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The Legal Digest

Defending Law Enforcement Officers Against Personal Liability in Constitutional Tort Litigation , (Conclusion)

"... liability ... will not be imposed if the 'official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew or should have known of the relevant logal standard. . . . ' "

Part 1 of this article described the leged to have violated in committing a basis for filing constitutional tort litiga- constitutional tort against the plaintiff tion against individual law enforce- was clearly established at the time of ment officers and emphasized the as- the incident which gave rise to the sertion of appropriate defenses to ex- civil action. Liability usually will not be peditiously resolve these actions prior imposed if the law was not clearly esto trial. In this regard, the principal tablished, but it will usually be imfocus of part 1 was to review the Supreme Court's revision of the qualified immunity defense in Harlow v. Fitzger- added another factor to consider ald 47 and to analyze the meaning of beyond this determination. The Court "clearly established law."

The conclusion of this article will analyze the second prong of the qualified immunity defense under the Harlow decision. This part will then discuss additional litigation tactics relevant legal standard. . . ." 48 which officers may use to mitigate or otherwise counter the adverse impact of being named as a defendant in a constitutional tort civil action.

THE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES

Prong of the Qualified Immunity Defense

As previously discussed, the key issue in asserting the qualified immunity defense is whether the applicable law which a defendant officer is al-

posed if the law was clearly established. In Harlow, the Supreme Court stated that liability still will not be imposed if the "official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the sought from a practicing member of


The significance of this factor is to create a second prong in the qualified immunity defense. Even assuming that plaintiff has pleaded a constitutional tort allegedly committed by a defendant officer and has proven that the law allegedly violated by the officer was clearly established at the time of the incident, the defendant may still avoid liability by justifying his conduct on exceptional circumstances. The difficulty with this argument is defining "extraordinary circumstances" and articulating facts that meet the definition.

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NOTE: This article presents a general discussion and is not intended to constitute legal advice in any specific situation or case. Legal advice in specific cases should be the bar.

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There have been relatively few cases litigated on this precise issue. It seems clear that the exceptional circumstances prong would protect officers or officials from liability for actions taken which were declared unlawful so shortly before the action took place that the acting officer or official could not reasonably have advice in the course of one's duties known or been expected to know that the conduct which he undertook had cient to avoid liability for a constitupreviously been declared illegal.49

The exceptional circumstances prong of the qualified immunity test cumstances case is one involving an may have other applications, however. officer or official who violates the con-For example, in January 1979, the stitutional rights of a person, but does newly elected governor of Tennessee so under the instruction of a superior. was sworn into office 3 days early in Should constitutionally violative conan attempt to end abuses in the duct undertaken at the instruction of a pardon of prisoners and commutation superior constitute an exceptional cirof sentences under the administration cumstance excusing an officer from liof outgoing Governor Blanton. One of ability? Only two known cases have newly elected Governor Alexander's dealt with the issue, and each has first acts was to order that the com- reached a different conclusion. mutation of sentences issued by Governor Blanton be held in abeyance. Maraio was the official court reporter When a lawsuit was filed challenging transcribing proceedings at the crimi-Governor Alexander's authority to nal trial of Leroy Green. Green alissue that order, Governor Alexander leged in his 1983 suit that Maraio deasserted the defense of qualified im- prived him of his constitutional right to munity.50 Though the court held that the law surrounding a governor's au- tered the official transcript upon the thority to hold commutations in abey- instruction of the judge who presided ance was unclear, and therefore, over the criminal trial. The circuit court qualified immunity was appropriate, it also noted that:

"The advice of the State Attorney General, two assistants, Special Counsel Fred Thompson, and counsel to the Governor . . . all was that the Governor was on firm legal grounds in taking the position he took. If necessary to the

decision, this Court would hold that such advice from such an array of qualified lawyers would certainly constitute good faith, and that he neither 'knew nor should have known' that his action was illegal.51 The court, in dicta, indicated on those facts that following official legal was exceptional circumstances suffitional tort.

The more difficult exceptional cir-

In Green v. Maraio.52 Camilla procedural due process when she alof appeals, however, dismissed Green's \$3 million damage claim. The court held that "Maraio acted pursuant to Judge Ingrassia's explicit instructions and thus is immunized from liability under 1983 by the defense of qualified immunity for actions carried out within the scope of those instructions." 53

The opposite conclusion was reached in Hobson v. Wilson.54 In Hobson, plaintiffs alleged that several

"The admonition that insubstantial suits . . . should be disposed of through motions filed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is . . . the most important aspect of the revised qualified immunity defense."

FBI Agents and others had participat- consider the possibility of raising and Certainly, "[w]here an official ed in a counterintelligence program litigating an extraordinary circumcould be expected to know that ceraimed at exposing, disrupting, and disstances defense. The decision will tain conduct would violate statutory or crediting certain radical black and leftturn on the facts of the case and the constitutional rights, he should be ist groups in an attempt to neutralize need to use "exceptional circummade to hesitate . . . [b]ut where an and counter their propensity for viostances" to buttress the argument official's duties legitimately require lence and civil disorder. At trial, a jury that the law was not clearly estabaction in which clearly established found certain of the defendants to lished. Certainly, under current judicial rights are not implicated the public inhave violated the plaintiffs' first interpretations, very recent changes in terest may be better served by action amendment rights of free speech and the law or reliance on official legal taken 'with independent and without association. On appeal, the Circuit advice in the course of one's duties fear of consequences.'" 56 Every Court of Appeals for the District of may be sufficient exceptional circumeffort should be made to resolve the Columbia was asked to hold that the stances to avoid liability. lawsuit quickly, without need for exdefendant FBI Agents were entitled to pensive and time-consuming discovqualified immunity because their indi-The Qualified Immunity Defense ery. Attorneys who do so will find they vidual participation was only in ac-Summarized have served their clients well and cordance with a counterintelligence When the Supreme Court abanhave also provided society in general program established at the highest doned the subjective component of a great service by returning the offilevels of the FBI. The circuit court rethe qualified immunity defense in cer's attention back to his investigaiected that argument believing that to Harlow v. Fitzgerald,55 it did so with tive duties and responsibilities. Under permit qualified immunity under such the desire to permit the speedy resothe Harlow decision a framework circumstances is tantamount to excuslution of insubstantial claims of constiexists for a defendant officer to argue. ing disobedience of law based solely tutional violations without the necessiwhere appropriate, that the law was on obedience to a defendant's superity of trial and its attendant discovery. not clearly established at the time of ors. The court left open the question, The admonition that insubstantial suits the incident and/or that even if it however, of whether the extraordinary should not become involved in discov- were, his conduct is justified on excircumstances prong might shield a erv or proceed to trial but rather should ceptional circumstances. defendant from liability who complied be disposed of through motions filed with approved organizational policy under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-Appeal of Denial of Qualified only after protesting the policy at cedure is, perhaps, to the sued officer Immunity issue. Inasmuch as there was no facor official the most important aspect One final issue remains with tual support in the record in Hobson of the revised qualified immunity deregard to the qualified immunity dethat any of the Agent-defendants parfense. If a defendant officer's attorney fense. If the attempt to resolve the ticipated in the counterintelligence uses defenses available under action by dispositive motion asserting program only after questioning or pro-Harlow, he may be able to prevent qualified immunity is denied by the testing the policy, the court found no the specter of a lawsuit from hanging presiding judge, does the defendant exceptional circumstances present. over the officer's head, interfering with have any recourse other than re-It is difficult to predict the paramthe performance of assigned duties sponding to discovery requests and eters for successful assertion of the and impeding his willingness to take going to trial? At that stage in the proextraordinary circumstances prong of necessary and immediate actions in ceedings, may the defendant appeal the qualified immunity defense. So other employment related situations. the denial of qualified immunity? The few courts have been faced with the courts which have decided this issue issue that the contours of this aspect have split 57 on whether the denial of of the defense are not yet formed. At qualified immunity is immediately apthis stage of the defense's developpealable, but the Supreme Court has ment. officers and their attorneys deagreed to address the issue.58 Until

fending actions for alleged constitutional violations should nevertheless

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"Police officers and officials who are named as defendants in constitutional tort litigation should make judicious use of the counterclaim based on advice of counsel,"

the Supreme Court rules, defendant officers and their attorneys should consider pursuing an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. The appeal is certainly preferable to responding to burdensome discovery requests and/or going to trial.

ADDITIONAL LITIGATION TACTICS FOR COMBATING FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION

As this article has indicated, police officers and officials often find themselves as defendants in civil actions. The nature of their work in making arrests and conducting searches and seizures certainly presents a climate in which lawsuits are, perhaps, inevitable. However, no one can reliably predict the precise reason a lawsuit is filed since, in truth, only the plaintiff knows why he chose to file his complaint. Greed and vindictiveness are among possible motivating factors which spawn litigation but fifth amendment rights counterclaimed are usually unsuccessful in securing against the plaintiff for defamation monetary awards. These actions are and injury to their reputation. The offivexing to both the individual defend- cers claimed to have suffered injury ents and to the judicial system forced by plaintiff's derogatory comments to to handle them. As previously dis- the press which accused the officers cussed, qualified immunity and other of theft and other illegal or improper defenses are available to dispose of conduct during the plaintiff's arrest frivolous or insubstantial lawsuits. and search of his home. A jury trial re-Other procedures are available to de- sulted in a verdict for the eight defendant officers and their attorneys in fendant officers and judgment against defending these actions. Appropriate the plaintiff in the amount of \$15,000. and restrained use of these proce- Although the award was overturned dures may discourage the filing or on appeal because of a faulty jury incontinued prosecution of groundless struction, the appellate court clearly actions which may have been filed solely to harrass a law enforcement officer. These procedures include the facts. counterclaims, attempts to have attorney's fees assessed against plantiffs. and attempts to have sanctions imposed against plaintiff's attorney.

Counterclaims

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which govern procedural matters in both § 1983 and Bivens actions permit, and sometimes require, that claims of a defendant against a plaintiff be raised and litigated at the same time as the plaintiff's claims are litigated.59 Some counterclaims against a plaintiff have been successful and resulted in monetary awards in favor of the officer against the plaintiff who originally filed the suit. If an officer has a legitimate legal claim against the defendant, he should bring it to the attention of his attorney for consideration as a counterclaim.60

Typical counterclaims raised by officers sued under 1983 include battery and defamation.61 For example, in Meiners v. Moriarity, 62 law enforcement officers who had been sued under § 1983 by a plaintiff for allegedly depriving him of certain fourth and indicated that such defamation counterclaims are viable if supported by

Defendant officers may also counterclaim for physical injuries incurred in the incident which gave rise to plaintig's civil action. In McCurry v. Allen,63 the jury awarded an officer \$105,000 for injuries suffered by the officer at the hands of the plaintiff. The officer, acting undercover, was shot by the plaintiff while involved in an attempted drug purchase and arrest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently alleged in a § 1983 action that the officer, along with others, violated his constitutional rights by beating him following his arrest, conducting an illegal search, and engaging in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. The defendant officer counterclaimed for damages resulting from the injuries inflicted by the gunshot. The jury dismissed the plaintiff's constitutional claims and awarded the officer \$5,000 in compensatory damages and \$100,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the judgment for the officer was upheld.

Police officers and officials who are named as defendants in constitutional tort litigation should make judicious use of the counterclaim based on advice of counsel. Counterclaims should be filed only where they are legitimately supported by facts and law. Where they warrant filing, in the opinion of counsel, they may be pursued by officers taking full advantage of their rights as citizens to seek redress of their own injuries through the judicial system

Attorney's Fees

One of the more obvious costs associated with an officer being sued for an alleged constitutional violation is the attorney's fees incurred in defending the civil action. The expenses of attorney's fees, if borne by the individual defendant, cause the officer to

be a "loser," even if he should prevail held that the defendant in a § 1983 action must do more than simply win the iudament on the merits before being entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees incurred in defense of civil rights The American judicial system oplitigation when the suit was "vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant." 65 "The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not itself sufficient justification for the assessment of fees" 66 in to litigate after it clearly became

on the merits. However, the use of a 1976 Federal statute can sometimes lessen this financial burden and serve as a deterrent to plaintiffs who may be considering filing a groundless civil claim. erates primarily on the theory that each party to a suit bears the expense of his own attorney's fees. In constitutional tort litigation, however, Concress believed that the sometimes heavy expense required to hire a favor of the defendant. The suit must lawyer acted as a barrier to impover- be groundless or without foundation ished people who could not afford a or the plaintiff must have "continued lawyer to represent them in their suits brought under § 1983. The fear that so." 67 legal expenses might foreclose Though this attorney's fees proviaccess to the courts for indigents with sion is not often invoked in favor of a legitimate constitutional claims defendant. some courts have applied prompted Congress to enact the Civil it after determining the plaintiff's civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of rights suit was wholly without merit. 1976.64

For example, in Hernas v. City of This statute was primarily de- Hickory Hills, 68 a plaintiff sued the City signed to insure persons with civil of Hickory Hills, the mayor, and cerrights grievances access to the Feder- tain named and unnamed police offial courts to litigate claims of constitu- cers and firefighters for alleged hartional violations. It allows for the re- assment. Russ Lindemann was one of covery of attorney's fees in addition to the Hickory Hills police officers named actual damages. The significance of as a defendant for allegedly violating this act to defendant law enforcement plaintiff's constitutional rights. Howevofficers is that it is actually phrased in er, despite naming Officer Lindemann neutral terms; it does not apply solely as a defendant, the plaintiff totally to a plaintiff, but may also be used by failed to make a single specific allegaa defendant. It provides that the pretion against Officer Lindemann that vailing party may, in the discretion of showed any harm to the plaintiff's the trial court, be awarded a reasonaconstitutional rights, Because of the ble amount for attorney's fees. This plaintiff's complete failure to connect provision should not be overlooked Officer Lindemann with a constitutionwhen an officer and his attorney preal violation, the court found that the pare a defense. plaintiff wrongfully caused the suit to Though the act's language allows be brought against him and that it the prevailing party to be awarded atwas, therefore, filed without any fountorney's fees, court decisions have dation. Accordingly, Officer Lindemann was entitled under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act to receive from the plaintiff an award of

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attorney's fees.

An even more dramatic example of a defendant recovering attorney's fees can be found in American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Teasdale.69 Teasdale was a former governor of Missouri who, during his term of office, publicly criticized the plaintiff-insurance company for its involvement in the sale of cancer insurance policies. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming that former Governor Teasdale had violated the company's constitutional rights and seeking damages totaling \$9 million. When a jury found for Teasdale and refused to grant any relief to the plaintiff, Teasdale filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees incurred in his defense. In support of the motion. Teasdale showed that the lawsuit had been filed in an attempt to hurt him politically, that it was only one of a series of lawsuits the plaintiff routinely filed in an attempt to silence its critics, that after it was filed plaintiff made no attempt to produce evidence of its claimed \$9 million financial loss. and that it was totally vindictive. The trial court judge found that the plaintiff's frivolous and vindictive lawsuit met the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart 70 and awarded Teasdale \$63,287.21 in attorney's fees. The court made clear its displeasure with the plaintiff by stating:

"Where a plaintiff has used the legal system as a vehicle of vengeance . . . it must be prepared to pay the fare. In this case . . . the fare is \$63,287.21." 71

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" 'Where a plaintiff has used the legal system as a vehicle of vengeance, . . . it must be prepared to pay the fare.' "

Plaintiff appealed the adverse judgment and attorney's fees award to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court joined the trial court in rebuking the plaintiff's claims. It found that:

"... American's multimillion dollar lawsuit was designed not to vindicate its legal rights, but to expose Teasdale to public obloguy, harassment and the enormous financial and emotional hardships of defending groundless charges that he misused his public office for personal gain. However, Teasdale was not the only victim; the entire public inevitably suffers when a vindictive plaintiff squanders limited judicial resources by prosecuting frivolous lawsuits." 72

The circuit court went one step further, finding that even the appeal was frivolous and "served only to prolong the plight of Teasdale and needlessly burden and inconvenience the judiciary." 73 The costs of the appeal were also assessed to the plaintiff.

The use of this statute by defendants who prevail over frivolous and insubstantial lawsuits can serve as a disincentive for plaintiffs who cavalierlv file civil rights suits knowing they cannot prevail.74 When circumstances permit, an officer's claim for attorney's fees from a plaintiff can discourage similar actions in the future.

Sanctions Against the Plaintiff's Attorney

The final countermeasure that has recently added to the § 1983 defendant's arsenal is found in Rule 11. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A recent change in that rule requires an attorney to take affirmative steps to insure the lawsuit he files is supported in both law and facts, under pain of sanction for failure to do so. The

sanction may be imposed either at the behest of the defendant or upon the court's own initiative.75 Since the change in Rule 11, sanctions have been applied in several cases.

For example, in Dore v. Shultz,76 the plaintiff alleged that Secretary of State George Shultz negligently permitted the father of her child to remove the child to Kenva without a passport, in violation of her constitutional right to due process of law. Finding Secretary Shultz to be obviously shielded from liability under any theory, the court ruled that the plaintiff's lawyer violated Rule 11 by having filed the suit and said:

"[T]his is a frivolous lawsuit. completely lacking in merit. The court is mindful of the recent observation made by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald (citations omitted), to the effect that insubstantial lawsuits against high public officials 'undermine the effectiveness of Government as contemplated by our constitutional structure.' . . . Such cases, the Court stressed, warrant a 'firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' . . . Accordingly, the attorney for plaintiff is sanctioned in the amount of two hundred dollars. . . . " 77

Similarly, a Federal district court invoked Rule 11 against two plaintiffs' lawyers in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service. Inc.78 In Rodgers. the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Chicago, the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, two individual Chicago

police officers, a private towing company, and two towing company employees over events arising from the towing of the plaintiff's car from a parking lot. The plaintiff's lawyers filed a "lengthy complaint that assert[ed] claims under virtually every conceivable theory. Using the Bill of Rights as a starting point, the plaintiff claim[ed] ... that the defendants violated his rights under the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth amendments. Not overlooking the later amendments, the plaintiff add[ed] a claim for denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment." 79 The plaintiff's lawyers also claimed violations of various Federal and State statutes. The court methodically reiected each of the plaintiff's claims of constitutional and statutory violations and found that "Imlost of those claims have no arguable basis in existing law. A reasonable amount of research before the [complaint] was drafted, which is all the new [Rule 11] requires would have revealed that

...," 80 Concluding that any lawyer should have been quickly able to determine the plaintiff had suffered no constitutional injury, the court found the plaintiff's lawyers to have filed "a ponderous, extravagant, and overblown complaint that was largely devoid of a colorable legal basis." 81 The court said:

"This was a clear-cut violation of rule 11. In such cases under the new rule, the court has the duty to impose an 'appropriate' sanction on the offending attorney." 82

The sanction imposed by the court required the two lawyers to personally pay a third of the fees and costs incurred by the defendants in defense of the action.

The recent changes in Rule 11 vidually and a drain on society as a 68 517 F.Supp. 592 (N.D. Illinois 1981). See also were specifically designed to reduce Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F.Supp. 1254 (D. Colorado 1978) Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th. Cir. 1984). whole, legal procedures have been the number of unfounded and frivoestablished to reduce this burden. De-F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1984). lous suits filed. They impose an oblifendant officers and their attorneys 70 Supra note 64. dation on the attorney representing a should use these procedures to mini-71 564 F.Supp. at 1575. 72 733 F.2d at 570. person who claims a constitutional mize this adversity and attempt to dis-73 733 F.2d at 571. injury to make an initial determination courage plaintiffs with frivolous and in-See, Kostiuk v. Town of Riverhead, 570 F.Supp. 603, 612–613 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). ⁷⁵ See, Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. that the claim is supportable in both substantial allegations. ¹⁰ See, Hule 11, Federal Hules of LIVII Procedure.
See also, Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596
F.Supp. 13, 16 (N.D. Illinois 1984).
⁷⁶ 582 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
¹⁰ Id. at 158. law and fact. If that professional obli-FBI gation is not met, the attorney may be personally subject to an appropriate Footnotes 78 Sunra note 75 sanction. ⁷⁹ 596 F.Supp. at 15. ⁸⁰ 596 F.Supp. at 16-17. 47 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982),

While Rule 11 permits the sanction to be imposed on the motion of a defendant or on the court's own initiative, defendant officers should not view this provision as a means of attacking attorneys who represent the plaintiffs and have filed suit against them. The rule recognizes that injured persons have a right to seek legal representation and permits attorneys to bring all suits which are reasonably supported by law. The rule was not designed as an instrument of attack for use by defendants merely because they have been sued. However, in instances where suit was filed when it clearly should not have been, a sanction against the attorney may act to deter other similar suits. Defendant officers and their attorney should carefully examine the lawsuit and the purpose behind this recent change in Rule 11 before asking the court to sanction a plaintiff's attorney for having filed the suit.

CONCLUSION

While civil litigation filed against responsible law enforcement officers in connection with the discharge of their duties is oppressive to them indi-

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- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra note 47, at 2739
- (1982). ⁴⁹ But see Muzychka v. Tyler, 563 F.Supp. 1061 (E.D. Penn. 1983), where it was held that a Supreme Court opinion decided only 3 weeks before the action
- complained of had clearly established the applicable la 50 Alexander v. Alexander, 573 F.Supp, 373 (M.D. Tennessee 1983) 51 Id. at 375, n. 4. See also, Wells v. Dallas
- Independent School District, 576 F.Supp. 497 (N.D.
- Texas 1983).

62 722 F.2nd 1013 (2d Cir. 1983). 53 Id. at 1018.

⁵⁴ Supra note 23, on petition for rehearing No. 76– 01326, August 17, 1984, This issue is, however, on appeal. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir, 1984). petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S. Jan. 14, 985) (No. 841139).

55 Supra note 47. 56 102 S.Ct. at 2739.

of For cases allowing an immediate appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, see, McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1983); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1984); For cases denying the right of an (1) Construction of Cases beinging the ingine of an immediate appeal, see, Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d
267 (3d Cir. 1984); Bever v. Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 349 (1984); Kenyatta v.
Moore, 744 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1984); Powers v. Lightner, -F.2d- (7th Cir., No. 84-2312, 1/16/85). 53 See, Forsyth v. Kleindienst, supra, cert, granted 105 S.Ct. 322 (1984).

59 See, Rule 13, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 50 Counterclaims available to Federal law

enforcement officers who are represented by the Department of Justice cannot be filed by the Governm defense attorney inasmuch as the Department of Justice is authorized to represent the interests of the United States in litigation. The interests of the United States permits the defense of a Federal employee for acts arising out of the employee's official conduct, but does not permit the prosecution of a counterclaim which would be of interest only to the employee-defendant. See, 28 U.S.C. 517.

61 Defamation as used in this article includes the

⁶¹ Detamation as used in this article includes the common torts of libel and slander.
⁶² 563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977). See also, Appletree
V. City of Hartlord, 555 F.Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1983).
⁶³ 688 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1982). See also, Driscoll v.

Schmitt, 649 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1981). ⁶⁴ Title 42, United States Code, 1988, See also. Hensley v. Eckethart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 (1983).

65 Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra note 64. 66 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980).

⁷ Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).

69 564 F.Supp. 1571 (W.D. Missouri 1983), aff'd, 733

- 61 596 F,Supp. at 22. 82 /d.

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