REDUCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CRIME

AIRPORT SECURITY COUNCIL
1974

CARGO SECURITY
AT THE
METROPOLITAN NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY AIRPORTS

*Reports of losses through crime
pass from industry to law enforcement. . . .*

FAA

POSTAL
INSPECTORS

FBI

Air Cargo Industry

JFK

LaGuardia   Newark

NYCPD

U.S.
CUSTOMS

Operations and Security

QUEENS DA

NEWARK PD

PAPD

*. . . Security advice and counsel based on
analysis of loss experience pass back
from law enforcement to the industry*

Accumulation, analysis and synthesis of
criminal intelligence data by police are
the foundation stones of security service
to the public. . . this service to the public
should rank with apprehension of criminals
as a fundamental product of law enforcement. . .

REDUCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CRIME

A Special Report by
THE AIRPORT SECURITY COUNCIL

3/28/75

A GOLD MINE OF KNOWLEDGE

Historically, crimes against property are the most difficult crimes to solve. For example, in 1972, according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, law enforcement throughout the nation solved 82% of all murders and 66% of aggravated assaults, but only 30% of all robberies and about 20% of larcenies and burglaries.

PERCENTAGE OF CRIMES CLEARED BY ARREST

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS: MURDER 82%, RAPE 57%, ASSAULT 66%, ROBBERY 30%

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY: BURGLARY 19%, LARCENY 20%, AUTO THEFT 17%

(hatched) % cleared by arrest

While solutions may be elusive, police departments of necessity spend time and energy on thousands of property crimes each year. Much of their investigative effort, though it does not result in apprehensions and prosecutions, is nevertheless a gold mine of useful knowledge and information about the way thieves operate. Progress is emerging from the success of forward-looking police departments which accumulate, analyze and synthesize data developed by their investigations, even those investigations that do not consummate in arrests. They can and do learn a great deal from this by-product, using it to teach people in their communities how to defend against future crimes. As police capability becomes increasingly sophisticated, through the use of computers and other new technology, this extra dividend of knowledge, which is so valuable to the community, may become one of the principal products of police work.

Year	No. (%)	Total thefts
1969	41(7.5%)	545
1970	23(5.8%)	400
1971	23(8.3%)	277
1972	21(10.1%)	208
1973	19(6.5%)	294

Legend

| Year | No. (%) | Total thefts |

Cases solved by Arrest   Percent Solved

100 200 300 400 500 600

HOW LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDED THE AIRLINES

Law enforcement know-how has been enormously helpful to the airlines. The airline industry in metropolitan New York/New Jersey had the good fortune to receive police guidance during the formation of the Airport Security Council at Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark Airports in 1968. The law enforcement agencies at the airports analyzed the thefts and losses of cargo which the airlines were experiencing. On the basis of this study, they proposed to the airlines 24 "do's" and "don'ts," which identified in quite specific terms the problems causing air cargo losses and made specific suggestions for corrective action. Here we have a significant departure from the "catch-the-perpetrator" philosophy, substituting instead a loss-prevention approach which has led to industry stopping thefts, not just police catching thieves.

HERE ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT'S 24 POINTS

Employee Matters

1. Each airline should assign security officer to cargo activities.
2. Do background checks of cargo applicants.
3. Install a photographic identification badge system.
4. Supervisors to question presence of unidentified persons in cargo area.
5. Restrict cargo area to authorized employees.
6. Hold supervisors accountable for whereabouts of employees.
7. Fix responsibility for signing freight in and out.
8. Do not allow employee vehicle parking at cargo terminal.
9. Gate guards to control and record movements in and out of cargo area.

Non-Employee Matters

10. Keep unauthorized persons away from cargo unless supervised.
11. Prohibit parallel parking of trucks in front of bays.
12. Keep trucking firm vehicles out of airline parking lots and segregate them from private vehicles.
13. Strictly limit access of brokers' runners and supervise their movements.
14. Do not allow any private vehicles to park near loading areas.
15. Do not permit pickups without valid orders; clear any doubts with consignee.

Equipment Matters

16. Establish burglar-proof high-value storage areas.
17. Consider silent alarms connecting vital cargo areas with Port Authority Police desk.
18. Keep loaded mobile equipment secure at all times.
19. Install key operated positive locking devices in all mobile equipment.
20. Do not allow keys to be left in ignition locks of unattended vehicles.
21. Cargo containers, empty or loaded, should always be locked.
22. Contents of cargo trains should not be open to view.
23. Watch forklifts so they won't be used to force doors.
24. Lock gates and doors of trucks containing cargo.

AIRLINE RESPONSE

Recognizing the validity of the law enforcement position, the airlines responded by mandating certain procedures to protect their cargo from theft and loss. Here are the first mandates.

1. **Theft Reporting System**
   Council members are required to record thefts, pilferages and losses of air cargo under the Airport Security Council Uniform Reporting System and report these matters to appropriate law enforcement agencies and to the Council.

2. **Employee Badging System**
   All employees working in air freight facilities at or near our airports are required to wear identification badges.

3. **Reward Program**
   A reward program was established for information leading to arrest and conviction of cargo thieves.

AIRLINE STUDY TRIGGERS ACTION

With law enforcement's 24 points in hand and the new mandates in place and working, an in-depth study of the airport theft/loss problem was begun by the airlines. The 24 points were anchors for specific security rules; what was needed next was development of the detailed data necessary to tailor these rules to operations. We had to seek more specifics. An airport in the New York metropolitan area is a complex facility, not adaptable to operating as an armed camp. We had to study the economics of the 24-point program with a view to adapting it to a highly competitive industry in which financial profitability is the key to survival.

The study pooled data from law enforcement, from knowledgeable airline security men who combine industry and law enforcement experience, and from cargo operations people who understand the intricacies of freight movements. In the words of the late Peter A. Marcus, one of our former chairmen, this combination represented an excellent marriage of skills. With this knowledge and staff as our basic resources, we turned to the newly-implemented loss reporting program to develop the specifics required to establish a sound system of security. Analysis of our loss reports proved to be the key to solving our problems. It provided us with numbers and values to assess the costs of our loss experience. More important as each theft and loss was tallied, the results provided details about the what, where, when, why, and how of the total experience.

These are the kinds of things the loss reports showed:

1. High value shipments of currency, furs, precious metals, jewelry, precious stones and watches comprise the major portion of cargo losses, but account for just a small portion of our cargo revenue.


2. In order to protect high value cargo, special handling procedures are necessary.

3. Cargo is stolen by persons authorized to be on the premises, using vehicles authorized to be there.

CAUSES/LOCATIONS OF LOSSES/THEFTS/PILFERAGES

Reports of loss, theft or pilferage over a five-year period, show. . . .

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76% of all thefts accomplished by persons        Only 24%
authorized to be on premises, using              by other
vehicles authorized to be on premises:           means:
      Theft from-terminal      :  70%            Transit:13%
                -interline vehicle:   4%          Pilfer.:10%
                -truck or cart   :   2%           Robbery
                       Total:  76%                or Hijack: 1%
                                                           Total:24%
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4. The weight of missing cargo is an indication that most stolen goods go out on trucks in the guise of normal cargo movement.

WEIGHT OF MISSING SHIPMENTS

52% of all missing shipments weighed more than 50 pounds

More than 100 pounds: 35%

Between 1 and 25 pounds: 33%

48% of all missing shipments weighed less than 50 pounds

Between 50-100 Pounds 17%

Between 25-50 Pounds 15%

100   50   25

5. High value security systems reduce losses; systems breakdowns lead to high value losses.

For example during two years:

Origin Station did not give high value warning to receiving station...
Resulting cargo losses...$407,634

Value Shipment in igloo
not promptly retrieved... resulting cargo losses... $143,107

NY/NJ station did not follow high value procedures despite high value warning from origin...
REGS HIGH VALUE RULES
resulting cargo losses...$461,742

1972-73 total losses due to system failures were $1,114,110... 56% of all cargo lost

Inadequate Maintenance or control of security cages or vaults... resulting cargo losses... $101,627

6. Armed robberies and hijackings while relatively infrequent are costly to airlines.

In 5 years only 8 thefts... less than 1% of all cargo thefts... were the result of armed robbery or hijacking...

number
value

...but...value of cargo lost through these crimes... $1,893,000... is 25% of all cargo lost.

$1,893,000

EXACT INFORMATION

Even before the installation of the reporting system, we had good, general — off-the-top-of-the-head-type — intelligence, but the specifics in reports to law enforcement had not yet been extracted, analyzed and synthesized for further use. The new reporting system enabled us to gather the scattered building blocks of sad experience and stack them in revealing columns that showed exactly what, exactly where, exactly when, and exactly why our goods were being stolen. It identified our vulnerable commodities; pinpointed the areas where most of the losses took place; suggested the times when losses were most likely to occur, and the points in the system where protection was inadequate and required bolstering.

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Reducing the opportunity for crime. . .
               reduces the incidence of crime. . .
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CLOSING THE GAPS

With this kind of knowledge available, it became possible for us to recommend economically viable deterrent plans that would close the gaps in security.

All measures are not necessarily appropriate in all terminals, but the major proposals were adaptable, in some acceptable form, to all of our operations. Universally suitable procedures were mandated for use by all member airlines. Proposals requiring more flexible application were advanced as recommended procedures.

REPORTING BY AIRLINES PINPOINTS DANGER

The reporting system, by correlating for examination the experience contained in the airlines' reports relating to thefts and losses, enables us to identify and pinpoint dangerous conditions, practices and areas. It also highlights the type of cargo most frequently sought by thieves.

KNOWLEDGE IS THE PRODUCT OF ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE

Bits of knowledge, accumulated in patterns, like pieces of a puzzle, form pictures of each problem, which may be studied in depth.

MANDATES

As our studies added to our understanding of our problems, we were able to add to our mandated procedures. The new mandates developed were the following:

1. " Loading/unloading platform doors in cargo terminals must be kept closed, except while in use.

2. Barriers or painted lines are required to separate public terminal areas from segregated areas, in which only authorized persons are allowed.

3. Airlines must not stow or leave cargo in front of such barriers or painted lines, except while attended.

4. Council members must designate prescribed parking areas in and around cargo terminals, segregating employee parking from operating areas.

5. Neither cargo nor documents may be released to anyone without full identification of the recipient.

6. All airlines are required to use the Kennedy Form for cargo imported at Kennedy Airport from abroad. This form is a combined document, including carrier's certificate, pickup order and tally, and U.S. Customs release. By its very nature, it prevents fraudulent pickups of cargo.

7. Airlines must follow specific procedures for protection of high-value cargo.

8. Council members are subject to fines and other penalties for failure to comply with mandates, and for action contrary to objectives of the Airport Security Council.

9. Council members must comply with regulations concerning locking and sealing of vehicles moving mail between ramps and air mail facility. This mandate establishes routes for moving mail designed to assure swift secure delivery between planeside and Post Office.

ACCUMULATED DATA IS PUT TO USE

The original input is important. It permits the synthesis of experience when its elements are collected and pooled in groupings. The catalytic agent, however, is the communication of the accumulated knowledge to the airlines' operations people, for use in attacking the problems identified. This is the role of the Airport Security Council at our metropolitan airports. In practice the system works beautifully in our specialized area, where we have the funds to support this private system.

THIS EXPERIENCE GIVES RISE TO SOME QUESTIONS

If this program works, should not law enforcement more fully process its available data concerning losses and thefts, for use in all major areas affected by property crimes? Is the system applicable only to property crimes? Are there other areas of police experience where solution rates of cases are so low that developing protective plans might be as important as seeking the elusive criminal? Are court rulings — making it ever more difficult to prove the commission of crime — telling us that there must be a better way to prevent crime than the incarceration of the occasional perpetrator caught by the police?

> Preventive security reduces the number
> of crimes. . . and the number of criminals.

AIRLINE INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE

Consider what has occurred in the airline industry. There, a security system recommended by police, reduced the numbers of crimes by over 35% in five years, while the rate of solution of crimes committed remained virtually unchanged at the 6% to 10% level. Is this kind of product worth the effort? It has proved so at the airports. Since there are fewer crimes, many hours of work are saved for enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, jailers and parole officers. Many wasted hours of criminal suspects have been saved. Many families have been spared grief, humiliation and financial loss because occasions for crimes of opportunity have been reduced. Similar results may well be achieved elsewhere by use of such a crime preventive system.

INCREASE/DECREASE: VARIOUS CRIMES

Air cargo crime, 1969 through 1973; other crimes per F.B.I. data available only through 1972.

ARE PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS PROPERLY LIMITED TO SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES?

Should this technique be available only in enclaves where private industry is able to foot the bill, as in airlines, jewelry, banking and the like? Or should the police, who have the same data in hand, set up their own equivalents of these private plans in areas where rates of solution of crime are low?

> Immunity to a disease is preferable
> to a cure. . . preventing a crime is
> preferable to catching a perpetrator

PREVENTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT

Law enforcement has blazed the trail for the airlines and certain other industries in specialized areas. The loss and damage prevention procedures developed by the airlines through the Airport Security Council are based upon accumulation of knowledge and systematic communication of that knowledge to the operations people who must move cargo in an economically practical manner.

The present state of experience clearly indicates that areas in the public sector also have the potential to move forward by developing similar programs at reasonable cost. Fully utilizing the wealth of knowledge in the accumulated experience and records of law enforcement agencies would pay generous dividends.

Solving crimes is a tedious process, often painfully difficult. It is, in fact, usually more difficult to solve a crime than to prevent it in the first place. There should, therefore, be much more concentration by law enforcement on preventive security in those areas where experience has revealed a low case solution rate. The possibility is here to reduce the level of crimes of this kind at less expense than is now required to identify, prosecute, incarcerate and rehabilitate the occasional perpetrators brought to justice.

REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CRIME

Every police department is capable of gleaning valuable data from its experience with crimes, solved or unsolved. Distribution to the community of the knowledge thus gathered, for use in defensive efforts aimed at reducing the opportunities for crime, provides protection against criminals. This is truly a service of the police that may be quickly activated at the present level of operations, without great increases of manpower or expense.

1974
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DEVELOP SECURITY TECHNIQUES AIMED AT PREVENTING CRIMES
AS WELL AS PERPETRATOR IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES IN SPECIAL PROGRAMS

"Modus operandi" files should be aimed not only at apprehending perpetrators, but at uncovering and correcting weaknesses which make crimes easy to commit. This use of readily available end-products of police investigation, aided by computer technology where practical and feasible, is infinitely more productive than the "catch-the-perpetrator" philosophy which dominates most law enforcement special programs. Law enforcement laboratories are almost totally perpetrator-oriented today, although actually our greater need is for means of preventing crimes.

Charles H. Russell
British Airways

ANOTHER GAIN: SOCIAL PROGRESS

Any police department that is primarily perpetrator-oriented in its efforts ignores its potential for identifying security weaknesses that are causative factors in the great mass of our crime. Juveniles begin criminal careers with small-time criminal activities. They go to reform school and come out ready to try new and bigger crimes that promise greater payoffs. Much of the fault and cause of troubles for this age group lies with Mr. Average Citizen, who has not bothered to protect his property or himself properly. Common juvenile violations, committed simply and seldom planned, are the introductory steps to careers in crime.

More sophistication by citizens, in applying deterrents against household, business and property crimes, based on guidelines and counsel derived from police experience, will prevent the curious or hungry youngster, as well as others tempted by ready opportunity, from falling into anti-social raids on the property of others.

Our experience shows that law enforcement agencies now possess the raw material needed to compile and make available to industry and individual citizens the know-how they need to protect themselves against crime. Implementation of this capability, on a broad scale, will reduce the opportunities for crimes against property. Fewer hours will be spent by police on investigations and apprehensions; fewer hours will be spent by prosecutors in preparation trials and appeals; fewer convicts will crowd our jails.

A UNIQUE SUCCESS STORY

It is our desire to encourage law enforcement agencies to develop more creative security programs for public use, as components of their on-going projects, and of equal status with programs aimed at apprehending perpetrators. We believe they should specifically establish units devoted to compiling, analyzing and disseminating, to private citizens and industry, criminal intelligence data for crime-prevention purposes.

The air cargo industry, working with law enforcement, has developed a truly successful means for the prevention of crime. The story should have sequels in wider successes in many other areas. As law enforcement, industry and private citizens work together in this endeavor, there should be continuing government participation through LEAA or some similar support for crime prevention programs throughout the United States. Such efforts in other segments of industry and society, modeled upon the successful airport approach will provide a more secure environment in which all of us may live and work.

Peter A. Marcus

This report is dedicated to the late Peter A. Marcus, Chairman of the Airport Security Council, 1972.

Peter Marcus was a man of action, a skilled professional in air cargo operations and a dedicated believer in effective security.

His philosophy in seeking the "marriage of cargo operations and sound security procedures," is expressed in the rules and guidelines established by the Airport Security Council for the New York/New Jersey metropolitan airports.

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97-45 QUEENS BOULEVARD
FOREST HILLS, NEW YORK 11374

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