POLICE DRUG CRACKDOWNS

AN EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Figure Title

INTRODUCTION

A police crackdown entails an abrupt increase in police activity, and especially proactive enforcement. It is intended to dramatically increase the perceived and/or actual risk of apprehension for specific types of offenses in certain places or situations, and so to produce a general deterrent effect (see Sherman, 1990: 7-8). As Hayeslip (1989: 3) observes, crackdowns are not new, but police crackdowns on drugs represent "refinements" of the older and more generic crackdown technology, to which American law enforcement agencies have increasingly turned. Crackdowns target police resources on specific problems in providing for substantial increases in police visibility and sanctioning.[1] Notwithstanding their promise, the effectiveness of police crackdowns in addressing the problems associated with drug sales and use is an issue on which little scientific evidence has accumulated. Furthermore, since substantial increases in the probability of apprehension do not come cheaply, one must also ask--even if crackdowns are an *effective* enforcement tool-- whether their benefits exceed their costs, and if so, how crackdowns can be conducted most *efficiently*.

In this report, we present the results of a process and outcome evaluation of drug crackdowns that were conducted by the Detroit Police Department Narcotics Division in 1990-1991. Our report is presented in five chapters. In Chapter 1 we review previous research to specify hypotheses about the impacts of police drug crackdowns, and we summarize and critically evaluate the extant evidence

[1] Neither are crackdowns limited to enforcing against only one type of offense; as Sherman (1990) points out, a crackdown can instead focus principally on a geographic area, enforcing against a wide range of offenses in that area.

on these hypotheses. In Chapter 2 we describe the design of this evaluation, including the planned crackdown interventions, the criteria that guided the specification of crackdown target areas, the sources of data on which we have drawn, and the characteristics of the target areas. In Chapter 3 we describe the crackdowns as they were actually implemented, to better specify the nature of the interventions, and to better understand the obstacles to implementing drug crackdowns. In Chapter 4 we present our findings about the impacts of the crackdowns, and provide a tentative interpretation of the findings. In Chapter 5 we summarize our findings and offer our assessment of this study's implications for police practice and for future research.

CHAPTER 1

POLICE DRUG CRACKDOWNS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

The potential benefits of police drug crackdowns include reductions in the number and visibility of drug transactions, a reduction in the amount of drugs consumed, a reduction in the size of the user population, a reduction in predatory crimes that are associated with drug use and drug trafficking, and improvements in the quality of life in targeted areas and in citizens' attitudes toward the police. These potential benefits must be weighed against the inescapable costs of personnel, equipment, and the benefits of forgone activities, as well as the potential costs of increases in crime and in police abuse and/or subversion of their authority, and the erosion of citizen respect for and willingness to cooperate with police. Each of these potential benefits and costs corresponds to a plausible hypothesis about the impact of a drug crackdown.

Hypothesized Impacts

The hypothetical impact of a crackdown on the incidence and prevalence of drug consumption stems largely from enhancing the perceived risks of buying or (especially) selling drugs.[1] To the extent that street-level enforcement efforts make the sale or possession of drugs appear risky, they disrupt networks of retail drug distribution: dealers take steps to avoid detection

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[1] That theoretical treatments of crackdowns emphasize their general deterrent effects is not to deny that they might also have incapacitative effects. Kleiman (1988: 26) acknowledges, with reference to an apparently successful crackdown in Lynn, Massachusetts, that "given the extremely high crime rates characteristic of some heroin users, the incarceration of relatively small numbers of them might be responsible for substantial changes in crime rates in a city such as Lynn." But as Sherman (1990: 9) observes, "over short term periods with large enough numbers of offenders, it seems reasonably plausible for police to interpret a crime reduction as a deterrent effect."

by police--e.g., they become more circumspect about where and to whom they sell--and in so doing also make themselves less accessible to buyers. Enforcement efforts may be able to so increase the nonmonetary costs of buying drugs--especially the costs of time and inconvenience, or "search time"--that experienced users reduce their consumption or desist, while novices refrain from (further) experimentation (Kleiman, 1988: 11-12, 25-26; also see Moore, 1973; 1977: ch. 5). One can reasonably hypothesize, therefore, that the abrupt increases in police presence and sanctioning for which drug crackdowns provide will affect both the aggregate level of drug consumption and, perhaps, the size of the user population.

Furthermore, by dispersing the markets for drugs, and perhaps by reducing drug consumption, police crackdowns might also reduce the levels of non-drug predatory crimes. Since a street drug market routinely attracts both "motivated offenders" and "suitable targets" (Cohen and Felson, 1979: 589) to the same area, the dispersal of that market is likely to reduce the number of offenses that the former perpetrate on the latter (Kleiman, 1988: 27; Sherman, 1990: 35), including homicide, robbery, assault, and larceny. Furthermore, insofar as narcotic addicts' rates of offending vary directly with their levels of consumption (see, e.g., Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Nurco, et al., 1988), the numbers of predatory crimes might be expected to decline with reductions in their consumption.

Police drug crackdowns might directly and indirectly affect the quality of life in targeted areas. A crackdown could directly affect the quality of life by reassuring the citizenry through visible police activity--e.g., street sweeps, raids, and patrols. A crackdown could indirectly affect the quality of life by dispersing drug markets and by reducing non-drug crime. Decreases in predatory crime diminish the likelihood of both direct and "indirect" victimizations, both of which

contribute to fear of crime.[2] Further, a street-level drug market creates nuisances in the form of traffic, noise, and loitering users, it poses a potential for violence, and it exposes children (and others) to the temptations of using or dealing drugs; a crackdown that disperses the market also reduces or eliminates these problems. By enhancing the level of order that prevails in public places in this way, a crackdown might reduce fear of crime and promote the extension of informal social controls.[3] Hence improvements in the quality of life in target areas could represent short-term benefits that pay long-term dividends.

Finally, police crackdowns on drugs might enhance residents' confidence in and attitudes toward the police. Citizens may become more willing to report drug trafficking and other illegal activity, if they come to believe that police will respond to their complaints. Citizens may also feel empowered by police efforts, without which individual or collective action could seem futile.

Crackdowns also entail costs. The cost of personnel can be quite high: for example, Kleiman (1988: 16) estimates that Operation Pressure Point I, in New York City, cost roughly $12 million per year in salaries. Although personnel and other costs are inevitable, they are not beyond the control of police administrators, whose choice of crackdown elements--i.e., the intensity and the duration of crackdowns--may affect the efficiency of this strategy (as we will discuss further below). But other potential costs must also be considered.

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[2] An individual's fear of crime is affected not only by a crime of which the individual is a victim (i.e., a direct victimization), but also by crimes that the individual witnesses or about which the individual merely has some knowledge--"indirect" or "vicarious" victimizations; see, e.g., Skogan and Maxfield (1981).

[3] Wilson and Kelling's (1982) "Broken Windows" thesis holds that police actions that preserve or restore public order and that reduce fear of crime can, by reinforcing or reestablishing citizens' commitments to their neighborhoods, prevent or reverse neighborhood deterioration.

One potential cost is an increase in non-drug crime. Predatory crime--especially larceny and robbery--could be expected to increase if enforcement efforts increase the *monetary* costs of drugs without proportionately reducing consumption, and if users must consequently increase their rates of offending (Kleiman, 1988: 13). An increase in non-drug crime seems theoretically unlikely, since street-level enforcement is directed less toward the supply of drugs than toward the availability of drugs, and price is driven more by the former than the latter (see Kleiman and Smith, 1990). Nevertheless, an increase in non-drug crime is the kind of unintended consequence to which evaluative research must be sensitive.

Crackdowns might also entail costs in terms of police-community relations, as a result either of police abuses or merely the greater degree of intrusiveness. Conventional wisdom holds that aggressive police tactics may not be well-received by the public (see, e.g., Wilson and Boland, 1978), even though empirical research has failed to detect a relationship between citizen attitudes toward the police and the frequency with which field interrogations are conducted (Boydstun, 1975; Whitaker, Phillips, and Worden, 1984). Drug crackdowns may be perceived as a more intrusive police tactic than field interrogations are, however, and one recent crackdown in Philadelphia apparently resulted in precisely the kind of community reaction that conventional wisdom would have predicted: the public was critical of what it saw (probably justifiably) as indiscriminate enforcement activity (Kleiman, 1988: 20). In view of the value of community involvement in controlling crime and maintaining order, which police officials are increasingly recognizing (see, e.g., Skolnick and Bayley, 1986; Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990), it is important for research to ascertain whether crackdowns have negative impacts on citizens' attitudes (and if so, the circumstances under which they do).

Another potential cost is an increase in police abuse and corruption. The conventional technologies of drug enforcement generate pressures on officers to subvert or abuse their authority (see Skolnick, 1975; Manning and Redlinger, 1978). But one cannot assume that police departments or individual officers are equally susceptible to such pressures; neither can one assume that an increase in the level of drug enforcement will yield a commensurate increase in police abuse and corruption. Moreover, a drug crackdown typically entails not only (if at all) an increase in enforcement activity but also (or instead) the geographic concentration of enforcement effort. Inasmuch as concentrated activity may be more effectively monitored, the implementation of crackdown tactics might *restrict* corruption and abuse.

One important refinement of the theory on which police crackdowns rest has implications for the expected costs of crackdowns. Sherman (1990) builds upon a distinction between the perceived *risk* of apprehension and offenders' *certainty* about the risk of apprehension (see Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). Normal enforcement efforts, Sherman observes, provide for fairly stable and usually rather low risks. But a series of short-term crackdowns that are conducted intermittently, or what Sherman calls a "crackdown-backoff" strategy, makes the risks of apprehension uncertain. This uncertainty may make it possible to complement the "initial" deterrent effect, which is attributable to the increase in police presence and/or sanctioning, with a "residual" deterrent effect, which is attributable to the inability of offenders to predict the time of the next crackdown once the police have backed off. According to this theory, the risk perceived by offenders remains high (compared to that produced by normal enforcement efforts) due to offenders' uncertainty. The residual deterrent effect will inevitably decay, as offenders adjust their perceptions of risk, but as long as offenders overestimate the threat of sanctions, society enjoys a "'free bonus' residue of

deterrence" (Sherman, 1990: 3). The intervals between crackdowns, i.e., the duration of the backoff, can be as long as it takes for this effect to decay; the slower the rate of decay, the longer the intervals between crackdowns can be, and consequently the lower the costs of using the crackdown strategy.

If this theoretical analysis holds for drug dealers and drug users, it implies that resources for street-level drug enforcement could be used more efficiently if they were concentrated in particular areas for brief periods at unpredictable times, rather than dispersed across precincts or districts at levels that remain more-or-less constant over time. Thus, departments that already conduct street-level enforcement could do so more effectively by following a somewhat different resource allocation strategy, while those that lack the resources to assign personnel to street-level enforcement units permanently might be able to achieve similar results by making temporary assignments.

Empirical Evidence

Unfortunately, few drug crackdowns have been the subjects of evaluation research; fewer still have been evaluated using research designs that provide a sound basis for inferences about impacts. Furthermore, research on drug crackdowns provides inconsistent results; on its face, the research suggests that crackdowns have "worked" in some cases but not in others.

Methodological Problems

Evaluations of drug crackdowns confront difficult problems in measuring outcome variables. The enumeration of drug offenses is even less reliable than that of other offenses, inasmuch as drug offenses are "invisible" (see Moore, 1983). While efforts to measure the level of, say, auto thefts can rely to a large degree on reports by victims to the police, efforts to measure the level of drug offenses cannot draw on a comparably valid source of data. Neither can researchers make inferences about the level of drug offenses from the number of arrests for those offenses; given the

pervasiveness of drug offenses in many jurisdictions, and the fact that the principal police role in enforcement is one of discovery, it is not surprising to find that the number of arrests rises and falls with the level of enforcement activity, and not (necessarily) with the level of drug sales and consumption. As a result of these measurement problems, previous evaluations of drug enforcement rest to some extent on indicators of dubious merit, such as the street price of drugs or the demand for drug treatment.

It is technically feasible but costly to collect valid and reliable data about other conditions on which crackdowns may have an impact. Police records of reported non-drug crimes have well-known shortcomings (see Skogan, 1975; Schneider and Wiersema, 1990).[4] Victimization surveys can enumerate crimes that go unreported to police (Biderman and Reiss, 1967), but victimization surveys, which are not without shortcomings of their own, are expensive to conduct. So too are surveys about the quality of life, through which evaluations can measure perceptions of neighborhood problems, fear of crime, and self-protective behaviors. But in the absence of such survey data, evaluations must rely on much less systematic and reliable information (e.g., see Kleiman's [1988] assessments of the Lynn and Lawrence crackdowns).

Furthermore, when evaluations of drug crackdowns lack equivalent control groups, and when they examine only the immediately pre- and post-intervention levels of crime and other indicators, it is difficult to ascertain whether any changes that are observed are due to the changes in enforcement activity or to some other circumstances. If the levels of drug and/or non-drug offenses

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[4] Moreover, these data do not permit researchers to distinguish drug-related offenses from other offenses in the same reporting category. One cannot, for example, disaggregate larcenies to enumerate only those committed in order to purchase drugs.

in the vicinity of the crackdown decline, it might be as a result of, educational efforts, short-term fluctuations, or long-term trends. Extant evidence is open to alternative interpretations that either confirm or disconfirm the impact of drug crackdowns.

One interpretation to which virtually all evaluations of police crackdowns are open is that drug sales, crime, and other problems are merely displaced rather than deterred or solved. From the perspective of one jurisdiction or neighborhood, even a displacement effect is beneficial, of course; but from a broader perspective, a displacement effect alone offers no meaningful benefit. Unfortunately, discussions of displacement often cast the issue in either/or terms: enforcement produces either a deterrent or a displacement effect. If drug enforcement displaces drug transactions, the displacement is probably partial rather than complete, since even a temporary disruption of a drug market would prevent at least some drug offenses as the market relocates; in theory, the aggregate volume of sales and consumption would not remain constant (Kleiman and Smith, 1990: 89; Caulkins, 1992). The question is properly an empirical one, but since social scientists cannot tag drug sellers and buyers as biologists might tag birds or deer, a definitive answer could not be found even in the best empirical evidence. It *is* feasible to conduct analyses that are at least suggestive (see Caulkins, 1992), but most evaluations do not include such analyses.

Findings from Previous Evaluations

The most encouraging evidence concerns a crackdown on street-level heroin dealing in Lynn, Massachusetts. The Lynn crackdown appears to have had all of the hypothesized impacts. First, casual observation and interviews with residents and merchants indicated that the volume of visible drug transactions decreased substantially. Second, interviews with treatment workers and with heroin addicts suggest that it became harder and riskier to buy heroin in Lynn; drug treatment centers

experienced an 85 percent increase in the demand for treatment. Third, burglaries, robberies, and other crimes against persons all decreased--38 percent, 18.5 percent, and 66 percent, respectively--in the year after the crackdown began, and during the following year, burglaries remained at the lower level while robberies decreased further, down 30 percent compared with the base year. The absence of a control group, however, makes it difficult to attribute these outcomes to the crackdown: some or even most of the decrease in street crime might have been observed in the absence of a crackdown.[5] A later crackdown in Lawrence, Massachusetts failed to produce the same results (Kleiman, 1988). Interviews with addicts indicated only a small reduction in the availability of heroin, and even though crimes against persons fell by 37 percent during the 28 months following the start of the crackdown, other crimes--burglary, larceny, and robbery--increased.

Similarly inconsistent results were reported for crackdowns in New York City. Operation Pressure Point, on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, reduced the amount of street dealing, increased the demand for drug treatment on the Lower East Side, and also appeared to reduce crime--robbery decreased 47 percent, burglary 37 percent, grand larceny 32 percent, and homicide 62 percent (Kleiman, 1988: 16-18; also see Zimmer, 1990: 55-60). Furthermore, "the quality of life improved as citizens shopped at local stores, enjoyed neighborhood parks and playgrounds again and even took evening strolls" (Bocklet, 1987: 49). But according to a New York Times report, another crackdown in Harlem was largely unsuccessful in reducing street dealing, and it had little effect on crime (Sherman, 1990: 22).

An evaluation of "Operation Clean-Sweep" in Washington, DC, reports mixed results

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[5] See Barnett (1988), whose analysis of a longer time period suggests that Kleiman's (1988) results may overstate the impact of the crackdown on street crime.

(Reuter, et al., 1988). This crackdown produced numerous arrests and, moreover, "good cases" that resulted in prosecution and conviction. It seems also to have reduced the number of street drug markets and to have enhanced the orderliness of some areas, although these conclusions must be qualified by the shortcomings of the indicators, as the authors acknowledge. These conclusions about neighborhood order are further qualified by the authors' speculation that intensified enforcement might have contributed to an increase in violence. An analysis of drug use failed to confirm the hypothesized decline, at least over the short term; in fact, drug use indicators rose after the crackdown began (Sherman, 1990: 22-23). An analysis of index crimes was inconclusive, owing partly to the lack of control groups.

In 1988 and 1989, the Oakland, California, Police Department experimented with a form of intensified drug enforcement that proved moderately effective. Oakland police created a special unit that was freed from calls for service and charged with street-level drug enforcement in targeted beats. The impacts of this unit's operation were analyzed by the Police Foundation (Uchida, et al., 1992). The unit engaged in "high visibility patrol" that included "stopping suspicious persons, making arrests, and disrupting drug deals" (Uchida, et al., p. 16), and it also used buy-bust tactics intensively in each of two police beats for six months.[6] The evaluation of this effort, which included a control beat, indicates that it had some impact: drug sellers changed their tactics, and officers reported that one beat had "dried up" (Uchida, et al., p. 18). In addition, in both of the beats in which the intensified enforcement was implemented, the evaluation found a decline in residents' perceived

[6] The department also planned to implement a form of community policing--namely, door-to-door contacts with and interviews of residents by the police--in connection with these efforts, and the Police Foundation designed an evaluation to assess the impacts of this program. This approach was not fully implemented, however.

severity of drug trafficking as a problem, a decline in fear of crime, and an improvement in residents' perceptions of the ability of police to handle the drug problem. Violent crime decreased in one beat, as did burglaries in the other.

Crackdowns conducted by the Hartford (CT) Police Department seem to have been no more than modestly effective in one targeted neighborhood and much more effective in another neighborhood (see Caulkins, et al., 1991). Both neighborhoods, Charter Oak Terrace and the Milner School area, were "considered major, open-air drug markets" (Caulkins, et al., 1991: 5). The crackdowns commenced with four weeks of undercover work that produced 55 arrests, followed by intensive patrol by uniformed officers from the Crime Suppression Unit. Fewer arrests were made in Charter Oak Terrace (4.1 per month) than in the Milner School area (16.9 per month), and since the numbers of officer-hours spent in the neighborhoods were nearly equal, Caulkins, et al. (p. 6) take this as an indicator of relative success in Charter Oak Terrace. This conclusion is also supported by retrospective surveys both of residents and of officers. After five months, more than 80 percent of the Charter Oak Terrace respondents, but only 30 to 40 percent of the Milner School area respondents, reported that there was less violent crime and fewer people selling drugs than there had been three months before. All of the 18 officers in Hartford's Crime Suppression Unit agreed that there was less drug dealing in Charter Oak Terrace and all but two believed that the neighborhood had become a more pleasant place to live; 12 of the officers reported that there was less drug dealing in the Milner School area, and only three believed that the neighborhood had become a more pleasant place to live. Once again, however, in the absence of control groups, the target areas can only be compared with each other.

The most recent evaluation of police crackdowns is the Vera Institute's evaluation of New

York City's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNTs) (Sviridoff, Sadd, Curtis, and Grinc, 1992). Each TNT consisted of 110 officers organized into fourteen "modules" of six to nine officers each, scheduled to ensure that the TNT operated in a targeted area each day of a 90-day intervention period. TNT crackdowns began with a "kick-off" meeting in the targeted community, at which TNT commanders explained the TNT's purposes and tactics, including the duration of the intervention; thus there was little uncertainty about when the risk of apprehension would diminish with the withdrawal of enforcement resources. TNT operations consisted primarily of buy-and-bust tactics, which were directed for the most part at open-air markets.

The Vera Institute's evaluation of the TNTs was a comprehensive one. Two target areas and a comparison area were examined before and after TNT intervention (although the intervention was not equally intensive in each target area). Outcome measures were based on street ethnography of drug markets, reported crime, a door-to-door survey of residents regarding quality of life, and in-depth interviews with community leaders. The results showed that the TNTs had the expected effect on drug markets, as participants became aware of the increased risk and took steps to reduce their vulnerability, at least for the duration of the intervention.[7] The results also can be interpreted to indicate that the TNTs had a small effect on residents' perceptions of crime and social disorder, and a small indirect effect on fear of crime. But hypothesized impacts of the TNTs on non-drug crime--burglary, robbery, assault, and homicide --found little support in the results.

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[7] The evaluation also showed that this impact was not an unmitigated blessing. The enforcement pressure prompted or accelerated the movement of dealers to indoors locations, such as the lobbies, stairwells, and hallways of apartment buildings, where residents found the dealers more difficult to avoid than they had been on the street. Some evidence showed that residents' fears *increased*. See Sviridoff, et al. (1992: 81-83 & 116-118).

Overall, then, evaluative research on police drug crackdowns has produced a mixed set of results. The results are also of mixed quality, as some evaluations lack control groups and rely on a limited set of indicators, while others include control groups and use multiple and/or stronger indicators of some outcomes. If one takes the findings at face value, then it appears that drug crackdowns have had striking effects in some instances, moderate effects in others, and no effects in still other instances. If one takes a rough account of the relative strength of evaluation designs, it would appear that the best evidence is of no greater than moderate effects. Given the complexity of the hypothetical impacts, however, such sweeping generalizations are probably unwarranted at this time.

Conditional Impacts

The inconsistent findings produced by previous evaluations of drug crackdowns could be methodological artifacts, but there are good reasons to expect that crackdowns will be more effective under some circumstances than they would be under others, and hence that perhaps the research findings reflect the empirical reality. These circumstances include characteristics of the neighborhoods that are the geographic targets of crackdowns, and characteristics of the crackdowns themselves. Evaluations of drug crackdowns must attend to both sets of circumstances.

Crackdown Target Areas. Police drug crackdowns are both offense-focused--enforcement activity is directed primarily or exclusively toward drug offenses--and geographically-focused--enforcement is directed toward a targeted area. The sizes of crackdown target areas could vary from entire jurisdictions, in the cases of small municipalities, to police precincts or beats in larger cities, to still more narrowly-defined areas of no more than several square blocks. Presumably, target areas are so designated by police departments partly on the basis of the severity of the drug-related problems

therein; although for administrative convenience the boundaries of target areas may coincide with those of beats or districts, thereby encompassing some smaller areas in which drug-related problems are less severe. The important points for evaluative research are, first, that if police crackdowns have impacts, those impacts are most likely to be felt (and detected) in those areas in which both drug transactions and enforcement activity are concentrated, and second, that the magnitude of the impacts may vary with the characteristics of the target areas.

Attention to the geographic focus of crackdowns usually takes the form of a discussion of drug markets. For example, Kleiman (1988) suggests that the impact of a crackdown is likely to depend on the size, concentration, and geographic isolation of the drug market: small, concentrated, and isolated markets (like Lynn's) are more vulnerable to crackdowns than are larger, fragmented markets in close proximity to other markets (like Lawrence's). Unfortunately, the term "drug market" is used rather loosely in the literature on drug enforcement, and market concepts have had far more value in developing theoretical propositions (e.g., Reuter and Kleiman, 1986) than in the empirical evaluation of drug crackdowns. (For an important exception, see Weisburd and Green, 1994).

For the purposes of evaluative research it might be useful to follow the lead provided by research on "hot spots," locations in which illicit activity is concentrated or from which a disproportionate number of calls for police service originate (see Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989).[8] The sites of drug transactions are not randomly distributed across a jurisdiction, and thus

[8] This is not to argue that we should abandon efforts to use market concepts in empirical research. More could be learned about market behavior by studying drug dealers and drug users through survey and ethnographic research, as we discuss below.

it should be possible to identify "drug hot spots" as areas within which drug and drug-related problems are concentrated. A drug hot spot need not correspond to a single drug market. A single hot spot could encompass two or more markets, e.g., one that caters to a local clientele and another that serves a more cosmopolitan clientele (e.g., suburbanites who drive in only to buy drugs), or one for heroin and one for crack. Furthermore, a drug hot spot need not correspond to the crackdown target area. If the target is, formally, an entire jurisdiction or even a single police precinct, the target area might encompass multiple drug hot spots. Evaluative research should seek to isolate one or more drug hot spots within crackdown target areas, since crackdown impacts may be greatest in those hot spots.

A drug hot spot might be delineated on the basis of indicators of drug and drug-related problems: enforcement activity such as arrests and raids; citizen complaints about drug sales; reported levels of non-drug crimes such as larceny, robbery, and auto theft; and perceived levels of drug sales, violence, and disorder as reported in surveys (see, e.g., Weisburd and Green, 1994). No one of these indicators suffices by itself. Enforcement outputs are, of course, indicative of police activity as much as of drug activity; this is all the more true during a planned intervention. Citizen complaints are sometimes--perhaps, as many officers claim, often--inaccurate; a citizen might mistakenly believe that drugs are being sold out of a house down the block, or might phone in a fraudulent "tip" out of vengefulness or spite. Levels of non-drug crimes vary, spatially and chronologically, with many factors, of which retail drug outlets are but one (see Rengert and Wasilchick, 1990: 64-94). Survey data suffer from one of the same problems from which citizen complaints suffer, namely errors in perceptions. The best approach is to use multiple indicators, in the hope that the strengths of some can compensate for the weaknesses of others.

Finally, if a drug hot spot is an area in which drug sales and related problems are concentrated, one must (implicitly or explicitly) establish a threshold above which the levels of these phenomena are such that the area is hot and not merely warm. There is no a priori basis for these judgments, and evaluations should test the sensitivity of the results to adjustments in the thresholds. Moreover, within any one jurisdiction the thresholds will be relative rather than absolute, and cross-jurisdictional comparisons of crackdown impacts should attend to these differences; a drug hot spot in Kansas City may seem no more than lukewarm in the context of New York or Miami.

Once we focus on drug hot spots we can begin to empirically describe the characteristics of those areas, and the conditions under which crackdowns are more or less effective. For example, the impacts of crackdowns are probably greater in those areas in which drugs are sold on the street than in areas in which transactions typically take place indoors (Kleiman and Smith, 1990: 85; also see Reuter, et al, 1988: 32); drug transactions on the street are more vulnerable to enforcement action, and the disruption of such visible drug sales is more easily detected by residents. Most of the evaluated drug crackdowns have targeted open-air markets, so it remains to be seen whether crackdowns have comparable impacts when they target areas in which sales are made predominately at indoor locations.

Other characteristics of drug hot spots could condition the impact of a crackdown. For example, Caulkins, et al. (1991) argue that the effectiveness of Hartford's crackdown in one neighborhood (Charter Oak Terrace) was enhanced by that area's well-defined physical boundaries (a river, a railroad track, and an interstate highway), which afforded limited access to the target area. Police could more easily observe those who entered the area, and they could establish more effective road blocks; patrons from outside the neighborhood were reluctant to drive in. Caulkins, et al.

further argue that these boundaries limited the opportunities for displacement to locations just outside the target area, and highlighted the region of increased risk for both dealers and users. For another example, Zimmer (1990: 61) observes that New York City's Operation Pressure Point (OPP) was most successful in neighborhoods in which some gentrification preceded OPP. Zimmer attributes the disparate impacts to the "make-up" of the communities; in gentrifying neighborhoods, "a new group of people, themselves once intruders into a run-down, sparsely populated neighborhood, began to establish new standards of acceptable conduct and assist the police in enforcing them" (1990: 63). Generally, one might expect that crackdowns would be more effective wherever enforcement action is complemented by community action.

Crackdown Content. Evaluative research must also recognize that crackdowns vary in their content, particularly in their tactics, their intensity, and their duration. Tactics are likely to vary with the methods of drug distribution and the nature and severity of drug-related problems (street crime, disorder), and perhaps with the skills and predilections of police. Some crackdowns consist of a uniformed police presence. Others rely largely on the use of observation-of-sale arrests and buy-bust tactics. Still others emphasize the execution of search warrants. Kleiman (1988: 18) offers the differences in police tactics as one explanation for the different results in Lynn and in Lawrence; the Lawrence crackdown, he points out, emphasized search warrants more and observation-of-sale arrests less than the Lynn crackdown. More generally, one could expect that different tactics have, by their nature, different impacts. A uniformed presence is as visible to law-abiding residents as it is to drug dealers and users, and thus it probably has a greater direct effect on the former than on the latter: it would reassure residents more than it would prompt dealers to take precautions. Undercover buy-bust tactics are more visible to drug dealers than to (other) residents, and thus

probably affect the ease and hence the volume of drug transactions more than it affects residents' feelings of safety.

Another characteristic of a crackdown is its intensity, or the level of enforcement activity. Kleiman (1988: 30-31) suggests that it may be necessary for a crackdown to exceed a "critical ratio" of officers to users and/or dealers in order to be effective. Furthermore, Sherman (1990) hypothesizes that the intensity of a crackdown affects both the extent to which offenders exaggerate the risk of apprehension and the duration of the residual deterrent effect. Intensity can be conceived and operationalized in different terms: numbers of police personnel, levels of enforcement outputs (e.g., arrests, raids), or (in principle, at least) ratios of personnel or outputs to population, area, drug transactions, or points of drug sales. The appropriate conceptualization and operationalization will depend, of course, on the tactics: the intensity of a uniformed presence is better measured in terms of resources than in terms of outputs, but the intensity of a crackdown that emphasizes the execution of search warrants might be measured in terms of raids (i.e., an output). Each of these definitions has drawbacks, and no one of them will suffice for evaluation.

A third characteristic of crackdowns is duration. As Kleiman and Smith (1990: 89) point out, "The ideal focused crackdown strategy in a big city would move slowly from neighborhood to neighborhood ...." But for practice and for evaluation we must operationalize "slowly." While theory predicts that "brief" crackdowns are more effective (and more efficient) than sustained crackdowns (Sherman, 1990), it does not specify the optimal duration of a crackdown; we can learn through empirical inference.

It might be added that the intensity and duration of a crackdown depends not only on the intentions of police managers but also upon the extent to which the crackdown is actually

implemented. Research on crackdowns has paid scant attention to the issue of implementation, even though a large literature makes it clear that policy directives are seldom translated readily into organizational action.[9] Sherman (1990: 10) observes that crackdowns suffer implementation "decay," which amounts to a decline in the intensity of enforcement: "Fewer arrests are made, fewer people are stopped, more officers are diverted to other duties, all of which could be planned by police commanders or just carried out by the lower ranks." At the limit, intensity may so diminish as implementation decays that the crackdown is effectively terminated. But previous research has seldom described in much detail the administrative arrangements that might be expected to affect the degree of implementation, such as the allocation of crackdown responsibilities, the competing goals and obligations of responsible actors, the structure of incentives, and the bases on which day-to-day enforcement decisions are made.

Summary

Police drug crackdowns could be expected to have a number of impacts. Some of the expected impacts are, conceptually, proximate to the intervention--adaptations by drug buyers and especially by drug sellers to the increased risk both of apprehension and of the confiscation of drugs, money, etc., as well as the reduced visibility of retail drug trafficking in which these adaptations would presumably result. Some of the expected impacts are more distant from the intervention--

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[9] See, e.g., Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and Ripley and Franklin (1986). On problems peculiar to agencies such as police departments, see Prottas (1978).

For evaluative purposes, the implementation of a crackdown is equivalent to the implementation of the experimental treatment. But an analysis of the former directs attention to issues of administrative structure and managerial choices, while an analysis of the latter directs attention to issues of internal validity. Both types of analysis are important, to be sure, but we are concerned here with the former, because it has received too little attention in previous research on police crackdowns.

reductions in the size of the user population and the volume of drugs consumed, a reduction in drug-related predatory crime, and an improvement in residents' subjective quality of life. Previous empirical research on drug crackdowns has provided mixed evidence, which could be attributable to the shortcomings of the evaluation designs, or to the contingent nature of crackdown impacts. Evaluative research on drug crackdowns confronts acute problems of measurement, and much of it has lacked control groups. Moreover, the impacts of crackdowns may depend on the characteristics of the areas to which they are applied, on the characteristics of the crackdowns themselves--their tactics, intensity, and duration--or a combination of these factors.

CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION DESIGN

In 1989 the Detroit Police Department (DPD) worked with us to design both its crackdown intervention and the evaluation thereof. In this chapter we first provide some background on the city of Detroit and the DPD's drug enforcement operations, and we then describe the evaluation design: the plan for the crackdown interventions, the sources of data from which process and outcome indicators were developed, the criteria by which the target areas were identified, and the characteristics of the target areas.

Crime, Drugs, and Drug Enforcement in Detroit

The city of Detroit is the city center of a PSMA in southeastern Michigan. The metropolitan area had a population of 4,267,000 in 1990, while Detroit's population was 1,028,000. Like many urban centers, Detroit has experienced dramatic demographic and economic shifts. While its suburban area has grown, the city's population has been declining; between 1970 and 1990, the population of Detroit declined by 32 percent. The demand for the existing housing stock has decreased with the population, leaving many structures in many neighborhoods vacant or abandoned. The economic base of the region has concurrently migrated away from the central city, and the decline in the city tax base is partially reflected in the reduction in the size of the police department: between 1970 and 1990 the sworn strength of the DPD decreased 17 percent, from 5,438 to 4,508.

Drug use and trafficking have become a major concern in Detroit, as they have in many urban areas. Crack cocaine became a popular drug there in the mid-1980s (Mieczkowski, 1990), and while

data on reported crime in Detroit show that the numbers of homicides, robberies, and index crimes overall declined between 1986 and 1990 (10, 21, and 11 percent, respectively), the numbers of aggravated assaults and drug offenses increased dramatically over this period (41 and 126 percent, respectively). Although the number of drug offenses is dependent upon the level of enforcement and, as such, is an imperfect indicator of the drug problem, it has increased substantially in recent years. In 1986 DPD reported 1,462 drug offenses to UCR. By 1989, this number had risen to 5,061, an increase of 246 percent, and although it then declined to 3,298 in 1990.

More direct indicators of drug use come from the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program of the National Institute of Justice. Among the sample of offenders booked into the DPD lockup facility during 1989, 50 percent tested positive for cocaine use, 8 percent tested positive for heroin, and 21 percent tested positive for marijuana. A further indicator of drug use comes from the Community Epidemiology Group Report for Detroit and Wayne County. Admissions to drug treatment in Detroit and Wayne County (for all drugs excluding alcohol as the primary drug) increased 22 percent between 1987 and 1989. Further, estimates from the DAWN (Drug Abuse Warning Network) program indicated an increase of 10 percent in emergency room drug mentions for cocaine between 1989 and 1991.

Given the level of concern about drugs in the city of Detroit, the Detroit Police Department was committed to providing a high level of enforcement through a multifaceted effort. Drug enforcement in the DPD was conducted principally through a centralized Narcotics Division. The labor of drug enforcement was divided several ways: vertically, among targeted levels of drug distribution networks; tactically, between street-level enforcement that employs surveillance and street-level enforcement that employs the execution of search warrants; and spatially, among

precincts of the city. A conspiracy unit focused on mid- and upper-level dealers and relied on long-term undercover investigations, i.e., "buying up the chain." Street Narcotics Enforcement Units (SNEUs) focused largely on open-air markets and relied on observation-of-sale arrests ("street raids"). Narcotics Enforcement Units (NEUs), each of which assumed responsibility for one (or in some instances two) precinct(s),[1] focused largely on crack houses and relied on search warrant raids. (Both SNEUs and NEUs were known in the Division as "raid crews.")

Because retail drug distribution in Detroit in the late 1980s involved sales from indoor locations (Mieczkowski, 1990)--due perhaps to the ample supply of inexpensive or abandoned houses --the Division devoted more resources to the NEUs and the execution of search warrants than to the SEUs and observation arrests. These resources were stretched rather thin by virtue of the fact that retail drug distribution in Detroit was not concentrated in any particular area but rather was quite dispersed spatially. Analyses of citizens' calls to a DPD drug hotline and of the locations of police raids (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) demonstrate that in Detroit drug trafficking locations are scattered across the city, in contrast with many cities where drug dealing may be confined to a few "combat zone" locations.

Prior to the inception of this project, the Narcotics Division had initiated a series of "crackdowns," or as they were known in the Division, "blitzes." These enforcement actions each targeted a single police precinct, concentrating the resources of the Narcotics Division to execute multiple raids--20 to 25 street and warrant raids--on a single day. These actions were implemented

[1] Although these units were referred to as precinct enforcement, they operated out of the centralized Narcotics Division and were not based in the precinct stations. This label noted merely a principal area of geographic responsibility.



FIGURE 2.1
City of Detroit
Hotline Calls
5/89 - 2/90



FIGURE 2.2
City of Detroit
Raids
1/1/89 - 9/30/89

on a sporadic basis, approximately once a month. The Division's leadership was interested in learning about the effects of these actions, and more generally in studying the impact of concentrated and intensified drug enforcement.

Overview of the Intervention and Study Design

In contrast with the sporadic, one-day "blitzes," the intervention provided for an abrupt and dramatic increase in enforcement activity that was to be sustained over a period of six months. The six-month period was determined largely on the basis of mere intuition, as neither theory nor previous experience provided a sound basis for specifying the time frame, and six months seemed on its face to be at least enough time to have an impact, but much less than an open-ended commitment. Enforcement activity in each target area was to include one raid on most days, a small scale "mini-blitz" (or approximately 5 raids) one day each week, and a "blitz" (approximately 20 raids) one day each month. Further, the crackdown target areas were to be much smaller than an entire precinct. Each target area was to consist of several contiguous police sectors, or reporting areas, together encompassing an area no larger than two scout car areas.

This enhanced level of enforcement was to be achieved within the existing resources of the Narcotics Division through differential deployment and administrative emphasis. NEUs assigned to the precincts in which target areas were located were given most of the responsibility for this enhanced enforcement and were instructed to raid in the target area as often as possible. Thus this entire effort involved the use of no additional resources. Insofar as the intervention might have beneficial impacts, then, it would represent a more efficient form of enforcement, and it would be a more useful model for other departments whose resources for drug enforcement could not be readily expanded.

Four areas were selected as target areas (see Figure 2.3), two from the east side of the city and two from the west, a geographical division that reflects traditional identities within the city. During the first of two six-month intervention periods, crackdowns were to be implemented in two of these areas (one on the east side and one on the west side), while the other two areas were to serve as control areas. For the second intervention period, these conditions were to be reversed. We describe the implementation of the crackdowns in Chapter 3.

A wide variety of data sources were tapped for this evaluation. Official data sources included Narcotics Division reports on raids and their outcomes, computer files of citizens' calls to the drug hotline (224-DOPE), and computer files of reported crime. Enforcement activity was observed on a regular basis throughout the intervention periods, and in-depth interviews were conducted with fifty-three officers and supervisors in the Narcotics Division. Residents of the four target areas were surveyed at three points in time: immediately prior to the first intervention period; six to seven months later (when the intervention was scheduled to rotate to other areas); and at the conclusion of the second intervention period. Interviews with a panel of community knowledgeables in each area were also conducted at the same points in time. Finally, the legal cases of offenders arrested in the target areas by the Narcotics Division during the intervention periods were tracked through disposition and sentencing, and offense histories were also obtained for each of these individuals. Each of these data sources contributed to our understanding of drug distribution patterns, the implementation of the crackdowns, and the impact of enforcement efforts. Below we describe each of these data sources in greater detail, and we then discuss the target areas--how they were identified, and how they compare to one another.



FIGURE 2.3
City of Detroit
Crackdown Target Areas

Data Sources

Official Records

The Detroit Police Department provided several sources of official data. First, from Narcotics Division reports on raids, we coded data on the locations and outcomes (arrests and seizures of drugs, money, and property) of raids in the target areas as well as raids throughout the precincts in which the target areas were located. These data enable us to specify the intensity and duration of the crackdowns as they were actually implemented. Second, we obtained computerized (albeit less detailed) data on raids conducted before and after the on-site data collection, from January, 1989 through August, 1992. With these data we can put enforcement activity during the intervention periods in a longer temporal perspective. Third, we obtained computerized data on calls to the anonymous drug hotline (224-DOPE) from its inception in May, 1989 through December 1993. These data form one indicator of the level of visible drug trafficking, at least insofar as it is detected and reported by citizens. Fourth, we obtained computerized information on all reported crimes in the target areas from January, 1986 through March, 1994, a time frame that is more than adequate for time series analysis of intervention impacts.

Observation of Enforcement Activities and Officer Interviews

In order to better understand the context, implementation, and operation of the crackdowns, members of the evaluation team accompanied NEUs and SNEUs regularly. One member of the evaluation team, who worked on-site and was responsible for the collection of official data on raids, accompanied raid crews on a daily basis during the intervention periods. Other members of the evaluation team not only met regularly with Narcotics Division managers to provide information on implementation, but also accompanied raid crews approximately once each week during the

intervention periods. These contacts with Division personnel permitted us to learn about the routine operations of drug enforcement in general as well as the implementation of the crackdowns in particular.

These contacts also allowed us to establish a rapport that facilitated a series of semi-structured interviews. These interviews were conducted at the conclusion of the second intervention period, with fifty-three members of the Narcotics Division who were assigned to raid crews, including officers assigned to target area units and those whose participation in the crackdowns was more incidental. These interviews focused on officers' perceptions of the drug problem and drug markets in Detroit, the processes of drug enforcement, and the perceived impact of various strategies of drug enforcement, including particularly the crackdowns. The duration of a typical interview was approximately thirty minutes, and all but one was recorded and transcribed; the interview data were analyzed using a computer program for analysis of qualitative data. These data shed additional light on the implementation of the crackdowns, and they were also a source of information about the immediate impacts of the crackdowns on drug market activity.

Resident Survey

A resident survey was one of the more important data collection efforts. A sample of the residents of each target area was surveyed prior to the interventions, and as many of those respondents as possible were surveyed on two subsequent occasions--at the end of the first intervention period, and at the end of the second intervention period. Respondents to the first wave of the survey who could not be contacted for one or both of the following waves were replaced by others, either in the same household or, failing that, on the same blocks. Thus we have one full sample at each point in time in addition to a panel.

Building upon previous community surveys conducted by the Police Foundation in Oakland and Birmingham (Uchida, et al., 1992), this survey sought to measure residents' perception of neighborhood characteristics and problems, perceptions of drug trafficking and the drug problem in their neighborhood particularly, the degree of community organization, perceptions of police drug enforcement in their neighborhood and the impact of enforcement efforts, perceptions of the frequency and effectiveness of police activity, personal victimization, fear of crime and the perceived likelihood of victimization, and defensive reactions to the threat of crime. The third wave of the survey included, in addition to these items, items measuring citizen involvement and cooperation with the police. Thus, the survey data provide indicators of the quality of neighborhood life available from no other source, as well as alternative indicators of drug market activity that enable us to triangulate on such phenomena.

A sample of households from each target area was selected from a sampling frame defined by a reverse telephone directory. Given the variation within target areas in the incidence and severity of neighborhood problems, including drug trafficking, the sample was stratified such that at least one household was sampled from each block face in each target area. Two households were sampled from those blocks on which a drug raid had been conducted in the preceding nine months. Oversampling blocks on which drug trafficking was, presumably, a demonstrable problem increases the likelihood that crackdown impacts could be detected in analyses of survey data.

The survey was conducted by telephone by the Survey Research Division of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University.[2] The relative advantages and

[2] These interviews were conducted by trained interviewers using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. In addition to their training in interviewing generally, the interviewers

disadvantages of conducting surveys by telephone or in person are debatable. On one hand, biases in telephone surveys may stem from the fact that some households have either no telephone or no listed number. On the other hand, one can anticipate that the reluctance of would-be respondents to participate in a door-to-door survey about the issues of drugs and law enforcement in their community could also produce considerable non-response bias. We surmised that in the target areas, which had been identified precisely because they experienced serious problems with retail drug markets, residents' fears of strangers on their doorsteps inquiring about neighborhood drug trafficking would generate a larger non-response bias than that introduced by using the telephone, a medium that allows residents to participate with greater anonymity and in greater safety. The experience of the Vera Institute of Justice in conducting a door-to-door survey of an otherwise similar nature, for which they report a very low rate of participation (Sviridoff, et al., 1992: 149-154), is further evidence that a telephone survey is at least a defensible data collection strategy.

Table 2.1 displays the response rates for each wave of the survey. For the first wave of the survey, responses were obtained from 585 of the 762 sampled households, a response rate of 76.8 percent. The response rate ranged from 71.2 percent in the eleventh precinct target area to 80.2 percent in the ninth precinct target area. Since one objective of the survey was to ascertain the degree to which enforcement activity was observed by residents of the target areas, it was important that as many blocks as possible be represented in the sample; Table 2.1 also demonstrates that this was accomplished. Respondents were located on 480 of the 577 blocks in the four target areas, which represents 83.2 percent of the blocks across these areas, with at least 81 percent of the blocks

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also received training from members of the evaluation team regarding the content and purpose of each item on this survey.

Table 2.1
Resident Survey Response Rates

Wave	Rate	Target Area				Total
		Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/ Eighth	Eleventh	
One						
	# Respondents	115/147 (78.2%)	162/202 (80.2%)	157/201 (78.1%)	151/212 (71.2%)	585/762 (76.8%)
	# Blocks Responding	93/114 (81.5%)	131/149 (87.9%)	133/163 (81.6%)	123/151 (81.5%)	480/577 (83.2%)
Two						
	# Respondents	119/147 (80.9%)	160/202 (79.2%)	138/201 (68.7%)	154/212 (72.6%)	571/762 (74.9%)
	# Blocks Responding	99/114 (86.8%)	123/149 (82.6%)	123/163 (75.5%)	124/151 (82.1%)	469/577 (81.3%)
	Panel	70	93	88	88	337
Three						
	# Respondents	105/147 (71.4%)	171/202 (84.7%)	146/201 (72.6%)	139/212 (65.6%)	561/762 (73.6%)
	# Blocks Responding	86/114 (75.4%)	133/149 (89.3%)	129/163 (79.1%)	114/151 (75.5%)	462/577 (80.1%)
	Panel	46	71	71	59	247

represented in each of the target areas.

A similar response pattern was obtained in the second and third waves of the survey. The overall response rate on the second wave was 75 percent, with 81 percent of all blocks in the target areas represented. In addition, 337 of the 571 respondents on the first wave were interviewed on the second wave to form a two-wave panel. The overall response rate on the third wave was 74 percent,

which represented 80 percent of the total blocks in the target areas. The panel that participated in all three waves of the survey includes 247 respondents.

Interviews with Community Knowledgeables

Police personnel, including mini-station officers and crime prevention officers, assisted us in identifying individuals who were knowledgeable about the neighborhoods in the target areas. These individuals were active in block clubs, neighborhood watch groups, or various other community organizations. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven groups of knowledgeables (one in the fourth precinct target area and two in each of the other areas) at each of three times: prior to the interventions, at the end of the first intervention period, and at the end of the second intervention period. The purpose of these interviews was to supplement the more systematic information obtained through the resident survey with more detailed information concerning perceptions of drug markets and other neighborhood problems, the nature of community crime prevention activities, and the perceived viability of various community and law enforcement tactics to address drug problems in their community. These open-ended discussions served to inform the evaluation team of important community dynamics and thus to better interpret the quantitative findings.

Prosecutorial Records

With the assistance of the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office, information about prosecutorial and adjudicative outcomes of narcotics arrests was collected, along with information on the prior records of arrestees. Information was collected about the 626 individuals arrested by the Narcotics Division in the target areas during the intervention periods. Those few cases not yet resolved at the conclusion of data collection typically involved offenders who had absconded and

thus still had pending charges.

Target Areas

Four target areas were identified in November, 1989, based upon the degree to which the drug markets therein represented problems, the existence of some community organization, and their geographic proximity to one another. As a preliminary step, the evaluation team analyzed data on the locations of drug raids conducted between January and September, 1989 (see Figure 2.2); ten areas, in which the level of raid activity had been relatively high, were demarcated. These data were then reviewed by the management staff of the Narcotics Division, along with representatives from the DPD Crime Prevention Section. Based upon their more detailed knowledge of the drug markets and community organization in the areas identified, four areas were selected. In addition, the boundaries of these areas were adjusted to more nearly coincide with known drug hot spots and neighborhood identities, and to match the size of each area to the plan for a six-month intervention.[3] (Adjustments were made by adding or deleting police sectors so that the boundaries also coincided with these data collection units, in order to facilitate the analysis of implementation and impact.) Thus the selection of target areas was based on an interest in concentrating resources in areas of

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[3] Police enforcement activity is certainly not a perfect indicator of drug distribution activity. Rather, it is an indicator of police activity. For a number of reasons police may not be able to raid a location at which drugs are sold: police may be unaware of the activity at particular locations; they may be unable to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence about particular locations; or they may be unable to conduct undercover or controlled drug purchases at particular locations. This is one compelling reason to rely on the expertise of police personnel and not exclusively on available data. Later analysis, however, revealed a high correlation between the number of narcotics raids and the number of hotline calls. For the period of May 1989 through September 1989 the product-moment correlation between hotline calls and raid activity at the sector level was .69. Thus, sectors from which a large number of calls to the hotline had been received tended also to be those in which many raids had been executed.

sufficient size, and with drug problems of sufficient severity, to warrant a six-month commitment, but not in areas with problems of such severity that increased enforcement would have little prospect for beneficial impacts. Further, police personnel considered it desirable to target areas whose neighborhoods already enjoyed some level of community organization. Finally, all agreed that no two areas should be so proximate to one another that potential displacement from one would be likely to affect the other.

Two of the target areas were located on the east side of Detroit, one in the ninth precinct and the other in the eleventh precinct. On the west side, one area was located in the fourth precinct and the other straddled the sixth and eighth precincts. Each of these areas consisted of five to seven police sectors and was approximately one and one half square miles in area.[4] As Figure 2.2 shows, these areas were the sites of numerous drug raids during the months preceding their selection, although it is also apparent that drug distribution (as measured by raid activity) is widely dispersed in Detroit. While the incidence of enforcement activity is disproportionately high in some areas, it is clearly not isolated in a few areas. A similar pattern can be detected in citizens' calls to the DPD's anonymous drug hotline (224-DOPE). Calls from May, 1989 (when the hotline was instituted) through September of the same year--a period that coincides as closely as possible with the raid activity depicted above--reveals that the target areas generated a substantial number of calls, but also that drug distribution (as measured by citizen reporting) was widely dispersed (see Figure 2.1).

Table 2.2 displays 1990 census data in terms of which the population characteristics of the

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[4] These four target areas were comprised of 23 sectors in all; the entire city is divided into 512 sectors. Although these sectors are not of identical size or population, this comparison provides a rough idea of the area targeted for these interventions.

Table 2.2
Demographic Characteristics of Target Areas:
1990 Census Data

	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh
Population Total	**13719**	**21379**	**12546**	**17440**
Race				
White	30.2%	6.9%	31.6%	22.6%
African-American	52.0%	92.2%	65.8%	75.8%
Native American	0.8%	0.05%	0.5%	0.4%
Asian	0.9%	0.2%	0.5%	0.9%
Hispanic	9.9%	0.5%	1.3%	0.3%
Other	6.3%	0.1%	0.4%	0.1%
Gender				
Male	48.0%	45.6%	46.8%	46.8%
Female	52.0%	54.4%	53.2%	53.2%
Age				
Under 10 years	16.7%	22.3%	24.1%	18.8%
10-17 years	15.1%	16.8%	12.9%	14.3%
18-24 years	9.5%	14.0%	12.5%	12.4%
25-44 years	28.9%	30.8%	32.5%	29.3%
45-64 years	15.3%	11.6%	11.8%	16.0%
65 + years	14.5%	4.5%	6.1%	9.1%
Types of Households Total	**4552**	**6181**	**4164**	**5656**
Owner Occupied	47.0%	48.8%	46.1%	50.5%
Renter Occupied	53.0%	51.2%	53.9%	49.5%
Median Income	**$11,750**	**$15,556**	**$17,886**	**$16,080**
Education, Persons 25 +	**7408**	**9951**	**6260**	**9473**
Elementary School	20.5%	8.7%	8.0%	14.7%
Some High School	37.7%	29.6%	28.3%	30.4%
High School Graduate	24.9%	27.0%	31.9%	26.4%
Some College	11.5%	23.4%	20.2%	17.6%
Associate Degree	2.9%	5.5%	3.8%	4.4%
College Graduate	2.5%	6.0%	7.8%	6.5%

target areas can be described and compared. Table 2.3 displays additional information about the demographic characteristics of the target areas' populations, based on the resident survey. Census tract boundaries are not coterminous with the target areas, so the census figures contain some degree of error and should be treated as estimates rather than precise measurements.[5] Where census and survey data diverge, errors in the census estimates, vagaries of sampling and survey non-response, and the fact that survey respondents were all adults, are the most likely sources.[6]

The census-based estimates indicate that the population of the target areas ranged from approximately 13,000 to 21,000, with the areas on the east side (in the ninth and eleventh precincts) larger than those on the west side. The areas were all predominantly African-American, and each of the areas was, relative to state or national averages, impoverished; in no area did the median household income exceed $18,000. About half of the households were occupied by renters, and more than one third of the adult population of each area had not graduated from high school. About one third of the population of each area was under 18 years of age, and about one eighth was between 18 and 24, the age group from which a disproportionate number of drug sellers might come.

The target areas apparently differed somewhat in their racial composition, as the ninth precinct target area had a considerably larger percentage of African-American residents than the

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[5] If the majority of a census tract was within the target area it was included in these estimates; if only a small portion of the tract was in the target area it was excluded. If there were equal portions in and out of the target area, the census figures were prorated for the target area.

[6] The most striking discrepancies are in home ownership and gender. Home owners may be more likely to agree to participate in telephone surveys when they are contacted. Women may be more likely to be contacted, either because they are more likely to be at home (although times of calling were staggered to attempt to minimize this source of bias) or because they are more likely to answer the phone.

Table 2.3
Demographic Characteristics of Target Areas:
Resident Survey Data

Percentage/Mean*	Precinct Target Area			
	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh
RACE				
African-American	64.9%	76.7%	35.3%	72.8%
White	30.6%	22.6%	62.7%	21.1%
Hispanic	2.7%	0.0%	1.3%	1.4%
Other	1.8%	.6%	.7%	4.8%
GENDER				
Male	30.4%	32.7%	38.2%	35.1%
Female	69.6%	67.3%	61.8%	64.9%
AGE				
Mean Age	52.2	43.7	42.2	48.9
ANNUAL INCOME				
Less than $8000	18.2%	11.0%	14.0%	14.4%
$8000 - $14,999	40.9%	25.3%	23.3%	28.8%
$15,000 - $24,999	21.8%	15.6%	23.3%	24.0%
$25,000 +	10.0%	37.7%	32.7%	21.9%
EDUCATION				
Elementary Only	11.6%	6.3%	3.9%	5.3%
Some High School	34.8%	16.9%	20.8%	19.3%
High School Grad	31.3%	34.4%	38.3%	37.3%
Some College	17.0%	25.0%	24.7%	26.7%
College Grad	2.7%	8.1%	7.8%	8.0%
Some Advanced	2.7%	7.5%	4.5%	3.3%
HOME OWNERSHIP				
Own Home	60.2%	69.1%	65.2%	70.7%
Rent Home	38.1%	30.2%	33.5%	29.3%
PERSONS IN HOUSEHOLD				
# Adults (mean)	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.2
# Male Adults (mean)	1.0	1.1	.9	1.1
# Children (mean)	.7	1.2	.9	.9

*Percentages may not total to 100% because of refusals to answer.

other areas, and the fourth precinct target area contained a significant Hispanic population. (Furthermore, these data probably understate the racial differences, as the eleventh precinct target area contained a concentration of Arab-Americans who are likely classified as White in the census data.) The population of the fourth precinct target area was somewhat older than that of the other areas, as 30 percent of the residents there were over 44, and almost half of those were 65 or older. The population of the fourth precinct target area also had somewhat lower incomes, and had completed less formal education. These differences in race, age, income, and education, might bear on many of the outcomes of interest here, but they can be statistically controlled as necessary in order to isolate their effects from the impacts of the interventions.

Table 2.4 presents information on patterns of reported crime in each of the target areas during 1989, with city-wide figures (which of course include crime in non-residential areas) for (rough) comparison. The table shows raw numbers of selected offenses along with rates per 10,000 residents; the latter should be interpreted with caution in view of the inexact population estimates for the target areas. Overall, these data indicate that two target areas especially--those in the ninth and sixth/eighth precincts--tended to have high rates of personal offenses, relative to the city as a whole and to the other two areas, and lower rates for auto theft and larceny. The eleventh precinct target area also had a high rate of homicide, and fairly high rates of robbery and felonious assault. The fourth precinct target area had, with few exceptions, crime rates that were lower than both the city-wide rate and the rates of other target areas.

Table 2.4
Reported Crime in Target Areas

Crime Type	Precinct Target Area				City Total
	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh	
Homicide (#)	6	16	13	15	673
Rate (per 10,000)	4.37	7.48	10.36	8.60	6.55
Rape (#)	19	60	33	24	2106
Rate (per 10,000)	13.85	28.06	26.30	13.76	20.49
Robbery (#)	122	194	161	201	13149
Rate (per 10,000)	88.93	90.74	128.33	115.25	127.91
Felonious Assault (#)	112	329	217	201	12698
Rate (per 10,000)	81.64	153.89	172.96	115.25	123.52
Breaking & Entering (#)	227	614	554	402	26167
Rate (per 10,000)	165.46	287.20	441.58	230.50	254.55
Auto Theft (#)	418	593	308	487	45553
Rate (per 10,000)	304.69	277.38	245.50	279.24	443.13
Grand Larceny (#)	145	245	154	226	21145
Rate (per 10,000)	105.69	114.60	122.75	129.59	205.70
Larceny (#)	209	256	166	224	18731
Rate (per 10,000)	152.34	119.74	132.31	128.44	182.21

Table 2.5 presents survey data on respondents' perceptions of the level of community organization in their neighborhoods. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they were aware of any community organizations and, if they were, whether they had participated in these organizations' meetings. From one third to over half of the residents reported that they were aware of the existence of such community organizations. Residents of the target areas in the ninth and fourth precincts were more likely to be aware of neighborhood organizations: over half of those in the ninth precinct target area and 42 percent of those in the fourth precinct target area indicated an awareness of such organizations, compared with 36 percent in the eleventh precinct and 34 percent

Table 2.5
Residents' Knowledge about Community Organizations

Percent responded "Yes"	Target Area			
	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh
Heard about community meetings	41.7%	53.1%	34.4%	36.4%
Of those who had heard:				
attended community meetings	58.3%	52.3%	37.0%	67.3%
know if meeting was organized by specific community group	83.3%	90.7%	90.7%	90.9%

in the sixth/eighth precinct target areas. Of those who were aware of these organizations, almost all could indicate the name of the organization and approximately half reported that they had attended meetings of these organizations. Thus, there is a moderate level of community organization across all areas, with the ninth precinct target area apparently having the greatest level of organization (which confirms the impressions reported to us by mini-station and crime prevention officers).

Table 2.6 presents survey data on respondents' perceptions of the drug problem in their neighborhoods. Most of these survey items provided a Likert type response set; this table shows the percentages of respondents that chose the most serious response regarding drugs. Substantial proportions of residents indicated that drug selling was a "big problem" in their neighborhood, with the respondents in the ninth precinct target area least likely and the respondents in the sixth/eighth target area most likely to characterize drug selling as a big problem. Similarly, over one half of the respondents from each area indicated that drugs were sold and used very often in their neighborhood,

Table 2.6
Residents' Perceptions of Neighborhood Drug Problems

	Precinct Target Area			
	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh
Selling drugs is a big problem: Big problem	47.5%	37.4%	54.1%	52.6%
Frequency of drug selling in neighborhood: Very often	68.1%	52.1%	64.5%	59.1%
Frequency of drug use in neighborhood: Very often	65.9%	50.4%	64.5%	55.9%
Seen/heard about drug selling/use: Yes	51.9%	41.3%	49.7%	47.3%
Ease in buying drugs: Very easy	67.7%	64.4%	73.9%	67.5%
Ease in buying drugs on the street: Very easy	58.8%	50.0%	60.4%	50.7%
Ease in buying drugs in a apt/house: Very easy	52.1%	41.5%	55.0%	44.5%
Knowledge of a crack house in the neighborhood in the last six months: Yes	61.1%	47.6%	60.2%	65.9%

and approximately two thirds or more indicated that it was very easy to buy drugs in their neighborhoods. Respondents also indicated that it was very easy to buy drugs both on the street and from indoor locations, but that it was slightly easier to obtain drugs on the street.[7] Respondents in

[7] These results are, on their face, inconsistent with the conclusion, based on police perceptions and corroborated by research, that drug dealing in Detroit was done mostly from indoor locations. One might expect, however, that residents would be more aware of street outlets.

all of the target areas reported knowledge of a crack house that had been operating in their neighborhood sometime during the preceding six months. This ranged from a low of 48 percent in the ninth precinct target area to a high of 66 percent in the 11th precinct target area. These data amply confirm that drug trafficking was a problem in the target areas.

Summary

The planned intervention provided for a very substantial increase in enforcement activity, to be implemented first in two target areas for a six-month period, with two other areas serving as controls, whereupon the treatment and control conditions were to be reversed. The evaluation design was quasi-experimental, with too few target areas to make randomization meaningful. Although the target areas were not identical to one another, the use of comparison areas itself represents an improvement over previous evaluations of drug enforcement efforts, and as we show below, it was quite important in this evaluation. Data sources were identified and tapped to enable us to describe the interventions and examine issues of implementation, and to measure a number of important outcomes, including drug activity, drug-related predatory crime, and residents' quality of life.

CHAPTER 3

CRACKDOWN IMPLEMENTATION, INTENSITY, AND DURATION

If a crackdown is an "abrupt and dramatic" increase in enforcement activity, then one might ask how intensive the enforcement activity must be, and for how long, in order to say that a crackdown has been undertaken. One might also ask how one would distinguish a crackdown from ordinary--i.e., nonstrategic--fluctuation in day-to-day and week-to-week enforcement in any one area. Insofar as the supply of enforcement resources fails to meet the "demand" of drug trafficking, one might expect the level of drug enforcement activity to rise and fall in any one area over time as enforcement agents direct their attention to different areas for which they are responsible, and one should not mistake for crackdowns increases in enforcement activity that are merely a part of this ordinary fluctuation. The literature (Kleiman, 1988; Sherman, 1990) does not define crackdowns in unambiguous operational terms, because it treats the intensity and duration of crackdowns as variables with no minima. Our impression is that police managers refer equally loosely to the "crackdowns" that they carry out. *As a working definition of a crackdown, we will use as a standard of intensity a level of enforcement that provides for two actions--or "raids"--every three days, for a period of at least two weeks.*

In this chapter we first describe routine drug enforcement operations in Detroit at the time that the evaluation commenced, against which the nature of the crackdowns there might be better understood. We then describe the crackdowns themselves, as they were actually implemented, including the nature and level of enforcement activity, the primary outputs of those activities (arrests

and confiscated drugs), and the secondary outputs (prosecutions, convictions, and sanctions). Finally, we discuss some of the reasons that neither the intensity nor duration of the crackdown conformed in practice to the original design of the intervention.

Routine Enforcement

As we explained in Chapter 2, the DPD Narcotics Division deployed two types of units for street-level enforcement: Narcotics Enforcement Units (NEUs), the activities of which were directed primarily at crack houses and other indoor sales locations in the precincts for which they were responsible; and Street Narcotics Enforcement Units (SNEUs), the activities of which were directed primarily at open-air drug markets and, to a lesser extent, abandoned properties. Most personnel were assigned to NEUs, because in most of Detroit's retail drug markets, the drugs--mostly crack--were sold from indoor locations (Mieczkowski, 1990). Each NEU was assigned principal responsibility for one or, in some cases, two precincts.

These units targeted specific locations for enforcement activity partly on the basis of citizen complaints, many of which were received through the Department's drug hotline (224-DOPE), partly on the basis of their and other police officers' observations of drug activity, and partly on information provided by informants. The activity of these units was not, for the most part, strategically directed--i.e., it was not based expressly upon an assessment of desired and attainable goals and an analysis of relevant information. Instead, the objectives of the NEUs were to execute raids, to make arrests, and to confiscate drugs, and the connections between these short-run objectives and longer-run goals were not explicit. Occasionally, an NEU was directed to a precinct for which it was not normally responsible, when vacations or personnel shortages left a precinct uncovered, or when all or most of the units "blitzed" one precinct on a single day. Enforcement

units were also expected to meet production standards--i.e., to execute a minimum number of raids--within the precincts for which they were responsible, but the selection of targets within the precincts was left largely to the enforcement crews. Drug enforcement by the Narcotics Division was, then, predominantly "investigator-centered" (Manning, 1980; Williams, Redlinger, and Manning, 1979). In this respect, street-level drug enforcement in Detroit probably followed the rule of street-level drug enforcement in the United States more generally. As a consequence, and given the spatial dispersion of drug dealing in Detroit, enforcement activity in any one area of a precinct fluctuated as enforcement units acted on information about drug dealing. But in the main, the level of enforcement activity--and hence the risk for dealers--that prevailed in any one area was fairly low.

As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, raids in each of the target areas fluctuated some from month to month. For example, in the fourth precinct target area during 1989 (the year preceding the intervention), the number of raids per month varied around a mean of 5.75, from a low of zero in August to a high of 17 the following month. In the eleventh precinct target area during the same year, the number of raids per month varied around a mean of about 12, from a low of 4 in March to a high of 21 in November. But these monthly means and maxima overstate the intensity of *routine* enforcement, because they include the results of one-day blitzes. On September 8, 1989, for example, 16 warrants were executed in the fourth precinct, and in the target area there 8 raids--almost half of the month's total for that area--were conducted. On November 8, 1989, 25 warrants were executed in the eleventh precinct, and 11 raids were conducted in the target area there. Aside from these concentrated efforts, then, the level of routine enforcement in all of these areas was rather low.

The one-day blitzes provide for abrupt and dramatic increases in enforcement activity, and

Figure 3.1

Raids in Target Areas Fourth & Ninth Precincts



Intervention Period: 3/90 - 9/90

Figure 3.2

Raids in Target Areas Sixth/Eighth & Eleventh Precincts



so they might themselves be considered crackdowns. There is good reason to doubt that crackdowns of such duration would affect drug dealers' perceptions of enforcement risks, however, or that they would have other impacts. Indeed, in the absence of any media attention, the dealers arrested in such a crackdown would be unlikely to distinguish their experiences from that ensuing from any raid. Partly for this reason, and partly because a target area usually received only a fraction of the enforcement attention during a blitz, we doubt that these operations had any effect on pre-intervention conditions in the target areas. Furthermore, when the intervention began in the first two target areas, the last such blitz that touched either area had been conducted more than five months earlier.

The Intervention

The intervention formally commenced in the fourth and ninth precinct target areas on February 28, 1990 (but to simplify analyses using months as the units of temporal aggregation, we include the activity on that day in the March 1990 totals), and it was formally terminated in those areas on August 31. The treatment and control conditions were then switched, as the crackdowns were formally begun in the sixth/eighth and eleventh precinct target areas. As the following analyses show, the crackdown during the first intervention period--in the fourth and ninth precinct target areas--consisted of a substantial increase in enforcement activity, and an especially pronounced increase in the fourth precinct target area. But the level of enforcement never reached a level of intensity commensurate with the original design of the intervention, which provided for approximately sixty raids per month. Even if one considered a level of enforcement activity that includes two raids every three days to be "intensive," as we stipulated above, then the crackdowns were sustained for no more than two months in each of these target areas. Moreover, the crackdowns

Figure 3.3
Number of Raids in Target Areas by Precinct



Intervention Areas: Fourth & Ninth
Control Areas: Sixth/Eighth & Eleventh

during the second intervention period failed to materialize: there was no demonstrable increase in enforcement activity. We discuss the reasons for these implementation outcomes below.

Intensity and Duration

As Figure 3.3 illustrates, enforcement activity in the fourth and ninth precinct target areas increased during the first intervention period (February 28, 1990 to August 31, 1990), and fell to (or below) pre-intervention levels thereafter. Enforcement activity in the fourth precinct target area reached a higher absolute level, which also represented a much greater increase proportionally, than that in the ninth precinct target area. In the former, enforcement activity more than doubled, compared to the preceding six-month period, but even in the latter, enforcement activity across the period increased 42 percent. Figure 3.3 also indicates that enforcement activity increased only modestly in the sixth/eighth target area, and not at all in the eleventh precinct target area, during the second intervention period (September 1, 1990 to February 28, 1991).

Table 3.1 shows that levels of enforcement activity were not stable across the first intervention period. In the ninth precinct, the level of activity during the first month of the intervention (20 raids) was double the average monthly activity during 1989, and during the second month the level of enforcement activity reached a level not seen before or since in that area--33 raids. The level of activity dropped precipitously thereafter, however, and despite a small rebound at the end of the intervention period, the level of activity failed to reach even our arbitrary level of intensive enforcement--20 raids in a month. In the fourth precinct, the initial month of the intervention period produced a level of activity that was not even marginally intensive, but during the succeeding two months reached a zenith of 25 raids. The activity then dropped substantially, to about 15 raids per month, for the following three months. A closer analysis of the temporal distribu-

Table 3.1
Raids in Target Areas
Before and During Intervention Periods

	Precinct Target Area			
	Fourth	Ninth	Sixth/Eighth	Eleventh
Before Intervention				
3/89	2	6	3	4
4/89	2	4	8	10
5/89	12	14	7	17
6/89	1	9	8	19
7/89	3	17	9	8
8/89	0	20	3	17
Six Month Total	20	70	38	75
9/89	17	12	12	19
10/89	11	10	8	14
11/89	3	6	6	21
12/89	4	10	3	14
1/90	5	21	10	14
2/90	7	8	5	10
Six Month Total	47	67	44	92
1st Intervention Period				
3/90	14	20	2	15
4/90	25	33	7	9
5/90	25	8	4	11
6/90	13	8	11	14
7/90	13	13	5	12
8/90	16	13	2	7
Six Month Total	106	95	31	68
2nd Intervention Period				
9/90	8	14	6	8
10/90	5	11	10	9
11/90	3	4	7	6
12/90	3	4	3	6
1/91	2	11	7	9
2/91	3	13	8	4
Six Month Total	24	57	41	42

tion of enforcement activity (not shown in tabular form) indicates that enforcement activity was particularly intensive for about a month to a month and one half in each area--from March 27 to April 27 in the ninth precinct, and from April 2 to May 18 in the fourth precinct.

An interrupted time series analysis of raids confirms that with the implementation of the crackdowns, the level of enforcement activity departed from the theretofore normal level of activity in each target area (see Table 3.2). In the ninth precinct, the crackdown--independent of the extraneous forces that would yield a serendipitous increase--produced an estimated 50 percent increase in the level of enforcement activity during the intervention period, from 10.1 raids per month to 15.8 raids per month. In the fourth precinct, the crackdown produced an estimated 200 percent increase in enforcement activity between April and August, inclusive, from 6.1 raids per month prior to the crackdown to 18.4 raids per month during the crackdown.

Table 3.2
Time Series Analysis of Intervention Impact on Raids

Target Areas	Coefficient	Estimate	Standard Error	t
Precinct 4	α	6.10	0.74	8.27*
	ω	12.30	2.19	5.62*
Precinct 9	α	10.11	0.86	11.74*
	ω	5.73	2.33	2.46*
Precinct 6-8	α	6.90	0.54	12.68*
	ω	-1.10	1.61	-0.68
Precinct 11	α	12.97	0.85	15.34*
	ω	-1.64	2.29	-0.72

α = constant term
ω = intervention effect
ϕ = autoregressive component

* $p < .05$
The intervention period for target areas in precincts 4 and 6-8 includes April through August 1990 (inclusive); the intervention period for target areas in precincts 9 and 11 includes March through August 1990 (inclusive).

These increases in enforcement activity were achieved not by increasing the enforcement activity of the Narcotics Division as a whole but rather by concentrating the activity normally undertaken within each precinct on each target area. In each of these precincts, about one quarter of the enforcement activity is normally devoted to the target areas.[1] But during the intervention period, about half of the enforcement activity in each precinct was conducted in the target areas, and this concentration was especially pronounced during the periods of greatest enforcement intensity, when 55 to 60 percent of the raids in these precincts were conducted in the target areas. The concentration of activity during the crackdowns can be seen in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, which present maps of the target areas and surrounding parts of their respective precincts, on which the locations of raids during the intervention period and during the corresponding six months of 1989 are marked.

About two thirds (in the ninth precinct) to three fourths (in the fourth precinct) of the raids involved the execution of a search warrant, while one in seven was a buy-and-bust; raids by SNEUs following their observation of suspected drug sales comprise the remainder. Somewhat less than half of the raids in each precinct's target area, and somewhat more than half of the warrant raids in each target area, were conducted by the NEU regularly assigned to that precinct. Both NEUs experienced some turnover in leadership, and other NEUs filled in during the transitions, as well as during furloughs (vacations). In addition, other NEUs participated in blitzes on the target areas.

Upon the rotation of treatment and control conditions, and for the duration of the second intervention period, one can detect no departure from routine enforcement in either the sixth/eighth or eleventh precinct target areas (see Figure 3.2). In the eleventh precinct target area, enforcement

[1] From January 1989 through January 1990, 27 percent of the raids in the fourth precinct, and 26 percent of the raids in the ninth precinct, were conducted in the study areas.


W WARREN AV
EDSEL FORD FRWY
LIVERNOIS AV
W GRAND BLVD
Raid Type
Warrant
Buy & Bust
Street Enforcement
4th Precinct Target Area
Raids 2/28/89 - 8/31/89


W WARREN AV
EDSEL FORD FRWY
LIVERNOIS AV
W GRAND BLVD
Raid Type
Warrant
Buy & Bust
Street Enforcement
4th Precinct Target Area
Raids 2/28/90 - 8/31/90

FIGURE 3.4


HOUSTON WHITTIER RD
GRATIOT AV
CONNER AV
CHALMERS AV
EDSEL FORD FRWY
Raid Type
Warrant
Buy & Bust
Street Enforcement
9th Precinct Target Area
Raids 02/28/89 - 08/31/89


HOUSTON WHITTIER RD
GRATIOT AV
CONNER AV
CHALMERS AV
EDSEL FORD FRWY
Raid Type
Warrant
Buy & Bust
Street Enforcement
9th Precinct Target Area
Raids 02/28/90 - 08/31/90

FIGURE 3.5

activity reached a nadir--the lowest level of any six-month period. Enforcement activity in each precinct as a whole does not seem to have diminished, especially when one considers the potential influence of seasonal conditions, but enforcement in the precincts was no more concentrated in the target areas during the intervention period than it was prior to the intervention period. It is appropriate, therefore, to characterize these areas simply as control areas, against which one can compare the fourth and ninth precinct target areas in the aftermath of the crackdowns there.

Outputs

A description of the intervention would be incomplete if it included only the number of raids, to the exclusion of enforcement outputs--arrests and confiscations--and their outcomes in the legal system. Table 3.3 shows that, in the fourth precinct target area, 106 raids produced a total of 97

Table 3.3
Raid Outputs During First Intervention Period

Totals*	Precinct Target Area	
	Fourth	Ninth
Arrests		
Total Arrests	97	118
Felony Arrests	56	60
Misdemeanor Arrests	41	58
Delivery Arrests	20	31
Confiscation Amounts		
Cocaine	124.9 gm	235.3 gm
Crack	105.6 gm	203.6 gm
Heroin	228.4 gm	125.3 gm

*Totals for Crackdown period 2/28/90 - 8/31/90

arrests, including 56 felony arrests, 20 of which were for the delivery (sale) of a controlled substance. In the ninth precinct target area, 95 raids produced a total of 118 arrests, including 60 felony arrests, 31 of which were for the delivery of a controlled substance. In addition, raids during the crackdowns resulted in the confiscation of 669 grams of either powdered or crack cocaine, and 353 grams of heroin. Thus the "average" raid during the crackdowns produced one arrest and one to three grams of cocaine or heroin. However, 50 raids (or 47 percent) in the fourth precinct target area, and 30 raids (32 percent) in the ninth precinct target area, produced no arrest at all; 68 raids (64 percent) in the fourth precinct target area, and 47 raids (49 percent) in the ninth precinct target area, produced no felony arrest. Only 54 percent of the raids resulted in the confiscation of any drugs.

Of the felony arrests, 69 percent were referred to court, 55 percent were charged with drug sales, and 14 percent were charged with drug possession (see Figure 3.6). Of those referred to court, 48 percent had one or more prior arrests (18 percent had three or more prior arrests), and 37 percent had one or more prior convictions; 33 percent had previously served time in prison; 29 percent had one or more felony drug arrests (see Table 3.4). Eighty-four percent of those referred to court were found guilty, and of those, 41 percent were sent to prison or jail; most (69 percent) of those who were charged with drug sales and who had a prior felony record were sent to prison. The legal outcomes of these arrests, moreover, are quite comparable to those made in these target areas after the crackdowns ended, and in the control areas during the entire study period. Thus it does not appear that the quality of arrests eroded with the effort to intensify enforcement.

FIGURE 3.6
Flow of Adult Arrests -Felony Drug Offenses*
4th & 9th Precincts 2/28/90 - 8/31/90



* Includes Drug Sales, Delivery, & Possession.
** All percentages are based on total number of arrests.

Table 3.4
Prior Records of Felony Drug Arrestees
Fourth and Ninth Precinct Target Areas
2/28/90 - 8/31/90

Prior Record	Court Referral	Charged with Drug Sale			Charged with Drug Possession		
		Charged	Guilty	Prison Sentence	Charged	Guilty	Prison Sentence
Total	(73)	79.5% (58)	68.5% (50)	27.4% (20)	20.5% (15)	15.1% (11)	2.7% (2)
# Prior Arrests							
0	52.1% (38)	35.6% (26)	31.5% (23)	2.7% (2)	16.4% (12)	12.3% (9)	2.7% (2)
1-2	30.1% (22)	27.4% (20)	23.3% (17)	16.4% (12)	2.7% (2)	2.7% (2)	0.0% (0)
3+	17.8% (13)	16.4% (12)	13.7% (10)	8.2% (6)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
# Felony Arrests							
0	54.8% (40)	37.0% (27)	32.9% (24)	2.7% (2)	17.7% (13)	13.7% (10)	2.7% (2)
1-2	32.9% (24)	31.5% (23)	26.0% (19)	19.2% (14)	1.4% (1)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)
3+	8.5% (9)	11.0% (8)	9.6% (7)	5.5% (4)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
# Felony Drug Arrests							
0	71.2% (52)	52.1% (38)	47.9% (35)	12.3% (9)	19.2% (14)	15.1% (11)	2.7% (2)
1-2	27.4% (20)	26.0% (19)	19.2% (14)	13.7% (10)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
3+	1.4% (1)	1.4% (1)	1.4% (1)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
# Felony Convictions							
0	63.0% (46)	45.2% (33)	38.3% (28)	5.5% (4)	17.8% (13)	13.7% (10)	2.7% (2)
1-2	30.1% (22)	27.4% (20)	24.7% (18)	17.8% (13)	2.7% (2)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)
3+	6.9% (5)	6.9% (5)	5.5% (4)	4.1% (3)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
# Felony Drug Convictions							
0	75.3% (55)	56.2% (41)	49.3% (36)	13.7% (10)	19.2% (14)	15.1% (11)	2.7% (2)
1-2	24.7% (18)	23.3% (17)	19.2% (14)	13.7% (10)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
3+	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
Prior Prison Sentence	32.9% (24)	31.5% (23)	28.8% (21)	21.9% (16)	1.4% (1)	1.4% (1)	0.0% (0)

Impediments to the Implementation of the Crackdowns

As we explained in Chapter 2, the crackdowns were to be implemented with no infusion of additional resources into the Narcotics Division. Principal responsibility for intensified enforcement in the targeted areas was given to the NEUs assigned to the precincts in which the target areas were located; SNEUs were also expected to concentrate more than the ordinary level of attention on the target areas, and NEUs assigned to other precincts were expected to supplement the efforts of the precinct NEUs. The crackdowns, then, represented an additional responsibility for each NEU for the period of the intervention. That this responsibility was only partially fulfilled by any unit, and not at all by some, can in hindsight be attributed to the other responsibilities with which the intervention competed, to resource cutbacks and other short-term shortages, and to the climate of day-to-day operations that prevailed in the Narcotics Division.

First, the target areas represented from less than one tenth to no more than roughly one sixth of the geographic area of any one precinct. Over the course of the first intervention period, citizen complaints (directed to the drug hotline) about locations within the target areas represented only 13 and 19 percent of the complaints about locations within the fourth and ninth precincts, respectively. In addition, of course, officers became aware of other suspected drug dealing locations through other sources of information. Thus even if a NEU had responsibility for only one precinct, its responsibilities other than the crackdown included the investigation of suspected drug trafficking in a large geographic area that generated a large volume of citizen complaints--excluding the target areas, 544 calls in the fourth precinct and 673 in the ninth precinct over the six-month period. Each NEU also was expected to participate in other enforcement operations--viz. one-day "blitzes" in other precincts, around selected schools, and in selected apartment buildings (a "vertical blitz")--and

occasionally to pick up the slack left by other NEUs whose officers were on furlough.

Second, the strains imposed by competing responsibilities were exacerbated by short- and long-term reductions in personnel in the Narcotics Division. The preparation for and initiation of military hostilities in the Middle East coincided with the intervention periods (especially with the second intervention period), and as a number of officers in the Narcotics Division were members of the reserves, their military obligations left the Narcotics Division short-handed. In addition, personnel strength in the Division was cut back over the course of the intervention periods, and these cutbacks reduced the number of NEUs and stretched those that remained even thinner.

Third, implementation of the crackdowns proved to be somewhat incompatible with the climate of day-to-day operations in the Narcotics Division. With the exceptions noted above, enforcement units appeared to exercise--and to be accustomed to exercising--autonomy in the selection of enforcement targets. The designation of target areas to which enforcement units were expected to devote disproportionate attention was an additional exception to the rule of autonomy in target selection, and moreover, it was an exception that held, in principle, each day that they worked; it would seem, then, to have represented a much more substantial infringement on the independence of a unit than, say, occasional participation in a one-day blitz.

Furthermore, the system of incentives conflicted with the implementation of the crackdowns. Each enforcement unit was expected to "produce," which in practice meant to conduct raids--one or two per shift.[2] Each unit had an additional incentive to conduct raids that resulted in arrests, inasmuch as officers received overtime payment for their appearances in court. In addition to these

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[2] The production standard changed at least twice during our study, from one raid to two and back to one.

extrinsic rewards for enforcement outputs, many officers found intrinsic rewards in a "good raid," which for them meant arrests (especially felony arrests) and the confiscation of a large amount of drugs. But insofar as the crackdowns succeeded in affecting retail drug markets--to which we turn in the next chapter--they would make it more difficult to complete the purchases of drugs necessary to obtain search warrants, more unlikely that (once obtained) the execution of a search warrant would result in either arrests (especially felony arrests) or the confiscation of large amounts of (or any) drugs, and more unlikely that drug transactions could be observed. The greater the impact of the crackdowns on the practices of drug dealers, the more difficult it would be for officers to reap the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards of enforcement. In other words, nothing failed like success.

We will offer recommendations in our concluding chapter, but it is, perhaps, appropriate at this juncture to speculate about how, given these circumstances, the intervention might have been better designed. In the absence of theoretical or practical guidance about the duration of "brief" crackdowns, the specification of a six-month time frame was based on collective intuition; it seemed sufficiently long that it could be expected to have an impact, but it was also far short of a continuing commitment of the sort that Operation Pressure Point in New York City was sometimes described. Once the planned duration was set at six months, the target areas were designed to be sufficiently large to justify enforcement efforts over that time span, but not so large that an impact could not be made. In retrospect, it appears that crackdowns of shorter duration, targeting areas of smaller geographic dimensions, would have been better implemented, achieved a higher level of intensity, and offered the potential for greater impacts.

Summary

Enforcement activity by the Narcotics Division increased substantially in both the fourth and ninth precinct target areas during the first intervention period. The increase in the fourth precinct target area was certainly "dramatic," as the number of raids more than doubled over the intervention period, and the increase was even more pronounced during the second and third months of the intervention period. The increase in the ninth precinct target area was certainly substantial, if not dramatic, and it too was especially pronounced during the first and second months of the period. Furthermore, these levels of intensity were sustained for sufficiently extended periods of time that drug dealers might be expected to recognize and respond to the enforcement pressure. Thus the interventions in the fourth and ninth precinct target areas afford an opportunity to examine the hypothesized impacts of crackdowns, to which we turn in Chapter 4. The implementation of those interventions also provides some lessons for future efforts, which we draw in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

CRACKDOWN IMPACTS

Based on the hypotheses specified in Chapter 1, we expected that the most proximate impact of the crackdowns would be on the drug market, as drug sellers perceived and adapted to the elevated risk of detection and arrest. We further expected that adaptations by the drug market would directly reduce the visibility of drug trafficking to residents, and indirectly reduce the level of predatory crime. As a result of all of these impacts, and perhaps also as a result of the visibility of police activity, we expected that the crackdowns would improve residents' subjective quality of life; more specifically, we expected that residents would report lower levels of the kind of social disorders or "incivilities" that are associated with drug markets (see Skogan, 1990), less fear of crime, and greater satisfaction with the neighborhood as a place to live. Finally, we expected that the crackdowns might affect residents' perceptions of and attitudes toward the police, either for the worse--insofar as residents might disapprove of intensified enforcement and any perceived abuses or excesses that it might entail--or for the better--insofar as residents might approve of more, and perhaps more effective, police attention to a problem of deep concern.

Impacts on the Drug Market

Our assessment of impacts on the drug market relies on two indirect measures of market activities and practices.[1] The first measure consists of the perceptions of narcotics officers. Fifty-

[1] A more direct measure of market practices would require "street ethnography" of drug dealers and users. Because it is labor-intensive and hence expensive, such an effort has been undertaken for only one previous evaluation of street-level drug enforcement (Sviridoff, et al., 1992).

three officers participated in semi-structured interviews; most of the NEU officers who were directly involved in the crackdowns were interviewed, as were many who played a more peripheral role. The former were asked whether they thought that "the concentration of enforcement activity in the target areas had any impact on the sale of drugs in the area," and if so what the nature and extent of the impact had been; the latter were asked whether they thought that such intensified enforcement can be effective, and what if any effects that this intervention had.

The second measure is based on the outputs of raids, namely arrests and confiscated drugs. Analyses of this indicator are based on the presumption that as drug dealers perceive and adapt to intensified enforcement, they adopt practices that make it less likely that drug raids will yield arrests (especially felony arrests) or drugs. Thus we examine the numbers and proportions of drug raids in which either: no arrests were made; no felony arrests were made; no delivery arrests were made; no drugs were confiscated; or neither arrests were made nor drugs confiscated (i.e., "dry holes"). We also examine the quantities of drugs that were confiscated.

Officers' Perceptions of Market Practices

Most officers reported that sellers altered their patterns of behavior in response to the crackdowns.[2] Forty-three officers (or 78 percent) described changes in sellers' methods of operation, which were implicitly or explicitly attributed to sellers' perceptions of enforcement activity.

[2] We sought to validate these reports of market practices against a form of data that is potentially more systematic: records of the dates and locations at which either informants or undercover officers unsuccessfully attempted to purchase illicit drugs. If drug sellers adapted to enforcement pressure in the expected ways, then the number of unsuccessful attempts, and/or the ratio of unsuccessful to successful attempts, would increase. Unfortunately, we discovered that the NEUs' activity logs did not consistently contain the level of detail necessary to enumerate the unsuccessful attempts. Some NEUs routinely provided detailed information of this kind, but some specified only blocks of time devoted to "getting warrants up" without listing individual contacts with suspected sellers.

Eighteen officers told us that sellers had become more cautious in making drug transactions, inasmuch as they asked more questions of undercover officers when they tried to purchase drugs. Fifteen of these officers indicated that sellers sold only to people they knew or to people who could name a known reference. As one undercover officer explained:

> They're more suspicious or more careful who they sold to. Like when you go, but they say well, who do you know? Have I seen you before? How did you know I was here? I think the dope man has become a little bit smarter ... there's a sense of him being extremely cautious as to who he sells to. You know, used to be anybody would sell to anybody. Now, who do you know? Who send you? I've come across that many a time.

Another undercover officer said

> I mean they will go clientele only, you know, or bring someone you know, that kind of thing. They'll ask who you know.

Other officers said:

> People would not sell to just anybody. And I think people were becoming wary of the police because they knew there were a lot of raids being performed in that area.

> The effect that I believe that it had was, we became very visible in that area. And what they began to do is, they began to get more selective [as to] who they would sell to. They would question you to the point that, if they didn't know you, they would assume that you were the police because of the concentration that they had received.

> That was the only thing bad, cause it was so tight, that they seen us so much that we couldn't try on a couple of buys at some of these places. And when we did they'd laugh at you and say, yeah, I know you the police.

Five of these same eighteen officers also mentioned that it became more difficult for informants to make purchases. For example:

> Sometimes our informants if they weren't known they wouldn't get the buy. Like I say they were selling basically to people that they knew .... It was very common to be questioned a lot more when you were buying drugs than in the past.

> It was hard to get a SOI [a source of information, or informant] buy in. Because no one wanted to sell. You, based on surveillance you can tell that they were, that there was narcotics trafficking going, but you really couldn't get a buy in .... We weren't getting any buys. They were very, very hinky as to who they were selling to.
>
> The toughest thing, it makes it tougher to purchase dope there. It's tougher for an SOI. It's tougher for an undercover officer to make a buy in an area when you're hitting it with saturation in that area.

One officer said that you had to act like a "crack head" and sell yourself:

> It was harder for the SOI to make buys over there. It was harder for me to make buys, too, because they were more shaky, more leery about, whereas a house that normally would sell to anybody became very suspicious of anybody they didn't know. So you had to go up there and talk your way into making the buy.

Another noted that dealers would

> ... put you through a ringer, smell your fingers, look at your nails, you know that kind of thing. Oh yeah, they definitely changed the routine procedures .... You know, he looks too clean, you know. Why don't you let him smoke some. See if he's not a cop.

Some sellers who were willing to sell to unrecognized buyers would immediately thereupon shut down temporarily or move to another location in anticipation of a forthcoming raid. As one officer explained:

> Well some of them will only sell to people that they know. And if they don't recognize you they will close down immediately. They will take the stuff and just leave.

And some officers cast sellers' caution in general terms:

> They were, and you hear it all the time, well this is a hot neighborhood. This is hot here. The police are all over the place. So it did make them have to work a little harder.
>
> ..... and say well, we better not, we better slow down here, or not do anything, cause a lot of times when we go up to buy they say, "No, its hot in this area today. So, we are not selling anything ....

> It keeps them off balance, it keeps them off guard. It keeps them unaware .... We're raiding every day. And they're starting to look at that and it's starting to make them a little nervous.

Some sellers limited the quantity of drugs at any one location at any one time, so that less would be lost in the event of a raid. But another implication of this practice was that the supply was more frequently exhausted, and would-be buyers would be told more frequently that the house was "down." As one officer observed:

> If you hit somebody real, real good over in that area, it gets tight. so the rocks get smaller.... they used to leave a lot of dope at the house. Now they're getting smaller packs so it's a lot of down time.

Sellers also reduced their vulnerability to enforcement in other ways. One was to fortify their houses to make entry more difficult:

> They secure the premises a lot better. I'm talking 2 by 6's all of them down the doors. And they lock people in now.

Another officer cited a wide range of tactics that sellers undertook: "We found that they had more lookouts, they hid their stuff better, barricaded the doors more, and they were a little bit more cautious to who they were selling to."

The duration of these effects was a subject of some disagreement among officers. Some officers thought that sellers made lasting alterations in their standard business practices, but other officers believed that the impact on drug trafficking was quite brief. For instance, one officer said,

> And it seems like there's always one person that's connected to the whole area and once he starts seeing that we're hitting all his places, then he'll kind of cool out himself. Until everything as they say, until we die down. And then they kick right back up.

Another said that patterns of drug transactions had been affected

> Only briefly. Only to the extent, only for the period of time that you are here. That's all. That's all.

While another officer said, "the drug men just waited till it died over".

Twenty-two officers (40 percent) believed that intensified enforcement had prompted sellers to move their operations, raising the long-standing issue of displacement. Three officers indicated specifically that sellers' perceptions of police activity was the impetus for them to relocate:

> After we had been over there so long, they wouldn't deal with just anybody.... Even started moving out of that little territory after being hit so many times.

> Yeah, it moved them around and got them out of there .... They're going to get the hint and get the hell out of there.

> you may not be stopping it, but you've got them on the move. You've got them. If you hit a particular area and the word gets out, they're going to move the dope. The dope man ain't stupid either. He's going to see what's happening and he's just going to move his little operation away.

Many officers, however, believed that sellers moved only a short distance--as short as a few blocks. For example:

> I think our experience, we find that they move a block or two, or within that area, basically. They don't move across the city or anything like that.

> ... it's going to have some effect, some positive effect. The dopers are going to go, but they're only going to go a couple of blocks.

> I mean a matter of blocks, you know. They'll go to the next place that hasn't been hit yet.

According to these officers, the nature of the crack business in Detroit prohibited sellers from moving more than a short distance from their previous locations. Some said that since there were a number of sellers operating in the target areas, it was unlikely that buyers would travel far to maintain a relationship with a specific seller; instead, they were likely to find another dealer. For

example one officer remarked that "they're going to move two or three blocks because he's got his users in that area." Another officer said that "they still have to keep their business going even though their location has to move. And they never really moved too far."

Several officers thought that sellers relocated just outside of the target area; for example:

> ... I think they just move the sales outside the target area. And it was evident to us really. We knew that there were sales just directly outside the target area.

Another officer, whose NEU was primarily responsible for a target area that included one of the more established and identifiable neighborhoods, agreed:

> If they start getting hit in one area, these dope dealers know what's going on. You know they start hearing Ravendale [a neighborhood in the ninth precinct target area] and everything else, they find out, they know what that area is. They'll just quit supplying that area. They'll move to the outlying areas and sell there.

Even so, of the officers who thought that dealing had been displaced, most agreed that this alone was a significant impact. One officer put it succinctly:

> Any time that you put heat on a certain area, you're going to be effective. Even if they shut down in one area and go to another, you've accomplished something. Even if nothing else, you're giving the word out that you cannot sell drugs in this area.

Thus officers inferred from their experiences, observations, and knowledge of the drug market, that sellers perceived the increase in enforcement activity and the risk of apprehension that it entailed, and that sellers adapted to the increased risk in a number of different ways. Officers' inferences could be erroneous, of course, although it is important to realize that officers were not reporting merely what they wanted to see. To the contrary, as we explained in Chapter 3 and as some of the comments above indicate, many officers did not find these developments gratifying, because it became more difficult for them to meet their day-to-day enforcement objectives: completing drug purchases, obtaining search warrants, conducting raids, making arrests, and

confiscating drugs.

Raid Outputs

Tables 4.1 through 4.4 show, for the respective target areas, the monthly numbers of raids and the numbers of raids in which no arrests were made, no felony arrests were made, no drugs were confiscated, and neither arrests made nor drugs confiscated (i.e., "dry holes"). Because in many months the number of raids was rather small, it may be difficult to detect a pattern in the monthly totals even if one exists, so these tables also include six-month totals for the period of the crackdowns and those immediately before and after the crackdowns. To the extent that drug sellers had become more cautious, we would expect that outputs in the target areas would diminish over time, as NEUs would be less likely to be able to make "pre-buys" (a drug purchase immediately prior to a raid, which provides evidence needed for a delivery arrest), less likely to make arrests, and less likely to find drugs at raided locations.

The data in Tables 4.1 through 4.4 provide some empirical support for this expectation. In the fourth precinct target area, the percentages of raids with no outputs of the various kinds increased substantially with the implementation of the crackdowns, and they remained at these higher levels for the following six-month period. In the control areas, an opposite pattern can be detected: the percentages of raids with no outputs decreased during and after the intervention period. In the ninth precinct target area, these outputs remained fairly stable during the crackdown period, and they declined thereafter. Thus these results provide more unambiguous evidence of a detectable impact on the street drug markets in the fourth precinct target area, where the crackdowns were more intense.

Table 4.1
Raid Outputs over Time: Fourth Precinct Target Area

Month/Year	# Raids						Amount of Drugs Seized*		
	Total	No Arrests	No Felony Arrests	No Drug Delivery Arrests*	No Drug Seizures	No Felony Arrests or Drug Seizures	Cocaine	Heroin	Marijuana
9/89	17	8	10		9	9			
10/89	11	2	6		3	3			
11/89	3	0	0		1	0			
12/89	4	1	3		1	1			
1/90	5	2	3		3	3			
2/90	7	0	2		1	1			
6 Month Totals**	47	13 (27.7%)	24 (51.1%)		18 (38.3%)	17 (36.2%)			
3/90	14	4	7	7	6	6	10.5	101.1	29.8
4/90	25	12	15	15	10	10	32.4	74.1	0.1
5/90	25	16	19	19	16	16	12.7	20.0	10.0
6/90	13	6	9	9	6	6	26.6	22.2	0.0
7/90	13	6	9	12	7	7	34.5	11.0	2.6
8/90	16	6	9	10	7	7	8.2	0.0	1.7
6 Month Totals**	106	50 (47.2%)	68 (64.2%)	72 (57.9%)	52 (49.1%)	52 (49.1%)	124.9	228.4	44.2
9/90	8	6	6	6	4	4	26.0	0.2	0.2
10/90	5	1	4	5	2	2	8.1	3.7	0.0
11/90	3	1	2	1	2	2	0.1	0.0	0 0
12/90	3	0	0	0	0	0	16.1	12.5	0.0
1/91	2	2	2	1	2	2	0.0	0.0	241.5
2/91	3	1	3	3	2	2	0.1	0.0	2.0
6 Month Totals**	24	11 (45.8%)	17 (70.8%)	16 (66.7%)	12 (50.0%)	12 (50.0%)	50.4	66.4	243.7

*Data not available on drug seizures or drug delivery arrests prior to 3/90.
**Parentheses indicate the percentage of total raids.

Table 4.2
Raid Outputs over Time: Ninth Precinct Target Area

Month/Year	# Raids						Amount of Drugs Seized*		
	Total	No Arrests	No Felony Arrests	No Drug Delivery Arrests*	No Drug Seizures	No Felony Arrests or Drug Seizures	Cocaine	Heroin	Marijuana
9/89	12	2	3		3	3			
10/89	10	5	6		4	4			
11/89	6	1	3		1	1			
12/89	10	4	5		4	4			
1/90	21	5	11		11	9			
2/90	8	4	7		2	2			
6 Month Totals**	67	21 (31.3%)	35 (52.2%)		25 (37.3%)	23 (34.3%)			
3/90	20	3	6	6	3	3	101.9	86.0	3.3
4/90	33	10	16	22	16	14	55.7	35.2	28.1
5/90	8	6	7	7	6	6	0.1	0.1	2.1
6/90	8	0	3	4	2	2	29.2	4.0	0.0
7/90	13	5	6	7	4	4	13.7	0.0	0.5
8/90	13	6	9	9	10	8	34.7	0.0	47.8
6 Month Totals**	95	30 (31.6%)	47 (49.5%)	55 (57.9%)	41 (43.2%)	37 (38.9%)	235.3	125.3	81.8
9/90	14	5	6	8	5	5	26.6	1.7	0.1
10/90	11	5	7	7	6	6	22.4	0.0	20.9
11/90	4	2	2	3	1	1	2.2	0.0	0.0
12/90	4	4	4	3	3	3	0.3	0.0	8.0
1/91	11	1	5	7	4	4	23.3	0.0	7.5
2/91	13	8	9	9	9	9	13.8	0.0	0.4
6 Month Totals**	57	25 (43.9%)	33 (57.9%)	37 (64.9%)	28 (49.1%)	28 (49.1%)	65.6	1.7	37.4

*Data not available on drug seizures or drug delivery arrests prior to 3/90.
**Parentheses indicate the percentage of total raids.

Table 4.3
Raid Outputs over Time: Sixth/Eighth Precinct Target Area

Month/Year	# Raids						Amount of Drugs Seized*		
	Total	No Arrests	No Felony Arrests	No Drug Delivery Arrests*	No Drug Seizures	No Felony Arrests or Drug Seizures	Cocaine	Heroin	Marijuana
9/89	12	8	10		10	9			
10/89	8	5	6		4	3			
11/89	6	5	6		4	4			
12/89	3	3	3		2	2			
1/90	10	7	8		6	6			
2/90	5	0	2		2	2			
6 Month Totals**	44	28 (63.6%)	35 (79.5%)		28 (63.6%)	26 (59.1%)			
3/90	2	1	1	2	1	1	8.8	0.0	6.6
4/90	7	3	4	4	3	2	9.6	0.5	962.5
5/90	4	1	2	3	0	0	20.4	0.0	18.2
6/90	11	3	7	8	7	6	3.1	3.9	9.3
7/90	5	0	2	2	0	0	12.0	9.3	0.0
8/90	2	0	0	0	0	0	18.0	0.0	0.0
6 Month Totals**	31	8 (25.8%)	16 (51.6%)	19 (61.3%)	11 (35.5%)	9 (29.0%)	71.9	13.7	996.6
9/90	6	2	2	3	2	2	2541.0	44.6	0.0
10/90	10	1	3	4	4	3	41.7	0.0	1153.2
11/90	7	1	1	2	2	1	34.8	41.0	113.1
12/90	3	1	2	2	1	1	1.5	0.0	1.1
1/91	7	4	5	5	5	5	7.8	0.0	5.0
2/91	8	5	6	6	4	4	15.2	0.0	0.0
6 Month Totals**	41	14 (34.1%)	19 (46.3%)	22 (53.7%)	18 (43.9%)	17 (41.5%)	2,642.0	85.6	1,272.4

*Data not available on drug seizures or drug delivery arrests prior to 3/90.
**Parentheses indicate the percentage of total raids.

Table 4.4
Raid Outputs over Time: Eleventh Precinct Target Area

Month/Year	# Raids						Amount of Drugs Seized*		
	Total	No Arrests	No Felony Arrests	No Drug Delivery Arrests*	No Drug Seizures	No Felony Arrests or Drug Seizures	Cocaine	Heroin	Marijuana
9/89	19	11	15		13	12			
10/89	14	5	5		5	5			
11/89	21	9	15		12	10			
12/89	14	3	5		4	4			
1/90	14	3	7		5	4			
2/90	10	0	1		0	0			
6 Month Totals**	92	31 (33.7%)	48 (52.2%)		39 (42.4%)	35 (38.0%)			
3/90	15	1	4	5	3	3	70.9	0.0	93.2
4/90	9	0	3	5	3	2	6.0	10.5	50.0
5/90	11	5	5	7	6	5	27.1	37.1	50.0
6/90	14	5	8	8	6	6	16.3	8.0	3.0
7/90	12	4	7	7	6	6	16.0	0.0	0.0
8/90	7	3	3	4	2	2	26.2	10.0	0.0
6 Month Totals**	68	18 (26.5%)	30 (44.1%)	36 (52.9%)	26 (38.2%)	24 (35.3%)	161.5	65.6	196.2
9/90	8	1	4	4	3	3	29.0	0.0	2323.0
10/90	17	1	2	10	10	2	83.0	0.0	36.9
11/90	6	0	1	1	0	0	13.0	0.0	3.0
12/90	6	1	2	3	1	1	5.5	0.0	0.0
1/91	9	3	4	4	3	3	12.4	0.0	40.0
2/91	4	1	2	2	1	1	5.8	0.0	0.0
6 Month Totals**	50	7 (14.0%)	15 (30.0%)	24 (48.0%)	18 (36.0%)	10 (20.0%)	128.7	0.0	2,402.9

*Data not available on drug seizures or drug delivery arrests prior to 3/90.
**Parentheses indicate the percentage of total raids.

Impact on the Visibility of the Drug Market

One might expect that some of the precautions that drug dealers reportedly took might make the drug markets less visible to the residents of the target areas. We analyze two indicators of market visibility to test this expectation. The first is based on calls to the DPD drug hotline that concerned addresses or intersections within the target areas; monthly totals of calls in each area are examined for changes over time. The second indicator is based on survey respondents' answers to questions about drug sales and use in their neighborhoods.

Hotline Calls

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show in graphic form the monthly totals of hotline calls in the treatment areas and the control areas, respectively. It is clear that the numbers of calls during and after the intervention period are smaller than those prior to the intervention, but it is also fairly clear that the decrease is probably not attributable to the crackdowns. It appears that the crackdowns commenced near a point in time when the number of hotline calls was stabilizing after a period of rather rapid decrease; moreover, this pattern is the same in the control areas as it is in the treatment areas.

An interrupted time series analysis of these data (see Table 4.5) confirms the impression left by a visual inspection of the time series. The intervention period is associated with no changes in the numbers of hotline calls that achieve a conventional (.05) level of statistical significance. There is, then, no evidence in the hotline data that the crackdowns reduced the visibility of the drug markets to residents.

Figure 4.1

Hotline Calls in Target Sectors Fourth & Ninth Precincts



Intervention Period: 3/90 - 9/90

Figure 4.2

Hotline Calls in Target Sectors Sixth/Eighth & Eleventh Precincts



Table 4.5
Time Series Analysis of Intervention Impact on Hotline Calls

	Coefficient	Estimate	Standard Error	t
Treatment Areas				
Precinct 4	α	11.25	3.74	3.01*
	ω	-1.42	3.59	-0.40
	ϕ	0.82	0.10	8.50*
Precinct 9	α	20.11	4.56	4.40*
	ω	10.75	6.38	1.69
	ϕ	0.71	0.12	6.06*
Control Areas				
Precinct 6-8	α	21.40	5.62	3.81*
	ω	-5.61	5.91	-0.95
	ϕ	0.80	0.11	7.55*
Precinct 11	α	24.70	9.41	2.63*
	ω	4.71	7.11	0.66
	ϕ	0.86	0.08	10.56*

α = constant term
ω = intervention effect
ϕ = autoregressive component
* $p < .05$

The intervention period for study areas in precincts 4 and 6-8 includes April through August 1990 (inclusive); the intervention period for study areas in precincts 9 and 11 includes March through August 1990 (inclusive).

Survey Responses

Survey respondents were asked eight items about their perceptions of drug sales and use in their neighborhoods. These items are:

> (Q 20) Now I am going to read a list of things that you may think are problems in the area right around your home, that is within 2 or 3 blocks. After I read each one, please tell me whether you think that it is a big problem, some problem, or no problem at all. ... People selling drugs in the neighborhood. (1=big problem; 2=some problem; 3=no problem.)
>
> (Q 37) Recently, drugs and neighborhoods have received a lot of attention. I'd like to know how often you think drugs are being sold in your neighborhood, that is, in the 2 or 3 blocks around your home. Do you think drugs are being sold very often, fairly often, or not very often? (1=very often; 2=fairly often; 3=not very often.)

(Q 38) How often do you think drugs are being used in the neighborhood? Do you think it is very often, fairly often, or not very often? (1=very often; 2=fairly often; 3=not very often.)

(Q 39) In the past month, have you seen or heard about drugs being sold or used out on the street in the 2 to 3 blocks right around your home? (1=yes; 2=no.)

(Q 42) How easy do you think it is for people who want them [drugs] to buy them in the area right around your home? Do you think it is very easy for them, fairly easy for them, or not very easy for them? (1=very easy; 2=fairly easy; 3=not very easy.)

(Q 43) How easily do you think drugs can be bought out on the street in the area around your home? Would you say that it is very easy, fairly easy, or not very easy? (1=very easy; 2=fairly easy; 3=not very easy.)

(Q 44) How easy would it be for someone to find an apartment or house where drugs could be bought in the area around your home? Would you say that this would be very easy, fairly easy, or not very easy? (1=very easy; 2=fairly easy; 3=not very easy.)

(Q 47) Do you know if there has been a crack house in the 2 to 3 block area right around your home during the last 6 months? (1=yes; 2=no.)

Responses to these questions are related to one another fairly strongly, which suggests that they all tap a single, underlying perceptual dimension, namely the perceived severity of the drug problem in the area immediately surrounding each respondent's home. Confirmatory factor analysis yields one factor on which all of these items have substantial loadings.[3]

Table 4.6 shows the percentages of respondents whose answers to these questions indicate that they saw the drug problem as a severe one in their neighborhood, at each of the three waves of the survey: wave 1, prior to the crackdowns; wave 2, immediately after the crackdown period; and

[3] Analysis of responses to the first wave of the survey produced one significant factor, with an eigenvalue of 5.09; the remaining factors all had eigenvalues under 0.70. Factor loadings were generally around 0.80, ranging from 0.71 (for Q 39) to 0.85 (for Q 37). The results for the second and third waves were nearly identical to those for the first wave.

wave 3, about seven to eight months after the crackdowns. The table also includes one additional item, about any perceived change in drug selling, asked only on waves 2 and 3. The pattern of responses is quite consistent across items. After the crackdowns, smaller percentages of respondents indicated, for example, that drug selling was a "big problem" in the neighborhood, that drugs were sold or used frequently, that it was "very easy" to buy drugs, and that they knew of a crack house that had operated in the neighborhood during the previous six months. For some items the percentages declined still further at wave 3, while others show a small rebound. But the improvements that these decreases presumably reflect cannot be attributed to the crackdowns, as they can be seen in the control areas as well as in the treatment areas. Analyses of variance confirm that the crackdowns had no effect on residents' perceptions.[4]

One might hypothesize that any impacts that the crackdowns might have on the visibility of the drug market would be concentrated, or at least more pronounced, in those blocks on which enforcement activity was conducted. However, when the analysis is restricted to those respondents drawn from blocks on which one or more raids were conducted during the intervention period, the results are very much the same.

---

[4] Analyses of only panel respondents yield similar results.

Table 4.6
Residents' Perceptions of Neighborhood Drug Problems by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventh		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Selling drugs is a big problem:												
Big problem	47.5	36.9	46.6	37.4	33.3	30.7	54.1	45.1	37.1	52.6	40.1	41.3
Frequency of drug selling in neighborhood:												
Very often	68.1	53.8	58.7	52.1	44.8	42.2	64.5	48.8	50.7	59.1	56.9	52.5
Frequency of drug use in neighborhood:												
Very often	65.9	59.8	59.1	50.4	48.5	47.6	64.5	52.9	50.0	55.9	47.1	52.5
Seen/heard about drug selling/use:												
Yes	51.9	51.7	52.4	41.3	45.2	42.0	49.7	46.0	46.9	47.3	48.7	45.7
Ease in buying drugs:												
Very easy	67.7	61.5	60.6	64.4	55.6	51.9	73.9	56.4	57.0	67.5	60.6	58.6
Ease in buying drugs on the street:												
Very easy	58.8	44.4	51.6	50.0	38.9	39.9	60.4	45.0	42.0	50.7	45.2	37.8
Ease in buying drugs in a apt/house:												
Very easy	52.1	39.8	43.0	41.5	43.5	37.8	55.0	42.7	48.6	44.5	46.3	39.8
Knowledge of a crackhouse within the neighborhood in the last six months:												
Yes	61.1	47.5	45.3	47.6	52.4	41.6	60.2	56.1	56.9	65.9	54.0	57.0
Noticed a change in drug selling in last six months:												
Much/Somewhat Better	--	41.7	35.4	--	40.3	44.7	--	25.0	34.3	--	38.8	39.5

Numbers represent percent of respondents choosing this category.

Impact on Predatory Crime

The adaptations of drug sellers to intensified enforcement would presumably make it more difficult for buyers to find sellers and less likely that, once found, sellers would have drugs that they would willingly sell. One might thus expect that the volume of drug transactions made in the target areas would decline, and with it the volume of drugs consumed. We have no measures of either drug transactions or drug consumption. However, to the extent that drug transactions were more difficult to initiate and complete, the drug markets in these neighborhoods might attract fewer buyers, and with fewer buyers, the numbers of crimes committed by (and against) buyers might decline. Moreover, since offending by drug users rises and falls with their drug consumption, one might also expect that the buyers who remain would commit fewer crimes. We therefore examine monthly totals of four categories of predatory crime--breaking and entering, larceny, grand larceny, and robbery--as they were reported to and recorded by the DPD from January, 1986 through March, 1994.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 display for each target area the time series of an index formed by summing these four types of crime; Table 4.7 presents the results of an interrupted time-series analysis of the same index. Neither a casual visual inspection of the time series nor a more rigorous analysis based on an ARIMA model indicates that the intervention period is associated with a change in the level of predatory crime. This is a fairly conservative test of the impact hypothesis, because we do not try to distinguish, say, "drug-related" robberies from other robberies or drug-related larcenies from other larcenies, and hence any decreases in crimes committed by or against drug users could be partially or completely obscured by stable or increasing numbers of other offenses in the same category. But there is no evidence of even a slight decrease in the levels of these crimes.

Figure 4.3

Drug Related Crimes in Target Areas Fourth & Ninth Precincts



Crackdown period: 3/90 - 9/90
Drug related crimes include Breaking & Entering, Larceny, Grand Larceny, and Robbery

Figure 4.4

Drug Related Crimes in Target Areas Sixth/Eighth & Eleventh Precincts



Drug related crimes include Breaking & Entering, Larceny, Grand Larceny, and Robbery

Table 4.7
Time Series Analysis of Intervention Impact on Drug-Related Crime

	Coefficient	Estimate	Standard Error	t
Treatment Areas				
Precinct 4	α	-.18	.70	-.26
	ω	-.87	3.32	-.26
	ϕ_1	-.68	0.10	-6.84*
	ϕ_2	-.26	0.10	-2.64*
Precinct 9	α	-.75	1.81	-.42
	ω	-.41	7.55	-.05
	ϕ	-.42	0.09	-4.47*
Control Areas				
Precinct 6-8	α	-.76	1.15	-.66
	ω	1.37	5.34	.26
	ϕ	-.51	0.09	-5.83*
Precinct 11	α	-.89	1.62	-.55
	ω	-.12	6.74	-.02
	ϕ	-.29	0.10	-2.87*

α = constant term
ω = intervention effect
ϕ = autoregressive component
* $p < .05$

Crimes include breaking and entering, larceny, grand larceny, and robbery. The intervention period for study areas in precincts 4 and 6-8 includes April through August 1990 (inclusive); the intervention period for study areas in precincts 9 and 11 includes March through August 1990 (inclusive). Each series has been first differenced.

Impact on Residents' Quality of Life

We hypothesized that the crackdowns would improve residents' subjective quality of life--that is, that residents would be less bothered by social disorders, less fearful of crime, and more satisfied with their neighborhoods as places to live. Such changes might stem from one or more of the preceding hypothesized impacts, although the foregoing analyses leave little reason to expect such indirect impacts. Such changes might also stem from the presumably reassuring visibility of police activity in targeted areas. Thus we examine, first, an indicator of police visibility, and then

indicators of subjective quality of life, all of which are based on survey responses.

Police Visibility

Respondents were asked several items in terms of which we can gauge the visibility of the crackdowns to residents. At each wave of the survey, respondents were asked whether they had seen a drug raid during the month preceding the interview, and whether they had seen a drug arrest during the month preceding the interview. At the second and third waves of the survey, respondents were asked whether they thought that drug houses had been raided more frequently, as frequently, or less frequently over the previous six months, and whether they thought that drug offenders were more likely, as likely, or less likely to be arrested compared with six months earlier. Respondents' answers to these items are reported in Table 4.8.

It appears that drug enforcement is not very visible to residents, and that even when drug enforcement is more intensive it is still not very visible to residents (even if the greater intensity is detectable to drug dealers); either individual residents are unlikely to observe drug enforcement activity, or they do not recognize it for what it is. In any case, only a small fraction of the respondents in any area reported having seen a drug raid in the month prior to the interview, and even smaller fractions reported having seen a drug arrest. More than a third of the residents in each area reported not having seen a raid in the prior six months. Small proportions of residents thought that drug raids had become more frequent, although larger proportions--one fifth to one third--believed that the likelihood of being arrested had increased. Moreover, the proportions of respondents who had seen drug raids or drug arrests, or who believed that either raids had become more frequent or arrests more likely, bear no relationship to the intervention, as these proportions

Table 4.8
Residents' Perceptions of Enforcement Activity by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventh		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Seen raid in last month												
Yes	14%	16%	11%	9%	19%	12%	8%	14%	13%	13%	11%	14%
Seen drug arrest in last month												
Yes	14%	16%	11%	14%	10%	5%	9%	8%	6%	4%	6%	13%
Frequency of raiding drug houses in last six months*												
More frequently	--	12%	5%	--	14%	5%	--	11%	7%	--	10%	10%
As frequent	--	13%	9%	--	17%	12%	--	11%	17%	--	14%	18%
Less frequently	--	37%	47%	--	35%	44%	--	37%	39%	--	40%	33%
Have never seen	--	37%	38%	--	35%	39%	--	41%	37%	--	36%	39%
Change in likelihood of being arrested*												
More likely	--	21%	26%	--	32%	33%	--	27%	30%	--	30%	28%
No change	--	58%	54%	--	54%	46%	--	54%	52%	--	51%	56%
Less likely	--	21%	19%	--	14%	21%	--	19%	18%	--	19%	16%

*Percentages are column percents and may not equal 100% due to rounding.

are no higher in the treatment areas than they are in the control areas. Further, respondents who lived on blocks on which police had executed raids during the intervention were no more likely than other respondents to report having seen a drug raid or drug arrests. There is, then, no evidence that the crackdowns were visible to residents of the targeted areas.

Social Disorder

Research on quality of life issues in American urban neighborhoods has shown that it is strongly affected not only by serious crime but also by disorder, including physical disorder--

vandalism, dilapidation, and litter--and social disorders, or "incivilities"--public drinking, "corner gangs," and street harassment (Skogan, 1990). We asked survey respondents about a number of these conditions, especially social disorders, with respect to each of which they indicated whether for them the condition represented a big problem, some problem, or no problem at all. These conditions, along with the proportions of respondents who deemed them either a big problem or some problem at each of the three waves of the survey, are shown in Table 4.9. Confirmatory factor analyses show that these items tap a single underlying perceptual dimension among the survey respondents: at wave 1, these items all load on a single factor, with loadings that range from .61 to .80, and very similar results are obtained from parallel analyses of wave 2 and wave 3 survey data.

It appears that, in residents' eyes, most conditions either grew marginally worse over time or remained about the same. One would credit the crackdowns with a beneficial impact if the deterioration in these conditions was smaller in magnitude in the treatment areas than it was in the control areas, but the pattern is much the same in all of the areas. Analyses of variance confirm that the crackdowns had no effect on residents' assessments of these problems.[6] Nor did we find an effect among respondents drawn from blocks on which raids had been conducted during the intervention period.

[6] Analyses of only panel respondents yield similar results.

Table 4.9
Residents' Perceptions of Neighborhood Social Disorder by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventh		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Problems with kids on the street:												
Big/Some problem	53.6	61.0	58.6	45.7	51.2	52.1	57.1	57.0	55.4	56.8	60.5	60.1
Problems with litter:												
Big/Some problem	60.5	65.6	71.1	54.9	60.6	56.8	66.9	71.0	76.7	65.1	62.1	69.8
Problems with alcohol use:												
Big/Some problem	48.2	55.5	53.9	37.1	39.6	37.5	39.8	46.6	47.6	45.8	48.0	48.9
Problems with people loitering:												
Big/Some problem	53.9	53.5	60.2	39.9	46.2	44.3	49.0	50.3	52.1	58.6	52.0	59.0
Problems with prostitution:												
Big/Some problem	27.2	25.9	29.4	30.2	29.6	30.3	43.4	36.8	37.3	29.9	24.3	31.0
Problems with traffic:												
Big/Some problem	39.5	40.3	37.5	36.9	49.7	47.9	51.3	47.8	52.1	47.1	44.4	45.3
Problems with loud parties:												
Big/Some problem	15.8	20.4	18.1	19.3	28.3	29.8	27.9	30.0	33.6	24.5	24.2	23.7

Numbers represent percent of respondents choosing this category.

Fear of Crime

We asked survey respondents a number of questions about fear of crime. Several items inquired about the degree to which respondents worried about each of several different types of victimization: breaking and entering, assault, robbery, harassment by drug users, and retaliation by drug dealers for reporting drug activity to the police. Confirmatory factor analyses show that these items all tap a single dimension of fear of and worry about victimization: at wave 1 these items all

load on one factor, with loadings that range from .66 to .87. Respondents were also asked how safe (or unsafe) they felt alone at night in their neighborhoods, and (for waves 2 and 3) whether they felt more or less safe than they had six months before.

The percentages of respondents whose responses reflected a fear of crime, at each of the three waves of the survey, are shown in Table 4.10. These results reveal only small fluctuations in fear

Table 4.10
Residents' Fear of Crime by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventh		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Worried about breaking and entering:												
Very worried	37.4	23.5	19.2	34.0	23.9	26.3	35.3	33.3	34.2	34.4	22.7	30.4
Worried about being attacked:												
Very worried	26.1	33.3	34.7	14.4	15.0	17.5	21.7	22.6	22.6	26.7	19.0	15.9
Worried about being robbed:												
Very worried	25.4	22.2	25.2	20.1	21.9	20.0	29.9	23.2	28.1	27.5	19.5	22.6
Worried about harassment from drug users:												
Very worried	18.4	10.2	12.9	11.3	13.1	11.4	19.2	15.9	16.4	12.8	16.3	17.6
Worried about retaliation for reporting drug users:												
Very worried	24.8	21.1	27.7	17.8	18.1	23.6	28.5	23.2	27.3	24.6	20.7	21.0
Felt safe alone at night in neighborhood:												
Very Unsafe	39.4	25.2	30.1	29.4	31.1	25.8	40.8	30.2	26.3	34.9	30.4	25.4
Felt safe alone at night compared to six months ago:												
Less Safe	--	30.6	26.4	--	27.7	27.7	--	27.6	23.7	--	26.3	36.5

Numbers represent percent of respondents choosing this category.

over time that follow no consistent pattern--some increases here, some decreases there. Moreover, the results for the treatment areas are not apparently different from those for the control areas. Analyses of variance confirm that the crackdowns had no effect on residents' fear of crime.[6] Nor did we find an effect among respondents drawn from blocks on which raids had been conducted during the intervention period.

Satisfaction with the Neighborhood

We asked survey respondents several questions about the communal nature of their neighborhoods and their satisfaction with living in their neighborhoods. In particular, we asked them:

> (Q 4) On the whole, how do you feel about this neighborhood as a place to live? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (4=very satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 2=somewhat dissatisfied, 1=very dissatisfied)
>
> (Q 5) In general, in the past six months, that is since [date], would you say this neighborhood has become a better place to live, become a worse place to live, or stayed about the same? (3=better place to live, 1=worse place to live, 2=stayed about the same)
>
> (Q 8) All things considered, what do you think this neighborhood will be like a year from now? Will it be a better place to live, a worse place to live, or do you think it will stay about the same? (3=better place to live, 1=worse place to live, 2=stay about the same)
>
> (Q 10) In some neighborhoods people do things together and help each other. In other neighborhoods people mostly go their own way. I'd like to know which kind of neighborhood you think this is. In general, is it mostly one where people help each other or one where people go their own way? (2=help each other, 1=go their own way)

---

[6] Analyses of only panel respondents yield similar results.

(Q 41) How likely is it that your neighbors would call the police to report suspicious activity? Do you think it is very likely, likely, unlikely, or very unlikely? (4=very likely, 3=likely, 2=unlikely, 1=very unlikely)

(Q 42) How likely is it that your neighbors would call the police to report drug-related activity? Do you think it is very likely, likely, unlikely, or very unlikely? (4=very likely, 3=likely, 2=unlikely, 1=very unlikely)

Factor analysis suggests that these items tap two distinguishable attitudinal dimensions among respondents. One has to do with respondents' overall satisfaction with the neighborhood and with the perceived direction of changing conditions, on which items 4, 5, and 8 above load. Another has to do with the perceived willingness of respondents' neighbors to call the police regarding either suspicious circumstances or drug activity, on which items 41 and 42 load. Item 10, which presumably reflects respondents' judgments about the strength of neighborhood ties, loads moderately on both of these factors.

The percentages of respondents whose responses reflected favorable assessments or perceptions of their neighborhoods, at each of the three waves of the survey, are shown in Table 4.11. These results reveal that the ninth precinct target area made some gains over the period of the study, but such improvements were not replicated in either the fourth precinct area or the control areas, and our interviews with community knowledgeables give us reason to believe that indigenous efforts at community organization and change in the ninth precinct, rather than the crackdowns, account for these patterns. We infer that the crackdowns had no impact on residents' satisfaction with their neighborhoods. Nor did we find an effect among respondents drawn from blocks on which raids had been conducted during the intervention period.

Table 4.11
Residents' Satisfaction with the Neighborhood by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventr		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Satisfaction with Neighborhood:												
Very/Somewhat satisfied	54.0	60.5	60.0	51.8	55.0	65.7	44.3	52.2	54.1	53.0	53.9	54.7
Satisfactory change in past six months:												
Better	6.2	10.9	9.5	7.5	18.2	14.6	8.5	5.1	9.6	3.7	7.1	10.9
Community prognosis for next six months:												
Better	13.0	12.1	8.9	9.8	21.6	13.4	4.0	5.3	7.7	14.7	16.5	12.7
Mutual help among neighbors:												
Help each other	48.6	55.7	57.3	42.9	49.7	52.4	38.5	40.3	40.3	49.0	49.3	46.4
Likelihood of neighbors to report suspicious activities:												
Very likely	56.0	44.2	42.2	53.3	53.2	60.4	52.3	46.7	46.2	50.3	49.3	51.8
Likelihood of neighbors to report drug related activities:												
Very likely	54.5	41.0	43.3	49.0	56.8	56.4	49.3	57.1	54.2	46.4	50.3	47.4

Numbers represent percent of respondents choosing this category.

Attitudes toward the Police

We asked respondents several questions about their perceptions and assessments of the police in their neighborhoods.

> (Q 32) Now I am going to read a list of things that you may think are problems in the area right around your home, that is within 2 or 3 blocks. ... Police stopping people on the street without good reason. Is this a big problem, some problem, or no problem? (1=big problem, 2=some problem, 3=no problem)

(Q 68) In general, how satisfied are you with the police? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (4=very satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 2=somewhat dissatisfied, 1=very dissatisfied)

(Q 69) How good a job are the police doing in working to solve the problems that worry people in your neighborhood? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job? (4=very good job, 3=good job, 2=fair job, 1=poor job)

(Q 70) How good a job are the police doing to keep order on the streets and sidewalks in this neighborhood? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job? (4=very good job, 3=good job, 2=fair job, 1=poor job)

(Q 71) How good a job are the police doing in controlling the street sale and use of illegal drugs in your neighborhood? Would you say they are doing a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job? (4=very good job, 3=good job, 2=fair job, 1=poor job)

Factor analyses show that the latter four items are strongly interrelated and all tap a single attitudinal dimension, and that Q 32, on which there is little variation, shares little in common with the other items. Few respondents believed that police stopping people was a problem. Otherwise, respondents tended on each wave to offer uniformly favorable, or uniformly unfavorable, evaluations of the police.

As Table 4.12 shows, respondents' answers to these questions provides no evidence that the crackdowns had any effect--positive or negative--on their perceptions or evaluations of police. Differences across waves of the survey are fairly small, and they bear no systematic relationship to the intervention. We may conclude that the crackdowns had no impact on residents' attitudes toward the police.

Table 4.12
Residents' Perceptions of the Police by Wave

	Precinct Target Area											
	Fourth			Ninth			Sixth/Eighth			Eleventh		
	Wave			Wave			Wave			Wave		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Police stopping people:												
Big problem	10.5	1.8	4.2	6.2	5.3	4.2	10.0	7.0	3.5	5.0	3.5	4.6
Satisfaction with police in neighborhood:												
Very/Somewhat satisfied	57.4	53.9	48.1	64.8	65.0	64.3	52.8	60.1	63.7	58.3	58.4	61.9
Ability of police to solve worrisome problems:												
Very good/good	38.3	38.1	33.6	39.6	37.6	40.4	31.7	27.0	31.7	47.4	30.8	35.6
Ability of police to maintain order:												
Very good/good	46.1	46.7	43.3	50.7	44.8	47.6	40.6	35.6	44.1	42.7	41.5	42.1
Ability of police to control drug problems:												
Very good/good	41.9	41.2	41.3	43.1	37.5	46.2	31.0	25.0	38.7	43.5	38.7	38.6

Numbers represent percent of respondents choosing this category.

Summary

The results of these analyses indicate that while the crackdowns in the fourth and ninth precinct target areas had a detectable impact on the drug market, this impact did not produce the expected ripple effects on levels of predatory crime, on the visibility of drug trafficking to residents, or on residents' subjective quality of life more generally. Thus the expectations for the crackdowns were no more than partially fulfilled. This pattern of findings begs the obvious question: why?

Two equally obvious answers are methodological in nature. The first holds that the crackdowns had, in fact, no effects, and further that the principal indicator of drug market activity--

officers' reports about drug dealers' changing practices--rests on impressions rather than hard, systematic information, and further that these impressions are marked by a *Hawthorne effect*--officers saw what they expected to see (even if it was not what they wanted to see) when researchers directed their attention to intensified drug enforcement. This is an argument that cannot be lightly dismissed, although we believe that the findings based on our interviews with the officers are valid. These findings are corroborated by the analysis of raid outcomes. Furthermore, the Vera Institute's evaluation of intensified drug enforcement by New York City's Tactical Narcotics Teams (Sviridoff, et al., 1992), into which street ethnography of drug markets was incorporated, uncovered a very similar pattern of impacts: market adaptations in the face of (but only for the duration of) intensified enforcement, but no effects on predatory crime or on residents' subjective quality of life. Thus our findings based on the officer interviews are consistent with those based on an alternative indicator, and they are consistent with those generated by another evaluative study using a superior method to examine drug market practices.

A second methodological answer to this question holds that our measures of drug-related predatory crime and of quality of life are not sufficiently sensitive to detect the impacts of the crackdowns. Even a significant reduction in the volume of drug transactions in the target areas would not *eliminate* predatory behavior by and against the participants in the drug trade, and their offenses, moreover, represent only a fraction--even if it is a substantial fraction--of all predatory crime. Thus, according to this line of argument, our measure of drug-related crime contains too much noise for us to detect the impact thereon of the crackdowns. Furthermore, our survey-based measures of residents' quality of life not only are subject to sampling and nonsampling errors but also capture residents' perceptions and judgments in a handful of crude categories that may not

suffice to discriminate perceived improvement from perceived stability in neighborhood conditions. This answer is, we think, more credible than the first, and we can hardly dispute that these indicators--like those used in other evaluations of drug enforcement efforts--are flawed. But we also believe that there is a third, substantive answer that is still more plausible than this one.

The flaws in all of these indicators notwithstanding, another interpretation of the pattern of results based on these indicators is that the scale of these drug markets was too great, and the clientele of these markets too regular, that market adaptations would, in turn, produce appreciable reductions in either the size of the user population or the volume of drugs consumed, or produce demonstrable improvements in neighborhood conditions. While the target areas were not the sites of the most thriving and entrenched drug markets in Detroit, they were home to numerous crack houses and, to a lesser degree, street-corner sales locations. Moreover, the markets in none of these areas were known to cater to a predominately non-local clientele. Only one of the areas, according to some police officers, attracted much interest by customers from outside the city; based on our observations, many of the buyers traveled to these locations by foot rather than car. It is possible that many of the buyers were known or at least recognized by the sellers, and if that is true, then the precautions that dealers reportedly began to take would perhaps have had only a small effect on the volume of drugs that they could sell. In this context, the impacts on the markets that could be achieved, particularly by crackdowns of the fairly modest intensity that were implemented for this evaluation, might be far too small to translate into improvements in either the rate of predatory crime or the quality of life. The implication is that if the crackdowns were to have impacts of real meaning to the residents of these areas, they would at a minimum have to achieve a level of intensity more nearly commensurate with the scale of the drug markets. Even then, we might add, our expectations

for the magnitude of impacts should not be too great; drug crime, like non-drug crime, is rooted in forces beyond the reach of police.

CHAPTER 5

POLICY AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

The program of intensified drug enforcement, or crackdowns, evaluated here represents a potentially significant departure from the conventional practice of street-level drug enforcement in the United States. It is strategically directed at outcomes beyond merely making arrests and seizing drugs--although it produces both of those enforcement outputs--and consequently, it entails a greater degree of planning and coordination than that which normally prevails in street-level enforcement, as target areas must be selected and activities must be directed over a period of time. Furthermore, this particular effort was mounted through a reallocation and redirection of enforcement activity within existing resources. This was truly an innovative undertaking, and a fortuitous confluence of individuals and events enabled us to systematically assess the process and the outcomes of this undertaking, so that police in Detroit and elsewhere might better learn from it. Here we will first briefly summarize the principal findings, and then discuss the implications of these findings for police practice and for future research on drug control by police.

Principal Findings

The implementation of the crackdowns proved to be more difficult than might have been anticipated. This, however, is part of the answer to one of the important questions addressed through this research: can the level of enforcement activity be abruptly and dramatically increased through a redeployment of existing resources? The effort in Detroit was no mere demonstration project, which might show what can be accomplished with resources that can only seldom be marshaled by

police agencies, and the experience in Detroit revealed several impediments to implementation under ordinary circumstances. The structure and informal norms of drug enforcement, competing enforcement demands, and cutbacks in personnel assigned to the Narcotics Division all appeared to detract from the implementation of the planned interventions. Some of these impediments--particularly the customary autonomy of drug enforcement units and the disincentives to achieve the intended effects on drug markets--are neither unique to Detroit nor easily overcome with additional resources. Implementing drug crackdowns even with substantial investments of resources requires skillful management, but implementing crackdowns with few or no additional resources requires extraordinarily skillful management.

Despite these impediments, and although the planned level of enforcement was not attained, enforcement activity was intensified, and this increase in intensity was sustained for some time. Indeed, in one target area, where raids were conducted at a rate of 5 per week, the level of enforcement was more than doubled over the six-month period. In the other target area, where raids were conducted at a rate of 4.3 per week, the level of enforcement increased by almost half. These increases in enforcement activity were of sufficient magnitude, and were sustained for a sufficient duration, that they were apparently detected by drug dealers, whose reactions to this enforcement pressure was one intended outcome. Unfortunately, however, these effects on the drug markets did not translate into effects on predatory crime or residents' subjective quality of life. Nor was the enforcement activity equally visible to residents, for whom such efforts might have been reassuring.

Dealers' adaptations manifested themselves in forms--e.g., a pronounced reluctance to sell drugs to strangers, including informants and undercover officers, and other practices that made drug buys, felony drug arrests, and drug seizures less likely--that presumably made it more difficult for

drug buyers to acquire drugs, but also made drug enforcement less rewarding for the officers. Herein lies one of the less tractable impediments to implementation. Enforcement measures that make drug markets less accessible to drug buyers also make them less accessible to enforcement agents. Thus measures that are potentially beneficial for the community are in some respects detrimental for police personnel. This dilemma can be resolved only by establishing incentives for enforcement personnel to produce--at least over more than the short-term--more than a steady stream of arrests. It might also require steps to alter the working assumptions of narcotics officers that drug enforcement is beneficial only to the extent that it takes dealers, users, and drugs off the street (see Worden, 1996).

That the crackdowns achieved at least a limited degree of success, notwithstanding the forces that attenuated the intensity of the crackdowns, leads us to believe that carefully planned efforts of a generally similar nature could realize still greater benefits. Detroit's experience is in some respects a conservative test of a crackdown intervention, as the size and nature of the markets there would seem to make them less vulnerable to intensified enforcement. The public will continue to demand drug enforcement from their police, although additional resources are not equally likely to be forthcoming, and further experimentation with more strategically directed enforcement efforts might enable police to learn lessons about how to practice drug enforcement more effectively and efficiently. We turn now to the lessons that we would draw from this evaluation.

Implications for Police Practice

Design Shorter and More Intense Crackdowns

Given that drug sellers detected the change in enforcement activity within 4 to 6 weeks, and given the pronounced difficulty of maintaining the intensity of enforcement in the face of sellers'

adaptations. crackdowns of shorter duration may be easier to implement, equally effective, and more efficient. The plan to maintain an elevated level of enforcement activity for six months was based only on intuition, and with the information born of this experience, the duration of crackdowns can be specified on a somewhat firmer basis. Intensified enforcement that extends much beyond the point at which sellers (and perhaps buyers) adapt to the increased risk is, in a sense, wasted effort, which could be better spent elsewhere (e.g., in another target area), and the resistance by officers to implementation is compounded by continued efforts to apprehend sellers who have already taken steps to reduce their risks. Furthermore, crackdowns of shorter duration lend themselves to the achievement of greater intensity, since they do not portend the same opportunity costs for other areas in foregone enforcement over an extended period of time, or for officers in foregone arrests and other rewards. Crackdowns of greater intensity would more likely reach a level that is commensurate with the scale of markets like those in Detroit, and so they might be more likely to have impacts on the market that produce ripple effects on predatory crime and on quality of life outcomes.

Create a Unit Dedicated to Crackdown Activity

Designing crackdowns of shorter duration may facilitate implementation, but the experience in Detroit illustrates how, in policing as in other organizational contexts, special programmatic activities are often not accorded a high priority when they are made the responsibility of existing units that have established responsibilities and routines. The NEUs to whom principal responsibility for the crackdowns was assigned had many other responsibilities as well. They were responsible for taking action against drug trafficking in an entire precinct (or even two precincts), of which the target area was but a rather small part, and in view of the spatial dispersion of drug markets in Detroit, it is easy to see that the broader geographic responsibility would represent strong competition with

crackdown activity. Citizen complaints received over the drug hotline, or through governmental or police channels, were regular reminders of the drug activity in other parts of the precincts, as were reports forwarded to the Narcotics Division from other police personnel, reports by informants about active drug locations, and the officers' own surveillance. In addition, other enforcement responsibilities--e.g., brief "blitzes" in the vicinities of schools, joint activity with other agencies--occasionally diverted the attention of the NEUs from the crackdowns. Furthermore, the "investigator-centered" pattern of drug enforcement that characterized the operation of the NEUs and SNEUs meant that a "hot tip" or other information that promised immediate results was likely to take precedence over continued activity in a specific target area, and all the more likely once the sellers in that area have begun to adapt to enforcement pressure.

For all of these reasons it may be preferable to assign responsibility for intensified enforcement in targeted areas to units dedicated to crackdown operations. Such a unit need not have a fixed geographic responsibility, but rather would move from target area to target area. The distinctive character of such a unit might be expected to facilitate the establishment of distinct performance expectations, including a somewhat different incentive structure, and thus to promote a set of working assumptions that are more compatible with brief, intensive, geographically focused enforcement activity. Routine enforcement and other special demands would continue to be the responsibility of the regular NEUs.

If the crackdowns were as brief as 6 to 8 weeks, then each such unit could conduct 6 to 8 such operations over the course of a year. Some of those operations might be applied to the same areas repeatedly, if when sellers detect the withdrawal of enforcement resources they adjust to the diminished level of risk. It is not at all clear whether sellers would make such adjustments, and if

so, how quickly or gradually those adjustments would be made. Some of the officers in Detroit believed that sellers made more-or-less permanent alterations in their day-to-day practices, while others believed that sellers would loosen their marketing very quickly. At a minimum, however, any "free bonus" of residual deterrence would seem to require that the initiation and duration of crackdowns in particular target areas remain unpublicized and thus unpredictable for sellers, unlike the practice of the Tactical Narcotics Teams in New York City, described by Sviridoff, et al. (1992).

Use Information to Formulate a Strategic Approach

This evaluation relied to a significant degree on official sources of data, and it demonstrates that the data on drug enforcement patterns and outcomes that is or could be routinely collected by the police can be used to target problem areas and design enforcement interventions. While no source of data is free of error--inaccuracies and omissions--they can be used to direct, assess, and (as necessary) redirect enforcement activities. We see, in particular, three areas in which the integration and analysis of such data can be beneficial.

First, such data can be useful in identifying "hot spots" of drug activity. While experienced narcotics officers certainly can point to recurrently troublesome areas, their case-oriented focus often directs their attention to individual locations--particular houses or street corners. Data on citizen complaints and on police raids can be represented on maps to redirect their attention to groups of spatially proximate locations, or hot spots; such data can also be useful in determining the geographic scope of these areas and the degree of activity therein (see Weisburd and Green, 1994). Analyzed in this way, these data can be examined periodically to ascertain problem areas and systematically target retail drug markets for enforcement efforts. Furthermore, other sources of information--including confidential informants and police surveillance--could be tapped more

systematically and integrated with complaint and raid data to better demarcate target areas and monitor changes in the level and nature of drug market activity in those areas.

Second, and relatedly, police data can be used to assess immediate impacts of enforcement activities, and thus to learn more about what works under particular circumstances. Little is known about the impacts of various drug enforcement tactics, which may be applied in different ways in different contexts. As we explained in Chapter 2, for example, so little was known about the appropriate duration of "brief" crackdowns that a six-month period was determined on the basis of nothing other than intuition. Based upon information derived solely from police sources for this evaluation, we now have some reason to believe that a much shorter period would suffice. Much more remains to be learned about how, if at all, crackdowns or other enforcement tactics can achieve positive results.

We would add that one potentially valuable source of information, which was not tapped for this evaluation, concerns attempts by informants and undercover officers to purchase drugs. Provided that the dates, specific locations, and outcomes of these attempts are recorded--as they routinely were by some but not all of the NEUs in Detroit--this information could be used to more systematically monitor the adaptations of drug sellers to enforcement activity, and so not only to learn about the immediate impacts of intensive enforcement on drug markets but also to better determine when crackdowns can be terminated in a target area (as well as when they should be resumed).

Third, police data might be used to track market dynamics. Data on complaints or raids can be aggregated by sector and by week or month, or mapping technology can be used to visually depict the individual locations of complaints or raids during specified time periods. Either form of analysis

could be useful in charting the changing levels of retail drug activity in Detroit. Furthermore, by using the names of individuals who were either arrested or investigated and released during raids at specific locations--information that is routinely recorded in Detroit in any case--police may be able to track the movement of individual sellers. All of this information too could be useful in planning enforcement interventions and in assessing their impacts.

The use of such data in formulating strategic enforcement efforts would represent a shift in orientation. The DPD Narcotics Division was fortunate to have, during the period of our research there, experienced narcotics officers who were very knowledgeable about drug distribution patterns in their areas of responsibility. But the application of their knowledge and expertise appeared to follow the rule of conventionally practiced drug enforcement elsewhere: it was oriented toward "making cases" rather than, say, improving the quality of life in Detroit's neighborhoods. The kinds of analysis described above are no substitute for officers' knowledge and expertise. Instead, analysis could be expected to enable officers to extend the application of their expertise in working toward strategic objectives. The formulation of such strategies could, but need not, involve a greater role for drug enforcement managers. But it would entail a shift in orientation from one that is concerned principally with making individual cases and arrests to one that emphasizes enforcement actions that are concentrated upon specific markets and neighborhoods.

Integrate Drug Enforcement Strategies into Community Policing

A recurring theme in our interviews with both officers and community residents was that an effective approach to drug control and the reduction of drug-related problems required community involvement. For some this meant simply increasing the information that community residents provide to the police, as the "eyes and ears" of the police. But for others it meant a broader range

of activities directed toward community development, which would include but not be limited to the removal of drug dealers from the neighborhood. To some degree the latter perspective reflects a recognition that illicit drug use and the individual and collective consequences of illicit drug use have deep roots in social and economic forces that are well beyond the capacity of the police to influence. But it also reflects an awareness that the impact of even the most well-designed and faithfully executed drug enforcement strategy is likely to be fairly modest. The effects of drug enforcement, as such, can perhaps complement and be multiplied by the effects of other police and community-based efforts.

In one neighborhood, known as Ravendale, which formed a part of the ninth precinct target area, the community was fairly well mobilized, in the form of block clubs and an organization associated with a Christian community center. Closing crack houses in the neighborhood was an important objective of these groups, and toward this end the groups not only encouraged residents to call either police or their block club presidents with information about drug trafficking, they occasionally met with managers of the Narcotics Division, they also organized anti-drug marches, they worked with the prosecutor's office to apply legal pressure on landlords to evict tenants who were drug dealers, and during the course of our research they attempted to establish a drug treatment facility in the neighborhood. But for these groups, ridding the neighborhood of drug dealing was but one plank in a platform of community improvement, which consisted of a wide range of community development activities. Residents participated in a series of community clean-up projects. They worked with willing landlords to find responsible tenants for rental housing in the community. They acquired and then rehabilitated a number of homes from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and worked with local banks to make low-interest

mortgages available to low-income buyers. They established recreational and educational programs for community youth. Much of this activity was facilitated--and probably stimulated--by a full-time community developer who was energetic and charismatic, and who established contacts with police and other state and local agencies.[1]

Police are now expected to cultivate operational relationships with such community groups, as the formation of partnerships with community organizations and with other government agencies is an integral part of community policing. Police officers can aid and abet these community efforts using means other than making arrests for drug offenses (see Connor and Burns, 1991; Kennedy, 1993; Weisel, 1990). They can use housing and building code enforcement to bring pressure to bear on landlords who tolerate drug dealing on their properties, and to condemn the property of landlords who refuse to respond to such pressure. They may be able to make alterations in the environment of drug markets--e.g., having additional or more powerful lighting installed, or trimming trees that provide shade--to make them less attractive to drug dealers. They can send warning letters to the owners of cars that are observed in areas known for drug dealing. Community organizations and other public agencies must cooperate in many of these efforts.

Most drug enforcement personnel will be understandably reluctant to become directly involved in meetings and other community activities, lest they compromise their capacity to perform drug enforcement operations (such as purchasing illicit drugs) and their safety. But the work of drug enforcement units should be informed by and coordinated with police efforts to mobilize the community and solve neighborhood problems. Thus it is incumbent on the managers of drug

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[1] On the forms and effects of community crime prevention efforts, see Rosenbaum (1988).

enforcement units to assume a role in these police-community partnerships, inasmuch as drug enforcement that is coordinated with the efforts of these other parties might have still greater impacts.

More specifically, the coordination of drug enforcement with other efforts to reduce (drug and nondrug) crime and improve the quality of neighborhood life will almost certainly require that drug enforcement units obtain more and more accurate information about drug distribution in the neighborhoods. As the Ravendale neighborhood demonstrates, communication mechanisms can be created that provide direct input to the police from the community without increasing the visibility of the narcotics unit.[2] Other opportunities to more closely coordinate drug enforcement with community policing may also exist. As the police begin or continue to work with communities in a problem-oriented community development strategy, opportunities for such collaboration may be increased. Intensive enforcement efforts, or crackdowns, as described above could be organized and rotated among neighborhoods that are experiencing drug problems and are becoming more organized through community policing efforts to address community improvement issues on a variety of dimensions. Indeed, if the impacts of crackdowns are enhanced by community mobilization, then the most efficient use of drug enforcement resources would emphasize neighborhoods that are mobilized (though not to the exclusion of less organized neighborhoods).[3] Such a coordinated and sustained drug elimination and community development strategy may have the greatest chance of

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[2] However, if informal mechanisms are routinely used to provide information, and if the formal records are used to track patterns of reported drug activity for strategic targeting of enforcement actions, then this information will need to be incorporated into the formal records system.

[3] The equitable use of resources might, in addition, require that efforts be made to mobilize the less organized neighborhoods.

realizing a lasting impact.

Implications for Research

The findings reported here are valuable insofar as they form the basis for better informed decisions about the promising forms that drug crackdowns--and perhaps street-level drug enforcement more generally--might take. Such lessons could be learned by describing and analyzing the process by which the crackdowns were implemented, and by examining as many of the intermediate outcomes--such as market adaptations--and ultimate outcomes--such as residents' subjective quality of life--as we could measure. Had we merely documented the magnitude of the increase in enforcement activity, in the form of numbers of raids, over the entire intervention period, and analyzed crime and quality of life indicators, our analysis would have led us to the conclusion that intensified enforcement had no impacts on important outcomes. The virtues of theory-driven evaluation research are well-known, and our research further illustrates the value of evaluations that are designed to address questions of how and why and not merely the question of what, based on an understanding of process and context. Such evaluation can form the partial basis for the reformulation of programs and policies, as we discuss above.

Our evaluation also testifies to the importance of incorporating a control group into the evaluation design, even when one cannot randomize and even when the match with the treatment group is far from perfect. Conditions improved where the crackdowns were applied, but they also improved to a roughly commensurate degree in areas of a roughly comparable nature and with drug problems of similar severity. We could conclude, then, that the crackdowns had no effects on the visibility of drug dealing, crime, or the quality of life, but our conclusions would have been different, albeit still more qualified, in the absence of a control group.

We would add, as another methodological lesson, that our analysis of survey data was strengthened by the stratified sampling plan that allowed us to focus analysis on geographically-defined subsets of respondents in each study area. As we explained in Chapter 2, we attempted, with much success, to obtain respondents from each block face in each study area. Thus we were able to test the proposition that crackdown impacts would be more pronounced, or detectable only, among residents of blocks on which raids had been conducted. Although this proposition was not confirmed, we can feel more confident in concluding that the crackdowns increased neither the visibility of police nor the quality of life even in more geographically circumscribed areas because we tested this proposition.

The expectation that drug crackdowns will have salutary effects on drug trafficking, drug use, nondrug crime, and the quality of life rests on a hypothesis about deterrence--that crackdowns raise the risk perceived by drug buyers and sellers, whose efforts to avoid the elevated risk have implications for all of these outcomes. The more successfully that future research can tap such market adaptations in systematic measures, the more it will illuminate this crucial causal mechanism. Whether, to what extent, and over what period of time drug buyers and sellers respond to increases in enforcement intensity are questions on which we could find no empirical evidence when we began our evaluation, and still only very little evidence is available. Future evaluative research should develop data sources--such as street ethnography, periodic reports by officers of their perceptions, daily reports by officers of attempted drug purchases and sellers' responses--on the basis of which we might draw inferences about market adaptations over fairly short periods of time.

Finally, we note with some dismay that recent research on drug control by police focuses on the application of innovative community- and problem-oriented approaches to the exclusion of more

conventional forms of street-level drug enforcement. We would not dispute the promise of community- and problem-oriented approaches; as we note above, there is much to recommend them, and street-level drug enforcement should be coordinated with such efforts. But even as police departments mobilize community resources and apply problem-solving techniques to drug and drug-related problems, they will continue to engage in street-level drug enforcement. We believe that street-level drug enforcement could be practiced more effectively and more efficiently, and efforts to do so should be evaluated.

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