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10th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security

Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge

Tuesday, 23 April 1985

8:00 am - 9:00 am

Registration

9:00 am

Opening Remarks

Lieutenant General Richard K. Saxer, USAF

Director, Defense Nuclear Agency

The Problem of Terrorism in Contemporary Societies

Paul Wilkinson

Professor, University of Aberdeen, Scotland

Legacy of the Age of Andropov

Ray S. Cline

Senior Associate, The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University

Lunch

"Religionization" of Conflict

Yonah Alexander

Director, Institute for Studies in International Terrorism

State University of New York

Senior Research Staff Member

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University

Incentives for Terrorism

Martha Crenshaw

Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan University

Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite:

The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.

Associate Clinical Professor

Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences

George Washington University Medical School

Summation and Future Policy Considerations

Robert H. Kupperman

Senior Associate

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

Georgetown University

5:00 pm - 6:00 pm

Social Hour

6:00 pm

Dinner

The Psychological Impact of Communication on the Hostage and

Family: A Hostage Experience in Colombia

Ambassador Diego C. Asencio and Nancy Asencio

8:30 pm

Adjourn

Wednesday, 24 April 1985

8:30 am

The Outlook for International Terrorism

Moderator: Paul Wilkinson, University of Aberdeen

Great Britain: John A. Dellow, Esq., CBE
Assistant Commissioner for Crime, Metropolitan Police
New Scotland Yard, London

Israel: Shaul Rosolio
Former Israeli Ambassador to El Salvador and Mexico
Former Commissioner General, Israel State Police and
Border Guard

Italy: Franco Ferracuti, M.D.
Professor of Forensic Psychiatry
University of Rome Medical School

Northern Ireland: Trevor E.T. Forbes, OBE
Assistant Chief Constable and Head of Special Branch,
Royal Ulster Constabulary, Belfast

West Germany: Reinhard Rupprecht
Deputy Director, Federal Police Division, Bonn

United States: Ambassador Parker W. Borg
Deputy Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency
Planning, Department of State

Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Lunch

Multinational Corporations' Response to International Terrorism

Deborah M. Jacob
Senior Vice President and Director of Security
Security Pacific National Bank

Terrorism: The Law as an Effective Deterrent

E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.
Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Department of Justice

State-Sponsored Terrorism: Truth and Consequences

Arnaud de Borchgrave
Former Chief Foreign Correspondent, *Newsweek*

Voices from Troy: What Are We Hearing?

H.H.A. Cooper
President, Nuevevidas International, Inc.

Closing Remarks

6:00 pm

Conclusion of Symposium

The Problem of Terrorism in Contemporary Societies

by Paul Wilkinson

Professor of International Relations

University of Aberdeen

The art of security is knowing where your weakest points lie and taking appropriate measures to remedy the situation. The democracies' experience of international war in the 20th century, combined with the development of nuclear weapons, has tended to concentrate the minds of most strategic thinkers and defence policymakers on the external threat.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has its *raison d'être* in the need for collective Western defence against the real and growing threat from Soviet military power. It is the overwhelming consensus among strategic analysts throughout Western Europe and North America that NATO has been the crucial factor in deterring Soviet expansionism over the past 35 years.

Moreover, it is correctly perceived, both by the professional defence community and by the majority of the electorates in the major NATO countries, that the defensive shield of the alliance is more than ever needed today. Warsaw Pact forces outnumber NATO in the ratio of 3 to 1 in tanks on the Central Front, more than 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft, and 2.7 to 1 in artillery. The gap in the level of intermediate nuclear forces is particularly worrisome. The Soviets currently deploy 467 missiles in this category, including 243 Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV), compared to only 41 on the NATO side—merely the preliminary phase of the NATO Cruise and Pershing deployment programme. NATO governments are thus amply justified in their decision to continue with strengthening their conventional forces and modernising their intermediate nuclear forces in the absence of any Soviet agreement to undertake mutual balanced reductions in forces.

But this comparison of NATO and Soviet bloc military strengths omits the important factor of the hidden balance, a comparison of the relative vulnerability of East and West to subversion, terrorism, sabotage, and other forms of unconventional warfare. There is overwhelming evidence that the liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America are infinitely more vulnerable to these characteristic modes of undeclared war than the Soviet Union has ever been or is likely to be.

The reasons are fairly obvious. The very openness and political freedom of our democratic societies make us more vulnerable to attack by those antidemocratic factions ruthless enough to exploit civil liberties in order to overthrow democracy. The free media, of which we are justly proud, provide an enormous magnetic attraction for publicity-hungry terrorists. In the Soviet Union and its

satellite regimes, on the other hand, terror is a weapon monopolised by the state. The all-pervasive police state control by the KGB and other organs of repression ensures that any kind of dissent is extraordinarily difficult; it renders the formation of armed terrorist campaigns virtually impossible. Thus it is hardly surprising to find that in 1983 only 0.8 percent of all international terrorist incidents occurred in Soviet bloc territory, while no less than 37.2 percent of the attacks were staged in Western Europe.

It is a paradox that part of the price we pay for liberal democracy is an inherent vulnerability to the violence of fanatical extremists. I believe that all genuine liberal democrats prefer to live with these real risks and dangers rather than contemplate the kind of totalitarian police state measures that would be needed to guarantee 100 percent security.

Far more important is the fact that the very freedom and popular legitimacy of our Western democracies give them a special moral and political strength that ultimately prevents even the most ruthless terrorist group from being able to destroy the democratic state. It is a dangerous illusion, assiduously nourished by terrorist propaganda, that terrorism is invincible in its battle with democracy. It is simply not true that democracies are powerless to defeat terrorism unless they suspend the rule of law and the democratic process. Was Canadian democracy destroyed by the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) terrorism in 1970? Did not the Federal Republic of Germany survive the assaults of the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Army Faction? Have we failed to observe that the Italian Republic, despite its rather cumbersome judicial procedures and bureaucracy, has succeeded in defeating the murderous campaign of the Red Brigades, and yet has kept the democratic process and rule of law intact? Even in countries still afflicted by protracted terrorist violence, such as Spain, France, and Northern Ireland, to conclude that the survival of the democratic state itself is threatened by the terrorists' attacks would be a wild misreading of the situation.

There is no case in postwar history of an operative parliamentary democracy's being overthrown by a terrorist campaign and replaced by a dictatorship of the terrorists' design. The worst that has happened, as in the cases of Uruguay and Turkey, is the adoption of extreme military emergency measures leading to the temporary suspension of normal democratic government and civil rights.

Given this record, are we really justified in giving the

problem of terrorism a high priority on the agenda of our democratic governments? Your answer to this question will inevitably depend on your national experience and perspective. If you are a citizen of Norway, Sweden, or Denmark, you will certainly tend to take a rather sanguine view. None of these societies has any modern experience of high levels of domestic political violence. If, on the other hand, you are an American diplomat or businessman or a government official responsible for U.S. relations with countries in violent areas of the world, you will treat the problem of terrorism very seriously indeed. You will be well aware that more than 40 percent of all terrorist incidents in 1983 were directed against U.S. citizens and property. Of the 1,925 casualties from international terrorism in 1983, 387 were Americans.

In the Tehran hostage crisis, the Carter administration was virtually paralysed by the problem of securing the release of its diplomats abducted by the Khomeini fundamentalists. The horrific truck bombings of U.S. and French troops in Beirut, culminating in the attack of 23 October 1983 in which 241 U.S. Marines died, undoubtedly had an effect in narrowing President Reagan's policy options in Lebanon. He and his advisers knew that the terrorist attacks strengthened public and congressional opposition to maintaining a U.S. military presence in Beirut. These dramatic examples clearly show why the U.S. Government regards the international terrorist threat as a particularly grave problem requiring high priority by the State Department, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other relevant agencies.

The Special Problems of Separatist Terrorism

The British and Spanish governments and people have somewhat different, yet equally justified, reasons for viewing terrorism as a major problem requiring urgent and effective countermeasures. In both Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, separatist terrorists have taken a tragic toll of innocent lives. Terrorists of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement (ETA) have murdered hundreds of innocent people, including police and soldiers who carry the grave burden of protecting life and property and upholding the rule of law. In Northern Ireland, so-called loyalist terrorist groups, carrying out shootings and bombings against the Catholic minority, have posed an additional threat.

These prolonged and ruthless terrorist campaigns have had grave implications for both societies, far beyond the tragic loss of life and the injuries and destruction caused. They

have imposed colossal strains on the democratic processes. By murder and intimidation, terrorists have tried to destroy the middle ground of politics: They have tried to sabotage the whole activity of negotiation, compromise, and intercommunal cooperation so central to a viable democracy. Terrorist violence and propaganda have bred hatred and suspicion and blocked, or in some cases destroyed, the groups working for peace and reconciliation. In both these cases, separatist terrorism has tried to undermine the rule of law—for example, by intimidating judges and witnesses, by vilifying the police and the judiciary, and by making the normal judicial processes almost impossible.

Nor should we neglect the economic aspects. The Basque region was traditionally one of the most industrially advanced and prosperous regions of Spain. The prolonged violence has scared investment away and put a blight on normal business activity in many areas. The IRA violence has had a grave effect on the economy of Northern Ireland, an area already suffering from high levels of unemployment because of the decline of the traditional industries. In both cases, the central government has had to meet the escalating cost, not only of propping up the battered economies, but also of the continuing and expensive security needed to deal with the terrorism.

These separatist terrorist problems are by no means confined to Spain and the United Kingdom. France must deal with the intractable violence in Corsica and the growing spillover of violence from Spain into the Basque region of France, in addition to the uniquely high vulnerability of Paris to international terrorist attacks.

Separatist terrorism is proving a stubborn problem for democratic states, primarily because any group that claims to be the true voice of a particular group, however spurious its pretensions, has a political support base and propaganda advantages far beyond anything that left- or right wing extremist groups are able to command. Moreover, in the IRA, ETA, and the Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC), nationalist ideology is combined with a Marxist revolutionary message which enables them to plug in to the international Communist network of support for terrorist groups.

The problem of IRA terrorism, however, is far and away the most severe and intractable. At least the Basque people live in one contiguous area, and an overwhelming majority are willing to work within the framework of the Statute of Autonomy in their relations with the democratic government of Madrid. ETA terrorists are now an

increasingly isolated and desperate minority. The recent, long-overdue French action in extraditing three ETA terrorists to Spain is evidence that the Paris government has at least realised that firm action must be taken against terrorism; things have now gotten much more dangerous for the ETA on the French side of the frontier.

In Northern Ireland, there are additional complications. The IRA claims to be a national liberation movement, but the majority of people in Northern Ireland are Protestant and are so stubbornly opposed to being "liberated" by the IRA that they are prepared to fight a civil war against any IRA attempt at coercing them into a united Ireland. The democratic government of the Republic of Ireland in Dublin fully realises that the IRA threatens its democracy as much as Britain's. The overwhelming majority of Irish people totally reject the murderous violence of the IRA. It is increasingly recognised in both Dublin and London that the IRA's campaign of murder and intimidation is not something that can be solved by a political formula: It is a cancer in the body politic, and unless it is eradicated it will always be the major obstacle to reconciliation and cooperation between Protestants and Catholics and between Britain and Ireland, which all decent people pray for.

The International Dimensions of the Terrorist Problem

Many tend to think of ETA and IRA terrorism as merely domestic affairs of their host societies. It is true that the vast majority of their acts of violence are geographically concentrated. But both cases provide overwhelming evidence that only by tackling the international dimensions of these conflicts is democracy going to succeed in defeating the terrorists. In both cases the terrorists have used long and easily penetrated international frontiers to escape justice, mount ambushes, find sanctuary, and establish planning and training centres and arms dumps. Until Dublin and Paris crack down with equal severity and efficiency on their sides of the frontiers, we have no chance of eliminating the terrorist attacks. Bilateral cooperation in intelligence, policing, hot pursuit, extradition, and other security matters is not simply a desirable bonus to existing national measures; it is a prerequisite for success.

Why has this kind of practical international cooperation been so difficult to obtain? One reason is the operation of a double standard. France and Ireland are by no means the only countries that have been too ready to regard terrorists as legitimate freedom fighters. We know that many Irish-Americans have been willing to finance IRA gangs' use of murder against the democratic government and citizens of a free society in which, by definition, they have the right and opportunity to promote their beliefs by

peaceful means. Some states lack the political will and courage to act against terrorism for fear of retaliation. Others are deluded into thinking that there is some simple political solution to all terrorist problems, and they see no need to engage in international security cooperation against the threat. Only when the guns and bombs are turned on *them* do they at last realise the basic truth that one democracy's terrorist is another democracy's terrorist.

The Western community of democracies can succeed in defending itself against terrorism only if it can begin to apply *internationally* the blend of measures used so successfully by countries such as Italy and West Germany at the national level. These include top-quality intelligence gathering and analysis; streamlined and effective command, control, and communications; highly trained professional antiterrorist capabilities for the police under effective central coordination; skillful use of specialist military units (e.g., for hostage rescue) in aid of the civil power; and a policy of firm and consistent judicial control, including extradition or prosecution where needed to bring the terrorist to justice. Firmness means no deals, no concessions, no appeasement, no offers of amnesty or special privileges for terrorist offenders.

The Moral Defences of Democracy

Even so, perhaps most important of all if we are to have an effective Western democratic strategy against terrorism, we must be ready to fight and win the battle of ideas against the terrorist philosophy of hatred and violence. We must defend the underlying values and institutions of liberal democracies against fanaticisms and totalitarianisms of all kinds. The defence of democratic ideas and methods must be won in the classrooms and seminar rooms and in the media as well as in the cut and thrust of political debate at the hustings. Only when the terrorist godfathers run out of fresh recruits will we be able to say goodbye to terrorist violence. As John Stuart Mill reminds us in a powerful insight, "The worth of a State in the long term is the worth of the individuals composing it."

Paul Wilkinson

Mr. Wilkinson is Professor of International Studies at the University of Aberdeen and a writer on terrorism and conflict. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Centre for Contemporary Studies; of the Executive Committee of the British International Studies Association; and of the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen. His publications include *Social Movement* (1971); *Political Terrorism* (1974); *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1977); *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (coeditor 1979); *British Perspectives on Terrorism* (editor 1981); *The New Fascists* (1981); *Britain and the Defence of the West* (1983); and *The Theory of Liberal Democracy* (1983).

Legacy of the Age of Andropov

by Ray S. Cline

Senior Associate, The Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University

The specter of politically inspired assassination, bombing, kidnaping, hijacking, hostage taking, and underground armed attack is permeating the climate of every non-Communist society today.

Thus, on November 4, 1979, Iranian militants, with the support of their government, seized the American Embassy in Tehran, taking 63 persons hostage and keeping 50 of them in captivity for 444 days.

On May 31, 1981, a Turkish terrorist, trained and armed by the Bulgarian secret intelligence service, attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in front of St. Peter's Basilica in the Vatican.

On October 9, 1983, North Korean military personnel set off a powerful bomb at the Martyr's Mausoleum in Rangoon, killing 17 South Korean officials, including the deputy prime minister and three other senior members of the cabinet of President Chun Doo Hwan, who escaped death by only a few seconds.

Most recently, during the first week of December 1984, four terrorists, said to be closely associated with an Iranian-backed Shi'ite group, hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner and held most of the passengers in captivity for 6 days at the Tehran airport. Before the hostages gained their freedom, the terrorists had killed two Americans on U.S. official duty.

The cumulative impact of terrorist atrocity of this kind shows many signs of spreading ever more widely. The citizens and officials of free nations owe it to themselves to study the tragic record of what has occurred in Lebanon, Italy, Burma, and elsewhere.

It is not surprising that the Soviet Union has found this kind of violence extremely promising for its own political advantage. The U.S.S.R.'s main objectives and *modus operandi* in international affairs are well documented in Soviet doctrinal literature and political conduct for more than 65 years. Soviet political leaders from Lenin to Chernenko have articulated and tried to follow coordinated, coherent, long-range plans to advance Soviet national and ideological goals and enhance Soviet power in the world arena. The Reagan administration has based its policies on building economic and military strength adequate to counter this Soviet strategy.

In many ways the most authentic representative of pure Soviet foreign policy since Stalin was Yuri Andropov. His short term as head of the Soviet state confirmed, as a key part of Soviet behavior, an extraordinarily dangerous adventurism and willingness to support revolutionary

movements in the use of terroristic violence. This legacy marks our era.

Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence to frighten or intimidate in order to gain a political goal. It is especially threatening when it is sponsored by one of the 170 sovereign political entities known as nation states that exist in the world today. States can bring to bear all of the repressive military and police technology and weapons that make the 20th century an age of tyranny in many parts of the world.

When violence is projected across national borders on a scale of intensity lower than conventional warfare, it is international terrorism, a crime against humanity. The pluralist states of the free world have yet to find suitable protection and retaliatory countermeasures.

Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalina, and Mao Tse-tung are the three greatest political terrorists of this era. All were geniuses at oppression of their own people and aggression for political benefits against the people of other nations.

Mercifully, all are dead, but their systems of state-sponsored terrorism have taken millions of lives in their own countries and abroad. Their systematic use of violence lingers on, much admired and imitated by certain totalitarian governments. Today the enormous power of the Soviet state is squarely behind creating a climate of terror. A number of its client states and some other international troublemakers act as proxies or auxiliaries for revolutionary Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. The target of this terror is YOU—the intellectual, the political proponent of democratic processes, the capitalist entrepreneur.

I call this era of terrorism the "Age of Andropov." Why? Terrorism has come into its own since 1968 with a special emphasis that is unique. There have always been political goals and grievances, as well as a few people prepared to achieve those goals by using the utmost level of violence to intimidate others. Now there is a pattern—a system of Soviet sponsorship, funding, training, and political indoctrination, and a supply of communications and false documents facilitating terror that did not exist in the early 1960's.

In 1967 Yuri Andropov, a brilliant, bitter, cruel Communist theoretician and activist, became head of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, assuming that post in May. I was chief of CIA activities in Germany in the 1960's, and I made a close study of the U.S.S.R.

Andropov was in full command of the KGB by 1968. It was a fateful year in world affairs. Lyndon Johnson decided not to run again for the U.S. presidency, signaling American defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam. The Communist dictatorship in North Vietnam, with Soviet and Chinese Communist assistance, expanded its political control over South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia by military force at the cost of at least four million Southeast Asian lives.

Also, 1968 was the year the people of Czechoslovakia, under Soviet domination for 20 years, sought a modicum of political independence to control their lives within the Soviet Communist political system. They were crushed by military occupation that still endures, while Western Europe and the United States stood by, giving lots of sympathy and no help.

In 1968 the KGB chief, Yuri Andropov, established a terrorist school system for the Syrian-controlled Palestinian terrorists of the Mideast. The fanatic anti-Israeli Moslems went to the system's training camps in the U.S.S.R. and then set forth to train other terrorists in Syria, Yemen, and Cuba. Their network brought into being a transmission belt for the export of terror by these client states of the U.S.S.R. to almost every part of the globe. They were reinforced by the terrorist skills of specialists from East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Vietnam, and Angola.

Soviet political leaders from Lenin to Chernenko have uniformly viewed international relations as a scene of an irreconcilable conflict between their own centrist, government-controlled socioeconomic system and pluralist states with representative governments and economies based on private capitalist enterprise. Furthermore, Soviet officials see the conflict as a zero-sum game, meaning that if one side gains the other side automatically loses.

As Soviet spokesmen have said frequently over the past 2 decades, intermittent periods of "peaceful coexistence" or "détente" do not mean the end of conflict and confrontation between the two opposing systems. They believe that either Communist-model socialism or capitalism must triumph, leaving the other in what they call the ash heap of history.

Only now are political leaders and intellectuals in the non-Communist world beginning to learn the real meaning of the Soviet term "wars of national liberation." It is simply Leninist revolutionary jargon for a conflict that economically and politically destabilizes nations cooperating with the United States or relying on American assistance

for security. The object is to deny the United States access to the resources and territory of these nations. The Soviet strategy, long established and well understood by Communist Party leaders, is to exploit indigenous difficulties in other countries, to disrupt social order, and to promote Communist revolutions, alternately threatening and cajoling everyone who resists.

The Soviet aim, in a nutshell, appears to be to undermine the political will of all non-Communist countries to pay the price of adequate regional self-defense, and to neutralize them politically and psychologically while in the process of separating them from one another and, one by one, from the United States.

Soviet policymakers have always believed in the maxim enunciated by their one-time Chinese comrade, Mao Tse-tung, that political power grows from the barrel of a gun. The gun that may destroy the democracies of this era, unless they learn how to contain the danger, is not in the hand of a soldier but in the hand of the revolutionary terrorist.

Most people in the free world are totally unaware of the broad-spectrum nature of the "war" that has been waged by the Kremlin against them in the entire 40 years since World War II. They seem to think that if there is no "shooting war" and there is a "dialog" under way between the two superpowers, then there is not much to worry about. But the truth is that even in a period in which the superpowers are technically at "peace," Soviet-sponsored propaganda, disinformation, subversion, espionage, political terrorism, and wars of national liberation continue.

Through its intelligence agencies Moscow manipulates political propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism as suitable substitutes for traditional warfare. Conventional military conflict has become too expensive and is too hazardous to be waged on the battlefield except close to Soviet borders, as in Afghanistan. By overtly and covertly resorting to nonmilitary techniques and by exploiting low-intensity operations around the world, the Soviet Union is able to continue its revolutionary efforts against democratic pluralism in the free world, as well as to expand its own influence into a wider target area.

More than 35 years ago, George Kennan described clearly the integrated, multidimensional global effort the Soviet Union was making:

...the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purpose in a hurry It can afford to be patient Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly,

wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.

The global projection of Soviet military power, therefore, becomes more formidable each year, continent to continent and ocean to ocean.

In the Mideast, Syria is the political base; Lebanon is the intermediate target and Israel the ultimate target whose destruction would gravely damage American interests in the region.

In Central America, Cuba is a client state, a base for exporting revolution to Nicaragua and then throughout Central America and the Caribbean, the vital seaway constituting much of the southern frontier of the United States.

In Africa, Angola was the chosen instrument, Namibia (Southwest Africa) the intermediate target, and the Republic of South Africa the ultimate strategic prize. South Africa is of great value because of its economic strength and its geographic location on vital sealanes linking the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Actually, Angola is in some jeopardy as a Soviet strategic asset because South Africa has fought back energetically. Pretoria's determined countermeasures are making the cost too great for the black states in southern Africa to continue to play the Soviet-Cuban game.

In Asia today, the Soviet Union is concentrating on three client states. One, of more than 30 years' standing, is North Korea. Its brutal terrorist assassination of South Korean leaders in Rangoon jostled the memories of the world to recall the bloody, unfinished Korean War of the 1950's, in which the Soviet Union armed both Communist China and North Korea to conquer South Korea. North Korea is still heavily armed and totally hostile toward the Republic of Korea.

The second Asian client state of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, is now providing air and naval bases for Soviet forces patrolling the West Pacific sealanes to and through the Strait of Malacca and on into the Indian Ocean. It also gives Moscow a hand to play in Laos and Cambodia against Thailand and China.

The third is Afghanistan, wracked by open warfare for 4 years since the Soviet Union used its own armed forces to invade this small country. The aim was to set up a client state on its own borders, from which the Soviet Union could threaten Pakistan and Iran, coming within striking

distance of the long-cherished Moscow goal of the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union now usually organizes its political efforts, propaganda, and—on occasion—disinformation around the concept of détente. It is the same thing as what Soviet leaders originally, quite scrupulously, referred to as "peaceful coexistence," an old Leninist formula for Soviet accommodation with non-Communist social systems as a temporary expedient. It would more honestly be called "coexistential conflict," that is, political struggle by all means short of total war.

Brezhnev made clear that intractable hostility is inherent in détente in his report to the 24th Communist Party Congress of March 30, 1971:

In recognition of its international duty, the CPSU will continue to pursue a line in international affairs which promotes the further activation of the world antiimperialist struggle and strengthens the combat unity of all its participants. The total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable, and for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength.

Emphasizing this same concept on December 21, 1972, not long after President Nixon's euphoric summit visit to Moscow, Brezhnev said:

The Soviet Communist Party has always held and still holds that the class struggle between the two systems—the capitalist and the socialist—in the economic, political, and also, of course, in the ideological spheres will continue.

The coming to power of Chernenko means no change in broad Soviet goals. There is a relentless consistency and clarity of Soviet doctrine: supporting revolutionary class warfare against non-Communist governments; aiding so-called wars of national liberation; and otherwise reducing imperialist influence so as to shift the "correlation of global forces" decisively in favor of the U.S.S.R. Conflict is built into the system. Negotiations tend to be talks that lead Western nations—but not the U.S.S.R.—to relax or disarm.

The payoff for the Soviet Union of its indirect strategy of military intimidation of Western Europe and expansion of Soviet power outside the NATO area has proven to be great. Moscow in Andropov's heyday in the KGB and the Politburo, after nuclear parity with the United States had been achieved, exploited hundreds of regional grievances around the globe to create lavishly equipped armies in client states like North Korea, Vietnam, Syria, and Cuba.

It encouraged and assisted each to recruit, train, arm, and fund local fighting units dedicated to undermining and destabilizing neighboring states.

A worldwide covert war consequently has been going on in the 1970's and 1980's, sponsored by the Soviet Union through proxies and proxies of proxies. The goal is to commit acts of destabilizing, cold-blooded terrorist violence, to encourage destructive ethnic and religious wars, and secretly to coordinate revolutionary political warfare in a dozen nations, aimed at multiplying Soviet clout and diminishing American influence and prestige. No American ally nor any nation occupying strategically valuable territory is free from danger.

The solution for protecting American security interests in this situation is not easy. The first step is to raise public and official awareness of the strategic dimensions of the problem by communicating the facts I have outlined. The second step is to establish an international concept of political accountability for state sponsorship and support of terrorism. The evidence may not be easy to accumulate. Nevertheless, it is time for some creative thinking to develop a theoretical base for imposing practical restraints and punishments on those parties responsible for state-supported terrorist violence.

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"Religionization" of Conflict

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Terrorism, as an expedient tactical and strategic tool of politics in the struggle for power within and among nations, is not new in history. From time immemorial, both established regimes and opposition groups, functioning under varying degrees of stress, have intentionally employed extralegal instruments of psychological and physical force—including intimidation, coercion, repression, and, ultimately, destruction of lives and property—to attain real or imaginary ideological, political, social, and economic goals.

Unlike their historical counterparts, present-day terrorists have introduced into contemporary life a new breed of violence in terms of technology, victimization, threat, and response. The universal and brutal nature of modern violence makes it abundantly clear that we have entered a new "age of terrorism" with all its frightening ramifications.

Tragically, the failure of the international community to fully recognize terrorism as criminal behavior and as low-intensity warfare has encouraged the growth of terrorist activity in the last 2 decades.

The statistics of terrorist violence are, indeed, staggering. From 1970 to 1984, some 23,000 domestic and international terrorist incidents occurred. A total of 41,000 individuals have been killed and another 24,000 wounded, with property damage estimated at over \$1 billion. The number of terrorist incidents involving fatalities has been increasing about 20 percent a year since the early 1970's. Americans are the victims of a large percentage of recent acts of violence by terrorists, suggesting a strategic international dimension of this phenomenon.

According to State Department sources, terrorist acts against U.S. diplomatic and military facilities and personnel between 1974 and the end of 1983 numbered almost 400. Western Europe accounted for 109 incidents; Latin America, 110; North Africa and the Middle East, 93. A majority of incidents occurred in seven nations: Turkey, 36; Greece, 35; West Germany, 30; Iran, 21; Lebanon, 20; El Salvador, 18; and Colombia, 16.¹

Although, at least thus far, no catastrophic disruptions or casualties have resulted from a single terrorist attack, future incidents could be much more costly. For instance, the prospect of the use of mass destruction weapons is seen by some observers as plausible and by others as inevitable.

Contemporary terrorism is likely to increase both at home and abroad, for several reasons:

1. Terrorism has proved successful again and again in attracting publicity, disrupting government and business, and causing significant death and destruction.
2. Arms, explosives, supplies, financial support, and secret communications are readily available.
3. International covert connections among states, especially between the Soviet Union and the less disciplined governments of the nations of the Third World, can and do greatly facilitate terrorist activities.
4. Eight percent of terrorist groups in the world are at least superficially Marxist-Leninist in their political thinking, and claim the right to support from the Soviet Union and its client states.
5. After politics becomes "religionized" or religion becomes "politicized," secular groups start resorting to religious or theological terms, concepts, and ideas to achieve their aims. Obviously, that introduces religion into political and secular conflicts, causing additional problems.

Examination of some aspects of the "religionization" of contemporary terrorism follows. The latest example relates to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Aukar, Lebanon, a suburb of East Beirut, on September 20, 1984.

An explosives-laden vehicle—a "suicide truck bomber"—drove up to the American Embassy annex outside East Beirut and detonated, killing 23 and wounding 60. Of this total, American casualties were 2 killed and 21 wounded. The explosion collapsed part of the front of the five-story building. Accounts by witnesses state that a van bearing what appeared to be Dutch diplomatic plates bypassed Embassy security guards, as well as the waist-high concrete blocks which were to serve as protective measures against such attacks. The van exploded within 20 feet of the building.

U.S. diplomatic posts had been on alert because of a September 8 threat by the Islamic Jihad against a vital U.S. installation in the region. At the time, the Islamic Jihad had warned it would take revenge for an American veto in the United Nations Security Council of a resolution condemning Israeli occupation tactics in South Lebanon.

This attack constitutes the third "suicide bomber" attack on a U.S. installation in Beirut. Other attacks also carried out by Iranian-backed Shi'ite terrorists include the April 18, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut which killed 63 (including 17 Americans) and the tragic truck bombing of the U.S. Marine compound near Beirut

International Airport on October 23, 1983. This attack killed 241 U.S. servicemen and 58 French paratroopers.

Most U.S. embassy functions were moved in July to the Embassy annex in Aukar. It was thought that the move from West Beirut would provide greater security. However, only 75 percent of the security-enhancing work had been completed at the annex at the time of the September 20 attack.

U.S. intelligence, working in cooperation with Israel and Lebanon, has traced the financing of the explosives to Hassan Hamiz, a Lebanese with high-level contacts in the Iranian government; Hamiz was paid \$50,000 as part of the operation supporting the October 1983 bombing of the Marine Headquarters in Beirut. Intelligence sources also established the identity of the driver of the van that carried the explosives in the September 20 bombing; he has been traced to the militant Shi'ite movement Hezbollah (Party of God). Hezbollah is one of the organizations that has received support from Iran and is one of several organizations that use the name Islamic Jihad.

After the attack, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved \$366 million to improve security at U.S. embassies. Although Reagan administration officials had asked for only \$110 million, saying they could use only that much immediately, Congress approved the full \$366 million.

This incident underscores the legitimization of "Islamic warfare" aiming to remove U.S. influence from the Middle East. As one Shi'ite kamikaze terrorist put it: "We cannot face the United States on the battlefield but we can force it from the region because God is on our side."²

To be sure, the religionization of terrorism is not exclusively Islamic. The Capucci case, which occurred some 10 years before the attack on the Embassy annex, illustrates the "Christianization" of contemporary terrorism.

On August 18, 1974, the Israeli police arrested Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, a Syrian national and the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Jerusalem and the West Bank, on suspicion of "subversive" activities, particularly smuggling arms and explosives on behalf of al-Fatah. As a church official, he held a Vatican passport and a *visa de service* which Jerusalem's Foreign Ministry had issued him in deference to his religious status. He repeatedly crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border at Rosh Hanikra without inspection, taking advantage of his privileged position.

While the suspect was remanded in custody for interrogation, the Greek Catholic Church, with its highest

seat in Lebanon, began efforts to obtain the release of the Archbishop. Patriarch Maximos V. Hahim, the head of the church, condemned the arrest as a "conspiracy" by Israel and "as part of Israel's attempts to Judaize the City of Jerusalem and drive its people away by various terroristic methods."³

He also declared that the arrest was part of a plan to discredit Catholic authorities and that this plan was adopted following the well-known stand taken by His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, in favor of the rights of the Palestinian people, which were defended staunchly by Archbishop Capucci. Maximos summed up his reaction by employing the Biblical adage, "Hit the leader and the sheep will disperse."⁴

In contrast, Archbishop Joseph Raya, who functioned at that time as head of the Israel Greek Catholic Church with headquarters in Haifa, issued a statement saying,

It is difficult for me to believe that a clergyman could be involved in such a case.... In general I can only say that the main task of a clergyman is to serve his God, his church, and his congregation, and not to violate the laws of the state in which he serves.... The Israeli government could not be so unfair as to fabricate stories in order to frame a man, particularly a clergyman, if there were no truth in the matter.⁵

The Greek Catholic Middle East Synod dispatched a three-man church delegation from Beirut to investigate the circumstances surrounding Archbishop Capucci's arrest. They apparently reported that the prelate had admitted to them that he had, indeed, served as a gunrunner and courier for the Beirut-based al-Fatah command. The Greek Patriarch Maximos rationalized Capucci's behavior by stating, "The possibility exists that the Bishop had contacts with people the Israelis call terrorists, but whom the Arabs call Fedayeen, people willing to lay down their lives to save their homeland." Maximos further explained, "It is possible he believed himself carrying out his duties just as did those priests who helped Jews in Europe who were victims of the Nazis. For the Israelis this is a question of culpability, but for the Arabs it's a question of heroism."⁶

Arab political leaders were also critical of Capucci's arrest. Lebanon's President Suleiman Franjeh remarked that this incident illustrated how Israel treated its Arab population. Addressing his cabinet, he also asserted, "They [the Israelis] do not refrain from persecuting even religious men."⁷

Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), speaking at a Palestinian

guerrilla training school in Damascus on September 16, 1974, declared that "Archbishop Capucci provides evidence of the facts that this revolution has extended to the clergyman." Arafat also asserted that Capucci told the Israeli authorities, "If I could turn the Vatican into a base for the Palestine revolution, I would have done it."⁸

Meanwhile, Capucci was indicted by the Israeli state attorneys for carriage and possession of illegal weapons, maintenance of contact with foreign agents, and performance of a service for unlawful association.⁹ On September 20, 1974, Capucci's trial, which lasted for several months, opened at the Jerusalem district court. The Archbishop's defense team included a prominent Arab lawyer from Ramallah, Aziz Shehadeh, and a French attorney, Rolan Dumas. On December 8, 1974, the Jerusalem court found Capucci guilty of all charges in the indictment and sentenced him to 12 years' imprisonment for the first count and 10 years for the second and third counts, the sentences to run concurrently. The Archbishop is now a prisoner in cell 318 in the Ramla maximum security prison.

Ever since Capucci's arrest, trial, and imprisonment, efforts have been made by Palestinian guerrilla groups and their collaborators in the network of international terrorist movements to secure the release of Capucci, notably by exchanging him for hostages. The Entebbe hijacking episode that took place on Sunday, June 27, 1976, has been, to date, the most dramatic effort. Although this terrorist operation to free the clergyman, as well as others, failed because of the daring rescue raid of the Israelis, there is no guarantee that other terrorist attempts will not be initiated in the future. The saga of Archbishop Capucci, as well as terrorism in general, is far from over.

Aside from the future terrorist activities Capucci might inspire, what is most disturbing is that this case is indicative of a movement, begun some 40 years ago, to add another more insidious dimension to an already volatile situation in the Middle East—the introduction and nurturing of theological hatred. A dramatic example of this practice is the Christianization efforts by the Arab intellectual and political leadership that began with the emergence of the Jewish state in 1948. Since the Koran clearly expresses recognition of Christianity, Arab leaders had no compunctions about using Christian-based symbols and ideas to further their secular objectives. As a result, they have succeeded in artificially politicalizing religion, cultivating extreme theological hatred to the point of sanctifying belligerent acts among Arab and non-Arab

Christians.¹⁰ So whereas the original conflict was political, stemming from the rift over the succession to British Palestine, a religious factor has now been added.

To intensify this religious conflict, Jews have been accused of rejecting Christ, crucifying the Son of God, and practicing human sacrifice, as well as being determined to exterminate Christians. Zionists, dubbed the "modern crusaders," have been characterized as those dedicated to the eventual "destruction" of Christianity in the Holy Land.

More recently, 2 months after the October 1973 war, Egypt's Minister for National Assembly Affairs, Albert Barsoun, dedicated his Christmas message to the notoriously outdated, Vatican-rejected belief that Jews were responsible for the crucifixion of Christ. Recalling King Herod's slaughter of the newborn in Bethlehem in order to kill Jesus Christ among them, Barsoun added, "History repeats itself. Today we see the Jews repeating the slaughter of their forefathers, with demonstrations of killing and expulsion in the pure and holy land."¹¹

With these descriptors circulating throughout the Arab world, it is not difficult to understand how Arabs, Moslems, and Christians find justification in mounting a "new crusade" and a "genocide day" against Zionism and the Jewish state.¹²

In fact, aside from the Capucci case, Christian church figures have become increasingly more visible as political and military activists. In 1958, Israeli authorities arrested the head of the ancient Christian Coptic Church in Jerusalem, Joachim El-Antoni, for an attempt to transfer military documents to Jordan at the then Mandelbaum Gate, following a visit to Israel. El-Antoni was tried and convicted and spent 5 years in an Israeli jail before he was deported to Jordan, from where he returned to his native Egypt.

Another clergyman, the Reverend Elia Khoury, head of the Anglican Church in Ramallah, was arrested in April 1969 for aiding Palestinians who had planted explosives in Jerusalem earlier that year. Khoury was tried and convicted and served part of his sentence before he, too, was deported to Jordan. In the summer of 1974, he was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO during the National Council meeting in Cairo. Reverend Khoury explained the significance of this event in a discussion with reporters: "The pulpit of the church carries influence especially in the Western world. We want to tell the West that the Palestine question is not only a Muslim question, but a Christian-Muslim cause."¹³

Middle East clergy also have been engaged in various communication efforts attempting to persuade the church leaders and their adherents outside the region to share its anti-Jewish, and therefore anti-Israeli, sentiments and to sanctify Israel's ultimate destruction. A statement which the heads of seven Christian churches in Iraq transmitted to Rome said:

*Zionism is a racist movement hostile to all accepted human values and linked to world imperialism. It is far removed from Judaism as a religion. The right of the Palestinian people to exist in its land has been approved by the laws of all religions. The recognition of this right is a step towards the peace for which Jesus worked. The violations of Jerusalem and Bethlehem are not far from convincing proof of Zionist barbarism and expansionism.*¹⁴

In light of these cases (and many others), it is becoming increasingly clear that theology-based communication by both substate and state bodies has intensified and exacerbated ideological, political, and social conflicts throughout the world.

And yet, this does not automatically preclude the likelihood that the negative role of religion could be revised. In fact, religion is an appropriate source to draw upon in persuading the warring parties to recognize the irrationality of their strife and to support disengagement and détente alternatives. Religion can help to accomplish this purpose by contributing to the lowering of tension. It can mobilize and strengthen those who are interested in and working for accommodation, and who are attempting to create conciliatory circumstances in which the antagonists might more readily accept a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The question is, then: What can be done specifically to use religion as an effective instrument of conflict resolution?

Although it would be rather presumptuous to offer any definitive recommendations as to how, at this time, this could be achieved, the suggestion of some preliminary steps might be useful.

After all, it is assumed that the preservation of peace requires taking some action. Anything that inhibits necessary action or that makes it difficult to determine what the action should be works against peace; anything that makes it possible to decide on the necessary action and to implement that action promotes peace. Pope Paul VI once explained it this way:

Peace is not enjoyed; it is created. Peace is not a level that we have reached; it is a higher level, to which each and every one of

*us must ever aspire. It is not a philosophy that lulls us to sleep; it is a philosophy of action, which makes us all responsible for common good and obliges us to dedicate all our efforts to its cause—the true cause of mankind.*¹⁵

Thus, churches and religious organizations willing and able to give substantial support to combat terrorism and encourage peace-making efforts might take the following initial steps:

1. Appeal to various antagonists to reduce, if not eliminate, religious components in their rhetoric. Emphasis should be placed on those elements in which various types of accusations and threats are based, as well as on distorted formulations of religion-based communications, such as proclamations of genocide and self-righteousness.
2. Petition governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations to localize religion-based communications by the immediate disengagement of outside parties.
3. Declare the sanctity of religions in a joint statement by the clergy of these faiths, similar to the unique doctrine of the separation of church and state in domestic affairs. These religions should be declared "out of bounds" vis-à-vis different regional conflicts.
4. Seek condemnation by both public and private bodies of all forms of theologically oriented communications from any source.
5. Work for an international convention of like-minded states declaring attacks against organized religious institutions and clergy to be a crime against humanity.
6. Form an interdenominational panel of "ombudsmen" before whom complaints of violence "for the sake of religion" will be presented and whose findings, after appropriate investigation of such complaints, will be brought to public attention.
7. Promote theological peace research by religious and educational bodies concentrating on the role of religious communications in preserving world peace.
8. Organize small theological seminars at the Ecumenical Institute in Jerusalem, the Vatican, and other recognized religious centers, for the clergy and other interested parties dealing with interfaith relations and focusing on how religion can advance the cause of peace.
9. Call a biennial convocation of the religious and intellectual leadership of the world to be held at a neutral site—such as Geneva—to discuss various "political-religious" conflicts and to adopt appropriate resolutions.

10. Conduct frequent interdenominational peace vigils at the United Nations, the Vatican, Jerusalem, and other political or religious centers to focus world attention on the deep concern for religious freedom.

11. Designate one day every month as a "day for peace" for particular political-religious conflicts and ask followers of different denominations to convey their desire for peace by conducting special services.

12. Appeal to the Nobel Committee to consider creating a special "Peace Prize" for a person or organization that has been instrumental in employing the religious traditions of different faiths to promote sectarian and international understanding.

It is not too unrealistic to suppose that the foregoing preliminary steps will help us to reduce the dangers and threats of contemporary terrorism, and to work together to realize Buddha's teaching that "the only real victory is one in which all are equally victorious and there is defeat for no one."

Notes

¹Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Intelligence Brief* (unclassified), December 21, 1984.

²Personal interview, August 1984.

³*New York Times*, August 20, 1974.

⁴*Jerusalem Post*, August 20, 1974.

⁵*New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Jerusalem Post*, August 21, 1974.

⁶*Jerusalem Post*, August 28, 1974.

⁷*Ibid.*, August 27, 1974.

⁸Quoted by the Palestine News Agency WAFA, as reported in *Brief*, No. 90 (September 16-30, 1974).

⁹*Jerusalem Post*, August 22, 1974.

¹⁰Of approximately 125 million Middle East inhabitants, about 10 percent are Christians.

¹¹Cairo's Middle East News Agency, January 6, 1974.

¹²For a detailed discussion see Yonah Alexander, *Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

¹³*Free Palestine* (London), VII, 7 (July 1974), 5.

¹⁴Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad), May 24 1973.

¹⁵From a message for the Celebration of the Day of Peace, January 1, 1970.

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Incentives for Terrorism

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Terrorism is a specialized form of organized political violence. Terrorist actions are the result of decisions made by individuals who are members of identifiable organizations with distinctive characteristics. As political organizations, terrorist groups have qualities in common with other organizations. Focusing on the organization as a determining factor in the process of terrorism can contribute to the development of appropriate and effective policy responses and to more reliable prediction. Moreover, the way one looks at the terrorist organization—what one considers its dominant incentives to be—influences policy response.

In assessing the threat of terrorism, it is possible to think in terms of two inherently different explanations of how terrorist organizations behave. The first explanation is based on the assumption that the act of terrorism is an instrument—a deliberate choice by a unitary actor with collectively held values. The organization, as a unit, acts to achieve these values, which involve changing the outside world. Terrorist behavior is often a response to external events. An increase in the cost or a decrease in the reward for terrorist actions, in terms of achieving ideological purposes, will make terrorism less likely.

However, a second explanation focuses on internal organizational processes within the terrorist group. The act of terrorism is the result of the organization's struggle for survival. The organization's leaders ensure maintenance of the organization by offering their followers varied incentives, not all of which involve pursuit of the group's stated political purposes. They seek to prevent both defection and dissent by developing intense loyalties in the group's membership. The terrorist organization responds to pressure from outside by changing the incentives offered members or through innovation. Terrorist actions do not necessarily or directly reflect ideological values.

The Instrumental Approach. From this perspective, violence is seen as instrumental and intentional. Government and the terrorist organization are engaged in a typical adversarial relationship, a conflict in which each party's actions are aimed at influencing the behavior of the other and which approximates an action-reaction pattern. The classic works on the strategy of conflict, such as those by Thomas C. Schelling, suggest that terrorism is violent coercion, a bargaining process based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of military force.¹

The terrorist organization is assumed to act on the basis of calculations of the benefit or value to be gained from an action and the probability of success. Terrorists may act

because the value they seek is enormously high, because the costs of trying are low, because the status quo is intolerable, or because the probability of succeeding (even at high cost to themselves) is high. They may act out of anticipation of reward or out of desperation.

This general perspective forms the conceptual foundation for a relatively recent issue in strategic studies—the analysis of surprise attack.² Terrorism is a strategy of surprise, on which terrorists rely significantly to compensate for material inferiority. It is in catching targets off guard that terrorists succeed in their immediate objectives.

Explanations of why surprise occurs frequently emphasize the government's lack of preparation, not only in terms of intelligence failures which may preclude warning of impending attack, but in terms of the government's insensitivity to warnings actually given.³ The political costs of acting in anticipation of an attack may outweigh the advantages gained by striking first. In the case of terrorism, these disadvantages seem to lie principally in domestic public opinion. The United States has been reluctant to use force against terrorists in part because of the fear of popular disapproval. Intelligence warnings are rarely clear enough to stand as evidence before public opinion.

The government may also be insensitive to warning because of doctrines or assumptions that discount the threat. In Beirut, for example, the American military command felt that because American forces were on a peacekeeping mission they would not be perceived as an enemy. American officials subsequently assumed that moving the Embassy to the Christian quarter of Beirut would provide sufficient security despite the fact that the Embassy's defenses were not ready. Tragically, neither assumption was correct.

The actions of the terrorist organization are determined by perceptions of incentive and opportunity.⁴ The existence of opportunities for surprise attack may generate a political incentive where none existed before. A terrorist organization may not consider translating its ideological goals into action until a concrete opportunity presents itself. Such an opportunity could stem from the vulnerability and availability of symbolic targets (such as the presence of American Marines in Beirut) or from the offer of support from foreign actors (such as the Government of Iran). In turn, a prior incentive or ideological direction may lead organizations to search for opportunities, which determined and risk-prone groups may

be quite good at creating. Looking at terrorism as a type of surprise attack leads one to stress the terrorist organization's perceptions of a government's vulnerabilities, and the disadvantages of being in the position of the defender against surprise.

What strategic conditions promote surprise? Surprise may simply be aggressiveness, aimed at winning quickly and cheaply. In terrorist terms the victory is usually a propaganda gain that demonstrates the government's weakness. In this case, the attack may stem from the terrorist organization's perception of its position as dominant. Yet surprise may also be a result of organizational weakness. Terrorists may act in anticipation of government action. Terrorist groups may be most dangerous when they feel beleaguered and on the defensive, with little to lose from a suicidal attack.

Bringing about surprise, from the operational viewpoint of the terrorist organization, is often a matter simply of timing.⁵ A government may know that a terrorist attack is probable and what the likely targets are, but cannot know the day or the hour. In addition, surprise may be achieved through doctrinal innovation—the invention of new modes of warfare. Terrorism is in itself such an innovation. Since the beginning of the modern wave of terrorism in roughly 1968, terrorists have developed new and elaborate methods of hostage taking, including aircraft hijackings, seizure of embassies or consulates, and kidnaping of diplomats and business executives. As these tactics became familiar to governments and corporations, they ceased to surprise and their targets found efficient means of coping. Terrorists then shifted to bombings, which were shocking in their destructiveness and in the willingness of their perpetrators to die with their bombs. The purpose of innovation in terrorism is to maintain the possibility of surprise because it is at the heart of the terrorist's success.

An instrumental interpretation emphasizes the leaders of the terrorist organization as the decisionmakers. Their values and goals are critical indicators of the organization's collective intentions. Terrorist organizations establish priorities among both long-term and short-term objectives. An organization's success or failure is measured in terms of its ability to attain its stated political ends. Few terrorist organizations actually meet these ideological objectives, which are often quite grandiose, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is ultimately a failure. The reason it continues in the immediate setting is that terrorist organizations frequently achieve their tactical objectives, such as publicizing their cause or creating immense

frustration in the governments faced with terrorism.

Should disunity or factionalism occur within a terrorist organization, the instrumental model would interpret it as disagreement over political goals or over how they should be pursued. The Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, split over the questions of how best to defeat Israel and the character of the future state. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) split, in the aftermath of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, as rival leaders disagreed on how to respond to new popular involvement. A constant failure to achieve stated goals would presumably lead to internal strife and disunity.

Since the specific intentions of any adversary, particularly a terrorist organization, are intrinsically difficult to determine, it is tempting to focus on the adversary's capabilities and to assume intention from actions. If terrorists are instrumental and calculating, the means they use are logically related to their ends. The targets of terrorism, for example, are symbolically related to the organization's ideological beliefs. This link determines their meaning not only to the watching world, but to the organization itself.

Terrorist ideology, no matter how unrealistic, has to be taken seriously as a guide to intention. Coupled with analysis of capabilities, it provides a basis for prediction. Organizations such as the Italian Red Brigades, for example, which seek to involve the masses in the political struggle, are unlikely to commit acts of violence that might alienate potential supporters. Ideology can be a factor in self-restraint. On the other hand, organizations which have no desire for an earthly constituency and which possess the necessary resources, such as the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, are unlikely to restrain their destructiveness.

The escalation of terrorist violence may be a response to government actions. Terrorist organizations are sensitive to governments' strengths as well as their weaknesses; terrorists engage in a process of constant adaptation to the strategic environment. Moving to greater destructiveness may be a reaction to a need to retain the initiative as governments find means of countering existing terrorist capabilities. Moreover, if terrorism is a means to an end, then substitutes are possible. The absence of alternatives to terrorism will be important; organizations that do not rely solely on terrorism may be more likely to abandon the strategy in the face of failure.

In seeing terrorist decisionmaking as directed toward changing the external political situation, this approach

has much to commend it. Terrorist organizations do act as units. Their leaders do make conscious choices based on calculations of costs and benefits. They are sensitive to the effects of their actions, for example, often timing them to take maximum advantage of television broadcasts. Terrorists do respond to changes in situations. Strategic theories are frequently elegant in their simplicity and parsimony. They permit one to link action with political purposes. Yet looking at terrorism only in this way may oversimplify reality. Terrorist behavior is also inner-directed, aimed at organizational survival as much as inflicting pain on adversaries to change their political behavior.

The Organizational Process Approach. This explanation, which has been adapted from the theories of James Q. Wilson, assumes that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.⁶ From this perspective, terrorist actions are outcomes of the internal dynamics of the organization. While the minimal goal of any organization is survival, the goals of the people occupying roles in an organization transcend mere survival. Leaders, in particular, wish to enhance the organization. Their personal ambitions are tied to the organization's success. This type of explanation suggests that terrorism can become self-sustaining regardless of objective success or failure.

Organizational analysis may focus on the nature of the incentives the organization provides for its members. The relationship between actual rewards for membership and the organization's stated objectives is not straightforward; the organization's follower's may not actually have joined the organization for the purpose of fulfilling ideological goals. The constraints and opportunities these nonpolitical factors create for leaders will affect the organization's political position. The critical factor in the terrorist organization is how its leaders try to secure their positions and how their tenure is related to the organization's political role. Leaders maintain their positions by supplying tangible and intangible incentives to members, which may not necessarily involve the pursuit of the organization's collective public ends.

The individual's primary incentive for joining an organization, especially one that is already established and is of known character, may have only a tenuous connection with the organization's ideology: Instead he or she may seek simply to belong, to acquire status and reputation in a sympathetic community, to find comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits. The popular image of the

terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a more complex reality.

There are, for example, known links between some terrorist groups and criminal interests in the drug and arms trades. Under certain conditions, membership in a terrorist organization is a valued social relationship, winning the terrorist the respect and admiration of peers and family. Joining a terrorist organization in order to enhance one's appearance in the eyes of others is not uncharacteristic of nationalist and separatist groups, where a popular constituency exists that may deplore the method but applaud the goals of the organization. The Basque ETA or the IRA, for example, may offer status incentives. The terrorist, furthermore, may be acting in terms of a nonindigenous reference group with whom he or she identifies. The terrorist may genuinely see his or her actions as the continuation of a historic struggle led by distant heroes in the Third World, winning the respect of other revolutionaries. Many Western European groups compared themselves to the Tupamaros of Uruguay. Since many terrorists are adolescents, joining may be a sign of personal daring or social rebellion more than political commitment. Other incentives are those intangible benefits of association in a group: a feeling of belonging, of acceptance, and of community. Psychological findings indicate that simply belonging to a primary group is often part of the motivation of members of terrorist organizations.⁷

Most organizations offer a mixture of incentives. The issues or causes which the group supports may shift with the organization's need to offer new incentives to members. The Rand Corporation, for instance, notes that in France the group Action Directe, "in chameleon fashion, rapidly refocuses on the most attractive antigovernment issues."⁸ Since 1979 the organization has opposed nuclear energy, imperialism, Israel, the Catholic Church, and French intervention in Chad. Organizational goals are not necessarily consistent.

Ideology is extremely important to most terrorist groups, but its interpretation in operational terms may vary according to the need to ensure organizational survival. Circumstances may alter incentive structures. For example, the loss of support from foreign governments—as happened to the Palestinian resistance after the Lebanese civil war—would reduce the attractiveness of material incentives and induce leaders to find substitutes.

Purposive incentives remain strong for a number of reasons. Collective goals appeal to the terrorist's sense of satisfaction at contributing to what he or she considers a worthy political cause. Although some terrorists' motivations are less than pure, many sincerely identify with the organization's purpose and others will be afraid to admit that they do not.

Wilson suggests that there are different categories of political purpose, categories which affect the stability of the organization.⁹ One type of purposive incentive offers the pursuit of a single specific objective. The Rand Corporation describes such groups as "issue-oriented" and notes that they are common but short lived.¹⁰ On the other hand, ideological incentives are based on beliefs that constitute a sympathetic, comprehensive rejection of the present political world and offer the promise of a future replacement. The members of ideological groups are required to accept this call for revolutionary change.

A third type of incentive is redemption, embodied in organizations whose efforts concentrate primarily on changing the lives of their members or followers. As examples of these moralistic groups, Wilson cites the 19th-century anarchists and the Weathermen of the 1960's. These groups are likely to focus on self-sacrifice, on living by stringent moral codes, or on conversion. Wilson suggests that such groups can never succeed; hence, their despair often leads to extreme destructiveness and willingness to take risks. The religious terrorists who now threaten American interests in the Middle East may fall into this category. The followers of the Iranian revolution wish not just to change United States policy but to please God and to convert the Muslim populations of the region to their cause. Extremist Shi'ite organizations may resemble the Assassins of medieval Islam, a Shi'ite sect that valued deception and martyrdom.¹¹

Incentive structures vary from group to group, over time, and with changing circumstances. Wilson concludes that conspiratorial organizations tend over time to substitute group solidarity for political purpose as the dominant incentive.¹² This development seems likely to be characteristic of tightly compartmentalized underground organizations. As they are progressively isolated from external events, they become both less informed about and less concerned with the achievement of the group's stated political goals.

Single-issue groups, whose members are usually part-time rather than professional terrorists, may find it easier to adapt by creating new incentives. It is easier to change a

position on a single issue than to change comprehensive belief systems. Given this apparent adaptability, it seems paradoxical that single-issue groups tend to be shorter lived. If this is the case, perhaps it is because they are more likely to achieve their goals. On the other hand, their demise may be explained by the hypothesis that when they do not succeed, they cannot recover by offering substitute incentives such as status or solidarity. Furthermore, organizations with multiple political goals and with a broader ideological range have greater latitude in interpreting events to suit their purposes.

Organizational analysis explains not only why terrorism continues regardless of political results, but how it starts. It implies that structural explanations of civil violence are of little use. The objective conditions likely to inspire grievances and hence incite violence are permanent, whereas violence is not continuous or universal.¹³ Instead, entrepreneurship is a critical ingredient; the leaders who form an organization must create appropriate incentives to attract members. The members must have an exceptional commitment to the group's purposes and an exaggerated sense of the group's likely efficacy.

In a terrorist organization, this sense of efficacy might come from assessing the government's weakness or from observing the apparent success of other, similar groups. It might also come from the encouragement of a foreign government. It is significant that there be a demand for the organization from some actual or potential constituency. The extent of mobilizable resources, in turn possibly dependent on foreign support or on domestic sympathy, is also a determinant.

What appears to be an essential condition is that the presence of skilled and determined leaders and some broader demand for action coincide with "the salience of purposive incentives."¹⁴ The prominence of ideas that legitimize violence and the example set by predecessors would contribute to making the terrorists' purpose salient. Potential terrorists are likely to organize and act if they believe that matters of concern to them are being affected by a government whose behavior can be altered. Such a belief is likely to emerge when a highly visible enemy appears to pose a serious threat to the values of the potential terrorists or their constituents. Thus terrorist organizations are much more responsive to the environment and to other actions during their inception than they are in subsequent operations. The older the organization, the more its behavior is explained by the dictates of organizational imperatives.

Emphasizing maintenance of the organization explains why terrorists persist in the face of evident failure to achieve political purposes. If purposive incentives are overshadowed by others, such as social relationships or financial reward, terrorism becomes self-sustaining. In fact, the organization's leaders may not really want to see its purpose accomplished and the organization's utility at an end. It may be in the organization's interest never to succeed completely—just enough to sustain group morale. If the group's purpose is ideological or redemptive, tactical failure will not disillusion those committed to a millenium for which the destruction of the existing political order is a precondition. If the group's purpose is to achieve a specific goal, it may adapt to success or failure by selecting a new short-term cause.

A second general theoretical approach to organization, focused on preventing decline in firms, is also worth considering because it suggests that terrorist organizations behave differently when they have a monopoly on antigovernment violence.¹⁵ Although the comparison between business firms and terrorist groups may at first seem bizarre, the resemblance has also been noted by the Rand Corporation: "Organizations are dedicated to survival. They do not voluntarily go out of business. Right now, the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed terrorist groups is the same as the immediate objective of many of the world's hard-pressed corporations—that is, to continue operations."¹⁶

Albert O. Hirschman's economic theory of organizational imperative supports Wilson's idea that organizations are more sensitive to their members than to anything else. Yet the implication of this theory is that organizations are fragile; they struggle to prevent decline. A fundamental precept is that organizations behave differently in competitive than in noncompetitive environments. In general, most terrorist organizations appear to have close competitors, rivals in the struggle: the Irish Republican Army competes with the Irish National Liberation Army; the Italian Red Brigades compete with Prima Linea; al-Fatah competes with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a host of other groups.

Hirschman proposes that dissatisfied members of an organization have two options, "exit" or "voice," each of which is exercised under different circumstances. "Exit," as it applies to the special circumstances of terrorist organizations, means the possibilities of joining another, rival terrorist organization that appears more satisfactory or splintering off and creating a new group. Exit often occurs

when a terrorist has failed in an attempt to exercise "voice," or the articulation of complaints in order to persuade the group to follow another direction.

Although terrorist organizations attempt to define exit as betrayal, factionalism is not uncommon. The possibility of exiting to another rival group of course depends on the existence of such an alternative. Where there are no competitors, the dissatisfied must create a new group. This option apparently is exercised when the most extremist members chafe under the restrictions imposed by the relatively moderate, and demand an escalation of violence. The Provisional IRA, for example, developed from the refusal of the parent or "Official" IRA to adopt a strategy of terrorism against Protestants and the British in the wake of the civil rights movement. To prevent the departure of a subgroup, especially if it endangers the survival of the organization, former moderates may consent to collective radicalization. The Official IRA subsequently followed the Provos into terrorism—both against the British and against each other. Only if there is no possibility of exit can the organization's leaders resist the demands of members for change.

Exit can thus hasten organizational decline. Yet the exercise of "voice" can also be destructive. Most terrorist organizations strongly (even forcibly) discourage the expression of discontent. Cohesion and solidarity are important values, both to the organization (for which security is a paramount concern) and to the psychological well-being of members for whom belonging is a dominant incentive. Terrorist organizations may therefore be more sensitive to internal disagreement than to defection. Organizations that are more centralized, secretive, and compartmentalized are likely to be the least tolerant of dissent. For ideological or redemptive organizations, dissent may be the equivalent of heresy.

The leaders of an organization with dissatisfied members can, by developing loyalty, remedy the dilemma, avoiding the extremes of exit and voice that will weaken the organization either through the loss of members or through internecine quarrels. Leaders stress commitment to group goals and try to strengthen group solidarity. Loyalty is strongest when the possibility of exit exists but members choose to stay anyway. Developing intense loyalty among followers may be intended to prevent both exit and voice, when leaders wish to be relieved of both deserters and complainers. Terrorist organizations often deliberately build loyalty through ideological indoctrination. However, outlawing both exit and voice will heighten the gravity of

either offense should it nevertheless occur; either departure or dissent would then potentially have more damaging consequences for the organization.

Another way in which organizations prevent their members from leaving is to establish what Hirschman terms "severe initiation costs." If members have invested a lot in joining an organization, they will be reluctant to leave. Terrorist organizations often require the commission of an illegal act for precisely that purpose, to eliminate the individual's option of abandoning the underground. While the imposition of this cost does not mean that the member will not be attracted to a close competitor should one exist, he or she has developed a certain stake in self-deception. Even if members perceive the organization's failure to achieve collective ends, they will "fight hard to prove they were right after all in paying that high entrance fee" rather than admit defeat.¹⁷

Given high initiation costs and the corresponding constraints they impose on exit, discontent serious enough to surface is likely to be explosive. However, extreme discontent may provoke not dissolution of the organization but increased activity directed toward achieving group goals. The decline of the terrorist organization under government pressure may engender a psychological dynamic in which initial complacency is succeeded by frenetic activism going beyond criticism of the leadership to desperate attempts to salvage the organization. Terrorist initiates, having paid a high price to enter the organization and facing an even greater penalty for exit, may react not by denying but by trying to change political reality. The response to decline, then, may be more intense violence.

Experimental psychological studies have in fact indicated that the person who has experienced a severe initiation will be dissatisfied with even a low-cost exit (e.g., to a similarly motivated group also pursuing a terrorist strategy). If there appears to be no alternative to exit when voice is prohibited or ineffective, then the disenchanted member will try to reduce the strain of exit by persuading others to join the defection. Once on the outside, these critics will be extremely hostile to the parent organization. Intergroup rivalry will be bitter.

These findings also tentatively support the "fight harder" hypothesis. The option other than exit open to the dissatisfied terrorist—changing the organization's political direction—may lead to "creative innovation" under pressure. The combination of high exit barriers and dissatisfaction may thus increase viability instead of destroying the organization. When members of a terrorist

group lack the possibility of exit and are intensely loyal, failure to achieve the organization's stated purpose may only make them work harder.¹⁸

The behavioral differences between terrorist groups in competitive versus noncompetitive situations may have significant implications. In competitive conditions, where exit is possible, there may be less internal dissent. Yet organizations may have to devote their efforts to distinguishing themselves from other groups, to prevent defection to successful rivals. Competition may inspire escalation, as each group tries to outdo the others in violence not only to keep their members but to attract recruits. Where exit is possible but no competitors exist, decline and dissatisfaction may result in a proliferation of organizations. The final result, therefore, may be competition by escalating extremism.

Differences between groups with high and low entrance fees may affect the organization's viability. For example, groups such as the West German Red Army Faction, which requires the total commitment of members who become professional terrorists with no other life, may find it harder to recover from decline than less structured groups like the Revolutionary Cells. Hirschman believes that all terrorist organizations are in this doomed category. No organization can make itself immune to the possibilities of exit and voice. Where both outlets for dissatisfaction are blocked, the organization will not survive.¹⁹ Innovative responses are the exception.

What are the lessons of the instrumental and organizational process theories for policy recommendations? Can these two explanations be combined into a synthesis, or do they yield fundamentally different prescriptions?

The Instrumental Approach. This explanation suggests that governments treat the terrorist as an adversary engaged in a new form of warfare. It is out of the question to reward violence by making political concessions to terrorist demands. In meeting the threat to national security, the government has two alternatives: *defense* and *deterrence*.

As Glenn Snyder has proposed in a classic formulation of the problem,²⁰ *defense* refers to forcefully preventing any enemy from attaining his physical objectives. Defending territory and values may involve not only strictly defensive measures—guarding potential objects of attack or erecting barriers—but a tactically offensive response. At its most effective, defense prevents attack by making it impossible. Offensive tactics in the interest of halting an attack would

engage an enemy before he reached the target rather than at the point of attack.

Anticipatory actions to remove enemy capabilities are of two sorts. *Preemption* occurs when an enemy attack is considered imminent. It aims at halting an adversary who is poised to strike. The use of force in the interest of *prevention*, on the other hand, is intended to incapacitate an enemy who plans a future attack but has not yet mobilized. The exercise of prevention is based as much on an estimate of enemy intention as of capabilities. Israeli policy exhibits this range of options, as Israeli borders are massively guarded and the Israeli military does not hesitate to strike Palestinian leaders or bases in anticipation of terrorist attacks.

Both preemption and prevention require exceptional intelligence. Decisionmakers are not likely to get the kind of precise warning of impending attack that they need to preempt effectively. In fact, an indication of an intent to preempt in order to avoid being surprised may provoke premature attack. Preventive attack to disarm the terrorist at an earlier stage of preparation may make even greater demands on intelligence. It involves detecting preparations for mobilization rather than mobilization itself. Because of inherent uncertainties of information and because public disclosure would compromise intelligence sources, it is difficult for governments to justify preemption or preventive use of forces to their citizens. This is the major problem in responding to warning.

In contrast to defensive measures, which are aimed at limiting the objective opportunities available to the terrorist organization, is the strategy of *deterrence*. Its purpose is to affect the terrorist group's perceptions of opportunity and incentives for attack. Deterrence purports to prevent conflict by convincing the adversary that the costs of the action contemplated far outweigh any potential benefits that might be gained. The defending government influences the terrorist organization's decisions by threatening unacceptable damage to collective values should be an act of terrorism occur. The value-maximizing terrorist organization will react to an effectively communicated and credible threat by desisting. For the defender, the problem lies in communicating the threat, making it credible, and making it a real threat to the should an act of terrorism occur. The value-maximizing terrorist organization will react to an effectively communicated and credible threat by desisting. For the pain to the terrorist group. The most feasible and hence most credible threat may not always be the most painful.

Two forms of deterrence are open to the defender, according to Snyder. The first is *denial*, a strategy resembling, and indeed in implementation basically identical to, defensive measures. However, in deterrence through denying gain to the adversary the purpose is to raise the immediate cost to the terrorists of the violence they contemplate. While the prospect of paying a high price for any gain may act as a deterrent, denial is conventionally thought to be the weakest form of deterrence. It is difficult to make this sort of battlefield cost unacceptable, especially to terrorist organizations whose members seek martyrdom. To them, the demonstration of willingness to die in the attempt may compensate for failure. And it is, of course, the followers and not the leaders of the organization who pay this price.

The second type of deterrence is the more commonly known form. Punishment or *retaliation* involves the threat of the use of military force in response to an attack. The threat is activated not before or during but after the commission of an act of terrorism. If the government's threat of retaliation is effective, the terrorist group will refrain from attacking even if the target is undefended. This strategy of deterrence is thus an attractive option, given the difficulties inherent in the physical protection of large numbers of potential targets.

Retaliatory threats may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. The defender can threaten to respond in a manner tailored to the offense—for example, by attacking the base from which a terrorist attack was launched. Because of the uncertainties and unverifiability of intelligence, the defender is more likely to issue (and carry out, if deterrence fails) more credible asymmetrical threats to retaliate against any object of value to the terrorists and to reserve the right to escalate. The government in effect states that punishment may not be in kind or on the same level of damage; something may be left to chance. Such threats may be effective because they are credible. However, the punishment inflicted on the terrorists may be less severe than symmetrical retaliation against a nerve center or against leaders. Asymmetrical retaliation may also be less justifiable in the eyes of the public.

If deterrence is a recommended policy against terrorist organizations, it should be doubly applicable to states that sponsor terrorists. States have a wider range of values that are easier to identify. For states, supporting terrorists is not likely to be a benefit that would outweigh any cost, whereas the terrorist may feel that no cost is great enough

to justify abandoning the struggle. Theoretically, it should be easier to alter a state's cost-benefit calculations.

Policy responses consistent with the instrumental explanation of terrorist behavior depend both on denying opportunities to terrorists (mainly a matter of defense) and on affecting the terrorists' incentives. The problem for intelligence is as much to discover terrorists' values as to discover their location and plans. Reducing opportunities may also minimize incentives for terrorism. The terrorist organization is presumed to be responsive both to increases in the cost of attacking and to threats of subsequent punishment.

This approach to combating terrorism is not without drawbacks. Deterring adversaries is problematic if their values and risk-taking propensities are imperfectly understood. Governments should never issue threats they are unable or unwilling to carry out. The use of force in response to terrorism is a contentious domestic issue: What kind of costs would be unacceptable to terrorist organizations and to their sponsors and also acceptable to the American public? The lessons of experience show that coercive diplomacy is not effective against adversaries with superior motivation. Furthermore, the use of force may provoke escalation and broadening of conflict. Actions that American policymakers perceive as defensive may be perceived elsewhere as aggressive.

Organizational Analysis. The organizational process approach to interpreting terrorist behavior assumes a complexity of motivation that goes beyond challenging governments. In this view, leaders of terrorist organizations struggle to maintain the viability of the organization. The incentives they offer members may require actions against the government regardless of the cost, *if* that cost is short of complete destruction of the organization.

The task of the government facing internally oriented organizations is to encourage disintegration without provoking the terrorist group to desperation. Absolute defeat will be very difficult. What the outside world perceives as "failure" may not appear so to the terrorists. The aim of policy is to make the organization less destructive and less cohesive.

The government must try to affect the organization's structure of incentives in order to reduce the possibilities of violence. Offering new, nonviolent incentives that increase opportunities for exit or promote the expression of internal dissent are promising policy options. At the same time, the government should try to avoid a proliferation of new organizations or competitions among rivals that

involves escalating violence. It should also try to avoid producing the sort of desperation which, in the absence of exit or voice or the presence of intense loyalty, leads terrorists to throw themselves into renewed and violent creativity. The use of military force is not best suited to this approach; counterintelligence initiatives combined with judicial and political measures are more relevant.

The Italian experience has been instructive in this regard. The apparent "repentance" of significant numbers of terrorists in response to offers of leniency from the Italian state has enabled the police to act effectively against the Red Brigades. The offer of reduced prison sentences in exchange for information leading to the apprehension of other Red Brigades members seems to have coincided, perhaps fortuitously, with a period of disarray within the terrorist organization, when numerous members were questioning the group's purposes. The successful timing of this offer suggests that offering the possibility of exit, not to a rival organization but to the aboveground world, can work at a time of dissatisfaction and intensified expression of discontent.

Similarly, with regard to creating opportunities for exit, governments might reconsider the wisdom of severe legal penalties for membership in terrorist organizations. The immediate reaction to this question is surely that increasing the costs of joining a terrorist organization will deter prospective entrants. However, even if this is the case, establishing such entrance fees, in effect, also makes it more difficult for terrorists to exit. Governments should decide, after considering the competitive or noncompetitive situation of terrorist organizations, whether prohibiting exit is or is not in the interest of reducing terrorism. It was to this end that governments in colonial wars often offered amnesty to rebels who surrendered.

Where incentives for many terrorists are nonpurposive, the government may be able to offer substitutes. Financial rewards may be influential where incentives are material. For example, legislation proposed by the Reagan administration in 1984 contained the inducement of a \$500,000 reward for information leading to the apprehension of terrorists. Policy models developed for dealing with criminal organizations or youth gangs may be applicable in certain circumstances. Where incentives are purposive, however, the government will find it difficult to provide satisfactory substitutes.

Organizational analysis also suggests that there may be counterintelligence opportunities to create dissatisfaction and dissent within terrorist organizations. Schlomo Gazit

and Michael Handel, for example, recommend attempts to disrupt terrorist organizations by making it hard for them to recruit new members or to keep the loyalty of existing members.²¹ (Exactly how this is to be done, however, is left unexplained.) This approach requires identifying the pool or constituency from which new members are drawn, specifying the incentives offered members, and reducing the attractiveness of these incentives.

Affecting recruitment (remembering that not all terrorist organizations are equally dependent on steady supplies of new members) and support functions would probably be more easily accomplished by influencing the attitudes of sympathizers than by directly undermining the loyalty of indoctrinated activists. The incentive structures for sympathizers are probably weaker than those for active members. Barriers to both entry and exit are lower, but there is also not much opportunity to exercise voice. Sympathizers have little direct control over the organization's decisions. If one could increase their dissatisfaction, the organization's support basis might crumble. The problem is to identify incentives for sympathizers. Most satisfaction must be vicarious; there is no close-knit community of believers to belong to. The government should work toward convincing sympathizers that terrorism is not efficacious or legitimate. Policymakers should insist that the news media avoid romanticizing terrorist exploits.

Gazit and Handel further recommend that governments try to create conflicts within terrorist organizations or between groups and their rivals. The problem is how to do this in some way other than infiltrating the activist core of the organization. An informer penetrating a hard-core terrorist organization must usually pay an entrance fee of committing an act of violence against the state. Joining a group of sympathizers, however, would be less likely to pose such moral and legal problems. Gazit and Handel recommend measures such as misinformation (e.g., announcing that a captured terrorist has actually gone over to a rival group). The goal is to create the appearance of organizational decline and to offer the possibility of exit. This line of thought would not exclude an elaborate scam that would involve the establishment of a phony competitor.

The organizational perspective stresses the need to consider variations among terrorist organizations, whereas the instrumental approach tends to see the adversary as relatively undifferentiated. The organizational approach suggests affecting the internal operations of the

organizations, basically destroying or reforming the group from within. The government works toward changing incentive structures, toward increasing the likelihood of exit, and toward encouraging decline but not innovative adaptation. This view suggests that "winning" in a conventional sense may not always halt or deter. Halting a terrorist attack may lead to more violence rather than less, if the result is proliferation (as members leave for new or rival organizations) or heightened creativity in an effort to revive the organization. Organizational analysis is an extremely complex approach, requiring exceptional information about terrorist organizations and delicate operations that are difficult to implement except in a domestic setting. The actual practices followed by the FBI closely resemble these recommendations, and they also reveal the political dangers inherent in counterintelligence operations. Like the instrumental approach, interpreting organizational dynamics places a premium on intelligence. Unlike the instrumental approach, it does not place a high value on policies of retaliation.

Can these two approaches be integrated in any meaningful way? Perhaps the first response, by making the objective costs of terrorism exceed the benefits, sets the stage for employing the second. When governments are faced with an immediate terrorist threat and are reduced to crisis management rather than prevention, the instrumental approach dominates decisionmaking. At this point such a simplification is both inevitable and necessary, but it may also be useful for decisionmakers to be aware of how government actions affect the internal processes of terrorist organizations. It is admittedly difficult for the United States to influence the viability of terrorist groups operating on foreign territory, where the United States Government has limited power to alter incentives. The organizational approach requires patience and is unlikely to show immediate and visible results, but in the long run it provides a useful warning against treating terrorist organizations as rational adversaries.

Notes

¹Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). See especially "The Diplomacy of Violence," 1-34.

²See, for example, Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington: Brookings, 1982), and Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983).

³Betts reaches this conclusion; see Chapters 4 and 5, "Why Surprise Succeeds," 87-149.

⁴See especially Klaus Knorr, "Strategic Surprise: The Incentive Structure," 173-94, in Knorr and Morgan, eds.

⁵Michael T. Handel, *The Diplomacy of Surprise* (Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1981).

⁶This argument is adapted from James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

⁷See Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism," in Margaret Hermann, ed., *Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985).

⁸Bonnie Cordes et al., *Trends in International Terrorism, 1982 and 1983* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1984), 29.

⁹Wilson, 49-50.

¹⁰Cordes et al., 3-4.

¹¹See David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review*, 78, 3 (Sept. 1984), 658-77.

¹²Wilson, p. 50 and Chapter 3 in general, "Organizational Maintenance and Incentives," 30-55.

¹³*Ibid.*, 296-301.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁵Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

¹⁶Cordes et al., 50.

¹⁷Hirschman, 93.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Appendix, 146-55.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 121.

²⁰Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

²¹Schlomo Gazit and Michael Handel, "Insurgency, Terrorism, and Intelligence," 125-47, in Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s: Counterintelligence* (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980; distributed by Transaction Books).

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Hostilité, Conformité, Fraternité: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior by Jerrold M. Post, M.D.

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The echoes are still reverberating from the massive explosion in October 1983 which destroyed the Marine barracks in Lebanon. The result of a Shi'ite terrorist's driving his explosive-laden truck into the barracks, losing his life in the process, this most dramatic suicide bombing is one of a series of violent acts by terrorists willing to give their lives for a cause, acts which have become a regular feature of the political landscape. While the lay public assumes such bloodshed can only be the product of deranged minds—the acts of crazed fanatics—behavioral scientists attempting to understand the psychology of individuals drawn to this violent political behavior have not succeeded in identifying a unique “terrorist mindset.”

Individuals who have entered the ranks of terrorist groups come from all walks of life, all strata of society. Most studies have not detected any striking psychological abnormality in the majority, although a range from normal through psychotic has been reported.^{1,2,3} Terrorists come from an extremely wide range of cultures, nationalities, and ideological causes. Considering this heterogeneity, what is particularly striking is the uniformity of terrorist behavior—how similar from group to group terrorists are in their blind allegiance to their cause and their willingness to go to any extreme, including giving their own lives, for that cause.

From our comparative research on diverse terrorist groups,⁴ we have concluded that group psychology provides the most powerful explanation for this uniformity of behavior within the diverse population of terrorist groups.

Clearly the group dynamics are strongly influenced by the nature of the membership. And while there is no single type of individual who is attracted to the path of terrorism, what leads individuals to join clearly will have an impact on the functioning of the group. In this matter, the group cause—the ideology—is of great importance. We do not believe “the cause” is the basic underlying psychological motivation for joining. Rather it serves as the rationale for the espoused, consciously acknowledged motivation for joining.

The bewildering welter of terrorist groups and their causes can be classified into two major types, which have different psychological attractions and different behavioral dynamics.⁵ We find it useful to distinguish between groups such as West Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF) and Italy's Brigade Rosse (BR), which are committed to the destruction or overthrow of their own government, and groups such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty

Movement (ETA) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), whose goal is to establish a separate nation. For members of groups in the first category—the “anarchic-ideologues,” *the goal of the group is to destroy the world of their fathers*. Their acts of terrorism are acts of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the society of their parents. On the other hand, the members of groups in the second category—the “nationalist-secessionists”—*are carrying on the mission of their fathers*; they are retaliating against society for the hurt done to their parents. Thus, at a symbolic level, the terrorist acts of the “anarchic-ideologues” are *acts of dissent against parents loyal to the regime*; for the “nationalist-secessionists,” they are *acts of loyalty to parents damaged by the regime*.

The choice to enter the “anarchic-ideologue” group is more profound, receiving a total commitment. A qualitative leap into illegality, it represents a complete break with society, requiring an underground existence. The German scholars identify this major act as *Der Sprung* (The Leap).⁶ Once the gulf into illegal activity is crossed, there is no turning back. H.J. Klein, an RAF terrorist, has expressed this graphically in his memoirs:

*...if you're long enough in the underground, you sooner or later pitch everything overboard. From humanity to your political ideals. You sink deeper and deeper into the shit. Once you've taken this path, all that's left is a straight road. You can't turn around.*⁷

For the “nationalist-secessionists,” on the other hand, joining the group is almost a rite of passage. The members may live with their families. Their identities tend to be widely known in their communities and they may be lionized for their heroism.

Despite these differences, social-psychological data suggest that in both cases the act of joining the terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate identity and—most important—to belong.

This strong need to belong and to achieve a stable identity sprang from circumstances in the period before entering the terrorist group. As the German scholars have noted, affiliation was the central problem at the end of the war and for the postwar generation.⁸ The lives of the future terrorists were characterized by social isolation and personal failure. Studies of the social background of terrorists of two of the major “anarchic-ideologue” groups—West Germany's Red Army Faction⁹ and Italy's Brigade Rosse¹⁰—indicate a pattern of incomplete family

structure, especially during adolescence; in the West German study, for example, 25 percent had lost one or both parents by age 14. Fully a third had been convicted in juvenile court. There was a high frequency of educational and job failure. Interviews of imprisoned terrorists suggest low self-esteem, inadequately integrated personalities, and a tendency to project onto society the reason for their failures. For these lonely, alienated individuals from the margins of society, the terrorist group was to become the family they never had.

It has been suggested that the decision to join a "nationalist/secessionist" terrorist group is much less profound, more a rite of passage. Yet here, too, the desire to join may well spring from a feeling of alienation. The Basque region of Spain is remarkably homogeneous. Only 8 percent of the families are of mixed Spanish-Basque heritage, and the children of these families are scorned and rejected. Yet fully 40 percent of the members of ETA, the terrorists whose espoused cause is establishing a separate Basque nation, come from such mixed-parent families.¹¹ Not belonging, on the margins of society, they try to "out-Basque the Basques." They exaggerate their political identity in order to achieve a psychosocial identity.

We are suggesting, then, that a strong need to belong is a feature terrorists around the world share, however disparate their ideological causes. Moreover, underlying the need to belong is an incomplete or fragmented psychological identity, so that the only way the member feels reasonably complete is in relationship to the group; belonging to the group becomes an important component of the member's self-concept. Indeed, belonging to the group for many is the most important component, the linchpin of psychological identity.

If this hypothesis is correct, it suggests that the psychodynamics of the terrorist group would be an unusually powerful mechanism for producing conforming behavior. A persuasive array of evidence supports this concept, including indirect evidence derived from studies of charismatic religious cults.

Particularly instructive are the studies of the Unification Church^{12,13,14} by Galanter and his colleagues. Analysis of the social background of the "Moonies" revealed that, like terrorist group members, they exhibited a high proportion of social isolation, inadequate adjustment, and depression and psychological distress before joining. They had used the sects "to reduce a sense of personal incompleteness." The greater the network of family relationships and friendships, the more likely the new recruits were to leave;

conversely, the more isolated, the more the cult represented the totality of the recruits' social relationships, the more likely they were to stay. Of particular interest was the relationship between willingness to engage in nonconforming or antisocial behavior and "the relief factor." Galanter studied the willingness of 1,410 Unification Church members to accept blindly the fiancés chosen for them by the Reverend Moon, a behavior contrary to the mores to which they had been socialized. The more psychological distress recruits had experienced before joining, and the greater "relief" on joining, the more willing they were to accept without question the dictates of the group. Those members who were reasonably intact psychologically before joining were much more apt to question the right of Reverend Moon to choose their marital partners. For many of them, this violation of their individual autonomy precipitated their leaving the group.

But one does not take the decision to leave the religious cult or the terrorist group lightly if the group provides the core of meaning and identity to the member. The main fear of the members is fear of being held in contempt and abandoned by the group. This helps explain an apparent paradox characteristic of terrorist group psychology: given that the ideologies of the terrorist group are highly antiauthoritarian, the organizational psychology of the terrorist group is highly authoritarian, demanding unquestioning conformity.

Andreas Baader,¹⁵ by threatening expulsion, was able to ensure compliance. He indicated that "whoever is in the group simply has to be tough, has to be able to hold out, and if one is not tough enough, there is not room for him here." The example is cited of a new recruit involved in a group discussion of an operation which had a high probability of causing loss of life.¹⁶ When the member questioned whether it was ideologically proper to conduct an operation where innocent blood would be shed, his act of questioning was defined as disloyalty, and it became quickly apparent that to question was to risk losing his place in the group. For the new member this is particularly threatening psychologically, for within the group there had been—often for the first time—a sense of social reinforcement, of truly belonging. And on the outside, there was no substitute group, so that to leave was to face isolation and alienation once again.

But the risks may be even more profound, including the risk of loss of life. Boock,¹⁷ a former member of RAF, describes the pressures "that can lead to things you can't imagine.... First of all, the fear of what is happening to

one when you say, for example, 'No, I won't do that, and for these and these reasons.' What the consequences of that can be." Baumann¹⁸ indicated that withdrawal was impossible except "by way of the graveyard."

This paradox of conforming antiauthoritarians was manifest during the recruitment process in the student movement in West Germany, a movement whose dominant ethos was antiauthoritarianism, a reaction against the passivity of their parents. After 1945—after Auschwitz and Hiroshima—the experience of older people could only be viewed negatively, as a warning.¹⁹ Young people were so suspicious of authority that they reacted negatively to any speaker who came across as a strong leader; their need to oppose authority was so strong that they joined together out of this common sentiment. But, as the authors point out, they failed to recognize that for a social movement to become a political force, it must recognize and implement the concepts of power, discipline, and force.

If this suspicion of strong leadership characterized the recruitment process, it was to be even more manifest once the member belonged. Thus it was necessary to lead without appearing to lead. Analysis of memoir material indicates that the tenure of an individual who made too manifest his desire for leadership and power was extremely short.

This intense ambivalence surrounding power and authority helps explain the pattern of shifting leadership and difficulty in sustaining leadership often found in terrorist groups, especially those of the "anarchic-ideologue" type. Scratch the surface of an antiauthoritarian and one finds an authoritarian, at once desirous of leading and wishing to submit. In order to belong, the individual was required to surrender his individuality to the greater good of the group.

It is important to distinguish between two structural forms characterizing terrorist organizations: horizontal and vertical.^{20,21} Many small terrorist groups have no outside locus of authority. They are complete unto themselves, autonomous cells. The conflicts over leadership described earlier are particularly manifest for those groups. Yet the larger terrorist groups adopt structural forms much like any large organization. The Brigade Rosse, for example, resembles nothing more than an army. There is a central command, which develops overall strategy; columns; and cells within columns. While the cells have a certain amount of leeway in carrying out instructions, the locus of authority is seen as lying outside of the small group. In this circumstance, when the authority is perceived as being outside the group, the member is prone to vest this

unseen and ambiguous authority with absolute wisdom and power—the paradox of blind submission to authority in the service of opposing authority. Studies of dropouts from the Red Army Faction, which also has a distinctly hierarchical organization, indicate that the centralized group structure was perceived as being threatening to the dropout's need to feel autonomous.

The Second of June Movement, on the other hand, had purposely adopted a looser organizational framework, with much greater autonomy to individual cells and avoidance of hierarchical structure. But the more the group is on its own, either as an autonomous cell or because of a breakdown in communications with the larger organization, the more visible and hence obviously imperfect the authority. Because these groups are composed of individuals who desperately wish to belong—and to follow a banner—but who are inherently suspicious of leaders of any shape or form, who have no authority within themselves and are opposed to authority but seek to submit to it, the tensions in such groups are powerful and the group dynamics unstable. The internal group structure of the Second of June Movement was much less stable than that of the Red Army Faction.

In joining the terrorist group, the member tends to break off all previous affiliations, to become dependent upon the group for emotional support. The move from outside to inside the terrorist groups mean a profound alteration in lifestyle. For the group member, especially one who has committed a criminal act, the group literally becomes a protection against danger. The member needs the group for protection against the hostile outside world. When the group's existence is threatened, it increases group cohesion, as individuals find their own source of security threatened.

The perceived legitimacy of the group is critical; it is the glue that holds the group together and gives meaning to belonging. Accordingly, when a member gives voice to doubt concerning the legitimacy of an action and of the group itself, it is profoundly disturbing to the group. This need to deny doubt leads to an upsidedown logic. Fighting off feelings of weakness leads to a delusion of strength, and the fear of defeat leads to a certainty of success. The group discussions lead to a bolstering, a mutual reassurance. Needing so strongly to belong, the members have suppressed their own doubts. Doubt is incompatible with absolutism. The only way to get rid of doubts is to get rid of the doubters.

The German scholars found that 23 percent of the terrorists dropped out.²² The predominant reason for dropping out was doubting the legitimacy of the group. Comparing the dropouts with the committed members, it appeared that the dropouts were ambivalent on joining, never resolved their doubts, and increasingly questioned the espoused goals of the group and whether the group's actions actually served those goals. The doubts were suppressed but never put to rest.

Without meaning to imply that age confers wisdom, one can suggest that life-cycle issues affect both individual terrorists and terrorist groups, and that with increased age and experience the initial idealization may be replaced by disillusionment and cynicism, with a resultant increase in the rate of dropping out. The duration of active membership among German terrorists who dropped out averaged only 1 year, with 36 percent lasting no more than 6 months. That the median age of terrorist in all groups is 22.5 years provides indirect support that the psychological dynamics of adolescence and youth contribute to joining the group, and that resolving the psychological conflicts of this age period may be associated with leaving the group, which no longer serves its original purpose.

On first reading the written communications of terrorist groups, one is tempted to dismiss these "theoretical expositions" as superficial slogans, devoid of substance or intellectual depth. Tedious to the extreme, they defy one to imagine how they could inspire anyone to action. Yet, considering the cultural differences between the terrorists of Italy, West Germany, Spain, Ireland, Peru, Puerto Rico, and the terrorists operating under the PLO umbrella, the similarity of rhetoric is remarkable. While to a degree this reflects similar sources in the revolutionary literature, the similarity is not just in substance but in form. In particular, the language is the language of absolutism, of black and white with no shades of gray, no room for ambiguity. It is a rhetoric of "we" versus "they," with an idealization of the "we" and a projection onto "them" of all that is wrong.^{23, 24} The causes for stress are to be found in society; society is the only seriously pathogenic factor. Thus the internal, individual crisis is refashioned into a hatred of society.

The world is divided into two camps—enemies and friends—and he who is not totally with me is against me. There is a tendency both in the written pronouncements of the groups and in the group deliberations to polarize, with an idealization of the in-group. At the same time, the source of all problems is externalized to the out-group, with a consequent projection upon the out-group of blame

and rage. This idealization of the in-group also extends to idealizing its brotherhood and harmony, so that intragroup tensions are projected upon the outside enemy too.

These psychological mechanisms—splitting and projection—sanctioned by the group ideology, are characteristic of individuals with borderline and narcissistic character structures, especially those with a paranoid orientation.²⁵ This splitting mechanism has been found in terrorist subjects who have been clinically interviewed.²⁶ Suellwold has observed a high proportion of angry paranoids among terrorist group members.²⁷ "It's not me, it's them"—the motto of the failed youth on the margins of society, seeking to find an external cause for personal difficulties. How attractive, for such personalities, to find they are not alone, that there are others like them, and that indeed there is a codified ideology explaining systematically how society is responsible for other problems they and their underprivileged fellows are suffering.

This labeling process (into which a reactive society can feed) bolsters the tendency to look outward for the source of problems and to strike out to get rid of their sources. This rhetoric of polarization is psychologically attractive to the alienated and troubled adolescent/youth as well as to individuals with borderline personality structures.

Consider this slogan of the hash rebels (the West German equivalent of the "yippies" during the protests of the 1960's)—"Shit on this society of semi-old men and taboos. Go wild and act out beautiful things. Have a joint. Whatever you see and dislike, break it up! Have the courage to fight! Have the courage to conquer!"²⁸ Incitement to the angry adolescent ready to strike out.

Entrance into the group is not sudden, but the end of a gradual period of selection and indoctrination. While the rhetoric seems extreme, it is rhetoric to which the new recruit has been exposed during the lengthy path into the group. Thus there is gradual movement from sympathetic individual, to tolerant though passive supporter, to active supporter, and finally to the "hard core" underground group. In this underground group, out of direct contact with the majority society, the psychological polarization is constantly reinforced through the repetition of this extremist rhetoric. The democratic debate demanded is increasingly reduced to internal group discussions by participants of the same ideological coloration.²⁹

It is important to note that until the final selection by and entrance into the "hard core" terrorist group, the concentric rings through which the terrorist-to-be passes are

all legal. There is a progressive extremity of attitude, but there has not yet been a crossing into the path of illegality. Alienated, on the margins of society, the would-be terrorist who would truly belong must find this rite of passage frustrating. With each step further toward the center, toward full belonging, the recruit needs to demonstrate fidelity toward the ideals of the group, a process that entails buying into the ethos and the extremist ideology. To express doubts is to ensure lack of acceptance. And each step inward brings emotional rewards: at first, new contacts, then affiliation with groups; after years of failure, the "high" of the experience of the direct effect of action; and the liberation of having at last a sanctioned channel for acting out previously blocked aggressive impulses.³⁰

Particularly for the underground terrorist group, isolated from society, group cohesion develops in response to shared danger.³¹ Group solidarity, in the words of a member of RAF, was "compelled exclusively by the illegal situation, fashioned into a common destiny."³² "The group was born under the pressure of pursuit," according to the testimony of another RAF member, a pressure considered to be "the sole link holding the group together."^{33,34}

The dynamics of the terrorist group then have all the ingredients of a classic—indeed an exaggerated—version of the "fight-flight" group as described by Wilfred Bion.³⁵ In extensive observations of group behavior in both clinical and organizational settings, Bion has observed that every group shows two opposing psychological tendencies, what he calls the "work group" and the "basic assumption group." The "work group" is that aspect of the group which tends to its job, acting in a goal-directed way to carry out its stated task. But, however healthy the group members, groups do not behave consistently in a goal-directed fashion. Rather, they regularly behave as if they are operating under particular psychological assumptions, what Bion calls "the basic assumption group."

Bion described three basic assumption states which characterize group life—the dependency group, the pairing group, and the fight-flight group. In the dependency group, members turn toward an omnipotent leader for security and blindly seek and follow directions. The pairing group is dominated by the assumption that a new world is around the corner. While terrorist groups often fall into these states, it is the fight-flight basic assumption that especially dominates terrorist group life. The fight-flight group acts in opposition to the outside world, a world that both threatens its existence and justifies its existence: "The only way for the fight-flight group to preserve itself is by

fighting against or fleeing from the enemy. The features I have enumerated earlier all tend to promote a fight-flight psychological assumption. But it is more than a psychological assumption. Like the poster above my desk, the terrorist might well say, "Just because I'm paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get me."

For the terrorist, there is indeed a fusion between the work task and the basic-assumption psychological state. The task is to destroy the enemy, and the outside society is indeed out to destroy the terrorist (although the terrorist group regularly ignores its own role in precipitating the hostile societal response). For the action-oriented individual, enraged at a frustrating world which he blames for his own failures, for the paranoid individual seeking a "legitimate" channel for his aggression, the terrorist group provides an ideal venue. Because terrorists bring their personalities with them when they enter the group, the same personality distortions that led to their conflict and isolation in society will express themselves in the group. But in the pressure cooker of the group on the run, surrounded by the enemy, these tensions are externalized. Such groups require enemies in order to cope with themselves. If such enemies do not exist, they create them (Niehardt),³⁶ for if they cannot act against an outside enemy they will tear themselves apart.

Political observers are often puzzled by the timing of terrorist events. What was it, at this particular time, they ask, that led the terrorist group to act? Why, after such a long period of inactivity, have the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades again taken action? The answer is not in external political circumstances. In our judgment, the predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. If the terrorist group does not commit terrorist actions, it has lost its meaning. On the basis of his experiences as a member of the Polish resistance during World War II, Zawodny has observed the pressure toward action in the underground group.³⁷ Even if the prudent course was to lay low for security reasons, after a time the tensions in this action-oriented group became unbearable. Contest for leadership often developed in such circumstances, between the group leader counseling inaction and the spokesman for the sentiment toward action. The steep decline of action by the group led to mounting dissatisfaction within the group.³⁸ In such circumstances, the sentient leader, wishing to hold the group together and preserve his own leadership, will direct the group to attack the enemy before they attack him. "Thus the underground group needs to act to reaffirm its

purpose and to reduce internal tensions. A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence and to maintain internal cohesion.

These observations concerning the group psychology of terrorism suggest that the nature of the interaction between the terrorist group and society should be examined. If these hypotheses are correct, the reactive response by society justifies and reaffirms the terrorist group's views and may in turn promote increased terrorist activity. Considering the group's need for significance, each time the media react disproportionately to a terrorist event, the action is rewarded. In a democratic society, terrorism cannot be eliminated without eliminating democracy. Clearly, terrorism cannot and should not be ignored. Multifaceted, proactive societal responses that are informed by an understanding of the social psychology of terrorism have an optimal chance of reducing the attractiveness of the path of terrorism.

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The Psychological Impact of Communication on the Hostage and Family: A Hostage Experience in Colombia

by Nancy Asencio

I. Introduction

On February 27, 1980, Independence Day for the Dominican Republic, 11 men and 6 women, members of the guerrilla group known as the M-19, stormed the Dominican Embassy in Bogota, Colombia. During the takeover, a couple of hours of gun battle, one of the terrorists was killed. Several terrorists were injured, as were personal guards of ambassadors and some of the guests at the reception. The guerrillas barricaded and held the site for 61 days.

Representatives from more than a dozen countries were taken hostage, as well as many of their spouses, other guests, and even the caterers. The spouses were released after 30 hours and most of the nondiplomatic persons were released within the first 2 weeks, leaving 15 ambassadors from all over the world as the primary hostages. Among the hostages was my husband, Diego Cortes Asencio, who was then the American Ambassador to Colombia. Although I did not attend the party and was never in danger, during Diego's captivity we both underwent the most stressful period of our lives.

The taking of the Dominican Embassy was a shock to my husband and me, even though there were many antecedents of such terrorist actions in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Mexico. At the time of the Dominican crisis the United States was also enduring the humiliation of Tehran, and there had been the then-recent (1979) murders of the American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, and the British Ambassador in The Hague. Nevertheless, we never imagine that such a thing will actually happen until we experience it personally. Even now, we function in Brazil with perfect tranquility, although we know that there is always the possibility of a terrorist action anywhere in the world. (It was in Brazil that the American Ambassador, Burke Elbrick, was kidnaped less than 20 years ago.)

Unlike most hostages, the captives at the Dominican Embassy were able to communicate by telephone with their embassies and their families. Although our conversations were brief and monitored, obliging us to talk about the most ordinary subjects, being able to communicate at all provided extraordinary stimulus. Without it, we might not have fared so well.

The terrorists also made political use of the telephone. During the first days of the siege the terrorist leader, Commander One, gave lengthy telephone interviews to the media. As it turned out, the telephone became a channel of communication for negotiating purposes, for finding

out what was going on, for determining how people were feeling, and for verifying what the Colombian Government's positions were.

II. Hostage and Family Behavior

A. Initial Psychological Reactions at the Time of the Embassy Takeover

When the terrorists shot their way into the Dominican Embassy, my husband's first reaction was to take cover—a survival reflex. Then, he tells me, he prayed, making the most perfect act of contrition of his life. During the shooting, when the terrorists used him as a shield at one of the windows, he felt he was already dead. This thought diminished his fear and he said a silent "goodbye" to his loved ones. Perhaps a feeling of helplessness engendered his stoicism.

Later that day when calls began to be received at the Dominican Embassy from various parts of the world, my husband talked to Leonard Greenwood of the *Los Angeles Times*. When Mr. Greenwood asked him if he had panicked during the shooting, Diego answered that he was about to panic soon if he didn't get some pipe tobacco, since his supply was running low. During his captivity, Diego's pipe smoking became an indispensable comfort to him. Interestingly, a year after his release Diego gave up smoking altogether and has never smoked since.

When Frank Cigler, the deputy chief of mission, telephoned me with the news of the "possibility of some problem" at the Dominican Embassy, I was leaning against a wall in our study. I slid down to the floor, sitting with my knees drawn up, feeling guilty for not having gone to the reception with my husband. The news was sketchy: There was no certainty that Diego was still at the party, so my next reaction was to hope that he had already left. Then there was a broadcast over a Colombian radio station that the American Ambassador was hurt and on his way to the military hospital. In a way, I felt relief. Better to have Diego out of the hands of terrorists; even thinking him hurt was easier to accept than uncertainty. But as I readied to go to him at the hospital, an embassy security guard announced over our radio communications system that terrorists had taken the Dominican Embassy and "Our man is inside."

Fear, frustration, and a feeling of impotence overtook me, compounded by dread that our five children, living in various parts of the United States, would be misinformed through the media. Fortunately, through the help of friends, I was able to inform all the children before they

heard the news broadcasts. My fears were justified, as reports of Diego's having been shot were quickly broadcast over the U.S. radio stations. Friends of ours in Mexico even heard that he had been killed.

During the first night of 61 nights of captivity, my husband says, he felt isolated from his family, his colleagues, and his Government. Although in the midst of a group of more than 60 fellow hostages, he felt completely alone in the world. His surroundings were very depressing. The wounded were unattended, the house strewn with broken glass. The dead guerrilla lying in the living room was a constant reminder of his own mortality. He was cold and hungry; there was nothing to eat.

Dr. Robert Hillman, in his paper for *The American Journal of Psychiatry* of September 1981, "The Psychopathology of Being Held Hostage,"¹ discusses the behavior of 14 hostages during a riot at a penitentiary in New Mexico. He writes that most of the hostages were certain that they would be killed; they pictured themselves dead after the riot was over.

During the takeover, the hostages at the Dominican Embassy had a similar psychological experience—what Dr. Hillman describes as helplessness, existential fear, and sensory input overload. The 2 hours of gun battle at the Dominican Embassy, accompanied by the screams of the injured, the shattering of glass, the death of the young guerrilla, was certainly sensory input overload. Existential fear was reinforced by the daily threats and by the guns and grenades the terrorists carried, guns pointed at hostages. My husband's initial feeling of helplessness was followed—and reinforced—by his feeling that he was as good as dead.

B. Reactions the Day After the Takeover

The next day, when Diego telephoned me for the first time, he was still depressed and pessimistic. Nevertheless, he spoke of the possibility of a quick solution, probably by the next day. For whatever comfort it gave us at the time, we both pretended that this would happen. The greatest comfort for me that day, and the many days that followed, was hearing his voice, knowing that he was alive, although I was still wondering whether he was hurt.

On that same day I heard from a woman who had been at the reception and had escaped through the kitchen door during the gun battle. She had taken several people with her, including the Peruvian Ambassador, but somehow she had left her own husband behind. I wondered at her behavior and thought about personal survival. In her

situation would I have been able to escape without Diego? I think not. My son-in-law, Donald Cooke, was a hostage in Tehran. There was a moment when he had an opportunity to attempt an escape with a group, but he chose to stay because he was one of the very few Americans at the Embassy who spoke Farsi, and he felt those being left behind might need his help. His altruistic behavior cost him 444 days of incarceration. One cannot predict how human beings will behave in a given situation.

C. Stress Reduction Through Activity and Communication

1. For the Hostages

The terrorists allowed the hostages to choose five members to represent them. Diego was among those chosen. The five lost no time in introducing themselves into the negotiations for their release, talking both to the guerrillas and, by telephone, to the Colombian Government and their own embassies. Diego's depression and feeling of helplessness diminished considerably with his involvement in these negotiations; he was able to keep mentally and physically active.

The use of the telephone did wonders for the morale of all hostages. Other forms of communication also were effective in raising spirits and reducing stress: Gifts were sent to the hostages by family and friends through the Red Cross—games, food, and wines. My husband was cheered by receiving a large supply of pipe tobacco and crossword puzzles. All of the hostages appreciated seeing a copy I sent of an editorial by Daniel Samper, a journalist respected by the Colombian Left, in which he strongly criticized the M-19 for their actions at the Dominican Embassy.

Two of Diego's most cherished gifts were works of art sent by two Colombian painters. One gift was Easter eggs with a personal message on each one, which David Manzur, my close friend and teacher, decorated for the basket that I sent. The other was an outstanding collage of a condor that Alejandro Obregon made especially for Diego. Most of the terrorists were professional, middle-class citizens, who knew and respected such people as Samper, Manzur, and Obregon and were impressed to find that they were Diego's friends.

Gifts were tokens of love. One curious present was a toilet seat. The bathroom assigned to Diego's group was missing a seat, a special type that was very difficult to find. When at last it was delivered through the Red Cross, Diego's secretary decorated it with Snoopy decals inscribed with

with the message: "Love is where you find it; I'll be here all day."

Laughter is by far the most important way of releasing tension. Diego's fellow hostages will never forget his parrot jokes. I tried to have something pleasant to say during those 3 precious minutes of communication that occurred almost daily; I went around collecting jokes that I might tell him. When Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, called to offer help, I asked him to send a book of jokes for Diego, which he promptly did.

Ability to speak Spanish was important in reinforcing cordiality between hostages and captors. The fact that the five representatives knew the language allowed them to talk to the terrorists; some, like Diego, even understood the culture. This permitted them to communicate on various levels and ultimately lead the negotiations with the Colombian Government. Communication was not limited to the negotiations; the ambassadors had regular discussions with the terrorists, and even organized a lecture series, much like discussion groups at universities. Led by Mexican Ambassador Ricardo Galan, most of the hostages engaged in physical exercise such as running in place and doing calisthenics. One day while I was talking to Diego on the telephone I heard screaming in the background and was alarmed. It turned out that some of the hostages were playing soccer in the living room near the phone. Those hostages who were inactive physically and mentally did not hold up as well.

2. For the Families

Early in the crisis I had a telephone call from the wife of one of my husband's colleagues in Washington, asking if I wouldn't consider going to the States. She was calling from the Department of State Operations Center in Washington. My first reaction was to suspect that the Department of State had asked her to telephone; that they were worried about me and wondered how I was coping. This suspicion, for some reason, annoyed me immensely, and I politely declined.

Being there in Colombia was the best course for me. The telephone conversations with Diego were the most positive form of communication. Wives of other hostages felt the same way about being able to talk with their husbands. I was also most fortunate in having the assistance of many persons at the American Embassy and of Colombian friends. This support system was probably a primary reason for my being able to hold up so well under the ordeal. Most of the spouses of other hostages were not as fortunate.

Realizing that I needed help, and accepting it, was probably my wisest decision. For example, the wife of the deputy chief of mission, Bettie Crigler, suggested that the residence telephone calls be screened. My social secretary did this during the day; from late afternoon until two in the morning a friend, usually from the American Embassy, took over the task.

Although none of my children were in Colombia at the time, my Colombian daughter-in-law, Norma, who was then engaged to my son Charlie, stayed with me for the duration of the crisis. My elderly mother was living with me at the time of the takeover and, not knowing what the outcome would be, I sent her to my sister in the States in order to reduce my own stress.

My children all wanted to travel to Colombia, but I strongly discouraged them. It was painful to keep them away at a time when I would have liked to have had all their love and attention, but one of my emotional reactions was to keep them *safely* in the States. Emotionally I was convinced that they would be in danger if they came to Colombia, and my husband and I agreed that they should stay in the States.

However, my daughter Anne was not convinced that I was holding up as well as I claimed, and her brothers and sister agreed that she should come in the name of all. She also had an understanding boss who was happy to give her some time off. Eventually, she managed to persuade me to let her visit for 2 weeks. It was wonderful having her near, and Diego also was happy to be able to talk to her on the telephone. She came at Easter time, about midway through Diego's captivity.

Manny, then at the University of Maryland, was so distressed that he quit school for the semester and spent most of the 2 months at the home of friends. Charlie, at Notre Dame law school, had a good support system, many friends. Unwilling to stay alone at his apartment, he accepted the offer of friends and moved in with them. Maria Dolores, in Florida at a new job, was living with some of my relatives, where she found support. Frank, our youngest son and a cadet at West Point, tells me that although he was very concerned about his father's situation, he "knew that Dad could handle himself," and apparently he felt the same way about me. As to handling his own emotions, he thinks his Army training strengthened his ability to cope. We have a family joke: Whenever he has a problem, we ask, "Frank, what would you do in a battle situation?" Frank and all the rest did indeed do very well.

If laughter is the most important tension releaser, then prayer is a most important reinforcer for hope, peace, and mental well-being. Of great comfort to me during Diego's ordeal were the daily visits of our priest from the English-speaking chaplaincy. He came to say Mass twice a week; I received callers only on those days. The service took almost an hour, and afterwards there would be refreshments, allowing enough time for people to express their concern, without tiring me. Some of the spouses of other hostages were plagued by people who, wishing to be helpful, thoroughly exhausted them.

Another advantage I had over some of the other spouses was that I was kept informed daily of the progress of negotiations. It is indeed important for crisis managers to have consideration for the intelligence of the victim's spouse or next of kin and to keep that person well informed. While Diego was negotiating on the inside, I was lobbying on the outside, especially with contacts in the States. These efforts bore fruit, as Secretary of State Vance sent a special emissary, Viron P. Vaky, who was influential in bringing about the final happy outcome.

There were moments of frustration that were almost unbearable. I am a person of action, and I felt such impotence; Diego was in a house across town and I couldn't get to him. I had continued with my Swedish exercise group thrice weekly but, when this activity did not provide enough physical release, I would put on roller skates and vent my fury as I skated faster and faster on the driveway and round the flagpole.

The sustained stress of not knowing how the hostage is (from phone call to phone call in my case) causes great frustration. Since the waiting loved one cannot "get at" the perpetrators, the anger is sometimes projected at the very people who are trying to help. Perhaps this explained why families of hostages directed anger at negotiators, crisis managers, the State Department, and so forth.

D. Dealing With the Media

It was my personal decision not to talk to the media while Diego was a hostage. I also asked my children and relatives to abstain from giving interviews and, with great difficulty, they all managed to avoid the press. Whenever my children found themselves unavoidably faced by a member of the media, they politely explained that they were saving their comments until their father was released. That they showed such maturity and restraints did not surprise me, as "Foreign Service brats" learn early how to handle publicity. What did surprise me was the fact that

the rest of my family also honored Diego's and my wish that they shun interviews—and I have a very extensive family.

I found the televised scenes of the families of hostages in Tehran obscene. Under no circumstances could I expose my naked emotions to the world. Penne Laingen, wife of the deputy chief of mission who was held in Iran, in an article published by the Association of American Foreign Service Women, wrote: "Perhaps the most difficult and stressful aspect of the crisis for many of the wives was coping with the media."² She added: "It was essential that the wives kept themselves from being victimized by the media. I laid down a few ground rules for myself; I would not do a live television program, only tapes, in order to avoid being put in an untenable position." I went a step further than Penne, refusing even to be interviewed by close journalist friends. It is interesting to note that Penne, to my knowledge, was the only wife of the Tehran hostages who was able to communicate by telephone with her husband on several occasions. This reinforcement may have lessened her need to speak to the media.

On the positive side, since most of the families of hostages from Iran had no way of communicating with the victims, some may have been comforted by following the news and knowing that all the people in the United States were sympathetic to their sorrow. The times when the Tehran videotapes were aired must have been very painful, but the visual evidence at least reassured those who could identify their relatives that they were still alive.

I agree with Dr. Yonah Alexander, Director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York, that terrorism is theater, and that terrorists deliberately try to manipulate the media for their own purposes.³ During the 2-month hostage situation at the Dominican Embassy, Commander One, the leader of the terrorist group, gave several long interviews to the press over the telephone. I would add that the media plays right into the hands of the terrorists. A few days after the taking of the Embassy, a tent city called "Villa Chiva" (Scoopsville) had sprung up as close to the embassy building as the troops surrounding the place would permit.

Some of the reporters from "Villa Chiva" came out with the first book on the taking of the Dominican Embassy, *Soy el Comandante 1, M-19*,⁴ edited by Jose Fajardo and Miguelangel Roldan, and dedicated to "the fellow journalists at 'Villa Chiva.'" It was issued in April 1980, before the release of the hostages! On the cover was a photo of Pabon Pabon (Commander One), eyes shining,

discernible smile under the handkerchief covering his nose and mouth. The cover has the following captions: "Best-seller in Latin America"; "The M-19 Speaks!"

My attention was recently drawn to a book review by Gay Talese, in the *New York Times* Book Review section of December 9.⁵ He reviews *The Sicilian*, Mario Puzo's latest book on the Italian Mafia. The reviewer perceives the author as portraying Salvatore Giuliano, "il bandito gentiluomo" (the gentle bandit), as a kind of Robin Hood. Social situations can turn a criminal into a romantic figure. Mr. Talese writes that Mr. Puzo has succeeded in "symbolizing a desperate society through the deeds of a desperado, and in revealing how thin is the line that often separates a freedom-fighter from a terrorist." Perhaps some Colombians viewed Commander One as a freedom fighter.

The Colombian Government did not permit the televising of the events at the Dominican Embassy in the country (the reason was that the terrorists had access to television sets). It was an attempt at a news blackout. Newspapers were also banned from the Dominican Embassy. (The couple of editorials that I sent Diego, I happened to "smuggle" within the pages of the crossword puzzles.) Personally, I was relieved not to be subjected to a daily bombardment of adverse television stimuli. It was bad enough seeing the photographs in the newspapers every day.

Paul Wilkinson writes in his book, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, "Liberal democratic governments have to carry their publics with them in broad support of their responses to terrorism. Moreover, due to the efforts of free and energetic media, the public generally develops very strong emotions and opinions about the terrorism in the headlines."⁶ While I am in favor of a free press, I feel that the press has to do some self-censoring. During recent years some of our American television networks have attempted to address this problem. Sensationalism at the expense of human suffering is unforgivable.

III. The Effect of U.S. Hostage Policy

The terrorists allowed and encouraged the use of the telephone. They hoped that the captives would influence their respective governments to exert pressure upon the Colombian Government to accede to the terrorists' demands, which were payment of a ransom of \$50 million and the release of more than 300 political prisoners.

U.S. hostage policy was no ransom, no prisoners, no dialog. To quote Robert M. Sayre, former Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism of the Department

of State: "What is the U.S. policy on combating terrorism? First we resist blackmail and pursue terrorists with the full force of the law, as do other countries. We do not pay ransom for any of our employees who may be taken hostage, and we encourage businesses to follow a similar policy. We do not bargain for the release of hostages, for we think that making concessions to terrorist blackmail only makes the problem worse for others who might be taken in the future."⁷

My husband always supported the U.S. policy of no ransom, no exchange of prisoners, even while he himself was in captivity. However, he is a firm believer in dialog, with force to be used only when it becomes inevitable. His firm stand resulted in arguments with some of his colleagues inside the Dominican Embassy.

Diego believes that our basic hostage negotiating policy needs to be rethought. He likes to refer to Frank Bolz, who set up one of the first hostage squads in the United States for the New York City Police Department and wrote the book *Hostage Cop*.⁸ With the help of psychologists and other professionals, Bolz outlined some ground rules and guidelines on dealing with hostage situations. One of the tenets, the Stockholm syndrome, assumes that the hostages, who are under duress, may feel sympathetic to their captors and may even help them; therefore, the hostages' judgment should not be trusted. They should be told to be still and wait to be rescued.

Back in Washington, Diego's messages were viewed with skepticism, and some colleagues there were sure that he was suffering from the Stockholm syndrome. His deputy in Bogota was caught between following his ambassador's instructions and fearing to disobey the conflicting orders from Washington. These problems accentuated Diego's frustration. He was being much more effective than his colleagues on the outside, and yet he was not being taken seriously; his actions were not being acknowledged.

Dr. Hillman, in his study of the 14 hostages at the New Mexico penitentiary, found that not one of them had suffered from the Stockholm syndrome. However, among the conclusions in his paper, he says:

It is obvious that there is no way a hostage 'should' act. The hostage, in fact, has no choice. 'Totally helpless' accurately describes his position. The hostage, who is severely traumatized, may respond in a pseudorational manner to dangerous instructions. Negotiators, as well as those who later analyze the hostages' responses, should keep this in mind.

Diego was completely rational and, as was later proved, not completely helpless; he was able to use his mind. But

apparently State Department crisis managers must have drawn conclusions similar to Dr. Hillman's.

IV. Aftereffects on the Hostage and Family

My feelings of guilt for not having been with Diego at the Dominican Embassy have lasted for years. I became so concerned with his safety that after his release, when he had to travel frequently, I found it very difficult to be separated from him. Each time he left on a trip I went through a traumatic experience.

In some situations the families of victims suffer more, psychologically, than does the victim. The hostage knows how he is; the loved one lives with uncertainty until the moment of being reunited. And, even later, the aftereffects can be more acute in a family member. Although the Tehran hostage crisis was completely different from the Colombian, when we met with a large group of former Iran hostages and their families in April 1981, I was surprised at the similarities in some of my reactions and those of some members of their families.

Diego and I participated with the State Department's medical team in a group therapy program for the former hostages from Iran, their families, and others significantly involved, called a "90-day reunion." It was held at the Greenbriar Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. The ex-hostages and their families had the option of just enjoying a few days of rest or participating in the scheduled workshops and meetings. A considerable number participated. Although I considered Diego and myself to be more of a "control group" being analyzed along with the other "subjects," I felt that my cooperation might help me, and perhaps others as well.

It was at Greenbriar that I had my first outburst of anger with my husband. It was a year after his release. Unfortunately, I don't think he ever understood what the uproar was all about. For the next 3 years I had therapy, and I have finally come to understand some of my problems: During the separation imposed by the hostage situation husbands and wives tend to idealize each other. When we were reunited we found that we were the same human beings as before, with the same faults and frailties.

The *Washington Post*, in an article titled "Aftermath" (September 1981)⁹, discusses the lingering effects for the hostages from Tehran and their families. It cites attempted suicides, divorces, insomnia, and other psychopathologies.

An article published in the *New York Times* November 4, 1984, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the taking of the American Embassy in Tehran, states that most of the

hostages have "picked up the threads of their lives" and are in relatively good form, but a few are still suffering from the effects of their captivity. Moorehead Kennedy, one of the hostages interviewed, said: "My wife and I were talking this over the other night. It took a long time to get over the hostage experience. It's been just now, during the last 6 months that we really feel back on the track."¹⁰

According to Dr. Hillman, "the intensity of the hostage experience, and not its duration, determines the later development of a traumatic neurosis." My son-in-law, Donald Cooke (Diego and I met Don at Greenbriar and introduced him to our daughter Anne a month later; by September they had married), has never shown any negative aftereffects from his experience in Tehran. He feels that, if anything, there were positive changes, such as greater empathy for other people. Diego insists that he came out of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in better shape than he went in. He exercised, ate only one meal a day, and lost 20 pounds. His hearing became more acute and his eyesight improved. He has shown no negative personality changes; in fact, one could say that he is now mellow and more sensitive.

These two hostages, Diego and Don, had completely different experiences:

- Diego was held 61 days; Don 444.
- Diego's group was in a barricade situation; Don's was not.
- Diego was in a friendly nation; Don was in a hostile one.
- Diego was never moved from his place of captivity; Don was moved often.
- Diego stayed throughout with the same hostage colleagues; Don had 12 different roommates.
- Diego was encouraged to organize and work with his fellow hostages; Don was not.
- Diego had use of the telephone almost daily; Don never had.
- Diego was the only American in his group; Don's fellow hostages were all Americans.
- Diego had 23 years of experience as a diplomat; Don was at his first post.

I have tried to find similarities in Don's and Diego's situations, to try to explain the fact that both men came out of their crises so well:

- Diego spoke Spanish fluently; Don spoke Farsi fluently.
- Diego talked with his captors; Don talked with his guards.

- Diego conversed with other hostages; Don conversed with his fellow hostages.
- Diego was allowed packages through the Red Cross; Don was allowed mail.

Don considers himself to be among the one-fourth of the Tehran hostages who reacted well during and after the crisis. He tells me that he felt that he was well informed and had a general perception of the situation, and therefore he was not as worried about the outcome. He experienced a personality clash with only a couple of his dozen roommates. Except in the initial period, his captors allowed him and his roommate to talk to one another.

Even during the time they were not allowed to talk, they managed nonverbal communication. After they were allowed to speak they shared one another's mail. Don said that the best thing in the world was everyone receiving mail; the second best was no one receiving mail; worst of all was only one person receiving mail. Sometimes the guards kept mail from them as a form of torture.

I asked both Diego and Don how they felt about the recent hijacking of the Kuwait Airlines airplane, taken to Tehran. Both felt great empathy, although their concern was not as great as it would have been if they had known the American hostages aboard personally. Don's main concern was for a Foreign Service friend based in Kuwait who, he felt, might be very disturbed by the incident. When I asked Don if he had any ideas how the terrorists would react, he said that he knew Persians well (his captors in Tehran) but not Arabs (the terrorists holding the hostages in the Kuwait Airlines plane). When I asked Don if he would mind serving in that part of the world again, he said no.

V. Recommendations

1. Special attention should be paid to any communications from hostages. They should not be disregarded; the possibility of the Stockholm syndrome should not be regarded as a certainty.
2. A mature, capable hostage should not be discouraged from active participation in the negotiations. In fact, persons who are in a high-risk position for kidnapping should be trained on how to best deal with their captors. (The ambassadors at the Dominican Embassy, using their negotiating capabilities, were able to help bring about their own release.)
3. Dialog is the most effective way of solving a hostage situation. Force should be used only as a last resort.
4. A hostage should try to stay physically and mentally active; those who do are less likely to suffer from

psychological problems during and after captivity.

5. Whenever possible, messages should be sent to the hostages. Any form of communication should be attempted.
6. Families of hostages should be kept informed of the course of negotiations.
7. Families should be advised to deal with the media carefully, if at all.
8. After release, therapy for the hostage and the family is advisable in most cases.
9. Further studies should be made of ex-hostages and their families, in order to alert and better orient high-risk personnel, whether in Government or in the private sector.

Notes

¹Robert D. Hillman, "The Psychopathology of Being Held Hostage," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 138, 9, 1981.

²Penne Laingen, *Promises to Keep: The Hostage Wives*, 1983.

³Yonah Alexander, *World Affairs*, 146, No. 1, 1983.

⁴Jose Fajardo, and Miguelangel Roldan, *Soy el Comandante 1, M-19*, (Bogota: Editorial Oveja Negra, April 1980).

⁵Gay Talese, "In the Land of the Godfather," book review, *New York Times*, December 9, 1984, pp. 1, 44.

⁶Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (New York: New York University Press, 1979).

⁷Robert Sayre, *World Affairs*, 146, No. 1, 1983.

⁸Frank Bolz, and Edward Hershey, *Hostage Cop* (New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc., 1979).

⁹Kathy Sawyer, "Aftermath, Ex-hostages Run into Problems," *Washington Post*, September 8, 1981, p. A 11.

¹⁰Frank J. Prial, "5 Years After Embassy's Fall, Former Hostages Reflect on 444 Days in Iran," *New York Times*, November 4, 1984, p. 33.

Nancy Asencio

Nancy Asencio holds a degree in psychology from George Washington University. She remained in Colombia while her husband was held hostage and played a key role in the negotiations for the release of the hostages. She and her husband coauthored *Our Man Is Inside*, an account of their experiences during this trying time. Mrs. Asencio has more than 28 years of diplomatic experience throughout the world and is currently working on a novel about the Foreign Service.

The London Perspective on International Terrorism

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Threat

Before embarking on this topic, I should perhaps introduce myself. I am the head of the Criminal Investigation Department of the London Metropolitan Police, and as such have under my command all the detective departments and offices in London. In the terrorist field, I control both the Special Branch, which gathers and collates intelligence, and the Antiterrorist Branch, which investigates terrorist offences after they occur and prosecutes those responsible. With the exception of a national responsibility within Special Branch for Irish Republican matters, I and my officers are responsible only for terrorist offences within the London area. I hope that this makes my position clear, since I do not set myself up to be an expert on international terrorism. The subject is monitored to assess the likelihood of events around the world having repercussions in London. Trends, therefore, are important to me, insofar as they might affect my officers and the population for which I am responsible.

The most obvious factor is the growth of terrorism. The number of countries affected has increased from 48 in 1970 to 87 in 1982. Related to this number is its breadth; at a fairly recent count, no less than 125 groups claimed attacks affecting 75 different nationalities. The trend of terrorism, then, has been up over the past decade and, although it may have reached a plateau, it shows no sign of abating.

Furthermore, it has become more lethal. Not only are terrorists less reluctant to kill, they are also less discriminating. In 1970, attacks on property just about equaled attacks on people. Now, attacks on people account for 75 percent of all incidents, with diplomats appearing to be about twice as vulnerable as other persons. The worst year ever in terms of deaths and injuries was 1983, with 720 fatalities and 963 injuries. Even though one-third of the 1983 total resulted from the bombing of the U.S. Marines in Beirut, the figures are still higher than those for 1982, when there were 221 fatalities overall.

Another feature that has caused concern is the disproportionate number of terrorist acts occurring in Western Europe, many of which have nothing to do with the countries where the attacks take place. Many European countries do, of course, have their home-grown problems. I have already mentioned the Irish Republican

movement, but one should not forget the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Corsican separatist movement in France, the Red Brigades or the Terzia Posizione in Italy, or the Basque separatist movement (ETA) in Spain. Each of these movements has been responsible for many incidents, including bombings, kidnapping, and murder, and is likely to have links with other similarly minded groups, for practical or political reasons. Nevertheless, they are not "international" since they almost exclusively carry out their violence within their own country, and against their own internal targets. The Irish Republicans might, I suppose, be considered international since they are operating abroad. However, with few exceptions (and even then the targets have been British) they have confined their violence to the United Kingdom.

Fugitives from all these "domestic" movements do arrive in neighbouring countries. Italian Red Brigades and German Baader-Meinhof people have been found in England, Irish terrorists have been found in France, Spain, and Holland, and so on. However, they have not been active outside their own borders and so, in general terms, the activities of these groups are not of great interest outside their own countries. True international terrorists, on the other hand, present a totally different problem and it is to these groups that I, although responsible only for the policing of London, have to pay attention.

Despite the decline of the United Kingdom as a world power, London is still an important political and business centre and as such contains a large number of tempting targets. Additionally, the United Kingdom, like its neighbour, France, has a tradition of welcoming political fugitives. This policy—as relatively recent events have shown—increases the terrorist problem in the United Kingdom, since these émigrés are sometimes the subject of attack from the country of their birth. Before looking forward, it may be interesting to consider what trends are apparent from terrorist events in the United Kingdom over the past 7 years. A list of such incidents is given in Table 1. Irish terrorism is excluded since, as already stated, it is domestic in nature and does not have sufficient international implications to warrant its discussion in this forum. The attacker is named only where evidence has become available, although clearly, in cases where dissidents have been attacked, the state is highly likely to have been responsible.

Table 1

Terrorist Events in the United Kingdom, 1977-1984

Year	Target/Victim	Attacker	Incident	Deaths	Injuries
1977	North Yemen	?	Assassination	3	—
1977	Syria	Syria	Bomb (Own Goal)	2	—
1977	India	Indian Dissident	Stabbing	—	1
1977	Spain	?	Bomb	—	—
1978	Turkey	Armenians	Bomb	—	—
1978	Palestine Liberation Organisation	?	Assassination	1	—
1978	Iraqi Dissident	?	Assault (Serious)	—	2
1978	Iraqi Dissident	?	Assassination	1	—
1978	Iraq	?	Bomb	—	—
1978	Israel	P.F.L.P.	Grenade/Gun Attack	1	9
1978	Bulgarian Dissident	?	Assassination	1	—
1979	Turkey	Armenians	Bomb	—	—
1979	Bahrain	15 May Group	Bomb	—	—
1980	Libyan Dissident	?	Fire Bomb (X2)	—	—
1980	Libyan Dissident	?	Assault	—	—
1980	Libyan Dissident	?	Assassination (X2)	2	—
1980	Iran	Iran Separatists	Assault on Embassy	6	—
1980	Kuwait	?	Bomb	—	—
1980	Iran	Iran	Bomb (Own Goal)	1	1
1980	Turkey	Armenians	Bomb	—	—
1980	Switzerland	Armenians	Bomb	—	—
1980	Libyan Dissident	?	Poisoning	—	2
1980	Libyan Dissident	?	Assassination	1	—
1980	France	Armenian	Bomb	—	—
1980	Libya	?	Firebomb	—	—
1981	Iraq	Iraq	Bomb (Own Goal)	—	—
1981	Iran	Iran	Bomb (Own Goal)	2	1
1982	Israel	Abu Nidal	Attempted Assassination	—	1
1982	Saudi Arabia	Al-Jihad	Bomb	—	—
1982	Turkey	Armenia	Conspiracy to Murder	—	—
1982	Tanzanian	Tanzanians	Hijack	—	—
1983	Turkey	Armenia	Bomb	—	—
1983	?	?	Bomb	—	—
1984	Libyan Dissident	?	Bombs (X7)	—	26
1984	Libyan Dissident	?	Bomb	—	26
1984	Libyan Dissident	State	Shooting	1 police officer	10
1984	?	?	Bomb (Heathrow Airport)	—	28
1984	Libyan Dissident	?	Assassination	1	—
1984	India	Separatists	Kidnap/Murder	1	—

Trends are clearly identifiable in this list and, while I have not researched international figures, I suspect that the pattern in many other countries that have suffered from international terrorism would be similar. One can identify, for example, the countries that are not generally at risk from the international terrorists. Conversely, one can identify the high-risk countries and persons. Turkey and Libyan dissidents stand out. The former has been consistently at risk throughout the period, and the latter have been at dramatically increasing risk since 1980. We see the countries and peoples that are the international aggressors—Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, the Armenians, and the Palestinians.

It may not appear to be very clever to identify trends with hindsight. However, it is postulated that they were identifiable when they were happening, and trends do not, after all, simply stop. By definition, they continue from the past, through the present, to the future. Correctly identified, therefore, they can assist the police counterterrorism effort in all its varied fields and may assist in predicting future events.

Two aspects of terrorism must be considered. The first is the type of attack that can reasonably be expected. The second is the direction from which it might come and the likelihood that it will happen—in other words, the level of threat.

The first is mainly the province of experts in the field of personal and physical protection, and many studies have been made on terrorist methods of both bombings and assassinations. Knowledge of trends is drawn upon to indicate preferred methods of attack and manufacture of devices, with a view to taking defensive action against them. It is a specialised field that need not be discussed here. Generalities are all that could be covered, and in this respect the trend away from property toward people has already been mentioned.

The second topic is probably more important in overall police terms. An examination of the 47 incidents that have occurred in the United Kingdom since 1977 shows that 33 were of Middle Eastern origin, 7 were of Armenian origin, and the remaining 7 could, in terms of this analysis, be discounted as one-time incidents that were unlikely to be repeated.

The major threat in the past has therefore been from the Middle East groups, with a similarly serious threat from Armenians. While the number of Armenian attacks is lower and the number of likely attackers is smaller, the targets are more specific. Despite a split in the Armenian movement, we have not seen in the United Kingdom the internecine strife that has characterised the dispute within the Palestine Liberation Organisation and has resulted in the assassination of pro-Arafat personnel throughout the world.

In general terms I see this pattern of international terrorism continuing. I would not be so bold as to predict trends for the next decade since there are too many variables, but certain general points about the future can be made on the basis of current trends. I have already mentioned the threat from Middle East sources. I do not see that threat diminishing and I view the threat from internecine warfare as seriously as the threat to Israeli

interests. State-sponsored terrorism is very common among Middle East nations; we have seen an upsurge of that in the United Kingdom in particular and it must be considered as a future trend. To couple this with another aspect, I also fear an increase in terrorist "spectaculars." The media have become blasé about terrorism, and bigger incidents are now needed to guarantee satisfactory coverage to the terrorists. Statistics confirm this development: The proportion of incidents involving multiple fatalities is up from 33 percent in 1982 to 59 percent in 1983; in 1982 there were 4 incidents involving 10 or more fatalities (making a total of 11 since 1980), while in 1983 there were 14. My reason for coupling this trend with state terrorism is that state aid is often necessary to mount the large incidents (the suicide lorry attacks in Lebanon in 1983 are an example); local expertise, logistics, and intelligence often are insufficient. A rise in state terrorism could thus be a logical accompaniment to an increase in "spectaculars."

Key trends may therefore be summarised as a continuing threat from Middle East and Armenian sources, with a continuing move toward personal and property targets as opposed to property alone. Western Europe will still suffer a high percentage of the terrorist attacks, and diplomats will remain more vulnerable than ordinary persons. Terrorism is more lethal and indiscriminate and the favourite form of attack is the bomb. Terrorist "spectaculars" may become more frequent and we may see an increase in state-sponsored terrorism.

I have deliberately left one topic to the end of my discussion of threat, both in view of the organisation hosting this gathering and in view of the fact that the topic does—if it fits anywhere—come under the heading of significant changes in the level of threat. What, if any, is the threat from terrorists intent on using an improvised nuclear device, or worse?

I don't have the definitive answer, and I know that research has been done by others in a far better position to judge than I. However, as I see it, the threat is threefold. The first possibility is that one of the nations engaged in state terrorism will obtain a nuclear capability and make such weapons available to its terrorists. The second possibility is that a terrorist group will manufacture its own weapon (or *claim* that it has manufactured its own weapon) and either use it, or threaten to use it. Third, and possibly most likely, is that some form of attack on a nuclear power plant will initiate a core meltdown and its ensuing disaster.

I know that safeguards exist—groups, task forces, and doubtless technologies—that can, or should, prevent such things from happening. I merely mention this hazard as a tail piece to my discussion of threat because such terrorism could pose the most dramatic change in the level of terrorism that this world has ever experienced. In the United Kingdom we have given considerable thought to our response, particularly to the placing of improvised nuclear devices. Contingency planning and exercises have taken place, and the issue is joined with the subject of terrorist and other criminal threats to water and air supplies by adulteration, as several common factors apply.

Response

General Philosophy. The general philosophy of response to terrorists can be stated very simply. There must be no surrender to them.

In the early days of hijacking, the United Kingdom released Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine terrorist Leila Khaled, who arrived at Heathrow in charge of a hijacked El-Al jet. The technicality that she had never been formally admitted to the country was used, and she was therefore refused permission to land. Khaled went on to hijack again and we had learned our lesson. This was the first and only time that the British Government surrendered to terrorists, and its resolve to stand up to them now extends beyond the United Kingdom to its staff and properties abroad. The British Ambassador to Uruguay and the British Trade Commissioner in Quebec both were kidnapped; the Government refused to negotiate and both were released unharmed.

There is, I think, little doubt in anyone's mind that, while a known refusal to deal will not prevent international terrorism, it will almost certainly deter some attempts. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a ready acquiescence to terrorist demands makes a country extremely vulnerable to further attacks, as many countries discovered during the early 1970's. It must be admitted that this policy has not deterred the Irish Republicans, but they, and members of separatist movements like theirs, are a special case. Nevertheless, even in their case, there should be no surrender to terrorist demands. More recently, certain countries have seen the result of the appeasement of terrorism. In each case, the demands by the aggressor became more outrageous and, in the end, resistance was the only way. That is the position we find ourselves in now and a policy of noncapitulation is the only way, however hard the decisions may be for those in authority.

Allocation of Responsibilities for Protection and Counterterrorism. Most law enforcement agencies, in the countries in which I have experience, existed before the tremendous growth in terrorism during the past decade. To meet the threat, they expanded, often in a somewhat piecemeal way. The result is that in most countries a number of agencies are involved in the fight against terrorism. Invariably they have separate roles, but frequently there is an overlap that can result in a duplication of effort. However, with good cooperation this should at least mean that there are few, if any, gaps. The United Kingdom is no exception.

In the United Kingdom, three groups have a role, namely the police, the army, and the various government intelligence agencies. Superimposed on this operational structure are various government-sponsored committees which have a coordinating role. The basic task of law enforcement rests with the police, and they have the main task of countering terrorism since they are the only body with executive powers.

There is no national police force and reliance is placed on some 43 police forces, ranging in strength from a thousand officers to my own, which comprises 27,000 police officers and some 15,000 civil staff (unsworn officers). While they are locally recruited and controlled, they do have access to many national services and facilities, an arrangement which ensures a maintenance of standards and a common approach to many problems. Forces that face terrorist problems have created their own specialist units to deal with them—perhaps in gathering intelligence or investigating terrorism. They can, if necessary, call on the military for explosives expertise, and on other police forces for investigatory aid, if no “in-house” experience is available.

The various government intelligence agencies play an important part, particularly in international terrorism, since it is often only through them that intelligence about international developments is available. However, like the Army, the intelligence agencies have no executive role and must pass their information to the police for action.

Coordination among the three agencies is very good. Each is aware of the others' roles and the norm is a direct person-to-person contact between those with similar interests. Government-sponsored committees are attended by members of all interested agencies, thus assuring coordination at policy level and facilitating government participation.

Free advice on physical security is available to any organisation from the local police. Particular attention is, of course, paid to premises regarded as especially at risk, but security in terms of the actual provision of manpower is provided only at official premises. This does not include military establishments, which look after themselves, but does include certain government offices, the Houses of Parliament, diplomatic premises, and so on. This protection is supplied from the Diplomatic Protection Group and other uniformed officers of the police service.

Personal protection is provided by the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, which has national responsibilities in this area. They care for British VIP's (with the exception of the royal family, who have their own protection officers from the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Department) and all visiting VIP's for whom protection is considered necessary. I have already mentioned the coordination between the various antiterrorist agencies, and this is relevant to the use of police, in contrast to an independent body, for personal protection. In a nutshell, not only do officers on protection duty have unrestricted access to the not inconsiderable facilities afforded by the United Kingdom Police Service, but, more important, they have access to all the intelligence fed into the system by the various agencies which have to provide liaison with the police service as the executive arm in the fight against terrorism. They are, therefore, in a position to be continually and fully apprised of the current situation regarding their principal. Both they and the whole system of which they are a part are able to use that intelligence to better gauge the type and depth of protection needed.

Relationship Between Governmental and Corporate Security Responsibilities. The availability of advice on physical security has already been mentioned. All large companies have their own security organisations, which work together and adopt a most professional approach to security. They seldom, if ever, need to seek official help, apart from advice on the level of threat, either generally or to them in particular.

There would, however, be a direct relationship in two particular cases. The first would be when a private company undertakes government work which is either classified or which puts the company more at risk. The second would be when a VIP already receiving police protection is to visit or stay at particular private premises. In both these cases police/intelligence agency advice would

he in strong terms, although not mandatory; ignoring the advice would result in cancellation of the contract or withdrawal of the visit.

The systems of liaison in this field vary depending on circumstances. Communicating a general level of threat is usually done by a press release to the media. In the case of a specific threat to a private company not involved in government work, the liaison would be by a personal visit from a police officer, probably from the local Special Branch, with the specific offer of a visit from the local (police) crime prevention officer. A similar system would obtain if a VIP were to visit a private company. If there were plenty of notice (the papal visit to the United Kingdom in 1982 is a good example), the physical security of the place would need to be brought to an acceptable standard. If this were not possible, then the visit would be one of few occasions when police would be physically present doing static protection duty on private premises. Indeed, if the visitor were important enough, police would be present regardless of the standard of security achieved.

Lessons Learned From Experience: International Perspectives

I have already said that in the United Kingdom we deal with terrorism as a crime, that is, in the legal sense. In every other sense it is something so far removed from normal crime that, when it exploded upon the scene, most police forces were ill equipped to deal with it. So, too, were governments for, although terrorism had existed for centuries, the global scale of the new wave was quite unprecedented. Mistakes were undoubtedly made in the early days, but most Western nations have now arrived at similar systems and attitudes through their own experiences and the mistakes of others. The United Kingdom is no exception and it is fairly easy to indicate what it has gleaned from its own experience and that of others.

The Need for Liaison. This need is recognized both interagency and internationally. The time is gone when each agency, and even each country, could concentrate on its own problems to the exclusion of others. The formation of coordinating groups or committees is an example of this development.

The Need To Take Physical Security Measures. The need to protect persons and premises at risk has become clear. I have already mentioned the ever-growing police involvement (in London at least) in this field. In addition, we have seen the need for special buildings to deal with

terrorists and have, for example, constructed special secure accommodations to prevent attempts to rescue terrorists from police custody. Every potential target for terrorists must now look at its own requirements, and seek advice if it cannot resolve the problem. The police forces of the world, alone, can no longer guarantee the safety of potential terrorist targets by the routine methods that they have traditionally employed.

The Need for Specialists. In the law enforcement field, terrorism probably has been the largest growth area. In the wake of terrorism, entire new departments have been created, from operational units to intelligence gatherers and liaison services. Existing groups have been enlarged and their operations refined. All this has been necessary because of the special nature of terrorism, and the many different threads and disciplines that must be combined to combat it.

Many of the crimes committed by terrorists were previously unheard of, and could not be dealt with by normal methods. A hijacking, for example, can require government involvement and diplomatic liaison with several different countries. It may require the assistance of airline officials, of aircraft manufacturers (this in itself may require the use of international contacts), of airport officials, of psychologists, of marksmen, of intelligence officers with a knowledge of the political background of the hijackers, of interpreters, of negotiators, and so on. A terrorist bomb (their most common weapon) requires specialist teams—to gather evidence often scattered over hundreds of square yards, to deal with multiple deaths, to analyse the evidence, to piece together the device. An intelligence analyst is needed to trace the bomb's origins and assess the likelihood of further attacks, persons with knowledge of the background are needed to question prisoners, and so on.

In liaison, specialists are needed because cooperation in the field of terrorism is a delicate matter, in view of the political implications. The possibility exists that certain countries might use the terrorist label to settle old scores with persons who are little more than political activists.

Perhaps recognition of the need for specialisation is one of the few useful offshoots from the fight against terrorism. Much has been learned, and many contacts have been made that are relevant to the fight against crime but might have taken much longer to develop in the absence of the urgency created by terrorism.

The Need for International Cooperation. This need can best be illustrated by referring to the case of the

infamous Carlos, "The Jackal." He spent some time in London (and bungled one assassination attempt). He then moved to Paris and introduced diplomatic hostage-taking to the Continent when he organised the seizure of the French Embassy in Holland (with Japanese terrorists). He made arrangements for a similar operation in Stockholm and tried unsuccessfully to do the same in Denmark and Switzerland. He got supplies from Swiss anarchists and supplied explosives to the Basque separatist movement in Spain. He worked with Italian terrorists to provide stolen travel documents and with Turks and Germans to smuggle weapons, and he kidnapped Arab oil ministers in Vienna. Unfortunately, Carlos was far from exceptional in the breadth of his international activities.

It is impossible to see how an investigation of the activities of someone like Carlos could be conducted without good cooperation among the various countries involved. Terrorism has become international because of the ease of modern travel and the facilities offered by modern communications. It is vital that the same ease of movement and communication be made available to those who have to fight terrorism and that the law enforcement agencies exchange information with the same freedom as terrorists exchange weapons, expertise, and identity.

The Need for Government Involvement. In the United Kingdom, the government is never involved in criminal matters; indeed, the independence of the police and judiciary is a proud boast. However, government involvement—and now a preparedness for it—has become essential in many terrorist incidents. All too frequently, direct government-to-government communication is needed; often, a decision is required that has far too many ramifications for it to be made by a police officer, however senior, with only local responsibilities. If foreign nationals or foreign property (an aircraft or an embassy, perhaps) are involved, for example, a decision not to deal with terrorists cannot be made by the police officer on the scene because it could, in the end, result in the death of the nationals and/or serious damage to the property. Conversely, as the recent incident at the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London showed, action at an incident can have serious repercussions on British interests abroad and, therefore, requires close government involvement at all stages.

The Need for Intelligence. This requirement is present in all fields of criminal investigation and law enforcement, but it is paramount in the case of terrorism—particularly international terrorism. It enables preemptive action to be

taken in terms both of arrests and of an increase in security measures around a target. Terrorists are transnational; they operate in a cell structure and in consequence have tight security. Traditional methods of intelligence gathering are, therefore, inoperative in many cases. In a sense, this discussion is a return to the topic of specialisation since intelligence gathering in this field has, for the reasons above, become a specialised subject. It is nevertheless most important. A mistake that has been made in the past has been to see a requirement for intelligence to "pay off" in terms of arrests. Most countries now realise that this is impracticable and that intelligence must be viewed in the longer term. Furthermore, intelligence is important in avoiding overreaction, in that early suppressive action can prevent the need for later repressive action.

Perhaps one might say that including intelligence under the heading "lessons learned" is foolish, in that the value of intelligence is already known. It is my contention that, although this may be so in general terms, we often tend to give intelligence a relatively low priority in normal law enforcement, having, for many reasons, to rely on a reactive approach. That, too, in my view, is wrong, but that is beyond the subject of this paper. In the field of counterterrorism we are in a different area for reasons I have already mentioned, and intelligence must occupy a much higher position in the order of priorities. Prevention of crime is important, but prevention or control of terrorism is *vital*.

Planning and Exercising. The incident at the Munich Olympics concentrated our minds in the United Kingdom, as it must have done elsewhere in the world. One of the effects was that police, in liaison with other agencies and government, prepared contingency plans to meet the range of possible terrorist activities as then perceived. Since then, the plans have been updated in the light of our experiences and those of others throughout the world.

The fundamental lessons learned and acted upon have been that (a) all incidents have substantial similarities, therefore it is possible to have a basic plan; and (b) each incident reveals major differences from previous incidents, therefore it is essential that plans remain flexible. We have learned also that, although contingency plans are implemented when real incidents occur, the plans must be exercised at frequent intervals between incidents.

Coupled with this approach, in the United Kingdom considerable importance is placed on debriefing after both real incidents and exercises, to ensure that contingency

plans are always as refined and effective as possible.

Resoluteness. Finally, and possibly most important: No matter what other lessons have been learned and what action has been taken as a result, it will all be in vain if authority is not resolute in the face of terrorism. I think we have learned this lesson well enough in the United Kingdom, and I hope that we will always be able to act accordingly.

Military Aid to the Civil Power in Terrorist Incidents

In Great Britain—I emphasise Great Britain because Northern Ireland is something special and different in this context—in terms of terrorism, military support of the police is at the far end of a spectrum of military responses collectively known as Military Aid to the Civil Power. At one end, the term relates to military assistance to local government at times of natural or manmade disaster, through aid to keep major social services running by taking over functions during industrial disputes or other breakdowns (e.g., strikes in the ambulance or fire services, or within the power industries). At the other end of the spectrum, the military is geared to support police in terrorist incidents, such as the Iranian Embassy siege, by combat intervention.

We are not, in the United Kingdom, inhibited from committing in action our Armed Services in support of the civil power by such provision as *posse comitatus*. However, checks and balances exist to ensure that the police, in concert with the military, cannot take action outside the legal and democratic process. Essentially the procedure of calling military assistance to the aid of the civil power under such circumstances is geared to obtaining two Cabinet-level authorities—first, to deploy the military to the civil incident to remain in waiting, and second, to commit the military to action at the incident.

Training. I will deal with the procedure for obtaining the required authorities when I describe the only occasion in modern times when the British Army has been committed within Great Britain in support of the police in a counterterrorist operation. At this point it is useful to mention the preparation for this action, and the British police habit of exercising contingency plans and our obsession with testing and updating them. On the whole, although time-consuming and expensive, both have resulted in a reasonable degree of success when reality has demanded.

In Great Britain, Chief Officers of Police are required to exercise themselves and their forces in responding to

various forms of terrorist incident. This ranges from paper exercises without use of personnel, through computer-based exercises for command ranks and localized negotiator exercises, to full-scale enacted incidents involving all appropriate agencies (including senior civil servants and members of Government with a responsibility in the field, up to and including the Secretary of State for Home Affairs).

The army is included in all the large-scale exercises and becomes used to deploying with the civil police. This practice not only serves to acquaint them with their likely role and objectives at times of real commitment, but also allows them to become acquainted with the personalities with whom they will work and the likely operating conditions.

In addition to training exercises of this sort, the Metropolitan Police (i.e., the force with responsibility for policing London) has a number of specially trained German Shepherd dogs known as antiterrorist dogs (or more colloquially as “hard-nosed” dogs). They are trained to operate in a gas and smoke environment and in close support of stronghold assaults. As well as training for police purposes, the dogs are included in exercises and are used to working with the army.

Additionally, frequent seminars are held at the Headquarters of the 22nd Special Air Services Regiment (SAS—the British Army unit designated as aid to police at terrorist incidents) for Chief Officers and Assistant Chief Officers of Police and other officers with responsibility in this field. The opportunity is taken not only to discuss policy but to update police knowledge of SAS capability and weaponry and of associated technology used by the army, police, and other agencies involved.

Deployment and Commitment. Only once in modern times has the SAS been deployed and committed in support of police at a terrorist incident on the United Kingdom mainland. This was during the 6-day occupation of the Iranian Embassy in London by terrorists, from 30 April to 5 May 1980. For purposes of explanation, that operation provides a good example of how the system works in Great Britain.

The occupation of the Embassy took place at 11:26 a.m. on 30 April 1980. By noon I had attended, made an initial reconnaissance of the scene, and received reports from the police officers who had made the initial response. I was then aware that the terrorists numbered at least four (subsequently found to be six) and that they were armed

with automatic weapons and hand weapons, and professed to be equipped with grenades and other explosives. I was also aware of the nature of the terrorists' demands.

Operational control of incidents of this kind in Britain is essentially in the hands of the Chief Officer of Police for the area in which the incident occurs. However, the Chief Officer is required to advise the government of the circumstances if (a) there is governmental interest in any aspect of the incident and/or (b) the police officer commanding the operation assesses that he or she may wish (or does wish) military assistance. In the case of the Iranian Embassy there was clear government interest: First, the target was a diplomatic mission, and second, the demands made by the terrorists involved the interests of a foreign power with which only Government could deal. Additionally, I considered that, should there be a need to assault the stronghold, it was likely that I would need military support.

Her Majesty's Government was informed immediately on the first ground (i.e., that of interest) and a government liaison officer (GLO) was dispatched to the scene. Thereafter I had the services of a GLO 24 hours a day until the matter was resolved.

It has been agreed that, before government is formally asked to deploy the SAS to an incident, an informal message will be passed to the 22nd SAS Regiment in advance, so that it can be ready to move if authority to deploy is forthcoming. In the Iranian Embassy incident, the informal message was passed at about 1:00 p.m., and at about 1:30 p.m. a formal request was made to the Home Office (the ministry that deals with police matters) for SAS deployment. By this time a crisis centre was being set up in Whitehall, and in this forum the Ministry of Defence was consulted by the Home Office and eventually the authority to deploy was given. I emphasise "deploy"; this was *not* authority to commit armed troops in support of the civil power—a second and subsequent authority must be granted for this.

The SAS first deploy an operations group in advance of the assault teams, which makes contact with the police commander. The police commander, having exercised with the army, should be aware of the military requirement before its arrival, and will have made provision in the forward control and base station for SAS planning and intelligence teams; one or more holding areas will have been prepared for the assault teams and their equipment and arrangements made for their covert infiltration and reception. This all was done in the Iranian Embassy incident.

Coincidental with establishing the unit at the scene, the military commander will, with urgency, prepare an immediate action plan for use should a sudden demand be made. The SAS planning group then, in the light of intelligence and the overall police strategy, commences preparing plans that will allow them to respond to a whole range of options should they be required to do so by the police commander. These plans will change or be refined as intelligence becomes available and as certain options for actions harden. The army commander will discuss plans for military action with the police commander before they are referred to the military representative in the crisis centre for ultimate ratification by the minister chairing the Crisis Committee.

In the Iranian Embassy siege, I informed the army commander upon his arrival that I made the assumption that Government would not capitulate to demands, that I intended to proceed by way of negotiation, and that I would ask to commit his unit only if I considered that hostages were gravely at risk and that an assault and rescue operation was necessary to save life. As the siege progressed, this last matter was defined more specifically to indicate my intention to rescue the hostages if I had evidence of two hostage deaths or more.

As a personal decision, I provided a facility for the army commander in my own command post. This is not necessarily standard operating procedure, but my close personal acquaintance and knowledge of the SAS commander made this possible and resulted in a much smoother operation insofar as military assistance was concerned.

On the first evening of the siege I obtained a blanket authority from Government to commit the SAS on my own initiative in the event of a sudden deterioration of the situation, when there would be no time to request formal second authority. During the siege I advised Government on several occasions of the criterion that I would apply in requesting the commitment of the military, and on each occasion Government accepted this.

Thus, when on the 6th day circumstances within the stronghold had become unstable and evidence was to hand suggesting two murders had taken place, authority to assault was quickly forthcoming when I requested it. It was given in such a manner as to leave the timing of the assault to me as the police commander. Duly, at 7:09 a.m. on 5 May 1980, I committed the SAS and recorded the order in writing, which I handed to the SAS commander. This gave him control to achieve the military objective.

Some 40 minutes or so later I recovered control in the stronghold when 20 of the 21 hostages who remained in the stronghold immediately before the assault had been released (one was shot by terrorists during the assault). Five of the six terrorists were shot during the assault and rescue, and one was taken prisoner.

Other Operations. In addition to incidents such as the one I have described, other units of the army are designated to deploy in support of police at certain vulnerable locations at times of heightened terrorist threat. These deployments with the civil police are also exercised in the same way as the set-piece incidents to which I have referred.

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Reflections on International Terrorism as Seen From the Middle East

by Shaul Rosolio

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Introduction. Terrorism is an old social and political phenomenon. It has changed shape, means, aims, and methods, but the basic underlying factor has never changed. The exact definition of terrorism would be interesting from the scholastic point of view but makes very little difference when discussing strategy and tactics, whether from the political, military, or law enforcement point of view. Suffice it to say that, in very broad terms terrorism can be defined as an unconstitutional way to enforce results achieved by unconstitutional means.

The diversity of causes, reasons, goals, and aims makes it almost impossible to take an overall approach to terrorism based on a common denominator. "One man's villain is another man's hero; the noble cause for one might be the curse of the other." It is true that some of the basic approaches to criminal law, regarding acceptable, understandable, or pardonable offenses, would apply here, too. Nevertheless, public and international order must be based upon universally accepted rules without which chaos would reign. The same reasoning applies to acts of terrorism. The subjective attitude of a person or group or trend must be considered immaterial in order to safeguard public or international order.

In recent years the subject of terrorism has received renewed attention as a result of the proliferation of terrorist activities. With the attendant enhancement of sophistication, these activities have caused alarm not only in isolated places or cases but nationally and internationally. A lot of research, staff work, and thinking have been dedicated to this subject, advancing knowledge and developing new strategies and tactics, both national and international. However, this advancement applies to terrorist thinking as well. Therefore, authorities must undertake a constant process of thinking and rethinking in order to stay abreast of the latest developments, to forestall yet unknown dangers and avoid, as far as possible, agony and losses.

As so often is the case in the cycle of action-reaction, the attacker has the initiative while the defender—because of a wish to avoid the unpleasant, or a prolonged administrative process, or orders of priorities—only sluggishly follows developments. This has to change. In the same way that medicine passed from treating the symptom to prophylaxis-prevention, as armies and police forces, or in fact most of the social services have done, those responsible for strategic thinking about combating terrorism will have to adopt this philosophy. Had Israel

only reacted to terrorist attacks, it would not have been able to maintain a relative state of tranquility—surrounded as it is by a multitude of enemies all dedicated to destruction, inconvenience, and terror.

The argument over whether terrorism achieves its final aims in bringing about the change envisaged by the attacker, and in what way the resort to terror is relevant in achieving such aims, is immaterial to the discussion here. What matters are the results on the ground—that is, death (in many cases of innocent people), damages and losses, and the undermining of public tranquility and daily life. Any discussion of the fight against terrorism should therefore divorce itself from the overall political results and concentrate on ways to forestall or alleviate terrorism as far as possible.

In my brief overview, I will try to analyze these factors as they are seen from the Middle East generally, based on the experience my country has, regrettably, acquired because of its special conditions. Let me state here that whenever I refer to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), I will do so only with regard to terrorism, without entering into the political aspects of the Palestinian problem.

A lot has been done on the government side and internationally, but a lot has been done on the "other" side as well. It should always be remembered that he who does not advance retreats.

Current Trends. The advance of science, the universality of communication, and the information explosion have contributed enormously to the progress of the international community and of the individual. However, in the same way, these factors have contributed toward progress in the methods and harmful results of terrorism. Specialization has affected terrorists as it has all walks of life. Public thinking concerning defense against terrorism has passed from the local to the national scene, and from there to the international. A most dramatic phase of this development was skyjacking, which is international by definition and which forced the international community to take an active posture that acted as a catalyst toward an international approach to the whole problem. The shock of the early 1970's, when the international community suddenly was faced with a courageous, audacious new phenomenon of concerted terrorist efforts, played its part in inducing a new approach.

The pattern of development adopted by terrorist groups was to infiltrate the political consciousness by adopting acceptable slogans, thus creating a sympathetic environment—for example, with reference to environmentalism, opposition to nuclear installations, opposition to missile positioning, and so on, not to mention acceptable and understandable political grievances. This approach was and still is a major factor conducive to the proliferation of terrorism and to the relative inertia with which it has been countered until quite recently. Terrorism was generally identified with what is termed the Left—an identification that made its targets and goals self-evident. However, recently a rightist trend has developed in terrorism (as, for instance, Action Directe in France), which brings a new dimension to the possible targets for terrorism.

A further element of confusion is infighting between terrorist groups, which is one of the results of the proliferation mentioned earlier. On the other hand, this same infighting can help to alleviate the difficulty in infiltrating these groups for intelligence purposes. Let me observe that any development which makes terrorist organizations more modern or advanced tends to direct them toward formalizing structures and philosophy. This tendency can be exploited by the counterforces if they adopt a correct way of thinking. I do not know the exact number of all the organizations that claim to have attacked Israel, or imperialists, or Zionists, or Jews. One thing is a fact: Their numbers, competition, mutual rivalries, hatreds, and infighting were invaluable in the process of successful intelligence infiltration—which was achieved and which was material in foiling most of their attacks.

It seems that development of a country's attitude toward terrorism passes through a four-stage process:

- Public and official awareness
- Public and official consensus
- Legislation
- Organization (manpower, wherewithal, planning, and training)

It is interesting and encouraging to note that the international posture now follows this pattern. Broadly, it can be said that awareness is already a fact and that the need for consensus is already obvious. Legislation and organization on the international level always have posed a problem, as they do now; however, a lot has already been done and many difficulties have been overcome. The dramatic reduction in the number of skyjackings and the

development of the political, strategic, and tactical doctrines used to handle these situations recently (as the Air Kuwait case demonstrated), show the dramatic change that has taken place since the days of helplessness and bewilderment typical in the early 1970's. Israel was often criticized for its unrelenting posture in refusing to negotiate, not to speak of its decision to fight back when it came to sky hostages. That unyielding stance, universal today, is an exact continuation of the clear policy Israel adopted then. Entebbe was a forerunner to Mogadisciu.

State-sponsored terrorism is a renewed problem that has acquired new and menacing proportions. The financing, harboring, diplomatic assistance, political backing, and refuge granted by host countries such as Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bulgaria, and Cuba, not to mention the overall eminence of the U.S.S.R., have given international terrorism an added dimension today. Hence it is doubtful whether effective countercombat can be mounted outside an international organizational structure, whether official or unofficial, diplomatic or otherwise. Israel's success in the fight against terrorism was to a decisive extent a result of informal rather than official arrangements in the exchange of information, combat methods, tacit assistance, and direct operational cooperation—many times in the face of official opposition and sometimes in spite of such opposition. This might provide a hint as to where some of the answers lie.

We all know one hard fact: To secure and defend all the people and all the places all the time is impossible without destroying everyday life and infringing on the basic rules of democracy. The overall strategic thinking used in our case was that of the "indirect approach," pro-action rather than reaction, deterrence rather than response. Clearly, this approach is indispensable, because of new developments in the handling of international terrorist situations, and because of the threat posed by the feasibility of terrorist organizations, state-sponsored or otherwise, resorting to unconventional means (including nuclear, biological, or chemical methods). The cost might be higher than what is usually considered acceptable, but so are the terrible results if the old methods fail.

In the early 1970's, some of Israel's citrus exports were contaminated by chemical injections, resulting in a 33 percent drop in exports the following year. The attitude we took resulted in an immediate discontinuation of this phenomenon and it was never tried again. I suppose it is obvious that this success was not a result of preaching and remonstrations.

Accessibility of terrorist organizations to unconventional nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical means is a fact. From technical, technological, and personal aspects, especially if activities are state sponsored, there is no problem in acquiring and using these means, with obvious terrible results. Atomic, bacteriological, and chemical (A.B.C.) material can be either produced or stolen. Another method is to attack installations using or storing such materials. The horrible consequences of the recent accidents in Mexico City and Bhopal, India, demonstrate the extent of death, injury, and destruction that may follow.

There is a lot of argument over whether terrorist organizations will use such methods, and if they do, which methods they will most probably use and which they will not. While this question is of great importance, it would be folly not to consider, as a fact, that they might indeed be used. Once we find out, it might be too late. Unconventional methods must be regarded as a possibility and must enter into any situation analysis in the fight against terrorism. Physics, chemistry, and electronics are not beyond the reach of modern terrorist organizations.

The balance of the current state in this world of terrorism might, therefore, be summarized as follows. On the negative side must be listed the strengthening of state-sponsored terrorism; the multiplication of terrorist organizations and their aims, possible targets, and political character; and, last but not least, the accessibility to terrorists of all the powers of modern science and communications, including unconventional weapons and methods. On the positive side can be counted the remarkable progress made in awareness, consensus, legislation, and organization, definitely on the national level but also, although to a lesser degree, on the international level. This level does, however, lag behind the terrorist advance and has to be further and dramatically developed.

Recent Lessons

Without reference to the political aspects of the war in Lebanon, in either criticism or justification, one thing is more than obvious. It had an effect on the overall aspect not only of terrorism in the Middle East, but of the whole structure of international terrorism. Lebanon was an example of terrorism that gained a semi-independent status within a state. Because of the weakness of the Lebanese Government, the PLO acquired virtual control over South Lebanon and the western part of Beirut. This enabled it to establish a solid command structure, headquarters, training facilities, refuge base—that is, all the paraphernalia of a

state within a state.

It should be pointed out that none of the Arab countries tolerated this state of affairs, some of them, like Egypt, even excluding and outlawing the PLO entirely. Jordan, as will be remembered, forcibly eliminated PLO activities—"Black September"—within its borders in September 1971 through a bloody military action that killed more than 1,000 Palestinians. Others fled for their lives to Israel, of all places, where they knew they would at least not be killed outright. Some went to Syria, which, although it tolerated the PLO, did not tolerate any terrorist activities being launched from its borders or by units not under its direct control.

Besides the PLO politico-military infrastructure established in South Lebanon, the area became a center for terrorist organizations all over the world. Members were sent there for training, political indoctrination, propaganda, recuperation, and rest.

At this stage I would like to mention the definition of international terrorism. The question as to whether an overall worldwide centralized and unified terrorist structure exists can be answered only in the negative. The diversity of organizations, goals, aims, methods, and the like, plus the appearance of right wing terrorism, makes such a unified structure impossible. However, what does exist is an international exchange—cooperation, mutual assistance, central financing sources, and, in broad terms, an informal overall availability of mutual aid and support. In this universe, Lebanon played a major role and for a while it was the center for this kind of cooperation. We found evidence of South Koreans, Japanese, Danes, Englishmen, Germans, Yemenis, Iranians, and others, both men and women. The abundance of intelligence information placed South Lebanon as a world center for terrorist activities as described above—a sort of home base for logistics and a central training facility.

There is no question that the dispersal of this center and the destruction of the infrastructure existing there dealt a severe blow to this type of international cooperation. The scattering of the PLO throughout the Middle East and the elimination of the possibilities offered by a home base under ideal conditions made international cooperation much more difficult for terrorists.

We can foresee that, until such time as central terrorist organizations like the PLO find a place where they can regroup and operate under conditions of total freedom of movement and activity, the overall structure of terrorism throughout the Middle East, and to a large extent in

Europe, will remain enfeebled. Experience has shown that terrorist organizations always seek and find the weakest places politically to establish themselves and form a home base. Eliminating these weak spots is a major contribution toward weakening terrorist organizations and operations.

The fact that the PLO was not eradicated is due in part to the background support it gets from the Soviet Union and other Arab states. However, as a side effect of the severe blow it has sustained, it cracked into two rival parts, greatly weakening both. Experience shows that terrorist organizations cannot function under constant, sustained, severe pressure. They tend to split and resplit and to start fighting among themselves. Moreover, all the satellite elements—foreigners, adventurers, underworld types, and the like—immediately flee under such conditions.

When it comes to tolerance, a further aspect should be discussed, that of leniency of governments toward apprehended terrorists. It has been shown many times that when governments give in to threats, either as a result of not wanting to be involved or under pressure from economic or business establishments, this action is a direct encouragement to terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, many are the examples of European countries that, after apprehending terrorists, either released them at once or gave them token sentences and, in any case, refused to extradite them. When the famous Daoud, who was the instigator of the Munich massacre, was apprehended by France, France then refused both Israel's and Germany's applications for extradition and instead released him to Algiers. There have been many other instances. I do not think that the effect of this practice needs any explanation. One of the major elements in forestalling terrorism is a clear, formulated, and proved practice of refusing to negotiate and of not giving in under threat from the outside or the inside.

The recent incidence of suicide attacks by fundamentalist terrorists is not a new phenomenon. "Assassins" date back to the 12th century and Japanese Red Army fighters are recent. In my opinion, the problem is marginal; it requires a tactical answer, not a strategic or political one.

State-sponsored terrorism has been mentioned before. There is no question that terrorism under such conditions should be regarded as an extension of a state's policy beyond conventional warfare. Once conventional war is impossible, futile, or inconvenient, state-sponsored terrorism is used instead as a proxy war, without the inconveniences of declared hostilities. The state can maintain diplomatic relations, embassies, trade, and overall

relations while completely disregarding the conventions and agreements pertaining to this kind of situation. This gives the aggressor a tremendous advantage. The tragic affair in Grosvenor Square last year is but one example. There is no question in my mind that as long as countries fostering terrorism can enjoy the luxury of holding both sides of the stick, this kind of terrorism will not only continue but increase.

It is not so much the small secret groups fostering sporadic terrorist acts against assorted targets that are the major problem. It is the organized, structured, state-supported, centrally financed terrorist setup that is the big threat to world politics. This is now more than obvious. Less obvious are the ways and means to counter this situation, and still less, the willingness to fight it unequivocally.

Countermeasures—Desirable

It would seem, therefore, quite clear that the reply to international terrorism, however it is defined, is international and not national. There is no possibility whatsoever of fighting international terrorism simply by strengthening the counterterrorist setup of individual countries, no matter how advanced and efficient they may be.

Response is by nature reactive and not proactive. This rule applies to the fight against international terrorism as it does to any other phenomenon. The question, however, is: Why—having once realized the imminence of the threat of international terrorism—wait until provocation materializes? Israel was criticized more than once for preempting terrorist attacks. Whether this criticism was justified is a matter for ideological or philosophical discussion. That it saved lives of those who were about to be attacked, and other demonstrated consequences, is a fact.

I have mentioned previously the four stages an overall organizational pattern has to follow; that is, awareness, consensus, legislation, and organization. As stated, this process has to be consciously adopted and fostered by the governments of the West in the field of international terrorism. However, the difficulties, opposition, and reluctance to cooperate fully in this field are known and understandable. Governments are reluctant to cooperate fully on the intelligence level, much less willing on the operational level. Even in the midst of the Second World War, the cooperation between the allies in intelligence and operations was incomplete, and this is using a mild term. This situation is even more evident in the field of counterterrorism where there is no concert of interest—

in fact, sometimes outright conflict, political or economic—between countries that should be on the same side. Therefore, as much as it would have been desirable to preach for a kind of combined operations between Western countries, this solution is, regrettably, impossible at present.

A major element within the whole structure of counterterrorism activities is psychological indoctrination—otherwise called public relations. Psychological indoctrination is needed in all stages of a successful system of fighting terrorism. Agreement in the awareness and consensus stages is impossible in democracies without a public understanding and approval of the legal and operational measures needed to fight terrorism effectively. Once consensus is achieved, public involvement is needed for awareness of and willingness to cope with inconveniences ensuing from antiterrorism measures such as body searches, curfews, street and road checks, and the like. It is most evident that the basic element that might foil terrorist attacks or, once they have happened, identify or describe both the acts and the perpetrators, is public awareness. This can be achieved only through a long and persistent system of psychological indoctrination. The number of terrorist attacks that have been foiled in Israel solely through public awareness and citizen involvement is decisive. For example, in a terrorist attack in a main street of Jerusalem in February 1984, a member of the public (a reserve paratrooper captain) understood the situation, identified the terrorist, and drew his pistol, which he carried legally. He shot and killed the terrorist, foiling a major part of the operation. Obviously a level of alertness such as that in Israel can be achieved only through complete public participation in the overall effort to forestall terrorism. It can be reached only in countries that are under constant attack and where the citizens are all trained. I cite this not as a level generally achievable, but as an example of what can be done, once the necessity exists.

Psychological indoctrination is important not only on the national level, but on the international level as well, only the target for this indoctrination is not the public but the government. In order to be willing to enter into all kinds of bilateral or multilevel agreements (to be discussed later), a government must have a lot of understanding, realization, and sometimes a change in priorities. Individual governments will participate only if they are totally involved and willing to enter into the reciprocal agreements needed. It has been mentioned that an aggressor's realization of a government's unrelenting aim

to curb terrorism, to apprehend terrorists and bring them to trial, is one of the strongest deterrents. This attitude, too, is achieved through psychological indoctrination. Israel's bombing of the atomic reactor at Osiraq in Iraq produced a lot of criticism and a whole chain of United Nations condemnations. But, and this without entering the political argument, one thing was made very clear: Israel will not tolerate atomic proliferation for militaristic objectives in the Middle East, particularly in countries which have refused for 37 years to accept even the existence of Israel and have repeatedly declared the aim of destroying it. That bombing had its effect.

As has been demonstrated in crimefighting, the most important stages are not investigation, apprehension, trial, and sentence, but deterrence, prevention, and preemption. Therefore, if this stage is to be reached, governments will have to consider their readiness to use strategic deterrents, such as severing diplomatic relations, imposing economic sanctions, and freezing assets. In the same way, the Western community of nations will have to consider ostracizing a country such as Libya in order to stop its involvement in state-supported terrorism. This aim is very hard to achieve. Yet it is but a further stage of the attitude that had to be reached on the national level when concerted efforts to curb terrorism were put into effect. Without a very thorough system of international cooperation, this level cannot be achieved. Therefore, the first aim should be to create the international atmosphere, on the political and diplomatic level, in which cooperation can flourish.

The question arises as to why existing international organizations, such as the United Nations, Interpol, the European Economic Community, the Organization of American States, and the like, cannot be used for this purpose. Because of the definitions and charters of these organizations, dealing with cooperation and other matters pertaining to antiterrorism activities would undermine the very existence of these organizations; at least in the case of the U.N., this course is utterly out of the question, for the most obvious reasons. Therefore, it appears that existing organizations cannot play the role of the coordinating body for an aggressive, proactive, efficient, and effective system to fight international terrorism.

Furthermore, it seems clear that at this stage an overall international fighting force to counter terrorism is unthinkable. In the Middle East we have had a lot of experience with international forces, whether under the aegis of the U.N. or otherwise. Everything goes smoothly

as long as there is a total identity in aims and points of view and no outside political pressure is brought to bear against the governments contributing contingents to this force. But from the very moment at which, for any reason at all, there is a difference of opinion, or any political pressure is directed at one of the contributing states, the whole setup runs into trouble and it is only a matter of time until that combined force dissolves. This was proved in the Sinai in 1967 and recently in Lebanon. Therefore, this is also not a solution.

Countermeasures—Feasible

What, then, can be done, other than leaving the subject to solve itself? There is nothing more dangerous than stoicism—"crossing the bridge when getting to it," "when the time comes we will know what to do," "time is the best remedy," and more of those bromides. After a series of major terrorist attacks have been committed, a solution certainly will be found, but by that time many lives will have been lost and much damage will have been caused. These deaths and losses might be spared if the measures and postures that presumably would be adopted after the attacks could indeed be instituted in advance, bearing in mind the difficulties dictated by reality. So, what can be done?

The absolute first stage must be a very thorough, cooperative system of intelligence. The amount of intelligence and information in the hands of the various countries today is imposing. The modern approach to intelligence is based on experience gathered during the past century with two major world wars and a long stretch of cold war, upheavals, rebellions, wars of independence, and so on. In addition, the ample use of electronics, optics, and modern analysis systems has revolutionized the process of collecting, sorting, collating, analyzing, and associating information on a national level. Extreme efforts must be made to adopt these methods internationally—if not through official, diplomatic ways, then by unofficial ties and cooperation, mostly secret, and for this purpose alone. As is commonly known, Israel has diplomatic problems that, in many cases, make open cooperation in these sensitive fields extremely difficult. In spite of, or perhaps because of, this situation, we have developed a very broad system of bilateral contacts and relations with security services of many countries, some of them not even having diplomatic relations with us. Once the benefits of cooperation are obvious, it is not difficult to convince a government where its best interests lie, and diplomatic, formal, or official hindrances have been sidestepped.

The same approach applies to the exchange of information concerning the organization, training, equipment, and fighting doctrines of special antiterrorist combat units. Naturally, some countries will have more experience than others. It would be contrary to the international interest to withhold experience and research accumulated in one country from the other countries identifying themselves with the overall aim. We have cooperated with other countries in this respect; for obvious reasons, I cannot specify. Cooperation in order to enhance technical and tactical knowledge must and can be achieved.

I have already mentioned the utter necessity of a strategic, politico-economic response, in the case of major incidents, as a retaliatory policy directed at states sponsoring terrorism in any way. It is the duty of national agencies in charge of security and antiterrorism activity to use their influence—social, political, and public—to induce both public opinion and the necessary echelons within parliaments and governments to understand the point and to be willing to use their position and influence to bring about the necessary decision. This is a long and difficult process, which will be opposed by means of a whole assortment of reasons, causes, and excuses because it is arduous, inconvenient, and unpopular with many a political or economic group within the country. But in the tug-of-war between the many contradictory forces, one has to pull to the best of one's ability and not give up in spite of the difficulties.

Psychological indoctrination must be constant, concentrated, and effectively handled without causing terror or hysteria. Terrorism is a phenomenon which the national and international community will have to live with and prepare for. The absorptive capacity of a community will, to a large extent, decide the outcome of this continuing battle, a capacity mainly determined by the communities' preparedness and psychological fortitude.

As an overall international organization is at present impossible, the appropriate agencies will have to work to set up a whole network of bilateral, or sometimes multilateral, ad hoc agreements, secret if necessary, with the aim of exchanging information and pooling experience. This is already being done but has to be developed and extended dramatically. As has happened before in many instances, this framework of agreements will eventually crystallize into a formal official system.

Conclusion

Terrorism is here to stay as an integral part of the everyday life of the national and international community,

the same as sickness, poverty, crime, wars, and all the other curses that have been the lot of the human race since it was expelled from Paradise. Terrorism has to be handled with a philosophy similar to that applied to the others — preventing rather than combating, preempting rather than defying.

The amount of knowledge and experience accumulated through research, discussion, and actual field experience is impressive. The progress made by nations in their readiness to face the problem of fighting terrorism and their willingness to cope with the difficulties, inconveniences, and embarrassment of doing so have reached a very advanced stage. The problem now is how to extend this progress into the international field and translate it into working, practical ways and means, and to do so quickly.

The order of government priorities did place counterterrorism way behind economic, political, social and other elements. I do not mean to say that the fighting of terrorism must head the list, but it should be placed in an appropriate position without every other consideration taking preference.

I would like to stress once again the danger in stoicism, wishing a thing away and hoping it will never happen here or to me. The United States has been fortunate up to now in that it has not been subject to international terrorism within its own borders. There is no guarantee that this happy situation for the United States will continue.

Countries of Western Europe, and my own, have organized themselves to repel terrorism. As has been mentioned, terrorism will always seek the weakest link. I hope it will not be the United States. Moreover, the United States, as the leader of the Western world today, must demonstrate an example of what should be done. It has the power, the knowledge, the capability, and, not least, the means. The world and the adversary will understand the signal.

International terrorism even at this early stage is basically state supported. It has therefore to be regarded for what it is—an extension of acts of war. This fact and the possibility of terrorist access to unconventional material make it essential for our international community to regard it as a direct threat to the existing order. It is true that terrorism never will decisively force political issues.

However, even without that, the suffering, loss, and confusion created in terrorism's wake, as futile as it may be, make it imperative that a courageous, aggressive posture be adopted by this international community of nations.

Shaul Rosolio

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Repentant Terrorist Legislation: A Preliminary Analysis of Problems and Results in Italy

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Several governments have scored impressive successes against various terrorist groups around the world, as a recent Rand study states (Cordes, et al. 1984). Yet international terrorism continues to increase and new terrorist groups emerge; 1983 has been "the bloodiest year for terrorist activity" (Cordes, et al. *ibid.*).

Furthermore, some countries are currently facing a problem that has received, so far, only limited attention from scholars, professionals, and policymakers. After a terrorist group has surrendered, or has been defeated, what is to be done with the surviving terrorists?

In past terrorist campaigns, survivors were few and, in general, the posture of the winning governments made life imprisonment or physical elimination the only probable alternatives. Occasionally (the Symbionese Liberation Army is a good example), the equivalent of mass suicide took place. In some countries, the legal system provided for long-term, large-scale imprisonment after public trials, thus simply postponing the problem, and occasionally creating unmanageable situations in the prison systems. Western democracies find it very difficult to resort to extermination, and in some countries (e.g., Turkey) the large number of captured terrorists makes this ultimate solution unrealistic.

Currently, Uruguay, Turkey, Spain, Colombia, El Salvador, Italy, to mention a few, are all debating the problem and searching for a solution.

This paper will focus on the Italian scene. Few data are available and, since the problem is not solved and its effects are in progress, no general report is as yet feasible. What follows is a description of the most important phenomenological aspects of the aftermath of terrorism and some of the major areas of policy conflict, in the hope of stimulating discussion and a sharing of experiences in an area where no optimal solution has yet emerged.

In other countries, various approaches have been tried. In Colombia, after prolonged negotiation an amnesty and reintegration plan is being implemented, including the unprecedented step of advertising it to the people and asking for popular support. Part of President Betancour's plan includes agrarian reform and increased political participation. Results are controversial. The leader of the guerrilla group known as M-19, Dr. Carlos Toledo Plata, was assassinated on August 10, 1984, having signed on April 25 a joint communiqué with Fuerza Armada de Revolucion Colombiana (FARC), calling for a truce. The former terrorists have formed a new party, "Frente

Comune," including all groups except FARC, which will establish a separate party.

In Uruguay, the release of retired General Liber Seregni, after 10 years' imprisonment, has been interpreted by the opposition as a sign of weakness rather than as a conciliatory gesture. The country is still uneasy and uncertain about a future course of action for the large terrorist population in its prison system (*Cambio* 16, 1984).

In Spain (R.P. Clark 1983), few *Ettarras* leave the ETA organization (Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement), once they have become full members. Revenge killings (by former colleagues or, as it is sometimes claimed, by rightwing forces) are not infrequent. The government continues attempts toward direct negotiations with ETA and the Henri Batasuna group. Again, recently (November 1984, Dr. Santiago Brouart, a founder of Henri Batasuna, was assassinated in Bilbao, probably by rightwing elements. General Roson Perez was assassinated in Madrid within a few days. Both had been working toward a cease-fire and pacification.

Of course, among the various possible types of terrorism, the only one that is interesting in this context, with regard to the exit from "armed struggle" and reentry into society, is the "pure" political type. A separatist, a nationalist, can move to a new society and escape the problem of choosing an identity—as, for example, Basque or Spaniard—by migrating to Canada or Latin America. For a political terrorist, the enemy is the state, any state. Society is corrupt, inadequate, oppressing. The terrorist is at war with it and has lost. The dream of future change is over. After utopia, what? Friends have died, or are imprisoned, or, worse, have defected. The masses have not risen, or have turned against the terrorist and applauded his or her capture. The options are limited to three:

- Insanity or self-destruction.
- Acknowledging error and defeat and rearranging the value system and "Weltanschauung."
- Moving over to the "enemy" and attempting to remove the past by helping the establishment.

Any country, once the practical impossibility of eliminating *all* the terrorists is accepted (a policy that might be militarily possible but is politically untenable), has an interest in helping terrorists rejoin the mainstream of society. If the terrorist choice is seen as final and irrevocable, the fight will be long and without quarter. Some way out must be provided to encourage dissent and defection in the enemy's camp. The best, if not ultimate,

solution to political terrorism may be cooption into the political system of the country, "making room" for dissent in exchange for the terrorist's renouncing of violence.

The Italian legal system is essentially inquisitory, like most continental systems, and does not include plea bargaining or turning state's evidence, as the Anglo-Saxon system does. Confession has a limited role in continental systems. The cultural relativity of the value of confessions has been made evident by recent studies by Hepworth and Turner (1982). As these authors state, self-condemnation for past crimes is not only based (Weber from a socialized perspective) and does not require (Marx from a philosophical viewpoint) the offender to repent. Sometimes confessions protect the ideology and interests of the ruling power (North Korea, China, U.S.S.R., the Inquisition). In England, confession by a convicted killer on the scaffold before execution strengthened society and permitted absolution both of the killer and of the judges. Thus confession, a basic aspect of repentance and the dissociation process, could serve functions of both social exclusion and social inclusion. Repentance and dissociation are internal postures that may have questionable sincerity. They displace criminal law from objective facts to what the German legal scholars call *Gesinnungsmerkmale*, or "conscience attitudes" (Manna in press). Proof, of course, would be difficult, and clear definitions would be largely discretionary.

In the Anglo-Saxon system self-incrimination is admissible only if not coerced or involuntary (Kamisar 1983), but the prospect of reduced sentences makes the voluntariness questionable because of the obvious psychological pressure involved in the process. In Islamic law, confessions are retractable for specified punishments (*hadd*), and nonretractable for discretionary (*Ta'zir*) punishments for less serious offenses (Forte 1983). In traditional Chinese law, under the state philosophy of Confucianism, no criminal could be sentenced until he confessed; the 1979 code states that no defendant can be convicted on the basis of his confession alone (Lubman 1983).

Early in Italy's struggle against terrorism, the need for a flexible judicial instrument that would facilitate exit from terrorism was recognized. Two different laws (N. 625, 15.12.79, "*Legge cassiga*" N. 304, 29.5.82, and "*Legge sui pentiti*") have been enacted. They imply a large reduction of the penalty if terrorists "collaborate" with the police and judicial authorities, or a smaller reduction if they "dissociate" themselves from the terrorist group. Collaboration, of course, most frequently takes the format

of denouncing former comrades and providing evidence against them. The reduction of the penalty is related to the amount of "substantial" aid given to the police forces, and can be as sizable as, for example, from life to 12 years, and freedom, counting good conduct, time served, and so on. A new law on "dissociation" is in preparation (Manna in press) and various bills are pending.

Both laws were enacted as temporary emergency laws and have already expired. However, their effects are still being felt, and several political forces in Italy are pressing the legislators to enact similar laws (permanent, this time) against organized and economic crime. A large-scale debate is going on, among legal scholars and politicians and policymakers, for and against similar laws for other, nonterrorist crimes (Caselli 1981).

The tactical success of the laws is undeniable. Terrorist events have decreased sharply and, even though recent actions demonstrate that some terrorist groups are still active, the country is out of the tunnel of terrorism that characterized the years from 1975 to 1981. "Repented" and "dissociated" terrorists are estimated to number at least 40 percent of the official 2,000 terrorists currently serving time or awaiting trial in Italian prisons. Legal scholars, in general, oppose the extension of the so-called "premium legislation" (rewarding dissent from the criminal, or terrorist, activity and collaboration) to organized and economic crimes (Tamburrino 1984; Manna 1984). Police operatives and administrators favor the extension of the laws. Arguments for and against range from moral to legal to philosophical considerations. Requests for a general amnesty for terrorist activities have been forwarded by several sides; public opinion is divided. Interviewed in the safety of asylum in Paris, Scalzone, a leading terrorist, has aptly stated that terrorism has lost the war; but a war is really over only when the war prisoners go home (Cuomo 1984). A high magistrate in Rome has summed up the contrary, prevailing argument:

Terrorism has been defeated in the street; it must now be defeated in Court. After the trials are over and terrorism has been convicted, there will be room for an amnesty.

The first "repented" terrorist was Carlo Fioroni, who was arrested in 1975 and repented in 1979. The next, and most important, was Patrizio Peci. Arrested in 1980, he repented after a few days, and his collaboration made possible the destruction of the Red Brigades columns in Turin and Genoa. Peci's brother was kidnaped and assassinated by the Red Brigades, although he had no part in the repentance and betrayal. Peci has written a

self-serving but interesting autobiography, *Io, l'infame*, which offers some insight into the decision process of repentance.

A few repented terrorists have been killed by former comrades and some have committed suicide. They live in hiding and in constant fear. Fioroni has migrated abroad and has refused to come back and testify at the trial of Toni Negri and Autonomia, in which he was to be a star witness. Some repented terrorists require extensive police protection and expensive relocations. They have begun to organize, presenting specific requests to the government (*Panorama*, 8.1.1984) which they claim "defaulted" on its promises.

Repented terrorists are many among rightwing terrorists. One special case has led to the incrimination of 150 former comrades. Occasionally, the declarations of the repented terrorist are unfounded and lead to tragic errors. The judicial system has applied the repentance laws unevenly, and public opinion is split. A public opinion poll conducted by Demoskopea in December 1983 indicated that 51 percent consider the repentance laws as positive, while 33.8 percent regard the laws negatively. However, 53.5 percent do not want the laws extended to organized crime, while 30.6 percent favor the extension. Toward the repented terrorists, 22 percent feel "understanding"; 21 percent disapproval; 21 percent contempt; 15.2 percent forgiveness; 6.7 percent gratitude. A self-study conducted by terrorists through self-administered questionnaires (D'Arcangelo et al. 1984) proves the unevenness with which different courts in Italy applied the repentance laws.

Interestingly, the text of the laws never mentions the word "repentance." It only lists the collaborative behaviors that permit a reduction of the penalties and states a time limit: The laws are applicable only for crimes committed before January 31, 1982, and the collaboration must have begun within 4 months from the enactment of the law.

Perhaps one major problem in the application of the laws has been the use of the word "repented," not included in the laws but quickly attached to them by the media and the public. Repentance, according to C. Sammarco, is a religious and philosophical category, an emotional posture with an ethical value. Philosophers (Cantoni, Montaigne, Kierkegaard), in analyzing repentance, have stressed the continuity of the existential trend. The actions for which repentance is felt are not denied. Should they be denied, the change implied in repentance would lack the important referent of what to change (Sammarco in press). The aspiration to change differentiates repentance from

remorse. The former is oriented toward the future; the latter is a lamentation of the past. The Catholic Church has taken a firm stand in favor of pardon and reconciliation (Del Rio 1984).

Criminal law gives some limited consideration to motives, both positive and negative, in determining penalties. Thus, offenders who desist voluntarily or actively stop the consequences of a crime they have committed (e.g., by helping the victim), receive a reduced penalty. The motives for desisting are not relevant. What is relevant is that desistance be the expression of the free will of the accused and not, for example, a response to a police car approaching the scene of the crime.

Repentance has been given legal status in the Italian legal system only in the analysis of the convict to be granted conditional release, an Italian equivalent of parole. However, what is being implied is that the subject has changed (*raffreddimento*) from a criminal to a noncriminal value system.

In the antiterrorism laws two possible behaviors are considered: One is a dissociation from terrorism, laying down weapons and abandoning the group; the other implies active collaboration with the authorities, denouncing former comrades, turning state's evidence, and so forth. Neither of the two behaviors necessarily implies repentance in a moral or psychological meaning of the term.

Dissociation may be the acknowledgment of defeat, the reality analysis of the impossibility of carrying out the grandiose revolutionary project, the awareness that killings and terror have alienated the masses and have not destroyed the establishment. Thus, it may express political realism and not moral change.

Collaboration may be a cold calculation of possible benefits, and, essentially, betrayal. Although technically important (not only does the collaborating terrorist give important information, but going back to terrorism becomes impossible), its morality is indefensible. The collaborator is labeled and isolated.

What happens in the mind of the terrorist who decides to abandon terrorism is not known. The material available consists of a few interviews and autobiographies, where real motives lie hidden under rationalization and self-serving reinterpretations of reality. If we accept the "fantasy war" concept (Bruno and Ferracuti 1982), then the end of the war is the acceptance of defeat and a negotiated surrender, not repentance. Preliminary data from ongoing

research seems to indicate that repented terrorists are less stable and less adjusted than hard-core, unrepented ones. The earlier, hard-core, "founding fathers" terrorists have seldom repented. A terrorist (Libardi, interview in Bernardi 1982, p. 94) gave an explanation for younger terrorists, based on the lack of a "collective subject" to which to subordinate one's own "private-self" in view of common goals: "Armed struggle, as a political project, is over" (ibid., Libardi interview, p. 92).

Cacciari, a leading Italian philosopher, has stated that the early terrorists, the "founding fathers" of the 1970's, given the totality of their choice and the depth of their moral commitment to terrorism, cannot repent. The younger terrorists, those who entered terrorism after 1977, chose terrorism as a utilitarian path to opportunities they felt were being denied them by society. Once the project fails, they can "repent" and betray (Franchi 1984). The message from the hard-core, unrepented terrorist is: We are not repented, we are tired (Buffa and Giustolisi 1984).

One interesting point has recently been raised by Turnaturi (1984). The laws on repentance, by erasing the terrorist event—the penalty being canceled by the subsequent (repented and collaborating) behavior of the terrorist—have shifted our legal image of society. The subject, as a member of society, is no longer the sole responsible agent, accountable for his or her deeds and misdeeds. The focus is on the event, which determines the quality and intensity of the legal reaction, and the event is defined by other events or consequences of events. This focus indicates a shift from Kant and Hegel and their concept of man as center and agent of social actions to Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann, for whom society is the focus in its complex net of interrelated systems. Thus, indictments, convictions, and penalties go around and beyond the subject. Should this be true, the path would be open for a major revision of some basic trends of Western legal thinking.

The extension of the "repented" laws to organized and economic crime could further undermine the legal system. Whether the practical advantages would offset the loss of basic principles of the legal structure of the society is questionable. Terrorists can "repent" if we assume, in the rather cloudy usage of the term, that they have abandoned their project of subversion or, at least, their choice of violence to express political dissent. But a Mafia member does not have a political ideology to abandon, and an economic offender rarely sees himself as a criminal in need of repentance and forgiveness.

One interesting study by A.J. Nassi (1981) has examined, 15 years later, a large group of Free Speech Movement activists arrested in the Sproul Hall sit-in of 1964, comparing them with student government members and subjects from the general Berkeley student population. The activists appear not to have abandoned their radical political philosophy, but they are less politically active, and accept the fact that change can happen inside the political system. They endorse leftist politics; their occupations are in social service or in creative jobs. They show moral commitment and principled moral judgment. As Keniston (1968), quoted by Nassi, stated, one of the dilemmas facing a radical is to have to remain committed while at least formally becoming part of the system. The career choices of the former activists reflect both their political ideology and the search for a channel for their energies.

The above does not imply that exiting terrorism can be as simple as entering an ecology group, or getting a job at the Environmental Protection Agency. Activists are not terrorists. The element of violence, acted out or even only vicarious, must be deprogrammed from the exiting terrorist. However, cooption into the system would permit savings on expensive (and ineffectual) prisons, defusing terrorism by allowing dissent and rechanneling strong energies and commitments. Of course, ecologists may be infiltrated, and some evidence points to such processes in some countries. Separation and identification of a bona fide ecologist from a repented terrorist and an infiltrator sponsored by a foreign power may be the most difficult task facing intelligence in the current decade. Difficult as the process may be, it is amply worthy of our attention. Repentance without cooption is only a tactical tool, and not a final solution.

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Provisional IRA—A Study in Contradictions

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Introduction

In this discussion paper, it is my intention to pose more questions than I provide answers to. My aim is to highlight inconsistencies and misperceptions.

How can an organization commonly regarded as aspiring to Marxist aims be so strongly supported by a traditional conservative group such as Irish-Americans? Is the Irish Republican Army (IRA) Marxist? How important is the American link? What importance does the IRA give to links with other international "terrorist" groups? Does the existence of the IRA pose an international threat—within the United Kingdom, and Europe?

In keeping with the symposium theme, I hope to reveal, in examining the above topics, inconsistencies that are open to exploitation by those democratic institutions empowered to eradicate terrorism. I intend to concentrate almost exclusively on the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in the interest of brevity, and I will rely heavily on published articles and texts.

Survival

How has the IRA survived as an organisation for nearly 70 years (the last 15 years being the most relevant) in a democratic state, confronted by one of the most adept, skillful, and technologically equipped security forces in existence?

Theorists have suggested several factors:

1. Propaganda manipulation, possible through the existence of a free press.
2. Self-imposed limitations on the British response (a "sense of fair play" inherited from hundreds of years of benign imperial rule).
3. The international climate—a growth in popular support for national liberation movements worldwide.
4. Birth of terrorist movements in other countries—providing international links and widening the "theatre of action."
5. Development of states supportive to terrorist movements—Libya, Iran, etc.¹

While important, these are external factors—the water in which the fish swims. They assume that the PIRA has survived because of favorable conditions, and ignore perhaps the most important factor—the ability of the PIRA to adapt, to assimilate a number of divergent trends and react quickly to a change in the environment.

One reason for it (i.e. survival) must be the variety of ideological currents which have been subsumed under the Republican banner - and to include (although uneasily) fascist and socialist tendencies within its ranks.²

Certainly within the past 15 years we have seen many examples of fascist tendencies within the PIRA, but more recently the new Northern leadership has been seen expounding Marxist philosophy.

...an extraordinary alliance of orthodox communism, the Islamic revolutionary left, and militant Irish America.³

Is there an inconsistency here? I would say yes.

It is extremely important to recognise that the PIRA remains very closely tied to that traditional support derived from the large Irish community in the United States. Given the importance of this support (particularly in finance) and also the need to retain traditional Catholic/Republican support in Ireland, the PIRA has been careful both to play down some of its relationships with extreme left, international terrorist groups and supportive states and also to cover the Marxist trend of some of their leadership.

Maria McGuire, writing about PIRA fundraising activities in the United States, stated, concerning representatives: "...on no account should anything be said against the Catholic church or about socialism."⁴

The importance the PIRA places on this American support poses two questions:

1. How important is it in effect?
2. Why do Irish-Americans support an ideology that is contrary to their religious and political beliefs?

President Kennedy, an "Irish-American" hero, was prepared in 1962 to risk global war to prevent military support to a nascent ideology (Cuba) that many would compare with that of the future PIRA.

The United States Connection

American support to the PIRA is important in two main areas—finance and weapons supply (both direct and as origin of manufacture). "Today there are five Irish-American persons in America for every Irishman in Ireland and it is these immigrants who provide the bulk of the money and arms to the IRA."⁵

Irish Northern Aid (NORAI) is the Provisional's main fundraising organisation in the United States and is the major source of IRA funds from abroad. The amount of money raised annually by NORAI cannot be accurately

assessed. A large proportion is not forwarded to Ireland but retained in the United States for PIRA arms purchases. Perhaps as much as \$750,000 to \$1,500,000 may be available.

Many Irish-Americans donate to NORAIID on the understanding that the money is raised for the purpose of "feeding and clothing the homeless, the hungry and the naked" (NORAIID Director Michael Flannery, March 11, 1975).

Martin Galvin (overpublicised), Director of Publicity, has long protested: "We support the struggle for freedom in Ireland morally. We have no direct connection with the IRA in any sense. We certainly do not supply weapons or do anything of that regard."

Unfortunately, too many Irish-Americans with ideas based on romantic myths believe this. The facts totally refute Galvin's claim:

*In 1973, James O'Gara was given a five-year suspended sentence for using false identification to purchase arms. He was an active NORAIID official and co-chairman of the NORAIID annual dinner dance in 1976....In June 1974, Joseph Myles was sentenced to two years in jail in Toronto, Canada, for conspiracy to export arms to the Irish Republic. Canadian police described him as 'an executive officer of a US organisation, Northern Irish Aid.'*⁶

In November 1982, Flannery and four co-defendants were acquitted on charges relating to the shipment of arms to the PIRA, following an arms seizure in the United States that included a 20mm cannon with shells, a flamethrower, 21 shoulder and handguns together with 12,500 rounds of ammunition, and boobytrap bomb components. Flannery admitted in court to a long-term involvement in financing IRA arms deals.

On August 11, 1984, Richard Lawlor, a NORAIID official, stated at Coalisland, County Tyrone, in response to a speech by Owen Carron, Sinn Fein member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, "I would not discourage people from sending guns here...it's probably the moral duty of every Irish-American to get these guns to ensure democracy."

And what of the weapons purchased by this finance?

From 1969 until November 1984, a total of 2,843 weapons believed to be of American origin have been recovered in Northern Ireland. At present, weapons of such origin are believed to be in PIRA hands. In the same period, a total of 2,264 weapons of U.S. origin have been linked to 3,789 shooting incidents.

Over the years, the most common weaponry identified have been Armalite rifles, Garand rifles, M1 carbines, and Colt pistols. "Prestige" weaponry has included the M60 machinegun. In August 1976, a number of weapons, including seven M60 machineguns were stolen from a National Guard Armory at Danvers, Massachusetts. All seven of these weapons have been recovered, three in the Republic of Ireland and four in Northern Ireland. The most recent recovery of one of these weapons was in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, on August 7, 1982. The use of these M60s has resulted in the total of 11 persons killed and 18 injured, including 3 civilians.

It is important to note that "origin of manufacture" does not necessarily mean that the weapon was shipped direct from the manufacturer. The current arms market is full of weapons of U.S. origin obtained from other accredited "end users." However, investigations have shown that at least 1,000 weapons have been purchased in the United States by or on behalf of the PIRA and shipped to Ireland.

Within the past few years the Garde Siochana, in cooperation with the FBI, has made a significant contribution in stemming the flow of arms from America.

In May 1982, 38 rifles, 11 handguns, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered in a container in New York en route to Dublin docks. In March 1983, a former Aer Lingus luggage loader at Dublin airport was jailed for 4 years on charges connected with the importation and attempted importation of arms from New York to Dublin in May 1981.

On September 29, 1984, the Republic of Ireland Navy intercepted the "MV Marita Ann" off the coast of County Cork. Five men were arrested, including Martin Ferris, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Approximately 164 firearms and 70,000 rounds of ammunition were recovered.

Why Irish-Americans continue to provide this assistance is seen as "...one of the most remarkably successful disinformation campaigns in recent history."⁸ "The Provisionals have carefully disguised their objectives behind the traditional symbols of Irish nationalism."⁹

Are the PIRA Marxists?

The Ideology

A great deal has been made of the "anti-Communism" of the PIRA in the early years of its existence. This is, however, taking too simplistic a view of the factors behind the 1970 split in the Irish Republican movement.

While the ideological shift to the left of some members of the organisation (notably those prominent in the abortive 1956-62 military campaign) was a factor, a greater factor behind the early PIRA leadership was "realpolitik," the motive of getting militarily involved. They wanted to exploit the backlash and civil disturbance created by the civil rights movement.

In taking this action, the PIRA in effect was rejecting the conventional Marxist line that revolution can be created only by historical forces, not by actions of individual groups. The preconditions for the mass rising of the proletariat did not exist, and what should have been limited action by the vanguard became the spearhead and driving force. This concentration on terrorist actions effectively cut the PIRA off from conventional Marxist mainstream parties such as the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI). The PIRA reverted to its nationalist roots with traces of socialism.

It is hard to see how any Marxist philosophy in the early 1970's could have combined the IRA with a mass working-class movement. The former was traditionally Catholic, nationalist, and republican. In Northern Ireland, the Protestant working class is potentially a powerful force, and steeped in unionism; the Catholic working class inherently weak, being generally rurally based.

The Workers Party, the descendant of the political wing of the Official IRA, canvasses strongly across both religions and has remained consistent to the Marxist ideology, attempting to bridge the sectarian divide with elements of the Irish nationalism of James Connolly.

Throughout most of the 1970's, the PIRA avoided concerted political activity, believing that victory—that is, British withdrawal—lay in a military campaign against military and commercial targets.

It was the 1981 hunger strike that really had as devastating an effect on the PIRA as the 1970 split. The success of the hunger strike to the IRA lay in that it allowed the IRA to reestablish itself in the heroic mould and to reaffirm its legitimacy in a historical context. The PIRA leadership initially was totally opposed to the hunger strike, seeing it doomed to failure—a failure that, in establishing martyrs, became a success.

But the hunger strikes had a far more significant impact on the IRA itself:

1. The mobilisation of public opinion around a particular issue, especially an emotive issue, could be exploited as support for the movement and become a powerful propaganda tool.

2. The contesting of elections provided a base to build an enduring political organisation.

3. A political organisation was a necessary prerequisite for taking power.

That the PIRA could contemplate these issues only 10 years after leaving the Official IRA because of its emphasis on political activity is truly remarkable. It can be seen as the imposition of an ideology upon the movement by its new "officer elite."

The transformation is alien to much of the rank and file, the bulk of whom remain, as in 1970, traditional, deeply conservative republicans. The talk of socialism, "going political," and contesting elections makes them decidedly uneasy. They remember the path the "old IRA" took in 1969 that led to the split in the movement.

These concerns led Gerry Adams to tell an interviewer in Dublin in 1979: "There is no Marxist influence within Sinn Fein. It simply isn't a Marxist organisation."

This assertion is half true. The organisation, in toto, is not Marxist but there are those in the leadership who do not hide the influence of Marxism on their thinking. Gerry Adams, elected a vice president of Sinn Fein in 1978, is one. The Sinn Fein (sometimes referred to as the Provisional Sinn Fein or PSF) is the political wing of the PIRA.

Another of the young Northerners who began to influence the ideological stand of the PIRA/SF was Danny Morrison. The editor of *An Phoblacht*, Morrison captured the new ideology through his much-quoted "ballot and bullet speech" made at the 1981 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis. "Will anyone object [to audience] if with ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland?"

With the election of Adams as president of Sinn Fein in 1983, the policy of forming a broad popular movement (traces of Marxism there) as an adjunct to the military struggle was complete.

The support in republican areas during the hunger strike, later translated into 90,000-110,000 votes in subsequent elections, was seen by many as the creation of the "mass movement" the IRA had lacked in the early 1970's.

The rapid politicisation of 1981-83 led the PIRA to look around for a political creed. It was natural to turn toward the "broad spectrum" of Marxism. Traditional nationalist/republicanism could not be considered by the new "young" political elite; that trend was embedded in

the political institutions of the Irish Republic, which for 12 years had opposed the PIRA.

Marxism with all its vagaries and deep meanings (how many different strands currently exist in the world?), was ideal for this situation. It had many answers to some of the questions posed (with rhetoric if nothing else) and was a focal point with many international "freedom fighters."

But by 1984 a number of "hiccups" occurred:

First, this Marxism might upset the U.S. supporters. While the disinformation process was a good shield, it could not cover too overt a declaration of Marxist principles. A number of top SF figures started publicly to deny their Marxist leanings. The terminology has never figured strongly in publications for international distribution. "Socialism" might still cause some discomfort in Irish-America but it was more acceptable—and anyway, nobody really understood what it meant.

Second, a number of PIRA activists were increasingly reminded of the move of the IRA toward political intervention in the late 1960's and were critical that political activity seemed to be dominating the armed struggle. The leaders were quick to redress the balance: "And the one thing I have to emphasise that all republicans are united on, is that electoral politics will not remove the British from Ireland. Only armed struggle will do that."¹⁰ (Danny Morrison). This balance between politics and military action is another apparent contradiction within the PIRA.

The contradiction of Mao Tse-tung's axiom that "the gun must never command the Party" is not new in the IRA. "The Civil War (1922/3) was fought by military means, without political leadership and failed miserably (because the IRA rejected political authority, believing the 1922 Dail Eireann and Treaty repudiated its aims). The 'call for action' created the Provisionals in 1969."¹¹ The IRA gun controls the Provisional Sinn Fein.

However, all military operations must have an overall political purpose. A purely military revolutionary movement can never make sense and gives added credence to the belief that violence and terror are the very "raison d'être" of the PIRA.

Third, the political process in 1981-83, intended to project "32 county socialism," was in effect swamped by nationalism. The latter overwhelmed socialism and not vice versa. There never has been, and it is hard to see in the future, any chance that this nationalist base of the struggle will ever be replaced (as per James Connolly) by a socialist or class base.

In Northern Ireland the religious factor stemming from perceived cultural loyalties and historic allegiances transcends purely class divisions. Sectarianism has been stronger than class conflict.

PIRA members have an increasingly ambivalent (and contradictory) attitude toward the Catholic Church. On the surface the PIRA tries to reconcile with the doctrines of the Church. "The Provisionals argue that they can be good Catholics by appealing to the ultimate sanctity of the conscience. They strive to make a distinction between religious and political dogma and they reserve the right to use violence in a just war."¹²

Again the "image" for U.S. and Irish Republic consumption is important.

One of the first IRA actions in 1969 was the "defence" of a Catholic Church, St. Matthews in East Belfast, against loyalists. "It is unlikely today, following the attitude of the Church over the decade, that the Provisionals would go to the aid of a church as Billy McKee did over St. Matthews in 1969."¹³

Irish Republicanism has always seen itself as a unique force inherent to Ireland. The name Sinn Fein—Gaelic for "Ourselves Alone"—epitomises this belief that republicanism imbedded in Irish nationalism does not rely on outside ideologies. Much of the antipathy to Marxism stems from this tradition.

One of the means guaranteed to awake opposition to the PIRA is to identify it as a member of an "international terrorist network." An attack by the Workers Party at their Ard Fheis in 1981, labeling the PIRA as a "bloodthirsty sectarian gang akin to the Baader-Meinhof group," brought scathing replies from Sinn Fein.

Is this just another "denial" for consumption by Irish-Americans? How important are PIRA links with international terrorist groups? First, consider a European context.

PIRA—European Links

For all terrorist organisations, international links provide a means of access to training, finance, political support, publicity, solidarity, and operational support. Some of these links (e.g., solidarity) are seen as no more than a propaganda issue to publicise the cause for international support and represent no more than, for example, fraternal links between trade unions, banking houses, and so forth.

Broadly speaking, PIRA links with three types of organisations can be identified:

1. Irish Solidarity Groups.
2. Leftwing, professional groups (e.g., lawyers) who provide support for the PIRA (e.g., legal backing).
3. Active and involved terrorist groups.

The PIRA and the PSF have extensive links with extreme left Irish Solidarity Groups. These links often have a more sinister undertone in giving the PIRA access to indigenous terrorist groups through these ostensibly political pressure groups. These come very much under what political theorists call "contact groups."¹⁴ "The point about these links...is that it is not at all an international revolutionary conspiracy, but rather a network of tiny groups acting illegally that come across one another in their search for arms...."¹⁵

This, however, is too simplistic and has, I would contend, been discounted to some extent by our actual experience. There has been evidence of close ties with Western European terrorist organisations throughout the 1970's, although currently little direct contact with such groupings is evident.

Here we need to digress briefly to attempt to classify the PIRA and other international terrorist groups. Who is a terrorist and who a guerrilla/freedom fighter?

Paul Wilkinson¹⁶ suggests three groupings of terrorism:

1. Repressive terrorism,
2. Subrevolutionary terrorism, and
3. Revolutionary terrorism.

While the PIRA would fit into (3), so perhaps might the Red Brigades.

Generally Irish Republicans believe that the IRA's concentration on a nationalist outlook and predominant working-class support differentiate it from groups more oriented to class conflict and middle-class support, such as Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army Faction.

In an article in a German magazine, a spokesman for the PIRA (unnamed) replied to a question about support from the remnants of the Red Army Faction:

*If you are implying that we receive material or physical support from the RAF or similar organisations, the answer is categorically 'No'. We are a freedom army which is supported only by the suppressed people of Ireland. As a matter of principle we have nothing to do with such groups, who pursue aims different to our own. We are nonetheless allied to such groups who as we do attempt to free their own people from oppression.*¹⁷

And again, from the other side, a convicted member of the Italian Red Brigades, Antonio Savasta, involved in the

kidnap and murder of Aldo Moro:

*He denied the Red Brigades had any links with the Provisional IRA which he described as 'too nationalistic'.*¹⁸

Our intelligence would not completely concur with these statements but, again, they must be seen in an international context, particularly noting U.S. support and bearing in mind the Red Brigades' kidnaping of U.S. Brigadier General James Dozier in 1981.

In fact, the PIRA was "stung" to issue a denial of its involvement:

The IRA have repudiated an allegation that it is involved in any international 'terrorist' network or pact as claimed in a so-called Red Brigade statement quoted in the European and American Press. The Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin, said yesterday that this was not the first time that such a slur has been made against the IRA in an attempt to distort our true image abroad and confuse potentially sympathetic audiences.

*The statement signed by P. O'Neill said: 'In fact, the decision to lump the IRA with individualist groups has been taken at the very senior levels of European and American Governments as part of a propaganda drive to precede the introduction of repressive legislation aimed at abolishing the political status of political activists or refugees attempting to thwart extradition. We repeat, the IRA is a national liberation organisation aimed at ending British rule in Ireland and establishing a United Ireland.'*¹⁹

Enough of "public face" and propaganda, to which I shall return in my conclusion.

Western Europe has become increasingly important to Republican paramilitaries in recent years, partly because of some of the difficulties they have encountered in North America and the Middle East in acquiring weapons. An increasing number of Irish terrorists "on the run" from the British and Irish authorities have found their way to Europe. There are indigenous terrorist organisations, especially in Spain, France, West Germany, and Italy. Nonindigenous terrorist groups—for example, Arabs and Armenians—operate widely on the Continent. Western Europe offers many British military, official, and commercial targets for Irish terrorists.

As the result of previously mentioned successes and increased cooperation and liaison between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Garda Síochána, and law enforcement agencies in the United States and Canada, a trend was identified in late 1981, when the PIRA switched some of its traditional weapons procurement to the Continental market. During the early part of 1983,

intelligence indicated that leading PIRA members were involved in attempting to smuggle arms from France to Ireland; again, close police liaison resulted in a lorry being searched at Le Havre in August 1983. An arsenal of weapons, including Soviet-made grenades; American, Belgian, and West German automatic revolvers; 12,000 rounds of ammunition; and magazine clips for Soviet Kalashnikov rifles, was recovered. The lorry driver, Michael McDonald from Dundalk, was charged with possession and transporting illegal weapons.

France is obviously a strategic point in the supply routes because of its geographical location and the sea-ferry connection. Some rather tenuous claims of PIRA connections with French terrorist groups have been made: "The IRA is training members of the outlawed separatist Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) according to France's top security chief."²⁰ It is, however, the acquisition of weapons and the access to British targets that attract the PIRA to the Continent.

In addition to the activities in France, a number of terrorist operations have been carried out by the PIRA against British targets in Germany. British military premises were bombed on several occasions in 1978 and 1979. A colonel with the British Army of the Rhine was murdered in February 1980 and two NCOs wounded in separate attacks in the following month.

Our intelligence would indicate that these, and the majority of PIRA-attributed operations, were carried out by PIRA members themselves, although local indigenous terrorist groups undoubtedly assisted in planning, "safe houses," and so on.

The terrorist group with which the PIRA is perhaps closest is the ETA Basque movement in Spain. There is evidence that ties were established with ETA in the early 1970's. Close links still exist between SF and EIA, ETA's political wing (or, rather, the political/military faction).

Since 1970, cooperation between European police forces has prevented consignments of arms from reaching the PIRA. There is considerable speculation (again confused by "origin of manufacture") that many weapons originated in Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union and its East European satellites have taken a great deal of interest in Northern Ireland and much propaganda has been directed at Britain. Over the years the RUC has collected an arsenal of weapons and explosives that originated in Warsaw Pact countries. In 1971 a consignment of weapons and explosives from

Czechoslovakia was intercepted at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam. Two years later the coaster "Claudia" was intercepted near Waterford and found to contain about five tons of arms and explosives, mostly of Soviet manufacture. Again, while Soviet weapons such as the AK47 have been employed, there is little recent evidence of direct supply.

PIRA—Middle East Links

Currently no firm evidence suggests that the PIRA and Arab groups have cooperated in actually carrying out terrorist operations. Cooperation, particularly with the PLO, has been strong in terms of training and arms supply.

In November 1977 approximately 3 1/2 tons of weapons from an Arab terrorist source were seized at Antwerp on board the "MV Towerstream." Contacts in the Middle East supplied the Soviet-made RPG7 rocket launcher (Bulgarian and East German versions have been found in Northern Ireland).

Activity between the PLO and the PIRA is graphically displayed in West Belfast. A typical piece of PIRA graffiti on a wall displays PLO and PIRA terrorists holding an RPG7 with the comment, "PLO-IRA. One Struggle." Again, denials of the links are published in the media.

In 1973 the seizure by the Irish Navy of the Cypriot vessel "MV Claudia" provided firm evidence of Libyan involvement in arms supply to the PIRA. While the weapons recovered were generally of Soviet/East European origin, origin of supply was established as Libyan.

It is hard to quantify Libyan financial aid to the PIRA and certainly some figures—"5m dollars" in the late 1970's²¹—seem inflated. Colonel Gadaffi, in an interview with America's *Time Magazine* in 1981, accepted Libyan support for the PIRA. "Colonel Gadaffi added that apart from the IRA and PLO, Libya had no connections with the other groups mentioned."²²

Following the siege at the Libyan Embassy in London in early 1984, and after the murder of a woman police constable in London, Gadaffi reacted to British diplomatic measures: "If the English government insists on its hostile attitude towards us, we will fight with all those hostile to it, and firstly the revolutionaries of Ireland...."²³

Other Soviet-backed states outside Europe and the Middle East (e.g., Syria, Cuba) have proclaimed solidarity with the PIRA, but there is no concrete intelligence of actual arms supplies or financial assistance.

The last area I intend to look at in this paper is the

destabilising effect that 15 years of PIRA activities has had, not only in a British but in a European context.

PIRA—Destabilisation

Terrorism in Northern Ireland and its effect have been portrayed by politicians and political commentators as Britain's Cuba and its Vietnam. A comment on a statement by the Right Honourable James Prior MP (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 1981-1984):

*It must have been all the more disconcerting for them to have read Mr. Prior's startling—some would say incautious—prediction of a Cuba-style regime emerging from the collapse of constitutional nationalism, North and South of the border.*²⁴

Another example:

*...the threat of a European Vietnam created by the unchecked terrorism of the Provisional IRA. This final threat is the most serious, for the Provisionals have been politicised by the European terrorist international and their marxist objectives now pose a serious threat to liberal democracy in Northern Ireland, the Republic and the United Kingdom.*²⁵

There is even historical text for those attitudes given by two men of widely different backgrounds. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote profusely on Ireland.²⁶ Initially Marx believed that the mass rising of the British working class would liberate the Irish working class (and nation) from imperial domination. Later, and inspired by the 1867 Fenian risings, he took the attitude that the Irish working class, throwing off the "colonial yoke," would be a liberating factor for the British "proletariat."

This divergence can still be seen today. Orthodox Communism sees the PIRA and sectarianism as influences in Northern Ireland diverting emphasis from the "true class consciousness."

Increasingly, socialist movements see the spread of ideas from Northern Ireland across to the British mainland. A reference to the inner-city riots in London and Liverpool in 1981:

*It is no coincidence that in 1981 as the revolutionary youth of Derry, Belfast and Dublin fought pitched battles on the streets against the British Imperialist Forces and their Loyalist and 'Free State' puppets so the unemployed youths—black and white—rose up throughout Britain against the British Imperialist State.*²⁷

There is no doubt that terrorism, both IRA and international, is having an adverse effect on European stability. Since 1973 Britain has been involved in the

European Economic Community in an attempt "to transcend the nation state."²⁸ While complex economic (EEC) and military (NATO) cooperation exists, in some areas (UK, Spain) the nation-state is itself under pressure. Terrorism has forced nations to strengthen, not weaken, their border controls. The PIRA has often attacked NATO through propaganda and direct attacks on British military personnel stationed in Europe.

In terms of the Irish Republic, the PIRA and the SF make no pretence of the fact that they do not accept the current constitutional arrangements as legitimate.

*I recognise that the vast majority of people in the 26 counties consider the state and its institutions to be legitimate. I still say that I don't consider it to be legitimate....It's a neo colony.*²⁹
(Danny Morrison)

The PIRA aim:

In Ireland under Sinn Féin—

*Only Irish citizens would be permitted to own or lease land. The big landlords would be dispossessed. Agricultural co-operatives would be set up, in which all members would have an equal say. Personal ownership of 'productive property', such as a large farm or factory, would be forbidden. No person or company would be allowed to rent out housing or accumulate wealth. All banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, and large industrial enterprises would be nationalised with workers control at all levels of industry and services. There would be no 'multinational filth'. Membership of the common market would cease and the New Ireland would try to associate itself with the non-aligned nations. A 200 mile fishing zone would keep out foreigners, strict government control of technology would keep out imported innovations, a permanent 'Buy Irish' campaign would keep out competition, and radical changes in the educational system would keep out unwelcome meddling by the Roman Catholic and other churches. The present system of government would be demolished in favour of 'democratic decentralisation', people's councils, district councils, regional councils and parliament. National culture would be 'purely Irish'. The present legal system would be scrapped and replaced with a network of people's courts enforcing 'Irish laws for Irish people'. Emigration would be banned.*³⁰

The first step in this process has been ongoing in Northern Ireland since 1969. The PIRA has attempted to attack the legitimacy of the state through attacks on police, judiciary, commerce, and so forth. This is the true context in which the RUC operates. The threat is not only to the existence of the institutions of the state, but in simple terms to the existence of a state per se.

The early terror campaign in Northern Ireland was taken by the PIRA to mainland Britain.

PIRA—Operations in the United Kingdom

Since 1972, the PIRA has mounted terrorist attacks on the British mainland to gain publicity and attempt to put pressure on public opinion in favour of a "withdrawal" from Northern Ireland. During the late 1970's a series of horrific and indiscriminate bombing and shooting attacks occurred in London and provincial cities. However, the police had many successes, including the interception and arrest of an entire PIRA shooting team in London in 1975. As a result, PIRA attacks have become less frequent but more sophisticated. Recently, they have not only concentrated on so-called "military targets." In July 1982 a ceremonial troop of the Household Cavalry in Hyde Park and a military band giving a concert in Regents Park were attacked with remote-controlled bombs, causing many deaths and horrible injuries.

Recent events have been dominated by the PIRA bomb attack in Brighton on October 12, 1984, and its effect on security on the United Kingdom mainland. This event also will influence future PIRA activity within Northern Ireland. The Brighton bomb and the indiscriminate car bomb outside Harrods store in London in December 1983 are logical steps in the PIRA's aim to destabilise the United Kingdom to such an extent as to force a British withdrawal to prevent further spreading of the "malaise" from Northern Ireland.

Conclusion

Like Pandora, I feel I have opened the box and thrown out a few ideas on the international aspect of Irish Republican terrorism.

One of the factors I hope I have brought out is the relevance of propaganda to the subject. Every terrorist act is intended to give maximum publicity to the perpetrator, to spread fear, gain support.

A true understanding of the act is essential:

Unfortunately American television has helped the Provisional IRA and its Irish-American allies to increase their support among the Irish-American community.... Terrorism in Ireland is being conveyed to the United States in the most superficial, romanticised and simple-minded terms.³¹

And again:

They still see the problems in Northern Ireland as being solved solely and simply by getting the British to leave. They cannot

seem to understand that the philosophy of the Provisional IRA is opposed to every moral and political principle they hold dear and that the ultimate aim of Provisional IRA is to establish a dictatorship throughout the island of Ireland.³²

In summarising the international link, some conclusions can be drawn:

1. The PIRA is heavily dependent upon support for provision of finance and arms. The United States is important here. The Armalite rifle is one of the IRA's basic weapons.
2. Links exist with international terrorist groups at different levels.
3. There are countries, states, and organisations willing to provide the PIRA, directly or indirectly, with finance and weapons. Libya is involved, and both the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc have contributed to this end, though not directly. AK47 Kalashnikovs and RPG7 rocket launchers have featured prominently in terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland.
4. Training of PIRA personnel has been carried out in a number of countries—by, or in, Libya, with the PLO.

The overriding fact in the international link of the PIRA is that the movement relies almost *totally* upon foreign support, in all its guises, to sustain its terrorist campaign.

Notes

¹Martha Crenshaw, "The Persistence of IRA Terrorism." In Yonah Alexander and Alan O'Day, eds., *Terrorism In Ireland*. London: Croom Helm, 1984.

²E. Moxon-Browne, "The Water and the Fish." In Paul Wilkinson, ed., *British Perspectives on Terrorism*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

³M. Tugwell, "Politics and Propaganda of the PIRA." In Wilkinson, *ibid*.

⁴Maria McGuire, *To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA*. London: Quartet Books, 1973.

⁵Insp. P. Rogan of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors. *Irish Independent*, October 23, 1984.

⁶*Irish Independent*, October 10, 1984.

⁷*Irish Times*, August 14, 1984.

⁸Neil Hickey, "The Battle for Northern Ireland." *TV Guide* 29, September 26, 1981.

⁹R.J. Raymond, "The US and Terrorism in Ireland, 1969-81." In Alexander and O'Day, *Terrorism in Ireland*.

¹⁰*Magill*, September 1984.

¹¹Sean Cronin, *Irish Nationalism*. Dublin: Pluto Press, 1980.

¹²F. Burton, "The Politics of Legitimacy in Terrorism in Northern Ireland." In J. Lodge, ed., *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State*. Oxford: At the University Press, 1981.

¹³Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*. London: Fontana, 1980.

¹⁴M. McKinley, "The International Dimensions of Terrorism in Ireland." In Alexander and O'Day, *Terrorism in Ireland*.

¹⁵Paul Janke, "The Response to Terrorism." In *Ten Years of Terrorism: Collected Views*. London: Royal United Services Institute, 1978.

¹⁶Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*. London: Macmillan and Company, 1977.

¹⁷*Der Spiegel*, April 7, 1980.

¹⁸*Irish Independent*, May 4, 1982.

¹⁹*Irish News*, December 31, 1981.

²⁰*Irish Press*, January 12, 1983.

²¹Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981.

²²*Irish Independent*, June 1, 1981.

²³*Irish News*, April 21, 1984.

²⁴*Belfast Telegraph*, November 18, 1983.

²⁵Raymond, "The U.S. and Terrorism in Ireland."

²⁶C. Desmond Greaves, *Marx, Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978.

²⁷David Reed, *Ireland: The Key to the British Revolution*. London: Larkin Publications, 1984.

²⁸Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain*. London: New Left Books, 1977.

²⁹*Magill*, September 1984.

³⁰*The Times*, April 22, 1984.

³¹Raymond, "The U.S. and Terrorism in Ireland."

³²P. Rogan, *Irish Independent*, October 23, 1984.

to the Border Area. He attended the Police Staff College at Bramshill, England, in 1976 and 1979. He was made an Officer of the British Empire by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in 1982.

Trevor E.T. Forbes

Trevor Forbes joined the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1950. He rose through the various ranks to his present position of Assistant Chief Constable and Head of Special Branch. Before taking over his present role, some of the posts he held were Head of Force Community Relations Branch, Head of Traffic Branch, and Operations Officer

Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany

by Reinhard Rupprecht

Deputy Director of the Federal Police Division,
Federal Ministry of the Interior, Bonn

Introduction

Definition of Terrorism. There are many different definitions of the terrorism phenomenon and extensive use of the term. To mark off terrorism from other kinds of politically motivated violence, I propose the following definition—taking into consideration the description by the U.S. State Department:

Terrorism is a *strategy*

- using criminal violence in a conspiratorial clandestine way
- to threaten and frighten individuals, and/or the public and the government
- with political motivation and for political purpose.

International Terrorism. Regarding international terrorism, the following trends have been evident in the last few years:

1. The international terrorist scene and its activity have grown: They have spread over all continents. Nearly 200 casualties were registered in 1983; since 1979, 4,300 have been wounded and more than 200 killed.
2. There has been an increase in the number of states supporting terrorist acts to influence policies of other countries, to establish or strengthen regional or global influence, and to terrorize dissident exiles. Most of the targets of these state-sponsored incidents were foreign diplomats and prominent leaders.
3. Targets of international terrorist attacks are not only top diplomats but those of lower rank. They are going down the diplomatic scale.
4. Geographically, Europe (Spain, Great Britain, and Greece) and the Near and Middle East seem to be the most problematic fields at present.

Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany

Terrorist groups. Social revolutionary terrorism in the FRG came into existence in the 1960's:

1. The *Red Army Faction* (RAF) committed arsons, bombings, kidnappings, and murders. Their most active years were 1972 and 1977, when they killed the general prosecutor and several prominent representatives of the economic system. After failure in hijacking an airplane to Mogadishu, the former leaders of the group (Baader-Meinhof, Ensslin, Raspe) committed suicide in prison. Other group members continued living in the underground or in other countries in Europe and the Near East; some are still active. Last year the RAF succeeded in recruiting

several new members. After a bank raid and the capture of many weapons, this terrorist group seems to be ready for new activities.

2. The so-called "*Second of June Movement*" dissolved itself in 1980 after some kidnappings and explosive attacks.
3. The *Revolutionary Cells*, existing and active since 1973, claimed responsibility for more arsons and bombings from year to year. They have a decentralised organisation structure and demonstrate "resistance," using whatever measures might be appropriate in given circumstances, whenever a particular issue is of concern to the "masses."
4. A lot of other—mostly unknown—groups use social conflicts and political issues on the national, regional, or local level as the motive and legitimation for arsons and bombings. A total of 416 terrorist actions of this kind were registered in 1983 (346 arsons and 70 bombings). The number in 1984 will be reduced by half.

Roots and Reasons. To find out roots and reasons of terrorism is important for understanding the phenomenon and for finding measures of prevention. A scientific interdisciplinary research project in the FRG during 1978-1983 analyzed social revolutionary terrorism, among other things, and led to the following findings:

1. On *microlevel*

- Leftwing terrorists on the average had a better social background than the population in general.
- They had a higher education.
- Many of them suffered from biographical deficits (for example, death of one of the parents, divorce).
- Many of them left school or university class without final examination.
- Most of the later terrorists lived together with comrades in communes. This led to restriction of outside communication and to radicalism.
- The retreat from family and the ordinary way of life was followed by the influence of ideologies.

2. On *macrolevel*

- The leftwing terrorists in the FRG used only elements of ideologies that could legitimize their actions (Marxism-Leninism, existentialism).
- The development of terrorist groups was the "waste product" of the students' protest movement in the 1960's. This movement protested against real and supposed deficits in the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions ("consumism," "capitalism," "imperialism," "fascism").

- Mutual misunderstanding and "speechlessness" between the student protest movement on one side and the police on the other side led to escalation of violence right down to terrorism.

Terrorist Weapons. Nearly all terrorist actions in the FRG nowadays are arsons and bombings. But contrary to trends of international terrorism, which has grown bloodier, the German "homemade" terrorism is not physically aimed at persons. Also in contrast to the international terrorist scene, fewer than 20 percent are bombings. The "guerrilla diffusa," as some of the groups call themselves, does not have enough financial resources and skill to operate on a high technical level.

1. *Explosives.* Mostly they use metal tubes or fire extinguishers, screwed on both ends, filled with self-made explosives (a mixture of "weed-ex" and sugar). Sometimes TNT is used as one of the military explosives, because it can be easily procured.

2. *Fuses.* Terrorists generally use prepared clocks as delayed action fuses. The tuner is exchanged with the wire of the igniter. Commercial batteries serve as energy. Igniters are often put in a condom filled with a mixture of chlorate and sugar.

3. *Incendiaries.* Mostly so-called "Molotov cocktails"—bottles filled with a mixture of gas and oil—are used as incendiaries.

Terrorist Targets. In 1983, 44 percent of the terrorist attacks in the FRG were directed against public and social institutions, and 56 percent were directed against private enterprises (including energy installations).

Other information on targets:

- 11 percent of the attacks were aimed at police institutions and police cars
- 7 percent against local authorities
- 4 percent against courts and prisons
- 5.4 percent against schools and universities
- 4 percent against political parties
- 3.4 percent against public transport
- 2 percent against post offices
- 1 percent against embassies or consulates
- In 22 percent of the attacks the target was a construction enterprise
- In 6.2 percent a bank
- In 5 percent a department store
- In 4 percent an enterprise in connection with armaments

- In 4 percent computer firms
- In 3 percent an energy installation
- In 3.7 percent a private corporation.

Seventeen attacks were directed against apartments of foreigners.

Taking all city institutions (authorities, transport, and energy installations), 13 percent of the attacks (26 percent of the bombings and 12 percent of the arsons) were aimed at them.

Relatively, the most terrorist energy was directed against computer firms: Half of the attacks against them were bombings.

The spectrum of targets—official institutions and private firms—reflects the symbolic aims and motivation of the terrorists. Principally the groups acting in the FRG fight against what they call imperialism and colonialism, capitalism, and consumism. Most of the selected targets have a symbolic meaning for terrorists, for example:

Banks stand for capitalism

Department stores for consumism

Military installations for imperialism

"Multis" for colonialism in the Third World.

Response to Terrorism

There is obviously no patent solution for combating terrorism, but it is important to see the complexity of the instruments of the broad spectrum in the FRG.

Task Forces. There are special units of carefully selected, vigorously trained, highly motivated men in all of the 11 Lander. The federal task force—the "GSG 9"—consists of 200 men with three combat units as nucleus, each with one command element and five combat teams of five men.

The decisive tactical advantage of this "unconventional" team structure are

- fighter command procedures
- greater mobility
- better communication
- greater range of use and strong firepower
- interchangeability of all members and functions
- better organisation of reserves within the unit.

Computerized Intelligence and Investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (BKA) has developed two special files for combating terrorism:

- The PIOS-system, a file for nonevaluated information about persons, institutions, objects, and addresses in connection with terrorist suspicions. As a fifth category of this system *events* will be added. The specialty of the system is the possible automatic connections among the five categories.

- A data file of persons who are under suspicion, but not wanted for arrest. Being recorded in this file, they are to be registered whenever they are controlled by police, especially crossing the border. The police agency which put the data of a potential terrorist in the system gets notice about when, where, in which car, and with which persons the suspected person has been controlled. Thus contacts and movements of this person can form a mosaic picture on a long-term basis.

The German domestic intelligence service uses a similar computerized system to recognize potential terrorists or persons being potentially in contact with terrorists.

Political Response. In the long term, terrorism of violent social protest can be eliminated only by diminishing roots and reasons for this protest. As long as terrorist groups try to legitimate their actions by social deficits and political conflicts, the best and most difficult way to destroy this legitimation is the serious attempt to solve such conflicts and to give—especially the youth—realistic possibilities to take part in the decisionmaking process in the community. The government has to make clear that terrorism is not a form of legal resistance against legitimate democratic decisions.

Protection of Nuclear Facilities. Terrorists intend to destroy nerve centers of the nation. Nuclear facilities are in any case excellent targets for terrorist attacks and threats. Their physical security must be independent of actual threats and has to correspond to the various possibilities of terrorist attacks, for example:

- invasion into sensitive areas
- assistance or terrorist operation by an insider
- stealing of nuclear material
- taking as hostage an operator of the nuclear installation
- bombing of nuclear facilities.

It is necessary to describe all the different types of threats and the possible tactics of attacks and to ensure physical security under all conditions. The broad spectrum of conceivable tactics requires the installation of a security system in many steps, from several barriers inside and around the facilities up to special measures of border control and international cooperation. It requires the use of

all reasonable methods of protection and defense, ranging from intelligence and information analysis to security checks of all personnel in the facilities, from modern security technology to special preparation of taskforce units.

Reinhard Rupprecht

Reinhard Rupprecht is the Deputy Director of the Federal Police Division, Ministry of the Interior, Bonn, West Germany. He is deputy to the director in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Border Patrol. He was a Division Chief in the Munich Police when the 1972 Olympics were held in that city.

Organizing To Meet the Threat

by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley

Director, Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning
Department of State

As I look around me at my colleagues on this panel, I am reminded that in each of your countries, terrorism has been and continues to be a frightening reality. You have all seen the effects of the assassin's bullet, of the random bomb. For you, this gathering is not an academic exercise, but rather one more avenue from which to approach a very real problem.

We in the United States have felt relatively little direct impact as a nation. Our losses have been relatively small—intimately touching only a very few people—and there is no credible domestic threat now or in the foreseeable future (why, I am not sure—mostly due to circumstances beyond our control). However, abroad we are the number one target for international terrorism, followed by Israel and France. And our commitment to combating this menace is no less strong than if the wolf were at our own door for, if I may quote Benjamin Franklin, "...we must all hang together or, most assuredly, we will each hang separately."

The Department of State began several years ago to organize itself to become the focal point within the U.S. Government for dealing with international terrorism. Over the past 5 years we have tried several configurations and have now settled down into a reasonably effective structure. It positions us to provide reasoned judgments and recommendations to our political leaders, allowing the Nation to work more closely with our allies and to support and protect our missions and citizens abroad. Last year, the President designated the State Department as lead agency within the U.S. Government for a greatly expanded antiterrorist program. More important than the structure (which I will describe in a moment) is the determination of President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, of which you are already aware, to confront international terrorism wherever and however it may be manifested.

At the senior working level, the United States has established the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. I am the chairman and the membership is composed of senior officers from each of the major agencies at the cabinet level. The function of the IG/T, as we are known in bureaucratic shorthand, is to develop policy recommendations for consideration by the National Security Council and the President. Included among the agencies represented on the IG/T are the Department of Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department of Justice (which administers immigration) and the FBI; the Department of the Treasury, which is responsible for the Secret Service, Customs Service, and

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Federal Aviation Administration; the Department of Energy; and the Office of the Vice President.

Others may also be present, depending on the issues to be examined. These range from consideration of possible improvements in U.S. domestic legislation, bilateral treaties, and multilateral conventions; through collection, analysis, and exchange of intelligence; to programs for assistance to or exchange with other governments in various fields of antiterrorist activity, better physical security and warning systems for our missions abroad, and the consideration of more active measures to deter or preempt terrorist action. The IG/T also has a Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), whose objective is to exchange information and coordinate R&D on technical measures to counter terrorism, and an Exercise Committee, which coordinates national-level, multiagency, counterterrorism exercises.

My office, the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, provides both a focal point for planning and a resource base for supporting a broad, interagency examination of terrorism in its myriad forms and of how to counter it, as well as a coordinating group to implement findings. To do these tasks, we are organized into three basic divisions: Counterterrorism Policy, Antiterrorism Assistance, and Emergency Planning and Exercises. The size of the total staff is small: It has been only 17 persons but will expand to 30 this year to cope with the added responsibilities. Its role, however, will remain primarily one of coordination and technical support rather than direct operations.

The first group, Counterterrorism Policy, is intended to have a strong analytical base. Its officers are grouped according to both geographic and functional specialties in order to provide us with, for example, an officer well-versed in the terrorist patterns in region X, including modus operandi of specific terrorist groups, attitudes of regional governments, and strengths and weaknesses of particular regions. We would also have an officer on the functional side, competent in such matters as civil aviation, national and international law on the subject, terrorism patterns in air hijackings and, once again, strengths and weaknesses of the United States as regards hijacking. This pattern of geographic expertise coupled with specific functional knowledge is designed to interface with other bureaus at State and other agencies at the working level, in order to pull together for senior decisionmakers and the IG/T the kind of information they must have in formulating policy and resolving crises.

Let me, at this point, make clear that we do not kid ourselves that understanding the problem can, in and of itself, lead to acceptable solutions. The converse, however, is true; without understanding there can never be hope of finding solutions.

The second division of my office, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) group, is empowered under U.S. law to provide technical assistance to and conduct professional exchanges with the civilian antiterrorism authorities of friendly nations around the world. We do this primarily by utilizing the large and very comprehensive program of training that exists throughout the U.S. Government at all times.

Let me give one example: All of us will agree that airport security is a fundamental starting point in deterring aircraft hijacking. Anything that can be done anywhere in the world to make more airports safe is in the interest of any nation not directly allied with the terrorists themselves. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operates an academy in Oklahoma City where, among other things, it teaches courses in airport security, from the screening of passengers to baggage inspection to protection of aircraft on the tarmac. With the strong cooperation of the FAA (a member of the IG/T), we have blocked out seats in these classes for civilian aviation officers from around the world. Simultaneously, the Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service and Treasury's Customs Service provide us training space at their schools to help foreign officials improve their skills at detecting and deterring terrorists in a manner that complements that of the airport authorities and promotes smooth, interrelated activity.

Needless to say, our efforts do not stop at airport security nor at the programs of FAA, Customs, and Immigration. On the contrary, officers of the Antiterrorism Assistance unit work closely with a participating nation to develop an individualized set of programs that best reflect both the needs of the participant and our ability to meet those needs. This is one of our fastest growing programs, indicating both the commitment of more and more countries to combating terrorism and the determination of my Government to work within a framework of mutual deterrence. Although we began this program only last April, we already have active programs under way with a dozen countries and will begin new programs with three more in the coming months. Participants range from the small island states of the Eastern Caribbean to experienced, sophisticated governments such as Italy and Egypt.

While training assistance is obviously important, it is after all only a means to an end; that of more effective cooperation and coordination between like-minded governments. The ATA program is also concerned with developing and expanding a professional dialogue between civilian officials responsible for their governments' antiterrorism policy and programs. Hence this unit sponsors seminars and exchange visits, such as the one so successfully conducted with Italy last fall. A very prestigious and experienced group of Italian officials visited the United States and spent 2 weeks meeting and talking with their American colleagues. I assure you that those American officials, on both Federal and local levels, who had the privilege of listening to our Italian friends on the subject of countering internal terrorism will never forget the experience.

The third group within my office is devoted primarily to preparing our own people overseas to meet terrorist and other threats better. It deals with the development and assessment of emergency action plans for each overseas post, as well as developing and implementing simulations and exercises to test the emergency plans. The main function of these exercises, in fact, is to provide realistic training in crisis management under field conditions. The activities of the group affect personnel of all U.S. Government agencies assigned to U.S. Foreign Service posts abroad (and may, as well, affect private American and specified third-country nationals who might require assistance or evacuation in an actual crisis). It draws on the resources and expertise of those agencies (particularly the Department of Defense and the unified commands) and geographic and functional specialist officers from elsewhere in the Department of State to improve plan criteria, and to review, correct, approve, and—through the exercise program—test emergency plans.

This group also has the responsibility for working within the U.S. counterterrorist community on developing and participating in multiagency exercises. Where possible, we also cooperate with friendly foreign governments on bilateral exercise programs to test our mutual capabilities, policy assumptions, and coordination.

This group has, as well, the responsibility for dealing with nuclear and chemical/biological terrorism. While as yet no credible incidents have occurred in these two areas, we all clearly recognize their potential for serious damage and must therefore prepare for them. In this light, we work within our own Government through realistic simulations and exercises to develop the technical expertise required

to evaluate the credibility and the means effectively to counter any such threat. We are, as well, interested in working with our allies on bilateral exercise programs to develop better understanding of our mutual capabilities, share technical information, and provide for the most rapid system for notification when actual incidents occur.

Robert B. Oakley

Robert B. Oakley became Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning on September 10, 1984. From December 1982 until August 1984 he served as United States Ambassador to the Somali Democratic Republic. From November 1979 through August 1982 he served as Ambassador to the Republic of Zaire.

His assignments have included service in Khartoum, Abidjan, Vietnam, Paris, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Beirut. He received the Department's Meritorious Honor Award in 1963 for his work in United Nations Political Affairs.

U.S. Perspectives on Terrorism

by Oliver B. Revell

Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chief, Criminal Investigation Division

Terrorism and its effect on the orderly conduct of world affairs has become one of the burning issues of our time. We need look no further than recent events in the Mideast for confirmation that terrorist activity, if allowed to continue unchecked, can adversely affect fundamental national interests. It is perhaps clearer now than ever before that governments, particularly those that are looked to for constructive international leadership, have a responsibility to counter the terrorists' attempts at what is essentially extortion.

Responding to this threat is considerably more difficult for a democratic society than for a totalitarian state. Repression by government is what most terrorist organizations seek, for it frequently leads to additional public support for the terrorist group. In the United States, our response must be carefully measured so that the openness we enjoy and the freedom we cherish are not destroyed.

The FBI has been designated the lead Federal agency in combating terrorism in the United States. In order to understand our approach, a definition will be helpful. The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. The FBI divides terrorism into either domestic or international categories on the basis of the origin of the group and the scope of its activities. If a terrorist group is one that originates within the United States and has no foreign funding, direction, or influence, it is domestic. If, on the other hand, the group originates outside the United States, is funded or directed from without the United States, and/or conducts activities that transcend national boundaries, it is international.

In discharging its responsibilities, the FBI has a dual mission: The first is preventive and is characterized by aggressive efforts to collect, analyze, and appropriately utilize all legally obtainable intelligence concerning terrorist groups that pose a threat; the second is reactive and involves responding to and investigating criminal acts committed by terrorist groups.

The emphasis of this symposium is on the preventive side. How do we outthink the terrorist? By what means can the international community head off senseless violence? Of course, the FBI strives to prevent terrorist violence, if possible. If advance information is available we can, through already established means, defuse potentially catastrophic situations. Further, many times this

information can be used as evidence in prosecutive actions.

To obtain advance information for use in preventing terrorist acts, members of the international law enforcement and intelligence communities must maintain close liaison and be willing to share critical information when the need arises. To successfully counter worldwide terrorism, a coordinated international response is essential. The key to that coordinated response is cooperation within the community.

Intelligence Collection

The FBI, as an operational agency, gathers information within a law enforcement framework to establish an intelligence base sufficient to identify and respond to terrorist threats. Data is gathered utilizing lawful techniques such as interviews, informants, undercover operations, and physical and court-authorized electronic surveillances. Additionally, we receive information from the U.S. intelligence community and from foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Our international terrorism cases are investigated under the Attorney General's Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines and the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Although the exact number of these investigations is classified, they far outnumber the cases involving domestic terrorist groups.

Our domestic security/terrorism investigations are best understood if terrorist organizations are viewed as criminal enterprises. Like other investigations of criminal enterprises, for example in organized crime, these investigations not only entail determining who committed specific criminal acts, but also how those individuals relate to others similarly motivated, how they are financed and supported logistically, and who their leaders are. As in other criminal cases, we gather intelligence and evidence for prosecution. This approach allows us to focus on the total terrorist network rather than on what a particular group decides to call itself.

These investigations are conducted under the Attorney General's Guidelines for General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises, and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. Viewing terrorist organizations as criminal enterprises under these guidelines, we now open Domestic Security/Terrorism cases when facts or circumstances indicate that two or more persons are engaged in activity for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through the use of illegal force or violence.

Although collection techniques for investigating both international and domestic terrorist groups are basically similar, certain differences do exist. In international matters, electronic surveillances are usually conducted according to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). These surveillances are authorized by a specially constituted Federal court. While the primary purpose for these intercepts is the gathering of intelligence information bearing on the national security, provision is clearly made for the use of evidentiary material in prosecutions. Recent court decisions indicate that surveillances under FISA will continue to be valuable in both preventing and reacting to terrorist incidents.

Electronic surveillances in domestic cases are conducted pursuant to the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Here the justification threshold is higher than that required by FISA and the authorization period is generally shorter.

Investigation of international groups almost always requires working within émigré communities. It is in the nature of these matters that, while the group members may be U.S. citizens, they have usually retained a strong sense of identification with their homeland. Indeed, the factor motivating these people to terrorist violence is frequently a perceived injustice perpetrated not just on them individually, but on them as representatives of a national or ethnic group. In order to progress in these investigations, an Agent must become familiar with certain cultural mores and perhaps even be fluent in the appropriate foreign language.

On the one hand, the special knowledge required to collect intelligence in international cases is a problem because it takes time and money to train investigators. The good news is that the investment is generally repaid. The same émigré communities that lend succor to the terrorist also provide law enforcement officials with a constant supply of information which is used to prevent and react to violence. The support that any terrorist group has received in the United States has always involved only a small segment of the relevant ethnic community.

In the domestic sphere, language and customs are not normally barriers. Here the problem is that the groups operate underground and are usually organized in a tight cellular format. That is to say, small groups of four to five individuals operate semiautonomously, with compartmentation the rule. The purpose of this, of course, is security and it does indeed make our job difficult. Penetration of the domestic groups has proven to be a real

challenge, the result being that we often are forced into reacting to crimes rather than preventing them. It can, however, be argued that the FBI's recent success in arresting and taking out of circulation members of most domestic terrorist groups has in fact prevented further violence.

Intelligence Analysis

As information collection is an ongoing process, so is the analytical process to which the information is subjected. This analysis is meant to convert investigative data into intelligence that will be helpful in solving cases and forecasting future activity. It is important to our investigations to discern associations between individuals and between groups, corroborate information received from sources, establish patterns of activity, identify group leadership, and trace financial data.

Terrorist activity lends itself to the analytical approach. This is true because the groups are generally structured and tend to behave in ways that become somewhat predictable. We have found that while group membership changes with the passage of time, the motivating forces for group activity often remain constant. These motivations may be opposition to "U.S. imperialism," independence for Puerto Rico, opposition to the Castro regime, or any other issue. This constancy at least gives us a starting point since it helps us gain an understanding of our adversary.

What do change, to a degree, are specific targets and methodology. These changes are generally evolutionary in nature and responsive to changing world conditions. Thus, we find that many of the same individuals who were violent in the early 1970's in opposition to U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia are now violent in opposition to U.S. policy toward Central America. This is where analysis proves its worth. When faced with terrorist activity, such as that carried out over the past 2 years by the United Freedom Front (UFF), we frequently have few clues on which to act. Detailed study of incoming information in the light of past cases (sometimes going years back) where the motives seem to be similar often provides the essential key. The facts of the current matter may take on new significance if they can be seen to be at the end of a traceable evolutionary chain. In the case of the UFF, the analytical process succeeded in building a chain of ideology, bomb-building techniques, and *modus operandi* stretching from the old Weather Underground Organization to Top Ten Fugitive Raymond Luc Levasseur. Using this link to form an investigative hypothesis, the UFF case was solved, culminating in the

apprehension of Levasseur and seizure of evidence proving the hypothesis to have been correct.

An example of intelligence analysis leading directly to prosecution occurred in May 1984 when information was received that two Libyan nationals were in the United States attempting to purchase weapons. Against the backdrop of previous intelligence indicating the likelihood of Libyan nations targeting anti-Gadhafi dissidents in the United States, this reporting assumed a sinister cast. Accordingly, an undercover Agent was introduced into the situation. He developed information that the Libyans wanted illegal silenced weapons and intended, indeed, to carry out retribution against an opponent. Not only did this case exemplify our goal in preventing violent acts, but information obtained established a violation of Federal statutes and was the basis for subsequent conviction.

Another situation, in August through November 1984, involved information indicating that certain individuals in the United States were plotting assassinations and an eventual overthrow of the Government of Honduras. Through utilization of an undercover operation and corroborative source information, sufficient evidence was gathered for a number of arrests to be made.

These examples are but a few indicating that our analytical process is working. To facilitate this effort, the FBI has developed the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center at FBI Headquarters to analyze and computerize data on terrorists and terrorist groups in the United States. Finished intelligence analysis emanating from this group has offered key support to FBI Agents conducting terrorism investigations throughout the United States.

Intelligence Sharing

The FBI receives information from various U.S. and foreign agencies. Liaison with foreign law enforcement and intelligence services is maintained through our representatives abroad serving in the role of legal attaché. FBI legal attachés are located in 13 countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Canada, and the Orient. We also receive substantial assistance from representatives of foreign services posted in Washington, D.C.

For foreign terrorists operating in the United States, the cooperation of friendly foreign governments and/or special multinational entities in providing intelligence can be of great assistance. An example was the arrest by the FBI in December 1983 of a Corsican terrorist in Miami, Florida, based on information furnished by French authorities.

Of course, when we discover information that can be useful to authorities in other countries, we do not hesitate to share it with them. For example, in March 1984 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) arrested four members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia for the attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul in Ottawa in April 1982. The RCMP was able to make these arrests on the basis not only of its own investigations but also those of the Ottawa City Police Department and the FBI. Indeed, FBI surveillance and other investigative work facilitated the recovery of weapons believed to have been used in the assassination attempt. The evidence found by the FBI is regarded as crucial by the Canadian Government.

In another case, in May 1983 four Provisional Irish Republican Army members, who had been arrested in June 1982 as a result of an FBI undercover operation, were convicted on charges of procuring and illegally transferring firearms to Ireland. This operation demonstrated the success of a joint United States, British, and Irish law enforcement effort.

In keeping with our desire to foster international coordination, the United States law enforcement community has sought to increase Interpol's involvement. At its 53rd General Assembly in September 1984, in Luxembourg, Interpol adopted two resolutions regarding international terrorism. As a result, the 136 nations that participate in Interpol will be better able to pool and exchange information on suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. This information will help us in our investigations and may prevent some terrorist activity.

While the FBI is the "lead" Federal agency in combating terrorism in the United States, we could not be successful without the help of other Federal, State, and local agencies. A striking example was the effort culminating in the recent arrest of Raymond Luc Levasseur, mentioned earlier, which involved representatives from three State police forces, several FBI Field Divisions, and a number of local law enforcement entities.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, composed of FBI and State and local law enforcement officers, have been established in both New York and Chicago. The Chicago group was formed to focus on the criminal activity of the Fuerzas Armadas Liberacion Nacional (FALN), a Puerto Rican terrorist group. In New York City the task force was created to investigate the October 1981 Brink's armored truck robbery in Nanuet, New York, and has continued its operations against domestic terrorist groups in the

New York area. These task forces have succeeded in obtaining numerous arrests and convictions.

In addition, during the security preparations for the 1984 Summer Olympic Games, our Los Angeles Division was part of interagency effort to combat terrorism at the Games. This effort was cochaired by the FBI, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department. Together, we designed the Anti-Terrorist Operations Center (ATOC) that served as the intelligence clearinghouse and received and evaluated all threats. All personnel assigned to the ATOC, regardless of agency affiliation, were given "Top Secret" security clearances after a security background investigation.

The FBI will continue the practice of forming joint investigative groups whenever the situation in a particular area warrants such an approach. We have established joint task forces on an ad hoc basis, as in the cases of the Cuban Group Omega 7 in Miami and the U.S. Capitol, Navy Yard, and Fort McNair bombings in Washington, D.C. Such arrangements have worked extremely well.

With respect to policy on information sharing, the FBI is guided by the concept of "need to know." Intelligence about international terrorism is routinely disseminated to appropriate U.S. agencies and friendly foreign governments. This type of information has obvious impact on certain agencies' interests in a particular country as well as the government of the country in question. Of course, identities of sensitive FBI sources providing such data and methods of collection are protected.

In the domestic area, however, dissemination is not nearly as broad. Information passage has generally been restricted to situations where there is reason to believe that an agency's interest is in jeopardy. When information is developed indicating a specific threat to personnel or property, whether in the United States or abroad, this information is furnished rapidly. We also routinely disseminate information on individuals against whom criminal charges have been brought, especially if they are fugitives.

As previously stated, in the terrorism field the FBI gathers intelligence in a law enforcement context. We use this intelligence to prevent and react to terrorist incidents. This information often has evidentiary value for prosecutions. Further, terrorist sources providing this information are often in an extremely vulnerable position and any action taken based on their information risks compromising their safety. Where the risk must be taken to protect life or property, it will be taken. However, such risks, either to

a sensitive source or to potential evidence for prosecution, may not be taken simply for the sake of passage of information. Stated simply, if a bona fide "need to know" is established, the information will be shared and every effort will be made to protect the information and its source.

Conclusion

The FBI has enjoyed significant accomplishments against terrorism in the United States, particularly in the recent past when successes have been achieved against virtually all major terrorist groups, both international and domestic. As a result, the number of terrorist incidents has declined significantly in the past 2 years, decreasing from 51 in 1982 to 31 in 1983 to 13 in 1984. These reductions can be attributed in part to the success of the FBI and cooperating agencies in preventing some six terrorist incidents in 1983 and nine in 1984.

These figures clearly show that the FBI has seriously weakened the major domestic and international terrorist groups in this country. But we won't allow our successes to blind us to the potential for terrorist activity here. That will always exist; however, we are confident that we have taken appropriate steps to make sure that terrorists do not succeed in getting even a beachhead such as they have enjoyed for years in other parts of the world.

Aggressive pursuit from both the prevention and the reaction standpoints appears to be the successful formula. We will continue to improve our intelligence base through collection and analysis, and to cooperate even more closely with other elements of the international and national law enforcement and intelligence communities. To avoid the lawlessness and chaos created by terrorism requires vigilance and the highest degree of professionalism. Otherwise the terrorist wins his objective. For us, the ultimate objective is to keep citizens of the United States safe and free. The FBI is working very hard to do just that.

Unfortunately, this problem has become one of increasing intensity for other nations; the future does not look brighter. Terrorist activity has proved to be extremely effective in the amount of worldwide attention it generates. Consequently, it is likely to continue. This challenge of preventing terrorist attacks and bringing to justice those responsible for violent activity must be a topic at the top of the agenda of the international community.

Oliver B. Revell

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Mr. Revell holds a bachelor's degree from East Tennessee State University and a Master of Public Administration degree from Temple University. He is an active member of the American Society for Industrial Security and serves on the International Advisory Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Multinational Corporations' Response to International Terrorism

by Deborah M. Jacob

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The rapid rise of international terrorism in recent years has led to major changes in the response to this problem by multinational corporations. One change has been to bring the response function in-house. Whereas in the past many companies felt that this responsibility could be adequately handled by occasional or ad hoc meetings with consultants, now most major multinationals have assigned full responsibility to their own corporate security staffs.

The stakes can be very high in a confrontation with terrorists, and the responsibilities of a corporation to its employees, its stockholders, and even to national security, can be enormous. No substantial multinational corporation can afford to be without a carefully tailored, continuously administered, comprehensive program to deter or respond to international terrorist attacks.

The increased role of crisis management teams is another significant change. Many corporations have long had crisis management teams designed to handle domestic disasters such as fires, earthquakes, and tornadoes, or high-risk crises such as kidnaping or extortion. Now expanded or new crisis management teams are being asked to be prepared to respond to potential international terrorist threats.

The composition of a typical team would include the chief executive officer or senior executive officers, a senior international executive, the chief or a senior financial officer, the chief legal officer, a senior public relations officer, and the head of the corporation's security group. The purpose of these teams is to anticipate international security problems on a country-by-country basis, and to devise appropriate counterstrategies. Some teams also hold training sessions to test and practice their responses to simulated crises, such as bomb threats, extortion, kidnaping, or terrorist penetration of their organizations.

The crisis management team can also be very helpful to the corporate security department in identifying defensive strategies to minimize the possibility of a terrorist act against the company. Some of the more widely used strategies today are:

1. Know the host country. Be aware of cultural, religious, and attitudinal sensitivities that could spark a problem. Establish networks with other multinational corporations in the area to exchange information and to call upon for help if needed. Be acquainted with local government and law enforcement officials and with U.S. Embassy officials so you will know whom to call in case of emergency.
2. Hire the right people. Try to ascertain whether a managerial candidate for transfer to a foreign country has

the temperament to handle a crisis. Discuss the potential problems with the candidate and family in advance. Hire the right locals. Carefully screen applicants, especially household servants who may easily become familiar with the personal habits and plans of executives and their families.

3. Train for defense. One of the most important defensive strategies is countersurveillance, teaching employees to recognize the unusual or suspicious, such as a strange van that is parked in a position to observe the company's operations or the movement patterns of its people. Teach employees and families to vary the timing and the routes they take, to avoid routine patterns, to keep a low profile.

Know all of the exits or other escape routes from office and home. Keep a copy of the floor plan at an outside location. Teach employees evasion tactics to use if they become involved in a pursuit and survival tactics in case they are captured.

And, of course, teach them that they must use all of the standard security features, such as locks, safes, alarms, and guards, wherever a breach could be serious.

4. Select safe locations. Terrorists seldom attack individuals; most often they are attacking a country, an industry, or a corporation. Therefore, it is prudent not to select office space in a building in which another tenant may be a high-risk target. The building itself should, of course, have a high security rating in terms of construction and location.

5. Employ local managers where possible. More companies are attempting to employ native managers because they are less likely to be selected as targets. This trend will probably continue to accelerate as more local employees can be trained to fill top managerial positions.

I am sure the multinational corporations that have invested in these strategies would agree that they are, indeed, effective. However, as we all know, little can stop the true fanatic to whom dying for a cause is a guarantee of paradise. Nevertheless, an intelligent plan of defense can reduce the odds that a particular company will become a victim.

It is sad, but true, that fanaticism and terrorism have left a history of blood and bitterness throughout recorded history. The more rational majority of mankind has been unable to eliminate terrorism so far, but we can slow its

expansion by making it more difficult. And we must keep trying. To give up would be to destroy growth and progress in the cultural as well as business aspirations of civilization.

Deborah M. Jacob

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She presently serves on the Board of Directors of the International Banking Security Association, is an official observer to Interpol, the American Bankers Association Insurance and Protection Committee, California Bankers' Association Crime Deterrent Committee, the ASIS Standing Committee on Terrorist Activities, and was past chairperson of the ASIS Joint Chapters Olympic Task Force.

Terrorism: The Law As An Effective Deterrent

by E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.*

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Vocal and voluminous debate has occurred recently on what this Nation's response to terrorism should be. The emphasis of the discussion has been on distinguishing those circumstances calling for a military reaction from those that would suggest a diplomatic reply. Throughout, little, if any, attention has been paid to the effectiveness of a law enforcement response. If the law can be an effective deterrent to terrorism, the question boils down to whether our laws are sufficient or whether they need be changed or augmented to battle the terrorist threat effectively.

A review of terrorist acts committed within the United States or against U.S. targets in the last decade clearly demonstrates that the objective of the threat is not physical, but psychological. Even in those situations where death or serious bodily injury does not result, the psychological toll taken on the American public can be severe. Clearly, during the more than 400 days of the Iranian hostage crisis there was no suggestion that Iranian terrorists posed a physical threat to the might of the United States. Equally clear was the daily bombardment on our national psyche of the sights and sounds we saw on the evening news. Similarly, terrorist bombings in the United States by groups such as Omega 7 and the Weather Underground could never hope to bring the United States to its knees militarily. Nonetheless, they have been successful in striking a chord of fear. If the terrorist's target is the mind of the American public, then his or her purpose is to undermine the public's confidence in its institutions of Government.

What is necessary to combat this threat is to demonstrate stability, calmness, and confidence in the face of this adversity. An appropriate response, then, will show that these very institutions are as effective in dealing with a terrorist threat as they are in dealing with any other situation which can arise. If Government can successfully use two centuries of jurisprudence, founded on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, it reinforces public confidence in our system of Government and provides a strong example to other nations.

When groups such as Omega 7, the FALN, and the Weather Underground succumb to effective law enforcement, much of the terror is taken out of their past activities. An anonymous and violent Omega 7 successfully committing murders and bombings up and down the East Coast understandably strikes fear into the populace. Clearly, however, a ranting Eduardo Arocena, the war chief and one of the founders of Omega 7, seems hardly so dangerous when droning on from the dock of the

Federal courthouse in Manhattan. This is equally applicable, of course, to a Willie Morales or a Kathy Boudin. There is something historically comforting about the sight of a handcuffed criminal in the custody of a beefy marshal or agent. Make the criminal in that picture a trussed-up terrorist and normalcy supplants relief.

The effect of capturing and prosecuting these individuals is more than merely a psychological salve. As members of terrorist groups are located, arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned, the number and severity of incidents they and their followers are able to commit decline measurably. Additionally, the Government's ability to mop up the less experienced residue is increased.

Even state-supported terrorism can be effectively met by a strong law enforcement approach. When the Director and Deputy Director of the Chilean Secret Police and Intelligence Service (DINA) were indicted for planning and ordering the assassination in Washington of Orlando Letelier, world opinion regarding the Chilean military junta was severely affected. The transparent refusal of the Chilean Government to extradite those indicted defendants to the United States to stand public trial only reinforced world opinion as to their guilt. While Chilean citizens are being subjected to daily abuse by their Government at home, the exposure of Chile's international terrorist activities by a law enforcement investigation has apparently deterred that Government from continuing its abhorrent activities outside its borders.

Since our legal institutions can be effective in dealing with certain terrorist acts, the question remains whether there are sufficient laws to deal with most or all of the variety of terrorist acts that can be committed. While, among Federal, State, and local laws, statutes probably exist to cover virtually any type of terrorist act, the combination of greater resources and wider experience generally leaves effective law enforcement to the Federal Government. A terrorist calling his act a political assassination, capitalist expropriation, or political prison rescue does not change the act from a murder, bank robbery, or escape. Yet often even a large metropolitan city does not have the resources to deal effectively with the investigation of a terrorist act, especially if the investigative trail leads out of the country.

Current Federal law, especially with the addition of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, signed by the

*The views expressed herein are Mr. Barcella's and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice or the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia.

President on October 12, 1984, is generally effective in dealing with terrorist acts. Certainly, if the target is a U.S. official or a United States installation, Federal law provides effective statutory coverage to permit both Federal investigative jurisdiction and Federal prosecutive jurisdiction.¹ Similarly, Federal law provides effective coverage for terrorist actions against foreign officials and foreign property located in the United States.² Further, Federal laws regulating the use of firearms; the possession, sale, and use of explosives; and the possession of nuclear material provide sufficient legal linkage for Federal input.

Even obvious acts of terrorism, however, have not always fallen under Federal law. For instance, the July 1980 assassination in Bethesda, Maryland, of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, an outspoken anti-Khomeini leader, by a Black Muslim Khomeini supporter gave Federal officials fits searching for a jurisdictional linchpin. Tabatabai was not a foreign official as those persons are defined under Federal law, and murder, standing alone, is a local offense. Only because of the unique Federal status of the District of Columbia were Federal prosecutive resources allowed to be brought to bear. Similarly, when Eugene A. Tafoya, a former Green Beret, was dispatched by former CIA agent Edwin P. Wilson, acting on behalf of his Libyan benefactors, to assassinate a Libyan student in Colorado, investigative difficulties abounded. The Federal Government provided all the assistance that it could, but was unable to assume a major role because of its lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, hostage situations, unless the victim is a Federal or foreign official or is taken across a State line, rarely come within the sphere of Federal jurisdiction. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 sought to close some of these loopholes.

In a chapter headnoted as "Terrorism," the Federal law covering kidnaping has specifically been expanded to include a new statute called "Hostage Taking."³ The statute basically provides up to life imprisonment for any person convicted of taking a hostage in order to compel someone or some governmental organization to take or abstain from taking some act as a condition for the release of the hostage. The statute adds certain conditions. If the act occurs outside the United States, the statute does not apply unless the defendant or victim is a U.S. national, the defendant is found in the United States, or the organization to be compelled is the U.S. Government. Similarly, if the act occurs in the United States, by U.S. nationals against U.S. nationals, the statute does not apply unless the organization compelled is the U.S. Government. Although these exceptions are somewhat ponderous, the

statute does provide both Federal investigative and prosecutive jurisdictions for terrorist hostage taking, whether here or abroad.

The new act also now makes it a Federal offense to use an interstate or foreign commerce facility to commit a murder-for-hire.⁴ Unfortunately, the statute limits its own effectiveness by requiring that the act or attempted act be committed "as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for promise or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value." "Anything of pecuniary value" is further defined to mean "anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage." The anomaly here is that while a Eugene Tafoya or Edwin Wilson, whose motives were financial, would be prosecutable federally under this section, the primary alleged perpetrator of the Tabatabai assassination might be able to avoid Federal prosecution if, as appeared to be the case, his motives were political and philosophical. More incongruous still, the Libyan intelligence officers who directed Wilson to dispatch Tafoya might escape Federal prosecution if their motivation for ordering the act was noneconomic. Even the creation of a new section on solicitation to commit a crime of violence⁵ does little to close the gap left by the new murder-for-hire statute. A statute that proscribes someone from commanding or inducing another to commit a violent act, however, cannot be underplayed.

In recognition that aircraft constitute one of the major targets of terrorist activities, the new act has made aircraft sabotage a Federal crime.⁶

Beyond simply creating new legislation, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 also amended the existing legislation to further enable Federal law enforcement to fight terrorism. For instance, the Federal wiretap statute has been expanded to allow emergency authorization of electronic surveillance in situations that involve not only "immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person" or "conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime" but also "conspiratorial activities threatening the national security interest."⁷ The potential importance of this amendment cannot be overemphasized, since the schedule of offenses and circumstances permissible under the prior law severely restricted the legitimate use of sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment in certain domestic terrorist situations, especially if any consideration was to be given to the subsequent use of that material as evidence.

The new act also amended the Agents of Foreign Governments Act to remove it from the State Department and place it, where it more appropriately belongs, with the Justice Department. The State Department has never enforced the statute since it came under Department jurisdiction, and the failure to promulgate regulations under the statute made it virtually impossible for Federal prosecutors to use this statute as an effective prosecutorial tool.

In light of the existing and newly enacted Federal legislation, the final question to be considered is whether further legislation is necessary or desirable to enhance our ability to fight terrorism. It is highly unlikely that we would win any long-term psychological battle, as noted above, if we were to enact or seek the enactment of draconian measures to fight the threat of terrorism. As the Roman sage Terence observed 2,000 years ago, "Extreme law is often extreme injustice." Remembering that the laws we make to control the worst of us equally affect the rest of us, we should never forget the values that we are trying to instill and protect by enacting legislation. The cure is surely more damaging to our democracy than the symptoms if we overreact legislatively.

In South Africa, for instance, in situations dealing with what is broadly described as terrorism, the presumption of innocence is removed, the burden of proof is shifted, double jeopardy is diluted, the warrant requirement is removed, and the reasonable doubt standard is rolled on its ear in that the defendant must prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even Western countries with long histories of democracy have occasionally taken severe measures to combat terrorism, but the effectiveness of those measures is open to discussion. For instance, Italy now has a patchwork quilt of special laws and decrees dealing with terrorism, rather than having a unified, cohesive criminal law structure. While Italy has had some spectacular successes in dealing with its terrorist problem, its approach to the problem certainly has not resulted in any deterrence. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the "Prevention of Terrorism Act" specifically outlaws the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and makes support for that group illegal. The British are clearly uncomfortable with the law in that they mandate its renewal at least every 2 years. Thus, not only has the law not been terribly effective as a deterrent, but it has not been psychologically effective either.

Most European countries, while signatories to the European Convention of Suppression of Terrorism, have no specific

provisions in their legal structures for dealing with terrorist events. One country, Sweden, had specific statutes but overturned them after 2 years. The Swedish approach, as in much of Europe, is to reinforce the provisions of generally applicable statutes rather than to rely on separate statutes narrowly aimed at combating terrorism.

This "reinforcement" approach has a variety of advantages. Initially, as indicated, it does no damage to the public psyche, in that there is no perception that draconian measures passed in a panic are necessary to combat a given problem. Second, it takes far less time and effort to strengthen an existing framework than to create an entirely new one. Third, it avoids what should not be, but is, a thorny legal problem: defining terrorism.

A digression is necessary here. The Congress repeatedly has had difficulty trying to define the term terrorism so as to avoid the hackneyed semantic dilemma that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Until the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress provided guidance only through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which had a workable, if slightly cumbersome, definition of international terrorism.⁸

Under the new act, Congress has not made terrorism *per se* a crime, but it has finally given us a definition, albeit through the side door.⁹ 18 U.S. Code, Section 3071, et seq. establishes authority for the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to pay rewards of up to \$500,000 for information concerning terrorist activity. The Attorney General's authority relates primarily to terrorist activity occurring within the United States, while the Secretary of State's relates primarily to international terrorism directed against U.S. nationals, or their business or property, outside of the United States.

In the final analysis, however, it appears that only minor tightening, such as removing the monetary motive from the murder-for-hire statute as mentioned above, is necessary to give us a most effective and pervasive Federal law enforcement weapon for fighting terrorism. These minor statutory changes and enactments should be made as soon as possible so that we can continue our leadership role in demonstrating the effectiveness of democratic institutions. With an efficient, existing legal framework capable of coping with terrorist actions, we will never realize the worst fears of our Founding Fathers—exchanging freedom for security and having neither. Only the terrorist wins this exchange.

Notes

¹See, for example, 18 U.S. Code, Section 111 (Assaulting a Federal official); 18 U.S. Code, Section 842 et seq. (Possessing, shipping, and using explosives); 18 U.S. Code, Section 922 et seq. (Possession, use, and sale of unlawful firearms); 18 U.S. Code, Sections 1113 and 1114 (Murder and attempted murder of United States officials); 18 U.S. Code, Section 1751 (Assassination, kidnaping, and assault of the President and the presidential staff); 18 U.S. Code, Section 2151 et seq. (Sabotage); 18 U.S. Code, Section 2381 et seq. (Treason, sedition, and subversive activities).

²See, for example, 18 U.S. Code, Section 1112 (Protection of foreign officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons); 18 U.S. Code, Section 956 (Conspiracy to injure property of a foreign government); 18 U.S. Code, Section 960 (Expedition against a friendly nation); 18 U.S. Code, Section 970 (Protection of property occupied by a foreign government); 18 U.S. Code, Section 1116 and 1117 (Murder and conspiracy to murder foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons).

³18 U.S. Code, Section 1203 (a).

⁴18 U.S. Code, Section 1952 (A).

⁵18 U.S. Code, Section 373.

⁶18 U.S. Code, Section 32.

⁷18 U.S. Code, Section 2518 (7).

⁸Section 1801(c) of Title 50, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, defines "international terrorism" as activities that—

(1) Involve violent act or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State;

(2) Appear to be intended—

(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;

(C) to effect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping;

(3) Occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they intend to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

⁹The new Section 3077 defines an act of terrorism in the identical manner as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, except that the new act deletes subparagraph (3).

E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.

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Voices from Troy: What Are We Hearing?

by H.H.A. Cooper

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"Theatre should be useful. It should make people share and feel. It should—well, waken people's awareness." John le Carré¹

We have lately been treated to another elegant, perceptive, and powerful historical tour de force from the fertile pen of Dr. Barbara Tuchman.² In a masterful exposition, she traces the history of folly in government from Troy to modern times. It is no part of the present purpose to subject that theme to any form of literary criticism, nor to extend it beyond the bounds to which it was confined by its distinguished expositor. Rather, what is intended here, by way of reference, is an explanation relative to the choice of the present theme and its place in the context of the present symposium sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency.

Dr. Tuchman began her treatise, metaphorically, before the Gates of Troy. It has seemed singularly appropriate to commence the present, slight commentary on international terrorism in much the same spirit, in the same place. Human folly doubtless existed and manifested itself in abundance long before the war-weary Trojans invited the perfidious Greeks³ within their gates. But as a transcendental echo of folly in government, the example of the wooden horse is with us yet, providing not only a vivid historical allusion and a linguistic figure that has enriched and educated countless successive cultures, but a salutary military lesson.

As Dr. Tuchman convincingly demonstrates, mankind has been slow to learn. Somewhat simplistically, it may be opined that while the Horse of Troy, in identical or similar form, is unlikely to fool all of the people all of the time, its variants down the ages have certainly fooled some of the people enough of the time to make its use profitable as an engine of war. Dr. Tuchman's most useful lesson resides in this observation: that the true danger of the wooden horse lies not in the intrinsic deadliness of the stratagem itself, but rather in the curious propensity of those targeted to refuse to recognize the nature and dimensions of the harm to which they are exposed.⁴ This is the position, then, that this paper takes as its point of departure.

One venturing into these dangerous areas of human endeavor should take note of the real or apocryphal fate of the unhappy Priest of Apollo, Laocoön. Almost alone among his bemused fellow Trojans, he suspected and spoke out against the Greek trickery that was to open the gates of the city for those who accomplished its destruction. He saw the wooden horse for what it was, but he reckoned without the folly and foibles of his fellows.

Those who would speak out in the present forum ought, at least, to be free from that fate. Laocoön, we are reminded, was summarily removed, together with his sons, from the pulpit of his admonitions by horrendous serpents that, rising from the deep, embraced father and sons in their coils and dragged them to a death that can only be imagined.

The lyricists have generally portrayed this ominous and decisive event as an incident in the ongoing war among the gods, but the dread feelings it inspires are far from unfamiliar to those urged, on portentous occasions, to trespass too close to the truth for their own good.⁵ Modern commentators would, no doubt, content themselves with the prosaic observation that poor Laocoön and his sons were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Certainly, throughout history it has proven wiser, if not always more helpful, to denounce treachery and violence in general or abstract terms rather than in specifics that might form the basis for specific action. Yet history records a constant procession of souls as courageous and perceptive as the hapless Laocoön, and many have been smiled on by the gods rather than suffering his grim fate at the hands of their ugly messengers.

Professionals—practitioners and academics from a variety of concerned disciplines—have been invited, on this occasion, to consider outthinking the terrorist. It is certainly an interesting challenge and one that is truly international in character and scope. Yet, in truth, we have been outthinking the terrorist for years. He (or she⁶), on the other hand, has been constantly, if not always consistently, outdoing us.

Such a seemingly heretical observation clearly demands some justification. The first part of the assertion is not difficult to sustain or document, particularly before an informed audience. One has only to appeal to the enormous quantity of literature deluging us that is generated by the interest in this subject and its relevance since its "discovery" in the early 1970's. The originality of thought has ever been on our own side. Indeed, that very originality has itself seemed to more cautious souls to be a danger. Recognizing that working terrorists may not have the time, skills, or inclination for undertaking the tasks conceived for them by many of our advanced thinkers, some observers have questioned whether those offerings have not, at times, been more useful to the other side than to those they were intended to alert and inform. The most thinking of terrorists has hardly to think at all to advance the leading edge of his or her craft; the software is

available to him or her, in largely unclassified form, to run the most sophisticated of programs on the terrorist mainframes.

Nor is the production of our better thinkers derivative. In particular, the works of fiction writers treating of these subjects have far outpaced the swiftest of those who have tried to give these ideas a deadly materiality.⁷ While actual terrorism remains, figuratively, in the Bronze Age, our authors of fiction have carried us forward to the technological frontiers of outer space. The truly frightening aspect of this outpouring is that their ideas constitute a blueprint for action. Their imaginings are such that they are capable of immediate materialization. Such advanced, specific thinking is almost entirely absent from the strategies and tactics of the terrorist side, which remains as pedestrian and unimaginative as it was more than a decade ago. This is not a complaint but a serious cause for reflection.

Professional students of terrorism as it has been, is, and might be have no cause to review their performance with concern when it is compared with that of their adversaries. The solidity and richness of thought on our side manifest themselves at every turn. The discerning will hunt in vain for a comparable display among the terrorists. Where, for example, can one point to a terrorist Brian Jenkins? A secret army that is still largely reliant upon the instruction of Mao and Marighella has not greatly advanced in the realms of thought.

This tremendous superiority in terms of the capacity to outthink the terrorist ought to be, one would imagine, a source of pride and self-congratulation. Widely used, it can contribute notably to the defense of society. As a substitute for the appropriate action, however, all this thinking about terrorism may be only a dangerous placebo, for it has scarcely any impact at all upon the sickness.

This is not to argue that we should cease to think about terrorism, or that our continuing endeavors to outthink the terrorist have little worth. Rather, we should dedicate some of our energies to considering the relationship between thought and action so as to discern some of the directions terrorism might take in both the near and the distant future. That terrorism is here to stay may be taken as a given; only its future forms need concern us. Outthinking the terrorist must not, therefore, be confused with outimagining him. We must not get so far ahead of the terrorist, conceptually, that the explosions take place in our rear.

Outthinking the terrorist means, most usefully, predicting with accuracy the next move and positioning ourselves to counter it before it occurs. Outthinking the terrorist is an exercise in anticipation. It involves, in the most effective of cases, getting inside the terrorist mind and the terrorist operation. It is a nice exercise in pacing, for we must be neither too far ahead nor too far behind. We must, in short, think like terrorists, keeping in mind all their advantages and limitations, their lack of inhibitions, their goals and objectives, as well as their value systems. This calls for a dedication and discipline, as well as a deployment of resources, that we have not always displayed in the past.

The contrast between our own modalities of thought and those of terrorists is nowhere more clear than in the area of definition. Our theorists and practitioners have spent countless hours trying to define terrorism. They are as far away from producing a definition acceptable to all and for all purposes as they were when they started.⁸ Yet, all this intellectualizing has not been in vain. Definition *is* important to us, and it is as necessary that we strive toward it as it is to recognize the elusive quality of the end product we seek.

We can scarcely begin a serious study of terrorism without defining what it is we are studying, let alone begin the process of devising effective, acceptable countermeasures. Terrorists labor under no such handicap. Like Voltaire's character, who had been speaking prose throughout his life, terrorists define themselves and their work through their actions. For terrorists, too much thought in certain areas is simply confusing. Indeed, if they thought too much about what they were doing, they might well not act at all. Given too much exposure to the rational, terrorism is to be seen not as the weapon of the weak but, rather, as the weakest of weapons. Destruction is simple to encompass in the abstract—and not all that difficult, in many instances, to carry into effect.

Profiting from the act is not, however, such an easy matter. This has always been at the heart of the terrorists' dilemma, and the area in which the true poverty of their thinking is most clearly evident. Hostage-taking, as it has been developed and refined by modern terrorists, borders on the absurd; it ought not to work at all—but it does. Kidnaping works somewhat better, but it is probable that few terrorists, if pressed, could say why. Yet all forms of terrorism have, rationally, but one useful end: the conversion of raw fear into a form of effective social control. Terrorism is an exercise in power. The most effective terrorists have always perceived this truism and

have sought to legitimate themselves and their acquisitions—in a word, to effect their transformation from terrorist to something more socially acceptable. How, practically, to achieve this end is always their problem.

It is axiomatic that those who offer predictions about anything are staking their professional reputations upon the outcome. If they are reasonably correct in their prognostications, they may be rewarded with a brief, uncertain glory. Their errors are certain to be thrown up in their faces with depressing regularity. Success has a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan. It may well be that ere these words reach their intended audience, they will be overtaken by events. We can never outthink the terrorist, in the sense described, by standing still and hoping our adversaries will do the same. A great American, H. Ross Perot, has said, "If you go through life worrying about all the bad things that can happen, you soon convince yourself that it's best to do nothing at all."⁹ To be prudent, those who are concerned with the subject of terrorism *must* go through life worrying about all the bad things that can happen. This obligatory professional pessimism ought not, however, inhibit action in the form of prediction, or of devising useful, appropriate countermeasures as a pattern of possibilities emerges.

Terrorism is designed to coerce, to bend the activities and associations of others to the terrorist's will. In suitable circumstances, the threat alone can achieve the terrorist's end since the cost of insuring against harm must be written into all countermeasures. Thus, the terrorist can keep us on our toes (and constantly dipping into our pockets) merely by raising a credible specter of action. The recent history of the Olympic Games bears eloquent witness to the effectiveness of that technique and the resultant expense to society. Yet who would have been rash enough to predict that the Los Angeles Games of 1984 would be free of all terroristic spoilers? And who would have been so irresponsible as to have recommended reducing the prospective security measures on the basis of such a prediction? And who is to say, in the aftermath, that the money applied to security was ill-spent, for how can we reliably tell who was deterred by the measures taken and who was not? We must account ourselves fortunate that the Games and the two political conventions, such significant causes of concern in this respect, passed off without incident. We could not have outthought the terrorist; here we could only seek to outdo him—a hollow victory, perhaps, in terms of cost and contest, but at least the terrorist did not choose to dispute the field.

We ought not take too much comfort, in the present context, from such small, though welcome triumphs. They say little about terrorist strengths or weaknesses and even less about future intentions. A terrorist can telephone a false bomb threat daily until, wearied by the charade, we abandon our precautionary measures—only to be met by the eventual, destructive blast. We cannot afford to relax our vigilance for a moment, for in that very instant the terrorist may strike. Countering terrorism is an expensive business, and bargain-basement remedies are rarely worth their marked-down price.

The private sector has been very short-sighted in this area. Those who would pride themselves, in other fields of endeavor, on a scientific approach to the management of business all too often lapse into a confused management-by-crisis when confronted by a terrorist threat. Much corporate crisis management planning is cosmetic only, melting away under the heat of a terrorist campaign. Too many boardrooms reign under a comfortable umbrella of denial: Nothing shall ever happen for the first time—and certainly not to us.

Yet it is self-evident that the capitalist system, the human and material resources that make up the sinews of the Western world, constitutes the richest and most inviting prize of all for the terrorist. The kidnappings, hostage-takings, and extortions to which business has so far been subjected have barely touched on the possibilities. They are not even the prelude to the first act of the real drama that could be played. The complacency that is so commonplace in the business community around the world is simply not realistic. There is little evidence that the magnitude of the perils has been perceived by the "captains of industry." For most, it is simply "business as usual" as the capitalist juggernaut storms forward, with an occasional stagger, on a largely uninsured course. It is certainly not tenderness of heart nor ideological concern that has so far spared private business the full onslaught of terrorist rage. How many would confidently aver that business has been, and continues to be, adequately shielded by its own preparedness to meet the storm? The voices of folly are less muted in this area than in many others.

Terrorism is not a discrete topic that might be conveniently examined apart from the political, social, and economic context in which it takes place. The forces that move terrorists in their deadly work are sometimes subtle, and at other times, brutally direct. Terrorism is a creature of its own time and place. It is a significant item in the

balance sheet of the never-ending struggle between the two superpowers. It became fashionable in the early 1980's, following the lead of Claire Sterling¹⁰ and others, to see the fine hand of the Soviet Union in every important manifestation of international terrorism. The work of determining the links among the various forces extant and operating is highly important—too important, indeed, to be entrusted to amateurs, academics, or journalists. It is a ceaseless labor for those with operational responsibilities and the resources to match the dimensions of the task.

Yet it must not be overlooked that terrorism generates its own momentum. Given the right soil and a little tillage, all that is needed for a fine crop is a modicum of seed money. Terrorism is a dangerous game for a nation-state to play; too many of the players end up as free agents and some of the better players have been known to change sides before the game is over. In any event, those whose only strategy is that of indiscriminate destruction are well served. For them, any terrorism, against any target, is better than none.

It is not reassuring to contemplate the prospects. Central direction of international terrorism is neither realistic nor feasible, but it is also not necessary for those who would profit from chaos and destabilization rather than order and stability. Our world is full of those who would dance without paying the piper. In the field of assassination, particularly, the "Becket effect"¹¹ is a frighteningly efficacious ploy. As has been sagely observed, always "...the dirt stuck to the man who dug it, not to him who paid for the digging."¹² We must recognize the conventions in these matters. Wellington reminded us that generals do not shoot at other generals in battle. But when, as inevitably they do, they shoot through their agents and underlings, we had better know how to respond. Terrorism is not a game played by the Queensberry rules. Our opponent is all too prone to up-end the table, sending the cards or checkers to the floor, or to conceal, Chaplin-like, a horseshoe in his glove. Such challenges are best faced in the spirit of Indiana Jones.

The greatest danger, however, resides in the fact that terrorist behavior invites a response in kind. It is here that one of the gravest problems for our consideration reveals itself, for in this terrorism offers its most blatant challenge to our values. Terrorists are inviting us to outdo them at their own evil game. While seeking to frustrate their designs, it is for us to outthink this flanking attack. It is often said that for the terrorist there are no innocents;

rather, when all are terrorists, there are no terrorists.¹³

As we enter the second half of this decade, the voices urging the preemptive strike as a form of terrorism immunology are growing louder and more insistent. They have had their way in surprising quarters. It is unequivocally asserted here that they are the voices of folly. The military effectiveness of a preemptive strike, in appropriate circumstances, is not disputed. At times, as at Pearl Harbor, it is simply mistaken. The price of such errors is, inevitably, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The attractiveness of the preemptive strike against terrorists is dangerously seductive. It can and does work—and may even save some lives. It may be a good way of winning the battle, but it is a certain way of losing the war. We must resist the Sirens, who would lure us on to these dangerous, arid shores.

The tragic example of Argentina ought never be absent from our minds.¹⁴ It is sad that a nation that produced so many illustrious jurists should have felt the need to depart so far from the rule of law. Undeniably, the need was great, but the price remains, to this day, as crippling as Argentina's national debt. Other nations, from time to time, will feel similar needs and pressures, as others, too, have felt them in times past. There is no room here for duplicity or double standard. Either we must combat the terrorist by our own rules, holding fast to those principles that are dear to us, or we may descend to the level of the terrorist and slug it out in the slime—but if we do, there may be no hot bath awaiting us when we emerge. Eight years ago, the National Advisory Committee Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism accepted that, "Our response should be practical and effective, but it must always be a civilized reply to an uncivilized act."¹⁵ We ought not, lightly, to consider departing from that well-mediated advice.

Other voices claim our ears as we move toward an uncertain future. The role of the modern communications media in shaping our view of terrorists, and perhaps even their view of themselves, has been but shallowly explored. Two avid European students of the subject have said, "What we know about terrorism we have learned—with few exceptions—from the news media."¹⁶ That is certainly true of the general public. If terrorism is truly theater, then television has expanded the audience exponentially. Moreover, we have witnessed in our times what one analyst has termed "...the collapse of the information float."¹⁷ Acts of terrorism are now brought to us, in the privacy of our own homes, as they occur thousands of

miles away. We can witness the agony of others, in living color, and receive the accompanying social commentary explaining its significance and how we ought to relate to it. By these means, terrorists have become larger than life and their acts have received similar, inescapable aggrandizement.

This formidable phenomenon was probably the most critical terrorism issue of the 1970's. What is now offered is an impressionistic view only, for the evidence has yet to be rigorously appraised. It is suggested here that the publicity pendulum has now swung against the terrorist so that it is becoming harder and harder to capture the attention of the masses. The public has become inured to the menu served up by the terrorist. So far as the wider audience is concerned, the terrorist is losing the capacity to shock. If this surmise is correct, the terrorist's domination of the media has proven extremely shortlived. Its very utility carried the germs of its own demise.

The implications of such a conclusion need most careful study by all who would outthink the terrorist. It undercuts, in the most significant way, the very underpinnings of modern terrorism. What will terrorists do to make up for this unexpected shortfall in their most vital assets? Like OPEC, terrorists had come to expect that the bonanza would last forever and, again like the oil cartel, they must adjust their strategies to these changed circumstances. Terrorists must, dramatically, recapture the audience they have lost and overcome its disappointing ennui. This represents a challenge to which the terrorist *must* rise if terrorism is to retain its effectiveness. Since 1976, terrorism has been teetering on the brink.¹⁸ Someone will soon have to take the plunge, for no better reason than that the ratings are going down.

The greatest weakness of the free world, in its struggle against terrorism during the 1970's, the so-called Terror Decade, was in the area of intelligence. So far as the United States is concerned, the weakness was substantially self-induced. The extraordinary outpourings of guilt that washed over Government and corporate America in the post-Watergate years carried with them much that was essential to the country's national security. The chief beneficiary was international terrorism. The psychological damage was probably as great as the structural. The country simply lost the will to inquire into the intrigues designed to bring about a violent demise of the Nation's most cherished institutions. Law enforcement intelligence, never very strong in the area of terrorism,¹⁹ was assailed by those with the most suspect of motives as well as by

the pure in heart and reason. The result was the demolition of an all-too-fragile infrastructure and the loss of precious informational sources that will be years in effective retrieval. Even worse, the laws enacted to purge the body politic of its ills and the effect of inhibiting vital information exchange with friends.

The consequences, to one familiar with the American solution, were hardly surprising. As Government found itself fettered by the self-proclaimed defenders of civil liberties, the private sector, with little fanfare, set about strengthening its own intelligence apparatus, out of reach of such well-meaning busybodies. There is now less public oversight of intelligence, in real terms, than ever, but Government remains hogtied at a time when the intelligence product is needed more than ever. While the 1980's have seen a welcome change of heart in some quarters, the results to date are not overly encouraging. The craft of intelligence in the United States has suffered. Intelligence remains a dirty word, its practice an unsavory profession. We have paid for the neglect in blood and, as terrorism builds once more, our weakness will become ever more obvious. A philosophical overhaul is long overdue here.

The opportunity must be seized to offer an observation on a malady that, from time to time, the intelligence community seems to share with the popular media. It might usefully be designated the "choking Doberman syndrome,"²⁰ after the archtypical urban legend exposed to scholarly analysis by Professor Brunvand. From time to time, some extraordinary terrorist stories surface, to be bandied about, embroidered upon, and generally prettied up in the interests of entertainment or to fill an otherwise slender dossier. These imaginative excursions might be harmless enough if they were revealed early on for what they are, but all too often their operational pursuit results in the expenditure of enormous amounts of energy and resources. Both terrorism and the practice of *desinformatsiya* generally thrive on fantasy and the well-placed rumor; creating a chase of mythical hit men across international boundaries can serve to divert attention from more substantial targets that are covering their tracks for other purposes.

We must learn to be more honest with ourselves. When we truly have no information about a terrorist or terrorists, it is operationally more useful to confess the same to those entitled to know rather than to bluff or attempt to hide behind the shameful stratagem of, "I really *do* know, but I am not allowed to tell you." There is a clear and

well-defined role for creative speculation in the intelligence process, but it should never be allowed to spill over and infect the areas where hard fact is mined and closely guarded.

The law enforcement intelligence community, in particular, needs urgently to restock its bare shelves with reliable commodities. The temptation to display an impressive pantry full of enviable goodies ought not to result in the indiscriminate purchase of untried, untested Brand X. We must set about producing a new generation of discerning shoppers, who know the markets and the commodities they seek. The development of such a discriminating palate will undoubtedly carry a correspondingly high price. But in the matter of intelligence, the very core of the concept of outthinking the terrorist, we simply cannot afford to be served up rubbish, other people's leftover scraps, or the remnants of meals, cold and long past. The latter diet will be all too depressingly familiar to those who have carefully studied the menu in the area of terrorism intelligence over the past decade. If we are truly to outdo the terrorist in this deadly contest, we need better, custom-prepared viands for our nourishment.

The folly lies not in looking upon the wooden horse but in failing to see it for what it is. The height of folly is to carry it, unexamined, within the gates. All too often, our policies and the way they have been implemented have aided terrorists in their work; we have opened the gates even when there was no credible threat of their being blown down. There are even critics who have accused us of making too much of this business of terrorism; in a pathetic adaptation of the striking Cancer Society advertisement, they hope that if we do nothing, "Perhaps It Will Go Away." There is certainly no sign that it will, and every indication to the contrary. Terrorism, like cancer, may not be eradicated in our lifetimes, but we must apply ourselves to understanding the disease if our remedies are to serve the body politic. As terrorism escalates and achieves greater sophistication in planning and execution, our historically reactive posture will have to change.

We must find more effective ways of taking the surprise out of terrorism. And here a very real fear must be voiced. Age and experience may be fine things in politics, as in many other walks of life, but those who, in these halls, have for so long been the voices to which the music has been written are growing old in thought and spirit.²¹ Where are those, on our side, who will match wits with the Atari generation of terrorists? The intellectual margin

we enjoy over the terrorist is slender and precious. The ability to continue to outthink the terrorist seeking to make up lost ground is our most vital line of defense and should not be taken for granted. We cannot afford to yield ground to those who may be better equipped to manage the new technologies than ourselves. In the 1960's and 1970's, many dropped out of establishments of higher learning to make bombs. Today many of the same bent drop out to make software. We cannot be sure the situation will not reverse itself once more.

It may be that "cometh the hour, cometh the man" (or woman, as the case may be), but we ought not count on it. New generations of terrorists spring fully fledged from the earth as though from the sowing of the dragon's teeth. Our own counterterrorism specialists are produced by less exotic, more thoughtful and extended processes. Had the sons of Laocoön been more independently critical and disposed in a better protection formation, they might have avoided the fate that overtook their father. Who knows but what their brash example might not have stilled the voices of folly and changed the course of history?

Notes

¹*The Little Drummer Girl*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984, p. 95.

²*The March of Folly*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984.

³Those who bridle at the choice of language here on grounds of ethnic affinity or innate or cultivated sympathies would do well to remind themselves, as we have been ad nauseam, that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.

⁴An excellent modern illustration derives from a situation in which an American corporation found itself in 1978-79. Its lawyer recalls: "I will never forget," says Luce. "The State Department said, 'Oh no, Iran wouldn't seize hostages. They must have done something.' The arrest of the two EDS employees occurred nearly a year before Iranian demonstrators took 63 American hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran." *The Dallas Morning News*, October 21, 1984, 5E.

⁵In this regard, the circumstances regarding the writing of and the extraordinary prepublication precautions surrounding *In God's Name* (David A. Yallop, New York: Bantam Books, 1984) are worth noting.

⁶This important gender annotation will be made here only, the masculine pronoun being merely used for convenience hereafter. A pertinent comment on the research aspects is Deborah M. Galvin, "The Female

Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective," *Behavioral Sciences and the Law*, No. 2, 1983, 19-32.

⁷For a very small sampling, see "Fiction May Become Fact," *TPI Journal*, Nos. 1-3, 1983, 10-13.

⁸On this see H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism: The Problem of the Problem of Definition," *26 Chitty's Law Journal*, No. 3, 1978, 105-108.

⁹Ken Follett, *On Wings of Eagles*, New York: William Morrow, 1982, 149.

¹⁰*The Terror Network*, New York: Berkeley Books, 1982; *The Time of the Assassins*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984.

¹¹On this see H.H.A. Cooper, *On Assassination*, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1984, 32. It will be recalled that King Henry II, concerned about the pronouncements of St. Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, uttered the words, "Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?" In short order, certain well-intentioned knights hastened to do the king's bidding, assassinating Becket in his cathedral.

¹²Michael M. Thomas, *Someone Else's Money*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982, 456. A well-informed author has written: "There are no documents when one head of state orders the death of another." Charles McCarry, *The Better Angels*, New York: E.P. Dutton, 1979, 11.

¹³"When everyone was a coward, no one was a coward. A single hero was a danger." Lawrence Sanders, *The Seduction of Peter S.*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1983, 124.

¹⁴For a thorough, first-person analysis, see Jacobo Timerman, *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981.

¹⁵*Disorders and Terrorism*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976, 29.

¹⁶Alex P. Schmid and Jenny de Graaf, *Violence As Communication*, London: Sate, 1982, 57.

¹⁷John Naisbitt, *Megatrends*, New York: Warner Books, 1982.

¹⁸See, on this, H.H.A. Cooper, "Whither Now? Terrorism on the Brink," *25 Chitty's Law Journal*, 1977, 181-190.

¹⁹For a salutary dose of honesty in this regard, see William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown, *The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979, esp. 57, 147.

²⁰Jan Harold Brunvand, *The Choking Doberman*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1984. Professor Brunvand has written an engaging work illustrating how the most bizarre tales pass from person to person and are firmly believed, by those who receive them as well as those who transmit them,

to be true. These tales are demonstrably the product of a lively imagination, but the ways in which they become imbedded in the folklore of our life and times are remarkably similar to the processes involved in the building up of the history of some of our modern terrorist groups.

²¹"Tell me, do our masters know,

Loosing blindly as they fly,

Old men love while young men die?"

"The Exploration," in *Rudyard Kipling's Verse*, New York: Doubleday, 1940, 368.

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2 cy ATTN: ECJ-7, LW

Under Sec of Defense for Policy
2 cy ATTN: DUSP/P

Under Secy of Def for Rsch & Engrg
2 cy ATTN: Tactical Warfare Prog
2 cy ATTN: C3I
10 cy ATTN: Chairman PSEAG

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Army Rsch Institute
ATTN: Commander

Combat Material Eval Element
ATTN: Security Analyst

Headquarters
Department of the Army
ATTN: DAMA-CSS-N
ATTN: DAMO-ODSO
ATTN: DAMO-NCZ
ATTN: DAMI-CI
ATTN: DAMO-OD
3 cy ATTN: DAPE-HRE

Headquarters
Joint Strategic Operations Ctr
2 cy ATTN: J-2
2 cy ATTN: J-5

Headquarters
Military Traffic Mgt Cmd
ATTN: Ofc of Security & Safety

Seneca Army Depot
ATTN: Surety
ATTN: Provost Marshal
ATTN: SDSSE-PO

Sierra Army Depot
ATTN: Security Operations

Headquarters
Southern European Task Force
ATTN: AESE-GCT-S

US Army Armament Rsch Dev & Cmd
2 cy ATTN: DRDAR-LCN-F

US Army Belvoir R&D Ctr
ATTN: DRCPM-PSE

US Army Comd & General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWJ-CA
ATTN: ATZL-SWS-L, D. Dorris

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (Continued)

US Army Corps of Engineers
ATTN: Security & Law Enforcement

US Army Criminal Investigation Cmd
ATTN: Commander

Headquarters

US Army Elct Warfare Lab, ECOM
ATTN: DELEW-I-S

US Army Europe and Seventh Army

ATTN: AEACC-ND

ATTN: Provost Marshall

2 cy ATTN: DCSI

2 cy ATTN: AEAGD-MM-SW

2 cy ATTN: AEAPM-PS

2 cy ATTN: DCSOPS

US Army Human Engrg Lab

ATTN: Director

US Army Intel Threat Analysis Det

2 cy ATTN: IAX-Z

US Army Intelligence Agency

ATTN: DELEW-I

US Army J. F. Kennedy Ctr, MA

2 cy ATTN: G-3, Special Projects

3 cy ATTN: AFJK-GC

US Army Material Cmd

2 cy ATTN: DRCPM-NUC

US Army Material Cmd

2 cy ATTN: DRCSS

2 cy ATTN: DRCNC

US Army Military Police School

2 cy ATTN: Phys Scty Committee

2 cy ATTN: ATZN-MP-TD

2 cy ATTN: ATZN-MP-Library

2 cy ATTN: Commander

US Army Nuclear & Chemical Agency

ATTN: Library

2 cy ATTN: MONA-OPS

2 cy ATTN: MONA-SU

US Army War College

ATTN: Library

2 cy ATTN: Strategic Studies

US Military Academy

ATTN: Dir of Libraries

ATTN: Dept of Behavioral Sci & Leadership

ATTN: Dir Natl Security Studies

59th Ordnance Brigade

ATTN: AEUSA-Z

ATTN: Surety

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Marine Corps

ATTN: Code PPO

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued)

Naval Civil Engrg Lab

ATTN: L64

Naval Electronic Sys Engrg Ctr

ATTN: Code 04

ATTN: Code 404HS

Naval Electronic Sys Cmd

ATTN: PME 121-3

Naval Facilities Engrg Cmd

ATTN: Code 032E

Headquarters

Naval Investigative Svcs

ATTN: 009-NIS-243

ATTN: NOP-009D

ATTN: NISHQ-22A

Headquarters

Naval Material Cmd

ATTN: MAT-0462

ATTN: MAT-0433

Naval Personnel Res & Dev Ctr

ATTN: Code P302

Naval Sea Sys Cmd

ATTN: SEA-643

Naval Surface Weapons Ctr

ATTN: G. Goo

Naval War College

ATTN: Library

ATTN: Ctr for Nav Warfare Studies

ATTN: Strategy Dept

Ofc of the Deputy Chief of Naval Ops

ATTN: NOP 91

ATTN: NOP 009D

ATTN: NIS 22

ATTN: NOP 06D

ATTN: NOP 60

ATTN: NOP 60D

ATTN: NOP 603

ATTN: NOP 009D3

2 cy ATTN: NOP 403

Deputy Chief of Staff

Plans, Policy & Operations

ATTN: Code-P

ATTN: Code-POC-30

Strategic Sys Project Ofc

ATTN: Code SP113

US Atlantic Fleet

ATTN: Plans & Operations

ATTN: Physical Security

ATTN: J2

US Naval Forces, Europe

ATTN: Special Operations

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (Continued)

US Pacific Fleet
ATTN: Plans & Operations
ATTN: Physical Security
ATTN: J-2

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Air Force Logistics Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

Headquarters
Air Force Ofc of Special Investigations
ATTN: IVS

Headquarters
Air Force Ofc of Security Police
2 cy ATTN: SPOS-SPPC
2 cy ATTN: AFOSP-SPPC
2 cy ATTN: AFOSP-SPPX

Headquarters
Air Force Sys Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

Headquarters
Air Training Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

Air University
ATTN: Strategic Studies
ATTN: AU/SP

Air University Library
ATTN: Library

Headquarters
Electronic Sys Div/OCB
3 cy ATTN: Physical Security Sys Directorate

Military Airlift Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

Pacific Air Forces
ATTN: Sec Police

Headquarters
Space Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

Strategic Air Cmd
ATTN: XPQ
ATTN: SPD
ATTN: Sec Police

Tactical Air Cmd
ATTN: Sec Police

US Air Force Academy
ATTN: USAFA/SP
ATTN: Strategic Studies
ATTN: Library

US Air Force in Europe
2 cy ATTN: USAFE/SP

US Air Force Inspector General
3 cy ATTN: IGS
3 cy ATTN: IGT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (Continued)

USAF Special Operations School
ATTN: Director

3280th Tech Training Sq
ATTN: TG1CC

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Department of Energy
ATTN: OMA, DP-22
ATTN: Safeguards & Security
ATTN: Tech & Intel Dir
ATTN: Ofc of Intelligence

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
ATTN: Chief Special Operations Div

Central Intelligence Agency
ATTN: Tech Library
ATTN: Ofc of Global Issues
ATTN: Security Committee
ATTN: R&D Sub Committee
ATTN: NIO-T
ATTN: Director of Security
ATTN: Counter-Terrorist Group
ATTN: Medical Services

Committee on Armed Services
ATTN: Staff Dir & Chief Counsel

Federal Aviation Admin
ATTN: Dir of Civil Aviation Security

Federal Bureau of Invest Academy
ATTN: Behavioral Rsch Unit
2 cy ATTN: Library

Headquarters
Federal Bureau of Investigation
3 cy ATTN: Terrorist Rsch & Analytical Ctr

Federal Emergency Management Agency
ATTN: Civil Security Div

General Svcs Admin
ATTN: PS

House Perm Select Committ on Intell
ATTN: Staff Dir

Interpol, US Natl Central Bureau
ATTN: Chief

Metro Transit Police
ATTN: Chief

National Bureau of Standards
ATTN: Law Enforcement

National Bureau of Standards
ATTN: Tech A219

Natl Criminal Justice Reference Svc
2 cy ATTN: D. Galarraga

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued)

Select Committee on Intelligence
ATTN: Staff Director

Subcommittee on Sec & Terrorism
ATTN: Chief Counsel/Staff Dir

US Capitol Police
ATTN: Chief

US Coast Guard
ATTN: Port & Environment Safety

US Coast Guard Academy
ATTN: Library

US Department of State
ATTN: A/SY/DASS
ATTN: A/SY/OP/T
ATTN: A/SY/CC/TAG
ATTN: M/MED
ATTN: FAIM/LR
2 cy ATTN: M/CTP

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (Continued)

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention, R. Whipp for
ATTN: Dir Div of Safeguards
ATTN: Ofc of Insp & Enforcement

US Park Police
ATTN: Chief of Police

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS

Kaman Tempo
ATTN: DASIAC

Kaman Tempo
ATTN: DASIAC

Pacific-Sierra Rsch Corp
ATTN: H. Brode, Chairman SAGE

Rand Corp
2 cy ATTN: Security & Subnation Conflict