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AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH
CENTRAL INDIANA AND TRI-COUNTY
NARCOTICS TASK FORCES

CCJRI-10

by

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and Drug Control Strategies in Indiana

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PREFACE

The evaluation presented in this report was conducted at the request of the Trustees of the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. It was designed to provide the Trustees and other justice system professionals with more detailed information about the performance of federally-supported multijurisdictional drug task forces in Indiana and to aid the Trustees in their efforts to improve drug enforcement programming in the State. At the end of 1990 nearly thirty multijurisdictional drug task forces were being supported with federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act funds in Indiana. They represent a major component of drug enforcement strategy in the State as well as in other states throughout the country. This report and the evaluation research on which it is based have been guided by the Evaluation Review Committee of the Research and Information Consortium.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, federal funds have been made available to state and local law enforcement agencies for the creation of multijurisdictional drug enforcement strike forces. Over 700 such strike forces have been created nationally. Twenty-four federally funded task forces were operational in Indiana during 1989-90.

The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute is the agency responsible for funding and monitoring the strike forces in Indiana. In an effort to learn whether the strike forces were an effective approach to drug enforcement, the Institute contracted with the Department of Criminal Justice at Indiana University Bloomington to conduct an evaluation of two of the strike forces. This report presents the findings from the evaluation.

The two strike forces are the Tri-Code Organized Drug Enforcement Task Force, operating in LaPorte, Pulaski, and Starke counties, and the South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force in Brown, Greene, Lawrence, Monroe, Morgan, and Owen counties. The evaluation consisted of a comparison of drug enforcement activity prior to and after the creation of the strike forces and a comparison of drug enforcement activity in the strike force regions with two control sites where federally funded strike forces were not operating. The primary sources of data include responses to a survey of law enforcement officials in both the strike force and control regions, responses to a series of interviews with key law

enforcement officials, and data on felony drug arrests for the period from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1989.

HIGHLIGHTS

Perceptions of Drug Enforcement

- Marijuana and cocaine are perceived as the most serious drug problems by law enforcement officials and they comprise the majority of felony arrests (76%) involving drugs.
- Lack of investigative personnel and confidential funds are considered the most serious obstacles to effective drug enforcement.
- Law enforcement officials within the strike force regions do not believe the strike forces would have been created without federal funds.

Organizational Characteristics

- The key goals of the strike forces are to penetrate organized drug networks and to apprehend and prosecute dealers.
- The three-county structure of Tri-Code, with agencies in all three counties contributing operational personnel and resources, led to higher levels of satisfaction and perceptions of effectiveness

among regional officials than did the South Central structure in which the strike force was centered in one county with service to five surrounding counties.

- Law enforcement officials in the strike force regions reported improved inter-agency communication and cooperation and increased willingness to share information than did officials in the control sites.

Arrest Activity

- Since the spring of 1988, when the strike forces became operational, there has been a considerable increase in the number of felony drug arrests in all four regions. Further, in all four regions this has included increases in charges for dealing and increases in cocaine cases.
- The increase in arrests in the Tri-Code region was greater than that experienced in the north control region. On the other hand, the most significant increase occurred in the south control region. This suggests that while the Tri-Code and South Central strike forces may have led to increases in felony drug arrests, the strike forces do not appear to be a necessary condition for increased arrests.
- The drug arrests for both strike forces seemed to be of a more

serious nature than those made by other law enforcement agencies within the region.

Conviction and Sentencing

- Most individuals arrested (76%) on felony drug charges were convicted of either misdemeanor or class D felony charges.
- During the period the strike forces were operational, there was an increase in the number of class A,B, and C felony convictions. The increases occurred in both the strike force and control sites.
- Most convicted drug offenders (63 percent) received a sentence involving some jail or prison time.

Penetration of Drug Networks and Asset Seizure/Forfeiture

- Both strike forces became involved in major investigations of drug organizations involved in inter-state trafficking leading to arrests and convictions of major traffickers. In both cases, officials believed that such investigations were highly unlikely in their local agencies prior to the creation of the strike forces.

- Both strike forces were involved in asset seizures and forfeitures. However, there is little evidence to suggest that forfeited assets provide sufficient funds to maintain task force activity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary, these findings suggest that the federally funded strike forces did have an impact on drug enforcement. This impact included both increases in levels of inter-agency communication and cooperation as well as increases in felony arrests and prosecutions. The findings need to be tempered, however, by the realization that similar increases in felony arrests and prosecutions were occurring in the south control region where no federally funded drug enforcement strike force was operating. These findings must also be tempered by the lack of knowledge available on the effectiveness of various law enforcement strategies used to reduce the availability and consumption of drugs. While these data suggest that task forces may produce the desired impacts sought by their creation, it is not clear whether the impacts themselves lead to a general reduction in drug activity.

With these in mind, the research leads to the following policy recommendations:

- Federally funded strike forces can improve communication and coordination among law enforcement agencies. The main

improvement in relationships, however, will be among the agencies actually contributing personnel and resources to the strike force. Consequently, all agencies participating in a strike force should be encouraged to make some formal contribution of personnel and/or resources to the strike force.

- Because of traditional agency rivalries and turf issues and because of the potential for corruption in drug enforcement, the integrity of key personnel is crucial to the effectiveness of the strike force. In selecting personnel for the strike force, particularly for the position of Chief of Operations, a primary criterion should be an established reputation for professional integrity.
- Task forces should develop policies regarding the allocation of funds generated through forfeitures in the early stages of the task force plan.
- Task forces need to give considerable attention to interagency communication for a cooperative, regional drug effort to develop.
- Task force officials should be aware of some of the hidden costs of regional drug enforcement efforts. For example, the increased costs for transportation should be

built into budgets for multijurisdictional strike forces.

- The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute should continue to set aside some of the federal drug funds for the development of a state drug plan and for monitoring task force activities. In updating and revising the plan from year-to-year, Institute officials should consider the findings and implications from the evaluation studies of task forces. Further, Institute officials should consult with law enforcement officials and researchers (e.g., members of the Research and Information Consortium) when developing future plans.
- A prototype model(s) of multi-jurisdictional task force structures, goals, and activities, should be developed. Although the model should be flexible enough to accommodate varied local-level needs, it should include specific guidelines (e.g., the expectation of contributions of personnel and/or resources from participating agencies, the maintenance of records) and it should be disseminated to all active and proposed task forces.
- State officials as well as members of strike forces should develop mechanisms to promote information sharing and collaboration between the federally

funded strike forces. Annual or semi-annual statewide meetings as well as training programs for strike force members would build on informal relationships that are already emerging among strike force officials from different parts of the state and contribute to the continued professionalization of drug enforcement in the state.

Finally, the findings from this study also raise several issues that must be considered by policymakers. These are issues, however, for which the research findings do not provide clear answers and where there may be disagreement over potential policy recommendations. These include the following implications:

- Federally funded multijurisdictional drug enforcement strike forces seem to be an effective way for local law enforcement agencies to increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of drug offenders and can enable local agencies to conduct long-term investigations of organized drug networks. The ultimate effectiveness of such strategies, however, remain subject to question.
- Similarly, policymakers should be aware of the constraints faced by law enforcement in their efforts to affect illegal drug markets.
- Policymakers and officials responsible for drug enforcement should consider the human costs

and fiscal implications of enforcement policies which place greater numbers of individuals in already overcrowded prisons.

- Local officials considering the development of a drug enforcement strike force should plan for "system-wide" effects. These include increases in the number of jail inmates and in the caseload of the prosecutor's and public defender's offices.
- Federal and state funding agencies should be aware of the potential for conflict between agencies due to competition for funds supporting the strike forces. This is likely to be exacerbated given reductions in federal funds or expansion in the number of strike forces.
- Asset seizure/forfeitures are unlikely to fully support the operations of most strike forces.
- State provisions regarding asset seizures require further attention, in particular with regard to their potential for abuse.

These findings, recommendations and implications are discussed in more detail in the following chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of the strike force concept and a description of the Tri-Code and South Central strike forces. Chapter Two presents a description of the evaluation methodology. Chapter Three presents findings on the perceived nature

of drug activity in the four regions, the goals of the strike forces, and funding issues. The next chapter presents information on organizational characteristics of the strike forces and on the interorganizational relationships between law enforcement agencies in strike force and non-strike force regions. Chapter Five includes data on both perceived effects of the strike forces on drug enforcement activity and data on drug arrests in the four regions. Chapter Six presents similar data on the court disposition of these cases. Finally, Chapter Seven presents a description of several of the major investigations of each task force and a discussion of how the strike force structure seemed to affect inter-agency relationships. This chapter concludes with a review of some of the apparent benefits and problems of the strike forces and the policy implications that arise from them.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND DESCRIPTION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TASK FORCES

This report presents the findings of an intensive evaluation of two multijurisdictional drug enforcement task forces operating in the state of Indiana. These task forces, the Tri-Code Organized Drug Enforcement Task Force, which operates in the north central counties of LaPorte, Starke and Pulaski, and the South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force, operating in Monroe, Brown, Greene, Lawrence, Morgan and Owen counties, are two of twenty four such task forces operational in the state during 1989-90. Though many of these task forces (also referred to as strike forces) have different structures and objectives, they were all created to increase coordination and communication between criminal justice agencies (federal, state, and local) for a more efficient and effective regional response to the drug problem. All were created through a federally funded formula grant program administered federally by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and administered at the state level by the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. The grant program requires that all task forces be subject to federal monitoring and that the state conduct evaluations of these programs. This report constitutes one such evaluation.

THE ORIGINS OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG TASK FORCES

The past decade has witnessed growing concern about the illicit use of drugs. In response, local law enforcement agencies throughout the country have placed drug

offenses high on the list of priorities for investigation, prosecution and conviction. Yet, the prevalence of drugs in the community, the difficulty in investigating more complex levels of drug activity and the limited resources available to law enforcement agencies combine to hinder an effective and efficient criminal justice response to the problem.

The biggest obstacle to effective enforcement at the local level stems from the nature of drug activity itself. While there is some evidence to suggest that casual drug use may be on the decline, drug usage remains extensive.¹ Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to suggest that frequent use of all varieties of drugs, and use of the most physically and psychologically damaging drugs is growing rapidly among particular sub-groups in our communities. Focusing drug enforcement at the user level is time-consuming, drains resources at both the police and court levels, and centers on short-term impacts.

Some experts argue that focusing drug enforcement activity at the retail and distribution levels holds more promise.² However, such a strategy presents problems for law enforcement, especially at the local level. First, the distribution of drugs necessarily involves some degree of organization, sometimes highly structured and organized, more typically, loose-knit networks of associations. Because of this organizational element, considerable time and resources, including equipment and manpower, are required for successful investigation and prosecution. In addition, this level of organized drug activity often takes place over a wide geographic area, presenting problems for law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions.

To overcome these problems, recent efforts have been made to foster cooperative arrangements among law enforcement agencies. As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, federal discretionary and formula grant funds have been made available to local and state units to expand drug enforcement efforts across the country. The majority of these funds (approximately 65 percent) went to the creation of

over 700 multijurisdictional cooperative drug control law enforcement task forces throughout the country. Presently, more than two dozen task forces operate in the state of Indiana.

Though multijurisdictional task forces are not new, there is clearly an increased commitment to expand interagency cooperation not only to pool resources and divide responsibilities in a rational manner, but also to combine and maximize expertise and capabilities available in various agencies. These arrangements have taken several different forms:

Horizontal Arrangements seek to maximize cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies across jurisdictional boundaries. These horizontal relationships range from relatively concentrated arrangements, such as between local police departments, to more extended relationships between law enforcement agencies and other components of the criminal justice system, particularly prosecutor's offices. More sophisticated relationships involve cooperation between various criminal justice agencies and other public and private organizations involved in the drug problem.

In theory, the benefits of these horizontal relationships are clear. Increased coordination between local law enforcement agencies provides an efficient means for targeting drug distributors whose activity crosses jurisdictional lines. The intelligence information collected is said to produce a more accurate picture of the structure of the drug distribution network. Furthermore, increased communication and coordination reduces the duplication of efforts which is likely to occur with agencies operating independently. In addition, such arrangements are economically more efficient for most agencies, as the coordination, in theory, allows agencies to share intelligence gathering responsibilities, equipment and manpower. The improved efficiency is also evident with horizontal arrangements between criminal justice agencies. Coordinated investigations involving police and prosecutors is said to maximize the likelihood of suc-

cessful investigation, prosecution, and ultimately, conviction.

Vertical Arrangements seek to maximize relationships between agencies at various levels (local, state, federal) of government. Such vertical arrangements vary in complexity and incorporate the elements of horizontal arrangements as well. The benefits derived from vertical arrangements are similar to those with horizontal arrangements. The various levels of government not only pool resources to investigate, prosecute and convict drug offenders, but combine different kinds and levels of expertise not available at one particular level of government. For example, local law enforcement agencies often lack the necessary buy money to make drug purchases in a complex and prolonged investigation. These resources are more likely to be available at the state or federal level. Similarly, local law enforcement agencies have considerable intelligence on drug activity in their region, but lack the expertise and time to analyze and make use of that information. State and federal cooperation may provide such resources.

In spite of the promulgation of these task forces, their effectiveness remains unknown. Some law enforcement officials express concern over the usefulness of these arrangements and question both the process (the structure and operations of the task forces) and the likelihood in achieving the intended results (changes in the quality and quantity of drug enforcement activity). For example, some are hesitant to share confidential information with other agencies and law enforcement officers. Concerns are raised about the potential for corruption and the lack of accountability for activities and funds. Disagreements often arise about the goals to be achieved or the means to achieve them, and who will take credit or blame for their success or failure. The selection and management of personnel involved can also inhibit operations and communication among individuals and agencies.

Information is also lacking on the effectiveness of such task forces in reducing

drug trafficking and use. Do multijurisdictional task forces target more sophisticated levels of drug activity, e.g., from the user and street-level dealer to the distributor and trafficker? Do the task forces enhance intelligence gathering and investigative ability? Do such task forces remove the more physically and psychologically harmful drugs from the community? Do multijurisdictional strike forces produce asset seizures and forfeitures not otherwise possible?

This intensive evaluation of two multijurisdictional drug task forces operating in Indiana examines many of these questions in detail. Though the task forces under evaluation here are not necessarily representative of all the task forces operating in Indiana, the findings presented here provide useful and timely information about the structure and activities of these task forces and suggest some important issues about their impact on the regional drug problem.

AN OVERVIEW OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG TASK FORCES

Multijurisdictional drug task forces currently operating in Indiana do not differ significantly from those operating across the United States. According to the Consortium for Drug Strategy Impact Assessment, which collects and analyzes information on multijurisdictional drug task forces operational in fourteen states, the stated mission of the task forces is "to investigate, arrest and prosecute street-and upper-level drug law violators."³ Most task forces are structured horizontally, managed by local law enforcement agencies or prosecutors' offices, and are limited to criminal justice agencies only.

Similarly, most of the task forces participating in the Consortium study cover a one to six county region, with the number of personnel ranging from one to 87, and the majority of those ranging between one to eleven. In terms of results, approximately three-fourths of the task force arrests for the year 1988 were for cocaine, with less than

one-fourth for marijuana. Distribution offenses constitute the bulk (two-thirds) of criminal arrests, followed by possession offenses. The task forces accounted for approximately 4,000 asset seizures in 1988, with a total value of close to \$20 million. Task forces reported approximately 2,700 asset forfeitures with a value of roughly \$1,800,000.

Most of the task forces operating in Indiana service a three to six county region, with many of those located in moderately populated rural areas of the state. Task force members describe their mission generally as an effort to develop cooperative enforcement networks among agencies and to disrupt drug trafficking by 1. arresting and prosecuting drug traffickers, dealers and users, 2. removing drugs in local communities and, 3. seizing the property of convicted drug offenders. By the end of 1988 (when nineteen task forces were operational), the Indiana task forces were funded by grant awards (both federal and state) of approximately \$3,800,000, with most of those monies going for personnel and equipment.⁴

Approximately one half of the Indiana task force arrests involved cocaine, followed by marijuana (approximately one-third). Most of those arrested were charged with distribution followed by possession offenses.

THE SOUTH CENTRAL INDIANA NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE

The South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force (SCNSF) was created in March of 1988, and received its first federal funds in April. The Strike Force is centered in Monroe County with service to five contiguous counties (Brown, Greene, Lawrence, Morgan, and Owen). Agencies directly involved in the task force include the Bloomington Police Department, the Monroe County Sheriffs Department, the Indiana University Police Department, and the Monroe County Prosecutors Office. The Monroe County Prosecutors Office serves as the administrating agency. The stated mission of

the task force is "to significantly reduce the trafficking and use of illegal drugs through enforcement and education."⁵ Given the geographic location, demographics (with the presence of Indiana University), and enforcement resources, the area covered by the task force is said to be a major center of drug trafficking and abuse. Bloomington is considered an "attractive marketplace" for illegal drugs and is thought to serve as the location for large scale manufacturing and distributing operations.

Development of the Strike Force

The SCNSF was initiated and has been administered in the Monroe County Prosecutors Office. Prosecutor Robert Miller was elected in the fall of 1986. Miller and his colleagues believed that drug enforcement had a negative image in the community. Drug enforcement practices had been criticized for being selective in targets of investigations, freeing sellers in exchange for information on buyers, violating civil rights through entrapment practices, etc. The Prosecutors Office sought a mechanism to gain some degree of control over drug enforcement practices within the county. In addition, the prosecutor wanted to shift the focus on enforcement priorities from low level sellers and users to higher level distributors.

In 1987, officials from the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute approached drug enforcement officers within the Bloomington Police Department and announced the availability of federal funds to support multijurisdictional drug enforcement task forces. Miller took the initiative in formulating a proposal for the federally funded program and solicited the support of the main law enforcement agencies within the county (Bloomington Police Department, Monroe County Sheriffs Department, and Indiana University Police Department) for participation in a task force that would be administered within the Prosecutors Office. He then gained the support of the prosecutors and sheriffs of the five contiguous counties for the creation of a

multijurisdictional strike force. These officials wrote letters of support that were included in the grant application.

Miller saw the SCNSF as an opportunity to achieve two goals. The first was to centralize control over county drug enforcement practices within the Prosecutors Office. The second was to increase the effectiveness of enforcement practices by targeting sales and trafficking rather than use. The federal funds were seen as a way of providing resources for equipment, buy money, and personnel. Further, the multijurisdictional task force structure was seen as providing the means to investigate trafficking that crossed county boundaries.

Structure of the Strike Force


The grant was awarded in the spring of 1988 and the SCNSF became operational shortly thereafter. The funding awarded in the first year totaled \$325,221 with \$171,317 of that coming from the federal government and \$153,904 from local funding. Funding for the second year of operation was significantly reduced (a 45 percent decrease) from that of the first year, with a total award of \$178, 230 (\$94,230 from federal and \$84,000 from local funding).

Figure 1-1 depicts the organizational structure of SCNSF. The prosecutor serves as the SCNSF Executive Director. The daily operations of the strike force are conducted by three full-time police officers (one officer each from the Bloomington Police Department, the Monroe County Sheriffs Department, and the Indiana University Police Department). One of these officers is designated Chief of Operations and is in charge of the day-to-day operations.

The operations of the SCNSF are overseen by a Strike Force Coordinating Committee. When originally conceived, the committee was to be comprised of the prosecutors and sheriffs of the six counties, the chiefs of the Bloomington and Indiana

Figure 1-1

Organizational Structure of South Central Narcotics Strike Force



- * Level I Monroe County Prosecutor; Sheriff; Chief, Bloomington P.D., I.U.P.D.
- Level II I.S.P., F.B.I., D.E.A.
- Level III Prosecutors, Sheriffs five Contiguous Counties

University Police Departments, and representatives of the Indiana State Police (ISP), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, neither the State Police, DEA or the FBI play an active role in the coordinating committee, though they remain supportive of the task force concept. Initially, the committee met on a monthly basis but meetings have become less frequent during the past two years. Officials cite the reasons for the decrease as involving difficulties between personalities of some of the members, as well as the fact that three of the prosecutors lost in the primary elections and are now "lame ducks." The prosecutors and the sheriffs of the region do meet on a monthly basis in the form a regional law enforcement coordinating committee, but not as a Strike Force Coordinating Committee.

Administrative tasks and technical assistance are handled by staff within the Monroe County Prosecutors Office. During the first year the task force operated, grant funds were used to pay for an investigator responsible for investigating reports of drug abuse in schools. During the second year, due to reduced project funding, the position was shifted to the Prosecuting Office's budget.

In addition, task force funds are used to support a substance abuse counselor who works with local schools and other community agencies on prevention activities.

Table 1-1 shows funding and expenditures for SCNSF for the 1988 and 1989 grant periods. The majority of grant funds for both the first (80 percent) and second year (84 percent) of operation were applied to cover personnel. Equipment comprised the second largest expenditure as it accounted for 13 percent of the first year and 6 percent of the second year's funding total. Confidential funds, used to purchase both information and drugs, followed with 4 percent of the first year's funds and 7 percent of the second year's expenditures in this category.

Table 1-1

Strike Force Funding and Expenditures by Year

South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force

FUNDING 1988/1989		
Type	Total	
Federal	\$171,317.00	
State	-0-	
Local	<u>\$153,904.17</u>	
	\$325,221.17	

EXPENDITURES 1988/1989		
	Amount	Percent
Personnel	\$260,584.17	80%
Travel	\$5,100.00	2%
Equipment	\$41,384.00	13%
Operating Expenses	\$4,553.00	1%
Confidential Funds	<u>\$13,600.00</u>	<u>4%</u>
	\$325,221.17	100%

FUNDING 1989/90		
		Percent Change from Past Grant
Federal	\$94,230.00	-45%
State	-0-	
Local	<u>\$84,000.00</u>	<u>-45%</u>
	\$178,230.00	-45%

EXPENDITURES 1989/1990		
	Amount	Percent
Personnel	\$89,613.13	84%
Travel	\$1,131.28	1%
Equipment	\$6,283.79	6%
Operating Expenses	\$1,641.21	2%
Confidential Funds	<u>\$8,000.00</u>	<u>7%</u>
	\$106,669.41	100%

*Expenditures reflect operating period ending 12/31/90

THE TRI-CODE ORGANIZED DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE

The Tri-Code Organized Drug Enforcement Task Force (Tri-Code) operates in a three county area in north central Indiana consisting of LaPorte, Starke and Pulaski counties. Tri-Code is located administratively in the LaPorte County Sheriffs Office.

Development of the Task Force

Tri-Code was formally established in spring of 1988, though its roots date back several years earlier.⁶ Law enforcement officials from northern Indiana note that since 1980, the cultivation and distribution of marijuana has "been an exceptional problem," due largely to the abundant growth of wild marijuana in the region. Eradication efforts and the arrest and prosecution of cultivators in the area led to an increase in the importation of marijuana from out of state. In 1982, evidence was established of "semi-organized efforts" to import marijuana to the north central Indiana region from Iowa and Nebraska. In 1986, law enforcement officials from LaPorte and Starke counties traveled to Nebraska to meet with members from some two dozen law enforcement agencies from Iowa and Nebraska to discuss what appeared as a significant organized attempt to distribute marijuana in the three country region comprising LaPorte, Starke and Pulaski counties. This marijuana was shipped to the region, where it was processed, distributed locally, or moved out of state for the purposes of bartering it for cocaine.

According to law enforcement officials, that meeting established lines of communication and intelligence sharing among the local agencies, not only within the three county region, but also between states. The result was the collection of intelligence information on several organized crime groups and the identification of approximately 200 persons as targets for investigation. In 1987, a federal grand jury was convened and indictments were handed down in both Iowa and Indiana.

Subsequent arrests in Indiana included the confiscation of marijuana with a street value of seven million dollars in Pulaski County and confiscation of marijuana with a street value of three hundred and sixty thousand dollars in LaPorte County. Both investigations involved one organized crime group operating in the region.

As a result of the case, and in light of evidence that other similar organized drug groups were operating in the area, law enforcement officials recognized the need to develop a formal unified multijurisdictional strategy to effectively combat the organized drug trafficking problem.

Structure of the Task Force

The proposal submitted for the creation of Tri-Code focussed on the following goals:

1. To identify and target organized marijuana trafficking conspirators and to further investigate the targets previously identified.
2. To reduce singular jurisdictional responsibility and duplicative work load.
3. To effect arrests on those targets deemed prosecutable under a systematic and consistent adjudication process.
4. To convict those targets and additionally recover any tangible "fruits" of the specific crime inclusive of both criminal and civil remedies with reference to forfeitures of personal property assets.

As with SCNSF, the start-up grant was awarded in the spring of 1988. The funding for the first year included \$43,895 from the federal government and \$19,875 from the local government, totaling \$63,770. As with the funding for SCNSF, the second year grant award was significantly lower than that of the first year. Federal allocation totaled \$28,605, a decrease of 35 percent, while the local allocation decreased 52 percent to \$9,562, for a total of \$38,167. Unlike the SCNSF, no monies were allocated for personnel for Tri-Code. Forty-eight percent of the first year award was expended for equipment, followed by 36 percent for confidential funds. Expenditures for the second year were largely directed toward confidential funds (56 percent) followed by operating expenses (22 percent) and travel (16 percent). Table 1-2 summarizes Tri-Code funding

Table 1-2

Strike Force Funding and Expenditures by Year

Tri-Code		
FUNDING 1988/1989		
Type	Total	
Federal	\$43,895.00	
State	-0-	
Local	<u>\$19,875.00</u>	
	\$63,770.00	
EXPENDITURES 1988/1989		
	Amount	Percent
Personnel	-0-	-0-
Travel	\$2,923.30	4%
Equipment	\$30,414.70	48%
Operating Expenses	\$7,432.00	12%
Confidential Funds	<u>\$23,000.00</u>	<u>36%</u>
	\$63,770.00	100%


FUNDING 1989/90		
		Percent Change from Past Grant
Federal	\$28,605.00	-35%
State	-0-	
Local	<u>\$9,562.00</u>	<u>-52%</u>
	\$ 38,167.00	-40%

EXPENDITURES 1989/1990		
	Amount	Percent
Personnel	-0-	
Travel	\$5,904.00	16%
Equipment	\$2,400.00	6%
Operating Expenses	\$8,346.00	22%
Confidential Funds	<u>\$21,517.00</u>	<u>56</u>
	\$38,167.00	100%

*reflects operating period ending 3/31/90

Figure 1-2

Organizational Structure of Tri-Code Task Force



* Did not formally participate on Executive Board.

and expenditures for the two year period.

As diagramed in Figure 1-2 the proposed structure of the task force consisted of a governing body of representatives from each of the participating counties. The governing body would also comprise several external advisors, including one from the Indiana State Police and one from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The task of the governing body was to assess the intelligence information and target specific individuals and groups to be investigated by the task force. The governing body would also be responsible for monitoring any on-going investigations.

The present operating structure of Tri-Code is somewhat different from that originally proposed. Though Tri-Code continues to operate under a governing body, neither the Indiana State Police or the Federal Bureau of Investigation participate in any formal capacity. Instead, the governing body includes the sheriffs and prosecutors of the three counties involved. Prosecutor involvement is somewhat limited, with only one prosecutor (Daniel Murphy from Pulaski County) actively involved in the decision-making activities.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

While not a new concept, multijurisdictional narcotics strike forces have expanded across the country in response to the growing concern about illicit drugs. Federal funds available through the 1986 and 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Acts have allowed for the development of more than two dozen multijurisdictional strike forces in Indiana. The general goals of the task forces are to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers, dealers and users, remove drugs from the communities and seize property of convicted drug offenders. These goals are achieved primarily through enhanced cooperation and coordination among local, state and federal agencies.

This report represents the findings of an evaluation of two task forces operating

in Indiana: The South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force, administered by the Monroe County Prosecutors Office and serving five contiguous counties, and the Tri-Code Drug Enforcement Task Force, administered by the LaPorte County Sheriffs Office, with agency involvement from LaPorte, Starke and Pulaski counties in the north central region of Indiana.

CHAPTER NOTES

- ¹ National Institute on Drug Abuse. 1989. National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: 1988 Population Estimates. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse.
- ² For a review of strategies see, Klieman, Mark A.R. and Kerry D. Smith, State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy in Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson Eds., Drugs and Crime Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. pps. 69-108.
- ³ Criminal Justice Statistics Association, "Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement Task Forces in State Drug Control Strategies." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, IL 1988.
- ⁴ Indiana Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information. Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces : An Enforcement Approach to Drugs in Indiana. Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, 1989.
- ⁵ Grant Proposal, South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force, 1988.
- ⁶ Grant Proposal, Tri-Code Drug Enforcement Task Force, 1988.

CHAPTER TWO

EVALUATION METHOD

This evaluation addresses both the product--the impact that multijurisdictional drug task forces have on narcotics control efforts--as well as process--the structure and operations of the task forces which account for the attainment, or lack thereof, of the desired impacts.

The general goal or mission of these multijurisdictional drug task forces is to reduce the use and supply of drugs in their respective regions. Such a goal is measured, or operationalized, in relation to specific results or outcomes. As noted earlier, the desired outcomes are usually expressed in terms of increased arrests, prosecutions and convictions of drug traffickers, dealers and users, the removal of narcotics from the street, and the seizure and forfeiture of offender assets related to drug activity. As will be demonstrated shortly, these outcomes vary and can be measured in a variety of ways.

Focusing on results alone can present a misleading, if not inaccurate, assessment of the effectiveness of task forces. First, many of the outcomes noted above may vary for reasons independent of task force operations. Changes in drug usage and supply may be the result of other factors, such as demographic changes in the population of users, market forces driving supply and demand, and the impact of other non-law enforcement related activities, such as the development of education and rehabilitation programs. While not eliminating these effects entirely, it is important to examine both the structure and the activities or process of the task forces to help determine the extent to which the task forces themselves account for such changes.

Second, it is the task force concept, with its particular arrangements and activities, which is hypothesized to lead to the desired results noted above. Thus, it


becomes crucial to understand whether task forces operate as intended and how particular task forces are structured and function in relation to the results they achieve. Task forces are an explicit attempt to establish inter-agency or interorganizational relationships believed necessary to effectively combat drug trafficking in the region. Thus, the process component of this evaluation examines the structure of these inter-agency networks and the flow of communication and resources within these networks. Furthermore, evaluating the interorganizational relationships created by the task forces will provide important guides for future development of multijurisdictional arrangements, as well as generate useful information to be incorporated by the present task forces as they continue over time.

In order to evaluate both product and process, this evaluation incorporates a "systems approach" which describes and evaluates the relationships among inputs, activities, results and outcomes of each task force. Figure 2-1 depicts this evaluation scheme.

Inputs: Inputs relate to the organizational structure, personnel and financial resources and provide information on the operation of the task forces and the interrelationships among the participating agencies. To understand decision-making requires an understanding of the formal and informal structures of the task forces and any changes that have taken place over time. Issues relating to personnel involve the composition of personnel in the task force and their organizational capacity and the manner in which involvement and noninvolvement are determined. Issues relating to financial resources concern the sources of funding, the allocation of resources and the mechanisms used for management and accountability.

Activities To evaluate the effectiveness of these task forces requires further assessment of the various activities they are engaged in, including the general patterns of communication within the task force and the more specific investigation and

Figure 2-1
 FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
 MULTIJURISDICTIONAL NARCOTICS TASK FORCES



prosecution activities. Questions we seek to address here include the following: What impact has the task force had on developing and facilitating communication among the agencies in efforts to coordinate drug enforcement activity? What impact has the task force had on the development of a strategic information/intelligence system for targeting drug enforcement efforts and how has this system facilitated coordination and cooperation among participants? To what extent have covert operations (undercover operations, surveillance activities, etc.) been developed and what has been their impact? What issues have arisen with the employment of such operations? What is the extent and impact of technical assistance (equipment, manpower, training)? How is the prosecution of drug offenses structured in the task force? What issues have arisen for the prosecution function as a result of the creation of the task forces?

Results and Outcomes The evaluation of results and outcomes assess the extent to which the goals and specific objectives of the task forces were met. In particular, what impact has the task force had on the nature of drug enforcement activity in the region? Has the task force led to more arrests? Has the profile of the arrested narcotics offenders changed (e.g. from users and low-level dealers to those involved in significant distribution conspiracies and networks)? What impact has the task force had on the availability of drugs in its jurisdiction, as well as the surrounding region in which the task force operates? What impact has the task force had on the development of drug education awareness programs in the area? Similarly, to what extent has the asset seizure program developed, both in relation to depriving offenders of illegally derived profits, and as a means of providing financial support for the task force in future years? Finally, what have been the key benefits and problems facing the task forces?

THE EVALUATION DESIGN

In order to more accurately assess the results of these task forces, this evaluation employed a pre-post design with comparison groups. Specifically, to understand the impact of task force activity it is important to examine drug enforcement activity prior to the implementation of the task forces. The two task forces under evaluation became operational in the spring of 1988. Data on drug enforcement activity (discussed below) were collected beginning January 1, 1987, through December 31, 1989, providing approximately 15 months of data prior to the start up of the task forces and 21 months during which the task forces were operational.

Similarly, this evaluation includes data on drug enforcement activity for two comparison sites (controls) for the respective task forces where no formal multijurisdictional arrangements existed. The inclusion of both task force sites and the two control sites significantly strengthens the design of the evaluation over that provided in a single case study of one site. Although not eliminating all threats to the validity and reliability of the findings, comparison with control sites allows us to address a number of policy relevant issues that otherwise could not be considered. For example, are changes in drug enforcement activity the result of the creation of multijurisdictional arrangements, or the result of other possible factors, such as a stronger commitment generally to drug enforcement by all law enforcement agencies regardless of their structural relationships? Similarly, are the levels of communication and coordination among task force agencies significantly greater than those occurring among similar law enforcement officials in non-task force sites? While we may see information sharing in task force sites, the same level of sharing may be occurring in non-task force sites. If this is true, focusing only on the task forces may provide an inflated sense of

accomplishment. On the other hand, even relatively low levels of inter-agency communication may appear significant if it is found that no such communication occurs in control sites. The point is simply that comparison significantly increases our understanding of the findings. The following is a brief description of the study and control sites, and how they compare.

Description of Study Sites

SCNSF

The SCNSF is centered within the Monroe County Prosecutors Office and serves five surrounding counties in south central Indiana. Monroe is the largest county in the region with a 1986 population of 101,700. Monroe County is also the most urbanized of the six counties. Morgan County, with a population of 53,000, is the second largest county followed by Lawrence and Greene counties (42,400 and 30,400 respectively). The final two counties served by the strike force, Owen and Brown, are less populous (16,900 and 12,800 respectively) and mainly rural.

Tri-Code

The Tri-Code strike force serves three counties in northern Indiana. LaPorte County with a population of 106,100 is the largest of the three. Starke and Pulaski counties, with populations of 21,400 and 13,200 respectively, are the other participating counties.

Selection of Control Sites

The objective in selecting control sites was to identify regions with similar demographic characteristics to each of the study sites, drawn from the same general region of the state, and that were not being served by a federally funded multijurisdictional drug enforcement strike force.

Because of the presence of Indiana University in Bloomington (Monroe County), we initially sought a county with a similarly large university. Unfortunately, the logical matches (e.g., West Lafayette) were served by federally funded drug enforcement task forces. We settled on a six county region in southern Indiana that includes Clark, Floyd, Harrison, Orange, Scott, and Washington counties. As will be discussed subsequently, these counties are similar in size to the SCNSF region, come from the same region of the state, and are close to a metropolitan center with a large university population (Louisville).

The control site for the Tri-Code task force consists of Porter, Jasper, and White counties. These counties are contiguous to LaPorte, Starke, and Pulaski and similar in demographic traits.

Figure 2-2 presents the location of the four regions included in the study.

Comparison of Study Sites¹


SCNSF and South Control

Table 2-1 presents data on the demographic characteristics of the individual counties and the four regions. Although the largest of the southern control counties, Clark, is somewhat smaller than Monroe County (88,800 vs. 101,700), Clark and Floyd counties taken together are very similar in population to Monroe and Morgan counties (151,800 vs. 154,700). The remaining south control counties are less populous (19,300 to 29,100) and overall the population of the two regions is quite similar (257,200 for SCNSF, 243,100 for south control). Because of the large student population in Monroe County, the proportion of the population ages 15-44 is higher in the SCNSF region but the difference is not dramatic. The two regions are both quite racially homogeneous, and the SCNSF is slightly more urbanized and has a higher proportion of high school graduates. The SCNSF region is somewhat larger in total area and the two regions are

Figure 2-2

Strike Force and Control Regions

KEY
 // Tri-Code
 +++ North Control
 ### SCNSF
 **** South Control



INDIANA HISTORICAL BUREAU
 140 North Senate Avenue
 Indianapolis, Indiana

Countries-Map

Table 2-1

Demographic Characteristics of Task Force and Control Counties 1985-86

SCNSF	Total persons 1986	Percent			High school graduates	Area	Acreage in farms	per capita income	Percent families under poverty level 1979	Unemployed rate
		15-44	White	Urban						
Brown	12800	NA	100 ¹	00.0	312	33	9269	8.6	6.1	
Greene	30400	41.2	99.6	29.7	546	211	8643	9.3	10.1	
Lawrence	42400	42.7	99.4	44.9	452	177	9083	7.1	8.8	
Monroe	101700	61.2	95.8	67.8	385	75	9250	8.1	3.9	
Morgan	53000	47.2	99.6	32.0	409	144	9754	7.0	6.7	
Owen	16900	NA	100 ¹	17.3	396	119	8339	10.0	7.1	
Total-SCNSF	257200	51.8	98.1	45.4	2490	759	9196	8.0	6.2	

remarkably similar in total farm acreage. The SCNSF has a higher per capita income and somewhat lower unemployment rate. None of these differences, however, are dramatic.

Table 2-2 presents data on local government finances, reported crime, numbers of law enforcement officers and jail capacity. Again the two regions appear quite similar. The south control region has higher local governmental expenditures but devotes a smaller proportion of its budget to police expenditures. Consequently, the actual expenditures for police in the two regions is very similar (\$5,211,000 and \$5,212,600). The number of serious crimes and the number of violent crimes reported to the police are also very comparable. The south control region employs a larger number of law enforcement officers but the SCNSF has a greater jail capacity. Again the magnitude of the differences are slight.

Tri-Code and North Control

As Table 2-1 indicates, the north control region is somewhat more populous than the Tri-Code region (172,700 and 140,700 respectively). However, both regions consist of one more populous county, LaPorte and Porter, and two smaller, rural counties, Pulaski and Starke, and Jasper and White. The north control region has a higher proportion in the 15-44 years of age category, is somewhat more urban, and has more high school graduates. Although 93 percent white, the Tri-Code region is racially more heterogeneous than the control site. The north control region is larger in area and in farm acreage. The control site also has a higher per capita income and a lower proportion of families under the poverty level but Tri-Code has a lower unemployment rate. As was the case with the southern region, however, the differences between the two sites are not dramatic.

The north control region has higher general levels of local expenditures, a slightly

Table 2-2

Government Expenditures, Crime and Criminal Justice Characteristics of Task Force and Control Counties, Selected Years

<u>SCNSF</u>	<u>Local government finances 1981-82</u>		<u>Serious crimes known to police, 1985</u>		<u>Law enforcement officers</u>			
	<u>Direct general expenditure (Mil. dol.)</u>	<u>Police Expenditures Total \$1,000 percent</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Violent</u>	<u>Full-time</u>	<u>Part-time</u>	<u>Jail Size</u>
Brown	7.4	214 2.9	91	728	5	10	NR	34
Greene	25.9	414 1.6	327	3726	17	25	NR	20
Lawrence	39.5	1185 3.0	925	2513	41	49	5	48
Monroe	54.9	22509 4.1	4558	4517	318	77	NR	128
Morgan	40.5	7695 1.9	509	2999	41	45	NR	55
Owen	8.6	1720 2.0	31	NA	5	22	6	17
Total-SCNSF	17.6	50060 2.8	6441		427	228	11	302

South Control

Clark	77.1	21588	2.8	2805	6225	140	117	39	52
Floyd	74.8	20196	2.7	2645	6702	182	81	28	84
Harrison	19.4	2328	1.2	352	1235	29	25	13	32
Orange	17.4	1914	1.1	33	NA	5	20	NR	74
Scott	17.0	3910	2.3	271	5340	8	22	15	32
Washington	18.5	2220	1.2	94	559	14	6	1	15
Total-South Control	224.2	52156	2.3	6200		378	271	90	289

Tri-Code

LaPorte	87.7	44727	5.1	4554	4318	283	174	8	137
Pulaski	16.7	2171	1.3	158	1179	26	11	2	18
Starke	17.8	4450	2.5	230	1299	29	20	35	46
Total-Tri-Code	122.2	51348	4.2	4942		338	205	45	201

North Control

Jasper	21.9	4380	2.0	365	1675	11	22	23	32
Porter	122.1	43956	3.6	3071	2640	103	158	31	158
White	27.3	4095	1.5	286	5401	28	23	3	26
Total-North Control	171.3	52431	3.1	3722		142	203	57	216

Source: see chapter note ¹.

higher percent of its budget devoted to police, and relatively higher total expenditures on police protection. The Tri-Code region has a higher number of serious crimes reported to the police and had twice as many violent crimes reported to the police in 1985. Most of the difference between the two regions is accounted for by the higher level of reported crimes in LaPorte County when compared to Porter. The two regions are very similar in terms of numbers of law enforcement officers and in jail capacity.

Summary

In a study such as this, there are no perfect control sites. Counties and regions are simply too varied to provide identical matches. The control sites employed here, however, appear to be as reasonable matches of geographical areas as one could find. The control sites are drawn from similar areas of the state and include a mix of counties quite comparable to those included in the task force sites. There are no dramatic differences among the sites in terms of the characteristics examined above and, indeed, for a number of characteristics the sites are remarkably similar. While caution always must be employed in making comparisons, the two control sites certainly seem to be reasonable matches for the two study sites.

Data Sources

This evaluation is based on three main sources of data: 1. Interviews with task force participants and law enforcement officials in both the task force and control sites, 2. A mail survey sent to law enforcement officials (police and prosecutors) in both the task force and control sites, and 3. Archival records of drug enforcement activity. The following is a brief description of each.

Interviews

A series of interviews were conducted with participants in each of the task forces, other law enforcement officials in the task force counties not directly involved in the task forces, and law enforcement officials in each of the counties represented in the control sites.

Preliminary Interviews were conducted in the late spring of 1989. These interviews were primarily introductory and focused on program history, perceived extent of the drug problem and the criminal justice response to it, involvement in the initial development of the task force, perceived goals and objectives, the identification of other key participants and the availability and appropriateness of archival data on drug enforcement activity. Preliminary interviews were conducted with approximately 50 officials in the 18 counties examined.

Follow-up Interviews were conducted with task force participants during the fall of 1989 and spring and summer of 1990. The purpose of these interviews was to track the progress of the task forces, noting significant developments over the time period under study. These interviews were also used to clarify or expand on questions or information arising from the mail survey and archival data discussed below. Approximately 20 interviews were conducted at this time.

Mail Survey

On the basis of the preliminary interviews, key individuals were identified for participation in a detailed mail survey sent in early summer of 1989. Two surveys were constructed. First, a short survey was mailed to key individuals in the control sites only. This survey (included in Appendix A) asked respondents to provide their views about the nature of the drug problem in their region, the extent of agency relationships regarding drug enforcement, the nature or degree of inter-agency communication and

cooperation in the region and law enforcement resources and public support for drug enforcement.

A longer version of the survey was sent to participants of the two task forces, and to non-task force members in the counties served by the task forces (a copy of this survey is found in Appendix B). Again, the respondents were asked about the nature of drug use and trafficking in their region, resources and support, and the relationships existing between agencies. An additional set of questions were asked directly relating to the structure and operations of the task forces themselves. Several questions concerned the structure, goals, and impact of the task forces to better understand the level of knowledge and agreement among task force representatives. Another set of questions concerned levels of communication and cooperation between participating agencies. These were followed by more specific questions on the structure and activities of the task force, including the nature of investigations, intelligence gathering and sharing, and asset seizure and forfeiture. A final set of questions elicited views about the benefits and problems of the task force structure and operations and issues regarding support and continued funding.

Through our preliminary interviews we were able to identify many law enforcement officials who could provide important perspectives on both the drug problem and drug enforcement issues in general, and task force activity in particular. However, it was clear that there were many other law enforcement officials not identified who were knowledgeable of these issues as well. Because we wanted to elicit responses from these individuals also, additional surveys were provided to identified individuals, accompanied with a letter requesting that the surveys be completed by officials in their respective departments or offices who were familiar with these drug enforcement concerns. A total of 190 surveys were sent to law enforcement officials (police and prosecutors) in the four regions (Tri-Code = 40, Northern Controls = 39,

SCNSF = 62, Southern Controls = 49). Of the 190 surveys sent, 80 were sent to named individuals, with 110 surveys sent to unidentified individuals.

The surveys were completely anonymous, with the only identifier being a code for the county from which the survey was returned. Information was also requested regarding task force membership and whether the respondent was a line level enforcement officer or an administrator or policymaker. The initial survey was followed by reminder letter six weeks later. Another follow-up letter, signed by the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, was then sent and included additional surveys for those who had yet to complete them. Ninety-six completed interviews were returned for a total response rate of 51 percent. (The percent response rate by region is as follows: Tri-Code = 45, Northern Controls = 32, SCNSF = 60, Southern Controls = 55).

Archival Data

The third source of data used for this evaluation involved archival records of drug enforcement activity. Through the preliminary interviews with law enforcement officials and prosecutors, it was decided that the most accurate data on drug enforcement activity were to be found in the court records at the respective county courthouses. A coding sheet was constructed to compile arrest, prosecution and sentencing data for all felony drug cases from the 18 counties for the time period of January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1989. Appendix C includes the case coding form used to record the following archival data for all cases involving at least one felony drug charge.

1. Date of filing
2. Name and cause number of defendant
3. County
4. Arresting agency
5. Number of charges
6. Act category of each charge
7. Drug type
8. Amount of drug involved
9. Legal class category of charge
10. Conviction/dismissal

11. Legal class category of conviction
12. Sentence length
13. Fines and fees.

Again, the data collected above refer to felony charges only. However, a good portion of drug enforcement activity involves misdemeanor charges; the most significant being possession of small amounts of marijuana. Understanding this activity is an important aspect of drug enforcement in general, since increases or decreases in misdemeanor drug activity may reflect changes in enforcement efforts or in charging practices. Misdemeanor drug arrests, however, are not a general goal of task force operations and are more likely the by-product of other criminal or traffic offenses. Because of their role, the number of misdemeanor offenses (including date) were recorded for the same time period.

Data Limitations

Several issues arose during the data collection stage which merit mentioning. First, there was considerable disparity in the completeness and accuracy of the court records. While some records contained all the necessary information in one central location, other courts required examination of several different sources in order to obtain all the necessary data. The most significant problems resulted with two of the data elements. First, the arresting agency was often difficult to determine. While it was possible to obtain information on all cases identifying some arresting agency, it was more difficult to determine cases involving multiple agencies or task force operations as they were not always identified in the arrest reports. In order to verify our own data, task force arrests were crosschecked with records from the task forces themselves. We are confident that the cases presented here constitute the total number of cases occurring during this time period. Second, the records seldom contained accurate, if any, information regarding the amount of drugs involved in the offenses. Small law

enforcement agencies are often not equipped to analyze or even weigh the drugs they seize. Even when they can weigh it, or have it weighed and analyzed by the State Police, the information is not often recorded. Some idea of the amount is available on the basis of the legal class of the offense, but this information is of little use in helping to understand the extent to which drug enforcement may affect the availability of drugs in the region. As a result, we removed this data element in our final analysis.

A second source of archival information included the quarterly reports submitted to the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. Those records provided us with information regarding the type and amount of drugs seized in task force operations, as well as information on assets seized and forfeited. Again, however, the usefulness of this information is limited. While it provides some indicator of task force activity, no inferences may be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the task force structure in producing these numbers, since similar data are not available before the task forces came into being or for the control sites. A survey was sent to all law enforcement agencies in the 18 counties requesting this information but the response rate was insufficient for analysis. It can be assumed that the poor response rate is due to the lack of records kept by most agencies on this information. Finally, the quarterly report provided information on task force inputs, particularly regarding funding and the allocation of financial resources.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The evaluation method employed here incorporates a systems approach and examines both the product (results) and process (structure and activities) of the two strike forces. The evaluation entails a pre-post design with comparison groups (similar regions without formal multijurisdictional task forces) and includes data from interviews

with police and prosecutors in the 18 counties, a mail survey of law enforcement officials in both the task force and control sites, and archival records of all felony drug arrests in the 18 counties for a three year period.

CHAPTER NOTES

¹ The data on the 18 counties discussed in this section and presented in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 were taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, County and City Data Book 1988, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, and Indiana Facts, Dallas, TX: Clements Research, 1987.

CHAPTER THREE

NATURE OF DRUG ACTIVITY AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE FOUR REGIONS: PERCEPTIONS OF INDIANA LAW ENFORCERS

In this chapter we examine the perceptions of law enforcement officials from the task force and control sites regarding the nature of the drug problem, their perceptions of the obstacles, resources and support for drug enforcement activity in general, and as they relate to the drug task forces particularly. These general perceptions provide the foundation for a more detailed examination of the organizational structure and activities as well as the interorganizational relationships of the two task forces, which takes place in the next chapter.

THE PERCEIVED NATURE OF THE DRUG PROBLEM

In order to better understand the nature and problems of drug enforcement, information was elicited from officials on the perceived nature of the drug problem in their region. Respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of a number of drugs within their region. As Table 3-1 indicates, marijuana and cocaine were seen as the most serious drug problems. Nearly all of the respondents (97 percent) rated marijuana as either a serious or very serious problem in their regions. Eighty-five percent rated cocaine similarly. The next most serious drug problems were stimulants and LSD with over half the respondents rating these as serious or very serious problems (63 and 56 percent, respectively). Crack, PCP, and heroin, were seen as less serious problems in these counties.

Table 3-2 provides a comparison of the four regions on this item. The southern

Table 3-1

Perceived seriousness of drug problem, by type of drug

	% Reporting				N
	Very serious problem	Serious problem	Minor problem	Not a problem at all	
Marijuana	62	35	3	0	94
Cocaine	46	39	14	1	94
LSD	20	36	39	5	92
Stimulants	13	50	34	2	91
Barbiturates	10	39	46	6	88
Crack	3	14	49	33	90
Heroin	1	4	53	42	91
PCP	0	16	49	35	89

Table 3-2

Perceived seriousness of drug problem, by type of drug and region

	\bar{X}					N		
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC			
Marijuana	3.59	3.56	3.77	ns	3.47	3.50	ns	93
Cocaine	3.30	3.11	3.42	ns	3.37	3.50	ns	93
Stimulants	2.74	2.83	3.16	ns	2.37	2.18	ns	90
LSD	2.69	2.62	2.96	ns	2.37	2.83	ns	91
Barbiturates	2.53	2.59	3.00	*	2.11	2.00	ns	87
Crack	1.86	2.03	1.88	ns	1.78	1.50	ns	89
PCP	1.81	1.83	1.75	ns	1.78	1.92	ns	89
Heroin	1.63	1.54	1.79	ns	1.53	1.75	ns	90

* t-test significant <.05

control region reported barbiturates to be a more serious problem than was the case among respondents from the other regions. Beyond this finding, however, few differences emerged between the four regions.

In addition to the type of drugs, we were also interested in respondents' perceptions of the level of organization of drug activity within the region. Table 3-3 indicates that the two northern regions were described as having more organized activity than the two southern regions. Among Tri-Code respondents, 95 percent described drug activity as either somewhat or highly organized. For the northern control region the figure was 92 percent. On the other hand, the SCNSF and southern control figures were 75 and 62 percent, respectively. This conformed with responses from interviews which attributed the more organized activity in the northern part of the state to trafficking involving the large urban centers of Chicago and Detroit.

Thus, respondents from the four regions tended to describe the drug problem in fairly consistent terms. Marijuana and cocaine were viewed as constituting the most serious drug problems. The majority of respondents viewed drug activity as at least somewhat organized with respondents from the northern regions more likely to describe it as organized than in the southern regions.

CHARACTERIZATION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

Perceptions of Obstacles and Resources

A consistent complaint of law enforcement officials is the lack of resources to address the drug problem. One of the goals of federally funded task forces is to provide resources to local enforcement agencies. Table 3-4 presents the results of an item that asked respondents to characterize the extent to which the lack of enforcement resources constitutes an obstacle to effective enforcement. The two major obstacles

Table 3-3

Perceived nature of drug activity in region

Organization of drug activity	% Reporting				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
Highly organized	13	14	8	16	17
Somewhat organized	65	61	54	79	75
Not very organized	20	22	39	0	8
Don't Know	2	3	0	5	0
N =	94	36	26	19	12

Table 3-4

Perceived obstacles in dealing with drug problems

	% Reporting				N
	Very serious obstacle	Serious obstacle	Minor obstacle	Not an obstacle	
Lack of investigative personnel	63	29	6	2	96
Lack of confidential funds	47	36	16	1	95
Lack of vehicles	30	34	26	9	96
Lack of equipment	29	39	23	9	94
Lenient criminal sentences	23	33	31	12	96
Unreliable informants	16	23	48	13	94
Lack of prosecutorial personnel	13	28	32	27	95
Lack of drug education programs	7	36	33	24	95
Lack of drug rehabilitation programs	5	30	39	26	95

appear to be lack of investigative personnel and lack of confidential funds. Over 90 percent of the respondents considered lack of investigative personnel a serious or very serious obstacle. Over four-fifths rated lack of confidential funds as a serious or very serious obstacle. These findings were reinforced in the interviews where respondents often claimed that they could make as many cases as their manpower would allow. The lack of confidential funds, or buy money, was also described as an obstacle to effectively moving up the ladder of organized drug activity. That is, while confidential funds were available for relatively small buys, the lack of funds became an obstacle when investigating cases involving larger amounts of drugs. As one officer explained, "we've cultivated networks, now we have no buy money. You can't go after a major seller with \$10.00."

The next major obstacles related to equipment, such as surveillance devices and automobiles. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents rated lack of equipment and lack of vehicles as serious or very serious obstacles to effective drug enforcement. Just over half the respondents considered lenient sentences a serious or very serious obstacle. Lack of prosecutorial personnel, unreliable informants, lack of rehabilitation programs, and lack of drug education programs, were considered to be less serious obstacles. This, of course, may reflect the law enforcement/prosecution perspective of our respondents and the findings might be quite different if defense lawyers and treatment personnel were included in the survey.

Table 3-5 presents the same data but with the findings broken down by region. Generally, respondents from all four regions tended to rate the obstacles very consistently. The main exceptions to this pattern occurred in the northern region where the northern control respondents viewed prosecutorial resources as less of an obstacle than did Tri-Code respondents and Tri-Code respondents were more likely to rate the lack of drug rehabilitation and education programs as obstacles.

Table 3-5

Perceived obstacles in dealing with drug problems, by region

	\bar{X}					Tri-Code	NC		N
	Total	SCNSF	SC						
Lack of investigative personnel	3.52	3.54	3.59	ns	3.37	3.50	ns	96	
Lack of confidential funds	3.29	3.43	3.31	ns	3.05	3.17	ns	95	
Lack of equipment	2.88	2.86	2.96	ns	2.68	3.08	ns	94	
Lack of vehicles	2.85	2.81	2.78	ns	2.89	3.08	ns	96	
Lenient criminal sentences	2.66	2.78	2.74	ns	2.53	2.33	ns	96	
Unreliable informants	2.43	2.56	2.31	ns	2.37	2.42	ns	94	
Lack of prosecutorial personnel	2.28	2.32	2.42	ns	2.63	1.25	*	95	
Lack of drug education programs	2.27	2.14	2.44	ns	2.47	1.91	*	95	
Lack of drug rehabilitation programs	2.14	2.08	2.15	ns	2.42	1.82	*	95	

* t-test significant < .05

An additional item addressed very similar concerns by asking respondents to rate the adequacy of selected resources. As Table 3-6 indicates, investigative personnel, confidential funds, vehicles and equipment were rated as the most inadequate resources. Table 3-7 contrasts the four regions on the resource item. It is interesting to note that Tri-Code respondents, where federal funds were used to purchase vehicles and equipment, rated the adequacy of these two resources higher than did the northern control respondents. On the other hand, northern control respondents described prosecutorial and drug education resources as more adequate. No significant differences emerged between the SCNSF and southern control respondents.

Perceived Support for Drug Enforcement Activities

Related to the issue of resources is the level of support both within the department and from local government. Table 3-8 compares the perceived support from local government and within the department for the four regions. It is clear that respondents perceived higher levels of support within the department than in local government. There were not significant differences between the four regions with the exception that respondents from the SCNSF region perceived lower levels of support within their departments.

Respondents were also asked to rate the priority of drug cases within the prosecutors office and the severity of sentences in drug cases. As Table 3-9 indicates, respondents from all four regions rated the priority given to drug cases relatively high. The northern control region was higher than any of the others but was not statistically different from Tri-Code. There was less satisfaction with the severity of sentences, particularly in the southern regions although, again, the differences were not dramatic (see Table 3-10).

Table 3-6

Perceived adequacy of resources for dealing with drug problem

	% Reporting				N
	Very adequate	Adequate	Inadequate	Very inadequate	
Confidential funds	0	17	37	46	95
Investigative personnel	1	7	54	38	95
Equipment	3	27	41	29	96
Vehicles	2	26	45	27	96
Prosecutorial personnel	8	50	31	12	95
Drug rehabilitation programs	4	39	47	10	94
Drug education programs	8	37	47	9	93

Table 3-7

Perceived adequacy of resources for dealing with drug problem, by region

	\bar{X}					NC		N
	Total	SCNSF	SC		Tri-Code			
Confidential funds	1.71	1.65	1.63	ns	2.06	1.58	ns	95
Investigative personnel	1.72	1.69	1.56	ns	1.84	2.00	ns	95
Equipment	2.04	1.97	1.89	ns	2.47	1.92	*	96
Vehicles	2.04	1.94	2.07	ns	2.32	1.83	*	96
Drug rehabilitation programs	2.39	2.38	2.42	ns	2.26	2.54	ns	94
Drug education programs	2.43	2.51	2.36	ns	2.21	2.73	*	93
Prosecutorial personnel	2.54	2.50	2.33	ns	2.42	3.33	*	95

* t-test significant < .05

Table 3-8

Perceived support for drug enforcement activities from local government and within department, by region

	\bar{X}				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
Support from city and county government	2.86	2.91	2.69 ns	3.10	2.67 ns
Support within department	3.89	3.46	4.27 *	4.00	4.27 ns

N = 93

* t-test significant <.05

Table 3-9

Perceived priority of drug cases within county prosecutor's office, by region

	\bar{X}				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
	3.76	3.65	3.48 ns	3.95	4.42 ns

N = 94

Table 3-10

Perceived severity of sentences in drug cases in county, by region

	\bar{x}				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
	2.37	2.32	2.12 ns	2.68	2.58 ns

N = 95

PERCEIVED GOALS OF STRIKE FORCE

We move now from questions regarding general drug enforcement concerns to those dealing more specifically with the strike forces themselves. Federally funded multijurisdictional strike forces are designed to reduce the availability and use of illegal drugs. The creation of the strike forces is intended to enhance the ability of law enforcement officials to target drug organizations and apprehend and prosecute dealers. In addition, the task forces are intended to improve communication and coordination among law enforcement agencies, to develop asset seizure and forfeiture capabilities, and (often) to develop drug awareness programs. As a way to determine whether these general goals of federally funded strike forces were considered goals of the SCNSF and Tri-Code strike forces, respondents were asked to prioritize from a list of goal statements.

Table 3-11 presents the results from these items. Overall, it was clear that four of the hypothesized goals of strike forces were considered high priorities of the task forces by law enforcement officials in the two regions. In the vicinity of three-fourths of the officials considered "increased penetration of drug organizations and networks" and "enhanced communication and cooperation" a "high priority". Well over one-half considered "development of a viable asset seizure program" and "increased apprehension and prosecution of dealers" a "high priority". In contrast, "increased apprehension and prosecution of users" was considered a "low priority" by over half the respondents. Thus, it appears that the goal of targeting higher level dealers and drug networks is accepted and shared by law enforcement officials in the task force regions.

While these results appeared fairly consistent in the two regions, there did appear to be a somewhat stronger enforcement focus in Tri-Code as compared to SCNSF. This showed up in the finding that 42 percent of the SCNSF respondents considered

Table 3-11

Perceived goals of Strike Force, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Increased penetration of drug organizations and networks:				
High priority	79	71	94	ns
Medium priority	8	9	6	
Low priority	13	20	0	
Enhanced communication and cooperation:				
High priority	70	69	72	ns
Medium priority	8	6	11	
Low priority	23	26	17	
Development of viable asset seizure program:				
High priority	62	49	89	**
Medium priority	9	9	11	
Low priority	28	43	0	
Increased apprehension and prosecution of dealers:				
High priority	59	60	56	ns
Medium priority	21	14	33	
Low priority	21	26	11	
Increased apprehension and prosecution of users:				
High priority	29	35	17	ns
Medium priority	14	9	22	
Low priority	58	56	61	
Development of a drug awareness program:				
High priority	15	24	0	*
Medium priority	14	18	6	
Low priority	71	59	94	

N = 53

** Chi-square significant <.01

* Chi-square significant <.05

"development of a drug awareness program" a high or medium priority while only 6 percent of Tri-Code officials responded as such. Similarly, although SCNSF officials by and large considered penetration of drug organizations and networks a high priority, 20 percent did not view such a goal as a high priority. No respondents from Tri-Code considered this a low priority. Finally, it appeared that developing a viable asset seizure program was a higher priority in Tri-Code than in SCNSF. These responses reflect the goals as articulated in the two strike force proposals.

We also asked whether the goals of the strike force had changed since its implementation. Ninety percent answered no (86 and 94 percent in SCNSF and Tri-Code, respectively).

The final item related to strike force goals concerned satisfaction with the goals. As Table 3-12 indicates, there was a significant difference between the two sites on this item. One-hundred percent of the Tri-Code respondents expressed satisfaction with the goals of the strike force. In contrast, 61 percent of the SCNSF respondents answered as such. Thus, while the majority of SCNSF respondents were satisfied, a sizable proportion were not. Possible sources of this dissatisfaction will be addressed in subsequent sections.

PERCEIVED SUPPORT, FEDERAL FUNDING, AND ASSET SEIZURES

Perceived Support

Significant differences between the two task force sites also emerged in terms of the level of perceived support for the strike force within the department and the community. As Table 3-13 indicates, while 60 percent of the SCNSF respondents reported high support from their department, nearly 90 percent of the Tri-Code respondents perceived high departmental support. Even more striking was the

Table 3-12

Reported satisfaction with goals of Strike Force, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Satisfied	76	61	100	**
Dissatisfied	24	39	0	
N =	49	31	18	

** Chi-square significant <.01

Table 3-13

Perceived support for Strike Force, by site

		% Reporting			
		Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Support within department:					
	High support	70	60	89	*
	Low support	30	40	11	
	N =	53	35	18	
Support within community:					
	High support	35	19	67	**
	Low support	39	47	22	
	Don't know	26	33	11	
	N =	53	36	18	

* <.05

** <.01

** Chi-square significant <.01

distinction in terms of community support. Whereas two-thirds of the Tri-Code respondents reported high community support, only 19 percent of the SCNSF respondents did. In addition, a sizable proportion (33 percent) of the respondents responded "don't know." This difference may be accounted for by the commitment or lack thereof of local financial resources for the creation of the task forces. Whereas all three counties in Tri-Code contributed resources to the strike force, only Monroe County and the agencies within it were able to provide resource support for the strike force. While the failure to commit resources may be due to a lack of support for the idea of a strike force, it seems more likely that local communities simply don't have the financial resources to contribute beyond basic services. These issues will be explored in greater detail later.

Perceived Role of Funding in Creating and Maintaining Strike Force

Respondents in both sites were nearly unanimous (97 and 94 percent in SCNSF and Tri-Code respectively) that the strike force would not have been created without the support of federal funds. This point was also made in interviews and was considered particularly true given the small population base of most of the participating counties. Law enforcement officials in these counties continually remarked on how the small sheriff and police departments simply could not afford to devote an officer full-time to drug enforcement given the other demands on their personnel. The federal funds allowed several departments to commit an officer to the strike force as well as providing funds for vehicles, equipment, and buy money. Logically, officials have expressed concerns in interviews about continued funding. As one officer noted, "these funds have helped to create this animal that keeps growing and growing. You have to be able to feed it, or it will die."

While the federal grant money was considered crucial in establishing the strike

forces, asset seizure and forfeiture provisions were considered by some as a means for long-term support of the strike force. As noted earlier, one of the goals of the multijurisdictional strike force concept, both in terms of the grant sponsors and the participants in the survey, was to allow local departments to create a viable asset seizure/forfeiture program. Our initial interviews indicated that participants were optimistic that forfeitures could support the strike force. Later interviews and the survey responses suggested more caution, particularly among SCNSF respondents.

As Table 3-14 shows, over half the SCNSF respondents do not believe asset seizure/forfeiture proceeds can support the strike force. Only 12 percent believe such provisions can support the strike force with the remaining 32 percent unsure at this time. Tri-Code respondents were much more likely to view forfeiture funds as being able to support the strike force although 22 percent responded that such funds cannot support the strike force. These issues are further addressed in subsequent sections dealing with asset seizure and forfeiture.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Law enforcement officials in the four regions included in this study see marijuana and cocaine as the most serious drug problems in their regions. Efforts to deal with the drug problem are believed to be hampered by a lack of investigative personnel and confidential funds. The multijurisdictional task forces, created through the federally funded grants, are viewed as vehicles to allow local law enforcement officials to conduct more sophisticated investigations of drug organizations and networks involved in the distribution of marijuana, cocaine and other drugs. In the next chapter we examine the structure of the strike forces and evidence concerning the effect of the strike forces on inter-agency relationships.

Table 3-14

Perceived role of asset seizures and forfeitures in future support of Strike Force, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Yes, can support	33	12	72	***
No, cannot support	44	56	22	
Cannot tell at this time	23	32	6	
N =	52	34	18	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

CHAPTER FOUR

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE STRIKE FORCES

Implementation of a federally funded drug strike force entails creating a new organizational structure and establishing or formalizing interorganizational or inter-agency relationships. Basic to successful implementation will be the development of an organizational structure that can support task force activities and be accepted by officials from relevant law enforcement agencies. In addition, by its very nature the multijurisdictional strike force is dependent on effective interorganizational communication and cooperation. In this chapter, we review findings on the acceptance of the organizational structure of the task force. In addition, we examine evidence on the impact of the task force on inter-agency relationships.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Perceptions of Organizational Structure

Table 4-1 presents the results of a question that asked respondents whether they were satisfied with the organizational structure of the strike force. As the table indicates, respondents from the Tri-Code region were much more likely to say they were satisfied than were respondents in the SCNSF region. Table 4-2 shows a very similar pattern with respect to satisfaction with strike force personnel. An interesting finding was that 42 percent of the SCNSF respondents compared to 11 percent of the Tri-Code respondents reported "don't know" to this item.

Successful implementation of federally funded projects can require adaptation of

Table 4-1

Reported satisfaction with organizational structure of Strike Force

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Satisfied	58	41	83	**
Not satisfied	42	59	17	
N =	45	27	18	

** Chi-square significant <.01

Table 4-2

Reported satisfaction with composition of Strike Force personnel, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Satisfied	46	31	78	**
Dissatisfied	22	28	11	
Don't know	32	42	11	
N =	54	36	18	

** Chi-square significant <.01

the program to meet local needs.¹ Table 4-3 asked whether the organizational structure of the strike force had changed since its inception. Relatively similar proportions of SCNSF and Tri-Code respondents (29 and 22 percent respectively) reported that the structure had changed. However, a much higher proportion of Tri-Code respondents reported that there had been little or no change. In contrast, the majority of SCNSF officials (60 percent) responded "don't know."

Participants in the survey were also asked whether they could name the members of the Strike Force's Coordinating Committee. Whereas 83 percent of the Tri-Code respondents could name the members, only 32 percent of the SCNSF respondents could do so (see Table 4-4).

The significant difference between the two sites in terms of knowledge of the Coordinating Committees, coupled with the sizable proportions of officials responding "don't know" to the items on organizational structure, suggests that one important distinction between the two sites is the knowledge or awareness among law enforcement officials of the strike force's structure and activities. This, of course, may be a product of the contrasting organizational structures of the two strike forces. Recall that Tri-Code is a three county operation in which the sheriffs department of all three counties has an officer assigned to the strike force. In contrast, SCNSF is centered in one county with service to five surrounding counties. Further, the full-time officers on the strike force are all members of law enforcement agencies within the hub county (Monroe). These different structures may lead to different flows of information about the strike forces and different levels of awareness among law enforcement officials. This issue will be explored in depth in subsequent sections.

Allocation of Strike Force Funds

A potential stumbling block for multijurisdictional task forces is to gain

Table 4-3

Reported changes in organizational structure of Strike Force since its inception, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Great deal or moderate change	26	29	22	***
Little or no change	32	11	72	
Don't know	42	60	6	
N =	53	35	18	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Table 4-4

Knowledge of Strike Forces' coordinating committee, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Yes, can name	50	32	83	***
No, cannot name	50	68	17	
N =	52	34	18	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

acceptance for the allocation of project funds. As Table 4-5 indicates, there appears to be greater satisfaction with the allocation of funds in the Tri-Code region than in the SCNSF region. In both sites, one-third of the respondents appeared not to know enough about allocation of funds and responded "don't know."

One of the reasons for the higher level of dissatisfaction in the SCNSF region may be traced to an incident in the first few months of the strike force operation. The first individual hired as Chief of Operations gained a degree of notoriety in the law enforcement community by leasing a red corvette to use in undercover operations. This individual was fired and replaced by a highly respected officer but it appeared that damage to the reputation of the strike force had been done. Repeatedly in our interviews and in written comments on the survey, law enforcement officials outside the strike force implored us to "check into the red corvette." The reaction to the incident points to the importance of communication in the initial stages of a project such as a task force. This may be particularly important in an area such as drug enforcement that has traditionally been associated with problems of corruption.

The importance of continued communication with ongoing funding allocation decisions also seems clear. Several officials in Tri-Code noted some concern about the allocation of funds from the second year grant award, as well as concerns with the distribution and allocations of money received through asset forfeitures. However, they all agreed that the issues were quickly clarified and resolved in a special meeting held to address the concerns. As noted earlier, the intended regular meetings of the Coordinating Committee of the SCNSF were discontinued shortly after the task force became operational. While officials from the participating agencies did meet to discuss other law enforcement issues on a regular basis, it does not appear that there was a formal mechanism or forum to address these important task force concerns.

Table 4-5

Reported satisfaction with allocation of money for Strike Force operation, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Satisfied	28	17	50	*
Dissatisfied	39	50	17	
Don't know	33	33	33	
N =	54	36	18	

* Chi-square significant <.05

Table 4-6

Perceived successful implementation of Strike Force, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Agree	60	42	94	***
Disagree	40	58	6	
N =	48	31	17	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Perceived Implementation and Acceptance

Students of implementation often find a disjuncture between the idea or goals for a project such as a task force and its actual implementation.² Consequently, participants in the survey were asked to assess the success of the strike force's implementation and its acceptance by law enforcement officers in the region.

As Table 4-6 indicates, there was a significant discrepancy between Tri-Code and SCNSF respondents on the perceived success of the task force's implementation. Tri-Code respondents were much more likely to report that the strike force had been successfully implemented than were respondents in the SCNSF region. Similarly, as displayed in Table 4-7, Tri-Code respondents were much more likely to see the strike force as well accepted by law enforcement officers than were respondents in the SCNSF region.

Effect on Morale

One possible effect of the multijurisdictional task force is that the increased attention to and resources for drug enforcement activities may lead to improved morale among drug enforcement officers. Table 4-8 provides a contrast across all four sites. Both strike force sites report higher levels of morale than in the control sites with the difference between Tri-Code and the north control reaching statistical significance.

When asked whether the strike force had affected morale, Tri-Code respondents were more likely to respond that it had increased morale than were SCNSF respondents (see Table 4-9). Once again, a significant proportion (30 percent) of the SCNSF officials responded "don't know".

Table 4-7

Perceived acceptance of Strike Force by other law enforcement officers

		% Reporting			
		Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Strike Force has been well-accepted:					
Agree		56	44	78	*
Disagree		44	56	22	
	N =	50	32	18	

* Chi-square significant < .05

Table 4-8

Perceived morale of drug enforcement officers in region, by region

		X					
		Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC	
	3.12	3.15	2.85 ns	3.61	2.92	*	
N =	90	34	26	18	12		

* t-test significant < .05

Table 4-9

Perceived effect of Strike Force on morale of drug enforcement officers in region, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Increased	29	14	61	***
Not affected or decreased	49	57	33	
Do not know	22	30	6	
N =	55	37	18	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Table 4-10

Perceived helpfulness of other local agencies in drug enforcement activity, by region

	X					
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC	
N =	93	36	26	19	12	*
	2.61	2.47	2.65 ns	3.00	2.33	

* t-test significant <.05

INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

Perceived Levels of Communication and Coordination

One of the main goals of the federally funded multijurisdictional strike forces is to increase communication and coordination among law enforcement agencies. Because illegal drug trafficking typically entails crossing jurisdictional boundaries and because of the need for extensive intelligence systems for targeting organized drug networks, increased communication and coordination among local, state, and federal agencies is viewed as an essential ingredient in effective drug enforcement.

The first item relating to inter-agency relations was a very general question about the helpfulness of other local law enforcement agencies in drug enforcement activity. As Table 4-10 shows, responses from the two southern regions were very similar. Tri-Code respondents, however, were more likely to give high ratings on the helpfulness item than were the north control officials (and higher than either of the southern sites). This may be an indicator of a positive effect of Tri-Code on inter-agency relations. On the other hand, it may be indicative of stronger pre-existing relationships that may be an important environmental trait of the law enforcement agencies in the LaPorte, Pulaski, and Starke region.

An additional item focusing on communication asked how willing law enforcement agencies within the region were to share drug enforcement information. Table 4-11 indicates that the Tri-Code and SCNSF regions had greater proportions of respondents reporting that agencies were very open and willing to share information than in either of the control sites. When comparing mean responses, however, the differences between Tri-Code and the north control region were not statistically significant. On the other hand, the difference between SCNSF and south control respondents was significant with more reported willingness to share information in the SCNSF region.

Table 4-11

Perceived willingness of law enforcement agencies in region to share drug enforcement information, by region

	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
Agencies very guarded, will not share information	17	14	27	16	8
Agencies somewhat guarded, will occasionally share information	66	64	69	53	83
Agencies very open, will readily share information	17	22	4	32	8
\bar{X}	2.00	2.08	1.77*	2.16	2.00 ns
N =	93	36	26	19	12

*t-test significant <.05

Tables 4-12 and 4-13 present the results to a set of items that asked respondents to characterize levels of communication and cooperation between law enforcement agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. Table 4-12 presents the overall results. Generally, there seems to be better communication and cooperation at the horizontal level, i.e., between local agencies, than at the vertical level, between local agencies and either state or federal agencies. This is most apparent when comparing the final column of the Table. Whereas less than one-third of the respondents characterized local level communication as "poor," nearly one-half described communication between local agencies and the State Police as poor and 60 percent so described communication between local and federal agencies.

Table 4-13 presents the same data but broken down by region. Respondents from Tri-Code consistently reported better communication and cooperation at all levels of law enforcement and several of these differences were statistically significant. A similar picture (with the exception of communication between local agencies where the south control mean response was slightly higher) emerged when contrasting SCNSF and south control, particularly with respect to communication and cooperation between local and federal agencies. Although this may indicate stronger pre-existing relationships between agencies in the two strike force regions, the findings are consistent with the policy goal of increased communication and cooperation.

Inter-agency Contacts

Another indicator of inter-agency relationships is the level of contacts between personnel in respective agencies. Table 4-14 presents the results of an item that asked respondents how often during the last month they had contacts with someone from another local, state, or federal law enforcement agency. The differences between SCNSF and south control were slight when placed in the context of local contacts or

Table 4-12

Perceived communication and cooperation between law enforcement officials in region

		% Reporting			
		Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor
Communication:					
Local level		3	31	37	29
Local-state		9	19	26	47
Local-federal		6	11	23	60
Cooperation:					
Local level		10	37	35	18
Local-state		7	31	25	37
Local-federal		9	13	33	46
	N =	94			

Table 4-13

Perceived communication and cooperation between law enforcement officials in region, by region

	\bar{X}				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
Communication:					
Local level	2.10	1.97	2.08 ns	2.56	1.83 *
Local-State	1.90	2.05	1.65 ns	2.28	1.42 *
Local-Federal	1.64	1.86	1.23 *	1.94	1.42 ns
Cooperation:					
Local level	2.39	2.40	2.23 ns	2.72	2.17 ns
Local-State	2.08	2.24	1.77 ns	2.42	1.75 *
Local-Federal	1.84	2.14	1.27 *	2.10	1.75 ns
N =	93	37	26	18	12

* t-test significant <.05

Table 4-14

Reported contacts regarding drug enforcement with officials in other agencies, by region

	% Reporting				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
<u>Contact during last month</u>					
With another local level agency:					
Never	11	17	4 ns	5	20 ns
One to five times	49	50	60	32	50
Six or more	40	33	36	63	30
With Indiana State Police:					
Never	34	29	39 ns	32	50 ns
One to five times	39	43	31	42	40
Six or more	27	29	31	26	10
With FBI or DEA:					
Never	61	56	81 ns	39	70 ns
One to five times	32	33	19	50	30
Six or more	7	11	0	11	0
N =	90	36	26	19	10

contacts with the State Police. However, as was the case with reported levels of communication and cooperation, SCNSF respondents reported more contacts with federal agencies (DEA and FBI). The differences between Tri-Code and north control respondents were more consistent at all three levels. Sixty-three percent of Tri-Code respondents compared to 30 percent of north control respondents reported six or more contacts with another local agency. Sixty-eight and 61 percent of Tri-Code respondents reported at least one contact with the State Police and federal agencies, respectively. The comparable figures for north control were 50 and 30 percent, respectively.

Table 4-15 reports the findings from a similar item that asked how many times during the last six months the respondent had worked with officials from other agencies on drug enforcement activities. The findings are quite similar to those for reported contacts. The differences between SCNSF and south control were not large with respect to working with local agencies or the State Police. There was a significant difference, however, when asked about work with federal agencies. Forty-six percent of the SCNSF officials reported working with a federal agency on drug enforcement whereas only 12 percent of the south control officials reported such work. Again, the differences between Tri-Code and north control respondents were consistent at all three levels of agency relationships with Tri-Code officials much more likely to have worked with another agency.

Perceived Effect of Strike Force on Communication and Cooperation

The findings reported above suggest that the strike force may have led to increased communication, cooperation, and joint drug enforcement activities between local agencies, local agencies and the State Police, and between local and federal agencies. In order to further investigate this issue, respondents were asked whether they believed the strike force had affected communication and cooperation among

Table 4-15

Reported times worked on drug enforcement with officials in other agencies, by region

	% Reporting				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
<u>Worked with during last six months:</u>					
Another local level agency:					
Never	11	14	16 ns	0	10 ns
One to five times	46	43	52	37	60
Six or more	43	43	32	63	30
Indiana State Police:					
Never	31	36	28 ns	11	60 *
One to five times	37	28	44	47	30
Six or more	32	36	28	42	10
FBI or DEA:					
Never	59	54	88 *	28	60 ns
One to five times	28	27	12	44	40
Six or more	13	19	0	28	0
N =	91	37	25	19	10

* Chi-square significant <.05

officials of these various agencies.

As Table 4-16 indicates, it is clear that Tri-Code respondents were much more likely to attribute increased inter-agency communication to the creation of the strike force than were respondents from the SCNSF region. Whereas two-thirds or more of the Tri-Code respondents agreed that the strike force increased communication between local agencies and between local-state and local-federal agencies, less than half the SCNSF respondents agreed. Similarly, as Table 4-17 shows, the results were nearly identical when the item addressed levels of cooperation. Finally, and consistent with the findings on communication and cooperation, Table 4-18 presents very similar findings to a question that asked whether the strike force led to increased sharing of intelligence information by law enforcement agencies.

TASK FORCE STRUCTURE AND SATISFACTION

The findings from the survey that contrast Tri-Code and SCNSF regional respondents on perceptions of the strike force, indicate higher levels of satisfaction within the Tri-Code region than in the SCNSF region. Our interviews indicated that the dissatisfaction within the SCNSF region came primarily from law enforcement officials within the counties surrounding Monroe County where SCNSF was headquartered. Many of these officials complained that they did not have sufficient voice in the administration of the strike force and that they were not kept apprised of what the strike force was doing. One prosecutor from a surrounding county stated, "I don't have a clue of what the task force is doing." This sentiment was echoed by several sheriffs who indicated that they had no contact with the task force nor were they aware of its activities.

In contrast, officials from Tri-Code, while not always aware of the day-to-day operations of the strike force, did say that they felt they were in touch with the general

Table 4-16

Perceived effect of Strike Force on communication among law enforcement agencies, by agency and site

	SCNSF	Tri-Code	N
Increased communication among local law enforcement:			
Agree	44	77	*
Disagree	56	24	
Increased communication between local and state police:			
Agree	18	67	***
Disagree	82	33	
Increased communication between local and federal law enforcement agencies:			
Agree	43	67	ns
Disagree	57	33	
N =	34	17	

* Chi-square significant <.05

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Table 4-17

Perceived effect of Strike Force on cooperation among law enforcement agencies, by agency and site

	SCNSF	Tri-Code	N
Increased cooperation among local law enforcement agencies:			
Agree	47	89	**
Disagree	53	11	
Increased cooperation between local and state police:			
Agree	19	61	**
Disagree	81	39	
Increased cooperation between local and federal law enforcement agencies:			
Agree	46	65	ns
Disagree	54	35	
N =	32	18	

** Chi-square significant < .01

Table 4-18

Perceived effect of Strike Force on sharing of intelligence information among law enforcement agencies, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Strike Force has increased information sharing:				
Agree	53	44	71	ns
Disagree	47	56	29	
	N =	49	32	17

Table 4-20

Reported involvement in South Central Narcotics Strike Force decisionmaking, by county

Involvement:	Monroe	Non-Monroe SCNSF	
Moderate or great deal	50	9	**
Little or no	50	91	
Satisfaction:			
Yes	64	19	**
No	36	81	

** Chi-square significant <.01

County officials reported at least moderate involvement while only nine percent of the non-Monroe officials reported such involvement. When asked whether they were satisfied with their involvement, nearly two-thirds of the Monroe officials said they were while only 19 percent of the respondents from the surrounding counties stated they were satisfied. These findings were supported in the interviews. For example, one prosecutor from a surrounding county said, "I don't have any influence in task force policymaking." And one sheriff noted, "they (SCNSF) may be doing stuff but nothing that I am aware of, or that we've been a part of." Thus, it appears that the task force structure adopted in the SCNSF region, with a central county housing the unit and supplying the personnel, and servicing the surrounding counties, faces obstacles in keeping officials from the surrounding counties satisfactorily involved in the strike force operation. This lack of involvement, in turn, may lead to lower levels of satisfaction with the strike force and more negative evaluations by law enforcement officials.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Comparison of the two strike force regions with the control sites suggests that the strike forces may have led to improved communication and coordination and increased contacts between law enforcement agencies. Officials from the strike force sites, particularly from Tri-Code, attribute improved relationships to the strike force. We cannot rule out, however, the possibility that these findings reflect more positive inter-agency relationships prior to the creation of the strike force.

When the two strike force regions are contrasted, Tri-Code respondents report higher levels of satisfaction with and knowledge of the strike force. This discrepancy, in turn, seems attributable to the different structures adopted by the two strike forces.

CHAPTER NOTES

¹ Musheno, Michael et al. "Evaluating the Implementation of Community Corrections." In Duffee, D. and E. McGarrell, Community Corrections: A Community Field Approach. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson pps. 251-268.

² Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron B. Wildavsky. Implementation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTS ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

Although changing organizational relationships is one key goal of the federally funded multijurisdictional strike forces, the broader goal is to increase law enforcement effectiveness so as to reduce the distribution and use of illegal drugs. This chapter considers a number of indicators of these potential outcomes. Included are survey data on perceived outcomes, data on arrests, and data on drug and asset seizures.

PERCEIVED IMPACT

One set of indicators of the impact of the multijurisdictional strike forces is the perceived effect of the strike force on organizational and community relationships and characteristics. A number of survey items were designed to measure these perceived outcomes.

Effect on Drug Enforcement Activities

Table 5-1 reports the results from several items that asked respondents how often they were involved in select drug enforcement activities. There did not appear to be consistent differences between the strike force sites and their control sites. Tri-Code respondents were, however, much more likely to have used confidential funds than were the north control officials. This may reflect the increased availability of buy money due to the grant. In contrast, the south control respondents reported having passed on

Table 5-2

Reported increase in contacts with informants since Strike Force became operational

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Increased contacts	42	32	61	ns
No change or decreased contacts	34	38	28	
Don't know	24	30	11	
N =	55	37	18	

Table 5-3

Perceived effect of Strike Force on quality of drug cases in region, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Increased quality cases	34	19	67	**
Not affected or reduced quality cases	40	46	28	
Don't know	26	35	6	
N =	55	37	18	

** chi-square significant <.01

Table 5-4

Reported awareness of general public of drug enforcement activities in region, by region

	\bar{X}				
	Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC
	2.58	2.53	2.50 ns	2.84	2.50 ns
N =	93	36	26	19	12

Table 5-5

Perceived effectiveness of Strike Force in increasing drug awareness in community

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Effective	46	31	72	**
Not effective	54	69	28	
N =	50	32	18	

** Chi-square significant <.01

Overall Assessment of Effectiveness

When asked to assess the effectiveness of drug enforcement activities within their communities, Tri-Code respondents tended to give higher ratings (see Table 5-6). The other three regions were quite similar. When asked about the effectiveness of the strike force as a means of addressing illegal drug activity, respondents from both the SCNSF and Tri-Code regions were very likely to view the strike force as effective (see Table 5-7).

When the items became more specific, however, differences between the two task force sites emerged. Table 5-8 presents the results of an item that addressed whether the strike force had allowed drug enforcement officials "to move beyond low-level dealers and focus on highly organized drug activity." Nearly 90 percent of the Tri-Code respondents agreed with this item compared to 19 percent of the SCNSF respondents. Similarly, as shown in Table 5-9, Tri-Code regional officials were much more likely to believe the strike force had been effective in reducing availability of illegal drugs than were officials in the SCNSF region. Thus, while drug enforcement officials in both task force sites were in agreement that the strike force was an effective drug enforcement tool, those from the Tri-Code region were much more positive about the effects of the strike force on targeting organized drug networks and reducing availability.

Further examination of the data indicated that, as discussed in Chapter Four, the lower ratings of effectiveness in the SCNSF region came primarily from officials outside Monroe County. As Table 5-10 indicates, there were significant differences between Monroe County respondents and officials from the surrounding counties on whether the strike force had allowed drug enforcement officials to focus on more highly organized activity and on whether the strike force had reduced the availability of illegal drugs in the community. Thus, differences in the perceived effectiveness of the strike force again

Table 5-6

Perceived effectiveness of drug enforcement activities in community, by region

	X				
Total	SCNSF	SC	Tri-Code	NC	
2.98	2.78	2.88 ns	3.44	3.08 ns	
N = 92	36	26	18	12	

Table 5-7

Perceived effectiveness of Strike Force as means to address illegal drug activity, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Agree	90	87	94	ns
Disagree	10	13	6	
	N =	48	30	18

Table 5-8

Perceived effects of Strike Force on targets of drug enforcement activity, by site

	% Reporting			
	Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Strike Force has allowed us to move beyond low-level dealers and focus on highly organized drug activity:				
Agree	42	19	89	***
Disagree	38	54	6	
Don't know	11	27	6	
N =	55	37	18	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Table 5-9

Perceived effectiveness of Strike Force in reducing availability of illegal drugs, by site

		% Reporting			
		Total	SCNSF	Tri-Code	
Effective		35	18	71	***
Not effective		65	82	29	
	N =	51	34	17	

*** Chi-square significant <.001

Table 5-10

Perceptions of effectiveness of South Central Narcotics Strike Force by County

	Total	Monroe	Other SCNSF County
Strike Force has allowed us to move beyond low-level dealers and focus on highly organized drug activity:			
Agree	19	43	4 **
Disagree	81	57	96
N =	37	14	23

** Chi-square significant $\leq .01$

How effective has the strike force been in reducing the availability of illegal drugs in your community:

Effective	18	36	5 *
Not Effective	82	64	95
N =	34	14	20

* Chi-square significant $\leq .05$

appear to be influenced by the structure of the strike force.

ARRESTS

Chief among the goals of multijurisdictional task forces is to increase both the frequency and the quality of drug arrests. In order to assess the extent to which the task forces accomplished this goal, information was collected on all felony drug arrests occurring within the 18 counties of the strike force and control regions from 1987 through 1989 (see Chapter Two for a discussion of method).

Characteristics of Drug Arrests in the 18 Counties

During the three year period, there were 1472 felony drug arrests. As Table 5-11 indicates, the arrests were evenly divided between dealing charges and possession charges. These two types of offenses comprised 90 percent of all felony drug arrests. Marijuana was the most common drug type comprising nearly half the arrests (see Table 5-12). Cocaine was the second most common drug type constituting 30 percent of the arrests. The only other drug type that comprised a substantial number of charges (18 percent) was the general category of controlled substance which in Indiana may involve marijuana, cocaine, or any of a number of other drug types. Nearly two-thirds of the cases involved Class D charges, the least serious felony charge (see Table 5-13). Class B and A each comprised 14 percent of the charges, while eight percent of the cases were Class C charges.

Comparisons Across Regions and Over Time

Table 5-14 provides comparisons for the four regions during the pre-task force and task force periods. For the northern region, the pre-task force period covers the 16

Table 5-11

Total Arrests by Offense Type

Arrests		
Offense Type	Number	Percent
Dealing	659	45
Possession	657	45
Conspiracy to Deal	70	5
Attempt to Obtain	28	2
Conspiracy to Obtain	11	1
Attempt to Deal	7	<1
Cultivating	6	<1
Conspiracy to Traffic	4	<1
Other	30	2
TOTAL	1472	100.0

Table 5-12

Total Arrests by Drug Type

Arrests		
Drug Type	Number	Percent
Marijuana	671	46
Cocaine	439	30
Controlled Substance	269	18
Narcotic Drug	39	3
Paraphernalia	23	2
Hashish	4	<1
Heroin	2	<1
Amphetamines	1	<1
LSD	1	<1
Other	23	2
TOTAL	1472	100.0

Table 5-13

Arrests by Class of Offense

Arrests		
Class of Offense	Number	Percent
Class D felony	932	64
Class C felony	122	8
Class B felony	204	14
Class A felony	202	14
TOTAL	1460	

Table 5-14

Total Arrests by Region and Period

Tri-Code	Pre-Task Force Period		Task Force Period		
	#	Rate per month	#	Rate per month	
		Annual rate per 100,000 population		Annual rate per 100,000 population	
97	6.1	51.7	235	11.8	100.2
NC	78	4.9	150	7.5	52.1
SCNSF	124	8.3	206	9.8	45.8
SC	109	7.3	473	22.5	111.2

months from January 1, 1987 to April 30, 1988 and the task force period runs from May 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989. For the southern region, the pre-task force period is one month shorter ending on March 31, 1988 with the task force period covering April 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989.

As the Table indicates, all four regions experienced increased levels of drug arrests in the task force period. The most significant increase occurred in the south control region where the monthly arrest rate tripled in the task force period. In comparison, the SCNSF region witnessed an 18 percent increase in its monthly arrest rate.

The Tri-Code region had the second largest increase during the task force period. In this region, the monthly arrest rate nearly doubled from 6.1 to 11.8. The monthly arrest rate in the north control region increased over 50 percent from 4.9 to 7.5.

Changes in the Nature of Drug Arrests

As previously noted, one goal of the strike forces is to not only increase the quantity of drug arrests but also to target more serious drug types and dealers and traffickers. Consequently, we were interested in examining shifts in drug types and increases in dealing/trafficking charges.

Table 5-15 provides pre-post comparisons of offense type for the four regions. These data indicate that not only was there the previously mentioned increase in arrests but all four regions experienced an increase in the number and monthly rate of arrests for dealing. The largest increase occurred in the south control region where the monthly rate of arrests for dealing increased from 1.8 to 13.0. The rate in the SCNSF region increased from 3.7 to 5.0. Both of these regions also experienced an increase in the monthly rate of possession arrests. Thus, it was not so much a shift away from possession cases as an increased emphasis on dealing cases.

The Tri-Code region also experienced a substantial increase in dealing arrests. The monthly rate increased from 1.8 to 6.8, a 278 percent increase. The north control region monthly rate for dealing arrests experienced a more moderate increase from 2.2 to 3.7. As was the case in the southern region, both of these regions had increases in possession cases as well, although Tri-Code's rate was relatively constant (4.3 and 4.5 per month).

Table 5-16 presents similar data for drug type. Here we were interested in examining increased arrests for cocaine. The data do show an increase in cocaine arrests for all four regions. Again, the south control region had a larger increase than the SCNSF region (2.1 to 6.8, 1.1 to 2.0, respectively). The south control region also had a large increase in the monthly rate of marijuana arrests (3.5 to 10.0) while the rate in the SCNSF counties remained constant in both periods. Both southern regions also had increases in the number of arrests involving controlled substances. Such arrests were rare in the two northern regions.

As was the case for offense types, the Tri-Code region had a very substantial increase in cocaine arrests from 1.1 to 5.9 per month. The north control region experienced a less substantial increase but the monthly rate did more than double during the task force period. Both regions experienced increases in marijuana arrests although the increases were smaller than was the case for cocaine.

Tables 5-17 and 5-18 present data combining drug type with offense type. For Tri-Code, these data highlight the significant increase in cocaine cases during the strike force period. Whereas there was a slight decline in possession of marijuana cases and a moderate increase in dealing marijuana arrests, there was a very large increase in arrests for dealing cocaine. Indeed, the monthly rate of such arrests increased by over 1000 percent. The increase in possession of cocaine cases was moderate. In the north control region the increases were less dramatic. The most notable increases were in

Table 5-16

Drug Type by Region and Pre-Post Period

Drug Type	Northern Region						Southern Region					
	Tri-Code		Task Force Period		North Control		SCNSF		Task Force Period		South Control	
	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month
Marijuana	65	67	88	4.1	37	4.4	88	4.1	52	48	210	10.0
Cocaine	17	18	119	1.1	51	6.0	119	1.1	31	29	143	6.8
Other	15	16	28	0.9	12	1.4	28	0.9	7	6	31	1.5
Total	97		235	6.1		11.8	235	6.1	109		473	22.5

Table 5-17

Offense and Drug Type by Pre-Post Period

Northern Region

	Tri-Code			Task Force Period			Pre-Task Force Period			North Control		
	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month
Possession Marijuana	47	48	2.9	50	21	2.5	23	30	1.4	30	20	1.5
Dealing Marijuana	18	19	1.1	37	16	1.9	16	21	1.0	35	23	1.8
Possession Cocaine	11	11	0.7	24	10	1.2	3	4	0.2	11	7	0.6
Dealing Cocaine	6	6	0.4	93	40	4.6	14	18	0.9	32	21	1.6
Possession Other	11	11	0.7	16	7	0.8	10	13	0.6	25	17	1.3
Dealing Other	3	3	0.2	9	4	0.5	5	6	0.3	7	5	0.4
Other	1	1	0.1	6	3	0.3	7	9	0.4	10	7	0.5
Total	97		6.1	234		11.8	78		4.9	150		7.5

Table 5-18

Offense and Drug Type by Pre-Post Period

	Southern Region													
	SCNSF						South Control							
	Pre-Task Force Period		Task Force Period		Post-Task Force Period		Pre-Task Force Period		Task Force Period		Post-Task Force Period			
#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month
Possession Marijuana	28	23	1.9	44	21	2.1	38	35	2.5	87	18	4.1		
Dealing Marijuana	32	26	2.1	40	19	1.9	13	12	0.9	121	26	5.8		
Possession Cocaine	3	2	0.2	10	5	0.5	17	16	1.1	41	9	2.0		
Dealing Cocaine	14	11	0.9	33	16	1.6	13	12	0.9	100	21	4.8		
Possession Other	23	19	1.5	33	16	1.6	22	20	1.5	50	11	2.4		
Dealing Other	10	8	0.7	34	17	1.6	1	1	0.1	54	11	2.6		
Other	14	11	0.9	12	6	0.6	5	5	0.3	20	4	1.0		
Total	124		8.3	206		9.8	109		7.3	473		22.5		

dealing marijuana and possession of cocaine.

In the SCNSF there was little change in marijuana cases but there were increases for possession and dealing cocaine and for dealing other substances. In contrast, the south control region experienced increases for all offense categories. Particularly large increases were observed in arrests for dealing marijuana and dealing cocaine.

A third measure of the seriousness of these drug arrests is the statutory class of the offense. In Indiana, felonies range from the less serious Class D to the most serious Class A. Drug offenses fall within the entire range of felony classifications. The more serious felony charges are typically based on type of drug, amount of drug, and whether the offense involves dealing/distribution or possession.

Table 5-19 presents data on shifts in the felony classification of drug arrests for the four regions. The rates in the SCNSF region were relatively constant for three of the four felony levels but there was a doubling in the rate of Class B felonies. In contrast, the south control region, reflecting its large overall increase in drug arrests, experienced increases in all four classes of felonies.

In the Tri-Code region, the rate of Class D felonies remained constant (4.7 and 4.9), but all other categories of felony drug arrests substantially increased. The north control region experienced increases in all four levels of felonies but the increases were of a smaller magnitude than in the Tri-Code region.

These data indicate that there was a substantial increase in the seriousness of drug arrests in all four regions from the second quarter of calendar year 1988 through the end of 1989. Whether examined as a shift from possession to dealing cases, an increase in cocaine cases, or an increase in the level of felony charges, the type of drug arrest did seem to increase in seriousness. The shift was most dramatic in the Tri-Code and south control regions, but also evident in the SCNSF and north control regions.

Table 5-19

Class of Offense by Region and Pre-Post Period

Class of Offense	Northern Region				Southern Region							
	Tri-Code		North Control		SCNSF		South Control					
	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period										
	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month			
Class D felony	75	77	4.7	97	42	4.9	50	64	3.1	84	57	4.2
Class C felony	14	14	0.9	35	15	1.8	9	12	0.6	17	12	0.9
Class B felony	5	5	0.3	42	18	2.1	6	8	0.4	22	15	1.1
Class A felony	2	2	0.1	60	26	3.0	13	17	0.8	23	16	1.2
Total	96		6.1	234		11.7	78		4.9	146		7.3
Class D felony	91	73	6.1	130	64	6.2	93	85	6.2	312	66	14.9
Class C felony	10	8	0.7	11	5	0.5	4	4	0.3	22	5	1.0
Class B felony	16	13	1.1	49	24	2.3	3	3	0.2	61	13	2.9
Class A felony	7	6	0.5	10	5	0.5	9	8	0.6	78	16	3.7
Total	124		8.3	200		9.5	109		7.3	473		22.5

Arresting Agency

As noted in Chapter Two, one of the most difficult data elements to collect through the court records was the arresting agency. While we were able to identify all strike force arrests, in the non-strike force cases it was often difficult to clearly distinguish the arresting agency. A typical problem would be where an arresting officer was identified but the arrest report indicated that a number of officers were involved and the agency affiliation of these other officers was unknown. Consequently, while we believe that the comparison of strike force arrests with non-strike force arrests (see particularly subsequent section) are reliable and valid, comparisons of arrests from other agencies are problematic.

With these qualifications in mind, we did wish to examine the role of the strike forces, the State Police, and other law enforcement agencies, in producing the increase in arrests observed in all four regions during the strike force period. Of particular interest were the issues of how much a role the strike forces played in the overall increase in arrests and whether there was a decline in drug arrests among other agencies in the two strike force sites once the strike force became operational.

Of the 1063 felony drug arrests made in the 18 county region during the strike force period, only 87 were made by the strike forces. Within the Tri-Code region, 24 percent of the drug arrests were made by the Tri-Code Task Force. In the SCNSF region, 16 percent of the felony drug arrests were made by the strike force. Thus, while the strike forces account for a substantial number of arrests, the majority of drug arrests continue to be made by other law enforcement agencies.

Table 5-20 presents data on felony drug arrests in the four regions by arresting agency for both periods. These data indicate that the activity of the strike forces did not seem to displace arresting activity by other agencies. Indeed, in the Tri-Code region the number and rate of arrests by other agencies and by the State Police actually increased

Table 5-20

Felony Drug Arrests by Arresting Agency, Region and Period

	Northern Region					
	Tri-Code Region		North Control Region		South Control Region	
	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month
Tri-Code Strike Force	--	2.8	--	--	--	--
Indiana State Police	8	0.5	27	1.7	37	1.9
Other law enforcement agencies	63	3.9	51	3.2	105	5.3
	Southern Region					
	SCNSF Region		South Control Region		North Control Region	
	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	Task Force Period Rate per month
SCNSF Strike Force	--	1.5	--	--	--	--
Indiana State Police	35	2.3	13	0.9	199	9.5
Other law enforcement agencies	85	5.7	90	6.0	252	12.0

during the strike force period. In the SCNSF region, the level of arresting activity by the State Police and other agencies remained at a relatively constant rate during both periods.

For purposes of comparison, the data indicate that in the north control region, the increase in arresting activity was primarily accounted for by local agencies as the rate of arrests by the State Police was relatively constant. In contrast, the large increase in arrests in the south control region was accounted for by the significant increase in arrests by both the State Police and other law enforcement agencies. Indeed, while the rate for local agencies doubled in the strike force period, the increase for the State Police was even more dramatic going from less than one arrest per month to over nine per month.

Characteristics of Strike Force Arrests

As a way of assessing the role of the strike force in the shift toward more serious drug cases, we compared the characteristics of arrests made by the strike force with arrests made by all other agencies within the region.¹

Tri-Code

Of the 234 arrests made in the Tri-Code region between May 1, 1988 and December 31, 1989, the Tri-Code Task Force made 55 felony arrests.² Of these 55 arrests, 32 were made in LaPorte County, 20 in Pulaski County, and 3 in Knox County. While this appears to indicate minimal activity in Knox County, it is important to note that during 1990 the task force focused on Knox County and a considerable number of arrests were made.

As Table 5-21 indicates, three-fourths of the Tri-Code Task Force arrests were for cocaine, 13 percent for marijuana, and 11 percent for other substances. In comparison,

Table 5-21

Drug Type by Arresting Agency, Tri-Code Region

Drug Type	Tri-Code Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Marijuana	7	13	74	50
Cocaine	42	76	55	37
Other	6	11	18	12
Total	55		147	

Table 5-22

Offense Type by Arresting Agency, Tri-Code Region

Offense Type	Tri-Code Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Possession	1	2	73	50
Dealing	52	94	70	48
Other	2	4	4	3
Total	55		147	

only 37 percent of the arrests made by other law enforcement agencies were for cocaine. Half of the arrests made by other agencies were for marijuana while the remainder (12 percent) were for other offenses.

There were also substantial differences on offense type. As Table 5-22 shows, nearly all the arrests made by the strike force were for dealing. In contrast, arrests made by other agencies were equally divided between possession and dealing charges. This point is reinforced in Table 5-23 that shows that the majority of strike force arrests were for dealing cocaine (71 percent). For other agencies, only one-quarter of the arrests were for dealing cocaine.

Similar findings emerged when we examined felony class. Sixty percent of the strike force arrests were for Class A charges compared to sixteen percent of the arrests made by other agencies (see table 5-24). In only two percent of the strike force arrests was the most serious drug charge a Class D felony. For other agencies, Class D felonies were the most serious drug charge in over half the cases.

Thus, it appears that much of the increase in the severity of drug arrests reflects the activity of the Tri-Code Task Force. Clearly, the strike force has targeted more serious cases than had previously comprised most felony drug arrests in the three county region and more serious cases than were being made by other law enforcement agencies in the region.

SCNSF

During the period from April 1, 1988 through December 31, 1989, 206 felony arrests were made in the SCNSF region for drug offenses. Of these, 32 were made by the SCNSF Strike Force. Table 5-25 compares the strike force arrests with those made by other agencies in the region for type of drug. The data indicate that the strike force arrests are very similar to those made by other regional law enforcement agencies in

Table 5-23

Offense and Drug Type by Arresting Agency, Tri-Code Region

	Tri-Code Strike Force #	Tri-Code Strike Force %	Other Agencies #	Other Agencies %
Possession Marijuana	0	0	44	30
Dealing Marijuana	7	13	29	20
Possession Cocaine	1	2	17	12
Dealing Cocaine	39	71	38	26
Possession Other	0	0	12	8
Dealing Other	6	11	3	2
Other	2	4	4	3
Total	55		147	

Table 5-24

Class of Offense by Arresting Agency, Tri-Code Region

Class of Offense	Tri-Code Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Class D felony	2	4	80	54
Class C felony	8	14	26	18
Class B felony	12	22	17	12
Class A felony	33	60	24	16
Total	55		147	

terms of type of drug. Nearly half the arrests involved marijuana, one-fifth to one-fourth involved cocaine, with the remainder of the cases involving other drug types.

Differences do emerge when we examine offense type. As Table 5-26 shows, a much higher proportion of strike force arrests (81 percent) were for dealing than was the case for arrests by other agencies (47 percent). Similarly, 34 percent of the strike force arrests were for dealing marijuana and 25 percent were for dealing cocaine (see Table 5-27). In contrast, 17 percent of the arrests by other agencies were for dealing marijuana and 15 percent were for dealing cocaine. Finally, as Table 5-28 indicates, 47 percent of the strike force arrests were for Class C or higher felonies while only 32 percent of the arrests by other agencies were of this nature.

These data thus suggest that while the strike force did not differ from other regional law enforcement agencies in the type of drug targeted, its arrests did seem to be of a more serious nature as indicated by the preponderance of dealing offenses and the higher proportion of serious felonies.

In addition to the data we collected from court records, the strike force provided us with data on the 64 arrests that they had made since the inception of the task force until July 1990. These data include the 32 cases discussed above, seven additional cases from 1989 that were not included in our data set (5 misdemeanors and 2 from a non-SCNSF county), and 25 cases from the first 7 months of 1990. Table 5-29 provides some descriptive data on these arrests.

As the Table indicates, the vast majority of arrests (70 percent) were made in Monroe County. Arrests were also made in three of the surrounding counties as well as in Bartholomew and Marion counties. Nearly two-thirds of the arrests were for dealing either marijuana or cocaine. An additional eight percent were for dealing other drugs. Only six of the strike force arrests were for possession of marijuana. Finally, there has been a steady increase in the number of arrests over time.

Table 5-25

Drug Type by Arresting Agency, SCNSF Region

Drug Type	SCNSF Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Marijuana	14	44	70	44
Cocaine	8	25	32	20
Other	10	31	7	36
Total	32		159	

Table 5-26

Offense Type by Arresting Agency, SCNSF Region

Offense Type	SCNSF Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Possession	5	16	74	47
Dealing	26	81	74	47
Other	1	3	11	7
Total	32		159	

Table 5-27

Offense and Drug Type by Arresting Agency, SCNSF Region

	SCNSF Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Possession Marijuana	3	9	38	24
Dealing Marijuana	11	34	27	17
Possession Cocaine	0	0	9	6
Dealing Cocaine	8	25	23	15
Possession Other	2	6	27	17
Dealing Other	7	22	24	15
Other	1		11	7
Total	32		159	

Table 5-28

Class of Offense by Arresting Agency, SCNSF Region

Class of Offense	SCNSF Strike Force		Other Agencies	
	#	%	#	%
Class D	17	53	104	66
Class C	1	3	10	6
Class B	14	44	32	20
Class A	0	0	10	6
Total	32		158	

Table 5-29

Characteristics of SCNSF Arrests Through July 1990

County	#	%	
Monroe	45	70	
Greene	6	9	
Owen	3	5	
Brown	1	1	
Marion	3	5	
Bartholomew	2	3	
U.S. District Court ¹	4	6	
Charge			
Possession Marijuana	6	9	
Dealing Marijuana	27	42	
Possession Cocaine	2	3	
Dealing Cocaine	14	22	
Dealing Methamphetamine	3	5	
Dealing LSD	3	5	
Dealing Other	2	3	
Other	7	11	
Year			
	#	%	per month
1988 ²	8	13	.9
1989	31	48	2.6
1990 ³	25	39	3.6

¹ County of arrest unknown

² From April 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988

³ From January 1, 1990 to July 13, 1990

These data, coupled with the data collected through court records, indicate that the strike force has targeted more serious drug offenses than other regional law enforcement agencies and than had predominated in the period prior to the creation of SCNSF. In Chapter 7 we consider additional case study data on the ability of the strike force to target organized drug networks.

ISSUE OF OVERCHARGING

One potential explanation for the increase in felony drug arrests, particularly for the increase in serious felony cases, is that it is the product of a change in charging practices. That is, the shift may be produced by the decision of prosecutors to seek maximum possible charges in drug cases rather than by the increased effectiveness of police officers in making such cases. The argument would be that cases formerly charged as misdemeanors began to be charged as Class D felonies, Class D felonies as Class C felonies, and so on. If overcharging was occurring, the increase in higher level felonies may be offset by a decline in misdemeanor and Class D felony charges. In an effort to consider this possibility, we also collected data on the number of misdemeanor drug arrests during the 1987-1989 period.

Table 5-30 presents data on the total number of drug cases by class of offense for the period prior to the strike force and for the strike force period. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the findings reflect the effects of overcharging, the data do not provide evidence of charge inflation. Rather, in all four regions the total number of drug cases increased and the number of cases in virtually all offense categories increased.

Table 5-30

Total Misdemeanor and Felony Drug Cases, by Region, Class of Offense and Pre-Post Period

Tri-Code	Pre-Strike Force Period		Strike Force Period	
	#	Rate per month	#	Rate per month
Tri-Code				
Misdemeanors ¹	85	5.3	146	7.3
Class D Felony	75	4.7	97	4.9
Class C Felony	14	0.9	35	1.8
Class B Felony	5	0.3	42	2.1
Class A Felony	2	0.1	60	3.0
North Control				
Misdemeanors	100	6.3	201	10.1
Class D Felony	50	3.1	84	4.2
Class C Felony	9	0.6	17	0.9
Class B Felony	6	0.4	22	1.1
Class A Felony	13	0.8	23	1.2
SCNSF				
Misdemeanors	242	16.1	343	16.3
Class D Felony	91	6.1	130	6.2
Class C Felony	10	0.7	11	0.5
Class B Felony	16	1.1	49	2.3
Class A Felony	7	0.5	10	0.5
South Control				
Misdemeanors ²	146	9.7	244	11.6
Class D Felony	93	6.2	312	14.9
Class C Felony	4	0.3	22	1.0
Class B Felony	3	0.2	61	2.9
Class A Felony	9	0.6	78	3.7

¹ Excludes Starke County due to missing data.

² Excludes Floyd County due to missing data.

ASSET SEIZURE AND FORFEITURES

A key component of most comprehensive drug enforcement strategies involves the seizure and forfeiture of drug offender assets derived through illegal drug trafficking. This "supply-side" approach to drug enforcement is based on the economic motivations of drug offenders. Eliminating the profit derived from their illegal activity eliminates a large part of their incentive to engage and remain in drug trafficking. Indeed, when compared to other supply-side approaches to the drug problem, such as lengthy terms of imprisonment and stiff fines, asset seizure and forfeiture is viewed by many law enforcement officials as a more promising strategy.³

Asset forfeiture is defined generally as "a legal mechanism by which property derived from or used in the furtherance of criminal activity can be seized and forfeited to the government, with the owner losing all rights in the property without compensation."⁴ Though forfeiture has been a legal remedy of long standing it has primarily taken place through the civil remedy. As a criminal sanction, its use, or resurrection, is relatively new, dating to the development of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act which included forfeiture provisions.⁵ In spite of calls for increasing application of forfeiture as a criminal provision, however, law enforcement at both the federal and state levels have relied primarily on civil forfeiture.

Virtually every state now maintains both criminal and civil forfeiture provisions, either as they are codified in Control Substances Acts, versions of RICO, or as general provisions which allow for forfeiture of property connected with the commission of any felony offense. Again, both civil and criminal forfeitures apply. Generally, most civil forfeitures are *in rem* proceedings against property; it is the property, rather than the individual which is subject to the finding of guilt, where guilt is established by a

preponderance of the evidence. Criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam actions against individuals; the individual must be found guilty of the criminal activity to which the forfeitures apply.

Forfeiture provisions in Indiana exist in both the state criminal and civil provisions as well.⁶ The employment of these proceedings in drug enforcement efforts has been clouded, if not mitigated, however, by a provision in the Indiana State Constitution which requires the monies derived from forfeitures to be placed in the state Common School Fund.⁷ The provision has been interpreted as applying to any excesses that may be incurred over and above the costs of the investigation, whereupon the excess is to be appropriated to the schools in the communities where the forfeitures took place.

As was noted earlier, the development of a viable asset seizure program is noted as one of the main goals of the task forces. Yet, the majority of law enforcement officials feel that asset seizure proceeds cannot sustain a task force by themselves. Much of this attitude may be explained by a general dissatisfaction with the present structure of the forfeiture provisions; if law enforcement agencies are allowed only to recoup the costs of their investigations, they will be unable to sustain the capital which they view necessary to continue, much less expand, their operations. Indeed, many seem to maintain almost a sense of ownership over the assets seized. They put the effort into getting the money and they see no reason why it should not be returned to them in full. As one interviewee explained, "It was generated out of law enforcement efforts on drugs, and by God, that's where it ought to go." Furthermore, many law enforcement officials see the state process as slow and cumbersome. The detail required in submitting an itemized list of costs is viewed as time consuming and burdensome, and most agencies do not have the personnel to dedicate to such tasks.

In an effort to circumvent the state limitations, many law enforcement agencies, including the State Police, opt to pursue forfeitures through federal provisions, under

what is termed, "equitable sharing." Federal provisions allow an agency to be reimbursed in direct proportion to the agency's contribution to the investigation. Though the federal provisions are presently under revision, the determination of an agency's "equitable share" in the past has been based on the amount of time and effort contributed by the agency in the investigation. Thus, it is not uncommon for local agencies to begin and develop an investigation, and then request that a federal agency adopt the case for prosecution, for which they will receive a percentage of the assets forfeited. Similarly, a federal agency may request assistance from a local agency and in return reimburse the agency approximately the same percentage of the assets as the effort contributed to the investigation.

While this approach is viewed by many as the more beneficial avenue to recover assets, it is not without criticisms. Several officials indicate confusion, if not skepticism, about how the allocations of the agency's share of the forfeited assets are made at the federal level. Indeed, Tri-Code officials, who worked in cooperation with DEA and other agencies in one case believed they were entitled to a much larger proportion of the assets seized than they have realized, at least to date. Similarly, problems of personnel and time can limit an agency's efforts to adequately document their contribution and complete the necessary paperwork.

A third avenue to recovering assets is also evident, with indications that its use is on the rise. Several local agencies (law enforcement and prosecutors) have now established specialized funds within their office and now request, if not in the form of a suggestion, that offenders contribute their ill-gotten gains to the fund. Such funds are considered "donations" and thus do not fall under the provisions regarding forfeitures under the State Constitution. Similarly, officials report that these contributions are "voluntary," and are not considered formally in the charging process. Furthermore, because they are voluntary, they escape any third-party entitlement claims that may

exist with monies and property seized and forfeited through the criminal and civil provisions. We will return to the policy implications of asset seizures later on.

To what extent have task forces been involved in asset seizures and forfeitures? As Table 5-31 indicates, SCNSF reported only one seizure over the two year period covering this evaluation, involving one automobile. That seizure was reported in the following year's forfeitures with a value of \$100.00. It should be noted, however, that these figures apply only to the first two years of the grant period. Since that time, SCNSF has reported the seizure of approximately \$152,000 in currency, vehicles and weapons. The single biggest seizure, involving \$106,000 in currency will be processed in federal court through equitable sharing provisions, though at this point in time it is uncertain as to the amount that will be returned to the task force. SCNSF officials also report using the Prosecutor's Drug Enforcement Fund, located in Robert Miller's office as a vehicle for obtaining some of the assets identified during this time period. This is achieved through the offenders' contribution of the assets to the fund.

The Tri-Code Task Force, on the other hand, reported a significant number of seizures in the first 1988/90 grant period, totaling \$229,021. The bulk of these seizures, which included property, currency, vehicles, weapons and jewelry, stemmed principally from one investigation involving a marijuana and cocaine trafficking distribution group, which we elaborate on in greater detail later in this report. This operation was conducted jointly with the Drug Enforcement Agency and also involved law enforcement agencies in other states. As noted in Table 5-32, the forfeitures appear in the following year, whereupon \$69,646 was returned to the task force. The money was then divided among the six agencies participating in the task force, as per the policy agreements of the task force members. Tri-Code also reported seizures of \$31,000 in the second grant year period, with the amount of forfeitures yet to be determined.

The data from these two task forces appear to confirm the confusion and

Table 5-31

Asset Seizures by Year

South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force

1988/1989
(For Grant Period Ending 3/31/89)

Type	Total	Value
Vehicles	1	\$600
Vessels		
Aircraft		
Currency	1	\$1,800
Property		
Weapons		
Other		
<hr/>		
Total	2	\$2,400

* No seizures were reported for 1989/90 (Grant Period Ending 3/31/90)

Asset Forfeitures by Year

South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force

1989/1990

Type	Total	Value
Vehicles	1	\$100
Vessels		
Aircraft		
Currency		
Property		
Weapons		
Other		
<hr/>		
Total	1	\$100

* No asset forfeitures reported for 1988/89 (Grant period ending 3/31/89)

Table 5-32

Asset Seizures by Year

Tri-Code

1988/1989

Type	Total	Value
Vehicles	2	\$23,960
Vessels	1	\$650
Aircraft		
Currency	7	\$60,230
Property	6	\$80,300
Weapons	26	\$4,292
Other	120	\$59,589
Total	148	\$229,021

1989/1990

Type	Total	Value
Vehicles	1	\$1,000
Vessels		
Aircraft		
Currency	1	\$30,000
Property		
Weapons		
Other		
Total	2	\$31,000

Asset Forfeitures by Year

Tri-Code

1989/1990

Type	Total	Value
Vehicles		
Vessels		
Aircraft		
Currency	9	\$69,676
Property		
Weapons		
Other		
	9	\$69,676

* No forfeitures reported for 1988/89 (Grant period ending 3/31/89)

frustration that law enforcement officials express with the present structure of asset seizures and forfeitures. As we can see, the time frame between seizures and forfeitures is quite long, and clearly, uncertainty exists as to the amount which will eventually be returned to the law enforcement agency. Furthermore, the data raise important questions regarding the reliance on seizures and forfeitures as a means of sustaining task force activity. Large seizures are relatively rare events. More typically, the offenders which constitute the bulk of those arrested by the task force are individuals without significant assets. While a sizable number of offenders arrested are charged with dealing rather than possession, it would be misleading to assume that the majority are dealing in large quantities and thus representative of the stereotypical wealthy drug dealer. Rather, a good portion of those arrested are poor, often in debt, with personal possessions of no significant value. When these individuals constitute the bulk of arrest activity, it is not likely that sizable asset seizures will result. Where investigations do reveal individuals with assets of value derived through drugs, it is generally likely that the investigations will be lengthy and will probably involve multiple agencies, all of which will want a portion of the proceeds. Given these realities, it is understandable why most local law enforcement officials doubt the feasibility of forfeitures as a means of sustaining local drug enforcement activity.

DRUG AVAILABILITY

Another important goal of the multijurisdictional drug strike force is to reduce the availability of drugs in the region. In theory, this is effected by increasing arrests, prosecutions and convictions of drug dealers and distributors, creating drug awareness programs, and by seizing drugs through arrest or eradication programs. Unfortunately, this goal is also one of the hardest to measure. First, the availability of drugs is

influenced by a wide variety of factors which go beyond these particular strategies. Demographic shifts in the population of users, changes in drug supply markets in other areas, education and drug awareness and law enforcement activities all can be said to influence the availability of drugs and do so in an interactive fashion. Furthermore, changes across time affect availability and can vary in consistent and inconsistent fashion according to the dynamic factors noted above. It is common knowledge, for example, that marijuana is more readily available during harvesting times in the fall. In sum, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to state with confidence that the change was attributable to any given factor, such as the existence of a task force.

Second, since we have no idea of the total amount of drugs available, we can only hypothesize about changes on the basis of a number of different indicators. These include the amount of drugs seized by law enforcement, the price of drugs, the purity of drugs and similar indicators such as hospital admissions for overdoses and admissions to treatment centers. Often a sense of the availability of drugs is based on no stronger evidence than "the word on the street," obtained from users or undercover officers. While these claims may indeed be accurate, they are difficult to validate. No single indicator is sufficient, and while the construction of an index of indicators allows for a more accurate picture than any single indicator alone the picture is a fuzzy one at best.

Because of difficulties in measuring drug availability, and because of data, resource and time limitations which precluded us from gathering information on all the above mentioned indicators, no effort will be made here to speculate on the effects of the task forces in reducing the supply or availability of drugs. For the purposes of describing the activities of the task forces, however, we do present information on the amount of drugs seized by the task forces in Table 5-33. Unfortunately, due to recording practices, similar information was not available for the non-task force regions, or for the pre-task force periods.

Table 5-33

Task Force Drug Removals by Year

South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force

	1988/1989	1989/90
Type	Total	Value
Cocaine	265 gms.	189 gms.
Hashish	0	0
Heroin	0	1 gm.
Marijuana		
pounds	138 lbs.	6 lbs.
plants (number)	139	0
Amphetamines	2 ozs.	0
Other	588 D.U.	145 D.U.

Tri-Code

	1988/1989	1989/90
Type	Total	Value
Cocaine	148 gms.	7 gms.
Hashish	0	0
Heroin	0	0
Marijuana		
pounds	3 lbs.	74 lbs.
plants (number)	0	31
Amphetamines	0	0
Other	104 D.U.	2 D.U.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter reviews findings relating to the effects of strike force activity. While law enforcement officials in both task forces believed that the strike force was an effective response to drug activity, Tri-Code region officials were considerably more positive than SCNSF officials about the effects of the task force on penetrating organized drug networks and reducing availability.

During the three year period, there were 1472 felony drug arrests in the four regions under study. Most arrests were for marijuana, followed by cocaine, and the arrests were evenly divided between possession and dealing. The majority of arrests were for D felonies, the least serious felony charge.

All four regions experienced significant increases in drug arrests, with the greatest increase occurring in the southern control site. Similarly, all four regions experienced increases in more serious drug charges such as dealing and trafficking, as well as increases in more serious drugs, mainly cocaine.

It is important to note the small role played by either task force in the total number of drug arrests. Only 87 of the 1063 felony drug arrests made in the 18 county region during the strike force period were made by the two strike forces. Even within the task force regions themselves, the bulk of arrests were made by other law enforcement agencies within the area. It appears, however, that in the Tri-Code region, much of the increase in the severity of drug arrests reflects the activity of the Tri-Code strike force. In this region there was a marked shift in both the seriousness of the drug (marijuana to cocaine), as well as in the type of drug activity. Data in the SCNSF region suggests that the strike force did not differ from other regional law enforcement agencies in the type of drug targeted, but did differ in that the arrests made by the task force were of a more

serious nature, as reflected in a higher proportion of serious felony charges and an increase in dealing offenses.

Finally, while both task forces were involved in asset seizures, the significance of these seizures is difficult to assess. Tri-Code seized approximately \$260,000 in assets, but to date has received through forfeitures only \$70,000. SCNSF, has seized \$2,400 in assets and recovered \$100 in forfeitures. It should be noted, however, that the SCNSF strike force has reported the seizure of \$152,639 in assets during the first quarter of the 1990/91 grant period. Our interviews and surveys indicate a general dissatisfaction with the present state asset forfeiture provisions, and this dissatisfaction has led in part to the growing use of federal provisions and contributory funds. The use of such funds raise concerns, given their lack of oversight and potential for abuse. Surveys also raise doubts about the usefulness of asset seizures as a primary mechanism to fund drug enforcement efforts, at least as they exist for the smaller task force efforts examined here.

CHAPTER NOTES

¹ We also examined arrests with the category "other agencies" broken down into "State Police" and "other agencies." Due to the problems with the reliability and validity of our identification of arresting agency, however, we decided to present the data showing the comparison of task force arrests with the arrests of all other agencies.

² Actual arrests made totaled 66, however some of the cases were handled through federal court while others involved juveniles.

³ National Drug Control Strategy, 1988.

⁴ National Institute of Justice: Asset Seizure and Forfeiture, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988: 1

⁵ 18 U.S.C. sec 1961 et seq. and 21 U.S.C. 853 et seq., respectively.

⁶ Indiana Code, Sections 16-6-8.5-5.1, 34-4030.1-1 to 30.1-7 (1984) and 34-4-30.5-1 to -6, 35-45-6-1.

⁷ Indiana State Constitution, Article 8 Subsection 2.

CHAPTER SIX

EFFECTS ON COURT DISPOSITION OF DRUG CASES

A final goal of the strike forces is to increase the prosecution of individuals arrested for drug offenses. Consequently, in this chapter we consider data on conviction rates, class of conviction offense, and sentences.

These data, however, must be interpreted cautiously. One problem has to do with pending cases. Even though the data collection period was extended to July 1990, 20 percent of the cases were still awaiting disposition. The vast majority of these cases (91 percent) involve arrests during the strike force period. Obviously, final conclusions about the effect of the strike force on prosecution of drug cases will be influenced by the dispositional outcomes of these pending cases. Finally, as discussed in Chapter Five, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of shifts in the nature of drug cases from shifts in prosecutorial charging policies and shifts in sentencing practices. In the sections that follow, we present the data on dispositions and attempt to address these issues related to interpretation of the findings.

DISPOSITIONS

During the three year study period, 982 (67 percent) of the 1472 individuals arrested were convicted (see Table 6-1). Only 12 percent of the cases were dismissed or acquitted. As previously mentioned, 20 percent are pending a disposition. Of those convicted, the vast majority were convicted of either a misdemeanor (40 percent) or class D felony (36 percent).

Table 6-2 presents a comparison of the class of the original charge with the class for which a conviction was obtained. As would be expected, there is evidence of

Table 6-1

Disposition Status of Arrests

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Conviction	982	67
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Misdemeanor	389	40
Class D Felony	351	36
Class C Felony	65	7
Class B Felony	119	12
Class A Felony	44	5
	968 ¹	100
Dismissal/Acquittal	182	12
Pending	286	20
Pretrial Diversion	12	1
Don't Know/Missing	10	1
TOTAL ARRESTS	1472	100

¹ The breakdown of class of conviction (N=968) does not equal total convictions (N=982) due to missing data.

attrition from charge to conviction. Perhaps most evident of this attrition is the fact that although all the cases were originally charged as felonies, 40 percent resulted in a conviction of a misdemeanor. It is important to note, however, that the proportion of misdemeanor convictions dropped during the task force period to 38 percent. During the pre-task force period the figure was 46 percent. This suggests that the increase in felony arrests was not simply the product of overcharging. If overcharging was the primary factor in the increase in felony arrests, we would expect the proportion of misdemeanor convictions to have increased during the task force period. As indicated above, just the opposite occurred.

The comparison of the pre-task force period with the task force period also shows an overall increase in the level of final conviction class. Whereas in the period prior to the task force 14 percent of the convictions were for Class A, B, or C felonies, the figure was 27 percent following the creation of the task force.

Tables 6-3 and 6-4 present these data by region and period. For conviction rates (see Table 6-3), Tri-Code experienced an increase from 77 to 85 percent in the proportion of convictions. This translated to an increase from 4.4 convictions per month to 7.8 per month. The north control region also experienced increases but these were less dramatic (convictions from 89 to 94 percent; rate per month from 4.1 to 4.4).

The SCNSF region remained relatively constant while the southern control region experienced an increase in the proportion of convictions and a dramatic increase in the rate of convictions per month (4.6 to 14.1).

Thus, while the evidence from the northern region suggests the strike force increased the proportion of convictions, the evidence from the southern region indicates that the creation of a strike force is not necessary for increasing conviction rates.

Tri-Code also experienced an increase in the level of seriousness of convictions. Prior to the creation of the strike force, only 11 percent of the convictions in drug cases

Table 6-3

Conviction Status by Region and Period

Disposition	Northern Region						Southern Region					
	Tri-Code			North Control			SCNSF			South Control		
	Pre-Task Force Period #	%	Rate per month	Task Force Period #	%	Rate per month	Pre-Task Force Period #	%	Rate per month	Task Force Period #	%	Rate per month
Conviction	70	77	4.4	156	85	7.8	66	89	4.1	93	94	4.7
Dismissal/Acquittal	21	23	1.3	27	15	1.4	8	11	0.5	6	6	0.3
Pretrial Diversion	0	0	0.0	1	1	0.1	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Total	91			184			74			99		
Conviction	96	79	6.4	136	82	6.5	69	76	4.6	296	84	14.1
Dismissal/Acquittal	25	21	1.7	28	17	1.3	17	19	1.1	50	14	2.4
Pretrial Diversion	0	0	0.0	1	1	0.1	5	6	0.3	5	1	0.2
Total	121			165			91			351		

Table 6-4

Class of Conviction by Region and Period

Disposition	Northern Region														
	Tri-Code				Northern Control				South Control						
	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period													
#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month										
Misdemeanor	27	40	1.7	50	33	2.5	35	55	2.2	27	30	1.4			
D Felony	34	50	2.1	40	26	2.0	14	22	0.9	38	42	1.9			
C Felony	5	7	0.3	24	16	1.2	4	6	0.3	9	10	0.5			
B Felony	1	2	0.1	25	16	1.3	10	16	0.6	13	14	0.7			
A Felony	1	2	0.1	14	9	0.7	1	2	0.1	3	3	0.2			
Total	68			153			64			90					
	Southern Region														
	SCNSF				South Control				South Control						
Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period												
#	%	Rate per month	#	%	Rate per month										
37	39	2.5	50	37	2.4	37	54	2.5	126	43	6.0				
45	47	3.0	49	37	2.3	24	35	1.6	107	36	5.1				
0	0	0.0	5	4	0.2	6	9	0.4	12	4	0.6				
10	11	0.7	28	21	1.3	1	1	0.1	31	11	1.5				
3	3	0.2	2	2	0.1	1	1	0.1	19	6	0.3				
Total	95		134			69			295						

were for Class A, B, or C felonies. During the strike force period the proportion of such cases increased to 41 percent. On the other hand, the north control region experienced a much smaller increase from 24 to 27 percent.

The SCNSF region also experienced a significant increase in the proportion of convictions for Class A, B, and C felonies. During the period preceding the creation of the strike force these offenses comprised 14 percent of the convictions. Following the creation of the strike force the figure rose to 27 percent. There was a similar increase in the south control region. Prior to the strike force period, 11 percent of the convictions were for Class A, B, or C felonies. During the strike force period the figure was 21 percent.

SENTENCES

Making predictions about the effect of the strike forces on criminal sentences in drug cases is problematic. While we expect an increase in the absolute number of offenders receiving jail and prison terms, it is unclear whether the creation of the strike forces would affect average sentences. Contrary predictions can be made. On the one hand, creation of the task forces marks a formal commitment by law enforcement officials to apprehend and prosecute drug users and dealers. This commitment may lead prosecutors to seek and judges to impose severe sentences. Indeed, a number of the prosecutors and judges we spoke to indicated that they saw imposing severe sentences as "doing their part in the drug war." On the other hand, the substantial increase in the volume of cases creates pressure to plea bargain as a means of addressing the demand on the court's caseload.¹ Further, along these same lines, serious felony drug cases were relatively rare in the pre-task force period. For example, there were only six class A convictions in drug cases for all four regions during the pre-task force period. As such, these cases were likely to occupy the status of the

"celebrated case" and were likely to command the full force of the law at the sentencing stage.² Thus, comparisons of sentences during the two time periods must be done cautiously.

Table 6-5 presents data on sentences for those cases resulting in a conviction across the four regions and for both periods. The Table contrasts whether the offender received no time served and no probation, a sentence to probation supervision with no time served, or a sentence involving some jail or prison time. The vast majority of drug offenders received a sentence involving some jail or prison time. Probation was used in most of the remaining cases with very few offenders not receiving either time or probation supervision. The data also indicate that the two lower volume regions, the north control and SCNSF regions, had higher proportions of offenders sentenced to do time than in their counterpart regions. For the most part the proportion of cases involving probation or time served remained relatively constant during the two periods. The exception occurred in the north control region that experienced a substantial increase in the proportion of cases receiving jail or prison terms during the task force period.

Table 6-6 presents the mean sentences for those cases that received at least some time served. The figures are somewhat inflated because the value "one" includes cases sentenced to less than one year. Consequently, the sentences for misdemeanor convictions do not vary as by definition these cases received a sentence of less than one year. For class D felonies, no significant differences emerged between the pre-task force period and the task force period. Further, the differences between the four regions were slight.

The data were collapsed for Class A, B, and C felonies because of the small numbers of such cases during the pre-task force period. For the Tri-Code region, the mean sentence declined substantially but the figures must be interpreted very cautiously

Table 6-5

Type of Sentence by Region and Period

	Tri-Code		Task Force Period		North Control		Task Force Period	
	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period %	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period %
No time served	2	3	4	3	6	9	4	5
Probation only	25	36	53	34	19	29	15	17
Time	42	61	98	63	41	62	67	78
	69		155		66		86	
	SCNSF		Task Force Period		South Control		Task Force Period	
	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period %	Pre-Task Force Period #	Pre-Task Force Period %	Task Force Period #	Task Force Period %
No time served	0	0	3	2	0	0	8	3
Probation only	24	25	27	20	36	52	137	46
Time	72	75	104	78	33	48	150	51
	96		134		69		295	

Table 6-6

Average time sentenced by Region and Period

	Northern Region						
	Tri-Code			North Control			
	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Task Force Period	
\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N
Misdemeanor	1.0	14	1.0	14	1.0	18	14
Class D Felony	1.7	23	2.0	30	1.6	11	25
Class A,B,C Felony	17.5	4	8.6	53	5.7	12	25
	Southern Region						
	SCNSF			South Control			
	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Pre-Task Force Period	Task Force Period	Task Force Period	
\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N	\bar{X}	N
Misdemeanor	1.0	24	1.0	30	1.0	12	36
Class D Felony	1.7	34	1.6	42	2.6	14	57
Class A,B,C Felony	10.2	13	8.2	31	12.3	7	56

because there were only four cases in the pre-task force period and the average is particularly affected by one 30 year sentence. The SCNSF region experienced a slight decline while the two control sites were relatively consistent during the two time periods.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has presented data on convictions and sentences for the felony cases examined in Chapter Five. Many cases are still pending. Of those completed, three-fourths of those convicted were convicted of a misdemeanor or Class D felony. The data show an increase in the level of conviction class between the pre-task and task force periods. For those convicted and sentenced, the majority received some jail or prison time. There is little evidence of significant changes in sentence length between the pre-task force and task force periods for similar offenses.

As previously noted, the sentencing data provide an ambiguous indicator of the effect of the strike force on court processing of drug offenders. The data do not, however, indicate a dramatic shift towards more misdemeanor convictions or a dramatic decline in sentences. As such, the data do not seem to indicate that the increase in felony cases was merely a product of overcharging. Nonetheless, we urge caution in interpreting these data, as sentencing is the product of a variety of forces, of which the existence of a strike force is only one. Given the low number of serious felonies in all regions prior to the task forces, and given that we cannot account for many of the other possible factors which influence sentencing, any attribution of changes in sentencing to the existence of the task force is discouraged.

CHAPTER NOTES

¹ Rosett, Arthur and Donald R. Cressey. Justice By Consent. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1976.

² Walker, Samuel. Sense and Nonsense about Crime. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1989.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In the preceding four chapters, considerable data from the survey of law enforcement officials and from arrest and court records have been presented. In this chapter, we seek to address several major issues not adequately covered with these earlier findings. Specifically, we consider the role of the strike forces in allowing local law enforcement officials to conduct more sophisticated investigations of organized drug trafficking networks and the organizational relationships created by the strike forces. In doing so, we hope to provide a summary of some of the accomplishments of the two strike forces as well as some of the problems encountered. We then consider a number of benefits and problems that arise with the creation of federally funded drug strike forces. Finally, we propose several policy implications on the basis of this evaluation.

INVESTIGATION AND APPREHENSION OF HIGHER LEVEL DEALERS AND PENETRATION OF ORGANIZED DRUG NETWORKS

As noted earlier, one important goal of drug task forces is to move beyond low level drug activity to investigate more complex networks involved in the distribution of drugs. The long term investigations and more sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities generally required to penetrate these groups are usually not available to local law enforcement agencies. In theory, the multijurisdictional task force concept allows agencies to pool resources and establish cooperative efforts through increased

communication in such a way as to enhance more proactive and sophisticated enforcement strategies. To what extent have the two task forces here been able to achieve such goals?

Tri-Code

As previously indicated, a summary of the drug arrests made prior to and during the task force operating period suggests a significant increase in the enforcement of more serious drugs (marijuana to cocaine), as well as more serious drug activity (possession to dealing, or low level dealing to higher level dealing and distribution). Yet, while these data are important, they tell us little in and of themselves about the ability of such task forces to penetrate drug organizations at more sophisticated levels of activity. For example, an increase in arrests for high felony dealing may indicate only the widespread ability to purchase larger quantities of drugs, in other words, it may be marketplace phenomenon. In order to evaluate such efforts it is important to understand more about both the task force enforcement strategy and the individuals arrested.

Tri-Code officials have structured their drug enforcement efforts as a multi-target strategy with three phases. Phase One began with the collection of intelligence information on a large-scale marijuana drug distribution organization operating out of the Indiana counties of LaPorte, Porter, Jasper, Starke, Carroll, White and Pulaski, with apparent ties to Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Florida and Tennessee. Tri-Code officials were also collecting information indicating that this group, largely a family operation (the Murphys), was also increasing its share of the cocaine market in the area.

Tri-Code officials were aware that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had been investigating the Murphys, though its focus was directed toward marijuana distribution activity. In May of 1988, the DEA attempted to arrest two of the brothers, Dennis and

Jack Murphy, thought to be the ringleaders of the organization. During the same time period, Tri-Code officials continued to collect extensive intelligence concerning the structure of the cocaine operation, and the extent of drug activity conducted by the group to date. This information led to seizure of approximately \$260,100 in property and assets belonging to the two brothers.

In the fall of 1988, a joint effort by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Indiana State Police and Tri-Code led to the arrest of James Murphy and Dennis Murphy. In the spring of 1989, and as a result of the intelligence information collected earlier, warrants were issued for 18 individuals involved in the cocaine and marijuana operation, including the three brothers, the mother, two uncles and one cousin. Those arrested included four suppliers, six distributors and five individuals involved in transporting the cocaine from Florida to Indiana. Several of the suppliers arrested in Florida were thought to be involved in the supply of cocaine to other organizations operating in Florida, Texas and along the eastern seaboard. Of the eighteen individuals arrested, eleven pleaded guilty, three were acquitted in a jury trial in Winamac, one died, one is awaiting trial and charges were dropped against two others.

Information collected from individuals involved in the operation indicates that during its two year operation (from June 1986 to December 1988) an estimated 720 pounds of cocaine had been distributed by the Murphys, with an estimated street value of 15 million dollars. Though the arrests and convictions significantly disrupted the Murphy operation, intelligence information suggests that as many as four other organizations of equal or greater size to the Murphys continue to distribute cocaine and marijuana in the area. This is supported by the general view among most law enforcement officials in the area that both cocaine and marijuana remain widely available in the region at relatively low prices.

Phase Two of the operation involved the issuance of warrants for the arrest of 43

street-level drug dealers operating primarily in LaPorte and Pulaski counties. In April of 1989 a raid was conducted involving thirty-two teams of police officers (approximately 160 officers total) from surrounding police departments and the Indiana State Police. The arrests stemmed from a long-term undercover operation with Tri-Code officers making controlled buys of cocaine, marijuana and other drugs. Most of the arrests were for dealing and possession.

Phase Three of the Tri-Code operation was completed over the summer of 1990, with the focus of attention on street-level dealers operating primarily out of Knox County. Again, the strategy involved the controlled purchases of marijuana and cocaine by Tri-Code undercover officers. However, Phase Three differs somewhat from Phase Two in that the individuals have been arrested individually, rather than as part of a large-scale raid. Such an arrest strategy is thought to maximize the amount of intelligence information obtainable from those arrested. Phase Three continues as of this writing.

SCNSF

Like Tri-Code, the priorities of the SCNSF include the investigation and prosecution of narcotics distribution activity as opposed to consumption. As noted earlier, drug investigations in the region were described as "piecemeal in nature," and "lacked a coherent strategy with sanctioned enforcement protocols." The task force afforded the opportunity to develop a systematic drug enforcement plan designed to target major actors operating at the distribution level in the area. Although task force officials see the need to develop a street-level enforcement response similar to that employed in Tri-Code, task force officials consider such efforts "problematic" given resource and personnel limitations. For instance, the task force tried early on to hire a female undercover officer to work at the street level, but their advertisements received no responses. Task force officials maintain, however, that focussing on the distribution

level indirectly affects the lower level by reducing the availability of drugs. This, coupled with the prevention and education component, serve as strategies to curb both drug supply and demand.

Task force officials were principally concerned with the distribution of cocaine, marijuana, LSD, and methamphetamines and the early efforts of the investigation team were directed toward the development of intelligence information and the subsequent surveillance of groups involved in those drugs. Shortly after the task force became operational in 1988, strike force members began an investigation with the assistance of the Indiana State Police on methamphetamine distribution taking place in Greene County. That investigation ultimately led to the arrest of the two largest distributors of methamphetamines in the region. However, task force members expressed frustration with the cooperation given by the Indiana State Police after the ISP removed one of the undercover officers assisting in the investigation and declined to either provide or develop information regarding the defendants' activities.

A similar case involving a marijuana distribution ring also serves to describe task force efforts, and, as with the case above, highlights some difficulties encountered when joint investigations are employed. Shortly after the task force became operational, the investigation unit began to gather information on a group involved in the large scale distribution of marijuana in the region. The group, headed by James Lee Rose, distributed marijuana in Indianapolis and southern Indiana. More importantly, Rose could be tied to a more complex and extensive distribution organization operating out of Mexico and throughout the southwest. On the basis of the information collected, task force members contacted the Drug Enforcement Agency in Indianapolis, and a joint investigation on the network began. Within several months, task force and DEA investigators had collected sufficient information to seek indictments on a half dozen members of the group (said to be distributing \$500,000 worth of marijuana in the region

at a time), including one of the major connections to the Mexican producers.

The investigation, however, was disrupted when one individual involved in the transportation of marijuana for the network was identified and arrested by local law enforcement officials in Utah. On the basis of information they gathered, the local sheriff in Utah contacted the Drug Enforcement Agency in Indianapolis. The DEA agent assigned was unaware of the ongoing investigation of James Lee Rose (who was operating under an alias) and subsequently contacted the Major Drug Unit of the Indiana State Police whereupon warrants were issued. Neither the DEA case agent handling the investigation, nor Task Force officials were notified by the State Police until Miller's office was contacted regarding a search warrant. It was at that point that Miller recognized the names of the individuals and recommended that the State Police talk with the Chief of Operations, Eric Schopmeyer, about the ongoing DEA and Task Force investigation. Schopmeyer met the State Police at the Rose residence where the arrest was made. Three other individuals involved in the distribution ring were also arrested at that time. Unfortunately, the individual alleged to be connected to the Mexican producers learned of the arrests and fled. He is now reported to be in Mexico. Task force and DEA officials subsequently seized \$106,000 in cash and two vehicles belonging to Rose.

Both Tri-Code and SCNSF officials agree that such investigations could not have taken place without the task force structure or the funding to engage in the more sophisticated investigations. To a significant degree, drug enforcement is serendipitous activity; a road officer pulls over a red BMW on a routine traffic stop and discovers five pounds of cocaine; or as in the case of Tri-Code, officers interview the wives of arrested drug dealers and are provided detailed accounts of drug deals over the span of two years. Such events occur frequently, and much of what may be called "narcotics intelligence" is based on the accumulated knowledge of unrelated events and names.

For most smaller agencies, such as those involved in this study, resource limitations preclude development of such cases on their own. And, often times, officers who stumble on important information find themselves with nowhere to turn. The task force structure provides the mechanism to channel and "institutionalize" such information and the resources and expertise needed to develop these cases.

This being said, it is difficult to assess the impact of these cases on drug activity in the two regions. Furthermore, this difficulty raises important considerations regarding one of the important reasons for the creation of task forces to begin with -- the penetration of complex drug organizations. The assumption underlying these network penetration strategies is that drugs will be more difficult to obtain, and if obtained will be more costly. This increased cost will thus act to depress consumption. But this may not in fact occur. If the drug network is not eliminated entirely, there remains the possibility that those persons arrested will be replaced by others in the organization. If the entire network is eliminated, there remains the possibility that a different network will take over the existing market. Furthermore, as some drug experts note, if consumption decreases, but decreases less than prices rise, the costs of engaging in the activity remain lucrative for dealers while at the same time increasing the users' demand to turn to crime as a means of supporting their habits. Thus, while it appears true that the cases above could not have occurred without the task force structure and funding, it is not clear that such cases are effective law enforcement strategies. As Mark Kleiman and Kerry Smith note, "a strategy whose advocates can show neither theory nor evidence in its support ought to be regarded as speculative rather than self-evidently valuable."¹

TASK FORCE STRUCTURE AND INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS

In addition to the goal of increased apprehension and prosecution of dealers and penetration of drug networks, a key goal of the multijurisdictional strike forces is to create an organizational structure that will foster improved communication and coordination among local, state, and federal drug enforcement agencies. The survey results presented in Chapter Four suggested that the strike forces did indeed lead to improved coordination and increased communication. It appears, however, that the patterns of communication and coordination and the participation and satisfaction of law enforcement officials is contingent on the structure of the strike force.

In Tri-Code, the sheriffs departments of all three counties contributed at least one officer to the strike force. This created a structure in which the main law enforcement agency in each county viewed itself as an active participant in the strike force and where open lines of communication between each agency and the strike force were established.

In SCNSF, a similar structure was created within the host county (Monroe County). Each of the three main law enforcement agencies within the county contributed an officer to the strike force. This led to very similar feelings of participation, lines of communication, and satisfaction within Monroe County as were observed in the Tri-Code region.

In both sites, however, the relationships with law enforcement agencies not actively contributing an officer were more strained or, at least, relatively undeveloped. In Tri-Code, this was particularly true of the Michigan City Police Department, a relatively large department with its own drug unit, that did not participate in the Tri-Code operation. In the SCNSF region, this was true of many of the law enforcement agencies and prosecutors offices in the surrounding "service" counties. It appeared that the

relationships between the strike force and the non-participating agencies were largely contingent on the preestablished personal relationships between the strike force officials and individuals within these agencies. For example, the most positive relationships between SCNSF and agencies outside Monroe County appeared to be in Greene County, where Executive Director Miller had previously been the prosecutor. Similarly, positive relationships seemed to occur where the chief of operations had established relationships with individual officers. Where these personal ties were not established and the agency was not contributing an officer to the strike force, the strike force did not seem to have a significant effect on agency relationships.

Much the same picture emerged in terms of relationships with the State Police. In both sites, strike force officials expressed disappointment that the State Police did not play a more active role in the Executive Board of the strike force. Further, while strike force officials spoke of the professionalism of the State Police, and State Police officials were supportive of the work of the strike forces, it did not appear that ongoing, joint operations between the strike forces and the State Police were likely to develop. From the perspective of the strike force officials, at least, the State Police were viewed as wanting to stay relatively insulated and autonomous in their drug enforcement activities.

On the other hand, strike force officials believed that the creation of the strike forces had provided a mechanism for improved relationships with the DEA and FBI. It appears that the development of the strike force created a situation where strike force officials and federal officials both saw the advantages of joint, cooperative efforts. From the perspective of the strike force officers, the federal agencies, particularly DEA, could provide intelligence on operations extending beyond the boundaries of the strike force operation, buy money, and assistance with federal forfeiture procedures. The federal agencies, in turn, benefited from the investigative work of a professional team of officers.

Thus, it appears that the federally funded strike forces can create improved organizational relationships between agencies contributing officers to the strike force and between local and federal agencies. Further, although officers expressed disappointment that more effective joint operations were not developed with the State Police, the strike force did not seem to damage relationships between local agencies and the State Police.

PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF STRIKE FORCE

In earlier chapters, we discussed some of the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the strike forces identified through the survey responses. In subsequent sections, we consider some benefits of the strike forces as mentioned by participants as well as some immediate and potential problems related to strike force activities.

Professionalization of Law Enforcement

In both strike force sites there developed close working relationships between the law enforcement officers and the prosecutors office. Prosecutors reported that the cases made by the strike force officers were of "very high quality" from a prosecutorial and constitutional perspective. As one prosecutor put it, "the quality of the work" is something local law enforcement agencies "could not approximate."

In addition, the officers in the strike forces were given an opportunity for specialized training in drug enforcement techniques. This included both formal training opportunities as well as learning through assignment with officers with years of experience in drug enforcement. This was considered particularly beneficial for officers in small departments that typically cannot afford to have officers specialize. One example of this came from an officer assigned to the strike force from a small, rural county, who said that he had no idea how to build a conspiracy case prior to his work

with the strike force. He had worked several similar cases with the strike force and had developed skills he could bring back to the sheriffs department when his assignment to the strike force ended.

Availability of High-Tech Surveillance Equipment

As noted earlier, the federal grants allowed for the purchase of technical surveillance equipment typically beyond the fiscal means of local law enforcement agencies. In both sites officers pointed to sophisticated recording devices they had used in investigative work of drug organizations that they believed would never have been purchased without the grant.

Formal Commitment to Drug Enforcement

Law enforcement officials also noted that a benefit of the strike forces is to have an identifiable unit dedicated to drug enforcement. The strike force becomes a funnel for information and a source of expertise for prosecutors and other law enforcement officers. Prior to the strike force, information and intelligence about drug cases would be handled on a largely ad hoc basis. It may have been handed over to the sheriffs department, a police department, or the State Police. Now there is a specialized unit where officials realize they can go with such intelligence and where they are confident the information will be responded to.

In addition, the strike force can act as a conduit between law enforcement officials. The prosecutor of Starke County mentioned an incident involving several defendants with ties to individuals in Pulaski County. One of the defendants was very eager to provide information on the dealings between the Starke and Pulaski organizations. The strike force officers were able to make the connection between the Starke County defendants and several defendants in Pulaski County. They then

contacted the Pulaski County prosecutor and asked him to hold off on bringing formal charges until they were able to fully investigate on the basis of the Starke County defendant's testimony. By doing so, they were able to identify additional traffickers and bring more serious charges against members of the drug organizations. The Starke County prosecutor was convinced that this regional effort would not have been possible without the strike force.

Similarly, officials from SCNSF mentioned an incident in which a routine traffic bust was turned over to the strike force. Interrogation of the defendant, coupled with SCNSF intelligence, revealed that the defendant could identify a major cocaine trafficker from Miami. Strike force personnel arranged a buy with the Miami dealer and arrested him. Once again, officials believed that without the strike force the original arrest would not have led to the higher level arrest. While such reactive traffic arrests are relatively common in the strike force and control counties, the strike force is seen as a means for following-up on these routine cases.

Improved Ability to Infiltrate Networks in Rural Counties

Law enforcement officials in the smaller counties said that a main problem with drug enforcement in such environments, second only to lack of manpower, was that law enforcement officers were known to drug dealers thus precluding infiltration of drug networks. One advantage of the strike force is that it allowed officers from other counties to work undercover and to penetrate drug organizations. Thus, an officer from LaPorte County might work undercover in Pulaski County while a Pulaski County officer might do such work in Starke or LaPorte counties.

Cooperation Between Strike Forces

The federally funded strike forces operating throughout the state were described

as becoming "a loose federation of drug enforcement units" that view one another as having a common mission and that have become involved in several joint operations. For example, officers from the Wabash Valley Narcotics Task Force and the Metropolitan Drug Task Force have cooperated with SCNSF in joint efforts exchanging intelligence and officers to work undercover. The strike forces now provide officers with an identifiable unit to contact on investigations extending to other parts of the state.

PROBLEMS

Manpower

In both sites, lack of manpower is considered a key obstacle to maximizing drug enforcement effectiveness. The Tri-Code operational enforcement staff basically consists of four officers for the three county region. In SCNSF, three officers are assigned to the unit covering six counties. Strike force officers conceded that while they were able to more fully investigate intelligence leads than had been the case in the past, the lack of personnel made it impossible to adequately respond to all the information flowing in.

The lack of personnel also made it difficult to keep officials throughout the region satisfied with strike force activities. In Tri-Code, the strategy followed involved phased operations within each of the three counties. The last of the three counties to have an operation was Starke. Early in our evaluation, several Starke County officials admitted that they wondered when Tri-Code would become active in their county. Later, during our follow-up interviews, Tri-Code was involved in a major investigation in Starke County and these officials were satisfied with the strike force's involvement in their county.

The personnel issues were magnified in the SCNSF region by the fact that twice as many counties were involved and that the strike force was primarily centered in one

county. The strike force had hoped that departments in the surrounding counties would be able to contribute an officer to strike force operations on at least a part-time basis. This did not occur because the agencies simply could not afford to make such a contribution. Consequently, the strike force has been primarily involved in Monroe County and has become involved in other counties when requested or when Monroe County cases provide leads to other counties. This has, however, precluded major investigative efforts in other counties and has led to expressions of dissatisfaction from officials in these counties.

Lack of Buy Money

A constant complaint of drug enforcement officers was the lack of adequate buy money. This was seen as a limit on the ability of officers to move into more organized networks involving more serious drug types. As one officer put it, "you can't make a major cocaine deal waving \$100." Both strike forces developed positive working relationships with the DEA and often were able to secure confidential funds by working with DEA officials. However, the strike force officers expressed frustration that from time-to-time major buy situations arose where they couldn't quickly come up with the necessary funds.

Drain on County Resources

One by-product of the increased number of drug arrests is a drain on court and jail resources. This is particularly true following the large raids conducted by the strike forces and by the Indiana State Police. Particularly in small counties, this increase in arrest activity means substantial increases in the workload of the prosecutor and public defender's offices and a strain on jail capacity. The potential problems for small counties is demonstrated by the Murphy case in Pulaski County. The prosecutor

estimates that the costs for the trial added at least an additional \$100,000 in extra expenses for the county. As one strike force officer stated, "the task force creates a monster" that inundates the prosecutor and threatens to bankrupt the prosecutor's budget.

One problem associated with the drug raids is the inability to follow-up on the information available from defendants willing to talk. A number of officials expressed frustration that the raids often become an end in themselves rather than a source of investigative leads. This criticism was leveled particularly at the State Police raids. While officials were very supportive of the professionalism of the State Police in conducting the initial investigations and raids, they were critical that resources were not devoted to following up on potential intelligence sources. As one prosecutor stated, the State Police raids "make a big splash but then they're out of it." One of the hopes of the strike forces is to build upon these raids as a source for further investigation. While this was clearly a strike force strategy, it was unclear whether they were able to effectively do so.

Travel Time and Costs

Task force officials noted on several occasions that the time and money spent on travel in the multijurisdictional region placed constraints on their ability to effectively respond to the requests made of them from different agencies in the area. The costs of conducting surveillance, providing information or equipment, or interviewing suspects and informants are made greater by the requirement to travel, sometimes considerable distances in the region. For example, in Tri-Code, the travel time from Winamac to La Porte is approximately one hour. This places burdens not only on officers who must make the trip on a regular basis, but also on vehicles.

One side-effect of this problem involves the future participation of other law

enforcement agencies in surrounding regions. Tri-Code officials noted that they had several requests from surrounding counties not involved in the task force for assistance. Several of these counties expressed interest in becoming involved in the task force. Though Tri-Code officials were willing and interested in such efforts, travel costs and time impeded their efforts in this regard.

These concerns raise important implications for future task force activities. As task forces succeed in their efforts, the geographic scope of their attention is likely to increase. This increase may be due to displacement effects brought on by law enforcement saturation, or may be the product of increasingly sophisticated narcotics intelligence which extends the boundaries of interest. Task forces will require the necessary travel resources to effectively respond to their own successes.

Profit Driven Investigations

Asset Seizure/forfeiture provisions were created to take the profit out of the criminal enterprise. In addition, one explicit goal of the strike forces has been to create a viable asset seizure/forfeiture program that could eventually replace the federal grant funds and support the strike force operation. Strike force officials acknowledge the danger that the need to produce forfeitures could create pressure to focus investigations on potential profitable targets. To the extent that the targets with large potential forfeitures are major traffickers this may not be problematic, however, were home or automobile ownership to become the key factors in targeting suspects, the drive for forfeitures may override traditional drug enforcement objectives.

Similarly, there is some evidence that forfeiture issues are becoming a part of plea negotiations in some counties. This raises questions regarding equality of justice and, at least, the appearance of impropriety if defendants seem to be able to buy themselves a "good deal."

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The study conducted here involves two task forces located in moderately populated regions. The demographic makeup of the regions, combined with the differing structures of the task forces preclude generalization to task forces in urban areas or of different structures. With these qualifications in mind, however, the following policy implications are offered for consideration by policymakers and law enforcement officials concerned with the issue of illegal drug distribution and use.

1) Federally funded multijurisdictional drug enforcement strike forces seem to be an effective way for local law enforcement agencies to increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of drug offenders and can enable local agencies to conduct long-term investigations of organized drug networks.

It is important to note, however, that with respect to the absolute number of arrests and convictions, the evidence from the control sites suggests that the strike force is not a necessary condition in all jurisdictions. That is, while officials from the strike force sites are convinced that the increases in arrests and in the level of cases could not have occurred without the strike force, the tremendous increase in the number of arrests in the south control region demonstrates that such increases can occur without a local agency-based federally funded strike force.

2) Federally funded strike forces can improve communication and coordination among law enforcement agencies but the main improvement in relationships will be among the agencies actually contributing personnel and/or resources to the strike force.

3) Because of traditional agency rivalries and turf issues and because of the potential for corruption in drug enforcement, the integrity of key personnel is crucial to the effectiveness of the strike force. In selecting personnel for the strike force, particularly for the position of chief of operations, a primary criterion should be an established reputation for professional integrity.

4) Federal and state funding agencies should be aware of the potential for conflict between agencies due to competition for funds supporting the strike forces.

Strike force officials predict that the statewide strike forces and the State Police are going to increasingly view one another as competitors for scarce funds and that this will exacerbate agency rivalry and a decline in sharing investigative intelligence.

5) The Indiana Criminal Justice Institute should continue to set aside some of the federal drug funds for the development of a state drug plan and for monitoring task force activities. In updating and revising the plan from year-to-year, Institute officials should consider the findings and implications from the evaluation studies of task forces. Further, Institute officials should consult with law enforcement officials and researchers (e.g., members of the Research and Information Consortium) when developing future plans.

One strike force official recommends that each strike force submit a detailed list of goals and objectives and that future funding be contingent on meeting goals. Success in meeting goals would be determined by a team of law enforcement auditors under the auspices of the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute.

The experience of this evaluation, however, suggests that monitoring of the strike forces is a complex activity. For example, one might contrast the increase in arrests in the south control region with that in the SCNSF region and conclude that the SCNSF Strike Force was not active enough to warrant continued funding. However, the objectives of SCNSF were to target dealers and traffickers rather than low level users. This strategy involves longer term investigations of more serious cases. Consequently, SCNSF did not produce a huge increase in the volume of cases but an increase in the quality of cases. To make funds contingent on increases in the volume of cases would likely push strike forces to a strategy focussed on users. As one SCNSF officer noted, "we could triple the number of arrests if we just went out and busted small-time buyers."

6) Policymakers should be aware of the constraints faced by law enforcement in their efforts to affect illegal drug markets.

While the data provided here suggest that the task forces are effective in increasing the seriousness of drug arrests, the benefits or utility of such a strategy is by

no means clear. Indeed, the various law enforcement strategies designed to confront the drug problem remain subject to intense theoretical and empirical debate by practitioners and scholars alike. As Kleiman and Smith note, "(drug) enforcement has to be thought of as changing the conditions confronting buyers and sellers of illicit drugs, and its effects have to be traced through the drug markets before a conclusion can be drawn about whether those effects are, on the balance, beneficial."² Unfortunately, those measures required to assess market conditions are the most difficult to develop. Furthermore, to the extent that research has been conducted on law enforcement strategies designed to influence drug market structures, it has been limited largely to urban areas with considerably different drug problems than those experienced in more rural regions such as those evaluated here. Their applicability to different conditions is uncertain.

7) Policymakers and officials responsible for drug enforcement should consider the human costs and fiscal implications of enforcement policies which place greater numbers of individuals in already overcrowded prisons.

Both law enforcement and alternative drug strategies merit attention by those interested in curbing the abuse of drugs. While the deterrent effects of many drug enforcement policies remain open to debate, the toll in human suffering brought on by increased incarceration is more clear. The isolation from family and friends, loss of employment, and stigmatization brought on by imprisonment, combined with the fear and hostility existing in prisons, can be argued to create conditions conducive to continued drug abuse and deviance. Further, the dramatic increase in arrests and convictions witnessed in the 18 counties included in this study, has serious implications for the continued expansion of the costly prison system.

8) Local officials considering the development of a drug enforcement strike force should plan for "system-wide" effects. These include increases in the number of jail inmates and in the caseload of the prosecutor's and public defender's offices.

9) Asset seizure/forfeitures are unlikely to fully support the operations of the strike forces.

This seems to be true because of a combination of factors including:

requirements under state law to contribute funds to the school fund, delay in return of funds under federal forfeiture proceedings, and perhaps most importantly, the lack of assets of most drug defendants.

10) State provisions regarding asset seizures require further attention from Indiana policymakers.

Current provisions which stipulate that forfeitures be turned over to the Common School Fund (except as they pertain to costs incurred in the investigation) are criticized on the grounds that they should be returned to the local law enforcement agencies for continued drug enforcement efforts. We are concerned, however, at the revenue generating implications of seizure and forfeiture provisions which return all or percentages back to the law enforcement agency. As officers noted to us repeatedly, the prospects of seizing an offender's assets are important considerations in investigations. We must consider the potential of choosing enforcement targets on the basis of offenders' wealth rather than the seriousness of their drug activity.

Furthermore, concerns arise over the use of contributory funds as a vehicle to filter offender assets to local law enforcement agencies. Such vehicles are open to great abuse as tools in plea negotiations, and though they remain "voluntary," the degree to which they can be said to be so is highly suspect. Concerns for justice require that such funds not be used regarding the assets of offenders coming before the courts. If such funds are allowable, at a minimum they require guidelines and oversight when such offenders are involved.

One alternative recommendation for consideration is to mandate that all money forfeited through drug activity be earmarked expressly for drug education in the community in which the forfeiture took place. Such a revision is in keeping with the

Indiana State Constitution and keeps the proceeds directed toward drug efforts at the local level.

11) Task forces should develop policies regarding the allocation of funds generated through forfeitures in the early stages of the task force plan.

Though large forfeitures are relatively rare, the potential for sizable funds through forfeitures exists. Such revenue is likely to stir considerable controversy among task force members unless policies for disbursement have been agreed upon earlier.

Along similar lines, task forces are advised to create explicit accounts of the allocation of funds, in particular, buy money.

12) Task forces need to give considerable attention to inter-agency communication for a cooperative, regional drug enforcement effort to develop.

Newly created task forces need to meet early and regularly to formulate consensus on goals and strategies and agreements on departmental contributions to the task force. Such goals should move away from those which are broad or vague, to those which are more specific and measurable. Existing task forces should meet periodically to review goals and objectives and should consider revising such goals and objectives to meet changes in funding, resources and activities.

13) State officials as well as members of strike forces should develop mechanisms to promote information sharing and collaboration between the federally funded strike forces. Annual or semi-annual statewide meetings as well as training programs for strike force members would build on informal relationships that are already emerging among strike force officials from different parts of the state and contribute to the continued professionalization of drug enforcement in the state.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The two federally funded strike forces studied in the present evaluation, the South Central Indiana Narcotics Strike Force and the Tri-Code Organized Drug Enforcement Task Force, appear to have been successful in meeting several of their

objectives. In particular, in both regions there was a significant increase in the number and seriousness of drug arrests and prosecutions following the creation of the strike forces. While much of this activity was due to the efforts of other law enforcement agencies, the task forces did make a number of arrests involving the distribution of more serious drugs than had previously occurred or that were being made by other agencies. Further, there is evidence from several investigations of major traffickers that the task forces were able to successfully conduct more long-term and sophisticated investigations of drug networks. Finally, although not without qualification, the task forces seemed to lead to increased levels of coordination and communication among law enforcement agencies in each region.

These findings, however, have to be qualified by the evidence from the control sites. Both the north and south control sites also experienced increases in the number of drug arrests. Indeed, the data from the south control region indicated quite dramatic increases made by local agencies and the State Police. The findings from the control sites suggest that while the task forces may lead to increased law enforcement activity, the task forces may not be necessary ingredients in all communities. It appears that the general war on drugs, coupled with expanded efforts by the State Police, can have similar effects to the creation of task forces.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that even with the expanded effort of law enforcement officials in the drug area, the ultimate effect of these efforts on the distribution and use of illegal drugs is an open question. Any policy discussion of the efficacy of the federally funded multijurisdictional task forces must be tempered with an awareness of the human and fiscal costs associated with an incarcerative strategy and the uncertainty of the ultimate effect on illegal drug use.

CHAPTER NOTES

¹ Kleiman, Mark A.R. and Kerry D. Smith, "State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy." In Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, Eds. Drugs and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF CONTROL REGIONS

DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN INDIANA: A SURVEY ABOUT THE CRITICAL ISSUES FACING
DRUG ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

This survey is intended to better understand the problems facing law enforcement officials in the area of drug enforcement and the variety of responses being taken to address the drug problem. Please answer all the questions. If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify your answers, please feel free to use the space in the margins. Your comments will be read and taken into account.

Thank you for your help.

Department of Criminal Justice
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I. The first set of questions asks your opinion about some of the problems your agency faces in the area of drug enforcement.

1. How serious a problem are the following drugs in your region: (Circle your answer)

	Very serious problem	Serious problem	Minor problem	Not a problem at all
COCAINE	1	2	3	4
CRACK	1	2	3	4
MARIJUANA	1	2	3	4
LSD	1	2	3	4
PCP	1	2	3	4
HEROIN	1	2	3	4
BARBITURATES	1	2	3	4
STIMULANTS	1	2	3	4
OTHER _____ (SPECIFY)	1	2	3	4

2. How would you characterize drug activity in your region: (Circle number)

1. HIGHLY ORGANIZED
2. SOMEWHAT ORGANIZED
3. NOT VERY ORGANIZED
4. DON'T KNOW

3. A traditional problem in drug enforcement has been that agencies are guarded with the information they gather and are often hesitant to share this information with other law enforcement agencies. How would you characterize the sharing of drug enforcement information in your region: (Circle number)

1. AGENCIES VERY GUARDED, WILL NOT SHARE INFORMATION
2. AGENCIES SOMEWHAT GUARDED, WILL OCCASIONALLY SHARE INFORMATION
3. AGENCIES VERY OPEN, WILL READILY SHARE INFORMATION
4. DON'T KNOW

4. Please rate the extent to which each of the following are obstacles for your agency in dealing with the drug problem at this time: (Circle your answer)

	Very serious obstacle	Serious obstacle	Minor obstacle	Not an obstacle
LACK OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ...	1	2	3	4
LACK OF VEHICLES	1	2	3	4
LACK OF EQUIPMENT	1	2	3	4
LACK OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
UNRELIABLE INFORMANTS	1	2	3	4
LENIENT CRIMINAL SENTENCES ...	1	2	3	4
LACK OF DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4
LACK OF DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4
ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES (FILL IN AND CIRCLE NUMBER):				
_____	1	2	3	4
_____	1	2	3	4

5. Please rate the adequacy of the following resources in your agency for dealing with the drug problem at this time: (Circle your answer)

	Very adequate	Adequate	Inadequate	Very inadequate
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	1	2	3	4
VEHICLES	1	2	3	4
EQUIPMENT	1	2	3	4
INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
PROSECUTORIAL PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAMS ..	1	2	3	4
DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4

II. The next set of questions ask your opinion about drug enforcement in your county and region. The first few questions address inter-agency communication, that is, the extent to which agencies talk with one another about drug enforcement activities.

6. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in this region? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
4. POOR COMMUNICATION

7. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in your county and the State Police? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
4. POOR COMMUNICATION

8. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in your county and federal law enforcement officials (FBI/DEA)? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
4. POOR COMMUNICATION

The next set of questions relate to inter-agency cooperation. This refers to the willingness of an agency to work with or assist another agency in activities related to drug enforcement (e.g. providing manpower, technological assistance, planning, etc.).

9. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in this region? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
2. GOOD COOPERATION
3. FAIR COOPERATION
4. POOR COOPERATION

10. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in your county and the State Police? (Circle number)

- 1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
- 2. GOOD COOPERATION
- 3. FAIR COOPERATION
- 4. POOR COOPERATION

11. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in your county and federal law enforcement officials (FBI/DEA)? (Circle number)

- 1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
- 2. GOOD COOPERATION
- 3. FAIR COOPERATION
- 4. POOR COOPERATION

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement:

12. When we've needed help with drug enforcement activity we've been able to get it from other local agencies. (Circle number)

- 1. STRONGLY AGREE
- 2. AGREE
- 3. DISAGREE
- 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE

13. During the last month, how often have you had contact with officials in the following agencies regarding drug enforcement: (Circle your answer)

	NEVER	ONE TO FIVE TIMES	SIX TO TEN TIMES	MORE THAN TEN TIMES
ANOTHER LOCAL LEVEL AGENCY ...	1	2	3	4
INDIANA STATE POLICE	1	2	3	4
FBI OR DEA	1	2	3	4

14. During the last six months, how often have you worked with or assisted officials in the following agencies regarding drug enforcement (e.g. sharing manpower, technological assistance, planning, etc.): (Circle your answer)

	NEVER	ONE TO FIVE TIMES	SIX TO TEN TIMES	MORE THAN TEN TIMES
ANOTHER LOCAL LEVEL AGENCY ...	1	2	3	4
INDIANA STATE POLICE	1	2	3	4
FBI OR DEA	1	2	3	4

15. How would you characterize the morale of drug enforcement officers in your region? (Circle number)
1. VERY HIGH
 2. HIGH
 3. MODERATE
 4. LOW
 5. VERY LOW
16. How would you rate the quality of drug cases (likelihood of prosecution) in your community? (Circle number)
1. VERY HIGH
 2. HIGH
 3. MODERATE
 4. LOW
 5. VERY LOW
17. How aware is the general public of the drug enforcement activities in your region? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY AWARE
 2. VERY AWARE
 3. AWARE
 4. NOT VERY AWARE
 5. TOTALLY UNAWARE
18. How would you characterize the level of support from city and county government for drug enforcement activities in your community? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE
 2. VERY SUPPORTIVE
 3. SUPPORTIVE
 4. NOT VERY SUPPORTIVE
 5. NOT SUPPORTIVE AT ALL
19. How effective have drug enforcement activities been in your community? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE
 2. FAIRLY EFFECTIVE
 3. SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE
 4. NOT VERY EFFECTIVE
 5. NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL

III. Next, we would like to ask you several specific questions about drug enforcement operations in your department and get your thoughts on the effects of drug enforcement in your region.

20. How much support is there within your department for drug enforcement activities? (Circle number)

1. GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT
2. MODERATE SUPPORT
3. RELATIVELY LITTLE SUPPORT
4. NO SUPPORT
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

21. Has your agency seized assets under asset seizure laws during the last twelve months? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW

22. Please list any problems your agency has encountered in using or attempting to use asset seizure provisions: (use back of page if necessary)

23. What changes in asset seizure laws would you recommend (if any)?

24. How many times during the last month have you contacted or been contacted by an informant on a drug case? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES
5. NOT RELEVANT, DON'T WORK WITH INFORMANTS

25. How many times during the last six months have you used confidential funds on a drug related matter? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES
5. NOT RELEVANT, DON'T USE CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

26. Within the last six months, how many times have you passed on intelligence information to a member of another agency? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES

27. How much of a priority is the prosecution of drug cases in the prosecution office of your county? (Circle number)

1. VERY HIGH PRIORITY
2. HIGH PRIORITY
3. MODERATE PRIORITY
4. LOW PRIORITY
5. DON'T KNOW/NO OPINION

28. How would you characterize the sentences in drug cases in your county? (Circle number)

1. TOO SEVERE
2. SEVERE
3. ABOUT RIGHT
4. LENIENT
5. TOO LENIENT

29. Are there any drug awareness programs operating in your community? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

If yes, please list (school, media campaigns, etc.) _____

30. In terms of your professional role in drug enforcement, would you say you are best described as a: (Circle number)

1. LINE LEVEL ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
2. ADMINISTRATOR OR POLICYMAKER

31. In which of the following counties is your professional appointment. (Circle number)

- | | |
|-------------|----------------|
| 1. BROWN | 10. MORGAN |
| 2. CLARK | 11. ORANGE |
| 3. FLOYD | 12. OWEN |
| 4. GREENE | 13. PORTER |
| 5. HARRISON | 14. PULASKI |
| 6. JASPER | 15. SCOTT |
| 7. LAPORTE | 16. STARKE |
| 8. LAWRENCE | 17. WASHINGTON |
| 9. MONROE | 18. WHITE |

32. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the drug problem, drug enforcement, or the strengths and weaknesses of the Strike Force? If so, please use this space for that purpose.

Your contribution to this effort is greatly appreciated. We will see that you receive a copy of the findings. Please return the questionnaire in the stamped envelope as well as the postcard indicating that you completed the survey. Thank you.

APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF TASK FORCE REGIONS

DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN INDIANA: A SURVEY ABOUT THE CRITICAL ISSUES FACING
DRUG ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

This survey is intended to better understand the problems facing law enforcement officials in the area of drug enforcement and the variety of responses being taken to address the drug problem. Please answer all the questions. (Note that questions are both front and back of pages.) If you wish to comment on any questions or qualify your answers, please feel free to use the space in the margins. Your comments will be read and taken into account.

Thank you for your help.

Department of Criminal Justice
Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana 47405

I. The first set of questions asks your opinion about some of the problems your agency faces in the area of drug enforcement.

1. How serious a problem are the following drugs in your region: (Circle your answer)

	Very serious problem	Serious problem	Minor problem	Not a problem at all
COCAINE	1	2	3	4
CRACK	1	2	3	4
MARIJUANA	1	2	3	4
LSD	1	2	3	4
PCP	1	2	3	4
HEROIN	1	2	3	4
BARBITURATES	1	2	3	4
STIMULANTS	1	2	3	4
OTHER _____ (SPECIFY)	1	2	3	4

2. How would you characterize drug activity in your region: (Circle number)

- 1. HIGHLY ORGANIZED
- 2. SOMEWHAT ORGANIZED
- 3. NOT VERY ORGANIZED
- 4. DON'T KNOW

3. A traditional problem in drug enforcement has been that agencies are guarded with the information they gather and are often hesitant to share this information with other law enforcement agencies. How would you characterize the sharing of drug enforcement information in your region: (Circle number)

1. AGENCIES VERY GUARDED, WILL NOT SHARE INFORMATION
2. AGENCIES SOMEWHAT GUARDED, WILL OCCASIONALLY SHARE INFORMATION
3. AGENCIES VERY OPEN, WILL READILY SHARE INFORMATION
4. DON'T KNOW

4. Please rate the extent to which each of the following are obstacles for your agency in dealing with the drug problem at this time: (Circle your answer)

	Very serious obstacle	Serious obstacle	Minor obstacle	Not an obstacle
LACK OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ...	1	2	3	4
LACK OF VEHICLES	1	2	3	4
LACK OF EQUIPMENT	1	2	3	4
LACK OF INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
LACK OF PROSECUTORIAL PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
UNRELIABLE INFORMANTS	1	2	3	4
LENIENT CRIMINAL SENTENCES ...	1	2	3	4
LACK OF DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4
LACK OF DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4
ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES (FILL IN AND CIRCLE NUMBER):				
_____	1	2	3	4
_____	1	2	3	4

5. Please rate the adequacy of the following resources in your agency for dealing with the drug problem at this time: (Circle your answer)

	Very adequate	Adequate	Inadequate	Very inadequate
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	1	2	3	4
VEHICLES	1	2	3	4
EQUIPMENT	1	2	3	4
INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
PROSECUTORIAL PERSONNEL	1	2	3	4
DRUG REHABILITATION PROGRAMS ..	1	2	3	4
DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAMS	1	2	3	4

II. The next set of questions ask your opinion about drug enforcement in your county and region. The first few questions address inter-agency communication, that is, the extent to which agencies talk with one another about drug enforcement activities.

6. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in this region? (Circle number)

- 1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
- 2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
- 3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
- 4. POOR COMMUNICATION

7. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in your county and the State Police? (Circle number)

- 1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
- 2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
- 3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
- 4. POOR COMMUNICATION

8. How would you describe the level of communication between local drug enforcement officials in your county and federal law enforcement officials (FBI/DEA)? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COMMUNICATION
2. GOOD COMMUNICATION
3. FAIR COMMUNICATION
4. POOR COMMUNICATION

The next set of questions relate to inter-agency cooperation. This refers to the willingness of an agency to work with or assist another agency in activities related to drug enforcement (e.g. providing manpower, technological assistance, planning, etc.).

9. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in this region? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
2. GOOD COOPERATION
3. FAIR COOPERATION
4. POOR COOPERATION

10. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in your county and the State Police? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
2. GOOD COOPERATION
3. FAIR COOPERATION
4. POOR COOPERATION

11. How would you describe the level of cooperation between local drug enforcement officials in your county and federal law enforcement officials (FBI/DEA)? (Circle number)

1. EXCELLENT COOPERATION
2. GOOD COOPERATION
3. FAIR COOPERATION
4. POOR COOPERATION

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement:

12. When we've needed help with drug enforcement activity we've been able to get it from other local agencies. (Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE

13. During the last month, how often have you had contact with officials in the following agencies regarding drug enforcement: (Circle your answer)

	NEVER	ONE TO FIVE TIMES	SIX TO TEN TIMES	MORE THAN TEN TIMES
ANOTHER LOCAL LEVEL AGENCY ...	1	2	3	4
INDIANA STATE POLICE	1	2	3	4
FBI OR DEA	1	2	3	4

14. During the last six months, how often have you worked with or assisted officials in the following agencies regarding drug enforcement (e.g. sharing manpower, technological assistance, planning, etc.): (Circle your answer)

	NEVER	ONE TO FIVE TIMES	SIX TO TEN TIMES	MORE THAN TEN TIMES
ANOTHER LOCAL LEVEL AGENCY ...	1	2	3	4
INDIANA STATE POLICE	1	2	3	4
FBI OR DEA	1	2	3	4

15. How would you characterize the morale of drug enforcement officers in your region? (Circle number)
1. VERY HIGH
 2. HIGH
 3. MODERATE
 4. LOW
 5. VERY LOW
16. How would you rate the quality of drug cases (likelihood of prosecution) in your community? (Circle number)
1. VERY HIGH
 2. HIGH
 3. MODERATE
 4. LOW
 5. VERY LOW
17. How aware is the general public of the drug enforcement activities in your region? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY AWARE
 2. VERY AWARE
 3. AWARE
 4. NOT VERY AWARE
 5. TOTALLY UNAWARE
18. How would you characterize the level of support from city and county government for drug enforcement activities in your community? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE
 2. VERY SUPPORTIVE
 3. SUPPORTIVE
 4. NOT VERY SUPPORTIVE
 5. NOT SUPPORTIVE AT ALL
19. How effective have drug enforcement activities been in your community? (Circle number)
1. EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE
 2. FAIRLY EFFECTIVE
 3. SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE
 4. NOT VERY EFFECTIVE
 5. NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL

III. The next set of questions ask your opinion about the effects of the Tri-Code Narcotics Strike Force. This is the Strike Force headquartered in the LaPorte County Sheriff's Office and serving LaPorte, Pulaski, and Starke counties. In the questions that follow, the Tri-Code Narcotics Strike Force is referred to as the Strike Force.

20. Following is a list of goals of some federally funded drug enforcement task forces. Please rate each statement in terms of whether you originally considered the item to be a low, medium, or high priority goal of the Strike Force. Insert NA if the item was not considered a goal of the Strike Force.

GOAL STATEMENTS	NOT A GOAL	LOW PRIORITY GOAL	MEDIUM PRIORITY GOAL	HIGH PRIORITY GOAL
Enhanced communication and cooperation among drug enforcement agencies	NA	1	2	3 4 5
Increased apprehension and prosecution of street-level dealers	NA	1	2	3 4 5
Increased apprehension and prosecution of users	NA	1	2	3 4 5
Increased penetration of drug organizations and networks	NA	1	2	3 4 5
Development of a viable asset seizure program	NA	1	2	3 4 5
Development of a drug awareness program	NA	1	2	3 4 5

21. Have the goals of the Strike Force changed since it became operational?
(Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

If yes, how have they changed? _____

22. How satisfied are you with the present goals of the Strike Force?
(Circle number)

1. EXTREMELY SATISFIED
2. SATISFIED
3. DISSATISFIED
4. EXTREMELY DISSATISFIED

What changes in the Strike Force's goals would you recommend (if any)?

For the following set of statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree:

23. The Strike Force is an effective way to address the problem of illegal drug activity. (Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

24. The Strike Force has been successfully implemented in our region.
(Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

25. The Strike Force has increased communication among law enforcement agencies in the Strike Force counties. (Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

26. The Strike Force has increased communication between local law enforcement agencies and the State Police. (Circle number)
1. STRONGLY AGREE
 2. AGREE
 3. DISAGREE
 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION
27. The Strike Force has increased communication between local law enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement agencies (DEA/FBI). (Circle number)
1. STRONGLY AGREE
 2. AGREE
 3. DISAGREE
 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION
28. The Strike Force has increased cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the Strike Force counties. (Circle number)
1. STRONGLY AGREE
 2. AGREE
 3. DISAGREE
 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION
29. The Strike Force has increased cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and the State Police. (Circle number)
1. STRONGLY AGREE
 2. AGREE
 3. DISAGREE
 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION
30. The Strike Force has increased cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and federal law enforcement agencies (DEA/FBI). (Circle number)
1. STRONGLY AGREE
 2. AGREE
 3. DISAGREE
 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

For the following statements, please indicate the level of support for the Strike Force:

31. How much support is there within your department for the Strike Force?
(Circle number)

1. GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT
2. MODERATE SUPPORT
3. RELATIVELY LITTLE SUPPORT
4. NO SUPPORT
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

32. How much support is there within your community (local politicians, media, citizens) for the Strike Force? (Circle number)

1. GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT
2. MODERATE SUPPORT
3. RELATIVELY LITTLE SUPPORT
4. NO SUPPORT
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

IV. Now we would like to ask about the structure, personnel, and finances of the Strike Force.

33. How much has the organizational structure of the Strike Force changed since it was initially adopted? (Circle number)

1. A GREAT DEAL
2. MODERATE CHANGE
3. LITTLE CHANGE
4. NO CHANGE
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

34. Are you satisfied with the present organizational structure of the Strike Force? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

What changes, if any, would you recommend? _____

35. Off the top of your head, can you name the Strike Forces' Coordinating Committee? (Circle number)

- 1. YES, ALL OF THEM
- 2. YES, A FEW OF THEM
- 3. NO

If yes, please list.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

36. How satisfied are you with the composition of Strike Force personnel? (Circle number)

- 1. VERY SATISFIED
- 2. SATISFIED
- 3. DISSATISFIED
- 4. VERY DISSATISFIED
- 5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

What changes, if any, would you recommend? _____

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

37. The Strike Force has been well-accepted by other law enforcement officers in this county. (Circle number)

- 1. STRONGLY AGREE
- 2. AGREE
- 3. DISAGREE
- 4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
- 5. DON'T KNOW/NO OPINION

38. How has the Strike Force affected the morale of drug enforcement officers in your region? (Circle number)

1. SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED MORALE
2. INCREASED MORALE
3. NOT AFFECTED MORALE
4. DECREASED MORALE
5. SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED MORALE
6. DON'T KNOW

39. Do you think the Strike Force would have been created without federal funding? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

40. Do you think monies from asset seizures and forfeitures will be sufficient to support the Strike Force in the future? (Circle number)

1. YES, COMPLETELY
2. YES, BUT ONLY PARTIALLY
3. NO, NOT AT ALL
4. CANNOT TELL AT THIS TIME

41. Has your agency seized assets under asset seizure laws during the last twelve months? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW

42. Please list any problems your agency has encountered in using or attempting to use asset seizure provisions: (use back of page if necessary)

43. What changes in asset seizure laws would you recommend (if any)?

44. Are you satisfied with the way the money is allocated for Strike Force operation? (Circle number)

1. VERY SATISFIED
2. SATISFIED
3. DISSATISFIED
4. VERY DISSATISFIED
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

What changes in the way money is allocated would you recommend (if any)?

V. Next, we'd like to ask some questions about the operations of the Strike Force.

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement:

45. The Strike Force has allowed us to move beyond low-level dealers and focus on more highly organized drug activity. (Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DON'T KNOW/ NO OPINION

46. Have contacts with informants increased since the Strike Force became operational? (Circle number)

1. SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED
2. INCREASED
3. NOT CHANGED
4. DECREASED
5. SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED
6. DON'T KNOW

47. How many times during the last month have you contacted or been contacted by an informant on a drug case? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES
5. NOT RELEVANT, DON'T WORK WITH INFORMANTS

48. How many times during the last six months have you used confidential funds on a drug related matter? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES
5. NOT RELEVANT, DON'T USE CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

49. Within the last six months, how many times have you passed on intelligence information to a member of the Strike Force? (Circle number)

1. NONE
2. ONE TO FIVE TIMES
3. SIX TO TEN TIMES
4. MORE THAN TEN TIMES

50. Without revealing confidential information, please describe what you believe is the next phase or activity of the Strike Force:

51. How much of a priority is the prosecution of drug cases in the prosecution office of your county? (Circle number)

1. VERY HIGH PRIORITY
2. HIGH PRIORITY
3. MODERATE PRIORITY
4. LOW PRIORITY
5. DON'T KNOW/NO OPINION

51. How would you characterize the sentences in drug cases in your county? (Circle number)

1. TOO SEVERE
2. SEVERE
3. ABOUT RIGHT
4. LENIENT
5. TOO LENIENT

VI. We are also interested in your thoughts about the effects of the Strike Force. The following questions ask about some of the outcomes of Strike Force activities.

53. How effective has the Strike Force been in reducing the availability of illegal drugs in your community? (Circle number)

1. VERY EFFECTIVE
2. EFFECTIVE
3. NOT EFFECTIVE
4. VERY INEFFECTIVE

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statement:

54. The Strike Force has increased the sharing of intelligence information among law enforcement agencies. (Circle number)

1. STRONGLY AGREE
2. AGREE
3. DISAGREE
4. STRONGLY DISAGREE
5. DON'T KNOW/NO OPINION

55. How has the Strike Force affected the quality of drug cases (likelihood of prosecution) in your region? (Circle number)

1. SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED QUALITY
2. IMPROVED QUALITY
3. NOT AFFECTED QUALITY
4. REDUCED QUALITY
5. SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED QUALITY
6. DON'T KNOW/NO OPINION

56. Are there any drug awareness programs operating in your community? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

If yes, please list (school, media campaigns, etc.) _____

57. What is the relationship (if any) between the Strike Force and these drug awareness programs?

58. Is the Strike Force an effective way of increasing drug awareness in your community? (Circle number)

1. VERY EFFECTIVE
2. EFFECTIVE
3. NOT EFFECTIVE
4. VERY INEFFECTIVE

VII. Finally, the following questions ask about your involvement in the Strike Force and drug enforcement activities?

59. How much involvement do you have in decisionmaking about Strike Force activities? (Circle number)

1. A GREAT DEAL
2. A MODERATE AMOUNT
3. LITTLE INVOLVEMENT
4. NO INVOLVEMENT

60. Are you satisfied with your involvement in the Strike Force? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

If not, why not? _____

61. In terms of your professional role in drug enforcement, would you say you are best described as a: (Circle number)

1. LINE LEVEL ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
2. ADMINISTRATOR OR POLICYMAKER

62. Are you an official member of the Strike Force? (Circle number)

1. YES
2. NO

63. In which of the following counties is your professional appointment.
(Circle number)

- | | |
|-------------|----------------|
| 1. BROWN | 10. MORGAN |
| 2. CLARK | 11. ORANGE |
| 3. FLOYD | 12. OWEN |
| 4. GREENE | 13. PORTER |
| 5. HARRISON | 14. PULASKI |
| 6. JASPER | 15. SCOTT |
| 7. LAPORTE | 16. STARKE |
| 8. LAWRENCE | 17. WASHINGTON |
| 9. MONROE | 18. WHITE |

64. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about the drug problem, drug enforcement, or the strengths and weaknesses of the Strike Force? If so, please use this space for that purpose.

Your contribution to this effort is greatly appreciated. We will see that you receive a copy of the findings. Please return the questionnaire in the stamped envelope as well as the postcard indicating that you completed the survey. Thank you.

APPENDIX C
CASE CODING FORM

CASE CODING FORM

I.D. # _____

Cause #: _____ Name: _____

1. Date of Filing: _____

2. County: _____ 3. Arresting Agency: _____

4. Charging Data:*

Charge 1 "X" ___ Act: ___ Drug: ___ Amount: ___ Class: ___ Conv: ___ Class: ___

Charge 2 "X" ___ Act: ___ Drug: ___ Amount: ___ Class: ___ Conv: ___ Class: ___

Charge 3 "X" ___ Act: ___ Drug: ___ Amount: ___ Class: ___ Conv: ___ Class: ___

Charge 4 "X" ___ Act: ___ Drug: ___ Amount: ___ Class: ___ Conv: ___ Class: ___

*Note: Multiple Charges- If there are more than four charges, first record all drug cases then record other charges beginning with the highest class charge. If there are four or more drug charges and a non-drug charge of a higher class than the lowest drug charge, list the non-drug charge as the fourth charge.

5. Sentencing: Time: _____ Fines/Fees: _____ (1=Yes, 2=No; restitution=1)

Drug Categories

- 01-Marijuana
- 02-Cocaine
- 03-Crack
- 04-Narcotic Drugs
- 05-Paraphernalia
- 06-LSD
- 07-Controlled Substances
- 08-Hashish
- 09-Heroin
- 10-Morphine
- 11-Opium
- 12-Other Narcotics
- 13-PCP
- 14-Other Hallucinogens
- 15-Met/Amphetamines
- 16-Other Stimulants
- 17-Barbiturates
- 18-Other Depressants
- 19-Other Drugs
- 20-Unknown Drugs

Act Categories

- 01-Possession
- 02-Dealing
- 03-Cultivating
- 04-Conspiracy/Deal
- 05-Conspiracy/Traffic
- 06-Conspiracy/Obtain
- 07-Attempt/Obtain
- 08-Attempt/Deal
- 09-Other/Drug
- 10-Other/Non-Drug

Class Categories

- 1-D Misdemeanor
- 2-C Misdemeanor
- 3-B Misdemeanor
- 4-A Misdemeanor
- 5-D Felony
- 6-C Felony
- 7-B Felony
- 8-A Felony

Agency Categories

- 1-Police Dept.
- 2-Sheriff
- 3-Task Force
- 4-State Police
- 5-Multiple Agency
- 6-Other

County Categories

- 01-Brown
- 02-Clark
- 03-Floyd
- 04-Greene
- 05-Harrison
- 06-Jasper
- 07-LaPorte
- 08-Lawrence
- 09-Monroe
- 10-Morgan
- 11-Orange
- 12-Owen
- 13-Porter
- 14-Pulaski
- 15-Scott
- 16-Starke
- 17-Washington
- 18-White

Conviction Codes

- 1-Convicted
- 2-Dismissed
- 3-Don't know


Time:

- 0-No time
- 97-0 to 0.999... yr
- 01-1 to 1.999... yrs
- 02-2 to 2.999... yrs
- 96-Probation only

ALL CATEGORIES

- 98-Not Applicable

Comments: _____



Other Publications of the Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information

Hunger, J. and C. Farris. **Drug Sample Processing Services in Indiana: Practices and Recommendations for Improvement.** Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. February, 1991. 35 pp. CCJRI-11.

Sabath, M., Doyle, J., and J. Ransburg. **Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces in Indiana: The First Two Years of Operations.** Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. September, 1990. 27 pp. CCJRI-09.

Blue Light Survey: The Costs of Adding Blue Lights to Indiana Law Enforcement Vehicles. Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. January, 1990. 18 pp. CCJRI-07.

Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces: An Enforcement Approach to Drugs in Indiana. Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. December, 1989. 15 pp. CCJRI-06.

Sabath, M., Doyle, J. and J. Ransburg. **Computer Systems in Indiana Law Enforcement Agencies.** Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. March, 1989. 230 pp. CCJRI-05.

Maxfield, M. and C. Sigman. **Indiana Police Task Analysis: Executive Summary.** Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. December, 1988. 13 pp. CCJRI-04.

Maxfield, M. and C. Sigman. **Indiana Police Task Analysis** (complete technical report). Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. January, 1989. 149 pp. CCJRI-03.

Survey of Indiana Chiefs of Police and Town Marshals. Center for Criminal Justice Research and Information, Indiana Criminal Justice Institute. October, 1988. 24 pp. CCJRI-02.

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