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Community Policing: From Officer Smiley to Inter-Agency Cooperation

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Background

Common to social outbursts is an underlying tension that is precipitated by a perceived - relative or absolute - social and economic deprivation and a sense of injustice. Unpopular judicial decisions or law enforcement behavior act as a triggering event. Such outbursts are not necessarily unique to democratic society as can be evidenced by the Tiananmin Square incident in China, or the riots in Bangkok, Thailand. What is **common** to all societies is the enactment of formal and informal mechanisms of social control. What is **different** is the method used and how acceptable it is.

When the jury found the officers not guilty in the beating of Rodney King, its verdict became that triggering event for the crowd's collective behavior whose rampage far surpassed in damage to life and property that caused by the riots in the '60s. It is mostly after such events that the effectiveness of social control is brought to the focus of national and international attention spawning volumes of reports and proposals. Yet the effectiveness of existing "law and order" mechanisms is also questioned following annual reports on crime statistics or in political campaigns when crime or "law and order" become an issue.

In the last few years attention was given to a new form of policing strategy which became to be known as community policing. The "professional" trend in policing so typical to the '50s resulted in a greater sense of isolation of police from the community they serve. In the early part of the '80s and in reaction to this isolation, it seemed as if police chiefs and commissioners from several countries (but most notably in Canada, England, Israel and the United States) have jointly decided to adopt this new policing strategy. While the trend towards deploying community policing is growing in the U.S. and the world, it is still actually practiced by a relatively small number of forces, it suffers from a lack of a clear definition, a lack of consistent programmatic implementation, as well as lack of measurable criteria for success. Most often it is left to a specialized unit or individual officers to practice while ignored force-wide. There are some encouraging signs of serious and original community policing efforts in cities like Baltimore, Houston, Kansas City, Madison, New York, Newark, Portland, Santa Ana, and

Savannah (in the U.S.), Edmonton, Halifax and Toronto (in Canada), Exeter and Manchester (England), and in Israel (Friedmann, 1992).

The community sets up its official law-enforcement arm to deal with the undesirable, with the criminals, with the order breakers and law violators, yet most of its activities focus on service delivery that is largely non-criminal in nature. In the West, various basic premises of personal and individual liberties provide set procedures to be followed by officers (and in most cases they are). Yet, there is not a single definition that is consistently applied or is adopted by law enforcement agencies, scholars, or communities alike. Moreover, the literature sees more of a set of guiding principles than any clearly formulated definitions. Perhaps the two most widely accepted principles have been offered by Alderson (1979:ix) and Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990:xiii-xv).

This is not the place to repeat the ten different principles that each has offered. Suffice it to state that while the principles forwarded, and accepted as such, deal mostly with macro level interventions while much of the implementation of community policing efforts is taking place, with few exceptions, at the micro level. It is perhaps, the lack of a clear definition that confuses a systemic issue with proposals and practices that are, by large, far from adequate.

Since the '50s, reactive policing stressed the point that crime is committed in the community and police respond to it. To a large extent the equation assumed a certain level of crime, an attempt to block as much of the opportunity to commit it and then mostly resorting to record, administer, and "control" the crime situation. The history of police community relations, crime prevention, community oriented policing, target policing and community policing is fraught with attempts to break the reactive cycle of crime and interject a preventive element to this picture where policing efforts are focused more on what leads to commit crime rather than how to deal with it once it has been committed.

This shift of emphasis is rather ambitious yet still mostly naive as it ignores much of the community forces that operate to create crime as well as those (often the same) that operate to prevent it. Police can do that much to replace the family, the school and other social institutions by telling people what elements of their behavior is acceptable in the eyes of the law and assuming that it will suffice to create law abiding behavior. Most people violate the law not because they do not know what it is or that it exists but precisely because they do.

Often times an attempt to enforce a law that stands in contradistinction to the will of the community proves to be a failure (i.e., prohibition). The war against drugs focuses mostly on the supply side yet does very little to change demand for it. Thus for community policing to succeed, it needs to stretch far beyond officer smiley into interagency cooperation. Therefore, a need arises for a more concise and measurable definition of community policing.

The following definition offers a view which is comprehensive and synthesizes the different prevailing conceptions in the area into a set of testable statements characterized by a switch from "policing" as such to improving the quality of life for citizens (and not only in the area of crime reduction): **Community policing is a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime-causing conditions. It assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision-making, and greater concern for civil rights and liberties.**

It advocates proactive policing into areas other than direct crime administration and removes some responsibility for fighting symptoms of social ills from the police and places it squarely on the agenda of a large variety of other social service agencies. Self-imposed control assumes that most people will abide by the law in the same sense that most people do not withdraw their savings from a bank at the same time. If these assumptions are violated, then societies and banks collapse.

Since it is obvious that some cooperation does exist between police and citizens and between police and some social service as well as other agencies, what is new about this approach is the characterization, direction, and scope of such relationships. In short, this calls for a redefinition of the division of labor of social service delivery. If the premise that combating and minimizing the **motives** for crime is perhaps as important as making a dent in **criminal behavior**, then police cannot be expected to carry that burden all by themselves. Yes, they should continue patrolling, investigating, recording, reporting, and even preventing crime. What they should not be expected to do is to **singularly** struggle to realize the "law-and-order" agenda. This can be achieved through a "Super Agency", or a "board of directors" comprised of agency representatives and civic leaders. It should facilitate, coordinate, enhance and support those actions needed to improve the quality of life in a neighborhood.

Oftentimes, the high crime areas are also those suffering from a plethora of social ills such as blight, high teenage pregnancy rate, poverty, low health levels, low education achievement, high dropout rate and high unemployment rate. The police can serve as a diagnostic device, but then it should be up to the "Super Agency" to take the necessary steps to facilitate a **concerted effort** which will act as a genuine "seeding" device so as to curb the motives and incentives to commit crime. Several police forces have already started to look at such a possibility. The City of Savannah, GA, has established such a "Super Agency" called the "Crime Collaborative". The City of Portland's Police Bureau is currently under a five-year transition plan at the end of which (1995) the total force will be under the Bureau of Community Policing and as such interacting with various social services.

The greatest advantage, as well as disadvantage, of this model is that it is clearly not a solution for problems requiring immediate attention. Nonetheless, it may well be the inevitable next step in policing revolution. It goes far beyond the traditions of cosmetic "Police-Community Relations" methods and is much more substantive in its approach and not necessarily more costly. It requires built-in safety devices to guarantee that it is carefully planned and fully implemented. Yet such an all out effort is possible and we should not shed the responsibility

for more effective crime control. Community policing can be realistically achieved and measured for success or failure. For example, the police will be the first to map the problems of the city, criminal and social alike, and may assist in targeting police and other service efforts at these areas.

In a sense what this approach proposes is the need to focus attention somewhat away from the individual level of police practice to the organizational level of coordination and synchronization of efforts. It recognizes the limits of a willing and dedicated officer and offers some possibilities that were ignored before. Hence the call of this paper for the necessity to shift attention from "Officer Smiley" to interagency cooperation.

The "Super Agency" is then to enter by taking action that police cannot and should not take alone. The Super Agency removes the need for dependence on good relationships between police and, say, a municipal public works/utilities department. Yet it also transforms the scope of responsibilities and the nature of social service provision by providing the possibility for a coordinated effort on behalf of and with citizens. It also holds the biggest promise ever for any meaningful empowerment of citizens by taking greater if not equal part in managing their residential and business areas with police and other agencies. We need to fight crime at the roots which create it and we need to guarantee that ALL citizens do have access to minimal acceptable decent standards of quality of life. It is essential that such an approach be formalized and not dependent on a specific police or city leader but become an agreed strategy and civil service standard. We have practiced the other possibilities far too long and cannot afford ignoring the promise that community policing has to offer. In community policing lies not only the hope for better policing but also for a better society.

Implications

Despite the strong identification of community policing with foot patrols, some proponents and observers still prefer a loose definition of community policing which assumes reciprocity between officers and citizens, area decentralization of command (but not necessarily

of the wider police organizational structure) and increased civilianization of the police force, all having in common the rationale that the police must involve the community in its activities (see Skolnick and Bayley, 1986). Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990:xiii-xv) and Alderson (1979:ix) see community policing as leading to the greater involvement of officers with citizens, preventing apathy and restraining vigilantism, and resulting in what may be viewed as (more) humane policing.

However, the difficulty in defining community policing in clear terms of 'do' and 'don't' prescriptions--which are not easily subject to operational terms--also raises some legitimate questions. With the increasingly perceived popularity of community policing programs with citizens and police departments alike, with research indicating some effectiveness of foot patrols,¹ with greater receptivity to community policing than to other policing innovations and with the values of community orientation displayed by a new cadre of police chiefs, some questions as well as criticisms are raised with respect to community policing (Kelling, 1988).

An assessment of what are considered to be the most carefully carried out crime prevention, or community policing programs, as well as those which were accompanied by the more rigorous experimental design and yielded meaningful research findings, ponders whether the interventions were unique, whether the evaluation results truly indicate success, whether efforts were targeted towards the highest crime areas and whether the findings are representative (Yin, 1986). It is also questionable whether community policing will deplete limited police resources, whether it will fit within policing as it is now organized and whether there is a likelihood that community policing will lead to greater police corruption and abuse of power (Kelling, 1988), whether supporting illegal community norms and seeking community support are compatible (Mastrofski, 1988), whether community policing may weaken the rule of law by selective protection and whether community policing may lead to lesser professionalism and lesser accountability because of the greater freedom and discretion of action (Bayley, 1988).

¹More so in the United States, but without any conclusive evidence in England.

Perhaps some of the difficulties and confusions surrounding the interchangeable terms of community policing which designate so many different activities and approaches - that at times defy classification - can be found in the language used to describe and define what community policing is and is not. The ambiguous descriptions that more often than not make themselves most difficult for empirical testing proved to be a rhetoric that in turn has been questioned as to whether it holds any substance beyond its emotional, symbolic and communicative values (see Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Klockars, 1988; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988; Weatheritt, 1987; 1988). One of the dangers of this new language is that it clouds and perhaps abolishes the positive genuine efforts of traditional policing strategies to control crime. The problem lies, perhaps, in not finding community policing officers being more willing or more capable to fight crime--even with the enlisted support of citizens--than traditional officers in car patrols. The individual officers are in all likelihood attempting to deliver the best service they can. It is questionable whether a perpetrator will be found, stolen property recovered and a specific crime prevented more efficiently and effectively under any one of these juxtaposed policing methods. The difference is perhaps not between the officers operating within distinct organizational contexts as much as between the contexts themselves. Under all policing methods the ends are the same, and from the research that we have seen, the results do not differ markedly either.² What is perhaps different is the organizational climate and the means employed to achieve agreed-upon objectives.

In a sense, if community policing is to be successful at mobilizing citizens and to become popular with citizens, it inevitably thrusts the officers on the beat, as well as the ranking police executives, into a political arena much different than the arena they were used too--and which was altogether not less political--i.e. of 'simply' enforcing law and order. Under the umbrella of community policing the police department plays a more salient and competitive role among other social services, as well as with city politicians such as mayors who cannot afford risking their popularity for that of police chiefs (Davis, 1985). That is partly why community policing

²Except that there is an expectation for rapid response but a preference for 'community policing' which raises the question as to what extent this is really a matter of choice or balance.

could simply be used for public relations and never be given teeth in terms of any effective programmatic aspects.

This also raises the question whether the goal for such greater community involvement is not a bit too large for the police to take on - endangering it by posing unattainable goals - as there is a limit to what police can do or even should do to improve conditions in the community and truly affect criminogenic factors in it (Klockars, 1988; Manning, 1984). For example, even if massive economic development raises the tone of a neighborhood and significantly improves its quality of life, this does not mean that crime will be eliminated. There is no guarantee that street crimes will not be transposed into less violent (white-collar) crimes whether political or economic in character. This is an illustration of a double displacement effect, too often ignored in the literature and in the field; that is, the displacement of one type of crime to other sections of the city coupled also with its replacement with another type of crime which emerges in its stead.

Philosophically, one can argue, then, that all recent community policing innovations in Canada, England, Israel and the United States amount--in the words of Ecclesiastes (1:9)--to **nothing new under the sun**. In fact, prior to the advent of community policing but at the height of police-community relations programs, the police were still viewed as attempting to prevent crime, apprehend offenders and recover stolen property (Davis, 1978). Yet to simply argue that nothing new has taken place is not only simplistic but socially irrelevant and politically misleading. In the sense that our society today is not much different from predecessor societies in terms of social institutions, patterns of behavior, motivation for action and deviance, it can be said that policing today is not much different from older police practices. These institutions, of course, are there by virtue of being social institutions and as such they remain societal fixtures. However, their form and characteristics are widely different and reflect adaptation to ever-changing conditions. In other words, by the virtue of accumulated knowledge and culture, societies are different and not merely because they live in different times and places. Similarly, as the institutions of formal social control--policing among them--will always be there

for such a purpose, they also underwent some evolutionary developments that make policing today quite distinct from what it was, not that many years ago, and what it will be in the more distant future. That is certainly true if we consider police goals and objectives as a social service agency.

What is dramatically different in the concept of community policing from the more traditional policing strategies is more than that it comprises merely proactive as compared to reactive policing measures. Proactive policing--at least in some aspects of it--is as old as policing itself. Reactive--or responsive--policing will never be eliminated and it should not be expected to be wished away. This is not only because the police cannot know precisely when crimes will take place and accordingly plan to prevent them (e.g. in specific instances of rape, murder, or even burglary), but once crimes occur it is at that exact time that police will be called upon to take testimony, collect evidence, catch the perpetrators, attempt to recover stolen property and bring criminals to justice. In addition to functioning in reaction to crime as it takes place, the proactive approach of policing attempts an element of planning and long-range control of crimes before they happen **on an aggregate rate**. But beyond the importance of proactive policing, reaching out to the community, long-range planning and greater effectiveness and efficiency in police work, the change and the difference in the direction policing is developing towards at the turn of the twentieth century lies in its ideological and political implications for policing democracies. Community policing is not only the epitome of what signifies participatory democracy. It is reflective of the attempt to redefine the relationship between the controlled and those who are in control. It is not just the attempt to share power in a different way than ever before; it is a way for the recipient of police services to determine not only how those services should be planned, delivered, evaluated and who should be accountable for them, but it is also an attempt to approach the problem of crime control through what generates crimes to begin with, and that is the community itself.³

³To paraphrase Homans' concept of 'bringing man back in' which sought the necessity to emphasize the role and place of individuals in sociological analysis, there is a need to 'bring the community back in' to recognize its role in crime production and crime control as well as the limits on policing.

Crime prevention and community policing became part of the political (though not necessarily always partisan)⁴ agenda in the same fashion that health, housing, education and other public policy issues are discussed. As the absolute and relative crime rates went up in Western democracies, law-enforcement budgets compelled police departments to do more with less (Bright, 1987). The need to achieve greater efficacy in the delivery of police services led them to seek support and legitimacy within and from the public. This was partly done through attempts to tailor law-enforcement tactics to specific needs of communities (Davis, 1985) and was part of a general urban and community planning approach that attempted to provide elements of remedial, strategic and rational planning. Issue-focused planning that concerned itself with crime reduction, crime prevention and the reduction of fear of crime attempted to enhance community integration through increased cooperation and decreased isolation within and from the community. Yet, by no means is such an approach unique to community policing. Much of the physical and social urban renewal that took place in various countries--particularly the United States and Israel--during the 1960s, 70s and 80s relied on advocacy planning to inform citizens about decision-making and participatory planning that actively sought not only substantial input from citizens but also the empowerment of citizens to become more effective in decisions that have consequences on their lives (Burke, 1979).

Much of the urban planning agenda attempted to provide different options for the selection of a solution, focused on countering possible opposition and then relied on self-fulfilling prophecies or the project dynamics to achieve defined objectives (Berry and Kasarda, 1977). Yet community policing, perhaps more than any other urban intervention, planned for consensus, or took it for granted as existent. The premise of community policing was the achievement of communal consensus about its philosophy and practice alike but it was also that the community is a 'harmonious' consensual entity. At the same time there was a belated, if at all, realization that at least the crime control aspects of policing deal with conflict as soon as

⁴Although it is true that in some countries such as the United States, presidential race platforms emphasized 'law and order'. Crime has certainly been used as an element and component of political campaigns either as fear tactics or as policies towards decreasing crime or increasing punishment.

force is used to regulate it. To a large extent, community policing forged ahead ignoring various dilemmas that its practice imposes. On the one hand, the uniqueness of communities, their structures and their specialized needs were emphasized but the expectation for decentralization and tailoring of services to unique situations ignored the consistent, if not dry, aspects of the law itself. Moreover, it also highlighted the potential friction between formal and informal controls in the community (Smith, 1987). On both sides of the Atlantic arguments were made that bureaucracies and agencies are incompatible with communities if not, in fact, a contradiction in terms (Mott, 1974). Bureaucracies are perceived as rigid, cold and indiscriminant bodies that have to enact policies and apply them consistently. Communities are considered spontaneous, emotional, unique, and problem-centered. While these images may be quite exaggerated, they point to a policy dilemma when rigid enforcement and spontaneous proactive work may not live well together.

New evidence confirms earlier views that while people are concerned about crime, in their daily life they are more affected by and concerned about nuisances, problems, stresses and disorder and that such concerns are linked to the unknown more than to specific knowledge of behavior or certain people. There is an understanding as to what a community can and may control informally and what incidents should come under the purview of police work. As police take over crime scenes they receive legitimacy from the public but if such relations between formal and informal social control aspects are not more clearly defined, the formal control of policing may get in the way of informal control as well as lose the much sought after support and legitimacy (Shapland and Vagg, 1987). As such, a careful balance needs to be struck between formal and informal social control so as not to jeopardize the potential of each, both as single factors and operating in synergy.

Therefore, for any policing innovation to succeed, police bureaucracies must undergo modification so that the police can work in concert with other agencies on a single plan to improve quality of life in the neighborhood (Mott, 1974; Sunahara, 1991). Such multi-agency planning and cooperation has rarely taken place on any significant level. In fact, many

difficulties with the implementation of community policing evolve at the pre-cooperation or pre-coordination phase. They include unrealistic expectations of community policing, beats that are too large to make significant contact, no coherently defined objectives and methods, turnover of officers, mistrust of police in neighborhoods where such intervention is needed most and there is a question as to the true impact of liaisoning and public relations beyond such cosmetic aspects (Punch, 1975).

For such policing tactics to become effective beyond the force level, not only police structure and practice needs modification but also the nature of cooperation with the public as well as with other agencies. While crime control is the formal responsibility and jurisdiction of the police, the main preventive efforts should fall on local authorities in cooperation with police, other organizations, and communities, in order to seek the support level necessary for effectiveness. Bright (1987:49-50) suggests a focus on local neighborhood councils that will have formal structures, management, committees and funds, to protect the community groups that are most at risk by implementing crime prevention measures, responding to the offending population by focusing on criminal justice as well as employment and play provisions, providing services to victims of crime and enhancing strategies for citizen participation.

Seeing community policing as not isolated from the community and its residents is perhaps a given in any attempt to shape the welfare of citizens, and the broader its scope, the more likely is the police force to be involved with other municipal or state agencies, as well as having such agencies (including private ones) more involved in defining police role, authority and responsibility (Reiss, 1985). Even those arguing pessimistically that not all the changes required and recommended for community policing to be successful can or will be achieved, also argue that such expectations and prescriptions are in the right direction. Manning (1984) acknowledges the need for police organizational change, legal change, change in the practice of dispute definition and resolution, performance evaluation and a reward structure for police officers. Such changes, of course, will not be achieved without sufficient preparation and

readiness to overcome external as well as internal resistance or competing visions of policing (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988).

Perhaps the answers and solutions to the problems and challenges community policing raises rest in the need continuously and consistently to monitor what exactly is needed to be done, what is being done, and how well, within a workable and agreeable definition. Such monitoring requires an agency outside of the police but one that is better qualified and prepared for such a task than the consultative groups or the civilian boards. Recruitment and training needs to take into account a total force perspective and not a divisive unit-based specialty approach that will only alienate officers from one another. In a way, policing policy is to be developed by both public and private resources and agencies to guarantee their effectiveness under acceptable democratic standards (Bayley, 1988). It is important to note that though we know more today about crime prevention it does not mean that the answer is readily applicable to high crime areas.

Most of the proven successes so far indicate that communities with the higher crime rates are also those least amenable for community policing. For community policing to succeed there, a much deeper recognition is required that extensive social and cultural change efforts are needed on a scale and scope not yet attempted, or perhaps practically achievable at a relatively low cost and the much needed multi-agency cooperation (Yin, 1986). This, more than anything, attests to the professional neglect of considering neighborhood and community characteristics both in terms of crime producers and as potential crime controllers within an environment of formal public and private service organizations.⁵

⁵There is also inadequate acknowledgement of community forces that make communities different as crime producers as well as consumers of police services. Yet, there are constant calls for implementing ideals such as decentralization, or beat patrols, irrespective of how relevant or irrelevant they are to or often disjointed from other policing efforts.

As Weatheritt (1987) was successfully able to demonstrate, citizens do not evidently prefer one policing method over another. In fact, she was able to point out that citizens prefer the community approach but they also do expect rapid responses to pressing issues whether they are of a criminal or social nature. If police organizations face an either-or choice between community policing and car patrols, that choice truly lies between a desired yet unattainable objective, and the practical but relatively effective policing the public does actually prefer. However, if the choice is not between the two but rather there is an attempt to combine the best of both, then community policing will not remain in the realm of rhetoric.⁶

Some suggest that perhaps grounding high-minded ideals to unburden police from noble yet futile missions must be the first item of any realistic agenda, and accept a less ambitious role than changing intricate, contradictory and uncertain social conditions and try to operate under consent not consensus (Klockars, 1988; Mastrofski, 1988). This may not be much to ask if it does not call for the elimination of community policing altogether. In a sense, as Bayley (1988) and Trojanowicz (1987) argue, the problems and shortcomings with traditional policing are as evident if not greater than those of community policing. If both policing methods have an equal-ineffective--impact on crime, why not embrace community policing if citizens are happier about some salient aspects of it?

What then, are, or could be, the future prospects for community policing? It is reasonable to assume that it will continue to progress along the lines that have been identified in these four countries, which indicates a greater readiness for a broadening of the police mandate towards the delivery of police services in a wider range of proactive planning aspects that involve the community. For this examination, there are two areas that naturally need our attention and together they compose the concept of community policing: the police and the

⁶There is no reason to assume that principles of community policing cannot be embedded into reactive policing, detective work, or even riot, and post-riot, control efforts.

community. However, within each of these different entities⁷ there are different aspects that require separate analyses; so does the interaction between them and the types of crimes that need to be addressed. Future prospects for community policing are likely to focus on the following paths:

1. Intra-organizational change.
2. Inter-agency cooperation and coordination.
3. Community mapping, and participatory power-sharing.
4. Development of a clearing house for community policing efforts.

Intra-Organizational Change

Within the police it is very plausible to contend that departments will increasingly adapt an on-going force-wide organizational process of review and strategic change according to a policing policy that needs to be differentially applied to the community according to needs, legal definitions and environmental realities. In addition to force-wide adaptation of policies and policing ideals, safeguards need to be put in place to prevent gaps between policies and practice. Without such safeguards the end result is likely to be the emptying of any potential positive plans of their meaningful content and denying them any possible success. What could be used as a safeguard to guarantee complete implementation?⁸

⁷These terms are treated differently because one is a formal organization of formal social control with symbolic significance of authority and representation; the other is a conceptual, all-inclusive, abstraction of people and places that is highly open to different meanings and interpretations.

⁸The issue of such safeguards is relevant to a whole host of social programs and is important in two regards: first, it secures the possibility of drawing valid conclusions that a program succeeded/failed because of the program features and not due to partial implementation which renders the program meaningless because it is not known whether the program potential was as promising as if it has been fully exhausted. Secondly, to secure the potential that the program will succeed for what it is, not for what it is not. For example, many criminal justice programs in preventive, correctional and therapeutic settings are rarely fully implemented due to budgetary shortages, inappropriate staff and other problems which then prevent the intervention from being fully carried out. Therefore, when failure is shown there is no way of knowing how successful the program could have been, had it been executed in other than a half-hearted manner.

The most logical answer lies in a methodical, comprehensive, and 'patient' strategic plan to be formulated around an existing or planned consensus that is hopefully reached across as wide a range of participants as possible. A city, or state-wide task force could initiate and work on receiving guidance from a steering committee which, in addition to guidance, will seek legitimacy. Involving police officials, public officials, agency representatives, experts and educators may guarantee long-term success.⁹

This is not a simple challenge in view of political realities, particularly in the United States, as a delicate balance is struck between mayors, city councils and police chiefs. Much of any ideal arrangement as those discussed here, depends, in turn, on the fragility of such relations which have an impact on the permanence or even successful implementation of community policing programs. In a sense this is a double-edged sword. A mayor committed to community policing can swiftly carry with him or her the city's police force (Portland is an example) while in cities where mayors have disagreements with police chiefs or are not supported by city councils such programs will either have a difficult time getting off the ground or may be terminated by the cutting off of existing support.

Even if a successful strategic plan achieves such an organizational metamorphosis, it will be painstakingly complicated, lengthy and will need to be very carefully structured and executed

⁹A brief discussion is in order here regarding the concept of consensus. Community policing has somewhat justifiably been accused of catering to a community consensus which is not always there or for ignoring it even when it is evidently missing. While to some extent, consensus need not be taken for granted, some elements of it are essential in order to keep a minimal neighborhood life (or that of a city, or a state) in place. Modern life partially means that some agreement or consensus is reached in order to facilitate any acceptable social arrangement. People do not agree with each other on all matters but those who are in a dispute do not disagree about everything either (unless the conflict is of an all-encompassing dissensual nature). If the concept of mediation has any value, it also implies reaching some consensus. If this argument holds for the community at large, it certainly should provide a sound foundation for any strategic plan as such. The alternative is to get no plan at all or to get one off the ground that may serve only a very small group of people over many others. The objectives of any community policing strategic plan ought to be to have impact on the quality of life of as many people as possible. This is particularly pertinent to social tensions such as in Brixton (England), Crown Heights (New York), or Wadi Salib (Israel), but these may be much more complex dissensual race conflicts of an organized violent political nature. It is precisely in this respect that criticism against community policing as assuming or planning for consensus should not totally discard the possibility of socially acceptable coexistence.

to avoid over-dependence on one specific advocate or administrator. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that Alderson's departure resulted in a relative disintegration of his policing style in the Devon and Cornwall constabulary. On the other hand, the Portland police reorganization effort is precisely in the right direction, as it seeks to institute organizational changes and not to become dependent on a specific administrator. It should be observed as to its future complete implementation and effectiveness.

Such strategic plans that are on the rise in Canada and the United States have different implications for England and Israel because of the complexities involved in police reform that affect the police force country-wide and not just one police department. Yet the difference is one of degree and not of kind. Such police reforms ought to be pursued, monitored and evaluated with a built-in (and on-going) research component that will be able successfully to measure differential impacts and to attribute success or failure in a reliable and valid fashion to policing components in a manner which hopefully will permit national and international comparisons.

However, in order to allow measurability, clear operational definitions of what is meant by force-wide community policing, and what should the assignment of the police officer consist of, need to be spelt out. If proactive behavior means planning with block committees and with school boards then officers need to be rewarded for it. But even if the performance and reward structure is modified, something much more basic than that issue needs careful examination. Incident-based policing requires officers to undergo pertinent training that is geared to equip them with the necessary skill for successful policing encounters.¹⁰ They need to be familiar with departmental procedures, with law, with emergency regulations and a host of other codes which dictate their behavior. Community policing is adding another dimension which requires a greater amount of interpersonal and social skills as well as a more global understanding of social problems, together with the ability to apply societal-relevant solutions. These added skills

¹⁰Success as defined by the police department, as measured and as rewarded by it.

can and should be embodied in reactive police measures as well. In either instance, this is not an easy demand to make of officers, especially when most other professionals such as social workers, psychologists and other counsellors, have at least an undergraduate education which is currently not required of police officers.¹¹

It may well be that the hierarchy of the police organization itself needs to be changed. Such change will require that the more experienced and educated officers will be assigned the more complex social, proactive and challenging tasks. It may also have implications for recruitment where self-selection may, in the future, be motivated by social and community orientation and not by a thrill-seeking image of policing. It does not mean that all senior police officers will become beat officers yet there is no reason why they could not patrol the streets again.¹² Rather, it means that in addition to - or as part of - their administrative responsibility they will for some periods be involved in community duties such as serving on liaison committees or being involved in civic affairs. However, the few successful changes reported earlier need to be contrasted with what Guyot (1979) calls efforts to bend granite, where any attempt at even minor modification to any existing rank structures--which are called for particularly if community policing is serious about redefinitions of officer assignment, evaluation and reward--are deemed unsuccessful as the granite-like police subculture opposes such attempts. Additionally, when such drives for change come from within and are supported by police management, a conflict emerges between what Reuss-Ianni (1983) describes as two cultures of policing: **a street cop culture of the good old days, working class in origin and temperament, whose members see themselves as career cops; opposed to this is a management cop culture, more middle class, whose members' education and mobility have**

¹¹There is no intention here to assume that these professionals are successful by virtue of their academic and professional education. The point to be made is that such education becomes an assumed necessary prerequisite. With the development of a professional body of knowledge, such professional education becomes a must and turns into an unaffordable liability when missing and can only disadvantage police officers in interaction with other service providers.

¹²In the same way that senior administrators teach and do research in universities and prominent professors teach large introductory classes. Otherwise it will continue to be considered a dirty job or a punishment.

made them eligible for jobs totally outside of policing, which makes them less dependent on, and less loyal to, the street cop culture. (Reuss-Ianni, 1983:121)

Reuss-Ianni correctly identifies the existence of organizational decision-making dilution of policy directives as they are further removed from the center of the agency, as well as the influence that loyalty to one's immediate unit has on the implementation of such directives, particularly when the 'good of the unit' is contrasted against the 'good of the organization'. Such realities are not mentioned here to discourage change or to point to its impossibility. Considering the fact that any change is either coming from or is instituted by bureaucracies, the hope for change--and its successful implementation--still lies with police agencies themselves. What is important in the process of instigating change is the proper realization of possible resistance points that have more to do with routines, traditions and loyalties than with the merit of new ideas. The recognition of two (or more) cultures of police does not preclude the need to inspire changes from the top, as this is perhaps the only possible way in a hierarchical organization.

Therefore, even without a complete overhaul of a police department or a national police force, community policing needs to be more narrowly and realistically defined, based on a plausible understanding of crime causation and crime control. It may well be that better relations with the public can and should be encouraged, but it is important that officers are not expected to be the ultimate problem-solvers. Even working as lobbyists who attempt to prompt a much sought-after solution may get them in trouble with other agencies and result in an inter-agency war from which only the citizens will suffer. This brings the discussion to other aspects of multi-agency cooperation.

Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination

As difficult a task as problem-solving for those community ills such as sewage, lighting, road quality and other decay problems is, it may be easier than drawing and then crossing inter-agency boundaries and facing the threat of professional or civil service competition. If

community-oriented police officers are expected to perform social diagnostic functions for individuals and groups, they may trespass over the professional boundaries of psychologists, social workers and community organizers among others. This is even more likely to happen if police-mediating intervention is expected to take place at a pre-crime phase in an attempt to mediate social conflicts before they become a matter for the law. It may also raise legal questions such as protection of privacy, and result in legal attempts to curb police intervention if crimes are not involved. Communities are rather sensitive to data collection, storage and usage by the police, or even to the possibility of random questioning by them.

This point is of particular relevance to communities finding the success of the Japanese koban system appealing, yet ignoring the social, structural and cultural aspects that are so conducive to its success, as well as ignoring its intrusive and sometime abusive potential of penetrating the privacy of individuals and violating various other civil rights. What is condoned, accepted and supported in Japan may not be as welcomed--to understate the case--in most Western societies. The experience of Santa Ana reported earlier imported only some aspects of Japanese community policing and so far has successfully avoided such intrusions and violations.

Therefore, while such a professional challenge may be successfully met it cannot be done without the recruitment of the appropriate personnel, without the provision of a sufficient foundation of relevant and necessary skills and without the understanding of potential competition or territory encroachment that awaits officers. In a sense, where community policing can innovate in the next decade or so is in redefining the players, in better understanding the individual, organizational and professional characteristics of the decision-makers, in understanding what in community policing is common to police and other social service providers, and in what is unique to police that differentiates it from other service-providers. Policing innovation should also be promoting governmental and private support for various policing programs. Police need to examine the extent to which what they do and what other social service agencies do overlap, compete and complement each other's work. Also it

is important to examine potential governmental and private support, particularly at times when service demands increase and public expenditures are reduced.

It seems that if we attempt to portray the future individual officer in any of these countries, police departments should aspire that the new role model--for reactive and proactive policing alike--will feature a better educated, better experienced and more public-oriented officer.¹³ This new officer will be part of a new, reformed police department that will have better training, define different task assignments, differently assess performance and provide appropriate and relevant reward structures. Since it may take years for a force to achieve such a transition it could be further facilitated by the reversal of the hierarchical pyramid and having senior police officers assigned patrol duties.

This new police officer needs to be socialized into and feel excitement about human interaction, the end result of community policing, and not about ritualistic processes associated with the display of uniformed authority. Even more important, the future officer should facilitate the closing of the gap between the professional socialization provided during training and police cynicism, or lip-service, evidenced in regard to community policing, which may undermine the success of community policing if it is not accompanied by the appropriate informal support and formal reward structure. In a sense, this is one of the reasons why a program is not fully implemented. In a hierarchical structure such as that of the police it is expected that such a closing of the gap will be initiated and pushed by the more senior officers.

Moving from the model of the individual police officer to organizational aspects of police management, perhaps the more far reaching innovation is in combining coordinating, consultative and oversight functions and having the police and other social service agencies

¹³In many agencies there is a distinction between people-oriented personnel who prefer and are capable of working with the public in direct service delivery and those who do not face the public directly (for example, bank tellers, teachers, social workers as direct service providers and bill processors, graphic artists, transporters who do not directly interact with the public).


become accountable to an umbrella coordinating agency or a super-agency which will better be able to channel service needs and achieve results without having agencies duplicate, compete, or quarrel for service delivery jurisdictions or territories. Considering the fact that if various law enforcement agencies, particularly in the United States, both within and between level of agency (local, state, or federal) are often competing with each other or reluctant to share information or cooperate, it is at least partly understandable why different social service agencies are even less enthusiastic about cooperation. Again, 'nested' loyalties are in play. If unit loyalty has an effect over organizational performance, then organizational identification can hinder inter-organizational cooperation. Therefore, it is perhaps, no less important to develop a sense of loyalty to the agency and the community and this should have priority over loyalties to smaller units.

Therefore, this should not become another bureaucracy similar to departments of public safety that are established and erased by the use of the executive pen, but one that will serve as a sort of 'board of directors' to all agencies and be an independent and accountable body. If we examine Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 it can be argued that while the police force--as an agency and as a bureaucracy--is self-centered, as are many other bureaucracies, it is truly the community that should be in the center. Therefore, while it is sensible to expect the decentralization of police services in order to achieve a 'better fit' with community needs and characteristics, paradoxically it is the managerial aspect of service delivery which cuts across agencies needs to be more centralized.

Figure 1 depicts this super-agency that will, perhaps, better represent community needs and facilitate the coordination and management of services in a more efficient and effective manner that should be both accountable to and representative of the community. In such an environment inter-agency cooperation and planning are but one benefit of police-public action that should be balanced against the dangers that such cooperations entails. On the one hand, there needs to be an enhanced environment which will guarantee efficient and effective service delivery. For example, blighted neighborhoods need a coordinated effort by education, health,

public works and social services and this should not be left for action by police officers. Such a super-agency can secure a more timely and parsimonious intervention on behalf of individuals as well as on behalf of collectives. It will also have the added advantage of avoiding 'area' wars among agencies. It is not suggested here that another large-scale bureaucracy which will cost more money and even exacerbate the already complicated inter-agency relations should be created. Rather, this is perceived more as a form of a 'board of directors' which will be like an inter-agency policy-setter, coordinator, facilitator and enhancer of what existing bureaucracies are already doing, and not a day-to-day service delivery mechanism. It is hoped that when inter-agency cooperation is needed for planning and implementation it will not be dependent on a single officer who may not be as powerful and efficacious as such an overseeing agency.

Figure 1: The Role of the Super-Agency



The existence of such a centralized effort and the existence of a new bureaucratized body may also mean having greater power in the hands of some individuals and some organizations. This raises the question similar to 'who shall police the police?' and that is who shall supervise this meta - or super agency. The question will become particularly important if individual data is used across agencies without built-in safety mechanisms to prevent an unacceptable intrusion of privacy and civil rights. In the United States, for instance, this has to be closely linked with the agenda developed by mayors and thus leaves room for political abuse.

The answer seems to lie in the need for the evident advantages that such a structure introduces and the warnings of the dangers it holds if not handled appropriately. Such a super-agency should have sufficient self-control both formally and informally to prevent a "take-over" by one of the representatives on it and at the same time allow a smoother service delivery through organizational and single agency accountability to the super-agency, on top of internal agency accountability. Therefore, this super-agency is not offered as a panacea to solve the bureaucratic and organizational ills that are so pervasive to civil service, but rather, to offer a mechanism to make some progress under admittedly unfavorable odds.

Community mapping and participatory power-sharing

After the discussion of the area of the police, the other, and most neglected area of community policing, is that of the community. Police departments will have to continue to target high crime areas, detect special crimes such as serial rape and killing or drug trafficking. Yet, if proactive policing is to be taken seriously by officers, other agencies and the public, a far better understanding of the community--and the nested communities within a community--is absolutely essential. The intervention strategies of proactive policing cannot assume that all communities are equal and that police officers are to be simply sent out there for the sake of improving relations with the public. Those relations need to be defined and redefined, agreed upon, targeted and only then worked on. In addition to reasonable treatment, responsiveness

and efficient handling of citizen concerns, proactive planning needs to understand better the social mapping of a community.

For proactive planning to become effective it behooves it to focus on identifying what the power structure is, what the reputation bases are, the available potential pool of volunteers and the formal and informal networks that could be used to assist or prevented from resisting community policing. It is extremely important to understand fully the crime profile as well as the profile of victims and offenders. It is also necessary to learn about the age, race, gender and ethnic group composition as much as to know what the illiteracy rate is. Above all, identifying grievances before they explode is necessary for any solutions to have a chance to become successful. Most issues resulting in violent social unrest need to be addressed in-depth to allow the development of solution mechanisms that have a likelihood of attenuating conflicts before they surface.

If policing is to deal more seriously with crime causation and not only with limiting opportunities to commit crime, a recognition of the limitation of policing is called for. In this sense, crime is a matter of acceptable thresholds or intolerable ceilings that are publicly, socially, or politically defined. To expect that major societal conditions be changed due to innovative policing efforts--even when proactive--is unrealistic. But in the same way that bureaucracies are responsible for quality of life in terms of a whole area of social services, there is no reason to assume that improved community policing efforts should not aspire to perform better. Banking on informal structures and networks, the best role for the police is to ascertain and promote the closing of the gap between norm-compliance and norm-evasion. It is absolutely important to guarantee that crimes that are condemned in public will not be condoned in private.

But the community aspect of community policing has an added dimension. It does not only consist of concerns, tactics, encounters and more sophisticated and well-intentioned policing. As important as these aspects are, emphasis need to be placed on the source of initiation of programs and on power-sharing. Despite the obvious operational need to develop

organizational plans at the agency level which designs and provides policing, initiatives should emanate from citizens who as individuals and groups do not need to wait for the police to review and reform its services. Such initiatives are also advantageous in providing a variety of avenues for increased power-sharing, which is a major concern in several countries. Power-sharing means greater accountability and it means greater representation for citizens' grievances. It also means that through a sense of empowerment and ownership over their affairs, citizens gain a greater sense of control over seemingly mundane, but truly important aspects of daily life.

If anything is to be expected in the foreseeable future in the area of power-sharing and greater representation, it is the continuation of the present trends of consultative committees, oversight boards, and other forms of civic involvement in police affairs. The call for greater power-sharing is typically recommended and adopted by those who do not have what they perceive as sufficient voice or control of their affairs. Once some groups gain the much desired control they may not be so willing to share power. In the United States, for example, blacks are gaining more and more mayoral positions (as well as those of police chiefs) and they may be reluctant to share power particularly with white groups soon after they assumed it themselves after so many years of disadvantage. Typical to immigrant countries such as Israel and the United States (and in migration areas in Canada and England), various ethnic groups that manage to arrive at powerful positions are not likely to share (or 'give up') power, being fearful that it might undermine their achievements or that they will be weakened or lose it altogether.

However, what is evident from the previous discussion is that for such civic activities to become more effective, the nature of such representation--if it is to be achieved at all--needs to be changed from symbolic to instrumental. Greater symmetry needs to be put in place so that the citizens' involvement will be somewhat increasingly equalized to that of the police. Without providing training, budgetary resources and greater power to civilian representatives, such power-sharing will be relatively nothing but a token activity. The greatest danger to the move from symbolic to instrumental representation lies in the potential for cooptation--in all four countries--of representatives by mayors, police chiefs and other highly powerful public figures

through allocation of budgets and through partial sharing of information, as well as the intimidation evident in the possible confrontation between the professionals who 'know' and the citizen who is, at best, a lay figure.

It is interesting to note that towards the turn of this century the great ideals of representation and participation that are typical of democracies met their own limitations. If police are expected to be representatives of their community and if elected officials are thought of as being representatives of the community, why then is there a need for 'additional' or more 'genuine' representation and power-sharing? The answer is simple. Bureaucracies develop their own domains, their own interest and their dynamics are in the direction of what best serves their survival and sustenance interest. This is not a completely cynical view or one that is introduced for purposes of pessimism and hopelessness. Rather, it is a realistic aspect of organizational life and political realities. If gaps exist in the areas of democratic representation, why not expect that such gaps will also exist with greater power-sharing? This is particularly realistic in the age of 'experts'¹⁴ who take over organizational life and create instant realities (see Yates, 1982). There are dangers that if safety mechanisms will not be put in place, self-styled local leadership may turn out to be as corrupt and powerful as its elected representatives, posing an even greater danger because they are not accountable in the sense of having to give up office or be penalized for violation of any laws.

This points to a possible structural danger in community policing that waits around the corner in the form of the political game. The strengths of police forces in England and Israel lies in that they have relatively few local political strings attached¹⁵ to their service delivery¹⁶

¹⁴In addition to paying ridiculous amounts of money for company logos developed by experts, the best illustration of experts in organizational life was exemplified in the English TV series 'Yes Minister' in which the political minister who wanted to introduce sensible policies had to battle with his civil servants who provided the 'internal expertise' to oppose him.

¹⁵With the exception in England of local police authorities and police consultative committees.

and they are perceived as loyal civil servants while police corruption charges in the United States were often brought against 'political machines' and police forces that cater to various interests other than those of the public. This is why loyal civil servants receive greater legitimacy, enjoy greater trust and can benefit from better cooperation. Yet, this advantage could be placed in danger if the police are found to be more responsive to some political pressures than to others or to assist in the development of a different power structure in the community.

Development of a clearing house for community policing efforts

What is evident from the review of our four countries and has implications for future prospects is that community policing is not yet prevalent across police departments or within police departments. It is still a competing ideology - with enthusiastic followers - but one that has not exhausted its potential. England has some 30,000 neighborhood watch programs and Israel has a watch team in almost every neighborhood, but community policing efforts are not yet widespread either in qualitative or quantitative terms. It would greatly facilitate the furthering of the community policing movement if a clearing house for community policing efforts were established to assist new departments in joining and in constantly learning from the experiences of others. Such a clearing house should be as important as producing annual crime reports or annual departmental reports and could assist in classifying programs, developing tactics, defining concepts, and sharing pertinent information by making it readily available to interested police forces and civil authorities.

Beyond the need to recognize police department and community elements pertinent to community policing there is another issue which has to do with crime, its perception, its definition and the response-choice to it. Community policing concentrates on violent, street

¹⁶This does not mean that policing there is free of politics altogether. Ministers receive ministries according to political partisan support based on agreed-upon distribution of offices to the winning parties which form the coalition government. There is also a constant dispute of sorts when different ministries argue over budgets and particularly budget cuts. However, as civil servants, the police forces in England and Israel could never have been accused of partisan loyalties or of preferential treatment. This is not contradicted by arguments that police forces do serve class and power interests.

crime but in that it is targeting individuals to assist in crime prevention. Yet another set of crimes, mainly of a 'white-collar' nature, remain relatively untouched by community policing although they are perhaps as important an element not only in the prosecution of crime but in policing and preventing it. Like the ideology of community policing which influences organizational climate and behavior, white-collar crime generates a climate that if condoned allows informal support of norm evasion and law violation and therefore needs to be attended to. A clearing house on community policing efforts could greatly assist in directing resources at white-collar crime.

There are temptations in a comparative effort to examine the possibilities of importing some aspects of successful policing from one country to another. Some caution is offered here when taking advantage of the growing body of comparative knowledge; a policing tactic should not be imposed where it does not fit. Unless all elements are well-considered and seem applicable indiscriminate, or biased, importation is not warranted. It is to be hoped the next ten to twenty years will provide us with the opportunity to enrich ourself with additional knowledge about successful community policing efforts and to learn from past mistakes so that we can further promote and improve these programs and place them within a context that will not corruption and eventually, disappointment.

After all, although the prospect of working with each other in a particular democratic environment may be not that exciting, it is certainly more appealing than the prospect of tyranny and abuse. The operationalization of community policing into activities that may help in the improvement of the coproduction of public safety and improved quality of life is what the ideals of community policing, traditional policing and society at large are all about. The consolidated definition I offered in the introduction with regard to community policing points out that if there is a genuine desire effectively to move in the direction of community policing efforts that exceed mere rhetoric, it will be a formidable task indeed. Yet, once this road has been charted it needs to be travelled on. My definition perhaps points out that good policing starts and ends with the individual citizen who is protected or the law-breaker who is brought to justice. But it also

clearly shows that between this dichotomy policing means a lot more than enforcement and reactive response to crime.

The future of policing in general and community policing in particular leads to inevitable changes in the definition of police work and operation, police assignment, command structure, performance evaluation and reward structure. But it also implies greater public ownership in and empowerment of groups and individuals as partners in community attempts to reduce not just the opportunity to commit crime but the motive for it. As such community policing holds the best promise for--to use Alderson's term--policing democracy. If anything, the turn of the twentieth century marks an unprecedented development in the history of policing and points to some very exciting prospects ahead. Community policing has just started its journey.

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