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# The Measurement of Police Integrity

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of the National Institute of Justice or of the United States Department of Justice.

## Introduction

By virtue of the fact that policing is a highly discretionary, coercive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight of supervisors, and before witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable, it is, as the history of virtually every police agency in the world bears testimony, an occupation that is ripe with opportunities for misconduct of many types. One type of misconduct, corruption - the abuse of police authority *for gain* - has been particularly problematic. Contributing to the difficulties of controlling corruption is not only the reluctance of police officers to report corrupt activities of their fellow officers - a phenomenon sometimes identified as *The Code* or the *Blue Curtain* - and the reluctance of police administrators to admit the existence of corruption, but also the fact that the typical corrupt transaction benefits the parties to it and thus leaves no immediate victim-complainant to report or call attention to it.

Until relatively recently the administrative view of corruption was to see it as largely reflective of the moral defects of individual police officers and to fight corruption by carefully screening applicants for police positions, pursuing defective officers aggressively, and removing them from their police positions before their behavior spread throughout the agency. Sometimes referred to as the “bad apple” theory of police corruption, it has been subject to severe criticism in recent years.

Contemporary approaches to corruption, pioneered by Goldstein,<sup>1</sup> stress the importance of four *organizational* and *occupational* dimensions of corruption that go beyond the understanding of it as a problem of the moral defects of individual “bad-apple” police officers.

### *Organizational Rules*

The first of these dimensions is organizational rules and the manner in which they are made, communicated to police, and understood by them. In nations in which police are highly decentralized (e.g., the United States) police organizations differ markedly in what they officially prohibit as corrupt behavior. This is particularly true of marginally or *mala prohibita* corrupt behavior such as off-duty employment, receipt of favors, gratuities, small gifts, free meals, and discounts. The problem is further complicated by the fact that in many agencies, while an agency’s official policy formally prohibits such activities, the *agency’s* unofficial policy, supported firmly but in silence by supervisors and administrators, is to permit and ignore such behaviors provided that they are limited and conducted discretely.

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<sup>1</sup> H. Goldstein, *Police Corruption: Perspective on its Nature and Control* (Washington, DC: The Police Foundation, 1975) and H. Goldstein, *Policing a Free Society* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977). See also L. Sherman, *Scandal and Reform* (Berkeley: Univ. Of California Press, 1978); G. Marx, *Surveillance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); M. Punch, *Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control* (London: Tavistock, 1986); and P.K. Manning and L. Redlinger, “The Invitational Edges of Police Construction,” in C. Klockars and S. Mastrofski (Eds.) *Thinking about Police* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1993) pp. 398-412.

***Corruption Control Techniques***

The second organizational dimension of corruption is the whole range of activities police agencies employ to prevent and control it. These include, but are not limited to education in ethics, proactive and reactive corruption investigation, integrity testing, and the general deterrence of corruption by the discipline and punishment of offenders. The extent to which these and other organizational anti-corruption techniques are employed also varies greatly between agencies.

***“The Code”***

The third organizational dimension of corruption has already been mentioned. It is “The Code” or the “Blue Curtain” - the informal prohibition in the occupational culture of policing against reporting the misconduct of fellow police officers. The contours of the Code can vary in a variety of ways. Exactly *what* behavior is covered by The Code varies *enormously* among police agencies. In some agencies it may cover only relatively low-level corruption; in others it may cover corruption of even the most serious degree. The Code not only differs in the type of behavior it covers but also differs with respect to *whom* the benefits of its coverage are extended. In some agencies The Code is largely limited to police *partners* who enjoy *vis a vis* one another, a testimonial immunity that police liken to traditionally privileged relationships between husband and wife, physician and patient, or attorney and client. In other departments the benefits of The Code may be extended to all police officers, even those employed by other agencies. Third, and finally, both who and what The Code covers can vary substantially not only *between but within* police agencies. Particularly in large police agencies the occupational culture of integrity can vary substantially between precincts, task forces, and work groups. Drug enforcement units can, for example, share a very different Code than traffic, juvenile, or patrol units.

***The Influence of Public Expectations on Police Integrity***

The fourth and final dimension of police corruption to which contemporary police theory gives emphasis is the influence of the social, economic, and political environment in which police institutions, systems, and agencies operate. Even within the same country, as United States history illustrates, there are areas with long and virtually uninterrupted traditions of police corruption, equally long traditions of minimal corruption, and still others that have undergone repeated cycles of scandal and reform. From such histories we may conclude not only that public expectations about police integrity exert vastly different pressures on police agencies in different areas, but also that public pressures toward corruption may be successfully resisted.

***Methodological Challenges and Conceptual Resolutions to the Problems of Studying of Police Corruption***

It is, of course, possible to bring many types of theory to the study of police corruption. One of the main virtues of an organizational as opposed to an individual, “Bad Apple” approach is that an organizational approach is far more amenable to systematic, quantitative research.

Corruption is extremely difficult to study in a direct, quantitative, empirical manner. Because most corruption incidents are never reported or recorded, official data on corruption are better regarded as a measure of police agency anti-corruption activity than the actual level of corruption. Moreover, police officers are unlikely to be willing to candidly report their own or other officer's corrupt activities, even in the face of assurances of confidentiality by researchers.

In contrast to these limitations on the direct study of corrupt behavior, the major propositions of an organizational/occupational approach to the study of police integrity involve questions of *fact and opinion* that can be explored directly and without anything like the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt *behavior* are likely to provoke. It is, for example, possible to ask non-threatening questions about officers' *knowledge* of agency rules and questions of officers' *opinions* about the seriousness of their violation, the punishment they deserve or are likely to receive, and their estimates of the willingness of officers to report such behavior without asking them directly about their own or others' corrupt *behavior*.

Finally, very different goals and visions of police integrity characterize individualistic and occupational/organizational culture approaches to the understanding of corruption. The individualistic approach envisions the police agency of integrity to be one from which all morally defective individual officers have been removed and in which the agency remains vigilant in preventing their entry or emergence. By contrast, the occupational/organizational culture approach envisions a police agency of integrity to be one in which the culture of that agency is highly intolerant of corruption.

Methodologically, the consequences of these different vision is critical. Measuring the level of corrupt behavior, the number of morally defective police officers, and agency vigilance in their discovery may not be impossible, but the obstacles to it are enormous. Measuring how seriously officers regard misconduct, how willing they are to support punishment of it, and how willing they are to tolerate it in silence - the occupational culture of police integrity - is well within the capacities of modern social science.

### *Measuring Police Integrity*

In order to measure police integrity a questionnaire was designed that presented respondents with eleven hypothetical case scenarios. The scenarios, displayed in Exhibit 1, covered a range of behavior from that which merely gave an appearance of conflict of interest (Case 1) to incidents of bribery (Case 3) and theft (Cases 5 and 11).

Respondents were asked to evaluate each of these case scenarios by responding to six questions. Each pair of questions was reflective of a dimension of police integrity - the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation. Two pertained to their own and other officers' perceptions of the *seriousness* of each case; two pertained to the *discipline* it *should* and *would* receive; and two to their own and other officers' *willingness to report* it (See Exhibit 2).

*The Samples*

At present, the survey has been administered to four different national samples of police officers, one in Croatia, one in Slovenia, one in Poland, and one in the United States.

Exhibit 1

**Case Scenarios**

- Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
- Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
- Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
- Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
- Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
- Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
- Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.
- Case 8. At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
- Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.
- Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.
- Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

(The Polish and Slovenian samples are currently under analysis and will not be discussed in this report.) The Croatian national sample consisted of 1649 police officers from 41 different police stations. It was a geographically stratified, representative sample of the entire country's police force. The U.S. sample consisted of 3,235 officers from thirty different police agencies. Although the U.S. agencies were drawn from many different parts of the U.S. and the sample is quite large, it is a convenience sample that over represents municipal, East Coast police agencies that were receptive to requests to participate in the research. About 19% of the respondents in the Croatian sample were in supervisory positions as compared with 20% in

**Exhibit 2**

<b>Case Scenario Assessment Options</b>				
1.	How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?			
	Not at all serious			Very serious
	1	2	3	4
				5
2.	How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?			
	Not at all serious			Very serious
	1	2	3	4
				5
3.	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think <u>SHOULD</u> follow?			
	1. NONE			4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
	2. VERBAL REPRIMAND			5. DEMOTION IN RANK
	3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND			6. DISMISSAL
4.	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think <u>WOULD</u> follow?			
	1. NONE			4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
	2. VERBAL REPRIMAND			5. DEMOTION IN RANK
	3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND			6. DISMISSAL
5.	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?			
	Definitely not			Definitely yes
	1	2	3	4
				5
6.	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?			
	Definitely not			Definitely yes
	1	2	3	4
				5

the U.S. sample. The average length of service was 3.33 years for Croatian respondents and

4.54 years for U.S. respondents.

### **National Integrity Profiles: The Cross-Cultural Results**

Tables 1 and 2 report the summary results for the U.S. and Croatian national samples. In general, both the U.S. and Croatian data illustrate that police officer respondents in both countries were highly consistent in their attitudes toward corrupt behavior: the more serious they regarded a behavior, the more severely they believed it should and would be punished, and the more willing they believed they and other officers would be to report it. There was, also, a very high correlation between the rank ordering of answers to all of the six core questions, not only within but between the Croatian and U.S. samples. Those findings suggest that there exists a shared understanding among the police officers in both countries of the hierarchy of the seriousness of various types of corruption and abuse.

Although U.S. and Croatian officers share a common understanding of the way in which the eleven cases presented to them should be rank ordered in terms of their *relative* seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and their own and other officers' willingness to report them, officers from both nations differed markedly in their *absolute* assessments of the cases.

#### *Differences in Assessments of Seriousness*

There were statistically significant differences between U.S. and Croatian police assessments of all eleven cases. In 9 of the 11 cases U.S. officers find the behavior described in the case more serious than their Croatian counterparts. While we should expect statistically significant differences because of the sample size, there appear to be six cases in which the differences of opinion on seriousness are not only statistically significant, but the absolute mean differences are substantial. The only case reflecting a substantially higher seriousness assessment by Croatian officers is the case of the officer who operates an off-duty security system business (Case 1). The reason for this difference is that such behavior is prohibited by law in Croatia while two-thirds of the U.S. respondents reported that it was not a violation of policy in their agency. The other five cases that reflect substantial difference in seriousness evaluations are: Case 3-Accepting a Bribe from a Speeding Motorist; Case 4-Accepting Holiday Gifts from Merchants; Case 6-Auto Repair 5% Kickback; Case 9-Accepting Free Drinks to Ignore a Late Bar Closing; and Case 10-Use of Excessive Force on a Car Thief after a Chase. All of these cases are evaluated as substantially more serious by U.S. than Croatian officers.

#### *Differences in Appropriate and Expected Discipline*

Evaluation of differences between U.S. and Croatian officers on questions of discipline are complicated by the fact that it was not possible to offer Croatian officers the same disciplinary options that were offered to U.S. officers. Croatian law did not provide for a demotion as a punishment. It did allow for both fines and "public reprimands," two punishments that are not normally disciplinary options in the U.S. Due to these differences

**the Croatian questionnaire had five disciplinary options “1=None; 2=Public Reprimand; 3= Fine; 4=Suspension without pay; and 5=Dismissal;” the U.S. questionnaire had six.**



The Measurement of Police Integrity: Executive Summary

Table 1 - U.S. Police Officer Perceptions of Offense Seriousness, Punishment, and Willingness to Report

CASE NUMBER & DESCRIPTION	SERIOUSNESS Own View		Other officers		Should Receive		DISCIPLINE Would Receive		WILLINGNESS TO REPORT Other					
	$\bar{x}$ (rank)	$\bar{x}$ (rank)	$\bar{x}$ (rank)	$\bar{x}$ (rank)	(rank)	(Mode)	(rank)	(Mode)	(rank)	(rank)				
Case 1 Off-Duty Security System Business	1.46	1	1.48	1	1.34	1	None	1.51	1	None	1.37	1	1.46	1
Case 2 Free Meals, Discounts on Beat	2.60	2	2.31	2	2.13	2	Verbal Reprimand	2.37	2	Verbal Reprimand	1.94	2	1.82	2
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.92	10	4.81	10	4.92	9	Dismiss	4.86	9	Dismiss	4.19	9	3.92	9
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.84	3	2.64	3	2.53	3	Verbal Reprimand	2.82	3	Written Reprimand	2.36	4	2.28	3.5
Case 5 Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.95	11	4.88	11	5.66	11	Dismiss.	5.57	11	Dismiss	4.54	11	4.34	11
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.50	7	4.26	7	4.40	8	Suspend w/o pay	4.46	8	Suspend w/o pay	3.95	8	3.71	8
Case 7 Supervisor: holiday for tune-up	4.18	6	3.96	6	3.59	5	Written Reprimand	3.43	5	Written Reprimand	3.45	6	3.29	6
Case 8 Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	3.03	4	2.86	4	2.81	4	Suspend w/o pay	3.21	4	Suspend w/o pay	2.34	3	2.28	3.5
Case 9 Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Close	4.54	8	4.28	8	4.02	7	Suspend w/o pay	4.08	7	Suspend w/o pay	3.73	7	3.47	7
Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	4.05	5	3.70	5	3.76	6	Suspend w/o pay	4.00	6	Suspend w/o pay	3.39	5	3.07	5

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Case 11 Theft from Found Wallet		4.85	9	4.69	9	5.09	10	Dismiss	5.03	10	Dismiss	4.23	10	3.96	10	
Table 2 - Croatian Police Officer Perceptions of Offense Seriousness, Punishment, and Willingness to Report																
CASE NUMBER & DESCRIPTION	SERIOUSNESS Own View × Other officers (rank)		Should Receive (rank) ×		PUNISHMENT (Mode)		Would Receive (rank) ×		WILLINGNESS TO REPORT Own View × (rank)		Other Officers (rank) ×					
Case 1 Off-Duty Security System Business	2.57	2	2.51	2	2.03	2	None	2.34	2	1.90	2	2.31	4			
Case 2 Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	3.01	4	2.79	4	2.24	5	Public Reprimand	2.43	5	2.15	5	2.38	5			
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.47	9	3.91	9	3.64	9	Suspend	3.74	9	3.16	9	3.07	9			
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.13	1	2.09	1	1.60	1	None	1.78	1	1.67	1	1.85	1			
Case 5 Crime Scene Theft of Watch Case	4.72	11	4.38	11	4.27	11	Dismiss	4.29	11	3.96	11	3.72	11			
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kick-back	3.86	7	3.50	7	3.23	8	Suspend	3.35	8	3.14	8	3.05	8			
Case 7 Supervisor: holiday for tune-up	4.09	8	3.76	8	2.73	7	Public Reprimand	2.51	6	2.72	7	2.73	7			
Case 8 Cover-Up of Pol. DUI Accident	2.79	3	2.65	3	2.17	4	Public Reprimand	2.42	4	2.09	3.5	2.20	3			
Case 9 Drinks to Ignore Late Bar	3.85	6	3.38	6	2.57	6	Public Reprimand	2.67	7	2.66	6	2.58	6			

Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.03	5	2.82	5	2.14	3	None	2.40	3	Public Reprimand
Case 11 Theft from Found Wallet	4.55	10	4.16	10	3.82	10	Fine	3.87	10	Fine

These differences in disciplinary options compromise attempts at more precise comparisons than are possible with both seriousness and willingness to report responses. A more limited analysis, based upon whether respondents believed no discipline, some discipline less than dismissal, or dismissal was appropriate or expected in each case, found that with the exception of Case 1 (off-duty security system) and Case 2 (free meals, discounts on beat) U.S. police officers support and expect more severe discipline for the conduct described in all of the case scenarios than did their Croatian counterparts. In only one case, Case 5 (Theft of a Watch from a Crime Scene), and that by the slimmest of margins, did Croatian officers expect to be disciplined with dismissal. Moreover, in no case did the majority of Croatian respondents support dismissal for any of the types of misconduct described in the survey. By contrast, the majority of U.S. police officers thought dismissal was the appropriate punishment for Case 3 (Accepting a Bribe from a Speeding Motorist); Case 5 (Theft of a Watch from a Crime Scene) and Case 11 (Theft of Money from a Found Wallet). In the bribery case the majority of U.S. officers thought that suspension without pay would be the punishment - a punishment which, in the opinion of the majority of U.S. officers, was too lenient.

*Differences in Willingness to Report*

Responses to the willingness to report questions describe the Police Code of Silence in each country. In both countries the Code appears to be very strong. On a five point scale where circling a "1" on the scale indicated a respondent would "definitely not" report an offense, while circling a "5" indicated the respondent "definitely" would report it, the mean score of U.S. officers exceeded 4.0 in only three of the eleven cases, one involving bribery and the other two involving theft. When U.S. officers were asked how likely most other officers in their agency were to report misconduct, only one case-Case 5, involving the theft of a watch from a crime scene, earned a mean value higher than 4.0.

While the Code is quite strong among U.S. police, it is substantially stronger among Croatian officers. With respect to officers' estimates of both their own and most other officers' willingness to report misconduct, in the Croatian sample none of the scenarios earned a mean score of 4.0 or more and only four of the scenarios earned a mean score of 3.0 or more on the five point scale.

**Individual Agency Integrity Profiles**

While measuring the inclination of a nation's police to resist temptations to abuse the rights or privileges of their occupation may prove useful for academic, historical, or cross-cultural studies of police, the ability to measure the culture of integrity of an individual police agency is more relevant to both police administrators who are responsible

for them and citizens who are policed by them. National averages mask great differences in the individual agencies that compose them. Each of the 30 U.S. agencies surveyed was presented with an “Integrity Profile” that sought to unmask those differences.

Each agency’s integrity profile compared and ranked the responses of officers in that agency with those of officers from the other agencies in the national sample. In agencies of sufficient sample size, analyses presented in their integrity profiles also identified areas of resistance to or lack of support for discipline, differences between line officer, supervisor, and administrative opinion on discipline, and a detailed portrait of the contours of the Code among line officers.

A review of the integrity profiles of two large agencies in the U.S. sample will help illustrate the full range of these applications. Agency A is a large municipal agency of approximately 500 sworn officers. It is highly receptive to research and enjoys both a national and local reputation for a high level of integrity. Agency B is also a large municipal agency of approximately 850 sworn officers. It has a long history of scandal and, despite various efforts at reform, continues to carry a local and national reputation as a police agency with persistent corruption problems. An examination of the survey results from each agency, summarized in Tables 3 and 4, gives strong, detailed, and specific support to the public reputations of both agencies.

#### *Agencies A & B: Contrasts in Perceptions of Seriousness*

Each integrity profile presented the agency not only with a summary of the rank, mean, and standard deviation for the responses from that agency but also the same figures for agencies of similar size, and the national sample. These figures probably failed to communicate much meaning to differences in absolute scores - even to a reader who studied them closely. A more compact, comparative sense of the meaning of the scores of each agency was developed to express where the scores from an individual agency ranked that agency among the thirty agency national sample.

To determine an agency’s summary ranking on the question that asked about officers’ own perceptions of the seriousness of the behavior described in each case, the mean score of each agency’s responses for each of the eleven cases was rank ordered from highest (1) to lowest (30). An agency was then awarded three (3) points if its mean score placed it among the top ten agencies on any question, two (2) points if it scored among the middle ten, and one (1) point if it scored among the lowest ten. These scores were then summed for all eleven cases. Using this scaling system agency scores could range on questions of officers’ own perceptions of seriousness from eleven (11), for an agency that scored in the lowest third of agencies on all eleven questions, to thirty three (33), for an agency that scored in among the highest third of agencies on all eleven questions.

These summary scores formed the basis on which the agencies were placed in rank

order from 1 to 30 and told that their agency ranked “nth out of 30” in their officers’ own perceptions of offense seriousness. Exactly the same procedure was used to calculate a summary score and ranking for each agency’s responses about most officers’ perceptions of seriousness.

When this system was used to rank the seriousness scores of Agency A, it came out in a five way tie for 10th place among the 30 agencies in terms of officer’s own estimates of seriousness and in a three way tie for 11th place among the 30 agencies in terms of officers’ estimates of how serious most officers in their agency would rate the cases. Agency B’s responses placed it in a two way tie for 27th place out of 30 agencies on officers’ own estimates of seriousness and in a four way tie for 22nd place among the 30 agencies on estimates of how serious most officers in their agencies would rate the cases.

Because a key component of an occupational environment that is intolerant of corruption is the belief among officers that such behavior is wrong, Agency A presents seriousness scores that are encouraging. By contrast, Agency B’s seriousness scores imply a level of tolerance of corruption that may be problematic.

#### *Agencies A & B: Contrasts in Discipline*

Inspection of the mean scores for discipline on Tables 3 and 4 above show that officers in Agency A not only expected more severe discipline in almost every case than did officers in Agency B, they also thought in virtually every case that more severe discipline was appropriate. This finding is consistent with the differences that were reflected in each agency’s seriousness scores. The more serious police officers regard an abuse of their office, the more willing they are to see it punished.

The same procedure that was used to establish summary scores that rank ordered all 30 police agencies on seriousness was also used to rank order them on discipline. Using this method of rank ordering agencies, Agency A received a score of 29 out of a possible 33 points on the “discipline should receive” questions and 31 out of a possible 33 points on the “discipline would receive” questions. These scores place Agency A in a two way tie for 2nd place among the 30 agencies surveyed. Agency B received a score of 16 out of a possible 33 points on the “discipline should receive” questions and 20 out of a possible 33 points on the “discipline would receive” questions. These scores place Agency B in a three way tie for 23 place among the 30 agencies surveyed on the “discipline should receive” questions and in a two way tie for 18th position among the 30 agencies we surveyed on the “discipline would receive” questions.

#### *Minority Opinions on Discipline*

Although there are clearly very different disciplinary environments in Agency A and Agency B, both agencies contained substantial minorities of officers who held specific differences of opinion on discipline. To assist each agency in understanding both the nature and the strength of that minority opinion, their integrity profiles presented two

**types of information on minority opinion in their agency. The first explored overall differences of opinion on the fairness of discipline and the second revealed differences of opinion on discipline between and among line officers, supervisors, and administrators.**

Table 3 - Agency A: Summary of Responses

CASE NUMBER & DESCRIPTION	SERIOUSNESS			PUNISHMENT			WILLINGNESS TO REPORT					
	Own View $\bar{x}$	Other Officers (rank)	Other Officers (rank)	Should Receive (rank)	Should Receive (Mode)	Would Receive (rank)	Own View $\bar{x}$	Other Officers (rank)	Other Officers (rank)			
Case 1 Off-Duty Security System Business	1.57	1	1.51	1	1.47	1	1.70	1	1.57	1	1.52	1
Case 2 Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	3.04	2	2.53	2	2.50	2	2.77	2	2.42	2	2.07	2
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.94	9,5	4.82	9	5.02	9	4.90	9	4.67	9	4.23	9
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	3.07	3	2.73	3	2.73	3	3.07	3	2.74	4	2.49	4
Case 5 Crime Scene Theft of Watch Case	4.97	11	4.93	11	5.85	11	5.73	11	4.92	11	4.63	11
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.58	7	4.31	7	4.41	8	4.45	8	4.38	8	3.92	8
Case 7 Supervisor: holiday off for tune-up	4.16	5	3.85	5	3.58	5	3.24	4	3.68	5	3.34	5
Case 8 Cover-Up of Pol. DUI Accident	3.16	4	2.80	4	2.85	4	3.33	5	2.67	3	2.40	3
Case 9 Drinks to Ignore Late Bar	4.68	8	4.32	8	4.10	7	4.11	6.5	4.21	7	3.79	7
Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	4.45	6	4.01	6	3.97	6	4.11	6.5	4.02	6	3.44	6
Case 11 Theft from Found Wallet	4.94	9,5	4.83	10	5.42	10	5.24	10	4.74	10	4.38	10

Table 4 - Agency B: Summary of Responses

CASE NUMBER & DESCRIPTION	SERIOUSNESS				PUNISHMENT					
	Own View (rank) x	Other Officers (rank) x	Other Officers (rank) x	Other Officers (rank) x	Should Receive (rank) x	Should Receive (Mode)	Should Receive (rank) x	Should Receive (Mode)	Should Receive (rank) x	Should Receive (Mode)
Case 1 Off-Duty Security System Business	1.36	1	1.40	1	1.26	1	none	1.34	1	non
Case 2 Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	2.85	4	2.57	3	2.32	2	verbal reprimand	2.52	2	verb reprim
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.78	10	4.60	10	4.44	10	suspend w/o pay	4.45	10	susp w/o p
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.79	3	2.61	4	2.60	4	verbal reprimand	2.89	4	verb reprim
Case 5 Crime Scene Theft of Watch Case	4.79	11	4.62	11	4.90	11	dismiss	4.93	11	dismi
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.02	7	3.75	7	3.75	8	suspend w/o pay	3.92	8	susp w/o p
Case 7 Supervisor: holiday off for tune-up	4.05	8	3.85	8	3.52	7	suspend w/o pay	3.53	7	susp w/o p
Case 8 Cover-Up of Pol. DUI Accident	2.68	2	2.54	2	2.58	3	none	2.84	3	non
Case 9 Drinks to Ignore Late Bar	3.77	6	3.44	6	3.18	6	suspend w/o pay	3.30	5	susp w/o p
Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.49	5	3.22	5	3.16	5	suspend w/o pay	3.47	6	susp w/o p
Case 11 Theft from Found Wallet	4.55	9	4.24	9	4.13	9	suspend w/o pay	4.26	9	susp w/o p

**Disciplinary Fairness**

To obtain a measure of officer perceptions of disciplinary fairness each respondent’s score on the “discipline WOULD receive” scale was subtracted from his or her score on the “discipline SHOULD receive” scale. If the difference was greater than zero, it indicated that the respondent thought the expected discipline was too lenient. If the difference was less than zero, it indicated that the respondent thought the expected discipline was too harsh. If the difference was zero, it meant that the respondent thought the discipline expected was, in terms of severity, fair.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 below display the results of this analysis for the entire national sample as well Agencies A and B. Overall, in the national sample and in Agencies A and B the vast officers thought that discipline was fair, at least in terms of its severity. However,



**in our national sample, more than twenty percent of officers believed that the discipline they would receive in their agencies would be too harsh in four cases: Case 2 - receiving free meals and discounts on their beats; Case 4 - receiving holiday gifts from merchants on their beats; Case 8 - covering up a DUI offense and minor accident by a police officer; and Case 10 - using excessive force on a car thief after a foot pursuit.**

**Similar sentiments about the undue severity of discipline for these same four cases were reflected in the responses of officers from both Agency A and Agency B. In both agencies objections to the undue severity of discipline prevailed with a substantial minority of officers in both agencies, despite the fact that in Agency B the general disciplinary environment was far less severe than in Agency A.**

***Line Officer, Supervisor, and Administrator Opinions on Discipline***

**The Integrity Profiles of all agencies of sufficient sample size included a table that displayed the mean, standard deviation, and modal responses of line officers, supervisors and administrators on discipline. Three matters of some importance may be explored by examining the data presented in this table. Tables 6 and 7 display these data for Agencies A and B.**

**First, by comparing the mean scores of answers by line officers to those of supervisors and administrators on the discipline WOULD receive question, it is possible to assess how well an agency does in communicating its disciplinary threat to line officers. Although Agency A generally threatens more severe discipline than Agency B, line officers in both agencies appear equally able to predict the discipline that would follow from engaging in the behavior described in each of the 11 cases.**

**TABLE 3: U.S. Police Officer Opinions on the Fairness of the Severity of Discipline in their Agencies: Percent of U.S. Police Officers Finding Discipline in their Agencies Too Harsh, Too Lenient, or Fair, by Case**

CASE	1 - OFF DUTY SECURITY SYSTEM BUSINESS	2 - FREE MEALS, DISCOUNTS ON BEAT	3 - BRIBE FROM SPEEDING MOTORIST	4 - HOLIDAY GIFTS FROM MERCHANTS	5 - CRIME SCENE THEFT OF WATCH	6 - AUTO REPAIR SHOP 5% KICKBACK	7 - SUPERVISOR: HOLIDAY FOR TUNE-UP	8 - COVER-UP OF POLICE DUI ACCIDENT	9 - DRINKS TO IGNORE LATE BAR CLOSING	10 - EXCESSIVE FORCE ON CAR THIEF	11 - THEFT FROM FOUND WALLET
DISCIPLINE											
Too HARSH	13.1%	<u>26.4%</u>	9.4%	<u>27.0%</u>	3.4%	12.5%	10.3%	<u>30.3%</u>	13.4%	<u>21.5%</u>	6.9%
FAIR	83.9%	64.6%	78.7%	66.3%	89.0%	79.8%	71.1%	62.9%	78.3%	71.7%	83.6%
Too LENIENT	2.9%	9.0%	11.9%	6.7%	7.6%	7.7%	<u>18.6%</u>	6.8%	8.3%	6.9%	9.5%

**TABLE 4 - Agency A: Opinions of Officers about the Fairness of Discipline: Percent Finding Discipline Too Harsh, Too Lenient, or Fair, by Case**

CASE	1 - OFF DUTY SECURITY SYSTEM BUSINESS	2 - FREE MEALS, DISCOUNTS ON BEAT	3 - BRIBE FROM SPEEDING MOTORIST	4 - HOLIDAY GIFTS FROM MERCHANTS	5 - CRIME SCENE THEFT OF WATCH	6 - AUTO REPAIR SHOP 5% KICKBACK	7 - SUPERVISOR: HOLIDAY FOR TUNE-UP	8 - COVER-UP OF POLICE DUI ACCIDENT	9 - DRINKS TO IGNORE LATE BAR CLOSING	10 - EXCESSIVE FORCE ON CAR THIEF	11 - THEFT FROM FOUND WALLET
DISCIPLINE											
Too HARSH	<u>20.1%</u>	<u>31.2%</u>	7.6%	<u>33.1%</u>	1.7%	12.4%	7.3%	<u>36.0%</u>	11.0%	<u>18.0%</u>	5.1%
FAIR	77.3%	56.8%	79.5%	59.3%	91.1%	78.2%	67.8%	58.6%	79.1%	75.3%	81.4%
Too LENIENT	2.6%	11.1%	12.9%	7.6%	7.2%	9.3%	<u>24.9%</u>	5.4%	9.9%	6.7%	13.5%

**TABLE 5 - Agency B: Opinions of Officers about the Fairness of Discipline: Percent Finding Discipline Too Harsh, Too Lenient, or Fair, by Case**

CASE	1 - OFF DUTY SECURITY SYSTEM BUSINESS	2 - FREE MEALS, DISCOUNTS ON BEAT	3 - BRIBE FROM SPEEDING MOTORIST	4 - HOLIDAY GIFTS FROM MERCHANTS	5 - CRIME SCENE THEFT OF WATCH	6 - AUTO REPAIR SHOP 5% KICKBACK	7 - SUPERVISOR: HOLIDAY FOR TUNE-UP	8 - COVER-UP OF POLICE DUI ACCIDENT	9 - DRINKS TO IGNORE LATE BAR CLOSING	10 - EXCESSIVE FORCE ON CAR THIEF	11 - THEFT FROM FOUND WALLET
DISCIPLINE											
Too HARSH	7.7%	<u>22.7%</u>	9.7%	<u>23.9%</u>	9.4%	16.7%	11.9%	<u>21.9%</u>	18.4%	<u>22.4%</u>	13.3%
FAIR	91.0%	70.1%	82.8%	71.8%	83.1%	78.4%	75.0%	73.2%	70.9%	74.4%	81.2%
Too LENIENT	1.3%	7.1%	7.4%	4.2%	7.5%	9.9%	10.1%	5.0%	10.7%	3.2%	5.5%



Second, by comparing line officer discipline **SHOULD** receive answers with the supervisor and administrative **WOULD** receive answers, it is also possible to assess the level of line officer support for discipline in each case. In both agencies there is a slight tendency for line officers to prefer less severe discipline than they would receive.

Third, comparison of the differences in line officer, supervisor, or administrator “should” and “would” responses as well as the standard deviation associated with each of the mean scores may reveal the diversity of opinion about appropriate and expected discipline at each of these levels in a police agency. After the marked difference in absolute levels of discipline that officers in Agency A and B thought appropriate, what most distinguishes Agency A from B is the higher standard deviations associated with the scores at all levels of Agency B. In Agency A standard deviations that were greater than or equal to 1.3 were found in only 7 of a total 66 cells in Table 6. In the equivalent table for Agency B, Table 7, standard deviations of 1.3 or more were found in 37 out of a possible 66 cells. Among administrators in Agency B there was substantial disagreement not only about how an officer who ran an off-duty security business *should* and *would* be disciplined, but the same levels of divergent opinion existed about the appropriate and expected discipline for a police officer who accepted a bribe, took a kickback, or stole from a found wallet or crime scene. Not surprisingly, the same levels of variation in opinion reign among both supervisors and line officers in Agency B.

*Agencies A & B: Contrasts in The Code*

When all thirty police agencies surveyed were ranked from highest (# 1) to lowest (# 30) in terms of their willingness-to-report scores, Agency A came out in 3rd place out of 30 agencies in terms of officers’ estimates of their own willingness to report the behavior described in the eleven cases. Their answers to the question about what behavior they thought most officers in their agency would be willing to report placed it in a two way tie for 7th place out of all 30 agencies surveyed. These scores indicate that officers in Agency A are much less willing than officers in most agencies surveyed to tolerate corruption and abuse in silence. It is a police agency in which the Code, relatively speaking, is under control.

Using the same ranking system, Agency B came out in 23rd place out of 30 agencies in terms of officers’ estimates of their own willingness to report the behavior described in the eleven cases. Their answers to the question about what behavior they thought most officers in their agency would be willing to report placed it in a four way tie for 21st place out of all 30 agencies surveyed. These scores indicate that officers in Agency B are much more willing than officers in most agencies surveyed to tolerate corruption and abuse in silence. The Code is very strong in Agency B and provides an environment in which police misconduct can flourish.

Table 6 - Agency A: Discipline Means, Standard Deviations, and Modal Responses from Line Officers, Supervisors, and Administrators

Case # & Description	Line Officers		Supervisors		Administrators	
	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode
Case 1 Off Duty Alarm System Business	$\bar{x} = 1.42$ SD = 0.89 None	$\bar{x} = 1.70$ SD = 1.06 None	$\bar{x} = 1.61$ SD = 0.93 None	$\bar{x} = 1.62$ SD = 0.93 None	$\bar{x} = 3.12$ SD = 1.56 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.00$ SD = 1.37 None
Case 2 Free Meals and Discounts on Beat	$\bar{x} = 2.40$ SD = 0.95 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.76$ SD = 0.95 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.02$ SD = 1.00 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.79$ SD = 0.97 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.12$ SD = 1.54 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.88$ SD = 1.56 Verbal Rep.
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	$\bar{x} = 4.92$ SD = 1.02 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 4.86$ SD = 1.12 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.43$ SD = 0.91 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.12$ SD = 1.06 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.06$ SD = 1.09 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 4.59$ SD = 1.23 Dismiss
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	$\bar{x} = 2.67$ SD = 1.24 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.10$ SD = 1.23 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.98$ SD = 1.05 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 2.95$ SD = 1.09 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.29$ SD = 0.98 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 3.29$ SD = 0.92 Writn. Rep.
Case 5 Theft of Watch from Crime Scene	$\bar{x} = 5.82$ SD = 0.59 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.71$ SD = 0.77 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.93$ SD = 0.37 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.86$ SD = 0.52 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.65$ SD = 0.79 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.53$ SD = 0.87 Dismiss
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	$\bar{x} = 4.38$ SD = 1.17 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.46$ SD = 1.15 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.58$ SD = 1.08 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.40$ SD = 1.08 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 5.00$ SD = 1.00 Susp./Dis.	$\bar{x} = 4.88$ SD = 0.99 Suspension
Case 7 Supervisor: Holiday Off for Auto Tune Up	$\bar{x} = 3.52$ SD = 1.24 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.17$ SD = 1.28 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.86$ SD = 1.17 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.51$ SD = 1.20 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.94$ SD = 1.30 Demotion	$\bar{x} = 3.47$ SD = 1.28 Writn. Rep. Suspension
Case 8 Cover Up of Officer DUI Incident	$\bar{x} = 2.79$ SD = 1.15 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.32$ SD = 1.09 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 3.18$ SD = 0.97 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.39$ SD = 0.76 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 3.29$ SD = 1.05 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x} = 3.29$ SD = 1.10 Writn. Rep.
Case 9 Free Drinks to Ignore Late Bar	$\bar{x} = 4.01$ SD = 0.95 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.07$ SD = 0.98 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.52$ SD = 0.53 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.23$ SD = 0.87 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.35$ SD = 1.13 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.18$ SD = 1.13 Suspension
Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	$\bar{x} = 3.95$ SD = 0.99 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.15$ SD = 0.89 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.12$ SD = 0.76 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 3.91$ SD = 0.35 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 4.17$ SD = 0.73 Suspension	$\bar{x} = 3.88$ SD = 0.48 Suspension
Case 11 Theft from found Wallet	$\bar{x} = 5.34$ SD = 1.03 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.18$ SD = 1.06 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.80$ SD = 0.65 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.61$ SD = 0.89 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.76$ SD = 0.66 Dismiss	$\bar{x} = 5.41$ SD = 0.94 Dismiss

Table 7 - Agency B: Discipline Means, Standard Deviations, and Modal Responses from Line Officers, Supervisors, and Administrators.

Case # & Description	Line Officers		Supervisors		Administrators	
	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode:	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline SHOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode	Discipline WOULD Receive Mean: Std. Dev: Mode
Case 1 Off Duty Alarm System Business	$\bar{x}$ = 1.22 SD = 0.63 None	$\bar{x}$ = 1.34 SD = 0.81 None	$\bar{x}$ = 1.34 SD = 0.91 None	$\bar{x}$ = 1.27 SD = 0.87 None	$\bar{x}$ = 1.56 SD = 1.29 None	$\bar{x}$ = 1.56 SD = 1.29 None
Case 2 Free Meals and Discounts on Beat	$\bar{x}$ = 2.24 SD = 1.04 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.48 SD = 1.10 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.70 SD = 1.01 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.72 SD = 0.91 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.50 SD = 1.25 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.61 SD = 1.50 Verbal Rep.
Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist	$\bar{x}$ = 4.36 SD = 1.26 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.38 SD = 1.17 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.91 SD = 1.39 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.84 SD = 1.40 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.44 SD = 1.46 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.39 SD = 1.38 Suspension
Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants	$\bar{x}$ = 2.53 SD = 1.40 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.86 SD = 1.35 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.96 SD = 1.35 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.98 SD = 1.36 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.39 SD = 0.98 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.72 SD = 1.07 Writn. Rep.
Case 5 Theft of Watch from Crime Scene	$\bar{x}$ = 4.83 SD = 1.20 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.87 SD = 1.18 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 5.34 SD = 1.18 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 5.27 SD = 1.15 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.94 SD = 1.39 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.83 SD = 1.38 Dismiss
Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	$\bar{x}$ = 3.65 SD = 1.48 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.84 SD = 1.40 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.29 SD = 1.33 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.35 SD = 1.29 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.56 SD = 1.50 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.83 SD = 1.29 Suspension
Case 7 Supervisor: Holiday Off for Auto Tune Up	$\bar{x}$ = 3.47 SD = 1.35 Writn Rep. Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.51 SD = 1.32 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.73 SD = 1.23 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.61 SD = 1.28 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.67 SD = 1.24 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.50 SD = 1.20 Writn. Rep.
Case 8 Cover Up of Officer DUI Incident	$\bar{x}$ = 2.53 SD = 1.55 None	$\bar{x}$ = 2.82 SD = 1.53 None	$\bar{x}$ = 2.79 SD = 1.28 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 2.88 SD = 1.26 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 3.39 SD = 1.19 None	$\bar{x}$ = 2.44 SD = 1.20 None / Writn. Rep.
Case 9 Free Drinks to Ignore Late Bar	$\bar{x}$ = 3.11 SD = 1.28 Writn. Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 3.24 SD = 1.36 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.50 SD = 1.13 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.57 SD = 1.11 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.22 SD = 0.94 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.11 SD = 1.02 Suspension
Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief	$\bar{x}$ = 3.09 SD = 1.51 Verbal Rep.	$\bar{x}$ = 3.42 SD = 1.48 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.52 SD = 1.32 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.75 SD = 1.37 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.22 SD = 1.06 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 3.11 SD = 1.08 Suspension
Case 11 Theft from found Wallet	$\bar{x}$ = 4.03 SD = 1.33 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.15 SD = 1.29 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.73 SD = 1.09 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.84 SD = 1.14 Dismiss	$\bar{x}$ = 4.00 SD = 1.37 Suspension	$\bar{x}$ = 4.00 S. D. = 1.37 Suspension

*Contours of the Code among Line Officers*

The Integrity Profiles of agencies of sufficient sample size included a table that presented a frequency distribution of line officer responses to the “own willingness to report” questions for each of the eleven cases. Because The Code dictates what an officer should or should not report to supervisors or administrators, focusing on line officer responses to the willingness to report questions is probably most helpful in answering two critical questions: “What type of misconduct will most line officers in the agency cover up?” and “What type of misconduct will most officers report?”

The answers to these questions for Agencies A and B may be found by examining Tables 8 and 9. It displays the number and percent of line officers in each agency who gave each of the five possible responses to the question about how willing they would be to report the behavior described in each case. To determine what behavior most officers would not report, if the sum of the percentage figures in highlighted columns 1 and 2 in any row exceeded 50%, it indicated that the behavior described in that case will NOT be reported by most officers in that agency. If the sum of the percentage figures in highlighted columns 4 and 5 in any row exceeded 50%, it indicated that the behavior described in that case WOULD be reported by most officers in that agency.

Examination of the frequency distribution tables from agencies A and B finds that in Agency A most officers would NOT report the behavior described in Case 1, Case 2, Case 4, and Case 8. They WOULD report the behavior described in Case 5, Case 6, Case 9, Case 10, and Case 11. In contrast, there is NO case that the majority of officers in Agency B say they would report and in all cases except Case 3 and 5, a majority of officers say they would NOT report the behavior described in them.

While the Code exists in some form in all police agencies, it is the responsibility of every police administration to circumscribe its domain. The failure of a majority of officers to say that they would report a kickback deal (Case 7); a bribery (Case 3); or thefts (Cases 5 and 11) should be regarded with particular concern. This concern should rise dramatically, if, in any of these cases, a majority of line officers declare that they would not report such behavior.

*Agency A and B: Summary Integrity Profiles and Composite Integrity Scores*

Each integrity profile closed with an attempt to summarize the central findings about seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report in that agency. The summary was designed to make possible a general standardized comparison with the results from all other agencies surveyed. Two measures, one displayed graphically and the other a composite numeric ranking, were the vehicles developed to express this standardized comparison.



Table 8: Agency A - Line Officer Estimates of their OWN Willingness to Report

<b>SCORE</b>	<b>Definitely Not (1)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Definitely Yes (5)</b>	<b>TOTALS</b>
<b>Case # &amp; Description</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>
<b>Case 1 Off Duty Alarm System Business</b>	<b>77.1% (225)</b>	<b>9.9% (29)</b>	<b>7.2% (21)</b>	<b>2.7% (8)</b>	<b>3.1% (9)</b>	<b>100% (292)</b>
<b>Case 2 Free Meals and Discounts on Beat</b>	<b>44.0% (129)</b>	<b>20.5% (60)</b>	<b>18.8% (55)</b>	<b>9.6% (28)</b>	<b>7.2% (21)</b>	<b>100% (293)</b>
<b>Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist</b>	<b>2.0% (6)</b>	<b>1.4% (4)</b>	<b>5.4% (16)</b>	<b>15.6% (46)</b>	<b>75.6% (223)</b>	<b>100% (295)</b>
<b>Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants</b>	<b>30.6% (90)</b>	<b>21.4% (63)</b>	<b>24.5% (72)</b>	<b>11.6% (34)</b>	<b>11.9% (35)</b>	<b>100% (294)</b>
<b>Case 5 Theft of Watch from Crime Scene</b>	<b>1.0% (3)</b>	<b>0.0% (0)</b>	<b>0.7% (2)</b>	<b>4.7% (14)</b>	<b>93.6% (277)</b>	<b>100% (296)</b>
<b>Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback</b>	<b>4.1% (12)</b>	<b>3.7% (11)</b>	<b>11.8% (35)</b>	<b>21.6% (64)</b>	<b>58.8% (174)</b>	<b>100% (296)</b>
<b>Case 7 Supervisor Offers Holiday Off for Auto Tune Up</b>	<b>11.3% (33)</b>	<b>13.7% (40)</b>	<b>20.5% (60)</b>	<b>20.1% (59)</b>	<b>34.5% (101)</b>	<b>100% (293)</b>
<b>Case 8 Cover Up of Officer DUI Incident</b>	<b>33.8% (99)</b>	<b>19.8% (58)</b>	<b>21.5% (63)</b>	<b>12.6% (37)</b>	<b>12.3% (36)</b>	<b>100% (293)</b>
<b>Case 9 Free Drinks to Ignore Late Bar</b>	<b>4.7% (14)</b>	<b>7.1% (21)</b>	<b>13.9% (41)</b>	<b>23.3% (69)</b>	<b>51.0% (151)</b>	<b>100% (296)</b>
<b>Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief</b>	<b>4.1% (12)</b>	<b>10.2% (30)</b>	<b>17.7% (52)</b>	<b>23.8% (70)</b>	<b>44.2% (130)</b>	<b>100% (294)</b>
<b>Case 11 Theft from found Wallet</b>	<b>2.7% (8)</b>	<b>1.0% (3)</b>	<b>3.4% (10)</b>	<b>10.2% (30)</b>	<b>82.7% (244)</b>	<b>100% (295)</b>



**Table 9: Agency B - Line Officer Estimates of their OWN Willingness to Report**

<b>SCORE</b>	<b>Definitely Not (1)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Definitely Yes (5)</b>	<b>TOTALS</b>
<b>Case # &amp; Description</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>	<b>% (#)</b>
<b>Case 1 Off Duty Alarm System Business</b>	<b>89.8% (239)</b>	<b>4.9% (13)</b>	<b>2.3% (6)</b>	<b>0.4% (1)</b>	<b>2.6% (7)</b>	<b>100% (266)</b>
<b>Case 2 Free Meals and Discounts on Beat</b>	<b>67.8% (181)</b>	<b>13.5% (36)</b>	<b>10.1% (27)</b>	<b>2.2% (6)</b>	<b>6.4% (17)</b>	<b>100% (267)</b>
<b>Case 3 Bribe from Speeding Motorist</b>	<b>34.7% (92)</b>	<b>10.9% (29)</b>	<b>17.4% (46)</b>	<b>9.8% (26)</b>	<b>27.2% (72)</b>	<b>100% (265)</b>
<b>Case 4 Holiday Gifts from Merchants</b>	<b>61.7% (163)</b>	<b>11.0% (29)</b>	<b>10.6% (28)</b>	<b>5.7% (15)</b>	<b>11.0% (29)</b>	<b>100% (264)</b>
<b>Case 5 Theft of Watch from Crime Scene</b>	<b>28.8% (76)</b>	<b>9.8% (26)</b>	<b>12.9% (34)</b>	<b>12.5% (33)</b>	<b>36.0% (95)</b>	<b>100% (264)</b>
<b>Case 6 Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback</b>	<b>42.2% (111)</b>	<b>13.3% (35)</b>	<b>13.7% (36)</b>	<b>9.1% (24)</b>	<b>21.7% (57)</b>	<b>100% (263)</b>
<b>Case 7 Supervisor Offers Holiday Off for Auto Tune Up%</b>	<b>44.5% (118)</b>	<b>12.1% (32)</b>	<b>12.1% (32)</b>	<b>9.8% (26)</b>	<b>21.5% (57)</b>	<b>100% (265)</b>
<b>Case 8 Cover Up of Officer DUI Incident</b>	<b>62.7% (165)</b>	<b>7.6% (20)</b>	<b>10.3% (27)</b>	<b>5.7% (15)</b>	<b>13.7% (36)</b>	<b>100% (263)</b>
<b>Case 9 Free Drinks to Ignore Late Bar</b>	<b>48.7% (129)</b>	<b>11.3% (30)</b>	<b>13.2% (35)</b>	<b>8.3% (22)</b>	<b>18.5% (49)</b>	<b>100% (265)</b>
<b>Case 10 Excessive Force on Car Thief</b>	<b>49.2% (131)</b>	<b>10.2% (27)</b>	<b>13.9% (37)</b>	<b>7.5% (20)</b>	<b>19.2% (51)</b>	<b>100% (266)</b>

## The Measurement of Police Integrity: Executive Summary

<b>Case 11 Theft from found Wallet</b>	<b>37.8%</b> <b>(101)</b>	<b>12.4%</b> <b>(33)</b>	<b>11.6%</b> <b>(31)</b>	<b>11.2%</b> <b>(30)</b>	<b>27.0%</b> <b>(72)</b>	<b>100%</b> <b>(267)</b>
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Both measures were based on the ranking an agency received on each of the six questions dealing with seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report. Each time an agency's summary score on one of the six questions placed it among the bottom third of the agencies surveyed it was awarded 1 point. Each time its score placed it in the middle third it was awarded 2 points, and each time it scored among the top third it was awarded three points. The scores on all six questions were then added. This 1-2-3 system made it possible for composite scores to range from 6 for an agency that ranked in the bottom third of agencies on all six questions, to 18 for an agency that ranked among the top third on all six questions.

Using this system the composite score achieved by Agency A was 17 out of a possible 18 points, a score that placed Agency A in 8th place among the 30 agencies surveyed. The same system yielded a composite score of 7 out of a possible 18 points for Agency B, a score that placed it in a five way tie for 24th place among the 30 agencies surveyed.

Exhibits 3 and 4 below are graphic representations of the same information. They display where Agencies A and B ranked on each of the six questions, compared with the median case in the national sample. On all but one question, asking for officers' estimates of how seriously most officers in their agency would evaluate the cases, Agency A ranked in the top third of agencies surveyed. On all but one question, asking for officers' estimates of the discipline they would receive, Agency B ranked in the bottom third.

#### *A Final Note*

The survey and the measures created to describe its results do *NOT* measure the amount or extent of corruption in any police agency or institution. They *ARE* a measure of the culture of police integrity - the normative inclination of a police to resist the temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their office. The measures and the survey do *NOT* identify either corrupt or honest individual officers nor do they provide any evidence whatsoever of any type of abusive or dishonest practice, past, present, or future. They *DO* describe in a fairly precise and specific way the levels and the areas in which the culture of a police makes it likely to resist or tolerate certain types of misconduct on the part of its employees.

Finally, it also bears emphasis that this attempt to measure police integrity is absolutely silent on what are probably the two most important questions that can be asked about police integrity: "*Why* do some police have a higher level of integrity than others?" and "*How* may one enhance the culture of integrity in a police?" Hopefully, the capacity to measure police integrity will prove of use in answering both questions at the same time it serves as both a reminder and a guide - a reminder that actively enhancing a police culture of integrity should be a major goal of police administration and a guide to where in any particular police those efforts might be directed.

Exhibit 3




Exhibit 4

