MF-1

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
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Minnesota
Crime
Prevention
Center

121 E. Franklin Ave.
Minneapolis
Minnesota
55404
612/872-2300

80726

PLANNING COMMUNITY CRIME
PREVENTION PROGRAMS

by

Marlys McPherson
Executive Director

and

Glenn Silloway
Research Associate

The Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, Inc.
121 East Franklin Avenue
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404

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CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM PLANNING

I. Introduction

This Program Model is about planning crime prevention programs in
and for the community. It is written for planners, practitioners,
community organizers, and members of neighborhood groups involved in
developing an organized program. The purposes of this report are to
raise and clarify the issues involved in planning a community crime
prevention program and to provide practical guidelines and advice
about how to go about doing it.

Since 19.), there has been a tremendous increase in the number of
programs initiated to prevent crime through citizen action. These
programs range in size from a group of five or six concerned neighbors
getting together to solve a local problem to comprehensive, complex
city-wide or even county-wide projects financed by hundreds of
thousands of federal dollars. Some projects are initiated by
citizens; others are supported by local clubs or organizations.
Hundreds of local police departments offer crime prevention services
to community residents. State and local government agencies have
started similar programs, often with the support and political backing
of powerful elected officials. An increasing number of national
associations, such as Kiwanis, General Federation of Women's Clubs,
AFL-CIO, Jaycees, National Retail Merchants Association, American Bar
Association, and numerous others, have started crime prevention
programs and encourage their members to join in the effort.[1]

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[1]National Crime Prevention Institute, Understanding Crime Preven-
tion (Lexington, Kentucky: National Crime Prevention Institute Press,
1978), p. 11-12.

And Congress and federal agencies -- the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Health, Education and Welfare, the Community Services Administration, the Administration on Aging, ACTION -- have given major financial and policy support for citizen-initiated and community-based crime prevention efforts.

Most of the funding for community crime prevention projects has come through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.[1] There has been a long history of support for crime prevention programs within LEAA. Officially-sponsored programs have been funded through the states' block grant monies and LEAA discretionary funds since about 1971. Citizen participation in crime prevention has been advocated in the agency at least since 1973. A major policy shift is evident in the Crime Control Act of 1976, where for the first time LEAA monies were made available directly to community groups and organizations to initiate and conduct programs (the Community Anti-Crime Program). Since 1976 two additional, major crime prevention initiatives (the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program and the Urban Crime Prevention Program) have been started in LEAA.

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[1]Part of the initial impetus for this Program Model was the experience of the LEAA-sponsored crime prevention program in Hartford, Connecticut. The Hartford project, which began in 1973, was a comprehensive approach to preventing crime through citizen involvement in a community setting. Based on a well thought out plan and a thorough evaluation, Hartford has provided some of the more interesting questions and lessons for our continuing efforts in community crime prevention. Simultaneously, LEAA funded the Westinghouse Consortium to plan, develop and test theoretical applications of crime prevention through environmental design in three different settings: a commercial area (Portland, Oregon), a school environment (Broward County, Florida) and a residential neighborhood (Minneapolis, Minnesota). The Minneapolis comprehensive crime prevention program, which is reported in this volume, is similar to these other efforts in its approach to planning.

The activities included in crime prevention programs are many and varied -- from citizen court-watching to marking personal property (Operation Identification), from buying better locks to helping ex-offenders find jobs. Despite the diversity of these programs, they have three features in common. First, the primary goal is to prevent or reduce crime in the community. Second, they are based on the assumption that private citizens have a role in preventing crime. Finally, it follows that all of these programs in some way involve citizens, either as individuals or in groups or organizations. In other words, citizen participation and/or action is a part of the project.

Some community crime prevention programs are successful in recruiting citizens and solving crime problems. Others are not. Often a group decides to take action, but its activities are short-lived. The momentum to "do something about crime" quickly dies or the group can't find the money to support itself, or it runs up against police opposition, or . . . any number of other reasons can cause programs to fizzle.

The central assumption upon which this report is based is that the success of a community crime prevention program depends to a great extent on how the program is planned. Planning is not viewed here as a sterile process of analyzing crime statistics, setting a goal of "reducing burglary by 20 percent," and writing "The Plan" that tells how to do it. Rather, planning is organizing for success; it is the on-going process of gathering together all of the resources, including citizen support, needed to identify problems and to develop programs to solve them.

II. The Study Approach

The content and advice contained in this report comes primarily from the experiences of those people who have already planned community crime prevention programs.

The approach used to develop this report consisted of three steps. First, literature, research studies, and reports about community crime prevention were reviewed and the opinions of an advisory group and other experts in the field were solicited. At the same time, a list of community crime prevention projects in operation around the country was developed from a variety of sources. The completed list included over 400 such programs, sponsored by many different kinds of private groups and organizations and local government agencies.[1]

The second step was to interview the directors or administrators of 87 of these programs by telephone, asking a series of questions about how their projects were planned, and who was involved in planning. Each interview lasted from 20 to 40 minutes. A copy of the telephone survey interview form is included in Appendix B. An attempt was made to include projects representing the range of factors and circumstances which might possibly affect the way in which a program is planned, including type of program activities, sponsoring agency, geography and kind of community, scope of project (small to large), source of funds, and level of resources.

Six diverse projects were selected from the set of telephone interviews for a more detailed examination. On-site visits were made to these projects from January through March, 1979. Personal

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[1]Police-sponsored crime prevention programs and state-wide programs are specifically excluded.

interviews were conducted with all of the individuals, where possible, who were involved in planning and developing the crime prevention program. In addition, written documents concerning the project, such as grant applications, progress and evaluation reports, and citizen survey and interview forms, were examined.

The six projects which were visited included:

1. The Neighborhood Safety Project, Contra Costa County, California.

2. The Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council, Inc., Iowa.

3. The Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention Project, Chicago, Illinois.

4. Ward I, Inc., Washington, D.C.

5. The Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Program, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

6. Port City Crime Prevention For Seniors Project (PCCPS), Port City.

These six site visits were documented in detail and are reported in Chapter 6. The report on the site visit to the "Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors" project has been modified in this Program Model to protect the identity of the project. The site visit produced information that led us to focus on several flaws in the project. This should not be taken to mean that the project has had no desirable consequences, nor that any of the project personnel as individuals were responsible for the shortcomings we found. In fact, the problems in the project are probably common and the lessons will be instructive to others planning crime prevention programs. Since a major purpose of the Program Model is to pass on the experiences of others, we have decided to include the "Port City" project without unnecessarily exposing its staff and participants to criticism based on the cursory report we are able to make here.

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During the course of this study it became apparent that our initial intention -- to present several alternative models for program planning -- was unrealistic. Our examination of projects uncovered extreme variation in the _way_ planning is done and _by whom_. These observed variations are due in part to the large number of factors which influence how planning can and does occur. While it is possible to abstractly describe how some of these factors affect planning, they can combine in a thousand different ways.[1] As a result, each community presents to the program planner a unique set of circumstances. It is impossible to present a definitive set of prescriptive "how-to's" which, if followed, would result in a well-planned and successful crime prevention program in all situations. At best, it is possible to discuss the types of problems which typically occur during planning and present some alternative suggestions for dealing with them, based upon the experiences of other community crime prevention planners.

III. Issues in Community Crime Prevention

The survey of practitioners also revealed that the simplicity of the phrase "planning a community crime prevention program" disguises a number of very controversial and sensitive issues. They are the kind of philosophical and political issues that have not been (and probably cannot be) resolved in any general sense. These issues have to do with control and authority, the role of the citizen, the impact of different values of different groups, and the role of planning in a democratic political system like we have. It shouldn't be surprising

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[1]These factors and how they influence the planning process are discussed in Chapter 3.

that these kinds of issues come up since they have been with us continually since the founding of the Republic, and even before that. We have not been able to observe the "truth" about any of these matters, but we have seen that these abstract political controversies are alive and well from coast to coast in some very concrete situations. Whether they are aware of it or not, all community crime prevention projects take sides on these issues. And the fact that they do has important consequences for the way the program is designed and for how it works in the community. The source of conflict in these issues is that some key terms have very different meanings and interpretations. These terms -- "community crime prevention," "crime," "citizen involvement," and "community-based" programs -- are used all the time, but different people in the field don't always mean the same thing when they use them.

A. Interpretations of Community Crime Prevention

It is impossible to define, once and for all, what is meant by the term "community crime prevention." Perhaps the best thing to do would be to list the wide variety of programs we found in our survey.[1] This variety includes many crime-specific programs, but also programs that focus on victims or have general educational goals. All of these kinds of programs are called community crime prevention by their directors and are being funded as crime prevention projects. We can bring a little order to this list that will simplify matters somewhat.

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[1]This is essentially what Lavrakas does to open his discussion of the state of the art in community crime prevention. See Paul J. Lavrakas, "Deliverable Project I: Preliminary Conceptual Framework, Preliminary Research Hypotheses, and Preliminary Methodological Issues," (mimeo), Citizen Participation and Community Crime Prevention Project, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University (November, 1978), pp. 1-4.

One very broad area of agreement is that community crime prevention refers to projects operating in the community where some amount of citizen activity in developing and/or implementing the program is present. This eliminates programs like police preventive patrol, which may deter crime but does not involve citizens in any active way. But beyond this there are several alternative ways to classify the various approaches to crime prevention, none of which includes all of the activities actually found in projects.

The basic reason for such variation is that there are many ways to look at crime: at the offender that commits it, the victim who suffers it, the underlying factors that cause it, the system of justice that reacts to it, the people who benefit indirectly from it or suffer from it, the institutions that pay for and moderate the consequences of it, and so on. Each of these points of view reflects but one step in a cycle of crime, and each step is linked to other steps in the cycle. In principle, we can reduce crime by intervening at any one of these steps. For example, without a reason or a need to do so, most people would not become offenders; without offenders, there would be no victims; without victims there would be no need for criminal justice or victim compensation; and so forth. This cycle may eventually go full circle to affect the underlying causes of crime in a positive or negative way, and begin again.[1]

In the absence of a generally acceptable definition, we have returned to a description of the kinds of programs we found in our investigation. The activities included in community crime prevention

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[1] For a concrete example of a crime life cycle, see Chapter 4, pp. IV-5 - IV-11.

programs fall roughly into four categories, each with a different focus, requiring different kinds of citizen action. The four categories are: 1) programs designed to deal with the direct causes of crime; 2) citizen activities to improve the criminal justice system; 3) approaches which rely on reducing the opportunities for crime to occur; and 4) programs aimed at assisting the victims of crime.

Some specific examples may help to illustrate the diverse ways that a community-based program can involve citizens in preventing crime.

1. Working on the Causes of Crime

Programs which attempt to prevent crime by dealing with the direct causes usually focus on the individuals who commit crimes (offenders or potential offenders), and then work with them to remove the conditions that induce them to become criminals. Counseling for juvenile delinquents, providing constructive recreational activities for troubled youth, assisting ex-convicts find a job upon release from prison, drug rehabilitation or drug education projects -- these are all examples of programs aimed at alleviating the conditions which cause some people to become criminals. Citizens usually participate in these programs as volunteers, assisting an official agency or community organization which establishes a formal program.

2. Improving the Criminal Justice System

Some citizen-initiated projects are geared toward encouraging or bringing about changes/improvements in the criminal justice system. Specific activities can include: court-watching, where citizens attend court sessions to monitor sentencing procedures; group pressure for improvements in police services; or lobbying for changes in the

legal system, such as demanding that greater attention be paid to white collar crime, organized crime, or official corruption. While citizens can become involved as individuals, most of these programs are initiated by groups of citizens, organizations, or associations.

3. Reducing Criminal Opportunities

Programs encouraging citizens to take the appropriate actions to reduce opportunities for crime to occur are currently the most popular type of community crime prevention approach. Operation Identification, a program where citizens mark their personal belongings with identification numbers; Neighborhood Watch, where citizens join with their neighbors to watch out for and report suspicious activity; home and business security measures (locks, alarm systems, good lighting, etc.) — are all examples of strategies which are aimed at discouraging crime by making it riskier or more difficult for the criminal to act. Most opportunity reduction programs focus on preventing burglary, although there are a number of actions which individuals can take to reduce the likelihood of rape, robbery, and theft. Many law enforcement agencies are involved in initiating or sponsoring this type of crime prevention program. And most are willing to assist citizen groups and organizations who wish to become involved in such programs.

Growing out of the idea of opportunity reduction is crime prevention through environmental design. This approach reduces opportunities for crime through the physical design of buildings, neighborhoods, or communities, in order to maximize the control law-abiding citizens can exert over their surroundings and to minimize the ease with which criminals can operate.

4. Assisting Crime Victims

Most of our energies and resources have gone into controlling crime. It has only been in recent years that programs designed to provide assistance and services to the victims of crime have been developed. Examples of these kinds of programs include: rape crisis centers, where sexual assault victims are provided psychological counseling and medical services; victim/witness programs, in which crime victims are counseled as to available services, court procedures, and appropriate testifying behavior; and crime victim compensation programs. In the strict sense, these programs do not "prevent crime" in the same way as the other programs discussed. Some of these projects, however, have an indirect crime prevention objective. For example, rape crisis centers may encourage victims to report the crime to the police, thereby increasing the likelihood of criminal apprehension; or, to the extent that counseled victims make better witnesses in court, the probability of conviction (and, therefore, crime reduction) is increased.

B. Interpretations of Crime

It's long been known that what is considered criminal depends on the values and expectations of the culture. In fact, we find that even within our culture, people who belong to different groups or live in different places will often have alternative ideas about what constitutes criminal activity.

Beyond this obvious difference, there is a more subtle difference in interpretations of what is meant by "crime." It is often the case that police and other official criminal justice agencies define crime problems in different terms than do private citizens. In part, this

situation results from the fact that citizens relate to the immediate neighborhood where they live, while official agencies are oriented toward larger geographic areas, such as the community or city, police beats/districts, etc. But it is also true that official agencies define crime in legal terms (such as robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, grand larceny, sexual assault, homicide), which sometimes mean very little to the citizen. From the official perspective, the "seriousness of the crime problem" is identified by the frequency with which each category of legally-defined crime occurs.

The citizen, on the other hand, thinks of crime in terms of the activities in his neighborhood which concern him, or those which offend his sense of right and wrong, or which he sees as detracting from the desirability of the area as a place to live. Obviously, this is a much broader view of "crime," which may be more appropriately termed "incivility."[1] It includes a number of behaviors, such as petty vandalism, youthful loitering (perhaps accompanied by pot smoking), disturbing the peace, etc., which official agencies do not consider serious. In fact, in most instances, these activities are never reported to the police.

Citizens become impatient with the limitations of the official definitions and perspectives on crime. As a consequence, a citizen may decide not to get involved because he believes that his concerns will not be addressed. The only solution to this problem lies in convincing official agencies that the citizens' perspective on crime may

be different, but their perspective is important if citizens are to become involved in solving crime-related problems.

Just as citizens and official agencies define crime differently in many cases, they also use different kinds of information in defining the problem. Official agencies have a tendency to rely on statistical data and relatively sophisticated techniques to define problems, whereas the citizens are more likely to rely on "gut reactions" or beliefs that "everyone knows" are true. Conflicts can and do occur in projects where one kind of information is ignored or suppressed in favor of the other one.

C. Interpretation of Citizen Involvement

Perhaps the most important premise of community-based crime prevention is that citizens will participate in the program. It has been found that citizens who participate are generally more satisfied with a program, and trust it more.[1] Our own findings in conversations with project directors across the country suggest the importance of citizen involvement in making a program a success.

Beneath this widespread agreement on the benefits of citizen involvement lie some conflicting interpretations of the concept that can lead to very different ways to plan, organize, and run a crime prevention program. Basically, these differences revolve around the kind and amount of citizen participation which is required and desirable. To some extent these differences in participation are based on what skills the citizens have, the objectives of the program,

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[1]See Dan Lewis and Michael C. Maxfield, Fear in the Neighborhoods: A Preliminary Investigation of the Impact of Crime in Chicago, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1978), pp. 30-38.

[1]Richard Cole, Citizen Participation and the Urban Policy Process (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 106-112.

what is thought to be worthwhile doing, and so forth. However, the basic differences seem to rest on alternative interpretations of what is considered the "appropriate" or "right" extent of citizen involvement in crime prevention programs:

(1) In one interpretation, citizen involvement means that the techniques or strategies of crime prevention require citizen participation.

(2) In a second interpretation, citizen involvement means that citizens participate in choosing the techniques or strategies.

(3) In another interpretation, involvement includes both choosing the program and participating in the strategies.

The first interpretation of citizen involvement is based on the realization that most of the strategies of crime prevention require some effort on the part of citizens to make the program work. Therefore, citizen involvement is taken to mean that citizens participate during the implementation of strategies and, in fact, citizen activities are necessary for some strategies to work. For example, Operation Identification requires citizens to buy or borrow an engraver, mark his property, and place a warning sticker on his door.

We tended to find this view of citizen involvement in programs sponsored by official agencies, in projects serving large geographical areas, in middle-class communities, and usually wherever opportunity reduction strategies were emphasized. Community organizing, which is probably the single most important task performed by most projects, tended to occur largely during implementation in programs based on this view of citizen involvement.

The role thus envisioned for citizens is one of "taking responsibility" for fighting crime: "Crime prevention [is not] everybody's business, it is everybody's duty."[1] In this view, the citizen has little or no role in determining how crime should be prevented, rather the citizen is encouraged to take certain prescribed individual or collective crime preventive actions.

The second interpretation of citizen involvement places greater emphasis on the participation of citizens in the formative stages of planning a crime prevention program. Citizen involvement here means that the activities of citizens influence the content of the program by helping define the problem they want to solve and how to solve it.

This second view tends to be more prevalent in community organizations and ad hoc citizens' groups, in small area projects, and where the causes of crime are seen to be specific rather than opportunistic. Community organizing occurs to some degree throughout program development and implementation.

The citizens' role in this second view is one of "taking the initiative" to design and activate the program. One consequence of this may be that projects with this second view of citizen involvement will be more likely to diverge from standard crime prevention strategies, or even from a crime-specific focus toward a more encompassing interpretation of the problems in a community. This kind of development could bring the project into conflicts with police or with official agencies that have more narrow crime reduction goals.

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[1] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, A Call for Citizen Action: Crime Prevention and the Citizen (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Justice, 1974), p. 1.

The distinction that is being made here has many far-reaching consequences for crime prevention projects. It is nicely summarized in a statement from Fourth Power in the Balance.

"...all initiators are participants but not all participants are initiators."[1]

The third view combines the first two. Generally, it doesn't add any greater understanding of possible conflicts in these matters since the issue turns on whether or not citizens participate in initiating and designing a program. Empirically, most programs where citizens help design the program are also programs where they are involved in implementation, although this is not necessarily true.

D. Interpretations of Community-Based

The kind and extent of disagreement we found over the meaning of the term "community-based" refers basically to the decision of who should have authority over and responsibility for programs. In our complicated federal system of government with its many levels of control, this is a very tough problem to resolve. Conflicts over the power to decide have always been a major source of trouble between our levels of government. In this on-going battle between authorities, whoever can claim to be community-based or whoever can claim to speak "for the people" wins extra credit in the struggle for being the rightful executor of the people's will. Cynics will notice that someone can <u>claim</u> to speak for the people when it isn't really true.

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[1] Lawrence A. Gibbs, et al, <u>Fourth Power in the Balance: Citizens Efforts to Address Criminal Justice Problems in Cook County, Illinois</u> (Chicago: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1977), p. 5.

These issues are too basic and too complex for us to discuss here in detail, but three problems associated with the interpretation of what a community-based program is come up in community crime prevention:

(1) Can an official agency run a community-based crime prevention program?

(2) How can any one group within the community claim to be representative of the whole community?

(3) When can we say a community exists upon which to base a program, and is it possible to create such a community if none exists prior to the program?

In the first problem, "community-based" does not necessarily imply <u>local community control</u>. The controversy in this issue is whether an official agency can run a program for a community that simultaneously reflects the particular needs and rights of the citizens in the community and still <u>retains control within the official agency</u>. Programs can operate at the community level under the auspices of an official agency or higher unit of government. In this case, official agencies will define a community-based program as one that is run <u>in</u> and <u>for</u> a community, but not <u>by</u> the community, i.e., control over the program is not given over to the community. Since about 90 percent of the crime prevention projects in our telephone survey depend on federal money for the primary source of funds, this is not a purely academic point.

To put it another way, community-based programs in this first view could be programs in which the community is the <u>object</u> of the program. For example, a planner of a city-wide crime prevention program may decide to designate the areas in the city -- such as neighborhoods -- as the "communities" and then implement the city-wide

plan within these areas according to the priorities of the city. In some instances, these communities may be required to meet certain program criteria in order to qualify for their share. They may have to have high crime rates, or show evidence of local demand for the program. The power to determine the rules the program runs by and to decide the services that will be available are still made by an agency or government above the level of the community where the services are actually delivered. The primary source of conflict is that the official agency may deliver services of a type or in a manner that does not reflect the desires or values of the community.

The second problem is closer in some respects to traditional beliefs about local control. In this case, it can be assumed that at least some members of the local community are in control of the program. Presumably such a program will reflect the values of the community and the needs and wants of the people most affected by the problem since some of these very people control the program. But because community organizations, neighborhood groups, and other informal units of control do not have official or legal ways to use their authority, this may not be the case.

First, there is a problem of representation. Community groups that claim to speak for all the people may or may not represent the full range of their opinions. Unlike official agencies or higher governmental units, many of these groups have no formal way to select leaders or devise representative policies, or even provide a means for all the viewpoints in a community to have an effect on the programs. Usually ad hoc methods are used. There is no sure guarantee that these methods will achieve the representation necessary to ensure that the community as a whole will accept the program.

Further, there is a distinct possibility of conflict between groups that claim to represent the community.[1] Communities are seldom homogeneous entities free of internal divisions. The possibility of conflict over points of view on problems and solutions may be increased by intervention of outside forces, with federal grant money being one commonly cited external source of conflict.[2] Similarly, the hasty or ill-informed selection of a community "representative" to devise or run a program may invite failure.

The third issue in the matter of community-based programs is whether or not a "community" exists upon which to base a program, and if it does not, whether it is possible to create one. The meaning of the term "community" isn't very clear in this issue, but it has something to do with a shared common identity among a group of people who live in the same area. But simply living nearby isn't always enough to create common identities among people. The other components of community are harder to pin down, but they are usually expressed in terms of having similar positive attitudes towards the community as a whole. This issue is especially important in all crime prevention programs that depend upon getting the citizens of an area to exert control over their territory. The most common term used is

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[1]Robert Kidder, "Community Crime Prevention: The Two Faces of De-legalization," Working Paper M-41F, Reactions to Crime Project, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University (August, 1978), pp. 8-9. Cited with permission of the author.

[2]In addition to Kidder on this point, see Paul Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 491-507.

"social control," which means that the majority of law-abiding citizens are encouraged to cooperatively assert their shared norms and preferences on the minority of people who might break the law. This idea of social control is closely related to the idea of community. As suggested above, many opportunity reduction programs -- including crime prevention through environmental design -- depend upon establishing social control in order to achieve crime prevention goals.

The question raised by some observers is whether it is possible to create this community-based social control through a program.[1] They argue that either a community already has the shared norms and preferences and the sense of identity that form the basis of social control, or it does not. If it doesn't it may be very difficult to create it, and therefore, difficult to establish community crime prevention projects that depend on it. One extension of this argument is that if a community already has a sense of itself (in the residents' attitudes), then a program that attempts to create it is unnecessary, even superfluous.

This issue has been discussed in the context of outside intervention trying to create a "community" (such as the federal intervention involved in providing funding through the Community Anti-Crime Program.)[2] However, we believe the logic is sound whether the program

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[1]Robert Kidder, Op. Cit., p. 4.

[2]For a very clear discussion of the logic of this issue in the context of federal intervention into community crime prevention, see Dan A. Lewis, "Design Problems in Public Policy Development: The Case of the Community Anti-Crime Program," (mimeo), the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University (n.d.). Forthcoming in Criminology.

is initiated from outside or inside the community: just because an organizer is a member of the community doesn't mean that all the people in the community share the organizer's ideas about how to "take control of the area for the law-abiding citizens."

E. Interpretations of Planning

One final key term is also subject to differing interpretations; that term is "planning." Because it is the central topic of this report, the term planning will be subjected to intensive scrutiny in the following chapters. Chapter 2 presents alternative ways to think about and define planning. We present our view of planning in that chapter, based on the results of field experience which suggests that both political and analytical aspects of planning are important. In Chapter 3 some of the factors that cause planning to vary from place to place are discussed. These factors are descriptions of the environment in which a program is placed. Chapter 4 is a description of the analytical aspects of the planning process, and shows how applications of the analytical process might be made in realistic situations. Chapter 5 explores the political aspect of planning through the identification of several of the major actors in a community and a discussion of how these actors might affect the planning process. Chapter 6 gives brief accounts of the planning process in each of the six site visits.

IV. Findings and Observations

What follows is a synthesis of the major findings and observations, based upon the results of our analysis of the information sources cited above. Each of these main points is discussed in detail in the remainder of the document.

● Planning in most community crime prevention programs tends to vary significantly from the textbook model of formal planning procedures.

Even though many projects used the language of formal planning analysis -- "goals," "strategies," "impacts," "evaluation," and so on -- they did not arrive at their goals or strategies by self-consciously using the techniques advocated by many professional planners.

In practice, the planning process is highly political -- it is a process of resolving conflicts and getting consensus on a program. Often, the general substance of a program is known before the goals, objectives, and strategies are specified. People backtrack and apply planning logic to justify what they already believe to be true. Much of the formal planning that does occur seems to be in order to get grants.

● Related to the limited use of the rational planning model, most projects are not equipped to do thorough formal evaluations of their programs, although evaluation does occur.

Formal impact evaluations are costly and require technical skills to accomplish. Most projects, especially smaller ones, do not have the resources to do such evaluations. This does not mean, however, that evaluative judgments are not made. Many projects do simple process evaluations that monitor project activity. More importantly, most projects develop informal methods to get feedback on how well the program is received by the community and official agencies (especially the grantor agency). Modifications and adjustments are made on the basis of these assessments.

● Many community characteristics vary from locality to locality, and combine to make each community unique; therefore, the planning process in each community is unique.

Some of the characteristics that were found to be related to variations in the planning process are:

-the type of sponsoring agency;

-the socio-economic characteristics of the community;

-the area's level of crime and perceptions of crime;

-the kind and number of community organizations;

-the scope of the target area; and

-the kind and amount of resources.

● Official agencies use formal planning techniques more often and more readily than do citizens' groups.

Official agencies often have staff members and access to the other resources needed to perform formal planning steps. But many projects -- especially those planned by ad hoc citizens groups -- have limited access to the information and expertise required by formal planning. With experience, citizens groups can become adept at using formal planning techniques, often with outside technical assistance.

● Citizens' groups usually handle the politics within the community better than official agencies do.

Citizens' groups are often more familiar with the political context within the community, than official agencies are. It is generally felt that by virtue of being "closer" to the community, these groups are in a better position to know and reflect the values and preferences of the people living there. Established political contacts can provide the citizen's group/community organization with the basis for developing consensual support for a program.

● Most crime prevention projects experience conflict over one or more aspects of the program.

Some of the more common conflicts have to do with disagreements between citizens and professionals/"experts," between citizens and police, or between competing groups in the community. Program design and control are the usual areas of disagreement, including conflicts over the program "turf," over substantive program issues, or over participation (or lack of it) in the program. Projects serving large geographical areas and/or heterogeneous populations usually find it more difficult to arrive at a consensus on the form and content of the program.

● Official agencies tend to believe that politics occurs during implementation, not during program development.

Many official agencies treat the program development stage of planning as an exercise for experienced professional planners who can use advanced techniques and quantitative methods. Then, in this view, citizens are involved in planning during the implementation stage, and this participation takes on a political character.

● Representation -- the extent to which a program incorporates and reflects people's interests, values, and opinions -- is an issue which is common to all projects; but few projects are representative of all interests.

Many program planners are not consciously aware of this issue in the planning process, and consequently don't devise appropriate methods to obtain the input of all affected groups and interests. Projects often serve a particular clientele, or sub-group of the area, and represent only part of the various interests in a given community.

● Many project directors assert that citizen involvement during program development would be desirable, but few are successful in doing it.

Many project directors commented that it was important to involve all affected groups and agencies as early as possible in the planning process. However, few seem to do this. Their failure to involve important affected interests stems from a failure to understand the importance of the issue soon enough in planning, a lack of knowledge about who should be involved, or a lack of attention to some implications of the project. Many of the conflicts and problems experienced by projects stemmed from these sorts of failures.

● Citizens can be motivated to begin community crime prevention programs, but such programs are difficult to maintain solely on the basis of the crime problem.

Citizens have concerns and priorities other than crime and they view crime as only one of the problems facing their neighborhood or community. While crime can be used as an organizing issue, citizens are likely to lose interest if the program isn't allowed to expand to deal with their other concerns about the neighborhood. Most crime prevention programs find it difficult to maintain a crime-specific focus and still keep citizen interest and involvement high.

● Very few, if any, crime prevention programs exist over a long time period solely on volunteer efforts (contributions of time and/or money from citizens).

Long-term volunteer activity by the same individuals is very unusual. Programs relying on volunteers face a constant struggle to recruit new volunteers. It is even more difficult to run a voluntary program in poor areas where there are fewer resources (both less money and fewer people with extra time available).

● The major expenditure of time and effort in most projects is directed toward reaching and mobilizing citizens and community groups in support of program initiatives.

The single most time-consuming and expensive part of most crime prevention projects is the activity of organizing. Nearly all community-based projects do this at some point in the program, either for general political support or for involvement in specific tasks, and sometimes for both. Surprisingly similar strategies are used under the guidance of very different sponsors in very different settings. Two of the most common strategies are block-club organizing and educational meetings.

● Many projects use existing community organizations as a channel to reach and mobilize individual citizens.

This strategy is applied differently, depending upon the number and type of organizations already existing in the community. In areas where there are no strong community organizations, crime prevention projects have done their own organizing, or have created community organizations where none existed.

● Successful participatory programs provide a number of different ways to involve citizens.

Meaningful activities must be provided in order to motivate citizens to participate in a crime prevention program. This means that different activities, tasks, and ways to become involved need to be provided that match with the different interests, needs, skills, and abilities of citizens.

● Community crime prevention projects in large target areas almost always partition or sub-divide the large area into smaller ones so that the program can more nearly match the needs of the people living in each sub-area.

There are both analytical and political conveniences to using smaller areas as the units for developing and implementing a program. From the analytical perspective, some areas require more resources and efforts than others, and need to be prioritized accordingly. It is

difficult to begin a large area program all at once, given typical resource constraints. From the political point of view, residents' preferences, priorities, and perceptions of problems are more likely to be relatively similar in smaller areas. It it not possible, however, to prescribe the ideal size for a planning unit.

● Police support and cooperation is usually necessary for a community crime prevention program.

Police can provide data, advice, manpower, and legitimacy to a program. Some strategies depend on police cooperation, which must be obtained from both the upper and lower levels of the police hierarchy. The support of one part of the police hierarchy does not necessarily imply the support of the rest of it, which some programs discovered to their dismay.

● Police are more likely to support crime prevention strategies that assist them.

Police recognize that citizens can function as their eyes and ears on the street. But some strategies seem to imply more citizen control over police business, or imply a criticism of the way the police do their job. These strategies are not greatly appreciated, and police opposition may be the result. Such conflicts may be heightened in communities where there is a history of distrust or conflict between police and people.

● A project's typical relationship with an official agency is as a funding source.

This is true whether the project sponsor is an official agency itself, or a citizens' group. The funding source has considerable influence over planning and program content, especially if it is the only source of funds anticipated. Official agencies, particularly LEAA, fund a large majority of the community crime prevention projects in existence.

CHAPTER II

AN INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING

I. A Story of Planning and Community Action

Essentially, social action programs (like crime prevention projects) are a response to a problem. For various reasons, things happen in society that threaten or harm citizens in some way. Some of these adverse events can best be confronted by collective action, whether by the government or by the citizens themselves. These collective responses to problems happen all the time as concerned citizens mobilize to improve their living conditions.

The unfortunate thing is that many of these collective responses are unable to achieve what they set out to do. The following hypothetical example shows some of the reasons a program may fail to make desired changes. The example here is a realistic one, taken from numerous crime prevention projects across the country, although it doesn't completely reflect the circumstances of any one individual project.

The scene is set in a neighborhood of a large city. The area has suffered some of the decline often found in inner-city neighborhoods. Crime rates -- especially for property crimes -- are relatively high. Large proportions of the population move in or out of the neighborhood every year, although many families have remained for years. This is especially true of a group of senior citizens who have lived in the neighborhood for most of their lives. The younger new-comers and the older long-term residents don't socialize very much, so the children of the newer families and the elderly are unknown to each other.

Yet, it is still a desirable place to live for many people who feel positive about the neighborhood. A Neighborhood Improvement Association has been formed by a group of the newer residents to further the interests of the area.

Then a series of unusual crimes disturb the day-to-day routines of the neighborhood. A series of elderly ladies have their purses snatched away in broad daylight, and a couple of them are injured fairly seriously in the rough and tumble of the confrontation.

There's always been crime in the area, but this time it's different. For one thing, it's happened frequently in a short period of time, and some people are more fearful than they've ever been before. The senior citizens are especially fearful, in part because as victims they are particularly vulnerable. Finally, one of the ladies who was robbed and injured is the mother of one of the members of the Neighborhood Improvement Association.

The Association member is the catalyst that brings the problem to the attention of others in the community. This person's personal motivation is enough to get other members of the Association and the neighborhood ready to do something. The Association organizes community meetings to discuss the problem. Initial enthusiasm is high. Many participants in these early meetings express eagerness to act as a group and volunteer to help. The first actions of the Neighborhood Ad Hoc Committee to Put Down Purse Snatching are to make up lists of volunteers willing to do something and to appoint another, smaller committee to figure out specifically what to do.

From the beginning, the research committee sees the problem as an obvious one: elderly people are being assaulted and robbed on the

streets, probably by juveniles according to one victim's description. They immediately begin considering solutions, and their first idea is again an obvious one: more police officers in the neighborhood. Even though police response to the crimes has been prompt and as forceful as possible, it hasn't been enough to stop the rash of crimes. But, they reason, if there are more police patrols the perpetrators will be caught in the act, or will become discouraged by the increased police presence.

Members of the Ad Hoc Committee journey down to the police station to meet with the police chief to demand more patrols. Unfortunately, the police explain that it's not possible to increase patrols even at certain hours of the day: it's very expensive to maintain a cruiser; there aren't enough to go around as it is; they don't have it in their budget to hire more officers; and the chances of catching someone in the act are pretty slim anyway.

Then someone in the research committee comes up with an idea she's read about that has worked in other cities: an escort service for the elderly.

The Ad Hoc Committee begins to sign up volunteer escorts. Visits are made to elderly housing units and senior citizen groups to tell them about the escort service and to ask them to inform others. Cars begin to shuttle from the senior citizens' high rise to downtown and suburban stores and offices.

But it's a constant effort to get and schedule volunteers, and the responses of the senior citizens to a program that helps them is somewhat disappointing. Many of them still take cabs and buses or walk to stores in the neighborhood. Volunteers are especially hard to

find for certain times of the day such as early morning or mid-afternoon. Yet those are the times when escort demand is high.

And worst of all, the elderly continue to be victimized. An old gentleman is pushed to the ground and robbed while waiting for a bus; a lady suffers a broken hip and has her shopping bag strewn across the sidewalk when a purse snatcher shoves her over a fire hydrant and into the gutter.

The committee members conclude that the escort service is simply not big enough or organized enough to do the job. They assume that the reason the program is not reducing the wave of street crime is because not enough senior citizens are taking advantage of the protected rides. They also assume that this is because the Ad Hoc Committee cannot supply enough escorts at enough times to meet demand. In other words, they assume, above all, that more of the same is needed. They believe that if they could just get some money to hire more escorts, they could solve the problem, so they begin to look for ways to get a government grant.

The Ad Hoc Committee is really trying to answer the question "What went wrong?" and then do something about it. Their response, however, just reinforces the program decisions they've already made, rather than examining them carefully to see if alternative strategies are available that might work better. But the Committee is in no position to make such a critical assessment because they have operated only on the basis of their own efforts and assumptions. They know they have a failure on their hands, but they don't know for sure why it's a failure, or what they can do to turn it into a success. They didn't plan their program ... an unfortunately common experience.

One undeniable consequence of this failure is to drain the enthusiasm the participants had in the beginning, making it very difficult to revive citizen support for the program. This is also a frequent occurrence: citizens who are ready and willing to work misdirect their energies and then lose the enthusiasm necessary to try again to solve the problem.

From our privileged point of view on this project, we can begin to identify some of the common mistakes which were made here.

In the broadest terms, we would say that there has been a lack of planning in the project. Planning involves utilizing both politics and formal analysis to design a program that can successfully achieve the goals of the project. Even small, straightforward projects like the one we are talking about here can benefit from planning.

To begin at the beginning, there is nothing unusual about the way this community initially responded to the problem of purse snatching with a spontaneous commitment to do something about it. But their troubles started almost immediately as they began the process of problem identification and definition.

The citizens assumed they knew what the problem was -- assault and robbery on the street -- and proceeded to try to eliminate it. While probably not a wrong statement of the problem, it is only one definition and it is inadequate. A more conscious effort to explore and define the problem may have led to a more refined statement or perhaps even uncovered other important problems.

In the first place, the Ad Hoc Committee apparently didn't have much input from the senior citizens -- those who were experiencing most of the victimizations -- in deciding what the problem was or what to do about it. Yet the elderly are the target group (what an official agency might call a clientele) that the project is supposed to help. A more thorough attempt to get senior citizens' views in defining the problem might have led to very different results. Perhaps they would have defined the problem more in terms of the paralyzing fear which kept them from wanting to go out at all. Or, for some the problem may be how to deal with the consequences of having been victimized -- the psychological trauma, or the economic loss which is far more severe for someone living on a fixed income. Or, alternatively, maybe most of the elderly in the neighborhood aren't concerned about the robberies at all. Had they been asked, they would have identified burglaries, which occur much more frequently, as the most serious crime problem in the neighborhood.

Let us assume, however, that the Ad Hoc Committee was correct in identifying the problem as elderly victimizations of robbery and assault. Still, involving the elderly in problem definition might also have given the program developers more and better information. For example, the elderly might have been able to identify some of the factors contributing to the problem, such as why they were targets (e.g., cashing social security checks at certain times of the month?); to provide more detailed information about who the offenders were, or data needed to establish patterns, such as when and where most of the mishaps occurred (e.g., do they coincide with the end of the school day?).

In addition to consulting with the elderly in the neighborhood, the Committee could have made more efforts to collect additional information from other sources that would have helped them to define the problem more precisely.

The police, for example, are another source of objective data, (in the form of analyses of crime statistics), as well as informed opinions about the problem and its causes. Social service agencies, youth-serving organizations, the local schools, other official agencies, and senior citizen organizations would have been additional sources of information to help define the problem and its causes. Rather than collect information to verify or clarify their assumptions about the problem, the Ad Hoc Committee made the common mistake of moving quickly to considering solutions to the problem, even before the problem was clearly defined.

Finding solutions to problems is the process of program development, where the goals and objectives of the program in solving the problem are determined, and strategies to achieve these are chosen. The Committee's initial solution was the strategy of increased police patrol. However, even at this point, the police were not invited to contribute their ideas about what could be done to solve the problem. The police were only asked to commit more of their resources. The police may have also suggested alternatives to either increased patrols or escort services if they had been requested to participate in program development.

Others in the community -- individual citizens, leaders, organizations and groups -- might have had different opinions about what needed to be done to solve the problem. An attempt to assess the needs of the community by contacting, interviewing or surveying others might have uncovered a whole different set of alternative strategies. While there was citizen involvement in the early stages of the project, clearly there was no attempt to get representation and participation of all affected interests in the community. For example,

had our group contacted all organizations serving seniors in the area for advice and opinions, they might have found out that an escort service had been tried several years back and it didn't work then either. Or maybe there already was an escort service available to the seniors through the local transit authority and the best use of our group's resources would have been to go door-to-door and publicize the availability of the bus company's "Senior Citizen Van", rather than duplicating services already available.

In general, participation of all interests in the community directly or indirectly affected by the problem will lead to a better choice of program goals, objectives, and strategies. The involvement of those most directly affected -- in this case the elderly -- is once again critical. The elderly might have been able to tell the well-meaning group of citizens why an escort service wouldn't be successful and could have suggested alternative program ideas which were higher priority to the elderly. At the very least, involving them in the process of designing the program would have insured more enthusiastic support and commitment during project implementation. This is of particular importance when the crime prevention strategies require citizens to take action in order for the program to work. (In this program, citizens had to be willing to volunteer their time, and the elderly had to sign up and want to be escorted.)

Successful implementation, in other words, depends upon a number of activities which must occur according to some workplan, which should also include a timetable for when the program activities are supposed to occur. Our hypothetical program depends upon volunteers to perform certain tasks. But the volunteer escorts may not have the flexibility

needed to fit the needs of the riders. Volunteers may be scarce in the middle afternoon because their own children are returning from school, but middle afternoon is precisely when the escorts would be most needed if the culprits are in fact juveniles on the loose after school. This is but one example of the kind of coordination problems many programs face.

Further, the seniors did not participate at a high rate. In part this may be because they weren't consulted from the beginning; rather they were simply told about it by the Committee. Or, it may be because they either don't know about the service (seniors who are fearful don't go out to club meetings), or can't use it because it's inconvenient (volunteer escorts may not be as flexible as taxis). Or, the program might not be working because of differences or conflicts in values. The senior citizens may value their independence and believe in their own capabilities; they may not want to feel weak and dependent upon others, which might be implied by the concept of an "escort service."

We have listed but a few of the possible explanations for the failure of one group of citizens, acting in isolation for what they believe to be the best interests of the neighborhood to solve a problem.

If the Committee has any spare resources at this point, it may be able to evaluate its program efforts to find out what went wrong and why, and then modify the program to make it serve the community better. Evaluation and modification are basically what the committee is trying to do when it decides that the program isn't succeeding and that more money is needed. But, as this discussion suggests, the

conclusion of the Committee -- to try to obtain government funding (read: power) in order to do more of the same -- is most likely not the correct assessment. If anything, competing for money with other organizations may stimulate damaging conflicts with others in the community. A more effective response would be to start over and plan a program with the involvement of people in the community.

This short story about one community group's response to a crime problem was designed to accomplish several purposes. It introduces the reader to the terminology, the concepts, and the language of planning. It illustrates some of the typical mistakes which often are made in the process of developing a cooperative effort aimed at reducing or preventing crime. People would rather act ("We've got to do something"), than plan. This undisciplined enthusiasm often leads to a sense of accomplishment in the short run ("I spoke to 50 organizations on crime prevention..."), but a feeling of frustration in the long run ("...but crime still increased!"). Or worse yet, as our story suggests, programs fail and quietly die despite the best of intentions. The point is that planning can make a difference: it can help to make a program better, more effective, and more successful.

Finally, this story helps to illustrate that planning is an inseparable combination of politics and formal analysis. The following discussion will explain what is meant by this statement.

II. The Basics of Planning

- "Planning is an ongoing process."

- "Planning is a problem-solving journey... that continues throughout the life of a program."[1]

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[1]Don Koberg, Universial Traveler: A Systems Guide to Creativity, Problem Solving, and the Process of Reaching Goals (Los Altos, California: W. Kaufmann Co., 1976).

- "A plan is a blueprint or a guide for action... the script that produces a successful program."

- "Planning is a series of events, stages, steps, phases, and activities."

All of these various ways to define planning suggest that there is some common process occurring in the development and operation of a program, regardless of its content. Diagram II-1 illustrates the series of steps which most textbooks on planning would say comprise a model of the planning process.

This skeletal framework doesn't say anything about how planning occurs, nor about who is or should be involved in the planning process. It does suggest that planning is logical; that there is some reason for the way in which the steps are ordered. For example, all programs are a response to some problem in the environment. It is the definition of the problem, therefore, that serves as the basis of the program which is developed to solve it.

Program development follows logically from problem definition because programs are the proposed solutions to problems. Diagram II-1 suggests that ideally during the stage of program development there are several steps which occur: determining program goals, setting objectives, and selecting program strategies. In practice, these three steps are often not followed in order. Many planners go directly from a problem statement to selecting one or more program strategies. Often, the goals and objectives of the program are not written down and made explicit in the same way that strategies are. Regardless of how self-consciously planners examine and evaluate alternative ways to solve the problem, they do at some point make a decision and a commitment to certain program activities, based on the

DIAGRAM II-1: _A Simplified Model of the Planning Process_

chosen strategies. (Or the program remains at the talking stage forever.) The actual carrying out of these activities -- implementation -- is the next logical step.

Finally, almost all projects obtain and use some kind of information as the basis for evaluating their program. As a result of knowing what is and what is not working, changes or modifications are made so that the program will work better in the future. As the Diagram suggests, these changes can occur in the way the program is being implemented (e.g., from relying on volunteers to hiring a paid staff); or in the strategies (a change from mass meetings to door-to-door canvassing); in the objectives of the program (e.g., from enrolling people in Operation Identification to organizing block watch clubs); or in the goals (readjusting goals to make them more realistic or setting completely new ones); and finally, new information may suggest that the problem itself has changed, necessitating a new definition of the problem.

Now let's go beyond this simplified framework of the planning process. As suggested previously, there is not total agreement about what the term "planning" means. Many people, for example, would agree with the following definition: "Planning is an analytic process in which an organization attempts systematically to make rational choices for the future. The emphasis is on the process by which choices are made, rather than the choices themselves."[1] According to this point of view, "planning" is a formal analytic process where the collection and analysis of objective data and information (usually quantitative)

_____

[1] Alfred Blumstein, "A Model to Aid in Planning for the Total Criminal Justice System" in Quantitative Tools for Criminal Justice Planning (Washington, D.C.: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975), p. 129.

forms the basis for assessing alternatives and making decisions. This formal view of the planning process is illustrated in Diagram II-2.

Nothing is said in this definition about who actually does the planning (i.e., who participates in making the choices). Rather, the emphasis is on the "how" ... the formal techniques of planning. The underlying assumption, therefore, is that some technical expertise is required in order to collect and analyze all of the needed information according to scientific standards of reliability and validity. Given the same set of information, the presumption is that the same choices would be made, regardless of who does the planning, since it is the content of the information and the rules of logic, reason, mathematics, and economics which prevail. Politics enters into planning only at the point of implementation, when the program must be "sold" to the citizens in the community; they must be persuaded or forced into accepting the program activities and participating according to the plan.

Without diminishing the importance of formal analysis during the planning process, our research and experience indicate that this conceptualization is inadequate. It ignores some important aspects of how planning actually occurs in most social action programs. By definition, this approach limits participation and involvement during program development to a small number of people who usually must have some formal, technical training in planning. This view contributes to the bad name planning has acquired over the years: the notion that plans usually sit on shelves in some bureaucrat's office collecting dust; that planners are bureaucrats sitting in offices

DIAGRAM II-2: *The Formal View of the Planning Process*

A

PROBLEM EXISTS

*People Recognize it
and Determine to
Do Something
about it.*

PLANNING

*Formal
Analysis*

PROBLEM DEFINITION

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

❶ *Determine Goals*

❷ *Set Objectives*

❸ *Select Strategies*

Politics

IMPLEMENTATION

EVALUATION

MODIFICATIONS

downtown dreaming up plans that never happen. Minimizing the importance of the political aspects of planning throughout the process (and hence, to limit involvement and participation) leads to serious and sometimes fatal errors.

An alternative view of planning is pictured in Diagram II-3 and is exemplified by the following quotation:

> "...planning is...a practice which openly invites political and social values to be examined and debated. Acceptance of this position means rejection of prescriptions for planning which would have the planner act solely as a technician."[1]

This view of planning explicitly recognizes that the series of decisions which make up the planning process involve subjective choices (often involving controversy), that cannot be decided solely on the basis of objective data analysis. Furthermore, if the planning process is to be democratic -- capable of producing a program which has popular support -- the process must work to include rather than exclude citizen participation. That is the essence of what is meant by the "political" side of planning.

III. Our Story of Planning and Community Action Revisited

Now that the basic framework of the planning process has been presented, the reader may want to return to the story at the beginning of the chapter to see how the methods might have been applied to that problem. The discussion of what went wrong with the program devised by the Ad Hoc Committee is especially relevant. In that discussion a number of points are made that illustrate the steps of the planning process as it might have been applied in that imaginary neighborhood.

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[1] Paul J. Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (November 1965), p. 331.

DIAGRAM II-3: _The Alternative View: Planning as Politics and Formal Analysis_

A
PROBLEM EXISTS

_People Recognize it
and Determine to
Do Something
about it._

PLANNING

Politics   Formal
                  Analysis

PROBLEM DEFINITION

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

- _Determine Goals_
- _Set Objectives_
- _Select Strategies_

IMPLEMENTATION

MODIFICATIONS

EVALUATION

The discussion shows the logical progression of program planning. It also illustrates how more and better information and a greater degree of involvement by others in the community could have produced a different result (in terms of both program content and effectiveness).

In re-reading the story and the analysis of what went wrong, two additional important things should be noticed. First, the underlined words are key terms that are important in the planning process: they are, in fact, the language of planning. These terms will be used frequently throughout this Program Model. They have been brought forward and appear in Diagram II-4 to show how they relate to the planning model. Straightforward definitions at this point would be awkward, and not very meaningful. The importance of the terms and their relationship to planning can be judged from the way they are placed and used in the context of the planning process outlined in the story discussion. Their meanings may be clear from this brief use, but they will also be more fully explored when planning is discussed in more detail in the following chapters. It will become clear that the terms refer to decisions and actions taken by real people in real crime prevention projects.

The second point is that the formal analytical and the political aspects of planning are not separated neatly in reality. They occur together, simultaneously, often in the very same action. For instance, a choice of a particular strategy depends not only on the objective data-based description of the problem, but also upon the subjective appraisals and opinions of the people in the area who participate in making the choice. Both objective and subjective kinds of information come into play in making the same program decision.

DIAGRAM II-4:   The Language of Planning

Politics

Agreement

Assessment of
  alternatives

Choice

Citizen involvement

Clientele

Commitment

Community

Competition

Compromise

Conflict

Coordination

Different opinions

Funding

Government

Groups

Input

Involvement

Neighborhood

Organizations

Participation

Police

Politics

Power

Representation

Resources

Support

Target group

Values

Volunteers

A

PROBLEM EXISTS

*People Recognize it
and Determine to
Do Something
about it.*

PLANNING

Politics   Formal
   Analysis

PROBLEM DEFINITION

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

  ● Determine Goals
  ● Set Objectives
  ● Select Strategies

IMPLEMENTATION

MODIFICATIONS

EVALUATION

Formal Analysis

Analyses of crime

Assessment of
  alternatives

Choice

Cost/Benefit

Data

  —why

  —who

  —when

  —where

  —how

Information

Interviewing

Needs assessment

Objective data

Prioritize

Quantitative

Rational

Scientific

Statistical

Surveying

Systematic

Target area

Tasks

Timetable

Work plan

Furthermore, program choices are as much the result of who participates in decision-making (and whose interests are represented), as they are a reflection of data and information sources.

In order to present the ideas in a fairly comprehensible way, the political and analytical aspects of planning have been separated in the diagrams. This is done only for purposes of organizing the discussion, and to emphasize the point that the political process exists and influences planning during its entire course. In practice, the political factors will encroach on the analytical, and vice versa; and often the two are inseparable.

Most of the better projects in the survey did use systematic intelligence and foresight in organizing their programs in order to achieve their goals -- in short, they planned. Some of these projects used sophisticated and technical analytical methods of planning; these projects followed the formal planning process and were improved by it. But it appears that these formal methods were not fully effective if they were applied to real-world events without taking politics into account.

CHAPTER III

REASONS FOR VARIATIONS IN PLANNING

I. Introduction

So far, planning has been considered in a fairly general way. In this chapter we introduce some of the ways to describe or characterize communities and program sponsors (henceforth called "factors") that can affect or have an impact on the way planning is done. The information presented here is largely descriptive in nature. It summarizes the experiences and situations faced by the projects surveyed.

> ● Many community characteristics vary from locality to locality, and combine to make each community unique; therefore, the planning process in each community is unique.

Each community that begins a crime prevention program is different from other communities. It possesses certain population characteristics, an economic situation, a political situation, and a physical environmental structure. Many of these factors affect the way planning can take place in a community-based crime prevention project.

Because each community presents a unique situation to the planner, each of the factors discussed below should be taken into account so that the program which is planned is appropriate for the particular community. Describing a community in terms of the factors discussed here provides the planner with much of the raw material he/she needs to develop an understanding of the community, and with the basis for making some of the important decisions that are part of planning.

The six factors to be discussed in this chapter are listed in Chart III-1. As the reader will notice, some of these factors are related

Chart III-1: Factors Included in Reasons for Variations in the Planning Process	
1. Sponsoring Agency:	a. grassroots group b. community organization c. coalition of community organizations d. official government agencies
2. Size of the project:	a. level of involvement b. problem definition c. program development d. implementation and organization
3. Type of Community:	a. Location – urban, suburban, rural b. degree of population homogeneity c. level of income
4. Degree of Community Organization	

5. Crime:	a. amounts
	b. types
	c. perceptions of crime
	  (1) interpretation of crime
	  (2) concern vs. fear of crime

6. Resources:	a. money b. human c. organizational d. time

to each other in a fairly consistent way. To the extent that there is overlap between some of these factors, it will show up in the discussion below. For example, it is likely that the larger the area and population served by a project, the less alike or homogeneous the population will be. Still, these two factors affect planning

planning differently, and must be considered separately. Chart III-1 may be considered an outline for the rest of this chapter.

II. Sponsoring Agencies

The sponsoring agency is the organization that is funded to actually do the program, which usually implies that the sponsor is also the organization that initiates and controls the planning and development of the program. Therefore, the type of sponsoring agency makes a difference in planning community-based programs because it largely determines who will have an input into which planning decisions and when in the planning process. Some sponsors are more open to citizen initiative and citizen control than others. This fact changes both the way a program is planned and the content of the program.

Four types of sponsoring agencies were identified in the telephone interviews: the ad hoc grassroots group, the established community organization, the coalition of community organizations, and the official government agency. Chart III-2 briefly describes the four types in terms of some of the characteristics these agencies have that affect the way they plan. These characteristics include: where the initiative for program decisions is located; the organizational structure of the sponsor; its relationship to the community in terms of authority and representation; the sponsor's internal resources and its access to external resources; and the security of the sponsoring agency (i.e., its length of existence and likelihood of survival). These characteristics suggest the capacities and capabilities of the various sponsors to develop a plan and operate a program. Some of these points are discussed in the following descriptions of each sponsor type.

Chart III-2: Characteristics of Types of Sponsoring agencies

		Ad Hoc Grassroots Group	Established Community Organization	Coalition of Community Organizations	Official Governmental Agencies
Location of Planning and Program Initiative		Citizens. May transfer to a council or staff over time.	Council or staff, with approval of membership and key persons.	Councils, staffs, or key individuals of the organizations which are members of the coalition.	Official planners or politicians begin program, transferring initiative to staff upon establishment of project. Citizens in a reactive role.
Organizational Structure		Relatively informal. Ad hoc Council, with very small staff added after funding.	Varies with size and capacity of C.O. Usually Council plus some staff, with some citizen representation structure. Some bureaucratic characteristics.	Complex structure, depending on how member organizations relate to coalition, share power, share resouces, etc.	Bureaucratic, whether large or small. Clear hierarchy relates sponsor to official policy making agencies or institutions.
Relation to Community		Direct: members and Council come from community. Authority given by community. Group may not represent all points of view in community.	Fairly direct. Members' views are consulted on major decisions. Members demands are often heeded. Members may not be representative of the community.	Indirect, but definite links to people through member organizations. Authority basis mixed.	Indirect. Authority of sponsor comes from officials, not community. Community input via elections, boards, etc.
Internal Resources	Political	Politically legitimate. Accepted by at least some community members. Official contacts probably weak.	Varies. Staff often politically shrewd. Can often mobilize members, public opinion.	Varies. Internal coalition politics are intense. Members' contacts with key persons, citizens may be good.	Poor visibility, may be low legitimacy in some communities. Good contacts with experts, politicians, other officials.
	Technical	Few skills, data, or experienced staff for planning.	Varies. Usually planning experience but little research expertise.	Varies.	Relatively high. Staff, data availability, support services.
Access to External Resources		Usually poor. Little information, contacts re: technical assistance, bureaucracies, grants, etc.	Varies. Strong, older organizations have good access to agencies, grants, etc. through contacts and political clout.	Varies. Coalitions sometimes form to gain access to external resources.	Good. Other agencies, experts are available. May be dependent on politicized budgets.
Security/Length of Existence of Organization		High uncertainty, especially for newer, single-issue organizations with low resource base.	Varies. Older, larger multi-issue organizations are more secure.	Varies. Threat to survival may exist in a coalition's organizational structure.	Relatively good, at least for project staff, who often are civil service.

A. The Ad Hoc Grassroots Group

"Grassroots groups" is a term used by many people to identify almost any community-based organization that has some regular contact with citizens and claims to represent their interests. The term is used here in a more restrictive way. Ad hoc grassroots groups are those groups in the survey that were begun by citizens coming together informally to begin an organization that would help them solve a problem of common concern.

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Observations:  Ad Hoc Grassroots Groups

  - These groups have good contact with some of the citizens in the
  community, although they may not represent the interests of all
  citizens.

  - They are generally not well-connected with official agencies or
  key individuals.

  - They have few of the prerequisites for analytical planning,
  although they may have someone in the group with generalized
  planning experience.

  - Grassroots groups face obstacles in getting information
  about grants and other financial assistance opportunities.
  They also have problems in meeting grant requirements.
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Grassroots groups often begin with single-issue or single objective programs in mind. Sixty percent of the grassroots groups in the survey had programs with victim services, causal, or system improvement strategies.[1] Perhaps more than with any other sponsoring organization, problems are considered "obvious" and not in need of systematic definition and probing. It is the perceived problem which provides the initial impetus for such groups to begin, and the

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[1]This was a far higher percent than for any other type of sponsoring agency.

programs developed often have a very direct problem solving focus. In planning terms, these groups may skip directly from their assumptions about the problem to devising strategies to solve it.

The simplicity of grassroots programs helps in their planning efforts, but in most cases there isn't enough of a formal organization to run even these. Thus, the first task for many of these groups is capturing the spontaneous energies of people who are concerned about a problem and creating an organized way to channel these energies. This is a critical planning task because the quality and type of organization will affect the planning process and its outcomes.

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● Citizens' groups usually handle the politics within the
  community better than official agencies do.
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Usually these groups organize to take advantage of a main strength: solid contact with people in the community. It is these people who supply time, money, ideas, and enthusiasm to an underfunded young organization. All members of the group usually participate in various ways in all stages of the planning process. The initial moral and political force of a grassroots group derives from its direct contact with citizens in the community. However, the group's members may not necessarily be representative of the whole community.

Most of the groups in the survey had already succeeded in establishing a citizens' organization; at least they had formed a core group or council. What they often lacked was political contacts in higher places, and resources like expertise in planning, grantsmanship, or fund raising. They needed to build the organization, establish contacts in official agencies, seek out experts, and initiate a dialogue with other affected groups in the community. Much of this effort involves acquiring the political resources to get critical support for

the program. This planning task may be difficult for grassroots participants who are new to politics and the social action game.[1]

Most grassroots projects operate with fewer analytical planning resources than other projects. The average grant size for this sponsor type was under $50,000 for a 12 to 18 month funding cycle, and many had less than $20,000. This compares to an average of over $100,000 for established community organizations. Small, inexperienced staffs, limited access to official data, low information about outside resources, and a very understandable confusion over the "officialese" of grant guidelines, make formal analytical planning very difficult for grassroots groups. These barriers force ad hoc groups to rely more heavily on the political aspects of planning, and to seek outside resources to bolster their analytical capabilities.

In order to get outside resources, it is often the case that a successful grant application must be made. This, however, may require formal analytical planning: in order to get the money to do planning, you must first do planning ("Catch 22"). Political resources may compensate somewhat in this situation, but the wily planner often seeks assistance from inexpensive or free sources, such as the police, universities, community action agencies, local business groups, and others.

To summarize, the advantages of grassroots groups:

-These groups can capitalize on their close identification with at least some members of the community and their ability to be perceived as representing a legitimate community viewpoint. Approaches which emphasize this strength -- volunteer activity, citizen initiation and involvement in all planning stages, reaction to problems of immediate concern to citizens, etc. -- are more successful.

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[1]See Chapter 5, especially.

The disadvantages:

-They must first build an organization and then tackle the problems. They usually do not compete for resources on an even basis with more established community groups. They lack many of the resources necessary for formal analytical planning, which further hinders their ability to get grants.

B. The Established Community Organization (C.O.)

In this survey, the established community organization was considered a private association with citizens as members that had been formally in existence for some time before beginning the current crime prevention program. It was committed to the community interest as defined by the organization.

C.O.'s ranged in size from small, but on-going single-issue advocacy organizations, to large, multi-issue community development corporations with total budgets in the seven-figure range. In many ways, the established community organization is a grown-up grassroots group. It has acquired the organizational capacity and the official contacts which most grassroots groups lack, and it has more internal resources for planning. Still, a thorough, systematic planning process is rare in these groups, even though some parts of planning, particularly the political aspects, are recognized as important.

The distinguishing feature of the C.O., which seems to determine to a great extent its performance in planning, is its unique position between the citizens and official government agencies. The established C.O. usually has organized contacts at the grassroots, and its governing council is generally made up of community people and sympathizers to the community point of view. Yet the C.O. can be as bureaucratic as a government agency, and the larger it gets, the more like a bureaucracy it becomes. This bureaucratic nature is reflected in a large professional staff that gradually becomes more and more involved in making decisions for the whole organization.

The fact that C.O.'s have features of both grassroots groups and government agencies may introduce some schizophrenia into the planning process. On the one hand, they generally have well-organized contacts in the community, perhaps through block clubs, and much of the power of the organization derives from the people. On the other hand, most of the policy and planning decisions are centralized. Community organizations usually have a council or board which makes policy decisions, and a full-time staff which varies in size from two or three employees to as many as a dozen or more. The council and/or staff are often composed of some people with planning and organizing experience (although not necessarily individuals with research experience). And C.O.'s usually have established contacts in agencies and other organizations. This knowledge and experience often leads to the situation where this bureaucratic part of the C.O. makes planning decisions in response to problems that arise in the community, or to take advantage of funding opportunities presented by outside agencies.

Nearly all C.O.'s recognize that planning is important. But given the typical organizing experience of the staff and the highly politicized nature of this organization, this usually means a reliance on the political aspects of planning. Policy decisions and program initiatives made by council and staff are usually ratified by the organization's members. The needs of the C.O. are to grow and increase the size of its staff, which also adds to its capacity for dealing with official agencies and politicians. At the same time, it must maintain its membership, its final source of power.

Sixty-five percent of the community organizations in the survey had opportunity reduction programs. The typical strategies of this type of program permit the organization's council or staff to retain

control over many planning decisions, obtain federal funding, and utilize the strategies' reliance on community involvement during implementation to build or maintain the organization.

Observations: Established Community Organizations

- Established community organizations occupy an intermediate position between citizens and official agencies. They depend on citizens for the justification for their authority, but they often depend on official agencies and contacts for information, funds, and assistance.

- Established C.O.'s are both community-based and bureaucratic.

Only a few of the C.O.'s in the survey emphasized the importance of the analytical aspects of planning. In part, this reflects the lack of staff research expertise, but mainly analytical planning is considered secondary to political considerations. The most common response to a question about crime data analysis was that it is important in its place, but only if it reflects and substantiates the demands of the people. As one project director put it, "If people can't see the problem, they won't respond to it."

Analytical planning is usually done as a response to grant requirements. To meet these requirements, projects attempt to present the problem and the proposed solution in a systematic way, while also demonstrating community support. Grant guidelines were frequently mentioned as an obstacle, rather than a useful exercise. A number of C.O.'s suggested they lacked the skills and resources to meet the requirements easily.

The advantages of established community organizations are:

- These groups have already built an organization and have established communication channels with citizens in the community.

- Staff members usually have some experience in setting up and running programs, even if not in crime prevention.

- Official and professional contacts are better developed than in grassroots groups. These contacts can be used to get information on new programs, funding sources, and technical assistance.

- Community organizations can make good use of technical assistance, and do so partly to displace some of the planning and management costs onto someone else's budget.

- The larger the community organization, the more able it is to absorb the initial costs of planning. Because of its larger staff, greater experience, and so forth, there are more resources available for planning to get more grants. Getting a grant, in turn, permits the organization to put even more effort into planning and getting more grants.

The disadvantages are:

- There is a constant tension between the need for grassroots support for the organization and the demands of funding agencies for professional expertise and bureaucratic accountability. Efforts to maintain the organization in this situation require constant balancing of sometimes competing demands, and a great deal of effort and expenditure of resources.

- Because of this tension, planning may satisfy neither the grassroots constituency nor the funding agencies.

- As the community organization grows and becomes more adept at meeting the requirements imposed by outside agencies, it may also become more difficult for the C.O. to represent all the points of view in the community -- or to represent any point of view adequately.

C. The Coalition of Community Organizations

In many respects the coalition is similar to an existing community organization. The principal difference is that the formation and operating conditions of a coalition require careful attention to internal coalitional politics. Each of the member organizations has slightly different interests and objectives. They must find some way to compromise their differences in order for the coalition to survive.

The coalition partners need to decide several issues in the context of planning:[1]

- Which organizations shall be members?

- What authority will the coalition have over the member organizations?

- Who will determine what the programs of each member organization will be? Will there be one program for the entire coalition, or will each member organization devise their own program?

- How will resources be divided?

- How will decisions of the coalition be made?

The telephone interviews revealed two main approaches to the coalition.[2] In one form, a number of organizations jointly created an umbrella organization and elected members to its governing council, and this umbrella organization developed a single crime prevention program for the whole group. The second common form was a group of organizations joining together to form a coalition in order to apply for funds that would then be divided among the member organizations.[3] Each organization ran their own crime prevention project. Variations on these two themes are possible.

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[1]Less complex organizations can ignore these. Coalitional issues are similar to other political aspects of planning: various interests must be considered and mutually-satisfactory decisions must be made. "Open-mindedness" and "willingness to compromise" are expressions project members make on this point. Hard-core power politics are not unknown in coalitions, either.

[2]Other categorizations are possible. There were two coalitions between government agencies and community organizations.

[3]Umbrella groups maintain greater central control over the program than coalitions do. Obviously, when control is highly centralized, the "umbrella group" becomes in effect a "community organization."

The choice of coalition partners is critical because it determines what the final program will look like. Often partners are chosen precisely because they can add to the coalition's chances for funding. Less attractive partners may be ignored or rejected. Another concern is representation: an attempt to ensure that all interests and points of view in the community are represented in the coalition's membership.

Because coalitions are sometimes made up of diverse organizations, very different program approaches and strategies may be favored by the individual members. An important part of planning is determining how successfully these different program preferences can fit into one overall program, or how different programs in the coalition can avoid duplication or interference with each other.

It's possible for coalitions to be quite removed from the citizens in the community, especially if the coalition organization itself runs the program. Several project directors emphasized the importance of contacting affected community groups and citizens directly to get their input and support.

The advantages of the coalition are:

-Planning efforts can be shared among the members so that more resources can be devoted to planning.

-By its very existence in an area, the coalition demonstrates that there is an ability and a desire to organize and compromise on a community-wide level.

The disadvantages:

-The coalition structure means there may be difficulty in reaching agreement among the coalition members on a number of vital issues.

-The coalition has a tendency to be removed from the citizens because it usually relies upon its member organizations to cultivate and maintain relationships with the grassroots.

D. The Official Government Agency

Many government agencies sponsor crime prevention programs, ranging in size from small to large. A wide variety of approaches to planning and different program strategies can be found in these projects. Some of the sponsors were part of the criminal justice system, others were not. No police-sponsored projects were included in the survey by design, although three projects were dominated by police units. Most of them receive all or part of their funding from the federal government, especially LEAA.

> ● Official agencies use formal planning techniques more often and more readily than do citizens' groups.

The main distinguishing feature of government agency sponsors is that they are a part of well-established bureaucratic systems. Therefore, they have comparatively easy access to all kinds of resources useful in planning, particularly analytical planning. The bureaucratic structure also imposes certain constraints on these sponsors since political accountability, civil service regulations, and standard operating procedures all limit the policies of the agencies.

Observations: Government Agencies

- These sponsors generally have more resources for analytical planning than other sponsors do. This ability is probably reinforced by the tendencies of bureaucracies to try to centralize and achieve control over policies and programs.

- The degree of community involvement in planning official programs varies with the type of strategy chosen, but it is rarely as extensive as it is for programs sponsored by grassroots or many community groups.

- Official planners tend to believe that citizen involvement should occur only during the implementation stage.

> ● Official agencies tend to believe that politics occurs during
> implementation, not during program development.

A common observation about planning among official agency sponsors,
regardless of the agency's size or the type of program, was that
citizen involvement occurred largely during the implementation stage,
usually as part of a community organizing strategy. One director of
an official city-wide program argued that he could not depend on com-
munity leaders or volunteers since these people are too distracted by
other issues and demands to give full attention to crime prevention.
He found that community leaders played a necessary role in getting
people to open their doors to the organizers, but there was an
"absolute need" for the organizers to be part of his staff, dedicated
to the program, and paid professionals.

This is not an uncommon attitude among official agency planners;
it retains program initiative and planning decisions in the hands of
the official agency. Some problems between planners and citizens may
come up if the citizens want particular (but unofficial) points of
view considered in the plan. Efforts are usually made to take this
into account in the official plan, but ultimate control remains with
the agency.

Few comments were made by official agency sponsors that would
suggest there was any problem with citizen involvement, especially
when compared to the number of times grassroots groups or community
organizations mentioned this problem. Instead, most official sponsors
believed that tapping into a network of community organizations or
key-person contacts is sufficient to assess community sentiment.
Judging from the site visits, this approach was not always successful,
although there are cases where the approach was adequate.[1]

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[1]See the Minneapolis site visit and the Port City report in
Chapter 6.

The advantages of government-sponsored programs are:

-The official agency has more access to resources useful in
analytical planning: expert staff, data, money, and official
cooperation.

-The hierarchic organization may reduce internal conflict.

-Project personnel are relatively more secure than in other
projects because they are usually civil service.

The disadvantage is:

- This sponsor is a bureaucratic entity, and may be distant
from the citizens at the grassroots. This distance may
encourage political troubles between the citizens who are
necessary to the successful community-based program and the
official agencies who try to retain control over it.

III. Size of the Target Area

The size of the target area has many effects on the way planning
can procede within it. Both large and small areas[1] have certain
advantages and disadvantages in planning. There is probably no per-
fect or optimal size for a community-based crime prevention progam.
The projects observed in the survey ranged from a target population of
20 families to multi-county projects.

> ● Community crime prevention projects in large target areas almost
> always partition or sub-divide the large area into smaller ones
> so that the program can more nearly match the needs of the people
> living in each sub-area.

There is a tendency among large sized crime prevention programs to
break down into smaller units or sub-areas for at least some purposes.
This tendency was observed in projects sponsored by both community

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[1]"Large" and "small" are difficult terms to define, and in using
them people often mean different things. In a community-based
program, "small" areas are those where the potential for personal
interaction exists and people can recognize it as "where they live."
Usually this is called a neighborhood. "Large" is an area bigger than
what a person would call his own neighborhood, such as the whole city
or several neighborhoods strung together. These terms are not
necessarily satisfactory, but we hope they make sense to the reader's
intuitions for the purposes of this discussion.

organizations and official agencies. In looking at the effects of size on several important aspects of community-based planning, some of the reasons for breaking down into smaller units will emerge.

A. Level of citizen involvement

The size of the target area clearly has an impact on how people can be involved in planning the program. In very large projects it is difficult, if not impossible, to involve a representative group of ordinary interested citizens. Project directors told us many times during the survey that planning groups cannot be too large or they become ineffective. Consequently, most large area projects adopted the strategy of involving a very select group of officials and key persons in all initial planning stages, including broad problem definition and program development. If the project remains at the large area level, the most effective way to include citizen preferences in planning decisions may be to take a carefully constructed survey of their attitudes, opinions, and preferences.

There are psychological, social and political reasons why it is easier to have more involvement and participation by citizens in all stages of planning in smaller areas. Residents are more likely to know and feel comfortable with each other. The boundaries of small areas are more likely to coincide with natural or perceived neighborhood boundaries. In addition, residents' values, their assumptions about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior, and their opinions about neighborhood problems and crime prevention priorities are more likely to be similar. As a result, conflicts over planning decisions are reduced and it is easier to get representation of all community interests.

B. Problem definition

The type of information available for problem definition varies with the size of the area. In very large areas, there may be enough quantitative information to define the problem adequately, but this is rarely the case in small areas. Most types of crime occur frequently enough on a citywide level that police crime data can be examined to discern patterns. But in small areas, most crimes do not happen often enough that statistical and quantitative techniques can be used. For example, in a small area, one berserk criminal could completely change the area's aggravated assault rate for the year in one day. However, this person's day of violence would not dramatically affect the totals for the whole city. In statistical terms, quantitative data on small areas may not be very reliable.

Also, the boundaries of small areas usually do not coincide with the geographical units by which data is collected. Crime data, for instance, may be collected and analyzed by police beats or census tracts, making it highly unlikely that a neighborhood association covering a few square blocks would be able to get data for their small area. Data not being available or broken out for small areas was a problem that was frequently mentioned by the project directors in our survey.

However, small areas do have sources of information that large areas don't have. The chances are better that people's perceptions of the crime problems are more similar throughout a small area than in a large area where there's more likely to be considerable variation in problems from sub-area to sub-area. This fact, along with the potential for people to participate more fully, makes problem identification based on personal report and dialogue -- that is, more qualitative information -- possible.

One consequence of using qualitative, personal information is that the problems identified may be highly specific to the small area. Large-area projects cannot, and do not, identify problems in such specific terms. This fact leads to a greater reliance on quantitative data and statistical analyses. Not only is the quantitative information more likely to be available, but the problems necessarily are defined in general terms, which requires less citizen participation during problem definition. For instance, burglary is a general problem that occurs frequently across large areas; that is the crime problem most large area projects focus on.

C. Program development

In part, the size of the target area determines the kinds of strategies that are appropriate or possible. In large areas, where the problems are generally defined, strategies that require extensive citizen involvement and group interactions often are not feasible. Large area projects usually cannot motivate or monitor/direct widespread citizen activity. As the size of a target area increases, the chances that all of the areas' residents know and/or care about each other diminshes. Therefore, strategies which rely on interpersonal or group activities, mutual acquaintance, and face-to-face contact are better suited for smaller areas. Strategies which permit independent, individual participation (usually at lower levels of involvement) are more common in large area projects. Operation Identification is an example.

D. Implementation and organization

The organization of a project and the way its program is implemented is affected in an important way by the size of the target area. The impact is variable because size may interact with other characteristics of a project to produce effects. Specifically, a project may break down into smaller areas for some purposes and not others. For example, many of the large area projects sponsored by official agencies in the survey broke down into sub-areas during the implementation stage of planning when community organizing strategies were used. Problems were defined and the program was developed, however, for the large area as a whole, with planning decisions under the control of the central official agency. On the other hand, community organizations serving a large target area usually break up the area into sub-areas, which serve to channel citizen participation during the earlier stages of planning as well as during implementation.

The issue is one of control over planning and program decisions. Projects in small areas may experience conflicts over who's in charge, but the organizational and power-sharing questions are much simpler in principle than in large-area programs.

E. Exceptions to the rule

Not all large area projects break down into smaller units. The large majority of those that do not are projects which serve a specific narrow clientele -- perhaps juvenile first-time offenders -- or try to improve some specific aspect of the criminal justice system. In each of these cases, size of the area is not so important.

IV. Type of Community

There are many factors that might be useful in defining "type of community." Here three factors that seem to be important in planning community-based crime prevention programs are discussed: the location of the project (urban, suburban, or rural); the extent to which the

area's population is made up of people with similar social characteristics; and the income levels of the target population.

A. Location - Urban, Suburban or Rural

Location is a convenient summary of several things that describe the environment of a project. Population size and density, whether people own or rent, the age of buildings, the number of the streets and the amount of traffic they carry, etc. are variables that differ depending on location. Most urban areas are similar in many respects to other urban areas, and the same can be said for suburban and rural areas.[1] Thus, we have made generalizations based on the typical case, which should be applied with care to each project's individual case.

Urbanized areas in the survey were densely populated, with a high proportion of apartment dwellers and renters, as compared to suburbs and rural areas. Some parts of urban areas, such as rental apartment complexes, have a lot of residents who move frequently and develop only passing attachments to the area. Busy urban streets carrying people to and from work may also carry criminal offenders into or out of an area. Planning a community-based program in an area where people do not know their fellow residents and cannot recognize strangers poses special difficulties for planners who want to involve citizens. On the other hand, many urban areas have well-established community groups and a neighborhood identity that may be assets in a crime prevention program, if the planners recognize and use them.

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[1]These characteristics are not _identical_ from one location to another similar one. For instance, some of the older, "inner ring" suburbs of large cities look more and more like urban areas as they age and reach mature development.

Suburban locations are frequently areas of middle class, single-family, owner-occupied homes. Lower traffic volume and more open space may inhibit criminal activity.

The large geographical spaces and low population density of rural areas present several problems to planners. The large distances between residences inhibit surveillance, and make meetings difficult to attend for some residents. In addition, habits and attitudes based on mutual trust are common among rural people, which leaves them unprepared for some crime prevention activities.[1]

B. Sub-groups in the community and planning: Degree of homogeneity

No community consists entirely of one kind of people; and in the United States, the variety of cultures, races, and ethnic backgrounds is probably greater than it is in most countries. Other characteristics, like income, age or sex, can also divide people. Wherever these natural and social divisions occur, they are a potential source of conflict.[2] Different values, outlooks, and experiences, as well as different living styles, may provide the basis for conflicts. Planning in a community-based program must take these into account at all points.

The majority of the project directors surveyed claimed that their target population was "mixed" in some way. In some cases, mixed populations apparently caused no problems in planning the program.

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[1]For a discussion of these and other issues, see G. Howard Phillips, _Crime in Rural Ohio_, Final Report (Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Ohio State University, March 1975). Also see the site visit report on Southeast Polk County, Iowa in Chapter 6.

[2]Other sources of conflict, such as economic position, organizational competition, police-community distrust, and so on, will be discussed in other sections. See Chapter 5 especially.

However, in other instances there were conflicts over resources or problem definition between population sub-groups within communities, and these conflicts affected program planning. There was distinct evidence of sub-group conflict in five of the six visits reported in this volume, although it took different forms in each one and was reflected in different ways in the planning process.

It is impossible to catalog all possible group conflict situations that might occur in planning community-based programs, but several types that occurred in the survey can be reported.

- One sub-group may attribute the crime problem in the community to another sub-group.

- Outside resources such as grants may serve as a catalyst for competition between sub-groups, or may initiate another in a long line of conflicts between these groups.

- Projects that serve large target areas with several different population sub-groups may encounter conflicts over what the problem is, or what should be done about it, especially if other factors such as age or income also distinguish these groups.

Analytically, it may be possible to count, survey, or distinguish these groups for separate consideration in a crime prevention program. This is more likely to be the case where the groups are geographically separated. However, the groups are often living in the same area, and the boundaries between them are social rather than physical. Analytical solutions, such as random surveys, may get a kind of representativeness of opinions from the different groups, but a community-based program will also require some political efforts to actively involve potential adversaries in the same program. To the extent that community-wide support is necessary for the success of a crime prevention program, these political aspects of planning take on more importance.

C. Income Level Effects on Planning

Studies of the geographical correlates of crime often report a strong relationship between the average income of an area and its crime rate. Lower income is associated with higher crime rates.[1] These correlations may not be true for every area at all times, but the generalization is strong enough that the average income of an area may affect planning in two different ways.

First, since low income areas generally suffer more crimes, projects may want to make low income areas high priority targets for crime prevention activities. This will have an effect on how problems are defined, which strategies are chosen, and so on.

The second, and more important point, is that a low average income means that the area has fewer resources to spare for planning and crime prevention than a wealthier community does. Low income areas are more dependent on outside resources -- money, expertise, information -- than richer areas. They are also more likely to view a crime prevention program as a means to get additional resources which the community needs, such as jobs and organizational skills. In this light it is not too surprising that the most successful volunteer-based programs operated in relatively higher income areas. Several directors in lower income communities remarked that people there couldn't be expected to donate time to programs like crime prevention when they had to work so hard for necessities.

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[1]Ronald W. Beasley and George Antunes, "The Etiology of Urban Crime," Criminology, Vol. II, No. 4, 1974, pp. 439-461.

V. Planning and Other Community Organizations

One way communities differ from each other is the extent to
which they contain organizations that provide services to residents.[1]
These organizations may be based on citizen initiative, or originate in
city hall, or they may be branches of larger organizations. The number
and kind of these organizations, and the relationships between them,
are important factors to consider in the planning process.

Organizations that have good contact with community residents will
probably be more useful in a community-based effort than an organization
of experts or professionals, although this depends in part on the kind
of strategy adopted.[2] To get positive results out of associating with
another organization, a project should be sure that the people in the
community have favorable attitudes toward it. Associating with an
organization with a bad reputation could easily hurt a crime preven-
tion project.

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[1]See Chapter 5 for a more complete discussion of community
organizations, which involve numerous political questions.

[2]Some crime prevention efforts, like juvenile offender counseling,
do rely heavily on expert opinion or the support of key persons.

VI. The Effects of Crime on Planning

The long-range goal of a crime prevention program is to prevent or
reduce crime, or to alleviate its effects. Therefore, the level of
crime, types of crime, and individuals' perceptions of crime will
affect the planning process.

A. Level of Crime

The total amount of crime in an area has one major effect on
planning: if there isn't a crime problem, there is no need for a
crime prevention program. Wherever crime is a serious problem or
people are concerned about it or its effects, a crime prevention
program is an appropriate response. Planning then becomes the order
of the day.

B. Types of Crime

Many projects are crime-specific; that is, they focus on a
particular type of crime. For these projects, the type of crime
selected makes a difference in planning. Information about some types
of crime is better than for others, and different kinds of information
are available, depending on the type. Program decisions must be
appropriate for the problem identified, and often a certain type of
crime or its effects figures prominently in the problem.

1. Reporting and non-reporting of crimes

Not every crime is reported to the police, and some crimes are
reported less often than others. The _actual_ crime problem in an area

may be very different from the one indicated by reported crime statistics. Murder, for example, is almost always reported, whereas there is reason to believe that vandalism often is not.[1] Generally, the more serious or costly the crime, the more it is reported. The willingness of citizens to report crimes is an important consideration in both problem definition and program development. If non-reporting is thought to be high, consideration should be given to alternative ways to analyze the problem, other than police offense reports.

2. Frequencies of types of crime

Frequency affects the _kind_ of information that may be used in describing a particular crime problem. If a crime occurs frequently enough (and is well reported), it may be possible to develop and use quantitative methods to describe and analyze the problem, and perhaps to help with program development as well.[2] For instance, many projects aimed at reducing burglary use statistical data to describe and monitor the problem. Some projects have analyzed crime data and found quantitative relationships between burglary and other factors in the community, such as number of apartment houses or proportion of transient residents. These statistical approaches assume that crime is fairly well-reported and that there are enough cases to be analyzed.

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[1]How can we know about crimes that _aren't_ reported to police? Basically, there are different ways to measure the same crime. For instance, victims' answers to survey questions can be compared to official police data. For many crimes, it is apparent that there is under reporting. Notice that this still doesn't tell us what the _true_ crime rate is. See Chapter 4 on data sources for a further discussion.

[2]This point unavoidably raises some technical, statistical issues. In short, statistical methods are based on certain assumptions about the information to which they are applied, or they don't work reliably. One of these assumptions is that there has to be enough cases in the analysis, or the methods cannot be used.

Crimes which occur less frequently, like rape, probably cannot be analyzed with quantitative statistical techniques, unless the area under consideration is very large.[1] In these cases, other kinds of information must be relied upon to provide a description of the problem.

3. Type of crime and strategy

To a great extent, the type of crime determines the strategy of the project. Most strategies are appropriate to counter one type of crime and not others. The definition of a crime problem, therefore, immediately limits strategy selection. It is of little value to mark property with an Operation Identification number if the crime problem is vandalism or assault. O.I.D. is appropriate only for the problem of burglary.

The planning process may differ for some types of crimes, depending on how much experience and effort other crime prevention projects have had in dealing with the crime. Many projects reported that one of their main sources of information on program development was other crime prevention projects. Numerous projects have used the familiar anti-burglary strategies, as an example. Thus, it is fairly easy for a new project to simply adopt a strategy which has proven effective elsewhere. It is desireable and beneficial to share experiences, but projects should evaluate their _own_ situation during planning to be sure these ready-made strategies are appropriate and realistic.

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[1]See discussion on size of area, above.

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Observations:  Type of crime and strategy            │
│                                                       │
│ - Other projects are a main source of program        │
│ development information for most programs. One        │
│ consequence is that program strategies appear to      │
│ be very similar from one place to the next.          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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C. Perceptions of Crime

People act on the basis of their attitudes and beliefs. Action on crime prevention is no different. People need to recognize and understand the need for crime prevention before they will take part in a community crime prevention program.

1. Citizens versus official agencies

There is one finding that occurred over and over again in the survey: citizens often have different ideas about what crime is than official agencies do. A related point, according to numerous project directors, is that people feel they know what the crime problems are where they live. They won't respond to crime prevention programs unless the problem to be attacked is visible and of concern to them. Crime statistics reflect an official, legalistic point of view and may not motivate people who are concerned about different problems.[1]

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ● Citizens often have different perceptions of crime │
│   than official agencies do.                         │
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The planning issue here is basic: unless crime prevention programs reflect the genuine crime concerns of citizens, they won't generate much enthusiasm. Problem definitions of a community-based program must, therefore, try to satisfy these concerns, even if they

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[1]This distinction is discussed more fully in Chapter 1.

are not the ones an "objective" observer would derive from police reports. One project director noted that his program for senior citizens chose reducing street crime as its major goal because that's what the seniors were most concerned about, even though official statistics indicated that burglary was the most frequent crime.

2. Fear of crime

In recent years, many people have noted that fear of crime may be as serious a problem in some areas as crime itself.[1]

There is a distinction between fear of crime and concern about crime. Fear of crime, as it is usually used, means anxiety about perceived crime risk to the point that the person may avoid normal activities.[2] This fear may be unwarranted or irrational in the sense that the person has unrealistically high estimates of his or her chances of being victimized.

Concern, however, means a recognition of crime as a serious problem. Concern about crime is usually seen as a positive asset to a crime prevention program because it can motivate people to become involved in the program. Fear, however, may stop people from participating if they are too fearful to go to meetings or take other steps to alleviate crime problems.

Fear and concern may be confused in the planners minds, with undesirable effects on a program. Many planners are faced with inadequate citizen support, which they may be tempted to call apathy.

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[1]Marlys McPherson, "Realities and Perception of Crime at the Neighborhood Level," Victimology, Vol. 3, 1978, p. 319.

[2]There is some evidence that people do restrict their normal activities in response to fear. See, for example, James Garofalo, "Victimization and the Fear of Crime," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1979, pp. 80-97.

To combat this apathy, they may try to stimulate citizen concern about crime by emphasizing its dangers. But if citizens are already fearful, this can make them even more afraid and cause them to further restrict their activities. This is opposite to the effect intended by the planner.

The planning problem is to distinguish between fear and apathy (lack of concern). But as one project director noted, there is no really good source of information on fear. Fear is an attitude, and as such, the best -- and the only source of information in this case -- is the citizen. Collecting information about fear requires the planner to rely on formal survey techniques, or on talking to people in a less systematic way, hoping to get a general idea about how residents of the area feel.

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Observations:  Fear of crime

- Fear of crime is increasingly recognized as a problem in
its own right, apart from crime.

- Fear of crime is distinct from concern about crime.
Planners may confuse lack of concern and fear.

- Projects which identify lack of concern as a problem when
really it is fear that is the problem may create effects
opposite to the ones they intend.
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VIII. Resources for Planning

There is a mutually interdependent relationship between planning and resources. On the one hand, planning cannot be done if there are no resources for it. Therefore, the kind and amount of resources available will have a very direct impact on the kind and extent of planning that is possible. On the other hand, one of the principal purposes of planning is to capitalize on or make the best possible

use of the resources there are and to augment or expand those resources when needed. The following points about resources will help in understanding this relationship.

A. There are many resources besides the most obvious one of money.

Its true that money is a resource needed by every program in some amount. Money is also the most versatile resource; it is easily and quickly used to buy other resources, such as skilled staff or technical assistance. However, there are other resources available to projects which are necessary for good planning. These include the experience, skills, and abilities of the people working on the project; contacts with other organizations and agencies; information; organizational strength; citizen support in the community; technical assistance; and time.

1. Human resources

The main impact of human resources is the generation of ideas, support, and enthusiasm for the project and its planning process.[1] The cooperation and support of people is a resource community-based program cannot do without. Depending on their level of involvement, citizens may be the basic resource for planning throughout the project. Several of the projects interviewed used volunteers from the community to accomplish most planning tasks.

2. Organizational resources

The previous discussion about the effects of alternative sponsoring agencies on planning illustrates how organizations begin planning for a project with different amounts and kinds of internal

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[1]Strategies for developing support are discussed throughout the consideration of politics in Chapter 5.

resources. As one director noted, planning is something that usually occurs in large, on-going organizations. The survival of a large organization is not threatened if one effort to develop and obtain funding for a new program is unsuccessful. Newer, smaller organizations, however, are struggling for survival and usually do not have spare resources to devote to major planning efforts.

3. Time

Time is a resource which is sometimes ignored. Yet it is a planning resource which must be used wisely, or it goes by taking events and opportunities with it. One-fourth of the projects in our survey suggested that they didn't have enough time to do a good job of planning. Most often, it was the pressure of meeting grant application deadlines which forced people to plan a program in less time than they felt was needed. Yet some people suggested that too much time for planning can also be a problem. People can lose their enthusiasm, momentum, interest, or become frustrated, if planning drags on and decisions aren't made. The passage of time affects planning in another important way: problems change and peoples' priorities and interests also can change dramatically over time.

B. Resources can be traded, substituted, or interchanged.

Many organizations in the survey traded one resource for another, or substituted resources they possessed for ones they didn't have. For instance, staff experience/expertise or volunteer efforts can substitute for money. If a project has a professional staff, they can acquire information and technical assistance, develop political contacts, or build citizen support for the program. Or if an organization has a good reputation and direct ties in the community, it may be able to recruit and rely on volunteers.

This general idea is what "planning to maximize existing resources" is all about. The challenge to the planner is overcoming the obstacle caused by inadequate resources and finding another way to do something using the resources that are available. However, there are limits to what substituting one resource for another can accomplish. Generally, if there is neither money nor community support, it is very difficult for a program to succeed.

C. Different kinds and amounts of resources will affect the types of strategies and approachs which can be chosen.

There are always absolute limits on the total resources a sponsor can command, and it is these resources which will define what can be done and what can't. There are some kinds of programs that require such large investments of money and expertise -- like intensive media campaigns -- that only official agencies stand a chance of making them work. And volunteer or citizen-involvement strategies will not be effective unless there is widespread support for the program's goals and objectives among the people in the target area.

D. The source of external funding for a project affects program planning.

While a few projects are able to sustain themselves completely on volunteer efforts and small local cash contributions, this happens only rarely. Outside funding in the form of grants is the lifeblood of most projects, whether they are grassroots, volunteer-oriented, or large-scale official programs. Over 90 percent of the projects in this survey had federal grant support, and virtually all of them received substantial financial aid from outside the project.

The federal government can supply money in quantities large enough to make programs feasible, but the money always has some strings attached. From the beginning, the applicant for government funds must

meet certain guidelines to qualify for the money, and then must meet

deadlines by submitting an application. The application must

demonstrate that the sponsor has devised a program that is likely to

achieve some of its objectives and those set up by the government.

The funds are also given on the condition that enough prior planning

has been done that there is a good expectation that the program can be

implemented and evaluated.

E. Finding additional resources is a continuous part of planning.

A successful federal grant application does not solve all resource

problems for a crime prevention project. Government grants are

awarded or renewed for a specified length of time. Most sponsors face

a critical point when government funds are no longer available.

Sustaining the program when funds run out is one of the most important

aspects of continuous planning. Generally speaking, it means

designing the program so that it can continue when funds drop off by

relying more on other resources, like citizen volunteers. If the

citizens aren't ready to go when the money runs out, the program

will fold. Alternatively, other sources of funding, like private

foundations or local governments, must be identified and their support

sought early enough that program activities are not interrupted.

THE FORMAL ANALYTIC PLANNING PROCESS

I. Introduction

> ● Planning in most community crime prevention programs tends to vary significantly from the textbook model of formal planning procedures.

One of the most surprising discoveries of our research was that in

reality very few crime prevention projects are developed through

strict adherence to the analytical planning model as it was described

in Chapter II. Even more unexpected was the fact that official agencies

and sophisticated community organizations with experience and knowledge

of formal planning procedures often did not follow the formal

analytical planning process.

Most of the formal planning which _does_ occur is for purposes of

completing the requirements of grant applications for outside funding.

Even in cases where a great deal of data and information is collected

about a crime problem(s), the analysis of that information does not

necessarily form the basis for program development.[1] Rather, one of

two situations usually occurs.

Situation A:

Planning Group A believes they already _know_ what the problem is

they want to tackle. Data and information is collected merely to

substantiate the problem in order to prove to outside funding sources

that there is a need for a crime prevention program. Sometimes the

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[1]Exceptions to the rule may occur when projects receive grants
specifically to do planning.

group will consider several different program ideas, but this consideration/deliberation process is usually done with little, if any, objective information about the costs versus the benefits of different crime prevention strategies. Instead, the group will select the program ideas which they think or believe will both work best in the community and be most acceptable to funding sources. Once the strategy(ies) are selected, Group A will backtrack to write program goals and objectives. Again, this is done merely to complete the grant application.

Situation B

The alternative scenario is one which also happens frequently. Planning Group B begins with a definite idea for a crime prevention program, at least in general terms. That is, Group B starts with their preferred solution to the problem. Then this group will backtrack to collect the necessary data and information about the crime problem and the selected approach to justify their program design in order to receive outside funding. Alternative crime prevention strategies are never examined.

There are several very real and pragmatic reasons as to why formal planning occurs in this fashion.

1) One common reason has already been suggested: some groups simply don't have the technical expertise to do formal analysis.

2) A second reason is that often there is not enough time to perform all of the research, data collection and analysis, information-gathering, etc. necessary to do a thorough job of formal planning. Because it is usually done to qualify for outside funding, the amount of time available to complete the analytic process is dictated by

granting cycles. If a group has a month or less to develop a program (i.e., complete the grant application), that's how much time they'll use to do the formal aspects of planning. One unintended consequence of rushing the planning process is the separation of the formal analytic aspects of planning from the political. Data and information which is hurriedly collected, analyzed, and presented in the grant application does not become an integral part of the political side of program development (the numerous series of meetings where the details of the program are actually hammered out).

3) Formal planning always occurs within the constraints of limited information. Perfect information about the problems and cost/benefit analyses of all program alternatives are never available. Because decisions must be made, they are made on the basis of whatever infor-mation there is to examine at that point in time. This is a universal fact of formal planning which limits its utility in practice.

4) Because people, and not machines, do formal planning, it is peoples' values and frames of reference which dictate the kind and amount of information that will be examined. Analytical planning occurs within the original perspective that planners have about the problem and its solution. Having preconceived notions means that planners do not examine alternative program ideas that are not within their preferences and their perspective on how to define the problem. The following section about the life cycle of burglary illustrates how many different ways there are to look at crime.

5) Finally, the formal analytic process may become subverted because the people developing programs simply don't believe in it.

They perform the analyses they have to in order to receive outside funding, but in reality they neither understand nor have faith in the utility of formal planning procedures.

The remainder of this chapter is designed to illustrate for the reader how the formal analytic process works in practice. We will walk through the various stages and steps of formal planning using realistic examples. Our purpose is to show how formal planning procedures can improve the programs that are developed to deal with crime problems, regardless of whether a federal grant application is involved.

II. Problem Identification and Definition

Identifying and then defining or describing the problem is the critical first step in planning a crime prevention program. It is the problem definition which serves as the basis of the program developed to solve it. Because of the key role of problem identification/definition throughout the remainder of the planning process, a good deal of attention should be given to gathering and interpreting the information needed to define the problem as clearly and as explicitly as possible. Otherwise, the program which is developed is likely to be inappropriate or ineffective.

Defining a crime problem is frequently a difficult process. It's usually not as simple or as straightforward as it may seem at first glance.

There are several reasons why this is so. It may be that there is considerable disagreement about what the most serious crime problem is in a given community. Or, it may be that the various people involved have different perspectives on how to define the problem. "Those mean kids down the block" may be one person's view of a vandalism problem, but the police will certainly not define the city's vandalism problem in those terms.

> Observations: Problem Identification/Definition
>
> - The way the problem is defined will dictate the form and content of the program.
>
> - Different people in the community have different perspectives or ways of viewing, and hence, defining crime problems.
>
> - The scope/size of the target area has important effects on how the problem will be identified and defined (see pp. III-16 – III-20).
>
> - There are basically two kinds of data/information used in defining crime problems: 1) objective (usually statistical) data describing the actuality or reality of the problem; and 2) subjective or qualitative information describing people's perceptions or opinions about the problem.
>
> - The reality of the problems, as well as the way they are perceived and defined, can change over time.

The following description of the "life cycle" of a burglary suggests that there are many different ways to look at and define "the problem" and, therefore, many alternative kinds of responses (types of programs).

Life-cycle of a burglary

Suppose a burglary is committed. In the most simple terms, this event becomes another statistic to add to police data, complete with address, goods stolen, time of occurrence (if known), and so forth.

Taken together with all the other burglaries in an area, it becomes part of the burglary problem that is most often described and is most visible. But a burglary also takes place in a much wider system of actions, reactions, and inaction.

To begin with, the burglary is committed by someone. Data on offenders is sketchy at best, partly because it's based on the ones who get caught -- the clumsy or unlucky ones. The burglar comes from somewhere, an environment that includes family, friends, past and future. He/she may come from a broken home, be a drug addict, have a prison record, or be a member of a gang that expects criminal behavior. Or he/she may simply be well-intentioned but unable to find a job.

The scene of the crime is distinct in some way or it would not have been chosen. Burglars may happen onto their targets by chance, but more likely they have reasons for choosing some places over others. A door is left unlocked, or a home is left too obviously vacant during a long vacation. Some neighborhoods are so transient that residents are unable to recognize each other or are unwilling to help defend one another. Or maybe the target just offers such tempting goods, the burglar can't resist. Usually police patrols -- even when they are frequent -- are unable to prevent burglaries by themselves.

The reactions of burglary victims vary. If the loss is small, the victim may not report the crime to the police. An insured loss may be taken more lightly than one that is not, thereby reducing the victim's desire to aid police in the identification and capture of the criminal. Many times the victim is unaware of easy steps that could

have been taken to avoid the crime. Sometimes the victim simply cannot afford the kinds of locks and precautions that are warranted by the situation. Or, a known crime prevention technique, like Operation Identification, may not have been used.

Similarly, the impact of the crime on the victim varies. The consequences of a loss are disastrous for some victims, merely aggravating to others. For some victims, the fear and overreaction to the experience can drastically change a person's life.

Neighbors may not take the steps necessary to know and recognize each other; therefore, they may be unaware of suspicious behavior around another's home, and fail to report it. They may not know the proper procedures, or they may hesitate to interfere in other people's business.

If the burglar gets away with the stolen goods, he/she probably needs to find a buyer. Usually this means there must be a "fence" who will buy the stolen goods and re-sell them. The fence won't be able to stay in business unless there are enough people willing to buy the hot items. People who want and will buy what the burglars steal are subsidizing crime.

Sometimes a burglar gets caught, but only in a small number of cases. There are just too many burglaries and too few clues for very many of them to be solved in traditional law enforcement ways.

When a burglar is caught, a whole new sequence is started. Evidence must be gathered. Often a plea bargaining session is opened to avoid a costly trial. If the case does go to trial, the chances of a conviction depend entirely on the facts that are known about the particular crime. Whether plea bargained or convicted, a guilty verdict leads to sentencing. A convicted burglar's sentence usually

varies from probation to a long mandatory term, depending on where the trial is held, the convict's record, the details of the crime, and so forth.

The effects of prison on a convict are uncertain. Some inmates may be rehabilitated completely, and some may use the time on the inside to learn new skills in crime. Likewise, probation can have different consequences for different offenders. The techniques of rehabilitation are many, and none are guaranteed to work.

Finally, the convicted burglar serves time or passes the probationary period. Free again, he/she may or may not commit another crime. Undoubtedly many do not; certainly some do. Carrying a record is not an easy way for a person to face society: good jobs are hard to come by and many people are fearful of ex-cons. The whole cycle may start over again.

It turns out that the burglary problem identified in police statistics is only a part of the whole picture. One event leads to another in a way that results in a burglary, with the aftermath of the crime taking on many forms. The possibility of breaking the burglary cycle (i.e., preventing a crime) exists at each step in the cycle, and programs could be devised for each.

Diagram IV-1 schematically illustrates a crime "cycle", such as the burglary example discussed above. All crime problems have similarly complicated "life cycles."

This diagram suggests that there are several different ways to look at and describe a crime problem. It can be defined in terms of: (#1) causes of crime -- indicators of why certain individuals commit crimes (indirect or societal causes and direct or personal reasons);

Diagram IV-1: A Crime Cycle

(#2) offenders -- the descriptive characteristics of those persons who commit crimes; (#3) opportunities for crime -- the number and type of criminal opportunities presented to the offender; (#4) criminal offenses -- the numbers of different types of criminal offenses which occur in a given locality over a certain time period; (#5) the victims of crime -- their characteristics and measures of the economic, physical, and psychological effects of crime on victims, and (#6) how well the criminal justice system responds to crime and deals with it.

While most problem definitions will have to take the crime rate (#4) and characteristics of the offenders (#2) into account, no community crime prevention program can directly reduce the crime rate. This could happen only if one knew exactly where and when a crime was going to occur, and then was there to stop it. Sometimes the police are able to do this, but no community crime prevention program can realistically prevent crime this directly. Instead, in the process of defining the problem certain assumptions are made about what causes

or contributes to a crime problem, and then a program is designed which tries to change these factors in hopes that this will lead to a reduction in the crime rate or an improvement in the way society responds to it.

To return to our burglary example, if the problem identification/ definition process begins with how potential victims contribute to the burglary problem by providing the opportunities for crime to occur (#3), then a certain set of strategies will be considered as appropriate. In opportunity reduction programs, assumptions are made that leaving doors unlocked, or homes unattended during vacations, or property unguarded, or other negligence contributes to the problem by giving the offender an opportunity to commit burglaries. The goals and objectives of these programs are, therefore, to reduce the opportunities for crime, not to directly stop the burglaries. If these assumptions are correct, and the program is set up the right way, there may be an effect on burglaries.

However, making a different set of assumptions about burglary will lead to different definitions of the problem and to alternative solutions. If the problem is defined in causal terms (#1), we begin by making assumptions about why offenders commit burglaries. . .for instance, lack of employment opportunities, juveniles impressing their peers or supporting a drug habit. In this case, rehabilitation programs, drug counseling or better job opportunities are strategies that may help to eliminate the reasons some people commit burglaries, and thus help to reduce the crime rate.

On the other hand, when the burglary problem is approached from the perspective of how effective current criminal justice policies are in deterring and controlling the problem (#6), then different types of

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1 OF 4

solutions will follow. When the problem is defined in terms of ineffective police patrols, lenient court sentencing of burglars, or inadequate police and court attention to fencing operations, then the program will focus on what citizens can do to lobby or force changes in those laws, policies and operating procedures. Here, the assumptions underlying the problem definition process have to do with how criminal justice policy and procedures deter or prevent crime.

Finally, the problem may be defined in terms other than the burglary itself. The problem may be identified as the effects or impact of the burglary on the victims (#5) or the community as a whole. The losses people suffer can cause real hardships if they have no way to replace them, and a victim's fear of crime can adversely affect his life far beyond the effects of the crime itself. If the problem is defined in this way, potential solutions will have to do with lessening the effect of crime, providing services to crime victims, or reducing unnecessary fear of crime.

There are still other problem definitions to be found in the burglary example that would be a valid basis for a crime prevention program. Community-based programs often focus on the ability of the community to invent cooperative methods to defend itself against crime. Thus, efforts to build strong community organizations and involve citizens in the life of the community may in themselves be worthwhile goals for crime prevention. All of these ways of looking at the burglary problem are useful and valid.

Information and Problem Indentification

Ideally, a group would begin the problem identification/ definition process by looking at the entire life-cycle of a crime, examining and evaluating all of the possible data sources to develop a statement of the problem. Chart IV-1 describes a number of different

Chart IV-1: Elements of a Crime Problem Statement: Alternative Ways to Describe Crime Problems		
Focus of Problem	Type of Data Which Might be Collected	Data Sources

A) Crime Offenses	1) crime rates for different types of crime; rates of increase or decrease
	2) where crimes occur
	  a) geographical location
	  b) environmental factors
	3) when crimes happen
	  a) time of day
	  b) any weekly, monthly, or seasonal patterns?
	4) how do they occur
	  a) modus operandi of criminals
	  b) contributing conditions/factors (e.g., for burglary, is entry made through unlocked doors?)
		Police offense reports, knowledgeable persons (e.g., police officers, victims, residents), victim surveys.

B) Offenders	1) who are they: descriptive characteristics
	  a) age
	  b) sex
	  c) race
	  d) previous criminal activity?
	2) why do they commit crime?
	3) what services are already available in the community?
		Offenders, police reports, corrections agencies, victims, social service agencies, schools, and other juvenile agencies.

C) Victims/ Potential Victims	1) number of victims, and who they are (age, sex, etc.)
	2) seriousness of physical injuries
	3) economic losses
	4) psychological/emotional effects
	  a) trauma
	  b) fear
	  c) isolation
	5) victim services already available
		Police reports, hospitals, crime victim crisis or intervention/ counseling centers, crime reparations board, etc.

D) Criminal Justice Response	1) police
	  a) clearance rates
	  b) response time
	  c) enforcement priorities
	  d) investigative procedures
	  e) budget and manpower data
	2) prosecution and courts
	  a) sentencing practices
	  b) budget and manpower data
	  c) caseloads
	  d) backlog of cases
	  e) court procedures regarding witnesses
	3) corrections
	  a) recidivism rate
	  b) types of rehabilitation programs available
	  c) parole practices
	  d) budgetary and manpower data
		Federal, state, and local govenment agencies.

data sources and types of information which could be collected and analyzed in the process of developing a problem statement.

As the chart clearly shows, it would be impossible to collect data about _all_ aspects of a problem. The sheer quantity of work involved would be enough to deter almost anyone from doing it. Instead, people and agencies begin with some ideas and a perspective on the crime problem and build a program from there. The Port City project began with senior citizens as its clientele.[1] This orientation suggested defensive programs and victim services as the focus of the program. It also meant that the program did not consider some of the causes related to offenders, nor did it consider system improvements. In short, _who_ you are often determines _what_ you see as the crime problem.

How the problem is approached also determines what _methods_ can be used to develop and analyze the information needed to define the problem. The types of data and the data sources listed above provide the basic information. But the methods used to obtain that information is a separate aspect of problem definition. Chart IV-2 lists several of the most common techniques used to collect and analyze information in community crime prevention projects.

The choice of a technique is largely determined by two things. First, the data sources chosen to define a problem are usually tied to certain techniques. For instance, the problem identified by the group may be straightforward and crime specific . . . one that can be described by quantitative data analysis of aggregate data sources, like police offense report summaries or the FBI Uniform Crime statistics. An elaborate profile of some crime problems can be

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[1]See Chapter 6, pp. VI-99 - VI-114.

Chart IV-2: Elements of a Crime Problem Statement: Methods of Developing Information

Method	Collection Technique	Advantages	Disadvantages
Formal Attitude Surveys[1]	Questionnaires constructed to get individuals' responses on issues of importance to the project. Surveys may be given by phone, in person, or through the mail to a sample of people scientifically selected to represent the entire population.	-Representative opinions and attitudes are obtained. -Timing may fit project's needs; can be repeated later for evaluation purpose. -Designed to fit specific needs of program. -A large population can be indirectly measured using the responses of a small group. -Produces quantititative data that can be used in tests, comparisons, and various mathematical analyses.	-Expensive; up to $25 per surveyed person, unless volunteers conduct the survey. -Requires expertise: formal surveys are not valid or reliable unless correctly designed and executed. -Formal surveys are not an effective way to encourage community involvement. -Because initiative for getting opinions rests with the survey taker, some respondents may acquire "attitudes" on the spur of the moment.
Informal Attitude Surveys	Collection techniques vary. People express opinions in many settings: meetings, public forums, debates, task forces, in testimony to committees, etc.	-Inexpensive. -People motivated enough to attend meetings, forums, etc., are usually concerned about the problems; provide authentic opinions. -Techniques can also be used for building community spirit, getting consensus, etc.	-Information generated may not be representative; those who participate may be different in some way from rest of community. -Responses may wander over many issues; may be difficult to identify "the problem". -Manipulation of responses possible.

[1]LEAA's National Crime Surveys are formal which measure experience with crime and attitudes toward it. The victim survey is useful on a national or perhaps a city-wide basis, but it requires very large sample sizes, and is too expensive for most projects to administer. City-wide projects located in one of the 26 NCS cities may want to examine the survey results, which may be useful for limited planning purposes.

Method	Collection Technique	Advantages	Disadvantages
Analysis of procedures, regulations, laws.	Statute books, agencies' published regulations and standard operating procedures, and other forms of policy statements are the source for this kind of analysis. These procedures are not always on paper -- informal rules also operate in organizations. Example: research on prosecutor's procedures on rape cases may be the basis for a system improvement program.	-Most of this information is accessible in published form. -Inexpensive. -No specialized statistical or quantitative skills required. -Can help pinpoint political or bureaucratic responsiblity for a policy.	-Legal expertise or credentials may be required for some aspects. -Procedures, laws, and so on, are often subject to different interpretations: the criteria are especially vague. -Less useful for crime specific projects. -Community members may be unaware of or indifferent to the information provided by this method; it is often not visible or easily understood.
Aggregate Data Analysis (Examples: police offense reports, census data, court statistics).	Summary reports are provided by the collecting agency. For example, crimes reported by citizens are collected, summarized, and reported by police.	-Information already exists, providing it is a function of the collecting agency. -Regularized collection creates series of data: comparisons over time are possible. -Information categories may be comparable across jurisdictions, e.g., Uniform Crime Reports or census data. -Inexpensive if the information can be used in the form provided by the collector. -Information is quantitative, permitting use of statistical analysis and tests. -Data is taken from entire population in the collecting area, so it must be representative (if it is accurate).	-Collection procedures may be imperfect. Therefore, information may not reflect true status of what is being measured. Example: citizens do not report some crimes, making crime statistics less than accurate. -Categories in the aggregate data may not reflect the interests of the project; members may have different ideas about important problems than the collecting agency. -Geographical units used in summary reports often do not match the target area. -Timing of summary reports may be inappropriate for project. -Aggretage data requires some expertise for detailed analyses.

Chart IV-2: Elements of a Crime Problem Statement: Methods of Developing Information (continued)

Method	Collection Technique	Advantages	Disadvantages
Key-Person Interviews	Contact and collect the opinions and attitudes of key persons, experts, professionals, and members of the target population on matters of concern to the project. Numerous techniques are available: structured or open-ended questionnaires by phone, mail, or in person.	-Interviews permit fuller expression of ideas than surveys. -Serve as a basis for recruiting support for project among key people during problem definition phase. -Helps identify other resources in community that may be helpful. -Shared experience, and expertise may be important in several aspects of program. -Inexpensive. -No highly specialized expertise required.	-Persons interviewed may not have opinions or views which are representative of the target area's population. -Interviewees may have strong but biased opionions that do not reflect the actual state of affairs in the area. They may express their own interests.

assembled in this way. But if this kind of source doesn't provide enough information to isolate problems, other data sources must be used. Excess fear, for example, won't show up in police reports. Good information is still necessary, but it will have to come from other sources . . . most often, people. Tapping this source may involve direct contact, from formal surveys to informal interviews with key people in the community.

The resource capabilities of the project is another important factor affecting the selection of information collection methods. If a group doesn't have many resources for planning, it will not be able to use methods that require expertise or big money. Instead it will have to use low cost data collection methods.

The Problem Statement: A Summary

Once the problems are identified and defined, using the information collected by the project, a problem statement should be written. The problem statement summarizes what is known about the problem, based on the data and information collected. It is a formal statement of the conclusions about the problem.

A written statement has several advantages. First, it clarifies for all participants the evidence and the assumptions underlying the project, making purposeless disagreements down the road less likely. Second, it provides a definite basis for the next steps in the planning process. Writing the statement forces planners to be systematic, clear, and specific in what they think the problem is and how they know. A separate problem statement should be written for each problem. If more than one problem is identified, then several statements can be compared and used as the basis for choosing the most important or pressing problem(s).

In writing each problem statement, a number of questions should be answered:

—Roughly speaking, what is the problem?

—What do we know about the problem? What sources of data do we have about it? What information should we have?

—How can the information we have be analyzed? How can we develop more information if it is necessary?

—Are other groups or agencies already working on the problem? If so, what are they doing?

—How does the specific problem relate to other problems in the area?

—What are the causes and effects of the problem?

—Is the problem one that can be handled by a community-based program?

—Is it an appropriate problem for the group or agency to tackle?

—What resources might be required to develop a program around this problem?

Answers to these questions are the foundation for the rest of the planning effort. It cannot be emphasized enough that the quality of the problem identification effort will determine the quality of the rest of the program.

III. Program Development

Logically, the next step in the planning process is to design and develop the program. The goal of any project is to solve or improve the problem that is chosen. Goals may be quite limited, just as the problem may be. In effect, stating the problem almost presupposes the goal. When the problem is defined in very specific and clear terms, the chances are better that the goals will be meaningful and achievable. Step-by-step improvement in problem identification means a step-by-step refinement of goals.

The following example illustrates how the process occurs. The example we have chosen is vandalism.

PLANNING

Politics   Formal Analysis

PROBLEM DEFINITION

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

IMPLEMENTATION

EVALUATION

MODIFICATIONS

To some, this may appear to be a petty crime not worthy of consideration. But the fact is that many people in neighborhoods across the country are <u>very</u> concerned about problems like vandalism. This thoughtless crime shows a lack of respect and consideration of other people that may be a symptom of much larger problems. If the example seems to be absurd at times, this has been done to make a point about program development: the problem selected and the way it's defined <u>limits</u> the strategies which can be considered appropriate.

Suppose a number of people in a neighborhood complain about an increasingly irritating vandalism problem. Let's assume they've talked enough about it to know they are talking about the same problem: intentional, petty destruction of others' property. The first evidence that appears is the physical damage.

Example 1:

Problem: Wanton destruction of property, documented by victim's concerns and physical evidence.

Goal: To reduce the incidences of vandalism and the value of property lost by 50 percent within six months.

The goal here seems specific enough, but the numbers in it are misleading. There isn't enough information in the problem statement to say anything except that vandalism is happening here. And the goal, as stated, doesn't logically follow and is probably unrealistic. On this basis alone, the neighbors would be at a loss about what to do. More information about the crime will help in a more specific definition of the problem. Let's assume there's data to show that 90 percent of the vandalism occurs between the hours of 3 p.m. and 6 p.m., and it is usually a matter of overturning garbage cans. Because the neighborhood has no alleys, the garbage cans have to be kept in the

front or moved there on garbage pick-up days. The garbage can targets are plentiful, and only a small proportion are overturned at a time.

Example 2

Problem: The accessibility of garbage cans on trash pick-up days makes them easy targets for vandals, at least for those cans that are out between three and six in the afternoon.

Goal: To reduce vandalism by reducing the number of garbage can targets in the afternoon.

A more careful definition of the crime and how it occurs has led to a more specific goal. At this point, the project may be able to develop a viable crime prevention program. The next step would be to specify measurable objectives and design strategies to achieve them. Hopefully, the group would consider several alternative objectives and select the best one (or ones). Here are four possible ones, given the goal of reducing vandalism by reducing the <u>opportunities</u> for it to occur.

Objectives: 1) To persuade residents to take the garbage to the dump themselves, perhaps through collective neighborhood efforts, if their pick-up time falls between three and six.

2) To have the garbage guarded, either in person, or through a security system of some kind.

3) To get the city to make pick-ups at other times of the day.

4) To have citizen patrols keep watch on the neighborhood during the critical hours.

Undoubtedly, many other objectives come to mind, perhaps involving the police. But it's more likely the police would choose to use their limited resources on more critical problems. Based on these concrete objectives, the project is then able to design strategies.

Strategies: 1) Organize a volunteer neighborhood collection service in the morning for homes whose pick-up times are between three and six.

2) Install locking systems for garbage cans and lids
   that can be opened only by collection service
   and customers.

3) Arrange with the city to change its collection
   schedule so that full garbage cans will be eli-
   minated from the street during the afternoon.

4) Organize volunteer citizen patrols on a rotating
   basis to walk through the target area.

It becomes evident that objectives and strategies are very closely

related. The "objectives" of the project state as clearly and quan-

titatively as possible what you would like to see done, and the

"strategies" state specifically how those ends can be attained, often

using very similar language. Several strategies could be developed

for each objective, since there are usually many ways to do anything.

In deciding upon the strategy or strategies to use, the community

needs to assess: 1) if the strategy is within the capabilities of the

community, 2) if it will be effective, and 3) if it is acceptable to

the community, given the predominant history and values of the citizens.

Chart IV-3 outlines some of the questions that might be asked during

the strategy selection process. Each strategy being considered should

be analyzed -- resource needs assessed, political cooperation

required, and so forth -- and then compared with the other possible

strategies. The best one(s) overall should be selected. If there are

enough resources available, several strategies may be implemented at

the same time, but care should be taken that they do not contradict

or conflict with each other.

Returning to Example 2 of the vandalism problem, the strategies

outlined can be evaluated using the questions in Chart IV-3 as a guide.

There's not enough space here to do a complete analysis of all of the

above strategies, but some remarks can be made which suggest how this

assessment process occurs.

Chart IV-3: Strategy Selection: Analysis of Alternatives

1. Is it possible?

   - Are the resources available?

   - Is it legal?

   - Is it within the authority of the community, or can
     that authority be acquired somehow?

   - Are there any obvious obstacles to this strategy, such as
     physical barriers or related problems that have to
     be solved first?

2. Is it effective?

   - Will it really help solve the problem, and why?

   - Has it been effective in other areas?

   - When compared with the alternatives, is this strategy
     more or less costly for the desired effects?

   - Will it compete with other programs?

   - Does it have undesirable consequences as well as the
     desired ones?

3. Is it acceptable to the community?

   - Will other groups and organizations in the community
     accept the strategy? Will they actively support it?

   - Is it compatible with the dominant ways of life in the
     community?

   - Does it pose a threat to any part of the community?

   - Who is likely to oppose it? and why?

The first strategy was to organize a volunteer morning collection

service. But, how exactly? A truck is needed, but should it be rented

or bought? How much will it cost? Who will pay for it? Is it legal?

Does the city require a license? Can the citizens be exempted from

paying for the city collection service if they don't use it? Are

alternative private collection services available? Who's willing and

has the time to find out? Is it worth the time and effort needed to pursue this strategy to prevent garbage can vandalism (i.e., is it cost-effective?). This first strategy obviously needs a good deal more elaboration before any real judgment can be made about it.

The same assessment process should be used for each of the alternative strategies. For example, the second strategy -- improving security systems -- is an individual solution. It may be easier to implement, at least for those people who can afford it. It doesn't require much organization or cooperation. The only joint effort required would be the willingness of the residents and the city collectors to use the lock-and-key system. The city or the residents might object if it's too time-consuming. Furthermore, how strong a lock is needed? Determined vandals could probably defeat anything short of a fortress garbage can . . . but it may be that vandalism is only committed on easy targets. If that's the case, simple locks might work as long as they are properly used. That's important to consider because people often buy and install good locks, then don't use them because they're inconvenient.

The third strategy would involve convincing the city to rearrange its collection schedule. Even if it were possible to get the city to cooperate, there's a possible unintended consequence to be considered. The city would have to change someone else's collection time to the three to six slot. If that move resulted in their garbage cans being vandalized, they would oppose it and community conflict would be the result.

The fourth strategy suggests a way of improving the surveillance of the targets, and frightening off or discouraging the culprits, or possibly even catching them in the act. This strategy would not cost

much money, but it would demand time and organization from the citizens. If citizens aren't willing to get involved, the project would be in trouble.

Each of the strategies considered so far is developed from a description of the crimes happening. Given this description, these strategies are based on the assumption that, in reducing the opportunities for the crime to occur, the crime problems in the neighborhood will end. However, there is also the possibility that the anti-vandalism program agreed upon will only be effective in displacing the crime from one place or time to another, or perhaps in turning the offenders to other crimes, such as splashing paint on autos. Furthermore, it may work only as long as the strategies are in effect. It's often difficult to tell if a program has made a real impact on crime, or has merely deterred it in the short-run. In other words, even if this program is well-defined and carefully researched (as stated in Example 2), it may not finally solve the problem.

An alternative response might have been to continue to explore the problems and solutions through discussions and debates among the residents of the area. New information and approaches may be generated from this source.

In fact, a very similar problem arose in one of the projects we visited. The citizens of a neighborhood were immediately aware of a vandalism problem. After discussions among themselves, they were able to determine who was causing it.[1] They never seriously considered the need to explore the formal data sources implied in

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[1]It is probably not uncommon at the neighborhood or sub-neighborhood level for people to "know what's going on."

Example 2. Instead, they moved directly to a very specific iden-
tification of the problem and potential goals, based on the information
citizens could provide about the culprits. Example 3 suggests the
kind of problem and goal statements that may come out of this process.

Example 3

Problem: Some teenagers from the local junior high some-
times spend the time between the end of the school
day and dinner vandalizing garbage cans.

Goal: To remove the vandals from the street.

The goal in Example 3 is deliberately vague. Even in cases where
direct information about who is causing the crime is available, there
are no obvious goals -- let alone objectives and strategies. For
instance, in our real-life example, some citizens wanted to move from
identification of the offenders to the strategy of removing the
offending youth from their homes. Thi. .mes too much. Without a
conscious examination of alternatives, th... may be a tendency for
some citizens to jump too quickly to conclusions.

Less punitive actions are preferable. The weakness inherent in
taking direct action against offenders is this: while you may be able
to force the persons who are the immediate source of the problem out
of the neighborhood, you are not necessarily removing or changing the
ultimate causes of the problem. Thus, eliminating the current crop of
offensive teen-agers may only set aside the problem temporarily, until
another group comes along to react to the same conditions. It may be
tempting to simply blame the problem on "bad" kids or irresponsible
parents. To some extent, such blame may be warranted, but a more
careful examination of the problem could yield some insight into its
causes, and then perhaps lead to more acceptable goals, objectives and
strategies.

To continue the report from the site visit, the citizens who had
wanted to remove the children from their homes and use legal
retaliation were persuaded by project staff to investigate a little
more thoroughly before taking action. Among other things, the youths
were invited to a neighborhood meeting so they could tell their side
of the story. It turned out that most of the youths were bored, and
possibly alienated. They had time on their hands with nothing to do.

Let us suppose that the community used in this illustration is
like many other communities across the nation. Declining school
enrollments have forced cut-backs in funds. School officials have
saved their budgets by reducing after school extra-curricular
activities. Example 4 shows how this additional information can be
used to further define the problem and develop more specific goals.

Example 4

Problem: A group of junior high youth with nothing better
to do (because there are no longer any organized
activities after school) cause trouble by turning
over garbage cans in the afternoon in certain
areas of the neighborhood.

Goal: To provide alternative, interesting activities for
these youth that will divert attention from
trouble-making to more constructive or harmless
pursuits.

The problem and the goal associated with it have evolved con-
siderably from that stated in Example 1 above. Each time
additional information is collected or the source of the information
changes, the problem definition changes and becomes more specific,
more precise. The goal statement has similarly changed and become more
specific, reflecting the improved problem identification. Example 4 is not
necessarily the end of the road in this process. A further exploration of
the problem may show that other causes are relevant and should be con-
sidered in developing the program.

There is usually not enough time and information to consider and assess all of the possible strategies. The selection of strategies often occurs from only a few alternatives. The more alternatives that are considered, however, and the more thorough the assessment process, the more likely it will be that the best and most effective strategies will be selected.

Once the problem is finally identified and clarified, and a program of goals, objectives, and strategies is devised, the project must move on to making the program work. This process involves developing a plan for implementation that tells who will do what, when, where, and how. It also involves setting up within the project organization the means for changing the program if it doesn't seem to be working well.

IV. Implementation

Implementation is to planning as the performance is to a play. It's where actions are taken to work out the strategies chosen during program development; where the intentions of the program participants are put into practice.

There are two distinct sides to implementation. One side is the thinking, talking, meeting, organizing, and decision-making that goes into an implementation plan specifying exactly what needs to be done. The other side is actually doing or carrying out those activities identified in the plan.

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The Implementation Plan

Implementation can be planned for in the same logical and systematic way that the program itself is developed. In an implementation plan we try to anticipate the problems and conditions the program is likely to face, and determine how best to carry out the strategies under these conditions. Then we organize ourselves and our resources to follow up on these decisions. The logic of planning is the same as it is at any other stage.

It is the strategies which form the basis for the implementation stage of planning. Each strategy requires that a certain set of resources be available and that activities and tasks be performed in order to make the strategy work. Here is where planners get down to the nitty-gritty details of figuring out how to get something done, and what the project needs to do it.

> Once strategies are selected it is necessary to define the strategies in very precise terms. Specifically, the project's objectives, target population, scope, performance standards, schedule, budget, and staff assignments should be clearly defined.[1]

In other words, all of the numerous things that are required to actualize a strategy must be considered and put into the plan. With the number of participants and the variety of resources and activities that go into making each strategy work, the implementation plan has to be concrete and very specific. It should provide for the coordination and timing of all aspects of the project.

A common device for helping with this part of the plan is the workplan or task sheet, which is a tool for organizing resources. The

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[1]Barry Masturine, "How to Effectively Plan Programs," The Grantsmanship Center News.

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workplan identifies what tasks need to be accomplished, when, and by whom. This information can be used to develop schedules, and to determine what resources are needed to accomplish each strategy. Sometimes this process will reveal that two strategies make demands on the same resources, or that time and money can be saved by combining tasks in a certain way.

The workplan will also help define areas of responsibility for staff, committees, volunteers, etc., and clarify the order of the decisions which must be made and their consequences. For example, educational materials must be prepared before other tasks, like training organizers to use the materials, can occur. Organizers must be trained before they can teach people about crime prevention actions. And so on.

A time period and completion date should be set for each task. Deadlines have a wonderful way of concentrating the mind, at least if those deadlines are taken seriously! The more thoroughly tasks are thought out ahead of time, the more realistic the timetable will be, and therefore, the more likely deadlines will be met.

Consider a hypothetical program operated by a grassroots group in a fairly small neighborhood. Assume that the project members have identified the problem to be the paralyzing fear of crime experienced by some people in the area, which is caused by a distorted and unrealistic view of the amount of crime in the neighborhood. Through meetings and analysis, they have decided upon a program which includes the following steps, among others:

> Goal: To reduce the unwarranted fear of crime in the
> neighborhood, especially among women and the elderly.

Objective 1: Educate the population of the neighborhood during the next year as to the actual crime levels and chances of victimization in the area.

Strategies:

1) Develop and distribute literature (brochures) about crime in the neighborhood.

2) Conduct neighborhood meetings.

3) Develop and mail a crime information newsletter to local residents.

4) Organize and operate a speakers' bureau.

Chart IV-4 is an example of part of a workplan outlining the tasks required to make the first two strategies of Objective 1 actually happen.

The strategy of developing and disseminating literature is divided into two major tasks. The first task consists of the activities designed to get the literature written and printed. The second task is to distribute the literature to the neighborhood residents. The points under each task (sub-tasks) illustrate how a detailed workplan assists the project in clearly anticipating its needs and commitments. The amount of detail that is appropriate varies, depending on the purpose of the plan. Certainly, there is a limit to the amount of detail necessary. Carried to an extreme, it would take so much time figuring out the plan that there wouldn't be time left for carrying it out.

The third task under Objective 1.a (literature) in the workplan is an evaluation task. These tasks should be spelled out in the workplan if the project intends to do any evaluation. It is discussed in the following section where some of the steps in evaluation, and the reasons for it, are outlined.

Notice some things this workplan does not do. It does not automatically allocate recources between tasks. That is a job for the project staff to do in discussions that set priorities and determine what is

Chart IV-4: An example of a workplan for a hypothetical program

Objective: Educate population of the neighborhood as to actual crime levels, chances of victimization in the area.

Strategy	Tasks	Person or Group Responsible	Time Period and Completion Date (Months)								
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Develop and disseminate information by: a. distribute literature	1. Develop materials: −Determine what information should be in materials to respond to problem of fear. −Acquire necessary information. −Write materials. −Determine format. −Get materials produced and printed. (decide who will do production −− and make arrangements.)	Citizens, director, staff, police.	▬▬								
	2. Disseminate materials: −Find volunteers to hand out literature. −Assign areas to each volunteer. −Deliver materials to volunteers; instruct on how to disseminate. −Pass out literature. −Follow up on volunteers to get feedback.	Citizen volunteers, staff.			▬▬						
	3. Determine effectiveness of literature dissemination strategy.	Director, Staff						▬▲			
b. meetings	1. Make meeting arrangements: −Arrange dates and locations of series of meetings. −Plan program for meetings. −Find speakers and films.	Director and staff		▬							
	2. Invite people to attend meetings: −Print invitations for meetings. −Distribute invitations.	Staff, volunteers			▬						
	3. Hold meetings: −Confirm meeting arrangements prior to date. −Make sure chairs, coffee, literature, audio-visual equipment is set up. −Conduct meetings. −Clean-up after meetings.	Director, staff, volunteers				▬▬					
	4. Prepare report summarizing meeting activities.	Director						▬▲			
c. newsletter											

Symbols

▬ Ongoing Activities

▲ Report Produced

possible and what isn't. The workplan can help to identify what resources are needed, when, and where, but actually allocating resources is something different. The tasks specified in the final version of the workplan should be compatible with the budget and the capabilities of the organization.

The workplan also doesn't show how to coordinate the efforts of the people responsible for the tasks to ensure that work is accomplished on time. This is usually the responsibility of the staff. For example, the workplan in Chart IV-4 lists literature distribution as a responsibility of staff and citizen volunteers, but it doesn't tell how these two should relate to, or coordinate with, each other.

Finally, the workplan will not indicate if various parts of the program conflict with or duplicate each other. The planner must determine that the various activities planned are compatible and supportive.

B. The implementation plan and the budget

Technically, planning is not the same as budgeting. But it's hard to imagine the two not fitting together closely. In fact, budgeting is one of the more important procedures used by experienced planners. It is impossible to devise a workable plan without formally looking at the available resources at some point in the planning process. At a minimum, the budget supplies the needed information on one very important resource, money.[1]

The budget and the program activities have to be adjusted to each other. Detailed knowledge of tasks permits a detailed budget to be

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[1]Some clear directions on working out a budget are given in "Guidelines for Preparing a Continuation Application...," Center for Community Change (Washington, D.C.: 1979).

worked out. If this figure exceeds the resources available, or turns out to be more than can be requested from an outside source, then changes in the plan must be made. This might mean that personnel costs have to be reduced, activities eliminated, or whatever. The budget should function as an important aid to management and decision-making.

C. Some issues and problems in implementation

Several common problems occurred in the surveyed projects that can be important to community crime prevention planners. The issues discussed are only several of the things that might present difficulties, but these happen frequently to community-based projects that rely on outside funding sources. Chances of success will be increased if these problems can be anticipated.

One common source of problems is management and control. Projects using somebody else's money are expected to use it very wisely. But many project directors complained of not having staff with the experience or skills to do the budgeting and administration tasks which are required. There is no way to prescribe an appropriate organizational form to take care of all these problems.[1] One project director noted the importance of clear assignments of authority and responsibility: all aspects of the program must be understood by everyone involved, specifically regarding who will do what, when, where, and how. A common response of projects was to seek technical assistance in management.[2]

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[1]Several suggestions for the organizational structure of community-based projects are outlined in Benjamin Broox McIntyre's Skills for Impact: Voluntary Action in Criminal Justice (Athens: Institute of Government, University of Georgia, Sept. 1977), Chapter 12.

[2]Numerous organizations give this kind of assistance, either for a fee or under contract to the government. See the section on resources, pp. IV-45 - IV-49.

Frequently, projects go through the problem identification, program development, and some of the implementation stages of planning in order to complete a grant application. However, grants are not given on the spot, and it may be some time before the funds are actually received. This creates a period of "slack" time when it may seem that there's nothing to do. A program director in Pennsylvania identified two ways that "just waiting around" can hurt the project:

(1) The problems the program is designed to solve may change, either in peoples' preferences or in occurrence.

(2) People may grow tired (or bored) from waiting, and lose interest in the project.

The first problem requires flexibility in the plan and in the funding organization's decision-making. The changes in the problem shouldn't be ignored. Rather, the plan should be adjusted or modified accordingly.

Dealing with the second problem requires planners to devise ways to keep up enthusiasm and further the goals of the project. Usually this must be done on a small or non-existent budget. Some tasks which can be worked on during this period include: building the organization, developing detailed workplans, and solidifying community support (see Chapter 5). One enterprising project found a meaningful and concrete activity for its members: holding a series of small fundraisers. It is vitally important to continue the momentum of the project during this gap between application and funding.

The last part of implemenation is to put the plan into action. Here, you're on your own. But the planning process continues through implementation. The activities of any program generate results, which form the basis for evaluation. In turn, evaluation leads to subsequent changes in the program.

V. Evaluation and Modification

A. The Purpose of Evaluation

As suggested in Chapter 2, the purpose of evaluation is to measure the activities and achievements of the program to see if it's working according to plan. Making a program work is usually a trial-and-error process. Evaluation is the testing that takes place to identify errors and mistaken assumptions. Once it is discovered what isn't working well, modifications can be made to change the program so that it works better. The basis for any evaluation is useful information. It is the planner's job to recognize what information will be needed to evaluate the program and then make provisions for collecting it. Evaluation, then, becomes a built-in part of the tasks that have to be performed, and these evaluation tasks should be included in the workplan.

This simple idea of evaluation can become complicated because even very basic programs involve a whole series of activities and steps. There's no sure way to know ahead of time which activities will be appropriate and effective, and which ones won't work or are based on incorrect assumptions. Some parts of the program are under the control of the project staff; but there are other parts which the project itself has no control over. For example, a program can produce and distribute brochures to members of the community, but it cannot force residents to read the brochures.

Programs can be divided into two parts for the purposes of evaluation. The first part is the program process. This refers to the tasks or the activities that the project performs in its efforts to implement the selected strategies. The important thing about the process is that this is the part of the program over which the project staff have direct control. By their own efforts project staff can schedule crime prevention meetings and invite people to attend; they can tell people what to do to protect their property. But project staff usually cannot go out and install new locks in every home in the neighborhood. Nor can they make people use them, even if every home had a good lock. Nor could project staff ensure that burglars would be deterred if all homes had better locks. These are program impacts, and they are different from the program process because the project itself can affect them only indirectly, if at all.

Each step of the program produces outcomes. Tasks are completed as planned or not, and objectives are met or they aren't. A thorough evaluation of a program is based on information that is gathered about each of the outcomes at all stages of the program. Like the program as a whole, there are two types of outcome measures: process measures and impact measures.

Process measures show the amount of effort being made by the project. They can indicate whether these efforts are productive and timely enough to fulfill the workplan and complete the strategies. For example, if one of the program strategies involves enrolling community members as participants in some aspect of the program, then process measures would include the total number of people contacted and the number actually enrolled. Part of the process evaluation

also would be to determine if these contacts were made on time, and if the staff was adequate to do the job. If progress is inadequate, adjustments can be made, either in how the contacts are made, or by whom.

Impact measures are used to attempt to assess whether the program is attaining its goals and objectives. One of the more common impact measures used is changes in the reported crime rate, since many programs have crime reduction as a goal. In cases where the crime rate does go down, projects usually take credit for success. It is extremely difficult, however, to design an evaluation in such a way that a reduction in the crime rate can be attributed to a single program. It is usually impossible to control for all of the other factors which affect the amount of crime occurring. More often, intermediate impact measures are taken which show indirectly how well the project has done. Often, these intermediate impact measures have to do with measuring changes in residents' behaviors or attitudes.

Chart IV-5 illustrates the logical relationship between process and impact evaluation and suggests some appropriate measures for each.

B. Setting up an Evaluation

Let's return to our example of the neighborhood fear reduction project to illustrate how an evaluation might be devised for that program. Two basic questions must be asked at the beginning of any evaluation: 1) what are the intended outcomes of the program?; and 2) how can these program outcomes be measured?

The final intended outcome of our program example is the goal of reducing fear, especially among women and the elderly. The program was designed based upon an important assumption . . . that the unwarranted fear was caused by a lack of knowledge about the amount

Chart IV-5: Impact and Process Evaluation Measures

Type	The Logical Connections	Sources of Information	Examples of Measures
PROGRAM PROCESS: Project has direct control over these parts of the plan.	Tasks are completed; (Logical assumption: if tasks are completed) then, Strategies are implemented according to plan; (Logical assumption: if strategies are implemented) then,	The major source of process information comes from the project: its staff and the records they keep.	- Number of meetings held - Number of residents contacted - Number of brochures printed and distributed - Number of volunteers obtained
PROGRAM IMPACT: Project has only indirect control over these parts of the plan.	Objectives are attained; (Assumption: that the objectives are appropriate, and if they are attained) then, Goals are attained.	Community feedback and participation; Police crime data	- Responses to surveys showing changes in participation, attitudes or opinions, level of fear - Expressions of support or interest in the program - Citizen attendance at meetings - Changes in the crime rate

and kind of crime that was _actually_ occurring in the neighborhood. The four strategies selected -- brochures, meetings, a newsletter, and a speakers' bureau -- are all designed to reach people and educate/inform them about the realities of crime in the neighborhood.

The effectiveness of these strategies is based upon several factors. First, for these strategies to work, neighborhood residents would have to either attend a meeting (one sponsored by the project or a meeting held by some other group who had requested a speaker through the speakers bureau), _or_ read the brochures or the newsletter. Second, the brochures, newsletter, and speakers need to be of sufficient _quality_ to convey the appropriate crime information in such a way that people pay attention and comprehend the messages being conveyed. Finally, the goal of the program suggests that the project should make special efforts to reach elderly and women residents.

A complete evaluation design for this program would include ways to measure all of the intended process and impact outcomes. Chart IV-6 is a logical presentation of the assumed project process, showing the expected process and impact outcomes, as well as how these could be measured.

This chart suggests several important points about evaluation. First, the kinds of measures used for evaluating the process and the impact of the two strategies of producing and distributing literature and a newsletter are very similar. The same is true for the strategies of conducting neighborhood meetings and providing speakers to other groups. This is so because there is an underlying similarity in the strategies: one set depends upon educating people via printed materials, the other by way of personal, verbal communication. If the project maintains cost information for each strategy (including personnel time

Chart IV-6: Formal Outcome Measures for a Hypothetical Fear Reduction Program

◄────────── PROCESS MEASURES ──────────► ◄────────── IMPACT MEASURES ──────────►

◄────────── INTERMEDIATE ──────────► FINAL

Strategies

					Objective	Goal
1) Brochures →	Production →	Distribution →	Read →	Understood (Comprehension) →	Increase in Knowledge →	Reduction in Fear
Evaluation measures	a) number brochures produced b) quality of brochures c) costs involved	a) number distributed b) to whom (e.g., how many to elderly, women, others) c) costs involved	a) number read b) by whom	a) comprehension rate b) community's assessment	a) level of knowledge about crime after as compared to before program	a) fear expressed after as compared to before program
2) Newsletters →	Production →	Distribution →	Read →	Understood (Comprehension) →	Increase in Knowledge →	Reduction in Fear
Evaluation measures	a) number newsletters produced b) quality of newsletters c) costs involved	a) number distributed b) to whom (e.g., how many to elderly, women, others) c) costs involved	a) number read b) by whom	a) comprehension rate b) community's assessment	a) level of knowledge about crime after as compared to before program	a) fear expressed after as compared to before program

PROCESS MEASURES →			IMPACT MEASURES			
			←INTERMEDIATE→		FINAL	
Strategies					**Objective**	**Goal**
3) Meetings → Arranged →	Held →	Attended →	Understood → (comprehension)	Increase in Knowledge	Reduction in Fear	
Evaluation Measures	a) number of meetings arranged b) number of residents invited c) costs involved	a) number of meetings conducted b) costs involved	a) number of residents in attendance b) who were attendees (e.g., how many elderly, women, others) c) costs involved	a) comprehension rate b) quality of meetings, as assessed by attendees	a) level of knowledge about crime after as compared to before program	a) fear expressed after as compared to before program
4) Speakers Bureau →	Speakers Obtained →	Speakers Requested →	Meetings Held →	Understood → (comprehension)	Increase in Knowledge →	Reduction in Fear
Evaluation Measures	a) number of speakers b) assessment of quality c) cost c) involved	a) number requested by other groups b) by whom c) costs involved	a) number of meetings where speakers gave presentations b) number of attendees and who they are c) costs involved	a) comprehension rate b) quality of meetings, as assessed by attendees	a) level of knowledge about crime after as compared to before program	a) fear expressed after as compared to before program

spent), it might be possible to compare the costs versus the outputs for each and determine roughly which strategies are most cost-effective.

The reader should also pay close attention to the impact measures listed under the objective and the goal. The measures are the same because all four strategies are designed to achieve the same objective and goal. The measures used to determine whether or not there has been an increase in knowledge about crime, and a reduction in fear, require two things. They suggest that some kind of attitudinal and opinion survey be conducted of the neighborhood population. And, because the effect of the program is being measured, two surveys must be conducted: one prior to the initiation of the program (to collect baseline information) and the second, some time after the program has been in existence. Then the evaluation is based upon a comparison of the results of the before and after surveys.

C. Using Evaluation Results to Modify a Program

Evaluation results may be used to change any part of the program. Some results will tell the project that the process of implementation isn't going according to plan. Others may indicate that the objectives are achieved but that there is no change in the final goal outcomes, which suggests that the program's objectives should be modified. Information might be collected to show that the problem itself has changed, and that the entire program should be redesigned accordingly.

> ⬤Related to the limited use of the rational planning model, most projects are not equipped to do thorough formal evaluations of their programs, although evaluation does occur.

Formal analytical impact evaluations are rare in community-based programs. Several large, well-funded programs have done these evaluations, but they remain the exception rather than the rule.[1] Data for these evaluations are hard to get and difficult to use. Many small area projects could not hope to gather reliable crime impact data, for example. Also, quantitative impact evaluations are expensive.

Many communities do perform impact evaluations, however. They use feedback from the community to determine how their programs are accepted. These evaluations are usually fairly informal, and often unsystematic. Expressions of approval or disapproval by members in meetings or by key persons in the area may be important responses to the program, or police or political figures may give opinions. Other, more "objective" measures of community reaction can sometimes be developed. If people's attendance at meetings declines suddenly, something is wrong (although it may be difficult to say exactly what).

Feedback from the community is a much surer and simpler way for most projects to evaluate impact and modify their programs. The evaluator of the Contra Costa Neighborhood Safety Project noted that community crime prevention projects "invariably lack quantifiable measurement parameters."[2] In other words, some of the typical

[1]See the Minneapolis site visit, below. The Hartford, Connecticut project was also analytically evaluated for impact. See Floyd J. Fowler, et al., Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program (Boston: Center for Survey Research, 1979), Chapter V, pp. 82-155. This evaluation used a sophisticated design to compare crime rates in different areas and in different time periods to ensure that the results were due to the program and not to something else. Evaluations like this one are beyond the means of most projects.

[2]Martha P. Wilson, Executive Summary of the Neighborhood Safety Project (Oakland: Pentad Consortium, 1978), p. 5.

objectives of a community crime prevention program are hard to measure using quantitative techniques. For example, one objective of many programs is to educate area residents about crime prevention and to try to develop positive attitudes about it. Most projects could not afford sophisticated attitudinal surveys to determine this impact. Like Contra Costa, they would probably have to rely on indicators like interviews with participants, the testimony of police involved in the program, or indirect measures like an increase in attendance or interest shown in crime prevention meetings. Staff members in the Contra Costa project meet weekly to assess community reactions, determine which techniques seem to be working (and which are not), and make changes in program activities or strategies based upon their day-to-day experiences in the community.

Process evaluation is also fairly common, but it is often used incorrectly. A process measure like the number of households contacted in a door-to-door canvass may say something about how well organized a project is, but not about how effective the program is.

Southeast Polk County, Iowa, presents an excellent example of modifying a program based on process evaluation information. One of the program tasks was to do a door-to-door canvass of the whole target area, using volunteers. When the canvass was not going according to the timetable, the project director traced the problem to a lack of volunteer efforts. The solution was to get CETA workers to perform the canvass. This didn't change the strategy or the objective of this phase of the program; it only changed how the task was accomplished; i.e., the process envisioned in the workplan was modified.

VI. Additional Resources: Places to go for Help

A. Organizations Providing Technical Assistance, Training, and Related Services to Crime Prevention Projects.

Following is a listing of organizations providing technical assistance in program planning and development, and a brief synopsis of the services they offer:

1. Center for Community Change
   1000 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
   Washington, D.C. 20007
   Tel: 202/333-5700

The Center for Community Change (CCC) is a non-profit corporation dedicated to providing technical assistance, advice and funding resources to low-income and minority community organizations involved in various community improvement and self-determination efforts. CCC through its Community Crime Prevention Services project provides technical assistance to community groups funded by LEAA's Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs (CACP). Services include on-site consultation, workshops, and resource materials on program development and project management. Services provided at no cost to grantees. Also publish newsletter entitled Action Line.

2. The Grantsmanship Center
   1031 South Grand Avenue
   Los Angeles, California 90015
   Tel: 213/749-4721

The Grantsmanship Center is a non-profit, educational institution that provides services to other private non-profit and governmental organizations. The Center conducts small-group training workshops throughout the country on program planning and development, identification of funding sources, and proposal writing. It publishes the Grantsmanship Center News, a periodic publication on grants and funding information, and provides reprints of News articles which can be used as text and reference material. The Center charges for the services provided.

3. Midwest Academy
   600 West Fullerton Avenue
   Chicago, Illinois 60614
   Tel: 312/975-3670

The Midwest Academy is a non-profit, educational institution dedicated to training citizen action group leaders and organizers. The Academy conducts training sessions on organizing, administration, fundraising, and research (for a fee), and distributes a range of articles and books on organizing skills and strategies.

4. Minnesota Crime Prevention Center
2344 Nicollet Avenue South
Suite 300
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55404
Tel: 612/870-3841

MCPC, Inc. is a private, non-profit corporation that provides training and technical assistance in crime prevention planning, program development, and evaluation. MCPC, Inc. has produced a series of articles summarizing its research findings and covering various aspects of planning, community and block club organizing.

5. National Center for Community
Crime Prevention
Southwest Texas State University
San Marcos, Texas 78666
Tel: 1-800/531-5009 (toll free)

The NCCCP conducts training programs in community crime prevention covering such topics as management skills, community organizing and program development. Training and technical assistance are provided free to groups designated by LEAA's CAC program. The Center maintains a crime prevention resource library and publishes a monthly newsletter entitled Prevention Press.

6. National Council of Senior Citizens
1511 K Street, N.W.
Suite 540
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel: 202/638-4848

Through its Criminal Justice and the Elderly project, the NCSC provides information/referral services and technical assistance on crime prevention programming aimed at reducing elderly victimization and alleviating its effects. It distributes a regular newsletter.

7. National Council on Crime
and Delinquency
Crime Prevention Office
20 Banta Place
Hackensack, New Jersey 07601
Tel: 201/489-9550

The Crime Prevention office of the NCCD is responsible for the administration of a national crime prevention campaign, with the slogan "Take a Bite out of Crime." Services provided by the national campaign include training, technical assistance, and public education. Training and T.A. is provided free of charge to staff and volunteers of nationally-affiliated organizations, key citizen and municipal leaders, businessmen and crime prevention practitioners. The campaign's monthly newsletter is called Catalyst.

8. National Crime Prevention Institute
University of Louisville - Shelby Campus
Louisville, Kentucky 40222
Tel: 502/588-6987

NCPI provides training in various aspects of crime prevention, such as program development and management, public speaking and the media, working with community groups. Training courses are offered for law enforcement officers, community leaders, government officials, on a fee basis. NCPI publishes a monthly newsletter called Focus.

9. National Self-Help Resource Center
2000 - S Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel: 202/338-5704

The Center is the national coordinator of community resource centers around the country. It provides on-site technical assistance and training in coalition-building, "networking" and community organizing, for a fee. The Center also operates a resource library and information referral/exchange. There are membership dues and a monthly newsletter entitled Network News, which is free to members.

10. National Training and Information
Center
1123 West Washington
Chicago, Illinois 60607
Tel: 312/243-3035

The NTIC provides training and consulting services to community groups and their staffs on crime prevention organizational development. They publish a newsletter entitled Disclosure. There is a fee for NTIC services.

11. Pacific Northwest Crime
Prevention Institute
Office of the Attorney General
Dexter Horton Building
Seattle, Washington 98104
Tel: 206/464 '6

The Pacific Northwest Crime Prevention Institute provides basic training programs for crime prevention officers and practitioners. It also conducts training sessions for volunteers. Services are free to Washington residents; outstate participants pay for actual costs.

12. Volunteer: National Center for
Citizen Involvement
1214 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: 202/467-5560

Provides free technical assistance to LEAA's - CACP grantees in the areas of program management and implementation. The organization also operates a management and information service on volunteerism and distributes a series of publications on organizing, fund-raising, and specific kinds of crime prevention programs.

B. Newsletters and Other Regular Publications

In addition to the newsletters distributed by the agencies described above, the following newsletters, journals, and other regular publications contain information about crime prevention programs and/or planning.

1. Community Crime Prevention Newsletter, Lawrence Resnick, Publisher (123 East 5 Street, Plainfield, New Jersey 07060).

2. Concern, National Victim/Witness Resource Center (P.O. Box 39045, Washington, D.C. 20016).

3. Criminal Justice Newsletter, National Council on Crime and Delinquency (411 Hackensack Avenue, Hackensack, New Jersey 07601).

4. Hands-Up, General Federation of Women's Clubs (1728 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).

5. LEAA Newsletter, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20531).

6. NILECJ Research Bulletin, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (LEAA, Washington, D.C. 20531).

7. Target, International City Management Association (1140 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).

8. Tempo, International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners, Inc. (3716 Court Place, Ellicott City, Maryland 21403).

9. The Arson Report, National Crime Prevention Association (985 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045).

C. Reference Sources

1. Directory of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Associations and Research Centers, National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 1973).

2. Directory of Community Crime Prevention Programs, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), LEAA (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1978).

3. Directory of Criminal Justice Information Sources, Third Edition, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 1979).

4. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) — a clearinghouse of information on law enforcement and criminal justice. NCJRS, sponsored by NILECJ, maintains a computerized data base of approximately 40,000 documents about the criminal justice system, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human resource development. (NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20850).

D. Articles and Books

Following is a listing of several introductory texts and articles about crime prevention and program planning/development:

1. Shirley Henke and Stephanie Mann, Alternative to Fear: A Citizens' Manual for Crime Prevention Through Neighborhood Involvement (Berkeley: Lodestar Press, 1975).

2. Don Koberg, Universal Traveler: A Systems Guide to Creativity, Problem Solving, and the Process of Reaching Goals (Los Altos, California: W. Kaufmann Co., 1976).

3. Benjamin Broox McIntyre, Skills for Impact: Voluntary Action in Criminal Justice (Athens: Institute of Government, University of Georgia, September, 1977).

4. Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, Crime Analysis for Crime Prevention (Minneapolis, Minnesota: MCPC, Inc., 1978).

5. National Crime Prevention Institute, Understanding Crime Prevention (Lexington, Kentucky: National Crime Prevention Institute Press, 1978).

E. Local Resources

1. Area colleges and universities (in particular, the criminal justice, sociology, statistics, urban affairs and public policy, and political science departments).

2. Foundations and other local groups providing financial support (e.g., United Way, businessman's organizations).

3. City departments (e.g., police, planning, housing, welfare, zoning).

4. State and local criminal justice planning agencies.

CHAPTER V

## POLITICS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

I. Introduction

In this chapter we will examine the political aspects of planning a community crime prevention program. The descriptive and analytical aspects of planning that have been discussed so far are important, but expert use of technique can go only so far. A program that "fits" a community according to a careful analysis of data is simply beside the point if people don't support it. An important part of politics in planning is finding and building support for the program, in particular from people in the community.

Because planning a program involves making decisions affecting many people, who is involved in making those decisions is absolutely central. The people involved determine the final content of the program, and it will reflect their opinions and points of view. If the people who make planning decisions are not representative of the whole community, the program itself will not be consistent with the viewpoints of residents. These are the issues of participation and representation.

Since most communities are made up of people with different opinions, beliefs and wants, the possibility of conflicts over the program design is high. Sometimes this leads planners to restrict the number of people involved, in order to minimize conflict. This

strategy can be damaging; it can result in a program which is unacceptable to many people. Also, it usually only postpones conflict until the program is fully-developed, and then it erupts in the public arena. This happened with the environmental design strategies in the Lowry Hill East neighborhood (Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention project).[1] Although the planners made some efforts to involve citizens, the placement of temporary traffic barriers on a few neighborhood streets aroused the opposition of people who had not consented to the idea, and the plan was defeated. Citizen involvement has to be adequate to permit all important and relevant concerns to be heard and accounted for in the plan.

Unlike the analytical process, the political aspects involve activities that are similar throughout planning. The stages identified in the formal analytical process -- problem identification, program development, implementation, and evaluation -- are not such clear-cut divisions in political terms. At each stage, political concerns must be recognized and incorporated into the plan. When we look at the politics of planning it becomes clear that in practice the stages are closely related and overlapping. This practical, political side of planning -- getting human beings to work together for a common end -- is a continuous process.

For this chapter, the political activities we observed are divided into three issue areas that concern all projects: participation, representation, and conflict resolution.

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[1] See Chapter 6, pp. VI-89-90.

II. Participation

● Many project directors assert that citizen involvement during program development would be desirable, but few are successful in doing it.

Almost by definition, widespread participation by citizens of the community is desired in community-based programs. But participation can mean many things. There are basically two questions to be asked about participation:

(1) Who participates in planning decisions? Which community members and how many have an input into the decisions determining the program content?

(2) What decisions do they make? In some projects citizens are encouraged to participate throughout the planning process, while others permit only limited participation, such as having citizens respond to the ideas presented by professional planners. Some decision-making procedures -- public hearings/meetings -- encourage a large number of people to join the deliberations. Other procedures, such as appointing a small planning committee, limit participation.

There are four types of actors who are important in planning a crime prevention program: individual citizens, community organizations, police, and other official government agencies. The rest of this section summarizes the political issues and techniques of participation for each of these actors.

A. Involving Individual Citizens

1. Why It's Important

The following comments -- all made to us during the telephone interviews -- emphasize the importance of citizen support and participation in planning:

"The most important thing is to have a sense of what people want and need. . ."

"You get unrealistic programs if you're not familiar with the local area and its problems . . . You must be sensitive to the area and its crime prevention needs."

"You have to ask people what can be done . . . get feedback from the people."

"Community support is essential. Personalize crime problems to bring them home to people."

"Unless you have the support of the people, you won't be successful; and the only way a program can get that support is for the program to reflect their concerns in its goals and objectives."

Getting citizen input. These comments suggest the importance of involving citizens for the input they can offer so that the program reflects their concerns. This is true throughout planning, from problem definition to evaluation. Much of the information needed to determine the nature of the crime problem can come only from citizens. Similarly, program strategies and activities must be consistent with the predominant values of the community. Most crime prevention strategies require citizens to take action -- from simple steps such as engraving personal property to complex, time-consuming activities like patrolling. The citizen involvement activities included in the program must coincide with their abilities, resources, and interests.

The only way to find out whether or not citizens are willing to participate in the different kinds of activities considered during planning (as well as if they have the abilities and resources), is to ask them. What some projects call "citizen apathy" is often a matter of the program telling or asking citizens to become involved in crime prevention activities in which they aren't interested or don't want to participate.

Expanding resources. Citizens have considerable resources they can contribute to a program, including time, money, expertise and simple verbal support within the community. Some projects received a lot of support and help from the people, while others didn't. There appears to be truth in the idea that people will work harder and give more effort if they feel they can influence the content of the program.

2. The Issues

How participation should occur is a controversial issue. Beyond a certain point, the level of citizen involvement will make a difference in who controls the program. Control is a source of power, a way to make a point of view win out. This implies conflict.

The citizen's role. An issue that has been a constant theme concerns the appropriate role for citizens to play in planning: at what stage in the process should citizens participate, and how much control should their participation entail? Grassroots groups and official agencies tend to be on opposite sides of both these questions.

It is relatively easy for grass roots groups to obtain the support and involvement of community residents in developing a program. Often, these groups form in the first place because of a very real concern about a particular crime problem. They know what residents' concerns are and those are what the program focuses on. Residents can become directly involved in determining the problem and deciding on goals or strategies.

Official government agencies, on the other hand, often have a tendency to forget how important the role of the citizen is in planning a program. As noted elsewhere, these agencies tend to

use official data sources and formal techniques to plan crime prevention programs. These programs may or may not fit the needs of the community. If they don't, citizens will certainly reject them sooner or later.

Official agencies sometimes consider "citizen involvement" as a way to channel information back and forth between the streets and "the office" so "the office" can better "explain" its program to the citizens. This attitude of superiority ("we know what the problems are and what to do about them") is immediately recognized by citizens; and it's often enough to discourage citizens from further "participation" in planning.

Volunteers. The all-volunteer community improvement effort is a worthy ideal, but there are some obstacles to achieving program goals while depending on volunteers.

> ● Very few, if any, crime prevention programs exist over a long time period solely on volunteer efforts (contributions of time and/or money from citizens).

In the first place, people must have time and energy left over from home and work duties in order to actively participate. Some communities have more extra resources than others. As one project director said:

"Volunteerism is white . . . Projects in high crime areas that have either low income or high minority populations cannot expect people to participate if they can't be subsidized for their time."

The Port City case study suggests that the elderly also may fail to participate, in part, because of the costs involved.

The issue of whether or not to pay citizen volunteers was raised by several projects. In some areas, directors argued, people cannot be expected to work as "volunteers" unless they are paid. They suggested the only way to get citizen involvement in planning was to have funds specifically to cover the minimum expenses of participating citizens (travel costs, baby-sitting expenses, etc.). With limited budgets, however, paying volunteers is beyond the means of most projects. Also, pay for service usually means the service will end when the money does.

Problems may also be created if some volunteers are paid and others are not. Many projects pay professionals to be responsible for the day-to-day work, and rely on volunteers for help in the massive, repetitive tasks, like door-knocking or distributing literature. This is a tricky game to play. Citizens may come to view the professional staff as the "experts" who are responsible, and thus feel less need or desire to participate as volunteers. Then, the overall effectiveness of the program can suffer.

Attitude. In order to recruit and keep volunteers over a period of time, citizens' attitudes toward crime and crime prevention must be positive: they have to be motivated to participate. Some people believe that citizens cannot or should not be involved in crime prevention. These negative attitudes may be due to a lack of information, or possibly to feelings of isolation: "I'm only one person; what can I do?"

A different attitude problem occurs where citizens are not concerned about crime, or where other neighborhood problems have higher priority.

> ● Citizens can be motivated to begin community crime prevention programs, but such programs are difficult to maintain solely on the basis of the crime problem.

Citizen concern about the crime problem varies; and often when concerns are expressed, they spill over into other neighborhood problems that may be only minimally related to crime. The experience of project directors suggests that it is a mistake to limit citizen participation to any narrow definition of crime. Once citizens are motivated to participate in the decisions affecting their neighborhood, it is better to let them pursue the problems they define as serious. Both the Contra Costa County project and the Minneapolis Crime Prevention program have encountered this situation.

It is especially difficult for official agencies, which are "delivering" a crime prevention service, to broaden the scope of the project when they don't have any authority outside of crime. Citizens' groups, like Woodlawn or the Neighborhood Safety project in Contra Costa, are able to view crime as one of the area's problems, and deal with it within a broader context of community concerns. Both The Woodlawn Organization and Ward I, Inc., view crime as only a part of the larger issue of community development and neighborhood improvement. Their crime prevention programs are designed to further more general, long-range goals for the community as a whole.

3. How to Involve Individual Citizens

> ● The major expenditure of time and effort in most projects is directed toward reaching and mobilizing citizens and community groups in support of program initiatives.

Despite the difference in sponsor types and the wide range of program activities, all projects share a common theme: how to get citizens to play an active, supportive role in crime prevention. To get participation from citizens, project planners must consider their current attitudes and opinions toward the problem, the incentives and encouragement they need to participate, and the kinds of opportunities they have for involvement.

Education. Negative attitudes or a lack of information about crime prevention can be partially overcome with techniques that inform citizens about the nature of the crime problem in their areas, and the kinds of things that can be done about it.

Most educational techniques -- such as meetings, mailings, and door-to-door canvassing -- are common among projects. Their simplicity shouldn't lull program organizers into neglecting the details needed to make them work. Meetings need to be well publicized . . . through community newspapers, leaflets, newsletters, bulletin boards, and so forth. Times and places should be convenient, and meetings well run. Advertisements should include specific details about what will take place at the meeting; they should encourage people with specific skills to come and share their knowledge. If possible, personal contact should be made with the people whose attendance is desired. The Woodlawn organizers claim that leafletting activities are much less effective in getting participation than the door-to-door canvass that permits face-to-face contact with members.

Key persons. Over 80 percent of the projects in the survey responded that they had contacted key people (the community's informal leaders and respected people); and some projects relied extensively upon this source. Key persons can help attract citizens to the

project by word of mouth advertising, by showing that participation in the project is good, to identify interested people, and by helping get the support of other influentials. Key persons can usually be identified by their positions in the community, e.g., as heads of neighborhood associations or active members in churches or schools.

Once again, it is important not to alienate these people by presenting the program as an accomplished fact and then ask for their endorsement. If contacted early, they may prove to be very helpful in providing ideas and support for the program. But if offended, they can also be potent adversaries.

Role of experts. Experts may add experience, judgment, and legitimacy to a program. However, it is important to find ways for both experts and citizens to participate in the program without conflict.

The experiences in Contra Costa illustrate the possibilities of police/community conflicts, and also point to some possible solutions to these expert vs. citizen problems. When citizens began demanding more control over their project, conflicts arose with the police who had been very influential in the earlier stages. The opposition of the police would have deprived the project of an important ally. Realizing that both the expertise of the police and the control of the project by citizens was important, Contra Costa uses a technique whereby police are invited to participate as resource people in meetings run by the citizens. The initiative remains with the citizens, but the valuable assistance of the police is still available.

Design of the program. One obvious factor affecting citizen participation is the final design of the program.

+--+
| ● <u>Successful participatory programs provide a number of</u> |
| <u>different ways to involve citizens.</u> |
+--+

The more successful projects included different types of citizen
involvement activities, which meshed with individuals' interests,
resources, and abilities. In Contra Costa, for example, citizens can
participate in the program in many ways, ranging from fairly passive
participation in target-hardening programs to time-consuming
organizing roles. The project permits each person to weigh his/her
costs against the benefits expected and participate accordingly; the
level of a person's activity is largely up to their interests. The
self-selection at work here permits the project as a whole to adapt
and change as the interests of the participants change. Thus, the
identified problems have changed over time, but many volunteers remain
for long periods.

    <u>Formal techniques</u>. Techniques such as surveys of the population
are ways to obtain individuals' opinions, but they are not adequate to
achieve citizen participation. It requires little of individuals to
complete a survey, and it is unlikely to give them a feeling of
control or responsibility for the project. Less scientific
techniques, like Woodlawn's survey of their membership in attendance
at meetings do not produce the same quality of representation as
scientific surveys, since the members are self-selected and may be
different from other residents. But the Woodlawn survey may be much
more effective as a motivator for continued participation.

    <u>Organizing</u>. One key to effectively involving citizens is
<u>organizing</u> them. The projects which were most successful in getting
citizen participation either organized citizens into small groups,

such as block clubs, or neighborhood committees, or used existing
citizen organizations as the vehicle to gain participation. The
Minneapolis program, for example, has gradually shifted its major
emphasis to community organizing.[1] Similarly, this is the principal
technique used in the Contra Costa County project. And the well-
organized structure of block clubs in Chicago is central to
understanding The Woodlawn Organization's project.

B. <u>Involving Community Organizations</u>

   1. <u>Why It's Important</u>

    There are several reasons for involving community organizations in
planning a community crime prevention program, but the one mentioned
most often was that these organizations are a good way to make con-
tacts with individual citizens in the community.

+--+
| ● <u>Many projects use existing community organizations as a</u> |
| <u>channel to reach and mobilize individual citizens.</u> |
+--+

    Most crime prevention projects do not have the resources to find
and organize all the citizens in the area who might be interested in a
community self-help project. Existing community organizations have
already identified many of these people.

    Sometimes crime prevention projects contact citizens indirectly
through the leaders of community organizations, while in others direct
contact is made with the individual members. In either case, the
leaders of the community organizations are contacted <u>first</u> to make
sure they are not opposed to project activity, and to get their help
if possible.

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[1]"Block Club Organizing Handbook," <u>mimeo</u> (Minneapolis: Minnesota
Crime Prevention Center, 1978). This is a short "how to" guide
developed for the Minneapolis project.

To expand resources. Community organizations have accumulated experience and other resources, such as political contacts and skilled personnel, that a crime prevention project may "borrow" or use. To the extent that these resources can be shared among organizations in the community, all are better off.

To gain legitimacy. If a new crime prevention program, especially one sponsored by an agency from outside the community, can gain the support and endorsement of a respected community organization, it can gain recognition and good will from community members and others. This kind of political blessing can make the job of gathering necessary resources and members much easier.

To avoid conflict over resources. Resources for community organizing are scarce in most places. An established community organization can be a potent adversary if it is somehow antagonized or is opposed to the crime prevention program because of conflict over resources. Then, the resources and good will the organization has built up in the community may be used against the crime prevention program, rather than to support it.

To avoid duplication. For both political and resource conservation reasons, it is wise to avoid having two or more projects in the same area doing the same things. Existing community organizations may already engage in some activities that could form the basis for a cooperative arrangement with a crime prevention program. But if these organizations are not involved in planning, the crime prevention project may end up duplicating, and possibly alienating, the existing community organization.

2. The Issues

In developing a program, planners are faced with decisions about which groups and organizations to involve, for what purposes, and how to identify and involve them. For the most part, three factors determine how existing community groups should be involved in planning. These are: 1) the number of organizations and how well they have already organized the community, 2) the pattern of competition or cooperation between these organizations, and 3) the way citizens perceive the community organizations.

Number of organizations. The extent to which the community is already organized involves two questions: how many organizations are there, and how many people in the community have they organized?

Where no community organizations exist, the crime prevention project may have to create its own. In a major residential crime reduction experiment in Hartford, Connecticut, program planners started two new community organizations. This was done to provide an efficient means for involving citizens in the program and as a formal link between citizens and police.[1] This suggests that community organizing may be critical in building the capacity of a crime prevention project to pursue its goals. Building a community organization is a costly process of contacting individuals and identifying natural leaders who can help motivate others to participate. Without an organization of this sort, it is very difficult to identify

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[1]Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., et al, Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program (Boston: Center for Survey Research, 1979), pp. 48-50.

citizens' views of the problems or their program preferences. In some cases formal techniques like surveys may serve some of the same purposes. But again, these formal approaches do not encourage active participation.

Where a single, dominant community organization exists, the political issue is finding a way to cooperate and coexist with it. Often times, the dominant organization is the group that sponsors the project (as in Woodlawn), which greatly simplifies the political situation. If the sponsoring agency is from outside the community, it is especially important that an effort be made to work with the dominant organization there, if only to gain respectability in the community.

A community may have several organizations already in existence. Where this is the case, planners need to determine the issues these organizations are concerned about, which of them might be interested in becoming involved in a crime prevention program, and what groups of citizens each organization represents.

If more than one community organization is interested in crime prevention activities, it may be appropriate to consider some kind of coalition to develop a program. If this is the organizational form the project decides upon, it is important to identify and involve as many of these groups as possible. In this way, adequate representation is given to all of the various segments in the community. Bringing together many groups to work together in developing a single unified crime prevention program suggests that conflicts during planning will be inevitable. Our telephone interviews support this statement, as almost every coalition program suggested that the process of getting groups to agree and cooperate was the most

difficult problem associated with planning. Some of this conflict can be contained by careful definition of the rights and responsibilities of coalition members.[1]

Number of organizational members. Even though the community as a whole may be highly organized, it is possible that many of the residents are not members of these groups. This situation was encountered by the Port City program for the elderly. The project planned to go through organizations in the community (especially senior citizen groups) to reach elderly residents. After the project began, they discovered that the vast majority of the elderly did not belong to these organizations. Therefore, it is important to find out how many people are actually represented by the various organizations in the community.

Patterns of competition and cooperation. The case where several community organizations exist raises the issues of competition and cooperation between the organizations. It is reasonable to expect conflicts between groups competing for the same scare resources: active members, money, political connections, and so on. These conflicts can endure over long periods, based on basic differences like ethnic background, class, or neighborhood boundaries. The issue faced by planners is to determine the reason and depth of the conflicts, and try to find a strategy for the crime prevention program that avoids entangling it with other, long-standing political problems. Selecting one of several competing organizations to work with the project will probably antagonize the members of the others.[2]

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[1]See the following section on "Resolving Conflicts" in this chapter and the Ward I site visit in Chapter 6, pp. VI-59-77.

[2]This occurred in the early stage of the Minneapolis project in one neighborhood. See pp. VI-94-96.

Citizens' perceptions of community organizations. The value of community organizations to a crime prevention program is contingent on the kind of reputation it has with citizens. An organization with a bad reputation can hurt a crime prevention program if it becomes closely identified with the project.

3. How to Involve Community Organizations

Resolving these issues in a program requires information, and then deciding upon a strategy to involve community organizations.

Identification of community organizations. Identifying the groups that exist in a community may be second nature to a grassroots group, whereas it may be extremely difficult for an official agency not already familiar with the political landscape of the target area. In either case, it is the first step toward developing participation among community organizations.

Before deciding which groups to involve and who the appropriate representatives are, it is necessary to know what organizations exist, who they represent, and what they do. Compiling a list of organizations in the community is a useful exercise. The number will vary, depending upon the size of the area and on how well the planners know the community.

Following is a list of some of the kinds of groups and organizations which a project may want to include in planning. All of these are potential sources of information about neighborhood problems, resources (volunteers, research, skills and planning expertise, funds), and support.[1]

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[1]For a more complete discussion, see Benjamin Broox McIntyre, Skills for Impact: Voluntary Action in Criminal Justice (Athens: Institute of Government, University of Georgia, September, 1977) p. 174-176.

- Local businesses and merchants associations

- Labor unions

- Professional associations and societies

- Religious organizations, local churches, and ministers

- Educational institutions (faculty, staff, administrators, students) and organizations, such as the PTA and school board

- Service and civic organizations (e.g., YMCA, United Way)

- Neighborhood improvement groups and other informal neighborhood clubs (e.g., block clubs)

- Senior citizen organizations

- Youth groups

- Tenants associations

- Local media (newspapers, radio, television)

The initial list will change as planning progresses. When organizational leaders are contacted, they should be asked to supply the names of other groups and key persons to be added to the list. Also, as the structure of the program evolves to meet the expressed needs of the community, some original contacts may no longer be as important as they once were. It is better, however, to have contacted too many organizations (some which may not have an interest in crime prevention), than not enough. Developing an ever-expanding network of contacts with community groups early in project development will make it easier to call upon them when the time comes to request more specific assistance. As one project director put it, "You never know who you will need 'down the road' for support or help."

Analysis of community organizations. Once they are identified, the planner needs information about how the various groups may be relevant to the crime prevention project.

The approaches used to contact these groups can range from very systematic to quite informal. The systematic approach is found more often where the sponsor is an outside agency with relatively little knowledge of the community's political structure, and where there are enough resources to develop a comprehensive list. Formal interviews may be set up, and a structured, questionnaire can be used for all interviews. The informal approach depends more on personal contacts and friendships. The systematic approach may help to establish a planner's neutrality among competing groups, and is less likely to result in a list which fails to include some important group(s).

Following is a set of questions that can help develop the necessary information for the political analysis that will lead to the formation of a project planning group.

i. Reason for Being

- What is the purpose of each group? What are their goals and priorities?
- What kinds of activities do they engage in?
- What have they done in the past?
- What are their priorities now?
- Have they, or are they, doing anything about crime? If so, what?

ii. Representation/Membership

- What part of the community does each group represent?
- How large a geographic area do they cover?
- Who are their members? (e.g., senior citizens, youth, citizens in general?)
- How large is the membership?

iii. Organization/Administration

- What is the internal administrative and decision-making structure?
- Who makes decisions? (Both "rubber stamp" and real decisions.)
- How much money do they seem to have?
- What is the source of their finances? e.g., volunteer group, federally funded, funded by private foundation?

vi. Determining the Best Person to Involve Within the Group

- Who has the positional authority to influence decisions?
- Who has the reputation of getting things done within the organization?
- Who actively participates in important decisions affecting the community?
- Who is involved in a variety of community programs?

v. Reputation

- What is the group's reputation in the community? What do other groups (people) think of them?
- What is their credibility?
- Are they in conflict or in opposition to other groups in the community?

vi. Potential Resources

- How can they help you?
- Do they have access to power? Are they a source of power?
- Do they have information about the community you need?
- Can they provide public support and/or political support?
- Are they a source of possible funding?
- Can they provide you with technical assistance? training? expert advice in community organizing?
- Are they a source of volunteers?

vii. Opinions

- Do they think crime is a problem? What is its priority vis-a-vis other problems?
- How do they define the crime problem?
- What do they think can be done about it?
- Are they interested in your program? Are they willing to help?

Knowledge about groups and organizations in the community is useful in determining which ones need to be further involved in developing the project. This process will also provide information to use in defining problems and assessing available resources. Those groups and individuals who want to be involved more extensively in project development should be identified and the planning group needs to organize itself. This might take the form of an advisory group, steering committee, board of directors, or task force, depending upon the role the group will play and its authority for making final decisions.

Strategies for community organizations. There was considerable variation among projects in how they dealt with community organizations. A few of the strategies they pursued to involve community organizations are presented. These strategies may suggest approaches useful in other crime prevention projects:

- The coalition of functionally distinct partners. Ward I provides an example of a project where a coalition was formed between numerous community organizations which divided the crime prevention program into non-overlapping, distinct areas of activity. The fact that each member of the coalition performs separate functions or tasks is a fundamental part of the basic agreement between coalition members.

- Coalitions based on sub-groups. Again in Ward I, blacks and Latinos participate in the coalition through their separate organizations. Traditional conflicts between the two groups have been recognized and avoided, at least for the crime prevention issue.

- Coalitions of community organizations and official agencies. In southern California, 26 municipalities with a common problem teamed up through a community organization to develop a common program. In Oakland, a police-dominated project set up committees and coordinating mechanisms through existing community organizations in several neighborhoods. As the history of the Contra Costa site visit shows, coalitions of this sort are subjected to severe strains if the ultimate control of the project becomes an issue.

- Areal subdivision. The Greater Woodlawn project moved outside of their traditional geographical boundaries into three adjacent areas that already had some community organization. These areas remain distinct in terms of specific concerns and program activities, under the overall direction of T.W.O.

- Forming a new community organization. Two types appeared in the research. Where several competing community organizations existed prior to the crime prevention effort, a new organization which was not closely associated with the competing organizations was created. This occurred in the Lowry Hill East demonstration neighborhood in Minneapolis, where two community improvement associations that had fought over issues in the past were by-passed in favor of creating a new organization.

Where no prior community organizations capable of developing a crime prevention program exists, one may be created in order to take advantage of the benefits of organization. The Hartford project is a previously cited example.

C. Involving the Police

● Police support and cooperation is usually necessary for a community crime prevention program.

With few exceptions, the people interviewed in our survey emphasized the importance and necessity of involving the police or sheriff's department from the beginning in planning a community-based crime prevention program. Those who did not establish a relationship with the police early -- or at all -- suggested (with the benefit of hindsight) that they wished they had, as the failure to do so had negative consequences for the project. Furthermore, law enforcement involvement needs to go beyond a simple "nod of approval" from the police or sheriff; it means active participation on the part of various members of a department throughout the planning process.

1. Why Police Involvement is Important

There are several reasons why police involvement is so vital. First, police consider themselves to be the experts in a community on controlling and preventing crime. While their ideas about the way to go about it may be different from or contrary to the views of some members of the community, the fact still remains that the police are an important and valuable source of information, knowledge, and experience about crime problems. Most citizens recognize that police possess the only legitimate authority to use force in controlling crime; therefore, police support for a program will usually add "legitimacy" to the citizens' effort.

Because the police are on the "front line," so to speak, it is courteous to let them know about the activities of others which will likely affect their job. Many (if not most) crime prevention strategies and activities require some police cooperation and participation to make them work. Other activities, which might not require direct police involvement, may be either threatening to the police or in opposition to their opinions about crime prevention. In the latter case, failure to include the police in planning -- providing them with the opportunity to voice their concerns and resolve differences -- can result in serious conflicts between the project and the police at some point in implementation.

Therefore, police support can add credibility and resources to a citizen-initiated crime prevention program. On the other hand, police opposition will almost surely undermine the effectiveness of the effort, and may cause the program to fail in the long run.

Illustrations of programs requiring police assistance. The telephone interviews and site visits provide numerous illustrations of crime prevention strategies which require police assistance. These fall roughly into three categories: ones which directly or indirectly expand the workload of police or make use of their resources; those which require police to perform duties differently from those dictated by current operating procedures; and strategies aimed at improving police/community relations.

Expanding the police workload. A number of citizen involvement strategies are included in the first category: programs which encourage citizens to report suspicious actions can substantially increase the number of calls to which the police must respond;[1] programs promoting premise security surveys of homes or businesses can result in greater demands placed upon police personnel, who are usually the only ones technically trained to conduct these surveys; the installation of burglar alarms often means an increase in the number of false alarms police must answer; or a sudden flurry of requests to have an officer attend citizen-initiated crime prevention meetings may overburden a department which is not prepared for a large increase in such demands.

While many law enforcement agencies support and cooperate with these types of citizen activities, others do not. Police often feel overworked and might not appreciate a significant increase in their

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[1]For example, in the Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council's project, the sheriff's dispatchers were unwilling to accept "anonymous phone calls," a key element of the Council's program (insuring anonymity to individuals calling to report information about crime). See the project summary in Chapter 6, pp. VI-26-41.

duties. In such instances, alternative strategies may need to be
considered. Even those departments encouraging opportunity reduction
strategies may be resentful of groups which initiate them without
police involvement since the police often sponsor these programs
themselves. If they are not involved, police may view a citizen-
initiated program as "unnecessary duplication of services." But if
they participate in program design, the very same program may be seen
as "providing assistance" to the police.

Changes in police procedures. Programs designed to provide
services to crime victims, such as rape/sexual assault crisis centers
or victim/witness advocacy and assistance programs, depend upon the
police for referrals of crime victims to their program (or at a
minimum, for the disclosure of the names of victims). If the police
are interested and cooperate by referring individuals, these programs
can reach more victims. But in order to operate smoothly, police
officers must be aware of the project and be willing to change their
procedures, e.g., by forwarding victims' names to project personnel,
or routinely informing victims of the available services. Officers
are more likely to provide enthusiastic assistance to the project if
they participate in establishing the procedural details.[1]

Improving police/community relations. Some projects have as a
goal "improving police/community relations." If this goal is to be
realistic, the police participate in developing the strategies which

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[1]The Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors project, for example,
ran into difficulties when the precinct officers who were supposed to
submit the names of elderly crime victims to the project failed to do
so. Even though the project had made contact with police administra-
tors during planning, the precinct officers whose actual respon-
sibility it was to make the referrals were not involved.

will lead to better relationships. For example, regular meetings
between police and community representatives were planned as an
activity to improve relationships in the Ward I, Inc., project. If
the police had been unwilling to cooperate and attend these meetings,
it would have been a worthless activity. Similarly, in the Woodlawn
project, one of the strategies was monitoring police responses to
citizen calls for service. If such an activity had been instituted
without prior police knowledge, the strategy probably would have back-
fired. The goal of improving police/community relations probably
is achievable only where members of the police department, along with
the community itself, genuinely desire improvements. Discovering the
feasibility or willingness of both sides to cooperate is a critical
aspect of the political side of the planning process.

2. The Issues

There are several important issues concerning police involvement
in a community-based crime prevention program.

Police attitudes. There appears to be an inherent tension between
the police and the citizens' perspective in community crime prevention
programs. The source of the tension stems from the police role as
"the experts" when it comes to controlling crime. It's a matter of
"turf" definition; police are proud of their authority and respon-
sibility for crime prevention. This is particularly true where money
is concerned. Many officers find it difficult to accept the idea of
money going directly to community groups for crime prevention
activities.* There is a tendency to see community-based crime

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*This is the basis of LEAA's Community Anti-Crime program; grant
money by-passes local and state official agencies.

prevention programs as a waste of money, which would be better spent if it went to the police. They often view community groups as uninformed about crime, inexperienced, and unable to administer a crime prevention program.

> ● Police are more likely to support crime prevention strategies that assist them.

Police opposition. The police are most comfortable when they can control or take the lead in directing citizen activities aimed at preventing or reducing crime. When citizens take the initiative and design their own programs, which either exclude the police or are not in line with their opinions, many police officers are likely to feel threatened by the project. At this point, the potential for enthusiastic cooperation diminishes. This built-in possibility of conflict may never arise in a program, so long as the program is consistent with the predominant attitudes of police. The experiences of the Contra Costa crime prevention project suggest, however, that even in middle-class communities with a history of excellent relationships between the community and the police, this attitude problem may surface when citizens become more aggressive in determining their own role in crime prevention.

The police are more likely to oppose crime prevention strategies which are perceived as threatening . . . those which may interfere with or usurp police authority or could be used to incite the community against the police. Citizen patrolling is a strategy where the police may perceive that citizens are encroaching upon their authority. Many law enforcement departments have had previous

negative experiences with citizen patrols and consider them dangerous, both for the citizens and the police, or nuisances.[1] Yet, community projects have obtained police support for such strategies, as long as the police can be assured that the citizens are properly trained and responsible. These kinds of reassurances and strategic details must be worked out during the development of the program.[2]

Working with community-based crime prevention programs is usually a new experience for both the sponsoring organization and the police. A mutually-beneficial relationship between the police and a community-based program takes time to develop, simply because negative, suspicious, or dubious attitudes on both sides must be changed.

Administrative structure. Another issue affecting the process of involving the police has to do with the internal administrative/management structure of law enforcement agencies. They are bureaucratic, and usually para-military organizations, with clear chains-of-command. There are likely to be many different units and divisions, each with duties and responsibilities potentially affecting a crime prevention program.

Uncooperative individuals. The bureaucratic, militaristic structure of law enforcement agencies also means that project planners may run into road-blocks or obstructions -- uncooperative individuals who occupy positions of importance and authority -- within the police department. Given the often skeptical attitude toward community-based

[1]Some studies indicate that these fears about contemporary residential patrols are unfounded. See Robert K. Yin, et al., Citizen Patrol Projects, National Evaluation Program (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, January, 1977), pp. 29-33.

[2]See the Ward I, Inc., site visit in Chapter 6 for a discussion of the way differences of opinion between the community and the police over citizen patrols were resolved. Pp. VI-67-71.

crime prevention efforts, it's likely that a project will run up against persons who are unwilling to cooperate or lend their support to the program. The planners must either maneuver around these individuals, finding other, more sympathetic officers to work with, or mount enough power from higher-ups with influence to force the recalcitrant individual to cooperate. The first strategy is better, unless the person's participation is absolutely necessary for the project to work effectively. Then a power-play may be the only option available.

3. How to Involve the Police

Most project personnel interviewed suggested that the key to effectively involving the police was the early identification of one or two officers who are sympathetic to the community's point of view. Every project needs an advocate/ally within the police department, someone willing to take the time and the responsibility for developing support for the project with other members in the department.

The police liaison with the community. The officer(s) selected for the important function of liaison between the police department and the project should possess the following characteristics*: 1) an understanding of the issues involved in a community-based crime prevention project and a willingness to act as an advocate for the community/citizens' perspective, 2) familiarity and respect within the neighborhood, 3) knowledge of internal police department operations and politics, and 4) have enough authority or respect within the police department to be effective.

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*It was suggested that it was better if project personnel selected the officer(s) they wanted to work with, rather than allowing the chief or district supervisor to select the officer to be the liaison. The project then eliminates the risk of an unsympathetic/ uncooperative officer being its primary link to the police department.

The officer(s) acts as "a sounding-board," reacting to project ideas, insuring that other department personnel are involved, building support and providing information about the project to other officers, changing negative attitudes, facilitating necessary police cooperation/participation and so forth. There is, however, a danger associated with relying too heavily on just one officer. If this individual leaves the department or is transferred, the project loses its primary contact with the police department. Involving the police means that starting with one officer, others need to be identified and included so that the loss of one staunch supporter doesn't seriously affect the program.

Contact with the chief. A meeting with the police chief or sheriff is a necessary step in securing the support of the department. It is not a good idea to approach him simply to request data or to present him with a fully-developed proposal. Any "cooperation" or "support" at that point will likely be halfhearted. Rather, he should be contacted for his assistance, and that of the department as a whole, because the project genuinely wants the opinions, ideas, and experience of police.

The chief is more likely to cooperate and offer the resources and services of his personnel if he can see that the department has something to gain from working with the project. Persuasive arguments are those which demonstrate how the project might be of assistance to the department; how the police role in the community will be made easier or improved. A reluctant chief might also be persuaded to cooperate if the project can demonstrate that it already has other important support from official government agencies and/or organizations, key leaders, or citizens in the community. If the

chief's response to the project is less than enthusiastic, the planners should not give up on involving other members of the department. It is still possible to identify the "sympathetic officer" who can secure the minimum amount of police assistance the project needs.

Internal divisions. One of the first steps for a program planner is to find out how the police department is organized, and determine which divisions or units to include in project development. As the planning process proceeds and evolves, other police divisions may be asked to participate, as strategies which affect them or require their cooperation are considered. Direct contact should be made with each affected division. Chart V-1 lists the personnel and divisions within a law enforcement agency which, depending on the program's focus, should be involved in planning.

It is not sufficient to contact the chief or sheriff, and assume that because he pledges the "support of the department" everything will be fine thereafter. As with most bureaucracies, internal break-downs in communication can be fairly common. An order from the chief to lower levels of the police hierarchy may get lost in the shuffle or have little meaning or impact on officers with many other priorities and demands on their time. One officer interviewed suggested that the chief administrator can insure the cooperation of key management and line officers by holding them personally responsible and accountable for coordinating the project with the police. In other words, officers should be told that the success of the police coordination aspects of the project will be tied to their personal records.

Chart V-1: Illustrations of Possible Law Enforcement Involvement in a Community-based Crime Prevention Program

Law Enforcement Personnel/division	Possible Types of Involvement
The Chief Administrator	He should be contacted early and told about the project to be developed. His support and cooperation should be requested. He is the person who can make other services of the department available to the project, help to identify other divisions and officers who should be involved, and issue the necessary internal directives to affected personnel. Except in very small departments, the chief is likely to be too busy to maintain continual contact with the project throughout its development.
Division/Precinct Commander(s)	The division/precinct commander(s) of the target area needs to be aware of the project. The commander usually authorizes specific officers to spend official time working with the project.
The Patrol Division	The local precinct/beat/patrol officers assigned to the geographical area where the program is located need to be familiar with the project and how it will affect their job. Also, they are the officers who will be most familiar with the area's crime problems. Therefore, their opinions and advice should be sought and incorporated during the problem definition phase of planning. The beat officers have initial contact with crime victims, so any project providing victim services will need their cooperation. Most projects identify one or two local patrol officers to work more extensively with the project throughout its development. This officer(s) acts as a liaison between the project and the department.
Community Relations and/or Crime Prevention Unit	Many police departments have special divisions whose primary responsibility is working with groups, organizations, or individual citizens on crime prevention problems and projects. The officers trained in premise security surveying, Neighborhood Watch, Operation Identification, business security, etc., usually operate out of this division. Projects considering target-hardening strategies, in particular, need to involve this unit in planning operational details and coordinating the project with any existing police-sponsored crime prevention program.

Chart V-1 continued

Planning/Research/Crime Analysis Division	Most larger departments have special units with responsibility for collecting and analyzing crime offense reports and other crime data. This unit can assist in the analysis of official crime data.
Police Dispatchers	Projects with strategies designed to increase citizen crime reporting need to familiarize those persons in the department responsible for receiving the calls. Often procedural details need to be worked out with the dispatchers and their supervisor.
Juvenile Division	Community-based projects working with juveniles should involve this unit in program development. Not only are the juvenile officers familiar with the problems, they also have opinions and ideas about preventive strategies which should be considered.
Training Division	This unit may need to be involved if a project contemplates any citizen patrolling activities. Most departments prefer that citizens receive prior training before taking on quasi-official or potentially dangerous responsibilities. Also, in projects where citizens assume responsibilities for premise security surveying or other opportunity reduction activities, the department may provide initial training to the citizens.

<u>Police/community relationship</u>. In communities with a history of poor or antagonistic relationships between the police and groups in the community, the process of involving the police in a community-based project may be more difficult and time-consuming. In this context, it is especially important that project planners do not start off by antagonizing the police. In the words of one officer,

"Don't take on the police. Don't raise the red-flag issues, such as police brutality or neglecting the community, which will <u>guarantee</u> that the police won't support the project."

Past conflicts are not the point at which to begin a positive relationship between the police and a crime prevention program. The individual(s) making the initial contact with the police department should be sensitive to the issues involved, and able to demonstrate the sincerity of the request for assistance.

On the other hand, projects can become too closely associated with the police, and may risk losing support in the community. In some communities, it is necessary to maintain a delicate balance between cooperating with police and acquiring their support, and maintaining control in the community.[1] The police have been singled out in our discussion because they are the one official agency which most crime prevention projects need to involve in program planning. Yet, there are other official agencies whose support is also significant.

D. Involving Official Agencies

1. Why Official Agency Involvement is Important

Most community crime prevention programs seek the involvement, cooperation and support of elected officials and government agencies.

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[1]For a discussion of how to deal with the problem of prior hostile police/community relationships, see the Ward I, Inc., and the Woodlawn projects in Chapter 6, pp. VI-59-77 and pp. VI-42-58.

> ● <u>A project's typical relationship with an official agency is as a funding source.</u>

<u>Obtaining resources</u>. The most common reason for involving official agencies is to obtain needed resources for the project. Most often, this resource is money to hire a full-time staff and pay for an office and the other items needed to run a program. Regardless of whether the project is initated by a grass roots group, an established community organization, or an official agency, programs need some funds in order to operate. And the larger sums of money are usually obtained by applying for a federal grant.[1] Sometimes, state and/or local government funds are also requested. Projects may need the support, endorsement, or sponsorship of other state, local, or regional government agencies/officials in order to qualify for funding. Usually, local government agencies can provide the necessary information about federal grants (guidelines, funding requirements, applicant qualifications, etc.).

<u>Assistance in program planning</u>. Program planners need data, statistics, and information about crime and its causes, and the criminal justice system's response in order to develop a better understanding of the problems in an area. Official agencies, such as the police, the schools, universities, the probation department, city planning, local, regional and state criminal justice planning agencies, the corrections department, and housing authorities, among

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[1]Agencies such as LEAA, ACTION, HUD, the Administration on Aging, and others have established program priorities in the area of preventing and controlling crime.

others, are all sources of data and information. Some government agencies also provide technical assistance in program planning, particularly in the areas of research, and data analysis and interpretation.

Avoiding duplication. As part of the planning process it is a good idea to check with government agencies to find out what policies, services and programs are presently operating in the community, i.e., what's already being done about the problem. The only way to avoid duplicating existing services or programs is to first become familiar with what they are. Often government programs and services are available, but not well-publicized.[1] The process of contacting official agencies to learn about current programs and policies is particularly important for groups which want to lobby for improvements or changes in the criminal justice system. It takes a thorough understanding of current policies, procedures, and the issues involved, before alternatives can be designed and promoted.

Getting cooperation. The failure to involve appropriate government agencies during program planning can have serious consequences during the implementation phase if their cooperation is necessary for the program to work effectively. A graphic example is provided in the Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors project. One of its objectives was to assist elderly crime victims obtain restitution from the State Compensation Board. After the project began, it was discovered that

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[1]One surveyed organization changed the focus of their program from counseling for rape victims to publicizing and augmenting existing services when it was discovered that the county hospital already had a rape victim counseling program.

most elderly victims didn't qualify for compensation under the existing regulations. The same principle applies here as presented in the previous section on police: strategic and procedural details must be worked out during the early stages of planning. For example, if a program for troubled youths intends to rely on the schools to refer these youngsters, a representative of the school system needs to participate in planning and developing the project from the beginning.

Adding legitimacy and support. Another reason to involve official agencies is to add legitimacy, credibility, and power/influence to the program. In particular, the support of state and local elected officials -- mayors, city council members, the governor, and others in positions of authority -- may be very important.

The visibility of a project increases as powerful people demonstrate their support, and it becomes easier to gain access to other needed resources and individuals with influence. For example, the developers of the Ward I, Inc. crime prevention project in Washington, D.C. made it their first order of business to obtain the support of the local criminal justice planning agency. Once they had the pledged support of official agencies, it was easier to obtain the cooperation of the police department and organizations in the community.[1] Similarly, another project director said he obtained the involvement of a reluctant police chief by having the mayor, who was committed to the project, "persuade" the chief to cooperate.

Local business organizations, private foundations, and other groups may be more willing to lend their support -- and resources -- if it can be demonstrated that the program is "legitimate," and has

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[1]See Chapter 6, pp. VI-65-67.

the support of respected officials. Projects planning to seek state or local funding after federal funding runs out, need to identify these local agencies early and encourage their involvement throughout the course of the program. If they are active participants, they are more likely to favor financial assistance for the project when it becomes necessary.

2. The Issues

The case studies provide numerous examples of how official support can be beneficial for a crime prevention project. They also serve to illustrate some of the trade-offs involved in obtaining that support and the potential dangers associated with it. Whether or not to involve government agencies in a program, and if so, which ones and for what purposes, needs to be carefully considered by the planners of a community-based crime prevention program.

Citizen attitudes toward government. It is not always true that the support of official agencies will insure greater support from citizens or organizations and groups. In some communities, there is a strong distrust of government programs. This attitude may be the result of government's failure to make good on unrealistic promises to "solve problems." In other cases, welfare and other government-sponsored efforts to "help the poor" are viewed as attempts to keep the poor dependent. In these areas, if a program becomes too closely associated with official agencies, or appears to be government-directed or controlled, it may be unable to gain the support of the community. In the Ward I, Inc., project, for instance, the support of government (in terms of grant monies and other resources) was very

important, yet the organizers believed it was necessary to establish and maintain as predominant the overall philosophy of "the community helping itself."

Program control. The trade-offs sometimes necessary between citizen support versus official government support are also evident in other projects we interviewed and visited. The Contra Costa County program, for example, operated for over two years on a totally volunteer basis, with limited government contacts. The decision to seek federal funding was made reluctantly, because one of the central premises of the program was encouraging citizen initiatives. The project organizers were fearful that the citizens would relinquish some of their control and direction over the program -- "their people-power" -- once it was supported with government funds. They saw a nearby county project, modeled after their own, fail because it started with a government grant, rather than with a base of citizen volunteers.

Political interference. Another issue concerns the potential negative effects of elected officials becoming advocates for the program. While the support of government officials may be useful in gaining other needed assistance, there is a danger of the program becoming "too political." If citizens and community groups perceive that the mayor, for example, is simply using the program as a way to get his name in the paper or as an issue upon which to further his/her chances of re-election, community interest, participation, and involvement may decline. Citizens don't like to feel that their program is being used by a politician for his/her self-promotion.

Grant requirements. Finally, a number of project directors suggested that the decision to apply for a federal grant should be weighed carefully by a community project. Federal grant programs usually have their own crime prevention priorities which may not be consistent with those of the community. Programs developed in accordance with government's established priorities in order to receive funding run the risk of arriving at objectives and strategies which are not desired in the community. As a result, the project is unable to motivate citizens to participate.

Federal grants have application requirements and funding rules and regulations, including record-keeping procedures, hiring guidelines, data collection and evaluation requirements, etc. Projects often find these administrative responsibilities useless, time-consuming, frustrating and annoying, or in some cases, beyond the management capabilities of their personnel. Also, once a grant application detailing in very specific terms what the project is going to do is approved, it becomes difficult -- if not impossible -- to make major modifications. If careful planning, is not done before the application is submitted, the planners may discover they are stuck with a program which is unacceptable to the community. The funding source may not allow significant changes to be made, since the program they approved was the one detailed in the grant application. Federal grants, therefore, can significantly restrict the flexibility and the choices available to a community-based crime prevention effort.

3. How to Involve Official Agencies

As suggested in Chapter 3, the process of obtaining the support and cooperation of official agencies is dependent upon the type of organization sponsoring or initiating the program.

Making contacts in government. It's usually easier for a project sponsored by a public agency or an established community organization to obtain the support of government officials, because individuals within the sponsoring group already have well-developed personal contacts and sources of information within official agencies. Personal contacts are the name of the political game. Nevertheless, with each new program, it may be necessary to spend time and effort identifying and contacting all of the relevant agencies, not just the ones where relationships have already been established.

Grassroots groups usually lack these experiences and established contacts. They must start from scratch to develop political contacts within public agencies and attract the attention of elected officials. A necessary first step is gathering information about how the local government system works, and who has the authority and responsibility to make various kinds of decisions. A number of different official agencies may be involved in policy making and providing services which potentially could be useful or affect a community-based crime prevention program. Most of the officials a group needs to attract are in highly visible positions. It may take a number of phone calls, but it should be relatively easy for a citizen group to identify the individuals with responsibilities related to the potential project.

Government sources of information. Following is a list of some of the local government agencies which are sources of information and support (in addition, of course, to local law enforcement agencies):

- Elected officials, such as the mayor, city council, county board of supervisors, city/county/district attorney
- Schools -- the principals, School Board, PTA
- City planning department

- Probation department and/or court services

- Corrections department or authority (often a state agency)

- City, county, regional, and state criminal justice planning
  agencies

- Safety commission

- Welfare department

- Family services

- Zoning and/or licensing commissions

- Housing and/or redevelopment authorities

- Building inspection department

- Fire department (especially regarding arson)

Gaining access. It is sometimes difficult to gain access to important government officials and persuade them of the significance of the citizens' efforts. According to most groups interviewed, it is necessary to build support among the citizens in the community before approaching government officials. The greater the community support which can be demonstrated, the more responsive elected officials are likely to be. Several groups indicated they were not successful when a neighborhood delegation "marched on the mayor's office." Elected officials were more receptive and cooperative -- offering their assistance and support -- when they were invited to a community meeting or public forum that included a larger representation of community residents, local business people, and other neighborhood groups. Officials believe that the concerns and ideas expressed at a large public meeting are more representative of the whole community.

Groups also should be sensitive to the limitations affecting public agencies. Elected officials and government bureaucracies have many competing demands and limited time and other resources. They are

more interested in program ideas which are complementary to existing programs. It is worth the time checking to make sure that the project idea is not an "unnecessary duplication of services" provided by some other organization or public agency before approaching key officials.

Personal contact. Some groups suggested that it is important to carefully select the individual who makes the initial contacts with official agencies. If possible, an individual from within the community who already has some access to official sources should be selected as the group's spokesperson. He/she should be someone with a track record for getting things done through traditional organizations or the local political system.

III. Representation

It's usually not possible for everyone affected by a program to participate in the decision-making process. The alternative is some form of representative participation, where a few members are selected or elected to make decisions for the many. Representative decision-making is a compromise between perfect democracy where everyone speaks for him/herself and the need to actually get some business done. In planning a community crime prevention program, the issues revolve around one central question: how well are different points of view in the community represented by those individuals making the decisions?

- Representation -- the extent to which a program incorporates and reflects people's interests, values, and opinions -- is an issue which is common to all projects; but few projects are representative of all interests.

Several project directors warned against letting the planning group get so large it couldn't make decisions, yet most directors favored extensive participation. The compromise solution is some type of structure or process where a wide range of views in the community can be expressed through leaders who are accepted by the various sub-groups. The councils, committees, and advisory panels we encountered in projects were usually formed with some effort to get representation of important and relevant groups in the community involved in planning.

These mechanisms to ensure representation cannot be discussed in detail here, because we have no information about how _truly_ representative of their communities these projects were. In a few cases, explicit efforts to build a representative structure were encountered. Woodlawn tried to base the decision-making structure on block clubs, neighborhood councils, and membership meetings which gave individuals a chance to participate in decision-making by influencing their leaders' opinions. More often, the _lack_ of representation in a program can be observed in its failures, as shown by the Port City example where senior citizens' views were not truly represented in the planning process.

There is an important relationship between participation and representation: only those groups in the population that are active and choose to participate have a chance at getting representatives into the decision-making process. Groups that are active and have large memberships supply their leaders with considerable power. Their power base helps them to make their points of view prevail.

It is possible to imagine a participatory, volunteer-based program that reflects the views of only part of the community. In fact, it is probably more common for programs to begin by representing the views of only one segment of the community. Over time, however, attempts should be made to get widespread participation in a program so that it becomes representative of the full range of opinions in the community. This may also increase conflict _within_ the project, but any program that emerges should receive more general support from the whole community.

It is difficult to identify _all_ the groups in a community that should be involved, but most project directors agreed -- at least _after_ the fact -- that it was important to do. It's also true that there are incentives for planners to try to keep a project _unrepresentative_, especially where large resources are at stake. Making a program representative means each group must give up some control; it must compromise and make concessions. This may weaken the political strength of particular groups, but, again speaking politically, it should improve the chances of a crime prevention program to succeed.

IV. Resolving Conflicts

⬤ _Most crime prevention projects experience conflict over one or more aspects of the program._

Judging from the surveys and the site visits, conflict during program planning is the rule, rather than the exception. This is understandable, given that the primary purpose of the planning process

is to develop a single, unified, workable program. The various participants must reach general _agreement_ on the goals, objectives and strategies of the program during planning. However, as the number of individuals, groups, organizations, police and other official agencies participating in decision-making increases, the probability of significant differences of opinion also increases. These differences all add up to conflict or potential conflict. In addition, the potential for conflict exists because of previous disagreements, competition, or a past history of bad relationships between leaders in a community, between organizations, or between the community and the police or other government agencies.

An important part of politics is the art of recognizing and resolving conflicts and differences of opinion and reaching agreement. How well a project deals with these inevitable conflicts has a lot to do with its success in developing a successful crime prevention program. Four broad strategies of conflict resolution were used by the projects in this study: 1) bargaining/compromise, 2) avoidance, 3) mediation, and 4) influence/power. Each of these strategies has many variations, depending on the context. Only a few examples can be discussed here.

A. Bargaining and Compromise

Bargaining and compromise are perhaps the best approaches to resolving conflicts because all participants stand to gain. These strategies are successful, however, only when all participants recognize that reaching agreement is the most important objective. In other words, a _willingness_ to bargain and compromise exists because all parties are committed to developing a program. In order to

achieve agreement, even in the face of previous conflictual relations between some of the participants, the areas of _common interest_ must be identified. It is these areas of consensus, where the participants can mutually agree, that must form the basis for the program.[1]

Bargaining involves trading something for something else. For example, an organization or a public official may agree to lend support to the program in return for the public relations benefits to be received. In the Hartford crime prevention project, planners designed environmental changes to reduce automobile traffic on certain streets. The businessmen in the area objected to these changes, threatening court action. The project and the businessmen eventually reached a compromise whereby limited design changes would be put in on a trial basis, subject to later removal if strong opposition continued.[2]

In compromising, a settlement is reached in which each participant makes concessions. An agreement was reached between the police and the Ward I, Inc., organization, for instance, on the strategies of citizen patrols and the community newsletter because both sides made concessions, and backed down from their original demands.[3]

As a coalition of community organizations, Ward I, Inc. provides a number of examples of effective bargaining and compromising among groups. In the first place, there was a definite incentive for groups to want to be involved in the project because there was a good chance that each one would gain some resources (money) from the federal government. Secondly, the coalition model is explicitly designed to

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[1]For a discussion of this idea, see Robert C. Trojanowicz and Forrest M. Moss, "Crime Prevention Through Citizen Involvement," _The Police Chief_ 42, June, 1975, pp. 66-71.

[2]Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., _et al_, Op. Cit., pp. 75-77.

[3]See Chapter 6, pp. VI-69-70.

be present at meetings to be counted in decisions, a rule that deci-
sions of the coalition were binding, upon penalty of expulsion from
the coalition, and a rule that each member would have full control
over the strategies of its part of the project.

Co-sponsorship of a project is another possible way to avoid
conflicts, much like the coalition model. It works especially well
where the co-sponsors/partners have complementary resources, so that
the program is strengthened by two forces joining together. The
Contra Costa crime prevention program provides an excellent example of
the partnership idea -- in this case, between the citizens and law
enforcement -- where the citizens supplied volunteers and support and
law enforcement provided technical expertise and manpower. The
project also illustrates what can happen to a partnership when one of
the partners tries to dominate the other.[1]

B. Avoidance

Some conflicts, particularly long-standing ones (such as a history
of confrontation between the police and the community), cannot be
resolved. In other instances, it may not be possible to establish
cooperation because the participants have nothing to offer or pose a
threat to each other. In such cases, there is still the possibility
that potentially disruptive conflicts can be neutralized or avoided, so
that the program itself is not damaged. There are two basic rules
that apply here. The first is to avoid raising or discussing those
unresolvable conflicting issues or sore points that will surely
increase antagonisms (the "red flag" issues). The second rule is to
by-pass those who will not join you: avoid threatening other groups'

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[1]See Chapter 6, pp. VI-71-76.

interests, and don't present obstacles in the way of their goals. In
developing their crime prevention project, the Woodlawn organization
took care to "get sanction" from potentially competing organizations
(that is, to inform them of Woodlawn's intentions ahead of time and
get their approval) before they moved into new territory with their
program. They avoided conflict with other groups by adopting a non-
threatening approach . . . limiting the services offered in those
areas to crime prevention only, without trying to recruit members away
from other organizations.

Overall, one central principle can go a long way toward avoiding
conflicts and misunderstandings which can lead to conflict: establish
an effective and open communications process. All individuals,
groups, organizations and agencies likely to be affected in some way
should be told about the project's plans as early as possible in the
planning process. For one thing, this will increase the input from
many sources and may yield valuable resources or allies. Equally
important, it can save a lot of trouble later on when the project sud-
denly needs the help of someone who has not been consulted and has
been hurt or threatened (usually unintentionally) by the project.

Good communication also means defining the intentions of the pro-
ject so all affected parties understand it in the same way. Just as
in the bargaining process, it is important to clarify the program and
the roles people play in it in order to eliminate any misin-
terpretations that may exist.

C. Mediation

Mediation is a way to resolve disputes in which a neutral "third
party" acts as a peacemaker for two opposing groups. It is a typical
strategy used in negotiations between labor and management in contract

disputes. It is also an approach which has been used successfully in a number of crime prevention projects. The mediator should be someone who understands the issues from both perspectives and who has the skills to work out a reasonable compromise between the conflicting parties. In communities where there is a long-standing conflict between the police and the community, for example, many projects look for a police officer who is sympathetic to and understanding of both points of view. This officer can act as an intermediary between the project and the police department. In its crime prevention program, the Woodlawn Organization functions as a mediator between the police and the community, trying to get both sides to change their negative attitudes toward the other.

D. Influence/Power

A final approach to conflict resolution is a power contest. The contestant with the greater amount of influence wins. The group that can get powerful people on its side insures that decisions will go in its favor or can force a recalcitrant to do what the group wants. This is classic power politics, in the crime prevention context. It implies that there is a winner and a loser. This option precludes the possibility of bargaining, compromise, mediation or avoidance. Confrontations are dramatic and often accompanied by righteous indignation on both sides. The truth is that even winning has its pitfalls. The loser may have a long memory and may never be an ally in the future.

A final comment on using this method of conflict resolution is in order. To put it simply: might does not make right. Whether an official agency uses the authority of government to enforce program

decisions on the citizens, or rival groups shoot it out in the political arena, winning does not necessarily mean that the result is a program that has community acceptance. Without this acceptance, the status of a program as "community-based" is in doubt.

V. Additional Resources: Places to go for Help

This resource list is a brief addition to the resources listed at the end of Chapter 4. These organizations and books are more directly concerned with political issues like organizing than the ones in Chapter 4, but resources listed in both places can be useful in understanding the political issues in planning crime prevention programs.

A. Organizations Providing Assistance

1. National Association of Neighborhoods
   1612 20th Street, N.W.
   Washington, D.C. 20009
   Tel: 202/332-7766

The National Association of Neighborhoods is an organization of neighborhood groups whose primary function is to represent the concerns of neighborhoods in policy deliberations at the federal level. NAN has held meetings in various cities on a number of topics, including crime prevention, and publishes occasional documents on neighborhood issues.

2. National Neighbors
   815 15th Street, N.W.
   Washington, D.C. 20005
   Tel: 202/347-6501

National Neighbors is a non-profit multi-racial organization that provides assistance in planning, training, and community organizing to community groups and municipalities. Speakers' bureau fees are for transportation only. Provides assistance in setting up programs at cost, using as many sessions as necessary to get the project going. Maintains an "Index of References" to provide information to projects, and publishes a quarterly newsletter which is free to members.

3. National Peoples' Action
   1123 West Washington
   Chicago, Illinois 60607
   Tel: 312/243-3038

NPA is a non-profit, national network of community groups interested in policitcal action on neighborhood issues.

B. Government Publications on Crime Prevention

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and other
agencies of the federal government have published numerous reports on
programs and strategies of crime prevention and their effectiveness.
For more information contact:

> Community Crime Prevention Division
> National Institute of Law Enforcement
>   and Criminal Justice.
> Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
> U.S. Department of Justice
> Washington, D.C. 20531

For a list of publications, contact:

> National Criminal Justice Reference
>   Service (NCJRS)
> Box 6000
> Rockville, Maryland 20850

C. Articles and Books

1. Desmond M. Connor, Citizen Participate: An Action Guide for
Public Issues (Oakland, Ontario: Development Press, 1974).

2. Lawrence A. Gibbs, et al, Fourth Power in the Balance:
Citizen Efforts to Address Criminal Problems in Cook County, Illinois
(Chicago: Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1977).

3. Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, Block Club Organizing
Handbook (Minneapolis: MCPC, Inc., 1978).

4. National Commission on Neighborhoods, People, Building
Neighborhoods (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979).

5. National Crime Prevention Institute, Citizen Participation, a
Special Information Package (Louisville, Kentucky: NCPI, University
of Louisville, n.d.).

6. Robert C. Trojanowicz and Forrest M. Moss, "Crime Prevention
Through Citizen Involvement," The Police Chief, 42 (June 1975):
66-71.

7. Robert C. Trojanowicz, et al, Community Based Crime Prevention
(Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing, 1975).

8. Rachelle B. Warren and Donald I. Warren, The Neighborhood
Organizer's Handbook (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1977).

9. George Washnis, Citizen Involvement in Crime Prevention
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1976).

CASE STUDIES OF SIX COMMUNITY-BASED

CRIME PREVENTION PROJECTS

Site visits were made to six programs selected from the telephone
survey. These programs were chosen to illustrate planning for
community-based crime prevention by different types of organizations
under a variety of circumstances. The six programs do not represent
all possible combinations of the important factors that affect
planning. But taken as a group, they indicate many of the possibil-
ities and help to show how various situations can affect the ways in
which programs are planned and implemented.

Two factors that significantly affect the planning process stand
above all others. These important factors are the type of sponsoring
agency and the type of community. The six programs discussed in this
chapter contain all four types of sponsoring agency, and six
variations of the complex variable called community type. Classified
by type of sponsoring agency, the six programs include:

Grassroots group: The Neighborhood Safety Project of Contra
Costa County, California, and the Southeast Polk County Crime
Prevention Council, Inc., are both sponsored by grass roots, citizen-
initiated groups located in two different types of community. Contra
Costa is a largely white, middle-class suburban area, including
several poor minority communities within the county, while S. E. Polk
is a rural area with a mostly white, moderate-income population.

Community organization: The Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention
Project is part of a long-established community organization situated

in a largely black neighborhood in south Chicago that has mixed income levels.

Coalition: Ward I, Inc., is a coalition of neighborhood organizations in a mixed black and Latino neighborhood of Washington, D.C.

Official government agency: The Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors Project (PCCPS) and the Minneapolis Crime Prevention Project are sponsored by city agencies. PCCPS operates programs for the elderly in three neighborhoods in a large urban city. The Minneapolis project operates city-wide, and is part of the Comprehensive Cities Program of LEAA.

The six programs described here also differ in scope of the project, the prior level of community organization, the funding source, the time the project and the organization have been in existence, the level and kind of resources available, and the kinds of programs developed.

In the final analysis, each program is unique. The planning that has occurred in each one reflects the particular conditions and objectives of the community it serves.

THE COUNTY-WIDE GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATION MODEL:
THE NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY PROJECT, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

I. Introduction

A community-based crime prevention program is dependent upon identifying and recruiting citizens who are willing to commit time and other resources to the program. One of the most difficult obstacles to overcome is citizen apathy. Most individuals appear to be disinterested, unmotivated, or simply unwilling to become involved. The Neighborhood Safety Project of Contra Costa County is an example of a project which started as a grassroots, citizen-initiated program, relying totally on citizen volunteers. Program personnel maintain that citizen apathy is a myth. People are willing to participate if they help plan programs so their perceived needs are met, and so they can determine the activities in which they want to participate.

At the same time, Contra Costa is an example of a large-scale program. It has tried to have an impact on crime problems within 18 different communities in a large and fairly diverse county, including both urban and rural agricultural areas. The approach used in this project illustrates how a single, county-wide program can be designed in such a way that individualized neighborhood crime problems and needs can be addressed.

II. Background

Contra Costa is largely a suburban residential county adjacent to the Oakland/San Francisco Bay area. Population in the county was estimated at slightly over 580,000 in 1975. There are several medium-sized cities (between 50,000-100,000 population), many smaller

communities, and unincorporated areas, where 30 percent of the population resides. Close to half of the people commute to Oakland or San Francisco to work. The county as a whole is predominately white and middle-class, although there is considerable demographic, cultural, and economic variation between individual communities in the county.[1] As in most suburban areas, the most serious crime problems for the county as a whole are crimes against property, particularly burglary. There is considerable variation within the county. Some areas experience significantly higher rates than others, and crimes against persons assume greater significance in some areas.

The Neighborhood Safety Project (NSP) is directed and implemented by the Contra Costa Crime Prevention Committee, Inc., a non-profit association of law enforcement officers and citizens. The NSP is in its third and final year of LEAA bloc-grant funding, provided through the State of California Office of Criminal Justice Planning as part of the regional plan developed by the Criminal Justice Agency of Contra Costa County. The Agency contracts with the Committee to conduct the Neighborhood Safety Project. The overall goal of the project is to "prevent crime," but the principal emphasis is on recruiting citizen volunteers to assist in the formation of self-sufficient, crime prevention committees in each local community. These local groups of citizens, with the technical assistance and training provided by the County Committee, participate in identifying and solving crime-related problems in their own neighborhoods.

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[1]Median household income in Contra Costa County was $15,026 in 1975. Contra Costa County Planning Department, Contra Costa County -- A Profile. (Contra Costa County, California: Contra Costa County Planning Department, September, 1976), p. 31.

To organize the local committees, the first-year grant project was administered under the dual leadership of two program specialists, one with a law enforcement background and the other with experience and training in community organizing. They directed six Area Coordinators, who were assigned to one of three geographic areas: West, Central or East. Each coordinator was given two to four communities to organize, according to the number of hours she or he worked. The coordinator's role was to meet with individuals and groups to generate interest in the program; recruit hosts and participants for the neighborhood home meetings; locate volunteers for the local committees, and train them to fulfill committee responsibilities.

The development of the Neighborhood Safety Project can only be understood within the context of the past history of citizen involvement with the criminal justice system in the County. The funded project grew out of previous citizen initiatives, and reflects the evolutionary nature of the planning process.

In 1970, a group of citizens in Orinda, an unincorporated area, became concerned about the rapid increase in burglaries and the minimal police protection provided by the County Sheriff's Department. The group formed the Orinda Police Protection Association, which was successful in its efforts to get two burglary investigators assigned to Orinda. With the assistance of the new officers, this group of volunteers continued to meet to promote education about home crime prevention. This local partnership of citizens and law enforcement was dramatically effective in reducing burglaries in Orinda. By 1972, burglaries had dropped 48 percent.

Simultaneously, the national movement toward law enforcement sponsorship of programs to get citizens involved in crime prevention activities (such as Operation I.D. and Neighborhood Watch), resulted in similar developments in the County. By 1974, a number of police departments and the sheriff's department had special crime prevention officers and had instituted these types of programs. The Criminal Justice Planning Board of Contra Costa County incorporated community crime prevention into its plan and earmarked a substantial amount of the county's allocation of LEAA monies to fund projects in this area.

Based upon the successful experience in Orinda and the new crime prevention focus within law enforcement agencies, a county-wide organization, the Crime Prevention Committee of Contra Costa, was formed in March, 1974. This committee was based upon the same organizing principle as the Orinda Association: that citizens and police working as partners can be equally responsible for preventing crime. Symbolic of the partnership idea, the committee had co-chairs, one a citizen and the other a law enforcement officer. The committee existed for over two years, relying primarily on citizen volunteers, crime prevention officers, and local cash contributions. The Criminal Justice Agency lent staff assistance for planning and coordination. During that time, committee membership expanded from 29 to 70. The unpaid volunteer committee members engaged in a variety of crime prevention activities. The focus, however, was limited largely to burglary prevention and relied upon the limited set of strategies popularly termed "target-hardening," or encouraging citizen actions to reduce criminal opportunities. Committee members raised all of the money necessary to print literature, buy engraving pens, and purchase other supplies and equipment from local businesses and organizations.

Because the committee was dependent upon volunteers, it felt hampered in its ability to expand into areas of the county where it did not yet have volunteers. In 1976 the committee developed a successful grant proposal to establish the Neighborhood Safety Project. The initial purpose of the project was to duplicate the model of local crime prevention committees, based upon citizen/police partnership and using the burglary prevention package of strategies. But as the project moved into its second and third years, there have been fairly significant modifications. As its organizing effort made its way into areas of the county characterized by high crime rates and differing crime problems, specific objectives and strategies have been changed.

The Neighborhood Safety Project is experimental in one important respect. It was designed to test the idea that voluntary, citizen organizational structures could be created during three years of decreasing federal funding to the point where they would be self-sustaining, without further dependence on outside governmental funding. The planned decrease in federal funding is in keeping with the consistent underlying philosophy that crime prevention can be a community effort, without financial support and direction from government.

III. The Formal Planning Process

It is almost impossible to isolate a distinct planning period in the Contra Costa project for several reasons. The Neighborhood Safety Project evolved out of a citizen-initiated, grass roots group. Previous citizen/volunteer experiences with effective crime prevention programs and strategies dictated the development of the funded project. In addition, the very purpose of the project is planning:

to assist groups, committees, or individual citizens in local neigh-
borhoods to plan and develop their own programs. Each one of the
citizen groups -- now over 20 -- which the project has helped start
has its own individualized planning "problem solving" process. Thus,
the ensuing comments are highlights of some of the useful approaches
and techniques employed during the nine-year period of crime preven-
tion programming in Contra Costa County.

A. Identifying the Problem

For the citizens in Orinda in 1970, the rapid increase in
burglaries was the motivating force for the group. It was genuine
concern, rather than police statistics, which defined the problem.
Yet the group collected and used data from the Sheriff's Department
on the number of burglaries. This data was used for purposes of
evaluating their efforts, rather than identifying problems.

When the Crime Prevention Committee of Contra Costa County was
formed (1974), the group recognized the need for a more systematic
analysis of the crime problems throughout the county. They were most
interested in finding out about citizens' knowledge, perceptions and
attitudes about the crime problems, and their opinions about police.
They circulated a questionnaire, which was also used to identify
people who might be willing to get involved as volunteers with the
Committee. The group made extensive use of local volunteer resources
in order to design, conduct and analyze a citizen survey. Community
colleges provided students to conduct the survey, which was in the
form of personal interviews.[1] Only those areas with committee repre-
sentatives were surveyed. Committee members tabulated and analyzed

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[1]Conducting the survey was part of a class assignment for the students.

the 251 questionnaires. The results of the survey coincided with the
police data . . . indicating that most citizens were concerned about
burglary. However, the results also revealed that many citizens were
concerned about crime problems which are not reflected in official
police data, such as vandalism, drug abuse, and juvenile delinquency.

The Committee has continued to collect police data on the number
of crimes by type for each area/community, as well as data on the
clearance rate. These statistics were useful in documenting the
county-wide crime problem in the preparation of the grant application.
During the second and third years of the project, crime data was used
to determine project priority areas. Project staff time has shifted
in emphasis from responding to communities which simply express an
interest in setting up crime prevention groups, to intensive
organizing in those areas which experience the highest crime rates.

According to project personnel, there are serious limits to using
official crime data to determine problems. Consequently, what has
come to be the most important way in which problems are identified is
through the informal home meetings, the vehicle for forming and per-
petuating local crime prevention groups. At these neighborhood
meetings held in one of the resident's homes, citizens are encouraged
to talk about their crime-related problems. The original partnership
concept dictated that a citizen and police officer jointly conduct the
meetings. With experience, this procedure has been modified. If the
problems have to do with the police, people are sometimes unwilling to
discuss their concerns candidly with an officer present. In such
instances, initial meetings of the group are held without law enfor-
cement attendance. One of the trained organizer/coordinators from the
County Committee acts as a facilitator, working with the local group

until all of the residents' opinions and concerns have been brought
out into the open. Then an officer is invited to attend, so that the
differences of opinion can be aired.

This informal procedure for identifying problems leads to very
specific, situational, and qualitative descriptions of the problems
which really bother people. These descriptions are quite different
from the kind of information contained in police statistics. Some
examples from several of the local meetings serve as illustrations:

> "Seven unsupervised children were seriously damaging
> property in the condominium complex. . . ."

> "The back gate of a drive-in movie was left open inter-
> mittently. Teenagers who hoped to get in free gathered there
> and hung around selling dope, vandalizing and burglarizing near-
> by homes. . . ."

> "A local gas station applied for a sales permit for beer
> and wine. Neighbors were alarmed at the increased prospect of
> driving while intoxicated, or with liquor in autos, especially
> among juveniles."

> "The block meeting was well attended by neighbors interested
> in crime prevention. However, their major concern was traffic
> problems on _____ Drive, a main thoroughfare. Their con-
> tention was that more crosswalks and stop signs were needed to
> get children safely ... to the grammar schools. Speeding ...
> was another real problem."[1]

As these scenarios suggest, when people get together to discuss
neighborhood problems, they usually identify a cause of the problem,
which may be only peripherally related to crime as officially defined.
This plan to encourage citizen participation in problem identification
is obviously not limited only to the crime issue. The project person-
nel facilitating at these local meetings attempt to focus discussion on

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[1]Martha P. Wilson, Final Evaluation Report of the Neighborhood
Safety Project, 1977-78. (Oakland: Pentad Consortium, Inc., Novem-
ber, 1978), pp. D-1 - D-5.

realistic problems amenable to solution, including safety problems as
well as drugs and vandalism. But they do not try to tell the citizens
what their concerns ought to be.

B. Developing the Program

The approaches used to determine goals/objectives and to make
decisions about appropriate strategies and activities have varied in
different stages of development of the Contra Costa Project.

Over the nine-year period, there has been a gradual shift from a
very narrow set of goals, objectives and strategies centering around
target-hardening activities aimed at burglary prevention, to a broad-
based and diverse mix of strategies. These focus more on the causes of
a variety of crimes and on solving crime-related and other neigh-
borhood problems. This shift has been paralleled by a gradually
decreasing reliance on citizen activities which assist only law en-
forcement, to an increasing number of citizen-initiated activities
designed to influence city government and neighborhood and community
affairs.

During the time that the County Committee operated without
federal funding, there was no conscious process of setting goals and
objectives, nor were alternative strategies considered. The activi-
ties which the Committee engaged in were the ones which logically
followed from identifying burglary as a serious problem and from the
successful experience with citizen volunteers in Orinda. At the time
the Committee applied for federal funding, these goals, objectives and
strategies were simply formalized and quantified. Since the woman who
had been so instrumental in getting the Committee started in the first
place was also a planner with the regional criminal justice planning
agency, she had the experience and technical knowledge to write the
grant in order to meet LEAA and State Planning Agency requirements.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

During the time that the project has received LEAA funding, its goals, objectives, strategies and activities have been modified significantly. These changes were necessary as the Area Coordinators started organizing in different kinds of communities from those they had originally worked in. The strategies that had seemed to work so well in middle-class communities (such as the burglary prevention package presented at home meetings) simply did not work in poorer areas or in minority communities. The more experienced project organizers discovered that of the local groups they helped form, the ones which continued to meet had expanded activities from the burglary problem and were also dealing with neighborhood concerns only tangentially related to crime. This expansion of activities helps draw new members to the project and assures its continuity.

These discoveries led to a shift in the emphasis of the project and in the specific strategies used. In the second and third years, greater staff resources have been committed to intensive organizing efforts in high-crime areas. Since many people in high crime areas distrust -- or even fear -- some of their neighbors, coordinators do not attempt to initiate home meetings. Rather, they try to find a "neutral territory" in which to meet with people. A moveable trailer has been obtained which serves as a meeting place for interested citizens in some areas. Since it was almost impossible to get local crime prevention committees started in higher crime areas, the Area Coordinators work either with individual citizens or small groups of citizens, without imposing any kind of committee structure. In other communities where there are strong existing community organizations, the project uses these groups to promote crime prevention. In these areas, the coordinators are minimally involved.

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While the burglary prevention package of strategies serves as the entree with residents, the major emphasis is placed on encouraging and helping citizens to first identify their problems and concerns, and then to solve those problems. The role of the coordinator as organizer/facilitator/resource person is crucial. The coordinator knows the "system," the resources available, and how to use them to bring about changes. Then, step-by-step, he or she assists the citizen in using those resources to solve problems.[1]

One of the primary reasons for making changes in a program is that staff -- with increasing time and experience -- learn more about what they're doing. When some strategies don't work, they try others. What is important in this process is that staff members frequently communicate and exchange information with each other. Weekly meetings with all staff members are held for this primary purpose. As problems arise, they are discussed, and a new approach is considered. All staff members are provided with periodic training to improve their skills in organizing techniques, inter-personal relations, and so forth.

In addition to these administrative and managerial techniques for evaluating and modifying the project, the grant included monies for an in-house evaluator. This individual has collected and analyzed a variety of data, both to measure the overall impact of the project and to provide staff with information for modifying the project. The evaluator conducted a series of interviews with staff, volunteers, law enforcement administrators, crime prevention committee members, and

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[1]An example of this process is given in the Appendix.

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conducted a citizen survey in a selected target area. Crime statistics were reviewed.[1]

IV. The Political Process: Building Support

A. Involving Citizens

This project has involved large numbers of citizens in crime prevention. It has been successful in maintaining a small, but significant, number of volunteers with a high level of commitment for relatively long periods of time.[2] Much of the project's success can be attributed to its organizational structure, which allows for great flexibility. The structure is designed to permit: 1) varying levels and kinds of participation and commitment from citizens/residents; 2) a variety of methods and strategies for organizing citizen activities, depending upon the type of community and the characteristics of its residents; 3) widely different kinds of problems and concerns to be raised and addressed; and 4) maximum opportunities for citizens to take the lead in planning for themselves.

Citizen participation can range from one-time activities, such as joining Operation I.D.; to sporadic activities, such as voluntarily calling the police to report suspicious activity; to more extensive involvements, such as volunteering to participate for a few hours in a door-to-door campaign, hosting a home meeting, becoming an active mittee member, or spending 20 hours a week or more organizing in the community.

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[1]Included in the Appendix is a summary of the projects' evaluation method and activities.

[2]Martha P. Wilson, _Ibid._, p. 24.

Involving citizens is both a strategy for affecting crime as well as a necessity for building support. The administrator of this project maintains that it would not have been successful without the efforts of volunteers who operated it for over two and one-half years.[1] This time was used to build a large base of citizen support and recruit committed volunteers, some of whom have remained active throughout the project's history. She suggested that other programs, which have used a similar organizational model, but started out with government funding through local law enforcement agencies have failed to develop effective citizen leaders or have taken much longer to do so.

Besides allowing for different levels of commitment, the project is designed to provide a variety of opportunities for involving citizens. People can participate as individuals, in a group with several of their neighbors, in a more formalized structure, such as the local crime prevention committee, or as a member of the county-wide committee. While the staff encourages the formation of local crime prevention committees, primarily to provide support for the program, they stand ready to provide assistance to any individual(s) or groups.

Two important principles have emerged for developing the local committees:

1) A strong leader is essential if the committee is to eventually become independent and self-sustaining.

2) Once a committee is organized, its survival depends upon developing a particular group _interest_, rather than focusing on a particular activity. Early in the project, staff members recognized that trying to limit the focus of local committees to burglary prevention,

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[1]See Appendix: "101 Ways to Give Recognition to Volunteers."

or even crime prevention, is self-defeating. The project encourges the local committees to consider and pursue other community issues, problems, and needs, according to the preferences of the participants.

Most citizens know very little about the criminal justice system. And they do not immediately realize how they can affect it. Initially in this project, people were pessimistic; they didn't believe that they could change things in their community. This was a particularly difficult problem in poorer areas, where people sometimes lack confidence in their own abilities. One of the primary roles of project staff is teaching citizens how they can participate in community action. According to the project administrator, it takes persistence and perseverance to develop positive attitudes toward participatory programs.

Volunteers move along at their own pace and on their own time schedule. It is unreasonable to expect the same level of commitment from them as from police officers and other people who are being paid to work on a project. Manageable and realistic problems are suggested for volunteers to improve their chances of success. Overly ambitious tasks are more likely to result in failure, which tends to discourage further volunteer action.

B. Involving the Police

Law enforcement participation in the Contra Costa program has always been of central importance. The nature of the relationship between the police and the citizens has changed as the project itself has changed, and the relationship varies from one community to another. In some areas, the programs are almost completely run by the police. In others, police involvement is minimal. Several factors

account for this difference: the type of community and its past history of police/community relations; the attitude and orientation of the chief administrator and other officers within the department; and the types of strategies and activities which the local citizens determine to be appropriate for solving the crime problems. Because of this program's long history and the county-wide scope (encompassing widely differing communities), this project illustrates many of the potentially divisive and controversial issues likely to arise between the police and citizens in a crime prevention program.

"Since police have the knowledge and experience about crime, the citizen often feels intimidated, so he lets the police take the lead." Comments like this are typical of the middle-class resident who, in most instances, has a high level of respect for law enforcement and its role in society. This position becomes a problem in a citizen-initiated crime prevention program, not because it makes it difficult to get police support, but because it has the opposite effect. An attitude like this leads to police control over a citizen-initiated program. When this happens, the program is likely to lose sight of its primary objective . . . getting citizen involvement. In many police-sponsored crime prevention programs, the police often become discouraged because they believe citizens aren't interested in getting involved. According to the experiences encountered in this project, this may not be the case. The real problem, according to the staff, is that citizens are not aware of their potential role in crime prevention. In most police programs encouraging citizen involvement, it is the law enforcement officer who conducts the meetings. And even in citizen-initiated programs, the invited officer will probably

assume the leadership role because of his experience and knowledge. Unless there are citizens present who are willing to speak out, the police officer as leader will not be challenged.

To ensure that citizens have the opportunity to express their concerns and opinions, home meetings are conducted differently in this particular project. Meetings are organized and arranged for by the citizens themselves, with the assistance of the area coordinators. The police officer is invited as a guest and a resource person. It is the trained volunteer, however, who conducts the meeting and encourages the citizens to voice their concerns.

"There is a difference between working with the police and working for the police." During the early years of this project, the citizens were content to devote their efforts toward Operation Identification and other anti-burglary measures. Although they require citizen action and involvement, all of these strategies are primarily designed to assist police. Most progressive law enforcement agencies are willing to work with interested citizens on such programs, since the citizens' role is defined in terms of supplementing police activities. When the citizens take the lead, however, and want to play a larger role in crime prevention -- one which they define for themselves and which may be outside the narrow law enforcement definition -- then the situation becomes threatening to the police. And they become less willing to cooperate.

This problem affected the Contra Costa project as the citizens acquired more experience and knowledge about crime and the criminal justice system, and as they gradually gained more confidence about what their role could be. Two different approaches have been used

here to deal with it. One has been to encourage the involvement of line/beat officers who understand the issues, are sympathetic to the citizen's point of view, and are willing to support it.

According to the Second Year Evaluation, the project maintained a positive relationship with the police officers in the field, but misunderstandings and differences of opinion exist with the police administrators. The recommendation of the evaluator was that the project should "continue to maintain excellent relationships with field officers precisely as in the past and minimize relationships with administrators, not because of problems, but in spite of them."[1]

The second strategy, simple "power politics," has been resorted to a couple of times. When the citizen group came up against an uncooperative police chief, they mounted enough power (people with influence) to persuade the recalcitrant chief(s) to "see things the citizen's way," or at least not oppose them. In the words of one of the individuals interviewed, "You can't operate on idealism alone; you have to learn how to become political, how to reach people with influence and get them on your side." This strategy requires careful planning and political skill. It didn't always work in Conta Costa. And of course, there are sometimes consequences of the use of power. In this project, the association of Chiefs of Police went on record as indicating non-support for a third year of federal funding. The Chiefs' Association subsequently reversed itself "in the spirit of cooperation" and supported the projects' funding request, probably because it had the support of many other influential people, including the Contra Costa County Sheriff.

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[1]Final Evaluation Report of the Neighborhood Safety Project, 1977-78 (Oakland: Pentad Consortium, Inc., November, 1978), p. 25.

This tension between the law enforcement approach and the citizen approach to crime prevention is intensified in communities with high minority populations. In such communities, the project organizers/coordinators found that the citizens were completely turned off by the police-oriented strategies. Their method has been to let the citizens decide what they want to do, but eventually to bring a sympathetic police officer into the program, once the residents feel confident that they can openly and freely voice their opinions. The role of the coordinator as a facilitator is critical in reducing the tension and uneasiness on both sides. In the words of one organizer, "It takes a lot of perseverance and know-how to deal constructively with conflictive situations."

C. Involving Groups in the Community

From the beginning, the Crime Prevention Committee depended on volunteer groups and organizations in the community as resources for developing the program. The community colleges provided assistance in the administration of the citizen survey; the Board of Realtors contributed money for printing brochures; a number of organizations donated engraving pens for Operation Identification; a nearby private foundation contributed the funds necessary to provide the local match required for the LEAA grant, etc. In all instances, individual Committee members made the contacts with these groups, explained what they were trying to do, and had no difficulty getting the assistance they requested. The group now feels that it didn't spend enough time identifying and approaching all the resources it might have: "the help is there, it's just a matter of asking for it."[1]

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[1]One committee member provided the following suggestion for other grassroots crime prevention groups: identify those associations and organizations which have roots in the community and have a commitment and/or reason for improving the neighborhood, such as insurance agents, real estate agencies, business associations, private and corporate foundations.

This technique for building support in the community works best in selected situations: 1) it is a viable approach in an affluent community, one where organizations have the money and other resources to give; 2) it works best when the crime prevention program is operating as a completely volunteer, grassroots association that can easily justify requests for resources; and 3) financial contributions or donated professional assistance can indicate support without requiring further commitments.

Another community resource which was considered important is the local media. The media were considered an important and necessary part of publicizing the project and changing attitudes in the community. In order to develop a mutually beneficial relationship with the newspapers, committee members spent the time and effort needed to get them to understand the group's purpose . . . changing community attitudes toward citizen involvement. The approach was to advise the newspaper that the Committee itself was not looking for credit, but for new models of citizen involvement. They would keep giving the newspaper good stories if they would highlight the citizen and his/her involvement. Often Committee members would provide reporters with written stories, which they could use "as is" or as a basis for writing their own articles.

As the Neighborhood Safety Project completed its third and final year of federal funding, it was again mounting a large-scale fundraising effort within the community in order to sustain the countywide effort. This consists of fund-raising events, seeking individual donations, tapping private and corporate foundations, and requesting some limited financial assistance from local governments.

Also in the third year, the Project has attempted to involve other community organizations in ways which require more extensive support and commitment. The Committee is pursuing this strategy for a couple of reasons. First, it has discovered that it is "politicially wise" to go through existing community organizations and use them as the "promoter," rather than to go into new areas as an outsider with no credibility. The Committee's attempts at organizing in some areas, particularly minority areas, were largely unsuccessful because they were resented as intruders, and the concept of the "community plus law enforcement partnership" idea was immediately rejected by the residents. Consequently, the revised strategy in minority areas consists of the following steps: 1) identify either a leader or an organization which commands respect and support from a large segment of the community; 2) present that individual or group with the general idea of citizen involvement in crime prevention; 3) let them arrive at their own definition of crime prevention and the ways to best achieve it in the community, including which problems to address and the kinds of activities and strategies to undertake; and finally, 4) offer encouragement, resources, training and technical assistance if and when it is needed.

Furthermore, the Committee recognized that it may have over-emphasized the citizen/law enforcement partnership idea in the early years, thereby giving less thought and attention to the kinds of activities and involvement that might be carried out by other organizations in the community. The problem has not been that others aren't willing to participate; rather the role they might play is not immediately obvious, as it is in the case of law enforcement.

In an effort to expand the scope of citizen participation in neighborhood problem solving, project staff are currently defining participatory roles for various types of community organizations. Several local committees have been successful in developing relationships with groups such as homeowners associations, the District Attorney's Office, the Safety Commission, and social service agencies, partly because it has been easier to define ways in which these agencies could become involved in crime prevention.

D. Involving Official Agencies

During the early years when this program was operating on a volunteer basis, very little time and effort was spent developing cooperative relationships with official government agencies, outside of the extensive work with law enforcement officers. Mayors and city council members participated in kick-off ceremonies and other symbolic events, but they were not involved beyond this minimal "show of support." In retrospect, the Project Director suggested that it might have made a difference if local government had been more heavily involved from the beginning. If elected officials had actively supported the program, it might have bolstered the group's credibility, at least with some people. Secondly, if local governments had been a part of the program all along, their commitment and support would have been assured when the Committee started seeking financial support to continue. Finally, if more contacts had been made within administrative agencies, interested individuals might have been identified who could have worked with the committee to define crime prevention roles for other official agencies. The project would have been able to expand its limited view of citizen involvement and responsibility in crime prevention and criminal justice much earlier than it did. Now,

the project is having some difficulties convincing people that the idea of citizen responsibility goes well beyond assisting the police . . . perhaps because it has been so successful selling the citizen/law enforcement partnership philosophy.

There are, however, some trade-offs involved. The position of the Committee has always been to respect the ideal of citizen initiative and responsibility without official intervention. In creating the forum for citizens to take the lead, it has built in a potential source of serious conflict, as citizens may push and lobby for changes which are contrary to the interests of official agencies. In building closer interdependent relationships with those agencies, the group risks losing some of its citizen-power potential.

While the Committee did not suffer from failure to build official support for the project during its volunteer days, government backing was critical during the LEAA grant application period. This project had one overwhelming advantage over most groups developing a grant proposal: one of the key persons in the Orinda Police Protection Association was hired as a planner for the regional criminal justice planning agency, largely because of her experience and reputation in Orinda.[1] In her role as planner, she then served as a liasion to the Committee. The Committee and its activities were well-known and it had a supporter in the Agency with the authority to determine crime prevention allocations in the State Plan. A last minute power play

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[1]She and another woman wrote a citizen's guide to organizing crime prevention committees, based upon their Orinda experiences: Shirley Henke and Stephanie Mann, Alternative to Fear: A Citizens' Manual for Crime Prevention Through Neighborhhod Involvement (Berkley: Lodestar Press, 1975).

by the law enforcement agencies in the county to develop their own proposal for a burglary strike force (in competition with the citizen-initiated proposal) failed, not only because they were unable to get their match, but also because of the strong influence exerted by a group of articulate citizen volunteers who had been working under her guidance. Her dual role also influenced the selection of the official agency that would act as the sponsoring agency.[1] Traditionally, a law enforcement department would have been the official sponsoring agency. But largely because of her belief that the program should be sponsored by a "neutral agency," and because of her base of support within the County Criminal Justice Planning Agency, it was decided that the agency itself would act as sponsor.

From the Committee's point of view, there were pros and cons affecting the decision to apply for a federal grant. They recognized that they could significantly expand their organizing efforts if they could hire full-time staff, instead of relying on part-time volunteers. But, they were also fearful of the consequences of federal funding: that the local committees might no longer be self-sufficient and self-sustaining. They recognized that citizens give up some of their power when government money is involved. Finally, the problems between law enforcement and the community became intensified when the federal money was at issue. They found law enforcement agencies to be more cooperative and responsive when the program was voluntary. There was no competition (citizens against police) for monies, and it is possible that the voluntary organization was perceived as less of a threat.

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[1]Private non-profit groups had to obtain official sponsorship from a unit of government under bloc-grant funding requirements.

A GRASSROOTS PROGRAM IN A RURAL SETTING:

THE SOUTHEAST POLK COUNTY CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, INC., IOWA

I. Introduction

Most community-based crime prevention programs in existence are in urban areas. Some believe that crime is not a problem in rural areas because crime rates are considerably lower there than in large cities. Yet crime has been increasing at a faster rate in rural areas, which has caused some residents to become quite concerned. The Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council, Inc. (SEPCPC) is an example of a grass roots organization which was formed by a group of citizens motivated by the rapid increase in crime in their predominately rural section of Iowa.

Planning and developing a crime prevention program in a rural setting poses certain difficulties. Large geographic areas, sparse population, and the tradition of trustfulness toward others (which rural people are proud of and reluctant to change), mean that the opportunities for crime to occur are increased and the probability of criminal apprehension is decreased. The fact that residents live relatively far apart means that many crimes can be committed with little fear of being seen or heard. Law enforcement services are also hampered by large geographic territorities: preventive patrolling makes little difference and response time is likely to be much longer than in urban areas. These factors suggest that crime prevention strategies that are effective in an urban environment may not work in a rural setting. The SEPCPC program to be examined here combines both rural-oriented and urban approaches. Its experiences illustrate some of the problems involved in developing a rural crime prevention program.

II. Background

The history of citizen initiatives in crime prevention is long in Southeast Polk County, Iowa. In pre-Civil War days the Vigilance Society had a branch in Polk County, and the farmers of Rising Sun revived the concept in 1905. Although the methods of the vigilantes have been discredited and dicarded, the notion of community action as a deterrant to crime is once again strong in Southeast Polk.

The Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council is a rural, community-based program established on citizen initiative to combat a rising tide of property crime occurring in the area in the 1970's. SEPCPC's target area includes all or part of five rural townships of Polk County which lie adjacent to Altoona, Iowa, on the southeast borders of Des Moines. Several unincorporated population centers such as Runnels and Mitchellville lie in the area, along with numerous very small "clusters" of dwellings. Most of the area is farmland. There is a small minority population, mostly in Delaware township. City workers, tired of congestion and higher taxes, are moving to small tracts of land in Southeast Polk in increasing numbers, building new city-style homes and commuting to work. The estimated population of the target area is slightly over 7,000, with approximately 2,800 households.

Overall property crime rates in unincorporated Southeast Polk are the third highest in Iowa, ranking behind only Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. A rash of burglaries and thefts prompted a group of residents to form the Crime Prevention Council during the spring and summer of 1976. The group met on an ad hoc basis for the next six months.

In January, 1977, the group learned of the LEAA Community Anti-Crime Program from a member of the Central Iowa Area Crime Commission (CIACC) and decided to pursue a grant to upgrade and institutionalize their program. SEPCPC was incorporated in April, 1977, in order to compete for federal funds, and with the help of the director of CIACC and the Sheriff's Crime Prevention Officer, they prepared and submitted a successful grant application in August, 1977, with the project officially beginning in January, 1978.

The 18-month grant award of $83,673 pays for three full-time staff members, office space, and program materials (educational brochures, rural address numbering signs, Operation I.D. equipment, etc.). The major focus of the program is on educating citizens about individual crime preventive (target-hardening) techniques and encouraging citizen action and involvement in those measures. The program also attempts to educate school-age youth about crime prevention.

III. The Formal Planning Process

A. Identifying the Problem

The owner of a small grocery store in Southeast Polk ran his store for several years without worrying about crime. Then, between spring 1975, and spring 1976, he was held up nine times. This is an extreme case, but the increase in crime in the area was apparent by late spring, 1976, when people were moved to do something about the problem. It was then that one of the parents at a PTA meeting in Four-mile Township lost his CB radio to a thief during the meeting. When he announced this to the gathering, the principal of the school immediately called for a meeting of the citizens to discuss the problem. The crime issue was not new to them, as incidences of burglary, theft, vandalism and even robbery were perceived by the

citizens as happening fairly often. The first meetings were held in June, 1976, with as many as 70 people attending to hear presentations given by the Polk County Sheriff's Crime Prevention Officer. Invitations to people in four other townships expanded the area to its present boundaries, and an Ad Hoc Committee was formed to investigate crime prevention. Volunteers were organized by the Ad Hoc Committee to distribute literature and solicit donations to the Committee.

The citizens complained that the Sheriff's response time was too long and that there were not enough patrols in the target area. However, the Sheriff responded that there weren't enough men or cars to heavily patrol the area. This situation is not unique: the Sheriff's lack of resources hindered him from providing what the citizens believed to be "adequate protection."

The citizens who attended the first meetings perceived the basic problem to be property crimes, and the Sheriff's Crime Prevention Officer probably reinforced this notion. The police had run two previous anti-crime programs in northern Polk County that seemed to significantly reduce property crimes. The C.P.O. also provided Sheriff's Department crime statistics to the Council, although they were forced to recode and reanalyze the data later because it was not originally broken down to fit the target area. The Central Iowa Area Crime Commission (CIACC) helped in the analysis of this data, and also continued to assist the group in further defining the problem.

The results of the crime analysis were startling, since they indicated that Southeast Polk had one of the highest property crime rates in the state. The Council selected the three most prevalent crimes -- burglary, vandalism, and larceny -- as the particular crime problems to fight. By looking at other data sources, primarily arrest

records from Polk County and elsewhere in unincorporated Iowa, the hypothesis was formed that juveniles were committing the majority of the targeted crimes, which was weakly supported by the fact that school enrollments in Southeast Polk's school district have continued to increase, while all other districts in the area have decreased. Therefore, the juvenile population increased at the same time crime rates increased.

Two cultural factors are related to the people's definition of the crime problem in the area. First, the rural residents presented numerous opportunities for crime by their trusting tendencies to leave vehicles, homes, buildings, and produce unguarded. And there was some resistance to initial suggestions that a change in their habits might help.[1] Second, a demographic shift in the population was widely believed to be related to the crime problem. Population in the unincorporated areas of Southeast Polk was growing, due to migration from nearby Des Moines. Several Council members expressed the view that the clash between rural and newly-arrived segments of the population (and, specifically, their teen-aged children) was somehow at the root of the crime problem. But no systematic analysis nor definitive evidence was examined to substantiate this position.

Finally, at no point in the definition of the problem, nor in the "Need for Assistance" section in the grant application, does the uniqueness of the physical rural environment figure prominently. It is considered at other stages of the planning process, notably in strategy selection and implementation.

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[1]This citizen resistance was not viewed, however, as an indication that target-hardening strategies might not work in a rural area. Rather, the resistance was seen as part of the problem . . . an attitude which needed to be changed.

B. Developing the Program

In designing the SEPCPC program, the role of the Crime Prevention Officer and the CIACC were again of major importance. Within the broad thrust of the community's mandate, these representatives of official agencies, in collaboration with Council members, selected the reduction of property crimes as the focus of the program. This goal is consistent with the problem, given the way in which it was defined by the group.

At this stage of planning, however, the detailing of goals and objectives as submitted in the grant application, was supplied by the representative from the Central Iowa Area Crime Commission (who actually wrote the grant) and the Sheriff's Crime Prevention Officer. These goals, objectives, and strategies are a reflection of tried-and-true, police-oriented procedures. Further, similar target-hardening strategies had been used with apparent success in an area north of Des Moines. The goals do not reflect the unique problems of the rural nature of the area, nor do they address the particular problem of the encroachment of urbanites upon the area, or the consequences of that move upon both the new and old residents. This cultural problem was repeatedly identified by Council members, but only tangentially arises in the formal crime prevention plan. To a great extent, the citizen Council members deferred to the knowledge and technical expertise of their official advisors from CIACC and the Sheriff's office.

The set of strategies selected by the Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council -- including neighborhood watch, Operation Identification, premise security surveys, and so forth -- are basically appropriate for property crime problems and consistent with the

project's goals and objectives. These strategies were accompanied by others aimed at educating, informing, and encouraging mass citizen participation in these target-hardening techniques: publicized open meetings, occupant mailings, a door-to-door canvass, and press releases. One strategy aimed at improving law enforcement response time was included . . . a rural numbering system to replace traditional place names on farm roads, with a set of addresses known to emergency services personnel. This particular strategy had been considered by the citizens in the community for several years. It represents not only a major strategic contribution of the Council, but also reflects adaptation of crime prevention to the conditions of rural life. The plan also included a number of program activities aimed directly at youth in schools and at the elderly through existing projects and institutions.

The major source of human energy planned for in SEPCPC stemmed from the pre-funding days of the program when a number of the co members of the group volunteered time to distribute literature and solicit money. This volunteer element was carried over into the LEAA phase, along with the addition of paid staff to train and monitor volunteers, as well as to carry out the regular staff responsibilities. The volunteers were to be used as part of a door-to-door canvass to enroll people in the neighborhood watch and Operation Identification programs, and to recruit new members and volunteers for the program.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

Shortly after the project started with LEAA funding, a series of unanticipated but connected events forced several basic changes in the program. The key to understanding the problems which the program has

dealt with during implementation lies in the false assumption that it would continue to be possible to recruit and retain volunteers for canvassing and educating.

The Council hired full-time staff (a director, an organizer, and a secretary) within a couple of months after the program was funded. At some point in this early period, the number of volunteers dropped off, and subsequent attempts to recruit and train new ones have not been successful. However, those people who do volunteer are expensive to train, and tend to drop out before they repay the training investment. Given these barriers to developing the volunteer aspects of the program, the staff has taken on more and more of the implementation tasks.

In order to adapt and correct for the loss of volunteers, staff used CETA funds to hire several community organizers to do canvassing work. This move permitted the project to complete the canvassing task of visiting each household in the target area at least once, and in some cases, twice. The LEAA resources would have been insufficient to hire these people, and if the program director had neither CETA nor volunteer staff, his main organizing goals would not have been met. A basic problem with the expert/client relationship this approach fosters is that feedback is difficult to generate. Staff cannot tell whether programs are actually being carried out or not. The fact that someone accepts the principle of Operation Identification does not mean that he is actually marking property. This marking procedure is a critical step in implementing Operation ID, but the staff currently has no control over it. In a staff-run program, methods of formal feedback play a more important role than they do in volunteer-based

programs in which information can be gathered through informal communication. And person-to-person contacts in naturally occurring community groups can help motivate people to take a desired action.

A second problem arose in implementing the neighborhood watch, a program where citizens are encouraged to report criminal activity and other information useful for solving crimes. Staff does not know how many people have made how many calls about suspected violations. In part, this problem is due to procedural habits of the Sheriff's personnel, who don't want to accept calls without the name and address of the caller. The new Sheriff has accepted anonymity as part of the Watch program, but somehow the word had not reached the duty officers that are needed to make it work. Lack of a fully supportive contact within the Sheriff's Department has hindered efforts to get this particular log-jam broken.

The program is currently moving toward an emphasis on youth involvement and youth education programs, with a clear eye toward the next funding cycle. This shift of emphasis in the program is reasonable, given the fact that the offenders have been tentatively identified as juveniles and the schools have always been cooperative and supportive of the project. What's more, the peculiarities of the "rural psychology" seem to have defeated attempts to implant a community-based program of property crime reduction using basically urban strategies.

The crime data resources used to evaluate the program -- including the time and work of the staff to relate the police data to the target area -- are quite adequate to chart crime trends in Southeast Polk. The major use of this data has been to monitor the three main target crimes. Using this data, Southeast Polk appears to

have experienced a decline in the incidence of all target crimes as compared to similar surrounding areas. This is important information for assessing impact, but doesn't give the detailed commentary on the program that is needed to change it or to improve its performance. The project is also, however, developing additional impact data through an unusual total community victimization survey which is being conducted in conjunction with the house-to-house canvass. The survey should permit better assessments of peoples' willingness to report crime to the police and give a check on official data.

IV. The Politics of Planning

A. Involving Citizens

The Southeast Polk County Crime Prevention Council distinguished itself from other crime prevention programs in the area by clearly being citizen initiated (grassroots), rather than generated by an official agency. It was concern about crime which motivated the formation of the Council: there was a "sense of anxiety which . . . motivated people."[1] The very first meetings were organized relatively easily and informally. Anyone who regularly attended these meetings was considered a member of the group. There are indications that a fairly large number of area residents were interested. Efforts to get the crime prevention program off the ground began with members of the Ad Hoc group volunteering to go door-to-door, telling people about the program, and asking for donations to maintain some minimal administrative functions of the group. In these contacts, memberships in the group were solicited and meetings advertised.

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[1]SEPCPC grant application prepared for LEAA, dated Aug. 24, 1977, p. 4.

Initially, the organization worked through respected community members and institutions -- principals and schools, pastors and churches, businessmen -- to gain the attention and allegiance of the community. When the officials from the CIACC and the Sheriff's Department were brought in to work on the project, they tended to be conservative in outlook and in program suggestions, so that people willingly accepted them and their proposals. But the net result was to place the program first in the hands of a self-selected (and probably rather elite) part of the community, and second, under the direction of the "experts."

Over time, however, and especially after the grant award and the hiring of full-time staff, the amount of direct participation in the Council boiled down to a group of "activists" that has remained very small, and a larger group of "joiners," who individually become members by being recruited into the Neighborhood Watch and/or Operation Identification programs. The activity of the latter group is somewhat limited.

The decline in volunteers was a major loss of resources that the planners had not anticipated. It may have been due to the fact that large numbers of citizens weren't directly involved along with the experts in planning the program; therefore, the assumption that people would volunteer was unfounded. Some Council members suggested that the citizens hold the opinion that "now, it's the job of the paid staff." The use of CETA workers may serve to reinforce the attitude that the project is being carried out by some "official" agency . . . by "them," rather than by the citizens who were actually responsible for getting it off the ground. This, of course, makes volunteers even more difficult to attract.

The Council and staff have also experienced difficulty in attracting new people in significant numbers to attend a Council or a cluster (block) club meeting. Block captains have been difficult to recruit. As a result, the program's main community involvement has been to enroll people in the property crime reduction strategies on an individual basis, or to make contacts with them through meetings of organizations to which they already belong.

In later phases of the planning process, meetings were held to discuss the content of the grant application and even later, the operation of the funded program. These meetings are always open to the general public, and they are publicized from pillar to pulpit. Still, general attendance remains low, restricted to the same small, dependable group. Their main involvement in planning was to call in a couple of very capable technical experts with knowledge about crime prevention, who put together a program the Council approved, basically without change.

B. Involving the Police

The Polk County Sheriff has law enforcement responsibility for the target area included in the Council's project. The Sheriff is the source of much of the data and technical assistance the Council receives, but many of the residents believe that his department, in part, is also at the root of their problems because his limited resources do not stretch far enough to patrol Southeast Polk adequately.

Soon after the project began, contact was made with the Sheriff to get help with the crime prevention project. The Sheriff at the time supported such efforts and the Crime Prevention Officer became a

guide and liaison to SEPCPC, providing experience, ideas and litera-
ture freely. His experience was in police-run crime prevention
projects, which emphasize the role of the community in helping the
police, or in individually protecting themselves. His suggestions,
therefore, were predictably limited and did not include possible solu-
tions for the problems associated with community involvement in
planning and running the program.

The Council relied very heavily on this officer and did not
attempt to make strong personal contacts with other officers within
the department. When the Crime Prevention Officer left the department
and a new Sheriff was elected, the group found itself without a strong
supporter within the law enforcemnt community.

Additionally, the deputies on patrol were not favorably disposed
toward the project from the outset. This is not an unusual reaction
or attitude on the part of law enforcement officials. There have been
efforts made to involve these people in the program by inviting them
to meetings and by having them assist in the "Officer Friendly"
program in the elementary schools. However, skepticism on the part of
the duty officers remains. In implementing the Neighborhood Watch
program, SEPCPC has found a reluctance on the part of the dispatchers
to accept anonymous calls. Since one of the premises of this program
is that participants will be assigned a number and may use that number
instead of their name when they call the police to report a crime or
provide information, this poses serious problems for the effectiveness
of the program. The dispatcher could be <u>required</u> by a superior to
accept the anonymous calls, but the superiors have been unwilling to
make such a demand. The new Sheriff supports the program, but largely
in name only. The lack of a confirmed supporter within the ranks of
law enforcement is hurting the program.

C. Involving Official Agencies

Other community-based groups figured into SEPCPC's planning
process earlier than official agencies did, but it was the official
agencies that dominated the planning of the program during the crucial
time when the grant application was being written. The impact of that
dominance on program development has been pervasive, and has had some
consequences during the implementation phase.

Gaining the support of the important official agencies was rela-
tively simple for SEPCPC. Two of the keys to their success were
1) their seriousness about crime prevention, as evidenced by their
volunteer efforts and their heavy reliance on the advice of the Crime
Prevention Officer, and 2) their grass roots orientation. This latter
fact proved especially attractive to the director of the Central Iowa
Area Crime Commission (CIACC). During a speech to the group, he
informed them that LEAA would soon make grant money available to
community-based groups such as SEPCPC. The Council decided to apply
for a grant from LEAA, and contacted the CIACC director to ask his
help, which he readily gave.

The grant application written by CIACC's director and submitted by
the group was consistent with the Community Anti-Crime guidelines and
reflected conscious attention to formal planning steps. It effec-
tively took the detailed specification of problems, goals, and strate-
gies out of the <u>initiative</u> of the Council and placed them within
CIACC. The Council essentially <u>reviewed</u> and <u>approved</u> the application.
CIACC's data access and expertise were undoubtedly useful to the com-
munity, but the resulting product must also be considered CIACC's
handiwork.

This official contact was useful and important to the project in several other ways. When the Sheriff's Department was reluctant to part with some data SEPCPC wanted, the fact the CIACC was reviewing some grant applications from the Sheriff helped get the data. Also, CIACC had contacts within LEAA. When the grant had been drafted, the Director of the Commission and the President of the Council contacted LEAA about some concerns they had, and received an invitation to go to Washington to discuss the project.

D. Involving Groups in the Community

The SEPCPC project began in a school building. It grew in the early stages with the material support of the schools, nearly all of which had been victimized by crime. School principals and other community leaders gave initial legitimacy to the Council's activities, and the first meetings were held by contacting people through these leaders and their institutions and organizations.

During the writing of the grant application, SEPCPC was advised by LEAA to build and demonstrate broad-based community support to qualify under the program guidelines. SPECPC made contacts with key persons -- mayors, police, leaders of civic groups, associations and so on -- to gather their support and ideas about the project. These people, however, were not systematically incorporated into the program planning process.

The project director continues to make efforts to contact service clubs, civic groups, etc., and will speak to all groups which express an interest in crime prevention. Some efforts have been made to involve organizations like the Farm Bureau, which are prominent in the rural environment. For the most part, these contacts are for the purpose of informing and keeping communications open. By itself, this is important, since the Farm Bureau and similar groups represent powerful interests and are also engaged in crime prevention activities in Iowa. Some efforts have been made to involve youth groups like 4-H in the program, through educational presentations. The fact that these organizations and groups were not actively involved in planning the project means they aren't as committed to it as they might be. Consequently, it may be difficult to get more than minimum involvement at this point in the project.

THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION MODEL:

THE GREATER WOODLAWN CRIME PREVENTION PROJECT, CHICAGO

I. Introduction

The Woodlawn Organization (T.W.O.) is a community organization
that has been formally chartered and operating continuously since
1960. The crime prevention program initiated by T.W.O. is based on a
fluid interaction between T.W.O., individual members of the group, and
other organizations. The key to citizen involvement in crime preven-
tion in Woodlawn is not only gaining their participation in the
program, but gaining their consent to deal with the crime issue in the
first place. To insure a successful program, the various demands of
the citizens and the resources available must be integrated and
unified.

II. Background

The Greater Woodlawn area of South Chicago is a 6.5 square mile
tract containing about 180,000 residents. The population is predomi-
nantly black, with a mixture of income levels, including large pockets of
families at the poverty level. The overall unemployment rate is very
high. According to Chicago Police Department statistics for 1976, the
rate of personal crimes was high in the 3rd Police District, roughly
the same area as Greater Woodlawn. The level of property crimes was
not found to be much different from the SMSA as a whole.

The Woodlawn project is a community-based prevention program,
relying on an extensive network of block clubs and community groups.
These citizen contacts are the basis for implementing numerous strate-
gies like Crime Watch, Operation Identification, crime prevention edu-
cation for both neighborhood groups and for youth in schools, advocacy

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and referral services run by T.W.O., target-hardening for the elderly,
and some innovative ideas to improve citizen/police contacts and
improve police performance. The program is designed to achieve a
maximum amount of flexibility, to accommodate the different demands and
needs of the many different groups in Woodlawn. The Woodlawn project
is funded under LEAA's Community Anti-Crime Program.

The Woodlawn Organization consists of a federation of block
clubs, churches, and other community groups that participate in the
central organization through selection of delegates to meetings and
councils of T.W.O. The organization is run and maintained on a day-
to-day basis by paid professional organizers and administrators who
have long experience (up to 20 years) in their jobs.

Traditionally, T.W.O. operates in an area about one-fourth the
size of the target area of the Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention
Project. However, in designing the Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention
Project, T.W.O. made the decision to encompass a larger geographic
area than they had before. The expended into three new areas
("Greater" Woodlawn), which called for the extension of the federation
into new clubs and groups. Each of the four areas now in the program
operates almost autonomously, under the general guidance of T.W.O.
The two professional staff members assigned to each area belong to
T.W.O and report to the Project Director, who coordinates the crime
prevention program for the entire area.

The historical development of the organization is important in
understanding its crime prevention program. Initially, T.W.O. was an
active part of the Civil Rights struggle of the 1950's and 1960's,
which placed the organization in conflict with many established
interests -- such as the police. This was a period of confrontation

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politics and the creation of a political consciousness among the
people. At this early stage, T.W.O. began organizing groups in the
neighborhood that would later provide the basis for program
initiatives. It cannot be overemphasized that this grassroots
organizing is the foundation of T.W.O.'s strength, and a necessary
condition for its existence.

By the early 1970's, the emphasis within T.W.O. was changing from
confrontation to broader community development. As early as the Model
Cities program, it was recognized that crime is intimately tied to
other issues, such as unemployment, that the organization was
interested in pursuing. In 1976, Woodlawn produced a 20-year plan
that focused mainly on physical planning, but continued to emphasize
the importance of the "soft" issue of crime, given the belief that
people would not invest in the area and remain there if they were
afraid.

In 1974, two general crime-related issues were identified by T.W.O.
leaders. From the community point of view, poor police performance in
responding to calls and respecting citizens' rights created distrust
of police among the citizens. From the police point of view, the
residents were unhelpful in reporting crimes and testifying in court.
There would have been no chance for a successful community-based crime
prevention effort if these opposing attitudes had continued. T.W.O.
extended its role to act as a mediator between the police and the
community, with its main goal being to get community and police sup-
port for a crime prevention program that included both groups.

In 1975 T.W.O. proposed a 10-point crime prevention program that
placed five demands on the police, in return for five community
actions that T.W.O. promised to organize. In late 1975, T.W.O. made

a successful application to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission
for money from the LEAA block grant to operate a victim/witness
counseling program. This program tried to bring the police and the
community closer together by explaining the criminal justice system to
victims and witnesses and by getting the agencies to be more aware of
people's attitudes. In early 1977 it was learned that Community
Anti-Crime Program money would be available to qualified applicants,
and T.W.O. decided to revise its earlier programs and apply for funds.

III. The Formal Planning Process

The Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention Project evolved out of the
historical experiences of the community. It was a conscious exercise
to further the purposes of T.W.O. and the community using LEAA funds.

A. Identifying the Problem

Problem identification in Woodlawn does not rely heavily on formal
techniques, even though the project planners are aware of the stages
of the analytical planning process (as their grant applications
demonstrate). Instead, problem identification is shaped by two major
characteristics of Woodlawn: its history and development, and its
thoroughly entrenched community organizing focus.

The organizational structure of Woodlawn influences problem defin-
ition in several ways. One is that it gives T.W.O. avenues to learn
what people's opinions are. Another is that the nature of the organ-
ization encourages some degree of autonomy on the part of the block
clubs and groups. These are spread out over a fairly large, diverse
area. Because of these factors, the problems identified in one area
or unit may vary quite a bit from the next. When these variations
occur, the central organization responds to different demands by

keeping the program flexible enough to serve sub-areas and sub-units. In Woodlawn, problems identifed from police data and citizen demands change over time and from area to area.

Roughly speaking, Woodlawn uses three basic sources of information in identifying their problems.

1) Statistical data taken from police offense reports forms the basic description of crime in the area. This is used on a day-to-day, month-to-month, and beat-by-beat (area to area) basis.

2) Survey data about peoples' perception of crime gives some insight on victimization and fear of crime.

3) The T.W.O. organizers are constantly in the community and use reports from people offered in meetings and from police to gauge attitudes and learn about current events. This source of information is not as systematic as the first two, but it can give important leads for solving particular problems, especially to an organization like T.W.O. that is so fully dependent on community involvement for its own survival and success.

None of these sources of information is completely reliable. Police data are not equivalent to victimization surveys, and the surveys were not based on random samplings of the whole population. The citizen survey was made through the block club organization, and the information gathered this way is limited to descriptions from T.W.O.'s formal constituency, which may or may not reflect the feelings of the whole community. It should be noted that these sources of information are well within the resource limitations of the organization, and in fact, they capitalize on its structure by using the block clubs and social networks to gain information for problem identification.

Given these limitations and constraints, some of the specific problems identified included the following:

- Crime and fear of crime create an obstacle hindering the development of the community economically and socially.

- The citizen survey, taken after the grant application to LEAA had been submitted, indicated which crimes block club members felt were serious. Perhaps surprising, in view of the offense report data, these include property crimes for many people. This difference in data may indicate that the Woodlawn Organization's members differ in some way from the population as a whole, since police data indicate that personal crimes are relatively more serious in Woodlawn.

- People distrusted and misunderstood police and the criminal justice system.

- Police reciprocated citizen distrust, saying that citizens did not faithfully report crimes nor dependably testify about crimes they had witnessed.

These problem definitions have been developed by Woodlawn staff and community members over a period of several years.

B. Developing the Program

In Woodlawn, the overall goals that have emerged in T.W.O.'s constant back-and-forth consultations with constituents and other organizations are of a system-improvement and community development sort. These goals have developed out of T.W.O.'s evolving experience in community action, and reflect a general need to continue building the capacity of the organization. Consequently, one priority for the leaders of T.W.O. is continuing to organize block clubs and groups, expanding membership. These goals are seen as necessary to and compatible with many of the more crime specific goals of the organization, especially for those strategies that require widespread citizen participation.

The extensive block club organization of the community gives T.W.O.'s leadership the ability to keep abreast of the concerns of their members and translate these into programs that are compatible

with the overall goals of the organization and the more specific demands of the citizens. The role of the leaders in devising concrete programs and choosing strategies is therefore decisive, but it is constrained by the demands put on them by members.

At the area and block club level, crime specific goals are stated, using neighborhood reports and official crime data. At this level, the problems vary from one area to another, and therefore, so do goals and strategies. For example, Area Center #3 identifed rape education and prevention as a primary goal because nearly half the rapes in the entire district occurred there. Likewise, Center #4 identified robbery, burglary, theft, and auto theft as its problems, and set a goal of reducing these crimes. These crime specific and community involvement goals come from the organized members. In different ways -- through conversations, comments in block clubs, the analysis of data, or experience with past programs -- T.W.O. increases the possibility of involving citizens in the goal identification process. Objectives change somewhat over time, as well as from area to area.

Although many of the strategies used in Woodlawn are fairly standard -- such as surveillance or education programs -- T.W.O. has made some more innovative responses that illustrate its role as mediator between the community and police and other official agencies. One example is the strategy designed to improve police performance, which is part of the overall goal of improving police/community relations. This strategy is being implemented in part through the monitoring of police responses to calls for service. In principle, many strategies could be used to achieve this goal. Direct complaints from individuals or groups could be effective in gaining police responses. But one problem in Woodlawn has been the peoples' distrust

of the police, and their apprehension about criminal justice generally. So the police monitoring strategy was set up to permit people to make calls for help to police and then to report the incident to T.W.O. as well, using a 24-hour hot-line established by T.W.O. The police are aware of this procedure, which may make them more responsive. The police may also recognize that this strategy may be the only way to encourage people to call and provide the information the police need. The political consequences of this kind of strategy are important, and are discussed below.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

The basic aspects of implementation involve paying attention to details, like those that are necessary to make a meeting work, or deliver the proper materials to the person who needs them. The heart of community activity in Woodlawn is to get people to attend block club and group meetings to hear presentations on crime prevention strategies or to ask questions and air grievances. The implementation of the participation strategies can only be effective if people actually attend those meetings and volunteer. Community and block club meetings are important not only for the crime specific parts of the program, but for the continued involvement of the membership in the organization.

An important indicator of Woodlawn's approach is that staff members are organizers, or have organizing experience. Many of the more specific objectives of the organization refer to the numbers of block clubs to be organized, or meetings held. As suggested above, one of the major problems now facing T.W.O. is that its established constituency, much of which is middle class, is aging or leaving the

area. Younger, poorer people have been difficult to organize with
T.W.O.'s brand of community development. Currently unresolved, this
issue must be solved for T.W.O. to continue in its present organiza-
tional form.

In a community involvement program like Woodlawn, there are two
sources of evaluation material, objective data and feedback from the
community. Objective data in the form of police reports is used by
area groups to determine which crimes require responses by the project.
Educational materials and discussions are chosen, in part, on the
basis of this data. As crime incidents occur in the four areas,
program responses change. The effectiveness of these strategies is
not evaluated in this approach.

Woodlawn has proved to be more sensitive to a second sort of
evaluation, the opinions and feedback of its membership. In several
instances, this has led to the modification of program goals or
strategies. This is part of the process called "getting sanction."
It can lead to changes in the program if some participants do not
accept the program as it stands, or do not share a consensual objec-
tive and understanding with the other members. In the early phases of
this project, members from a couple of the Area Centers doubted that
T.W.O. had established "sanction" with the police, and appropriate
changes in the program had to be made to encourage these members to
work with the police on the terms established in the project.

IV. The Politics of Planning

The key to the Woodlawn project has been the maintenance of an
extensive network of contacts both inside and outside the
organization. These contacts have been consciously planned, in much
the same way that crime prevention objectives have been. Both are

necessary to the program. Throughout, the Woodlawn organization has
been described as a democratic federal structure, and T.W.O. has
placed itself between this community structure and official agencies,
including the police. In order to implement any program, then, T.W.O.
must be able to offer something to all these parties to gain their
cooperation. This means building support among the various actors in
the community.

As the police monitoring example shows, this political approach
sometimes forces T.W.O. to balance contradictory goals and demands.
T.W.O. often functions as an advocate in defense of peoples' rights.
But this activity is related to the kind of confrontation politics
that helped make T.W.O.'s (and the peoples') relations with police bad
in the 1960's. Still, a community-based organization like T.W.O. can-
not afford to reject the demands placed on it by the community, in
this case for some kind of action to improve police performance. The
police monitoring strategy chosen takes both sides of this coin into
account. It can provide an effective way for citizens to bring
pressure to bear on the police, satisfying T.W.O.'s community obliga-
tion at the same time. On the other hand, the police -- while they
may not like it -- are aware that information exists about their per-
formance but also that it is in T.W.O.'s hands to be used in a respon-
sible way. The police get crime incident information they wouldn't
otherwise have.

A. Involving Citizens

The "people" have been the basis of Woodlawn's success ever since
it began, partly because their numbers provide T.W.O. with political
clout with politicians and bureaucrats, which has become particularly
advantageous in the citizen-participation programs the Federal
Government began in the 1960's.

The organization's success is also based on the fact that it attempts to reflect the preferences of its membership in program choices. Before any final program decisions are made, the organization has to "get a sanction" from its members to continue. Even though many policy decisions or program choices are made by the staff, they are not rigid; instead, they are presented at various times to influential individuals and members of block clubs and churches to get their approval. While some of these referrals are subjected to formal votes, many are not. But the principle remains: without the approval of the constituents, T.W.O. would soon run out of its primary resource -- supporters in the community. T.W.O. leadership is unwilling to support any project or issue that is not a concern to their constituents.

The basic unit of organization is the block club or other community groups, such as churches. The primary task of the organization is to form, encourage, and strengthen these units. Individuals must be persuaded to participate in them by going to meetings and discussing their common concerns. This requires a process of constantly canvassing the neighborhood, making face-to-face contacts in order to build interest in community crime prevention. By attending meetings, people's support for crime prevention may be encouraged, and at the same time, T.W.O.'s organizational basis is strengthened. Further, getting people to attend meetings demonstrates to LEAA and other agencies that T.W.O. does have community support. T.W.O. makes these meetings interesting to people by choosing presentations that take advantage of events in the community. Particularly terrible crimes may stimulate concern about some topic, to which the T.W.O. staff tries to respond. In addition, the services of T.W.O.

have to be available when and where individuals need them. One way of making themselves accessible has been to locate the neighborhood centers in store-front offices along well-traveled roadways. This permits a casual drop-in atmosphere convenient for residents.

The current structure permits responsiveness to community members' needs, both individual and collective. An example occurred when residents of one area experienced a series of robberies in some unlighted, dilapidated garages. Through a member of their Area Council, these citizens successfully persuaded the garage owner to correct the hazards that seemed to foster crime. T.W.O.'s staff will act as advocate or referral agency to help solve particular citizens' problems. This sort of action helps solidify the relationship between T.W.O. and its constituent block clubs and their members. Even though citizens who participate in T.W.O. are concerned about the general level of crime, demonstrations of T.W.O.'s willingness and ability to respond to particular requests -- even if the issue doesn't directly involve crime -- reinforce the organization's standing in the community.

A community leader from one of the Area Councils suggested that the sub-units of the organization are having difficulty bringing new people into the organization. Many people with children have left the neighborhood, and they've been replaced by more transient people. The organizers note that many of the current residents of Woodlawn are difficult to organize because they don't respond to the same incentives that might encourage members of a more stable and homogeneous community to band together. Under these circumstances, T.W.O. organizers have attempted to appeal to the most general anti-crime

motives as possible. Where community groups have other unifying
interests -- for example, property owners -- more specific appeals can
be made on that basis.

B. Involving Groups in the Community

The Greater Woodlawn Crime Prevention Project is based, in part,
on other organizations in the community. The advantage of working
through existing groups is that they provide established contacts with
people. Once these groups become part of the federation, numerous
lines of communication between people and the central organization are
available and can be used to disseminate information or mobilize
people for meetings.

In organizing around crime prevention, T.W.O. moved into new
geographic areas where other community organizations existed and
T.W.O. did not have established citizen support. They risked
violating another organization's "turf." Although the areas
surrounding Woodlawn proper were probably not so well organized as
Woodlawn itself, there were block clubs and groups already existing,
sometimes as part of other organizations like the powerful Democratic
Party in Chicago. T.W.O. is relatively large and enduring, making it
a credible threat to other groups. As a result, before T.W.O. moved
into new areas they followed the procedure of "getting sanction," at
two levels. First, through personal contacts with members of the new
areas, they found interest at the grassroots for a community crime
prevention program. This was not done in a formally systematic way
(e.g. a survey), but rather through existing organizational contacts.

At the leadership level, contacts were made with potentially
opposed people. In one particularly difficult area, an organization
existed that had already established roots in the community, and its

leadership exerted a high degree of control over some residents of the
area. T.W.O. went to these leaders with the proposal that they would
organize the area for the crime prevention program only, leaving the
functions of the other organization intact. After some consideration,
T.W.O. was permitted to go into the new areas to organize around the
crime issue. These other leaders did not actively support T.W.O., but
they also did not oppose the project openly, thus eliminating one
potentially divisive source of conflict.

In another kind of situation, T.W.O. followed similar procedures
to gain the confidence of people in established organizations in order
to use these organizations as forums for crime prevention presen-
tations. For example, in the early stages of organizing the project,
a certain amount of skepticism and perhaps distrust were apparent
among parents and school administrators. The first step here was to
make contact with P.T.A.'s, parent-teacher councils, administrators,
and other people affected, to make the T.W.O. organizers and programs
known. Once familiarity and understanding were established, it proved
relatively easy to get inside the schools to present youth-oriented
crime prevention materials.

C. Involving the Police

As noted in the history above, relations with the police were
both important and difficult for Woodlawn's crime prevention efforts.
Prior confrontations between the people and the police had taken place
in an era of violence, with T.W.O. on the vanguard of the people's
struggle. Scars from those days still remain, especially among
police on the beat.

The fact that the two organizations need each other provides the basis for a good relationship. This situation is recognized by both T.W.O. and the police. From the police point of view, the Commander of the 3rd District put it clearly when he noted that for almost every crime committed in the neighborhood, some citizen has information that would help the police solve it. But the citizens must be persuaded to give that information to the police, which they have often been unwilling to do. From the community point of view, the police are a source of information, media resources, advice, and assistance at meetings, as well as the only authorized users of deadly force in the crime fight. But the police have often imposed their methods and solutions on the community.

Rebuilding support with the police began in the early 1970's when the then-Commander of the 3rd District proved to be a strong supporter of community anti-crime efforts. His support was the wedge that was used to begin the long effort to gain police support for the project. He supported the T.W.O. programs in negotiations with police leaders in 1975. When requested by T.W.O., he offered statistical aids and sent men and materials to meetings held in the community by T.W.O. He supported proposals to begin coordinating the official police/community programs with the T.W.O. program (such as the Beat Representative Program . . . a volunteer effort to establish police contacts in the neighborhoods and improve peoples' awareness of appropriate responses to crime). Through this kind of cooperation, the neighborhood relations sargeant and other officers had opportunities to meet residents, under the auspices of T.W.O., who were concerned about crime. This tended to improve the images of participants in the other's eyes. Of course, the police representatives

to such meetings are trained in community relations and understand the importance of their role. The beat cops who are never exposed to such meetings may continue to hold negative opinions about residents. In the same way, T.W.O. members may not be representative of the community as a whole, either, and these limitations could affect the ability of these contacts to significantly improve police/community relations.

About two-thirds of the way into the first grant-year, this very supportive District Commander was promoted downtown and replaced by a man whose personal history involved strong antagonisms between him and T.W.O., and between him and many community members in general. Since this man is vital to providing resources T.W.O. depends upon, it was important to develop good relations with him. First, upon his appointment, T.W.O.'s leadership made a point of welcoming him back to the district to show their good will. Second, in a continuation of established programs, they openly kept up contacts with other officers in the 3rd district who support their project. And finally, they made numerous efforts to involve and educate the new Commander in the beneficial aspects of the program by inviting him to meetings and keeping him aware of activities in the neighborhood.

D. Building Official Support

Official agencies, such as LEAA and local criminal justice agencies, are an important part of the environment of T.W.O. Obviously, any organization like T.W.O. that wants to operate a crime prevention program must have complete information on the guidelines and proced-ures of LEAA and other funding sources. In addition, some of the constituency-building advocacy and referral activities of a community-based organization require a familiarity with the procedures

and also the personnel of agencies like the courts, parole boards, prosecutors' offices, welfare and schools. Finally, official agencies can be important in providing technical assistance, political support, and program legitimacy with review boards or other agencies.

Part of T.W.O.'s 1975-76 program funded by ILEC involved helping victims and witnesses deal with the often impersonal and always imposing institutions of the criminal justice system. T.W.O's program helped these individuals, and at the same time improved the organization's access to the larger system. One of the problems people had with these institutions stemmed from the fact that they were large, centralized bureaucracies based in downtown areas. This led people to avoid contact with them. T.W.O.'s efforts led to a decentralization of some parts of this system to smaller, neighborhood units more accessible to people and less likely to inhibit them from trying to deal with the system. T.W.O not only managed to make the people more likely to press their claims and responsibilities, it probably improved the operating efficiency of the system as a whole.

According to T.W.O.'s leadership, this kind of activity has built a reputation that the organization is a "winner." T.W.O. is able to "get the brass out" as they did for the crime prevention project's start-up celebration when several top members of Chicago's Police Department and numerous media people made appearances.

On the bureaucratic side, T.W.O. has maintained close contact with the grant monitor at LEAA. He has helped them in several ways, including offering a suggestion that T.W.O. and other LEAA projects in the area should establish relations with each other to exchange information and experiences.

THE COALITION MODEL:

WARD I, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.

I. Introduction

Building a coalition of existing community organizations into a cohesive group -- one which can successfully resolve conflicts and reach agreement on overall program goals, objectives, and strategies -- is not an easy task. The development of the Ward I, Inc., crime prevention program typifies the kinds of problems likely to arise in a highly organized community with an existing network of diverse community organizations involving several minority groups. Each of the organizations in the Ward I area of Washington, D.C. is well-established, with its own constituency and roots in the community; each has its own set of goals and organizational perspective as to what the community's problems are and what needs to be done to solve them. The following discussion presents the methods and strategies used by Ward I, Inc., as it tried to bring together over 100 separate community organizations for the explicit purpose of cooperating in the development of a single, unified crime prevention program.

II. Background

Ward I, Inc., is an umbrella organization. On paper, it consists of 103-109 existing community organizations, all operating in the Ward I area of Washington, D.C. In reality, 20 to 30 organizations participated in varying degrees in planning and developing Ward I, Inc. Nine of these organizations were included in the proposal for a crime prevention program.

Ward I is one of eight ward divisions of Washington, D.C. There are approximately 88,000 people living in the area, of which 84 percent are non-white. The majority are black, although there is also a large

Latino minority, and a smattering of other ethnic groups. There is a wide range of income levels represented, but the majority of the residents have below-average incomes. The two police districts with jurisdiction over Ward I ranked higher than average in total reported crimes in 1976. One of the two police districts reported the highest number of personal crimes in the city for that year.

Ward I, Inc., was created with the specific purpose of applying for LEAA Community Anti-Crime monies. Initial meetings were held in November, 1977, and the grant application requesting LEAA monies was submitted at the end of April, 1978. LEAA approved the $250,000 grant request in September, 1978. The planning process described here covers the six-month initial planning phase, the four-month interim period (May - September, 1978), and the following transition or start-up period (October, 1978 - January, 1979).

Nine individual crime prevention projects, each implemented by a separate community organization, are funded under the Ward I, Inc. umbrella. These nine projects include a diverse set of crime prevention strategies, including: a drug abuse and rehabilitation training effort aimed at pre-adolescent youths; citizen anti-crime patrols; escort services for the elderly; a crime prevention educational program; a community newsletter; regular community meetings with police; counseling for truant students; and rehabilitation and job training for ex-offenders.

The Ward I, Inc., organization has three full-time employees. The major function of the central staff is to provide technical assistance to the nine individual projects, primarily in the areas of program and financial administration. Central staff also attempt to coordinate

the separate projects, as well as to build and strengthen the Ward I organization so that it can continue as a unified force capable of addressing other community-wide problems.

III. Formal Planning Process

Throughout the initial phases of planning, Ward I, Inc. had technical assistance from the American Institutes for Research (AIR, a private consulting firm located in Washington, D.C.). This consulting organization provided help in the following areas: identifying groups in the community and their resource capabilities; identifying, collecting and analyzing data; making presentations at organizational meetings; identifying external government funding sources; insuring that the proposed strategies and budgets were within the guidelines of the LEAA Community Anti-Crime program; preparing the grant application; and facilitating contacts with government officials.

The general orientation to planning used in Ward I is termed "a neighborhood resource management approach" by AIR. The emphasis is on linking residents, community organizations, and official institutions into a resource network, in order to respond to the problems in an urban neighborhood. The approach is based upon an analysis of the problems and an inventory of all available resources (both internal and external) which might affect those problems.

A. Identifying the Problem

Three sets of data were collected by AIR for the purpose of analyzing crime and its relationship to other problems in the Ward I area.

1) Archival information -- Written reports, documents and studies relevant to crime were reviewed. Sources included Washington, D.C. newspapers, a community newsletter, news releases and reports

from local government and private agencies. This literature search uncovered a 1976 resident survey suggesting that crime was the number one concern of most Ward I residents.

2) _Crime data_ -- The Metropolitan Police Department provided crime statistics for the years 1976 and 1977 for the two police districts encompassing the Ward I area. The data was analyzed by the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis (OCJPA, the LEAA Planning Agency for Washington, D.C.). As in most cities, crime statistics are collected by police beats, which do not coincide with other boundaries, such as neighborhoods, or in this case, wards. Consequently, it was impossible to determine the exact number of each type of crime occurring in the defined neighborhood. The analysis prepared by OCJPA included ranking crime rates for various crime types in the two police districts, comparisons with other police districts and with the city as a whole. Some data on arrest rates, offender and victim characteristics and crime characteristics (time of day, day of week, method of commission, etc.) was also collected and analyzed.

3) _Key person interviews_ -- AIR conducted approximately 30-35 interviews with persons who were identified as being informed about the community's problems and the availability of resources. Those interviewed were persons holding key positions in organizations, or generally recognized by the community as "leaders" (for example, the leaders of block clubs, churches, community councils, umbrella groups, business organizations, social service groups, etc.). The purpose of the key person interviews was 1) to define the primary problems and issues of the community, particularly as related to crime, 2) to identify the existing resources and skills available within the community,

and 3) to develop an understanding of community organization networks. The interviews were conducted in-person by AIR staff. In addition, six to eight interviews were conducted with residents, who were identified by community leaders, for the purpose of obtaining some citizen perceptions of problems and concerns.[1] It took two individuals two weeks to complete the approximately 50 interviews, each of which lasted one and one-half to two hours.[2]

The set of key person interviews (plus additional input gathered at the planning meetings), was the data relied on to provide an understanding of the crime problem. For the most part, the analysis of police data coincided with the results of the key person interviews with respect to the most serious crime problems. In addition, the interviews included open-ended questions which provided detailed information about the situations surrounding crime. This information was useful in developing a couple of crime prevention strategies. Those interviewed admitted the primary reason official crime data was analyzed was to justify the project, to add "legitimacy," and to satisfy the grant application requirements. People familiar with a community believe they know its problems, without referring to quantitative data; and regardless of what the crime data shows, projects want to address the problems that concern people.

B. Developing the Program

Using the results of the resource inventory (part of the key person interviews), AIR made the first attempt at matching existing

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[1]AIR had planned to complete approximately 50 interviews with residents, but lacked the time to do so.

[2]A sample of the Key Person Interviewing Guide developed by AIR is included in Appendix A.

resources with the problems identified. Another important consideration during this matching process was LEAA's Community Anti-Crime Guidelines and their priorities. The purpose of matching was to identify, in general terms, the kinds of crime prevention projects/services which were 1) needed in the community, 2) within LEAA guidelines and priorities, and 3) capable of being undertaken by existing organizations in the community. These results were presented to the planning group at a March meeting. Using this information, the group decided which organizations and what general kinds of programs would be included in the grant proposal to LEAA.

The nine organizations whose programs w re to be included then went back to their own memberships and boards to formulate specific strategies and to design the crime prevention program for which they would be responsible. Some groups already had ideas; others talked with key community persons within their own constituency; some held meetings, and still others looked to experts outside of the community for new, innovative ideas. But the main emphasis was placed on using their knowledge and contacts within the community for assistance in designing programs.

Once the nine organizations came up with their own program ideas, a bargaining, compromising and coordinating meeting was held by the Steering Committee. The projects had to "mesh" into an overall program and a budget had to be developed -- one which was within funding limits. These strategies were then reviewed by the police department. The project goals and objectives were defined after the strategies were determined, as part of the proposal-writing process. Ward I was then incorporated as a private, non-profit corporation. AIR prepared the final grant application which was submitted to LEAA at the end of April, 1978.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

During the interim period (April-September, 1978), Ward I, Inc., created the management and supervisory structure for the organization. They named a Board of Directors, which continued to meet regularly during that period. Once the rush to complete the grant application was over, the major task was to rebuild the organization: making intensive personal contacts with the organizations left out of the LEAA proposal; bringing in new organizations; developing future plans for the organization, etc. The Board has been responsible for determining the overall scope of the organization and identifying and developing the leadership skills appropriate for implementing the program.

The budget for the Ward I project did not include monies specifically allocated for evaluation. It was suggested that evaluation and program modification is a continual process. The visit to Ward I took place while the majority of the individual projects were just beginning to be implemented, so it was too early to see how this process will occur. Several of those persons interviewed emphasized the importance of building flexibility into the proposal which is submitted to funding sources, since it is difficult to make major modifications in a project once funding has been approved.

IV. The Politics of Planning

A. Involving Official Agencies

The original architects of the Ward I coalition emphasized the necessity of building official support for their coalition proposal idea prior to contacting the other community organizations which would eventually become part of Ward I, Inc. A series of meetings,

which included representatives from several community organizations, the Office of Criminal Justice Plans and Analysis, and the American Institutes for Research. The purpose of these meetings was 1) to explore the political and financial feasibility of a comprehensive neighborhood crime development program, 2) if the idea seemed "worthwhile," to agree upon an overriding philosophy for the program which federal funding agencies would find receptive, and 3) to develop a general framework for identifying useful representatives in the community to include in program planning and development.

This early series of discussions led to AIR agreeing to provide technical assistance in program planning, and OCJPA agreed to provide a small grant to assist in covering AIR's costs and to help in the analysis of crime data. The underlying philosophy for the project was also determined: 1) the program would be developed and implemented by the community itself -- existing agencies, institutions, and interested individuals -- rather than by an official agency, 2) the proposal would attempt to represent the wishes of the entire community (a "cooperative coalition"), rather than a single organization in competition with any other, and 3) crime was viewed as a problem that could not be separated from other problems in the overall context of the community . . . in other words, the principal long-range goal of Ward I would be to improve the quality of life in the neighborhood.

Obtaining the approval, support, and advocacy of the offical LEAA agency in Washington, D.C., and securing the involvement of a consulting firm with contacts within LEAA's Community Anti-Crime Office incr ased the likelihood of the project receiving LEAA approval. According to those involved in project development, if they had not been assured

that the proposed grant had a good chance of being funded, they would not have continued with any further planning, at least not for LEAA monies. Their reasoning was that the community was extremely distrustful of government funding because of negative experiences with government programs in the past. If the program developers had gone ahead and asked community organizations to commit the resources necessary to plan a project and the grant had not been approved, the effect would have been to increase the community's anger and frustration, not only toward LEAA and government in general, but also toward those individuals developing the project.

B. Involving the Police

Over the years, many Ward I residents had shown cynicism, suspicion or antagonism toward the police. It was believed by the Ward I, Inc., planners that a police-sponsored project simply would not work in the community. If citizens perceived that police controlled the program, they probably would not be willing to get involved. Law enforcement crime prevention programs, such as Operation Identification, target-hardening strategies, police-organized block clubs and neighborhood watch, etc., were already available in the area. But few residents were participating in these programs because they were apparently viewed as police strategies. Since the philosophy of the project, was based upon the premise of the community helping itself, the police role in implementing the project was likely to be minimal.

At the same time, it was recognized that police support for the project was a necessity. Some of the program strategies might require positive, active police participation; and, if the police were

not involved from the beginning in planning, there could be serious consequences later on for the project.

The general strategy used to secure police cooperation and involvement was to identify those members of the police department who would support the concept of a community-initiated crime prevention program and use them to work internally with others in the department whose cooperation was necessary but who might be less sympathetic to the community's point of view.

The first police contact was with a community relations officer. This office was regularly assigned to the Ward I neighborhood; was well-respected by diverse groups within the community (and therefore able to bring together the blacks and Latinos); was sympathetic to the community's point of view; and he understood the issues involved.

Once this officer had agreed to help, a meeting was held with the Chief of Police to tell him about the proposal project and ask for his support and cooperation. In addition to Ward I organizers and the community relations officer, representatives were present from AIR and OCJPA. Because the project idea already had official government support and sanction, there was a greater incentive for the police department to cooperate. They could become one of the first law enforcement agencies to actively participate in a community-based crime prevention program . . . a move that could enhance the image of the department and improve police/community relations. The Chief also agreed to make the services of other divisions within the department available, subsequently issuing a directive to all department divisions to provide whatever assistance was requested by Ward I.

In this directive, the District Supervisor was instructed to allow the community relations officer and/or his partner to spend time on the project.

The neighborhood community relations officer and/or his partner attended all of the bi-weekly meetings of the steering committee, so that at least one representative of the police department was continually in communication with the project, participating and providing input throughout project development. These officers reviewed and reacted to the crime prevention strategies each individual organization developed, although they did not participate in the design of those strategies.

In reviewing and commenting on proposed program strategies, police input was most crucial regarding those strategies which border directly on law enforcement activities or which required police participation. These are also the strategies where there is likely to be a conflict between the police and the community's point of view. In the Ward I, Inc., project, these controversial strategies included citizen anti-crime patrols (some of which would involve youth) and a community newsletter. In the case of citizen anti-crime patrols, the police were concerned about citizens usurping law enforcement authority. They also had reservations about citizen patrols getting out of hand (vigilantism, etc.). In order for this strategy to be acceptable, the police initially insisted that the citizen patrol volunteers go through the official police training academy and become auxiliary police reserve officers. This demand was unacceptable to the community organizations involved, for then the volunteers would be viewed as an official extension of the police, not as a community

patrol. In the case of the proposed newsletter, the police were concerned that it would be "inflammatory". . . used as a vehicle for reporting negative comments and one-sided stories about police abuse. The community organizations, on the other hand, felt that if the police had the opportunity to review it prior to publication (as they requested), they might use it for their own purposes, to promote police department programs.

Both controversies were successfully resolved through mutual accommodation and compromise between the police and the Ward I organization.[1] Agreement was possible only because both sides had a stake in the success of the project and, therefore, approached controversial issues with a willingness to make compromises.

Finally, at the point of actual implementation, formal meetings were held with the district commanders in the Ward I area to present the finalized strategies and request police assistance in implementation. Some of the individual projects -- those which required more extensive police cooperation (such as the drug abuse and rehabilitation program and the citizen patrol) -- were presented to the beat officers at roll-call sessions. The purpose of these meetings was educational: to inform those police officers working in the Ward I neighborhood about the crime prevention activities which the groups were about to undertake. Regular monthly meetings with police are planned as a strategy leading toward the goal of improving police/community relations.

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[1]It was finally agreed that the citizen patrols would be trained by the police, but would not be officially connected to the department following completion of the training. The Ward I, Inc., organization promised to review the newsletter and be responsible for insuring that it would not be anti-police.

In summary, the planners strived to develop and maintain a positive working relationship with the police department throughout the development of the project. The project developers relied heavily on the neighborhood community relations officer to foster positive involvement and support for their program within the police department, a role which this particular officer continues to play during implementation. He provides information about the project to other members of the police department, attempts to change negative attitudes toward the project, and serves as a link between the department and the community. Other police divisions were not given the opportunity to approve or reject the selected strategies or to participate in developing them, because it was felt that the police would not have given their approval to many aspects of the overall program. Yet, key members of the department, including the Chief, were involved in planning the program from its inception. Consequently, the department had an investment in the project and a self-interest in seeing it succeed. This facilitated cooperation and a willingness to compromise on controversial issues.

C. Involving Groups in the Community: Building a Coalition

The creation of a "new" organization was viewed as a threat by most of the existing organizations in the community. Because of conflicting vested interests, overcoming opposition to a coalition-type organization had to be dealt with if the new organization was to successfully develop the program.

Existing organizations manifest the deeper conflicts which are often inherent in a heterogeneous community, conflicts which stem from differences of race, ethnic background, income, values or lifestyles.

Organizations representing very different constituencies are likely to be in conflict. The potential for disruptive conflict was aggravated in Ward I because these organizations had a history of competing with each other for resources. Larger organizations did not see any benefit in joining with smaller, disadvantaged groups; the organizations with more resources (trained, professional staffs, money, etc.) were in a better position to act singly in seeking outside monies. Smaller organizations were more inclined to join the coalition, but they feared losing their functions and resources to the more powerful groups (it was commonly believed that the larger groups will get the money anyway).

Sufficient incentives had to be provided so that the individual organizations perceived a self-interest -- a high probability of something to be gained -- from joining the coalition. Simultaneously, inter-group conflicts had to be resolved and the fears surrounding the creation of a new organization allayed. The Ward I, Inc., organizers used the following rationales to overcome these obstacles and obtain organizational participation in the coalition:

A positive, holistic approach. The focus was on the whole community; on what the organizations as a group ("we") are doing in the community; on the common interests of all organizations in improving the quality of life for all residents. The purpose was to minimize previous conflicts between organizations and make it clear that the Ward I, Inc., organization would become larger and more significant than the individuals involved, it would eventually represent the interests of the entire community.

Emphasis on the community solving its own problems. Decisions about what should be done would be made within the community, not arbitrarily by an external government agency. By pre-empting government funding sources from choosing projects from among competing organizations in the same community, the community had to first resolve its own conflicts.

Sharing the resources. The principle governing negotiations was that groups having the interest, expertise and organizational capabilities in crime prevention would get something. The starting point was the question: "How do we, the community, make the best use of approximately xxx dollars?" Organizations with an interest had to be willing to put forth some effort to be included in the grant application. They had to regularly attend the meetings, develop their own proposals, and be willing to compromise with others, which meant settling for less than they might have preferred. Because Ward I, Inc., was envisioned as continuing beyond crime prevention and LEAA funding, additional organizations were enticed into joining by the possibility of inclusion in future Ward I coalition proposals to other funding sources.

Providing an assurance of funding. Because Ward I, Inc., organizers first built official support for their idea prior to approaching other community groups, they could promise, with some confidence, that organizations would not be wasting their time by getting involved.

Selling the idea of technical and administrative management assistance. Organizations were encouraged to join Ward I, Inc., because they would be provided with assistance in planning, grant application, and project administration and management. Ward I, Inc., would provide direct benefits to individual organizations in the form

of technical expertise and knowledge about federal guidelines and funding requirements.

Despite what were termed "vigorous attempts" to get large-scale organizational participation in the Ward I coalition, there were -- and continue to be -- problems in this regard. As suggested, the list of 103-109 participating organizations is misleading. Somewhere between 20 to 30 organizations--or about one-fourth--were involved during the first part of the planning process. There is conflicting information about the number of groups and individuals who regularly attended the bi-weekly planning meetings. Once it was decided which organizations would be included in the grant proposal (sometime in March, 1978), there was no longer an incentive for other groups to continue attending meetings. At this point a Steering Committee, consisting of a representative from each of the nine groups, AIR, OCJPA, and the police, was established to continue the planning effort.

Although meeting notices were sent to the entire list of organizations and follow-up telephoning was done with some groups to encourage involvement, it was suggested that if more personal contacts had been made initially, some later problems could have been avoided. For example, the Latino community did not send a representative to any of the planning meetings and, therefore, was not included in the initial grant proposal. Later, the Chairman of the Steering Committee had to contact a number of different individuals within the largest Latino organization before he was able to secure their involvement. According to the Chairman of the Ward I Board, there would have been serious consequences if the Latinos had not agreed to participate, as it would have further divided the community. One of the primary

responsibilities of the project director is re-contacting those groups and organizations which failed to participate, encouraging them to do so in order to build up the organization.

Some problems, however, appear almost unavoidable. For instance, there is no guarantee that the appropriate individual(s) within an organization will receive the information which is sent (meeting invitations, minutes, etc.). The organizations themselves are responsible for internal communications, such as informing their board and membership, and selecting appropriate staff members to participate. If there is a breakdown of communications within an organization, some key people may feel they were deliberately excluded. One suggestion was to spend the extra time required to personally contact individuals within an organization, beginning with the agency head and the board of directors.

Ward I organizers emphasized the importance of fostering cooperation and resolving conflicts between organizations throughout the planning and proposal development process. In order to do so, they selected a strong leader to chair the regular planning meetings. This person had the ability to conduct meetings according to pre-determined agendas, without permitting unrelated and potentially self-defeating issues to arise. The planning group worked backwards from the date the application was due in order to determine what decisions needed to be made at each meeting. A set of decision rules was agreed upon at the initial meeting, which governed all subsequent organizational meetings. The established rules were designed to insure fairness and discourage behind-the-scenes conflicts.

Organizers made an effort to identify and encourage the participation of all existing groups and organizations in the Ward I community. Starting with a list of known organizations, each group was encouraged to identify and invite others. As the list of organizations and individuals grew, invitations to successive meetings, as well as minutes of previous meetings, were sent to the entire list.

There was an established rule that disagreements would be aired openly at the regularly scheduled meetings, not in private sessions. Once the decision was made to include the organizations that became part of the overall crime prevention project, those organizations developed their own strategies. The individual strategies were not subject to review or approval by the total Ward I, Inc., organization.

Despite all efforts to achieve an amicable consensus, there are bound to be continual conflicts and tensions among organizations and between the member groups and the umbrella organization. The nine organizations implementing crime prevention projects under the Ward I coalition have a contractual relationship with the umbrella organization. They are required to coordinate with each other and to fulfill the grant obligations within LEAA requirements and regulations. Yet, they must also maintain a certain independence since they are first and foremost responsible to their own individual boards of directors. This is a potential source of tension/conflict inherent in the coalition model.

D. Involving Citizens

Ward I, Inc., did not involve any community residents directly in the planning effort, with the exception of the six to eight interviews conducted with residents during the problem identification phase and

the two-year-old survey showing that Ward I residents were very concerned about the crime issue. The assumptions underlying the development of Ward I, Inc., were that: organizations and groups in the community accurately represented the opinions and concerns of their respective memberships; these groups were in continual communication with their constituents, and the majority of the residents were either members of, or represented by, these groups. To the extent that these assumptions are accurate, the program is responsive to the needs of citizens in the community. There is no way, however, to test or know the accuracy of these assumptions. For the coalition model to be effective, however, it is dependent upon groups which have a good base of support, experience and knowledge of the community.

A CITY-WIDE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PROJECT:

THE MINNEAPOLIS COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAM

I. Introduction

The Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Program was chosen for a site visit for several reasons. First, it is a good example of a community program planned and implemented by an official government agency. Second, this program made great use of a formal, rational planning process. Third, the project is interesting because planning occurred at two levels . . . city-wide and neighborhood. And fourth, the project has been planned and implemented in several stages: (a) the pre-program stage in which planning for a city-wide comprehensive crime prevention program was done, (b) the demonstration stage in which three neighborhoods were chosen to test and develop crime prevention strategies, and (c) the city-wide implementation stage. (See Figure VI-1.)

Figure VI-1: Chronological Sketch of Minneapolis Project Stages

Stage 1 (1975 - June 1977)	Pre-program Planning: Data collection and analysis, and support building in official agencies. City-wide focus.
Stage 2 (June 1977 - June 1978)	Demonstration Neighborhoods: Information gathering, program development, and building community support.
Stage 3 (June 1978 - present)	City-Wide Implementation: Standardization and application of program experience to city neighborhoods. On-going data collection and program development.

The stages of this project did not begin and end abruptly with the dates on the left. The data collection and analysis begun in Stage 1 continues in the present. However, the stages are helpful ways to describe the program. Different problems and approaches are important at different stages, and the transitions between stages provide

important information about this project. The Minneapolis project demonstrates a mix of formal planning procedures, while trying to build community and political support among official agencies and neighborhood residents. Carefully documented and statistically valid statements of the crime problem initially provided the focus of the program and helped identify priorities, but these priorities have been modified and developed in the context of interaction with neighborhood groups and individuals.

II. Background Information

Minneapolis is the largest city in Minnesota, with an estimated population of 380,000 residents. The proportion of racial minorities living in Minneapolis -- estimated at 10 percent in 1975 -- is relatively small. The city has a national reputation of being a "clean," "safe," city. However, the city experiences surprisingly high rates of crime, especially burglary, according to victimization surveys.

In the middle 1970's, two large crime prevention projects were started in Minneapolis and later joined into one project. One was a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design project implemented in one northside Minneapolis neighborhood by the Westinghouse Consortium.[1] At about the same time, the Minnesota Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control was investigating the possibility of a city-wide CPTED project for Minneapolis. Eventually, the Minneapolis city-wide project was designated one of the seven comprehensive demonstration cities by LEAA, and the Westinghouse project was absorbed by it.

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[1]Westinghouse chose the Minneapolis neighborhood as part of a demonstration of CPTED techniques. The Minneapolis project was a residential program. Two other sites were chosen by Westinghouse to investigate CPTED in the schools (Broward County, Florida) and in a commercial setting (Portland, Oregon).

As the Governor's Crime Commission planning progressed, it became apparent that a city-wide project would be too ambitious for an initial undertaking. While the city-wide plan and report was being completed,[1] planning staff identified three neighborhoods which they felt would make good demonstration sites. These neighborhoods were selected on the basis of the level of crime in the neighborhood and the crime-environment setting, which included factors such as the type of crime problem, the type of neighborhood environment, the level of community organization, and population characteristics. These areas, Willard-Homewood, Hawthorne, and Lowry Hill, offered significantly different settings for the program. Also, Willard-Homewood was included in the demonstration project partially because of the CPTED program conducted there by the Westinghouse Corporation. Planners wanted to ensure that the future city-wide program would be coordinated with that project.

Planning for this program proceeded on two levels with different emphases: 1) city-wide planning took place primarily on a bureaucratic or official level, and 2) neighborhood planning involved citizen participation via block clubs and neighborhood meetings. The linkages between these two levels are among the most important aspects of the planning process in Minneapolis.

III. The Formal Planning Process

Of all the sites visited, the Minneapolis project had the most complete formal planning process. There were funds available for

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[1]Douglas Frisbie, et al, Crime in Minneapolis (Minneapolis: Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, 1978). This document contains descriptions of procedures, analysis of data, and recommendations for the comprehensive program.

planning; it was conducted by planners specifically hired for the task; and official organizations -- especially the state planning agency -- provided an environment conducive to formal planning.

A. Problem Identification

The Minneapolis project spent a great deal of effort systematically collecting and analyzing data to identify and define the crime problems.

Planners from the Crime Commission documented city-wide crime problems using police offense reports, and augmented that basic data with a survey of citizen fear and concern. Much of the specific data measures were adapted from the previous experience of the Hartford crime prevention project. This analysis yielded information on some possible causes of crimes, and also on the effects of crime on the quality of life. Problem identification occurred on two levels: (a) city-wide, and (b) in the neighborhoods.

When the process of identifying crime problems began in 1975, the Minneapolis Police Department did not keep crime information in an easily retrievable form. Police offense report data was transferred to computer readable forms, which produced a data base most projects cannot afford. This data covered one year and provided the background for the city-wide pre-program planning effort. The data was broken down by planning communities designated by Minneapolis city planners in order to get a better idea of the crime problems in different areas.

The city-wide survey included a random sample of citizens taken from each planning community; a total of 1,541 adult residents of Minneapolis were interviewed. Questions concentrated on citizen perceptions of neighborhood crime, citizen fear and concern about crime,

crime prevention measures used by citizens, and actual victimization over the previous year.

Other sources of information supplementing the crime information came from the U.S. Bureau of Census, the Minneapolis City Directory, publications of the City of Minneapolis, including Population and Housing, Summary of Minneapolis, and State of the City, interviews with city officials and criminal justice professionals, and interviews with convicted offenders.

Through analysis of this information, a number of specific recommendations emerged that dealt with both organizational and crime-specific aspects of a city-wide program. The crime analysis identified residential burglary as the most severe problem, and showed that the problem varied greatly from one area to the next. The recommendation was made that Minneapolis should (1) concentrate on residential burglary, and (2) develop a way to distribute scarce resources to places where they were most needed.[1] These early suggestions prevailed and are evident in the way the crime prevention program is currently designed to focus on residential burglary and targeting of resources.

Some of this analysis also proved useful in describing crime problems to citizen groups. Because crime depressed the property values of all housing in a neighborhood, the residents could be shown they had an incentive to act together against crime. It was decided that only the neighborhood acting as a whole could significantly improve the community crime prevention effort. This implied the importance of citizen participation, which was implemented in the demonstration phase.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 283-284.

In the demonstration neighborhoods, crime data was analyzed and the citizen survey oversampled from these areas to get a reliable idea about their attitudes. Interviews were conducted with residents and precinct police officers to get a clearer impression of specific crime problems.[1] Public hearings were sponsored by community organizations and block club meetings were held. These meetings also served to acquaint residents with the crime problem as identified by official records and citizen surveys.

There were instances in which residents identified problems beyond the crime problem, such as abandoned housing, poorly supervised rental property and others. However, program staff felt that the crime problems identified in the data analysis coincided with citizen perceptions on broad points, and that citizens could add detail and extend the data-based approach. The combined sources of information were expected to guide planners to strategies more appropriate to community needs than strategies implied by data sources alone.

In the city-wide implementation stage now in progress, a more limited approach to problem identification is used which is more similar to the initial emphasis on crime analysis, rather than the citizen involvement approach used during the demonstration. The project continues to use police offense report data aggregated at the neighborhood level. Rather than extensively analyzing this data, however, a set of fairly standard criteria have been developed that classify the neighborhoods into four ranks. Rank one requires the greatest staff attention, and will be served first. The criteria include: (1) the burglary crime rate, (2) the acceptance of the program in the neighborhood, (3) the availability of police and staff

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[1]A copy of the Community Interview Guide is included in Appendix A.

resources, (4) the fact that the neighborhood suffers instability due to fear of crime or victimization, and (5) the political expediency of putting a crime prevention effort into neighborhoods in each alderman's ward.

The extensive community-staff interaction used in the demonstration period is no longer so evident in problem identification. The program now focuses explicitly on residential burglary. Along with crime data analysis, organizational and political factors still figure explicitly in problem identification, but the detailed and highly politicized approach to neighborhoods characteristic of the demonstration phase is gone. The city-wide implementation stage operates on a centralized basis to allocate scarce staff and funds to areas with the most pressing problems. Current problem identification emphasizes setting priorities among neighborhoods, according to the central staff's criteria.

The role of citizens in problem identification in the city-wide phase remains, but their role is carefully restrained by staff. The staff present their crime analyses and program to the citizens, and get their reactions. Staff believe that the reason for the program is crime, and crime is the focus of the neighborhood organizing efforts. It is recognized that crime is not always the main concern of the residents of an area, and when residents raise other problems, the staff attempt to refer them to the proper authorities. These other problems do not receive extensive program resources. However, it is believed that any problem identified by citizens that helps keep them actively involved in community affairs is serving the goals of the crime prevention program.

B. Developing the Program

Planning for the Minneapolis project began in 1975 with two overall goals in mind: 1) to significantly reduce crime and fear of crime in Minneapolis, and 2) to develop a comprehensive crime prevention program incorporating physical design, law enforcement, citizen organizations and administrative strategies, going beyond traditional law enforcement activities, to involve the community in defending itself against crime. These broad goals were developed by the official agencies that initially sponsored the program. These goals were then elaborated during the pre-program planning stage mainly by gathering and analyzing crime data and related information.

The elaboration of these goals occurred within the demonstration neighborhoods where project staff tried to get members of the community to organize around crime problems. Planners identified objectives and set priorities by combining the input from crime data, citizen surveys, resident interviews, and community meetings. After the objectives were formalized, they were taken back to the various neighborhood organizations for their comments, alteration and approval. The process varied from neighborhood to neighborhood, but citizen reaction was sought in each. Most of the work involved in developing the program was done by staff planners.

The objectives and strategies developed in each neighborhood varied slightly. For instance, in Lowry Hill East, the crime analysis suggested that the biggest problem in the area was residential burglary, and the citizens tended to agree with this. Therefore, the reduction of burglary became the primary goal in Lowry Hill East. However, the usual anti-burglary strategies were augmented by neighbors.

They identified "party" houses, high transiency, and many unconcerned absentee landlords as part of the causes of the crime problem. So efforts were made to encourage landlords to control and keep up their properties, to contact new neighbors, and to report excessively disruptive "party" houses to police.

The program now instituted uses a fairly standardized approach to program development, with necessary modifications made to account for particular neighborhood characteristics. The overall direction of the city-wide program is entirely within official agencies, and the central staff sets priorities for organizing among neighborhoods. The staff organizers identify community groups and leaders as quickly as possible, and present the burglary reduction program to them. Where necessary, the program may be modified to take different local crime problems into account, and citizen input is solicited for this purpose. Citizens organize themselves for crime prevention strategies following suggestions made by the staff, e.g., to develop a surveillance program by meeting, setting up a telephone network, and sharing experiences. Citizens may easily develop additional goals and strategies if they want, but the staff does not spend a lot of time making it happen. Beyond the basics, the program is the responsibility of the citizens, but the basics are provided by the agency.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

Implementation during the pre-program planning phase consisted of the crime analysis and development of a city-wide plan, plus decisions on the organizational and staffing procedures of the project. These activities all occurred in the official agencies and with their consultants or sub-contractors (like Westinghouse).

Figure VI-2 is an organizational chart of the Minneapolis project during the demonstration phase. The central project staff were housed in downtown city offices, while the implementing staff were housed in the neighborhoods. In principle, these neighborhood staffs were working for the central director. An exception was made in Willard-Homewood where, in addition to regular staff, a contract was given to a community-based organization to help organize block clubs.[1]

In practice, the organization proposed in Figure 2 did not work equally well in all neighborhoods. The problem was that the authority of the central project staff could be challenged by neighborhood-based groups which had some control over the direction of the program. This emerged most clearly in Willard-Homewood where day-to-day operation of the program was partly in the hands of a community-based group. At issue was the method to be used in organizing block clubs, the principal community involvement strategy. The central staff proposed a focused crime prevention approach that would present the entire program in two meetings. This was judged to be an effective and economical way to promote program objectives. Some of the neighborhood organizers, however, argued that the goal of community organizing would be better served by permitting citizens to freely express problems and to present crime prevention over a longer period in the context of the citizens' other concerns. The evaluators of the demonstration supported the view of the central staff that the

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[1]Marcy Rasmussen, et al, Evaluation of the Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Demonstration (St. Paul: Crime Control Planning Board, 1978), pp. 25-26.

FIGURE VI-2: Organization of the Minneapolis Project during the
Demonstration Stage.[1]

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                │ Minneapolis City Council │
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                ┌─────────────────────────┐
                │     City Coordinator     │
                └─────────────────────────┘
                            │
                ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                │ Community Crime Prevention   │
                │   Demonstration Manager      │
                └─────────────────────────────┘
                            │
        ┌───────────────────┼───────────────────┐
  WILLARD-HOMEWOOD    LOWRY HILL EAST        HAWTHORNE
 ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
 │ *              │ │ *              │ │ *              │
 │ Neighborhood   │ │ Neighborhood   │ │ Neighborhood   │
 │ Coordinator    │ │ Coordinator    │ │ Coordinator    │
 │                │ │                │ │                │
 │ Neighborhood   │ │ Neighborhood   │ │ Neighborhood   │
 │ Aides (2)      │ │ Aide (1)       │ │ Aides (2)      │
 │                │ │                │ │                │
 │ 4th Precinct   │ │ 5th Precinct   │ │ 4th Precinct   │
 │ Police         │ │ Police         │ │ Police         │
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 │ **             │ │ **             │ │ **             │
 │ Block Clubs    │ │ Crime Prevention│ │ Block Council  │
 │ Community      │ │ Action         │ │ Other Organized│
 │ Organizations  │ │ Council        │ │ Groups         │
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* <u>Project staff</u>.

** <u>Mechanisms for citizen participation</u>.

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[1]Chart is taken from the grant application made to the Governor's
Crime Commission for block grant funds to implement the demonstration
project. February, 1977.

single-purpose focused approach was more efficient and equally
effective.[1]

Partly as a consequence of these conflicts between central and
field staff, changes were made in the organizational structure during
the current city-wide implementation. Staff is now centralized and
work out of the central office on a temporary basis in different
neighborhoods. In part, this is also due to the simple fact that the
same number of staff have to organize about 15 to 20 times the number
of citizens, so the less costly method has a big advantage from the
point of view of the central organization.

Again, an exception has been made in Willard-Homewood, where a
contrasting solution has been adopted. The crime prevention activity
has been contracted out to a community group that uses the multi-
purpose "process-oriented" block club organizing strategy. Past deci-
sions and methods about involving the community in Willard-Homewood
have made it impossible to implement the same officially coordinated
organizing strategy there as in the rest of the city.

In terms of actual program activities, the demonstration neigh-
borhood program was a <u>comprehensive</u> effort that tried to coordinate
several approaches to crime prevention within the block club community
involvement strategy. The original plans included some ambitious
schemes for changes in the physical environment along with the com-
munity involvement crime prevention activities. The environmental
design changes involved altering traffic flows with diverters and
alley modifications to limit the accessibility of parts of the neigh-
borhoods to outsiders. In both Willard-Homewood and Lowry Hill East

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[1]Marcy Rasmussen, <u>et al</u>, <u>Evaluation of the Minneapolis Community
Crime Prevention Demonstration</u> (St. Paul: Crime Control Planning
Board, 1978), pp. 231-232.

these changes were initally supported by the residents who were interested in the program. But opposition to the CPTED changes developed when uninvolved citizens who lived in the areas became aware of them. Aldermen withdrew support of these parts of the program, and large-scale CPTED plans have been abandoned in the Minneapolis program.[1]

The predominant activities that remain in the city-wide implementation are community organizing into block clubs in support of an anti-burglary program that includes Neighborhood Watch and premise security surveys by police as its prominent strategies. The present program design reflects the administrative arrangements that favored centralization of the program. Experience in the communities suggested that the organizing techniques most suitable to centralized control and limited resources should be one that emphasizes individual and community responsibility for crime prevention, as defined by the program. This approach is compatible with most anti-burglary strategies relying on surveillance, target-hardening and improved reporting of crime, but not with the CPTED approach that requires heavy initial investments in building political coalitions strong enough to get environmental changes past the opposition of affected citizens.

IV. The Politics of Planning

The experiences of the Minneapolis project with citizen and community organizational reactions illustrate some of the political

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[1]Another project that utilized CPTED hypotheses, which served as one of the early models for Minneapolis, is in Hartford, Connecticut. Similar opposition to environmental design changes arose in Hartford, but the project there was more successful in (a) getting support through organizational arrangements that pushed the program, and (b) in making extensive compromises in the final designs to keep citizen support.

problems an official agency sponsor may have in running a community-based crime prevention program. At different stages in the program, the support of different segments of the city's political and social structure has been critical. The arena of continuing importance throughout has been the official agencies.

A. Involving the Official Agencies

The staff of the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control was primarily responsible for planning the comprehensive project. They contacted the mayor of Minneapolis and a city council member in early January, 1975, to build support for a city-wide community crime prevention program. The council member was head of the Council's Community Development Committee. The approval of both the Committee and of the Council as a whole were necessary for the program.

The support of the Police Department was also necessary. After meeting with the program planners from the Crime Commission, the Mayor presented the concept to the Chief of Police. He was interested enough to accompany the Mayor, the City Council member and the Director of the Crime Commission and his staff to New York City in January to visit a well-known proponent of crime prevention through environmental design, and to visit an LEAA-sponsored crime prevention project in Hartford, Connecticut. Upon their return, all were committed to the idea of a comprehensive crime prevention program in Minneapolis, and gave their support to the program.

Obtaining high level official support made it easier to obtain approval from the Committee on Community Development, and later from the City Council to apply for an LEAA grant "to conduct pioneering

work in the area of crime control known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).[1]"

This support opened many doors within city agencies. Before the planning grant was received, Crime Commission staff held planning sessions with the Mayor and the City Council member to identify city agencies which could potentially become involved. The support of official agencies enabled planners to obtain data and information for identifying problems and selecting strategies, and as a means of reaching community residents. This information was used to develop a standard criteria for selecting the three demonstration neighborhoods and for targeting specific strategies and amounts of assistance needed by neighborhoods in the city-wide project.

Once the focus of program planning shifted from the whole city to the demonstration neighborhoods, gaining community support took precedence over obtaining the support of official agencies. Because of difficulties encountered in the implementation phases, environmental design began to lose importance as a program strategy. Consequently, the support necessary from some official agencies, such as public works, became less important. Although links with official agencies remained, they were not maintained to the degree held when planning first began. The primary exception was the police.

B. Involving the Police

Once LEAA funds became available to begin extensive planning, the police chief made department personnel and police information (in the form of offense reports) easily available to program planners. The

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[1]Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, "CPTED in Minneapolis: A Progress Report" (St. Paul: Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, May, 1976), Introduction.

planning staff had office space in the police department where they coded the offense reports. Unfortunately, there have been three police chiefs in the life of the program.[1] Police support never completely evaporated, but every recent election has meant that political bridges to the police department have had to be rebuilt.

When implementation in the demonstration neighborhoods began (summer of 1976), Crime Commission staff, with the approval of the police chief, went to the precinct captains of the neighborhoods to gain their support, and to seek more extensive information about these neighborhoods. Police officers were invited to attend community meetings at which both residents and police aired their opinions and concerns about neighborhood problems. In one demonstration neighborhood, after initial skepticism from officers (but with the strong support of the precinct captain), the police, particularly a number of young officers, played an active and cooperative role in planning. However, in another neighborhood, where there was a history of poor police/community relations, the Crime Commission staff worked through one interested police officer. This self-selected officer acted as a liaison between the police and the community until a degree of trust and cooperation developed between them.

In the one neighborhood where police officers were especially cooperative and interested, they were included along with community residents on the committees that interviewed applicants for staff positions on the project. In both the demonstration stage and the current implementation stage, a police officer has acted formally as a liaison between the police department and the program staff.

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[1]The police chief serves at the pleasure of the mayor in Minneapolis.

Police involvement in the current phase of program varies with each neighborhood. The primary roles of the police in the program are to perform premise security surveys and to attend neighborhood and block club meetings. The scarcity of police resources and the magnitude of the crime problem in a neighborhood dictate the extensiveness of police involvement.

C. Involving Community Organizations

As the city moved from planning on a city-wide basis to planning the demonstration neighborhood programs, it solicited the support of neighborhood organizations. Crime Commission staff, representing an outside agency coming into neighborhoods, recognized the need to respect the existing community structure. Commission staff also recognized that existing organizations were a source of information about the community and a means of reaching individual residents.

The kind and amount of community organization was different in each demonstration neighborhood, and the program staff learned that each neighborhood would have to be approached differently because of this. The community organizations could serve as channels to the individual residents, but they could also be the sources of opposition to the program within the neighborhood. Where no community organizations existed, the crime prevention effort required more input from staff in forming the basic structure of community involvement. Where the organizations did exist, their role in the program had to be worked out to permit them to participate on their own terms and still contribute in the directions desired by the program directors.

Lowry Hill East had two competing community organizations, one which was larger than the other. Program staff approached the traditional rivalry between these two groups by presenting the program as a

neighborhood effort, avoiding too close an association with either existing organization. Through numerous meetings with these groups and their shared concern for crime, and a neutral crime prevention action council with representatives from both groups was formed. Community organizations helped sponsor crime prevention meetings which were attended by citizens, business representatives and police, in addition to Crime Commission staff. These meetings were used by the planners as a platform for citizens to air their concerns about crime, to identify problems, to react to problems identified through crime data, and to suggest and react to potential strategies.

While contacts with existing community groups went fairly smoothly in Lowry Hill East, there were a number of problems in Willard-Homewood. At the beginning of the crime prevention program, there were two strong, competitive organizations. In the early CPTED program, Westinghouse started on the wrong foot by appearing to side too much with one of the community rivals over the other, in part by using one of the organizations as a recruiting ground for leadership for the program. Political conflicts probably worsened the misunderstandings community members held about the program, such as the mistaken belief that Willard-Homewood was the demonstration program for the whole city -- and therefore entitled to more resources -- rather than just one part of a larger scheme. The results of these splits are partially revealed in the battle over organizing technique that still goes on between Willard and the central staff. In the long run, the failure to build a solid base of organization support hurt the crime prevention project.

The predominant crime prevention strategy developed in the demonstration neighborhoods and currently used in the city-wide

Minneapolis project involves community organizing around the issue of crime. In areas where there is enthusiastic response or a dominant community group exists, the staff has subcontracted with it to run the program themselves. The staff may provide practical, technical assistance to the community group, but otherwise, they stay out of the community. Since these neighborhoods tend to be lower priority anyway, this is an economical approach. In other neighborhoods, the staff tries to meet with all existing community groups and to demonstrate how crime is a concern common to all community residents. By presenting the crime prevention program as just another service offered by the city, the project director attempts to separate the crime prevention program from the politics of individual neighborhoods.

D. Involving Citizens

The support of individuals became important during the demonstration stage, and continues today in the city-wide implementation. Citizen involvement has been a central goal and concern -- in theory -- of the Minneapolis project, although as an officially-sponsored project, reaching citizens has presented special problems.

In the pre-program planning stage, citizen involvement was highly structured, mostly limited to passive participation in problem identification through the city-wide citizen survey which tried to identify crime concerns and attitudes.

During the demonstration stage, mechanisms of more direct citizen participation evolved, primarily through the organization of the neighborhoods into block clubs, with residents acting as block captains providing the community-based leadership. Interviews with police, citizens, and members of community organizations were aimed at identifying these leaders.

In early 1977, Crime Prevention Action Committees (CPAC's) were formed in the demonstration neighborhoods. The majority of members were community residents, but representatives of the police department, legislative agencies, and official administrative agencies were included. The Action Committees were neutral task forces, independent of existing organizations, although members from the various organizations served on them. The Committees acted as advisors and monitors of the crime prevention project in each neighborhood, and initially they played a fairly active role in the crime prevention projects. The Action Committee proved vulnerable to political conflicts, and the only remaining Committee is in Lowry Hill, where it has merged with the block captains group, which is now primarily a citizen's group.

These developments in citizen's participation groups have been incorporated into the current city-wide approach to citizen involvement. First, the neighborhoods are no longer organized to use the CPAC-type representative council as the neighborhood policy coordinator. The program no longer attempts to have official agency representatives on resident councils or committees, at least not on a permanent basis. In this respect, more of the program responsibilities have been turned over to the citizens in the neighborhoods. And by not trying to impose the necessarily political CPAC's on existing community structures, possible conflicts are avoided.

The dominant forms of program organization in the community are now the block club and the block captain's group. Rather than using these groups to give legitimacy to the official crime prevention effort, the program attempts to identify and develop leadership in the citizens, and then turns organizing and program development over to

them as quickly as possible. Program staff try to avoid getting embroiled in community conflicts by carefully assessing the status of current community organizations before using them and by presenting crime prevention as the focus of the program. Still, the motivation for involvement by many citizens may not be crime, and this is recognized by encouraging fledgling neighborhood groups to follow-up whatever concerns they may have on their own.

The end result is a very lean and focused program in Minneapolis. The program itself can only be described as an officially-sponsored one with fairly conservative crime prevention objectives. The role for citizens in this program is carefully designed and controlled by the central staff. The staff presents the program, and modifications are few. No advantages or personal incentives are offered to either individuals in the form of jobs or to communities in the form of politically useful resources. Participation has to be on the basis of interest in crime prevention, or in the community, and the program staff makes every attempt to sustain that interest through meetings, training, phone calls, and personal contacts. An evaluation of this approach has not been completed, so its effectiveness remains to be seen.

A GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PROGRAM IN TARGET NEIGHBORHOODS FOR A TARGET POPULATION: THE PORT CITY CRIME PREVENTION FOR SENIORS PROJECT

I. Introduction

It has been suggested that when an official agency plans a community crime prevention program, it must pay close attention to involving community residents or representative groups and organizations in the design of that program. Official agencies have a tendency to over-emphasize the analytic planning process, and to neglect the political aspects of getting adequate representation from the community during program planning.

The Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors project (PCCPS) was planned by officials within a municipal department of "Port City." It was developed quickly in order to meet federal grant application deadlines. It was an experimental project designed to test alternative crime prevention approaches in selected neighborhoods for a specific target group, the elderly. The experiences of this project suggest there may be some unique problems associated with crime prevention programming for older people. But since the grant proposal was written in haste, time was not taken to involve the appropriate individuals, groups, and agencies in program development. An examination of this project dramatically illustrates how incomplete planning can directly and seriously affect the way a program works in the community. The discussion is not meant to lay blame on any of the individuals involved. Rather, the experiences here are fairly common: projects are often developed in short order simply because of the availability of federal funds. That fact makes this particular story all the more compelling.

II. Background

The Port City Crime Prevention for Seniors project is one of seven projects included in a national demonstration program, which is funded by several federal agencies. Each of the seven projects devised its own anti-crime program. But all were required to keep within broad guidelines, which stipulated that elderly constituents should be served by: 1) reforming public policies affecting elderly crime victims, 2) helping the elderly avoid victimization, 3) re-establishing social networks among the elderly (e.g., forming block clubs or a "neighborhood watch"), and 4) aiding the elderly victims of crime.

The PCCPS program operates in three selected neighborhoods in Port City. In each of the three neighborhoods, a different set of crime prevention strategies has been selected, "tailored to community needs." In addition, there is a headquarters office which oversees the three neighborhood projects and administers a public education and information campaign designed to have city-wide impact.

One neighborhood is an "area in transition." It has experienced a rapid change in racial and socio-economic composition over the past ten to fifteen years. Now the neighborhood is mixed, consisting of elderly, Jewish residents and young black families. The crime rates are higher than the average for the city as a whole, with elderly residents victimized disproportionately for certain kinds of crimes (notably street robberies and purse snatches). There are numerous community organizations in the neighborhood, although there is no overt network of black community groups. A large number of elderly are not members of any organizations. The crime prevention strategies selected for the neighborhood included target-hardening techniques, such as Operation I.D., block watch, security surveys (and where

recommended, the installation of free locks), citizen and youth patrols, victim/witness support services, and court watching/ monitoring.

A second neighborhood was selected for its contrast to the first. Its population is relatively stable: primarily middle-class, with one housing project included in the target area. Although the crime rate is rising, it is still fairly low. Similar crime prevention strategies were implemented in this neighborhood as in the first. In addition, a telephone reassurance program and a door-to-door survey for linking up the elderly with their neighbors was planned, along with the distribution of freon horns.

The only program activity included for the third neighborhood was counseling for elderly victims of violent crimes who might qualify for compensation through the State Compensation Board. This aspect of the program was modified significantly, for reasons to be explained.

III. The Formal Planning Process

A. Identifying the Problem

During 1974-77, the tremendous and horrible impact of crime on elderly victims generated a great deal of national interest. The media, in particular, dramatized such events. It was also an issue which the municipal Department for Social Services -- and particularly its Commissioner -- had been interested in for a couple of years prior to the start of the PCCPS project. As a result, the Department engaged in a number of data and information gathering activities for the purpose of specifically defining the problem of crime and the elderly in 1975-77. It had conducted its own victimization study in selected inner-city neighborhoods, which found that 41 percent of the

respondents 60 years and older had been victimized at least once.[1] Since the Department had been working with the Port City Police Department, it had data on the age of crime victims . . . a fortunate situation, since most police departments do not usually keep or analyze such information. This data substantiated other sources indicating that, contrary to public opinion, the elderly are not disproportionately victimized for most types of crime, with the exception of personal robberies, particularly purse snatching.

In addition, the Social Services Department had sponsored a series of public hearings in 1975, and many senior citizens testified that "crime," or more specifically "safety in the street," was one of their major problems. Its research staff had also completed a literature search, collecting data from a number of national opinion polls as well as essays, reports and studies conducted in other parts of the country. Staff members had attended national seminars on the problem of crime and the elderly. Finally, the Department had initiated several projects prior to developing the PCCPS program, (some in conjunction with the Port City Police Department), aimed at preventing crimes against the elderly and providing direct services to elderly crime victims.

Therefore, when the time came to develop the PCCPS proposal, the staff of the Social Services Department relied on a variety of crime data, research studies, staff experiences and impressions which it had already collected. As defined, the problem focused on the impact of crime on the elderly victim . . . the financial loss, physical injury,

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[1]First Year Proposal.

and the social and psychological consequences (including fear, which often leads to self-imposed isolation). These aspects of the problem, however, were not substantiated with empirical data; rather, they were presented as logical arguments which follow from the economic, physical, social, and psychological effects of the aging process itself. Given the emphasis on defining the problem in terms of elderly victimization, the staff also noted that while the State had a compensation board set up to provide money to victims of serious personal crimes, "very few elderly have availed themselves of the provisions of this law."[1] The staff reasoned that perhaps the Board was not widely known to the elderly, or the claims process was too complex or lengthy. These suppositions were not verified, either by checking with elderly crime victims or with the Board.

When an agency serves a particular segment of the population, a definition of the crime problem has already been narrowed to that particular sub-group. In the case of the elderly the problem definition is likely to be in terms of the effects of victimization (what the victim might do to avoid it, handle it, or recover from it), rather than in causal terms (who is committing these crimes and why). These latter kinds of questions are usually outside of the agency's domain.

B. Developing the Program

The design of the PCCPS program was heavily influenced and largely determined by the Social Services Department staff, based on their knowledge and experience. Program development was also limited by the guidelines and general orientation of the national consortium, of which this project was a part.

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[1]Ibid., p. 8.

The decision to select target neighborhoods, rather than attempt a city-wide program, was made partly because of funding limitations. Except for a city-wide information campaign, the amount of money available wasn't anywhere near what would be needed to provide direct crime prevention and victim services to all elderly. At the same time, "neighborhood strengthening activities," such as "rebuilding social networks among the elderly," was one of the areas of emphasis determined by the national consortium. One critera for receiving federal funding was that projects had to incorporate at least three of these identified areas of emphasis.

The choice of the specific target neighborhoods conformed to an official planning and research perspective: select two different kinds of neighborhoods with high concentrations of elderly residents, one in transition, with a high crime rate (neighborhood number one) and the other stable, with relatively low crime (neighborhood two); apply a similar set of strategies, and then evaluate the results. Because the Department already had a crime prevention program operating in the third neighborhood which provided crime prevention education and direct victim services, that neighborhood was selected as the area in which to establish a program to aid crime victims in obtaining restitution from the State Compensation Board. It seemed logical to tie this new victim assistance aspect of the project into an already-existing program.

The specific crime prevention and victim asistance strategies included in the grant proposal came almost entirely from staff knowledge about other programs around the country and the Department's previous experiences in elderly crime prevention programming. With

the exception of restitution assistance and the court monitoring activities, all of the strategies were already being used in other Social Services Department programs. Since the Department had worked closely with the Police Department and its own Crime against Seniors Program, the emphasis in the strategies selected was on target-hardening approaches (Operation I.D., premise surveys, locks, neighborhood watch, block clubs) and other measures designed to protect the elderly from criminal victimization.

The formal grant proposal was written by a Social Services Department staff member in a period of less than one month. In order to incorporate some community input into the project design, the list of specific crime prevention activities was developed by the staff, with the understanding that neighborhood task forces would be formed after the grant was funded. These task forces would then select from the pre-determined list the activities they wanted.

C. Implementing and Modifying the Program

The first grant proposal was submitted in August, 1976. The budget (and, therefore, the project) was subsequently reduced by almost $150,000 and resubmitted, with a planned start-up date of March 1, 1977. The first project staff members were hired in May, 1977. Before December of that same year, the project was forced into making major modifications in the design of the program. The problems which arose can be traced back to the planning phase, and the fact that Department staff didn't have enough time to adequately define the problem, or to fully explore existing resources.

The project had set the goal of helping an estimated 2,000 elderly crime victims receive compensation through the State Victim Compensation

Board.[1] But, as project personnel quickly found out, this goal was unrealistic. First, staff discovered that there were statutory limitations on eligibility for reimbursable losses that would seriously hinder the project. According to state statutes, crime victim's compensation is only provided for wages lost due to injuries suffered because of a crime, or for medical expenses not reimbursed by other sources. Because of these restrictions, retired elderly victims were not eligible for compensation (their sources of income, e.g., Social Security, Supplemental Security Income or pensions, are not wages). Compensation for medical expenses was also not available for elderly victims who are covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and/or private health insurance. These situations apply to most elderly persons. If the Social Services Department had involved the Compensation Board in the planning process, it would have been aware of these statutory limitations. Then, the problem definition would have been quite different, and more realistic program activities could have been developed. As it was, the project could not assist elderly crime victims obtain compensation because most elderly did not qualify for it.

As a result of this insurmountable problem, the project was modified. The Crime Victim Counselor became a Victim Service Coordinator, and PCCPS significantly altered its crime prevention strategies in the third neighborhood. These modifications have had further consequences. The other senior citizen crime prevention program already

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[1]The annual figure of 2,000 was arrived at from police data indicating there were 200-250 elderly victims of violent crimes per month in the third neighborhood.

operating in this neighborhood had a victim assistance component. Now there's two programs providing similiar services, with neither program having ultimate responsibility for the tasks.

Although contact has since been established between the Social Services Department and the State Compensation Board, and there have been discussions which might result in future policy changes, there have been some serious consequences for the project. The expectations of the elderly regarding victim compensation have been raised, but not met. The elderly may lose trust and respect for an agency ostensibly representing its concerns which promises services, but fails to deliver.

The project staff also had problems obtaining the names of elderly crime victims. According to the plan, the names of victims would be referred to the PCCPS staff through the police precinct offices. Yet less than one-fourth of the crimes were referred to PCCPS during the first five months of the project. The Second Year Proposal noted that "Precincts may have failed to notify the district headquarters of a significant number of elderly victims of crime." While the Social Services Department had developed a working relationship with the Police Department administration, it didn't have the time to involve all the necessary police personnel in each of the precinct offices. Their cooperation and involvement, however, was critical if the program was to be effective. Project staff had to modify the strategy and establish a "notification control mechanism" to double-check police reports to find the names of elderly victims.

The project has encountered other difficulties that have required staff to make changes in the way the program works. In most instances, these problems can be traced back to the way the program

was planned. For example, one of the program activities was promoting premise security surveys. After the project began, it was discovered that only the designated crime prevention officers in the Police Department have the training and the authority to conduct premise surveys. And, there was only one crime prevention officer in each precinct. Had the planners of the project known this fact during planning, they might have developed alternative strategies, such as arranging with police for the authority and training so that project staff could conduct the surveys.

Another example: it was originally assumed that the project would work through existing neighborhood organizations to reach elderly citizens. However, support for the project was not established with these organizations during planning. As the project moved into territory with strong organizations, the staff found many of them to be uncooperative. Some didn't agree with the neighborhood boundaries which had been selected; others asked, "Why this neighborhood?" Next, the project staff found that the majority of the elderly residents were "unaffiliated," that is, they were not members of any organizations in the community. Staff modified their activities at this point to try to make direct contact with elderly residents.

But there were problems with this approach as well. There was no easy way to determine where the elderly lived. When meetings were held to offer PCCPS crime prevention services, there was no legitimate way to restrict attendance -- or the services -- to just the elderly. The project found itself serving people of all ages, but still finding it especially hard to reach the elderly, who often could not or would

not attend meetings.[1] Even going door-to-door to find elderly residents was not always successful, because many of the elderly were so fearful, they wouldn't answer or open the door to strangers.

PCCPS staff members frankly admit that the traditional methods of community organizing do not seem to be effective in reaching and involving the elderly. They also openly question the appropriateness of trying to single out the elderly in any crime prevention program with education/involvement in target-hardening techniques: "When you offer crime prevention services, how can you limit them to the elderly?" Staff members suggested that a better approach might be for existing crime prevention programs to make special efforts to reach the elderly.

IV. The Politics of Planning

A. Involving Official Agencies

A government agency initiating a crime prevention program starts with a certain amount of official support just because it is an official agency. Beyond its inherent legitimacy, the Port City Social Services Department had good contacts with a number of federal agencies. Because of these contacts, the PCCPS project had an edge in receiving federal monies. The project was developed quickly, however, and contacts which should have been made with other official agencies (such as the State Compensation Board) were not made, resulting in serious consequences for the project, as described above.

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[1]Some elderly complained that the location of the neighborhood office in one area was in such a dangerous place, they were afraid to go to meetings there . . . even when offered a ride by PCCPS organizers.

B. Involving the Police

The staff members who planned the PCCPS project appropriately contacted administrative officials within the Police Department and district headquarters. These contacts were all favorable; staff members had no trouble obtaining the data they requested on elderly victimization, and it was assumed that the project had the full cooperation of the Police Department. However, the crime prevention strategies selected were ones that required active police participation in the neighborhood. The precinct beat officers were not involved in planning the program, but they were expected to perform crime prevention services once the project got started. It was at the point of operational planning, where the strategic details of "who would do what, when, where, and how" that PCCPS ran into problems with the police. The two most notable problems had the most serious consequences: 1) the failure of the precinct officers to regularly notify PCCPS of elderly crime victims, and 2) the lack of trained officers to meet the demand for premise surveys. Once the Task Forces were organized (July, 1977), police officers were included as members. This involvement opened up communications between the project and at least some officers in the neighborhoods.

C. Involving Groups in the Community

Existing community groups and organizations were not included in the initial planning and development of the PCCPS project. Consequently, they had no part in defining the crime problems, in designing the program, or selecting the target neighborhoods. Community organizations were brought into the project when the neighborhood Task Forces were organized -- four months after the project start-up date -- in two of the three neighborhoods. The Task Forces were created by identifying social service agencies and community groups (such as senior citizen organizations, tenant associations, block clubs, etc.), which operated in each of the target neighborhoods. From the initial group, PCCPS obtained the names of others. It took several meetings before the Task Forces were fully organized. Almost all of the Task Force members are representatives of agencies and organizations.

As originally conceived, the Task Forces were to play an important role in the project.[1] Ostensibly, they were to participate in planning by selecting the crime prevention strategies to be implemented. But since this was done from the predetermined list included in the grant proposal, their role in planning was very limited. Most important, the groups and organizations represented on the Task Forces were supposed to provide the volunteer support needed to implement the strategies, in conjunction with PCCPS staff (a community organizer and community aides in each neighborhood). Finally, the Task Forces were to coordinate and oversee all activities.

The Task Forces have been maintained throughout the project, and continue to hold monthly meetings, but they have never assumed the functions in implementation that they were designed to provide. With few exceptions, all of the organizing done to reach and involve elderly residents has been performed by PCCPS staff, not through the community organizations as planned.

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[1] One of the criteria in selecting target neighborhoods was evidence of an informal support system, such as block associations, clubs, churches, etc.

Staff members suggested three reasons for the failure of the Task Forces to provide the expected volunteer support. First, in the transitional neighborhood the importance of organizations was declining because the kinds of people who support these groups keep moving away from the neighborhood. Second, the vast majority of the _elderly_ residents did belong to groups, clubs or organizations. Therefore, groups are not the appropriate vehicle for reaching most of the elderly. And finally, community groups and organizations have their own perspectives and priorities on neighborhood problems, and the relationship of crime prevention to those problems. By and large, these diverse perspectives were not consistent with the overall emphasis of the project as it was designed by the Social Services Department.

PCCPS staff have had a difficult time trying to control the Task Force meetings and redirect the discussions to matters pertaining to the project. Meetings often deteriorate into general gripe sessions. In the words of one PCCPS staff person, "Crime prevention means only one thing to them . . . the cop on the beat. Their notion of what should be done is to add more police." Staff members try to be responsive to the wishes of the Task Forces, but staff are often impatient and frustrated with what they perceive as a "lack of sophistication" on the part of the Task Force members about planning and crime prevention.[1] Task Force members, on the other hand, want to broaden the definition of crime prevention to include the causes of crime, such as juvenile delinquency, truancy, etc. There were indications that as the program approached the end of its second

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[1]Staff have implemented strategies, such as the youth street patrol, over the resistance of the Task Force.

year of funding, staff members were beginning to seriously consider the problems and solutions expressed by representatives in the community.

It appears that many of the difficulties the PCCPS project has encountered stem from trying to impose an officially-planned program on the community, which has a different definition of crime problems and ideas about how to solve them. Because the community groups and organizations which are represented through the Task Force structure were not involved in planning and designing the project, they have never given it the kind of whole-hearted support and commitment which would be required for it to succeed. If these groups _had_ been involved in defining the problem and designing the program, it seems clear that PCCPS would have a very different set of goals, objectives, and strategies than it does now.

D. Involving Citizens

Beyond the series of public hearings held in 1975, when elderly citizens expressed a general concern about crime, the PCCPS project was planned without input from the individuals which the program was trying to reach and involve. Perhaps the most serious result of this failure to involve elderly residents in planning the project has been an inadequate -- and probably incorrect -- definition of the problem itself. As the staff tried to organize the elderly, they kept coming up against the fact that so many elderly (at least in the transitional neighborhood) were so fearful that they had virtually locked themselves in. If fear of crime is a more serious problem than crime itself, then the selected stategies are inappropriate. There is evidence to suggest that target-hardening techniques, such as installing good locks, participating in surveillance activities,

and encouraging citizens to report suspicious behavior, may have the
unintended consequence of raising citizens' concern and/or fear of
crime.[1] While the final evaluation of the PCCPS project was not
available at the time this report was written, preliminary results
indicate that the elderly's fear of crime (in the target
neighborhoods) has "significantly increased" since the project
began.[2]

Also, project staff have encountered a certain degree of apathy
among elderly residents . . . an unwillingness or apparent disinterest
in participating in the kinds of activities which the project
promotes.[3] Preliminary results of the evaluation of PCCPS indicate
that at the end of one year, [the evaluators] "were not able to
detect any significant changes in behavior" among those elderly
interviewed. It cannot be said with certainty that because elderly
residents were not involved in designing the program, they aren't
willing to participate in the program's activities. Yet, the fact
remains that few elderly are participating . . . suggesting that many
of the strategies are inappropriate.

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[1]Leonard Bickman, et al., Evaluating Citizen Crime Programs,
National Evaluation Program, Phase I, Summary Report (Washington,
D.C.: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
April, 1977), p. 28.

[2]Information from telephone interviews conducted as part of the
evaluation and provided by the director of the Criminal Justice and
the Elderly program.

[3]For example, two senior citizen members of the transitional
neighborhood Task Force said that elderly apathy is a serious problem
in trying to strengthen neighborhood support systems. Their comments
are substantiated by the small number of elderly involved in the Task
Forces. Only three or four of the ten elderly members of this neigh-
borhood Task Force regularly attend the meetings.

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Samples of Information from Visited Projects

1. Sample description of the activities and role played by one area organizer/coordinator in the Contra Costa County Crime Prevention project.

2. Documentation of problem-solving process, Contra Costa County.

3. Evaluation methods and activities used in the Contra Costa County Crime Prevention project.

4. "101 Ways to Give Recognition to Volunteers."

5. Key-Person Interviewing Guide, prepared by the American Institutes for Research for use in the Ward I, Inc., project.

6. Community Interview Guide, used in Minneapolis Crime Prevention Program.

7. Residential burglary analysis, prepared for the Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention program; from Crime In Minneapolis: Proposals for Prevention (Minneapolis: Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, 1977), Chapter 5.

Sample Description of

Organizer/Coordinator Role in Contra Costa

5/26/78

Shirley Henke
NSP Administrator

Subject: Beer & wine land use permit in the Vine Hill Area.

Information gathered

1. Sheriff Department statistics on juvenile arrests for the county.

2. Probation Department referrals 1/1/77 to 12/31/77 on youth (under 18) involved in alcohol abuse and related crimes.

3. Copy of application dated 1/18/78 from Diablo Petroleum requesting an amended land use permit.

4. Zoning Administrator's staff report.

5. A survey on Alcohol & Drug Abuse in Secondary Schools. Prepared by the Center For Human Development and submitted to the Contra Costa County Alcoholism Advisory Board.

6. Letter from Captain A.E. Luntz , Inspection & Control Div. offering staff to clarify what problems the Department would have to deal with if application was approved.

How Information was used

1. Statistics read into the record at May 8th public hearing.

2. The survey, letter from Captain Luntz, and copy of application was submitted to Zoning Director previous to May 8th meeting.

3. Based on information gathered, staff (Barbara Peterson) made a security check of the property in question with the Manager/ friend of the owner.

4. The owner, Mr. Charles O'Connor, was invited to speak before the Vine Hill Association by Dorothy Sakazaki & Mary Taylor.

5. Based on security check and Mr. O'Connors willingness to cooperate the people in Vine Hill voted to support the "limited time of sale" at the gas station.

How Information was used (con't)

6. Dorothy Sakazaki & Mary Taylor attended the public hearing and voiced their concerns, as well as support of staff recommendation of 11 pm ending time for sale of alcohol.

Role of Coordinator as Resource

1. Requested letter from Captain Luntz by seeing him in person.

2. Requested statistics from Probation Department in person.

3. Alcohol Abuse Report was available at CPC Office.

4. Application for land use was picked up by coordinator and information obtained as to how to proceed was gained by speaking to Planning Department staff.

5. Security check and informal talk with owner of property to assure him that his safety was just as important as the concern of the residents about the sale of alcohol.

6. Supported Vine Hill Association by requesting (at the public hearing) the safe storage of supplies, the 11pm cut off for the sale of beer & wine, and that signs be posted outside as well as inside.

7. As a coordinator for the Crime Prevention Committee I suggested to the Zoning Director that future applicants be restricted to 11 pm.

8. As a resource to all parties concerned I suggested that we all had a job to do - plan defensively for personal safety, neighborhood safety, and community safety.

9. I called Mrs. Goodman of the Alcoholism Advisory Board to inform her how the report by Mr. Andre Allen and his staff was used by a NSP group.

10. I spoke to Mr. Allen and also gave him and Mrs. Goodman copies of the information we used to limit the sale of beer & wine in the Vine Hill area.

11. Probation Department (Mr. Nice Concord Office) was kept informed of results, as well as also receiving copies of all information used.

Summation of outcome

Everyone involved felt like a winner.

Mary Taylor, Dorothy Sakazaki and I made an appointment with John Searles, Superintendant of Schools in the Martinez School District, to let him know how the report his schools had participated in had helped this neighborhood.

He was asked if he would see that the recommendations made by the report would be implimented - such as keeping records of youth involved in the use of alcohol & drugs. He understood that we ment a number count only and he agreed to following the recommendation based on the fact that they would find it useful - meaning the community represented by the Vine Hill Association.

Mr. Andre Allen(CMD) has written letters to Dorothy, Mary, and John Searles to commend them for their involvement and concern.

Mr. Allen also sent a letter to every secondary school in Contra Costa County to let them know the report, and the survey they participated in, is helping change things.

A bridge has been built between the community, its schools, and County Departments.

Sincerely,

Barbara Peterson, Coordinator
Crime Prevention Committee

The   condominium complex on   , Pleasant Hill, consists of 120 units. Complaints had been registered with the Home-owners Association Board of Directors over a period of at least six months about acts of vandalism, mischief, and general disturbance in the common areas of the condominiums, engaged in by nine resident youths. Police had been called on an average of once or twice a week. Some residents had attempted to contact parents, to no avail.

When the Neighborhood Safety Project was called in by an attorney re-tained by the Association Board, some steps had already been taken. The attorney had written a letter in October to the parents of the offending children advising them of the complaints and of the legal steps that would be taken if cooperation wasn't forthcoming. Those steps included a court injunction, removal of children from their homes if supervision was inadequate (all parents worked), and civil suit for torts caused by children. The letter acknowledged the lack of facili-ties for children at

By January, the situation had not been resolved. Twenty residents signed a petition protesting the destruction and lack of supervision, whereupon the Association Board instructed the attorney to proceed with legal action immediately.

NSP staff attended a Board meeting in February where instructions on how to make a citizen's arrest were being sought from the Police Depart-ment as the continuing calls to police had been nonproductive. Tensions were extremely high. NSP staff learned that the children under discussion were aged 5 to 13.

Following the Board meeting, NSP Coordinator stepped in as a third-party mediator. She encouraged leaders of the group to try a more construc-tive approach to the problems. Leaders were persuaded to call a neigh-borhood meeting in February, including the parents of the offending children, to discuss the problems and air grievances. Tension was so high that this was not easy to achieve. However, a meeting was called and four parents attended. NSP led the meeting and attempted to draw out statements of the problems. There was considerable reluctance to speak up. Barriers were lowered somewhat when one of the parents identified herself as a victim of vandalism and said too that the residents needed to band together, not polarize, in order to solve the problem.

Several positive suggestions were made, such as a proposal to take turns supervising the children during Easter vacation, and several ideas about play areas. NSP suggested holding another meeting where the children would be included. The police officer present said he would not attend that meeting.

Following the second meeting, there was negative feedback from residents who asserted that NSP had glossed over the problems and were whitewash-ing the children's behavior by suggesting a meeting with them. Some

residents had not expressed their grievances. NSP convinced them of the need for a constructive attitude toward the problem and of the need to bring out all the problems at a third meeting as planned.

Despite a heavy rainstorm, a dozen adults (including three parents) and seven children turned out. NSP facilitated the discussion. The attorney set the tone by saying that this neighborhood had the structure and potential for exercising self-control; i.e., resolving their disputes short of calling on the formal legal system. NSP stated firmly that no one should leave the meeting without expressing his problems and concerns.

The discussion led off with a brainstorming of problems. Timorously at first, the problems came--"supervision", "noise", "property damage", "vandalism", "no place to play" (from the children), etc. Then solutions were sought. At this time, the attorney said that the developers would be having a meeting the following week on recreational sites, and invited the children to come and make their needs known. From this point on, NSP was able to step back while the group facilitated itself. Adults and children spoke up freely about their problems, brought personal grievances out in the open. NSP observed during the course of discussion that not knowing each other had been a barrier to communication-- adults had dealt directly with children and had not informed parents. Parents now made it clear they would welcome complaints from the residents; residents said that knowing parents would make it easier to complain to them. All residents observed that attitudes and children's behavior had improved greatly since the meetings had begun. (One mother and two older boys were controlling the younger ones during the meeting.) Someone finally observed that if such meetings were held periodically, there would be no problems.

NSP kept the group long enough to nail down the results. These steps were agreed upon:

1. Two parents took on the responsibility of scheduling a neighborhood meeting in June; possibly including a social or program.

2. One parent became the secretary.

3. A father agreed to help the boys develop a car-wash project to earn money to build a clubhouse.

4. The attorney promised to seek a site for the children to build a clubhouse.

5. The father agreed to teach the boys how to build the clubhouse.

6. One mother agreed to call Diablo Valley College to find out if anyone in the child care classes would be available during Easter week to help supervise the children, and also during the summer.

7. The attorney agreed to assure better supervision of the pool in summer.

8. The boys were invited to attend the developers' meeting on

recreational facilities.

9. The boys decided to form a club of their own.

10. An Executive Board member asked parents to participate in Board meetings. Youth were invited to attend.

11. The neighborhood established limits. They made it clear that they were not concerned about minor mischief as long as it was corrected, but would not tolerate excessive property damage or theft.

12. The residents decided against an NSP-suggested residents' code or written procedures, satisfied that regular meetings would be sufficient.

13. People were observed talking to each other after the meeting and seemed positive about the outcome.

NSP followup included informing police of the outcome. Contact with the group will be maintained. One possible outcome of the mediation that is measurable is a reduction in calls to the police. Most important, the neighborhood established a structure and mechanism for self-resolution of conflicts in the future.

EVALUATION METHOD AND ACTIVITIES

The evaluation method was structured to incorporate both qualitative and quantitative information designed to provide an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Neighborhood Safety Project implemented in Contra Costa County, California. While the primary focus of the evaluation is the second year of the NSP, appropriate first year information has been considered to provide a more complete perspective on project progress and activities.

Literature Review

A review of the literature was conducted to provide an overview of the general state of crime prevention activities. A bibliography of the most pertinent references has been submitted as Appendix E. The findings of the literature review have been incorporated into the analysis of the project activities and impact.

Record Review

All project-related documents were reviewed including grants, progress reports, memoranda, continuation funding applications, correspondence, newspaper articles, first year documents, etc. During the first two quarters of the evaluation period the major portion of these documents were reviewed. During the remaining quarters, project documents were reviewed on an ongoing basis. The record review served as a major source of information for analysis of the status of local committees.

Observation

Observation of project activities included attendance at regular NSP staff meetings and special staff meetings during the course of the year and continuous contact with project members. As well, the evaluator attended three meetings of the NSP Executive Advisory Committee, the CPC Antioch Workshop, the conference with the Sheriff's Crime Prevention Unit, the NSP Press Conference, two NSP training sessions for volunteers, the CPC Pot-luck Get-Together, the funding meetings of the Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board, two San Ramon committee meetings, and one Pittsburg committee meeting. During the conduct of the community attitude survey in San Ramon, the evaluator had the opportunity to observe local volunteers at work and the reaction by the general public to them.

Considerably more observation would have been appropriate to this design. However, constraints of time, resources and the project structure limited the degree of observation. Therefore, the assessment of committee status relies heavily upon the perceptions of project staff and volunteers, project and committee documentation and selected observation. The third year evaluation should devote considerable attention to observation of local committee activities, CPC activities and meetings and NSP activities on a selective basis.

Interviews

A. Staff Interviews

The NSP coordinators and the Project Director have been interviewed twice, once during the first quarter of the year and during the final project month in order to obtain their perceptions of the project, status of their respective committees and organizational efforts. The responses were compared and combined for use in the final analysis of the NSP. These interviews were anonymous and confidential and informally structured for maximum flexibility of responses.

B. Volunteer Interviews

A total of nine (9) volunteers were interviewed (two in person, seven by telephone) to gain their perceptions relative to the NSP, the CPC and their local crime prevention committee and/or activity. Considerable difficulty occurred in obtaining these interviews due to summer vacations, illness, working hours, summer school, etc. Consequently, in the interests of time and convenience, the majority of volunteers were interviewed by telephone. Volunteers were selected with the assistance of project staff according to the length and degree of activity. Most of those selected had volunteered with NSP for a minimum of one year by the end of this evaluation period. As well, they were judged to be active volunteers on a regular basis. Six of the respondents were from fairly stable committees. Of the other three, one was from an area where the committee was unable to get off of the ground, one was from a brand new committee and the third was from a committee still in developmental stages. The interviews were informally structured and confidential.

Questionnaires

A. Law Enforcement Administrators

A questionnaire was sent to all police chiefs and the Sheriff of Contra Costa County to gain their perceptions of the NSP, its impact and relationships between law enforcement and citizen volunteers. While preliminary findings were reported in the second progress report, it was determined that only those jurisdictions with overt NSP activity would be valuable for analysis. Thus, only responses from the following are considered: Contra Costa County Sheriff, Police Chiefs from Martinez, Antioch, Richmond, San Pablo, Walnut Creek, Concord, Pittsburg and Pinole. These questionnaires were designed to elicit information from officials and were not confidential.

B. Crime Prevention Committees

In January 1978, questionnaires were mailed to all area groups and/or committees designed to elicit from each group the

priority activities to be conducted in the future and the re-
sources which might be needed in order to complete these acti-
vities. Seven (7) questionnaires were returned and analyzed
for the June 10, 1978 quarterly progress report.

Technical Assistance

The evaluator provided assistance to the project on an on-
going basis. This assistance included suggestions and advice
relative to planning, activities, direction, etc. Specific
assistance was given for the refinement of goals and objectives,
as well as in defining project terms. The consultant assisted
in the design of the third year project; its staffing,
structure and direction.

As well, the evaluator provided technical assistance to
staff and volunteer chairpersons via a presentation and explan-
ation of "statements of purpose" for local committees. Sample
statements were designed by the evaluator and distributed for
reference. All committees were offered assistance in the deve-
lopment of this document, but only two requested it by the end
on the second year.

The evaluator and the project director engaged in continuous
and regular dialogue about the project both in person and by
telephone. This dialogue offered many opportunities for tech-
nical assistance by way of advice, suggestions and idea exchange.

Target Area Survey

The evaluator selected a target area, San Ramon, for a survey
designed to elicit citizen perceptions regarding crime, crime
prevention, the local committee, fear, safety etc. The consul-
tant designed, tested and refined the instrument, trained vol-
unteers, supervised and participated in the survey effort. A
total of 90 responses were received and analyzed for the final
report. This report has been made available to the Crime Pre-
vention committee of San Ramon for reference and is included in
this report as Appendix C.

A-3 (of 3 pages)

101 WAYS TO GIVE RECOGNITION TO VOLUNTEERS

By
Vern Lake
*Volunteer Services
Consultant,
Minnesota
Department
of Public Welfare*

Continuously, but always inconclusively, the subject of recognition is dis-
cussed by directors and coordinators of volunteer programs. There is great
agreement as to its importance but great diversity in its implementation.

Listed below are 101 possibilities gathered from hither and yon. The duplica-
tion at 1 and 101 is for emphasis. The blank at 102 is for the beginning of your
own list.

I think is it important to remember that recognition is not so much something
you do as it is something you are. It is a sensitivity to others as persons, not a
strategy for discharging obligations.

1. Smile.
2. Put up a volunteer suggestion box.
3. Treat to a soda.
4. Reimburse assignment-related expenses.
5. Ask for a report.
6. Send a birthday card.
7. Arrange for discounts.
8. Give service stripes.
9. Maintain a coffee bar.
10. Plan annual ceremonial occasions.
11. Invite to staff meeting.
12. Recognize personal needs and problems.
13. Accommodate personal needs and problems.
14. Be pleasant.
15. Use in an emergency situation.
16. Provide a baby sitter.
17. Post Honor Roll in reception area.
18. Respect their wishes.
19. Give informal teas.
20. Keep challenging them.
21. Send a Thanksgiving Day card to the volunteer's family.
22. Provide a nursery.
23. Say "Good Morning."
24. Greet by name.
25. Provide good pre-service training.
26. Help develop self-confidence.
27. Award plaques to sponsoring group.
28. Take time to explain fully.
29. Be verbal.
30. Motivate agency VIP's to converse with them.
31. Hold rap sessions.

13

32. Give additional responsibility.
33. Afford participation in team planning.
34. Respect sensitivities.
35. Enable to grow on the job.
36. Enable to grow out of the job.
37. Send newsworthy information to the media.
38. Have wine and cheese tasting parties.

58. Write them thank you notes.
59. Invite participation in policy formulation.
60. Surprise with coffee and cake.
61. Celebrate outstanding projects and achievements.
62. Nominate for volunteer awards.
63. Have a "Presidents Day" for new presidents of sponsoring groups.

Merci!

39. Ask client-patient to evaluate their work-service.
40. Say "Good Afternoon."
41. Honor their preferences.
42. Create pleasant surroundings.
43. Welcome to staff coffee breaks.
44. Enlist to train other volunteers.
45. Have a public reception.
46. Take time to talk.
47. Defend against hostile or negative staff.
48. Make good plans.
49. Commend to supervisory staff.
50. Send a valentine.
51. Make thorough pre-arrangements.
52. Persuade "personnel" to equate volunteer experience with work experience.
53. Admit to partnership with paid staff.
54. Recommend to prospective employer.
55. Provide scholarships to volunteer conferences or workshops.
56. Offer advocacy roles.
57. Utilize as consultants.

64. Carefully match volunteer with job.
65. Praise them to their friends.
66. Provide substantive in-service training.
67. Provide useful tools in good working condition.
68. Say "Good Night."
69. Plan staff and volunteer social events.
70. Be a *real* person.
71. Rent billboard space for public laudation.
72. Accept their individuality.
73. Provide opportunities for conferences and evaluation.
74. Identify age groups.
75. Maintain meaningful file.
76. Send impromptu fun cards.
77. Plan occasional extravaganzas.
78. Instigate client planned surprises.
79. Utilize purchased newspaper space.
80. Promote a "Volunteer-of-the-Month" program.
81. Send letter of appreciation to employer.

82. Plan a "Recognition Edition" of the agency newsletter.
83. Color code name tags to indicate particular achievements (hours, years, unit, etc.).
84. Send commendatory letters to prominent public figures.
85. Say "we missed you."
86. Praise the sponsoring group or club.
87. Promote staff smiles.
88. Facilitate personal maturation.
89. Distinguish between groups and individuals in the group.
90. Maintain safe working conditions.
91. Adequately orientate.
92. Award special citations for extraordinary achievements.
93. Fully indoctrinate regarding the agency.
94. Send Christmas cards.
95. Be familiar with the details of assignments.
96. Conduct community-wide, cooperative, inter-agency recognition events.
97. Plan a theater party.
98. Attend a sports event.
99. Have a picnic.
100. Say "Thank You."
101. Smile

102.

14

Key Person _____   Interviewer _____

Position _____   Date _____

Organization _____   Starting/Ending Times _____

Telephone _____

I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Do you: yes   no

Live in Ward I?   ____ ____

Work in Ward I?   ____ ____

Shop, go to church, etc. in Ward I?   ____ ____

Have close friends or business associates
who are residents of Ward I?   ____ ____

II. EXTERNAL/INTERNAL RESOURCE SURVEY

1. Holders of current leadership positions, method of leadership selection. (PROBE: get names, titles and selection process of all Board of Directors members; also copies of organizational chart)

2. Geographic area covered

3. Reasons for establishment of organization (PROBE: social conditions which led to the organization's development; specify whether past, present, future conditions)

4. Number of: Proportion Active How Selected

staff   _____ _____

volunteers   _____ _____

members   _____ _____

5. Major goals of the organization, how progress towards goals determined. (PROBE: get specifics)

6. Define programming areas, how implemented and general strength of each.

7. Skills of those operating each program area and proportion of residents on staff in each programming area.

8. What do you consider are some of the best methods of getting residents involved in community action? Name three residents who are actively involved in community affairs. (PROBE: get names, addresses and telephone numbers)

9. What community organizations should be contacted concerning the following examples of problem areas? (PROBE: get key person names, addresses and telephone numbers)

street crime	unemployment	health problems
rape	rent payments	threats from teenagers
robbery	child care	transportation needs
burglary	crisis situations	others
other crimes	(death, fire, etc.)	

10. What resident groups or individuals could be contacted concerning the following examples of problem areas? (PROBE: get key person names, addresses and telephone numbers; use problem areas in 7 above)

III. PROBLEM/ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

(*Use critical incident technique for these questions. Probe especially for what, when, why, how and where responses)

1a. What is the most important problem for Ward I? (PROBE: get specific problem and if/how problem relates to crime)

*1b. What conditions do you feel contribute to this problem?

*1c. For whom, e.g., victims, offenders, elderly, adolescents, etc. (PROBE: specifically identify groups for which this issue is a problem)

*1d. To which residents or organizations do each identified group turn to for help with this problem? (PROBE: relate each identified group in 1c. to the individuals or organizations to which that group would turn)

*1e. What federal, district or community organizations (either in the past, present or future) address this problem? How?

2a. What is the next most important problem for Ward I? (PROBE: attempt to get four problems listed in order of importance; probe if/how problem relates to crime)

COMMUNITY INTERVIEW GUIDE[1]

Date of Interview: _____   Interviewer: _____

Background Information:

Name: _____

Position: _____

Organization: _____

Address: _____

Length of residence in community: _____

1. Community Trends

·What trends do you see occuring in _____?

(Probe for trends in property values, population characteristics, land use.)

·What is responsible for these changes?

2. Crime Problems

·Is crime a major problem in _____?

·What do you feel is the most serious crime problem facing ____ _____?

(Probe for these crimes: commercial robbery, residential burglary, street crimes including assault, rape, purse snatching. List them and ask if that crime poses a problem.)

·Over the last few years, do you think crime has increased, decreased or remained about the same?

---

[1]The Community Interview Guide should be used 1) as an informal mechanism for soliciting input from the community particulary from community and organization leaders and city department supervisors 2) as a way to reach those individuals with education about the Community Crime Prevention philosophy, approach and programs 3) as a means for gaining involvement in planning and subsequent implementation of crime prevention programs and 4) as a complement/supplement to other data gathered for the purposes of developing specific crime prevention programs.

- Do you think people are changing their behavior because of crime? In what way?

- Who do you think are committing most of the crimes in _____ _____?

- Who do you think is most affected by this type of criminal activity?

- Are there any places within _____ that you feel are dangerous or that have a reputation for being high crime areas?

- Why do you feel these areas are unsafe or perceived as being unsafe?

3. Suggested Solutions

- Would you be able to suggest any possible solutions to these problems?

- Who should be involved in implementing these solutions?

4. Police Community Relations

- What is the feeling between the community and police?

  (Probe to identify conflict, do police respond efficiently, sensitively, etc. . . .)

- Could you suggest ways they could be more effective?

5. Existing Crime Prevention Efforts

- Do you know of any existing programs intended to reduce crime that are underway or have been tried in _____?

- Who runs them?

- How successful do you think they are?

6. Planning and Development Activities

- What planning and community development activities are currently underway in _____?

  (Ask if appropriate:)

  Are there any plans for major rehabilitation or new construction of housing for _____?

  What are they?

  Where are they located?

  How can I get more information about them?

- What kind of involvement does the community have in planning and community development activities or planning process?

7. Neighborhood Agencies and Citizen Groups

- What are the important organizations active in _____?

  (For each organization:)

  What is the group's purpose?

  How active is it?

  Names and phone numbers of contacts?

8. Conflicts between Groups

- Are there any conflicts between groups or individuals which we should be aware of?

9. Community Involvement

- What do you think would be the best way to obtain community participation in a Community Crime Prevention project?

10. Contacts

- Are there other people you feel represent important points of view that you could refer us to?

  (For each person:)

- What is their role/position? Telephone number or address?

11. Support

- On the basis of what we have discussed, do you think you can give this project your support?

  (Based on the interview, ask if appropriate:)

  Would you be interested in being involved with developing strategies for a Community Crime Prevention project?

  How would you like to be involved?

Crime in Minneapolis

Proposals for Prevention

Principal Authors:

Douglas W. Frisbie, Executive Director
Glenn Fishbine
Richard Hintz
Mitchell Joelson
Julia Brown Nutter

With Contribution by:

Carol Bevis
Michael Pionk
Barbara Runchey

5 Residential Burglary

Introduction

Residential burglary is the forced or unforced unlawful entry of a dwelling, residential premise or enclosed area adjacent to a residential premise, for the purpose of committing a crime.[1]

From July 1, 1974, to June 30, 1975, there were 7,559 residential burglaries reported to the Minneapolis Police Department. These burglaries, recorded on Minneapolis Police Department offense reports, are the basis of the present analysis.[2]

No suspects are recorded in about three-fourths of the residential burglaries reported to the police. This is to be expected, as the intent of the burglar is to operate without knowledge of the victim. Only 12 percent of victims report actually being on the scene during the burglary of their premise.

Police report that only about 12 percent of residential burglaries are cleared by arrest. This is consistent with the small proportion of

[1] Definition adapted for residential burglary from *Minnesota Crime Information 1975*, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Criminal Justice Information Section, p. 40.

[2] About 6 percent (467) of the cases involved the unsuccessful entry of a premise and were classified by the police as burglaries; under Minnesota law, these would more properly be classified as property damage cases.

APPENDIX B

This Appendix includes a quantitative description of the telephone survey, and a sample of the interview form which was used to obtain the responses from the project directors interviewed over the telephone.

A. The Sample

From the initial compiled list of over 400 community-based crime prevention programs operating throughout the country, 87 were selected for the telephone survey.

The sample itself can be described in statistical terms.[1] One of the variables that makes a difference in the planning process is the type of sponsoring agency. The breakdown in the sample is in Chart 1.

Chart 1

Type of Sponsoring Organization:	Percentages (N=78)
Grassroots	7.7%
Established community organizations	41.0%
Coalition of community organizations	23.1%
Government agency	19.2%
Other, unclassified	7.5%

[1]The number of projects with codeable, completed surveys was 80. This is too small a sample for many of the possible methods of statistical analysis. Recoding the data give statistical significance for some relationships, but it also loses some of the "richness" of the data. Generally, we have refrained from "cooking" the data in favor of purely descriptive statistics, e.g., frequency distribution or means. Where cross-tabulations seem to have uncovered a pattern in the data, we report it if it is relevant to a discussion in the text, but these are interpretations of the authors, not statistical verities.

Most of the community-based crime prevention sponsoring agencies are community organizations, either established community organizations or coalitions. In a similar way, a large majority of the sampled projects are in urban areas: 19 percent of the projects in Chart 2 are suburban or rural.

Chart 2

Urban, Suburban, or Rural Communities:	Percentages (N=79)
Rural, small town	10.1%
Suburban	8.9%
Urban - central city core	27.8%
Other urban[1]	32.9%
Combination[1]	20.3%

The sample takes in a broad range of geographical scope.

In Chart 3, the largest category is "more than one neighborhood,

Chart 3

Geographical Scope of Project:	Percentages (N=80)
Less than one neighborhood, rural	7.5%
Neighborhood of city	12.5%
More than one neighborhood, less than city wide	31.3%
City wide	11.2%
County wide	21.2%
More than one county	14.9%
Other	1.2%

[1]"Other urban" indicates an area that is marginal in the sense that it contains a mixture of ethnic, economic, and/or types of residences, according to the reports of the projects. "Combination" means that large enough areas of urban, suburban, and rural exist in the target area so that it cannot be classified in one of the three main categories.

less than cityside." In other words, several neighborhoods of a city make up the target area. If the three largest types of areas are added together (city wide, county wide, and larger than county wide), over 47 percent of the projects fall in the large scope category.

Finally the projects have a range of types of crime prevention strategies. Chart 4 indicates the popularity of opportunity reduction

Chart 4

Dominant Crime Prevention Strategy of Project:	Percentages (N=77)
Opportunity reduction	48.1%
System improvement	1.3%
Causal	22.1%
Victim services	13.0%
Combination	15.6%

strategies relative to other approaches. It should be noted that nearly all programs had elements of more than one type of strategy, but each project was classified by its dominant approach if that was possible to do. Those projects that had major investments in more than one strategy were put in the "combination" category.

Community Crime Prevention Planning Models

Telephone Interview Form

Project Name: _____ Phone Number: _____

Address: _____ Interviewee: _____

_____ Title: _____

Date of Interview: _____

Hello, I'm _____ from the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center. We're conducting a national study for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) dealing with how to plan community crime prevention programs. I'd like to take 20-25 minutes of your time to ask you a few questions about your program.

Were you involved in the planning of your project? _____ IF NO, can you give me the name and phone number of someone who was involved in planning the project?

Name:_____ Phone Number:_____

Are you available to be interviewed now? _____
IF NO, when would be the best time to conduct the interview?

Date:_____ Time: _____

IF YES, verify the name and address of the project and the name and title of the person interviewed. Then proceed with the following questions.

First, I'd like to ask you some questions about your project and the area in which it operates.

1. How long a period of time did you have to plan your project? (How much time elapsed between the time you first started planning for your project and the time you started implementing it?) _____

_____

Do you think this was a sufficient amount of time, or do you wish you had had a longer period of time to spend planning the project?

_____

_____

2. How would you describe your organization? That is, is it a neighborhood group or council, a community organization, part of a national organization, a local governmental unit, a private non-profit coroporation, or what?

_____

_____

_____

_____

Did the organization exist prior to this project, or was it formed to apply for a grant or administer this project? _____

3. How many people work in the project?

    _____ number of volunteers   _____ number of paid staff

4. What are the sources of funds of your project, and can you tell me the amount of money received from each funding source?

    Funding sources   Total Dollar Amount per year

    _____   _____

    _____   _____

    _____   _____

5. I'd like you to tell me about the goals of your project. First, do you have any specific crime reduction or crime prevention goals?
    If yes, what are the crimes you are focussing on and what are the goals?

    _____
    _____

    _____

    _____

    What are the other goals of your project?

    _____
    _____

6. What are the programs, activities, or strategies which you have developed to accomplish your goals?

    _____

    _____

    _____

7. How would you describe the geographical area which your project serves? That is, have you selected:

    _____ a small target area (such as a building or a several-block area)?

    How large is the area? _____

    _____ an identifiable neighborhood(s) within a city?

    How many/what are they? _____

    _____ citywide?

    _____ or a larger geographical area? What is it?

    _____

8. Approximately how many residents/clients are you trying to reach through your project? _____

9. Can you describe the type of community in which your project operates? Is it a

    _____ rural area/small town in rural area

    _____ suburban area (of which city?) _____

    _____ urban area (city). IF YES, is it an inner-city core area, adjacent to a core area ("marginal"), or a stable residential area within the city?

10. Would you describe the amount of crime where your project operates as being low, average, or higher than average, as compared to other areas in the country?

    _____

11. Can you tell me about the socio-economic characteristics of the area your project serves? _____

    _____

12. Does your project focus on any particular population sub-groups, such as the elderly, or women, or the unemployed, or some other groups? What sub-groups?

    _____

    IF YES, how and on what basis was this particular focus selected?

    _____

Now I would like to ask you some questions about how you planned your project.

13. Did you collect any data, statistics or information prior to deciding on the goals and specific activities of your project? In other words, how did you determine the nature of the problem that needed to be addressed? For example, did you collect the following kinds of information:

    _____ data on crime? (Probe to find out the quality of the data, asking the sources of the data or information, the form it was in, whether or not it pertained to their target area.)

    _____

    _____

    _____

_____ a survey, or interviews, or meetings with key persons in the area?
(Probe to find out the extensiveness and the quality of the process,
asking the following questions:)

who conducted the survey/interviews? _____

how were they conducted? Did you have a survey/interview format, or were they
informal?
_____
_____

what was the purpose? What were you trying to find out? (For example,
peoples' opinions about the problem, what was needed, what the available
resources were, or what?) _____
_____
_____

when did you do this, relative to project development?
_____
_____

_____ a survey of community residents? (Probe to find out the extensiveness and the
quality of the survey and the process, asking the following questions:)

who conducted the survey? _____

how was it conducted (questionnaire, in-person interviews, telephone, or what?)
_____

how many people were contacted? Was this a sample? How was it drawn?
_____

what were you trying to find out? What was the purpose?
_____
_____
_____

when was it conducted, relative to project development? _____

_____ any other kinds of data or information? IF YES, what? _____
_____

Other than what you have already mentioned, did you do anything else to determine
what might be needed in order to deal with the problem, or what resources were
already available in the area dealing with the problem? IF YES, what?   .
_____
_____

Did you try to get any information or data which you were unable to obtain? _____
IF YES, what kinds and from what sources? And why couldn't you get this information?
_____
_____

IF NO DATA OR INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED OR OBTAINED, ask the following: How did you
determine what the problem was that the project would address?
_____
_____

14. How did you use this information in developing and structuring your project?
_____
_____
_____

15. Who decided, and how was it determined (by what process), what the goals of the
project would be? _____
_____
_____

16. Who determined, and how (by what process), were the specific project activities
selected? _____
_____
_____

Were any other alternative strategies considered, besides the ones selected?
IF YES, what were they and why were they rejected? IF NO, why not?
_____
_____

17. Did you have any contact with the police during the planning stages of the project? IF YES, for what purposes (to solicit their opinions, to obtain their cooperation, for data? Any other reasons)?

_____

_____

What was their response? Did they cooperate with you? _____

_____

When did you contact the police, relative to project development?

_____

IF NO, why didn't you contact and involve the police? _____

_____

18. Did you have contact with any other citizen groups or organizations, other than the ones you have already mentioned, while you were planning your project?

IF YES, which ones and for what purposes? _____

_____

When?

IF NO, why didn't you contact other groups? _____

_____

19. Did you contact any local elected officials or local governmental agency employees while you were planning your program (other than ones already mentioned)?

IF YES, who did you contact and for what purposes? _____

_____

When did you contact them, relative to project development? _____

_____

IF NO, why not? _____

20. Are you collecting any information or data during the project which will enable you to assess the effectiveness of the selected strategies or of the overall project?

IF YES, what kinds of information, and is it being used to modify the project in any way? _____

_____

IF NO, why not? _____

_____

21. Does your project/grant include monies for data collection and analysis? _____

IF YES, how much? _____

22. Do you have people on your staff (including yourself) who have a background in planning? _____ IF YES, how many individuals? _____

What about people on the staff with a background or experience in data collection/ analysis, statistical skills, or evaluation methods and techniques? _____

IF YES, how many? _____

23. Has your organization ever undertaken a similar-type project (i.e., applying for monies to develop and implement a project)? _____

24. How important do you think it is to spend time analyzing the crime problem before developing specific strategies to affect the problem?

_____

_____

25. How important do you think it is to involve a large number of individuals, groups, organizations, and agencies in planning a community program?

_____

Are there any particular kinds of organizations/agencies which are particularly important to involve if a project like yours is to be successful? IF YES, which ones and when in the planning process?

_____

_____

26. Do you think the amount and kind of planning which is done will affect the subsequent success of the program? How?

_____

_____

27. Has your project run into any difficulties or problems which you think could have been avoided? IF YES, what are they and how could they have been avoided?

_____

_____

28. What, in your opinion, are the greatest obstacles facing organizations like yours who wish to undertake community crime prevention programs during the initial planning phase of the project (i.e., barriers to planning)?

_____

_____

29. Do you have any suggestions about how these barriers could be overcome? Or how the planning process could be improved?

   _____

   _____

30. Is there anything else you would care to add which might be useful for other groups planning community crime prevention programs?

   _____

   _____

INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH

KEY PERSON INTERVIEWING GUIDE

Key Person _____   Interviewer _____

Position _____   Date _____

Organization _____   Starting/Ending Times _____

Telephone _____

I. Biographical Data

   Do you: yes   no

      Live in Ward 1?   ___   ___

      Work in Ward 1?   ___   ___

      Shop, go to church, etc, in Ward 1?   ___   ___

      have close friends or business associates
      who are residents of Ward 1?   ___   ___

III. EXTERNAL/INTERNAL RESOURCE SURVEY

   Holders of current leadership positions; method of leadership selec-
   tion. (PROBE: get names, titles and selection process of all Board
   of Directors members; also copies of organizational chart)

   2. Geographic area covered

3. Reasons for establishment of organization (PROBE: social conditions which led to the organization's development; specify whether past, present, future conditions).

4. Number of: Proportion Active How Selected

staff _____ _____

volunteers _____ _____

members _____ _____

5. Major goals of the organization, how progress towards goals determined. (PROBE: get specifics)

6. Define programming areas, how implemented and general strength of each.

7. Skills of those operating each program area and proportion of residents on staff in each programming area.

8. What do you consider are some of the best methods of getting residents involved in community action? Name three residents who are actively involved in community affairs. (PROBE: get names, addresses and telephone numbers)

9. What community organizations should be contacted concerning the following examples of problem areas? (PROBE: get key person names, addresses and telephone numbers)

street crime   unemployment   health problems
rape   rent payments   threats from teenagers
robbery   child care   transportation needs
burglary   crisis situations   others
other crimes   (death, fire, etc.)

10. What resident groups or individuals could be contacted concerning the following examples of problem areas? (PROBE: get key person names, addresses and telephone numbers; use problem areas in 7 above)

III. PROBLEM/ISSUE IDENTIFICATION

(*Use critical incident technique for these questions. Probe especially for what, when, why, how and where responses)

*a. What is the most important problem for Ward 1? (PROBE: get specific problem and if/how problem relates to crime)

*b. What conditions do you feel contribute to this problem?

*1c. For whom, e.g., victims, offenders, elderly, adolescents, etc.)
(PROBE: specifically identify groups for which this issue is a
problem)

*1d. To which residents or organizations do each identified group
turn to for help with this problem? (PROBE: relate each
identified group in to the individuals or organizations to
which that group would turn)

1e. What federal, district or community organizations (either in
the past, present or future) address this problem? How?

2a. What is the next most important problem for Ward 1? (PROBE:
attempt to get 4 problems listed in order of importance;
probe if how problem relates to crime)

Date of Interview: _____   Interviewer: _____

Background Information:

Name: _____

Position: _____

Organization: _____

Address: _____

Length of residence in community: _____

1. Community Trends

•What trends do you see occuring in _____?

(Probe for trends in property values, population charac-
teristics, land use.)

•What is responsible for these changes?

2. Crime Problems

•Is crime a major problem in _____?

•What do you feel is the most serious crime problem facing ____

_____?

(Probe for these crimes: commercial robbery, residential
burglary, street crimes including assault, rape, purse
snatching. List them and ask if that crime poses a prob-
lem.)

•Over the last few years, do you think crime has increased, de-
creased or remained about the same?

---

[1]The Community Interview Guide should be used 1) as an informal
mechanism for soliciting input from the community particulary from com-
munity and organization leaders and city department supervisors 2) as a
way to reach those individuals with education about the Community Crime
Prevention philosophy, approach and programs 3) as a means for gain-
ing involvement in planning and subsequent implementation of crime pre-
vention programs and 4) as a complement/supplement to other data
gathered for the purposes of developing specific crime prevention pro-
grams.

•Do you think people are changing their behavior because of crime? In what way?

•Who do you think are committing most of the crimes in _____ _____?

•Who do you think is most affected by this type of criminal activity?

•Are there any places within _____ that you feel are dangerous or that have a reputation for being high crime areas?

•Why do you feel these areas are unsafe or perceived as being unsafe?

3. Suggested Solutions

•Would you be able to suggest any possible solutions to these problems?

•Who should be involved in implementing these solutions?

4. Police Community Relations

•What is the feeling between the community and police?

(Probe to identify conflict, do police respond efficiently, sensitively, etc. . . .)

•Could you suggest ways they could be more effective?

5. Existing Crime Prevention Efforts

•Do you know of any existing programs intended to reduce crime that are underway or have been tried in _____?

•Who runs them?

•How successful do you think they are?

6. Planning and Development Activities

•What planning and community development activities are currently underway in _____?

(Ask if appropriate:)

Are there any plans for major rehabilitation or new construction of housing for _____?

What are they?

Where are they located?

How can I get more information about them?

•What kind of involvement does the community have in planning and community development activities or planning process?

7. Neighborhood Agencies and Citizen Groups

•What are the important organizations active in _____?

(For each organization:)

What is the group's purpose?

How active is it?

Names and phone numbers of contacts?

8. Conflicts between Groups

•Are there any conflicts between groups or individuals which we should be aware of?

9. Community Involvement

•What do you think would be the best way to obtain community participation in a Community Crime Prevention project?

10. Contacts

•Are there other people you feel represent important points of view that you could refer us to?

(For each person:)

•What is their role/position? Telephone number or address?

11. Support

•On the basis of what we have discussed, do you think you can give this project your support?

(Based on the interview, ask if appropriate:)

Would you be interested in being involved with developing strategies for a Community Crime Prevention project?

How would you like to be involved?

Community Crime Prevention Planning Models

<u>Telephone Interview Form</u>

Project Name: _____ Phone Number: _____

    Address: _____ Interviewee: _____

             _____ Title: _____

Date of Interview: _____

    Hello, I'm _____ from the Minnesota Crime Prevention Center.
We're conducting a national study for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
dealing with how to plan community crime prevention programs. I'd like to take 20-25
minutes of your time to ask you a few questions about your program.

    Were you involved in the planning of your project? _____ IF NO, can you give me the
name and phone number of someone who was involved in planning the project?
Name:_____ Phone Number:_____

    Are you available to be interviewed now? _____
IF NO, when would be the best time to conduct the interview?

Date:_____ Time: _____

IF YES, verify the name and address of the project and the name and title of the person
interviewed. Then proceed with the following questions.

    First, I'd like to ask you some questions about your project and the area in which
it operates.

1. How long a period of time did you have to plan your project? (How much time elapsed
   between the time you first started planning for your project and the time you
   started implementing it?) _____

_____

   Do you think this was a sufficient amount of time, or do you wish you had had a longer
   period of time to spend planning the project?

_____

_____

2. How would you describe your organization? That is, is it a neighborhood group or
   council, a community organization, part of a national organization, a local govern-
   mental unit, a private non-profit coroporation, or what?

_____

_____

_____

   Did the organization exist prior to this project, or was it formed to apply for a
   grant or administer this project?
_____

3. How many people work in the project?

   _____ number of volunteers   _____ number of paid staff

4. What are the sources of funds of your project, and can you tell me the amount
   of money received from each funding source?

   <u>Funding sources</u>   <u>Total Dollar Amount per year</u>

   _____   _____

   _____   _____

   _____   _____

5. I'd like you to tell me about the goals of your project. First, do you have
   any specific crime reduction or crime prevention goals?
   If yes, what are the crimes you are focussing on and what are the goals?

   _____

   _____

   _____

   _____

   What are the other goals of your project?

   _____

   _____

6. What are the programs, activities, or strategies which you have developed to
   accomplish your goals?

   _____

   _____

   _____

   _____

7. How would you describe the geographical area which your project serves? That is,
   have you selected:

   _____ a small target area (such as a building or a several-block area)?

      How large is the area? _____

   _____ an identifiable neighborhood(s) within a city?

      How many/what are they? _____

_____ citywide?

_____ or a larger geographical area? What is it?

_____

8. Approximately how many residents/clients are you trying to reach through your project? _____

9. Can you describe the type of community in which your project operates? Is it a

_____ rural area/small town in rural area

_____ suburban area (of which city?) _____

_____ urban area (city). IF YES, is it an inner-city core area, adjacent to a core area ("marginal"), or a stable residential area within the city?

10. Would you describe the amount of crime where your project operates as being low, average, or higher than average, as compared to other areas in the country?

_____

11. Can you tell me about the socio-economic characteristics of the area your project serves? _____

_____

12. Does your project focus on any particular population sub-groups, such as the elderly, or women, or the unemployed, or some other groups? What sub-groups?

_____

IF YES, how and on what basis was this particular focus selected?

_____

_____

Now I would like to ask you some questions about how you planned your project.

13. Did you collect any data, statistics or information prior to deciding on the goals and specific activities of your project? In other words, how did you determine the nature of the problem that needed to be addressed? For example, did you collect the following kinds of information:

_____ data on crime? (Probe to find out the quality of the data, asking the sources of the data or information, the form it was in, whether or not it pertained to their target area.)

_____

_____

_____ a survey, or interviews, or meetings with key persons in the area? (Probe to find out the extensiveness and the quality of the process, asking the following questions:)

who conducted the survey/interviews? _____

how were they conducted? Did you have a survey/interview format, or were they informal? _____

_____

what was the purpose? What were you trying to find out? (For example, peoples' opinions about the problem, what was needed, what the available resources were, or what?) _____

_____

_____

when did you do this, relative to project development?

_____

_____

_____ a survey of community residents? (Probe to find out the extensiveness and the quality of the survey and the process, asking the following questions:)

who conducted the survey? _____

how was it conducted (questionnaire, in-person interviews, telephone, or what?)

_____

how many people were contacted? Was this a sample? How was it drawn?

_____

what were you trying to find out? What was the purpose?

_____

_____

_____

when was it conducted, relative to project development? _____

_____

_____ any other kinds of data or information? IF YES, what? _____

_____

Other than what you have already mentioned, did you do anything else to determine what might be needed in order to deal with the problem, or what resources were already available in the area dealing with the problem? IF YES, what?

_____

_____

Did you try to get any information or data which you were unable to obtain? _____
IF YES, what kinds and from what sources? And why couldn't you get this information?

_____

_____

IF NO DATA OR INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED OR OBTAINED, ask the following: How did you determine what the problem was that the project would address?

_____

_____

14. How did you use this information in developing and structuring your project?

_____

_____

_____

15. Who decided, and how was it determined (by what process), what the goals of the project would be? _____

_____

_____

16. Who determined, and how (by what process), were the specific project activities selected? _____

_____

_____

Were any other alternative strategies considered, besides the ones selected?
IF YES, what were they and why were they rejected? IF NO, why not?

_____

_____

17. Did you have any contact with the police during the planning stages of the project?
IF YES, for what purposes (to solicit their opinions, to obtain their cooperation, for data? Any other reasons)?

_____

_____

What was their response? Did they cooperate with you? _____

_____

When did you contact the police, relative to project development?

_____

IF NO, why didn't you contact and involve the police? _____

_____

18. Did you have contact with any other citizen groups or organizations, other than the ones you have already mentioned, while you were planning your project?

IF YES, which ones and for what purposes? _____

_____

When?
IF NO, why didn't you contact other groups? _____

_____

19. Did you contact any local elected officials or local governmental agency employees while you were planning your program (other than ones already mentioned)?

IF YES, who did you contact and for what purposes? _____

_____

When did you contact them, relative to project development? _____

_____

IF NO, why not? _____

20. Are you collecting any information or data during the project which will enable you to assess the effectiveness of the selected strategies or of the overall project?

IF YES, what kinds of information, and is it being used to modify the project in any way? _____

_____

IF NO, why not? _____

_____

21. Does your project/grant include monies for data collection and analysis? _____

    IF YES, how much? _____

22. Do you have people on your staff (including yourself) who have a background in
    planning? _____ IF YES, how many individuals? _____

    What about people on the staff with a background or experience in data collection/
    analysis, statistical skills, or evaluation methods and techniques? _____

    IF YES, how many? _____

23. Has your organization ever undertaken a similar-type project (i.e., applying for
    monies to develop and implement a project)? _____

24. How important do you think it is to spend time analyzing the crime problem before
    developing specific strategies to affect the problem?

    _____

    _____

25. How important do you think it is to involve a large number of individuals, groups,
    organizations, and agencies in planning a community program?

    _____

    Are there any particular kinds of organizations/agencies which are particularly
    important to involve if a project like yours is to be successful? IF YES, which
    ones and when in the planning process?

    _____

    _____

26. Do you think the amount and kind of planning which is done will affect the subsequent
    success of the program? How?

    _____

    _____

27. Has your project run into any difficulties or problems which you think could have
    been avoided? IF YES, what are they and how could they have been avoided?

    _____

    _____   _____

28. What, in your opinion, are the greatest obstacles facing organizations like yours who
    wish to undertake community crime prevention programs during the initial planning
    phase of the project (i.e., barriers to planning)?

    _____

    _____

29. Do you have any suggestions about how these barriers could be overcome? Or how
    the planning process could be improved?

    _____

    _____

30. Is there anything else you would care to add which might be useful for other groups
    planning community crime prevention programs?

    _____

    _____

INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

END