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# CRUISE NIGHT INVESTIGATION CITY OF LIVERMORE

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A REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION  
COMMISSIONED BY  
THE LIVERMORE CITY COUNCIL  
FOR THE CITY MANAGER  
AND THE CITY COUNCIL

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# INTRODUCTION

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The four parts of this introduction provide a concise overview of this report. The introduction examines these four areas:

A) The Incident: an account of the events of August 18, 1984, Livermore Cruise Night;

B) The Investigation: why this report was commissioned, and how the investigator reached conclusions;

C) The Report: how the report is structured;

D) The Findings: what the investigator determined.

Each of these parts is more fully amplified in the report.

THE INCIDENT

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## THE INCIDENT

A large crowd gathered in Livermore on Saturday evening August 18, 1984, due to a long tradition of cruising, a publicized "National Cruise Night," publicity over the cruising ordinance debate, and good weather. The crowd was similar in size to several other "national cruise night" crowds (estimated at 10-12,000 plus 3-6,000 cars).

The Livermore Police Department (LPD) Administration had determined, according to a pre-arranged plan, to close First Street with barricades when the street became "impassible for emergency vehicles." The LPD closed First Street early - at about 9:30 p.m. - even though there had been in fact, and by all witness accounts, very few arrests and very little serious trouble, and as the festive Saturday night crowd continued to swell with families, senior citizens and a great many young people.

However, not enough officers were assigned on 8/18 to effectively close the street, or to provide for effective traffic control and dispersal. Furthermore, the crowd, and perhaps some police, were pre-conditioned for a police confrontation by the lengthy public debate over cruising, the recent vote on an LPD-sponsored ordinance and extensive media coverage. The unexpected early closure of many intersections with small barricades, with no police officers posted at many barricades, was a precipitating event which caused the cruisers and observers to coalesce into an angry crowd. With

insufficient officers present to control traffic or disperse the crowds after First Street was closed, tension mounted. Within an hour the closure tactic completely broke down, as many vehicles breached the barricades, and increasingly hostile pedestrians and heavy cruising packed the downtown arterials, including Second Street and Third Street.

Officers were confronted with non-compliant and angry large groups. In a few cases, some people threw eggs, rocks and bottles. In one instance an officer called "officer needs help" as a result of being pelted with eggs and other objects from above a liquor store.

This incident prompted the police to "back off and let them go home." The police withdrew for about an hour to a nearby Command Post which had not previously been used.

At the Command Post, there was a great deal of confusion about who was in command and what the fallback strategy was. Soon after the withdrawal, the LPD Tactical Commander, a Sergeant, announced eight times that the downtown gathering was an "unlawful assembly," and the Operations Commander, a Lieutenant, called by phone from headquarters for help from five nearby police agencies. Officers at the command post put on protective riot clothing.

The 24 officers assigned downtown were reinforced to about 90. Then the officers, shoulder to shoulder, in skirmish lines, made sweeps down First and Second Streets, again to move the crowd out of the downtown in the hopes that they would leave and go home. An impasse occurred, and the police were heavily assaulted by rocks and bottles at several

intersections; as the police advanced, the crowd retreated. As they retreated, the crowd advanced. The rocks and bottles were frequent and dangerous.

These sweeps were made without adequate planning for the arrest and transport of missile throwers and those encouraging riotous behavior. The inadequate LPD Administration response to circumstances which should have been anticipated based on prior experience, resulted in seventeen reported rock and bottle injuries to line officers, but otherwise failed to disperse the crowd significantly. In fact, elements of the crowd became increasingly expressive and angry.

The police subsequently made a second withdrawal to the Command Post for about an hour, still hoping that this tactic would encourage the crowd to go home. Officers were then redeployed - mostly in pairs - on foot and in cars to disperse the remaining cars, groups, and stragglers. This technique did not work due to the numbers of people and cars still on the scene. There were several contested arrests, including a number that concluded in complaints against the police as well as resisting arrest charges.

Finally police were re-deployed in the downtown area in teams of 5-7 officers supervised by a sergeant or senior officer. They continued in a more strongly organized fashion to make additional arrests, in the downtown area, until nearly 4 a.m.

According to police reports, 11 LPD officers and 6 outside officers "officially" were injured by rocks and bottles, etc. Many more officers and reserves were hurt but did not report their injuries.

Cruise Night had other consequences. Vandalism and property damage of an estimated \$11,000 occurred. Clean up and other special costs were also high. Perhaps most importantly, the cruise night incident seriously divided the Livermore community, and resulted in a mutual loss of respect and alienation between the police and many adults and young people.

Leading up to this incident, Livermore had a history of more than 10 years of cruising, sometimes with resulting police problems, and more often well contained by special police enforcement. Generally, however, cruising had been a favored recreational past time in Livermore.

Prior to the 8/18 Cruise Night, Livermore's citizens had been polarized by a public debate about the need for greater police control over problems associated with the increased number of cruisers. Only weeks before 8/18, the Council finally passed an anti-cruising ordinance that had been repeatedly promoted by the LPD administration. The measure, which had stirred debate by the Council and in the community, was not adopted as an "urgency measure," and so it was not in effect on August 18.

THE INVESTIGATION

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## THE INVESTIGATION

The very polarization that had preceded August 18, and the debates about cruising and the anti-cruising ordinance, escalated after the incident. When asked if failure to vote for the urgency ordinance was a "cause" of the cruise night incident, one Council member, who witnessed the event, publically claimed that the "police provoked" the incident. Many persons responded to this claim with anger, and several other City Council members and concerned local organizations quickly "took the side of the police," before the facts were known. This exchange culminated in a strong letter to the Council from the Police Officers Association, maintaining that "the police" were not at fault. This letter appears to have led the Council to agree to an investigation.

In all cases, the City Council members did not, as is the proper procedure, first go through the City Manager to complain, ask questions, or make judgments about the LPD. The criticism and angry exchanges stung police morale, and seriously limited the ability of the City Manager to review the controversial incident. The community debate over police conduct, without facts, served to further polarize views and raise questions about the incident.


The Council's bypassing of established avenues of communication limited the City Manager's ability to thoroughly investigate the incident as well as institute the

appropriate corrective action. The resulting dysfunctional conditions prompted the commissioning of this report.

In December, 1984, Livermore's City Council engaged the services of attorney and law enforcement consultant Alan Kalmanoff, to investigate the Cruise Night incident of 8/18/84, and to make findings and recommendations to avoid similar incidents. The investigation concluded in May, 1985, after a five month period.

Essentially, the testimony provided by each witness interviewed was the same in substance. No one source had the total picture, but all sources, taken together, painted a picture that no one source significantly disagreed with. Information provided by witnesses in the crowd, as well as that provided by police officers yielded basically the same account of the facts. That account is the same as the chronology provided by review of the police tapes of radio communication. In other words, all the witnesses, participants and documentation are basically in agreement. This general concensus is also supported by numerous newspaper accounts, photos, a video tape, etc.

THIS REPORT



## THIS REPORT

This report has 6 major sections, beginning with this Introduction, which includes findings.

Section II discusses "Methodology for the Investigation." Section III, "The Police Response," is a detailed section which treats the police areas of A) Intelligence; B) Planning; C) Operations; and D) Training for Cruise Night.\*

Section IV, "Recommendations," completes the report; and Section V, "Appendices," and, Section VI, "Sources and Bibliography," provide documentation for the findings and recommendations.

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\*The report does not cover every aspect of the many and complex events of Cruise Night 8/18 (e.g., numerous small incidents, and a great many citizen-police contacts that resulted in everything from an exchange of words to a contested arrest). This report covers only the prominent events and issues of general concern.

**FINDINGS**

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## FINDINGS

Cruise Night circumstances resulted from a lack of adequate intelligence, planning, and command by the LPD Administration. Inadequate intelligence and planning culminated in a rigid operational plan with no fallback options or contingency arrangements for policing the event, prisoner transport, arrest teams, call-back procedures, etc.

The City Council, by involving itself in an indecisive debate for a year on the policing of cruising, while not taking a position or offering clear or consistent policy direction, contributed to a polarized climate, distracting from careful LPD intelligence, planning, and operations.

The LPD police officers followed orders, and generally worked with a high degree of courage and acceptable discipline and restraint under the dangerous, extremely protracted and highly frustrating and stressful circumstances. The LPD field supervisors were for the most part in control of the LPD line officers as well as officers from outside agencies; thus the field sergeants did a creditable supervision job, considering the context.

Cruising in Livermore, particularly when advertised by flyers as it was on August 18th, has been the major (and perhaps the most serious) on-going activity faced by the local police department over 7-10 years. In view of some violence, many arrests and occasional officer injuries reported during past events, it was incorrect to thrust the

responsibility for major tactical decisions upon a street supervisor.

The sergeants functioned as well as they could given the poor planning and lack of adequate personnel as well as the failure in leadership, i.e., the non-involvement of the department's top two command officers. The Chief was an "observer," and the Captain was at home, in telephone contact with headquarters and able to monitor by radio, but not on the scene until nearly midnight.

The Chief of Police is not necessarily supposed to be a "street cop" or a crowd control technician. However when ill-prepared street supervisors - operating with a defective plan in a highly volatile situation - were thrust into command roles due to an administrative vacuum, the Chief remains responsible for the outcome. The operational plan for Cruise Night, with its obvious deficiencies, was read and approved by the Captain and the Chief; the Chief was present at the scene and at the command post and in a position to initiate appropriate action or countermand inappropriate decisions.

Early attempts to regain control of the street on August 18th failed due to the planning inadequacies addressed elsewhere in this report. The resulting crowd hostility provoked by the understaffed LPD tactics caused two separate retreats; the officers had to leave the streets unpoliced for a total of nearly two hours. Much of the illegal behavior occurred downtown during that period of time (e.g., vandalism, traffic violations, and related offenses). The

second attempt to gain control, after reinforcements arrived, also failed because the administrators allowed decisions that failed to anticipate the natural consequences of the hastily conceived police action. They also failed to provide the tactical support (arrest teams and transport) necessary for successful crowd dispersal. So the police had to withdraw again.

All police administrators failed to take appropriate, timely action to bring under control the obviously worsening traffic control conditions. By 9:30 p.m., when the barricades were put up to close First Street it was obvious that the existing police force was too small to maintain the street closure plan. The verbal abuse previously directed toward foot patrol units communicated a level of crowd hostility that clearly would, according to basic tenets of crowd control practice, immediately escalate when the crowd's freedom of action was arbitrarily and unexpectedly restrained. Calls for outside agency assistance, however, did not go out until much later. Tardy consideration of the Santa Rita transport bus caused it to be unavailable for arrests from the subsequent crowd sweeps.

Conventional crowd control tactics have been taught in training sessions within LPD as were standards and guidelines for police tactics in volatile crowd circumstances. (This report discuss these standards and conventional tactics.) Nonetheless, the training direction was not employed on 8/18, due to the poor planning involved.

Administrators failed to correct the following three ill-advised decisions made by supervisors:

A) The setting up of barricaded intersections that were unmanned;

B) The declaration of an unlawful assembly without sufficient arrest and transport resources; and,

C) The forming up and placing into motion of skirmish lines of officers in riot gear to clear the streets without planning of dispersal routes or adequate arrest and transport resources.

# METHODOLOGY

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## II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE INVESTIGATION

The investigation of the Cruise Night incident of 8/18 occurred after a preliminary review of 6 days. The preliminary review was to identify the issues and develop a work plan for the City Manager's approval.

Most interviews were conducted by the prime investigator, Alan Kalmanoff; some were conducted by Palmer Stinson, a retired Oakland Police Department Captain with State level management consulting experience with the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training; and a dozen interviews were done by James McFadden, an ex-San Diego Police Department Sergeant with extensive experience in police administration and crowd control.

The inquiry itself included in-depth personal interviews with all LPD officers on duty for Cruise Night, and all the supervisors and commanders of the other agencies who were called in to help (these agencies included the Pleasanton, Dublin and the East Bay Regional Parks police departments, the Alameda County Sheriff, and the California Highway Patrol).

Interviews were also held with the dispatchers and clerks on duty on Cruise Night, and with officers involved in cruising control in many other representative Northern California departments. City workers who placed the barricades on First Street were interviewed, and at least two interviews were held with the City Manager and members of the

City Council. Significant assistance and direction came from the City Attorney. In all, as to the LPD, open and candid interviews were held with 26 line officers, 6 reserves, 2 cadets, and 4 sergeants. There were also two or more interviews with the Lieutenant, Captain and Chief in the line of command on 8/18.

In addition, a hotline was set up and publicized so that witnesses could call and arrange interviews. The investigator talked to many responding concerned citizens, and many of these were formally interviewed. The investigator also conducted many informal interviews with Livermore citizens, brief telephone talks with secondary figures, etc. Over the course of the five month investigation, over 300 calls were received on the hotline, and over 150 people were interviewed, many at length and in depth. The calls and interviews reflected a tremendous variety of opinions, but basically were in accord with regard to what happened.

In addition to the above interviews and contacts, many written materials were collected and reviewed. The investigator reviewed the complete City Council file on cruising, including many letters, memos, resolutions, ordinances, staff reports and the like. The entire LPD file on Cruise Night was reviewed, including all reports, prior to and subsequent to the 8/18 incident; and including the operational plan and order, critique (proposals, briefings and de-briefings), memos, duty rosters, all LPD training materials, personnel documents, and various policy and

procedures documents. Also reviewed were the police radio dispatch tapes, the dispatch cards, and related deployment records. LPD personnel were extremely cooperative and forthcoming in response to all requests.

A complete listing of the resources employed is found in the section on sources and bibliography.

In addition, the investigator obtained and reviewed more than 100 photos of Cruise Night, a privately recorded video tape, city reports and reports from other jurisdictions which were called on for assistance, media material including a complete clipping file on cruising, and a recent training film. Legal research was also conducted into law enforcement and management standards for crowd control, unlawful assembly, and the legal obligations of City Manager and Police Chief.

In an effort to insure a broad-based as well as objective inquiry, the investigator held a press conference and distributed a press release at the start, to publicize the inquiry and the availability of the investigator to interview all interested witnesses. A similar press release was published near the end of the investigation, to be sure all who wished to speak were contacted.

# THE POLICE RESPONSE

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### III. THE POLICE RESPONSE

The assignment to investigate Cruise Night was focused on four areas:

- A) Police intelligence;
- B) Police planning;
- C) Police operations (and standards); and,
- D) Police training (and standards).

These four areas are covered in four separate discussions below.

INTELLIGENCE

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## INTELLIGENCE

In the aftermath of the 8/18 Cruise Night incident, it was concluded by some LPD officers and other persons familiar with law enforcement agencies that one cause of the problems was inadequate police intelligence.\* This conclusion is correct.

With the exception of the LPD administration, few people in Livermore who were interviewed did not analyze the available information and conclude that both the "intelligence" and obvious pre-conditions required preparation for a major police crowd control problem. The administration of the LPD, based on the claim of a lack of available police intelligence, determined that there was no basis for staffing and planning for contingencies (e.g., an unusually large and troublesome National Cruise night crowd).

The Investigator has determined that the LPD Chief and Captain ordered that intelligence be collected from surrounding police agencies with regard to the upcoming 8/18 Cruise Night. Initially, no police information was found showing specifically what size and kind of crowd should be

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\*In this discussion, "intelligence" is defined not only as the specific set of facts or actual information available and collected by the police, but also the analysis of past events and of information in the actual police environment and community context.

expected by the LPD for the "Last National Cruise Night" of August 18.

It appears that the LPD has not established effective contacts among the large Bay Area and Livermore cruising communities, although the investigation has determined that there is a great deal of communications through magazines, radios and clubs that occurs within the cruising community. Information on cruising is relatively available in the Livermore schools and through auto shops, car clubs, and car publications.

During the month preceding the August 18 event, only one flyer was obtained by the LPD announcing a "last cruise night" (the idea of "last" was in response to the recent anti-cruising ordinance). In the week just prior to Cruise Night 8/18, a number of flyers were dropped off at the LPD with a note "to Captain Essex". Apparently no other information was available through surrounding police departments. As a result the administration of the LPD assumed the position and claims that there was no basis in information and intelligence to expect and provide for an unusually large crowd, or an unusually troublesome National Cruise Night.

On the other hand, interviews with LPD officers and sergeants, witnesses, and city officials convincingly demonstrate the wide anticipation in Livermore that Cruise Night on 8/18 would be a very large event and that it could easily result in police problems.

The LPD's own extensive written reports concerning past cruising suggest that pre-cruise night publicity is an important intelligence indicator of police problems. Prior to the Cruise Night on 8/18 there had been extensive publicity about the controversy over the anti-cruising ordinance and cruising, as well as the scheduled "last" Cruise Night on 8/18.

In addition to external warnings, there had been internal LPD communications calling attention to the increasing problems associated with national cruise nights, and the "lucky" escape from real trouble for the LPD that had occurred in February 1984 at a prior national cruise night. A number of these reports were prepared by the Captain for the Chief, City Manager, and in one case, for the City Council. In a memo written by the same Lieutenant who was assigned the Operations Command for 8/18, the point was made that real trouble could occur on national cruise nights, and the clear inference was that it should be planned for. The LPD written materials, when analyzed in context, suggest directly that a large and perhaps troublesome night should have been planned for. The LPD line officers and supervisors who were interviewed knew, for the most part, that 8/18 would be a large and difficult event to police. Almost everyone else interviewed also knew.

Other information was available prior to 8/18. In particular, the City Manager had warned the Police Chief that he had directly heard there "might be trouble" on 8/18, and asked for a cautious approach.

Interestingly, there were specific measures taken at the LPD middle management level to prepare for the "big night" that was expected by most officers; and importantly these activities were within the direct knowledge and direct approval of the Captain and Chief. At the request of the Lieutenant/Operations Commander, barricades were specially rented by the Captain well in advance of 8/18, and city workers were scheduled on overtime to place barricades at intersections noted on a map, to close First Street.

It was generally known by the city workers and most of the officers on duty on 8/18, that First Street would be closed "if necessary," and that such a closure was highly likely to occur and to occur quite early (in comparison with the 4/83 LPD efforts to close First Street well after cruising had begun to diminish).

So, in looking at the LPD arrangements, it appears that in the absence of adequate administration contingency planning, tactics were planned at the mid-management level for a likely and early street closure. This tactic was deficient in staffing, but it illustrates that mid-management was aware of the available intelligence and assumed that even the sketchiest police intelligence required preparations for very large crowds.

Furthermore, an analysis of the overall situation on the basis of both the LPD's experience and the existing context did not occur. The LPD response directed by the administration was based on the naive belief that "no news

was good news" and that there was insufficient justification for mounting a major crowd control effort and contingency plan.

PLANNING

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## PLANNING

A second major issue addressed in the investigation was the adequacy of the planning for the 8/18 Cruise Night event.\* The Investigator concludes that planning processes prior to the 8/18 incident did not nearly meet contemporary police administration and management standards.

A Lieutenant was assigned by the Captain as Operations Commander for 8/18; as such, the Lieutenant was assigned to develop an Operations Order (plan) for Cruise Night.

The plan was based on a long series of very similar operations orders. It inherited past planning faults; the LPD operations plans have tended to be simply schedules and assignments rather than plans which provide alternative tactics for the more likely situations which might arise. Standard police crowd control procedure requires such contingency planning.

On 8/18, however, and on earlier National Cruise Nights, there was no definitive tactical plan; i.e., there was no explicit strategy for dispersing the crowd and handling difficult traffic. In the case of the 8/18

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\*Planning" in this case is defined as the application of intelligence analysis, to development of tactics and staffing for Cruise Night as well as providing for contingencies (such as the failure of a planned tactic, or the need for assistance by outside agencies).

Operations Order, the plan was even missing major elements that were part of the previous (and also inadequate) plan for the National Cruise Night on February 11, 1984.

It was a result of that prior February 11th Cruise Night that the Lieutenant in charge had written a long "After Incident Report" warning LPD administrators of many potentially serious problems that had luckily been avoided when the crowds thinned as the rains came. That memo was widely circulated.

The only addition of any consequence to the 8/18 Operations Order, however, was the inclusion of language calling for an early closure of First Street as a tactic to be employed, if necessary, due to serious traffic congestion. Importantly, the plan was lacking several critical elements included in February, such as provision for a Station Commander, provision for mass arrest transportation, as well as provision for a change in watch schedules (e.g., holdover or call-in).

The following chart compares the staffing assigned for the February 11th National Cruise Night (the event which led to the Lieutenant's warning) with the 8/18 National Cruise Night.

# STAFFING

	<u>2/11/84</u>	<u>8/18 84</u>
LIEUTENANT	1	1
SERGEANTS	5	4
OFFICERS	25	19
RESERVES	6	6
CADETS	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	37	32

Of crucial importance, the staffing of the Operations Order for 8/18 was on its face inadequate for an effective street closure. The closure of First Street early on a National Cruise Night had never been attempted, but the LPD administrators had heard that such an early closure had worked in Fremont (Fremont is quite nearer than Livermore, to a freeway, for purposes of re-routing traffic).

The Lieutenant/Operations Commander asked the Captain for additional staffing which was not provided. The Captain called for "minimum staffing." Later after the City Manager warned the Chief of possible trouble, and asked for a prudent LPD response regarding preparations for Cruise Night, and, after "warning" flyers were dropped off at the LPD headquarters, some more staffing was provided for by the Captain.

The staffing ultimately made available by the Captain to support the Lieutenant's plan, however, was still not nearly adequate for the plan. The inadequacy of the assignment schedule for purposes of the planned closing of First Street was obvious from the map prepared; at least 30-34 intersection control officers were needed, just for First Street. Assigned to the downtown area on 8/18, including the Tactical Commander, there were only 25 on hand (including six less seasoned reserves and 2 cadets).

At the briefing prior to 8/18, and later, there were open comments by officers noting that the staffing was inadequate for the number of intersections involved and the required re-routing of traffic. In the opinion of many LPD

officers and supervisors, it was a violation of good managerial practice, for the plan written by the Lieutenant to not be reviewed and staffed by those field supervisors responsible for implementing it. It is a widely quoted truism in policing that, in any given tactical situation, there are almost never enough officers to handle large crowds. So, police tactics must assume available staffing, only. For example, a LPD plan based on no street closure and only 25 officers might have called for early arrests, particularly of rock throwers around the periphery of the crowds. Through careful crowd control tactics, such as selective enforcement and the recognition and isolation of leading agitators, it is generally possible to compensate for minimum levels of personnel.

An explanation has not been offered as to why the Captain, and later the Chief, allowed plans to proceed for an unprecedented early closure of First Street, without adequate provisions to maintain that closure and disperse vehicles. It is also not clear that the City Manager knew precisely which circumstances would justify the street closure although he reviewed the Operations Order, and was aware of the Council's direction regarding a street closure only "in an emergency."

Last, it should be noted that the Council had directed the Chief to close First Street in an emergency, if necessary to protect life and property; i.e., "when cruising causes congestion to the point of an emergency situation as

determined by the Police Chief." According to City Council minutes, the Chief was not directed to close the street simply if the passage of emergency vehicles was blocked.

Obviously the fact that the closing might itself risk life and property or cause an emergency should have been a major consideration in making the decision.

The Operations Order did not address the possibility that the street closure tactic might fail, although it had failed in part in April of 1983, when barricades had been breached after a much later closure of First Street. Also, in April 1983, there were more officers assigned than on the 8/18 Cruise Night. Because the Operations Order did not address the key contingency of failure of street closure with a back-up plan, control efforts fell apart and control was never regained until the crowd got tired and began to dissipate.

Due to the lack of contingency planning, the outside agencies notified that their help might be required on Cruise Night were not alerted to details or arrangements required to effectively involve their help when and if it was needed.

No plans were made for a large number of arrests and transport, e.g., should the street closure fail and the crowds become difficult to manage (no flex cuffs were available). No specific advanced plans were made for receiving or deploying outside help, nor for defining the situation that might require it, nor for listing the names and numbers of contact persons. There was no provision for

vans or busses to transport prisoners, should a large number of arrests be desirable or required.

Because there was no planning with regard to this key arrest and transport issue, later in the evening, when a transport bus was belatedly ordered from the Sheriff, there was no licensed driver and the bus could not be provided in a timely manner. Even so, the bus was somehow dispatched and cancelled later, in the confusion.

There was also no provision for arrest vans on loan from the Sheriff to transport arrestees to Santa Rita, although this arrest plan had worked well for past National Cruise Nights. Interviews showed that the Santa Rita detention facility was not notified or at all prepared for a large number of arrests.

There was also no plan for calling in extra LPD personnel, and when the need arose the call-back effort was sporadic, late, incomplete, inconsistent, and confusing; a number of LPD officers were at home and available, while five nearby agencies were called in with little preparation and inadequate coordination. One LPD officer was called in only after he called himself to see if he was needed.

Because the Operations Order did not provide for adequate personnel there was no Station Commander, leading the Lieutenant in charge to assume that he had to stay "trapped" at the police headquarters, instead of out in the field or at the command post. (In any event, the Lieutenant also had no police vehicle with which to get to the command post.)

As a result, there was only a Sergeant in charge, as Tactical Commander in the field. Crucial decisions were made in difficult situations; e.g., closure of the street, and crowd sweeps. Decisions were made without an actual on-site observation by the Lieutenant/Operations Commander, or by the Captain (who was at home), or the Chief (who was present as an observer but did not involve himself in these serious decisions).

In an excellent post-Cruise Night critique which is attached, LPD sergeants and lieutenants note the foregoing as well as additional clearly articulated criticisms of the planning for cruise night. (The critique did not, as claimed in an LPD memo, call for earlier street closure; it warned against an inadequate closure plan.) There happens to have been no follow-up LPD meeting or discussion with regard to that excellent de-briefing memo. Apparently there was also no meeting (beyond that of the Captain with the Lieutenant) to prepare in advance for Cruise Night 8/18.

The failure of the LPD administration to plan for contingencies amounted to a serious administrative lapse. Without a workable plan, the Sergeant/Tactical Commander was left in a no-win position.

Throughout the Cruise Night, plans were made and decisions were implemented by the Sergeant, as Tactical Commander. These, however, simply did not work. Without further leadership from the Chief and Captain, in the end a great many line officers and street supervisors were put in situations where they were vulnerable to injuries. Most of

the officers interviewed noted that many more officers and citizens could easily have been seriously injured, and that the property damage could have been far far worse.

**OPERATIONS**

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## OPERATIONS

The following discussion of police operations on Cruise Night focuses on:

1) Command: Reviews the LPD chain of command and leadership on 8/18.

2) The Actual Operation: Reviews of police operations for each of the three stages of Cruise Night:

- street closure;
- crowd sweeps; and,
- team clean up operations.

3) Outside Agency (or "Mutual Aid") Useage; and,

4) Relevant Standards and Guidelines.

1. Command

With the exception of the Chief as "observer," there was no one in the field of superior rank to the Sergeant until near midnight, when the Captain relieved the Lieutenant at headquarters, and the Lieutenant went to the field. According to interviews, the Chief gave directions only three times during Cruise Night, and was otherwise not in charge or involved in any decisions. The directions were: 1) to suggest that a police car move from an intersection; 2) to urge that sweeps to disperse the crowds occur without waiting for further outside reinforcements; and, 3) to approve sharing LPD protective equipment with unequipped outside officers.

The Chief explains his managerial style as that of a modern police administrator properly delegating crowd control tactics and responsibility to skilled "technicians." The investigation concludes, however, that the proper delegation did not occur. It is clearly inadequate, in the face of a large crowd and an understaffed and inflexible plan, to leave an overworked field sergeant in total command of a volatile situation involving a wide range of important policy as well as tactical concerns. The underlying command issues concern the absence of the Captain and the Lieutenant. In this context the presence of the Chief as an "observer" raises serious concern.

## 2. Operations

The first question concerning operations relates to the wisdom of an unprecedented early closure of First Street. Justification for this tactic is claimed from the City Council direction given to the Chief, with regard to street closure. In fact, the direction was for the Chief to make the decision to close the street, "in an emergency," based on protecting life and property. (Later, there was an LPD administration claim that First Street had been closed "as pre-planned with the Council." The Council, however, was clearly not involved in the 8/18 closure, nor in approving such a closing.) Instead, a sergeant made the decision to close the street based on a plan (pre-arranged and approved by the Captain and Chief) to maintain the free-passage of emergency vehicles.

The implications of the impact on the crowd were not thought through. Once the decision to close First Street was to be made, the Chief should have been involved in the decision-making.

The sergeant had too much to do in simply taking care of supervisory responsibilities; e.g., providing assistance in cover, shifting assignments, and in implementing the traffic control plan. It was a serious error to thrust him into an administrative vacuum which required him to make major strategy decisions that had obvious political consequences.

Only after regrouping, with adequate arrest support to back up the LPD declaration, should the announcement for unlawful assembly have been made. The 8 public address announcements to disperse an unlawful assembly, as made without adequate coordination of field support, further exacerbated the hostile mood of unruly elements in the crowd. It is significant to note that the first and only real call for "officer needs help" occurred shortly before the first police pull-back. The unlawful assembly announcements, however, were given later, yet well before calls were made to outside agencies.

Later, when outside agencies were called in to support the effort to "re-take" the streets, the leadership of the Chief and Captain was even more necessary. In fact, the Sergeant asked the Chief if he wanted to ride through the downtown to survey the situation, and the Chief declined this crucial reconnaissance task. This present but not in command role continued during the crucial on-the-spot planning of the sweeps down First and Second Street which was worked out at the Command Post.

The interviews as well as the dispatch tapes of the evening demonstrate that there was significant confusion on numerous occasions regarding who was in charge. E.g., interviews show that many officers did not know which way the sweeps were to go after reaching Livermore Avenue. The manner in which the dispersal tactics were planned and implemented involved major errors in judgment, errors that went unchallenged.

The first error was the dispersal order to the crowd, declaring the gathering an "unlawful assembly." It was clear to the crowd and officers that the police could not follow through to enforce that order. A second error concerned not clearing the streets of cars before using officers on foot for crowd sweeps. Officers were at risk during those sweeps. A third error was in not permitting people wishing to leave the area to get through to their cars, nor providing an alternative. As a consequence many in the crowd could not reach their cars in order to leave Livermore. A fourth error was the lack of arrest teams.

The errors included the failure to anticipate and provide for a dispersal route after the sweeps reached Livermore Avenue, the absence of arrest plans or transport to enforce the dispersal, and the lack of an alternative strategy for dealing with the failure of the sweeps, in the face of danger to many officers from the angry crowds and 30-70 rock and bottle throwers. It does not appear that the Chief ever suggested any changes in the tactics or commands, e.g., calling out of the Captain, or of the Lieutenant.

At the final stage in the evening, another Lieutenant arrived at the Command Post, to join the Lieutenant/Operations Commander (who had been relieved at headquarters by the Captain). The Lieutenant/Operations Commander had driven the Captain's car around the clogged downtown area to the Command Post.

At that point in time it appears that some leadership role was taken by the fresh Lieutenant. The second Lieutenant helped plan the larger 5-7 officer teams when the smaller and largely unsupervised 2-3 person teams ran into strong resistance from some groups of citizens, in clearing the streets of sometimes hostile stragglers.

The Chief was again present at the Command Post during this transition in tactics, and was given opportunities to be involved in decision-making. It was at this late point in the evening that field supervision was the weakest and the most needed, given the high level of officer stress, fatigue, frustration and confusion attendant on nearly eight hours of earlier events.

It was from this last late hour operation that the most complaints were made against the police, and that most resisting arrest charges arose. The most severe of the complaints, however, were not extreme in their allegations; the complaints reflected angry police and angry young people, but not serious "brutality". This investigation has determined, however, that a few unnecessarily physical arrests and hitting of cars appear to have occurred late in the evening.

Litigation against the City has also tended to stem from events at this last stage in the overall incident. There were few fresh officers or reserves, and the evening was beginning to weigh heavily on the overwrought officers.

### 3. Outside Agencies

Five outside police agencies were involved on Cruise Night 8/18, each leaving their own jurisdictions to assist LPD. The outside agencies were the Pleasanton, Dublin and East Bay Regional Parks Police Departments, the Alameda County Sheriff, and the California Highway Patrol. Some outside agency officers were injured and some were the objects of citizen complaints. Generally, the outside aid was highly appreciated, and regarded as professional and helpful by LPD officers.

Some questions related to the use of outside agencies have already been considered, including the lack of planning with regard to their notification and, specifically, coordinating operations in advance. Although the outside agencies had been advised of a possible situation by phone, none had received the LPD operations plan, and none had been involved in pre-planning.

Outside agency officers arriving at the Command Post generally did not know who was in charge, and when calls for assistance were made by the LPD (some by the Lieutenant and others by a dispatcher) the name of the Tactical Commander was not provided in every case. Outside agencies arrived in haste, some without adequate equipment, and some functioning at a "charged" level as a consequence of the earlier Livermore radio calls of "officer needs help," (radio code 11-99).

On their arrival at the Command Post, there was initial confusion due to the absence of any Livermore commanders. Later, these fresh outside officers were directly involved with Livermore patrol officers in sweeps and other patrol activities, although interviews show some had had no contact with a commander and others were dispatched without identification numbers.

The administration of the LPD has developed the pattern of invoking "informal mutual aid" in events where the operations plan or circumstances lead to a situation of inadequate personnel.

The existing well developed California system of Mutual Aid is characterized by statutes and extensive local legal arrangements. Accordingly, to lawfully employ "Mutual Aid" requires notifying a central authority, and reviewing plans and coordination as well as actual and relative need.

Instead, LPD has simply used a radio code "11-99" to summon help not only in emergencies, but in crowd operations that develops as to require extra staffing. This has often occurred (sometimes by prior arrangement) with Pleasanton.

While the call of "11-99 - officer needs help," results in a fast response, it also serves to undermine the State mutual aid system as well as the officer safety value of the high priority radio code. Obtaining outside assistance in this manner serves to diminish the value of police planning and accountability. In the case of the Cruise Night incident of 8/18 it served to embarrass the LPD and the City by requesting outside aid for a bad plan while some Livermore

officers were still available but not called. It led to deploying outside assistance in a situation, without strong leadership, that was perhaps not appropriate to either Mutual Aid or "officer needs help."

When "11-99" is used instead of a lawful Mutual Aid procedure, one issue is the liability and immunity of visiting officers. There is also the fairness question with regard to using the resources of other jurisdictions. Last, there is the question of management and coordination of many outsiders (including Lieutenants) by one LPD sergeant, with a Chief standing by.

#### 4. Standards and Guidelines

Police work does not give rise to a great many formal standards and guidelines because, generally, each patrol situation tends to be somewhat unique. Where crowd control is concerned, however, because crowd situations have many themes in common, there are generally accepted standards and guidelines for a police response.

There are "Guidelines for Civil Disorder Mobilization and Planning" published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). These guidelines, the National Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the guidance of locally employed training themes, procedures and practice in crowd control are all discussed below, in application to the Cruise Night incident of 8/18.

The Standards and Goals report on disorders notes that ". . . every law enforcement agency should adopt a contingency plan for disorder related emergencies." Included should be ". . . methods for assessing hostility to police in advance of routine operations to prevent the development of mass disorder as a reaction to law enforcement action in potentially volatile situations (and) methods of effecting valid arrests in volume with provisions for prisoner transport and housing . . ."

The Standards recognize ". . . the existence of a police responsibility to plan, independent of economic constraints and efficiency values [underlining added]." In the face of these four standards, LPD administrators had no

contingency plan, inadequate intelligence, no arrest plans and an ill-advised concern with the overtime costs of contingency planning.

The IACP Guidelines distinguish between control of a "civil disturbance" and control of a "crowd" (such as those at parades, and special events). Civil disturbances "... have a lawless element intent on damage of property, injury of persons, and interference with normal business and traffic operations, usually resulting in other crimes related to acts of violence."

The IACP Guidelines define a "mob" as "a disorderly crowd whose members, under the stimulus of intense excitement or agitation, lose their sense of reason and respect for law and follow leaders in lawless acts." Civil disturbances require a restoration of law and order whereas crowd control seeks primarily to avoid a civil disturbance, or a mob.

It appears that a crowd control activity in Livermore on 8/18 may have caused a "civil disturbance," and perhaps ultimately something approaching a "mob" type situation.

The IACP Guidelines state the following with regard to "Deployment Against Rock, Bottle and Missile Throwers":

"Persons engaging in this kind of assault usually are in the background of a crowd, positioned behind some type of cover, utilizing hit and run tactics . . . To apprehend the . . . assailant, special deployment tactics must be used..."

For "special tactics," the IACP Guidelines recommend flanking, spotters placed on buildings, undercover officers, and protective gear. The IACP Guidelines emphasize the need

to arrest, and to act in a coordinated and disciplined, well-organized manner.

The IACP Guidelines also address the useage of a command post as follows: "If the Chief of the department decides to allow a subordinate to make meaningful decisions at or near the scene of a civil disorder, then a field command post should be established under the command of the designated individual. However, decisions of this nature are based upon information and intelligence reports concerning the incident, and a field commander isolated by lack of radio and telephone communications cannot make well founded decisions."

The problems of coordinating field observation and command supervision, combined with calling outside agencies and dealing with transport of injured, etc., clearly were hampered on Cruise Night by the establishment of a Command Post not previously used, on the opposite side of the disorder from the Lieutenant/Operations Commander at police headquarters. This also meant police vehicles were hampered in travel to and from headquarters (e.g., with arrestees).

With regard to outside agency assistance, the Standards and Goals report calls for ". . . specification of procedures for requesting support, of preconditions on which support will be made available, and of the circumstances in which support will be denied or limited; . . . and detailed descriptions of the command relationship that will apply in emergency operations involving support from other agencies."

None of these standard procedures appear to have been in place on 8/18.

**TRAINING**

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## TRAINING

It is not uncommon, when the handling of a policed event has been criticized, for the issue of the adequacy of training to be raised. LPD officers appear to be trained to POST standards and (prior to Cruise Night 8/18) had been recently exposed to advanced officer crowd control training. The Academy curriculum and POST approved materials that were reviewed are current and relevant, and clearly show techniques which are standard.

Livermore's Police Training Program has, on numerous occasions, focused on the problems of controlling crowds. Prior to the disturbances on August 18th a film had been shown to almost all members of the department ("CROWDS"). The Lieutenant and Sergeant in command on 8/18 had seen the film, although it is not clear whether it was viewed by the Captain or Chief. The following discussion shows how very relevant this film was to the 8/18 incident; the film is excerpted and the Cruise Night incident is analyzed in the context of that training.

Additionally, all officers have routinely received training in crowd control tactics (e.g., use of the baton, crowd dispersal formations, etc., using training curricula from the County Sheriff).

However, most of the techniques that were the subject of training were not employed on 8/18, or were limited because of inadequate planning. For the most part, the line

officers and sergeants applied the relevant training whenever possible, but most of those interviewed noted their frustration with an inability to employ tactics and techniques that were the subject of recent training.

## Training Guidelines

The film "CROWDS," in cogent layman language, describes the common, observable characteristics of crowd behavior that require police intervention. The training film also explicitly prescribes the correct courses of action to be followed in a given crowd control circumstance. The following are excerpts from the training film as well as from several Alameda County Sheriff's Department training curricula used by the LPD. Excerpts are from sections most relevant to Cruise Night and to the street closure, crowd sweeps and other tactics.

"Before people even get together there has to be some kind of preconditioning, [e.g, anti-cruise ordinance] . . . something has to happen - something of a nature to attract attention - an incident that means something to this group and gives them a common focus" [e.g., street closure, dispersal order and sweeps].

"And the point, of course, is not to give it to them. The main point of course is that once any group is allowed to get this far, because of something that has happened, something you've done, then you know you had better be ready."

"What you're seeing of course is the mobilization of a large number of police immediately - a basic principle in handling a mob . . . if a crowd becomes a mob it also becomes irrational, which means its only going to respond to superior force . . . any movement on your part must always be done as

a unit, knowing that the strength of police is in discipline and unity . . . constant pressure, never allowing them to reassemble but always providing a route of escape [versus the two withdrawals, and the impasse at N. Livermore Ave.]. At the same time leaders are identified and removed as quickly and as cleanly as possible [versus no arrest arrangements] . . . to avoid a confrontation you have to avoid any incident that is going to give them a common focus . . ."

Curricula material employed by the LPD (from the Alameda County Sheriff) also covers Civil Disturbance. In application to the street closure tactic, these curricula note, as follows:

- o "A casual crowd quickly turns into a cohesive crowd as soon as an event takes place that focuses their attention."
- o "Police should plan always to deal with these transitions if they occur."

During the Cruise Night of 8/18, there were preconditioning factors which are precursors of violence. There was latent hostility among the young people present, some of whom perhaps saw Livermore's recent policy against cruising as being unfair and overly restrictive.

Interviews showed that there was also preconditioning on the part of the police, some of whom believed that the problem (according to the words and writings of the LPD Captain) had been aggravated by the City Council's failure to pass an ordinance in a timely manner.

The crowd hostility was manifested very early in the evening in verbal taunts directed at the police teams walking in the downtown area. When incidents began to occur the police reaction was incongruent with the training received. The barricading of streets and unlawful assembly orders given without adequate implementing forces gave focus to the crowd, causing it to assume a more expressive character (i.e., civil disorder). The subsequent total withdrawal of police presence gave the now angry crowd a sense of real power.

Whenever a crowd reaches this state the police must be prepared to move rapidly and forcefully to disperse the crowd. The key, crucial element of dispersal tactics is the use of arrest teams to apprehend leaders and other violence instigators.

On the basis of the training provided to the LPD, the ultimate course of events on 8/18 could be clearly anticipated by those responsible for controlling the situation.

The crowd behaved in a classically predictable fashion which was graphically presented step-by-step in the training film and in several related curricula. The control tactics actually employed did not however follow these recommended tactics.

# THE CAUSE

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#### IV. THE "CAUSE" OF CRUISING PROBLEMS AND CRUISE NIGHT 8/18

The question of the "causes" of Livermore's real and/or perceived cruising problems, and the causes of the 8/18 Cruise Night incident have been raised repeatedly in the investigation, as have the many related policy questions concerning what to do about cruising.

Some believe that the City Council's failure to pass an anti-cruising ordinance, and the failure to pass an urgency measure before the 8/18 "last National Cruise Night," sent a signal to the cruising community that added to the problem crowds, and created a climate that actually "caused" the incident.

The LPD Captain has been a frequent proponent of this viewpoint of blaming the City Council, this in written LPD memos and in personal statements. Additionally, several organizations and a newspaper have espoused this analysis, and pushed informally for a crackdown on cruising. Others, especially when confronted with this view of the Council's "at fault role" argue that "it was the police who provoked" the Cruise Night incident.

The Council has long been ambivalent about cruising, and the strong LPD administration stand against cruising. The Council's lengthy and unresolved direct involvement in debating the police/cruising issue did in fact create a polarized climate as well as a great deal of publicity. This polarized climate and extensive publicity had not been

present in years past. Yet, in years past Livermore (according to LPD reports) had an extensive regular cruising pattern and had dealt effectively with truly major crowd problems.

A tradition of heavy cruising existed in Livermore long before the Council became involved. Problems associated with cruising had been reduced periodically, when necessary, with intensified police foot patrol and selective enforcement. On occasion the LPD handled extremely large and rowdy gatherings with few officer injuries or serious costs.

The LPD administration did not profit from this past experience; it was only after the 8/18 Cruise Night that three sergeants and a training officer spelled out errors in judgment and tactics and outlined a sensible approach to controlling rowdyism and traffic problems coincidental to a publicized national cruise event. The more relevant tactics outlined in their report are classic maneuvers which appear in most authoritative texts on crowd control. These excellent LPD reports should be the basis for planning the policing of future cruising and national cruise nights. The plans are set forth in an Appendix because they recommend techniques that the Investigator has concluded are demonstratively effective.

The rationale supporting the notion that an "anti-cruising" ordinance will solve or reduce problems associated with cruising is not supported by either logic or other

police agency experience, nor by the LPD's own study of the issue.

Most anti-cruising ordinances require that a police observer be stationed at a fixed surveillance point. The LPD administration maintains that selective traffic law enforcement (which has worked quite well in the past according to LPD reports) had to be discontinued "because of a lack of manpower." In view of the perceived lack of staffing and questions about its constitutionality, it is difficult to understand the LPD administration strong promotion of an ordinance, the enforcement of which would immobilize observers for lengthy periods of time in order to secure the legal elements of the crime, and perhaps result in litigation.

Many of the cities which had cruising problems have used vigorous vehicle inspections, parking control, traffic diversion and dispersal tactics as well as roving motorcycle traffic enforcement to discourage the growth of the excesses sometimes associated with heavy cruising. There are already very effective laws, both in the Vehicle Code and City Traffic Ordinances, which have direct application to the nuisance aspects of cruising and which can be enforced without shackling the mobility of assigned law enforcement officers. These laws include impeding the flow of traffic, blocking intersections, double parking, litter violations, vehicle equipment violations, open container in vehicle, disorderly conduct, etc.

An undated LPD study of the cruising reponse of nearby cities was presented to the City Council during the City Council's debates on cruising. That study acknowledged that the effectiveness of an anti-cruising ordinance was untested, and made no recommendation with regard to an ordinance. Yet the LPD Captain and the City Manager incorrectly assumed that an ordinance was needed, and used the LPD report incorrectly to justify calling for an anti-cruising ordinance.

The LPD report summary actually credited the procedures of standard parking control and street closures as the most sucessful tactics (not an ordinance).

Many of the police agencies originally contacted by the LPD, along with other nearby suburban towns, were recontacted during this investigation to update the status of cruising tactics aimed at police problems. The matrix below provides a review of the control tactics employed by the various police agencies.

An analysis of the successful tactics clearly suggest that: (1) anti-cruising ordinances are not a significantly useful device to control cruising; (2) street parking control - supported by appropriate ordinances - is an extremely effective control tactic; (3) barricaded intersections and re-routing, supervised by uniformed officers can effectively discourage would-be cruisers; and 4) the early recognition of growing problems associated with cruising, with prompt assignment of special enforcement personnel, will contain the cruising phenomenon problems to quite manageable proportions, and ultimately limit initial enforcement costs.

## SURVEY OF POLICE CRUISING CONTROL TACTICS

LIVERMORE CRUISE NIGHT REPORT

Jurisdiction	Traffic Law Enforcement	Vehicle Inspections Equipment Violations	Parking Law Enforcement	Parking Lot Ordinance	Vehicle Dispersion/ Dispersal	Anti-Cruising Ordinance	Severity Of Problem	Comment
San Leandro	High Level	High Level	Not A Problem	No	Yes-One Way Pattern	No	Small to Moderate	
Los Gatos	High Level	High Level	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Recurring Moderate To Severe	*See Below
Cupertino	High Level	High Level	Yes	No	No	Yes	Nil	**See Below
Walnut Creek	High Level	High Level	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nil	Strong Enforcement Credited With Eliminating Cruising
Hayward	High Level	High Level	Not A Problem	No	No	No	Nil	
Fremont	High Level	High Level	High Level	Yes	Yes	Yes	Small To Moderate	Anti-Cruising Ordinance Only 4 Months Old & Not Extensively Invoked
Santa Clara	Periodic Special Enforcement						Declined In Recent Years	
Sacramento	Routine	Routine	Yes-Open Emergency Veh. Lane	No	One Way Traffic	No	Small	
Danville	Routine	Routine	Routine	No	No	No	None to Date	Advertised Cruise Night April 20, 1985
Livermore	Intermittent ****	No	Yes	No	First on Aug. 18	Yes/No	Moderate to Severe	***Enforcement Subject To Officer Availability

NOTE: According to League of Cities records the only California Cities which have passed an Anti-Cruising Ordinance are: Los Gatos, Cupertino and Fremont.

\*Los Gatos: Best Tools: No Parking Ordinances, Enforcement Teams, Traffic Dispersion/Diversion using 20' aluminum barricades supported by pipes inserted into permanent street receptacles. In the past delays in starting enforcement/diversion program allowed cruising to get out of control. Anti-cruising ordinance not considered useful.

\*\*Cupertino: Sheriff's office (contract) anticipated problems from publicized Cruise Event with plan backed by 50-60 Officers. Arrest teams on standby. Very heavy traffic law enforcement augmented by Officers on Trail Motorcycles. Anti-cruising ordinance apparently not a factor. Cruising problem never came back.

The police problems associated with large cruising events in Livermore have been long-standing; nearly a decade of experience with occasional public disturbances, vandalism and vehicle accidents was cataloged in extensive chronological summaries prepared by the LPD. These LPD summaries demonstrate that most of the persons arrested or cited are from Livermore or nearby. Over a long period, according to LPD documents, the amount of violence, public drunkenness and traffic disruption has always been directly correlated with the level of police attention to the regular week-end cruising action. When special enforcement was applied, the attendant problems and "outside trouble-makers" diminished. When special enforcement was discontinued, the problems increased.

The LPD Captain's summary of the Cruise Night incident of 8/18 contends that police personnel were not available to control the cruising problem on a continuing regular basis. The facts are, however, that inadequate scheduling is the root of that problem rather than insufficient personnel.

The LPD administrators have used statewide ratios of officers per thousand to show need for more officers, but the statistic is highly misleading (i.e., it includes "heavy" urban areas.) The right measure for staffing is work load, or calls for service (i.e., demand). Interviews suggest that, in comparison with other police departments that have dealt with cruising and large crowds, LPD has an adequate number of officers for its calls for service load.

The demand for police service generally follows a regular cyclical pattern. The evening hours in a suburban town such as Livermore are relatively quiet on Sunday through Thursday. On Friday and Saturday evenings, however, the volume of calls for service usually increases. For approximately seven years the LPD administration has disregarded this classic week-end increase in the need for police officers by assigning patrol officers to work a schedule which provides a three day week-end after five nine-hour work days. Although this is a real and cherished benefit for the officers, the practice has created a staffing pattern in Livermore that appears to bear little relationship to Livermore's actual need for police service. For example, under the current scheme, without overtime, more officers might work on a Wednesday evening than on a Friday or Saturday evening.

In many ways this schedule is an underlying cause of the problems associated with Livermore cruising, as well as the excessive police costs in overtime. It is also indirectly as well as directly a cause of the 8/18 Cruise Night incident, in that the police were understaffed for the operations plan employed.

The Investigator concludes that "the police" did not provoke Cruise Night in that the line officers and their supervisors basically followed orders, coping with an inadequate plan and operations system. The Investigator finds that the cause of the periodic problems associated with heavy cruising, and of the Cruise Night incident is a failure

of the LPD administration to efficiently employ appropriate enforcement resources, particularly in light of the City Council's repeated reluctance to completely "close down" the popular local cruising activity. The major cause of the Cruise Night incident was poor planning and leadership of the top administration.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

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## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that a great many more Livermore citizens cruise or participate in cruising than the relatively few complaints, City policy must aim at controlling the problems and abuses rather than seeking to eliminate the cruising activity.

A cruising ordinance should only be considered as a "symbolic message" to cruisers, and it should not be expected, if passed, to significantly reduce the cruising problems. While cruising is accused of some public nuisance problems and clearly results in many complaints from some citizens, cruising has also been the preferred recreation for far more Livermore citizens than those relatively few who have voiced strong complaints.

In order that the views of a very few do not come to dominate the prudent administration and management of the LPD, City Council members must once and for all develop a community wide consensus on cruising. If the Council cannot as a deliberative body develop a consensus (by employing the aid of the policy recommendations in this report) then the direction regarding cruising should come from a broadly based citizen policy committee, appointed by the Council.

Clarified policy direction regarding cruising should quickly be developed, approved by the Council and handed over to the City Manager and then to the LPD.

To remedy the problems associated with heavy cruising, the Council must operate so as to remove law enforcement from political debates, and work entirely through the City Manager's office. Cruising and some related problems will not disappear, but a planned and coordinated patrol effort can gain control over the problems caused by cruising, and this can be accomplished with or without a cruising ordinance.

The City Council should remove itself from direct involvement in police department problems and procedures, and deal instead through the City Manager only, and with broad policy direction on the LPD and on cruising. The Council may wish to ask for information or reports, or for the recommendations of the LPD; but the line of communication command and authority must be through the City Manager to insure proper accountability and control.

In no case should the LPD be encouraged to continue to advocate its position on cruising policy directly to the Council, or engage in similar policy advocacy with local organizations or in public. The City Manager should exercise control over the forum and format for discussion of LPD policy programs and procedures, and the Council should provide only broad policy direction.

If the City Council maintains the police chain of command, the City Manager can in the future be held strictly accountable for the performance of the LPD.

The City Manager should approach administration over the police department by expecting less and inspecting more.

The role of the City Manager is to probe and insure appropriate performance by the police and ultimately to be responsible for the city government administration over that police performance.

The issue of police-community relations needs to be addressed by the LPD and City Manager in concert with the cruising problem. An active program which supports safe and monitored cruising (perhaps with police-sponsored rules), combined with adequate police planning, scheduling and proactive deployment, and the selective use of citations and arrests should serve to regain the lost ground and rapidly limit the need for extra enforcement.

The LPD has quality personnel and effective field leadership. A renewed emphasis on planning, and flexibility in operations that allow for efficient maximum use of existing available resources, is required.

It is much less expensive to control cruising by adequate scheduled patrol than to periodically have to resort to overtime, unexpected help from other agencies, and the possibility of a large uncontrolled and unplanned for crowd.

Police department command procedures need to be modified so that staffing is in place to always allow a ranking commander to leave headquarters, and with adequate transportation, be in the field, as required. Similarly, police department crowd control plans should always include an adequate arrest plan, and provision for transport.

When an arrest program is not possible, planning and tactics must be adjusted to insure that the police peace-keeping role can be maintained, even without resources for an adequate arrest response.

The police department should open the critical incident planning process for major events, across rank. The development of a command hierarchy and responsibility for planning and coordination must be clarified, and the process requires more accountability, from an open review or briefing process.

Currently feedback on operations orders is called for in writing, but LPD officers are given no meaningful advanced opportunity to meet and discuss plans for major events. Planning must include more coordination within the department, so the insights of line officers and field supervisors can more effectively be employed.

Planning procedures for events likely to generate large crowds must be thoroughly reviewed. Plans must specify adequate staffing for the planned tactics and strategies, and include both contingency arrangements for unexpected but possible eventualities, as well as an orderly means of employing the full resources of the LPD, and if needed, prompt support from outside agencies. These improvements in planning and managing should occur in the LPD under the supervision of the City Manager.

Training with regard to crowd control, particularly where there is the possibility of mutual aid, requires some minimal simulation or practice and rehearsal. The police

department should provide in written policy for the simulation of critical incidents, and, at least, a "walk through" by supervisors, before a large crowd control activity.

To handle cruising, it is recommended that the LPD respond to the problems associated with heavy cruising with prompt assignment of special enforcement personnel (including some motorcycle enforcement, using current personnel), in combination with street parking control and effective use of other existing ordinances. Barricaded intersections and traffic re-routing, supervised by uniformed officers, can also be considered to discourage heavy cruising, if that is desired.

The LPD must employ tactical measures appropriate to the requirements, and within the constraints of available personnel. Much has been made of the lack of officers on Cruise Night; but the truth is that Livermore has an adequate number of police officers although they are not efficiently employed. Serious scheduling problems have already been discussed. Efficient use of scheduled manpower requires careful planning with contingency arrangements, (e.g., in place, call back procedures; and carefully planned, rehearsed and lawfully employed mutual aid procedures). Planning must always consider the possible impact of police tactics themselves on crowds and police personnel requirements. The LPD should consider adopting the standard five-day week in order to efficiently deploy its patrol force on the week-

ends. The officers made available by this or a similar change in scheduling should be able to implement measures to keep cruising under control through vigorous vehicle inspections, roving traffic law enforcement, traffic diversion and dispersal when necessary, and selective violation enforcement.


The LPD should be directed to open up lines of communication through and up the ranks, to allow a more grounded analysis, in context, of intelligence information, interpretation and assumptions. Line officers should be charged with generating regular intelligence on cruising and similar community activities of police interest (e.g., high school rumors, car shops, and information from officers with families in Livermore). The proper police policy must balance the interests of all, not merely one element of the community.

Whether it is cruising or a demonstration or a rodeo, the LPD Administration must identify and really "see" the dimensions of a problem, and then take appropriate tactical measures. This objective requires a broader police community relations effort.

Attendance at the meetings of associations should be broadened so that input to the LPD is not limited to a few established business oriented service organizations that may not fairly reflect all viewpoints, and then appear to many to dominate LPD thinking. Police community relations, intelligence gathering, analysis and planning are tasks integral to the patrol function, and to knowing the community

in depth. These work areas require increased LPD Administration attention in the form of written policies and procedures; i.e., detailed operations plans with contingencies and resources, as well as periodic evaluations.

# APPENDICES



## APPENDICES


This report contains three appendices:

1) Two "confidential" LPD memos, concerning the debriefing of Cruise Night, and planning for future Cruise Nights. These memos are **OMITTED** in the public edition.


2) A letter from the Police Officers' Association to the City Council, concerning Cruise Night; and,

3) The Investigator's resume.


APPENDIX A



APPENDIX B



September 10, 1984



Members of the Livermore City Council:

The membership of the Livermore Police Officer's Association has voted unanimously to speak out on the "Cruise Night" issue and give the public a factual account of the events which led to the cruise night violence. We have all listened to and read opinions from citizens regarding this issue and we are appreciative of the strong community support we have received.

As in the past with prior "announced" cruise nights, plans were made to deploy additional police officers in the downtown area to minimize the problems associated with these events. Problems occurring in the past have included vandalism to downtown businesses and public property, increased alcohol and drug abuse by juveniles and young adults, serious assaults, and grid-locked traffic on First Street. Unknown cruising organizers advertized the August 18th cruise as "The last cruise", and stated they would "Make the most of this cruise". The following is a chronological account of events on cruise night, August 18, 1984:

7:30 p.m. Numerous vehicles began to cruise First Street. Large groups of juveniles and young adults began to gather on First Street.

8:30 p.m. Traffic was virtually stopped on First Street. Vehicles were clogging up at First/Railroad and First/Holmes.

9:40 p.m. Traffic was backed up to Holmes/Vancouver and First/Railroad overpass. At this time First Street was closed due to congestion. Emergency traffic (i.e. police, fire and ambulance) could not travel First Street if necessary. The intersections of First/Livermore, First/P and First/L were also clogged impeding traffic. City crews began placing barricades along side streets feeding into First Street in an attempt to clear First Street. However, at unmanned intersections cruisers would either remove the barricades or, as in many cases, simply drive over the barricades. Over twenty barricades were destroyed by vehicles or vandals.

10:10 p.m. Traffic was successfully diverted from First Street, however, Second Street became congested causing similar problems.

LIVERMORE POLICE ASSOCIATION  
P. O. BOX 646  
LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA 94550  
INCORPORATED JUNE, 1968

10:30 p.m. Groups of fifty to one hundred people began to gather on Second Street.

10:50 p.m. A fight broke out on First Street which resulted in two injuries to juveniles. During the fight, a group of between 100 to 150 people gathered requiring six officers to disperse the crowd and stabilize the area.

11:00 p.m. Officers in three separate locations (First/P, First/Livermore, and Second/P) reported that rocks, bottles and eggs were being thrown at them. Two officers were hit by either eggs or bottles at this time. The crowd on Second Street was now unruly and out of control. Traffic was heavily congested, pedestrians were walking in the roadway, and numerous traffic and alcohol violations were observed.

11:20 p.m. The decision was made to announce that a condition of unlawful assembly existed on Second Street (407 of the California Penal Code). All police officers were ordered to leave the downtown area and report to a staging area to obtain safety equipment (i.e. helmets). During the next twenty-five minutes eight announcements were made on Second Street proclaiming the unlawful assembly, in compliance with 726 of the California Penal Code. Each time the announcement was made over the public address system of a police vehicle, cruisers would start honking their horns and pedestrians would start chanting obscenities in an attempt to drown out the P.A. system. The patrol vehicle was struck by rocks and bottles at least five times during the announcements. The crowd continued in this unruly manner and would not respond to the unlawful assembly announcement.

Signs of vandalism were beginning to appear (i.e. broken tree limbs, turned over garbage cans and broken glass in the street). Cars were being driven recklessly and too many vehicle code violations were observed to even attempt enforcement. There was a total disregard for the law.

During this time a request for assistance was made to Pleasanton P.D., Dublin P.D., Alameda County Sheriffs Office, East Bay Regional Parks, and California Highway Patrol. Each of these departments sent officers.

11:50 p.m. All officers were at the staging area and were issued helmets for safety purposes due to the thrown rocks and bottles and also in compliance with Cal-CSHA rules.

12:30 a.m. The crowd was now estimated at 10,000 people and was given approximately forty-five minutes to lawfully disperse which met with negative results. Officers then proceeded east on First and Second Streets in an attempt to disperse the crowd. As officers began to move through the area they were met with a volley of flying debris. Several officers were struck with rocks and bottles during the first block of movement.

At Second/L the crowd intensified and many bottles and rocks were thrown at the officers. As the crowd was moved back to Second/K cable spools were rolled at officers. One officer was struck in the head with a full bottle of beer causing his helmet to crack. This same officer was then struck on his face shield by a rock which tore the face shield off his helmet.

The crowd was moved to First/Livermore and Second/Livermore and began to disperse. Upon reaching Livermore Avenue officers were told to return to the staging area to allow the remainder of the crowd to disperse.


During the two hours it took to move the crowd off First and Second Streets, three officers were seriously injured requiring medical treatment and several others had been struck by rocks and bottles.

By not complying with police barricades and the unlawful assembly announcements, cruisers left local police no other alternative but to call for assistance from outside agencies to help clear the downtown area. Anyone remaining in the downtown area after the announcements was in violation of the law and subject to arrest. Helmets were issued and worn due to the demonstrated violence of the crowd and again to comply with Cal-OSHA regulations.

Prior to the August 18th cruise night, cruising in Livermore had been a social activity for nearly thirty years. We acknowledge some problems with traffic, alcohol and physical confrontations, but not to the degree we had experienced on August 18th. Over the last two years we have averaged approximately seventy tickets per weekend (Friday and Saturday nights). Why did this problem explode this particular summer? Perhaps the answer lies in the passage of anti-cruise ordinances by other cities and counties. The cruising and associated problems became too great for them so they shut down their streets. The result? Livermore became the dumping grounds for all the problems these cities refused to deal with.

This summer we've issued approximately one hundred fifty (150) tickets per weekend, with seventy-five percent of these being issued to juveniles and young adults from out of town. It's our businesses that have suffered, it's our teenagers and young adults who have been condemned with the masses, and it's our police department that has also been condemned by a very small but vocal portion of this community as to the handling of cruising and the protection of the downtown area.

Again we would like to thank those in the community who have shown their support to the police department in regards to the "Cruise Night" incident.




Officer James Perry  
President, L.P.O.A.

JP:ms

cc: City Manager  
Chief of Police  
City Council Members  
Herald Newspaper  
Valley Times Newspaper  
Independent Newspaper

APPENDIX C



ALAN KALMANOFF

EDUCATION

- 1972 Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley,  
School of City and Regional Planning
- 1969 M.S.W., University of California, Berkeley,  
School of Social Work
- 1967 J.D., University of California, Berkeley, Boalt  
Hall School of Law
- 1964 B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Honors  
in Political Science

CURRENT WORK

Consultant, Kern County. Directing the preparation of the Public Facilities and Services Element (PFSE) for the General Plan, involving 60 departments, development of a database, and a financial scheme.

Consultant, Tulare County. Directing the preparation of County Court House Facility Planning Study, involving projections, database, site planning, and estimation.

Consultant, San Diego County. Directing major Jail Population Management Study, involving analysis of causes of overcrowding in county-wide system and projection of alternatives to alleviate overcrowding.

Consultant to Monitor, Toussaint v. McCarthy (No. C73-1422SAW), the "San Quentin Case," U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. Assistance in implementation of consent decree; facilitated hearing between plaintiffs and defendants on prison gang issues, lock-down procedures, and other compliance concerns; developed resources for the Court.

## ONGOING POSITIONS

- 1965-present      Consultant to U.S. and California Departments of Justice, Human Services, and Rehabilitation, National Institute of Corrections; over 200 law enforcement and corrections agencies, and legislatures in California, Alaska, Nevada, New Mexico and over 50 counties.
- 1967-present      Attorney at Law.
- 1979-present      Executive Director, the Institute for Law and Policy Planning, a non-profit agency specializing in planning, training, and research.
- 1979-present      President, California Planners, a planning organization conducting training in corrections, law enforcement, and criminal justice; city and health planning, education and related social policy areas.

## PRIOR POSITIONS

- 1976-1979      Lecturer, California State University at San Francisco, Departments of Sociology and Political Science.
- 1973-1976      Lecturer, University of California, Berkeley, School of Criminology.
- 1973-1979      General Partner, Approach Associates (predecessor to California Planners).
- 1971-1973      Director, Federal planning and research team for development of information systems and systems analysis for reorganization of Oakland Police Department.
- 1969-1970      Executive Director, Oakland Lawyers' Committee (most were Bar Association directors); programs involving private lawyers in public problems.
- 1967-1969      Associate, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work.
- 1966-1971      Analyst, Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education in America and for Dean J. Scott Briar, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work.
- 1965              Intern, New York State Attorney General's Office, Civil Rights Division.

## CONSULTING

- 1983-1984      Consultant, Alameda County Office of Court Services, directed the "Driving Under the Influence Adjudication Evaluation Project", an analysis of the impact of 1982 DUI legislation on the court system.
- 1982-84        Dean-in-Residence, Bureau of Prisons, National Institute of Corrections, directed Political Leadership unit, Advanced Management Training for the National Academy of Corrections.
- 1982            Consultant, Bureau of Prisons, National Institute of Corrections, to develop strategic planning for National Academy of Corrections.
- 1981-1984      Consultant, for Corrections Needs Assessments, justice system planning and programming, and development of comprehensive facility plans and funding applications to Board of Corrections; variously for San Francisco, San Mateo, Placer, Merced, Ventura, Kings, Nevada, Yuba, Sierra and Monterey Counties.
- 1983            Consultant, Violent Crime Task Force, National Institute of Corrections, to assess all Federal corrections violent crime initiatives, develop recommendations with and without funds and legislation.
- 1980-1984      Trainer, for in-service training in field interrogation, interviewing and interrogation skills, sexual assault and child abuse investigation, for Richmond, Concord, Sunnyvale, Garden Grove, Santa Barbara, Ventura, East Bay Regional Parks, BART, U.C., and over 50 other law enforcement agencies.
- 1982            Consultant, American Correctional Association, to develop a major corrections plan for Nevada, consolidating state prisons, probation and parole.
- 1982            Consultant, Shawnee County, Kansas, and Blackhawk County, Iowa, for jail planning.
- 1981            Consultant, California Department of Justice, Advanced Training Center, sexual assault investigation, child abuse investigation, and victim/witness crisis intervention.

- 1981 Consultant, National Institute of Corrections; facilitated national policy seminar on overcrowding; evaluated planning for National Academy of Corrections; technical assistance to National Information Center, regarding development of national corrections clearinghouse; and various training seminars on jail planning.
- 1980 Director, National Institute of Corrections. program planning and major technical assistance to Arkansas Department of Corrections for new reception and diagnostic, mental health, and pre-release/work furlough institutions.
- 1980 Planner, National Institute of Corrections, for evaluation and plan for national corrections clearinghouse.
- 1980 Expert Consultant, U.S. Department of Justice, for policy analyses and technical assistance in narcotics and organized crime enforcement, and policy planning and research.
- 1980 Consultant, Rehabilitation Services Administration and Center for Independent Living, for research and training agency directors in disability law.
- 1979-1980 Facilitator, California Department of Rehabilitation, on State Architect's regulations for barrier-free public buildings.
- 1979-1980 Principal Consultant, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Civil Rights, for \$2,000,000 in major national training and technical assistance contracts with the Center for Independent Living, to train 2,500 disabled consumers in 26 states in "504" compliance activities.
- 1979 Consultant, Vallejo Unified School District, for implementing of a student/faculty high school grievance procedure.
- 1979 Consultant, Center for Independent Living, to train trainers and facilitate training at Navajos Nation, Arizona, for disabled Native Americans.
- 1979 Director, planning evaluations of 12 district attorney projects for the Wisconsin Criminal Justice Planning Board.

- 1979            Consultant, research for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), to assess and assimilate police research in patrol and investigation.
- 1978            Director, major California Legislature's Study of Correctional Needs for comprehensive evaluation of prison facilities and programs and incarceration alternatives to determine needs for new facilities and programs.
- 1977            Consultant, California Department of Justice. Training in communication skills in 100 agencies over seven years.
- 1977            Director, study of impact of alternatives to incarceration in Alaska, for Attorney General.
- 1977            Director, services for non-retarded developmentally disabled, United Cerebral Palsy Association of California, Inc.
- 1977            Director, evaluation of statewide juvenile police diversion projects, and technical assistance, Wisconsin Criminal Justice Planning Board.
- 1977            Consultant, drug program evaluation, Contra Costa County Probation Department.
- 1977-1973      Director, Alameda County Revenue Sharing Evaluations, over four years, of 300 community-tised social service programs.
- 1976            Consultant, New Mexico Department of Hospitals and Institutions. Development of master plan for mental health and feasibility study for delivery of community-based services, including population projections;
- 1976            Director, New Mexico Master Plan for Corrections (unimplemented). Planning for adult, juvenile, and local jail system, including all programs, services and institutions.
- 1976            Consultant, planned the California Protection and Advocacy System for its Developmentally Disabled, and Ohio's needs assessments for the statewide protection and advocacy systems.
- 1976            Consultant, Santa Cruz County Administrator, Assessment of alternatives to incarceration and planning for EIR.

- 1976 Director training program for two hundred Tucson police officers in crisis intervention.
- 1976 Consultant, Berkeley Police Department, Operations Study.
- 1976 Consultant, for Contra Costa County; programming for new jail; comparison of pre-trial release in Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
- 1975 Consultant, for five California counties. Curriculum development and trainer training in sexual assault investigation.
- 1975 Consultant, City of Pacifica. Feasibility study for proposed civic center.
- 1975 Director, University of California and Alameda County District Attorney; study of plea-bargaining.
- 1974 Consultant, Santa Clara County. Sexual assault study.
- 1974 Consultant, California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Wrote Part E Plan for California Corrections and Designated Funds Plan. Developed program monitoring curriculum, trained state and regional planning agencies staff, and developed proposals in delinquency prevention and control, narcotics enforcement, and police response time analysis.
- 1974 Director, University of California. Cost-benefit study of Alameda County Work Furlough Program; with Alameda County Sheriff.

#### MEMBERSHIPS AND HONORS

Special Career Development Fellowship, National Institute of Mental Health (1969-1971); Moot Court, U.C.B. Law School (1967); honors, University of Wisconsin (1964); class president, Western Reserve University (1961).

Alameda County Bar Association; California State Bar Association; University of California Alumni Association; Boalt Hall Alumni Association.

California Community Colleges, life-time credential in Law, Public Services and Administration, and Professional Education.

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- 1981-1984 "Major Needs Assessment," Counties of Ventura, Placer, Merced, Kings, Nevada, San Mateo, Yuba, and Monterey.
- "Minor Needs Assessment," Counties of San Francisco, Sierra, and Placer.
- 1982 "Double Trouble: The Alienation of Disabled Inmates," Corrections Today, December 1982.
- 1982 "Ventura County Master Plan for Adult Corrections," Ventura County. "Ventura County Master Plan for Juvenile Corrections," Ventura County.
- 1981 Arkansas Department of Correction Program Plan and Technical Report. Oakland, California: Institute for Law and Policy Planning.
- 1980 Review of Population Projection Methods in Washington Corrections Planning. Oakland, California: Institute for Law and Policy Planning.
- 1980 Quick Evaluation of National Institute of Corrections Clearinghouse Operations. Oakland, California: California Planners.
- 1979 Police Research: An Assessment of the Investigations/Patrol Interface. National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (with K. Brown).
- 1978 California Legislature's Study of Correctional Needs, Vols. I-V. Oakland, California: Approach Associates (with C. Kizziah, et al).
- 1977 New Mexico Master Plan for Corrections. Oakland, California: Approach Associates.
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- 1976 Criminal Justice: Enforcement and Administration (college textbook). Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown & Co.
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- 1976            The Plan for the California Protection and Advocacy System for Persons with Developmental Disabilities, for the California Department of Health.
- 1974            Guide to Corrections Planning. Sacramento, California: Office of Criminal Justice Planning (with C. Kizziah, J. Brown, and P. Stinson).
- 1973            Field Interrogation Training. For the Police Foundation and San Diego Police Department.
- 1972            Policies and Priorities in Vice Control. For the Office of the Chief of Police, Oakland, California (with M. Morris and J. Tendler).
- 1972            Report on the Criminal Investigation Division. For the Office of the Chief of Police, Oakland, California (with M. Morris).

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- II - 1-8
- III - 1-26

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Memorandum to Livermore Social Concerns Committee, Oct. 9, 1984.  
Memorandum to City Manager, Oct. 10, 1984.

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Perry, James, President, Livermore Police Association. Letter to Livermore City Council, Sept. 10, 1984.

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### Photos

Cruise Night Photographs: 13 rolls of film.

Roll #1.	First St.	9:30 p.m.-10:00 p.m.
Roll #2.	First St.	2:00-2:30 a.m.
Roll #3.	First St.	2:00-2:30, 3:00-3:30 a.m.
Roll #4	First St.	9:30-10:00 p.m.
	Second St.	10:00-10:30 p.m.
Roll #5	First Sweep	11:00 p.m.-11:30 p.m.

Roll #6	Second Sweep	3:00-3:30 a.m.
Roll #7	Night of Aug. 17	9:00 p.m.
	Night of Aug. 18	8:00-9:00 p.m. (First Street)
Roll #8	Second St.	9:00-9:30 p.m.
Roll #9	Second & Livermore	12:00 a.m.-12:30 a.m.;
		1:30-2:00 a.m.
Roll #14	First St.	8:00 p.m.-9:00 p.m.
Roll #15	First St.	10:00 p.m.-10:30 p.m.
Roll #17	First & P; First & Livermore; Second St.	10:00 p.m.-10:30 p.m.
Roll #18	First St.; Second St.	9:00 p.m.-9:30 p.m.

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