their ability to ward off crime.

Table 4-37 shows that among the actions under discussion, only one is considered to be relatively highly effective by a majority of the population--locking doors even during a brief absence (recall the high belief in the effectiveness of special locks). Otherwise, there is an overwhelming amount of skepticism regarding the possible effectiveness of each of the remaining crime prevention "hints." Perhaps "skepticism" is too strong a term in light of the fact that in no one instance does more than a quarter of the 1981 sample consider a particular activity to be among the least effective means for preventing crimes.

Table 4-38 presents data relating to how effectiveness belief (and disbelief) influences the taking of selected high and low frequency crime prevention actions.

In each instance where there is a belief in the high efficacy of a particular action, those holding the belief are likelier than the population overall to engage in that action with high regularity.

Conversely, in those specific cases where there is a relatively high lack of confidence regarding its efficacy, the rule--disproportionately--appears to be never to engage in that activity at all.

From the discussion so far, it seems that before communicators attempt to persuade people to engage in protective actions that require repetitious behaviors, they first must make certain that in the belief systems of those targets, each of the recommendations is accorded a high effectiveness appraisal to begin with. Where there are no predisposing efficacy beliefs, the communicator must first provide such; where there are negative beliefs regarding the efficacy of certain recommended actions, the responsible communicator is faced with two options--either to correct the mistaken public judgments or to withdraw those particular demands for action altogether.

CHAPTER 5

THE NATIONAL SAMPLE CAMPAIGN EVALUATION

The national sample evaluation of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, primarily addresses the extent of citizen exposure to the campaign and their reactions to it, particularly in terms of their perceptions of its impact upon them.

As we shall see in detail below, over half of all U.S. adults said they had seen or heard at least one of the McGruff PSAs. Most of those people also indicated that they were favorably impressed by the ads, and a substantial portion reported that the ads had influenced their views and actions concerning crime prevention.

This chapter deals with in turn: (1) patterns of public exposure to the campaign; (2) the ways in which various kinds of audiences reacted to the campaign; (3) some of the psychological processes underlying reactions to the campaign; and (4) the impact of the McGruff campaign as compared to other crime prevention dissemination efforts.

EXPOSURE TO THE CAMPAIGN

As in the 1980 national survey, simple exposure to campaign stimuli in 1981 was measured in terms of respondents' ability to recall having seen or heard any of the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs in any of the media. Respondents were classified as having been exposed if they either: (1) mentioned the PSA voluntarily when they were asked to describe any one particular recent public service ad that stood out in their memory (unaided recall); or (2) indicated recognition of the ads when they were shown to them by the interviewer (aided recall).

Forty-one respondents (three percent of the national sample) mentioned the ads without interviewer aid, and 573 (48 percent) said they recognized the PSA when prompted by the interviewer. The unaided recall group was considered too small for meaningful subanalyses, and the two cohorts were combined to constitute the compaign-exposed group, totalling 614 respondents or 51.7 percent of the sample.

The autumn 1981 exposure rate represents a substantial increase (74 percent) over the 30 percent exposed figure for the spring of 1980. While it appears as no mean feat for a campaign dependent primarily upon gratis PSA placement to reach 30 percent of the public within about four months of its inception, it is even more noteworthy that it attracted the attention of over half of the adult population in less than two years of dissemination. This suggests a combination of aggressive media placement, a providing of the audience with appropriate attention-getting cues, and initial motivations on the part of the audience to respond to it. These factors will be examined in some depth later in this chapter.

Circumstance of Exposure

The PSAs apparently made a fairly strong impression on those recalling them. Sixty-three percent of those exposed said they were "very sure" they'd seen or heard ads exactly like the McGruff one, and 29 percent said they were "fairly sure" they had.

Moreover, more than a third said they had seen the ads more than ten times, and only a fifth had seen them only "once or twice."

The ads also were gaining new audiences up to the point of the 1981 survey. Twenty-six percent of those exposed said they had first noticed the PSA "within the past couple of months," while 37 percent said they had first

seen or heard it between two months and a year before. Twenty-eight percent recalled first noting it a year or more before, a figure which jibes quite well with the 30 percent exposure rate found in early 1980.

Television emerged as the dominant medium of choice for exposure, with 78 percent of the exposed group naming it as where they had seen or heard the ads most often. Posters or billboards ran a somewhat surprising second, with 14 percent naming them. Following in order were newspapers (eight percent), radio (six percent), magazines (five percent), and car cards (four percent).

Campaign Exposure and Demographic Characteristics

The most striking demographic correlate of exposure to the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs in 1980 was age (Table 5-1). Nearly half of the respondents aged 18 to 24 recalled the ads, while no more than a fifth of those over 54 could. About 30 percent of the respondents in the middle age groups had been exposed.

The impact of age on exposure continued into 1981, but became somewhat attenuated. While over 70 percent of the 18 to 24 year olds reported having seen the ad, two-thirds of those in the 25-to-34-year-old age group did likewise, as did a third of the elderly. The most marked increase (118 percent) occured among 25 to 34 year olds. A small proportion of that rise might be explained by the natural movement of perhaps more exposure-prone 23 and 24 year olds into that group over the 18-month span between surveys. However, other more substantively based reasons for it will be examined later in this section.

Turning to other characteristics, those exposed in 1980 were also likelier to have been male, to have had children in the home, to have lived in less affluent neighborhoods, and in smaller cities and towns. While these attributes denoted those with stronger exposure rates, there was no demographic

group which was inordinately low in exposure; the campaign generally cut a wide swath across citizens at large.

And, the overall demographic profile of those exposed remained largely unchanged a year and a half later, with two exceptions being a slight lessening of the age disparity already noted, and a slim gain in exposure among women as compared to men. Also worth noting is that renters and persons having lived fewer than four years at a particular residence showed substantial gains, a finding no doubt related to the jump in exposure among typically more transient 25 to 34 year olds.

Strong increases in exposure between the two time periods were also found among college graduates (a 110 percent gain), persons perceiving themselves in the upper middle (104 percent) and lower (128 percent) social classes, suburbanites, and those located in the Northeast, East North Central, and Pacific Coast geographic regions.

Media placement and accessibility of media to respondents may have worked together to bring about the divergence in exposure rates across geographic regions and among different sizes and types of communities. The differences between geographic regions reporting greater exposure in 1980 versus 1981 may simply have resulted from varying extents of PSA placement within specific states over the two years, for as yet undetermined reasons. On the other hand, residents of suburban areas reported less exposure than did central city residers in 1980, but the highest awareness was among small town and rural dwellers. Putting aside for the moment possible variation in citizens' interest in the content of the ads, urban dwellers typically have more opportunity to see and hear a diverse media array, including those carrying the McGruff PSAs, than do suburbanites. And, media outlets in more ruralized areas may well be more apt to carry public service advertising overall, including

these particular ones. The gain in suburban exposure later in the campaign suggests its greater dissemination in media channels reaching those areas.

Taken at face value, the gross depiction of demographic characteristics presented thus far suggests that the Advertising Council prevention campaign was particularly successful in reaching individuals usually regarded as being more crime-prone than others. These include the young, males, the more residentially mobile, and those residing in lower-working class neighborhoods. The campaign appeared to have lesser, but still noteworthy, reach among two cohorts with typically higher self-perceived vulnerability to crime--the elderly, and to a less striking degree, women.

At this point it will be helpful to gain some insights into which of the demographic indicators examined thus far were independently the most important in predicting the likelihood of exposure to the PSAs. The multiple regression analysis depicted in Table 5-2 denotes the relative predictive power of each demographic variable on exposure, simultaneously controlling for the other variables. Only the primary demographic indicators are included, and the beta values represent the relative influence of each demographic variable on exposure, controlling for all others.

Age emerges as the most powerful predictor, with sex being the only other statistically significant variable. Thus it appears that the previously found associations between exposure and presence of children in the household, length of residence, and rental of a residence primarily resulted from strong correlations between each of those and age. Age remains clearly the dominant predictor, and the significant effect of sex on exposure had apparently been modestly suppressed through its interactions with other demographics. A regression equation for the 1980 exposure proved essentially similiar.

A closer inspection for possible interactions between age and other demographics in order to help explain its impact proved fruitless for both the 1980 and 1981 samples. (The same held true for sex.) However, as Table 5-3 indicates, the younger persons exposed were likelier to be home owners and to be living in smaller communities. In sum, the overall conclusion at this point is much the same as the one made for the 1980 analysis: younger people were simply likelier to be exposed, for reasons yet unclear. Nonetheless, the campaign did reach substantial portions of all population subgroups examined.

Campaign Exposure and General Media Use

Persons spending more time with various forms of mass media would be expected to have more of a likelihood of seeing or hearing at least one of the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs. This held true for broadcast media, but not for print (Table 5-4).

Exposure to McGruff was reported by 60 percent of those watching television for four or more hours on the "average weekday," but by only 44 percent of those watching less than two hours of television. When these figures are compared to the 1980 exposure rates, it appears that those viewing fewer than four hours per day gained slightly in exposure to the campaign relative to those in the heavy viewer category. Thus by late 1981 the campaign seemed to be "catching up" with less frequent viewers, increasing their exposure rate. However, more frequent viewers registered proportionately even greater gains in exposure. While more time spent with radio was strongly indicative of greater campaign exposure in both 1980 and 1981, the relative increase proportions between those years were rather inconsistent.

As in 1980, usage of newspapers and magazines was essentially unrelated to exposure to the PSAs. However, persons with low amounts of print media

readership gained considerably in campaign exposure over the two-year span. The lack of a relationship between print media exposure and campaign recall may have resulted from relatively few of the print PSAs having made their way into publication. However, an equally plausible explanation may be that exposure to newspaper and magazine ads overall tends to be more selectively based than is the case for broadcast commercials. Readers can pick and choose those ads of interest, and ignore the rest at a quick glance. Broadcast audiences, however, often have little choice but to at least partially attend to commericals as they happen to appear. Thus gross amount of exposure to broadcast media tends to be more highly correlated with attentiveness to commericals, regardless of their content (the extent to which such selectivity may have played a role here can be more fully tested in the subsequent panel analyses by examining the association between print media use and campaign exposure while controlling for previous levels of crime concern and prevention interest.)

The dispersal pattern of the campaign after two years is most distinctively apparent in the summary media exposure index (Table 5-7), which aggregates frequency of use across all media. While persons attending more to media in the spring of 1981 were much likelier to have noted the McGruff PSAs, by the autumn of 1982 an individual's total amount of media exposure appeared quite irrelevant in determining whether they had seen the ads or not. In one way or another, awareness of the campaign had "leveled" across low, moderate and high media users. Among low users, campaign exposure jumped a rather startling 138 percent, while among the high group it rose a "modest" 56 percent. It is important to note that these figures deal only with one-time exposure, and do not take into account accumulated repeated exposure over time.

Campaign Exposure and Attendance to Media Crime Content

Apart from the impact of the sheer volume of exposure to mass media on exposure to the campaign, it was anticipated that audience members more attuned to crime-oriented entertainment programs and news accounts of crime would have their attention triggered by the crime-related subject matter of the PSAs, and perhaps also by the similarity of the cartoon dog character to various prototype fictional detectives.

Indeed, the more attention paid to media crime content overall, the greater the likelihood of exposure to the McGruff campaign (Table 5-5). This relationship was particularly prominent in the campaign's early stages, and between 1980 and 1981 the greatest gains in exposure were being made by persons who paid lesser attention to crime in the media.

Turning to depictions of crime in specific media, the 1980 data show that greater campaign exposure was associated with higher viewership of televised crime dramas, and with more attention to crime news on television and radio and in newspapers and magazines. By late 1981, however, the increase in exposure among even those with low media crime attendance had reached the point where the level of attention to print media crime news had no bearing on whether or not one was aware of the campaign. And, those with "low" levels of exposure to broadcast crime content increased in exposure to the campaign by over 100 percent between 1980 and 1981.

In the early stages of the campaign it therefore appears that the PSAs were reaching a more "media crime conscious" audience segment--and presumably those with more interest in crime per se. However, by a year and a half later

this interest factor seems to have lessened in import, and the campaign was reaching a far more diversified audience.

Campaign Exposure by Attention to Public Service Advertisements

Our previous examination of audiences for public service advertising in general suggested that many people, probably for a variety of reasons, were somewhat more attentive to PSAs overall, regardless of their particular content.

The results for the early stage of the campaign indicate that attentiveness to PSAs across all media was strongly predictive of campaign exposure (Table 5-6). For example, 39 percent of those paying high attention to televised PSAs reported exposure to the McGruff ads, while only 19 percent of those with low PSA attention did so. Less pronounced but still significant differences were found for radio, newspapers and magazines.

However, as has become a continuing pattern, by the autumn of 1981 attentiveness to print media PSAs was found to have little to do with exposure to the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, and for broadcast media the most marked gains in campaign exposure were found among those respondents paying lesser attention to PSAs.

Once again we have a rather strong indication that the wide dissemination of the campaign over the 16 month period separating the two national surveys worked to at least partially override individual predispositions affecting campaign exposure. Not only were audiences typically low in crime content interest reporting substantial rates of exposure to the McGruff ads by late 1981, but so were those who generally attend less to public service advertising per se.

Campaign Exposure, Media Use and Demographics

The regression analysis in Table 5-8 examines the relative strength of each main media attribute while controlling for the others, and for demographic characteristics as well. It is clear that ability of media variables to predict campaign exposure is severely attenuated when demographics are taken into account. Overall media exposure, PSA attention and media crime attention fail to significantly predict exposure, while age remains the paramount demographic indicator of exposure.

The sharp drop in the predictiveness of crime media attention for campaign exposure when demographics are controlled parallels the situation found in the 1980 study. It was suggested at that time that the strong association between media crime attention and campaign exposure appeared to be primarily an artifact of younger persons being likelier to be campaign-exposed and higher attenders to media crime content in general. Since age and media crime attention are negatively correlated here at -.12, the same argument would seem to hold. The major role of age in explaining exposure to the campaign is thus again strengthened.

Campaign Exposure and Ancillary Characteristics

The previous descriptions have dealt with variables which could logically be assumed to be predictive of campaign exposure, rather than vice versa. That is, amount of television viewing, for example, can be safely assumed to have an effect on campaign exposure, while campaign exposure is not likely to effect degree of overall television viewership.

However, several other critical variables could be reasonably expected to interact with campaign exposure in various ways, making it impossible to

determine from the national sample data alone whether exposure to the ads was an antecedent or a consequence of them. As an obvious example, interest in crime prevention may well have sparked an increased likelihood of exposure to the campaign, while such exposure in turn heightened crime prevention interest. The same can be said for a host of other variables reflecting a wide range of orientations toward crime and crime prevention. In this section, we will report the general relationships between campaign exposure and many of those variables, mainly for the purpose of establishing baseline data which will later be examined more fully in concert with the panel analysis. The panel data will provide a much more valid test of the causal sequences involved in these relationships.

Crime Orientations

Campaign exposure was unrelated to perceptions of neighborhood crime rate, perceived vulnerability to crime, or fear of being victimized (Table 5-9). However, persons previously victimized were likelier to have been exposed. It seems safe to assume in this case that prior victimization increased the probability of exposure rather than vice versa. This profile markedly resembles that of the 1980 study, in which subsequent panel analyses uncovered campaign impact on certain aspects of respondent crime perceptions, and it is again cautioned that the above findings should not be taken to mean a lack of campaign influence on these variables. Rather, a tentative conclusion at this point is that the campaign was reaching a wide array of individuals with varying perceptions of crime and the dangers it presents.

Crime Prevention Orientations

Similarly, campaign exposure was only marginally related to key variables denoting crime prevention competence (Table 5-10). Those who saw themselves as knowing more about prevention, and as being more capable at it, were likelier to have been exposed. However, exposure was unrelated to general attitudes toward prevention, interest in it, or preventative behaviors. These findings are again somewhat similar to those of 1980, and panel analyses teased out the interactive effects and found campaign influences on several prevention attributes.

Psychological, Sociographic and Communication Characteristics

Rather low levels of association were found between exposure to the campaign and any of the psychological, sociographic or interpersonal communication characteristics examined (Tables 5-11, 5-12, 5-13). As in the 1980 study, exposure was positively related to sense of altruism, quite possibly as a function of the strong positive relationship between altruism and attention to PSAs in general. The other associations were marginal at best.

Concluding Note

Overall, strong gains were found in citizen exposure to the Take a Bite Out of Crime over a two-year period. Generalizing from this sample, over half of U.S. adults reported having had seen or heard at least one of the ads by November 1981, and most saw them most often on television. While exposure to them was still likelier among younger than among older persons, substantial proportions of all demographic subgroups could recall them. The PSAs appear to

have made particular gains in penetration among audiences who were less likely to have seen or heard them in the early stage of the campaign. This suggests an ongoing diffusion of campaign input across a wide spectrum of the populace, rather than among only members of the population with specific crime prevention-related concerns.

PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN

General public reaction to the campaign was evaluated with the same self-reporting technique used in the previous national sample survey, but with the addition of several more specific components. The technique is based upon the Mendelsohn Active Response Test (Mendelsohn, 1962). Unlike many single-attribute measures of communication effectiveness, the MART assumes that audience reactions to communication campaigns involve cumulative patterns or processes within individual audience members. These cumulative patterns successively incorporate varying degrees of response, beginning with simple awareness of the message, moving to psychological integration of what is learned, and then to positive dispositions with regard to the intent of the message. These latter dispositions may include information gain, attitude change, motivational change, and/or behavioral change.

Audience responses to the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign were organized into three main categories:

1. Simple exposure or awareness as measured by recall and discussed previously;
2. Integration of the message as measured by:
   a. Ability to verbalize the ads' intent;
   b. Attentiveness to the ads;
   c. Self-perceptions of the ads' effectiveness;

   d. Perceived value of the ad for other persons;
   e. Predisposition for action based upon the ads.
3. Self-reported changes in information, attitude and behavior as a function of exposure to the ads.

We will first discuss the overall results for each of the above dimensions, and then turn to an examination of the relationships among them, and present an analysis of the types of individuals reporting various reactions.

Message Integration

Over a quarter of those exposed reported paying "a great deal" of attention to the ads, and another 51 percent said that they usually paid "some" attention to them. Twenty-two percent said they paid "hardly any" attention. This finding in of itself suggests a generally positive interest in the ads among most persons.

Eighty-eight percent of the campaign-exposed individuals were able to verbalize one or more points related to crime prevention when they were asked what they thought the ads were "trying to get across" to people. More specifically:

- 46 percent gave a "general" answer along the lines of saying that the PSAs were trying to make people more aware of crime as a problem, or more aware of how to prevent crime, or asking people to be more careful in protecting themselves from crime.
- Another 20 percent more specifically suggested that the campaign was aimed at telling people how to protect themselves and their homes, and many gave detailed examples.

- And, a rather substantial 28 percent pointed specifically to the encouragement of citizen participation in crime prevention efforts, ranging from working with neighbors, joining community action programs, reporting crimes when observed, helping police, and the like.

The emphasis in the more recent stages of the campaign on community participation appears to have made its mark, at least in part.

Apart from simply recalling the general theme or logo used in the ads, thirty-nine percent of those exposed could describe a specific ad which stood out in their minds. Of those, a third named the "moving van" television spot showing burglars looting a house while the people were out. And, 15 percent mentioned the original spot with McGruff touring a house pointing out vulnerabilities, with another 15 percent noting the ad with the elderly person using a portable radio phone.

A sizeable majority of the exposed respondents (71 percent) said they thought the campaign was "getting through" to them, while only 18 percent disagreed. When asked why they thought so:

- 65 percent said in various ways that the PSAs made them more aware of crime and prevention methods. Specific responses included that it served as a reminder to them; that it made them more conscious of protecting themselves; that it told them about things they could do; and that it gave them more of a feeling of empathy with their neighbors.
- Another seven percent mentioned positive things about the message design and production techniques. ("It was eyecatching." "They made me pay attention.")

- On the negative side, the most consistent complaint (among 11 percent) was that the ads didn't tell anything new, and one percent specifically criticized the dog character as "unrealistic" or "silly."

When directly asked whether they personally liked or disliked the use of the McGruff cartoon character, 57 percent of those exposed responded positively, five percent disliked it, and 36 percent were neutral. A third of those liking it said they did so simply because they liked dogs or animals, and another half praised it as being attention-getting, "clever," "different," or as appealing to all ages. The few negative comments referred to it as "too cutesy," too vague, and the like.

The pattern of positive affect toward the ads is reinforced by the finding that only 15 percent could name anything in the PSAs that specifically "turned them off" (individual comments were highly varied), and just eight percent said they were annoyed by them (as opposed to 59 percent saying they were "pleased" by them).

Similarly, 63 percent mentioned something that they had learned from them that they would consider passing along to relatives or friends. Of those:

- 21 percent mentioned getting together with neighbors, or other forms of increased community involvement;
- 23 percent mentioned personal or household prevention techniques;
- 22 percent named increased awareness of crime and prevention in general.

The campaign apparently had the potential for having an impact on children as well. Thirty-two percent of the group said that they knew of children

(under age 16) who had seen or heard the ads, and 54 percent of those said they thought the children were getting useful information out of them.

Self-Perceived Changes in Information, Attitudes and Behaviors

While the campaign seems to have gotten favorable "reviews" from its audiences, it is more important to determine whether it made an impact in terms of helping to change public awareness, attitudes and beliefs regarding prevention. In the national sample, this was ascertained by directly asking respondents the extent to which they thought the PSAs had influenced them in various ways. While such self-perceptions may not always reflect precise degrees of change, they do provide a general impression of such reactions across the sample, and in the previous study proved to be fairly congruent in results with the more rigorous objective change panel measures.

Information Gain

Respondents were asked both whether they thought they had learned anything new from the ads, and whether the ads had "reinforced" or reminded them of things they might have previously known but had forgotten about (Table 5-14). Twenty-two percent said they had learned something new from the PSAs, and 46 percent said that they had been reminded of something they'd known before but had forgotten about.

Nearly half of those specifying something new they had learned named household security precautions, and another 27 percent mentioned neighborhood watch or crime reporting activities.

Attitude Change

Self-perceived attitude change was ascertained along six dimensions reflecting a range of possible affect-related influences of the campaign. The ads at face value appeared to have the potential for influencing individuals' degree of concern about crime per se, their level of confidence in being able to protect themselves, and quite possibly their sense of fear of being victimized as well. Moreover, a key purpose of this phase of the campaign was to invoke in people a greater sense of self-responsibility in helping to prevent crime, more positive feelings toward the effectiveness of group prevention efforts, and corollarily an increased likelihood that they might consider participating in group prevention efforts.

The data strongly suggest that the ads had a substantial and positive impact on each of the above dimensions (Table 5-15). Forty-six percent of those exposed reported that the ads made them more concerned about crime, and 37 percent said the PSAs made them feel more confident in their ability to protect themselves. Practically no respondents said they had become less concerned or less confident.

And, 22 percent said that the campaign made them more afraid of being victimized, while six percent reported becoming less afraid. It should be noted that generation of fear was decidedly not a purpose of the campaign, and that in fact efforts were made to avoid its doing so. Strong fear reactions may well inhibit more productive affective and behavioral changes. However, the nature of the topic itself may well invoke some degree of anxiety among many audience members, no matter how subtly the ads were handled. This issue will be further discussed below.

The PSAs appeared to clearly stimulate feelings of self-responsibility, with over half of the respondents saying that they made them feel more responsible. And, over half reported that the ads made them feel more confident that group action could help prevent crime. Nearly a third said that the PSAs made them consider getting together with others in prevention efforts. All in all, the campaign appears to have scored a strong "plus" in achieving its intended impact upon around half of those exposed to it.

Behavioral Change

Twenty-two percent of the exposed respondents said they had done something that they probably wouldn't have done had they not seen or heard the ads (Table 5-16), and nearly all of those could name a specific behavior. Over a third of this group indicated that they were either more careful about locking up their residences, or had purchased new locks. Another 21 percent said that they were keeping a closer watch on their neighbors, including a few who said they had reported suspicious activities in their neighborhoods. Twenty-four percent of the exposed group overall indicated that they were thinking about doing things in the future that had been suggested by the PSAs.

One notable weak spot in the findings is the lack of respondents seeking further information about prevention which was recommended in almost all of the ads. Only two percent of the exposed group said they had written or phoned for more information about crime prevention. On the other hand, a respectable six percent said they had seen the detailed "Take a Bite Out of Crime" booklet. And, most of those said they had read at least some of it and found it at least somewhat helpful. Apart from pre-ordered mail distribution, the booklet is

apparently available from such outlets as federal information distribution centers, some post offices, and some municipal agencies as well.

Concluding Note

Public reactions in 1981 seem thus roughly comparable to those of the year previous. The overall impression made by the PSAs is positive, with only negligible numbers of respondents appearing put off by them. There is again scant evidence of a "boomerang" effect in terms of exposed persons feeling less concerned about crime, less competent in protecting themselves, or feeling that group action is less effective. The results suggest quite strongly the opposite. The one exception, if it may be called that, is that nearly a quarter of the respondents reported becoming more fearful of victimization. Since at face value the content of the ads down-played that element, perhaps such respondent perceptions necessarily go with the territory of dealing with a troublesome topic with almost inherent fear-arousing components.

REACTIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN: AN AUDIENCE PROFILE

This section primarily will be concerned with presenting a demographic profile of the kinds of respondents who reacted to the campaign in various ways. Apart from its own descriptive value, it will serve as a baseline for subsequent panel-based analyses of other audience characteristics which may be more causally linked to campaign reactions.

Message Attention

Younger persons were not only likelier to have been exposed to the campaign, but they paid more attention to it as well (Table 5-17). In fact,

age emerged as the only clear significant correlate of message attention (excluding length of residence, which as we have seen is highly related to age). Women and persons perceiving themselves as higher in social class were slightly likelier to have attended more closely. Table 5-17 also presents the demographic correlates of frequency of exposure, which strongly resemble those for one-time exposure with the exception that women were no likelier than men to have had repeated contact with the McGruff PSAs. One concludes that attentiveness to the campaign was rather equivalent across all of the population characteristics examined, with the exception of age.

Perceptions of Campaign Effectiveness

And, younger persons tended to view the campaign as more effective at least in terms of saying that they thought the ads "were getting through to" people like themselves (Table 5-18). They also held a more positive view of the use of the McGruff character. These two findings in particular raise the possibility of younger adults being more attracted to the cartoon character, and thus perhaps more receptive to the ads in general. This need not conversely imply that older persons tended to dislike the character: nearly equal proportions of young and older respondents were included among the five percent total who were negative toward McGruff.

In sum, the campaign was perceived as effective across all population subgroups, with younger persons seeing it as being even more so.

Information Gain and Reinforcement

The learning of new information from the PSAs was about equally dispersed over all demographic subgroups, except for slight indications that minorities

and homeowners may have been likelier to gain information (Table 5-19). However, reinforcement or being reminded of previously known information tended to occur more among the young, women, and those in higher occupational and perceived social class strata. A partial explanation for these differences may lie in the fact that reinforcement was the dominant response to the campaign, and since younger adults, and to a lesser extent, women and upper social class persons were more attentive to it, they were likelier to have been reinforced as well.

Concern, Confidence and Fear Arousal

The campaign was significantly more successful in generating increased concern about crime among women and lower-income persons (Table 5-20). The overall pattern of correlations suggests that concern rose more among lower socio-economic groups in general. Recalling findings presented earlier in this report, more concern appears to have been stimulated among those demographic groups who perceived their neighborhoods as being more crime-prone and who exhibited lesser competence in prevention.

Confidence in protecting oneself increased fairly equally among all groups, with a particular rise among the young, a cohort already likely to rate itself as high in prevention capability.

Fear arousal proved greater among women, acknowledgedly an already more crime fear-prone group. For reasons non-apparent at this time, fear also increased more among members of lower occupational strata and single-detached unit home dwellers.

Self-Responsibility, Group Effectiveness and Group Participation

Increases in perceptions of self-responsibility for prevention efforts were somewhat more apparent among the young, women, married persons and home-owners (Table 5-21). The results for younger adults and women may be seen as especially encouraging.

More positive evaluations of the effectiveness of group crime prevention efforts tended to be found more among upper social class strata, residents of smaller cities and towns, and the young. However, increased desire to participate in such group activity was likelier among women and minority group members, as well as among upper social class cohorts.

Behavior Change

Behavioral changes reported as a consequence of campaign exposure were rather evenly dispersed across demographic subgroups, with the notable exception of women being significantly likelier to indicate increased activity than were men (Table 5-22). There were no substantial differences between men and women in the kinds of actions taken. Panel analyses will later attempt to determine the role of previously existing dispositions among women which may have led to more action-taking on their part.

Processes of Campaign Reactions

Despite the tendency for the campaign to generate somewhat differing reactions from various groups--particularly the young and women--the overall pattern of perceived effects suggests that the campaign's impact was relatively uniform across the exposed populace. As was the case with exposure to the

campaign per se, no particular demographic subset seemed immune to its effects. More extensive cross-tabulations carried out on the correlational presentations above strongly bear that out.

It is therefore not surprising that persons reporting having been influenced in one way were likely to report having been influenced in others also. Respondents reporting action-taking were also significantly likelier to have gained in information or to have been reinforced, and to have changed their attitudes in a direction supportive of prevention (Table 5-23). Similarly, those reporting information gain tended more to report reinforcement and attitude change as well. Persons who said they felt more self-responsible also saw groups as being more effective, indicated a greater possibility of joining one, and said they had become more concerned about crime and confident in defending themselves.

As might be expected, the more effective respondents evaluated the campaign as having been, the more likely they were to report having been influenced in various ways. The sole exception was in the case of fear arousal.

Information campaign effects, and communication effects more generally, are usually thought to depend on not only mere exposure to a message, but also to the amount of attention paid to it. Maximum campaign effects are typically thought most likely when a high degree of attention is being paid to a message over repeated exposures--up to a point of saturation. Some have also argued that some salient effects can take place even with a quite low level of attention being paid, given enough repeated exposures. Television advertising often is designed based upon such thinking. While a more complete view of competing paradigms in this area will be included later in this report with more extensive analysis based upon both this sample and the panel, it is

helpful here to point to some early indications of the respective roles of exposure and attention in generating reactions to the McGruff PSAs.

In Table 5-24, we see that when simultaneous controls for both exposure and attention are introduced, attention has the greater impact on most of the campaign reaction variables. The more attention paid, regardless of the frequency of exposure, the more the likelihood of information gain, reinforcement, crime concern, protection, confidence, self-responsibility, perceived group effectiveness, desire to join a group, and action-taking. Exposure alone has practically no impact on any of these, save reinforcement.

In other words, repetition of the same PSAs to the same audiences over time is likely to have only one productive effect--reinforcing or reminding them of things they may have forgotten about prevention. This is obviously an important consequence, but there is no indication that repeated exposure alone leads to any effects beyond such reinforcement, such as attitude change, and more importantly, behavioral change. It appears much more critical to reach audiences either previously disposed to attend rather well to the messages once they see or hear them, and/or to design the messages in ways that will enhance attention paying across a broad spectrum of audiences.

The Salience of Fear Arousal

While the PSAs attempted to avoid explicitly fear-arousing content, we have seen that 22 percent of the exposed respondents said that the ads made them "more afraid of becoming a victim of crime themselves." Given the potential for any communications regarding crime to arouse fear, it is important to take a closer look at this group and other influences of the campaign upon them.

The effectiveness of using fear-arousing messages in attempting to persuade audiences has been the subject of some debate over the years. The earliest studies suggested that practically any degree of fear arousal would inhibit attitudinal and behavioral changes among audiences because the resulting anxiety would distract from attentiveness to the communication (Janis and Feshbach, 1953). On the other hand, Leventhal (1970) demonstrated in several studies that moderate or perhaps even high levels of fear arousal could be more conducive than low fear arousal for attitudinal and behavioral change, particularly when specific and presumably effective means of reducing the fear were simultaneously presented. Results supporting moderate uses of fear arousal under certain conditions have also been offered by Janis and Mann (1965), Insko, Arkoff and Insko (1965), Evans et al. (1970), and Dembroski et al. (1978).

McGuire (1968, 1973) has argued that what is at work is a curvilinear relationship between fear arousal and persuasion, with a "moderate" degree of arousal likely to be the most persuasive. At moderate levels of arousal, individuals may feel more insecure or anxious and thus more susceptible to persuasive messages. But, if the message induces fear beyond a certain point, audiences become overly concerned with the fear or anxiety per se and become distracted from the message, inhibiting further effects. On the other hand, low or non-existent fear arousing messages may not be interesting or exciting enough to generate attention to them.

While the above research has strong implications for mass mediated persuasive messages, attempts to test propositions concerning fear arousal in field settings using media-disseminated messages have been lacking. In this case, however, we have the opportunity to examine the impact of fear arousal in a "naturalistic" situation, utilizing respondent self-reports of fear arousal

and persuasion as a consequence of exposure to the McGruff campaign. As compared to previous experimental studies, the messages themselves could at most be described as "moderate" in fear arousing capability. There were no depictions of violent crimes in the PSAs, nor any emphasis on potential consequences of physical injury to victims, nor any content which would come close to comparing with the graphic depictions of the consequences of smoking or tooth decay found in some of the previous research.

Following McGuire's proposition, it appeared likely that persons who self-selected themselves into a "moderate" fear condition would: (1) report having paid greater attention to the PSA messages than those in the low fear condition; and (2) be more likely than those in the low fear condition to report increased awareness; positive attitudinal changes; perceptions of increased capability; increased motivation; and greater behavioral change regarding crime prevention.

The data in Table 5-25 clearly indicate that fear arousal was a function of the amount of attention paid to the PSAs, providing correlational support for the first hypothesis. Respondents indicating fear arousal were significantly more attentive to the ads. Fear arousal was unrelated to frequency of exposure.

The relationships between the dependent effects variables and fear arousal, attention and exposure are delineated in Table 5-25. Frequency of exposure per se was generally unrelated to PSA influences, except in the case of reminding persons of prevention information, likely involving a "reinforcement" process. On the contrary, amount of attention paid to the ads was significantly related to each of the campaign effect variables. The more attention paid by respondents, the more awareness, attitude change, perceived capability, motivation and behavioral change they reported. Moreover, fear

arousal was significantly and independently associated with campaign effects on eight of the nine measures. Only in the case of the PSAs making people feel more self-confident in protecting themselves did the level of fear not make a difference.

These findings suggest that self-perceived "moderate" fear arousal resulted in increased awareness of prevention techniques; more positive attitudes concerning prevention; increased motivation to take preventive actions; and the taking of preventive actions per se. However, fear arousal was not related to increases in one's sense of capability or confidence in self-protection, which is perhaps not too surprising since the interjection of fear has rarely been applauded as a confidence-building technique.

A test for possible interaction effects between attention and fear arousal on the dependent variables yielded negligible results. Significant interactions were found only on concern over crime and considering group efforts; in both cases increased attention in the fear arousal condition resulted in greater change.

The findings suggest strong support in a naturalistic field study setting for the contention that moderate amounts of fear arousal are conducive to an increased persuasive impact for a message. While the "one-shot" survey methodology used, and the reliance upon respondent self-reports, limit the extent of the inferences that can be derived from the results, they are highly and consistently supportive of McGuires' initial proposition. Moreover, the strength of the overall campaign effects found here imply that a revised view of the efficacy of public information campaigns may be needed, the use of fear appeals notwithstanding. The consistency of campaign effects found in this survey and in the concurrent panel study suggest a great deal more closure

between experimental laboratory studies and field surveys of communication effects than was apparent in previous decades.

Concluding Note

Citizen reactions to the McGruff campaign were strongly positive, and by and large were consistent among nearly all population subgroups, with younger persons somewhat more enthusiastic. Not only were the PSAs favorably evaluated as communication vehicles, but respectable numbers of individuals reported that they had learned from them, had their attitudes about crime prevention modified by them, and had taken actions consistent with the messages of the campaign. While there was no evidence of a "boomerang" effect of the ads in the sense of their influencing people in ways opposite of those intended, the PSAs did appear to stimulate greater fear of victimization among some members of the audience. When such fear arousal did occur, it may have increased other more beneficial potential effects of the campaign among some citizen subgroups.

CITIZEN CRIME PREVENTION NEEDS, INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS AND MCGRUFF

In the 1980 study, it seemed rather clear that in the early stage of the McGruff campaign the ads were reaching some types of people who were not usually exposed to other sources of crime prevention information. Those reporting more exposure to other kinds of prevention information were likelier to have used the media more overall. Additionally, they paid more attention to PSAs and to crime content in the media. Also, they did not differ from those less exposed in terms of such demographic characteristics as age, sex, and education. Moreover, those persons who said they paid more attention to crime prevention messages tended to be older, female, and to consider themselves as

more vulnerable to crime. Similarly, those who indicated a greater need for information about prevention tended more to be women and persons generally seeing themselves as more at risk.

Thus a fair amount of disparity was found in 1980 among: (1) persons exposed to the early McGruff campaign; (2) persons exposed to other prevention information efforts; and (3) persons indicating a need for crime prevention information, and attending more closely to it when they got it. The suggestion was offered in the previous report that there may be a certain amount of inefficiency in crime prevention campaign efforts if a main goal of those is to reach those audiences with the greatest need for--and willingness to attend to--such information. To the extent that those most exposed to campaigns differ from those most in need and potentially attentive, inefficiency exists in the dissemination and diffusion process. It appears quite critical for audience targeting or marketing strategies to take into account such motivational constructs as citizens' perceived needs for crime prevention information and attentiveness to it.

How does the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign fare in this regard after nearly two years? To what extent was it successful in penetrating groups of people both more in need of and more attentive to crime prevention information? Somewhat better, as it turns out, but probably more as a function of the high rate of diffusion of the PSAs over a wide range of social groups than as a consequence of any special targeting efforts. The campaign reached 49 percent of those saying they had "a great need" for crime prevention information, and 53 percent of those indicating "hardly any need." Comparable figures from the 1980 sample were 29 percent and 31 percent. Because in 1981 the campaign was reaching more kinds of people, period, it was also getting to more of those with particular need for such information. However, the ads were no likelier

to reach audiences with greater need than those with lesser need, as the near-zero correlation between campaign exposure and information need in Table 5-26 suggests.

Moreover, those exposed to the Take a Bite Out of Crime ads were significantly less likely to have been exposed to other prevention information inputs, and McGruff exposure was unrelated to attentiveness to other prevention information. On the other hand, persons exposed to other kinds of prevention information were also significantly likelier to have expressed a need for such messages. What these findings reinforce is the notion of the campaign reaching a rather homogeneous "mass" audience, and a quite indiscriminate one at that in terms of particular needs or orientations regarding crime prevention. Eighty-two percent of the respondents said they had come across information from sources other than the McGruff campaign in the previous 12 months on how to protect themselves and their households from crime. We have no way of knowing, of course, precisely where that such information was acquired nor the effectiveness of it. However, the data does indicate that many--and perhaps most--other prevention campaign efforts seem to be rather specifically reaching those persons with greater informational needs.

This is even more clearly apparent from the regression analyses presented in Table 5-27. Exposure to the McGruff PSAs remains unpredicted by any of the orientations toward crime, media usage variables, or demographics, save the problematical characteristic of age. Even the zero-order correlations, while significant in a few instances, remain fairly low. On the other hand, exposure to other prevention information is clearly and independently predicted by age (with <u>older</u> persons more exposed), sex (<u>women</u> moreso than men), race (<u>minorities</u> higher), as well as perceived vulnerability to crime and previous victimization experience.

The third regression analysis in Table 5-27 depicts characteristics of those respondents saying they were more in need of prevention information, and their characteristics more closely match those of the general prevention information-exposed group than those of the McGruff campaign-exposed cohort. However, the overlap between the "information needy" and general prevention information exposure is by no means a complete one. While lower income persons indicate significantly greater need, there is a tendency for upper income groups to receive more information. (Actually, the McGruff campaign had if anything more of a tendency to reach lower income groups.) Further, persons perceiving their neighborhoods as more dangerous, as well as those with heightened fear of being victimized, indicated a greater information need, but appeared no more likely to be reached by either McGruff or other prevention campaign efforts.

Once exposed, people with greater informational need indeed were somewhat more attentive to the McGruff campaign ($r = .29$), but not as attentive as individuals with greater informational need typically are to other information efforts ($r = .44$). The regression equations in Table 5-28 suggest that greater attentiveness to the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign was primarily a function of age, and media characteristics, than of orientations toward crime. Conversely, attentiveness to other kinds of prevention information was almost solely dependent on crime orientations, and income level.

In sum, the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign does appear to have been successful in reaching large segments of the populace with: (1) specific concerns about crime; (2) a greater potential for victimization; and (3) an expressed need for ideas and advice on prevention. It also seems to have reached nearly equally sized proportions of persons with lesser crime prevention-related concerns and needs, which may well be important as well if

for no other reason than building public awareness. Thus, if one criterion of success of the McGruff campaign was that it reach proportionately more target groups with greater crime-related concerns, the effort seems to have come up somewhat short. But, if another criterion was that it mainly reach a more general population overall--including individuals less likely to be exposed to prevention information ordinarily--the campaign fared quite well.

CONCLUSIONS

It was found that over half (52 percent) of the national sample respondents recalled having seen or heard at least one of the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs, primarily over television, and a third of the sample had encountered them more than 10 times. The campaign also appeared to be reaching a highly diversified audience demographically, with little indication that persons in any particular social or economic strata were beyond the scope of the PSAs. (Something of an exception was age level, with younger persons decidedly more likely than older ones to report exposure; nonetheless, a third of respondents over age 64 could recall the McGruff ads.) Persons who regularly either watched more television or listened more to the radio were likelier to have come across the ads, having of course greater opportunity to do so.

A strong majority of those exposed perceived the ads as effectively conveying their message, and said they found the information contained in them worth passing on to other people. The reactions were consistently favorable among all population subgroups, although younger persons tended to rate the ads more positively. However, nearly a quarter of those exposed said they had learned something new from the PSAs, and 46 percent said they had been reminded

of things they'd known before but had forgotten. Younger persons and women were likelier to report having been reinforced in this way.

Upwards of half of the respondents recalling the ads said they had made them more concerned about crime and more confident in protecting themselves. Over half said the PSAs had made them feel more responsible about preventing crime and in perceiving citizen group efforts as more effective. Twenty-two percent said the ads made them more fearful of being victimized, with women being likelier to report this than men. Nearly a fourth of the exposed sample said they had taken preventative actions due to having seen or heard the ads, including improving household security and helping their neighbors in prevention efforts. Women were likelier to have reported doing so than men. Moreover, persons reporting having been influenced in one particular way were likely to report other influences as well. The extent to which people reported having been influenced appeared more a function of how much attention they paid to the ads, rather than a consequence of how many times they had seen or heard them.

The campaign, perhaps for a variety of reasons, appeared to be transcending many of the audience-bound constraints which seem to inhibit the wider dissemination of other crime prevention information campaign efforts. Other prevention campaigns were found to have greater penetration among those seeing themselves in greater need of information about prevention, e.g. women and minority group members. However, the McGruff ads reached sizeable numbers of those individuals as well as citizens with perhaps lesser crime-related concerns.

CHAPTER 6

THE PANEL SAMPLE CAMPAIGN EVALUATION

The panel sample campaign evaluation was aimed at providing more stringent empirical evidence concerning the McGruff campaign's ability to stimulate specific kinds of changes in citizens' psychological orientations toward crime prevention, and in their taking of personal actions to help reduce crime. The findings will also be viewed in the context of the more population generalizable national sample results.

The panel sample consisted of 426 residents of three major urban areas, interviewed both prior to the campaign and two years later in November 1981. The results presented below generally suggest that the campaign had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on their taking of specific preventative actions.

The chapter addresses in turn: (1) patterns of exposure and attention to the campaign; (2) the effects of the campaign on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention; (3) the effects of the campaign on citizen crime prevention action-taking; (4) demographic differences in campaign effects; and (5) more psychologically based differences in campaign effects.

EXPOSURE AND ATTENTION TO THE CAMPAIGN

Given the national sample data alone, it was impossible to specifically determine the extent of exposure among individuals with differing beliefs, attitudes and behaviors about crime and prevention prior to the campaign. We could not tell, for example, whether the campaign was reaching more people who were already more knowledgeable about, or favorably disposed toward, crime prevention, or perhaps the opposite. This issue is a key one in evaluating

campaign effects, and indeed communication effects in general. (Hypotheses relating to selective exposure and a possible media-generated "knowledge gap," and their relevance to crime prevention campaigns, are reviewed in other portions of the report.)

The panel design gives us the advantage of comparing and examining exposed and unexposed respondents' crime prevention dispositions as they were prior to the campaign. Similarly, we can investigate the role of those antecedent dispositions in terms of their impact upon the degree of attention paid to the campaign among those exposed. Before addressing those issues, however, we will first scrutinize the more general patterns of campaign exposure within the panel sample, primarily to provide us with a baseline for comparing those with what was found in the more representative national sample.

Campaign Exposure

Forty-eight percent of the panel sample recalled having been exposed to at least one of the Take a Bite Out of Crime public service advertisements. (Respondents were classified as having been exposed to the ads if they indicated recognition of them when described by the interviewer.) This figure is markedly close to the 52 percent recognition rate found in the national sample.

Seventy-one percent of those exposed said they had seen the ads most often on television (compared with 78 percent of the national sample), and 38 percent said they had seen or heard them more than 10 times over the previous two years (compared with 37 percent of the national sample). Eighteen percent said they had encountered them only once or twice. And, 46 percent said they had first seen them over the past year.

Campaign Exposure, Demographics, and Media-Related Characteristics

The demographic characteristics of exposed respondents closely matched those found in the more definitive national sample (Table 6-1). Again, age was the strongest correlate, with 65 percent of those under 35 recalling the ad and 31 percent of those over 54 doing so. Respondents with children in the home and those who had resided in the same neighborhoods for a shorter period were also likelier to have recalled the ads. Both of these results are likely in large part to be artifacts of age, and again match national sample findings. And, as found previously, residents of higher social status neighborhoods had somewhat lower exposure rates. However, while men were slightly likelier to have recalled the PSAs in the national sample, women were slightly predominant in that regard in the panel. (This may in part be an artifact of fewer males being present in the panel sample.) Exposure was highest in Buffalo and lowest in Denver.

Given the limited size of the panel sample, the analysis of media-related characteristics and exposure was limited to television viewing habits. Once again, there was a high correspondence with the national sample data in that those likelier to have been exposed: (1) viewed more hours of television; (2) watched more crime-oriented entertainment programs; (3) paid greater attention to televised news about crime; and (4) paid more attention to televised PSAs overall (Table 6-2).

In all, these findings at once provide even greater validation for the national sample results, and yield a fair amount of assurance that inferences made from one sample can be rather legitimately generalized to the other.

Campaign Exposure and Crime Orientations

Not only did the campaign have widespread penetration within all demographic subgroups, but it appears to have reached across individuals with strongly varied perceptions and attitudes about crime in general and their own personal safety (Tables 6-3 and 6-4). No significant differences were found between exposure and respondents' 1979 perceptions of crime rates and personal safety within their own neighborhoods, nor their sense of perceived vulnerability to crime or personal victimization experiences prior to the campaign.

There is thus no evidence that individuals were selectively exposed to the campaign on the basis of their general orientations toward crime per se. The campaign reached: (1) those perceiving more crime in their immediate environs and those not doing so; (2) those seeing themselves as more vulnerable to crime and those not; and (3) citizens who had previously been victimized and those unvictimized.

Campaign Exposure and Crime Prevention Orientations

Audience selectivity factors become somewhat more relevant when we consider individuals' orientations toward crime prevention. Respondents who had previously seen themselves as less knowledgeable about prevention, and those who had more favorable attitudes about the effectiveness of citizen actions in preventing crime, were significantly likelier to have recalled the PSAs (Table 6-5). The finding for knowledge appears to be in part an artifact of the relationship between exposure and the dominant demographic variable of age. When age is controlled for, the probability level for the exposure-knowledge relationship drops to the .10 level; the exposure effectiveness relationship, however, remained significant at the .05 level.

Thus there is support here that individuals who held a more favorable initial attitude toward a major theme of the PSAs--that citizen efforts can be effective--were likelier to recall having seen them. And, there is at least marginal evidence that rather than reaching people who already saw themselves knowledgeable about prevention, the campaign tended to reach those in the lesser knowledgeable category. This should be seen as something of a plus, and goes against the notion of campaigns typically attracting those who have the least use for the information provided.

It is also clear from Table 6-5, however, that once again substantial proportions of individuals across the broad range of prevention orientations examined here were able to recall having seen the PSAs, including nearly 40 percent with high perceived prevention knowledge, and over a quarter of those seeing personal prevention measures as relatively ineffective. Moreover, the campaign appeared to cut across individuals with differing perceived informational needs regarding prevention, as well as those with varying anticipations of how useful such information would be to them and how much of an impact it might have upon them (Table 6-6). While respondents scoring higher in prevention opinion leadership appeared likelier to be exposed, when age is controlled for, the relationship drops to well below significance.

While, with a few exceptions, exposure rates do seem relatively homogeneous across the sample, this should not of course imply that the messages were perceived in the same way by persons with varied orientations to crime and prevention, nor that the messages were as effective for some individuals as for others. But the findings do testify to the strength of dissemination of the campaign, as well as to the impact of its themes and appeals, in allowing

citizens with many varying dispositions toward crime and prevention to at least have had the opportunity to hear the message.

Attention to the Campaign

The sheer volume and availability of the Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs may well have made it difficult for even those persons least interested in crime to avoid them, particularly the televised ones. However, we need also to consider how attentively citizens followed the ads once exposed. Simply glancing at them closely enough to remember the logo and the "crime" theme would certainly limit their potential effectiveness. Fortunately, data from the national sample indicate a rather high degree of attentiveness among most citizens, and the panel data are strongly supportive of that as well.

Thirty-one percent of those in the panel sample exposed to the ads reported paying "a great deal" of attention to them (versus 26 percent in the national sample), and 53 percent said they had paid at least "some" attention (versus 51 percent nationally).

Campaign Attention, Demographics, and Media-Related Characteristics

Degree of attention to the campaign among those exposed appeared fairly well distributed over demographic groups, with only level of education being significantly--and negatively--correlated with attentiveness: lesser educated persons were likelier to have paid greater attention (Table 6-7). (These results are slightly at odds with those of the national sample, in which only age was significant. However, a check of attention levels for national sample metropolitan area residents indicates that middle-aged respondents were the most attentive age group, and that respondents with the least education had the

highest attention scores. Thus the data for the two samples are not quite as diverse as first appears.)

As might be expected, the more campaign-attentive also paid more attention to televised public service announcements overall, and also more frequently watched television crime shows (Table 6-8).

Campaign Attention and Crime and Prevention Orientations

Individuals with varying perceptions of crime in their neighborhoods and their own personal vulnerability did not differ in attention paid to the campaign (Table 6-9). However, those who had more direct experience with actual victimization were significantly more attentive.

Sharp differences in attentiveness are found, however, in looking at citizen orientations toward crime prevention (Table 6-10). More attentive persons also: (1) saw themselves as knowing more about prevention; (2) were more concerned about crime prevention; (3) were more confident about protecting themselves; and (4) were likelier to have taken more preventative actions.

It happens that prevention concern is almost uncorrelated with prevention knowledge (.02) and confidence (-.04), so it would seem that two somewhat separate cohorts were actually more attentive: (1) those seeing themselves as more knowledgeable and confident; and (2) those more concerned about prevention. It seems quite likely that members of the former group were getting some degree of psychological reinforcement by paying greater attention to the ads, while those in the latter group may have been doing more in the way of seeking information of value to them. This possibility is buttressed by the findings in Table 6-11, which indicate that more attentive individuals tended to have expectations prior to the campaign that such information would be useful to them, that they would attend to it, and that it could influence their

thinking about prevention. All three of these anticipatory information dispositions correlate highly and positively with prevention concern, but not with prevention knowledge or confidence (Table 6-12). The low correlation between information need and attentiveness would appear to be in part an artifact of the strong negative correlations between attentiveness, and knowledge and confidence. The issue of anticipatory information dispositions is an emerging and intriguing one in communication effects research, and will be more fully treated, particularly in light of these data, later in this report.

Not surprisingly, we also find that persons scoring higher in prevention opinion leadership, as well as those discussing crime and prevention more, were also more attentive to the campaign.

Concluding Note

The panel data generally support the inference drawn from the national sample that the campaign reached a broad-based population demographically. Moreover, while there was a tendency for persons perceiving themselves as less knowledgeable and prevention measures as more effective to have been exposed, the PSAs appear to have reached goodly numbers of individuals with widely varying perceptions and orientations regarding crime and its prevention. However, attentiveness to the PSAs was much less uniform, with greater attention to them being paid by persons more knowledgeable and confident regarding prevention, and those more concerned about protecting themselves. Individuals engaged in more prevention activities were also more attentive, as were those who anticipated that more information about prevention would benefit them.

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Not surprisingly, we also find that persons scoring higher in prevention opinion leadership, as well as those discussing crime and prevention more, were also more attentive to the campaign.

Concluding Note

The panel data generally support the inference drawn from the national sample that the campaign reached a broad-based population demographically. Moreover, while there was a tendency for persons perceiving themselves as less knowledgeable and prevention measures as more effective to have been exposed, the PSAs appear to have reached goodly numbers of individuals with widely varying perceptions and orientations regarding crime and its prevention. However, attentiveness to the PSAs was much less uniform, with greater attention to them being paid by persons more knowledgeable and confident regarding prevention, and those more concerned about protecting themselves. Individuals engaged in more prevention activities were also more attentive, as were those who anticipated that more information about prevention would benefit them.

CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: PREVENTION ORIENTATIONS

The panel sample analysis of the effectiveness of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign will focus on several components of citizen responsiveness vis a vis crime prevention. The campaign in general, and the public service advertisements in particular, presented citizens with a rather diversified range of appeals, content areas, media formats, and suggestions for actions. Here, we will consider those crime prevention orientations and behaviors which the campaign would seem to have had the greatest potential for influencing during its first two years.

As discussed previously, we view the campaign as having been largely concerned with effecting increased citizen competence in helping to reduce crime. The term "prevention competence" serves as an organizing rubric encompassing several kinds of orientations and behaviors through which citizens may demonstrate their ability in the crime prevention arena. Prevention competence is likely to increase among citizens to the extent that they: (1) are more fully aware of effective prevention techniques; (2) hold positive attitudes about the effectiveness of citizen-initiated prevention activities, and about their own responsibility for getting involved in prevention; (3) feel capable about carrying out actions themselves to reduce their chances of victimization; (4) are concerned about protecting themselves and others from crime; and (5) actually engage in actions aimed at reducing crime.

The correlations in Table 6-13 suggest that for the panel sample there is not necessarily a high degree of correspondence among the five attributes representing prevention competence. Perceived knowledge, for example, while highly correlated with perceived effectiveness and confidence, is practically unassociated with concern and only modestly related to sense of responsibility.

Concern is also essentially unassociated with confidence. Apparently, within this limited sample, it is quite possible to have citizens who are concerned about protecting themselves, but who do not see themselves as knowledgeable or competent in doing so. Thus the campaign could impinge upon those two types of citizens in rather different ways.

These and related issues will be more carefully considered in subsequent sections of this study. At this point, it is important to note that the examination of media campaign effects is still a highly emergent field, and that the area is a most complex one. We will proceed with the panel analyses of McGruff campaign effects by first investigating the impact of the campaign on prevention competence characteristics up to the point of behavioral change, which will be examined on its own in the following section.

A Methodological Note

As indicated previously, the analyses of the panel sample effects data require not only a simple comparison between campaign-exposed and unexposed groups to find out if the exposed group "changed more," but also the control of extraneous variables which may have interactively influenced either campaign exposure, or the change measure over time, or both simultaneously. While it is impossible to constrain the influence of all potential extraneous variables, we can make some good judgments about what kinds of variables would be most likely to intervene, and control for them accordingly. Toward that end, our analyses utilize a rather stringent hierarchical multiple regression control procedure.

The most obvious potential intervening variables appeared to be: (1) respondent encounters with crime prevention campaigns other than McGruff; (2) exposure to crime-related mass media content; and, of course, (3) direct encounters with crime, or having been victimized. Measures of each of these

stimuli were inserted into the regression equation as a block immediately preceding the campaign exposure measure.

As a more conservative device, we also chose to include in the equation as control variables a block of five demographic indicators which appeared most closely associated with campaign exposure and prevention orientations, including age, sex, education, income and neighborhood social status. These were included as a block prior to the above one. It appeared likely that any unidentified extraneous variables tending to influence the change scores would do so unevenly across at least some of those demographics, and thus "controlling" for the demographics should help minimize their impact. It was also hoped that this would help minimize any effects based upon interaction between the precampaign interviewing round and exposure to the campaign or other intervening stimuli. This "regressed change scores" technique is further elaborated upon in Cohen and Cohen (1975).

Prevention Orientation Effects

Persons exposed to the campaign showed significant changes in three of the five crime prevention competence dispositions. Campaign exposure was associated with: (1) increases in how much respondents thought they knew about crime prevention; (2) more positive attitudes about the effectiveness of citizens taking action to help prevent crime; and (3) greater feelings of personal competence in protecting oneself from crime. The campaign appeared to have no impact, however, on feelings of personal responsibility for helping prevent crime, or on personal concern regarding crime prevention. These findings held even when controlling for the possible intervening variables discussed above.

Tables 6-14 and 6-15 detail these results. Taking the relationship between campaign exposure and self-perceived prevention knowledge in Table 6-14 as an example, we see that the simple regression analysis yielded a beta value of .09, indicating a positive and significant relationship between campaign exposure and perceived knowledge in 1981, controlling for level of knowledge in 1979. (One-tailed significance levels are used for these analyses, since we are predicting that campaign exposure will result in a change in a specific direction for each dependent variable, e.g. we expect "more" rather than "less" knowledge.)

The hierarchical regression analysis in the lower part of the table indicates that the relationship between exposure and perceived knowledge remains significant (beta = .08) when the other potential intervening variables are controlled for.

Specifically, the 1979 knowledge score (Time 1 or "T1") was entered as the first block of the regression equation, allowing it to explain as much of the variation in the 1981 (Time 2) knowledge score as it could. In the second block of the equation, the demographic indicators were entered as a "generalized" control on unspecified extraneous variables. The third block consisted of the three factors--apart from McGruff campaign exposure--most likely to directly affect prevention knowledge: (1) victimization experience; (2) attention to news and entertainment media crime content; and (3) exposure to other prevention campaigns. Finally, exposure to McGruff was entered as a dummy variable in the fourth block, with that beta value reflecting the singular impact of campaign exposure of knowledge, with the effects of the other variables on knowledge "controlled out."

The regression analysis for prevention knowledge also indicates that exposure to other prevention campaigns was also associated with gains in

knowledge over the two-year period (beta = .10), and that men gained more in knowledge than did women (beta = .08). The possibility that those or other variables may have interacted with campaign exposure so that they acted in combination to affect prevention knowledge will be considered later in this report.

Table 6-14 also indicates that campaign exposure was not associated with changes in prevention responsibility (uncontrolled beta = -.02; controlled beta = .03), but that exposure was related to more positive attitudes concerning the efficacy of personal prevention behaviors. And, Table 6-15 reveals that changes in prevention confidence, but not concern, were related to exposure to the McGruff campaign.

These findings are of course strongly supportive of (and in turn are reinforced by) what respondents in the national sample said they thought they had gained from the PSAs. An apparent exception to that is that while over half of the national sample respondents recalling the campaign said that it made them feel more responsible about crime prevention, no effect was found for the campaign on sense of personal responsibility in the panel. However, the panel item asked how much responsibility respondents thought they had compared with the police. Nearly three-quarters of the respondents in 1979 reported that they felt "equal" responsibility with the police, which perhaps minimized the opportunity for significant changes to occur on that measure. It could well also be that the ads themselves reinforced the concept of equally shared responsibility, given their emphasis on cooperating with the police by reporting suspicious incidents.

The lack of impact of campaign exposure on concern about protecting oneself from crime lends itself to some ambiguity in interpretation. On the one hand, a goal of the campaign is to make citizens concerned enough so that

they will act appropriately, but not so concerned as to unduly frighten them. Given the finding noted earlier that concern about prevention in the 1979 data was substantially correlated with heightened perceptions of crime in one's own environment, and greater personal vulnerability, it may actually be a "plus" for the campaign that it did not significantly increase such concern. Indeed, the PSAs, by emphasizing the most positive approaches to crime prevention, appear to have built more positive citizen dispositions--knowledge, sense of efficacy, and confidence--while at the same time minimizing potentially more negative orientations toward prevention.

Crime Orientation Effects

Before moving ahead into discussing the effects of the campaign on preventative behaviors, it may be helpful to take note of the campaign's potential for affecting citizen's orientations toward crime per se. It could be argued that while the campaign was having positive influences on certain prevention dispositions, it may have been doing so at the expense of making individuals more fearful of crime or seeing themselves as more vulnerable to it.

The panel sample respondents were asked in both waves of the survey: (1) whether they thought the crime rate was increasing or decreasing in their neighborhoods; (2) how safe they felt being out in their neighborhoods at night; (3) how dangerous in terms of crime they saw their own neighborhoods as compared to others; (4) how likely they thought it was that their residences would be burglarized; and (5) how likely they thought it was that they would be attacked or robbed.

The findings presented in Table 6-16 suggest that the campaign had virtually no impact on respondents' perceptions of crime within their immediate

neighborhoods. No meaningful changes in perceptions of crime rate, sense of personal safety at night, or comparative neighborhood danger were found to be associated with exposure to the campaign. However, Table 6-17 suggests that the campaign was having something of an effect on perceptions of likelihood of victimization, and in a curiously inverse way at that. Persons exposed to the McGruff PSAs significantly lowered their estimations of likelihood of being burglarized. But, campaign exposure was also related to modest increases in perceived probability of being a victim of violent crime. (The uncontrolled relationship was significant at the .01 level; with controls the association dropped to just below significance.) One working hypothesis at this point might be that, since the most prominent features of the campaign dealt with household protection against burglary, the exposed respondents may have felt somewhat assured that what they got out of the campaign would help diminish their chances of burglary. On the other hand, the overall theme of "crime" in the PSAs may have also heightened their general concern about it, channeling that concern more into thoughts about violent crime, which most of the PSAs dealt very little with.

It also appears that attention to media crime content in general is strongly related to many citizen orientations toward crime, particularly their perceived vulnerability. The previous tables also picked up a positive relationship between media crime attention and prevention concern and the perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention techniques. While more fully developed analyses of this relationship are beyond our scope here, they will be more fully considered later in the study.

Concluding Note

The Take a Bite Out of Crime PSAs had a noteworthy impact on citizen perceptions and attitudes vis a vis crime prevention. The psychological processes underlying these changes will be dealt with later in the study, but through one means or another persons as a group exposed to the ads came away from the experience thinking they knew more about how to protect themselves, feeling that personal precautions against crime were more effective, and feeling more confident that they indeed could help protect themselves. While the campaign had little influence on personal perceptions of crime in one's neighborhood, it did appear to reduce perceptions of likelihood of being burglarized, while slightly increasing perceptions of likelihood of being a victim of violent crime.

CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

The most stringent test of an information campaign's effectiveness is whether changes in people's actual actions or behaviors can be traced to their exposure to the campaign. In the national sample, nearly a fourth of the campaign-exposed respondents said they had taken preventative actions as a result of having seen or heard the McGruff PSAs, and they typically gave such examples as improving household security or helping their neighbors in prevention efforts.

Panel respondents were queried in both 1979 and 1981 as to whether or to what extent they were engaged in each of 25 prevention activities aimed at protecting themselves and others from victimization. To the degree that the campaign was effective in stimulating behavioral change, it was expected that

persons exposed to it would have been likelier than those unexposed to have either adopted or begun "doing more of" specific kinds of activities.

As others have alluded to (cf. Lavrakas, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), categorizing the full set of prevention activities is a complex undertaking due to their diversity. Moreover, some activities may be seen as functionally equivalent to others, and some have greater relevance to certain kinds of people in certain situations. For organizational purposes here, we will tentatively arrange the activities into several discrete groups, building on the groundwork provided by Lavrakas and Skogan and Maxfield. We have generally attempted to order them according to the degree of "cost" involved in implementing or practicing them.

We begin with the most effortless behaviors of locking doors or leaving on lights when out, moving to more effortful actions such as asking neighbors or police to watch the house, to cooperating with neighbors or joining prevention groups. We conclude with more costly actual "purchases" such as buying burglar alarms, theft insurance and the like. We also include under purchases any employment of professional prevention sources, such as having police do a household security check. Even though usually "free of cost," the effort can be quite time-consuming.

Obviously, some individual actions are going to be relatively easy for some people while costly for others, and we do not offer this schema as a uniform "scale" of difficulty. Rather, it is a way of organizing a wide range of diverse actions in a reasonably coherent manner. Moreover, we have discriminated within the "behavioral" actions and the "purchase" actions by noting ones associated with target hardening, deterrence, surveillance, personal precaution, loss reduction, and cooperation with others, borrowing heavily from Lavrakas and Skogan and Maxfield.

Our full array of preventative actions is as follows:

PREVENTATIVE BEHAVIORS

Target Hardening

Locking doors in the home, even when only leaving for a short time.
Keeping doors locked, even when at home.

Deterrence

Leaving on indoor lights when away from home at night.
Leaving on outdoor lights when away from home at night.
When away for more than a day or so, using a timer to turn on lights or a radio.

Surveillance

When away from home for more than a day or so, notifying police so that they will keep a special watch.
When away for more than a day or so, stopping delivery of things like newspapers or mail, or asking someone to bring them in.
When away for more than a day or so, having a neighbor watch your residence.

Personal Precaution

When going out after dark, going with someone else because of crime.
Going out by car instead of walking at night because of crime.
Taking something along with you when going out that could be used as protection against being attacked, assaulted or robbed.
Avoiding certain places in your neighborhood at night.

Cooperative

(Keeping an eye on) what's going on in the street in front of your home.
(Contacting) police to report a crime or some suspicious activity in your neighborhood.
(Being part of) a community group or organization in your neighborhood that tried to do something about crime in your neighborhood.

PREVENTATIVE PURCHASES

Target Hardening

(Having) your local police do a security check of your home.
(Having) special locks put on your doors or windows.
(Having) an operating burglar alarm system.

Deterrence

(Having) outdoor lights for security.
(Having) anti-theft stickers on doors.
(Having) a dog at least partly for security.

Loss Reduction

(Having) your property engraved with an I.D.
(Having) theft insurance.

Personal Precaution

(Having) a peephole or window in your door.
(Having) personal security devices such as a gun, tear gas, etc.

Table 6-18 indicates that the propensity for action-taking among the respondents within the panel sample is rather unevenly distributed across their psychological prevention orientations. It is clear, for example, the concern about protecting oneself is highly and positively related to the lion's share of preventative behaviors, but not to preventative purchases. Moreover, prevention confidence, while somewhat negatively associated with such behaviors as personal precautions, is largely unrelated to most of them. Sense of personal responsibility for prevention is also unrelated to most behaviors. Perceived prevention knowledge and effectiveness tend to be positively associated more with preventative purchases, and to some extent with cooperative behaviors. It would be unwarranted at this point to draw too much out of these limited sample data, except to point out once again the complexity of the interactions among prevention orientations and behaviors. These will be more productively examined at a later time with the national sample data.

Campaign-Relevant Activities

A "test" of campaign effects on prevention action-taking is made even more difficult because of the varying degrees of emphasis placed on specific activities within different components of the campaign. While the televised PSAs

focused on a fairly discrete set of activities, print ads--and especially the booklet--covered a much broader range of recommendations, including at one point or another nearly all of those the panel respondents were asked about. There is an additional problem in that local prevention groups may have used the McGruff logo, whether sanctioned or not, as a tie-in to their own campaigns. While we know, for example, that buying or carrying "protective devices" such as guns or tear gas were never advocated in the PSAs or in any other formal aspect of the campaign, we may be less certain as to whether such actions may have been implied by prevention interest groups perhaps using the campaign as a springboard. Furthermore, we have no assurance that some individuals who were prompted by the campaign to view individual action-taking as more effective "translated" that disposition on their own into such behaviors as weapon purchasing.

Thus we might argue that "positive" changes, i.e. in the direction of "doing more," in any of the prevention activities among those exposed to the campaign provide some evidence of its impact on behavior. But also, we may have more concrete assurance of the effectiveness of the campaign if more changes are found among those activities that were clearly advocated in the specific PSAs to which respondents were more exposed. Since 71 percent of the respondents said they saw the ads most often over television, it seems reasonable to expect that, to the extent that the campaign was having an impact, it would be best discerned among those activities specifically recommended in the televised PSAs. (See Appendix B for specific television PSAs.) (Apart from television, the panel respondents named the other possible PSA sources in almost equal proportions. And, only three percent recalled ever having seen the booklet as of November 1981.)

Consequently, we might expect the most likely changes to have been in:

- Locking doors when out of the house ("Stop a Crime" PSA)
- Leaving outdoor lights on ("Stop a Crime")
- Using timer lights indoors ("Stop a Crime")
- Having neighbors watch the house ("Stop a Crime")
- Keeping a watch on the neighborhood ("Gilstraps," "Mimi Marth")
- Reporting suspicious incidents to police ("Gilstraps," "Mimi Marth")
- Joining with others to prevent crime ("Mimi Marth")

In terms of emphasis, the first four of the above actions were mentioned individually in the original "Stop a Crime" PSA, but the latter three served as the overall themes for the two more recent ads, "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth." As for the other activities, no other specific behaviors (police security checks, not going out at night alone, etc.) were mentioned or alluded to in the televised PSAs, nor were any of the prevention purchases recommended.

Campaign Exposure and Prevention Activity Effects

Out of the seven prevention activities the campaign would seem most likely to have influenced, significant changes associated with exposure to the campaign were found in six. No changes traceable to campaign exposure were found in any of the other activities, save one--having acquired a dog at least partly for security purposes.

This striking finding strongly suggests a marked and consistent influence of the campaign on citizens' crime prevention activities. Moreover, the one case in which a significant campaign effect was expected but not found was that of more frequently locking doors when leaving the residence. Here, there is strong evidence of a "ceiling effect" precluding measurable change, since 75 percent of the respondents in the first wave of interviews reported "always"

locking up to begin with. And, the only significant result found among the "less expected" activities--that of acquiring a dog--is perhaps too obvious to comment on at this point. We turn to the findings in detail.

Campaign Exposure and Behavioral Activity Effects

The analyses follow the same pattern as described earlier for the prevention orientation effects. In Table 6-19 we see that neither of the target hardening behaviors--locking doors when out of, or when in, the residence had changes significantly associated with campaign exposure, with or without controls inserted. On the contrary, campaign exposure was significantly related to leaving on outdoor lights and using indoor timer lights with greater frequency, both of which were advocated in the "Stop a Crime" televised PSA (Table 6-20). No significant campaign effects were found for leaving on indoor lights per se, nor for the surveillance behaviors of having police do a security check, nor for stopping deliveries when out of town (Table 6-21). However, persons exposed to the PSAs were significantly likelier to have asked a neighbor to keep an eye on their homes when they were out, as recommended in "Stop a Crime."

None of the changes in the taking of personal precautions when out of the house were related to campaign exposure (Table 6-22); nor were they mentioned in the televised PSAs. It might be noted that exposure to campaigns other than McGruff was significantly related to changes in three of the four precautionary measures, indicating that there was some publicity given to those actions among the panel cities.

The strongest relationships between McGruff exposure and behavioral changes occurred among the cooperative action-taking steps, which also received the heaviest emphasis in the "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth" PSAs. Campaign

exposure was significantly correlated with increases in "keeping a watch" outside one's home (beta = .11), reporting suspicious events to the police (beta = .13), and joining crime prevention groups or organizations (beta = .09) (Table 6-23). The strength of these relationships is particularly noteworthy given that these can be regarded as fairly "costly" actions to take in terms of time and effort--at least certainly moreso than, say, locking up or leaving on lights. As with the precautionary actions, exposure to prevention campaigns other than McGruff was also significantly related to positive changes in cooperative behaviors, again suggesting community-based campaign efforts advocating such in the panel locales.

On the whole, the PSAs appear to have been most effective in promoting cooperative behaviors, followed by certain deterrence and surveillance actions.

Campaign Exposure and Purchasing Activity Effects

The campaign overall generally downplayed the need for citizens to spend money on property protection by purchasing such things as burglar alarms, theft insurance and particularly, weapons. We have also included under "purchases" activities which require effort in terms of contacting and enlisting the help of professional crime prevention agencies, including having police do security checks, obtaining property I.D. materials, and the like. While some of these latter steps may have been recommended in other components of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, they were not dealt with in the televised PSAs.

The panel findings clearly indicate that campaign exposure was generally unassociated with such purchases made during the period between the two surveys (Tables 6-24 to 6-27), with the notable exception of getting a dog "at least partly for security purposes." While the campaign never specifically advocated or remarked on the value of canine acquisitions, apparently the ambiance of the

McGruff character and its general identification with "watchdogs" and "taking a bite out of crime" sparked in some respondents a desire for a dog for protection. This result was no doubt abetted by the rather stong positive audience appeal of McGruff noted among national sample respondents.

Purchases of new locks and anti-theft stickers were significantly associated with campaign exposure in the simple regressions, but the relationships did not hold with the controls in place.

Percentage Changes in Preventative Activities

Despite the strength of the above relationships, it should be kept in mind that the campaign of course did not impact all persons encountering it, or even necessarily sizable majorities. The findings may be seen in a somewhat more "pragmatic" light by examining the net percentage changes in Table 6-28. The activities shown are those for which a significant campaign-related effect was found. In the first column, we report for rough baseline purposes the percentage of respondents reporting consistently taking actions in the pre-campaign wave of interviews. In the remaining columns, the net change in frequency of activity between the first and second interviewing waves are presented, for the campaign exposed and unexposed groups. (The net change represents the percentage of respondents doing the activity more frequently at Time 2 minus the percentage doing it less frequently at Time 2.) We see, for example, that the net change in using outdoor lights between Time 1 and Time 2 for the exposed group was 29 percent, while for the unexposed group it was only nine percent. Similarly, use of timer lights "gained" in the exposed group by 18 percent, while it actually declined in the unexposed group by 13 percent, and so forth down the table. Thus we see that in most instances the actual percentages of

respondents involved in these campaign-associated activity changes is quite substantial.

Concluding Note

The findings for the impact of campaign exposure on preventative action-taking appear quite striking. Seven specific behaviors were identified as having had received the greatest emphasis via the televised McGruff PSAs, and campaign exposure was significantly related to positive changes in six of those. Furthermore, exposure was not associated with changes in any of the other activities either less (or not at all) stressed in the PSAs, save one: acquiring a dog for security purposes.

The overall results of both the panel and national sample studies thus far suggest that rather noteworthy and consistent changes in preventative behaviors were related to citizen exposure to the McGruff campaign.

A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF CAMPAIGN EFFECTS

Despite the rather uniform levels of exposure to the campaign within the panel sample, its impact on prevention competence dispositions proved to vary somewhat across population subgroups. This is in modest contrast to the only slight demographic differences found among self-reports of campaign influences by individuals in the national sample. This was not altogether unexpected, since in the national sample we were asking about more general and broad-based types of influences, while in the panel we have more numerous and quite specific indicators, hence less potential for measurement error and greater

validity. We will consider in turn demographic differences found in campaign effects on prevention orientations and preventative action-taking.

Preventative Orientation Effects and Demographics

Campaign-related changes in prevention orientations were consistently greater for men than for women (Table 6-29). Gains in perceived prevention knowledge and effectiveness were strongly and significantly associated with exposure among men (beta = .18 and .17, respectively), while the same relationships were only marginally positive for women. Campaign-exposed women did show significant increases in prevention confidence (beta = .09), but not nearly at the level found among men (beta = .23).

The findings across age levels are less consistent. While younger persons were most likely to have reported exposure to the McGruff PSAs, the only campaign-stimulated attitudinal effect on them appears to have been a rise in the perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention actions. On the other hand, middle-aged individuals demonstrated significant campaign-related increases in perceived knowledge, confidence, as well as in effectiveness. And, while campaign exposure was unassociated with increased concern about prevention for the sample as a whole, the campaign did appear to trigger a rise in concern among persons age 55 and over.

There is also evidence that it was primarily those individuals in higher socio-economic strata who rose in perceived knowledge following exposure to the campaign. Perceived knowledge was significantly related to exposure only among the college-educated and those earning over $25,000 per year. Level of confidence increased significantly across all education levels, but only within the uppermost income group. Gains in perceived effectiveness were about equally dispersed across educational levels, but sizably greater for middle

income earners. Finally, exposure to the campaign appears to have increased concern about prevention among low income persons, a finding which may be seen as congruent with the rise in concern among older persons as well.

In general, then, despite the widespread and rather uniform dissemination of the McGruff campaign, its influences appear to have been quite substantial within certain demographic subgroups and practically negligible in others. A key question becomes one of whether the campaign was most effective among those demographic cohorts which already had more positive orientations toward crime prevention. If so, then it could be argued that the campaign was primarily effecting change among those populations perhaps least in need of it, while not having much if any impact on the more "competence needy." Such a consequence could further widen any gap between groups in terms of their respective prevention capabilities.

The panel sample data suggest that while the campaign may have had greater effects on already more prevention-competent populations in some cases, it also stimulated more positive prevention orientations among other demographic groups as well. Table 6-30 depicts the correlations between demographic attributes and prevention orientations for the panel sample prior to the campaign. Taking the case of sex differences, we see that men were already somewhat higher in perceived knowledge, and significantly more confident regarding prevention, than were women. And, as discussed above, men showed the stronger campaign-related gains in perceived knowledge and confidence. But on the other hand, campaign-exposed women became significantly more confident as well, suggesting that the campaign was inducing change not only among those already more positively inclined.

An even stronger argument for the non-selectivity of effects can be made in the case of age. While younger persons had previously indicated higher

levels of confidence in protecting themselves than did older persons, the strongest campaign-related gains in confidence were clearly among middle-aged and older individuals. Similarly, although prevention concern was somewhat higher among the young, it was for those over 54 that the greatest campaign-stimulated changes occurred. In the case of effectiveness, on the other hand, younger persons came into the campaign with more positive attitudes, and those appear to have been strengthened by the campaign.

Finally, among the socio-economic attributes, upper-income persons clearly felt the most confident prior to the campaign, and shared the greatest gains in confidence afterwards. But, among middle and lower income groups the increases in confidence appear about equal in each cohort, and fall just short of being statistically significant. The other comparisons for socio-economic status, however, seem more congruent with a view of lesser-competent groups not getting as much out of the campaign as the more competent ones. Although the relationships are not as strongly defined as the ones discussed above, the overall pattern suggests that, for instance, higher income and more highly educated persons were originally somewhat higher in perceived knowledge, and showed the greatest increases as well. And, increases in prevention concern were moderately greater among the non-college educated, they initially being lower in concern.

Insofar as the general impact of the McGruff campaign on prevention orientations is concerned, then, it appears that the campaign stimulated positive effects within those categories of individuals already positively inclined to the themes of the campaign, suggesting that the campaign was having a reinforcing influence. However, in many instances the PSAs were also likely to promote positive changes within groups initially scoring quite low on

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2 OF 3

various attributes of prevention competence, suggesting persuasive influences as well.

Preventative Activity Effects and Demographics

For simplicity's sake, we will consider here only those preventative activity variables in which change-related effects were found over the sample (Table 6-31). Beginning with the crime deterrence activities of outdoor lighting and use of timer lights, we find that campaign-associated gains in the former were quite evenly dispersed over demographic subgroups, with two notable exceptions: males and lower income persons were substantially likelier to have used outdoor lighting more often following campaign exposure than were women or upper income persons. Pursuing our above analysis of selectivity of effects across the population, Table 6-32 indicates that use of outdoor lighting was slightly more likely prior to the campaign among women and upper-income groups. Thus, if anything the campaign appears to have boosted outdoor lighting use among those less apt to have done so previously.

Increased use of timer lights was even more equally distributed over population subgroups, although middle-aged persons, the upper income group, and college-educated individuals showed somewhat stronger gains. However, the lowest income and non-college groups showed a substantial increase also, falling just short of significance. Prior to the campaign, timer use was clearly greatest among upper income and education levels. Once again, changes were the most substantial among those taking the action previously, but there are indications that lesser active cohorts changed positively as well.

Sharp demographic differences were found for campaign-associated gains in asking a neighbor to watch one's residence when out. Changes were most likely among women, middle-aged persons, the middle-income group, and the non-college

educated. While women were somewhat more likely to have previously asked neighbors to keep watch, such action was much more prominent initially among upper education and income cohorts. In this case, the campaign seems to have been quite successful at influencing initially less active individuals.

The campaign also appeared to influence women more than men in terms of other neighborhood cooperation efforts. Women showed markedly stronger increases in organization joining activity than did men, and were somewhat more likely to increase in neighborhood observation behavior. The campaign's impact on women in both instances appears to have been more along the lines of direct influence than reinforcement, since in neither case did the extent of women's previous activities differ substantially from men's.

Campaign-associated gains in both neighborhood observing and group participation were far likelier to be found among upper income persons as well. Again, in both instances the result seemed not to stem from simple reinforcement: income was essentially unrelated to either observing or group joining prior to the campaign in this sample.

In looking at differences according to educational level, we see that group joining increased only among the lesser educated, while neighborhood observation was likelier to gain among the college educated. (Both activities were only slightly more likely to occur among the college-educated prior to the campaign.) In the case of organization joining, there at first glance seems to be something of a contradiction in that both lesser educated and upper income persons exhibited substantial gains. This may be somewhat resolved by considering the effects within age groups: organization joining clearly rose most among older individuals, who may be likelier to be earning more despite a lower level of educational attainment. In the case of observing activity, on the other hand, younger persons appeared more influenced by the campaign, as

did more educated and higher income individuals. These same age differences were found to a modest degree before the campaign, with older individuals tending somewhat more to be joiners, while the younger were slightly likelier to be observers. Community organizational activity in general is more apt to be found among older persons with longer ties to the locale.

At least in terms of age, then, we find the campaign to have been somewhat more reinforcing of these cooperative activites. However, the campaign effects do seem to have been constrained by income level, with significant influences found only among upper income younger persons in the case of observing activity, and among upper income older persons for group participation. From a social policy perspective, it might have been preferable for the campaign to have stimulated increased neighborhood cooperation among lower income--and more crime prone--cohorts.

The campaign appears to have met with greater success across all income levels in stimulating the reporting of suspicious incidents to the police. Such increased reporting was slightly greater for the upper income group than for the other levels, but findings for all income cohorts were significant. While for other cooperative efforts the greatest gains were among women, police reporting activity rose significantly only among men. Campaign-related increases in reporting were also significant among college-educated persons, but not among the lesser educated. And, while pre-campaign reporting activity was greater among younger persons, the PSAs stimulated the greatest gains in reporting among those aged 55 and older, further evidence against strictly selective campaign effects.

Similarly, while having a dog at least partly for security purposes was likelier among upper income individuals before the campaign, the activity increased about equally over all income groups. Campaign-exposed men and

college educated persons also were significantly likelier to have acquired a dog.

Concluding Note

The McGruff campaign's effects on prevention orientations and activities were by no means uniform across the population. Campaign-associated changes tended to occur more among those demographic groups already more prevention-competent in various ways; however, the PSAs also appeared to stimulate at times substantial changes within other demographic cohorts as well.

Perhaps the most sizable demographic differences in campaign impact were found between men and women. The PSAs appeared to stimulate far greater attitudinal changes among men, as well as increases in somewhat individualistic behaviors, e.g. police reporting and acquiring a dog. On the other hand, women were considerably more likely than men to engage in increased cooperative prevention activities with their neighbors.

Certain income-related differences were also apparent. Upper income persons tended to show the greatest campaign-associated gains in most cooperative activities, and gained in perceived prevention knowledge and confidence. The lowest income group, however, became more concerned about crime prevention, and increased in such activities as use of outdoor lights, as well as police reporting. Less consistent differences in campaign impact were found across age and education levels.

PREVENTION COMPETENCE AND CRIME, CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNICATION ORIENTATIONS

As might be expected, the campaign had varying impacts upon citizens depending upon their orientations toward crime per se, their pre-campaign orientations toward crime prevention, and their communicative dispositions and behavior. We shall consider each of these in turn.

Prevention Competence and Crime Orientations

The Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign appeared to have its strongest influences on prevention cognitions and attitudes among individuals feeling less threatened by crime. However, it seems to have influenced action-taking in differing ways among both more and less threatened citizens.

Campaign-related gains in prevention knowledge and confidence occurred at significant levels only among those seeing their neighborhoods as relatively safe at night (Table 6-33) and those calling their environs less dangerous than others (Table 6-34). These findings suggest a somewhat counterproductive impact of the campaign in that prior to the campaign, the greater the perceived neighborhood crime threat, the lesser the levels of prevention knowledge and confidence among citizens (Table 6-35). Thus an "optimal" impact of the campaign would have been in the direction of making those individuals who felt more threatened more knowledgeable and confident. However, the campaign appears to have had little influence on the prevention orientations of that group, and instead had a marked effect on those perceiving themselves as being in less crime-ridden locales.

Parallel results were found based upon the extent to which respondents saw themselves as vulnerable to burglary or violent crime (Tables 6-36, 37). Increases in prevention knowledge, effectiveness and confidence were found only

among those seeing themselves "not at all likely" to be a victim of physical assault. Moreover, increases in prevention effectiveness and confidence were found only among those perceiving low risk of being burglarized. (Prevention knowledge, however, did gain among those reporting a high burglary risk.)

Campaign-related gains in prevention action-taking, however, were quite mixed according to citizens' crime orientations. For one thing, neighborhood observing activity (including either watching on one's own or asking others to) showed the sharpest gains among individuals with perceptions of greater neighborhood crime and perceived vulnerability (Tables 6-33, 34). Furthermore, neighborhood organizational activity jumped significantly among those perceiving themselves as more at risk from burglary or assault. Adding to the striking nature of these findings is the indication that prior to the campaign, more crime-threatened panel respondents were no more likely than the less threatened to engage in such cooperative efforts (Table 6-35).

On the basis of the evidence here, the campaign "worked" quite effectively in prompting those citizens with the greatest felt need to protect themselves from crime to "do something" in the form of the campaign-advocated cooperative measures. Those perceiving a greater crime threat were also likelier to have acquired a dog for security purposes. Police reporting rose only among lesser crime threatened respondents, but reporting appears to have been initially more frequent among high crime threat citizens, suggesting a ceiling effect. Campaign-related organization joining increased significantly among those perceiving less neighborhood danger.

Prevention Competence and Previous Prevention Orientations

We also need to consider the possibility that levels of prevention competence were increased primarily among those citizens already more

prevention conscious. As was noted in Chapter Four, citizens with more positive cognitions and attitudes regarding prevention do not necessarily take actions congruent with those orientations. Table 6-39 bears out this finding for the panel sample as well. Persons with higher levels of prevention knowledge, perceived effectiveness and confidence were not any more likely than other citizens to take most of the prevention actions, with police reporting and to a lesser extent having neighbors watch their homes the only consistent exceptions. However, prevention knowledge, perceived effectiveness and confidence were highly correlated with each other.

One possible result of the campaign would have been to inspire greater action taking among those respondents with more positive psychological orientations, while having relatively little behavioral impact on citizens with less positive prevention orientations. This could create a greater "gap" between the already more prevention competent and those less so. However, the findings in Tables 6-40 to 6-42 strongly suggest that a somewhat opposite effect occurred. Increases in prevention activities were consistently greater among those persons with lower initial levels of knowledge, perceived effectiveness and confidence. At the same time, persons with lower initial knowledge levels increased in confidence (Table 6-40), those perceiving prevention techniques previously as less effective rose in knowledge and confidence (Table 6-41), and those initially less confident increased in perceiving themselves as knowledgeable (Table 6-42). Thus the campaign appears to have stimulated greater overall levels of prevention competence among those initially less, rather than more, competent.

Prevention Competence and Media Orientations

As expected, crime prevention opinion leadership correlated positively and significantly with prevention knowledge and confidence, and with police reporting, neighborhood observing and organization joining (Table 6-43). However, opinion leaders also showed evidence of their persuasability in that those exposed to the campaign registered significant gains in how effective they saw citizen prevention measures as being, and in use of outdoor lights and in organization joining (Table 6-44). For many opinion leaders, the campaign may have substantiated their already existing perceptions of being knowledgeable and confident, and in addition provided them with arguments that citizen actions were more effective as well.

Contrarywise, non-opinion leaders showed substantial gains in levels of prevention knowledge and confidence, as well as in such activities as police reporting, neighborhood observing and the joining of groups. Not incidentally, these data further support a view of opinion leaders not being as necessary to information and influence dissemination processes as they may have been several decades ago (cf. Robinson, 1976; O'Keefe, 1982). In this instance, the opinion "followers" appear to be undergoing changes as a direct consequence of exposure to the campaign. The extent to which some of those changes occurred through interaction with opinion leaders as well is unknown here, but it seems clear that campaign exposure per se was at a minimum a major agent of change.

Those respondents indicating a greater need for information about crime prevention prior to the campaign appeared generally less knowledgeable and confident, although somewhat more inclined to report suspicious incidents to police and to be watchful of their streets (Table 6-43). The campaign appeared to benefit this group moreso than the less information curious in the sense of

increasing their propensity for taking part in cooperative prevention activities, acquiring a dog, and using outdoor lights. The campaign also appeared to raise their confidence about protecting themselves to higher levels.

On the other hand, the campaign seemed to stimulate greater cognitive and attitudinal change among those seeing themselves with lesser informational needs, along with increasing prevention activities on just two dimensions.

Respondents who attended more to crime news and television dramas proved to be higher in pre-campaign prevention knowledge, and in perceived effectiveness of citizen prevention techniques (Table 6-46). They also tended to be taking most of the prevention steps under study here. For high media crime attenders, exposure to the McGruff campaign appears to have increased their confidence in protecting themselves (perhaps legitimizing information they had garnered from other media sources) (Table 6-47), and also strongly reinforced the range and intensity of their action-taking. Similarly, persons more sensitized to public service advertising overall tended to display more change (Table 6-48).

Concluding Note

The impact of the campaign upon citizen cognitions and attitudes regarding crime prevention appeared most salient among persons seeing their neighborhoods as relatively safe and themselves as less vulnerable to victimization. However, such important behavioral changes as increased cooperative prevention activity seemed most likely to occur among individuals seeing themselves as more at risk from crime. These results suggest that the campaign in some instances may have stimulated behavioral changes without corresponding changes in cognitions and attitudes.

Furthermore, the campaign appears to have effected greater preventative action taking among those citizens initially perceiving themselves as less, rather than more, competent in the crime prevention arena. There is thus little evidence here that the campaign promoted an even wider "gap" between more prevention competent and less competent citizens.

There was also little direct evidence that opinion leaders played an important role in the dissemination of campaign-based information and influence among citizens. While the reactions of opinion leaders and non-leaders to the campaign differed somewhat, substantial changes appeared within both groups. Moreover, persons indicating having had a prior need for information about crime prevention seemed likelier to adopt specific behavior changes, most notably cooperative ones. Similar results were found for individuals more attentive to other crime content in the media, and to public service advertisements in general.

CONCLUSIONS

The panel survey evaluation suggests that the Advertising Council's Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign had marked and consistent influences on citizen perceptions and attitudes regarding crime prevention, as well as on the taking of specific preventative actions.

Major findings from the panel sample include:

- The panel data support the inference drawn from the national sample that the McGruff PSAs reached a broad-based population demographically.
- Exposure to the campaign was somewhat greater among persons who saw themselves initially as less knowledgeable about crime prevention,

and among those who saw citizen crime prevention efforts as more effective. However, across the board the PSAs appear to have reached substantial numbers of citizens with widely varied perceptions and attitudes regarding crime and its prevention.

- The amount of attention paid to the PSAs varied to some extent across the sample, with greater attention being paid to them by persons who saw themselves as more knowledgeable about prevention and those who were more confident about being able to protect themselves from crime. More attention was also paid by individuals already engaged in more prevention activities, as well as by those who anticipated that getting more information about prevention would be useful to them.
- Citizens exposed to the campaign exhibited significant increases over those not exposed in: (1) how much they thought they knew about crime prevention; (2) how effective they thought citizen prevention efforts were; and (3) how confident they felt about being able to protect themselves from crime. The campaign appeared to have no impact, however, on feelings of personal responsibility for helping prevent crime or on how concerned people were about crime prevention.
- The campaign appeared to have a strong impact on the taking of crime prevention actions by citizens. Exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized in the televised PSAs. Particularly noteworthy were campaign-related increases in neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts.
- Persons exposed to the campaign showed no significant changes in any of the other prevention activities which received lesser emphasis in

the PSAs, with the interesting exception of campaign-exposed individuals having been more likely to have acquired a dog for security purposes.

- The above findings for campaign effects remained statistically significant when such potentially intervening variables as prior victimization, exposure to other prevention campaigns, and attention to crime media content, as well as relevant demographic variables, were controlled for.
- While the campaign appeared to have significant effects on prevention orientations and activities for the sample as a whole, the distribution of those effects was by no means uniform across demographic subgroups. And, while in many instances the PSAs seemed most effective within those demographic subgroups already more competent in terms of prevention, the campaign also appeared to stimulate substantial changes within other demographic cohorts as well.
- More specifically, the PSAs appeared to stimulate far greater attitudinal changes among men, as well as increases in somewhat individualistic behaviors, e.g. police reporting and acquiring a dog. On the other hand, women exposed to the campaign were considerably more likely to engage in increased cooperative prevention activities with their neighbors.
- Moreover, upper income groups tended to show greater campaign-related gains in cooperative activities, as well as in perceived knowledge and confidence. Campaign-exposed lower income persons, however,

became more concerned about crime prevention, and increased in such activities as use of outdoor lights and reporting suspicious incidents to the police.

- While the campaign appeared to have greater cognitive and attitudinal influences on persons seeing themselves as less threatened by victimization, increased preventative action-taking was found among those seeing themselves as more vulnerable. Increased action-taking was also likelier among citizens perceiving themselves as less prevention-competent prior to the campaign.
- Campaign effects were found among both opinion leaders and non-leaders, although the nature of the effects differed between the two cohorts. Greater action-taking was found among persons who had previously indicated a greater need for information about prevention, and who were more attentive to media crime content overall and to PSAs in general.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have thus far considered in some depth citizen reactions to the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign, and in particular to the Advertising Council's McGruff PSAs. We have examined those results in the context of what is known about citizen orientations with respect to crime and its prevention, and about media influences on individuals in general.

We will now briefly highlight what we see the overall import of the combined findings from the national and panel samples as being for crime prevention practitioners and for the design of subsequent crime prevention campaign strategies. Following those conclusions, we will present more specific concerns and recommendations as to the development of communication-based crime prevention strategies.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MCGRUFF EVALUATIONS

From the composite findings of the national and panel sample surveys, we infer the following about the McGruff campaign's impact on the public.

Campaign Exposure

The campaign had, in our view, substantially widespread penetration among the American public. Just over half of U.S. adults could recall having seen or heard the McGruff PSAs within two years of the campaign's start. Given the catch-as-catch-can dissemination of PSAs, this suggests a rather heavy commitment on the part of media channels to use them, and that the ads were

salient enough to make at least a minimal impression on substantial numbers of people.

Television was clearly the "medium of choice" by which the most people saw the most PSAs. We cannot answer whether that was because more of them were shown over television, or because the television ads were more memorable to people; we suspect that both reasons were operative, and perhaps others as well. It does appear, however, that the ads were quite heavily repeated across the media: a third of the people said they had seen or heard them more than 10 times.

The campaign's penetration was extensive enough to reach a highly diversified audience demographically, and no economic or social class appeared beyond the campaign's reach. While McGruff was decidedly likelier to reach younger adults, a third of the people over age 64 could recall the ads.

Persons who regularly either watched more television or listened more to the radio were likelier to have come across the PSAs, having greater opportunity to do so. Exposure to the campaign was also somewhat greater among persons who saw themselves as initially less knowledgeable about crime prevention, and among those who saw citizen crime prevention efforts as potentially more effective. Just why this occurred is somewhat unclear, but for whatever reasons McGruff appeared to be reaching an audience at least in part rather ideally targeted to the campaign's themes. However, it should be added that across the board the PSAs reached substantial numbers of citizens with widely varied perceptions, attitudes and behaviors regarding crime and its prevention.

Among those exposed to the campaign, a greater amount of attention was paid by persons who saw themselves as more knowledgeable about prevention, and those more confident about being able to protect themselves from crime. More attention was also paid by individuals already engaged in a greater range of

prevention activities, as well as those who felt that getting more information about prevention would be useful to them. This pattern is in keeping with the "selective attention" hypothesis: people tend to pay more attention to message content which they are already interested in, and/or in agreement with. However, as we have seen above, there was less evidence of selective exposure to the campaign.

Campaign Effectiveness

The format and content of the PSAs elicited favorable reactions from the vast majority of the audience. Most said they thought the ads were effective in conveying their message, that they liked the McGruff character, and that they felt the information in them was worth passing on to other people. These reactions were consistently favorable across the sample, although younger persons tended to rate them most highly. From a perspective of long-term impact, that is quite encouraging.

The campaign appeared to have a sizeable impact on what people knew about crime prevention techniques. Nearly a quarter of the national sample exposed to the campaign said they had learned something new about prevention from the PSAs, and nearly half said they had been reminded of things they had known before but had forgotten. Campaign-exposed persons in the panel sample were significantly likelier than those unexposed to show increases in how much they thought they knew about crime prevention.

Similarly, the McGruff PSAs appeared to have a positive influence on citizens' attitudes about crime prevention. Nearly half of the national sample respondents recalling the ads said they made them feel more confident in being able to protect themselves from victimization, and that citizen prevention

efforts were an effective means of helping prevent crime. Significant changes in both of these attitudes were found among exposed panel respondents as well.

Individuals reporting having been influenced in one particular way were likely to report other influences as well. The extent of influence seemed to depend more on how much attention was paid to the ads, rather than how many times they had been seen or heard. Moreover, people who said they had been made more fearful of crime by the ads were likelier to report having been influenced in other ways as well. Less conclusive was evidence for campaign-stimulated changes in degree of concern about crime and sense of individual self-responsibility to help prevent it: while about half of the exposed national sample respondents reported having gained more positive attitudes from the campaign on both dimensions, no significant differences were found within the panel sample.

On the most salient criterion of campaign success--behavioral change--the McGruff campaign appears to have had a noteworthy impact. Nearly a fourth of the exposed national sample said they had taken preventative actions as a result of having seen or heard the ads; mentioned in particular were improving household security and cooperating with neighbors in prevention efforts, the two main themes of the McGruff PSAs. Moreover, among the panel sample exposure to the campaign was significantly related to increases in six of the seven specific preventative activities most emphasized in the televised PSAs. Again, particularly strong increases were found for neighborhood cooperative crime prevention efforts. Importantly, the campaign appears not to have stimulated greater use of behavioral restrictions or avoidance methods among citizens in dealing with crime, and any "boomerang" effects overall were either slight or nonexistent.

Variations in Campaign Effects

While the campaign appeared to have had significant effects on the populace as a whole, there was considerable variation in the degree of influence across demographic subgroups. (While the more general national sample self-report items showed relatively small demographic differences, the more precise panel change measures revealed far less uniformity.) While in many instances the PSAs seemed most effective within those demographic groups already more competent in terms of prevention, the campaign also appeared to stimulate substantial change within other cohorts as well.

Demographic differences in campaign effects appeared to reflect the varying kinds of opportunities people had in carrying out actions advocated by the campaign. For example, women and members of upper-income groups tended to show greater gains in neighborhood cooperative prevention activities. Lower-income persons increased in such activities as use of outdoor lights and the reporting of suspicious incidents to the police. Men showed increases in somewhat more individualistic behaviors, e.g. acquiring a dog and reporting things to police. Greater attitudinal changes were also found among men than women. Upper income groups indicated greater gains in perceived knowledge and confidence, while lower income persons became more concerned about crime prevention. The social class differences are akin to comparisons previously made between "resource poor" and "resource rich" citizens, each type apt to cope with crime according to the means most readily available to them (Lavrakas, 1980).

The demographic differences notwithstanding, perhaps more meaningful indications of "who was" versus "who wasn't" influenced by the McGruff PSAs rest in people's perceptions prior to the campaign of crime per se. Clearly, the

campaign had greater impact on the attitudes of citizens who felt themselves to be less at risk from crime. Conversely, it had more influence on the behaviors of those perceiving themselves as more at risk. Thus we have evidence that the campaign acted as it was designed to in terms of inducing behavioral change on an appropriate target, but failed to impact at the supposedly easier task of bringing about attitudinal change. Some reasons why this may have occurred will be considered below.

There was little evidence that the McGruff PSAs widened the gap between more prevention-competent and less competent citizens. To the extent that the campaign did stimulate more preventative action taking, it was among those who had previously indicated less knowledge, perceived effectiveness and competence. Persons fitting this profile also were likelier to have indicated a greater need for information about prevention.

More generally, the campaign appeared to reach and influence substantial proportions of individuals across a wide spectrum of communication dispositions. McGruff seemingly overcame many of the audience-bound constraints which often inhibit other information campaign efforts. Thus opinion leaders as well as non-leaders were affected, as were those with greater and lesser informational needs, and those typically more attentive to crime content in the media and those not so attentive. The nature of the effects within these varying cohorts differed, but not necessarily their intensity.

Before proceeding with more extensive interpretations of the findings, we should note again that these results are based upon standard social survey research techniques, and are subject to the same limitations as are all such data. At the risk of sounding overly cautious, it should be kept in mind that the findings derive from respondents' self-reports of their own cognitions, attitudes and behaviors, and thus may be subject to the typical respondent

perceptual biases inherent in any survey research effort. Be that as it may, it seems clear that such survey self-reporting techniques have more than adequately demonstrated their value and validity as evaluative research tools over the decades. In addition, the present study benefits strongly from the congruence of findings derived from the more population-generalizable national survey and the more causally explicit panel survey.

Gleanings from the Findings

The necessarily scattershot nature of the campaign's dissemination appears to have resulted in a wide range of effects across an even wider range of people. While the impact of the key themes of the PSAs--improved home security and cooperation with neighbors and police--were clear and prevalent throughout these findings, it is also apparent that some parts of the messages hit home with some citizens but not with others. The reasons underlying such differences are doubtlessly bound up in a host of interacting personal dispositions and social and environmental considerations, which we will consider below with an eye toward recommendations for future successful crime prevention campaign strategies.

From a more theoretical viewpoint, the findings suggest several interesting things about the overall impact of the McGruff campaign. For one, there is a strong suggestion that in at least some instances behavioral change was stimulated without corresponding changes in cognitive or attitudinal orientations. Citizens seeing themselves as more threatened and more at risk increased their cooperative observing behavior, but showed no significant changes in prevention knowledge, effectiveness or competence. Nor does it seem likely that the behavioral change came at the end of a cumulative series of previous changes in orientations. The high threat-high risk group was indeed

lower in prevention knowledge, effectiveness and competence prior to the campaign, and thus they were not poised at a high attitudinal plateau "waiting" for a message or other stimulus to goad them into action-taking. It may also be that such citizens have unrealistically low assessments of their own abilities, due to their greater fear of victimization.

What seems more likely is that the PSAs suggested behaviors to them which seemed reasonable enough to try out, perhaps on a quite experimental basis, and perhaps even somewhat warily. (It should be kept in mind that what we are talking about here is persons who see themselves more threatened or at risk, either simply looking out for their neighbors and/or asking their neighbors to do the same, and/or actually joining with them in group efforts. These may not be, for many people, effortless tasks.) At least some of these people may see themselves in rather desperate straits regarding their personal safety, and may be willing to try just about anything. Perhaps the realistic touches in the "Gilstraps" and "Mimi Marth" PSAs provided the proper cues relating to their own environments. However, they also appear to be waiting to see some results before "adopting" those cooperative behaviors with any confidence. They seemed to be trying out the actions before believing that they've learned anything, or that they feel more confident, or that they believe that citizen prevention measures are necessarily effective.

On the other hand, among the lesser threatened and at-risk, the campaign appears to have done a better job of stimulating cognitive and attitudinal changes, along with some action-taking as well, most notably police reporting. The pattern here is more akin to the classic reinforcement process, in which persons with already somewhat positive orientations toward crime prevention

become even more positive through exposure to the campaign, and indeed take some actions which they had not been carrying out before, or at least as extensively.

The campaign also appears to have stimulated greater overall levels of prevention competence among those initially less, rather than more, competent. The lack of increased action-taking among those more psychologically disposed to crime prevention is not immediately explainable from these data. One possible hypothesis is that they perceived themselves as already doing as much as they thought was warranted for self-protection. This argument would be supported by the finding that those high in prevention orientations saw their neighborhoods as safer, and themselves as less prone to victimization.

It is also noteworthy that the campaign seemed to stimulate greater cognitive and attitudinal change among those seeing themselves with lesser informational needs, along with increasing prevention activities on just two dimensions. Thus we have yet another instance of mixed effects for mixed groups, although again it is possible to impose a certain logic on the pattern of findings. In this case, it seems likely that those indicating a need for information were looking for just that--some practical advice. They received a great deal of advice from the campaign advocating cooperative actions, and they put that advice to use, perhaps on an experimental basis. Attitudinal change was only partial here, and it may be another case of persons trying out the advice before committing themselves to it. Among the low information need group, in which cognitive and attitudinal levels were already high, the campaign served to reinforce or strengthen those even further, without a great deal in the way of concommitant behavioral changes taking place. While this group may have benefited from more action taking, they may have been too

confident of their own position prior to the campaign, and not motivated to follow the specific information offered.

The campaign, perhaps for a variety of reasons, appeared to be transcending many of the audience-bound constraints which seem to inhibit the wider dissemination of other crime prevention information campaign efforts. Other prevention campaigns were found to have greater penetration among those seeing themselves in greater need of information about prevention, e.g. women and minority group members. However, the McGruff ads reached sizeable numbers of those individuals as well as citizens with perhaps lesser crime-related concerns.

It is highly appropriate to ask when we might expect "saturation" of the campaign to occur. That is, at what penetration of the population can we safely say that the campaign has reached just about everybody that it is going to? Campaign effectiveness and diffusion theorists have often indicated that about ten to fifteen percent of any general population can be classed as being equivalent to "know nothings" and beyond the impact of any campaign or innovation, and lying beyond the realm of traditional communication efforts. Most public service campaigns begin with a premise of reaching "everybody concerned" with the topic or remedy under dissemination, but typically fail to attribute any realistic absolute number of percent to when "success" occurs. Given a lack of previous guidelines, simply reaching half of the general population with a campaign certainly seems significant, and it is indeed difficult to conclude from these data as to when we might expect the diffusion of awareness of the PSAs to begin diminishing.

STRATEGIES FOR SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGN EFFORTS: SOME CENTRAL ISSUES

Based upon our own research efforts as well as previous ones, we see several key issues which need to be taken into account in the planning of subsequent crime prevention campaign efforts, including those based upon McGruff. These include: (1) the salience of crime as an issue on the public agenda; (2) the necessity of community-based campaign efforts; (3) the perplexing role of fear arousal in campaign effectiveness; (4) the role of formative research; and (5) the potential for neglect of the elderly as an audience.

The Salience of Crime as an Issue

The campaign began during a period when crime as an issue was decidedly high on the public agenda of citizens. Virtually every public opinion poll measuring importance of issues in the early 1980s found crime listed in the top three, and often as the most important issue. Within weeks of each other in 1981, the three major national news magazines all had cover stories on the crime issue, e.g. "The Curse of Violent Crime," Time, March 23, 1981; "The People's War Against Crime," U.S. News and World Report, July 13, 1981. Newspapers and television newscasts devoted substantial amounts of continued emphasis to crime news (cf. Graber, 1980). Thus the McGruff campaign was acting in an environment of already existing public interest and concern about the problem, and presumably including more of a willingness to listen to some ideas as to what to do about the problem.

This is not to say that the campaign was simply "reinforcing" citizen orientations which already existed: the wide-ranging influences of the campaign per se seem quite clear. But rather, it does imply that the first three phases of the campaign benefited from a climate of opinion that probably made

it more likely that the campaign would have an impact. The opening phases of the campaign did not have to cope with public apathy toward the central issue being dealt with.

Many, and perhaps most, information campaigns of course do not have such an advantage, and there is no guarantee that crime prevention campaigns will have it over subsequent years. In fact, the normal cycle of such public issues is one of peaks and valleys, and one can already see that the state of the economy and unemployment have edged out crime as the critical issue facing the country as of this writing. On the other hand, it can be assumed that "crime will always be with us," and that citizen concern over it is unlikely to soon drop to a trivial level.

However, subsequent prevention campaign efforts should not simply assume that because the early phases of McGruff made notable strides, that future efforts will as well. Indeed, campaign designers might well want to consider strategies that will either keep crime and prevention high on the public agenda, or increase the visibility of the issue should it be drastically reduced on that agenda.

In a sense, the challenge for campaign planners is much the same as that encountered when a highly successful product finds itself competing with newer products; marketing strategies have to be developed to keep the public from tiring of the old one or simply wanting to experiment with the new. "Brand loyalty" becomes a central issue. Those people who have improved in their crime prevention activities have to be reminded to keep doing what they have been, regardless of various changes in the social climate.

The Necessity of Community-Based Efforts

While under-investigated in this study, we cannot overemphasize the import of supplementing the national media campaign with strong local community-based input. This is particularly necessary if the campaign is to have long-term impact once the initial novelty wears off. Studies of campaigns from Cartwright (1949) to Maccoby and Solomon (1981) have consistently demonstrated the strong power of interpersonal and community-level communication in information dissemination and persuasion efforts. While the media campaign appears to have brought about significant effects on its own, we would have every reason to suspect that, as Maccoby and Solomon empirically demonstrated, the effects would be substantially heightened with the placement of community action programs.

Such programs serve several purposes. For one, they reinforce the national campaign and provide it with greater visibility. This is particularly true if local broadcast and print media are encouraged to run more of the McGruff ads as a result of local concern. For another, local efforts give an important local "angle" to the campaign, letting citizens know that crime prevention is indeed a concern in "River City" as well as nationally. Concurrently, as is already apparently happening, the campaign serves as a focal point for various local agencies, groups and interested citizens to gather under. The simple use of the logo provides an image of familiarity, and probably a certain degree of status conferral as well. The logo is "recognized" as a symbol which has gained a certain degree of legitimacy through its use in national media. Moreover, the McGruff character is quite well liked, lending to positive dispositions toward the campaign as well.

The main function of grass-roots support for the campaign, however, should be to facilitate face-to-face interaction with and among citizens on the issue of crime prevention. Without the element of personal contact, a great deal of the potential impact of community involvement will be lost. Local programs should attempt to maximize opportunities for crime prevention professionals to meet with citizens in groups or individually, and also stimulate greater discussion among citizens themselves about crime prevention.

We would also strongly advocate that local prevention professionals emphasize instruction in their meetings with citizens, as opposed to simply trying to "motivate" or "persuade" citizens to become more involved. Focus should be upon specifically how steps advocated in the general campaign could be applied by individuals within the specific community or neighborhood. For example, a neighborhood of apartment complexes is unlikely to have the same response pattern to neighbor watch programs as is one of single detached dwellings. And, of course, high crime areas are apt to have different concerns than low crime ones, and so forth. Many useful and specific considerations concerning community level prevention practice are found in Lavrakas (1980) and Podolefsky and Dubow (1981).

However, the main argument to be made here is that the most effective and efficient "targeting" of crime prevention information to specific subgroups of citizens is most likely to be through narrow community-level channels, not the mass media. Moreover, the greater the role of interpersonal communication in those efforts, the greater the chance of meaningful impact.

Fear Arousal and Campaign Effectiveness

While the McGruff campaign was quite cautious in terms of any deliberate use of fear-provoking themes, the area of crime is one which is bound to raise

some anxiety among at least some citizens, as our findings have indicated. Subsequent campaign efforts will doubtless encounter the same problem. As we have found, however, the arousal of some minimal level of fear may not be wholly counterproductive, as long as the fear may be justified by the "reality" of the actual situation being dealt with.

In a more practical vein, the findings do not contradict the view that information campaigns dealing with such "loaded" topics as crime prevention may often do well to soft-pedal fear appeals in the design of messages. However, it is important to note that the reasoning should not necessarily be that stimulating a low fear among audience members will be detrimental to the campaign goals. Fear arousal to at least a limited degree may well enhance the persuasive impact of a message. But, if the topic is such that one can assume that target audiences are already anxious over it, many individuals may be counted on to become more fearful by simply having the topic brought to their attention. And, that arousal can "work" to stimulate more effective persuasive changes, assuming that the message provides adequate information and argumentation to serve as a basis for them. On the other hand, for topics for which previous fear is unlikely to exist among audience members, it may in some instances be beneficial to introduce limited, realistic fear appeals within the message assuming that they are legitimate and reasonably restrained. Prior research would be critical, however.

The findings more specifically suggested that the messages used here triggered more in the way of what McGuire has referred to as the drive component of fear as opposed to the cue component. The stimulation of the drive component of fear increases the likelihood of activity to reduce that fear, e.g. attitudinal or behavioral change. On the other hand, if a message arouses fear by cuing undesirable consequences (such as being criminally assaulted) in

the mind of the receiver, the message stands more of a chance of being unattended to or refuted without resulting in persuasion. The likely explanation here is that while the PSAs were quite bereft of specific fear-arousing cues, for many individuals the topic of crime in general aroused fear, resulting in drive to reduce it. Had the PSAs included more in the way of particular information about how people are victimized, or the consequences of victimization, those cues may well have triggered fear in ways which would have interferred with the persuasive impact of the message.

It is also likely that the emphasis of the PSAs on offering rather concrete actions which citizens could reasonably take to help protect themselves increased the persuasive force of fear arousal here. As Leventhal has indicated, fear appeals appear more likely to succeed when specific and preferably immediate means of reducing the arousal are presented as well, and subsequent campaigns would do well to note that.

Given the range of fear arousal occurring among members of an audience to one group of PSAs with the same low level of fear appeal in the content, it also seems clear that in instances where fear as a message response is either likely or being sought, extensive pre-campaign research among target audiences is highly necessary.

The Role of Formative Research

We would hope that the use to which the panel survey design was put here would also serve as something of a plug for formative, pre-campaign evaluative research efforts. Our use of it was more to help define and explain effects, but it should be clear that if the first stage of panel interviews had taken place prior to the design of the first phase of the campaign, things might have

been learned about audience dispositions regarding crime and prevention which would have helped generate even more substantial effects. Pre-campaign research efforts--at the national or community levels--become even more important when specific kinds of target audiences are being delineated.

The Problem of Audience Targeting

Targeting is a very useful concept in campaign planning, but with a reliance upon public service advertisements a great deal of the rationale and work goes for naught. Even if PSAs are aimed at, say women in higher crime areas, it becomes highly inefficient to produce the ads and then literally "throw them to the winds" in the media, hoping that some might just happen to show up on television programs or in publications with a respectable reach among that audience. This is not to say that it should not be done failing other alternatives, but just that it's quite wasteful of communication resources. While this is a recommendation beyond the scope of our charge here, there would seem to be a great deal of value in having representatives of the broadcast and print industries get together with those concerned with public service advertising (such as The Advertising Council) to attempt to work out a system through which PSAs would have a better chance of being placed in times and slots more appropriate to their intended audiences. Perhaps a standard method of coding PSAs by audience type could be devised, or maybe a plan could be worked out for some "paid" PSAs to be run in more appropriate slots, but at rates much lower than regular commercial rates.

As the situation is at this time, however, targeting would seem to be more in the baliwick of campaign strategists within individual communities. In instances where targeting does seem appropriate and possible, we recommend following the general conceptual strategy of seeking to build greater levels of

prevention competence among citizens. Previous to implementing the campaign, research should establish the makeup of target groups in terms of: (1) their awareness of crime prevention techniques; (2) their attitudes toward citizen-initiated prevention activities, e.g. how effective they are; how responsible citizens ought to be; (3) how capable they feel about acting on their own; (4) how concerned or interested they are in protecting themselves and others from crime; and (5) the extent to which they have already taken prevention-related actions. Once an existing level of competence in terms of these factors can be identified, appropriate messages can be designed to attempt to stimulate change effects as warranted.

The Elderly: A Potentially Neglected Audience

The evaluation suggests that the campaign made less of an impression upon one group with particularly strong concerns about crime: the elderly. Why that happened remains unclear, but one can speculate on a few possible reasons. For one, many of those aged 65 and over may not be as attuned to advertising in general, and television advertising in particular, including PSAs. Some may have also felt less pulled to the dog character than, say, later generations weaned on movie and television cartoons. (However, elderly persons who were exposed to the PSAs were about equally supportive of the format as were younger individuals.) In some instances, diminished ability to remember or recall the stimulus may have been a factor as well. One element which would most probably have been likely to attract older audiences is the story content of the PSAs. The situations depicted in the television ads could not be seen as "age biasing" in any obvious sense, and in fact the central character in "Mimi Marth" should have appealed more to the elderly.

Be that as it may, what can be done to direct a stronger appeal toward older citizens, particularly those who see themselves as more vulnerable? One suspects that, for some of the above reasons and others, media may be less effective in reaching the elderly than younger cohorts. Rather, local community and neighborhood campaigns focusing specifically on the problems of the elderly would seem to be far more effective. The elderly may also be more in need of social and environmental crime prevention supports than are younger adults.

RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFIC TO THE ONGOING MCGRUFF CAMPAIGN

The campaign would do well to continue several things that have apparently been working quite well. Certainly one of these is the use of McGruff. The dog "tested" very positively in terms of citizen evaluations of it. And, it appears to be in continuously high demand as a logo for neighborhood and statewide crime prevention efforts. (Over 200 copyrights have been issued for such uses of McGruff, and it is in the process of being marketed as a doll figure aimed at general consumers. Personal conversation with Mac Gray and Elinor Hangley, June 18, 1982.) The character may well approach the general popularity of "Smokey the Bear" as a campaign symbol. At the least, there does not seem to be any character other than those two which have become so highly visible through public information campaigns. In short, the high acceptance of McGruff needs to be taken advantage of.

In a similar vein, it is important to note that the popularity of both McGruff and the Take a Bite Out of Crime label is probably in large part due to the high quality of the PSAs themselves, and to the source credibility which we can assume The Advertising Council and National Crime Coalition hold. It is

critical to future efforts that such credibility be maintained. The Advertising Council should continue, as it has been doing, to keep a watchful eye on unauthorized uses of the logo. This includes not only misuses of it in campaigns which may be providing specious or inaccurate information, but in campaigns of arguably poor production quality as well. Such uses can only diminish the credibility and attractiveness of the character.

The central--or at least most visible--feature of the campaign should continue to be television spots. It is adamantly clear from the findings here that prevention activities advocated in them were the primary ones which the most citizens were showing the most substantial changes in. This does not necessarily mean that the print PSAs or the campaign booklet were not finding appropriate audiences, however. It may well be that their more audience-specific content was having an impact on smaller, but still noteworthy, groupings of citizens. Such influences are extremely difficult to "pick up" in survey evaluations. But overall, the evidence strongly favors the use of television PSAs to carry the most important campaign themes. It probably goes without saying that the apparent popularity of the campaign among broadcast producers implies that they will continue to give heavy play to the McGruff ads, assuming that their quality remains high.

We also suspect that the high impact of the television PSAs resulted in part from their simplicity, or lack of clutter. Each segment included but a few bits of information, carefully orchestrated within a central theme, with citizen cooperation of course the dominant one. Again, the survey findings concerning neighborhood cooperative efforts would seem to speak for themselves in attesting to the effectiveness of that appeal.

It may be a quite effective campaign ploy to keep the public informed in a factual way of how public adoption of various techniques has helped reduce

certain kinds of crimes, either nationwide or within specific communities. If the overall theme is to inform the public of how they can become more prevention competent in order to reduce their risk or probability of being victimized, it would be most appropriate to use basic statistics supporting that claim. This may be particularly important given the finding that some people appear to be adopting preventative activities without necessarily undergoing attitudinal changes. It may be productive for subsequent ads to reinforce those tentatively adopted behaviors by showing how they can and have been effective. Perhaps McGruff could even be featured in a self-congratulatory bow.

The campaign producers appear to have been quite effective in pursuing tie-ins not only with state and local agencies, but with corporations and other groups as well. The use of the campaign in 1982 with the Southland Corporation (7-11 stores) is a notable example. Those avenues certainly deserve further efforts.

Another tie-in consideration might be with the media themselves. It seemed rather clear from the findings that persons high in exposure to television crime content, both journalistic and entertainment-oriented, were particularly concerned about crime as an issue and receptive to the campaign as well. Efforts might be made at cooperating, for example, with producers of some of the crime or police-oriented television entertainment programs to include citizen prevention information in them, perhaps subtly using the McGruff logo as well. On a recent "CHiPs" episode, for example, a subtheme involved the drunk driving problem, with publicity given to the "MADD" program. The past year has also seen a spate of citizen features on television news programs and in newspapers, often involving citizen "tip-off" themes. Local prevention groups might emphasize to local journalists the value of using at

least the popular McGruff logo in the content of those presentations. Moreover, given the cartoon format, perhaps similar tie-ins could be used on Saturday morning children's programs. Or, perhaps a specific PSA aimed at children could be produced particularly for insertion in child-oriented programming. Our data suggest that the existing PSAs already have a fair amount of appeal for children, and perhaps that could be emphasized even more.

Reiterating what was noted above, it is highly difficult to predict when the campaign as a whole may reach a point of saturation, or when the public will simply become bored with repeated messages from it. In large part, what is desired is to maintain the same campaign theme and logo for reinforcement purposes, while emphasizing new information and story lines to maintain freshness and interest. This is obviously not an easy task, and it demands a high amount of creative ingenuity on the part of campaign designers. It may be instructive to draw from the ongoing experience of the Smokey campaign, now in its 37th year. (An excellent description of the development of it appears in McNamara, Kurth and Hansen, 1981.) It is also important that campaign practitioners keep closely abreast with what crime prevention practitioners and researchers, as well as communications specialists, learn about the effectiveness of both various prevention techniques and means of disseminating such information.

In conclusion, the time may well be at hand for strategists involved with the McGruff campaign to more elaborately formulate specific goals as to what kinds of changes are desired in citizen crime prevention efforts, and to what extent. This would seem particularly practical at the community level. One of the rather obvious difficulties in our own evaluation process has been one of "deciding" at what points the campaign was "succeeding" or falling short, the simple reason for that being that no criteria for success or failure have been

established by those responsible for the campaign. Nor could there have been: we have already alluded to the lack of baseline research on the efficacy of public information campaigns overall, not to mention crime prevention campaigns. Given the data provided in this report, however, it may now be quite appropriate for the campaign strategists to work with prevention and communications researchers to try to determine, for example, what citizen participation rates within communities are "optimal" for actual crime reduction. Or, to determine what percentages of citizens being involved in, say, neighborhood watch programs, are effective for minimal reductions in household burglaries. Given such data, prevention campaigns could then be even more specifically targeted for communities or neighborhoods with demonstrable shortcomings either in citizen participation or crime rates. The task would not be easy, since such variables as police protection and environmental factors enter in. But nonetheless, the effectiveness and efficiency with which prevention information campaigns can be disseminated are highly dependent upon having such baselines.

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APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SPECIMEN CAMPAIGN MATERIALS

TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

"STOP A CRIME"

Crime Prevention Coalition

Public Service Announcements
Available in :60, :30, :10 Versions

60 SECONDS



(SFX: DOOR OPENING)



DOG: You know what I think? I think you forgot to lock your door.



It's a funny thing. A lot of people do that...they forget.



That's too bad, because all crime needs is a chance. Don't give it a chance.



Like...light up your doors. Lights make burglars nervous.



And make your windows secure.



Say, I understand you're goin' to Peoria next week.



While you're gone, have a neighbor keep an eye on your house.



You know, pick up your mail, keep the place looking lived in.



And use a timer, to turn lights on and off.



Fudge brownies! And me on a diet.



Oh, you don't know me, see. It's my job to teach you to protect yourselves.



Make it your job to learn. Write to Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland.



Oh, and one more thing -- Lock your doors. That's an easy way to, ahh...



Take a bite out of crime.



Volunteer Agency: Dancer, Fitzgerald, Sample, Inc. Volunteer Coordinator: Edward W. Dooley, Citibank, N.A.
CNCP-9160/CNCP-9130/CNCP-9110

1179

Ad Council

TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

Crime Prevention Coalition

"GILSTRAPS"

Public Service Announcements
Available in :60, :30, :10 Versions
60 SECONDS



DOG (VO): Y'know, the Gilstraps aren't really movin'... they're being robbed.



DOG (OC): These crooks know the Gilstraps are out of town.



So, they're trying to move the Gilstraps—permanently.



They figure: they look like movers, they act like movers, so who's gonna know?



The Joneses. They know.
JONES BOY: Dad, aren't the Gilstraps in Toledo?



MR. JONES: I think they're being robbed. Should we call the police?
MRS. JONES: Call the police.



DOG: See, the Joneses know, if they don't tell the cops now,



the Gilstraps'll have to tell them, later. (MR. JONES: Hello, this is...)



DOG: Meanwhile, these fellows are eating lunch—oh, about a block away.



Hey, hot pastrami! That looks very good.



COP: 10-4.



DOG: How 'bout that!



Know what it takes to stop a crime? Your help. And your neighbors'.

Find out more. Write to Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland. And help—ahh...



Take a bite out of crime.



Volunteer Agency: Dancer, Fitzgerald, Sample, Inc. Volunteer Coordinator: Edward W. Dooley, Citibank, N.A.
CNCP-0160/CNCP-0130/CNCP-0110

Ad Council

TAKE A BITE OUT OF CRIME

Crime Prevention Coalition

"MIMI MARTH"

Public Service Announcements
Available in :60, :30, :10 Versions
60 SECONDS



McGRUFF: Hey, McGruff here.



See that guy — he's stealin' that bike.



Now — see that lady — she's callin' the cops.

This is Mimi Marth, part of the Eyes and Ears Patrol of Hartford, Connecticut.



There's 126 of 'em — regular people like you and me, workin' together against crime.



Here's another one: Albert Bell. Yesterday, it was his turn to patrol.



Halfway down the block, Albert sees a strange man nosing around the Barnett's basement window.



So, Albert calls the cops. Fast.



And the cops pick the guy up. Fast. Way to go, Albert!



Y'know, when it comes to preventin' crime,



people like Mimi and Albert really make a difference.



So could a person like you. Find out more.



Write to Box 6600, Rockville, Maryland.



And help, ahh...Take a bite out of crime.



Volunteer Agency: Dancer, Fitzgerald, Sample, Inc. Volunteer Coordinator: Edward W. Dooley, Citibank, N.A.
CNCP-1160/CNCP-1130/CNCP-1110

Ad Council

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF ITEMS AND INDICES

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF ITEMS AND INDICES

CAMPAIGN ORIENTATIONS

Campaign Attention

All in all, how much attention have you paid to those ads when you've seen them--have you usually paid a great deal of attention, some attention, or hardly any attention at all to them?

Campaign Exposure-Unaided (National)

Can you tell me about any one particular recent public service ad that stands out in your memory? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE BELOW)

Campaign Exposure-Aided (National)

How about public service ads that look something like these? (SHOW "MCGRUFF" ADVERTISEMENT) Have you ever seen any advertisements or commercials like these on television or in newspapers or magazines, or heard ones with this "Take A Bite Out Of Crime" theme on the radio?

Campaign Exposure (Panel)

Now I'm going to describe one particular kind of public service ad to you, and I want you to think about whether you remember having seen them anywhere. The ads always say, "Take a Bite Out of Crime," and include a cartoon character dog dressed in an overcoat telling people how to protect themselves from crime.

These ads have been on television and radio, in newspapers and magazines, and on posters and billboards. Do you remember ever having seen that kind of ad anyplace at all?

Campaign Frequency of Exposure

Please give me a rough estimate of how many times you've seen or heard ads like this one over the past two years--would it have been just once or twice, or up to ten times, or up to twenty times, or more than twenty times?

Behavior Change (National)

As a result of these ads, did you do anything that you probably would not have done before if you hadn't seen or heard them?

(If yes:) What specifically did you do?

Crime Concern (National)

All in all, did these "Take a Bite Out of Crime" ads make you any more concerned about crime than you were before, any less concerned, or didn't they make any difference at all in that way?

Victimization Fear (National)

Did these ads themselves make you more afraid of becoming a crime victim yourself, less afraid, or didn't they make any difference?

Future Behavior Change (National)

Are you thinking about doing something in the future that was suggested by the ads that we've been talking about?

Group Effectiveness (National)

Did these ads in any make you feel more confident that citizens like yourself can get together to effectively prevent crime, or not?

Group Participation (National)

Did they in any make you consider getting together with other people around here to help prevent crime, or not?

Information Gain (National)

Have you yourself found out anything about crime prevention from these ads that you hadn't known before?

(If yes:) What was that?

Information Seeking (National)

Did you happen to write or phone for more information about crime prevention?

Prevention Self-Responsibility (National)

Did they in any way make you feel more responsible for helping prevent crime on your own, or not?

Reinforcement (National)

Did the ads remind you of things that you may have known before regarding crime prevention but had since forgotten about?

Self-Protection Confidence (National)

Did they make you feel any more confident about being able to protect yourself from crime, any less confident, or didn't they make any difference at all in that way?

Victimization Fear (National)

Did these ads themselves make you more afraid of becoming a crime victim yourself, less afraid, or didn't they make any difference?

COMMUNICATION ORIENTATIONS

Anticipated Information Attention (Panel)

If you were to read or hear about information on how to protect yourself and your household against crime in the mass media, would you pay a lot of attention to it, some attention, or not much attention at all?

Anticipated Information Influence (Panel)

How much influence do you think that such information in the media would have on what you personally will do about protecting yourself against crime - do you think it would have a great influence, some influence, or not much influence at all?

Anticipated Information Utility (Panel)

If you were to read or hear about that kind of protection information in the mass media, how useful would you expect it to be - very useful to you, somewhat useful, or not very useful at all?

Information Need

In general, how much of a need do you have at this time for that kind of information? Would you say that you have a great need, a small need, or hardly any need at all for such information?

Campaign (Other) Prevention Attention

Do you pay a lot of attention to this kind of information when you come across it, some attention to it, or not much attention at all?

Campaign (Other) Prevention Exposure

Turning now to all sources of information, including mass media, other people, and the rest--except those particular ads--how often in the past 12 months have you come across information on how to protect yourself and your household against crime? Have you seen or heard such information often, occasionally or never?

Crime Discussion

When you talk with neighbors and people you consider close to you, including family and friends, do you discuss things about crime very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Crime Prevention Discussion

When you discuss crime, how often do you exchange ideas about what citizens like yourself can do to prevent crime--very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Crime Prevention Opinion Leadership

And, are you more likely or less likely to be asked for your ideas and opinions about what to do to prevent crimes in your neighborhood?

Magazine Exposure

About how many different magazines do you usually get to look at or read over a month's time?

Magazine Crime News Attention

How much attention do you ordinarily give to news about crime in magazines?

Media Exposure (4 items)

(1) On the average weekday, how much time do you usually spend watching television from the time you get up until you go to sleep?

(2) On the average weekday, how much time do you usually spend listening to the radio, both inside and outside your home?

(3) How much time do you usually spend looking at a newspaper on an average weekday?

(4) About how many different magazines do you usually get to look at or read over a month's time?

Newspaper Exposure

How much time do you usually spend looking at a newspaper on an average weekday?

Newspaper Crime News Attention

How much attention do you ordinarily give to news about crime in the newspapers?

PSA Attention

Most advertisements and commercials advertise different products and other things that people can buy. Other kinds, called public service advertisements and commercials deal with things like traffic safety, cancer prevention, help for alcohol and drug problems, crime prevention and so on. They tell people how they can stay healthy, what they can do to help themselves, where to go for help at social service agencies and so forth.

In general, how much attention do you give to public service ads which appear: (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)

	A lot	Some	Hardly any	Don't know
a. On television?.....	3	2	1	0
b. On radio?.....	3	2	1	0
c. In newspapers?.....	3	2	1	0
d. In magazines.....	3	2	1	0

Radio Exposure

On an average weekday, how much time do you usually spend listening to the radio, both inside and outside your home?

Radio Crime News Attention

How much attention do you ordinarily give to news about crime?

Television Exposure

On the average weekday, how much time do you usually spend watching television from the time you get up until you go to sleep?

Media Crime Attention (3 Items)

(1) When you come across stories about crime in the newspaper, do you usually read most of the some of the story, or not much of the story at all?

(2) When you watch the news on television and news stories about crime are reported, do you usually pay close attention to them, some attention to them, or not much attention at all to them?

(3) How often do you watch police, crime, or detective programs on television? Do you watch them very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

TV Crime Entertainment Realism

Do you think that police, crime, and detective programs on television give a very accurate picture of crime in America, a somewhat accurate picture, or not a very accurate picture at all of crime in America?

CRIME ORIENTATIONS

Burglary Probability

How likely do you think it is that your residence will be broken into or burglarized during the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

Neighborhood Crime Rate

Within the past year or two, do you think that crime in your neighborhood has increased, decreased, or remained about the same?

Neighborhood Crime Danger

How dangerous do you think your neighborhood is compared to other neighborhoods in terms of crime? Do you believe it is much more dangerous, more dangerous, about average, less dangerous, or much less dangerous?

Neighborhood Safety (At Night)

How safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood AT NIGHT?

Victimization Experience (4 items)

(1) Have your yourself been a victim of crime during the past year?

(2) Has any member of your immediate family (whether or not in same household) been a victim of a crime during the past year?

(3) Do you personally know anyone else in this neighborhood who has been a victim of crime during the past year?

(4) Do you personally know anyone else at all who has been a victim of crime during the past year.

Victimization Fear

(Combined Burglary Probability and Violence Probability)

Violence Probability

How likely do you think it is that you personally will be attacked or robbed within the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

PREVENTION ORIENTATIONS

Prevention Capability

Compared to most other people, do you feel that you are more capable in protecting your home from burglary or break-ins, about as capable, or less capable than most people?

Compared to most other people, do you feel that you yourself are more capable in physically protecting yourself from being attacked or robbed, about as capable, or less capable than most people?

Prevention Concern

Compared to most other people, would you say you are more concerned about protecting yourself from crime, about as concerned as others, or less concerned than others are?

Prevention Confidence

How confident do you feel that you as an individual can do things to help protect yourself from crime--do you feel very confident, somewhat confident, or not very confident at all?

Prevention Effectiveness

If ordinary citizens took more precautions to protect themselves, do you think that would help reduce the crime rate a great deal, somewhat, or hardly at all?

Prevention Interest

Overall, would you say you are very interested, fairly interested, or hardly at all interested in crime prevention?

Prevention Knowledge

How much do you think you know about how to make yourself and your home less likely to be victimized by criminals--do you think you know a great deal, know some things, or don't you think you know much at all?

Prevention Responsibility

When it comes to helping prevent crimes in a neighborhood like yours, do you believe that individual citizens have more responsibility than the police, less responsibility, or equal responsibility with the police?

PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

Cooperative Behaviors

Neighborhood Observing

Do you usually try to keep an eye on what's going on in the street in front of your home, or do you usually not notice?

Police Reporting

In the past year, have you contacted the police to report a crime or some suspicious activity in your neighborhood?

Organization Joining

Have you ever been part of a community group or organization in your neighborhood that tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?

Deterrence Behaviors

Indoor Lights On	Always	Sometimes	Never
Leaving on indoor lights when away from home at night	3	2	1
Outdoor Lights On			
Leaving on outdoor lights when away from home at night.	3	2	1
Timer Lights			
When away for more than a day or so, using a timer to turn on lights or a radio.	3	2	1

Precaution Behaviors

Go Out/Someone	Always	Sometimes	Never
When going out after dark, going with someone else because of crime.	3	2	1
Go Out By Car			
Going out by car instead of walking at night because of crime	3	2	1

Take Device	Always	Sometimes	Never
Taking something along with you when going out that could be used as protection against being attacked, assaulted, or robbed.	3	2	1
Avoid Places			
Avoiding certain places in your neighborhood at night.	3	2	1

Surveillance Behaviors

Police Check			
When away from home for more than a day or so, notifying police so that they will keep a special watch.	3	2	1
Stop Deliveries			
When away from home for more than a day or so, stopping delivery of things like newspapers or mail, or asking someone to bring them in.	3	2	1
Neighbor to Watch			
When away for more than a day or so, having a neighbor watch your residence.	3	2	1

Target Hardening Behaviors

Lock Doors When Out			
First, what about locking the doors to your home, even when leaving for only a short time? Do you do it always, sometimes, or never?	3	2	1
Lock Doors When In			
What about keeping the doors locked when at home?	3	2	1

Deterrence Purchases

Outdoor Lights

Do you have outdoor lights for security?

Anti-Theft Stickers

Do you have anti-theft stickers on doors?

Dog for Security

Do you have a dog at least partly for security?

Loss Reduction Purchases

Property I.D.

Have you had your property engraved with an I.D?

Theft Insurance

Do you have theft insurance?

Personal Precaution Purchases

Peep-hole in Door

Do you have a peep-hole or window in your door?

Protective Devices

Do you have personal security devices such as a gun, tear gas, etc?

Target Hardening Purchases

Security Check

Have you had your local police do a security check of your home?

New Locks

Have you had special locks put on your doors or windows?

Burglar Alarm

Do you have an operating burglar alarm system?

PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Alienation (National)	Strongly agree	Agree	Don't know	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree
In spite of what some people say, the life of the average person is getting worse.	5	4	3	2	1
It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future.	5	4	3	2	1
Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.	5	4	3	2	1
These days a person doesn't really know who can be counted on.	5	4	3	2	1
There's little use in writing to public officials, because they aren't really interested in the problems of the average person.	5	4	3	2	1

Altruism (National)

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
Every person should give some of their time for the good of their neighborhood or town or city.	2	1	0
People who fail to finish a job they promised to do should feel very badly about it.	2	1	0
We would be better off if we could live our own lives the way we want and not have to be concerned about doing things.	2	1	0
In school I usually volunteered for special projects.	2	1	0
Letting your neighbors down occasionally is not so bad, because you just can't be doing good for everybody all the time.	2	1	0

Sense of Control (National)

Generally speaking, do you feel that you have a great deal of control over the things that affect your life, a fair amount of control, or hardly any control at all?

Trust in Institutions (National)

How much of the time do you think you can trust the Federal Government in Washington to do what is best for the people?

Just about always
Most of the time
Some of the time
Hardly at all
Don't know

How much of the time do you think you can trust the local government here to do what is best for the people?

Just about always
Most of the time
Some of the time
Hardly at all
Don't know

APPENDIX C

NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Trust in People

Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

Do you feel that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

Neighborhood Cohesion (National)

All in all, is this the kind of neighborhood where people seem to go their own way, or is it the kind of neighborhood where people seem to be really concerned about each other?

Neighborhood Satisfaction

Generally speaking, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not at all satisfied with this neighborhood?

CF# | | | | | | | | |
6- 7- 8- 9- 10- 11- 12- 13-

STUDY #243-004 OCTOBER 1981 COUNTY _____ PLACE _____ Blk.#____

Time started _____ Time finished _____ Total minutes _____ 14,15

Hello. I'm _____ from The Roper Organization and we're conducting a survey about matters that concern people these days. Here's the first question.

1. On the average weekday, how much time do you usually spend watching television from the time you get up until you go to sleep?

Less than two hours.....	1	16/
2 to less than 4 hours...	2	
4 or more hours.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

2. On an average weekday, how much time do you usually spend listening to the radio, both inside and outside your home?

Less than 2 hours.....	1	17/
2 to less than 4 hours...	2	
4 or more hours.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

3. How much time do you usually spend looking at a newspaper on an average weekday?

None.....	0	18/
1 - 20 minutes.....	1	
21 - 40 minutes.....	2	
41 - 60 minutes.....	3	
61 minutes or more.....	4	
Don't know.....	5	

4. About how many different magazines do you usually get to look at or read over a month's time?

None.....	0	19/
One.....	1	
2 - 3.....	2	
4 or more....	3	
Don't know...	4	

5. How often do you watch police, crime, or detective programs on television? Do you watch them very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	3	20/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever.....	1	
Don't know, varies....	0	

6. Do you think that police, crime, and detective programs on television give a very accurate picture of crime in America, a somewhat accurate picture, or not a very accurate picture at all of crime in America?

Very accurate.....	3	21/
Somewhat accurate.....	2	
Not accurate at all...	1	
Don't know, varies....	0	

7. How much attention do you ordinarily give to news about crime: (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)

	A lot of attention	Some attention	Hardly any or none	Don't know	
a. On TV?.....	3	2	1	0	22/
b. On the radio?.....	3	2	1	0	23/
c. In the newspapers?	3	2	1	0	24/
d. In magazines?.....	3	2	1	0	25/
e. In talking with others?.....	3	2	1	0	26/

8. Please take this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD). Look at the statements and tell me which one you agree with most.

Crime is MORE serious than the newspapers and TV say.....	1	27/
Crime is ABOUT as serious as the newspapers and TV say.....	2	
Crime is LESS serious than the newspapers and TV say.....	3	
Don't know/no opinion.....	0	

9. Most advertisements and commercials advertise different products and other things that people can buy. Other kinds, called public service advertisements and commercials, deal with things like traffic safety, cancer prevention, help with alcohol and drug problems, crime prevention and so on. They tell people how they can stay healthy, what they can do to help themselves, where to go for help at social service agencies and so forth.

In general, how much attention do you give to public service ads which appear: (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)

	A lot	Some	Hardly any	Don't know	
a. On television?..	3	2	1	0	28/
b. On radio?.....	3	2	1	0	29/
c. In newspapers?..	3	2	1	0	30/
d. In magazines?...	3	2	1	0	31/

10. Can you tell me about any one particualr recent public service ad that stands out in your memory? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE BELOW)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE REPLY TO Q.10 AS FOLLOWS:

Mentions "Detective Dog," crime dog, "Take A Bite Out Of Crime," etc.....	1	(SKIP TO 13)	32/
Mentions other crime prevention ad.....	2	(ASK 11)	
Mentions ad other than above..	3	(ASK 11)	
Mentions no ad.....	0	(ASK 11)	

11. How about public service ads that look something like these? (SHOW "MC GRUFF" ADVERTISEMENT) Have you ever seen any advertisements or commercials like these on television or in newspapers or magazines, or heard ones with this "Take A Bite Out Of Crime" theme on the radio?

Yes, recognized ad.....	1	(ASK 12)	33/
No, can't recall.....	2	(SKIP TO 52)	

12. A lot of ads sometimes look alike. Would you say that you're very sure that you've seen or heard ads exactly like these, or fairly sure but not altogether certain?

Very sure.....	2	34/
Fairly sure.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

13. Please give me a rough estimate of how many times you've seen or heard ads like this one over the past two years--would it have been just once or twice, or up to ten times, or up to twenty times, or more than twenty times?

Once or twice....	1	35/
Up to 10 times...	2	
Up to 20 times...	3	
More than 20 times.....	4	
Don't know.....	0	

14. Can you recall--even if you have to guess--about when it was that you first noticed these ads--was it within the past couple of months, or two months to a year ago, or a year or more ago?

Past couple months..	1	36/
Two months to year..	2	
Year or more.....	3	
Can't recall.....	0	

15. Where have you seen or heard these ads most often--on television, on radio, in a newspaper, in a magazine, on a poster or billboard, or on cards on trains, or buses, or cars? (MAY MULTIPLE RECORD)

Television.....	1	37/
Radio.....	2	
Newspaper.....	3	
Magazine.....	4	
Poster or billboard.	5	
Car card on trains/ buses/cars.....	6	
Can't recall.....	0	

16. All in all, how much attention have you paid to those ads when you've seen them--have you usually paid a great deal of attention, some attention, or hardly any attention at all to them?

Great deal.....	3	38/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any.....	1	
Can't recall.....	0	

17. What do you think are the main points that these ads are trying to get across to people? (PROBE) (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Named one/more points.....	1	39/
Did not.....	0	

18. Have you yourself found out anything about crime prevention from these ads that you hadn't known before?

Yes.....	2	(ASK 19)	40/
No.....	1	(SKIP TO 20)	

19. What was that? (PROBE) (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Named anything.....	1	41/
Did not.....	0	

20. Did the ads remind you of things that you may have known before regarding crime prevention but had since forgotten about?

Yes.....	2	42/
No.....	1	

21. Did you feel that these particular ads were getting through to you, or not?

Yes.....	1	(ASK 22)	43/
No.....	2	(ASK 22)	
Don't know.....	0	(SKIP TO 23)	

22. Why do you think so? (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Gave reason.....	1	44/
Did not.....	0	

23. Did these ads make you feel more pleased than annoyed, or more annoyed than pleased?

More pleased.....	1	(ASK 24)	45/
More annoyed.....	2	(ASK 24)	
Neither.....	3	(ASK 24)	
Don't know.....	0	(SKIP TO 25)	

24. Why is that?

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Gave reason.....	1	46/
Did not.....	2	

25. What if anything about these ads would you consider worth passing along to your friends or relatives? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE:

Mentioned something.....	1	47/
Nothing, can't recall...	2	

26. As a result of these ads, did you do anything that you probably would not have done if you hadn't seen or heard them (it)?

Yes.....	1 (ASK 27)	48/
No.....	2 (SKIP TO 32)	
Can't recall....	0 (SKIP TO 32)	

27. What specifically did you do? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE: 49/

Any mention of calling/writing for crime information.....	1 (SKIP TO 29)
All other mentions....	2 (ASK 28)
Did nothing, can't recall.....	3 (ASK 28)

28. (IF CALLING OR WRITING FOR INFORMATION ABOUT CRIME PREVENTION NOT MENTIONED IN Q.27) Did you happen to write or phone for more information about crime prevention?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 28)	50/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 32)	
Can't recall....	0 (SKIP TO 32)	

29. (IF GETTING MORE INFORMATION MENTIONED IN Q.27), OR IF YES TO Q.28) Have you received the information you requested?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 30)	51/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 32)	
Can't recall...	0 (SKIP TO 32)	

30. Did you find that information helpful or not helpful?

Helpful.....	1 (SKIP TO 32)	52/
Not helpful....	2 (ASK 31)	
Don't know.....	0 (SKIP TO 32)	

31. Why not? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE: 53/

Gave reason.....	1
Did not.....	0

32. Was there anything in these ads themselves which turned you off? (PROBE) (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE:

Named something.....	1	54/
Did not.....	0	

33. Are you thinking about doing something in the future that was suggested by the ads that we've been talking about?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 34)	55/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 35)	
Don't know.....	0 (SKIP TO 35)	

34. What specifically are you thinking about doing? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE:

Named something.....	1	56/
Did not.....	0	

35. All in all, did these "Take a Bite Out of Crime" ads make you any more concerned about crime than you were before, any less concerned, or didn't they make any difference at all in that way?

More concerned.....	3	Less concerned.....	1	57/
No difference.....	2	Don't know.....	0	

36. Did they make you personally feel any more confident about being able to protect yourself from crime, any less confident, or didn't they make any difference at all in that way?

More confident.....	3	Less confident.....	1	58/
No difference.....	2	Don't know.....	0	

37. Did these ads themselves make you more afraid of becoming a crime victim yourself, less afraid, or didn't they make any difference?

More afraid.....	3	Less afraid.....	1	59/
Neither.....	2	Don't know.....	0	

38. Did they in any way make you consider getting together with other people around here to help prevent crime, or not?

Yes.....	2	60/
No.....	1	

39. Did they in any way make you feel more responsible for helping prevent crime on your own, or not?

Yes.....	2	61/
No.....	1	

40. Do you personally know any children under 16 who have seen or heard any of those ads?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 41)		62/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 42)		

41. (IF "YES") As far as you can tell, do they seem to be getting any useful information about crime prevention out of them?

Yes.....	2	63/
No.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

42. Did these ads in any way make you feel more confident that citizens like yourself can get together to effectively prevent crime, or not?

Yes.....	2	64/
No.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

43. Do you know of any crime prevention activities in your community which have been based upon those particular ads?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 44)	65/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 45)	
Don't know.....	0 (SKIP TO 45)	

44. (IF "YES") What were they? (PROBE) (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Named something.....	1	69/
Did not.....	0	

45. Can you think of one particular "Take a Bite Out of Crime" ad that stands out in your mind?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 46)	70/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 47)	

46. Would you describe the ad, and tell me why you think it stands out in your mind? (PROBE) RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Described ad.....	1	71/
Did not.....	0	

47. All in all, do you personally like the use of the cartoon dog character in the ads, do you dislike it, or doesn't it matter to you?

Like it.....	3 (ASK 48)			6/
Doesn't matter.....	2 (SKIP TO 49)			
Dislike it.....	1 (ASK 48)			
Don't know.....	0 (SKIP TO 49)			

48. (IF LIKE OR DISLIKE IN Q.47) Why do you (like,dislike) it? (PROBE) (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

CODE:

Gave reason.....	1	7/
Did not.....	0	

49. The people putting out those ads also have a small booklet available describing in more detail what people can do to protect themselves from crime. Do you recall ever having seen that booklet?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 50)	8/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 52)	

50. Did you read all of that booklet, some of it, or hardly any of it?

All of it.....	3	Hardly any of it.....	1	9/
Some of it.....	2	Don't know.....	0	

51. How helpful did you find it in learning about how to protect yourself from crime? Did you find it very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful at all?

Very helpful.....	3	Not very helpful.....	1	10/
Somewhat helpful....	2	Don't know.....	0	

52. Turning now to all other sources of information--mass media, other people, and the rest, but not including those particular ads, how often in the past 12 months have you come across information on how to protect yourself and your household against crime? Have you seen or heard such information often, occasionally, or never?

Often.....	3	(ASK 53)	11/
Occasionally.....	2	(ASK 53)	
Never.....	1	(SKIP TO 54)	
Don't know.....	0	(SKIP TO 54)	

53. Do you pay a lot of attention to this kind of information when you come across it, some attention to it, or not much attention at all?

A lot.....	3	12/
Some.....	2	
Not much.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

54. Overall, how much of a need do you have at this time for that kind of information? Would you say that you have a great need, a small need, or hardly any need at all for such information?

Great need..... 3
Small need..... 2
Hardly any need..... 1
Don't know..... 0

13/

55. Do you recall having seen or heard any ads over the past few months that try to sell household crime prevention devices, such as burglar alarms and the like?

Yes..... 2 (ASK 56)
No..... 1 (SKIP TO 57)

14/

56. Have those ads had any influence on how you feel about crime prevention?

Yes..... 2
No..... 1

15/

57. During the past few months, have there been any major news events about crime around here that have particularly caught your attention?

Yes..... 2 (ASK 58)
No..... 1 (SKIP TO 59)

16/

58. Has that had any influence on how you feel about crime prevention?

Yes..... 2
No..... 1

17/

59. Within the past year, do you think that crime in your neighborhood has increased, decreased, or remained about the same?

Increased..... 1
Same..... 2
Decreased..... 3
Not been here that long 4
Don't know..... 0

18/

60. How safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood AT NIGHT--very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

Very safe..... 1
Reasonably safe..... 2
Somewhat unsafe..... 3
Very unsafe..... 4
Don't know..... 0

19/

61. How dangerous do you think this neighborhood is compared to other neighborhoods in terms of crime? Do you believe it is much more dangerous, more dangerous, about average, less dangerous, or much less dangerous?

Much more dangerous..... 1
More dangerous..... 2
About average..... 3
Less dangerous..... 4
Much less dangerous..... 5
Don't know; can't tell..... 0

20/

62. How likely do you think it is that your residence will be broken into or burglarized during the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

Very likely..... 3
Somewhat likely..... 2
Not very likely..... 1
Don't know..... 0

21/

63. Is having your residence burglarized or broken into something that you worry about a great deal, or something that you worry about somewhat, or something that you hardly worry about at all?

A great deal..... 3 (ASK 64)
Somewhat..... 2
Hardly at all..... 1
Don't know..... 0
(SKIP TO 65)

22/

64. (IF "A GREAT DEAL" IN Q.63) Why do you worry about it? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE:
Gave reason..... 1
Did not..... 0

23/

65. Compared to most other people, do you feel that you are more capable in protecting your home from burglary or break-ins, about as capable, or less capable than most people?

More capable..... 3
About as..... 2
Less capable..... 1
Don't know..... 0

24/

66. How likely do you think it is that you personally will be attacked or robbed within the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?

Very likely..... 3
Somewhat likely..... 2
Not at all likely..... 1
Don't know..... 0

25/

67. Is being attacked or robbed something that you worry about a great deal, or something that you worry about somewhat, or something that you hardly worry about at all?

A great deal..... 3 (ASK 68)
Somewhat..... 2
Hardly at all..... 1
Don't know..... 0
(SKIP TO 69)

26/

68. (IF "A GREAT DEAL" IN Q.67) Why do you worry about it? (RECORD VERBATIM REPLY AND CODE)

VERBATIM REPLY: _____

CODE:
Gave reason..... 1
Did not..... 0

27/

69. Compared to most other people, do you feel that you yourself are more capable in physically protecting yourself from being attacked or robbed, about as capable, or less capable than most people?

More capable..... 3
About as..... 2
Less capable..... 1
Don't know..... 0

28/

70. Overall, would you say you are very interested, fairly interested, or hardly at all interested in crime prevention?

Very interested... 3
Fairly interested. 2
Hardly interested. 1
Don't know..... 0

29/

71. Compared to this time a year ago, are you more interested or less interested in crime prevention?

More interested	3	(ASK 72)	30/
Less interested	2		
Same (vol.)....	1	(SKIP TO 73)	
Don't know.....	0		

72. Please tell me if any of the items listed on this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) had an influence on how interested you are in crime prevention. Just read off the letters. (MAY MULTIPLE RECORD)

a. Brochures, leaflets or booklets on crime or crime prevention that you've read.....	1	31/
b. Crime prevention public service ads that you've seen on TV, radio, or in newspapers and magazines.....	2	
c. News stories you have seen or heard about crimes or crime prevention.....	3	
d. Fictional things you've read or seen in the media about crime stories.....	4	
e. Crime or crime prevention talks you've had with other people...	5	
f. Actual crimes that have been committed against you or against people you know.....	6	
Other influences (vol.)(SPECIFY) _____	7	
None.....	8	

73. Compared to most other people, would you say you are more concerned about protecting yourself from crime, about as concerned as others, or less concerned than others are?

More concerned.....	1	32/
About as concerned.	2	
Less concerned.....	3	
Don't know.....	4	

74. When it comes to helping prevent crimes in a neighborhood like this, do you believe that individual citizens have more responsibility than the police, less responsibility, or equal responsibility with the police?

More responsibility...	1	33/
Less responsibility...	2	
Equal responsibility..	3	
Don't know.....	4	

75. How confident do you feel that you as an individual can do things to help protect yourself from crime--do you feel very confident, somewhat confident, or not very confident at all?

Very confident.....	3	34/
Somewhat confident....	2	
Not very confident....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

76. How much do you think you know about how to make yourself and your home less likely to be victimized by criminals--do you think you know a great deal, know some things, or don't you think you know much at all?

Know a great deal.....	3	35/
Know some things.....	2	
Don't know much.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

77. If ordinary citizens took more precautions to protect themselves, do you think that would help reduce the crime rate a great deal, somewhat, or hardly at all?

A great deal.....	3	36/
Somewhat.....	2	
Hardly at all.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

78. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) How good a job of prevention or reducing crime would you say...

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't know	
a. The local police are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	37/
b. The other people in this neighborhood are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	38/
c. The local courts are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	39/
d. The local newspapers and TV and radio stations are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	40/
e. Local volunteer organizations, clubs, and groups are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	41/
f. Local elected officials are doing?.....	4	3	2	1	0	42/

79. Do you usually try to keep an eye on what's going on in the street in front of your home, or do you usually not notice?

Usually keep eye.....	1	43/
Usually don't notice...	2	
Not applicable/can't see front of house.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

80. In the past year, have you contacted the police to report a crime or some suspicious activity in your neighborhood?

Yes.....	1	44/
No.....	2	
Can't recall..	0	

81. Compared to how you felt a year ago, are you more inclined or less inclined to call the police--even if you just suspect that a crime may take place?

More inclined.....	1	45/
Less inclined.....	2	
Same.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

82. Would you say that you personally are doing a good job, a fair job, or a poor job of helping to reduce crime in this neighborhood?

Good job.....	4	46/
Fair job.....	3	
Poor job.....	2	
Not doing anything....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

83. Here is a list of some things people sometimes do to protect their homes against burglary. Please tell me which of them, if any, you've done in this household. Just read me the appropriate numbers. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)(IF PROVIDED BY LANDLORD, DON'T COUNT) (MAY MULTIPLE RECORD) 47/

1. Had property engraved with I.D.....	1	
2. Had local police do security check of home.....	2	
3. Installed special locks on doors/ windows.....	3	
4. Installed peep-hole/window in door..	4	
5. Installed outdoor lights for security	5	
6. Put anti-theft stickers on doors....	6	
7. Installed operating burglar alarm system.....	7	
8. Have dog at least partly for security.	8	
9. Bought theft insurance.....	9	
10. Have personal security devices--gun, tear gas, etc.....	0	
Other (SPECIFY) _____	X	
None of them.....	Y	

84. Look at the card again, and regardless of whether it's something you've done or not, please tell me which two of those things, in your opinion, are the most effective ways to protect oneself from crime, and which two, in your opinion, are least effective. Just read off the numbers.

	Two most effective		Two least effective	
	1	48/	1	49/
	2		2	
	3		3	
	4		4	
	5		5	
	6		6	
	7		7	
	8		8	
	9		9	
	10		10	
Don't know..	Y		Don't know..	Y

85a. On this card are some things people sometimes do to protect themselves against crime. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you read through them and tell me which things you never do? (RECORD BELOW IN COLUMN 85a) Just read off the letters.

b. Now, please read through the remaining things you do at least some of the time. Of those, which do you always do, which do you do most of the time, and which do you only do once in a while? How about (READ EACH LETTER NOT CIRCLED "NEVER")?

	85a. Never	85b. Once in while	85b. Most of time	85b. Always	
a. Locking doors short time	1	2	3	4	50/
b. Keeping doors locked	1	2	3	4	51/
c. Locking windows, screens short time	1	2	3	4	52/
d. Leaving on indoor lights	1	2	3	4	53/
e. Leaving on outdoor lights	1	2	3	4	54/
f. When away notifying police	1	2	3	4	55/
g. When away stopping delivery	1	2	3	4	56/
h. When away neighbor watch	1	2	3	4	57/
i. When away using a timer	1	2	3	4	58/
j. Going out with someone else	1	2	3	4	59/
k. Car instead of walking	1	2	3	4	60/
l. Taking some protection	1	2	3	4	61/
m. Avoiding places in neighborhood	1	2	3	4	62/
n. Getting together with neighbors	1	2	3	4	63/
o. Joining with neighbors	1	2	3	4	64/
p. Keeping a helpful watch on neighbors and their property	1	2	3	4	65/

86. Now, look at the card again, and regardless of how often you do it yourself, please tell me which three of those things, in your opinion, are the most effective ways to protect oneself from crime, and which three are the least effective? Just read off the letters.

	Three most effective		Three least effective	
a.	1	66/	1	68/
b.	2		2	
c.	3		3	
d.	4		4	
e.	5		5	
f.	6		6	
g.	7		7	
h.	8		8	
i.	9		9	
j.	0		0	
k.	X		X	
l.	Y		Y	
m.	1	67/	1	69/
n.	2		2	
o.	3		3	
p.	4		4	
Don't know...	5		Don't know....	5

87. Have you ever been part of a community group or organization in your neighborhood that tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?

Yes..... 1 (ASK 88) 70/

No, can't recall..... 2 (SKIP TO 91)

88. Are you a member of the group at this time?

Yes..... 2 71/

No..... 1

Don't know.. 0

80-2

89. Did you join this group during 1981 or before that? When?

During 1981..... 2 6/

Before 1981--When?..... 1

Date: _____

Can't recall..... 0

90. Did anything you saw or heard in the mass media play a part in your deciding to join the group?

Yes..... 2 7/

No..... 1

Don't know.. 0

91. How effective do you think such neighborhood groups are in helping to reduce crime? Do you think they are very effective, somewhat effective, or hardly effective at all?

Very effective..... 3 8/

Somewhat effective.... 2

Hardly effective..... 1

Don't know..... 0

92. In the foreseeable future, do you think there is a very good chance that you will take more of these steps we've been talking about, some chance, or not much chance at all?

Very good chance..... 1 9/

Some chance..... 2

Not much chance..... 3

Don't know..... 0

93. On this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) are four statements telling about different ways of possibly reducing crime. For each statement, please tell me whether you think it is a very effective way of reducing crime, a somewhat effective way, or not an effective way at all of reducing crime.

	Very effective	Somewhat effective	Not effective	
a. By improving conditions as much as possible for all people in our society	3	2	1	10/
b. By punishing criminals to the fullest extent of the law possible	3	2	1	11/
c. By having individual citizens acting responsibly by themselves or with others to protect themselves and their property	3	2	1	12/
d. By putting more policemen on the streets and giving them more ability to control criminals	3	2	1	13/

94. Now, please tell me which of the statements you think is the most effective means of reducing crime? (RECORD BELOW)

95. And, which is the next most effective means? (RECORD BELOW)

96. And, which is the least effective means? (RECORD BELOW)

97. (INTERVIEWER: RECORD REMAINING LETTER IN LAST COLUMN)

	94. Most	95. Next	96. Least	97. Remaining statement	
a	1	2	3	4	14/
b	1	2	3	4	15/
c	1	2	3	4	16/
d	1	2	3	4	17/

98. Would you say that you personally are more concerned about crime because of the effect it might have on you as an individual, or more concerned about it because of the effect it has on society?

As individual	2	18/
Society	1	
Both, don't know	0	

99. In general, how serious of a problem do you think that crime is today? Do you think that it is a very serious problem, a moderately serious problem, or not a serious problem at all?

Very serious	3	19/
Moderately	2	
Not serious	1	
Don't know	0	

100. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each statement on this card. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) How about statement (CALL OFF EACH LETTER IN TURN)?

	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	
a. Every person should give some of their time for the good of their neighborhood or town or city	2	1	0	20/
b. People who fail to finish a job they promised to do should feel very badly about it	2	1	0	21/
c. We would be better off if we could live our own lives the way we want and not have to be concerned about doing things	2	1	0	22/
d. In school I usually volunteered for special projects	2	1	0	23/
e. Letting your neighbors down occasionally is not so bad, because you just can't be doing good for everybody all the time	2	1	0	24/
f. There is not much use in trying to protect yourself against crime these days--if criminals want to get you, they'll get you	2	1	0	25/
g. Human nature being what it is, there will always be crime and criminals	2	1	0	26/

101. I am going to read you some statements with which you may agree or disagree. From this card tell me how much you agree or disagree with each statement. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Don't know	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
a. In spite of what some people say, the life of the average person is getting worse	1	2	3	4	5	27/
b. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future	1	2	3	4	5	28/
c. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself	1	2	3	4	5	29/
d. These days a person doesn't really know who can be counted on	1	2	3	4	5	30/
e. There's little use in writing to public officials, because they aren't really interested in the problems of the average person	1	2	3	4	5	31/

102. Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

Can be trusted	1	32/
Can't be too careful	2	
Don't know	0	

103. How much of the time do you think you can trust the local government here to do what is best for the people?

Just about always	1	33/
Most of the time	2	
Some of the time	3	
Hardly at all	4	
Don't know	0	

104. Generally speaking, do you feel that you have a great deal of control over the things that affect your life, a fair amount of control, or hardly any control at all?

A great deal.....	3	34/
A fair amount.....	2	
Hardly any.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

105. How interested are you generally in what goes on in politics and governmental affairs in this community--are you very interested, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all?

Very interested.....	3	35/
Somewhat interested..	2	
Hardly interested....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

106. Do you know most of the people in this immediate neighborhood, some of the people, or hardly any of the people in this neighborhood?

Most of the people...	3	36/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

107. Would you say that practically all of the people in this neighborhood usually obey the law, that most of the people do, or that only a few of the people do?

Practically all do...	3	37/
Most do.....	2	
Only a few do.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

108. All in all, is this the kind of neighborhood where people seem to go their own way, or is it the kind of neighborhood where people seem to be really concerned about each other?

Go own way.....	1	38/
Concerned about each other.....	2	
Don't know.....	0	

109. When you talk with neighbors and people you consider close to you, including family and friends, do you discuss things about crime very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	1	39/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever at all...	3	
Don't know.....	0	

110. When you discuss crime, how often do you exchange ideas about what citizens like yourself can do to prevent crime--very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	1	40/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever at all...	3	
Don't know.....	0	

111. In comparison to other people like yourself, are you more likely or less likely to be asked for your ideas and opinions about what's going on in this neighborhood?

More likely.....	1	41/
Less likely.....	2	
The same, as likely..	3	
Don't know.....	0	

112. And, are you more likely or less likely to be asked for your ideas and opinions about what to do to prevent crimes in this neighborhood?

More likely.....	1	42/
Less likely.....	2	
The same, as likely..	3	
Don't know.....	0	

113. Generally speaking, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not at all satisfied with this neighborhood?

Very satisfied.....	1	43/
Somewhat satisfied...	2	
Not at all satisfied.	3	
Don't know.....	0	

114. Have you yourself been a victim of a crime during the past year?

Yes.....	1	44/
No.....	2	

115. Has any member of your immediate family (whether or not in same household) been a victim of a crime during the past year?

Yes.....	2	45/
No, don't know.....	1	

116. Do you personally know anyone else in this neighborhood who has been a victim of crime during the past year?

Yes.....	2	46/
No, don't know.....	1	

117. Do you personally know anyone else at all who has been a victim of crime during the past year?

Yes.....	2	47/
No, don't know.....	1	

118. Altogether, how many organizations and clubs do you now belong to?

None.....	0	(SKIP TO 120)	48/
One.....	1	(ASK 119)	
2.....	2		
3 - 4....	3		
5 or more	4		

119. Do you belong to any organizations or clubs that are mostly concerned with improving this community?

Yes.....	1	49/
No.....	2	

120. What was the last grade of regular school that you completed--not counting specialized schools like secretarial, art and trade schools?

No school.....	1	50/
Grade school (1-8).....	2	
Some high school (9-11).....	3	
High school graduate (12)...	4	
Some college (13-15).....	5	
College graduate (16).....	6	
Post graduate (17+).....	7	

121. What is your occupation, or aren't you employed?

Top management, top talent and major professional.....	1	51/
Executive, administrative, lesser professional.....	2	
Owner--small retail store or business.....	3	
Farmers (owners and managers).....	4	
Technicians, minor administrative.	5	
White collar, clerical (non-supervisory).....	6	
Salesmen.....	7	
Skilled and semi-skilled labor....	8	
Unskilled labor.....	9	
Service and protective workers....	0	
Not employed.....	X	

122. Here is a list of age groups. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you call off the letter of the age group you happen to be in? (IF REFUSED, INTERVIEWER ESTIMATE GROUP)

a. Under 18....	1	52/
b. 18 to 24....	2	
c. 25 to 34....	3	
d. 35 to 44....	4	
e. 45 to 54....	5	
f. 55 to 64....	6	
g. 65 and over.	7	

123. Do you own this residence or are you renting it?

Own.....	1	53/
Rent.....	2	
Don't know	0	

124. How many people live in this household altogether, including children and babies?

Household total = _____ 54/

125. How many persons in this household are under age 19?

Total under 19 = _____ 55/

126. Are you married, single, widowed, separated or divorced?

Married.....	1	56/
Single.....	2	
Widowed.....	3	
Separated or divorced	4	

127. About how long have you lived in this particular neighborhood?

Less than one year.....	1	57/
1 - 4 years.....	2	
5 - 8 years.....	3	
9 - 12 years.....	4	
13 years or more.....	5	
Can't recall.....	0	

128. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong either to the upper class, the upper middle class, the middle class, the working class, or the lower class. If you had to make a choice, would you say you belong to the upper class, the upper middle class, the middle class, the working class, or the lower class?

Upper.....	1	58/
Upper middle...	2	
Middle.....	3	
Working.....	4	
Lower.....	5	
Don't know.....	0	

129. Now here is a list of income categories. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Would you call off the letter of the category that best describes the combined annual income of all members of this household, including wages or salary, pensions, interest or dividends, and all other sources?

a. Under $5,000.....	1	59/
b. $5,000 to $9,999....	2	
c. $10,000 to $14,999..	3	
d. $15,000 to $19,999..	4	
e. $20,000 to $24,999..	5	
f. $25,000 to $29,999..	6	
g. $30,000 to $39,999..	7	
h. $40,000 or more.....	8	
Don't know.....	0	

INSTRUCTION: RECORD QUESTIONS 130 - 133 WITHOUT ASKING RESPONDENT.

130. Respondent's sex:

Female.....	1	60/
Male.....	2	

131. Respondent's race/ethnic background:

Race

Caucasian.....	1	61/
Black.....	2	
Other _____ (write in)	3	

Hispanic

Yes.....	1	62/
No.....	2	

132. Type of residence:

Single family: detached, row-house, townhouse.....	1	63/
Double (duplex): detached, row-house, townhouse.....	2	
Apartment: high-rise, low-rise, garden.....	3	
Mobile home.....	4	
Other _____ (write in)	5	

(RECORD AFTER LEAVING HOUSE)

133. Type of neighborhood:

Upper class.....	1	64/
Middle class.....	2	
Working class.....	3	
Poor.....	0	

Name: _____

Address: _____

City or town: _____

State: _____

Zip code: _____ Apt. #: _____

Area code: _____ Tel.#: _____ 65-74

Date: _____ 75,76

Interviewer's initials: _____

80-3

APPENDIX D

PANEL SAMPLE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

STUDY NO.243-004 OCTOBER 1981 CITY_____ I.D. 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] 6/1

Respondent name_____ Telephone number _____

Time started_____ Time finished_____ Total minutes_____

Hello, may I speak to _____. I'm _____ from The Roper Organization and we're conducting a survey about matters that concern people these days. Here's the first question.

1. On the average weekday, how much time do you usually spend watching television from the time you get up until you go to sleep?

Less than two hours.....	1	7/
2 to less than 4 hours.....	2	
4 or more hours.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

2. On an average weekday, how much time do you usually spend listening to the radio, both inside and outside your home?

Less than 2 hours.....	1	8/
2 to less than 4 hours.....	2	
4 or more hours.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

3. How much time do you usually spend looking at a newspaper on an average weekday?

None.....	0	9/
1 - 20 minutes.....	1	
21 - 40 minutes.....	2	
41 - 60 minutes.....	3	
61 minutes or more.....	4	
Don't know.....	5	

4. About how many different magazines do you usually get to look at or read over a month's time?

None.....	1	10/
One.....	2	
2 - 3.....	3	
4 or more.....	4	
Don't know.....	0	

5. How often do you watch police, crime, or detective programs on television? Do you watch them very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	3	11/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever.....	1	
Don't know, varies....	0	

6. When you watch the news on television and news stories about crime are reported, do you usually pay close attention to them, some attention to them, or not much attention at all to them?

Close attention.....	3	12/
Some.....	2	
Not much.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

7. When you come across stories about crime in the newspaper, do you usually read most of the story, some of the story, or not much of the story at all?

Read most of story....	3	13/
Read some.....	2	
Read not much.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

8. On the whole, do you think that crime is more serious than the newspapers and television say it is, about as serious as they say it is, or less serious than they say it is?

More serious.....	3	14/
About as serious.....	2	
Less serious.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

9. Most advertisements and commercials advertise different products and other things that people can buy. Other kinds called public service advertisements and commercials deal with things like traffic safety, cancer prevention, help with alcohol and drug problems, crime prevention and so on. They tell people about how they can stay healthy, what they can do to help themselves, where to go for help at social service agencies, and so forth.

When you watch television, do you usually pay a lot of attention to these public service announcements, some attention, or hardly any attention at all?

A lot.....	3	15/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any....	1	
Don't know....	0	

10. When you listen to the radio, do you usually pay a lot of attention to public service accouncements that are broadcast, some attention, or hardly any attention at all?

A lot.....	3	16/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any....	1	
Don't know....	0	

11. Newspapers also carry public service advertisements. Do you usually pay a lot of attention to those, some attention, or hardly any attention at all?

A lot.....	3	17/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any....	1	
Don't know....	0	

12. What about public service advertisements in magazines? Do you usually pay a lot of attention to those, some attention, or hardly any attention at all to them?

A lot.....	3	18/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any....	1	
Don't know....	0	

13. Now I'm going to describe one particular kind of public service ad to you, and I want you to think about whether you remember having seen them anywhere. The ads always say, "Take a Bite Out of Crime," and include a cartoon character dog dressed in an overcoat telling people how to protect themselves from crime.

These ads have been on television and radio, in newspapers and magazines, and on posters and billboards. Do you remember ever having seen that kind of ad anyplace at all?

Yes.....	2 (ASK 14)	19/
No.....	1 (SKIP TO 25)	

14. Advertisements like this have been running in all the media for about two years now. Please give me a rough estimate of how many times you've seen or heard ads like this one over the past two years--would it have been just once or twice, or up to ten times, or up to twenty times, or more than 20 times?

Once or twice....	1	20/
Up to 10 times...	2	
Up to 20 times...	3	
More than 20 times.....	4	
Don't know.....	0	

15. Can you recall--even if you have to guess--about when it was that you first noticed these ads--was it within the past couple of months, or two months to a year ago, or a year or more ago?

Past couple months	1	21/
Two months to year	2	
Year or more.....	3	
Can't recall.....	0	

16. Where have you seen or heard these ads most often--on television, on radio, in a newspaper, in a magazine, on a poster or billboard, or on cards on trains, or buses, or cars?

Television.....	1	22/
Radio.....	2	
Newspaper.....	3	
Magazine.....	4	
Poster or billboard.....	5	
Car card.....	6	
Can't recall.....	0	

17. All in all, how much attention have you paid to those ads when you've seen them--have you usually paid a great deal of attention, some attention, or hardly any attention at all to them?

Great deal.....	3	23/
Some.....	2	
Hardly any.....	1	
Can't recall....	0	

18. Did these ads show or tell you anything that you did not already know before?

Yes.....	1	24/
No, don't know..	0	

19. As a result of these ads, did you do anything that you probably would not have done if you hadn't seen or heard it?

Yes.....	1	25/
No.....	2	
Can't recall....	0	

20. All in all, did those "Take a Bite Out of Crime" ads make you any more concerned about crime than you were before, any less concerned, or didn't it make any difference at all in that way?

More concerned..	3	26/
No difference...	2	
Less concerned..	1	
Don't know.....	0	

21. Did they make you personally feel any more confident about being able to protect yourself from crime, any less confident, or didn't it make any difference at all in that way?

More confident..	3	27/
No difference...	2	
Less confident..	1	
Don't know.....	0	

22. The people putting out those ads also have a small booklet available describing in more detail what people can do to protect themselves from crime. Do you recall ever having seen that booklet?

Yes.....	2	(ASK 23)	28/
No.....	1	(SKIP TO 25)	

23. Did you read all of that booklet, some of it, or hardly any of it?

All of it....	3	29/
Some of it...	2	
Hardly any of it.....	1	
Don't know...	0	

24. How helpful did you find it in learning about how to protect yourself from crime? Did you find it very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful at all?

Very helpful.....	3	30/
Somewhat helpful	2	
Not very helpful	1	
Don't know.....	0	

25. Turning now to all sources of information, including mass media, other people, and the rest--except those particular ads--how often in the past 12 months have you come across information on how to protect yourself and your household against crime? Have you seen or heard such information often, occasionally or never?

Often.....	3	(ASK 26)	31/
Occasionally	2		
Never.....	1	(SKIP TO 27)	
Don't know..	0		

26. Do you pay a lot of attention to this kind of information when you come across it, some attention to it, or not much attention at all?

A lot.....	3	32/
Some.....	2	
Not much....	1	
Don't know..	0	

27. Overall, how much of a need do you have at this time for that kind of information? Would you say that you have a great need, a small need, or hardly any need at all for such information?

Great need.....	3	33/
Small need.....	2	
Hardly any need.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

28. Do you recall having seen or heard any ads over the past few months that try to sell household crime prevention devices, such as burglar alarms and the like?

Yes.....	2	(ASK 28a)	34/
No.....	1	(SKIP TO 29)	

28a. Have those ads had any influence on how you feel about crime prevention?

Yes.....	2	35/
No.....	1	

29. During the past few months, have there been any major news events about crime around here that have particularly caught your attention?

Yes.....	2	(ASK 29a)	36/
No.....	1	(SKIP TO 30)	

29a. Has that had any influence on how you feel about crime prevention?

Yes.....	2	37/
No.....	1	

30. Within the past year, do you think that crime in your neighborhood has increased, decreased, or remained about the same?

Increased.....	1	35/
Same.....	2	
Decreased.....	3	
Not been here that long..	4	
Don't know.....	0	

31. How safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at NIGHT--very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

Very safe.....	1	39/
Reasonably safe.....	2	
Somewhat unsafe.....	3	
Very unsafe.....	4	
Don't know.....	0	

32. How dangerous do you think your neighborhood is compared to other neighborhoods in terms of crime? Do you believe it is much more dangerous, more dangerous, about average, less dangerous, or much less dangerous?

Much more dangerous.....	1	40/
More dangerous.....	2	
About average.....	3	
Less dangerous.....	4	
Much less dangerous.....	5	
Don't know; can't tell...	0	

33. How likely do you think it is that your residence will be broken into or burglarized during the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

Very likely.....	3	41/
Somewhat likely..	2	
Not very likely..	1	
Don't know.....	0	

34. How likely do you think it is that you personally will be attacked or robbed within the next year--do you think it is very likely, somewhat likely, or not very likely?

Very likely.....	3	42/
Somewhat likely...	2	
Not very likely...	1	
Don't know.....	0	

35. Overall, would you say you are very interested, fairly interested, or hardly at all interested in crime prevention?

Very interested...	3	43/
Fairly interested.	2	
Hardly interested.	1	
Don't know.....	0	

36. Compared to most other people, would you say you are more concerned about protecting yourself from crime, about as concerned as others, or less concerned than others are?

More concerned.....	1	44/
About as concerned.	2	
Less concerned.....	3	
Don't know.....	4	

37. When it comes to helping prevent crimes in a neighborhood like yours, do you believe that individual citizens have more responsibility than the police, less responsibility, or equal responsibility with the police?

More responsibility.	1	45/
Less responsibility.	2	
Equal responsibility	3	
Don't know.....	4	

38. How confident do you feel that you as an individual can do things to help protect yourself from crime--do you feel very confident, somewhat confident, or not very confident at all?

Very confident.....	3	46/
Somewhat confident.....	2	
Not very confident.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

39. How much do you think you know about how to make yourself and your home less likely to be victimized by criminals--do you think you know a great deal, know some things, or don't you think you know much at all?

Know a great deal.....	3	47/
Know some things.....	2	
Don't know much.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

40. If ordinary citizens took more precautions to protect themselves, do you think that would help reduce the crime rate a great deal, somewhat, or hardly at all?

A great deal.....	3	48/
Somewhat.....	2	
Hardly at all.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

41. Do you usually try to keep an eye on what's going on in the street in front of your home, or do you usually not notice?

Usually keep eye...	1	49/
Usually don't notice.....	2	
Not applicable/ can't see front of house.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

42. In the past year, have you contacted the police to report a crime or some suspicious activity in your neighborhood?

Yes.....	1	50/
No.....	2	
Can't recall	0	

43. Would you say that you personally are doing a good job, a fair job, or a poor job of helping to reduce crime in your neighborhood?

Good job.....	4	51/
Fair job.....	3	
Poor job.....	2	
Not doing anything	1	
Don't know.....	0	

44. When you talk with neighbors and people you consider close to you, including family and friends, do you discuss things about crime very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	1	52/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever at all	3	
Don't know.....	0	

45. When you discuss crime, how often do you exchange ideas about what citizens like yourself can do to prevent crime--very often, sometimes, or hardly ever at all?

Very often.....	1	53/
Sometimes.....	2	
Hardly ever at all.	3	
Don't know.....	0	

46. And, are you more likely or less likely to be asked for your ideas and opinions about what to do to prevent crimes in your neighborhood?

More likely.....	1	54/
Less likely.....	2	
The same, as likely.....	3	
Don't know.....	0	

47. Have you ever been part of a community group or organization in your neighborhood that tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?

Yes.....	1	(ASK 48) 55/
Now in process of being formed.....	2	(SKIP TO 49)
No, can't recall..	3	(SKIP TO 49)

48. Are you a member of the group at this time?

Yes.....	2	56/
No.....	1	
Don't know.....	0	

49. I'm going to read you a list of some things people sometimes do to protect their homes against burglary. Please tell me which of them, if any, you've done in this household.

	Yes		No
Have you had your property engraved with an I.D.?.....	1	57/	1
Have you had your local police do a security check of your home?.....	2		2
Have you had special locks put on your doors or windows?.....	3		3
Do you have a peep-hole or window in your door?.....	4		4
Do you have outdoor lights for security?.....	5		5
Do you have anti-theft stickers on doors?.....	6		6
Do you have an operating burglar alarm system?.....	7		7
Do you have a dog at least partly for security?.....	8		8
Do you have theft insurance?..	9		9
Do you have personal security devices such as a gun, tear gas, etc.?.....	0		0
Are you keeping a helpful watch on neighbors and their property?.....	Y		Y

50. Finally, I'm going to read to you some other things that people sometimes do to protect themselves from crime. For each one, would you please tell me whether it's something that you always do, something that you do sometimes, or something that you never do?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	
a. First, what about locking the doors to your home, even when leaving for only a short time? Do you do it always, sometimes, or never?	3	2	1	58/
b. What about keeping the doors locked even when at home?	3	2	1	59/
c. Locking windows and screens, even when leaving for only a short time	3	2	1	60/
d. Leaving on indoor lights when away from home at night.	3	2	1	61/
e. Leaving on outdoor lights when away from home at night	3	2	1	62/
f. When away from home for more than a day or so, notifying police so that they will keep a special watch.	3	2	1	63/
g. When away from home for more than a day or so, stopping delivery of things like newspapers or mail, or asking someone to bring them in	3	2	1	64/
h. When away for more than a day or so, having a neighbor watch your residence	3	2	1	65/
i. When away for more than a day or so, using a timer to turn on lights or a radio	3	2	1	66/
j. When going out after dark, going with someone else because of crime	3	2	1	67/
k. Going out by car instead of walking at night because of crime	3	2	1	68/
l. Taking something along with you when going out that could be used as protection against being attacked, assaulted, or robbed	3	2	1	69/
m. Avoiding certain places in your neighborhood at night.	3	2	1	70/
n. Getting together with neighbors to discuss steps to take against crime	3	2	1	71/
o. Joining in with neighbors in various activities aimed at preventing crime	3	2	1	72/

51. Have you yourself been a victim of a crime during the past year?

Yes..... 1 73/

No..... 2

52. Has any member of your immediate family (whether or not in same household) been a victim of a crime during the past year?

Yes..... 2 74/

No, don't know.. 1

53. Do you personally know anyone else <u>in your neighborhood</u> who has been a victim of crime during the past year?

Yes..... 2 75/

No, don't know... 1

54. Do you personally know anyone else at all who has been a victim of crime during the past year?

Yes..... 2 76/

No, don't know..... 1

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY

Interviewer's Initials _____

END