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NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE  
LEAA FAMILY VIOLENCE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM:

FINAL REPORT

VOLUME I--ANALYTIC FINDINGS

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We dedicate this report to the projects, the women and children they served, and to the shelter volunteers whose sacrifices helped to build these institutions.

JF  
SW

May, 1984

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### Preface

Chapter 1 The Family Violence Program--  
Social Problem, Social Action

Chapter 2 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Chapter 3 From Theory to Practice--  
Family Violence Interventions

Chapter 4 Victim and Family Characteristics

Chapter 5 Impacts on Victims and Families

Chapter 6 Impacts on the Justice System

Chapter 7 Institutionalization of Family  
Violence Services

Chapter 8 Knowledge, Policy and Research in  
Family Violence

### References

## Preface

In January 1978, the United States Commission on Civil Rights sponsored a consultation to study the problems of battered women and domestic violence. During two days of hearings in Washington, D.C., panels of experts presented papers and testimony on topics including the causes and treatment of domestic violence, the role of law enforcement and the courts, support services and social interventions, and the federal role. Participants included researchers, practitioners, attorneys, and representatives of federal agencies sponsoring demonstration efforts to serve victims of domestic violence.

Although grassroots organizations for several years had provided various types of supportive services in response to the needs of victims, the hearings identified the often fragmented nature of the responses of public agencies--social services, juvenile and criminal justice, mental health, and medical services--to the needs of victims and their rights to protection and safety. Perhaps most important was the apparent unwillingness of the criminal justice system to recognize battered women as victims of crime and the system's inability to coordinate other service providers to assist victims. In effect, the nature of institutional responses and the public accountability of service agencies were major focuses of the consultation. The consultation provided one of the first opportunities to thoroughly examine the issues raised in considering whether to develop public policies and services to aid families troubled by domestic violence.

At the hearings, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) identified its role as a leader in developing the first national demonstration program specifically designed to assist battered women and other victims of domestic violence. Beginning in 1977 and continuing through 1980, LEAA allocated over \$8 million to clarify the role of the justice system in preventing and controlling family violence and to improve its ability to coordinate with other agencies to respond to violence in the home.

During the consultation, LEAA expressed the hope that its discretionary grant program in family violence would provide program models that states and local communities could replicate. The LEAA initiative included six projects funded under its Victim/Witness Program in FY78, and 11 additional projects funded under the Family Violence Program in FY79. One FY78 project was not refunded. Nine additional projects were funded in FY80 for a total of 25 projects funded under the Family Violence Program over three years. These projects represented a comprehensive experiment in public policy; they reflected an attempt to test a variety of program models and policy initiatives aimed at preventing and reducing family violence, including two projects funded to intervene with sexually assaulted children.

Consistent with its Congressional mandate to assess the impacts of family violence and the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) awarded a grant to the URSA Institute to conduct a national evaluation of the demonstration program. The evaluation was designed to provide information on viable program approaches and services to legislators, policy makers, and to communities wishing to develop services for victims of domestic violence. The evaluation also provided projects with data for decision-making on service delivery and program management. A major evaluation goal focused on changes in institutional responses--from the justice system and medical, legal, and social service sectors--as well as in community attitudes toward domestic violence that resulted from project efforts. In addition, the evaluation assessed a range of client outcomes as a function of project and other institutional services received, and family characteristics. Evaluation findings describe and suggest the optimal role of the justice system, in coordination with other agencies, in family violence intervention.

This report is the last of four analytic reports from the National Family Violence Evaluation. The First Interim Report (November, 1979) analyzed the history and development of the LEAA Family Violence Demonstration Program, from its origins as the Citizens Initiative Program through early funding in the Victim/Witness Program to categorical funding as the Family Violence Program. The report analyzed organizational development, structural features, and service components of the demonstration projects. Also, the report documented the initial effects on systems and communities of implementation of the Family Violence projects.

The Second Interim Report (September, 1980) presented data and information to measure and describe project operations and services. The report presented data on project characteristics and inputs, including funding, staffing, organizations, service components, client populations, and environmental characteristics such as domestic violence legislation and geographical area. Project services to clients were also described. The report concluded with an analysis of project and client characteristics which identified the major analytical dimensions to represent project typologies and activities.

The Third Interim Report (June, 1981) presented characteristics of clients arrayed by project. Those associated with individual projects were able to view various characteristics of their client population as well as to contrast those attributes with the national aggregate. Data included in the analysis derived from the Initial Assessment form of the PMS. It is important to note that these data were obtained by staff at each site from among some proportion of individuals who requested project assistance and do not purport to describe the etiology and dynamics of family violence. The PMS data reported were supplemented by information gathered during client follow-up interviews, which form the core of the client impact study.



The Final Report consists of three volumes. Volume I: Analytic Findings reviews several topics. First, we examine the history and operations of the LEAA Family Violence Program Initiative, including demonstration project characteristics (organizational and staffing patterns, funding levels, intervention designs, services provided), case characteristics (victim and assailant demographics, relationship histories, violence histories, the incident leading to project contact) and assess the over influence of federal inputs on projects' activities. We also present the primary impacts of the 23 Family Violence projects in terms of client outcomes, justice system changes affected, and the continuation of projects and service components subsequent to the grant period. Volume I concludes with recommendations for policy development, services and programs that will promote more effective and efficient responses to the problem of family violence, and a research agenda for the future. Volume II: Case Studies presents descriptive "life histories" of ten "core" projects, a representative sample of the demonstration projects which were selected for intensive scrutiny. The case studies trace these ten diverse projects from startup through implementation to their situations at the conclusion of the federal experiment. As such, the volume supplies narrative depictions to complement the analytic assessments offered in volume I. Finally, Volume III: Appendices contains supplemental information, including: the evaluation's principal data collection forms; more detailed service descriptions; relevant legislation from the ten "core" project states; and distributions of basic client characteristic data across the 23 projects.

# 1 The Family Violence Program --Social Problem, Social Action

## Family Policy and the Discovery of Violence in the Home

The past quarter century has been characterized by increases in government intervention in many aspects of society, from poverty to pollution. Much attention by government has been to problems brought about by population growth. The post-Eisenhower era witnessed a nearly 50% increase in the labor force. The United States was challenged to absorb this increase without major economic or societal impacts. Both unemployment and inflation rose only moderately during the period, and remained well below international levels--only successive leaps in world energy prices reduced society's ability to more aggressively meet this challenge (Schwarz, 1983). Nevertheless, the federal government has remained an active force in American social and economic life in the last two decades.

One consequence of these major demographic shifts has been a fundamental change in the fabric of American family life. Between 1960 and 1979, the proportion of married women in the labor force with children less than six years of age more than doubled, from 18 percent of all women in the workforce to 43 percent (Gilbert, 1983). Over nearly the same interval, divorce rates rose 112 percent; by 1979, nearly 50% of all marriages ended in divorce (Gilbert, 1983). By 1980, 18 percent of families with children were headed by a single parent, typically a woman, with little or no support from the other parent. Simultaneously, the proportion of the elderly living with



their children declined by nearly half, while the percentage of "senior" citizens (over 65 years of age) in the population nearly doubled. Increasing support for government intervention in family issues has resulted in part from these extraordinary changes (Gilbert, 1983).

Help for families during this period generally took the form of economic support. Social Security, Medicare, and other entitlement programs were accompanied by income supplements such as food stamps, cash grants, and tax credits. Social services--job training, nutrition, day care, Head Start--were developed as "people" investments, designed to help individuals become economically productive members of society (Lasch, 1979). Basic family functions, such as childcare and education, were increasingly externalized. The emerging policy, then, supported government intervention to ensure the well-being of families, in part to cushion the socio-economic impacts of changes in demographics, technology, and culture in the post-war period.

These profound changes in family economic policy were gradually accompanied by closer attention to family social policy. The growth of social services in the 1960s, designed primarily to wrestle with extrafamilial social problems such as crime or substance abuse, focused public policy not only on the economic behavior of families, but also opened up the family as a social institution amenable to public scrutiny. Thus, family behaviors and social roles became issues of public policy. What had been condoned because it was "private" was now defined in a social context and placed in the public domain. Accordingly, family interactions became subject to social interventions and sanctions (Wexler, 1982).

#### THE DISCOVERY OF WIFE BEATING

Until the mid-1960s, when public policy began to look behind the closed doors of family life, few people considered the home--and especially, marriage--to be other than "a compassionate, egalitarian, peaceful affair in which violence played no part" (Wardell et al., 1983). Two major trends in this era raised doubts about this tranquil view of American family life. The "discovery" of child abuse in the mid-1960s focused public attention on violence in the home. Medical and sociological research confirmed the existence of a "battered child syndrome" while other research documented the incidence, severity, and frequency of violence toward children (DeFrancis et al., 1967). The re-emergence of the women's movement at that time made visible the use of physical force as a conflict resolution tactic within the family, and elevated it to prominence as a social concern (Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980). By the early 1970s, numerous studies of wife beating and spouse abuse had been published (see, for

example, Goode, 1974; Sprey, 1974; O'Brien, 1971; Gelles, 1974; Martin, 1976; Roy, 1977). A new social knowledge of family life emerged, and for the first time brought forth underlying issues of violence and power in the family.

As interest and concern for domestic violence grew, research activity into the extent of violence in the home also increased. Yet the actual extent and dynamics of family violence are still unknown--family violence remains difficult to study due to traditions regarding the privacy of family matters and its extraordinary sensitivity. In turn, the range of consequences are also yet to be determined. The family violence research of the past decade provides a first glimpse into the scope of the problem.

#### Incidence and Prevalence--The Home as a Battleground

Early research aimed at establishing the incidence, prevalence, correlates, and the "socially patterned nature" of family violence (Hotaling and Straus, 1980). During the mid-1970s, several studies appeared which established spousal violence as a widespread phenomenon, and part of the way of life of many families. Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980) estimate that nearly 23% of all couples experience physical violence during their relationship, or about one in six (16.6%) every year. This means that about 1.8 million women are beaten annually by their spouses or partners. These rates were confirmed in several other studies. A Spokane, Washington study also placed the victimization rate at 28% (Kuhl, 1980), and a telephone survey of Kentucky women estimated the violence rate at 21% (Shulman, 1979). A study of randomly selected households in southwestern Pennsylvania found that 35% of the women had experienced violence by their husbands (Frieze et al., 1980). There is general agreement, then, that between one in five and one in three women are victims of violent crime by their partners or husbands.\*

The frequency of spousal abuse within violent homes offers another perspective. Straus et al. (1980) report a median of 2.4 incidents annually among the couples who reported any violence at all. Two-thirds of their sample reported more than one incident during the year: 19% reported two beatings during the year; 16% reported three or more, and 33% reported five or more. Gelles (1974) estimated that 26% were violent between six times per year and daily.

However, these data should be cautiously interpreted for two reasons. First, most family violence research considers any violence (from

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\*Straus et al. (1980) also identified violence by women against men in their survey. However, the extent and consequences of violence by husbands is far greater. Women tend to be violent less often and usually as retaliation or self-defense mechanisms.

slapping or hitting through attempted murder) as spousal violence (Frieze et al., 1980). It also appears that couples who are violent tend to be of two types: either quite violent (once a week or more) or "mildly" violent (on rare occasions or never) (Frieze et al., 1980; Staus et al., 1980). Second, these general data on the incidence of spousal assault may underreport the actual incidence of physical violence among couples. Many studies look only at married couples and, therefore, fail to account for divorced or separated couples who are currently experiencing violence or have in the past (Straus, 1978). Single people or remarried persons who were victims of violence in previous marriages or relationships are also omitted. As a result, according to one researcher, the actual percentage of couples with some violence in their relationship may be 50-60% of all couples (Straus, 1978).

Other data portray a battering family with more than one victim of violence. Recent findings of the American Humane Association's national child abuse study show that in at least one in four reported child abuse incidents, there is some evidence of spousal assault as well (Alta, 1978). Although the data are inexact and based on non-random samples, evidence is emerging that sibling violence, child abuse, and retaliatory violence (violence committed by domestic violence victims in retaliation to physical abuse) frequently occur (Straus et al., 1980).

Victimization surveys and police reports (reported crimes, calls for service) are an important source of information about family violence. National Crime Survey data from 1973-76 reveal that nearly 55% of all incidents of violence between intimates go unreported (BJS, 1980). About 50% of spouse abuse cases are reported (Gaguin, 1978). Violence between "intimates" included numerous disputes between estranged couples and/or disputes between adults and minors who were non-strangers. Shulman (1979) found that only one in ten abused women ever called the police. Unlike child abuse reporting statutes, which mandate certain agencies and professionals to report suspected child abuse and neglect cases, reports of spousal violence are usually not mandated.\* If reported to police, family violence cases are often recorded in several non-crime categories. Usually, they are reported as family fights or domestic disturbances. Also, most police record-keeping systems fail to distinguish stranger from non-stranger cases. Accordingly, accurate estimates of violence within families are difficult to obtain, without directly asking the victims.

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\*A number of states now mandate recording by law enforcement of domestic violence against spouses. According to state law enforcement authorities, New Jersey recorded over 15,000 incidents in the first nine months of 1983.

Despite the apparent underreporting by both agencies and victims, the "new social knowledge" of family violence yielded a disturbing and ironic picture of American family life. What is intended as a refuge for intimacy, love, and nurturance may actually be an institution which is a source of injury, pain and possibly lethal. It also may be a teacher of violence, whose consequences are still unknown. Once opened to public scrutiny, the family was identified as the site and source of violent crimes whose victims overwhelmingly are women and children.

### The Consequences of Family Violence

Violence in the family can be lethal to participants or to intervening police officers. Nearly 10,000 homicides each year (about one in four) are familial, and half of those are between common-law or married spouses. A 1977 Police Foundation study showed that in 85% of Kansas City homicides, police had responded to previous domestic disturbance calls at the address of the suspect or victim, and to five or more previous calls in half the cases (Meyer and Lorimer, 1977). Nearly a third of Atlanta's 1972 homicides stemmed from domestic fights (Gelles, 1974). McCormick (1977) found that nearly 40% of Chicago women who had killed their husbands had been severely beaten by them. Spouse assault apparently makes a substantial contribution to this country's atypically high homicide rate (Sherman, 1983). The occurrence of police injuries and fatalities during family disturbance incidents also is well documented (Loving, 1980).

The impacts of family violence on children in the home and during their later adult life point to some alarming trends. Numerous studies have determined that violence as a problem-resolution method is learned, and that one does not necessarily have to be rewarded for violent behavior in order to learn it (Gelles, 1977). Recent research has identified a correlation between violent childhood experiences and experience as an adult of either being victimized or becoming an abuser (Martin, 1976). The AHA (1979) study showed that child abuse and spouse abuse are highly correlated. Children in violent homes are at risk either for removal to foster care, physical or emotional abuse, or for learning violent behavioral patterns that may emerge in adulthood (Owens and Straus, 1975). Fagan et al (1983) found that violent delinquents often came from homes with spousal, sibling, and/or child abuse. Numerous studies have shown that spouse abusers were raised in violent homes (Roy, 1977; Kuhl, 1980). Potts et al. (1979) found that child abusers frequently were exposed to violence in the home. Career criminals often were victims of violence as children (McCord, 1979; Petersilia, 1980). Finally, abuse during pregnancy is common, and is often the most serious (i.e., injurious) type of abuse for victims (Martin, 1976; Straus, 1979). It has been described as *invitro* child abuse.

### Victims and Assailants

Although spouses tend to beat each other in about equal numbers (Straus et al., 1980), most research has identified women as the victims of family violence. The type of violence directed toward women, and the injuries they receive, are far more severe than the same actions against men (Frieze et al., 1980; Straus et al., 1980; Gelles, 1979). According to the Straus and Frieze studies with randomly selected populations, victims tend to be:

- women,
- between 20 and 28 years of age,
- with average to below average education levels,
- as often working as unemployed,
- but often with few material or economic resources.

However, the problems in underreporting and the selectivity of most research populations complicate any analysis of victim or batterer characteristics. Victims come from diverse social class, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Most have at least one child and many are socially isolated (despite being employed) (Fagan et al., 1980b). Spousal violence was reported in one study to be most common among young families with several children and in another, among non-white younger, urban families. Although alcohol abuse by assailants is present in many cases, there are no data to support alcohol abuse as any more than a correlate of domestic violence.

An increasing amount of research on spouse abuse has focused on the psycho-social characteristics of victims and their assailants and the nature of their relationships (e.g., Walker, 1979). This research has identified a number of correlates of violent behavior in the home, such as alcohol abuse, generational patterns, economic and other types of stress, particular types of power relationships in the couple, and poor sexual relationships. Based upon her clinical experience, Walker (1979) has profiled victims and abusers. Low self-esteem, stereotypical attitudes about battering and sex roles, and severe stress reactions characterize both victims and batterers. Victims also suffer from guilt and believe that little can be done to stop the violence (including police or other types of intervention). Batterers tend to blame others for their problems and behaviors, are extremely jealous, condone their own violence, often present a dual personality, and use sex as an aggressive and esteem-enhancing act.

In sum, the "discovery" of spousal abuse coincided with the expansion of social policy in the 1960s to include family behaviors.\* Through

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\*Stark and Flitcraft (1983) note that the "discovery" of family violence in the 1970s is hardly new. "Virtually every 20 years...the popular press has joined women's groups and charitable organizations to denounce wife-beating, child abuse, and related forms of family violence in the strongest terms" (page 330).

both feminist activism and medical attention to battered children, public attention turned to battered wives as part of a growing concern with rape, sexual abuse, and violent crime. Researchers examined not only the epidemiology of family violence, but also the profiles of victims and abusers. The scientific study of family violence increased as public recognition of its incidence and toll rose. Media attention focused on battered spouses, often with unfortunate and ironic consequences (Pagelow, 1978). Nevertheless, attitudes and beliefs about the family and marriage were consistently challenged. The privacy of the family gave way to new definitions of "appropriate" family behaviors, and demands for public policy and social interventions.

### FAMILY VIOLENCE--A SOCIAL PROBLEMS ANALYSIS

The process by which a social issue rises to the status of "social problem" often explains the sequence of events leading to the development of programs, services, and legislative initiatives to aid victims of family violence. Having once again "discovered" spouse abuse, public attention turned to the process of legal and social reform. A new social knowledge of family life, developed during an era when social intervention in family life had gained widespread support, created a context for defining family violence as an urgent social problem. However, social intervention, whether as policy or programmatic response, is not an inevitable consequence of a socially-defined problem (Kalmuss and Straus, 1983). A series of processes can be traced which shaped and influenced public responses to spouse abuse. In general, these processes take what are initially objective conditions (in this case, that there is violence in the home toward women and children) and collectively redefine them as harmful. The federal response to spouse abuse may be understood within this paradigm.

### Defining Family Violence

Social problem theorists focus on the processes by which issues are identified, defined, legitimated, and responded to as public concerns (see, for example, Becker, 1963; Blumer, 1971). The preceding section traced the identification of spouse abuse as a disturbing phenomenon. Having emerged from the shadows of family "privacy," the nature of the problem and its etiological roots were subjected to varying interpretations and definitions. As expected, the definitions varied according to the perspective and interests of the definer. Definitions ranged from violence against family members (including children and the elderly, as well as between spouses) to violence against wives.



Definers included grassroots groups, professionals, and government agencies.

The early definitions were rooted in the experiences and activities of private and public agencies who saw victims of family violence. Child welfare agencies saw battered children in increasing numbers as hospital staff and social workers identified and reported injured children as suspected victims of abuse. They saw family violence primarily as a family problem affecting children\* and broadened its definition to include emotional abuse and physical neglect. The emergence of grassroots programs for rape victims, followed by the development of shelter services for battered women, identified large numbers of adult victims of domestic violence. However, victim assistance and police crisis intervention programs identified a wide range of victims, from children to the elderly. Thus, while violence in the home was widely perceived, there was no unifying approach to defining the problem and policy responses remained fragmented.\*\*

Governmental activity began the process of legitimating family violence as a social problem, in part by subtly redefining it to shape its acceptance as a valid area of state intervention. Just as the early definitions from "the field" reflected the perspectives and interests of each sector, the reactions of federal agencies trying to stake claim to the new social problem were also highly individualistic (Wexler, 1982). Moreover, definitions of the nature and/or causes of family violence were influenced by the mission and interest of each agency.

For example, research in the late 1960s by the American Humane Association documented the problem of child abuse and neglect. By the time of the Congressional hearings in 1974, authorizing the creation of the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN), a popular definition emerged that child abuse was not a medical, legal or mental health problem, but a problem whose roots lie in social factors (unemployment, housing, health) and systemic family dysfunction. This view was reinforced by the 1977 NCCAN reauthorization hearings. Researchers, social workers, and child welfare agencies gave testimony identifying the varieties of family interventions which had developed in response to that early definition. Perhaps most significant is that there was little resistance to that definition from other public sectors. For nearly a century, the problem of child abuse has been placed squarely in the domain of child welfare agencies and public social services, with the support of the criminal justice system and medical profession (Schechter, 1982).

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\*Later on, maltreatment of adolescents also was identified.

\*\*They still are, according to a 1982 report by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, entitled The Federal Response to Domestic Violence.

While consensus on a definition of child abuse was reached relatively quickly, this was not the case with violence toward spouses. At one time, there were attempts to define spousal violence as part of a broader family violence definition including child maltreatment. Connections between child abuse and spouse abuse were documented in several NCCAN-funded studies of child abuse programs. Estimates of the incidence of spouse abuse among child abusing families were as high as 38 percent, according to NCCAN's Director (Besharov, 1978). However, there was resistance from several quarters to the notion that spouse abuse was rooted in a larger "social service" problem. With the "re-discovery" of spouse abuse came several competing explanations of its causes and cures. Each new paradigm spawned a lively debate, which to some observers represented a claims-staking activity by various federal agencies. Wexler (1982) identified three primary approaches to define family violence which were derived from early research:

- A "sick" society causes violence in the home and elsewhere. Spouse abuse is seen as the result of dysfunctional societal systems, part of a broad "culture of violence" thesis where physical force is an accepted method of conflict resolution. In this view, violence is a cultural norm, and the culture is "sick" (see, for example, Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967; Straus, 1973; Straus, 1976; Gelles, 1976).
- A "sick" family or individual is responsible for violence in the home. Dysfunctional or deviant families or offenders violate social norms and laws. Violence, whether at home or toward strangers, is a marginal phenomenon rooted in family deviance, conflict theory, or psychological dimensions (take your choice). Behavioral change and social control are prerequisites for ending violence (abuse). Unlike societal explanations, this orientation focuses on individual or family interactions rather than social structure as external events as the locus of intervention (see, for example, Elbow, 1977; Goode, 1974; O'Brien, 1971; Bard and Zacker, 1971).
- An ideology of patriarchy and male supremacy is responsible for all violence toward women (and children), including pornography and rape as well as violence in the home. Male power and authority cause violence toward women, and gender inequalities in the home in particular lead to violence toward spouses. Family violence is the act of maintaining paternal authority, and the "sickness" in this case is masculine privilege. As primarily a feminist analysis, this orientation calls for fundamental social changes in gender roles and power (both economic and political) to stop violence toward women, both in and out of the home (see, for example, Martin, 1976; Litcraft and Stark, 1978; Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Wardell et al., 1983).

In sum, while family violence had gained popular recognition as a social problem, a consensus on definitions was not forthcoming. Early definitions varied both on causes and on what victims or types of behavior should be included. For example, some definitions were limited to violence against wives, while others included any family member. Feminists saw violence in the home as part of violence toward women, while others saw violence in the home as part of societal violence and accordingly a part of criminal violence. While neglect or emotional abuse (e.g., threats or humiliation) were recognized as part of child maltreatment, this aspect of family violence remained an unresolved issue for adult victims. These contending claims were brought forward into the next stage: the process of legitimization.

#### **Legitimizing the Problem: Federal Interest**

Historically, the "nature" of a social problem is subject to continuous redefinition as it emerges and commands public attention (Blumer, 1971). It is the process of legitimization in which an emerging definition is institutionalized through "official" action by major social institutions, often government. Eventually, program and policy responses are implemented which reflect this "official" definition. By tracing family violence from emergence to definition to legitimization, it becomes possible to understand the courses of action proposed by various government agencies and the programmatic responses which grew out of those initiatives.

As described earlier, the new knowledge and understanding of family violence gave rise to competing definitions. Conflict and debate over the definition and nature of family violence spilled over from the research and practitioner communities into government attempts to define it so as to design social policy. Four separate federal-level hearings in an 18 month period indicated strong interest, but yielded little convergence or an understanding of appropriate responses:

- Commission on Civil Rights (January, 1978),
- House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis, and Cooperation (February, 1978),
- Senate Subcommittee on Child and Human Development (March, 1978),
- House Subcommittee on Select Education (July, 1979).

The hearings provided important forums for the presentation of conflicting claims about the causes of family violence and possible responses. However, a consensus on either causes or policies failed to emerge. Instead, the hearings helped to clarify the positions of several government agencies. Each went on independently to pursue a course of action consistent with its legislative mandate and agency mission. (These actions also may be viewed as attempts to "own" )

family violence, a path followed in other social problems such as child abuse). By 1979, seven federal agencies had developed programs or become associated with family violence. Each had developed its own problem definition and responses.

**Social Services Administration, Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) (now, Health and Human Services).** HEW defined family violence as the result of social factors (e.g., unemployment, health care) which create stress on the family and lead to dysfunctional family systems. The agency targetted limited funds under Title XX of the Social Security Act to aid battered women through a wide range of services, including shelter services.

**Community Services Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development.** Although no agency policy was developed to "define" family violence, limited funds were made available through Community Development Block Grants for battered women's services, including shelter funding.

**Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor.** CETA funds were made available for battered women's services, again without an "official" agency policy. Funds were used to pay staff salaries for shelter workers and to pay for job training for battered women (including stipends). The Women's Bureau of DOL was an important source of information and assistance, publishing a Resource Kit and providing knowledge on the programs of other federal agencies for battered women.

**National Institute on Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, HEW.** NIAAA viewed intra-family violence as the result of alcohol abuse, and provided funding through both services and research to support services for victims of family violence. Shelter services were eligible for NIAAA funding, through research and demonstration programs to reduce family violence through alcohol abuse intervention.

**National Institute on Mental Health, HEW.** Viewing family violence as a symptom of family deviance or individual pathology, NIMH funded programs to reduce spouse abuse through therapeutic programs to reduce spouse abuse through therapeutic interventions (e.g., counseling). Training, services, and research were available, through a competitive grant process. Also, community mental health centers provided services to violent husbands, victims, and families. NIMH funded the epidemiological studies of Straus et al., as well as post-doctoral fellowships to train family researchers.

**Office of Human Development Services, HEW.** The Office of Domestic Violence was created in 1979 as a policy coordination and clearing-house for HEW activity in family violence. ODV's role included recommending policies and programs to the HEW Secretary. Limited funds were available for publications, technical assistance, and other indirect (i.e., non-service) activity. No services were funded by ODV.

**Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice (DOJ).** DOJ viewed domestic violence as a crime, and considered it an act of individual deviance from legal behaviors. As such, the LEAA programs focused on legal sanctions and crime control policy. Two types of LEAA funds were utilized for domestic violence services. First, family violence was included as an eligible area for block grant funds to states and local agencies (Regional Planning Units). A variety of services were funded across the country, from training grants to shelters, police crisis intervention, prosecutorial programs, victim assistance programs, and counseling programs for identified spouse abusers. Second, federal discretionary grants were available specifically for domestic violence, beginning in 1978. LEAA was the first and most active federal agency to directly fund family violence services. Training, technical assistance, and information dissemination were also funded by LEAA. The LEAA program is the subject of this report, and is analyzed in detail later in this chapter and also in chapter 3.

Several legislative initiatives also attempted to clarify federal perceptions of domestic violence, and provide funds and services consistent with those perceptions. The 96th and 97th Congresses were a crucial period. In 1978, two bills were introduced; neither passed both houses. In 1980, bills again were introduced in both houses. The Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1980, introduced in the Senate, provided funds for federal demonstration programs and state block grants specifically for services for battered women, primarily shelters. A companion bill was introduced in the House. The bills differed only in their formula for allocations of monies between state and federal government. Several observers attributed the defeats to growing opposition to federal involvements in family violence--in effect, an attempt to reprivatize family matters despite over a decade of federal involvement (Marshner, 1979). Lobbyists for legislation to fund shelters reported some odd political bedfellows. Ironically, some who generally opposed federal intervention supported these bills, seeing them as an attempt to preserve families who had become irreversibly dysfunctional or as a reprieve for a victim about to leave.

Two other bills were introduced with the more modest goal of amending Title XX of the Social Security Act to allow funds to be used for shelter services for battered women. The companion bills, one in each house, were designed to stop states from prohibiting such use of Title XX funds. No additional funds were requested to serve

this currently unserved group, forcing battered women to "compete" with other groups for available service dollars. Once again, growing Congressional opposition to federal involvement in family violence defeated these bills. Again, opposition to the 1980 bills for federal aid to victims of domestic violence was premised on the twin ideologies that family matters were private and excluded from government intervention, and that federal aid to victims of family violence would violate the sanctity of marriage and the family.

In sum, the process of legitimating family violence as a social problem involved a burst of federal activity over a relatively short time. Federal hearings, legislation, and programs all began within a two to three year period starting in early 1978. The interest of the legislative branch and the competing definitions of family violence made it "available" to a responsive federal agency. Seven federal agencies undertook policy and/or programs for spouse abuse alone, while others also were active in child abuse matters. No single agency could say that it had taken a leadership role, nor did any agency's definition of family violence become the prevailing view.

However, it ended nearly as quickly as it began. Before a consensus could emerge, growing Congressional opposition to involvement in family violence resulted in the defeat of legislation and the dismantling of programs. Despite the extensive legislative and programmatic activity in states and localities across the country (Kalmuss and Straus, 1983), the federal government withdrew from the legitimatization process. For example, ODV and the LEAA program were both defunded after Fiscal Year 1980. What remained were local programs and new legislation designed to comprehensively aid victims of family violence through increased access to legal remedies and social services.

During this brief era, LEAA had developed and implemented the most extensive federal response to family violence. LEAA's family violence activity included, in addition to state/local block grants, federal discretionary grants, totaling over \$8,200,000 in four fiscal years through FY1980. Its activities included services, training, media, public education, and policy/research coordination. Its definition of family violence gained attention and acceptance, in part because the LEAA program was the largest and most visible federal response. In effect, LEAA inherited family violence.

From the LEAA policy initiative emerged what was the first (and last) "official" plan of action, implementation of policy, and programmatic response. Family violence had run its course as a social problem, and its definition and solutions were determined by LEAA. Family violence had become identified with LEAA, and accordingly, were seen as crime control through legal sanctions, despite the broader interpretations and responses from feminists and others which had emerged across the country.



## The LEAA Family Violence Program

The origins of the Family Violence Program are found in LEAA's Citizen's Initiative Program and its successor, the Victim/Witness Program. The Citizen's Initiative Program began in 1974 (FY1975) and continued until the establishment of the Victim Witness Program in 1976 (FY1977). In a LEAA paper entitled "An Overview of Victim Witness Assistance Programs," the progression is referred to as an "outgrowth." The "outgrowth" notion can be validated from several perspectives. First, the Citizen's Initiative Program emphasized citizen involvement in the criminal justice system. One program goal was for the criminal justice system to "consider and stratify highest the needs of interacting citizens." Second, these early demonstration projects established the need for expanded and refined services for victims and witnesses, and a specific program, Victim/Witness, was established. Included in this second program was an emphasis on victims of "sensitive crime": rape victims, sexually abused children, and domestic violence victims. With the support and urging from both feminist and criminal justice constituencies, the domestic violence and sexually abused children categories were separated out the following year into a distinct program: Family Violence.\* This history is examined in detail in Chapter 3.

However, the creation of the Family Violence Program, and its subsequent development and impact, are best understood within the historical context of LEAA. As described earlier, LEAA's program began at the same time that federal interest in family violence peaked. At the same time, LEAA, as an agency, was facing mounting pressure to justify its continuation. LEAA was created by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, and for several years had received relatively large appropriations. A rather large and complex organization developed out of the agency's various activities at the federal, state, and local levels. By 1978, it had become a somewhat controversial example of federal intervention in social problems. Congress began to ask for evidence of the agency's impact on crime as justification for continued reauthorization. LEAA's criminal justice constituency across the nation lacked the influence to counter criticism of wasteful bureaucracy, and ineffective programs.

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\*The definitions of victims and family violence varied from the Victim/Witness Program to the Family Violence Program. Rape victims were not included in family violence (apart from marital rape), but domestic violence was explicitly defined to include the elderly. Also, victims of extra-domestic violence--specifically, sexually abused children--continued as target populations for the two child sexual assault programs which were transferred from Victim/Witness to Family Violence funding.

In this context, LEAA's interest and entry into family violence served several purposes. First, the definition of family violence as a criminal activity allowed the agency to logically extend its jurisdiction into that area. LEAA's earlier involvement in Citizen's Initiative and Victim/Witness Programs provided strong precedent for the agency's involvement with victims. By adding family violence to the agency's agenda, LEAA sought to justify its continuation at a time when critics openly wondered whether the agency was effective. Second, the development of the Family Violence Program enabled it to broaden its constituency. This new program added to the ranks of LEAA supporters a variety of interest groups previously not identified with crime and justice issues. Feminists, child welfare and social service agencies, and clinical practitioners became new participants in LEAA activities. These constituencies were natural and strong supporters of the Family Violence Program--and accordingly, the agency's continuation. However, these additional constituencies created pressure on LEAA to broaden the intent and scope of the program. As described later on, these events influenced the goals, services, and ultimately the impacts of the programs.

A third purpose reflected events internal to LEAA. The increasing scrutiny of LEAA's activities and impacts gave rise to questioning within the agency about its programs and their contributions to the attainment of its mission. In 1977, it was rumored that new LEAA leadership would phase out the Victim/Witness Program. The Family Violence Program can be seen as a strategic effort to retain the victim advocacy focus within LEAA, though recast to fit the emerging family violence issue.\*

Moreover, by redefining family violence as essentially a crime problem, LEAA was able to withstand growing Congressional resistance to federal involvement in family violence. While other agencies did not come forward with family violence initiatives, LEAA was able to launch a program by emphasizing the need for criminal justice assistance to victims. The Victim/Witness Program manager proposed a special initiative on family violence, with the following rationale:

"In spite of the high incidence of these crimes, the justice system has traditionally given these problems low priority, ignoring, perhaps, the fact that these patterns of violent behavior are being passed on from one generation to the next, often progressing from violence in the home to violence in the street. A new LEAA Initiative directed at "Crimes in the Home" would be very timely, given the media's recent

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\*Several of the Family Violence Program goals were taken directly or adapted from the goals of one of the Victim/Witness programs.

attention to child abuse, wife battering, and community crime prevention. It also is timely in terms of the Carter Administration's interest in strengthening families (LEAA, 1977)."

No longer a social issue but now a crime concern, LEAA moved forward while other federal agencies did not. To mobilize support for agency involvement in family violence, the LEAA Program Manager testified at the U.S. Civil Rights Commission hearings in January, 1978, as well as at the NCCAN reauthorization hearings in 1977. She became active both within and outside the agency in a concerted attempt to mobilize LEAA to initiate a family violence program. By increasing the criminal justice emphasis in the definition of family violence, and broadening its political constituencies through a proactive stance to what many viewed as a feminist or social service issue, the Family Violence Program Manager was successful in gaining agency acceptance of family violence as an area of agency interest and direct involvement. In return, the program attracted new supporters for agency continuation and reinforced the victimology perspective in agency programs.

#### PROGRAM GOALS AND INTENT

In FY1977, the Special Programs Division of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), LEAA's demonstration program division, awarded six grants under its ongoing Victim/Witness Program to develop comprehensive programs and services for victims of family violence. Grant awards were made in FY1977 to four programs serving battered women and two programs serving victims of child sexual assault; these programs had been funded originally in FY1976 as Victim Witness programs. In December, 1977, a special program initiative was developed by OCJP specifically to address family violence, in response to the internal memorandum described earlier. This set forth the guidelines for an expanded demonstration program which was to begin in FY1978. Eleven new grants were awarded under this program, while five of the original victim/witness grantees were funded for their second year under the national family violence program. Altogether, the LEAA Family Violence Demonstration Program funded 16 programs in FY1978 and nine others in FY1979, providing comprehensive services to victims of domestic violence and child sexual assault.

\*Special Programs Division, Office of Regional Operations, LEAA, April 15, 1977. Internal Memorandum.

First-year funding for the six family violence programs (and technical support) funded under the Victim/Witness Program totalled \$721,159. Grants were awarded for a 12-month period, although many of the grantees extended their first year operations to 15 months. Under the expanded family violence program, funding for 16 projects in FY1978 totalled over \$2.4 million, and \$2.1 million in FY1979 for 25 sites. In chapter 3, the funding strategy is described in greater detail.

As described earlier, the Family Violence Program grew out of earlier LEAA efforts in Citizen's Initiative and Victim Witness Programs. The agency goals and purposes were presented in a "Background Paper" accompanying the Program Announcement in 1977. The original six, and eventually all 23 family violence projects pursued the following nine goals:

- reduction in community acceptance of intra-family violence;
- increased reporting of incidents of intra-family violence and documentation of the extent, nature, and interrelationship of these crimes;
- demonstration of an effective mechanism for institutional coordination among police, prosecutors, protective services agencies, welfare, hospitals, community mental health, and other relevant public and private agencies and community organizations to respond to family violence situations;
- documentation of the needs of these families and the development of methods to address these needs, including a reallocation of existing services as well as creation of new services;
- improved knowledge, skills, and cooperation of medical and social service agency personnel in the collection and transmission of evidence and information to the legal system in cases of intra-family violence;
- reduction in the number of repeat calls to the police related to family disturbances;
- increased prosecution of cases involving repeated violence of a severe nature;
- establishment of community corrections and/or pre-trial diversion programs specifically designed for defendants involved in intra-family violence cases; and
- reduction in the number of intra-family homicides and serious assaults.

### Program Intent

Reflected in these goals are several perspectives which combine the interests of LEAA and the program's broader constituencies. First, the program goals called for the participation of several agencies and systems in responding to family violence. "Institutional coordination," improvement of skills, etc. in medical and social service agencies, and documentation of family service needs were specifically identified. LEAA envisioned a multi-agency response which required cooperation between justice system and other public and private agencies. Several forms of cooperation were implied, including referrals, training, and case documentation (information sharing). This aspect of the goals strongly reflected LEAA's victim assistance perspective as a central program element.

A second perspective is the effort to involve medical, social services, and other agencies in the "criminalization" of family violence. Although the goals repeatedly emphasize the role of the justice system, they also imply that the police and courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction in these cases. Again, the theme of cooperation and system linkages is evident. There apparently was an assumption that criminal justice intervention alone would not be sufficient to reduce family violence--there was a strong emphasis on social service involvement to meet the needs of violent families. However, prosecution and corrections were clearly the central aim.

Third, the program goals referred to the more serious and repeated acts of family violence--cases where the violence has been either more severe or occurring longer. The mentions of "serious assaults," homicides, and "repeated violence," together with the emphasis on prosecution and corrections, suggest that the programs were expected to devote more attention to intervention than to prevention. While some goals reflected a victimology perspective, others were clearly rooted in deterrence. Identifying the optimal role of the justice system became a central issue in the program; and activities spanned the range of justice system responses, from police calls-for-service to diversion and corrections.

Fourth, the LEAA program was conceived as a broad policy experiment, testing a wide spectrum of intervention models to determine which was best. It left open the question of methods, and instead broadly included both direct and indirect services--that is, providing services to clients while also attempting to change the services provided by other agencies. In addition, community attitudes were targeted for change. Grantees were faced with a rather ambitious agenda to serve victims, train other agencies, promote coordination and educate the public. The goals were defined in a way to encourage broad community participation.

However, a precise model for accomplishing this agenda was not suggested--it was left to the grantees to determine how these goals

could best be met. The performance measures to accomplish these ends were not addressed. Rather, the overall program purpose was "to help communities identify effective approaches to the reduction and prevention of acts of violence upon family members." The goals were stated in a way which encouraged participation from a variety of groups, the broader constituencies for the program as well as LEAA's traditional grantees. Although they offered little explicit direction, the goals were easily embraced by diverse groups.

In sum, the Family Violence Program assumed that the criminal justice system must play an active, but not exclusive, role in responding to family violence. In its December 1977 Program Announcement, LEAA carefully stated the need for criminal justice intervention in combination with social services and community groups to develop a "comprehensive" approach. The guidelines suggested that the role of the legal system should not be enlarged, but clarified and strengthened vis-a-vis other agencies. The approach called for "cooperative interaction" between agencies of the justice, social service, and medical systems. The range of interventions included both victim safety and protection as well as interaction with offenders for punitive or therapeutic purposes. LEAA also stated that one purpose of the program was to define precisely the responsibilities of criminal justice agencies, and to develop models for cross-agency responses to family violence centering on the justice system. Despite the criminal justice focus of LEAA, the goals and activities were designed to respond to the other constituencies for family violence, while also recognizing the complexity of the problems.

### Underlying Assumptions: Deterrence and Social Control

A review of source documents suggests that the Family Violence Program was rooted in the assumptions of deterrence and social control. No specific theory base was acknowledged by program initiators; the deterrence orientation was neither explicit nor conscious. Nevertheless, both internal LEAA memoranda\* and several program documents emphasize criminal justice processing as the centerpiece of the program design. The program design encouraged both the reality of punishment and the use of the justice system's more informal nuances to threaten punishment. These efforts represented attempts to both deter and control the behavior of spouse abusers.

\*Eventually, LEAA expanded its scope of prescriptive activities to include services provided by the other family violence constituencies. In effect, the federal agency had broadened its problem analysis, in recognition of the complexity of family violence and the projects' documentation of victims' service needs and wishes. (See chapters 3, 6 and 7, as well as Volume II: Case Studies for a review of this process of re-definition.)



The offender-focused goals--increased reporting, arrests, and prosecutions--suggest that family violence could be reduced through criminal punishment. The victim-focused goals directed projects to encourage victims' efforts to pursue criminal justice remedies to prevent further violence. The goal of establishing community corrections reflects the effort at social control of offenders through the imposition of legal sanctions for potential violations and probation supervision. The community-focused goals--increased reporting, reduced community acceptance--identify the importance of well-publicized criminal justice services to establish community norms for "official" intervention with potential spouse abusers. These norms in turn were seen as enhancing the "deterrent climate" for criminalizing spouse abuse.

These perspectives define family violence as a criminal act, motivated by the individual offender's deviance rather than by cultural norms or ideology. Among the various alternative "causal" explanations of family violence--cultural norms, individual deviance, or patriarchal dominance--the program's emphasis on deterrence and social control is associated most closely with assumptions of individual pathology, deviance, or violence. This problem analysis, inherent in both the national program goals and the projects' individual objectives, minimized other perspectives--culture, patriarchy--which were prominent during earlier stages of the emergence of family violence as a social problem. Although medical and social service providers were encouraged to participate in the community-wide response, justice system intervention was the centerpiece." Other responses--and the causal assumptions underlying them--were assigned secondary importance.

The adoption of the deterrence perspective came amid a vigorous national debate over the appropriateness of criminal sanctions in reducing the high crime rates of the 1970s (Blumstein et al., 1978). Based on encouraging research findings on the deterrent and incapacitative effects of criminal sanctions, the Family Violence Program proceeded to experiment with an array of criminal justice system interventions to reduce and prevent family violence. The broad range of program goals implied that deterrent effects would be found across the spectrum of justice system interventions, from informed police "warnings" to conviction and incapacitative sentencing.

Deterrence theory presumes that criminal activity can be inhibited by the impositions of criminal sanctions (Gibbs, 1975). Two types of deterrent effects are thought to result from the imposition of criminal sanctions:

- specific deterrence, where the subsequent behavior of a punished (or threatened) offender is presumed to be reduced by the threat or reality of further punishment, and
- general deterrence, where the effect of a sanction is to inhibit the criminal activity of people other than those punished.

Deterrence theory also assumes that offenders are rational decision makers--that they will respond to incentives, especially the negative incentives offered by criminal justice interventions. Accordingly, when offenders are arrested, convicted, and sentenced, a deterrent effect occurs--both the punished offender (specific deterrence) and other offenders (general deterrence) will be inhibited from committing crimes by the likelihood of negative consequences of those same sanctions. Of course, offenders must perceive the negative consequences of criminal sanctions. Deterrence also presumes that differences in sanctions (if perceived) will produce decreases in crime rates. In other words, when sanctions become either more severe or more likely and offenders perceive these risks, marginal decreases in crime rates will parallel marginal increases in the severity or frequency of the imposed sanctions.

Several cognitive processes are thought to occur within the deterrence framework. The heart of deterrence is the proposition that human behavior can be influenced by incentives (Blumstein et al., 1978). Various theories differ on precisely how people perceive sanctions, how they consider the "utility curves" (i.e., opportunity costs) of sanctions, how offenders respond to different sanctions, and how these processes are mediated by background or contextual factors such as personality or cultural prerogatives. The effects of sanctions are likely to vary for different types of behaviors, so that burglary or loitering may be subject to quite different reductions by the imposition of particularly stiff penalties or an increase in the likelihood of arrest. The commonality among various deterrence theories is that the negative inducements of criminal sanctions will discourage others from committing similar criminal acts. These linkages are presumed to operate regardless of the causes of criminal behavior (i.e., the offenders "drive" or "motivation") and factors affecting crime (such as economic conditions) and the sanctions themselves (such as prison conditions).

Other theorists agree that it is too simplistic to assume that people respond to the threat of punishment. Zimring and Hawkins (1973) suggested that a variety of processes, particularly changes in attitude, condition the individual's responses to the threat of punishment. These processes may include anxiety, moral judgements, economic choice behaviors, or operant conditioning. Whether any of these processes are evident for particular types of behaviors--that is whether the causes of certain criminal behaviors are responsive to attempts to activate these processes--determines whether deterrence will actually effect such criminal behaviors.

Both general and specific deterrence rely on these foundations. They differ, though, in that specific deterrence assumes that attitudinal changes occur in response to actual punishment, while general deterrence operates via the threat of punishment which one perceives being meted out to others. Specific deterrence is akin to a social control approach, where the apparatus of the justice system is used

both to change the conditions affecting criminal behavior while threatening punishment if prescribed behaviors are not followed. Komhauser (1979) describes social control as "actual or potential rewards or punishments which accrue from conformity to or deviation from norms" (p. 641). In this framework, deterrence, social control and social learning perspectives are closely related--offenders "learn" appropriate behaviors through avoidance of the negative consequences of prohibited acts. Personal and social rewards accrue from changing one's behaviors, and often are tied to changes in attitude or social conditions. Accordingly, specific deterrence is most appropriate for learned criminal behaviors; that is, for those offenders who see both positive rewards and the avoidance of negative consequences in no longer committing crimes.

Deterrence as crime control policy is implemented through criminal justice intervention and the imposition of criminal sanctions. Whether one views the punishment as the sanction itself or simply the experience of criminal justice processing (Freeley, 1979), the effectiveness of a deterrence policy depends on the consistency and rationality of the justice system response. For both general and specific deterrence, inconsistent enforcement weakens the perception that crime and punishment are linked. Lacking predictable consequences, the potential offender most likely will continue to commit crimes.

For family violence, the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the consistency of sanctioning.\* Historically, justice system responses to family violence were weak, inconsistent, and mediated by social factors. Generally, criminal justice system responses reflected the attitude that these cases didn't belong in the system. Parnas (1972) defined a continuum of police responses to domestic disturbances, from "negotiation" to arrest. The decision to arrest depended on officers weighing several subjective factors, including the probability of serious harm. Field and Field (1973) identified a "stitch" rule; severity of injury dictated the arrest decision. Black (1979) found that race and social class mediated officers' decisions to arrest or use other approaches.

Overall, arrest for family violence was rarely invoked, and was the subject of two landmark lawsuits. In New York (Bruno v. Codd, 1978), the police department was required to make arrests for violations of temporary restraining orders. The civil injunctions carried a civil contempt penalty for violation, and the suit challenged the police practice to not arrest violators. In Oakland, California (Scott v. Hart, 1979), a similar suit required the filing of police complaints for all spouse abuse cases. This suit challenged the longstanding police

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\*Wilson (1975) argues that swiftness is crucial as well, to ensure that offenders link the act with the consequence and not with some intervening event.

practice to use conciliatory or other non-arrest responses to family violence. Ironically, the perception of a high rate of police injuries in domestic disturbance calls was indicated as a reason that had deterred police from making arrests.

Studies of prosecution and corrections for spouse abusers were even rarer as LEAA began its effort. With so few cases resulting in arrest, there were few criminal court actions. Recall the evolution of family violence as a social problem--the Family Violence Program began at a time when the laws presented significant obstacles to arrest (Lerman, 1979) and when non-arrest alternatives were fashionable (e.g., police crisis intervention; see, for example, Bard and Zacker, 1974). The statutory barriers to arrest, the "witness" requirement for misdemeanors, as well as police officer attitudes toward arrest in family violence cases (Black, 1979) served to limit the number of cases entering courts. Once in the courts, family violence cases presented complexities which prosecutors were ill-equipped to handle. Smith (1983) suggests several reasons for weaknesses in criminal court responses:

- attitudes of court officials that family violence cases did not belong in the courts;
- witness reluctance;
- prosecutors' beliefs that convictions were harder to obtain due to weak evidence;
- judges' reluctance to convict offenders in non-stranger violence cases due to a lack of sentencing alternatives.

Arguably, the failure of the police and courts to respond to family violence cases undermined the deterrent affects of criminal justice interventions. In fact, the failure to respond with "swift and sure" sanction may inadvertently add to family violence. There is no legal check, no social control, on the wife beater who learns that he will be neither arrested nor punished for his actions. Absent sanction, the spouse abuser could reasonably assume that his actions were tacitly approved. The inaction of the justice system may contribute to the escalation into even more serious and lethal violence of many spouse abuse cases (Wilt et al., 1977).

In sum, the Family Violence Program for spouse abuse was an experiment in deterrence and social control. By increasing the number and rate of arrests, the deterrent effects of arrest were increased for both arrested offenders and those not yet identified. The LEAA program sought to expand community awareness of the new policies for justice system intervention, and create a climate where arrest was seen as a likely result of family violence. Victim support services and special prosecution efforts similarly were designed to increase the frequency and severity of court sanctions. Civil remedies were seen as methods to limit future violence by threatening violators with further court action. Both the threat and reality of prosecution were

used as social control mechanisms for identified spouse abusers, as was early intervention/diversion services and community corrections (projects using rehabilitative techniques for offenders). Social services were included in the program to support victim efforts to utilize justice system interventions.

The Family Violence Program encouraged the full response of the criminal justice system--from its subtlest nuances to its severest sanctions--to stop violence and abuse among family members. Through a national demonstration program designed around nine goals, LEAA conducted a major policy experiment to test the deterrent effects of criminal justice responses to family violence. The program also tested several ways to implement deterrence, and boldly sought to include medical, social service, and grassroots programs in what is essentially a criminal justice function. Eventually, the program approach expanded to acknowledge the complexity of family violence, but justice system services remained central to the theory and design.

In policy experiments, there are two potential sources of variability--theory failure and program failure. To the extent that the assumptions and processes of deterrence were compatible with the complex phenomena of family violence, the program design was an appropriate response. For example, if family violence is indeed a learned behavior, the behaviorist assumptions of deterrence theory are most appropriate. If, on the other hand, family violence is rooted in cultural norms, the general deterrent effect of justice system interventions may be neutralized by other social processes. Alternative explanations of spousal assault were acknowledged in the program design only to the extent that grassroots, medical and social service providers could address them while still funneling cases through the justice system.

The deterrence assumptions of the Family Violence Program were implemented and tested by criminal justice agencies and social service providers, who challenged the traditional practices of the police and the courts in family violence cases. Changes in policy and procedure were needed to put into practice deterrence policies. Based on the apparent success of its Victim/Witness Program in effecting similar changes, LEAA naturally assumed that the family violence projects could reasonably be expected to accomplish system change goals and that such changes would be accepted, if not welcomed, by criminal justice agencies. In this way, the tests of deterrence presupposed this acceptance, and corollary changes in policies and attitudes dating back to the nineteenth century (Stark and Flitcraft, 1983).

This report presents the results of this test. It presents empirical evidence of the successes and failures of the Family Violence Program, as well as an analysis of the process underlying these results. The report also examines the federal government's conduct of the policy experiment, including an analysis of how the social problem responses of LEAA were instrumental in the results of the Family Violence Program. Conclusions and recommendations address the conduct of

future policy experiments, policies and programs to respond to family violence, and future directions for research and policy analysis.

## The National Family Violence Evaluation

The 1977 amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act mandated that the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) study the effects of family violence on children and youth. To meet this mandate, OJJDP's research agency, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP), awarded a grant in September, 1978, to the URSA Institute, a nonprofit social research and planning organization located in San Francisco. The evaluation was designed as a four year effort leading to the development of national policies and guidelines for intervention strategies to aid battered women and reduce family violence.

The LEAA Family Violence Program was a national policy experiment to test the efficacy of deterrence theory and criminal justice approaches in reducing the incidence and severity of family violence. The Family Violence Program differed from "traditional" demonstrations where comparable experimental models are tested in several sites under varying conditions. For example, there was no preliminary analysis that identified key aspects of project structure and operation for inclusion in the development of a "model." Rather, the national program goals were developed in such a way as to encourage a diversity of project initiatives that would impact on the policies of systems and institutions as well as on victims and families.

While the absence of a model complicated potential analyses of the effects of any single approach, the programmatic range of the national demonstration generated a wide range of information and knowledge about responses to domestic violence. The range in program models developed a spectrum of justice system approaches for family violence intervention and provided evaluation audiences with empirical knowledge about the impacts of family violence on children and youth, community institutions, and victims--overwhelmingly women.

In 1978, the Family Violence Evaluation took on special significance given the "state of the art" at that time in approaches to preventing and reducing family violence. Research and evaluation data were scarce: research on family violence to date was limited to studies on etiology, incidence, and a small number of treatment efforts. In



contrast, the array of family violence projects encompassed the entire range of programmatic and institutional responses to family violence throughout the country. Consequently, the hypotheses constructed from the national evaluation provided an exploratory analysis of methods to implement deterrence policies and the effects of these approaches on a broad population of victims and their families.

## EVALUATION GOALS

The evaluation of the LEAA Family Violence Demonstration Program had the following major goals:

- develop information on the epidemiological characteristics of family violence project clients (incidence, severity, chronicity) compared to national samples and determine the implications for programs, policies, legislation, and service delivery;
- determine how well the family violence projects receive cases from both the justice system and community resources of referral;
- assess the impact of family violence and subsequent intervention on children and youth;
- describe and analyze implementation problems, project service strategies, community education and outreach activities, and methods of system coordination and improvement;
- determine the extent to which the family violence projects improve the responses of service agencies and institutions to victims of domestic violence, including service integration and delivery;
- explore and assess whether the family violence project intervention strategies (direct service and system change) contribute to reductions in repeated incidents of intra-family assault and acts of violence.

## APPROACH

The emerging service approaches and intervention strategies each had strong advocates during the program development period. Yet little evidence of their relative effectiveness existed at that time. The focus of the evaluation was on analyzing which types of projects

using which approaches and in what settings were most likely to achieve the program goals to impact on family violence. Also, the evaluation tried to develop research strategies, methodologies, and techniques--evaluation technology--to assist agencies and programs to assess the impacts and effectiveness of other efforts in family violence. There was no consensus on what constituted project "success" or positive client/family outcomes. The complex needs of family members in violent homes, as well as varying interpretations by projects of the causes of family violence, made it difficult to define universally applicable or desirable outcomes. Accordingly, a broad range of family outcomes were included in the evaluation design.

For these reasons, the evaluation design relied on several methods--qualitative and quantitative--to measure the effects of the wide range of policies and services being tested. The design also attempted to measure incremental changes in attitude and policy which preceded the larger impacts on victims and families. Figure 2-1, shown in chapter 2, shows the analysis framework for the evaluation, where the goals of system change and community involvement are viewed as interim steps in achieving impacts on the incidence and severity of family violence. The methodology is described in detail in chapter 2.

## COMPONENTS

Three major data-gathering and analysis components were used to gather evaluation data, measure project and program impacts, and attain the evaluation goals:

- an analysis of the history and development of each project;
- a process study; and
- an impact study.

### History and Development Study

At each site, detailed histories were compiled of the project's and the community's responses to family violence. The first report focused on a cross-site discussion of the origins of the national program and the projects, the variation in service approaches, and projects' experiences in operationalizing their service components. A discussion of project structural features--how they were organized to deliver services (e.g., subcontracting approaches, organizational affiliation)--and a compilation of services provided across-site were included in the first report. In addition, the report summarized the immediate

consequences or effects of project implementation in each community as observed in civil courts, criminal justice agencies, and social service systems. The report also discussed the barriers encountered by projects in attaining LEAA program goals. Issues in measurement and their implications for evaluation of project effects were described.

### Process Evaluation

There were two components in the Process Evaluation: qualitative analyses of project services and approaches, and quantitative data to measure and describe program inputs. A second interim report featured quantitative descriptive assessments of client characteristics, project services, and services through referral to other agencies, including civil court and criminal justice agencies. Documentation and measurement of project operations and approaches were utilized as input variables for inclusion in the impact analyses in the Final Report.

An additional component of the Process Evaluation was a description and analysis of project services and approaches. A discussion of structural features of programs--how they were organized to deliver services (e.g., subcontracting approaches, organizational affiliations, etc.), and a description of the social process of intervention--are included in this final report. These portrayals illustrate the complexity of both the service needs of violent families, the host of causal factors contributing to spouse abuse, and the difficulty of developing and sustaining an intervention strategy. The impacts of organization and structural features on interventions are described. This information provides clues for implementation strategy in future endeavors. These descriptions also provide a background for explaining why particular services were effective and how they might better impact on systems and families. Finally, the descriptions identify the issues and difficulties in implementing deterrence policy for family violence. The unique program design, where several agencies collaborate with the justice system to improve criminal interventions to deter future violence, is analyzed. Recommendations are made on the success and feasibility of this crime control strategy.

### Impact Study

This Final Report presents the Impact Study. It addresses questions concerning the projects' impact on the justice and social service systems, community responses and attitudes, and on the victims and families who use the projects' services. In addition, the Impact Study includes a cost component providing estimates of project costs and the utilization of resources. These measures provide approximate indicators of projects' cost efficiency, according to service emphasis and structural characteristics. The policy analysis examines the origins of the Family Violence Program and the emergence of criminal justice responses to spouse abuse. The structure and process of

project efforts to implement the deterrence assumptions of the program design are analyzed for future policy development. The impact analyses examine both project impacts on the justice system (to improve the deterrent effects of the justice system) and on victims and families. The outcomes of the demonstration projects--the institutionalization of services and the continuation of projects--are analyzed as a further test of the practical and theoretical significance of the Family Violence Program.

The remainder of this report begins with a review of the evaluation methodology (chapter 2). The program history and process analysis is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents information on victim, offender, and family characteristics. Data on the incidence, severity, and history of violence among project clients is analyzed to contribute knowledge on the dynamics and context of family violence. Chapter 5 analyzes the impacts of project services on victims and families. Both the recurrence of abuse and social outcomes are analyzed, and the mediating effects of background characteristics and violence history are identified.

Chapter 6 examines the impacts of the projects on the justice system, measuring the responses of the police, prosecutors, and corrections agencies to the development of family violence projects and services and efforts to strengthen criminal justice interventions. Chapter 7 reviews the institutionalization and continuation of projects and services as a further measure of project impact and the practical issues in deterrence policy for family violence. The final chapter presents conclusions from the tests of project interventions, and recommendations for policy, program design, and a research agenda for family violence.

Volume II presents case studies from 10 projects. The case studies examine the history, development, process and systems impact of each site. The outcome of each project is also discussed, including an analysis of factors leading to the continuation of projects and institutionalization of services and policies. The ten sites were selected to present a cross-section of service emphasis, project auspices and origins, organizational structure, and geographic variation. Volume III presents tabulated data from each site for client characteristics and project services.

## 2 Evaluation Approach & Methodology

This chapter describes the approach and methodology for the national evaluation of the LEAA Family Violence Program. It begins with an overview to the evaluation, including both the goals of the evaluation and the scope and methods employed in the effort. Next, the problems encountered in implementing the research design are described. The data sources for this report are presented. The final section summarizes several key methodological lessons learned from this evaluation.

Several policy and programmatic considerations influenced the evaluation design. The description or analysis of social interventions in an action setting raises numerous methodological choices. These choices are not limited to decisions about which methods or techniques should be employed, but also include more fundamental issues such as the links between theory, practice, and methods; the selection of variables to operationalize theory; and, measurement and attribution of "change." One also must arrive at a synthesis between the purpose or goal of evaluation research and its conduct. That is, clarity as to the informational needs to be served by the evaluation should shape and guide the conduct of the study. If purposes or goals are vague or conflicting, the conduct of the study may be made more difficult and its results less powerful. Following the discussion of the evaluation design, the chapter describes how such considerations influenced the research design for the Family Violence Program evaluation.

## Orientation of the Evaluation

The LEAA Family Violence Demonstration Program was a national policy experiment to test the efficacy of several intervention approaches and services in reducing the incidence and severity of family violence. The program differed from "traditional" demonstrations where comparable experimental models are tested in several sites under varying conditions. Rather, the national program goals were developed in such a way as to encourage a diversity of program initiatives that would impact on the policies of systems and institutions as well as on victims and families. While the absence of a concise model complicated potential analyses of the efficacy of any single approach, the broad programmatic range of the demonstration projects was expected to provide extensive information and knowledge to improve institutional responses to family violence. The evaluation was designed to lead to the development of sound national policies and guidelines for the development of intervention strategies for battered women and their family members.

When the Family Violence Evaluation began in 1978, it took on special significance given limited empirical knowledge on the "state-of-the-art" in preventing and reducing family violence and the dearth of basic research in this area. The array of projects encompassed a broad spectrum of programs, services, and policies on family violence. The 23 sites throughout the country insured a study of national visibility and importance. Knowledge regarding family violence, at that time, was limited to case study analyses to suggest etiological hypotheses and early attempts to measure incidence and a prevalence. There were few studies of treatment efforts. Consequently, an important aspect of the evaluation, for some audiences, involved hypothesis construction and knowledge building. The hypotheses generated through the evaluation, in turn, were designed for more conclusive testing and identification of promising approaches in this area.

## EVALUATION GOALS

As described in Chapter 1, the nine program goals set forth in the Program Announcement guided the activities of the 23 grantees. However, the broad program goals were not cast in the specific terms necessary to guide an evaluation effort. The URSA Institute in collaboration with OJJDP developed evaluation goals to guide the study. The major evaluation goals included:

- Develop information on the epidemiological characteristics of family violence project clients (incidence, severity, chronicity) and determine the implications of programs, policies, legislation, and service delivery;
- Determine how well the family violence projects received cases from both the justice system and community resources of referral;
- Assess the impact of family violence and subsequent intervention on children and youth;
- Describe and analyze implementation problems, projects' service strategies, community education and outreach activities, and methods of system coordination and improvement;
- Determine the impact of the family violence projects on the responses of service agencies and institutions to victims of domestic violence, including service integration and delivery;
- Explore and assess whether the family violence project intervention strategies (direct service and systems change) contribute to reductions of repeated incidents of intra-family assault and acts of violence;
- Determine the estimated cost-effectiveness of family violence intervention strategies and relative costs of achieving the various national program goals.

The selection of these evaluation goals attempted to blend the interests of various evaluation stakeholders and audiences. Each of the actors involved in this effort brought personal expectations for the evaluation. As is illustrated by the above list of evaluation goals, the disparate concerns included desires for more basic or epidemiological research, applied research regarding service documentation and effects, and more wide-ranging analyses of impacts not only on adult participants in intra-family disputes but also the effects of such disputes on children and youth. Thus, while the goals chosen for the evaluation represented an attempt to synthesize these differing informational needs, the variations in emphasis and interest created tensions which were manifest throughout the evaluation effort. Also, the evaluation was intended to develop evaluation technology (research strategies, methodologies, and techniques) to assist other agencies

and programs in assessing the impacts of other efforts in family violence. The effects of these differing orientations on the evaluation are more fully described in later sections of this chapter.

## Approach and Methodology

The evaluation approach was a pretest-posttest cross-sectional design comparing the impacts of various types and combinations of intervention services on system responses and victim outcomes. The program design assumed that criminal justice processing of family violence cases, in conjunction with various social services, would reduce the re-incidence of abuse and improve the social functioning of victims and families. The evaluation examined projects' impacts on justice and social service system responses by analyzing their policies and services before and after project implementation. To measure project impacts on victims and families, the incidence and severity of post-project abuse was measured, controlling for victim (and family) background and services received. A parallel analysis of victims' social outcomes was conducted. The relationship between social outcomes and subsequent abuse also was analyzed to assess the overall impact of project services. Figure 2-1 graphically displays the conceptual framework for the evaluation.

Although each service approach and treatment strategy had strong advocates, little evidence as to their relative effectiveness existed when this study began. Thus, a primary focus of the evaluation was to determine which types of projects using which approaches and what settings were most likely to achieve LEAA program goals to impact on family violence. Moreover, when the evaluation started, there was little consensus as to what constituted either project "success" or positive client and family outcomes. The complex needs of families involved in family violence (both adults and children) made it difficult to identify universally applicable or desirable outcomes. Thus, the evaluation effort proceeded from the recognition that there was no simple or single outcome measure available for study.

To address the broad range of policies and services being tested, and to sensitively measure incremental changes in policy and behavior, the evaluation employed both qualitative and quantitative methods to assess the various program goals. The Research Design (Fagan et al., 1979) described a general approach to the evaluation which included



FIGURE

Program Inputs

- Developmental History
- Advisory Board
- Organization/ Administration
- Staff experiences, training, and qualifications
- Budget and other resources
- Outreach
- Linkages
- Client demographics and history of abuse
- Services & Advocacy

Federal Inputs

- Media packages
- Prosecutor training
- Police training
- Technical Assistance

*Direct Service*

*Community Education*

*System Coordination and training*

Intervening Community/System Impacts

- Increased prosecutions
- Provision of "comprehensive" services
- Establish diversionary programs

- Community acceptance and attitudes
- Budget
- Legislation
- Increased reports

- Improved documentation of family needs
- Improve knowledge, skills
- Service coordination & integration of medical, legal & social services

Impact on victims & families

Changes in:

- Family ecology
- Reduce repeat calls for intervention
- Reduced intra-family assaults and homicides

three hierarchical, yet inter-dependent domains of variables: program inputs, intermediate or intervening goals, and impacts on victims and families. These domains were analyzed to answer three primary areas of inquiry:

- Did the family violence projects do what they set out to do?
- Which project service and impact goals were met?
- Which project and client characteristics influenced the observed impacts?

Given these general areas of inquiry, three major data gathering and analysis components were designed to attain the evaluation goals. These included: 1) an analysis of the history and development of each project; 2) a process study; and 3) an impact study. Each component is presented below in more detail. Tables 2-1 and 2-2 present a summary of the major data collection components and activities in relation to the national program goals:

# HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT STUDY

The History and Development Study was designed to document and describe the emergence and start-up phase of the family violence projects. This component of the evaluation examined federal and local factors which shaped the projects and assessed the influence of those factors on project development. Federal inputs to project formation included: the national program goals; national guidelines which delineated service and networking priorities; technical assistance on selected topics; and the level of financial support available.

A primary purpose of this component study was to assess the operating environment at the point of project initiation. At each site, detailed histories were compiled of the projects' and the community's response to family violence. The project's inputs included local awareness of the problems of family violence and extant community services, responses by formal agencies or systems, resources available within the locality, and the grant writing process including problem definition, proposed intervention strategies, and resource levels. These inputs both influenced and established the preliminary boundaries within which the family violence projects developed.

This approach fostered an understanding of the projects as both shaped by and, in turn, shaping their local environment. In this way, the emergence and development of the family violence project as new organizations and as the initiators of new services could be traced.

Table 2-1  
DATA COLLECTION METHODS FOR ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM GOALS

FAMILY VIOLENCE PROGRAM GOALS	EVALUATION DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES	DATA ITEMS AND ELEMENTS	ANALYSIS
1. Reduce Community Acceptance of Intra-Family Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structured survey</li> <li>• Interviews with agency and system staffs</li> <li>• Observations of local facilitators, professionals</li> <li>• Monthly contacts between projects and agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functioning and policies of other agencies</li> <li>• Rates and methods of reporting</li> <li>• Expansion and changes in services provided</li> <li>• Community responses to program initiatives (patterns, needs)</li> <li>• State laws</li> <li>• Budgets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assess attitudes of key community and system actors over time by panel studies and repeated interviews</li> <li>• Examine and analyze changes in reporting policies and methods in key agencies</li> <li>• Examine and analyze community responses to abuse, expansion of system or services</li> <li>• Ethnography of community organization and "moe" for domestic violence</li> </ul>
3. Increase Reporting of Incidents of Intra-Family Violence and Documentation of the Extent, etc., of these Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre/post comparisons of Police, Court, and Protective Services data</li> <li>• Survey of personnel to assess quality of interviews</li> <li>• Observe system</li> <li>• Monitor quality of reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports received by agencies in community--polices and procedures for reporting to RFP</li> <li>• Calls-for-service records</li> <li>• Court dockets, DA requests, police incident reports, medical reports (hospital)</li> <li>• School records</li> <li>• Mental health, crisis intervention, hotlines</li> <li>• CPS, Social Services, Juvenile Probation Reports and Records</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compare reporting statistics in each site for two years against baseline data</li> <li>• Analyze and compare interview data on quality of information over time</li> <li>• Analyze and compare number of substantiated reports of abuse</li> <li>• Analyze and compare court dockets, convictions, and court-ordered treatment resulting from batterer reports</li> <li>• Observe and analyze documentation and reporting practices</li> </ul>
5. Demonstrate an Effective Mechanism for Inter-Agency Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structured analysis of services integration</li> <li>• Interviews with system actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number and kinds of services provided to same families by more than one provider</li> <li>• Frequency, type and extent of linkages among providers</li> <li>• Collateral contacts between agencies for family clients</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyze array of services available</li> <li>• Compare number of families receiving multiple services</li> <li>• Determine which agencies are linked, and in what ways, and measure increased coordination over time</li> <li>• Client interviews to determine experiences and perceptions of service integration</li> <li>• Monitor Advisory Committee deliberations to describe process for planning and developing new services or local evaluation of services</li> </ul>
6. Document Family Needs and Develop Methods to Address Needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standardized intake interviews with client families</li> <li>• Interviews with criminal justice and service agencies regarding clients</li> <li>• Interview program staff, administrators, clients</li> <li>• Structured process analysis and participant observation of project development and operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intake interviews--family history and current background</li> <li>• Exit, follow-up interviews--client services</li> <li>• History and development of provider unit: organization, staffing, funding, decision-making, treatment planning and case management, assessment and treatment strategies</li> <li>• Documentation of services; assess quality of service</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop descriptions of how each project conducts family needs assessments; analyze treatment plans; monitor treatment goals, follow-up clinical assessments</li> <li>• Client perceptions of service adequacy and quality</li> </ul>
8. Improve Knowledge, Skills, and Cooperation of Medical and Social Service Personnel re: Collection and Transmission of Evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of service integration, coordination, and development of linkages</li> <li>• Structured surveys and interviews over time with medical and Social Services personnel</li> <li>• File review</li> <li>• Observation of service providers' practices re: intake procedures</li> <li>• Monitor quality of reports</li> <li>• Monitor case outcome and case dispositions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentation of procedures and practices</li> <li>• Observation over time of process and service</li> <li>• Monitor training and supervision practices</li> <li>• Analyze collateral contacts and joint training, staffing, planning, and budgeting</li> <li>• Interviews with clients, key staff, and clinicians re: "assessment of skills"</li> <li>• Interview CPS, court, DA-staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyze and describe linkages between medical and CPS agencies</li> <li>• Document and compare quality of services and extent of coordination over time</li> <li>• Analyze client perceptions of skill level and sensitivity of CPS/medical agencies</li> <li>• Analyze court staff interview data on adequacy and comprehensiveness of evidence reaching court</li> <li>• Document training--joint and separate--to CPS and medical staffs on detection and reporting of family violence</li> <li>• Interview clinicians on skills and knowledge of CPS/Medical agency staffs in reporting</li> <li>• Monitor changes in number of court cases dismissed</li> </ul>
F. Reduce Repeat Calls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor CPS reports</li> <li>• Monitor Private Criminal Complaints</li> <li>• Monitor Civil Court Petitions</li> <li>• Monitor Calls-for-Service</li> <li>• Monitor ER Records</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CPS reports and calls</li> <li>• Police calls-for-service</li> <li>• Emergency medical calls</li> <li>• Crisis calls</li> <li>• Repeat referrals to diversion, mental health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine impacts of services on community by comparisons of reporting agency data against baseline (or pre-project) records at 6-month intervals for duration of the evaluation</li> </ul>
3. Increase Prosecutions of Repeat Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre-post comparison of prosecution and court records</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police Offense Reports</li> <li>• DA filings, plea bargains, convictions</li> <li>• Prosecution in Family Court, Criminal Court</li> <li>• Sentences, probationary conditions, treatment orders, custody orders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Determine number of convictions, filings, and prosecutions</li> <li>• Monitor policies and activities of District Attorney's office, linkages with police and CPS for house prosecutions, use of CPS as a resource or witness</li> </ul>
4. Establish Diversionary Programs for Family Violence Offenders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Structured direct observation and process analysis of programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number and kinds of services provided</li> <li>• Project reviews and analyses</li> <li>• Case studies of individual projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop descriptions of how programs function--staff, structure, procedures, services, client perceptions, decisions and actions</li> <li>• Examine diversionary procedures and compare alternatives to prosecutions across sites</li> </ul>
1. Reduce Intra-Family Homicides	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pre/post comparison of police and court records</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Police incident reports and arrests</li> <li>• CPS records and reports</li> <li>• Court records</li> <li>• Medical reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analyze and compare criminal justice data on reported homicides over time</li> </ul>

Table 2-2

## EVALUATION COMPONENTS FOR ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM GOALS

FAMILY VIOLENCE PROGRAM GOALS	PMS DATA RECORDING PROCEDURE	QUALITATIVE EVALUATION	SPECIAL STUDIES
A. Reduce Community Acceptance of Intra-Family Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community Contact Log</li> <li>Domestic Violence Report</li> <li>Volunteer Log</li> <li>Project Director Log</li> <li>Donation Log</li> <li>Contact Logs</li> <li>Criminal Justice Monitor</li> <li>Civil Court Monitor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community ethnography (media, public events, professional associations)--Process observation</li> <li>Community Relations and Media Log</li> <li>Community Interviews (Legislators, Key Actors, Professionals, other Networks)</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaire</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Neighborhood Comparison Studies</li> </ul>
B. Increase Reporting of Incidents of Intra-Family Violence and Documentation of the Extent, etc., of these Crimes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic Violence Report</li> <li>Critical Event Report</li> <li>Contact Log</li> <li>Initial Assessment</li> <li>Needs Assessment</li> <li>Criminal Justice Monitor</li> <li>Civil Court Monitor</li> <li>Protective Services Monitor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Records Summaries (Criminal Justice, Social Service Agencies, Medical/Hospital)</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaire (Report Procedures, Case Handling, Documentation)</li> <li>System "Flow" Data</li> <li>Record Checks--Police, Prosecutors, Courts, Social Services, Family Court--Reports of Incidents Between Husband-wife, Live-in Partners, Estranged Spouses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spouse Abuse/Child Abuse Study</li> <li>Calls-for-Service</li> <li>Neighborhood Comparison Studies</li> <li>CRT Scales</li> <li>Adolescent Study (Juvenile Court)</li> </ul>
C. Demonstrate an Effective Mechanism for Inter-Agency Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Domestic Violence Report</li> <li>Community Contact Log</li> <li>Project Director's Log</li> <li>Client Telephone Directory</li> <li>Advocacy Log</li> <li>Service Log</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>History and Development--Program Emergence</li> <li>FVP Administrator and Caseworker Interviews--Involvement with Agencies/Systems</li> <li>Records Summaries--Reporting Procedures</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaire Involvement with FVP (knowledge of domestic violence services)</li> <li>System "Ethnography"--observe Coordinating Entities</li> <li>Advisory Board--Process, Observation of Meetings, Community Interviews with Participants</li> </ul>	
D. Document Family Needs and Develop Methods to Address Needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contact Log</li> <li>Initial Assessment</li> <li>Needs Assessment</li> <li>Service Log</li> <li>Advocacy Log</li> <li>Service Agreement</li> <li>Exit Interview</li> <li>Follow-up Interview (1-month)</li> <li>Project Director's Log</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client (Victim-Offender) Follow-up Interview (3-month)</li> <li>FVP Administrator and Caseworker Questionnaires</li> <li>Records Summaries (Documentation)--Service Agencies</li> <li>System "Ethnography"--observe Program Records, File Reviews, Service Approaches</li> <li>Program Ethnography--observe procedures, case management, services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Longitudinal Study of Client Impact</li> <li>Spouse Abuse/Child Abuse Study</li> <li>Adolescent Study</li> <li>Neighborhood Comparison Studies</li> </ul>
E. Improve Knowledge, Skills, and Cooperation of Medical and Social Service Personnel re: Collection and Transmission of Evidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial Assessment(Agency Responses)</li> <li>Advocacy Log</li> <li>Medical Examination for Assault</li> <li>Client Telephone Directory</li> <li>Criminal Justice Monitor</li> <li>Civil Court Monitor</li> <li>Exit Interview--satisfaction and experience with services</li> <li>Follow-up Interview (1-month)</li> <li>Project Director's Log</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FVP Administrator and Caseworker Interviews--Relations with Other Agencies</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaire (Procedures, Records, Inter-Agency Contacts)</li> <li>Records Summaries (Documentation)--Service Agencies</li> <li>System "Ethnography"--observe procedures for gathering data/evidence, transfer procedures</li> <li>Record Checks--Case Disposition as a Function of Quality of Evidence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Longitudinal Study of Client Impact</li> </ul>
F. Reduce Repeat Calls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contact Log</li> <li>Initial Assessment</li> <li>Exit Interview</li> <li>Follow-up Interview (1-month)</li> <li>Domestic Violence Report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Record Checks--Police, Prosecution, CPS, Civil Court</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaires (Client Intake Activity)</li> <li>FVP Administrator and Caseworker Questionnaire--Client Activity, Perceptions</li> <li>Client (Victim-Offender) Follow-up Interview (3-month)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Calls-for-Service</li> <li>Longitudinal Study of Client Impact</li> <li>CRT Scales</li> <li>Neighborhood Comparison Study</li> </ul>
G. Increase Prosecutions of Repeat Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Criminal Justice Monitor</li> <li>Civil Court Monitor</li> <li>Protective Services Monitor</li> <li>Advocacy Log</li> <li>Service Log</li> <li>Exit Interview</li> <li>Follow-up Interview (1-month)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Client (Victim-Offender) Follow-up Interview (3 months)</li> <li>Record Checks--Police, Prosecution, CPS, Civil Court</li> <li>Service Agency Questionnaire (Procedures, Program Activity)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Calls-for-Service</li> <li>Longitudinal Study of Client Impact</li> </ul>
H. Establish Diversionary Programs for Family Violence Offenders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial Assessment</li> <li>Service Log</li> <li>Advocacy Log</li> <li>Exit Interview</li> <li>Follow-up Interview (1-month)</li> <li>Criminal Justice Monitor</li> <li>Project Director's Log</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Program Ethnography--Observation of Program Services, Case Management, Linkages</li> <li>FVP Administrator and Caseworker Questionnaire--Program Services, Structure, Linkages</li> <li>Service Agency Interview--Describe Diversion Procedures through Prosecutor, Police</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Longitudinal Study of Client Impact</li> </ul>
I. Reduce Intra-Family Homicides	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial Assessment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Record Checks--Police Homicides</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Homicide Study</li> </ul>

Delays or difficulties in implementing services, therefore, were analyzed in relation to organizational features of the projects as well as community indicators. In addition, immediate consequences of project implementation as observed in civil courts, criminal justice agencies, and social service systems were documented.

The History and Development Study also identified initial barriers encountered by the projects in establishing their services. Additionally, impediments to measurement and their implications for the evaluation of project effects were assessed. As such, this study component established the baseline for the first two stages of inquiry (i.e., determining whether the projects did what they set out to do, and measuring project goal attainment). The findings of the History and Development study were presented in the First Interim Report (Fagan et al., 1980).

## PROCESS STUDY

The Process Study was designed to document developments over time in the structural and service delivery components of the Family Violence Demonstration projects. From the developmental phase of the demonstration program, there emerged a cohort of projects that varied extensively along several dimensions of project structure, operation, and direct and indirect services. The absence of an experimental model and the variability in structure and operation of the demonstration projects complicated potential analyses of the efficacy of any single project or approach. There was no single "treatment" variable which could be used to account for variations in client impact. However, the national demonstration was able to provide a wide range of data and information on efforts to alter institutional responses and impacts on violent families.

The emphasis of this study component, therefore, was on measuring and describing what occurred at each site. This specification included descriptions of project activities to alter institutional responses to family violence as well as efforts to attain national program goals regarding client impacts. Relying on both qualitative and quantitative data sources, the process study reported data on project clients, services, and service delivery methods.

The intent of this evaluation component was not simply to describe the social reality of working in a complex and emotional area, although this as a task in itself was central to an understanding of the demonstration effort. The Process Study also was designed to provide a basis for measuring the "treatment" variable. As indicated earlier,

this national effort differed from more typical demonstration programs in that an experimental model wasn't specified. The quality of the data depended on the capture of complex dimensions of the independent variable. Therefore, the process study had two goals. First, it provided quantitative data along a range of critical dimensions of project and case characteristics to permit identification, description and differentiation of projects and services. Second, data reduction identified and simplified the analytic dimensions, or principal components of these variables, for use in subsequent impact analyses. The specific objectives of the process study were to:

- provide quantitative data and information to describe federal inputs and project resources, plus project and client characteristics at each demonstration site;
- measure and describe project direct and indirect services for achievement of system change and client impact goals;
- analytically identify salient principle components that represent domains of project and client characteristics, project sites and project clusters, to serve as predictive variables in analyses of system and client impacts; and
- empirically define the intervention beings tested and determine the central and replicable elements of the services and projects.

Thus, the Process Study yielded descriptive information on project structure, organization, and service delivery, and characteristics of clients receiving project services. Moreover, empirically derived clusters of project, client, and site characteristics were analytically constructed. These principal components, representing variates of treatment, were used as predictive variables in analyses of system and client impacts. The findings of this evaluation component were described in the Second Interim Report (Fagan et al., 1981).

## IMPACT STUDY

The Impact Study was designed to address questions concerning the projects' effects on justice and social service systems, community responses and attitudes, and on victims and families who used the demonstration services. Assuming for the moment that the projects did what they had set out to do, the objective of this evaluation component was to determine if those activities made a difference in rates of subsequent abuse among victims and their families, as well as in the responses of social service and justice system agencies.

The Impact Study was implemented at the five "intensive" sites rather than at all projects. The decision to limit the number of sites participating in the Impact Study was based on an understanding of the difficulties associated with obtaining the type of data needed to address these issues. In effect, a trade-off was made wherein evaluation resources were concentrated in a smaller number of sites so as to assure the quality and consistency of data rather than thinly disperse them across all sites with no guarantee of securing useable data.

To measure the impacts of indirect services, indicators such as community attitudes, justice system and social service agency processes and procedures, were assessed in relation to project activities. Moreover, unanticipated changes in the projects' operating environment were documented. Although changes could not in all instances be directly attributable to project actions, except for those sites with on-site field staff, approximations of effect could be garnered through structured interviews with key agency and community respondents.

However, the central goal of the national demonstration effort was to reduce the repeated incidence of violence as well as to assess the effects of intra-family violence on all family members. In the absence of consensus as to what would constitute a "successful" intervention outcome, the evaluation design used self-reports by former family violence projects' clients to determine whether or not the services they received were helpful. These clients, overwhelmingly women, also reported the effects of their violent home situations on their children. A series of behavioral and attitudinal indicators were developed to describe the impacts of witnessing as well as participating in intra-family violence situations. Conducted at a selected number of sites, these clients' self-reports provided a rich and robust data base for analysis of project outcomes and effects.

## SPECIAL STUDIES

A series of special studies, proposed in the original Research Design, were constructed to complement the major evaluation components. These special studies were pre-tested at selected sites. Seen as providing richer, more detailed information on particular aspects of the phenomena of family violence, these special studies encountered several significant problems during the pre-test phase. The following provides a summary of these special studies and the reasons why they were not implemented.



### **Homicide Study**

The homicide study was to include a three year baseline and six month checks of police homicide records to document changes in the rates of intra-family homicides and assaults. This special study was attempted at two sites. However, it was found there were too few documented cases of spousal homicide to warrant the continuation of this effort, despite widespread agreement that homicide victims were often well-known to the assailant.

### **Child Abuse Study**

There has been speculation in this field as to the association between spousal abuse and child abuse. It has been found in studies of child abuse families that spousal abuse has also occurred. The intent of the child abuse study was to examine a random sample of family violence project clients and to conduct records searches of child protection service agencies for child abuse or neglect reports. A period of six months prior and six months after referrals to the family violence project was to be the study period. A pre-test of this special study revealed significant obstacles with respect to client confidentiality, the availability of child protective service records, and the number of cases which were either reported or substantiated and thus available for study.

### **Adolescent Study**

As with the child abuse study, other research efforts have found links between adolescent abuse and family violence instances. In addition, there has been suggestion in the literature as to the relationship between growing up in a violent home and violent actions outside of the home. The adolescent study attempted to look at the effects of growing up in a violent home situation in terms of one's own experience of violence as well as violent acting out behaviors such as delinquency careers or status offenses. The study was designed to obtain a random sample of clients with adolescent children and then to conduct record checks both for child protective service reports as well as status or delinquency offenses. A major obstacle to the adolescent abuse study involved the low number of teenage youth who were children of project clients. Because of the relatively young age of project clients the majority did not have children within this age category.

### **Longitudinal Study of Client Impact**

To supplement the three month follow-up study, interviews with former family violence project clients were scheduled for fifteen months after termination of project services. This longer time period

would permit identification of more lasting effects of project services. A difficulty in the conduct of this follow-up study was in locating clients after fifteen months. When evaluation staff attempted to locate former clients even three months after termination of project services, many could not be found. In part, this reflects the reality of the lives of victims of family violence, who for their own safety often must "disappear." Given the difficulties of locating clients three months subsequent to project contact, a fifteen month follow-up was viewed as too resource intensive for a small return.

### **Calls for Service Study**

Using a pre/post-test design with a selected sub-sample of project clients, the calls-for-service study was designed to indicate changes in the rates of calls for police services. It was postulated that an effect of project intervention would be a decrease in the rate of post project calls for service. This was attempted at selected impact sites but was complicated by poor recordkeeping systems of law enforcement agencies. It was found in many cases that calls for service for domestic disputes were coded by police agencies under the same category as calls for such non-violent incidents as neighborhood disturbances, loud parties, or a cat in a tree.

### **Emergency Room Study**

Using ethnographic methods, changes in procedures of hospital emergency rooms were to be documented. Also, record checks for medical services were to be conducted on clients of the family violence projects one year after termination of project services. Although pre-tested at a site, this special study was never fully implemented because of concerns of client confidentiality as well as the general priority of the national demonstration to document changes in criminal justice agencies. Accordingly, this special study was given low priority.

### **Neighborhood Comparison Study**

In order to determine whether representative family violence project clients were representative of neighborhood residents, a comparison study was proposed in which family violence project clients were to be contrasted with families randomly selected from the same block or neighborhood. This study was to be conducted during the second 24 month, or "Phase II," of the evaluation period. However, due to funding cuts the evaluation was limited to one year of the original 24 month cycle for Phase II.

## **Data Collection Methods and Data Sources**

Because of the diversity of family violence projects, the evaluation assumed an approach that was both flexible and sensitive to detect incremental changes. As mentioned previously, the evaluation employed both qualitative and quantitative methods to assess achievement of the various program goals. By employing multiple methods the evaluation hoped to be able to accurately describe and assess the on-site realities. Often, several techniques were used to assess a single aspect of project activities. The types of data acquisition activities employed and the sources of evaluation data are described below.

### **THE PROGRAM MONITORING SYSTEM (PMS)**

The PMS was a management information system designed to provide evaluation and monitoring data across sites. It was divided into two sub-units: the Program Monitoring Informational System (PMIS), and the Client Management Information System (CMIS). The impetus for developing a management information system came from OCJP. In light of the large number and diversity of projects participating in the national effort, evaluation staff were asked to design a system which could serve as a tool for monitoring project administrative and service delivery activities for federal stakeholders. A standardized, cross-site monitoring system was developed to fulfill their informational needs as well as those of the evaluation. During the early stages of the evaluation, the continuation of OCJP, and its parent agency LEAA, was in doubt. Thus, OCJP staff viewed the design of a management information system as an opportunity for securing information that could establish the accountability of the agency as well as justify its involvement in what commonly was defined as a social service problem. Each of the data base systems which comprised the PMS is described in more detail below.

#### **The Program Monitoring Information System (PMIS)**

The PMIS was designed to obtain program-level data across sites. Constructed as a user-oriented management information system, the

PMIS obtained program-level information on the services provided and changes in those activities over time. It documented such things as number of staff and volunteers; the number of community contacts; the number of community presentations given, as well as an assessment as to the outcome of the presentations; the number of clients who had active criminal cases; and a client master list to facilitate client-based data collection.

In addition to these forms, a project summary was included. This summary, completed on a quarterly basis by project directors, provided a standardized reporting format which identified changes in local goals and objectives, staff and volunteers, administrative decision making structures, services, and critical events. Critical events were defined as any positive or negative occurrences, either anticipated or unanticipated, during the quarter and effected the project. Moreover, the reporting format sought to capture changes in the project's operating environment. Particular emphasis was placed on developments or modifications in the projects' relationships with formal agencies or systems using such indicators as the source and number of client referrals. Accordingly, the PMIS supported both process and system impact assessments.

#### **The Client Management Information System (CMIS)**

As with the PMIS, the CMIS served as a user-oriented management information system. Data were collected by project staff. The CMIS collected case level data on clients receiving project services. It documented services from the time of intake through termination. The CMIS included both required and optional forms which were developed to complement and support the delivery of project interventions. An Initial Assessment form, completed during client intake, captured such items as referral source, primary service request, date and location of most recent dispute, demographic information, violence history information, prior attempts to obtain service, and immediate service decisions. Additional instruments documented the number, type and length of services received, the number of referrals provided to the client, the length and number of persons receiving residential service from shelter projects, and medical treatment. Further, given the national program's focus on affecting changes in the justice system, the CMIS included three forms specifically designed to track clients in those agencies. These instruments included a Civil Justice Monitor, a Criminal Court Monitor, and a Youth Intervention Monitor. The Youth Intervention Monitor fulfilled a dual function of gathering data and children or youth from violent homes as well as the involvement of those youngsters with the juvenile justice system.

The CMIS offer a rich and detailed source of client data. In particular, the Initial Assessment data provided a unique, yet systematized,

portrait of victim characteristics and backgrounds. CMIS data regarding client service needs documented not only those needs met by the family violence projects but also those which had to be met through community systems. These data, therefore, served to highlight the complexity of service needs of domestic violence clients as well as necessity for interagency cooperation to fulfill those needs.

## INTERVIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS

### Participant Observation

On-site field workers were employed at the five intensive evaluation sites. The on-site field researchers served as the eyes and ears of the evaluation at those sites and provided descriptive data on project activities and services. Drawing upon ethnographic traditions, the field researchers served as participant observers to gather qualitative data on project activities--the social process of intervention--and system impacts. Participant observation as a research technique involves immersing one's self in the environment under examination while at the same time maintaining a critical distance. In this instance, the field researchers were expected to involve themselves in the life of the project while maintaining their ethical and scientific neutrality. They were to both participate in project activities as well as observe those activities.

The data obtained by participant observation were able to highlight subtle variations or modifications in project activities. Because evaluation staff were stationed on-site, unanticipated events or outcomes could readily be documented. These qualitative data detailed the maturation of the projects as organizations as well as the development of their service delivery strategies. The participant observation data provided not only extensive descriptive information but also served as an explanatory context within which quantitative data could be understood.

### Client Follow-up Interviews

Interviews with former clients at five "intensive" evaluation sites were conducted approximately three months after termination of services. Clients were selected systematically, although not randomly, for participation in the follow-up interview from projects with a range of services. Therefore, the client follow-up interviews were able to assess the effects of varying intervention approaches on domestic violence. Consisting of both open and closed ended items,

the follow-up instrument was designed to collect detailed data to determine what types of services were most effective with which client types. The domains of variables included:

- client demographic and background characteristics;
- assailant demographic and background characteristics;
- characteristics of the relationship;
- characteristics of the violence history;
- client reports regarding the effects of family violence on their children;
- prior help seeking;
- project services received;
- services from community agencies--in particular, the client's experiences with the criminal justice system;
- the client's life situation subsequent to project intervention; and
- the client's overall assessment as to the "helpfulness" of project services.

The client follow-up interviews were conducted by evaluation staff through on-site interviewers. After sampling clients for inclusion in the follow-up study, the interviewers contacted the individuals to obtain permission for the interview. A major obstacle in conducting the client follow-up interviews involved difficulties in locating former project clients for participation. Many women, fearing for their own and their children's safety, tended to "disappear" after project contact. Given the nature of family violence, this occurrence was not surprising and had been anticipated. Every effort was made to maintain the integrity of the sampling scheme although adjustments were made over the course of the follow-up period.

After locating the client and obtaining consent to participate, an interview was set up for a public location. The interview was conducted face-to-face. Frequently, follow-up interviews took an hour or more to complete. They provided clients with an opportunity to discuss their lives with a "neutral" person. The follow-up interviews offered a unique vantage point from which to view client experiences, project interventions, and outcomes.

### Interviews with Project Staff

Staff from all of the family violence projects were periodically interviewed over the course of the evaluation. These interviews were conducted by the on-site field workers at the intensive sites and by core evaluation staff during regular site visits. These interviews elicited staff impressions regarding project administration and organization; services; relations with other formal agencies; client characteristics and needs; and project impacts. These data provided participant assessments of project activities and outcomes and contributed to both process and impact assessments.

### **Interviews with Key Agency Respondents**

Key respondents at each site were identified in criminal justice, civil justice, social service, and community agencies. Interviews with these key actors were conducted periodically by evaluation staff. These interviews elicited respondents' impressions of project activities; the local environment; and specific changes in their own agencies regarding the processing of domestic violence clients. By conducting these interviews at several points (i.e. project startup, during the implementation phase, and at the termination of grant funding) changes in respondents' perceptions along these dimensions were assessed.

The interviews with key agency respondents served two important functions. First, they detailed community actors' understandings and perceptions of the family violence projects. Second, they documented modifications in processes and procedures of local agencies, of which the projects may not have been fully aware. Data from these interviews were contrasted with those obtained from staff interviews. In this way, areas of perceptual agreement and divergence could be identified. Finally, these interviews served as an important qualitative source of impact data regarding project effects on community agencies.

## **Implementation of the Evaluation Design**

The evaluation design was developed and implemented in four stages. First, evaluation staff inventoried the existing data collection focus and protocols at the first six projects. Next, a preliminary evaluation design reconciled the data needs of the sweeping federal program agenda with the practical realities of project services and data collection capabilities. The evaluation design was then pre-tested at two sites to assess its appropriateness and feasibility, and subsequently implemented at all the grantee sites. To implement the design, a training conference was held in April, 1979, for project staff to familiarize them with evaluation instruments and data collection activities. Training included self-instruction manuals for the PMIS and CMIS, which were distributed to all projects; evaluation technical assistance was provided following the conference.

Despite these efforts, the vast majority of projects objected to the complexity of the design and the demands it placed on staff. Moreover, projects felt that the evaluation was unresponsive to their needs since it assessed progress toward attaining the national program

goals instead of examining achievement of each project's local goals and objectives. Revisions in the design were undertaken in October, 1979, to assuage these objections. After negotiations with three representatives, selected by the project directors, the evaluation instruments were finalized and implemented across sites in January, 1980.

As this scenario illustrates, the major elements of the evaluation design were implemented not without difficulty across project sites. Several portions of the preliminary design were eliminated because of barriers encountered during the pretest stage. These were mainly the "knowledge-building" components of the design. Many projects resisted the criminal justice data collection components, since it involved tracking cases across numerous agencies. Since few cases penetrated the justice system beyond the arrest stage, the tracking became a source of embarrassment to the LEAA-funded projects (see Chapters 5 and 6). The special studies, which were developed to provide more specific data on particular aspects of family violence, were cancelled when it was found that the costs of conducting those studies far outweighed the possible benefits which could be derived from them.

Yet, not all of the problems encountered in the implementation of the evaluation design resulted in the elimination of some portion of it. In many instances, obstacles were mitigated or alternative plans were initiated. The use of multiple measures of service delivery and case outcome was, in particular, a valuable strategy for minimizing the effects of the difficulties encountered. For example, "official records" were not useful to determine the re-incidence of abuse. Accordingly, self-report measures from the client follow-up study became a primary data source to determine the impact of services.

In the following sections, three major areas of implementation difficulties are described. Each of these areas represents a nexus of problems and constraints which were experienced in the evaluation. In turn, these difficulties can be traced to factors or processes operating at the federal level, at the project level, and from the evaluation design itself. Each is presented below.

### **FEDERAL LEVEL CONSTRAINTS**

The National Evaluation of the LEAA Family Violence Demonstration Program involved the activities of two federal agencies--the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the National Institute for Juvenile



Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP) of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Each agency was politically independent; each agency administrator was a political appointee, and the agencies were authorized by separate legislation. Moreover, each agency had different responsibilities in the national program. OCJP, as the funding agency for the family violence projects, was responsible for overseeing and monitoring project activities. NIJJDP was the federal agency responsible for funding and monitoring evaluation activities. While such a division of tasks does not necessarily have to be problematic, in this instance, differences in evaluation philosophy and program orientation, because of their political independence, were evident in their expectations of the evaluation. Each of these agencies brought their own interests and emphases to the national effort. There was no single authority to resolve disputes and make policy for the joint effort. Those areas where agency interests diverged created problems for the design and implementation of the evaluation.

For example, OCJP asked that a MIS be added to the evaluation to facilitate program monitoring. NIJJDP felt this was beyond the scope of the evaluation and somewhat violated the traditional evaluation role. Several projects expressed a fear that the evaluators would cut off their funding, despite the fact that no such authority existed. Apparently, OCJP used such fears to gain project compliance with the MIS. Conversely, OCJP objected to the "knowledge-building" aspects of the evaluation, claiming that such was more the province of research than evaluation. They questioned the appropriateness of client data on violence history. NIJJDP supported these components as useful to learning "what works for whom."

#### **Design of the National Program**

Three factors in the design of the national program constrained evaluation activities. First, project activities were funded well in advance of the evaluation. In fact, several projects were continued from LEAA Victim/Witness Assistance Program funding in a previous fiscal year. This led to a situation where the project designs were developed independently from evaluation interests or needs. That is, primary emphasis was placed on designing direct services or coordination strategies without integrating data gathering or documentation requirements. Therefore, data collection procedures were superimposed upon existing project designs rather than integrated into them. Moreover, selection of project sites did not weigh the projects' ability to gather data. Often, local agencies did not demonstrate that evaluation data were accessible or that they had the capability to collect it.

Project budgets did not anticipate data collection, nor were resources or incentives provided for those agencies to cooperate with the evaluation. Data collection was added to formidable direct service burdens

with no funds for additional staff. Projects were left to balance service delivery and evaluation tasks. OCJP, attempting to please both political and project constituencies, did not give projects a clear and unambiguous message on the priority of the evaluation until the second evaluation year.

Second, the complex and numerous national program goals complicated the evaluation design. Most of the national goals specified for the projects were neither quantifiable nor measureable. Several of the national goals, such as reducing community acceptance of intra-family violence, reducing the number of repeat calls to police, or reducing the number of intra-family homicides and serious assaults, assumed the existence of baseline indicators and that such data were accessible over the course of the program. However, agencies in the majority of sites did not keep such records (Fagan et al., 1981). The breadth and generality of the goals, combined with the lack of documentation, presented serious obstacles to measurement. Even disaggregating the goals into discrete components or activities did not successfully resolve difficulties regarding how to quantify them or obtain data for evaluation purposes.

A third design issue was the array of project designs. Projects varied along such dimensions as type of service (shelter, legal, social service), locus of service (client, system, community), organization (single entity, subcontractor, consortium), extent of client contact (no client contact, single contact, multiple contacts), and type of contact (residential service, telephone I & R, police crisis intervention, assailant psychotherapy, community education forum). There were too many dimensions to support meaningful (or rigorous) comparisons of project-level effects, and too few projects within each dimension to support a natural policy experiment. The final design focused at services within projects to test the program's policy assumptions.

#### **Conflict Over Purpose of Evaluation**

Lack of consensus as to the purposes to be served by the evaluation can be traced back to differences in the missions of the two federal agencies. OCJP, a program office within LEAA, was created to improve the criminal justice system. NIJJDP, as a research office within OJJDP, applied an evaluation policy which promoted both program development and knowledge-building efforts. While sharing a common goal of reducing crime in the United States, the missions of these agencies suggested different approaches to achieving this goal. OCJP's mission was oriented to crime reduction by improving criminal justice system processing. NIJJDP, in contrast, viewed its task in the Family Violence Program as reducing crime by addressing the etiology of violent behavior as well as assessing program services. These differences in agency mission and orientation were exemplified by the following debates which occurred throughout the life of the evaluation.

**Should the evaluation encompass both applied and basic research questions?** That is, was the evaluation to address issues of etiology or causality or was it solely to investigate the processes and outcomes of the demonstration projects? OCJP tended to stress questions of criminal justice system effects whereas NIJJDP was more interested in looking at the causes and consequences of family violence, as well as evaluating services. These differences were not resolved until the second evaluation year. In the absence of a clear policy direction for the evaluation, it was difficult to prioritize evaluation activities. Since the requirements of applied research are somewhat different than those of basic research, the evaluation design attempted to address both agenda items. Yet, lacking clarity and consensus from federal actors, the evaluation at times was unable to successfully fulfill the policy needs of either agency.

**Should the evaluation address issues of specific deterrence through criminal justice processing or should it address issues of the efficacy of intervention services which often were apart from the justice system (e.g. shelter, counseling)?** The program assumptions were rooted in deterrence, yet project services reflected several sets of assumptions, including both victim and offender foci. Again, differences as to the missions of the federal agencies involved were manifest in terms of different emphases placed on the objectives of the evaluation. If the primary purpose of the evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of criminal justice intervention as a deterrent to family violence, then major resource allocations should have been directed to assessing project effects on the criminal justice system and criminal court outcomes.

However, the allocation of evaluation resources would have been quite different if the purpose of the evaluation was to assess the efficacy of intervention services. This implies a broader targetting of evaluation resources aimed at a variety of areas such as social services, criminal justice services, or civil justice services. Outcome measures also would have to be obtained from a variety of sources rather than strictly relying on criminal justice system data.

Consensus on this issue was achieved. Accordingly, the evaluation design assumed that deterrence was one aspect of a broad, cross-sectional investigation of service efficacy. Thus, while the evaluation was concerned with the range of services provided, OCJP interest was limited to projects' role in criminal justice processing, and the effects of criminalization. Their perspective ignored the social reality of service delivery in two ways. It overestimated the extent to which cases were processed in the justice system (see chapters 3 and 6), and undervalued the primary services of 17 shelter-focused projects (see chapter 3).

**What should be the evaluator's role in program design?** Since project services preceeded the evaluation, an unresolved question remained as to whether and how projects should accomodate evaluation needs. In its purest sense, the objective of evaluation research is to document on-site realities irrespective of whether those realities reflect broader policy interests. This perspective presupposes the existence of quantitative as well as qualitative data so that project activities may be documented. However, the Family Violence Program design did not anticipate evaluation data needs. Accordingly, the evaluation agenda intruded on established project designs to incorporate documentation activities, and in some cases took resources away from direct services.

Two choices existed to obtain documentation of services and outcomes-- either superimpose evaluation instruments on existing project services or modify services so that data acquisition was integrated into service delivery. Absent resources or incentives for projects, the second approach would have been better. But there was insufficient support by OCJP to mandate that services be altered to include documentation activities. Accordingly, to fulfill evaluation requirements, data acquisition was conducted either in parallel to or superimposed upon ongoing service delivery. This, in turn, created anger and resistance from projects who viewed the intrusion of evaluation activities as an imposition on their already burdened and emotionally drained staffs. In the absence of consistent policy and support from OCJP, this strategy relied on informal negotiations between projects and evaluators, and the development of personal relations with the project staff in order for it to succeed.

## PROJECT LEVEL CONSTRAINTS

Other factors at the project level further inhibited the implementation of the evaluation design. These factors included the size of the grants available to the demonstration projects; the structure of the grants which required escalating matching funds; the orientation of the projects to service provision rather than a combination of service provision and research; and the availability and accessibility of documentation in the host communities. Each of these issues is described below.

### Size of Grants

The funding level for the family violence projects was both a programatic and an evaluation issue. The nine national program goals reflected exceedingly high expectations for project effects. Projects

were expected to pursue all nine goals. However, the available funding was not commensurate with the ambitious program agenda. The majority of projects received fairly small grants in light of their expected activities. The scope of the effort at the project level, including development and provision of both direct and indirect services, meant that few resources were available for documentation activities. Project resources often were taxed simply in attempting to provide client services. (For example, the New York project received a grant of less than \$75,000 to serve a target area of Manhattan.) The addition of evaluation activities further strained scarce project resources. Accordingly, projects viewed evaluation activities as unnecessary and additional burdens, which detracted from their ability to provide services. This stance, while logical from a project point of view, further impeded the evaluation's implementation.

#### Structure of Project Grants

In several instances, the structure of the project grants further inhibited the evaluation. Projects were required to provide matching funds which escalated from 10% to 50% of total budget over the course of their project period. Accordingly, several projects strategically allocated whatever resources they could muster into raising these matching funds. While for any private agency raising matching funds is a difficult and time consuming task, for the family violence projects this task necessitated a concerted effort on the part of staff who already were overburdened by service delivery needs. In this context, evaluation requirements clearly were a low priority and a source of frustration and resentment. In the day to day struggle of the projects, evaluation data were seen as belonging to someone else and/or potentially threatening, and were not seen as reflective of or useful to project activities.

An additional structural problem was the use of subcontracts for services. Politically independent subcontractors felt no obligation to participate in the evaluation, and were confident that their contracts would not be jeopardized by this position. They were right. Evaluators, lacking a direct relationship with the subcontractors, had little influence. The quality of the evaluation data suffered.

#### Community Constraints

The selection of the project sites was made without systematic investigation as to the ability of the host communities to support evaluation activities. Record keeping systems of local agencies were often idiosyncratic. Frequently, data were neither available nor accessible (see Special Studies, earlier this chapter). Attempts to

obtain archival data from criminal justice service agencies on family violence calls for service, arrests, or court cases were often frustrated. For the most part, there were no accurate baseline data sets from which comparisons could be drawn. With 23 projects, it was not possible to collect "original" and compatible data at all sites.

Not only were historical data unavailable, but current record keeping systems did not provide the information necessary for the evaluation. Attempts to modify record keeping practices of local agencies were futile without incentives or resources for those agencies. Often, the requests by "grass-roots" feminist groups to criminal justice agencies for record-keeping changes were met with hostility. Thus, the evaluation faced a significant constraint given the lack of available documentation regarding the characteristics and outcomes of family violence cases.

#### EVALUATION DESIGN CONSTRAINTS

In its attempt to fulfill a disparate federal evaluation agenda, the evaluation design itself contained certain problematic areas. Some of the issues faced by the evaluation included: the development of a research agenda; the decision to focus the evaluation on clients and projects; the potential intrusiveness of evaluation questions in a treatment context; the difficulty of measuring the impact of indirect services; and the number and staging of projects to be assessed.

#### The Evaluation Agenda

In the absence of consensus at the federal level, the evaluation agenda included research as well as more typical evaluation activities. The inclusion of both basic and applied research concerns led to an ambitious evaluation undertaking. While every attempt was made to merge research and evaluation questions, it was at times necessary to develop separate strategies to fulfill both needs. Moreover, the dual foci of the evaluation agenda made it more difficult to win the projects' support in the evaluation activities. From the projects' perspectives evaluation activities may have been viewed as burdensome but were at least understandable. Research, on the other hand, often raised fears among service providers since it dealt with questions not directly germane to daily activities. Moreover, projects feared that research findings would be misinterpreted and used to reinforce myths about wife beating. During the evaluation, several such news articles appeared, reinforcing projects' fears. Thus, the task of involving projects in the evaluation effort was made more difficult by the dual foci of the evaluation agenda.

### **Evaluation Focus on Clients and Projects**

Given the weaknesses in "official" data, the evaluation relied heavily on projects and clients as primary data sources. Since the evaluation did not have sufficient resources to maintain an on-site presence at each project site, the projects were requested to document their own activities as well as gather background data on clients. However, since staff at many of the projects viewed the evaluation as coming from insensitive and unknowledgeable "outsiders," they were reluctant to participate in evaluation activities. Requests to have workers gather even minimal evaluation data were viewed as aggravating the burdens on already overextended staff. Additionally, staff concerns regarding client confidentiality and privacy issues acted to further complicate data collection activities. Even when reassurances were obtained from the evaluators, project staff still displayed a reluctance to collect client data.

### **Evaluation Questions Conflicting With Treatment Needs**

A related issue involved the perceived intrusiveness of evaluation questions within a treatment context. That is, project staff expressed reluctance to question clients at "crisis moments." Moreover, the research aspects of the evaluation activities were seen as unimportant to the provision of services. The evaluation questions included: what works, and for what types of clients? This involved exploration of clients' backgrounds. Project staff, concerned with minimizing crises and delivering services, often did not see the utility of these items to their own activities. Perhaps, most importantly, staff perceived the evaluation questions as threatening the relationship they were attempting to develop with clients. Additionally, the range of services provided by the projects often made evaluation questions inappropriate. Projects offering short-term or single contact services felt that their limited client contact was best spent in providing direct services rather than in attempting to fulfill evaluation needs. From the projects' perspective, these objections were both consistent and logical. From an evaluation standpoint, these objections presented significant obstacles to measurement and analysis.

### **Measuring the Impact of Indirect Services**

In response to the national program goals, projects attempted to effect positive change not only in the lives of clients directly served, but also in general community attitudes towards family violence and formal system responses to spouse abuse cases. To address the indirect service goals many projects developed educational presentations and materials for community and professional audiences. For the evaluation, the difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of these activities was great, particularly given the number of projects involved

and the disparate types of activities initiated. Something as ephemeral as community beliefs or attitudes is at best problematic to measure; given the sensitivity of the family violence issue, these measurement difficulties increased exponentially.

To measure the impact of these indirect services, some type of community survey was necessary. However, the cost of conducting interviews with representative community samples was prohibitive and beyond evaluation resource. While qualitative data to address these issues were obtained by the on-site staff at the five intensive sites, the evaluation could not thoroughly or rigorously assess the impact of the projects' indirect services at all sites.

### **Number and Staging of Projects**

When the evaluation started, six projects were already underway. Over the course of the evaluation period, projects were added in two phases. By the end of the second evaluation year, 23 family violence projects were included in the national evaluation. The simple number and phasing of projects severely complicated evaluation activities; the task of designing an evaluation for the number and diversity of projects was overwhelming. Although evaluation core staff made every effort to maintain ongoing liaison with the projects, it was frequently difficult to keep up with project developments and address their concerns. Finally, the assistance projects required in implementing the PMS taxed evaluation resources. With so many projects at so many different stages of development it was logistically difficult to provide evaluation technical assistance to ensure uniform interpretation of evaluation requirements.

## **Data Sources for this Report**

This report presents analyses conducted on a variety of qualitative and quantitative data sets. Sources of qualitative data include the participant observation activities conducted at the five intensive sites as well as the key actor interviews undertaken during site visits to all the project sites. Case study analyses of 10 sites provided data for analyses of system impact and services continuation. Quantitative data sources were the PMS and the client follow-up interviews. Data from the initial assessment instruments of the Client Management Information System document approximately 2,700 clients served by



the family violence projects. Client follow-up data, collected at five sites in two panels, provide information on 270 clients served by the projects. These qualitative and quantitative data are analyzed in terms of the project effects on clients and local agencies.

### **3 From Theory To Practice-- Family Violence Interventions**

This chapter describes the development and implementation of the Family Violence Demonstration Program, tracing the initiative from its emergence as a national policy issue to the reality of intervening with victims and their families. The Family Violence Program was an ambitious national policy experiment, whose central assumption was deterrence--the application of criminal and civil law protections for victims and criminal sanctions against assailants. The demonstration projects were the vehicles through which these assumptions were tested. LEAA's concern that family violence is a multi-faceted problem prompted a program design emphasizing a multi-agency approach with both criminal justice and social service. The result was a national demonstration program testing the effects of several intervention approaches and types of services in reducing the incidence and severity of family violence. The 23 projects in this program represented the intervention variable in this experiment, and the component services expressed the underlying assumptions of the LEAA program.

The chapter also describes the interventions tested in this policy experiment. A brief historical review traces the program's origins and intentions. The projects' organizational characteristics are analyzed, for these features influenced the content of the services provided. As seen in chapter 7, these features also were predictors of whether projects, services, or policies were continued at the conclusion of the federal demonstration. The services are described briefly--they serve as the "treatment" variable in the crucial tests of the program's assumptions. Finally, the "social process" of service delivery is described. The data in later chapters take on additional significance where readers are aware of the intense emotions resulting from day to day work with physically abused victims in deep personal crises.

## Program Development

The Family Violence Demonstration Program can be viewed as the product of national and local events which set the stage for its creation. Chapter 1 described the process by which family violence was identified as a social concern and evolved into a social problem. This section examines the history of the program in the broadest social and political context--its relationship to family violence as an emerging national policy issue. A brief chronology of events traces the convergence of two perspectives--the feminist movement and the justice system's growing awareness of domestic violence as a crime issue--in shaping the LEAA program. Federal contributions are also assessed as they attempted to integrate the criminal justice emphasis--and hence the deterrence assumptions--into the projects.

### EMERGENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A POLICY ISSUE

Examining the historical context of the projects, three distinct yet inter-related themes emerge as contributors to the Family Violence Program:

- feminist involvement in recognizing family violence (and in particular, wife abuse) and making it a major policy issue;
- the criminal justice system's growing awareness, partially due to previous LEAA programs, of family violence;
- changes in legislation on domestic violence.

The individual projects can be viewed as they fit into the history of family violence as a policy issue. Some stem from initial feminist work in the area of family violence, while others are a result of an institutional response on the part of social service or criminal justice agencies to recent concern over domestic violence. The projects can also be seen in terms of a social and political phenomenon--a largely grassroots feminist movement around "battered women" gathered momentum, created services and pushed for changes in legislation and institutional responses. Concurrently, the criminal justice system

and social service agencies took steps toward working more systematically with victims of family violence. Government funding for family violence programs through LEAA was made available; both traditional agencies and grassroots groups created new programs around both legislation and funds. Each of the projects was distinct in the way it came into existence; however, all can be better understood in relation to this broader context, and their subsequent fates can be predicted from these themes.

### Feminism

To understand the history of the family violence demonstration projects funded under the national program, it is necessary to see the programs in the wider setting of the recognition of family violence as a nationwide problem of significant proportions. The "discovery" of battering, especially wife abuse, was due in large part to the work of feminist organizations, nationally and locally, and to feminist writers and scholars who documented and publicized the issue. Together with family researchers and children's advocates, feminists have been central to the expansion of domestic violence as a multifaceted public policy issue. During the past decade, feminist groups have been instrumental in initiating legislative changes, altering police and court procedures, and working as advocates for victims within traditional social service agencies. Feminists created the concepts and first ventures into alternative, community-based services such as hotlines and shelters.

The nature and breadth of services which were offered by many of the family violence projects can better be understood in light of how these projects grew out of feminist grassroots efforts, especially those directed toward rape victims. Battered women presented themselves to many feminist-oriented service groups via rape hotlines started by these groups, as well as to victim assistance agencies (Miami) or rape crisis centers. Hotline workers learned to their surprise that their crisis lines received a disproportionately high number of calls from battered wives. The origins of one rural shelter based project, for example, stem from a rape hotline created by a VISTA worker at the local women's community center. This experience was seen in several projects, especially in rural areas.

In addition to "discovering" the battered woman, the grassroots groups rapidly identified the array of services victims need: shelter, transportation, counseling, legal assistance, advocacy, jobs, childcare, etc. They also became aware of the limits in the legal resources available to victims of domestic violence: inadequate police response, discouragement in efforts to prosecute, and civil and criminal legislation which did not provide sufficient protection for the victim. Feminist activists thus became involved in many aspects of the family violence issue: legislative reform, police and prosecutor training,

shelters and attempts to obtain large-scale funding for services to victims of family violence. This involvement generally occurred within the context of community-based grassroots organizations such as shelters, rape crisis programs, hotlines, and women's resource centers.

### Criminal Justice System Responses

As family violence became a public policy issue, the criminal justice system was obliged to respond in new ways. The feminist movement exerted political pressure on the criminal justice system to fulfill its legislative mandates to treat wife abuse as a serious issue. Traditionally, family violence was perceived as burdensome by criminal justice agencies: as an ever-present phenomenon, it created dangerous situations for the police and generated cases difficult to resolve for the courts. To this day, family violence programs continue to grapple with ways of changing such attitudes.

Within criminal justice agencies, however, there were several movements which counterbalanced such attitudes and served to create favorable pre-conditions for family violence programs. At the police level, innovative training programs had been sought to teach officers how to solve disputes and defuse violent situations have been underway since the late 1960s. The work of Bard\* and others helped create such programs and documents the difficulties in implementing them. A major issue was teaching police officers to reconceptualize their role and to begin to view themselves as "conflict managers." Police training programs in family crisis intervention were begun in the early 1970s by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, LEAA's forerunner. The victim/witness programs funded since 1974 by LEAA were instrumental in making law enforcement agencies amenable to the idea of providing services for the victims of crime--extending their sphere of responsibility. The victim/witness programs also functioned as magnets for victims of family violence; the sponsoring agencies were presented with the need to provide additional special services for family violence victims, who quickly became a major portion of the caseload of victim advocates' programs.

\*See Morton Bard, "Family Crisis Intervention: From Concept to Implementation", in Roy, Maria (ed.), Battered Women. New York: Van Nostrand, Reinhold Co., 1977. Feminists were critical of this approach, though. They viewed the psychological terminology of "dispute" and "conflict" as obfuscating the criminal violence at the heart of family domestic disturbance. Moreover, this approach tended to spread blame among both parties, instead of identifying an assailant.

Other criminal justice system programs which raised awareness of family violence included mediation and diversion programs. The counseling and dispute settlement services in these programs often were utilized for the "treatment" of a violent spouse, or the non-criminal resolution of cases seen as "inappropriate" for the criminal courts.

### Legislation

Family violence legislation is crucial to understanding the climate in which the programs arose, as well as forming an important constraint on the kinds of services programs are able to offer. Some of the programs came into being at the same time as newly enacted legislation. In several instances, changes in legislation took place after the programs were well underway. The pressure for legislative change came largely from feminists and attorneys who had worked in the legal system, attempting to secure protection for victims of family violence. In a number of states individuals who had been active in creating the family violence program also worked on legislation. The Philadelphia project, for example, rose from the Protection From Abuse Act, passed by the Pennsylvania legislature in October, 1976. Before the LEAA grant, a women's group had started a part-time voluntary program of legal counseling in the DA's office to inform victims of their options. These efforts pointed toward the necessity for a more formalized advocacy service to fully implement the Protection from Abuse Act. The family violence project which later evolved was designed specifically to enable the legislation to be used more effectively by victims.

In New York, two family violence projects arose after a lawsuit and legislative changes had made domestic abuse a well-known and highly charged issue in some parts of the criminal justice system. A 1976 lawsuit was brought against the police department for their lack of response to abuse victims. A parallel suit against the clerks and probation officers in the Family Court charged Family Court intake staff with diverting victims from hearings before a judge where they could obtain emergency protective orders. Victims were allegedly not informed that the informal adjustments made by probation staff were not binding and that they have a statutory right to see a judge. The rather complicated set of options the victim can choose, coupled with past problems with the court and police reaction to family violence, must be viewed as critical antecedent conditions which dictated the approaches of the two New York family violence projects. One project focused on the criminal prosecution of assailants, while the second was provided to assist victims in dealing with the complicated Family Court System.

In sum, the historical context of the Family Violence Program is one in which several social and political trends merged to create a climate of both advocacy and institutional responsiveness to family violence. The issue was first advanced by feminist organizations. However, simultaneously, there was a growing victims advocacy movement within criminal justice agencies. Earlier prosecutorial innovations such as diversion programs using mandatory counseling also set the groundwork for the multifaceted family violence programs. The momentum created by the newly expressed concern over family violence resulted in legislative reforms which in many cases spurred program development.

Although the feminist community's interest in domestic violence and the victim's rights trend coincided in time, there still remain distinctions between the way in which the problem and solutions to family violence are viewed in these respective quarters. In examining the programs it is important to bear in mind their origins and to understand the differing approaches they bring to the problem. These differences are reflected in the service emphasis of the projects, the interpretation of the program's deterrence assumptions, and ultimately in the social process of service delivery.

#### ORIGINS OF THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROGRAM

The origins of the Family Violence Program are to be found in LEAA's Citizen's Initiative program and its successor, the Victim/Witness Program. The Citizen's Initiative Program began in 1974 (FY1975) and continued until the establishment of the Victim/Witness Program in 1976 (FY1977). In a LEAA paper entitled "An Overview of Victim Witness Assistance Programs", the progression is referred to as an "outgrowth." The "outgrowth" notion can be validated from several perspectives. First, the Citizen's Initiative Program emphasized citizen involvement in the criminal justice system. One program goal is for the criminal justice system to "consider and stratify highest the needs of interacting citizens." The demonstration and research projects established the need for expanded and refined services for victims and witnesses, and a specific program, Victim/Witness, was established. Included in this second program is an emphasis on victims of "sensitive crime": rape victims, sexually abused children, and domestic violence victims. The following year, the domestic violence and sexually abused children categories were separated out into a distinct program: Family Violence.

The "outgrowth" process at first glance seems to reflect and parallel events on the local level, both in the victim/witness programs and in

grassroots organizations. However, official LEAA documents which describe the programs, their objectives, and delineation of goals, indicate a somewhat different pattern. In fact, the Family Violence Program appears as a radical departure from the Victim Witness Program within the context of these documents. Review of the origins of the Citizen's Initiative and Victim Witness Programs confirm the considerable differences between these programs.

#### The Citizen's Initiative Program

In 1974, the Citizen's Initiative Program was instituted as a national priority program of LEAA. LEAA administrators expressed publicly, at that time, a concern that the average citizen has lost confidence in the criminal justice system. To ameliorate this situation, LEAA solicited bids on demonstration programs which were to: "...cause the criminal justice system to consider and stratify highest the needs of citizens who interact...and...which enable and assist the citizen in better performing a function for the criminal justice system."\*

The detailed description of the initiative contained a statement of purpose which specifies that programs are to have a "...significant impact on the reduction of crime through the active involvement of the citizen in the criminal justice process."\*\* The programs included in their scope, goals for public education, volunteer involvement and reduction of circumstances which promote crime.

#### The Victim/Witness Program

In FY 1977, the Victim/Witness Program was established as a separate program. A major program objective was "to assist in the development, implementation and replication of projects designed to improve the treatment of victims and witnesses and to increase citizen confidence in and cooperation with the Criminal Justice System."

This objective is similar to that of the earlier Citizen's Initiative Program. For example, the Victim/Witness Program called for:

- increased reporting of crimes by victims and witnesses;
- reduced waiting time and unnecessary appearances of police and civilian witnesses;

\*Guideline Manual M4500.1B, p. 34-5, February 1974. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the Purpose section also includes a closing statement saying that "These goals conform to LEAA's mission to develop, test, and evaluate effective programs, projects and techniques to reduce crime and delinquency."

\*\*Guideline Manual M4500.1C, p. 121.



- increased witness cooperation in the prosecution of cases, particularly those cases involving traditionally uncooperative witnesses, including rape victims, victims of domestic violence, children who have been sexually assaulted, the elderly and those fearing reprisals;
- systems improvements for victims and witnesses, including computerized witness notification, televised testimonies of expert witnesses, citizens' information terminals in courthouses, and other new and improved methods aimed at cost savings;
- development and dissemination of programmatic guidelines for victims of sensitive crimes including rape, sexual abuse of children, and domestic violence;
- development and demonstration of new methods for victim participation in criminal justice proceedings;
- reduction in the repeated victimization of sexually abused children, victims of domestic violence, and vulnerable elderly victims.

#### The Family Violence Program

The Family Violence Program was funded in FY1978, and in fact included six programs funded in FY1977 as part of the Victim/Witness Program. However, a close reading of the Family Violence Program Guideline shows that the overall purpose of the Family Violence Program was quite dissimilar: "to provide support for several comprehensive program models designed to test appropriate and effective responses to family violence." This objective indicates a break with the original rationale for establishing services for victims--to increase their cooperation/confidence with/in the criminal justice system.

Moreover, the emphasis in the purpose of the Family Violence Program was not as explicitly focused on criminal justice improvements as in the Victim/Witness Program. The Victim/Witness Program was perhaps viewed as appropriately inclusive of social service programs and program components because the underlying assumption about the program was that it would ensure citizen confidence in and cooperation with the criminal justice system. LEAA thinking may have focused on development of a strong set of criminal justice goals for the Family Violence Program, to enhance the likelihood that the issue would be perceived as legitimately within the scope of that agency's legislative mandate. By FY1977, when the Victim/Witness Program scope was broadened to become the Family Violence Program, the Program Manager had come to consider as essential an emphasis on inter-agency coordination and some basic LEAA concerns regarding agency statistics, the level of criminal justice involvement in family violence, and a multi-faceted approach to family violence. On the most general

level, the intent of the program initiators was to "mobilize community support and interest" in family violence issues. At the agency (LEAA) level, initiators were apparently interested in facilitating agency acceptance of family violence as an "appropriate program area" of LEAA concern and attention.

Initiators felt that making money available for domestic violence programs focused on the criminal justice system would provide an impetus for improvement of system response and give the issue an increased priority nationwide. A precise formula--a program model--for accomplishing this aim was not developed. Initiators' additional areas of interest included questions concerning the appropriate use and effectiveness of the "nuances of criminal justice authority," i.e., measures not involving incarceration--e.g., arrest, prosecution in order to divert. In addition, initiators were interested in discovering the level of effectiveness (in terms of a reduction of the battering phenomena) given minimal criminal justice action.

In sum, the elaborate and ambitious set of Family Violence Program goals appear to have been developed, in part, as an attempt to justify the integration of the family violence programs originally funded under Victim/Witness auspices into the new program. It can also be seen as an attempt to justify the funding of "family" services within a "crime" agency. One can see that some of the project components were also mandatory parts of the earlier Victim/Witness funded projects. These factors are important in understanding how some projects (those with smaller budgets and lacking an institutional affiliation) were overwhelmed in their attempts to provide direct services while coordinating with the range of criminal justice agencies in their communities. The difficulty experienced by some projects in implementing services may be traced to the broad LEAA agenda (nine goals) and the resources available. In turn, the test of the basic program assumptions--specific deterrence and victim "empowerment"--may have been weakened by the broad range of program goals and the resultant absence of a program model.

#### IMPLEMENTATION AND FEDERAL SUPPORT

Federal support to the Family Violence Program, provided by the Office of Criminal Justice Programs of LEAA, had two components:

- discretionary action grants to public agencies and private nonprofit organizations to develop demonstration programs, and

- technical assistance grants and contracts to several organizations to generate activities and publications supportive of action grantee efforts and services in domestic violence.

In addition, OCJP developed a national goals statement and a short background paper that established the legal and theoretical underpinnings of the national program. These documents served as the conceptual foundation for the national program and exerted considerable influence on project tactics and organizational development. Federal support is described below.

#### Action Grants

In FY1977, the Special Programs Division of the Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP) of LEAA awarded six grants under its ongoing Victim Witness Assistance Program to develop programs and services for victims of family violence. Grants were awarded to four projects serving victims of spousal assault and two projects serving victims of child sexual assault and their families. As described above, OCJP had decided to develop a special program initiative specifically to address family violence, setting forth guidelines for an expanded federal demonstration program. Eleven new grantees and five of the six FY1977 grantees were funded under the Family Violence Program in FY1978. In FY1979, nine additional grants were awarded under this program. The funding strategy included both program support and action grants. Table 3-1 lists the grants by fiscal year. Over \$8.2 million was awarded over a four year period, excluding costs of \$1.32 million.

Table 3-1  
Family Violence Program Grant Activity  
Fiscal Years 1977-80

	1977	1978	1979	1980
<b>ACTION GRANTS</b>				
Phoenix, AZ	61,700	8,518		
Brattleboro, VT	48,000	42,000	32,400	
Henry Street, NY	68,920		79,310	49,492
Dade County, FL	79,088	88,870	67,000	
Children's Hospital, DC	161,176		206,628	188,423
Harborview, WA	170,115	166,081	193,577	
Fayetteville, NC		117,097		106,451
Santa Barbara	249,167	213,639		
Delaware		140,000		122,666
White Plains, NY		80,553		92,101
Alaska		260,886	244,500	

Table 3-1 (continued)

	1977	1978	1979	1980
Cleveland, OH		155,000		127,783
Philadelphia, PA		185,802		191,157
South Florida		268,836		135,296
Utah		81,234		76,260
Gary, Indiana		114,300		56,680
Salem, MA		126,000		105,000
Portland, OR			195,000	
Rhode Island			222,360	
Hinesville, GA			90,000	
Ashland, KY			100,000	
Charlottesville, VA			100,000	
San Francisco			184,761	
Faribault, MN			60,000	
Northampton, MA			90,000	
Morgantown, WVA			78,427	
North Dakota				125,000
Montgomery, AL				200,000
Milford, MA				135,000
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>588,999</b>	<b>2,085,324</b>	<b>1,700,463</b>	<b>2,169,448</b>

#### PROGRAM SUPPORT

CWPS	132,160	249,974	334,992	334,992
Home Economics		53,212		
PERF		35,290		
National ass'n. of Counties			9,900	
Center for Prevention of Violence			97,000	
ODN Productions, Inc.				265,635
San Jose, CA				50,000
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>721,159</b>	<b>2,423,800</b>	<b>2,142,355</b>	<b>2,922,075</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>\$8,208,389</b>		

#### Federally Sponsored Technical Assistance

Technical assistance to the Family Violence Program sites was provided during this period by the Center for Women Policy Studies (CWPS). CWPS also published a newsletter and maintained a National Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence. These activities were supported initially

by LEAA (OCJP) and later by both OCJP and the now defunct Office on Domestic Violence of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

OCJP also funded efforts to support and improve the response of criminal justice system agencies in each project jurisdiction in order to facilitate the realization of program goals. For example, a three-day conference was held in Memphis, Tennessee, in September 1978, to discuss the role of the prosecutor in spouse assault cases. Jointly sponsored by CWPS and the National District Attorney's Association, the conference was attended by prosecuting attorneys from each of the family violence project sites as well as representatives from victim/witness and dispute resolution programs. The conference had two major objectives: (1) to develop a consensus on strategies for prosecutorial management of domestic assault cases and (2) to exchange information on strategies and tactics for prosecutorial handling of the cases.

The conference results were reported in The Victim Advocate. While reaffirming the LEAA premise that spousal assault is a crime and should receive the same treatment as other offenses, participants recognized that factors intrinsic to these cases often make prosecution difficult. In addition, attitudinal barriers among justice system staff often were seen as impediments effective prosecution. Instead, prosecutors relied on a range of responses: filing of charges; diversion; victim support services; and referrals for services, including mediation, social services, and civil court remedies.

OCJP also supported the development of standards and guidelines for improved law enforcement handling of domestic violence cases. A grant to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) resulted in a research monograph on current practices, the legal and traditional underpinnings of those practices, and documentation of recent advances in police handling of cases (Loving, 1980). Focusing on domestic disturbances involving the threat or use of violence, the study included three phases: a study of the incidence and prevalence of domestic assaults and current police responses; field and survey research of 17 police agencies and 130 officers at the family violence project sites to examine policies and procedures for handling "violent" domestic disturbances; and the development of proposed policies and procedures ratified by a peer review panel of 20 criminal justice and social service professionals.

The PERF research confirmed the results of several previous studies of police intervention in domestic disputes. The study was critical of "alternative" police responses such as crisis intervention and reconciliation of the parties. Officers cited impediments to effective intervention, including poor training, ambiguous departmental policies, and a lack of incentives to devote more time and attention to spouse abuse cases. Loving (1980) suggested that policies be developed to

"impose sensible limits and structure on the range of available police intervention practices for these calls." The report recommends increased arrests in felony spouse assault cases and in some misdemeanor assaults. Although these procedures seem contrary to the traditionally broad discretion of police officers, the designation of specific dispositions for specific types of cases was deemed necessary given the indiscriminate use of informal and largely ineffective "adjustments" for these potentially lethal situations. Police training in the Family Violence Program sites was left to the individual projects.

OCJP also took steps to improve institutional responses to child sexual assault cases in 14 of the Family Violence Program sites. A grant was awarded to the Sexual Assault Center of Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, to conduct community training conferences in case management and criminal justice system response to these cases. SAC staff conducted one-day conferences of prosecutors, police administrators, and medical and social service agency staffs in 1980 at 14 sites to discuss methods for adaptation of the technology developed under the SAC family violence grant.

Other OCJP-supported efforts included technical assistance at project sites to develop treatment programs for batterers and conferences to foster linkages between the projects and clergy. In addition, over the past 18 months, OCJP has convened the grantees for three "cluster conferences" to exchange information and data on project service delivery and organizational development as well as to receive further technical assistance from CWPS. Finally, OCJP awarded a grant to the National Home Economics Association to generate public education materials to support local grantee efforts in altering attitudes toward domestic violence.

In sum, OCJP took substantial and concrete steps to assure criminal justice involvement in family violence cases. The training and technical assistance programs were designed to assist the projects to conduct training and work within the context of the criminal justice system. These inputs were thorough but modest supports toward achieving goals of substantial change in longstanding social service and justice system policies in a relatively short time period. OCJP selected a cohort of demonstration projects, rich in geographic, organizational and institutional diversity, who best demonstrated the existence of family violence problems in their communities. They also offered assurances of linkages with the justice system, and offered to pursue the broad OCJP agenda. Armed with a variety of inputs and resources, the projects ambitiously sought to develop and coordinate services, alter policy, and educate the community against violence and in favor of utilizing services.

## THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STATUTES AND LEGISLATION

The major premise of the LEAA program--that increased involvement of the criminal and civil justice systems is a primary means of reducing spouse abuse and family violence--was implemented at the project sites only to the extent that family violence statutes, penal code sections, and civil procedures permitted police intervention and created legal options for victims. These options included protection orders or criminal sanctions which varied widely across states. The options available to police and prosecutors, including the means to effectively intervene, arrest, prosecute, and otherwise sanction these offenses, also varied by state legislation.

Analysis of the impact of project intervention on violent families must include available criminal and civil court options as a major contextual variable. This section presents an assessment of the key provisions in civil and criminal remedies for family violence in the project sites. State-by-state assessments appear for the ten core sites in Appendix C.

### Civil Remedies--Temporary Restraining Orders and Protection Orders

Several forms of civil remedies were available to battered women, including protection orders, temporary restraining orders, divorce, damages, and alimony (Lerman, 1980). At the family violence projects, the most important and widely used remedies were temporary restraining orders and protection orders. A temporary restraining order (TRO) (or a temporary order of protection) is an emergency protection order, which may be issued on demand or within a few hours of an incident. A TRO is available in most incidents involving threat of violence or injury, and may not require the appearance of the assailant (Grau, 1982).

In the domestic violence sites, 18 of 23 (78%) had provisions for a TRO. This legislation is recent in nearly all states; 88% of these laws have been passed since 1977. TROs are usually available ex parte, that is, the order may be issued after a hearing at which the victim is present but not the abuser, and usually the same day she files the petition. Of the 18 states with civil TRO provisions, 17 (94%) provide for ex parte relief. The rules on who may obtain a TRO, however, differ from state to state. In some states, anyone abused by a spouse, former spouse, household member, family member, or former household member can obtain a TRO ex parte. Other states limit TROs to women married to the abuser, and others require that the victim file for divorce to obtain a TRO. Among the 17 family violence sites with ex parte TRO provisions, six (35%) are limited to spouses only. Of these, two require that another civil action (e.g., filing for separation or divorce) be pending or in effect.

Temporary orders remain in effect for a limited period of time until a full hearing can be held or until the court re-opens. After the hearing, the TRO becomes a Protection Order and may remain in effect for a period of up to one year. Protection Orders are renewable in three (17%) of the 18 states.

Enforcement of a Protection Order is a critical determinant of the effectiveness of family violence sanctions and statutes. In New York, the failure of law enforcement to enforce arrest provisions for violations of restraining orders was the subject of a class action lawsuit and subsequent consent decree (Bruno v. Codd, 1978). In 78% of the states where protection orders are available, a violation is punishable either as criminal contempt or a misdemeanor.

Civil contempt, a more common sanction, is generally punishable by a jail sentence (up to six months) and/or a fine of \$500, or a term of probation supervision. Only one state has a provision for a minimum or mandatory jail sentence. In criminal contempt or misdemeanor violations of protection orders, four states (17%) permit a police officer to make an arrest without first obtaining a warrant or observing the violation. Unlike other misdemeanors, the officer can make a warrantless arrest if he believes there is "probable cause" that a violation has occurred, even where there is no visible injury. (Probable cause arrests are usually reserved for felony violations involving stranger-to-stranger offenses.) Two states (19%) have established mandatory arrest for violations of protection orders.

### Criminal Remedies

While most states have statutes prohibiting physical assault, law enforcement and the courts have historically treated violence among spouses as a family matter and have failed to apply criminal sanctions in other than the most brutal cases. Application of criminal sanctions has been selective and discretionary, and even in convictions sentences have been lenient.

Recently, several states have enacted legislation to overcome many of the barriers to criminal justice intervention. Warrantless arrest for misdemeanor spousal assaults, special chapters defining spousal assault as a criminal offense separate from stranger assault, and mandatory arrests for violations of criminal orders or repeat offenders are options created by recent legislation. All these measures are designed to afford victims of family violence access to criminal remedies traditionally inaccessible due to procedural, attitudinal, and political barriers (Loving, 1980). In the 23 project sites, only two (9%) have created special penal code sections defining spousal assault as a felony or misdemeanor. Seven (30%) have enabled probable cause arrest for misdemeanor spousal assault. As mentioned above, 17% have enacted statutes providing for probable cause arrest for a viola-



tion of a TRO or a Protection Order and 9% have established mandatory arrest for such violations.

Overall, these new statutes have created opportunities for increased criminal justice involvement in spousal assault cases. However, the utilization and application of these provisions remains a function of victim choice and police officer discretion. Training programs for officers should be part of a policy development and implementation process to assure consistent and comprehensive application of these statutes.

#### **The Focus of Reform: Criminal Sanction for Civil Violations**

The review of legislative action at the family violence project sites suggests a trend toward statutory reform enhancing civil remedies for family violence and spousal assault. Included in this trend is the criminalization of violations of civil remedies. Reforms in the criminal statutes (i.e., penal codes) are not nearly as prevalent, however. Fewer than 30% of the states have undertaken reforms in penal code definitions or criminal procedure.

Several plausible hypotheses for this trend can be set forth. First, the emphasis on civil remedies may have resulted from recognition of the substantial barriers in criminal justice processing of family violence and non-stranger violence cases. These barriers are numerous and complex, involving issues such as time to response or case resolution, quality of response, difficulty in accessing agencies for relief or service, and ineffective or irrelevant case dispositions and sanctions. Civil remedies, on the other hand, are more accessible and timely (although there remain questions about the effectiveness of current sanctions for violations of protection orders).

Second, it is possible that less resistance would be encountered in attempts to alter civil codes. Revisions of the criminal (penal) code must be deliberated by several highly visible legislative committees subject to lobbying by numerous interest groups with strong ideological positions. The civil codes, with jurisdiction over "family matters," are subject to less intense debate by fewer interest groups or lobbies.

Finally, the emphasis on reform in civil code and procedure reflects the political and ideological positions of activists in family violence, as well as victim preferences in service requests. Criminal justice remedies were largely already in place (e.g., it is a crime for one individual to physically assault another, regardless of their personal relationship); however, there are well-documented barriers to their use. Civil remedies, such as those pioneered in New York (N.Y. Family Court Act, Article 8) and Pennsylvania (Act 218, Law of Pennsylvania) were until recently unavailable in most states. The efforts to expand civil options while improving available criminal

options, together with other efforts to expand and improve medical and social service responses, may have reflected the interests of practitioners and activists to create a broad network of service options for victims of family violence.

## **Interventions**

Having analyzed the origins and context for the Family Violence Program, we turn now to the intervention itself. The theoretical underpinnings of the Family Violence Program were expressed and operationalized through numerous direct and indirect services. Though not explicitly called for in the LEAA Program Guideline--indeed, as noted earlier, OCJP avoided a particular program model--these services were a natural outgrowth of the combined efforts to serve victims, batterers, and their families. In the national policy experiment, these services became the intervention variables both in testing the program assumptions and demonstrating means of achieving the program goals.

This section presents a brief descriptive assessment of the types of direct and indirect services the 23 family violence projects undertook to address the needs of family violence victims (and their families) and in response to the OCJP goal statement. The brief discussions identify the types of services and the variation within categories. Both direct services to clients and indirect services to alter system or community responses are discussed. More elaborate descriptions are included in Appendix B. The discussions in this section also identify some issues confronted by projects in operationalizing services. A simple typology of projects is offered based on primary service or service emphasis. This typology is useful in simplifying the analyses of service impacts in chapter 5, as well as impacts on systems in chapter 6. Next is a discussion of indirect services--training, service coordination, and outreach. Although projects engage in several types of indirect services, these three are the most common across site. The section concludes with a description of the outreach and referral networks established by the projects to improve the handling of family violence cases.

DIRECT SERVICES

The types of services implemented by the 23 projects is impressive in its diversity and implications. Table 3-2 summarizes the extent to which each service was provided in the national program.

Table 3-2  
Direct Services Summary

Service	N	(%)
Shelter	12	(52)
Childcare Services	13	(57)
Information & Referral	23	(100)
Advocacy: Non-legal	19	(83)
Advocacy: Legal/Non-formal	21	(91)
Advocacy: Legal/Formal	12	(52)
Crisis Intervention	16	(70)
Counseling	16	(70)
Diversion Counseling	10	(43)
Mediation	2	(9)
Transportation	13	(57)

The most common services were information and referral, non-legal advocacy (i.e., assistance with social agencies), and legal advocacy (i.e., assistance in obtaining civil or criminal remedies provided by non-attorney project staff). Mediation services were offered by the fewest projects.

Shelter

Shelter care within the context of the family violence projects generally referred to sustenance--the provision of housing and food for women and their children who have recently experienced violence in their homes and are consequently seeking refuge. The length of stay that a woman and her dependents were allowed varied across projects. Most shelters offered a supportive environment for victims of family violence--women were encouraged to share feelings, experiences, ideas and knowledge.

Most projects accepted and provided services to any woman and her children who have been recent victims of physical abuse or who had recently been threatened with violence. Several shelters also accepted rape victims. A rural shelter-based project, for example, had set a maximum length of stay at two months, while a statewide shelter

network expected a woman to stay no longer than 30 days. However, exceptions were made (i.e., extensions were given), and women were seldom evicted.

Childcare Services

Services to children, though limited in most projects, were provided by all 12 shelter projects (see table 3-3). Only one of the non-shelter projects (Cleveland) offered supervision/babysitting services while adult clients attended mediation sessions, appeared in court or met with project staff. Children's services across shelter projects included the provision of room and board, supervision and babysitting. Six projects featured parenting instruction, and four projects offered children a more formalized daycare program. In some sites, project staff also worked with shelter residents--the mothers of these children--to help them develop parenting skills and nonviolent disciplinary methods.

Table 3-3  
Childcare Services

Type	N	(%)
Supervision/Babysitting	13	(56)
Parenting Instruction	6	(26)
Daycare	4	(17)
No Childcare Services	10	(43)

Nonsystematic, though critical, assistance to children was also provided through court testimony and collaboration with CPS and welfare agencies to assist clients involved in custody cases. In some of these instances, child abuse was an issue. Non-shelter projects--civil action, criminal action and service coordination projects--were less likely to detect child-related family violence issues, due, no doubt, to their limited direct access to children and also to the reluctance of adult clients to reveal or discuss the impact of parental violence on their children.

Information and Referral

All 23 projects provided various kinds and amounts of information, including referrals for services, to both potential and actual clients. "I&R" was conveyed either in-person or by phone. Referrals were generally made to social service agencies and medical or legal services

within a community. Women in shelter projects were provided with referral information concerning temporary or permanent housing, financial aid, legal assistance, employment assistance, medical care and long-term counseling. In some instances, project staff identified contact persons in certain agencies to whom clients were then referred directly.

### Advocacy

The connotation of the term "advocacy" varied widely across projects. The term may be used to explain one or a combination of the following:

- the actual setting up on client referrals and appointments;
- preparing or coaching clients on the type of demeanor or behavior most likely to obtain desirable results in agency settings;
- escorting or accompanying specific clients to or through services or criminal justice agencies;
- speaking to services and criminal justice agency representatives in order to alter practices of individual workers or policies or procedures unfavorable or detrimental to clients.

Three types of advocacy were identified: non-legal advocacy, legal (but informal) advocacy, and formal legal assistance. Non-legal advocacy was provided by 19 projects, and generally referred to project efforts on behalf of clients with social service agencies or community organizations. This type of advocacy usually included setting up appointments, accompaniment, and transportation.

Legal advocacy was both formal and informal. In keeping with the OCJP guidelines, most projects offered some form of legal assistance, including:

- Legal counseling and advocacy. Such assistance involved coaching or training clients in terms of appropriate demeanor, informing a person of available legal options, and explaining legal procedures. Another dimension consisted of accompanying clients through the court system, appearing as a witness on behalf of a client, and discussing client needs with various court officers, either privately or publicly.
- Direct court-action services. Recent legislation in some sites allowed the court to empower project workers to file restraining order petitions for clients. In other sites, workers assisted clients in deciding options (e.g., whether to file a civil or criminal petition) and determining other alternatives (e.g., letters from prosecutors, separation or divorce).

Legal advocacy was either formal or informal, depending on the characteristics and qualifications of the staff performing the services. Non-formal legal assistance was rendered by paralegals, law students and other paid and nonpaid staff knowledgeable in justice procedures. Nearly all (21) projects provided clients with this type of assistance, the most common form involving referrals and setting up appointments for clients--usually by phone--with criminal or civil justice personnel. Clients were also provided with procedural information relevant to the type of justice system involvement. In-person court accompaniment by staff occurred in civil court matters--including divorce, restraining orders and child custody cases--and in criminal matters, including prosecution and violation of restraining orders.

Formal legal assistance was available through 12 projects in the form of attorneys' services. Attorneys provide legal advice and/or representation in appropriate civil and criminal court matters. Special prosecutors were a feature of two projects: Salem and Santa Barbara. Attorneys performing this role prosecuted family violence cases in courts, trained paralegal and law student volunteers, and developed linkages with probation officers, law enforcement agencies, judges, court clerks and other assistant district attorneys. They also determined which cases were more and less amenable to prosecution, advised clients on the advisability of pursuing prosecution, and supported clients who decided to pursue this option.

### Crisis Intervention

"Crisis intervention" designated a variety of activities across sites, which can be differentiated according to:

- the point in time at which a project attempted to intervene in violent incidents;
- the mechanisms or procedures through which an intervention was to be accomplished;
- the statuses of those designated to intervene.

Sixteen projects offered one or more forms of crisis intervention assistance. Of these, 15 maintained a hotline, nine offered staff intervention/counseling at the project site, and four intervened at the scene of a dispute.

### Counseling

Projects provided a range of counseling services to clients, including approaches with individuals, groups (victim and assailant), couples and families. Though techniques and approaches varied across projects, such concepts as "independent decision-making," "self-reliance," and

"taking responsibility for one's actions" were the general focus of the counseling services. A variety of approaches were used, including:

- client-centered approach--projects placed special emphasis on assisting the victim toward a greater understanding of emotional difficulties that battering experiences have produced;
- behavioral contracting models--counselors assisted clients to establish realistic and measurable objectives with reference to perceived needs and work toward goals on the basis of a "social contract";
- anger management classes--assisted clients in understanding and controlling violent behavior;
- problem-solving approach--staff assisted clients in determining the range of immediately available options and encouraged them to discover practical solutions to difficulties with housing, childcare and employment.

Table 3-4  
Counseling Services

Type	N	(%)
Victim (Individual)	16	(70)
Victim and Assailant (Conjoint)	8	(35)
Family (Partners, Children)	3	(13)
Assailant (Individual)	7	(30)
Children (Individual)	4	(17)
Victims' Group	11	(48)
Assailants' Group	3	(13)
No Counseling	7	(30)

Across projects, staff differentiated between long- and short-term counseling. Short-term counseling was most often provided by project staff. Clients who requested more in-depth, long-term assistance were usually referred to mental health centers. Table 3-4 shows that 16 projects provided counseling to clients (excluding diversion projects); individual counseling to victims was most frequent; the next most frequently offered service was victim groups. Fewer projects offered conjoint or family counseling, and still fewer offered individual or group counseling services to assailants. Some projects receptive to assailant clients encountered difficulty obtaining their cooperation. The lower incidence of services to assailants also reflected project policies limiting client target

populations to victims, or to victims and children. Relatively few projects offered individual counseling to children, for reasons discussed previously (see Childcare Services).

#### Diversion

As alternatives to formal criminal adjudication and sentencing, diversions projects were based on a dual philosophy of early intervention/rehabilitation and social control. Batterers were diverted from the criminal court system at various points in time: post-complaint or pre-arrest, pre-trial, or post-conviction. Projects of the first type received referrals of batterers for counseling from police as alternatives to arrest and from district attorneys as alternatives to prosecuting complaints. If an arrest was made or charges pressed, judges diverted as an alternative to trial or a conditional disposition of the case. Sentencing also offered diversion as an alternative to other dispositions (e.g., fines or incarceration) or as a condition of probation.

Table 3-5  
Diversion Counseling

Type	N	(%)
Victim (Individual)	0	(-)
Assailant (Individual)	9	(43)
Assailant and Victim (Conjoint)	7	(30)
Family (Partners, Children)	1	(4)
Assailants' Group	8	(35)
Victims' Group	1	(4)

Table 3-5 shows that 10 projects offered diversion counseling to clients. The legal connotation of the diversion label suggests a primary project concern with services for assailants. However, services in some projects were extended to other members of a client's family. Projects also utilized different approaches in dispensing services. Approximately the same number of projects offer individual (assailant), group (assailant), and couple counseling. Few projects provide family or victim counseling. Project staff, suggesting that victims are often unwilling to participate in these types of services, were hesitant to pressure victims toward involvement for fear that, if pressured, they would feel further victimized.



Mediation/Arbitration

Only two projects offered mediation/arbitration services. In Cleveland, services were designed to assist families with violence problems before they result in requests for formal court intervention or adjudication. It was composed of two unique, but related, components: the "notice to appear" (NTA), which allows police to recommend counseling for one or both parties in a domestic dispute, and the technique of mediation, used when both parties agree to draft a contract to end their violent conflicts. Ideally, the two activities occurred in a smooth sequence so that the attending police officer could issue an NTA instead of arresting the offender or doing nothing at all. However, each component could stand alone as well as in tandem, because without the voluntary consent of both parties, the police could still make "simple referrals" to the project for individual counseling. Clients referred by agencies other than the police or through NTAs could also take advantage of the mediation process. At the conclusion of the mediation process, each party receives a summary of a written contract listing clauses derived from their consensus.

Transportation

Thirteen projects offered clients transportation. Although projects did not consider transportation as a discrete project service, in practice it was a critically important element of delivering several other forms of assistance: in-person advocacy with clients, shelter services involving post-incident relocation of clients, dependents and their belongings, and, of course, critical emergency intervention during the course of a violent episode are accomplished effectively and efficiently to the extent that transportation issues and policies have been considered. Transportation is especially critical in rural regions, where distances between cities or towns can be great and public transportation (buses, trains, taxis) nonexistent or unreliable. The Utah project, for example, covered a 25,932 square mile area encompassing seven counties with sparsely populated and physically isolated communities. Distances between population centers were great, and no adequate means of public transportation existed.

INDIRECT SERVICES

Projects engaged in a variety of activities in which staff did not provide services directly to clients but engaged in activities designed to alter community attitudes and the responses of public agencies

whose services were needed by family violence victims. These activities, generically called "indirect services," include training, outreach, and service coordination. Projects engaged in these indirect services activities not only to meet the LEAA program goals but also to enhance the likelihood of project tenure. Building relations with agencies tended to establish a project's legitimacy and creidbility as a service provider among personnel in other service agencies. Project staff also intended to improve direct services to family violence clients when they visited other agencies to request that family violence victims receive special attention.

Table 3-6 differentiates project indirect services activities--training, service coordination and community outreach--according to the audiences addressed by each approach. Training was directed mainly toward agency staff likely to deliver direct services to clients, such as social services, mental health, or health care services. Service coordination activities were undertaken with agency staff at administrative and direct service levels. Outreach and public information efforts were focused at broader "public-at-large" audiences, including schools and community and civil organizations.

Table 3-6  
Indirect Service Activities and Audiences

Type	Projects	Audience
Training	21	Criminal Justice, Civil Court, and Service Agency Direct Service Staff
Service Coordination	23	Criminal Justice, Civil Court, and Service Agency Administrative and Direct Service Staff
Community Outreach	23	Public-at-Large, Schools, Comunity and Civic Organ-izations

Training

Training of criminal justice, mental health, and social service agency workers was a strategy project used to increase awareness of domestic violence, expedite case handling, and improve interagency coordination. Topics typically addressed in training social service and law enforce-ment personnel include:

- dynamics and legal issues of family violence;
- resources available to battered women;
- services and goals of the family violence project;
- techniques for handling family violence cases;
- profiles of family violence victims; and
- requests for volunteers, "safe homes," and/or donations.

Depending on the project and needs of the audience, project staff also discussed crisis intervention techniques, mediation, and ways to document family violence. Techniques for counseling assailants received specific attention in the program's second and third years. The Center for Women's Policy Studies provided funds for experienced treatment personnel from both LEAA and non-LEAA projects to visit interested family violence projects. Staff, trained in the latest techniques, then transmitted this information to local interested service providers. Training also included hospitals and mental health centers. Two projects provided training to hospital staff in ways to improve identification and documentation of victims of spouse abuse. Training in mental health agencies focused on assisting counselors to better understand and counsel persons affected by domestic violence. Several projects developed and disseminated expertise concerning counseling batterers. Staff in these sites noted the inexperience of many mental health counselors, as well as themselves, in working with a relatively new client group. To improve this situation, one project established an 8-week intern program to train mental health professionals and para-professionals which included a section on counseling techniques for batterers.

### Service Coordination

Projects approached the development of coordinated services for family violence participants through a series of steps:

- identification of agencies currently providing services and those potentially able to provide services to family violence clients;
- development of mechanisms among existing service providers to include family violence clients and/or arrange for services in areas where service gaps exist; and
- information transfer and dissemination to service providers concerning services available in the target area to facilitate development and/or expansion of networks.

The projects also facilitated service coordination by sponsoring workshops, conferences, and adult and child abuse task forces. All projects sponsored and/or participated in one or more of these service

activities. For five projects, service coordination was its primary goal--these projects were funded essentially to perform service coordination tasks. In fact, the Rice (Minnesota) site offered no direct client services.

### Outreach and Community Education

Outreach activities included speaking and media (film) engagements, inter-agency staff meetings, soliciting representatives for Advisory Board participation, lobbying for family violence legislation, and participation in coalitions and conferences. When their major aim was informing agency or community actors about the family violence project, these activities were termed "outreach."

In a sense, outreach activities were initiated even before the projects actually began operations. Through soliciting letters of endorsement for the grant, holding community meetings to support the grant, or presenting media publicity to garner public support, the emerging projects were performing outreach activities in order to increase their visibility and dramatize the issue among community and service agency members.

This initial outreach was only the first step. Outreach continued in order to solidify support for the program, obtain assistance for program clients, and educate a community about family violence. Project staff invited criminal justice, social service, or community actors to sit on advisory boards. Programs sent outreach staff to other important agencies to discuss the functions of the family violence project and offer services to the agency. During these contacts, mutual referral networks (and/or other agreements) often were established. Most projects also attempted to reach out to the community-at-large. Through media, speaking engagements, political lobbying and coalition attendance, programs hoped to educate the public about the extent and causes of, and system responses, and alternatives to family violence. Potential self-referred clients were sought through outreach. Additionally, high visibility was undertaken to increase support for the program, including donations and volunteers.

Finally, projects became involved in legislative lobbying on two levels. One type of legislative action sought changes existing criminal and/or civil laws regarding family violence crimes. Through activity in this sphere, projects responded to the national program goals regarding attempting to both reduce community acceptance of domestic violence as well as impact upon the criminal justice system. Another form of lobbying was legislation is that mandating financial resources for family violence programs.

## PROGRAM SERVICES TYPOLOGY

A typology of the family violence projects was constructed, based on projects' direct services. The importance and relevance of this is its potential contribution to analysis of system change and client impact; it is introduced as an independent variable in later analyses to differentiate projects in terms of client characteristics and service impacts on victims and families. To describe projects in terms of service configuration, the 11 direct services were entered into a principle components analysis. For each project, the 11 services were coded according to whether the service was offered. The correlation matrix representing associations among all pairs of the 11 services was analyzed using factor analysis and Pearson product-moment correlations. The first two factors (i.e., components) were particularly instructive (table 3-7).

Table 3-7  
Factor Matrix for Services Offered

	Factor	
	I	II
Shelter	.92	-.16
Childcare	.90	-.10
Transportation	.94	-.17
Information and Referral	.66	.34
Non-Legal Advocacy	.93	-.12
Legal Advocacy (Informal)	.48	.45
Legal Advocacy (Formal)	.18	.26
Crisis Intervention	.75	.10
Victim Counseling	.75	.18
Diversion Counseling	-.11	.90
Mediation	.12	.53
EIGENVALUE	5.85	1.65

This analysis identified two types of project service emphasis--shelters and non-shelters--which provides as a basis for viewing the projects' cases and services. The first factor emphasizes victim support services; in fact, diversion (batterer) counseling loads negatively on this factor. The second factor emphasizes diversion (batterer) counseling, and includes mediation and two types of legal advocacy. The factors appear to describe two distinct project intervention strategies--victim support (shelter, childcare, transportation, advocacy) and batterer intervention (diversion, prosecution,

mediation). The factors account for 63% of the variance--leaving ample "room" for the few projects which attempted a dual strategy.

This typology illustrates important differences between projects. Two major service characteristics differentiate projects--the provision of shelter as the primary service focus and the provision of legal assistance as the primary service focus. The first dimension describes whether shelter services were provided to clients by the family violence project. The second describes whether clients had access to the court (adjudication) process, or if they are diverted to alternate services outside of the formal jurisdiction of the court.

### Shelter Service Projects

Although there is diversity among the 12 projects within this type and in the means by which services were provided, the basic service mix is fairly "pure." Shelter, counseling, advocacy, and crisis intervention were offered to clients and (usually) their children. Exceptions within this "pure" typology are one project which also offered mediation services, and another which featured a diversion program. These projects relied heavily on police referrals.

### Legal Service Projects

The 10 projects in this service type are differentiated from the other projects in the national program in that they do not offer direct access to a shelter. Rather, their primary service component consisted of the provision of legal services within the civil or criminal justice system, and usually under its auspices. Within this category, variation was found along several dimensions--the type of service offered; the point at which they intervened in the legal process; and identification of the client population. Services category in this include: counseling advocacy, crisis intervention, civil/criminal assistance or representation, and diversion.

In sum, we can better understand the types of cases seen and case handling practices in terms of project service emphasis. In turn, these categories assist in understanding the contribution of such factors to case outcomes. The results may also bear on the planning of outreach, direct service, and community development strategies for future programs, depending on which service "type" is more effective. Finally, the optimal points of intervention and service mixes may be determined by comparing the different service types.

## REFERRAL NETWORKS

Project referral activity is another dimension of family violence interventions. The "system" from which a client was referred, describes the type of help initially sought by the client prior to contracting the family violence project. Referral source indicates the "path" that clients took to obtain services and illustrate the referral network established by the projects. The variation in referral network by project service emphasis further illustrates the importance of victim or offender service focus in describing overall project intervention strategy.

Referral sources are shown in table 3-8. As expected, police and district attorneys were the modal referral sources, accounting for over 40 percent of all referrals. When the courts and other criminal justice agencies are included, over half of all referrals were from the criminal justice system. Portland had an especially high level (93%) of police referrals, reflective of their service design emphasizing prosecution and diversion. Philadelphia and White Plains--both located in prosecutors' offices--had the highest percentage of prosecutor referrals.

Table 3-8  
Referral Source by Project Service Emphasis

Referral Source	Shelters	Others	Total
Other Domestic Violence Project	31 ( 3.6%)	73 ( 4.5%)	104 (4.2%)
Police	121 (14.1%)	449 (27.6%)	570 (22.9%)
Prosecutor	6 ( 0.7%)	456 (28.0%)	462 (18.6%)
Public Defender	2 ( 0.2%)	7 ( 0.4%)	9 (0.4%)
Legal Aid	17 ( 1.9%)	37 ( 2.3%)	54 (2.2%)
Probation	4 ( 0.5%)	31 ( 1.9%)	35 (1.4%)
Court	63 ( 7.4%)	150 ( 9.2%)	213 (8.6%)
Other Legal	13 ( 1.5%)	35 ( 2.1%)	48 (1.9%)
Private Doctor	5 ( 0.6%)	3 ( 0.2%)	75 (0.3%)
Hospital	62 ( 7.2%)	13 ( 0.8%)	78 (3.0%)
Other Health Care	8 ( 0.9%)	9 ( 0.6%)	17 (0.7%)
Social Services	69 ( 8.1%)	32 ( 1.9%)	101 (4.1%)
Welfare	33 ( 3.8%)	6 ( 0.4%)	39 (1.6%)
Private Mental Health	14 ( 1.6%)	10 ( 0.6%)	24 (1.0%)
Public Mental Health	30 ( 3.5%)	11 ( 0.7%)	41 (1.6%)
Hotline	43 ( 5.0%)	19 ( 1.2%)	62 (2.5%)
Housing	2 ( 0.2%)	7 ( 0.4%)	9 (0.4%)
Employment	10 ( 1.2%)	2 ( 0.1%)	12 (0.5%)
School	6 ( 0.7%)	1 ( 0.1%)	7 (0.3%)

Table 3-8 (continued)  
Referral Source by Project Service Emphasis

Referral Source	Shelters	Others	Total
Church	20 ( 2.3%)	5 ( 0.3%)	25 (1.0%)
Friends	81 ( 9.5%)	51 ( 3.1%)	132 (5.3%)
Relatives	64 ( 7.5%)	33 ( 2.0%)	97 (3.9%)
Media	50 ( 5.8%)	32 ( 1.9%)	82 (3.3%)
Other	79 ( 9.2%)	115 ( 7.1%)	194 (7.8%)
Not Applicable	24 ( 2.8%)	41 ( 2.5%)	65 (2.6%)
TOTAL	857	1,628	2,485 (100%)
Missing=48			

Social service referrals were uniformly low (5.5% overall), as were mental health (2.5%), medical and health care providers (4.0%), and legal aid (4.1%). Only Charlottesville, a shelter, had an appreciable number of referrals from hospitals (N=24, 38.7%).

That the criminal justice system accounted for the vast majority of referrals is not surprising: it reflects both the influence of LEAA on these projects and the pivotal role of the justice system in family violence. Indeed, the justice system was often, if not usually, the first public agency where a victim sought help. Usually it was through the police, or the prosecutor, as these data suggest. However, the pattern of other referral sources displays a breadth of community contacts.

Comparisons of referral sources for shelters and other (usually justice) agencies reveal striking differences. As table 3-8 shows, the referral networks of shelters were considerably more diverse than those of justice system projects. Hospitals, mental health and social service agencies, hotlines, churches, friends, relatives, and other social networks accounted for over half of shelter referrals (50.4%), compared to only 12 percent for justice system projects. Moreover, police and prosecutors accounted for a much lower percentage of shelter referrals: police referred about one client in seven to shelters, but one in four to other projects; prosecutors, who referred 28 percent of justice project clients, were a negligible referral source for shelters. Justice system projects, on the other hand, made few inroads into other social networks, particularly hospitals and social service agencies.

Whether these trends reflect differences in community perceptions of the problem or strategies for remediation is not readily evident. They may be a function of the widely held belief that, given the



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**1 OF 4**

potential lethality of domestic violence situations, the priority needs are for physical safety and escape from the violent home--i.e., for shelter. Alternately, the data may reflect the availability of shelter resources in a community. For example, White Plains and Philadelphia (two prosecutor-based projects) did not have shelter resources immediately available and drew few clients from outside the justice system. Fayetteville and Wilmington, two shelters in locales with no special justice system services, drew clients from a wide range of community contacts.

Regardless of the potential explanations, the data strongly suggest that justice system projects had difficulty establishing networks with both shelters and other agencies where victims may present themselves. This finding points to the need for greater outreach by justice system projects--particularly to hospitals, social service agencies, the mental health system, and to the general public and other social institutions--through community education and publicity. Also, the relatively few in-referrals from justice system agencies suggests a need for much closer cooperation, particularly if the justice system is to become involved in family violence cases at an early point.

## Project Characteristics

The type and emphasis of intervention services offered by the demonstration projects describes only one dimension of the Family Violence Program. An additional area of interest in the program was the nature of the organizations which provided the services. Policy-makers were concerned with identifying the types of organizations which could most effectively implement the prescribed services. An evaluation concern was understanding the process of how services were delivered. It was necessary to understand not only which services were most effective in reducing family violence, but also how to provide them and how they worked. The selection of project characteristics to describe and further typify projects began with the program development analysis. These same features are analyzed in this section to identify structural characteristics which are associated with service delivery.

The discussion begins with an overview of how projects perceived and applied the program's theoretical assumptions. Institutional affiliation is shown to be a key factor in service implementation. Decision making, staffing, and resources are discussed, and projects are

contrasted using the services typology developed in the preceding section.

## PHILOSOPHY AND ORIENTATION

The theoretical underpinnings of the Family Violence Program were expressed first in the program goals and then interpreted by projects in developing services. The projects brought to the Family Violence Program a wide range of philosophies both of services and of the causes of violence in the family against women which deeply affected the process of service delivery. The projects' approaches can be categorized in three types: feminist, social control, or legalistic. These three outlooks had very different implications for the type of services offered and the manner in which services were provided. These philosophies in turn serve as predictors of the impact of certain interventions or service mixes.

### The Feminist Approach

Projects in this category focused their attention on the woman/victim. Little attention was paid to the family as a unit, and it was considered a "conflict of interest" to simultaneously serve the victim and the batterer. Feminist projects generally believed that little could be done to "save the relationship" or the family as an entity. The concern was for the woman--providing her with a safe environment and assuming that once in the environment and informed of options she would then take concrete steps to end the abuse. This usually meant that she would consider whether to leave the relationship. However, the projects learned that most of the battered women had a much more traditional approach to life--their preference was to return to the relationship if the violence would cease. The case studies (volume II) illustrate how the feminist projects were often quite unprepared for the economic and emotional realities of the victims' lives and quickly learned the necessity for taking these perspectives into account.

An example of this is the lack of preparation for children's services in both the Brattleboro and Salem projects. In Brattleboro and Salem, the emotional needs of the victims themselves were underestimated and counseling approaches for women with children were not fully developed. There appeared to be a strong interaction between the victims' emotional needs, economic circumstances, and the presence of children. In many instances, projects were confronted with the difficult task of assisting physically injured women with children and

few economic resources, to make complex decisions about their lives and the well-being of their children.

Ironically, another feminist foundation of the family violence initiative was the victims assistance approach which grew out of LEAA's Victim/Miami Witness Program. In the LEAA family violence initiative, victim assistance was extended to include the idea of victim empowerment: the typical victim of spousal violence is a woman with few options other than remaining with the abuser and who may not be fully cognizant of her own victimization.\* Thus, the LEAA program sought to fund services such as counseling, shelters, and employment assistance to enable the woman to make lifestyle and economic choices.

The public education aspect of the "prevention" (indirect services) components came the closest to a hypothesis about the etiological roots of family violence in the LEAA initiative. In many projects, the premise behind public education was that family violence is a hidden aspect of our culture and bringing it out into the open enables victims to identify that the violence is not their "fault": what they have heretofore seen as a private dilemma is in fact a widespread social phenomenon, and the causes of this phenomenon be in societal attitudes about violence against wives.

#### Social Control

The focus in these projects was on the victim but in the context of the family unit. Projects such as Fayetteville, combining shelter and social services, and Cleveland, using a mediation approach, expressed concern about the integrity of the family unit and more readily adopted an analysis which saw the victim as co-contributor to the problem. The theoretical position of many of these projects tended to be a family systems model, in which all members of the family were part of the system of violence and hence to deal with it one had to "treat" all members. Early intervention could stop violence before it reached the point where criminal justice sanctions were required. For example, the Miami DIP and Cleveland projects designed crisis intervention plans to work in conjunction with the police to provide on-site counseling (Miami) or a notice to appear for counseling (Cleveland). These services were predicated on the notion that the authority of the legal system would exercise control over the disputants and coerce or influence them to obtain help to stop the violence. Another presupposition implicit in this approach is that it is easier to stop violence before it has escalated into serious physical abuse. Unfortunately, this approach ignores the fact that violence may have

\*Interestingly, this description of victims was not entirely accurate. See chapter 4 for an analysis of victim characteristics.

been a constant pattern in the relationship and that calling the police (especially if it is a friend or neighbor who does so) may be totally unrelated to a "stage" in the relationship.

#### Legalistic

The focus was on the victim and abuser in the context of laws which were being broken. Legalistic projects most strongly and directly expressed the deterrence assumptions of the Family Violence Program. Projects such as Miami-DIP, some components in Philadelphia, and the New York City and White Plains sites took the perspective that their role was to facilitate the enforcement of the law by aiding victims to cooperate with prosecution of the batterer or to develop diversion programs with criminal justice sanctions for noncompliance. Projects in this category recognized that although spouse abuse was technically illegal, neither police nor prosecutors tended to treat it as criminal behavior. Deterrence, through criminalization and enforcement of sanctions, was the central focus of the LEAA program. "Deterrence" in this case included both "general" and "specific" deterrence. Von Hirsch (1976) defines general deterrence as "the effect that a threat to punish has... in inducing people to refrain from prohibited conduct." Specific deterrence implies the reducing of the likelihood that an individual will repeat his act based on the punishment meted out or the fear of future punishment.

Several different types of deterrent efforts were designed. The White Plains project was the one most explicitly predicated on a deterrence model. Housed in a District Attorney's Office and directed by a prosecutor, this project was designed to offer prosecution services, and little else, to victims of family violence. As described in the case study and chapter 6, the White Plains project was ultimately obliged to broaden its services. Many of the victims who came to the District Attorney's Office were ultimately not prepared to prosecute or had cases which were not amenable to prosecution. Although deterrence for batterers continued to be the orientation of the White Plains project, it evolved services--information and referral and crisis counseling--for the victims themselves.

The projects such as Philadelphia, which focused on civil remedies--e.g., restraining orders for family violence were also deterrence-oriented. With a civil order, the possibility of sanctions was a threat imposed on the batterer if he continued his behavior. The Philadelphia project's attorneys were quite explicit about this when they explained the purpose of the civil order to clients and batterers. The restraining order was designed to forestall future violent episodes under threat of fines or imprisonment.

The thrust of public education efforts for the deterrence-oriented projects was toward informing the public that domestic violence is a crime and that such acts may have serious criminal justice sanctions. This was a different approach than that taken by the feminist (and victim-focused) projects whose publicity centered on providing victims with information on resources in the community--'where to go for help'--and a feminist analysis of the etiological roots of spouse abuse.

### INSTITUTIONAL BASE

The trends which identified family violence as a policy issue were reflected in the institutional bases of the LEAA-funded projects. The projects were housed in institutions covering the gamut from grassroots feminist organizations to district attorney's offices. Some were located within victim/witness programs and others had a quasi-independent status within a larger governmental umbrella agency. While most of the family violence projects offered a range of services, the previous section shows that they can be categorized according to the primary focus of the services they provide: shelter or criminal justice system. This section examines the institutional bases of the projects, and its service focus as factors constraining or facilitating the inception of service. Of particular interest are the kinds of links that programs were able to forge with other agencies, specifically to expedite client referral and cement relationships with agency personnel. The data indicates that the ability of a family violence project to successfully begin operations is in part a function of its institutional base and the type of service it attempts to provide.

### Criminal Justice System

The criminal justice system projects were housed either in a criminal justice agency, or a district or state attorney's office. Despite the similarity of institutional location, these programs approached different aspects of intervention in the legal process. The White Plains project was designed from a punishment and deterrence model: increased prosecution would punish and thereby prevent abuse. Miami-DIP was primarily a diversion program using compulsory counseling. The Philadelphia site, while designed with a diversion component and a special prosecutor, was centered mainly on the creation of a legal clinic to enable victims to better utilize civil remedies. The latter program can be seen as an effort to divert victims from pursuing criminal prosecution in favor of the civil avenue.

Implementation of direct services was facilitated by a project's institutional affiliation. The Philadelphia Legal Clinic, although operated by a private subcontractor, was able to affect linkages through involving its sponsor, the District Attorney's Office. For example, this relationship facilitated the establishment of a procedure whereby the local county sheriff serves the defendant (the abuser) with the temporary protective order and the notification to appear in court. In contrast, Community Legal Services had numerous problems in obtaining similar service. Referral of clients to the Legal Clinic from the District Attorney's Private Criminal Complaint Unit, after cooling of early tensions, also proceeded fairly smoothly.

A project's placement within an agency appears especially critical when a direct impact on the criminal justice system is desired. One mediation program, located within a victim/witness service but outside of the criminal justice agency network, called for police to issue non-compulsory summons for appearance by domestic disputants before a program mediator. Police were not structurally integrated into the program nor were the summons backed up by sanctions (or threat of sanctions) from a criminal justice agency. The project had difficulties in obtaining clients; this can be seen in part as a result of attempting to impact on the criminal justice system from an institutional location on its periphery and without a "direct" case processing function.

Another project, part of a private non-profit social service agency, suffered referral problems for similar reasons. Designed to serve abuse victims seeking assistance from Family Court, the project was to have clients referred to it through the Probation Intake Unit at the Family Court. Probation interpreted the function of the Family Abuse Project differently than did project staff. Instead of using the program as an automatic referral for all domestic violence cases to encourage court intervention, the Intake Unit sent only those clients who they felt were best suited for a hearing in Family Court. There was no mandatory relationship upon which referral systems are built. The Probation Intake Unit saw the family violence project as yet another service to whom they could refer clients, but not as an integral part of their functioning.

### Shelter Based Projects

In the shelter focused programs, there was a far less critical relationship between ability to implement services and institutional location than in the criminal justice system oriented projects. However, many external and internal issues the shelters faced were related to the type of organization with which they were affiliated.

Brattleboro and Salem, two rural shelter-based projects, were formed by feminist grassroots groups which incorporated into non-profit organizations. In both cases, the groups were obliged to maintain a



balance between presenting themselves as feminist organizations and gaining acceptance in the community, particularly with social service and criminal justice agencies. The issue they faced was one of legitimacy: how does a new organization, with a different point of view, treating a "new" and volatile social problem, prove itself qualified to other agencies, yet retain a sense of the principles on which it was founded?

Two strategies were used by shelter-based groups to gain acceptance. First, the needs of the client population and their willingness to utilize services offered by the feminist community were important factors in getting service professionals to accept the services. The program faced the dual problem of establishing the legitimacy of their services at the same time as legitimizing themselves as service providers. A second strategy was to make a concerted effort to lay a groundwork of community support and to obtain funds from local public and private sources in order to become an integral part of the community and service provider network. A location outside a public institution required the creation of linkages to agencies these projects could rely upon for coordinated services. Pre-established links did not exist for shelter-focused groups. Staff created ties with social service agencies in one program by physically accompanying individual clients to the agency.

For shelter-focused projects, largely private non-profits, another important aspect of their independent status was the necessity to continuously search for funding: match funds for the LEAA grant and the eventual need to become self-sustaining. Staff members whose previous experience had been in government agencies were not prepared for the pressures of fund-raising. The need to raise funds was also perceived as conflicting with services provisions to clients. Projects housed in larger government or private institutions could operate on the assumption that if they function well they will be taken over by the host agency; they can therefore concentrate on developing the program to its fullest. The independent projects, however, were faced with the dual task of establishing their services and constantly looking for new sources of funds.

Overall, six shelter projects were administered by public agencies. They ranged from regional units of state government to county and city agencies. Their autonomy can be seen along a continuum of being tightly integrated into a City Department of Social Services to the fairly autonomous 'confederations' of grassroots programs operating with reference to an administrative unit. Affiliation with traditional public agencies reduced some of the initial problems around credibility faced by the more grassroots feminist programs and facilitated early linkage development. Staff in some cases were drawn from the host agencies. In contrast, the grassroots shelters were obliged to establish both their institutional and program credibility, while the shelters directly associated with traditional agencies faced simply the latter task.

## ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS

Projects in this evaluation adopted three basic organizational models: "hierarchical," "collective," and "subcontractor."\* Only two collectives were funded, and seven were subcontractors. The remainder were heirarchical organizatoins.

### Hierarchical Model

In this "top to bottom" organizational model, lines of authority, decision-making, and spheres of responsibility were most clearly delineated. A specific individual, usually the Program Director, tended to be the final authority and was responsible for determining policy, program, and staff operations. Staff were accountable to the director, who is usually empowered to hire and fire.

In no project were directors totally independent decision-makers. Most were involved in complex structural relations with criminal justice and/or service agency administrators and were accountable to representatives of agencies hosting the programs.

### Collective Model

In this model, decision-making was accomplished either through staff consensus or consensus of certain staff members and a steering committee or other decision-making group. Spheres of responsibility the collectively organized programs tended not to be the exclusive province of one person. Most staff members are viewed as capable of and responsible for carrying out most activities necessary for program functioning. In some programs, however, roles were more highly specified than in others.

### Subcontractor Model

This was the most complex of the three kinds of organizational models. An administrator or administrative unit usually was responsible for coordination of service providers rather than for the day-to-day direction of staff programmatic activities. Groups (or

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\*In this document, organizational models are considered mainly in terms of the positions and roles of decision-makers. See Eugene Titwah and Jack Rothman, "Toward the Theory and Practice of Coordination Between Formal Organizations," in Rosengren, William R. and Mark Tefton, Organizations and Clients. Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1970.

subcontractors) which had been contracted to deliver services designated individual representatives who were responsible for cooperating with the administrator or administrative unit to coordinate goals and activities of the program overall. Directors of subcontractor programs have varying degrees of authority over subcontractors, and their spheres of responsibility are inconsistent across site.

When compared with other programs, those with hierarchical structures experienced the least difficulties--which informants attributed to structure--in becoming established as identifiable entities among other service providers in communities. It may be that this result is, in part, explained because systems with which most programs must interface were also almost ubiquitously organized along hierarchical (bureaucratic) lines. Forming relationships between agencies was probably facilitated to the extent that organizational structures are similar and the requisites of interaction are familiar to all concerned.

#### STAFFING PATTERNS

Staffing is a major structural feature of every organization. Particularly important are the mechanisms through which staff are recruited and selected, and the staffing patterns finally adopted. In this section, we discuss these aspects of project staffing. They are then analyzed in relation to the problem of worker burnout. Finally, the role of Advisory Boards in these projects is discussed.

##### Recruitment and Selection

Recruiting, socializing, and training staff presented all projects with difficulties endemic to implementing new services. They also presented myriad opportunities for creative problem-solving. As projects evolved, changes in administrative personnel, services focus, and objectives were reflected in staff recruitment strategies and hence in personal characteristics. For example, when the Cleveland project began, it was primarily staffed with graduate students. Following a change of coordinators, the staffing pattern changed. Whenever possible, more experienced professionals were hired. The coordinator felt that graduate students had fine theories, but their performance did not reflect sufficient practical experience or skills. As the demonstration concluded, the paid staff--characterized by the coordinator as "the finest in the country"--was composed primarily of social services professionals.

A particular orientation or philosophy underlied staff selection criteria in some projects. One effect of this policy in the Salem project was an over-representation of some forms of staff expertise and an under-representation of others. A consistent steering committee policy required personnel hirings who had:

- primarily counseling rather than administrative backgrounds and skills;
- a grassroots commitment; and
- are feminists.

This policy affected organizational development. Counseling as opposed to administrative aspects were stressed. They responded well to the day-to-day demands of client service needs rather than the issue of fund-raising because it reflected their priority to meet client needs, their primary skills as counselors, their commitment to a feminist service orientation, and their collective decision making model. However, they entered their final year of federal support without external linkages to secure continuation funding. Other factors also came into play around staff recruitment and selection. In projects where hiring must be done through local governments, civil service procedures and requirements frequently superceded the needs of projects in that they had problems obtaining approval for various positions. Also, civil service hiring procedures tended to be time consuming and tedious. At one site, for example, job openings first were listed; applications and the layoff lists were then reviewed before advertising and screening of applicants takes place. Only then were names of qualifying applicants passed on to the project.

Hiring the director/administrator at times became a political event. In Mia ni, for example, several criminal justice system actors initially saw the project director who was hired from outside the established "power networks" as thus capable of innovative decision-making.

##### Volunteer and Student Staffing Patterns

Insufficient staff constituted a significant problem at a number of sites. Attempts to cope with understaffing include recruiting volunteers, CETA workers, VISTA workers, work-study and other students. One explanation for the understaffing was an understandable initial lack of knowledge at the outset of precisely what types and numbers of staff various service delivery strategies require. These were, after all, demonstration projects with innovative and occasionally untested services.

All projects were more or less dependent on volunteers--sometimes including former clients--to accomplish their work. In general, training and management of volunteers reportedly required considerable time, skill, and sensitivity. Project staff noted across sites that dealing

effectively with victims of violence is a demanding and sometimes depressing job for all involved--whether paid or volunteer workers. Paid staff had to not only cope with their own feelings, but also remain cognizant of volunteer needs for recognition and reinforcement in performing unremunerated and greatly needed services.

In Brattleboro, a rural shelter, special attention was given to screening volunteers in this small town atmosphere to ensure they were not voyeurs or gossips. Volunteer turnover occurred frequently, so valuable staff time was continually allotted for training. Volunteers remained with the program about six months.

Despite difficulties, volunteer services were enlisted in all projects which required their services. Projects were very astute and creative in accomplishing recruitment using such mechanisms as offering internships and serving as a restitution alternative for convicted offenders. At the same time, the feminist origins of family violence services helped attract a natural group of highly energized and dedicated volunteers.

Nevertheless, a variety of other problems and issues were noted in using non-paid staff. Turnover was continual and inevitable. Precious staff time was allotted for periodic or ongoing training of new workers. Volunteers performing functions similar to those of paid staff were likely to leave if they feel under-valued and comparatively unappreciated. Administrative sanctions for unacceptable, unreliable staff behavior were minimal or absent with respect to some personnel categories. This problem was further compounded in projects heavily dependent on volunteers, where the imposition of sanctions for rule infractions or poor performance may result in departures. Finally, supervision of volunteers was particularly difficult when differences in treatment ideology or strategy emerged in relation to particular clients.

#### Worker Burnout

All project personnel were critically aware of the potential for their staff experiencing "worker burnout." Workers attribute the burnout experience to perceptions of over-stimulation. A person feels bombarded by too many sensations, feelings, thoughts, and too much information. Burnout was said to occur to the extent that self- or project-defined expectations were seen as impossible to meet for reasons beyond anyone's control. Shelter staff were particularly concerned with burnout, perhaps because staff interactions with clients frequently occur at crisis points where the effects of battering and violence are most visible and distressing. Burnout was experienced frequently by workers in positions:

- perceived of as demanding of personal commitment of time, energy and emotional involvement;
- where interactions between clients and staff involve a high degree of intimacy; and
- where client characteristics promoted potential worker identification with victims.

Projects tried to anticipate burnout by discussing the phenomena with staff, by developing structural and other mechanisms to help staff deal with their feelings, by structuring staff positions to include multi-faceted roles, and by creating opportunities for staff to switch roles. Regular formal and informal meetings and get-togethers where staff could share feelings and receive support and reinforcement were mentioned across site as important in reducing potential for worker burnout.

#### ADVISORY BOARDS

Federal guidelines mandated that projects plan for and constitute advisory boards. Advisory Board activities covered a range of role functions, including:

- providing feedback to projects about their image and helping with fundraising;
- establishing initial administrative and higher-level relational mechanisms in various service agencies (e.g., among emergency room personnel in a hospital);
- developing a political lobbying effort to represent the interests of family violence victims on the local and state level;
- resolving intra-program conflicts;
- educating the community through participation in speaking engagements and media events.

Overall, the level of commitment and performance varied widely both across sites and among members within specific boards. One advisory board member from a police department developed a procedure for and then implemented a survey designed to ascertain police response to one aspect of the program. Advisory Boards were limited, in retrospect, by two syndromes:

Conflict of Interest. A popularly held belief concerning advisory boards is that as a collective body they will facilitate inter-agency coordination, expand community contacts and assist in fundraising. These beliefs lead programs to invite

heads of services agencies from one or another services sector (e.g., medical, social) to participate as advisory board members. There is some indication that this strategy may need re-thinking. In many sites county agency directors who sat on advisory boards occupy structural positions which ensure conflict of interests. To the extent that monies are solicited from the county agencies, project staff and advisory board members were competing for the same monies.

Sanctions. Advisory Board participation was voluntary and discretionary. Therefore, projects had limited available sanctions to ensure attendance or cooperation. Levying sanctions--such as requesting resignations for non-attendance or participation--against powerful advisory board members proved risky for projects seeking to expand relational networks. To the extent sanctions were not incorporated in the original advisory board by-laws, the potential risks were further increased.

## RESOURCES

The resources available to social intervention projects often are determining factors in the strength and integrity of their services (Sechrest and White, 1978). In the Family Violence Program, federal contributions included action grants and technical assistance. Projects in turn recruited staff and obtained facilities within their budgets to translate these funds into services. This section examines the utilization of three resource categories--funds, labor, and facility--and their influence on the services delivered by the 23 projects.

### Funding

Annual budgets ranged from a mean of \$73,000 for private, non-profit shelters to \$246,000 for multi-service projects. The lowest annual budget was in the Brattleboro shelter (\$42,000 in FY1978), and the highest was the multi-component Santa Barbara program (\$275,000 in FY1979). Table 3-9 shows the annual budgets for projects along three organizational dimensions: institutional base, service emphasis, and decision making structure. Shelter-based projects received the lowest mean annual funding; private (shelter) agencies had the lowest annual budgets (Salem and Brattleboro were the "consensus" projects). System programs (among "single-service" projects) had the highest annual budgets.

Table 3-9  
Annual Federal Support by Project Feature

Project Feature	Number of Projects	Annual Federal Budget
Service Emphasis:		
Shelter/Counseling	13	\$ 117,000
Justice Intervention	5	172,000
Service Coordination	3	131,000
Multiple Component	2	246,000
Institutional Base:		
Private (Non-Profit)	5	73,000
Public Social Service	11	133,000
Public Justice System	7	206,000
Decision Making:		
Hierarchical	14	146,000
Collective	2	76,000
Subcontractor	7	115,000
Annual Budget (Mean, all sites)		\$ 142,000

### Staff

Paid staff were supported by a wide variety of sources: LEAA funding, CETA block grant funds, VISTA "volunteers," and student work-study programs. The average paid staff complement was between six and ten persons (13 projects were in this range). LEAA-funded staff ranged from 1-15 persons per site. Eight projects had from three to five staff, and eight others had between six and 10 persons supported by the family violence grant. Table 3-10 shows the distribution of total staff and LEAA-funded staff by project features, as well as the percentage of total staff paid by LEAA funds.



Table 3-10  
Staffing Patterns by Project Features

Project Feature	N	Total Paid Staff	LEAA-Funded Staff	Percent of Total Staff
Service Emphasis:				
Shelter/Counseling	13	8.8	6.1	69
Justice Interventions	5	11.5	10.0	85
Service Coordination	3	5.7	4.7	82
Multi-Service	2	14.0	14.0	100
Institutional Base:				
Private (nonprofit) Shelter	5	9.6	4.4	46
Public Social Service	11	7.5	6.5	87
Public Justice System	7	12.3	11.0	89
Decision Making Structure:				
Hierarchy	14	8.9	7.4	83
Consensus	2	14.5	7.0	48
Subcontractor	7	11.3	10.4	92
AVERAGE (all sites)		9.4	7.4	79

The results in table 3-10 reflect patterns similar to the annual budget patterns in table 3-9. The multi-service emphasis projects, for example, shows a value of 100%, i.e., the entire reported staff is LEAA-funded. Only 69% of staff in projects with a shelter/advocacy/counseling orientation are reported as LEAA-funded. The lowest percent of LEAA-funded staff (46%) is reported as operating under private non-profit auspices, and the consensus decision-structured projects report only a slightly higher 48%. These tend to be shelter projects. Justice system projects, publically-sponsored projects, and hierarchical organizations had larger staff complements and a higher percentage supported by the LEAA grant. The percentages in table 3-10 suggest that non-traditional projects, especially shelters, drew on a broader range of sources for staff resources. In turn, justice system agencies were least likely to utilize other, non-grant sources of support to staff their projects. This apparent dichotomy in staffing/funding patterns reinforces the typology developed earlier based on service emphasis. Projects can be defined as primarily providing shelter or justice system services, and this definition also "predicts" their institutional base and funding/staffing pattern.

## Resource Utilization

The utilization of LEAA resources in supporting staff to provide services is an approximate measure of the efficiency of projects' service delivery. Differences within categories permit contrasts of the relative cost of providing a particular type of service. Table 3-11 compares cost per paid staff and cost per LEAA-funded staff as indicators of resource utilization. Again, the distinction is evident between private, non-profit organizations whose primary emphasis is on services to victims (i.e., shelter, advocacy, counseling), and publically-funded organizations whose primary emphasis is on justice system interventions and services coordination.

The shelter-focused projects appear to be the most cost effective in total staff utilization--they attract a greater number of staff to complement the grant-funded staff.

Table 3-11  
Resource Utilization by project Feature  
(Budget/Staff Ratio for Paid Staff and LEAA Staff)

Project Feature	N of Projects	Budget/Paid Staff	Budget/LEAA Staff	Percent Difference
Service Emphasis:				
Shelter/Counseling	13	\$13,295	\$19,180	30.7
Justice Interventions	5	14,957	17,200	13.0
Service Coordination	3	22,982	27,872	17.5
Multiple Service	2	17,571	17,571	--
Institutional Base:				
Private (nonprofit) Shelter	5	7,604	16,591	54.2
Public Social Service	11	17,733	20,462	13.3
Public Justice System	7	16,748	18,727	10.6
Decision Making Structure:				
Hierarchical	14	8,539	10,270	21.3
Consensus	2	10,069	20,857	51.7
Subcontractor	7	10,177	11,058	8.0
AVERAGE (all sites)		\$13,968	\$17,979	22.3

This in turn suggests that they are able to draw on a broader base of staff resources to provide their services. The emotional involvement of shelter staff reflects a blend of life-style and occupational commitments. The demands of shelter work are such that in all but a limited number of

staff positions, special, expensive expertise is not a job skill requirement. The labor pool from which shelter staff and volunteers can be drawn is thus potentially large, and salaries in shelter projects appear to reflect both these market conditions and the ideological rewards of this labor. Given equal funds, shelter as opposed to other types of projects can be expected to employ greater numbers of both unpaid and relatively low paid staff.

In contrast, service coordination projects, the most "expensive" services, utilize a small, somewhat specialized (and comparatively expensive) staff to identify and coordinate existing community services. Direct services work--the type of work most likely to attract volunteers and less expensive paid staff--is extremely limited, if offered at all, in such projects. Accordingly, their job specifications may result in a more limited labor pool and demand higher salaries and benefits to attract professional staff with the appropriate skills levels.

These results, while offering useful indicators of efficiency and utilization to classify projects, should be viewed with caution. For example, these measures do not describe how projects utilize resources, (e.g., for which staff positions or how many part-time staff). Nevertheless, these findings validate the conventional wisdom that small, grassroots organizations--in this case, shelters--were more efficient in using fewer monetary resources and stretching them further. Criminal justice and social service system projects were expensive, dollar for dollar: they used fewer staff and, on the average, cost more.

These measures do not address the dual questions of efficacy and impact. While shelter projects may cost less and use more staff at lower salaries, the data do not indicate whether such projects achieve greater or ultimately better impacts on domestic violence. Nevertheless, this typology is useful in later impact analyses to suggest preliminary answers to these questions.

### Setting

A final type of project feature which influenced service delivery was the facility where the service was provided. The projects' physical environment became an integral part of clients' perception of services, and influenced their decisions to continue with services over a period of time. The physical plants occupied by the projects varied sharply across sites. The physical locations ranged from starkly modern office complexes to ramshackle buildings in industrial neighborhoods. Both hierarchically-structured (usually bureaucratic) offices and "hippiesque" drop-in centers were within the federal program's scope.

These different settings communicated to clients various messages, and were in some cases symbolic of barriers to service delivery. For example, shelters in lower middle class or working class neighborhoods

were seen as unattractive by middle class victims. Official settings in downtown offices were often intimidating to some clients unfamiliar with the style of such agencies. The physical setting and the projects' overall financial well-being also set the tone for the project and contributed to staff feelings about their jobs. Conversely, the formality of the setting often was a predictor of whether services (or organizations) were continued beyond the grant period. Finally, setting was far from a negligible factor in staff burnout.

Although the case studies (in volume II) contain detailed descriptions of the projects' settings, the following excerpts illustrate some of the contrasts, and the effects of, project settings.

**Philadelphia.** The legal clinic and the project's administrative offices were both housed in City Hall. The administrative office was on the ground floor, dark, vaguely smelling of urine with the constant rumble of arriving and departing subway trains. The legal clinic was on the 5th floor, a small cramped room stuffily overheated in winter and erratically cooled in the summer. There was no privacy for client conferences--desks were stacked side by side with barely enough room for clients who had brought family or friends with them to be seated. There was no room for clients to wait within the office so they lined up on the hall, sometimes sitting on folding chairs sometimes standing or sitting on the floor. Kids careened down the echoing halls. The restrooms were almost a city block walk away. A comfortable victim/witness room across the hall was "off limits," the court custodian of that room had his own sinecure of political power and did not want the women and their noisy children disturbing his realm. Despite numerous attempts, entree into this quiet space was rarely permitted. On most Monday mornings, staff were greeted with a hall choked with bruised and bandaged women.

**Cleveland.** Tucked into a ground floor corner of the city's criminal justice complex were the project's spotless and stark offices. They were difficult for the newcomer to find, a cul-de-sac led to a circumspect entry and a security guard stationed at the door of the building. The physical distance of the project from the other realms of the justice complex reflected or perhaps presaged the thwarted linkage efforts the project faced (see chapter 6). Staff were constantly attempting to reach out to justice system and agencies community to coordinate with other service providers, but the location and isolation of their quarters were not conducive to such efforts.

**Brattleboro.** The lament about the physical space in the Brattleboro project of too small, too shabby, too cramped--trying to fit many people and activities into too small a space--was characteristic of this small, grassroots organization. Brattleboro had the smallest LEAA grant which was its primary fiscal resource; yet it had as elaborate an agenda for

services as any of the projects. The physical space for the shelter was separate from the office where the staff spent all their time. Visits by staff and volunteers to the shelter were limited--and evidently subject to being delayed by crises or other distractions. The facility was a six-room house (its location was secret) with only one bath and sheltered up to five women and their children. There was no yard or other outside space the children. The central office space was also too small to allow for complete privacy during counseling sessions.

**Miami Safespace.** Here too the shelter was in a separate and secret location from the project administrative offices. The four-bedroom second floor flat was located near a central intersection in downtown Miami. The shelter, for the first year, lacked air conditioning and was wretchedly hot in the summer months. It had drab furnishings with chipped and peeling paint and a lack of privacy for client counseling or staff meetings.

## The Social Process of Working With Victims

The day-to-day experience of staff in the family violence projects offer a glimpse of the social process of service delivery and the reality of working with abused women, their children, and their assailants. This perspective is important, for it is difficult for observers to understand the contingencies faced by workers and limitations on service delivery imposed by the social reality of family violence. It also provides an understanding of why services took certain forms, and in turn, of the operating practices and reactions of project workers. Finally, the description adds to our understanding of why services worked or failed, and how they might be improved in the future.

### STAFF PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS

Most of the staff and administrators hired by the family violence projects, as well as the volunteers, had never previously worked with abused women. Although many were experienced counselors and some had prior experience with crisis intervention work, little in their

background prepared them for the massive problems of abused women. For example, legal staff, even those with a background in "poverty law," were unprepared for the intensity of dealing with so many clients, most of whom were in deep personal crisis and emotional distress.

For both legal and social service staff, one of the most difficult aspects of dealing with the clients were the overwhelming physical, social, material, and emotional needs of the victims. Clients were in the throes of total turmoil in their life: they had been physically assaulted and were often physically and mentally suffering as a result of the experience.\* Clients who had been hit in the head--although not technically suffering concussions--were often disoriented and confused about sequences of events and had great difficulty deciding what they wanted to do. All clients, from the least to the most injured, were in a position of having to make very consequential decisions about their lives after having undergone the traumatic experience of physical violence at the hands of a loved one. Victims faced a proverbial Hobson's Choice in making decisions which could completely alter the course of their lives and their children's lives: leaving home and provider and starting on their own with few resources or skills, or else return to their spouses and face the possibility of future violence. Some clients were very dependent "helpless" people who had little experience making decisions and being on their own (Walker, 1979), while others simply lacked the material resources to alter their circumstances.

Faced with these clients, the project workers experienced a variety of reactions. One initial staff reaction was to feel helpless in the face of helping a victim with such all encompassing problems. Although using crisis counseling techniques, they focused the victim on the decisions which had to be made immediately, they knew full well that she would ultimately (and often in a very short period of time) have to find solutions to the full range of her problems. The staff, especially in the start up phase of the project, before linkages had been established with other agencies and bureaucratic dilemmas resolved, many times were unable to provide the resources clients needed. Clients often reacted with anger toward the staff, mistaking the inability to help them for an unwillingness.

Staff themselves experienced anger toward the clients for many reasons. Staff, especially at the outset of the project, were incredulous of how truly helpless they felt some of their clients were: these women had never managed money, had sometimes never even done the family shopping, and were completely at a loss as to how to plan their lives and their children's lives. Social class distinctions also led to staff looking

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\*The limitations of the quantitative data may have served to underestimate the extent of injuries--women who suffered "bruises" were often black and blue all over their bodies and in considerable pain.

down at clients: some of the younger, grassroots feminists were from middle and upper social classes (i.e., highly educated) backgrounds, carried a certain disdain toward clients who fed their children "junk food" and watched TV constantly.

Legal staff were angry at clients who didn't follow through with prosecutions or civil proceedings, especially when staff had put a lot of work and effort into a case. The attorneys feared for their reputation before judges and for the credibility of the battered womens' movement when clients failed to make a court date.

Another root of staff anger lay in over-identifying with clients. Many admitted that they found echoes of their own relationships with men in the dynamics clients described. Although most of the staff had not themselves been battered, many recognized the "learned helplessness" and the "low self image" as things they had undergone or seen in their family. This anger was often deflected toward the client. Informal conversations with staff revealed that working with battered women sometimes brought an element of tension into marital and other relationships. Anger and distrust of men became an occupational hazard for many staffers.

A different reaction by some staff in dealing with clients' overwhelming problems and needs was the very opposite of identification. They "defined" the clients as very different from themselves and interpreted all the things that happen to clients as being totally out of the realm of possibility for themselves or anyone like them. In other words, they denied that such violence could ever happen to them. Sometimes this simple emotional defense brought on some cognitive dissonance. For example, a young legal worker in the Philadelphia project described her chagrin when a woman from a local shelter who had trained some of the family violence project staff addressed her law school class on the issue of family violence and the law. When the speaker/trainer drew on her own experience as a battered woman, the law student found she was unable to listen to the talk and had to leave the room. "Them" and "us" were no longer distinct or useful categories.

Another dynamic which took place in the family violence projects created a division between direct service workers and administrators and indirect service providers. This "macho" of direct service resulted from staff feelings that their particular work was more valuable. The work with domestic violence clients and the accumulation of war stories and recitations of the horrors clients went through became a badge for the direct service workers and a form of social currency. It was as if the direct service workers had come through a "rite of passage" or "trial by fire." The work with battered women was expressed in terms of hardship (virtually never in terms of satisfactions or accomplishments) and became that which was most highly valued in the projects. Consequently the efforts of project administrators, trainers, and community publicity staff were denigrated by counselors and shelter staff; their jobs were

described as "soft" regardless of the hard work and long hours they contributed.

Thus, in terms of the workplace culture which was created in projects, there was an interesting reversal of the value of work. Administrators with no client contact often succumbed to the devaluation of their efforts. It seemed that the "martyrdom" of staff was a transposition of the suffering of the clients into the created culture of the projects. Night work was an aspect of working conditions which proved difficult for staff. This was especially the case in the Miami shelter which kept a staff of night shift counselors who responded to hotline calls and dealt with new admissions to the shelter. These workers, who had low pay and little opportunity for advancement, and a difficult and often thankless job rapidly left the project. The entire night shift turned over in the first year.

#### PROJECT PHILOSOPHY: CHANGES OVER TIME

The beginning of this chapter characterized the projects' philosophy as reflecting either a feminist, social control, or legalistic approach. Despite these differences, the projects' understanding of family violence evolved and broadened over the course of the funding period. Eventually, a consensus approach began to emerge.

The legal providers underwent the greatest change, moving from a focus on prosecution and the criminal justice system to a more inclusive viewpoint which recognized the necessity of integrating social services with legal services. In their second and third years, they began to include crisis counseling for victims and established referral systems for those not able or willing to prosecute. The White Plains prosecution project set up a diversion program for batterers in conjunction with a local drug and alcohol center. Some legal staff, especially in the Philadelphia project, experienced a growing disillusion with the efficacy of legal services. Despite high client demand, staff ultimately had no sense of accomplishment from their work as there was no ongoing contact with clients.

The legal staff questioned whether restraining orders really aided clients or if prosecution efforts deterred batterers. In Philadelphia, there was one case which brought home quite poignantly the need for victim counseling as well as prosecution: one woman whose successful prosecution of the batterer was covered in the local newspapers returned to the project some six months later after having been beaten by a new partner. Other cases in this same project pointed to the need for further work with batterers when new victims appeared whose batterers had been prosecuted by their previous partners.



The feminist projects, especially the shelters, also began to see the need to focus on the batterers as well as the victims. The feminist projects also began to recognize that there was an analysis possible which did not "label" and "blame" the victim for the violence but which nonetheless acknowledged the fact that the victims were in need of counseling and general life skills assistance. All of the shelters gained a further appreciation of the multi-level needs of their clients and the difficulty of expecting a client to change their lives in a four to six week shelter stay. The shelters had to grapple with what they considered an abuse of the shelter--the women using it as an escape hatch for violent incidents but returning home every time. Some of the shelters had limits as to the number of times a woman could come back to the shelter. Some shelter staff disagreed with this policy and saw the process of a battered woman leaving a relationship as slow and tortuous and one which often required a great many trial separations.

However, whatever their philosophy about the number of stays in the shelter, all staff had to grapple with the difficulties facing a woman who has reached the point of leaving the relationship to establish herself outside the home. Housing, jobs, welfare and food stamps, even clothing for herself and her children, all presented formidable obstacles to decisive action, and all required project attention.

Frustration with the emotional difficulties of working with the clients and the constant setbacks in attempts to change a recalcitrant social service and criminal justice system, led many staffers to see their work as a meager palliative and to question if there was not a better approach to preventing family violence. Much of the speculation was centered in two directions: the need for different ways of raising children and the general question of violence in society. The childrearing approaches included notions that girls should be raised with better self-images (so they wouldn't tolerate a man hitting them), more capacity to earn a living and take care of themselves, and that boys should be allowed to be more emotionally rather than physically expressive. These childrearing ideas resulted in staff advocating public education especially in the schools around the issue of family violence. The staff saw the need to educate women when they were still young girls before they entered into a cycle of being beaten by husbands or partners.

Other staff came to see family violence as another manifestation of violence in the larger society. They felt that people were socialized to see violence as a legitimate solution to problems and frustrations and hence either used it or expected it in a family context.

Regardless of the view of family violence which staff initially or ultimately held, all came to be perplexed and disturbed by the complexity of the issue, and the lack of ready answers and solutions.

## Conclusions

The Family Violence Program was the culmination of a decade of social activism around issues of family policy. In this chapter, we have examined the historical antecedents of the LEAA-funded family violence projects: the feminist movement around battered women and the criminal justice system's responses to the victims of crime. Both of these approaches inform the ways in which programs deal with domestic violence. The institutional base of the programs as well as the focus of the services offered stem from the historical roots of the family violence issue in general, and the plight of battered women in particular. The past is also reflected in the range of programs which span grassroots feminists shelters to those housed directly within criminal justice system agencies.

The effects of the institutional base and service focus on the development of the projects were analyzed. Examining the origins of the justice system components, we see that the institutional base is a crucial variable for projects working directly within the criminal justice system. Institutional base is a less vital factor for shelter-focused projects. However, it is in light of this nationwide movement that the relationship to feminism to the LEAA program should be considered. For some of the projects, feminism was an explicit part of the conceptualization of the project and informs the services offered and the approach used. In these sites, issues such as the relationship of sex roles in the family and sexism in society to battering are part of the fundamental assumptions underlying the service approach and are incorporated explicitly into the plan of services. In several projects, the roots of the program are to be found in what can be called the "feminist alternative service model." The focus of these groups was to create services, especially shelter-based facilities, centered outside of traditional agencies.

## INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

In examining project services, we found two natural clusters: victim-focused (nonlegal) interventions and assailant-focused (legal) interventions. Certainly these findings are conditioned in part by the availability of services, but also by such factors as project ideology, service design, and linkages with alternate system. For example, despite the extensive physical violence and serious injury among victims, only a small

percentage of referrals from hospitals or doctors. Earlier evaluation reports described the difficulties in establishing linkages with hospitals. Even though most projects attempted to accomplish the federally mandated goals of "improving the transmission of evidence from medical agencies," they were generally ineffective in establishing viable referral linkages with hospitals or private physicians.

This simple classification of projects into "shelter" and "others" (largely justice system projects) facilitated comparisons of project populations and responses. Shelters, for example, often became the focal point of services for battered women in a community, drawing clients from a wide range of agencies and community sources. Justice agencies, on the other hand, received referrals either directly or from other justice system agencies. As seen in the next chapter, shelters indeed differed from justice system projects not just in service mix, but in several other important respects:

- referral networks and sources;
- severity of abuse and injury of clients in both presenting problem and prior history;
- family configuration, victim-assailant relationship, and presence of children;
- victim and assailant background characteristics;
- client and project strategies for intervention and problem remediation.

#### THE EFFECTS OF PROGRAM GOALS

From its early origins in the Citizen's Initiative and Victim Witness Assistance Programs, LEAA developed a set of program goals which reconciled the interests and concerns of the constituencies supporting the program, and hence, the agency. However, the agency's interest in deterrence underlied the program design and dictated the structure and content of the project's services. Accordingly, the agency defined family violence as a multifaceted problem only to be helped by multi-agency responses. The cooperation of feminist organizations with the social service and criminal justice communities is seen as an attempt to involve these agencies in the implementation of deterrence-based policies. Both direct and indirect services were oriented toward both serving victims and prosecuting batterers.

These twin concerns led LEAA to proliferate the program's goals. The guidelines mandated that projects provide services which, in the case of several private organizations, were well beyond their capacities. The budgets were in many cases too small to support these efforts. In fact, the smallest budgets went to the shelters, whose service matrix often was most complex. Instead of acknowledging that a multi-faceted approach is the ideal and then funding projects which had the capacity to work well in one or two institutional arenas, LEAA took steps to assure that the criminal justice approach to family violence would be operationalized throughout the program, irrespective of budget. For example, grassroots and social service providers also conduct training and work within the context of the criminal justice system. The funding pattern analyzed in this chapter is difficult to rationalize, and foreshadows issues in victim impact which emerge in later chapters.

As discussed in chapter 1, LEAA's goals themselves were internally inconsistent. For example, the goals of increased reporting contradicts the goal of reduced homicides. The goals called for major (and perhaps overly ambitious) changes in a short time in long-standing social service and justice system policies. The daily stress of working with victims in pain and crisis, together with sweeping program goals and continuing pressures from project monitors to fulfill them, contributed in several sites to staff burnout and tensions within the projects. This was particularly true for smaller, often grass-roots, projects, especially shelters or subcontractors. As the discussion proceeds in later chapters to program impacts, it is important to keep in mind the different philosophical orientations of the projects as well as where they, as newly created agencies, were located. These philosophical orientations, and in turn the service types which they seem to correspond with, are predictors of impact on both systems and client families.

## 4 Victim & Family Characteristics

This chapter summarizes process evaluation findings to assist policy-makers and family violence project staff to understand the nature of the client populations (victims, assailants, and children), the variation in client population as a function of type of project (service emphasis), and the types of services sought and received as influenced by project or case characteristics.\* The analyses also reveal those "control" variables required for the impact analyses in chapter 5.

Data for the analyses presented in this chapter were generated from the Client Management Information System (CMIS) implemented at 21 of the 23 project sites.\*\* The CMIS recorded data on client and case characteristics at the point of their initial contact with the projects. (For the the primary CMIS instrument, the "Initial Assessment," see Appendix A.) Additional data to describe an extended subset of descriptors of domestic violence were generated from an extensive interview protocol administered to 270 victims at six sites approximately three months after project participation. (For the follow-up protocol see Appendix A.)

### Data Domains

The major domains of client, case, and service data that form the basis for the project descriptions include:

- client characteristics;

\*These analyses are not intended to explain the etiology or dynamics of family violence, nor to represent its incidence or prevalence.

\*\*The two other sites--Rice County, Minnesota, and San Francisco, California--did not emphasize direct services to clients and were not, therefore, included in the PMS.

- instant incident attributes;
- dimensions of spousal violence; and
- help-seeking behaviors.

Client characteristics include the disputants' sociodemographic backgrounds, substance use, violence histories, and children. Among the background variables considered are: sex, age, formal educational attainment, and health conditions. The remaining variables are situational: they describe the extent to which various family members have been engaged in or exposed to violence and their responses to these episodes. These factors may be related to the type of help or services requested as well as predictive of victim and assailant responses to various interventions.

The instant incident refers to that abuse episode that led to contact with the family violence project. Instant incident attributes include alcohol use, drug use, types of abuse, weapon use, and severity of injury. These variables describe the extent and severity of the violence as well as certain environmental or contextual factors common to these cases.

Dimensions of spousal violence are investigated so as to develop empirical pictures of differing abuse patterns. Having examined a wide range of individual background and situational variables, multi-variate techniques are employed to explore relationships within and between variable domains. Patterns assessed include: stranger violence and severity of prior injury as a function of victim and alleged assailant background characteristics, and abuse history. These analyses determine those variables that are representative of each domain and, in turn, yield control variables for the impact analyses.

Help-seeking behaviors include calls to police (slightly over half the cases); medical treatment (one-fourth of the cases); formal complaint filing against alleged assailants (one-third of victims); and service requests (which varied appreciably by project orientation).

### Limitations of the Data Base

The URSA Institute designed the CMIS, developed composite materials, and provided training and technical assistance on implementation for the 23 projects. Nevertheless, the actual utilization of the system varied across projects, both in percentage of cases recorded and in extent of data collected for each case. Omissions resulted from ideological, legal, and/or administrative constraints. For example, several projects chose not to record information on victims' backgrounds, fearing a repetition of earlier experiences where such data was inaccurately reported in the press and subjected to misleading interpretations.

National evaluation staff members edited all PMS forms for consistency and sense and contacted projects when data appeared anomalous.

Any deficiencies that may have survived this process are more than outweighed by the size of the data base (approximately 3,000 cases).

Two qualities of these data should particularly be noted:

- They are drawn from client (i.e., victim) reports and, thus, reflect the client's knowledge about and perspective regarding events; and
- Project clients do not necessarily represent the overall population of domestic violence disputants.

Finally, in all discussions, those clients for whom "don't know" was recorded are not present in the percentage base. Strictly speaking, each discussion should be prefaced, "For those clients reporting (a 'live' response), . . ." Thus, fluctuation in the number of cases reported is related to the data base used (e.g., CMIS vs. client follow-up) and the number of live responses obtained for the given variables.

## Client Characteristics

The prevalence of spousal assault in the contemporary American family is staggering, perhaps overshadowing the problem of violence in the street (Steinmetz, 1980). A national sample of 2,143 families found that one out of six couples had a violent episode, five percent experienced severe physical abuse, and .4 percent used a gun or knife (Straus et al., 1980). Nearly 1.8 million women annually are beaten, an average of one every 18 seconds. The incidence of domestic assault is nearly ten times greater than that of stranger assault, and the risk of injury at home or among friends is far greater than in the streets (U.S. Department of Justice, 1980). Given these sobering statistics, the information in this section represents a sample of violent partners that only scratches the surface of an enormous national problem.

In this section, we present descriptive data on the victims of domestic violence who sought help from the LEAA projects, their assailants, and characteristics of their relationships. Contextual data are also provided on factors thought to be predisposing of domestic violence or at least correlates of the phenomenon. This examination is responsive to the call of current researchers for assessments that go beyond the simple descriptive to consider situational factors that may help to explain violent behavior (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Monahan, 1981).

## DEMOGRAPHICS

### Sex

Victims were overwhelmingly female (94.6%), and assailants were overwhelmingly male (94.4%). Thus, the incidence of husband-battering, to the extent that it exists at all, was negligible among the LEAA project sample. This finding corresponds with that of Berk et al. (1981), who found that husband-battering (injury) accounted for less than 5 percent of domestic violence cases reported to police. While some retaliatory violence may occur, the rates of severe or injurious abuse leading to a project referral are consistent with national samples. The Straus et al. (1980) sample found that 7 percent of the women were likely to be severely abused, but only 0.6 percent of the males--a ratio of more than 11:1. In only three of the projects did the ratio of male victims exceed the national mean. These were justice system projects that also reported higher than average rates of female assailants.

In general, caution is necessary in interpreting these results. For example, Wilt and Bannon (1976) suggest that violence by men against women is more likely to be reported to the police than violence by women against men. Such differences in male and female reporting behavior may be evident in this sample as well.

### Age

Almost one-third of the victims were under 25, while only one-fifth of the assailants were in that range. Age differences were insignificant across projects. The median age of 27 for spousal assault victims is consistent with other research, which has found more spousal violence in couples in their twenties (Straus et al., 1980; Frieze et al., 1980).

### Race

Whites comprised about 57 percent of the sample. Blacks were the largest nonwhite group (over one-third). Urban projects had larger proportions of nonwhite clients, consistent with their general populations.

### Education

Victims' educational attainment was generally higher than that of assailants. Although the percentages of high school graduates are about the same, victims had a higher rate of college participation



(22.4% vs. 17.4% for assailants) and graduation (7.1%, compared to 5.7%). However, both victims and assailants tended to have lower than average education levels.

Without a comparison group, these educational data are difficult to interpret. At least two previous studies have pointed to the mediating effect of the victim's higher education, reporting more battering of high school drop-outs and less battering of college-educated women (Steinmetz, 1980; Straus et al., 1980). In our sample, however, there is no such pattern. High school graduates are the most common victims and assailants.

Educational attainment varies by type of project, both for victims and assailants. As table 4-1 shows, justice system projects served a higher percentage of victims with high school diplomas or better, while shelters served more clients with less than a high school degree. In shelter cases, the assailants somewhat more often had a high school degree or some college.

Table 4-1  
Educational Attainment of Disputants by Project Service Emphasis

	VICTIM		ASSAILANT	
	Shelter	Other	Shelter	Other
Less than 7	28 (3.1%)	42 (2.9%)	31 (4.3%)	76 (5.8%)
7-9	104 (11.7%)	92 (6.5%)	84 (11.6%)	128 (9.8%)
10-11	194 (21.8%)	305 (21.4%)	119 (16.5%)	280 (21.4%)
HS Graduate	336 (37.8%)	595 (41.8%)	322 (44.6%)	533 (40.7%)
Some College	148 (16.6%)	205 (14.4%)	98 (13.6%)	138 (10.5%)
College Graduate	36 (4.0%)	84 (5.9%)	24 (3.3%)	45 (3.4%)
Post-Graduate	16 (1.8%)	30 (2.1%)	15 (2.1%)	33 (2.5%)
Not Applicable	27 (3.0%)	72 (5.1%)	29 (4.0%)	77 (5.9%)
TOTAL	889	1,425	722	1,310

#### Employment

In our follow-up sample, 69 percent of the victims and over 70 percent of the alleged assailants were employed full- or part-time. Unfortunately, PMS data were only available for victims, of whom 44 percent were employed (full- or part-time) and 18 percent were full-time homemakers. Despite the lack of comparison data, it is clear that the stereotype of the battered woman as an unskilled housewife did not prevail in the LEAA program.

#### Health

Disputants reported few health problems. Over three-fourths of the victims and four-fifths of the assailants reported no problems, with few variations among the projects.

However, pregnant women were frequently abused, comprising 5.5 percent of the victims in our sample. This finding is in keeping with the observation that the financial and emotional stress that accompany pregnancy has been linked to husbands' frequent and severe physical attacks on their wives (Steinmetz, 1980). Moreover, abuse during pregnancy appears to be much more common among shelter than justice system clients (10.1% versus 3.7%). (See table 4-2.) Assuming that most observers would concur that abuse during pregnancy is a qualitatively "worse" act than other nonlethal abuse,\* these data confirm that shelter cases are more severe than others.

Table 4-2  
Victim Health Problems by Project Service Emphasis

	HEALTH PROBLEM		
	None	Pregnant	Other
Shelters	624 (78.5%)	80 (10.1%)	91 (11.4%)
Others	1,234 (86.3%)	53 (3.7%)	143 (10.0%)
TOTALS	1,858 (83.5%)	133 (6.0%)	234 (10.5%)

#### SUBSTANCE USE/ABUSE

##### Alcohol

The heavy use of alcohol by battering men has been reported by several researchers (see, for example, Frieze and Knoble, 1980). These same studies also report that battered women tend to drink less often or at a lower volume than nonbattered women, while

\*Aside from subjective judgment, Steinmetz (1980) also reports that, although many wives report beatings before and after the pregnancy, those that occurred during the pregnancy were considerably more brutal and often included being kicked or punched in the stomach, a phenomenon that Gelles (1974) has labelled intrauterine child abuse.

batterers drink more often and more heavily than nonbatterers. These findings were echoed in the present study.\*

Thirty-one percent of the victims reported that their assailants abstained from alcohol. There was, however, high interproject variability regarding rates of abstinence. The highest rates of alleged assailant abstinence were reported by clients in White Plains, New York, and Miami's Safespace (71% and 93% respectively). Among those alleged assailants reported to consume alcohol, 82 percent were said to drink at least once a week. Additionally, 65 percent of the alleged assailants were reported to be "heavy" alcohol consumers when they did drink. The heaviest drinkers, both in volume and frequency, were found in Portland. Overall, there were about as many assailants who either abstained or drank less than once a week as there were "regular" (more than once a week) drinkers.

Assailants in shelter cases drank more often and abstained less often than assailants in other cases. (See table 4-3.) "Regular" drinkers comprised 53.6 percent of shelter client assailants but only 46.3 percent of justice system assailants. Conversely, 22.5 percent of shelter client assailants were abstainees, compared to 36.5 percent in other cases.

In contrast to assailant trends, 69 percent of victims reported that they abstained from alcohol. Among those victims who drank, 43 percent reported that they did so at least once a week. Moreover, 11 percent of the victims described their own alcohol consumption as "heavy" on those occasions when they drank.

Table 4-3  
Alleged Assailant Alcohol Use  
by Project Service Emphasis

Alcohol Use	Shelter	Other
None	200 (22.5%)	553 (36.5%)
Every Few Months	33 (3.7%)	48 (3.2%)
Once a Month	30 (3.4%)	35 (2.3%)
More than Once a Month	61 (6.9%)	34 (5.5%)
Once a Week	88 (9.9%)	93 (6.1%)
More than Once a Week	241 (27.1%)	278 (18.3%)
Daily	235 (26.5%)	424 (28.0%)
TOTAL	888	1,515

\*In previous as well as the present studies, data are drawn from victim reports and, hence, may be skewed.

## Drugs

Other research reporting drug use of victims and assailants has revealed a trend toward higher drug use by assailants than victims, heavy marijuana use by assailants, and relatively high use of tranquilizers by victims. (See, for example, Frieze and Knoble, 1980.) In the present sample, victims reported that 23 percent of the alleged assailants (in aggregate) used drugs. Of this number, 86 percent reportedly used drugs at least once a week. The most commonly reported drug used was marijuana (15% of the aggregate). Of the six percent of victims (in aggregate) who used drugs, 65 percent reported at least weekly use. Again, marijuana was the most commonly reported drug used.

## RELATIONSHIP AND VIOLENCE HISTORIES

This section provides descriptive and analytic information on the violence backgrounds of a sample of violent spouses or partners. Such situational, or contextual, factors are essential for a full understanding of violent behavior among intimates (Dobash and Dobash, 1979). Our situational indices include specification of the relationship between the victim and alleged assailant, length of relationship, abuse history, experiences with other violence, and past attempts to stop the violence. Data for the first analysis were generated by the CMIS, while those presented in the remainder of this section were gathered in face-to-face post-project follow-up interviews at five sites.

### Relationship of Victims and Assailants

About 63 percent of the cases involved partners residing together at the time of the most recent incident, and an additional 26.4 percent were current or former partners living apart. Assaults on children, other family members, and friends or relatives comprised just over 10 percent of the case types.

The data suggest strong differences in case types between shelters and justice system projects. (See table 4-4.) Nearly 80 percent of shelter victims were from cohabitating relationships, while just over half of the justice system clients were cohabitating partners. Victims living apart from an abusive partner would, understandably, not generally need shelter, and the relatively low incidence of such cases (13.9%) confirms this. By contrast, separated partners comprised one-third of justice system cases. Nearly all of the child abuse cases were handled by justice system projects.

**Table 4-4**  
**Relationship of Victim to Offender by Project Service Emphasis**

	<u>Shelter</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spouse/Partner in Home	328 (79.2%)	996 (54.1%)	1,824 (63.2%)
Spouse/Partner not in Home	26 (12.1%)	390 (21.2%)	516 (17.9%)
Former Spouse/Partner	19 (1.8%)	226 (12.3%)	245 (8.5%)
Child	13 (1.2%)	75 (4.1%)	88 (3.0%)
Other Family Victim	26 (2.5%)	50 (2.7%)	76 (2.6%)
Other Family Spouse	2 (0.2%)	14 (0.8%)	16 (0.6%)
Friend	16 (1.5%)	46 (2.5%)	62 (2.1%)
Other	15 (1.4%)	44 (2.4%)	59 (2.0%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,045 (36.2%)</b>	<b>1,841 (63.8%)</b>	<b>2,886</b>

#### Length of Relationship

Roy (1976) found that spousal violence peaked between 2.5 and 5.0 years of cohabitation. In our sample, the modal (and median) length of cohabitation was five to six years rather consistently across sites. An earlier analysis of the CMIS data (Fagan et al., 1980) found that the median length of relationship for shelter cases was two years, considerably shorter than for cases in other service systems.

#### Abuse History

The median length of abuse in the relationship was less than two years. The absence of repeated data collection activities with this client group precludes analyses of escalation or desistance of violence.\* However, abuse among couples in this sample was frequent and severe. Forty percent of the victims suffered abuse at least once a week, with seven percent reporting daily abuse (table 4-5). Injury was common--at least occasional in nearly a third of the cases and frequent in over one-fourth (table 4-6). Two-thirds of the victims had suffered injury in some prior incident, with lacerations or worse in 44 percent of the cases (table 4-6). Abuse during pregnancy occurred in 44 percent of the cases, of which 17.8 percent (21 of 118) resulted in miscarriage.

\*Shields and Hannecke (1981) have noted patterns of spousal abusers expanding to include stranger victims and of abusers shifting from both to stranger violence only. Walker (1978) and others have shown that spousal violence commonly escalates to the point of lethality.

**Table 4-5**  
**Frequency of Abuse**

Never	5	( 2%)
1 or 2 times	16	( 6%)
Once a year	9	( 3%)
Once a year/every 6 months	17	( 6%)
Every 2-4 months	46	(17%)
Every 3-5 weeks	55	(20%)
Every week	46	(17%)
Every 4-6 days	21	( 8%)
Every 2-3 days	20	( 8%)
Daily	18	( 7%)
Other	15	( 6%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>268</b>	

**Table 4-6**  
**Injury to Victim**

<u>Frequency</u>		
Rarely/Missing	71	(41%)
Occasionally	54	(32%)
Frequently	46	(27%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>171</b>	
<u>Most Serious Past Injury</u>		
None/Missing	38	(33%)
Bruises or Less	64	(24%)
Lacerations or Worse	118	(44%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>270</b>	

Other Experiences with Violence

**Childhood Histories.** Several researchers have noted the importance of growing up in a violent home to a violent adulthood (Alfaro, 1978; Sorrells, 1977; Potts et al., 1979). Social learning theories, for example, posit that violence is learned and reinforced in childhood as a coping response to stress or a conflict resolution method and is carried forth to adulthood (Bandura, 1973). To explore this generational theory further, we examined the disputants' childhood experiences with abuse and physical violence between parents.

In our follow-up sample, the victim had been abused as a child in 25 percent of the cases, compared to 37 percent for the assailant. The notion that victims seek out abusers fails to find support in these data, since 75 percent of the victims had not been victimized themselves as children. It should be noted, however, that these data do not address the converse of the question; that is, one cannot determine how many of those victimized as children become victims of intra-family violence as adults. Disputants' parents had been violent toward each other in a roughly comparable proportion of cases (41% of victims and 45% of assailants).

Table 4-7 establishes the extent to which a parental legacy of violence existed in our sample of reportedly violent men. Overall, 57 percent (N=98) of the alleged assailants were exposed to one form or another of domestic violence as children--either as victims of child abuse or as witnesses to spousal violence. Where such violence occurred, more often than not it was in combination: almost one-third were both victims and witnesses. An additional one in eight were victims of child abuse only and another one in seven were witnesses to spousal violence only.

Table 4-7  
Physical Violence Between Assailants' Parents  
by Partner Abused as Child

	Assailant Abused as Child			
	No		Yes	
Physical Violence Between	No	73 (74%)	21 (29%)	
Assailant's Parents	Yes	25 (26%)	52 (30%)	

( $\chi^2=35$ ,  $P = .000$ )  
(Panel 2 only,  $N = 171$ )

**Assailant Violence against Strangers.** Few data exist on the correlation of violence inside and outside the home. As with domestic violence, however, there is strong evidence of links between childhood victimization and stranger violence (Alfaro, 1978; Sorrells, 1980; Groth, 1980). Thus, an important research area is the extent to which violent spouses are also violent outside the home and the existence of common explanatory variables such as generational patterns of abuse.

In our sample, alleged assailants were as likely to restrict their violent behavior to the home as they were to be violent with strangers as well. That is, 54 percent had also victimized strangers. Victim reports of both incidents and arrests established the nontrivial nature of the extra-domestic violence: over 80 percent of those reported to be violent with strangers were said to have also been arrested for such behavior. Such incidents reportedly occurred at least four times per year (quarterly or more frequently) in 47 percent of the cases and between one and three times per year in 53 percent.

Significantly, violence against both strangers and spouses was closely associated with childhood exposure to violence. Over two-thirds of assailants abused as children and a slightly smaller proportion of those who witnessed violence between their parents victimized both strangers and spouses. (See tables 4-8 and 4-9.) By contrast, those assailants with no exposure to violence as children were split almost evenly on this violence scale.

Prior Attempts to Stop the Violence

Participation in the LEAA projects was by no means most victims' first attempt at either seeking legal intervention to stop the violence or ending the relationship. Most victims (89%) had previously called the police, with one in six having called ten times or more. The mean number of prior calls to police was two. However, only 10 percent of the victims reported that the alleged assailant had been arrested for abuse.

Table 4-8  
Violence Scale by Assailant Abused as Child

	Abused as Child	
	No	Yes
Domestic Violence Only	77 (54%)	28 (33%)
Domestic and Nondomestic Violence	67 (46%)	58 (67%)

$\chi^2=9.6$ ,  $p = .008$



Table 4-9

## Violence Scale by Violence Between Assailant's Parents

	Violence Between Parents	
	No	Yes
Domestic Violence Only	36 (56%)	27 (39%)
Domestic and Nondomestic Violence	28 (44%)	42 (61%)

$\chi^2=15.3, p .0005$

(Panel 2 only, N = 171)

Over 60 percent of the clients had separated at least once due to violence before project contact. Ten percent of clients at the time of intake had a petition for divorce pending. This figure ranged across projects from approximately 6 percent in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Hinesville, Georgia, to 25 percent in Brattleboro, Vermont and Santa Barbara, California.

Thirteen percent of the clients had had prior contact with a domestic violence project. Interproject variability on prior contact ranged from 38 percent in Morgantown, West Virginia, to only 3 percent in Hinesville, Georgia.

Overall, 9.4 percent of project clients had a temporary restraining or protection order\* in effect at the time of the instant incident. This finding varied widely--from highs of 36 percent in Salem, Massachusetts, 27 percent in Miami's Safespace, and 19 percent in Morgantown, West Virginia, to lows of 2 percent in Miami's DIP and 1 percent in Fayetteville, North Carolina. The very disparate figures in the two Miami projects probably reflect differences in intervention strategies used by the two sets of client groups. In North Carolina, the structure of the law in combination with local court organization and practices presented significant obstacles to victims seeking protective orders. By contrast, Massachusetts' relatively progressive legislation enabled victims to obtain orders on a 24-hour basis through local magistrates.

\*These civil orders, which provide emergency protection against further abuse, were available in 18 of the 23 (78%) project sites. See Appendix C for a full description of the orders and sample legislative provisions.

There were no differences in victim use of temporary restraining orders as a function of project service emphasis. The structure of the law, the ease of access, and factors relating to enforcement and violation penalties appear to have governed use of civil remedies.

## CHILDREN IN VIOLENT FAMILIES

## Involvement in Parental Violence

Given our findings on the effects of assailant exposure to violence as a child, it is alarming to note the number of client children who witnessed parental violence (44% of the cases) and attempted to stop it (23%). Children were present in 80 percent of the homes of project clients and averaged 1.9 per household. Sixty percent of the clients took their children with them to the first project contact, and 63 percent of shelter populations were children.

Table 4-10

## Involvement of Children in Violence between Parents

Frequency	Witnessed	Intervened
No/Missing	152 (56%)	208 (77%)
Rarely	35 (13%)	18 (7%)
Occasionally	30 (11%)	23 (8%)
Frequently	53 (20%)	21 (8%)
TOTAL	270	270

Our follow-up study revealed violence involving children in 12 percent of the cases. Children were threatened in 40 percent of these cases, actually abused in 41 percent, and suffered injury one-fourth of the time. Medical care for such injuries was received in 13 percent of the cases.

## Problem Responses

Despite these alarming findings, few clients reported child-related problems at their first contact with the projects. The relatively low reporting rate of child-related problems may reflect the reluctance of clients to admit to these difficulties and also may be a function of the age of clients' children (e.g., young children may exhibit few "problem" behaviors). Delinquency actions were pending against only

4 percent of the children, indicating perhaps that for project families, children were not engaging in the types of acting out behaviors that warranted official intervention. In only 2 percent of the cases had children been previously removed from the home. The only significant deviation from this general trend occurred in the Alaska project, where fully 11 percent of the children had reportedly been removed from the home at some time.

Our follow-up study, which sought further details on children's behavior since the onset of parental violence, also revealed few problems. Nervousness, sleeping problems, and excessive fearfulness were the most frequently reported difficulties, all in about one-third of the population. (See table 4-11.)

Table 4-11  
Child Behavioral Problems since Onset of Abuse

Problem Behaviors	
Frequent Illness	36 (21%)
Bedwetting	25 (15%)
Loss of Appetite	31 (18%)
Sleeping Problems	52 (30%)
Behaving as Younger Child	31 (18%)
Excessive Fearfulness	50 (29%)
Nervousness	57 (33%)
Withdrawal	34 (20%)
Lethargy	21 (12%)
Lying	27 (16%)
Running Away	11 (6%)
Self-Destructive Behavior	19 (11%)
Violence Against Parents	24 (14%)
Violence Against Others	18 (11%)
Property Destruction	13 (8%)
Threats Against Parents	21 (12%)
Threats Against Others	12 (7%)
Temper Tantrums	38 (22%)
Whining or Crying	36 (21%)
School Performance	28 (16%)
School Attendance	13 (8%)

A factor analysis of these problems is illuminating. As shown in table 4-12, the first factor includes behaviors that might be termed "externalized distress": destruction of property (loading = .78), lying (loading = .72), violence against parents (loading = .71). These are behaviors directed against others. The second factor could be termed "internalized distress": it contains loss of appetite (loading = .80),

sleeping problems (loading = .79), and behaving as a younger child (loading = .70)--problem areas where the child directs stresses inward. Indicating that children do react to living in a violent home and that their reactions will typically vary in pattern, these findings suggest directions for diagnosis of (and early intervention with) children from violent homes.

Table 4-12  
Factor Loadings for Children Behaviors

	Factor	
	I	II
Frequent Illness	.06	.69
Bedwetting	.13	.49
Loss of Appetite	.05	.80
Sleeping Problems	.13	.79
Behaving as Younger Child	.22	.70
Excessive Fearfulness	.16	.65
Nervousness	.10	.70
Withdrawal	.29	.59
Lethargic	.26	.53
Lying	.72	.29
Running Away	.52	.03
Self-Destructive Behavior	.58	-.02
Violence Against Parents	.71	.25
Violence Against Others	.65	.32
Destruction of Property	.78	.14
Threats Against Parents	.65	.25
Threats Against Others	.66	.26
Temper Tantrums	.59	.31
Whining or Crying	.38	.50
Academic Performance	.55	.05
School Attendance	.55	.15
EIGENVALUE	7.21	2.42
Percent of Variance	34.4	11.5

## The Instant Incident

The nature of the instant incident\* is an important epidemiological variable to the extent that it can inform the development of outreach and intervention strategies. Key characteristics of this variable include location of the incident, substance use, the severity of abuse and injury, and medical care sought. Taken together, these factors help to identify the immediate needs of victims and their children and to design appropriate crisis intervention services.

### LOCATION

Nearly two in three incidents occurred in a home shared by the disputants, which suggests the need for alternative housing or removal of the assailant. The victim's home (not shared with the disputant) was the site of 18.8 percent of the incidents. The remainder took place in the assailant's home, another private home, or a public location.

Among shelter clients, 70.1 percent of the instant incidents occurred in a shared home, compared to 59.7 percent in other projects. Shelter clients exhibited a greater need for housing and accompanying children's services, as expected given the cohabitating status and need to escape.

### SUBSTANCE USE

#### Alcohol

About half the assailants had reportedly been drinking at the time of the instant incident, with shelter projects reporting a slightly higher incidence of assailant alcohol use (55.7%) than other projects (47.3%). Above average trends occurred in Portland, Oregon (80%), Morgan-

\*The "instant incident" was the most recent abusive episode leading to initial contact with an LEAA project.

town, West Virginia (72%), Brattleboro, Vermont (71%) and Juneau, Alaska (67%). Extremely low trends were reported in Miami-Safespace (21%) and White Plains, New York (23%).

The data suggest that, while alcohol is prevalent, there is not sufficient basis to infer causality. In the absence of statistical controls, there may well be as many "drinkers" who do not become violent. As previous studies have suggested (Frieze et al., 1980), the relationship between alcohol and marital violence is a complex one.

Victims, in contrast to assailants, reported using alcohol themselves in only 10 percent of the instant incidents. Almost four times as many Juneau victims (38%) and approximately three times as many Santa Barbara victims (32%) had been using alcohol. Miami's Safespace clients had the lowest reported usage of alcohol (2%) at the time of the incident.

### Drugs

Drug use by alleged assailants was reportedly much lower than alcohol use. The overall average was 17 percent, with only four projects deviating significantly: Philadelphia (32%), Morgantown, West Virginia (28%), Hinesville, Georgia (7%), and White Plains (4%).

Victim reports of their own drug use at the time of the instant incident were extremely low--3 percent--in the aggregate. Somewhat higher reports of victim drug use (13%) were obtained in Santa Barbara.

There were no detected differences in drug use by project service emphasis.

### SEVERITY OF ABUSE

The severity of abuse in the instant incident describes the violence of the assailant as well as the potential lethality of the situation. This variable was measured using Conflict Resolution Technique (CRT) scales specially developed for domestic abuse (Straus, 1978; Straus et al., 1980). Although this measurement technique is not without its detractors (see, for example, Straus, 1981; Wardell et al., 1981; Klein, 1979), it remains a useful index to describe certain dimensions of violence such as lethality. The danger in such measures is their inappropriate interpretation and the omission of other attributes necessary to fully describe the context in which spousal assault occurs: the nature of the abuse, the situation itself, confluences of events, and the supposed role obligations of members of each relationship (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Wardell et al., 1981).

## Types of Abuse

The types of abuse handled in the national program are summarized in table 4-13. The data indicate that victims were frequently multiply abused, a finding consistent with previous research (Straus et al., 1980; Freize et al., 1980).

Table 4-13

### Type of Violence in the Instant Incident

Verbally Abused (N=2,790)	2,541	(91.0%)
Pushed, Slapped, or Grabbed (N=2,793)	2,027	(72.6%)
Punched, Kicked, or Choked (N=2,772)	1,587	(57.3%)
Sexually Assaulted (N=2,656)	168	( 6.3%)
Threatened with Weapon (N=2,709)	1,960	(72.3%)
Weapon Used (N=2,522)	(647)	(25.7%)
Knife	(175)	( 6.9%)
Gun	(190)	( 7.5%)
Other	(282)	(11.2%)

Almost all respondents (91%) reported having been verbally abused. Interproject variability ranged from 100 percent in Miami-Safespace to 68 percent in Brattleboro and 70 percent in Price, Utah. Verbal abuse includes threats of violence, psychological abuse (intimidation, deprecation, etc.), and other tactics that do not involve actual or attempted violence.

Almost three-fourths of victims reported some physical violence (pushed, slapped, or grabbed). The reports ranged from 100 percent in Miami-Safespace to 40 percent in Utah and 44 percent in White Plains, New York. Shelter clients reported this type of violence slightly more often (76.6%) than other projects (70.5%).

Over half of the victims had been punched, kicked, or choked. Variability on this report ranged from 96 percent in Miami's Safespace to 32 percent in Price and 33 percent in Brattleboro. Again, shelter clients reported a slightly higher frequency (60.8%) than justice system clients (55.3%).

Victims reported sexual assaults in 6.3 percent of the cases overall. Sexual assaults ranged from 29 percent in Brattleboro to 2.5 percent in both White Plains and Price. One in nine shelter clients (11%) had been sexually assaulted, compared to only 3.7 percent in other projects.

Threats with weapons and actual weapon use both occurred in a little more than one-quarter of the cases. There was high interproject

variability for both measures. Threats with weapons ranged from 65 percent in Charlottesville to 18 percent in White Plains and were reported in 35.8 percent of shelter cases, compared to 23.5 percent for other projects. There was less variability in weapon use by project service emphasis.

## The Structure of Abuse

Measurements such as the CRT scales and other indices involve judgments that are normative and also reduce violence to a level of abstraction equal to an opinion survey. Several critics (Dobash and Dobash, 1979; Wardell et al., 1981) have questioned the usefulness of empiricism and logical positivism in defining and measuring wife beating. In coming to understand better the phenomena subsumed by the phrase "domestic violence," an analysis of the severity of abuse in the instant incident is instructive.

Borrowing a phrase from strategic thinkers such as Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling, we sought to develop the "escalation ladder" of domestic violence. To do so, a Guttman scalogram analysis (Guttman, 1944) was undertaken on each of the types of abuse, which yielded the following scale:\*

- verbally abused
- pushed or slapped
- punched or kicked
- threatened with weapon or object
- use of weapon or object
- sexually assaulted

This analysis goes beyond assessing severity to show the linkages among the types of abuse. Put most simply, if one reported the use of a weapon or object, one was likely to report having been threatened with same; if one reported being threatened with a weapon or object, one was likely to report having been punched or kicked; if one reported being punched or kicked, one was likely to report having been pushed or slapped; and if one reported having been pushed or slapped, one was likely to report having been verbally abused.

The reader will note that sexual assault was omitted from the preceding enumeration. While this type of abuse was entered into the final Guttman scale, a large proportion of those reporting sexual assault did not report all of the subsidiary attributes. This suggests that the sexual assault cases were not simply rare events but were quite different, i.e., that they were qualitatively different and not simply quantitatively more extreme.

\*The scale meets the conventional scalogram analysis criterion of reproductibility in excess of .9.

## SEVERITY OF INJURY

Nearly two victims in three (65.5%) reported a physical injury resulting from the instant incident. Of these injuries, the most serious were typically bruises, although 22.6 percent reported lacerations or worse. The lowest incidence of injury (32%) occurred in White Plains, and the highest (91%) in Miami-Safespace. That shelter's clients also suffered the most serious injuries (72.4% reporting lacerations or worse).

As in severity of abuse, the data on severity of injury again indicate that shelter cases were more dangerous than other cases. As shown in table 4-14, more shelter victims suffered at least some injury, and the more serious types of injury were consistently more frequent in shelter cases.

Table 4-14  
Severity of Injury by Project Service Emphasis

Injury	Shelter	Other	Total
None	307 (31.0%)	684 (37.9%)	991 (35.5%)
Bruises	397 (40.1%)	773 (42.9%)	1,170 (41.9%)
Lacerations/Bleeding	195 (19.7%)	242 (13.4%)	437 (15.7%)
Fractures	58 (5.9%)	68 (4.5%)	126 (4.5%)
Loss of Consciousness	26 (2.6%)	30 (1.7%)	56 (2.0%)
Miscarriage	6 (0.6%)	6 (0.3%)	12 (0.4%)
TOTAL	989 (35.4%)	1,803 (64.6%)	2,792

## MEDICAL CARE SOUGHT

Three-fourths (75.4%) of victims had not sought medical care for injuries suffered during the instant incident. Variation ranged from 90 percent not seeking medical care in Price, Utah, to 45 percent in Charlottesville and Providence. There was apparently no significant difference on this measure by project service emphasis.

Most medical care was provided by hospitals (18.2%). Charlottesville (48%) and Salem (31%) showed much higher rates of hospital services, which could reflect effects on client recruitment of project training and coordination efforts with local emergency room staffs.

## Understanding Spousal Violence

The data presented thus far have examined a wide range of variable domains to describe victim and assailant background characteristics and relationship history, and violence in the instant incident. A series of multivariate analyses was undertaken to simplify the emerging pictures of spousal violence, to empirically determine those variables that are representative of each domain, and to explore the relationships between the domains of variables. These analyses also yielded control variables for the impact analyses in chapter 5.

## VICTIM AND ASSAILANT PATTERNS

As noted earlier, this research lacked sufficient controls to determine how victims differ from women in the general population, or even how project clients differ from other battered women. Factor analyses were undertaken to identify naturally occurring groups of victims or assailants. Also, multivariate analyses were used to examine the relationship of victim and assailant backgrounds to two dimensions of domestic violence--severity of injury and assailant involvement in extra-domestic violence. Such classification methods are useful in interpreting observed patterns, in data reduction, and index construction.

### Victim Patterns

A factor analysis of nine victim background variables generated two factors that explained approximately one-third of the variance. The variables primarily associated with the first factor are length of cohabitation, age, race, and cohabitation with the assailant. The second (orthogonal) factor is typified by social class variables--the absence of children, a shorter relationship, and living separately from the assailant. Victims' childhood violence experiences are negatively associated and equally loaded in the two factors, suggesting that these variables are complex and, perhaps, related to dimensions not examined here.



Table 4-15  
Factor Analysis of Victim Background Characteristics

	Factor	
	I	II
Age	.80	-.10
Race	-.33	.10
Education	.02	.67
Employment	.05	.57
Presence of Children	.08	-.35
Abused as Child	-.43	-.38
Length of Cohabitation	.82	-.18
Physical Violence between Parents	-.31	-.50
Living Separately from Assailant	-.19	.33
EIGENVALUE	1.74	1.45
Percent of Variance	19.4	16.2

Thus, the first victim profile describes the typical older, white woman in a longer and still intact relationship with her assailant. The second factor represents a victim profile that has not been commonly associated with domestic violence: the upwardly mobile woman without children living apart from her assailant. In contrast to the first profile, the second encompasses a new victim group served as a result of the LEAA program.

We next examined the relationship between victim background characteristics and two dimensions of spousal violence--the most serious prior injury and assailant involvement in extra-domestic (i.e., stranger) violence. Victim participation in or provocation of domestic violence has long been hypothesized in the research literature (see, for example, Gelles, 1976). In particular, the popular conception is that women who were childhood abuse victims were "more likely as adults to marry a person who is prone to use violence" (Gelles, 1976: 664-3) and more inclined to remain with an abusive husband. Multiple regression analyses of victim background characteristics and assailant violence allowed us to determine to what extent this conception was applicable to the LEAA population.

**Stranger Violence.** As table 4-16 shows, a victim's childhood violence experience is, indeed, associated with her involvement with a more violent male, as indicated by his violence toward strangers as well. Both childhood victimization and exposure to parental violence are well correlated with this violence scale. Age is a strong but negative contributor, indicating, again, that younger abuse victims were involved in more violent, and therefore potentially lethal, relationships. Of interest is the failure of socioeconomic factors (race, employment, and education) to emerge as important contributors.

Table 4-16  
Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence as a  
Function of Victim Background Characteristics

Background Characteristics	r	B
Victim Abused as Child	.36	.29
Victim's Age	-.36	-.26
Violence Between Victim's Parents	.26	.17
Drug Problems in Relationship	.22	.14
Victim's Employment Status	-.08	-.10
Drinking Problem in Relationship	.00	-.08
Victim's Education	-.05	-.07
Victim's Race	.12	-.02
(R <sup>2</sup> = .28, F <sub>8,69</sub> = 3.41, p .003)		

**Severity of Injury.** A different response to this research question is found in the relationship of victims' backgrounds to their most serious prior injuries from domestic violence. (See table 4-17.) Unlike the previous analysis, childhood exposure to and experience with violence is not associated with the severity of domestic violence. The most serious injuries are explained by the victim's youth and the presence of a drinking problem in the relationship. Again, socioeconomic characteristics are relatively unimportant.

Table 4-17  
Severity of Prior Injuries as a  
Function of Victim Background Characteristics

Background Characteristics	r	B
Drinking Problem in Relationship	.32	.29
Age	-.28	-.26
Drug Problem in Relationship	-.10	-.21
Education	-.14	-.15
Race	.19	.16
Violence between Parents	.17	.13
Employment Status	.00	.05
Abused as Child	.08	-.03
(R <sup>2</sup> = .26, F <sub>8,69</sub> = 3.08, p .005)		

Together, these analyses cast doubt on the victim-as-perpetrator hypothesis. Specifically, there is only partial support for the notion that female victims from violent homes seek out more violent men. While victims' childhood violence experiences are associated with more widely violent men, they are not associated with the most severe forms of domestic violence.

Obviously, the relationship here is complex and difficult to understand. The only consistent pattern that emerges is the risk of younger women, which suggests the importance of outreach to this group. Also consistent was the failure of socioeconomic factors to predict violence, which belies the notion that "unattractive" women with few resources are at greater risk for abuse and injury.

#### Assailant Patterns

A factor analysis was conducted to identify profiles of assailants in terms of their background characteristics. (see table 4-18.) The first factor describes one assailant group as younger men who had shorter relationships and did not live with the victim. The second factor includes less educated white males in longer relationships often involving children. Both groups had had extensive childhood exposure to violence, as victims and witnesses. Of interest is the absence of employment in describing assailants, while employment appears strongly in one victim profile.

Table 4-18

#### Factor Analysis of Assailant Background Characteristics

Assailant Characteristic	Factor Loadings	
	I	II
Age	-.80	.08
Race	.28	-.36
Education	.21	-.47
Employment	.01	-.11
Presence of Children	.02	.48
Abused as Child	.33	.73
Length of Cohabitation	-.71	.41
Violence between Parents	.53	.58
Living Separately	.38	-.01
EIGENVALUE	1.80	1.63
Percent of Variance	20.0	13.1

Earlier analyses examined assailants' childhood abuse histories and the extent of stranger violence by these individuals. To further describe patterns of assailant characteristics, we include here a series of multiple regression analyses of both severity of violence and extra-domestic violence.

**Stranger Violence.** The first analysis considers the relationship between assailant background characteristics and involvement in both stranger and domestic violence. As shown in table 4-19, exposure to violence as a child strongly predicts the use of violence as an adult.

Both witnessing spousal violence as a child and abuse as a child are positively correlated with violence both inside and outside the home. Younger men and white men also tended to be more violent (although these variables were weak contributors to the equation).

Table 4-19

#### Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence as a Function of Assailant Background Characteristics

Background Characteristics	r	B
Physical Violence Between Assailants' Parents	.51	.60
Race	.42	.50
Age	-.27	-.01
Abused as Child	.29	.12
Employment Status	-.01	.05
Education	-.04	-.03
(R <sup>2</sup> = .37, F <sub>6,48</sub> = 4.73, p .001)		

**Severity of Injury.** We next looked at the contributions of these same assailant characteristics to the severity of injury to the victim. Of the various background variables, the assailant's abuse as a child, education, employment, and age predict most serious past victim injury. (See table 4-20.) Again, violence between parents appears to overlap with assailant's abuse as a child. Assailants with higher educational attainment appear to inflict more severe injuries, as do unemployed assailants. Age is a suppressor variable, operating both on education and on employment. Closer examination of the correlations between age and those two sociodemographic variables shows that age has a zero-order correlation of  $r = -.21$  with employment, and  $r = .24$  with education. The relationship of the assailant's age to prior injury is indirect, and prior injury is associated with both employment, probably due to younger unemployed assailants, and education, again due to older but more highly educated assailants.

Table 4-20

#### Most Serious Past Injury as a Function of Assailant Background Characteristics

Background Characteristics	r	B
Abused as Child	.46	.40
Education	.20	.30
Employment Status	-.12	-.28
Age	.04	.22
Race	.16	.16
Violence Between Parents	.37	.11
(R <sup>2</sup> = .36, F <sub>6,164</sub> = 15.25, p .001)		

Educational attainment and employment are moderately correlated in our sample ( $r = .27$ ) but act in opposite directions on severity of victim injury. It is possible that younger but more highly educated men produced this result. Since youth seems to predict violence, we would otherwise expect a stronger contribution of the age variable. Its low correlation indicates that the variance in age remains. Again, we suspect here that younger men with higher educational attainment, as well as younger unemployed men, may inflict more severe injuries.

Disputants' Childhood Exposure to Violence

Given the indications of the importance of childhood exposure to violence, we turn to a straightforward analysis of violence between parents of both victim and assailant as predictors of abuse during pregnancy. This variable was selected because it represents an extremely severe and, perhaps, the most lethal type of spousal assault (Martin, 1976).

As displayed in table 4-21, whether or not the client had been exposed to violence as a child, her partner's childhood exposure to violence had a significant association with current severity of domestic violence. If the client had also been exposed to violence as a child, the impact of the partner's childhood experience was increased. That is to say, the assailant's background was the stronger indicator of abuse during pregnancy, and there was an interaction effect between the two childhood experiences of violence.

Table 4-21  
Violence between Disputants' Parents  
Predicting Abuse in Pregnancy

		Violence between Victim's Parents				Violence Between Assailant's Parents			
		No		Yes		No		Yes	
Abuse During Pregnancy	No	53 (75%)	22 (52%)	29 (76%)	23 (47%)				
	Yes	18 (25%)	20 (48%)	9 (24%)	26 (53%)				
		$\chi^2 = 5.9$		$p .02$		$\chi^2 = 7.7$		$p .006$	
(N=200)		$\chi^2 = 14.5$		$p .002$		$df = 3$			

ABUSE HISTORY PATTERNS

Overview

A factor analysis was undertaken to determine the patterns of situational variables in the abuse histories of project clients. The results are shown in table 4-22.

Table 4-22  
Factor Loadings for Abuse History Variables

Assailant Characteristic	Factor Loadings	
	I	II
Abuse During Pregnancy	.56	-.60
Miscarriage Due to Abuse	.53	-.33
Frequency of Abuse	.30	.50
Length of Abuse	.39	-.16
Prior Calls to Police	.45	.41
Prior Separations Due to Abuse	.55	-.31
Frequency of Injury	.73	.36
Most Serious Prior Injury	.70	.07
Children Witnessing Violence	.60	.18
EIGENVALUE	2.73	1.18
Percent of Variance	30.3	13.1

With respect to the history of abuse in the current relationship, the first factor is clearly a general, or "G," factor defined primarily by frequency of injury (loading = .73) and most serious injury (loading = .70). The factor also has significant loadings associated with children witnessing violence (loading = .60), abuse during pregnancy (loading = .56), number of prior separations due to abuse (loading = .55), and miscarriage due to abuse (loading = .53).

The second factor is not easily understood. Abuse during pregnancy is negatively associated with the factor, but frequency of abuse is positively associated with the factor. The second factor appears to include variables not associated with the first factor; in other words, these are the variables that account for the remainder of the variance.

In any event, the strong positive loadings of the first factor indicate that violence may be seen as a singular dimension, that is, there may be only one type of abuse pattern, strongly described by the frequency and severity of injury as well as children witnessing violence and abuse during pregnancy.

### Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence

To further examine the impact of abuse history variables, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to identify predictors of involvement in extra-domestic violence. As shown in table 4-23, both frequency and severity of domestic violence were predictive of involvement in stranger as well as domestic violence. The most serious present and past injuries and abuse during pregnancy were strongly correlated with involvement in stranger violence. Frequency of abuse appears to be a suppressor variable, but is nevertheless also correlated with extra-domestic violence. Thus, those assailants who inflicted the most injurious and frequent abuse were also those who were violent outside the home.

Table 4-23  
Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence as a  
Function of Abuse History Variables

Background Characteristics	r	B
Most Serious Injury--		
Instant Incident	.59	.59
Abuse During Pregnancy	.36	.61
Most Serious Prior Injury	.35	.09
Frequency of Abuse	.26	.04
Prior Calls to Police	.07	.01
$(R^2 = .52, F_{4,59} = 10.71, p = .0002)$		

In summary, one-half of the variance in the criterion variable (extra-domestic violence) is predicted by a composite representing severity of domestic violence. Interestingly, it is the severity of injury in the instant incident that is most predictive, whereas the most serious past injury might be expected to be a more reliable (stable) indicator of level of violence.

### Severity of Injury

The same descriptors were analyzed to determine which patterns or types of abuse were predictive of the severity of injury. Table 4-24 shows that the severity of injury is well predicted by the history and frequency of abuse and injury as well as abuse during pregnancy. Clearly, the most frequently violent men inflict the most severe injuries.

Table 4-24  
Most Serious Past Injury as a  
Function of Abuse History Variables

	r	B
Frequency of Injury	.60	.43
Abuse During Pregnancy	.34	.31
Frequency of Abuse	.41	.07
Number Prior Calls to Police	.02	-.08
Length of Cohabitation	.13	.12
Drug Use Accompanies Abuse	-.14	-.11
Length of Abuse in Relationship	.18	-.08
Separations Due to Violence	.18	-.22
Drinking Accompanies Abuse	.07	-.03
$(R^2 = .48, F_{9,145} = 4.63, p = .00002)$		

### DISPUTANT CHARACTERISTICS AND RELATIONSHIP HISTORY

The final set of analyses compared the associations of two combinations of predictor variables with the indicators of severity of injury and stranger and non-stranger violence. The history of abuse in the relationship was conjoined first with victim background characteristics and then with assailant background characteristics in multiple regression analyses to predict each of these indicators of assailant violence. The results provide important insights into the role of assailant and victim factors in understanding spousal violence.

### Severity of Injury

**Victim Variables.** The combined set of victim background and relationship variables is highly predictive (explaining over 50% of the variance) of the severity of injury. As table 4-25 shows, the history of abuse in the relationship far outweighs victim background in explaining this violence indicator: frequency of abuse and injury, length of abuse in the relationship, and abuse during pregnancy (including miscarriages from abuse) are strong predictors. The victim's age (again, younger) and drinking in the relationship are the strongest background variables. Children witnessing violence are also evident in the regression equation, which is significant at the .01 level.

A comparison of these results to our earlier assessments of the separate effects of victim background and abuse history (tables 4-17 and 4-24) is instructive. The combined sets explain more than twice the percentage of the variance explained by victim characteristics

alone ( $r^2 = .58$  vs.  $.26$ ) and one-fifth more than situational variables alone ( $r^2 = .48$ ). It is evident that situational variables are powerful predictors of the severity of injury, whether assessed separately or in combination. These findings support the claims of such researchers as Dobash and Dobash (1978) that contextual variables are critical to a complete understanding of domestic abuse. Victim background characteristics, while not strong alone in predicting violence, do appear to strengthen the predictive power of abuse history variables.

Table 4-25  
Severity of Injury as a  
Function of Victim Background and Abuse History

	r	B
Frequency of Injury	.46	.19
Length of Abuse	.36	.42
Age	-.28	-.33
Drinking Problem in Relationship	.32	.17
Cohabitation	.34	-.16
Miscarriage from Abuse	.30	.21
Education	-.14	-.14
Children Witness to Domestic Violence	.43	.14
Abused as Child	.08	-.08
Parental Violence	.17	.09
Prior Separations Due to Domestic Violence	.18	-.06
Drug Problem in Relationship	-.10	-.05
Employment Status	.00	.05
Frequency of Abuse	.21	-.04
Abuse During Pregnancy	.38	-.05
Length of Cohabitation	.09	-.06
Prior Calls to Police	.12	-.02

( $R^2 = .58$ ,  $F_{18,59} = 4.47$ ,  $p = .01$ )

**Assailant Variables.** When assailant characteristics are conjoined with situational variables (table 4-26, below), the proportion of variance explained increases to 62 percent from the 36 percent explained by assailant background alone (table 4-20) and the 48 percent explained by situational variables alone (table 4-24). Here, the pattern is quite clear: the assailant's childhood abuse history, both in terms of victimization and witnessing, predicts the severity of injuries inflicted. Equally important in this analysis is the history of abuse in the relationship. A longer and more frequent abuse pattern appears to lead to more severe violence, providing some indication that domestic violence may indeed escalate.

Table 4-26  
Severity of Injury as a  
Function of Assailant Background and Abuse History

Background/Situational Factors	r	B
Frequency of Injury	.60	.49
Abused as Child	.46	.15
Employment Status	-.12	-.28
Education	.19	.37
Frequency of Abuse	.41	.20
Length of Cohabitation	.13	.13
Prior Calls to Police	.02	-.11
Abuse of Partner During Pregnancy	.34	.14
Age	.04	.15
Drinking Accompanies Abuse	.07	-.10
Parental Violence	.37	.10
Drug Use Accompanies Abuse	-.14	-.03
Length of Abuse	.18	-.03
Race	.17	.01
Prior Separations Due to Violence	.18	-.01

( $R^2 = .62$ ,  $F_{15,155} = 19.33$ ,  $p = .0001$ )

#### Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence

**Victim Variables.** As shown in table 4-27, the combined set of victim variables is also highly predictive of assailant involvement in stranger as well as spousal violence. Interestingly, the percentage of the variance explained by the combined set (41%) is considerably more than victim backgrounds alone (28%, table 4-16) but less than situational variables alone (52%, table 4-23).

As in earlier analyses, strong predictors of victim association with a more widely violent partner include childhood exposure to violence and abuse history variables--abuse during pregnancy, prior separations, and most serious past injury. Newly emergent predictors include the length of cohabitation and the length of abuse, both in the negative direction. These variables may, however, reflect the same trends shown by victim age in previous analyses.

These findings, like those for severity of injury, suggest that shorter but more violent relationships in the home are predictive of violence toward strangers as well. However, additional risks associated with victims' childhood exposure to violence emerge here, but not for the injury criterion. This is a puzzling result requiring closer and more controlled study.



Table 4-27  
Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence as a  
Function of Victim Background and Abuse History

Background/Situational Factors	r	B
Length of Cohabitation	-.38	-.20
Abuse During Pregnancy	.31	.25
Abused as Child	.36	.27
Prior Separations Due to Domestic Violence	.25	.20
Drinking Problem in Relationship	.00	-.20
Drug Problem in Relationship	.22	.07
Most Serious Past Injury	.17	.32
Cohabitation	-.01	-.12
Parental Violence	.26	.07
Length of Abuse in Relationship	-.22	-.16
Presence of Children	.15	.07
Race	.12	-.08
Employment Status	-.08	-.05
Education	-.05	-.04
Miscarriage from Abuse	.10	-.05
Frequency of Injury	.11	-.06
Prior Calls to Police	.05	.06
Most Serious Injury-Instant Incident	.10	-.06
Frequency of Abuse	-.01	.02

( $R^2 = .41$ ,  $F_{20,57} = 1.98$ ,  $p = .05$ )

**Assailant Variables.** Table 4-28 combines assailant background and abuse history to predict involvement in extra-domestic violence. The results show that 45 percent of the variance is explained by the combined set, compared to 37 percent for assailant background (table 4-19) and 52 percent for abuse history variables (table 4-23).

Again, both sets of variables are associated with assailants who are violent outside the home as well. Salient situational variables include frequency of abuse and injury (including abuse during pregnancy). These men were also younger, nonwhite, and usually drinking during violent episodes. Childhood exposure to violence\* most strongly predicts these assailants' involvement in stranger violence, as it did the severity of injury to intimates. Given the previous victim analysis, there emerges a common high-risk profile of the younger couple, both exposed to violence as children, in a short but violent relationship that reaches outside the home.

\*Assailant childhood victimization, highly correlated with assailant parent violence, drops out of the equation.

Table 4-28  
Stranger and Non-Stranger Violence as a  
Function of Assailant Background Abuse History

	r	B
Parental Violence	.51	.51
Race	.42	.60
Prior Calls to Police	.07	.18
Abuse During Pregnancy	.36	.24
Age	-.27	-.0009
Length of Abuse	.03	.16
Length of Cohabitation	-.08	-.11
Drinking Accompanies Abuse	.26	.20
Drug Use Accompanies Abuse	-.10	.15
Separations due to Violence	.05	-.10
Education	.04	.05
Employment Status	-.01	.04
Frequency of Injury	.22	.04

( $R^2 = .45$ ,  $F_{13,41} = 2.59$ ,  $p = .05$ )

## SUMMARY

Table 4-29 provides a summary comparison of the proportion of variance explained by the several combinations of background and abuse history factors. The results are both policy-relevant and provocative. First, the predictive ability of background variables alone is quite limited compared to the predictiveness of either abuse history or the combined sets. Second, situational variables alone show a greater predictive ability than either victim or assailant background variables alone. Third, victim background variables account for a substantially lower portion of the variance than do assailant variables. Fourth, the combined sets are more predictive of severity of injury than of stranger violence, while the other sets show approximately equal predictiveness for both criterion variables. Finally, although the combined sets of background and situational variables are the strongest predictors of severity of injury, stranger violence is best predicted by abuse history alone.

These results provide further support for refuting the notion that victims are somehow complicit in their own victimization. While victims may tend to associate with more violent men, their youth appears to be the strongest influencing factor. Moreover, assailant characteristics are stronger predictors than victim background, and situational variables--describing the history of violence in the relationship--are the most important contributors, whether alone or in combination. Indeed, actual violence is the strongest predictor of the

Table 4-27  
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Function of Victim Background and Abuse History

Background/Situational Factors	r	B
Length of Cohabitation	-.38	-.20
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Drinking Problem in Relationship	.00	-.20
Drug Problem in Relationship	.22	.07
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Cohabitation	-.01	-.12
Parental Violence	.26	.07
Length of Abuse in Relationship	-.22	-.16
Presence of Children	.15	.07
Race	.12	-.08
Employment Status	-.08	-.05
Education	-.05	-.04
Miscarriage from Abuse	.10	-.05
Frequency of Injury	.11	-.06
Prior Calls to Police	.05	.06
Most Serious Injury-Instant Incident	.10	-.06
Frequency of Abuse	-.01	.02

( $R^2 = .41$ ,  $F_{20,57} = 1.98$ ,  $p = .05$ )

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These results provide further support for refuting the notion that victims are somehow complicit in their own victimization. While victims may tend to associate with more violent men, their youth appears to be the strongest influencing factor. Moreover, assailant characteristics are stronger predictors than victim background, and situational variables--describing the history of violence in the relationship--are the most important contributors, whether alone or in combination. Indeed, actual violence is the strongest predictor of the

most severe violence in the home, which in turn predicts violence on the street. Thus, violence in the home may not only escalate in severity, but also predict an increase in the number and types of victims.

Table 4-29  
Summary of Factors Predicting  
Severity of Injury and Stranger Violence

Factors	Percentage of Variance Explained	
	Severity of Injury	Stranger Violence
Victim Background	.26	.28
Assailant Background	.36	.37
Situational Variables	.48	.52
Situational Variables and Victim Background	.58	.41*
Situational Variables and Assailant Background	.62	.45*

p = .01      \*p = .05

Thus, the intersection of violence in the home and violence on the street is apparently best described, not by social structural factors, but by assailant behavioral patterns encompassing social learning as a child, escalating severity of violence toward intimates, and violence toward strangers as well. This relationship between domestic and extra-domestic violence injects further meaning into the concept, "Violence begets violence."

## Help Seeking and Services

Program planning should, ideally, tailor outreach and intervention strategies to empirical knowledge of help-seeking behavior among the target population. Yet victim help-seeking in domestic violence is not well understood. Thus, one of the principal areas of knowledge gained through this evaluation concerns the help-seeking styles of program clients as a function of case characteristics, instant incidents, service needs, and project interventions. Several measures of help-seeking behavior were used to assess victim responses to and strategies for halting abuse. Reflecting the national program's

concern with promoting the involvement of criminal justice agencies in spousal assault cases, the measures include calls to the police, filing of official complaints, and requests for services from the projects. (An additional measure, seeking medical care, was described earlier.)

## CALLS TO POLICE

Overall, the police were contacted in 57.5 percent of the cases. Most commonly (37.9%), the victim initiated these contacts. Contacts for police assistance were most frequently reported in Portland, Miami's DIP, and Santa Barbara--all projects whose primary direct service involved criminal justice interventions.

Calls to police were more common for cases of justice system projects for nearly all categories of callers (table 4-30). It is unclear whether these results are a function of case characteristics or project service availability. On one hand, we observe that shelter cases are more potentially lethal, yet we also observe that clients in shelters were less apt to call the police. At the same time, project case studies repeatedly demonstrate shelter success in establishing certain types of linkages with law enforcement agencies.

Police responses to calls for assistance were recorded only in our follow-up study. Police offered assistance most often to victims (36%). Such assistance ranged from transportation to shelters to provision of information on criminal and civil remedies. (See volume 2, Case Studies.) Arrests were made in 15 percent of the cases, and citations in lieu of arrest were issued in 1 percent. More than one-third of the time, police took no action (22%) or used informal measures (13%), the latter including the traditional "walk around the block" with the assailant. Police failed to arrive in 6 percent of the cases.

Table 4-30  
Calls to Police by Project Service Emphasis

Caller	Shelter	Other	Total
None	595 (59.5%)	609 (33.2%)	1,204 (42.5%)
Victim	253 (25.3%)	821 (44.8%)	1,074 (37.9%)
Assailant	11 (1.1%)	29 (1.6%)	40 (1.4%)
Other Disputant	3 (0.3%)	17 (0.9%)	20 (0.7%)
Family or Friend	70 (7.0%)	173 (9.4%)	243 (8.6%)
Unknown Caller	25 (2.5%)	114 (6.2%)	139 (4.9%)
Other	43 (4.3%)	70 (3.8%)	113 (4.%)
TOTAL	1,000	1,833	2,833

COMPLAINTS FILED

Formal complaints to police or prosecutors were filed in 27.8 percent of the cases. Several projects had very high reporting levels-- Portland (89%), Santa Barbara (66%), and Cleveland (48%)-- most likely reflecting their focus on justice system interventions.

There was extreme variability in complaints filed by project service emphasis. Only one quarter (25.3%) of shelter clients filed complaints, compared to 44.2 percent in justice system projects. Again, the proximity to or location of these projects in the justice system apparently facilitated the formal involvement of the system in cases originating there.

PRESENTING PROBLEM

At their initial contact with the projects, clients were asked to report two problems. Not surprisingly, the most frequently reported were physical abuse (64%) and fear or threat of violence (both at about 33%). Reports of battering ranged from 98.5 percent in Miami (Safe-space) to less than 40 percent in White Plains, New York, and Brattleboro, Vermont. Interestingly, White Plains clients reported harassment as a presenting problem almost three times as frequently as did the clients of the remaining projects (53% versus 19%). Sexual assault of either adults or children was infrequently reported in the sample, as was physical child abuse. These data suggest that multiple victims were a rare occurrence for the LEAA projects and that the victims were overwhelmingly adults.

The presenting problems appear to vary by project service emphasis, suggesting that a project's service emphasis may have influenced client decisions to seek its services. As shown in table 4-31, harassment was a presenting problem for over 30 percent of the justice system clients, compared to only 15 percent of the shelter clients. Fear and threats were slightly more prevalent for shelters. (Of course, there was considerable interproject variability in the definitions of harassment, fear, and threat.) Although physical abuse cases were represented almost equally in both types of projects, justice system projects received more cases without physical violence, while shelter cases more often involved threatened or actual violence, sexual assault, or child abuse. This is consistent with previous evaluation findings showing that shelter is the service most often requested by victims either threatened or actually abused, while legal assistance or information is most commonly requested by victims of harassment or those fearing abuse (Fagan et al., 1980).

Table 4-31  
Clients' Presenting Problems by Project Service Emphasis

	Shelter		Other		Total	
Harassment	163	(15.2%)	558	(30.0%)	721	(24.5%)
Fear of Violence	422	(39.5%)	557	(30.0%)	979	(33.3%)
Threats of Violence	400	(37.5%)	558	(30.0%)	958	(32.6%)
Physical Abuse (Violence)	703	(65.8%)	1,184	(63.8%)	1,887	(64.3%)
Adult Sexual Assault	26	(2.4%)	20	(1.1%)	46	(1.6%)
Child Abuse or Neglect	55	(5.1%)	56	(3.0%)	111	(3.8%)
Child Sexual Assault or Incest	25	(2.3%)	12	(0.6%)	37	(1.3%)
Other	89	(8.3%)	89	(4.8%)	178	(6.1%)
TOTAL	1,068		1,855		2,933	

SERVICE REQUESTS

Overview

Although requests for services are naturally related to project service emphasis, their distribution is instructive. Table 4-32 displays the results of up to two service requests recorded for each client. Overall, legal services\* were the most frequently requested interventions (55%), reflecting the LEAA program policy and project service innovations. Counseling, shelter, referral/advocacy (with social services), and information were also commonly requested.

\*Legal services, in this analysis, include criminal prosecution, filing for civil protection orders or divorce, legal advocacy, and other justice system interventions.

Table 4-32  
Service Requests

General Information	483	(16%)
Referral/Advocacy (nonlegal)	528	(18%)
Legal Services	1,615	(55%)
Mediation/Diversion	247	(8%)
Crisis Intervention	269	(9%)
Counseling	875	(30%)
Shelter	626	(21%)
Transportation, Housing, etc.	211	(7%)
TOTAL	4,854	
(N=2,938)		

There was extremely high interproject variability on client service requests. For example, against an overall average of 30 percent requests for counseling, only 2 of 465 White Plains clients (0.4%) but fully 93 percent of Miami-DIP clients were reported to have requested this service. Similarly, requests for legal information or representation ranged from 68 percent in Portland to less than 10 percent in several sites.

#### Client Strategies

To identify victims' strategies for problem remediation, we examined the patterns or relations of their service requests. To do this, the probability of a specified couplet of service requests is computed under the condition that the two requests are statistically independent (i.e., the probability of their joint occurrence is equal to the product of their individual probabilities). For this analysis, the four most frequently requested services (excluding referral/advocacy because it combines mixed requests) and their probabilities of being requested are:

- general information:  $P = .116$
- general legal services:  $P = .134$
- counseling:  $P = .170$
- shelter:  $P = .141$

Table 4-33 displays the ratio of the expected to actual probabilities of the requests for each of the six possible service couplets. (Values in excess of 1.0 indicate disaffinity, while those less than 1.0 indicate a probability of services being requested together.)

Table 4-33  
Probability of Joint Service Requests

Service Couplet	Probability
General Information/Legal Services	.63
General Information/Counseling	.87
General Information/Shelter	3.20
Legal Services/Counseling	1.28
Legal Services/Shelter	1.58
Counseling/Shelter	.56

The results reveal three strategies often pursued and three often avoided in seeking assistance with domestic violence. The marked disjunction between general information and shelter requests indicates that a client who requested shelter was most unlikely to also request general information, and vice versa. Somewhat weaker dissociations were found between legal services and both counseling and shelter. The affinities between the general information-legal services, general information-counseling, and counseling-shelter couplets designate these as three frequently used client strategies for intervening in domestic violence.

Several potential hypotheses about client strategies for intervention services may be drawn from these findings, particularly the dissociations. Certainly patterns of service requests reflect as much about projects as they do about clients. But the consistency of patterns across projects suggests that client perceptions/definitions of the problem guide their decision-making and mediate project service delivery along two dimensions:

- certainty of need for intervention--exploratory service requests (e.g., general information) vs. concrete service requests (e.g., shelter), and
- strategy and extent of intervention--requests for external or institutional intervention (e.g., legal services) vs. requests for internal or individualized interventions (e.g., counseling).

The first dimension is most clearly manifest in the strong dissociation between requests for general information and shelter. The request for general information may reflect a relatively diffuse perception/definition of the situation, while shelter requests represent a greater degree of certainty as to the extent of intervention necessary. (Such perceptions may, in turn, be based on victim assessment of the severity of the instant incident and, thus, type of help needed.) In other words, the client requesting general information is exploring options as a first step, while the client requesting shelter has decided that a definitive intervention is necessary.



The counseling-legal services dissociation, on the other hand, represents a distinction in strategies for dealing with the relational problem. Counseling requests imply a willingness to resolve problems within the family, while legal requests imply a desire for protection based on severing the relationship. These are, then, orthogonal distinctions in definition of the problem and approach to its resolution, which suggests that client assessment and case planning can be determined based on client service requests along a counseling-legal continuum.

From the probabilities of joint service requests in table 4-23, we can hypothesize that clients requesting either shelter or legal services have selected a strategy for halting spousal abuse. These stronger options suggest recognition of the need for outside intervention to end the violence. Often, they may result in the end of the relationship or removal of the assailant. Conversely, clients requesting general information or counseling can be viewed as still exploring options. These options are not compatible with the stronger measures, hence their dissociations. Previous analysis of these data (Fagan et al., 1980) show that these differences in strategy are mediated by the length of the relationship. Thus, victims in shorter relationships primarily seek shelter services, while victims in longer relationships seek primarily counseling or (increasingly with duration of relationship) legal assistance.

SERVICES RECEIVED

Overview

Follow-up study clients (N=270) were asked to indicate whether they or their family had received any of eight types of services. As shown in table 4-34, counseling and general information were most common, followed closely by legal services.

Table 4-24  
Services Received

Shelter	105	(39%)
Crisis Intervention	90	(33%)
Counseling	213	(79%)
Mediation/Diversion	16	(6%)
Legal Services	159	(59%)
General Information	200	(74%)
Referral/Advocacy (Nonlegal)	125	(46%)
Childrens Services	57	(21%)

Project Strategies

As noted earlier, services received are, to a significant degree, a function of availability. A brief discussion of a factor analysis of services received is apt at this point, however. As displayed in table 4-35, the first factor is dominated by the two more traditional services--shelter (loading = .74) and counseling (loading = .73). In addition, children's services contributes one-third of its variance (i.e., the loading is .57) to this factor. The second factor is dominated by legal services (loading = .85), with appreciable participation by information and referral services (loading = .65) and nonlegal advocacy services (loading = .53).

Table 4-35  
Factor Loadings for Services Received

Service	Factor	
	I	II
Shelter	.74	.15
Crisis Intervention	.16	.21
Counseling	.73	.14
Mediation/Diversion	-.009	-.14
General Information	.16	.65
Referral/Advocacy (nonlegal)	.49	.53
Children's Services	.57	.35
Legal Services	-.03	.85
EIGENVALUE	2.39	1.17
Percent of Variance	29.9	14.7

The factors represent two distinct and possibly orthogonal project strategies for domestic violence intervention: victim support services (shelter, counseling) and legal interventions. These project service trends are consistent with both client strategies and project service emphases. The apparent separation of victim- and assailant-focused projects results from several possible factors, including the conflicting ideologies of offender vs. victim foci, the different types of cases (service requests) presented to each type of project (e.g., difference in severity of injury or assailant in home), and the difficulty of implementing assailant-focused projects (see, for example, the case studies on Miami-DIP and Santa Barbara). Indeed, one of the primary impacts of the LEAA program has been the addition of the justice system dimension to the traditional social services focusing mainly on victims.

### Service Recipients

A regression analysis of the associations between services received and victim background characteristics and abuse histories further informs our understanding of the case types to which each service responded. As shown in table 4-36, children's services is the best predicted service. The most powerful predictor is presence of children in the home; indeed, the two variables are probably confounded. Other strong associations are found with abuse during pregnancy and frequency of injury. These results suggest that the most lethal cases--those involving abuse during pregnancy, frequent injuries, and the presence of children--are the recipients of children's services.

These services were provided primarily in shelters, where child protective services or other legal agencies were not involved. This pattern further underscores the fact that shelters were presented with the most complex and potentially lethal cases, in which children are at risk and a range of services are required.

Among the other services, background and situational characteristics were significantly associated only with crisis intervention and non-legal advocacy. Crisis intervention appears to have been associated with white victims who had infrequently called the police prior to project contact. Social service advocacy was received by white women with shorter relationships and abuse histories who were abused during pregnancy and whose children witnessed spousal violence.

Shelter clients tended to be younger women in shorter relationships, often married to the assailant, and having experienced relatively frequent abuse and injury. Restraining orders recipients also tended to be younger women, but often employed and not married to the assailant. These clients had shorter abuse histories and had previously separated due to domestic violence. Apparently, those receiving restraining orders were considerably less "tied" to the assailant than other service recipients.

Table 4-36

## Victim Background and Situational Variables as Predictors of Services Received

Variable	<u>Crisis Intervention</u>		<u>Nonlegal Advocacy</u>		<u>Shelter</u>		<u>Information &amp; Referral</u>	
	$R^2=.42$		$R^2=.34$		$R^2=.27$		$R^2=.21$	
	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>
Age	-.13	-.09	.19	.12	-.23	-.08	.19	.13
Race	.49	.47	.27	.33	.03	-.08	.20	.28
Education	-.06	.04	.06	.20	0.00	-.01	*	*
Employment Status	-.08	-.01	-.10	-.05	-.08	-.04	.06	.12
Presence of Children	-.07	.19	.06	-.05	.10	.09	0.00	-.05
Relationship to Assailant	.14	.06	.13	.07	-.19	.24	-.10	-.20
Length of Cohabitation	-.10	.19	-.25	-.17	-.31	-.17	-.21	-.25
Length of Abuse	-.22	-.30	-.20	-.21	-.29	-.22	-.05	.19
Number of Separations Due to Violence	.12	.21	.16	.05	.13	.10	.03	-.03
Abuse During Pregnancy	.07	-.08	.26	.29	.11	.03	.19	.12
Miscarriage Due to Abuse	.09	.11	.18	.05	.12	.09	.07	.01
Most Serious Injury	.18	.19	.17	-.05	.08	.10	.17	.06
Frequency of Injury	0.00	-.09	.17	-.10	.18	.10	*	*
Frequency of Abuse	*	*	.16	.08	.13	.14	.01	-.08
Physical Violence Between Parents	.10	.09	.10	-.01	-.12	.14	.15	.17
Abused as a Child	.06	-.14	.03	-.19	-.001	-.07	.03	-.19
Children Witness to Violence	-.14	-.18	.21	.22	.16	.11	.05	.05
Number of Calls to Police	-.30	-.20	.11	-.20	.02	-.04	-.08	.02
<hr/>								
	df=17,74	F=3.14	df=18,73	F=2.08	df=18,73	F=1.49	df=16,75	F=1.23
	p = .01		p = .01		p = .05		p = ns	

\*Dropped out of equation.

Table 4-36

Victim Background and Situational Variables as Predictors of Services Received, cont.

Variable	<u>Legal Services</u>		<u>Counseling</u>		<u>Restraining Order</u>		<u>Children's Services</u>	
	R <sup>2</sup> =.19		R <sup>2</sup> =.11		R <sup>2</sup> =.25		R <sup>2</sup> =.27	
	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B
Age	-.05	.04	.22	.29	-.20	-.13	-.19	-.05
Race	.17	.04	.05	.08	-.01	-.01	-.08	.08
Education	-.09	-.03	.14	.09	*	*	-.04	.01
Employment Status	-.02	.02	.09	.06	.25	.27	*	*
Presence of Children	-.16	-.20	.05	-.02	.08	.28	.79	.75
Relationship to Assailant	.04	-.04	-.07	-.13	.21	.12	-.05	-.04
Length of Cohabitation	-.14	-.19	-.14	.06	-.05	.24	.04	.01
Length of Abuse	-.02	.06	.11	-.04	-.11	-.34	.08	-.05
Number of Separations Due to Violence	.15	.13	*	*	.13	.24	.10	-.05
Abuse During Pregnancy	.17	.18	-.03	-.15	.02	-.03	.34	.13
Miscarriage Due to Abuse	.03	-.17	.04	.10	*	*	-.02	-.10
Most Serious Injury	.22	.18	.02	-.04	.09	.22	*	*
Frequency of Injury	.17	.03	.06	.06	-.05	-.16	.27	.11
Frequency of Abuse	.15	.11	*	*	.11	.13	*	*
Physical Violence Between Parents	.16	.08	.02	.02	.02	-.09	*	*
Abused as a Child	.13	.06	*	*	*	*	*	*
Children Witness to Violence	*	*	.10	.12	*	*	*	*
Number of Calls to Police	-.04	.02	-.002	-.05	-.04	-.21	.11	.07
<hr/>								
	df=17,74	F=1.00	df=15,76	F=.64	df=14,77	F=1.79	df=12,70	F=12.08
	p=ns		p=ns		p=ns		p=ns	

\*Dropped out of equation.

## Conclusions

### DISPUTANT CHARACTERISTICS

Victim and assailant backgrounds and relationship (or situational) factors generated important findings to further describe the correlates of spousal violence. Assailant background--particularly exposure to violence as a child--emerged as a salient contributor to violence, measured both by severity of spousal injury and prevalence of violence. Victim backgrounds explain only partially, and with weaker association, violence in the home, thus providing no confirmation that abused women are somehow complicit in their victimization. On the other hand, women abused as children showed a tendency to associate with men who were more widely violent, i.e., strangers as well as their spouses.

The strongest predictors of violence (specifically, injury) in the home are assailant background factors and the history of violence in the relationship. Overall, the latter, situational factors, are the most powerful predictors of assailant violence in and out of the home.

The analyses of violent behavior suggest that younger men and women in shorter but more violent relationships are the highest risk families. Serious spousal violence appeared to be unrelated to either social class or race. Rather, exposure to violence during childhood, particularly for assailants, is the strongest and most consistent predictor of adult violence in the home and violence toward both intimates and strangers. These results suggest that children in violent homes are particularly at risk to become violent adults, and that children's services are strongly indicated as a preventive measure.

Finally, the severity of violence in the home predicts violence on the street (and quite possibly the reverse). Thus, actual violence may predict not only future violence but also an increase in the number of victims. Those wishing to impact on violence in general should look to the home. It appears that it is the home where violence is first learned in childhood, reinforced during adulthood, and transmitted generally. However, this research was not designed to examine the extent to which these patterns are interrupted. We do not know what

factors or antecedents allow certain children in similar situations to avoid violent adulthoods.

### INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

Ironically, victims in shelters used the justice system less often than those in other projects. An analysis of client service requests revealed that victims eschewed a combined shelter/legal services strategy, while counseling/shelter was the most common strategy. Certainly these findings are mediated in part by the availability of services, but also by such factors as project ideology, service design, and linkages with alternate systems. Indeed, in examining project services, we found two natural clusters: victim-focused (nonlegal) interventions and assailant-focused (legal) interventions.

Few clients overall sought legal interventions. Although police were called in the majority of cases, these were usually justice system-based projects. Police usually offered advice and assistance (such as transportation) but rarely made arrests or issued citations. It was disturbingly common for officers to take no action or informal actions. A similar pattern prevailed with respect to complaint filing and prosecution: few victims pursued such remedies, and those who did were typically clients of justice system projects, especially those with special prosecutors. The importance of the availability of a special prosecutor to use of criminal remedies is readily apparent in this finding.

Despite the prevalence of physical violence and serious injury, few victims sought medical care. Equally important is the relatively small percentage of referrals from hospitals or doctors. Earlier evaluation reports described the difficulties in establishing linkages with hospitals. Even though most projects attempted to accomplish the federally mandated goals of "improving the transmission of evidence from medical agencies," they were generally ineffective in establishing viable referral linkages with hospitals or private physicians.



## 5 Impacts On Victims & Families

The last quarter century and, in particular, the past decade have witnessed a surge in our knowledge and understanding of spousal abuse in America. Research on domestic homicides (e.g., Wolfgang, 1953), victimization surveys (e.g., Shulman, 1979), national incidence studies (e.g., Straus et al., 1980), and evaluation studies (e.g., Bard and Zacker, 1971) have generated a vast body of literature on the prevalence, severity, antecedents, and social contexts of violence within the family. These efforts to better understand the phenomenon have, as Loving has pointed out, "been accompanied by intense debate over what methods should be used to reduce these problems" (1980: p. 29). Still at issue are the proper intervention roles of public and private agencies as well as the most effective types of interventions.

The Family Violence Program provided an ideal opportunity to inform this debate. The array of project service designs and institutional auspices encompassed by the program made it possible to test the effectiveness of a number of intervention roles and strategies in reducing and halting spousal violence.

Effectiveness, in the present chapter, will be assessed in terms of impacts on victims and their families. Such impacts encompass three sets of outcomes:

- subsequent incidents of abuse and related calls to police,
- changes in victim life style, and
- shifts in family configuration.

Our analyses examine overall project impacts, the relationships between the sets of outcomes, and the relationships between each outcome domain and the client background variables discussed in the

previous chapter. Finally, we analyze the impacts of fourteen types of project services on the three outcome domains, controlling for previous violence in the relationship.

### Limitations of the Analyses

The follow-up interview sample (N=270) included victims from five projects selected systematically but not in a purely random fashion. Variation in project institutional and socio-political contexts and service designs were included in sampling, but not introduced as controls in the analysis. In addition, interviews were conducted in two waves; therefore, some measures are only available for the second round of interviews.

Although the data are rich in an area where there is scant knowledge, several caveats are in order:

- these are victim reports;
- project clients do not necessarily represent the population of domestic violence victims, and
- those who could be reached and consented to an interview do not necessarily represent the population of project clients.

Beyond these basic limitations, our analyses of the linkages between services received and outcomes must also be viewed with some caution. First, it should be noted that clients may not, by and large, have had choices in service access; instead, they may have received services on an as-available, rather than an as-indicated, basis. A second reason for caution is that some services appear to have had little effect in deterring subsequent violence while, at the same time, perhaps, assisting project clients in making alterations in their life situations that may lead to cessation of abuse and violence in the long run. Finally, our service analyses are in large part limited to simple tabular displays where most serious prior injury is introduced as a control variable. This simple view does not accurately reflect the complex and dynamic reality of multiple outcomes for each family and a lengthy developmental process that builds toward a cessation of violence.

### Review of Services Received

The following analyses examined the effects of 14 services provided by the family violence projects. The distribution of these services as received by our sample are shown in table 5-1. Service frequencies ranged from 5.9 percent for diversion to 77 percent for individual counseling (victims or families). Other frequently received services include information and referral (74.0%), and legal advocacy (67.4%).

Infrequently received services included mediation (6.3%) and children's services (21.1%). Group counseling, in contrast to individual counseling, was not common (27.4% of victims). Nearly all victims who received criminal legal representation (31.1%) attempted prosecution (27.4%). (Again, see Appendix B for a more thorough discussion of each service.)

**Table 5-1**  
**Services Received by Post-Project Interviewees**

Legal Advocacy (Civil and Criminal)	182	(67.4%)
Civil Legal Representation	156	(58.9%)
Criminal Legal Representation	84	(31.1%)
Diversion	16	( 5.9%)
Shelter	105	(38.8%)
Children's Services	57	(21.1%)
Information and Referral	200	(74.0%)
Nonlegal Advocacy	125	(46.3%)
Crisis Intervention--Hotline	56	(20.7%)
Crisis Intervention--In Person	64	(23.7%)
Mediation	17	( 6.3%)
Individual Counseling	208	(77.0%)
Group Counseling	74	(27.4%)
Prosecution Attempted	74	(27.4%)

## The Outcomes

We examined three domains of outcome variables consistent with the national goals of the Family Violence Program:

- life circumstances and actions;
- post-project abuse and violence; and
- living situation/family configuration.

## LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES

"Life circumstances" encompassed several dimensions of spousal abuse victims' quality of life, including their socioeconomic status, relationships, interpersonal skills, and physical and emotional well-being. For each life circumstance or area, victims indicated whether their status had worsened, remained the same, or improved either "somewhat" or "a lot" since involvement in the family violence project. (For analytic purposes, the improvement categories were collapsed.) Table 5-2 shows the effects of project interventions on 14 life circumstances.

**Table 5-2**  
**Impacts on Life Circumstances**

	<u>No Change</u>	<u>Worse</u>	<u>Better</u>
Obtain Job	219 (81%)	2 ( 1%)	49 (18%)
Change Job	231 (86%)	4 ( 2%)	35 (13%)
Obtain Vocational Training	244 (90%)		26 (10%)
Return to School	231 (86%)	5 ( 2%)	34 (13%)
Relationship with Partner	75 (28%)	12 ( 4%)	183 (68%)
Relationship with Children	144 (53%)	16 ( 6%)	110 (41%)
Relationship with Friends	120 (44%)	23 ( 9%)	127 (47%)
Handling Disputes	39 (33%)	9 ( 3%)	172 (64%)
Drug Use	246 (91%)	2 ( 1%)	22 ( 8%)
Alcohol Use	211 (78%)	3 ( 3%)	51 (19%)
Financial Situation	126 (47%)	55 (20%)	89 (33%)
Physical Health	110 (41%)	26 (10%)	134 (49%)
Mental Health	55 (20%)	20 ( 7%)	195 (72%)
Changed Residence	178 (66%)	2 ( 1%)	90 (33%)

The results indicate that the family violence projects directly or indirectly (through direct services or referrals) impacted positively on a wide range of clients' life circumstances. Although many clients reported that several aspects of their lives remained unchanged, those changes that did occur were most often in a positive direction. The highest improvement rates (41-72%) were reported for aspects of life related to health and to family, social and interpersonal relations, including ability to handle disputes.

There were six life circumstances in which most victims (78-91%) reported no change. These areas related to work and education and alcohol and drug use.

Victims' financial situation was the only life area that worsened noticeably, although more women reported improvement than deterioration (33% vs. 20%). Recognizing that some victims might avoid possible financial hardship by not reporting domestic violence, the projects forged linkages with social service agencies, especially public assistance, and attempted to develop job opportunities.

We next sought to determine if there were naturally occurring groups or trends of changes in the lives of former project clients. A factor analysis yielded two distinct dimensions. (See table 5.3.) The first is strongly associated with better mental and physical health (loadings = .65 and .54 respectively), better ability to handle disputes (loading = .57), improved relations with friends (loading = .54), and reduced alcohol abuse (loading = .53). By contrast, the second factor is the far less common outcomes associated with work and education: vocational training (loading = .74), returning to school (loading = .61), obtaining a job (loading = .59), and changing jobs (loading = .50). Thus, while the first factor suggests improvements along attitudinal and "behavioral" dimensions, the second factor relates to more concrete or social structural aspects of life. That these factors appear as "separate" types of changes may result from either client background characteristics and/or different types of service interventions.

It is interesting to note that change in residence is almost equally associated with both factors (loadings of .37 and .30 respectively). It should be recalled, however, that in many instances, the alleged assailant was not cohabiting with the client at the time of the instant incident or was no longer cohabiting at the time of the follow-up interview; hence, a change in residence is not a necessary condition for termination of the relationship.

The above two factors, while orthogonal, appear to be distinguished by degree of difficulty. This notion finds support in the percentages associated with each outcome (combining the job/school/training cluster into a single composite):

- improved mental health 72%
- improved ability to handle disputes 64%
- improved physical health 49%
- improved relations with friends 47%

Table 5-3  
Factor Loadings for Life Circumstance Changes

Variable	Factor	
	I	II
Obtain Job	.07	.59
Change Job	.10	.50
Obtain Vocational Training	.09	.74
Return to School	.01	.61
Relationship with Partner	.44	.01
Relationship with Children	.49	.05
Relationship with Friends	.54	.16
Handling Disputes	.57	.11
Drug Usage	.45	.21
Alcohol Use	.53	.13
Financial Situation	.33	.22
Physical Health	.54	.30
Mental Health	.65	.29
Change Residence	.37	.30
EIGENVALUE	3.00	1.59
Percent of Variance	20.0	10.6

- vocational/job/school 33%
- change in residence 33%
- improvement in alcohol use 19%

However, a Guttman scalogram analysis of these variables yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of only .79 (appreciably below the conventionally imposed level of 0.9). Thus, there is no continuum along which changes in life circumstances tend to occur. Rather, they are somewhat autonomous, which is not surprising given the disparate nature of these life domains.

## POST-PROJECT ABUSE AND VIOLENCE

A primary impact goal of the Family Violence Program was to reduce repeat serious assaults and intrafamily homicides. Direct and indirect project services were designed to encourage public agencies to support victims in the pursuit of criminal and civil legal sanctions against assailants as deterrents to subsequent domestic violence.

Within this "escalation ladder," any level of abuse also included all abuse types falling above it. Thus, those cases where there was harassment of children, for example, also included harassment, threats, and violence against the client as well as property destruction. (The coefficient of reproducibility of this pattern is .94, where .90 is the conventionally imposed minimum value.)

The data suggest that there may be two "consecutive" ladders--one involving attacks on the client and the next involving abuse against children. Assailants who were violent toward the children were apparently qualitatively "more violent" than those violent only toward the spouse.

## LIVING SITUATION

As a measure of the impact of domestic violence interventions on families, we examined the cohabitational patterns of project clients before and after project contact. As table 5-5 shows, more than three out of five (62%) were living separately from their assailants following project intervention. Of these, 22 percent were having no contact with the assailant.

Table 5-5  
Post-Project Relationship with Assailant

Living Together	103 (38%)
Living Separately/Some Contact	93 (34%)
Living Separately/No Contact	58 (22%)
Living Separately/Contact Unknown	16 (6%)
TOTAL	270

Comparing pre- and post-project living situations, we found that twice as many victims had been living with the assailant at the time of the instant incident (77%) as were at the time of reinterview (38%). (See table 5-6.) More than three out of five (61%) pre-project cohabitants were living apart at reinterview. Of those who had been living apart prior to project contact, more than one-third (34%) were living together at reinterview. The relationships shown in table 5-6 are not significant; that is, the living arrangements at the two points in time are independent of each other.

However, these results do not necessarily indicate that victims were not likely to stop living with the assailant as a result of project intervention. In fact, from these data we might define four groups and analytically examine service impacts on victims' living situations:

- Stay Together: 30%
- Dissolve Cohabitation: 47%
- Stay Apart: 15%
- Begin (or renew) Cohabitation: 8%

Table 5-6  
Living Situation Before and After Project Intervention

PRE-PROJECT INTERVENTION				
		<u>Living Together</u>	<u>Living Apart</u>	
POST-PROJECT INTERVENTION	<u>Living Together</u>	82 (39.2%)	21 (34.4%)	103 (38.1%)
	<u>Living Apart</u>	127 (60.8%)	40 (65.6%)	167 (61.9%)
		209 (77.4%)	61 (22.6%)	
$\chi^2 = .46, p = ns$				

## RELATIONSHIPS AMONG OUTCOMES

Finally, to address some significant policy issues regarding the types of family and social-structural changes required to successfully intervene in spousal violence, we analyzed the relationships among the foregoing case outcomes. Specifically, we sought to determine which life circumstance changes were associated with avoiding post-project abuse and violence.

A stepwise multiple regression analysis of the life circumstance variables (see table 3-1) was conducted with post-project violence as the criterion variable. The results were ambiguous and not statistically significant ( $R^2 = .15, F_{14,255} = 0.30$ ). Thus, no discernable pattern emerges with respect to violence and the victims' life circumstances.

This finding is not without importance, for it suggests that violence occurs in a context that cuts across socioeconomic, psychological, and "social relations" areas and that the cessation of violence is not a function of victim functioning in those areas. Victim "treatment," then, may not be essential to the cessation of violence. In effect, we do not find support for the "medical model" of domestic violence intervention, which hypothesizes that a victim can be "treated" to cease abuse.

### The Effects of Case Characteristics

While it is reasonable to posit that background variables mediate clients' responses to service interventions, a precise analysis of such mediating effects would require a study sample considerably larger than ours. Therefore, we undertook several analyses to determine the relationship of case characteristics to case outcome, independent of service intervention. The results of these analyses reveal those case characteristics that appear to contribute to case outcomes as well as identify control variables for subsequent analyses of service impacts.

#### LIFE OUTCOMES

A canonical correlation\* analysis was undertaken on the two sets of variables:

- victim background--e.g., relationship and abuse history, children involvement, and victim demographics (see chapter 4); and
- outcome--life circumstances, post-project incidents, and family configuration.

\*A canonical correlation forms a linear composite for each of two sets of variables such that the correlation between the two composites is maximized. While multiple roots (solutions) are available, the present analysis is restricted to the first pair of canonical variates or composites. For discussions of canonical correlation analyses, see Hotelling, 1935, and Stewart and Love, 1968.

As shown in table 5-7, the variables from the background set that predict to the outcome composite include age, race, educational attainment, length of abuse in the relationship, calls to police due to previous domestic violence, children witnessing violence, and frequency and severity of past injury due to domestic violence. To summarize this canonical variable, more positive outcomes are a matter of less violence involved in the relationship according to various criteria. In addition, age and two important social-structural variables (race and education) also are associated with positive outcomes.

Table 5-7  
Canonical Composites for Victim Background/Outcome Relationships

Background Variates	r	Outcome Variables	r
Victim Age	-.23	Obtained Job	.40
Victim Race	.31	Changed Job	-.11
Victim Education	.22	Vocational Training	-.16
Victim Employment	-.14	Attending School	-.21
Presence of Children	-.06	Improved Relationship with Assailant	.19
Miscarriage During Pregnancy	-.002	Improved Relationship with Children	.19
Frequency of Abuse	-.06	Improved Relationship with Friends	.26
Length of Abuse	-.30	Improved Ability to Handle Disputes	-.53
Prior Calls to Police	-.29	Reduced Drug Use	.38
Prior Separations from DV	-.14	Reduced Alcohol Use	-.17
Frequency of Injury	-.34	Improved Financial Status	-.06
Most Serious Prior Injury	-.28	Improved Physical Health	-.23
Children Witness to Violence	.25	Improved Mental Health	.33
		Changed Residence	.51

$$r_c = .81, R^2_c = .65, p .001$$

The  $r_c = .81$  of this canonical correlation indicates that two-thirds of the variance of each composite is predicted from the variance in the opposite composite. The highest zero-order correlation scores for each variable are those that predict the variables with the highest correlations in the opposite set. In other words, the highest loadings in each set are the most commonly occurring background/outcome pairs.

The variables most highly associated with the outcome composite include change in residence, not improving in handling disputes, and not being involved in a post-project incident. Somewhat weaker associations are found for obtaining a job and reduced drug use. Clearly, this can be viewed as a "success" composite. It also appears plausibly linked to the background composite in that those project clients who had reported little in the way of past abuse were those



most likely to take swift, decisive action by moving out. Instead of "learning to handle disputes," they simply removed themselves from the violent situation. It is also of interest to note the positive association between the outcome composite and obtaining a job, which supports the new independent living situation.

The policy and intervention implications of the above findings are profound. To the extent that women can be recruited into a project before a long-term pattern of violence becomes established, successful outcomes (specifically, avoiding involvement in a subsequent incident) may be maximized. While this suggests the need for outreach and education, the effects of personality and social class variables must also be taken into consideration. Finally, the negative association of facility in handling disputes with positive outcomes suggests that victims may not be particularly well-served by counseling strategies that focus exclusively on development of victim skills in responding to spousal assaults.

## POST-PROJECT ABUSE

### Victim Characteristics

A regression analysis revealed that post-project violence is more highly associated with situational variables and that victim characteristics are relatively unimportant. As table 5-8 shows, the most powerful predictors are prior separations due to abuse, length of abuse, prior calls to police, and frequency of injury. Interestingly, victim characteristics such as age, race, and education\* are not predictive of post-project incidents. The client's history of childhood victimization, abuse during pregnancy, and length of cohabitation are weakly associated.

\*The effects of education were so trivial that they were excluded from the equation and, thus, do not appear on table 5-8.

Table 5-8  
Post-Project Violence as a Function of  
Victim Background and Situational Variables

	<u>F</u>	<u>B</u>
Number of Separations Due to Violence	.37	.32
Length of Abuse	.29	.18
Client Abused as Child	.18	.24
Number Prior Calls to Police	.26	.23
Miscarriage from Abuse	.06	-.20
Victim Employment Status	.05	.11
How often Injured	.23	.07
Presence of Children	.08	-.06
Relationship of Victim to Assailant	-.005	-.08
Abuse During Pregnancy	.18	.14
Victim's Age	.05	.11
Most Serious Prior Injury	.15	.10
Violence Between Victim's Parents	.08	-.05
Children Witness to Violence	.14	-.06
How Often Abused	.03	.03
Victim's Race	-.08	-.04
Length of Cohabitation	.13	.03

$R^2 = .32, p .01$

Consistent with the results of the previous canonical correlation (table 5-7), these findings suggest the nature of the "hardest" cases in post-project violence. Again, those cases with the longest and most severe (as defined by injury) abuse histories are more likely to evidence post-project violence. We might further conclude that these are also the most difficult cases in which to intervene.

We also conducted a canonical correlation of the same background variables to predict subsequent levels of post-project abuse, for which four dummy variables were defined:

- no post-project incident;
- harassment or threats of violence;
- push/slap/scratch; and
- punch/kick/choke or more violent acts.

Yielding no significant canonical variates, this analysis showed that there is no particular relationship between background factors and

level of post-project abuse (the highest  $r_C = .50$ ,  $R^2 = .25$ ,  $p = ns$ ). However, the highest zero-order correlations with the set of violence variables were with situational factors. These results suggest, again, that victim characteristics do not predict post-project violence and that the most violent relationships are those most likely to suffer post-project violence.

#### Assailant Characteristics

As a final analysis of the effects of background factors on post-project abuse, we turned to assailant characteristics. These factors, as revealed in chapter four, were strongly predictive of the "hardest" cases, as measured by an index including the severity of abuse and injury as well as several other dimensions of violence. In particular, the assailant's childhood exposure to violence--either as victim or witness--was most closely associated with severity of violence. Therefore, to illustrate the role of both assailant characteristics and, by association, pre-project violence in predicting post-project abuse, we examined the relationship of the partner's abuse history (as a child) and post-project abuse.

The results in table 5-9 show that the assailant's childhood abuse history is, indeed, strongly associated with post-project abuse. If the assailant was not abused as a child, the client is slightly less likely to be revictimized, indicating a certain responsiveness to service interventions. On the other hand, if the partner was abused as a child, the client is more than twice as likely to be revictimized. Again, the more difficult cases appear to be more resistant to the range of service interventions. These findings suggest that where injuries are most severe, the history of abuse is the longest, and the assailant also has a history of victimization, the strongest service interventions are prescribed.

Table 5-9  
Post-Project Abuse as a Function of  
Assailant Abused as Child

		Assailant Abused as Child			
		No	Yes		
<u>Post-Project Abuse</u>	No	89 (52%)	31 (31%)		120
	Yes	81 (48%)	69 (69%)		150
		170 (63%)	100 (37%)		270
		$\chi^2 = 10.78, p .001$			

#### LIVING SITUATION

Finally, to discover whether case characteristics affected clients' post-project living situations, we conducted a regression analysis focusing on two groups--those who changed their living arrangements and those who stayed together. Although the results (shown in table 5-10) were not significant, they suggest that older victims in longer relationships tended to stay together. There were no salient predictors among such situational variables as violence history and prior help-seeking. Thus, we can assume that the decision to remain together was dictated in large part by temporal factors, including both age and attributes of the relationship that may emerge in the maturation of a longer relationship.

These results neither confirm nor disprove various theories (see, for example, Gelles, 1976; Pagelow, 1981) on why abused wives stay or leave. Neither background variables nor severity of violence in the relationship are salient predictors of decisions regarding cohabitational status.

Table 5-10  
Living Arrangement as a Function of  
Victim Background and Situational Variables

	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>
Length of Cohabitation	.19	.17
Parental Violence	.08	.08
Relationship with Assailant	-.09	-.09
Employment Status	-.07	-.06
Most Serious Prior Injury	-.05	-.06
Prior Separations Due to Violence	.07	-.06
Children Witness to Violence	-.05	-.05
Education	-.07	-.05
Race	-.09	-.03
Age	.14	.05
Abuse during Pregnancy	.15	.03
Frequency of Injury	-.01	-.04
Abused as Child	.02	.02
Miscarriage due to Abuse	.03	.02

$R^2 = .28$ ,  $F(15, 67) = 0.37$ ,  $p = ns$

## The Effects of Services

In its simplest form, evaluation research entails the applications of social science methods to social problems. In this paradigm, the principles of social experimentation can be applied to determine the effects of interventions (social programs) to ameliorate social problems and, thereby, to inform social policy and program design. Numerous practical, ethical, methodological, and political constraints usually prohibit a definitive (i.e., rigorous) assessment of the effects of social programs. Moreover, social problems (and their solutions) are often complex, ideologically defined, and generally not receptive to the types of empirical designs and methods that evaluators are encouraged to apply.

Analyses of the service impacts of the Family Violence Program provided a unique opportunity to explore the effectiveness of alternative methods to impact on wife beating. Such assessment focuses attention on the assumptions underlying social policy program design. Despite its methodological limitations, the following analyses suggest hypotheses and policies for more rigorous experimentation and future approaches to domestic violence intervention.

The ongoing debate concerning the most appropriate problem definition and effective solutions resulted in a national program comprising several types of interventions often used in varying combinations within projects and by clients. The desired client and project outcomes were subject to similar variation. Therefore, our analyses use several cross-sectional methods to assess the effects of services both individually and in combination.

As in previous analyses in this chapter, we will examine service effects on post-project abuse, life circumstances, and family configuration. At appropriate times, we introduce pre-project violence as a control variable, because of its strong predictive power in the earlier analyses of background variables and outcomes. The variable selected for this purpose was most serious prior injury, which we dichotomized into "low" (bruises or none) and "high" (lacerations or worse) severity.

## SERVICES AND POST-PROJECT INCIDENTS

### Overview

Two regression analyses provided a rough overview of service impacts on post-project abuse and violence.

Service associations with post-project abuse of the victim (table 5-11) were weak, but showed some interesting trends. In terms of correlation coefficients (the relationship of each service to the outcome variable), the three services most highly associated with post-project abuse are children's services, shelter, and counseling. The services showing a negative relationship with post-project abuse are criminal legal services and information and referral. That is, the absence of post-project abuse appears to be mildly associated with these services.

Table 5-11  
Service Impacts on Post-Project Abuse of Victim

Service	r	B
Children's Services	.17	.17
Criminal Legal Services	-.10	-.12
Crisis Intervention	.07	.10
Information and Referrals	-.05	-.08
Counseling	.12	.08
Nonlegal Advocacy	.006	-.06
Shelter	.13	.05

$R^2 = .07, p = ns$

A similar pattern emerged with respect to service impacts on post-project violence. Although a relatively small and insignificant portion of the variance is explained, shelter services and children's services were again most closely associated with post-project violence, both individually (simple correlations) and in the composite (regression coefficients). Criminal legal services were again the strongest negative indicators. Other services appear to have no noticeable relationship to post-project violence.

These analyses suggest that shelter clients, as well as those who received children's services, may have been a little more likely to experience post-project abuse and violence. At the same time, it appears that criminal legal services were most closely associated with the absence of post-project abuse or violence. Moreover, the results are the same regardless of whether we broadly

Table 5-12  
Service Impacts on Post-Project Violence

Service	r	B
Children's Services	.19	.18
Criminal Legal Services	-.14	-.14
Shelter	.17	.12
Counseling	.01	-.05
Crisis Intervention	.05	-.04
Nonlegal Advocacy	.04	.03
Information and Referral	-.04	-.06

$R^2 = .08, p = ns$

define the criterion variable as abuse (including verbal abuse) or limit it to incidents of physical violence.

Earlier analyses revealed that the level of pre-project violence was greatest in shelter cases, suggesting that the apparent association between shelter and post-project domestic violence may be a function of the severity and difficulty of these cases rather than any attribute of shelter services. Therefore, analyses of service impacts on post-project violence must control for pre-project violence, using pre-project severity of injury as the control variable.

Two series of elaborated analyses were conducted to determine whether services impacts on post-project violence are "explained" further by the severity of the violence in the case. We used partial correlations (which do not assess interactive effects among control and impact variables) and contingency analyses (which do examine such effects).\*

The partial correlations yielded no appreciable differences in comparable coefficients from the preceding regression analyses (i.e., between the zero-order uncontrolled coefficients and the partial, controlled, coefficients). In other words, the effects of services on outcomes are similar for victims experiencing different levels of pre-project violence. Readers are again cautioned that the above findings, descriptive of the overall service composite, do not measure the effects of individual services or their interactions with prior violence. These are described in the following sections.

### Counseling

**Abuse.** Among those who had suffered lesser injuries in the past, 50 percent of those receiving counseling services were reabused and 35 percent of those not receiving counseling services were subsequently abused. Of those victims who had suffered more serious injuries in the past, 61 percent of those who received counseling services were subjected to post-project abuse, compared to 56 percent who did not receive counseling services. These results, summarized in table 5-13, are not significant for either the two- or three-way relationships.

\*Partial correlations permit the analyst to view the predictor variables as a set, whereas contingencies require an examination of each predictor variable separately. Partial correlations partition the variance in a data set to measure the portion of the variance explained by the control, or predictor, variables.

**CONTINUED**

**2 OF 4**



Table 5-13  
Counseling Services and Post-Project Abuse

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>	<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>
<u>Counseling</u>	No	13 (65%)	7 (35%)	14 (44%)	18 (56%)
	Yes	44 (50%)	44 (50%)	48 (34%)	76 (61%)
		$\chi^2 = 1.47, p = ns$		$\chi^2 = .27, p = ns$	
		$\chi^2 = 1.80, p = ns$			

**Violence.** These trends reverse in post-project violence. There is a positive trend found among those with less severe prior injuries for receipt of counseling services and post-project violence. However, there is no effect for those with more severe prior injuries. Again, however, the results are not statistically significant.

#### Shelter

**Abuse.** A slightly higher likelihood of post-project abuse, for victims with both more and less severe prior injuries is found among those who had received shelter services. (See table 5-14.) Again, these differences are not statistically significant, indicating that they could have occurred by sampling variability alone.

Table 5-14  
Shelter Services and Post-Project Abuse

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>	<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>
<u>Shelter</u>	No	40 (55%)	33 (45%)	40 (44%)	51 (56%)
	Yes	17 (44%)	23 (56%)	22 (34%)	43 (66%)
		$\chi^2 = 1.6, p = ns$		$\chi^2 = 1.6, p = ns$	
		$\chi^2 = 4.2, p = ns$			

**Violence.** The same relationship also obtains with respect to post-project violence, i.e., post-project violence was more likely experienced by shelter clients than by nonshelter clients. As has been noted earlier, use of shelter services appears to be close to the end of an escalating series of responses. It should be cautioned here, however, that the trends found are no doubt quite complex (and probably interactive) insofar as it holds for both levels of severity of prior abuse and is not statistically significant.

#### Information and Referral Services

Information and referral services are not related to either post-project abuse or violence in anything approaching significance (overall  $\chi^2 = .29$  and  $1.4$  respectively) or a systematic manner. This is not surprising, since such services are not necessarily focused directly on the reduction of abuse and violence but on meeting client's service needs.

#### Advocacy (Nonlegal) Services

Project referrals and accompaniment to obtain social service, medical, mental health, housing, and other client service needs had mixed and weak associations with post-project incidents.

**Abuse.** For less severe cases, there was no difference in the occurrence of post-project abuse among those receiving or not receiving nonlegal advocacy services. For high-risk cases, however, there was a mild (but statistically insignificant) relationship between post-project abuse and receipt of nonlegal advocacy services. (See table 5-15.)

Table 5-15  
Nonlegal Advocacy and Post-Project Abuse

		Prior Injury			
		Low		High	
		No Abuse	Abuse	No Abuse	Abuse
Nonlegal	No	22 (46%)	26 (54%)	29 (37%)	49 (63%)
Advocacy	Yes	16 (47%)	18 (53%)	33 (42%)	45 (58%)

$x^2 = .01, p = ns$        $x^2 = .43, p = ns$   
 $x^2 = 2.3, p = ns$

**Violence.** The trends for abuse only are reversed in the case of post-project violence: both low- and high-risk cases evidence a slight negative relationship between receipt of nonlegal advocacy services and subsequent violence. Again, readers are cautioned that the associations are weak, statistically insignificant ( $x^2 = .71$ ), and most likely due to sampling variability alone.

#### Crisis Intervention

**Abuse.** Crisis intervention evidences no association with post-project abuse. Over half of both low- and high-risk cases experienced subsequent abuse, regardless of whether they received these services.

**Violence.** Crisis intervention appears to be related to lower rates of post-project violence for low-risk clients; but for high-risk clients, the differences are negligible. These trends, shown in table 5-16, are not statistically significant at conventionally accepted levels.

#### Children's Services

For those project clients with less severe prior injuries, post-project abuse and violence exhibited a slight association with receipt of children's services. For more seriously injured clients, children's services show no interaction with post-project abuse and a marginal relationship with post-project violence. It should be noted that children's services are almost totally restricted to shelter clients. These data, shown in tables 5-17 and 5-18, are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Table 5-16  
Crisis Intervention and Post-Project Abuse

		Prior Injury			
		Low		High	
		No Abuse	Abuse	No Abuse	Abuse
Crisis Intervention	No	18 (46%)	21 (54%)	27 (47%)	31 (53%)
	Yes	8 (62%)	5 (38%)	20 (51%)	19 (49%)

$x^2 = .92, p = ns$        $x^2 = .21, p = ns$   
 $x^2 = 4.80, p = ns$

Table 5-17  
Children's Services and Post-Project Abuse

		Prior Injury			
		Low		High	
		No Abuse	Abuse	No Abuse	Abuse
Children's Services	No	24 (49%)	25 (51%)	35 (39%)	54 (61%)
	Yes	6 (33%)	12 (67%)	12 (33%)	24 (67%)

$x^2 = 1.3, p = ns$        $x^2 = .39, p = ns$   
 $x^2 = 1.74, p = ns$

Table 5-18  
Children's Services and Post-Project Violence

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>	<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>
<u>Children's Services</u>	No	14 (54%)	12 (46%)	25 (48%)	27 (52%)
	Yes	5 (36%)	9 (64%)	8 (36%)	14 (64%)
		$x^2 = 1.25, p = ns$		$x^2 = .86, p = ns$	
		$x^2 = 2.43, p = ns$			

#### Macrolegal Services\*

**Abuse.** For those victims with less severe prior injuries, receipt of any legal service was related to a slightly lower rate of post-project abuse. This trend, however, approaches but does not reach statistical significance. For higher-risk clients, macrolegal interventions evidence a statistically significant relationship with post-project abuse. (Here, the trend is significant at the .06 level.) The overall chi square (12.2) is significant, indicating that the effects of legal interventions were different for victims with different prior injury levels.

\*For purposes of data analysis, we used three conceptions of legal intervention. First, we examined the effects of any legal intervention--including both civil and criminal legal services--which we termed "macrolegal" interventions. Then we examined separately the effects of criminal legal services and civil legal services.

Table 5-19  
Macrolegal Interventions and Post-Project Abuse

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>	<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>
<u>Macrolegal Interventions</u>	No	25 (44%)	32 (56%)	27 (50%)	27 (50%)
	Yes	32 (57%)	24 (43%)	35 (34%)	67 (66%)
		$x^2 = 2.01, p = .16$		$x^2 = 3.63, p = .06$	
		$x^2 = 12.2, p = .007$			

**Violence.** The pattern with respect to post-project violence is quite different, however. There was a marked decrease in post-project violence among clients receiving any legal services. As table 5-20 shows, nearly three in five clients who had received no legal services experienced some post-project violence. By contrast, among those who had received such services, less than half of the high-risk cases and only two in five of the low-risk suffered new violence. The overall  $x^2 = 15.1$  is significant, indicating that, although both groups benefit, low-risk clients may, in fact, benefit more from macrolegal interventions.

Table 5-20  
Macrolegal Interventions and Post-Project Violence

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>	<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>
<u>Macrolegal Interventions</u>	No	9 (39%)	14 (61%)	7 (35%)	13 (65%)
	Yes	17 (59%)	12 (41%)	40 (52%)	37 (48%)
		$x^2 = 1.95, p = ns$		$x^2 = 1.83, p = ns$	
		$x^2 = 15.1, p = .002$			

Civil Legal Services

**General Services.** The same pattern of post-project abuse as reported for macrolegal services obtains, though in attenuated fashion, for clients receiving civil legal services. These services are associated with lower likelihood of post-project abuse of clients with more severe injury histories. The results, however, are not statistically significant. The same trend obtains with respect to post-project violence, but also is not statistically significant.

**Restraining Orders.** Obtaining a civil restraining order, either before project contact or as a consequence of project intervention, appears to have had a slightly positive effect in reducing post-project abuse and violence. As shown in tables 5-21 and 5-22, restraining orders are associated with moderate reductions in rates of post-project incidents for low-injury cases but evidence no association in high-injury cases. In neither table are the results statistically significant.

Criminal Legal Services\*

Important impacts on both abuse and violence were associated with criminal legal services.

**Abuse.** Those low-risk clients who had received such services were less likely to experience post-project abuse than those who had not. Among high-risk clients, receiving criminal legal services yields a similar but less pronounced difference. For the latter group, the incidence of post-project abuse increases regardless of whether services were received. Moreover, those subjected to more serious prior abuse were more often recipients of criminal legal services, indicating a strong responsiveness on the part of providers of criminal remedies.

\*Reports regarding the receipt of criminal legal services were obtained only during the second wave of interviews. Hence, table distributions reflect the second panel (N=171) rather than the total follow-up population (N=270).

Table 5-21  
Restraining Orders and Post-Project Abuse

		Prior Injury			
		Low		High	
		No Abuse	Abuse	No Abuse	Abuse
<u>Restraining Order</u>	No	43 (46%)	50 (54%)	25 (35%)	47 (65%)
	Yes	24 (56%)	19 (44%)	15 (33%)	31 (66%)
$x^2 = 1.08, df = 1, p = ns$ $x^2 = .06, df = 1, p = ns$					
$x^2 = 2.59, df = 3, p = ns$					

Table 5-22  
Restraining Orders and Post-Project Violence

		Prior Injury			
		Low		High	
		No Violence	Violence	No Violence	Violence
<u>Restraining Order</u>	No	49 (70%)	21 (30%)	38 (76%)	12 (24%)
	Yes	22 (80%)	6 (20%)	17 (74%)	6 (26%)
$x^2 = .74, df = 1, p = ns$ $x^2 = .04, df = 1, p = ns$					
$x^2 = .93, df = 3, p = ns$					

**Violence.** The relationship between criminal legal services and post-project violence is even more striking. As table 5-24 shows, the high-injury victims enjoyed greater percentage reductions in post-project violence and differed significantly from the low-injury group. Moreover, the reduction for high-risk clients is itself significantly different. This is the only service where intervention appears more efficacious for higher-risk victims.

Table 5-23  
Criminal Legal Services and Post-Project Abuse

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>	<u>No Abuse</u>	<u>Abuse</u>
<u>Criminal Legal Services</u>	No	14 (34%)	27 (66%)	14 (23%)	46 (77%)
	Yes	6 (54%)	5 (46%)	14 (38%)	23 (62%)
		$\chi^2 = 1.56, p = ns$		$\chi^2 = 2.37, p = ns$	
		$\chi^2 = 8.21, p = .04$			

Table 5-24  
Criminal Legal Services and Post-Project Violence

		<u>Prior Injury</u>			
		Low		High	
		<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>	<u>No Violence</u>	<u>Violence</u>
<u>Criminal Legal Services</u>	No	19 (46%)	22 (54%)	23 (38%)	37 (62%)
	Yes	7 (64%)	4 (36%)	24 (65%)	13 (35%)
		$\chi^2 = 1.0, p = ns$		$\chi^2 = 6.47, p = .01$	
		$\chi^2 = 12.2, p = .007$			

#### Summary

Table 5-25 summarizes the percentage differences in the likelihood of post-project abuse and violence of the low- and high-injury groups according to whether they did or did not receive each service. (A positive index indicates that more clients receiving the service were not revictimized, whereas a negative score indicates that more clients were revictimized.) Only three services are consistent across the four columns of this display: shelter (-), children's services (-), and criminal legal services (+).

Table 5-25  
Summary of Service Impacts on Post-Project Incidents

	<u>Abuse</u>		<u>Violence</u>	
	<u>Prior Injury</u>			
	Low	High	Low	High
Counseling	-15	- 5	+12	+ 1
Shelter	-11	-10	-12	-12
Information and Referral	+ 5	+ 1	0	+ 8
Advocacy	+ 1	+ 5	- 4	- 5
Crisis Intervention	- 2	0	+16	+ 4
Children's Services	-16	- 8	-18	-12
Macrolegal Services	+13	-16	+20	+17*
Civil Legal Services	+ 7	- 9	+ 8	+ 6
Restraining Orders	+10	- 1	+10	- 2
Criminal Legal Services	+20	+15	+18	+27*

\*Indicates significant difference.

#### Shelter and Criminal Legal

Given the results in table 5-25, we undertook a final series of analyses of revictimization conjoining shelter services with criminal legal services.\* (Although severity of prior injury has been used to this point as a control variable, the sample size and distribution characteristics here preclude the introduction of a fourth variable in these contingency analyses.)

**Shelter and Criminal Legal Services.** This combination of services is especially important: criminal legal services appear, at first glance, to have been most strongly associated with fewer post-project incidents of abuse or violence. Shelter, while perhaps evidencing the weakest relationship with these outcomes, was, at the same time, sought by and used in the most difficult and complex cases (see chapters 3 and 4).

\*The small number of clients who received both criminal legal services and shelter (17) or children's services (15) suggests that these conjunctions are highly confounded with specific projects and constrains quantitative analysis. Since each project represents an idiosyncratic environment, the case studies in volume 2 should be used to complement these analyses.



Their joint effects are shown in tables 5-26 and 5-27. In terms of post-project abuse, the use of criminal legal services did not affect the experiences of shelter clients. In terms of post-project violence, however, the introduction of criminal legal services appears related to reduced revictimization of shelter clients. Moreover, those women receiving shelter services alone suffered the highest incidence (62%) of further violence. (Note that criminal legal services alone produces the lowest rates on both measures of post-project incidents, although these results were not statistically significant.)

Thus (despite the methodological concerns of causal attribution), it appears safe to say that:

- victims with more severe problems appear as shelter clients; and
- victims in shelters who receive criminal legal services appear safer than those who do not.

Table 5-26

Shelter and Criminal Legal Services: Post-Project Abuse

		<u>Shelter Services</u>				
		No		Yes		
		<u>Criminal Legal</u>				
		No	Yes	No	Yes	
<u>Post-Project Abuse</u>	No	23 (35%)	17 (47%)	14 (26%)	5 (29%)	59 (35%)
	Yes	42 (65%)	19 (53%)	39 (74%)	12 (71%)	112 (65%)
		65 (65%)	36 (35%)	53 (76%)	17 (24%)	

$$x^2 = 1.36, p = ns$$

$$x^2 = .06, p = ns$$

$$x^2 = 4.33, df = 3, p .23$$

Unfortunately, few shelter clients (24%) pursued criminal interventions. Chapter 6 (Impacts on the Justice System) and the case studies in volume 2 suggest various reasons for this phenomenon, including a shelter intervention philosophy that does not encourage criminal remedies (see also Ferraro, 1981), lack of victim faith in the justice system, the cycle of violence (Walker, 1978), and poor system responses to victims. Our present analysis suggests that programs should overcome these impediments. By integrating into their service

design the delivery of or support for (legal advocacy) criminal legal interventions, shelters can enhance the protection from revictimization that they offer their highly at-risk clients.

Table 5-27

Shelter and Criminal Legal Services: Post-Project Violence

		<u>Shelter Services</u>				
		No		Yes		
		<u>Criminal Legal</u>				
		No	Yes	No	Yes	
<u>Post-Project Violence</u>	No	35 (54%)	24 (67%)	20 (38%)	9 (53%)	88 (51%)
	Yes	30 (46%)	12 (33%)	33 (62%)	8 (47%)	83 (49%)
		65 (65%)	36 (35%)	53 (76%)	17 (24%)	

$$x^2 = 1.57, p = .21$$

$$x^2 = 1.23, p = .27$$

$$x^2 = 7.5, df = 3, p .06$$

## LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES

### Overview

A canonical correlation\* yielded an overview of the impacts of services on victims' life circumstance outcomes (ranging from "no change" to "changed a lot"). As shown in table 5-28, the life outcomes most

\*Recall that, in this analysis mode, both outcomes and services variables are treated as composite sets, with the factor loadings indicating the most likely pairings of outcomes across sets. That is, each loading describes the association of one variable in the set with all the variables in the other composite.

Note that in this analysis we used "macrolegal" services to represent both civil and criminal services. This was done to increase the available data for that variable domain, thereby avoiding spurious statistical results due to small N's, missing data, and sampling error.

closely associated with the composite service variable are change in residence (loading = .46) and improved relations with children (loading = .36). Improved financial and vocational aspects of life also appear to be associated with services. The service variables most closely associated with the life outcome composite are shelter (loading = .50) and crisis intervention (loading = .57). It appears, then, that change in residence, obtaining a job, improved economic status, and improved relations with children may be the outcomes most closely associated with the most difficult cases, i.e., those that received shelter services.

Table 5-28  
Canonical Correlation of Life Circumstances with Service Interventions

Life Circumstances	Canonical Coefficient	Service Interventions	Canonical Coefficient
Obtaining Job	.22	Macrolegal Services	-.03
Changing Job	.07	Information and Referral	.08
Obtaining Vocational Training	.15	Nonlegal Advocacy	.32
Returning to School	-.19	Shelter	.50
Relationship with Partner	.07	Crisis Intervention	.57
Relationship with Children	.36	Counseling	-.11
Relationship with Friends	.10		
Handling Disputes	.06		
Drug Usage	.05		
Alcohol Use	.08		
Financial Situation	.26		
Physical Health	.13		
Mental Health	-.06		
Obtained Counseling	.19		
Changed Residence	.46		

$R_c = .56$ ,  $rc^2_c = .32$ ,  $p$  less than .001

To determine whether the effects of services on life outcomes were, in fact, different according to the severity (i.e., prior injury) of the case, we conducted a series of partial correlations\* relating services to life outcomes, controlling for background violence. Table 5-29

\*It should be emphasized that partial correlations, which do not capture interactive effects, do not provide as strong a control as does partitioning of the data.

displays those zero-order correlations that achieved a minimum value of .25. Juxtaposed with the comparable partial correlation, these controlled findings show no appreciable differences, thus indicating that prior violence does not predict different service impacts on life situation outcomes.

Table 5-29  
Service Interventions and Life Outcomes,  
Controlling for Prior Violence--Selected Pairs

Correlation (Not Controlled)	Outcome/Service	Correlation (Controlled)
.36	Relationships with Children/ Children's Services	.36
.29	Relationships with Children/Hotline	.29
.29	Relationships with Children/ Crisis Intervention	.29
.29	Relationships with Friends/ Crisis Intervention	.30
.25	Financial Status/Shelter Services	.26
.27	Physical Health/Crisis Intervention	.27

#### Individual Service Effects

To determine service effects for each life outcome described earlier, a series of multiple regression analyses were undertaken. Overall, the equations were significant in 9 of the 14 outcomes examined. (See table 5-30.) The data are informative in several respects:

- Services were well associated with obtaining a job but not with changing jobs, job training participation, or educational re-entry.
- Services were associated with improved relationships with children and friends but not with the assailant.
- Alcohol usage decreased, but drug usage did not (although drug use was not a major problem for program clients).
- Crisis intervention had the consistently highest correlation coefficients with the overall life outcome set.
- Diversion services had the most consistently negative (though not statistically significant) correlations with life changes.
- Counseling had the consistently weakest coefficients of all the services.

A brief review of the significant associations of services with individual outcomes follows.

Table 5-30  
Service Interventions and Impacts on Life Outcomes

SERVICE INTERVENTION	LIFE CHANGE													
	Obtaining A Job		Changing Jobs		Vocational Training		Return to School		Relationship with Partner		Relationship with Children		Relationship with Friends	
	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B	r	B
Macrolegal Services	.10	-.10	.07	-.03	.07	-.02	-.17	-.05	--	--	.10	.07	.15	.16
Information and Referral	.07	-.06	--	--	.14	.09	.01	.05	-.11	-.17	.03	-.11	.08	-.11
Nonlegal Advocacy	.20	.13	--	--	.14	.02	.05	.12	-.03	-.02	.17	.03	.16	.07
Diversion	.03	.05	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.03	.06	.05	-.01	-.03	.01	-.01	-.17	-.16
Shelter	.22	.19	.07	.01	.26	.21	.01	.01	-.01	-.02	.13	-.07	.03	-.08
Crisis Intervention	.14	.06	.19	.17	.07	-.01	-.07	-.09	.15	.19	.35	.40	-.39	.40
Counseling	.10	.05	.08	.09	--	--	.05	-.02	.03	.05	.07	-.06	--	--
Children's Services	-.05	-.16	-.08	-.11	.13	.06	.04	.05	-.02	-.02	.44	.49	-.02	.01
Civil Legal Services	.18	.23	.12	.15	.10	.04	-.18	-.19	-.002	.03	.12	-.03	.12	-.04
Criminal Legal Services	--	--	-.07	-.08	--	--	--	--	.10	.08	.002	-.12	.004	-.12
R	.34		.27		.29		.25		.24		.59		.45	
R <sup>2</sup>	.11		.07		.08		.06		.06		.35		.20	
F	2.36		1.59		1.83		1.16		1.13		8.51		4.49	
P	.025		ns		ns		ns		ns		.01		.01	

Table 5-30, Cont.

## Service Interventions and Impacts on Life Outcomes

SERVICE INTERVENTION	LIFE CHANGE													
	Handling Disputes		Drug Usage		Alcohol Usage		Financial Situation		Physical Health		Mental Health		Changed Residence	
	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>B</u>
Macrolegal Services	.06	-.17	.02	.16	.16	-.05	.12	.11	.16	.13	.10	.10	.02	-.15
Information and Referral	.001	-.10	.09	.03	.06	-.06	.20	.10	.15	-.02	--	--	.19	.12
Nonlegal Advocacy	.10	.07	.08	.05	.08	-.03	.18	.07	.26	.21	.18	.07	.17	.04
Diversion	-.008	.009	-.06	-.03	-.08	-.06	-.16	-.10	--	--	.04	.05	-.11	-.05
Shelter	.05	.06	.04	.02	--	--	.28	.27	.009	-.09	.03	-.08	.26	.25
Crisis Intervention	.26	.23	.21	.21	.33	.33	.25	.17	.29	.22	.33	.31	.27	.21
Counseling	-.006	-.03	-.06	-.14	--	--	-.05	-.20	.09	.03	.10	.04	.003	-.12
Children's Services	-.12	-.16	.02	.06	-.01	-.03	.07	.03	--	--	.04	.05	.02	-.03
Civil Legal Services	.07	.17	-.03	-.23	.14	.14	.09	-.15	.10	-.08	.07	-.06	.05	.05
Criminal Legal Services	.11	.17	-.01	-.08	.14	.12	--	--	.12	.04	.03	-.05	-.01	.06
R	.34		.27		.37		.42		.37		.36		.39	
R <sup>2</sup>	.11		.07		.14		.18		.14		.13		.15	
F	2.07		1.26		3.26		3.88		3.18		2.67		2.87	
P	.05		ns		.01		.01		.01		.01		.01	

**Obtaining a Job.** This life impact was closely associated with nonlegal advocacy, shelter, and civil legal services. These services also are most closely associated with other major life changes, including changing residence and ending the relationship with the batterer.

**Relationship with Children.** Not surprisingly, children's services are closely associated with this life impact, but surprisingly, crisis intervention is as well. The negative loadings of criminal legal services and information and referral underscore the complexity of the relationships among these services, as observed earlier.

**Relationships with Friends.** Crisis intervention is the only strong contributor to relations with friends. Again, criminal legal services has a complex effect: its correlation with the life outcome is marginal, but it has a negative explanatory effect. Information and referral appear similarly. These regression coefficients suggest that criminal legal services and information and referral are associated with children's services, but not with the life outcome. We have previously noted the complexity of the criminal legal/children's services pairing.

**Handling Disputes.** Again, crisis intervention is the explanatory variable with the strongest association and contribution. Both macrolegal services and information and referral are correlated with crisis intervention, suggesting that the relationships (interactions) among these services are complex. Indeed, it is not surprising, given the analyses in chapter 4 of victim strategies, to observe a confounding of information and referral with crisis intervention.

**Alcohol Usage.** Once more, the associations with crisis intervention and information and referral are observed.

**Financial Status.** Shelter, information and referral, and crisis intervention all predict improved financial status, while civil legal services appear to be a negative contributor. Apparently clients in shelters were more successfully referred to other services (e.g., welfare assistance, housing) that supported a new financial independence. By contrast, civil legal services--often involving divorce actions--may have drained clients' financial resources for attorney fees without providing adequate referrals to sources of support for independent living following divorce.

**Physical and Mental Health.** The findings for these two life outcomes are closely related: nonlegal advocacy and crisis intervention are the strongest predictors of improved mental and physical health. These services often lead to obtaining needed health care or other services (e.g., welfare, jobs, or housing) that reduce many of the potential stressors associated with help-seeking.

**Changed Residence.** Shelter and crisis intervention and, to a lesser degree, nonlegal advocacy and information and referral predict change in residence. These regression findings (table 5-30) were borne out in a series of contingency analyses showing highly significant associations between this outcome and those four services, particularly shelter. As noted earlier, shelter clients present the most violent and complex problems, often necessitating the dissolution of a relationship to prevent further abuse. These data describe that process. Information and referral and advocacy services, commonly associated with shelter, help clients to secure employment, housing, and other services necessary to begin independent living.

#### **Interactive Service Effects**

A final set of life impact analyses attempted to capture the interactive effects of the two most powerful and policy-relevant service predictors--shelter and criminal legal services. (The large number of service couplets precluded an elaborated analysis of the interactive effects of all services.)

These analyses showed that the conjoining of criminal legal services and shelter appears to have strengthened their individual effects on several life outcomes. These findings were most dramatic for improvements in relationships with friends ( $p = .007$ ), handling of disputes ( $p = .037$ ), alcohol use ( $p = .006$ ), mental health (where 100% of clients receiving both services reported improvement), and changed residence ( $p = .07$ ). Similar, though not statistically significant, interactive effects were found for improved physical health. (In the area of mental health, shelter alone also had significant impact.) In only one life outcome area--obtaining a job--did an individual service (shelter) have greater impact than the two conjoined, but this finding was not significant.

The small sample size (clients receiving both services numbered only 17) limits the generalizability of these findings. Nevertheless, they suggest, once again, that victims of domestic violence may be best served by programs that incorporate both shelter and criminal legal services.



## LIVING ARRANGEMENT

Our final measure of service effects focused on living arrangements. The only predictor associated with victims staying with their assailants is diversion services. However, a very small number of assailants participated in diversion. Among the predictors of moving out, civil legal services and obtaining restraining orders show the highest correlation and regression coefficients. Other weak contributors include macrolegal services, shelter, and nonlegal advocacy. The findings are significant ( $p = .01$ ).

Table 5-31

### Moving Out as a Function of Service Interventions

Services	r	B
Restraining Order (post-project)	.22	.20
Diversion	-.16	-.14
Information and Referral	.14	.09
Civil Legal Services	-.06	-.29
Macrolegal	.07	.14
Shelter	.14	.12
Nonlegal Advocacy	.15	.10
Children's Services	.01	-.07
Criminal Legal Services	.12	.07
Counseling	.12	-.02

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$$R^2 = .38, F(10,161) = 2.72, p = .01$$

The findings suggest that, while no particular service is closely related to moving out, those victims who do move out often use civil legal services to obtain restraining orders for protection during the process. Shelter and nonlegal advocacy services provide support for the move, consistent with earlier findings on changed residence.

## Conclusions

### LIFE CIRCUMSTANCES

The family violence projects directly or indirectly (e.g., through referrals to direct services) positively effected a wide range of victims' life circumstances. Most frequently reported life improvements involved physical and mental health and family, social and interpersonal relations. A Guttman scalogram analysis of life circumstance changes found that these changes did not occur along a continuum; rather, they appear somewhat autonomous, which is not suprising given the disparate nature of these life domains.

A canonical correlation was undertaken in order to understand the influence of background characteristics on life outcomes. We found that more positive outcomes are a matter of less violence in the relationship according to various indicators. In addition, age (younger), race (caucasian), and education (higher) also are associated with positive outcomes. Exploration of the impacts of client services on these life circumstances suggests that such life changes may be most closely associated with the most difficult cases, i.e., those that received shelter services.

### POST-PROJECT ABUSE AND VIOLENCE

Overall, 56 percent of the former clients interviewed reported experiencing post-project abuse and 28 percent reported suffering physical violence after project intervention. A Guttman scalogram analysis of the types of post-project abuse identified an increasingly complex and violent pattern wherein assailants who were violent toward children were apparently qualitatively "more violent" than those violent only toward their spouse.

Among victim background and situational variables, the most powerful predictors of post-project violence include prior separations due to abuse, length of abuse, prior calls to police, and frequency of injury. In terms of assailant characteristics, the assailant's childhood abuse history is strongly associated with post-project abuse.

The only client service evidencing a clear relationship with decreased rates of post-project abuse and violence is criminal services. The deterrence effect of criminal legal intervention holds irrespective of the severity of prior violence in the relationship (i.e., positive impacts are found when controlling for severity of prior injury). Moreover, the conjoined influence of criminal legal services appears to reduce slightly the revictimization rates of shelter clients, who represent the most difficult cases in terms of severity and longevity of abuse histories.

## 6 Impacts On The Justice System

One of the major presuppositions of the Family Violence Program directive was that improved justice system response to domestic violence would reduce repeat incidents and lessen victim injury. The LEAA goals thus called for broad system impact and, concomitantly, for immediate documentable improvements for victims. Moreover, an examination of the program directive reveals two crucial assumptions that operated as implicit program goals:

- a successful initiative against domestic violence could only be achieved by a comprehensive program of coordination both within the justice system and between the justice system and service agencies; and
- criminal justice system responsiveness was to be achieved through the recognition of domestic violence as a serious criminal matter.

The grantee projects formulated instrumental objectives to meet the explicit system-impact goals, but their design made it virtually impossible to carry out the implicit goals.

None of the projects (with the possible exception of Santa Barbara) was staffed or structured to undertake concerted efforts in both the criminal justice and social service systems. Concentrating on implementing specifically mandated services, the projects focused inter-agency coordination in areas critical to their operations. Other coordination efforts fell by the wayside or were attempted sporadically in response to LEAA program officer prodding.

Within the justice system alone, efforts were, by and large, piece meal. The envisioned interagency coordination would have required that all agencies grant the project considerable authority and power. Most projects lacked the structural position to even attempt such coordination. In those that did attempt it, bitter power struggles erupted. (See, for example, the Miami-DIP case study.)

The implicit goal of criminalizing domestic violence was undercut by the types of projects funded, most of which provided social services to victims or offenders. The Westchester Domestic Violence Unit was the only project with a clear view of domestic violence as a criminal matter. Other projects conceptualized domestic violence in a variety of ways, including feminist, social-psychological, family systems, culture of violence, etc. While most project staff did believe that domestic violence was a criminal offense, the criminal aspect was not a central focus. For example, shelter staff emphasized creating opportunities for the victim to extricate herself from the violent situation; deterrence or punishment for the offender was a secondary concern. More significantly, the diversion/treatment projects called for in the LEAA goals undermined to a certain extent the criminalization goal: diverting batterers into treatment reinforces justice system attitudes that such cases do not "really belong" in the courts.

Mindful of these limiting circumstances, this chapter assesses the effects that ten projects had on the justice system. Impacts in each of the system's areas--law enforcement, criminal courts, and civil courts--are considered by the type of project and the strategy employed. Each section examines the background issues as revealed through the literature and project evaluation data; details implementation efforts--both strategies and constraints--and discusses impacts on the area. The chapter concludes with a summary of major findings in each area of the justice system.

## The Police

### BACKGROUND ISSUES

To understand the impact of the projects on law enforcement, it is instructive to review research on police response to family violence, criticisms leveled by victim advocates, and this evaluation's findings from interviews with police.

A recent review of the literature on police handling of domestic violence revealed:

a confusing patchwork of unproved assertions and incomplete accounts of how police handle spousal violence calls and why they handle them the way they do. Nearly everyone has a theory, but few have systematically gathered reliable data . . . The predominant belief continues to be that police have responded to these calls with a policy of minimum intervention and avoidance of arrest. Police officials generally agree with this assessment . . . (Loving, 1980)

Victim advocates have criticized the police for their:

- attitude that domestic violence is not a crime;
- attempts to mediate or resolve conflicts when arrests were warranted;
- failure to inform victims of rights and options;
- taking the side of the assailant and blaming the victim;
- slowness or lack of response to calls for domestic violence (i.e., call screening that gives such calls low priority); and
- failure to document domestic violence. (Fleming, 1979)

These criticisms find support in the results of two class-action suits brought against the police departments in New York City and Oakland, California, by battered wives charging that they had been denied adequate police protection against abusive husbands (Bruno v. Codd, 1978; Scott v. Hart, 1979). The settlements in both cases resulted in very explicit changes in police procedures for domestic violence incidents.

The criminal justice and advocates literature report a number of reasons why police have historically "under-responded" to domestic violence. These reasons were echoed by police in interviews conducted during the national evaluation:

- Definition of "crime"--bounded by rules of evidence, statute, procedure, belief;
- Self-defined roles--as authority figures enforcing the law, not as social workers helping families;\*

\*Given this role definition, and domestic violence is not defined as a crime, police resent being called and see their intervention as inappropriate. The results of this ideology are vividly evident in the total absence of domestic violence from Rubinstein's classic ethnography (1973) of the Philadelphia police. In over three years of observing the department, Rubinstein undoubtedly witnessed domestic violence incidents. He reports none, however, mirroring the view that the problem lies outside the sphere of appropriate police concerns.

- Personal attitudes about
  - male/female roles, i.e., viewing husbands as within their rights when physically "punishing" their wives, and
  - the family as sacrosanct, and not to be interfered with by government agencies (Bannon, 1975);
- Personal concerns about
  - law suits if they overstep their legal authority\* and
  - their own safety;\*\* and
- Frustration and futility because
  - victims do not follow through with prosecution if the batterer is arrested,
  - the court system (judges and prosecutors) do not take domestic violence cases seriously and follow through on police actions; and
  - in any event, domestic assaults will continue.

The lack of police response to domestic violence thus emerges as an interaction between personal sexist attitudes, lack of incentives and direction from the justice system, and an underlying awareness of dangers. These factors have been given varying weights depending on the analyst's perspective. Feminist advocates, for example, tend to cite police sexism (Martin, 1978; Fleming, 1979), whereas criminal justice researchers usually focus on organizational factors (e.g., police procedures, prosecutor priorities) (Loving, 1980).

The range of project experiences in working with police and the results of their various strategies suggest that one cannot make sweeping generalizations about or create a model of "the" police response to family violence. Rather, it is necessary to examine law enforcement through various factors, including the internal ideology of a particular department, attitude variation by organizational level, and the changing role of the police.

A police department's view of itself and its relationship to the community will dictate its response to domestic violence. Departments can be characterized as operating predominantly in one of these "styles" (Wilson, 1968):

- Legalistic--emphasizing strict adherence to the letter of the law;

\*Brattleboro and Miami police repeatedly expressed fears of suits for false arrest if they arrested a batterer who violated a protective order.

\*\*Cases where the victim and/or abuser turns on and attacks officers are familiar to all police. FBI statistics show that one out of five police killed in the line of duty was trying to break up a domestic fight (U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, 1978).

- Watchman--seeking to maintain community standards and public order as opposed to enforcing laws per se; or
- Service--frequently using informal sanctions to intervene (found mainly in homogenous middle-class communities).

Of the police departments in the project communities, those that were legalistic in style had a dual reaction: domestic violence became reclassified either as a "real" crime, requiring enforcement, or as a special issue not criminalized and dealt with through mediation.\* The watchman style departments were generally loathe to arrest, desired to avoid involvement in the dispute itself, used traditional techniques such as walking the man around the block, but cooperated in transporting women to shelters. Service style departments were likely to cooperate with a project's social service approach and to avoid arrest whenever possible.

Different levels of the police hierarchy frequently reflect different attitudes. The attitude of the chief is important for setting the tone in the department, but "filter down" time is needed for a new direction to be incorporated by on-line officers. Special units within departments can develop their own world view that conflicts with prevailing departmental opinion. (See, for example, the Miami case study discussions of the Safestreets unit.) Finally, individual officers differ by social characteristics such as ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds as well as life experiences, which shape attitudes about the officer's role and domestic violence.

Regardless of the peculiarities of local environments, the role of the police is generally under question in our society. Police everywhere are concerned with clarifying and reasserting their function in society and the parameters within which they operate. Domestic violence as an issue touches on a number of sensitive issues for the police:

- Are the police authority figures, or are they mediators/regulators?
- What is the role of jail as a deterrent for crime?
- What is the role of diversion/counseling programs as opposed to prosecution and jailing?

The problem of role definition affects all ranks of the police as they deal and work in conjunction with other government and private agencies.

\*The Oakland Police Department offers a good example of the latter reaction. In the early 1970s, this legalistic department started a domestic crisis intervention unit on its own initiative, largely unaided by federal funds. Specifically mediation/non-arrest oriented, the unit made referrals to social service agencies. (Liebman and Schwartz, 1973)

## IMPLEMENTATION

The family violence projects conducted their dealings with law enforcement, especially training efforts, in accordance with their respective analyses of why police did not take instances of family violence seriously. Some projects focused on changing the attitudes of individual officers, on the assumption that if they "understood" the plight of the battered woman, they would be more apt to help her. Other projects worked on police procedures: if they had clear-cut arrest and enforcement rules, police would deal with victims more fairly. Others concentrated on police as referral sources: law enforcement was not the appropriate agency to deal with domestic violence, but police could inform victims about other sources of help. The projects developed their respective ideologies about what police thought of battered women and, hence, could realistically be expected to do. Some projects felt police attitudes were amenable to change; others did not.

Project impacts on police varied by project type. Shelters created one sort of relationship with police, while special prosecutors and diversion projects each experienced a different response. As elaborated below and in the case studies, such factors as what the projects asked of police, what they offered the police in return, and ideological issues all entered into the equation. These factors were, in turn, mediated by the style of the police department as discussed above.

### Shelters

**Referral and Transportation.** Police performed an integral function in the process by which women in dangerous situations contacted and reached shelters. The police either transported victims directly or arranged a pick-up site with shelter staff. The most vital tie the shelters needed with the police was that of direct referral and transportation of victims.

Police often made the first judgment of the victim's situation: Is the victim likely to be in continued, acute danger once the police leave? Does the victim have other housing possibilities with relatives or friends? Once the police decided the victim needed shelter, they would tell her about the project and help her make contact. This basic referral model between police and shelters was readily established by all projects. Even when police were dubious about the feminist orientation of a shelter, they nonetheless referred victims to it.

Major changes in police attitudes and procedures were needed less by projects whose primary service was offering shelter to domestic

violence victims than by those dealing with other aspects of the criminal justice system. For example, a police officer could refer women to shelter without altering such attitudes as conceiving of domestic violence as noncriminal, believing the woman to be at fault for provoking the attack, and/or thinking that the criminal justice system should not intervene in family matters. All that was required was that the officer perceive the situation to be dangerous and know that there was a place for a woman to go while tempers cooled. A study conducted in the project areas found that 79 percent of the police questioned considered removal of the woman to a shelter to be an effective alternative to arrest (Loving, 1980).

The extent to which police actually transported victims to a shelter varied by site. Some of the factors affecting transport were:

- police jurisdiction policy when a shelter served an area with a number of police departments;
- an individual officer's rapport with shelter staff;
- distance and availability of other forms of transportation; and
- police assessment of the danger in a given situation.

**Other Types of Police Assistance.** In three of the four case study shelter sites, police provision of "stand-by assistance" became an accepted practice. In this very simple yet essential service, the police officer accompanied the woman to her residence and "stood by" while she gathered belongings and legal documents for herself and her children. The presence of the officer minimized the chances for a new out-break of violence or retaliation, in which event he could protect the woman. In a variation of this procedure, Miami shelter staff went to the woman's home accompanied by the officer.

It is interesting to note that stand-by assistance is not discussed in the literature on police and domestic violence. The recent PERF report (Loving, 1980) makes no mention of it. The fact that the procedure was initiated in such diverse sites as Salem, Philadelphia, Fayetteville and Miami suggests that it is a fairly widespread informal police practice.

In two small cities, Fayetteville and Salem, an officer from the police community relations unit became unofficially attached to the shelter project. In both cases "Officer Friendly" (so dubbed by an evaluation staffer) served on the project advisory board, provided stand-by assistance, and acted as liaison between the project and police. The role was mutually beneficial. The officers were upwardly mobile in their departments, and the domestic violence specialization and record of working with an experimental project enhanced their careers.



The development of the "Officer Friendly" phenomenon is most likely related to the size of the cities involved. Both were large enough to have had some specialization in their police forces, yet too big for the small-town situation (e.g., in Brattleboro) where all officers rapidly became acquainted with the shelter. The long-term impact of having a "forward thinking" and upwardly mobile officer who is an advocate for shelter services and generally knowledgeable about domestic violence will probably prove quite positive.

**Training.** With the exception of Miami, all the shelter projects kept police training to a fairly informal procedure: staff spoke to police about domestic violence at roll calls.\* Initially, most of the shelters had viewed it as necessary to educate police about battering. Fayetteville, for example, had planned an elaborate police training curriculum. Project staff quickly realized, however, that extensive and formal training was not necessary for coordination with police.

As in all the projects, training content varied by shelter, ranging from legal issues to social/psychological analysis of battering. Some presentations included a bit of both. The legal presentations covered arrest procedures and criteria, new or amended legislation, enforcement of protective orders, documentation of domestic violence cases, etc. The social/psychological presentations examined the psychology of the victim and batterer and analyzed the social causes of battering. These latter presentations varied from a feminist perspective to a victimology or culture of violence approach.

Two shelters cannily adopted the strategy of presenting themselves as having something to offer the police: instead of requesting police assistance, they presented their shelters as a resource for the police to use. Of all the shelter projects, Brattleboro focused most heavily on changing police attitudes through training. However, prior to the training, staff had "proved" themselves to the police by their dedication and willingness to be available to "rescue" women at all hours. Moreover, the training was not tied to new procedures. (Because police in Vermont could not legally arrest for violation of civil orders and the area had a recalcitrant prosecutor who refused to prosecute for domestic violence, the shelter did not press for changes in the police mode of operations.)

It is difficult to assess the results of the training. Most police were referring victims to the shelters prior to training. During evaluation interviews, officers did seem to recall the common-sense appeal

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\*Miami's development of more formal police training is attributable to the project director's position in the legal community in her other position with Victims Advocates and her recognized expertise in the area. (See the Safespace case study).

notions discussed in training. For example, the idea that family violence is learned behavior that is passed on to successive generations made an impression on the police. Walker's "cycle of violence" theory (1979) proved useful in explaining to officers why victims would not carry through with prosecution. These perspectives on domestic violence validated officers' widely held assumptions about the causes of domestic violence and appealed to, rather than challenged, their sense of expertise.

### Prosecution Projects

Unlike shelter projects, where the police response was fairly uniform across sites, the special prosecutor units experienced a range of reactions. It is important to note that the units themselves were not strictly comparable. The special prosecutors held very different structural positions in district attorney offices and within their projects. The division of functions between police and prosecutors also varied across sites. Finally, the Salem unit was in operation for the project's first year only. These factors had decided effects on dealings with the police. In the context of these differences, the following sections examine a range of implementation efforts:

- documentation of domestic violence incidents and/or reporting to the project;
- referral of victims to the project;
- provision of stand-by assistance;
- changes in charging procedures; and
- training.

**Documentation/Reporting Changes.** Both the Santa Barbara and Westchester projects spent a great deal of effort to induce police to document incidents of domestic violence and inform the project about them. Westchester initially tried to institute a post-card referral system. Both projects came to rely on copies of police reports forwarded to the project. In Santa Barbara, this effort resulted in a statistically significant rise in the number of domestic violence cases reported by police--from eight to nearly 23 per week on the average (Berk et al., 1979). Initially, these reports were used to identify complainants and to initiate the prosecution process. As the projects evolved, clients came directly to the offices, and it was no longer necessary to have police reports for recruitment purposes. But the reports were still valuable for informing the prosecutor's decision on whether to file charges in each case.

In contrast, the Philadelphia project began with a police referral system already in place. Non-arrest misdemeanor prosecutions were initiated by complainants through filing private criminal complaints.

It was standard procedure for police officers to refer victims to the unit of the district attorney's office that processed such complaints, which averaged over 180 per month. In an attempt to comply with LEAA goals, the project did make several unsuccessful attempts to change police documentation procedures to record domestic violence cases separately. Fortunately, the issue did not affect the project's ability to prosecute cases.

**Victim Referral.** In contrast to the other prosecutorial projects, the Salem special prosecutor did not attempt to set up a direct police referral system. She received her referrals through the district attorney's office and one of the local victim/witness programs.

Police in all other sites readily referred victims to the projects. In Philadelphia, despite minimal linkage with law enforcement, officers agreed to hand out project referral cards. In other sites, victims were told to go to special district attorney units. It should be noted that police often gave incorrect information on what the projects could do for victims. (For example, Philadelphia victims were often told to get a warrant or a peace bond, neither of which was available.)

**Stand-By Assistance.** In contrast to the shelter experience, only one prosecutorial project arranged stand-by procedures with the police. In Philadelphia, largely due to the social service orientation of the project's feminist subcontractors, police were asked for stand-by assistance in the name of the district attorney's office. The service was never formalized, and project staff were always quick to reduce their requests when rumors of police displeasure reached them.

**Charging Procedures Changes.** The only project to direct police to change charging procedures was Philadelphia. For the duration of the special prosecutor's tenure, police were instructed to change the way they charged violators of restraining orders. According to the Pennsylvania legislation, violation of a protective order was chargeable as indirect criminal contempt, for which the violator was to be brought back before the (civil) judge who had issued the order. Because this process requires the victim to recontact her attorney and file for a violation hearing, the special prosecutor instructed police to charge the violator with a substantive charge (e.g., assault, trespassing) as well so that she could try the case in criminal court. Although police were inconsistent in arresting for order violations, they generally complied with the change when they did make arrests.

**Training.** Two of the four special prosecutor units made police training a major priority. In Westchester, the project director

personally conducted training with over 40 police departments on the legal aspects of domestic violence and the information that police were legally required to give to victims. As a result of the training, police began to refer clients and implemented a reporting procedure whereby the project received information on all domestic violence incidents.

Santa Barbara conducted similar training but with a feminist cast, to which police reacted negatively. One officer reporting on the reaction to a videotape produced by the project said that police had wanted variously to "punch out" or "shoot" the narrator.

Santa Barbara coupled its training efforts with an on-going feedback process on police response to incidents. Because the project included shelter operations, it had immediate access to victims' stories about police handling. In the case of positive actions, the project wrote letters of commendation to police supervisors. Complaints were handled more subtly: officers were spoken to individually by a project staff member. This approach had mixed results. Project staff reported that police appeared to become more helpful to the victims, but they were still loath to arrest. The project's end was marked by the death of a victim whose husband had gone unarrested in a previous incident.

The Philadelphia project did not conduct direct training with line officers. (One of the project's subcontractors held a separate police training grant but was never able to gain access to the department.) Instead, the project concentrated on effecting procedural changes through indirect means. They helped to issue a revised police directive for enforcement of restraining orders, with minimal effect. The special prosecutor developed a manual of new guidelines for handling domestic violence cases to be used in police recruit training. However, by the close of the grant, the chief had not yet approved the final version of the manual.

The Salem prosecutor did train police during her year with the project, but any effects were not apparent.

#### Diversion Programs

The Cleveland project and Miami DIP differed in design, organizational auspice, and intervention approach. But both failed in their attempts to work in conjunction with the police to intervene pre-arrest in domestic violence. The histories of these projects are remarkably similar. Both had a difficult time starting up. Their staffs had little contact with clients for months and became demoralized. Much time was wasted in training staff for functions that were never implemented. Neither project implemented its pre-arrest service as originally conceived.

The experiences of Cleveland and DIP reveal certain inherent barriers to conjoint approaches:

- Police role definition, which excludes "civilians" from areas defined as police "turf";
- Changes in police administration and policy;
- Lack of police aid in service implementation, despite prior participation in program planning; and
- Lack of referrals.

**Police Role Definition.** In Miami, counselors from DIP's pre-arrest unit were to accompany police on domestic disturbance calls to provide on-the-scene crisis counseling. The officers with whom they were to work were a specially trained unit called Safestreets, which handled all domestic calls and represented a subcurrent of social regulatory ideology within a legalistic police department. In resisting DIP's crisis intervention approach after start-up, Safestreets officers questioned the expertise of DIP counselors, debated the division of responsibility at the scene of the incident, and objected to the added burden of civilians present in dangerous situations. These reactions may have stemmed in part from fears of role usurpation by the DIP counselors and of erosion of the unit's somewhat tenuous legitimacy within the department.

In a similar fashion, Cleveland police decided that project counselors were not qualified to work with dispatchers in the radio room to do crisis counseling for incoming domestic violence calls. After a study of the radio room had documented the overwhelming need for this service (400 calls in one week during the summer), the project entered into months of negotiations and actual training of counselors as dispatchers. When the plan was finally rejected, the reason given was that calls to the police should not be answered by civilians. Most police dispatchers at the time were civilians. Although the content of this situation differed from Miami's, the structure of the rejection of a joint service approach was much the same. The area of expertise--the "turf"--was defined as belonging to the police, and non-police were excluded from it.

**Police Administration Changes.** The two-year period of the Cleveland project's operations witnessed three changes in police chiefs. As a result, the project had to repeatedly recommence negotiations at the very point when an agreement was about to be finalized. The administrative changes and the accompanying frustration felt by project staff probably prevented the project from seriously examining the premises of the services they were trying to implement.

In Miami, a number of changes in key police personnel in the Safe-streets unit impeded initial attempts to create procedures for the DIP counselors and unit officers to work together. In addition, the outbreak of severe racial tensions and riots in response to alleged police actions made the entire department reevaluate its priorities. Domestic violence training and programs were relegated to a low priority while the police department attempted to deal with its community relations problems.

**Lack of Implementation Assistance.** In both sites, police officials had served on the interagency task forces that planned the family violence projects and wrote the grant proposals. Project staff thus anticipated a greater degree of cooperation around implementation issues than was forthcoming. Largely for the reasons described above, the police proved to be a stumbling block rather than the partners envisioned during the planning phase. In neither case did the police officials who had helped to write the grants foresee the reluctance that the officers in the streets would exhibit.

**Lack of Referrals.** In Cleveland, where the police were the primary source of referrals, the number of clients who reached the project were so low as to cause LEAA officials to order a restructuring of the project. According to a survey conducted by the project, police were loath to issue the specially designed quasi-legal summons to disputants. They also were skeptical of the project's mediation services. Gradually, police referrals did increase. Toward the end of the grant period, the project initiated a more successful link with the police. The police prosecutor accepted the project's pre-trial counseling diversion service as an attractive alternative to prosecuting domestic violence offenses.

DIP, after abandoning the crisis intervention strategy, looked to police for referrals for their counseling service. They were slow in coming. Once police began to distribute a brochure describing the project, client numbers did increase.

These experiences suggest that police may not be an appropriate referral source for a counseling service. Even if police conscientiously made referrals, it is questionable whether people would view social service as within the expertise of law enforcement and act on the referrals. Further support for this hypothesis is found in the Philadelphia project, which arranged for the police to distribute referral cards to victims at the scene of domestic disturbances. Although the cards contained information on a number of service programs, the project's legal services received a great number of clients from this referral mechanism while the counseling service received very few.

In a survey of police attitudes conducted by the Cleveland project (1979), 41 percent of the officers recommended that someone other than the police should contact violent families. They also were skeptical that a quasi-legal summons would draw clients to the project.

## IMPACTS

The official goals for the family violence projects' impacts on police called for:

- interagency coordination,
- reduction of repeat calls for police assistance, and
- increased reporting and documentation of intrafamily violence.

To summarize the degree of attainment of these goals is a difficult enterprise and glosses over the very real differences in design and context among the projects. Again, an assessment by project service focus yields the most accurate picture.

### Interagency Coordination

- Shelters--successful in creating strong referral procedures with the police, who readily used them as a resource.
- Prosecutorial projects--largely successful with referral links; lesser degree of success with changes in arrest patterns and other procedural matters.
- Diversion/counseling projects--weak referral links, having experienced considerable difficulty in establishing legitimacy/expertise with police.

### Increased Reporting and Documentation

None of the projects changed the manner in which police collected statistics. Two prosecutorial projects were able to create reporting systems whereby police sent copies of incident reports to them. No other project created such a link.

### Reduction of Repeat Calls

Fifty-seven victims in the national evaluation follow-up study reported that they had called police for domestic violence prior to their contact

with the project. Of these victims, 42 percent (24) reported that they had not called the police after contact with the project.

This reduction in repeat calls to police may be attributable to one or more of several causes. Victims may have not called police again because (1) the abuse had stopped, or (2) they were frustrated with attempts to invoke law enforcement, or (3) they used other self-help techniques learned from the projects rather than call the police. The data support all of these possibilities. Of the 24 victims, approximately half had been abused post-project (13), and the rest (11) reported no abuse.

## Criminal Remedies

### SPECIAL PROSECUTORS

#### Background Issues

Paralleling police reticence to intervene in domestic violence, prosecutors also have exhibited a reluctance to pursue domestic violence cases. The literature on prosecutorial actions in domestic violence cases, though sparse, reveals a higher charging and conviction rate for stranger assaults than for domestics (Forst et al., 1977; Vera Institute, 1977). The literature and evidence from the family violence projects, especially those having no formal affiliation with a district attorney's office, point to several reasons for the lack of prosecution of domestic violence cases:

- witness refusal to cooperate and dropping of charges;
- prosecutors' view that domestic violence is not a "real" crime;
- evidentiary problems; and
- lower conviction rates.

**Witness Refusal to Cooperate.** Prosecutors stereotype domestic violence complainants as unpredictable witnesses who change their minds and drop charges to reconcile with their partners (Lerman, 1981). Anticipating witness noncooperation, prosecutors are thus loath to pursue such cases (Cannavale, 1976). Data from the Philadelphia and Westchester projects and from the Battered Women's project of the Seattle City Attorney's Office (Lerman, 1981) show that, indeed, in 21-25 percent of cases filed, victims drop the charges.

The literature on battering offers social and psychological insights into why domestic violence victims would fail to cooperate. Among these are Walker's theory (1979) of the battering cycle, in which a "loving respite" phase follows an abuse incident. Walker also describes a "learned helplessness" that undermines the victim's ability to follow through on a criminal justice action. Underscoring this helplessness is the fact that many victims and their children are economically dependent on the batterer (Martin, 1976).

Evidence from the family violence projects suggests several additional reasons why victims fail to cooperate with prosecutors. An important factor appears to be fear of retaliation. Widespread in nonstranger assault cases, such fear is likely to be heightened in spouse abuse (Cannavale, 1976). Nancy M. Sieh, the Santa Barbara District Attorney's Office, wrote that "as a beginning prosecutor, I had a personal policy of meeting with each victim privately to discuss . . . a dropping of charges request. Almost half the women immediately confessed that they did not really wish to drop charges at all but the offender was outside waiting and had threatened her into making the request for dismissal" (1979, p. 2).

A case from the Philadelphia project dramatically illustrates the validity of such fears. A victim failed to keep her court date, because she was beaten unconscious by the abuser to prevent her from testifying. At the hospital where she was taken, a staff member knew of the project, listened to the woman's insistence that she had to go to court, and contacted the project. Ultimately, the abuser was convicted of tampering with a witness as well as the assault charge. Threats to victims are not usually, however, made before witnesses or so linked to the judicial process as to permit tampering charges.

Multiple court appearances also discourage victims from continuing prosecution. Victims have difficulty arranging for child care or release time from jobs. Project staff in Philadelphia found themselves calling employers to explain that the women were, indeed, making necessary court appearances. A paralegal with that project felt that multiple court appearances was a principal reason for women discontinuing prosecution (Lerman, 1981).

**Domestic Violence as Not a "Real" Crime.** Some prosecutors see domestic violence as different from other assaults. There are a number of perspectives from which this classification ensues:

- Most domestic assaults are not serious in nature, a view reinforced by victim behavior in withdrawing charges.
- The husband has a right to "discipline" his wife when provoked by her behavior.

- The integrity of the family must be protected, and prosecution is disruptive.\*

Whatever the perspective, the prosecutorial attitude that domestic violence is not a real crime has consequences for the victim as well as for projects attempting to increase prosecution. In Brattleboro, for example, the prosecutor's office set prosecution priorities for particular types of crimes. Domestic violence was not one of those priorities. Try as it might, the project could not get the prosecutor to change. At the same time, the Brattleboro prosecutor classified rape as a "real" crime and cooperated with the rape crisis staff employed by the same group sponsoring the project.

**Evidentiary Problems.** In many domestic violence cases, evidence is difficult to obtain. The assault is usually not witnessed, except perhaps by the couple's children. Hospital records may not be available or may not indicate the real cause of the injury (Flitcraft and Stark, 1978).\*\* One study found that prosecutors reject 43 percent of cases involving family members, as compared with 17 percent of stranger cases, on the basis of evidentiary problems (Forst et al., 1977).

**Lower Conviction Rates.** Stranger assault cases have a higher conviction rate than do domestic violence cases--in one study, nearly twice as large (Forst et al., 1977). Since prosecutors' reputations and potential for advancement are linked to successful prosecution records, the lower conviction rate for domestic cases operates as yet another disincentive to pursuing such cases.

#### Implementation

**Project Characteristics.** In response to its goal of "increasing prosecutions of repeat violence," the LEAA program funded four projects with special prosecutors for domestic violence. The sites operated by

\*This view is well expressed by a former prosecutor, Frank Miller, who wrote, "If prosecution were to be commenced in every case in which a drunken husband struck his wife, . . . the charging decision would place an additional strain on an inevitably continuing relationship" (Lerman, 1981, p. 2).

\*\*Victims often lie about the causes of their injuries, and hospital staff rarely ask or probe for causes. Moreover, as reported by hospital staff interviewed during the national evaluation, the batterer often accompanies the victim to the emergency room and stays with her while she responds to questions.



different models and the special prosecutors enjoyed differing degrees of power, autonomy, and support. The start up and continuation of special prosecutor services also varied across projects.

- The Westchester special prosecutor was the project director, held senior status in the District Attorney's Office, and had broad community contacts. The district attorney, active in victim/witness issues, and was very supportive of the project. The special prosecutor had paralegal, secretarial, and investigative staff and took on a second assistant district attorney in year two.
- The Santa Barbara special prosecutor was located in the prosecutorial unit subcontracted by a multi-component project, which was sponsored by a countywide commission. The District Attorney had authority over the unit's personnel, which, in addition to the special prosecutor, included a criminal investigator and a secretary/administrative assistant. In the project's second year, the special prosecutor was replaced by two advocates, and the prosecutorial function returned to a general role in the District Attorney's Office.
- The Philadelphia special prosecutor was funded as part of the District Attorney's match for the grant and formed one unit of a multi-component project administered by the District Attorney's Office. No funds were allocated for support staff, but it was assumed that a criminal paralegal hired by one of the subcontractors would work in conjunction with the special prosecutor. In the first year, the special prosecutor handled a regular caseload as well as domestic cases and was not integrated into the project. In the second year, a beginning assistant district attorney took on an exclusively domestic violence caseload.
- The Salem special prosecutor was part of a private nonprofit project but worked out of the District Attorney's Office (and also maintained office space at the project's shelter). She was a newly hired assistant district attorney in a system in the process of switching from police prosecutors to assistant district attorneys. She had no support staff and worked in an area with five district court jurisdictions. The special prosecutor was eliminated in year two of the grant.

The structural differences in the units are illustrated in tables 6-1 to 6-3.

**Table 6-1**  
**Special Prosecutor Implementation and Continuation**

	First Year Fully Implemented	Second Year Continued
Westchester	Yes	Yes
Santa Barbara	Yes	No
Philadelphia	No	Yes
Salem	Yes	No

**Table 6-2**  
**Special Prosecutor Organizational Structure**

	Project Director	In Distinct Unit With Support Staff	In District Attorney's Office with No Separate Support Staff
Westchester	X	X	
Santa Barbara		X (year 1 only)	
Philadelphia			X
Salem			X

**Table 6-3**  
**Institutional Auspice of the Project**

	District Attorney's Office	Private Nonprofit	Community Commission
Westchester	X		
Santa Barbara			X
Philadelphia	X		
Salem		X	

It is apparent from the discussion and charts that the Westchester special prosecutor enjoyed a structurally far more powerful position than any of the others. It was, in fact, the only prosecution unit to survive into the second year and ultimately succeeded in leveraging funds to continue beyond the LEAA grant.

**Contextual Features.** An obvious factor affecting implementation of special domestic violence prosecution services is the ability to consolidate cases. Westchester and Philadelphia had minimal problems with case consolidation, although their methods were quite different. Westchester had to create a system whereby the county's police

departments and out-stationed assistant district attorneys sent victims and arrest reports to the unit. Philadelphia simply had to induce the trial commissioner, police headquarters, and precincts to list cases into a single courtroom. In both instances, the special prosecutors had the authority to effect these changes. Indeed, in Westchester, the District Attorney personally facilitated case consolidation.

Santa Barbara and Salem faced more difficult situations for consolidating cases. The physical area covered by the Santa Barbara project (over an hour's drive from one end of the county to the other) and relative independent operations of out-stationed assistant district attorneys impeded the creation of a centralized prosecution unit. The Salem special prosecutor experienced problems exercising her authority over the multiple police departments in her area and failed to garner a caseload sufficient to devote full time to domestic violence.

Filing and judicial procedures also favored special prosecution efforts in Philadelphia. The complaining witness herself filed a private criminal complaint; she then proceeded through a trial commissioner hearing and, finally, to the Municipal Court, where the assistant district attorney received her case.\* Between the time she signed the complaint to her Municipal Court appearance, over two months had elapsed, during which time she had undergone at best brusque treatment from PCC staff and a pretrial hearing with a trial commissioner outspokenly critical of battered women. While project staff had advocated for many of these victims, they nonetheless had been subjected to a long and somewhat arduous process. There was thus a de facto very strenuous screening process that produced determined witnesses. In addition, the long wait between the battering incident and the actual trial may have played fortuitously into the dynamics of the battering relationship (see Walker, 1979), allowing the disputants to complete the "loving respite" phase and enter into a new tension-building period.

In Philadelphia, 37 percent of the convictions were guilty verdicts in which the victim testified against the abuser. The Santa Barbara and Westchester projects reported to rely more heavily on plea bargaining.

**Strategies.** While all the special prosecutors worked to criminalize domestic violence and create a more attentive judicial response, they did so from different ideological perspectives. The Santa Barbara and Salem prosecutors were outspokenly feminist. The Philadelphia and Westchester prosecutors, who did not have a feminist orientation,

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\*This is true for the majority of cases, which were nonarrest misdemeanor assaults. Arrest cases were listed directly into Municipal Court.

saw their role as one of increasing prosecution of a heretofore neglected crime. The feminist prosecutors readily embraced the notion of forced prosecution; neither of the other prosecutors used it. Ideological differences seemed unrelated to other strategies, including warning letters, summons letters, and pre-trial diversion.

The Santa Barbara and Westchester projects both used warning letters, but with different approaches. In Santa Barbara, as part of a year one experiment, the project arranged for the police to relay reports of domestic violence incidents. Staff then mailed one of two letters to the home of disputants: a "hard" letter, sent in more serious cases, informed the abuser that domestic violence was a crime and described the legal sanctions against it; a "soft" letter explained projected services.

In Westchester, warning letters were instituted as a result of complainants withdrawing criminal charges. Altering its prosecution approach within a few months of start-up, the project offered reluctant victims the option of a warning letter to the abuser. The letter, written on district attorney letterhead, informed the batterer that the victim had reported his actions to the district attorney. It stated that the victim wished to be left alone and that if he complied, no further action would result.

The warning letters met with differing responses in the two sites. The Santa Barbara campaign was discontinued because the letters evoked little response from either batterer or victim. In Westchester, the letters were judged a success on the basis of reports from social service agency personnel that their clients had been satisfied with the letter. The Westchester project sent 207 warning letters in year one and 240 in year two.

The Westchester project also used a letter to summon the alleged abuser to an appointment at the project's office when the police report indicated a severe battering. After reading him the Miranda warnings, project staff discussed the incident with the abuser. In some cases, this discussion coincided with the filing of charges. Use of the summons letter increased dramatically over the two years of the project--from 125 to 298.

All of the prosecutorial units used the different forms of pre-trial diversion. Salem and Santa Barbara both succeeded in implementing their plans to divert batterers to project-run counseling services. (See the Diversion Project discussion under this section for further details.) Santa Barbara initially had problems with mandated counseling diversion, because the judges were imposing such light sentences for a guilty plea that defense attorneys advised their clients to plead guilty.

Deferred prosecution options in Philadelphia (ARD) and New York (ACD) allowed the prosecutors to place defendants on "good behavior" release for a specified period of time. Used in cases where the defendant had no prior criminal record, prosecution was held in abeyance as long as he refrained from further abuse; otherwise, the case was reopened. Treatment--either counseling or drug and alcohol programs--could also be stipulated. The Philadelphia project attempted to use this procedure for abuse counseling but never implemented its counseling component. In its later stages, Westchester worked out a substance abuse counseling service with a local program.

The Philadelphia Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) was particularly useful when the complaining witness wished to drop the charges. Urging victims not to withdraw, the special prosecutor explained that ARD would serve the victim's purposes: it would give her something to "hold over the abuser"; at the same time, if the abuser obeyed the conditions, he would not have a criminal record at the end. The ARD was used in 23 percent of Philadelphia cases, more than twice as often as Westchester used the Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACDs), which averaged 11 percent over two years.

Santa Barbara was the only project to attempt a policy of obliging victims to prosecute by subpoenaing them as witnesses. The rationale behind this strategy was that the victim would then be able to place the responsibility for her testimony on the district attorney's office, thus mitigating any guilt and/or reticence about testifying against her partner and providing her defense against his anger. Unfortunately, the strategy proved to be flawed in practice. For example, as described by the special prosecutor, two victims brought to trial denied that the defendants had struck them. In one case, the prosecution impeached the victim with her prior statement to the police, and the jury found her to be such a liar on the stand that they were unwilling to believe her prior statement.

The special prosecutor in Salem had a similar experience in the one case that she attempted to oblige the victim to testify. The woman had been so severely battered that the special prosecutor decided to prosecute even after the woman began to refuse to cooperate. Once on the stand, the victim's denials of abuse were impeached with testimony from police, photographs, and hospital records. Nevertheless, the victim adamantly asserted that she had provoked the abuse and did not want the defendant punished. The judge, according to the special prosecutor, was "furious" that she had forced the woman to testify, and the jury acquitted the defendant.

## Impacts

**Prosecution Outcomes.** Tables 6-4 and 6-5 display the outcomes of prosecution from Philadelphia and Westchester, while table 6-6 compares the sites.\* The outcomes are strikingly similar and also virtually replicate those of a non-LEAA special prosecution unit of the Seattle district attorney's office. (See Lerman, 1981, for Seattle figures.)

Approximately half of all cases resulted in conviction: 43 percent in Philadelphia, 50 percent in Westchester. Although both prosecutors made use of the deferred prosecution option, the Philadelphia prosecutor's emphasis on this approach was reflected in her higher percentage (23% vs. 10%) of ARDs. Totalling both conviction and ARD/ACD figures produces a 60 percent rate for Westchester and 66 percent for Philadelphia.

Table 6-4  
Philadelphia Cases Prosecuted, 1/25/80 - 12/80

Case Outcome	Number	Frequency
Conviction	174	43%
ARD	93	23%
Acquittal	6	1%
Prosecution Withdrawal	39	22%
Discharged	41	10%
Other <sup>1</sup>	2	.5%
TOTAL	406	

1. Includes a deferred adjudication and a psychiatric commitment.

\*Santa Barbara data are not included in this discussion, because they were not compiled in the same manner. No figures were available from the Salem special prosecutor.

Table 6-5  
Westchester Cases Prosecuted

Case Outcome	1979		1980	
	Number	Freq.	Number	Freq.
Conviction	152	44%	183	50%
ACD	41	12%	37	10%
Acquittal	6	2%	4	1%
Prosecution Withdrawal	99	29%	90	25%
Dismissed	30	9%	28	8%
Other <sup>1</sup>	16	5%	23	6%
TOTALS	344		265 <sup>2</sup>	

1. Includes those found incompetent to stand trial and those transferred to Family Court. (New York State has a 72-hour period in which the complainant can transfer charges from criminal to family court or vice versa.)

2. 162 cases were pending at the close of 1980.

Table 6-6  
A Comparison of Cases Prosecuted in  
Westchester and Philadelphia, 1980

Case Outcome	Philadelphia		Westchester	
Conviction	43%	(174)	50%	(183)
ARD/ACD	23%	(93)	10%	(37)
Acquittal	1%	(6)	1%	(4)
Prosecution Withdrawn	22%	(89)	25%	(90)
Dismissed/Discharged	10%	(41)	8%	(28)
Other	0.5%	(2)	6%	(23)
TOTALS		(406)		(365)

Both sites had an extremely low rate of acquittal--1 percent. Clearly, if the prosecutor obtains the cooperation of the complaining witness and screens cases properly, domestic violence cases are winnable.

In approximately one-fourth of the cases, the prosecution withdrew the case. Most of this attrition can be attributed to the complaining witness deciding not to go on with the case--in all probability, a product of the dynamics of abusive relationships. Since these results are echoed in the Seattle project, it appears realistic for prosecutors to expect such a drop-out rate.

**The LEAA Goals.** Assessing achievement of the specific LEAA mandate to "increase prosecutions of repeated violence" was severely constrained, most particularly by the absence of baseline data. None of the sites had statistics on domestic violence prosecution prior to project start-up, and it proved virtually impossible to retrieve such data from the high numbers of misdemeanor cases in urban sites.

For the Santa Barbara site, a local evaluation team estimated previous year data and concluded that there had, indeed, been an increase in prosecution (Berk et al., 1979). Examining cases over the first seven months of the project, evaluators found that "the establishment of the special prosecution unit added another two incidents per week to the number processed by the District Attorney's office. In the absence of these interventions, the number of incidents processed is typically less than one per week. Consequently, the intervention increases are clearly non-trivial" (p. 4).

Other indirect evidence on the special prosecution units' success in increasing prosecutions emerges from comparisons of their results to data collected over the same time period by the Cleveland project. The Cleveland court had a comparable jurisdiction to those of Westchester and Philadelphia, but the project there undertook no special prosecution effort. The Cleveland study found that 70 percent\* of domestic violence cases in which at least one court appearance was made were dropped. By contrast, the combination of withdrawn and discharged cases for Philadelphia and Westchester was 33 percent. The difference is most striking viewed from another perspective: when there was a special prosecutor, two-thirds of cases were successfully prosecuted; in the absence of a special prosecutor, over two-thirds were dropped.

**Summary.** The special prosecution units had the following effects:

- **Improved case handling.** In domestic violence cases coming before the criminal courts, victims were provided with adequate information about the prosecution option and possible outcome. Victims who wished to prosecute were aided with preparation and court accompaniment or supportive services. Victims who did not wish to prosecute were referred to other sources of assistance.

\*This figure is a composite of dismissals at the request of the prosecution and/or the complaining witness.

- Very low acquittal rate. The 1-2 percent acquittal rate for cases tried refutes the stereotype that domestic violence cases are not winnable.
- Increased awareness. The units brought domestic violence cases to the attention of judicial system personnel as a matter worthy of special handling and serious attention.
- Institutionalization of services. The special prosecution unit in Westchester and advocacy services in Santa Barbara and Philadelphia were continued following the cessation of LEAA funding.

#### ADVOCACY AND VICTIM/WITNESS SERVICES

As discussed in chapters one and three, the Family Violence Program found its origins in LEAA's earlier Victim/Witness Program. Victims of spousal assault had come to victim/witness projects, where staff became aware of their multiple service needs. Created partly in response to this awareness, the more specifically focused Family Violence Program recognized the continuing need for victim/witness services for domestic violence victims. Five of the ten projects under discussion provided various combinations of these services in the criminal courts. (See table 6-7.)

TABLE 6-7  
Types of advocacy by Site

	Explanation	Information & Referral	Advocacy	Court Accompaniment
Santa Barbara	X	X	X	X
Philadelphia	X	X	X	X
Westchester	X	X		
Cleveland	X	X		X
Fayetteville	X	X	X	

#### Implementation

Under the rubric of advocacy and victim/witness work, the projects provided a range of services: explanation of the court process, information and referral, advocacy, and court accompaniment.

**Explaining the Court Process.** Project advocacy staff described to victims in simple language what the court proceedings would entail and what results they could expect. In most cases, these staff were based at the project's office. The Philadelphia paralegal advocate was stationed in the pre-trial hearing courtroom.

**Information and Referral.** Staff referred victims to appropriate social service providers, arranged for shelter, discussed civil options, and provided other related information. This service often took on a crisis intervention aspect: victims came to projects in a disoriented state, and giving them information entailed a structuring process wherein they were helped to make decisions.

**Advocating.** In some projects, advocates assumed an active role on behalf of the victim to urge reluctant courtroom personnel, assistant district attorneys, trial commissioners, etc., to acquiesce to a client's wishes. In Fayetteville, for example, the paralegal advocate examined cases rejected by the district attorney in which the client wished to prosecute. Where appropriate, she urged the assistant district attorney to reconsider. The Philadelphia criminal paralegal also advocated for victims during the pre-trial hearing.

**Court Accompaniment.** In Philadelphia, Santa Barbara and Cleveland, project personnel accompanied clients to court to provide emotional support during the trial. Cleveland's court accompaniment began in year two, as did Philadelphia's service for felony cases.\*

In Santa Barbara, the advocate reviewed police field reports and contacted victims to discuss prosecution and offer court accompaniment. If the victim cooperated with prosecution, the advocate accompanied her to all court appearances.

In addition to court accompaniment, counseling was available through the projects. Victims were contacted subsequent to final court appearances to determine if they needed further assistance or wished to take advantage of counseling.

#### Impacts

Quantitative impacts on the court system from advocacy work (e.g., increased victim cooperation leading to increased prosecution) were impossible to document due to the absence of baseline data and the national evaluation's focus on cross-site data. Differences in court

\*We are differentiating between having a project staff member based in the courtroom (as with the Philadelphia paralegal) and the role of individual accompaniment, where an advocate contacted a victim and went with her to the court appearance.



structure and judicial processing precluded the construction of a uniform test.

Philadelphia did collect data on felony abuse for two years, the first year without advocacy and the second with advocacy. The results were inconclusive. The second year figures showed slight increases in conviction rates and reductions in withdrawals, but the differences were not statistically significant.

Field staff reports and interviews with justice system personnel documented qualitative changes in awareness and attitudes. Sensitization of officials to the problem of domestic violence and the special needs and behavior of abuse victims came about slowly and to varying degrees. Often, the legitimacy of the victim was established through the advocate's credibility and professional expertise. Advocacy efforts also brought abuse cases into relief as meriting special attention and "marked" them as serious in a system that had formerly denied such cases any real status.

Finally, advocacy and/or victim support services were institutionalized in Santa Barbara, Philadelphia, Westchester, and Cleveland. Thus, changed attitudes will probably become entrenched further in these sites.

**DIVERSION AND PROBATION WITH MANDATED COUNSELING**

**Background Issues**

To combat repeat incidents of domestic violence, many of the projects planned to create diversion or probation counseling programs for batterers. In three of the projects (Salem, Santa Barbara and Philadelphia), diversion counseling was to be linked with a special prosecutor. Many of these programs began very slowly or failed to start; others experienced considerable difficulty controlling offenders who did not attend counseling or continued to abuse the victim. In most cases, it proved easier to continue an established diversion/probation program than to create the initial linkages in a system not familiar with the approach.

A special issue with these efforts was that diversion casts domestic violence in a different light than does a prosecutorial approach. Part of LEAA's emphasis on special prosecutors was to criminalize domestic violence, i.e., to have it recognized as a "real" crime of equal stature to comparable assaults between strangers. A diversion to treatment approach operates on a medical model, which views the abuser as "sick" and in need of special psychological help (see Balch, 1975). Implementing diversion and prosecutorial approaches simultaneously, and often in the same project, communicated contradictory messages that clearly played a part in the start-up difficulties that many counseling programs experienced.

**Implementation**

Tables 6-8 and 6-9 depict the types of diversion that the projects attempted and their success or failure.

The counseling programs to which batterers were diverted varied in format. Some projects concentrated on one-to-one counseling, while others experimented with a group format. Nearly all the projects

**TABLE 6-8**  
**Pre-Trial Diversion<sup>1</sup>**

	Year One		Year Two	
	Attempted	Achieved	Attempted	Achieved
Miami--DIP		X		X
Philadelphia	X		X	
Salem	X			X
Fayetteville	X			X
Santa Barbara		X		X
Cleveland <sup>2</sup>				X

1. The Westchester special prosecutor arranged for abusers who received a deferred sentence under ACD to be referred, when appropriate, to the local LEAA-funded drug and alcohol counseling program (TASC).

2. Not a part of formal project goals, Cleveland's diversion counseling service was initiated in year two in response to an LEAA directive to focus on the criminal courts.

**Table 6-9**  
**Counseling as Probation Condition**

	Year One		Year Two	
	Attempted	Achieved	Attempted	Achieved
Philadelphia	X		X	
Fayetteville				X
Salem	X			
Santa Barbara		X		X
Cleveland <sup>1</sup>				X

1. See note 2, table 6-8.

found that couple counseling created fairly volatile situations. Each project's abuser counseling services are summarized below.

- Miami-DIP--short-term counseling for individual abusers, couples, and families; referrals out for longer term counseling.
- Cleveland--individual counseling for batterers (following failure to implement mediation approach for victims and batterers).
- Fayetteville--individual sessions at intake and exit; group counseling focusing on anger management and sex role changes; counseling for victims on request. Probationers reported monthly to the project for a year following completion of counseling.
- Salem--group format with optional individual and couple counseling.
- Santa Barbara--individual counseling and anger management classes.\*

**Pre-Trial Diversion.** Of the five projects attempting to start pre-trial diversion programs in their first year, two were successful. Late in its second year, Salem set up the mechanisms to divert offenders and received only five referrals. Among the recurrent themes that conditioned successful diversion efforts were the presence of other diversion programs, shared ideologies about diversion and the counseling approach, and project credibility/legitimacy.

- Presence of other diversion programs. In both sites where pre-trial diversion was readily established, there were pre-existing diversion systems. In Miami, the director of the existing program supervised DIP diversion staff. The presence of other diversion programs permitted the project to concentrate on convincing judges and prosecutors that the content of the counseling approach was legitimate. Absent an existing program, projects had to negotiate the usually complicated referral and screening procedures as well as convince the court of the value of the counseling.
- Shared ideology about diversion. Because diversion programs require a coordinated effort between judges, prosecutors, and court personnel, the system must share a wide commitment to diversion treatment. In Miami, a greatly overcrowded court system and general skepticism of the value of jail sentences in preventing or reducing violent behavior of any sort led all actors to cooperate with DIP's diversion efforts. In Philadelphia, the District Attorney held that harsh jail sentences serve as a deterrent and had placed very little emphasis on developing an overall diversion approach. Operating under the auspices of the District Attorney's Office, the project thus found itself presenting a new line of thought when it sought to divert violent offenders. The Fayetteville project failed to enlist the

\*Anger management was incorporated into the adult education curriculum in the Santa Barbara school system and was offered to convicts, who, though not jailed for abuse, admitted to violent relationships.

support of the prosecutors and was unable to implement counseling services.

- Shared ideology about the counseling approach. Court personnel have to believe that the project's approach to counseling is logical. The Philadelphia project was unable to convince the trial commissioner to use its group therapy for abusive men: she felt that women provoke men and therefore require counseling as well.
- Project legitimacy/credibility. Criminal justice system actors were influenced by a project's institutional auspice and the staff's previous background. DIP enjoyed ties with the prosecutor's office and existing diversion program, and staff had worked in the court system. The Santa Barbara project drew on its links with the district attorney's office and established referral mechanisms. By contrast, Salem and Philadelphia had common problems of lack of perceived legitimacy. Salem diversion efforts suffered from association with the shelter, whose staff assumed an advocacy/adversarial position toward the justice system. The Philadelphia diversion component was headed by a radical feminist who had never counseled violent men and, in fact, was going to hire a consultant to do the work.

**Probation with Mandated Counseling.** Implementing probation with mandated counseling experienced problems similar to diversion efforts. Only Fayetteville and Santa Barbara succeeded in fully implementing post-conviction counseling programs. Cleveland arranged to have some convicted batterers sent to the program.

The probation mandate falls heavily on judges, who determine the sentence and terms of probation. The Fayetteville project was fortunate to find a sympathetic judge who felt that families should be kept together and decided to make use of the counseling program to help change the man's behavior so as to induce the woman to stay.

Even when coordination with judges is achieved, the probation office can present other obstacles. Philadelphia and Salem failed to establish referral mechanisms with probation. Santa Barbara was able to create a good referral system, but probation did not adequately follow up on cases. As a result probation-mandated batterers abandoned counseling with little risk, especially in comparison with pre-trial divertees. In a 20-month period, 11 out of 102 pre-trial clients violated program requirements, compared to 23 out of 75 probationers. Several factors account for this difference. Pre-trial divertees do not have a criminal record and, afraid of acquiring one, are more apt to comply with requirements. Probationers often have criminal records and may be sophisticated enough to know that the system rarely incarcerates a person for failing to attend a counseling program.

## Impacts

Those projects that succeeded in establishing the requisite referral links were able to routinely counsel batterers. However, the efficacy of such counseling has not been documented. The local evaluation of the first year of the Santa Barbara project noted that many of the batterers "stonewalled" their way through the therapy sessions (Berk et al., 1979). The year two change to a behavior modification approach may have overcome this problem. However, it was not possible to trace the victims of counseled batterers to determine whether battering had ceased.

The Santa Barbara, Miami-DIP, Salem, and Fayetteville projects all continued their services following the cessation of LEAA funding.

## Civil Remedies

### BACKGROUND ISSUES

Although victims of domestic violence use civil courts for divorce, separation, child custody and similar action, the family violence projects' primary service in the civil system was to assist victims in obtaining restraining or protective orders. Use of such orders--a fairly recent phenomenon in the area of domestic relations--was initially connected with divorce or dissolution actions. New York's 1962 legislation was the first to create a special court process, but with access limited to married persons. The next major change took place in the District of Columbia, which established a process for handling domestic violence regardless of marital status. In 1976, Pennsylvania passed what is considered to be the model for domestic violence legislation--the Protection from Abuse Act (PAA). The PAA offered a comprehensive definition of family violence, opened access to all family members, provided for a restraining order, and listed specific penalties for violation. The act includes provisions for temporary custody and support, ex parte orders, and eviction of the abuser from the household. (See Appendix C for a detailed review of state legislation.)

The very recent passage of the legislation lends further significance to an analysis of what took place in the family violence projects. The

range of problems and issues in implementing such legislation are mirrored in the project histories, particularly in the case of New York City, which was designed with the family court as its sole concern. Many major legislative changes took place during the course of the national program. Thus, most of the projects found themselves in the position of a newly established agency trying to work with newly enacted legislation.

## IMPLEMENTATION

### Type of Service

Table 6-10 illustrates the extent of project involvement in the civil court. Table 6-11 displays the type of assistance provided by each project. Those projects that did intervene in the protective order process with ancillary, attempted, or major services are reviewed below.

Table 6-10  
Project Emphasis on the Civil Court Process

	<u>Little or No Involvement</u>	<u>Ancillary Service</u>	<u>Attempted Service</u>	<u>Major Service</u>
Santa Barbara	X			
Cleveland			X	
New York City				X
Westchester	X			
Miami-DIP			X	
Miami-Safespace	X			
Fayetteville		X		
Brattleboro		X		
Philadelphia				X
Salem		X		

**Ancillary Service.** The Fayetteville, Salem, and Brattleboro projects all incorporated some assistance with the civil court process as an ancillary component of their overall service design.

- **Fayetteville.** Following the passage of the domestic violence legislation in 1979, the project's paralegal created a referral system to private attorneys who were willing to take abuse cases for reduced fees. The attorneys became frustrated when women decided to drop the civil action, and the paralegal subsequently instituted a more careful screening technique and relied more on informal settlements between clients. In its second year, the project retained an attorney who represented women for protective orders on a limited basis.
- **Salem.** Staff assisted women in filing temporary restraining orders and accompanied them to the hearings for final orders. In addition to court advocacy, staff attempted to induce police to enforce orders as required by Massachusetts law.

Table 6-11  
Type of Assistance in Obtaining Protective Orders

	Information and Referral	Court Accompaniment/ Advocacy	Legal Assistance
Santa Barbara			
Cleveland	X		(attempted)
New York City	X	X	
Westchester	X		
Miami-DIP	X		X
Miami-Safespace	X		
Fayetteville		X	
Brattleboro	X		X
Philadelphia			X
Salem	X	X	

- **Brattleboro.** The project assisted clients in completing protective order petitions, which up until the last year were available only in divorce actions. A law student initially acted as a paralegal and later trained other project staff in petition preparation. Legal Aid attorneys came to Brattleboro on a weekly basis to handle the court process on behalf of the project's clients.

**Attempted Service.** The Cleveland and Miami-DIP projects both made concerted efforts to implement domestic violence legislation passed in their states in 1979. Both attempts were largely thwarted.

- **Cleveland.** In response to the new legislation, the project hired an attorney to assist clients in obtaining protective orders through the civil court. The attorney was never able to establish a procedure whereby he could represent clients, because the Domestic Relations Court opted to follow its established custom of referring clients to private attorneys. The attorney resigned, and the project limited its subsequent involvement to providing information and referral to clients.
- **Miami-DIP.** DIP attempted to work with both judges and police officers in establishing case handling procedures and enforcement standards to make Florida's new civil protection remedy readily available to victims. The project also sought to directly assist victims in preparing and filing the necessary papers. At the close of the grant, it was still difficult for a victim to obtain a protective order, and police resistance made enforcement doubtful.

**Major Service.** Civil court intervention was a primary service focus of the projects located in New York City and Philadelphia.

- **New York City.** The project was designed to offer a number of direct services to clients of the Manhattan Family Court and to improve that court's response to domestic abuse cases. Services were to include needs assessment, explanation of civil and criminal court options, and, as requested, legal assistance and court accompaniment for the civil remedy. Never implemented as planned, the service was eventually scaled down to information, referral, and court accompaniment for the civil procedure.
- **Philadelphia.** The project's Legal Clinic component assisted victims through the civil court protective order system. Paralegals and student staff conducted client interviews and prepared petitions for those found eligible. Clients not found eligible for the civil remedies were referred to social service agencies and were advised about the criminal court recourse. Student staff were also stationed at police headquarters on weekends to assist with the paperwork for emergency protective orders. By the end of the first year, project attorney began to represent clients in court--a service that grew with the addition of attorneys in the second year.

Constraints to Implementation

Interventions in the civil court process were constrained by a number of conditions, including features of the new legislation, local procedural conventions, the timing of legislation, and project characteristics.

**Legislative Features.** The state laws governing protection of family members from abuse differed greatly. The major parameters of eligibility, filing procedures, provisions, and violations are displayed in tables 6-12 through 6-15. According to these parameters, the states can be roughly characterized as having strong, explicit protective legislation (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio) to weak (Vermont prior to 1979) or ambiguous (Florida).

The ambiguity and eligibility stipulations of Florida's legislation proved destructive for Miami-DIP. In addition to limiting access to spouses and stipulating a prior complaint filed with the police, the act did not specify filing procedures or violation penalties. Orders are at the court's discretion, without any guidelines; the duration of the order is unclear; and there are no enforcement provisions. DIP spent over a year working with the court and police, at the end of which, procedures had been only partially implemented and orders were averaging only five or six a month.

Table 6-12  
Domestic Violence Legislation: Eligibility Stipulations

	Married Persons Only	Other Stipulations
Santa Barbara		
Cleveland		
New York	X	
Miami	X	X
Fayetteville		
Brattleboro	X*	
Philadelphia		
Salem		

\*Includes formerly married persons; prior to 1980, divorce proceedings had to be concomitant.

Table 6-13  
Domestic Violence Legislation: Provisions

	Ex Parte Orders	Stop Violence	Custody/ Eviction	Visitation
Santa Barbara	X	X	X	X
Cleveland	X	X	X	X
New York	X	X		X
Miami	X			
Fayetteville	X	X	X	X
Brattleboro	X	X	X	X
Philadelphia	X	X	X	X
Salem	X	X	X	X

Table 6-14  
Domestic Violence Legislation:  
Protective Order Filing Procedures

	WHO FILES		
	Victim	Victim's Attorney	Undefined
Santa Barbara			X
Cleveland		X	
New York	X		
Miami			X
Fayetteville		X	
Brattleboro		X	
Philadelphia		X	
Salem	X		



Table 6-15  
Domestic Violation Legislation: Order Violations

		CLASSIFICATION			PENALTY		
		Contempt	Misde- meanor	Not Specified	Fine	Impris- onment	None or Not Defined
Cleveland				X	X	X	
New York				X		X	
Miami				X			X
Fayetteville	Civil						X
Salem			X		X	X	
Brattleboro				X			X
Philadelphia	Criminal				X	X	
Santa Barbara			X		X	X	

Procedural stipulations strongly affected the ultimate accessibility of legal remedies and proved a determinant of the projects' strategies for using the legislation. The inserting act for the Massachusetts legislation, for example, states that the chief justices of the superior, probate, and "district courts shall jointly promulgate a form of petition . . . which shall be simple and permit a person to file a petition himself" (ALM GL c209A section 6, emphasis added). In response to this provision, the Salem project created advocacy services using staff with no formal legal training to accompany women to court and assist them in filling out the form. By contrast, in states that required representation by an attorney, projects were obliged to retain attorneys or establish a referral system to private or legal services attorneys. The Salem project thus differed considerably from that in Philadelphia, which in the absence of a legislative mandate and established local court procedures, had to create a sophisticated component tantamount to a civil law office.

Although the power to charge violators of court orders with contempt is an inherent power of all courts, the legislative intent that violation of protective orders be a punishable offense had important ramifications for what police would (or could) do when they arrived on the scene of a domestic altercation in which the victim had a protective order. For those states that classify violations (e.g., criminal contempt, misdemeanor), there was little ambiguity. When a state merely terms the violation "contempt" or leaves it unspecified, however, the offense is left in the rather murky legal domaine of contempt.

One important distinction is that of civil contempt versus criminal contempt. Civil contempt is distinguished as not an "offense against

the dignity of the court, but against the party in whose behalf the mandate of the court was issued"; hence, the remedy of the court is to impose a fine or jail sentence to oblige the party to obey the mandate of the court (Black, 1968, p. 390). Criminal contempt, on the other hand, is construed as "offenses or injuries offered to the court, and a fine or imprisonment is imposed upon the contemnor for the purpose of punishment" (Black, 1968, p. 390; emphasis added).

In states such as Vermont and Florida, which lack legislative directives, common law principles and state case law determine the type of contempt imposed for a violation of a protective order. Ohio state law defines punishment for contempt (Revised Code section 2705.5) as a fine of up to \$500 or imprisonment for not more than ten days. Thus, although the Ohio domestic violence legislation is quite comprehensive, it has relatively trivial penalties attached to it.

The Pennsylvania legislation is one of the most explicit: it defines violation of a protective order as indirect criminal contempt and specifies penalties of up to six months in jail and a fine of up to \$1,000. The Philadelphia project was able to draw on the explicit nature of this law to exhort the police department to seriously enforce protective orders. New York is notable in that it does not classify the violation but does delineate a punishment.

In North Carolina, where there has been a long legal history of ambiguity around contempt proceedings, the Fayetteville project decided not to place much emphasis on protective orders.

**Local Procedural Conventions.** A project's ability to help victims obtain protective orders and to have violations punished also was affected by local conditions. In many sites, court conventions and procedures were resistant to project legal interventions or the new legislation itself. In Cleveland, for example, Domestic Relations Court judges refused to allow the project attorney to represent clients and insisted they use private or legal aid attorneys. The Dade County court resisted the new legislation based on the vagueness of the act, its failure to specify jurisdiction, and other shortcomings.

In Fayetteville, a combination of local procedures and circumstances made it virtually impossible to implement domestic violence legislation. The local legal services could not represent clients in domestic matters. Police were reluctant to inform victims of civil remedies and, project staff felt, would also be lax about enforcing orders. On the other hand, there was a criminal judge who was willing to cooperate with the diversion program. Thus, it proved simpler to concentrate on prosecution/diversion for severe cases and to effect informal agreements between partners in cases where the victim was uncertain about pursuing legal remedies.

**Timing of the Legislation.** Domestic violence legislation was passed or substantially amended during the course of five projects. Since many of the changes were unforeseeable, many of the projects' services were inconsistent with the new legislation. In Cleveland, for example, the project sought to implement a quasi-legal summons mechanism through the police despite the passage of legislation with strong police action mandates. Several projects (e.g., Fayetteville, Miami-DIP, Cleveland) altered or added services to work with the new legislation. The Vermont project focused much of its attention to bringing about change in domestic violence legislation, but by the time the changes were enacted, the project was in its final year.

Table 6-16  
When Domestic Violence Legislation Was  
Enacted or Substantially Amended

	<u>Pre-Project</u>	<u>Concurrent With Start-Up</u>	<u>During</u>
Santa Barbara			X
Cleveland		X	
New York	X		
Miami			X
Fayetteville			X
Brattleboro			X
Philadelphia	X		
Salem	X		

**Project Characteristics.** Among the project-related factors that operated as constraints to civil court impacts was the organizational auspice of the project. This was particularly evident in New York City, where the project was sponsored by the Henry St. Settlement House and was regarded by family court personnel as yet another social service agency with no particular prerogatives in the court system. From this weak institutional base, the project could not deliver its services effectively. The Miami-DIP and Philadelphia projects, both housed in district attorneys offices, encountered some resistance to the involvement of a project sponsored by a criminal justice agency working on a civil matter. The administrative judge of the Philadelphia family court refused the project's request that one judge be allocated for abuse cases to consolidate the caseload and facilitate representation.

The Cleveland and Miami-Safespace projects, both sponsored by victim/witness programs, had stronger ties to the criminal than the civil courts. The independent shelter programs (Salem and Brattleboro) found that their lack of formal ties to the court system gave them latitude: Salem developed a strong advocacy approach, and Brattleboro provided paralegal assistance and played a strong role in effecting legislative changes.

Philosophies of appropriate interventions in domestic violence also affected the emphasis that the projects placed on the civil courts and use of protective orders. The various approaches can be characterized as:

- deterrence through criminal justice sanctions
- psychological change for the woman
- psychological change for the abuser
- justice system protection for the victim

In reality, each project embraced a version of one or more of these approaches. The Westchester project was most clearly deterrence oriented and its use of protective order options for clients attached only with the filing of a formal complaint. Cleveland and Fayetteville, which focused on psychological change for both men and women, made an attempt to use the protective legislation but were easily frustrated by resistance. The Philadelphia project, at least in its feminist subcontractor components, was adamant about the obligation of the justice system to protect women and saw the protective order procedure as a means of forcing the issue. Over time, however, the project became increasingly skeptical of the efficacy of the protective orders.

#### The Case of Philadelphia

With the exception of Massachusetts, no state legislatively provided specific procedures for a victim of abuse to petition for a protective order herself. In the absence of such a mandate, procedures were created at the discretion of the local courts. In Philadelphia, for example, court procedures strongly discouraged *pro se* representation, virtually requiring that the petition for a protective order be completed and filed by an attorney and that both plaintiff and defendant be represented by attorneys at the court hearing. Given that the Pennsylvania legislation (Protection from Abuse Act) has been used as the model domestic violence legislation, the Philadelphia case provides an important study of the complexity of implementation.

**Filing a Petition for a Protective Order.** The protective order process in Philadelphia--from inception to enforcement--involved a coordinated

effort between courts, attorneys, and police. As the project evolved, it became clear that much of this coordination was very difficult to achieve. Listed below are the steps of the petition- filing and hearing process.

1. The project legal clinic files a petition with a Family Court judge, who issues a temporary (ex parte) order.
2. The defendant is served (by the county sheriff or writ server) with the temporary order, which lists a hearing date within ten days from the date of issuance of the order.
3. The plaintiff (in the interim) has received her copy of the temporary order from the legal clinic and has been advised on counsel by a legal clinic, community legal services, or private attorney.
4. A hearing is held before a Family Court judge, where both defendant and plaintiff must appear with respective counsel.
5. If the petition is granted, a copy is sent for inclusion on the police computer.

The Legal Clinic was designed to handle only step 1 and to refer clients either to legal aid or a private attorney. It soon became apparent, however, that this plan would not work. Many of the battered women came to the clinic disoriented from their experiences and were unable to follow through with a set of instructions that directed them to yet another agency and then to the courts. The movement from agency to agency also seemed to augment the reluctance battered women exhibit to take steps against the abuser. With no one to follow through on whether clients contacted an attorney, many of them failed to make their court appearances. The clinic's credibility suffered as judges noted its name on the petition and faulted the clinic for failing to withdraw the case.

Coordination with writ servers also proved problematic. Sheriffs often failed to notify the Legal Clinic that they had been unable to serve orders. Even when the defendant was served, it was often so late in the 10-day period between the issuance of the order and the court hearing date that the defendant had difficulty retaining an attorney. Delays in serving the defendant and in his obtaining counsel led to postponements of hearings.

As a result of these problems, the Legal Clinic began to represent clients for whom they had filed petitions. Additional support staff, a second full-time attorney, and certified law students (who were able to represent clients in court) were added in the project's second year. Eventually, Philadelphia's legal services for battered women became concentrated in the family violence project, and the local legal aid offices virtually stopped filing petitions and representing these

victims. Data on filings of protective order petitions illustrate this outcome: during its first month of operations, the Legal Clinic filed 25 percent of the county's abuse petitions; 14 months later, that figure was 81 percent.

**The Court Hearing.** The extent to which victims gain protection from the civil court system depends in large degree on the judges within that system and the premises that they use in interpreting the law. Interviews with judges from the Philadelphia Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas\* revealed that, while many supported the PAA and were sympathetic toward victims, several judges:

- questioned the validity of the new legislation;
- were skeptical that any serious intrafamily violence occurs;
- imposed qualifications on the amount/kind of abuse necessary for the issuance of a protective order;
- had serious qualms about issuing an eviction with a protective order (many limiting such provisions to cases involving violence on the level of felonious assault);
- questioned plaintiff motivation in seeking protective orders (some suspecting that women were trying to build grounds for a divorce settlement or to cover their own misdoings); and
- had qualms about affecting the balance of power in marriages (i.e., giving the woman the "unfair advantage" of being able to threaten the man with a violation charge if he failed to comply with her demands).

This variation in attitudes toward domestic violence and the protective legislation made it difficult to advise clients. The project was obliged to adopt the court's criteria for severity and usually did not try to obtain an eviction unless a felony level assault had occurred. Attempts to change judicial attitudes met with little success: one training session was held but was poorly attended. As the judges did not hold regular meetings, there was no on-going forum in which to work.

Staffing shortages (both in project attorneys and judges) and court procedures further limited victim access to the new protection. Domestic violence cases were listed before 12 judges in separate

\*Midway through the Philadelphia project, seven judges were interviewed in an open-ended format about their evaluation of the Protection from Abuse Act, ideas of causation of family violence, and opinion of the project.

locations, which made it difficult for project staff (initially only one attorney) to keep all court appearances and led to cancellations. The project and Community Legal Services tried repeatedly to have these cases consolidated before one judge and listed on certain days of the week. Their attempts were thwarted by judges' attitudes, a shortage of judges, and concomittant case overload throughout the court. Domestic violence cases, coming as they were on such short (10-day) notice, were listed among judges' regular caseloads and treated as extra ad hoc matters so as to enable the court to keep abreast of its remaining caseload.

Given these attitudinal, procedural, and staffing constraints, the Legal Clinic could not ensure easy access to a protective order. Although the legislation was intended to provide a mechanism that would both protect victims and prevent further abuse, in practice protective orders were filed only for those who had experienced severe, repeat violence. The final year's figures from the project are illustrative: the clinic filed petitions for less than one-fourth of its clients; 43 percent of the final orders issued contained eviction clauses (indicating the level of violence had been quite severe). The criminal courts remained far more accessible to victims of domestic abuse.

**Enforcement of Orders.** A major factor in the efficacy of restraining orders, enforcement can take the form of an immediate police response and arrest of the batterer or can entail filing of contempt charges by the victim, thus commencing a court hearing. Pennsylvania's was the only legislation to specifically provide for the arrest of the violator on probable cause even when the violation is not witnessed by the police.

Once a final protective order was issued, the police had to be informed of its existence. Entering the order in the police computer proved routine, but there were delays in giving the police instructions about arrest and charging procedures. It took six months to issue a revised police directive detailing the Protection from Abuse Act. The directive proved too cursory, and the project prepared an elaborate procedures manual. By the close of the project, the manual had still not been implemented. The result was that, despite the legislative mandate, police in Philadelphia were sporadic in their enforcement of protective orders, as revealed in informal reports from clinic clients.

## Impacts

There are three perspectives from which project intervention in the civil courts/restraining order process must be examined:

- System impact--implementation of new or changed discretionary practices in case handling;
- Legislative impact--the creation of new or alterations in existing legislation as a result of project efforts; and
- Impact on the criminal justice system--the effect of civil remedies on the criminal courts.

**System Impact.** Two of the programs, Philadelphia and Miami-DIP, had concrete and probably lasting effects on the civil court system.

### Philadelphia:

- Emergency protective orders--As a result of the project's lobbying efforts, the presiding judge of the Court of Common Pleas issued an administrative order effectively altering the Protection from Abuse Act to enable lower court (Municipal Court) judges to serve as Common Pleas judges for the purpose of issuing emergency protective orders on weekday nights. Prior to the new ruling, emergency orders were only available on weekends, and a victim beaten on a week night was obliged to wait for a week to ten days before receiving a protective order.
- Centralized representation and legal counseling--The project's Legal Clinic provided a central location to which all victims of domestic violence could be referred for advice, filing of papers, and legal representation.

### Miami-DIP:

- Drafting new procedures--The project formulated and coordinated procedures for the courts and police to use for restraining orders.
- Restraining order service--The project screened victims wishing to obtain restraining orders and helped them through the court process.

While these procedures and services were at best a qualified success, they constituted the beginnings of legislative implementation.

**Legislative Impact.** In two states, Vermont and Florida, project staff and board members were active in effecting legislative changes that were enacted during the demonstration program. The Vermont legis-

lative changes, significantly more powerful and broader than previous provisions, eliminated the requirement of concurrent divorce action and made ex parte orders available. The changes in the Miami legislation were far less comprehensive.

**Impacts on the Criminal Justice System.** Implementing civil protective legislation held the potential for two primary impacts on the criminal process: (1) it could deflect victims from prosecuting batterers, and (2) violators of protective orders could enter the criminal courts.

- **Decreased Criminal Prosecution of Batterers**—The only project to have a concerted effort for civil relief and prosecution was Philadelphia. Comparison of two years of data show that there was a non-trivial decline in the percentage of spousal private criminal complaints during the year in which the project civil legal component became operational. This change can be attributed in part to screening practices by which virtually all married victims were referred to the legal clinic. However, any victim who was dissatisfied with the civil remedy was told about the criminal process and helped to file a criminal complaint. In practice, very few victims exercised this option. This evidence points to a possible longer range effect of civil measures recently enacted throughout the country.

- **Prosecuting Violations of Orders**—In those states with protective legislation that specifies that the violation of a protective order is a misdemeanor (see table 6-15), the case is effectively removed from the civil to the criminal system for prosecution. Even where the violation is not a misdemeanor, contempt proceedings could result in criminal court involvement. In practice, prosecuting for violations of protective orders was problematic across sites.

In California, for example, willful and knowing violation of orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and the Family Law Act (dissolution of marriage, separation and annulment proceedings) is a misdemeanor punishable by six months imprisonment or a maximum fine of \$500 or both. Despite this available sanction, the Santa Barbara district attorney was initially unwilling to prosecute violators of restraining orders. He later reversed his stance, but there is no record of the number of such prosecutions.

In Pennsylvania, the PAA specified that violations be tried in family court as indirect criminal contempt. Due to a lack of attorneys to represent women, the Philadelphia special prosecutor circumvented this mandate by instructing police to charge violators with substantive acts, thus enabling her to initiate criminal proceedings.

## Conclusions

### LAW ENFORCEMENT

The experiences of these ten family violence projects illustrate how difficult it is to get police to criminalize domestic violence, i.e., to treat it in the same manner as nonfamilial assaults. Similarly, police documentation practices are impervious to change in the absence of legislative or comparable mandate. Procedural changes, however, are easier and potentially less volatile to effect than attitudinal changes. Shelter projects were able to establish cooperative relations with police with relative ease since, if for no other reason, they offered police a viable and concrete victim option. Finally, a decrease in repeat calls to police is evidenced when victims are assisted by special domestic violence services.

### CRIMINAL COURTS

Special prosecutors are most effective if they are in a special unit with support staff. Contrary to common myths about the impossibility of prosecuting these cases, special domestic violence prosecutors can reduce attrition and acquittal rates in spousal abuse cases. Moreover, advocacy and victim/witness services "mark" domestic violence cases as serious and improve case handling. Diversion programs are critically influenced by their institutional auspice and credibility among system agents. Absent prior diversion system and/or staff experience with such programs, diversion projects are extremely difficult to implement.

### CIVIL COURTS

Implementation of civil domestic violence legislation is very difficult due, in large part, to the multiplicity of justice system linkages



required. Furthermore, features of the legislation itself can present severe barriers to its implementation. Finally, the recency of such legislation and the concomitant period needed for interpretation and action to "filter down" to community agents impeded the ability of the projects to effect changes within this arena.

## 7 Institutionalization Of Family Violence Services

This chapter develops two distinct yet interrelated themes: (1) the ways in which services for victims and perpetrators were implemented, changed and institutionalized, and (2) the factors influencing organizational development of the family violence projects over the funding period. Earlier evaluation reports (Fagan et al., 1980) documented the numerous obstacles the family violence projects encountered during the initial phases of operation. The details of local constraints on the projects' services and a close examination of the process of institutionalization are provided in the case studies. This chapter highlights the key factors affecting organizational development and service institutionalization in the ten projects studied in depth and relates these to the outcomes of the projects following cessation of federal funding.\*

The first section of the chapter examines the services offered by the projects, beginning with a review of the type of services offered and the evolution of these services over the life of the projects. This section explores factors influencing changes in the services and presents information on which services survived termination of grant funds. This analysis contributes to an understanding of the strategies used by projects to incorporate their services into the local justice and social service systems.

The second section identifies the major variables affecting the development and institutionalization of the family violence projects. The section begins with a discussion of the organizational models of the projects and reviews changes in the models over the course of federal funding. The following variables had a major impact on the history of the particular projects: ability to establish "domain" (an area of

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\*Information is current as of the summer of 1980, approximately six months following termination of LEAA support.

acknowledged expertise), project leadership, organizational issues, sponsorship, ideology and resources. These factors are discussed for each of the projects.

As the case studies illustrate, there is no correlation in many cases among successful implementation of the project as a viable, well-functioning organization, the outcomes of institutionalization of project services and continuation of the organization. Several of the projects which had considerable difficulty defining their service domain and functioning as an organization were nonetheless able to secure continuation funding. Most services which survived into the final year of funding were continued by subsequent funding streams.

It is important to emphasize in this chapter the many differences which existed among the projects. The projects varied in organizational structure, type of and relationship to sponsoring agency, services offered, project leadership, available resources, and the environment of other service and justice agencies in which they existed. While such differences constrain our ability to generalize across projects, this analytic framework nevertheless provides a perspective from which policy and program implications can be drawn. The policy implications discussed in the summary will focus on those factors which facilitated or prevented implementation of services and which helped or hampered organizational functioning.

## The Institutionalization of Services

### OVERVIEW

Over the course of the Family Violence Program, the direct services the various projects offered evolved and changed. A number of the services grant writers had planned failed to begin in the first year and were eliminated by Year II. The content of all the services changed over the course of the projects' life. These changes took place for a number of reasons:

- constraints and pressures from outside agencies (police, courts, social service, etc.);
- explicit guidance and direction from the federal grant monitor;

- constraints from LEAA program goals;
- influence from the local sponsor;
- expressed victim needs;
- increased knowledge and sophistication in dealing with domestic violence victims.

Sponsors, local agencies and the federal government all directed and channeled the family violence projects into what they considered appropriate directions. Sometimes the pressures arose from "turf" issues where the family violence projects were seen as impinging on the prerogatives of other agencies. This was especially acute when the family violence projects attempted to work in conjunction with the police (see Cleveland and Miami-DIP case studies). In other cases, agencies curbed the scope of the projects' activities. For example, in Philadelphia the Family Court succeeded in curtailing the number of cases the project brought to court. The federal grant monitor also exerted a good deal of control over the scope of activities. An instance of this can be found in the diversion programs. Many of the projects wished to include batterers, who were not under court mandate, in their counseling groups. The grant monitor would not authorize project funds to be spent for non-divertees. The grant monitor also played a direct role in reshaping the direction of the New York City and Cleveland projects.

The wide scope of the LEAA program goals also affected service development. The projects were constrained from focusing all their attention and resources on direct services as they were obliged to work simultaneously on outreach and training efforts despite limited funding. The projects with a social service orientation were continuously urged to give attention to linkages with the criminal justice system.

Growing knowledge and expertise in the area of domestic violence also led to the alteration of services. Most staff had had little or no prior experience with domestic violence victims. The programs themselves were created using experimental treatment or service delivery models and were designed with flexibility in mind. Thus services were altered over the course of the funding cycle. One major impetus for change came from the domestic violence victims themselves; the project clients were quite explicit in demands for additional or different sorts of services.

Tables 7-1 and 7-2 summarize the results of the attempts to implement and continue services during the term of the LEAA funding. Certain services--diversion, police crisis intervention, and special prosecution--proved quite difficult to implement. Police crisis intervention caused such extensive implementation problems that all attempts were eventually abandoned. Other services, once implemented, were dropped in favor of more appropriate or simply more workable alternatives.

Table 7-1  
Direct Services--Implementation (Year One)

	Shelter	Victim Counslg.	Civil Advocacy	Crim. Advocacy	Special Prosec.	Mediation	Police Crisis Intervent.	Diversion
New York City		+	+					(+)
Brattleboro	+	+	+	+				
Safespace	+	+						
Cleveland		+				+		(+)
Fayetteville	+	+	+	+				(+)
Salem	+	+	+	+	+			
White Plains				+	+			
Miami--DIP		+					(+)	+
Philadelphia		+	+	+	(+)			(+)
Santa Barbara	/+/ /+/	/+/ /+/			+			+

+ = service implemented and delivered to clients  
(+) = service attempted but not fully operationalized  
/ = service not included in evaluation

Table 7-2  
Direct Services--Development (Years Two and Three)

	Shelter	Victim Counslg.	Civil Advocacy	Crim. Advocacy	Special Prosec.	Mediation	Police Crisis Intervent.	Diversion
New York City		+	+					( )
Brattleboro	+	+	+	+				
Safespace	+	+	*					*
Cleveland		+	(*)	*		( )	(+)	
Fayetteville	+	+	+	+				+
Salem	+	+	+	+	( )			+
White Plains		*		+	+			/*/
Miami--DIP		+	*				( )	+
Philadelphia		+	+	+	+			(+)
Santa Barbara	/+/ /+/	/+/ /+/	*	*	( )			+

+ = service continued  
(+) = service attempted but not implemented  
( ) = service or attempt to implement service dropped  
\* = new service  
/+/ = service not included in evaluation

Mediation, for example, emerged as an inappropriate intervention with most domestic disputants and was dropped in the second year. Several of the projects replaced special prosecution efforts with other services. Finally, some of the projects added civil and criminal advocacy efforts as well as additional counseling services as the need was manifested during implementation.

Beyond implementation delays, additions, and deletions, virtually all services evolved substantively as well. This evolution and the factors that influenced it are examined below for each major service.

## SHELTER

Five of the ten case study projects offered shelter services to victims of family violence--Brattleboro, Miami-Safespace, Fayetteville, Salem and Santa Barbara.\* Of these, only Brattleboro did not survive the termination of federal funding. Three areas--childcare, shelter internal management, and counseling--emerged as common problems for all the projects. As discussed below, most of these problems stemmed from lack of experience both with the difficulties encountered by victims emerging from a battering incident and in managing a group-home environment.

## Management

The amount of time and effort needed to manage the daily activities of a shelter had been severely underestimated by project planners. Little thought was given to organization of such basics as cleaning the shelter and preparing food; most planners had assumed that clients would be able to handle such matters with little structure or supervision from staff. Such optimism proved unfounded and, over the course of their development, all of the shelters evaluated moved toward a more strictly managed environment. Rules solidified and procedures became more defined.

Staff roles within the shelter were also restructured, especially in the Brattleboro and Salem shelters which were organized originally as collectives with shared decision-making responsibilities. Both evolved toward a hierarchical structure with roles and tasks more strictly

\*The Santa Barbara shelters were not included in the URSA Institute evaluation as they were not funded by LEAA.

delineated after undergoing a similar management crisis at the end of the first year. In both cases, staff had neglected shelter living conditions in their preoccupation with other project activities, including fundraising for grant match-funds. Staff resolved the crisis by allocating more time to the shelter and creating more structured staff responsibilities for shelter management.

Fayetteville and Miami-Safespace also underwent shelter management shifts in the early part of the project and ultimately found experienced managers for the shelters.

**Counseling**

All the shelters experienced problems in providing responsive therapy for shelter clients. Overworked staff found it difficult to make time for counseling sessions. Moreover, a short-term treatment model suitable for clients in crisis was difficult to construct. Brattleboro staff found it problematic to refer shelter clients to therapists at local mental health agencies whom they saw as having "blame the victim" viewpoints. Ultimately former shelter clients in Brattleboro formed their own peer support group which later evolved into a separate organization to provide peer counseling to battering victims.

In Salem, staff underwent a change in attitude toward counseling. Initially they decided not to include counseling services in the shelter as they reasoned that simple removal of the woman from the battering situation would be sufficient. However, in response to client requests for counseling, such services were instituted in the second year.

The development of counseling methods is discussed in the following section, "Victim Counseling."

**Child Care**

Only one shelter planner had foreseen the need for special staff to work with and counsel children. All the shelters soon found that the child residents (whether or not they had been directly involved in the battering episode) were agitated and needed special attention. The adult clients, themselves in a state of emotional crisis, were often unable to provide the attention their children required. Some of the shelters were able to hire additional staff to work with the children, while others were not able to secure the extra funds.

**VICTIM COUNSELING**

Victim counseling was the most pervasive and widely utilized service in the family violence demonstration projects. The projects offered three distinct types of counseling services: hotline counseling, option counseling, and various forms of therapy. Although all projects counseled victims in some fashion, not all provided each type (see table 7-3).

Table 7-3  
Counseling Services by Project

	Hotline	Option/I&R	Therapy
New York City		X	
Brattleboro	X	X	X
Safespace	X		X
Cleveland			X
Fayetteville		X	X
Salem	X		X
White Plains		X	
Miami--DIP			X
Philadelphia		X	
Santa Barbara	/X/	/X/	/X/

/X/ = Service not included in evaluation.

**Hotline**

Three of the shelters (Salem, Safespace, and Brattleboro) offered hotline assistance to victims of family violence. However, the shelters found that providing this service contributed to staff and volunteer burnout. This was especially true for Miami, where hotline staff worked nights for low pay and little opportunity to advance. The hotline, nevertheless, proved an essential service in that it enabled the project to intervene during the actual incident and arrange for the victim to be transported to the safety of the shelter.

**Option Counseling**

Option counseling spanned the gamut from crisis intervention--when a client came to a project office in an extremely agitated state--to information and referral (I&R) provision. I&R involved discussing

services and service providers with the client and either setting up an appointment for her or providing her with names, telephone numbers and addresses. Often an I&R session would turn into a crisis counseling session when the client became distraught over her situation.

Projects which were not initially conceived of as counseling projects were obliged to turn, at least partially, toward providing such services. In White Plains, for example, the project was originally oriented strictly toward prosecution of batterers. Staff soon found that women who were unable to prosecute (either due to the merits of the case or their own personal desires) nonetheless needed help. The project developed I&R capacities and networks in accordance with the demand.

The New York City project was originally designed as an advocacy project to inform victims of the full range of civil and criminal recourses for domestic violence victims and to actively assist with the civil or criminal judicial process. Stymied by recalcitrant court personnel, the project direct services evolved into an information and referral service and option counseling.

The services provided by the Philadelphia civil Legal Clinic staff and criminal paralegal also changed over the course of the project. Prior to LEAA funding, volunteers had provided social service oriented option counseling to victims who sought assistance from the District Attorney's office. Once the grant began, the options counseling took on a more legal-options orientation. During the second year of the grant, there was a return to including social service options in the counseling. This was due in part to a growing skepticism on the part of staff of the efficacy of legal remedies. Social workers from another agency were stationed in the Legal Clinic in the second year and provided crisis intervention as well as option counseling.

In Brattleboro, project staff maintained office hours for drop-in clients and were available at all hours for crisis calls and visits to clients. These services continued throughout the term of the grant.

In Fayetteville, counseling services were offered out of the project's central office. Counseling ranged from option counseling to more therapeutically oriented sessions. The option approach developed in response to client need (see discussion below).

#### Therapy

The two Miami projects, Brattleboro, Fayetteville and Salem (beginning Year II) all offered counseling or therapy services to project clients.

Two of the projects, Fayetteville and Miami-DIP, had planned extensive therapeutic interventions with both victims and batterers. The Fayetteville project found that it had to drastically readjust its model of therapy to meet the short-term crisis needs of battered women. According to the director of that project:

The philosophical underpinnings of counseling as it is traditionally practiced is to make people well. We learned quickly that we could not do this for our client population. What they requested and what we provided was information and options regarding ways to stop the violence. Counseling under these circumstances becomes an evaluation of the client's situation and an assessment of her service needs.

Thus, in Fayetteville counseling goals and expectations were scaled down. The project found that a very small percentage of its female clients actually entered into a multi-session therapeutic relationship with the counselors.

The DIP project was able to conduct more intensive therapy, although directed toward batterers as well as victims. This project had originally envisioned that it would have a subcontracting arrangement for therapists who would train its counselors. However, after the first year it became apparent that a permanent staff with more sophisticated therapeutic skills was necessary, and such therapists were hired directly. DIP expanded its counseling services in the final year to include abusers groups and victims groups. The type of therapy varied with the skill of the counselor and the need of the client; however, medium-term counseling with a goal of achieving personal growth was the most extensive therapy offered. Staff did not attempt long-term therapy, nor did they focus on characterological change.

As mentioned previously, the Salem and Brattleboro projects in response to client demands provided more therapy than they had originally envisioned.

#### CIVIL COURT ADVOCACY

Seven of the projects--New York City, Brattleboro, Safespace, Miami-DIP, Salem, Fayetteville and Philadelphia--provided some form of civil advocacy. Although all of these projects provided assistance with protective orders and made referrals for divorce and child custody issues, the degree and type of involvement varied considerably. (Civil advocacy is discussed at length in chapters 3 and 6.)



For most of the projects, civil advocacy changed over the life of the project. In New York City, where civil court advocacy was the central focus of the project, civil court staff thwarted the project from providing the planned civil/criminal options counseling. Following a brief attempt at advocacy and court accompaniment, the project became an I&R service. The Philadelphia project, designed to provide legal assistance to victims seeking restraining orders, complied with pressures from the family court to keep down the numbers of clients for whom it filed protective orders; its role turned from pure advocacy to a screening function. Philadelphia was also obliged to represent clients in court as the availability of legal aid attorneys diminished. In Brattleboro and Miami-DIP features of the domestic violence legislation itself limited the extent to which it could effectively be used. Miami-DIP expended a great deal of time developing procedures for the issuance and enforcement of restraining orders; by the close of the grant funding, these procedures were just beginning to be utilized.

Fayetteville also became involved in the civil process: it retained an attorney in the second year to aid victims to obtain restraining orders. The project's paralegal gave information on divorce and child custody and made referrals to attorneys.

Salem was the only project whose advocacy role remained as implemented. Advocates from the Salem project accompanied women to court and aided them to complete the forms needed to secure a restraining order.

#### CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVOCACY

The Philadelphia, White Plains, Brattleboro, Cleveland, Fayetteville and Santa Barbara projects all gave assistance to victims who wished to prosecute batterers. At the beginning of the Family Violence Program, the Philadelphia project was the only one with a staff position designated solely for advocacy in the criminal justice system. The Philadelphia criminal paralegal's job was to guide victims through the filing of private criminal complaints (for misdemeanor non-arrest assaults) and the pretrial hearing. Over the course of the Family Violence Program, other projects began to designate staff for similar functions and the Philadelphia project itself obtained another part-time advocate to aid victims with felony prosecutions.

In Santa Barbara, the special prosecutor position was eliminated after the first year (see below) and in its place two positions for paralegal prosecution advocates were created. They counseled victims who wished to prosecute and accompanied them through

court hearings. Fayetteville's paralegal was originally supposed to facilitate implementation of the diversion program. However, when that program failed to start in Year I, the paralegal began to devote attention to victims who wished to prosecute.

The Cleveland project became involved in the criminal courts only during the last year of LEAA funding. They provided advocacy services for prosecution cases referred to them from the Victim/Witness Program. Originally designed as an early intervention program (i.e., aiding victims prior to their involvement with the legal system), the Cleveland project was obliged to move into victim/witness work when the requisite client numbers failed to materialize for early intervention efforts.

Paralegal staff from the White Plains project counseled victims who decided to prosecute. They explained court procedures to them although they did not do court accompaniment work.

Overall, the family violence projects found that much of the advocacy work with victims involved in the criminal courts revolved around explaining their rights and options, informing them of exactly what the court process entails, and giving them emotional support through court appearances. In the experience of some of the projects, such assistance to victims proved more effective than had special prosecutors.

#### SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

At the inception of the Family Violence Program, four of the projects had special prosecutors. However, by Year II, the special prosecutor was dropped from the Salem and Santa Barbara projects. Both of these projects made the decision that grant resources could be more productively used in other areas. Low caseloads and difficulty in obtaining convictions contributed to the decision to drop the special prosecutor from these projects.

However, these problems were overcome by the White Plains and Philadelphia projects where techniques for screening clients were developed and winnable cases constructed (see chapter 6 for details). These projects learned that complaining witnesses had to be properly prepared for the court experience and carefully briefed for testimony. As discussed earlier, the fact that the Philadelphia and White Plains project were sponsored by the District Attorney's Office facilitated case handling procedures and helped guarantee sufficient client numbers.

MEDIATION

The Cleveland project initially focused on mediation as a way of stopping violence between disputants. However; the mediation procedure was curtailed and finally eliminated when it was found that clients were not receptive to it. The project found that the strong emotions and overall relationship arising in battering situations were not amenable to the rational process of mediation. The project also learned that mediation agreements were difficult to uphold in light of the great power differential between victim and abuser.

POLICE CRISIS INTERVENTION

Both the Cleveland and Miami-DIP projects planned joint domestic violence crisis intervention with the police. Miami-DIP intended to have trained crisis counselors accompany police to the scene of a domestic violence incident, while the Cleveland project wanted to have hot-line counselors stationed in the police radio room to counsel abuse victims calling for police assistance. Due to turf disputes between the police and the projects (detailed in chapter 6), both attempts to do this sort of crisis intervention met with failure.

DIVERSION

Of the five family violence projects (Miami-DIP, Fayetteville, Salem, Cleveland, and Santa Barbara) which successfully implemented a diversion counseling program, only Miami-DIP and Santa Barbara were able to implement their services from the beginning of the grant. The other programs experienced considerable delays in creating referral links with the courts.

After experimenting with a number of counseling strategies, the projects found that a short-term behaviorally oriented therapy focusing on achieving discrete goals proved most effective. As discussed in detail in chapter 6, the projects had difficulty keeping control over abusers who did not fulfill the terms of their diversion agreements.

The White Plains project introduced an innovative program by linking with another agency to which diversion cases were sent for counseling.

SUMMARY

Table 7-4 shows the array of direct services which were institutionalized following termination of federal funding. With the exception of the Brattleboro project and the Philadelphia special prosecutor, all of the services which were implemented and carried into the second and third years of the projects received continuation funding. This is consistent with the findings in chapter 6, that policy impacts in the justice system occurred primarily in the projects' first year. Obviously, the survival of projects and their impacts in their early years are critical. However, as discussed in the next section, the continuation of services was related to the organizational development and fate of the projects.

Table 7-4  
Direct Services—Post-Federal Support

	Shelter	Diversion	Special Prosec.	Crim. Advocacy	Civil Advocacy	Victim Counselg.	Mediation	Police Crisis Intervent.
New York City					+	+		
Brattleboro	/	( )		/	/	/		
Safespace	+				+	+		
Cleveland		+		+	+	+	(+)	( )
Fayetteville	+	+		+	+	+		
Salem	+	+	(+)	+	+	+		
White Plains		+	+	+		+		
Miami--DIP		+			+	+		( )
Philadelphia		( )	/	+	+	+		
Santa Barbara	+	+	(+)	+	+	+		

- + = service continued
- / = service discontinued at end of federal program
- (+) = service dropped earlier
- ( ) = service never implemented

# Organizational Development and Continuation

As noted in chapter 3, there were three different organizational forms:

- Subcontractor/interagency coordination model. These projects were characterized by a central administrative unit which managed direct service subcontractors located in other agencies. The Miami-DIP and Philadelphia administrative units managed newly created services while Santa Barbara administered a combination of pre-existing and new services.
- A new, nonprofit organization. Salem and Brattleboro were both newly created organizations. However, in Brattleboro the project was the offshoot of an existing women's center.
- Special unit/project in an existing agency. Social service and criminal justice agencies created (or continued) units and special projects in response to the family violence funding. Miami-Safespace, Fayetteville, White Plains, New York City, and Cleveland were all formed in this way.

The organizational forms were designed in response to the LEAA goal of "demonstration of an effective mechanism for (inter)institutional coordination." Therefore, the configuration of organizational types represents an attempt to conform to the expectation that the family violence projects would play a brokerage role between agencies.

All three of the organizational types encountered difficulties during the start-up period; however, the subcontractor model proved the most problematic. Ultimately, the subcontractor organizations changed to resemble a conglomeration of semi-independent units (Santa Barbara, Philadelphia) or else eliminated some of the sub-contracted services and began to function as a domestic violence unit within an agency (Miami-DIP).

Organizational changes occurred over the life of the LEAA funding and immediately following the cessation of federal monies. Table 7-5 below shows the original organizational form of the family violence projects, and table 7-6 illustrates the post-LEAA form. Only half the projects kept the same organizational form after the termination of federal funds. However, with the exception of Brattleboro, all the family violence projects successfully maintained themselves after federal funds ceased.

Table 5-5  
Original Organizational Form

	Subcontractor	Unit of Agency	Independent
New York City		X	
Brattleboro			X
Safespace		X	
Cleveland		X	
Fayetteville		X	
Salem			X
White Plains		X	
Miami-DIP	X		
Philadelphia	X		
Santa Barbara	X		

During the implementation and subsequent development stages, a number of factors emerged which proved central to the success of the projects and affected their continuation once federal funding ceased.

Table 7-6  
Organizational Form--Post-LEAA Funding

	Services Dispersed within an Agency	Unit of Original Agency	Unit in New Agency	Inde-pendent	Sub-contractor	No FVP
New York City			X			
Brattleboro						X
Safespace		X				
Cleveland	X					
Fayetteville		X				
Salem				X		
White Plains		X				
Miami-DIP					X	
Philadelphia			X			
Santa Barbara			X	X		

Among the most critical factors were:

- Problems with the organizational model
- Successful establishment of a "domain"\*
- Project leadership (including issues of planning, fundraising, internal management, and linkage development)
- Sponsorship
- Ideology
- Resources

The influence of each factor on organizational outcome is discussed below.

## THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

The three organizational types--subcontractors, independent non-profits, and the special units (within larger agencies)--all dealt with issues particular to their form of organization.

### Subcontractor Projects

Two of the subcontractor projects met with the most organizational difficulties. In neither Philadelphia nor Miami-DIP were agreements between subcontractors and sponsoring agencies fully elaborated in advance. Consequently, questions of subcontractor autonomy and the authority of the project administrator led to months of bitter disputes. The attempt to create and implement new services was particularly difficult in the absence of clear leadership and direction. Both projects were plagued by questions of authority: was the director the administrator or merely a coordinator of services and activities? In Miami-DIP, the hierarchy problems eased following the resignation of the first director. However, the Philadelphia project never resolved these issues, and the project was plagued by lack of internal coordination and much duplication of effort between the components. Partly as a result of management problems, the range of services in

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\*"Domain" here refers to specific areas of competence claimed, tasks performed, and services rendered by an organization. Established domain refers to the recognition of a project's area of competence and services by most of the other agencies in a project's operating environment. See: Cook, 1977; Levine and White, 1961; Benson, 1975.

both Miami-DIP and Philadelphia was curtailed over the course of the grant.

The Santa Barbara project had a less ambitious role planned for the administrative unit, and many of its service components had already been operationalized prior to the federal program. The role of its administrative unit was diminished in the second year of the grant in anticipation of spinning off the components.

The resolution of the subcontracting problems had consequences for the final organizational form of these family violence projects. Santa Barbara's dispersion of project components was by design: the administrative unit was phased out gradually over the course of the grant and each of the components became independent. In Philadelphia the subcontractors each functioned fairly independently; however, only the legal clinic and the criminal paralegal obtained continuation funds under the auspices of the subcontractor. Miami-DIP continued as a subcontracting project, but functioned as a single unit.

### Independent Nonprofits

Very different kinds of organizational issues confronted Salem and Brattleboro. Sponsored by feminist constituencies, both projects incorporated ideas of collective management and minimal role differentiation into the design of the project. Over the course of the funding period, the projects moved to a more hierarchical structure and a stricter differentiation of roles and duties. Part of the decision to change in this direction was engendered by the need to maximize staff efficiency in the face of pressures from clients and performance demands from LEAA. For Salem, this change permitted effective work on fundraising; for Brattleboro, it led to the resolution of internal management difficulties and better shelter operations. However, these changes did not significantly affect survival of the Brattleboro project (see discussion of "Resources" below).

### Special Unit

The five projects that were units of larger agencies faced yet a different set of organizational issues. These projects had to grapple with their relationship to their sponsoring agency. The directors had to steer a course between establishing a separate organizational identity for the family violence project and maintaining good working relations with their superiors in the parent agency, to whom they were tied for resources and legitimacy in the community.

The degree to which this became an organizational issue varied from project to project but had no significant effect on project develop-

ment. The only exceptions were Miami-Safespace and Cleveland, where the project directors were leaders in the sponsoring agencies as well. This fact facilitated relations with the larger community, but also contributed to the Cleveland project's failure to establish a separate identity.

Despite the connection with the sponsoring agency, continuation funding was not assured for all the projects. White Plains and Miami-Safespace were obliged to raise their own funds, and New York City was assumed by a new agency which changed its service focus. Cleveland became part of the Victim/Witness program which had sponsored it and changed its services accordingly.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF DOMAIN

An initial, crucial task of the family violence projects was to demarcate an area among service providers and justice agencies in which they were the recognized experts. The experiences of shelters and justice-related components differed significantly in the establishment of domain.

##### Shelters

The shelter components of all projects succeeded in establishing their domain fairly readily because they entered a service vacuum: there had previously been no emergency housing for adult battering victims. Shelter was a noncontroversial service, had a ready supply of clients, and proved a boon for other service providers who heretofore had no way of dealing with victims in need of emergency housing.

Establishing domain in this service area helped in large part to ensure the continuation of all shelters except Brattleboro's.

##### Justice-Related Projects/Components

For a number of projects attempting to link services with police, prosecutors, courts, and/or probation, domain was more difficult to establish. (Details of these attempts are given in chapter 6.) Both successes and failures in establishing domain in the justice arena had important ramifications for organizational development and institutionalization.

**Cleveland.** Multiple attempts to carve out a service area for battering victims that would be the sole province of the family

violence project were thwarted. The project was unsuccessful in implementing a referral system using the police, in gaining access to the police radio room to provide hotline services, and in establishing itself in civil court as a provider of free legal services. In the face of these failures, the project retreated to the domain already established by its sponsoring agency--victim/witness services. In addition to the impacts on services, this shift had important organizational ramifications: the once semi-autonomous project became absorbed by the Victim/Witness Service Center.

**New York City.** Given the pre-defined domain of the Family Court, the New York City project was placed in the unfortunate position of having to rely on the court's probation officers--the very persons the project was created to "police"--as its sole referral source. The project attempted several domain-establishing strategies, under the direction of federal grant monitors, but ultimately foundered on the obstacles inherent in its situation. Eventually, the project was picked up by a new sponsor, the Victim Services Administration, and adopted a different service model that had proved successful in establishing domain in other city courts.

**Philadelphia.** Although the complex of subcontracted services that comprised the Philadelphia project did not establish a domain, the civil Legal Clinic component proved quite successful in so doing. Initially assured a steady stream of clients from the district attorney's office, the Legal Clinic was soon inundated as police and social service providers became aware of its existence. As in the case of the shelters, the Legal Clinic entered an area in which there was a virtual vacuum of services. Its domain expanded further as funding cutbacks in legal aid services created a need for court representation. By the end of the national program, the Legal Clinic's exclusive domain proved a powerful argument in its quest for continuation funding.

**Miami-DIP.** The pre-trial intervention unit that was to conduct on-the-scene crisis intervention in concert with the police failed to establish domain. The Safestreets police unit with whom the project was scheduled to work saw themselves as already carrying out the type of crisis-intervention work that the DIP counselors were supposed to do. The domain dispute led to the demise of the proposed joint effort.

**Diversion Components.** Domain issues proved critical impediments for most of the diversion efforts. Due in large part to difficulties in establishing domain, Fayetteville and Salem began their diversion services late in the course of federal funding. Both were social service agencies and experienced problems creating ties within the justice system. Ultimately personal ties with key justice system actors formed the linkages necessary for the diversion program.



Philadelphia never succeeded in overcoming domain obstacles: the project's expertise in treating batterers was never accepted nor was an adequate referral system created.

Santa Barbara, while successful in implementing its diversion program, ran abreast of domain issues in trying to follow-up on batterers who failed to attend counseling. The probation department refused to cooperate and withheld information necessary for follow-up.

The most successful of the diversion efforts in establishing a clear domain was the DIP program. It enjoyed a privileged location in a unit of the state attorney's office that had already created other types of diversion programs. DIP's special client area was easily demarcated, and the necessary linkages already existed.

**Prosecution Components.** Domain issues proved central to the initial success or failure of the special prosecutors. Special prosecutors whose projects were not funded through district attorneys' offices had difficulty generating a sufficient caseload. In both Salem and Santa Barbara the lack of a caseload led to the elimination of the special prosecutor position in the second year of the grant. In Santa Barbara, the special prosecutor's salary was converted to funding for paralegal advocates, a role with an easier domain to establish.

The White Plains special prosecutor was funded out of the district attorney's office and was the head of the domestic violence project. Her position in the District Attorney's Office and the clear support of the project by the District Attorney made the creation of referral networks virtually automatic.

In Philadelphia, first year prosecution efforts were hampered by the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the individual who held the position. In Year II, an assistant district attorney with a clear commitment to the project was hired, and the process of creating a special domestic violence caseload was easily accomplished.

The Philadelphia and White Plains prosecution efforts met with opposite results at the end of federal funding: the Westchester project was picked up locally and the Philadelphia one discontinued. Domain considerations proved paramount. In Philadelphia, the special prosecutor and the remainder of the domestic violence project never coalesced as a unit. The special prosecutor functioned independently of the rest of the project, and her successes were attributed to her personally rather than to the project. Thus, when LEAA funding ceased, the position of special prosecutor was discontinued although the individual remained on the district attorney's staff.

In contrast, in White Plains the special prosecutor had clearly established a solid domain for the project itself. When the project was threatened with dismantling following cessation of federal funds,

the special prosecutor was able to marshal a considerable and vocal constituency of clients and representatives from other agencies to gain continuation funds.

## PROJECT LEADERSHIP

Project directors ranged from individuals with years of experience in creating and managing social service programs to persons for whom the family violence project represented their first management endeavors. Many of the experienced directors brought with them valuable contacts from previous positions as well as personal status within the sponsoring agency. Specifically, we can isolate the effects of project leadership in the following areas: organizational planning, fundraising, internal management, and linkages with other agencies.

### Organizational Planning

The project director's involvement in initial planning had obvious effects on early implementation. In several projects (for example, Miami-Safespace, White Plains, Fayetteville, and Cleveland) the future project director took part in grant-writing and conceptualization of the project, creating continuity between the planning and the start-up of the program. In many of the other projects, the director was hired after start-up and had to begin to implement it as well as reshape it. In several cases (e.g., Miami-DIP and Philadelphia), the directors were implementing project designs with which they were quite dissatisfied.

Another important aspect of organizational planning was whether and how the director conceptualized the long-term future of the family violence projects. Many of the more experienced directors designed implementation strategies with specific long-term goals in mind. These goals varied across projects. For example, the Santa Barbara director followed an explicit strategy of eventual dispersion of project components as independent entities at the end of the federal program. By contrast, the Fayetteville director sought to create a model program with so strong a reputation as to assure its incorporation and continuation by its sponsor, the Department of Social Services. Both goals, although quite different, were realized in the institutionalization of the projects.

The directors of Miami-Safespace and Salem also instituted long-term organizational planning and survival strategies for their projects. Both projects experienced an orderly transition from LEAA to other funds.

Fundraising

A number of projects were obliged from inception to devote a great deal of project resources and staff time to fundraising efforts. This was especially true for the two nonprofit corporations, Brattleboro and Salem, which had to obtain matching funds for the LEAA grant from local municipalities and private sources. For Brattleboro, the leadership of the project proved unprepared for the task: attempts to raise funds compromised project services but did not secure continuation funding. By contrast, the second director of the Salem shelter was a skilled fundraiser and directed staff in writing funding proposals. She was able to obtain a combination of federal and local support to continue the project.

Good fundraising skills led directly to the successful continuation of the other projects. The White Plains project director, when told that the district attorney's office could not fund the project, was able to launch a countywide drive that brought the appropriation of special funds. The Miami-Safespace director successfully employed a combined public-private fundraising strategy: (1) as part of a lobbying group, she helped to pass a marriage license tax bill that would fund shelters; and (2) she secured private donations for the shelter.

Internal Management

In a number of instances, project directors with little management experience were hired to manage very difficult projects. Philadelphia and New York City serve as prime examples in point. In Philadelphia, the complex subcontractor arrangement was plagued by an atmosphere of mistrust and political differences and by an absence of clear lines of authority. In New York City, the original project design had undergone major and ill-conceived shifts in emphasis that placed it in conflict with its main source of client referrals. In neither case were the project director's experience and skills equal to the difficult management situation.

All project directors, however, had to deal with the difficulties inherent in starting new services, conducting outreach and training, and seeking to work in two very different institutional spheres--social service and criminal justice. The more experienced managers prioritized their service goals and concentrated on firmly establishing one before going on to another. In Fayetteville, for example, the director focused on implementing the shelter and counseling services, leaving for year two the diversion program and civil legal services, which were then successfully established. The White Plains project provides an example of adept management in response to unforeseen circumstances. In the face of victim reluctance, the director there quickly recognized the need to re-order priorities and establish referral links to social service providers instead of urging all clients to prosecute.

Establishing Linkages

Development of linkages with other agencies for referral of clients and other joint endeavors was a vital part of start-up activities and of the process of establishing domain. Linkages ensured the projects a sufficient client load and enlisted the resources of other agencies for their clients.

The directors of the family violence projects played a key role in structuring the development of linkages with other agencies. They arranged meetings with heads of other agencies, allocated staff time to developing contacts, and in general prepared a strategy whereby project activities such as training sessions and speaking engagements would serve the function of creating linkages.

Where the directors were skilled managers with prior experience in the area--as in the cases of Miami-Safespace, White Plains, Fayetteville, and Santa Barbara--such linkages were readily created. These directors drew on former contacts and allocated the necessary staff time to pursue a policy that prioritized linkage formation. These same directors were most adept at using the linkages they had developed with other agencies to help them in their efforts to obtain continuation funding. Other agencies wrote letters and helped with political lobbying in support of project continuation.

SPONSORSHIP

The types of agencies sponsoring the family violence projects are shown in table 7-7 below.

Although sponsorship was a vital factor in the start-up of the project services and initial linkage building, once these issues were resolved and a project domain established, the sponsorship variable declined in importance.

Table 7-7  
Agency Sponsorship

Private Non-Profit	Public Agency	
	Social Service	Criminal Justice
New York City	Fayetteville	Philadelphia
Brattleboro	Miami-Safespace	Miami-DIP
Salem	Cleveland	White Plains
Santa Barbara		

In terms of project perpetuation, the role of the sponsor varied by individual project rather than by type of sponsor. In general, sponsors did not automatically assume fiscal responsibility for the projects. Only Fayetteville and Cleveland were assumed by their sponsors. The other projects that remained with their original sponsors were obliged to generate the major portion of their own funds, although in Philadelphia the district attorney assisted one of his project components to negotiate for continuation funds.

The two independent non-profits, Salem and Brattleboro, met with different outcomes--Salem finding funding and Brattleboro not doing so. Thus, no conclusive generalization can be made about the viability of this form of sponsorship.

#### IDEOLOGY\*

Like sponsorship, ideological factors played a significant role in the inception of the family violence projects and in service initiation but a lesser role in the continuity of the projects post-LEAA funding. There were three major ideological issues in play during project development: feminism, concepts of family integrity, and concepts of appropriate roles for social service and criminal justice personnel.

#### Feminism

As discussed previously (see Fagan et al., 1980), feminist organizations played a central role in the identification of domestic violence as a major social problem and were instrumental in urging LEAA staff to involve the agency in intervention programs for family violence. Of the ten projects, three--Santa Barbara, Salem, and Brattleboro--were explicitly feminist; a fourth, Philadelphia, had feminist organizations as subcontractors; and a fifth, New York City, had a feminist orientation. Initially, the feminist ideology created difficulties in dealings with justice agencies and more traditionally minded social service providers. However, as project services became a regular feature in the social service community and as ties to

\*As used here, "ideology" refers to the philosophical orientation that provides a rationale or justification for the goals and activities of organizations. The orientation contains both an attitudinal and an action prescription. This definition draws on discussions by Turner and Killian (1972) and Oberschall (1973).

individuals within agencies became established, the feminist character of the projects ceased to be a major issue.

Ties to the feminist community and to domestic violence coalition groups proved instrumental in obtaining continuation funding. Such groups formed the lobbying effort for marriage tax to support shelters. In Massachusetts, a feminist coalition helped with fundraising efforts for the Salem shelter. Support from the feminist community was also vital in the perpetuation of services in Santa Barbara.

#### Family Integrity

Another ideological factor was the value many services providers placed on "family integrity." Since most projects emphasized victim safety as their utmost concern, they were continually educating other service providers about the life-threatening nature of domestic violence. The family violence projects had to contend with perceptions that their purpose was to split families apart when many social service and criminal justice personnel believed firmly in keeping families together. The New York City project was viewed by its host agency, the Probation Department, as working against the legislative mandates of the Family Court to "maintain families." Clients referred for restraining orders were seen as trying to break apart their families, and accordingly were often referred elsewhere for social services.

The projects varied, however, on the emphasis they placed on keeping families together when this was an option. The Fayetteville project, for example, put a great deal of importance on counseling for batterers and reuniting families. This orientation enabled them to work with a judge who believed in family integrity and saw the project's diversion program as a way of preserving families.

#### Social Service vs. Justice Roles

Another ideological issue was the question of appropriate roles for criminal justice personnel and social service providers when intervening in family violence. As discussed in chapter 6, many police officers did not see family violence as a crime equivalent to assaults between strangers. Similar attitudes pervaded other areas of the justice system as well.

During the initial phases of the grant, accommodations took place between justice system personnel and the projects or, when such arrangements were not forthcoming, the projects abandoned efforts to work with the justice system. Therefore, by the time the funding cycle was terminated the role issues were resolved and did not play a major part in project continuation.

**CONTINUED**

**3 OF 4**

## RESOURCES

All of the family violence projects were required to match the LEAA grant through local funds, and the percentage of local funds increased over the funding cycle. Projects sponsored by traditional agencies readily obtained matching funds by internal lobbying. Obtaining the match was more difficult for the independent non-profits, who were obliged to solicit funds from local governments and private sources. Problems in raising funds locally contributed greatly to staff burnout in the Brattleboro project; lack of local resources and limited government budgets made fundraising a lengthy and discouraging process.

The paucity of local resources ultimately led to the demise of the Brattleboro project. The comparatively small population of the county (33,000 versus 290,000 in Santa Barbara or 1.9 million in Philadelphia) provided a very limited tax base. The county was also quite poor and suffered from a high unemployment rate. Vermont has few private foundations from which to draw support. There was also no special legislation, such as in Florida and California, to support shelters from marriage license taxes.

All of the other projects were able to secure funds for continuation from a variety of sources including foundations, private donors, local and state funds, and other federal programs. Cleveland, Fayetteville, and Miami-Safespace were picked up by their sponsors. However, Safespace generated its own private donations and also received funds from the state marriage license fee. White Plains lobbied for a special county appropriation of funds. Miami-DIP received continuation funding from federal funds designated to Dade County in the wake of the 1980 race riots. Salem put together a combination of federal (Title XX and Housing and Urban Development) monies and local Community Mental Health funds. Philadelphia's Legal Clinic, the only part of the project to continue, was funded by the Department of Public Welfare. New York City was funded through a victim services program. The Santa Barbara program received support for its newly separated components from several sources: its paralegals were funded by the District Attorney's Office; the shelters received marriage tax funds; and the diversion services were funded locally through the Probation Department.

## Conclusions

The institutionalization of the projects and their services depended on the viability of the services and the organizational success of the family violence projects themselves. However, as seen in this chapter, it is more possible to analyze the factors affecting service implementation than to formulate generalizations about the institutionalization of the projects. Examining table 7-8, we find that each of the ten projects has a distinctive profile of factors affecting institutionalization. There are a number of reasons for this. The projects were highly individualized, with no two projects offering the same array of services. Even among projects with similar services, there was great divergence in types of sponsors and geographic location. Although the analysis has isolated those factors affecting organizational development and institutionalization--organizational model, domain, leadership, sponsorship, ideology and resources--in every project these factors assumed different importance in final outcomes.

Despite the difficulty in generalizing about the combination of factors involved in both project and service institutionalization and organizational continuation, one major variable stands out: ability to establish a domain. Establishing a domain set the underpinnings for the projects' services as well as their ultimate institutionalization in the community. There were two important aspects to establishing domain which became salient to institutionalization:

- The ability to establish a credible and well-known identity for the project in which the legitimacy of domestic violence as an issue was recognized as well as the project's ability to deliver services.
- The project had to be perceived as a vital service by criminal justice and/or social service agencies.

The projects which successfully kept their identity as family violence programs intact and maintained their service model all established a strong domain. Two projects, Cleveland and New York City, which did not establish a clear domain were absorbed in other agencies and the focus of their services changed. Both were amalgamated into victim/witness services, a far more curtailed and less focused activity than they had originally planned. The emphasis on domestic violence as originally envisioned was marginal at best.



Table 7-8

## Factors Affecting the Institutionalization of the Family Violence Projects

	Organizational	Domain	Planning	Leadership in:			Sponsorship	Ideology	Resources
				Fundraising	Management	Linkages			
New York City	+	-	-	x	x	x	x	x	+
Brattleboro	-	x	-	-	x	x	-	x	-
Safespace	+	+	+	+	x	+	x	x	+
Cleveland	+	-	x	x	x	x	+	x	+
Fayetteville	+	+	x	x	x	x	+	x	+
Salem	x	+	+	+	+	x	x	+	+
White Plains	x	+	+	+	+	+	x	x	+
Miami-DIP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	+
Philadelphia	-	-+	-	x	x	x	+	x	+
Santa Barbara	x	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	+

+ = major positive effect  
 - = major negative effect  
 x = negligible or no effect  
 -+ = mixed positive and negative effect

### Viability of Services

Virtually all the services which were successfully implemented survived the termination of federal funds. The exceptions were the Philadelphia special prosecutor and the services offered through the Brattleboro project.

Despite these successes, it is important to reiterate that a number of services failed to begin and a great many experienced considerable start-up delays and problems. For example, none of the attempts to work directly with police on crisis intervention were implemented. The failure of these efforts can be traced in large part to lack of detailed arrangements between projects and police during the planning stages. A more viable strategy might include a police/family violence project co-sponsorship.

Diversion services also proved difficult, and in one case impossible, to implement. Projects experienced problems with developing proper client flow mechanisms. Analysis of the projects' experience in diversion endeavors showed that the institutional location of the family violence project and the existence of other types of diversion programs were key elements for implementation and ultimate success. Criminal justice affiliated projects and programs where other diversion programs existed implemented domestic violence diversion with greater ease. Once implemented, all of the diversion programs were continued.

Special prosecution efforts were also subject to problems with client flow and linkage creation. However, projects which had full support of the district attorney and enough political leverage to ensure sufficient caseloads proved successful. Continuation of these positions was linked to the overall success of the family violence project.

Success of advocacy services in civil and criminal courts was tied to the institutional location of the family violence project as well as to particularities of local legislation and court procedures. Across the projects two very different institutional locations proved positive for advocates. Salem advocates were situated far enough outside of the criminal justice system to enable considerable freedom of action while paralegals in Philadelphia and Santa Barbara effectively used their vantage points within the system to the advantage of their clients. However, where advocates were dependent for referrals, such as in New York City, their advocacy efforts were severely hampered. Advocacy also proved to be a service which readily received continuation funds.

Shelter facilities with their counseling and related services also proved viable given a sufficient local funding base. The only shelter not to be continued was Brattleboro which was located in a rural, economically depressed area.

### The Organizational Model

Given the wide range of services and the great variety of project sponsors, it is not possible to declare one organizational model superior to another. However, the difficulties subcontractor projects experienced with project management and service creation make the effectiveness of this model open to question. Santa Barbara was the only site where the subcontractor model functioned effectively. This was largely because most of Santa Barbara's services predated the LEAA grant. The Santa Barbara project director gave the units considerable autonomy and most functioned as independent entities.

The evaluation revealed that projects which are units of another agency need a combination of considerable independence (in order to develop a domain) as well as the strong support of their sponsoring agency. The relatively unsuccessful Cleveland project is an instance in which agency support was forthcoming but not autonomy. The Fayetteville, White Plains, and Miami-Safespace projects were among the most successful projects and all were given needed support by their sponsor coupled with a great deal of freedom of action.

The fate of the two independent non-profits stresses the importance of a need for strong community or coalition backing in order to continue beyond the termination of federal funds. The Salem project was successful in obtaining local support whereas the Brattleboro project was unable to amass the needed resources.

## 8 Knowledge, Policy & Research In Family Violence

### The Policy Context

In American society, the family historically has been exempted from public scrutiny. Nevertheless, during the post World War II era, and particularly beginning with the Great Society in the 1960s, the principle of limited government intervention in families gained acceptance as fundamental social, economic, and demographic changes deeply altered American family structure and lifestyles. It wasn't until the social discovery of violence in the family in the late 1960s and early 1970s that this principle was widely defended and translated into public policy. In the mid-1970s, when the federal government declared that an epidemic of violence had swept across America, the notion of intervention in violent families by the justice system (and other agents of social control) gained legitimacy. Only then did an action program, a federal demonstration program to perfect justice system solutions to the family violence problem, receive endorsement and, most important, funds. Though feminist organizations and grassroots programs called for the development and funding of services for battered women and their families, the federal response was an ambitious program integrating shelter, medical and social services with justice system approaches to prevent and reduce family violence among children, spouses, and the elderly.

This final chapter summarizes the evaluation results from the LEAA Family Violence Program, the first federal effort designed specifically to respond to violence between spouses. The 42-month study examined the historical roots of the LEAA program, including both the origins of family violence as a social problem and the program's development

by a federal crime control agency. The diversity of services were analyzed, each representing an attempt to translate the program assumptions into a social intervention. The efforts to alter and improve the justice system's responses to family violence were analyzed, as were the impacts of these efforts on victims and their families. The impacts on communities were determined by the continuation of both services and the organizations which provided them.

The policy implications of these efforts are discussed in this chapter. Most federal agencies conduct research through both evaluation and knowledge production activities, as an aid to policy and program development. In this chapter, the results of these activities are translated into conclusions and recommendations to support future efforts to reduce violence toward women in the home. The discussion begins with a review of the mission of the Family Violence Program and the evaluation. Family violence as a social problem is analyzed in terms of the knowledge gained through this and other studies, and its amenability to justice system interventions is discussed. Issues in the development and efficacy of services are identified. Conclusions and recommendations include policy, services, and future activities. A closing discussion, indeed an epilogue, ends this report.

### THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROGRAM: MISSION AND GOALS

The LEAA Family Violence Program was the result of a long tradition of activity in LEAA (and its forerunner, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance) to develop approaches for law enforcement to deal with domestic disturbances. A second perspective which supported the LEAA program was its concern with victims, and increasing the participation of victims in the criminal justice process. The Family Violence initiative emerged from an agency which had adopted a particular perspective on crime, which has been called the "victimization perspective" (Lewis, 1982). That perspective defined crime as an event rather than an act, and focused on the interaction between victim, offender, and environment. Crime is viewed as an experience of citizens rather than an activity of offenders. From this perspective came the two initiatives which directly gave rise to the Family Violence Program: Citizen Involvement, and the Victim/Witness Program. Though departing somewhat from the Victim/Witness Program by emphasizing the development of concrete services for victims, the

Family Violence Program continued the LEAA tradition of aiding and encouraging victims to participate in the justice process, thereby improving the crime control efforts of criminal justice agencies.

After several years of social activism and research in family violence, and building on the precedents established both by grassroots women's organizations (shelters for battered women) and criminal justice agencies (the development of crisis intervention teams and the use of special prosecutors), LEAA responded to several constituencies by funding a services demonstration program in FY1977. Over \$8 million was spent in a four year period to support 23 sites plus technical assistance services and program development activities.

The central mission of the LEAA program was to help communities identify effective approaches to the reduction and prevention of acts of violence upon family members. In particular, the program tested a variety of methods to combine criminal justice interventions with other (social service, medical) interventions to ensure victims' safety as well as punishment for offenders. Despite LEAA's criminal justice focus, national program goals and activities explicitly included other systems and constituencies involved with family violence victims, recognizing the complexity of family violence as a social problem. However, a precise model for accomplishing this agenda was not provided--it was left to demonstration projects to design methods to meet the LEAA program goals.

The nine program goals represented an ambitious agenda with proposed changes in community attitudes, policies of the justice and social service systems, development of service coordination methods, and specific targets for reduction of certain violent behaviors. All projects were expected to pursue all nine goals, with funding ranging from \$42,000 to \$275,000 annually with an increasing local match which reached 50% in the third grant year. Over the four year history of the LEAA program, the 23 sites which were funded provided a range of 13 services, identified by grantees as strategies to achieve these LEAA program goals.

The evaluation of the LEAA program was conducted under the auspices of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention through its research agency, the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (NIJJDP). Though both LEAA and OJJDP were part of the Department of Justice, OJJDP was separate from LEAA in its authorizing legislation and the political stature of its administrator. Under the OJJDP legislation, NIJJDP was instructed to assess the impacts of family violence on children and families. Consequently, the decision to administratively locate the evaluation in OJJDP established more than the usual independence and "arms length" relationship which evaluators traditionally maintain from program activities. As described in chapter 2, this arrangement at

times complicated and impeded the development of a consensus on evaluation goals and procedures, as well as the relationship of the evaluators to the demonstration programs. Nevertheless, the evaluation pursued its mission in four broad areas: explore the assumptions of the LEAA program, evaluate the development and efficacy of the services provided, assess the extent of attainment of LEAA program goals by the demonstration projects, and develop knowledge and policy recommendations to guide future activities in family violence.

Despite the unusual relationship between program and evaluators, the evaluation was able to develop a wealth of knowledge about the causes of family violence, the development and delivery of services, and policies which impede or facilitate interventions with violent families. Evaluation results were based on data gathered from across 23 projects from case records on 3,100 families, 270 followup interviews, and program observations and key actor interviews as part of a study of system and community impacts.

#### FAMILY VIOLENCE AS SOCIAL PROBLEM: CENTRAL QUESTIONS FOR LEAA

Throughout the period when family violence and wife battering emerged as a social problem, there was general consensus among researchers and activists that this was an incredibly complex phenomenon with strong psycho-social, socio-economic, and cultural elements. At the time when the LEAA program was designed, a variety of competing views and alternative explanations were under debate, and there was consensus on neither causes nor cures within the agency or among the several constituencies supporting the program. Perhaps this was the reason why there was neither an explicit set of program assumptions nor a program model to be tested.

The victimization and deterrence perspectives pervaded the program goals. Most of the services funded were centered on the victims. However, the "victim's environment" (i.e., the family in which the victim and abuser lived) was intended to be a marginal focus of the services offered. The majority of services were designed for victims or abusers, and did not encompass the family as a social or economic unit or even as the setting in which abuse took place. Efforts to assist victims often were aimed at having the victim prosecute the offender, although prosecution would severely disrupt the economic and emotional equilibrium of the family. In effect, the deterrence/social control perspective was integrated with the victimization perspective

primarily to promote criminal justice interventions, and only secondarily to assist victims to address the family environment in which violence occurred.

Whether this was an appropriate strategy depended in large part on the assumptions about the causes of spouse abuse. As family violence emerged onto the national agenda as a social problem, several "causal" analyses were offered:

- Family violence was seen as a violent crime, analytically related to deviant behavior and street violence. It was seen as a life-threatening disease whose "pathology" spread through some contagion and could be controlled by isolating and treating the offender.
- Family violence resulted from some family dysfunction, similar to a deviance/pathology analysis but incorporating an interactional, systems perspective. Accordingly, the deviance or pathology seen as causing the violence was located in the family as a unit rather than in an individual. Hence, all members of the family were in need of "treatment" and when family systems were restored to "normal" socio-economic and behavioral functioning abusive behaviors would cease.
- Family violence reflected cultural attitudes toward violence, and developing social norms where violence was increasingly evident in and tolerated by a "sick" society. Through a variety of "public health" measures, violence in and out of the home could be reduced, even though we may not know until some later point what triggers it and how to prevent it. This perspective regards violence as rooted in society, and the incidence of family violence is not explained in the dynamics or ideology of families apart from other sectors of life.
- In contrast to the cultural perspective, family violence was seen as a reflection of sexual inequalities which derive from an ideology of patriarchal dominance. Society provides men in marriage (or other intimate relationships) with a "license to hit" (Straus, et al., 1978). Family violence results from an "environment" where powerless family members (women and children) are abused to maintain patriarchal hegemony.

In turn, each of these assumptions about causes gave rise to a variety of assumptions about appropriate responses. Understandably, justice system intervention was the centerpiece of the LEAA program, but several sets of assumptions were reflected in the various project designs:

- Justice system projects were designed to deter future violence through both the threat and reality of punishment, irrespective of family or culture.

- Shelter projects viewed justice system intervention as a protective measure for victims while pursuing more fundamental changes in the victims' attitudinal, emotional, and material circumstances in the relationship. In other words, they attempted to empower victims to make choices about their lives and to take actions to change the family environment. Reflected here are assumptions about causality rooted in ideology.
- "Therapeutic" projects (mediation, diversion) sought to alter either the individual's pathology or the family's "systems" which led to violence. Justice system interventions were utilized to "encourage" or coerce offenders/family members to participate in therapeutic services.

The central question, then, for the LEAA Family Violence Program was whether family violence was amenable to justice system interventions. Regardless of the complexity of family violence as a phenomenon, and irrespective of the various perspectives in which justice system interventions were applied, the ultimate test of the Family Violence Program was whether the involvement of the justice system could in and of itself prevent the reoccurrence of family violence.\* This question is really a two part issue:

- Does the phenomenon of family violence lend itself to a deterrence/social control approach? Can abusers be stopped from committing further acts of violence against family members by arrest, prosecution, and correctional intervention?
- If so, what are the issues and constraints for justice system agencies in responding to the phenomenon of wife beating? If, for example, spousal violence is in fact a form of family dysfunction or victim disempowerment, what issues confront justice system agencies in addressing victims' or families' multiple service needs?

A second set of questions for LEAA was the identification of strategies to achieve each of the program goals. What structures, philosophies, contents, and service approaches, both direct and indirect, were most effective in achieving the program goals? Equally important were the ingredients of such success, both within and across projects. Recognizing that such demonstrations often are unique confluences of people and events, the search for replicable strategies and elements was an important issue. Moreover, what policies could be identified from these efforts? For example, certain

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\*Unfortunately, the design of the program did not lead to an understanding of why such approaches were effective.



features of criminal procedure statutes in fact were impediments to victims. The development of policies to ease such problems was a central concern.

Finally, it was possible that some strategies were better suited for certain victims than others. Though knowledge of family violence is still at a relatively young stage, it is safe to assume that violence is not a unicausal phenomenon. It is likely then that the dynamics and characteristics of violent families will vary, and that even the most well-implemented services would be limited in their effectiveness by family characteristics. This raises a third central issue: What are the interactions among services, project designs, and family backgrounds which limit or promote the effectiveness of interventions? With knowledge of the range of families and the interventions best suited for each, can we identify a "complete" service delivery system to respond to violent families?

#### DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT: WHAT IS VIOLENCE, WHAT IS SUCCESS

As an emerging social issue, family violence was often a focus of intense and emotional debate. Driven by ideology, professional orientation, and bureaucratic mandate, the various constituencies of the family violence issue put forward an impressive variety of definitions of violence. Earlier we saw the range of orientations in etiological (i.e., causal) assumptions and their corresponding intervention approaches. However, there was controversy and, occasionally, disagreement within the Family Violence Program on what constituted family violence and, subsequently, what was success.

##### What is Violence?

One of the consequences of working within the justice system was the limitations imposed by codified law. Gatekeepers in the justice system were constrained by the penal code definitions of illegal acts. Accordingly, threats, denigration, humiliation, yelling, and other forms of systematic abuse were technically not illegal and not within the jurisdiction of the justice system. Also, given the kinds of violence more commonly seen by justice system agencies, these non-physical acts were regarded as less serious.

On the other hand, most non-justice system projects viewed such acts as at a minimum antisocial and often as forms of emotional violence, inflicting injury to the victim's self-esteem and sense of well-being. Victims of such abuse were encouraged to seek help and often did. Shelter staff at times viewed such victims as simply at an earlier stage of what would eventually become a physically violent relationship. They viewed them as appropriate for services, though not perhaps appropriate for justice system intervention.

As the data in Chapter 5 show, varying definitions of violence and/or abuse may make the difference in whether a particular intervention appears as effective. Few services seem effective in stopping "abuse" which includes non-physical forms of violence. However, several services seem to be somewhat effective in deterring violence. Though non-physical abuse is a repugnant and offensive behavior, it may be unrealistic to expect it to stop due to these interventions. In fact, it is possible that some physically violent men may "transfer" their aggressiveness to non-physical (i.e., verbal) types of assault.

The key here, though, is that projects differed in their definitions of abuse and violence often depending on their service emphasis. These differences affected the types of victims (and families) seen, as well as the "outcomes" of the interventions. The limitations imposed by the penal codes were pervasive, and deeply affected the type of response by projects, especially in the justice system. Police, for example, simply could not arrest for other than a violent act or statutory violation. In non-violent cases, they were limited to information and referral responses or mediation. Similarly, prosecutors were constrained in charging by the type of violence and injury to the victim. In some cases, the questions of "malice," "intent," or other elusive attributes were ingredients in justice system decisions. For shelter or social service projects, these were not questions of eligibility or decision criteria, but were part of a case evaluation system which helped determine an intervention strategy.

##### How is Violence Measured?

Controversy surrounds the measurement of violence. The secrecy of family violence complicates an already problematic area. Measurement problems limit our knowledge of the severity, incidence and prevalence of violence in the home. Our knowledge of abuse is even more limited in view of its contextual and perceptual features. To reliably determine the effectiveness of family violence intervention strategies, one must address and resolve these measurement questions. Indeed, assessment of the effectiveness of a strategy may rest on both conceptual and measurement issues.

There are four available sources of information on the occurrence of violence--information collected by official agencies, direct observations of researchers, surveys of random households, and self-reports by victims and assailants. Studies using more than one of these measures often reach divergent conclusions, and suffer methodologically from the context of social interaction in natural settings where violence occurs. Gelles (1979) thoughtfully reviewed the difficulties in measuring family violence. Current standards for measuring family violence include measures of behaviors (e.g., how many times did you...) and injuries. Both may be inadequate to study family violence since each captures only one dimension. For example, injury may vary according to the skill of the attacker, so that an accidental fracture may appear much more severe than a bruise from being struck with an object. And who is to judge whether three punches are worse than two bites, irrespective of their frequency or the injuries they cause?

While these distinctions were of little significance to shelter projects, these codified behaviors and the injuries suffered were useful and important evidence in criminal cases. At the same time, the difficulty of recalling and describing such acts constrained prosecutors who hoped to convict assailants. These problems often gave rise to a willingness to negotiate a lower plea or even to conditionally discharge cases in return for promises of desistance.

For researchers and projects alike, measurement issues posed dilemmas and constraints. Direct observation in homes is certainly unacceptable, leaving only self-reports and documented evidence to determine the complex acts which occur during an intra-family assault. The usual absence of witnesses (other than children) further limits the ability to accurately assess what occurred in the home. These issues weighed heavily in terms of policy, program, and research.

#### What is Success?

Finally, the definitions of "success," particularly for victims and families, varied widely across projects, reflecting their differences in ideology, service emphasis, and a host of emotional and psycho-social factors relating to victims. At the "community" and "system" levels, most projects agreed that a stronger community response was an ingredient of "success." Increased reporting of incidents, improved coordination of services, and proliferation of services to victims and families were widely accepted indicators. For justice system projects, a stronger response by the police and courts was the primary objective, including increases in arrests and prosecutions. At the outset, these projects viewed "success" as a unitary measure: the cessation of violence through deterrence and social control of the offender. Over time, though, justice system projects became equally concerned with the proliferation of services to address victims' multiple service needs,

understanding that prosecution was not a viable option for victims when its socio-economic and psycho-social consequences were not simultaneously addressed.

Shelters always understood this, and from the beginning defined "success" in somewhat different and broader terms. Responding to victims' needs, whether to prosecute the offender or develop an alternative living arrangement, was the primary objective. "System" objectives focused on developing and coordinating such responses, across a variety of agencies. Shelters generally defined "success" to include not only the victim's physical safety but also her emotional, psychological, and material well-being. Few projects considered the family in these terms.\* Justice system projects lacked the resources, other than through mediation efforts, to address families, while shelters considered it a conflict of interest to work with both victims and assailants.

For victims, "success" was a difficult and complex decision. Consider a victim's choices: lacking economic means, the decision to prosecute would likely take away her spouse's income, jeopardizing her and her children's well-being. So too would leaving a violent home. In many instances, victims accurately saw that their financial conditions would worsen, or that they would be left with sole responsibility for child care. Few family violence projects were equipped to address these concerns. On the other hand, remaining at home risked further injury to her and her children. Victims with greater economic resources or choices nevertheless were faced with a host of emotional and psycho-social issues, from loss of self-esteem to fear of loneliness or isolation. Also, many victims again correctly feared the wrath and increased violence of a spouse against whom they filed criminal charges. Victims made choices, weighing all these factors; such choices obviously were mediated by personality and, more importantly, social structural factors such as age, race and income potential.

Evaluators, too, were faced with choices regarding "success," and attempted to reconcile these varying perspectives. Given the mission for the research, it was necessary to consider a range of "success" measures consistent with the program goals, project objectives, and victim choices. The task was simplified somewhat by the convergence of project perspectives in later years--collecting client data by justice projects, for example, became more consistent with their service designs as they expanded to address a wider spectrum of victim needs. In analyzing the outcomes and effects of services, it was again necessary to consider for each service a range of impacts.

\*A notable exception was the Fayetteville shelter, where staff conscientiously pursued attempts to intervene with all family members throughout the victim's stay.

Accordingly, the results show how services can have conflicting effects--that stopping violence can bring on other problems--that projects were ill-equipped to handle. Yet the multi-dimensional nature of "success," its texture and inconsistencies, are very much a part of the social reality of family violence and attempts to assist victims.

## Knowledge Development

Basic epidemiological knowledge of family violence still remains scarce. Despite its extraordinary prevalence and life-threatening implications, there have been few studies examining violence in American families. These studies in turn have yielded only limited knowledge beyond incidence, prevalence, location, and behavioral descriptions of the violent acts. Accordingly, the information developed through this evaluation contributes to the somewhat limited knowledge base which drives programs and policy. Moreover, it goes beyond earlier epidemiological studies in examining several contextual aspects of wife abuse: violence history, previous interventions, and the situational contexts of violent incidents. Again, readers should remember that this information comes from a self-selected sample--those victims (and, rarely, assailants) who sought services from the Family Violence Program sites.

### CORRELATES OF FAMILY VIOLENCE

Victims and assailants were comparable in several respects to the profiles obtained in earlier epidemiological studies. They are young, disproportionately minority, and mostly high-school graduates. Nearly 70% of both victims and assailants were employed. Though differences between victims and assailants were noted, they again were comparable to the victim-assailant profiles in the Straus et al. (1980) and Shulman (1979) general population surveys.

Victims and assailants were usually married and cohabitating, though nearly 18% lived apart. Naturally, cohabitating victims

frequently sought shelter. The relationships were usually of short duration (two to five years), though that is mediated by victims' age.

There are two significant implications in these data. Looking across projects, it appears that victims and assailants who seek services are not very different from the "general" abused population. This suggests that the Family Violence Projects were fairly effective in reaching the range of abusive families. In addition, they successfully avoided the pitfall of serving only a small stratum of their target population. This may have been the result of a widespread absence in the project sites of services specifically targeted to family violence victims--the Case Studies in Volume II suggest that these projects quickly became a focus of local services for battered women, both directly and via referral.

Second, these data refute the stereotype of the battered woman as an unskilled housewife with few resources. The employment and education data for victims suggest that victims who seek services have above average educational attainment and are often more highly educated than the assailants. The national incidence studies suggest that battering is more frequent among high school dropouts: these data show no such pattern. Though the victim stereotype may not prevail, there may be a residual, unreached population of victims with less education who have not sought services.

Finally, abuse in these families was frequent and severe; injuries and medical care were common. The extent of abuse of pregnant women is shocking and repugnant. Miscarriages often resulted from such incidents. Though abuse had been ongoing for about two years, the median frequency was once a week.

### The Search for Causes

Despite the numerous theories advanced over the past 30 years to explain violence and, more recently, wife abuse, there is little agreement on the causes and correlates of family violence. In this study, we examined the severity of violence by assailants as a function of victim and assailant backgrounds and features of the violent confrontation themselves. The results were noteworthy and suggest several policy and research issues.

We found that exposure to violence during childhood was a consistently strong predictor of the severity of assailants' violence, both in recent and in prior incidents. Victims and assailants both were exposed to violence during their childhoods, but assailants were more frequently exposed. Exposure played different roles, however, in the violence patterns. Victims' childhood exposure was not related to severity of injury, but was related to whether the assailant was

violent both in and out of the home. For assailants, childhood exposure was strongly associated with all aspects of their violence.

Other background factors were less important in understanding violence. Age (younger), race (white), and education (higher) were associated with the severity of violence. Drug and alcohol use were not strong predictors of the severity or extent of violence.

We also examined the relationship history as it related to wife abuse. The results were clear and consistent--the assailants' history of violence, both outside and inside the relationship, is the strongest contributor, whether analyzed separately or in combination with background variables. The analyses combining background and abuse history variables suggest that childhood exposure to violence and abuse history are the most powerful explanations of the severity of wife abuse. Also, we found that those assailants violent toward strangers were also most violent at home, and were abused as children. Indeed, actual violence apparently predicts future violence, particularly among frequent lawbreakers.

These results support a social learning explanation of violence. Early socialization to violence apparently teaches and perhaps reinforces violence as either a coping mechanism or a method to resolve conflicts. Violence may be transmitted through the generations, though we know little about the modeling and reinforcement processes which comprise the social learning paradigm. That social structural variables are unimportant in understanding family violence is consistent with other self-report studies of crime and delinquency. The weight of evidence in this study and elsewhere is that violence is not associated with a particular social class or race.

Two other findings hold policy implications. First, drug or alcohol use per se was unrelated to the severity of violence. However, the report of substance abuse as a problem in the relationship was associated with severity of violence. Whether this indicated behavioral problems specific to substance abuse, or a more generalized inability to cope with problems, is unknown. Rather than diminishing the importance of alcohol as a correlate of family violence, it suggests a behavioral dimension of alcohol abuse which, for some abusive men, is a point for intervention. That is, a general inability to deal with "problems" may be a worthy focus for intervention.

Second, the "most" violent spouses (or partners) are often violent toward strangers as well. Violence at home may indicate violence "on the street," and the reverse may well be true. In attempting to evaluate violent families for a social or legal intervention, a history of violence toward strangers, childhood victimization or exposure to violence, and prior injuries to strangers or intimates, should be

carefully examined. These risk factors should inform both policy and program design for intervention in most forms of violent behavior. We will say more later on the policy and theoretical implications of these findings.

## CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND WITNESSES

The apparent intergenerational linkages in family violence raises concerns regarding the exposure to violence of children of project clients. The assailant profiles suggest that being victimized as a child is not the only condition under which violent behaviors are learned--witnessing parental violence also can be a powerful learning process for children. Accordingly, we must consider whether the children of victims should also receive care and attention in the course of family violence intervention.

Children were "exposed" to wife abuse in several ways. Nearly 60% of the client families had children, with an average of about two children per household. Children reportedly were victimized rarely--violence toward children was indicated in only 12% of the cases. But 44% witnessed violence between their parents (or caretakers). More important, children attempted to intervene in the violence in about one case in four.

Most of the children of family violence clients were young, attributable to the low median age (27 years) of the victims. Accordingly, manifestations of behavioral and emotional problems was not widely reported--only 12% of the victims reported such problems. These problems may be underreported by clients due to the liabilities and consequences of reporting--mandatory child abuse reporting laws and child welfare agency interventions threatened many clients with possible removal of children from their care. Policies of intervening agencies or programs must consider this contradiction in their service design. Probing for evidence of childrens' problems should be thorough and detailed. The failure to intervene may lead to subsequent violence in adulthood. Yet mothers may understandably withhold information in fear of losing their children. Such actions can further victimize an already victimized spouse.

Social service agencies, particularly agencies mandated to receive reports of child abuse and neglect, should develop protocols which evaluate cases in light of circumstances of wife abuse, and should involve organizations serving abused women in developing an overall response encompassing both spouse and child well-being. Childrens



services should be incorporated, either directly or via referral, into a community response to family violence.

The impact of domestic violence on children raises other implications for policy and programming. First, children should be identified as primary audiences for outreach and preventive activities. Teachers and school administrators might build upon the efforts begun several years ago with respect to child abuse identification and reporting. As more becomes known about behavioral responses to family violence, outreach can be systematically planned. Counseling services and other interventions might be planned for children identified as victims and/or observers of domestic abuse. Identification and assessment services could be developed based on empirical knowledge gained through several ongoing research efforts of the behavioral and emotional effects of family violence and spousal assault on children.

Second, if, as Gelles (1980) has stated, "violence begets violence," there is some urgency to the need to develop child-focused crisis intervention services for children in families identified as experiencing spousal assault and/or child abuse. These early intervention efforts can intercede in what have come to be known as a generational pattern of domestic violence that is passed down from parent to child. Such efforts have been developed in three demonstration projects funded by the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

### VICTIM STRATEGIES

The services requested by victims were mediated by several factors: victims' background and abuse history factors, the projects' service emphasis, and the options available by statute and service availability. For example, justice system interventions were more often requested of justice system agencies. Among shelters, where more severe cases with shorter relationship histories were seen, there was a greater interest in changing the family structure and, often, family dissolution. Also, victims in less severe cases tended to be less certain about strategy, often requesting services such as general information and counseling. Victims in more severe cases sought stronger interventions. From justice system projects they requested prosecution, and from shelters they sought protection and/or separation.

In a community with only justice system services (e.g., Philadelphia, Cleveland), victim strategies reflected the available service emphasis. In communities with a wider range of services, victims with more

severe violence histories usually sought shelter and, less often, legal intervention. Others requested more general services. This suggests that a community-wide response should include services encompassing a range of victim strategies--both legal and non-legal, "stronger" and more general services, and both victim- and assailant-focused.

Of particular importance is the recognition of the factors which mediate help-seeking, and the need to translate that information into strategies for outreach and public education. The role of severity of injury and medical help-seeking in a general model of help-seeking behavior suggests the importance of outreach via hospital emergency rooms, public and private clinics, and private doctors. The importance of age and length of relationship suggests more general, community-wide outreach strategies which focus on couples in shorter relationships with no history of prior contact with service agencies (e.g., police or domestic violence projects). Recognizing that relatively "older" victims more readily seek assistance, outreach to younger women and couples should occur through public service announcements and other media-oriented activities.

The identification of different client strategies establishes empirically what family violence practitioners have long acknowledged: that clients often contact domestic violence projects several times before reaching a decision as to a course of action. With each visit, the client's decision progresses with respect to firmness of decision and strategy for stopping the violence. Whether this progression is related to an escalation in the violence, changes in the relationship, or changing perception of the violence by the victims is a topic for further research.

Of additional significance is the role of project intervention in changes in clients' perception of the problem and progression of strategy development. The contribution of the projects to development of perceptions and strategies can be expressed in terms of inputs to client decisions, such as:

- delineation of options or alternatives;
- problem definition and clarification through counseling;
- assistance in accessing services and mobilization of resources;
- protection, shelter and emotional support.

Finally, our analysis suggests that family violence victims are active participants in the selection of interventions, and that the client characteristics which predict selection of an intervention strategy may in fact predict the eventual success or impact of that strategy.



## Developing Effective Services

The development of the Family Violence projects and services provides insight into the factors which shape and influence a community-wide response to family violence. These important lessons provide the basis for designing future responses to family violence.

### WHO SEEKS WHAT TYPES OF SERVICES?

The previous discussion of victim strategies touches on the relationship between project structures, case characteristics, and the services sought and received. The eventual organizational and service outcomes (chapter 7) are the end result of the tensions created by these relationships and the natural evolution of project services to address victim needs.

#### Two Types of Services

A consistent theme emerged from several perspectives on clients, services and projects--there were two distinct types of projects in the Family Violence Program. Analyses of client characteristics, services offered, services requested, services received, projects' structural features and other attributes identified two types which we termed "shelter" or "justice system" projects. In various frameworks these were called "victim- or assailant-focused," "shelter or justice emphasis," or "general or certain" victim strategies. The implication was the same--justice system and shelter projects were quite different, and these differences were important in understanding the types of cases seen, the responses to them, and often whether they effectively stopped family violence.

Typologies are rarely defined in such precise terms as to "clearly" classify all possibilities. Social services are rarely that unambiguous. For example, in the Family Violence Program, many "shelter" projects also had strong justice system components or linkages. The reverse was not often true, however. Table 3-7 provides a concise analysis which classifies direct services by project type. Victim-focused, shelter-based services included shelter, childcare, transportation, information/referral services, non-legal advocacy, victim counseling

and crisis services. These projects had different referral sources from justice system projects, though the police were a major source. Their cases were more serious (i.e., victims receiving more severe injuries), and client strategies were more certain.

Justice projects were primarily legal advocacy, prosecution, diversion, and mediation services. They were assailant-focused and tended to receive cases primarily from other justice system or legal agencies. The cases were often less serious, in terms of injuries and violence. Victims usually requested more general types of information, and their strategies were often unrelated to legal interventions. Rather, they tended to inquire about various legal and non-legal options including the consequences of each option. The data suggest that victim strategies in these agencies were not fully formed, and were mediated by background factors.

#### Shelters Saw More Serious Cases

The decision to seek shelter services reflected a conscious decision for many victims to escape the danger of a violent household. The reasons are instructive for program design and policy. Shelter cases proved to be more dangerous as seen by the severity of the instant and past incidents, severity of injuries, and the overall violence of the assailants. Shelter clients feared for their children, who usually were younger. These victims more often had called the police or other justice agencies in the past, usually with little success in stopping the violence. For them, seeking refuge from their home was a drastic but necessary step. They had fewer options, socially and economically, and had no alternatives. A shelter provided them with immediate relief, unlike other options requiring court appearances or appointments. It is anonymous, safe, and in most instances, free. It is difficult to imagine what becomes of victims in locales without a shelter.

Law enforcement apparently viewed shelters in the same way. It was safe and immediate, providing them with a dispositional alternative for what may be their most difficult cases. Our data suggest that police referred the most difficult (i.e., most violent and most prior calls) to shelters. Shelters were accessible alternatives which provided police with an option to arresting the assailant. The various reasons why police are reluctant to arrest spouse abusers are well-documented. In many instances, police substituted a shelter referral for an arrest. It is ironic then, that an option which protects the victim may in fact reinforce police decisions that further victimize a battered woman.

If shelters saw the "toughest" cases, why then did they receive the fewest resources? Chapter 3 shows that shelters received the lowest budgets and, though cost effective, were generally understaffed and

staff were underpaid. Their highly emotional and crisis-oriented settings often led to staff turnover and overreliance on volunteer staff. It appears that the relatively poorer performance of shelters in stopping abuse is the result of a combination of extremely complex cases and low resources, together with constant crises in funding and organizational "health." Future shelter efforts must be supported at an adequate level of resources to be effective in meeting the health, emotional, and material well-being of their clients, those abused women who have suffered the most severe forms of abuse and who have exhausted all other options.

#### Justice System Projects as Entry Points

In contrast, the cases seen by justice system agencies tended to be couples whose violence was usually not serious--the type of violence was less severe, and injuries had occurred less frequently. In general, these were victims who were seeking general information, but not necessarily help. Significantly, they less often had children. In many instances, they had rarely called the police, and certainly had not learned from repeated calls to police that there was little response forthcoming. However, a substantial number of clients of justice system projects were actively seeking legal remedies to violence, including both prosecution of the batterer or divorce.

As such, justice system projects tended to be gatekeepers for access to the strongest (and most effective) legal interventions. But they also were the initial entry point for many victims whose violence history had not yet escalated to more dangerous levels. They determined whether legal services would be available and provided assistance. Given the complex service needs of victims, they had a central role in referring victims to a variety of agencies and programs. These demands became increasingly evident over time, as justice system projects diversified their program designs to emphasize information and referral plus counseling.

The combination of relatively high resource levels plus less complex case types may underlie the apparent "success" of justice system projects in stopping abuse. Also, their "natural" linkages within the justice system gave them greater access to prosecution and other legal interventions (e.g., diversion). Shelters lacked such access, perhaps explaining the relatively low incidence of prosecution among shelter clients.

The development of future projects in the justice system must acknowledge the wide range of cases likely to be seen and the different types of services likely to be needed. Such projects should have a flexible response set, ranging from information and referral to crisis intervention to access to prosecution services. These projects

must be knowledgeable of the full range of services available in the community, including counseling, shelter, and legal services. They must also be knowledgeable of other services and systems, particularly social service agencies which provide essential cash and housing for victims in crisis. They recognize and acknowledge that they may in fact become the focal point for all types of services to family violence victims.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF SERVICES

The origins of both justice system and shelter-focused projects offer lessons for planning responses to family violence. They also provide an historical context in which to understand the successes and frustrations of the Family Violence projects.

#### Family Violence Services in the Justice System

The development of justice system projects was generally traced to the early crisis intervention initiatives plus the precedent for victim services set by the Victim/Witness Program. The Family Violence Program can be characterized as a more specified version of the LEAA Victim/Witness program, though sometimes generalized to settings outside the justice system. However, in translating victim support services to the family domain, the Family Violence projects encountered several cross-currents which complicated the achievement of the program's mission.

First, the projects encountered "traditional" attitudinal barriers to family violence interventions by justice system actors. Though police were well inclined to refer victims to shelters, they still were reluctant to arrest assailants and initiate the process by which criminal offenders were sanctioned. Despite court orders, arrests of violators of restraining orders were still uncommon. Prosecutors continued to relegate family violence cases to a lesser priority. Court officers screened out those seeking restraining orders in New York. In general, at the conclusion of the three year Family Violence Program experiment, there was still a relatively low incidence of arrest, criminal prosecution, and correctional interventions for offenders in family violence cases. These cases, or the units in which they were processed, were rarely able to overcome resistance among line officers or administrative staff, despite training.

Second, clients often were not inclined to file charges and follow through to prosecute assailants. The fact is, prosecutions were rare. Client strategies included prosecution only as part of a more generalized strategy to end the relationship. Otherwise, their service requests reflected more preliminary inquiries for advice and options. We can hypothesize that abuse victims only elected to prosecute assailants if they had also decided to end their association with the assailant. An important question for future research is victim perceptions of prosecution which may underlie these decisions.

Third, the Family Violence Program began in an era of shrinking resources, both at the federal and local levels. There was a general and persistent pressure on justice system agencies to narrow their focus and more selectively target resources on high-risk, politically visible "front page" crimes. The longstanding tradition of non-intervention in family problems mitigated against elevating family violence cases to a higher status when widespread layoffs and budget cutbacks affected police, prosecutors, and corrections agencies.

These trends were neutralized in sites where the projects received strong political support. Justice system projects, particularly prosecution units, fared well when they were strongly enclosed and protected by key system actors, especially elected District Attorneys. Political climate was essential to successful development and institutionalization of services. White Plains and Miami DIP projects suggested that intact units with separate staffs developed well when strongly endorsed politically. More typical experiences were observed in Santa Barbara and Philadelphia where, despite political support, the attempt to integrate a family violence unit into the prosecution "system" was resisted and nearly defeated.

#### Shelter Development

Shelters also depended on political support, but in a different form. Funds were crucial, as were auspices. Underfunded shelter services were diverted from organizational development to fundraising activities, limiting their growth and effectiveness. Again, shortfalls in funding created overreliance on volunteers and caused excessive staff turnover. Shelters under public auspice, whether in the justice or social service systems, seemed to fare better in achieving programmatic stability. Of course, the political support which they enjoyed under public auspice was helpful in institutionalizing services.

Linkages were essential in the development of shelters. Client referrals from the police were important both to programs and the victims they served. Linkages with the police resulted in transportation

of clients to shelters. Obtaining emergency cash assistance and other financial aid from public social service agencies were also critical to shelter clients, especially those seeking new housing. Several sites had to lobby strongly to have their victim-clients declared eligible for such aid. Housing, jobs, childcare services, and other tangible forms of assistance were made available to shelter clients via such linkages. The data on victim needs and service requests suggest that indeed such linkages were necessary to effectively serve victims.

Finally, perceptual and definitional postures affected the development of shelter services. Here, ideology played a key role in the developmental histories of feminist projects. Shelters sponsored by public agencies fared better at linkage development, though at least one held many of the same goals and values as the more explicitly feminist programs. Such perceptions were more important in smaller, rural communities. Since shelters provided an important dispositional outlet for law enforcement, ideological differences were less important. But it did bear on the development of linkages with other sectors of the justice system as well as with social service agencies and other public and private service providers.

#### Is One Model Better?

Neither shelter nor justice system models appear to have fared better in terms of either organizational development and outcome, or services retained after the grant period. These program outcomes are likely to vary by community. What does appear to be crucial is that family violence services should be developed in an organizational setting where services to spouse abuse victims are a priority. Evidence of this priority status may include pre-existing services units, agreements on system coordination and linkages, and a history of funding at a reasonable level for services to "special" populations. Intact units, with separate staffs and budgets, seem to fare better than adjunct services in ongoing, standard operational units.

There emerged two core services which seemed to be common components of projects whose services were eventually institutionalized. Common to both justice system and shelter projects were the following two cross-cutting elements: case management and advocacy. Providers of these service elements recognized that victim needs spanned several service systems-- medical, legal, social service, and mental health--as well as shelter and protection. Victims in crisis needed to stabilize their lives before acting, and our data suggest that this alone was a formidable task. These two activities assured that basic needs were addressed-- housing, food, cash, legal protection--before more long-term strategies could be formed, decisions made and actions taken. The inclusion of these two elements appears central to viable projects, regardless of auspice, ideology, statutory environment, or service emphasis.

### Limitations of the Program Design

The complexity of family violence and the range of service needs to even minimally address the problem raises some difficult questions. Did the program raise false hopes for victims? Were victims really aided, or was an illusion that society was prepared to take steps to definitively stop violence in the family simply created? Even the strongest services were unable to overcome certain obstacles, which in turn mitigated program effectiveness. Some of the barriers encountered are described below.

**Shelters.** As discussed earlier, most of the shelters had a fixed number of times a woman could return to the facility. This hampered women who needed to make a slow transition out of the battering relationship. Even if a client wanted to leave her husband, the shelters averaged a maximum stay of six weeks. This is a very short period for someone who must find employment or other income source and arrange for housing, in addition to dealing with the emotional and legal repercussions of moving to a shelter. The shelters were generally unable to provide much on-going support for the client after she left the facility. In the small town setting of Brattleboro, clients were able to organize a continuing support network; however, clients in other places were left largely to fend for themselves. Such arrangements for continuing support should be built into a shelter program design.

**Counseling.** Much of the counseling work was designed with a crisis intervention or "therapy" model. A needed component would have been a "life skills" format which could teach women how to find housing, employment, handle financial matters. This could have been structured into the shelter programs and done in group settings using various self-help, presentational and case management methods. Few programs did so, and these were notably successful.

**Police.** There are limitations on what police can do for battered women. Despite training and the best intentions, the police simply cannot be bodyguards or chauffeurs. Many of the clients expected, and perhaps were led by the projects to expect, protective orders to give them a "bodyguard" type of protection for a relatively long period of time. Such assistance was not forthcoming, and in some instances, the police had few response options from which to choose.

**Prosecution.** Most of the cases filed were misdemeanors. Even when felony charges were filed they were often pled down to misdemeanors. If a batterer was found guilty and given a jail term, he usually was sentenced to under six months. Although some prosecution clients reported that they were relieved to know that their assailant would

be incarcerated for even a short period of time, this does not solve the problem of what happens to the victim when the batterer is released.

**Protective Orders.** These appeared to be a deterrent to future violence only when the batterer feared the justice system. That is, assailants with little or no prior record were more responsive to protection orders. Often if the batterer was familiar with courts and prisons, he was unimpressed by the consequences of violating the order. We must ask whether repeated contacts with the justice system which resulted in no effective sanction, in fact taught assailants that the law was indeed empty for them--in effect, a form of counter deterrence.

In conclusion, the larger question which the program design raises is that of emphasis. A number of the projects held back or greatly curtailed their efforts to publicize the issue of family violence for fear that their services would be overwhelmed by clients. Over the life of the projects, direct service needs of the clients postponed or diminished efforts at community education or outreach to churches and schools. The LEAA initiative was designed for a short-term intervention model of dealing with family violence. Indeed, it was much needed, given the incidence, prevalence, and severity data. Yet we are led to question whether a program design aimed at more long-range solutions to family violence which would have included community education, organizing and an emphasis on victims' social and economic self-sufficiency would have proved ultimately more effective. School programs for young children would also certainly make sense, given their broad reach at low cost to a highly educable audience.

## Conclusions

Ultimately, we must raise the question of whether the program's focus on the justice system was justified in terms of the issue of family violence itself. Is criminalizing family violence and handling cases via the justice system a viable form of intervention? Is the civil and criminal justice system the place to expend the limited public resources available to counteract family violence? Are the program assumptions correct, and if so, did these projects offer feasible strategies to implement them?



## THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF JUSTICE INTERVENTION

The LEAA Family Violence Program was firmly rooted in specific deterrence theories. Sanction and punishment are assumed to deter people from repeating the acts for which they are punished, and the effects are assumed to be strongest when punishment is swift and severe. However, deterrence theory has been difficult to prove, since it is nearly impossible to control for the myriad factors which confound the deterrent effects of the criminal justice process and the responses to crimes which occur after sanctions are imposed. Also, deterrent effects are likely to vary by people, situations, and behaviors (Sherman and Berk, 1984), and are both crime-specific and situation specific.

We cautiously find support in the follow-up data for deterrent effects of criminal justice processing of wife abuse cases. Based on victim self-reports of repeat violence and abuse four months after project interventions, those women who utilized criminal justice sanctions were less often victimized or injured. These effects seem to be particularly true for those couples with fewer prior injuries, shorter histories of abuse, and fewer prior justice system interventions. However, the construct validity of the justice system intervention variable is suspect, at the least, due to extraordinary variability in type and point of intervention. Nevertheless, using a dummy variable representing a broad range of criminal justice sanctions, we found that violence in "early" cases could be effectively halted. Non-legal responses by justice system agencies--that is, mediation--were especially weak.

At the same time, our data show an absence of specific deterrent effects for more severe cases, including those with prior police interventions. This suggests that a form of counterdeterrence may occur when police calls result in no action, especially for more severe cases. Criminal justice sanctions weakly applied may quickly teach wife beaters that the law is an empty threat. The relationship between spousal homicide and prior calls to police is well established (Police Foundation, 1976). Whether a police call resulting in no action actually reinforces and escalates wife abuse is difficult to determine. Though there is now sufficient data to conclude that arrests in fact do reduce repeat incidents of spouse assault (Sherman and Berk, 1984), these studies include only misdemeanor assaults.

In sum, specific deterrence appears to be effective for less severe forms of spouse assault. Our data show that none of the interventions tested were effective for more severe abuse cases. Whether this was due to the effects of the interventions themselves or the program strategies that weakly delivered them cannot be determined from this study. The strength and integrity of justice system interventions were limited by police and court attitudes, legislative mandates (requiring corroboration or probable cause for arrest), and organizational variables in justice system agencies.

The effectiveness of justice system interventions depends on the commitment of those agencies to respond to wife abuse. However, the complexity, emotion, and violence of spouse abuse create a range of critical needs such that no single element of a response can be effective in stopping family violence. A successful approach to family violence intervention certainly must include strong justice system responses. Indeed, family violence should be criminalized.

Yet we cannot say that the justice system should be the place to coordinate responses. The agency or system which should orchestrate the community's response to family violence should be that actor which has the strongest commitment to respond comprehensively to the entirety of victims' needs. In this research, we observed both successful and weak instances where justice system agencies took a lead role. Whether this should be a justice system agency depends on the climate and politics of each locale.

## A COMMUNITY-WIDE RESPONSE

The experiences of the Family Violence projects suggest the essential elements of a community-wide response to family violence. Though deterrence effects were observed, they were often diluted by the weakness of the programmatic strategies which tried to implement those assumptions. The analyses of services development and outcomes, plus case studies of the projects, allowed us to identify the components of an effective and strong response which at once sanctions offenders while providing for the needs of victims.



## Shelter

Shelter is the central and critical element in a community-wide response to family violence. The provision of shelter services is a health and safety issue for victims and children. Shelters, by definition, have the commitment to address the entire range of victims' needs, including linkages and advocacy services for victims electing to utilize the strongest justice system sanctions. Such organizations place the highest priority on serving battered women, and have the widest flexibility in responding to the various victim strategies and service requests. They also have the knowledge and commitment to seek changes in laws and regulations which impede services to battered women. But their central role derives from the protection they offer from dangerous, indeed life threatening situations. Shelters are a mandatory component of a community-wide response.

## Justice System Interventions

Justice system actions are also a central and mandatory response to family violence. But justice system agencies should not be the formulator, coordinator, or activist in developing a community-wide response, except under rare circumstances of politics and individual commitments. The Family Violence Program experiences suggest that family violence is difficult to establish as a priority concern in justice system agencies, especially in times of scarce and shrinking resources.

Justice system agencies must address family violence in their protocols and policies, recognizing that spouse assault is a critical, perhaps lethal, event. Police, prosecutors, the courts, and corrections agencies each must address family violence in their respective decisions.

**Police.** Police policy should assume that arrest for spouse assault is presumptive; guidelines should state not when an arrest should occur, but rather the conditions under which an arrest is exempted. Though there are many instances where an arrest may be counterproductive, it may be better to narrow the margin for error. Even where arrests do not result in prosecution and incapacitation is only for one or two days, arrest is an effective deterrent to further abuse (Sherman and Berk, 1984).

**Prosecutors.** Prosecutorial screening of spouse abuse cases should be designed specifically to identify those high-risk cases which are in need of stronger intervention and sanction. In particular, cases with

prior injury, prior arrests for spouse abuse, and prior convictions for violence toward non-spouses, should receive the highest attention.

Victim ambivalence is a reality which prosecutors should anticipate. It should not be a reason to screen "out" cases--rather, it should be a signal that the justice process may be the disincentive. Nevertheless, help is needed and being asked for. The uses of the nuances of prosecution, such as the warning letters in White Plains, or the "Mary Rebstock" hearings in Philadelphia, are useful ideas worthy of further testing.

**Courts.** The courts should recognize not only that "swift and sure" punishment is essential to making deterrence effective, but that it is also an incentive to the victim to seeing the process through to conclusion. Court attitudes in sentencing are also a potential area where the actualization of deterrence can be weakened. It is essential that the courts mete out sentences which are proportionate to the injuries inflicted on the victim and responsive to offender needs for control and treatment.

**Corrections.** Again, control and treatment of spouse abusers are central to an effective response. However, the effectiveness of correctional intervention depends on the integrity of supervision and the development of treatment interventions responsive to the etiology and dynamics of wife abuse. Several treatment experiments have been undertaken across the country, but evaluation data are sorely needed. Promising approaches include "anger management," a behavior modification technique which "teaches" abusive spouses to respond non-violently to anger-provoking situations, and self-help groups for batterers such as EMERGE in Boston. The Parents United program in San Jose, California, an organization for abusive parents, has experimented with developing a program for batterers modeled on their self-help group approach.

## Case Management Services

The range of client profiles, service needs and requests, and intervention strategies indicates the need for a flexible response system with rapid response time and effective coordination of services. The ability to cut across public systems is necessary to ensure the provision of all of the services which victims and families require to end the abuse. Case management services are designed to identify client needs and obtain the necessary responses from responsible agencies. Case management services include four primary elements.

**Case Management.** A single agency or individual should be identified to assess victim or family needs, direct them to agencies capable of

providing such services, and ensure that services are provided in a timely and efficient manner. Case management has been perfected as a service delivery methodology in several social policy areas, from child welfare to mental health to delinquency. It involves advocacy functions to monitor that services are delivered in a prompt and effective manner. For this reason, case managers should be specifically assigned to these activities.

**Resource Coordination and Development.** It is essential that case managers be knowledgeable about available services, and that these services be accessible to victims-clients. A wide range of issues emerges here, including eligibility criteria, hours of service, service fees, and the type and quality of response. The organization implementing case management services should address these issues at the client program, and policy levels. Clients should receive the services they need; likewise, agencies or programs should not work at odds with each other (e.g., requiring the couples be intact to receive certain benefits). Funding policies should be coordinated to support the entirety of needed services. The organization responsible for case management should include in its mission the identification of service gaps, promotion of service improvements, and advocacy/lobbying for the development of new services.

**Information and Referral.** "I & R" services provide an important source of knowledge regarding choices. Options for victims, assailants, and families create the flexibility to resolve family problems and address victims' needs in a manner commensurate with the severity of the violence at home and the problems it creates. I & R serves as an entry point for victims whose ultimate problem resolution will likely require considerable time and knowledge of several systems. The ability to draw upon a central knowledge source is convenient to agencies where victims are likely to present themselves--the clergy, the police, the schools or hospitals. In turn, I & R providers can direct victims to appropriate entities who can respond to their situations.

**Crisis Intervention.** The social reality of family violence is stark--its lethality, the extraordinary emotional contradictions it fosters in all family members, and the fact that it simply is not a predictable event which conforms to society's definitions of routine family life. These crisis events often require legal and medical help, protection, emotional support, and other tangible and intangible resources for victims and their children. Accordingly, a crisis intervention capability must be present in a community-wide response, providing immediate and certain help across a range of events. It is not cheap--it is a night-and-weekend service requiring considerable expertise and resources. Yet life-and-death situations require such attention. Again, the extent and severity of family violence necessitate this type of service.

## Community Education

Though public agencies and policymakers may elect to respond to family violence through programs and services, often the public's awareness and cooperation lags behind. As in the case of child abuse over a decade ago, a considerable amount of public education is required to bring private family matters into the public domain. Yet it is essential that family violence be treated in the public domain. To establish the social and political climate for effective and consistent sanctioning of assailants, there must be well articulated public sentiment that wife beating is unacceptable behavior which violates community standards. This can be accomplished via community education programs, relying on the media as well as tapping natural leadership. Several objectives can be pursued:

- build support for criminal justice sanctioning via arrest, prosecution, diversion, and referral to treatment;
- encourage victims to report cases and seek assistance;
- notify the community about the availability of services;
- teach preventive measures which promote non-violent responses to family conflict among children and adults;
- promote attitudinal change among children, adolescents, and young adults regarding family roles, sexual inequality, and other cultural family dynamics associated with abusive families.

If in fact the social learning paradigm underlies much family violence, then we can assume that community attitudes and cultural norms are important reinforcers of violent behaviors. This is particularly important in families (Pagelow, 1978). Community education campaigns present strategic opportunities to introduce norms and knowledge to the public which can interrupt the reinforcing contingencies of the current social environment. Without such efforts to promote long-term changes in the community dynamics associated with family violence, our short-term efforts to remediate cases as they come along will be futile.

Family violence continues to grow, and we are only beginning to discover its proportions--witness the experience of the New York project and others which were quickly overwhelmed with requests for assistance. Community interventions via public education campaigns may be the most cost-effective strategy to interrupt family violence at its source.

## THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

These essential elements of a community-wide response to family violence cannot occur without strong leadership. The development, coordination, and improvement of services to battered women requires political skills, substantive knowledge, and the commitment to work with diverse groups. To effect wide response, one must address: Who can or should take a leadership role? Which agency should be "responsible" for the development of a community-wide response?

### The Importance of Leadership

Leadership is crucial in two ways. First, it should result in explicit actions--creation of services, changes in policies, allocation of resources. Without it, there is no way to motivate and orchestrate various constituencies to lobby for such actions. The changes we saw leading to the coordination and development of services to family violence victims were a combination of two things: "natural," field-initiated responses by law enforcement agencies and grassroots, feminist organizations, and political actions leading to legislative and policy changes. Leadership, therefore, translates constituent demands for better services and improved options into explicit actions via the political process. Whoever best provides that leadership should become "responsible" for services development.

Second, leadership provides symbolic meaning to the explicit actions. That is, it provides evidence to the community at large of the priority assigned to family violence by community leaders. It is a sign that there is a commitment to address family violence as a social (and thereby a public) concern. This includes the enforcement of laws, the protection of victims and their children, the treatment of batterers, and the creation of options for family violence victims.

Leadership also involves multiple levels of government: hence, state and federal legislative actions provide leadership (and incentives) for local actions which, in turn, stimulates the enforcement of laws and creation of services. Through community education, leadership states publicly its concerns for victims, the importance of intervention, and the values which demand that violence in the home be rejected as socially unacceptable.

We saw empirically that services in the absence of leadership often failed to survive federal funding. Those which were institutionalized had effective leaders or were sponsored by agencies with a high commitment to address family violence. Ultimately, the development of an effective community-wide response to family violence is a political process.

## Identifying Leadership

The elements of the community-wide response offer directions for assigning leadership roles. Also, history is instructive--there are several examples of leadership in the Family Violence Program and its predecessors which are instructive for communities formulating a response.

Among the elements listed earlier, many are not central to the justice system mission. Case management services, especially, span several systems. Though the justice system is a necessary element, the involvement of many other agencies suggests that the justice system should not be in a coordinating position. We observed that the justice system generally deals "internally" with family violence cases--they are either referred from police to the courts, or referred to other agencies as a final disposition. The specific mission of justice system agencies, especially in a time of scarce resources, suggests that their role is finite. The police and prosecutorial agencies are not designed to provide the sustained involvement with numerous services necessary to fully remediate family violence cases. The social reality of family violence--realities such as repeated attempts to leave partners or ambivalent feelings about prosecution-- is inconsistent with the needs of justice system agencies to efficiently process a large volume of cases.

Leadership should reside with the natural constituencies of family violence victims--those organizations whose primary commitment is to that population. These most often are feminist and other women's organizations whose missions include services to battered women. In most cases, this will not be the justice system, though we observed several instances where justice system agencies provided strong and effective leadership, politically and programatically. This suggests that leadership will likely vary by community according to political environment and, as so often is the case, key individuals. This is not to say that the justice system will not be in the leadership role--in the Miami and White Plains sites, justice system agencies were the strongest community leaders. These were exceptions, however.

But justice system agencies must participate in community and networking activities to make their responses effective and well coordinated with other agencies. Justice system agencies must speak to the community with other family violence agencies as one voice to ensure that their ranks enforce the law and that the public perceives community-wide values and commitments. Leadership must involve the justice system in a mutual consensus of the community-wide response. Without a shared understanding of the problem and its solutions, family violence will continue to grow.

The leadership roles should include political and policy advocacy, and, depending on whether it is a service agency, direct interventions. Leadership should lobby for legislative change, advocate for new services and the funds to support them, monitor and evaluate existing capabilities, and serve as a resource organization for other agencies serving family violence victims. It should disseminate knowledge via training and technical assistance, and stimulate the development of public education campaigns to promote community-wide changes in behaviors, values, and knowledge of family violence.

## Recommendations

The evaluation of the Family Violence Program suggests recommendations on policy, program, and research, to further the development of a community-wide response to the national problem of family violence. Each year, approximately 7.2% of all of the violent crimes identified in a National Crime Survey were committed within the home. Of these, 57% were committed by spouses or former spouses, and 91% were attacks on women by their husbands. These data, which Department of Justice officials state as seriously underestimating the extent of the problem, leave little doubt that family violence remains an urgent, national problem requiring resolution and attention at federal and state levels. The following recommendations are offered to re-establish a national commitment to reduce family violence and address its root causes.

### POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Federal Responses

- The federal government must take a leadership role in coordinating national activities designed to reaffirm the commitment to stop family violence and to assist state and local initiatives to carry out that work. Specifically, the federal government should be active in promoting knowledge

development activities (e.g., research and development, meta-analyses of existing research), and knowledge dissemination through clearinghouse activities and development of training and technical assistance materials.

- The federal government should promote the coordination of policies and knowledge among various federal agencies to ensure that legislative and policy barriers in entitlement legislation and administrative law do not impede the development of state and local responses. The federal government should consider the reinstitutionalization of the Office of Domestic Violence within the Administration of Children, Youth and Families. Alternatively, a federal coordinating council should be established, perhaps within the executive branch, to undertake a coordinating role. In addition, the establishment of such a coordinating entity will signal to state and local constituencies the reaffirmation of family violence as a national concern and the continuing assignment of priority to family violence as a national social problem.
- Federal research agencies, in partnership with foundations and private corporations, should conduct research and development programs to perfect social technology and treatment interventions for batterers, and the development of effective justice system responses, as well as identification of promising models for case management services for victims and families.
- Federal research agencies, including the National Institute for Mental Health and the Department of Justice, should continue basic research activities on the incidence and prevalence of spousal assault, characteristics of batterers and victims, and consequences for children and other family members. For example, there should continue to be special analyses of national crime survey victimization data to identify epidemiological factors associated with family violence. Such research should lead to the development of both prevention strategies and treatment interventions.
- The extent of family violence must be documented as fully as possible, by changing the FBI Uniform Crime Report codes to include family violence as a discrete category. Such changes in the UCR system will promote accountability among law enforcement agencies regarding the documentation of family violence and their responses to these events. In addition, the Department of Justice should promote documentation procedures in the criminal courts by providing technical assistance in court administration systems to identify victim/offender relationships in criminal cases, and to include violations



of temporary restraining orders (TRO's) as offense categories on criminal court dockets.

#### State Policy Responses

- State legislatures should consider changes in criminal and civil statutes to criminalize family violence. This should, in turn, include three efforts:
  - permit misdemeanor arrests without an officer witnessing the offense or similar corroboration requirements,
  - criminalize violations of TRO's,
  - permit access to TRO's via the criminal courts (see appendix C for a description of Massachusetts legislation with similar procedures).
- Civil codes, particularly those chapters relating to obtaining temporary restraining orders, should permit victims to obtain orders requiring assailants to vacate homes. Current legislation usually does not include such options, instead forcing the victim to be once again victimized by having to leave her natural environment and resources. In addition, emergency relief should be available twenty-four hours a day and restrictions based on definitions of household should be waived if children are present. The cost of filing fees and filing procedures should not limit accessibility of this form of relief. Court personnel should be made available to assist victims in completing and filing appropriate forms.
- Victims should have access to both emergency assistance (cash, food, and housing) as well as other benefits through entitlement programs such as Title 20 (AFDC). This is particularly crucial for shelter residents who have been forced to leave their homes to ensure the physical safety of themselves and their children. Other victims, who may seek refuge with relatives or friends, may also require such financial assistance to avoid having to return to a threatening environment.
- Funding for case management, shelter, and other services, including public education campaigns, should be available to leadership organizations via revenues from marriage license taxes and other general revenues. In California, state law requires a surtax on marriage licenses which reverts to a funding pool from which shelters derive certain revenues. Other funding mechanisms for shelters and family violence services should be made available through contract support to private organizations. Per diem reimbursements should include not only room and board but legal advocacy and case management services as well. Funding should be structured to avoid the fiscal crises

which often undermine the efficacy of private organizations. Rather, funding should be structured to sustain organizational development. Moreover, children's services is a critical component and should be included in the computation of per diem reimbursements.

#### PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

- Goals for domestic violence programs, regardless of service emphasis, should be set realistically. The experience in the LEAA Family Violence Program suggests that the overly ambitious and at times contradictory goals had a negative effect on program impacts. Goals should be set specifically within service domains, system domains, or other realms in which project endeavors are designed.
- Community-wide responses should include case management services (including legal advocacy) within each community. These services should be supported as part of overall per diem costs of family violence services, or via special allocations from either general revenues or targeted funding mechanisms (e.g., marriage taxes).
- Shelter funding should be made available through a combination of general revenues, special revenues, protective services monies and entitlement program funds via disbursement to entitlements and per diem reimbursements via contracts with counties or cities.
- Violence prevention activities should be undertaken in several areas. School curricula should explore sex roles, and encourage the development of programs to shape non-violent responses to anger situations, and decision making skills for children regarding problem resolution and coping skills for interpersonal conflict. Other prevention activities should include monitoring of media violence and testing its effects on children. Similar undertakings should be encouraged regarding the process and effects of sex role stereotyping. These factors have been identified by Pagelow (1978), Straus (1978), and other researchers as instrumental in the intergenerational transmission of violence in the home.



- Diversion counseling and treatment programs for batterers should be formulated with explicit experimental designs that allow for rigorous evaluation. In California for example, Penal Code Chapter 1000 permits diversion of first offender spouse abusers from the criminal courts to treatment programs monitored through the county probation department. However, the California program does not provide funds for counties to purchase services or establish programs. Incentives via funding for such services must be provided to make the statutes and programs effective. The creation of such diversion options should provide a greater incentive for prosecutors to file cases in the courts since a dispositional option will exist that has the potential to decrease the number of victims dropping the charges or judicial decisions releasing batterers without formal sanction. Moreover, these programs carry the additional benefit of establishing a general deterrent effect by making real the prosecution and social control of spouse abusers.
- Screening and case evaluation techniques must be developed to target the most serious and potentially lethal cases for special court processing and dispositions. Such criteria should include the severity of injuries (both past and current) to victims, prior record of justice system interventions for violence toward either strangers or spouses, and the frequency and recency of such interventions. Given the scarce resources of the court, these criteria will help prioritize cases referred to prosecutors, thereby permitting the imposition of sanctions as the norm for more serious (e.g., injurious) family violence cases. Again, as with the establishment of diversion programs, these actions will serve to actualize the general deterrent effects of spouse abuse cases.
- Special prosecutors for family violence cases should be retained and vertical integration of cases instituted to allow prosecutors to handle both felony and misdemeanor assaults against spouses. Though special prosecutors in the LEAA Family Violence Program encountered several types of barriers to the implementation and effectiveness of their activities, this option is necessary as a short term solution within the justice system until other, longer-term strategies (prevention efforts, batterer diversion) begin to take effect.
- Police training should be ongoing as well as emphasized during initial police orientation. Such training should include sensitization to the problem of family violence, specific procedures for the handling of initial incidents, and procedures for responding to violations of protective orders. In addition, officers should be trained on policies regarding arrest, with clarification made as to cases in which arrest is presumptive.

- A leadership forum should be identified and established in each community (county or city) to promote the development of community-wide responses, to coordinate services and policies, and to communicate attitudes to the public regarding community values and norms regarding family violence. It is critical to send a message to the public that family violence, in all its forms, will not be tolerated and will be subject to the full sanctions of the law. In addition, the message to the public should emphasize the priority assigned to responding to domestic violence, including the availability of services to victims. Examples of such leadership include state task forces (as in New York State), county or mayoral task forces (as in the task force in Miami, Florida leading to the development of the family violence program there--see case studies).

## RESEARCH

- Research and development efforts should be undertaken to test specific models for treatment interventions with spouse abusers. The assumptions underlying spouse abuse should be explicitly articulated in any such effort, and incorporated into the intervention approaches being tested. Though costly, such research should include longitudinal follow-up, with case study analyses as well as rigorous empirical analyses, of the long term effects of such interventions.
- Demonstration programs, with strong evaluation components, should be initiated to perfect methods for implementation of temporary restraining orders, the design the special prosecution component, and case management services to address the full range of victim and family needs. Such demonstrations should be carefully designed for evaluation and replication purposes. They should be followed up with the development of model programs, complete with replication initiatives via regional training workshops. A model for such endeavors is the federally funded Minneapolis spouse abuse arrest program assessment which rigorously and empirically tested the effectiveness of a particular justice system response.
- Basic research should be conducted on the causes and correlates of family violence. Such research should be characterized by longitudinal studies, including cohorts in a variety of community and cultural contexts studying the onset, escalation or desistance and its environmental or individual correlates.

## Final Thoughts

Most of the services developed in the Family Violence Program were centered on the victim and the environment in which the victim sought help. However, the "environment" (i.e., the family in which the victim and the abuser lived) was a marginal subject of the services offered as well as the evaluation. The majority of the services were targetted at the victim or abuser, and did not encompass the family as a psycho-social or economic unit, or even the context in which the abuse took place.

Other "environmental" factors which were excluded from intervention were the social realities of sexism, unemployment and violence. (In some projects, sexism was an implicit assumption but not an explicit focus of intervention.) Both the evaluators and the projects steered away from analysis of the effects of poverty: the evaluators did this because we accepted the explanations offered by family violence research to that date, explanations which indicated the violence in the family crossed all class lines. Rather than question these assumptions, they were rationalized by the fact that the projects were public agencies which by their nature attract poorer clientele. The projects also accepted the ideology that family violence is pervasive throughout the society and hence tended to minimize the economic realities and constraints of clients' material lives.

Neither the projects nor the evaluation effort looked at battering as an act and explored the reasons why men batter.\* The projects which dealt with abusers did so from a set of conclusions about battering and abusive men rather than from a theoretical or experimental model which identified those assumptions empirically. The focus of diversion counseling efforts, for example, was primarily anger management and making the abuser "own up to" the battering rather than denying it. However, such behavior modification techniques skirt the issue of causality, and in fact may well deteriorate when the reinforcement contingencies are withdrawn.

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\* Fagan et al., (1981) analyzed data from the study and examined the related violence patterns of the abusive men.

## THE FAMILY: LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT

If the family as the ground on which violence took place was ignored by the evaluation and the projects, the hopes and desires of victims about their families were also unexplored. Informal contacts with clients and staff by the field researchers revealed a desire among the clients for everything to work out alright and to have their family reunited with no violence. They wanted desperately to believe that a reconciliation could be affected with no recurrence of violence. Staff saw part of their job as dispelling such hopes or at least warning women whose men were extremely violent that reconciliation was very dangerous for themselves or their children.

Several programs were exceptions to this rule: the Fayetteville project was dedicated to saving the family unit whenever possible through court-mandated counseling of batterers. The Miami-DIP program began with a subcontractor using a family therapy perspective. However, even these programs eventually found their emphasis turning toward services to victims and batterers separately. Part of the reason for this was that the extremely volatile nature of the batterers and relationships between them and their victims created serious practical safety issues for working with the couples or the family unit. In this context, it is important to pose the question that given the degree and long history of violence we found in the client interviews is it a feasible or a morally justifiable strategy to encourage or help families to stay together? Most of the projects implicitly answered no to this question.

Thus, even though LEAA designed this as a "family violence" initiative, the thrust of the services offered was toward the individual--the victim or the batterer. Ignored was the lived reality of both the victims and batterers that made them think and operate as members of families. This reality was largely disregarded in program design and service provision. Both feminist and victim service advocates addressed the individual, transforming family violence into a woman's issue or a victim's issue. However, the fact remains that the victims and batterers were members of a family unit. Lack of attention to this basic fact may emerge as a significant barrier to helping victims, their children, and ultimately to stopping the widespread incidence of violence in the home. Neither the law nor other social interventions will alter this reality.

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