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Working Together to Prevent Crime:

A Practitioner's Handbook

Canada

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Preface

This Handbook describes programs to prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime in Canadian communities. It has been prepared under the direction of the Research and Communication Divisions of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada by Dr. Rick Linden of the University of Manitoba, Irwin Barker of the University of Alberta, Dr. Doug Frisbie, and the staff of Synergistics Consulting Limited.

The aim of the federal Ministry of the Solicitor General in publishing this Handbook is to ensure that crime prevention practitioners are aware of and can benefit from the experience of their peers. The Ministry sees this as one way of fulfilling its mandate to reduce crime and its attendant social and economic costs, thereby helping to improve the quality of life in Canada.

The authors would like to especially thank the following individuals for their assistance in preparing this manual: Brian Pollick, Ministry of the Attorney General, Province of British Columbia; Sergeant G. Hollingsworth, Calgary Police Service; Inspector David Cowley of the RCMP; and Dr. Michael Petrunik of the Research Division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, the project director. Students at the Canadian Police College helped to test the planning model developed here and gave us many of the examples. The Ministry of the Solicitor General Library and Reference Centre and the National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the U.S. Department of Justice provided valuable reference services, and the Institute for Social and Economic Research of the University of Manitoba and the Programs Branch of the Ministry of the Solicitor General provided administrative support.

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Introduction

Crime prevention, according to one commonly accepted definition, is "the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to reduce that risk" (National Crime Prevention Institute, 1978, pp. 1-2).

Crime prevention is not a new idea. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel, the father of modern policing, stated that "the basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder." Peel went on to specify that this should be carried out with the co-operation and assistance of the public. The police, however, have been concerned primarily with law enforcement, while citizens more and more have placed the responsibility for crime prevention with the criminal justice system.

In recent years, however, we seem to be moving closer to Peel's ideal with the advent of various crime prevention programs that involve close co-operation between criminal justice professionals, other professionals, business people, and ordinary citizens. The police, for example, have been moving beyond increased patrolling and public education and are working with specific community organizations and professional associations in initiating crime prevention programs based on citizen involvement. Business and professional organizations, as well as lending valuable support to these police/community programs, have undertaken their own measures aimed at theft, robbery and other criminal activity.

While not all approaches to crime prevention discussed in this document are community-based, the emphasis will be on those approaches in which the community plays an active role. A discussion of what is meant by community is provided in more detail in Chapter 3 of this report. For now, suffice it to say that a community is a collectivity of people with common interests and concerns whether or not they share a common geographical area. Communities may either be "natural" in origin or created through the concerted organizational efforts of individuals.

Community-based crime prevention has advanced in part because criminal justice professionals, business organizations, and the community have realized that the patrol and investigative resources of the police are limited in preventing many types of crime. Several studies suggest that the police have been moving in the right direction in recent years with their increased interest in alternative forms of crime prevention.

Moreover, most crimes are committed outside the view of the police. Those who break and enter, for example, take great pains to avoid being seen by the police and are rarely caught in the act unless they have been reported by a member of the public. A study of the Los Angeles Police Department found that "in a week the entire force happens upon at most 100 opportunities to detect burglaries in progress and two opportunities to detect street robberies in progress. These are high estimates, yet they represent only 12 per cent of the burglaries and only two per cent of the robberies known to the police. An individual patrol officer can expect an opportunity to detect a burglary no more often than once every three months and a robbery no more than once every 14 years." (President's Commission, 1967: 12). Because the rates of these offences are much lower in Canada than in the United States, the chances of our police detecting such a crime in progress are even more remote.

The recognition of these basic limitations on effective policing has led to a greater encouragement of citizen involvement in crime prevention, as noted in a U.S. National Advisory Commission report cited by Cirel et al.(1977: 2): "Criminal justice professionals readily and repeatedly admit that, in the absence of citizen assistance, neither more manpower, nor improved technology, nor additional money will enable law enforcement to shoulder the monumental burden of combating crime."

Fortunately, citizens are becoming increasingly involved in community crime prevention programs. They get involved for many reasons. Protecting families and property is obviously a significant one. So is a desire "to make the community a better place in which to live" by increasing social interaction and good neighbourliness. "Active citizens" — especially those involved in one or more community organizations — are concerned first of all with building a community, then with a particular issue. To others, "self-help" is the best way of meeting their needs. Self-help groups are already active in such areas as day-care and housing.

It takes more than mutual interest, however, to get criminal justice professionals and community members working together effectively to prevent crime. Experience suggests that unless the practitioner involves the community early in the planning process and has respect for its views, priorities, and ability to mobilize resources, citizen "ownership" of the program and participation in it will be minimal. Once community support has been ensured, experience further suggests that a rigorously planned approach, aimed at specific crimes and communities, will have the greatest chance of success.

This Handbook outlines some ideas on planning and implementation that criminal justice professionals and others have found successful. In part, these ideas work because they involve citizens in a way which allows the practitioners to play advisory and legitimizing roles with a large number of groups.

The Handbook also evaluates some of the more well-established approaches and describes some innovative ones. In Appendix A, three major crime prevention approaches are assessed: media campaigns, property-marking programs, and Watch programs. Of the three, Watch programs have been the most consistently successful.

The following chapters address both the "whats" and the "hows" of getting citizens to work together, and in co-operation with police, to build an environment that discourages crime. It is hoped that this Handbook will help criminal justice professionals make even more efficient use of resources, personnel and time in crime prevention activities.

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Chapter 1

Crime Prevention — What's Working

This chapter presents five case studies of well-planned and well-executed community crime prevention programs. They illustrate what can be accomplished when the framework and techniques presented in this Handbook are successfully applied. Each involved a careful study of a particular crime problem and the co-operation of both the police and the community. The first was initiated by the RCMP detachments serving a small city and its adjacent rural areas; the second by a professional association; the third by the management of a chain of neighbourhood convenience stores; the fourth by a municipal government; and the fifth by the crime prevention unit of a large city police department. All were effective in tailoring their approach to the needs of their particular community.

Portage la Prairie — What Police in a Rural Community Can Do

Some programs discussed in this guidebook have received generous funding from government and other sources and have been run by academics or private consultants with extensive backgrounds in crime prevention. Most people interested in implementing crime prevention do not have these resources. What, then, can be done on a simpler scale? A good answer can be given by looking at several successful programs carried out by the RCMP detachments serving Portage la Prairie, a city of about 14 000 people 50 miles west of Winnipeg, and its adjacent rural areas.

Farm Chemical Theft

In 1978, the Portage la Prairie Rural Detachment received several complaints about thefts of liquid farm chemicals from grain elevators. The chemicals were worth up to $200 per five-gallon pail, and could be sold fairly easily to local farmers.

The crime was not difficult to commit, because many of the elevators were in isolated areas. Within a fifteen-day period, nine break-ins resulted in a loss of $22 500 worth of chemicals. Conventional police methods could not prevent this crime. It was not possible to stake out all the elevators in the detachment area. Similar crimes elsewhere in the province were never solved, nor were any chemicals recovered.

Prior to the 1979 seeding season, several members of the rural and municipal detachments met to develop a program to prevent a recurrence of the previous year's loss. After analyzing the problem, they decided that making the chemicals more identifiable would reduce the likelihood that the thieves could sell them. After a meeting with representatives of the local agricultural chemical dealers, a type of property-marking program was developed.

The program involved assigning to each elevator a simple identifier that could be applied to each pail of chemical. A local paint dealer helped to devise a suitable marking agent — a special blend of paint that was unique and would stand out on all the various colours used on the pails. A Blaze Orange latex paint that could be quickly applied with a one-inch brush was used, resulting in markings that were very noticeable and made the cans readily identifiable. Each dealer was given some paint, a brush, and a large sign warning that the cans were marked. Local radio stations and newspapers publicized the marking program, so that farmers and potential offenders would be aware of it. Neighbouring detachments were notified as well. The RCMP carried out security surveys of the premises of each chemical outlet and monitored the program.

The program was highly successful. During 1979, the only chemical thefts in the detachment area were from an outlet not included in the program because the RCMP were not aware that it sold the chemicals, and from a local farm. In the first case, the break and enter was solved and the chemicals

recovered when the offenders tried to sell them to farmers who knew that all the pails should have been marked. In the second instance, the twelve cans of chemicals had been marked and were recovered in Saskatchewan, along with other stolen property. The program was continued and there were no thefts in 1980. The only loss in 1981 was from a truck containing unmarked chemicals that had not been purchased locally.

In Cline's (1982) evaluation of the program, three factors were identified as being crucial to its success:

- The program was simple.
- All those involved were consulted before its implementation and follow-up visits were made to encourage continued participation.
- The co-operation of the news media helped ensure public awareness of the program.

Business and Residential Break-ins

Another program, begun by the Portage la Prairie RCMP Municipal Detachment in 1979, was directed at residential and commercial break-ins and thefts. In 1978 there had been 170 business break-ins (out of 492 establishments) and 111 residential break-ins (out of 3544 single-dwelling units and 975 apartment suites). Both totals represented a slight increase over 1977 figures. It was decided to introduce Operation Identification and Operation Provident programs.[1] To implement them, local students were hired with funds obtained through the Summer Youth Employment Program. This practice was adopted again in 1980 and 1981.

Their first task was to review all break and enter files back to 1976 in order to learn more about the exact nature of the offences, to identify areas with the highest rate of break and enters, and to provide a statistical base against which to measure the success of the programs. During the first summer, the project was limited to areas with the highest rates of break and enter, such as the main business

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1. For a discussion of these two types of property-marking programs see appendix A.

district. Other areas were introduced in subsequent summers, so that by the end of 1981 the entire town had been included.

An evaluation of the programs indicated the following:

- After one year, commercial break and enters had decreased by 70 per cent, residential ones by almost 50 per cent.
- A further small decrease in business break and enters was maintained through 1980 and 1981.
- Residential burglaries showed increases in 1980 and 1981 but remained below the 1978 levels.

In addition, a detailed check of crime reports from September 1980 to August 1981 revealed that 81 per cent of residential break and enters and 78 per cent of commercial ones occurred at premises *not* involved in the program.

Jones' (1982) evaluation of the programs points out that the actual marking of property was likely only one of several factors resulting in a noticeable decrease in break and enters in Portage la Prairie. The programs were started by an RCMP detachment committed to crime prevention who prepared the community in a number of ways:

1. Prior to launching the project, the detachment increased police visibility through concentrated car and foot patrols in the target areas.
2. High priority was given to investigation of break and enters.
3. Efforts were made to educate the public about crime problems and how the police handle them.

These measures improved police-community relations and ensured community support.

The Portage la Prairie community crime prevention efforts were made effective by a thorough crime analysis, the development and implementation of programs to address the selected problems, co-operative media, a rigorous program evaluation, and the special efforts of the detachment prior to implementation.

Drug Diversion Programs — What A Professional Group Can Do

Many drugs available illegally on the street are produced by legitimate manufacturers and diverted for illegal use through such means as break and enters, armed robberies, multiple doctoring, and prescription forgery. Such offences have been increasing across Canada during recent years. For example, the number of armed robberies in Canadian pharmacies increased from 64 in 1978 to 206 in 1982.

Pharmaceutical associations in several provinces took action to deal with the problem. They realized that since their members were responsible for drug distribution, they were also responsible for doing something to control the drug diversion problem. There was little they could do to affect the motivation of offenders, since many are drug addicts, and even non-addicts have a high motivation for stealing drugs. An estimated profit of $5000 could be made by stealing and selling just one 1000-tablet bottle of Percodan. Further, traditional reactive criminal justice approaches had not been very effective. In British Columbia between 1978 and 1980, charges were laid in only 5 per cent of prescription forgery cases, 11 per cent of pharmacy break and enters, and 24 per cent of pharmacy robberies.

In response to this problem, the associations worked with the police to:

- reduce the extent of drug diversion;
- protect the lives and property of pharmacists; and
- assist law enforcement officials.

Several different strategies were chosen because of the diverse nature of the offences. The pharmacists also recognized that in several respects they were inadvertently contributing to the problem. Some did not take proper security precautions, others kept restricted drugs in view in their stores during business hours rather than keeping them in cabinets until needed. Often they did not call doctors when they were suspicious about a prescription, or call police if they suspected a forgery. Finally,

in some areas pharmacists were reluctant to take the time to testify in court in drug diversion cases.

As a first step in implementing prevention programs, the *Canadian Pharmaceutical Journal* published several articles on the responsibilities of pharmacists in dealing with the problem and published a set of guidelines for the distribution of narcotic and psychoactive drugs. In addition, workshops and other educational activities were undertaken by the associations, dealing with such topics as the laws concerning drug diversion; who to call in the event of a problem; the patterns of various offences and characteristics of offenders; the duty of pharmacists to assist the police and the courts; how to handle a suspected forgery; and how to behave when threatened by an armed robber.

In addition, a number of suggestions, ranging from new legislation to better physical security, were made on how pharmacists could help reduce drug diversion. Many pharmacies needed improved doors, locks, window bars, alarms, and locked storage cabinets. It was recommended that fewer drugs be kept on the premises and that restricted drugs be confined to secure cabinets at all times.

Fan-Out

The major initiative was a Fan-Out program, now in operation in B.C. and in Manitoba, in which pharmacists who suspect that they have received a forged prescription are asked to delay filling it and to call the association office. The pharmacist also has a list of nearby pharmacies to call with the suspect's description.

There are no data as yet on the effectiveness of these Canadian programs, but similar programs have been quite successful in the U.S. (Barger, 1981). In Mt. Lebanon, Pennsylvania, pharmacies reported that they received approximately 360 prescription forgeries per year. Virtually none was reported to the police. Five of the eight pharmacies in town agreed to install document transaction cameras and to photograph individuals receiving prescriptions. The average number of fraudulent prescriptions in participating pharma-

cies was cut to five, but remained at previous levels in two of the three non-participating pharmacies. The third non-participating pharmacy eliminated the problem by instituting a telephone check of all narcotics prescriptions.

These programs provide an example of how much a group of professionals working with the police can do to prevent crime.

Convenience Store Robbery Prevention — What Small Neighbourhood Retail Firms Can Do[2]

Some business chains have developed their own crime prevention programs tailored to their particular security problems. Small businesses such as neighbourhood convenience stores can learn from their experience.

Convenience stores are a major target for robbers, because of their long hours of operation and because most of their business is conducted on a cash basis.

In 1974, Southland, the parent corporation of the 7-Eleven convenience store chain, formed a Corporate Security Committee to develop crime prevention programs. Finding little available information on the prevention of convenience store robberies, they funded their own research, which was carried out by a rather unlikely combination of social scientists and ex-convicts. The reformed robbers were asked to carry out surveys of stores and to identify characteristics that made the stores attractive to potential robbers. These characteristics were:

1. the presence of large amounts of cash;
2. a sales area hidden from view by window signs or merchandise displays, or by its location in the back of the store;
3. inattentive clerks;
4. little or no outside lighting; and
5. easy escape routes.

On the basis of this information, certain changes were recommended:

1. The amount of available cash was limited to $50.

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2. The view into the store was improved.
3. Employees were trained in robbery and violence prevention.
4. Lighting inside and outside the store was increased.
5. Escape routes were blocked by fences and gardens.

Initially, 120 stores were selected to participate in the program. Sixty were changed and the other 60 were left as is. The results — a 30 per cent reduction in robberies in the changed stores — led to the company-wide adoption of the program.

Southland has since made additional physical changes, including moving the sales area close to the front windows. The new store design incorporates principles of crime prevention through environmental design. A Time Access Cash Controller system which provides the clerk with change on a time-delay basis, was installed in all stores and resulted in a reduction in the average loss per robbery from $129 to $42. All information on cash loss is systematically analysed. An adaptation of this program, including a robbery prevention kit, was developed and is now being used by the RCMP and the Vancouver Police Department for a variety of small businesses. This adaptation of the Southland program is currently being evaluated with funding from the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada. While it remains to be seen whether the program will be effective for the small independent convenience stores now using it, Southland's results with its own stores are impressive. During the past seven years, 7-Eleven Stores have had 55 per cent fewer armed robberies, principally because an extensive planning process was followed. The problem was identified and several prevention strategies were implemented and monitored.

Comprehensive Planning for Community Crime Prevention — What a Municipal Government Can Do[3]

The following is only one example of effective crime prevention carried out by a large municipal-

ity, but it's a key one because it was comprehensive, well-planned, and carefully evaluated.

The Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program began with a survey of Seattle residents conducted by the city's Law and Justice Planning Office in 1972, which found that more citizens were concerned about burglary than any other offence. A follow-up study of the incidence and patterns of burglary in Seattle found that:

1. In over one-third of the reported burglaries, entry was made through unlocked doors and windows. Most entries into locked dwellings were accomplished by brute force, suggesting that the burglars were relatively unsophisticated.
2. Most victims had not marked their property and only 11 per cent of stolen property was recovered.
3. Most burglaries occurred during waking hours, but less than 10 per cent were witnessed. The vast majority of burglaries resulting in an arrest or property recovery were witnessed.
4. Most of those arrested for burglary were juveniles.
5. The problem could not be dealt with by traditional police patrol methods.

Federal government funding was obtained to improve burglary investigation and to develop the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP), which was based on the previous research and involved four components:

1. residential security inspection services
2. property marking (done during the home security inspection visit) and display of a warning decal
3. organization of Block Watch groups of 10 to 15 families each
4. educational activities to inform citizens about burglary prevention

The goals of the program were to demonstrate a

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2. *This section is based on material provided by Mr. Gerald Bull, Canadian Division Security Manager of 7-Eleven Food Stores.*

3. *Material for this section was largely drawn from Cirel et al. (1977) and Mathews (1974, 1976, 1977).*

significant reduction in residential burglaries in test sectors compared with the rest of the city and to increase the number of burglary-in-progress calls made by citizens in these areas. These goals were to be met through a series of intermediate, or process, goals:

1. To complete security inspections in 30 per cent of target households.
2. To mark property in 30 per cent of target households.
3. To form Block Watch groups in 30 per cent of single family and duplex dwellings.
4. To provide information about burglary to 70 per cent of target households.
5. To provide aid on request to communities outside test communities.

The city hired full-time organizers to hold meetings in the target communities to explain the program and to encourage neighbours to meet one another directly. Lists of neighbours' names and telephone numbers were distributed and participants were told who they could advise if they were going to be away from their homes and wished to have their homes watched.

Block captains were selected to serve as contacts with the city area co-ordinators and to maintain communications with block residents. The block captain's tasks included distributing material to block residents who didn't attend the organized meeting, maintaining a schedule for the use of the engraving tools for property marking, organizing a meeting for block residents at least once a year, and delivering a bi-monthly newsletter.

Although this strategy was effective initially, interest and motivation diminished after a few months and some participants moved away from the target areas. The program directors then developed a maintenance component as a "booster shot" to repeat and reinforce the original contact of the block captains at regular intervals.

In addition, the program provided advice for those in non-target areas who wanted crime prevention services. An organizer was assigned to the advisory services and in this capacity trained community volunteers to establish CCPP-type activities in their own areas.

Although the Community Crime Prevention Program was carried out by civilians, the project had the full co-operation of the police, who made it legitimate in the eyes of the public. In addition, they trained staff, provided equipment, facilitated data collection and retrieval, responded to citizen inquiries about the authenticity of CCPP field workers, and assisted with media relations and the Block Watch program.

Careful planning and detailed evaluation permitted the Seattle Project organizers not only to successfully meet their primary goals of significantly reducing the rate of burglary (after one year, by 61% in participating residences) and increasing the reporting of burglaries-in-progress, but also to improve project services at various stages of their implementation, to accurately assess the impact of the project, and to indicate changes for the future. The Seattle success story is not just one of correct planning and evaluation, however, but of effective co-operation among the municipal government, the federal government, the police, and the public with, in this case, the municipal government leading the way.

While the program was established with federal funds as a three-year demonstration program, Seattle now provides the funding. By 1982, 42 000 households were participating in Block Watch programs, which were directed by ten full-time community organizers. This burglary project is only one of a number of programs adopted by Seattle as part of a comprehensive justice plan.

Neighbourhood Watch — What the Police and Neighbourhood Groups Can Do

Neighbourhood Watch (or Block Watch, as it is sometimes known) is a means of organizing communities so that residents will help look after one another. Involvement in such a program in a high-crime neighbourhood is probably the best thing that a citizen can do to prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime in the community. Since most Neighbourhood Watch programs are quite similar to one another, we shall examine one program,

which has the virtue of having been written up in detail, to illustrate the general principles of how such programs operate. Similar programs have been implemented in many Canadian cities but none have been so thoroughly described and carefully evaluated.[4]

Neighbourhood Watch is an excellent illustration of how informal social controls can limit crime in a community. These controls exist naturally in some communities — neighbours watch over one another's houses and the presence of strangers or other suspicious persons is reported to other community members or to the police. The crime rate in these communities is typically low and the quality of life is high. In other communities, however, people keep to themselves and may not even know their neighbours.

Detroit's Neighbourhood Watch

One of the largest and most comprehensive Neighbourhood Watch programs in existence is run by the Detroit Police Department. During the 1970s, Detroit gained a reputation for being one of the most violent, crime-ridden cities in North America. The Motor City had become Murder City.

One attempt at dealing with the problem had been the establishment of a tactical police unit known as the STRESS squad (Stop the Robberies — Enjoy Safe Streets). This squad was involved in twelve civilian deaths in its first fourteen months and was the focus of a great deal of criticism from citizens.

Under a new mayor and a new police chief, however, the department greatly expanded its involvement with the community. Part of this effort included the expansion of the Crime Prevention Unit to a strength of 150. The major emphasis of this unit was on establishing Neighbourhood Watch programs.

The Watch program used both sides of one city block as a basic geographical area. Initially, the program was implemented in a high crime area

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4. A study in Thunder Bay (Worrell, 1983) came to our attention just as this document was going to press.

consisting of 155 city blocks. An analysis of crime patterns and community characteristics was carried out prior to the program's implementation.

To get the program started, uniformed officers canvassed the community in order to find one resident on each block who would agree to hold an organizing meeting. Often officers would then go door-to-door with the convener in order to invite other block residents to attend. A police officer contacted each resident again on the day of the meeting to ensure as high a turnout as possible. The objective was to establish a block group consisting of at least 50 per cent of the residents.

Each meeting was attended by a crime prevention officer who explained the program and ensured that the residents all met each other. Subsequent meetings focused on home security, property marking, and other crime prevention issues. The local Community Council provided assistance in organizing residents and a neighbourhood church provided office space and other help.

Almost all of the 155 blocks were organized with the required 50 per cent participation. Other programs were also implemented in the community, including programs for seniors, social assistance for the needy, and youth programs.

One other important feature of the program was its concern with maintenance activities. Because people gradually lose interest in programs and residents are constantly moving in and out of the community, if maintenance is not carried out, a program's impact is lost.

Detroit's maintenance activities focused on the block leader or block security chief. Special workshops and training seminars were held for leaders, who were responsible for encouraging their neighbours to stay in the program. Active members were recognized with special awards, and community leaders were enlisted to serve on the Chief's Crime Prevention Advisory Committee. Newsletters and information letters were sent to participants.

The results of the program were similar to those in Seattle. Burglary was reduced by 60 per cent in the target community, and serious crimes were re-

duced overall by 58 per cent. A survey was administered to a sample of participants prior to the first meeting and a post-program survey was conducted by telephone between one and two years after implementation.

The results of the survey indicated that the program markedly reduced the level of fear in the community. There was a substantial increase in the number of citizens who had taken some protective measures. The rate of self-reported victimization fell from 24 per cent in the pre-test period to only 5 per cent after the program, and attitudes towards the police were more favourable afterwards.

The Detroit program illustrates most of the features of Neighbourhood Watch. The program may be administered by the police, as in Detroit, or a community group may take the initiative and implement the program in co-operation with the police. In either case, the key to the program's success is the block leader, who acts as the organizer at the block level and is responsible for calling meetings and for ensuring that block activities are carried out.

While the block leaders in the Detroit areas targeted for Neighbourhood Watch were recruited by the police, in other parts of the city the police have not made this effort. Instead, they have waited until citizens interested in organizing their blocks called to request help from the Crime Prevention Unit. In this way, police resources can be used in neighbourhoods that require the most effort, either because of a serious crime problem, or because they are more disorganized.

Chapter 2

A Planning Framework

Successful crime prevention programs do not just happen — they are planned. To understand the relationship between crime prevention and planning, it is helpful to return to our definition of crime prevention as "the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to reduce that risk." Planning is the phase of crime prevention that involves anticipating, recognizing, and appraising the crime risk, and identifying the appropriate programs to reduce that risk.

Successful crime prevention activities are focused on specific community needs. For instance, Neighbourhood Watch and Operation Identification programs are most effective when directed towards areas having a high rate of the type of crime these programs are designed to prevent. Focusing crime prevention activities on carefully selected targets has several positive consequences. First, limited resources, whether financial or human, can be directed towards what the police and community identify as the most serious problems. Second, once all crime prevention practitioners in a community have focused on the most serious problems, they can increase the impact of whatever projects they decide to undertake by coordinating their activities. They are far more likely to achieve positive results by working together. Third, it is easier to demonstrate positive results when crime prevention activities are focused on a few high-priority problems. The importance of being able to demonstrate success in crime prevention activities should not be underestimated. When you are trying to enlist support within your own profession, from community groups and citizens, or from potential program funders, the credibility of current crime prevention activities will be a key factor in their decisions.

A Crime Prevention Planning Model

Focusing on selected problems is just the first step in planning for a successful crime prevention program. One model of the stages you need to plan for in designing a crime prevention program is shown in Figure 1.

This particular planning model was developed by the RCMP Crime Prevention Center and the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, and is used in the crime prevention courses taught at the Canadian Police College. It is based on recognizing the cyclical nature of good crime prevention programming — with the evaluation stage constantly re-defining and re-directing the approach in ever more effective channels. The model breaks down this cycle into four major components:

- **Problem Definition.** This is the research stage. Crime statistics and consultation with the community are used to define crime problems in their community context, establish priorities, and describe the key aspects of these priority problems through detailed crime analysis. The result is a precise statement of the problem(s) to be addressed.

- **Program Planning and Development.** This is the strategic planning phase. Again with community involvement, the practitioner develops a set of approaches most likely to be successful in addressing the problem as defined, including selecting potential participants, setting goals, establishing success indicators, and choosing between alternative strategies. The product of this phase is the overall strategy to be used.

- **Implementation.** This is the action phase. Specific objectives are established, roles determined, community support obtained, and a work plan developed. Then action can proceed.

- **Evaluation.** This is the assessment stage. On completion of each component of the program strategy, there should be process and impact evaluations using success indicators and performance measures defined in the planning phase and monitored during the implementation phase. The result of interim evaluations is a revised work plan for the next action phase. Periodically, more formal evaluation reports should be produced for external use (usually to secure funding).

In the following chapters these four phases are discussed in detail.

Figure 1: Community Crime Prevention Planning Model

I PROBLEM DEFINITION
1. Compare problems through crime analysis
   a. Determine information needs and sources
   b. Collect information
2. Set priorities
3. Describe priority problem through crime analysis
Product: Problem statement

II PROGRAM PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
4. Determine level of intervention
5. Identify participants
6. Develop goals
7. Generate strategies
8. Select strategies
Product: Implementation plan data

IV EVALUATION
12. Evaluate (impact) and monitor (implementation)
Product: Information to determine whether program should continue and how it should be modified

III IMPLEMENTATION
9. Formulate objectives
10. Select structure/process
11. Develop work plan
Product: Work plan

Chapter 3

Defining the Problem

Defining the problem or, in the words of our crime prevention definition, recognizing and appraising the crime risk, is the first task outlined in the planning model described in the previous chapter.

First, determine the geographical boundaries of the area you are dealing with and the appropriate sources of information for what you need to know about your community and its crime problems. Next, collect and analyze as much information as is feasible from and with these sources. Then, using these data, choose crimes on the basis of their priority for the community and their potential for reduction through community-based crime prevention activities.

When the research and problem selection phases are complete, a focused and detailed description of the priority problems will permit you to plan and develop a prevention program targeted to these crimes.

This process can sometimes be quite direct, especially in small towns or in rural areas. In Portage la Prairie, for example, the RCMP initiated a program in response to complaints from victims of theft. After consultation with others they devised a program to deal with the specific problem of chemical theft.

Sometimes the diagnostic process is more complex, especially in urban areas and with certain types of crimes. There are a variety of factors to consider and several points of view about the crime problem of a given community. The systematic research and analysis essential to defining the problem will lay the groundwork not only for planning and implementing a program that meets the crime prevention needs of your community, but also for evaluating the program as it evolves and after it is implemented.

Whose Problem?

Determining which community you are dealing

with is the first step. Sometimes communities correspond to natural geographical areas or administrative areas for some branch of government or the criminal justice system. This was the case with Portage la Prairie.

Sometimes the community does not correspond to a geographical area or political jurisdiction. It may be a community of interest. For instance, in the case of drug diversion for illegal use, the "community" was an association of pharmacists. A project dealing with problems on Vancouver beaches defined the "community" as the citizens who used the beaches and the lifeguards who worked there.

Defining the community helps determine which people should be involved in defining the problem. There need to be some natural boundaries — whether geographical, professional, or business, or some combination of these. Administrative boundaries for criminal justice organizations often do not coincide with natural boundaries for communities. To initiate a truly community-based program, crossing some administrative boundaries may be necessary.

After you have defined the community, it is essential that you involve a cross-section of members of that community in discussing its crime problems. At this stage, criminal justice professionals need to be sensitive to the concerns expressed by community members — not just because they will not otherwise be motivated to co-operate, but also because their input is essential in developing a program relevant to the community's needs.

When criminal justice professionals and the community work together in defining the problem, it is much more likely that they will be successful in developing and implementing a program. It is hard to co-operate on a project if the parties involved do not agree on the nature of the problem. In fact, disagreements over strategy often are due to underlying disagreements over what the problem really is.

Developing mutual understanding can take considerable time and energy, but successful programs can only grow out of an experience of listening and learning on both sides. In this environment, it is more likely that creative approaches to solving the problem will be generated.

Even when the police and the community already share the same perspective it is still important to formally include community members in discussions about law and order problems in order to get their ideas and support for succeeding stages.

Community Involvement

Local conditions will determine which members of the community to involve in identifying the problem. As a rule, anyone who can provide information about law and order problems, or who can be expected to help implement subsequent programs has a role to play in defining the problem. In particular, groups and organizations already in existence should be consulted, because they have both knowledge about the community and resources to implement programs.

There are a number of ways to involve members of the community in defining the problem. Formal surveys are the most accurate means of identifying community concerns, but interviews of key persons and group and public meetings are more likely to ensure community participation. These methods can be used to identify potential supporters as well as possible opponents. Ideally, a combination of these methods will be used.

1. The Community Survey

There are several purposes in carrying out citizen surveys.

1. They involve the public in crime prevention planning.
2. They can be used to supplement official crime analysis data in identifying crime problems. Citizens' perceptions of neighbourhood problems and their victimization re-

ports are useful in deciding where to implement prevention programs.

3. They typically measure the fear and concern of members of the community. Since fear and concern often affect behaviour, these factors should be addressed by planners. Even if crime rates are low in a community, if residents are afraid to go out after dark their quality of life is affected. A high level of fear is a problem that should be addressed.

4. They can be used to provide victimization data as a baseline for evaluating prevention programs.

5. They can be used to identify communities where there will be support for crime prevention programs. In setting program priorities, it may be important to initiate a program in an area where there will likely be a high level of co-operation and involvement on the part of citizens.

The most systematic way to obtain information from the community is to carry out a survey of a sample of its members. Research professionals can help you select a reliable sample and design a useful survey. The survey may be conducted through mail questionnaires, personal interviews, or telephone interviews. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. A sample questionnaire, adapted in part from a Winnipeg Police Department crime fear survey, is included in Appendix B.

Questionnaires sent and returned by mail offer a standardized presentation and low cost. Their major disadvantage is that the response rate (percentage of questionnaires returned) is often so low that the results do not reflect the entire community. By paying careful attention to format, keeping the survey short and to the point, and sending follow-up letters to non-respondents, the response rate can be improved.

Personal interviews generally yield higher response rates than mail questionnaires. However, the costs are also much higher. Interviewers must be hired and trained and travel costs are often involved.

The telephone survey is a compromise between mail questionnaires and personal interviews. It has a relatively high response rate, like the personal interview, but is much cheaper to carry out. Telephone surveys have not been common in the past because a lower proportion of people with low incomes owned telephones, and because people with unlisted numbers were excluded from samples taken from telephone directories. The first problem has been overcome by the fact that virtually all households now have telephones, and the second by a procedure known as *random-digit dialing*, which allows those with unlisted numbers to be included in random samples.

The characteristics of particular communities will have to be taken into account in selecting a method. For example, in a community survey of native rural communities around The Pas, Manitoba, 70 to 80 per cent of those contacted refused to participate in personal interviews. Telephone interviews and questionnaires would have even been more inappropriate. In such a case, innovative methods may have to be developed to involve such communities in the planning process.

The results of surveys may sometimes be surprising. In the town of The Pas, the survey revealed that the issues that residents were most concerned about were not those considered most important by the police. This survey information has served as a basis for police-citizen collaboration on solving the problem.

2. Key Person Interviews

Another way to obtain the input of the community before the implementation of crime prevention programs is by carrying out systematic interviews with criminal justice officials and with people who are familiar with the community and with local issues, and who in some sense can be seen to speak for the community. Key persons can be used to familiarize researchers with general community trends and problems, crime problems, and current planning and development activities. In addition, they can help identify community agencies and citizen groups that might be interested in crime prevention activities.

The key persons to be interviewed will vary from community to community, but might include local political officials, church leaders, representatives of the media, school officials, leaders of minority groups, church groups and service clubs, hospital officials, industry representatives, welfare officials, police (especially those who regularly patrol the area being studied), judges, lawyers, workers in agencies such as detoxification centres, and probation and parole officers.

3. Group Meetings of Community Members

If the target community is a geographical neighbourhood, residents of the neighbourhood can arrange meetings at which crime problems can be discussed. Unlike formal surveys, the opinions presented will not likely be representative of all members of the community, but the information may be richer in content. The interviewer has the opportunity to probe and the citizens are able to respond to one another.

4. Public Hearings, Commissions, and Task Forces

Generally, these methods involve citizens making informal or formal presentations to a chairman or to a panel in a public meeting. The opinions are less likely to be representative than those obtained through other methods, and public meetings can be difficult to keep on topic. Moreover, such meetings run the risk of being either too large or too small. Nevertheless, used in conjunction with other methods, hearings can add an important element to crime prevention efforts.

Community Analysis

To place crime problems in context, obtain information about the physical characteristics of the community as well as the social characteristics of the residents. Such information may be obtained from a number of sources including city planners, municipal boards, community surveys, and through observation of the target neighbourhood.

Physical Characteristics

The physical nature of a community shapes both crime and crime prevention. We need information about such factors as:

1. **Transportation and circulation patterns.** The presence of a major thoroughfare brings non-resident traffic into a community, which may lead to higher crime rates. The thoroughfare also physically divides the community, which may hinder prevention activities.
2. **Population size and density.** Information about population size is required in computing crime rates for a community, and is used in defining the scope of the program required. Density may be a causal factor in crime if overcrowding is seen as a problem by residents. In areas where density is low and houses are widely scattered, programs such as Neighbourhood Watch may be less effective.
3. **Type and condition of housing.** If housing is old and run-down, physical security may be a problem. A neighbourhood consisting predominantly of high-rise apartments requires a different program than one with a high proportion of single-family dwellings. Neighbourhood Watch programs are most easily implemented in areas with single-family or duplex houses.
4. **Concentration and types of businesses and industries.** An area with a mixture of industrial and residential buildings will require special attention by prevention planners. Shopping malls and establishments which serve alcohol may contribute to crime because they bring outsiders into the community. Since many types of crimes are associated with alcohol use, drinking establishments present particular problems.
5. **Boundary characteristics.** Crime tends to flourish in areas of transition from one neighbourhood to another, particularly from an industrial or commercial area to a residential one.
6. **Neighbourhood condition.** Observation of a neighbourhood can determine whether or not it looks "orderly." If graffiti, garbage, broken windows, and poorly tended yards are common, it is likely that a substantial effort will have to be made to help residents regain control of their community.

Social Characteristics

It is important to know as much as possible about the members of the community you have defined.

Each one has some relation to crime, whether as a victim, potential victim, someone who fears victimization, or a participant in prevention activities. And, of course, offenders are members of some community or other.

Listed below are some of the characteristics of community members that should be examined.

1. **Age.** Although the elderly are not victimized any more frequently than citizens in general, they feel particularly vulnerable to crime and remain indoors more often. Special programs such as community escorts can be designed for them. They, in turn, can provide a pool of skilled volunteers if encouraged to participate in prevention programs.
2. **Gender.** Women (particularly those working late at night as waitresses, cashiers, or nurses) feel especially vulnerable to certain types of crime such as sexual assault. Areas with a high proportion of women, may thus require special attention.
3. **Socio-economic status.** The same type of crime might have quite different characteristics in different communities. For example, break and enters in a wealthy neighbourhood might be committed by professional criminals who are after valuable objects while the same type of offence in a poorer community might be a crime of opportunity committed by juveniles. Different programs may be appropriate in communities where residents have different educational and income levels.
4. **Race and ethnicity.** Different racial and ethnic groups may vary in their support for crime prevention activities. Some may feel alienated from the police and from official community organizations, or isolated because of language, religion, and other cultural differences. Traditional means of obtaining community support and traditional prevention programs may not be appropriate for such groups.
5. **Household composition.** Different types of households require different kinds of programs. For example, if most households are made up of persons who are away from home most of the day (e.g., working singles or couples without

children), programs that depend on neighbours watching each other's homes will not be successful.
6. **Degree of heterogeneity.** Communities made up of people of similar characteristics are more easily organized than those in which people have less in common. Differences in age, income, ethnicity, race, or language may lead to suspicion and hostility between groups. For example, in a housing project with a mixture of adolescents and elderly, the aged may fear the teenagers and may be reluctant to get involved in community activities.
7. **Stability.** It is easier to implement programs in stable communities than in those with a large proportion of transients. Homeowners have more of a vested interest in their community than do renters and may be more likely to participate in some types of programs. Crime also tends to be more severe in communities with a high degree of turnover. If programs are implemented in such areas, program maintenance activities will have to be carried out more frequently as participants leave the community and newcomers arrive.
8. **Interaction patterns.** Through surveys and systematic observation of residents' behaviour, interaction patterns may be assessed. It will be easier to implement programs in communities with a high level of interaction between neighbours and between residents and the police, and with strong neighbourhood organizations, because programs can be built on these strengths.
9. **General economic conditions.** How are employment and business trends affecting the community? What is the level of unemployment? Who is most affected?

Many of these elements are related to the total "resources" of members of a community. The resource-rich (those with a combination of personal initiative and ready access to community services) will respond proactively to the threat of crime, while the resource-poor are more likely to respond reactively and will often do no more that to restrict their own behaviour. In extreme cases, the fear and consequent disorganization in a community

may make traditional prevention programs impossible unless the quality of life of residents can first be improved.

Research on program implementation in large public housing projects has found that residents often are afraid of each other and are reluctant to participate in community-based programs unless special efforts are made by organizers.

Crime Statistics

Good crime statistics are invaluable for both planning and evaluating crime prevention programs. Police departments and government agencies regularly publish compilations of crime statistics. Unfortunately, this information is not useful for crime prevention purposes because the areas covered by these reports are usually much larger than or otherwise different from those targeted for prevention programs, and the information is not presented in enough detail to be useful in defining specific crime problems.

As a result, special information will have to be collected from police files and other sources of official statistics that relate to the crime in your community. Even where access to such files is obtained, however, resources may not permit a detailed analysis of the statistics. Planners and those who keep such files should work together closely to make maximum use of the available information.

Several types of crime-occurrence reports, ranging from relatively simple logs of calls made to the police to elaborate files that are developed as a case is processed through the criminal justice system, can be used to obtain planning information. The logs or index file cards can be used to count and map large numbers of offences relatively quickly and cheaply. Even simple offence pin-maps may provide useful information, but it may be possible to get better information without a large investment.

In a problem-identification study carried out in Winnipeg, for example, six students hired on a federal government summer student employment grant were able to code and analyse over 50 000 crime occurrences in less than three months. These were taken from index cards kept by the police which included information on the characteristics of victims and offenders, address, date, and type of complaint. These data allowed the researchers to identify the types of crimes that occurred most often in these areas. For instance, they noted high rates of wilful damage, mischief, and theft from cars, particularly in parking lots serving high-rise apartments and in car dealership lots.

To obtain the required information from these files, a data collection form must be designed. Information is then transferred from the files to the form. In the Winnipeg study, the data were analysed manually, but the data from a complete file study should be processed by computer. A great deal of information can be gathered from such a study. Detailed knowledge of crime patterns and the characteristics of victim and offender is necessary if prevention efforts are to be successful. However, while it might be desirable for every program to be based on such detailed knowledge, this sort of project is time-consuming and expensive. For practical purposes planners will usually have to rely on whatever specific information about their community is readily available.

Computerized police records simplify the analysis of crime data. If addresses are coded by "block", "atom", or "geo-zone", most of the information required for crime prevention planning can be obtained in a few minutes at relatively low cost.

The Calgary Police Service has implemented a Preventive Policing Analysis and Action System that uses a computer data base. By providing weekly crime occurrence data and other relevant information, the system allows for a quick recognition of changes in crime patterns and can be used to identify problems and monitor the progress of prevention programs. It also includes data on population, dwelling units, business premises, financial institutions, schools and churches, registered motor vehicles, and registered bicycles so that the rates and risks of offences can be compared. Information such as day of the week, time of occurrence, location, and modus operandi will be available at the zone and geo-zone level. Since an increasing number of police forces are using computers, statistical data of this nature should be more readily available in the future.

Unfortunately, in this handbook we have not been able to provide a complete discussion of how to carry out crime analysis or community surveys. Those interested in planning such research should consult researchers affiliated with universities, government agencies, or police departments or private research firms.

Setting Priorities

The information gained from data collection and analysis is used to set priorities. Crime prevention practitioners must decide which crime and fear problems, and which geographical areas, to target. Available resources can only be used efficiently if practitioners identify and adhere to priority programs.

Identifying and focusing on priority crime problems also increases the chances of success. It is impossible to deliver all crime prevention services effectively. Furthermore, not all problems deserve equal treatment or equal expenditures of resources. Programs can focus on priority crimes and areas and still respond to pressures to extend the program to other target problem areas. As the Seattle program has shown, some areas of the community can be given useful programs that satisfy their needs but do not draw as heavily on limited project resources. Adherence to a firm set of priorities will prevent too much attention being paid to these activities.

Who Should Be Involved?

Just as identifying the problem requires the involvement of the community, so does setting the priorities. We are not suggesting that the public is always right and that programs should only be directed at crimes that the community believes are a problem. However, the community perception of a priority crime may reveal something hitherto ignored by the police. In one Detroit neighbourhood, the police, citing official statistics, wanted

to implement an anti-burglary program. Residents of the community, however, felt that sexual assault was the priority problem. The police took a closer look at the statistics and discovered that a number of sexual assaults had been committed during burglaries. Eventually a program focusing on burglary was developed with the goal of reducing both burglaries and sexual assaults committed after break and enters. The residents were satisfied because the police had listened to and acted upon their perception.

The Process

The task of determining priority crimes is illustrated in Figure 2. The first step consists of identifying which crimes in a community are preventable through community action. A number of crimes can be eliminated from this category because they are almost impossible to prevent without major enforcement efforts and/or legislative change. For example, violent personal crimes such as murder and rape are difficult to prevent. They are relatively rare events, occurring most of-

Figure 2 Crime Analysis

Source:
Donohue, 1982.

ten among relatives or acquaintances in private places.

Organized crime such as gambling and narcotics trafficking are not readily preventable by community groups, nor are "white collar" offences such as tax evasion and embezzlement. Typically, prevention programs focus on crimes such as break and enter, vandalism, shoplifting, auto theft, fraud, and robbery because there is a better chance that these crimes may be prevented through community-based programs.

Second, an assessment is made of the impact of these preventable offences. The major effort should be to reduce crimes that have the most impact on the community. Measures such as the *frequency*, *rate*, and *risk* of particular offences are useful in assessing the impact of various crimes. Frequencies are tabulations of the number of offences reported in a given time period. The rate consists of the frequency divided by the population of the area. Typically, crime rates are expressed as the number of crimes per 1 000 or

Figure 3   **PRIORITY SETTING MATRIX**

Type of Problem	Magnitude	Rate of Change	Fear	Injury	$ Loss	Systems Response	Reduction Potential
Residential Burglaries							

100 000 population. Risk expresses the number of crimes per target in a given time period, for example, the number of commercial break and enters per 1 000 businesses. The *rate of change* in rates or in risk and the cost (both financial and personal) of potential target offences should also be considered.

Data from citizen surveys and interviews are also useful. Respondents identify the offences they believe are most common in their neighbourhoods, the ones they are most afraid of, and those that cause them to take precautions. This aspect should be taken seriously in deciding on priority crimes, because the best co-operation will be received from people who are concerned about these offences. Some planners have found it useful to use a matrix such as Figure 3 in order to record and compare information about several different offences. Once all the relevant data for each are listed, a decision on priority crimes can be made.

The case of Seattle indicates how elaborate a priority-setting procedure can be. Each year, an extensive city Criminal Justice Plan is prepared, including an analysis of each of several types of major crime. This analysis is used to select several priority crimes and to develop problem statements for those which will become the focus of prevention programs. Figure 4 shows an example of some of the kinds of information that might be used to develop a problem statement for one of the priority crimes — burglary.

It is difficult to provide guidelines for the selection of priority crimes. For example, how does one justify selecting commercial break and enter as a priority over armed robbery? Break and enters cause more property loss, but robberies carry a greater potential for personal injury. Such decisions are probably best made by a planning group in which different points of view can be presented. While the process is not an easy one, a consensus reflecting the needs of the community concerned can usually be reached.

The final step in setting priorities is to decide which communities should receive program services. It is important that project organizers determine which areas are served. Often, programs are "response-oriented", in that citizen requests for service determine the sites to be involved. Such programs will be scattered over the community and may be too diffuse to have any impact on crime. Further, neighbourhoods most in need of assistance will often be those which are least likely to request services. Thus site selection must be based on the results of the problem identification process. Figure 2 suggests that target neighbourhoods should be the communities with the highest crime rate, but the amount of crime is not the only consideration. The community with the greatest crime problem may not be cohesive enough to support a community-based program unless sufficient funds are available for the necessary organizational work. By contrast, planners should avoid the problem encountered in one program where the number of burglaries in target communities

Figure 4 EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM STATEMENT FOR BURGLARY

1. Frequency:	2. Seriousness:	3. Relative Threat of Offender Group:	4. Reduction Potential:	5. System Response:
In 1976, 11 835 cases of residential and non-residential burglary were reported to the police in Seattle. Local victimization studies recorded 16 992 residential burglaries or one for every 12 residents. The 2 965 reported commercial burglaries represented a risk rate of one for every 4.5 business establishments.	Burglary represents an invasion of personal security as well as property loss. A Seattle victimization study found that citizens fear burglary more than any other crime. Burglary is among the most serious of all property crimes not only because of its cost in terms of dollar loss but also because of the element of force and intrusion involved. Victims of burglary often react strongly, reporting feelings that they and their homes have been violated.	Persons arrested for burglary in 1974 averaged 2 arrests per arrestee over a 32-month period. This arrest rate exceeds that associated with all other property crime arrestees.	Approximately 30 to 40 per cent of residential burglaries involved entry through unlocked doors and windows. While it is difficult to significantly reduce burglary rates (in part because burglars tend to choose dwellings that are unoccupied and afford little opportunity for surveillance), some reduction is possible through better door and window security, measures to simulate occupancy, and increased citizen action, including surveillance. An indication that the city's response to burglary can be improved is that reported burglary decreased by approximately 8 per cent from 1974 to 1975 and an additional 9 per cent in 1976.	Because only about half of residential burglaries are reported by victims the criminal justice system loses numerous opportunities to identify and deal with burglars. Only about one in five reported burglaries have identified witnesses. Approximately 87 per cent of all burglaries are not solved — the lowest rate among serious crimes.

Source: Adapted from Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office (1978).

was already so low that it was not possible for the program to have an impact. A balance must be found between the seriousness of the crime problem and the likelihood of successfully implementing a program.

Crime Analysis

Having identified a solvable problem, the final step in defining the problem is to describe it through a crime analysis. Using the data collected for problem identification as well as any additional information that might be collected, the problem is described in as much detail as possible. Any information that might be useful in designing and implementing a prevention program should be used.

If shoplifting by juveniles in a shopping mall is the perceived problem, planners might meet with the mall management and security personnel, police, store owners, students from nearby schools, school officials, and representatives from the retail clerks' union and the small business section of the Chamber of Commerce. Each source might provide information on the nature of the problem and assess why and how it is occurring. It may also be necessary to carry out a more systematic survey of mall businesses.

The result of this work should be a problem statement that will guide the remaining steps in the planning process, and will contain what is known about the problem, how it is related to other problems in the target community, and its possible causes and effects. A number of different elements are necessary in order to develop a problem statement. Among these are the following:

1. **Target/Victim Characteristics** — including the age, sex, race, ethnicity, and occupation of the victim; type and location of residence or business establishment; type and make of stolen property; target of vandalism; level of security; etc. These characteristics can help to identify which type of program is most appropriate for the problem. For instance, a different solution might be used for elderly victims than for school children. Similarly, break and enters of

apartments might require a different solution than break and enters of houses.

2. **Offender Characteristics** — including age, race, ethnicity, sex, distance travelled to commit the offence, previous criminal history, and probable motivation. This information is less likely to be available than data about the victim, because few offenders are caught. Even where suspects have not been identified, educated guesses can be made at some characteristics. For example, certain types of entry may suggest that break and enters are being committed by amateurs rather than professionals and a low rate of recovery could mean that cars are being stolen by organized thieves rather than by juvenile joyriders.

   Different programs are appropriate for different types of offenders. For example, simply being careful about locking car doors may deter joyriders, but a Watch program in close co-operation with the police may be required to deter organized thieves.

3. **Time** — The time at which the offence is committed has implications for program implementation. If offences take place during the evenings on summer weekends, there is no sense implementing a program that involves activity during the winter. A good example is the Portage la Prairie chemical theft program which is in effect only during a few weeks in the spring, because there is no demand for these chemicals at other times of the year.

   Information about the time a crime is committed is also important to an evaluator. An example can be found in a review of evaluations of street lighting programs by Tien et al., (1979). The impact of many projects could not be assessed because most did not break down crime rate data by night/day or street/non-street and many did not provide information on crime type. Street lighting is directed at particular types of crimes that take place on public streets during the hours of darkness, so data on all these characteristics is required in order to carry out a meaningful evaluation.

Planners should also be aware of cycles, such as those involved in the delivery of pension, welfare, and family allowance cheques. The recipients may be at risk if the dates of receipt are known, because they are more likely to have cash at those times. Also, stolen payroll cheques may be cashed relatively easily on paydays at bars frequented by large numbers of employees of the firm from which the cheques have been stolen. Finally, recent trends indicate that there has been an increase in the number of break and enters committed during the day. This is probably due to more homes being unoccupied during the day because more women have entered the labour market.

4. **Modus Operandi** — Knowledge of the manner in which offences are typically carried out is obviously useful in trying to prevent them. If we know that break and enters in an area are unforced apartment entries rather than forced single-family dwelling entries we can infer something about factors involved in the offence (such as poor key control in apartments) which then have implications for the program.

5. **Spatial Aspects** — Studies of crime patterns have shown that criminal acts are not randomly distributed. Crime rates vary within and between different neighbourhoods. For example, while most areas in one city had no robberies, over 50 per cent of the robberies took place along thirty-six major streets, and 25 per cent took place in only 4 per cent of the half-block-sized areas used in the analysis (Feeney and Weir, 1973). Residential break and enters are more likely to occur on streets forming the boundaries of neighbourhoods, and are less likely to occur in homes that are not on through streets. Programs may be targeted more efficiently if these patterns are known.

6. **Opportunity Factors** — Some crimes result from particular opportunities that are available to potential offenders. Examples include environmental design (a parking garage with poor access control and limited possibilities for surveillance); "soft" targets (an apartment building or hotel constructed with ineffective locks); and

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"people" factors such as community apathy, poor supervision of apartments or shopping centres, absence of most community residents from their homes during the day, or little supervision of back lanes.

Such factors may be identifiable from the analysis of data collected in the problem identification stage of your research, but this will not necessarily be the case. Perhaps the best way to identify such factors is to go through the process of determining crime problems, then go back to the target community to try and find out if particular opportunity factors are apparent.

For example, a small suburban police department used graduate students from a nearby university to carry out a small crime analysis project dealing with the problem of frequent police service calls to a high-density apartment building. The students found that most of the calls were for vandalism, noise, petty theft, and other minor offences and were likely due to the failure of the resident manager to look after the building and enforce the rules concerning behaviour in it.

As a result of this information, the Chief Constable met with the manager to discuss his responsibilities, suggesting specific actions the manager could take and hinting that if the situation did not improve the building owners would be informed. These simple and straightforward actions were effective in reducing calls for service from an average of over 150 per month to 10 per month (Engstad and Evans, 1980). Conventional law enforcement activities, including standard crime prevention procedures, would almost certainly have been more costly and less effective.

7. **System Response** — What else is being done about the problem? What success are the police having with the target crime? If the system is not performing well, what are the reasons for its lack of success? For example, a study of the patterns of armed robbery over a ten-year period found that crime rates were increasing, while clearance rates were declining owing to a lack of physical evidence and the failure of victims or witnesses to identify suspects because they were afraid of "getting involved." As a result of this analysis, surveillance cameras were installed in high risk locations and a secret witness program was established through the local newspaper office. The result was a substantial increase in robbery clearance rates. While this program was reactive rather than preventive, increasing the certainty of arrest should ultimately reduce the robbery rates (Greenberg and Fennesy, 1977).

Although collecting and analysing the kinds of information listed above requires a considerable commitment of time and effort, the results justify the effort. With clear priorities the next stage will go much more smoothly.

Chapter 4

Program Planning and Development

Once a priority problem has been identified and its various aspects have been defined, the next planning task is to deal with the problem. The work put into earlier stages of the planning process will pay off here, as it is much easier to develop programs once the dimensions of the problem are known.

Choosing the Level of Intervention

The basis of community crime prevention is the idea of returning to the community some of the responsibility for crime control. The analysis of crime problems reveals which segment of the community shares some responsibility for crime and will be able to help control it. The drug diversion program discussed earlier provides an example of this principle. The pharmacists were better able to introduce measures to control the problem than were the police.

Programs may be implemented at national, provincial, city or town, neighbourhood, block, group, or individual levels. A particular level may be chosen because it is the most appropriate one for dealing with the problem or because resources do not permit expanding the program further.

Many of the popular "off-the-shelf" programs, including Neighbourhood Watch and Operation Identification, are directed at the block level — the most important unit, because the programs depend on having a good concentration of participants. This factor is important in Neighbourhood Watch because the safety of an individual residence is dependent upon surveillance by immediate neighbours. This concentration of participants is also important in property-marking programs because ideally these programs will establish "security pockets" to minimize the likelihood of crime being displaced from a protected to an unprotected house.

Bigger is not always better. While it would be ideal to have everyone in a given community participating in several crime prevention activities, it is usually better to plan to operate at the level of the community group or service clubs which have been involved in the planning process. Studies of property-marking programs have shown that the highest participation rate has been achieved when programs were directed at target areas of less than 10 000 households.

On occasion, however, resources will permit expanding some aspect of a crime prevention program to a provincial or national level. These programs cannot be focused in the way more locally oriented programs are, but they can draw attention to crime prevention activities and provide impetus and resources to communities which have not been actively or effectively involved in developing local crime prevention programs. In 1982, for example, the Province of Manitoba held a very successful Crime Prevention Month which provided the stimulus for a wide variety of local crime prevention programs.

Programs requiring legislative changes must work at the government level. For example, an effort to reduce drunk driving should include appeals to provincial and federal legislatures, because these bodies have the powers to change laws and to tighten the enforcement of existing ones. Obtaining changes in building codes to require improved security devices in new construction might require intervention from city governments or national bodies such as the CMHC.

One successful effort directed at the federal level dealt with a rapid increase in the amount of credit card fraud in Canada. Since the problem was due to the indiscriminate distribution of these cards, the solution was for the federal government to introduce measures controlling their distribution.

Selecting Participants

Once a level of intervention has been decided upon, the persons to be involved in the planning and implementation phases should be identified. Some will already have been involved in the earlier stages of the planning process. If a steering or planning committee was established to deal with the problem identification, members of this committee can form the core of the group that will direct the remainder of the program. This group should be expanded to include key participants from groups whose support is anticipated, but it must be kept to a workable size.

For example, if a police department decides to focus crime prevention activities on juvenile shoplifting, it will want to involve more than representatives of retail merchants in its program. Other participants might include representatives from the school board, teachers, home and school associations, student councils, and other youth groups.

The planning committee should set policy, identify the responsibilities of each program participant, and co-ordinate all project activities. Participation may be broadened through the use of subcommittees whose chairmen report back to the planning committee. Some projects have advisory committees that include prominent community members in order to give the program greater visibility and credibility.

In The Pas, Manitoba, the data collection and analysis were carried out by the RCMP Crime Prevention Center, which presented its findings at a community meeting held at a local school. The mayor of The Pas encouraged the Protective Services Committee of the Town Council to contact community leaders and to establish a Crime Prevention Committee. The head of the Protective Services Committee organized a meeting with representatives from Town Council, the local RCMP detachment, probation and correctional services, and a number of local community groups such as the school division, the housing authority, the recreation commission, the Chamber of Commerce, and the local media. This group established subcommittees to deal with traffic problems, set up a

Neighbourhood Watch, and organized Crime Prevention Month activities.

It is also necessary to establish a management structure to look after the day-to-day activities of the group. Only one person might be required, but for large projects several would be needed. This role might be played by the police, by an existing community organization, by the city administration, or by an administrator hired by the project. Someone must be responsible on a full-time basis for arranging meetings and looking after the numerous administrative details that will arise. In The Pas, for example, a member of the RCMP was assigned to co-ordinate the group's activities.

While the type of participants depends on the community and on the crime problem, some suggestions can be offered on who should be involved and the ways of trying to secure their participation.

The Importance of Police Participation

No matter who initiates a crime prevention program, police involvement is vital. The evaluators of the Seattle project concluded that it could not have succeeded without such support. The police participated by training staff; providing equipment such as projectors and security hardware; collecting, storing and retrieving data for program evaluation and citizen education; verifying the authenticity of project workers to concerned citizens; assisting with media relations; and providing credibility and motivation by attending Block Watch organizing meetings.

The extensive police involvement in Seattle and other American cities has helped citizens to become effective partners in improving the quality of life in their neighbourhood. According to Feins (1983), one reason police get involved with citizens' groups is as a way of coping with increased demands for their services. Sometimes the impetus for such involvement comes from the municipal government.

In Ottawa, police participation saved an Operation Identification program. In 1973 two Ottawa insurance agents' associations purchased a supply of engravers and advertised their availability to the public. The response was poor, however, so they asked for police help in gaining wider coverage. The Ottawa Police Force decided to make Operation Identification a priority project. Using advertising space donated by the media or purchased by donated funds, they advertised extensively, using newspapers, T.V. program guides, radio and television, bus advertising, brochures, press kits, posters, displays and exhibits, and billboards. The campaign resulted in 18 000 persons participating in the program — a rate of about 15 per cent, which is high for a program of this nature.

Whether the initial impetus has come from inside or outside the police unit, the openness, understanding, and enthusiastic co-operation of the police at all levels has been an essential component of all successful community-based crime prevention programs. With mounting evidence of the success of well-planned and carefully implemented co-operative crime prevention programs, increasing numbers of police departments and detachments are investing more of their energy and manpower in these activities.

Involving Citizens in Crime Prevention

In the realm of law and order, citizens pay for police services through tax dollars, and have come to expect the police and other criminal justice professionals to solve law and order problems for them. One major task of crime prevention practitioners is to mobilize community members into taking direct responsibilty for preventing crime, not just in terms of individual home and store owners securing their property, but of community organizations, business associations, unions, and other government agencies sharing the burden for delivering crime prevention programs. Although sometimes the credibility that a police officer provides may be required for services such as home security inspections, police crime prevention specialists do not have the time to be fully engaged in the direct delivery of all services. Rather, they must use their skills to organize community re-

sources, getting people involved in the program, training leaders, and — once the program is under way — providing guidance.

One of the best methods of mobilizing citizens is to use existing community groups (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1981). Although the major focus of these groups may not be crime prevention, a large proportion of their members will participate in prevention activities when their organization is involved. In addition, public support will be more likely if a program is sponsored by a group with a reputation for success. Such groups are also aware of the needs and resources of the community. The remarkably high enrolment rate of a property-marking program in Burnaby, B.C., described in chapter 5, is an example of how effective community organizations can be in obtaining citizen participation.

It is difficult to organize new groups around the issue of crime, as they tend to unite around other issues until they achieve some organizational maturity (Lewis and Salem, 1981). Using existing groups is the most efficient way of initiating and implementing community anti-crime programs.

What kinds of community organizations can be involved in crime prevention? One obvious choice is one that has been established to improve a community, since crime is often one of the most important community problems. In Winnipeg, the Riverborne Development Association is a nonprofit citizens' organization established to bring economic and social revitalization to an older area of the city. It received funding from the federal Ministry of the Solicitor General and is now carrying out a number of crime prevention activities. Such an organization, which is not organized solely around the issue of crime, is not likely to collapse if its programs do not show immediate results or if some of the volunteers begin to lose interest.

One of the most extensive crime prevention programs in Canada has been developed by the Montreal YMCA through its Office of Community Justice Initiatives. This crime prevention effort includes a number of different programs: a contract with a number of municipalities to lead groups in

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Neighbourhood Watch programs; contracts with municipal and provincial agencies to operate diversion programs for juveniles; a volunteer-based community service restitution program; the establishment of an alternative school for dropouts; and a two-year training program in crime prevention and diversion services for all Quebec and Atlantic YMCAs.

Professional and business associations can be useful in dealing with crime problems affecting their occupational concerns. Some examples are pharmacists organizing programs to reduce drug diversion; the North American Securities Administrators Association and the Council of Better Business Bureaus jointly sponsoring an Investor Alert program for the public about investment fraud schemes; business associations developing anti-shoplifting campaigns; and school boards and teachers' associations becoming involved in programs to reduce school vandalism or drug abuse.

The Hamilton-Wentworth police have involved a number of builders' associations in a security improvement program for new housing. The police, the Real Estate Board, the Society of Architects, the District Home Builders Association, the City Building Department, and the Insurance Bureau of Canada agreed on a voluntary building standard with several crime-prevention design features. The police issue a "Shield of Confidence" certificate and decals for doors and windows to each new home that passes inspection. The program is a good selling feature for builders and may result in lower insurance premiums for homeowners.

Business and professional organizations can implement programs that would be very difficult to carry out by any other means. Implementation is facilitated because these groups have good lines of communication with their members. Their incentives for getting involved range from professional interest and enhanced profits to improved working conditions and personal safety.

Service clubs may take on crime prevention work as a means of fulfilling their community responsibilities. They can provide a source of able and committed people and, through their fund-raising skills, may be able to provide financial assistance for new programs. Organizations such as the Junior League have been involved in co-ordinating large-scale programs and the Kiwanis Club recently donated a crime prevention trailer to the Manitoba Police Commission.

While these three types of groups have been involved in a number of crime prevention programs, organizers should also involve church groups, ethnic organizations, and senior citizen and youth groups. The possibilities depend on the particular circumstances and on the imagination of the planners.[1]

A good example of diverse groups working together to prevent crime is Manitoba's Project Prevention. The Manitoba Society of Criminology established a committee to develop crime prevention programs, to assist existing projects, to promote new local prevention committees, and to develop a resource centre. The committee involved representatives from the Manitoba Teachers Society, RCMP, Manitoba Police Commission, Manitoba Association of School Trustees, Manitoba Government Employees' Association, Winnipeg City Police, Manitoba Bar Association, Manitoba Department of Education, Manitoba Social Workers Association, representatives of the media, Manitoba Child Care Agencies, Manitoba Chamber of Commerce, Manitoba Metis Foundation, Attorney General's Department and Department of Community Services and Corrections. Each group was able to identify ways in which its members could assist in developing programs in the community.

A project in Saanich, British Columbia called "Operation Knockout" (Goodacre 1983) shows just what can be done in mobilizing the resources of a specific community around a commonly-held crime prevention goal. In 1982, the Youth and Community Services Division of the Saanich Police Department decided to involve the community in addressing a high rate of juvenile crime (specifically, vandalism and break and entering) in the Gorge-Burnside District of the municipality. Through careful attention to process, they were able to involve a wide range of local organizations in both target-hardening and youth diversion activities. High school students and members of the local ratepayers association conducted door-to-door security audits on 5 000 residences, police reserve volunteers did business security checks, schools held poster and essay contests, neighbourhood businesses contributed funds, prizes and in-kind services, older students did "peer pressure education" with younger students, and the university basketball team co-operated in the production of players cards featuring anti-delinquency messages from each player. (These cards also served as free passes to home games.)

In communities where the levels of social organization, cohesion, and control are minimal, community-based programs will require more effort to develop and sustain. Such communities may also need a wide variety of other social services, and crime prevention may not be a high priority. Planners will have to dedicate a substantial proportion of their resources to organizing the community for crime prevention before program implementation can be considered. In some programs, full-time organizers go into the communities and create the necessary neighbourhood block organizations.

Setting Goals

To guide the implementation of crime prevention programs and to provide a basis for their evaluation, goals and objectives must be established. Definitions of the terms vary, but here "goals" refers to the final aim of a project (e.g., to reduce the incidence of break and enters in our community by ten per cent by December 1984) and "objectives" refers to the specific program targets that should be met in order to achieve the goals (e.g., to organize 75 per cent of the houses on each block in Neighbourhood Watch by June 1, 1984).

Goals have several purposes. They provide:

1. A basis for allocating resources. If the goal is to reduce shoplifting, why set up Neighbourhood Watch programs? Either there is an unstated goal — to reduce residential break and

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1. A list of some of the possible roles that can be played by various groups is provided in a publication of the National Crime Prevention Institute (1978).

enters — or resources are being allocated improperly. The allocation of resources should be closely linked to specific goals.

2. Clarity. Goals become the explicit basis of understanding between everyone involved in the program. They keep the program on track and reduce the likelihood of disagreements among those involved.

3. A means of monitoring progress. If the goal is to reduce reported instances of shoplifting in downtown businesses by 20 per cent within one year, an assessment at mid-year will tell whether more effort will be required to achieve the goal, or whether the program should be modified in order to have more impact.

A goal statement converts the identified problem into a sentence. It is useful to put goals into a standard format.

ACTION	RESULT
To reduce	by 10 per cent
PROBLEM	DATE
residential break and enters in apartments	by December 1984

Setting realistic target figures for results and dates is important. It is better for the morale of participants, most of whom will be volunteers, to exceed modest goals than to fall short of more ambitious ones.

An example of the kind of problem that can occur unless planners set goals carefully was illustrated by the Minnesota Crime Watch. A major goal of the project was to effect a reduction by 1979 in the property crime rate in Minnesota from the 1972 rate. A related objective was to enlist 20 per cent of all households and businesses in Operation Identification by the end of the second year.

At first glance, their goal and related objective — to reduce property crimes through an Operation Identification program — seem reasonable enough. Evaluators, however, pointed out that these goals could not possibly be attained (State of Minnesota, 1976). First, since 1972 was the first year since 1965 that property crime rates had

dropped, the program was measuring itself against a very demanding standard. Secondly, Operation Identification is properly directed at burglary, not at all property crimes. In Minnesota, burglaries constituted only 29.1 per cent of property crimes, with larceny and auto theft making up the other 70.9 per cent.

In order to affect the rates of property crime, either larceny and auto theft would have had to be held constant or reduced, or the reduction in burglaries would have had to be large enough to compensate for increases in the other two. Neither possibility was realistic.

Finally, without massive resources, the goal of enlisting 20 per cent of all residences and businesses in Operation Identification was unrealistic. In fact, in its first two years the project achieved an enlistment rate of 8.6 per cent — better than that achieved by most other programs using indirect enrolment methods. The project could not possibly have succeeded when measured against these unrealistic goals.

A final point about goals is that they should not include statements about the program. The goal is to reduce residential break and enters in apartment units by 10 per cent. How that goal is achieved has yet to be determined. It may be reached through enacting a security ordinance, through an Apartment Watch program, or through increased premise security surveys. Goals do not dictate strategies; they are targets that focus people's attention, time, and energy. Determining how they are to be accomplished is the next planning step — developing strategies.

Generating and Selecting Strategies

Many crime prevention initiatives can better be characterized as activities rather than as programs. The activities may be many and varied, but together they do not form a comprehensive approach to clearly identified problems. Careful attention to problem identification and to setting goals and objectives should guarantee that a program has a focus. The task of ensuring that programs are comprehensive and co-ordinated can

be included in the process of generating and selecting strategies.

The more comprehensive the program, the greater the likelihood of success. Such a program might involve four major components:

1. Law enforcement: preventive patrol, business and household security surveys, educational efforts, etc.

2. Community participation: volunteer efforts for Operation Identification, escort service, CB radio patrol, Block Watch, etc.

3. Physical and environmental: improved street lighting, traffic diversion, standard target-hardening (locks and doors), etc.

4. Administrative or legal: city ordinances, assigning special prosecutors for target crimes, etc.

The mix of individual strategies will vary depending on the particular problem and on the community. For example, while Neighbourhood Watch may work for break and enters in some communities, increased police foot patrols may be more effective in neighbourhoods where social cohesion is low and suspicion of other residents is high. Property marking and improved home security might be used instead of Neighbourhood Watch in communities where most households are vacant during the day.

How Can Strategies Be Generated?

The specific means of generating strategies depends on the circumstances of each program. Although no explicit direction can be given, there are numerous sources of ideas. Planners can obtain information about programs that have been successful in other areas. A number of different programs have been discussed in this handbook; more information can be obtained from the publications listed in the bibliography at the back of the handbook.

Figure 5 shows a list of programs compiled by Judith Feins. A brief description of each program is provided in her guidebook (Feins, 1983). Material may also be obtained from provincial police commissions, the RCMP Crime Prevention Centre in

Figure 5

CRIME PREVENTION TACTICS*

Direct Resident Activities	Direct Police Activities
Police/Community Boards	Neighbourhood Beats
Street Observation	Police Mini-Stations
Privately Sponsored Crime Hotlines	Crime Analysis Units
Block Clubs	Police Department Environmental
Tenant Organizations	Design Review
Block Watch	Community Service Officers
Block Watch Variations	Police/Community Boards
Apartment Watch	Police/Community Relations
Citizen Patrols	Programs
Radio Patrols	Street Observation
Escort Services	Crime Prevention Educational
Block Houses	Projects
Victimization Surveys	Police Telephone Projects
Home Security Surveys	Victimization Surveys
WhistleSTOP	Home Security Surveys
Operation ID	Operation ID
Neighbourhood Directories	Police Directional Aids
Self-Defence Courses	Crime Prevention for Business
Police Directional Aids	

Working within the Criminal Justice System

Police/Community Boards
Victim/Witness Assistance Programs
Court Watch
Crime Hotlines
Crime Reporting Projects

Changing the Physical Environment

Police Department
  Environmental Design Review
Home Security Surveys
Improving Street Lighting
Changing Traffic Patterns
Police Directional Aids
Neighbourhood Clean-up
Installing Emergency Telephones
Crime Prevention for Business

* When tactics can be appropriately placed in more than one column, they have been listed in each.

Ottawa, the Federal Ministry of the Solicitor General, and local police departments. Once planners have some ideas of what has been done elsewhere, they can assess the applicability of these programs to their own particular problem.

After this information has been gathered, planners should brainstorm with those who have participated in the program planning process, including community representatives. A diverse group of people can come up with a number of strategies under each of the four categories mentioned earlier. Each suggested strategy should then be evaluated in terms of how it would address the problem, its potential for success, its costs, the possible side benefits, the possible objections to its implementation, likely sources of funds and personnel, and so on. This process should result in a list of possible strategies that can be implemented with the resources available.

The Vancouver Beach Review project provided a good example of this brainstorming process. Surveys of beach users, lifeguards, and police determined that the major problems on the beaches were alcohol use, parking problems, beach fires, littering, "public indecency", stereo noise, and racing vehicles. The committee which carried out the study met with an additional fourteen interested parties, in order to plan preventive strategies. Using the four components we have suggested, along with an additional public education component, the committee produced forty recommendations.

Planning for Maintenance

Even the best planned and implemented program will eventually diminish in effectiveness. Thought must be given not only to getting the program off the ground, but also to keeping it afloat year after year.

It can be very discouraging to both organizers and participants to see the incidence of target crime rise again after a dramatic drop in the first six to eighteen months of the program. There are limits to volunteerism and often full-time staff members are necessary to ensure that members of the community stay involved in crime prevention activities.

Maintenance activities such as awards programs, refresher courses, special advisory committees, regular follow-up on participating individuals, newsletters, and so on must be included in the program right from the outset. Taking maintenance needs into consideration will help organizers be realistic about setting goals.

In Seattle, four maintenance components were used to reinforce the efforts of block captains:

1. Keeping public attention focused on the program by means of a bi-monthly newsletter, awards, and media coverage.
2. Conducting an annual meeting for all participants.
3. Conducting meetings with groups of block captains six months after their neighbourhood had been organized.
4. Identifying and replacing ineffective block captains.

Chapter 5

Program Implementation

The end result of the planning process is the implementation of a prevention program. Once a decision has been made on the strategies to be used in the program, specific objectives and an implementation plan are needed to connect these strategies with the goal. Finally, a work plan to guide the implementation process is developed.

Formulating Objectives

Both the objectives to be achieved and the activities that each entails must be specified. For example, an analysis of a shoplifting problem in a suburban shopping mall shows several factors to consider in developing a work plan. Several of the stores are poorly laid out and have attractive items on open display near the entrance. Shop owners and their clerks are unclear about their legal right to detain shoplifters and the procedures they should use. Owners are reluctant to prosecute, believing that the Crown will not pursue the case and that judges do not impose meaningful sentences. The major group of offenders are students from a nearby school who gather at the mall during lunch hour and after school. Store personnel have the impression that the students do not understand the implications of shoplifting and are responding to peer pressure. Students seem to think that store owners will not bring charges against them. Finally, certain items are more likely to be stolen than others.

Using this information, a comprehensive implementation plan can be developed. The specific objectives of the program should be stated as clearly as were the goals. A combination of goals and strategies might be presented as follows:

Goal:
To reduce reported instances of shoplifting at Mitchell Mall by 20 per cent by March 1985.

Objectives:

1. To redesign and rearrange each of five stores with poor layouts by April 1984.
   Activity: A crime prevention officer will conduct surveys and make recommendations. Mall store owners and managers will volunteer time to help rearrange store displays.

2. To educate 150 store owners and managers and their clerks on shoplifting laws by April 1984.
   Activity: A crime prevention officer in co-operation with the Crown Attorney's staff will prepare and conduct a series of seminars on shoplifting.

3. To educate 315 students at John Smith Junior High about shoplifting laws and the implications of shoplifting by April 1984.
   Activity: A police school liaison officer, crime prevention officer, the Crown Attorney's staff, and selected students will develop an educational program to train senior high students by February 1984. These students will deliver the program in school by the target date.

4. To reduce the peer pressure on students to shoplift.
   Activity: Develop with students and counsellors a program to counter peer pressure by May 1984.

5. To make students and others aware that store owners will prosecute for shoplifting by April 1984.
   Activity: Prepare and post signs in all co-operating stores. The signs will be posted at the time of the education programs. The media will be contacted for publicity about this change.

6. To make it more difficult to steal the most vulnerable items by September 1984.
   Activity: Place electronic sensors on vulnerable items. Co-operating stores will order equipment by May 1984.

7. Meet with criminal justice personnel to discuss possible programs by September 1984.
   Activity: Arrange a meeting between the Chief of Police, crime prevention officer, mall representatives, Crown Attorney, and juvenile court judge to develop a restitution program for juveniles involved in shoplifting.

There are other strategies that could be developed to deal with the problem. Also, there are other details to be dealt with such as the nature of the peer pressure program. The purpose of the example, however, is to illustrate the logic of the process. Each problem or problem component has an objective and each objective has a strategy. For program planners, the explicit statement of objectives and strategies clearly delineates to everyone involved exactly what must be done. The timing of the objectives is such that there is a sufficient interval between the achievement of various objectives and the target date for the goal so that the impact of the activity on reaching the goal can be fairly assessed. In cases where not all objectives are achieved, problems can be pinpointed and adjustments made.

Selecting an Implementation Plan

The selection of an implementation plan can take place at a number of different points in the planning process, depending on whether or not those responsible for planning the program will also be involved in its implementation. Specific details vary widely from program to program depending on local circumstances, but there is a basic distinction between programs that are run by police crime prevention units and those run by other members of the community.

The role of the crime prevention specialist is becoming increasingly that of a co-ordinator and resource person. The professional co-ordinator may

be involved as well in the delivery of certain aspects of the program, with other community members being asked to take on more responsibility for program implementation. This is the most cost-effective way of dealing with many crime problems. For example, it is more efficient to help school boards, teachers, and students develop and organize an anti-vandalism program than for the specialist to do all the work himself. Regardless of which program structure is chosen, it is clear that close co-operation between the police and the community is crucial to success.

Obtaining Community Support

If programs are dependent on the support of volunteers, the means must be found to obtain their participation. Programs that have the support of existing community organizations must also secure the co-operation of individual citizens.

Making use of a wide variety of communications media is the first step in publicizing the program. These include public service announcements on television and radio; information enclosed with utility bills; posters in work-places, schools, playgrounds, housing projects, and apartments; articles in community, company, or union newsletters; and maintaining good relations with the news and feature staff of newspapers, and radio and television stations. Many cities have Volunteer Bureaus which maintain lists of potential recruits; newspapers often print requests for volunteers. In Winnipeg, one crime prevention coordinator arranged to have all the school children in his district take home notices about crime prevention activities.

While using the communications media is an effective means of raising public awareness, ensuring a high participation rate usually requires personalized recruitment techniques as well. Organizers can visit church, youth, and senior citizens groups. Employers and school administrators may provide organizers with opportunities to recruit volunteers. In one city, the project staff conducted door-to-door visits and left packets of crime prevention information along with stamped postcards that could be returned by people interested in holding neighbourhood meetings in their homes. Once a program is established, word-of-mouth can be used to get additional community support.

An Operation Identification program run by the RCMP in Burnaby, British Columbia, provides an example of a well-planned and executed project that generated a remarkable degree of community support. The Burnaby experience shows that it is possible to mobilize both community groups and individual citizens by using media and personalized recruitment to achieve specific objectives.

The goal of the program was to reduce residential break and enters in Burnaby by 20 per cent over a one-year period. The program consisted of four phases. The first was a pilot study in which experimental and control areas of similar size (45 blocks and 800 homes) and rates of break and enter were selected. The property-marking program was supplemented with media publicity, stickers for participating residences, and distribution of home security and Neighbourhood Watch information. Ninety-five per cent of homes in the experimental area were marked within a one-month period.

The second phase was designed as a service for those who had heard about the pilot project and who called to request program services. Organizers had anticipated several hundred calls, but received several thousand. To keep up with the demand, they persuaded several community groups to carry out the program.

The third phase was the city-wide implementation of the program. To reach all of Burnaby's 40 000 homes, the RCMP obtained volunteer support from a number of community organizations. They divided the city into several areas and assigned an organization to each. In June and July of 1976, 2 000 volunteers visited 23 000 of the 30 000 single-family homes — a participation rate of 77 per cent. While the rate for multiple-family dwellings was considerably lower, organizers anticipated a 90 per cent overall coverage rate by September. The fourth phase of the project involved looking after the 20 per cent turnover rate of Burnaby residents to ensure that the high rate of coverage was maintained.

Keeping It Going

Because it may be difficult to keep people concerned about crime for a long period, some means must be found of keeping volunteers once they have been recruited. This may be accomplished in a number of ways. An effective training program can help retain volunteers because it informs them about the goals of the project and gives them some expertise to make their work more productive and enjoyable. Well-planned programs should be able to retain their personnel more effectively, since their efforts will be directed to achieving clearly defined goals and their progress will be more visible.

Strong leadership is also related to the longevity of citizen groups. Many groups now ask volunteers to sign agreements specifying their duties and commitments to the program. Opportunities should be provided for volunteers to communicate to organizers their ideas about publicizing or improving the program. Finally, groups should try to show their appreciation for the work of their members by providing rewards and incentives, which may take the form of public recognition from government or police officials, parties, awards dinners, or feedback that describes what the organization is doing and what their role has been in its accomplishments.

Preparing a Work Plan

The final step before going into the field is to develop a work plan. Separating goals, objectives, and strategies into specific tasks is a good way of clarifying the logic behind programs and of eliminating problems and inconsistencies before the program is actually in place.

The development of a work plan may also bring to light differences between members of the planning group over the specific manner in which programs are to be implemented. Again, it is important to discover such differences before programs are actually in place. Failure to do so in one project led

to confusion and disagreement among participants concerning the implementation schedule. As a result, several proposed activities were not introduced at all, and others were introduced at inappropriate times.

The work plan will act as an implementation timetable. While such plans should have some built-in flexibility, planners should develop time lines that clearly specify the dates by which an activity should be started and finished. This will prevent problems such as a project advertising its services before it has staff trained to respond to public inquiries. Care should be taken that the time frame specified in the work plan is realistic, or a program will be behind schedule before it has started. It is easy to underestimate the time required to set up a planning office or to carry out a crime analysis or victim survey project. It may take three to six months for a program to get started if it is necessary to hire staff, find offices, obtain furnishings, and so forth.

Chapter 6

Evaluation

The final stage in the planning model is evaluation. Often evaluations are planned only after the program has been completed, rather than as a monitoring aspect built into the program's design from the beginning. The goals of the program and the evaluation measures to be used in assessing whether or not those goals have been achieved should be determined, and some of them begun, prior to implementation.

Measuring Impact

The first thing an evaluation will show is whether conditions have changed as a result of the program. The reasons for the success or failure of part or all of a program, its efficiency compared with other activities, and any intended or unintended side effects can be demonstrated.

Cost-benefit analysis is difficult at the best of times; it is impossible without an adequate impact evaluation. The information such an evaluation provides is useful in justifying crime prevention activities to funding agencies, particularly at a time when money is tight and when programs that cannot demonstrate their effectiveness are being cut.

In the United States during the 1970s, hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on program implementation and very little on outcome evaluation. When the money ran out, program supporters could not demonstrate that their programs were worth continuing, and funding was not renewed. Projects were closed down, state and city crime prevention offices were abolished, and officers working in police crime prevention units were transferred back to regular duties. Many of the programs were not well planned and their activities were too diffuse to have any impact on crime. However, the failure to include an evaluation

component in most projects meant that the good programs went out with the poor ones.

Another function of impact evaluation is that it introduces an element of accountability into the program. If there is no "threat" that a program will ultimately be assessed in terms of its impact upon the target community, then the crime prevention activity can easily become an end in itself, rather than a means to achieving the ultimate goal of crime prevention.

Monitoring Implementation

Monitoring each step of the program to see whether objectives were fulfilled and the program properly implemented will often give clues as to why a program succeeded or failed.

An evaluation of a target-hardening project found that the program failed to show any effect on burglaries. Evaluators found, however, that the persons installing new locks as part of the program had not been properly trained, and the security devices were improperly installed. It would have been an error to conclude that improved locks did not affect burglary rates, because in fact the locks had not been improved (Katz et al., 1980).

Process evaluation helps organizers to manage prevention programs more effectively. Controlling implementation can be difficult for program administrators, so it is important that progress be monitored constantly.

At an earlier stage of the planning process, goals were established and objectives set. These objectives are targets that must be met as the program is implemented. In the work plan, times are fixed by which these targets are to be achieved. Monitoring provides an accounting of how well this is being accomplished.

A police detachment, for example, might develop a plan to implement a liquid chemical theft pro-

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gram similar to that carried out in Portage la Prairie. Most thefts of these chemicals take place during the months of April and May, the months when these chemicals are applied. The activities to be carried out are meetings with chemical dealers and with the media, as well as the actual application of the painted markings. Marking will take place during the month of March when the chemicals are shipped to dealers.

A simple time line can be developed showing that initial contact with all chemical dealers and with media representatives should be made by January 15th, that the program should be discussed with them by January 31st, that publicity materials and advertisements should be prepared and distributed by February 15th, that paint and brushes should be made available to dealers by February 22nd, that marking begin during the first week in March, and be complete by March 31st.

If all these target dates are met, the program should be implemented at just the right time to ensure that chemical thefts are kept to a minimum. While this example is a simple one, it can be seen that this sort of management control is absolutely essential in a larger, more complex program involving several diverse activities. In principle, process evaluation is relatively easy to carry out. Since it consists of monitoring the activities carried out by project workers, the data can be obtained from project records if these are properly kept.

Records should be as detailed as possible. If one objective of a given program is to carry out security surveys in 40 per cent of a community's homes over a three-month period, records should be kept on the number of households contacted, the number where surveys were actually carried out, and the costs of these surveys. The addresses of each participating household should be recorded in order to determine if some parts of the community have higher participation rates than others and to make possible more detailed behaviour evaluation later.

It would also be useful to record some basic demographic data that would make possible a comparison of participants and non-participants. Such information was useful in the Minnesota Crime

Watch project where it was determined that the elderly and those with little formal education were less likely than the rest of the population to be aware of the crime prevention techniques that were being promoted as part of the project. Special programs designed to reach these target audiences were recommended.

Finally, those responsible for the security survey program should follow up with participants in order to find out what proportion had complied with some or all of the survey's recommendations. These procedures should be followed for *each* project activity.

Questions and Answers

1. Why Evaluate?

It is probably not an exaggeration to say that some kind of evaluation is vital to the continued success of a crime prevention program. While funds and personnel can sometimes be obtained in the short term to get a project going, rarely will it be supported indefinitely by a department, agency, organization, or the community if its effectiveness cannot be demonstrated.

Evaluation also permits program organizers to reallocate personnel and resources from unproductive areas to those having greater impact. Intelligent decisions are best made on the basis of accurate records and evaluation.

The heightened credibility and increased possibility of further funding and community support that proper evaluation makes possible justify the time and expense required to properly evaulate a program. If no evaluation of programs had been done, a guidebook like this would be of little help. Criminal justice professionals are looking for proven approaches to crime prevention, not just novel ideas.

2. When Should You Evaluate?

Different kinds of evaluations need to be carried out at each stage of the planning and implementation process. At the outset, evaluations help determine a community's priority crime problems and what might be done to address them. The results

of these initial evaluations provide a bench-mark against which to measure the impact of the program.

Surveys conducted before the program begins are a valuable complement to the information provided by official statistics. One kind of survey can be used to assess the nature of the relationship between citizens and the police, levels of crime fear, degree of participation in crime prevention activity, and the safety and crime concerns of the potential program participants.

A more specific and demanding survey, the victimization survey, will tell exactly how many potential participants in a given constituency have been targets of criminal activity in a defined period before the implementation of the program, and whether they report their victimization to the police.

The first survey is more general in nature and can be conducted with a representative sampling of potential participants. A victimization survey should be performed with a fairly high proportion of potential participants in order to assess accurately the real extent of certain crime problems in the community.

One or both of these types of surveys should be conducted before the program is begun, and may be repeated at some point during the course of implementation. Planners must allow sufficient time at each stage for proper evaluation, especially after implementation is completed.

The pre-determined completion date should leave a reasonable interval before the evaluation; for instance, it is usually good to conduct the final surveys from three to nine months after the implementation phase is complete. If impact evaluations are done too soon, the program will not have had a chance to show any effect. If too late, the effects may have begun to diminish.

Process evaluations, which monitor implementation, also need to be conducted to help administrators make decisions about modifying and refining a program and dealing with problem areas before the project has run its course.

3. How to Proceed

Evaluation is simply a logical series of steps aimed at providing quantitative and qualitative measures of how well the program is achieving its goals and objectives.

Once your goals and objectives have been decided upon, some measurable indicators of success should be identified — for instance, percentage of area homes which have received security inspections, percentage of homeowners and tenants who comply with suggestions, percentage of residents who join Neighbourhood Watch, and per cent decrease in the incidence of burglary in the target area. These success indicators closely parallel the goals and objectives set in the planning stage, and will determine the shape of the evaluation.

Next, you need to decide what numerical factors will constitute success — 50 per cent of homes inspected, 70 per cent compliance with suggestions, 50 per cent joining Neighbourhood Watch and 25 per cent decrease in incidence of burglary, for example. These four measures can quite easily be documented.

If the goal is to reduce the incidence of vandalism by juveniles in a particular area, an after-school recreation program at the local high school might be offered. Some indicators would be the percentage of target group participation, the percent reduction in the incidence of vandalism both overall and between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m., and the level of participation in and support for the program by members of the community.

The basic information that you use for comparison must also be readily available. In the first example above, you would need to know the total number of households and the incidence of burglary in past years. In the second example, more specific information would be required, such as the previous incidence of juvenile vandalism in the after-school period and the characteristics of the offenders and program participants, to know whether you are reaching the real target group. This information can be obtained from official statistics, from surveys commissioned by the project staff, or from other research projects carried out by academics or government agencies.

4. Who Should Carry Out the Evaluation?

Evaluation research is a rather complicated enterprise. Unless project staff have been trained to carry out such research, specialists should be consulted. If funds permit, it is desirable to have researchers not connected with the project carry out the evaluation. Such people, who might be found in a private consulting firm or in a university social science department, would have the expertise necessary to do the research and would likely have a greater degree of objectivity than would members of the project staff. Their assessment might carry more weight with funding agencies, since they are not seen to have a vested interest in the outcome of the project.

If consultants or outside evaluators are used, it is important that they be involved in the project from the beginning, so they will be able to design the evaluation component prior to implementation. They may also be able to provide assistance to planners by making them aware of potential problems while changes are still possible.

All those involved with a program are part of the evaluation process. Volunteers should understand the importance of keeping good records and communicating results to the program's administrators. Any evaluation, whether done by the project staff or independent researchers, is more meaningful if abundant, accurate information is available; therefore community volunteers have a key role to play in the evaluation process.

5. The Importance of Comparative Data

It is sometimes argued that we cannot measure what does not happen. In the field of crime prevention, we are trying to ensure that crimes do not happen. How, then, can we measure what is prevented? In order to measure the impact of a crime prevention program, we have to have a standard against which to compare our post-program measures. Without such a standard, we may find ourselves in the position of those running the Minnesota Crime Watch Program. The rate of burglary was still rising, but the state-wide program had no comparison group, so evaluators could not tell whether the program had slowed the rate of increase.

It is important, also, to have a way of ruling out alternative explanations for reductions in crime rates that might have occurred. These alternative explanations include such factors as changes in police activities not related to the program; economic changes; seasonal changes; yearly patterns such as vacations; and competing programs (your provincial police commission may be running a province-wide program at the same time yours is in operation).

It is important that data on crime rates be collected for a period of several years prior to the implementation date. A comparison with just the year preceding the program may be misleading if that year did not follow the long-term trend for that particular type of crime. Similarly, the more comparisons made with non-target communities, the more confidence one can have that effects observed are due to the program.

The only way to deal with these problems is to collect comparative data. For example, in order to rule out the effects of displacement (see 6a, following), you would need data on such things as whether crime rates have increased in adjoining areas or in non-participating households in the target community; whether rates of other offences in the target community have increased; and whether the nature of items most commonly stolen has changed.

6. Evaluating Your Evaluation

a) Displacement

Although your evaluation of the area in which your program has been implemented may indicate a reduction in crime, the overall crime rate in a broader context may have increased. Any evaluation has to take into consideration the problem of displacement if it is to assess accurately the impact of the program. For example, a target-hardening program may be effective in that potential thieves may not be as likely to break into the protected premises, but crime

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rates will not change if the break and enter is simply displaced to the home next door which has not been protected.

Repetto (1976) has outlined five possible types of displacement: temporal (committing the same offence at more convenient times); tactical (altering tactics to commit the same crime); target (switching to an easier target within the same area); territorial (committing the same crime in a different area); and functional (switching from one type of crime to another). The extent to which displacement will occur depends on such factors as the type of offence, the type of offender, the nature of the program, and the community in which the program is carried out. While we cannot discuss all the possible combinations, we can provide several illustrations.

Temporal displacement would seem to present a serious problem for programs that involve augmented police patrols during certain times of the day or programs that impose juvenile curfews. A study of the effect of a juvenile curfew revealed evidence of displacement of the criminal activity to different hours of the day.

Property-marking programs are vulnerable to target displacement. Burglars may simply change their target to another home or business unless the participation rate in a community is high enough to preclude this step.

Prevention programs such as Neighbourhood Watch may primarily deter young, non-professional burglars who tend to commit crimes of opportunity in their local area. Professionals are more likely to switch to different targets in non-participating blocks or in other communities. The research evidence concerning the likelihood of displacement is mixed. In general, however, popular programs such as Neighbourhood Watch and Operation Identification do not seem to cause serious displacement if the participation rate in the target community is sufficiently high.

b) The Number of Program Elements
Ideally, evaluations should specify which pre-

vention activities were having an effect. For example, the Portage la Prairie chemical-marking program involved only one type of activity and one can feel confident in the evaluator's claim that this activity eliminated the problem of chemical thefts. However, many programs such as the Seattle Community Crime Prevention project involve several activities, and it is difficult to sort out which are responsible for reducing the crime rate. Evaluation is particularly troublesome when a program involves elements such as environmental design changes and changes in police patrolling along with community-based activities. There is no easy way for practitioners to deal with these situations, but they should be aware of them.

c) Legal and Political Issues
Evaluations may also be affected by some very practical considerations. One of the most serious of these is that administrators may have a vested interest in maintaining particular kinds of programs and may resist evaluation or refuse to co-operate with researchers. There have even been cases in which officials have altered the data used by evaluators. In one instance in the United States, a police chief was given an increased budget to deploy more police during certain times of the day. To make it look as though the program was more effective, the chief apparently encouraged his men to alter times when recording crimes to make it appear that more crimes took place during these hours (Chaiken, 1978).

Also, certain kinds of data may be impossible to obtain. In one project, evaluators wanted to assess the impact of prevention programs directed towards school-age youth by obtaining information on self-reported delinquency and by looking at school attendance records. Both the Use of Human Subjects Committee of the researcher's university and the school administration recommended that self-report data not be collected, and the schools would not release attendance records to the researchers. As a result, the programs in question could not be adequately assessed (Hayes et al., 1978).

Case Study: Seattle's Evaluation
Two impact evaluations of the City of Seattle's Crime Prevention Program were carried out: one by Mathews (1974, 1976, 1977) which dealt with the entire project between 1973 and 1976; and a second (Cirel et al., 1977) which looked at one phase of the project over a one-year period. Both impact evaluations showed that there were fewer burglaries in participating areas than in non-participating areas, and that within such areas participating households usually had fewer burglaries than non-participating ones. In addition, there was a significantly greater number of burglaries-in-progress reported in the participating areas.

Process evaluations were also carried out to see if project goals had been met. After the first year of the program, for instance, a random sampling of the residences which had received home security inspections was surveyed. It was found that 37.8 per cent of the inspected residences had implemented security improvements within ninety days of the inspections.

Since official statistics do not record burglaries committed, simply those reported to the police, project evaluators relied on other sources of information. Victimization surveys were conducted before the project was initiated, at the time a household joined the project, and after the project had begun.

The Sea-King victimization survey was carried out in selected target areas before the project was implemented and then again one year later. The approximately 1300 homes surveyed included about equal numbers of residences which had and had not received project services.

Data from this survey indicated that the Community Crime Prevention Project was effective in reducing the number of burglaries committed in participating homes. The pre-project burglary rate for participating homes was almost identical to the rate for non-participants. One year later, however, burglaries in participating homes had decreased by 61 per cent, whereas non-participating homes

showed only a 12 per cent decrease. The decline in burglaries in adjacent control communities was only 5 per cent. The evaluators also concluded that crime displacement to non-participating homes in the target areas or to homes in adjacent areas did not occur.

In a telephone survey conducted by the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO), the five areas surveyed were selected on the basis of at least 30 per cent of their households having participated between six and eighteen months previously. Data from the 3300 homes surveyed, showed a somewhat lower burglary rate in the participating homes. The difference, however, was not statistically significant as it was in the Sea-King survey.

When the rate for participating homes was examined to determine how long it had been since they had received project services, it was found that three of the five areas studied had received project services nine, twelve, and fourteen months prior to being surveyed. In these areas, there was a significant difference in the burglary rate between participating and non-participating homes. The other two areas surveyed had taken part in the program seventeen and eighteen months before the survey. Participating homes in these areas were burglarized at a higher rate than non-participating homes. These data show the need for repeating the program at regular intervals to maintain effectiveness.

While the victimization survey data consistently revealed a greater decrease in burglary rates in the target areas, official statistics did not always concur. During the first year of the project, official police statistics showed a significant decrease in burglaries in target areas relative to the rest of the city. But statistics for the second year showed just the reverse, most likely owing to an increased rate of reporting burglaries.

As often happens with crime prevention projects, the rate of reporting burglaries in Seattle's target areas increased. Such an increase sometimes masks a real decrease in burglaries. A comparison between victimization data and official statistics at various intervals will reveal whether official statistics accurately reflect the real rate of burglary or changes in the rate of reporting.

The Challenge

Evaluation is a key component in the ongoing development of ever-more-successful approaches to crime prevention. Funding and commitment, both from professionals and community members, is more likely to be directed towards programs that can demonstrate their effectiveness.

No matter how limited or how elaborate your resources, ensuring that the best level of evaluation you can afford is carried out goes a long way towards ensuring the vitality of your program. Not only will demonstrated success help to mobilize potential participants at all levels, it will also serve as a tool for program administrators in improving programs and nearing the goal of enhancing the quality of our lives in tangible ways.

Chapter 7

Cost Effectiveness

One of the major concerns of those funding crime prevention activities has been their cost effectiveness. In order to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of these programs, we must first add up the benefits that accrue because of a project and then subtract the costs. When a number of different options are available, cost-benefit analysis enables us to select the program with the largest net difference between benefits and costs.

This concept, while simple, is difficult to apply to criminal justice programs. The major problems are that it is hard to decide what factors should be included in the analysis and even harder to quantify these factors. For example, how can one set a dollar value on the benefit to the community of reducing the fear of crime, and then subtract that "figure" from the cost of hiring a community organizer to promote and manage Neighbourhood Watch programs? Costs are easier to determine than benefits, but even here some problems arise. The most obvious cost is the salaries of the people working on a program. To this must be added the costs of administration and overhead and also of any evaluation component.

While dollar costs can be assigned to these items, there are other factors to be considered as well. For example, if the program involves target-hardening, we must consider the costs to business and individuals who purchase and install new security devices. Many programs use volunteers, and a decision must be made as to whether to consider their time as a cost of the program, since it might be taken from other volunteer programs that would be beneficial to the community. Some writers have suggested that crime prevention programs may increase the level of fear in a community by drawing attention to crime and thus creating a garrison mentality (Riopelle and Everson, 1980).

Benefits are also often difficult to quantify. One of the more easily quantifiable ones is the reduction in dollar loss attributable to crimes. If a program reduces crime rates, the number of crimes prevented can be multiplied by the average dollar loss for each event of that type in the community to arrive at a total benefit figure. For example, if a Neighbourhood Watch program is estimated to have prevented 100 break and enters in a one-year period, and if the average dollar loss per break and enter is $250, the benefit is $25 000. Even this indicator has limitations, however, since many offences such as crimes against the person do not involve a direct dollar loss.

We can also calculate approximate savings in expenditures of the criminal justice system, though in fact reduced crime rates may lead to a re-allocation of priorities in the system rather than to any savings. For example, if break and enters can be reduced through community crime prevention efforts, the police may be able to devote more of their resources to policing white-collar crime or to some other enforcement activity.

We might also be able to estimate savings in insurance premiums and reductions in security costs caused by lower crime rates. Very rough estimates can also be made of the decline in housing and land values because of high crime rates and to the loss in tax revenues caused by this decline. For example, Gray and Joelson (1979) have estimated that in 1975 the City of Minneapolis lost $19 million in tax revenues because of the effects of crime on property values. Other financial costs that might be calculated include the costs of the medical care and lost productivity of those injured by crimes and the time lost by victims and witnesses who must appear in court as a result of their involvement in crime.

However, many of the greatest costs of crime cannot be quantified. If people's activities are curtailed or if they feel they must barricade themselves in their homes because of their fear of crime, the quality of their lives has been dimin-

ished. They become prisoners of a different kind. Since a major function of government is to enhance the quality of life of its citizens, it can be argued that crime prevention should be given a high priority even if this dimension cannot easily be fitted into a cost-benefit equation.

The mandatory screening program designed to prevent aircraft hijackings suggests that, at least in a limited sense, governments have recognized this dimension. Landes (1978) has demonstrated the effectiveness of this program but has also shown that it was accomplished at enormous cost. He has estimated the cost per deterred hijacking at between $3.24 and $9.25 million dollars, or $76 718 to $219 221 per hijacked passenger. If cost were the only consideration, the program would be difficult to justify.

One final consideration to be taken into account is that we should not always view the costs of crime prevention programs as just costs to be added to existing criminal justice costs. It may be cost-effective to re-allocate funds within the system to reflect a higher priority for crime prevention. In the rest of this chapter, we shall look at several cost-benefit analyses of crime prevention programs.

The most thorough of these evaluations was done by Riopelle and Everson in their report on eleven crime prevention programs funded by the State of Wisconsin. All of these projects were run by local departments and involved program activities such as property marking, security surveys, Neighbourhood Watch, and community education. Since the major target crimes of these projects were burglary and theft, the evaluation was based on a comparison of the number of burglaries and thefts that actually took place in participating communities, with a predicted number based on the statewide increase in these offences over the same time period (13.9 per cent).

They calculated the dollar savings by multiplying the estimated number of burglaries and thefts prevented by the average statewide dollar loss per in-

cident. A second benefit was calculated based on the reduction in the average loss per theft and burglary. They also estimated the savings that accrued to the criminal justice system as a result of the reduction in the predicted number of offences. When this figure was compared with the total cost of the eleven projects, the net cost was calculated to be about $4 000, a small sum considering that approximately 850 crimes were prevented.

A cost-benefit analysis of the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program was done by calculating the unit costs of the services provided by the project and measuring the costs of the crime reduction achieved. Dividing the total program costs by the number of homes contacted and by the number of homes joining Block Watches, the per household costs were $48 and $92 respectively during the first year; $12 and $44 during the second year; and $18 and $55 for the third year. Part of the increased costs during the third year were due to the fact that project staff had to spend greater amounts of time maintaining existing activities and providing consultation for people in non-target communities.

Comparing project costs with the direct loss to burglary victims (based on the average loss per burglary in Seattle of $457.78), a saving of 39.7 per cent of the project cost from this factor alone was found. Since this is only one type of benefit that can accrue from a successful prevention program, the cost-benefit picture again looks quite positive. While no formal cost-benefit study has been carried out of any Canadian crime prevention programs, we can use available data to assess the cost effectiveness of the Portage la Prairie property-marking program. During the three summers the program was in operation, the cost of hiring students was $57 146 — or $35.29 per participating residential or business unit. Based on the assumption that without the program break and enters would have stayed at the 1978 level, about 450 offences were prevented during the period covered by the evaluation — a cost of $126 per deterred offence. While this is only a rough figure, it does suggest that the program was an inexpensive means of reducing crime compared to alternatives such as hiring more police officers.

Postscript

This handbook for criminal justice professionals is simply an introduction to a model of systematic planning and implementation for community-based crime prevention programs. We have tried to select examples of programs that have been evaluated to give you an idea of the process followed by organizers of successful programs in a wide variety of settings and with a diversity of crime prevention goals.

While literature on crime prevention is still rather limited, we have included a bibliography of some of the studies available that explore in greater depth the issues raised in this handbook.

Although many of the studies are evaluations of American programs, some of the principles can be adapted to the Canadian context. Needs and situations vary greatly, so that a close examination of your local context is necessary before applying any of the data or programs.

While the details may differ, the process of identifying the problem, setting priorities, planning and developing a program, and conducting an evaluation varies little among successful programs. This guidebook is about the "how" of building partnerships with your community to prevent crime. We hope that it will stimulate you and provide some focus as you fulfill your professional commitment to improve the quality of Canadian life through remedying the problem of crime.

Appendix A
Crime Prevention Approaches — An Assessment

Over the past ten years, a great number of crime prevention programs have been implemented in North America — mainly by police forces. This appendix reviews three of the most popular approaches — mass media campaigns, property-marking programs, and "Watch" programs. Each of these approaches is analysed in terms of its principles, its effectiveness, and the factors contributing to its success.

Media Campaigns

For many years governments and other agencies have tried to use media campaigns to deal with various social problems. Advertisements tell us not to drink excessively, not to smoke, and to lock our doors at night. To the sponsoring agencies these programs have a number of advantages, not the least of which is that they are easily implemented. Advertising agencies will plan the campaigns and the media will present them. Often media space or time will be donated as a public service. The problem with these programs is that they *don't appear to work*.

The failure of media campaigns when used in isolation is well illustrated by evaluations of two media-based crime prevention programs. The first, a province-wide crime prevention program carried out by the office of the Solicitor General of Alberta, was directed towards reducing the incidence of several specific offences.

Material relating to the prevention of vandalism, residential break and enter, and theft from automobiles was directed at potential victims, while information about auto theft and hitch-hiking-related assaults and rapes was intended for both potential victims and offenders.

The first phase of the program consisted of advertisements intended to increase public awareness of crime prevention and, particularly, the campaign theme, "Let's not give crime a chance." The second phase used this slogan, but also used specific messages directed at the target crimes. Both phases used radio, television, newspapers, and billboards.

An evaluation of the program was carried out by Sacco and Silverman (1981). They carried out pre- and post-campaign telephone surveys of separate samples of respondents selected from the seven largest communities in Alberta. In these surveys, respondents were asked a number of questions concerning their attitudes and behaviour with regard to crime and crime prevention, as well as some post-campaign questions concerning their exposure to the media campaign. Sacco and Silverman also used official crime statistics from one of the largest cities in the province.

On the basis of this research, they concluded that "large numbers of Albertans were exposed to the campaign; a considerably smaller number of residents perceived campaign themes and messages as salient; and only a negligible number of residents altered their behaviour in response to the campaign" (1981: 198).

While many Albertans showed some familiarity with the slogan of the campaign, only about 12 per cent could recall any of the specific crime prevention information provided by the campaign. Only 9 per cent of the sample indicated that they engaged in some sort of crime prevention behaviour as a result of the program, and overall a *lower* proportion of post-campaign respondents had initiated some measures to reduce crime and its impact[1] in the previous six months. As might be expected, there was no change in crime rates that could be attributed to the program.

Sacco and Silverman discuss a number of factors that might have affected the impact of the campaign. First, residents did not appear to think that crime or crime prevention were particularly relevant issues. As a result, the information presented in the media did not generate high levels of interest or motivate people to take any action. Second, those responsible for the program did not specify any particular target audience for the campaign. If this had been done, messages could have been designed to appeal to particular segments of the population. Finally, the planners did not delineate the objectives of the program or the mechanisms through which these objectives could be achieved. Thus, the campaign used a number of unrelated appeals in an attempt to deal with a relatively large number of different types of crime. Planners did not pre-test the campaign materials in an attempt to find appeals that seemed to work.

A study by Burrows (reported by Clarke and Heal, 1978) examined a British mass media campaign using radio, television, newspapers, posters, and handbills designed to encourage people to lock their cars when they were left unattended.

To assess the effectiveness of the program, uniformed police officers accompanied by research-ers carried out a series of vehicle security checks along fixed routes. These checks were carried out on the day preceeding the campaign, at intervals during the campaign, and following the campaign — in all cases during the evening, when most thefts from vehicles were likely to take place.

Burrows found virtually no differences in the proportion of unlocked vehicles as a result of the campaign — 19 per cent of all vehicles checked before the campaign were unlocked, compared with subsequent levels of 20.9, 21.7, and 19.2 per cent. Another part of the study had determined that a high percentage of motorists were familiar with the campaign. Again, *lack of salience and public apathy are not readily overcome by crime prevention information presented through the mass media.*

Are the mass media then of no use to the crime prevention planner? This is not the case at all. While a media campaign on its own is not a promising strategy, media efforts can be extremely valuable in complementing other aspects of a program. They can help reach a large number of people with information about the availability of services and with general educational material about crime prevention.

However, *media campaigns as a single strategy are generally unsuccessful.* The broad themes presented are insensitive to the varying public perceptions of crime among different types of individuals and across communities, as well as to the motivation processes involved in changing people's behaviour.

The media can be useful in transmitting general information, but the effort is almost pointless unless it is followed by personal contact. For example, the Ottawa property-marking program discussed in chapter 6 was exemplary in its use of the media. The campaign was well designed and the whole range of media were used to publicize one simple message. By using this technique,[2] 10 to 15 per cent of Ottawa households participated in the project. This rate was much higher than that typically obtained in media-based Operation Identification programs. However, it was still far lower than that believed necessary for a marking pro-gram to have an impact on rates of break and enter. In those areas of the city where the Ottawa Police Force was able to follow up the media campaign with personal contacts, however, the participation rate was 100 percent and the program appeared to have reduced the number of break and enters committed in the following year.

Planners should be aware of the possible unintended consequences of media campaigns. In an evaluation of a number of projects directed towards the elderly, it was found that media campaigns did little to change their behaviour, and instead increased levels of fear of crime. (Bishop, *et al*; 1979.)

A media campaign should be one element of a community-based crime prevention program to educate the public about particular programs. This familiarity almost certainly will increase the participation rates when personal contact is made with citizens by police, project staff, or volunteers.

Property-Marking Programs

Perhaps the most widely used crime prevention program is property marking.[3] Residential property-marking programs (usually referred to as "Operation Identification") involve the use of engraving tools or some other means of identifying transportable property. Participants use an identifying number which allows the police to trace the owner; social insurance or driver's licence numbers are commonly used, although some programs use unique numbers. Numbers are filed in a central police registry. In addition to marking their property, participants receive warning decals which alert the burglar to the fact that items have been marked for police identification. Similar pro-

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1. *These activities included locking doors and windows, installing new lights, installing new locks, buying a dog, buying insurance, securing valuables, and securing cars.*

2. *Even in this project there was an attempt to increase enrolments by means of personal contact. Citizens requesting engraving tools were encouraged to involve their immediate neighbours to form a security pocket. The evaluation of the program does not allow us to measure the impact of this personal contact (Zaharchuk and Lynch, 1977).*

3. *White et al. (1975) found that over 80 per cent of U.S. police departments had some type of property-marking program.*

grams exist for commercial establishments (Operation Provident), cottages, marinas, and construction sites.

The logic of the program is that burglars will perceive a greater risk of being caught in the possession of marked rather than unmarked items. Second, marked items will be more difficult to sell and thus be perceived as less desirable targets. Third, once police have recovered goods, they can be more easily identified and returned to the owner. Fourth, marking can help establish that goods are stolen, increasing the likelihood of successful prosecution.

Research (Heller et al, 1975) indicates, however, that while burglary rates do decrease for households participating in marking programs there is no hard evidence that Operation Identification increases either apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of burglars or that it hinders the disposal of stolen property. Burglars did *not* appear to be reluctant to burglarize houses with warning decals or to steal marked property. Marking did not appear to significantly affect the ability of burglars to dispose of stolen property, as it could be taken to other jurisdictions where the numbers could not easily be traced, markings could be altered, and people who purchased stolen property were not particularly concerned about whether stolen goods were marked. In addition to these factors, marked property could be kept for private use or sold informally to friends. Also, burglars could still steal money or other items not as easily marked. *Successful Operation Identification programs are usually part of larger crime prevention projects,* however, and perhaps other facets of the project, such as improved security, have an impact on burglary rates instead of (or in addition to) the marking of property.

Property recovery and return, has been found in some cases to have been an absolute failure. "Not one . . . project contacted for this study was able to substantiate the claim that . . . marked property was more difficult to dispose of by burglars, was more likely to be recovered by the police, or was more likely to be returned to its owners if stolen" (Heller et al, 1975:13). A similar conclusion was

reached in an evaluation of identification programs in Wisconsin (Riopelle et al., 1979). Heller and his colleagues believe that part of the problem is that not all property can be marked and that markings are easily altered. They suggest that two major reasons for the poor recovery rate are problems with identifying numbers and with police property procedures.

A recurrent problem with property-marking programs has been that different jurisdictions have used different numbers for property identification. If property is recovered outside the jurisdiction it may consequently be quite difficult to trace.

Driver's licence numbers are perhaps the most commonly used identifying numbers. Their major advantage is that the police can quickly trace the property owner through a computer search, though different provincial files may have to be checked if the item recovered is from out-of-province. There are problems with using the driver's licence, however. Some jurisdictions change numbers on a regular basis and some numbers are so long that engraving becomes a difficult task (e.g., Manitoba's licence currently has twelve characters). In addition, even though some provinces have permanent numbers, drivers moving from one province to another will have to change numbers. And, of course, not everyone has a driver's licence.

In Minnesota, a Permanent Identification Number was issued to participants which included a unique identifier to indicate state, city, and police department, as well as an individual number given to each citizen. Even if such a numbering system were to be adopted on a national basis, it would have to be filed on police computers and address changes would have to be recorded at this central registry as people move about. Until such a system is developed, there will continue to be a proliferation of numbers used in this program. In Canada, Social Insurance numbers would probably be the best choice. Access to such numbers for property search purposes is not yet permitted but an agreement in principle has been reached which will likely allow such access.

The problem of low recovery rates might be remedied if police property-disposition procedures were changed. Typically, these sections are understaffed and inefficient, but they may be made more effective. For example, White and his associates (1975) discuss a program developed in Indianapolis in which a computer-based property file stores information on stolen property. Part of the program also involves the registration of all pawned property with the police, along with a thumbprint of the person pawning it. Data on stolen and pawned property is regularly checked through the computer. The program has resulted in an increase in property recovery from 10 per cent to between 30 and 35 per cent.

Green and his colleagues (1979) report that San Diego Anti-Fencing Units have developed search procedures that allow them to return from 80 to 90 per cent of recovered property. These examples suggest that improved search procedures along with property marking may have an impact on the rate of property recovery.

Another possible reason that property-marking programs do affect the burglary rate may involve the people who participate. Engraving property is a time-consuming task. Often an individual willing to take the time to engrave property is also willing to carry out less time-consuming home security measures. Some individuals are motivated to participate because they have been recently victimized. These people may tend to be more security conscious in other respects as well.

Are property-marking programs worth implementing? The answer is a qualified "maybe." Unless a high participation rate is anticipated, their function is probably one of public relations, since it is highly unlikely that a program covering only a small proportion of a community will have any impact on crime rates. Participants experience less break and enter and theft even where there is a low participation rate, but the whole community does not benefit unless there is a high participation rate.

Second, while property-marking programs can

sometimes be virtually cost-free, they can also, in some circumstances, be relatively expensive. If it is anticipated that the costs will be high, serious consideration should be given to other types of programs in preference to property marking. Third, if planners hope to benefit from property marking they should ensure that local police have the means to carry out this task effectively.

Fourth, property marking will likely be most cost-effective when used with other measures such as Watch programs and security devices. If it is carried out in conjunction with these measures, the cost per household or business will be reduced. However, it is not known what proportion of the overall impact is due to each component of the project.

Property-marking programs are probably most useful in specialized circumstances such as those involved in the Portage la Prairie chemical-marking study described in chapter 2. One of the strongest features of property marking is that it can be adapted to a wide variety of problems. For example, the Ottawa Police Force has operated the following programs: Bike Identification, Operation 900 (for businesses), marking the material in office buildings, projects involving materials at construction sites, Operation Vending Machine (using marked "bait" coins and warning posters), dog identification, cottage programs, and senior citizen programs (Zaharchuk and Lynch, 1977).

The sponsoring agency might also consider property-marking programs if the problem is limited to a manageable target area, and if financial and volunteer resources will be adequate to ensure a high rate of participation. Because the turnover rate in many communities is as high as 20 per cent per year, marking campaigns must be repeated. Sometimes maintaining a program is harder than initiating one. The media lose interest and are less likely to continue to provide free advertising, outside funding is often short term, and repeat marking requires continuing work on the part of the organizers to maintain the same level of participation.

Property-marking programs are simple, easily understood and may be useful as a means of getting

people involved in crime prevention and introducing them to more sophisticated types of programs.

Watch Programs

In many respects, Watch programs exemplify the central philosophy of community-based crime prevention. In contrast to individual prevention strategies which often lead to increased fear and isolation, Watch programs represent a collective solution to crime. Individuals acting together are able to undertake crime prevention activities that they could not accomplish on their own. Rather than encouraging people to cut themselves off from their neighbours, Watch programs are intended to encourage a sense of citizen concern for the community. While the program may be organized by the police department or another government agency, the Watch program leader, who represents the link between the organizers and the community, can ensure that the program represents community needs and interests.

As is the case with any other prevention program, the chances of running a successful Watch program are increased if it is properly planned and implemented. A systematic analysis of the target area and its crime problem should precede the program. A high participation rate is important — the Detroit program described earlier required 50 per cent enrolment before a block was considered to be a part of the program. Signs announcing the Neighbourhood Watch program were not posted unless this percentage had been reached.

It is important that Watch program members be properly trained. They are advised to call the police if they see trouble and not to try to take action themselves, and are given instruction on other means of crime prevention. Block leaders have to be motivated and their involvement monitored. If they are not carrying out their duties they must be encouraged to do so and advised that they will be replaced. Finally, maintenance activities have to be a major part of the program. If not, the program's positive effects are likely to dissipate quickly.

If these guidelines are followed, the program will have a high probability of success. The best pro-

grams, such as those in Seattle and in Detroit, report *crime reductions of over 50 per cent*. If participation rates are sufficiently high, displacement does not appear to be a problem. In Seattle, it was found that non-participating blocks in areas where programs were in operation also experienced reductions in victimization when compared with residents in areas without programs. Thus the gains of the Neighbourhood Watch participants are not accomplished at the expense of adjoining blocks or neighbourhoods.

Finally, one other strength of Watch programs is their versatility. Just like property-marking programs, they can be applied in a wide variety of contexts. There are **Boat Watch** programs for marinas, **Apartment Watch** programs for high-rise apartment buildings, and **Vertical Watch** programs for high-rise office buildings.

In some communities, Watch programs were expanded into citizen **walking patrols** in which pairs of residents were assigned to walk around a block, an apartment building, or a housing project to watch for suspicious activities. Other variations include **C.B. Alert** and **Taxi Alert**, which utilize vehicles with C.B. radios and taxis respectively to watch for suspicious occurrences and report them to the police.

Block Watch may be run across alleys rather than streets, if analysis shows that those locations are contributing to the crime problem. Feins (1983) discovered even a **sitting patrol** in which residents of an apartment building took lawn chairs into their lobby to keep an eye on who was entering the building.

Appendix B

Sample Questionnaire

Questions should be tailored to the nature of your community and to the needs of your project. The following are some sample questions, adapted in part from a Winnipeg Police Department crime fear survey:

1. **Where does crime fit into your list of priority concerns?**
   a) _____ top of list
   b) _____ high
   c) _____ medium
   d) _____ low
   e) _____ not at all

2. **What do you think are the three major crime problems in your neighbourhood?**
   a) _____
   b) _____
   c) _____

3. **In the past year have you been a victim of any type of crime?**
   a) _____ Yes
   b) _____ No

4. **If yes, what type(s) of crime?**
   a) _____ Theft
   b) _____ Break and enter
   c) _____ Vandalism
   d) _____ Assault
   e) _____ Rape/Sexual assault
   f) _____ Other (specify)_____

5. **Did you report the crime(s) to the police?**
   a) _____ Yes
   b) _____ No

   If no, why not?

6. **If you were victimized where did the crime occur?**
   a) _____ House
   b) _____ Garage
   c) _____ Yard
   d) _____ Street
   e) _____ Other (specify)_____

7. **How long have you lived in this area?**

8. **In your opinion, has there been an increase or decrease in crime in this area in the last few years?**
   a) _____ Increase
   b) _____ Decrease
   c) _____ Same
   d) _____ Don't know

9. **If increase, what crimes have increased?**
   a) _____ Theft
   b) _____ Break and enter
   c) _____ Vandalism
   d) _____ Assault
   e) _____ Rape/Sexual assault
   f) _____ Traffic Offences
   g) _____ Other (specify)_____

10. **How does your neighbourhood compare to others in your community in terms of amount of crime?**
    a) _____ More
    b) _____ Less
    c) _____ Same
    d) _____ Don't know

11. **To what extent do you fear becoming a victim of crime in this area?**
    a) _____ None
    b) _____ Very little
    c) _____ Somewhat
    d) _____ A great deal
    e) _____ Don't know

12. **Have you changed the pattern of your activities — are there things which you now do, or no longer do — because you fear being a victim of crime?**
    a) _____ Yes
    b) _____ No
    If so, what changes?

13. **Do any of these conditions exist in your area and if so do they make you feel uneasy about your safety?**
    i) Poorly lit streets
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know
    ii) Strangers or kids hanging around
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know
    iii) Intoxicated persons
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know
    iv) Abandoned buildings
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know
    v) Unconcerned neighbours
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know
    vi) Other conditions
       a) _____ Yes
       b) _____ No
       c) _____ Don't know

14. **Which of the following types of crime do you feel you can help reduce, either through personal preventive actions in your own home or by getting involved with your neighbours in crime prevention programs?**
    a) _____ Theft
    b) _____ Break and enter
    c) _____ Vandalism
    d) _____ Assault
    e) _____ Rape/Sexual assault
    f) _____ Other (specify)_____
    g) _____ None

15. **Have you done anything in the last year to protect your house (apartment, store) from crime . . . things like stronger locks, outside lighting, alarms, etc.?**
    a) _____ Yes (specify)_____
    b) _____ No

16. **Do you have an arrangement with any of the neighbours on your street to watch each other's house while you are away?**
    a) _____ Yes
    b) _____ No

17. **Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the quality of police services in your community? If not, why not?**

18. Are you familiar with any Crime Prevention Programs in your community?
   a) _____ Yes
   b) _____ No
   If yes, which ones?
   a) _____ Neighbourhood Watch
   b) _____ Block Parents
   c) _____ Operation Identification
   d) _____ Other (specify) _____

19. What kinds of Crime Prevention Programs would you like to see undertaken in your community?
   a) _____
   b) _____
   c) _____

20. Would you be willing to participate with your neighbours in a community involvement Crime Prevention Program?
   a) _____ Yes
   b) _____ No

21. For our analysis purposes, how would you categorize yourself?
   a) _____ Homeowner
   b) _____ Tenant
   c) _____ Business person

22. What is your age?
   a) _____ under 30
   b) _____ 30 to 39
   c) _____ 40 to 49
   d) _____ 50 to 59
   e) _____ 60 or over

23. Are you a parent with children still at home?
   a) _____ Yes
   b) _____ No

24. (Interviewer should indicate sex of respondent and code their location for later analysis.)

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