

COURT SECURITY AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS: A NATIONAL STUDY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



National Sheriffs' Association
1450 Duke Street, Suite 204
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October 1995

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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October 1995

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This publication is dedicated to the many loyal men and women who staff our nation's courts, jails, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

Editor's Note: The words "he," "him," "his," "man," and "men," when used in this publication, represent both the masculine and feminine genders, unless otherwise specifically stated. The words "jail," "detention center" and "correctional facility" are used interchangeably throughout this book. Similarly, the words "jail officer," "deputy" and "correctional officer" are used interchangeably. The words "court security officer," "bailiff," "constable," "court service deputy" and "security officer" may be used interchangeably.

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Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3490

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number [Pending]

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FOREWORD

The National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) has prepared this publication, *Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners: A National Study*, with support from the United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.

This study continues the work which NSA began in 1978 with its publication of two documents: *Court Security -- A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures*, and *Court Security -- Training Guidelines*. In 1991, NSA continued its efforts in this important area with the publication of *Court Security Training Guidelines and Curricula*.

The sharp rise in acts of violence in the courts, used as a means of expressing dissent, has caused us to re-evaluate our methods of safeguarding the judicial process and the transportation of prisoners. Attacks on the courts have ranged from minor disturbances and physical assaults to senseless acts of murder, injuries and mass destruction. Many bailiffs, constables, deputy sheriffs/officers, marshals and others charged with court security and the transportation of prisoners are in some cases not fully prepared to meet this new and emerging challenge.

Regardless of past experience, there is no assurance that violence will not happen in our courts - the potential is there. No area has the right to believe it is immune to violence by virtue of geographic location. All criminal justice officials who are responsible for protection of the judicial process should implement basic practical procedures to provide a reasonable level of security for courts and the transportation of prisoners in their jurisdictions.

Providing court security and the transportation of prisoners is a responsibility most often shared by the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, other criminal justice components and private security service agencies. We must all work together to ensure that justice can be administered in an environment free from the threat of danger.

I am confident our bailiffs, constables, deputy sheriffs/officers, marshals, and others charged with court security and the transportation of prisoners will find this publication a useful resource. This publication presents viable courses of action and is intended to help the total criminal justice community protect its courthouses and judicial systems.

The National Sheriffs' Association is proud to have taken the lead in the field of court security and the transportation of prisoners.



Charles B. Meeks
Executive Director
National Sheriffs' Association
October 1995

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners: A National Study, is the product of several contributors, without whom this work would not have been completed.

First, special recognition must be given to Bonnie Gowdy, our project monitor from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (NIJ). Dr. Gowdy, who oversees corrections and criminal sanction projects in NIJ's Criminal Justice Section, generously helped guide the project from the outset, offering support and invaluable suggestions regarding the direction the research should take. We are especially grateful for her help in developing the format in this book for the final presentation of research findings, as well as her encouragement to us to "keep on going" when we became discouraged at the massive amount of work still to be completed. For us, Dr. Gowdy has been much more than a project monitor--she has served as a true friend.

We are also grateful for the help provided to us by Carole Knapel, NIJ Fellow, who wrote Section One of Chapter Four on court facility architecture.

Three vital members of the Project Staff are David Hudak, Program/Data Processing Manager at the National Sheriffs' Association, who analyzed the survey data; the Honorable John P. Corderman, retired Circuit Court Judge in Hagerstown, Maryland, who wrote the section dealing with the legal issues in court security and the transportation of prisoners and who also served as a member of our Project Advisory Board, representing the American Bar Association; and David M. Seiler, of the U.S. Department of Transportation (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration), who took the photographs appearing in this publication.

Special recognition must be given to two teams of criminal justice system professionals who served on our Advisory Board Committee and Staff Review Committee for their dedication and perseverance throughout the development and publication of this book. Their insights into the problems involved in court security and the transportation of prisoners was invaluable.

Members of the Advisory Board Committee are: Rocco A. Pozzi, Commissioner, Westchester County Probation Department, White Plains, New York; Arne Schoeller, Senior Program Manager, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nevada; Carolyn Kinelski, Associate Dean, University of Orlando School of Law, Orlando, Florida; Honorable John P. Forte, Justice Trial Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Roxborough, Massachusetts;

Steven E. Stone, U.S. Marshals Service, Louisville, Kentucky; Robert Feild, Director (Justice), American Institute of Architects, Washington, D.C.; Joe C. Steele, State Court Administrator, Lincoln, Nebraska; John H. Rockwell, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia; Honorable John P. Corderman, Retired Circuit Court Judge, Hagerstown, Maryland; Director Eduardo Gonzalez, U.S. Marshals Service, Arlington, Virginia; Newman Flanagan, Executive Director, National District Attorneys Association, Alexandria, Virginia; David I. Tevelin, Executive Director, State Justice Institute, Alexandria, Virginia; Tom Henderson, Executive Director, Association of Trial Lawyers, Washington, D.C.; Tim Matthews, Executive Director, American Parole and Probation Association, Lexington, Kentucky; and Hunter Hurst, Director, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Members of the Staff Review Committee are: Lieutenant Stan Barry, Captain Marshal Valentine, and P.F.C. Curtis LeMay, Office of Sheriff, Fairfax County, Fairfax, Virginia; Walt Copeland, Chief, Prison Transportation Unit, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.; Undersheriff Richard Ruscak, Chief Deputy Ed Prokop and Deputy Dawn Jeffries, Office of Sheriff, City of Alexandria, Virginia; J. Michael Stouffer, Assistant Warden, State of Maryland [M.C.T.C.], Hagerstown, Maryland; Sergeant John L. Shriver and Deputy Sheriff Mary Krall, Office of Sheriff, Baltimore City, Baltimore, Maryland; Deputy Sheriff Nancy Suders, Office of Sheriff, Fulton County, McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania; Bailiff Jim Carbone, Office of Sheriff, Jefferson County, Charlestown, West Virginia; Deputy Dana Hubble and Sergeant Randall Freysz, Office of Sheriff, Frederick County, Frederick, Maryland; John A. Schmaltz, U.S. Marshals Service, Arlington, Virginia; John Stanley, U.S. Marshals Service, Arlington, Virginia; Herndon Russell and Carl Siler, G.S.S.C. (District of Columbia Court System) - Court Security, Arlington, Virginia; Sergeant William G. Robinson, Knox County Sheriff's Department, Galeburg, Illinois; Patty Fix, Clerk of Court, Fulton County, McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania; Emil Minnar, State of Pennsylvania Constables Association, Norristown, Pennsylvania; Jack Esher, Constable, Delaware County, Lansdowne, Pennsylvania; Bert Lawson, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Sheriff Diane Arnold, Deputy Sheriff Chris M. Geraghty, Deputy Sheriff Dick Wiser, Loudoun County Sheriff's Office, Leesburg, Virginia; Sheriff Frank Policaro, Office of Sheriff, Beaver County, Beaver, Pennsylvania; Edward J. Colonna, Director, Beaver County Adult Probation and Parole Department, Beaver, Pennsylvania; and Michael Sheldon, Director, City of Las Vegas, Department of Detention and Enforcement, Las Vegas, Nevada.

Special appreciation is extended to Philip Lynn, Senior Manager, National Law Enforcement Policy Center, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia, for permission to reprint IACP's *Policy and Procedure on Transportation of Prisoners*; Sheriff Richard Paul Doria, County of DuPage, Illinois, for permission to reprint the *DuPage County Court Security Manual*; and to Brian J. Ostrom, Ph.D., Director, Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia, for permission to reprint *State Court Structure Charts* from the publication, *State Court Caseload Statistics*, February 1994.

The National Sheriffs' Association Conference Review Committee members are: Sheriff Kevin M. McLaughlin, Chittenden County, South Burlington, Vermont; High Sheriff Wayne E. Vetter, Rockingham County, Brentwood, New Hampshire; Sheriff Phil Bozarth, Hancock County, Hawesville, Kentucky; Sheriff James R. Dougan, Kent County, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Sheriff Dick Warren, Summit County Akron, Ohio; Sheriff Stephen Zotos, Douglas County, Castle Rock, Colorado; Retired Sheriff Vincent G. Swinney, Washoe County, Reno, Nevada; Deputy Sheriff John F. Getlein, New Haven County, New Haven, Connecticut, and Chief Deputy Jack Putnam, Tulsa County, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Last but not least, a special thanks go to Gladys Rising; Miriam Kendall; Melissa Betances; Michele Parsons; Ellen Hicks; Dr. Robert I. Bradley, Ph.D.; and Clyde diAngelo, who worked so hard organizing, typesetting, proofing, critiquing and reviewing the many chapters.



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October 1995

Special Acknowledgements

Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners: A National Study, contains the most current information and documentation available at this time. Special recognition must be given to several contributors, experts and practitioners without whom this publication would not have been completed.

Includes:

- ◆ National Police Chiefs and Sheriffs Information Bureau
P.O. Box 365
Stevens Point, Wisconsin 54481
[National Directory of Law Enforcement
Administrators, Correctional Institutions, and Related
Agencies]
- ◆ National Center for State Courts
300 Newport Avenue
Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798
[State Court Structure]
- ◆ Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Human Resources Division
Superintendent of Documents
Washington, District of Columbia 20402-9328
[United States Court Directory]
- ◆ Delta Airlines, Inc.
At Baltimore/Washington International Airport Terminal,
State of Maryland-Aviation Administration,
Baltimore/Washington International Airport Security and
the Maryland State Police,
[Photography of Security in the Transportation of
Prisoners and inside air terminal buildings]
- ◆ United States Department of Transportation: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Highway
Administration and Federal Aviation Administration
[Commercial Drivers' License requirements, Federal,
State, Municipal and University Aircraft Operations,
"Public Law 301-411" and Carriage of Weapons and
Escorted Persons Flying in Commercial Aircraft. F.A.R.
108.]

- ◆ Judicial Conference of the United States, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the court facilities for the U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. District Courts, including U.S. Magistrate Judges and the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts and the United States Marshals Service.
[U.S. Courts Design Guides]

- ◆ Laws and Statutes and Codes for the Extradition of Prisoners
 - West Publishing Company
610 Opperman Drive
St. Paul, Minnesota 55123

 - Michie Butterworth
P.O. Box 7587
Charlottesville, Virginia 22906

 - Allen Smith Company, Inc.
1435 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202

 - Anderson Publishing Company
2035 Reading Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

 - McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated
West Publishing Company
610 Opperman Drive
St. Paul, Minnesota 55123

Finally, our sincere appreciation to the countless individuals who so generously shared their knowledge and experience with us. The credit belongs to all who assisted us throughout this effort.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Scope:

The sharp rise in acts of violence in the courts, used as a means of expressing personal anger or public dissent, has caused us to re-evaluate our methods of safeguarding the judicial process and the transportation of prisoners. Attacks on the courts and other governmental facilities in recent years have ranged from minor disturbances and physical assaults to senseless acts of murder, injuries and mass destruction [see, for example, "A Typology of some Representative Courthouse Security Incidents," included in Chapter One of the full report, *Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners: A National Study*.] Many bailiffs, constables, deputy sheriffs/officers, marshals and others charged with court security and the transportation of prisoners are in some cases not fully prepared to meet this new and emerging challenge.

The potential exists for violence to occur in any court system, no matter its size or geographical location. No court system is immune from security problems or violence.

The purpose of this study is to assess the current state-of-the-art in court security and the transportation of prisoners, determine common areas where improvements ought to be made, and recommend methods for upgrading procedures for court security and

the transportation of prisoners. It has been the objective of the National Sheriffs' Association throughout this in-depth 18-month study to focus on recommendations applicable to all agencies which are responsible for court security and the transportation of prisoners, no matter how large or small the agency in terms of budget and personnel. The recommendations contained in this report are generic in nature and applicable to agencies of various sizes, depending upon the needs and resources of the agency. Our focus, as much as possible, was on practicality, suggesting procedures which, when implemented by trained personnel, would provide jurisdictions with a reasonable level of security for courts and the transportation of prisoners.

This project built upon the work NSA began in 1978 with its publication of two documents: *Court Security - A Manual of Guidelines and Procedures*, and *Court Security - Training Guidelines*. Further work in the field of court security was completed by NSA in 1991 with the publication of *Court Security Training Guidelines and Curricula*. This present study also focused on the transportation of prisoners, which in many aspects can be considered a component of an effective court security program.

While the focus of this study is on the role of sheriffs in providing for effective court security and the transportation of prisoners, since sheriffs generally have primary jurisdiction for

these duties throughout the nation, the study also provides useful information for the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and private security companies. These agencies may share responsibility for court security and the transportation of prisoners and as such, must work cooperatively with sheriffs' offices to ensure that justice can be administered in an environment free from danger.

This project is a direct result of recognition by the U.S. Justice Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) that improvements and recommendations may be necessary for court security measures and prisoner transportation in this violent era in which we are now living. Uniform guidelines could provide various types of courts with information to determine necessary levels of court security, the types of security measures and technology available, and the minimum steps which must be taken to safeguard people and property. This study focused on producing recommendations that could be used to develop operating standards and guidelines for sheriffs, judges and court administrators. The recommendations were derived from: an analysis of questionnaires administered to court security, probation/parole and sheriffs' personnel throughout the nation; research and an analysis of the existing literature and violent incidents occurring in courts over the past two decades; and input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and other criminal justice system organizations.

Methodology:

The research methodology involved these procedures:

1. An extensive review of the literature on court security and the transportation of prisoners, consisting of books; research studies; articles in professional periodicals; policy and procedures manuals from various sheriffs' offices, the U.S. Marshal's Service and courts; training manuals; catalogs of technological and security equipment; and personal correspondence between members of the NSA Project Staff and criminal justice system professionals throughout the nation.
2. Input from the Project Advisory Board, Staff Review Committee and various public/private agencies, organizations and criminal justice associations at a series of four meetings in Alexandria, Virginia, and San Antonio, Texas. Extensive reviews of preliminary project reports were conducted by members of the advisory committees and criminal justice organizations and written suggestions, critiques and materials for consideration were provided to the NSA Project Staff.

3. Three nationwide surveys to generate data on the state-of-the-art in court security and the transportation of prisoners. The objective of the surveys was to gather data to determine what needed to be included in the recommendations for improving court security and transporting prisoners. The confidential surveys were: Job Analysis Survey #1 and #2, Task Analysis Survey, and Probation and Parole Survey. Job Analysis Survey #1 and #2 contained 326 questions designed to elicit information on the priorities of court security and prisoner transport personnel in the performance of their jobs, analyzing the tasks they perform and rank-ordering the tasks in terms of importance. The Task Analysis Survey was designed to determine the existing situation in courts regarding such issues as educational levels of employees, training received, staffing patterns, job duties within the employee's span-of-control, need for additional training, and responsibility and authority for court security and the transportation of prisoners; the survey consisted of 350 questions. The Probation and

Parole Survey, consisting of 53 questions, sought both factual material and opinions regarding court security, job duties, risks and probation/parole issues.

Description of Surveys: The surveys, the primary data collecting instruments, were self-administered confidential mail questionnaires. Because of the immense variations between those to whom the questionnaires would be sent (sheriffs' office and other county law enforcement personnel, judicial services officials, and probation/parole administrators and officers), it was necessary for the NSA Project Staff to develop survey instruments that were clearly worded, substantive, and fairly simple to complete.

Several problems emerged in the initial design of the questionnaires:

- ◆ Differences in size of the agencies which would receive the questionnaires (e.g., from large metropolitan areas to rural counties);
- ◆ The need to obtain data that was quantifiable and which could be easily compared;
- ◆ The need to provide a questionnaire which did not require an overly long time period to complete on the part of agency personnel.

To overcome these problems, the NSA Project Staff decided to use a single confidential questionnaire which would be applicable to all variances between agencies rather than using an approach that tailored one or more questionnaires to the differences between departments. In order to speed the time required to complete the questionnaires and obtain quantifiable data, forced choice responses were used instead of open-ended questions. However, open-ended questions were employed in a few instances to obtain qualitative data such as the views and attitudes of respondents on specific matters.

Survey Population: The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Task Priorities Analysis Survey was mailed in April and June 1994. Three agencies in each state and United States Territory were randomly selected by NSA Project Staff to receive the questionnaire. The questionnaire was mailed to a large, medium and small sheriff's department in each state. The return rate for the survey questionnaires was 79.27 percent.

The Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Job Analysis Survey was mailed twice - in April 1994 and in June 1994. Each survey was mailed to agency directors who were asked to have the survey completed by employees in the following job categories: bailiff, constable, court security officer, deputy, court aide, clerk of the court, court supervisor or facilities specialist.

Job Analysis Survey #1 was sent to two agencies in each state and U.S. Territory randomly selected by NSA Project Staff. Job Analysis Survey #2 was sent to three randomly selected large, medium and small agencies in each state and U.S. Territory. Both surveys contained identical questions. The return rate for the survey questionnaires was 80.38 percent.

The final survey questionnaire, Probation and Parole Confidential Court Security and the Transportation of Prisoners Survey, was mailed to a random sampling of probation and parole line officers chosen from the membership list of the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) by APPA executives. Due to the constraints of the project, the Probation and Parole Survey was from the outset designed to sample only a small portion of this vital component of the criminal justice system. The objective of this initial survey was to obtain preliminary data on how court security and prisoner transportation issues impact upon probation and parole line personnel. The results of this data gathering process could serve as a basic starting point for further research with a much more detailed survey instrument and larger sample population.

For the NSA survey, APPA officials sought to confirm reports that field safety is the primary concern today of probation and parole line officers and that more intensive training in safety measures is needed by officers.

To obtain a survey sample, APPA used its membership list of 3,500, which groups members by categories (e.g., Federal parole agent, state probation administrator, state parole line officer, etc.). Using the Statistical package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) protocol, APPA computer-searched its membership list to provide the names of members from each state and territory who served in line officer positions. The computer generated the names of all line officers in each state and was then asked to randomly select from among these names representatives of agencies of varying sizes, ranging from small to mega agencies. Agencies were defined by size as follows: small (0-99 full time employees); medium (100-850 full time employees); large (851-2,200 full time employees); and mega (2,201-13,000 full time employees). Survey questionnaires were mailed to 200 line officers in all 50 states and U.S. territories; 109 officers returned the completed survey forms to NSA, for a response rate of 66.06 percent.

In their review of the NSA survey analysis, APPA officials stated that this small survey held no surprises and confirmed what the Association had been hearing from its membership, i.e., that criminals on probation and parole have become increasingly violent in recent years, that personal safety in the field is the number one overriding concern of probation and parole officers, and that training in safety measures needs to be provided to officers.

The survey data was entered into a computer and analyzed with SPSS revision 6.0, with most data presented in the form of pie or bar charts. Survey questions were grouped by subject area for analysis to obtain information on such topics as: duties currently being performed by court security and prisoner transport officers; type of training provided; type of training needed; equipment provided; staffing of the court security function; background data on court security employees; responsibility and authority for the court security and transportation of prisoners functions; responsibility and authority for the extradition of prisoners; issues of concern to probation and parole officers; and priority ranking of tasks performed by court security and prisoner transport personnel.

Major Findings:

Based upon the data generated by the three surveys administered by the NSA Project Staff, the survey of the literature, interviews with court security personnel, and input from the various project advisory committees, the following major conclusions can be drawn (note: these conclusions are summaries of more detailed findings presented in the text):

1. Background of court security/prisoner transport personnel responding to the survey questionnaires: Most have attended college for at least one or two years, are males in the 40-50 age

group, and are employed by a county sheriff's office. The majority of the respondents have completed a certified training program in court security, transportation of prisoners, or the serving of civil or criminal process. The majority of court security officers have previous work experience in law enforcement.

2. Contract services: The survey questionnaires found that contract court security officers from private security firms generally are not employed outside the Federal system.

3. Training needs: Survey respondents indicated that training is most needed in the following areas: legal liabilities, legal responsibilities of supervision, firearms, vicarious liability, court functions/duties/security, the serving of civil or criminal process, and how to transport prisoners (with such training focusing on transportation in vehicles of all types).

4. Job satisfaction: The majority of court security and prisoner transport personnel who responded to the survey said they have a high job satisfaction, rating their jobs "very interesting" or "extremely interesting."

5. Probation and parole personal safety issues: The 109 probation and parole officers from small, medium and large agencies who responded to the NSA survey were most concerned about personal

safety issues. A majority felt that they should wear bullet-proof vests when conducting field work. A majority also felt that they should be permitted to carry firearms for field work and that the firearms should be issued by their agencies, which would also provide training in the use of firearms. At the same time, however, a slight majority of survey respondents believe that not all probation and parole officers should carry weapons while on duty. But the majority of agents believe that those agencies which do not have a firearms policy in effect should allow agents to carry alternative forms of protection. The majority of the agents stated that their agencies provide them with two items to enhance their safety while on the job: communications equipment and handcuffs. The majority of the agencies do not provide body armor, Mace or handguns to probation/parole agents. Since the majority of agents believe that their clients have increasingly become more violent-type offenders in recent years, they feel they need better equipment to reduce their chances of being harmed by clients.

6. Use of metal detectors: Probation and parole agents responding to the survey support the increased use of metal detectors outside courtrooms and probation/parole offices, stating that metal detectors add to their feelings of safety on the job.

7. Transportation of prisoners by probation and parole agents: A majority of the 109 probation/parole agents

participating in the survey believe uniformed officers should transport prisoners. However, most of the probation/parole agents have been required during the performance of their official duties to transport prisoners. But less than half of the survey respondents have ever received special and refresher training in prisoner transportation. Nor do most of the agencies have a vehicle that is specially equipped for prisoner transportation. While officers are required to transport prisoners, more than half of the agencies surveyed do not permit agents to submit their clients, gender appropriate, to a strip search for the agent's protection while transporting the client. It appears that probation and parole agencies are vulnerable to liability actions in the transportation of prisoners since less than half of the agencies provide training in how to transport prisoners safely, most agencies do not provide specially equipped transportation vehicles and more than half of the agencies do not permit agents to authorize gender-appropriate strip searches prior to transporting a client. Yet at the same time the majority of probation/parole agents are required to transport prisoners.

8. Inspection of security equipment by court security and prisoner transport personnel: Survey respondents rarely perform maintenance tasks, but over half inspect some security equipment and conduct inside and outside security checks. The devices and equipment inspected by more than half of survey respondents include

vehicles, weapons, doors, restraint devices, locks and general security equipment. However, the survey revealed that fewer than half of the survey respondents inspected the following types of equipment: scanning devices, alarms, bars and cameras. Perhaps the court agencies and sheriffs' offices in which the majority of survey respondents work do not have this technical equipment, thus accounting for the response that fewer than half of the respondents routinely inspect the equipment to determine that it is in proper working order. If the agencies do have this equipment installed (alarms, closed-circuit television cameras and scanning devices), then failure to periodically inspect it can lead to serious security problems and needs to be addressed by these agencies.

9. Access control to court facilities: Fewer than half of the court agencies and sheriffs' offices participating in the survey appear to place a high priority on access control, illustrating the need for improved security measures in many court facilities. This conclusion was reached from the survey data, which found that fewer than half of the survey respondents: monitor remote surveillance devices; patrol the exterior perimeter of the court facility; supervise and scan mail and packages entering the judicial or court facilities; approve and supervise passes for entrance into the judicial facilities; and supervise the usage of elevator service in judicial facilities.

10. Use of equipment and technology: The court duties of the sheriff involve the use of equipment and technology, which may include electronic or mechanical devices, such as a basic intrusion alarm system or walk-through or hand-held magnetometers, as well as more sophisticated items such as video arraignment, microwave alarms, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and infrared viewing and photography devices. However, the NSA Project Staff found in its research that equipment alone is not the solution to a security problem; at best, it is a supportive tool when used by trained personnel in a well-prepared plan or procedure.

11. Comprehensive security surveys of court facilities are a necessity in determining security vulnerabilities and equipment and training needs. A risk assessment, which identifies the potential for loss, injury to personnel, visitors and guests, or damage to property, is an integral part of all security surveys.

12. Training of court security and prisoner transport personnel: The "litigation explosion" has generated many costly lawsuits against law enforcement agencies which allege "negligent training" of personnel [see, for example, *City of Canton, Ohio, v. Geraldin Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412, 109 S. Ct. (1989) and "Supervisor Liability" in Dr. Betty Bosarge (ed.), *First/Second Line Jail Supervisor's Training Manual* (Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs' Association, 1989, rev. 1993, pp. 1-2 of Addendum,

Chapter Two).] thus, every effort must be made by the sheriff's office to assure that employees can demonstrate capable performance of the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) needed to perform each task in their job description prior to being assigned to perform the job. Those agency administrators who fail to provide the necessary training may find themselves held vicariously liable when a subordinate performs negligently and as a result causes harm, or allows harm to be caused, to a prisoner, citizen, court employee or fellow officer/deputy. In addition, because the United States has become a much more violent nation in recent years, more intensive training in dealing with high-risk situations, as well as incident prevention measures, is now a necessity.

The NSA survey found that more than half of the agencies responding to the questionnaires are providing training in the following subjects: Developing contingency plans for courts; developing evacuation plans for the transportation of prisoners, courts and buildings; cardiopulmonary resuscitation and emergency cardiac care certification and recertification; firearms certification, recertification and day-time handgun use; use of some restraining devices, particularly waist chains and handcuffs; use of force (deadly, non-deadly and physical holds), and prisoner transportation procedures. However, fewer than half of the agencies participating in the survey are providing training in the operation of vehicles, a key area for liability actions in the

transportation of prisoners. Similarly, fewer than half of the agencies surveyed are teaching court security and prisoner transportation employees the proper use of several commonly used restraining devices, again leaving the agency open to liability actions for negligent training. The survey found that fewer than half of the court security and prisoner transport employees are taught to properly apply the following restraining devices: leg irons, flex cuffs, leg braces, straightjacket and straps.

The NSA Staff concluded that a basic training program for court security and prisoner transport personnel requires a minimum of 80 hours of classroom instruction. More effective training will be accomplished by lengthening the basic training program to four to six weeks, depending upon the previous law enforcement training and experience of those selected to serve as court security and prisoner transportation personnel. For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.

13. Balancing physical security needs with the operation of the courts: To the maximum extent possible, the physical security system should not interfere with the activities of the courts being protected. The key objective for the security planner is to strike a balance between physical security and the operation of the

courts. Cooperation is necessary to develop a security system that is effective and has the support of those who will benefit from the system (e.g., judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys).

14. Court security policies and procedures: Once a court security plan has been developed, continual monitoring is one of the most important components of any effective court security program. In addition, it is necessary for the jurisdiction to develop a written policies and procedures manual and update it periodically, since the manual is the backbone of the court security function.

15. Assessing risk factors: The NSA Project Staff, in its review of incidents which have occurred in courts throughout the nation, found that an important component of the court security function is to assess the risk levels of all hearings and trials in order to determine what level of security to provide. Providing the correct level of security for specific judicial proceedings assures that security officers will be prepared for any violence or disruptions which may occur. At the same time, the risk assessment process helps keep the cost of security down by increasing manpower when it may be most needed and decreasing it for those judicial proceedings which are expected to be trouble-free.

16. Transportation of prisoners: The NSA Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees, a search of the literature, and interviews

Executive Summary

with sheriffs and court security personnel, led the Project Staff to conclude that there seem to be no fixed rules or procedures throughout the nation governing the transportation of prisoners (with the exception of those rules established by the Federal Aviation Administration). Different jurisdictions have a variety of rules and procedures, and some jurisdictions have no established rules or procedures at all. Yet the transportation of prisoners is one of the most dangerous tasks in law enforcement and accounts for several deaths and injuries each year to escorting officers, bystanders and prisoners. The most important first step in preparing to transport a prisoner safely is to correctly classify the prisoner as to degree of dangerousness so that proper levels of care, custody, control and supervision are implemented for each individual prisoner. Every prisoner is a potential carrier of contraband and an escape risk.

17. Use of force when transporting prisoners: It should be the policy of any agency that unless there is a clear and present danger to staff and/or prisoners, every effort shall be made to peacefully resolve the situation. Force ranging from the use of restraining devices to deadly force, may be employed against a prisoner in defense of life and to protect property, to prevent an escape, or to maintain or regain control of a situation or an event. The force used shall always be the minimum amount necessary. The type of force used will be dictated by the

situation and will either increase or decrease as the situation or event requires. Force is to be used as a measure of control and should never be used as a means of punishment. Mechanical restraints should never be used as a method of punishment; about the head or neck of a prisoner; or in a way that causes undue physical pain, restricts blood circulation, or restricts breathing.

Recommendations:

The recommendations which follow were developed by the N.S.A. Project Staff in consultation with members of the Advisory Board, Staff Review Committees and APPA. They derive from an analysis of both the literature and major findings of the data collection surveys described in Chapter Three.

In addition, the Advisory Board and Staff Review Committees developed several recommendations during the course of meetings conducted to review and discuss the issues involved in court security and the transportation of prisoners. Committee members, individually and as a group, pinpointed security needs in specific areas and suggested solutions to common problems in jurisdictions of varying sizes throughout the nation.

The recommendations are grouped in categories and numbered by category for easy reference. They are not listed in the categories in any particular order of importance.

These recommendations are for advisory purposes only and are not "guidelines" or "standards". However, these recommendations could serve as the foundation for the development of future standards for the transportation of prisoners and courthouse security programs if

a national commission were to be established to develop a certification and accreditation program, similar to the program offered by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) or the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC). In the interim, these recommendations can assist court security administrators in evaluating their own facilities and programs to determine where improvements ought to be made.

Section 1

ADMINISTRATION

Recommendation 1-1: Each agency assigned jurisdiction for court facility security and the transportation of prisoners should have a written policies and procedures manual governing operations. These documents should be reviewed and updated annually. All agency personnel should receive training to assure that they understand the policies and can apply the procedures.

Recommendation 1-2: Each agency responsible for court security should have a current organizational chart describing the chain-of-command. This chart should be reviewed annually and updated as needed.

Recommendation 1-3: Each agency responsible for court security should develop a "mission statement" for the court security function.

Recommendation 1-4: Each governmental entity should establish clear jurisdictional authority for the court security function and determine whether a sole agency, such as the office of the sheriff, is to be given authority for court security both within the court buildings and on surrounding grounds.

Recommendation 1-5: The courthouse facility should have a public information program that is reviewed at least annually and updated as needed. This plan should include policies and procedures governing media access to the courthouse facility, consistent with the preservation of the rights of defendants, victims, witnesses, court and criminal justice system employees, as well as with the maintenance of order and security. These policies and procedures should conform with any state "Freedom of Information" statutes.

Recommendation 1-6: Each court facility should maintain an up-to-date inventory of all property and assets.

Section 2

EMERGENCY, HEALTH, AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Recommendation 2-1: An emergency plan should be developed for the courthouse facility in compliance with all Federal, municipal, county, state and/or regulatory entities. It should include plans for the following types of emergency situations: fire, bomb threat, general evacuation, natural disaster, civil disorder, power/utility failures, communications system failures, emergency medical aid, shootings and hostage incidents.

Recommendation 2-2: Emergency and evacuation plans should be posted throughout the courthouse facility for specific types of emergency situations (e.g., fire, tornado, hurricane, etc.).

Recommendation 2-3: The courthouse facility emergency and

evacuation plans should be sent to the following agencies to ensure cooperation and coordination during all emergency situations:

- ◆ Fire and rescue department;
- ◆ Fire marshal;
- ◆ Law enforcement agencies;
- ◆ Sewer and water departments; and
- ◆ Public utilities (gas and electricity).

Recommendation 2-4: The courthouse facility should have adequate first aid kits readily available throughout the complex.

Recommendation 2-5: The courthouse facility should have adequate centrally controlled lighting which meets security system requirements.

Recommendation 2-6: The courthouse facility should have a minimum and maximum temperature both to ensure comfortable working conditions and to meet the operational requirements of computerized security equipment.

Recommendation 2-7:

The courthouse facility should provide adequate acoustical conditions to ensure that noise levels do not interfere with normal human activities and court proceedings.

Recommendation 2-8:

The courthouse facility should be in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et. seq.) and the Final Rule for State and Local Government Facilities, U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, May 20, 1994 (36 CFR Part 1191.)

Recommendation 2-9:

The courthouse facility should be soundproofed on external and internal walls, if feasible, with the appropriate sound absorption materials to assure that unnecessary noise does not interfere with the operations of courtrooms, jury deliberation rooms, grand jury rooms, chamber spaces, attorney conference rooms, holding cells and witness waiting rooms.

Recommendation 2-10: The courthouse facility should have a backup power supply to assure an uninterrupted power source, which is especially important to the continued operation of integrated access control and alarm systems during emergency situations.

Recommendation 2-11: The courthouse facility should have an internal data communication network for the security function as well as linkage to other county or state criminal justice databases.

Recommendation 2-12: The courthouse facility should have a room large enough to house all shared computer equipment or telecommunications equipment. Data communications closets should be provided on each floor of the courthouse, when feasible. Included should be electrical surge protection devices that protect computer equipment from power fluctuations, outages or natural disasters. An independent air conditioning unit with the necessary

plumbing and electrical services should be provided to service the room as required. An emergency warning light and intrusion alarm should be provided outside the computer room to indicate a malfunction, intrusion or shut down of the computer equipment. The computer room should be monitored 24 hours a day by a computerized integrated security system. The computer room should be located within the courthouse facility to assure appropriate security and to minimize the harm from natural disasters, fire, threats, theft or utility failures.

Recommendation 2-13: The courthouse facility should have ample conduits for current and future computer equipment needs, particularly since many security functions are now integrated into computer-based systems.

Recommendation 2-14: For computer security purposes, the computer room should house the central components of other administrative, case

tracking and judicial functions, video arraignment equipment, telephones, facsimile and computerized security system equipment.

Recommendation 2-15: The courthouse computer room should have an adjacent office and storage area for data processing, storage of computer supplies/parts, and centrally used printers. This room should have a high security classification with intrusion alarm systems. There should be limited access to the room to prevent tampering with equipment.

Recommendation 2-16: The courthouse facility should provide adequate structural support for all roof mountings of microwave and satellite dishes that may be required for video arraignment, training and other applications needed for the court security and transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 2-17: The courthouse facility should include on

each floor of the complex adequate connections for state-of-the-art communications equipment (e.g., telephone, facsimile, computers, security and fire detection systems, video connectors, copying machines and teletype systems).

Recommendation 2-18:

If the courthouse facility is more than one story in height, it should have a mix of elevators and escalators to enhance accessibility. However, consideration should be given to the need to separate each of the three circulation zones in most courthouse facilities (public, private and secured) and to the special needs of the disabled or handicapped. There should always be a separate for prisoners, which should not be used by the general public, visitors and courthouse employees.

Recommendation 2-19:

New courthouse facilities should be designed and structured to provide access for persons who are handicapped or disabled and who may be either visitors to

the facility or employees. However, the elimination of architectural and transportation barriers for the disabled should not be permitted to create security problems.

Recommendation 2-20:

The courthouse facility should have a program for sign utilization that harmonizes with the circulation zones of the facility (public, private and secure zones). They should be attractive, contemporary and legible signs of both a directional and an information character; they should be incorporated into the interior design of all public areas. The sign system should meet all nationally recognized standards, guidelines, codes and regulations. Signs should be posted where they can be seen easily. They should be multilingual when appropriate. Braille lettering and audio signals should be provided at elevators, entrances, exits and other appropriate locations throughout the court complex.

Recommendation 2-21: The courthouse facility should have an information booth and building directory located near the major public entrance. The information booth should feature a diagram that lists all major components in the building accessible to members of the public. It should never list the locations of judges' chambers, holding cell areas, or secure areas of the building.

Recommendation 2-22: The courthouse facility's public waiting areas should include adequate seating and be located as close as possible to the areas of highest public use. These seating areas should have easy access to restrooms, water fountains and telephones, as well as snack bars or vending machines, to discourage citizens from wandering around the building searching for these facilities.

Section 3

FIRE PROTECTION AND FIRE ALARMS

Recommendation 3-1: Integrated systems of fire detection and

suppression alarms, bells, and buzzers should be included in the design of all new and remodeled facilities. These integrated systems should comply with all state codes and regulations and the National Fire Protection Association standards, guidelines and recommendations.

Recommendation 3-2: The courthouse facility should comply with all Federal, local and state sanitation, safety and health codes.

Recommendation 3-3: The courthouse facility should have an adequate system of fire inspection. Testing of equipment by a local fire official should be conducted on a quarterly basis.

Recommendation 3-4: Accessible standpipes, working firehoses, and properly charged fire extinguishers should be placed at appropriately marked locations throughout the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 3-5: All courtrooms should install and maintain an automatic fire alarm, bell,

heat and smoke detection system which is approved by the state fire marshal. The system should be inspected monthly.

Recommendation 3-6: Continual monitoring of fire, heat and smoke detectors should be conducted by the integrated computerized security and alarm system on a 24-hour basis.

Recommendation 3-7: The courthouse facility should have exits which are distinctly marked, continuously illuminated and kept clear and in usable condition at all times in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state and local fire safety codes.

Recommendation 3-8: The courthouse administration's purchasing manager should acquire only those furnishings and materials which are flame-retardant and, where feasible, made of non-toxic substances.

Recommendation 3-9: Both sprinklered and non-sprinklered courthouse facilities should have the

necessary travel distance to exits as specified by the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code, covering the following areas: holding cells and prisoner detention rooms; judges' chambers/suites; offices/work areas; courtrooms; jury rooms; lavatories; lobbies; hallways; storage rooms; library; utility/maintenance rooms; backup power supply room; cafeteria/snack bar; conference rooms/computer rooms; reception rooms; and communications and control center.

Section 4

PERSONNEL

Recommendation 4-1: Sworn courthouse employees should be selected and promoted on the basis of merit. They should have the ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing and should pass a background and medical examination.

Recommendation 4-2: All sworn personnel, including court security deputies, officers, bailiffs, and prisoner escort officers, should be provided access to and training in the agency's policies and procedures manual.

Section 5

TRAINING AND STAFF DEVELOPMENT

Recommendation 5-1: Each agency should develop a written training and staff development plan for all sworn and non-sworn employees.

Recommendation 5-2: All agencies should develop and provide basic (recruit) and in-service training programs for all sworn employees who work in the court security or transportation of prisoners functions.

Recommendation 5-3: All employees newly assigned to the transportation of prisoners or court security functions should receive a minimum of 80 hours of formal classroom instruction in the following subject areas:

- ◆ Report writing;
- ◆ Legal issues;
- ◆ Fire emergency and evacuation plan;
- ◆ First aid certification;
- ◆ C.P.R. certification;
- ◆ Communication skills;
- ◆ Dealing with the public;
- ◆ Rights and responsibilities of staff;
- ◆ Use of lethal and non-lethal force;
- ◆ Searches of cells, facilities, courtrooms, visitors, guests and defendants;
- ◆ Negligent release/negligent supervision;
- ◆ Operation of security equipment and technology;
- ◆ Litigation procedures;
- ◆ Patrol of courthouse and facilities;
- ◆ Understanding problems of prisoners:
 - ◆◆ Suicide prevention;

- ◆◆ Alcohol and drug emergencies;
- and
- ◆◆ Diabetes, epilepsy and
infectious diseases;
- ◆ Supervising prisoners
(males/females/juveniles);
 - ◆◆ Principles and skills;
 - ◆◆ Security; and
 - ◆◆ Transportation;
- ◆ Media relations guidelines;
- ◆ The nature of court violence and
security threats;
- ◆ The state court system and how it
functions;
- ◆ Methods of intelligence gathering
and threat assessment;
- ◆ How to handle court disruptions;
- ◆ Parking lot, parking garage,
sallyport and perimeter security;
- ◆ Bomb, weapon and contraband search
and identification;
- ◆ Defensive tactics;
- ◆ Firearms training and
qualification, if this
has not been included in a basic
law enforcement course;

- ◆ Disguised and concealed weapons;
- ◆ Protecting persons at risk;
- ◆ Crowd control;
- ◆ Hostage situations;
- ◆ Handling sequestered juries; and
- ◆ Roles and duties of bailiffs.

Recommendation 5-4: All court security and prisoner transportation personnel should be trained and certified in the following areas:

- ◆ Electronic non-lethal force equipment;
- ◆ Firearms [lethal force];
- ◆ Riot equipment; and
- ◆ Methods of applying physical force to control defendants.

Recommendation 5-5: When court security and transportation of prisoners are two distinct areas of employment in a sheriff's office, separate training programs focusing on the specific duties of each job should be offered. If, however, officers/deputies will most

likely serve in both capacities depending upon the available manpower strength of the agency and the need to staff a particular post at a given time, then officers/deputies should be cross-trained to perform both the court security and prisoner transportation functions. This is particularly applicable to smaller agencies.

Recommendation 5-6:

All officers/deputies assigned to the court security and transportation of prisoners functions should be provided with annual in-service training in compliance with the certification requirements of the state peace officer standards and training commission. A minimum of 40 hours of annual in-service training is recommended for all sworn personnel.

Recommendation 5-7:

For legal protection of both the agency and its trainees, all trainees should be thoroughly tested to make certain that they have learned the necessary knowledge and skills to perform each task correctly.

Recommendation 5-8: The agency should keep complete written records on all trainees, specifying what they were taught when, how they tested, and whether the trainee was required to keep re-testing until the relevant skills were learned.

Section 6

INVENTORY AND PROPERTY CONTROL

Recommendation 6-1: All prisoners should be thoroughly searched before being placed in courthouse holding cells prior to trials and hearings.

Recommendation 6-2: An itemized inventory should be made of all personal property of prisoners, including the prisoners' legal paperwork.

Recommendation 6-3: Provisions should be made to secure and store all property belonging to prisoners, including money and other valuables. Prisoners should be given written receipts for all property stored by court security officers.

Recommendation 6-4: Provisions should be made to return all property belonging to prisoners when prisoners are released from the jurisdiction of the court after hearings or trials. Each prisoner should sign a receipt for his returned property.

Section 7

PHYSICAL PLANT

Recommendation 7-1: Prisoner reception and release areas should be located inside the security perimeter of the courthouse facility.

Recommendation 7-2: Adequate and secure parking for judges and prisoner transportation personnel should be provided at the court facility.

Recommendation 7-3: Weapons lockers should be located outside the secure areas where prisoners are detained. These lockers should be equipped with individual compartments, each with an individual lock and key. The lockers should be available to all sworn law enforcement personnel.

Recommendation 7-4: All court facilities should provide secure temporary holding cells to court trials or judicial hearings. Holding cells should contain, at a minimum:

- ◆ Sufficient fixed benches;
- ◆ Wash basins; and
- ◆ Toilet.

Recommendation 7-5: Holding cells should provide sight/sound separation of male, female and juvenile prisoners.

Recommendation 7-6: The holding cells should be located so that prisoners can be observed in the secure area by bailiffs or officers on a periodic or continual basis, if needed.

Recommendation 7-7: Holding cells should have at least 70 square feet of floor space.

Recommendation 7-8: The courthouse should have designated exits to permit prompt evacuation of prisoners, visitors and staff in any emergency.

Recommendation 7-9: Every courthouse should have provisions to evacuate prisoners in a secure manner in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 7-10: Architectural plans for new construction or remodeling should be reviewed and certified to conform with nationally accepted standards for court facility security.

Recommendation 7-11: Appropriate recording and video equipment should be available in all courtrooms.

Recommendation 7-12: All courtrooms should have adequate seating capacity for those participating in the proceedings as well as visitors.

Recommendation 7-13: Space should be provided for law enforcement officers, witnesses, attorneys, probation and parole officers, media representatives and other parties to wait for hearings or court trials.

Section 8

SECURITY AND CONTROL

- Recommendation 8-1: The courthouse should contain a command, control and communications center to ensure order and security and to monitor all security equipment.
- Recommendation 8-2: A bailiff, officer or deputy should not enter a high security cell block area without backup assistance.
- Recommendation 8-3: A bailiff, officer or deputy should have access to a working audio communication system between duty posts and the command, control and communications center.
- Recommendation 8-4: A bailiff, officer or deputy should conduct a security inspection of the courtrooms each day before any judicial proceedings begin. The inspection should cover the following areas:
- ◆ Doors,
 - ◆ Windows,
 - ◆ Desks,

- ◆ Seats/benches,
- ◆ Trash cans,
- ◆ Locks,
- ◆ Cell block areas,
- ◆ Walls
- ◆ Ventilation and heating ducts; and
- ◆ Tunnel entrances.

Recommendation 8-5: All courtrooms should be locked and secured at the end of all hearings or trials.

Recommendation 8-6: There should be a key control plan to cover the entire courthouse facility.

Recommendation 8-7: There should be a complete set of emergency keys maintained in a secured area.

Recommendation 8-8: The security command, control and communications center should have available a complete set of updated floor plan drawings that indicate the location of all entrances, exits, windows and doors. These drawings should also indicate the location of:

- ◆ Perimeter fences, gates and sallyports;
- ◆ Fire hoses and fire extinguishers;
- ◆ Emergency equipment;
- ◆ First aid kits;
- ◆ Air packs and breathing apparatus;
- ◆ Mechanical and electrical rooms;
- ◆ Maintenance rooms;
- ◆ Numbered emergency exits and emergency key numbers to fit locks;
- ◆ Stand pipes; and
- ◆ Heat/smoke detectors.

Recommendation 8-9:

The following agencies should be listed in the security command, control and communications center with up-to-date telephone numbers: gas company, water/sewer company, ambulance service, fire/rescue service, and local/state law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation 8-10:

A security and control manual should be developed to include the following written policies and procedures:

- ◆ Court security duty posts;
- ◆ Job description and position responsibilities for each duty post;
- ◆ Court liaison duties;
- ◆ Courtroom external communications procedures;
- ◆ Courthouse population circulation patterns;
- ◆ Courthouse facility arrests and placing arrestees into custody;
- ◆ Courthouse security guidelines;
- ◆ Prisoner control and holding facility procedures;
- ◆ Prisoner transportation procedures;
- ◆ Weapons control;
- ◆ Courtroom search procedures;
- ◆ Prisoner escapes;
- ◆ Hand-carried article search procedures;
- ◆ Screening procedures;
- ◆ Facility evacuation plan;

- ◆ Facility evacuation plan
court security response;
- ◆ Bomb threat procedures;
- ◆ Hostage plan;
- ◆ Major emergency/disaster
plan;
- ◆ Special operations
incident plan;
- ◆ Crowd control;
- ◆ High risk trial plan;
- ◆ Emergency medical
assistance plan;
- ◆ Security survey guidelines
and procedures;
- ◆ Inventory;
- ◆ Physical security plan
incident reports;
- ◆ Authorized use of the
stunning device
[NOVA XR 5000];
- ◆ Remotely activated custody
control (RACC) belt; and
- ◆ Authorized use of
electronic riot shield.

Recommendation 8-11: A courthouse and facility security audit should be developed and conducted at least annually to include the following areas:

Exterior:

- ◆ Perimeter,
- ◆ Lights,
- ◆ Parking areas,
- ◆ Landscaping, and
- ◆ Exterior of building.

Building:

- ◆ Doors, windows, other openings;
- ◆ Ceilings and walls;
- ◆ Alarms;
- ◆ Fire protection;
- ◆ Attic, basements, crawl spaces, air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- ◆ Elevator, escalators, dumb waiters, etc.;
- ◆ Storage areas, armories and dangerous substance storage areas;
- ◆ Community areas;
- ◆ Records storage areas;

- ◆ Public areas (waiting rooms, restrooms, hallway and visiting or interview area);
- ◆ Maintenance rooms.

Courtrooms and Related Areas:

- ◆ Courtrooms;
- ◆ Courtroom doors, windows, and other openings;
- ◆ Courtroom lights;
- ◆ Courtroom air conditioning, ventilation and heating systems;
- ◆ Courtroom furnishings;
- ◆ Courtroom security devices;
- ◆ Judges chambers and related offices;
- ◆ Witness waiting rooms;
- ◆ Attorney-client conference rooms;
- ◆ Jury deliberation rooms;
- ◆ In-custody defendant reception areas;
- ◆ Restricted and secured passageways;
- ◆ Temporary holding areas; and
- ◆ Security equipment storage areas.

Recommendation 8-12: An officer/deputy post should be located immediately adjacent to a cell block or detention cell area to permit personnel to hear and respond promptly to calls for help.

Recommendation 8-13: Audio or visual electronic surveillance should be located primarily in hallways, elevators, corridors, or at points on the security perimeter, such as entrances and exits.

Recommendation 8-14: All prisoners should be searched thoroughly whenever entering or exiting the security perimeter.

Recommendation 8-15: All violent incidents or acts which occur on court facility premises should be recorded for the record. Examples of such incidents or acts include:

- ◆ Verbal threats;
- ◆ Disorderly conduct;
- ◆ Physical assault and battery;

- ◆ Weapons display and use, including firearms, explosives, knives, chemical weapons, etc.;
- ◆ Suicides and suicide attempts;
- ◆ Physical assaults with weapons;
- ◆ Property damage;
- ◆ Rape and other sexual assaults;
- ◆ Carjacking in parking areas;
- ◆ Robbery, both armed and unarmed;
- ◆ Burglary;
- ◆ Break-ins to court computer system by "hackers";
- ◆ Electronic break-ins to court telephone systems; and
- ◆ Breaches in the security system.

Recommendation 8-16: Security officers should make complete written records of all disruptions or assaults which occur on court facility premises.

Recommendation 8-17: Each court facility should develop a written policy and procedure addressing the possession of weapons in the courtroom by sworn law enforcement officers. If no weapons are allowed in the courtrooms, then secure storage lockers should be provided.

- Recommendation 8-18: Court security officials should provide cross-training for prisoner transport officers and the bailiffs to assure that both groups know the proper procedures to follow if an incident occurs in the courtroom.
- Recommendation 8-19: All transport personnel should be provided with handheld radios to enable them to communicate with their respective agencies at all times while they are on duty.
- Recommendation 8-20: All court agencies should provide duress alarms in courtrooms and judges' chambers.
- Recommendation 8-21: All prisoner transport personnel and bailiffs who serve in a security capacity should be qualified in the use of intermediate force weapons and devices, such as batons, electronic restraints and oleoresin capsicum.
- Recommendation 8-22: Criminal justice agencies in all states should work together to develop a

statewide or regional radio frequency to be utilized by prisoner transport officers. A common radio frequency is necessary for officer safety and to summon help in emergencies.