


**CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
RESEARCH**



9957
LOAN COPY
DUPLICATE

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice**



CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Volume III Guidelines for Intelligence Personnel

By
W. THOMAS CALLAHAN, Senior Author
RICHARD L. KNOBLAUCH, Project Manager

Operations Research, Inc.
Silver Spring, Maryland

This project was supported by Grant Number NI-71-097-G awarded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

June 1973

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

ABSTRACT

This project produced a set of operational guidelines for police activities to prevent and control collective violence. The guidelines are based on the techniques and experiences of 14 city police departments and 5 state law enforcement agencies. The guidelines focus on the information required by police for planning, training, operations, and evaluation of both prevention and control measures.

Separate volumes of guidelines were prepared for officers who serve as Chief of Police, Community Relations Personnel, Intelligence Personnel, Patrol Commanders, and Patrol Personnel.

PREFACE

This document constitutes one volume of the final report under LEAA Grant Award NI 71-097-G. The complete series of five volumes is designed to meet contractual requirements and provide an archival record for the interested law enforcement science community, and also to serve as operationally useful manuals in providing information and guidance to the various police decision-makers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Because of the nature of this project, many individuals were involved in, and contributed to, its success. Mr. George Shollenberger of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration served as the award monitor during the last half of the award period. Mr. Adrian Jones, also of LEAA, served in the capacity during the first half.

A panel of law enforcement specialists selected by LEAA made a much appreciated contribution to the report. They provided a substantive review and criticism of the preliminary draft as well as guidance in adapting the study methods to the needs of the police. The consultants included: Winston Churchill, Chief of Police, Indianapolis; Arthur Grubert, Assistant Chief Inspector, Intelligence Division, New York City Police; John Knox, Chief, Patrol Division West, Los Angeles; Dr. Peter Lejins, Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Maryland; and Colonel Ray Pope, Director, Department of Public Safety for the state of Georgia.

The cooperation of the many police officers in the 14 cities and 6 state police departments visited during the data collection effort is greatly appreciated. Without their cooperation and assistance, this report would not have been possible.


The project team for Operations Research, Inc. (ORI) was headed by Mr. Richard L. Knoblauch, project manager and co-author of this report, and Mr. W. Thomas Callahan, senior author of this report. Dr. Lynn Llewellyn, formerly with ORI, was project manager during the early stages of the project. Administrative support and guidance was provided by Mr. Donald W. Walter, Program Director. Mr. Michael Brown of the ORI technical staff provided assistance in the reorganization and rewriting of the preliminary draft. The authors would particularly like to thank Mrs. Roberta Thompson for her patient assistance in typing and editing the report.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
PREFACE	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
I. INTRODUCTION	1-1
NEED FOR GUIDELINES	1-1
PURPOSE	1-1
METHODS OF PREPARATION	1-2
BASIC PROPOSITIONS	1-3
DISCUSSION OF TERMS	1-5
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL	1-8
Locations of CV; Reasons for CV; Time Considerations in CV; Persons Involved in CV; Types of CV Events; Ways in Which CV Occurs	
OUTLINE OF THE REMAINDER OF THIS VOLUME	1-19

II.	INTRODUCTORY NOTES FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL	2-1
III.	PLANNING	3-1
	PLANNING FOR PREVENTION	3-2
	Potential Locations of CV; Reasons for CV Potential; Times When CV May Occur; Per- sons Who May be Involved in CV; Events Which May Lead to CV; Ways in Which CV May Develop	
	PLANNING FOR CONTROL	3-5
	Locations of CV; Reasons for CV; Time Considerations for CV; Persons Involved in CV; Ways in Which CV May Occur	
IV.	TRAINING	4-1
	TRAINING FOR PREVENTION	4-2
	Reasons for CV Potential; Persons Who May be Involved in CV; Ways in Which CV May Develop	
	TRAINING FOR CONTROL	4-4
	Locations of CV; Reasons for CV; Time Considerations in CV; Persons Involved in CV; Types of CV Events; Ways in Which CV Occurs	
V.	OPERATIONS	5-1
	OPERATIONS FOR PREVENTION	5-2
	Potential Locations of CV; Reasons for CV Potential; Times When CV May Occur; Per- sons Who May be Involved in CV; Events Which May Lead to CV; Ways in Which CV May Develop	
	OPERATIONS FOR CONTROL	5-9
	Locations of CV; Reasons for CV; Time Con- siderations in CV; Persons Involved in CV; Types of CV Events; Ways in Which CV Occurs	

VI.	EVALUATION	6-1
	EVALUATION OF PREVENTION	6-2
	Suggested Evaluation Criteria; Potential Locations of CV; Reasons for CV Potential; Times When CV May Occur; Persons Who May be Involved in CV; Events Which May Lead to CV; Ways in Which CV May Develop	
	EVALUATION OF CONTROL	6-7
	Potential Locations of CV; Reasons for CV Potential; Times When CV May Occur; Persons Who May be Involved in CV; Ways in Which CV May Develop	



I. INTRODUCTION

NEED FOR GUIDELINES

While massive civil disorders and violent protest demonstrations have become less frequent in this country over the past year, these and other acts of collective violence continue to threaten public safety and security. Incidents involving ambushes and assaults of police and other public safety personnel, bombings of public and private property, and various types of violent confrontations between police and organized groups persist. This indicates that, while smaller in scope and somewhat less visible, collective violence must continue to be dealt with as a serious national problem. Furthermore, the possibility that massive disturbances will erupt in the future cannot be ignored.

Perhaps the strongest assurance that occurrence of collective violence can be minimized, and that the dangerous effects of such incidents can be reduced rests with the continual improvement of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. Police departments are increasingly successful in detecting and resolving conflicts before violence erupts, and when it does erupt, in safely containing the situation. The guidelines presented in the volume are intended to strengthen law enforcement agencies in their performance of these tasks.

PURPOSE

The development of these guidelines has been based upon descriptions of prevention and control practices which have already been implemented, and with which some success has already been achieved. The information contained in this volume was obtained from personnel in 14 city police departments and six state law enforcement agencies. Since such a sample does not support

broad generalizations concerning the most appropriate actions to be taken by police across the country, the appropriateness of the guidelines must be judged by each reader based upon his own circumstances and requirements. While some departments and agencies may discover little of value here, it is likely that others will be able to apply these guidelines to their needs for improved planning, training, operations, and evaluation pertinent to their collective violence problems. It should be emphasized that this volume is intended to provoke thoughts and introduce ideas and it in no way intends to stifle initiative.

METHODS OF PREPARATION

- The development of these guidelines consisted of five steps.
 - a. A review was made to identify literature pertinent to topics of collective violence and the police role in prevention and control of CV.
 - b. A two-day seminar on police methods and organization was held in which four high-ranking police officers and a university professor of criminology—all of national repute—discussed questions of interest to the police regarding CV.
 - c. A survey of 14 police departments was made in cities with populations between 40,000 and 2,000,000 in the Northeast, Southeast, North Midwest, South Midwest, and Southwest United States; the survey consisted of 120 interviews. Wherever possible, the Chief of Police, intelligence, detective, community relations, patrol and communications personnel were contacted in each city. Although unstructured, the interviews were designed to elicit all information concerning how each department prepared for CV, what actions were taken during CV, and what daily operations were underway to prevent CV. Approximately 190 hours were devoted to interviewing police personnel in the cities.
 - d. Similar interviews were conducted with members of six state law enforcement agencies to determine how these organizations support local agencies with regard to CV control and prevention. This state agency survey was limited to high ranking officers—a total of 20 nation-wide.
 - e. A compilation of all descriptions of police decisions and information requirements in support of decision-making culminated in the preparation of the written guidelines which are presented in this document.

BASIC PROPOSITIONS

Certain basic views held by the writers of the guidelines will be observed in the tone and orientation of this volume. These views were developed during the review of the literature at the beginning of the study, and during the interviews which were conducted with police officers. They are listed here to demonstrate that the writers make no pretense of being completely objective.

- a. Collective violence is apparently the result of growing tension among groups of communities. The growth of tension can be observed, over a period of time, by police in the performance of their normal duties. Following investigation and analysis of reports and behavior which indicate tension, police can take a number of actions which can serve, in some situations, to prevent violence. Prevention of collective violence in every case, however, is probably not possible.
- b. All police officers are decision-makers in the context of their own assignments, and all provide information upon which other officers and unit (precincts, departments, etc.) commanders can base their decisions. The flow of information within law enforcement agencies consists of reports which reflect not only criminal activity but also a wide range of other social conditions including those which may indicate tension.
- c. During a CV situation, the primary objective of law enforcement agencies is to end violence and restore order as rapidly as possible, while at the same time minimizing personal injury, property damage, animosity toward police and the likelihood of additional violence.
- d. After CV has begun, or when crowds with potential for CV have formed, policemen must achieve their objectives through disciplined teamwork in support of command decisions. As a result, while continuing to maintain law and order to the best of their ability, police may find it necessary to refrain from

making arrests or otherwise enforcing the law when such actions would break up the team effort or provide an opportunity for the escalation of violence. Commanders must make the decisions affecting the nature of police responses based on their estimate of each situation, although it may be said that police efforts should concentrate first on actions against persons who are endangering life (with deadly weapons, fire, etc.).

- e. Law enforcement and peace-keeping, although they are the specific duties of police, are general responsibilities of all citizens.
- f. Police provide not only law enforcement and peace-keeping services but a number of their services in support of public health, welfare, education, sanitation, etc. Police may find it useful to increase these additional services from time to time in order to decrease tension in the community. Such increased effort—clearly not a duty of police—may be particularly effective when other public and private organizations fail to take action to reduce tension.
- g. It should also be emphasized that the writers made no evaluative judgments of police practices, which are described herein as "guidelines." Accordingly, some of the guidelines which are included may be found unacceptable to specific readers.

These guidelines assume, furthermore, that in every law enforcement agency, an individual or individuals fills the roles to be described below. The titles attached to these roles are intentionally general, and may not exist in any given department's table of organization. In very large departments, these roles are divided into more specialized roles. Small law enforcement agencies may require that one or two officers perform the duties entailed in all of these roles.

Chief of Police (Sheriff, Colonel, etc.). The commander and administrator of all law enforcement and peacekeeping forces in a specific jurisdiction. Also, the Chief is the law enforcement officer directly responsible to the overall government administration in the jurisdiction, and the primary point of contact between his agency and other public service departments within the same jurisdiction. The Chief is also the major link with heads of other law enforcement agencies.

Community Relations Personnel. The police officers whose primary responsibilities consist of maintaining an accurate, positive image of the police department and police officers in the minds of citizens, and assisting police in understanding the community. They are not involved in law enforcement activities directly, but support the actions of other officers by attempting to create an atmosphere in which police effectiveness will be high. They interact directly with citizens face-to-face or indirectly through the mass media. Community relations officers may also enlist the assistance of other police officers in fostering and supporting community development and human relations programs.

Intelligence Personnel. These include officers who are specifically assigned to the support of decision-making by gathering, analyzing and disseminating information pertaining to potential or actual collective violence. These also include detectives or agents who, in the course of investigations of criminal offenses other than CV, may collect information pertaining to CV.

Patrol Commander. This category consists of commanders of patrol shifts and all police officers who serve as commanders of police during crowd control and CV control operations. It should be noted that no particular rank is implied by the title "patrol commander."

Patrol Personnel. This group of police officers, for the purposes of this volume, consists of officers whose primary duties involve patrol of streets and initial police response to illegal activity, complaints, or requests for assistance. Furthermore, this group includes officers who may not be assigned to patrol except during crowd control or CV control operations.

Separate guidelines have been prepared for each of these police roles. Readers of this volume may wish to read the others as well, since the roles of police in prevention and control of CV clearly overlap. Law enforcement officers whose duties may extend across several of the roles mentioned above may find it especially useful to read all of the volumes. Care was taken to state all guidelines as concisely as possible, in an effort to minimize the size, and thus facilitate the practical use of each volume.

DISCUSSION OF TERMS

- a. Collective Violence—(a) any group activity which interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes property damage or personal injury, or (b) any

activity of an individual or group which interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes multiple incidents of property damage and personal injury.

- b. Groups—Conceivably, any group has the potential of causing or becoming involved in CV. Most police efforts which were observed, however, have been keyed to preventing and controlling violence among the following:
1. Political Activists—persons who demonstrate their belief that the Federal, state, or local government, or a huge range of government policies, should be changed. This group potentially includes all Americans who may choose to exercise the right of assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, this group cuts across all others which are mentioned below, and includes persons who favor or permit violence, although most are committed to non-violent action as a political tactic.
 2. Students—Within the general area of campuses, students have protested the administration of their schools and various other political issues. By far, the majority have chosen to be non-violent, but some have employed violent methods including the use of lethal weapons.
 3. Urban Minorities—The most striking cases of large-scale street violence has occurred among members of urban minority groups, especially urban blacks. The underlying causes of violence and the incidents which triggered these disturbances have been widely studied by police. Again, only a small percentage of urban minorities were connected with the disorders, and an even smaller number were actively violent.
 4. Violent Extremists—Especially in recent years, a number of groups have developed which are openly dedicated to the use of any means, including violence, to achieve their goals. Most of these groups are small in any one community, but they may be linked to similar groups in other areas. They may or may not

have a well articulated political ideology on the far left or far right. They may be of a single race, ethnic or religious group, or a mixture of several. Bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs with police and planned destruction of property are tactics of these groups.

5. Labor Unions—Strikes, especially at very large factories or in the streets continue to present the potential for violence.
 6. Gangs—Youth street gangs and motorcycle clubs, especially when rivalries between gangs develop, can generate violence, sometimes over an extended period.
 7. Crowds—Persons drawn by various kinds of entertainment such as music concerts or athletic contests have, at times, become violent.
- c. Prevention of Collective Violence—Prevention is the result of all actions taken by citizens, including police, in order to
1. Reduce tension among members of the community
 2. Neutralize the influence of persons or groups who have expressed or demonstrated an inclination towards violence
 3. Abort the planned violent activities of persons or groups
 4. Protect, pacify or disperse crowds which may generate violence
 5. Avoid triggering violence by intentional or inadvertant abuse of police authority.
- d. Control of Collective Violence—Control is the result of all actions taken by citizens, especially police, in order to
1. Limit the geographical area and the number of persons affected by CV
 2. Disperse violent groups
 3. Minimize personal injury and property damage

4. Restore the rule of law and the value of order
5. Minimize the probability of the recurrence of CV.

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Police officers gather information on events and trends in the community on a continual basis. Such information, if it has any significance for CV at all, will be applicable to both prevention and control, since police act in a "preventive capacity even when they are "controlling" a full-scale CV incident. Furthermore, intelligence produced during control operations may be used in preventing future outbreaks of violence. Why, then, is it useful to separate prevention from control at all? The answer focuses on the context in which police operations occur as is described by the following observations:

- Prevention activities are extremely valuable if effective, since control activities presume that some personal injury or property damage is occurring
- Prevention activities include all police actions accomplished in the course of normal police operations
- Prevention operations may address long-run community problems, while control operations focus on one short-run problem—violence—and the need for restoring order
- Many elements of information gathered during times when the local jurisdiction is quiet can be used to plan in advance for control operations
- Control operations require extensive planning and a high level of training
- Control operations demand disciplined, coordinated efforts of police officers working as a team
- Control operations occur in an atmosphere of pressure which magnifies the necessity for rapid gathering, processing and dissemination of intelligence, efficient communication and pre-planned command and control procedures.

Having stated these primary differences between prevention and control operations, it is now appropriate to discuss both types of activities, including their similarities and differences in terms of the elements of information required to support them.

Locations of CV

General Locations. Police know from long experience the general neighborhoods that have presented the threat of CV in the past. Through constant monitoring and analysis of tension indicators (i.e., public opinion and social and economic conditions), police can identify other potentially troublesome areas.

The relationship of likely CV areas to the entire jurisdiction must also be considered. An incident of CV in a small area, for example, may affect traffic flows in a much larger area of the jurisdiction. Furthermore, the whole jurisdiction must be considered in terms of its closeness to other jurisdictions where persons known to favor violence reside. Clearly, then, police planning and action relative to CV control must extend beyond the boundaries of the areas in which violence actually occurs.

Particular Locations. Within the neighborhoods which present a general threat of CV, certain locations may be identified as important. These places may be considered as three types.

- Areas where crowds are regularly present. Taverns, pool halls, theatres, housing projects, college student unions. These areas commonly attract large numbers of people for recreation and other social functions. The potential for CV increases, especially when criminal operatives, political dissidents, youth gangs and juveniles frequent these places.
- Areas when crowds assemble less often. Public parks, government building, college quadrangles, business establishments (such as banks and factories), sports stadiums and open fields are sometimes centers of social and political activity. Political demonstrations and protests, labor picketing, and "rock concerts" usually occur at or near these places.
- Areas which may become targets of CV. Police can identify potential targets, primarily through intelligence activities, but sometimes from public announcements from dissidents themselves. Government buildings (especially defense facilities), police stations, public utilities, etc., have been targets. After widespread CV has broken out, liquor, grocery, clothing, appliance and furniture stores may become targets.

Location Characteristics. Police also consider the ways that the characteristics of locations affect control operations. Each neighborhood will present a number of hiding places for persons and weapons and perches for snipers, and some buildings may affect radio transmissions.

Reasons for CV

Historical trends, the social and economic environment, the physical environment and competition for leadership contribute to increasing the potential for CV.

Historical Trends. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, Indian-Americans, Orientals, and other minorities are attempting as groups to make social and economic progress. They raise the level of tension among their own group by recalling their heritage as victims of persecution and oppression.

Although many people agree that minority groups should seek social and economic improvement, many also disagree with the way in which the minority groups work. Individuals and groups take action to oppose the minority group movements. They often use racial or ethnic stereotypes to fortify their opposition to the emerging minority groups. These stereotypes and the actions taken by the opposition groups raise the level of tension further and increase the potential for violence.

A third important historical trend is the fact that police departments are improving in many ways, but the attitudes of people toward police is changing less rapidly. In some areas, among some groups, the police of today represent all the mistakes which police have made in the past.

Social and Economic Environment. In urban areas, people often feel and are victimized by merchants, politicians and police. Especially in slum areas, the whole "system" seems to prey on the people. Poverty brings ignorance and illness—which breed more poverty. All kinds of criminals—drug pushers, robbers, burglars, loan sharks, extortionists, pimps, con men, etc.—all seem to thrive in the poor areas. The merchants are endangered by crime and bad debts, so they raise prices and anger more citizens. The politicians promise rapid social changes, but they seldom deliver. The police seem to bring trouble when they do their job of enforcing the law, but they never seem to enforce the law enough to protect citizens from crime.

On college campuses, the social and economic view is brighter, but the potential for violence can be just as great. Unlike a community, a college population is a very select group. Everyone is young, wanting to have fun, wanting to impress each other, wanting to find a way to make a living and possibly improve society. They want to assert their independence from parents and from other authorities. They want to demonstrate that they have their own ideas, their own interests, their own "life style."

As S. I. Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State College, has pointed out, college students are very good with words. Ability with words got them into college in the first place. Words enabled them to score high marks on high school tests and entrance exams. At college, students learn about life mostly through words—in books, in classrooms, in rap sessions, in rallies. Soldiers know about war and its horror because they have seen it in terms of jungle, rain, bullets and blood. Students see the same things—in words. Poor people know about poverty because they have felt hunger and sickness. They may have seen rats in the kitchen and muggings in the street. Students know these things exist—because they read about them. Police have witnessed crimes and have interviewed criminals. Students read the newspaper reports of crime. In each case, students are at a great disadvantage, because events like war, poverty and crime are complex, while words are simple. Consequently, students can gain real knowledge of events without necessarily facing all the difficulties which these events really entail. This is one reason why students are very good at discussing social problems, less good at providing solutions.

The combination of group pressures, youthful enthusiasm, growing knowledge and social impatience can increase the potential for violent action among students. The potential is increased even more when a large number of students on a campus are away from home. If they were arrested in their home towns, they would bring community disgrace on themselves and their families. The campus, on the other hand, may be far away from this social pressure. After college years, students will probably have relatively little contact with the university or the town. Accordingly, students from out-of-town are more willing to participate in potentially violent protests.

Physical Environment. A number of aspects of the physical environment also tend to raise the potential for CV. Apparently unequal public services can cause citizens, especially taxpayers, to become angry. In many areas, citizens are disturbed by the quality of street maintenance, trash collection, fire protection, police services, public transportation and recreation. Especially among tenants in low-income housing areas, dissatisfaction with public enforcement of building codes is deep and vocal. Failure of these public services gives residents the impression that society has physically isolated them in a holding camp for second-rate citizens.

Other aspects of the physical surroundings also increase tension. Crowding and abandoned buildings where rats breed and criminals hide sometimes lead people to think of themselves as helpless victims of "the system." When these physical conditions are removed by "urban renewal," the local environment actually becomes worse, at least temporarily. The demolition and re-construction of buildings, or the construction of highways and rapid transit facilities further disrupts the area, often without consideration of area residents. When new facilities, such as super-highways or

railways are completed, they become boundaries between communities. Those "on the other side of the tracks" may be depressed or feared. All of these physical conditions extend the potential for violent actions by residents.

Leadership Competition. The existence of organized political groups does not itself increase the potential for violence. Many groups and their leaders utterly oppose violence. But whenever an extremist group which advocates or condones violence emerges, competition for political leadership begins. The end result may be an increase in the potential for violence among all concerned.

Each group leader seeks political advantage by attracting as much attention as possible. In order to compete with other leaders, politicians tend to make hard, striking, and even outrageous statements which will be spread by the mass media and by word of mouth. These statements, even if completely non-violent, often create tension because they usually promise things which make current society look dismal.

When extremists enter the picture, the whole competition changes. They may actually advocate, incite, or perpetrate violence against society. Even if they only threaten violence repeatedly, they may be eventually forced, to take violent action. Otherwise, they may look foolish before their supporters, and their leadership status may be eroded.

During the control phase of CV operations, police have little opportunity to consider or influence the underlying reasons for violence. Police may be able to assist, however, in establishing meetings between community leaders who can reduce violence and government officials who can directly affect the conditions which led to violence. Furthermore, the fairness with which police control violence will affect the basic feelings of citizens toward police and society in the future.

Information must be collected even while violence is occurring to determine the reasons for continued violent action. The following paragraphs describe some of the reasons for the persistence of violent disturbances which have been reported by police.

- a. An organized group, devoted to violence for its own sake or as an acceptable political tactic, is encouraging the continuation of the incident.
- b. An organized group, devoted to a political or social change, is encouraging violence in the belief that it will further their cause.
- c. Rumors are creating continuing tension.

- d. Persons or groups believe that cases of apparent police misconduct will go unnoticed or unpunished and that "the people" must take their own revenge.
- e. The general violence itself provides a mask for personal violent behavior which in "normal" times is prohibited by the customs and social pressures of the community.
- f. Opportunities for looting or "rip-offs" encourage individuals to take advantage of the situation.

Time Considerations in CV

Collective violence can occur at any time, but police experience has shown that the potential for violence increases at the following times.

- a. On Weekends. Time off from work means that people are free to gather in the streets. Since paydays are often on Fridays, many people have a surplus of cash on weekends. Weekend evenings are traditional times for drinking and recreation for many people. This leads to crowds, police involvement with traffic and other illegal actions, and perhaps, careless behavior by people "having fun."
- b. During Hours of Darkness. Darkness provides a mask for vandals and persons intent on violent crimes such as arson to hide behind. People can shout at police, throw bottles and rocks or break into store fronts much more easily in the dark than during daylight hours. Crowds partially obscure the identities of individuals. At night, persons in a large group become almost anonymous.
- c. After the Public Arrest (especially when physical coercion is necessary) of a Member of the Community. This may lead from charges of police brutality, to the formation of crowds, and finally to violence.
- d. After or During Collective Violence in Other Areas of the City or Country. Most experts believe that the city riots of the 1960's were partially contagious. When dissident citizens of one city saw riots occurring elsewhere, they started "sympathy" demonstrations or riots in their own area. The best example of this kind of behavior was the widespread violence which followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968.

- e. After or During Local, National or International Events in Which Groups Have a Clear Interest. Spectacular incidents other than collective violence may become the occasion for CV. The treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, the United States incursion into Cambodia and other events have produced a collectively violent response among some groups. Such events are of great concern to many people, and consequently they receive extensive coverage in the media. Certain groups, such as militant American Jews or militant students may respond to these incidents with violence or with mass action which increases the potential for violence.
- f. After or During Political Meetings or Demonstrations. Although they have been less frequent recently, mass political meetings and demonstrations are part of American life, and in most cases are non-violent.

The time of an outbreak can also have important effects on CV control efforts. Nightfall, rush hour traffic, convention or spectator crowds, groups of people leaving taverns at closing times—all of these exert extra pressures on police if violence breaks out at these times.

During the control phase, the most important aspect of time involves the rapidity with which police move from their normal operations, which emphasize individual decisiveness, to a CV control mode, which stresses disciplined, coordinated team effort.

The changeover to control operations is somewhat aided by the tendency of CV outbreaks to develop over a period of time. Prevention operations provide much information upon which decisions can be based during the control phase. Even the "triggering event" in a CV situation sometimes precedes overt violence by hours or even days. In the period between the first clear indication of violence and a large-scale outbreak, police can begin to execute control plans while intensifying preventive efforts as well.

Persons Involved in CV

The members of the community who are involved in CV and are of interest to law enforcement agencies include both those who are participating and those who are opposing the violence.

Participants in CV. The persons who may produce or participate in violence are listed here based on the level of their probable threat, and are described by the behavior which may indicate their potential danger.

- Persons may come to the area from outside for the purpose of confronting the police in the streets or for the purpose of committing another illegal act such as a bombing.
- Local groups may advocate violence and death for police, especially when these groups are fighting within themselves. Such groups are generally involved with isolated bombings and killings. They participate in mass violence only when the costs to them are low and the benefits high.
- Local individuals may have demonstrated animosity toward police or society and seek public support for their position.
- Ambitious political activists may attempt to gather large crowds in order to attract attention to their cause or to themselves.
- Juvenile gang leaders and members may try to draw attention to themselves.
- Group leaders may become convinced that collective violence is the correct way or at least an acceptable way to achieve benefits for the group. These leaders may hold their position of leadership because of their material wealth in the midst of poverty, because they have achieved material success in the past or simply because they can act effectively as spokesmen for their groups (they need not be clergymen, club presidents or student body officers). They may even be involved in gambling, prostitution or more serious crimes and are leaders because they have expressed interest in group advancement. The group they represent may be as large as a whole race or class, or simply the "regulars" at the tavern or pool hall.
- Any other person may decide that his background and beliefs do not prohibit collective violence for the sake of personal or supposed community gain.

Opponents of CV. Since the prevention of CV is a relatively long-run effort, many citizens can be recruited by police to support programs that will reduce tension in the community.

Any person who has a clear interest in preserving the community or in frustrating those who seek violence can help. Even criminal operatives and political extremists may help to prevent violence if they can see that peace, at least temporarily, is in their best interests. More often, assistance to police in preventing CV will come from community action leaders, local businessmen, religious leaders, youth groups, and administrators of health, welfare, housing and education programs. Representatives of the mass media can also be very helpful.

During the control phase, police must determine who has actually become involved in participating in CV. These persons will include all those who have fostered, planned or committed acts of violence—perhaps to achieve a goal—and other citizens who have joined in the violence for their own reasons.

Groups and individuals must be identified, as well as their addresses and vehicles. The number of persons who are participating must also be estimated since police employ formations and tactics which are suited to crowd size. The number of participants will also indicate whether reserve forces should be readied or deployed.

An accurate assessment of who is involved may be hindered by two factors.

- a. The sudden, apparently unorganized nature of many large civil disorders may disguise the characteristics of the groups and individuals involved.
- b. Police may encounter difficulty in attempts to infiltrate groups who advocate violence; even though such infiltration may be necessary for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the triggering and sustaining of civil disorders. Infiltration is considered the single most effective way to determine who is involved in a violent event.

Assistance for police control operations is likely to come first from individuals or groups who attempted to help police in preventing CV. In some localities, active community relations boards—with many contacts in the community—have supplemented the police in taking rapid action to effectively control efforts. Members of such boards as well as other citizens can be asked to help, if circumstances permit, by taking direct action, especially in rumor control and other community relations efforts. It should be emphasized that the use of community resources can serve to prevent unfounded accusations of arbitrary police action or police brutality following the CV incident.

Types of CV Events

CV events and events which have been included in CV in the past consist of bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs, demonstrations, strikes and crowds. After any of these events has produced widespread violence or other illegal activity, they may be referred to as riots or mobs. It should be stressed that many demonstrations, strikes and crowds are completely legal gatherings in which police activity is devoted both to the protection of life and property and the guarantee of rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, these events should not be viewed beforehand as essentially violent, although each should be reviewed in terms of its potential for causing or providing the setting for violent activity.

Bombings may be the result of conspiracies, although some have been carried out by individuals. Bombings and ambushes usually require extensive planning and secrecy. Shoot-outs appear to be the result of general plans which can be enacted at any time, usually against police.

Demonstrations vary greatly in size and are organized in support or protest of government or institutional policies. Although most demonstrations are legal and intended to be peaceful, violence may develop within them on a small- or large-scale. Some demonstrations, furthermore, are essentially illegal, such as traffic disruption or the occupation of public or private buildings. A very small number of demonstrations have been not only illegal, but intentionally violent.

Strikes have the same characteristics as demonstrations, except that they are undertaken by persons who are very well organized (over many years, perhaps) and usually involve action of specific labor groups against specific business organizations or public service agencies.

Crowds vary greatly in size and usually are disorganized. Violence in crowds is usually not planned, and is small-scale, although it may grow.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

Actions which are most likely to require police action are listed in the following paragraphs in the order of their urgency.

Planned violence may be organized by individuals or groups against persons or property, especially against groups of persons. The bombing or burning of buildings, ambushes and ritual murders can be considered in this category which takes first priority for police preventive action.

Planned confrontations with police or confrontations with groups of citizens may occur. These will require police action to restore traffic flow or public order.

Spontaneous formation of groups of citizens to protest police action may follow public arrests. Whether the police action was correct or mistaken, crowds may react violently. Thus, in every case when arrests or other police work leads to spontaneous confrontation between police and groups, prompt action is required to prevent violence.

Crowds may grow or move beyond the limits of police capability to protect lives and property. This requires direct intervention by police to provide for orderly crowd growth and direct movement. When police intervention occurs, a confrontation between citizens and police can develop, and violence may result.

Violent reaction to the words of speakers or violent acts incited by speakers may occur at meetings and rallies. Potentially inflammatory speech, although protected from abridgment by the First Amendment, is reason for police to prepare to take action to prevent violence.

Tension may grow within a group in a place where potential for violence is high. This may occur, for example when performers fail to appear for concerts, and at athletic contests which excite feelings of participants.

If violence actually begins to occur, a virtually limitless number of different violent acts may be performed. Some of the most significant actions which have been reported by police include those in the following list.

- Threats to life are posed by snipers, arsonists, and persons with incendiary and explosive bombs.
- Fire and explosive also threaten real property.
- Rioters attempt to destroy police vehicles with fire or other means.
- Violent persons throw a wide variety of missiles at police and other passers by, both in vehicles and on foot.
- Large or small groups attempt to break through police lines by force.
- Barricades are built to hinder traffic flow and to conceal and cover persons who are throwing missiles or sniping.
- Vandals break windows and may attempt to loot retail business stores or warehouses.


- Non-violent militants illegally block streets and building entrances or occupy buildings or offices. Although these acts are not violent in themselves, violence often results when police attempt to remove these persons who are breaking the law.

OUTLINE OF THE REMAINDER OF THIS VOLUME

Chapter II consists of introductory notes for the personnel for whom the volume was prepared. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI are entitled Planning, Training, Operations, and Evaluation, respectively. Relative to each of these activities, each chapter discusses the information which police require in support of decisions regarding both prevention and control of CV. Within each chapter, prevention and control guidelines are listed separately. Prevention and control guidelines are further broken down into categories based upon six essential intelligence elements:

- Locations of CV
- Reasons for CV
- Time Considerations in CV
- Persons Involved in CV
- Types of CV Events, and
- Ways in Which CV Occurs.

A similar format has been used in all the volumes of this series: Volume I, Chief of Police; Volume II, Community Relations Personnel; Volume III, Intelligence Personnel; Volume IV, Patrol Commander; and Volume V, Patrol Personnel.



II. INTRODUCTORY NOTES FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Part of the mission of intelligence personnel is to support decision-making by acting as the primary gathering agency, clearinghouse and analysis center for information concerning collective violence. This mission includes the performance of tasks within the community, within the local department, and and between the local department and other law enforcement agencies.

Intelligence efforts within the community consist primarily of overt monitoring of events and organizations which have potential ramifications for the problem of CV. Police departments have found repeatedly, however, that certain CV threats are so forceful and clandestine that covert penetration of violent and potentially violent groups may become necessary.

Within the local department, intelligence personnel are responsible for intelligence planning and training in relation to CV and for assuring that information flows unimpeded through the rank structure and functional divisions and units.

Training in intelligence subjects regarding CV should be stressed to all police officers. Many pieces of information, which could be overlooked by some officers because they have little apparent value as evidence in the legal sense, may be useful to intelligence personnel in estimating the potential for CV in an area.

The relationship between an intelligence unit and similar sections of other law enforcement agencies is one which is in the process of growth in many departments. Within the subject area of collective violence, this growth is especially important, because certain issues that have created the atmosphere for CV involve many jurisdictions, and persons who foment conflict or increase community tension may travel to or recruit supporters in several areas.

Readers of this volume may also wish to consider the guidelines within Volume II of the series, Community Relations Personnel. Although it should be emphasized that police community relations is not an intelligence activity, the approaches recommended for community relations officers in dealing with CV may also prove useful to intelligence personnel.

III. PLANNING

Planning for prevention consists of all analyses and decisions undertaken by police to prepare operations which will reduce tension among normally nonviolent persons and to interrupt the potentially violent activities of persons who see violence as necessary or acceptable. Planning efforts include identification of needs, organization of action groups, formulation of prevention strategies, generation of tactics, selection and purchase of equipment and materials, and recruitment and training of personnel. Specific CV planning supplements a variety of police general orders, regulations and procedures which are inherent in routine police operations.

Planning for control includes all of the steps of planning for prevention, but is oriented toward preparing operations to restore order rapidly and to decrease the likelihood of further violence. Planning for control emphasizes the development of standard procedures which can be exercised swiftly and coordinated effectively. A recommended product of planning for control is an Emergency Operations Manual which prescribes Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Command and Control practices to be used during violent incidents. This manual is supported by all other police planning documents and procedures which are used by police during periods when CV is not occurring.

PLANNING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. Besides relying on the experience of the police department in identifying areas with violence potential, intelligence personnel should also utilize available statistics. Areas with high population density, low average per capita incomes, high crime rates, and large numbers of minority group members can usually be outlined by the use of public data. The data can be utilized to prepare a detailed analysis of the relative seriousness of problems in various neighborhoods.
2. Identify areas where students and members of non-conformist communities live. Although these areas are not necessarily prone to violence, actions can be taken in these neighborhoods to prevent these citizens from becoming completely alienated from police.
3. Prepare maps of the community overall, including surrounding areas, to show the relative seriousness of local problems. For especially difficult areas, such as an urban slum, a business area, or a campus, prepare more detailed maps.
4. Identify which of the potentially violent areas are most difficult to investigate. Attempt to identify the reasons for the difficulty. For example, the department may not have a sufficient number of detectives or patrolmen from minority groups to establish close contact with a minority community. Other problems may exist. Suggest a plan for correcting these problems to the Chief of Police.

Reasons for CV Potential

5. Train yourself to be sensitive to the types of complaints that you may receive in the course of criminal investigations. Some of these will represent only the specific anger of disgruntled individuals. Other complaints may indicate the dissatisfaction of many people with conditions in the community. Try to test the depth of the dissatisfaction and how widespread it is. Even if the anger seems unreasonable or unfounded, report the complaints to community relations personnel.
6. Listen to the general or "off the topic" observations of contacts and informants as well as to their specific information reports. These general statements, when pieced together and compared with other information, may lead to indications of growing tension or developing violence.

Times When CV May Occur

7. From studying past events in the jurisdiction and in other areas, try to outline possible target dates for demonstrations, or actual violence by various groups. May Day, for example, is the traditional day for demonstrating sympathy with communism and socialism. The anniversaries of the deaths of radicals such as Fred Hampton of the Black Panther Party, George Jackson, and others may also appeal to radicals as opportune times for a violent show of sympathy. Less radical groups may demonstrate on the anniversaries of the deaths of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Kent State Four, etc. In a local jurisdiction, the memory of less publicized people may be an important motivation for rallies. Counter demonstrations may also arise at these times.
8. Traditional parades, such as the ethnic celebrations of St. Patrick's Day, Columbus Day, the community celebrations of athletic festivals and harvests, and even county fairs may occasion counterdemonstrations. Factions which have broken with the participating groups may attempt to disrupt events. Persons protesting war or social injustice unrelated to the events themselves may use parades as an opportunity to gain attention. Some people may protest parades as a misallocation of funds that supposedly should be put to more serious purposes. Investigation beginning even several months before these events may identify possible trouble that can be prevented.
9. When possible problems are discerned, inform the Chief of Police and community relations personnel. They may, in conjunction with other police and private citizens, be able to reduce the likelihood of violence before it increases.

Persons Who May Be Involved in CV

10. Devise a practical approach for keeping lines of communication concerning potential collective violence open. Because detective personnel are involved in gathering evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions, they may be reluctant to pass on information concerning the subjects of their investigations. Detectives might be concerned that an investigation of CV may put suspected criminals on their guard, and make gathering of evidence for criminal prosecutions more difficult, or perhaps impossible. They may also be afraid that their cases may be spoiled by lack of secrecy, or that their suspect may be arrested first by some other law enforcement officer. Detectives in criminal cases may also let patrolmen (who may wish to become detectives) know that information concerning certain individuals in the community should be reported only to detectives and not to other intelligence personnel who are responsible for analyzing information.

Intelligence officers should suggest to detectives involved in criminal cases that the information indicating the development of CV is not necessarily the same as the data which might become evidence in criminal prosecutions. Intelligence officers, many of whom sometimes act as detectives, can sympathize with detectives' interests and can work to preserve criminal cases at the same time that they work to prevent CV.

Intelligence personnel can also approach patrolmen and ask their assistance in watching certain individuals in the jurisdiction. Some departments have encouraged intelligence officers to have lunch or coffee with a different patrolman each week. Patrolmen are assured that nothing will be done to harm potential criminal cases.

11. Plan a filing system which can include the names of organizations as well as individuals. Collect reports from all sources on the numbers of members, leaders, goals, ideology and tactics of these organizations. Take all precautions necessary to assure that the names of non-criminal organizations and non-criminal persons are never confused with criminal files and records, even though some of the organizations may include persons with a criminal record.
12. Develop a plan for contacting politicians and other celebrities who come, or who plan to come, to the jurisdiction. An explanation should be prepared to assure these people that police are interested in protecting them. A file may be kept on these famous persons. This file may show which individuals or organizations have threatened them with violence or promised disruption of their activities. Many of these celebrities have agents or "advance men." Intelligence personnel should ask their cooperation in planning the movements of the celebrity to afford him the best possible protection. At the same time, intelligence personnel will be building a plan for preventing violence within the crowd which the famous person may attract.

Events Which May Lead to CV

13. Utilizing sources within the community and in other law enforcement agencies, prepare a plan for identifying threats of planned CV. Include suggestions for improving the coordination of municipal, county, state, and FBI investigations. Also, outline a network of key informants who can supply information on plans for violence. As necessary, develop plans for the recruitment, training and management of undercover agents.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

14. Review all information on the tactics and incidents which have led to CV, and which are available for use by groups who wish to increase CV potential. Such information can be obtained from many published reports, from other law enforcement agencies, and from reports which were prepared for use within your department.
15. Never take a "peaceful demonstration" at face value. Any large gathering or protest march has the potential for collective violence. Never assume collective violence "can't happen here."
16. Devise a plan for obtaining all materials found in the course of criminal investigations that could be used in a CV situation. These materials should include such objects as weapons, planning documents, instruction manuals, clothing and distinctive paraphernalia.

PLANNING FOR CONTROL

Although many of the prevention guidelines (above) are clearly applicable to control planning as well, the following discussion specifically oriented to control planning should be considered.

Planning for control consists primarily of three major steps: (1) the development of a set of written operational procedures for use by the local department during crowd control and CV (these written procedures will be referred to as the Emergency Operations Manual and Plan); (2) the institution of a mutual aid arrangement with other nearby law enforcement agencies; and (3) the design of a centralized, well equipped command center. Many police departments have achieved success with these three steps. Intelligence personnel can best support planning for control by developing the kinds of information needed to plan for control operations. The following guidelines are aimed at that task.

Locations of CV

17. Attempt to determine the areas within the community that are likely locations for unplanned ("spontaneous") outbreaks of CV. These are apt to be those areas with the highest unemployment, the poorest living conditions, and the greatest amount of anti-police sentiment.
18. Analyze the location of your jurisdiction in relation to other areas where persons with a demonstrated inclination toward violence reside. Can they send agitators or come themselves to support violence which has erupted? By what routes are they likely to come?

19. Construct a priority list of buildings and facilities which may become targets during a CV outbreak in various parts of the local jurisdiction. Devise procedures for notifying the operators of these buildings to increase security during violence.
20. Maintain a liaison with patrol personnel, especially in potentially troublesome areas.

Reasons for CV.

21. Devise ways of determining the reasons for continuing activity. Are the motivations which produced the initial outbreak still strong? Have additional factors been added?
22. Set up a network of contacts who can be trusted to provide good readings of the reasons for violence once it has broken out. These persons can be contacted before and after violence has begun to assist in estimating the importance of organized groups, community anger with police, rumors and personal gain as motivations for violence. Be certain that such individuals can be used once CV has erupted. Some departments have found that informers will stop providing information during CV.

Time Considerations for CV

23. Analyze the characteristics of activity in your jurisdiction which are dependent on time. Are there rush hours on business days? Do persons from outside the jurisdiction come into the area on weekends or weekend nights? Are there tourist attractions which are active at specific times of the year? Are conventions of controversial political or business associations scheduled? The combination of any of these events may present targets for violence or act as diversions for violence. If persons or groups wanted to start trouble, when would police be least able to contain it? Can anything be done to fortify police capability at such times?


Persons Involved in CV

24. Prepare lists of potentially influential community leaders, criminal operatives, activist group leaders and political dissidents. After a CV outbreak, these lists can be used as leads to analyze who is involved. These people, especially if they are not directly involved in the violence, may also be convinced to exert pressure on members of their own group to refrain from violence. Both law-abiding citizens and persons who are involved in criminal activity during peaceful periods can be directly opposed to CV which endangers their home, their friends or their businesses.

25. Prepare a staffing plan for CV situations to assure that intelligence personnel will be available for duty in the emergency operations center, for investigations of criminal acts during CV, and to make tours of the area of CV to estimate the situation.
26. Prepare lists of organizations or groups who might react violently to demonstrations by other organizations whose political views or social characteristics they despise.
27. Know the members, leaders, and strength of any self-appointed vigilante groups who may attempt to control violence on their own—to the detriment of the police and community.
28. Intelligence personnel should hold brain-storming sessions with similar officers in other agencies or adjacent jurisdictions. Exchange ideas. Pool resources during critical periods. Regular meetings of this type will build trust and confidence, provide better information, and help in area-wide planning for collective violence.

Ways in Which CV May Occur

29. Be alert to the type of tactics that might be used in the future as well as in ongoing CV events—arson, window breaking, looting, snipers, and bombings—each require that different control tactics be planned.



IV. TRAINING

Training for the prevention of CV consists of all efforts to prepare police for preventive operations. Training familiarizes police with underlying causes of tension in the community with local groups which exploit or increase tension, the ways in which violence develops, and the times and places where CV may occur. The goal of training is to prepare officers to recognize and reduce tension, detect approaching violence and thwart the attempt of individuals or groups to commit violence. Training for prevention of CV can be incorporated into police recruit training, and it can be given as supplemental training to experienced officers. A large number of universities, colleges and adult evening schools also support police training for prevention of CV with courses in the fields of sociology, psychology, and economics.

Although police at higher ranks may have a high level of professional expertise, opportunities for in-service or school training in both prevention and control of CV should be made available whenever time and budgetary constraints permit. Advances in law enforcement techniques are occurring at a rapid rate, and the problems which police are asked to address are increasing in number and complexity. In such an environment, all officers are likely to benefit from training, and all officers, including intelligence personnel, can provide inputs into such training.

TRAINING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. Provide the training program with pictures, descriptions and maps of the areas of the jurisdiction which have potential for collective violence. Choose the areas from historical experience and/or from current intelligence estimates.
2. Provide descriptions of places where radical groups are likely to conceal weapons, manufacture explosives or crude missiles, hold revolutionary training drills, etc.
3. Show maps of whole areas of the jurisdiction to demonstrate that crowds in some areas can have serious effects on traffic flow. Since stopped cars can become targets for rocks, bottles, and firebombs, police cannot allow peaceful crowds to clog key traffic arteries. Re-routing of traffic may be necessary to avoid this possibility.

Reasons for CV Potential

4. Provide training sessions with reports concerning the relationships of narcotics, crime, poverty, unemployment and inadequacy of public service to historical outbreaks of violence. Try to relate these to the local area.
5. Emphasize the role that crime plays in creating tension in a community. The proceeds from gambling, prostitution and other consensual crimes can be used to finance the importation and sale of narcotics. Narcotics addiction has been shown to increase the frequency of burglaries, robberies, assaults during robberies, and murders. An atmosphere of crime requires that police must be present continually to perform investigations or make arrests, and desperate criminals may compel police to use force. Uninformed passersby may view forceful police work as brutality. Reports of real and imagined police brutality circulate and have, in the past, led to violence. Furthermore, one or two actual or supposed incidents of police brutality can put many members of a community in a mood susceptible to accepting rumors as facts. Rumors increase tension and cause violence.

Persons Who May Be Involved In CV

6. Describe the types of information which all policemen can gather concerning persons who are involved in potentially violent activities. Who appears to be leading dissident groups? Where do they live? Where do they spend their time? What cars do they use (description and license number)? Who are their closest friends? Although it is unlikely that a single police officer could obtain all the answers, a nearly complete file can be constructed by intelligence from many different reports obtained from many officers.
7. Emphasize the importance of accuracy in making reports about persons who can affect community inclinations to violence. False or inaccurate reports can lead to unjust acts by police against citizens. Rumor spreading can also result. Further, police officers may waste time trying to verify and follow up leads that grow out of misinformation. Cite examples of cases in which accurate information helped, misinformation hurt. Stress accuracy concerning the number of people involved in any incident; what happened or is happening; what was said, and by whom.
8. After mentioning the various individuals and groups who are involved in activities having potential for collective violence, cite the relationship of these same persons to known or suspected criminal operatives. Be sure to point out those who have no significant association with known or suspected criminals.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

9. Give examples to illustrate that violence is usually detectable long before it occurs. Police may find evidence that groups are planning, organizing and propagandizing among other organizations and among individual citizens. Pamphlets, flags, uniforms, newspapers and other media are used to gain attention to their views. Rumors become more frequent and exciting.

Vulgar phrases and mottos concerning police or governmental officials and programs proliferate and spread. Many issues concerning change are adopted as objectives by activist groups even though the change they advocate may not specifically benefit their own self interests. Women's rights, blacks' rights, Chicanos' rights, consumerism, peace and other desires are fused into one campaign. Although such coalitions sometimes result in confusion, leaders hope to attract enough people from each group to make their own movement powerful. At the same time, they unwittingly provide an opportunity for police to find out about their plans.

When one, clear, specific issue attracts great attention—such as civil rights or school bussing—political action by crowds begins. Violence still may be avoided, especially if police and others work to maintain a sense of reason. But if such a "hot" issue arises, and its seriousness is confirmed by intelligence and community relations reports, the department will prepare for the control phase.

When an issue becomes clear, group leaders will attempt to gather a crowd, to show police (the city, the nation, the world) that the group is serious about its concerns. The process of forming this crowd gives police another chance to observe the quality of organization and planning, the mood and the probable tactics of the group. The larger the crowd desired, the more complicated is the planning, and the greater is the opportunity for police observation.

10. Opponents of social or political change may behave in a similar matter. Persons who oppose racial or ethnic group advancement, women's liberation etc., may coalesce and develop campaigns. Such persons may increase tension, especially by organizing counter demonstrations which may physically interact with activities of the groups who favor change. These opponents of change and their activities are also usually identifiable by police some time in advance of any public gathering which they organize.

TRAINING FOR CONTROL

Training for control consists of familiarizing police personnel with the Emergency Operations Manual and exercising the instructions contained in the Manual until proficiency is achieved. Police also require familiarity with various types of crowd control formations and with the kinds of threats which may be encountered during a violent incident. As opposed to training for daily police work which emphasized individual judgment and action, training for CV control stresses coordinated, disciplined team work. Training in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies who are components of a mutual aid plan may be required. Some departments have provided special training for a small number of personnel sometimes called a "Tactical Patrol Force." Training for control may also be supplemented by courses such as the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (CDOC) given by the U.S. Army at Ft. Gordon, Georgia.

Locations of CV

11. From contacts and agents reports in intelligence files, those areas that are likely to become sites of CV can be determined. Inform all trainees of these areas. Also inform trainees of potential strategic targets of CV and the vulnerability of these locations. Update this training so that daily roll-call briefing can be used to inform patrol personnel of any changes in the problems of these potentially violent areas.

12. Explain the use of maps in the emergency operations center. Using maps of the local area, demonstrate how the command center can direct police movements if reports of incidents are submitted clearly and rapidly.

Reasons for CV

13. From intelligence files in the local department and from other materials, prepare training sessions on the motivational factors which are likely to lead to individuals to confront the police in future CV situations.
14. Describe to trainees the economic reasons which motivate persons to participate in violence. Explain that looting has been a widespread practice in many riots, but looting has also occurred following earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Looters are simply there to milk what they can from a bad situation. The decline in number when an atmosphere of order is restored—when they are no longer sure that police are too busy to capture them.
15. Describe how some people perform destruction for its own sake or for peer group approval. These motivations seem to be very important to some juveniles even when they lack the cover which CV provides.
16. Discuss revenge for historical or contemporary injustice as a motivation for violence.
17. Explain the beliefs of some groups that violence is an actual good; that violence is the best, and perhaps the only way to achieve political goals. This position is taken by groups of all races, all political extremes, and by persons of different ages and educational backgrounds.

Time Considerations in CV

18. Stress the importance of rapid and clear reporting of information. The overall command center, which may have several telephones and radios, may be overwhelmed by the number of reports unless each report is clear and concise, and radio discipline is maintained.

Persons Involved in CV

19. Determine who has been involved in previous incidents of CV, including individuals, groups and leaders. Use this information in training sessions or roll-call briefings of line personnel on the characteristics of the individuals involved and what to expect from them.

20. Keep files on dissidents. If collective violence erupts, the leaders can be identified. If engaged in illegal activity, they may be arrested.

Types of CV Events

21. Attempt to determine what types of CV activities are considered likely by the key members and leaders of the community. For example, are riots considered to be a thing of the past and not likely to recur soon? Inform the training officer so that training programs on control tactics can be kept current.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

22. Describe all known tactics used by violent groups in confrontations with or attacks on police and other citizens. Note the willingness of some groups to use clubs and missiles, firearms or bombs against persons or property. Explain that certain persons will attempt to have themselves arrested and offer no resistance, while others may resist strenuously. Other topics which may be covered are methods of stopping and disabling vehicles, frightening police horses, and pretending to be injured by police.
23. Try to relate all tactics to groups in the local jurisdiction. In some localities, none of the local groups will have any record of or demonstrated inclination toward using violent methods.
24. Use contacts and undercover agents to determine tactics being planned by CV activists. Use this information in police tactics training courses.
25. After a CV outbreak, use undercover agents and contacts to determine tactics being planned. Inform the Chief and patrol commander. Use the information to prepare roll-call briefings during the course of the violence.

V. OPERATIONS

Operations for prevention of CV include all efforts by police or encouraged by police to detect and reduce tension and to repel attempts at initiating violence. These operations include community relations, press relations, information collection, verification, processing and dissemination, street patrol, crowd control and various types of community services. Although some extraordinary actions may be required to prevent CV, most preventive efforts are part of daily police work.

Operations for control includes the deployment, movement, command, control and support of police officers to end violence, protect persons and property, restore order and preclude the recurrence of violence. During control operations, patrol, intelligence, community relations and command functions focus on curtailing violence while continuing to perform law enforcement and other services outside of the area of violence.

OPERATIONS FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. On a continual basis (hourly, when necessary), review all areas of the jurisdiction to identify places which have the highest potential for violence.
2. Set priorities for collecting information to support preventive operations based upon the level of the potential for violence in each area.
3. Initiate own investigations to determine all reasons for high tension in specific areas.
4. Provide patrol commanders and detectives with all information concerning areas of high tension where CV might break out. Provide such information on demand, and on own initiative as well.
5. Request that community relations personnel intensify efforts to decrease tension in specific areas.
6. Be prepared to provide estimates of CV potential in specific areas to the Chief of Police, patrol commanders, and other law enforcement agencies.
7. Request that personnel investigating criminal acts in high tension areas be watchful for weapons, fortification, revolutionary training manuals, bomb construction manuals, or any other materials indicating preparations for violence. Personnel should seize these when justified. Request that, in all cases, findings should be reported for intelligence purposes.
8. Request that investigative personnel be watchful for leaflets, letters, distinctive clothing or insignias indicating the presence of political organizations in high tension areas, and report observations for intelligence purposes.
9. Informants on criminal activity in high tension areas should be contacted by investigative personnel to find out what the informants know about the potential for CV in the area. Results should be reported for intelligence purposes.

Reasons for CV Potential

10. For each area of potential violence, prepare a list of the most important grievances, as well as any other disruptive influences. Periodically update each list to show which influences have grown, declined, or remained the same in intensity.

11. Communicate to patrol commanders, detective and community relations personnel all disruptive influences of which they should be aware. Violence-oriented militant groups are an example.
12. When the reasons for the potential for violence have been identified, intensify efforts to determine who is exploiting these reasons, and when and how they might attempt violence.
13. Request that personnel investigating criminal acts listen for indications of changes in the community which might provide the background for CV.
14. Persistent rumors should always be checked out. Plan for events—which are rumored as upcoming—until the rumor is proven false. Also, be very watchful for bogus information designed to confuse or mislead police, or even to lead them into an ambush.
15. Request that investigative personnel contact informants to find out if publicly-expressed grievances of citizens are real. Informants may know if other unstated issues exist. Demands of citizens concerning an end to racism or war, for example, may disguise the fact that these citizens are jealous of the success of other groups in achieving greater attention from police, health, welfare, or other public service agencies.
16. Pay close attention to sudden, unexplained increases in applications for weapons, physical and verbal attacks on policemen and firemen, rock throwing incidents, resistance to arrest, and false calls for assistance (e.g., "officer in trouble"). In some jurisdictions these factors have preceded serious civil disturbances. Don't overlook increased anxiety on the part of long term residents.
17. Watch the papers and other media for upcoming events that will gather crowds. Athletic events, entertainments, rallies, parades and demonstrations—none should be ruled out. Analyze each for its potential for CV. Provide the Chief of Police with an estimate of danger involved in any of these events which will require police attention.
18. Attempt to understand the social structure of the community. If an important person gives up his leadership role (because he dies, moves away, is arrested, etc.), in-fighting to establish a new leader may occur, and the potential for violence might increase. Accept the fact that unsavory, even criminal persons, can be effective, powerful leaders in their own group. Estimate what is likely to happen if such people leave, or if challenges to their power arise.
19. Note CV in other cities for its possible contagion effect.

Times When CV May Occur

20. Monitor newspapers and other media to identify upcoming events with potential for CV.
21. Collect flyers, posters, and other materials distributed by organizations that sponsor or support public events. These usually have a schedule of events which may be useful for planning purposes.
23. Whenever bizarre or startling events occur (such as the killing of a citizen by police), quickly assess the potential for CV in the area, the reasons for the potential, who is likely to be involved, what they can do, and how it can be done.
24. Attempt to identify each planned event (such as a parade, demonstration, entertainment, etc.) and the key times at which each gathering is most likely to produce violence. Movement of the group from place to place, break-up of the group, and planned confrontation with authorities have been occasions of violence in the past.
25. Provide guidance to investigative personnel, in their attempts to consult informants concerning community talk of violence at upcoming events.
26. Investigative personnel should contact informants concerning possible violent community reaction to widely-publicized occurrences in the area or elsewhere.

Persons Who May Be Involved In CV

27. Prepare a list of leaders of all groups who may contribute to the development of CV. Know their faces, addresses, cars, telephone numbers. Know the goals, strategy and tactics of their organizations, the numbers of members, the level of their funding and the sources of their funding. Know their attitudes toward police and toward violence. Find out if they have a distinctive uniform or paraphernalia, a newspaper or facilities for printing. The list can often be supplemented by careful reading of the underground and conventional press. Leaders of dissident groups tend to boast of their alienation from society and of their plans to change the system. The media often provide background information which police can use to analyze whether specific individuals have any potential for violence. The media reports, including pictures, can be filed for possible future use.

28. Check the names of all known leaders and members of groups for criminal records. A record of a large number of crimes, especially violent crimes, demonstrates a willingness to violate the law. Dissident groups which include persons with extensive criminal records must be treated differently from those which consist of persons whose dissidence derives solely from political or social beliefs. A check on the criminal records of the group may also give some indication of the kinds of activities the group can engage in to raise money to support its operations. Finally, a check with other departments or through the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) or the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) may show that a group leader or member is a fugitive from prosecution.
29. Don't overlook unusual sources of information when rumors of collective violence appear. Sometimes information can be obtained from ghetto apartment residents, cab drivers, and from employees and patrons of taverns, pool halls, coffee shops, grocery stores, beauty parlors and barber shops, etc.
30. When individuals are specifically identified as persons who are advocating or planning violent acts, regardless of purpose, a detailed investigation would include surveillance of the movement of the leaders, their groups, and those who visit them frequently.
31. Factions often develop among groups that are planning either political demonstrations or actual violence. One faction will sometimes wish to undermine the success of the planned event in order to embarrass the other faction. The jealousy between the sub-groups may enable police to elicit information from each about the other. This information can help police to take action to avoid trouble. In some cases, jealous members have enabled plainclothes officers to obtain entry into meetings of the dissident groups.
32. Preparation for campus gatherings requires close cooperation and teamwork. Intelligence sections should make use of all available sources of information. Have professors, secretaries, switchboard operators and campus security forces been encouraged to provide information? Have undercover agents attempted to infiltrate radical groups? Have friendly media reporters been consulted?
33. If reports of potential campus trouble have not been proven false, intelligence people should attempt to find out how many people might be involved. What groups are likely to participate? What is their stated purpose? What student leaders and groups are dedicated to nonviolence? What groups might join radicals? What is the past experience with these groups?

34. Guard intelligence files carefully. In some jurisdictions it has been necessary to purchase paper shredders because janitors and cleaning personnel were discovered searching waste baskets.
35. Whenever possible, check accuracy of intelligence by using independent sources. Sometimes, two informants who are unknown to one another can be used to verify information. If both tell the same story, you can be more certain of its reliability. Single informants sometimes tell police what they think police "want to hear."
36. Maintain close cooperation between intelligence sections and patrol sections. In larger jurisdictions having a patrol officer serve as a liaison with intelligence has improved the two-way flow of information. During outbreaks of CV, a representative of intelligence should be present in the mobile Command Post.
37. Intelligence sections should make every effort to seek information from patrol personnel. There is a real need for cooperation and mutual trust. Avoid using intelligence personnel for internal police investigations. When this happens, trust is destroyed.
38. Some potential violence is planned in one jurisdiction to be performed in another. In such cases, the necessity of coordination among intelligence personnel is clear. Some travel may be required. The meetings held to plan events which may lead to violence are usually considered important events by dissidents, who may talk about them in advance and boast of their plans to attend. Police, especially in the jurisdiction where the planning meetings will be held, can usually hear about the meetings in advance. They may also hear about individuals coming from other jurisdictions to attend. The police in the other jurisdictions should be notified.
39. The need for passage of essential CV information among jurisdictions points to the need for police coordination. Passage of information concerning individuals can be accomplished through the FBI, NCIC, or LEIU, or by personal contact of an intelligence officer in one jurisdiction with an intelligence officer in another. At the local level, especially with regard to collective violence, the municipal and state police will benefit mutually from passage of information, and the National Guard should be briefed in advance of any potentially violent gathering. Briefing of such other agencies will be facilitated if regular liaison is maintained among all agencies concerned.
40. Remember that the leaders of dissident groups who are dedicated to non-violence may be helpful to police in neutralizing the violent tendencies of the others. Files should be kept, accordingly, on the statements of non-violent leaders, and their names should be given to community relations personnel.

Events Which May Lead To CV

41. Make a list of the possible ways that CV can break out in the area. Is a spontaneous eruption likely? Is a planned campaign of violence likely? What capabilities do various groups have?
42. Be sensitive to evidence that violence or disruption is being planned. In 1970-1971, some groups actually boasted to the media that they were about to interrupt traffic flows regardless of the potential for violence. More dangerous were groups and individuals who "went underground." Careful investigation is required to discover the plans of such people. Also needed is coordination of municipal, county, state, and FBI investigations, and verification of all reports.
43. Questioning of informants and the use of undercover agents may be required to determine what plans are being made to cause or precipitate violence.
44. Many of the promoters of planned non-violent or violent acts have previous experience, sometimes in several localities. From police and media reports of their activities, a probable modus operandi can be developed. This can be used in planning police response strategies.
45. Some group behavior clearly indicates the probability of violence occurring. Some groups hold classes in maintaining battle formations (women in the front rank), weapons manufacture and resistance to arrest. Some prepare written manuals to support such training.
46. Some other group behavior clearly indicates the probability of police confrontation, though not necessarily violence. Bail money is collected in advance. Legal aid groups are formed. Training is given in resistance or non-resistance to arrest.
47. The location chosen by a group to gather its crowd may also indicate the probability of violence. Rallies or parades which are planned for areas with high social tension indicate that the leaders of the group are at least willing to take the risk of violence even if they do not intend it. Intelligence personnel should recommend to the Chief that permits for gatherings in such areas be denied. The permit can be used to bargain groups into gathering or marching in areas with a lower potential for violence.

48. The inclusion of famous radical speakers in rallies raises the potential for violence. Such speakers may actually attempt to incite violence. Others may only advocate it. If the speaker is known to have advocated violence in other areas, some members of the audience may come to the rally with the anticipation that violence will again be advocated.
49. Look for indicators that spontaneous collective violence may develop. A series of minor incidents involving police in an area or a single major widely-publicized incident increases the potential for spontaneous violence. An additional incident may trigger it. The additional incident may involve police, but may also consist of such things as careless driving by persons from outside the area who appear to cause accidents without being arrested. In such cases, dissident people can often rally a protest group very rapidly. The police, including patrol personnel, should be informed by intelligence personnel that the potential for spontaneous violence is high before an additional incident occurs.
50. Monitor investigations for reports of persons or groups planning violence against merchants, utilities, transportation systems, schools, monuments, etc. Further investigation may reveal the planning of looting, arson, bombing or shooting. Some of these may be planned to coincide with public events that will draw police away from the intended targets.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

51. Review any public statements of dissidents which may indicate the nature of the trouble they seek.
52. Review the information available on the numbers of weapons, the numbers of trained people, and the tactics which potentially violent people have used in the past.
53. Attempt to learn the operational plan and schedule for a particular event. In a large operation, some important moves will have to be written down in order to coordinate activities. Written copies of such plans may become available.
54. Attempt to learn if any new types of devices (such as time bombs) have been developed.
55. Investigative personnel should contact informants before upcoming events. If informants say that violence is likely to occur, attempt to find out how the violence is scheduled to be started.

56. Listen for talk of new tactics or new weapons being developed among dissidents or groups. Reports of new tactics and weapons development should be verified by investigators.

OPERATIONS FOR CONTROL

The control phase, in general, consists of implementing the Emergency Operations Plan and Manual, the Mutual Aid Plan, when necessary, and the operation of the Emergency Operations Center. For intelligence personnel, the control phase involves the collection and reporting of information that command personnel need to implement these control plans. The following guidelines outline ways that intelligence personnel may provide such support.

Locations of CV

57. Determine the location of greatest CV activity and determine which buildings, areas, or locations seem to be the objectives of the CV activity.

Reasons for CV

58. Attempt to determine what interests or groups might benefit from the continuation of CV activity. Such groups might have individuals actively involved in supporting disruptive crowd behavior. These groups may see the CV as a means of achieving organization objectives.
59. Determine what grievances helped to "set the stage" and what particular events triggered the CV outbreak. Report all findings including those which may seem too obvious to consider. The factors which you are aware of in your job may be very important yet not be known to other officers or citizens who are involved in control efforts.

Time Considerations in CV

60. Attempt to determine when (if) organized events include "scheduled" violence or planned confrontations with police. Inform the Chief of Police so that proper action may be taken to prepare to control any such outbreaks.

Persons Involved in CV

61. Go to the scene of CV and assist detective personnel to identify and arrest leaders if they break the law.

62. Utilize contacts to determine who are the most influential individuals among the dissidents. Remember that they need not be members of any organized group or participants in the violence.
63. Intensify efforts to make contact with informants during CV. Such informants may confirm or deny rumors and give advance warning of planned violence.
64. Make walking patrols of the area of the disturbance to assist in identifying "leaders" of the violence, to detect possible new targets and to test the mood of most of the citizens in the area. Such tours of the scene of disorders may require under-cover officers who fit in with the persons participating in the violence.
65. Undercover officers may also be useful for confirming the truth or falsity of rumors by "rapping" with citizens, and for confirming reports made by other officers concerning the number of violent persons and the nature of their activities.

Types of CV Events

66. Try to determine what activities are planned which can extend the violence or create additional violent events.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

67. Try to determine what tactics will be or are being used by the groups involved. Are they armed? Will explosives or bombs be used? Will snipers be used?
68. Attempt to determine what police control tactics will produce a violent reaction by the group involved and what control tactics would be tolerated. For example, the use of chemical agents might be tolerated, but if dogs were brought in, the group might be incensed to commit additional violent acts.
69. Attempt to determine what arms, equipment, and supplies are available to the riot leaders.

VI. EVALUATION

This section will discuss ways in which intelligence personnel can support the Chief of Police in conducting assessments of prevention and control actions. Evaluation is undertaken to determine how well police are conforming with prescribed procedures and how effective their actions are. Inadequacies will indicate the need for an increase or reordering of operations.

The evaluation function is a responsibility of command. The Chief of Police may delegate the task of evaluation to a Deputy Chief, to a separate internal review section, to a strategic intelligence or community relations unit or to another high-ranking officer. In smaller departments, or as needed, the Chief may perform the evaluation on his own.

Each policeman should make an evaluation of his own performance. Any inadequacies should be identified, with no implication of fault or guilt necessary. Supervisory and command personnel should also evaluate the capabilities of their subordinates without implying the necessity of assessing blame or prescribing punishment. Improvement in performance is the primary objective of evaluation.

EVALUATION OF PREVENTION

Evaluation of any preventive activity in CV is always difficult, because when problems do not become acute, there is usually little solid evidence that CV would have occurred if police had not intervened effectively. The evaluation criteria listed below, therefore, are numerous, and although each is related to tension in the community, estimates of a small number of them will probably suffice for evaluation of the prevention activities of most departments.

Recently, many departments have developed and implemented "Management Information Systems (MIS)." These systems, which emphasize rapid storage, retrieval and dissemination of accurate data, would be very compatible with the evaluation criteria mentioned below.

Suggested Evaluation Criteria

1. When violence does not occur at the scene of a crowd, intelligence personnel performance may be judged successful if:
 - a. Intelligence personnel correctly estimated that the potential for violence was low
 - b. Intelligence personnel correctly estimated that the potential for violence was high and disseminated this estimate to other police who took action to prevent violence
 - c. Intelligence personnel monitored the crowd, either in person or through detective personnel
 - d. The procedures which intelligence personnel have developed to identify, monitor and analyze positive and disruptive forces in the community
 - e. The number of reports of community trends which are communicated to intelligence personnel by other members of the department
 - f. The ability of intelligence personnel to obtain information from other law enforcement agencies
 - g. The ability of intelligence personnel to deliver estimates of the danger of collective violence in specific areas
 - h. The ability of intelligence personnel to identify dangerous individuals, to disseminate information concerning them, their location, their plans and tactics to other officers

- i. The ability of intelligence personnel to infiltrate organizations which have been identified as potentially violent
 - j. The degree of coordination between intelligence and detective personnel to avoid conflicts between the peace-keeping and law enforcement functions of police.
2. The attitudes and behavior of citizens in dealing with police indicate to some extent the effectiveness of attempts by police and other citizens to reduce tension in the community.

Some of the indicators of citizen attitude which police can estimate directly are:

- a. Number of physical attacks on policemen in view of other citizens (in a year or month)
- b. Number of physical attacks on police vehicles or other property
- c. Number of reported cases of resistance to arrest
- d. Number of reports of police brutality (accurate reports, reports that are exaggerated because of emotion, reports that are inaccurate and deliberate lies)
- e. Number of anti-police demonstrations
- f. Number of physical attacks on other public servants (especially firemen) or employees of utilities, or on their vehicles or property
- g. Number of citizens who support actively or participate in the activities of groups who preach hatred of police or of other groups
- h. Number of instances of verbal abuse of police in the performance of their duties or as private citizens.

Potential Locations of CV

3. Review all areas of the jurisdiction to determine which areas are most uncertain with regard to their potential for violence. Consider increased efforts or different tactics, including the placing of undercover men in areas in which there is a known, but unspecified, danger.
4. Analyze detectives' capability to assist in gathering indications of possible violence in each area. Some areas, for example, may have excellent informants with many contacts in activist groups. Other areas may lack informants or other police contacts who can observe and report indications of rising dissatisfaction. Consider new approaches which can be used as needed to gather community information.
5. Report all findings and suggestions to the Chief.

Reasons for CV Potential

6. Assess the changes which have occurred in the disruptive influences in the jurisdiction over the past year; the past month. Estimate shifts in the tone and mood in which persons express grievances. Is the community better organized to achieve citizens' goals without violence? What is the attitude of citizens and their leaders to crime and drug abuse? Is local rhetoric becoming less racist or less violent?
7. Examine the capability of all police officers to provide readings of social conditions. Can this process be improved by training or by new administrative procedures?
8. Estimate the effects of crime on the tension within the community. Have police efforts to control crime and drug abuse improved the social environment? Are the citizens so concerned about crime that they actively help police? Or are police investigators thought of as oppressors? Is there anything that the police can do to take advantage of and build a positive attitude in the community; to soften a negative attitude?
9. Report observations and suggestions to the Chief.

Times When CV May Occur

10. Review all indications of potential violence during the last period (year, month, etc.). Did any of these situations come as a surprise? Could anything have been done to reduce the element of surprise, e.g., better procedures,

such as filing or data processing programs; better contact with other law enforcement agencies; better training of intelligence, detective or patrol personnel, undercover agents? Any of these may have helped to make information more timely and useful to the department.

11. Consider the kinds of violence which seem to be most surprising. Can police do anything, with electronic equipment, for example, to detect these kinds of CV before they happen?
12. Report your findings and suggestions to the Chief.

Persons Who May Be Involved In CV

13. Is the intelligence division prepared to issue an immediate report on the individuals and groups who have the potential for perpetrating or inciting CV at any time in the future?
14. Are the opinions and emotions of local citizens and groups known well enough to predict what events would increase the potential for violence? If specific nationally-known persons visited the jurisdiction, would potentially violent groups gather to hear speeches by these leaders or protest their presence? Would a specific national event (such as an assassination) or a specific international event (such as persecution of a minority in another country) touch off violence locally?
15. Are patrol personnel informed of the identities of especially dangerous persons and groups? Are they asked to look for vehicles these people use or materials they may distribute?
16. Are intelligence operations coordinated effectively with actions of detective personnel assigned to criminal investigations? Are estimates of the criminal activities of persons who favor CV communicated to intelligence personnel by detective personnel?

Events Which May Lead To CV

17. Were undercover officers available to investigate the possibility and characteristics of planned violence? Were their operations successful in supplying enough information to support effective police operations?
18. Were undercover narcotics agents also effective in investigating the potential of violence?

19. For each type of violence threat, which sources of information were most helpful? What was the accuracy of public media reports concerning developing problems? Did any group intentionally put out false information? Was it merely bragging, or were spokesmen attempting to lead police to prepare plans incorrectly? Did any group attempt to steal or compromise police plans?
20. Consider the quality of informants' information regarding potential CV. Are usually reliable informants in criminal investigations equally reliable when reporting on developing CV? Are they as willing to talk about the threat of CV as they are about clearly criminal action?
21. Did other law enforcement agencies pass their information to the department?
22. Submit your assessment and suggestions to the Chief.

Ways In Which CV May Develop

23. How confident are police that they know which weapons and tactics are available in the community to persons who might attempt to stir up or commit CV?
24. Have all weapons; instruction manuals, pamphlets, etc., collected during criminal investigations been examined for their relationship to possible collective violence? Have all indications of CV leads been referred to intelligence personnel? Can these procedures be improved?
25. Has knowledge of the tactics used by agitators been disseminated to all members of the department who may have to deal with them?
26. When gaps are found in the ability of the department to anticipate the modus operandi of groups who are known to favor violence, are steps taken to supply the missing information? Are other law enforcement agencies contacted?
27. Report your observations to the Chief of Police.

EVALUATION OF CONTROL

Evaluation of control operations, of course, begins while violence is still occurring. Based upon this type of evaluation, the Chief of Police and patrol commanders make decisions concerning the deployment and tactics of control forces. These considerations were mentioned in the "Operations for Control" section of this volume.

The type of evaluation which is discussed below begins after violence has ended and is intended to support decisions concerning changes in the organization, equipment, training and operational procedures of control forces.

The essence of the evaluation which follows control operations is the "after-action report." This report should be a detailed, overall description of the violence itself, the actions which police and other forces took to end the violence and the level of effectiveness which was achieved. The preparation of this overall report, in some departments, has been assigned to a single high ranking officer who is then responsible for compiling and supervising reports from patrol, intelligence, community relations and command personnel who were directly involved in control operations. Some departments have made such a task more efficient by instituting a separate evaluation unit— independent of all other operational units. This independent unit is designed to function at all times, but may be particularly important during CV operations when charges of misconduct are often levied against police.

In cases where very serious incidents of CV occur, evaluation of control operations by agencies outside of the law enforcement community may be necessary. In recent years, the bulk of collective violence has emanated from political issues. In such a context, the community and the entire nation need an in-depth view of the achievements of law enforcement agencies in dealing with CV. Many persons, including members of the mass media, the academic community, legislative bodies, etc., have attempted to produce such evaluations, and police have solicited other studies. Such investigations by persons outside of law enforcement may often assist police, and they may be accomplished by local groups or by persons from outside the jurisdiction. Many experts have worked extensively to understand collective violence, and many other persons representing public opinion discussion and thought may be available to evaluate serious outbreaks of CV.

Intelligence personnel can support the evaluation process at whatever level it is undertaken, by providing the kind of information discussed in the following guidelines.

Potential Locations of CV

28. Determine from contacts and undercover agents if any participants in the CV episode had chosen another or additional targets for CV. Attempt to determine if effective police action helped to prevent the violence from spreading into those areas.
29. Estimate whether the properties or areas which were damaged most severely formed any kind of pattern. If such a pattern exists, it may reflect the objectives of violent members of the crowd, some of whom may have been known beforehand to have declared the damaged areas as probable targets.
30. Which areas during the violence were centers for organized criminal activity? Arms caches, bomb construction areas, drilling areas, etc., may be identifiable. Some of these areas may fit in with estimates which were made before the violence occurred. Other areas may be complete surprises and will require further investigation.
31. Were any headquarters for violent activity discovered? Extremists in one case actually built fortifications by hardening walls (against police gunfire) and digging tunnels to be used as hiding places or escape routes. A headquarters may also resemble a business office with telephones, duplicating machines, files, etc.

Reasons for CV Potential

32. Was any clear connection observed between known grievances (such as poverty, price-gouging, racism, etc.) and the behavior of groups or leaders during the violence?
33. Did the violence seem to change in scope or intensity following public statements of local leaders? Did any sensational rumors feed the violence?
34. Did a number of persons seem to be acting as self-sacrificing fighters for a cause? Had any of these people been identified as extremists before the violence began?
35. Was the violence supported by propaganda in written flyers or pamphlets or in speeches? Can the sources of such propaganda be identified? Did the propaganda seem to be professionally designed and produced—thus indicating considerable financial investment?

Times When CV May Occur

36. Attempt to find out why the CV episode began when it did. Was there a planned time? Or was the outbreak the result of an uncontrolled acceleration of crowd behavior?


37. Were any warnings of the time of the outbreak or any specific violent events accurate? Were rumors of events about to happen communicated to intelligence personnel? Were these rumors investigated by intelligence personnel?

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

38. Determine from contacts, undercover agents, etc., who was involved in planning, inciting and committing violent acts during the CV episode. After the violence has subsided and reports are compiled and analyzed, it is often possible to get a more coherent idea of who was actually involved (especially the leadership). Report all additional or revised information on who was involved to the Chief. Such updated information is vital to evaluation.
39. The complete analysis of who was involved, including the names of groups, their leaders, number of people present, number actively violent, number of casualties (police and other citizens) and number of arrests (by charge) should be submitted to the Chief. This may be a separate report or may be combined with an after-action report from the overall field commander of control forces.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

40. Cooperate fully with the patrol commander when he prepares the after-action report. On the basis of observations made during the violence, report how police tactics were effectively (or ineffectively) matched to crowd and mob tactics.
41. Determine from contacts and undercover agents how effective any CV leaders considered their own tactics during the incident. In public, organizers or leaders of pro-violence groups usually claim success. Their real opinions may be different.



END