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Grant No. 80-IJ-CX-0066

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"Organized Crime in the United States: A Review of the Public Record"
(G. Robert Blakey)

is not enclosed, due to the lack of extra copies. The report is 830 pages long.

AN OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZED CRIME

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This report was prepared under Grant No. 80-IJ-CX-0066 from the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Temple University School of Law. Points of view are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official positions or policies of the National Institute of Justice, the U.S. Department of Justice, Battelle Memorial Institute, or Temple University School of Law.

I. ORGANIZED CRIME AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

If there is one thing that has changed since the time of the President's Crime Commission Task Force Report on Organized Crime (1967), it is the number and variety of criminal organizations associated with the term "organized crime.". Previously reserved for Mafia or La Cosa Nostra groups, the term now encompasses groups whose sphere of influence may be merely local or regional, but who nevertheless are engaged in many of the activities associated with illicit entrepreneurship, in particular narcotics trafficking, gambling, loansharking, theft, and fencing.

Ianni (1974), with his work on ethnic succession, can be credited with shifting attention away from the Mafia toward other, ethnically-based groups participating in organized crime. A number of other authors have also noted the importance of non-Mafia groups in specific types of organized crime activities. Salerno and Tompkins (1969) and Inciardi (1975) point to the involvement of Cuban, Black, and Puerto Rican groups in the narcotics trade. Abadinsky (1981) notes the increase of Black and Hispanic groups running independent gambling operations. Robertson (1977) describes the involvement of the Triads in San Francisco in narcotics, prostitution, and gambling activities, as well as in protection rackets.

The work of state and local crime commissions has emphasized the impact of locally- or regionally-based groups on organized crime in a given jurisdiction. The California Organized Crime Control Commission (1978, 1979), for example, reports on the contribution of such gangs as the Mexican Mafia, the Nuestra Familia, the Black Guerrillas, and the

Aryan Brotherhood to the organized crime problem in that state. Each of these gangs began in state prisons as protective membership organizations, eventually taking control over prison gambling, prostitution, and extortion rackets, as well as contract killings. When many of these groups' members were paroled in the early 1970s, they continued their activities in their communities, specializing in narcotics trafficking, extortion, and robbery. Motorcycle gangs, particularly the Hell's Angels, are viewed as a major organized crime threat in California, especially in narcotics trafficking and extortion rackets. The Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council has described the activities of the Dixie Mafia (1977), a loose-knit federation of criminals running gambling, pornography, narcotics, fencing, and prostitution operations throughout Texas and the Southeast. Both the Texas Council and the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission (1977; 1976) have depicted the dominance of the "Mexican Connection" in the distribution of drugs in those states.

The reports of such commissions are always careful to distinguish locally-based examples of organized crime from "syndicate" crime figures or groups, the term of art for La Cosa Nostra or Mafia figures. Yet the activities of both kinds of groups are associated with the term "organized crime." Thus, gambling organizations in Georgia (1978) and auto theft rings in Indiana (1978) are labeled "organized crime," even though their activities are distinguished from the activities of "syndicate" groups. A statement from the U. S. Justice Department that the activities of a number of motorcycle and youth gangs should be included within the concept of organized crime illustrates the change in the type of groups defined by the term since 1967.

The one area of illicit activity in which the broadest range of criminal organizations are reputed to be involved is narcotics trafficking, apparently a result of greater opportunity for new groups than is the case in other kinds of illegal activities. Thus, narcotics trafficking is reported to be dominated by the Mexican Connection in the Midwest and Southwest; Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Black criminal organizations in some of the large cities in the East; and the Dixie Mafia in the Southeast to the virtual exclusion of syndicate groups in these areas. (See especially Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, 1976.)

The emergence of such groups, however, does not appear to validate Ianni's theory of ethnic succession. Instead it demonstrates the advantage that many of these groups have enjoyed on the basis of language and geography. Thus, as the major sources of supply for drugs switched from Turkey to Mexico and Latin America, Spanish-speaking groups gained some advantage based on language and, in the Southwest, on geography. Similar geographic and language advantages have also benefitted Cuban criminal organizations in Florida (Messick, 1979). In addition, the peculiar geographic advantages of isolated large Eastern city ghettos, together with changes in enforcement practices, have enabled groups in those locales to enter into illicit enterprises, in particular gambling and narcotics operations (Abadinsky, 1981).

Few of these other groups have been able to achieve, however, what La Cosa Nostra has always done well, syndicate the activities of a number of disparate units into some sort of cartel or confederation--what Cressey calls "the rational decision for peace" (Cressey, 1972:21). The syndication of criminal activities of similar but theoretically competing groups does not appear to be occurring in these newer criminal organizations, with the exception of the Hell's Angels motorcycle group. Indeed authorities in California, where the activities of the Hell's Angels are probably best known and examined, have noted the evolutionary similarity between the Hell's Angels as a national and international organization and the syndicate gangs of several decades ago (California Department of Justice, 1979). These authorities warn that this newly forming syndicate represents the same serious challenges to law enforcement that its more famous predecessor has posed. Other groups, however, despite their ability to enjoy temporary or total monopolies over certain criminal industries, appear unable to translate this advantage into the ability to syndicate across broad geographic areas. Instead, each unit continues to compete, often quite violently, with other units, and that "rational decision for peace" that Cressey describes as exemplified in the cartel and confederation style has not yet emerged.

Since 1967, as well, there have continued to be investigations of "Mafia" from a historical perspective, going back to its origins in 13th-century Sicily in an attempt to understand the concept better. In one interesting study, Servadio (1976) has suggested that "Mafia" is less an organization than a style of acting or behaving, a patronage style reminiscent of the big-city politics of the early 20th century in the United States (see also Abadinsky, 1981). These works are representative of a larger trend that has developed since 1967 in which there has been movement away from studies of Mafia or La Cosa Nostra as a monolithic organization and toward dissecting the nature of the activities in which such groups are reputedly involved.

The road for much of this work was clearly charted by Schelling (1967). The aim of these endeavors is to examine whether an "organization" evolves in order to perform effectively its criminal activities or whether its form is set beforehand. (See Homer (1974) for a good explication of this argument.) The influence of this approach on the study of organized crime can be seen in much of the research literature produced since 1967, which is more aptly characterized as socioeconomic than sociological in genre. The emphasis of this literature is on the nature and structure of activities, not of groups (see Smith, 1975, 1978; Moore, 1977; Reuter and Rubinstein, 1978; Homer, 1974).

Journalists are one group that has continued to focus on La Cosa Nostra and its members, writing vivid accounts of important investigations that have occurred (see Daley, 1978; Moore, 1969; Goodman, 1971), and stunning exposes of the influence of racketeers and syndicate figures on public officials and of public corruption at the local, state and, to some extent, Federal levels (see Shecter, 1973; Demaris, 1969; Kwitny, 1979; Wendland, 1977; Cook, 1966; Messick, 1968). Recently several autobiographies and biographies of Mafia "defectors" or insiders have appeared, bringing new insights into the organization that has been associated for the longest time with the term "organized crime" (see Talese, 1971; Teresa, 1973; Demaris, 1981; Maas, 1968; Messick, 1971).

But perhaps the most important change since 1967 has been the focus on organized crime as "enterprise" and on the functional needs of enterprises, a focus spurred initially by Schelling's contribution to the President's Task Force Report and embraced by both the research and the law enforcement communities. The 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute as a part of it, focuses on "enterprise," and there has been a much greater sophistication on the part of researchers, investigators, and prosecutors in appreciating the revenue and investment requirements of enterprises. The appeal of this focus is the potential to discourage organized crime by removing some of the economic incentive for its perpetration.

What this new approach has meant is that the group undertaking an enterprise becomes less important than the enterprise itself. Probably one of the reasons that the number and variety of groups associated with the term organized crime has grown so dramatically since 1967 is this shift of emphasis from analyzing illicit groups to investigating illicit activities.

Unfortunately, a clear theoretical base for distinguishing organized crime from other forms of crime has not developed along with this new focus, although some attempts have been made (See Cressey, 1972; Smith, 1978; Schelling, 1971). There remains wide disagreement about the essential characteristics of organized crime, as well as about the elements that are most important to attempts to control it.

Cressey (1967) suggested that the theoretical distinction was that organized crime groups used internal discipline and corruption whereas other crime-committing groups or individuals did not. Clearly, the internal discipline and some of the corruption activities that Cressey found to be characteristic of La Cosa Nostra groups have been reported in other groups (see, for example, California Organized Crime Control

Commission, 1979; Robertson, 1977). Others, however, have questioned whether corruption and discipline are group phenomena or dynamics of the activities in which organized groups typically participate (Homer, 1974). For example, providing illicit goods and services, where substantial profits can often be reaped, possibly creates the means to finance corruption (see, for example, Bequai, 1979). At the same time, the social ambivalence toward the goods and services provided by these markets makes corruption more likely (see Cressey, 1972; Chambliss, 1978; Homer, 1974).

Cressey, for example, compares an "innocuous" crime like bookmaking and a "heinous" crime like armed robbery, suggesting that persuading public officials and law enforcement authorities to overlook a bookmaking operation would be much easier than convincing them to ignore an armed robbery (Cressey, 1972:54f). He argues that the provision of illicit goods and services by itself produces both the possibility and the likelihood of corruption; corruption results inevitably from the activity rather than from the group involved in the activity. Importing narcotics is another example (see Moore, 1977). This activity requires a high degree of internal discipline; since high stakes are involved, the discipline can become brutal. At the same time, the profits from narcotics trafficking finance corruption.

The question remains, then, whether illicit activities structure the organizations that participate in them. Is narcotics trafficking marked by violence and corruption because of the character of the groups drawn to it or are violence and corruption engendered by the activity itself? (But see McIntosh Part II <u>infra</u>.) The similarity in the behavior of the groups associated with narcotics trafficking since 1967 suggests that some credence be given to the notion that the activity does structure the behavior of the groups that come to participate in it. Something in the narcotics trade produces violence and corruption, regardless of whether the group is La Cosa Nostra, the Mexican Connection, the Triads of San Francisco, or the Hell's Angels.

In addition to stimulating analyses of the economic and structural requirements of illicit market activities, Schelling made another contribution to the building of an organized crime "theory." In a piece written in 1971, Schelling suggested that syndicated organized crime was not really in the business of providing illicit goods and services but of shaking down those individuals and groups who provided illicit goods and services, and to some extent, legitimate services as well. Schelling's piece contended that syndicate crime was basically extortion, and monopoly extortion at that.

The ability to be an effective extortionist derived, in Schelling's view, from widespread corruption of public officials, permitting organized crime syndicates to control the response of law enforcement agencies. By manipulating this response, syndicates could exert control over all sorts of people involved in providing goods and services, such as drug traffickers, loansharks, numbers operators, and bookmakers. The capacity to extort from legitimate entrepreneurs such as restaurant owners, for example, derived from improper influence over the labor organizations that controlled labor services.

While Schelling's extortion theory is enormously intriguing, the empirical research that has been done since 1967 (and it should be stressed that there has been relatively little empirical research on organized crime) has not supported this argument. Reuter and Rubinstein

(1978), for example, reported that syndicate figures were not substantially involved in the New York City gambling marketplace, either as extortionists or as entrepreneurs. Anderson (1979), on the other hand, observed a high degree of participation in illicit market activities by Benguerra family members, but as providers not as extortionists. Thus, a promising theoretical base for defining organized crime and the relationship between syndicated organized crime and other forms of the behavior has not emerged.

One may question whether the lack of theory in organized crime research makes any difference. It can be argued, for example, that Schelling's extortion scenario contributes to theory-building. Thus, merely increasing the number of people devoting attention to the subject of organized crime and the number of empirical studies being done will improve our understanding of the phenomenon; from this knowledge, sound theory will somehow emerge. Although that argument has some force, the current lack of some coherent, agreed-upon theoretical guidelines creates a real problem for attempts to control the phenomenon. The "hit and miss" method of undertaking studies without any consistent theoretical basis, in the hope that the theory will eventually emerge, is not the best way to proceed.

More and more commentators appear to agree that organized crime as a phenomenon is related to the provision of illegal goods and services (see Moore, 1977; Smith, 1978; Homer, 1974). It is enterprise crime, an ongoing economic operation. Since the analyses of organized crime activities based on this perspective are economically-based, one would expect a common theory to underlie all of the analyses. Yet, even here, the theoretical approaches diverge.

Most intriguing about such analyses of organized crime is that so basic an issue as whether these marketplaces are structured by demand or supply remains unsettled. The question is whether bookmakers providing opportunities for betting, narcotics distributors providing the opportunity to use drugs, and pimps and prostitutes providing the opportunity to engage in sex in effect produce the bettor, the drug user, or the john. Or is it the desire to bet on college basketball games and the desire to use drugs which call forth entrepreneurs to meet such demands in the marketplace?

This debate is not merely technical or theoretical. The perspective one endorses will determine the strategies one chooses to eradicate the activities. Thus, if one believes that supply creates demand, then both a socially undesirable activity such as drug use and the social pariah of organized crime can be eliminated by eradicating the source(s) of supply. If, on the other hand, one believes that demand creates supply, the enforcement focus would be on the user, the bettor, those who purchase stolen property, or those people who must borrow money outside of legitimate financial institutions. Without the demand side of the market, organized crime would cease to exist.

The President's Task Force Report appeared to take the view that if supply does not create demand, it at least encourages it; the reports of most crime commissions and other official bodies agree. To be sure, they acknowledge the public tolerance of and ambivalence toward many activities of organized crime and realize that such tolerance enables organized crime groups to survive. At the same time, official assessments of organized crime also express the belief that, while the public appears to like to make bets on college basketball games, if it

were not so easy to do so, the public probably would not do it; the available supply creates the demand.

This is very different from the notion that demand creates supply, a position that James Q. Wilson takes in his discussion of the contagion theory of heroin use (Wilson, 1975). Wilson suggests that heroin use does not occur as a result of pushers coercing otherwise uninvolved people to become drug users, but as a result of drug users encouraging their friends to do the same. Thus, the supply side of the market exists merely to meet the level of demand, not to create it. Smith (1978), in his theory of illicit enterprise, describes similar marketplace dynamics, where demand is neither licit nor illicit. The legal system intervenes in this economic situation, arbitrarily drawing a line in the marketplace on one side of which the demand is illegal, and on the other legal. Smith suggests that we naively believe that by making a certain demand illegal, it will magically go away, but demand does not so conveniently disappear. Instead, entrepreneurs enter the market in the hope of enjoying the economic rewards of meeting that demand.

To illustrate his point, Smith gives the example of loansharking. There exists a given level of demand in the United States for financial resources, which is met by a great number of institutions. Many of these institutions, such as banks, credit unions, and finance companies, are legal, and are governed by the conditions under which a loan is extended, the collateral accepted, and the amount of interest set. So long as the terms of the loan or the interest charges conform to those requirements, then the provision of financial resources is legal. But a number of people cannot participate as legal borrowers, because, for example, they cannot meet collateral requirements or their borrowing purposes are not acceptable to financial institutions. Their demand for financial resources, however, does not go away. Other sorts of entrepreneurs will take the risks of extending money to these customers and meeting the demand because of what they expect to be the economic rewards for undertaking those risks.

To suggest that the level of demand remains unchanged by any legal constraints and that current participants in undesirable behavior (such as betting and drug use) structure the marketplace, is to suggest a social control strategy that bypasses suppliers to focus on customers. Further, it suggests that the supplier is no bogeyman at all but rather a normal, red-blooded entrepreneur behaving as expected. As Packer (1968) so nicely pointed out, the entrepreneur is responding to the perfect protective tariff situation that has been set up for him. And so long as the economic incentive to respond to illicit demand remains, targeting the supplier is likely to have very little impact. It may change the nature of the supply side, but it is unlikely to eradicate the marketplace.

While proponents of the idea that demand somehow structures supply have increased, law enforcement strategies have not changed in the direction suggested by this theory. In fact, the changes in law enforcement strategies since 1967 have been increasingly away from the demand side and toward the supply side of illicit marketplaces. In narcotics enforcement, for example, the major change of philosophy since the late 1960s has been the shift away from harassing and frequently arresting individual addicts, and toward targeting the suppliers. This shift has engendered analyses of the many different levels on the supply

side and the strategic importance of the various level dealers (see Moore, 1977).

For some theoreticians, more important than the supply side or the demand side is the infrastructure of illicit marketplaces. Such analyses focus on the technical specialists, the less visible actors in the marketplace that facilitate illicit markets, as well as on the critical functions that they perform (see Moore, 1976; Smith, 1978; Walsh, 1977; Karchmer, 1981). For example, this approach to investigating prostitution would focus not on the prostitute or client, but on the pimp. The relationships with legitimate and illegitimate institutions that permit markets to develop and operate efficiently are especially emphasized. It is these relationships that are believed to be open to intervention.

When one considers how important economic analyses have been in shaping our thinking about organized crime and, to some extent, our legislative approaches to controlling it, then the fact that such a basic issue as whether demand drives supply remains unsettled constitutes a serious problem.

II. ORGANIZED CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Perhaps the one characteristic most associated with organized crime is violence. The history of wars between rival organized crime groups displayed on the streets and on the front pages of newspapers in major cities in the 1920s and 1930s suggested a serious instability. Revelations in the 1950s of Murder Incorporated suggested a cabal of criminals who were not only capable of committing violent acts but organized to make violence a viable business. Broadcasts of congressional hearings in the 1950s and 1960s enhanced the portrait of dark and sinister men for whom violence was a frequent resort if they did not get their way. The use of violence to advance organizational objectives was one aspect of organized crime that made it difficult to cope with, since the reputation for violence made informants and witnesses reluctant to come forward.

Since 1967, however, violence has become a readily apparent part of American life. By the late 1960s, police were much more likely to engage in violent exchanges with radical political activists, and civil rights or student demonstrators than with organized crime figures. Political assassinations or attempted assassinations had become all too frequent. Careful examinations of social institutions revealed substantial violence in public schools and extensive unreported violence in American homes. The use of or reputation for violence was no longer a characteristic unique to organized crime. At the same time, more aggressive use of the Federal Witness Protection Program and of immunity grants resulted in a number of "defectors" from and witnesses to organized crime activities coming forward, most of whom never experienced the expected consequences.

Whether the period since 1967 has numbed us to violence is not certain, but the emphasis on violence in discussions of organized crime has clearly diminished. To be sure, journalists and crime commissions continue to recount the numerous murders associated with organized crime activities. The California Organized Crime Control Commission, for example, attributes 98 homicides over a five-year period (1972-77) to the activities of several prison gangs (California Organized Crime Control Commission, 1979). Wendland (1977) reports extensive violence by Arizona criminals engaged in a range of illicit activities. Robertson (1977) similarly describes the violent bent of the Triads in San Francisco. Most of the popular and scholarly literature, however, comments on the absence of violence more frequently than on its presence.

With the exception of a report by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission (Decade Report, 1980), there has been little recent commentary on the state of violence in La Cosa Nostra. The Crime Commission commented on recent violence in the Angelo Bruno family active in the Philadelphia and South Jersey areas. Two theories were suggested to explain the series of killings. The first linked Bruno's assassination to his allowing members of other La Cosa Nostra groups into Atlantic City, which antagonized members of his own family. The second theory, on the other hand, was that his attempt to maintain exclusive control over activities in Atlantic City rankled other families and led to his demise.

When organized crime violence is described, it is frequently in the context of its use as an internal disciplinary mechanism. Such descriptions echo Cressey's portrait (1967) of the enforcer position. Salerno and Tompkins (1969) suggest that the enforcer role is sought after in Mafia families since it is often a ladder to rapid advancement. Internal rules such as those against informing and those requiring obedience and respect remain as the President's Task Force described them. Violating these rules results in the expected consequences (see Albini, 1971; Messick and Goldblatt, 1972; Bequai, 1979). Often merely the fear of violence, suggest Salerno and Tompkins (1969), makes its use unnecessary. Homer (1974) observes that violence in syndicate groups is highly institutionalized and governed by careful rules. The capacity for violence, however, is not the same as using it, and in fact excessive violence suggests organizational instability. For this reason, the reputation for violence may be more important than the capacity or inclination to engage in it.

Clearly, La Cosa Nostra insiders seem more impressed with the violence-proneness of their organizations than do many outsiders. Thus, Valachi recounts frequent internecine warfare (Maas, 1968) with violence extending as well to witnesses. Fratianno also describes a high level of internal enforcement activities that, in his view, were becoming less and less competently undertaken (Demaris, 1981). Outsiders, however, appear far less likely to be "muscled" into line. Competitors, for example, are as likely to be exposed to the police (see Salerno and Tompkins, 1969) as they are to be assaulted. Tardy or recalcitrant

customers consistently seem to be able to work new deals (Demaris, 1981; Anderson, 1979).

This is true even in marketplaces traditionally associated with violence, such as loansharking. Thus, Reuter and Rubinstein (1978) report neither violence nor threats in collection practices. Anderson (1979) suggests that there is self-regulation in the marketplace such as when loansharks refrain from lending money to overextended borrowers who cannot pay the money back. The Benguerra family established a rule that no more than one loanshark do business with each customer so that it does not become impossible for that individual to pay up. The real discipline in loansharking then is on the supply side, in making the loan, rather than on the customer side, in collecting it. Fratianno, too, suggests that the ability to put the muscle on and collect from customers has decreased, especially with those who are "friends of friends" (Demaris, 1981). In fact, he recounts instances where completely legitimate claims for payment were blithely ignored by people who just happened to know the right strings to pull within Fratianno's organization.

So the ambiance of loansharking has changed to a picture of people who have money out on the streets somehow trusting that their borrowers, either out of gratitude or fear, will pay up. Only then will the expected return on one's money materialize.

Similarly, the portrait of business "partners" being coerced into that role seems rarely to be the case. Teresa (1973) describes many instances in which legitimate professional and business people literally pushed money at him to invest legally or illegally. Fratianno also suggests that willing investment partners were never hard to find

(Demaris, 1981). Both men, however, indicate that many of these "partners" ended up getting ripped off with little chance for redress.

If syndicate crime is now less violent than it was, the same cannot be said of emerging groups, most of which participate in drug trafficking. Whether due to the instability of these groups or of the marketplace itself, the narcotics trade remains one area of organized crime activity frequently characterized as violent (see, for example, Abadinsky, 1981; Wendland, 1977). Complicating this marketplace are changes in the nature of drug use, in drug preferences, and in the major geographic sources of illicit drugs. These factors, when added to the evolving nature of many of the groups, create a highly unstable marketplace, not unlike the highly volatile bootlegging marketplace before the consolidation of rum-running gangs.

McIntosh (1971) suggests that the high level of police activity in the drug arena may also contribute to the violence; technological and bureaucratic improvements in law enforcement agencies engender greater organizational and technological sophistication among offenders. Many of her examples concern technical innovations, such as improvements in the safe, which resulted in an interesting learning curve for safecrackers. She contends that organizational evolution can be viewed in the same way; as law enforcement becomes better organized, offenders must respond by becoming better organized themselves. McIntosh argues that the level of violence in the drug marketplace may be related to the level of the law enforcement attention directed at it. Drug cases, after all, are big cases. Unlike many other organized crime enforcement areas, they produce impressive enforcement statistics; but they are expensive to pursue and the stakes are high.

The stakes are high as well for those involved in the illicit activity. Although the potential gains are large, police informants and unscrupulous competitors are rampant. In this environment a high premium is placed on secrecy--secrecy ensured by violence. Thus, the perception of the danger created by law enforcement activities actually engenders the violence (see also Moore, 1977). At the same time, law enforcement authorities themselves acknowledge that for all their efforts and all their drug seizures, their impact on the illegal flow of drugs is minimal; for example, enforcement efforts succeeded in intercepting only about 10 percent of all the drugs imported through Florida (see Florida House of Representatives, 1978).

III. ORGANIZED CRIME AND GAMBLING

The estimates of revenue generated from illicit gambling are impressive; national figures, which are compiled by the IRS, estimate $45 to $56 billion annually (Department of the Treasury, 1979); estimates from state crime commissions include $4 billion annually for California and $1 billion for Texas (see California Department of Justice, 1979; and Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1977, respectively); Salerno and Tompkins set the figure at $47 billion annually during the 1950s (Salerno and Tompkins, 1969). Since 1967, however, there has emerged the view that the place of gambling in the portfolio of La Cosa Nostra has changed. Rather than being the major source of syndicate revenue, as reported by the President's Task Force, it has been supplanted by other activities. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission makes this statement explicitly, reporting that gambling has been supplanted by narcotics trafficking as the major source of income in that state, with the estimated revenue from gambling at $10-12 million and from narcotics $16-23 million. (see Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1980.) Abadinsky (1981) suggests that use of the telephone rather than wire services has eased entry into bookmaking operations, and reduced syndicate control. Casino, card, and dice games, however, are still said to be syndicate controlled.

The degree of syndicate control and involvement in gambling varies. The IIT study in Illinois (Kornfeld, 1971) certainly suggested that syndicated crime was an important controlling mechanism in gambling.

The Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council (1977) reported that while many independent groups operated gambling establishments, the layoff services* of organized crime syndicates were extremely important and that the financial backing of these syndicates was the web or fabric of illicit gambling in Texas.

Mafia insiders, however, have claimed that gambling is not as lucrative as law enforcement estimates suggest, a claim supported by Anderson (1979) and Reuter and Rubinstein (1978). Valachi, for example, complained of high overhead costs frequently running about 50 percent of profit (Maas, 1968). Fratianno suggests that gambling rackets provide only pin money for syndicate figures. Thus, in the same way that there is always loanshark money on the street, there is always some gambling action (Demaris, 1981). Yet the real opportunities, according to Fratianno, are not in illegal gambling, but in the skim and scam possibilities in legal gambling activities, particularly in Las Vegas and Atlantic City.

If Fratianno correctly states the views of syndicate crime leaders, that may explain why bookmaking and numbers operations reputedly have changed hands from La Cosa Nostra to many independent entrepreneurs. Reuter and Rubinstein's persuasive study (1978) about New York City gambling and syndicate involvement certainly suggests a major role for autonomous independents, most of whom are relatively powerless to do much about customers and employees who cheat them, and who, therefore, are cheated frequently. Abadinsky (1981) suggests that the increased

*The process by which smaller bookmakers transfer some of the illegal bets placed with them to larger bookmakers as a means of balancing their accounts. This system is designed to avoid the situation of having more "winners" than "losers." For a fuller discussion, see Blakey (orig. draft p. 436) participation of Blacks and Hispanics as numbers entrepreneurs in New York City has resulted from reduced enforcement, allowing many more independents to operate. This development is consistent with Homer's hypothesis (1974) of why syndicate groups became important in gambling in the first place; gambling requires organization in order to have the funds and the infrastructure to protect it from law enforcement. Where the pressure from law enforcement is removed, there is less need for a well-developed organization and therefore newly emerging groups are able to operate successfully.

Crime commissions also report a large number of independent operators involved in gambling. The California Department of Justice (1979), for example, reports that gambling is not syndicate-controlled in the state; the New Mexico Organized Crime Prevention Commission (1974) makes the same claim. In both reports, however, there is an exception: layoff bets that are tied into such places as Las Vegas and New York, which suggest a syndicate involvement at this level in the marketplace. Overall, however, syndicate interests do not dominate the gambling marketplace.

Thus, we return again to Fratianno's contention that the real opportunities in gambling are in legal gambling settings. The President's Task Force, and indeed many law enforcement authorities, operate on the opposite assumption; since it is their major source of revenue, organized crime syndicates have staked a great deal on making sure that gambling remains illegal. Maintaining its illegality, then, enables organized crime to make enormous profits. If Fratianno is right, on the other hand, syndicate criminals perceive the real opportunities in places like Las Vegas and Atlantic City. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1980) lends some credence to Fratianno's

contention by suggesting that the Bruno assassination was a result of conflicts over turf in Atlantic City. The New Jersey State Investigating Commission (1979) reported that such opportunities were already being capitalized on in the ancillary businesses, such as restaurants, bars, and cigarette vending, that attended the recent Atlantic City development. The Commission noted that organized crime opportunities actually lay in these areas as a result of enforcement efforts focusing on the control and ownership of the casinos themselves, instead of on general licensing statutes (1977). The New Jersey Commission's perceptions support Fratianno's argument.

Therefore, it is time to reconsider whether legalization will truly remove a huge profitmaking opportunity from organized crime. If syndicated organized crime has greatly reduced its involvement in illicit gambling during the past fifteen years, legalizing gambling will not greatly affect syndicated organized crime. Instead, making many forms of gambling legal might only increase the kinds of opportunities that Fratianno suggests are more attractive and lucrative to organized crime syndicates. At the same time, the vacuum created when the syndicate abandons such undertakings as bookmaking and numbers may open the way for other groups to gain large profits and, then, great power, just as syndicate groups once did through gambling.

IV. ORGANIZED CRIME AND NARCOTICS

Drug trafficking is one area of organized crime activity that has experienced considerable flux since the 1967 publication of the President's Crime Commission Task Force Report on Organized Crime. As mentioned earlier, part of this instability is reflected in the chronic violence and homicides associated with the drug trade. Another part of the instability is caused by the constant attention of law enforcement authorities at the local, state, and Federal levels, and the efforts of the United States government to persuade other countries to stop cultivating drug crops and to discourage their export.

The instability of the marketplace, which has rarely impeded the supply of drugs, has affected the shape of the market entrepreneurs. There appear to be four main factors that have affected drug trafficking in the past fifteen years. The first of these is the geographic shifts that have occurred in the sources of supply of illicit drugs. By the early 1970s, the supply of Turkish heroin had been largely curtailed by crop abatement efforts of the United States and Turkish governments, and by the interception of the famous French Connection (see Moscow, 1968; Moore, 1969; Shecter, 1973). At the same time, United States involvement in Southeast Asia permitted the growth of Asian suppliers in the Golden Triangle (Abadinsky, 1981). After the United States left Viet Nam, Latin American sources of supply became important, particularly in Mexico and South America (Albini, 1971; Ianni, 1974).

These shifts in the sources of illicit drugs created considerable market flux since new relationships, habits, and customs had to be established with new foreign nationals and growers of the illicit crops. In addition, the newly-emerging, ethnically-based organized crime groups

with linguistic and geographic links to the new market areas were at a great advantage.

The second factor that has affected drug trafficking is the change in drug usage patterns in the United States, with the epidemic level of heroin use in the 1960s being replaced by the widespread use of marijuana and cocaine in the late 1970s. Also altered were the values of different drugs and the size of the market demand for them. Growth in the synthetic drug market also had an impact; it became even easier to enter the drug marketplace since the component parts of synthetic drugs were readily available. Thus, during this period, the sources of supply, the drugs most frequently used, and the composition of the drug clientele all changed, creating opportunities and challenges for established and emerging entrepreneurs in the drug marketplace.

The third factor affecting drug trafficking seems to have been a change in the role of syndicated crime in the drug marketplace. It almost became an article of faith by the time Salerno and Tompkins wrote (1969) that La Cosa Nostra was out of the drug business, a rule having been established to that effect. Inciardi (1975), in fact, described it as a 1964 "law" that had been laid down in the Mafia prohibiting drug trafficking. Salerno and Tompkins pointed out that with La Cosa Nostra out of drug trafficking, other ethnic groups began to import and distribute drugs.

By the mid to late '70s, however, writers were suggesting that this so-called La Cosa Nostra ban on, or law against, drug trafficking was less successful, less enforceable, and, in fact, less real than had initially been believed. Homer (1974), for example, suggests that the ban was in fact the La Cosa Nostra Commission's ban, and that it could not be enforced because the strength of La Cosa Nostra lies in the family structure and the autonomy of the individual family. Thus, so long as families would tolerate the behavior there was really nothing that could be done to stop it. Valachi (Maas, 1968) suggests that in fact bosses winked at the ban so long as they got their cut, a suggestion that Fratianno seems to support (Demaris, 1981). By 1979, the California Department of Justice was reporting a resurgence of syndicate criminals in drug trafficking (California Department of Justice, 1979).

Whether or not the La Cosa Nostra law or rule was enforceable, there appears to have been some diminution in the involvement of syndicated criminals in drug trafficking. The decrease created the opportunity for other groups to make inroads in this area, and the evidence at this point is strong that they have been successful. This change in the groups engaged in drug trafficking is the fourth factor that has contributed to the instability in the marketplace.

There are three groups prominent in contemporary drug trafficking. The first of these--noted early on by Salerno and Tompkins (1969)--is the so-called "Cuban Connection." Ianni (1974) and Inciardi (1975) also note the importance of this group. Messick (1979) reports this group to be the key import connection, particularly for cocaine and marijuana. The influence of the Cuban Connection is felt not only in the Northeast, but also in Florida, where it has a tremendous influence on the South Florida economy. Florida authorities view their state as the primary point of importation of cocaine and marijuana from Latin America into the United States (Florida House of Representatives, 1978).

The second major emergent drug organization is the "Mexican Connection," involving primarily heroin. Wendland (1977) alleges that by the mid-1970s 92 percent of the heroin coming into the United States was of Mexican origin. At the same time the Mexican Connection was also involved in importing marijuana. As one might expect, the states that focus the greatest attention on the Mexican Connection are those that abut Mexico; California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas all report the strong influence of independent, non-syndicate drug trafficking groups who make alliances in Mexico. Most of these groups are either <u>ad hoc</u> gangs of Mexican-Americans, the "Mexican Mafia," or bikers (see California Department of Justice, 1979; Battelle/Arizona Report, 1982; New Mexico Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 1978; and Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1977). Arizona authorities have been concerned about alliances between such traffickers in Mexico and some famous La Cosa Nostra figures who appear to be in semi-retirement in Arizona, but this alliance seems less prevalent than those forged between biker groups and emerging ethnic gangs in these border states. Interestingly enough, another state investigating commission that reports on the importance of the Mexican Connection is Illinois. The Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission (1976) labeled Chicago as the main distribution center in the continental United States for Mexican heroin once it has come through the border states.

Finally, there is the "Asian Connection," a drug supply channel of concern primarily on the West Coast. Canadian authorities particularly have been focusing on the Asian Connection, and especially the involvement of strong Chinese gangs, both youth and adult, in the drug trade (Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit, 1977). British Columbia, which has some 70 percent of all of Canada's addicts, has an enormous heroin-engendered theft problem. California, particularly San Francisco, has long been the site of Asian gangs--the Tongs (Dillon, 1972), and the Triads (Robertson, 1977)--both of which have been associated with drug trafficking in addition to many other illicit activities.

No matter where one looks in the United States, then, the overwhelming impression is that the drug marketplace is very different from what it was fifteen years ago. The differences in this marketplace probably have as much to do with the altered role of syndicated criminals as with the emergence of other often ethnically-based groups. What the exact role of other factors, such as the change of usage patterns and the geographic shift in the sources of supply, has been, is not completely clear.

V. ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE LEGITIMATE ECONOMY

In 1979, the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that syndicate criminals owned some 10,000 legitimate businesses nationwide, generating annual profits in excess of $12 billion dollars (Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1980). The reasons frequently given for the acquisition of legitimate businesses by organized crime figures include the desire to gain respect and social prominence as business owners; to acquire a legitimate entity to serve as a tax front, a source of income that can be "explained"; to make investments; to gain new power; and to acquire a front for illicit activities--for example, when a restaurant is used as a front for a fencing, gambling, or prostitution operation (see Bequai, 1979; Moore, 1969). Florida authorities, in particular, have found that the opportunity to wield political clout legitimately as a land owner and a business owner has motivated organized criminals in that state to invest in legitimate businesses (Florida House of Representatives, 1978).

The move to acquire legitimate business is not a recent development, but few commentators seem to agree with Messick and Goldblatt (1972) that it dates back to the 1929 stock market crash. At that time, the authors argue, syndicate gangs, unlike most groups, possessed big money. By lending this much needed capital, syndicate infiltration of legitimate business was begun. Whenever it started, it is clear that syndicate crime ownership of legitimate businesses is now frequent and that it demonstrates the various points of intersection between organized and white-collar crime (see Battelle/Arizona Report, 1982; Edelhertz, 1970; Jester, 1974; Smith, 1980). Anderson's study of the Benguerra family (1979), for example, lists a wide range of businesses owned by the organization, including restaurants and bars, retail establishments, food manufacturing and wholesaling companies, vending companies, and construction and building companies. Teresa (1973), Valachi (Maas, 1978), and Fratianno (Demaris, 1981) also demonstrate the great degree of syndicate ownership of legitimate business.

Such business acquisition, however, is not limited to syndicated organized crime. Messick (1979) describes the impact of independent drug traffickers on the South Florida economy, and how that economy would probably collapse if these criminal businessmen were seriously undermined. California authorities suggest that the Hell's Angels have adopted the same involvement in legitimate businesses earlier practiced by La Cosa Nostra or Mafia groups (California Department of Justice, 1979). Their motivations are also the same: the desire to acquire a cover for illicit activities and to gain respectability and political clout. The Hell's Angels now own quite a number of cycle shops, mail order businesses, and real estate holdings.

Once organized crime groups acquire legitimate businesses, they generally advance the interests of those enterprises through unlawful means. New Mexico authorities describe the typical tactics of bribing and corrupting those in charge of the public contracting process, particularly in the Racing Commission in that state (New Mexico Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 1974). Amick (1976) quite vividly describes the many abuses of the public contracting process perpetrated by syndicate and non-syndicate organized crime figures, working through legitimate business firms.

Valachi (Maas, 1968) noted that loansharking was frequently an access route into legitimate business, with declining debt collection

violence being replaced by silent partnerships and ownership of legitimate businesses. In fact, organized crime figures cultivated such clients in order to develop these relationships. Goodman (1971), in his account of the Marcus affair in New York City, suggests some interesting relationships between loansharks, attorneys, and businessmen in need of loans for personal or business investments, with many attorneys playing the role of a broker, bringing organized crime and business figures together. Goodman's work gives credence to Valachi's contention that loansharking is a means of entering legitimate businesses.

Labor union connections are another well-established road into legitimate business. Through years of labor racketeering, entrenchment in many, particularly transportation-related, labor unions, has enabled the syndicate crime figure to keep out other union organizers, guarantee labor peace, or produce a sweetheart contract (see Hutchinson, 1970). The Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, through a series of investigations and public hearings, exposed the importance of labor union connections in the vending and jukebox industries, which closely resembled Schelling's notion (1971) of the shakedown or extortion of legitimate businessess.

Providing public relations and arbitration services in jukebox and vending industries, as described by the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission, is precisely the pattern that Kwitny recounts in the New York meat market (Kwitny, 1979). There "labor consultants" with important positions in the butchers and meatcutters unions control the industry, often serving as "special consultants" and as executives in food chains as well. New Jersey authorities have documented similar situations, particularly in the building services trades where "arbitration services" provide a means to control an entire industry, such as janitorial services (New Jersey State Investigating Commission, 1979). The clear and extensive evidence of the ability to control labor supports the Fratianno and Valachi contentions of the importance of labor-related connections in extending syndicate influence within legitimate industries.

Fratianno (Demaris, 1981) examines the kinds of businessess that are most attractive to syndicate figures. In particular, cash flow businesses are prized since they create the opportunity to skim. Crime commissions have also highlighted this phenomenon. In describing the "infiltration" of Atlantic City by syndicate figures, the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation (1977) reported that these figures were mostly engaged in vending companies, bars, restaurants, hotels, and gambling schools.

Many of these businesses have a large cash intake, and all are businesses which are not controlled as stringently as gambling casinos. They provide crucial ancillary services to the casinos, and therefore are a way of exerting influence without risking public exposure by attempting to own or operate casinos. Another cash business where skimming is very easy, and where crime commissions believe there is extensive involvement of syndicate figures, is the pizza business. New York and Pennsylvania authorities have investigated supply companies as well, particularly cheese suppliers (see Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1980).

Fratianno suggests that another aspect of legitimate businesses that makes them attractive are the opportunities for scams, particularly for making contacts with other legitimate businessmen who can be of

great assistance in scams. Abadinsky (1981) recounts some of the better known bankruptcy scams of organized crime, and also notes the movement of syndicate figures into security theft, fraud, and stock manipulation. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1980) documents the manipulation of Magic Marker stock to illustrate the many inroads into legitmate business that syndicated crime figures now enjoy.

Although the pattern of legitimate investment by syndicate figures, and to a lesser extent, by Hell's Angels, is well-documented, it is not well-documented for other emerging organized crime groups. Generally the pattern of business ownership described for such groups is one in which the businesses serve the dominant illicit interests of the group: what might be called "instrumental" business ownership. Thus, there does not appear to be as much a pattern of disinterested legitimate investment as one finds among syndicate figures. Nor is there the pattern of investing in order to escape categorization by law enforcement authorities as a "racketeer." This inability to expand into legitmate enteprises may be a result of organizational immaturity; since their illegitimate activities are not well in hand, they are unable to devote time, money, and personnel to legitimate activities. This is especially true of drug-based groups who face an unstable marketplace, which requires constant attention, leaving little time for managing legitimate interests.

What is most striking about the evidence of organized crime involvement in the legitimate economy during the last fifteen years is that so little has changed since the President's Task Force Report. This movement toward legitimized money, respectability, and political clout has not been stemmed in the least; if anything it has become more entrenched. This legitimation may account for the benign way in which many persons in the professions and entertainment industries view some syndicate crime figures (see Teresa, 1973; Demaris, 1981): While organized crime figures may have had dark pasts, their current lives are really quite respectable. They can afford to be benevolent "godfathers" since they are now quite removed in space and time from their violent beginnings.

But rather than being a comforting sign, the extent of organized crime involvement in the legitimate economy, as suggested by Kwitny's well-documented examples (1979), is alarming. At the same time, we might do well to ask whether there has been real growth in organized crime involvement in legitimate business since 1967, or whether the President's Task Force Report stimulated a closer examination of business, which has merely revealed what already existed.

VI. ORGANIZED CRIME AND LOANSHARKING

In 1970, the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission issued a report on what it termed "juice racketeering" in the Chicago area. The report described exorbitant interest rates, and practices such as failing to apply weekly interest payments against the principal, so that the retirement of the loanshark debt was an ever-receding goal. Also reported were violence, both the violence used to intimidate borrowers and/or their dependents, and the violence resulting from debtors' committing crimes in order to retire their debts.

The Commission expressed some surprise at the apparent change in the demographic characteristics of loanshark customers. Rather than being gamblers or other offenders trying to borrow money in order to pay off debts, the borrowers of the juice operators were people from a broad range of socioeconomic backgrounds who needed money for all sorts of business, investment, and personal reasons.

The structure of the juice industry reported by the Commission was one in which syndicate criminals financed a large number of retail juice operators. The retail operators tended to operate through finance companies, factoring firms, and savings and loan associations, used as fronts. Thus, the portrait of the loanshark qua loanshark without the facade of a legitimate financial enterprise had all but disappeared. Instead, there was a patina of respectability or legitimacy in the juice rackets. By 1971, the Commission found a decrease in the violence associated with juice rackets, which the Commission attributed in part to its own investigations.

The Illinois Commission's description resembles that of Salerno and Tompkins (1969), in which syndicate criminals serve as bankers for retail juice operators, grossing about $10 billion. Furthermore, loansharking turned out to be a nice investment of gambling income. Homer (1974) also suggests that loansharking and gambling are two illicit activities that feed on each other.

Many writers suggest that if gambling is a primary enterprise of organized crime, and particularly of organized crime syndicates, then loansharking occupies a second position. Anderson (1979), for example, reports loansharking to be the second most profitable operation of the Benguerra family, although she reports only modest profits for such enterprises. Bequai (1979) and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1980) also note that loansharking is the second most fruitful source of organized crime income.

Anderson's suggestion that only modest profits could be reaped from loansharking was echoed by Valachi (Maas, 1968), who complained of high overhead costs cutting into the profits. But what Valachi reported as particularly attractive about loansharking was the opportunities it often provided for entry into legitimate businesses. Valachi suggests that the declining violence in debt collection practices by loansharks has been replaced by creative repayment arrangements in which, for example, the juice operator receives a piece of the business of a debtor as payment for all or part of the debt. Or the juice operator might have the debtor allow the operator's vending machines to be installed on the debtor's business premises in return for reducing the debt. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1980) reports similar repayment arrangements.

The relationship between loansharks and a broad socioeconomic range of borrowers was underscored in Goodman's study of the Marcus affair in New York City (1971). Here the purchase of stock by the city Water

Commissioner was financed by a loan arranged through loansharks, demonstrating a dramatic change in the level of respectability of loansharking, or at least less compunction on the part of people in fairly high government and business positions to become involved with loansharks.

Fratianno (Demaris, 1981) contends that loansharking was in effect another source of pin money for syndicate figures, as well as a source of quick cash. Because so many organization figures and their friends were borrowers, however, Fratianno complains that it was easy to get stiffed by these people. He suggests that a lot of the customers of syndicate loansharking operations are in fact members, or friends of members, of the organization, who find it easier to get a loan from somebody within the organization than from a regular financial institution. Fratianno also suggests that, in his experience, failure to monitor the activity resulted in continual cheating. Still, the money to be made in loansharking is great enough to give some return on investments.

By 1978 Rubinstein and Reuter report a loansharking industry, in New York at least, tied to gambling, that is largely non-violent. Thus, an activity which was violent in the early 1970s, by the end of the 1970s is consistently described as a fairly non-violent industry, in which creative repayment arrangements have replaced the earlier strong-arm tactics. Nevertheless, here and there reports surface of some violence and intimidation. Abadinsky (1981), for example, reports some threats of violence in New Jersey juice operations (see also Goldstock and Coenen, 1980). Recently, loansharking has been linked more and more--particularly by crime commissions--as a sideline, rather than major, activity. In California, for example, loansharking is a sideline to bookmaking, and while syndicate connections exist in state loansharking operations, the industry is not reported to be syndicate controlled (California Department of Justice, 1979). Indiana reports the same phenomenon of loansharking as a sideline of other illicit activities (Indiana Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1978).

Finally, an interesting aspect of loansharking is that the loansharking interests of syndicate figures permit them to invest in and influence the illicit enterprises of other organized crime groups. Thus, syndicate figures may be mentioned as financiers of fencing operations at the same time that they are getting a piece of a gambling operation (see, for example, Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1977). Loansharking creates opportunities for financial investments (real entrepreneurship) as well as the ability to exert influence ("moral" entrepreneurship) that otherwise would not be available.

Of note is the absence of attention that loansharking receives in the South. Most of the crime commission work on loansharking is in the Northeast, the Midwest, and California. In the South, despite the fairly extensive reports on organized crime activities in several states, loansharking is barely mentioned, and when it is, it is only in vague and general terms. Reports from Florida and Georgia, for example, barely note the existence of loansharking operations, raising the question of whether there are regional differences in loansharking activities (See Florida House of Representatives, 1977; Georgia Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1980).

VII. ORGANIZED CRIME AND THEFT AND FENCING

Theft and fencing are areas of criminal activity that are usually associated with criminal independents rather than organized groups. While the bulk of fences are purportedly legitimate businessmen (Walsh, 1975; 1977), criminal entrepreneurs as well operate as wholesalers; Blakey and Goldsmith (1976) have termed them "master fences" or "broker fences." Businessmen-fences, then, fall generally into a retailing role, often as outlets for the broker-fence entrepreneur. This structure of the industry, peopled primarily by independents closely linked by a sophisticated communication network, is basically the pattern reported in the early 1970s to the Senate Small Business Committee during its hearings on cargo theft (U.S. Senate, 1974). It is a pattern uncovered again by the New York State Temporary Commission of Investigation in its report on the theft and distribution of beauty aids in the New York metropolitan area (New York State Temporary Commission of Investigation, 1978).

Such fences, whether wholesalers or retailers, businessmen or criminal entrepreneurs, are the individuals who service the organized theft rings in many parts of the country. The Georgia Organized Crime Prevention Council (1980), for example, describes the activities of mobile interstate theft rings that operate not only in that state but throughout the southeastern United States. Such rings often specialize in the type of merchandise that is stolen or in the type of target that is robbed. The Georgia Council reports on the activities of one group that specialized in targeting institutions which held large amounts of cash over a weekend, and on another ring that specialized in thefts of credit cards. Nearly every jurisdiction reports similar kinds of theft rings operating within it. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission's 1971-72 report describes the activities of such mobile, professional thieves, while Indiana reports on the activities of auto theft rings (see Indiana Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1978).

In the early 1970s, the Indiana Organized Crime Prevention Council (1973) surveyed businesses, inquiring about their perceptions of threats to their enterprises. Nearly all types of business firms (manufacturers, transportation, financial, and retail firms) reported a high incidence of theft victimization, but the extent to which theft was viewed as an external rather than an internal, employee-related problem varied by sector.

When asked about specific organized crime activities, (narcotics trafficking, gambling, loansharking, and fencing), on the other hand, fencing was the only area in which the businesses felt directly victimized. Firms in nearly all sectors of the economy acknowledged to a small degree the presence of other organized crime activities (such as loansharking or gambling), either adjacent to their facilities or indeed involving their employees. But interestingly enough, few firms regarded their theft problems as organized crime-related; they did not see that loansharking and gambling could be linked to theft.

These findings are contradicted by Teresa's (1973) suggestion that theft-related activities are a way for truck drivers and other laborers to work off loanshark debts. This arrangement, which Teresa termed the "ten percenter," involved the driver's "giving up" a truckload of merchandise in exchange for erasing 10 percent of his gambling or loanshark debts. When the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission (1978) conducted a series of studies on fencing, it concluded that

fencing was not a highly concentrated industry in Illinois, but that it was an industry fueled largely by <u>internal</u> theft. Yet, the possible relationship between internal theft problems and ancillary organized crime activities was not mentioned by the Investigating Commission.

There are several areas in which organized crime involvement in theft and fencing is more easily seen and more frequently reported. The first is in the area of narcotics trafficking, where stolen property is bartered for drugs. This phenomenon is reported particularly in the Southwest border states where drug traffic with Mexico and Latin America is prominent. For example, the state of Texas reports a lively trade in weapons smuggling, particularly small arms, which is directly related to the drug trade with Mexico (Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1977). Of the weapons smuggled across the border, nearly 40 percent are stolen small arms. New Mexico reports a similar phenomenon in which pusher-fences exchange drugs for stolen property before crossing the border into Mexico, then exchange the stolen property for drugs in Mexico, returning to complete another exchange; the cycle goes on and on (New Mexico Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1973). New Mexico estimates that 75 percent of the stolen property fenced in that state is linked to this sort of drug trade. Because the trade in narcotics is tied to organized groups, and the fencing of stolen property is similarly tied to these groups, this type of theft and fencing operation, which finances the purchase of drugs, is most frequently linked with organized crime.

The second form of theft and fencing where organized crime, especially syndicate organized crime, is reportedly greatly involved is in cargo theft. The IIT/Chicago Crime Commission study (Kornfeld, 1971), for example, reports cargo-related thefts are syndicate-dominated, while lower level fencing is conducted by either independents or lesser organized crime groups. Texas estimates that 1 to 2 percent of all the goods that come into Texas ports is being diverted systematically to a black market (Texas Organized Crime Prevention Council, 1977). Both the Dixie Mafia and organized crime syndicates are viewed in Texas as having some involvement either as financial backers or as retailers for this systematic diversion of cargo. Florida (Florida House of Representatives, 1978) reports the same sort of relationship between systematic cargo theft and organized fencing outlets.

The other often noted relationship between cargo theft and organized crime syndicates results from the connections between those syndicates and the labor unions associated with transport trades. New Jersey authorities, for example, have described certain truck hijackings as "give-ups," events engineered by racketeers in the unions (See Walsh, 1976). Often such give-ups can be traced to ten percenters who are working off loanshark or gambling debts or performing favors for racketeers.

Finally, the other area in which theft and fencing is viewed as syndicate-related is the distribution of bootleg cigarettes and pirated records and tapes. Here, pre-existing networks of wholesale and retail outlets facilitate the distribution of illicit property of all types. The extensive interests of syndicates in vending companies and restaurants, for example, create a distribution network in which bootleg cigarettes can be easily sold. This is a phenomenon reported by Florida officials (Florida House of Representatives, 1978) and by Abadinsky (1981) as well. The distribution of pirated records and tapes is also

reported by Abadinsky and documented by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission in its decade report (1980).

In its study of professional crime (1972), the Pennsylvania Crime Commission discovered that important alliances had evolved between syndicate figures and professional criminals. Walsh (1977) as well reports that syndicate figures may tip off or aid professional criminals by gaining information necessary to theft. Syndicate figures can also help professional criminals to purchase immunity in the event things do not go as planned.

For the most part, however, it appears that Bequai's (1979) estimation of the relationship between organized crime syndicates and fencing operations is most apt. He suggests that organized crime figures serve as customers of fences and sometimes as outlets for them, but that fencing is dominated by independents. Homer (1974) suggests that syndicated organized crime involvement in fencing is only with large quantities of goods (carloads, for example), or with especially unusual items.

One fencing operation that does appear to be dominated by syndicates is the chop shop. The U.S. Senate hearings into chop shop operations uncovered a syndicate-controlled nationwide distribution system for motor vehicle parts; the chop shop appears to be dominated by syndicate interests in Chicago with extensive contacts coast to coast. Arizona authorities suggest that there is some vertical integration in which the original shops, the wholesalers, and the retailers are employed by or associated with the syndicate, with some distribution to independent retail outlets. Although stolen motor vehicle parts and accessories appear to be one fencing industry in which syndicated organized crime has become largely involved, it is an anomaly. Nearly all other types of theft and fencing operations remain an organized activity dominated by criminal independents.

VIII. ORGANIZED CRIME AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION

Messick and Goldblatt (1972) advance the interesting hypothesis that the breakup of the big city machines associated with the Franklin Delano Roosevelt era left a power vacuum that organized crime syndicates filled. Demaris' (1969) description of Chicago, however, suggests that the relationship between syndicates and big city politics had been established long before that. The involvement of organized crime syndicates in city politics is portrayed as being well-entrenched by the late 1930s.

The importance of corruption to organized crime was voiced eloquently by Cressey in the President's Task Force Report and in his later work (Cressey, 1967, 1969, 1972). Salerno and Tompkins (1969) echo Cressey's sentiments that public corruption is essential to syndicate crime. Chambliss (1978) suggests that corruption results from several pressures on law enforcement agencies, the first of which is social ambivalence toward many of the undertakings of organized crime, such as gambling. This ambivalence extends to its criminal enforcement and results in a climate in which corruption is easier. Another pressure results from the structure of the bureaucracy itself.

According to Chambliss, a law enforcement agency likes nothing better than a smooth running enforcement operation, not even spectacular or effective crime-busting activities. Corruption fosters predictable, smooth enforcement operations either by limiting the geographic distribution of illicit goods and services or by giving the appearance that they are limited. Thus, systematic corruption and payoff systems really serve both the illicit entrepreneur who seeks safety from law enforcement harassment, and the law enforcement bureaucrat who prefers a predictable, smooth running enforcement operation to one left to the vagaries of chance.

The kinds of payoff systems that Abadinsky (1981) recalls in the Chicago Police Department and the New York Police Department support Chambliss' hypothesis that the bureaucratic pressures are indeed a potent force. Of special note is the way in which entrenched corruption satisfies the continual need to produce acceptable enforcement statistics. Without corruption law enforcement agencies might find it difficult to produce an acceptable level of enforcement statistics on a continuing basis.

While Chambliss views corruption in the United States as a result of the structure of government and enforcement agencies, Servadio (1976) suggests that corruption for the Sicilian Mafia was part of the society in general distrusting the government. The Mafia was not alone in viewing the government with suspicion; it was widely believed that the government worked for the people only through corruption. Homer (1974) suggests that corruption is never undertaken by organized crime groups as an end in itself, but is a functional requirement of certain illicit activities. In other words, some illicit activities cannot occur unless there is systematic corruption.

Perhaps the one organized crime activity most frequently associated with corruption is gambling. Anderson (1979), for example, found widespread corruption only in numbers operations; and this corruption occurred on the neighborhood level, but not at the higher levels of the operations. Valachi (Maas, 1968) also tied corruption to gambling operations; the New Mexico Organized Crime Commission (1974, 1977) found it most prevalent in the state Racing Commission and gambling interests;

the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans (1968) relates corruption to pinball machines and gambling interests; and Abadinsky (1981) reports on the New York Police Department's collusion in bookmaking operations.

Fratianno (Demaris, 1981), in his discussions of corruption and attempts to influence governmental figures in particular, contends that syndicate criminals are more attracted to the powers behind authority figures than to the public figures themselves. They would not attempt to influence a state governor but the governor's powerful friends, his or her political and financial backers. Fratianno also suggests that since organized crime figures realize their notoriety and the problems that it causes politically, they frequently use buffers, especially attorneys, to serve as bridges between them and these friends of political figures.

The notoriety of organized crime also results in the preference for the undetected, "backdoor" influence, through friends of friends. Further, Fratianno suggests that the media exposure of the relationship or attempted relationship, or even of some indirect influence proves deadly, because the notoriety of organized crime figures is a severe liability to political figures. If Fratianno is correct, the strategy of California law enforcement authorities in their "Operation Exposure" may have been a very good one (California Department of Justice, 1978). The enforcement officers publicly exposed organized crime figures and alerted public officials and citizens to whom these persons were. Many of these efforts are now the subject of libel suits.

Whether or not a considerable undetected influence in fact occurs, the public views that influence as great. In the ITT/Chicago Crime

Commission study (Kornfeld, 1971) in Illinois, for example, the public explicitly held much of officialdom in low esteem. The results of the survey of households were that some 75 percent of all politicians were improperly influenced by organized crime figures: 68 percent of city and county employees, 62 percent of the police, 55 percent of the judges, and 52 percent of the prosecutors. Over 50 percent of the populace believed that public officials were influenced by organized crime.

Perhaps the best sources of information on corruption are not law enforcement agencies or even law enforcement crime commissions, but the exposes of journalists, such as Daley's work on New York (1978); Cook on Youngstown (1966); Messick on Cleveland (1968); Demaris on Chicago (1969); and Wendland and the IRE reporters on the state of Arizona (1977). The importance of journalism cannot be overstated; it has often pushed the criminal justice system to take stock of corruptive influences. The other type of source that seems to be important for uncovering corruption are state investigating commissions, as distinguished from commissions that have both investigative and prosecutive authority. Commissions responsible solely for investigations rather than prosecutions appear to do well in uncovering corruption. The New Jersey State Investigating Commission, for example, has uncovered, through a number of investigations, corruption in different jurisdictions in the state. The same is true of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, which, like the New Jersey Commission, is an investigating body with subpoena authority but no prosecutive responsibilities.

The New Jersey authorities have uncovered an area of public corruption that other writers have documented as well; corruption in the public procurement process (New Jersey State Investigating Commission, 1979). Goodman (1971) and Amick (1976) also describe situations in which officials in charge of public procurement and contracting become corrupted. What is fascinating about Goodman's description of the Marcus affair is the apparent "bribe mentality," common both among public officials and the business people with whom they come in contact. Public officials expected to be offered a bribe and businessmen expected to have to offer one. So common is this mentality that it would be unusual for such overtures and acceptances not to occur.

Amick describes this same phenomenon in the public contracting process, a system infected by widespread abuse in which public officials encourage, if not demand, bribes and payoffs just for performing their duties. The notion, then, of corruption forced on a public official is widely disputed by the work of these authors. Gardiner's study of public inspectors in the land use area (1978) describes public officials who are willing not only to look the other way for a payoff, but also to use their positions to extort bribes. Karchmer (1981) reports that arson-for-profit schemes are often much enhanced by the connivance, if not the participation, of fire inspectors or insurance adjustors. Thus, while Chambliss may suggest that in law enforcement circles bureaucracy itself engenders corruption, which is then encouraged by the hypocrisy and ambivalence of society, corruption in other types of public agencies, particularly in procurement and inspection, has different causes. In these latter areas, corruption results from the entrepreneurship of the public official and/or the business people with whom he or she must deal.

In studies of corruption, as well as in the other areas in which organized crime is active and which have been reviewed here (gambling, loansharking, legitimate business, illicit drugs, etc.), researchers and enforcement officials suffer from the lack of agreement about what organized crime is and how best to fight it. This lack of agreement affects not only the usefulness of broad investigations of the phenomenon, but also the consistency and effectiveness of day-to-day enforcement strategies. Organized crime remains a subject that is much talked and written about, but whose study has been little advanced over time. The small number of empirical studies undertaken stem from different perspectives and, without a central, coherent theory, do not build well on each other. Each researcher wants to create his or her own grand framework rather than build on the work of other people. And while these varying perspectives are valuable, they do not contribute much to theory building or providing a framework for a social control policy.

Without some basic theory of the workings of organized crime, it is difficult to launch the kinds of empirical studies which will fill in the missing pieces in our understanding of the phenomenon. Organized crime has benefitted from consistent attention since 1967; the number and variety of groups encompassed by the label organized crime has clearly increased. Some refinements in analysis have occurred and our perspectives on the phenomenon have been greatly broadened. But, except that we are even more sure that we do not like organized crime, we are no closer to a coherent theory or control policy than we were fifteen years ago.

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