

# **PROTECTING DISSENT**

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# **POLICING DISORDER**

**An evaluation and documentation of  
law enforcement services during the  
1972 national political conventions**

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration**

PROTECTING DISSENT

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**An evaluation and documentation of  
the National Political Convention  
Law Enforcement Services Project**

**Prepared for the city of  
Miami Beach, Florida**

**by**

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PROTECTING DISSENT; POLICING DISORDER,  
an Evaluation and Documentation of the National  
Political Convention Law Enforcement Services  
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## PREFACE

About midway through the Republican National Convention, a brief incident occurred at a streetcorner in Miami Beach that now seems to have illustrated much of what law enforcement agencies were able to accomplish during the two national political conventions held there in 1972.

A crowd of demonstrators had occupied a sidewalk near the entrance to one of the city's hotels. As elected delegates to the convention came and went in front of the hotel, the crowd of anti-war demonstrators hooted and jeered. "Murderers! Stop the bombing!" they shouted. Although subjected to this verbal abuse and the inconvenience of disrupted traffic, most delegates escaped any actual jostling by demonstrators. At the curb of the sidewalk, a police officer seated on a motorcycle kept the crowd from going too far.

At the moment, amid all the noise and emotional confusion, the important thing about this incident seemed to be the indignity to which the convention delegates were subjected. In retrospect, however, a more important factor emerges from the little scene. Although it seemed commonplace within the context of the 1972 law enforcement effort, it seems remarkable in retrospect that the police officer was not the target of the abuse.

Somehow, somewhere along the difficult path that led from the first planning stages more than a year and half earlier, through the innovative and frustrating training, organization and field operations, this Miami Beach police officer had scored an enormous success. He had achieved a neutral, third party position between the demonstrators and the delegates. From this position he could control the situation without joining one group against the other.

As preparations were being made for the 1972 political conventions, the police experience during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, 1968, was a vivid recollection in the minds of law enforcement planners. Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance has since spoken understandingly of the Chicago experience. The Chicago police, he said, "were operating under traditional police tactics and they were facing something new. Had Chicago not happened, I don't think ours could have been successful. We profited greatly from their experience."

By November, 1971, Chief Pomerance's plans for the 1972 conventions had progressed to the point that he could make the following statement: "What we hope to do is a continuation of the type of enforcement we have offered this community — primarily supportive and service oriented rather than repressive. I really feel that the climate of enforcement may go a long way toward the success of the security portion of the convention."

To a large extent, the report that follows here is an elaboration on how that climate of law enforcement was developed and to what degree it did contribute to successful security. It is not a flawless success story. The very nature of the atmosphere of accommodation that averted so much potential violence obviates victorious speech making in the aftermath. Few participants in the 1972 political convention law enforcement experience left the scene feeling victorious. Many were proud that they had achieved so much. Many were saddened that they did not achieve more.

Among spectators to the law enforcement experience, as documented in post-convention letters received by the Miami Beach Police Department, public reaction ranged from bitter denunciation to unqualified praise. The letters most prized by the police themselves, however, are those that speak of "fairness." Actress Julie Newmar, for instance, wrote on September 28: "From a former radical protester, appreciation and congratulations for your understanding, forceful and fair handling of the August demonstration. At last, someone has given the world an image of American justice that is truly high grade." Among the police planners who sought to influence the climate of enforcement this element of police fairness was one of their highest goals.

In more tangible areas, the various chapters that follow in this report provide a basis for certain "lessons learned" through the Miami Beach experience. It seems clear, for instance, that massive assistance from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was absolutely necessary. The resources required to successfully police a national political convention are simply beyond the capability of any single police department. The coordination of this assistance, furthermore, seems to warrant more attention than was afforded it during 1972. Joint planning was a continuing problem. Funding and organization processes were fraught with unexpected difficulties. Inter-agency cooperation was hampered by



seemingly justified preoccupations of each agency commander with his own jurisdictional responsibilities. The timing of certain decisions and events seemed only barely under control.

More positive lessons were also learned. The value of outside police consultants to supplement local resources was proven. A policy of negotiation and accommodation with demonstrators provided numerous benefits. An early involvement of judges and other members of the criminal justice system in planning for the conventions produced a smoothly functioning system capable of operating well during mass arrests. The value of intervening third party groups was tested. Finally, the police discovered potential strengths in the effective use of symbolism to influence events. In summary, it can be said that during the Miami Beach conventions of 1972 the police were no longer dependent on traditional police techniques. The police were experimenting with new approaches to problems and with new techniques for solving them.

At the 79th annual conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Chief Rocky Pomerance recalled his personal reactions to the convention law enforcement program with these words: "Although I told our Chamber of Commerce that our city as a convention city has proven now that we can handle any convention in the world, I'd hate to have to prove it again. But I would like to say that for me it was a privilege to be in that place at that time in our nation's history. I think that we were able to prove that our profession can effectively respond to the most serious of challenges under great stress while operating fully within the Constitution."

Now that those conventions are history, a statement made by Chief Pomerance a full year before they began continues to hold truth for the law enforcement profession. "I'm firmly convinced a convention is our most important democratic process, and to keep it that way has become a challenge to law enforcement officers."

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## INTRODUCTION

This book has a double purpose. It is first an official report from the Miami Beach Police Department to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U. S. Department of Justice, describing how funds granted to that police department for the national political conventions of 1972 were used. This book is also a manual of instruction. Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance recognized that the full significance of the complex experience of policing the conventions might not be adequately communicated to other members of his profession within a sterile evaluative report. For this reason, on September 6, 1972, Chief Pomerance sent the following message to Quinn Tamm, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police:

"The summer of '72 has proven to the world that our honored profession can operate successfully within the framework of our Constitution in spite of great provocation . . . . Recognizing that careful study and documentation of the events which occurred in our city during the two political conventions could be valuable to police agencies throughout the world, I would recommend that the International Association of Chiefs of Police consider the development of a comprehensive document which would be informative, instructive and useful to the police profession . . . . I believe that the insight and experience gained this past year should not be lost to the police profession."

This attitude was shared by representatives of the U. S. Justice Department's Community Relations Service who met with Chief Pomerance on September 25 to review the convention law enforcement experience. At that time, according to an MBPD file memorandum of September 26, the CRS Special Project Section Chief "advocated that the activities and

procedures adhered to by Miami Beach Police during the conventions be documented to serve as a guideline to other law enforcement agencies."

Funds were sought from private sources to produce an informative and readable document that would convey the breadth of activities carried out during the two conventions, including the complexities of institutional relationships and the richness of human interplay. These attempts to obtain private funding were unsuccessful.

Faced with two separate needs, one imposed by external requirements, the other created out of personal conviction, Chief Pomerance realized that these needs were compatible. Both could be satisfied in one report if the dual objectives were clearly recognized from the start. Proceeding within the bounds of the grant, an invitation to bid was drawn up and sent to a number of organizations capable of performing the desired evaluation and documentation. As the end result of the competitive bidding, formal approval of the contract award was given to IACP by the Miami Beach City Council. Work on the report began on June 7, 1973. Six months were allowed to perform all the work related to researching, writing and printing the final report.

In view of the amount of time that had passed between the end of the conventions and the commencement of IACP's work, Chief Pomerance's broader interpretation of the nature of this report tended to be reinforced. There seemed little point in merely writing up "old news" without taking advantage of the opportunity to develop materials that would be instructive and helpful to others in the police profession. From the start of our work, therefore, IACP developed this report of law enforcement activities during the 1972 political conventions with the additional intent of making a useful contribution to law enforcement efforts at future political conventions and other mass assemblages.

## EVALUATION AND DOCUMENTATION

We all like to show the success of our work. It is also natural to take less pleasure in reviewing things that did not work out so well. Pleasure aside, it is important that we learn from experience. There is a need to know both what worked and what did not. We need to know what approaches were most effective and what approaches proved to be dead ends. Ultimately we need to come out of the evaluation experience with the ability to generalize our findings, making them applicable to other places and times.

At first glance, evaluation brings to mind some of the usual objective indices of police performance - the number of arrests or injuries; citizen complaints or commendations; the extent of property damage; the variations in crime rates, traffic citations or traffic accidents; the number of hours of training or overtime worked. One could possibly extend this

list to include the number of hours spent on preliminary meetings, the number of items processed through the intelligence system, the ratios of police to demonstrators at major events, the frequency and length of radio transmissions, or even the number of hands shaken by Chief Pomerance. These matters might be interesting, but they fail to get to the heart of the matter.

Evaluation must be related to a specific objective. In this case, it is related to effective and humane policing. The nexus between this overall objective and indices such as those above is at best indirect. Also, most of these measures can be artificially manipulated by those who know that evaluators are counting these things. Additionally, from our point of view, most of the data related to these indices are unknown or unknowable after-the-fact. Those readers with a penchant for quantification will be disappointed in this report.

Ideally, evaluation should be designed to consider multiple measures, both objective and subjective. The nature of the events in Miami Beach extending through 1971 and 1972 and the circumstances under which this evaluation was undertaken are such that this ideal cannot be realized. Our emphasis is on subjective measures and relies heavily on descriptive material. This is not to say that our approach is any less valuable than a more objective approach. Given the unique situation, its longitudinal nature, and our after-the-fact involvement in the evaluation, our approach is the only feasible course to follow.

It is one of our cultural traits that we desire to quantify everything. This predilection tends to obscure the value of a qualitative approach to evaluation, which can often be especially valuable in viewing programs longitudinally. In short, although IACP set out to write this report knowing that all of its analyses could not be supported with mathematical precision, the work was performed with the knowledge that a thorough and honest "case study" report could still contribute a great deal to the law enforcement profession. Evaluation could proceed on the basis of descriptive measures, relying heavily on documentation. This approach explains our emphasis on chronology as a tool for understanding events.

One fundamental approach for making a sound evaluation is to examine the chain of events from various perspectives. In a general sense, this methodology was virtually guaranteed during our research because the events to be described involved several law enforcement agencies, each of whom tended to recall and report the events from their own point of view, much like the legendary seven blind men who sought to describe an elephant. In the case of convention related law enforcement, each of the "blind men" also seemed to be strongly motivated to convince the listener that his own point of view was the correct one.



Lacking any direct observation of convention law enforcement, the researchers repeatedly confronted difficulties arising from the selectivity of data included in records and possible selectivity of access to records. We can only hope that we have properly assessed such intangibles as "tone" and interpersonal relationships.

In the absence of data and the inappropriateness of a rigorous scientific evaluative design, certain judgements had to be made about the way that IACP would, in fact, evaluate what it learned about law enforcement in Miami Beach during the 1972 political conventions. It was first determined that any attempt to reduce our impressions to describing the overall effort as either a "success" or "failure" would be absolutely improper. Such a simplification would contribute nothing in the way of helpful information. Instead, it was decided to conduct our evaluation at the level of pertinent elements of the law enforcement process (such as planning, funding, field operations, etc.) rather than to simply affix a subjective label to the total process. Each of the separate parts of the picture that we isolated for study would be evaluated in terms of the relationship of the action to the overall goals set forth initially by Chief Pomerance as the three components of "effective and humane" policing:

1. To maintain the peace and tranquility of the community.
2. To protect the rights of delegates to carry out their duties.
3. To protect the rights of dissenters to voice peaceful protest.

While referring to these three goals as a norm for evaluating law enforcement actions, it was important for IACP researchers to avoid making personal judgements about the relative priority of these three goals. For example, the goal to maintain the peace and tranquility of the community was intended to protect local residents who perceived the demonstrators as a threat. A post-convention evaluation that regarded this goal as uppermost, i. e. to be achieved at the expense of other goals, would reflect the inaccurate expectations of some citizens for total enforcement of all laws and an adversary relationship between police and demonstrators. Similarly, if the goal to protect the rights of dissenters to voice peaceful protest were judged to be foremost, any action that frustrated the intentions of demonstrators would tend to be described in terms of failure. For the making of this evaluative report, it was important that IACP researchers maintain an attitude of respect for all three expressed goals. A "best possible" action would be one that moved however unevenly toward achievement of all three goals. A less praiseworthy action would be one that moved toward achieving one goal without regard for the other two.

In the aftermath of the political conventions, the Miami Beach Police Department received many letters from individuals throughout the nation who expressed both praise and condemnation for law enforcement activities in Miami Beach. For the most part, the reactions contained in these letters reflected the letter writer's own judgement about goal priorities. In other words, both the praise and the condemnation received



from the general public tended to be founded in a point of view that regarded only one of the police goals to be uppermost. For the making of this report, that kind of simplification could not be permitted.

While evaluating segments of the process in terms of stated goals, it was also deemed important to comment on the propriety of police procedures used during the conventions. In other words, while we were committed to an evaluation in terms of the net result of an action, it was also considered important to evaluate the way in which the result was achieved. This additional consideration was a direct result of the intended purpose of the report to provide useful guidelines for future police performance. While it is conceivable that one can do all the little things wrong and still come out all right, the more rational approach is to increase one's chances for overall success by doing the little things correctly.

One final comment is necessary with respect to the time limitations on the making of this report. Once involved in the reconstruction of events, it became very clear that the task was an "open ended" one. The recollection of one event by a participant evoked memories of other occurrences. The more that was learned, the greater was our sensitivity to what remained unknown. Because our data was largely supplied from essentially self-serving reports and recollections, each new fragment of information had to be considered in light of information obtained from other sources before it could be considered reliable. Ultimately, the research was ended for the purpose of completing the writing and production of this report within the allotted time, not because we could say with any sense of finality that our research was complete. At one arbitrary point in time, it had to be decided that our research had ended and production had begun.

MIAMI BEACH EVALUATIONS & DOCUMENTATIONS. As previously noted, it is more appropriate for the evaluator to become involved in a project at its outset than a year after it has ended. In fact, the original grant request from Miami Beach Police Department to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration contained provision for a project director who would undertake, among other things, a comprehensive evaluation of the law enforcement effort at the political conventions. For reasons that are discussed in greater detail in both the Planning and Training chapters, the position of project director came to be limited almost entirely to the training aspects of law enforcement preparations. The project director did prepare a documentation and evaluation but, by mutual agreement with the Chief of Police, that report was confined to the training program which had become the project director's only area of responsibility.

The Miami Beach Police Department also took steps to create a "documentation" of the convention experience in the form of photographs, written records, and tapes. The results of that documentation effort produced the bulk of the materials reviewed by IACP as the initial phase of our research. As such, the materials compiled by MBPD were an

invaluable resource without which this report would be wholly inadequate. It is fair to say at this point that the Miami Beach Police Department probably did more in the way of a systematic documentation of an historical event than most other police departments have done for events of comparable magnitude. Standards in this activity however, are not unlike standards in any other area of police performance. Once the task has been done reasonably well, there is an immediate demand to do it better.

MBPD compiled a chronological "convention file" containing nearly 900 documents (correspondence, publications, memoranda, orders, plans, etc.) that were systematically reviewed and categorized by IACP researchers. MBPD had recorded on tape 22 planning meetings attended by representatives of various agencies preparing for the conventions. Two massive scrapbooks contained newspaper clippings related to law enforcement aspects of the conventions. The articles dated from June 29, 1971, through the aftermath of the Republican Convention. Hundreds of still photographs had been taken before and during the conventions. Thirteen reels of 8mm motion picture film had been used to record certain events. During the Republican Convention, video tape was also used to record a wide variety of convention related activities. In addition to these resources, Chief Pomerance also made his personnel available to the IACP staff for hours of interviews. As he stated in a directive to his division heads, "Full cooperation should be extended to the IACP staff in their efforts to obtain pertinent information . . . . I intend to talk openly with the IACP representatives about all our convention related activities, and I expect that you will do the same."

With all of these things done, it seems unfair to say that it was not enough. Nonetheless, that observation must be made. The documents that made up the convention file often raised questions without supplying answers. The value of the taped meetings was reduced by technical deficiencies and a frustrating inability to determine who was speaking to whom. The films and video tapes, while long on quantity, were often underexposed and dull. More importantly, camera coverage was uneven and undirected. While numerous trivial actions were recorded in enervating detail, much that was extremely important was entirely missed. It should be stressed while making these critical comments that the effort at documentation was undertaken by working police officers. While producing invaluable source materials for this particular study, the department also made it clear that the business of recording and documenting an historical event is best placed in the hands of professionals who can control the process from inception to final product. A part-time, "amateur" effort produced amazingly good results in 1972, but that kind of an effort will not be adequate in the future.

In addition to the source materials compiled by the Miami Beach Police Department, IACP writers studied after-action reports and other convention related reports generated by other participating law enforcement agencies. Scores of interviews were conducted with command

officers in each of the participating agencies. Again and again, gaps were encountered in the written record. In some instances, carelessness or haste was the cause. Perhaps in other instances, someone had decided that something was not important enough to record or, possibly, that something was too important to record. Recognizing that history often comes to be that which is written down rather than that which occurred, such lapses in the record were always viewed as serious shortcomings.

#### A NOTE ON PRODUCTION

This book is intended to be read from front to back. If that sounds overly fundamental, it is intended only to discourage readers from immediately thumbing to a specialized subject akin to one's own job responsibilities and starting to read the book at that point. Because of the huge amount of material that had to be condensed into this report, an effort has been made to reduce duplication wherever possible. Therefore, available information has been parceled out among the various chapters of the report in a logically sequential way. It is assumed, in other words, that the reader of the chapter on "Courts" has already read the chapter on "Legal Considerations." The reader of the chapter on "Demonstration Groups" is assumed to have read the "Background" and "Chronology" chapters. An orderly progression from front to back should provide the reader with all of the information he needs to understand the convention experience as it is here related.

The authors would also like to take this opportunity to thank the many individuals at law enforcement agencies and other municipal, state, and federal departments and organizations that have contributed to providing us with an understanding of the overall law enforcement effort made during the 1972 political conventions. Thanks should also be extended to members of the Miami Beach City Council for supporting this outside analysis of events that took place in their city. Without exception, everyone we contacted in the course of our interviews shared the conviction of Chief Pomerance that "the insight and experience gained this past year should not be lost to the police profession."

###



## BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTIONS

While generally supporting the concept that one learns from past performance, it should also be conceded that every historical situation is, in fact, unique. Events are generated from complex, situational backgrounds that are never perfectly duplicated once the event has occurred.

A national political convention in the United States does not — cannot — occur in isolation. During the time immediately before and during a national convention, each and every ripple of public opinion is carefully measured for its potential influence on the electoral process. Convention politics in a modern democracy could not function properly without this acute sensitivity, which makes the political convention both a product and a prisoner of its own time.

The "background" of a political convention consists of the effects of various issues and tensions that existed in the nation at that time. No two backgrounds will ever be precisely the same, but they can be described within the limits of certain rational perspectives that permit transfer of useful information from one time period to another. Most of the issues and events that shape our times are beyond the powers of any Chief of Police to control. Nonetheless, these issues and events often determine the stage upon which law enforcement agencies must act. Therefore, law enforcement officers, whose responsibility it will be to maintain order and protect constitutional rights during future national political conventions, must be able to recognize and work within the limits of "backgrounds" that are specifically different but generally similar to those that influenced the national political conventions of 1972.



Uppermost among influential background tensions in 1972 were the following:

1. Recollections of similar past events; primarily recollections of the preceding political conventions of 1968 and memories of such key incidents as the Kent State shootings in 1970 and the anti-war "May Day" demonstrations of 1971 in Washington, D. C.
2. International issues and tensions, primarily those concerning the Vietnam War.
3. Domestic issues and tensions, including race relations, inflation, and "law and order" concerns.
4. Intra-party conflicts, i. e., the political differences among candidates seeking party nomination at the convention.
5. Local tensions, considered as problems specifically affecting the city where the convention is held.
6. Law enforcement issues, defined as matters of importance within the criminal justice system, influencing the morale and effectiveness of professional law enforcement personnel.

Each of these six areas of concern will be considered in order to recall the overall background that influenced the national political conventions of 1972.

## RECOLLECTIONS OF PAST EVENTS

CHICAGO, 1968. No one wanted "another Chicago." That was the single, dominant point of agreement voiced repeatedly by virtually all the principals who were going to participate in the conventions of 1972. Not the Democrats, nor the Republicans, nor the police, the press, the community, nor the demonstrators themselves wanted to experience "another Chicago."

The events that occurred in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention of August 26-29, 1968, had shocked the nation. Whether justified or not, the event came to be recalled in terms such as "street justice" and "police riot." Whether it deserved to be or not, Chicago became the ideological battleground for a nation confused and frustrated by an unpopular, escalating war and stung into bitter reaction by the assassinations of Martin Luther King in April and presidential candidate Robert Kennedy in June. Following the Chicago convention, political scientists were seriously speculating that convention

politics may have ended its life as an American political institution during those violent confrontations in Grant Park and Lincoln Park.

This same speculation was voiced at an early planning meeting in Miami Beach, attended by representatives of various agencies that were involved in preparing for the Democratic National Convention of 1972. A spokesman for the Democratic Party urged the group to undertake their preparations with the view that the task was larger than merely preserving order in a particular community or assuring the safe conduct for a number of politicians. The American political convention, as an institution, was being given a "second chance" in Miami Beach. If it failed again here, there was a real possibility that it could never be fully restored.

Among demonstrators, who were preparing to attend the DNC in large numbers, leaders expressed similar intentions to avoid a repetition of 1968. Jerry Rubin, a nationally known Yippie leader, was quoted in the press as early as February, 1972, saying that Yippies were "planning non-violent demonstrations" for Miami Beach and that they "wanted to avoid unnecessary confrontations with the police." The regional leader of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War said, "The way we feel about the Democratic convention is that any violence can only hurt our cause."

Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance said in June, "We're not going to have another Chicago here . . . . My effort is to remove the police as an abrasive quality in the convention. We're supposed to be of assistance. We're a service organization."

REPUBLICAN CONVENTION, 1968. Less well remembered nationally, but very prominent in the minds of individuals in the Miami area as they prepared for the 1972 conventions, were recollections of the 1968 Republican National Convention in Miami Beach. That convention had proceeded without violent incident, the only memorable demonstration being a "poor people's march" led by Ralph Abernathy, the successor to Martin Luther King as leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The convention had been policed by a loosely organized force consisting of 90 Miami Beach policemen, assisted by a total of 323 other officers drawn from the city of Miami, Dade County, the Florida Highway Patrol and other state agencies.

Many of the same individuals who had been involved in policing the 1968 convention were also involved in preparing for 1972. Leaders who shared the 1968 experience included Miami Beach Chief Rocky Pomerance, Sheriff Purdy of Dade County, Paul Rundle of the Secret Service, and Jim McDonnell of the Andy Frain Agency (supplying private security personnel inside convention hall). Chief Garmire of Miami was new to the area, but many of his senior officers were familiar with the 1968 experience.

These leaders, furthermore, saw parallels between the situation of the Republicans in 1968 and that of the Democrats in 1972. Like the Republicans of 1968, the Democrats of 1972 would not be the incumbent party. Therefore, they would not be the primary target for violent demonstrators. Statements by leaders of protest groups tended to confirm that any serious trouble would be reserved for the Republicans, and at that time the Republicans were scheduled to convene in San Diego.

Equally significant to those who remembered 1968 was the fact that the only violence that did occur during the Republican convention broke out on the mainland, in a predominantly black neighborhood northwest of Miami. Three persons had been killed in the Liberty City rioting. Sheriff Purdy had to assume command in the area, and 600 National Guardsmen had been used to restore order. It had been a traumatic experience for Miami — its first encounter with massive urban disorders.

A subsequent report of the Liberty City riots, prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, concluded that, "The fact that the Republican National Convention was taking place . . . seven miles away from Liberty City, played only an incidental part in the course of the disturbances." The causes of the outburst were instead attributed to "accumulated deprivations, discriminations and frustrations of the black community . . ." Despite this official report, the riots and the convention remained firmly linked in the minds of law enforcement leaders in the Miami area. The lesson apparently learned was: If violence occurs during the conventions, it will be on the mainland.

KENT STATE, MAY 1970. No one was about to forget Kent State. On May 4, 1970, while reacting to campus disorders at Kent State University, a contingent of Ohio National Guardsmen had fired into a crowd, killing four students and wounding nine others. The nation recoiled in horror, as if it had exposed a cancerous sore in the spectacle of uniformed men attacking — and this time killing — rebellious young people. Investigations were demanded, and they were forthcoming, but significant parts of the population continued to feel that those to blame for Kent State would never receive justice. Leaders of protest groups regarded the incident as one more example of uniformed brutishness, performed while protecting wealthy exploiters and crooked politicians.

Within the law enforcement community, Kent State was extremely significant. Without consideration for differing degrees of professionalism among National Guard units, the reaction to Kent State among police planners was an increasing reluctance to rely on the National Guard for protection during civil disorders. This virtually dismantled most existing plans for crowd management, which relied



heavily on the National Guard as a ready reserve. The net effect of an erosion of confidence in the Guard was to deny local police a backup force that they were willing to use. This, in turn, placed additional pressure on police to devise ways to control mass demonstrations themselves — using police techniques instead of military ones.

MAY DAY, 1971. Massive anti-war demonstrations in the nation's capital early in May, 1971, produced memorable effects within the law enforcement community. The May Day demonstrations were the culmination of a series of mass demonstrations held in the capital to protest U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. In addition to a certain amount of awe at the numbers who participated in the initial march (in excess of 100,000), a great deal of interest was generated by the tactics utilized by both demonstrators and police during the prolonged series of protest actions.

Vowing to "close down the government," the demonstrators undertook a series of exercises in massive civil disobedience that were calculated to bring the criminal justice machinery to a halt by sheer weight of numbers. Demonstrators voluntarily submitted to arrest while blocking entrances to government buildings and intersections. Eventually, they hoped, the police would not be able to arrest fast enough, the jail would not be large enough, the system would not be adequate to withstand a massive assault by thousands who set out to purposely bring it to its knees.

In response to this challenge, police in Washington, D. C., initiated mass arrest procedures, sweeping up large groups of demonstrators without much emphasis on singling out real trouble makers from spectators and innocent bystanders. On one day during the May Day demonstrations, 7,000 arrests were made, the largest number of persons arrested in a single day in the nation's history.

In preparing for the national political conventions of 1972, police had to anticipate that similar exercises in massive civil disobedience would take place. Mass arrest procedures developed in Washington, D. C., were studied, and actions were taken to develop a cooperative judicial system that could continue to operate smoothly if tested by thousands of demonstrators willing to be arrested. These steps were taken in Miami Beach, primarily on the initiative of Chief Pomerance, largely because of the importance placed on recollections of May Day.

## INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND TENSIONS

VIETNAM WAR. The dominant international issue influencing the backgrounds of the national political conventions was the Vietnam War, as it had been in 1968. Unlike 1968, however, the war in 1972 was not escalating. On the contrary, it was obviously declining, at



least in terms of American manpower commitments. Throughout the year preceding the conventions, steady withdrawals of American troops were made until — just 8 days before the Republican Convention began — the last American combat units were withdrawn from Vietnam.

The troop withdrawals gave little satisfaction to anti-war groups, however, because they had been paired with an intensification of bombing attacks over North Vietnam and an apparently broadened interpretation of the American bombing role in Laos and Cambodia. Key events related to the Vietnam War are listed below.

- March 23 - U. S. suspends Paris peace talks.
- March 31 - North Vietnam launches new offensive  
April 9 which sweeps through Quang Tri, threatening Hue. Drive stalls west of Quang Tri and slowly is pushed back.
- April 15 - U. S. bombers strike North Vietnamese port of Haiphong for the first time since March, 1968.
- April 25 - President Nixon announces that troop withdrawals will continue despite the new offensive in Vietnam.
- April 27 - U. S. returns to Paris peace talks.
- May 4 - Once again, U. S. suspends Paris peace talks.
- May 8 - President Nixon announces mining of Haiphong Harbor and resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.
- July 24 - United Nations Secretary General appeals to the U. S. to halt bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
- August 12 - The last U. S. ground combat troops leave Vietnam.

The troop withdrawals apparently were changing the nature of the American participation in the war without reducing the killing and devastation caused by it. Among those opposed to the war, the confusion and frustration of 1968 were replaced by resentment in 1972, accompanied by a deep mistrust of the Nixon administration, which at least in the eyes of those opposing the war, had cynically prolonged Vietnam withdrawals until a politically expedient time.

MILITARY CONSCRIPTION. The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam had been accompanied by a steady decline in the need for conscription into the armed forces. Despite continuing bloodshed in Vietnam, the reduced possibility of being drafted tended to defuse the war issue among the young people who had been most threatened by it. During 1966, the military draft had disrupted the lives of 364,000 persons. By 1971, that number had been reduced to 96,000. During 1972, it was expected that inductions would not exceed 50,000. The year had opened with Defense Secretary Laird announcing that no one would be called for the draft in the first three months of the year. In June, President Nixon announced that draftees would no longer receive Vietnam assignments unless they asked to go. Although described as a politically motivated gesture, this effort to keep draftees off the Vietnam casualty lists had the desired effect of greatly reducing tensions about the war among the general public.

AMNESTY FOR EXILES AND DESERTERS. As the war and the military draft faded as emotional issues, the question arose concerning amnesty for the estimated 50,000 to 70,000 exiled draft evaders and deserters. Although both the Democratic candidate, Senator McGovern, and the Republican candidate, President Nixon, attempted to avoid any firm commitment on the issue in the early part of their campaigns, a clear difference of opinion existed by the time of the Republican Convention. President Nixon offered no hope whatsoever for amnesty. Senator McGovern, while opposing amnesty for deserters, generally supported a lenient approach for those who had evaded the draft by choosing exile.

VISITS TO PEKING AND MOSCOW. On February 21, President Nixon became the first American chief executive to visit China. His week-long meetings there were recognized as heralding one of the most significant reversals of American foreign policy since the Second World War. On May 22, President Nixon arrived in Moscow for a series of meetings with leaders of the Soviet Union. It was anticipated that agreements flowing from these contacts with the communist powers would result in wider areas of international cooperation and a commensurate decrease in the level of hostilities with them.

While delighting the "liberals" of both political parties, these two friendly gestures toward the world's largest communist powers resulted in a political backlash from conservative politicians in both parties. In the Democratic Party, a policy of victory in Vietnam and continued "hard line" opposition to communism was voiced by Governor Wallace of Alabama and by John Schmitz, presidential candidate of the American Party. To a lesser degree, Democratic Senator Jackson of Washington and Republican Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio also expressed conservative opinions on foreign policy. Representative Ashbrook campaigned against President Nixon in some Republican primary elections. This conservative opposition to foreign policy

initiatives placed President Nixon in the unaccustomed position of being attacked from the right wing of the political spectrum as the Republican National Convention approached.

THE MIDDLE EAST. Although tensions regarding the Middle East never reached the level of an emotional issue during the 1972 election year, the highly volatile situation there was recognized as having the potential to become a "second Vietnam," if not carefully handled. Israel, which derived support from the American government (and numerous Jewish individuals and groups within the United States), had embarked on a policy of military reprisals against Arab nations from whose territory guerrilla raids against Israel had been launched. Neither presidential candidate in 1972 ruled out the possibility of big power intervention in the Middle East. Senator McGovern, who was prepared to abandon Vietnam entirely, indicated that he would support Israel in any serious conflict. The existence of the Middle East issue, therefore, denied idealistic war protesters any clearly "pacifist" candidate who opposed war on principle. The best that was available was a policy that advocated abandoning one particular war.

#### DOMESTIC ISSUES AND TENSIONS

Generally speaking, no single domestic issue dominated the background of the political conventions to the extent that the Vietnam War dominated international tensions. Opposition to school bussing for purposes of racial balance temporarily led all other concerns during the early primary election months, but by the outset of the Republican Convention school bussing was just one of nine or ten diverse domestic issues vying for attention.

RACE RELATIONS. Somewhat artificially, tensions arising from changes in race relations within the United States tended to center on the issue of school bussing during the election year of 1972. School busses had operated for many years as a common service in nearly all the nation's school districts except for urban, "neighborhood" schools where student transportation did not constitute a problem. Recently, however, the school bus had been used as a tool to achieve "racial balance." Black children were bussed out of their own neighborhoods into schools that were predominantly white. Less frequently, white children were bussed into predominantly black neighborhoods. Protests were forthcoming from both racial groups. These essentially local problems became a national issue primarily because of criticism directed at the bussing program by Governor Wallace of Alabama and President Nixon. Not far beneath the surface of the ostensible "education" issue lay all the old emotional attachments to the broader issues of discrimination and segregation.



Early in 1972, President Nixon had announced that he would take steps to "offset federal court decisions" requiring school bussing to achieve racial balance. On March 14, Governor Wallace — making school bussing the central issue of his campaign — won the Democratic primary election in Florida, defeating Senators Muskie, Humphrey and McGovern. Two days later, President Nixon announced that he favored a "legislative moratorium" on court ordered bussing of school children. As the political conventions drew near, all candidates had to tread lightly near the political dynamite contained in the so-called bussing issue.

The unfortunate concern with bussing obscured much of the progress as well as many of the continuing problems in race relations. In an interview published in the Miami Herald preliminary to the Democratic Convention, a spokesman for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference outlined some of those problems in race relations: "The day of the big confrontations," he said, "is over." The issues today, he continued, are not the dramatic confrontations between masses of blacks meeting head-on with forces of legalized segregation. The issues today are jobs, housing, poverty, and political education. These are important issues, he said, but not the type to capture the nation's imagination and emotional support.

Actually, blacks in 1972 were probably less inclined to participate in massive street confrontations than at any time in history. Largely at the insistence of Reverend Ralph Abernathy, SCLC did plan a Resurrection City II encampment in Miami Beach, but the black community was far from dominated by Rev. Abernathy's thinking. SCLC had been weakened during the previous year by several defections by leaders whose ideas about effective protest differed from those of Rev. Abernathy. (Jesse Jackson, Andrew Young, Hosea Williams.)

On March 12, the first National Black Political Convention met in Gary, Indiana. Little was settled beyond confirming intentions to form a National Black Assembly, but the meeting called attention to the significant progress made by black leaders working within the traditional system. In 1972, there were enough black members of Congress, Mayors, appointed officials, and prominent businessmen to form a potent influence without exercising the tactics of street confrontation.

The Democratic Party had accepted reform rules for electing delegates which virtually guaranteed that 14% of the voting delegates inside convention hall would be black. Although not committed to a percentage quota, the Republican Party also increased the number of blacks named as delegates from 1.9% in 1968 to 4.1% in 1972. During the Democratic Convention, there was even a black candidate for president, Representative Shirley Chisholm of New York. Among most blacks, the inclination seemed to favor using this newly achieved power within the traditional system rather than risking it in disorderly street confrontations.



THE INFLATIONARY ECONOMY. Throughout 1971 and 1972, a series of spectacular measures were undertaken in an effort to control an inflationary economy. Despite these efforts, the economy continued to be a nagging issue throughout the election year, working to the disadvantage of the incumbent administration. Official figures, based on the GNP price deflator (a weighted average of component price indexes) indicated that at midyear all prices appeared to be gaining at a rate of only 3.2%. This adjusted average, however, was a meaningless abstraction to the consumer, who had been startled by erratic and sharp jumps in food prices and other highly visible living costs. On March 22, George Meany, leader of the AFL-CIO, quit the 15-member Pay Board, which had been established to regulate wage increases, calling it "unfair."

Accompanying worries about a rising cost of living, general dissatisfaction was voiced with the system for providing public welfare. Taxpayers complained that the welfare system was inefficiently administered and exploited by welfare recipients. Persons who were dependent on welfare payments complained that the payments were overly restricted and not high enough. Virtually all the politicians campaigning in 1972, including the incumbents, felt obliged to take a position in some way critical of existing public welfare, but no one offered a solution that was acceptable to the public. As the conventions began, general dissatisfaction with public welfare continued.

LAW AND ORDER. Despite considerable outlays of federal money through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the average voter in 1972 continued to be worried about crime in the United States. A Gallup poll found that the number of people who feared to walk alone in their own neighborhood at night had risen sharply during the past four years. In 1968, a poll had indicated that 46% of women interviewed said that they were afraid to go out at night. By 1972, the percentage had risen to 60%. Politicians of both parties felt obliged to take a position on measures deemed essential to reduce muggings, rapes and other so-called "street crimes." Incumbents generally maintained that present efforts were having a considerable impact in reducing the problem, while candidates seeking office insisted that not enough was being done. Tensions concerning law and order were probably most visible in two areas: airplane hijacking and drug abuse.

Air piracy had been used in the past for the purpose of protest or escape by political militants. During 1971, the extortionist/hijacker (who held the plane and its passengers for ransom) emerged as a new threat to public safety. During the election year, effective measures to protect against air piracy were still in development.

Drug abuse continued to be a major domestic concern. Considerable federal activity in this area was reportedly decreasing the availability of heroin, but the sudden popularity of other dangerous drugs

(such as barbiturates) alarmed many of the voters. On March 22, 1972, the President's National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse released its first report, which recommended "decriminalization" of private use of marijuana. President Nixon, perhaps correctly anticipating a majority reaction, officially rejected the findings of the Commission and stated that he opposed any legalization of marijuana.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS. For many years a gradual cultural change had been taking place in the United States, which manifested itself in shifting broader and more public roles to women in society. During the election year of 1972, several organizations claimed to speak for the rights of women. Generally, these organizations focused their energies on assuring the "equality" of women by attacking sexually discriminatory state and federal laws and by supporting legislation to guarantee equal pay, promotion and hiring opportunities in the business world. Occasionally, other domestic issues became identified as "women's issues," such as regulations governing child care and abortions.

During the political conventions, women's groups were planning two separate but mutually supporting efforts. National associations representing women's rights planned a strong lobbying effort to influence committee members and delegates to the convention by holding assemblies that would attract candidates and the news media. This effort was to be augmented by "educational" exhibits in Flamingo Park, and a parade and rally in the demonstration area outside convention hall. Within the various demonstration groups, pressure also developed from their own female membership to express support for the women's demonstrations.

ENVIRONMENTALIST CONCERNS. Considerable rhetoric had been expended in government agencies and private environmentalist associations about the enormous dangers involved in prolonged pollution of the natural environment. In response to this concern, certain government agencies and the Congress had established several "standards" for future production and development. Certain projects, such as a pipeline to transport oil across the state of Alaska, had been delayed until studies of potential environmental problems could be completed. Generally speaking, although environmental concerns continued to exist in the months preceding the national political conventions, the issues were in a state of suspension. Strict guidelines were on paper, but they were yet to be implemented or tested in real life.

#### INTRA-PARTY CONFLICTS

Neither political party produced an unchallenged candidate for president. Since the Democratic Party was not in power, a larger number of persons announced their candidacy and participated in primary elections. In January, 1972, no less than eleven persons were considered to be candidates for the Democratic Party nomination. By the eve

of the national convention in July, this large field had been reduced to three or four reasonable possibilities. In the Republican Party, Richard Nixon as incumbent president had an enormous advantage in securing renomination, but he was challenged from both the extreme left and right of his party. As unlikely as an upset seemed, it had to be considered a possibility based on Senator Eugene McCarthy's challenge from within the Democratic Party to incumbent Lyndon Johnson in 1968.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY. The year began with Senator Muskie recognized as the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination. On January 10, Senator Humphrey announced his candidacy. Senator McGovern, at the time considered to have only a small chance for success, had broken precedent by declaring his candidacy a year early. A series of primary elections then produced the following highlights:

- March 7 - Senator Muskie wins the first Democratic primary election in New Hampshire. Muskie's margin of victory, however, is much lower than expected.
- March 14 - Governor Wallace, stressing the bussing issue, wins the Florida primary.
- April 4 - Senator McGovern wins his first Democratic primary election in Wisconsin.
- April 25 - Humphrey wins in Pennsylvania.  
McGovern wins in Massachusetts.
- April 27 - Muskie discontinues active campaigning for the nomination.
- May 2 - Humphrey defeats McGovern in Ohio.  
Humphrey defeats Wallace in Indiana.
- May 15 - George Wallace is shot while campaigning in Laurel, Maryland.
- May 16 - Wallace wins in Maryland.  
Wallace wins in Michigan.
- June 6 - McGovern defeats Humphrey in California.
- June 17 - McGovern wins in New York.

As delegates began arriving in Miami Beach for the national convention on July 10, their choice as a presidential candidate was still unknown. Senator McGovern had established a commanding lead in delegate strength, but challenges involving Illinois, California, and other



states left the final count uncertain. Although it was clear that McGovern would lead all others on the first ballot, it was suggested that if he failed to muster a clear majority using the guaranteed first ballot votes won in primary elections, his strength would tend to diminish as other candidates negotiated for support.

In addition to the "normal" conflicts between candidates seeking the same job, the Democratic Party was also shaken at the outset of its convention by the visible results of the idealistic reforms enacted after the ill-fated Chicago convention in 1968. The new reform rules set quotas to guarantee proportional delegate representation of non-white minorities, women and young people at the national convention. Senator McGovern had been chairman of the committee that drew up the new party rules, and he had candidly taken advantage of them in building his delegate strength. As a result, a survey conducted by the New York Times at the outset of the Democratic Convention revealed the following analysis of the delegates who would be selecting the party's presidential candidate:

- only 60 members of Congress.
- only 10 percent union members.
- more than one-fourth under 30.
- almost 4 out of 10 are women.
- about 14% black.
- 9 out of 10 have never been to a political convention before.

Chief Pomerance recalls a young delegate who came to him at the convention hall one night and said, "Remember me?" He had been a demonstrator at the 1968 convention. "Now I'm on the inside," the young man said. Conflicts between the new delegates and politicians aligned with more traditional Democratic Party establishment were inevitable, and they began almost immediately.

REPUBLICAN PARTY. President Nixon scored overwhelming victories in the primary elections that he entered. Congressman McClosky won one delegate vote, and Representative Ashbrook won none. Both men, nonetheless, continued to make known their opposing points of view in hopes of influencing the party platform and government policy.

As the Republicans began to convene in Miami Beach, it was certain that Richard Nixon would again be the candidate for president. Some speculation circulated about whether or not Spiro Agnew would be replaced as vice president, but no open struggle for the nomination was ever revealed. As the Republican Convention began, the mood of the delegates was described by one reporter as setting out on a "four day party."



## LOCAL ISSUES AND TENSIONS

MIAMI BEACH. Miami Beach is a very young city. It was officially incorporated only in 1915, when it boasted just 300 residents. Rapid population growth has been a characteristic of Miami Beach throughout its short history. (1915 = 300; 1930 = 6,494; 1950 = 46,282; 1970 = 87,072.) The island seems to be constantly readjusting in order to house more people who want to live there. At present, single family residential dwellings have become very expensive, while the overwhelming majority of the population lives in apartments or condominiums, many of which cost more than complete houses in other parts of the country. With its numerous luxury hotels, Miami Beach very definitely lives up to its reputation as a playground for wealthy vacationers.

Somewhat incongruously, Miami Beach has also become the home of thousands of elderly persons, many of whom live alone in small rented rooms on very modest incomes. The contrast between affluent vacationers on Collins Avenue and the elderly shoppers on lower Washington Street is striking. All of Miami Beach's elderly population is obviously not subsisting on the threshold of poverty, but some of them are. The percentage of families in Miami Beach whose income is less than the so-called "poverty level" has been reported at a surprisingly high 13.0%.

The age of its resident population is an important factor determining the kinds of municipal services that are needed on Miami Beach. The 1970 census indicated that 48.7% of the population of Miami Beach was over age 65. The "average age" on the Beach is estimated at close to 70. Obviously, whatever is done on Miami Beach must follow consideration of the effect of the project on its elderly population. Consequently, public transportation is good; public parks are good; police manpower is relatively high and accustomed to emphasizing the "service" aspects of the police role.

The residents of Miami Beach are white (only 319 census respondents described themselves as black), and a very large number of residents have moved to Miami Beach as adults from other parts of the country, most notably from New York City. Only 12.7% of the Beach population was born in the state of Florida. A large percentage of the elderly population is foreign born, many of them originating from Germany or eastern European countries. A large number of residents are Jewish.

Early in its history as an incorporated city, Miami Beach began to develop as a winter retreat for wealthy industrialists. This trend, extended into the present day, has produced a city that accepts tourism as a major industry. Vacationers and conventioners are routinely scheduled in and out of Miami Beach with assembly line

precision. Its capability to house and provide services for a large number of temporary residents was instrumental in the selection of Miami Beach to be the first city in twenty years to host both national political conventions.

That selection did not happen automatically. Miami Beach had to compete for the Democratic Convention against a bid also offered by the city of Louisville. An estimated 16,000 hotel rooms were required by delegates, guests, media representatives, technicians and others involved in the staging of the national political convention. Miami Beach was selected by the Democratic Site Selection Committee largely because of its advantage in housing capabilities. When Miami Beach is combined with surrounding municipalities, more than 30,000 rooms are available in the area within reasonable distance of convention hall.

The Democratic Party asked for a one million dollar donation from the city before agreeing to have its convention in Miami Beach. As one local newspaper editor expressed it, "Facilities, accommodations and security is only half the battle. Money is the other half." This was arranged, largely in the form of free goods and services, in the following way:

Miami Beach:	\$250,000
Hotel Industry:	100,000
Tourist Development Authority:	250,000
Broward County:	250,000
Individual Democrats:	25,000
State fund raising committee:	100,000

In return for this outlay of cash, goods and services, the various business interests expected to share something like \$20 million worth of convention related business attracted to the area.

Selection of Miami Beach as the site for the Republican Convention was much more complex. Negotiations took place in an atmosphere of desperation on the part of the Republican Party (which was finding it necessary to make a last minute shift from San Diego) and considerable reluctance on the part of Miami Beach residents to welcome the Republicans. For months, planners for the Democratic Convention had been reassuring people that the real trouble would occur at the Republican Convention. Now the Republicans wanted to come to Miami Beach.

Following the successful completion of the 1968 Republican convention in Miami Beach, municipal leaders had extended an immediate invitation for the party to return. Although this was not a binding invitation, many of the local leaders felt that a rejection of the Republicans would look like party favoritism. Acceptance of the Republicans, furthermore, would be linked to considerable federal assistance in the areas of security and provision of adequate support services. The

Miami Beach City Council was divided over the issue, but eventually voted on May 3 to extend an offer to the Republicans. On May 5, the Republican Convention was officially moved from San Diego to Miami Beach.

CITY OF MIAMI. Like Miami Beach, the city of Miami is young and growing. Its population has increased rapidly through the years as follows: 1900 = 1,681; 1930 = 110,637; 1970 = 334,859. Unlike the Beach population, the residents of the mainland city are a diverse racial and cultural mixture that includes a large proportion of middle-class residents with small children and many of the concerns that characterize residents of any large metropolitan center. Serious crime is more common on the mainland than on the Beach, and Miami police tend to have a high respect for the traditional crime-fighting role of police officers.

A sizeable number of black residents exists, most notably in the northwest portion of the city, and a very large number of foreign born, Spanish speaking residents (184,779) are concentrated in the southern and southwestern part of the city. Nearly all of the Spanish speaking population originates from Cuba following a decade of refugee flights operating between Havana and Miami.

The Cuban population, because of its status as a population in exile, is notably anti-communist in political persuasion. As a group, the Cubans have been described as "super patriots." They appreciate the freedoms of life in the United States and are adamantly opposed to leftist groups that are critical of the government. During the preparatory stages before the national political conventions opened in Miami Beach, the intentions or possible reactions of the Miami Cuban population was a cause of great concern by both law enforcement personnel and those who were coming to demonstrate.

DADE COUNTY AND STATE OF FLORIDA. The state of Florida has been undergoing an enormous increase in population for the past twenty years. (1950 = 2,771,000; 1960 = 4,952,000; 1970 = 6,789,000.) This influx of new residents has changed much of the character of many parts of Florida as small towns and rural communities become transformed into industrial and metropolitan residential areas. The state has traditionally included diverse interests which in the past have tended to polarize between groups representing the "panhandle" including Tallahassee, the state capital, and the "gold coast" which includes Miami and Dade County. Any shared undertaking involving the two areas brings together attitudes shaped in two separate worlds and characterized by mutual mistrust.

Dade County is the largest county in Florida measured by several standards. It has the largest land area (2,042 square miles — approximately the size of the state of Delaware) and the largest population (1,267,792). It is probable that it also contains the greatest wealth.



With reference to law enforcement functions, the Dade County Public Safety Department is comparable in many ways to a state police agency with respect to the size of its jurisdiction and the range of responses that it must be capable of producing.

The area of southeast Florida that includes Dade County, city of Miami, and Miami Beach has been organized into a metropolitan form of government to provide the efficiencies of consolidation in offering services to the numerous incorporated municipalities in the area. The existence of this "Metro" form of government, coupled with municipal reactions to it, form one of the most important background elements for understanding law enforcement efforts during the 1972 national political conventions.

"Metro" consists of a council of elected commissioners assisted by an appointed County Manager. It functions to provide a broad range of metropolitan services to 26 independently incorporated municipalities in the area. The services available to these municipalities (16 of them having less than 10,000 population) could be neither developed nor coordinated successfully without some form of "Metro" government. Nonetheless, each municipality vigilantly protects its own independence and regards any extension of power by Metro as a form of subversion that will eventually end with the absorption of the independent municipality. The independent municipalities are incapable of functioning properly without Metro, but they fear and distrust any surrender of local authority to the larger entity. Metro, for its part, is aggressively increasing its own responsibilities, lending credence to some of the municipal fears.

In the law enforcement field, Dade County PSD was accustomed to dealing with others from a position of authority. During one year preceding the political conventions, it had been necessary for Dade PSD to assist municipal police forces in Opalocka (twice) and South Miami. In each case, PSD exercised its customary rule of assuming command in areas where their forces were committed. As one spokesman for Dade PSD describes the policy: "Whenever we interface with another agency, we take over."

With respect to the national political conventions being planned for Miami Beach, this customary policy was not feasible. Because Miami Beach was a separate, incorporated municipality having jurisdiction over the convention site and the quarters for delegates, Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance was named Chief of Convention Security by the Governor. Funds were allocated by LEAA to assist in his jurisdiction. Sheriff Purdy of Dade County retained a constitutional authority to assume command in the convention area during an emergency, but the "emergency" clearly did not include planning for the event. It was obvious that Miami Beach would require help from Dade County in policing the conventions, but it would clearly be a political



blunder for Dade County to insist that PSD "take over" preparations for the conventions. This inability of PSD to function normally (i. e., from a command position with respect to a municipal police force within the Metro system) created considerable tension that persisted throughout the convention season.

The temporary reversal of normal lines of authority between law enforcement agencies of Metro and Miami Beach occurred simultaneously with an increased dependence by Miami Beach on other Metro agencies to provide coordination and help in convention preparations. This was true in terms of coordinating health and hospital services so as not to be overtaxed by the needs of thousands of uninvited demonstrators, providing sanitation and other municipal services to these demonstrators, and developing a cooperative criminal justice plan that would continue to operate if tested with mass arrests. Throughout the period of preparations for the conventions, therefore, lines of authority and responsibility tended to shift from one agency to another — between municipal government and Metro — depending on the particular function in process. This shifting command structure, partly inherent in the interdependencies and rivalries of the developing metropolitan government, ultimately produced gaps where cooperation was needed and it was not forthcoming, and convention preparations suffered negative effects.

#### LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES AND TENSIONS

The issues and tensions that formed the "background" for the political conventions within the law enforcement field were also experienced as significant events by persons not directly concerned with law enforcement. Some events, however, tended to be either particularly significant for law enforcement officers or likely to be interpreted differently by them. Some of the incidents that were significant within the law enforcement field were the following:

- February 18 - California Supreme Court declares capital punishment unconstitutional in that state.
- March 3 - Senate Judiciary Committee begins hearings into charges that the Justice Department improperly settled an anti-trust suit against ITT after the firm made contributions to the Republican Party.
- April 27 - After considerable debate, Richard Kleindienst receives Senate approval as Attorney General.

- May 2 - FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dies at the age of 77.
- June 17 - Five men are apprehended with wiretap equipment inside Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate Building.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT DECISIONS. Although superficially removed from concerns of day-to-day policing, the series of decisions in 1972 concerning capital punishment exerted a subtle influence on law enforcement agencies. The California decision banned capital punishment on grounds that it was "cruel and unusual" punishment. A New Jersey decision to the same effect had been based on grounds of capital punishment "coercing" defendants to plead guilty to avoid risk of death. In June, the United States Supreme Court ruled that death penalties imposed by judges or juries who had to decide between capital punishment and life imprisonment violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishments.

As time passed, these combined decisions tended to produce a certain amount of confusion within police departments, particularly with reference to use of the police firearm to stop a fleeing felon. One officer described the situation in this way: "If the Supreme Court of the United States doesn't have the right to take a man's life, what right has the patrolman on the street to make that decision?" In the wake of the capital punishment decisions, many departments instituted regulations (occasionally unwritten) that limited use of the handgun to situations when an officer's life was actually in danger. It was not at any time anticipated that a need to use firearms would arise during the political conventions, but the attitudes that governed this area of police restraint tended to permeate other areas. The capital punishment decisions produced a situation where police departments were increasingly reluctant to use lethal weapons. This attitude, in turn, led to the position that any use of force was considered to be less desirable than the ability to settle a problem without using force.

NATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS. Both President Nixon and Senator McGovern responded to public concern about "crime in the streets" by citing conflicting crime statistics. The use of this data for political purposes — and the questions raised by political attacks upon it — was demoralizing and confusing to some police officers.

President Nixon used statistics from the FBI "Uniform Crime Reports" to claim that serious criminal behavior had risen only 1% during the first six months of 1972, the slowest rate of increase in several decades. McGovern insisted that the period of the Nixon administration had witnessed a 30% increase in serious crime, the highest for a three year span since the statistics were recorded. The President cited a 50% decrease in the amount of crime in the District of Columbia.

McGovern alleged that police in the Capital had merely begun to assign lesser values to stolen items, thereby keeping a large number of larcenies and burglaries out of the category of "serious crime."

The overall impact of the manipulation of crime statistics by politicians involved more than a police officer merely choosing a side to believe. The underlying validity of the crime statistics was put into question, and the continuing debate tended to reduce confidence in official figures produced by law enforcement agencies.

DEATH OF J. EDGAR HOOVER. Although J. Edgar Hoover was an old man, his death caused a shock among the general public who had come to regard Mr. Hoover as a national institution. Within the law enforcement field, the immediate questions raised pertained to a successor as head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following the Senate hearings into the alleged Justice Department misconduct pertaining to the ITT anti-trust suit, critics of the Nixon administration expressed fears that the FBI would be transformed into "political police" used to carry out White House orders. With the naming of L. Patrick Gray, a Nixon appointee in the Justice Department, as the President's choice for the job, it was certain that this issue would produce a long battle over confirmation. Alternate choices existed within the ranks of professional law enforcement agencies, and it is possible that some of the individuals who participated in the convention experience saw themselves in the role of successor to Mr. Hoover.

WALLACE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. When Arthur Bremer shot down Governor Wallace at a campaign rally in Laurel, Maryland, on May 15, the deepest fears of all the law enforcement officers engaged in planning for the political conventions were aroused. Here, before their eyes, was a graphic example of the worst possible thing that could occur . . . and it had happened.

For months, police leaders had been hammering home a message of "low profile," "accommodation" and "restraint." Now it was suddenly apparent that a great deal was at stake. Occurring as it did — just ten days after the Republican Convention shift from San Diego to Miami Beach — the incident heightened tensions enormously in the Miami area. The basic "low profile" strategy remained in place, but a new seriousness was evident.

WATERGATE BURGLARY. The disclosure that five men, apparently political henchmen, had been apprehended on June 17 inside Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate was greeted initially with only mild reprobation and some humor. As the days passed, however, and the implications involved in using the enormous power of the White House against political opponents came to the surface, some of the principals engaged in preparing for the national political conventions began to have disturbing thoughts about the federal officers assigned to "protect" political candidates and the convention hall.



Richard Murphy, Democratic Convention Manager, and the top Democrats began to worry about their party's dependence on federal organizations such as the Secret Service and the FBI. Federal agents in these agencies were to be stationed inside the hall to make decisions on the degree of force needed to respond to possible disruptions. They were also to provide bodyguards for key persons. Finally, on July 4, Mr. Murphy announced that he would bar all "politically appointed" Justice Department and Treasury Department officials from the convention hall during the Democratic Convention. In practical terms, this meant that Mr. Murphy would welcome the assistance of "career" agents as security officers, but he would not permit anyone who owed his present position to the Nixon administration, through appointment or promotion, to be present in areas where political spying could possibly take place.

However unlikely it may have been that these federal agencies contained the political spies that Mr. Murphy feared, the events at the Watergate seemed to justify his action. The shaking of confidence in the federal agencies was one of the most immediate negative effects of the Watergate burglary.

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT. The following general information is descriptive of the Miami Beach Police Department preceding the national political conventions in 1972:

- Size of force varied between 230 and 250.
- Ratio of police to population was 2.6 per thousand.
- No residence requirement. Only the Chief of Police and a few officers living in the community.
- Starting patrolman pay was \$9,288.
- Sergeant pay was \$13,312 (highest in Florida).
- 15 men had 4-year college degrees.
- Two men had doctorates, one sergeant had a masters degree.
- Only one black officer, a detective sergeant.
- Total police budget voted by City Council was \$3,881,730.
- Equipment operated included: 58 squad cars (27 unmarked), 16 motorcycles, one paddy wagon, and two boats.

By way of comparison with other law enforcement agencies who had a major role in the political conventions, the Miami Beach department was accustomed to patrolling an area with a relatively low overall crime rate and a much lower percentage of violent crime. During the first six months of 1972, the following county and municipal offense data was generated:



	<u>Total Crimes</u>	<u>Crime Rate per 100,000</u>	<u>% Violent Crimes</u>	<u>% Breaking and Entering</u>	<u>% Cleared</u>
City of Miami	11,150	3,275.6	22.6	37.3	17.6
Unincorporated Dade County (PSD)	14,289	2,381.5	12.7	35.3	21.8
Miami Beach	1,191	1,367.7	5.4	57.7	12.6

The relatively low percentage of cases cleared is a natural outcome of the relatively high number of unwitnessed crimes such as breaking and entering.

The only significant internal problem affecting the Miami Beach Police Department immediately before the conventions involved a dispute with members of the Identification Division. Chief Pomerance took the position that identification work did not require sworn police personnel but should be performed by skilled civilians. I.D. personnel upheld their side of the dispute with a \$500,000 law suit against the Chief and the City. The significance of this dispute should be regarded with the knowledge that the Identification Division was at the time enforcing a registration law affecting service industry personnel in Miami Beach. Between the period of May 1, 1972, and July 7, 1972, the Identification and Records Division fingerprinted 11,950 job applicants. These fingerprints were processed through the NCIC in Washington, D. C., then turned over to the Secret Service and then forwarded to the FBI for a criminal history check. During this period, the workload of the Identification Division was approximately six times that experienced during the same period in the previous year.

On the bright side, Chief Pomerance was successful in gaining a pay raise for police officers that became effective just before the beginning of the conventions. The City Council had indicated that they would approve a raise for policemen and other municipal employees at the September budget review. With the need for long hours of convention duty and the importance of good police morale in mind, the City Council on June 7 approved a 7.5% raise for all patrolmen and a 5% raise for remaining officers. Only police and firemen were affected by the early raises.

This was the background — these were the backgrounds — of the 1972 national political conventions in Miami Beach.


This diverse and complicated array of issues and tensions — some of national significance and others purely local — was omnipresent during the days before and during the national conventions. The

"background" was always there, just out of sight, exerting an invisible influence on the events that were then materializing at the forefront of time and place. Broad national issues, such as race relations, the economy, welfare, the war, and other diverse concerns became mixed with innumerable bits and pieces of past events in a massive, largely undefined stream of recollection and understanding that funneled inevitably onto the city that would host the conventions.

Despite the importance of these past and concurrent themes, in no way should it be assumed that the background of the conventions determined what happened. The background influenced attitudes. The background influenced relationships. The outcome of the 1972 convention experience, however, was determined on the spot by individuals who weighed the significance of these background pressures against the needs for the present and hopes for the future. It is to a consideration of the actions that made up that present that we now turn.

###

MIAMI BEACH



JULIA TUTTLE CAUSEWAY

ARTHUR GODFREY RD.

COLLINS AVE.

PINE TREE DR.

DADE BLVD.

CONVENTION HALL

17th ST.

VENETIAN CAUSEWAY

ALTON RD.

15th ST.

BISCAYNE BAY

FLAMINGO PARK

MERIDIAN AVE.

WASHINGTON AVE.

COLLINS AVE.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

5th ST.

MacARTHUR CAUSEWAY

POLICE DEPT.

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

The record of an event is always more orderly and more comprehensible than the event itself. This expectation forms part of one's motivation for producing an official record.

Much of the remainder of this book will attempt to describe how things were done in Miami Beach during the summer of 1972, and to evaluate some of the law enforcement activities there. Within this chapter, we merely want to describe what happened.

The record presented here is organized chronologically. In other chapters many of the incidents summarized here are described in greater detail and evaluated within certain useful, rational contexts. Here we simply want to get a chronological report on record, with the implication that the reader will be better able to evaluate information in later chapters if he first gains a basic familiarity with what happened during the national political conventions of 1972. In order to fully comprehend and analyze decisions and events, one should be aware of what other events preceded, followed or occurred simultaneously with the event in question. In short, although it is useful to analyze events within the context of abstract categories, it remains essential to understand the real life situations that originally existed.

Obviously, any chronological record is selective. Thousands of possible entries have been omitted simply because of limited space and time. Sources used to produce this record include chronological logs produced by the Miami Beach Police Department, the City of Miami Police Department, Dade County Public Safety Department, Florida Highway Patrol, and the National Guard. In addition to these sources, daily after-action reports distributed by intelligence officers during the convention



period were utilized. Also studied were copies of daily reports made by Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC), a group charged with performing the role of "observer" during the convention period. Newspaper accounts of events provided a valuable resource, as did numerous conversations with police officers and others who participated in the events.

Day by day, hour by hour, as close to the minute as we can safely ascertain, this is the record of the national political conventions as it was experienced. It is hoped that this "bare bones" chronology will communicate some of the excitement, frustration, and occasional wonder that was so important at the time. Things simply did not happen in orderly, predictable ways. In the midst of all those rather unusual looking young demonstrators who congregated in Flamingo Park, the daily shuffleboard games of the elderly continued without interruption. Little old ladies sat placidly on park benches to watch female demonstrators strip to the waist or lead a rousing cheer of "Fuck War". Young policemen, who might have been expected to sympathize with demonstrators of their own age, turned out to be hard line cops. Older, married men - with a greater stake in the "establishment" under attack - turned out to be accommodating diplomats on the streets. Chief Pomerance recalls the convention period well. He says, "It was really an Alice in Wonderland experience."

## CHRONOLOGY

JUNE 29  
THURSDAY

Parade. Less than 100 supporters of Youth International Party (Yippies) parade from convention hall to golf course in the first "street action" of the Democratic National Convention, intended to demonstrate that YIP does not threaten the community.

Legal. American Civil Liberties Union files a suit in U.S. District Court challenging the constitutionality of recently enacted Miami Beach parade permit ordinance.

JUNE 30  
FRIDAY

Politics. Democratic credentials committee in Washington, D. C., votes to deny 59 delegate seats to Mayor Daley of Chicago. Same committee voted to divide California's block of delegates, favoring the position argued by Senator Humphrey.

Politics. Governor George Wallace, recovering in a Maryland hospital from an assassination attempt, announces that he will attend the DNC in Miami Beach.

JUNE 30  
FRIDAY

Military. Army engineers from Fort Stewart, Georgia, are erecting a campsite to house at least a battalion of troops at Homestead Air Force Base south of Miami.

Campsite. Dade County employees are erecting a chain link fence, six feet high, around a park on Watson Island, which has been offered as a campsite to non-delegates. YIP spokesman says that demonstrators will insist on a campsite on Miami Beach.

Campsite. George Rodericks, civil defense chief from Washington, D. C., working as a consultant to Dade County Manager Ray Goode, predicts that only about 6,000 non-delegates will attend the DNC and that only about 2,000 will be seeking a public campsite.

JULY 1  
SATURDAY

Politics. John Mitchell resigns as Richard Nixon's campaign manager following Watergate break-in June 17 and an extraordinary series of telephone interviews between Mrs. Mitchell and UPI reporter Helen Thomas.

JULY 3  
MONDAY

Politics. Gallup poll indicates that Nixon leads both McGovern and Humphrey by wide margins: Nixon 53% - McGovern 37%; Nixon 55% - Humphrey 33%.

Legal. Judge Atkins, U. S. District Court, temporarily enjoins city of Miami Beach from enforcing its parade permit ordinance.

Demonstration. Yippies initiate plan to camp out overnight illegally on the Miami Beach golf course. Crowd gathers on course at night.

Police. Chief Pomerance arranges for temporary housing for non-delegates at a Jewish temple on Miami Beach. Offer accepted by all but a handful of Zippies, who remain on golf course.

JULY 4  
TUESDAY

Demonstration. National Tenants Organization (NTO) holds a picnic in Lincoln Garden Park, a predominantly black neighborhood in Miami. Crowd

JULY 4  
TUESDAY

estimated at 175, including speakers from several groups planning convention demonstrations.

JULY 5  
WEDNESDAY

Demonstration. Miami Women's Coalition, approximately 25 females, picket the new Miami Women's Detention Center.

Police. Dade County Public Safety Department reports intelligence that school teachers in Liberty City and Brownsville areas are being told that children will be absent during the convention because "parents do not want them in the area when the riots break out."

Demonstration. About 50 members of organizations representing welfare and poor people briefly occupied seats inside the convention hall to dramatize their demands for a bloc of delegate votes to represent their interests.

Campsite. Miami Beach City Council votes 4-2 in favor of granting a campsite to non-delegates. Flamingo Park site is granted to Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) under leadership of Rev. Ralph Abernathy.

Demonstration. Fund raising meeting for Miami Convention Coalition draws 300 to Jewish cultural center, reportedly raising \$600 for MCC.

JULY 6  
THURSDAY

11:00 am

Demonstration. La Gorce Country Club picketed by about 50 persons led by Yippies and including some elderly residents. Target is alleged discrimination against Jews and other minority groups.

Police. No uniformed police officers present at La Gorce. Two plainclothes detectives, one with rank of Major, observe the demonstration. Only police action is to calm an angry spectator at the scene.

Afternoon

Campsite. Rev. Abernathy arrives at Flamingo Park to supervise erection of tents for SCLC. Poet Allen Ginsburg and Abernathy meet reporters.

JULY 6  
THURSDAY

Midnight

Campsite. Approximately 500 persons camping in Flamingo Park. A medical service unit has been set up inside the park.

JULY 7  
FRIDAY

am

Demonstration. Representatives of black groups — SCLC, National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and National Tenants Organization — numbering approximately 150, force their way into a closed meeting of the Democratic Arrangements Committee at the Fontainebleau Hotel. Protest leaders demand 750 convention seats for their constituency. Formal meeting is adjourned as demonstrators occupy the stage and microphones.

Campsite. A "land coalition" is formed to perform the functions of self-government within Flamingo Park. Two members of each participating group make up the land coalition.

Noon

Demonstration. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) demonstrate outside the Eden Roc Hotel during a Democratic National Committee luncheon.

Police. Chief Pomerance briefly visits Flamingo Park.

Campsite. Discussions continue throughout the day concerning plans for demonstrations. Zippies, for instance, want a "smoke-in" for legalized marijuana. Yippies and SCLC feel that more important issues — war, poverty, discrimination — should be focal point.

Politics. Senator Humphrey, Senator Muskie and Governor Wallace arrive at Miami International Airport. Wallace, in wheelchair, is greeted by cheering crowd of 4,000.

3:15 pm

Demonstration. Occupation of rooms at the Fontainebleau by SCLC, NWRO and NTO ends with formation of a committee by Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence O'Brien to negotiate the demand for 750 seats.



JULY 7  
FRIDAY

10:00 pm

Demonstration. Zippies lead nude swimming at Flamingo Park pool. About 40 bathers participating. This action taken despite rules established by land coalition against nude bathing.

Campsite. Representatives of SCLC and other black groups strongly disapprove of nude swimming in the pool.

JULY 8  
SATURDAY

Elsewhere. Rock concert at Pocono International Raceway in Lake Pond, Pa., attracts 200,000 young people.

Military. Transport planes land throughout the day at Homestead Air Force Base, positioning approximately 2,500 Army paratroopers and Marines as backup reserve forces.

Military. National Guard units, approximately 3,000 men, stationed in the Miami area. Some 800 located at Miami Beach High School near convention center.

11:45 am

Demonstration. SDS leads a noisy sidewalk demonstration outside the Eden Roc Hotel during a Democratic National Committee luncheon, protesting racism and war.

Police. Mostly plainclothes detectives observe demonstration at the Eden Roc. Only action is to stop two SDS demonstrators who attempted to enter the hotel, supposedly to obtain drinking water. A policeman goes into the hotel and returns with water.

2:00-4:00 pm

Recreation. SDS Beach Party at 10th Street, approximately 35 people on the beach. Police officers occasionally wander through area but take no action.

Politics. Senator George McGovern arrives in Miami Beach.

JULY 8  
SATURDAY

4:45 pm

Parade. Marchers depart from the Sharon Hotel at 20th St. and Collins Ave. for parade to convention hall. Crowd estimated at 250-300 is led by NWRO and NTO, many of whom are staying at the Sharon. Purpose is to dramatize demands for 750 convention seats for poor people.

Police. Assisted marchers by stopping traffic at four intersections along the path of the parade.

5:00 pm

Demonstration. Marchers reach convention complex and find gate at 20th St. and Washington Avenue unguarded. They proceed into North Hall and the group occupies seats in the hall. Leaders state that they will not leave until demands are met. Speeches commence.

6:10 pm

After speeches by black leaders and a brief address by Chuck Hall, Mayor of Miami Beach, demonstrators march once around the inside of the hall and prepare to leave. At the gate, the departing group is met by 150 more demonstrators who have come from Flamingo Park to join them in the convention center.

6:30 pm

Combined group of demonstrators leaves convention grounds.

6:55 pm

Politics. Mrs. Coretta King, widow of Dr. Martin Luther King, arrives at Miami International Airport and is met by a car from McGovern staff.

7:30 pm

Politics. Rally at Dupont Plaza Hotel attracts 700-1,000 persons to hear Senator McGovern. Rally is presided over by Dr. George Wiley (NWRO).

Police. Four uniformed officers serve as security guard for speakers.

10:00 pm

Rally ends without incident.

JULY 8  
SATURDAY

10:00 pm

Flamingo Park. Zippie leaders are urging people to participate in nude swimming despite camp rules against it. Zippie leader is dumped into pool fully clothed by a lifeguard suspected of being a policeman.

Midnight

Flamingo Park. Approximately 20 nude males enter swimming pool. Most are persuaded to leave by other campers. Campers reject suggestion to remove the remaining bathers by force.

1:30 am

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) clear the pool of spectators, hoping that nude swimmers would then leave.

2:30 am

Activity at pool ends.

JULY 9  
SUNDAY

am

Flamingo Park. Intelligence estimates indicate about 1,000 campers in park (250-300 tents). SCLC is the dominant group with 60 tents. Yippies have 25, VVAW 16-20. Approximately 100 tents belong to "independents."

Flamingo Park. Zippies have begun to antagonize other groups, including VVAW, SCLC and Yippies.

Noon

Flamingo Park. Internal government now organized as Resurrection City II, comprised of six members of each major political group. Marshalls from groups possess walkie-talkie communications. Public address system is restricted to public service announcements. Nude swimming is prohibited. Throughout the day, tourists and elderly residents wander freely through the campsite.

JULY 9  
SUNDAY

3:00 pm

Demonstration. "Smoke-In" sponsored by Zippies and People's Pot Party in Flamingo Park. Crowd of about 2,000 in park, but only 50-60 active participants. The action draws objections from SCLC leaders who do not want marijuana smoking in the campsite.

3:00 pm

Police. Command Post "Beta" at the convention center becomes fully operational.

Demonstration. Black groups sponsor an all day rally in Manor Park in northwest Miami. Estimated crowds of 1,500-2,000 participate during the afternoon and evening. Several "observer" groups present, including Community Relations Service of the Justice Department, YMCA Outreach, Ombudsmen, and Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC).

4:40 pm

Parade and Demonstration. Marchers (100 plus 150 spectators) leave Flamingo Park and parade to front of convention center at 18th Street and Washington Avenue. Crowd mills around, chanting slogans, then sits on lawn to hear speakers. Many appear to be smoking marijuana.

5:00 pm

Demonstration. A religious group, numbering about 20, is simultaneously carrying a cross at front of convention center.

Police. Direct traffic and maintain stationary guard at gates.

5:25 pm

Demonstration. Most of the demonstrators proceed around the convention center to the rear of the hall at Meridian Avenue and 18th Street, where they again chant slogans and display signs. Group then returns to Flamingo Park.

5:30 pm

Police. A 50-man contingent of Dade PSD officers is positioned inside the Playboy Plaza Hotel, 5445 Collins Avenue, in anticipation of demonstrations later in the evening.



JULY 9  
SUNDAY

6:40 pm

Demonstration. First demonstrators arrive in front of Playboy Plaza to greet guests arriving for the 1972 Sponsor's Club Cocktail Party and Reception (campaign contributors).

7:20 pm

Demonstration. Estimated 150 persons outside Playboy Plaza led by SDS, chanting slogans. At this point the crowd begins to pound on automobiles arriving at the hotel and to surround and push guests arriving on foot. Some sit down in the driveway attempting to stop traffic.

Police. Four prisoner vans are requested to be sent to 46th Street and Collins Avenue.

7:40 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol task force moves from 46th Street parking lot to Playboy Plaza. State troopers arrive in 36 FHP cars, sirens on and blue lights flashing. A formation of troopers quickly moves demonstrators away from the hotel entrance. No arrests.

Demonstration. Many of the demonstrators who moved southward from the Playboy Plaza then participated in sidewalk demonstrations outside the Fontainebleau at 44th Street. These demonstrations did not become violent.

8:00 pm

Demonstration. Manor Park rally ends after speeches by Coretta King and Ralph Abernathy. Response reportedly is low key.

9:25 pm

Demonstration. About 75 protesters returned to Playboy Plaza after Fontainebleau group dispersed, but no serious incident occurred.

Campsite. Gay Activist Alliance moved tents into Flamingo Park during the evening despite fears that they would not be accepted by other demonstrators.

Recreation. Mass nude swim-in occurred in Flamingo Park when demonstrators returned from the activities at the Playboy Plaza and Fontainebleau.

JULY 9  
SUNDAY

11:05 pm  
11:25 pm

Police. Units from PSD, FHP, and Miami relieved for the night.

1:00 am

Police. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Division personnel assume security of convention center and relieve Miami Beach units at perimeter posts.

JULY 10  
MONDAY

First day of 1972 Democratic National Convention.

10:25 am

Parade and Demonstration. Group numbering 200-350 proceeds from Flamingo Park to Washington Avenue outside convention hall, led by VVAW. Orderly speeches. Crowd grows to 1,000.

Police. Direct traffic on Washington Avenue around occasional groups spilling over sidewalk.

Demonstration. A second group, consisting of 20 persons carrying a cross, simultaneously conducts a counter-demonstration against the larger group. Leader, using bullhorn, frequently interrupts larger demonstration.

11:30 am


Activities end in area of convention center.

Police. Two platoons from Dade PSD staging area on 6th Street are moved to Miami Beach Municipal Court, anticipating demonstrations at the trial of Zippie Pat Small, scheduled for 2:00 p. m. (Small threw a pie at a City Councilman on June 23.)


Noon

Parade. About 100 persons, led by Zippies, march from City Hall to Miami Beach Court Building. Stated purpose is to "free" Pat Small.

★ CANDIDATE HEADQUARTERS  
AND KEY HOTELS — DNC



PERIMETER FENCE WITH GATE NUMBERS





JULY 10  
MONDAY

1:20 pm

Demonstration. Crowd gathers at Municipal Court building. Some demonstrators permitted to enter building before doors are closed. Many carry pies with them. Announcement is made that Small's trial has been postponed because lawyer cannot be present. Pies are ceremoniously eaten, and Small leaves with crowd.

3:20 pm

Demonstration. Small group from Poor People's March congregate in south demonstration area at front of convention hall. Orderly speeches.

5:50 pm

Demonstration. Several groups leave Flamingo Park and Manor Park in Miami to attend a combined rally led by Rev. Abernathy and Dr. Wiley at convention center. Crowd estimated at 1,200 gathers on Washington Avenue.

Demonstration. Speakers at rally include Coretta King, Dr. Spock, and Gloria Steinem. Crowd increases to 2,500.

Police. All gates on Washington Avenue side of convention center closed during rally because of rumored attempts to crash gates.

7:00 pm

Politics. Scheduled time for Democratic National Convention to officially convene. Delegates enter complex through gates on 17th Street and Meridian Avenue.

Politics. Inside the convention hall, delegates will act on reports from the Rules Committee and Credentials Committee. (Credentials committee challenges involve blocs of delegates from eleven states.)

7:45 pm

Demonstration. Mass rally on Washington Avenue ends. SCLC marshalls urge people to return to Flamingo Park. Remaining crowd, estimated at 1,200 and containing a group ranging from 200 to 500 led by SDS, attempts to force open the gate at Washington Avenue & 18th St.

JULY 10  
MONDAY

Police. Two PSD platoons brought from staging area inside the complex to reinforce officers at gate 5X and along fence on 17th Street.

Demonstration. Failing to break gate 5X, group moves around the corner to similarly test gates on 17th Street.

8:19 pm

Police. Miami Beach Sergeant is injured (cut over eye) when struck by gate 8AX while attempting to secure it against pushing crowd. Lock mechanism at gate 9X breaks, but officers successfully prevent crowd from entering complex. Mace is used by City of Miami officer to repel persons attempting to climb over the fence near gate 9X. Florida Highway Patrol task force stationed at St. Patrick's School (37th Street and Garden) is requested to move to convention complex.

Arrest. One demonstrator succeeds in climbing over the fence on 17th Street and is immediately apprehended and arrested - the first arrest of the Democratic National Convention.

Accident. A Miami Beach motorcycle patrolman is slightly injured in an accident while escorting FHP task force to convention center.

8:48 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol mobile task force arrives at convention center, entering at rear of hall at Meridian Avenue & 18th Street and proceeding in vehicles to a point near gate 10X at 17th Street.

Demonstration. As FHP troopers are exiting their cars, a section of fence - 45 feet in length between gates 9X and 10X - is torn down by crowds in the street.

Police. FHP unit immediately forms a line to block the opening in the fence. Two troopers are slightly injured when struck by rocks thrown at them.

8:56 pm

Police. Six large Mark IX mace dispensers are sent to gate 10X. Crowd, seeing their arrival, moves back to area where fence is down.

JULY 10  
MONDAY

9:25 pm

Marshalls. Throughout the disturbances, marshalls from various demonstration groups had been urging people to return to Flamingo Park. Under their prodding, the group begins to thin out. A sudden downpour accelerates the crowd dispersal.

9:54 pm

Police. All gates at convention center ordered to reopen for normal use. Fence repair crews begin work, adding reinforcement to each post.

10:15 pm

Parade and demonstration. About 75 members of Gay Activist Alliance leave Flamingo Park carrying lighted candles and proceed to front of convention center on Washington Avenue, planning to conduct an all-night vigil to call attention to demands of gay groups. About 35 remained throughout the night.

12:13 am

Bomb threat. Convention still in progress as debates continue on convention floor. Telephone call to convention hall warns of bomb set to go off in 20 minutes. Secret Service and other units alerted. False alarm.

Politics. Senator Humphrey releases about 90 black delegates pledged to him so they can vote for Rep. Shirley Chisholm on the first ballot. This interpreted as a move to push Senator McGovern into making a similar (self-weakening) gesture.

Politics. Senator McGovern wins credentials decision restoring the full California delegation to him. This makes McGovern the overwhelming favorite to win the presidential nomination.

JULY 11  
TUESDAY

Second day of Democratic National Convention.

Police intelligence system revised. State beverage control agents and operatives of Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) begin operating "scout" cars throughout the area to provide needed reports on actions in progress.

JULY 11  
TUESDAY

Police. Overall perimeter defense strategy at convention center is modified to improve tactical response time. "Zone defense" adopted, assigning authority to counter threats against segments of the perimeter to designated unit commanders.

Noon

Demonstration. Zippies push a dummy of Gov. George Wallace in a wheelchair to the beach at 14th Street and attempt to send it out to sea. Waves repeatedly wash it ashore.

1:10 pm

Demonstration. Zippies (150) arrive at convention center where they throw the Wallace dummy and wheelchair over the fence onto convention grounds at Washington Avenue & 18th Street.

Police. Gates are routinely locked as groups approach and reopened after they have passed.

Hotel demonstration. Fontainebleau, 4441 Collins Avenue, meeting of the National Women's Political Caucus is target of National Women's Rights Organization and the National Tenants Organization (less than 100). No police action required.

2:15 pm

Hotel demonstration. Four Ambassadors, 801 South Bayshore, in Miami. Unsuccessful attempt of Poor People's group (75 persons) to present their platform to Governor Wallace.

3:00 pm

Hotel demonstration. Americana, 9701 Collins Ave. First Lady's Tea and Fashion Show attended by wives of candidates is picketed by SDS demonstrators (50 persons).

Hotel demonstration. Doral, 4833 Collins Ave. SCLC representatives (50) ask to see Senator McGovern but he is not available. Group hands out leaflets and departs.

Politics. Senator Humphrey withdraws from presidential candidate race, yielding to Senator McGovern.

Politics. Senator Muskie also yields to McGovern.



JULY 11  
TUESDAY

6:00 pm

Parade. Approximately 800 Cubans depart from Burdine's department store at Meridian Avenue and 17th Street for march to convention center, demonstrating anti-Castro, anti-communist position. Route moves from Meridian, east on 17th to Washington, then north on Washington Avenue past convention hall.

6:08 pm

Parade. First groups depart Flamingo Park for a unified parade and rally. Total numbers estimated at 1,000 to 1,500. Route moves north on Meridian to 15th Street, east on 15th to Washington, then north on Washington to north demonstration area.

(Cubans and Flamingo Park campers are mutually antagonistic groups.)

6:15 pm

Parade. Cuban group becomes disorganized, strung out all along 17th Street from Washington back to Meridian.

Police. Report of slow Cuban progress is reported to Miami Beach patrol car leading the Flamingo Park parade.

6:20 pm

Parade. VVAW and SCLC marshalls (15 each), leading the parade, halt at intersection of 15th Street and Washington Avenue. Demonstrators block intersection, chanting slogans. Delay provides time for Cubans to close ranks and move north on Washington. Flamingo Park marchers then continue to south demonstration area.

6:35 pm

Police. As marching groups approach convention center, all gates are closed except for one - gate 11X on Meridian Avenue, which remains open to receive delegates.

7:00 pm

Parade. A third parade, consisting of 50-60 Gay Activists, approaches convention hall from the north, moving south on Washington Avenue, passing through the assembly area occupied by Cuban organizations.

JULY 11  
TUESDAY

Cuban marshalls (25 men) successfully keep the two groups separate and avoid violent confrontation.

7:00 pm

Politics. Second assembly of Democratic National Convention scheduled to begin. Florida Governor Askew delivers keynote address.

Politics. Governor George Wallace scheduled to address convention during debate of Platform Committee recommendations.

7:25 pm

Parade. Organized Migrants in Community Action, a coalition of migrant farm workers including blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and others, departs from Flamingo Park for convention center with 110 persons. Purpose of demonstration is to protest Florida Governor's "insensitivity" to migrant workers while he is making keynote speech.

7:50 pm

Demonstration. Farm workers arrive at convention center, where other demonstrations are in progress. Two farm workers make speeches over the loudspeakers.

7:55 pm

Cuban groups move northeast from convention hall to board busses waiting at 22nd Street & Park Avenue.

8:00 pm

Ambulance. An elderly farm worker fainted, and an ambulance passed through the demonstration area to reach him.

8:00 pm

Confrontation. Cuban stragglers return to convention area via 19th Street. Brief scuffle breaks out at Washington Avenue and 19th. Marshalls from Flamingo Park groups and third party groups link arms to keep antagonists separated until Cuban marshalls restrain their own people.

JULY 11  
TUESDAY

8:05 pm

Demonstration. About half of the Flamingo Park group initiates a march around the convention center, leading back to campsite. VVAW, SCLC, and Gay Activists participating. A smaller group (200-250), led by SDS, continues the rally.

8:43 pm

Demonstration. SDS group proceeds back to Flamingo Park, taunting police units along the 17th Street fence as they go.

9:15 pm

Transportation arrives for waiting farm workers. Convention area quiet outside. Convention business continues inside.

9:30 pm

Recreation. Free rock concert in progress at Flamingo Park. Some nude swimming again occurs in park pool.

2:30 am

Flamingo Park. Mayor Chuck Hall shows up in Flamingo Park for informal conversations with demonstrators.

JULY 12  
WEDNESDAY

Third day of Democratic National Convention.

am

During the night, a power failure on Venetian causeway - which carries TV cables from Miami Beach - prompted fears of sabotage. It was discovered however, that a duck had flown into a transformer, electrocuting itself, and causing the power failure.

Arrests. Secret Service agents arrested two men at the Doral Beach Hotel, McGovern headquarters, on charges of carrying concealed weapons. Both men are members of Republic of New Africa, headquartered in Jackson, Miss. Hearing set for July 18. Bail set at \$100,000.

JULY 12  
WEDNESDAY

11:30 am

Demonstration. Group of about 15 persons gather in front of stockbroker offices on Washington Avenue, shouting slogans to protest American involvement in African affairs and the lack of African bonds on the stock exchange. Crowd grows to 50.

Police. Officers positioned themselves between demonstrators and office windows. Group disbanded after 35 minutes.

1:00 pm

Demonstration. Crowd gathering at the Doral Beach Hotel, apparently to demonstrate at McGovern headquarters.

1:47 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol task force sent to Doral Hotel.

1:55 pm

Demonstration. Two busses arrive at Doral with demonstrators from Flamingo Park. About 100 persons occupy the lobby of the hotel, demanding to see Senator McGovern. The demonstration follows a McGovern statement on Tuesday to the effect that he would withdraw from Vietnam, but leave military forces in Thailand. Anti-war groups feel betrayed and demand clarification.

2:04 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol initiates a sweep of the hotel lobby, moving demonstrators out of the building onto Collins Avenue. Meanwhile, more demonstrators have arrived from Flamingo Park.

2:23 pm

McGovern staff people at the Doral request police to leave the hotel, apparently to avoid political consequences of overt police protection before demonstrators.



JULY 12  
WEDNESDAY

2:30 pm

Demonstrators at Doral, now numbering 200-300, re-enter hotel lobby as police leave. They will remain in the lobby, demanding to see McGovern, throughout the afternoon and evening.

2:30 pm

Demonstration. A Zippie group (150-200) entered a basement auditorium of the Victor Hotel, 1144 Ocean Drive, being used as headquarters for McGovern youth group. Zippies occupy the auditorium and refuse to leave until Senator McGovern meets with them.

Police. Task force staged to proceed to Victor Hotel, but McGovern staff insists that they can handle the problem without the police.

6:30 pm

Police. Miami Beach community relations officer, assisted by members of MCC and VVAW, succeeds in talking the Zippie demonstrators out of the Victor Hotel.

6:45 pm

Parade. Gay Activists march from Flamingo Park to convention center.

7:00 pm

Parade. Miami Women's Coalition and groups forming the Miami Convention Coalition (150) march from Flamingo Park to convention center. Group remains outside convention hall.

7:00 pm

Politics. Third assembly of Democratic National Convention scheduled to begin. Evening's business includes nominations and balloting to select a presidential candidate.

7:30 pm

Demonstration. Vietnam Veterans Against the War join other groups at the convention center and commence building a sand dike on Washington Avenue demonstration area. Sand for dike construction is delivered by truck.

JULY 12  
WEDNESDAY

Purpose of dike building is to protest the bombing of river dikes in North Vietnam.

8:15 pm

Demonstration. SCLC marchers arrive from Flamingo Park. Many participate in dike building. Crowd on Washington Avenue now estimated at 600-700 demonstrators.

Police. Traffic is detoured off Washington Avenue between 17th and 20th Streets to permit demonstrators to build the dike safely.

8:30 pm

Demonstration. At the Doral Beach Hotel, Senator McGovern briefly appeared before the demonstrators, answering questions while standing on the stairs to the hotel mezzanine. A crowd of about 1,000 estimated at the Doral.

8:35 pm

Convention Hall. A group of 25 Vietnam Veterans Against the War enter gate 11X on Meridian Avenue in possession of valid entrance passes, rumored to have been supplied them by McGovern staff. As the group enters convention hall, they fold hands on top of their heads in POW fashion.

9:05 pm

Demonstration at the Doral Hotel ends.

9:30 pm

Entertainment. As work proceeds on the dike building outside convention center, a variety of performers using the "free speech" microphones provide entertainment.

Demonstration. The dike taking shape is 50 feet long, 2 feet high, located about 15 feet from the fence on Washington Avenue and running parallel to it.

JULY 12  
WEDNESDAY

11:30 pm

Entertainment outside convention center ends. Crowd drifts back to Flamingo Park.

Politics. Inside convention hall, Senator McGovern wins nomination as presidential candidate on the first ballot.

12:45 am

Several hundred people milling around in front of the Doral Beach Hotel, but causing no problems.

1:00 am

Politics. Senator McGovern invites all campers in Flamingo Park to a victory celebration at the Doral. Most of the group outside the hotel accepts the invitation.

JULY 13  
THURSDAY

Fourth and final day of Democratic Convention.

4:05 am

Bomb scare. Suitcase with wires coming out of it found behind chairs inside Miami Beach Auditorium (used as police command post on convention complex.). Building is evacuated. Suitcase found to contain tape recording materials.

11:40 am

Hotel demonstration. Fontainebleau Hotel scene of disorganized milling around by about 50 persons.

12:45 pm

Demonstration. Rennie Davis, representing People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), holds a 30-minute press conference at site of dike construction on Washington Avenue & 19th Street.

JULY 13  
THURSDAY

1:55 pm

Hotel demonstration. Lobby of Carillon Hotel, 6801 Collins Avenue, is occupied by about 40 persons responding to alleged "cover up" by Miami Beach police of an auto accident in which a Humphrey aide struck a female jaywalker.

3:30 pm

Police. Carillon Hotel demonstration ends after Miami Beach community relations officer shows copy of accident report to demonstrators, explaining that normal procedures are being followed.

Politics. Senator Thomas Eagleton is named as McGovern's choice for vice presidential running mate.

Flamingo Park. Demonstrators are packing up and departing from campsite in small groups. SDS loudspeaker is used to find rides for hitchhikers.

6:00 pm

Demonstration. At termination of "silent march" to convention center, about 60 VVAW assemble at dike on Washington Avenue with hands folded on head in POW style. Joined by group from Miami Women's Coalition, group moves to rear of convention hall and sits down in the street at Meridian Avenue and 18th Street. Group is hoping to be admitted to the convention hall.

Police. Detour traffic around group sitting in the street on Meridian Avenue.

7:00 pm

Politics. Last day of convention scheduled to begin. Business includes nominations and balloting for vice president, followed by acceptance speeches by candidates for vice president and president.

7:50 pm

Demonstration. Inside convention hall, delegates voted to permit 15 VVAW into hall as guests. Passes are distributed to group on Meridian Avenue, and representatives enter convention hall. Remainder of group stays in street.



JULY 13  
THURSDAY

8:00 pm

Parade. Zippies and others (200 persons) arrive outside convention center on Washington Avenue, carrying a large picture of former president Lyndon Johnson.

8:07 pm

Arrest. At gate 9X on 17th Street, a male demonstrator grabbed a Miami police officer by the shoulder and kissed him. Demonstrator charged with assault and battery.

Demonstration. Groups on Washington Avenue center on the dike. Firecrackers and smoke bombs are set off to simulate bombing. The picture of LBJ is set on fire and thrown over the fence.

8:50 pm

Demonstration. Groups move from Washington Avenue to 17th Street. Gasoline is poured on the street and ignited between gates 9X and 10X. 100 demonstrators sit down in street outside gate 10X.

9:15 pm

Demonstration. When it becomes clear that no more passes to convention hall will be available, remainder of VVAW group at Meridian & 18th St. departs southward.

9:20 pm

Police. When it appeared that the VVAW group might join Zippies at Meridian & 17th, the FHP mobile task force was summoned. Troopers arrive in 36 cars, driving close together with blue lights flashing, entering complex at Meridian & 19th. Arrival of FHP produces momentary confusion among demonstrators, some antagonism, but majority of group continues to move southward to Flamingo Park.

9:30 pm

Demonstration. Remaining 100 Zippies occupy positions at Meridian & 19th vacated by VVAW. Demonstrators demand entry at gate, but do not attempt to force it.

10:15 pm

Marshalls. YMCA outreach marshalls assist police at Meridian & 18th. Demonstrators move back 10 feet, permitting marshalls to form line for

JULY 13  
THURSDAY

orderly entry of persons having passes. Delegates and newsmen permitted to enter, reducing crowd by about 1/3.

Convention hall. A U.S. Marine deserter, assisted by sympathetic California delegates, attempts to gain access to a convention floor microphone. Purpose is to publicly surrender himself to Senator McGovern, dramatizing the amnesty issue. Security guards prevent this action. Deserter talks to newsmen for about 30 minutes before arrested by military police.

JULY 14  
FRIDAY

Courts. In Tallahassee, Florida, six leaders of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War are indicted on charges of conspiring to disrupt the Republican National Convention scheduled to begin August 21.

Military. National Guard begins trucking men home from Miami.

Military. Federal troops begin evacuating Homestead base for return to North Carolina.

1:00 pm

Demonstration. Twelve members of women's organizations enter convention hall after security forces are released and begin to make speeches from atop the podium.

Police. Camera crews inside the hall are requested to temporarily leave. A few minutes later, the demonstration ends.

2:00 pm

Politics. Senator McGovern, the Democratic Party presidential candidate, departs from Miami airport.

JULY 25  
TUESDAY

Politics. Senator Eagleton reveals his medical history of hospitalization for "nervous exhaustion and depression."

JULY 31  
MONDAY

Politics. At the request of Senator McGovern, Senator Eagleton withdraws his candidacy as vice president.

AUGUST 4  
FRIDAY

Demonstration schedule. Rennie Davis (PCPJ) releases a schedule of planned demonstrations at the Republican National Convention. Davis vows activities will be non-violent. "It will not be another Chicago," he says.

AUGUST 5  
SATURDAY

Politics. Senator McGovern selects Sargent Shriver, former Peace Corps Director, as his new running mate.

AUGUST 11  
FRIDAY

Assasination threat. Secret Service arrests a man in Manhattan, New York City, charging him with paying \$1,000 for killing of President Nixon.

AUGUST 13  
SUNDAY

Demonstration. A small group of young people (People's Pot Party) attempted to camp in Flamingo Park overnight without permission. Police negotiated unsuccessfully with the group until 3 a.m. then gave them 15 minutes to leave or face arrest. Group left.

AUGUST 14  
MONDAY

Campsite. After lengthy debates and prolonged indecision, Miami Beach City Council votes (4-3) to permit camping in Flamingo Park for Republican convention. Permit is issued to Religious and Community Leaders Concerned, a group that functioned as observers during Democratic convention. City Manager subsequently announces that park will be open to campers after midnight Wednesday.

AUGUST 15  
TUESDAY

11:00 pm

Campsite. Confusion about availability of Flamingo Park for camping leads to gathering crowd in park. Police announce that the park will

AUGUST 15  
TUESDAY

be closed at midnight. Temporary accommodations have been found for demonstrators at Community Church, Miami Beach.

12:30 am

Police. Miami Beach police and Dade PSD officers enter Flamingo Park and clear demonstrators from the area. Many demonstrators headed for Community Church.

1:15 am

Police. Remnants of Flamingo campers in front of City Hall are informed that they are a disorderly gathering and subject to arrest. Police direct demonstrators to Community Church. Officers are posted at intersections along the way to guide campers.

AUGUST 16  
WEDNESDAY

Demonstrations planned. Anti-war leaders David Dellinger and Rev. Daniel Berrigan announce that they have turned over a copy of their tactical manual to the FBI in order to "prevent misunderstandings." Both emphasize non-violence.

Demonstration. Members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War are marching down the coast of Florida to dramatize their journey to the Republican convention.

Flamingo Park. Crowd ranging from 200 to 400 gathering in park for the night. Music, dancing, some pot smoking. RCLC observer reports that a CBS newsman was inciting demonstrators by arguing that "If you were really serious, you'd be willing to stand up to these guys."

1:15 am

Recreation. About 40 campers in Flamingo Park begin a football game that goes on at least until 3:30 am.



AUGUST 17  
THURSDAY

11:10 am

Parade. Estimated 90 Zippies leave Flamingo Park for Fontainebleau Hotel, where Republican platform committee hearings are in progress.

11:40 am

Police. Parade is briefly stopped on Collins Avenue, then accompanied by several police cars for the remainder of the distance.

12:30 pm

Hotel demonstration. Zippie group outside Fontainebleau chants slogans and makes speeches for approximately one hour.

6:00 pm

Hotel demonstration. SDS group (35-40) picket outside Fontainebleau during meeting of full Republican platform committee.

8:45 pm

Flamingo Park. Land government meeting commences. Long debates occur as demonstrators debate form of internal government and questions pertaining to park sound system.

Midnight

Flamingo Park. Approximately 15 male demonstrators participate in nude swimming while TV crews film the event.

AUGUST 18  
FRIDAY

Military. 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C., are arriving by plane at Homestead Air Force Base, south of Miami.

Police. Two police officers and George Rodericks, consultant to Dade County Manager Ray Goode, are present in Flamingo Park, actively assisting demonstrators to set up campsite.

AUGUST 18  
FRIDAY

11:00 am

Flamingo Park. Prolonged land government meetings continue throughout the day as rules are established for campsite organization. Many tourists and visitors wander freely through the park.

2:40 pm

Flamingo Park. Fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntire visits campsite, engaging in verbal confrontation with demonstrators, who are generally antagonistic to him.

AUGUST 19  
SATURDAY

10:00 am

Flamingo Park. Land government meeting under way. Tents going up, demonstrators arriving.

11:00 am

Police. Command Post "Beta" becomes operational. All Miami Beach units assigned to convention security assume their posts.

Police. "Scout" teams, initiated for intelligence gathering during the DNC, are increased from 15 to 43 for the Republican convention.

Military. 500 Marines from Camp Lejeune, N. C., join Army paratroopers at Homestead Air Force Base, south of Miami.

Military. National Guardsmen (3,000) once again take up positions in Miami area.

Elsewhere. Rock concert staged this weekend in Rockingham, N. C.

10:00 pm

Flamingo Park. Intelligence estimates indicate 700 overnight campers in park. Estimated total 1,400 demonstrators present.

AUGUST 19  
SATURDAY

3:00 am

Flamingo Park. Land government security force removes tent and occupants from campsite on charges of dealing in hard drugs.

AUGUST 20  
SUNDAY

10:00 am

Demonstration. Crowd (est. 200) assembled at Washington Avenue & 18th Street outside convention center for "I Love America" rally. Orderly speeches.

10:54 am

Police. Mobile Command Post placed in operation. Positioned in street at front of convention center.

1:00 pm

Police. All FHP, PSD and Miami units in position at staging areas for convention duty.

1:30 pm

Demonstration. Farm Workers Union (15-20 persons) pickets Algiers Hotel at 2555 Collins Ave., protesting opposition to lettuce boycott by Governor of Arizona, whose delegation is housed at Algiers.

2:40 pm

Demonstration. Approximately 350 persons, led by Zippies, participate in "piss-in" at convention center demonstration area on Washington Avenue. American flag burned; flag and other symbols are doused with liquid said to be urine. Some demonstrators urinate on objects.

3:00 pm

Flamingo Park. VVAW caravan arrives in park and assumes active role in campsite organization.

AUGUST 20  
SUNDAY

3:25 pm

Demonstration. Zippies depart from convention center, return to Flamingo Park.

3:25 pm

Demonstration. National Socialist White People's Party (American Nazi Party) contingent, numbering 15-20, enters Flamingo Park and occupies stage of free speech area. Speeches made to antagonistic crowd.

4:00 pm

Flamingo Park. VVAW, after forming circle around stage, attempts to accompany Nazis from the area. Fights break out, and one Nazi receives a broken nose while being ejected. Nazis say they will return at night with 150 "storm troopers". Following this incident, VVAW and SDS security guards are armed with nightsticks and stationed at posts throughout the park.

4:00 pm

Demonstration. Cuban memorial rally, to commemorate those lost at sea while attempting to flee Cuba, attracts 3,500-4,000 persons to Marine Stadium, Miami.

6:00 pm

Demonstration. Approximately 300 persons, led by SDS, proceed from Flamingo Park to Fontainebleau Hotel, 4441 Collins Avenue, to demonstrate at a convention-eve party for wealthy Republicans.

6:10 pm

Police. One FHP task force is positioned at Fontainebleau. Another FHP task force positioned at 46th Street parking lot.

6:45 pm

Demonstration. Large group marching back and forth in front of Fontainebleau, shouting slogans, occasionally blocking traffic and in driveways.



AUGUST 20  
SUNDAY

6:54 pm

Police. Traffic detoured off Collins Avenue between 63rd and 41st Streets as crowd grows to 600.

7:40 pm

Demonstration. Crowd outside Fontainebleau attempts to block all entrances to hotel. Cars pounded on, driveway blocked, guests arriving on foot are roughed up.

7:45 pm

Police. FHP troopers form line and push demonstrators across the street, away from hotel entrance. Two prisoner vans requested sent to Fontainebleau.

7:55 pm

Police. FHP forms line across Collins Ave., moving demonstrators to point south of hotel. Dade PSD task force positioned to assist in mass arrest.

7:55 pm

Demonstration. Protesters begin to depart in groups southward on Collins Ave. Police permit them to leave the area.

8:30 pm

Police. Traffic detours removed from Collins Avenue.

9:20 pm

Demonstration. Nazis (15) arrive at curbside opposite entrance to Fontainebleau in uniform, carrying banner reading "Flush Integration". They remain for about an hour.

9:20 pm

Parade. Gay Activists (125) conduct candlelight parade, accompanied by police escort, from Flamingo Park to convention center where they remain on grass making speeches for about an hour.

AUGUST 20  
SUNDAY

11:13 pm

Police. PSD bomb squad effects a sweep of convention hall preliminary to first day of Republican National Convention.

AUGUST 21  
MONDAY

First day of Republican National Convention.

11:00 am

Flamingo Park. Number of campers estimated at 2,000. Total non-delegates population at 3,500.

Flamingo Park. Throughout the day, rumors persist that the Nazis are returning. Security people remain alert.

1:00 pm

Politics. Opening session of Republican National Convention. Business includes welcoming speeches and presentations until 3 p. m. Three films will be shown at this session and the evening session on Dwight Eisenhower, Nixon Administration accomplishments, and Mrs. Nixon.

Politics. "Youths for Nixon," approximately 3,000 supported by party, attend daily assembly at Nautilus Junior High School, about 2 miles from convention hall.

Politics. Opinion polls show Nixon far ahead of McGovern. Nixon 53%, McGovern 36%.

2:00 pm

Parade. VVAW and others (700-800) leave Flamingo Park for Miami Beach High School where detachment of National Guard is stationed. TV truck leads parade.

2:30 pm

Demonstration. Small group (20) of middle aged and elderly persons (20th Century Reformation) on Washington Avenue are urging victory in the war at the time that VVAW parade passes. Animosities exchanged, but no serious incident.

AUGUST 21  
MONDAY

Arrest. As parade passed convention hall, one man removed all his clothing and performed cartwheels. He was arrested.

3:00 pm

Demonstration. Guerilla theater performed at Miami Beach High School grounds. Crowd calls for Guardsmen to join their own ranks.

3:40 pm

Arrests. Seven demonstrators climb to the roof of Miami Beach High School where they are apprehended by Guardsmen and held for arrest (trespassing).

3:40 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol task force positioned behind the high school, out of sight of demonstrators.

4:00 pm

Parade. Zippies (200) leave Flamingo Park for convention center.

4:10 pm

Demonstration. About half of VVAW at high school depart to join Women's Coalition program scheduled at convention center.

4:30 pm

Demonstration. Zippies at convention center hold a "nude-in". Two girls strip to the waist. Three men strip altogether.

4:30 pm

Parade. Miami Women's Coalition (200) participate in "March Against Sexism" to convention center.

4:55 pm

Demonstration. As other groups assemble at convention center for Women's Coalition program, Zippies go to Miami Beach High School vacated by VVAW. Girls again strip.

AUGUST 21  
MONDAY

5:15 pm

Demonstration. Women's program under way on Washington Avenue. Includes all-girl band and speakers from stage.

5:25 pm

Demonstration. Zippies at high school raise Viet Cong flag and Zippie flag briefly on school pole, then depart to join convention center rally. Crowds on Washington Avenue, gradually build to estimated 1,250 preliminary to scheduled mass rally.

6:45 pm

Parade. Cuban groups (700) march from Burdine's department store at Meridian and 17th Street to convention demonstration area. (Cubans are antagonistic toward Flamingo Park groups.)

6:55 pm

Police. Cuban parade is prevented from turning north on Washington Avenue by police lines and assorted marshalls. Parade is routed east one block to James Avenue, then north to 19th Street, and back to Washington Avenue.

Marshalls. Brief encounter with Zippies at 17th and Washington controlled by Cuban marshalls and VVAW.

7:15 pm

Marshalls. Cubans entering Washington Avenue at 19th Street briefly encounter demonstrators already assembled for rally at 18th Street. Marshalls from YMCA Outreach and VVAW separate the two groups by linking arms in line.

7:30 pm

Demonstration. George Jackson Memorial rally begins on Washington Avenue. Unified action by demonstrators, speakers to include actress Jane Fonda and Black Panther leader Bobbie Seale.



AUGUST 21  
MONDAY

7:37 pm

Parade. Group of about 500 Flamingo Park campers reported enroute to convention center.

7:40 pm

Demonstration. Cubans depart from convention center by retracing their route to Burdine's.

7:55 pm

Parade. Stragglers among departing Cubans still occupy 17th Street as large group from Flamingo Park approaches up Washington Avenue.

Marshalls. "Ombudsmen" form line east of Washington Avenue, cutting off Cuban stragglers until others have passed.

8:00 pm

Demonstration. Crowd at Washington Avenue rally estimated at 2,500 plus spectators and newsmen.

8:00 pm

Police. Pepper foggers issued to five gates at convention center in the event that the large crowd attempts to storm the fence.

8:30 pm

Police. City of Miami task force arrives at convention hall from mainland staging area, positioned along Washington Avenue fence.

8:30 pm

Politics. Evening session of Republican National Convention begins. Business includes address by convention chairman and keynote speeches.

Demonstration. Delegates are verbally harassed as they enter convention gates. Bunting on street lamps is torn down; some is burned.

AUGUST 21  
MONDAY

9:45 pm

Convention Hall. Yippie leaders Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin are reported inside convention hall in possession of valid press passes.

11:00 pm

Demonstration. George Jackson Memorial rally ends. Demonstrators return to Flamingo Park.

1:00 am

Arrest. Man with woman in car attempts to enter convention grounds at Washington Avenue and 20th Street by impersonating a Secret Service agent. Rifle and bullets found in car.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

Second day of the Republican Convention.

am

Flamingo Park. VVAW announces their withdrawal from role of total camp security, citing thefts in their own area and lack of cooperation from other groups.

9:00 am

Hotel demonstration. "Jesus Freaks" (25) outside Fontainebleau Hotel, 4441 Collins Avenue, where Republican National Committee meetings are taking place.

9:15 am

Demonstration. Elderly members (40) of religious "20th Century Reformation" distribute literature outside Fontainebleau.

10:00 am

Parade. Led by SDS, approximately 400 demonstrators march from Flamingo Park to Fontainebleau. Police escorts provided.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

10:27 am

Police. Fifty FHP troopers stationed at entrance to Fontainebleau.

10:45 am

Police. Two prisoner vans parked on Collins Avenue, opposite entrance to Fontainebleau.

Demonstration. 20th Century Reformation shifts activities to Doral Beach Hotel, 4833 Collins Ave.

11:00 am

Demonstration. SDS group (400) picketing Fontainebleau. Cars stopped and attacked. Air let out of tires. Guests arriving on foot stopped. Three SDS women penetrate Republican "Women of Achievement Brunch" inside the hotel. Meeting is disrupted with denunciatory speeches until demonstrators are removed.

11:30 am

Police. FHP forms line across Collins Avenue, and moves demonstrators south, away from hotel.

11:30 am

Flamingo Park. Various "non-political" groups reported in park. Group of Hell's Angels (motorcycle gang) arrives and raises the American flag in normal position, indicating opposition to other campers.

11:32 am

Demonstration. SDS group departs from Fontainebleau, moving south. Approximately 175 stop at Saxony Hotel, 3201 Collins Ave., to demonstrate against "Colonial" Puerto Rican delegation.

12:16 pm

Demonstration. SDS group leaves Saxony, proceeding south. Numerous incidents occur along route of withdrawal (trashing, two windows broken, tires ice picked, hotel property vandalized) marking the first widespread trashing at the Republican Convention.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

12:50 pm

Parade. Zippies (150-200) leave Flamingo Park for convention center.

1:04 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol task force ordered to Collins Avenue & 16th Street to make appropriate arrests. Four prisoner vans dispatched.

1:08 pm

Police. FHP order cancelled. Vandalism reported ended; demonstrators proceeding back to Flamingo Park in orderly manner.

1:13 pm

Politics. Third session of Republican National Convention begins. Action on various committee reports. Evening session to include nomination of presidential candidate.

Politics. A "script" of final day's proceedings is mistakenly distributed to press. Script depicts RNC as a television drama; contains exact timing for "spontaneous outburst" for Nixon.

1:15 pm

Police. In response to new crowds gathering in front of Fontainebleau Hotel, FHP unit repeats sweep of street, clearing north driveway. Police units remain in place.

1:20 pm

Demonstration. Zippies arriving at convention center assemble at Washington Ave. and 19th Street, making repeated forays north to 20th Street where they stop traffic, pound on cars, etc.

1:25 pm

Parade. VVAW leads a "silent march" from Flamingo Park to Fontainebleau Hotel. Estimated 800-1,200 participating. Route to proceed up Washington Avenue past convention hall. Parade moves slowly, led by three men in wheelchairs, escorted by police cars blocking traffic.



AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

1:30 pm

Police. FHP task force repositioned at 23rd Street and Dade Blvd., accompanied by two prisoner vans.

1:37 pm

Demonstration. Zippies move back to 19th Street. Girl, topless, climbs lamp post and sets fire to red, white and blue bunting.

1:40 pm

Arrest. Florida Highway Patrol task force, arriving on Washington Avenue in 36 cars, traps demonstrators between police lines and convention fence. Mass arrest procedures initiated.

1:45 pm

Police. Two PSD platoons are moved off convention center grounds onto Washington Avenue, establishing line at 19th Street between mass arrest action and approaching VVAW parade.

1:50 pm

Parade. VVAW marchers elect to avoid confrontation. Parade turns east on 19th Street, bypassing mass arrest in progress.

2:00 pm

Demonstration. Seminole Indian group (30) begins picketing gate 11X at rear of convention center on Meridian Avenue.

2:45 pm

Arrest. Mass arrest completed at convention hall, 212 prisoners transported to county jail in Miami.

3:00 pm

Demonstration. VVAW arrives at Fontainebleau. Crowd (1,200) sits in street, blocking traffic.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

3:15 pm

Police. Traffic on Collins Avenue detoured at 41st and 63rd Streets. Five prisoner vans dispatched to Fontainebleau.

3:15 pm

Parade. Group of black demonstrators (38), carrying posters that praise Nixon and ridicule McGovern, marches south on Collins Avenue from the Playboy Plaza to the Fontainebleau.

3:20 pm

Demonstration. VVAW group reported quiet and orderly, listening to speeches, demanding to see Republican VIPs.

3:30 pm

Demonstration. Blacks for Nixon arrive at Fontainebleau to hold simultaneous demonstration beside VVAW.

4:00 pm

Politics. President Nixon arrives at Miami International Airport.

4:30 pm

Bomb threat. Fontainebleau lobby is cleared following warning of bomb in men's room. False alarm.

4:35 pm

Demonstration. VVAW leaders, including two men in wheelchairs, are permitted to enter Fontainebleau lobby to present written message for the President. Colonel Cotzin, Miami Beach P.D., personally pulls one wheelchair up steps to hotel entrance. After this action, VVAW group departs from Fontainebleau.

6:00 pm

Parade. An estimated 2,000 demonstrators, many of them costumed and painted with death masks, depart Flamingo Park to participate in "Street Without Joy" demonstration, sponsored by People's Coalition for Peace

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

& Justice. Parade includes floats depicting war atrocities and a rented elephant pulling a coffin.

6:20 pm

Parade. VVAW demonstrators returning from Fontainebleau join parade at Meridian Avenue and 16th Street.

6:20 pm

Convention Hall. Afternoon session ends while demonstrators are approaching convention center. Most delegates vote to remain inside building for catered meal.

6:30 pm

Parade. Marchers divide ranks at Meridian and 17th. One group moves north on Meridian, the other turns east on 17th to Washington. Individuals drop off along the way until the entire convention area is encircled by a silent ring of costumed demonstrators. Remainder of parade terminates at Gate 2X, Washington and 20th Street, where a series of guerilla theater presentations commence. Traffic detoured off Washington Ave. Total demonstrator strength estimated at 3,000.

6:47 pm

Military. National Guard unit at Miami Beach High School placed on 15 minute alert.

6:50 pm

Demonstration. Cuban group (50) reported marching on 17th Street and Washington Avenue. Cubans remain in the area throughout the evening, but no trouble occurs with other demonstrators.

7:30 pm

Demonstration. Guerilla theater ends on Washington Street. Coffin and paper props used in skits are set afire and thrown over Gate 1X at north-east corner of compound.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

7:38 pm

Police. Unified communication system fails. Each agency switches to individual channels.

7:39 pm

Demonstration. Ring of demonstrators has all gates blocked except gate 11X on Meridian Avenue as delegates begin arriving for evening session (at which presidential candidate is to be nominated). Demonstrators begin to lie in street before gate 11X.

7:43 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol requested to sweep Meridian Avenue groups south to 17th Street. Command post gives FHP 12 minutes to complete action. Police with delegate busses instructed to arrive at gates 11X and 12X on Meridian. One gas grenade discharged in police ranks during sweep; either thrown by demonstrators or dropped accidentally.

7:55 pm

Demonstration. Groups swept from Meridian Avenue join demonstrators on 17th Street. Gates blocked, traffic stopped.

8:00 pm

Demonstration. Car occupied by delegates is surrounded on 17th Street. Police officers enter street to accompany delegates into compound.

8:00 pm

Demonstration. Delegates attempting to reach convention hall on Washington Avenue are harrassed by demonstrators. VVAW forms safe corridor across Washington Street at gate 5X, but delegates are subjected to abuse as they run this gauntlet to the hall.

8:00 pm

Accident. Car attempting to enter gate 4X at Washington and 18th is subjected to pounding and rocking. Driver makes rapid "U" turn to escape crowd; injures several demonstrators. Ambulance enters Washington Avenue to pick up one serious injury.



AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

8:08 pm

Police. FHP initiates a slow sweep of 17th Street, pushing demonstrators east to Washington Avenue.

8:16 pm

Police. Unified communications system back in service.

8:30 pm

Police. Demonstrators had moved north from Washington Ave. onto Dade Boulevard in order to obstruct delegate busses enroute to Meridian Avenue gates. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish personnel move them back to demonstration area.

8:30 pm

Politics. Evening session of Republican National Convention begins. Business includes nomination and election of candidates for president.

8:38 pm

Police. FHP completes sweep of 17th Street, unit remains in place, confining demonstrators to Washington Avenue area. FHP also blocks Washington Avenue entrance to Lincoln Mall to prevent vandalism. Estimated 3,500 demonstrators in street.

9:00 pm

Demonstration. Crowd on Washington Avenue listens to speeches. Arriving delegates continue to be harrassed at gates.

9:00 pm

Accident. Cadillac limousine driving through corridor of demonstrators suddenly accelerates, striking one person. Car races away from angry crowd.

9:40 pm

Demonstration. VVAW leave convention area. Cubans also gone.

AUGUST 22  
TUESDAY

10:10 pm

Crowd estimate: 1,000 total; 700 listening to speeches, others at gates on Washington Avenue.

10:30 pm

Flamingo Park. Members of black group supporting Nixon (15) arrive at campsite to spend the night.

11:30 pm

Politics. Busloads of pro-Nixon young people arrive at convention hall for victory celebration after Nixon nomination.

11:30 pm

Demonstration. Speeches end on Washington Street. Remainder of crowd returns to Flamingo Park.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY


Third and final day of the Republican National Convention. Business includes nomination for vice president and acceptance speech by Vice President and President Nixon.

6:45 am

Barricade. Three wreckers begin to move derelict busses from convention parking lot onto Meridian Avenue, where they are positioned bumper-to-bumper on the west side of street. This action taken in response to threats by demonstrators to prevent delegates from entering convention hall.


8:15 am

Barricade. Solid line of 33 busses in place on Meridian, effectively extending the defensive perimeter in that area from the fence to the opposite side of the street and reducing possible access points for demonstrators.



PERIMETER FENCE WITH GATE NUMBERS

BUS BARRICADE PLACEMENT





AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

11:30 am

Flamingo Park. Demonstration leaders hold strategy session, reacting to possible effect of bus barricade on plans to block gates at convention hall later in the day.

11:30 am

Police. Strategy meeting in progress at command post. New duties assigned to take advantage of bus barricade. Additional intersections selected for busses to be positioned later in the day.

11:37 am

Demonstration. Nazis (NSWPP) demonstrate with "Flush Integration" banner on 17th Street outside convention complex. Nazi leader submits to arrest for wearing the swastika symbol, prohibited by a Miami Beach ordinance. Others move banner to Washington Avenue where they remain until about 1 p.m.

11:40 pm

Demonstration. Pro-Nixon blacks (35) demonstrate inside Flamingo Park, continuing speeches until about 1 p.m.

1:54 pm

Police. PSD motormen (41) assisted by 50 deputies assume patrol of Lincoln Mall, one block south of convention center, to prevent vandalism there. City of Miami assumes responsibility for entire perimeter of convention center except for one sector on 17th Street controlled by PSD.

2:00 pm

Barricade. Additional busses (12) towed into place at following locations:

- blocking Meridian Avenue at 17th Street.
- blocking Alton Road at Dade Boulevard.
- blocking Washington Avenue south of 20th Street.
- blocking 20th and 21st Streets at Washington.

In combination with placement of Game and Fresh Water Fish guards on 3 foot bridges, the above barricade effectively cuts the island of Miami Beach in two. Safe corridors to gates 11X, 12X, and 2X are protected by a solid barrier of busses.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

2:15 pm

Police. Three FHP platoons assigned to operate north of convention center, keeping traffic lanes open between hotels and convention hall.

Police. Two FHP platoons assigned to keep hotel entrances clear on Collins Avenue. Three FHP platoons held in reserve at Miami Beach High School.

2:15 pm

Flamingo Park. News of additional bus barricades upsets plans for evening. Leaders continue strategy sessions amid much confusion.

4:00 pm

Flamingo Park. Groups ranging in size from 10 to 100 are reported leaving the campsite for various assembly points.

4:45 pm

Police. Large number of disorderly incidents initiated by small groups at various locations. Many of these incidents were handled by a small Miami Beach unit assigned to off-site crowd control and by Miami Beach officers on normal city patrol, not specifically assigned to convention duty.

4:45 pm

4:52 pm

Disorders. Individuals on hotel roof, Washington and 19th, throwing things into street. Individual on 17th Street assaults several people and runs north. Trashing in progress at Collins and 23rd. Park benches dragged into street at Collins and 22nd. Group attempts to bypass bus blockage at Alton Road by swimming canal. Tires flattened on cars waiting for red light at Collins and 23rd. Attempt made to set fire to busses at Meridian and 17th.

From this point, numerous individual arrests are made as appropriate throughout the evening and night.

4:52 pm

Flamingo Park. Several large groups depart from campsite at intervals, eventually forming continuous column from Washington Avenue and 16th Street all the way back to Flamingo Park, now nearly empty.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

4:54 pm

Police. Half of FHP task force at Miami Beach High School placed on foot patrol on Dade Boulevard to discourage attempts by demonstrators to get north of Dade.

5:05 pm

Disorders. Wooden street barricades used by police to block side streets are removed by demonstrators. Unsuspecting motorists drive onto Washington Avenue where cars are surrounded and damaged.

5:15 pm

Disorders. Large number of persons on 2nd deck of parking lot at 17th Street reported throwing objects at police. PSD platoon sweeps the area.

5:20 pm

Disorders. Numerous reports of traffic blocked on Collins Ave.

5:21 pm

Military. National Guard places units on 15 minute alert.

5:25 pm

Arrests. Numerous arrests are made throughout the evening on Pine Tree Drive as demonstrators infiltrate the area north of convention hall attempting to stop delegate bus traffic.

5:26 pm

Gas. Attempt by 40-50 demonstrators to swim canal at Michigan Ave. and move north is turned back with "baseball" tear gas grenades.

5:26 pm

Demonstration. Symbolic sand dike is being constructed across Washington Avenue at convention center apparently by PCPJ and VVAW.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

5:30 pm

Accident. Car on Washington Avenue surrounded by demonstrators. Driver accelerates, strikes woman, and races off.

5:38 pm

Disorders. Barrage of stones, beer cans and bottles thrown at Miami policemen behind Washington Avenue fence. This continues throughout evening.

5:45 pm

Gas. Large group of demonstrators moving north on Indian Creek Drive apparently bound for Fontainebleau or Doral Hotel is intercepted by command car at 36th Street. Gas is used to turn back crowd until FHP units are positioned to block advance.

6:00 pm

Mass arrest. Demonstrators retreat to 30th Street and Collins were sit-in at intersection is led by Alan Ginsberg and (Yippie) Jeff Nightbyrd. FHP initiates mass arrest procedures at 30th and Collins.

6:05 pm

Collins Avenue. Delegate bus is stopped and surrounded by demonstrators at Collins and 22nd Street.

6:15 pm

Collins Avenue. Second delegate bus stopped and surrounded at Collins and 24th Street.

6:16 pm

Police. All Florida Highway Patrol troopers not assisting in mass arrests are directed to begin "fluid patrol" on Collins Avenue, responding to dozens of small groups using hit and run tactics.



AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

6:25 pm

Gas. Miami officers use tear gas at Washington Avenue and 18th Street to disperse crowd gathering at gate.

Military. National Guard once again puts units on 15 minute alert.

7:05 pm

Demonstration. Large group (500) arrives on 17th Street at convention center, surrounds two busses of delegates attempting to enter gate 9X. PSD platoon enters street and escorts delegates inside compound.

7:10 pm

Accident. Taxi, attempting to deliver delegates to gate 6X, 17th Street and Washington, strikes several demonstrators. Ambulance picks up injured person.

7:24 pm

Police. PSD begins sweep of 17th Street to clear gates. Demonstrators are pushed east to Washington Avenue.

7:25 pm

Gas. Pepper fogger used to disperse large crowd at Washington Avenue and 17th Street. PSD officers making sweep on 17th Street accidentally gassed.

Gas. Demonstrators cleared from 17th Street occupy upper deck of parking lot. Gas launcher used to fire tear gas into parking lot to disperse crowd.

7:40 pm

Politics. Final session of Republican National Convention begins, ten minutes late. Business includes nomination of vice presidential candidate, and acceptance by President Nixon.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

7:45 pm

Gas. At 17th Street and Washington Avenue, RCLC observer reports police throwing tear gas directly at mobile hospital unit stationed there to treat gas victims. Medic asks police to stop and is maced by police officer.

8:00 pm

Police. Two PSD platoons held until now at Miami Airport are asked to assist at convention center.

8:00 pm

Demonstration. Several hundred demonstrators on Washington Avenue are being urged by Dave Dellinger and Father Groppi to participate in a march to the Doral Hotel on Collins Avenue.

8:07 pm

Bomb threat. Bomb warning received at convention hall. False alarm.

8:12 pm

Police. Florida Highway Patrol requests other police units to keep demonstrators on Washington Avenue, and off Collins Avenue.

8:30 pm

Police. Demonstrators attempting to block busses are swept south from intersection at Washington Avenue and 17th Street.

Gas. Parking lot on 17th Street is cleared with gas. Washington Avenue also gassed.

8:55 pm

Convention Hall. Interior Security Commander at convention hall orders all doors closed on east side of hall because of quantity of gas drifting from street.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

8:55 pm

Flamingo Park. Demonstrators attempting to leave Flamingo Park are swept back inside by police. RCLC observer reports trashing and vandalism by police officers. Tires had been flattened on several motorcycles parked at campsite entrance and headlights were smashed.

9:00 pm

Parade. About 800 demonstrators on Washington Avenue, led by Dave Dellinger (PCPJ) and remainder of VVAW, begin march to Doral Beach Hotel, 4833 Collins Ave., headquarters of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

9:05 pm

Disorders. Group departing from Washington Avenue pelts Miami officers at fence with barrage of debris.

9:05 pm

Gas. Commencing at this time and continuing throughout the next hour, Miami units on Washington Avenue frequently release gas until Washington Avenue between 17th and 20th Streets is entirely cleared.

9:40 pm

Parade. Marchers bound for Doral reach 30th Street and Collins.

Negotiations have taken place between parade leaders and police. Parade will be orderly, no trashing, followed by sit-down demonstration. Police will announce intentions to arrest and permit those who do not want to be arrested to leave the area.

Police. 8 FHP platoons sent to Doral Hotel to make mass arrests.

9:55 pm

Politics. President Nixon arrives at convention hall by helicopter.

9:56 pm

Police. Miami units move off convention compound onto Washington Avenue, clearing small groups from Washington Avenue and side streets.

AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

10:24 pm

Parade. Crowd now estimated at 1,000 arrives at Doral Hotel, sits down in street and driveway.

10:30 pm

Politics. Acceptance speech by President Nixon in progress at convention hall.

10:45 pm

Arrest. Order to disperse is given crowd at Doral. Approximately 250 submit to mass arrest. Remainder disperses south. FHP units effect mass arrest.

11:05 pm

Parade. A second group of marchers (400), stating their intention to "trash the Doral", are moving up Collins Avenue at 23rd Street.

11:10 pm

Politics. Final session of Republican National Convention concludes. Nixon and Agnew shaking hands in convention hall. Few people actually leave at this time.

11:10 pm

Convention Hall. Bus drivers who delivered delegates refuse to drive them back to hotels for fear of demonstrators in the streets. Delegates leaving by car are advised to drive north on Alton Road or Pine Tree to 63rd Street, then return south on Collins Avenue to hotels.

11:30 pm

Demonstration. The second parade moving up Collins Avenue merges with returning crowds from first parade. Merged group attempts unsuccessfully to cross bridge at 41st Street, which is blocked by FHP motormen. Task force composed of PSD and Miami officers begins to push demonstrators south from 41st Street.



AUGUST 23  
WEDNESDAY

12:03 am

Arrest. Mass arrest completed at Doral Beach Hotel.

12:15 am

Collins Avenue. Crowd moving south from 41st Street disperses. Several small groups arrested for trashing incidents and vandalism. Remainder returns to Flamingo Park.

12:20 am

Flamingo Park. Miami police officers (30) enter campsite, apparently in pursuit of remnants of disorderly crowd. After police leave, campers throw stones and oranges at police outside.

12:35 am

Police. No activity in area of convention complex. Nearly all demonstrators back in Flamingo Park preparing to leave town. Police are requested to stay away from the campsite.

12:37 am

Politics. President Nixon is reported at his Key Biscayne complex.

1:00 am

Clean-up. Sanitation Department crews begin cleaning up streets, implementing procedures developed for cleaning up hurricane damage.

3:00 am

Flamingo Park. Tear gas reportedly thrown into park from street. Only 300 campers still present.

3:20 am

Flamingo Park. Two tear gas cannisters reported thrown from red convertible into campsite.

End of Republican National Convention.

This chronology has been a long, detailed trip through the "Alice In Wonderland experience" of the 1972 national political conventions. It is admittedly incomplete, but hopefully enough is included to convey a sense of the incredible variety of experiences related to those two central events. As the reader proceeds through the evaluative chapters of this report, it may occasionally be helpful to review portions of the chronology to refresh one's memory as to the sequence of events. In order to properly evaluate particular actions discussed in other parts of this report, it may also be of assistance to occasionally refer to the chronology for information concerning other events that either occurred simultaneously or which may have influenced the event in question.

###

## PLANNING

Planning for policing the 1972 Democratic National Convention, and inadvertently for the Republican National Convention, began well in advance of official notification that the Democratic Party had selected Miami Beach to be the site of its convention. Approximately 18 months before the Democratic National Convention, when bidding for the convention was undertaken by the City of Miami Beach, Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance began formulating his goals and developing plans relative to the policing of the conventions.

Planning for the policing of political conventions requires the formulation of carefully thought out, realistic and obtainable objectives to guide the planning process. To initiate the convention planning process, Chief Pomerance stated that the primary objective would be the "effective and humane policing of the political convention." Under this broadly stated objective, he identified three subgoals. They were:

1. To maintain the peace and tranquility of the entire community.
2. To protect the rights of delegates to attain the objectives for which they had been selected.
3. To protect the rights of dissenters to voice peaceful protest.

With the objectives clearly stated, the next step was to determine the method of attaining those objectives. Chief Pomerance and his staff proceeded to outline a general plan. This plan included additional training

of police officers in behavioral fields and the acquisition of equipment to facilitate the protection of all parties.

Financial assistance was perceived as necessary to achieve these ends. Therefore, a grant proposal was prepared and submitted to LEAA in February of 1971. This was still well in advance of the final site selection by the Democratic National Committee, which did not occur until June 29, 1971. The early general plan called for utilization of resources from external law enforcement agencies including federal, state, and neighboring local units.

During the preliminary planning stages, a policy was established to meet and communicate at every opportunity with all third party intervenors who sought to have a role in the convention. Similarly, plans were developed to establish liaison with counter-culture groups and other protestors. The general theme of planning was that police would assume a "low profile" during the conventions. Whenever possible, police would prevent or avoid confrontations. This was to be accomplished, in part, by using "third party" groups whenever possible to function as "buffers" between the police and the demonstrators.

A departmental convention planning staff was created. This staff consisted of Chief Pomerance; Colonel Larry Cotzin, Assistant Chief; Major Karl Schuler, Chief of the Uniform Division; Major Walter Philbin, Chief of the Detective Division; Major Ted Schempp, Chief of the Services Division; and Captain Bastion Kruidenier, Acting Chief of the Identification and Records Division. In December, 1971, Mr. Wayne Hanewicz, who had been employed by Miami Beach Police Department to administer the LEAA grant, was added to the planning staff. Additionally, Mr. Seymour Gelber, Assistant State Attorney, joined the planning staff in January, 1972. In May, 1972, a supplement to the original LEAA grant provided for the hiring of three consultants to assist with convention planning. Employed in these positions were Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders and Lieutenant Roland Perry of the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and Lieutenant John Konstanturos of the Los Angeles, California Police Department.

Starting in 1971, convention planning matters were appended to the regularly scheduled weekly departmental staff meetings. The progression of business at those meetings followed the order of old business, new business, and convention business. However, as the conventions drew nearer in 1972, convention business occupied the entire agenda. In addition to these sessions, numerous meetings were also conducted with representatives of the Democratic National Committee, City and County Managers' offices, private security personnel, news media representatives, civic groups and counter-culture or non-delegate groups.

Regularly scheduled joint planning meetings were held with representatives from other agencies. These planning sessions were attended



by the MBPD planning staff plus representatives from the Dade County Public Safety Department (PSD), Miami Police Department (MPD), Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Florida Marine Patrol, Florida National Guard, Florida Beverage Department, State Attorney's Office, Public Defender's Office, Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and the Andy Frain Private Security firm which had been employed by the Democratic Party to provide security at the convention hall. Chief Pomerance also invited representatives of the MBPD police associations to attend the joint planning meetings, thereby utilizing an important channel to communicate with all members of the department.

The deliberations of these planning sessions were assisted by guest speakers who possessed special knowledge in areas pertinent to convention security planning. The speakers included Mrs. Marge Curet and Mr. William Seldon of the Federal Community Service Agency; Mr. A. G. Gilbert, Federal Communications Commission; Mr. Larry Seib, Assistant to Democratic Party Chairman, Larry O'Brien; Mr. George Rodericks, Washington, D. C. Civil Defense Office; Mr. Robert Donlan, Department of Justice (LEAA); and Cook County Illinois Sheriff, Richard Elrod.

Planning/research trips were made to San Francisco, Chicago and Washington, D. C. (sites of previous large scale demonstrations and disorders). Information and intelligence was obtained from the San Diego Police Department prior to the Republican site change, and additional research was accomplished by telephone, written correspondence, file records and newspapers. Weekly intelligence reports and estimates were provided to the planners. Information was also obtained during meetings and negotiations that police representatives held with non-delegates. An appreciation for the number and variety of planning meetings that preceded the conventions can be gained by reviewing the following chronological synopsis of convention planning activities as compiled by MBPD.

#### CHRONOLOGICAL SYNOPSIS OF PLANNING PROCESS

##### DATE

##### SUMMARY

June 22, 1971

Review of Democratic Convention contract in reference to services required, i. e. access, parking, transportation and security.

July 2, 1971

Conference with representatives of ABC and other media.

DATESUMMARY

July 14, 1971 Chief Pomerance attended meeting with officials of Federal agencies reference manpower needs.

July 15, 1971 Assignment of staff officers to specialized training courses.

July 19, 1971 Chief Pomerance and staff escorted Democratic National Convention coordinators on tour of convention complex. Security conference followed.

July 22, 1971 Staff meeting concerning further fencing of complex, telephone service, construction of chickees, availability and cost factors of rental buses.

July 26, 1971 Checked status of Miami Beach Senior High School during summer months and potential usage.

August 31, 1971 Chief Pomerance and staff had meeting with private security guards; re: guidelines.

August 31, 1971 Correspondence with Director Purdy and General McMillan, re: preplanning potential Florida National Guard participation.

September 18, 1971 Meeting with private security agency.

October 8, 1971 Chief Pomerance and staff met at Convention Hall to plan additional fencing of complex.

October 13, 1971 Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with representatives of "Switchboard" re: non-delegates.

October 13, 1971 Chief Pomerance and staff met with "new party" representatives re: new party political convention.

October 27, 1971 Preparation of index of names, titles, agencies, addresses and telephone numbers of officials prominent in convention planning.

DATESUMMARY

October 28, 1971	Restricted vacations for all personnel.
October 28, 1971	Recommendation for additional city ordinances to deal with curfews, parades, etc.
November 9, 1971	Meeting with Florida Department of Law Enforcement personnel on intelligence gathering.
November 12, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with LEAA administrators.
November 15, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff held conference with officials of Florida International University re: training and convention grant.
November 15, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff in meeting with representatives of Westinghouse re: security systems.
November 17, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff met with representative of Controlonics Corp. for demonstration of radio scrambling equipment.
November 22, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff met with Lawrence O'Brien, Governor Marvin Mandell, and other officials of the Arrangements Committee, re: liaison and security.
November 29, 1971 thru December 10, 1971	Staff members attended seminar at Southern Police Institute, Louisville, Ky., on demonstrations, protests, bombings, etc.
November 29, 1971	Requested Director Purdy and Chief Garmire to make recruit classes available to implement security details in non-critical assignments.
December 1, 1971	Meeting with advance party of CBS news.
December 1, 1971	Meeting with Motorola officials re: communications equipment.

DATESUMMARY

December 6, 1971	Discussion with owner of Octogan Towers apartment building (across from complex) concerning utilization of space for security purposes.
December 7, 1971	Conference concerning LEAA Grant.
December 8, 9, 10, 1971	Convention related trip to Washington, D. C.
December 9, 1971	Correspondence firming up Florida International University training program.
December 14, 1971	Chief Pomerance and staff met with American Civil Liberties Union officials.
December 30, 1971	Meeting with several individuals interested in input into training sessions.
January 3, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff in meeting concerning updating rules and regulations.
January 3, 1972	Staff members attended luncheon meeting with Coalition of Greater Miami.
January 5, 1972	Staff to San Francisco planning session.
January 6, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff attended demonstration of night vision devices.
January 7, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting and planning session with religious leaders.
January 8, 1972	Chief Pomerance, staff, members of Secret Service and Democratic Security Committee held meeting and survey of convention complex.
January 10, 1972	Chief, staff and Florida International University officials attended meeting dealing with behavioral science portion of training sessions.
January 10-14, 1972	Five officers attended anti-swat school, Quantico, Virginia.



DATESUMMARY

January 11, 1972	Planning on convention priorities.
January 11, 1972	Second meeting with CBS News advance party.
January 12, 1972	Communication from Florida Marine Patrol reference utilization of their personnel.
January 12, 1972	Meeting held to research possible utilization of mobile command unit and related equipment.
January 12, 1972	Request made to U. S. Army Military Police School, Ft. Gordon, Ga. for instructors from SEADOC to participate in our training program.
January 20, 1972	Meeting was conducted with instructors of preconvention physical conditioning program.
January 24, 1972	Plans made for additional lighting of the complex.
January 25, 1972	Chief Pomerance briefed Grand Jury on convention.
January 25, 1972	Behavioral planning session attended by representatives of Miami Beach Police Department, Florida International University, University of Florida, State Attorney's office, Carnegie Mellon University, F. B. I., and community and religious leaders.
January 25, 1972	Meeting with press concerning training program and LEAA grant.
January 25, 1972	Preparation of Mayor's luncheon invitations.
January 25, 1972	Meeting with Southern Bell to discuss feasibility of implementing group alerting phone service for emergencies.
January 25, 1972	Continuing correspondence relating to SEADOC instructors.

DATESUMMARY

January 26, 1972	Outline submitted for role of Greater Miami Coalition in security planning for convention.
January 27, 1972	List of suggested instructors submitted for behavioral training sessions.
January 27, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff attended meeting with "Snowplow" and Center for Dialogue reference non-delegates and goals of the organizations.
January 28, 1972	Proposed schedule submitted for convention training.
January 28, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with F.I.U. officials on training program.
January 31, 1972	Mayor's luncheon held, attended by community leaders and representatives of state, county and city law enforcement agencies. Purpose of meeting was to discuss tentative arrangements for the maintenance of community order preceding, during and subsequent to the 1972 Democratic National Convention.
January 31, 1972	Communication from Chief Pomerance to Mr. Norman Kassoff of Greater Miami Coalition.
January 31, 1972	Evaluation made of prospective needs concerning two-way radio equipment.
January 31, 1972	Staff meeting held to study requirements for interior hall security telephones and perimeter fence security phones.
January 31, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff met to plan overall needs for communication equipment.
January 31, 1972	Chief Pomerance in contact with General McMillan of Florida National Guard in regard to cooperation and support.

DATESUMMARY

February 2, 1972	Planning session with Dr. LeGrande of Florida International University re: LEAA grant.
February 3, 1972	Chief Pomerance met with Department of Justice Community Relations officials.
February 3, 1972	Convention briefing for British Broadcasting Co.
February 3, 1972	Chief Pomerance, staff, held planning session with Department of Natural Resources and Marine Patrol.
February 4, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with senior officials of Florida National Guard.
February 4, 1972	Chief Pomerance guest speaker at Community Relations Board meeting.
February 4, 1972	Planning session with representatives of Southern Bell.
February 7, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with officials of the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
February 8, 1972	Chief Pomerance in planning session with Secret Service.
February 8, 1972	Chief Pomerance invited Archbishop Coleman Carroll to address opening session of training program scheduled for February 14, 1972.
February 8, 1972	Meeting with Southern Bell representatives to study telephone connections for the mobile command post vehicle.
February 10, 1972	Meeting with Rennie Davis and "Snowplow".
February 14, 1972	Democratic National Convention training program for law enforcement officers began.

DATESUMMARY

February 15, 1972 Planning session concerning convention complex alterations, cafeteria location and fencing for trailer security.

February 15, 1972 Planning session attended by officials of DNC and representatives of City Manager's office, Miami Beach Police: Convention Hall and metered parking.

February 15, 1972 Weekly meetings with Democratic National Committee commenced on this date.

February 16, 1972 Chief Pomerance to Tallahassee to meet with Governor Askew, re: Democratic National Convention.

February 17, 1972 Planning session of "Snowplow" attended by community relations officers of Miami Beach Police, Miami Police and Dade Public Safety Departments.

February 17, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff met with non-delegate group requesting campsite.

February 17, 1972 Staff met with representatives of "TRAIN" (Technical Research and Innovation Corp.) and Southern Christian Leadership Conference re: non-delegates.

February 18, 1972 Planning session with Chief Pomerance, staff and F. B. I. officials concerning F. B. I. role in connection with dissident and militant groups.

February 22, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff met with "Snowplow" representatives seeking campsites.

February 24, 1972 Community relations officers attended "Snowplow" meeting.

February 24, 1972 Second DNC staff meeting. (joint)

February 25, 1972 Chief Pomerance met with George O'Connor of the Center for Urban Studies of the University of Miami.



DATESUMMARY

February 25, 1972	Staff meeting with LEAA officials.
February 29, 1972	DNC planning session concerned with transportation.
March 1, 1972	Security planning session with representatives of Florida Power and Light.
March 2, 1972	Community relations officers attended "Snowplow" meeting.
March 6, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff in convention planning sessions with Secret Service and Treasury Dept.
March 7, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
March 7, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff met with Tom Turner and Jack Lamont of Miami Liberation Front, re: non-delegates.
March 7, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff in convention planning sessions with Secret Service and Treasury Dept.
March 9, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff in planning session with officials of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice.
March 9, 1972	Community relations officers attended "Snowplow" meeting.
March 10, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff in convention planning sessions with Secret Service and Treasury Dept.
March 14, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
March 14, 1972	Pre-planning for March 16th security staff meeting.
March 15, 1972	Planning session on traffic and transportation routes.
March 15, 1972	Planning session with other agencies on missions and manpower.

DATESUMMARY

March 16, 1972	Weekly "Snowplow" meeting attended by Community Relations officers.
March 21, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
March 22, 1972	Planning report on un-budgeted convention needs.
March 22, 1972	Staff meeting with Mr. Tyree Broomfield, Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.
March 23, 1972	Staff meeting with supervisors of State Beverage Department.
March 24, 1972	Dade County Alliance for Safer Cities meeting addressed by Sgt. Valeriani, MBPD.
March 27, 1972	DNC security meeting.
March 27, 1972	Evaluation made of training program.
March 28, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
March 28, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff attended meeting with DNC Security Advisory Committee.
March 29, 1972	Security meeting with Florida Power and Light.
March 29, 1972	Finalized personnel assignments for Democratic National Convention.
April 4, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
April 5 & 6, 1972	Chief Pomerance on convention related trip to San Francisco.
April 7, 1972	DNC intelligence meeting with various agencies.
April 7, 1972	Staff met with Mr. Phil Seib, Assistant to Mr. Lawrence O'Brien, DNC. Re: non-delegates.

DATESUMMARY

April 11-13, 1972	Chief Pomerance on convention related trip to Washington, D. C.
April 12, 1972	Staff meeting with Mr. Richard Bryant, re: Miami Baptists "Demo 72".
April 13, 1972	Staff and Secret Service planning session.
April 13, 1972	Colonel Cotzin and Major Schempp visited Washington, D. C. to study that city's command post operations, staffing, coordination of municipal services, communications, training, and parade permits.
April 13, 1972	Weekly "Snowplow" meeting attended by community relations officer.
April 18, 1972	Weekly DNC staff meeting.
April 18, 1972	Staff meeting with Miami Police, Public Safety Department, Florida National Guard, re: National Guard role.
April 25, 1972	Chief Pomerance to Washington, D. C. planning session.
April 27, 1972	Chief Pomerance, MBPD staff, Federal, State, local agencies and Florida National Guard met to plan for Republican Convention security needs.
April 29, 1972	City Manager and Chief Pomerance to Washington, D. C. planning session.
May 1, 1972	Chief Pomerance to Tallahassee planning session.
May 1, 1972	Staff meeting with representatives of Southern Bell, re: telephone security, bomb and extortion threats, etc.
May 2, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff met with Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee.

DATESUMMARY

May 2, 1972 Joint planning session with Chief Pomerance, staff, Director Purdy and his staff.

May 3, 1972 Planning session with police - mass media seminar.

May 4, 1972 Staff convention planning session - summary and up-date.

May 4, 1972 Pamphlet "Guidelines for Demonstrations" completed and ready for distribution.

May 5, 1972 Chief Pomerance to Washington, D. C. planning session.

May 5, 1972 Staff planning session with Justice Department Community Relations Service.

May 9, 1972 Chief Pomerance met with representatives of Secret Service and Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement.

May 9, 1972 Minutes, Criminal Justice procedures Committee, Dr. Seymour Gelber.

May 10, 1972 Staff checklist on planning details not to be overlooked.

May 12, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff attended meeting of all local law enforcement agencies called by Director Purdy at Dade Junior College North.

May 15, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff held meeting with Y. I. P. leaders Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Stew Albert, Jerry Gorde, Arizona Jeff (Nightbyrd), Patty Ordenberg, Ed Sanders, Brad Fox and Gabnelle Schang.

May 15, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff held planning session with 18th Corps, U. S. Army and Florida National Guard.

May 16, 1972 Minutes, Criminal Justice Procedures Committee, Dr. Seymour Gelber.



DATESUMMARY

May 17, 1972 Staff and Florida Department of Law Enforcement meeting re: State participation, training, LEAA grant, etc.

May 19, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff meeting with leaders of Zippies and Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

May 22, 1972 Chief Pomerance held meeting with Mr. James Flug and Mr. Henry Herlong, representing Senator Edward Kennedy's Senate Sub-Committee on Administrative Practices and Procedures.

May 23, 1972 Chief Pomerance in three separate meetings during the day with Chief Garmire, officials of CBS, and representatives of Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

May 23, 1972 Staff convention hall planning session.

May 23, 1972 Minutes, Criminal Justice Procedures Committee meeting; Dr. Seymour Gelber.

May 26, 1972 Convention planning, funding and support services conference.

May 30, 1972 Chief Pomerance in meeting at City Manager's office with non-delegate groups, later with R. C. L. C. leaders.

May 30, 1972 Minutes, Criminal Justice Procedures Committee, Dr. Seymour Gelber.

June 1, 1972 Joint planning office at 920 Alton Road became operational with office facilities made available for Miami Beach Police, Miami Police, Dade Public Safety, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, Florida National Guard, military, Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Marine Patrol, advisors Zanders, Perry and Konstantorus, LEAA and training representatives of F. I. U. Planning office to remain operational continuously until end of Republican National Convention.

DATESUMMARY

June 1, 1972 Staff meeting with Chief Zanders, etc. re: platoon system.

June 5, 1972 Meeting at planning office - all agency heads re: squad platoon, etc. concept. Address by Deputy Chief Zanders.

June 7, 1972 Planning session - local area police officials, representatives of the Governor's office, LEAA, FDLE, Florida Highway Patrol, Department of the Army, Florida National Guard, State Attorney's office and Department of Justice and Secret Service and F. B. I.

June 8, 1972 City Department Head staff meeting.

June 9, 1972 Colonel Cotzin and Chief Zanders planning trip to Tallahassee.

June 12, 1972 Staff meeting with FAA officials and Miami Air Traffic Control, re: use of helicopters and potential landing sites.

June 12, 1972 Chief Pomerance to Washington, D. C. planning session.

June 13, 1972 Chief Pomerance met with observers from Brandeis University.

June 13, 1972 Staff meeting, re: mass arrest procedures.

June 13, 1972 Weekly DNC staff meeting.

June 14, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff met with YMCA officials re: observers.

June 15, 1972 Staff meeting with leaders of Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

June 16, 1972 Chief Pomerance in meeting with Mr. Harlington Wood, Assistant Attorney General.

June 19, 1972 Meeting with City Manager Reese, County Manager Goode, City Manager O'Key, Chief Garmire and Director Purdy.

DATESUMMARY

June 19, 1972	Staff planning session with representatives of private security agencies.
June 19, 1972	Planning for non-delegate campsites.
June 20, 1972	Staff meeting with Florida Power and Light representative re: security on installations, transformer vaults and feeder lines.
June 22, 1972	Staff meeting with Andy Frain service relative to handling and distribution of credentials.
June 23, 1972	Staff planning re: tactical squad beef-up.
June 26, 1972	All participating agencies met with County Manager re: planning up-date, State "T.O.", additional manpower needs, etc.
June 27, 1972	Planning for emergency medical service in convention complex.
June 27, 1972	All participating agencies meeting re: additional manpower commitment and National Guard participation, etc.
June 28, 1972	Continuation of meetings with County Manager - planning up-date and communication systems to be utilized.
June 28, 1972	Planning session with County Manager's office reference toilet trailers, water, and medical facilities for non-delegates.
June 29, 1972	Staff meeting with General Manager of Miami Beach Dog Track and federal attorney reference contract for facility being utilized by U.S. Army.
July 3, 1972	Staff meeting with County Manager reference county support toilets, water, feeding, etc.

DATESUMMARY

July 4, 1972 Plans made to assign two detectives, working alternate 12 hour shifts, to campsite to act in liaison capacity with the non-delegates.

July 5, 1972 Meeting with Florida Highway Patrol at Miami Beach Senior High School.

July 7, 1972 Campsite liaison officer met with leaders of SCLC, VVAW and YIP in Flamingo Park.

July 7, 1972 Revised task force assignments.

July 9, 1972 Orientation classes for convention hall assignments.

July 10, 1972 Campsite liaison officer held planning session with Justice Department Community Relations Service Personnel.

July 10, 1972 Democratic National Convention convened.

July 18, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff met with Young Republicans, Committee for the Re-Election of the President.

July 19, 1972 Chief Pomerance and staff met with non-delegates coalition representatives Davis, Whitehead and Nightbyrd.

July 19, 1972 Staff met with GOP transportation chairman and convention bus coordinator Warren Binder and Jim McDonnell of Andy Frain Security Service.

July 21, 1972 Negotiated with RNC for use of entire auditorium facility for security personnel during convention.

July 21, 1972 Chief and staff held security meeting with Senator Knowles of RNC, Frank Spence, Assistant City Manager and other convention officials.

July 26, 1972 Staff met with convention hall labor officials.



DATESUMMARY

July 26, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held convention security meeting with Ody Fish, Tom McAndrews and Harold Robinson of RNC.
July 31, 1972	Community Relations Officer met with National Association of Social Workers.
July 31, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff met with non-delegate group leaders re: policy, campsite, etc.
July 31, 1972	Chief and staff meeting with RNC, news media, etc., re: pre-convention complex security.
August 1, 1972	Staff processed security personnel requests for credentials.
August 1, 1972	Staff processed prospective VIP drivers at request of Committee for Re-Election of the President.
August 3, 1972	Staff negotiated liaison with non-delegates and Young Voters to Re-Elect the President.
August 3, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff held security meeting with Committee to Re-Elect, RNC Security and Doral Hotel personnel re: hotel security.
August 5, 1972	Police personnel assigned to observe and report on rock festival at Flamingo Park.
August 5, 1972	RCLC Training Program.
August 8, 1972	Chief and staff studied and reviewed non-delegate manual for Republican Convention.
August 8, 1972	Staff attended security meeting reference pre-convention council meetings in convention hall.
August 8, 1972	Staff reviewed convention needs and policy with Fire Department heads.

DATESUMMARY

August 10, 1972	Staff contacted and advised construction site superintendents in the area of convention complex re: debris removal, etc.
August 11, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff conducted weekly joint agency GOP convention planning staff meeting.
August 11, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff reviewed Secret Service manpower needs for RNC.
August 11, 1972	Staff conducted in-depth communications meetings reference additions, transformations and terminations of convention communication equipment and procedures.
August 14, 1972	Chief Pomerance corresponded with Tom Forcade re: campsite for Zippies.
August 15, 1972	Chief and staff attended convention-oriented Governor's briefing.
August 16, 1972	All Miami Beach Police personnel advised of their specific convention assignments.
August 16, 1972	Staff negotiated with non-delegates re: vacating pre-convention campsite at Flamingo Park.
August 17, 1972	Campsite agreement approved with non-delegate group leaders concurring and affixing signatures.
August 16, 1972	Captain Kruidenier and other agency coordinators attended Army C. P. exercise in Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.
August 17, 1972	Staff met with other contributing agencies reference updating command post Beta situation room operations.
August 18, 1972	Joint Republican Convention planning session.

DATESUMMARY

August 18, 1972	Chief Pomerance and staff met with Whitehead, Davis and Nightbyrd reference civil disobedience arrests at convention complex gates.
August 18, 1972	Colonel Cotzin and staff met with Reverend Adams, George Rodericks and representatives of non-delegate groups, reference campsite problems.
August 18, 1972	Assigned personnel to First Family security and escort detail.
August 19, 1972	Conducted scout detail briefing and orientation.
August 19, 1972	All agency convention assigned supervisors briefed and furnished maps, communications guidelines and crowd estimator charts.
August 19, 1972	Parade ordinance reinstated, applications accepted and distributed.
August 20, 1972	Five civilian union food handlers employed to serve meals to security personnel.
August 21, 1972	Forty-five junk buses transported to inside convention complex in early a. m. (examined for condition and photographed).
August 21, 1972	Republican National Convention convened.

PLANNING PROCESS

On June 29, 1971, the Democratic Party officially announced its selection of Miami Beach as its 1972 national convention site. Four years earlier, Miami Beach had hosted the Republican National Convention. At that time, police planning was accurately based on the premise that the thrust of demonstrator activity would not be focused on the non-incumbent party, but rather on the incumbent party. Proceeding on this assumption, the Miami Beach Police Department successfully planned and policed the RNC with minimal assistance from other law enforcement agencies. In

1972 the position of the two major political parties was reversed in regards to incumbency. Miami Beach was again to host the non-incumbent party.

Initial planning for the policing of the 1972 Democratic National Convention (DNC) proceeded on the same assumption that had proved correct in 1968. The incumbent Republican Party, scheduled to meet in San Diego, California, was expected to be the primary target of protest activity. Problems at the DNC were expected to be minimal. Based on past experience, then, the city of Miami Beach sought and obtained the DNC in much the same way that the city invited and hosted 75 other non-political conventions held in Miami Beach during 1972.

Much later, some of the principals involved in this early, relatively informal planning would recall that very little joint planning preceded the offering of a convention site to the Democratic Party. Some critics of the planning process have since stated the opinion that Miami Beach sought the DNC independently, and that this "unilateral" action on the part of the Miami Beach City Council was a factor in creating poor working relationships among the various agencies involved in convention law enforcement. A review of the record, however, makes it clear that Miami Beach did not act unilaterally in seeking the Democratic National Convention.

As early as May 6, 1969, a resolution signed by Florida Governor Claude Kirk marked the beginnings of public, official efforts to obtain the Democratic National Convention for Miami Beach. Quoting from that resolution, "Be it resolved: That the 1972 Democratic National Convention be invited to Miami Beach, Florida, and that this Resolution be directed to the attention of the Democratic National Committee and the members of the Congressional delegation from the State of Florida to take whatever united action is necessary to bring about the selection of Miami Beach as the site to hold the Democratic National Convention in the year 1972." On May 7, 1969, correspondence from the Attorney General of Florida to the Mayor of Miami Beach informed him that the "committee outlined in the Resolution will be appointed shortly and its chairman will be in touch with you. I am sure that by working together we can achieve our goals." The statewide committee to attract the DNC was eventually led by former Governor LeRoy Collins who accepted the position on July 3, 1969.

On January 13, 1971, Miami Mayor David Kennedy announced formation of a 15-man committee to promote a convention bid for the DNC. Mayor Kennedy acted at the request of State Democratic Chairman Jon Moyle, who also asked Miami Beach Mayor Jay Dermer and Metro Mayor Steve Clark to name 15 persons to the Dade County Democratic National Convention Committee. The purpose of this committee, according to correspondence from Moyle to Kennedy, was "to conduct an all out campaign to bring the convention to the Miami/Miami Beach area." Later in that same month, a statewide Site Presentation Committee, headed by Governor Askew, met with the Dade County committee to organize convention site plans.



The ensuring efforts to attract the DNC to Miami Beach were anything but secret. Efforts to raise contributions in the form of goods and services were well publicized. Political leaders, including the mayors and city managers of all Dade County and Broward County municipalities, met with Governor Askew in May, 1971, for the purpose of convention financing. Under the circumstances, anyone who had not been officially informed of efforts to attract the Democratic National Convention to Miami Beach almost certainly learned of them through the public news media. Any public official in the law enforcement field or any other department of government had ample opportunity to involve himself in this planning process if he so desired.

As in 1968, MBPD recognized that some assistance from other law enforcement agencies would be needed. Within three days after the announcement that the DNC was going to be held in Miami Beach, a newspaper article quoted Chief Pomerance as saying that the MBPD would be assisted by personnel from Dade County PSD, Miami Police Department, Florida Highway Patrol, and the Florida Marine Patrol. At this early date, however, the extent of involvement of these mutual aid agencies was unknown. These agencies were also anticipating that the 1972 Democratic Convention would be a "replay" of the 1968 Republican Convention. This assumption was reflected in Miami Mayor Kennedy's approval of \$100,000 in supporting funds for convention policing. This sum proved to be considerably less than the actual amount needed after the full extent of MPD's involvement was finally determined. An initial commitment of only 100 men by both MPD and PSD also reflected this shared assumption.

Miami Beach police planning prior to July, 1971, centered primarily around obtaining grant funds from LEAA. These funds would provide for the acquisition of additional equipment and for the training of all MBPD police officers plus 100 officers from "mutual aid" police agencies. Starting in July, 1971, following the official announcement by the Democratic Party that their convention would be held in Miami Beach, the MBPD planning staff began planning for a wide range of convention related needs. This planning was initiated solely by MBPD and focused primarily on security needs at the convention hall site and on training needs.

On July 13, representatives from the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice (Florida's State Planning Agency for law enforcement) met with Chief Pomerance to discuss the LEAA grant application. The Council recommended that the Dade County Public Safety Department and the City of Miami Police Department join with MBPD to plan jointly for the conventions. In response, Chief Pomerance explained that, based on past experience, the law enforcement roles of PSD and MPD during the conventions would be minimal. Chief Pomerance further explained that his three-pronged approach: to research problems related to civil disturbances, to develop professional operations plans, and to implement

an innovative training program; would be adequate to police the convention and would necessarily involve the other agencies.

A convention funding meeting was held on September 10, 1971, in the Washington, D. C. offices of Clarence M. Coster, Associate Administrator of LEAA. In attendance were Chief Pomerance, Chief Garmire, Director Purdy, City of San Diego Police Chief Hoobler, San Diego County Sheriff Duffy and Mr. Coster. The purpose of the meeting, according to Mr. Coster in his invitation letter to the police administrators was to "provide cross-information to all jurisdictions that are facing this encounter (the policing of a political convention) and to discuss the involvement of LEAA in support of these efforts." At this meeting Mr. Coster explained the convention funding policy of LEAA which had implications relative to planning. That policy was that grant requests received from convention cities (Miami Beach and San Diego) should reflect the financial needs of all supporting law enforcement agencies, i. e. Dade County Public Safety Department, Miami Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's Department, etc. The implication was that joint planning should occur.

The MBPD had prepared a grant request reflecting only its own needs. Although that grant wasn't approved by LEAA until November 15, 1971, no revisions were made in it to include PSD or MPD. This undoubtedly had some ramifications relative to subsequent joint planning. The Dade County Public Safety Department and Miami Police Department eventually submitted independent grant requests to LEAA to provide for their individual convention training and equipment needs. An additional factor that had an influence on convention planning and concomitant inter-agency cooperation was the September 24th announcement by Governor Reuben Askew that he was appointing Chief Pomerance as "Chief of Convention Security for the State." This was considered by some to be an unusual appointment because it bypassed Director Wilson Purdy of the Dade County PSD, who commands the largest agency in the area and is, according to the Florida constitution, the Chief Law Enforcement Officer in the County.

During this period of time, MBPD conducted numerous meetings with civic groups, members of the judiciary, the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. In January, 1972, MBPD saw the need to share their convention preparations with other law enforcement agencies. Consequently, on January 31, the city of Miami Beach sponsored a meeting attended by 32 persons representing area city and county governments, and federal, state, county and city law enforcement agencies. All attendees were briefed on MBPD's convention preparations and their convention training program. Middle management police personnel from other agencies were invited to attend the training sessions. Planning for the development of mass arrest procedures was discussed, but other than statements calling for inter-agency cooperation, no in-depth preliminary actions were taken to establish a joint planning venture.

This is not to say that there were no joint planning meetings. Starting in February, joint planning meetings involving all criminal justice agencies with a convention role were held weekly on Fridays. In substance these meetings, in the words of one police official, were "reporting" meetings and not true planning meetings. Absent from the content of these sessions was the development of written plans relative to joint operations, communications, command and control, and the handling of emergencies. These were serious omissions in light of newspaper reports and unofficial estimates at the time which indicated anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000 demonstrators would be arriving for the DNC. These early reports also conflicted with the original assumption that the DNC would not be the focus of major protest activity.

At approximately this point in time, and at the direction of Chief Pomerance, Mr. Wayne Hanewicz's role as overall administrator of MBPD's convention grant was reduced to the area of training only. This meant that planning responsibilities for developing operational and tactical plans, originally assigned to Mr. Hanewicz by the conditions of the grant, were assumed by the MBPD command staff.

As late as April, manpower commitments from "mutual aid" agencies had not been determined or finalized, although discussions were held and attempts were made to secure a combined convention security force. In an April 4th letter from Chief Pomerance to Governor Askew, a request was made for 100 Florida Highway Patrol officers, 50 State Beverage Agents, and 46 Florida Marine Patrol officers, to be assigned to convention related duties. The Miami Police Department and the Dade County Public Safety Department had tentatively committed 100 men each. These forces, combined with MBPD police, were considered to be far below the number of officers needed.

It was also during the month of April that first indications were received that the Republican National Committee was considering moving their convention from San Diego to Miami Beach. This had considerable effect on the planning process. With the prospect on handling two potentially volatile national events occurring in close proximity in time, it became even clearer to Chief Pomerance that the planning for these events could benefit from persons with considerable expertise in policing mass demonstrations and civil disorders. Consequently, in May, an adjustment in the original MBPD grant was made and submitted to LEAA. Authorization was requested to hire three consultants who had "functioned extensively as field commanders during periods of civil disorders and demonstrations" in their respective cities. The grant supplement described the roles of the consultants as providing assistance "in developing operational plans, establishing procedures, and coordinating local and state law enforcement units in effective conventions security, particularly related crowd and/or disorder control," and to "provide on-site technical assistance capability to insure continuity and execution of established plans, and for contingencies which may arise during the conventions period." In late May, 1972,



Chief Zanders and Lieutenants Perry and Konstanturos arrived in Miami Beach to assume these duties.

Information that the Republican National Convention might also be held in Miami Beach (officially confirmed on May 5, 1972) generated increased concern from Governor Askew. As the constitutionally appointed chief law enforcement officer of the state of Florida, he naturally held great interest in the policing of the conventions and wanted to keep abreast of how plans were developing. Accordingly, on April 28, after several visits to Miami Beach, the Governor's staff submitted a report to him pertaining to the content and progress of convention planning. In that report it was stated that planning was lacking in several critical areas, most noticeably in operations. Additionally, the lack of multi-agency planning coordination was noted. This report accurately suggested that, while plans were being made, the plans were not being made jointly for the policing of events that required the pooling of manpower and other resources. Each of the three principal agencies was developing its own plans, independently, which would primarily provide security for the jurisdiction for which it was responsible.

Upon being appraised of the shortcomings in the progress of convention planning, Governor Askew moved to assert more control over the process. On May 5, the Governor wrote to Mr. Jerris Leonard, Administrator of LEAA, and requested that Mr. Leonard "not entertain applications or engage in direct negotiations with prospective sub-grantees in this State" until representatives from the Governor's office met with Mr. Leonard. What this meant was that the Governor was going to exercise more control over the separate requests for LEAA funds made by the three principal law enforcement agencies, thereby assuring some measure of control over the planning process. The ultimate tool would be to withhold grant funds until coordinated planning took place and until the necessary plans were drawn.

On June 5, the Governor took another move designed to improve convention planning. On that date, Governor Askew issued an Executive Order which formally injected state law enforcement and the Dade County Manager into the convention planning process. Mr. William Reed, Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, was named State Coordinator for Convention Security. He was given the responsibility to coordinate the state resources that would be provided for convention security and to review the grant applications that were being channeled through the state to LEAA from Miami Beach, Miami and Dade County. Mr. Ray Goode, Dade County Manager, was designated the Local Area Coordinator with the overall responsibility for coordination of all public health, welfare and safety within Dade County. He was given the responsibility to develop the necessary support services that would be needed by demonstrators and to coordinate the movement of officers from one jurisdiction to another as needed during the conventions. Additionally, his office was to coordinate all grant applications before they were passed up to the state level. The three area police chiefs (Pomerance, Garmire and Purdy) were assigned



law enforcement responsibilities for convention security within their respective jurisdictions. The Governor's actions centered more control at the state level over local convention funding and planning. It created a convention organization, but local planning still had not developed comprehensive coordinated plans.

On May 19, Chief Pomerance announced at the regularly scheduled joint planning meeting that a special planning office at 920 Alton Road, a location near the convention complex, was being opened to facilitate the development of interagency convention planning. This office was occupied by representatives from the affected law enforcement agencies in the area. As one person located in that office later observed, however, the police officials assigned to the planning office were not experienced in the type of planning necessary for policing the conventions. They were not the decision makers who could lend authority to their planning input, and there was an apparent lack of administrative commitment to the functions of that office. As a result, by June, with less than a month to go before the start of the first convention, finalized plans were still lacking.

During this period of time, intelligence estimates regarding the number of demonstrators expected for the conventions were steadily being revised downward. The original estimates of from 50,000 to 250,000 had dwindled to an estimation of from 5,000 to 10,000 by mid-June. Updated intelligence also indicated that protest activity would occur only in Miami Beach and that demonstrators, at least during the Democratic Convention, did not want confrontation with the police.

During the 1968 Republican Convention in Miami Beach, no activities had occurred that required extensive utilization of "mutual aid" police forces. However, across the bay in Miami serious civil disorders did occur that required policing by large forces of Dade County and Miami officers. As a result of that occurrence, the Chiefs of those two departments believed that in 1972 civil disorders would again occur in their own jurisdictions. Therefore, they were reluctant to commit a large number of men to Miami Beach, while conceivably leaving their own jurisdictions undermanned. Each had made a tentative commitment to assign 100 men to Miami Beach and considered any further drain on their manpower resources as jeopardizing their ability to adequately protect their own jurisdictions. The 200 men that were committed were subject to recall if disorders broke out in the city of Miami or any other area of Dade County. With the unknown factor being the number of men to be assigned to police the conventions, a complete and effective joint operations plan could not be developed.

In early June, Chief Pomerance determined that less than 400 mutual aid officers had been committed to convention policing duties up to that point in time. This led him to place greater emphasis on negotiating with dissidents in an attempt to limit the potential for convention violence by gaining their cooperation. The three police consultants, upon learning

of the limited manpower commitments, considered 400 men to be an inadequate force to effectively handle the forthcoming events. They recommended that a force of 1200 to 2000 men would be more realistic. They contended that such manpower resources would be necessary for the implementation of proper crowd management techniques, including utilization of crowd dispersal methods and mass arrest procedures.

The three consultants also recommended that all manpower resources be formed into three mobile task forces of 400 men, each organized into squads, platoons and companies of uniform size. This configuration had the advantage of facilitating the rapid deployment and movement of large numbers of men. It also provided the flexibility to respond to static or fluid situations anywhere in the county. Additionally, it enabled manpower elements to be assigned on a spatial or functional basis. If directed effectively, this would obviate the need to utilize the National Guard or the Army.

It was recommended that the three mobile task forces be positioned in Miami Beach, with one positioned inside the convention hall complex and the remaining two positioned in locales north and south of the complex. These recommendations were rejected at the same joint planning session that they were proposed. In the first place, it was argued, there was a question as to where 1200 to 2000 police officers would come from. Secondly, Dade County and Miami Police Department were still reluctant to release more men to convention related duties for previously mentioned reasons.

The consultants answered the first question by explaining what came to be known as the "three-fifths rule". This "rule" was based on the announced schedules of the Miami Beach Police Department, the Dade County Public Safety Department, and the Miami Police Department, to the effect that personnel of those three agencies were going to work 12 hour shifts with no days off during the conventions. Based on the authorized strength of these three agencies, minus 10% for attrition and vacancies, consultants calculated that a resource pool of 2,671 officers would be available.

During normal working days of eight hour shifts, it takes 5.1 officers to staff a position through three tours of duty, taking into consideration days off, annual leave and sick leave. In reverting to a 12 hour, 7 day work week, two officers are required to staff a given position. Calculating that two-fifths of a given force should be capable of delivering normal police services to a community without loss of efficiency or effectiveness, it was concluded that three-fifths of a given force should be available for convention related crowd control duties. As this formula applied to the three agencies directly concerned, 892 officers would be available for normal services and 1776 available for convention duties.

The three-fifths rule was an apparent solution to the question of the source of manpower, but it did not diminish the reluctance of some of the area police administrators to release more men than had already been committed. Without additional manpower commitment, a unified operations plan could not be developed.

By the third week in June, after consideration of many alternatives that proved not feasible for one reason or another, Chief Pomerance was resigned to command whatever forces were available to him. Should those forces prove insufficient, the Florida National Guard would have to be called for assistance. Using the Guard was an alternative that police officials wanted to avoid as long as possible in light of the 1970 Kent State incident and because some demonstration group leaders were reported to have claimed that the utilization of the National Guard would serve their purposes.

Although police manpower resources were still an undetermined factor and operations and communications plans remained to be developed, convention planning in other important areas made significant progress. County Manager Ray Goode was achieving a monumental task in arranging for the provision of essential services for the expected demonstrators. An emergency medical plan was being formulated, and a committee consisting of representatives of police, courts and corrections was nearing completion of a criminal justice plan that provided for the handling of mass arrests and the speedy processing of arrested parties through the criminal justice system. The Miami Beach City Council had favorably acted upon Chief Pomerance's recommendation to enact city ordinances germane to crowd control, and police negotiations with demonstration leaders continued to be an ongoing process.

Dade County and the City of Miami government councils had acted favorably on granting demonstrators a campsite in their respective jurisdictions. The City of Miami Beach, however, had not done so and indications at the time (June) suggested that it was unlikely that they would take similar action. The fact that Miami Beach would not let demonstrators camp within the city lent support to PSD and MPD contentions that they could not commit more men to Miami Beach because disorders were more likely to occur in their jurisdictions since the demonstrators were going to camp there. (The campsite issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.)

At this point in time, Florida state officials moved to assert even more control over convention planning. In the third week of June, Mr. William Reed, Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, met separately with PSD and MPD planners and with Dade County Manager Ray Goode. In those meetings, Mr. Reed informed those officials that grants submitted for the payment of overtime to officers would not be approved at the state level for subsequent LEAA funding until a unified operations plan for convention policing was developed. Additionally, Governor Askew and his staff continued to monitor convention planning



and were dismayed that no adequate or firm manpower commitments had been made by PSD or MPD and that no unified operations plan had been agreed upon. Consequently, on Sunday, June 25, 1972, the Governor met with Dade County Manager Ray Goode to express his deep concern. The Governor advised that final determination of the numbers of state law enforcement personnel could not be determined until the commitment from local police agencies was realistically adjusted. It was the Governor's belief that planning should account for all available local manpower resources so that a basis for determining the amount of state support needed would be established. The Governor also stated that he was aware of Chief Zanders' mobile task force plan and the three-fifths rule and that he supported both. He added that he wanted to see a written unified operations plan and assigned Chief Zanders to the task.

On the following day, Monday, June 26, at the regularly scheduled joint planning meeting, County Manager Goode briefed the attendees on the prior day's meeting with the Governor and of Chief Zanders' assignment to prepare a written unified operations plan. The announcement of the Governor's support of Chief Zanders' strategy lent more weight to Chief Zanders' role as an advisor. Prior to this time, as an outside consultant, he had encountered some difficulty in getting the joint planning committee to accept his role and to take action on his recommendation. He had been given responsibility without commensurate authority. This position became somewhat more balanced with the Governor's support. Consequently, when Chief Zanders again explained the mobile task force concept and plan, his message carried more authority and was more seriously considered by the area police commanders, although unanimous endorsement of it was still withheld.

Following discussion of this plan, on which no firm action had been taken, discussion centered on the utilization of the Florida National Guard. The Guard was planning to preposition 3,000 guardsmen in the Dade County area, but no police plans had been developed detailing how and under what circumstances the Guard would be used. After discussing the possible use of the Guard, the meeting adjourned with the matter undecided.

With time running out, Chief Zanders proceeded to write a tentative unified operations plan, delineating command and control responsibilities, and manpower allocation. This plan included manpower sources from PSD, MPD, MBPD, and state agencies. Because of the uncertainty of the numbers of men these agencies would eventually commit to convention duties, the plan called for only 876 officers, a number considerably less than the desired 1500 to 2000.

The first draft of the plan was distributed to police commanders on July 1, 1972. It was considered as being somewhat difficult to conform with by the Dade County PSD. They viewed the plan as seriously depleting their own manpower reserves, as well as requiring them to modify their original plans and to undertake a crash training program to orientate their



men to the new configuration. The plan received by PSD was identified as part one of an intended four-part plan. Originally, Chief Zanders had intended to prepare plans relative to the command post, intelligence, and utilization of the National Guard and the U. S. military, but shortness of time precluded the completion of this task. It was not communicated to PSD that the three additional plans would not be forthcoming, a circumstance that indicated a lapse in inter-agency coordination and information exchange.

On July 6, at the last joint planning meeting and only four days before the start of the Democratic National Convention, another attempt was made to obtain conformance with the "three-fifths rule". Chief Garmire had extended his cooperation with the "rule" on the basis that the mobile task force concept provided the element of fluidity that he deemed necessary to adequately protect all areas. The Dade County Public Safety Department, however, continued to balk at increasing its commitment. Consequently, upon the advice of the Governor's office, Mr. Robert Donlan, who was assigned by LEAA to the Miami Beach area to assist local agencies in preparing and expediting convention grant requests, announced that a police agency must commit three-fifths of its sworn personnel to a task force for the five day convention period as a condition of receiving operational overtime funding from LEAA. This presented no problem for Miami Beach police since they had long ago committed every available man to convention duties. However, PSD considered Donlan's announcement an imposition and sought to obtain an alteration in this requirement. Dade County Manager Goode subsequently contacted state officials to determine if the three-fifths requirement could be changed, but his effort was to no avail.

During the four days prior to the start of the convention, manpower allocations were finally determined and task force assignments given on the basis of the operations plan prepared by Chief Zanders. The total convention police force equalled approximately 700 to 800 men, a number considered less than desirable. Obviously, the three-fifths rule was never wholly embraced.

REPUBLICAN CONVENTION. Police intelligence reported that the level of demonstrator activity during the Republican National Convention would be of greater intensity than that experienced during the Democratic Convention. This expectation was viewed as necessitating increased manpower. On July 31, Governor Askew received a report from his Task Force to Evaluate Public Safety and Related Support Services to the Convention, recommending that "additional manpower should be sought NOW from within Florida . . .," and that the principal source of that increase should come from the three local agencies conforming to the "three-fifths rule."

While efforts were being made to secure additional manpower to police the RNC, Mr. Paul Rundle of the U. S. Secret Service advised at

the August 11 meeting of the Joint Planning Committee that the Secret Service would require an additional 250 local police officers to provide assistance in protecting the First Family, the Vice President and their residences. This announcement contributed little to an already tenuous planning process and added to the manpower shortage problem. On August 14, a special meeting was convened in County Manager Ray Goode's office to consider the allocation of state/county/local law enforcement personnel for the RNC in light of Mr. Rundle's request. In attendance at the meeting were Mr. Goode, Mr. Rundle, Commissioner Reed, and Chiefs Pomerance, Garmire and Director Purdy. Several alternative ways were recommended to handle Mr. Rundle's request. In summary, they were:

1. Assent to Secret Service request; make do with remaining officers.
2. Assent to Secret Service request; supplement convention task forces with Florida National Guard.
3. Assent to request; supplement task forces with additional state officers.
4. Assent to request; supplement Task Forces with outside civilian law enforcement.
5. Deny request; let Secret Service avail itself of additional federal resources.

Finally, it was decided that Dade County would withdraw some of its forces from convention assignment and reassign them to some of the details requested by the Secret Service. In place of the withdrawn Dade County PSD forces, the FHP and MPD would increase their commitments. The effect of all this was that the manpower resources available to police the RNC were approximately the same that had been available during the DNC, even though the expectations for violence were greater.

Between conventions the nature of the planning process remained essentially unchanged as did the major content of most plans. On August 16th and 17th, LEAA officially approved the grant requests submitted by state and local agencies, which served to alleviate concern about overtime payment. During both conventions police and government officials met daily to review the previous day's activities and to make any necessary alterations in police response plans.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Throughout the entire planning process for the conventions, three principal approaches to planning emerged. The first of these was the internal planning accomplished by the Miami Beach Police Department. The "low profile" philosophy that Chief Pomerance correctly advocated as the proper role for police in handling convention demonstrations pervaded MBPD's planning and was manifested in several effective ways. First, Chief Pomerance maintained an "open door" policy to any individual or group seeking a role in the conventions. He welcomed third party intervenors such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and the Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC) and actively assisted their planning and operations. Secondly, he invited any and all counter-culture representatives to engage in good faith negotiations with him and the MBPD command staff. This measure proved invaluable for exchanging mutual behavioral expectations and for negotiating campsite controls, parade regulations and mass arrests. Thirdly, he perceived the need for behavioral training for his men so that they could better understand and accept the "low profile" policy and perform in concert with its meaning. Fourthly, Chief Pomerance maintained good relations with the press, a factor that enabled him to obtain broad community and nationwide exposure for MBPD's approach to the conventions and their fervent desire to avoid another "Chicago '68."

All of MBPD's convention planning did not center around the "low profile" approach. Stringent security measures were planned for public and private buildings, including the convention complex. While some attempt was made to train the officers behaviorally, they were also being prepared and equipped to handle the more physical exigencies that might occur. Additionally, legal measures for controlling demonstrator activities were studied as well as mass arrest procedures. A complete review of the internal planning undertaken by the MBPD leads to the conclusion that the task was accomplished thoughtfully and thoroughly.

The second principal approach to convention planning had to do with joint interagency planning. The history of the civil disorders that occurred in the 1960's provided ample evidence that, in those localities requiring a multi-agency response, the responses made usually resulted in a complete breakdown of command and control of police operations because of the absence of coordinated planning. Coordinated multi-agency police planning for the conventions was not completely absent in 1972, but it was lacking to a significant degree. Each of the three principal Miami area police agencies developed its own plans separately, almost entirely devoid of in-depth consideration of a joint response. There are several reasons that can be attributed to this, some of which are historical and some of which are political.

Perhaps the overriding reason was the different perspectives from which each of the police administrators approached convention



planning. Security of their own jurisdictions was uppermost. Each leader was thinking that his own jurisdiction would be the main focal point of disorders. It seems as if coordinated response planning was equated with relinquishment of control. However, if joint planning occurs to the extent required, the possibility of adverse repercussions would be minimized to that degree. Additionally, consideration of public safety needs in all related jurisdictions should transcend any validity that could be attached to unilateral planning.

Another reason for the absence of joint response planning was the relative inexperience with this type of planning by the three principal Dade County area police agencies. The Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department had both individually and jointly policed civil disorders in their jurisdictions prior to 1972. Insofar as the Public Safety Department goes, the joint policing of these events is based on their charter from the state constitution, which provides that all county law enforcement agencies have final responsibility for maintaining peace and order throughout their jurisdictions, including all the municipalities within the county. Based on this constitutional provision, the authority of a sheriff supercedes that of a municipal police chief. In practice then, in Dade County, whenever a municipal police agency was confronted with an overwhelming circumstance, the Dade County Public Safety Department asserted a controlling position. However, little joint planning occurred before the assertion of this position. The Miami Police Department has no legal responsibility for any jurisdiction other than its own. Consequently, its joint planning efforts prior to the conventions was fairly limited. The nature of the city of Miami Beach, being primarily a medium to high income community consisting of retired persons, tourists and service workers under normal circumstances does not require police expertise in civil disorder planning. The 1972 national political conventions were the first events in Miami Beach that required in-depth joint planning with other police agencies.

This lack of an experiential base undoubtedly influenced the 1972 joint planning process and could have been related to the fact that funding preceded planning. Although funding will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, one aspect of it is especially relevant to planning and warrants mentioning here.

The Miami Beach Police Department applied for and received LEAA funds for convention security needs on a unilateral basis on the assumption that joint planning could take place without joint funding. This reversal of the normal and well advised process of planning followed by determination of financial needs contributed greatly to the fragmented multi-agency planning that did occur. The inverted process drew the following comment at the May 19 joint planning meeting from Mr. Paul Rundle, head of the Secret Service forces in Miami Beach for the conventions: "How can you come up with a request for dollars without a plan?" It was partly because the first Miami Beach grant included no funds for



the other law enforcement agencies that those agencies proceeded to develop their own plans and seek funds according to their individual needs. This process was only partially corrected late in the convention preparation stages. The entire planning process would have benefitted greatly if joint planning preceded the first application for federal funds. This would have resulted in one comprehensive grant request, reflecting the financial support needs of each of the affected agencies, including those at the state level.

The third principal approach to convention planning was the utilization of "outside" police consultants. It is to the credit of Chief Pomerance that he recognized the apparent shortcomings in the local planning process and sought outside assistance from the three consultants. The value of having the input of Deputy Chief Zanders, and Lieutenants Perry and Konstanturos was immeasurable in terms of final convention outcomes. Their field operational concepts of command and control, crowd management and defense against "trashing," although not unanimously accepted by local police officials, were sound approaches. The advice and recommendations that were accepted proved to be instrumental to the successful policing of the conventions. With the assistance of Colonel Cotzin, MBPD, they performed a crucial task by producing the only written unified plan developed for the conventions.

The contributions to the planning process made by the consultants could have been maximized had they been brought into the planning process at its formative stages when the first joint planning meeting was held on January 31, 1972. Also, it seems that if their roles had been specifically stated and clearly articulated to all of the involved agencies, any question of resistance relative to their presence could have been resolved. When plans are developed by "outsiders," the recipients of those plans normally have the feeling that something is forced on them. The following comment relative to this point was made in the after-action report of one of the local agencies: "The unified operations plan ... was forcefully imposed upon local law enforcement officials without representation or participation in the planning process. Combine this 'clubbing' approach with the vacuum in the decision-making process, and it created a situation where law enforcement in Southern Florida was forced to acquiesce."

Despite this element of resistance to "outsiders", there were also times when it was considered an advantage to have outsiders available to present operational plans. However difficult it was for Chief Zanders to obtain compliance with his "three-fifths rule", it would have been virtually impossible for Chief Pomerance to propose a similar plan and have it accepted by the larger departments in the area. Both Chief Pomerance and Colonel Cotzin, for example, contributed to the development of operational plans being drawn up by the consultants, but it was considered politically sound to maintain the appearance that the consultants operated more independently. Lacking the necessity to cope with local politics and interpersonal relationships, the consultants could possibly have been more

effectively used in purely advisory roles. Within the actual situation that existed at the time, however, the consultants contributed a great deal to the convention planning process.

During later field operations, Chief Zanders and Colonel Cotzin worked very closely together. Since it was often necessary for Chief Pomerance to remain at Command Post Beta, personal control of officers in the field was frequently exercised by Colonel Cotzin. At these times, Chief Zanders was frequently at his side or sharing the same command car. Colonel Cotzin, of course, was responsible for field decisions, but the MBPD commander took full advantage of the broader experience of the department's chief consultant.

Similarly, during the planning stages, the value of Chief Zanders was not strictly limited to his assigned role in operational planning. Because of his experiences in Washington, D. C., Chief Zanders was one of the few police leaders known by many of the demonstrators. In turn, Chief Zanders knew many of the demonstrators far better than most others involved in the convention planning process. He was also familiar with the workings of LEAA in Washington, and was able to supply useful advice to Mr. Donlon as planning progressed.

Among the numerous frustrations and circuitous manipulations that seemed at times to characterize convention planning, one of the most critical decisions was undoubtedly to recruit and use police consultants drawn from outside the local circle. The consultants who came to Miami Beach did not remain as visitors or observers. They worked. They were used. Furthermore, the same individuals who struggled with development of acceptable plans remained on hand to share in the effort to implement them. When elements of the plan did not work, the consultant could suggest appropriate changes. Thus the consultants provided a valuable continuity that ranged from the planning stages, through funding and training and relations with demonstrators, onto the streets where the plans were brought to life.

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## CONVENTION FUNDING

### CONVENTION GRANTS

State and local law enforcement officials accurately calculated that the cost of providing comprehensive police services to a political convention in 1972 would far exceed their individual and collective financial capabilities. Based on the understanding that a major political party's presidential nominating convention is a national event which attracts thousands of delegates, demonstrators, and news people from throughout the nation, state and local officials looked to the federal government for financial assistance. Consequently, Florida police and other government officials submitted funding requests to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) which had been created in 1968 for the specific purpose of providing financial and technical assistance to state and local governments for law enforcement.

LEAA disburses funds through two programs: block grant funding and discretionary funding. Germane to our discussion here is the discretionary funding program. Under this program, funds are made available for high priority programs that otherwise might not be adequately funded. Funding for these projects falls under five broad categories: police, courts, corrections, organized crime, and disorders. It was under the last category that 1972 convention funds were provided.

To support law enforcement services provided to both political conventions, LEAA funded grant requests from state and local governmental units amounting to \$3,414,085. To match the federal funds, requesting agencies proposed to make in-kind contributions, which are now estimated to have exceeded \$3 million. Both amounts far surpassed original estimates. The LEAA funds were awarded in response to 15



separate grant applications submitted by Miami Beach Police Department, Miami Police Department, Dade County Public Safety Department, Metropolitan Dade County Government, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the Florida Highway Patrol. Following is a summary of the individual grant proposals and the amounts of the separate awards.

MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT. The MBPD submitted two grant applications to LEAA totaling \$817,612. The first grant was entitled "National Political Convention Law Enforcement Services Project" and was for the amount of \$395,424. The purpose of this grant was to develop and implement an innovative training program for MBPD officers and 100 "mutual aid" officers and to purchase equipment considered necessary to effectively police the conventions. This grant request was dated October 8, 1971, and was approved by LEAA on November 15, 1971. However, it was not until December 6, 1971, that the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice forwarded the approved grant to Miami Beach. In May, 1972, this grant was adjusted to provide for the consulting services of three police experts in civil disorder control. The addition of this expenditure was offset by a reduction in the anticipated purchase of communications equipment, thereby leaving the dollar amount of the grant unchanged.

On June 22, 1972, the Miami Beach Police Department submitted a supplemental grant application to LEAA to support additional expenditures necessitated by the Republican National Convention. Supplemental funds were to be expended for operational overtime for 304 MBPD officers and support personnel, training overtime, contractual services, additional equipment purchases and for additional supplies. Training overtime funds for the Miami and Coral Gables police officers who attended the MBPD training program were also included. The total amount of this grant was for \$422,188 and it was approved by LEAA on August 16, 1972.

MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT. The MPD submitted one grant application, "Miami Police-Disorder Response Project." This grant request, in the amount of \$95,410, was dated March 16, 1971, and was approved by LEAA on May 16, 1972. Its purpose was to provide training for Miami police personnel in areas that were considered most important for policing demonstrations and disorders. These areas included psychological response training, and training in unarmed response or non-deadly weapons response to mass violence. The grant also included the purchase of crowd control chemical agents, for which \$29,300 was budgeted.

FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL. This agency applied for only one grant since much of their training and equipping needs were included in the FDLE grants. The FHP grant was submitted on July 20, 1972, for the purpose of correcting a communications problem identified during the Democratic National Convention. This grant was entitled "Portable Helmet Radios for Tactical Squad Members." Its purpose was to provide all platoon and squad leaders with portable radio transceivers, and all



platoon and squad members with portable receivers to facilitate command control. LEAA funded this proposal on August 16 for the amount of \$79,795.

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY GOVERNMENT. The Dade County Manager's office requested funding from LEAA for two grant applications. The first application, which was dated June 16, 1972, and in the amount of \$103,220, was entitled the "Dade County Community Services Project." The majority of the funds were to be used for the support of the Dade County YMCA's convention program. This consisted of the creation of a rumor control center, the observation of activities away from the convention site where disorders were likely to occur or had occurred in the past, and the development of an information system that would provide a common channel for communications for delegates, non-delegates and local governmental groups. LEAA approved this project in the amount requested on August 16, 1972.

The second grant proposal submitted by the Dade County Government was for \$153,943 to establish an Area Command Center. This Command Center would coordinate federal, state and local resources to maintain public safety and welfare and to provide related support services as required on a 24 hour basis. The center was to maintain close communication with other command posts, and it was to house representatives from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Florida National Guard, U. S. Military, U. S. Department of Justice, County Manager's Office and the Dade County Public Safety Department. LEAA approved this grant in the amount requested on August 17, 1972.

DADE COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT. On August 16, 1972, LEAA awarded \$1,258,502 to the DCPSD in response to their grant application entitled, "Dade County National Services Project." This grant was a consolidated request for funds estimated to be needed for convention preparations by the Public Safety Department, other municipalities within the county, and by the courts and corrections components of the criminal justice system within Dade County. Grant funds were to be spent for training, training overtime, operational overtime and equipment purchases.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (FDLE). FDLE applied for and received a total of eight separate grants from LEAA amounting to \$905,604. These grants included funds for training and overtime compensation for the state law enforcement agencies, equipment purchases and medical services. Funds were also provided to support the formation of a Governor's Task Force to Evaluate Public Safety and Related Support Services at the 1972 National Political Conventions.

#### CONVENTION FUNDING PROCESS

The process of obtaining LEAA financial assistance formally commenced when the Miami Beach Police Department submitted a grant

application to the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice (Florida's State Criminal Justice Planning Agency, hereinafter referred to as the GCCJ) and to LEAA on April 5, 1971. This proposal was to allow for extensive training of MBPD officers and for the purchasing of equipment considered necessary for the effective policing of the Democratic National Convention. At this early date, the GCCJ withheld approval of the application because no formal announcement had been made that the Democratic National Convention was going to be held in Miami Beach. LEAA took no action on the grant because it had not been endorsed by the GCCJ.

When the GCCJ received Miami Beach's grant application, it was the first indication received by that agency that LEAA funds were going to be made available for policing the convention. Since this was the first time that such funding would be provided for a national political convention in Florida, the GCCJ sought to obtain LEAA's guidelines and policy pertaining to this matter

In June, 1971, Mr. Paul Estaver of the LEAA Riots and Civil Disorders Office advised the GCCJ that LEAA would provide financial assistance for the conventions under its discretionary grant program and that normal funding channels would be used for this special category funding. This meant that requests for grant funds to be used for convention related policing purposes would be forwarded by the originating police agency to the GCCJ, who would in turn forward the application to LEAA's regional office in Atlanta, Georgia.

On June 29, 1971, the Democratic National Committee formally announced that their 1972 presidential convention would be held in Miami Beach. Following this announcement, Chief Pomerance requested the GCCJ to reactivate MBPD's grant application which at that time was in the amount of \$334,525. Because this amount exceeded the dollar limit previously established by LEAA for special grants, the GCCJ again sought the advice of LEAA on what action should be taken on the grant. The dollar limit was determined by a formula based on population and incidence of crimes. The GCCJ staff was advised that it would be necessary to maintain conformance with established policy and that the amount of Miami Beach's grant application would have to be reduced to the prescribed limit of \$100,000.

Subsequently, on July 13, 1971, a meeting was conducted for the purpose of discussing this matter. In attendance were the MBPD command staff and Mr. Tim Crowe and Mr. Bud Newhall, both of whom represented the GCCJ. Upon being informed by those representatives that the grant would have to be substantially reduced by more than \$200,000, the command staff concluded that it would not be possible to adequately train and equip their men with a program reduced to such an extent. Based on the nature of the convention event and its national implications, an exception to the established policy would be sought at a higher level. MBPD then sought approval for their grant at the federal level.

On August 12, 1971, the Atlanta Regional Office of LEAA received a revised application of the MBPD grant proposal, which reflected a request for \$283,688. Mr. Douglas L. Brown, an LEAA Senior Field Representative for Florida, reviewed the application, consulted with the GCCJ, and submitted a report to LEAA. In his report Mr. Brown wrote that "the overriding concern of this office ... is the lack of a coordinated, comprehensive plan for the use of the equipment by law enforcement departments in the Miami Beach/Miami/Dade County area, both during the implementation of the project and after the 1972 Democratic National Convention is completed." Mr. Brown went on to say that, "We feel it necessary that a more comprehensive plan be delineated as to the aforementioned area of Florida." In essence, Mr. Brown's report suggested that funding of the grant application be withheld until tangible signs of coordinated planning became evident.

LEAA had also received a grant application for approximately \$800,000 from the city of San Diego, which had been selected as the site of the Republican National Convention. In response to receiving two grant requests from the two convention cities totalling more than \$1,000,000 LEAA invited the top administrators of the police agencies that would be most directly involved to a meeting to discuss convention funding. This meeting was held on September 10, 1971, in Washington, D.C. at the offices of Mr. Clarence Coster, Associate Administrator of LEAA. In attendance were Mr. Coster, Mr. Robert Donlan of LEAA, San Diego County Sheriff Duffy, City of San Diego Police Chief Hoobler, Chief Pomerance and Chief Garmire, and Director Purdy. LEAA officials explained that their agency had approximately one million dollars to disburse for convention security needs and that the intention was to provide the San Diego area and the Miami area with a half million dollars each. LEAA recommended that the police agencies jointly plan and coordinate their anticipated needs so that one grant application from each of the two areas would reflect the financial needs of all supporting law enforcement agencies.

On Wednesday, September 15, 1971, Chief Pomerance advised Mr. Coster by telephone that the MBPD was in the process of reshaping its grant application. In its new form the request would include the needs of the other area police agencies that were expected to provide "mutual aid" assistance during the convention. The following week, on September 23, Chief Pomerance was appointed Chief of Security for the State by Governor Askew and formally assigned the responsibility of coordinating police responses to the convention.

LEAA received a copy of the revised MBPD grant in late October. On November 15, LEAA approved it. The approval was based on two factors: the Governor's appointment of Chief Pomerance as state coordinator for convention security and the assurances LEAA had received that the grant reflected the needs of the total law enforcement community in the area. LEAA approval of the grant, however, created at least a



a procedural problem for the GCCJ because that agency had not endorsed the grant. This indicated that the advice received earlier from LEAA's Regional Office - that normal funding channels would be followed - had been changed. Confirmation of this procedural change was received from the Atlanta office when they advised that the GCCJ could forward the grant received from LEAA to Miami Beach without GCCJ's endorsement. This left unclear the role of the GCCJ in convention funding.

The Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department did not view the Miami Beach Police Department grant as reflecting their own convention security needs. In the first place, they had no part in planning and developing the grant application. Secondly, the grant provided for payment of overtime for MBPD officers but not for officers from other departments. Consequently, the Dade County PSD and MPD proceeded to prepare grant applications to reflect their own needs. On February 2, 1972, PSD forwarded a grant application for the amount of \$399,620 to LEAA and GCCJ. The funds were to be used for training Public Safety Department personnel and for purchasing necessary equipment. In reply to this grant application, Mr. Clarence Coster of LEAA wrote to Director Purdy on February 11, 1972:

"It is the position and policy of this agency that we can react only to grant requests in support of police involvement in the convention cities that are submitted by the specified convention cities. Therefore, in the case of this grant, please contact the Chief of Police of Miami Beach, (and) the City Manager of Miami Beach and request that they coordinate your grant request with the grant request from their city and incorporate your request into their stated needs and application for funding to this agency. This can be accomplished by the City of Miami Beach submitting a modified grant request.

"The policy of this Agency, and the procedure is necessary to ensure that no duplication or unnecessary expenditures take place and to further ensure that the greatest degree of cost effectiveness is applied to this effort.

"As stated in my letter of December 8, it is questionable if this Agency has adequate funds to meet all of the needs of all the various jurisdictions participating in the convention activities of the various parties. I can assure you that every effort will be made to support you through the City of Miami Beach in every possible way, but funding limitations do present us with a very serious problem."

Copies of this letter were forwarded to Chiefs Pomerance and Garmire and their respective City Managers.

This letter reiterated LEAA's convention funding policy first stated at the September 10, 1971, meeting. Since the Governor had appointed Chief Pomerance as the Chief of Convention Security for the State, it seemed only natural that LEAA refer the Dade County PSD to



the City of Miami Beach for assistance in obtaining aid for convention preparations. However, this was an unusual position for Director Purdy and his agency to be in. As the head of the largest agency in the county (1,800 personnel as compared to MBPD's 235), and as the constitutionally appointed chief law enforcement officer of the county, it was difficult to accept what might be interpreted as a subordinate position.

In conformance with Mr. Coster's letter, a copy of the PSD grant proposal was forwarded to the Miami Beach Police Department for their action. In responding to the proposal, Chief Pomerance wrote Director Purdy stating the following:

"In keeping with our historically close working relationship, I completely support your efforts to appropriately train your personnel. The Miami Beach training project is about to get underway and, in view of the similarity of our approach, I wish to extend to you the availability of participation in our training program. In either event, however, I completely support your request for the training and education funding of personnel who will ultimately be assigned to the National Democratic Security Mission."

The content of this letter suggested that there was some misinterpretation of Mr. Coster's February 11th letter, which stated that PSD and MBPD should coordinate and combine their needs into one grant request. Although Chief Pomerance offered to share the MBPD training program, that offer fell far short of Mr. Coster's intent. Consequently, the PSD continued to seek funding from LEAA.

The Miami Police Department during this time, had submitted its grant application to LEAA and the GCCJ for the amount of \$160,140 which was to pay for special convention related police training. Mr. Jerris Leonard, Administrator of LEAA, responded to this grant request on March 9, 1972. In a letter sent to Chief Garmire, Mr. Leonard notified him that the MPD grant request was being returned. He reiterated the LEAA convention funding policy: LEAA would "react only to grant requests from the city specified as host to a national political convention." This meant that MPD would have to submit their grant request to the MBPD for endorsement as the sponsoring applicant.

Also in his March 8 letter, Mr. Leonard advanced a new approach to costing out convention related law enforcement expenditures. The recommendation was that Chief Garmire should separate the cost of policing anticipated disorders in Miami from the cost of providing aid to Miami Beach. "It is suggested you separate the cost of these two separate activities, (1) support of Miami Beach during the course of the convention and transmit that through the City of Miami Beach with their official endorsement and (2) redraft the application and request specific support for any demonstrations or civil disorders you anticipate in your city as a result of the National Convention."

At the direction of this letter, the MPD revised its grant application, reducing it from \$160,140 to \$95,410 and resubmitted it to LEAA and the GCCJ. The Dade County PSD also submitted a revised grant application with a reduced dollar figure of \$384,960. However, Director Purdy, upon reading a copy of Mr. Leonard's letter to Chief Garmire, concluded that it would not be possible to separate convention-site and nonconvention-site security needs. In an April 18 letter to Mr. Leonard he explained his reasoning:

"The management of this convention in terms of planning, training, coordination, staffing, etc., is a county-wide activity. The impact of participants and results of convention activities will be felt throughout the area, not just around the convention hall itself. Consequently, to divide the request for assistance to meet our anticipated needs would dilute and emasculate our county-wide obligations and responsibilities. The constitutional responsibilities of the Public Safety Department preclude such an approach."

Director Purdy also wrote that, "the provisions and expressed needs of our grant still apply" and he emphasized that grant funding should be expedited. He noted that, "Should there be any additional delays, we will be too late to participate in the training conducted by Florida International University, to obtain communications equipment through proper purchasing channels, and in general, to implement and administer our proposed planning, training and convention coordination responsibilities and functions."

On April 25, Chief Pomerance and Miami Beach City Manager Clifford O'Key visited the LEAA offices in Washington, D. C. in an attempt to obtain additional funding for convention training. This money, which amounted to \$113,750, was slated to go to MBPD, Coral Gables P. D., Miami P. D., and the Dade County Public Safety Department. On April 27, an article appeared in the Miami Herald quoting Chief Pomerance on the success of the mission. According to that article Chief Pomerance stated, "They told us to fill out the paperwork and applications and we'd get it."

After the Washington trip, Major Ted Schempp, Chief of the Administrative Services Division of the MBPD, met with Mr. Howard Rasmussen, Supervisor of the Dade County PSD Planning and Research Bureau and informed him that \$49,661 of the \$113,750 would be signed over to the PSD. Verbal agreement was reached on conducting a joint dissent and disorder training program. As events turned out, however, these funds were never received by the MBPD. One report stated that LEAA had not received the grant request for the \$113,750. As a result, this particular joint training venture never materialized.

The GCCJ had been receiving copies of other grant applications, but was unable to take any action on them because the normal funding channels were no longer in effect and clarification of LEAA's funding policy for this special event was needed. On March 23, the GCCJ forwarded a letter to the Atlanta Regional Office of LEAA addressing these

questions. However, the Atlanta office had not been included in the new funding channels nor had it been advised of its agency's convention funding policy and guidelines. On April 18, the staff of the GCCJ telephonically spoke with Mr. Coster to determine what the ceiling was on money available from LEAA and what the parameters for funding were. Mr. Coster replied that no definitive policy had been established due to the many ramifications that had arisen, but that LEAA was going to attempt to stay within the one million dollar range it had previously set. He further advised that, since Chief Pomerance was still the Governor's appointed Chief of Convention Security for the State, grant requests should continue to be coordinated with him. The role of the GCCJ in convention funding was left undetermined.

The Republican Convention site change from San Diego to Miami Beach prompted several actions by local and state officials. First, the Miami Beach Police Department, acting on the advice and consent of LEAA officials, submitted a request to make an adjustment in their original grant. The adjustment request provided for the hiring of three "outside" police consultants, the cost of which would be offset by a reduction in the purchase of communications equipment. This request required no change in the amount of the grant and was approved by LEAA. Secondly, PSD officials interpreted the forthcoming presence of the additional convention as placing a greater responsibility on its agency to maintain the peace and security of the county. Consequently, in an attempt to assume a more controlling position in convention related funding/planning, Director Purdy wrote Mr. Jerris Leonard the following letter:

"The problems contingent on the presence of two conventions will demand county-wide coordination and cooperation on a more formal basis for a prolonged period under conditions not first perceived by LEAA. Of particular concern to our community are those conditions which may result during the period of approximately six weeks between the two conventions. It is this period of time which perhaps identifies best that a national convention being held on Miami Beach is a community-wide problem rather than a specific problem of security at a particular location.

"We are requesting, therefore, that any future planning or funding be consistent with the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Sheriff (Director of Public Safety). This responsibility cannot be abrogated regardless of the desires or intentions of individual or agencies involved. It is furthermore consistent with staffing and coordination of other county-wide agencies.

"The potential problem of these two conventions is of such enormous magnitude that consideration must be given to a much broader-based assistance, funding and planning level than is now being experienced. Consequently, we are again placing before you for your consideration our request to be considered the primary funding, planning and coordinating agency for all security and associated law enforcement matters dealing with the impending political conventions."



Compliance with this request would have required LEAA to reverse Governor Askew's appointment of Chief Pomerance as Chief of Convention Security for the State, a measure that LEAA did not want to take because it was beyond the purview of that agency's charter. Consequently, LEAA maintained its stance on remaining distant from local political considerations.

The third action related to funding that was prompted by the Republican Convention site change was taken on the part of Governor Askew. The Governor was aware of the fragmented convention funding and planning process that was occurring and moved to realign the authority structure to facilitate a more orderly process. To do this, he requested LEAA, in a May 5th letter, to withhold taking any action on grant requests from Florida police agencies until a meeting between LEAA and the Governor and his staff had taken place. The Governor also stated in the letter that it was his position that all LEAA funds should be made to the Office of Governor and distributed the same way as other LEAA grants are distributed by the state to local governments.

It was in this letter that the Governor first announced two significant changes in convention related authority lines. William Reed, Executive Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, was designated as the "State Coordinator" for security and public safety in accordance with the Florida Mutual Aid Act. Chief Pomerance was to "continue to serve as the 'Chief of Security' for the convention site and adjacent area." (Emphasis added.)

On May 11, 1972, the Governor and his staff went to Washington, D. C., to confer with LEAA officials and Mr. Richard Kleindienst, the U. S. Attorney General. At this meeting the Governor explained in greater detail the contents of his May 5th letter to Mr. Leonard. The Attorney General and LEAA promised full cooperation with the Governor and offered to assist him in every way possible.

Concurrent with the Governor's appointment of Mr. Reed as State Security Coordinator, Mr. Ray Goode, Dade County Manager, was appointed as area coordinator for convention planning. This last appointment by the Governor completed the revised convention funding channel, which was as follows: Agencies requesting LEAA funds were to submit their grant applications to County Manager Goode, whose responsibility it was to coordinate all local area grant requests. After receiving his review and approval, the grant application was then to be forwarded to Mr. Bill Reed, who upon approving the application, would forward it to the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice. The GCCJ would in turn submit the application to LEAA for final approval. The Atlanta Regional Office of LEAA was not included in this process because, according to one LEAA official, it is a standard procedure for the central LEAA office in Washington, D. C. to become directly involved with large discretionary projects that are national in scope.



The intent of the Governor's May 5 letter was formalized on June 5 when he signed an Executive Order delineating convention responsibilities. The order was significant to the funding process in that it removed Chief Pomerance from the convention funding channels, a move that undoubtedly pleased the Dade County PSD since their grant applications no longer needed the approval of MBPD. On May 16, 1972, the Miami Police Department's grant application for the amount of \$95,410 received approval by LEAA. The grant application submitted by the DCPSD was still pending.

The local area police commanders received an explanation of what implications the Governor's reorganization plan had for them at the regularly scheduled May 19 joint planning meeting. Mr. Reed, as the Governor's representative, explained the State's expectations relative to the funding and planning process. An official document summarized Mr. Reed's comments as follows:

"Mr. Reed spoke further and indicated that all grant applications should be coordinated, planned and prepared locally and approved through the office of the County Manager with the help of a grant writer assigned to the office from LEAA. This grant should encompass the needs of the total law enforcement effort of all contributing agencies at the municipal and county level. These needs should include monies for overtime as well as the total training requirements. The County Manager's Office would, upon completion of grant application, forward to the Office of the Governor for processing and review."

It was indicated during this meeting by Mr. Robert Donlan, representative from LEAA that tentatively his organization had set aside \$2.5 million in federal funds to assist local authorities in handling the two conventions. The \$2.5 million consisted in part of the funds originally scheduled for the San Diego area. Because San Diego did undertake training preparations during the intervening months between the time the Republican Party announced that city as its convention site until the change to Miami Beach, LEAA supported that training effort for an amount in excess of \$200,000.

Mr. Douglas Brown of LEAA's Atlanta Regional Office was assigned to the convention area to assist the local agencies with the grant process. Additionally, during the last week of May, Mr. Tim Crowe of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice was assigned to the area to provide grant planning assistance. Mr. Crowe had previously provided valuable consultation to the Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department and was held in high regard by officials from those agencies. It was also during this time that Deputy Chief Zanders, and Lieutenants Perry and Konstanturos arrived in Miami Beach to provide operational planning assistance. Mr. Robert Donlan of LEAA arrived in Miami Beach on May 22 to assist in the preparation of grant proposals, to expedite the processing of these proposals, and to approve line item changes for fund expenditures when reasonable and necessary.

Police officials were frustrated by the slowness of the funding process and felt that time was running out. Naturally, it was with relief that they greeted Mr. Donlan. He was the senior LEAA official in the area, and police officials perceived his role as a facilitator and expeditor. However, the expectations of the police officials exceeded reality. Some police officials observed that Mr. Donlan was unable to provide them with the type of rapid assistance needed. His inability to meet these expectations served to exacerbate already strained LEAA/local relationships.

The Miami Beach Police Department viewed the assignment of policing a second political convention as substantially increasing its preparation needs. Accordingly, MBPD prepared a second grant application in the amount of \$465,353 to supplement the first grant that it was awarded in November, 1971. The supplemental grant request was submitted on June 22. It was to provide funds primarily for operational overtime for MBPD officers and support personnel, for training overtime, and for additional equipment acquisition. While this grant was being prepared, LEAA authorized Chief Pomerance during the second week of June to proceed with acquiring the necessary equipment items to the extent of \$70,000. This was done so that those items would be delivered in time for training purposes and for their possible use during the conventions.

Also concurrent with these events, the Dade County Public Safety Department initiated measures to develop a consolidated grant proposal for Dade County law enforcement agencies. At the request of Director Purdy, Dade County municipalities (excluding MBPD and MPD since they had prepared their own grant applications) submitted their anticipated funding needs to PSD for inclusion in a consolidated grant. Areas covered would include training, equipment acquisition and operational overtime. With this information, Dade County PSD prepared a grant application in the amount of \$2,079,565.

On June 16, 1972, PSD delivered five copies of this grant to Mr. Robert Donlan, who had been provided office space at the 920 Alton Road convention planning office in Miami Beach. On June 19, a copy of this proposal was also forwarded to Mr. Leonard and to the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice with County Manager Goode's endorsement. Director Purdy attached a letter to the copy of the grant proposal sent to Mr. Leonard. Director Purdy wrote that the grant included, "the needs of other law enforcement agencies and criminal justice system components . . . ." The letter closed by noting the need for "expeditious endorsement and approval of this grant application."

The approval of this grant was delayed by two factors. First, the copy of the grant application received by Mr. Leonard was not endorsed by Commissioner Reed or the GCCJ. Since this violated the convention funding channels established by Governor Askew, Mr. Donlan at the request of Mr. Leonard wrote the following response to Director Purdy:

"As I have explained to you in the past, convention grant applications must be submitted in accordance with the procedures established by the Governor in Executive Order 72-33. First of all, any grant application emanating from within Dade County must be endorsed by the Local Area Coordinator, County Manager Ray Goode. The application must be then sent to the Governor's State Coordinator, Commissioner William Reed. In turn, the grant must be approved and endorsed by Mr. James Stewart, the Director of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice. Only after that endorsement has been attached, can we consider such a grant application for funding."

The second factor, which delayed approval of the PSD consolidated grant and also approval of Miami Beach Police Department's supplemental grant was the circumstance that no unified operations plan had been developed up to this point in time. As a result, state officials withheld the processing of grant applications until such a plan was forthcoming. It was with their advice and consent that Mr. Donlan announced at the July 6 joint planning meeting that three-fifths of an agency's sworn personnel must be committed to convention related duties before that agency could be considered for overtime funding.

As the Democratic National Convention began, LEAA had funded the first MBPD grant request and the Miami Police Department's only grant request. Additionally, it had funded two grants submitted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Still pending were the Dade County Public Safety Department's consolidated grant and the Miami Beach Department's supplemental grant, as well as the remainder of FDLE's grant applications and the Dade County Government applications.

Between conventions a negotiation process occurred between Mr. Donlan and Florida state officials relative to the funding of grants. LEAA had increased the previously announced \$2.5 million ceiling on convention funding to \$3 million, but the total amount of the pending grant requests, coupled with the grants previously funded, exceeded that amount.

On August 3, the Dade County PSD submitted a supplemental grant application for \$139,473, which brought their grant requests alone to a total of \$2,219,938. The problem was solved in part by the military loaning Dade County needed equipment, thereby reducing the amount of the consolidated grant. Funds requested for operational overtime were also reduced. These reductions left the requests for LEAA funds at \$3,414,085. That figure was acceptable to the U. S. Attorney General, LEAA, and Florida state officials. By August 18, all grant requests had been processed and approved by LEAA.



## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A characterization of the convention funding process might best be described in terms of decision points and (mis)interpretations. From the beginning of that process until near the end, significant decisions and interpretations of those decisions unmistakably affected all subsequent activities related to funding.

The first decision point in the funding process was the Miami Beach Police Department's decision to formulate a grant application on a unilateral basis. The reasons for taking this approach were based on several assumptions which appeared sound to the MBPD at the time.

That agency had previously planned for and policed a national political convention with little outside assistance. They were again policing a non-incumbent party's convention, during which it was assumed that no major outside police assistance would be needed to prevent or quell large scale demonstrations or disorders. Because they did plan on being assisted by some outside police forces, 100 "mutual aid" officers were included in the first MBPD grant as participants in that agency's convention training program. Funds for the payment of overtime to those 100 officers, however, had not been included as had similar funds for MBPD officers. The assumption made at the time was that the outside police agencies would welcome the opportunity to send their officers to a training program at no cost to those agencies. That those assumptions proved incorrect is to the discredit of no one, but they do serve to illustrate the difficulty of determining someone else's needs and the importance of joint planning.

The Dade County PSD and the MPD felt, and rightly so, that they could best determine their own convention needs, which were not reflected in MBPD's grant application. It was only natural for them to subsequently submit their own convention grant proposals. The unilateral planning of the first grant application had the effect of barring subsequent joint grant planning. If joint planning had preceded the submission of the first MBPD grant, many of the complications that subsequently entered into the funding process possibly could have been avoided.

The second decision point was Governor Askew's appointment of Chief Pomerance as Chief of Convention Security for the State, responsible for coordinating all convention related law enforcement projects. This decision was interpreted as abrogating the constitutional authority of the Dade County Sheriff as the top law enforcement officer of the county. As such, it undoubtedly affected the attitude of the PSD Director and subsequent relationships. This appointment also indicated that a full appreciation of the magnitude of the convention project, with all of its ramifications for the county and the state, had not been realized at the state level at that point in time.



The third decision point was LEAA's decision not to consider grants from PSD and MPD unless they were coordinated with and channeled through the MBPD. LEAA's frequently communicated intent to fund one coordinated grant was apparently misinterpreted, or at least not clearly understood, by all parties involved because such a grant never was developed. On the other hand, some of the local area agencies did not feel that LEAA fully comprehended the local environment and viewed LEAA's position as being intransigent in delaying the funding of local grant applications.

The complications that arose in the transfer of funds from LEAA to local agencies were not all related to LEAA's advocacy of joint planning. As with most new programs that suffer from inadequate lead time for planning, many problems surfaced in the convention funding role of LEAA that were related to unformulated policies and procedures or to new policies and procedures that had not been adequately communicated to all parties involved. At first it was unknown by the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice that LEAA was going to provide funds for the conventions. When this was established, LEAA's Regional Office determined that the discretionary grant category under which MBPD's grant fell, had a funding ceiling much lower than the amount requested in the grant, thereby compelling MBPD to bypass the GCCJ and LEAA's Regional Office to seek exemption with LEAA's national office. This led to the convention role ambiguity of the GCCJ and suggested that either the established criteria for special discretionary grants needed clarification or that new rules were needed specifically for convention funding.

Another problem that arose was the perceived lack of detailed guidelines. The after-action reports of at least two law enforcement agencies with convention responsibilities expressed the need for more and clearer LEAA funding guidelines. Those reports commented as follows:

"It is recommended that should future LEAA grants be prepared, adequate guidelines be made available so that valuable resources are not dissipated through the grant preparation process . . . ."

"There was a great deal of confusion concerning the proper procedures for filing grant applications and considerable delay in approval once the application had been filed . . . ."

These comments refer to funding parameters. Information as to what would be funded (e.g. operational overtime, training overtime, equipment purchases) and who could be included in the grant (e.g. court personnel) and the amount of funds available was essential to prevent the cycle of grant preparation - submission - rejection - revision - resubmission, and so on.

The fourth decision point was the Republican National Committee's announcement of the change in its selection of a convention site. This decision induced LEAA to increase the amount of its convention financial assistance. It also prompted the concerned law enforcement agencies to request additional funds, and it motivated the Governor to insert state officials into the funding process.

The Governor's Executive Order shifting statewide convention coordination responsibilities from Chief Pomerance to Mr. William Reed, Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) was the fifth decision point. In addition to the implications this order had relative to planning, it also formally injected the state into the funding process by providing Mr. Reed with the authority to review and authorize grant applications prepared by local agencies. As previously mentioned, the withholding of grants was considered by the state as a method of prompting the initiation of joint planning at the local level.

The Executive Order placed Mr. Reed in a dual role. He was a grant applicant for FDLE and for other state law enforcement agencies, and he was also a grant endorser for all convention related grant requests. This dual role created some concern at the local level, because it was viewed as a conflict of interest and because it generated anxiety from local administrators in regards to federal funds reaching the local level. These concerns were expressed by Dade County Manager Ray Goode in a letter dated July 25, 1972, which was addressed to Mr. Reed and to Mr. Ed Dunn, Governor Askew's General Counsel.

"At the beginning of our planning sessions with the state, concern was expressed by local officials that the \$2 million LEAA commitment, considered firm based on discussions and meetings with LEAA, not be reduced by the state but passed directly to the local area. From the first meeting, we were informed that as a result of direct negotiations between Governor Askew and the U. S. Attorney General, an additional \$1.5 million allocation (over and above the \$2 million for local government) would be made to the State of Florida for FHP, FDLE, etc., and that we should not be concerned about state competition for the \$2 million commitment from LEAA.

"We currently hear rumors that the above described situation may not be true, and that both state and local expenditures must be covered within a total of \$2 million including grants already awarded. If so, this presents an intolerable financial problem for our local units of government."

As it turned out, local agencies received more than a \$2 million share of the federal funds. Nevertheless, the arrangement remained less than satisfactory with some grant recipients, as was indicated by this comment made in an after-action report of one of the local agencies. "It is also recommended that any law enforcement agency with a vested interest (FDLE) should not have the responsibility of deciding the program and funding allocations of other law enforcement agencies." Frequently,

the appearances of a fact are misleading. But if those appearances are accepted by others as fact, then the wisest course of action would be to avoid those appearances.

There was one other factor relative to the funding process that warrants consideration, and that has to do with the timing of grant funding. Of the 15 convention grant applications, federal and state approval for ten of them was not forthcoming until after the conclusion of both conventions. This delay caused some anxiety on the part of police officials and had the effect of exacerbating LEAA/state/local relationships.

One after-action report contained the following comment: "Future operations of this type will require closer coordination and planning, particularly in the area of LEAA grants. As previously noted, coordination was lacking in this instance, especially between federal and state units. As a case in point, the members of this agency were not compensated for overtime hours worked at either convention until September 30, 1972. The responsibility for this delay must be shared, but points up the need for better planning."

The Miami News quoted a police official as stating that the "LEAA program founders in a bureaucratic maze that makes it impossible for us to get real consideration." These impressions and observations underscored the need not only for greater federal/state/local cooperation, but also for streamlined procedures to eliminate funding delays.

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## ORGANIZATION

### INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

Organizational adaptations at the local level were required for the policing of the national political conventions. Chief Pomerance early recognized that the normal everyday structure of the MBPD and its mode of operations would be inappropriate to successfully institute the social control activities that would be required to police those events. Consequently, several important intra-organizational adaptations were implemented.

First, the MBPD organization was expanded. Mr. Wayne Hanewicz was employed to administer the training and equipping grant. Mr. Seymour Gelber, Assistant State Attorney, was assigned the important functions of acting as legal advisor to Chief Pomerance and serving as his liaison person with criminal justice planners and with third parties seeking a convention role. And, as previously mentioned, Deputy Chief Zanders and Lieutenants Perry and Konstanturos were added to the staff as consultants to assist with operational planning.

Mobilization of departmental manpower was undertaken. It was necessary to eliminate or reduce many of the normal police services provided to the Miami Beach Community. For example, fewer patrol officers and fewer investigators would be available to the community. Days off and annual leaves were cancelled and all personnel were placed on 12 hour shifts during the conventions. During the convention period, contrary to normal operations, command level officers took an active role in field operations, making tactical decisions as emergent circumstances arose. During this period, the exercise of discretionary authority was shifted from its normal locus with patrolmen to the command staff. The former were expected not to take individual action without specific orders from



superiors. Command support functions were also centralized and relocated to the convention complex, where the Miami Beach command post was established.


CONVENTION SECURITY FORCE - MBPD. The convention security force consisted of inside and outside security units and a traffic and parade escort section. The inside security unit's mission was to insure admittance of those persons possessing proper credentials, to protect honored persons and distinguished guests, to maintain order on the convention floor, and to protect property and promote the general welfare of all persons in attendance. This unit was commanded by Miami Beach Police Major Walter Philbin. It consisted of 77 officers from MBPD, Miami Police Department, Dade County Public Safety Department, and the Florida State Beverage Department. Members of this unit were assigned to strategic security points throughout the interior of the convention hall.

The purpose of the outside security and fixed post detail, which operated outside the convention hall but inside the perimeter security fence, was to assist the Andy Frain Agency to initially screen persons seeking admittance into the convention complex, to maintain order at the entrance gates, to secure or open individual gates as directed by proper authority, and to safeguard vital installations and property within the complex. This detail was composed of 48 Miami Beach police officers commanded by Major Calvin Schuler. These men were assigned to fixed posts at the perimeter security gate, the heliport inside the complex, candidate trailers parked behind convention hall, and to observation posts.

The traffic and parade escort section was assigned the responsibility of insuring an orderly flow of traffic within the city of Miami Beach, establishing emergency detour traffic patterns as conditions dictated, furnishing escort and traffic control for parades or demonstrations, establishing and maintaining an orderly traffic flow pattern within the convention complex, and to enforce vehicular parking assignments within the convention complex. This unit was subdivided into three details: traffic control and parade escort, convention complex parking detail, and complex traffic control detail. A total of 57 officers and 32 cadets from Miami Beach, Miami, and Dade County were commanded in this section by Captain Buford Whittaker of the Miami Beach Police Department.

GENERAL PATROL FORCE. The general patrol force of the Miami Beach Police Department was assigned to provide normal police services to the community of Miami Beach. This force consisted of 64 officers who were divided into two 12-hour shifts designated "A" shift and "B" shift. Each shift was commanded by a captain. Of the 64 officers, 36 were assigned to "A" shift which was operative from 8:00 a. m. to 8:00 p. m. Sixteen of these officers were assigned to patrol, and eight to detective functions, with the remainder assigned to supervisory functions, the complaint desk and the jail. Fourteen officers on the "B" shift were assigned to patrol, six to detective, and the remainder to supervision, the complaint desk and the jail.

**MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT TABLE OF ORGANIZATION**



## MIAMI BEACH COMMAND POST

The Miami Beach Command Post was located in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium adjacent to the convention hall. This command post was designated Command Post "Beta" and consisted of the communications center, the intelligence center, the operations situation room, and the field commander's office. Although the personnel and functions operating in these rooms were to provide staff services to several agencies, their primary responsibility was to provide staff and support services for the MBPD field and tactical commanders who were responsible for convention site security. These services were provided to facilitate command, control and coordination of the multi-agency mobile task force assigned to the command of the Miami Beach Field Commander.

The intelligence center, which was located in a room adjacent to the command center and coordinated separately, was comprised of intelligence officers from participating police, state, federal and military agencies, whose purpose was to provide strategic and tactical information to the Field Commander, Area Commander, and top officials of each agency involved. Each of the participating agencies was assigned to a liaison office.

In its final form, the command post consisted of twelve key functions and responsibilities. Many of these positions evolved during the course of the conventions as the need was seen to improve tactical information gathering and to increase the flow of information to Command Post "Alpha" (described later in this chapter). The twelve positions were set forth in the Miami Beach Police Department Command Post "Beta" Manual as follows:

**Press Relations:** Under the direction of the field commander, the press relations officer shall be responsible for: gathering related newsworthy information and preparing it for distribution to authorized news agencies, and maintaining liaison with and assisting representatives of the news media. Representatives of the news media shall not be allowed into the Beta C.P. complex, they shall be referred to the press relations officer. Problems with members of the news media shall immediately be brought to the attention of the press relations officer.

**Executive Officer:** The Executive Officer, under the direction of the field commander, shall coordinate all the functions within Beta C.P. to assure effective support services for the field and tactical commander. His function is not to be construed as an additional position in the chain of command between the C. P. staff and field commander. His responsibility is to relieve the field commander of concern as to the technical aspects of command post and communications system, and to coordinate staffing and functions to the extent necessary support services operate as a well coordinated unit. He shall also be responsible for coordinating the assignment of liaison officers to and from the Florida National Guard and the military;



and to the demonstrators' campsites. He shall also assure the liaison offices of other agencies located adjacent to Beta C.P. receive necessary resources and assistance. He shall arrange and coordinate security for the Beta C.P. personnel and C.P. facilities. This position is sometimes referred to as chief of staff or support commander.

**Personnel Officer:** The personnel officer is responsible for maintaining an accounting of all personnel assigned to the jurisdiction of the field commander, including the number of personnel, names, agency, and their assignments. He is also responsible for obtaining personnel to fill requests for assignments after the C.P. is activated, and assuring that all personnel are fed, and relieved at the duration of a shift. He coordinates arrangements for staging locations, and provides resources, equipment and assistance necessary for the operation of police staging sites - including considerations as to the comfort of officers staged there.

**Intelligence Officer:** The intelligence officer shall coordinate the functions of the intelligence section in the Beta C.P. situation room. The intelligence section includes the Miami Beach situation report officer, the Area C.P. situation report officer, the scout coordinator, scout dispatchers, scouts, map officer and messengers. All information of any significance concerning police, demonstrators, and related activities, requests for personnel and equipment resources, or any other information which should be brought to the attention of police and/or military officials should be recorded on tri-copy message forms by personnel in the command post complex. All such messages shall be routed immediately to the intelligence officer in the Beta situation room. The intelligence officer shall control dissemination of messages to assure that duplications and inaccuracies are not forwarded. He shall also assure that there are no significant areas where information flow is lacking, and take necessary action to eliminate such voids. The intelligence officer has the ultimate responsibility for dissemination of messages to appropriate individuals or command posts for purposes of action, or to inform. He shall also coordinate the posting of maps and preparation of situation reports to maintain a descriptive on-going "picture" of current convention and demonstrator activities, for purposes of assuring action through the operations officer, and for briefing of participating commanding officers. He shall be prepared to participate in long range planning and strategy meetings.

**Miami Beach Situation Report Officer:** The Miami Beach situation report officer shall be assigned in the situation room to monitor incoming messages and situation maps for purposes of immediately forwarding all pertinent information to the Miami Beach field and tactical commanders. Although he need not forward scout reports because they will be monitoring the frequency, he shall monitor scout deployment to assure tactical intelligence needs are fulfilled. He shall also prepare periodic situation reports, and assure forwarding of strategic intelligence summaries to the field and tactical commanders. During off-session hours this duty will be assumed by the intelligence officer.



Area C.P. Situation Report Officer: The Area C.P. (C.P. Alpha) situation report officer shall be assigned in or adjacent to the Beta situation room. He shall be responsible for the dissemination of information, processed through the situation room, to the Area C.P., and accordingly to the Florida National Guard and military C.P.'s. He shall prepare and submit periodic situation reports as directed, and assure the forwarding of strategic intelligence summaries to these command posts. He shall maintain telephonic liaison with appropriate officers at these three C.P.'s to assure they are receiving necessary information. Although the scout frequency will be monitored at each of these locations, he shall forward all other significant intelligence and operations information via the 2740 operator, and when necessary by hotline or telephone.

Scout Coordinator: As directed by the intelligence officer, the scout coordinator shall monitor all incoming messages, the scout frequency, and strategic intelligence reports for purposes of maintaining the tactical deployment of scouts. Using a combination of observation post, zone, and roving assignments, he shall continuously maintain scout deployment at the scene of actual or potential problems which might necessitate a tactical response. He is responsible for anticipating and fulfilling the tactical intelligence needs of the field and tactical (905) commanders. As officer-in-charge of the scouts, he is responsible for adjusting work schedules to meet tactical needs, and for coordinating feeding and relief for the scouts. The scout coordinator shall direct the activities of the scout radio dispatchers, and shall assure the maintaining of a radio log and the writing of message forms on significant scout reports. During off-session hours, the intelligence officer shall assume the responsibilities of the scout coordinator.

Map Officer: The map officer shall maintain separate maps depicting current strategic and tactical intelligence activities and other related information as directed by the intelligence officer.

Operations Officer: The operations officer shall coordinate the functions of the operations section in the Beta C.P. situation room. He will receive copies of all messages routed to the situation room. He shall monitor these messages, and with the assistant operations officer, monitor the tactical and command frequencies for purposes of maintaining a current and descriptive accounting of all convention related police tactical responses. The operations officer shall ensure that messages are written on all such responses and that maps are maintained depicting current police operations, for purposes of informing top police and military officials of current police activities. He shall continuously review the current intelligence and operations situation to verify there is an appropriate response, and shall notify the tactical commander when it appears a tactical response might be required, or when a response might need modification. This responsibility is especially important because the tactical commander will not always have access to information which might have been received in the C.P. by telephone, or by radio of another agency such as the Secret Service or

F.B.I. The tactical commander (905) and the communications coordinator shall notify the operations officer of all movements of officers on tactical assignments, including activities such as tactical responses, movements to and from staging sites, movements from one gate or location to another, relief for feeding, etc. He shall also monitor the radio and maintain an accounting as to which perimeter gates are currently open or closed. He shall be prepared to participate in long range strategy and planning meetings in order to maintain a thorough knowledge of police operations planned for later in the day, the next day, etc.

**Logistics Officer:** The logistics officer will be assigned in the command post to facilitate coordination of requests and the distribution of police equipment and supplies, and the use of police transportation. He shall maintain liaison with the operations officer for purposes of coordinating logistics needs with police responses and general police operations. For example, when a planned tactical operation is being considered, the operations officer can thus readily submit needs for transportation, gas, additional radios, etc., to the logistics officer, and assure that those needs are fulfilled as requested by the field or tactical commanders. The logistics officer should have at least two assistants in the Garden Center to coordinate use of police transportation and supplies and equipment. The logistics officer and his assistants shall sign out these resources and maintain a current accounting of their use. Telephonic, radio, and other requests for logistics resources shall be recorded on message forms and submitted immediately to the logistics officer. He shall be prepared to participate in long range strategy and planning meetings.

**Prisoner Control Coordinator:** The prisoner control coordinator shall be assigned within Beta C. P. for purposes of coordinating and controlling the dispatching and assignments of prisoner control buses and accompanying mass arrest processing teams. He shall maintain liaison with the operations officer to facilitate the strategic movement of prisoner control vehicles. He shall accordingly anticipate the need for such vehicles thereby minimizing response time. He shall submit message forms to the operations officer indicating the time of request, location, times of arrival, etc., of prisoner control vehicles. He will also coordinate the transportation of prisoners to appropriate facilities. If the problems should necessitate large numbers of arrests in small groups at separate locations, he shall coordinate the dispatching of several smaller vans or wagons to pick up prisoners at locations of request, and transport them to awaiting prisoner control buses at nearby central locations. Prisoners picked up by these smaller transport vehicles shall be processed in the same manner they would be by processing teams on the larger vehicles - before they enter the vehicle.

**Communications:** The communications coordinator is responsible for coordinating activities of the multi-agency communications center at the Beta command post, and for exercising functional control over all telephonic, radio, and other communications systems and equipment

designed to support police operations in Miami Beach. He shall assure that these communications systems are operational and properly supervised on a 24-hour basis during activation of the center. He shall exercise direct or line control over the operation of the tri-channel (PSD-Miami-Miami Beach) tactical frequency, and over all Miami Beach reports related to the convention and demonstrations, which are received at the Miami Beach Police station or other locations, are forwarded to the Beta C. P. for necessary action.

#### FLORIDA INTER-AGENCY ORGANIZATION

Normally, police agencies carry out their responsibilities autonomously within their own legal jurisdictions. However, the national political conventions necessitated a multi-agency response. An interdependency therefore existed among several local and state agencies. This interdependency in turn, required that some effort be taken to coalesce the several components into a working team that could effectively achieve a common goal.

It was logical that the impetus for formalizing an inter-agency convention organization structure should emanate from the Governor's office since, in Florida, the Governor is constitutionally the chief law enforcement officer of the state. As such, it was his task to systematize and to establish areas of responsibilities and authority lines for the state and local law enforcement agencies under his jurisdiction. In accordance with these responsibilities, on June 5, 1972, Governor Askew issued an Executive Order that delineated inter-agency organizational relationships and administrative responsibilities for state and local officials. The order was set forth as follows:


(a) State Coordinator. The Executive Director of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Commissioner William L. Reed, shall be the "State Coordinator" for the support of the political conventions, and he shall be responsible for overall coordination of all state non-military functions, services, and support in the areas of public health, safety and welfare. The State Coordinator shall serve as the Chairman of the "State Coordination Group" and shall be the principal state liaison official with the U. S. Departments of Justice and Defense.

(b) State Military Coordinator. The Adjutant General of Florida, Major General Henry W. McMillan, shall be the "State Military Coordinator", and shall be responsible for the coordination of state military functions and services, and all matters involving the Florida National Guard and any federal military forces which may be required.

(c) State Coordination Group. The Executive Director or Secretary of the following state agencies and departments:



# FLORIDA INTER-AGENCY CONVENTION ORGANIZATION





- (1) Department of Administration
- (2) Department of Business Regulation
- (3) Department of Commerce
- (4) Department of Community Affairs
- (5) Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
- (6) Governor's Council on Criminal Justice
- (7) Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
- (8) Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
- (9) Department of Law Enforcement
- (10) Department of Military Affairs
- (11) Department of Natural Resources

are hereby requested to serve or to designate a representative who shall serve on the "State Coordination Group". The State Coordination Group shall coordinate and correlate the various functions and activities of all state agencies and departments which have been or may be called upon to provide assistance, direct or indirect, for the support of the conventions.

(d) Local Area Coordinator. The County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County, Mr. Ray Goode, shall be the "Local Area Coordinator", and he shall have overall responsibility for the coordination of all public health, welfare and safety (including convention site security) within the Dade County area. He shall serve as chairman of the task forces set forth in sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) below.

(e) Chief of Convention Site Security. The Chief of Police of the City of Miami Beach, Florida, Chief Rocky Pomerance, shall be the "Chief of Convention Site Security", encompassing the convention complex and adjacent areas.

(f) Local Task Force for Support Services. The chief administrative officers of the municipalities which are principally affected and the county government, viz., Mr. Ray Goode, Dade County; Mr. Melvin Reese, City Manager, City of Miami; and Mr. Clifford O'Key, City Manager, City of Miami Beach, Florida, and such other persons as the Local Area Coordinator may designate, shall constitute the "Local Task Force for Support Services". This task force shall coordinate the public health and welfare activities and support services in the Dade County area, consistent with and as part of the Florida Comprehensive Inter-Agency Plan.

(g) Local Task Force for Public Safety. The Director of Public Safety, Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Director E. Wilson Purdy; The Chief of Police of the City of Miami Beach, Chief Rocky Pomerance; and the Chief of Police of the City of Miami, Chief Bernard Garmire, and such other persons as the Local Area Coordinator may designate, shall constitute the "Local Task Force for Public Safety" for the conventions. The task force shall coordinate all public safety functions and activities related to the political conventions, including both on-site and off-site, in the Dade County area, consistent with and as part of the Florida Comprehensive Inter-Agency Plan.

## 2. GOVERNOR'S COMMUNITY COORDINATING TASK FORCE.

In order to facilitate and encourage a meaningful dialogue and exchange of information between the responsible municipal, county and state officials, and interested citizen groups, both resident and non-resident, a task force to be known as the "Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force" has been created: eighteen persons, representing various governmental agencies and private organizations in the Dade County area have been appointed as members.

(a) Membership. The persons previously appointed to the Governor's Community Task Force are:

\*Earnie Seiler, Miami, Executive Vice President of the Orange Bowl Committee.

Alva Chapman, Jr., President of the Miami Herald and Executive Vice President of Knight Newspapers.

M. Athalie Range, Secretary, Florida Department of Community Affairs.

Lester Freeman, Executive Vice President of Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce.

Sylvan Meyer, Editor, Miami News.

Jay Jannis, Vice President, MGIC-Janis Properties, Inc.

Joyce Dieffenderfer, Immediate Past President, League of Women Voters.

Jorge Luis Hernandez, Publisher, Regreso Newspaper.

Dr. Joseph Poitier, Pharmacist, Economy Drug Store.

Herbert Cunningham, Student, Miami-Dade Junior College.

Barbara Goldern, Student, University of Virginia.

Father Theodore Gibson, Miami City Commissioner.

Reverend Edward Graham, Metro Commissioner.

Dr. Leonard Haber, Miami Beach City Councilman.

Jim McKillips, Metro Commissioner.

Hal Spaet, Representative, "Operation Snowplow".

Gwen Cherry, State Representative.

Julius J. Shepard, General Manager, DuPont Plaza Hotel, Miami.

\*\*Harry Douglas, Deputy Secretary, Department of Community Affairs.

\*Chairman, Governor's Community Task Force

\*\*Staff Director, Governor's Community Task Force

(b) Function. It is the function and responsibility of the Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force to advise and report to the Governor concerning the identification and resolution of community problems relating to the holding of the said conventions, and, in the capacity, to serve as a principal liaison between the governmental agencies and participating private organizations, groups, and individuals, and to evaluate the planning

and other actions of the coordinating officials and task forces, as set forth and provided in this executive order.

## CONVENTION AREA ORGANIZATION

AREA COMMAND POST. Two command posts were established to coordinate police activities during the conventions. One was to be located in the Dade County Courthouse in the City of Miami and the other was to be located in the City of Miami Beach. County Manager, Ray Goode, outlined the organization and purpose of the courthouse command post in a memorandum to Chief Pomerance, Chief Garmire, and Director Purdy.

"The Area Command Post (C. P. Alpha), under the direction of the Area Commander, Mr. Ray Goode, will serve two primary functions for commanders assigned to convention related duties. It will be the Command Center for Mr. Goode, and for top officials representing the Governor of Florida, the Florida National Guard, the military, and the Department of Justice. Additionally, the Area Commander, and the staff assigned therein, will be responsible for coordinating all requests for police support services, including support requests for the National Guard and federal military forces.

"Accordingly, when personnel or logistics (vehicles, equipment, and related services) resources immediately available to a police field commander are insufficient to meet their needs, the concerned field commander or his staff representative, shall submit the request to C. P. Alpha. For example, if the personnel or equipment from the various local and state agencies assigned to the task force in Miami Beach must be supplemented from outside that city, the request for needed items would be submitted to C. P. Alpha - rather than the Public Safety Department, the Miami Police Department, or the Florida Highway Patrol.

"The three field commanders or their respective command post staff members are thereby relieved of the burden of calling around to various agencies in an attempt to locate additional items, personnel or specialized services. Essentially, they can call one location and ask for what is needed. The staff in C. P. Alpha will locate the delivery to the designated location. Accordingly, by channelling such request to the Area Command Post, the Area Commander and his staff can accomplish their second responsibility - coordinating the reallocation of resources among and between the jurisdictions of the three field commanders. The coordination function is particularly critical for purposes of minimizing the possibility of duplication in requests, and in assuring that resources are not over depleted in any of the three jurisdictions.

"The official requests by a field commander for activation of the National Guard or federal military shall be submitted by hotline, radio, or telephone to the Area Commander at C. P. Alpha."



COMMAND STRUCTURE. As the local area coordinator, Dade County Manager, Mr. Ray Goode, was to personally direct and assign police reserve task force units across jurisdictional lines on the basis of priority of need. All field commanders were to channel all requests for police support services through the local commander, including support requests for the Florida National Guard and federal military forces.

Each of the heads of the three primary local law enforcement agencies were designated as field commanders. Chief Pomerance of Miami Beach was to direct all police arrangements and details in that city pertaining to the conventions. Although Chief Pomerance was to exercise personal control over all police personnel, supervisory personnel of police agencies other than MBPD were to remain in command of their respective forces and receive functional assignments rather than direct supervision. Chief of Miami Police Department, Bernard Garmire, was to direct all arrangements in connection with convention security within the City of Miami. If necessary, he would also exercise control over functional assignments for police personnel from outside jurisdictions, but not direct supervision of them. The third field commander was E. Wilson Purdy, Director of the Dade County Public Safety Department. He was to have responsibility for all security within the Dade County area, with the exception of the cities of Miami and Miami Beach. The three field commanders were to coordinate their convention planning functions so that the occurrence of any contingency anywhere in the county could properly be handled.

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION. Throughout the planning process, Deputy Chief Zanders advocated the concept of organizing police manpower resources into a task force configuration. However, initial manpower commitments from mutual aid agencies were considered inadequate to implement this concept. As a result, several alternatives to obtain additional manpower were recommended by various governmental and police officials.

In May, 1972, when the Miami Beach City Council was deliberating whether or not to extend an invitation to the Republican Party to hold their convention in the City, grave concern was expressed concerning available police manpower. Consequently, a recommendation from the Council was made for the Federal Government to create a "Convention Peace Corps". This Corps was to be patterned after the original Peace Corps and Vista. It was to be comprised of 1,000 specially selected men and women drawn from the entire United States Armed Forces. They were to augment the city of Miami Beach police force and perform the same duties as police officers. The Corps members were to be deputized as special police officers of the city of Miami Beach under the control of Chief Pomerance for on-site training and convention duty. This plan was rejected by LEAA, however, on the basis that it would be inappropriate to use military personnel to augment local police in this manner and because there was insufficient time to select and train the Corps even if it were appropriate.



Several other alternatives were explored for increasing police manpower. Recommendations were made that officers from out of state and from other jurisdictions within the state of Florida should be used, but these recommendations were rejected because of probable differences in professionalization, training, and operational policies that would only serve to hamper command and control. The utilization of U.S. Marshalls and the Federal Protective Services Agency was also considered, but these were rejected because their charters did not provide for their use in this manner. An effort was also made to obtain manpower from the Washington, D.C. Police Department. On June 20, 1972, Governor Askew met with the U.S. Attorney General and made a formal request for a 500 man task force contingent from the Washington, D. C. police force. This request was not considered feasible by the Attorney General on the basis that such a movement of D. C. personnel could adversely affect Metropolitan D. C. public safety.

Finally, it was recommended that the entire Florida Highway Patrol be utilized to assist in policing the conventions. The reasoning was that local sheriffs could temporarily perform the traffic enforcement function in their own jurisdictions, thereby freeing FHP officers for convention duties. This recommendation was rejected by state officials because civil disorders had occurred in other parts of the state and their feeling was that these areas would be extremely vulnerable if no state officers were present.

By the first week of June, mutual aid agencies had increased their manpower commitments so that, although still considered inadequate, they were sufficient for adaptation to the task force configuration. Consequently, four task forces were developed and they were designated as task forces "Beach," "County," "City," and "State."

Task force "Beach" was to be commanded by Chief Pomerance and staged in the auditorium inside the convention complex. This force was composed of 21 Miami Beach officers, 112 Dade County officers, 113 Miami officers, 64 State Highway Patrol officers, and 42 Florida Marine Patrol officers. The primary mission of task force "Beach" was security of the convention complex and provision of reinforcements for the perimeter fence.

Task force "County" consisted of three units composed of personnel from the Dade County Public Safety Department. The first unit consisted of 106 officers who were staged at the South Beach Community Center on Sixth Street, Miami Beach, near the convention complex. The second unit consisted of 50 officers who were staged at the V.F.W. club house, 650 West Avenue, Miami Beach, which is also near the complex. The primary mission of these two units was to provide timely response under the direction of Chief Pomerance to unusual occurrences that originated in areas outside of the complex. The third unit was a 41-man contingent of officers that was staged in the city of Miami. This force was to be utilized at the discretion of PSD's Director, E. Wilson Purdy.

Task force "City" was composed of 180 Miami Police Department officers. This unit was staged in the city of Miami under the direction of Chief Bernard Garmire. Task force "State" was composed of 147 Florida Highway Patrol officers and 36 state vehicles. This unit reported to Chief Pomerance and was staged at St. Patrick's Church, located at 3700 Meridian Avenue, Miami Beach. Its primary mission was to provide a timely mobile response to unusual convention related occurrences anywhere in the city and to effect any required mass arrests.

The above configuration varied slightly from the Democratic Convention to the Republican Convention. For the latter event, Dade County PSD withdrew some of their forces and reassigned them to the President's Key Biscayne compound, which is in Dade County's jurisdiction. To compensate for the withdrawn manpower, the Miami Police Department and the Florida Highway Patrol increased their commitments. It was estimated that a total force of approximately 876 officers policed the DNC, and that this number was increased to 930 for the RNC.

Deputy Chief Zanders had recommended that all platoons and squads within each task force be of uniform size to facilitate command and control. With all units of the same size, a field commander requesting one or more squads or platoons would know in advance the number of men he would be getting regardless of which units responded. This recommendation, which was made on June 5, 1972, was not adopted. It was decided that there was insufficient time to retrain officers in a uniform squad configuration. As an alternative, individual agencies planned to furnish the command post with information relative to the number of people per squad.

#### MILITARY SUPPORT

At the direction of Governor Askew, a force of 3,133 Florida National Guardsmen were committed to the security of the national political conventions. The normal two-week summer training requirement of National Guardsmen was extended to 2 two-week sessions and was scheduled to occur in the Miami area instead of the nation of Panama as had originally been planned. In Miami Beach High School, 678 Guardsmen were stationed. The remainder of the force was staged in school facilities in Miami, Coral Gables and Hialeah Lakes.

In addition to the Florida National Guard, 2,500 Army and U.S. Marine troops were staged at Homestead Air Force Base, 25 miles south of Miami. These troops were in a state of readiness if convention events should require their presence.

## ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Organizational structure is the setting within which people work. The degree that people work effectively, individually and in groups, is, for the most part, the degree to which the organization will be effective. Normally, law enforcement agencies act relatively autonomously within their jurisdictions. Relations are maintained with other agencies, but these are usually informal and low-keyed. In contrast, management of the conventions prompted new and/or intensive intra- and inter-organization relations as a result of the need for integrated action. The efficacy of these relations was varied, and, as could be expected, the occurrence of dissonance was more apparent with inter-organizational relationships than with intra-organizational relationships.

MBPD INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The MBPD's role in policing the conventions required organizational changes. However, change is not accepted without resistance unless it is built on the strong foundation of trust and harmonious relationships. To the credit of the MBPD organization, just such a foundation and relationships were existent.

That such an organizational environment existed can primarily be attributed to Chief Pomerance's leadership style, which includes flexibility, the willingness to delegate, a strong identification and concern with the rank and file members of the department, and a keen political sense. These attributes are supported by a complementary command staff, who share Chief Pomerance's managerial philosophy and are able to communicate his concepts to their subordinates. Hence, there is little distortion of command intent and communications, all of which fosters a strong department-wide commitment to the leaders and to the organization.

One indication of this commitment was manifested in the absenteeism rate. It is not unusual for civil service workers to take liberal advantage of accumulated sick time, and police officers are no exception. In a period of greater hazard and longer working hours, one might assume that the absenteeism rate would increase. However, just the opposite occurred during the conventions. During the DNC, only four officers were absent due to reported illness. During the RNC, only two officers reported an illness. This contrasts significantly with the absenteeism rates reported during the weeks immediately following each event. From July 15 to July 22, thirty-six men called in sick, and from August 25 to August 29, twenty-four men called in sick.

The extent of the influence of leadership style on the behavior of MBPD officers was also evident during the conventions. This was illustrated by officers going out of their way to engage in affable conversations with dissidents, by exercising restraint when verbally abused, and by pointedly refusing to become an abrasive factor in their contacts with dissidents. All of these were approaches strongly advocated by the command staff. In essence,



then, the organizational changes made within the MBPD had no apparent adverse effects on its personnel. All MBPD personnel seemed to adjust to the adaptations with little or no conflict and were able to perform their roles in accordance with expectations.

LOCAL INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. The relationships between MBPD, MPD, and the Dade County PSD were naturally influenced by the way in which their members perceived each other individually and collectively. General characterizations, based in both fact and fiction, come into play in the traditional rivalries which normally exist between police departments in proximity to one another. However, in a period of uncertainty, such as that created by the conventions, these images may intrude on the establishment of good working relationships. As a consequence, it is important to consider the stereotypical images of each of the major police agencies in Dade County.

The MBPD, with 235 men, is the smallest of the three agencies. It provides services to a predominately white, middle and upper middle class community of elderly citizens and tourists. Because of these demographic factors, the incidence of violent crime is relatively low. Police emphasis is heavily oriented toward the service style of law enforcement, with the imposition of formal sanctions being avoided when possible for minor violations. This approach to police work by the MBPD is interpreted by some area law enforcement officers from other departments as not being "real" police work. Consequently, the MBPD has been viewed in a somewhat condescending manner by some others who feel that they cannot handle "real" or "heavy" police work, meaning violent crimes. In fact, beyond its immediate neighbors, the MBPD enjoys a reputation for being a department that is particularly sensitive to the needs of its own citizenry and visitors to the city. In return, Miami Beach citizens support the police, as evidenced by adequate police salaries and a generous pension plan.

The Miami Police Department (MPD) was led in 1968, as during the two decades prior to that year, by Chief Walter Headley, a strong advocate of the "get tough" policy. This policy emphasized an open show of force in dealing with criminals and civil disturbances. Human relations and other more modern approaches to dealing with crime and police-community problems were spurned in favor of the more traditional police methods. Chief Headley's philosophy and approaches to police work were internalized by his subordinates, who also assumed a "tough" posture in the performance of their duties. As a result of this approach, the MPD had acquired a reputation as a tough, traditional type organization.

A new image was created for MPD by Chief Bernard Garmire, a highly respected professional who was an advocate of progressive police administration. Although Chief Garmire had assumed his position in 1969 and had made significant strides in upgrading the department before the 1972 conventions, it was felt to be possible that the tough style of MPD policing might emerge again during a period of great stress.



The Dade County Public Safety Department prior to 1966 was primarily noted for its corruption. In that year, E. Wilson Purdy was appointed director of the department and successfully proceeded to upgrade the PSD into a progressive, well trained, and highly disciplined law enforcement agency. As a result, its members are intensely proud of their department and of their own professionalism, considering both to be far superior to that of other area law enforcement agencies. They customarily "take over" rather than "work with" others. Not surprisingly, this kind of elitist bearing has sometimes strained relationships with other departments in the county.

The variations in the style and image of these three agencies are a part of the folklore which exists in Dade County. Another part of that folklore is the strong leadership image each agency head projects locally. Each individual is a prominent national leader in his profession. During the convention planning, each was also preoccupied with his own specific responsibilities related to the conventions. The combined effect of the differences in department images, leadership characteristics, assigned responsibilities, and perceptions of convention related problems, made interagency cooperation difficult in some situations. This reality cannot be ignored. It is to the credit of each department and its leader that a sense of professional dedication and a desire to get the job done took precedence during actual working relationships.

STATE/LOCAL INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. Generally speaking, the relationships between state officials located in Tallahassee and local officials in the Dade County area of southern Florida are pervaded by a mutual wariness founded in traditional sectionalism. Whereas northern Florida typically consists of smaller towns populated for the most part by long time residents, Dade County is a fast moving, constantly growing and changing metropolitan area with the largest population concentration in the state. These contrasting factors contribute to differing life styles, political views, and approaches to problem solutions. All of this is to say that, even before the conventions started, there were present traditional and historical factors that affected inter-agency relationships.

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement, as a statewide agency, played a significant role in police planning for the conventions. However, this role did not unfold without certain misgivings attached to it by local officials. The FDLE was a relatively new state agency (1967). It had not entirely gained the confidence of many local police departments in Florida, including some in the southeast section of the state. Because of its newness in comparison to well established local agencies, FDLE was perceived as lacking the necessary experience for the assumption of a leadership role in convention planning and policing. Consequently, when FDLE was inserted into the planning process, its presence was viewed as more of an interference than as a facilitator. An example of this impression was recorded in the after-action report of one of the local police agencies. LEAA was also included in the comment.

"It is obvious that the LEAA and Florida Department of Law Enforcement are not qualified, based upon training and experience, to plan and administer local law enforcement responses to this or similar events. The role should be the provision of assistance in their respective areas of responsibilities and in the future they should not impose themselves or their opinions into areas where they lack appropriate and adequate expertise."

This comments intimates that FDLE was viewed as less than a "full partner" in the process, whose advice and direction lacked credibility. However, it is to the credit of FDLE that it accepted and carried out a difficult role in assuming a leadership position at the request of the Governor in the convention planning and funding processes. The role was an essential one, even though its belated insertion into those processes apparently detracted from its potential.

The Governor's office is, of course, a key element in inter-agency relationships. Local agencies and the Governor's office had less than two years (from elections to the conventions) to establish a basis for inter-governmental relations. During that period of time, the Governor became recognized as an astute and concerned politician and administrator. Conversely, the Governor had himself gained a considerable appreciation for the professional skills of the three principal law enforcement administrators in Dade County.

Normally, the Governor would not intervene in local law enforcement matters. There were several factors related to policing the conventions, however, that compelled his intervention. First, the planning process was encountering difficulties at the local level, where the equal authority of the three principal police administrators tended to impede timely decision making. The process was in need of direction from a higher authority, and the Governor - as the chief law enforcement officer of the state - was the logical source. Secondly, the possibility of utilizing the Florida National Guard was imminent. Activation of the Guard was a decision that rested with the Governor. Naturally, he wanted to insure that all available local resources were committed to convention policing before calling for the National Guard's assistance. Finally, the policing of the conventions carried some important political implications. The Governor had worked hard to capture the Democratic National Convention for Florida. If the conventions were policed very badly, undoubtedly that would reflect negatively on the Governor's office.

Intervention by the Governor's office assumed three forms: (1) the appointment of Chief Pomerance as chief of convention security for the state; (2) the issuance of the Executive Order which changed and clarified convention leadership roles; (3) the withholding of grant funds. No matter what were the compelling reasons for these acts, they tended to aggravate some state/local relationships. The decision to intervene was a difficult one. In light of the many ramifications that convention policing had at the state level, intervention nonetheless was necessary.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Ideally, there would have been one convention policing organization that consisted of the various components delineated in the Governor's Executive Order. These components would have worked in unison toward a common goal. As it turned out, there was not one convention organization but several autonomous entities, all attempting to approach a common goal from different and occasionally conflicting directions. Three predominant factors contributed to this organizational fragmentation. First, the continuing preoccupation of each police administrator with his own responsibilities tended to hinder a sharing of resources. Secondly, there was an inevitable sense of competition for a fixed amount of federal money. Thirdly, there were divergent opinions as to which agency should be the primary funding agency and planning coordinator.

These factors significantly intruded upon the nature of inter-agency relationships. The frailness of those relationships caused some real concern as to whether a joint operational venture could be carried out. This concern prompted the Governor's Task Force to Evaluate Public Safety and Related Support Services at the 1972 National Political Conventions to recommend to the Governor that a meeting of all of the principal police administrators and the Area Commander was needed "so as to improve communications and establish better working relationships." This recommendation was made on July 14. On July 31, the Task Force further reported to the Governor that "a fragile set of relationships exists among key command personnel . . . ." The observation was also made that "these relationships were adequate given the absence of serious challenge to law enforcement units (at the DNC)".

It is difficult to precisely determine what the effect of the nature of inter-agency relationships had on convention outcomes. On one occasion during the RNC, officers from one agency refused to respond to a command given by a commanding officer from another agency. Undoubtedly those agencies cooperated to the extent of accomplishing their assigned missions. However, in organizations, it is important to eliminate or reduce those factors of abrasion that tend to diminish the coordination and harmony of interdependent parts. During the convention period, it seems accurate to assume that many of the problems encountered with planning and funding could have been avoided or more quickly resolved if the fabric of inter-agency relationships had been stronger.

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## LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The policing of the national political conventions gave rise to a whole set of legal considerations that needed either clarification or resolution prior to and during the conventions. The city ordinance code of Miami Beach, for instance, needed expansion to provide greater control by police over demonstrators. The source of legal authority for police mutual aid had not been clearly determined prior to the convention period. The important question of whether or not to grant demonstrators a campsite permit also had to be resolved, and decisions had to be made as to what laws were going to be enforced and when.

### CITY ORDINANCES

After reviewing the City Code, Miami Beach police officials recognized that it did not include certain desirable ordinances that would provide legal authority for police to control a wide range of demonstrator activities and related situations. Prior to recommending the adoption of any new city ordinances, however, police officials and the City Attorney's Office researched the codes of other cities that had experienced large demonstrations in order to determine the applicability and adaptability of those codes to the city of Miami Beach. One result of this research was preparation of a parade ordinance by the City Attorney's Office for action by the City Council.

PARADE PERMITS. Prior to this time, the city of Miami Beach did not have a parade ordinance. A parade ordinance was considered necessary for the conventions for two principal reasons. First, a parade consisting of several hundred people would require



police assistance along the parade route, including traffic control and the blockage of street arteries. Secondly, not all of the non-delegate groups that would parade were of the same political views. For example, the political positions of the VVAW and the YIPPIES were in conflict with that of the Cuban Brigade (strongly pro-Nixon). Police needed to control the parade times and routes of such groups to keep them from coming together and possibly engaging in violent physical confrontation.

The proposed parade ordinance was prepared at the request of the Chief of Police and was an adaptive copy of a standardized ordinance governing parades in many of the metropolitan cities in the country, primarily Los Angeles, California, and Washington, D. C. The parade ordinance was presented to the City Council on June 7, 1972, as an emergency measure and was carried unanimously.

The ordinance defined a parade as "any march or procession consisting of persons, animals, vehicles, or any combination thereof, traveling upon any public way, within the territorial jurisdiction of the City." To conduct a parade, a written permit would have to be obtained from the Chief of Police. Application for the permit would have to be made 15 to 90 days before the event. The ordinance gave the Chief of Police authority to grant or refuse parade permits at his discretion. Violation of the parade ordinance carried a penalty of \$1,000 fine and 90 days in jail.

Subsequent to the enactment of this law, some demonstrator groups submitted parade permit applications, while others challenged the legality of the law in court. The American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Youth International Party, Miami Women's Coalition and the National Coalition of Gay Organizations, filed a suit in Federal Court against the ordinance on the basis that it was "overbroad, vague and arrogates all powers to the chief of police." On July 3, U. S. District Court Judge C. Clyde Atkins issued a temporary injunction against the parade ordinance.

In his ruling, Judge Atkins said that the law was deficient because: (1) It did not adequately define "parade." (2) It required too lengthy a period of time for application and processing. (3) It lacked standards of administrative review. (4) It failed to "cast upon the City the burden to permit parades unless the City specifically finds that the community's health or safety is imminently threatened." The city of Miami Beach was given 10 days to file arguments before the Judge ruled on the constitutionality of the ordinance.

The timing of the temporary injunction against the enforcement of the parade ordinance left Miami Beach without any legal control over parades during the Democratic Convention. Police initiated alternative methods of control, however, in absence of the ordinance.

On the first day of the DNC (Monday, July 10, 1972), police relied on information relative to parades provided by sources within the demonstrator groups. This information was of some value, but frequently was inaccurate. On the following day, police initiated a strategy that was to serve them well throughout both conventions. Fifteen Florida State Beverage agents began operating in scout cars for the primary purpose of following demonstration groups and reporting on their numbers, parade routes and destinations. With accurate information and advance notice, the police were then able to take the necessary precautions.

On July 13, Miami Beach City Attorney, Joseph Wanick, responded to the temporary injunction by filing a scathing Brief of Defendants with the Federal District Court. In the brief, Mr. Wanick wrote that, "It is astounding that this Ordinance cannot pass this Honorable Court's inspection" and cited several precedents arguing for the various legal points challenged in the injunction. Mr. Wanick made a point of the fact that the Plaintiffs had not applied for a permit and had not tested the ordinance nor been subject to its enforcement. In petitioning the court to uphold the validity of the ordinance, Mr. Wanick requested the court to "adhere to the accepted and traditional rule that the burden is on the party who attacks the constitutionality of legislation to prove his charge. It is never the duty or responsibility of the legislative body to assume the burden of proving that it is." On August 17, 1972, four days before the Republican Convention was to convene, Judge Atkins dismissed the case on the Court's own motion, thereby leaving the parade ordinance standing as law. The case was not appealed.

EMERGENCY POWERS. While the parade ordinance was being contested, police officials requested the City Attorney's office to research and prepare other ordinances that would constructively add to police control over demonstrators. Acting upon this request, the City Attorney prepared and submitted ten ordinances to the City Manager for his presentation to the City Council. Those ordinances provided for the following:

1. Establishment of procedures for the declaring of a state of emergency and the designation of the city official empowered to declare that a state of emergency exists.
2. Make it an offense to participate in a "riot, rout or unlawful assembly."
3. Make it an offense to be present at a riot, rout or unlawful assembly.
4. Make it an offense to incite to riot.
5. Make it an offense to use vulgar and abusive language and to engage in certain disorderly conduct.

6. Make it an offense to sing or speak obscene songs.
7. Make it an offense to engage in disorderly conduct in streets, avenues, parks and other public and private places.
8. Make it an offense to make derogatory remarks to a police officer.
9. Make it an offense to use indecent, profane, or obscene language in public.
10. Empower the police to create police lines.

Prior to the City Council meeting at which the new ordinances were to be presented, Chief Pomerance reviewed the ordinances and recommended to the City Manager that only the ordinances pertaining to the declaration of a state of emergency and police lines be submitted to the City Council for their consideration. He reasoned that some of the other eight ordinances were covered by state law and others were not essential to controlling demonstrators.

At the June 28 Council meeting, the City Manager recommended to the Council that action be taken on the first and tenth ordinances only, in conformance with Chief Pomerance's request. He asked that the remaining eight ordinances be referred to him for additional study. The Council followed his recommendation and passed favorably on the two recommended ordinances, but deferred action on the remaining eight. No further action was taken in regards to those eight ordinances, and they were not presented again to the Council.

In acting favorably on the first proposed ordinance, the City Council designated the Chief of Police as the city official empowered to declare a state of emergency and to exercise the emergency powers subject to City Council approval. Included in those powers were authority to prohibit the sale, display, or possession of firearms; the authority to establish curfews; close places of public assemblage; and prohibit the sale or possession of alcoholic beverages and gasoline or any other flammable liquid.

In passing the ordinance on police lines, the City Council provided the Chief with authority in cases of riot, unlawful assemblies or disorderly gatherings, to establish areas or zones for the purpose of affording a clearing for police or firemen, the passage of a parade, the movement of traffic, the exclusion of the public from the vicinity of a riot or other exigency, and the protection of persons and property.



The exercise of these additional powers by Chief Pomerance would have been warranted if during the conventions there existed a danger of riot and substantial injury to persons or to property, or if there existed a disaster situation caused by the activities of demonstrators. However, at no time during the conventions did the actions of the demonstrators threaten the control of police. Consequently, these additional powers were not used.

APPAREL REGULATIONS. In addition to the parade ordinance, two other Miami Beach city ordinances were successfully challenged in the courts by demonstrator groups. The two ordinances pertained to males impersonating females. The first ordinance read as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any male person to exhibit or display himself costumed, clothed, garbed, or apparelled in any manner not appropriate to his sex or other wise to impersonate a member of the female sex in any play, dialogue, theatrical production, pantomime, stage or floor show or act within the city. It shall be unlawful for any person to permit any male person to exhibit or display himself costumed, clothed, garbed, or apparelled in any manner not appropriate to his sex, or other wise to impersonate a member of the female sex in any play, dialogue, theatrical production, pantomime, stage or floor show or act within the city."

The second ordinance made it illegal for any person to be in any public place in the city "in a dress not becoming to his sex. . ."

A suit challenging these two laws was filed in federal court by the ACLU on behalf of the leaders of the Miami Gay Activist Alliance and the National Coalition of Gay Organizations. U. S. District Court Judge William Mehrrens, on June 22, declared both ordinances unconstitutional on the basis that they were too vague, leaving the interpretation and enforcement of the law entirely to the discretion of the police. In recognition of contemporary standards, the city did not contest this ruling. The Gay Activists considered this a victory for gay civil rights and stated that gay activists from all over the country would be invited to Miami Beach during the conventions to participate in a victory celebration.

PROHIBITED SYMBOLS. One other city ordinance surfaced to public attention in relation to convention activities. That was the city's ordinance prohibiting the wearing and display of communist and nazi symbols. The ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to wear or display, in any manner, either the hammer and sickle or the swastika on any public street. . ."

At the June 29 City Council meeting Mr. Ellis Rubin, a Miami Beach attorney, appeared before the Council and requested that this ordinance be amended to include a ban on the display of the Viet Cong



and North Vietnamese flags. Former Miami Beach Mayor D. Lee Powell also appeared before the Council and stated that, when he was mayor, he had introduced the present ordinance prohibiting the display of the hammer and sickle and swastika. Because of the ordinance, he said, a number of incidents were averted. He added that he supported Mr. Rubin's request and urged the City Council to act on it. Mr. Richard Seiderman, a resident of Miami Beach, also appeared before the Council and advocated amending the present ordinance to include the Viet Cong symbols.

Following these citizen statements, the Councilmen engaged in a lengthy discussion over the issue. Mayor Hall concluded the discussion by deferring further consideration of the matter until a study was made of the many other flags and symbols that might conceivably fall in the same category as the hammer and sickle and the swastika. No further action was taken on this issue prior to and during the conventions and the matter was dropped.

REGISTRATION. A registration ordinance adopted by the City of Miami Beach in the 1930's had special importance relative to the 1972 conventions. This ordinance required that virtually everyone in Miami Beach employed in a service industry must be registered, photographed, and fingerprinted at police headquarters. Included in this category were waiters and waitresses, bartenders, store clerks, gas station attendants, porters, maids, cab drivers, boat operators and newspaper delivery boys to name a few. Employers were responsible for insuring that their employees were registered within 48 hours of employment and were subject to a \$100 fine for violating the law.

In April, Miami Beach police reminded the employers of service oriented workers of the registration requirement and requested their compliance with it. During May and June, 1972, the Identification and Records Division of the Miami Beach Police Department registered 11,950 workers, more than eight times the number registered during the same period of time the previous year. The fingerprints obtained from the registrations were processed through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) network and then turned over to the Secret Service. The Secret Service then forwarded them to the FBI for criminal history checks. This made fingerprints, photographs and criminal records of several thousand people available to the local police, Secret Service and FBI.

#### MUTUAL AID

An integral part of the plan for policing the national political conventions was the obvious dependence of the city of Miami Beach on law enforcement agencies from other jurisdictions to provide manpower assistance. The imminent possibility of police officers from neighboring jurisdictions making arrests in Miami Beach during the conventions raised the question of mutual aid and the legal authority for that assistance.

Prior to the conventions, the three major Dade County law enforcement agencies agreed on the strategy of charging persons arrested during the conventions with violations of county ordinances rather than Miami Beach City Ordinances. This was necessary because it was planned that persons arrested in Miami Beach were to be transported across Biscayne Bay to the county jail.

No contractual mutual aid agreements were in existence between the city of Miami Beach and the city of Miami or any other police agency. Assistance was considered assured from the Dade County Sheriff's Department because, in Florida, the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer in his county and is technically responsible for maintaining the peace and security of that jurisdiction. However, the Dade County Department of Public Safety could not provide all of the needed manpower. Therefore, aid was still required from other jurisdictions.

In the absence of local contractual mutual aid agreements, consideration was given to the proposition of deputizing police officers from other jurisdictions so that they could serve with full arrest powers during the conventions. There was some question as to whether the city of Miami Beach had authority to do this. A question also arose concerning the applicability of the Florida Mutual Aid Act to the policing of the conventions, lacking any "emergency" situation.

State Attorney Richard E. Gerstein requested an opinion from the State Attorney General, Robert L. Shevin, to clarify these points of law. Mr. Shevin responded that it was unnecessary for officers from neighboring jurisdictions to be deputized because state law provided that: "Whenever the employees of any political subdivision are rendering aid outside and pursuant to the authority contained in this part, such employees shall have the same powers, duties, rights, privileges and immunities as if they were performing their duties in the political subdivision in which they are normally employed." The interpretation of this law by the Attorney General provided that officers from other jurisdictions would have arrest powers in Miami Beach during the conventions.

In response to the question as to whether the political conventions would fall under the purview of the Florida Mutual Aid Act since that act provided for the furnishing of mutual aid only in situations of extreme emergency, disaster or local peril or emergency, Mr. Shevin replied in the affirmative. He reasoned that it wasn't necessary for any of the designated conditions to be in actual progress before preventative action could take effect, adding that the intent of the legislature was to allow adequate preparation for civil disturbances before they reached "uncontrollable proportions."

With the Attorney General's opinion then, the question of legal authority for mutual aid during the conventions was resolved. However, although state law provides for mutual aid at the local level, it seems as

if the several Dade County law enforcement agencies would have benefited if there existed among them mutual aid contractual agreements. Local contracts would predefine responsibility and establish indemnity on a mutually agreed basis by local officials who are familiar with the environments in which they operate.

## CAMPSITE PERMITS

The question of whether or not permits should be issued to demonstrators for campsites was the most intense issue to precede each convention. Campsite permits were eventually granted to demonstrators for both of the political conventions, but those decisions were not arrived at without hours of negotiation, emotional debate and protest.


Initially, representatives of groups intending to demonstrate during the conventions requested separate campsite permits. The Yippies and Zippies wanted to camp at separate areas on the Municipal Golf Course. The Gay Activists wanted a permit to camp at the beach at 21st Street, and the SCLC wanted to camp at Flamingo Park or another appropriate site for what that group termed Resurrection City II. These groups and others had one thing in common in their campsite requests. They wanted to camp in the city of Miami Beach at a location not too distant from the convention hall complex.

As the time passed and articles began appearing in local newspapers reporting that some Miami Beach councilmen were against granting any campsite permits to demonstrators, the demonstrators realized that all of their campsite requests were in jeopardy of being rejected. Thereafter, demands for permits merged into the need for a single campsite. The site selected by demonstration leaders was Flamingo Park.

DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION. Several weeks prior to the Democratic Convention, proponents and opponents of a campsite permit within Miami Beach were pressing for a decision by city officials. At a June 7th City Council meeting, the councilmen deferred taking any action on the granting of a campsite permit until the matter had been completely studied by the City Manager and until he had submitted recommendations to the Council. Several leaders of demonstration groups considered this a "stalling" action. At a meeting of the Governor's Community Coordinating Task Force, they stated that demonstrators were coming to Miami Beach whether or not a campsite was permitted, and that their present spirit of cooperation with authorities would be short lived unless city officials took some action on their campsite requests soon.

During this period of time police officials were also studying the matter. Deputy Chief Theodore Zanders, on loan to the Miami Beach Police Department from the Washington, D. C. Police Department, compiled a list of numerous points for officials to consider when negotiating







a campsite permit with demonstration leaders. Chief Pomerance was also at work surveying potential campsites in the area. After studying the matter, Chief Pomerance recommended to the City Manager that Watson Island Park, located between the cities of Miami Beach and Miami, technically in the jurisdiction of the city of Miami, be offered to demonstrators.

On June 23, a special meeting of the Miami Beach City Council was held to consider the report and recommendation of the City Manager. Each person desiring to speak on the subject of campsites for non-delegates was permitted to do so prior to the City Council taking any action.

The first speaker in favor of providing a campsite in Miami Beach was Mr. Alvah Chapman. Mr. Chapman was speaking for the Governor's Task Force Committee, which had been charged with serving as a liaison among demonstration groups, the various levels of government, and the business and civic community in Dade County. Mr. Chapman reported that the Dade County Manager had been given authority to designate a campsite in Dade County, and that Haulover Beach (north of Miami Beach) would probably be selected. Additionally, Mr. Chapman said that the Miami City Manager had also been given authority to designate a campsite, which would probably be Watson Island Park. His committee felt that it would only be reasonable for the City of Miami Beach to also provide a campsite for the demonstrators. He reasoned that the demonstrators could be better cared for if located at several sites rather than just one.

Mr. Chapman was followed by more than 25 speakers who represented such diverse groups as Youth International Party, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Miami Convention Coalition, Jewish Labor Committee, clergymen, and individual residents, all of whom spoke in favor of providing campsites in Miami Beach.

Speaking in opposition to providing campsites in Miami Beach were Ellis Rubin of Operation Back-Bone; Shepard Davis, President of the Tenants Association of Florida; Dick Hayes of the National Coalition Against Election of George McGovern; representatives of Young Americans for Freedom; and five individual residents of Miami Beach. After all citizens had an opportunity to voice their opinions on the matter of a campsite permit, City Manager Clifford O'Key gave his recommendations to the City Council. Mr. O'Key recommended that Watson Island and Haulover Park be designated as demonstrator campsites and that Flamingo Park be utilized as a staging area by demonstrators for their marches to the convention complex. Mr. O'Key's recommendation for a campsite outside the city of Miami Beach was based primarily on expectations of demonstrators arriving in numbers ranging from 50,000 to 250,000. No areas in Miami Beach were considered adequate to hold this many people.

After lengthy debate, the City Council voted 5 to 2 in favor of adopting the City Manager's recommendations. This vote meant that Flamingo Park would not be used as a campsite. The decision caused an emotional protest from many of those in the audience who had earlier spoken in favor of a campsite in Miami Beach. Pat Small, a member of the Zippie organization, threw a pie at one of the City Councilmen who had voted in favor of designating a campsite outside of the city. Small was promptly arrested and charged with assault.

Demonstration leaders considered the decision of the City Council to be irresponsible and unacceptable. In their view, the designated campsites were too far from the convention complex. Demonstrators continued to press for a site in Miami Beach. Governor Askew began to investigate the possibility of demonstrators using land that had been designated for the National Guard's use in Miami Beach but not absolutely needed by the Guard. Other governmental and civic leaders continued to seek alternatives and a change in the City Council's decision.

At the June 28 City Council meeting, Reverend Ralph Abernathy of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and his staff requested that approximately 500 members of the SCLC be permitted to erect "Resurrection City #2" in Flamingo Park. The Mayor advised Mr. Abernathy that the Council had already determined that there would be no campsites in the city. Councilman Rosen, however, moved that the matter be referred to the City Manager for further study and recommendations. This motion carried unanimously. This decision reopened the once closed matter of allowing campsites in the city of Miami Beach.

Between June 23rd and July 5th, numerous meetings with demonstration leaders were held by the Mayor, the City Manager, and the Chief of Police to negotiate the campsite permit matter. At the same time, intelligence reports from law enforcement agencies and information received from demonstrators gave strong indications that the number of demonstrators who would be arriving in Miami Beach for the conventions would be considerably fewer than the original estimates. On June 29, Mr. George Rodericks, Chief of the Washington, D. C. Civil Defense Office and special consultant to Dade County Manager Ray Goode for the conventions, estimated that only 6,000 demonstrators would arrive in Miami Beach. All of these factors motivated the City Council at their July 5 meeting to reopen the question of where to permit demonstrators to camp during the Democratic Convention.

The make-up of the audience at the July 5 City Council meeting was similar to that at the June 23 meeting. A similar format was followed, with all persons being allowed to speak on the matter. The first speaker was Dr. Ralph David Abernathy, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Dr. Abernathy repeated his request for use of Flamingo Park to build Resurrection City #2 for the duration of the Democratic National Convention. He stated that he was speaking for his organization and the National Welfare Rights Organization and the National Tenants

Association. Dr. Abernathy and his assistants rejected the use of any other area as a campsite, but they promised to be liable for any damage done to Flamingo Park. Perhaps most significantly, SCLC was willing to coexist with other demonstration groups at the campsite and to accept responsibility for those groups while they were in the park.

Several City Councilmen attached importance to the opinions and recommendations of police experts and the City Manager. They requested that Deputy Chief Zanders, Chief Pomerance, and the City Manager speak at the meeting. Some Councilmen expected Chief Zanders to take a "hard line" toward demonstrators and recommend a vote against issuing campsite permits. However, Chief Zanders stated that, if he were in Washington, D. C. and it was his decision to make, he would grant the permit to demonstrators for Flamingo Park. Chief Zanders based his conclusion on the lowered estimates of expected demonstrators.

Following Chief Zanders' statement, Chief Pomerance made two recommendations: A permit for Flamingo Park should be given to Dr. Abernathy of the SCLC as an "umbrella" agency, and the City Manager should be given the authority to continue negotiating with groups that agreed to come under Dr. Abernathy's "umbrella." In response to questions, Chief Pomerance offered the opinion that failure to grant a campsite would increase police security problems. If Flamingo Park in particular were not granted, the police would be attempting to enforce an untenable position.


Mr. O'Key, the City Manager, reported to the City Council that he would recommend granting Mr. Abernathy's request for a campsite permit for Flamingo Park. After the City Manager's statement, the Councilmen listened to no less than 32 speakers from the audience who spoke for or against the granting of a campsite permit for Flamingo Park. During this session, the audience was noisy and disruptive and had to be continuously reminded by the Mayor to be quiet and to keep order. After several hours of discussion, the Council voted 4 to 2 to grant the campsite permit for Flamingo Park.

The campsite permit was subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the City Manager pertaining to the health, safety and welfare of the public. It was also understood that the permit would be issued to SCLC, and that SCLC would be the "host" to other demonstration groups. The Council specifically emphasized that the permit would only be valid for the Democratic National Convention and would not be applicable to the Republican National Convention. The granting of the permit for only the period of the DNC reflected police and city officials' concerns with discouraging demonstrators from remaining in Miami Beach during the six week interim period between the two conventions.









Several factors influenced this favorable decision. The City Council placed considerable weight on the statements of Deputy Chief Zanders. His knowledge and experience in handling demonstrators in Washington, D. C. was highly respected. Council members also had considerable faith in the ability and judgement of their own Chief of Police, Rocky Pomerance. Thirdly, Dr. Abernathy's rational, non-violent posture was one with which Council members could identify. Additionally, his organization represented a responsible body that the Council could reasonably grant a campsite permit to and expect adherence to the conditions of the permit. The significantly reduced estimates of arriving demonstrators lessened the worries about massive, uncontrollable crowds. The stated intentions of many demonstration leaders that they wanted to demonstrate peacefully and avoid violence also served to benefit their cause.

REPUBLICAN CONVENTION. The process leading to a decision to grant demonstrators the use of Flamingo Park as a campsite during the Republican National Convention was similar to the one preceding the granting of a permit for the DNC. Certain key differences, however, influenced the RNC decision making process.

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, for instance, had no intention of assuming an "umbrella" role in Flamingo Park for the RNC, as it had done for the DNC. This left a vacuum in demonstration group leadership, since there now was no "respectable" group to whom the City Council could grant a permit. It was clearly evident that they would not grant a permit to a "radical" organization. Chief Pomerance recognized the gravity of this situation and suggested to Mr. John Adams, leader of Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC), that his organization apply for the campsite permit. RCLC could offer to become the planning coordinator for use of the park. A similar request was made of Mr. Adams by Rennie Davis of PCPJ and Jeff Nightbyrd of YIP. RCLC agreed to accept the coordinator role and apply for the campsite permit.

Reports of apparent law violations that had occurred in Flamingo Park during the DNC also jeopardized the issuance of a second permit. The reports centered around violations concerning desecration of the American flag, marijuana smoking, and nude bathing in the Flamingo Park public pool. All of these reports had a chilling effect on those City Councilmen who favored full enforcement of the laws. Demonstration leaders also had stated for months that they were saving their major protest efforts for the Republican National Convention. This tended to raise doubts in the minds of some public officials regarding the ability of the police security force to maintain control over the demonstrators.

The campsite permit issue for the RNC received its first public consideration at the August 2 City Council meeting. At that time, the Council deferred taking any action on the matter until they had received

more intelligence information and recommendations from the Chief of Police and the City Manager. A special meeting of the Council was scheduled for August 14 to decide this issue. During the interim, RCLC representatives continued to meet with police, city officials and demonstration groups to work out a strategy for obtaining a campsite permit.

During this time, two actions by the Zippies threatened the campsite negotiation process. Tom Forcade, of that organization, addressed a letter to the city administration stating that his group represented the true Youth International Party (Yippies) and that negotiations for a campsite permit should be discontinued with the YIP representatives presently being dealt with. Forcade requested that city officials deal directly with the Zippies. He intimated that otherwise there would be trouble. The letter did not contain a return address, so no reply was made to it. City administrators chose not to let it alter their negotiation process.

The second threat to the process occurred on the night of August 13, when approximately 65 members of the Zippies entered Flamingo Park with the intention of camping there overnight without a permit. The group was urged to move out of the park by other demonstration group representatives, because their illegal presence in the park would negatively influence the City Council's decision on the granting of a campsite permit. That decision was expected on the following morning. The Zippies continued to occupy the park until police arrived. They were then cleared from the premises with no arrests being made.

The August 14 meeting of the Miami Beach City Council was set aside for the specific purpose of considering a campsite for demonstrators during the Republican National Convention. Following the pattern established previously, the public was afforded an opportunity to speak on this matter. As before, proponents for the granting of a campsite permit outnumbered opponents by a margin of almost three to one. After more than 31 speakers had expressed their concerns, the City Manager recommended that the use of Flamingo Park as a campsite be permitted, subject to criteria as approved by the City Manager. There was some discussion about the police strictly enforcing all of the laws. Chief Pomerance reminded the City Council that the Democratic National Convention had been relatively peaceful and that no violence occurred in Flamingo Park during that time. On a 4 to 3 vote, the City Council approved the use of Flamingo Park as a campsite during the Republican National Convention.

Although the City Council voted approval for the use of Flamingo Park on Monday, August 14, the City Manager was left to determine when the park could actually be opened as a campsite. The City Manager still had to make final arrangements for services, such as toilets, electricity, etc. He also had to draft the rules and regulations governing the campsite. Before this work could be completed, on the evenings of August 14



and 15, Zippies again moved into Flamingo Park with the intention of camping all night without a permit. To avoid a confrontation, Chief Pomerance, Mayor Chuck Hall and Reverend Adams obtained assistance from a local church in which the demonstrators could be housed when evicted from the park. The evictions were made by police with no arrests. The Flamingo Park campsite permit became effective on Thursday, August 17, at 12:01 AM. In effect, this opened the campsite on the night of Wednesday, August 16.

The importance of granting demonstrators permission to use Flamingo Park as a campsite cannot be overstated. In Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention, campsite permits were denied to demonstration groups. Having no place else to go, hundreds of demonstrators remained in the park to be violently evicted by police. It is highly probable that the denial of campsite permits in Miami Beach would have spawned similar violence. The police would have been placed in the untenable position of evicting demonstrators from the park into the streets. There being a city ordinance prohibiting sleeping in the open, the next move would have required the police to either keep the demonstrators awake all night, chase them out of town, or arrest them. All of these were less desirable alternatives than granting a campsite permit.

The granting of the permit worked to the advantage of the demonstrators, the police and the community. The demonstrators had a place to sleep, meet, and conduct their own programs without interference. They were not continuously frustrated by authorities. Hence, an issue that could have generated hostility toward authorities was defused.

The police also received advantages by having the demonstrators in the park. First, the demonstrators during both conventions did an excellent job of policing themselves within the confines of the park, thereby reducing the need for police manpower. Secondly, police were able to assign an officer to the park to serve as liaison between the demonstrators and the police. This opened up another communication channel with demonstrators and allowed the police to be better informed of the mood and activities of the demonstrators. The primary advantage to the community of having demonstrators camped in the park was that the demonstrators did not annoy homeowners and hotel owners. No complaints were received by police from citizens reporting demonstrators sleeping or trespassing on their property or using their swimming pools.

The delay that preceded the granting of campsite permits may possibly have had a strategic value, in that the prospect of not having an authorized place to sleep might have served to deter some young people from traveling to Miami Beach. That theory, however, is questionable. It seems more obvious that the several disadvantages caused by the City Council's delay in arriving at their final decision outweighed any such possible strategic advantage.



The prolonged indecision almost caused demonstrators to cease negotiations with police. Chief Pomerance had placed great emphasis on maintaining communications with demonstrators to facilitate his control of the convention environment. Had the demonstrators broke off negotiations, a major segment of Chief Pomerance's general "game plan" would have been destroyed. Secondly, the indecision affected the development of operational plans relative to the assignment of manpower. Protection of the convention hall site was the only thing assured until a campsite decision was made. Most other manpower assignments depended on where the demonstrators would be located.

The campsite issue underscored the relative inability of police forces to prepare for convention problems without the cooperation and understanding of the highest authorities in city and county government.

#### DISCRETIONARY VS. FULL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAWS

The decision of whether to exercise discretionary powers during the conventions or to initiate a policy of full enforcement was one that had the most far reaching implications and one which had the greatest influence on convention actions by police and demonstrators.

A policy of total law enforcement requires that the police enforce all of the criminal laws and ordinances all of the time against all violators. In the use of discretion, police determine what specific laws they will enforce and the level of enforcement given to those laws at any particular time. The enforcement of certain laws is given priority over others as determined by the seriousness of the violation, the immediate environment in which the violation takes place, and the level of community tolerance of certain violations.

Of course, police normally exercise discretion daily when carrying out their expected functions. However, the exercise of discretion is not normally officially recognized. To the contrary, police administrators publicly support the position that they are committed to a policy of total or full enforcement. To do otherwise would imply less than the total objectivity that is expected of police in enforcing the law without fear or favor. Despite this official stance, discretion is recognized and practiced by police administrators and their men. The constraints placed upon police operations (e.g., limited manpower, unenforceable laws) necessitate the use of discretionary powers even though social norms expect ideal, full enforcement of the laws.

It was expected during the planning stages that more than 50,000 demonstrators might arrive in Miami Beach. To police this many people, plus delegates and others attending the convention, approximately 1,000 police officers were assigned. These manpower factors alone mitigated against a full enforcement policy. Equally significant was the desire

of police administrators to avoid violent confrontations with demonstrators as much as possible. To make arrests for every minor, non-violent, non-threatening violation would surely be interpreted as repression of the right to dissent and would likely inflame the crowds to increase their level of challenge to authorities.

The decision in favor of discretionary enforcement during the political conventions was never overtly or publicly stated. However, no attempts were made by the Miami Beach Police Department personnel to conceal the "low profile" policy that Chief Pomerance strongly advocated for his men and publicly espoused. On numerous occasions Chief Pomerance publicly explained during press and radio interviews that police were not going to be the "abrasive factor" during the conventions. If confrontation occurred, it would be by the initiation of demonstrators and not the police, who were instructed to scrupulously protect the First Amendment rights of all citizens. Arrests that could not be made at the time of the violation because of danger to the officer, the violator, or other parties, were to be postponed until the violator could safely be arrested at a later time.

Some citizens interpreted Chief Pomerance's explanation of the "low profile" policy to mean that demonstrators would have license to do as they pleased without fear of law enforcement. Consequently, a few citizens took action to reverse this policy in favor of full enforcement of the laws. As early as seven weeks prior to the Democratic Convention, the Miami Beach City Council began receiving letters from citizens and non-delegates requesting to be placed on the agenda for the purpose of discussing this enforcement policy.

One of the first such letters received by the City Council, which fairly accurately expressed the opinion of subsequent letters taking the same position, was dated May 25, 1972, and signed by Mr. Ellis Rubin, an attorney representing a local organization called "Operation Backbone." Mr. Rubin stated that he would request the City Council to "require the municipal police department to strictly enforce all city ordinances and laws concerning unlawful assemblies, inciting to riot, disorderly conduct, obscene literature, open profanity, lewd and lascivious conduct, drug abuse and other violations of the law." In concluding this particular point in his letter, Mr. Rubin made a veiled reference to Chief Pomerance's public statements relating to "low profile" by saying, "As you know, there have been indications that minor infractions of the law should be overlooked during the convention period."

As a special City Council meeting on June 23, 1972, held for the purpose of considering the report and recommendations of the City Manager concerning campsites for non-delegates, several people who spoke in opposition to the granting of campsites also expressed the opinion that all laws should be enforced by the police. Additional pressure for full enforcement came from Robert Rosasco, the Dade County

Republican Party Chairman. Mr. Rosasco called for strict law enforcement and considered taking legal action to assure that no special treatment was afforded to convention protestors. In contrast to Mr. Rosasco's position, state and national Republican leaders said that they would let local officials decide how to handle demonstrators.

With demonstrators present in Miami Beach for the DNC, the intensity of opposition to the discretionary enforcement policy increased. Court actions were initiated by those opposed to the policy.

On July 12, 1972, the Crime Commission of Greater Miami, in a telegram to the Dade County Grand Jury, cited a report of "... a large number of non-delegate demonstrators allegedly participating in a mass 'marijuana smoke-in' at Flamingo Park on Miami Beach" in which no police action was taken. The telegram also considered "disgraceful" the lack of police enforcement during the DNC and requested the grand jury "to initiate an immediate investigation to determine if these flagrant violations of the state drug laws were committed and to pinpoint responsibility for any lack of law enforcement."

The Grand Jury, in its report to Judge Vann of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, stated the following in response to the Crime Commission telegram: "The facts revealed by our investigation are that a minimum of violations occurred, that law enforcement was superb, and regardless of what might have been alleged, the convention was a thorough success. We believe this community owes a debt of gratitude to the City of Miami Beach, the local law enforcement agencies, and to all citizens, including non-delegates, for their mutual cooperation in creating an atmosphere conducive to peaceful demonstrations."

Not all of the criticism of the discretionary law enforcement policy originated with non-governmental citizens. Three Miami Beach City Councilmen, referring to reports alleging drug usage and other law violations in Flamingo Park during the DNC without enforcement action, cited the discretionary enforcement policy as one of the principal reasons they could not vote for the granting of a campsite permit during the RNC. One Councilman went so far as to state that he "would personally move that disciplinary action be taken for the suspension or removal of any officer who shirks his duty during the forthcoming convention," meaning that he expected all laws to be strictly enforced.

On August 20, just one day prior to the start of the RNC, an incident occurred that served to present still another challenge to the discretionary enforcement policy. According to an MBPD police report made on that date, a car occupied by two men and bearing license plates that read "MIKE-GOP" was set upon by "a crowd of twenty to thirty movement people who began beating on the car with sticks, spitting on the car, etc." The police report continued that one occupant of the car said that he "had requested assistance at the time of the incident from three motorcycle officers, who responded that they were sorry but there was nothing



they could do." Later it was determined that the request for police assistance actually came shortly after the incident and that no arrests resulted because of the difficulty in identifying specific individuals as the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the occupants of the vehicle were unsatisfied with the police response. They petitioned Judge Highsmith of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court to issue an injunction requiring the police to enforce all laws.

Named as respondents in the petition were Chief of the Miami Beach Police Department, Rocky Pomerance, and all members of the Miami Beach City Council. The writ, signed by Judge Highsmith, ordered Chief Pomerance and the City Councilmen to appear in court at 12:00 noon on August 23, 1972, to show cause why all of the laws of the city of Miami Beach, Dade County, and the State of Florida should not be enforced.

On the second day of the Republican Convention, August 22, the level of protest activity and law violations by demonstrators intensified. Additionally, there were plans and threats by the demonstrators to "close down" the convention hall on the last day of the convention, August 23. Having these circumstances to contend with, Chief Pomerance concluded that his services to the community would be better rendered if he was to command his officers in the field at the time of greatest need, rather than spend precious time in court over a matter that would be moot after the conclusion of the convention. Chief Pomerance took no action in response to the writ. Subsequently, the petitioners and the court took no further action, and the matter was dropped.

The discretionary enforcement policy remained in effect throughout both conventions. Police had an extremely difficult task. They had to strike a balance between maintaining the rights of protestors to demonstrate and the rights of other citizens to be free of annoyances caused by the demonstrators. Without the judicious and controlled exercise of police discretion, the First Amendment protections of freedom of expression would have been seriously jeopardized. It appears that police discretion, not police intransigence, was essential to the successful policing of the political conventions.

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## TRAINING

### STANDARD TRAINING PROGRAM

All Miami Beach police recruits attend a 24-week, 960-hour police training academy when they initially join the force. Annually thereafter all non-command police personnel return to the classroom for 36 hours of in-service training to review and update their knowledge in such areas as community relations, patrol techniques, crime scene investigation and criminal law to name a few. Additionally, the training unit of the department conducts roll-call training sessions, utilizing the Training Key series produced by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. At every opportunity, mid-management and command staff personnel are sent to police management training seminars, conferences and schools, such as the Southern Police Institute and the FBI National Academy.

In conjunction with the advocacy of training, Chief Pomerance strongly encourages his personnel to continue their formal education. Hence, approximately 92% of the sworn personnel on the MBPD have attained some college credits. This includes 15 baccalaureate degrees, one masters degree, one law degree, and two doctoral degrees.

### CONVENTION TRAINING GRANT

Even though the Miami Beach police force can be considered well trained and educated in comparative terms, Chief Pomerance recognized that policing a political convention in 1972 would be a unique experience for his officers that required additional preparation through special behavioral training. To support the convention training needs as determined by the command staff, a grant proposal was submitted to LEAA and

subsequently funded in the amount of \$395,424 for the development and implementation of an innovative approach to police training. In the proposal, the Miami Beach Police Department planned for extensive research, upon which to base convention related police training and equipment acquisition, as indicated by the following statements:

"The purpose of this proposal is to train and equip law enforcement officers in the handling of a national political convention. This project will research and document requirements for law enforcement services during national political conventions. It will concern itself with the recognition, evaluation and control of individuals and groups who pose a threat to the orderly conduct of convention proceedings, the general welfare of the community and the personnel safety of delegates and candidates.

"Key personnel and operational procedures of agencies providing services during prior political conventions will be consulted. Innovative techniques in conflict management developed by police departments will be analyzed. Emphasis will also be given to evaluation and acquisition of on-site communications, non-lethal control systems, surveillance and identification procedures, and equipment.

"Following the research and documentation set forth above, in-depth training curricula will be developed and implemented to upgrade the abilities of all local law enforcement personnel who will participate in providing convention security. Equipment which has been acquired will be introduced into local operational convention procedures, in accordance with the most effective and promising methodology developed by our research . . . ."

The proposal called for the administration of the grant to be accomplished by a project director and two assistant project directors. The criteria for selecting the project director, as stipulated in the grant, required that he possess a background in law enforcement or related government service at the executive or administrative level and experience in the areas of research, advanced and vocational education, and operational planning. An ability to make in-depth evaluations and full documentation was also required. The project director was to have overall responsibility for the execution of the terms of the grant. The magnitude of this task can best be appreciated in terms of what were the goals of the grant.

The primary goal was to enhance local police capabilities in providing effective law enforcement services for, and during the national political conventions. More specifically, six subordinate goals were identified in the grant:

1. To comprehensively research and document problems and solutions with regard to police service during national political conventions.

2. To draw operational and tactical plans for implementation of police services.
3. To train police personnel to function effectively with regard to the demands placed upon them.
4. To equip this department with certain devices in augmentation of local resources so as to enhance present capabilities.
5. To effectively implement our plans with trained and equipped police personnel during national political conventions.
6. To fully and objectively document the results and relative effectiveness of our initial research, planning, training, equipping and operational execution of police services.

In essence then, the project director was to have a major responsibility not only for training, but also for conducting research, developing operational plans, purchasing equipment, and ultimately the evaluation of all activities relative to providing police services to the political conventions.

Initially, MBPD selected Professor James LeGrande, Chairman of the Criminal Justice Program at FIU, to assume the role of project director. Professor LeGrande possessed a background of practical police experience, broad experience as an administrator and leader within the criminal justice field, and perhaps most importantly, he had earned the confidence and respect of the local police. However, after LEAA approved the grant, Professor LeGrande informed MBPD that he would be unable to accept the position because of his other responsibilities. In declining the position, he recommended that Mr. Wayne Hanewicz, at that time an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at Montana State University, be considered for the position. Professor LeGrande assured the MBPD command staff that he would work closely with Mr. Hanewicz as time permitted. In essence then, according to Professor LeGrande, the MBPD would be receiving two project directors.

Mr. Hanewicz had experience as a developer and administrator of a university level criminal justice educational program, as a law enforcement planner and research analyst, and as a consultant. Additionally, he had previously worked with Professor LeGrande on law enforcement projects in the Midwest. Nonetheless, the MBPD command staff had reservations about employing him because Mr. Hanewicz's age at the time (27) suggested limited experience in areas that are normally gained with time and exposure. In any event, Mr. Hanewicz was employed as the project director. The decision was based on his impressive academic credentials (M. A. Magna Cum Laude), the strong recommendations of Professor LeGrande, and

Mr. LeGrande's assurances that he would be available to guide the program.

The grant called for the two assistant project directors to be selected from the men on the Miami Beach police department who held the rank of captain. One was to be selected on the basis of field operational experience in uniform and patrol functions, and the other was to be selected on the basis of having experience in investigations and intelligence. These criteria were established so that the assistant project directors could provide the project director with input concerning the style of local law enforcement and its operations.

The assistant project directors were to allot 100% of their time during the life of the grant performing five primary functions:

1. Assist the project director.
2. Conduct field interviews and research under the guidance of the project director.
3. Relate findings to local resources and problems.
4. Assist the project director in drafting operational plans and training curricula.
5. Assist the project director in the evaluation and documentation of research products, training and execution of operational planning generated within the project.

Captains Ozzie Kruidenier and Buford Whitaker were selected by Chief Pomerance to fill the roles of assistant project directors. Both men possessed extensive experience in police operations and administration. At the time of their selection, Captain Whitaker was in charge of departmental training and Captain Kruidenier was in charge of the records and identification division.

The grant provided for the compensation of 200 Miami Beach police officers at their regular hourly rate to undergo 96 hours of training. An additional 100 officers from outside agencies were also to attend the training program, but without compensation from the grant funds. The training program was to consist of 32 hours of Crowd Psychology, and 16 hours each of Intelligence Operations, Equipment Familiarization and Use, Management of Conflict and Personal Defense. Additionally, 140 selected Miami Beach police officers were to receive 48 hours of Special Tactical Force Training. The proposal also provided for research travel, training consultants, and instructors, and a wide variety of equipment, the latter item being budgeted for \$228,408.



## FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

To assist in the execution of the training program described in the grant, MBPD sought the aid of an accredited university. This approach was taken for two reasons. First, MBPD wanted to take advantage of the relevant knowledge and expertise of academia. Secondly, it was reasoned that the active involvement of a university in police training would be favorably interpreted by dissidents as a serious attempt by the MBPD to train its officers in a quality program to justly and humanely police the conventions. If this interpretation was made by dissidents, then the police speculated that it might influence reciprocal behavior on the part of dissidents.

On November 11, 1971, Chief Pomerance wrote to Dr. Charles Perry, president of Florida International University, requesting that institution's cooperation and assistance. In his letter, Chief Pomerance stated that it was his "desire to utilize to the maximum extent possible the facilities and resources, both human and physical, of Florida International University." He also stated that the selection of a project director would be made upon the advice and recommendation of the university. By mutual agreement and contract, the project director was to be jointly selected and employed by Florida International University and the Miami Beach Police Department and would function under the supervision of Chief Pomerance while receiving resource support from FIU. Although the agreement and contract delineating the terms of the affiliation of FIU and MBPD were not formally instituted until January 5, 1972, immediate efforts were undertaken to obtain a project director.

### PLANNING AND RESEARCH

Mr. Hanewicz was hired on December 13, 1971. From that date, he had only until February 14, 1972, to conduct the necessary research, develop a curriculum, and acquire a training staff. February 14 was not simply an arbitrary starting date. The training staff wanted to have the program completed by mid-June, so the trained officers would have a chance to interact with dissidents before the DNC began. Hopefully, this would favorably influence the perceptions and behavior of the dissidents. With that completion date in mind, once the number of possible weekend training sessions had been calculated, it was a matter of simple arithmetic. The target date for completion, minus the desired number of weekends for training, equals the starting date. That was February 14.

According to the grant, 19 three-day research trips were to be made by the project director and his two assistants to seven major cities whose police departments had handled major civil disorders or demonstrations in the past. As it turned out, no research trips were made by the training staff to those cities. Research trips to the Leburg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, to the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, and to the Medical School at Yale University were planned by Mr. Hanewicz, but again did not materialize. Convention planning trips were made to other cities by MBPD command staff personnel, but these resulted in no input into the training program.

Mr. Hanewicz did make one research trip to the Stanford University Medical School in Palo Alto, California. The purpose of the trip was to meet with two psychiatrists, Dr. David Daniels and D. Frank Ochberg, to solicit their suggestions regarding the most appropriate kind of training preparation for potentially violent interpersonal confrontations. The primary recommendation that resulted from that meeting and which was later incorporated into the training program was that the training or portions of it be addressed to dealing with the misconceptions that police officers might experience in approaching the conventions.

Because time constraints precluded additional research trips, eleven specialists in such behavioral fields as training, psychiatry, educational psychology and police community relations were invited to participate in a "Behavioral Planning Session" on January 21, 1972. This meeting was to assist in developing that part of the training program which would be concerned with affecting the behavior of the police officers. The meeting resulted in three major recommendations that served in part to guide the program. The first of those recommendations was that "intensive encounter sessions" should be avoided. This was done because of the potential negative effect of the interactions resulting from that technique. Secondly, the behavioral training phase of the program should continue throughout the duration of the program. And thirdly, it was decided that the behavioral sessions would not be structured and would not consist of preplanned and prepared content material. Four reasons were given for this last approach:

- a. Since time constraints had required that we expand our preimplementation research into the implementation phase, this approach would allow the almost spontaneous utilization of relevant research results.
- b. It would allow the trainees to provide meaningful input into the planning and implementation process. Such input would be conducive to the development of individual decision-making capacities as well as the nourishment of a more positive self-image.
- c. It would allow the men and their trainers to proceed at their own pace, thereby individualizing the program. This approach is finding increasing support from contemporary educational theory.
- d. It would allow the freedom for experimentation and the development of innovative approaches to training which

the trainers might develop during the process of interaction with the trainees on the basis of their own personal and professional experience.

Following the Behavioral Planning Session and based upon the recommendations developed from it, a training program format was developed by Mr. Hanewicz and approved by the MBPD command staff on January 27, 1972.

Scheduling the hours during which the training program was to be conducted posed a formidable problem because of the around-the-clock shifts worked by the 300 to 400 officers expected to attend the course. After considering several alternatives, it was finally decided that, for all police personnel to receive the planned training course, three 4-hour sessions would be held on Saturdays and Sundays for 17 consecutive weeks. Two sessions were scheduled on Saturdays from 8:00 a. m. to 12 noon and 4:00 p. m. to 8:00 p. m. The third session was held from 11:00 a. m. to 3:00 p. m. on Sundays.

#### PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

In order to train officers to effectively and humanely police the political conventions, it was determined that the training program should be designed to focus on three behavioral dimensions of the police officer. Consequently, the program consisted of three distinct phases:

- (1) Behavioral Input Sessions (BIS's)
- (2) Cognitive Input Sessions (CIS's)
- (3) Technical Input Sessions (TIS's)

BEHAVIORAL INPUT SESSIONS. The overall goal of the BIS's was to "develop the officer as a more fully realized integrated personality capable of dealing with conflict (and its concomitant and/or emotional stress) both within and without himself, and one more tolerant of deviations from social and political norms." More specifically, as a result of attending the BIS's officers were to be able to experience personal stress and examine its effect on personal behavior and perception; analyze ways in which interpersonal behavior may lead to or ameliorate confrontation; understand one's role in the team objective of allowing for a successful 1972 Democratic National Convention; and develop the ability to think for oneself and to take active and meaningful part in the decisions which affect one's being.

Acquiring a training staff to direct the officers toward achieving the objectives of the BIS phase of the training program presented a difficult problem for Mr. Hanewicz, the project director. This was so primarily because of the scheduling of the classes, which required a continuing weekly commitment to the trainers. This constraint, coupled



with a very limited amount of time to acquire a training staff, restricted the search for prospective trainers to the Miami area, where weekly commuting would not be too difficult or expensive. During the week before the training program was to commence (February 14, 1972) and after much searching, final arrangements were made with area psychologists, psychiatrists, educators and trainers for their participation in the program. The estimable training staff finally engaged included Dr. Dennis O'Donovan, psychologist; Dr. Steven Beltz, psychologist; Dr. John Croghan, educational administrator and psychologist; Dr. Barry Crown, behavioral counselor; Dr. Norman Enteen, educational counselor; Dr. Harvey Langee, psychiatrist; Ms. Eleanor Lipton, intergroup specialist; and Mr. Bruce Hammersly, educator.

The trainers agreed that the objectives of the BIS phase of the training program could best be achieved by not imposing structure or pre-planned and prepared content material on the trainees. Learning was to take place by the group process method, involving discussion, problem solving, feedback and evaluation, with trainees assuming a certain amount of responsibility for their own learning through their level of involvement and participation. Since this instructional method is best conducted in small groups, the training staff concluded that groups of 20 to 25 men would be appropriate. It was also decided that during the first six BIS sessions (4 hours each) police supervisors would work in groups separate from patrolmen. This was done for the purpose of allowing more honest discussion by patrolmen of problems involving professional interaction. It also provided trainers an opportunity to assist supervisors in developing skills for leading a group of men by means other than official or command authority.

Of the 76 hours allotted to the three phased training program, 36 hours were scheduled for the BIS phase. During the first six weeks of the program, the BIS sessions were to be conducted for the entire four hours per session. During the seventh through the eleventh week of the program, two hours of the four hour sessions were for BIS training with the other two hours spent on CIS training. Thereafter, BIS training was to be conducted for one hour per week until the end of the training program.

COGNITIVE INPUT SESSIONS. The CIS's were included in the training program for the purpose of broadening "the individual officer's understanding of dissent and its role in the democratic process, and to present the officer with alternative ways of explaining or rationalizing some of the major and potentially dangerous activities which he would be exposed to during the political conventions. It was expected that such increased understanding would produce a more rational response to situations where cognitive thought processes are the more significant factors in behavior. The CIS sessions were to provide officers with information such as: the role dissent plays in a democracy; the reasons people dissent; the forms that dissent have taken and may take in the future; types of



police responses to the forms of dissent; U. S. Constitutional protection of certain forms of dissent; and the applicable laws relating to dissent.

Academicians for the CIS phase of the program were less difficult to obtain than were the trainers for the BIS phase. This was because there were available numerous professional educators throughout the country possessing expert knowledge in academic fields relevant to the program, and also because the CIS sessions did not require a weekly commitment from any one lecturer. Prior to the commencement of the training program, a CIS subject matter schedule had been developed, and commitments from appropriate professionals had been received. The CIS phase was scheduled as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lecturer</u>
April 1-2	Philosophy of Dissent	Dr. Gerald MacCallum, Chairman Department of Philosophy - University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin
April 8-9	Historical & Con- temporary Modes of Dissent	Dr. James L. LeGrande, Chairman Criminal Justice Program, Florida International University
April 15-16	Constitutional Law	Dr. Frank D. Day (Ret.) Professor of Law Criminal Justice Administration Michigan State University
April 22-23	Constitutional Law	Dr. John C. Klotter Interim Dean Southern Police Institute University of Louisville
April 29-30	States Statutes & Local Ordinances	Mr. Jack Blumenfeld Assistant State's Attorney State's Attorney Office Miami, Florida

The order of presentation was purposefully scheduled by Mr. Hane-wicz to provide the officers with a logical sequence of the material. The first lecture was intended to provide a theoretical or philosophical basis for understanding dissent, while the second lecture would indicate the forms which such dissent might take. Following these two presentations, it was felt that the officers would be in a better position to understand the basis and rationale for constitutional and legal provisions dealing with dissent. The last lecture was intended to be the most "pragmatic." This lecture

would provide the officers with a working knowledge of the laws with which they would likely be utilizing in the event that conditions required such use.

The only instructional method considered feasible for the CIS phase of training was the lecture method. This was in consideration of time constraints (only two hours for each topic), the goals of the particular topic to be instructed, and the proven effectiveness of lectures when conveying factual materials and theoretical principles. The small groups that were formed for the BIS phase of training were combined into one large group for the CIS lecture series. During the CIS phase then, all of the trainees at each session would receive the same lecture during the first two hours of the session. For the second two hours, they would again form their small groups to continue the BIS phase, at which time discussion could center around the lecture delivered during the previous two hours or any other topic of the trainees choice.

TECHNICAL INPUT SESSIONS. The primary objective of the TIS's was to arm the officers with the necessary technical skills to enable them to individually and collectively maintain ultimate control over the environment of the national political conventions should the use of those skills become necessary. Miami Beach officers had been trained in basic police techniques, but MBPD officers had little exposure to mass demonstrations, civil disorders or riots because of the nature of the Miami Beach community. Therefore, the TIS phase focused on the development of skills to handle mass conflict situations. The planned schedule was as follows:

May 6-7; Departmental Policy, two (2) hours.

This articulation of departmental police (re: drug arrests, nudity, etc.) was to begin Phase 3 of the training program. It was to "set the tone" for approaching the technical aspects of policing the 1972 DNC.

May 13-14; Mass Arrest and Booking Procedures, two (2) hours.

A description, and participation in a simulation, of the mass arrest and booking procedures which would be in effect during the convention.

May 20-21; Equipment Familiarization, two (2) hours.

Discussion of the potential and limitations of the various pieces of equipment (communications, non-lethal weaponry, etc.) which may find use during the 1972 DNC. Instruction in and practice with those pieces of equipment which officers might utilize during the convention.

May 27-28; Equipment Familiarization, two (2) hours.

June 3-4; Defensive Techniques, Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (SEADOC), two (2) hours.

A presentation of relevant operational tasks and techniques, manifestations of dissent, and other applicable tactical and equipment training.

June 10-11; Defensive Techniques, SEADOC, two (2) hours.

Continuation of above.

Date unannounced, Specialized Tactical Training.

In-depth, specialized tactical training for a select group of 35 officers who would comprise a tactical team for the city of Miami Beach. Preferably, this training was to be in concert with other metropolitan tactical teams.

Continuous, Physical Training, six (6) hours.

A minimal, but continuous, program of physical exercise for all trainees. The Universal Gladiator Mini-Gym was to be utilized for this purpose. Each officer would be required to attend at least one hour per week, and it was anticipated that many officers would utilize the facility more often than the required hours. It was further planned that this segment of the program would be decentralized to the supervisor level for implementation.

After completing the three phased training program, all participants were eligible to receive a Certificate for Special Training jointly awarded by the Miami Beach Police Department and Florida International University. Additionally, Florida International University arranged to award four academic credit hours to those officers successfully completing the training program. A series of five tests were planned to be administered to determine which officers were eligible for college credit as well as to determine how well all of the trainees were retaining information received from the training program.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING. During the month of September, 1971, eight command staff officers from Miami Beach attended the Army's Civil Disorders School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. In November, 1971, two command officers attended an 80 hour riot training course at the Southern Police Institute in Louisville, Kentucky. During the month of May, 1972, Miami Beach police officers trained for eight hours with the Dade County Public Safety Department in specialized physical activity relating to crowd control. This training included riot control formations, use of the baton, self-defense, mass arrest procedures, firearms training and training in the use of gas.

One hundred forty-three MBPD officers participated in eight hours of training in crowd control formations with city of Miami officers on



June 26. On July 6, an eight-hour training exercise was conducted in mass arrest procedures with approximately 500 officers participating. These officers were from Miami Beach, Florida Highway Patrol, Florida Fresh Water and Game Commission, and Florida Marine Patrol. The exercise consisted of simulating a mass arrest situation. Attending officers alternately acted as demonstrators and arresting officers, and in the latter role practiced approaching the demonstrators, making the arrests, and filling out the arrest form.

Training for the conventions concluded on July 7 and 9, when Miami Beach Police Department provided orientation training sessions for all convention assigned police personnel. These sessions included a walk-through of the convention complex and assignment orientation.

COMMAND STAFF TRAINING. During the implementation of the training program, concern about training for the MBPD command staff was expressed by command personnel, consultants, police officers and the training staff. The consensus was that it would be beneficial and consistent for the command staff to receive training appropriate to their level of authority and responsibility. Consideration was given to having the command staff attend short term institutes and seminars, but this idea was discounted because the numerous preparations that had to be made for the approaching conventions precluded their attendance at a distant training program. The only alternative was to conduct training for the command staff in or near Miami Beach.

After several planning meetings between the command staff and training personnel, a program was developed to be conducted by Professor James LeGrande, Chairman of the Criminal Justice Department at Florida International University, and Dr. Harvey Langee, Psychiatrist and Director of Medical Education at the University of Florida. The substance of the program was as follows:

Dr. Langee would meet with each command officer privately for one hour on the day prior to the departmental staff meeting. The purpose of these sessions was threefold:

- a) To determine individual roles and needs within the context of command group interaction, in order that these roles may be complemented and needs provided for.
- b) To allow the command officers to develop more substantive objectives for continued command training based upon their personal experience and insight. ("What do you want from the program?").
- c) To determine the extent of command commitment to the executive training program (What would you do to see that the goals of the program are achieved?").



Both Dr. Langee and Professor LeGrande would attend departmental staff meetings (the frequency to be determined by the command staff at a later date) with the following objectives in mind:

- a) Dr. Langee would "process" the meeting for the command staff at the completion of session. That is, he would observe and comment on the means by which interaction occurs within the group, and how this interaction affects, or can affect, interpersonal communication.
- b) Professor LeGrande would analyze and comment upon the substance or content of the command meeting, in an effort to more effectively utilize the talent and expertise of the command officers.

It was anticipated that the process content analysis would be conducted approximately once every month, or perhaps a bit more frequently, until the conclusion of the DNC, or until the command staff terminated it.

#### THE IMPLEMENTED PROGRAM

OPENING SESSION. Considerable importance was attached to obtaining national publicity of the training program. It was thought that extensive publicity of the program would create a positive image of the city of Miami Beach and the Miami Beach Police Department. Thereby apprehensions about the occurrence of unbridled police violence, such as was witnessed during the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968, would be relieved. Also, it was thought that, if the expected demonstrators possessed a positive image of the police, their attitudes and approaches to police during the conventions would be less abrasive. Before the actual training was to begin, and in order to obtain the desired publicity, a two-hour block of time on February 14, 1972, was scheduled specifically for the conduct of public ceremonies announcing the start of the convention training program.

Present at this session were the MBPD command staff, 134 MBPD officers, and distinguished invitees. Representation from the Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department was minimal. The distinguished invitees and speakers included Reverend Coleman Carroll, Archbishop of Miami; Dr. Leonard Huber, Councilman, City of Miami Beach; Mr. Chuck Hall, Mayor, City of Miami Beach; Mr. Richard J. Murphy, Democratic National Committee; Dr. Charles Perry, President, Florida International University; and Mr. Paul Rundle, U. S. Secret Service.

These personages represented a desirable cross section of law enforcement and political and educational community elements, and in their remarks they set the proper tone for the commencement of the training program. The session was considered constructive by command staff personnel

and was well received by the officers. However, the session failed to achieve its primary goal of attracting national publicity for the training program. This was attributed to the absence of a well known, popular national figure. That the desired amount of national publicity was not obtained at this point in time had no apparent adverse effect on convention outcomes. Although the strategy was worth pursuit, it was not essential.

THE FIRST BIS SESSION. The convention training program substantively commenced on the weekend of February 19-20. Three objectives were established for the initial sessions:

1. The administration of pretests.
2. The introduction of the trainers within a small group context.
3. The distribution of training notebooks including an introductory letter from Chief Pomerance, a description of the accrediting procedure for those wishing college credit, and a time-subject schedule of the entire training program, as well as the clarification of questions raised regarding these items.

The significance of achieving these objectives was no small matter. Many police officers were approaching the training program with some very serious reservations. First of all, attendance was mandatory. Officers had to attend whether they wanted to or not. The negativism attached to mandatory attendance was somewhat mollified by the payment of time and a half to MBPD attending officers, a factor that assured at least minimal role conformance. Secondly, in the words of a ranking MBPD police officer, the men approached the training with the viewpoint that psychologists were going to attempt to "brainwash" them. Thirdly, the program was being conducted primarily by trainers who had no practical police experience and are typically considered "outsiders" by police officers.

It was, therefore, critical that credibility and rapport be established quickly. Since the BIS and TIS sessions were a new approach to training for the MBPD, everyone was anxious to see if it would work. Since doubt was present in the minds of many officers from the start - indicating that lasting judgment of the entire program might hinge on their first impression - the importance of a successful first session relative to the whole program took on greater significance.

The pretests were administered by Mr. Michael O'Neill, Assistant, Department of Social Ecology at the University of California, for the purpose

of preparing an independent evaluation of the training program, using objective and empirical indices. The tests administered were:

1. O'Neill Activity - Formalism Scale (Police Role Perception)
2. Critical Incident Scale
3. Rokeach Dogmatism Scale
4. Ways to Live Questionnaire
5. Trust Scale
6. Myers Briggs Type Indicator

The tests were completed by all officers, but not without some difficulty. The officers felt threatened by the psychological nature of the tests and were under the impression that the tests were going to be used for clinical purposes as well as for evaluative purposes. Chief Pomerance and Mr. Hanewicz attempted to dispel this false impression by explaining that the tests were only for the purpose of evaluating the training program and had no other purpose. That some officers still remained skeptical was evident when it was later determined there was some incidence of false identification and lack of response to certain items on the questionnaire. These intended deceptions and omissions by officers provided the first tangible indication that they were less than receptive to the training program.

The second and third objectives were undoubtedly the most important ones to be successfully accomplished during the first session. The major portion of the training program was scheduled to be devoted to the BIS sessions. The success of the BIS session was dependent on how trainers were perceived by the officer trainees and how well the goals of those sessions were explained. If these were accomplished, then the apprehensions of the officers would be laid to rest. Mr. Hanewicz later prepared a comprehensive evaluative report on the training program. In that report he wrote that these objectives "had not been achieved to the extent necessary in order to allay apprehensions among the trainees regarding the nature and goals of the training program." Essentially then, many officers rejected the trainers initially. They left the first BIS session with the feeling that they didn't know where the training program was going to take them or how they were going to get wherever that was. It was inevitable that this first impression would have some consequence for the remainder of the program.

The first BIS session was significant from another perspective. Chief Pomerance and the MBPD command staff had recognized the value of a union between academicians and law enforcement personnel and welcomed the contributions that the former could make. Contrary to customary police practices, the command staff entrusted the training of MBPD officers almost entirely to non-police trainers. Because of this investment of trust as well as the need to see that officers were being properly trained for the conventions, command personnel were closely monitoring the program. Unfortunately, the unsuccessful first session



left the high expectations of the command staff wanting, and apparently had some influence on the degree of support for the training program that was subsequently extended by the command staff.

THE SECOND BIS SESSION. Three approaches were taken by the training staff at the second BIS session in an attempt to resolve some of the confusion and criticism that resulted from the first session. First, a schedule was distributed to all trainees, giving the substance of each session for the remainder of the program. Secondly, a written statement of the goals of the training program was provided to each officer. In this statement, Mr. Hanewicz explained that the program had two primary purposes: "(1) to impart technical knowledge (law, crowd control tactics, proper use of equipment, etc.) which you may find useful during the convention and (2) to develop your ability to utilize that knowledge effectively and humanely under conditions of emotional and physical stress."

It was also explained that the BIS sessions were not going to be planned by the training staff, because unplanned sessions would give the officers an opportunity to make their own suggestions and discuss their own ideas freely and spontaneously. This approach was based on the assumption that the officers were as well equipped as anyone to assist each other in developing the special techniques and abilities characteristic of professional police officers.

The third approach called for the trainers to explain to the trainees that the dissention that was experienced during the first BIS session was similar to that which could be expected to exist during the Democratic National Convention. In other words, at the first session, officers had felt threatened in an atmosphere over which they had little control. That situation could be viewed as a practice run for the "real thing." It was thought that if the officers could understand and cope with the feeling that they were experiencing in the training program, they would be better prepared to cope with the environment of the political conventions.

The approaches taken by the training staff were correct in that it was essential to provide the officers with complete information about the training program and its goals. However, the effort was late. The negative effect of the first session was not entirely overcome by the second session. Officers still harbored skepticism towards the program. Additionally, the goals of the BIS sessions and the methods for achieving those goals were still not clear to the officers and continued to remain nebulous to them throughout the duration of the program.

REMAINING BIS SESSIONS. During the remainder of the BIS sessions, the trainers utilized a variety of training techniques in an attempt to achieve the goals of the program. Those techniques included group discussion, role playing, analysis of interactions, situational analysis and use of visual aids and guest speakers. The following is a list of films utilized and guests who participated.



## Films

"Generations." Modern Learning Aids Division of Wards Natural Science  
Artemis Films - New York, N. Y.

"Eye of the Beholder." Produced by: Stewart Reynolds Dist. by Stewart  
Reynolds.

"Help-I'm a Cop." Produced by: Human Development Institute Division  
of Bell & Howell Company.

"Run." Produced by: American Telephone & Telegraph.

"The Assembly Line." Produced by: American Telephone & Telegraph.

### Free Film Module Series:

- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| a. "Anger and Humiliation" | Produced by Robert Rubin<br>Film Modules Inc. New York, N. Y. |
| b. "Fear"                  |   |
| c. "Feeling Good"          |   |

"Seasons Change." American Civil Liberties Union.

"The Whole World is Watching." International Association of Chiefs of  
Police, Washington, D. C.

## Guests

\*Names withheld on request.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| *Mr. "A"                                | Miami Liberation Front                         |
| *Mr. "B"                                | Miami Liberation Front                         |
| *Mr. "C"                                | Miami Liberation Front                         |
| *Mr. "D"                                | Miami Liberation Front                         |
| Miss Lynn Slavitt                       | Miami Snowplow Organization                    |
| Mr. Ed Cook, Assistant<br>Director, CAA | Dade County Metro Community<br>Relations Board |
| Mr. Henry Gallagher, Lt.                | Cambridge, Massachusetts,<br>Police Department |
| Mr. Rich Duffy, Lt.                     | Newton, Massachusetts, Police<br>Department    |
| Mr. Allen MacIssac, Lt.                 | Medford, Massachusetts,<br>Police Department   |

Mr. Neil Behan, Deputy Chief  
Inspector

New York Police Department

Mr. "E"

Graduate Student, University  
Of Miami, former Chicago  
Police Officer

Mr. James Carey, Captain

Fort Lauderdale Police  
Department

The unnamed persons from the Miami Liberation Front were closely identified with the counter-culture individuals that police officers would be dealing with during the conventions. They were included as guest speakers in the training program to provide the opportunity for an exchange of viewpoints which, it was hoped, would lead to increased understanding and tolerance on a mutual basis. This was one strategy that proved to be effective.

The reservations that officers initially held were never resolved during the BIS phase. Throughout that phase, classroom behavioral problems arose to the extent that many group sessions were seriously threatened by some officers hostilely expressing their feelings toward the program and/or the trainers. Such behavior included intimidation and harassment of certain trainers, brandishing of weapons, flying paper airplanes, and officers simply walking out of sessions. The presence of command officers at these sessions did little to deter the misbehavior of the officers. Trainees repeatedly requested the command staff to cancel the BIS phase of the program in view of these problems. However, the command staff recognized an intrinsic value in the sessions and decided in favor of their continuance.

This decision was changed during the first week of May, at which time the Republican Convention was switched to Miami Beach, necessitating an alteration and acceleration of convention preparation plans. The BIS phase of the program was formally ended on May 4, 1972, six weeks prior to its scheduled conclusion.

Even though the BIS sessions were attendant with numerous problems, some officers placed value in them and felt at their conclusion that they had personally and professionally benefitted from them. That the BIS sessions were not more successful can be attributed to the following factors:

Unfamiliarity with group processes. Police training traditionally follows the pattern of the lecture method, with each lecture being pre-planned, rigidly structured and formally presented. All of the officers attending the convention training program had been trained in this traditional manner, which was similar to and served as reinforcement of the

instructional methods that they had been exposed to throughout most of their formal education. Beliefs as to how learning should take place, as a result of continuous reinforcement, were ingrained and fairly limited in scope. Little was in their student background that would have served as preparation or as introduction to the group processes method. Instituting change in expectations that were developed over a period of years was a risky business at best. It minimally required a recognition on the part of trainers that the group process method was foreign to the trainees. Secondly, because of this, an unmistakably clear explanation of group processes was necessitated. All apparent indications suggest that consideration of these factors fell short of the required emphasis.

Unstructured sessions. Closely related to the problem of the trainees being unfamiliar with the group process method was the intentional lack of structure in the BIS sessions. The unplanned, unstructured sessions also contrasted sharply with the traditional police training practice. Officers had difficulty accepting the proposition that they were to be responsible for their own learning, and that they were as capable of providing learning for themselves and each other as anyone else. This was vague and less than meaningful to many officers.

The timing of the unstructured sessions also had some influence on their receptivity. When these sessions first began in February, 1972, little concrete information was available in regards to how many demonstrators were expected in Miami Beach or what specific assignments were going to be. Yet, it was this type of specific information that officers were most interested in hearing. Again, they had difficulty accepting what was, in their view, abstract training approaches.

Trainers and collateral problems. A number of factors related to and including the trainers had considerable influence on the conduct and results of the BIS sessions. First, there was little time for the trainers to prepare in advance of the program, which was to start on February 19, 1972. Three trainers were hired on February 11, and three others were hired on February 15. With the program starting the same week, there was insufficient time for individual and coordinative planning.

As the program progressed, other coordination problems became apparent. Trainers were not meeting to share their experiences, successes and failures. Consequently, techniques found to be unsuccessful by some trainers were continued to be used by other trainers, and successful techniques used by some trainers were not shared with other trainers. Additionally, there was little coordination between the command staff and the training staff. No meetings between the two groups were held. As a result, the command staff did not receive a full and complete explanation from the trainers detailing their methods and the reasons for their use. On the other hand, trainers did not receive adequate information regarding convention intelligence, policy and procedures. This information was needed to satisfy the informational needs of both trainers and trainees.



Another factor that had considerable influence on the conduct and results of the BIS sessions relative to trainers was the matter of establishing credibility. Although they were experientially qualified to perform their roles, more than one of the trainers failed to establish the degree of credibility that was essential to being effective. As observed by Mr. Hane-wicz, one trainer had difficulty overcoming his personal appearance, which included casual dress and a beard. This apparently unexpected problem was compounded by a newspaper article about the trainer that indicated how he and his family traveled around the country in a school bus for the purpose of exploring their interpersonal relationships, an adventure that was apparently unacceptable to many police officers. Another trainer was a woman lacking in graduate credentials who had an extremely difficult time achieving rapport with police officers. All of the trainers were faced with the problem of establishing credibility and trust in themselves and their methods. That some did not accomplish this can be attributed partially to the perceived lack of command support for the training program, which will be discussed in another part of this chapter, and partially to the lack of trust that police officers frequently have in non-police trainers.

Another factor was the problem of communication. As previously mentioned, no formal meetings were held with all of the trainers present or with all of the trainers and the project director. Consequently, the informational flow was fragmented and inadequate. This contributed to low trainer morale and hindered the project director's control of the program.

COGNITIVE INPUT SESSIONS. The second phase of the training program, which consisted of lectures to the trainees on dissent, constitutional law, and state law, followed by small group discussion on the content of the lectures, took place as planned. However, as the five week phase progressed, it became apparent that its effectiveness was diluted by a carry-over of some of the problems experienced during the first phase of the program and by problems peculiar to the CIS phase alone.

At the time that the CIS phase started (April 1), the officers had already completed six weeks of the BIS phase. Many of the officers considered the time spent in training for those weeks as an unpleasant experience, and they strongly desired the early termination of the program. Consequently, when the lectures started they were met with less than enthusiasm. The behavior of officers ranged from interest on the part of some, to outright boredom on the part of others, including sleeping during the presentations. (It was reported that one officer even went to the extent of sleeping on the floor.)

That more interest was not displayed in the CIS phase was partly due to the transference of negativism toward the training program in general that was displayed during the first phase, and partly due to the unfulfillment of the officers' informational needs. At this point in the program,



officers still strongly felt the need for concrete information, not theory, that would tangibly assist them in performing their roles at the conventions. The MBPD command staff was in the process of developing guidelines for handling demonstrators, which would provide officers with direction, but this was not completed and distributed until May, 1972.

Some indication of the interest and attitude that officers had toward the program was illustrated when the Cognitive-Informational tests were administered during the second phase of the program. The purpose of the tests was to determine how well the officers retained material presented at the opening session and the BIS and CIS phases of the program, as well as to determine who would be eligible for college credit. Originally, it was planned to administer five tests, but due to changes in the program schedule and cancellation of the last segment of the BIS sessions, only two tests were actually administered. These were administered on April 1 and 2 and on April 15 and 16, 1972.

Eighty men in the program did not take one of the two tests - apparently for no other reason than a lack of interest. A procedure was established to provide the men the opportunity to make up the tests, but only three of the 80 officers took advantage of that. Sixteen men were caught cheating, and several others indicated their lack of interest by being non-responsive or facetiously responsive to some of the test items.

The validity of the test results was further undermined when it was discovered that during the administration of the first test, officers in the first session would describe the test to other officers who still had to take it, thereby giving them an undesirable advantage from the viewpoint of the test administrators. This resulted in relatively high scores being achieved by approximately 78% of the men taking the first test. For the second test, the order in which the questions appeared was reversed, causing many officers with preplanned responses to items to mark those items incorrectly. As a result, the scores of the second test were significantly lower than those of the first test. Approximately 66% of the men taking the test failed with a percentage score of 60% or less. After the two test scores were averaged, it was determined that, of the 248 men participating, 157 men would be eligible for college credit. Undoubtedly, many men approached the tests seriously and deserved the award of college credit. However, in consideration of the above mentioned factors, the validity of the eligibility for college credit awarded to others is questionable.

There were two other problems that were unique to the CIS phase of the program. As originally planned, following each lecture, the officers were to adjourn to their assigned small groups to discuss the lecture with a trainer. It was thought that this follow-up discussion would serve to clarify and increase understanding of the theoretical principles imparted during the lecture. This approach was hardly effective though, primarily because no provisions had been made to compensate the trainers for the

time they spent in attendance at the lecture sessions. As a result, most of the trainers did not attend the lecture sessions. Having little other preparation, they were in no position to facilitate the follow-up discussion.

The second problem was relatively minor in nature, but was indicative of the lack of communication that was prevalent throughout the program. Arrangements had been made with the Dade County Department of Public Safety to receive video-tapes of the CIS lecture series. However, the lecturers were not informed that their presentations were going to be recorded and expressed some concern about this. Although it is doubtful that the unexpected video-taping affected the quality of the presentations, it seems reasonable to assume that the lecturers would have altered their approach in some manner to accommodate the larger and more diversified audience.

TECHNICAL INPUT SESSIONS. This last phase of the planned training program was by far the best received by the officers. Its intent to provide officers with technical knowledge and ability was something tangible that the officers could easily identify as being directly relevant to their needs. The original TIS schedule was modified considerably at the time it was to be implemented, because it had been announced that the Republican National Convention was going to be held in Miami Beach. As a result, the May 6, 7, 13, 14, 20 and 21st classes were either postponed or cancelled. The Equipment Familiarization sessions scheduled for May 27-28 were changed to Mass Media Dialogue. This change resulted from a meeting between MBPD staff and media representatives, both of whom wanted to improve communication and mutual understanding between police officers and field reporters. This session was rated very productive by police personnel.

On June 3-4, a film of the 1971 Mayday demonstrations in Washington, D. C., "The Whole World is Watching," was substituted for the originally scheduled Defense Techniques, Civil Disturbance Orientation course. On June 10-11, Mass Arrest and Booking Procedures supplanted the scheduled Defensive Techniques course. This class was presented by Major Ted Schempp, who is the Legal Officer of the MBPD, with assistance from Judge Rhea Grossman, Deputy Chief Zanders, and Lt. Roland Perry of the Washington, D. C. police department.

The content and conduct of the TIS sessions was satisfactory to the command staff and officers alike. However, there were two aspects of it that are noteworthy. First, there was insufficient interdepartmental input and participation, a circumstance that was attendant with the entire program. Secondly, was the lack of special assignment training. This would include the areas of intelligence and photography. The officers assigned to these two functions had either expressed an interest or displayed some aptitude in those areas and were pretty much assigned on the basis of those factors. However, their limited professional experience in intelligence and photography suggested that they could have benefitted from specialized training.

COMMAND STAFF TRAINING. The command staff training program was initiated as originally planned. On April 24, 1972, Dr. Langee conducted individual interviews with the command staff. On the following day, the departmental staff meeting was analyzed according to the process-content method. The staff meeting did not progress as originally planned for the purposes of training, however. The training staff and command staff had agreed that there would be no interruptions during the meeting. As the meeting progressed, however, there were several interruptions caused by telephone calls received by command officers and by command officers leaving the room to converse with other individuals.

On May 1, the command staff discontinued the program, citing the heavy demands convention preparations made on their time schedules as the reason for this decision. The Project Director perceived the cancellation of the command training program as further evidence of the lack of commitment on the part of command officers. Indications suggest that both factors influenced the decision. A third factor also deserves attention. The point in time that the command training program was initiated was less than ideal. The myriad details that needed attention a scant few weeks prior to the convention took precedence over training, and reasonably so. Although early consideration had been given to command training, its belated implementation precluded its continuance and effectiveness. Command training is a necessity, but it should have occurred at a point in time far enough in advance of the conventions so that other convention preparations would have not been so pressing as to interfere.

#### ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

Despite the numerous problems that arose during the training program, after the conventions were concluded most MBPD command staff and other persons in the area criminal justice system considered the training program to have been a success in terms of achieving the overall goal of effectively and humanely policing the political conventions.

Because successfully policed conventions followed the training program, however, that does not necessarily prove that the training program was responsible for the success. Examination of the total convention environment indicates that several other factors could reasonably be considered to have had a stronger influence on the convention outcomes than did the training program itself. This can be attributed to both the strength of those other factors and the considerable problems experienced with the training program that contributed to the dilution of its impact. That its impact was diluted is not to say that it was without value. Many officers were consciously aware of the positive effect that the program had on their attitudes and behavior, and others undoubtedly were favorably influenced by the program without being able to specifically articulate how. Since the majority of officers considered the program valueless and were intensely



critical of it, it is instructive here to consider some of the additional factors not previously mentioned that served to detract from its anticipated potential.

The position of project director, as described in the grant, was crucial to both the training program and to MBPD's total convention preparations. With that position being of central importance, concomitant emphasis should have been placed on the selection process. The original verbal agreement that the MBPD had entered into with Professor LeGrande regarding his appointment to the position did not materialize. Consequently, due to the urgent need to employ a project director, the MBPD relied almost solely on his recommendation for a replacement. This chain of events and the resultant outcome suggest that a less expedient, more formal and systematic selection process would have been of greater benefit to the MBPD had they used such a process.

As originally conceived, the project director was to be the overall administrator of all conditions of the grant. The concept of a professional person - not on the police department's staff - having a principal role in contributing to the development of operational and tactical plans, to administer equipment acquisition, to develop and implement the convention training program, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the research, planning, training, equipping and operational execution of police services is sound in theory and could have been sound in practice. However, there were several factors which either were existent at the time the grant was approved or which emerged during the life of the grant that considerably modified and reduced the role of the project director and his effectiveness.

First among these was the time frame within which the project director had to plan, research, and develop a training program. From the date that he was hired, Mr. Hanewicz had only 61 days, including weekends, to accomplish the myriad functions necessary to implement the "innovative" training program envisioned in the grant. In terms of research alone, limited time prohibited an adequate review of relevant literature and consultation with experts in the field of interpersonal conflict and collective violence. Information gathering visits to police agencies that had experienced civil disorders in the past were similarly restricted. The time factor was the main reason cited by Mr. Hanewicz in his report as requiring "that considerable flexibility be built into the program to accommodate cogent results of on-going research and investigation."

The press of time perhaps would not have been so critical if, as the grant stipulated, two assistant project directors had been assigned full-time to the project. According to the grant, two Miami Beach police captains were to be assigned full-time to assist the project director with the administration of the grant and the training program. As it worked out, this arrangement proved impractical. The 230 man Miami Beach Police Department has only seven persons holding the rank of captain, all of whom occupy important administrative or operational positions. These regular



positions took on even greater significance and demanded more time as the conventions approached. The department could scarcely afford to detach almost 30% of its officers of the rank of captain at this critical time. Consequently, the two assigned captains assumed the assistant project directors' positions, while at the same time maintaining responsibility for their regular assignments in the police department. With dual responsibilities, both of considerable magnitude, it was inevitable that responsibilities to the training program, as delineated in the grant, were not fulfilled to the extent possible.

Both captains were instrumental in managing the logistical details that were essential to the program. These included arranging for facilities, scheduling personnel and their classroom assignments, communicating with other police agencies, and obtaining instructional visual aid materials. The members of the Miami Beach Police Department command staff spent more hours on the training program and the general administration of the grant than was originally planned. However, of the police time devoted to the program, little of that time was contributed to research, the development of the actual content of the program, or the selection of trainers.

Strongly contributing to this problem was the fact that the assistant project directors were not physically removed from their normal working environment. They continued to operate out of the Miami Beach police headquarters building while the project director was situated at Florida International University, a location several miles away. This spatial relationship seriously affected the degree of control and direction that the project director could exercise over his two assistants. It also adversely affected the quantity and quality of communication between the three grant administrators. Other than their participation at the weekly staff meetings at the Miami Beach Police Department, the project director and his two assistants seldom met. Consequently, the opportunity for additional input and exchange of ideas was severely limited. Also, as could be expected as a result of being physically present, they continued to respond to the everyday needs of the police department.

The role of the assistant project directors was to a large extent defined by the role of the project director. If the role of the project director had existed as defined in the grant, the active roles of the assistant project directors might have been broader than they actually were. But the role of the project director was significantly reduced from that which was described in the grant, thereby limiting the roles of the two assistants. The project director's role was formally diminished through a series of letters between Chief Pomerance and Florida International University from overall grant administrator to a responsibility for researching, implementing, and evaluating the training program. The cause and effect of this role diminution had a major adverse influence on the entire program.

Mr. Hanewicz had assumed the position of project director completely aware of the magnitude of his new role and fully expecting to execute

the duties stipulated in the grant. However, as the research and planning phase progressed, it became apparent to him that he was not going to receive two assistants on a full-time basis. It also became apparent that he was not receiving the degree of support and cooperation necessary from the MBPD command staff to adequately perform his role.

The first indication that less than full support for the project director and the training program would be forthcoming from the command staff occurred when Mr. Hanewicz requested approval to make research trips to academic centers and institutions. Although the command staff never formally disapproved such trips, their delay in responding to the requests effectively caused their cancellation. As the program progressed, Mr. Hanewicz found that equipment was being purchased without his knowledge and that intelligence meetings were being conducted without his knowledge and presence. These were functions essential for him to participate in to carry out the evaluation phase of the comprehensive grant project. Mr. Hanewicz, in his final report, interpreted several other actions of the command staff as being non-supportive of him and/or the training program. These included the "absence of any command representation at the first lecture of the CIS, presented by an internationally known figure in political philosophy," and the circumstance that the "command staff unilaterally cancelled three May training sessions without consultations with or prior notification of the training staff."

All of these actions were interpreted as indicating that command staff commitment to Mr. Hanewicz and the training program was lacking to some degree. These actions did not go unnoticed by either the officer trainees or the training staff. This factor can be considered to have had some influence on the negative behavior and attitude that many of the officers displayed during the program. Of the trainers who submitted after-action reports on their experience with the training program, half of them cited either lack of command support or lack of "full and trusting communication between the trainees and the department decision makers" as a major fault of the program.

Management literature is replete with treatises on the necessity of command support for organizational programs. Absent that support, there is small chance of any particular program achieving effectiveness. That same management principle is applicable to police training. If police officers and their trainers perceive that the command staff does not support the training program, then it is inevitable that the attitude and behavior of the students and their trainers will be adversely affected. It is essential that unreserved and unqualified command support of special departmental training programs be made to reflect strong command commitment for such programs.

That the command staff was perceived as not being fully supportive of the training program can be attributed in part to the fact that communication efforts of the project director in almost every area of the program

were deficient, a problem that had ramifications for many other aspects of the program. That the goals of the program were never clearly understood by the officers indicates that explanations were inadequate. It must be kept in mind that this particular training approach was completely new to the officers, thereby requiring special efforts to clarify expected results.

A different problem arose in regards to communicating the expected response behavior of the trainees. No advance explanation or warning had been provided to the command staff as preparation for the officers' ventilation of hostility, aggressive behavior, and skepticism, which was an expected result and an integral part of the learning process. Consequently, the police command staff viewed this behavior as indicative of program ineptitude. As apparent problems arose during the program, the project director would repeatedly explain that the learning process was "just about where it should be" for that particular point in time. This did little to satisfy the command staff. They had no pre-stated reference base with which to compare the project director's personal evaluation of the officer's behavior and progress. The command staff remained skeptical that it was all turning out as expected. Because a clear and complete articulation of anticipated stages and goals of the training program was never forthcoming, criticism of the program never abated.

The final factor to be considered here as having some influence on the conduct and results of the training program was the element of inter-agency involvement. The city of Miami Beach police department, like many other small and medium size police agencies throughout the country, must necessarily depend on law enforcement assistance from other police agencies when confronted with a potential for mass civil disorder. The policing of the political conventions was one such situation that called for mutual aid. In the greater Miami area that assistance would naturally be provided in part by the two largest police agencies, the Dade County Public Safety Department and the City of Miami Police Department. Ideally then, the planning for the convention training program and participation in it should have been a joint, coordinative effort involving these principal agencies.

The grant did provide for the participation of "100 additional police officers, deputy sheriffs and other 'mutual-aid' law enforcement personnel employed by nearby governments." However, no provisions were made to compensate these personnel with grant funds while they were attending the training classes, as had been made for MBPD officers. Miami and Dade County PSD officials considered this to be a serious omission. They concluded that they could not send any officers to the training program unless their officers also received compensation because attendance at the program would be during an officer's scheduled off-duty time. Miami and PSD officials also balked at sending their officers to the program because no provisions had been made for their inclusion in the planning of the training program. Furthermore, PSD in particular did not consider the MBPD convention training program either new or innovative. As one PSD official



stated, their officers had previously received training similar to the program being offered by MBPD.

The uncertainty of mutual aid officers participating in the training program created a planning problem for Mr. Hanewicz and his training staff. In his final report, Mr. Hanewicz wrote, "Training program planning was initially unable to satisfactorily account for the following important elements:

1. The possibility that Miami Beach police officers might be functioning with Miami Police officers or PSD deputies during the 1972 DNC. This, in fact was the case in 1968, and that experience suggested the need for at least a joint inter-personal exposure to common training.
2. The different departmental policy emphasis which may have been internalized by the respective police officers, which internalization might be reflected in different (perhaps incompatible) operating philosophies.

Such factors have significant impact on overall training preparation, the ambiguous state of their existence during the formative stages of the training program clearly affected the scope and adequacy of the latter."

In an attempt to obtain broad inter-agency participation in the training program, MBPD extended a formal invitation to area police chiefs to send their middle management personnel to the program. Response to this invitation was limited. At the time the program started, only five agencies were represented. These included MBPD; Coral Gables P.D. which sent six officers; Florida Highway Patrol which sent eight officers; Florida State Beverage Department with one officer in attendance; and Florida Marine Patrol also with one officer in attendance. After the first week of the program, 69 Miami police officers entered the program. Still absent was the Dade County Public Safety Department, the largest police agency in the area. This situation remained unchanged for the duration of the program.

The absence of Dade County PSD officers at the convention training program was considered to be of such significance that two actions were taken to provide for some degree of coordinative training. First, videotapes were made of the Cognitive Input lecture series to be shown to PSD personnel. Second, the project director participated in the PSD in-service supervisory training program, which was oriented exclusively toward preparation for the political conventions. The purpose of his presence was to familiarize PSD supervisors with the nature of the planning and training activities under way in Miami Beach. Other coordinative training efforts were eventually undertaken prior to the conventions, but these were in the area of tactical training, which has been previously mentioned.



Although no way exists after the fact to measure how much more beneficial coordinated training might have been, it seems reasonable to assume that training for the policing of national political conventions, when occurring in jurisdictions that require mutual aid assistance, should be coordinatively planned and jointly participated in.

There is also no way to precisely determine the effect that the training program had on overall policing of the convention. Observers reported that MBPD officers were much more informal and relaxed with demonstrators than were officers from other agencies. MBPD officers engaged in conversations with demonstrators more freely and frequently, and this includes many so-called "hard-line" officers who had not previously manifested such behavior. The extent that this behavior can be attributed to the convention training program is unknown. As previously mentioned, there were other important factors present that undoubtedly influenced officer behavior. These would include the "normal" police role as it pertains to Miami Beach, Chief Pomerance's strong role model, and the officers' personal interpretations of police professionalism, including their own desires to avoid "another Chicago."

The numerous difficulties that arose during the training program lead to the following observations:

- Agencies which must depend on mutual aid for the policing of mass civil disorders should engage in participative grant and program planning with those agencies providing such aid.
- Grant proposals submitted to LEAA for financial assistance to support civil disorder training should be reviewed for feasibility relative to the administration of the grant in consideration of the organization of the requesting agency.
- Special event policy and plans should be formulated far enough in advance of the event itself so that they may form the basis of training program planning.
- Funded programs should receive the unqualified vocal and behavioral support of the command staff.
- Command staffs should receive specialized civil disorder training in the areas of planning and organization, as well as in behavioral areas such as interpersonal conflict and confrontation.
- Civil disorder training emphasis should be placed on the behavioral and attitudinal aspects but not to the extent whereby tactical training is neglected.

- Civil disorder training should have significant input from non-police academicians.
- Trainers should be mutually selected by police personnel and the training director if that position is occupied by a non-police individual for the purposes of special event training.
- Police personnel should receive a complete and clear explanation of the nature of the training program they are to attend and the methods to be used to achieve the program's goals in advance of their actual attendance in the program.

## EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

Evaluative tests and questionnaires (previously listed in this chapter) were administered to the trainees before and after their exposure to the training program by Mr. Michael O'Neill, assistant professor, Department of Social Ecology, University of California. Following, in summary, is Mr. O'Neill's description of those instruments as well as the interpretation of their results as recorded in his report on the evaluation.

EVALUATION DESIGN. The evaluation component was designed to measure the training program's effectiveness in terms of achieving four goals: to increase the police officers' tolerance of political and personal variations from the norm; to increase the officer's ability to remain cool under conditions of extreme provocation; to increase his awareness of alternatives in conflict situations, and to instill the officers with a pre-disposition against the arrest as a means of resolving conflicts.

The evaluation design took into account several attitudinal and behavioral indices, the measurement of which occurred both before and after the training in a pre-post design. Three instruments were used to measure the attitudinal component to determine if the important goal of affecting a change in the officers' attitudes had been accomplished. The first of these was Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, which was used to measure the officers' level of tolerance in response to external stimuli. O'Neill's Activity Formalism Scale was administered to provide an indication of officers' approach toward the police role by measuring "activity" (extent to which the respondent believes is appropriate to intervene in situations where action is discretionary) and "formalism" (degree to which he sees the formal legal sanctions of arrest citations etc., as his sole tools for coping with official problems). It was hypothesized that training would produce a decrease in the test group's average formalism scores while leaving the activity index unaffected.

The third instrument used to measure the attitudinal component was the Oakland Critical Incident Questionnaire. This test was developed in the Oakland (California) Police Department and was designed to measure the degree to which an officer is "violence prone." This test allows a respondent to detail his preference for a solution to problems presented in a series of hypothetical police-citizen encounters. Responses were graded according to their likelihood for exacerbating conflict, and an additive total score was produced to reflect predisposition toward inflammatory courses of action. It was hypothesized that the training program would cause a decrease in the group's average critical incident score.

While attitudes, beliefs and preferences of the policemen were a source of deep interest to the trainers, the most immediate concern was actual behavior. Since the police force was being trained for "effective and humane" performance, concern with attitudes was relevant only to the extent to which those attitudes affected behavior. In view of this fact, a strong behavioral component was built into the evaluation design and was given weight equal to that given the attitude tests.

To measure the effect of events during training on the group's performance, three separate records of departmental operations were assembled. First, records of the number of cases handled by the total police department were collected by month to give a base-line indication of overall workload. Second, the number of arrests made each month by all Miami Beach policemen was recorded to show the extent to which the men were handling matters formally. Finally, a list was made of those charges that appeared to be most frequently preferred when an arrest is made under vague and discretionary conditions. This list, as it was formally constituted, contained charges of drunkenness, loitering, lodging in the open, voluntary inquiry, unsatisfactory account, failure to make criminal registration, drunk on drugs, vagrancy, disorderly conduct - wandering and strolling, disorderly conduct - prowling, and disorderly conduct - idle person. Monthly installments of arrests on charges from this list were collected and assembled into what was called the "discretionary arrest" figures.

Both discretionary arrest and total arrest figures were divided by the monthly case statistics to yield indices that controlled for fluctuations in workload. Data was collected for the period February-June 1972 (the period of time that the training program was in effect), and for corresponding periods in the four years prior. To reduce the possibility of interaction between the training and evaluation, no records were collected until after the program had been completed. Further, efforts were taken to conceal the specific indices being considered since knowledge of them could conceivably have altered the behavior of the police officers.

It was hypothesized that the index relating to discretionary arrests, as controlled by workload, would decrease from previous years' experience as a result of the training program. It was also hypothesized that the index



comprised of total number of arrests divided by workload would not decrease from previous years' rates as a result of the training program.

EVALUATION FINDINGS OF ATTITUDINAL PRE-TESTS. Individual pre-test scores on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale were computed and compared to the most reliable reported scores of similarly tested policemen. This comparison showed that respondents in the Miami Beach training program scored significantly lower, that is, less dogmatic than those examined in the earlier investigation. In other words, police officers in the convention training program appeared at the outset of the program, considerably less dogmatic than might be expected for a normal group of policemen.

Similarly, individual pre-test responses on O'Neill's Activity Formalism score were computed and compared to those of a corresponding group of officers, and again, the Miami Beach officers' scored significantly more positive, that is higher on the activity scale and extremely lower on the formalism scale than the officers who set the norms for the test. This meant that, prior to convention training, officers preferred to become involved in a wide range of activities while at the same time preferring to use more informal methods of resolving issues. They felt, much more than the comparison policemen, that arrest is a drastic weapon to employ in discretionary situations and should be used only with caution.

The pre-test scores of officers attending the convention training program in response to the Critical Incident Scale were also positive. Officers tested high on the "activity" scale and low on the two most crucial indices, dogmatism and formalism.

EVALUATION FINDINGS OF ATTITUDINAL POST-TESTS. There was considerable shrinkage of the number of officers taking the post-tests in comparison to the number of officers that completed the pre-tests. Of the 230 men that took the pre-tests, only 185 appeared for the post test. Only one officer from a mutual aid agency took the post-tests and, despite standing orders to attend all training sessions, 27 MBPD officers failed to show up for the final administration. The effect of this shrinkage is immeasurable. Hence, the following conclusions resulting from comparison of the pre-test to the post-test must be taken as extremely tentative and subject to independent verification.

Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. Differences in average scores were calculated to indicate the total training group's change between February and June. Analysis of this data indicated a slight erosion of the extremely low level attained by the group polled in the first administration of the instrument. If valid, this would indicate that the group as a whole, became slightly more dogmatic, less open to outside stimuli, and less able to rationally analyze and evaluate data on its intrinsic merits. Again, because of shrinkage, the validity of this finding is questionable. Those respondents who dropped out could simply be the ones who scored lowest on the pre-test.



To check for individual changes in dogmatism scores, each respondent's pre-test questionnaire was matched against his post-test, and the difference in scores was calculated. Of the 126 responses that could be matched, no significant change was apparent over the period of the study. This suggests that, while no deterioration of the officer's previously low dogmatism scores took place, this instrument provides no justification for a claim of success in accomplishment of the project's goals.

O'Neill Activity-Formalism Scale. Differences in mean scores on the activity and formalism scales were juxtaposed in a comparison-of-means test to show the total group's change during the course of the training program. Analysis of this data revealed a decrease in average activity scores, with no emerging in the formalism scores. Proceeding solely on the data available, there is no evidence to claim achievement of the project's goals. On the other hand, neither is there any evidence to support a conclusion of deterioration in police role attitudes.

Critical Incident Scale. Mean group pre-test and post-test scores on the critical incident questionnaire were compared in the same manner as those from other scales. This comparison indicated a very significant downward shift in violence potential scores taking place during the period over which the training program was in operation. Again, limitations are placed on the validity of these results by the shrinkage in sample size. Those officers who dropped out might well have been atypical, unlike those who remained. Nevertheless, it appears that those members of the training group who completed matching pre- and post-test critical incident questionnaires may well have experienced a decrease in violence potential during the training program. Although there is no way to confidently judge whether this change was a product of the training program or the product of some external event occurring at the same time as the training program, this apparent result constitutes support for a claim of success in achievement of the training program's objectives.

BEHAVIORAL EVALUATION RESULTS. Patterns of change in the discretionary arrest index and the arrest index were not strong enough to support a conclusion of unqualified success in reducing the inappropriate use of arrest powers. They do appear with sufficient magnitude and lack of restriction to suggest that a trend in this direction was in effect during the first four or five months that the training program was in operation. This is perhaps the most clear indication of the entire evaluation, coming as it does without restrictions posed by research interaction or sample shrinkage. The behavioral indices thus should be given the most weight and consideration. These results, together with some of the attitudinal instruments, tend to support a conclusion of reduced tendency to arrest under vague circumstances during the period February through May, 1972. There is, nevertheless, weak contradictory evidence. There is no evidence of any strength to support a conclusion of decreased dogmatism or increased

tolerance on the part of the officers participating in the political convention  
police training program.

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## DEMONSTRATION GROUPS

Early in the convention planning process, groups intending to demonstrate in Miami Beach were described as "non-delegates" by police planners. This relatively neutral designation avoided the emotional content of such terms as "protesters" and "demonstrators," labels which had been scarred by past association with civil disorder and riots. The media picked up the neutral terminology and used it throughout the two events. For the purpose of this report, however, the term "non-delegate" is also non-descriptive. Members of the press, the police, guests of delegates, and thousands of spectators were also "non-delegates." Since the value of using non-descriptive terminology ended with the conventions themselves, the terms "demonstration groups" and "demonstrators" are preferred in this chapter.

Demonstration groups consisted of those organized groups that intended to make some public exhibition in Miami Beach in conjunction with the national political conventions in order to publicize a particular issue or gain support for a particular point of view. More often than not, demonstration groups were opposed to current government policies and sought to influence some change in them. Some groups, however, also demonstrated in support of current programs. In general, demonstration groups were not in any way affiliated with either of the two political parties or with any local government agency or community committee that participated in the convention experience. A demonstration group existed solely for the purpose of publicizing and gaining acceptance for certain points of view shared by its members. In addition to organized groups, hundreds of demonstrators also came to Miami Beach unattached to any particular group but eager to exhibit their personal feelings by supporting demonstrations that coincided with their interests.

Operations by demonstration groups are based on certain fundamental assumptions: (1) The normal political process for effecting change is perceived to be either closed to the supporters of a particular point of view or unable to effect change unless subjected to extraordinary pressure. (2) It is assumed that the demonstration will arouse "public opinion" to create the required pressure for change. The "public opinion" so aroused may be sympathy, anger, fear or shame, so long as the required pressure is produced.

## NUMBER OF GROUPS

Partly because of the numerous domestic issues that were current in 1972, partly because of the image of relative intransigence that had been acquired by the Nixon administration, partly because of the lack of any unifying cause except for a declining involvement in the Vietnam War, a very large number of organizations representing a wide range of interests were expected to demonstrate at the conventions. A list of the various expected demonstration groups follows. Organizations considered to have achieved a degree of leadership at some point in the convention experience are underlined.

American Friends Service Committee

Attica Brigade

Convention Coordinating Committee

Cuban Organizations

Abdula

Confederacion Cubana de Profesionales

Cubanos Libres

Comite de Ayuda a La Resistencia Cubana

Federacion de Estudiantes Cubanos

La Alianza para la Liberacion del Partido Liberal

Nacionalismo Realista

Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autentico

2506 Brigade

Florida Tenants Organization (FTO)

Florida People's Coalition

Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), also known as National

Coalition of Gay Organizations

"Jesus Freaks"

Joint People's Action Coalition

Miami Communist Party

Miami Convention Coalition (MCC)

Miami Women's Coalition

National Socialist White People's Party, formerly the

American Nazi Party

National Student Coalition for America

National Tenant's Organization (NTO)

National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO)

Neo-American Church, a radical organization



NEGRO, blacks for Nixon  
Operation Backbone  
Organized Migrants in Community Action, migrant farm  
workers  
Peace Action Coalition  
People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ)  
People's Party, also known as the New Party  
Pot People's Party  
Progressive Labor Party  
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)  
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)  
20th Century Reformation  
United Klans of America  
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)  
Vietnam Veterans for the Re-Election of President Nixon  
Workers Action Movement  
Youth International Party (Yippies)  
Zippies, an offshoot of Yippies

#### NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATORS

At planning sessions in February, 1972, demonstration leaders were talking about an anticipated 100,000 demonstrators in Miami Beach. Some estimates ran as high as 250,000 altogether. At a February 16 news conference, Jerry Rubin promised that 10,000 naked Yippies would march down Washington Avenue, in front of convention hall. On the basis of these very high estimates, several organizations and interested individuals attempted to become involved in preparations for the conventions in order to provide adequate peace keeping and humanitarian services to the masses who were expected to descend on Miami Beach. As the conventions drew near, however, these estimates were revised steadily downward, first to 50,000 and then to 20,000. On June 30, just a few days before the Miami Beach City Council's last minute decision on whether or not to issue a campsite permit, George Rodericks - the Washington, D. C. Civil Defense Chief acting as a special consultant to Dade County Manager Ray Goode - announced that "no more than 6,000" demonstrators were expected. Half of these had registered in hotel rooms, and only about 2,000 persons would probably be seeking a place to camp. These figures proved to be an accurate measure of the actual demonstration activity. By way of explanation for the relatively small number of expected demonstrators, Mr. Rodericks said, "Movement people are broke and are having a hard time getting down here."

The reduced numbers made the campsite decision easier and gave some comfort to the general public, but professional law enforcement officers remained alert. It was to be recalled that the Chicago disorders four years earlier - which resulted in 641 arrests and numerous injuries to police and demonstrators - at no time had involved more than 2,500 demonstrators from out of town. Of course, the Miami

area did not contain the numbers of potential local demonstrators as Chicago, but the expected "non-delegate" influx was still significant.

## RANGE OF ACTIVITIES

Those demonstrators who did arrive in Miami Beach participated in a broad range of activities during the two national conventions. That range may be visualized on a scale as follows:

- "educational" exhibits
- parades
- rallies (speeches, picnics and entertainment)
- picketing
- offensive language (chants, taunts)
- symbolic civil disobedience (occupation of offices, auditoriums)
- mischievous civil disobedience (nude bathing, apparent pot smoking)
- disruption of political meetings
- disorderly conduct (trashing, vandalism)
- passive attempts to impede delegates (sit-down demonstrations at convention gates and at street intersections)
- aggressive attempts to impede delegates (physical restraint of pedestrians; attempts to disable automobiles and busses)

Although it is true that violent incidents occurred more frequently and in greater magnitude at the end of the second convention, the escalation from mild exhibition to street violence was neither gradual nor entirely planned. A potential for violence existed from the beginning and could have been precipitated at any time depending on the wisdom of police reaction to specific situations. Police response to demonstrator activity ranged from active assistance, through trained inattention, to arrest.

"Non-violent" protest was the expressed goal of virtually all of the leaders of significant demonstration groups. In the months preceding the conventions, Abbie Hoffman (YIP), Jeff Nightbyrd (YIP), Rennie Davis (PCPJ), Dave Dellinger (PCPJ), Ralph David Abernathy (SCLC), George Wiley (NWRO), and independents Father James Groppi and Father Daniel Berrigan held news conferences to publicize their efforts to organize "non-violent" demonstrations in Miami Beach. The intentions of smaller groups (such as SDS and Zippies) were less well known. SDS leaders at least theoretically approved of violence as a means to an end. Zippies, who occasionally described themselves as "clowns," kept the Miami Beach community on edge with "news leaks" describing how the municipal golf course had been seeded with marijuana or revealing "plans" for filling all the local swimming pools with Jello.

A discussion of activity undertaken by demonstration groups follows. One possible approach could be to methodically describe the activities of each group, perhaps matching up an alphabetical list of groups with unit reports of their respective activities. This kind of report, however, would be far more logical and organized than things were in reality. Most demonstrations of any significance were supported by more than one group. A large number of independents were present among the demonstrators, and these individuals floated between organized demonstrations depending on their personal interests and whims. There is continuing uncertainty about the group affiliations of leaders and participants in certain events. Finally, a strictly mechanical rendering of piecemeal group activity contributes little toward any understanding of the overall demonstration process and police response to it.

Consequently, emphasis has been placed instead on an essentially sequential rendering, moving from the planning stage, through action occurring during the Democratic Convention, through action occurring during the Republican Convention. Selected activities and groups are highlighted in order to emphasize certain points, but specific groups are differentiated only when and to the extent that it contributes to an understanding of the overall phenomenon of mass demonstration at the 1972 conventions.

## THE PLANNING PHASE

POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION. At least a full year before the scheduled opening of the Democratic Convention, it was already decided that the police would approach potential demonstrators in a spirit of accommodation. In his initial planning goals for convention policing, the Miami Beach Chief of Police had noted the following priorities: (1) To maintain the peace and tranquility of the entire community. (2) To protect the rights of delegates to perform their functions. (3) To protect the rights of dissenters to voice peaceful protest. The formal establishment of a priority to protect dissent was a notable feature of convention planning in Miami Beach.

This planning goal was implemented by command officers who set an example of reasonable tolerance for their men. Officers remained receptive to contacts made by demonstration leaders preliminary to the conventions. In addition, the MBPD frequently took the initiative for making contacts with groups that were expected to demonstrate. Whenever possible, a personal contact was established and formal meetings with demonstration leaders were held frequently throughout the planning phase. At these meetings, police attempted to learn the intentions of the demonstrators while offering cooperation and assistance to them so long as the demonstrations remained peaceful. As an example of the kind of receptivity that was common at the upper levels of MBPD during this period, the following story of an initial contact by the Youth International Party (Yippies) is related:



On Sunday, May 14, Colonel Larry Cotzin, Assistant Chief of Police, was telephoned at home by the officer in charge at police headquarters. The police had received a call from Abbie Hoffman, recognized as one of the "Chicago 7". Mr. Hoffman requested a meeting with the Chief of Police and other city officials to begin planning for YIP demonstrations at the Democratic Convention. Col. Cotzin contacted Mr. Hoffman by telephone and informed him that the Chief was not available that night, but that he himself would be glad to participate in a preliminary discussion. In response, Mr. Hoffman said that, since Chief Pomerance was not going to attend, he would send a "lieutenant" to meet with Col. Cotzin.

Col. Cotzin then contacted Dr. Seymour Gelber (who had been assigned by the State Attorney's Office as legal aide to Chief Pomerance) and the two proceeded to Denny's Restaurant where they met two of Mr. Hoffman's "lieutenants". The Yippie spokesmen initially wanted a joint meeting with the Chief and members of the City Council, but it was explained that this would be too difficult to arrange on such short notice. A meeting was then arranged for 10:30 a.m. on the next day between Mr. Hoffman and Chief Pomerance. In general conversation that followed, it was also learned that: (1) The Yippies were very concerned about having a peaceful demonstration because they did not want to hurt candidate McGovern. (2) The Yippies wanted a campsite in Miami Beach but did not want an area on the beach front because they feared people drowning while under the influence of drugs. (3) There was some apprehension about the reaction of Miami's Cuban population. (4) The Yippies had obtained a local address and telephone number where they could be contacted.

This pattern was repeated several times during the months and weeks preceding the Democratic National Convention. The police were receptive to contacts. They were not altogether acquiescent to every preliminary demand, but they were always ready to "play the game," meaning that they were prepared to offer the status of formal negotiations to virtually anyone. An atmosphere of mutual compromise was encouraged. The information learned had intelligence value, and the personal relationships established proved to be a valuable asset in controlling the developing demonstrations.

Specific responsibility for establishing and maintaining contact with potential demonstration groups was assigned to the community relations officer at MBPD, Sergeant Nicholas Valeriani, who was assisted occasionally by other officers. This unit was also responsible for monitoring the activities of community groups that were involving themselves in preparations for the conventions. To some degree, these assignments overlapped because many of the demonstration groups were represented at meetings of the community planning groups. Officers who attended these meetings wore civilian clothes but were identified as police officers. Their role was to act as liaison between the demonstrators and the department, clarifying police policy when asked, conveying requests for assistance, frequently setting up meetings between the demonstration



leadership and police command officers, and generally conducting themselves in a non-threatening, helpful manner. Occasionally, the police officer in attendance would provide a demonstrator with a ride home after the meeting or take the opportunity to make a similar friendly gesture.

A list of some of the early formal meetings requested by demonstration groups provides some insight into the length of time spent developing these contacts. Once initial contacts were established, they were maintained throughout the two political conventions.

October, 1971	Meeting with "Switchboard", a conglomerate group
October, 1971	"New Party" meeting, later known as "People's Party."
December, 1971	American Civil Liberties Union
January, 1972	Greater Miami Coalition
January, 1972	Coalition of Religious Leaders
January, 1972	"Snowplow", umbrella group to achieve services for demonstrators.
February, 1972	Southern Christian Leadership Conference
March, 1972	Gay Leadership
April, 1972	Miami Baptists "Demo 72"
May, 1972	Youth International Party
May, 1972	Vietnam Veterans Against the War
May, 1972	Zippies
June, 1972	Numerous groups, campsite negotiations
July, 1972	Flamingo Park liaison officers assigned.

CAMPSITE NEGOTIATIONS. During the month of May, demonstration leaders were still talking about an expected 100,000 demonstrators. Leaving problems concerning services (such as water, toilets, and medical facilities) to community planning groups and the responsible county agencies, demonstration leaders for the most part concentrated on attempts to secure a campsite permit at a suitable location on Miami Beach.

Originally, many of the demonstration groups had requested individual campsites. The Yippies preferred the municipal golf course. Jeff Nightbyrd commented: "We don't want to take the parks away from the old people who sit in the sun. We want to camp on the golf course where the rich people play." The Gay Activists requested the beach park at 21st Street, partly because they feared "possible animosities from other demonstrators" and also because the site is a "world known gay beach" according to the news media. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) wanted Flamingo Park as a site for their "Resurrection City II" encampment, because the demonstrating poor people could not afford transportation from any more distant point. The Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) asked for Lummus Park, on the ocean at 10th Street. The Zippies wanted a campsite on the golf course separate from that of the Yippies.


The Miami Beach City Council was reluctant to grant any campsite permit at all. Several community organizations and semi-official committees recommended approval of a campsite area to be used by all groups, but members of the City Council remained sensitive to fears of Miami Beach residents. Two sites - Watson Island and Haulover Beach - were offered to the demonstrators. Both of these sites were outside the city limits of Miami Beach. Demonstration leaders rejected both locations because they were too far from convention hall. Free transportation was offered to campers at Watson Island, but this site - located on the causeway between Miami Beach and mainland Miami - had the obvious potential for being transformed into a massive detention center simply by blocking bridges in both directions. On June 23, the City Council heard lengthy testimony concerning the campsite issue and finally voted 5-2 against providing a campsite permit. At the next City Council meeting on June 28, Rev. Abernathy of SCLC requested a permit for Resurrection City #2, and the campsite question was reopened. At last, on July 5, the City Council voted 4-2 to approve a campsite permit for SCLC in Flamingo Park. At this meeting, both Chief Pomerance and his consultant, Chief Zanders, expressed support for the campsite request. It was understood that SCLC would permit other demonstrating groups to share the campsite, subject to certain rules that would be established for maintaining internal order. (A more detailed description of the campsite permit decision is found in Chapter 6.)

The net effect of the campsite permit issue on groups intending to demonstrate was pressure to cooperate with a coalition leadership. It was obvious that the city would not grant campsite permits to separate groups. Groups with disparate aims such as SCLC, VVAW and Yippies found it expedient to work together in common cause. During the protracted period of debate and negotiation, leaders of the various groups met and became familiar with one another. After the permit was granted, the need for a coalition leadership was again underscored by demands for some kind of self-government apparatus inside the campsite.

FLAMINGO PARK. Flamingo Park is not an "empty" park area. It is an extraordinarily well equipped public recreation facility including tennis courts, basketball courts, handball and shuffleboard facilities and numerous public buildings. The campsite permit had been granted only to SCLC, which theoretically was responsible for campers in Flamingo Park and therefore "in charge" of activities there. In fact, this was not the case. SCLC exercised considerable influence at the outset of the Flamingo Park experience, because Dr. Abernathy had to give permission for various groups to share the campsite. At no time, however, was SCLC in command of other demonstration groups in the sense of being able to generate orders that would be obeyed.

Instead, Flamingo Park was governed by a coalition of representatives from participating groups. Initially, the "land government" consisted of two members from each group. When this system became unworkable, it was replaced by six members from each major political

# FLAMINGO PARK CAMPSITE





group. Various forms for discussing issues were tried, including debate within committee, public debate by group spokesmen, and open assemblies. The result of all this experimentation in self-government was decidedly mixed.

Some hard rules were made, and a security force was established to enforce them. A prohibition against hard drugs or barbiturates inside the campsite was successfully enforced by evicting individual violators from the park. A prohibition against nude swimming in the public pool, on the other hand, was repeatedly violated by the Zippie group, and this rule proved to be more difficult to enforce. The nude bathing took place late at night in a second-deck pool that could not be seen at ground level. It was apparently done largely for the sake of the publicity achieved.

Beyond acceptance of required ground rules and agreement about designated camping areas within the park, the effort at self-government tended to bog down in interminable discussions over details. (See accompanying map of Flamingo Park.) Rules governing use of the public address system, for instance, occupied speakers for hours. Questions apparently settled at one meeting were raised again. By way of example, a report from a police liaison officer who attended many of these meetings captures some of the frustrating repetition of campsite administration.


"The campsite coalition met again in the recreation office. This meeting was a rehash of previous meetings and they continually haggled over minor details such as the cars on the lot, how many cars should be on the lot and who should have how many cars. They had a long discussion on putting up chicken wire fencing behind the women and gay groups' camps which are located on the Michigan Avenue side of the campsite. They did reach some agreement on things which included the installation of the fence . . . . They went over the pool situation again and they are going to continue in their efforts to maintain the pool under the rules that were set down yesterday."

During the Republican Convention, when the campsite permit was issued to Religious & Community Leaders Concerned, the situation was even more confused internally. RCLC had functioned as "observers" during the Democratic Convention and continued that role during the Republican Convention. Unlike SCLC during the Democratic Convention, RCLC had no demonstrators of its own to influence other groups or impose its authority. RCLC functioned merely as an "umbrella" organization within the park, providing a reputable link between authorities outside the park and demonstrators within.

Excerpts from reports of RCLC observers communicate the overall atmosphere that existed inside the campsite: "A land government meeting got underway near the north entrance about 8:45 p. m. Prolonged debate occurred over whether to have representative government or open meetings in which all present would have the right to speak. Later the debate also centered on the question of whether or not there should be a



# FLAMINGO PARK CAMPSITE



unified sound system. Frequent disruptions, hassling over who would chair the meeting, frustration, and erupting emotions characterized the meeting. Participants voted for open meetings. However, repeated attempts were made to reopen that question. After 1½ hours, participants voted to adjourn, with a decision to meet again on the next day . . . .

"Shortly after 9:00 p.m., the land government committee meeting was called together again, in open session just inside the south entrance to the campsite. There was some noisy confusion about how to organize because a drummer was at work on the Showmobile stage . . . ."

And so it went. A newspaper reporter observed in the New York Times (August 21) that the demonstrators in Flamingo Park had created an assemblage that contained all of the traditional elements of small town American life: loose coalition government, vague parliamentary procedure, incessant town meetings, an internal security force, a hospital, food markets, newspapers, and rules determining acceptable and unacceptable behavior.

Although feelings of community within Flamingo Park were generally strong, the campsite developed an internal crime problem. Most groups selected security people to guard their tents against thefts of supplies and equipment. The VVAW accepted much of the responsibility for overall campsite security and posted guards at park gates. Fights broke out and were stopped by security forces. Drug distributors were discovered and physically thrown out of the park. Rumors reached police outside that three girls had been raped, but this could not be verified. Female demonstrators inside organized an "anti-rape" squad to protect themselves.

The "small town" atmosphere extended to the point of quick recognition of who "belonged" and who didn't. By the end of the Republican Convention, the occupants of Flamingo Park had come to think of their campsite as an inviolate sanctuary. This sentiment was so thoroughly taken for granted that - during the last hours of the last day of the Republican Convention, on the heels of all the disturbances and violations of the peace that had filled that day - when a contingent of Miami police officers entered Flamingo Park in pursuit of a group they had chased from Lincoln Mall, official observers within the park reacted to the intrusion with sincere outrage.

#### DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

YIPPIES. The first "street action" of the Democratic National Convention occurred eleven days before the official opening. On Thursday, June 29, the Yippies organized a parade from convention hall to the municipal golf course, where they hoped to camp during the conventions. Only about 100 demonstrators were on hand, but they were joined by dozens of newsmen, a handful of elderly Miami Beach residents who

supported Yippie demands for a campsite, and Miami Beach Mayor Chuck Hall, who briefly joined the parade long enough to be photographed with Jerry Rubin. It was a peaceful demonstration, intended to illustrate to the Miami Beach community that the Yippies were not violent and did not represent a threat.

During this period immediately prior to the opening of the DNC, the Yippies were probably the most effective single demonstration group. Led by individuals who had become known during the Chicago convention of 1968 (Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Stewart Alpert) the Yippies had rented a five-room office suite near convention hall for the summer and were involved in negotiations with police and community groups. Hoffman and Rubin had become active in the Miami area as early as May 13, when they spoke at a University of Miami rally urging students to remain in town for the summer to demonstrate at the conventions. When the progress of the Democratic primary elections indicated that the liberal candidate, Senator McGovern, might win the nomination, the Yippies endorsed McGovern and announced on June 16 that their scheduled protest marches during the Democratic Convention would be cancelled. Abbie Hoffman was quoted as saying, "We don't want street riots in Miami. If we're 5,000 running through the streets screaming, we'll only hurt McGovern." They called off their mass demonstrations, but the Yippies remained organized and continued to participate as members of the Miami Conventions Coalition (MCC).

The Yippies were particularly interested in forming an alliance between the young demonstrators and the not-so-well-off elderly residents of Miami Beach. To that end, Yippies sponsored a picnic in Lummus Park on Sunday, July 2, where they served 100 watermelons, peanuts and orange juice to elderly Miami Beach residents. Speeches at the picnic (organized by Jeff Nightbyrd) emphasized the advantages of an alliance uniting the wisdom of age with the energy of youth. With this same goal in mind, Yippies organized a demonstration at La Gorce Country Club on July 6 to protest alleged discrimination against Jews and other minorities. The demonstration consisted of a peaceful picket line involving both young and old demonstrators.

With the arrival of the black demonstration groups on the scene, Yippie influence became less prominent. Yippie leadership tended to be exercised within the MCC umbrella. During the Democratic Convention the Yippie role was probably correctly analyzed by Norman Mailer, who wrote in his Life magazine account: "Their role in this convention was small if McGovern were nominated; once he was stopped, they would be catalytic agents to thousands of furious young sympathizers . . ." During the Republican Convention, Yippie leaders functioned in close cooperation with the People's Coalition for Peace & Justice, led by Rennie Davis and others.

BLACK GROUPS. Black demonstration groups dominated much of the protest activity during the early part of the Democratic Convention.



SCLC commanded a position of respect based on its accomplishments while under the direction of Martin Luther King, and SCLC's role as "landlord" of the Flamingo Park campsite guaranteed the organization an influential role. SCLC, however, was going through a difficult period. The organization was said to be suffering from dwindling financial contributions and quite a lot of division within its rank. The central demonstration sponsored entirely by SCLC - the Resurrection City II encampment - proved to be disappointing. Instead of 400 campers expected from the Deep South states, Resurrection City II materialized as 88 pup tents, about the size of two Boy Scout troops. Although large enough and sufficiently well organized to maintain order in Flamingo Park, SCLC was frequently upstaged by other black groups during actual demonstrations.

Recent defections from SCLC had dispersed the once consolidated black leadership. During 1970 Rev. Andrew Young, SCLC executive vice president, left to run for Congressman in Atlanta. Although unsuccessful, he remained an influential force outside of SCLC. The national field coordinator for SCLC, Hosea Williams, had taken an indefinite leave of absence during 1971 to lead a statewide organization in Georgia. The most spectacular defection was that of Jesse Jackson, who resigned from SCLC in December, 1971, to lead his own organization in Chicago. During the Democratic Convention, Jackson would be inside convention hall as a voting delegate. Outside the hall, the most notable black groups other than SCLC were the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) under the leadership of George Wiley, and the National Tenants Organization (NTO) led by Jesse Gray. Neither of these two groups were very interested in arousing sympathetic "public opinion" through convention-related publicity. Instead, they hoped to utilize demonstrations as a direct "lobbying" technique to achieve greater influence over the outcomes of the convention itself.

The weekend before the official opening of the Democratic Convention was notably dominated by black demonstration groups. On Friday morning, July 7, approximately 150 representatives of the major black groups forced their way into a closed meeting of the Democratic Arrangements Committee at the Fontainebleau Hotel. Leaders at the demonstration demanded 750 seats inside the convention hall for their constituency. Demonstrators occupied the stage, making it impossible for the official committee meeting to continue. Finally, Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence O'Brien met with demonstration leaders and formed a committee to continue the negotiations.

On Saturday, a parade led by NWRO entered the convention grounds through an unguarded gate and physically occupied seats inside the convention hall. The convention hall at that time was supposed to be guarded by the Andy Frain Agency. Again, demands were made for 750 seats during the convention. After an hour or so of speeches, including an appearance by Chuck Hall, Mayor of Miami Beach, the demonstrating group peacefully left the convention grounds. On Sunday, July 9, the



combined black groups sponsored an all day rally in a northwest Miami park. Crowds were estimated at 1,500 to 2,000. Speakers urged local blacks to attend a mass rally scheduled to take place on the next night.

On Monday night, while the first session of the Democratic National Convention was in progress, a mass rally sponsored jointly by SCLC, NWRO and NTO was held on Washington Avenue. Speeches were made by several black leaders, most of whom were advocating increased welfare support and an end to discrimination in jobs and housing. In all, supported by other groups demonstrating at the convention, the rally attracted approximately 2,500 persons. This action represented the high point of influence by black organizations during the political conventions. From this point onward, other groups tended to gain importance at the expense of the early leadership role achieved by SCLC, NTO, and NWRO.

Like the Yippies, NWRO had endorsed the candidacy of George McGovern. As the convention progressed and Senator McGovern emerged as the victorious candidate, many of the blacks felt that there was little left to be achieved by demonstrations. Of course, both Senator Humphrey and Rep. Shirley Chisholm had strong supporters among blacks at the convention, but Senator McGovern proved to be an acceptable alternative. Throughout the Democratic Convention, the black groups were recognized as being better able to muster large crowds, but the emphasis of the action was always peaceful protest. The black groups seemed unlikely to participate in any violent confrontations, despite urging from other groups sharing the streets.

This point was clearly made on that first Monday night. As the combined rally drew to a close, Zippies and SDS demonstrators had begun attempts to force open locked gates in front of convention hall on Washington Avenue. With the potential for violent confrontation rapidly increasing, leaders of the rally ended their speeches and SCLC marshalls circulated through the crowd urging people to return to Flamingo Park. A few minutes later, when the assaulting group actually succeeded in ripping down a portion of the fence on 17th Street, most of the black demonstrators were already marching away from convention hall.

VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS. Although the level of demonstration activity during the Democratic Convention was profoundly influenced by the successful candidacy of Senator McGovern, some groups continued to foment actions that brought them dangerously close to direct confrontation with police. Two groups came to be recognized as possessing a higher than average potential for violence. These were the Zippies and the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

The Zippies were a young organization, having come into being as a result of disagreement within the Youth International Party, particularly in reaction to growing disaffection with Yippie leaders Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, whom the Zippies described as "aging youth leaders." Zippies represented former YIP factions from New York, Chicago, and

Madison, Wisconsin. They were led by Dana Beal and Tom Forcade. Zippies had formally withdrawn from YIP when Hoffman and Rubin announced their support for Senator McGovern. Politically the Zippies were anarchists. "Zippies support no living presidential candidate," said a Zippie publication. "Our candidate is a rock."

The Zippies injected a unique brand of free-wheeling humor into the convention experience. They baited the police, downgraded symbols of American tradition, and generally went about looking for trouble in the spirit of so many Katzenjammer Kids oddly infused with a fuzzy sort of idealism. The number of Zippies in Miami Beach probably never exceeded 200, but their antics were always well publicized and they exerted considerable influence in shaping the overall tone of convention demonstrations.

The Zippies made headlines early. On June 23, one of their members in attendance at the City Council meeting - which ended with a 5-2 vote against providing a campsite - expressed his displeasure at the decision by throwing a pumpkin pie at one of the City Councilmen. The individual was promptly arrested and a trial was set for July 10, the first day of the Democratic Convention. When the trial date arrived, a confrontation was avoided by postponing it. A later trial produced a jail sentence.

From the beginning, the Zippies did not fit in well with larger demonstration groups. The first scheduled Zippie demonstration was a "smoke-in" on Sunday, July 9, at Flamingo Park intended to dramatize the need for more lenient marijuana regulation. The major organizations (SCLC, VVAW and Yippies) informed the Zippies that the "smoke-in" would not be permitted because it detracted from more important issues. Zippies held their demonstration anyway, but it was pointedly ignored by other demonstrators. Reaction to this snub led the Zippies to inject the "pot issue" into virtually every other demonstration where they were present. They would characteristically do this by openly making and smoking "marijuana" cigarettes in full view of television cameras and police officers. Many of these displays involved smoking leaves, twigs, and other substances to simulate marijuana smoking.

Zippies repeatedly ignored the Flamingo Park rules against nude bathing in the second-deck public pool. They insisted on flying the American flag at half mast and upside down although this action clearly upset police officers and spectators. During the Republican Convention Zippie activity included a "nude-in", at which several persons removed their clothes, and a "piss-in", which involved splashing urine on such symbols as a flag and a Bible. Throughout the two conventions, the Zippies proved themselves to be relatively adroit manipulators of symbols in their protest actions. Much of their protest was either expressed in easily understood symbols - such as the Wallace wheelchair episode and the "All-Right-Turn McGovern March" - or it attacked establishment symbols by exhibiting public disrespect for the flag and other venerated objects. The humor

injected into their protests undoubtedly strengthened the impact of their deeds. During the Republican Convention the Zippies also, almost accidentally, became the first demonstration group to experience mass arrests.


SDS, like the Zippies, was a relatively small group, probably numbering no more than 150 persons at any one time during the conventions. SDS consisted for the most part of college students of a radical political persuasion who used public demonstrations to draw attention to perceived inequities and exploitation in American life. Among SDS members were numerous individuals who were willing to risk violent confrontation for the sake of making this point.

The first confrontation between masses of demonstrators and the police occurred on Sunday night, July 9, at the Playboy Plaza hotel. The demonstration was led by SDS. Beginning at 6:40 p. m. demonstrators picketed in front of the hotel and heckled guests arriving at a pre-convention cocktail party for influential Democrats. During the next hour, the situation grew progressively more unruly, until demonstrators were attempting to physically restrain guests from entering the hotel and were pounding on automobiles as they entered the hotel driveway. These actions drew an immediate police response. Prisoner vans were positioned on Collins Avenue, and a Florida Highway Patrol task force was used to move demonstrators away from the hotel entrance. Implementation of mass arrest procedures were imminent when the demonstration suddenly began to disintegrate. Participants were permitted to drift away from the hotel as the demonstration broke up.

On Monday night, it was SDS that emerged with a leadership credit for ripping down a section of fence at convention hall after the rally sponsored by the black coalition. SDS leaders were prominent among those who repeatedly shook locked gates and sections of fence, apparently testing the police defenses. A section of fence on 17th Street between gates 9X and 10X, approximately 45 feet in length, fell to the ground as crowds pulled on it. The hole was immediately filled by a newly arrived FHP task force, and no attempt was made to rush the convention complex through the breach. This downing of the fence upset police and led to an immediate reappraisal and reassignment on the next day of convention perimeter responsibilities. Among demonstration groups, SDS added to its growing reputation for leadership in the streets.

Actually, the fence was never intended to be more than a demarcation line, separating areas where demonstrations were permitted from areas where they were not. It was not particularly strong. The downing of the fence seems to have been more accidental than planned. Chief Pomerance remarked immediately after the incident, "I think they were as surprised as we were." Later, an underground publication reported an interview with the SDS member from Columbus, Ohio, who had been identified as the leader of the group. "Listen," he said, "those people had never torn a fence down before in their lives. No shit. They started








shaking the fence, and then suddenly it fell down and everybody jumped back, like 'Oh God, we broke it!'"

On Tuesday, the second day of the Democratic Convention, SDS remained active by attempting to disrupt a fashion show at the Americana Hotel which was attended by wives of prominent Democrats. Picketing took place outside the hotel, and two women infiltrated the show itself where they harangued those present until removed by police officers. On Wednesday, the lobby of the Doral Hotel - McGovern headquarters - was occupied for most of the day by demonstrators from several groups who were upset about statements made by McGovern pertaining to Southeast Asia. McGovern had mentioned that as president he would retain a military force in Thailand. This led to confusion and anger among protesters who perceived McGovern as a pacifist candidate. It is unclear who actually first thought of the Doral Hotel demonstrations. VVAW, SDS and other groups were involved. Again, however, SDS exhibited its ability to "take over" once it became active in the field. By the time that Senator McGovern spoke to the crowd in the lobby at 8:30 p. m., SDS was in control of the demonstration.

To some extent this capability to take over other demonstrations was aided by a simple advantage in equipment. SDS possessed a portable bullhorn and amplifier that was more powerful than that used by other groups. Quite literally, the voice of SDS was heard above that of others. During most of its street actions, SDS was led by a thin, energetic, sharp tongued girl named Marty Riefe. Throughout the course of a picketing action, for instance, her strident voice could be heard leading the crowd in a variety of chants and slogans. When that same voice gave occasional commands, the crowd followed.

Although the equipment advantage was significant, it should also be noted that SDS leaders remained active throughout the convention, they lived in Flamingo Park with other campers, and directly participated in much of the street action. Leaders of other groups were often notably absent from the streets. Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin lived at the Albion Hotel, avoiding Flamingo Park hardships. Many of the "big guns" of the protest movement also spent much of their time meeting with police, the press, or delegates inside convention hall. This often left leadership in the streets in the hands of such groups as the Zippies and SDS.

OTHER DEMONSTRATORS. Several additional groups participated in demonstrations during the Democratic Convention. The VVAW and PCPJ conducted limited activities - such as parades and construction of a symbolic sand dike on Washington Avenue to dramatize bombing of dikes in Vietnam - but saved their greatest efforts for the Republican Convention. Other groups, such as the Women's Coalition, led an occasional march or lobbied at committee meetings but remained generally in the background of demonstration activity. Some smaller groups, such as the Gay Activists and the "Jesus Freaks" were often in the forefront of convention publicity but never achieved a position of leadership within the demonstration process.



## DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

The Republican Convention got under way in a manner reminiscent of the Democratic affair. It was preceded by long debates over the campsite issue; minor demonstrations occurred up to a week before the convention began; and the first major confrontation involved picketing of the Fontainebleau Hotel led by SDS during a convention-eve party for influential Republicans.

The campsite permit had not been approved by the City Council until August 14. Already campers were in the Miami Beach area attempting to use the facility at Flamingo Park. Temporary accommodations for demonstrators were located for them by the Chief of Police at Community Church, Miami Beach. The campsite permit was issued to Religious and Community Leaders Concerned. (More detailed information about RCLC is contained in Chapter 9.)

The demonstration groups planning major activities during the Republican Convention differed from those that had been most active during the Democratic Convention. The black groups, for instance, had pragmatically decided that it would be futile to attempt to influence the outcome of the Republican Convention. Therefore, SCLC, NWRO, and NTO were not participating as demonstration groups. Leading roles during the Republican Convention went instead to anti-war groups and their supporters. Demonstration leadership was prominently exhibited by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). As before, the Zippies, SDS, Gay Activists and other demonstrating groups were present. A small contingent representing the National Socialist White People's Party (formerly the American Nazi Party) was also present in the area, as were two small pro-Nixon groups that were suspected of being financed and supervised by the Republican Party. These latter would include NEGRO, representing blacks for Nixon, and a group calling itself Vietnam Veterans for the Re-Election of President Nixon. As before, much of the administration and decision making affecting the demonstration groups was theoretically controlled by a leadership coalition.

CUBAN GROUPS. Organizations representing segments of Miami's Cuban population had also formed a temporary coalition for the purpose of demonstrating their point of view at the conventions. During the Democratic Convention, the Cubans had paraded in the vicinity of convention hall on the second evening. The Cuban parade and demonstration had been kept separate from a parade by Flamingo Park residents only by alert action on the part of police officers and volunteer parade marshalls. The Cubans planned a similar parade and demonstration to take place on the first evening of the RNC. This would place the Cubans at convention hall at the same time that a large rally was planned there by Flamingo Park groups, to whom they were adamantly opposed.



In response to the anticipated arrival of anti-establishment demonstrators the various Cuban groups began to form a coalition as early as May 18. At that time, a meeting of the Cuban leadership at the Dupont Plaza Hotel resulted in a warning that the Cuban community might stage counter-demonstrations at the convention. It was expected that anti-war demonstrations would spark hostile reactions from the fanatically anti-communist Cuban exiles. On May 24, Cuban leaders met with Chief Garmire, Chief Pomerance, and Robert Sims, director of the Miami Community Relations Board. The Cubans announced that they intended to demonstrate "in favor of the freedom of our enslaved country." It was clear that the Cubans did not want to provoke trouble with anti-war demonstrators, but they fully expected trouble to occur. A Cuban attorney told Chief Pomerance, "It is not the police that we fear. We feel we will be provoked by professional agitators who will want to clash with us to make us look as the aggressors."

At about this same time leaders of anti-war groups, who were then becoming involved in preliminary negotiations with the police, voiced similar worries about encountering the Cubans. A "Miami Survival Manual" that had been distributed by groups belonging to the Miami Conventions Coalition contained the following passage: "There are 150,000 Cubans living in Miami and Miami Beach. Frankly, we are not allies with most of the Cubans . . . . The responsible members of the Cuban community don't want trouble with us. They believe that we don't want violence. And boy, do we ever not want violence with the Cubans. Let's face it, people, they'd cream us and the local gentry would be only too glad to see them do it." As the conventions approached, the phrase often used by Cubans to describe non-delegates was "criminal communist element."

WOMEN'S GROUPS. The first day of the Republican National Convention was planned by demonstration leaders to highlight the theme: "Women In Revolt." This theme would be portrayed through exhibits in Flamingo Park, guerrilla theater in front of hotels, a parade to convention hall, and a rally on Washington Avenue during the afternoon. A featured speaker at the women's rally was actress Jane Fonda, who had recently returned from a trip to North Vietnam. Because of pressure generated from their own female membership, virtually all demonstration groups felt obligated to support the women's activities. The women's activities were well planned and executed, but they tended to be upstaged by other events that pushed them into the background. Particularly at the Republican Convention, the anti-war theme appeared to overwhelm issues that were important to women's groups.

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR. At 2 p. m. on Monday afternoon approximately 800 persons led by the VVAW marched from Flamingo Park to Miami Beach High School, where a National Guard unit was quartered. The Guardsmen remained inside the school as demonstrators occupied a field in front of the building and proceeded to demonstrate with chants, jeers and guerrilla theater. The skits performed by the demonstrators emphasized the horrors and hypocrisy of war and



culminated in appeals for the Guardsmen to renounce their military leaders and join the ranks of the demonstrators. The Guard took no action except to apprehend seven individuals who had climbed onto the roof of the school. The VVAW demonstration was well organized, disciplined and - although it did not achieve the exaggerated goal of persuading Guardsmen to mutiny - it was an effective display of anti-war sentiment and demonstrator strength.

Throughout both the Democratic and Republican conventions, the characteristic that set VVAW apart from all others was its discipline. The membership of the organization consisted of Vietnam veterans who had come to oppose the war as a result of their own involvement in it. Many police officers, as well as other demonstrators, afforded the VVAW a certain amount of respect because of their personal military experiences. Some of the leaders in the movement had been severely wounded during their war. During demonstrations, VVAW members often wore remnants of old uniforms which gave them the appearance of a bedraggled, defeated army.

Although its membership was better united than most other groups demonstrating in Miami Beach, the VVAW was undergoing a leadership crisis at the time of the conventions. On July 13, six members of VVAW had been indicted by a federal grand jury in Tallahassee on charges of conspiring to cause riots during the Republican Convention by using fire bombs, automatic weapons and slingshot propelled fireworks. The indictments included one for the Southeast Regional Coordinator for VVAW. A local Miami coordinator also named in the indictments temporarily appeared to be a witness for the state, then was further discredited by admissions that he had become a drug addict. The national VVAW leadership took measures to simultaneously defend their indicted members while removing them from positions of responsibility and assuring that the alleged violence did not occur. VVAW president Bruce Farrell and Steve DuPuy, the newly named Miami Coordinator, were in the process of tightening national control over the VVAW presence in Miami Beach as the Republican Convention began.

VVAW discipline was tested on that same Monday evening. After completion of the demonstration at Miami Beach High School, the VVAW joined the Women's Rally in progress on Washington Avenue in front of the convention center. Approximately 1,250 persons were on Washington Avenue at 6:45 p.m., ending the women's rally and preparing for the George Jackson Memorial rally, at which both Jane Fonda and Black Panther leader Bobbie Seale would speak. At that time, a group of 800 Cubans began a march that was routed to take them directly through the Washington Avenue demonstration area.

Once again, a violent confrontation was narrowly avoided by alert police parade control assisted by numbers of volunteer marshalls provided by demonstrator and intervenor groups. (A detailed explanation of actions taken to reroute the Cuban parade while in progress and placement of

volunteer marshalls who kept the two groups separated is provided in chapters 9 and 14.) The point to be made here is that at one critical area VVAW marshalls formed a line across Washington Avenue by linking arms and prevented the two groups from becoming involved in a violent confrontation.

On Tuesday, the VVAW staged a "silent march" from Flamingo Park to the Fontainebleau Hotel to dramatize the war dead. As the parade passed the convention center, marchers ignored mass arrest proceedings in progress there against the Zippies. At the Fontainebleau, the large crowd sat down in the street but did not engage in any trashing or vandalism. VVAW leaders demanded to see a presidential aide. Eventually, two VVAW leaders in wheelchairs were permitted to enter the Fontainebleau to present the organization's written demands to an obscure "Republican official." In one of the memorable scenes that came out of MBPD's policy of police accommodation to peaceful protest, one of the wheelchair leaders was personally pulled up the Fontainebleau steps by Larry Cotzin, Miami Beach Assistant Chief of Police.

With the beginnings of the massive "Street Without Joy" demonstrations on Tuesday night, the VVAW planned no further separately organized protest. VVAW members assisted PCPJ people in constructing a symbolic dike on Washington Avenue to dramatize American bombing of dikes in Vietnam. On Wednesday morning VVAW leaders announced in Flamingo Park that they would leave Miami Beach by the afternoon in order to be present in Gainesville for the opening of the trial against their indicted members. Individual VVAW members remained to demonstrate with other organizations on the last day. Later, when the mass demonstrations had deteriorated into chaotic vandalism, trashing, gassing and arrests, VVAW members participated in one last parade from the heavily gassed convention center to the Doral Hotel, where many of them submitted to a negotiated mass arrest. This last gesture by VVAW, like so many others made by them during the two conventions, dramatized their organizational ability and the internal discipline which separated them from other demonstration groups that shared the same anti-war goals.

SDS AND ZIPPIES. On Tuesday, August 22, demonstrators of SDS and Zippies inadvertently cooperated to produce the first mass arrest of the convention summer. SDS began the activity with a parade from Flamingo Park to the Fontainebleau at 10 a. m., followed by demonstrations outside the hotel that rapidly became disorderly. Demonstrators began stopping traffic, vandalizing vehicles and attempting to physically restrain pedestrian guests who were arriving for a Republican "Women of Achievement Brunch."

Police lines moved the demonstrators south on Collins Avenue away from the hotel where the demonstration broke up into several small groups. These groups then moved slowly down Collins Avenue while participating in scattered incidents of vandalism and disorderly conduct. Shortly after 1:00 p. m., police units were ordered to Collins Avenue and

Lincoln Road to make appropriate arrests. As had frequently happened previously, just at that time the demonstration began to break up and individuals returned to Flamingo Park.

Meanwhile, a Zippie parade had left Flamingo Park at 12:50 for the convention center. The Zippies arrived in the vicinity of Washington Avenue and 19th Street at 1:20 p.m. and began making occasional forays onto 20th Street to stop traffic. Police units monitored the Zippie demonstration from positions on Dade Boulevard. At 1:37 a Zippie girl climbed a lamp post and set fire to a decorative red, white and blue bunting as part of the protest action. Immediately, police units - already aroused by the earlier disorders and positioned to make arrests - swooped down on the Zippies in 36 Florida Highway Patrol vehicles traveling bumper to bumper. The entire demonstration group was trapped between police lines and the convention fence, and mass arrest procedures were initiated. 212 were arrested.

PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE (PCPJ). Many of the massive anti-war demonstrations planned for the Republican Convention had been developed by PCPJ, functioning as an influential part of the Miami Conventions Coalition, which included Yippies and other movement groups. PCPJ was led by individuals whose movement credentials preceded Chicago '68, such as Rennie Davis and Dave Dellinger. Although strong in leadership, PCPJ had no real membership since its members were simultaneously members of other groups.

PCPJ had been instrumental in developing the Manual for the Republican Convention. This was a printed handbook for mass demonstration, patterned after the May Day Manual which had been used in Washington, D. C., by anti-war protesters in 1971. The Manual for the Republican Convention was distributed in limited quantities in advance of the convention. It outlined demonstration plans for the entire three-day convention and included maps and explanations of tactics. A second publication, the Revised Manual for the Republican Convention, was distributed in Miami Beach during the convention. It named specific times and places to assemble for demonstration, such as the Street Without Joy demonstration on Tuesday night, and it specified exact march routes and seven locations for planned civil disobedience on Wednesday night. These publications were high quality productions requiring considerable editorial skill and financial support. They provided demonstrators with printed planning materials that were generally superior to those available to police patrolmen.

Tuesday night's anti-war protest began with a "March Against Murder" involving large numbers of costumed and painted demonstrators marching from Flamingo Park to the convention center. A rented elephant and floats participated in this parade. As the marchers proceeded around the convention fence, individuals dropped off along the way until the entire convention area was encircled by a ring of silent demonstrators. A series of guerrilla theater skits followed on Washington Avenue, and finally a "Gauntlet of Shame" was formed at the major access gates where delegates



were subjected to verbal abuse as they entered the hall. Sporadically, certain groups of demonstrators attempted to block gates or intersections by sitting or lying down in front of them. It was necessary for police to effect sweeping maneuvers on both Meridian Avenue and 17th Street in order to keep gates clear for arriving delegates. Although these actions resulted in numerous individual arrests, no mass arrest was effected on Tuesday night.

On Wednesday, the manual called for an all out effort to block access to convention hall by voluntarily submitting to arrest while forming a human barricade in front of the gates. The purpose was to create the spectacle of Richard Nixon scheduled to make his acceptance speech to an empty convention hall. Lacking that, demonstrators would be satisfied with a spectacle of Richard Nixon making his acceptance speech inside a hall ringed by military troops. In the event that sit-downs proved to be unworkable, the manual suggested a vaguely defined alternative known as "mobile civil disobedience." The Revised Manual outlined the following strategy:

"In both mobile and stationary civil disobedience, people are expected to arrive at their targets through the organization of affinity groups. These are small groups of your friends, collectives or communes, numbering from 5 to 30 . . . .

"The object of stationary civil disobedience will be to encircle the convention hall of Meridian Avenue and 17th Street. This will be accomplished by people getting as near to the access road and gates on these two roads and sitting down and allowing themselves to be arrested (a process which is definitely obstructive and time consuming) . . . .

"People who engage in mobile civil disobedience complement the efforts of those engaged in the sit-down. While the sit-downs will be aimed at the streets west and south of the convention hall, mobile civil disobedience will occur only north and northeast of the convention . . . .


"The basic idea is to flood each of the four areas with hundreds of people and by our very presence to disrupt the flow of delegate buses and vehicles. Of course, we will be moving around in the area but delegate traffic should not be allowed to pass through the key intersections. As a last resort, we recommend that people sit down and not move to prevent buses from making it through any of the key intersections.

"If our efforts in mobile civil disobedience are frustrated in one way or another, affinity groups should fall back to the area immediately around the convention hall and either join the stationary sit-ins or the dike-building."

The events of Tuesday night convinced police commanders that demonstrators might possibly be able to implement these plans unless countered by new police action. The Tuesday night march and demonstrations placed about 3,000 persons on the streets outside convention hall in







a more or less unified demonstration. Unlike virtually all previous activities, the Street Without Joy and Gauntlet of Shame demonstrations had the effect of unifying the demonstrators for a common purpose. For the first time, a degree of discipline and responsiveness to mass leadership was evident.

At the same time, the Tuesday night activities made it clear that the leaders with whom the police had been negotiating could not fully control or guarantee the conduct of demonstrators in the streets. The nearly successful attempts to block gates on Tuesday night had not been in the script. The forays by demonstrators onto the major boulevards to briefly halt traffic had not been scheduled until the next night. Incidental trash-ing, vandalism and attempts to physically assault delegates had been specifically prohibited by the leaders, but they took place.

Police commanders have described subsequent police action as being generated by concern over decreasing control by demonstration leaders. Officers on the fence recall their own concerns over an apparently increasing ability to muster unified masses of dissidents. Recognizing that lack of control could be dangerous, it was determined by police leaders to implement a contingency plan on Wednesday which barricaded the convention center with derelict busses and essentially "cut the island in two" with police barricades. This combined action guaranteed that convention gates could not be blocked and that avenues for delegate traffic would be relatively well protected. (Details of the bus barricade and related police movements are described in Chapter 14.)

The presence of the bus barricade at convention hall meant that plans for stationary civil disobedience would probably not be effective. A greater emphasis was shifted to "mobile civil disobedience," which was essentially an attempt to disrupt transportation of delegates to convention hall by creating a large number of delaying incidents at key intersections. When during the afternoon it became clear that police had divided the island and could contain the demonstrators in its southern half, the top leaders admitted defeat, conceding that their plans to delay or halt convention proceedings could not be implemented. Rennie Davis and others made statements disavowing responsibility for actions in the street that would result from the police "betrayal."

The demonstrations proceeded under their own momentum. Small "affinity groups" attempted to carry out the plan despite police moves that had destroyed key elements of the strategy. Unable to block traffic at the key intersections designated, bands of demonstrators proceeded to block traffic less effectively elsewhere. Mass arrests began on Collins Avenue. Unable to move large numbers of persons north of the convention hall for passive blocking actions, small groups infiltrated the area and participated in disruptive vandalism. Perhaps most seriously, being unable to "fall back to the area immediately around the convention hall" as planned in the Manual (because of frequent gassing of the area by police), the mass of demonstrators stayed dispersed and on the run throughout the southern half



of Miami Beach. Control by demonstration leaders over protest activity completely broke down.

Shortly before 9:00 p. m., Dave Dellinger, speaking from the stage at the Washington Avenue demonstration area, exhorted all demonstrators in the convention hall area to join the VVAW for one last, peaceful march to the Doral Hotel (headquarters of the Committee to Re-Elect the President). A negotiated mass arrest would take place there for those who wanted to make a gesture of protest. The demonstrators left the convention area, some to join the Doral march, others merely to flee from repeated gassings of that area. When President Nixon did make his acceptance speech, the convention hall was full and it was the demonstration area outside that was empty.

## EVALUATIONS AND COMMENTS

Measured against their own expressed goals, the convention related demonstrations were obvious failures. Not one demonstrating group was able to muster anywhere near the number of participants they had predicted. Not one significant government policy was changed in direct reaction to a demonstration. Demands made by demonstrators were systematically refused, ranging all the way from pre-Democratic convention efforts by SCLC and NWRO to obtain 750 seats in the hall to demands by the VVAW to see a presidential aide at the Fontainebleau. Delegates were not deterred from entering convention hall on the last night of the Republican convention. On the other hand, it may not be fair to evaluate demonstration performance in such rigid terms. Many of the stated goals relating to numbers of participants and specific targets appear to have represented more hopes and ideals than true intentions. To say that either the demonstrators or the police failed to realize their fondest hopes is not to say that they failed. We might wonder instead why so many came that did, or that they called attention to so many diverse issues, or that they produced so many arrests, or remained peaceful as long as they did. Success could also be measured in those terms. While considering these more reasonable evaluators of success, we should keep in mind that many of the demonstrators tended to judge themselves in extreme terms. "We failed," said one protester, "because we didn't end the war."

It has been estimated that less than 2,500 persons from out of state participated in the Chicago activity in 1968. It seems probable that at least that many traveled to Miami Beach in 1972, and they traveled greater distances. The Chicago confrontations resulted in 641 arrests. In Miami Beach the arrest total during the Republican convention reached 1,194 (although a large percentage were relatively mild "negotiated" arrests). Instead of merely engaging in violent street confrontations, the demonstrators were able to call attention to an incredibly diverse lot of issues while continuing to make a powerful, unified anti-war effort. Despite the deteriorating events of the last day and a half, scores of conflicts and confrontations had been avoided through negotiation and reasonable compromise.



POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION. Much of the success achieved by demonstration groups was made possible because of the policy of accommodation for peaceful demonstration which had been adopted by the Miami Beach Police Department. By remaining sensitive to the need for protection of the rights of demonstrators as well as those of delegates and community residents, the MBPD made an enormous contribution toward guaranteeing a degree of "success" for demonstration groups participating at the conventions.

The accommodation policy includes assets for both demonstrators and police. The police, obviously, gain a certain amount of information and control. Without the help of the police department, however, certain key goals of demonstration leaders could not be achieved. The campsite permits, for instance, would almost certainly not have been granted for Flamingo Park. With police assistance, a demonstration leader can obtain certain comforts that might not otherwise be available, such as temporary housing for early campers after the park is opened. Unwanted confrontations with other groups, like the Cubans, can be avoided. The leader who can achieve these goals and provide such comforts enhances his own stature among followers. The simple fact (when it is publicized) that a demonstration leader is "negotiating" with the Chief of Police grants a certain amount of flattering importance to members of the group so represented. In short, the policy of accommodation virtually guarantees a demonstration leader some degree of personal success. The pressure on a leader to accept the accommodation option includes the reasonable assumption that if one leader does not accept the advantages of accommodation, perhaps a rival will.

Through the policy of accommodation and cooperation, the police make it possible to consolidate potential opposition under known leadership and maintain open communications with that leadership. This is a far better situation than attempting to anticipate the actions of several intransigent small groups.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS EFFORTS. Contact with demonstration leaders and continued communications with them were accomplished in Miami Beach by community relations efforts. The appearance of police officers at planning meetings involving demonstration leaders eventually created a "human" image of the officer, i. e. as distinguished from a purely job-related image. One of the outcomes of this long involvement by the community relations officer was the establishment of personal relationships with many of the demonstrators and a certain amount of mutual trust. This working relationship between police and demonstrators proved its worth on several occasions, most notably when there was a need to utilize civilian marshalls to prevent violent confrontations.

Apparently, the value of such "humanizing" was also recognized by some demonstrators, most notably the VVAW. During the interim period between the Democratic and Republican conventions, the Miami Beach community relations officer was approached by VVAW leaders who

suggested a softball game between their members and Miami Beach police officers. The suggestion was quickly accepted and the game was played without publicity. No one kept score. The police and VVAW henceforth tended to regard each other differently, after having been permitted to see each other in roles other than those centered on convention conflict.

EMERGING LEADERS. Part of the difficulty of pursuing a policy of accommodation with demonstration leaders is inherent in the nature of demonstration groups. The leadership hierarchy is always fluid, often under attack from within, and has no legal or semi-official authority that characterizes establishment group leaders. In a sense, the movement leader is always campaigning for office. He is dependent on his own personality, a few personal loyalties, and an ability to achieve what the group wants. Through accommodation, the police automatically strengthen the position of the individual with whom they negotiate, but the process of negotiation cannot restrain a new group of leaders from emerging from the ranks. In fact, while encouraging the "top" leaders to spend time with establishment figures, the opportunity is provided for a new leadership to emerge during action on the streets. No amount of compromise with Yippie leaders, for instance, could have turned around the Zippie rebellion. Nor could hours of detailed planning with a Rennie Davis or Dave Dellinger have reduced the on-the-spot effectiveness of a Marty Riefe.

This point is not lost among those who presently lead demonstration groups. It is instructive to note that the principal demonstration leaders themselves urged police to make early mass arrests during the Republican Convention in order to discredit more radical emerging leaders whom they feared would encourage violence. When the first mass arrests were made, senior demonstration leaders reacted with relief because the action placed limits on demonstration behavior. Rocky Pomerance recalls with some humor a planning meeting in his office involving the major demonstration leaders during the Republican Convention. One of the leaders repeatedly complained about harassment from another group that was planning to heckle him during a planned rally. "She can't break up my meeting," the leader kept repeating. "But, listen," Chief Pomerance laughed, "we call that free speech." The unsmiling demonstrator shot back, "I don't care. She can't break up my meeting."

Of course, we are confronted here with the difficult problem of defining acceptable behavior for a successful revolutionary. Radical protest often ends with the beginnings of a fresh establishment. Successful protesters very often end by imitating much of the behavior of their former antagonists simply because their new position makes the old behavior seem more practical. For example, shortly after the shooting of Governor Wallace on May 15, Abbie Hoffman began to fear for his personal safety. The Yippie leader went so far as to request an armed bodyguard from the police. He was told that he would have to apply for a license in a routine manner, and the request was subsequently dropped. Such changes in attitude, however, do not go unnoticed by rival leaders within the demonstration group.

TONE OF DEMONSTRATION. One concluding observation should be made about the overall tone of the demonstrations. This was not another Chicago. Nor was it another May Day. The demonstrators in Miami Beach in the summer of 1972 were not angry, bitter militants. They were not fired with any idealistic lust to do battle with establishment types. In fact, recalling the published warnings about the Cubans "creaming" them, they seemed not very eager to do battle with anyone. Instead, the demonstrators who came to Miami Beach did so for two general purposes: (1) to publicize a point of view, and (2) to be part of the show.

The points of view brought to Miami Beach included strong feelings about a large number of international and domestic issues. Generally speaking, the demonstrators attempted to influence events by gaining publicity for their opinions. They were, in other words, exhibitionists rather than revolutionaries. The revolutionary comes into a situation fired with a Messianic fervor that enables him to suffer discomfort and pain for the sake of his ideals. Those who came to Miami Beach wanted to be seen and heard, but no one wanted to risk getting hurt.

The large number of arrests were handled smoothly by the police and the courts partly with the tacit help of the demonstrators. Unlike May Day, 1971, the demonstrators in Miami Beach never launched any concerted attack on the criminal justice system itself. When a dispersal order was given preliminary to initiating mass arrests, all but 250 of a crowd of 1,000 would choose to leave the scene rather than be arrested. Once inside the jail, arrested demonstrators cooperated fully with all of the measures designed to keep them moving quickly through the system. Never at any time did they directly attack the system or attempt to bring it to a halt through passive resistance.

Dr. Seymour Gelber, acting as legal aide to Chief Pomerance, made the following observation on the second day of the Republican convention, which generally sums up this latter point: "They're street people," Gelber said, "and they're here because it's an event. Politics is incidental. They don't have the discipline or the motivations the so-called leadership would like to see. That's what makes it so different from the scene four years ago in Chicago."

The tone of police response at the Miami Beach conventions also differed from that in Chicago in 1968. Most notably, it appears that the police in 1972 never lost sight of the fact that they were dealing with demonstrations, i. e. with public exhibitions that did not necessarily have to deteriorate into violent confrontation with the police. There is some reason to believe that police treatment of individuals as "demonstrators" prompted them to respond to these expectations by living up to the relatively peaceful role of demonstrators. A police policy that branded all demonstrators as collective "trouble makers" may have produced markedly different results.



Throughout the convention experience, police also seemed able to make distinctions among the various groups and individuals who participated in demonstration activity. In other words, they remained able to make intelligent distinctions between the "good guys" and the "bad guys," differentiating - at the level of police response to a situation - between those who were merely making a symbolic protest and those who could become dangerous to other persons. This continued ability to differentiate between groups and to treat individual demonstrators as reasonable human beings proved to be a valuable asset during convention law enforcement.

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## INTERVENING THIRD PARTY GROUPS

Very early in the convention planning process, Chief Pomerance determined that he would follow a course that would seek to remove the police as an abrasive factor during the political conventions. Many of the key prerequisites for achieving that goal were to be found in the manner in which the police used the resources made available to them by intervening third party groups.

The term "intervening third party groups" is admittedly less than perfect. It refers to those groups, representing either elements of the local Miami area population or nationally based organizations, who wanted to participate in some helpful way at the 1972 conventions in order to help assure that they were not conducted in the same environment of tension and hostility that had emerged during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Their designation as "third party" groups suggests an oversimplified version of the conventions as a two-part contest between police and demonstrators into which the "third party" buffer is inserted. In fact, the convention experience involved numerous groups with diverse goals, including the news media, the political delegates, and other special interest groups that could be described as competing with other groups. Nonetheless, despite this flaw, the term "intervening third party groups" does effectively differentiate between the intervenors and the demonstrators while suggesting the neutral "buffer" role that most of them envisioned for themselves.

Like the demonstration groups attending the conventions, the intervening third party groups were numerous, had diverse political and social goals, and preferred to operate independently, although they eventually accepted a loose coalition leadership which was largely dependent

on police cooperation for its effectiveness. Also like the demonstrators, the role of various intervening groups changed as time passed. Some organizations accepted far more leadership responsibility than they had originally intended, while others ceased to function entirely.

As the two conventions progressed, one of the most visible roles performed by the intervening groups was that of "observer." This relatively neutral role did not initially appeal to many members of intervening third party groups who sought a more "active" involvement in the convention process. The leadership of nationally based organizations consistently supported the neutral "observer" role, however, and this eventually became one of the most important functions performed by the intervening third party groups.

#### NUMBER OF THIRD PARTY INTERVENORS

Because of the intense public reaction to events in Chicago in 1968, numerous church and social action groups throughout the nation were eager to involve themselves in preparations for the 1972 conventions. Many of these groups sought some role for themselves that would simultaneously support the rights of demonstrators while creating an atmosphere of restraint for both demonstrators and police. Locally, numerous church and social action groups were also eager to involve themselves in convention planning because of local fears and tensions aroused by the anticipated arrival of thousands of demonstrators into the Miami area.

The groups that sought to become involved did so for diverse and occasionally contradictory reasons. ACLU and AELE, for instance, represented opposing legal groups. Some members of the Miami Snowplow Company wanted to provide free services, including food, to demonstrators for the entire six-week period encompassing the two conventions. Another group — Operation Backbone — was organized for the express purpose of denying all public services, including a public campsite, to the demonstrators. The goals of most intervening third party groups fell somewhere between these two extremes, with the majority seeking some relatively neutral role that would create a restraining influence on events.

Some idea of the diversity of the groups involved can be gained from the following list:

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)  
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE)  
Comprehensive Health Planning Council of South Florida  
Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of  
Justice (CRS)

Dade County Alliance for Safer Cities  
Dade County Bar Association (Ombudsmen)  
Dade County Community Relations Board (CRB)  
Greater Miami Coalition, Inc.  
Miami Outreach (YMCA)  
Miami Snowplow Company  
National Association of Social Workers (NASW)  
Operation Backbone  
Religious and Community Leaders Concerned (RCLC)

It should be noted that numerous other groups participated in convention planning to the extent of sending correspondence outlining views to law enforcement leaders and local political figures. Groups that did not actively intervene in the process, however, at least to the extent of attending planning meetings, have not been recorded in this report.

In addition to the above organizations, contacts were established by the Miami Beach Police Department with such local "third parties" as church leaders and various other departments of municipal and county government, such as parks and recreation or sanitation. In these cases, the contact leading to third party involvement was initiated by the police because they recognized the potential value of having a "neutral ground" available locally. For example, during the week before the opening of both political conventions, campers repeatedly attempted to occupy Flamingo Park prematurely and were turned away by police. At the request of the police department, many of these demonstrators were provided with temporary quarters at Bethel Lutheran Church and Salem Baptist Church, both in Miami, and the Temple Menorah and Community Church in Miami Beach. The individual clergymen who provided this service were certainly involved in important third party intervention even though they did not actually initiate the contact themselves.

With reference to the overall picture of third party intervention, it is difficult to estimate at this point how many persons may have been involved in the activities of all intervening groups in Miami Beach. The number, however, was large. With reference to observers alone, one estimate made by police preliminary to the Republican Convention was in the neighborhood of 600 observers of all types on the streets.

#### RANGE OF INTERVENING THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY

Although the third party "observer" function proved to be the most visible job performed by the intervening groups (and possibly the function involving the greatest number of persons), several other activities were undertaken by third party intervenors. The range of these activities included the following:

- liaison services.
- information services.
- observer reports.
- legal advice.
- medical services.
- parade and rally marshalls.
- campsite organization.

Although some degree of labor specialization tended to develop as time passed, a great deal of duplicated effort was more characteristic. For instance, RCLC eventually became the dominant observer group, but observers remained in the field from ACLU, CRS, CRB, and others. Similarly, the YMCA Miami Outreach program placed trained youth workers on the streets to function as marshalls and liaison personnel. Nonetheless, many demonstration groups continued to provide their own marshalls and so did other third party intervenors such as the Ombudsmen, whose primary role was the provision of free legal advice.

The responsibility for maintaining contacts with intervening third party groups was assigned to the police Community Relations Section. This section was also responsible for maintaining contacts with demonstration groups and local community leaders. Chief Pomerance took an active interest in meeting with leaders of third party groups during the convention planning stages. Later, when it became necessary for the Chief to assume a greater operational role, Dr. Seymour Gelber assumed the duties of police department spokesman during meetings with intervening groups. Despite his police position, Dr. Gelber was himself something of a third-party intervenor. His academic title and position as an independent lawyer lent credibility to his dealings with third party leaders.

While leaders of intervening third party groups often were responsible for establishing initial contact with the police, it should not be assumed that the role of the police was merely one of either approving or disapproving a plan for group intervention. Often the third party group did not know exactly what job it wanted to perform. The police role then became one of actively attempting to find useful, appropriate work for the intervening group to do. Once the policy decision had been made by the police to encourage and accept assistance from intervening groups, the police task often became one of assisting the intervening group to develop its own form of intervention. Like several other aspects of law enforcement during the 1972 political conventions, this probably exceeded the traditional limits of normal police work. Within the context of the convention situation, however, the police role seemed appropriate and sensible.



An attempt to provide a detailed account of all police involvement with each intervening group would produce a chapter too voluminous to be helpful. Therefore, only selected accounts have been included here, with the understanding that many of the same patterns were repeated several times. Police interaction with third party groups occurred at two distinct phases: during planning and during the conventions themselves.

## PLANNING WITH INTERVENING GROUPS

Most of the intervening third party groups that became operational during the political conventions went through a long, difficult period of internal development months before any working relationship was established with police agencies. Problems of group organization, funding, and internal agreement on group goals often remained unresolved at the time when the police contact was made.

While intervening third party groups are described here separately (and actually preferred to operate independently) an important point to keep in mind is that the membership — and at times the leadership — of some of the most influential groups tended to overlap. Most notably within the three church-related local organizations — RCLC, YMCA, and Snowplow — the lay committee leadership of each group was often involved with more than one organization and enjoyed close working relationships with the local leadership directing other third party groups. Some information pertaining to the early development of selected groups is provided here in order to better illustrate the general nature of intervening third party groups. They were very different from the police. They had different capabilities and could not be judged fairly by the same standards of efficiency and performance. More often than not, their weaknesses were perfectly obvious to the average police officer, whereas their strengths tended to go unrecognized.

RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS CONCERNED. RCLC began as a true local effort arising from the concerns and foresight of interested civilian leaders within the Miami community. It developed specifically from actions taken by a local organization known as the Christian Community Service Agency, Inc., which functioned as an "umbrella" agency to coordinate support from six Protestant denominations for service projects within the Miami metropolitan area. During July, 1971, the executive leadership of this organization met to discuss plans for the agency's work in 1972. Agency leaders at this time included Miss Joan Gross, executive vice president of CCSA, the Reverend Jack Cassidy, minister of Metropolitan Mission of the United Church of Christ, and the Reverend August VandenBosche, executive director of the Florida Migrant Ministry and field representative of the National Council of Churches. All of these individuals later became influential leaders within RCLC.

Concerns were expressed at the July meeting about the potential impact on the community of the forthcoming Democratic National Convention and the possible involvement of local religious organizations. It was decided to circulate a letter to various organizations both locally and nationally — including Roman Catholic and Jewish organizations — expressing these concerns and suggesting a national conference or workshop to discuss possibilities for third party intervention by religious groups.

Difficulties in arranging an acceptable date for the meeting led to postponement until December 6. Even then, although all major faiths were represented by local leaders, only one national denominational staff person was present. That was the Reverend John P. Adams of the United Methodist Church, who later emerged as the national leader of RCLC. The most tangible outcome of this December 6 meeting was the formation of a steering committee. In a report prepared by Reverend Adams after the political conventions, he commented obliquely on the haphazard nature of RCLC's leadership development by noting: "The national staff person (himself) was made a part of the steering committee partially because his staff responsibility with the Board of Christian Social Concerns of the United Methodist Church had involved him in crisis intervention projects for nearly five years — and partially because he was able to attend the first meeting."

At about this same time, beginning in August, 1971, a similar program was being developed in San Diego to prepare for the anticipated Republican Convention. The Community Congress of San Diego ( a coalition of street agencies, community groups and urban ministries) had developed a task force called the August Project to develop strategies for third party intervention during the Republican Convention. The expressed goals of the San Diego group were:

1. To facilitate the delivery of needed social services before, during, and immediately following the convention in the areas of housing, food, communications, camping facilities, medical and legal aid.
2. To facilitate responsible social and political action alternatives in relating to the convention.

On January 5, the district superintendent of the Miami District of the United Methodist Church corresponded with the general secretary of the Board of Christian Social Concerns to request that Mr. Adams be made available for "as much consultation and involvement as possible." A similar letter from the superintendent of the San Diego District dated January 12, requested that Mr. Adams "be assigned to work with us if he is available." Subsequently, Mr. Adams assumed a role as consultant to the steering committees of both local organizations. He was given

permission from his Methodist Church superiors to consider the convention assignment as a top priority.

Thus was established the critical linkage between a local ad hoc committee and the resources and power of a national church organization. It was this combination that made it possible for RCLC to establish credible contacts with, for example, the Democratic National Committee, the national staffs of other church organizations, and ultimately with the Miami Beach Police Department.

During January, 1972, a meeting was arranged between RCLC leaders and the Democratic Party's Advisory Committee on Security, headed by Wes Pomeroy. Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance attended this meeting, suggesting at one point that the projected goals of the religious community should include a concern for the functioning of the political convention itself and for the rights of the delegates to perform their tasks. The outcome of this meeting was the formal recognition of three goals by RCLC:

1. The peace and stability of the greater Miami community during the conventions.
2. The right of citizens and organized groups to exercise fully their freedom of speech and petition.
3. The providing of an atmosphere in the greater Miami community which will enable the democratic process to work effectively through the political convention.

These goals bore a striking resemblance to the three priorities developed by Chief Pomerance as part of police planning for the convention. Despite these shared goals, dealings between the intervening group and the police were not free of mutual suspicion. According to Mr. Adams, Chief Pomerance later revealed that he had "some real hesitancy about relating to the religious community program as it focused on the convention planning, if not strong suspicion about how it would actually perform. At the same time, those who represented RCLC were quite reluctant to accept the role that the police seemed to propose as being appropriate . . . The representatives of the religious community did not want to become part of an intelligence network for the police, although they wanted to be in full communication with them and wanted to be supportive whenever it made possible a balanced effecting of the three principal goals."

Following establishment of its credentials through participation of the national staff of the United Methodist Church, RCLC moved with greater authority at the local level. A suite of offices was rented near convention hall to serve as the organization's headquarters, and attention turned to developing specific tactics for achieving policy goals.



The question of providing support services for protest groups was uppermost in the minds of many individuals, but that issue was soon preempted by the Miami Snowplow Company. Mrs. Lynn Slavitt, who was later to emerge as the primary coordinator of Snowplow, had been named a member of the original RCLC steering committee. Mrs. Slavitt had formed an RCLC task force to work on the services problem in cooperation with the Lutheran Church Center for Dialogue of which she was associate director. Issues of control and accountability led eventually to separation of the two organizations, but in January, 1972 — working on the assumption that the planning for support services was being handled by a "task force" — the RCLC steering committee was free to focus its attention on other measures.

An "Awareness Seminar" was held on March 8, 1972, at Miami Beach Convention Hall. This well-publicized meeting was attended by scores of religious leaders in the Miami community, Democratic Convention Chairman Richard Murphy, and all three of the local law enforcement leaders who would be involved in the conventions: Chief Pomerance of Miami Beach, Chief Garmire of Miami, and Sheriff Purdy of Dade County. The presence of the three law enforcement leaders, according to Mr. Adams, helped to "legitimate the kind of citizen involvement that RCLC was seeking." The workshop sessions at the seminar produced more than 50 usable ideas for third party intervention, which reflected the still fragmented organizational development of RCLC. They were essentially still groping for a mission to perform.

The more important function of the Awareness Seminar was its effect on volunteer recruitment. At the time, RCLC was only one of several local organizations seeking volunteers for convention service. Before March 8, only 50 volunteers had actually registered with RCLC. Subsequently, more than 400 persons became RCLC volunteers. The legitimizing effect of the three police speakers at the Awareness Seminar was later credited by RCLC leaders with placing their organization in a favored position to attract concerned volunteers from the so-called "establishment" segment of the population. Credibility among protest leaders was maintained by employing persons with movement credentials to assist in the training of volunteer observers.

The "observer" function performed by RCLC during both conventions developed in piecemeal fashion from a limited agreement made at the Awareness Seminar. At that time, Mr. Wesley Pomeroy appealed to members of the religious community to assist the Andy Frain ushering service, which had been given the contract for security chores inside convention hall. RCLC responded by suggesting that they could supply neutral observers to watch the interactions between Andy Frain employees and others inside the convention hall. Mr. Pomeroy supported this idea, and Mr. McDonnell of the Andy Frain Service welcomed the community involvement.



Soon it became clear that the "inside" observers could also be advantageously used at the gates of the convention complex and inside the perimeter fence where they could observe interactions between police officers, delegates, newsmen and demonstrators. It was finally decided that the largest number of volunteers recruited by RCLC would be asked to work as observers, and they would be used not only inside the hall and within the perimeter fence but also at any campsite used by demonstrators, on the streets during protests, and at hotels where the political candidates were headquartered.

This concentration of RCLC resources on observing was questioned repeatedly throughout the preparatory months. Movement representatives wanted to know for whom RCLC would be observing and what would be done with the information. Some police representatives were cool to having RCLC observe police actions on the streets. Many members of the religious community felt that "observing" was too neutral a role. Some felt that the religious community should be an issue advocate, marching with the protesters. Others believed that the churches and synagogues should primarily support the police, helping to protect rather than protest. The fact that RCLC was able to maintain its organizational direction despite all of this dissension is largely credited to the skill and determination of the Reverend John Adams.

The RCLC leader never lost sight of the strengths and weaknesses of his own group. He was first and foremost a leader of concerned clergy. When pressed during the late Spring to respond more directly to the needs of movement leaders, party officials, and police representatives, he replied, "Let us be who we are. Let us plan as we can plan. Let us develop and maintain our institutional integrity, and we will be able to assist you far more than if we respond to your immediate demands and specific requirements."

In his own report of RCLC activity, Mr. Adams underscores his commitment to the observer role for RCLC. "The observer role was not determined as a priority by effecting a compromise. It was deliberately selected as a primary role that the religious community could most effectively perform and which would have the effect of reducing police over-reaction, inhibiting potentially violent types of protests, monitoring the activities of the communications media, while furnishing a disciplined orientation for a sizeable and representative segment of the local community."

Gradually the observer role was accepted by RCLC volunteers, and a high level of commitment to that role developed. Movement leaders accepted the idea, and — after RCLC provided some timely liaison services during the campsite negotiations — Chief Pomerance signalled police acceptance of the observers by arranging for the Reverend Jack Cassidy to explain the observer function at a police orientation meeting attended by 1200 police officers. By personally introducing Mr. Cassidy, Chief Pomerance provided at least a partial accreditation for RCLC among the police.

MIAMI SNOWPLOW COMPANY. Like RCLC, Snowplow began as an essentially local movement founded under church-related auspices. It was formed at a January 6, 1972 meeting held at the Lutheran Church Center for Dialogue in Miami. At that time, representatives of several local organizations formed a "cooperative relationship to deal with the problems of youth during the 1972 Democratic Convention." A "non-political" approach was underscored, but a list of member organizations clearly established its position to the left of center. Member organizations of the Miami Snowplow Company included: The National Organization for Women, The Women's Center, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Young Socialists Alliance, The Outlaw, WBUS, New Community, People's Party, Youth Relations Board, Greater Miami Coalition, the Gay Liberation Front, American Civil Liberties Union, and Youth for Urban America.

Unlike RCLC, the goals of the newly formed group were neither vague nor intangible. Areas of concern were outlined in correspondence to the Dade County Commissioners on January 10. They included needs for housing (which became synonymous with campsite), medical, legal, communications, transportation, and entertainment services for an estimated 10,000 young people who would come to Miami during the Democratic Convention. This relatively conservative first estimate by Snowplow was quickly revised upward to 25,000 and 50,000 and ultimately to 100,000.

The Miami Snowplow Company remained throughout its existence under the chairmanship of Mrs. Lynn Slavitt, who had earlier formed a task force of RCLC to concern itself with the same goals. Mr. Hal Spaet, chairman of the Dade County Youth Relations Board, was also an important spokesman for the group. On the invitation of Mrs. Slavitt, a representative of the Miami Beach Police Department attended the first public meeting at the Center for Dialogue on January 13. When asked to respond to the group's plans, the police representative advised them that, "While the Miami Beach Police Department assumes primary responsibility for training and otherwise preparing its officers for effective and humane policing of the convention, it nevertheless encourages other groups who want to participate in social logistical planning to coordinate their efforts with the Greater Miami Coalition." The police were invited to attend all other Snowplow meetings.

Although Snowplow undoubtedly voiced the fears of many persons in the Miami area with respect to the wisdom of preparations to meet demonstrator needs, Snowplow spokesmen were met with resistance wherever they sought to enlist the support of "establishment" leaders. Local Democratic politicians were reluctant to openly cooperate with the Miami Snowplow Company or to grant the organization any official status. When Mrs. Slavitt attempted to gain a hearing before the Dade County Commissioners, a prompt reply from County Manager Ray Goode informed

her, "The County Commission is well aware of these potential problems in the areas which you cited, and it has directed us to develop a program for their control or alleviation. This activity is being pursued by staff from the County's Community Relations Board and this office." The requested meeting with the Commissioners was coolly downgraded to a promised contact from the Community Relations Board.

Similarly, when Hal Spaet attempted to appear before the Miami Beach Tourist Development Association to discuss "the assistance from local government that will eventually be necessary," he was firmly turned away by Jack Gordon, the TDA chairman. Mr. Gordon wrote, "I do not find any present need for you to appear before the TDA. As a matter of fact, I think that any open effort to create accommodations for large numbers of students who will be here during the convention will insure that they come."

This attitude was repeatedly stated by members of the private business sector: public preparations for non-delegates would encourage demonstrators to come. Whether this position represented a true conviction at the time or was simply an excuse to avoid involvement cannot be known. One of the few "establishment" organizations that did respond cooperatively to early contacts from the Miami Snowplow Company was, in fact, the Miami Beach Police Department. Police observers had been invited to attend Snowplow meetings, and they did so regularly. On each occasion, the police officer was clearly identified. His function at the meeting was simply to observe the activity and to serve as a liaison between the Snowplow group and the police leadership when information or assistance was requested.

As early as January 25, a meeting was arranged at the Miami Beach Police Department between Snowplow leaders and the police command staff. Those in attendance included Chief Pomerance, Colonel Cotzin, Mrs. Slavitt, Mr. Spaet and others. General agreement was reached that all parties sought a peaceful and successful convention. Mr. Spaet inquired about a demonstration area near convention hall and mentioned rumors that young people and blacks might not be permitted to cross the bridges into Miami Beach during the convention. Chief Pomerance assured him that peaceful demonstrations would be welcome and that there were absolutely no plans to bar anyone from the city. Colonel Cotzin emphasized that police intentions were for "cooperation not confrontation." Some comments were exchanged about the need for an appropriate campsite, mass arrest procedures, and the possible participation of the Cuban community, and the meeting ended with an agreement to maintain communications.

The police, of course, were not in a position to supply what Snowplow needed to achieve its goals. Snowplow needed money and volunteers. Although rebuffed by important segments of local government and private business, Snowplow did generate considerable



publicity, because the concerns expressed by its leadership were legitimate issues that disturbed many people in the Miami metropolitan area. Publicity in the news media brought Snowplow quick recognition within the Miami area as an intervening third party group, but it apparently did little to soften opposition to the organization or its goals. Instead, as the question of planned services for demonstrators escalated into a public debate, the positions of both supporters and opponents tended to become more emotional and more exaggerated.

On February 3, Snowplow leaders met with the Dade County Community Relations Board to address the problems of providing medical care, legal assistance, etc. for non-delegates attending the political convention. This meeting was followed up by a request from Snowplow for public funds from Dade County to support its effort to provide these services from the private sector instead of as extraordinary government expenditures. The County Manager rejected this request on February 16, stating that he believed, "The county, not Snowplow, can best provide services." Mr. Goode's reasoning was based on county experience with providing emergency relief services during hurricanes and other natural disasters.

From this point onward, the Miami Snowplow Company failed to improve its position as a viable intervening third party group. Because the group held weekly meetings that were often attended by movement leaders, it continued to generate publicity about convention preparations and generally kept the issue of demonstrator needs before the public. It continued to function as a catalyst for others via publicized complaints and warnings, but as a direct action group the Miami Snowplow Company became a failure. It attracted neither the money nor the volunteers that were needed to carry out its objectives. It never significantly broadened its base of support beyond those who openly sympathized with the protest movement.

On May 21, the steering committee of the Miami Snowplow Company announced that it had voted to disband the organization. Following transfer of the Republican Convention to Miami Beach, Snowplow leaders said they felt that the existence of their organization had become the "scapegoat" for the government's own failure to plan adequately for demonstrator services. Feelings on both sides were bitter. Snowplow leaders described government agencies as "thoughtless" and "reckless." They charged government leaders with "repeated postponements, buck-passing and evasions." On the other hand, government leaders expressed the view that Snowplow had performed a "disservice" to the community by overstating the situation and emphasizing emotional reactions. "By creating an environment of exaggeration, they made it hard to develop rational plans," said one prominent official.



Before disbanding, Snowplow forwarded an anticipated budget for convention services to County Manager Ray Goode. The budget, totalling \$6 million, was based on expectations for 100,000 demonstrators who would remain in the Miami area for eight weeks. The relatively small number of demonstrators who did come, and the handful who remained between the two conventions, tended to support government claims of amateurism and exaggeration.

Whatever Snowplow's real potential had been as an intervening third party group, the cooperative police response to it provided the police with several advantages. Attendance at Snowplow meetings produced useful information about demonstration plans, even though that was not the primary function of the police observer. Because the Snowplow meetings were attended by movement leaders, they also provided an opportunity for police officers to meet these demonstrators and establish personal contacts with them within a non-police setting. The numerous contacts established in this way outlasted Snowplow's existence as an organization and proved to be extremely valuable during the course of the two conventions.

YMCA MIAMI OUTREACH. The YMCA effort in Miami Beach represented still another variation of third party intervention. The initiative in this case was originally forthcoming from the national organization. After approval by the local YMCA board of directors in Miami, the plan was then implemented with the financial support and staffing resources of the national organization.

Actually, it could be said that the Miami Outreach program began in San Diego. The executive director of the San Diego YMCA, anticipating thousands of young adults converging on San Diego for the Republican Convention, had requested ideas and assistance from the executive director of the National Board of YMCA's. The national YMCA responded with a plan to supply 100 experienced youth workers to San Diego. The youth workers would all be graduates of the National Training Center for Youth Outreach Workers in Chicago and would be recruited from over 70 YMCA agencies throughout the nation. At the same time that the plan was offered to San Diego, it was also offered to the Miami YMCA to help during the Democratic Convention. The Republican Party then announced that its convention would be moved to Miami Beach, and the San Diego portion of the plan was dropped.

With the support of George Abbott, executive director of the Miami YMCA, David Hume, president of the board of directors of the Greater Miami YMCA, called a special meeting in his home on May 11, at which representatives of the National YMCA presented a detailed proposal for the Outreach program. After extensive discussion, the local YMCA board decided to sponsor the program subject to three conditions: the plan would have to be approved by County Manager

Ray Goode; funding would have to be raised from sources other than the normal Miami YMCA budget; the National YMCA would have to assume legal liability for the project.

The first and third conditions were quickly met. Fund raising then proceeded through requests to corporations and foundations, appeals for contributions from other YMCA's and eventually to a request for direct federal aid. As the YMCA work progressed, the needed funds were never clearly in hand in advance. Funding for the Democratic Convention effort eventually included a large cash gift from Eastern Airlines, printing services donated by Xerox Corporation, donations of free hotel rooms, half price restaurant meals, and free use of rental cars and vans. For the Republican Convention, the YMCA Outreach group received a \$40,000 federal grant.

From the outset of the program, the work to be performed by Outreach workers was defined with reasonable clarity. Three primary types of activity were involved:

1. Information services, including rumor control, making sure that all parties concerned had access to complete and accurate information activities on the streets and inside the convention hall.
2. Life support services, including direct medical services and referral to other life support services provided by the county or other agencies.
3. Direct third party intervention, including negotiation and physical intervention to prevent violent conflict. This last category produced the marshalls who were trained to link arms and form a human wall between antagonistic groups.

Since members of the Miami YMCA board of directors were affected by the same issues that influenced other members of the community, considerable difference of opinion existed relative to the provision of services to demonstrators during the conventions. Largely through the personal persuasiveness of Colquitt Clark, the local board supported the effort despite internal differences. One board member wrote: "The YMCA does not belong in this position, and I do not wish to be a party to it, and I will not make any effort to raise any funds to provide the facilities, because I feel that those people who will be coming down at the time of the conventions — who have made threats or implied threats and thereby coercing good-intentioned people such as yourself to do something for them — should not have this help." Nonetheless, this same board member voted with Mr. Clark to support the program.

Staffing of the Miami Outreach program was effected through internal transfer within the YMCA organization. Ronald Kinnamon, a member of the southwest regional staff, was named project director. Assisting him as an executive "core" staff were Ronald Johnson of the National Headquarters YMCA staff, Patrick Davidson of the southwest regional staff, and Colquitt Clark of the Greater Maimi YMCA. Professional Outreach Workers were recruited from their places of employment throughout the nation, and large numbers of young adults from the Miami community were recruited to act as co-workers with the professional newcomers. Immediately before the Democratic Convention, a five-day training program was conducted for both the Outreach Workers and the Miami volunteers.

The businesslike manner of organization and operation displayed by the YMCA Miami Outreach group led to early approval by government agencies, including the police. Chief Pomerance has recalled that, with the arrival of the YMCA Outreach people in the area, he felt that he had a dependable group that he could call on to act as neutral marshalls if needed, and this provided him considerable relief at that stage of development.

#### SERVICES FOR DISSIDENTS

Provision of support services for thousands of expected demonstrators was the reason for existence of the Miami Snowplow Company. After Snowplow disbanded, the issue remained to be solved. Much of the work to provide services was undertaken by Dade County under the leadership of County Manager Ray Goode. Mr. Goode was assisted in this area by Mr. George Rodericks, head of the Washington, D. C. Office of Civil Defense. Mr. Rodericks was assigned as a special consultant during the political conventions. Other work was performed by third party groups that had been stimulated into action during the period of Snowplow's short but vocal existence.

Before considering further details of provision of services for dissidents, it should be noted that the issue primarily affected the resident population, not the demonstrators. Most demonstration leaders affected a relatively unconcerned attitude toward support services. They were intensely interested in obtaining an appropriate campsite. They obviously preferred to have a campsite with adequate water and sanitation facilities. If these latter conditions did not exist, however, the demonstrators would simply do as Yippie Jeff Nighbyrd suggested they do: "We'll all just troop in and use the johns in their hotels." The real pressure for services was not coming from the demonstrators but from the resident population, who had a tangible or emotional stake in preserving order.



MEDICAL SERVICES. During the early stages of convention planning, both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party developed programs for supplying emergency personal health services. In the case of the Democrats, the following actions had been taken as of May 1, 1972. Arrangements had been made to rent a mobile medical van which would be kept at convention hall and dispatched from there to points of need. A suite of offices had been rented at the Playboy Plaza which would be manned by doctors and nurses. Interviews were being conducted to place nurses and medical students at the Americana and Fontainebleau Hotels, at Convention Hall, and at the free speech area in Flamingo Park.

At about this same time (April 26) the Dade County Manager requested the Comprehensive Health Planning Council of South Florida to develop a coordinated plan for provision of emergency personal health services during the period encompassed by the two political conventions. The planning was undertaken in order to avoid overloading normal health care facilities, such as hospitals, that were needed by the resident population. A committee of 30 members was formed by the Health Planning Council, which in turn selected a steering committee, which in turn named a seven-member subcommittee to actually draft the emergency health plan. Chairman of the subcommittee was Dr. Milton Saslow, director of the Dade County Department of Public Health. The health services plan was submitted to County Manager Goode on June 27. It named Dr. Saslow as Operational Director of the program. Basic health services were to be provided in four escalating stages:

1. Street medics, consisting of trained volunteers, would operate in teams of four at crowd gatherings and at key points throughout the city to provide services to individuals suffering from minor cuts, sunburn, and similar problems.
2. Mobile health units would be assigned to key points, including Flamingo Park and Convention Hall, manned by individuals who could administer first aid and contact ambulance services via radio communications.
3. Stationary primary care units would include treatment rooms for such problems as drug effects and tear gas detoxification. The building so designated would also serve as storage depot for medical supplies.
4. Emergency room of hospital, staffed by additional doctors who volunteer for convention duty, would perform operations and provide other complicated medical treatment.



The emergency personal health services plan was intended to function for 24 hours per day during both political conventions. It was estimated that 330 persons, mostly volunteers, would be needed to implement the plan.

In actual practice, the medical services plan was less grandiose but contained the basic elements intact. Many of the volunteers were provided by other third party organizations, such as the Community Relations Board and the National Association of Social Workers. During the Democratic Convention, medical services were provided by two mobile units placed at Convention Hall and Flamingo Park, and one stationary primary care unit at Ida Fisher Junior High School. According to a post-convention NASW report, 227 persons were treated at the three units, the most common problems being minor colds, cuts and sunburn. A low incidence of reported drug abuse problems was attributed to the presence of a YMCA "drug tent" inside Flamingo Park, which reportedly treated more than 50 cases of drug abuse during the two conventions.

Dade County Manager Ray Goode had requested that the Civil Defense Office make available to him four mobile hospital units (200 beds each) that were presently being stored in Dade County. These hospital units, however, could not be used for that purpose. Instead, Mr. Goode obtained two mobile units from other Florida county governments — one from Broward County and another from Duval County. A large tent furnished with ten cots was also placed in Flamingo Park near one of the mobile units.

Operations during the Democratic Convention unearthed some problems. Late deliveries of medical supplies and poor inventory control were probably the most serious deficiencies of the system. During the DNC, however, the need for services was very light, so these shortcomings were correctable before any serious consequences occurred. The biggest problem during the DNC for medical volunteers was comparable to that endured by security personnel — fighting off boredom. Relative to the number of demonstrators who actually attended the DNC, the medical services plan was grossly overstaffed. Preliminary to the Republican Convention the consequences of the dull days in July were felt in terms of greater difficulty recruiting enthusiastic volunteers.

During the Republican Convention, the medical services staff was busier, but not dramatically so before the final day. The stationary primary care unit had been moved from Ida Fisher Junior High to a location inside Flamingo Park, essentially expanding the capacity of the mobile unit stationed there during the DNC. Ida Fisher became a medical supply depot. During the RNC, 496 patients were treated at the stationary unit. Most problems again were minor. On the last night of the RNC, approximately 1,000 persons were reportedly treated for tear

gas exposure at all levels of the medical services program including services offered by street medics.

As a sidelight to consideration of medical services, it should be mentioned that the achievement of tactical goals by intervening groups can occasionally interfere with their overall credibility as neutral, third party groups. The YMCA, for example, operated a radio communications system for the purpose of providing medical services at point of need. On the first day of the Democratic Convention, however, it was reported that the YMCA radio was being used to monitor police communications. According to the volunteer medics, police calls were being monitored so that medical services could be provided at locations where police action was taking place. The police, however, felt that information about police movements was being monitored and passed on to demonstration leaders. Police complained to the Federal Communications Commission about the monitoring, but the FCC did not take any action to rescind the license issued to the temporary station. For the purposes of this discussion, the point to be made is that an intervening group must be concerned with preserving the appearance of neutrality, as well as actual neutrality. Actions that create suspicion should be avoided by the third party intervenor.

SANITATION SERVICES. The County Manager assumed responsibility for obtaining appropriate facilities to provide campsite residents with water and portable toilets. Water supply was accomplished by simply attaching hoses to underground water piping at several points within Flamingo Park. The toilet problem was solved through acquisition of three trailers equipped with 24 toilets and 20 wash basins each. Two of these trailers were positioned at Flamingo Park and another was placed near the convention hall demonstration area. These facilities were supplemented by portable single toilet units that were distributed throughout the area. The city of Miami Beach assumed responsibility for providing additional trash containers in Flamingo Park and emptying them when necessary.

FOOD SERVICES. Food for demonstrators was a politically sensitive issue. Pre-convention suggestions that the county or municipal government should actually feed campers in Flamingo Park brought down a storm of protest from irate citizens. County Manager Goode took the risky position that food services, though undesirable, "might become necessary." Contingency plans were therefore developed for the operation of mobile kitchens and utilization of surplus commodity food. These plans, however, never materialized. Actual provision of food at Flamingo Park was handled for the most part by the demonstration groups themselves, assisted by intervening third party groups, or by two food cooperatives having close associations with the demonstration groups. The two food cooperatives were known as Green Power and the Coconut Co-op. These groups solicited donations of food and money from both the demonstrators and concerned members of the community, then supplied low

cost or free meals to campsite residents. Commercial food vendors also visited the neighborhood around Flamingo Park frequently and did a lively business.

LEGAL SERVICES. Considerable attention had been afforded during the planning process to assuring that adequate legal services would protect the rights of demonstrators during the conventions. Details of the planning activity of the locally formed criminal justice committee are described in chapters 6 and 15. The third party intervention here involved essentially the formation of a committee which possessed both the expertise and the authority to develop working plans for arrests, bond hearings, detention, and various other aspects of the criminal justice system that would be operative during the conventions. Primarily as a response to initiatives taken by the Miami Beach Police Department, this committee was formed and eventually developed laudatory procedures for rapid processing of persons who were arrested during demonstrations.

In addition to this more or less official planning committee, certain groups placed lawyers on the streets as observers, where they could supply legal advice to individuals who needed it. Among these groups were the American Civil Liberties Union and the Ombudsmen, led by Allan Milledge of the Dade County Bar Association. The legal rights of police officers, who might conceivably be sued by participants in convention demonstrations, were protected by the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, who also fielded observers in the area.

#### ACTIVITIES OF INTERVENING THIRD PARTY GROUPS

Once the political conventions began, many of the third party groups that had exerted their independence during the planning stages tended to merge their resources for the provision of certain basic types of service. Although an extremely broad range of activities was actually performed by members of intervening third party groups, from a law enforcement point of view the most important of these services were:

1. Information services.
2. Campsite organization.
3. Parade marshalls.
4. Observers.

INFORMATION SERVICES. One of the more successful efforts at providing information services was the production of the Street Sheet, a xeroxed newsletter distributed daily within Flamingo Park by YMCA Outreach workers. The Street Sheet provided a schedule of the day's



forthcoming events, including both official program plans at convention hall and delegate hotels and demonstration plans by non-delegate groups. The newsletter contained telephone numbers where demonstrators could contact various movement groups, third party intervenors, and relevant "establishment" agencies. In operation, the newsletter was plagued by the same kind of misinformation that hampered police intelligence systems. This stemmed from indecisiveness on the part of demonstration leaders who would repeatedly cancel demonstrations or change announced plans at the last minute. During the Democratic Convention, the failure of politicians to maintain announced schedules for events also contributed to this problem. Despite these handicaps, the Street Sheet did provide an objective instrument for distributing information that was useful to all parties involved in the conventions.

Possibly one of the most important parts of the Street Sheet was the daily "Drug Report" that identified questionable drugs being circulated within the campsite. For instance, the Drug Report of August 20 includes the following notations: "Orange barrel tabs being sold as mescaline and THC are PCP, an animal tranquilizer. The large red caps with the indentation being sold as mescaline and THC are orange and grape Kool-Ade. The medium red caps with no markings are seconal."

CAMPSITE ORGANIZATION. Campsite organization is discussed in considerable detail within chapter 8. Here it should merely be noted that intervening third party groups, including Snowplow, YMCA, and virtually all other intervening groups that became active during the conventions, had some input into the campsite negotiations that preceded each convention. Preliminary to the Republican Convention, lacking an acceptable demonstration group such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to assume overall responsibility for the Flamingo Park campsite, the Miami Beach City Council issued the campsite permit to RCLC. The intervening third party group was officially designated as "coordinator of planning for camp operation and site designation" by City Manager O'Key.

RCLC leaders were not particularly enthusiastic about their role as campsite organizers. The Reverend Jack Cassidy has since reported, "We were very reluctant to take on the campsite, even as simply a coordinating group. Our primary role is that of impartial third party observers." The uncertainties about campsite approval for the Republican Convention, however, were in the process of producing an atmosphere of high tension in Miami Beach, and RCLC was disposed to do whatever was necessary to reduce the potential for violence. On July 31, the Reverend John Adams was contacted by Miami Beach Chief of Police Rocky Pomerance, who asked him to consider becoming the applicant for the Flamingo Park permit. Later in that same day, Mr. Adams was visited by demonstration leaders Rennie Davis and Jeff Nightbyrd, who also urged him to apply for the permit. On the next



morning, RCLC agreed to seek the role of campsite coordinator. Because of delays and complications (described in detail in chapter 6), the campsite permit was not actually approved by the City Council until August 14.

MARSHALLS. The organization and skillful utilization of parade marshalls was probably one of the key factors that minimized violent incidents during the two conventions. As has been previously mentioned, the police repeatedly urged demonstration groups to form their own marshalls for the purpose of avoiding violence. The marshalls so formed would minimize contact between marchers and spectators and inhibit the activities of stragglers. During rallies, the marshalls would both contain the demonstration and protect it from possible hecklers seeking to disrupt it. During a July 6 meeting with Cuban leaders, for instance, Sergeant Valeriani, MBPD, urged them to have their more responsible members serving as marshalls. An appropriate armband was suggested to identify the marshalls, and the leaders were reminded to use bunting and banners for protest signs instead of placards mounted on sticks, because sticks and poles could quickly be transformed into weapons.

Only the YMCA Outreach program among intervening third party groups sought to develop a group of independent marshalls. The individuals who served in this capacity also engaged in numerous other types of conflict resolution, such as liaison and negotiation services and generally circulating through crowds seeking out potentially violent incidents to defuse. Their most dramatic utilization, however, was in the formation of "buffer zones" between hostile groups. These buffer zones were created by individuals who linked arms and formed a human wall to separate potential adversaries. This tactic was used with great effectiveness on two occasions — once during each convention — when Cuban marchers demonstrated on Washington Avenue in close proximity to Flamingo Park campers.

During the George Jackson Memorial rally that took place during the first night of the Republican Convention, the various marshall units accepted the direct supervision of MBPD Sergeant Valeriani, who positioned them at various locations to secure the perimeter of the rally. Discipline among the volunteer marshalls was surprisingly good. For instance, at one point during the evening two Secret Service agents approached Sergeant Valeriani for permission to leave the area, because volunteer marshalls would not let them cross security lines without his approval. As events progressed through the two conventions, it became apparent that marshalls formed from the demonstration groups — most notably those from VVAW and the Cuban organizations — were at least as effective as the YMCA group. Nonetheless, the presence of a marshall force sponsored and trained by a reputable third party group provided an additional resource to law enforcement personnel that contributed much to the peaceful conclusion of numerous events.

OBSERVERS. The observer function, as it was developed by RCLC, became a respected activity involving more than 300 RCLC volunteers. The same general "observer" activity was performed by several other organizations, particularly during the Republican Convention, but these were often self-serving, educational undertakings that contributed little to the situation beyond involving additional quantities of personnel. The RCLC observers, on the other hand, received training in the role and subscribed to certain principles of objectivity that increased the credibility of their reports.

During both conventions, RCLC published daily Observer Reports that described events during the previous day that had been monitored by RCLC observers. Although the value of these reports was not always evident at the time, the kind of information contained in them developed into an important information resource pertaining to convention activities. A review of RCLC reports has contributed materially, for instance, to the making of this evaluative report.

The primary value of the observer function was not, however, in the product that it produced but in the doing of the thing itself. The activity involved hundreds of persons who wanted to participate in the convention experience. Their presence undoubtedly created a restraining influence that minimized points of conflict between police and demonstrators. Aside from the role of observing, the presence of these third party intervenors at virtually every incident that occurred during the two conventions contributed a valuable "neutral" resource that could be utilized by either party as needed to assist in peaceful conflict resolution.

In closing, it should be added that the "objective" attitudes maintained by observers and inculcated by other groups during the conventions tended to carry over into evaluative comments made by leaders after the conventions had ended. For example, Ron Johnson, one of the YMCA leaders, said, "It was obvious the demonstrators did not have organized leadership, and there were people who worked out their own fantasies in trashing and harrassing police. But the majority conducted themselves very well in terms of their objectives, which were as much civil disobedience and disruption of traffic as possible." Allan Milledge, leader of the 75 lawyer Ombudsmen, commented: "My overall assessment is that the release of hostility through indiscriminate violence was just about equal between some police and some demonstrators."

Such strained attempts to achieve absolute neutrality were common during the aftermath of the conventions. In a sense, it was disappointing to police, who might otherwise have expected high praise from these sectors of the community. Instead, cheers of approval were restrained; back pats were few. The close involvement of so many community leaders in the convention experience, where objectivity was so highly prized, precluded any loud applause in the aftermath for a police victory. On balance, however, the trade seemed a wise one to make.

It was very important that the involvement of the third party groups began during the planning stages. Involvement at the planning stage provided time for the groups to establish their own identities and to win support from the police with whom they would be working. An effort to intervene during the conventions without having participated at these preparatory stages would almost certainly have created additional tensions for all concerned instead of decreasing them.

It is also important to note that the presence of the intervening third party groups apparently was one of the factors that made it possible for the police to act with restraint. Particularly with respect to minor violations that would have drawn a police reaction during more normal times, intervenors provided valuable help. For instance, the incidents related to nude swimming were nearly always handled by third party intervenors assisted by cooperating members of demonstration groups. This regulatory action pertaining to minor violations of the law permitted the police to withhold their own response for more serious violations. Thus was created the very desirable situation wherein police officers could avoid becoming involved in minor entanglements that might, and probably would, escalate into serious violations or confrontations. To the degree that third party intervenors acted to discourage or stop minor violations of the law, they provided a direct benefit for law enforcement services.

Police encouragement of intervening third party groups created an environment where numerous beneficial programs could be developed. If one of the byproducts of that effort was objective criticism of the police, its greater thrust was in the direction of accomplishment of police goals. Whether the specific service involved is a relatively intangible benefit, such as that created by observers, or the direct aid given by medical volunteers, it is clear that intervening third party groups have much to offer for effective law enforcement.

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## INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

An intelligence system exists for one purpose — to assist the head of a police agency to make better decisions about the problems he faces. In the first instance, though, he must make some fundamental decisions about the nature of the intelligence system he needs to support his judgements. The system must be shaped by him to produce the kind of information he needs to accomplish his objectives. The choice of personnel, the means of gathering information, the attention given to validation and analysis, the balance between strategic and tactical intelligence, the distribution of the system's output, and the ultimate use made of the intelligence are all functions of the personality, the preferences, and the perceptions of the chief executive.

As Miami Beach readied itself for the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Chief Pomerance had to face a series of early decisions about the kind of intelligence he needed and the structure of the system that would give him what he wanted. Since he had no intelligence unit in his department before he began preparing for the conventions, the actions he undertook indicated something of the nature of the man. To some degree then, this chapter reflects the perceptions Chief Pomerance had of the conventions as political events and of the demonstrators as participants in the political process. However, it must be recognized that the intelligence system that finally evolved was the result of a combined effort on the part of a number of people — each with their own perceptions and each trying to shape the system to meet their own needs.



## THE INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium at the south end of the convention complex housed Command Post "Beta." This command post consisted of the intelligence center and the adjoining individual command posts used by the various local, state and federal agencies participating in the convention policing.

The intelligence center was a crowded setting of offices, partitions, communications and support equipment, and visual displays. Along with this equipment, approximately 55 people were grouped together into the 2378 square feet of floor space. The primary intelligence functions were carried out in the analysis section which processed the incoming information and the situation room where intelligence was disseminated to operational personnel. The intricacy of the setting in the intelligence center, the high level of activity within it, its proximity to the individual command posts, and the aura of importance attached to intelligence made Command Post Beta one of the greatest physical attractions during the conventions. The floor plan of the command post differed between the DNC and the RNC as improvements were made in the intelligence system. Basically, these changes centered on improving the flow of intelligence to operational personnel.

As complex as Command Post Beta was, it was not the only command post nor was it self-sustaining. A network of connecting relationships were necessary to support Beta. Similarly, Beta's output supported the existence of the other command post on the mainland. Ancillary to the Beta Command Post was the Area Command Post located on the 20th, 21st and 22nd floors of the Dade County Courthouse in the City of Miami. This command post, designated Alpha, served the intelligence and control needs of the County Manager and high ranking officials of the state, the National Guard, Federal military forces and the Department of Justice. Alpha served the function of coordinating and controlling the movement of personnel and logistics resources from one jurisdiction to another.

During the first two days of the DNC the information flow from Beta to Alpha was uncoordinated at both the point of origin and the point of reception. As a result, only partial information was received. At this early point in time, the primary inputs to Alpha were from monitoring the tactical radio frequencies used on the Beach, telephonic reports from Beta, periodic reports received from Beta on the FDLE 2740 communications terminal, and direct reports from the Dade County PSD intelligence officer. As modifications were made in Command Post Beta over the time span of both conventions, the quality of information received by Alpha improved significantly. In large measure, the improvement resulted from the assignment of an MBPD liaison officer to Alpha and a more effective grouping of all liaison officers. Also, the creation of the position of Area Command Post Situation Report Officer was a significant improvement.

This position had the responsibility for communicating information processed through the situation room in Beta Command Post to the Area Command Post.


Another responsibility of this position was the preparation of periodic situation reports. These reports, along with strategic intelligence reports, were to be directed to the officials in Alpha Command Post. Supplementing this flow of information was a one channel microwave system which gave Alpha the capability to monitor any one of the six television monitors showing various views of the convention complex surroundings. Alpha also had an additional television monitor which showed the complex from the roof of the Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association Building. This camera was manned by Dade County PSD personnel.

Related to the development of strategic intelligence used by personnel assigned to Command Post Beta was the Intelligence Support Unit operated by FDLE and located in the city of Miami. This covert unit provided strategic assessments of significant activities and problems for the Governor and his legal counsel, FDLE command personnel, and selected federal and local law enforcement agencies. Initially, these analyses, highly detailed and long range in nature, were purely strategic rather than tactical. Later, during the conventions and the interim period, the unit routinely prepared daily estimates and weekly summaries of convention activities.


The FDLE 2740 computer terminal was not only an important communications link between Alpha and Beta Command Posts but it also gave access to NCIC, LETS and the 200 other law enforcement agency terminals throughout the state in the FCIC network. The terminal was routinely used to obtain information requested about automobile licenses and arrest records. In this instance, the written request was submitted to the information control and exchange unit, and then forwarded to the 2740 operator for direct inquiry into the system.

A civil defense center was also linked in with the command posts. This center was staffed with personnel from all local and county governmental agencies. The variety of services available through civil defense were to be made immediately available if requested by command personnel.

THE SITUATION ROOM. Although the situation room in Command Post Beta has been described as "the very heart of the Intelligence Center while the conventions were on-going," it should be noted that this crucial location came into being as an afterthought and continued to undergo modification during the two conventions. Throughout this period of evolution, the importance of the Situation Room in the overall intelligence system continued to increase.



**COMMAND POST "BETA" FLOOR PLAN  
DEMOCRATIC  
NATIONAL  
CONVENTION**



**DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION**



Directly related to the changing form of the Situation Room and its increasing importance was the assignment of additional personnel to various positions in the room. In its final form, the Situation Room was organized in accord with the following positions:

Intelligence Officer ... had overall command of the situation room and was responsible for the coordination, control, and dissemination of intelligence.

Situation Report Officer ... had primary responsibility for monitoring incoming messages and studying situation maps so as to be able to forward useful and timely information to field commanders.

Operations Officer ... kept fully informed about operational situations so as to be able to advise the tactical commander when certain responses are necessary or in need of modification.

Logistics Officer ... facilitated the delivery of equipment, supplies and transportation services as requested by command personnel.

Scout Coordinator ... monitored incoming messages including those on the scout frequency, correlated this information with strategic intelligence reports and deployed scouts in accord with tactical needs.

Map Officer ... maintained an array of maps showing current activities of strategic and tactical importance.

When considered individually and collectively, the positions described above give the impression of great overall importance, power and responsibility. Nevertheless, the situation room as a functional part of the command post should not be thought of as the locus for decision making. In reality, decisions were made by the field commander, Chief Pomerance, and the tactical commanders, Colonel Cotzin, Major Philbin, Major Schuler and Captain Whitaker. The officers in the situation room could not usurp the powers of the command staff. They could merely advise, inform and support. Such decisions as were made within the situation room at best set broad limits or defined general circumstances. In the final analysis, tactical commanders faced the task of making their own on-site decisions within the parameters received from the command post. The real power and importance of these officers inhered in the information they had, coupled with their ability to convey this information to command personnel when needed.


INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. One of the primary means of bringing the intelligence output to the attention of operational personnel was through briefing sessions. At the outset, daily intelligence briefings were thought of as an indispensable preliminary to the next day's action. As planned, these briefings were held by the Intelligence Coordinator for field personnel at the end of each day's action.

At the start of the DNC, interest in these meetings was high. It should be noted in the floor plan that at this time there was no direct entry from the Miami Beach command post into the situation room. Hence, access to intelligence output was somewhat restricted to personnel inside the Beach command post. Further, there were few reports, maps, and charts posted in areas where field commanders could study them. Given this situation, their best single source of intelligence was from these briefings.


During the DNC, the briefings were held for the benefit of the field commanders from all law enforcement agencies represented at the conventions. The discussions centered on the activities of the previous day and the activities thought to be planned for the coming day. For the most part, the Miami Beach intelligence representative reported on pertinent intelligence at these meetings while the execution of plans for the next day was a tripartite endeavor involving Colonel Cotzin, Chief Loughheed of PSD, and Chief Denham of the MPD. After-action reports and daily intelligence summaries were distributed to those in attendance. Maps and charts were used to visually support the information given verbally during the briefings and in the written reports.

By the time the RNC was underway, direct access from the Miami Beach command post into the situation room was possible. This allowed for informal briefings to be held whenever necessary to supplement or revise the information discussed at the formal daily briefings. Also, the posting of charts and maps on the walls in and around the situation room facilitated the transfer of intelligence to field personnel. One chart, 20 feet in length and marked off in days, showed a schedule of preconvention and convention events planned by demonstrators. For each activity, the chart showed the name of the group involved, how many persons were expected to participate and what the demonstrators planned to do. One intelligence officer claimed that this chart successfully predicted the conditions of every convention event 24 to 48 hours in advance.

Intelligence briefings occurred at another level at Command Post Alpha. Local police agency heads as well as federal and state officials regularly attended briefing sessions with the area commander, Ray Goode. These briefings were held mid-morning of each day of the conventions. In addition to a consideration of previous and anticipated activities, inter-departmental relationships and strategies were discussed.



COMMAND POST "BETA" FLOOR PLAN



REPUBLICAN CONVENTION



## REPORTING PROCEDURES

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE. Everyone with a major convention responsibility was preoccupied with strategic intelligence. The general purpose of strategic intelligence was to provide field commanders with long range projections of the capabilities and planned activities of demonstration groups who might be bent on disrupting the political conventions. Basically, the generation of strategic intelligence began with the input of raw information from a field intelligence gathering team or an undercover agent.

This information was submitted directly to the intelligence representative from his own agency assigned to the Intelligence Center. The representative would then record this information on an Intelligence Collection Memorandum and attach an appropriate routing slip. The form would then be forwarded to the Information Control and Exchange Unit. Here the staff assigned a control number to the memo and entered the number in the correspondence log. Identification of the source of the information was deleted, and the remaining sterilized information was typed in final form. Copies of the typed memorandum were forwarded to each intelligence representative and to the analyst section. Because of the priority "need to know" of the Miami Beach intelligence representative, all memorandums were routinely routed to him first. Once copies were routed to the various representatives, the original copy was serially filed in the Information Control and Exchange Unit. Finally, the return date was recorded in the correspondence log.

Memorandums received in the analyst section were evaluated, screened, and checked. The information was then correlated, synthesized and published as part of a weekly or daily intelligence summary. Generally, the items within the summary were categorized by group. The intelligence representative had the final responsibility for distributing these summaries to the command staff of his department. In the case of Miami Beach, copies of the summaries were given to Chief Pomerance and Assistant Chief Larry Cotzin. They in turn would judge whether or not further distribution within their own department was necessary.

The strategic reports received by command personnel took a variety of forms. Basic to these reports was an intelligence study of protest groups across the nation whose activities and aims might involve them in the conventions. This report, which was updated for the RNC, was the only intelligence study prepared and distributed to department commanders. Both the DNC and the RNC studies were organized in the following way:

- I. Organizations which are believed to be coming to the national political conventions ...
  - A. Organizations which may be violent or may engage in non-violent but unlawful activities.

- B. Organizations which it is believed will engage in peaceful activities.
  - C. Organizations whose impact or plans are unknown which will probably be present at the Democratic and/or Republican conventions.
- II. Organizations who have the potential to plan activities at either or both of the conventions but as of May 22, 1972, have not announced any plans.
  - III. Groups which are believed will not attend the conventions.

For each group listed in this study, attention was given to their purposes, tactics, organizational structure, membership and leadership and current activities. The need for supplemental information which would be useful in completing these assessments and increasing their validity was also specified.

From this time forward until one week before the DNC started, the intelligence group prepared a weekly intelligence summary which was distributed by each representative to their respective commanders. One week before the start of the DNC and continuing through its completion the intelligence summary was distributed on a daily basis. Daily after-action reports, special information reports, schedules of events, and miscellaneous information reports were also used to bring intelligence to the attention of field commanders. The same basic plan of report preparation and distribution was followed before and during the RNC.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE. The purpose of tactical intelligence was to provide field commanders with timely information about the current activities, movements and intentions of demonstration groups present during the time of the political conventions. Although this seems self evident, during the time of planning the structure and function of both command posts, the importance of tactical intelligence was not fully appreciated. Weeks before the DNC began, John Konstanturos, one of the MBPD consultants, made the prophetic observation: "There is now a need for establishing the vital link between intelligence and operations. These two command post functions which are essential to effective command and control systems must be located in the same room. The situation room is recommended for that purpose." Nevertheless, specific provisions were not made for generating and disseminating tactical intelligence before the start of the DNC.

During the first day of the DNC, it was apparent that field commanders were seriously hampered by a lack of tactical intelligence. As one of the primary actions taken to overcome this problem, a group of





15 State Beverage Division personnel was quickly organized, equipped with hand held radios and briefed on what to look for and report. Concurrent to the creation of this scout unit was the establishment of a situation room which was to serve as the location for linking both tactical and strategic intelligence to operations.

Thus, beginning on July 11, the second day of the DNC, tactical commanders had timely information on the plans of the demonstrators, their actual groupings, their present locations and their directions of movement. They also had a means to obtain an immediate firsthand assessment of any reported incident. From this rudimentary beginning came a series of refinements which continued to be made through the RNC.

The scout teams operated from a base station in the Command Post Beta situation room under the direction of the scout coordinator. The Unusual Occurrence Message Form was originally used as the means of routing the incoming information from the scouts to the various intelligence representatives. At this time, the scouts' radio was monitored only by the Miami Beach Tactical Command Unit. To facilitate the flow of information during the RNC, the field and tactical commanders of all agencies had scout monitors.

#### GRANT REQUESTS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

The original Miami Beach grant request contained few references to the important matter of intelligence. In the budget narrative, the project director's duties had no specific mention of his involvement in intelligence. However, one of the assistant project directors was to be selected by virtue of his background in intelligence so as to be able to provide the project director with input on local law enforcement problems. In another section of the request, Methods and Timetable, it was specified that the project director was expected to engage in a search of existing resources related to the production of intelligence. By implication, the project director was expected to have some responsibility at least for intelligence planning.

Further recognition of the importance of the intelligence function was expressed in the original grant request. In the section that outlined the training curricula, six major subject areas were listed — one of which was "intelligence operations." Sixteen of a total of 96 hours were to be given on this subject. Again, by implication, it appears that there was an early awareness of the central role police personnel at the operational level play in the overall intelligence system as both producers of raw information and consumers of verified intelligence.

While a lack of multi-agency coordination and planning was noted in some aspects of preparing for the conventions, the intelligence group tried to be an exception — particularly after the effects of the change in



location of the Republican National Convention were experienced. This event accelerated their planning efforts, and a series of meetings of the intelligence representatives and other law enforcement officials were held. Intelligence plans were made at the May 26 and May 31 meetings and by the first of June an intelligence plan was completed and the details for setting up a multi-agency Intelligence Center were incorporated in the supplementary grant request submitted by the Miami Beach Police Department. A total of \$15,070 was requested to construct the center within the convention complex. The center, to be staffed by 55 persons from nine agencies, was to be set up to "obtain, process and disseminate convention related strategic information."

Later, on August 13, the FDLE submitted a grant request entitled "Enhancement of Intelligence Assessment Capabilities During the 1972 National Political Conventions." As with other grants, it was intended that the award would cover activities already completed for the DNC. The approval of this grant was expedited. Four days later, FDLE was notified that \$99,733 had been awarded them. The funds were to be used to provide overtime compensation, travel and per diem expenses for FDLE analysts, technical personnel, supervisors and a consultant assigned variously at the Combined Intelligence Center, the Intelligence Support Center and the FDLE computer base in Tallahassee.

Beyond the costs for the construction of the center and for the salaries of assigned staff, a wide range of equipment was needed. The MBPD expended funds for maps, general office supplies, telephones and copying machines. The FDLE furnished typewriters, cross-cut paper shredders, television monitors and videotape systems, CB radio monitors, a computer terminal, a facsimile transmitter and scrambling device, coffee service, and a wide range of consumable office supplies.

## LEADERSHIP AND INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

In every aspect of planning for the conventions, interagency cooperation was vital to the ultimate success of the endeavor. In no other activity was the need for interagency cooperation greater than in the intelligence operation. Yet, in no other activity was the need for interagency cooperation more difficult to obtain. In the arena of intelligence, latent feelings of mistrust may surface and become intensified. Prudent caution may become unreasoned suspicion. A natural disinclination to openly share information may become deliberate withholding. Innocuous rivalry between agencies may become destructive hostility.

At the inception of the planning process, Chief Pomerance sought to avoid the possible complications which could detract from effective operation of a combined intelligence system. As in other parts of convention planning, he recognized the value of using a neutral third party in a situation which held the potential for conflict. In this instance, the third party was to be the U. S. Secret Service.

As first conceived, leadership in the intelligence effort was to be exercised by the Secret Service. It was planned that they would operate a cooperative intelligence system through which incoming information from all agencies would be processed. Once analyzed, the intelligence was to be disseminated to all participants in the convention policing. Since the Secret Service had the respect and trust of all the agencies involved as well as the expertise to operate the system, interagency cooperation would be assured.

As sound as this approach appeared to be, it would not have given Chief Pomerance the kind of intelligence system he needed in order to accomplish his objectives. He needed strategic intelligence about the demonstration groups as early as possible, since so many other aspects of the planning process were dependent upon this information. On the other hand, the intelligence needs of the Secret Service could be satisfied through a system set up four to six weeks in advance of the DNC. In this first approach to setting up a cooperative intelligence system, the timing was wrong.

An alternative plan was devised whereby each agency would designate a man as intelligence representative. These representatives would work together on plans for a combined intelligence center, while at the same time they developed and exchanged strategic intelligence about the dissident groups which might appear in Miami Beach during the convention.

Chief Pomerance designated Sergeant Dennis Goddard as Department Convention Intelligence Officer. Although Miami Beach had no personnel regularly assigned to intelligence, Sgt. Goddard's background as an investigator of major crimes had given him firsthand experience with police intelligence procedures and familiarity with members of the intelligence community. Thus, given the nature of the choice, Chief Pomerance's selection of the man to lead the intelligence effort in the convention was a sound one. His appointment was seen as an act which would assure some measure of cooperation on the part of other departments.

After his appointment early in March, 1972, Sgt. Goddard set up bi-weekly meetings of local, state and federal intelligence representatives who would be involved in convention activities. Though these meetings were relatively informal, agreement was reached on basic matters of importance such as the relationships among departments, the flow of information, and general operational guidelines for the intelligence function. It is significant to note that he received no help in this preliminary phase of his work from the project director or his assistants. Instead he relied heavily on personal contact with other intelligence specialists as a source of information and advice.

Since Miami Beach had tactical responsibility for the convention center, their "need to know" was the greatest of all agencies represented. This fact resulted in Sgt. Goddard taking on a major leadership role. That

he was the only agency representative without actual intelligence experience did not appear to have detracted from his performance in this critical position.

During this early period of preparation, Sgt. Goddard chaired the meetings of the intelligence group and considered further details of the intelligence system. Plans for a combined intelligence center were drawn together. Sgt. Goddard served as the intelligence spokesman for the MBPD at the joint convention planning sessions. In an effort to improve relationships with other municipal and county intelligence officers throughout the state, he met with the fifty or so members of the Florida Intelligence Unit, a self-supporting statewide association of police intelligence personnel, and discussed preconvention needs. During this time, the inherent "need to know" of Miami Beach supported Sgt. Goddard's position of leadership.

When the decision to relocate the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach was announced on May 5, 1972, a new set of circumstances arose which directly affected the leadership of the intelligence effort. The anticipation of a larger number of demonstrators, the realization of a greater potential for disorder and lawlessness, and the consequent recognition of the need for an expanded intelligence operation resulted in the FDLE stepping into a leadership role.

The governor's need to know took priority over Chief Pomerance's need. The Commissioner of FDLE, designated by the governor as state convention security director, named Mr. Emory B. Williams as coordinator for the combined intelligence center. In turn, Director Williams then designated Mr. Jack Key to carry out this central role. Mr. Key had worked in the Miami area for three years as a supervisor of the FDLE field office. In this position, he was responsible for all intelligence activities. Thus, he knew all the principals involved and, for the most part, had their pledge of full cooperation in this undertaking.

Supporting this change was the growing awareness of the need for additional funding to support an expanded intelligence system. At the time, the justification for the direct involvement of FDLE in the intelligence function was a consequence of a complex political decision seen by some as an usurpation of local control over intelligence operations. However, this change in no way reduced Chief Pomerance's need to have the kind of intelligence system he needed to accomplish his objectives as chief of security for the convention complex.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Key met with Chief Pomerance, Colonel Cotzin and Sergeant Goddard to decide the details of this realignment. On May 19, 1972, Chief Pomerance introduced Mr. Key as intelligence coordinator to the large group of attendees at the regularly scheduled Joint Convention Planning Session. From this point on, both Mr. Key and Sgt. Goddard served as spokesmen for the coordinated intelligence center.



They regularly reported on the status of the center, their plans to staff and equip it, and the nature of the strategic intelligence which had already been developed.

This bipartite leadership was quickly recognized, and it served to the advantage of all involved. Those who considered FDLE's participation in the intelligence effort as an intrusion in local matters were quieted by the presence of Sgt. Goddard in a leadership role. Others who were inclined to withhold their total support from the intelligence operation because of misgivings about other local law enforcement agencies drew solace from the leadership shown by Mr. Key.

For example, on May 23, Mr. Key met with Director Purdy and Captain Bertucelli of PSD in an effort to clarify the question of who was actually controlling the intelligence effort. Two days later, at a joint convention planning session, a representative of the U. S. Secret Service expressed general concern about security at the Intelligence Center and raised the particular question of who was to be in charge. In both instances, Mr. Key's crucial position in the overall intelligence operation assured the full cooperation of these two agencies.

On July 9, when Command Post Beta became fully operational, the bipartite nature of the leadership in the intelligence operation continued to be advantageous. At this time, the apparent emphasis of FDLE with strategic intelligence and the misbelief that sufficient tactical intelligence would be generated as a matter of course when operational personnel took to the streets caused a crisis to occur. During the first day of the DNC, the inadequacy of tactical intelligence and the abundance of strategic intelligence caused discontent among operational personnel. As one ranking officer said, "We weren't planning an invasion." As a result, some dissatisfaction arose with regard to FDLE's role in intelligence. However, the continuity of the overall operation was ensured by the existence of its two-part leadership.

Based upon the idea of the MBPD consultant, John Konstanturos, plans for the creation of a scout unit were quickly made and implemented by MBPD and FDLE personnel. The scout unit was intended to supply current information direct from the streets to the intelligence center. In turn, this input was to serve as the primary basis of tactical intelligence for field commanders. Without bipartite leadership in the intelligence operation, it is unlikely that the planned reaction to overcome the lack of tactical intelligence could have been implemented as quickly and as effectively as it was.

Following the conclusion of the DNC, the divided leadership in the intelligence operation again proved to be valuable. In a detailed report to the Area Commander, Mr. Goode, dated July 27, John Konstanturos presented his after action comments regarding the command post operations and the intelligence system. His cogent remarks became the focus of



discussion at the interim planning meetings and remedial actions were formulated with regard to resolving the differences between intelligence personnel and tactical commanders, in expanding the number of scout teams, in coordinating the scout's activities with the situation room, and in limiting access to the intelligence center.

Although there were advantages to this two man form of leadership, there were also disadvantages. From the top down, lines of authority were not clearly established. As a result, no one had control of the overall operation. This was evident to Lieutenant Konstanturos, who wrote in his DNC after action report, "Someone should be appointed to function as executive officer, or chief of staff, for purposes of having a single coordinator of all functions within the command post." Ideally, this was a sound recommendation. In reality, it was not possible to designate a single coordinator who would have been as effective as the existing bipartite form of leadership.

All things considered, the Intelligence Center functioned as a relatively loose confederation. Throughout the conventions, the intelligence effort remained fragmented because of the desire of each agency to extract from the center the intelligence seen as necessary to satisfy their own concerns and responsibilities. As it turned out, the bipartite leadership of the intelligence operation was a fortuitous organizational feature which tended to hold the intelligence confederation together in times of stress.

LOCATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CENTER. The bipartite leadership of the intelligence group made each decision difficult enough to consider and set into motion. However, the decision making process was further complicated when LEAA became involved. The choice of the location of the intelligence center was a good case in point.

The plan to set up a combined intelligence center necessarily meant that the primary intelligence operation would be located at one site. Although several locations were considered, the choice narrowed down to two possibilities: The one, favored by the MBPD, was inside the convention complex; the other, favored by FDLE, was on the 7th floor of a strategically located bank building near the convention site. The former location in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium provided limited space, poor ventilation, inadequate lighting and troublesome acoustical characteristics. In its favor though were a variety of technical advantages for the installation of equipment and the linkage of the post to other locations. The latter location provided excellent security at first glance and its location away from the convention site would keep to a minimum the number of officials who would try to make unauthorized tours of the center. However, a number of different technical problems would have to be faced if this location was chosen.

On May 23, Director Williams of FDLE discussed the possibility of federal funding for the intelligence center with the LEAA representative, Robert Donlan. At that time, Mr. Donlan was reluctant to consider the request as presented to him. Since LEAA had already funded a center for convention planners, grant writers, LEAA personnel, and various other administrative personnel, he expressed the view that this office space could be used for the intelligence center.

On May 24, Director Williams, Jack Key, and Sergeant Goddard met with Mr. Donlan to make it emphatically clear that the office space suggested on the previous day was totally unsuitable for intelligence purposes. In the face of this united reaction, Mr. Donlan changed his position and agreed to fund the intelligence center, provided it was located in the Convention Hall as an extension of the MBPD Command Post. At this point, Sergeant Goddard presented his plan to establish the facility at this location. Mr. Donlan accepted the plan to set up the intelligence operation in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium and agreed to fund the center. At the May 31 joint convention planning session, Mr. Key announced the decision that the combined intelligence center would be located in the convention complex basement, the same place the intelligence center had been placed during the 1968 RNC.

#### PRELIMINARY INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

During the preconvention period, the intelligence needs of the MBPD were centered on the development of strategic intelligence. Until the plans of the demonstrators and their expected numbers were known to police officials, the police response to the demonstrators could not be formulated. One of the important unknowns in the situation was whether the "demonstrators" intended to demonstrate their dissenting views or to destroy the national nominating conventions as a part of our political process. The answer to this question was crucial for overall planning.

Concurrent to making specific plans for a combined intelligence center which would operate during the time of the single convention expected at this time, the intelligence representative of the MBPD sought to develop strategic intelligence which would assist his chief in making general plans for police services. The intelligence representatives in other departments also set out to find answers to these same fundamental questions.

THE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATORS. How many were coming? From the outset of preparations, this was the basic question asked by the law enforcement officials who held some responsibility for policing the political conventions. The answer to this question was crucial for obtaining manpower commitments from other departments, for developing operational plans and for acquiring equipment appropriate to the policing task. Other public officials at the local and county level with a

responsibility for providing social and health services to the demonstrators also needed accurate estimates. Beyond this, the Governor and other state officials needed to know the number of demonstrators expected at the DNC - particularly with regard to the commitment of state law enforcement officers and the possible utilization of the National Guard. Even at the federal level, the Attorney General needed to be informed about the numbers expected since he was expected to advise the President of the necessity for committing federal troops. The need to know how many were coming was generalized throughout all levels of government.

Residents of Miami Beach also felt they needed to know how many were coming. Businessmen in the area, long accustomed to looking forward to large numbers of visitors, began to ask the question out of fear rather than eager anticipation. According to Sgt. Goddard, a first goal of the intelligence effort was to derive a reasonable estimate of the total number of people expected to come in order to satisfy community concern.

DNC Estimations. In order for the MBPD to begin the difficult task of making a reasonable estimate of the number of demonstrators coming to the Democratic Convention, attention was first given to certain general considerations about the Miami area. Local universities were thought to be relatively non-political with few activist groups represented. Because of the time of the DNC, most students would be away on summer vacation. Before the end of the school year, however, they had been urged by protest group leaders to stay in the area to participate in convention activities. Further, there were no large organized dissident groups in Florida. Those that were organized elsewhere in the country would probably opt to demonstrate at the RNC in San Diego. Most importantly, there were no dissident leaders with national stature residing in the south Florida area.

Another important factor affecting the estimations was the fact that July and August was "pick season" for the citrus growers in central Florida. Migrants who could earn from \$40 to \$70 per day would not have the time nor the inclination to demonstrate their political views at the national conventions which were scheduled to be held during these two months.

The methods used to calculate estimates of the number of demonstrators were based on the assumption that most of the protesters would come from outside the state of Florida. Contacts were made with state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the nation where dissident groups were known to be concentrated. Information was solicited from these agencies regarding the preparations of various groups to attend the DNC. As an example of the kind of information sought, one major mid-west municipal police department informed the MBPD that a group of 100 members of a national coalition had made plans to leave the city by bus for Miami Beach on a specified date. They were to be accompanied by a loosely organized group of 20 students.



The public statements of demonstration group leaders as to the numerical strength of their followers provided another source of information which, of course, had to be cautiously interpreted. This procedure consisted of making systematic comparisons between the number of people expected to attend protest type events as reported in the press and the number of protesters who actually showed up. Current estimates related to the conventions could then be corrected downward according to the margin of error shown in the past.

At a later point in time, the Florida Highway Patrol was requested by the MBPD to assist by making a "migration analysis." Information about hitchhikers, private cars, vans and campers displaying the symbols of dissident group identification and unusual caravans of vehicles was needed.

Paralleling these approaches, the FBI sought "... to gather intelligence all over the country relative to the groups who are making plans or anticipating being here ..." in Miami Beach. During the joint convention planning sessions, summaries of information gathered by the FBI were presented and carefully noted by those in attendance.

From all appearances, the attempts by the MBPD to make estimates from incoming information of this kind during the first six months of 1972 were relatively unsuccessful. As a consequence, plans for coping with the myriad of problems posed by an influx of demonstrators at the DNC were difficult to firm up.

Concurrent to the efforts of the MBPD, it is significant to note that the MPD, Dade County PSD, and FDLE were also engaged in their own independent attempts to estimate the number of demonstrators expected in their respective jurisdictions and in the convention city. Given the uncertain nature of this important intelligence activity, it appears that differences in the working estimates accepted at various points in time by each jurisdiction tended to complicate cooperative planning and agreement on manpower commitments to Miami Beach.

When the decision was announced on May 5 to move the RNC to Miami Beach, the problem of estimating the number of demonstrators became even more difficult. It now became necessary to make estimates for both conventions as well as for the interim period. It was known that San Diego had been preparing to deal with 10-15,000 "street people" but that figure had to be considered cautiously as a minimum in light of other non-police estimates ranging up to 250,000 persons. Police officials recalled that slightly more than a week before the change, Philip Seib, a Democratic Party official warned them that if the RNC was also held in Miami Beach, 100,000 "non-invited potential demonstrators" could be anticipated.



Selected Estimates of the Number of Demonstrators Expected at  
DNC as Published in Miami Area Newspapers

Month	Demonstration Group Leaders		Official/Quasi-Official Spokesmen	
	Number	Source	Number	Source
January			5,000	"Hypothetical figure" in convention story
February	50,000	Jerry Rubin	10-50,000 50,000	Lynn Slavitt, Snowplow Reference to federal grant to prepare officers for convention
March	40,000	Rennie Davis	10-50,000 10-250,000	Social service volunteers General convention story
April	50,000 1-2,000 (gays) 9,000 (VVAW)	"Leaders of the Chicago '68 protest" Gay group leader VVAW leader	5,000 100,000	Unspecified public officials Greater Miami Crime Commission
May	100,000	Jerry Rubin	100,000 100,000	"Health officials" Snowplow spokesmen
June	20-30,000 1,200 (NWRO)	"Yippie leader" NWRO spokesman	"up to 100,000" 6,000 100,000	general convention story George Rodericks Public Health Official
July	25,000	"non-delegate leaders"	6,000 5-8,000	Unspecified authorities Ray Goode

As time passed, it seemed a certainty that the RNC would attract far more demonstrators than the DNC. However, valid estimates were difficult to make in either instance. At the June 9 joint convention planning session, it was announced that they had "no hard and fast numbers." The June 16 meeting, it was admitted that we were "not able to come up with any numbers of people expected."

Several days later, representatives of the FBI met with Chief Pomerance and told him that they believed that less than 5,000 demonstrators would be coming to Miami Beach to participate in the DNC. This estimate was said to be based on an analysis of airline, bus and railroad reservations coupled with other information they had developed. Thus, for the first time, Chief Pomerance had what he considered to be a valid estimate of demonstrator strength.

At the June 30 planning meeting, Chief Pomerance informed the session that intelligence information and advice from counter culture group leaders as well as experts in the field indicate that the number of "non-delegates" intending to come to Miami Beach to demonstrate at the DNC is decidedly less than previously predicted and may not exceed 6,000. He warned against unnecessary publicity in this regard. Thus, for the first time, the MBPD had arrived at an estimated figure in which they placed sufficient confidence that it could be announced to and accepted by the police community. That this estimate was given ten days before the start of the DNC suggests one fundamental difficulty which affected the overall process of planning for the convention. There was no mutually accepted estimate of the number of demonstrators expected upon which all other plans could be based.

One of the stated purposes of the intelligence function was to allay community fears about the number of demonstrators expected in Miami Beach. This need was not apparently met by definitive statements from the police. Before June 30, police officials studiously avoided public references to the topic. Into this vacuum stepped an assortment of people who freely offered their own estimates. Some of the spokesmen held official positions while others occupied positions of importance in the community. Still others were putative leaders of protest groups which would be represented at the conventions. With regard to the DNC, Yippie Jerry Rubin's announcement carried in newspapers across the country in November of 1971 that one million demonstrators would be present in San Diego for the RNC created an ominous background for considering how many would come to Miami Beach. Published estimates for the DNC convention were consistently well below this hyperbolic Yippie statement but were nevertheless sufficient to cause disquiet in the beach community.

The published estimates of official and quasi-official spokesmen up to the end of June were generally no more realistic than the exaggerations of the demonstration group leaders. Had George Rodericks not ignored Chief Pomerance's caution at the June 30th planning session against

Selected Estimates of the Number of Demonstrators Expected at  
the RNC as Published in Miami Area Newspapers

Month	Demonstration Group Leaders		Official/Quasi-Official Spokesmen	
	Number	Source	Number	Source
April	50-100,000	San Diego Coalition of Anti-War Youth Groups	100-200,000 "Upward of 50,000"	Snowplow Spokesman Miami Beach City Councilman
May	100,000	Abbie Hoffman	100,000 50,000 100,000	Snowplow Spokesmen General Convention Story General Convention Story-Cuban Newspaper
June	15,000 Vets	Scott Camil	"5,000 to 100,000, take your choice" "The figures of 75-100,000 are pure rhetoric"	General Convention Story Chief Pomerance
August	5-10,000 "At least 6,000" "10,000 or as low as 5,000"	Protest Group Coalition Yippie Jeff Nightbyrd Protest Organizer	"It's still too early to talk about numbers." "Below even 5,000"	Chief Pomerance "Police estimate" in general convention story

"unnecessary publicity" of the 6,000 person estimate, the Miami Beach community would have lived through a period of grave uncertainty and almost gone into the DNC with an estimate of 100,000 in mind. Only the county chairman's reference to an estimated 5-8,000 demonstrators stands as an effort on the part of local officials to quiet the fears of the public.

RNC Estimations. Estimations of the number of demonstrators expected at the RNC had some basic reference points which guided the calculations. First, it was known that the RNC would attract a greater number of persons than the DNC. Second, it was determined that at its peak, the DNC drew only 3,500 demonstrators. At this time, official intelligence reports were relatively tempered in tone. A July 29 estimate stated: "It is difficult at this time to estimate the number of demonstrators that will be present at the RNC. However, left wing groups have estimated that their support will reach 10,000 to 20,000. Based on available intelligence, it is believed that they are capable of gaining approximately 5,000 non-delegates."

A later intelligence estimate issued just a few days before the start of the second convention contained the following: "It is currently anticipated that the number of non-delegates at the RNC will be approximately 3,500 to 5,000." In the case of both conventions, intelligence estimates of the number of demonstrators given shortly before the start of the event were exceedingly accurate.

To the larger community, whose sources of information came from local newspapers, estimates of the number of demonstrators expected in Miami Beach for the RNC continued to be disturbing until the month of the event. It should be noted that during the time of the decision to hold the RNC in Miami Beach, demonstration group leaders and official spokesmen were generally in agreement on the hordes of protesters that could be expected. However, it should also be noted that by the time the RNC convention approached, both the protest leaders and the official spokesmen had reduced their estimates to realistic levels. Another notable difference in this preconvention period was the fact that the local newspapers gave attention to the efforts of Chief Pomerance to moderate the exaggerated estimates of others. For example, in a June 7 newspaper article, Chief Pomerance was quoted as saying, "No one has any idea how many will attend, and I think the excessively large numbers are just fright figures." In the case of the RNC, the goal of satisfying community concern was addressed by the police.

INTENTIONS OF THE DEMONSTRATORS. The question of the number of demonstrators estimated to be coming to the conventions was a matter of primary importance for police planning. Parallel to this question was one related to the intentions of the demonstrators. On the face of it, their intentions were to lawfully demonstrate their dissenting political views. However, things are not always as they appear to be.



Obviously, the uncontrolled exuberance of lawful dissent has sometimes spilled over into unlawful acts. Beyond this, it must also be recognized that the occasion of mass dissent has also been accompanied by the intentionally lawless acts of a few. Hence, there was a need to make an assessment of the potential of the collective demonstrators and the subgroups within them to act unlawfully.

If acts of extreme violence were planned during the national political conventions, certainly lesser degrees of unlawful conduct could be expected. More specifically, if it could be determined that some who were coming to Miami Beach for the conventions possessed weapons and the ability to use them, then other forms of criminality could also be anticipated.

Beginning in April and continuing through August, intelligence reports carried a number of items related to weaponry. Information about the theft, purchase, transportation, use, possession and storage of weapons was contained in the intelligence reports of the preconvention and convention periods. Although the items concentrated on rifles, handguns, ammunition and tear gas cannisters, other items ranged from the extreme of hand grenades, land mines, explosives, napalm, anti-tank bazookas, and machine guns to stink bombs, bows and arrows, crossbows, wrist rockets and steel guitar string choking devices. If these reports were valid, the safety of public officials and candidates was in jeopardy, and the political process of a national nominations convention was threatened with extinction.

Investigations were initiated to determine the validity of this information. Where candidate security was involved, the investigative responsibility fell to the Secret Service. In other instances, investigations were carried out by other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The prominence of the VVAW in the planned demonstrations intensified the efforts of the investigators. As a group, VVAW members were experienced in the use of the wide range of weapons described in the intelligence reports.

As a result of these extensive efforts, all reports were either confirmed or denied. Some weapons were recovered, other weapons were voluntarily turned in. The VVAW never came forth with weapons during either convention. All things considered, much credence must be placed in the opinion of one intelligence representative who stated that the dissidents tried to play on the fears of the police by generating rumors of weaponry. In retrospect, the circulation of these reports appeared to be a deliberate tactic to incite police.

Obviously, the attempt to make a judgement about the intentions of the demonstrators from their weapons capability was beset with difficulty. As it turned out, the protesters appeared to be circulating these reports deliberately to create an intended effect. Although this activity

is far less serious than the readiness to use weapons, it nevertheless leads one to question whether the demonstrators intentions were merely to express their dissenting views.

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

At the joint convention planning meeting held on May 12, one week after the change of the RNC to Miami Beach, the heightened interest in intelligence on demonstrator groups was intended to be satisfied in part by the appearance of George Rodericks, a consultant from Washington, D. C. with extensive experience in dealing with "movement people." One of the things he told the men attending the meeting pertained to the intelligence ability of this group: "They work 365 days a year making damn sure that they know you and know all they can about you so they won't be tricked."

Rodericks' observation was, of course, known to the intelligence groups and counter-intelligence activity was already underway. Stories that exaggerated the technical capabilities of the police and the nature of security measures were circulated among the demonstrators. In this instance, the intelligence group appeared to have made a correct assessment of the inability of the demonstrator's putative intelligence effort to validate incoming information. From feedback information received from various sources, it was learned that several of these fabrications were accepted as reality and tended to restrain the actions of the demonstrators.

Other stories, based in reality, were made known to the demonstrator groups. These centered on the antagonism, if not hostility, of the Cuban population toward the demonstrators. Even without any help from the intelligence community, the Cuban threat was directly perceived by the demonstrators and tended to moderate their activities. As Chief Pomerance later observed as a result of his meetings with anti-establishment groups, "Their greatest fear is what the Cubans could do."

The demonstration groups also engaged in this same kind of ploy. As previously mentioned, a common strategy was to circulate exaggerated stories not only about their weaponry but also about their numbers, their intentions, and their tactics. It was hoped that the police intelligence system would be incapacitated by information overflow and consequently would be unable to separate fact from fiction. To the credit of the intelligence group, the circulation of spurious information by the demonstrators did not incapacitate the intelligence center. This input was subjected to routine evaluation and analysis.

Some observers of the conventions from outside the police community have questioned the legitimacy if not the wisdom of the police for engaging in such deceptive acts. On the face of it, it does appear to be contrary to Chief Pomerance's open door policy. In all fairness, the same question should be raised in the case of the demonstrators circulation of

bizarre rumors about their weapons capability. A partial answer to the question emerges if one considers the intended outcomes of these actions. In the case of the police, their intentions were to quell the situation, to control the unrestrained behavior of the demonstrators, and to reduce their willingness to act unlawfully. In the case of the demonstrators, their intentions appear to have been to incite fear and to create a readiness for violence. All things considered, the greater morality appears to inhere in the actions of the police.

RUMORS. Because of the protesters tendency to circulate rumors intended to arouse the public and manipulate their collective attitudes, it was necessary to give attention to setting up a system outside the Intelligence Center for processing this kind of information. Originally, the need to deal with rumors was thought to be met through an organization called Switchboard. Switchboard was to operate a telephone center for receiving rumors and ascertaining their validity. The organization was to be operated by dissidents and was to serve their unique needs.

On March 23, staff members of the Community Relations Service, the U. S. Department of Justice, attended the convention planning meeting and offered to set up a rumor control and information center. The center would coordinate the processing of rumors received from the general public. As planned, the center would establish communications with as many elements in the county as possible. Switchboard was to be one point of contact. The plan of CRS was to be given further consideration.

On May 5, CRS personnel again attended the convention planning session and outlined their present plans. They sought to establish a center in Command Post Beta, the court liaison office, DNC party headquarters, various third party observer groups, as well as the demonstrator groups.

Because of the necessity for a rumor control center to serve an area beyond Miami Beach, the center was eventually set up by the CRS under the control of Robert Sims, Director of Dade County Community Relations Board. This board, which coordinated the activities of all volunteer observer groups, was an appropriate organizational setting for the CRS center. Here the center would be able to establish lines of communication with a diverse range of citizen contacts. Ideally the rumor control center was an important point of contact for the entire community - including the police. In actual operation, the rumor control center appeared to serve an important function for the public. However, attempts by the intelligence personnel to obtain information from the center during the conventions were less than satisfactory.

#### SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The intelligence activities carried out by the MBPD were, in large measure, a function of the preconceptions of the Chief. The respect he had



for the law and its constitutional protections set the underlying theme of his plans. Whether he viewed the demonstrators as political dissenters or destroyers was also decisive. As lawful dissenters, he could work relatively openly to make the expression of their political views possible. As unlawful destroyers, he faced a challenging adversary which necessitated covert methods of developing information about their true intentions.

In making decisions about the ways in which he would develop information as input to the intelligence system, he was not insensitive to the feelings of many Miami Beach citizens with Jewish backgrounds. He anticipated that many of the residents in the community would have reacted negatively to the ideas of infiltrators and informers. For this reason, he did not actively seek information from the general citizenry.

Significantly, Chief Pomerance avoided any approach which would lead to grand generalizations about the demonstrators. As the leader of convention security, he sought to be able to make valid distinctions among the demonstrators. To this end, he needed a variety of information sources which functioned in support of one another. He recognized that an emphasis on one approach could negate the use of other approaches.

OVERT SOURCES. From the start, the need for intelligence about the wide variety of non-delegate groups expected to attend the DNC was critical. As described earlier, there was an urgent need to know the size of the groups, their composition, their intentions and their capabilities. Each agency involved in the conventions had to make an early decision as to how they would satisfy their need for intelligence. At bottom, this decision became somewhat of an act of faith made on the basis of whether the non-delegates were believed to be coming to Miami Beach primarily for lawful demonstrations or unlawful disruptions.

Consistent with Chief Pomerance's outgoing personality and his overall approach to dealing with the myriad of convention related matters, he sought to obtain the information he felt he needed on the non-delegate groups by frequent and open discussion and gathering information overtly primarily by asking the leaders of the demonstration groups the questions he needed answers for. As a result, feelings of limited mutual trust were established between many group leaders and the Miami Beach police command. The side benefit of this open door policy was that the bond of trust created in these early meetings permeated the ongoing relationships between the police and the demonstrators and set the stage for relatively open communication during the actual conventions.

Consistent with this approach of meeting directly with demonstration group leaders was a reliance on other overt methods of information gathering. In developing information about the demonstrators and their plans, the MBPD intelligence representative, like other members of the intelligence community, was aware of the fact that the press was utilized by demonstration leaders as one of their primary approaches to generating



interest in and support of their protests. This was their primary means of conveying information to one another about their planned activities. Because of the geographical spread of protest groups around the nation, their concentration in certain areas, and their unique organizational structure, protest leaders were heavily dependent on the underground press as a means of communication. As a result of this knowledge, the intelligence group systematically obtained copies of underground newspapers and related publications distributed in selected cities across the nation. Reports of plans in these publications, although inflammatory in tone, contained much information which was useful to intelligence specialists.

As the time of each convention drew near, useful information was also obtained from the major local newspapers. Many protest leaders were in the Miami area weeks before the start of each convention. During this period, they sought and received considerable public attention. To maintain their positions as leaders, they took advantage of the many opportunities for public exposure. In their preliminary negotiations with various officials, they often referred to their plans. Newspaper accounts of these meetings were useful sources of information in developing strategic and tactical information about the demonstrators.

COVERT SOURCES. Ideally, the verification of information coming into an intelligence system is best accomplished when several sources, both overt and covert, produce consistent information. This is as true in the operation of a single department intelligence unit as it is for a complex cooperative intelligence effort of the kind set up for the 1972 political conventions. In each case, a decision must be made regarding the balance between the use of overt and covert sources of information. Reality dictates that the decision does not take the form of exclusive reliance on either overt or covert methods. During the preparations for the DNC, Chief Pomerance set the balance for his department heavily in favor of overt collection of information while other agencies chose to emphasize to a greater degree the use of covert sources. It should be recognized that it would have been difficult for anyone in this situation to have pursued both approaches equally. In a sense, one method is inimical to the other.

Preparation for the DNC was but one of many activities carried out by the MBPD during the first six months of 1972. Obviously, they still had their primary responsibility for providing the full range of police services to the city of Miami Beach. Essential to this general responsibility was the specific task of narcotic enforcement and the use of undercover police investigators was previously deemed necessary to carry out that police function. Because of the concentration of illicit narcotics use in the age group coming to Miami Beach to demonstrate, it was inevitable that the MBPD undercover narcotic officers would be drawn into supplying their department with information about the demonstrators which they had obtained covertly. As the DNC approached and the decision was made

to move the more troublesome RNC to Miami Beach, circumstances dictated that these undercover officers would come across more information about demonstrator groups. Thus, while Chief Pomerance publicly avowed his commitment to an open door policy with regard to the demonstrators, he, like all the other agencies, was obtaining some information from undercover operatives.

The effectiveness of this approach, which held reliance on covert methods of information gathering to a minimum, is difficult to determine. During the preliminary convention period when each of the law enforcement agencies carried out their intelligence operations in relative independence of one another, it does not appear that the MBPD was disadvantaged by limited information. Such differences in strategic intelligence that appeared to be evident among the departments could not be traced to different approaches to information gathering. In the multi-agency intelligence operation that operated during the conventions, the emphasis of one department on open methods complemented the more clandestine approaches of other agencies.

The question of the effectiveness of either approach should not be considered in the abstract, i. e. which method is most effective in producing useful information. Rather, in reality, the question must be considered in regard to each specific situation. Because Chief Pomerance committed himself to an open and above board approach to obtaining information and building working relationships with the leaders of the demonstration groups, this method worked for him. He committed his resources to follow this approach. Others who placed greater reliance on covert methods found that these methods met their needs. They, too, committed their resources in a different way. In this situation, the success of either method was self-fulfilling.

The knotty part of the situation arose with regard to the apparent reluctance of Miami Beach command officers to submit information into the combined intelligence center about their meetings with leading demonstrators. In the view of the number of officers involved in intelligence, the outcomes of the meetings between the Miami Beach command and the demonstrators were not reported. Even the fact that there had been a meeting was often not disclosed as input to the intelligence system.

When high ranking Miami Beach officials met with the demonstrators, a promise of confidentiality was exchanged regarding the nature of their discussions. One result of such promises was a conflict between the pledge of confidentiality to the group leaders and the obligation to fully support the overall intelligence effort. The combination of the reliance of MBPD personnel on non-traditional open methods of obtaining information from demonstration group leaders and the reluctance of command personnel to share information concerning these meetings with other participants in the intelligence system detracted to some degree from Chief Pomerance's position of leadership. On balance, he had weighed the consequences of his actions and had chosen to live with the resulting conflict.

EVALUATIVE COMMENTS. The individual pursuit of convention related intelligence by each of the three law enforcement agencies during the planning stages seems not only to have set the stage for the later withholding of information but also may have made the coordinated planning of other activities more difficult. Unless all agencies had the same information base upon which to build their mutual plans, disagreements would tend to result. Common understandings about the number of demonstrators expected and the possibility for problems to arise on the mainland were crucial in coming to an agreement on manpower needs and tactical plans. Even though all agencies received an important part of their intelligence from the same federal agencies, it appears that there were differences in strategic intelligence accepted by each agency as the basis for their planning.

In such a complex situation as that created by the 1972 political conventions, the early coordination of intelligence among the various agencies was an essential precondition to the establishment of the Intelligence Center. Ideally, this should have been planned for. However, once again, a combination of circumstances tended to make this objective unattainable.

#### ORIENTATION OF OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL

One of the central problems in the support of an intelligence operation is the matter of trust and the active involvement of other officers in gathering raw information. Though this is true of men of all ranks, it is especially so for men at the basic operational level. The failure to recognize this was in part the cause of the inability of the intelligence system to generate usable tactical intelligence at the start of the DNC. The belief expressed by a member of FDLE that "You get all the tactical intelligence you want when you send that first car out on the street" may be true under ideal circumstances, if the men in the field have been given an adequate understanding of their role in the overall system. The question then becomes one of determining to what extent field personnel were informed about their crucial role in producing information and to a limited extent consuming intelligence output.

In an effort to give the members of the MBPD information about the intelligence needs related to the convention, Sgt. Goddard delivered a 15-minute lecture on the subject to the men attending the MBPD training program. This fell far short of the 16 hours of training on intelligence operations stated in the original MBPD grant application.

Prior to the start of the DNC, tours of the command post were given to interested police personnel assigned to the convention center. During this brief walk-through, the men were shown communications equipment, maps and charts. An awareness of the multi-agency participation was created. Before going out on the street, men were given



briefings as to what could be anticipated. Their role in obtaining information was stressed and the methods of reporting this information were reviewed. The use of field interrogation reports was also covered. During lulls in convention activities, Sgt. Goddard toured the fence line and spoke informally with the men assigned there. They were given reports on pertinent matters and again told what to look for. The younger officers showed great interest in knowing the number of demonstrators on the other side of the fence. These approaches of Sgt. Goddard were intended to dispel some of the disenchantment that uniformed officers had for the intelligence function and to enlist their active cooperation.

As a system, intelligence was subjected to some unnecessary criticism by operational personnel - particularly at the command level. On the one hand, the system was described as being "sluggish" in processing information. On the other hand, it was also criticized as being "unreliable" for sending out unscreened information. On the face of it, these two charges reflect a lack of understanding of the inherent conflict which intelligence operations typically face. The validation of incoming information takes time. Yet, operational personnel need intelligence as rapidly as possibly.

A system must strike a delicate balance in regard to these conflicting needs with each assignment it undertakes. That this is true is not unrecognized by experienced police officers. What appears to have been the case is that the system was a vulnerable target for criticism - some based on rational considerations, some based on irrational considerations. The carping that took place could have been minimized had the orientation for field personnel more thoroughly covered intelligence operations and realistically structured the expectations of the consumers of its output as to what the system could and could not do. In other instances, criticism could have been reduced by the preparation of written guidelines regarding access to intelligence output to other members of the department. This would have been particularly helpful in relationship to the sharing of selected intelligence with the MBPD public information officer. All things considered, it would appear that the training input on intelligence was too brief and the other methods of orientation affected too few people to really make them effective in changing the opinion others held of the intelligence operation.

#### ORIENTATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

The disenchantment between operational and intelligence personnel was reciprocal. In a number of instances, intelligence reports clearly indicated that a significant event was to occur 24 to 48 hours in advance. Much to the dismay of the intelligence group, when these events took place, there was no evidence that field personnel anticipated their occurrence.



There is a need for feedback from the field that the outcome of the work of intelligence personnel is being used. To some extent, feedback was obtained in the daily briefing sessions of the intelligence staff and field commanders. Beyond this, there appears to be a more general need for the orientation of intelligence personnel regarding the uses made of their information by operational personnel. The basic premise that intelligence is intended to help the police command make better decisions should be stressed in such an orientation.

### WITHHOLDING INFORMATION

One criteria of the success or failure of the intelligence system is in large measure a consequence of the extent to which the intelligence group can hold the trust of others who produce raw information and consume the intelligence output. Unfortunately, there appears to have been a number of instances where an adequate measure of trust in the intelligence system was lacking.

When the intelligence group first began to hold their bi-weekly meetings and discuss the need for a central depository of information, it appears that the support given to a combined intelligence center was in the abstract. Each agency paid lip service to the concept of full cooperation at the meetings. After the meetings were over, the intelligence representatives proceeded to act independently. For one thing, each went ahead and made his own estimates of the number of demonstrators expected. The preoccupation of each representative with the needs of his own jurisdiction tended to spill over into the actual operation of the intelligence center. Despite avowals of the intelligence group that their efforts would not be diminished by the entanglements of others, they were unable to insulate themselves from these outside influences.

A mystique surrounds intelligence operations. Part of this results from a lack of information about the nature of the activity while the greater part comes from the emotions. Knowledge is, in fact, power. To experience real or imagined exclusion from the intelligence output of the system leads to the stoppage of information input. To raise the question of another's "need to know" tends to make him bristle. Although it is difficult to deal with the affective component of the mystique of intelligence, it is an easier matter to improve the situation by informing others in realistic terms about the system and its functions. These considerations were not unknown in the intelligence group but they nevertheless continued to intrude in the efforts to cooperatively produce intelligence.

Before and during the conventions, there was a constant feeling within the intelligence group as well as outside it that information was being withheld. At planning meetings, it frequently happened that a statement would be made and others would react by saying, "Oh, you never told me about that." Though this was explained away as an unintentional act

of carelessness during a period of rushed activity, the result was a weakening of cooperative efforts.

At the June 2 joint convention planning meeting, reference was made to a previous meeting of police chiefs in the Miami area. "There is a great feeling that somebody is keeping a lot of information from us" was said to describe the collective emotions of the chiefs in the nearby smaller jurisdictions. With the exception of Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood, whose representatives regularly attended the intelligence meetings, Sgt. Goddard set out to personally contact these chiefs and inform them of their role in the intelligence system. This was a laudable effort.

The withholding of information took other forms which were not so easily dealt with. Within the intelligence group, it was commonly felt that local officials who met with demonstration group leaders in closed sessions to negotiate certain issues related to their needs and plans failed to provide the intelligence center with information about the outcomes of the meetings. In another variation on this theme, an important state official found that he could not even obtain information on parade applications and permits issued to the demonstrators despite the fact that this information should have been a matter of public record.

The Miami Beach City Manager, Clifford O'Key also felt that he was getting insufficient information about convention activities even though he was given verbal briefings by Chief Pomerance. As the titular head law enforcement officer according to the city charter, he felt he was entitled to further information in order to respond to questions raised by the city council. In a July 12 memo to Chief Pomerance, he wrote "I am not satisfied that I am receiving adequate information." Consequently, he specifically requested that he receive "written summarizations of all actions during the previous 24 hours" and "copies of those intelligence reports emanating from the intelligence units."

On the intra-departmental level, the intelligence representatives sometimes withheld information from other members of their own department by invoking the lack of a right to know. Even the prohibition against physical access to the intelligence center was interpreted by some as an act of withholding information. In the opinion of many men who merely wanted to view the center, this denial represented a form of status derogation.

The after-action reports of several law enforcement agencies made repeated reference to the withholding of information. One such reference in an RNC after-action report read as follows: "As before, some agencies tended to hold back information or gave information on a limited basis." This withholding was not confined to agencies at the local level. One observer of the intelligence system noted that "there had been insufficient cooperation from some federal agencies in providing strategic intelligence to Florida law enforcement officials." However, this view

did not reflect the feelings of Chief Pomerance. He felt that he had received excellent cooperation from federal law enforcement agencies throughout the time of the conventions.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that real or imagined withholding of information from another tends to produce a real reaction of restraint. It should be recognized that an intelligence system which is dependent in large measure on the input of information from others must be careful to avoid the creation of uncooperative reactions from these sources in the law enforcement community. This is true on both the inter-agency and intra-agency level. Once this reaction occurs, it tends to be infectious and difficult to counteract.

### NEED FOR VALID ESTIMATES

Published reports in the press and intelligence estimates of the number of demonstrators expected in Miami Beach varied considerably. Almost without exception, the reports were overestimations. Several reasons were offered for this kind of consistent error:

1. The need to secure manpower commitments or to withhold the commitment of manpower elsewhere could be justified by overinflated figures.
2. The competition for federal funds invited exaggerated reports of the magnitude of the demonstrators.
3. In carrying out covert negotiations with demonstration group leaders, it was undesirable for the police to undercut their leadership image by publicly scaling down their inflated figures of the size of their followers.
4. In preparing officers for duty at the demonstrations, it was self-defeating to get the men into a condition of physical and psychological readiness, and then refer to minimal estimates of demonstrator strength.
5. As a general rule, it is better to err in planning for too many rather than too few demonstrators. As one agency head said, "I hope that we are seriously criticized afterward for overpreparation."

Though these reasons are understandable, there was a more compelling need to derive an estimate which could have been accepted by everyone in the police community as realistic. It is unfortunate that one intelligence representative felt that the figures on demonstrators published in the weekly intelligence estimates were deliberately overinflated. The



estimates were said to be magnified for "political reasons." In such a setting, the problems of interagency planning were aggravated.

#### TACTICAL ESTIMATES OF CROWD SIZES

Problems related to the estimation of crowd sizes took another form with regard to tactical intelligence. As a demonstration group moved toward its destination, different scout teams would give reports on their size, location and direction. Variations in the reported estimations of the group's size caused some confusion for the personnel receiving these reports. What was in reality one group was thought to be several and as a consequence, the police responses to the situation were inappropriate. The problems of making valid estimations were magnified by the sometimes shifting composition of the groups and the accumulation of an assortment of interested third parties along the way.

All Miami Beach personnel were given an instruction sheet titled "crowd estimator" to assist them in making estimates of crowd sizes based upon the number of people who would fill areas of known dimensions. Each estimate made on this basis could then be adjusted to three density factors. Be that as it may, all convention personnel were not given the information. More particularly, the scout teams were unpracticed in making estimations. Further, the recipients of the reported estimates should have been prepared to accept the estimations with certain tolerance limits.

Although the problem of making estimates of the number of demonstrators in a group was not a crucial one, it was nevertheless troublesome for those who received the estimates and had to base their tactical decisions on this information. Despite the fact that the present methods of making estimations are relatively crude, training can be given to operational personnel which will improve their estimates. Such training should involve practice in making estimations of actual groups and filmed projections of groups of varying densities. In addition, miscalculations arising from the perception of a crowd as threatening should be demonstrated.

#### DIMINISHING COMMUNITY FEARS

The objective set by Sgt. Goddard to satisfy community concern about the large numbers of demonstrators expected to come to Miami Beach appears not to have been forthrightly met. During the series of events leading up to the DNC, Chief Pomerance and his representatives appeared to have been silent while other non-police spokesmen proceeded to make inflated reports. However, preliminary to the RNC, some attention appeared to have been given to meeting this important objective. Though criticism in this regard seems merited, it must be softened in light of the following realities:



MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT


CROWD ESTIMATOR

C O D E


Code (1) = Tightly Packed = Approximately 5 persons per square yard.

Code (2) = Medium Packed = Approximately 3 persons per square yard.


Code (3) = Loosely Packed = Approximately 1 person per square yard.




Code: (1) = 25,000 persons  
 (2) = 15,000 persons  
 (3) = 5,000 persons




Code: (1) = 3,000 persons  
 (2) = 1,800 persons  
 (3) = 600 persons



Code: (1) = 50,000 persons  
 (2) = 30,000 persons  
 (3) = 10,000 persons



Code: (1) = 10,000 persons  
 (2) = 3,000 persons  
 (3) = 1,000 persons



1-Lane

Code: (1) = 15,400 persons  
 (2) = 9,240 persons  
 (3) = 3,080 persons

3-Lanes

Code: (1) = 45,000 persons  
 (2) = 27,720 persons  
 (3) = 9,240 persons

1. Great difficulties exist in deriving valid estimates.
2. Countering the numerical estimates of others with generalities is ineffective.
3. A possible bias in news coverage may have eliminated the tempered comments of Chief Pomerance and his staff.

In any event, it would seem appropriate that the police effort to calm community fears should have been carried out more actively.

Directly related to dealing with this aspect of the community's attitudes was the matter of controlling rumors. Although the rumor control and information center appeared to meet the less exacting needs of the greater Miami community, the center was inadequate in its responses to the needs of the Intelligence Center. An awareness of the necessary attention which the intelligence system needed to give to the rumors being circulated in the area by the dissidents leads to the observation that a greater degree of control over the rumor control and information center should have been exercised by the police leadership. This could have been done even though the CRS desired to avoid the appearance of being controlled by the police and were required to respect the confidentiality of their sources of information.

#### LOCATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CENTER

The location of the intelligence center in the auditorium basement satisfied a number of important technical needs. However, its location was less than ideal. The floor space was inadequate. To some, it appeared unsightly and disorganized. The high noise level was sometimes oppressive. The constant din of speech and the undertone of ventilator fans combined with the blare of radio monitors and ringing telephones. The poor acoustical characteristics of the basement aggravated the situation. In all fairness, there was no ideal choice in this matter. Both the installation of additional sound deadening material and equipment modifications would have been costly. The practical realities of the situation dictated that the shortcomings simply had to be tolerated. In future situations of this kind, attention should be paid to the overall acoustical qualities of the center during the early planning stages.

#### INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

When attention is given to the value of the reports prepared by the intelligence group, their usefulness can hardly be questioned. These reports, coupled with background information supplied during the daily intelligence briefings, gave field commanders timely and accurate

information. As a group, these commanders were unanimous in stating that there were "no surprises." In light of the apparent value of these reports, the pace of events on the streets, and the rush of activities carried out in the Intelligence Center, it is somewhat picayune to note that there was a need to routinize the preparation and distribution of intelligence reports. Be that as it may, good information should not be lost or obscured as a consequence of careless or rushed reporting procedures.

Report titles should have been standardized to a greater degree. Also, reports should have been numbered serially so each recipient would be sure that he had the complete series of reports prepared under a particular title. This is especially important because the procedures for distributing the reports did not assure that each designated commander received every report. Many reports were undated and this made them less useful as a reference. Further, the content of some reports was inappropriate for the report title. For example, several after-action reports included what was apparently raw information about certain events that would occur. Extra copies of reports for intra-agency distribution were sometimes unreadable because of poor quality duplication. All things considered, there was a need to be more systematic in the preparation and distribution of intelligence reports.

Not to be overlooked is the value of the intelligence study of protest groups. The intelligence coordinators were both aware of the need to make distinctions among the variety of groups expected to attend the conventions. They were both aware of the problems which occurred at the 1968 Chicago convention as a result of the inability of the police to discriminate among groups of protesters. They were mindful of the meaning of the following paragraph contained in the report entitled Rights in Conflict submitted by Daniel Walker to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence:

"In determining the security precautions needed to cope with large numbers of demonstrations, the intelligence agencies apparently made little effort to distinguish between the philosophies and intents of various groups. They were concerned not with whether a group advocated violence or adhered to non-violent tenets, but with the dangers inherent in large crowds of demonstrators, regardless of whether all members espouse violence. They believed that even an orderly crowd of peaceful demonstrators could easily develop into a mob and could be led by a few determined agitators to violent action."

This single strategic intelligence study was an important part of the overall objective to enable the MBPD personnel to make distinctions among the groups present. The content of this study was a useful complement to the training program which also focused on the need for the police to recognize differences among groups in terms of their intentions and capabilities for unlawful conduct. Undoubtedly, this one study



was a valuable input to the decision making process of field commanders but it should be recognized that additional in-depth studies would have made the early study of groups even more valuable. Reference has already been made to the value of a subject matter report on weaponry as a means of corroborating other intelligence centered on the intentions of the groups. Additional intelligence studies on such subjects as communications equipment and capabilities, vehicles, group interrelationships and leadership rivalry would have given field commanders another dimension of background information about the groups they were dealing with.

Another apparent problem related to the intelligence study of demonstration groups was that it influenced the format of later intelligence reports and perhaps the conceptions of those who read these reports. Entries in intelligence reports were categorized under the names of the separate demonstration groups. Unfortunately, the demonstrators did not conform to this conceptual schema, particularly during the last days of the RNC. Except for the VVAW, group identities were weakened or lost during this period. When this occurred, the format of the intelligence reports appeared to be mismatched to the reality of what had occurred. Though this impression may have been countered through briefings, it nevertheless underscores the need for intelligence reports to have some flexibility in format in order to realistically reflect changes in the situations described.

As part of an ideal approach to strategic intelligence, special subject matter reports have great usefulness but it must also be acknowledged that comprehensive reports of this kind are difficult and tedious to assemble. However, at their simplest level, intelligence studies could have been prepared from the information which existed in other reports generated by the Intelligence Center. Selected entries on a given subject could have been extracted and logically ordered. If time and resources were available, additional intelligence studies of this kind should have been prepared and distributed to command personnel.

#### LACK OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

The multi-agency intelligence center described in the supplementary MBPD grant request was to be designed to "obtain, process and disseminate convention related strategic information." It is significant to note that no reference was given to tactical intelligence needs.

At this time, the pre-convention period, the need of Chief Pomerance and the other agency heads was for strategic intelligence. However, once the conventions began, the primary need shifted to tactical intelligence. As has been said, the system was found to be inadequate at the start of the DNC to produce useful tactical information and several modifications were hurriedly made. At this point in time, the FDLE became the target of criticism arising from this crucial oversight. Their



analysts were trained as organized crime specialists. Their consultant-analyst was a former CIA employee. In both cases, these FDLE personnel were thought to be unfamiliar with the machinations of dissident groups and the operational needs of the police. In this situation, the target was vulnerable. In reality, the momentary inadequacy of the system to produce useful tactical intelligence at the start of the first convention is a criticism which should have been shared by all agencies involved in planning, staffing and operating the intelligence center. In this instance, divisiveness seems to have come to the surface.

## RESPONSIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM

There is no doubt that there were many problems related to intelligence both in the planning stages and during the time of the conventions. Perhaps the most telling of all these problems were the evidences of restricting the information input, the withholding of intelligence and the duplication of effort. These problems occurred among different agencies and between individuals on the same department as well.

Because intelligence is so highly valued, the activities related to its production are clouded with secrecy. Perhaps as a consequence of its intrinsic value, intelligence is the last thing to be shared with others in a cooperative venture. Each agency head was preoccupied with his immediate responsibilities, each experienced the press of time, and each experienced delays and uncertainties. In this setting, personal sensitivities tended to come to the surface. Yet, to the credit of the men who shaped the system, it worked for each of them - singly and collectively. By and large, valid strategic intelligence was developed and useful tactical intelligence was produced for each agency head.

The system had remarkable flexibility and a built in capability for improvement. Where gaps occurred, they were plugged. Where problems existed, they were corrected. Where new needs arose, they were met. In the final analysis, the system generally gave the command of the MBPD valid intelligence appropriate for the decisions they had to make.

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## POLICE EQUIPMENT

The original MBPD grant application contained an extensive listing of equipment which was thought to be necessary "to equip this department with certain devices in augmentation of local resources so as to enhance present capabilities." The federal funds requested by the MBPD for the purpose of equipment acquisition was \$228,408 or 57.7% of the total federal support asked for the policing of the Democratic National Convention. The equipment specified was to be used for both operational and research purposes. The application also stated that the equipment would "be of benefit to local police agencies in the accomplishment of police services."

By far the greatest need was for communications equipment. Over 78% of the total equipment funds requested were to be used for the purchase of such items as portable radio transmitters, a paging system, a radio scrambler system, closed circuit television equipment and a mobile command van. The next largest amount requested was to be used for night vision devices with an assortment of related lenses and for high intensity lights. These items made up 8.4% of the total.

A mini-van for the transportation of police personnel, equipment and prisoners was the next most costly item in the list of equipment originally requested. The price of this van constituted 6.4% of the total funds initially requested for equipment acquisition. Further details of the equipment needs listed in the original grant application are shown in Table 1.

When the decision to hold the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach was announced on May 5, 1972, a number of additions and changes were made in the plans of the MBPD. For one thing, they sought

to augment their planning capability through the use of three police experts from other departments. These men, experienced in civil disorder control, were to provide technical assistance before and during the two conventions. In order to pay for their services, a revised grant application was submitted to LEAA. Expenditures for communications equipment were reduced by \$29,843 and the funds were to be reallocated to pay for the consultants' services and the FICA contribution for the project director. The downward adjustment in communications equipment expenditures was brought about by a decrease in the cost of re-crystallizing the radio units of cooperating police agencies, the purchase of microphone/ear speaker devices, and the elimination of the purchase of radio equipped helmets and radio scrambling devices. Overall, this revision reduced the funds requested for equipment purchase to 50.2% of the total federal support.

The following month, on June 22, 1972, MBPD submitted a supplemental grant application to LEAA. Additional funds were sought to take care of the cost of policing the second convention. In this instance, \$42,122 was sought to purchase additional equipment such as chemical agents, photographic equipment and personal protective equipment. As shown in Table 1, the total supplemental request for equipment purchases in this case constituted a much smaller proportion of the total project funds sought in the original and revised grant applications. Of the \$465,353 requested, only 9.1% was to be allocated for equipment purchases. Concurrent to the submission of this supplemental grant application, LEAA authorized the MBPD to acquire critical equipment up to \$70,000 in anticipation of the grant award.

An appreciation of the overall process of equipment acquisition, as well as the details of the specific items requested and received, can be gained from an examination of Table 2. The table traces the major equipment items listed in the original grant application, the modifications requested in the revised grant, the additional equipment listed in the supplemental grant application, and the equipment which was listed in the final after-action inventory.

In addition to the federal funds sought for the purchase of equipment, the MBPD also requested money for supplies and operating expenses. The details of the LEAA support requested are shown in Table 3. The item of greatest significance is, of course, the \$10,109 requested in the supplementary grant application for the installation of telephonic communications equipment in the five agency command posts, the intelligence center and the convention planning center.

Judgements about which equipment to buy were made on the basis of previous experience, anticipated events, known product specifications, and actual field tests. These decisions were supplemented by technical information given by independent experts and vendors. For grant purposes, the MBPD was authorized to use the resources of the General

TABLE 1

## LEAA FUNDS REQUESTED FOR EQUIPMENT

Items	Original Grant Application		Revised Grant Application		Supplementary Grant Application	
	Dollar Amount	Percent of Equip. Total	Dollar Amount	Percent of Equip. Total	Dollar Amount	Percent of Equip. Total
Communications Equip.	178,486	78.1	148,643	74.9		
Night Vision Devices	19,138	8.4	19,138	9.6		
Chemical Agents & Devices					15,916	37.8
Mini-Bus	14,500	6.4	14,500	7.3		
Photographic Equip.	3,684	1.6	3,684	1.9	10,213	24.3
Personal Protective Equip.					9,997	23.7
Physical Conditioning Equip.	5,000	2.2	5,000	2.5		
Armory	4,585	2.0	4,585	2.3		
Office Furniture					4,146	9.8
Graphic Display Equip.	2,725	1.2	2,725	1.4		
Crowd Control Devices					1,850	4.4
Fingerprint Equip.	290	.1	290	.1		
Total Equipment Funds	228,408	100.0	198,565	100.0	42,122	100.0
Total Project Funds	395,424	--	395,424	--	465,353	--



Services Administration for the acquisition of equipment and supplies. Under this authorization, the supply officer of the Federal Supply Service in the Atlanta Regional Office of GSA was to provide assistance to the MBPD in placing orders.

#### SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY SUPPLIES

At the joint planning session held on May 26, Mr. Arthur Sachs, the LEAA Property Control Manager, explained the procedures for borrowing supplemental property from the Department of Defense. Mr. Sachs explained that this equipment was ordinarily made available by two methods. First, under the DOD Emergency Program, equipment could be loaned to a civil police agency for a 15-day period once a riot was underway. In this instance, delivery would be immediate. Second, under the anticipatory program, selected equipment and supplies would be prepositioned at nearby military bases ready for movement into a potential riot area within 6-8 hours after request. Since neither of these arrangements was satisfactory for convention law enforcement purposes, Mr. Sachs stated that an arrangement could be made between LEAA and the DOD whereby a special consolidated equipment loan would be made based on the justification that "the requirements of the law enforcement agencies during this period exceed what they normally would need."

For purposes of borrowing property from the Department of Defense, Mr. Goode, the County Manager, was to be designated by Governor Askew to act as his representative. In light of this, the commanders of the various law enforcement agencies present agreed to draw up a list of their respective equipment needs. This list was to include the type of equipment needed, the amount needed, and the current supplies of the item held by the agency. All lists were to be submitted to Mr. Goode by May 31 for inclusion in a consolidated equipment request.

On June 22, Mr. Goode sent a letter to the Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army to request the loan of equipment which would be used for maintaining order during the time of the political conventions. The request was made by him under the authority of an Executive Order issued by the Governor on June 5, 1972. The list consolidated the equipment requests of the MBPD, MPD, FDLE, and a number of smaller police agencies in Dade County, in addition to the Dade County PSD. The letter requested the loan of the equipment between July 5 and September 1. Although the equipment was requested under the anticipatory program, the property was to be delivered to a warehouse in Miami rather than prepositioned at a military installation. It was specified that the property had to be in the possession of civil police agencies before the first convention, a time described in the letter as "the period of anticipated civil disorders."

In response to this request, the MBPD received the following items in the quantities shown:

250	Gas masks - Check Pad Type
24	Portable public address sets
10	Floodlights
150	Protective vests
30	Coils concertina wire
150	Stakes for wire
25	Work gloves for wire
25	5-gallon water cans
12	7 x 50 Binoculars
50	Smoke grenades
1000	Gas grenades (Baseball type)
1000	Gas grenades (Burning)
3	Riot control agent generators
500	lbs. Riot control agent (CS)
2	100 KW Electric generators

These items were to be used only for convention law enforcement purposes. The equipment was to be returned sometime before September 1. The MBPD, like the other law enforcement agencies borrowing DOD equipment, was then to reimburse the federal government for all lost or expended items.

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. The array of chemical munitions available to the MBPD was extensive. Their inventory consisted of equipment obtained through the original LEAA grant and the supplementary grant, the additional equipment borrowed from the Department of Defense, and the supplies normally maintained.

The Supply and Service Detail had the responsibility of providing a supply of defensive weaponry to various zones around the convention complex perimeter. This weaponry was stored in ten chickees located around the convention complex. Armory vans, manned by this detail and immediately available when ordered, were stocked with gas dispensers and related chemical supplies. In the event the vans were ordered outside the complex, they were to be accompanied by a motorcycle escort. The Supply and Service Detail was also required to keep an additional supply of defensive weaponry on hand at the supply command post. For convention purposes, a total of 250 Haversack munitions bags were prepared for MBPD personnel assigned to convention duties. The bags were packed five different ways and were available on an "as needed" basis. Varieties of munitions bags included: all baseball grenades; all blast grenades; all burn grenades; assorted grenades; long and short range projectiles.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS REQUESTED IN LEAA GRANT APPLICATIONS  
AND THE FINAL LEAA EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

Equipment Requested in Original Grant	Revision of Original Grant	Equipment Requested in Supplementary Grant	LEAA Equipment Inventory - May 1973
<u>Photographic Equipment</u> 1 Three Pose Mugging Camera 1 Wide Angle Lens w/field Case and Tripod 12 Polaroid Cameras 1 Film Processing Tank 1 16mm Cannon Movie Camera		8 Additional Polaroid Cameras  1 8mm Bell & Howell Projector  2 8mm Kodak Movie Cameras 2 8mm NIZO Movie Cameras 1 16mm Bolex Sound Recording System 1 35mm Slide Projector  20 Instamatic Cameras 6 Light/Flash Units 1 35mm Konica Autoreflex Camera w/optional Body 3 35mm Lenses (1 zoom, 2 fixed)	1 Three Pose Mugging Camera w/2 Lenses 1 300mm Lens, carrying case and Tripod 10 Polaroid Cameras - Model 444  1 8mm Bell & Howell Projector - Design 469A 2 8mm Kodak Movie Cameras, XL55 2 8mm NIZO Movie Cameras, S56 1 16mm Bolex Camera, 16 EBM 1 35mm Kodak Carousel Slide Projector - 760 16 Instamatics, Kodak 4 Flash Units, Mecablitz & Vivitar 1 35mm Konica Autoreflex Camera  3 35mm Lenses (1 zoom, 2 fixed) 2 Step-on Unipods - SOSIS 2 35mm Canon Camera - FTB 2 Carrying case & accessories for Canon Camera 1 35mm Sawyer Slide Projector 1 8mm Herculite Movie Film Editor 1 8mm Kodak Film Splicer 1 Exposure Meter - Gossen "Luna Pro" 6 Tripods
<u>Armory and Protective Equipment</u> 1 Metal Detection Sweeper & Amplifier 2 Metal Detection Friskers 1 Pepperfogger  40 Face Shields 120 Gas Hopper Gernades & 20 Launchers 5 Gas Dispensers - Federal on/off Aerotrol 10 Gas Dispenser Refill 2000 Nylon Retaining Cuffs 20 Marking Pens for Cuffs		2 Additional Pepperfoggers 20 Tear Gas Guns 210 Additional Face Shields 150 Additional Gas Hopper Gernades & 10 Launchers 15 Additional Gas Dispensers  40 Additional Gas Dispenser Refills 3000 Additional Nylon Retaining Cuffs 25 Additional Marking Pens for Cuffs 20 Crowd Control Barrier Lines 100 Gas Mask Cannisters 50 Topex Helmets 500 37mm Projectiles 400 CS Caseless Gernades MK I 200 Mace MK 1X 150 Federal Mini-Streamer	1 Metal Detection Sweeper - Sirchie  1 Hand Held Metal Detector - Cameco 3 Pepperfogger - GOEC MK X11-A 20 Tear Gas Guns, 37mm, S&W Model 276

<u>Night Vision and Optical Equipment</u> 4 Night Viewing Devices 4 Carrying Cases 2 Binocular viewers 8 Assorted Lenses (fixed and zoom) 2 Mitralux High Intensity Lights  4 TV Camera Adapters			4 Star Tron Vision Scopes GEOC MK 303 4 Cases for Scopes 1 Binocular Camera - RICOH/TELECA 6 Lenses (2 zoom and 4 fixed) 2 High Intensity Lights - Mitralux 5-967 2 Electric Generators, 110 v. Onan 1.7  2 Cases for Lenses 1 Heavy Duty Rifle Bore Sight Mount
<u>Classroom Equipment</u> 1 Overhead Projector 1 Lecturn w/built-in P. A. System			1 Overhead Projector, Bell & Howell 301 1 Lecturn w/P. A. System, Soundcraft 230-10A 2 Lecturn Portable Speakers, Soundcraft TN-4
<u>Physical Conditioning Equipment</u> 1 Universal 15 Position Mini-Gym 1 20' x 20' Resilite Mat			
<u>Identification Equipment</u> 1 Portable Field Fingerprint Kit			1 Rotary Identification Stand - Sirchie 1 Portable Fingerprint Cabinet
<u>Graphic Display Devices</u> 8 Magnetic Display Boards 1 Wall Bracket & Accessories			
<u>Transportation Equipment</u> 1 Mini-Bus, 22 passenger			Returned. Defective Equipment.



Equipment Requested in Original Grant	Revision of Original Grant	Equipment Requested in Supplementary Grant	LEAA Equipment Inventory - May 1973
<u>Radio and Communications Equipment</u> 45 Portable Radio Transceivers - 5 Channel 45 Spare Batteries for Walkie Talkies 5 Chargers - 6 Unit Capacity 23 Radio Pagers, Batteries & Chargers 1 Mobile Command Van 3 Mobile Relay Units, 2 Channel 4 Antennas 60 Radio Scramblers, mobile w/cables & modules  1 Radio Speech Scrambler Base Station 50 Helmet Radios 200 Crystals	4 Channel Units Acceptable      4 Telephone Scrambler Units 10 Headsets Eliminated  Eliminated Obtained/Installed at Reduced Cost		50 Walkie Talkies, GE PR 25  96 Ni-Cad Batteries, GE  48 Chargers 44 Radio Pagers and Chargers  1 Mobile Command Van 1 Switching Relay 3 Antennas 4 Telephone Scrambler Units - CT 300  10 Headsets   50 Leather Cases for Walkie Talkies
<u>Closed Circuit TV Equipment</u> 8 Monitors 1 Synchronizing Generator 1 Video Tape Recorder and Accessories 4 Standard Cameras  Tripods, Switches and Accessories 2 Low Light Level Cameras 5 Microphones 4 Boom Stands 1 Sound Mixer Lighting Equipment			8 Monitors, Sony/CVM-112 1 Synchronizing Generator, CG-1 4 Video Tape Recorders, Sony/AV 3650  1 Standard Camera, Sony, w/lens, tripod & monitor 7 Tripods, Sony VCT 20-A   12 Video Cameras, Sony, AVC 3400 12 Videocorders, Sony, AV 3400 8 Power Adapters, Sony, AV 3400 8 Video Camera Lenses, fixed and zoom 3 Vidicon Tubes, Sony 4 Gell/Cell Battery Packs, BP-20

All officers were to carry a standard Mark VII Mace Dispenser. Mark IX Mace Dispensers were issued to sergeants assigned to each of the twelve gates in the perimeter fence. Each of the tactical commanders carried a supply of chemical munitions in his vehicle. Additionally, a special task force was issued three bags of assorted grenades, two 37 mm gas guns, two bags of CS gas projectiles, and a pepper fogger. In summary, there was a ready supply of chemical munitions available to MBPD personnel. Unfortunately, there was no systematic attempt to control and record the issuance, availability, and use of this equipment insofar as individual officers or units were concerned.

## EQUIPMENT FAMILIARIZATION

One of the problems related to the acquisition of a great deal of new equipment over a relatively short period of time is the need for familiarization with the use of the various devices. Though the original grant showed that 16 hours of training was to be used for equipment familiarization, the actual length of this training varied considerably according to the anticipated convention assignment of the men. Officers in specialized assignments were given intensive training related to the specific equipment they were expected to use during convention duty. For example, members of the task force, the canine unit and the motorcycle squad were given training in the use of gas dispensers. A photographic team was given training in the use of photographic equipment. Despite this individualized approach, the training provided in equipment use appeared to be inadequate for the demands of convention policing.

A ten position mini-gym was purchased to condition police personnel to the physical demands of convention policing. The regular use of this equipment was expected to minimize "fatigue factors" and provide for "psychological enhancement." The Miami Dolphins professional football team, a user of the same equipment, provided an impressive model of the advantages which could be gained from this form of exercise. Like any other form of equipment, the mini-gym required department personnel to become familiar with the machine and their personal capability to use it. For this reason, Captain Whitaker, the training director was named "coach." Because of the shortness of time and the uncertainty of the situations which might be encountered during the convention, the men initially pursued the regimen of weight lifting with a bit too much enthusiasm. Unfortunately, some officers became ill as a consequence of the over strenuous use of this equipment. After these incidents became known, the other officers showed considerable restraint in their exercise programs. Be that as it may, this experience stands as a vivid example of the need for equipment familiarization.

TABLE 3

LEAA FUNDS REQUESTED FOR SUPPLIES  
AND OPERATING EXPENSES

Items	Original and Revised Grant Application	Supplementary Grant Application
Telephone Installation		\$ 10,109
Classroom Furniture	\$ 2,500	
Office Furniture & Equipment	1,325	
Telephone Service	1,175	500
Audio Visual Equipment	1,115	
Teletype Installation		1,010
Office Supplies	750	1,200
Office Equipment Rental	750	
Printing	750	1,650
Tape Recording Equipment		600
Postage	525	
Purchase Books	450	
Sundries		450
Total Supply Funds	\$ 9,340	\$ 15,519

An extensive array of photographic and video-taping equipment was acquired for reasons which seemed to change as time passed. The equipment purchases were first justified for intelligence purposes and for documentation of the actions of the demonstrators for purposes of prosecution. Later, the purchases were justified for training purposes and for visual documentation of the event as a part of history.

A tactical photo team was formed to visually record what was deemed necessary to achieve the various objectives. However, members of the team received little or no direction from the MBPD intelligence officer as to what was necessary for their unique purposes. Similarly, they received little or no direction as to what events should be documented for training purposes. A member of the team reported that he made independent judgements about what events he would record. As a result, a random selection of events was filmed. Some of the events were significant, while others were insignificant or meaningless. To add to this problem was the need for a higher level of skill in operating the camera equipment and related accessories. Miami Beach police had anticipated this problem. Prior to the conventions, they had attempted to acquire private funding to employ professional photographers for this purpose, but they were unsuccessful. Although proficiency of the police photographers improved noticeably over the time span of the two conventions, the uneven quality of the results diminished the value of the final product. This was unfortunate because the actions carried out at the conventions had high potential value for purposes of both training and historical documentation.

Though these examples may not be indicative of the general problems which resulted from the relatively low priority given to equipment familiarization, they nevertheless underscore the essential need for such training. In addition to giving men the basic technical competence for using various pieces of equipment, this form of training should create direct knowledge about the interface between man and machine under stressful circumstances that are likely to be experienced.

#### PROJECT MONITORS' REPORT

During the period of July 18-20, two staff members of the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice went to Miami Beach to monitor the activities carried out by MBPD under their original LEAA grant. Following the site visit, they submitted a program evaluation report to their director, Mr. James R. Stewart. On August 2, Mr. Stewart sent a letter and a copy of the evaluation report to the City Manager of Miami Beach, Mr. Clifford O'Key. The letter indicated that, because of the many deviations made from the original grant, it would be necessary to make another formal revision in the original grant. Aside from the contents of the report, the timing of the letter was destined to irritate



TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASES UNDER ORIGINAL LEAA GRANT, WITH PROJECT MONITORS COMMENTS AND MBPD RETORT

A. Equipment Listed in Original Grant	B. Purpose Stated in Original Grant	C. Comments Made in Project Monitors Report	D. Response Made in Chief Pomerance's Letter
Three Pose Mugging Camera	... To facilitate rapid identification procedures in multiple arrest situations	Not delivered as of July 18, 1972.	Not received until Aug. 18, 1972. Production problems with German lens maker.
16mm Cannon Movie Camera and Accessories	... To provide documentation of individual and group conduct; ... To gain intelligence and evidence	Purchased Bolex camera instead of Cannon. Used for making training films and documentation.	Camera purchased thought to be more rugged and trouble free. Film processing tank unnecessary.
12 Polaroid Cameras and Film-packs	... To facilitate rapid and accurate identification in mass arrest situations ... To photograph arrestees, arresting officers, and evidence	Purchases as of July 18, 1972. Issued to prisoner control arrest teams.	In addition to 12 cameras listed, 2 Polaroid cameras and 3 cases were obtained.
40 Face Shields	... To protect members of special tactical forces to be deployed in severe physical confrontations	With addition of 40 face shields, all personnel equipped. Used during first convention.	No face shields purchased prior to grant. Used by tactical forces only.
120 Gas Hopper Gernades & 20 Launchers	... To eliminate the possibility of ignited gernades being thrown back at the police	Not delivered in time for first convention. Substitute gernades in armory vans during DNC.	Substitution necessary since vendor unable to furnish items originally ordered.
5 Federal Gas Dispensers and 1 GOEC Pepper Fogger	... To permit continuous gas/smoke dispersal ... To allow field comparisons of gas dispensing devices	Basic units in armory vans during DNC. Additional equipment for pepper fogger charged to grant.	Original grant omitted pepper fogger supplies. Operational necessities were purchased.
3 Metal Detectors (1 sweeper & 2 friskers)	... To facilitate the rapid search of persons ... To search premises for pipe bombs & other explosives	Purchased only one sweeper with amplifier. Used during DNC in prisoner control center.	Obtained one sweeper and one frisker. Purchase of second frisker was unnecessary.
2000 Nylon Retaining Cuffs & 20 Marking Pens	... To aid the handcuffing of prisoners in multiple arrests	Bought and used during DNC to hold fence against posts. Marking pens not used.	Two arrests made during DNC & reinforcement of fence did not deplete supply.
4 Sylvania night viewing devices & accessories	... To observe night-time activities	Purchased a Star Tron viewing device as substitute. Used to observe campsite and boating activity.	Field testing showed equipment purchased to be superior in performance and construction.

2 High Intensity Lights w/Portable Generators	... To assist in handling nighttime emergencies & crowd control	Purchased and available in armory van during DNC. Not used.	Items permit photographic documentation of night scenes.
Portable Field Fingerprinting Kit	... To facilitate the rapid identification of arrestees under field conditions	Purchased and used in prisoner processing center for two arrests made during DNC.	Kit originally specified required four additional fingerprint pads.
Physical Conditioning Equipment	... To condition and train police personnel	Purchase of this equipment questioned. Facilities at local schools should have been used.	Equipment available 24 hours. Physical training best accomplished with equipment used exclusively by police.
45 Portable Radio Transceivers & Related Equipment	... To enhance communications between field forces of MBPD ... To facilitate inter-departmental field communications	Portable radio units and substitute equipment obtained. Receiving transmissions inside buildings was troublesome.	4 channel radio package purchased through state. Savings realized and delivery expedited.
50 Helmet Radios	... To permit radio communications in high noise areas without manual operation	10 headphones purchased instead of 50 helmets. Headphones used by command officers in noisy areas.	Helmet radios previously judged to be impractical. 10 microphone/headsets used in command center.
23 Radio Paging Units and Chargers	... To reach key command and technical personnel	Ordered 41 pagers. Since not delivered before DNC, public works system used by command officers.	Reallocation of funds permitted equipping 41 key personnel. Existing base station utilized during DNC.
1 Mobile Command Van	... To facilitate field command operations in massed or skirmish-like disorder situations	Not used during DNC. Radio equipment not installed. Somewhat of a waste of funds.	Radio equipment was installed and operational during DNC. Van on standby status - ready for activation.
Radio Scrambler System	... To assure the security of radio transmissions	4 telephone scramblers obtained instead of radio system. Phone system used by intelligence & commanders.	Comments made in project monitors report are accurate.
Close Circuit Television Equipment	... To observe crucial areas and critical events ... To provide visual records for prosecution	Not used for training purposes since delivery delayed. Monitors used to observe network TV broadcasts.	4 portable & 1 fixed cameras purchased. Delivery delays experienced. Full usage during DNC not achieved.
Mini-bus, 22 passenger capacity	... To transport police personnel, equipment and prisoners	Needed numerous repairs after delivery. A superfluous purchase. Only one vehicle necessary.	Delays in funding led to purchase of inferior equipment. Both command van and mini-bus were necessary.
Graphic Display Devices	... To assist command post in tactical deployment planning and control of police manpower	Devices obtained were deviations from original specifications. Used for planning, training & commanding.	Modifications made in procurement of equipment. Several devices were constructed on-site.

the recipient. Mr. O'Key received the letter and the copy of the 24-page report on August 4, just six days before Mr. Stewart requested a response to the many comments made in the report.

At the start, the report restated the condition that "LEAA retains the right to withdraw all equipment purchased under Federal Grant funds at the expiration of this grant project." Four pages of the report set forth the minutia of equipment problems perceived by the staff monitors. Their comments about each of the major equipment purchases are briefly paraphrased in Table 4. In summary, the project monitors' report stated, "Most of the major items of equipment have either not been received or were determined to be defective or ineffective after receipt or delivery." All things considered, this was clearly an overstatement.

Mr. O'Key made a preliminary response on August 4 to Mr. Stewart's letter. Several weeks after the RNC ended, Chief Pomerance sent a detailed response to Mr. Stewart regarding his letter and the need for another formal revision of the grant application. The essence of each of Chief Pomerance's responses are also shown in Table 4. As indicated, delays were experienced which were beyond the control of the MBPD. Modifications in equipment purchases were made in ways which indicated considerable flexibility and the exercise of reasonable judgement. The many problems encountered were, of course, aggravated by the press of time.

If anything, this experience encapsulates the enormity of the problem posed by the purchase of a wide variety of equipment with federal funds in the amount of \$198,565. At the time the grant application was drawn up, only the sketchiest of strategic intelligence was available about the nature and magnitude of the problems which could be expected. Consequently, decisions about the needed equipment were fraught with the possibility of misjudgement. The grant review process and the timing of the grant award; the actual purchase, acceptance and installation of equipment; and the monitors' review of these actions all combined to make the task of equipping the MBPD both difficult and trying.

## INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT

Under the conditions of the grant, the inventory of equipment before and after the conventions was a required activity. Monthly progress reports showing a detailed chronology of equipment ordered and received were to be submitted to LEAA as a running inventory. The project monitors' evaluation conducted during July 18-20 was, in part, an on-site inventory of equipment. In regard to this inventory, it is significant to note that in Mr. Stewart's August 2 letter to Mr. O'Key, it was recommended that "the city should add to their property control system the assignment of a unique number of each item of equipment."

Also of interest in this regard is the reaction to this recommendation stated by Chief Pomerance in his September 8 letter to Mr. Stewart. "We have on order 500 metallic identification labels which bear the words 'Property of the Miami Beach Police Department' and a sequential number. These are being attached with permanent adhesive on a conspicuous part of each of the accountable items."

The process of equipment inventory neared an end on May 3, 1973, when a 59-page final inventory was completed of all items purchased under LEAA grants. This list, as detailed as it was, omitted some accountable items such as the mini-gym, the 20' x 20' resilit mat, and the magnetic display boards. Other items found in the list, such as the videocorders and the videocameras, showed no serial number. These same items also showed no Miami Beach control number. For a document which was meant to be a final inventory, this compilation was less than accurate. As a result, when it was submitted to the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice, the inventory was returned to Miami Beach for correction before it was officially accepted as the final inventory.

Except for 53 chairs, 18 desks, six cabinets and one blackboard used in the intelligence center, LEAA has not further exercised its right to withdraw all equipment purchased with federal funds. Some of the equipment retained by the MBPD was permanently issued to various units in the department while other pieces of equipment were retained by the property bureau and released to authorized personnel when needed.

The property bureau maintains two logs for the control of equipment, the "Sony Audio-Video Recorder Equipment Control" and the "Emergency Equipment Control." The first entry in the Audio-Video log was made on June 3, 1973, while the last of 12 entries was made on June 29, 1973. In the Emergency Equipment log, the first of three entries was made on July 14, 1973, while the last was recorded on July 28, 1973. The timing of these entries suggests a belated concern for the control of property. When all of these findings are considered in combination, they tend to lead to the impression that insufficient attention was given to the post-convention inventory and control of equipment originally purchased with federal funds for convention purposes.

This impression is further supported in regard to the return of borrowed federal equipment. Under the terms of the loan, the Dade County Manager was responsible for the care and return of the federal property. To carry out the final part of this responsibility, Mr. Goode wrote to Chief Pomerance immediately after the conventions ended and stated that on August 28, the MBPD was scheduled to return their borrowed federal property to the Miami depot where the items had been initially obtained. Specific instructions were given for the preparation of equipment before the turn-in.



Ordinarily, a return inventory can serve as a useful means of determining the number of expendable items used in a specific operation. Because unsupported charges were made regarding the excessive use of gas during the RNC, it would have been particularly useful to have determined the difference in the number of grenades and the quantity of riot control agents returned. The army had specified that they would not accept the return of open cases of equipment. Moreover, the inventory figures were further contaminated by the fact that local police agencies had a built-in incentive to "purchase" expendable items at a reimbursement price, which was significantly lower than the price they would ordinarily pay for the same or an equivalent item from their regular supplier of chemical munitions. Though these limitations would have made the inventory data relatively useless for the purpose of determining the number of expendable items used by the MBPD during the conventions, the turn-in inventory was nevertheless sought for examination during the making of this report. However, it was misplaced and could not be inspected.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In a time period of less than a year, the MBPD purchased slightly less than one-quarter of a million dollars worth of police related equipment with funds obtained from the federal government. The enormity of this undertaking should not be overlooked. In light of the limited strategic intelligence available about the demonstration groups and their planned activities, it appears that the initial judgements made by the command officers were, on the whole, reasonable. Decisions about which specific equipment to purchase were made on the basis of previous experience, known product specifications, limited field tests, and the advice of experts and vendors. Further information would have improved the quality of the decisions. Other agencies facing similar problems in the future could benefit from information such as that provided in the IACP Police Weapons Center Data Service. This service provides current information for law enforcement officials pertinent to the purchase of weapons and protective equipment. It is significant to note that the MBPD recognized the value of information of this kind and, in October 1972, two months after the end of the RNC, became one of the first police agencies in the nation to subscribe to this service.

MBPD showed considerable flexibility in obtaining needed equipment. Where excessive delays were encountered, acceptable substitutions were obtained. Where it appeared that better equipment was available, it was purchased in place of the equipment requested in the original grant application. The display of such flexibility in a situation of stress and severely limited time is commendable.

The inventory of equipment purchased with federal funds was a problem area for the MBPD. Their final LEAA equipment inventory reflected some inaccuracies. The turn-in inventory of borrowed federal equipment was misplaced. Although there was no indication that these problems were anything more than inattention to the details of record keeping, it was nevertheless important that complete and accurate inventory records were kept on all property. This is not a trivial matter. Without such records, a department is vulnerable to unjustified charges.

Fundamental to an effective inventory system is the accountability of individuals or units for the equipment issued to them. This is particularly important with regard to expendable items, such as chemical munitions. The MBPD recognized that no method of accountability would be entirely satisfactory for a situation as complex as the conventions. However, they also recognized that no system at all would tend to invite abuses. Without some system of accountability, a minor situation involving the use of gas may spread and become uncontrolled.

In the view of some observers of police activity, an uncontrolled use of gas occurred on the last day of the RNC. As the convention drew to a close, both demonstrators and police anticipated the use of gas and, as expected, there was extensive use of chemical munitions on the last night. As some saw the events that night, gas was grossly overused by the police. Although there is little information to suggest that the offending officers were from Miami Beach, the lack of an adequate system of accountability makes the department somewhat vulnerable in the face of this charge.

By and large, much of the success of the police control of crowds, parades and demonstrations was due to their ability to coordinate their actions through the use of their extensive communications system. The early judgement of the MBPD at the time that they drew up their first LEAA grant application proved to be correct. Communications equipment was more important than weaponry.

However, in considering the importance of communications, it should be recognized from the description of police field operations that problems of command and control tended to occur when the ordinary channels of communication were less effective. In instances where the demonstrators were noisy, police communications were troublesome. Under these circumstances, command was less certain. When gas was used, the reduced ability of the police to communicate with one another apparently contributed to the escalation in the use of gas. With the gas mask on, radio communications were made difficult. As a result, there were reported incidents where police were gassing other police. Part of this resulted from the failure of the police in the command center to announce to all units via radio communications channels that gas was going to be used in a specific area. Another cause of this was purely technical. In

the event of gas and the use of protective masks, the ordinary means of communication were ineffective. Hence, one is led to the conclusion that technical exploration should be undertaken to overcome this difficulty.

The lack of attention to equipment familiarization was aggravated by the fact that some gas and photographic equipment was delivered to the MBPD too late for their personnel to be adequately trained in its use. A great deal of time and money was spent on the acquisition of equipment thought to be necessary for handling problems which might arise at the conventions. It is obvious that in order to have obtained maximum value from this equipment, the men should have been prepared to use it properly under real life circumstances. Beyond this obvious statement is the psychological reality that men who feel they have had insufficient training to function in a stressful situation will tend to exhibit fear reactions to a greater degree than men who believe they have been fully trained. Men who know how to take care of themselves and use their available equipment skillfully will worry less about the uncertain dangers they face. In many instances, this means that equipment training should be directed at the level of mastery rather than mere familiarization. When so much attention was focused on the psychological preparation of police officers, it was unfortunate that the importance of equipment familiarization was apparently undervalued in the overall training program. Both objective and subjective advantages could have been gained from this type of training.

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## COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Written by Roger W. Reinke

Communications planners from the three primary Miami-area law enforcement agencies, with consultant help, identified the following system elements. The goal was to integrate several quite different kinds of communications requirements into an effective system, a goal made somewhat difficult to attain because of the varieties of equipment to be available during the conventions. In summary, the final plan contained the following elements:

- Provide sufficient telephone trunk line capacity between and among the command centers, Miami Beach and Miami telephone central offices, and direct lines between agencies, for both data and voice communications. In the event telephone cables are cut or otherwise decommissioned, install adequate alternate trunks and switching equipment.
- Nominate a dedicated radio channel already licensed to each of the participating agencies for the convention site communications of that agency's units.
- For tactical situations requiring multi-agency response, create a common channel to be accessed and monitored by each unit so equipped.
- Integrate all communications capability in the convention communications center, including that of state agencies. In like manner, provide communications center facilities (telephone and/or radio) for medical and civil defense functions. Create a primary backup center in the city of Miami.



- Establish video monitoring capability, with monitors at both the site and remote command centers. Provide for the recording of all radio communications.
- Obtain auxiliary communications devices or networks as required, such as pagers, mobile radio-telephones (accessing the regular telephone system), facsimile equipment, scramblers and mobile public address equipment.
- Install hard wire perimeter security communication equipment at the convention site.
- Supply specialized communication networks to facilitate intelligence gathering and to coordinate candidate movements.

These elements were for the most part addressed well in the pre-convention planning. Responsibilities for procurement had been assigned, and most of the needed equipment was on hand if not actually installed as the Democratic convention gathered.

#### PLANNING DEVELOPMENT

Given an environment of considerable sophistication in communications matters, the final plan that emerged for the provision of communications services during the conventions was on the one hand complementary to the agencies involved, but on the other a disappointment in terms of its efficacy. The former conclusion is based on the relationships that have developed over the years among the larger departments in the Miami area; the latter, because the system malfunctioned at a particularly critical time. In perspective, the plan was well conceived as the resources and projected demands were reviewed in the spring and summer of 1972.

The foundation upon which the convention communications system was built included the existing radio communication systems of Miami, Dade County and Miami Beach. These systems ordinarily function independently, although provision is made for simultaneous transmission of high priority radio messages on an inter-system basis. Both the city of Miami and Dade County have invested substantially in designing and implementing networks responsive to a variety of tactical law enforcement needs. They also have been engineered to accommodate workload increases caused by demands within their jurisdictions or resulting from the supplying of communications services to smaller agencies desirous of participating in the city or county systems. Thus, both the Miami and Dade County systems were capable of embracing new demands without jeopardizing their effectiveness of each.

In Miami Beach itself, the existing radio system met the needs of that department, but because of its size it did not have some of the flexibility of the area's larger systems. Some planning was underway to convert this typical, vehicular-based network to one using personal portable transceivers to a much greater extent.

Beyond the capability to routinely process and dispatch calls for police service, the radio frequencies used by each system were discrete. Two systems, Miami and Miami Beach, at least were in the same part of the UHF frequency spectrum. Dade County, however, operated most of its equipment in the VHF band.

The implicit requirement was to devise a communications network which would integrate disparate systems but not unduly threaten individual system integrity. It was recognized that any one of the south Florida jurisdictions could experience convention related incidents which would saturate their own communications capability. A rather delicate balance between competing interests had to be discovered.

A further complication was the autonomy of each agency's manpower assigned to the conventions. A monolithic force with its own separate logistical support was not created when the participating agencies gathered in Miami Beach. Despite the need for reliable and accessible ways of intercommunicating, each agency felt compelled to provide for its own communications system at the convention site. In summary, initial overall planning goals were to:

- Provide for continued if not augmented capability for communications operations within each jurisdiction, away from the site
- Provide for communications capability for each of the agency's components at the site
- Provide for effective intercommunication at the site wherever and whenever coordination needs could be anticipated.

The concern for autonomous agency communications at the convention site itself was not entirely selfish. At several planning meetings, the prospect of jamming attempts on the integrated tactical channels had been seriously discussed. It was determined that, if jamming should occur to the integrated tactical system (i. e. to the channels shared by the three agencies), reliance would then be placed on the individual systems. Coordination in this situation would be effected through dispatchers located at the communications center, on a face-to-face basis.

The determination of the channels to be used by each participating agency at the convention site was much more complicated than merely

## BASIC RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>City of Miami</u>	<u>Dade County</u>	<u>Miami Beach</u>
Dispatching Channels	453/458 MHz repeaters; geographical zones (3)	155 or 156/158 MHz repeaters; geographical zones (9)	460/465 MHz repeaters (2)
Specialized Channels	453/458 MHz tactical	155/158 MHz tactical	460/465 MHz command
	453/458 MHz surveillance	156/159 MHz surveillance	460/465 MHz surveillance
	453/458 MHz information	155/158 MHz information	460/465 MHz information
	453/458 MHz administrative	156/158 MHz administrative	156 MHz records/ident.
Intersystem	155.370 MHz	155.370 MHz	155.370 MHz



selecting a channel or two that would not otherwise be too busy. In a situation bringing together a number of transmitters in proximity to one another, the probability of disruptive intermodulation interference is high. The third harmonic of a 155 MHz transmitter, for example, falls at 465 MHz; the multiple combinations of generated harmonics when several transmitters are actuated or keyed at the same time require a computer to calculate. A pragmatic solution was to proceed with the installation of transmitters as far in advance of the Democratic National Convention as possible, and test the system for intermodulation products. After all, the primary agencies' equipment had been operated in the same area over a long period of time, although not so close together.

Another potential complication was the securing of appropriate Federal Communications Commission authority to relocate base transmitters and establish new central points. The Miami field office of the Commission proved to be quite helpful in the issuance of special temporary authorizations, and especially so in helping to identify suspicious or unlicensed radio operations. Deliberate jamming attempts being a matter of concern, the FCC did plan to have some of their spectrum analyzers and radio direction finding gear on site. The use of easily procured automatic scanning receivers by demonstrators or others merely "curious" about convention communications could not be controlled. Therefore, it was determined to put scramblers on the radio telephones of top commanders and if possible, intelligence scouts. It was correctly anticipated that by the time other users of radio communications would be on site and operating, usually in the same frequency bands if not on adjacent channels, the mixture of transmissions - who was responsible for what harmonic or co-channel interference - would be almost impossible to sort out.

The most difficult planning problem was to achieve a common tactical channel for use at the site by units equipped with dissimilar capabilities. A mobile repeater seemed to be required, which could be keyed by tactical units of Miami, Miami Beach, or Dade County. Cross band repeaters are not particularly unusual, but in this case in addition to (for example) a 150 MHz transmission keying a 450 MHz transmitter, provision had to be made for another 450 MHz band transmission to key two other transmitters. Further, a mixture of both vehicular and portable (hand held) units would be occasionally competing to capture the repeater, a contest which would likely be won by the more powerful vehicular unit. Add to these conditions the likelihood of more than one hundred units having access to this channel, and some feeling for the problem can be gained.

On July 8, 1972, two days before the Democratic Convention was to begin, engineering difficulties in the mobile repeater installation were such that the system was still not operational. Because of the lateness of the hour and the need to have some kind of system in operation, it was decided to abandon the repeat capability and to effect coordination through respective agency dispatchers at the communications center. While Dade



## CHANNEL ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Function</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Channel</u>	<u>Alternate Channel</u>
Tactical	Miami Beach (MB)	MB 5    Common	MB 2
	Miami (M)	M 5    Mobile	M 6
	Dade County (PSD)	PSD 4    Repeater	PSD 2
	Florida Highway Patrol (FHP)	FHP 1	FHP 2
	Miami Beach	MB 4	MB 1
Interior/ Candidate Security			
Command	Miami Beach	MB 3	-
Off-Session Security	Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish (FG)	FG 2	FG 1
Traffic/ Ident.	Miami Beach	MB 2	MB 5
Scouts/ Comm.	Florida Dept. of Law Enf. (FDLE)	FDLE 3	FDLE 1
Prisoner Transport	U. S. Bureau of Prisons (USBP)	Not specified	-
Candidate Protection	U. S. Secret Service (USSS)	Not specified	-
National Security	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	Not specified	-
Fire	Miami Beach Fire Dept.	MB (UHF)	-
Public Works	Miami Beach DPW	MB (UHF)	-
Reserve	Florida Beverage Department Florida Marine Patrol	Regularly licensed channels	

County engineers had created, designed, and had accepted responsibility for implementation of the repeater feature, it should be noted that differences of opinion on the part of both Miami and Miami Beach personnel as to the best techniques to accomplish simultaneous multiple transmitter keying and lock out while maintaining constant audio levels contributed to the lack of time in which to perfect the operation.


The site selected for the installation of the mobile repeater and related equipment was the roof of a high rise apartment building located opposite the convention hall. This site, Octagon Towers, was strategically located, but not far from the auditorium, which was soon bristling with antennae of other convention communications users. It is remarkable that the intermodulation problems were not overwhelming even during the preliminary check-out. Satellite receivers were installed at other more favorable sites throughout the area and at the nearer locations in the City of Miami.

A communications van was procured by Miami Beach early in the convention planning for use at the convention site, and equipped with Miami Beach transmitters, receivers on various area frequencies, telephone equipment which could be readily tied into the regular Bell telephone system, and a Bell system mobile telephone. Another agency's van was to be available if needed.


A final major planning need concerned the arrangements in the communications center which was located in the basement of the Jackie Gleason Auditorium. Limited space was available. By the time a radio operator, supervisor, and messenger from each of the major agencies were shoe-horned in, personnel would be quite literally elbow to elbow. There seemed to be no alternative, since each agency felt the need to be aware of events which might be reported on another agency's channels. The situation room, located a short distance away, was to be supplied with monitoring capability on all the critical channels, but commanders located there were to rely on their respective communications personnel for relaying directives.

In early July, additional equipment had been ordered and delivered, largely paid for through the LEAA grant. Major items were 45 General Electric PR 25 portable ("walkie-talkie") transceivers, with spare batteries and chargers (\$50,700); crystals for the Dade County portable units to permit their integration (\$4,520); a radio paging system (\$15,600); the mobile communications/command van (\$42,300); and closed circuit television cameras, monitors, a video tape recorder, and tapes (\$33,315). The television equipment was not installed in time for the Democratic National Convention. The total figure given for "Radio and Communications" was \$148,643. Miami Beach also reflected a purchase of six additional portable transceivers. A committee recommendation for the purchase of 45 scramblers for portable units and 15 for vehicular application apparently was not pursued. Interestingly, the Florida Highway Patrol, shortly

**SEATING IN COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION**



**SEATING IN COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  
REPUBLICAN CONVENTION**





before the Republican Convention, sought and was awarded a \$79,795 LEAA grant for the purchase of 250 personal helmet mounted radios. The use of personal helmet mounted receivers or transceivers by Miami Beach was rejected because of the patterns of tactical deployment anticipated by that department.

## THE SYSTEM IN ACTION

As the Democratic Convention began, those responsible for communications were particularly sensitive to any potentially disruptive intermodulation products and deliberate interference or jamming generated by dissident groups. Intelligence summaries indicated that the latter was a good possibility. As it turned out, there were no known attempts to jam the critical channels, but that is not to say that there were no problems.

The Octagon Towers site, where so many transmitters were located, clearly caused some intermodulation interference. There was no way, realistically, to install cavities, crystal filters or other common remedies in time to do much good, however. Miami Beach's Channel 3, intended for command purposes, seemed to be the primary police source of some of the intermodulation problems, so it was deactivated. Commercial broadcasting installations on Octagon Towers and nearby (studio/transmitter links and private voice channels) were believed to be the cause of much of the interference, but no substantial attempts to isolate sources other than MB3 were made. Communications concerning one of the candidates at one point captured Dade County's central zone dispatching channel. The offending equipment turned out to be some portable transceivers borrowed from another state police agency and unlicensed for use in Florida. That situation was quickly resolved without the need for formal FCC action. Another variety of interference was noted which tended to reduce effectiveness. Pre-convention instructions notwithstanding, some officers were inclined to use operational channels for locating certain restaurants, directing sightseers, and unnecessary tests of individual equipment.

As noted, operation of the multi-channel repeater system was not undertaken for the Democratic National Convention, but not all agencies were apparently aware of the change in plans. Field units simply continued to use their assigned tactical channel, and evidently dismissed the lack of transmissions from units or other agencies as a temporary technical failure. Back at the communications center, however, personnel were acutely aware of the lack of coordination among tactical units. What coordination was accomplished was the result of much strident conversation over the din of loud speakers, ringing telephones, and the rejection of requests to enter the center by both officials and non-officials who had no immediate business there. The close physical proximity of each agency's dispatchers to one another might have been expected to enhance coordination, but in fact the use of loudspeakers soon became competitive.

In order to hear one's own unit, speaker volume had to be progressively increased. Most communicators consistently used the word "chaos" to describe the busier periods. The three primary agencies' dispatchers were separated by other agencies' dispatchers, which further contributed to the disorganization during the DNC.

As the Republican convention began to gather, it was apparent to all that better coordination of tactical units was required. The three channel repeater's idiosyncracies were ironed out, but Miami did place two battery operated standby transmitters on Octagon Towers, and equipped their dispatcher with a "breakaway" switch in the event that the repeater was either deliberately jammed or captured by the presence of a transmitter carrier caused by a stuck or open microphone push-to-talk switch.

Instructions issued prior to the RNC emphasized the importance of this tactical channel and the need for proper operating procedures. "Only those broadcasts which are absolutely essential shall be made ... effective command and control necessitates the use of this consolidated frequency ... if the problems are great in number, and fast moving, the use of separate unassigned channels or radio designations could result in delayed or insufficient responses ... ." This advice was generally heeded, but the number of units on the channel generated extremely high volumes of radio traffic. While the consolidated tactical channel functioned adequately until 7:30 pm, August 22, written records were abandoned when message loading became heavy.


At 7:38 pm on the second day of the Republican National Convention, the temperature on the roof of Octagon Towers in the room housing the repeaters and other transmitters was well over 100 degrees. The technician on duty took advantage of the view from the roof to watch the action unfurling below him around the convention hall. The largest demonstration of the RNC was in progress on the streets below. A fuse blew in the primary tactical channel transmitter. The technician was unaware of the failure. No provision had been made to communicate with the technician directly from the communications center, nor had any transmitter monitoring capability been installed.

Dispatchers and tactical units of the three primary agencies soon realized that a malfunction had occurred. They reverted to their own channels, again placing all coordination squarely in the lap of the dispatchers at the communications center. At this critical time, previously issued communications guidelines were forgotten. The last words on one memo to supervisors were "Reminder - Do not use ten signals and other codes. Use plain, brief English." The monitoring of some tapes during this period revealed that tactical officers were very prone to use familiar codes during stress situations, in spite of the fact that personnel of other agencies might not comprehend the intended message.

At 8:16 pm, word had been transmitted to the technician - by messenger - and the blown fuse had been replaced. A large, heavy box

\* PLACEMENT OF TELEVISION MONITOR CAMERAS

MIAMI  
BEACH  
HIGH  
SCHOOL



\* HELICOPTER

19th ST.

18th ST.

17th ST.

MERIDIAN AVE.

WASHINGTON AVE.

21st ST.

20th ST.

PARK AVE.

19th ST.

\*

18th ST.

17th ST.

ROOF \*

N. MERIDIAN AVE.  
DADE BLVD.

PRAIRIE AVE.

DADE CANAL

SOCIAL HALL

CHESS CLUB

BUS PARKING

SCOUT CAMP

GARDEN CENTER

INSIDE  
\* NORTH  
\* CONVENTION  
ROOF HALL

CONVENTION PARKING

APT. HOUSE

SOUTH CONVENTION HALL

DEMONSTRATION AREA

DEMONSTRATION AREA

CONVENTION PARKING

ROOF  
\* BANK

STAGE (Cafeteria)

AUDITORIUM

DEPT. STORE

PUBLIC PARKING

STORES

STORES

M. B. FED. BUILDING

LINCOLN RD. PEDESTRIAN MALL

STORES

STORES

STORES

STORES



of bolts had been left blocking access to the equipment involved, and no one had taken time to remove it on the assumption that it belonged to "another" agency.

The communications van, parked in a reasonably secure place inside the fence, was not used for the purpose of local control in response to street incidents, but rather as a good observation platform. The van was not used as an important communications resource at any point during the conventions, but was regarded as good insurance should the communications center be rendered inoperative.

The telephone cable linking perimeter security posts had been installed approximately three feet above ground level during the Democratic National Convention. Prior to the RNC, it was relocated at ground level and made much less conspicuous. It was not disabled during the convention. A further precaution to insure cable integrity was to require periodic reports from each post, and this appeared to work well.

Emergency power generators (one 60 KW and two 100 KW, diesel) had been installed and checked out for the basement command/communications facilities, but no emergency power had been provided for at the Octagon Towers site other than for the city of Miami's equipment. No power failure occurred. If it had, tactical communications would have been severely affected to a much greater extent than by a blown fuse.

The demonstrator incidents and responses thereto demonstrated convincingly that a need existed for better equipment for the officers engaged in crowd control activities. During the DNC, Florida Highway Patrol officers and their supervisors found themselves in situations where the persons over whom control was being attempted heard instructions being communicated to police better than the officers to whom commands were addressed. The timely provision of helmet receivers for line personnel and portable helmet transceivers for supervisory personnel made crowd control actions at the RNC more effective.

Video cameras and monitors in place and operating for the Republican Convention also proved to be quite helpful, especially in permitting command staff to correlate and reconcile radio reports with what was observed on the monitors. Selected channels were also relayed via Dade County micro-wave paths to Command Post Alpha. Cable routing and camera placement chores were time consuming, but evidently well worth it. In addition to the raw intelligence information provided by viewing of the television monitors, the primary scout channel was heavily relied on by tactical commanders in the field and in the situation and intelligence areas at the auditorium for decision-making. There was some evidence that the scout channel (FDLE 3) was not being adequately received during the Democratic National Convention. Mobile unit or portable signal strength was not consistent and reliable, with the result that manual relay of information had to be undertaken, accompanied by the inevitable distortion



of information along the way. It is not clear if the installation of additional satellite receivers or merely relocating receiving antennae cleared up the problem for the RNC.

The intelligence area had access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the Florida State counterpart (FCIC), and the Law Enforcement Teletype System (LETS) through an IBM type 2740 terminal. Additional equipment was made available to monitor citizens band transmissions by demonstrator groups. The intelligence staff also monitored the transmissions of the business radio licensed on a special temporary authority to the Miami "Outreach" group. This monitoring was mutual, for it was soon apparent that this group and others were well aware of police movements and information which had been transmitted by radio. An abandoned car towed in after the Republican National Convention, for example, contained a handwritten log of tactical channel transmissions. Primary control over the scout channel was exercised through a remote control unit in the situation room, and monitors were installed on the federal and local channels on which tactical information was processed.

One communications medium that seemed to operate well throughout the conventions was the telephone system. Initial planning had provided back-up trunk capability, internal communications within the complex (two digit dialing for most stations), forced disconnect equipment in the event of deliberate jamming attempts, and telephone company personnel to visibly and electronically check for any attempted interceptions. One anticipated problem - a number of overhead cables in the area of vulnerable poles - did not seem to attract the attention of those intent on destruction. The weakest links in this system turned out to be the number of communications center installations equipped with buzzers. Flashing lights or less audible devices would have helped to reduce the center's distracting noise level. To an even greater extent, the number of dispatchers/operators/supervisors orally exchanging information and directives contributed to the "chaos." Telephone lines were used to feed recorders at the city of Miami and for transmitter control purposes with good results. The acoustically coupled facsimile devices, 28 in all, were used with no problems being reported.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Communications services during the conventions can be described fairly as competently developed and responsive to the anticipated requirements. It is true not all facilities were used. The communications van was probably the least impressive in terms of cost benefits, but this would have been invaluable had the communications center broken down. A large measure of credit for making available equipment serve its intended purpose must be given to the Miami Beach civilian communications aide, Mr. Van Logothetis, and communications center dispatchers responsible for convention operations. They consistently applied sound procedures. In

the field, system discipline was usually effective, but the problem in this regard was that when breaches did occur, the system could least afford to take the time to straighten itself out. These lapses in proper communication techniques were for the most part caused by the channel loading and coordination problems on the tactical channel.

The engineering difficulties that precluded the use of the combined repeater at the DNC were resolved for the RNC. The engineering approach to the disparate frequency problem was sensible and would have been entirely successful were it not for the number of units which relied upon it. The usual criterion for channel loading in the police radio service - 50 units per operational channel - was not applicable in this situation. Given a large, mobile force composed of personnel of several agencies operating their own equipment, how can communications coordination be best achieved?

No simple answers are offered, for there are none. There may be ways, however, to reduce the number of occasions when the system fails to function properly. One step is to reduce as much as possible the number of units having access to the channel. This suggestion runs counter to the recent trend in police communications to supply communications capability to virtually all individuals in the field. In crowd control situations, however, not all personnel need to be equipped with transceivers. In fact, even top command staff may be over equipped in this regard. The concept of a "gun bearer," but with a radio in lieu of a gun, has something to offer. The radio operator would be concerned entirely with the communications process, and could make much better use of his capability than could a commander, for example, who is assessing a situation and making decisions without much regard for what might be taking place on the radio channel he must use to implement his decisions.

Another possibility is to devise some geographical separation and provide discrete tactical channels for each area. In a comparatively confined operation, it would seem that there would be too much overlap to effectively divide territory, but it should be explored. For example, some perimeter security units shared the tactical channel with units surrounding the convention complex. If separate channels had been allocated for units within the complex and those outside, the overlap would have occurred only when the fence was breached. In fact, when that situation did occur, units of the Florida Highway Patrol, using their own frequencies and not sharing the tactical channel, brought the situation under control.

It is realistic to expect communications center personnel to effectively coordinate field operations only when they have reliable information flow to and from field units, and when they are not distracted by unrelated matters. This particularly refers to the myriad of lower level operational decisions made by dispatchers, and not important deployment decisions which were made by situation room command staff. There were by all accounts simply too many people in the communications center, and

many competing demands. Elbow room, status displays, and fewer audible signalling devices would have helped to establish a more dispassionate environment when action was breaking at several places.

A decision was made at some point not to pursue the procurement of scramblers for tactical usage. This was probably wise, because of the occasional difficulties in properly netting these devices (assuring that descrambling took place without degrading quality and at the right monitors). Also, in a tactical situation, the usefulness of the intelligence gained through monitoring is strongly correlated with timeliness. Practically speaking, most of the unauthorized monitoring did not provide the demonstrators with information to which they could react in time to gain their objectives. There may even have been an advantage to permitting those monitoring to gain some appreciation of the effectiveness of police response.

Communications planning in convention situations could benefit from an approach which evaluates communications requirements from the standpoint of actual tactical deployment practice. That is, if the organization of response teams is composed of various distinctive levels of responsibility, each level's communications needs should be objectively examined. Only that communications capability which is justified should be assigned. The Florida Highway Patrol's use of helmet mounted radios is a good example. Individual squad members actually needed only paging receivers to monitor the instructions of the supervisors with whom they were working in close proximity when not in direct view of one another. This approach relates directly to the combined repeater operation in the sense that supervisors (or even higher levels) may be the lowest level of responsibility actually requiring access to the repeater. Further advantage could be gained in the independent use of agency equipment, since greater use could be made of it while retaining agency autonomy. This would result, in turn, in fewer numbers of transceivers accessing shared facilities.

Finally, top level commanders in the field and at the command center must have confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of their communications links with one another. There is some evidence that commanders of the three Miami area agencies resorted to the use of telephones when radio would have been appropriate. Whether this usage was prompted by concern for system security (unauthorized outside monitoring), or by the desire to keep certain agency communications from the ears of other agencies, the result of Miami Beach was a feeling of distrust about the efficacy of command level communications. The problem could have been dealt with partly through the installation of a more sophisticated communications system. More appropriately, the problem was one in inter-agency relationships rather than in technology. Until the preoccupations of the various agencies with their immediate responsibilities gave way to a heightened spirit of inter-agency cooperation, the concern for system security would not abate.

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## SECURITY

Since the broad meaning of security is discussed throughout this report, this chapter will consider security in a more circumscribed manner. Security here relates only to the static protective measures applied to safeguard persons, places, and things. Information related to personnel movements and mass arrests is described in Field Operations.

### THE CONVENTION COMPLEX

The most prominent target to be defended during the conventions was expected to be the Miami Beach Convention Hall complex, the location where most of the political activity was to take place and where the largest number of political officials were to be gathered together. The complex is located adjacent to Miami Beach's central business district and is only two blocks from Collins Avenue, which is the city's "hotel row" and main tourist street. Flamingo Park is located within a half mile to the south of the complex. In size, the complex is approximately square with each side being about four blocks in length. It is bordered by Dade Canal to the north, Washington Avenue to the east, 17th Street to the south and Meridian Avenue to the west.

The two buildings within the complex of primary concern to police security planners were the convention hall and the Miami Beach Auditorium. The convention hall building is a single structure consisting of a south hall and a north hall, each of which has 120,000 square feet and a combined seating capacity of approximately 33,000 people. During the conventions, the south hall was used as a massive press room. The north hall was the actual location of political activity, where over 3,000 delegates, 1,900 alternates, 2,400 members of the news media and approximately 4,000 invited guests were seated.



The auditorium is the smaller and older building. It is normally used for concerts, boxing matches and other entertainments. Bi-weekly City Council meetings are also held in the auditorium. During the conventions, the first floor was converted into a cafeteria for police personnel. The building's significance relative to security is based in the fact that the Miami Beach command post was in the basement.


The problems presented in protecting the complex site in its entirety were formidable. Central to the issue was controlling limited access. An unbreachable fail-safe system was needed to prevent even one unauthorized person who might do irreparable harm from gaining entry. With thousands of people authorized to enter the complex, this was no small task. Security planners postulated that the best method of safeguarding the area and persons in it would be to have two principal lines of defense, with each consisting of collateral parts. Consequently, convention complex security plans were separated into two categories, exterior security and interior security.

## EXTERIOR SECURITY

The first line of defense for the convention complex was the erection of a six-foot high chain link fence that was placed around the perimeter of the entire complex at a cost of \$22,000. Entry and exit were accomplished through twelve gates, which were manned by police personnel who checked all persons for valid credentials. On the Washington Street side of the fence, thick hibiscus bushes were planted to deter fence climbers and to give the fence an unobtrusive, less harsh appearance. Actually, the fence was not considered to be an impenetrable barrier. Instead, its primary purpose was to serve as a "demarcation line" separating areas where demonstrations were permitted from areas where they were not. During several preliminary meetings with demonstration leaders, police pointed out that any attempt to breach the fence was "the action that would precipitate a firm law enforcement response." This was clearly understood by demonstration leaders. The fence also served to limit access to the convention complex and to hinder the progress of any group bent on illegally entering the convention hall. In this latter eventuality, the fence would provide police with sufficient time to adequately take preventative measures. Police personnel were stationed at spaced intervals on the convention hall side of the fence as part of the manpower protective forces of the first line of defense.

A second fence was erected for the purpose of providing additional protection to the candidates' trailers. President and vice presidential candidates were allotted from one to three trailers each in which they and their staffs could work. These trailers were parked on the west side of the north convention hall, directly behind the podium inside the hall. It was reasoned that, if unauthorized persons were successful in gaining entry into the complex, the second fence would provide an extra measure of

PERIMETER FENCE WITH GATE NUMBERS



security for the people within the trailer compound. Two Miami Beach police officers were assigned to patrol this area.

Several additional security measures were taken to protect the exterior of the convention hall. A three-man, MBPD canine unit was assigned to patrol the grounds of the complex. Two Florida State Beverage Department agents were posted on the roof of the north hall. A one mile wide air security corridor was established over the convention complex by the Federal Aviation Administration. Aircraft were prohibited from entering this corridor without approval from the Secret Service. Additional lighting was installed on the north and west sides of the north hall to provide better nighttime illumination of the large parking areas at those locations. Finally, loose debris such as rocks and sticks, which could be used as missiles by dissidents, were removed from the area around the complex and from other locations in the city.

## INTERIOR SECURITY

The second line of defense consisted of all of the security measures taken to protect the interior of the convention hall. These precautions for the most part, consisted of the assignment of men to strategic areas. The interior security force was made up of private security personnel and public police officials from local, state, and federal agencies.

ANDY FRAIN. Both political parties contracted with the Andy Frain Security Services company. This private security force consisted of 350 personnel. It was mainly responsible for checking access credentials at all entrances into the north hall. The private guards also served as ushers, responsible for keeping the aisles clear, and as protectors of property, keeping a watchful eye for pilferage and thefts. As private security, these officers did not carry a firearm nor did they have the power of arrest, other than the normal power to make a "citizens arrest."


FIXED POSTS. Police officers were organized into fixed post details, limited area patrol details, and roving patrol details. There were nine entrances that were designated as fixed posts to which a total of 32 officers were assigned for the purpose of providing support to the Andy Frain personnel checking entrance credentials. The officers assigned to the entrances worked in groups of threes and fours, most of whom were in plain clothes. These officers were detectives from the Miami Beach Police Department, the Miami Police Department, Dade County Department of Public Safety, and the Florida State Beverage Department.

Each entrance was designated as a gate (not to be confused with the gates on the perimeter fence) and assigned a number. Additional physical security measures were applied to gates considered to be most vulnerable by virtue of either their construction or location. For example, gates one, two, and three were the main entrances on the east side of the hall - facing the designated demonstration area. Gate one consisted of









glass doors, which were bolstered for the conventions by the addition of a cast iron gate that slid across the floor in front of the doors. A wire mesh and a sliding metal gate were added to gate two, as well as overhanging barbed wire on the roof. Gate three consisted of doors with small windows which were fortified with Lexon, a material that is capable of repelling most bullets. The remainder of the gates were not considered to need additional security measures.

A procedure was established to "button up" the hall. In case the perimeter fence was breached or if any other emergency or near emergency situation arose outside of the complex, all points of entry were to be closed until the emergency was over. This procedure was partially activated once during each convention.

On Monday, July 10, the first day of the Democratic Convention, several of the entrances were closed when a 45-foot section of the fence on 17th Street, between gates 9X and 10X, were pushed down by demonstrators. The downing of the fence surprised the demonstrators as much as the police. Police called up reinforcements, but the demonstrators made no serious attempt to enter the complex. Earlier on the same evening, demonstrators successfully broke the locking mechanisms on gates 8X and 9X, but were prevented from entering the complex by police forces. The full "button up" procedure for the convention hall was not activated at this time. These attacks upon the fence on the first day of the convention demonstrated to police officers that the fence was vulnerable. They also demonstrated to the dissidents that there was a way into the complex if they really wanted to get in.

During the last night of the Republican Convention, when gas was being used extensively, all entrances were closed. This was more for keeping out the gas than for any actual assault by demonstrators on the north hall. Neither of the two times that the hall was "buttoned up" represented a full emergency according to the security plan, but the thinking was - and rightly so - on maximum security.

In addition to the entrance gates, several other locations required fixed post assignments. Two officers were assigned to the podium, and one officer was assigned to the podium registration room, which was located to the rear of the podium. Candidates and other dignitaries had to pass through the registration room enroute to the podium. Consideration was given to the possibility of unauthorized entry to the television anchor booth located above the convention floor. Therefore, two officers were assigned to protect that area. Four officers patrolled the catwalk areas, and two officers were assigned to the south hall lobby to prevent unauthorized entry into the press corps working area. Four policewomen from the Miami Beach Police Department were assigned to the ladies' rest rooms to check those areas. Finally, officers were assigned to the power vault room and to the entrances to the Secret Service command post.

LIMITED AREA PATROLS. The limited area patrol details were established to provide a constant surveillance over the main floor of the north convention hall, which was divided into quadrants for purposes of assignments. Two officers were assigned to each quadrant to patrol the aisles. One officer would patrol the inside aisles, and the other would patrol the outside aisles. Eight officers working in pairs were assigned to patrol the corners of the main floor. All of the officers assigned to limited area patrols were in plain clothes. The objective was to have an adequate, unobtrusive police presence in a position to observe potential trouble spots and to respond quickly to any actual trouble.


ROVING PATROLS. The roving patrol details were organized into four teams, each consisting of two men. Two teams were assigned to the north quadrant and two teams were assigned to the south quadrant. Each team was to patrol anywhere within its assigned quadrant for essentially the same purposes as the limited area patrol details, and also for the purpose of providing back-up support to any response made by the limited area details.

SECRET SERVICE. During presidential selection periods, the responsibility of the Secret Service is expanded to provide protection for all presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as for the incumbent president and vice-president. Consequently, that agency played a significant role in security planning for both the Democratic and Republican Conventions. The Secret Service established their command post in the north convention hall. Also, their personnel were stationed throughout the facility working in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies. Naturally, they kept a close and constant watch over all candidates.

## SPECIAL INTERIOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

BOMB THREATS. In addition to the protective security force which was capable of handling overt threats, special precautionary measures were taken to manage covert threats. Prior to the start of each convention, a bomb disposal unit made a thorough inspection of the hall for hidden explosive devices. This unit was composed of bomb technicians from the U. S. Army's Emergency Operations Division and from the Dade County Public Safety Department. In case a bomb was found, a bomb disposal structure was constructed at the rear of the convention hall. Bombs could be detonated within this structure.

Bomb threats received during the conventions were handled according to a prescribed system. When a bomb threat was received, it was reviewed by the Secret Service, police and political party officials who would evaluate the call and the potential danger. Bomb search teams consisting of the Secret Service and personnel assigned to interior security would then commence a bomb search. The fire department would not be called (so as not to attract undue attention to the circumstance), but bomb





trucks in the area operated by the U. S. Army and the Dade County Public Safety Department were notified.

Security officers throughout the hall were alerted that a bomb search was in progress by certain designated blue lights within the hall, which were illuminated while the search was under way. During the search, security personnel remained alert, but the remainder of the people in the hall were not informed of the threat. After the search was made, the above mentioned officials would again evaluate the situation. The final decision to evacuate the hall rested with the Secret Service and the political party in residence. During the course of the two conventions, numerous bomb threats were received. All of these turned out to be no more than empty threats, which were correctly appraised by officials. Consequently, the hall was never evacuated.

Precautionary measures were also taken to protect the convention hall against any bombing attack that could be perpetrated by using an automobile or truck laden with explosives. The west and north sides of the hall were judged to be the weak points where such an attack might be successful. When the candidates' trailers and the protective fence surrounding them were placed behind the west side of the hall, this was considered an adequate barrier to a vehicle bomb attack. Protection of the north side of the hall was provided by a line of buses parked parallel to it, thereby making it impossible for an explosive laden vehicle to be positioned directly against the building itself. If such an attack were launched, the parked buses would absorb the greatest part of the explosive shock. No such attack was attempted during either convention.

AIR CONDITIONING PROTECTION. Of special concern to security personnel was the air conditioning system. It needed protection for three reasons. First, and most obviously, the summer heat and humidity in Miami Beach required its use in an enclosed building containing thousands of people. If the system were rendered inoperative, the working environment inside the hall would become intolerable. Secondly, there was the threat of stink bombs. These devices are easily concealed. If stink bombs were brought into the hall and released, the air conditioning system would be essential for clearing the air to prevent a total disruption of the political proceedings in session. Thirdly, there was the possibility of a harmful gas substance or a stink bomb being introduced into the air conditioning system itself. These eventualities required that the system be protected from sabotage.

To safeguard the air conditioning system, two direct measures were taken. First, the air conditioner room in the north hall was guarded 24 hours a day before and during the conventions. Secondly, metal jalousies were constructed on each intake vent, which effectively prevented anyone from throwing a gas projectile into the vents. A method was also devised to neutralize stink bombs should they be released inside the hall. In the event that extensive use of gas occurred outside of the hall, the air conditioning system could be adjusted to recirculate the air inside of the

hall. This recirculating system was determined to be effective from three to five hours.

PODIUM SECURITY. Special precautionary measures were built into the newly constructed speaker's podium that was used by high ranking officials of both political parties. At a cost of \$125,000 the podium platform was built nine feet high and 100 yards in length. The center of the podium was a 50 x 50 structure that was two stories tall. Candidates and other dignitaries using the podium entered through the rear via the podium registration room. As they proceeded to the speaker's platform, the officials passed down a walkway that had a "moat" on each side to prevent anyone from jumping onto the platform. Officials then went up two sets of stairs that carried them to the nine foot high speaker's platform where they were protected by bulletproof glass. The background for the speaker's platform was 32 feet of fireproof drapes. The height of the podium, coupled with the moat, the bulletproof glass and the fireproof drapes were sound and well planned security measures. Secret Service agents were also stationed on the podium.

WEAPONS CONTROL. The control of weapons possessed by numerous security personnel inside the convention hall presented a problem different from those mentioned previously. Without the exercise of some kind of control, it was conceivable that everyone occupying a security position would be carrying a firearm. This included the FBI, the Secret Service, uniformed and plainclothes police officers from several agencies, private security guards, and personal bodyguards of political dignitaries from the various states. The problem was resolved by restricting the number of security people allowed to carry firearms into the hall and by issuing special credentials to all law enforcement personnel. These credentials were to be worn by the individual so as to be clearly visible.

As previously mentioned, personnel employed by private security firms were not allowed to carry firearms. These people were identifiable by their blue uniforms. Only two personal bodyguards assigned to protect a governor or other dignitary were allowed onto the convention floor. If these people were regular sworn police officers, they were permitted to carry a firearm when escorting their personage to his seat. Once seated, that official was considered under the protective shield of the interior convention hall security force, and the personal bodyguard was relieved of his responsibility. A holding room underneath the podium was set aside for bodyguards to wait until the session was over. These individuals wore pink VIP identification cards.

Police officials carrying weapons were identifiable by the wallet sized, laminated identification cards clipped to their suit pockets. These cards were color-coded according to the governmental level the bearer represented. All local police officials were assigned yellow cards. State officials were assigned green cards, and federal officials wore blue cards. There were no firearms restriction on these personnel.

## AUDITORIUM SECURITY

Measures taken to secure the auditorium, where the Miami Beach command post was located, were basically the same as those provided to the north hall with one exception. Since the command post was occupied only by police officials and trusted civilian police employees, there was no need for officers to be assigned inside the command post specifically for security purposes. The most important concern was preventing unauthorized entry.

A closed circuit television monitor was set up behind the auditorium so that officials in the command post could observe all activity at the entrance way. To control access, all persons were required to display the proper credentials to the Florida State Beverage Department agent posted at the main entrance to the command post. All other entrances were also guarded as were the power vault room and the PBX room. The air conditioning system protection has already been discussed. Throughout both conventions, the auditorium and the command post remained secure.

## PRE AND POST CONVENTION COMPLEX SECURITY

Several events occurred immediately before and after the Democratic Convention that suggested more stringent security measures were needed for the convention hall during those periods of time. On June 22, a set of master keys to all major locks at the convention complex were stolen from a maintenance supervisor's attache case that had been left overnight at the complex. This necessitated a change of all the locks at considerable expense to the city. A few days prior to the DNC, individuals driving automobiles with out-of-state license plates were observed in and around the convention complex taking pictures and making notes and drawings. In consideration of the numerous bombings and other types of violent assaults on public and private buildings throughout the country in recent years, individuals with no legitimate purpose should have been denied access to the complex during this period.

On Saturday, July 8, 1972, two days before the start of the Democratic Convention, approximately 700 to 800 people participated in a parade and demonstration organized by the National Welfare Rights Organization and the National Tenants Organization. When the group arrived at the convention complex, it was noticed that there was no Andy Frain security guard at the 20th Street and Washington Avenue perimeter gate. The group immediately marched through the gate and into the north convention hall, where workmen were making last minute adjustments to equipment. The demonstrators seated themselves and vowed to stay until the Democratic National Committee allocated 750 seats for the group during the convention. While seated, they listened to speakers from their own groups and also to Miami Beach Mayor, Chuck Hall, who was in the building when they entered. The group remained in the



hall for approximately 90 minutes. They were non-violent, inflicted no damage on the facility or equipment, and they left peaceably on their own accord.

A similar event occurred on Friday, July 14, 1972, the day after the Democratic Convention ended. On that day, twelve members of a women's liberation organization entered the north convention hall after security forces had been released, and delivered speeches from the convention hall podium. Camera crews were shooting scheduled scenes in the area of the podium reflecting the post-convention appearance of the hall. The two Miami Beach police supervisors who had been called to the hall to handle the situation requested the camera crews to temporarily leave the hall, inasmuch as their presence was thought to be encouraging to the demonstrators. Shortly thereafter, the women also departed. Again, no violence had been perpetrated to the facility.

The object of security, however, is to prevent "what could have happened." In the above described circumstances, one could speculate endlessly as to what could have happened if the groups that entered the convention hall had been more prone to violence. At the time that those incidents occurred, the Democratic Party had responsibility for security of the hall as specified in the lease. The contract signed by the Democratic National Committee with the City of Miami Beach gave the political party unlimited access to the convention hall two weeks prior to the start of their convention, during which time the Andy Frain Security Service was to provide security and protection to the building and the special equipment it contained. An unlocked and unguarded gate could be attributed to carelessness on the part of a single security guard, negligence on the part of a supervisor, or an oversight in the overall security plan. Whatever the case may have been, the circumstances pointed out the need for greater diligence.

#### CREDENTIALS SYSTEM

The integrity of convention security depended to a great extent on the credentials system developed to control access to the convention complex. Such a system was needed to insure that only persons in possession of valid passes would be permitted to enter the complex. Furthermore, the credential or pass held by an individual would permit access to only limited areas within the complex which the individual needed to enter.

The responsibility for developing a credentials system for the Democratic National Convention was assigned to the Advisory Committee on Security. This committee was chaired by Mr. Wes Pomeroy, Director of the Department of Safety and Development at the University of Minnesota. The committee consisted of seven additional members, all of whom were top law enforcement administrators at either the municipal, state, or federal level. The development of a credentials system for the Republican National Convention was handled by that party's Chief



Sergeant-at-Arms, Mr. Ody J. Fish, and security consultant Mr. Thomas J. MacAndrews. Both committees worked in close cooperation with the Miami Beach Police Department. The systems developed for the two conventions were similar.

Anyone who desired entrance to the convention complex had to have a pass. This policy applied to everyone from janitors to presidential candidates. Delegates and alternates received their passes at their respective hotels. The Advisory Committee on Security hand delivered the passes each day between 7 a. m. and 10 a. m. to the Chairman of each state delegation. This relatively late hour for distribution was chosen to reduce the opportunity for counterfeit reproduction. Each delegate and alternate would obtain his or her pass from the delegation chairman. It was left up to the delegations to devise their own system for internal distribution. Passes for members of the press, Governors, members of Congress, Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates were delivered to designated locations and individuals for further distribution.

All passes were color-coded, indicating by color the areas that the bearer was permitted to enter. For example, certain passes permitted entry into the complex but not into the convention hall. Other passes permitted entry into the hall but not onto the floor of the hall, where the delegates and alternates were seated. Still other passes permitted access to all locations, such as those possessed by law enforcement officials. Credentials were checked by security personnel at the perimeter entrance gates and again at the entrances to the convention hall or the auditorium. One instance when this system proved effective occurred on the last day of the Democratic Convention, when a U. S. Marine deserter attempted to reach the floor of the hall in order to dramatize his surrender for the purpose of drawing attention to the amnesty issue. This individual had obtained a pass to enter the hall, but the pass did not permit access to the floor. When the deserter attempted to go beyond the limits authorized by his pass, security officials detained him and ultimately turned him over to military authorities.

The fact that the deserter had a pass, presumably obtained through legitimate channels, raises the question of the level of security consciousness of individuals authorized to distribute credentials for the political parties. The integrity of the credentials system was as much dependent upon those individuals as it was on security forces. Police naturally assumed that credentials would be issued only to "legitimate" persons whose purposes inside the hall were purely related to contributing to the political process. As it turned out, credentials were issued to counter-culture group members whose purposes were less clear and whose behavior was somewhat less predictable, thereby creating additional security problems for the police.

One example of this type of problem occurred on the third evening of the Democratic Convention, when a group of 25 Vietnam Veterans

Against the War (VVAW) entered the convention hall with valid entrance passes. In light of their protest activities on the street, they required special scrutiny from the police while they were inside. Another example occurred on the last night of the Republican Convention when four VVAW members, three of whom were in wheelchairs, entered the hall with valid credentials. They carried protest signs that read "Stop the Killing" and proceeded to shout other protest slogans and statements at the time that President Nixon was delivering his acceptance speech. Police officers in civilian clothes surrounded the demonstrators, thereby completely shielding the podium from them and simultaneously blocking a view of them from the podium. The police action was taken to prevent possible harm to the President. When other spectators raised their own signs, the effect was to totally obscure the protest.

These two incidents provided examples of political party officials overruling the police on a very basic security issue. Although no serious consequences resulted, credentials distribution should have been more judiciously exercised by political officials.

The efficacy of the credentials system was successfully challenged twice during the Democratic National Convention by unauthorized individuals who managed to reach the floor of the convention hall. On the first occasion, one person discovered that his identification card from Mercer County Community College, his place of employment, was similar in size and color to the identification cards worn by plainclothes security officers. Many of those officers had punched a hole in their ID cards and wore them around their necks attached to chains. This unauthorized individual wore his college ID card in a similar manner. He succeeded in passing the several check points without being discovered.

The second breach in security occurred when a Miami Beach citizen also reached the floor of the hall on phony credentials. Fortunately, the interest of these two individuals was only in observing the political process. The apparent ease with which they reached the interior of the hall suggests that security personnel, at least on occasion, only superficially checked credentials by the color code and not by the content of the pass.

There were no reports of security breaches during the Republican Convention. With the exception of the above mentioned incidents, the system was also adequate for controlling limited access to the hall during the Democratic Convention.

In a sense, a credentials system was also applied to the thousands of service workers in the City of Miami Beach. As previously mentioned in Chapter 6, all persons in a service related job (waiters, gas station attendants, etc.) were required to register with the MBPD prior to the two political conventions. Registration information was then channeled through the Secret Service and the FBI.

## TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

The safe transportation of political officials between their hotels and the convention complex was a crucial consideration in security planning. There was a distinct possibility that dissident groups might try to disrupt the movement of political officials traveling to and from the complex. To forestall such an eventuality, detailed procedures for cab companies and bus drivers were developed. Also, security measures were applied to the drivers of those vehicles.

All cab drivers were required to register with the Miami Beach Police Department, as were all other service personnel working in the city. Cab radios were to be left on at all times so that the drivers would be able to receive information about present conditions of street activity which might call for the use of an alternate route or an alternate entry gate at the complex. Cab drivers were to use only entrance gates 2X or 5X on Washington Avenue at 20th Street or at 18th Street. If those gates were closed, gate 6X at 17th Street and Jackie Gleason Drive was to be used.

Passengers were to be brought into the convention complex and discharged at the main entrance to the hall. They could be discharged outside of the perimeter fence only if all of the vehicle entry gates were closed. If that occurred, passengers were to be discharged on a side street as close as possible to the nearest pedestrian entry gate so as to minimize the amount of time they would be exposed to potential harm from dissidents. Identification decals were to be attached to every cab. Also, every driver was required to show his credentials to security personnel at the perimeter gates. Drivers were asked to report any useful information to the MBPD.

Bus operators were required to complete a short questionnaire provided by the Secret Service for security purposes. This was equivalent to the registration procedure that cab operators underwent. Specific shuttle routes to and from the hotels were designated by the MBPD, and drivers were instructed to strictly adhere to these routes. A tight departure schedule from delegate hotels was established from which no unauthorized deviations were permitted. All passengers desiring to ride the shuttle buses were required to purchase a color-coded ticket, which indicated whether its bearer was a delegate, alternate delegate, a member of the press or a guest. Passengers without a ticket would not be permitted to ride the shuttle bus, and they would not be permitted to enter the complex. After discharging passengers, all cab and bus drivers were to follow specially designated exit routes from the convention complex.

Procedures were established to control the movement of bus company employees operating within the complex. All bus transportation personnel, including operators, mechanics and supervisory personnel inside the complex were restricted to the bus assembly area. No bus transportation personnel were allowed into the convention hall or any of



its connected facilities. In addition to the above security measures, bus companies were requested to secure the lids of the engine compartments of their buses and to remove the benches located at certain bus stops in the area of the complex.

#### FIRST FAMILY AND VIP PROTECTION

The primary responsibility for protecting the President, the first family, and the Vice-President rests with the Secret Service. However, during the Republican Convention, Miami Beach police detectives were assigned to the Secret Service units guarding these personages. Those assignments were made primarily because the MBPD officers knew the local geography. In case of an emergency, they could more quickly determine the best alternate routes to use to avoid a conflict area. Also, MBPD officers were in direct communication with their command officers, thereby providing a system that enabled the command staff to know the movements of the first family at all times. This was a factor considered to be essential for field operations.

#### PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BUILDING PROTECTION

HOTELS. Consideration was given to the provision of security for hotels that housed presidential candidates. It was accurately assumed that those locations would be targets for extensive demonstration activity. Because of the number of hotels involved, it was impractical to station a contingent of police officers at each one. Therefore, the responsibility for internal hotel security was assigned to each hotel's normal security force which worked with the Secret Service, who maintained constant surveillance over hotel entrances, lobbies, elevators and rooftops. Whenever a particular hotel was seriously threatened by dissidents, regular police forces would supplement the internal forces. All hotels were advised to remove the decorative rocks adorning their landscapes, thereby removing potential missiles.

More stringent security precautions were taken at the Doral Beach Hotel during the Republican Convention. This was the headquarters for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. The hotel was completely closed off to the public. The Republican Party issued special credentials to authorized persons, and the Wackenhut Security Agency was hired to man the entrances and check credentials.

External hotel security was handled by regular police forces who would respond to a particular location as the need arose. Police relied on tactical intelligence to provide a warning of which hotel was going to be the target of a demonstration and at what particular time. This tactical intelligence gave police time to respond to the site and establish a protective screen before the demonstrators arrived. These measures proved adequate for the most part during both conventions, although during the



Democratic Convention demonstrators did gain access into the Doral Hotel, Senator McGovern's headquarters.

This occurred on Wednesday, June 12, the third day of the convention. Demonstrators had been moved out of the hotel lobby by FHP officers, but members of Senator McGovern's staff then asked police to permit the demonstrators to re-enter the hotel. This created a difficult situation for security officers and raised some important questions relative to command responsibility for controlling demonstrators. Should a candidate permit a demonstration by requesting police to withdraw from the premises? If asked, should the police withdraw or should they remain in control of the situation? Under normal circumstances, without a complaint from the management, they should withdraw. But the protection of a presidential candidate is not a normal circumstance. If the presidential candidate was harmed to any extent, criticism would be directed at the police and not at the candidate or the hotel management.

In this case, the Miami Beach police took the position that they would respond only to the request of the hotel manager because the McGovern staff, as a tenant in the hotel, did not have the right to inconvenience other tenants. Initially, the hotel manager wanted police to keep demonstrators out of the hotel. Members of the McGovern staff then promised to pay for any damages that might occur and, furthermore, threatened to sue the hotel if police did not withdraw. At that point, the manager requested police to withdraw and they did so.

Once again, the point is made that good security can be undermined by essentially political decisions. As in the cases where valid credentials were distributed to protesters, the Doral Hotel incident illuminates the multi-faceted character of security and demonstration control at a political convention.

#### POLICE STATION SECURITY

The Miami Beach police station is only ten blocks from Flamingo Park. Prior to the conventions it was naturally considered as a facility that would receive some assault from dissidents. Consequently, several physical security features were added to the structure.

The main entrance consists of floor to ceiling glass that was exposed to the street. Hence, it was vulnerable to any missiles that might be thrown at it. As a protective measure, decorative steel grillwork was constructed around two sides of the entrance way. This effectively established a barrier to missiles while leaving an opening for entry and exit. By reducing the entrance space, this measure also facilitated access control should an attempt be made to "storm" the building.

Additional security measures included the installation of Bahama shutters on the first and second floors on the east side of the building, the filling in of a second story plate glass window with cement blocks, and the installation of additional lighting at the north and west sides of the building.

Surprisingly enough, the Miami Beach police building and the adjoining Municipal Courthouse received the attention of dissidents only once during the conventions. On July 10, the first day of the Democratic Convention, approximately 100 persons marched to the police and court buildings from Flamingo Park to stage a demonstration for Pat Small, a Zippie leader who had been arrested on June 23 for throwing a pie at a Miami Beach City Councilman. The demonstration resulted in a non-violent confrontation between the police and the dissidents. No damage was inflicted on property or persons. The demonstration peaceably dissipated when it was learned that Small's trial had been postponed due to the absence of his lawyer.

## PRIVATE AND PUBLIC UTILITIES PROTECTION

WATER PROTECTION. The possibility of contaminating the water supply with an undesirable chemical substance was naturally viewed as deserving preventative measures. Officials recognized that in order to contaminate the water sufficiently to affect large numbers of consumers, tremendous quantities of a substance would be required because of huge dilution. Also, only a very small amount of the normal Miami/Miami Beach daily water consumption rate of 150 million gallons is ingested by the public. Nevertheless, officials took measures to safeguard water facilities and the water.

The most serious concern was the use of inorganic poisons because of the difficulty of fast detection and the lack of adequate means of chemical treatment to reduce their effect. Also of concern was the use of pathogenic bacterial cultures. To reduce the opportunity for contamination, all water treatment plants, pumping stations, and storage reservoirs were inspected prior to the conventions for determination of additional security needs. Many of the facilities were considered as containing adequate physical security features such as reinforced wire screened vents. Facilities that were considered vulnerable or which were not normally staffed at all times, were provided with additional inspection and security personnel. In order to maintain the highest possible degree of safety, chlorine dosages were increased during the convention period. Also, higher water pressures were maintained to facilitate combatting any emergencies that might arise. Finally, a special water sampling program was instituted to provide for early detection of contamination.

ELECTRICAL POWER PROTECTION. The Florida Power and Light Company utilized its own security personnel to protect installations and feedlines in Miami Beach. Inside the convention complex, two Florida Power and Light Company electrician crews, each consisting of two men

and a supervisor, were on standby while the conventions were in session to handle emergencies. Additionally, uniformed officers from the Dade County Public Safety Department were stationed at three transformer vaults at the convention hall on an around the clock basis. During off-season times the vaults were locked. All of the Florida Power and Light Company's manhole covers within the area of the convention complex and on main parade routes were either welded shut to prevent entry to underground lines or painted so as to indicate if they had been opened.

#### TELEPHONE SYSTEM PROTECTION AND OTHER SECURITY.

The Southern Bell Telephone Company utilized private security agencies to protect their vital installations and equipment in the City of Miami Beach as well as within the convention complex. They also welded many of the manhole covers leading to underground facilities. One potential security hazard to telephone equipment existed when telephone lines were placed at waist height on the perimeter fence, leaving those lines visible and vulnerable to dissidents. This problem was reduced to some extent when the lines were lowered to ground level. Television networks also employed private security agencies to protect their tremendous amounts of broadcasting equipment.

Throughout the duration of both conventions, no attempts were made to sabotage the water supply, utilities, or television equipment, nor did any other unusual problems with these facilities occur that could be considered as convention related. The overall protective measures applied to persons, places and things during the conventions proved to be adequate and effective. Security plans were thoroughly prepared and for the most part, conscientiously carried out. However, these measures by themselves are not sufficient. They must be supported by more mobile uses of power, such as are described in the following chapter on Field Operations.

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## FIELD OPERATIONS

The success of nearly a year and half of police planning and months of training was to be determined through the exercise of field operations. The police response to emergent demonstrator activities was the crucial test. To achieve the objectives of convention policing initially established by Chief Pomerance, it was essential for police to maintain control of all demonstration activities within the city "effectively and humanely." How well this was accomplished depended upon how well the police controlled themselves.

### ARREST POLICY

Handling demonstrations is not typical in the average police officer's life. During such events he is tested mentally, physically and emotionally to an intensity unequalled by his normal work day. Because of the increased threat to a policeman's level of tolerance of discord during demonstrations, the Miami Beach Police Department issued a document entitled Guidelines for Demonstrations to all police officers who were to be involved in convention related security. Besides outlining the arrest policy, this document further contributed to the overall "low profile" style that law enforcement personnel were expected to assume during the conventions.

In the guidelines, the department listed three primary rights of people that must be protected during the anticipated demonstrations:

- (a) "The right of the demonstrators to speak freely and to assemble peacefully.
- (b) "The right of other persons in the area of the demonstration to free movement and privacy.



- (c) "The right of everybody — demonstrators, non-demonstrators in the area, policemen, and the community at large — to be free of violence to their persons or their property."

Recognizing that these rights may conflict with each other and that the behavior and philosophy of protestors is frequently antithetical to that of the police, the guidelines instructed police officers to remain neutral and calm: "A policeman must give precisely the same treatment to demonstrators supporting causes which he or even the vast majority finds personally obnoxious as he does to those who support the most popular cause. That is, of course, required by the Constitution and our laws. It is also consistent with the American belief in fair play and is a basic principle of professional, effective law enforcement. For once a policeman loses his objectivity, or even appears to do so, his very presence may increase tensions, and then his work and the work of his fellow officers is made harder . . . As professionals, we are expected to do our job calmly, without emotional overreaction, whether the job is simply standing by, protecting demonstrators from hostile onlookers, or making necessary arrests of violent demonstrators. The best police work is that which is clearly fair and unemotional. Insofar as possible, our job is to minimize confrontation."

Officers were informed of the necessity for police command personnel to be at the scene to supervise and control police action during demonstrations. As such, the officers were instructed to "maintain unit and squad integrity at all times" and to avoid, as much as possible, taking action without instructions from superiors.

The guidelines also instructed police operations personnel to openly communicate with protestors: "Whenever possible, discussion should also be had in advance with leaders of the demonstrating group. Contact during the demonstration is useful. The leaders of many groups will understand a particular police problem when explained to them and then can be helpful in reducing tension. This is just a specific example of the general rule that the police role in demonstration situations is most effective when it is understood to be fair." (original emphasis)

Actions by protestors that would be on the fringe of illegality, and in some cases actually illegal, were interpreted. Free speech was to be protected to the point of incitement to riot or criminal solicitation. In no case were arrests to be made or overt action taken for verbal harassment of officers. Officers were instructed, in concert with United States Supreme Court rulings, that streets and sidewalks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." To assist officers in determining what action to take during street demonstrations, officers

were instructed to tell the demonstrators "that they are entitled to convey their message, that their present location is improper, but that (if it be so) they could move to another area without improperly obstructing the area." If the demonstration was causing a safety hazard, police were to tell the demonstrators why there was a safety problem. Police were to exercise maximum effort to avoid confrontation.

Violations of the law were not to be uniformly ignored, but the Guidelines for Demonstrations instructed officers to consider the environment in which a possible arrest might occur and also to consider an alternative to the arrest prior to actually making the arrest. The overriding theme was for officers to maintain control of themselves and control of street activities, while at the same time exercising discretion in situations that could result in arrest. The role of police, then, was to be more of maintaining order than that of aggressive enforcers of all of the laws.

The nature of the guidelines suggested that the optimal time for distribution of the document was during the behavioral training sessions. However, at that time, intelligence reports lacked sufficient information as to what the nature of the conventions were going to be and what officers should be prepared for. As a result, the guidelines were not distributed until late May, when it became apparent through all intelligence sources that the numbers of demonstrators and their intentions were of such a nature as to make the Guidelines for Demonstrations a realistic and acceptable approach.

#### USE OF FORCE POLICY

Recognizing that not all of the levels and types of force that are used to handle criminal activities would be appropriate to apply to demonstrators, a policy was established delineating the levels of force that were to be implemented during the national political conventions. That policy underscored the "humane" approach and was stated as follows:

"It shall be the policy to deploy personnel in a low profile manner, with task force units held from public view. If an incident occurs, a ranking official should respond to the scene and attempt to resolve the issue by persuasion and/or negotiation. Most problems can be resolved at this level. If a situation fails to respond and continues to escalate, it shall further be the policy to utilize minimal personnel and minimal force to neutralize same. Chemical devices shall only be utilized upon the command of an official and their use shall promptly be discontinued upon similar order. Officers assigned to squads and platoons shall maintain unit integrity and follow the command of their squad leaders, taking no individual action of their own volition. The levels of force are as follows:

1. Persuasion and negotiation
2. Orders to disperse
3. Show of force
4. Arrest
5. Crowd management formations
6. Chemical munitions

"Levels of force generally include selected firepower and full firepower. These tactics have no place in crowd management and therefore have been deleted from the above.

"The list does not imply a field commander must commence his operation at Step 1 and proceed through each subsequent level of force. For example, if looting is taking place upon arrival at the scene, the field commander could immediately implement Steps 4 and/or 5, depending upon all facts known to him and the resources available. The level of force is simply a uniform policy statement to assist the commander in the field."

Even though the use of firearms was not considered a proper level of force for crowd control, all officers were permitted to carry their standard police gun with one exception. At times during the first days of the Democratic National Convention, a unit of MBPD officers was positioned outside of the perimeter fence in front of convention hall without firearms and wearing soft hats. This assignment, which was entirely voluntary, was created for the purpose of illustrating to the demonstrators and delegates that the police had no intention of being a threatening or abrasive factor.

All police officers were permitted to carry the small mace canisters that they normally are equipped with and to use them at their own discretion. The larger "Mark IX" mace canisters and other types of gas devices were distributed only to supervisory and command personnel, who were to use them only as a last resort and with restraint. The behavior of police was to be guided by the arrest and use of force policies, coupled with training and the close exercise of control by police commanders. It was expected that the effect of these measures would result in the achievement of the overall convention policing objectives.

## TRAFFIC AND PARKING

Traffic control was far from a minor consideration. Throughout both conventions, traffic problems had to be solved quickly and effectively



in order to avoid causing additional problems. In fact, during the late afternoon hours of the last day of the Republican National Convention, protection of traffic lanes between delegate hotels and the convention complex became a primary police mission.

Parking for the thousands of new arrivals in the city, including security personnel, also posed formidable problems. Normal parking patterns in the city were disrupted during the conventions, which led to several citizen complaints. The municipal parking lot at 46th Street and the ocean beach, for instance, was rented to the Democratic National Committee during that convention, which made the beach less accessible at that point to Miami Beach residents. Another beach front parking lot was made available to the Secret Service, thus denying it to resident public. Modification of normal parking patterns included removal of certain parking meters from locations in front of hotels where demonstrations were expected and enforcement of no parking regulations at those locations.

The normal traffic control force of MBPD was expanded with additional manpower supplied by the city of Miami and Dade County PSD. Police recruits were used to control parking within the convention complex, which was in itself a massive problem. MPD and PSD supplied approximately 80 recruits to direct traffic and assist parking. During the DNC, about half of these recruits were used at intersections outside the convention complex fence. During the Republican National Convention, because of expectations for increased violence, the recruits were used only inside the convention complex. Technically, the recruits had no legal authority to make arrests. They proved to be a valuable resource, however, in controlling parking at convention hall in such a way that it did not interfere with other business or demonstrations in progress.

Parking areas at the convention complex had been assigned to individuals attending the convention at the same time that they were issued valid credentials. Colors and code letters on the credential corresponded with colors and code letters in the parking lot, which designated the proper area in which the individual should park. Signs on the streets in the neighborhood of convention hall directed the holder of credentials bearing certain colors and codes to enter the complex at specified gates. These two preliminary steps minimized the amount of driving around within the complex that otherwise might have ensued and simultaneously reduced the possibility of accident or confusion by drivers who arrived while demonstrations were in progress.

Outside the convention complex, traffic control was largely achieved through utilization of a motorcycle force made up of twelve motor-men from the Miami Beach Police Department and eleven motormen from Miami Police Department. Officers with the rank of Sergeant in each of the two departments acted as supervisors for this detail. This motor force was assisted at times by a "roving patrol" involving six police cars




of the MBPD manned by eleven officers during the DNC and eight officers during the RNC. This unit was particularly useful for control of traffic during demonstration parades.

PARADE ESCORTS. Parade escorts during the political conventions were often provided on the initiative of the police, whether or not they were requested by marchers. The lack of a binding parade permit ordinance created a situation where demonstration parades occasionally began without any preliminary formal consultation with the police. More often, police were notified of demonstrator plans in advance, because it was usually recognized by the demonstrators that police protection along the parade route was a desirable service. When escort service was not requested, police provided it anyway, because they also regarded it as a desirable function. In other words, although the lack of a parade permit law created problems for the police, it was proven to be unnecessary. Police overcame their difficulties in this area by electing to provide "aggressive protection" for demonstration parades, i. e., by seeking out parades and providing escort protection on their own initiative.

Parade escort was usually accomplished in the following manner. A lead car was positioned at the head of the parade. Communications equipment in the lead car provided direct contact with the police command post. Police cars or motorcycle escorts would accompany the parade along parallel streets on either side of the parade route, stopping cross traffic on streets until the last of the parade had passed through the final street intersection. Vehicles traveling in front of the parade halted traffic on cross streets as the parade approached. The lead car remained in constant radio contact with the command post in order to pass on information about the parade route, rate of progress, and intentions of the marchers. More often than not, the parade was joined by a police officer on foot in civilian clothes who would communicate enroute with the march leaders.

Without any advance notice of demonstrator intentions, the beginning of an unauthorized parade might have been met with any of at least three possible police reactions. (1) Stop the parade because it is a public nuisance containing a potential for disorder. (2) Remain neutral, permitting events to unfold naturally and responding to incidents as they occur. (3) Provide police escort protection for the parade, whether or not it is requested, in order to minimize the potential for violence. This latter decision was obviously the wisest course of action under the circumstances.

Parade control was also assisted materially by parade "marshalls" who were usually organized from among the ranks of demonstrating groups. The parade marshalls marched along the periphery of the parade to restrain possible confrontations between marchers and spectators. The marshalls also restricted the actions of stragglers and acted as peacekeeping guards at mass rallies which often followed major parades. The strategy of developing internal marshalls for these purposes was consistently urged on



demonstration groups by the MBPD community relations officer during his preliminary contacts with these groups. A more detailed explanation of this strategy and the functions of marshalls thus organized is described in Chapter 9.

On at least three very important occasions, the police strategy of providing protection to unauthorized parades resulted in avoiding volatile situations that could easily have produced violent confrontations. Two of these occasions involved possible clashes between Flamingo Park demonstrators and a large contingent of Miami's Cuban population.

On the second day of the Democratic National Convention, Cuban marchers paraded from Meridian Avenue & 17th Street to the Washington Avenue demonstration area outside convention hall at the same time that a parade was enroute from Flamingo Park, also bound for the Washington Avenue demonstration area. As the demonstrators from Flamingo Park moved north on Washington Avenue, the Cuban parade progressed slowly down 17th Street, eventually becoming strung out all the way from Meridian Avenue to Washington Avenue. As Cuban marchers arrived at the Washington Avenue intersection, they turned north. Meanwhile, the Flamingo Park group was approaching from the south, and a confrontation between the two antagonistic groups seemed inevitable. At that point, police officers in the car leading the marchers from Flamingo Park received information about the slow progress of the Cubans from the command post, and they relayed this information to parade marshalls. At Washington Avenue and 15th Street the parade was halted. Demonstration leaders led the temporarily halted marchers in chanting slogans. The delay provided time for the Cubans on 17th Street to close ranks and move north on Washington Avenue before the arrival of the Flamingo Park parade at the same intersection.

A very similar situation occurred on the first day of the Republican National Convention, although this time the problem was somewhat more complicated. Again, Cuban marchers paraded from Meridian Avenue & 17th Street to the Washington Avenue demonstration area. This time, however, the south demonstration area on Washington Avenue (located on the route of the proposed Cuban parade) was already blocked by a demonstration rally already in progress. In this instance, police initiative in providing parade escorts yielded the capability to change the designated parade route while the parade was in progress. Marshalls were utilized to form a human barrier at the north side of the intersection at Washington Avenue & 17th Street. This prevented the Cubans from turning north, and it also prevented stragglers from the rally from interfering with the Cuban parade as it passed. The Cuban parade moved one block further east on 17th Street, then turned north on James Avenue to 19th Street, and re-entered Washington Avenue at 19th Street, this time above the demonstration rally in progress at the south end of the demonstration area. Marshalls were also used to separate the two groups at 19th Street and prevent outbreaks of violence at that location.



When the Cubans completed their demonstration, the parade returned to its starting point by retracing the same route around the rally still in progress in the south demonstration area. Again, however, the Cuban parade became strung out and disorganized on 17th Street. Cuban stragglers were still passing through the intersection at Washington Avenue & 17th Street (with marshalls blocking the north side of Washington Avenue) when a new parade consisting of about 500 marchers from Flamingo Park approached from the south on Washington Avenue. A confrontation was avoided by parade marshalls who quickly formed a line across 17th Street east of Washington, temporarily cutting off the last marchers in the Cuban parade until the demonstrators from Flamingo Park had been escorted through the intersection.

These were extremely tense moments for law enforcement personnel. The two antagonistic demonstrating groups were both present in large numbers on the same street at the same time. Violent confrontations between members of the two groups could rapidly escalate into riot conditions. The fact that such violence was avoided is rightly credited to two key factors: the disciplined conduct of the marshalls under the supervision of the Miami Beach community relations officer, and the capability of the police parade escort unit to carry out an exercise in split second timing. It should also be mentioned that, because of newly acquired communications equipment, parades were closely monitored in the command post. This tended to prove correct MBPD's emphasis on the acquisition of communications equipment for the conventions.

One final example of the advantages of close police contact with parades in progress was provided on Tuesday of the RNC, when a mass arrest was effected on Washington Avenue directly in front of an approaching VVAW parade bound for the Fontainebleu Hotel. Instead of interfering with the mass arrest in any way, VVAW marchers turned east on 19th Street and avoided confrontation with the police. This action was seen by police commanders as resulting from close contacts previously established with the VVAW leadership by the community relations officer and communication with VVAW marchers while the parade was in progress.

While parade escort was probably the most dramatic type of police traffic control during the two political conventions, other types of activity were equally significant in maintaining the peace. For instance, on several occasions demonstrations that occurred at hotels on Collins Avenue made it necessary to detour all routine traffic off of that street. Since Collins Avenue is a primary traffic artery in Miami Beach, such detours required rapid police response to quickly route traffic over predesignated alternate routes. This action was accomplished repeatedly, without much fanfare, but it contributed greatly to the smooth execution of other law enforcement responses to hotel demonstrations.



Before closing a consideration of traffic control, it should be noted that the special circumstances of the conventions tended to produce a need for highly qualified personnel on the traffic detail. Officers engaged in convention complex security or in task forces to effect mass arrests generally operated under closely supervised conditions in large numbers. By way of contrast, the traffic officer often functioned alone. No fence separated the traffic officer from the demonstrators. He was in a "high contact" position that brought him into daily face-to-face contact with demonstrators on the streets. In that role, it was extremely important that the traffic officer be an individual who could establish control over a situation without precipitating needless confrontations. In this respect, based on innumerable reports of cooperative police action during the conventions and virtually no reports of confrontations caused by abrasive traffic units, the police officers so involved deserve high praise for exercise of control.

#### FIELD OPERATIONS AT HOTELS - DNC

One strategy of the demonstrators was to gain attention for their particular viewpoints by demonstrating at the hotels where presidential candidates and delegates were housed or where certain political events were occurring. Throughout the course of both conventions, nearly two dozen demonstrations took place at selected hotels, most of which involved some level of police response. Only a few can be examined here for purposes of illustrating police field operations.

The first hotel demonstration occurred at the Playboy Plaza Hotel on July 9. The object of the demonstration was to disrupt the 1972 Sponsor's Club Cocktail Party and Reception that was scheduled to begin at 8:00 p.m. Police had received advance information of the planned demonstration and positioned a 50-man contingent of Dade County Public Safety Department officers inside the hotel at 5:30 p.m. At 6:40 p.m., approximately 65 demonstrators were in front of the hotel. A squad of PSD officers was positioned in the entrance driveway to the hotel to prevent their entry. By 7:20 p.m., the number of demonstrators had increased to 150 and the tone of the demonstration was escalating to violence. Demonstrators began by simply parading back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the hotel, waving Viet Cong flags, displaying protest banners, and chanting slogans. As vehicles and guests began arriving, demonstrators attempted to block their entry. A few guests were pushed and verbally abused. Some of the demonstrators beat on the hoods, fenders and windshields of vehicles trying to enter the hotel, and several car radio antennas were broken off, including the antenna on Chief Pomerance's vehicle. A few demonstrators sat down in the driveway and had to be removed before traffic could pass.

Up to this point in time, police officers on the scene had made no arrests and took only minimal action. At approximately 7:40 p.m., the Florida Highway Patrol's 144 man mobile task force, consisting of platoons 7, 8 and 9, was requested to respond to the scene from their nearby staging area. At the same time, four prisoner vans were positioned just south of the Playboy Plaza Hotel in anticipation of a mass arrest.

The FHP task force arrived with sirens and blue lights turned on. After exiting their vehicles, the FHP officers assembled in formation and proceeded to advance slowly toward the demonstrators. The demonstrators offered little resistance and immediately began to retreat south on Collins Avenue, thereby avoiding arrest. By 9:20 p.m., the demonstration was completely over and the FHP platoons and prisoner vans were returned to their staging areas.

This event was the first major field activity of the conventions, and it served to demonstrate several things to police officials. First, the FHP's mobile task force and their strategy of arriving on the scene in a "Code 3" response proved quite effective. Thirty-six police vehicles approaching with blue lights flashing and sirens wailing was an awesome sight. When four officers exited from each vehicle, it seemed to be a much larger force than was actually present. All of this served to strike a note of caution to the demonstrators, and it undoubtedly had some influence on their rapid retreat from the scene. This was a strategy that was to be used effectively on other occasions throughout the course of both conventions.

Secondly, the demonstration provided police commanders an opportunity to observe the behavior of at least a portion of their officers in a field maneuver. Throughout the entire event, police officers maintained unit integrity and acted with restraint. There was no violent physical contact between police and demonstrators, although there easily could have been if police had so desired. There was also no use of mace or other chemicals. The efficient and restrained manner in which officers conducted themselves provided the first indication that perhaps line officers had internalized the command officers' directives relating to "effective and humane" policing of the conventions.

Thirdly, the fact that the demonstrators retreated quickly, offering little resistance, communicated to the police that the demonstrators weren't really bent on warfare, and that perhaps they really did not want trouble with the police. It should be remembered that this was a point demonstration leaders made frequently in previous press interviews and in meetings with police officials.

The second hotel demonstration during the DNC of any significance to police operations occurred on Wednesday, July 12, at the Doral Hotel, which was Senator McGovern's headquarters. The demonstration began at 12:54 p.m. when 35 protesters arrived in front of the hotel. Other

demonstrators continued to arrive in small groups. At 1:30 p.m., several buses left Flamingo Park for the Doral Hotel. During this time, hotel security officers had permitted some of the demonstrators to enter the hotel lobby, but were attempting to bar entry to those who were not wearing shoes. This latter group attempted to force their way past the guards. Some pushing ensued, and regular guests of the hotel who were attempting to enter at the time were also pushed. As demonstrators continued to arrive in groups of 10 or 15 persons, the hotel security unit decided that the situation was getting out of hand and called for police assistance.

Florida Highway Patrol platoons 7 and 8 were dispatched to the hotel. When they arrived at 2:00 p.m., approximately 60 to 70 demonstrators were in the hotel lobby, chanting, distributing leaflets, making speeches, and causing confusion. At 2:04 p.m., the FHP troopers entered the lobby and proceeded to move the demonstrators out of the hotel and onto the street.

This hotel demonstration served to illustrate the difficulty of assessing demonstrations that developed relatively spontaneously and which gradually escalated in size and potential for violence. The importance of an accurate assessment rests in the need for timely police response as well as for an appropriate type and amount of police response. In the Doral Hotel incident, police responded quickly and appropriately when called, but whether they were called at the proper time is open to question. It seems that hotel security should have requested police assistance earlier. The decision to permit demonstrators to actually enter the building without calling for police assistance seems particularly questionable.

The initial action by FHP, incidentally, did not end the Doral Hotel demonstration that day. Additional details about the demonstration are related in Chapters 8 and 13.

Not all of the demonstrations at hotels during the DNC were handled by police task forces. On two occasions, only the MBPD community relations officer was needed at the scene of a hotel demonstration to handle the incident. The first occasion occurred on Wednesday, July 12, when 150 to 200 Zippies "took over" a ballroom in the Victor Hotel, where the McGovern youth organization was headquartered. Their purpose apparently was to protest their understanding of an "identity between McGovern and Lyndon Johnson." The demonstrators said they would not leave the hotel until they spoke with Senator McGovern.

Miami platoons 22 and 23 and Miami Beach platoon #1 were placed on buses ready to respond to the hotel if needed, but representatives of the youth organization said they could handle the situation without police. However, two hours later the demonstrators were still in the hotel demanding to see Senator McGovern. The management of the hotel



called the Miami Convention Coalition headquarters and asked for assistance in getting the demonstrators out of the hotel. In response to the call, an MBPD community relations officer went to the hotel with several VVAW members. Through their combined efforts they persuaded the demonstrators to leave the hotel peacefully.

The second hotel demonstration handled by an MBPD community relations officer occurred on Thursday, the last day of the DNC. At 1:55 p.m., 40 demonstrators entered the lobby of the Carillon Hotel, which was Senator Humphrey's headquarters. Their purposes were to demand full payment of all medical bills for a female jaywalker, injured by a car driven by a Humphrey aide, and to expose the MBPD for "covering up" the accident. As the number of demonstrators increased, individuals in the group tried to incite the crowd to physically "take" the driver involved in the accident. An MBPD community relations officer arrived at the scene with a copy of the accident report and explained the incident and its routine follow-up to the crowd. These measures effectively calmed the crowd and ended the demonstrations.

Several demonstrations at hotels during the DNC required no police field operational activities other than an awareness of the events. Demonstrations occurred at the Fontainebleau, the Four Ambassadors Hotel, the Americana Hotel, and the Doral Hotel. These demonstrations were attended by only 50 to 100 people who picketed, handed out leaflets, or generally milled around. During these events, police monitored the demonstrations by maintaining communications with hotel security, but did not maintain a physical presence at the scenes.

#### FIELD OPERATIONS AT HOTELS - RNC

Prior to the start of the Republican National Convention, a coalition of several demonstrator groups published a Manual for the Republican Convention, in which they described their strategy for protest. Attached to this document was a statement that said, "we are not planning any resistance activity in the area of the hotels." The statement explained that they had discarded the tactic of demonstrating at hotels because their goal was to "protest against the Republican Party and its war strategy, not to disrupt the community." This statement was issued on August 9, 1973.

It soon became evident that not all demonstrators were influenced by the "Manual." On Sunday, August 20, between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., a demonstration occurred at the Fontainebleau Hotel that required the presence of ten police platoons and almost precipitated the first mass arrest of the two political conventions. Police intelligence had reported that a large demonstration was going to take place at the Fontainebleau Hotel in the afternoon to protest a \$500 per plate Republican Dinner to be held inside. In response, Dade County Public Safety Department's platoons 10 and 11 were staged inside the hotel. At 6:00 p.m., one FHP task force



consisting of platoons 21, 22 and 23 was positioned at the Fontainebleau and another FHP task force consisting of platoons 24, 25 and 26 was positioned nearby at the 46th Street municipal parking lot.

As the demonstrators approached the front of the hotel, 20 officers exited from the hotel to prevent entry. At approximately 7:00 p.m., the number of demonstrators had increased to 600. More officers were moved out of the hotel to a position at the hotel entrance. The demonstrators continued to march in a large circle chanting, "Keep the rich out." They pounded on cars trying to enter the hotel driveway. When a Cadillac approached, demonstrators climbed on it and police moved quickly to free the car.

In the meantime, FHP platoons 24, 25 and 26 were called from their staging area. Additionally, FHP platoons 19 and 20 were sent to the hotel from their staging area at the convention complex, as were DCPSD platoons 6 and 7. Two prisoner vans were also requested to respond to the scene, and police made ready to proceed with a mass arrest. By this time demonstrators had completely blocked the north-bound lanes on Collins Avenue, requiring police to detour traffic at 63rd Street and 41st Street. Demonstrators had also formed human fences across the hotel's entrances, further restricting pedestrian and vehicular movements.

At 7:45 p.m., FHP troopers began clearing the entrances to the hotel. They advanced from the hotel on the demonstrators, moving them to the west side of Collins Avenue. Then the troopers formed a line across Collins Avenue and moved the demonstrators south on Collins. The demonstrators offered little physical resistance, and police allowed them to disperse, thereby avoiding a mass arrest. By 8:30 p.m., the demonstration was over and traffic returned to normal. Demonstrators at that time were still spread out on Collins Avenue between 25th and 20th Streets, requiring the presence of FHP patrol cars to prevent trashing and also to prevent the demonstrators from reorganizing and returning to the Fontainebleau. By 9:06 p.m., however, most of the demonstrators had returned to Flamingo Park and all police forces had returned to their staging areas.

The next significant demonstrations at hotels occurred on Tuesday, August 22. Several demonstrations were held outside the Fontainebleau Hotel throughout the day. At about 10:00 a.m., 400 demonstrators gathered in front of the hotel and what ensued was a "replay" of the Sunday night demonstration at the same location. Demonstrators harassed people trying to enter, damaged vehicles, and blocked traffic. Police responded just as they had previously by clearing the entrances to the hotel, forcing demonstrators to move into the street and then to move south on Collins Avenue. Just as before, at the time police decided upon effecting a mass arrest, the demonstrators began to break-up and disperse. Later in the

day, approximately 800 VVAW demonstrators protested at the Fontainebleau. Police and prisoner vans were positioned at the hotel, but the demonstration was peaceful and did not require any police action other than the rerouting of traffic.

One other major hotel demonstration during the RNC occurred at the Doral Hotel on Wednesday, August 23. That event will be described later in this chapter within the section on Mass Arrests.

The pattern that emerged for police field operations at hotels when a task force configuration was used consisted of: (1) blocking demonstrators from entering; (2) clearing them away from the hotel property; (3) preparing to make a mass arrest. This was a logical sequence that progressed from the most important security measure (keeping demonstrators out and thereby preventing possible injury to people or property) to the least important (effecting a mass arrest after the police were already in control). Police executed these tactics in a well disciplined and restrained manner.


## THE CONVENTION COMPLEX

The convention complex was the site of more demonstrator activity than any other single location in the city. In the spirit of accommodation two areas in front of the complex, outside of the perimeter fence on Washington Avenue, had been designated as demonstration areas for dissidents. It was at this location that demonstrators were authorized to carry out their various protest activities. Naturally, some of those activities were expected to be of such a nature as to require some level of police response.

THE COMPLEX AND THE DNC. At the outset of the DNC, the perimeter fence was defended by squad size units of police officers, who were located behind the fence at each of the twelve gates in a non-threatening defensive role. These units were commanded by Sergeants and were backed up by Miami Beach Platoon #1, a 21-man task force. The plan was to direct the task force to any gate at which demonstrators were located to prevent a successful attempt at entry.

At 4:40 p.m., on July 9, the first message was received in the command post reporting that approximately 100 Zippie demonstrators followed by 150 spectators had left Flamingo Park and were heading for the convention complex. In response to this information, all perimeter gates were locked and all task force units were placed on alert. Florida Highway Patrol platoon #11 was prepositioned at 18th Street and Meridian Avenue by gate 11X, and Miami Beach platoon #1 was prepositioned on the Washington Avenue side of the complex. The demonstrators marched to gate 4X at Washington Avenue and 18th Street, where they shouted slogans, waved protest signs and generally milled around. After 45 minutes the

- PERIMETER FENCE WITH GATE NUMBERS
- - - - BUS BARRICADE PLACEMENT





demonstrators paraded to gate 11X where they again demonstrated, but for a shorter period of time. By 5:25 p.m. the demonstrators started returning to Flamingo Park, and by 5:40 p.m. the FHP platoon and the MBPD platoon returned to their staging areas in the complex.

This first demonstration at the complex began and ended peacefully. There was no violence and no extensive movement or involvement of police personnel. However, a general pattern did emerge that was to be followed throughout most similar events during the conventions. As demonstrators approached the complex, all police personnel would be alerted and some or all of the perimeter gates would be locked. The gates would be unlocked after the demonstration, and police personnel would then return to their staging areas. This pattern was modified according to the level of threat to the complex at any particular time.

On the following day, July 10, events occurred that more seriously tested police tactical response. Information was received in the command post at 5:27 p.m. that SDS members were trying to recruit demonstrators at Flamingo Park for an assault on the perimeter fence. At the same time, Reverend Abernathy of SCLC, led 1,500 to 2,000 marchers from Flamingo Park to the complex.

Because of the rumored gate crashing attempts, all gates on Washington Avenue were closed. All police units were placed on alert. Dade County PSD platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were assembled at the rear of the Auditorium ready to respond to the fence when needed. Delegates who were arriving at the complex for the opening session of the DNC were directed to enter through gates on 17th Street and on Meridian Avenue. Gates on Washington Avenue were closed.

When Reverend Abernathy's rally, which had been peaceful, ended shortly after 7:30 p.m., his marshalls urged demonstrators to return to Flamingo Park. However, some demonstrators remained at the complex for the avowed purpose of forcibly entering it. The police responded to this threat by bolstering the perimeter fence defenses. PSD platoons 2, 3, 4 and 5 were called from the auditorium and positioned along 17th Street between gates 6X, 7X, 8X, 8AX, and 9X. At 8:19 p.m., demonstrators were attacking the fence by pushing on it and making several attempts to scale it. Florida Highway Patrol officers who had been staged in the auditorium were positioned along the fence between gates 9X and 10X. FHP platoons 7, 8 and 9, previously staged outside the complex at St. Patrick's Church, were directed to respond to the complex.

As the demonstrators moved along 17th Street, they took on the characteristics of a mob; throwing rocks, bottles and pieces of metal at the officers and attempting to force each gate as they came to it. During this time, the locking mechanisms on gates 8 AX and 9X were broken by the pushing crowd, but the officers stationed at those locations were able

to prevent the demonstrators from entering the complex. At gate 8 AX, Miami Beach Sergeant Joseph Spoto received a laceration on his head when he was struck by a gate while attempting to reclose it after the crowd had forced it open. At gate 9X, mace was used to repel several demonstrators who had attempted to climb over the fence. One demonstrator did succeed in climbing the fence but was immediately apprehended by MPD Sergeant Lawrence Hoffkins, who suffered a cracked rib while making the arrest.

At 8:45 p.m., FHP platoons 7, 8 and 9, which were mobile task forces, arrived at the complex in 36 state police cars with four men to a vehicle. The vehicles approached with blue lights flashing and sirens wailing. Just as the officers were exiting from their vehicles, 45 feet of the fence between gates 9X and 10X fell to the ground under the weight of the demonstrators. The newly arrived troopers joined the police already positioned at the fence to form a defensive line, and the demonstrators made no serious attempt to cross over the downed fence to challenge them.

At gate 10X demonstrators continued to throw missiles at the police and to challenge the fence. In response, the police commander at gate 10X requested delivery to that location of six large "Mark IX" mace dispensers. When these arrived, the demonstrators apparently recognized them, and rather than risk being maced, proceeded to disperse and head back toward Flamingo Park. By 9:34 p.m., the demonstration was over. All tactical units returned to their staging areas and all of the locked gates were opened.

As a result of this first violent demonstration at the convention complex, police officials recognized that the original plan of positioning one squad at each gate backed up by the 21-man MBPD task force was inadequate. This was so for two reasons. First, one squad positioned at a gate plus the 21-man task force was not a sufficiently large force to repel hundreds of demonstrators. Secondly, the task force could respond to only one gate at a time. When significant numbers of demonstrators appeared at more than one gate simultaneously, the 21-man unit obviously could not respond to all locations. Consequently, after the first day of the DNC, the field operations for the defense of the complex were changed to a "zone defense" strategy.

The "zone defense" strategy consisted of assigning task forces to protect designated zones along the perimeter fence. Each commanding officer in charge of a task force was given responsibility for a designated number of gates within his assigned zone. For example, Miami Police Department's Task Force "C," which consisted of 104 men, was assigned to the Washington Avenue Zone. This zone encompassed gates 1X through 5X. The zone commanders were responsible for making the decision as to when gates would be locked and when their task force would be fully activated.

The shift to the "zone defense" offered several advantages. First, the task forces in each zone were in a position to respond more quickly and required fewer men on constant duty. Secondly, it relieved constant pressure on MBPD's 21-man task force. Thirdly, it overcame a problem in the chain of command that had arisen when the fence came down. During that incident, one field commander ordered troops from another agency to respond to the fence. However, those officers did not respond to the command because it did not emanate from their own field commander. This situation forced the first field commander to channel his request through the command post, and thereby waste valuable time. Under the "zone defense" plan, each unit was under the direct control of its own commanding officer, which avoided the unwarranted delays in response time.

One other aspect of police operations was evident after the first encounter. That pertained to the police officers' conduct while under fire of missiles and the worst kind of verbal acrimony from demonstrators. There was some limited use of mace by the Miami Police Department, but there was no widespread or general use of mace or other chemicals. After the incident concluded, some demonstrators in Flamingo Park claimed that mace had been used indiscriminately and attempted to rally others to charges of police brutality. However, members of the SDS told the crowd that no police brutality had occurred. The VVAW supported the SDS on this issue and were successful in calming the crowd.

The remaining demonstrations at the complex during the DNC, although varying in size and volume, did not present any comparable level of threat. For the most part, the later demonstrations consisted of speeches and various other forms of symbolic protest that were non-threatening, but included verbally taunting the police. Nevertheless, during each demonstration at the complex and whenever any demonstration group approached and passed the complex bound for another destination, police units inside the perimeter fence were positioned at their assigned stations and reserve forces were alerted.

THE COMPLEX AND THE RNC. During the Republican National Convention there were also numerous low-keyed demonstrations and half-hearted attempts by some demonstrators to enter the complex. The police during these incidents maintained the "zone defense" strategy that had proved effective during the DNC. Whenever there were no demonstrators or very few demonstrators at the complex, the only police forces in evidence would be two MBPD police officers and an Andy Frain security officer at each gate. When numerous demonstrators were present, additional police forces were moved out of their staging areas inside of the auditorium to positions behind the perimeter fence. During the RNC, Miami police units were assigned the zones from gate 1X to gate 9X. Dade County PSD units were assigned to the zones from gate 9X to 12X and north to the perimeter fence at the Dade Canal. Miami Beach platoon #1 was assigned along the north perimeter.



Although many of the demonstrations at the complex were considered as relatively routine from the perspective of police response, there were occurrences during the RNC that prompted police to implement adaptations to their perimeter defense strategy and to increase the level of force used to protect the complex.

SWEEPING ACTIONS. The first adaptation in police field operations was the use of police units on the street side of the perimeter fence to effect "sweeping" actions to move crowds. The chain of events that led to this tactic began when an estimated 2,000 demonstrators concluded a march from Flamingo Park to the convention complex at 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday, August 21.

As the demonstrators approached the complex, police units were positioned at their assigned areas behind the perimeter fence. Miami Beach platoon #1 was reassigned to a position on Jackie Gleason Drive in front of the auditorium with pepper fogger gas dispersal units. Additionally, officers of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Department, who normally protected the perimeter fence during off-session hours, were alerted at their hotels and requested to go to the complex.

When the demonstrators arrived at Meridian and 17th Streets, one group proceeded north on Meridian and the other proceeded east on 17th Street. As the two groups moved around the complex perimeter, they left a solid line of demonstrators standing along the curb behind them. At each gate demonstrators announced to the police that they intended to block the gate. They also taunted police and spectators behind the fence and threw various objects at them. By 7:30 p.m., demonstrators had all gates blocked except for gate 11X on Meridian Avenue, and demonstrators were beginning to lie down in front of that gate.

Because delegates were arriving at the complex for the evening session of the Republican National Convention, police began "sweeping" actions outside of the perimeter fence to clear away demonstrators. FHP platoons 21, 22, and 23, who were staged at the Miami Beach High School parking lot, were requested to report to Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue. This unit was instructed to clear Meridian Avenue of demonstrators. Platoon commanders were told that they had just twelve minutes to complete the "sweep" because buses carrying delegates had been advised to enter the complex through gate 11X, and they were expected to start arriving shortly. Three prisoner vans were also sent to Dade Boulevard and Meridian in expectation of arrests being made. FHP platoons 24, 25 and 26 were placed on alert.

FHP platoons 21, 22, and 23 formed across Meridian Avenue, four lines deep. They advanced toward the demonstrators at a fast walking pace. The officers pushed and shoved the demonstrators with their batons, but refrained from any clubbing action. When the officers had moved the demonstrators to Meridian and 17th Street, they stopped

their advance. At that intersection, demonstrators verbally taunted the police before moving east along 17th Street toward Washington Avenue. Gates 11X and 12X were then opened to delegate traffic, and some FHP troopers remained there to keep them open.

The demonstrators who had been cleared from Meridian Avenue merged with demonstrators on 17th Street to harass delegates attempting to enter the complex through gate 9X. At 8:00 p.m., MPD platoons 15, 16 and 17 had just arrived at the complex after being called from their staging area in Miami. These units were requested to go out through gates 8X and 9X to clear the demonstrators from those areas. Game and Fresh Water Fish Officers were assigned to do the same in the area of gate 10X. The demonstrators were moved away from the gates, but they went into the street and began harassing vehicular traffic. FHP platoons 24, 25 and 26 then effected a sweep of 17th Street, pushing the demonstrators east onto Washington Avenue.

At about this same time a group of demonstrators had gone to Dade Boulevard and Washington Avenue to attempt to block delegate traffic enroute to gates 11X and 12X. Game and Fresh Water Fish Officers were transferred from gate 10X to this intersection and proceeded to push the demonstrators back into the Washington Avenue demonstration area. By 8:30 p.m., traffic was flowing freely at that intersection.

Delegates attempting to enter the complex through gates 4X and 5X were subjected to much harassment by demonstrators. At gate 5X, members of the VVAW formed a corridor across Washington Avenue to allow delegates safe passage through the crowd to the gate. But this corridor soon took on the characteristics of a gauntlet, because the delegates received some pushing and a lot of verbal abuse from other demonstrators as they made their way toward the gate. Upon seeing the rough treatment that the delegates were receiving, police went out of the complex to assist them in.

At 8:38 p.m., FHP officers cleared the intersection at Washington Avenue and 17th Street, pushing demonstrators north on Washington Avenue toward the demonstration area. After the intersection was cleared, officers blocked off both Washington Avenue and 17th Street. This confined the 3,500 demonstrators to only the area in front of the complex. Shortly after 9:00 p.m., groups of demonstrators started to drift away from the demonstration area and head south on Washington Avenue toward Flamingo Park. The line of officers stretched across Washington Avenue at 17th Street was moved to allow demonstrators to pass. However, officers continued to block access to 17th Street, and others were assigned to patrol the Lincoln Road shopping mall to prevent vandalism.

The value of the "sweeping" strategy, of course, was that it prevented demonstrators from achieving their objective of restricting delegates from entering the complex. The sweeping actions did not prevent the demonstrators from exercising their rights to protest; it merely prevented them from denying the just rights of others in the area of the demonstration.

**BUS BARRICADE.** The second adaptation to police field operational strategy relative to the protection of the complex was the implementation of a bus barricade around much of the convention complex. Prior to the RNC, demonstration leaders had published plans which called for demonstrators to fill key intersections around the complex to prevent the arrival of delegates in time for President Nixon's acceptance speech.

The number of police available to effect mass arrests and to control the "hit and run" tactics of demonstrators was inadequate. As a solution to this problem, 45 derelict buses were added to the police inventory of defensive tools. The derelict buses were used for three purposes: (1) to extend and seal the complex perimeter; (2) to supplement police forces and thereby obviate the need for calling out the National Guard; (3) to help "cut the island in two," a strategy which would keep demonstrators away from delegate hotels in the northern half of the city.

Several days before the RNC, the 45 derelict buses had been located in West Palm Beach, Florida. They were rented at a cost of \$36,000 and towed to a parking area inside the convention complex two days before the RNC started. Surprisingly enough, the parked buses received little attention from demonstrators and newsmen during the first two days of the convention. At 6:45 a. m. on Wednesday morning, three tow trucks began to move the buses into place. Buses were placed bumper to bumper on the west side of Meridian Avenue from Dade Boulevard to 17th Street and across Meridian Avenue at 17th Street. The buses were placed in this manner to form a solid barricade around gates 11X and 12X, while leaving those gates accessible to traffic arriving from the north.


To prevent demonstrators from going north of the complex, buses were used to block traffic at Dade Boulevard and Alton Road and at Dade Boulevard and 23rd Street. The Dade Canal cut off all other streets in the area not otherwise blocked. Buses were also positioned across Washington Avenue just south of gate 2X and across 20th and 21st Streets and across Washington Court at Washington Avenue. This would bar demonstrators from the area of gate 2X, while also leaving it accessible to delegate traffic arriving from the north.

Squads of police officers were positioned at three strategic foot bridges across the water. One bridge was located at 24th Street and Collins. The second bridge was located between 28th and 29th Streets



PERIMETER FENCE WITH GATE NUMBERS

BUS BARRICADE PLACEMENT




at Indian Creek Drive, and the third was located at 41st Street between Indian Creek Drive and Pine Tree Drive. These were all locations not far from the complex. If demonstrators crossed these bridges, they would be considered inside the perimeter defense zone and capable of disrupting delegate traffic enroute to the complex.

Collins Avenue was not blocked. Three platoons of FHP officers were assigned to keep traffic arteries open on Collins Avenue between Dade Boulevard and 41st Street. Also, two additional FHP platoons were assigned to Collins Avenue north of 41st Street to make sure demonstrators could not delay delegates by blocking hotel entrances and exits.


These assignments completed the police strategy for preventing demonstrators from sealing off the convention complex. Delegates could enter the complex unmolested by demonstrators by traversing down Pine Tree Drive to Dade Boulevard and entering through either gate 2X on Washington Avenue or gates 11X or 12X on Meridian Avenue. The demonstration area in front of the complex was left to the demonstrators. Demonstrators also had the option of "crashing" the perimeter fence along 17th Street or along Washington Avenue up to the point of the bus barricade, but this was not in their plans. They wanted to keep delegates out, but did not want to attempt the hazardous task of trying to go in themselves.

The bus strategy not only thwarted the demonstrators' plans, but many among their ranks say it also frustrated them to the extent that they went out and perpetrated violence. This reasoning is not only specious, since each is responsible for his own actions, but it also raises the question of what would have happened if the buses had not been used. It is likely that the level of violence would not have been any less, since trashing was part of the original demonstration plan anyway. Had demonstrators completely shut off access to the complex, police would have had to increase their level of response to clear openings. These factors lead to the conclusion that the bus strategy had little influence on the level of violence, but it contributed significantly to police field operational capabilities.

FOOT PATROLS AND ROVING PATROLS. The third adaptation to police field operational strategy came about as a result of the reaction of demonstrators to the bus strategy. Since the primary objective of closing down the convention hall had been thwarted by the buses, the police fully expected that the demonstrators would resort to "hit and run" trashing tactics. The police were also aware that their large task force units would be too cumbersome to handle that type of tactic. Consequently, the task forces were separated into platoons and squads to form foot patrols and roving vehicle patrols. These smaller and more numerous units provided police with the capability of responding to several locations simultaneously, which was a flexibility they did not possess with the large task force units.







Protest activity began on Wednesday between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., when demonstrators started to move out of Flamingo Park in groups of various sizes. Within a short while incidents were occurring that required rapid police response at numerous locations simultaneously. Several demonstrators had jumped into the Dade Canal and attempted to swim along the canal to the north fence of the complex. They were seen by officers when they reached the bridge at Dade Boulevard and Meridian Avenue, and they were dispersed from the area with gas. A large number of demonstrators were continuously present at the perimeter fence, taunting the police and throwing beer cans, dirt, paper and stones over the fence at them. Police responded by spraying mace. Numerous demonstrators went to the second deck of the 17th Street parking lot and threw objects down at police. A PSD unit responded to that location and cleared the area. Other demonstrators set up a barricade at 23rd Street and Park Avenue, and still others pushed and pulled heavy park benches into the street at 22nd Street and Collins Avenue. At 23rd Street and Collins Avenue, demonstrators approached cars stopped for a traffic light and let the air out of tires. A group on 21st Street east of Washington Avenue tried to overturn an automobile but failed. They then turned over a large "dumpster" garbage container in the middle of the street. Various groups used newsstands, benches, garbage cans and any other objects they could find to obstruct traffic on Collins Avenue.

Collins Avenue was swept clear of demonstrators just before 7:00 p.m. At that time protest activities increased in intensity around the convention complex. About 500 demonstrators at 17th Street and James Avenue marched down 17th Street. At 7:05 p.m., the crowd completely surrounded two bus loads of delegates attempting to get into the complex at gate 9X. PSD platoon 4 was sent out into the street to assist the delegates into the complex. The officers were pelted with rocks and two arrests were made. Meanwhile, an estimated 1,000 demonstrators had regrouped on Collins Avenue between 19th and 21st Streets. Police again proceeded to sweep Collins Avenue.

And so it continued for hours. The dozens of small groups with their hit and run tactics and the larger groups blocking traffic and harassing delegates kept police and prisoner vans on the move. However, at 7:40 p.m., the final session of the Republican National Convention was called to order, only ten minutes behind schedule. The dissolution of the large task forces was obviously the best decision to make for the special problem at hand.

LEVELS OF FORCE. Throughout the Democratic National Convention and up to the second day of the Republican National Convention, police relied primarily on persuasion, negotiations, a restrained show of force, and occasional "sweeping" movements and individual arrests to control the convention demonstration environment. Demonstrators responded to these tactics sufficiently to forestall the use of more drastic control measures by police. However, during the RNC demonstrator

activities were of such a nature that police, in order to maintain control, felt compelled to significantly increase their usage of chemical munitions and arrest powers.

CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. According to all reports, mace was used on only one occasion during the Democratic National Convention. That was when the fence was downed on Monday evening. On the last day of the RNC, however, amid all of the confusion and chaos, police used tear gas extensively.

Most of the gas that was dispensed was used at the complex perimeter fence or in nearby areas. As previously mentioned, police used tear gas to disperse swimmers in the Dade Canal and also to disperse demonstrators on the second deck of the 17th Street parking lot. In those circumstances the use of gas was the most expeditious way of dispersing the demonstrators.

At the perimeter fence police used their "Mark VII" mace canisters on numerous occasions. Early in the evening on Wednesday, demonstrators in the area of 18th Street and Washington Avenue were throwing beer cans and other debris over the fence at police, and police responded with squirts of mace. At approximately 5:39 p.m., a large group of demonstrators tried to "crash" gate 6X and were repelled by mace. Later, when demonstrators were still present at gate 6X but not engaging in any threatening activity, some police moved out of line behind the fence and, without apparent provocation, sprayed mace at the demonstrators. It was reported that one officer went out of his way to spray mace in the face of an RCLC observer. Crowds in front of the gates on Washington Avenue and 17th Street contained as many as 700 demonstrators, and small groups moved from gate to gate harassing police and delegates. Almost every attempt by demonstrators to either block a gate or prevent a delegate from entering drew a response of gas from police.

On one occasion, officers accidentally sprayed mace on other police officers. This occurred at the perimeter fence when a unit of police officers was operating on the street side of the fence to clear demonstrators. Officers on the interior side of the fence could not see what was happening. Upon hearing the commotion, they began to spray mace, much of which affected the other police officers. The two groups of officers were from different agencies, and this incident contributed little to their sense of brotherhood.

Throughout Wednesday evening, police were constantly clearing demonstrators from Washington Avenue and 17th Streets, using liberal dosages of tear gas in the process. Demonstrators would flee, then return minutes later, prompting another round of gas. At 7:45 p.m., RCLC observers reported that police had thrown tear gas canisters directly at a mobile hospital unit parked at Washington and 17th. That



report also stated that a medic, who was clearly identified as such, approached an officer and requested that the gassing stop. The officer responded by macing the medic in the face.

A few minutes before this incident occurred, several police units moved out of the complex through gate 9X and proceeded to move several hundred demonstrators east on 17th Street toward Washington Avenue. Several other police units were already at the other end of 17th Street at Washington Avenue waiting for the approaching demonstrators. What happened next was observed by Mr. Sy Gelber, convention legal advisor to Chief Pomerance, and was described in his written account of convention events. "It looked like a Bobby Fischer pawn move with the police now having the alternative of effecting a mass arrest or dispersing them in a direction away from the convention hall. No, it won't be arrest or dispersal. It's gas. There go the canisters like a shoot-out at the old corral; the sky suddenly filled with bursting little clouds. The earlier use of gas had been sporadic one-shotters, but this was a Fourth of July fireworks barrage." Naturally, this display sent the demonstrators running in all directions. Gas was used so extensively that it drifted into the convention hall, requiring that all doors on the east side of the hall be closed and the air conditioning unit to be shut off. Its extensive use was also dwindling the available supply. Chief Pomerance requested a more limited use of gas.

Shortly after 9:00 p.m., one other major gassing on Washington Avenue in front of the complex took place, described by Mr. Gelber as resembling "a new Tet offensive." Although the air was fairly heavy with gas from previous usage, there were still some demonstrators, newsmen and on-lookers on the street. Officers walked down the street warning everyone to leave the area. When the street was almost empty, numerous gas grenades were lobbed into the street. This continued intermittently for approximately an hour and brought to an end large gatherings of demonstrators at the complex.

While all this action was taking place around the complex, police were busy on nearby streets, preventing trashing, making arrests and breaking up groups of demonstrators. These actions often involved the use of gas. On one occasion, in the 3500 block of Collins Avenue, three high level police commanders were monitoring a parade of approximately 200 demonstrators when the group suddenly began trashing the area. The police commanders stopped their vehicle and proceeded to lob gas grenades at the trashers, causing them to disperse. The use of gas in this case effectively neutralized the 100 to 1 manpower disparity at that time.

While discussing the use of gas by police, it should be kept in mind that police wanted to avoid "hand-to-hand combat" with demonstrators. They wanted to avoid injuries to all parties concerned. The avoidance of physical contact required some kind of barrier between police

and the demonstrators. In a sense, tear gas presented such a barrier before physical combat. Even though gas was used excessively at times, it was for the most part used effectively for specific purposes.


Two exceptions to this general conclusion occurred at Flamingo Park, where the use of gas was incomprehensible. Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on Wednesday, tear gas was thrown into the park which affected the 500 to 600 campers still inside the park and greatly increased tension. An RCLC leader reported the incident to police officials, who ordered all units away from the park.

The second incidence of gas being used at Flamingo Park occurred at approximately 3:20 a.m., long after all was quiet on the streets. The RCLC reported that four or five men, described as wearing white shirts and having short hair, approached the park and threw two canisters of tear gas into the park. The incident was reported to police, but no apprehensions were made.

Undoubtedly, it was essential for police to use tear gas in order to maintain control of the streets during the last day and night of the convention. Accordingly, police officials had made early decisions toward that end. The decision that gas would be used was followed by a policy of when it would be used — only as a "last resort" when other means proved inappropriate or ineffective. No mention was made of how much should be used, but the assumption was that only the amount needed would sufficiently guide officers. Despite the vagueness, these directives were well intentioned and in concert with the "humane" approach. If followed, they would have produced only the desired results.

Unfortunately, something went wrong. Two high ranking police officials closely related to the convention events frankly acknowledged after the fact that too much gas was used. In some instances, they said, it was used unnecessarily. A more serious problem was that some officers, on occasion, apparently used gas vindictively. It seems that the excessive use of gas could be attributed in part to the loss of command control over operating units. It can also be attributed to the lack of a sense of responsibility and accountability by mutual aid officers. Most of the excessive and unnecessary use of gas was done by certain units of mutual aid officers, who, after the conventions were over, could return to their own community and not be concerned with any problems they may have created in Miami Beach. This speaks to the issue of professionalism, or rather, to the lack of it.

MASS ARRESTS. Numerous arrests of individuals and small groups were made during that last day of the RNC. These resulted primarily from the trashing tactics of demonstrators and their attempts to block traffic and harass citizens. Many of these arrests were made when officers on foot or on vehicle patrol approached demonstrators engaging in unlawful activity and were able to apprehend them. Prisoner vans were





usually dispatched to areas where arrests were anticipated, and only infrequently were no vans available. The most dramatic arrests, however, occurred in three separate mass arrest situations, each of which was attended by different circumstances.

The first mass arrest occurred on Tuesday afternoon at the northern section of the demonstration area in front of the convention complex. Approximately 200 Zippies had paraded from Flamingo Park to the demonstration area at 12:50 p.m. After demonstrating there for a few minutes, the group moved to 20th Street and Washington Avenue and began to block traffic. Individuals jumped on the roofs of stopped vehicles and rocked cars back and forth. One female demonstrator had removed her blouse and was walking around topless, her body painted several different colors. In the meantime, FHP platoons were sent to 23rd Street and Dade Boulevard to stand by as police monitored the demonstration. By 1:35 p.m., the demonstrators were back in the demonstration area where they climbed light poles on Washington Avenue and pulled off the red, white and blue bunting and set it afire. When the demonstrators started to harass delegates trying to enter the complex, the decision was made to effect a mass arrest. The three FHP platoons previously staged at 23rd Street and Dade Boulevard arrived almost immediately with lights flashing. The troopers quickly exited their vehicles and surrounded the demonstrators on three sides. With the perimeter fence behind them, the demonstrators had no place to go. The no-nonsense demeanor of the FHP officers discouraged attempts at escape as a field commander announced over a bull horn that the group was under arrest for disorderly conduct. Four prisoner transport vehicles moved into position and mass arrest processing procedures began.

The first mass arrest was an unexpected police response from the viewpoint of the demonstrators. SDS demonstrators had engaged in similar trashing activity earlier in the day and had not been arrested. Also, police had made very few arrests of any kind prior to this time, which evidently lulled demonstrators into a false sense of immunity from arrest. Even though surprised, or perhaps, as a result of being surprised, the Zippies did not resist the arrest and undertook no efforts to delay the arrest processing. This event signalled to demonstrators that the policy of accommodation was not without limits. It also had special meaning for the community and for the police. The mass arrest communicated to the community that the police could maintain control of the demonstrators and that they could do so efficiently and effectively. As for police officers, it meant that they were going to be permitted to exercise their authority to prevent violations of the law.

The second mass arrest occurred on the following day and involved a different set of circumstances. Police had been chasing demonstrators on Collins Avenue for nearly two hours, making arrests when they could and taking preventive actions. Tear gas was noticeable in the







air. At approximately 6:00 p.m., Alan Ginsberg and Jeff Nightbyrd led a group of demonstrators numbering approximately 100 to the intersection at Collins Avenue and 30th Street, and staged a sit-in there. The group sat on the ground blocking traffic, fully expecting to be arrested. They weren't disappointed. In short order, FHP troopers surrounded the group and commenced with mass arrest procedures.

The third and last mass arrest occurred later in the evening on Wednesday and involved still another set of circumstances. At approximately 9:00 p.m., Dave Dellinger spoke to a crowd of approximately 500 at the demonstration area in front of the complex and persuaded them to march to the Doral Hotel (headquarters for the Committee to Re-Elect the President) to stage a peaceful protest. Police officials had been in touch with Dellinger, and the conditions of the march had been negotiated. It was agreed that leaders of the march would not permit trashing or other disruptive conduct, and that they would keep the marchers on the sidewalk where they would not interfere with traffic. The police agreed not to use gas and to permit the march to continue as long as it remained non-violent. The march leaders stated that most of their followers wanted to be arrested as part of their demonstration but stressed their intention to be non-violent and to submit peacefully to the arrests. Police officials responded by saying that an order to disperse would be given to allow anyone who wished to avoid being arrested an opportunity to leave the area. With this understanding, the march proceeded to the Doral Hotel.

Being aware of the difficulty demonstration leaders have controlling their unpredictable followers, police officials, as a precautionary measure to prevent trashing along the march route, ordered FHP platoons 24, 25 and 26 to patrol Collins Avenue from 23rd Street to 44th Street at that time. Additionally, Miami platoon 15 was assigned to patrol Collins Avenue from 15th Street to 23rd Street for the same reason. The 24-block march to the Doral Hotel occurred without incident. As they marched, the numbers of demonstrators increased. By the time they reached the Doral, the crowd was estimated at 1,000 demonstrators. Anticipating having to arrest so many people, all FHP platoons were requested to go to the Doral. Additionally, ten prisoner vans were also sent to that location.

When demonstrators arrived at the hotel, they sat in the street singing and chanting anti-war slogans. As negotiated, the police permitted demonstrators ten minutes for expressions of protest. At this time, demonstration leaders realized that they had neglected to bring along a bull horn. In one of those odd scenes that develop from such negotiated arrests, MBPD Colonel Cotzin then loaned a police bull horn to Dellinger so he could speak to the demonstrators. After the ten minutes had passed, police announced to the group that "your failure to disperse constitutes an unlawful assembly." The warning was repeated before mass arrests procedures were implemented.

Surprisingly enough, most of the group decided not to be arrested and left the area. Officers then proceeded to arrest approximately 250 demonstrators who remained. The demonstrators did not resist arrest, nor did they cooperate. They went limp. By going limp, they forced officers to carry them to the prisoner vans standing nearby. This gave the appearance of police use of excessive force, which apparently was the intent of the demonstrators. Despite this tactic, police moved carefully and quickly, completing the mass arrest in less than an hour and a half.

Even though the three mass arrests made by police were different (in that the first was a surprise maneuver, the second was anticipated, and the third was negotiated) the tactics and manner in which police carried out the arrests were similar. In each case, the police surrounded the demonstrators, advised them of the violation, and using one or two officers per demonstrator, removed them from the crowd to be processed. There was no macing, clubbing or other types of police violence during the mass arrests. The arrests were made dispassionately, with practiced precision. These factors dramatically distinguished Miami Beach in 1972 from Chicago in 1968.

#### COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE

Under normal circumstances, citizens at times complain about some aspect of police behavior, and it was expected that some aspect of convention policing would also draw complaints from citizens despite the psychological training and the emphasis placed on restraint and the maintenance of unit integrity. In the event that complaints were received, the Miami Beach Police Department intended to use their established internal mechanism for handling them. Five months before the DNC, Chief Pomerance issued a General Order establishing a Departmental Review Board whose purpose was to examine and review conduct of police officers "which is of a quality significantly above or below required standards of performance . . . ."

Steps were also taken at the state level to develop a convention complaint procedure. Prior to the conventions, the Governor's office received a recommendation from a state official that some mechanism should be established for receiving and processing complaints from citizens about the actions of state officers assigned to convention policing. Since there were five different state law enforcement agencies related to convention policing, the need was also for a uniform system to apply to all of those agencies as well as a central location where any complaints could be received.

As Director of State Law Enforcement for Convention Policing, Mr. William Reed, Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, was assigned the task of developing the complaint review system. At his direction, a State Convention Complaint Review Unit was

established and was given as its primary responsibility, "the receipt, review, processing and investigation of citizen complaints against state law enforcement personnel who are assigned to convention duties." This unit opened offices in the basement of a church building in Miami Beach on a 24-hour a day basis during the conventions and made its existence known, as well as its telephone number, through the local media.

Additionally, a complaint form was developed on which citizens could record their complaints. This form became the center of some controversy. Two factors were involved. First, although the form was designed to be used for complaints against state officers, it was recognized that citizens and demonstrators could also use it for county and city officers. A notation at the bottom of the form read, "In the event the complaint involves city, county or local law enforcement personnel, it will be processed and forwarded for action to the Department having primary and initial responsibility for the involved officers."

Commissioner Reed attempted to notify the three principal local law enforcement chiefs of the form's existence. The problem was that county and city officials did not participate in the development of the form and did not agree with its contents. Secondly, the form was distributed in Flamingo Park without the prior knowledge of Chief Pomerance or other local officials. As a result of these two problems, a misunderstanding over the form and the intent of its creation further aggravated the tenuous state/local relationships.

Throughout both conventions, the Miami Beach Police Department received only one complaint from a citizen relative to convention policing. That pertained to a minor incident which was handled to the satisfaction of the complainant when the police provided him with a complete explanation of the circumstances surrounding the case. The State Convention Complaint Review Unit did not receive any citizen complaints. Also, no civil or criminal legal suits were filed in court against the police after the conventions were over.

Many reasons could be attributed to this extremely low incidence of formal citizen complaints. One reason is that demonstrators might have had a difficult time identifying a single officer. Another is that the demonstrators might have had no faith in the internal complaint review system, since counter-culture groups normally advocate civilian review boards. Still another reason is that the transient status of most demonstrators might have discouraged them from initiating a lengthy procedure that would at some future time required their presence. Perhaps most importantly, the behavior and actions of the majority of officers did not warrant complaints. True, it seems that more complaints should have been received just on the basis of previously mentioned gassing incidents. In the context of the total convention environment, however, and in view of the myriad contacts that police had with demonstrators, it also seems that for the most part police comported themselves appropriately. "Chicago '68" did not emerge from its historical resting place.

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## CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURES

During the best of times, a smoothly efficient criminal justice system is more the exception than the rule. Police departments, courts, and corrections departments normally lack the resources needed to operate with smooth efficiency. Typically, they also lack the degree of coordination that might enable them to operate better with less than adequate resources. During abnormal situations, such as those involving mass arrests, these problems are seriously compounded.

The planners who anticipated the national political conventions in Miami Beach had the advantage of time and precedence to develop adequate criminal justice procedures. With six months lead time prior to the conventions, and with the benefit of the experiences of other jurisdictions that had handled mass arrest situations, planners for the 1972 political conventions developed a coordinated plan that was intended to guarantee fair and speedy processing through the criminal justice system during the two conventions. Following is a description of those planned procedures.

### MASS ARRESTS

The first and perhaps most difficult problem confronting the police and court planners was that of developing mass arrest procedures that would be capable of processing thousands of arrested demonstrators quickly, without sacrificing either the rights of the arrestees or the legal quality of the arrests. Some guidance for the development of mass arrest procedures in Miami Beach was provided by court interpretations that followed mass arrest procedures implemented during the May Day 1971 demonstrations in Washington, D. C. At that time, the courts ruled

that certain practices, such as assigning a single arresting officer arbitrarily to a large number of prisoners, allowing one officer to sign a field arrest form and another to fill it out, or using a general charge with no specifics described, were incorrect. The courts also criticized the illegibility and incompleteness of the field arrest forms.

Being cognizant of the increasingly exacting requirements of the courts, criminal justice procedures planners outlined the following mass arrest procedural plan for the 1972 political conventions:

1. A field arrest form will be filled out at the arrest scene, signed by the officer and sworn to by a deputy clerk traveling with the arrest team in the detention van.
2. A polaroid photo will be taken of the subject and officer for future court purposes and the officer will then return to the field.
3. The subject will be transported by van to the detention center.
4. Processing areas will be maintained as reserves in the event of emergencies such as overflow of prisoners in jail or inaccessible routes to the detention centers.
5. At the jail, a special in-sheet and control card will be made for each subject and forwarded to the (emergency) information center so that interested people may be advised of the current status of all arrested persons.
6. The subject will then be transported to the Metro Justice Building for a magistrates hearing to set bond.
7. In the event that there is a back-up of subjects awaiting bond hearings, in the opinion of the jail personnel, an alternate plan will be put into effect by order of the on-duty judge in charge. This order will provide for ROR (release on recognizance) releases of all subjects charged with loitering, curfew violations, public profanity, unlawful assembly and any other second degree misdemeanor not involving weapons, violence or destruction of property. The only exception will be if the police or prosecutor specifically requests a magistrate's hearing. Thus, if there is any person arrested for one of these offenses, in the opinion of the officer or prosecutor, should appear before a judge, that notation should be placed on the field arrest form at the processing area.

FIELD ARREST FORM. Three primary objectives were articulated during the early design stages of the field arrest form. The form should be able to identify arrested persons with specific code violations accompanied by a brief narration; it should assure that an arresting officer was paired with the right defendant; and it should be sufficiently brief in total to permit the officer to return to his assignment as soon as possible.

The arrest form that was designed for use during the conventions facilitated the attainment of these objectives and was legally sound. A reproduction of the field arrest form is included in this chapter. The form consisted of an original plus four carbon copies. The original was to be delivered to the court, and the four remaining copies were for the arresting agency, the arresting officer, the State Attorney, and the corrections or jail division. On the reverse side of the jail division's copy of the arrest form, a prisoner control number was printed. This number was to be visible in a Polaroid photograph of the arresting officer and his prisoner. Prior to the conventions, all officers assigned to convention security received training on the proper completion of this form.

TRANSPORTATION PROCEDURES. The responsibility for transportation to a place of confinement for persons arrested during the political conventions was assigned to the Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department. That department was to assign 74 of its personnel on a 24-hour basis (12 hour shifts) to man 27 transportation vehicles consisting of trucks, buses, and vans with a 40 to 45 prisoner capacity each. These personnel and vehicles were to be assigned to four staging areas. One staging area was in Miami Beach, contiguous to the convention complex. The other three staging areas were to be located in the city of Miami and in Dade County in the event that civil disturbances might occur in those areas. A central dispatch office was established at the Miami Beach staging area with communication connections to the Miami Beach Police Department, the county jail, and to each prisoner transport vehicle. At each staging area identification teams were also present to photograph, fingerprint, and search the arrestees. Police chase cars were available to support the prisoner transport vehicles. Deputy court clerks to attest to the signatures of arresting officers on the field arrest forms were also present.

When a prisoner transport vehicle was dispatched to a scene of arrest, appropriate numbers of the above mentioned support personnel were to accompany it. After prisoner processing was completed, the prisoner transport vehicle driver was to receive three copies of the field arrest form for each prisoner from the arresting officer. Upon delivery of the form to the driver, the arresting officer was free to return to his assignment. When the transport vehicle reached capacity load, or when all available prisoners were processed and ready, the driver was to proceed to the place of confinement.



Provisions were made for the separate transportation and housing of males and females. All male arrestees were taken to the Dade County Jail while the female arrestees were taken to the Metro Jail Annex (City Jail). Provisions were also made for the transporting of juveniles separate from adults. The Criminal Justice Procedures Plan detailed the following guidelines:

1. When conditions permit, the juvenile offender should be transported to a vehicle separate from adult offenders pursuant to Florida Statute 39.03(3).
2. When conditions permit, the juvenile offender should not be transported in the same vehicle containing adults who were involved in the same offense or transaction as the juvenile offender.
3. Upon general order of the court when emergency conditions allow no reasonable alternative, a juvenile may be transported in the same vehicle with other adults in order to insure the safety, health, and welfare of the community, and of the persons under arrest.

All juveniles were transported to the Dade County Jail, where a detention wing was set aside for the initial safe keeping of juveniles apart from adult offenders and for the separation during internment of male juveniles from female juveniles.

ADULT PROCESSING. When a prisoner transport vehicle arrived at the place of confinement, it was to be met by the sergeant in charge of intake. This sergeant was to receive all of the arrest forms from the driver, brief the arrestees on prisoner processing procedures, and unload the vehicle. The vehicle would then be free to return to its assigned area.

The prisoners were to be searched and escorted into jail. Field arrest forms were to be forwarded to the officer in charge of the special processing desk. The necessary information from the field arrest forms was to be entered into a numbered booking log that would later serve as the court docket. Five copies of the entry on the special booking log plus a 3 x 5 card containing name, race, sex, and special booking log number were then to be forwarded to the emergency information center. After this procedure was completed, prisoners in groups of ten were escorted to a designated courtroom by three officers, one of whom carried the appropriate arrest forms.

Special procedures were established for persons bound over for misdemeanors who could secure their own release. These persons were to be returned to the jail, assigned a standard jail number, and then

**FIELD ARREST FORM**

**UNTY OF DADE  
STATE OF FLORIDA**

1.  ADULT     JUVENILE

2. DATE

Department \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_ A.M.    P.M.

F.A. N<sup>o</sup> 49365

TIME

4. \_\_\_\_\_ 5. \_\_\_\_\_ 6. \_\_\_\_\_ 7. \_\_\_\_\_  
DEFENDANT'S NAME Last First Middle    DOB    SEX    RACE

8. CHARGE

9. PLACE OF ARREST

10. LOCATION OF OFFENSE

11. \_\_\_\_\_ 12. \_\_\_\_\_ 13. \_\_\_\_\_ 14. \_\_\_\_\_

ARRESTING OFFICER    BADGE NO.    AGENCY & NO.    OFF. ID. NO.

15. AFFIDAVIT: BEFORE ME, an officer duly authorized to administer this oath personally came the police officer named above (item 11), who, being first duly sworn, for the purpose of making a complaint, says that, the named Defendant (item 4), did then and there unlawfully violate the laws and statutes of the State to wit: F. S. Ch \_\_\_\_\_, and/or the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Ordinance number 21-81a, by,

16. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARREST.

Arresting Officer    Ass't. State Atty. or Deputy Clerk, Metro Court

17. TRANSPORTATION OFFICER    18. TRANSPORTED TO:

19. PROPERTY IS:    20. OWNERSHIP IS:    21. VEHICLE  
 PRISONERS     EVIDENCE     KNOWN     UNKNOWN    TOWED

22. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY

23. COMPLAINANT'S NAME    ADDRESS

24. COMPLAINANT'S BUSINESS    ADDRESS

COURT COPY

Processing Officer

**49365**



released. They were not required to be photographed or fingerprinted. Misdemeanants who could not secure their own release were to be processed in the normal manner. Persons bound over for felonies were to be processed in the normal manner prior to receiving bonding opportunity. Care was taken to house persons not securing their release separately from incoming arrestees. Further, those persons bound over for felony charges were to be segregated from minor offenders.

The fenced area surrounding the County Stockade is capable of containing several hundred prisoners, and this facility was readied in the event that the county and city jails reached their capacity.

JUVENILE PROCESSING. Upon arrival at the Dade County Jail, all juveniles were to be delivered to staff members of the clerk's office of the Dade County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and the Florida Division of Youth Services. These personnel were assisted by staff members of the Dade County Department of Youth Services and the Department of Corrections. The detained juveniles were to be removed from the temporary detention wing as quickly as circumstances permitted for initial interviewing, notice and contact with the child's parents, preparation of appropriate legal petitions, and presentation of the child before a Juvenile Court Judge.

Juvenile arrestees who could not safely be released were to be housed in one of the juvenile detention facilities in Dade County pending a full hearing. Juvenile arrestees who could be safely released were released to the custody of their parents or were transported to their residences by the Florida Division of Youth Services. Transient juvenile offenders were to be returned without delay to the jurisdiction where they resided. Temporary emergency transportation funds for the return of these juveniles were to be made available by Dade County. The Florida Division of Youth Services was assigned the responsibility of arranging transportation and delivering the juvenile to the point of embarkation. An order was to be issued directing parents to reimburse the county for the cost of their child's transportation.

EMERGENCY PRE-TRIAL RELEASE PROCEDURES. A course of action was also developed to become operational if the large number of prisoners brought to the county jail should render it impossible to bring each prisoner before a judge for a bond hearing or some other type of release. If this circumstance were to occur, the Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation could declare that an emergency situation existed. An order was then to be signed by the Chief Judge of the Judicial Circuit formalizing the declaration of the emergency situation and directing those defendants charged with curfew violations, loitering, obscenity, unlawful assembly and similar misdemeanors not involving violence or destruction of property to be released from custody on their own recognizance upon the signing of a promise to appear later. All other offenses were to be unaffected by the emergency procedure and were to continue to be brought before a judge. Special stamping

devices were to be provided to the Assistant State Attorneys at the arrest site. These devices would enable the attorneys or the arresting officer to note on the arrest form that an arrestee was not eligible for pre-trial release under the emergency conditions.

The primary purpose for this anticipated emergency procedure was to bring about a rapid return to normal procedures by releasing from custody offenders who were charged with non-violent misdemeanors. This would assure that those charged with more serious violations could continue to be processed normally and brought before a judge.

EMERGENCY INFORMATION CENTER. An emergency information center was to be created for the purpose of responding to incoming inquiries about persons arrested for convention related offenses. The center was to be located at the Dade County Jail, and it was to be manned by volunteers. These volunteers were to undergo training that would provide them with an understanding of the processing procedures for adults and juveniles, court hearings, and arrest sheets. During any mass arrest, they could adequately answer questions concerning arrestees. Two telephone numbers, one for the dissemination of information concerning adults and the other concerning juveniles, were advertised to the public. Ten telephones on a rotary line system were to be installed.

Procedures were established for the quick recording of prisoner information and its delivery to the emergency information center, where it would be organized and filed for ready reference by the volunteers manning the telephones. The only information to be released was that concerning a specific individual, when he was arrested, where he is presently situated, and the disposition of the case if it had already been heard by a judge or magistrate, the amount of bond, and the exact place of his incarceration.

MANPOWER RESOURCE PLAN. With the apparent necessity of having to be prepared to process arrestees numbering in the thousands, every effort was taken to make ready all available manpower resources. On July 7, Mr. Marshall Wisheart, Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida suspended all trials and hearings in the Dade County Court and Criminal Court of Record from July 9 through July 15, and from August 21 through August 25. Judge Wisheart's order also suspended jury trials in all other trial courts and all proceedings, civil or criminal, involving police personnel. Exempt from this order, except in cases requiring the presence of law enforcement personnel, was the Dade County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

This order allowed the police to concentrate their manpower resources on convention and community security. Perhaps more importantly, it freed the calendars of judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and their support personnel. This permitted them to participate freely in the convention related criminal justice procedures.

The Criminal Justice Procedures Plan called for judicial and other court manpower to be provided for bail hearings on a 24-hour basis. The Metropolitan and Criminal Court Judges were to serve as magistrates for the ordinary caseload, with additional judicial support being provided when needed from the Circuit and Civil Court of Record Judges. Bailiffs were to be provided for the magistrate proceedings by the Circuit, Civil Court of Record, and Small Claims Court as needed in each courtroom. Clerical personnel were to be provided by the clerk of the Metropolitan Court.

Seventy-one assistant state attorneys and 20 volunteer lawyers recruited from the Dade County Bar Association were to represent the state at bond hearings. Twenty-five lawyers from the Public Defender's Office, 50 lawyers from the Legal Services of Greater Miami, and numerous volunteer lawyers were to represent insolvent defendants. The Public Defender's office was also to be supported by law students who were certified to assist at the bond hearings. Other students were to assist with the interviewing of insolvent defendants.

#### CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURES PLANNING PROCESS

Planning by officials of the Greater Miami Area court system for the kind of arrests and the number of arrests that result from major civil disorders actually began in early 1971. At that time, an ad hoc committee of eleven judges formed to develop a master plan relating to the "Administration of Justice in Major Civil Disturbance Situations." The objectives formulated for this "master plan" were to provide the philosophical tenor and procedural system that later served to guide the criminal justice planners for the political conventions. Those objectives were stated as follows:

- The arrest and effective prosecution of those who riot and engage in related criminal activity.
- Prompt arraignment and judicial hearings for arrested persons under conditions which comply with the letter and spirit of due process and do not aggravate community relations.
- The prompt availability of an effective legal counsel to protect the rights of arrested persons.
- The maintenance of bail and release reforms despite riot conditions.
- Adequate and accessible facilities and transportation for arrested persons.



- Return of police to patrol duties in the shortest possible period of time after an arrest.
- The emergency feeding, clothing, and housing of persons who might be dislocated as a result of the civil disorder.
- The dissemination of adequate detailed information regarding persons arrested.
- Provisions for responsible community leaders to act as impartial observers to report back to the community on all stages of processing of persons arrested.

The attainment of these or similar objectives during the conventions implied that the degree of coordination and cooperation among the several components of the criminal justice system (police, prosecutors, public defender, courts, correction) would have to be achieved on a level not frequently experienced previously.

Mr. Seymour Gelber, Administrative Assistant to the State Attorney, initiated the planning process for the criminal justice procedures when he directed a memorandum on January 26, 1972, to MBPD Chief Rocky Pomerance. In the memorandum, Mr. Gelber captured the essence of how the Dade County criminal justice system was going to have to function during the political conventions if it were to be truly effective during mass arrest situations: "The various governmental agencies of the Dade County criminal justice system should have a uniform plan of action. The agencies representing the police, the prosecutor, the court and the jail should determine the precise responsibilities of each agency and make certain that the agreed upon procedures are in accord with the total plan. This encompasses a system that processes mass arrests, provides for the transportation, housing and feeding of prisoners, offers facilities for judicial hearings and for making the prisoners available for counsel. The above and other contingencies arising from these emergency circumstances will require an organized, centralized effort."

Subsequent to Chief Pomerance's favorable response to this memorandum, Mr. Gelber inquired of Judge Thomas E. Lee, Jr., of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida if he would volunteer to form a criminal justice procedures planning committee and assume the role of the committee's chairman. Judge Lee had chaired the previously mentioned ad hoc committee that developed the "master plan," and was eminently suited to perform this role. Judge Lee agreed to form and chair the committee, and he held the first meeting of the Criminal Justice Procedures Committee in March, 1972.

That first meeting and subsequent weekly meetings were attended by representatives from the three major law enforcement agencies in the area, Miami Beach and Miami Police Departments and the Dade County Public Safety Department, and by representatives from the Florida Division of Youth Services, the Public Defender's Office, the Dade County Juvenile Court, the Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, the State Attorney's Office, the County Manager's office, and the American Civil Liberties Union.

The committee formulated as its objective the following statement: "To assure due process to all persons arrested during the Democratic and Republican Conventions by providing immediate bail hearing and a preliminary hearing within three to seven days for incarcerated persons, and three to ten days for persons not incarcerated."

Judge Lee then formed subcommittees, with each subcommittee representing one of the components of the criminal justice system. The subcommittees were charged with the responsibility for developing a procedural plan for their own areas of responsibility. For example, the State Attorney's office was to develop a plan that would adequately provide for the prosecution of a large number of defendants. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was to develop a plan providing for the transportation and processing of a large number of prisoners. Under the guidance of Judge Lee, the Criminal Justice Procedures Committee achieved the "organized, centralized effort" that Mr. Gelber identified as essential to preparing for large demonstrations and mass arrests.

#### CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURES AND THE DNC

The criminal justice procedures plan developed for the political conventions was never tested during the Democratic National Convention. Although there were parades, demonstrations, missiles thrown at police, verbal taunts, and many other tense situations, no mass arrests were necessary. The handful of arrests related to the Democratic National Convention that did occur were handled in the routine manner.

The first of these arrests occurred five days before the start of the convention, when a member of the Zippies threw a pie at a Miami Beach city councilman during a City Council meeting. The councilman had voted against issuing a campsite permit for Flamingo Park. The second arrest occurred on the first day of the convention. One demonstrator climbed the fence surrounding the convention complex, and he was immediately apprehended. Two arrests were made by the Secret Service at the Doral Beach Hotel on June 12, when they apprehended two men carrying concealed weapons. Senator McGovern and his staff were staying at the Doral Beach Hotel. The fifth arrest resulted in a charge of assault and battery of a police officer when one of the demonstrators grabbed a Miami police officer by the shoulders and kissed him. The

sixth and last arrest of the DNC occurred when a U.S. Marine deserter attempted to enter the convention hall and gain access to a microphone in order to dramatically surrender himself to authorities. He was prevented from doing so and was quietly turned over to military authorities.

After the Democratic National Convention was over, the several parts of the criminal justice procedures plan were reviewed for the purpose of identifying any changes that might be needed for the higher levels of disorder that were anticipated during the Republican Convention. This review resulted in no procedural changes since the plan was deemed sufficiently coordinated and flexible to handle any mass arrest situations at the RNC.

#### CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURES AND THE RNC

On the first day of the RNC, there was relatively little violence and no mass arrests. Beneath the surface appearance of order and rational protest, however, there existed among the demonstrators a tension of anticipated violence. Demonstrators at the Republican National Convention felt that a greater challenge to the "establishment" should be presented before the incumbent party.

Unlawful behavior on the part of demonstrators resulted in the activation of mass arrest procedures on the second day of the RNC, August 22. The first mass arrest began at 1:37 p.m. on Tuesday. From that point in time until Thursday morning, all facets of the criminal justice procedures plan were operational. During the three-day convention a total of 1,194 arrests were effected, with 948 of these occurring on the last day.

#### Republican Convention Related Arrests - 1972

	Male Adults	Female Adults	Juveniles	Totals
Monday	17	0	0	17
Tuesday	181	37	11	229
Wednesday	752	175	21	948
Totals	950	212	32	1,194



Of the 1,162 adults arrested, only three were charged with felonies (assault with a deadly weapon, possession of heroin and possession of marijuana). The majority of the misdemeanor charges were for disorderly conduct (527), unlawful assembly (299), obstructing traffic (111) and disobeying an officer (71). No juveniles were charged with felonies.

Individuals arrested on the second day of the convention, Tuesday, August 22, were given low bonds or were released on their own recognizance. By noon of Wednesday, August 23, no convention related arrestees remained incarcerated. Interestingly enough, none of those arrested were known to be rearrested during demonstrations and mass arrests that took place later on Wednesday evening.

The majority of people arrested on the last day of the convention, Wednesday, August 23, received reduced bonds amounting to five or ten dollars. On Friday morning, August 25, convention related arrestees who had not posted bond and remained incarcerated numbered 391. At that time, Judge Rhea Grossman signed an order releasing that group of people on their own recognizance. For a brief time, some of these prisoners refused to be released as a symbol of protest. However, by noon on Friday no convention related arrestees remained in jail.

#### CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Analysis of the criminal justice system established for the handling of mass arrests related to the political conventions indicates that structurally the system operated according to plan. Prisoners were identified and processed at the arrest site in a minimum amount of time. Arresting officers were able to return to their field assignments within minutes after making an arrest. No bottlenecks occurred in the flow of prisoners through the court system.

The one logical result of the mass arrests that should have occurred, but did not, was that of prosecution. Of the 1,194 arrests, less than a dozen were actually prosecuted. This was due, not to the procedural system or to police policy position, but to error in completion of the arrest forms. The principle of accommodation, which was extended to demonstrators by the police in regards to many behavioral activities prior to arrest, was not intended to be operative after arrest. It was the clearly stated intention of the police to fully prosecute all those arrested for convention related law violations just as they would prosecute any person arrested during normal times.

Toward this end, efforts were taken to insure that arrestees were adequately identified and paired with the right arresting officer. Officers received training on how to complete the field arrest form. Most importantly, police were prepared to have arresting officers, most

of whom were from distant areas of the state of Florida, return to Dade County for subsequent trials. Additionally, the preparations of the Criminal Justice Procedures Committee were designed to insure the legal quality of each case.

Even though there was no administrative support for a lenient prosecution policy, and adequate measures had been taken to insure the eventuality of prosecution, improper completion of the field arrest forms by officers at the arrest scene barred prosecution efforts. Some arrest forms contained a penal code section number but no narrative description of the violation. Others were processed with only the name of the defendant and arresting officer, without any reference to a criminal charge. The only notation inserted in the space provided for narrative on one arrest form was, "Good guy." Many other arrest forms were illegible. The lack of care in filling out the forms in a complete and clear manner resulted in several hundred of the convention related criminal cases being dismissed on the basis of legally defective field arrest forms.

That so many police officers, most of whom were experienced, attached so little importance to the proper completion of the arrest form can be attributed to several factors. First, their primary concern was to stop the disorder occurring on the streets by removing those persons who were creating the disorders. Once that was accomplished, officers were not seriously concerned with what happened to the demonstrators after the arrests. The officers apparently considered their job as being finished when the arrests were made.

Most of the arrested demonstrators were from out of state. Because of this, officers accurately concluded that the arrestees were not likely to return for trials after the conventions were over. The arrests also included several hundred "negotiated" and voluntary submissions to arrest that were actually a form of political protest. Apparently, police officers had little interest in seeing these persons prosecuted. The inherent lack of selectivity of mass arrests typically nets spectators and innocents as well as law breakers. This point also was not lost on arresting officers, who were aware that any subsequent prosecution would require them to be specific about the offense charged. Under normal circumstances, officers derive little satisfaction from making arrests for relatively minor charges. They have even less desire to spend time in court for cases that usually draw only a small fine or probation. This attitude was easily transferred to convention related arrests, the great majority of which were for minor offenses. Finally, the excitement and tension at the arrest scene distracted officers from completing the arrest form properly. The feeling of urgency in expediting the arrests to alleviate the problem at hand may have overwhelmed any thought of adhering to legal requirements.

Originally it had been planned for the processing of prisoners — including completion of the arrest form — to be accomplished at a designated prisoner processing area in Miami Beach. In other words, arrested demonstrators were to be removed from the arrest scene and transported to the processing area with the arresting officers. At the processing area, officers were to fill out the arrest forms. Prisoners were to be searched, photographed and fingerprinted prior to being transported to the jail. This plan was attractive, because officers removed from the noise and excitement of an arrest scene could be more careful in filling out the arrest form. Also, when prisoners are removed quickly from an arrest scene, the opportunity for them to incite a crowd or plead for rescue is diminished.

This plan for a processing area was discarded, however, in favor of prisoner processing at the site of arrest. The primary reason for this was the need for officers to remain at the scene ready for continued operational service in the field. It was reasoned that the arrest form was relatively simple to complete, that the officers had been trained in its use, and that the entire processing of prisoners at the arrest scene was brief enough in time to allow for their rapid departure to jail.

For the implementation of the criminal justice system to be consistent with its theory, it is essential that every function from arrest through the courts adhere to necessary legal requirements. As such, it is recommended that during training programs greater emphasis be given, not only to the mechanical use of the field arrest form, but also to the importance of a properly filled out form. It is also recommended that during mass arrest situations, personnel from the prosecutor's office or lawyers authorized by the prosecutor be present at the site of mass arrests specifically for the purpose of reviewing arrest forms to insure their legal quality.

Although defective arrest forms were the main reason for lack of prosecution, they were not the only reason. Many of the demonstrators carried no personal identification with them and provided police with incorrect names and addresses when arrested. When they were bailed or released on their own recognizance, they did not appear for trial. This was not totally unexpected by police and court personnel. The administrative cost of pursuing cases beyond the point of forfeiture of bail precluded further legal action.

Two additional problems were identified after the first mass arrest took place on Tuesday, August 22. First, the communications system linking the jail, the prisoner transport staging area, and the Miami Beach Police Department proved to be inadequate. Originally, the jail and the prisoner transport staging area were assigned a radio frequency separate from the MBPD operations frequency and had no capability to monitor MBPD operations channels. Therefore, to obtain a transport vehicle, the arresting officer had to communicate his need



to the command post at the convention hall complex. The command post would then call the jail dispatcher, who in turn would call the prisoner transport staging area to advise of the need for a vehicle at an arrest scene. This system caused delays of several minutes before a vehicle was dispatched. It also prevented jail personnel from knowing exactly what the "street action" was at any particular time. This problem arose during the first mass arrest on the second day of the RNC. It was remedied the following morning when the jail and transport units were assigned the same frequency as police operations, thereby allowing for direct communication from the arrest site to the prisoner transport staging area and also to the jail. Prisoner transport vehicles were then dispatched to the arrest scene at the time that the original request was made.

The second problem that arose had to do with some of the prisoner transport vehicles. Area police agencies did not have a sufficient number of vehicles on hand to serve as prisoner transport vehicles. Consequently, several trucks were rented from a moving company to supplement the normal police prisoner vans. These rented vehicles were closed vehicles with little ventilation in the cargo section. The Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections installed air vents in the trucks, but these were still inadequate to properly ventilate the vehicle. Because of poor ventilation, it was originally intended to use these vehicles last, only when no others were available. It did not work out this way.

The normal prisoner transport vehicles used in the area are a bright orange color and are easily identifiable. During the first day and a half of the Republican National Convention, whenever a potential mass arrest situation arose, police command personnel would request the required number of transport vehicles. Upon the arrival of those vehicles, the police noticed that the demonstrators usually would disperse. The police quickly recognized the deterrent effect that the prisoner transport vans had, and proceeded to use them for that purpose. On Tuesday afternoon, when the first real mass arrest took place, most of the regular prisoner transport vehicles were already in use as deterrents. Consequently, the rented trucks were pressed into service and used to transport prisoners.

The distance from Miami Beach to the county jail can be traversed by truck in 20 minutes traveling at 40 mph. The brief travel time, coupled with partial ventilation, presented no serious health hazard. Still, the trucks were hot and uncomfortable, and they were the source of many complaints voiced by arrested demonstrators. This problem was partially resolved when the rented trucks were again put on a "use as a last resort" basis.

The excellent degree of cooperation that was extended by each component of the criminal justice system in developing the special convention procedures was undoubtedly the most salient feature of the process.

The extent of cooperation was unusual, because of the differing beliefs and philosophical approaches to the system by the police prosecutor, public defender, judges, and correctional officers. More often than not, such philosophical differences normally hinder interagency cooperation instead of improving it. But planning a system for the national political conventions was also unusual. In contrast to multi-agency police planning planning for the criminal justice system had several special advantages.

First, the criminal justice planners did not have to contend with jurisdictional problems, as did the police. The conventions affected no change of normal functional areas within the court system. Secondly, criminal justice planners did not have to be so concerned about the number of demonstrators as the police. Because of limited police manpower, this was an important factor in police planning. In contrast, the criminal justice planners knew that they could handle any number of arrested demonstrators with available resources. It was simply a matter of how long the planned procedures remained in operation. Criminal justice planners also did not have the concern about where the trouble occurred, as did the police. It made no difference to them whether demonstrators were arrested in Miami or Miami Beach because those arrested would be taken to the same location and processed uniformly. Finally, during the conventions each component of the criminal justice system operated independently, just as in normal times. In other words, cooperation was needed for an orderly progression, to assure that prisoners would not be backlogged, and not to carry out a specific function. Police, on the other hand, had to depend upon each other for virtually all operational activities.

Naturally, each criminal justice component wanted to avoid a breakdown within its own area of control, which was a compelling reason for the extension of cooperation. More importantly, each component of the system participated in the planning process as a result of representation on the Criminal Justice Procedures Committee. This gave each participating individual a real stake in the final outcome and provided the determination to make the system work. That it worked so well prompted one of the members on the planning committee to state that, on the last night of the Republican Convention, when over 900 arrests were made, "We had judges waiting for prisoners. We never anticipated that."

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## PRESS RELATIONS

As Democratic Party delegates prepared to open their national convention on July 10, the widely predicted influx of demonstrators into the area actually took third billing to two other massive arrivals. Only about 2,000 non-delegates arrived in town for the first day of demonstrations. By way of contrast, approximately 6,500 security forces of all types had recently arrived at staging areas, while an estimated 7,000 newsmen and media representatives made up the largest single group of newcomers. The procedures for controlling this army of newsmen and effectively distributing information to them were contained in a deceptively brief memorandum sent from the public information officer of the Miami Beach Police Department to all news media represented at the convention. With only minor omissions that memorandum is reproduced as follows:

"The information desk for dissemination of all police news related to the Miami Beach convention center and adjacent areas will be in the south building of convention hall, directly opposite the arena entrance to the Flamingo Room. It will be staffed 24 hours a day by the Public Information Officer and a relief officer backed up by clerical staff and professional media consultants.

"An ample amount of special telephones will be installed for easy accessibility to the Police Information Officer. There will be telephone rotaries, an outside line, a city switchboard line, internal line and provisions for taped releases via the rotary lines. Activation of the police news number (861-4422) and the general news information number (861-3658) is scheduled for July 8, 1972.



"Routine bulletins will be issued to the media on an hourly basis from 6:00 p. m. to 1:00 a. m. daily when the convention is in session. Naturally, other statements and bulletins will be escalated as newsworthy events dictate. In the event that Chief Pomerance deems a press conference necessary, it will be held in the LaRonde Room of the Fontainebleau Hotel and ample notification will be provided.

"The police information desk will be in constant communication with the police command post as well as internal and external security posts. Representatives of the Dade County Public Safety Department and the City of Miami Police Department will also be available to the media at the police information desk. Should the situation deteriorate to warrant military support, a representative of the military public affairs unit will also be accessible through the police information desk . . . ."

Behind this brief list of directives lay months of planning and preparation. Physical facilities to house a working group of newsmen numbering in the thousands had to be provided. Equipment, such as telephones and other essential items, had to be anticipated and made available. A system had to be developed to distribute reliable information and respond to questions in some credible manner. Basic ground rules had to be established so that neither the police nor the news media would interfere with legitimate missions of the other. Perhaps most importantly, it was essential to develop a working environment of mutual respect between newsmen and the police.

Preparations for convention press relations began early and soon developed along two separate paths. One effort, which we will discuss first, was primarily concerned with designing procedures and systems for distributing legitimate news during the two conventions. A second, possibly more ambitious effort, attempted to influence the tone of the conventions themselves through a long range public information program. With the development of this two-pronged effort, it became obvious that press relations were expected to play an important role in the outcome of law enforcement efforts in Miami Beach.

## PREPARATIONS AND TRAINING

While the physical means to handle 7,000 media people should never be underestimated, preparations actually began with less tangible things. The relationship between police and press in this country is typically an adversary system, at best mutually respectful and willing to temporarily cooperate. The 1968 experience in Chicago had left bad feelings in both camps. Initially, then, an effort was made to bring the two professional groups together in order to reduce mutual hostilities and prepare the way for acceptable working rules.

Meetings with network television representatives began as early as July, 1971, a full year before the Democratic Convention. At these early meetings, media people conceded that mistakes had been made in Chicago that they did not want to repeat in Miami Beach. For their part, the police conceded that Chicago did not represent a victory for anyone and that their efforts would be directed at finding a method for projecting a "fair and objective image" of the police.

TRAINING PROGRAM. The public information officer at MBPD developed a program for police/press relations based on the understanding that a technically adequate system for communicating information was only part of the problem. Press relations was defined as encompassing certain educational efforts to improve the abilities of patrolmen to communicate directly with newsmen. To that end, three "panel shows" dealing with press relations were incorporated into the training program that was then being formed with the assistance of an LEAA grant. Representatives of national and local news media were invited to participate on the panel and respond to questions from the police trainees.

Each panel session was structured to bring the press and the police into a constructive confrontation situation. Some very candid and hostile remarks were made during these sessions, but there was general agreement that representatives of each profession ended with a better appreciation for the attitudes and responsibilities of the other. One main thrust of the sessions was identification of "legitimate news," which usually required a degree of compromise.

An example of this kind of "compromise" followed a heated discussion on the apparently exaggerated emphasis by the press on arrests of women during any photographic coverage of crowd management. The discussion ended with both sides in agreement with the statement: "There is no graceful way to arrest a woman." This understanding tended to relieve some of the police feelings of persecution because it identified the situation as automatically attractive to the press. At the same time it tended to reduce press interest in the event because it was defined as routine and not capable of much improvement. Through the cumulative effect of numerous understandings such as this, relations between the police and the press gradually acquired the level of active cooperation.

The public information officer at MBPD was experienced with the "normal" needs of a public information system and had contacts among local media people, but nothing similar to the anticipated convention experience was in his background. Initially, Chief Pomerance had considered hiring a professional public relations man to handle the department's press relations. However, representatives from the national news media reacted negatively to this plan at early meetings, declaring a strong preference for dealing with a professional police officer. It was surmised that an undesirable element of professional competition would be introduced by using a professional public relations man (who is usually a former news-

man) as spokesman for the department. It was clear that the press would not fully trust a professional PR man as spokesman.

Therefore, while training others, it was also important that the public information officer obtain additional training for himself. Assistance in the form of written materials was requested from several departments in larger cities that had experienced similar problems in the past. The written policies and procedures obtained in this way were modified to conform to conditions in Miami Beach and served as the basis for the emerging press relations plans. In addition to this kind of preparation, the panel sessions produced for the training program also provided valuable instruction and insight for the public information officer. The PIO, Sergeant Peter Corso, admits that, "They gave me plenty of ammunition." After the panel sessions, he was better able to understand what the news people considered to be important and to recognize that these things often differed from things that police felt were important.

PRESS RELATIONS POLICY. Some of these insights were included in a training lecture that set forth the department's emerging policy for press relations during the conventions. The initial premise was set forth that, while the police maintain public support and respect by good performance, it is also essential that a fair and objective description of that performance be communicated to the citizenry. The foremost police responsibility during the conventions, therefore, remained good performance of the police mission - protecting life and property. But this foremost need was "not the sum total of police responsibility." An effort was also needed to assure good press relations.

The following directives were stated: "At no time will any member of this department hinder a member of the media from gathering legitimate news material. This includes prohibition of smashing cameras, destroying film or notes, posing a favorable situation, or (similar actions). This is not to say that the media has a carte blanche in what they may gather and publish. There are some legitimate restrictions on information that police may disclose. Most media accept and agree with these legitimate restrictions."

Officers were warned to expect numerous questions from the press during the conventions and they were instructed how to react: "As an incident or newsworthy event happens, you will be totally committed to the police mission. The media may take all the film and notes they wish, as well as interviewing witnesses. Police personnel will not disseminate news to anyone but the command post through the proper channels. Once this information is received by the command post, it will be relayed to a central news dissemination point, thereby giving the media benefit of on-the-scene coverage as well as access to official reports of offenses or incidents."

"In some situations the police officer on the scene will have to respond to legitimate news inquiries after the police mission has been



accomplished and after authority has been granted from the command post to release information to the newsman on the scene . . . . Officers should report the facts as they know them, clearly and objectively, avoiding personal opinion, evaluation, or inflammatory language . . . . If an officer is reluctant to answer because of doubt, he should say so, and not attribute his silence to some non-existent department policy. Police officers who are asked for information beyond their range of knowledge are expected to say so, and to refer the newsman to the correct source. The newsman will understand that the lack of response is related to the facts of the situation and not police unwillingness to cooperate. Regard all members of the media as competent professionals who have a public service responsibility similar to that of the police."

The press relations policy developed by the Miami Beach Police Department for the national political conventions, therefore, specifically rejected any "no comment" response. Instead, the policy became one of delayed comment. In practice, this policy functioned according to the following principles:

1. Members of the press would be free to interview anybody, anywhere, subject to proper procedures.
2. No comment would be made by officers while an action was in progress, i. e. while performing the basic police mission.
3. After the police mission had been accomplished, on the request of the press, any individual would be made available for interviews.
4. A replacement would be posted before the officer was removed from his station for an interview.

Initially, these procedures were viewed with suspicion by members of the press. They did not believe that men would actually be made available for questioning as promised. During the Democratic Convention, however, the system was pointedly tested by various media representatives who found it an acceptable working arrangement. For the police, the system of delayed comment included several advantages. Primarily, it avoided the possibility that thoughtless immediate reactions would find their way into print where they might unfairly characterize police attitudes. The delay also provided time for the public information officer to obtain additional information about the incident in order to avoid any distortions that might result from reporting the incident with insufficient background.

#### NEWS DISSEMINATION DURING CONVENTIONS


In order for the police to fairly distribute information and adequately respond to questions from such a large group of newsmen, it was obviously necessary that the media agree to certain self restraints during

the conventions. Some of the restraints on timing of interviews have already been mentioned while defining overall departmental policy. Other restraints involved freedom of movement within the convention hall and the need for specific procedures for releasing information to print media, preparing recorded comments for radio release, and arranging interviews for television newsmen.

The bulk of the media people were quartered in the south hall of the convention center. This was a very large area capable of seating 16,000 persons during business conventions. During the national political conventions, it provided an adequate work area for individuals who had to write and edit reports for distribution to media outlets throughout the country. The area had been adequately equipped with telephones and other essential items prior to the opening of the convention.

PRESS CREDENTIALS. All newsmen permitted to work in the south hall were not automatically permitted to enter other parts of the convention complex. Additional credentials were required to gain entrance to the north hall. Still other credentials were required to gain access to the podium inside north hall, where space had been provided for approximately 1,200 working members of the "pencil press". Entrance onto the floor of the convention hall (where delegates were seated) during working sessions was possible only with a limited number of temporary passes that were issued for the purpose of obtaining specific interviews. When the interview was concluded, the newsman holding the temporary pass was obligated to withdraw from the area and permit another individual to use the pass. These rules were developed cooperatively in working sessions involving members of the press, the police, the Secret Service, and the Democratic and Republican National Committees. Generally, the maximum permissible numbers were established by security personnel, the rules were determined by the political party, and the procedures were enforced by the media themselves, most commonly through organization of press pool coordinators.

Although for the most part these rules were respected by members of the press during both conventions, the credentials system contained some obvious flaws. Most notably, the basic press credential was issued by the political parties with extremely little selectivity. Both police and members of the news media had requested that press credentials be denied to representatives of the college press and so-called "underground press", limiting credentials only to bona fide members of the working press. The political parties chose to ignore this advice. Consequently, as pointed out by the Miami Beach public information officer in his after-action report on the Democratic convention: "Walter Cronkite, Mike Wallace and Dan Rather had the same credentials and freedom of movement as Tom Forcade, Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman." Hoffman was representing Popular Mechanics while Jerry Rubin claimed to represent Mad Magazine. One "reporter" who carried legitimate credentials during the Democratic Convention was a 14-year-old boy named Leonard Lucchi, apparently authorized to cover the conventions for the Bowie Blade in Bowie, Md. (circ. 20,000).





The infiltration of the regular press corp by "underground" reporters and other amateurs created numerous problems that might otherwise have been avoided. Within the ranks of the regular press, these persons were immediately recognized and were the target of considerable resentment from individuals who recognized that their presence made the accomplishment of their own professional goals all the more difficult.

POLICE INFORMATION DESK. The Police Information Desk was physically located during the Democratic Convention inside the south hall, where it was positioned in order to be easily accessible to the news media. The information desk was set apart from the rest of the hall simply by enclosing three sides of an area with drapery material. This arrangement proved to be physically inadequate, and the location of the police information desk was shifted to the adjacent Flamingo Room during the Republican Convention. The drapery material did little to diminish noise inside the cavernous hall, which made private conferences difficult among the officers who represented the various law enforcement agencies at the desk. Serious security inadequacies were also revealed when a Secret Service agent discovered a newsman attempting to tape a private police conference from behind one of the curtains. Within the Flamingo Room, the information desk was positioned in the corner of the room where it was impossible for anyone to get behind it.

The police information desk was staffed by officers representing most of the security agencies involved in the cooperative law enforcement effort. The three local agencies (MBPD, MPD and PSD) and the Secret Service were well represented. Representatives of the Florida Highway Patrol and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement were less available. On at least two occasions during the Democratic Convention, this lack of representation by FDLE and FHP produced failures of the police information desk to respond to legitimate queries from news media.

Although he normally works in civilian clothes, the public information officer reported for duty during the conventions wearing the police uniform. This was done in response to expressed preferences by the media to deal with a professional police officer. Police officers working at the information desk were assisted by professional public relations people supplied by Hank Meyers Associates, a Miami Beach firm, but these assistants never directly acted as spokesmen for the law enforcement agencies. Instead, they acted as advisors to the police, contributing the benefit of their experiences and personal contacts within the news field.

It had been planned to issue hourly bulletins from the information desk and distribute written press releases from that central location. In practice, this was immediately discerned to be unworkable. Members of the press did not want to wait for written releases. If simply told the information as it became available, they could write their own reports faster than a written release could be prepared for them. No written press releases were actually distributed during either convention from the information desk.

Instead, as soon as information had been checked for accuracy and cleared through the command post, it was announced verbally to the assembly, and reporters did their own writing. Press releases originating from all law enforcement agencies at the conventions were channeled through the central information desk. The Miami Beach public information officer did not actually control releases made by other agencies, but other agencies voluntarily and routinely notified him of the contents of their releases. This voluntary notification to the public information officer usually preceded the actual release of information, including releases made by the FBI and the Secret Service.

When questions were asked at the information desk, the public information officer himself provided whatever general information he had available to make a reply. Numerous inquiries of this type concerned background on police training, biographical data on Chief Pomerance and other police leaders, and some more detailed information specifically concerning the Miami Beach Police Department. When a question was asked that concerned the operating policies of another agency, such as the city of Miami or Dade County PSD, the information officer would refer the questioner to the representative of that department at the desk.

Communications were kept open between the information desk and the command post in order to obtain current operational information relating to ongoing demonstrations, parades, or other occurrences outside the convention hall. The anticipated communication with officers at perimeter posts around the convention complex did not materialize, however. Somewhat ironically, this portion of the information system proved to be incompatible with the overall "delayed comment" policy. For instance, officers reacting to a disturbance on the fence concentrated on the police mission and failed to make use of the gate telephone for reporting the incident until the police mission had been completed. By this time, newsmen within the hall were usually already aware of the incident and asking questions about it. Answers had to be obtained through the filter of the command post instead of directly from the affected area.

One further unanticipated complication arose when attempting to answer operational questions for newsmen. The public information officer found himself increasingly unable to respond adequately to "bad news" concerning negative or unflattering police actions. Prior to the conventions, other officers had been directed to share information freely with the public information officer, but in practice this tended to be less than sufficient. Other officers, although they did not actually suppress information or disguise the truth when asked, did not volunteer information that was unfavorable for the police. In other words, while remaining truthful and candid when asked for information, other officers within the department did not rush to the PIO with bad news to be passed on to the press. This would seem to be a perfectly normal reaction, but it created numerous problems. Newsmen who had successfully obtained other details from this officer refused to believe that he was uninformed of the "bad news". Instead, they chose to believe that he was "covering up" the incident. Any prolonged

inability of the public information officer to respond to questions about "bad news" would inevitably destroy his credibility with the press and undercut his efforts to influence coverage of police news.

One example of this type of information gap occurred when a police officer was slightly injured during a motorcycle accident. Since it is not very flattering to say that an officer had an accident, no word was passed to the PIO. The press, of course, learned of the incident and asked questions. Lacking any substantial response from the information desk, rumors began to circulate about demonstrator attacks against the motorman, other injuries to civilians caused by the accident, and so on. The need for "negative input" to the information desk was underscored in the Democratic Convention after-action report prepared by the Miami Beach Police Department. As stated in that report, "Knowing what not to say can be more beneficial than a positive news release."

INTERVIEW PROCEDURES. Interviews requested by representatives of the print media were handled in the manner outlined previously. Any officer could be interviewed following clearance from the command post and positioning of a relief to assume his police duties. Essentially the same procedure held true for radio and television media with some modifications to meet their special needs.

The interview system was quickly tested by suspicious newsmen. One of the early tests involved a request from the British Broadcasting Company for a televised interview with a police officer to be selected at random by BBC. No advance questions would be submitted, and there would be no taboo areas for questioning. Most newsmen believed that the police would deny the request. Instead, BBC was permitted to select their man, and he was immediately made available. As chance would have it, the man selected at random by BBC turned out to have recently acquired a Masters Degree and completed a visit to Europe. He gave an extremely good impression of American law enforcement officers.

Chief Pomerance had decided that routine press conferences during the convention period would be inappropriate, preferring to respond to the press on an "as needed" basis and rely otherwise on press information officers. When requests were made by television people for an interview with the Chief, the information desk usually responded with information about the Chief's approximate whereabouts and advice to "chase him." When found, the Chief usually would take a minute or two to provide a brief piece for the television interviewer. Generally speaking, the conduct of television newsmen was very good in terms of interview procedures. Television interviewers would nearly always wait until after an event to interview the Chief and then ask for a recap. This gave the newsman a more balanced concept of the story and gave the Chief time to think about his response instead of speaking under the pressure of developing events.

These relatively informal interview procedures initially worked well, but eventually they produced some unforeseen problems. As the



conventions progressed, for instance, Chief Pomerance became something of a celebrity. When he was in the field, he tended to attract large crowds of newsmen. Consequently, the Chief's own freedom of movement became somewhat hampered. There were times when he hesitated to visit certain areas during delicate police operations because the newsmen attracted to the area could produce an increase in demonstrator activity.

A special problem that arose concerning radio announcements was successfully solved by modifying the news distribution system between the Democratic and Republican conventions. It was noted during the DNC that, whenever any newsworthy event occurred, numerous calls were received by the police information desk from out-of-town radio stations that were not represented by reporters at the convention site. These radio stations requested 30-second or 60-second taped announcements pertaining to some particular aspect of law enforcement activity. Comments on police training, security measures and arrests were commonly requested. Because law enforcement activity at the Democratic Convention was relatively minimal, the information desk was able to respond to these requests as they arrived. It was anticipated that increased activity during the Republican Convention, however, would make compliance with these requests impossible.

Police information officers responded to this problem by taking the initiative and producing taped announcements before they were requested by the radio stations. During the Republican Convention, whenever an information officer at the convention center had some spare time, he would cut an updated tape pertaining to some aspect of convention law enforcement. Personnel within the public information office of the Miami Police Department were then utilized to distribute the tapes to radio stations that might otherwise request them. When the updated tape was offered by the police department, the radio station nearly always accepted. Using this system, requests for taped commentary dropped from 20 per day during the Democratic Convention to three or four per day during the Republican Convention.

## MEDIA INITIATIVES AND PRESS COVERAGE

TELEVISION NEWS. Following the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, the national television news media had been criticized having "editorialized" the news. Numerous examples were cited where "excessive" coverage was given to street confrontations at the expense of reporting political business inside the hall. A 1969 report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence had further underscored the televised news media's potential for spreading violence or causing disturbances to escalate. With this background in mind, news executives who planned coverage for the 1972 conventions were determined not to leave themselves vulnerable to the same charges.

At preliminary meetings between media representatives and the police, newsmen frankly admitted that they had made mistakes in Chicago that they did not want to repeat. Decisions had been made at all of the major networks to cover street action during the 1972 conventions with restraint. CBS commentator Walter Cronkite explained, "If the item is a non-event — just seeking to gain exposure on national television — we turn our backs on it. On the other hand, if a demonstration disrupts the business of the convention or is participated in by very large numbers, we must cover it. It then becomes our duty to cover the story." News commentators expecting to handle news during the political conventions were directed by network executives not to sensationalize coverage of demonstrations. They were told to avoid phrases like "police brutality" and "angry mob" when describing any action. The overall policy for televised news coverage during the conventions was essentially this: The networks would cover the conventions as a political event, not as a police story. The police story would be part of the convention story, but the first priority must be to report the political event, not street confrontations.

To assure that this policy of restraint was successfully implemented, the television networks assembled experienced personnel to cover the political conventions. At a police joint planning session in late May, Chief Pomerance reported on a meeting held the previous day with CBS executives. The Chief said, "The people who will be coming in for this coverage are all seasoned, calm, cool kind of people that were at Bangla Desh and similar places. Burt Quint, for example, who is now in Rome, has been in the Mid-East. They are bringing these kinds of people because they feel that they are calm, level headed and don't get shook that easily by either the demonstrators or crowd reaction . . . ."

In addition to possessing a capability for influencing action through live coverage, the television media also contains a tremendous capability for distortion and misunderstanding caused by severe editing. A preconvention film by CBS, for example, described the activities of the police and the demonstration groups during erection of the campsite in Flamingo Park. Filming took place for seven days, producing four hours of film. When this material was edited for television viewing, it produced a telecast lasting six minutes. Obviously, decisions concerning what scenes are kept and which are rejected are extremely important in taped portions as well as in live coverage.

The live coverage, however, represented the greater problem area, and the policy of restraint did not have to wait long to be tested. On the first night of the Democratic Convention, demonstrators outside the convention hall succeeded in tearing down a section of the fence surrounding the complex. All three television networks filmed the event. All three either delayed coverage or canceled coverage before it appeared on the air. On CBS, Walter Cronkite mentioned the incident, but did not go into details, and the film was not shown to viewers. On NBC, David Brinkley commented that there were reports that there is a riot

outside" and promised to go outside later, but the camera never did. At that point, Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence O'Brien began his speech and NBC elected to stay with him. On ABC, George Merlis said, "The magnitude of the demonstration really wasn't all that big."

This incident set the tone for all television coverage of the DNC to follow and continued through the eventful third day of the Republican National Convention. One follow-up survey of television news coverage of the conventions reported overall estimates as follows:

- 50% live podium coverage.
- 45% interviews, commentaries, and taped background pieces.
- 5% for demonstrations and street activities.

During the Republican Convention, coverage during the evening sessions was tabulated as follows:

Monday night:

- CBS - two minutes discussing demonstrations; no visuals.
- NBC - one minute discussing demonstrations; no visuals.
- ABC - no mention of demonstrations.

Tuesday night:

- CBS - eight minutes of telecast for demonstrations (including taped documentary).
- NBC - two minutes of telecast for demonstrations.
- ABC - four minutes of telecast for demonstrations.

Wednesday night:

- CBS - 13½ minutes of live or taped street activity.
- NBC - 9½ minutes of live or taped street activity.
- ABC - 4½ minutes of live or taped street activity.

On Wednesday night, Vice President Agnew was renominated as President Nixon's running mate. Within the convention hall, Agnew's renomination precipitated a 19-minute demonstration consisting of continuous applause and cheering. NBC maintained live camera coverage of this entire 19-minute demonstration, which proved to be twice the time allotted that evening to report protest activity. It is possible that the television media's policy of restraint worked too well. While maintaining the integrity of the news broadcasts, i. e. while making it impossible to use news time to advertise demonstrator causes, it is possible that the media let the pendulum swing too far in the other direction, i. e. by defining political convention news as merely the transmittal of party editorials.



It would be unfair to chastise the television news media now for providing too little live coverage of street action. Nonetheless, the policy did contain some unexpected side effects that are worth mentioning. The most serious problem was that the policy pointedly ignored peaceful demonstrations. Much of the planned demonstration activity during the conventions had assumed television coverage on news shows. Under normal conditions, demonstrators participating in bizarre, visually oriented exhibitions might reasonably have expected to see their efforts broadcast on the evening news. The media policy during the conventions, however, withdrew the basis for those expectations and transformed many of the planned peaceful demonstrations into mere exercises in futility. Such a tactic as "guerrilla theater," for instance, is absolutely useless without an audience. Most of the "non-events" staged by demonstrators had little potential for escalating into violence. Ironically, they were ignored by the news media precisely because of their known peaceful nature.

In stating their intent to cover the conventions as a "political event" instead of a story of police confrontation, the networks were warmly supported by police. When that policy was implemented, however, some officers began to feel differently about it. One MBPD Major commented that on several occasions he was present on the street during an activity involving hundreds of demonstrators. The demonstration was proceeding peacefully, entirely under control by a handful of police officers and cooperating demonstration leaders. The Major would turn to a television newsman and say, "Why don't you get a picture of this? This is beautiful. This is how it should be done." The newsman would shrug helplessly. "Can't do it, Major. Not unless it gets violent." Police officers soon got the impression that the news media were interested only in sensational coverage of violence. This was a truly unfortunate misunderstanding because the motivation for the television news policy originated from a desire to avoid encouraging violence. The reaction it produced among police officers on the streets, however, was one of growing cynicism and hostility.

Among the demonstrators, the point was not lost. Just before the worst disorders of the last day of the Republican Convention, Jerry Gorde (Yippie coordinator for Miami) openly discussed plans to halt delegates from entering convention hall, and he concluded defiantly: "NBC and CBS are going to have to take pictures of demonstrators!" Frustrated police quickly recognized the needs of the frustrated demonstrators, but they were usually powerless to make policy changes. At one point, however, a television camera stand was erected at police request inside the convention complex fence overlooking the Washington Avenue demonstration area. This stand provided television crews with a safe vantage point from which to photograph demonstration activity without interfering with police lines. It also, incidentally, provided an "audience" for demonstrations that were held in that predesignated area.

An overall evaluation of television media efforts to improve news coverage at the 1972 political conventions would have to be marked very high. It was a well intentioned, logical effort that improved greatly upon the performance of 1968. The results of the policy, however, were unbalanced and not entirely foreseen. Its greatest weakness was a repeated failure to discriminate between peaceful demonstrations and potentially violent confrontations. There seemed to be no evaluative mechanism for making decisions about the probable impact of television coverage for an event. There were certainly times when the presence of a television camera would have encouraged violence. At other times, law enforcement interests may have been better served by permitting peaceful demonstrators to obtain a piece of the news.

PRINT MEDIA. Efforts at improvement by the print media (newspapers, magazines, etc.) were less successful. Problems arising from the unselective issuance of press credentials by the two political parties have already been mentioned. These problems - consisting primarily of the sheer quantity of newsmen on the scene and the large proportion of amateurs within their ranks - obscured any attempts that may have been made to improve on the 1968 print coverage.

The print media, of course, is immensely more difficult to coordinate or control than network television news. Traditional rivalries among newsmen to obtain a "scoop" for their own papers generally work against efforts at cooperative, quality coverage. The rush to get information into print occasionally created strained relations between the police and newspapermen. For example, preliminary to the Democratic Convention, the Miami News printed a complete line-by-line report of police operational plans for convention law enforcement. This thoughtless breach of security did nothing to improve police-press relations.

Literally thousands of publications were represented at the conventions, and their representatives arrived at Miami Beach with virtually no coordinated plans except those made by the largest and most professional organizations among them. Even setting aside the problem of representation by the college and underground press, the quality of newsmen assigned to cover such an important event as the national political conventions varied dramatically. Generally speaking, newspapers that were located far from the convention site were represented by senior, experienced political reporters. This selection process occurred through the simple economics of travel and expense account priorities. Local media and regional papers, who were under no such financial restraints, apparently sent large numbers of reporters into the Miami Beach area who had minimal professional background to prepare them for such an important assignment.

With such large numbers of correspondents present, the only feasible manner of operation was through a series of "press pools". The pool usually consists of a limited number of newsmen who represent a larger group with shared interests. For instance, out of a group of 7,000 newsmen, it can be assumed that at least a few hundred may want to

interview Senator Humphrey. At the moment, Senator Humphrey may not have the time or facilities to meet with a few hundred persons. Instead, he makes time available to meet with four persons. These persons are elected by the group that is interested in the interview. Normally, the pool consists of respected professionals who are trusted by their peers. Questions can be given to pool members, who will attempt to ask them during the interview. The pool member is obligated to report all information learned during the interview back to the group before he makes use of it himself. It is strictly taboo for a pool representative to seek "exclusive" comments during the pool interview. The point being made here is that the vast majority of newsmen present at the political conventions never at any time received any hard news that was not obtained from a second hand source. Typically, print news submitted by correspondents at Miami Beach was based upon pool reports, news releases and other shared sources, then supplemented with the random and commonly inaccurate observations of the individual writing the story. Since those individuals included persons with all levels of professional background, the quality of press coverage obtained thereby seemed hardly to justify the expense and difficulty involved in sending so many correspondents to the scene.

One final critical comment must be made relative to photographic coverage in the print media. Despite the involvement of various press representatives at police training, photographic coverage was generally characterized by the same lack of judgement that had built previous intergroup hostility. Of particular note in this respect is the award made at the end of the year by the Florida Society of Newspaper Editors and the Florida Press Association for the year's best spot news pictures. The prize winning entry was a four-picture series taken during the conventions which showed a girl being maced by a Miami police officer. The pictures are not well framed, there is nothing visually attractive or dramatic about them, nor do they contain any reference to the conventions. They depend utterly on a cutline. The sequence was apparently taken with a motorized, automatic camera that did not even require any technical skill. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the judges were excited by the subject matter - macing a girl. When these kinds of inadequate professional standards are applied at the state press association level and singled out for applause, it seems clear that any significant improvement in the quality of photo coverage will have to await a changing of the guard.

#### POLICE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM

Very early in the preparations for the conventions, Chief Pomerance recognized the need for a "national publicity base" for news about law enforcement preparations. Local news outlets were considered to be important but not sufficient to reach the audience that the Chief most wanted to reach. Since demonstrators would be coming to Miami Beach from all parts of the country, a concerted effort was made to contact and influence news media located far from Miami Beach. This was done in order to publicize the more positive aspects of police training and



preparations in newspapers that would be read by those planning to come to Miami Beach. The point was to make it clear that the police were not preparing themselves for an armed confrontation in the streets. Instead, they were learning how to accommodate themselves to peaceful protest while maintaining order in the community. It was expected that this message about police expectations would influence the eventual behavior of those that did come to the conventions.

This effort to implement a national public relations program for the purpose of influencing eventual behavior in Miami Beach was an extraordinary undertaking for a police department. When considered in relation to the size of MBPD, initiation of the program is understandable only in terms of an extension of the personality of one man, the Chief of Police, Rocky Pomerance. Chief Pomerance is highly aware of the need for good communications and is extremely sensitive to the potential influence of symbols, gestures and emotional phrases. With the benefit of hindsight, knowing the numerous difficulties that arose in obtaining police manpower commitments and operational plans, one is tempted to attribute much of the success of both conventions to such preconvention influences as might have been exerted by this public relations effort. Of course, no firm evaluation of this effort can actually be made. It must be enough to say that it was an extraordinary additional factor, that its potential made fascinating speculation, and that within the context of the 1972 conventions it seems at least possible that it had something to do with the way events turned out.

It seems that any successful public relations campaign must have a slogan, and Chief Pomerance's was no exception. As the umbrella phrase to describe his goals, Rocky settled on "effective and humane policing." This became the key phrase, the trademark, that he inserted into virtually every interview. By February, 1972, the Chief had already carried his message to the San Francisco Chronicle, Washington Post, Newsweek, Houston Post, and the Baltimore Sun. "I don't make trips to see them especially," Chief Pomerance said at that time. "But if I'm in town on other business, I let them know I'm around. Usually they invite me in for a talk."

Taking the initiative in this way offered several advantages in terms of influencing the news. In addition to the specific content of the news, however, something was probably also gained simply by the act of making the initial contact. It reversed the customary game of hide and seek often played between the police and the press and firmly established Chief Pomerance in control of his own press image.

As the conventions approached, a need was recognized for "background" conferences between the police and the local press in order to establish working ground rules for convention coverage. Chief Pomerance was successful in involving the Center for Urban Studies of the University of Miami as an intervening group. The Center for Urban Studies provided

a symbolic "neutral ground" for the holding of such a police/press meeting. In one report of this activity which took place on May 16, the Center for Urban Studies described the conference as "comprised of the news directors of the major television stations, managing editors of the Miami Herald, the Miami News, the Spanish speaking newspaper, the Miami Beach Sun Reporter, along with the chiefs of police of Miami Beach, the city of Miami and the director of public safety for Dade County. The purpose of gathering these groups was to give them an opportunity to explore the best methods of communication between them in anticipation of the upcoming Democratic and Republican conventions . . . . The meeting seemed to be most valuable to both these types of agencies."

A critical point in the overall public relations effort was reached on June 13, when a long and very favorable profile of Rocky Pomerance was distributed by the Associated Press to newspapers throughout the nation. The dozens of stories which appeared in newspapers on June 13, 14 and 15 spoke highly of police training in Miami Beach and emphasized the "effective and humane" policing planned for the conventions. Stories that were published after this time often included important positive points that were derived from the AP story. With this, the Chief of Police had achieved the national publicity base that he originally sought.

Not only the establishment press was included in Chief Pomerance's public relations program. A distinct effort was made to obtain coverage for the police in the "underground" press. Before 1972, this type of undertaking seemed wildly improbable. Now it appears as the only wise and logical thing to do. Chief Pomerance apparently never lost sight of the need to reach a particular audience, those persons who might become demonstrators in Miami Beach. He seems never to have fallen into the trap of seeing an interview or a news release as a thing in itself, divorced from the effect it was intended to achieve. Consequently, the Chief provided an exclusive interview to reporters from Rolling Stone Magazine, which appeared in the issue of June 22, 1972. The article included favorable comments about Chief Pomerance and carried an outline of the behavioral college training that had been given to Miami Beach police officers. Rocky Pomerance has since said that, when he had the interview with Rolling Stone, he considered it to be "more important than Time Magazine."

The efforts of the Chief of Police to obtain national publicity for his own department were not undertaken without a certain amount of personal risk. Throughout the months preceding the conventions, it was always possible that the public relations program would be misunderstood as seeking after publicity for personal aggrandizement. Persons in neighboring departments and also within the Miami Beach department had occasional "feelings" about the amount of time that Chief Pomerance spent with the press. At times it appeared that he gave a higher priority to the public relations effort than to meeting operational needs of the moment. In the aftermath of the convention experience, however, these feelings have

disappeared. "I was wrong," said one individual. "And he was right. His personal handling of the news media had a great deal to do with our eventual success."

One important criticism deserves attention before closing this chapter. Despite its impressive efforts in the field of press relations, including both the public relations program conducted by the Chief of Police and the news distribution system developed under the supervision of the Public Information Officer, the Miami Beach Police Department did not at the time of the conventions possess a written press relations policy for the department. One had to be devised in response to the needs of the moment and the good judgement of the individuals involved. In 1972 this much was sufficient, but the results were highly dependent on the individuals who assumed positions of leadership at that time. It seems imperative that written press relations policy be developed well before an event of the magnitude of the national political conventions in order to avoid an unnecessary chance of error or misunderstanding.

It should be stressed that the press relations effort made by MBPD, despite the lack of written policy at the time, was not merely a series of reactions to events. It was a well developed, rational plan that anticipated many problems and included sufficient flexibility to cope with the unexpected. The Public Information Officer, in fact, developed the following theoretical approach to his task that would have to be described as highly unusual for a professional police officer.

The role of the PIO was frankly recognized as including a responsibility to "influence" the news. This means that the PIO must try to assure that news reports include information that is favorable to the police or, at least, to assure that the story is a fair rendition of the events that took place. With this purpose in mind, the news reporting process was visualized as consisting of three separate phases:

1. Information gathering phase.
2. Writing phase.
3. Editing phase.

Within this system it was considered possible to influence the story at points 1 and 3. Attempts to influence the story by directly requesting the writer to withhold information or exerting other pressure on the writer were considered to be impossible. Instead, the story could be influenced at either the information gathering point or at the editing point by supplying additional facts either to the writer or to the editor. The additional facts, of course, were true items of information that tended to produce a more favorable impression of police action.

It is important to note that this is a positive program. It aggressively seeks to influence the news by grasping the initiative and providing newsmen with useful facts. The plan assumes that a defensive, wait-to-be-asked press relations posture will be less effective because such an attitude



will produce reactive, evasive responses. Instead, the news is influenced by actively assisting the newsman in the preparation of his story by providing additional facts to him. When it is perceived that the story is being written by a "hostile" writer, the story can still be influenced by telephoning additional facts to some other person at the newspaper who can insert the material into the story at the editing phase.

Although this policy was developed with print media in mind, the basic tenets that it proposes are equally applicable to all media. The same underlying policy was the basis for both the news distribution system used during the conventions and the long range public information program that preceded it. In either case, a good press relation was achieved largely because the police actively worked to achieve it and contributed a great deal to it.

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## SYMBOLISM

The common police approach to anticipated problems would normally be described with words like "practical," "pragmatic," "straightforward," and "realistic." One would not ordinarily describe police work with terms such as "abstract" or "symbolic." In this sense, the 1972 political conventions were most unusual. One of the striking things about that portion of law enforcement services undertaken by the Miami Beach Police Department is that much of it tends to fit most comfortably under designations such as "psychological" and "symbolic." Again and again, relatively trivial actions occurred far in the background of events that apparently exerted considerable influence on what took place. Indeed, much of the most innovative police work performed in Miami Beach may have been in the relatively obscure and intangible area of manipulation and control of symbols.

This was a different kind of police work. It attempted to influence the situation at a symbolic level instead of at the customary physical level. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy enough to see that this approach is consistent with what we now know about the nature of reality as perceived by the human mind. The mind, for instance, does not merely perceive and record physical events. It perceives and records events within a certain symbolic context. A raised fist or a pointing finger can carry several meanings, but the mind perceives the gesture as a symbol within the context of a specific situation, and one "correct" meaning of the gesture becomes part of the mind's perception. The situation is not markedly different when the interaction takes place between individuals. A certain context for the use of symbols becomes established and exerts some influence on the perceptions of one group by the other. In order for one group to consciously influence a situation on this symbolic level, the

initiator of the action must first be aware of this "big picture" of symbolic reference, then he must carefully use the best possible words and gestures to produce a consistent symbolic impact on the perceiving group.

Everyone expects political demonstrators to be sensitive to the impact of emotional phrases and symbols. Professional demonstrators are supposed to work hard to construct psychologically powerful displays. Until the 1972 conventions, this same effort was not expected of police. In Miami Beach, however, the police displayed an acute awareness of the power of symbols to influence events. For the first time on such a grand scale, police competed actively at this intangible, psychological level in order to gain control over a massive event.

While it is correct to speak of a competition among those seeking to manipulate symbols, it should be immediately noted that the police and the demonstrators were not the only participants. Similar efforts to exert influence were being made by others, most notably by the news media and by political candidates in both parties. Nor were the efforts of the police and the demonstrators always directly antagonistic. In fact, police and demonstration leaders shared at least one very important goal. Neither wanted violence. Generally, the demonstrators sought to heighten emotional reactions in order to emphasize a sense of shame and outrage before perceived injustices. Police sought to lower emotional reactions in order to avoid complications in carrying out their basic protective mission. The two groups, therefore, sought to influence the tone of events in opposite directions. Neither police leaders nor demonstration leaders, however, wanted to precipitate violent confrontations. It is important to note this very significant shared goal. The demonstrators generally wanted to operate at an emotional level that brought them to the brink of violent confrontation, but not into it. The police preferred to deflate the emotional setting as much as possible at every opportunity, also for the purpose of avoiding violent confrontation. This was the nature of the competition.

#### POLICE USE OF SYMBOLISM AND HUMOR

All effective demonstrations involve a certain amount of symbolism. This fact was well known to demonstration leaders who were planning to attend the 1972 conventions. In 1970, Jerry Rubin had published a book called Do It! A Revolutionary Manifesto in which poet Allen Ginsberg was quoted as saying, "A demonstration is a theatrical production." For the greater part of both conventions, neither the demonstrators nor the police lost sight of that basic truth. Words would be used to communicate unsaid things. Humor would find a place. Costume, gesture and timing would all be important props, and success or failure would be achieved in the mind of the audience. Chief Pomerance says, "I thought we were fighting for people's minds. We had to overturn the Chicago experience."



It has already been noted in Chapter 16 that Chief Pomerance undertook a long range, nationally based public relations program for the purpose of influencing the tone of events in Miami Beach. The words and phrases used to publicize police work during this period were carefully selected for their potential emotional impact. For instance, when there was a need to speak of demonstrators or protest groups, they were identified as "non-delegates." This relatively neutral term avoided emotional association with riots and street confrontations. At past conventions it had been customary for each political candidate to highlight his nomination by bringing a group of non-delegate floor demonstrators into the convention hall for a quick parade. Such floor demonstrations were to be eliminated at the 1972 conventions. The "non-delegate" demonstrators would have to perform outside the hall. Chief Pomerance quickly made use of this term to include all demonstrators seeking to influence the conventions. The "non-delegate" label not only avoided unwanted associations, but also served to legitimate the actions of those intending to demonstrate in the streets.

Careful selection of words characterized much of the convention publicity originating from the police. For instance, Miami Beach police were undergoing special training to prepare them for the conventions. Chief Pomerance consistently referred to his officers as "attending college." Since the classes were given by Florida International University faculty and college credits were earned for attendance, this was technically correct. The "college" image was emphasized in pre-convention publicity, however, primarily for its effect on potential demonstrators. It was assumed that many of those who were planning to demonstrate were college students. It was hoped that advance publicity about police "attending college" would soften any preconceived notions held by demonstrators about the police and permit the two groups to interact more freely in Miami Beach.

Police were also careful to avoid pre-convention publicity about police training in the use of tear gas, mass arrest procedures, or other activities that would conflict with the primary message of intended cooperation. It was imperative, for instance, that police officers receive some practice with the planned mass arrest procedures before they were called upon to make arrests during the conventions. Initially, Miami stadium had been considered as a likely spot to conduct this training. The stadium was rejected as the training site, however, primarily because training conducted there would be accessible to the press and almost certainly would be reported in newspapers and on television. It was decided instead to hold the mass arrest training at a remote site to the west of Miami.

The point of the changed location was not that the procedures themselves were considered to be so secret that they had to be protected from the press, but rather that televised reports of the police practicing mass arrests could seriously disrupt the symbolic context that had emerged

after long months of police effort. Pictures on television of police officers practicing mass arrests could create a misleading impression that they were preparing for "armed conflict." That impression would be in conflict with the "cooperative" police image developed thus far.

Non-threatening euphemisms were used whenever possible to describe preparations for convention law enforcement. At one preliminary point, the Miami Beach City Council requested assignment of 1,000 riot trained military personnel to maintain order during the two conventions. The term used to describe this force was a "Peace Corps." Police task forces were called "Citizen Protective Units." For another example, the ushers supplied by the Andy Frain Agency were expected to perform some guard functions. The guards would carry clubs, but that word was never used by Jim McDonnell, head of the private security force. Mr. McDonnell made the following distinction: "The ushers will carry no weapons. There will be defensive equipment available if necessary."

The careful use of such terms was more than simply changing the names for things. Within the context of the situation, the terms carried special symbolic impact and were consistent with the overall effort to avoid unnecessary association with violence.

One of the first physical security measures to be implemented involved erection of a fence to entirely surround the huge convention complex. It was a chain link fence approximately six feet high. It was not particularly strong, and it was intended less to withstand a concerted attack than it was to serve as a symbolic demarcation line, dividing areas where demonstrations were permissible from areas where they were not. The fence was made more attractive by planting a fast-growing hibiscus hedge in front of it. The fence, however, was recognized by the press as constituting a "defensive line," a "barrier," and so on. One day, Mrs. Pomerance in conversation with the Chief casually referred to the hibiscus decorated fence as "the trellis." Henceforth, the threatening fence became known in all public statements as "the trellis," a rather pretty little thing out there on the lawn.

Once the conventions began, the same careful use of words to reduce emotional impact was evident. For instance, Flamingo Park rules against nude bathing in the public pool were repeatedly violated by the Zippies. The nude bathing occurred at night at a location that could not be easily seen by passersby, but many older residents of Miami Beach were outraged by the knowledge that nude bathing had gone unpunished. "Nude bathing" was associated with lewd, lascivious, immoral conduct that some residents perceived as threatening. When Chief Pomerance was forced to respond to expressions of dissatisfaction with police enforcement of laws against nude bathing, he very pointedly referred to the activity as "skinny-dipping." Somehow "skinny-dipping" threatens no one. It is merely childish, uninhibited, mischievous behavior.

A concern for the emotional impact of appearances led to an effort to improve threatening appearances wherever possible. For instance, it was necessary that police establish several supply points in different parts of the city where they could obtain special equipment (including tear gas) when it was needed. Unadorned storage sheds would serve the purpose. A police guard could be posted in front and signs could proclaim "Danger," "Keep Out." Instead, the police chose to construct picturesque, palm-roofed "chickees" similar to the open-sided shade structures found on the ocean beach. The police officer standing in the shade of a chickee threatened no one. The cumulative effect of dozens of background decisions such as this tended to undermine any attempt by demonstrators to portray law enforcement as "repressive" or Miami Beach as an "armed camp."

Concern for appearances extended into police operational strategies. At a joint planning meeting preliminary to the Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach Assistant Chief Larry Cotzin informed the group that the strategy planned in San Diego was to initially show a small force which would be increased as the convention progressed. Chief Pomerance approved of this strategy, but added that he was "toying with the idea of starting with zero and staying there as long as possible."

This so-called "low profile" strategy was implemented on the weekend preceding the Democratic National Convention and on the first day of the DNC by positioning volunteer officers of the Miami Beach Police Department outside the central gate of the convention center in police uniform but unarmed and wearing soft hats instead of helmets. This was done in order to provide a highly visible image of the police officer as a non-threatening public servant. This particular ploy was not well received in the community. Individuals on a local radio talk show accused the Chief of "going too far" by disarming his men. The officers were re-armed (although this action should also be attributed to escalating demonstration activity at the Playboy Plaza on Sunday and at the convention fence on Monday). Despite the need to show a greater force than "zero," the overall strategy remained one of showing the least possible force required by a situation, while holding substantial reserve forces ready to strike from concealed positions.

The role of Chief of Convention Site Security placed Chief Pomerance in a key position as a negotiator with various groups planning to participate in the conventions. While Chief Garmire, Director Purdy and other law enforcement officials contributed much in terms of manpower and operational support, the job of conducting pre-convention negotiations was performed almost exclusively by Chief Pomerance. Each of these negotiation sessions was recognized as an opportunity to extend police influence. Chief Pomerance developed a knack for communicating unspoken support for each visitor, regardless of the outlook represented.

On one day, for instance, the Chief was visited in the morning by a right-wing group and in the afternoon by a left-wing group. When the



second group departed, a police officer who had been present at both meetings expressed amazement that both leaders seemed to feel that Chief Pomerance secretly supported their own point of view. "I sat here through both meetings," the officer said. "He said exactly the same thing to both groups: 'Keep me informed of your plans. We'll assist you in any way we can as long as the demonstration remains peaceful.' And each group left feeling that he was on their side."

Later, Chief Pomerance revealed that there was more to the performance than artful dodging. He had, in fact, encouraged certain contextual interpretations of his words. Specifically, he made use of objects in his office as theatrical props to convey a message through symbols. For the morning meeting with the right-wing group, he moved the American flag to a position close to his desk; a photograph of J. Edgar Hoover was displayed directly above his head; books advocating right-wing policies were placed in prominent positions on his desk. For the afternoon meeting, the flag was moved to a far corner, the Hoover portrait was replaced with a family photo, and a few underground periodicals replaced the right-wing literature. The Chief said exactly the same words to each group. Each left the room feeling that the Chief was sympathetic to their cause. It is difficult to say where, during the course of such manipulations, polite deceits become serious deceptions. It is a difficult line to walk and should only be attempted by those who can proceed with perception and restraint.

An equally difficult task involves the effective use of humor to decrease tensions. Humor is very difficult to define. When used well, humor can transform a surly crowd into a cooperative group. It can contribute enormously to a favorable public image of an individual or an occurrence. The dangers, of course, are numerous. Humor that slips into sarcasm or veiled contempt can produce opposite results from those intended. Too little accomplishes nothing; too much produces a foolish boor.

Perhaps simply because of his own personality, Chief Pomerance was able to inject a certain amount of humor into the convention experience. Chief Pomerance communicates with people easily and enjoys a reputation for being good humored. The press regards him as good copy because he comes through as a personality. For instance, a report of a pre-convention meeting between police commanders and Cuban leaders opened with: "Rocky Pomerance happily munched on a large Cuban sandwich and spoke Spanish as (others) looked on wistfully." A report during the interim period between the two conventions summarized the local atmosphere by noting, "Much of the local mood stems from the jovial cool of Police Chief Rocky Pomerance . . . ." Demonstration leaders seem to have held similarly high opinions of the Chief. The Manual for The Republican Convention, which outlined the strategies for civil disobedience, also included the following description: "Rocky Pomerance, confident self-styled Police Chief and smiling protector of the people, is a decision

maker and rational thinker. Though he catches flack from all sides ... refusing to bust for pot and favoring a camping ground in Miami Beach, he keeps on truckin'."

#### DEMONSTRATOR USE OF SYMBOLS AND HUMOR

The only demonstrators to make effective use of humor were the Zippies. Although relatively small in numbers, the Zippies were able to make an impact on the conventions primarily because of their ability to use humor. Zippie humor was nihilistic, barbed mockery. One Zippie show outside convention hall, for instance, included a laugh-in for Ed Muskie, a yawn-in for Wilbur Mills, a toke-in for Shirley Chisholm, and an egg-in for "Humpty Dumpty" (Senator Humphrey). At one memorable point during the Republican Convention, Zippies were participating in a picketing action in front of one of the hotels. News photographers became enamored with two blond toddlers who apparently belonged with the group. When one photographer asked a young woman to identify the children, she said, "They are our leaders."

More commonly, the protesters prepared their demonstrations in a gravely serious tone. The principal demonstration leaders openly disapproved of Zippie clowning because it detracted from the serious content of demonstrations against racism, poverty, sex discrimination and the war in Vietnam. To convey protests about these important issues, most leaders felt that a special emphasis on symbolism was required. On the eve of the Republican Convention, Rennie Davis (PCPJ) commented about the planned demonstrations: "There has to be a special creativity to break through to people's guts and hearts." With humor specifically banned, most demonstrations depended on some kind of bizarre symbolism in order to attract media attention.

The most effective use of symbols by demonstrators was undoubtedly employed for protest against the Vietnam War. It is also true, however, that some of the least effective demonstrations were associated with Vietnam. Effectiveness with symbols, therefore, does not flow automatically from subject matter. Because of television media decisions to deny news coverage to peaceful demonstrations (see Chapter 16), it is impossible to evaluate how effective much of the protest symbolism might have been if distributed nationally. It is only possible to react to impressions gained by observers in Miami Beach.

The bizarre, esoteric symbolism that would be used later during the "Street Without Joy" demonstrations of the Republican National Convention was first unveiled at a pre-Democratic Convention exercise on July 4. At that time, a group of about forty demonstrators, comprising members of VVAW, Yippies, and other members of the Miami Conventions Coalition, participated in a "funeral boat" launching in the Dade Canal behind convention hall. Police were not informed of the demonstration in

advance, but learned of it while it was in progress. Demonstrators carried a miniature coffin adorned with flowers to the bank of the Dade Canal. After some obscure chants and ceremonies, they proceeded to launch the coffin into the canal where it floated atop the water. Although it was not known at the time, it was later learned that the ceremony was a mock Buddhist funeral intended to honor Nguyen Thai Binh, a North Vietnamese who had recently been killed while attempting to hijack a Pan Am jet to Hanoi.

Police reacted to the symbolic demonstration with obvious restraint. A police boat stood by to retrieve the floating symbol because such debris constitutes a hazard for pleasure craft using the canal. Officers in the boat picked up the floating coffin and placed it on the canal seawall. A demonstrator pushed it back into the canal. Police again placed it on the seawall. A demonstrator again pushed it into the canal. At this point, police announced that they would transport the funeral boat to the ocean. It was pulled aboard the police boat, and the demonstrators departed from the area.

The incident served as an accurate preview of things to come. During the conventions, police would not react forcefully to symbolic gestures on the part of demonstrators. The manner in which the officers in the patrol boat handled the ceremonial coffin was pointedly unaggressive. Police approached the floating coffin slowly, and an officer lifted it carefully into the patrol boat. This incident could have become a confrontation, but it did not. Police response was unhurried. There were no roaring engines of the patrol boat, no splashing of demonstrators, no rough handling of the fragile symbol. Instead, police merely waited until the peaceful ceremony was over, and then they ended it. When difficulties arose, a face saving retreat was made available.

While setting a favorable precedent for police/demonstrator cooperation during the conventions, the funeral boat incident also revealed one serious weakness in demonstration strategies. Much of the symbolism and so-called "educational exhibits" planned for the conventions were concerned with Vietnamese culture. The symbols derived from Buddhism and other aspects of Vietnamese life may have been meaningful to veterans and a few scholars who understood their significance, but they carried no emotional impact whatsoever for the general public. Such actions as the funeral boat launching were usually either misunderstood or they communicated nothing at all. With the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to see clearly that, while the American people were intensely interested in the Vietnam War, they had little or no interest in the people or culture of Vietnam.

In other words, no commonly accepted context existed within which to interpret the demonstrator symbolism. Lacking any understanding of the emotional situation being imitated, the American audience did not react with the kind of "gut reaction" sought by demonstration



leaders. Recalling our earlier reference to fists and fingers, the mind here saw only hands waving in the air, devoid of any emotional significance. Similarly, the bizarre "death masks" and other odd paraphernalia used to portray the horrors of war were far from the experience of most observers. The demonstration leaders apparently hoped to build a context for the appreciation of these symbols during the conventions themselves through educational exhibits and descriptive footnotes about Vietnamese culture. The available time for such context building, however, was entirely inadequate. Most of the symbolic demonstrations attracted attention because they were unusual, but they communicated little emotional impact. The sight of the death masks did not stimulate feelings of revulsion and shame. The most common reaction was simple curiosity.

By way of contrast, the one symbol used by demonstrators that consistently produced a highly emotional response was the American flag flown at half mast and upside down. The flag, of course, is a symbol that is well known and full of meaning to an American audience. Its symbolic context is firmly established. The upside down flag was flown at various times by the VVAW and Zippies. The VVAW flew it as a symbol of "distress". The Zippies flew it because it angered police. To most observers, flying the flag in this manner amounted to public disrespect. Ironically, the use of this emotional symbol was met with disapproval from some important demonstration groups and led to internal differences among demonstrators.

Except for the unified mass demonstrations scheduled for the Republican Convention, most protest action involved either picketing or a rally at which slogans were chanted. The content and style of these slogans contributed much to the effectiveness of any demonstration. They also revealed a great deal about the relatively fragmented and disorganized nature of most demonstration activity. Each demonstration apparently called for a new chant, until the variety apparently ended with large numbers of demonstrators unsure of the words.

While demonstration leaders had been extremely sensitive to the possible ill effects of humor, little attention apparently was given to the predominantly light hearted style of street chants. An early demonstration at the Fontainebleau Hotel involved a thin line of homosexual picketers chanting in sing-song fashion: "We're here, because we're queer . . . ." Football style cheers were common: "Give me a G. Give me an A. Give me a Y." And so on. A mass rally sponsored by women's liberation groups joins in a rhyming chorus that begins with, "Richard Nixon is a jerk . . . ." Throughout the course of both political conventions, an obvious clash existed between the serious nature of the protest and the playful, football-game cheers and slogans used by the demonstrators. No matter how serious the issue, it is hard to communicate outrage when it is chanted to the tune of "Fight on, Polytechnic." Notable exceptions to this poor use of street slogans would be the anti-war chant of the VVAW and the Attica Brigade's "Fight Back," which enjoyed some popularity on the last day of the Republican National Convention.

A word should also be said about the use of profanity in demonstration chants. Like humor, profanity can be very effective, but it must be handled properly. For instance, one of the most effective displays of emotion at either convention was the action taken by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War at the Miami Beach High School. The guerrilla theater which was intended to urge defections from the National Guard was a total failure, but the use of slogans was very good. At the high school, approximately 800 demonstrators stood close together in the schoolyard and chanted repeatedly, "One, two, three, four. We don't want your fucking war!" That was a powerful moment. The language was intended to be shocking. Because it was delivered in unison by so many in that setting, it was a very effective expression of deeply felt protest. The particular group involved, the VVAW dressed in tattered military uniforms, lent further credence to the protest.

This same chant was attempted less successfully during other demonstrations. When events were less dominated by the VVAW, those using the chant could not seem to agree on a proper adjective. Some replaced "fucking" with "frigging." Others used "stinking." The chant was also modified to meet the needs of special groups. Black groups chanted "racist" war. Women's groups chanted "sexist" war. By the latter part of the Republican National Convention, the anti-war chant had degenerated into one of those dismal Happy Birthday tunes, where all the guests know the celebrant by a different name. (Happy Birthday, dear ... Daddy, Don, Donald, Mr. Whatzit ... .) The profanity - the impact word - is lost in a mumble. Instead of the most powerful part of the chant, it becomes an embarrassing gap. Instead of exhibiting emotional solidarity, the garbled profanity reveals confusion.

It comes as no surprise to realize that the most effective symbolic actions by demonstrators were those either initiated by or dependent upon the support of the VVAW. (The Miami Beach High School demonstration, the silent March Against Death, dike building, the Street Without Joy.) Effective manipulation of symbols requires well organized, well disciplined participants.

In this sense, it also becomes evident that the police - despite their relative lack of experience with conscious manipulation of symbols - were in a position to perform well. When the police choose to compete at this level, they bring numerous physical and organizational assets with them that can contribute materially to achieving the desired effect. They are accustomed to discipline. Therefore, police leadership can usually control the words and actions that build symbolic context. In fact, the police are already experienced in the use of such symbols as the uniform, the badge, and other related objects. They lack only a recognition of their own strengths in this area and some guidelines for performance.

## LEADERSHIP AS A SYMBOL

It is important that the Chief of Police, like demonstration leaders, recognize that his own person is a symbol. The tone that he establishes through his words and gestures will profoundly affect the behavior of his followers and the eventual course of events. To some extent, every Police Chief is a symbol of law enforcement. Because of his prominent position as chief spokesman to demonstrators and newsmen, Rocky Pomerance very early acquired the unofficial title of "symbol of law enforcement at the conventions". That is, within the context of the political conventions, Rocky Pomerance became recognized as the symbol of law enforcement at that place and at that time, even though several other police leaders were also involved.

This situation carried both advantages and disadvantages. As the "symbol of law enforcement," Chief Pomerance was aware that he could influence a situation for better or worse simply by controlling his own appearance and reactions to events. On the other hand, the requirements of the "symbol role" occasionally interfered with the Chief's relationships with other law enforcement leaders. At times, other leaders may have suspected Chief Pomerance of "setting himself up" as the symbol of law enforcement. From Chief Pomerance's point of view, he was merely taking advantage of a role that had been thrust upon him by the press. A candid recognition of the way in which one is seen by others represents important insight that should not be ignored. A modest refusal to see oneself, at least temporarily, in the inflated terms used by others could represent a serious weakness in this particular context.

It should be emphasized that a "jovial" public image such as that enjoyed by Chief Pomerance in Miami Beach is not intrinsically better than a "tough cop" public image. The artistry comes about by matching the image to the situation at the proper time. For instance, when Chief Zanders arrived in the Miami area from Washington, D. C., local newsmen incorrectly assumed that he was a "hard liner", who would represent the federal interest in maintaining order. It was known that Chief Zanders favored mass arrest as a crowd management tool, so he was quickly tagged with a "tough cop" public image. Chief Pomerance did not say anything to dispel this opinion, and Chief Zanders himself made no comment. At a critical point in the campsite debate, the wisdom of maintaining this public image was realized.

Members of the City Council who opposed the campsite permit could not be persuaded by either Chief Pomerance or the City Manager to change their position. An opposing Councilman pointed to Chief Zanders during the debate. "We want to hear what he has to say," he demanded. Obviously, the expectations were for a "hard line" rejection of the request for a campsite permit. Chief Zanders responded with a recommendation that the permit should be granted. This expression of public support, coming from an individual who had until then been tagged with the public



image of a tough cop, was probably a key factor in the City Council's approval of a campsite permit in Flamingo Park.

Whether "jovial" or "tough," the important thing about a public image is that it be consistent. For this reason, an attempt to create a patently artificial image would almost certainly fail. The exaggerated "tough cop" image was maintained for Chief Zanders primarily through inactivity, i. e. no one corrected the initial false impression and Chief Zanders henceforth avoided contacts with the press. A more active role as police communicator with the public would have brought about immediate modification of his image. An unsuccessful attempt to create an artificial public image can be absolutely ruinous. Therefore, this should not be considered an area for trial-and-error experiments in image building. Instead, the wiser course is to behave honestly and naturally, although with an awareness of the importance that is being assigned to one's words and gestures within the emerging symbolic context.

A word should be said about maintaining the visibility of leadership symbols. Throughout both political conventions it was observed that senior command officers of the Miami Beach Police Department were present at every incident of any significance. Officers with the rank of Major or higher were always present on the streets. This use of command staff should not be interpreted as a lack of confidence in junior officers. Instead, it was a conscious effort to provide police officers on the streets with a constant symbol of disciplined leadership. The command staff of MBPD were unanimous in their acceptance of the "low profile" strategy and were aware of the significance that would be applied to their words and gestures within the symbolic context that had been established for convention law enforcement. Their presence on the streets constantly reinforced the consistency of the police image that had been shaped during the pre-convention period.

By way of contrast, demonstration leaders were unable to produce a unified, consistent leadership symbol. Internal arguments over tactics and policies were aired publicly, and open disagreement between groups occurred repeatedly during the conventions. Some demonstration leaders slept in good hotels and dressed in business suits while others dressed in rags and slept in tents. The inconsistency thus produced made it impossible for any set of leaders to create a consistent symbolic context that would verify their own leadership. Both the audience for whom the demonstrations were performed and many of the individual demonstrators who participated remained confused as to who was in charge and what was the significance of their actions.

The point being made here is summed up more eloquently on one of the documentary video tapes made by MBPD photographers inside Flamingo Park. During one of the many public debates that occurred there, hundreds of young people were gathered before the Free Speech microphone as a young man delivered an emotional reminder of the

"peaceful" goals of the demonstrations. Violence must be avoided, he said, because it would detract from the credibility of their protest. Disorderly, unseemly conduct would reduce the "dignity" of the demonstrations. Members of the audience interrupted with hostile questions and disagreements, and the speaker replied to each with great intensity. Suddenly a young man stood up in front of the crowd and said, "If that's all true, then why are we here?" For two or three awkward seconds, a silence fell over the group. The speaker then picked up his basic message about peaceful goals, and the session continued. But the question did not go away. It stayed with the demonstration effort until the very end, and for many it remained unanswered.

The police, on the other hand, experienced no such confusion once the conventions actually began. Their leaders were all saying the same words, conveying the same intents and determinations, essentially all working for the same thing. At times the sense of unity may have been superficial, but fundamental confusion about basic goals simply did not arise to hamper or detract from police control over their own image.

In closing, it should again be noted that the attempt to control a volatile situation through the conscious manipulation of symbols represented a different kind of police work. Perhaps it represents a higher, more "civilized" level of police work. During the political conventions, the police proved that they could operate adeptly in this area. Possibly, the police are in a stronger position to develop their capabilities in this area than most police leaders suspect. It is an invisible, intangible arena of competition, but one that favors the group that can produce a unified, disciplined appearance and firmly established understandings about basic goals.

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## CONVENTION AFTERMATH

In a sense, the aftermath of the 1972 political conventions is still incomplete. We shall be living with recollections and reactions to the events that took place during the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions at least until 1976, when fresh experience can fuel a new cycle of influence. In this broad sense, the aftermath correctly describes reactions to events that occurred during both national political conventions. It is useful to recall, however, that an interim period of six weeks existed between the two events. During this period, it is also correct to speak of an aftermath to only the Democratic National Convention, which contributed to the overall tone of preparations for the Republicans. It is in that separate sense that this chapter considers the aftermath to the conventions.

### POST-DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

REPORTED CRIME STATISTICS. Reaction to law enforcement during the Democratic Convention was generally favorable within the Miami Beach community with a few notable exceptions. A favorable reaction was prominent in both the local and national press. News media consistently applauded police "restraint" and noted with some surprise that, during the week in which the Democratic National Convention was held, Miami Beach actually had a decrease in reported crime. The following figures were released:

Arrests during same week one year ago:	41
Arrests during Democratic Convention:	31
Major crimes, same week one year ago:	59
Major crimes, Democratic Convention:	49



Drunk charges, same week one year ago: 16

Drunk charges, Democratic Convention: 7

Immediately following the end of the convention, a large number of rental cars were reported stolen. Nearly all of these vehicles were quickly recovered at the airport where they apparently had been abandoned by the individuals who rented them. These reported thefts were not included in the overall crime statistics because they were not actually crimes. They are perhaps better described as problems of coordination between the Democratic Party transportation committee and those individuals for whom they had rented the cars. The Democratic National Convention proved to be a relatively mild affair that never approached the levels of community disruption that had been predicted in some quarters. The generally peaceful nature of the convention was usually explained in the press by citing three causes: (1) general support for Senator McGovern among protesters; (2) some groups withheld their major demonstration efforts for the Republicans; (3) the policy of discretionary enforcement by police in regard to minor violations.

DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS. Discretionary enforcement during the DNC became one of the principal tools for police accommodation for peaceful protest. It had been decided that certain relatively minor, non-threatening violations would be ignored by the police in order to avoid the greater dangers of escalating violence that could result from repeated confrontations. The resulting tone of the convention became characterized as "tolerant," "permissive," and "accommodating."

Although the policy of discretionary enforcement was applauded elsewhere, some influential Miami Beach citizens reacted negatively to the knowledge that persons had been swimming nude and smoking marijuana without any police reaction. Instead of rejoicing that the law enforcement policy had worked so well, some individuals immediately launched an attack against the "permissive" police. Perhaps stung by this reaction at home to a policy that was being recognized throughout the nation as having produced a dramatic success, Chief Pomerance made the following statement on July 16: "American history will record that this was an extremely well policed convention, and it will not go down in history that some young man skinny-dipped at two in the morning in a second deck swimming pool . . . . Throughout the whole event, we established priorities, and the highest priority was the public safety of the delegates, the citizens and the protesters. I would say that skinny-dipping was the lowest priority."

The conflict did not end there, however. As late as August 14, when the Miami Beach City Council finally agreed to a campsite permit for the RNC, the issue flared up. One councilman threatened to suspend any officer who did not enforce the laws. Since this was a direct challenge to his own authority, the Chief of Police responded, "The same people who complained about Flamingo Park here today were the same

people who said at the previous meeting that this city would be in ruins . . . . During a convention, we do not hand out tickets for jaywalking." The Chief's position was immediately supported by the City Manager who said "We are going to exercise that degree of judgement concomitant with the situation. You do not always enforce the law to the letter of the law."

Although some individuals were truly upset by police failure to enforce all laws, most persons in the community felt that the Democratic National Convention had been well handled. The community relations officer of the department reported that, in his judgement, most residents in Miami Beach felt more relaxed about the approaching Republican National Convention than they had before the Democratic affair, despite reports that demonstrators were planning more intensive and possibly more violent demonstrations during the RNC. It was apparent that most residents - because of their experience during the DNC - felt confident that the police would be able to handle the situation.

POLITICAL REACTIONS. Among demonstrators who were planning major efforts at the Republican National Convention, the effects of the DNC were also felt. The success of the McGovern candidacy, for instance, produced the immediate effect of attracting many potential demonstrators into the political process as campaign workers. Quite a large number of demonstrators left Miami Beach at the end of the DNC intending to join the McGovern campaign as volunteers. Much of this enthusiasm for establishment politics soon wilted however, as McGovern made conciliatory gestures to such persons as Mayor Daley of Chicago and George Meany of the AFL-CIO. The "Eagleton affair" was particularly damaging in this respect. After McGovern forced his running mate to resign, many young supporters came to see the Democratic leader as simply one more politician who was willing to compromise his ideals for political expediency. Consequently, by the time that the Republicans met, many of McGovern's idealistic supporters were once again frustrated and ready to carry their protests into the streets.

SECURITY FORCES. The security forces that had been mustered during the DNC spent much of their time fighting off boredom. One detachment of motorcycle officers, that spent eventless days inside a school building as a ready reserve, found some relief when a supervisor located movies of old Miami Dolphin football games. The National Guard amused themselves as best they could within the grounds of Miami Beach High School, and Army and Marine units languished sourly at Homestead Air Force Base. All of this inactivity generated charges that the police had "over prepared." Monday morning quarterbacks came forth to proclaim the enormous waste of money and manpower. Although irritating to those in the law enforcement profession, these criticisms did not result in any reduced preparations for the Republican National Convention. Of course, expectations were for a much more active convention for the Republicans.

## POST-REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

CLEAN UP. The Republican National Convention had ended with a bang instead of a whimper. When President Nixon was reported safely within his Key Biscayne home at 12:37 a. m., mass arrests on Collins Avenue had only recently ended. The area around the convention complex still reeked with the smell of tear gas, and all the major streets on Miami Beach were littered with trash and the debris of massive vandalism. The first municipal action taken during the post-convention period was to clean up. Trash crews were on the street by 1:00 a. m. while the smell of tear gas was still in the air. Cleanup crews also removed the sandbags used by demonstrators to build their symbolic dike across Washington Avenue in front of convention hall. According to Al Penfield, Refuse Division supervisor, damage was not serious. "It was all minor. There was a lot of debris - broken glass, bus benches overturned, papers and garbage containers in the streets. The clean-up procedure was the same procedure we use for hurricanes." In this respect, Miami Beach was fortunate. The city is occasionally struck by tropical hurricanes, so procedures had been developed for cleaning up quickly. By 9 a. m. on the following day, approximately 90% of the cleanup had been completed. Most Miami Beach residents never saw the trashing of their city that had been done during the last day of the Republican National Convention.

DAMAGES. On the day after the convention period, City Manager O'Key estimated physical damage to city property at no more than \$5,000. In making the estimate public the City Manager said, "A lot of what was going on was not destroying things, just disarranging things." A large part of the city's costs were in restoration of Flamingo Park, which had been used as the public campsite. The sprinklers could not be used during the convention, and that caused some of the grass and shrubs to die in the summer heat. Nearly every fixture inside Flamingo Park also needed repainting to cover up slogans that had been sprayed on walls by demonstrators. As a sidelight, it was reported by those who did the repainting that the vast majority of the graffiti was apparently the work of the gay demonstrators. Relatively few political slogans were found, but nearly every wall included slogans such as: "Gay Power," "We are lesbians. We are strong." "A nation of lovers cannot fail," etc.

The estimate of damages to the city did not include damages to private firms. Twenty Metropolitan Transit Authority and Gray Line busses were reported damaged during the Wednesday night disorders. Three busses used to transport delegates from hotels to the convention hall were disabled. Two of these busses had slashed tires. One had been stopped by demonstrators who opened the rear engine compartment and ripped out fuel lines. Other damages occurred at hotels and other places of business in Miami Beach, but no buildings were seriously damaged. No major arson was reported. The usual repairs involved broken windows and similar damages.



DELAYED ARRESTS. In some cases, arrests that could have been made during the Republican National Convention were delayed until the aftermath. At 4:00 a. m. on August 24, five Zippie leaders were arrested on felony charges at their headquarters in Coconut Grove on the mainland. Three were arrested for sale and distribution of marijuana, one was charged with grand larceny for the theft of a portrait of Lyndon Johnson from convention hall, and one was charged with inciting to riot during the Zippie "piss-in" demonstration. These arrests obviously could have been made by police during the convention but were delayed until a time when it seemed unlikely that the arrests could precipitate any violent group reaction. Evidence for the arrests was obtained from Miami Police Department undercover agents who were operating within the ranks of the demonstrators. The delayed arrests also served the function of protecting these undercover agents and keeping them operational throughout the full course of the convention.

DEMONSTRATION LEADERS. Following police implementation of the bus barricade at the convention center and related moves that contained demonstrators in the southern portion of the island, plans by demonstrators to halt or seriously delay the Republican National Convention on Wednesday became impossible. Some leaders of demonstration groups made public comments to the effect that they had been "betrayed" by the police. Some feeling was expressed that the cooperation extended by police had been from the beginning only a smokescreen to mask plans for disrupting peaceful protest in this way.

It was true, of course, that a contingency plan for the bus barricade existed before the RNC opened, but the decision to implement that plan was not made until after the disorders that occurred on Tuesday night. It was also true that police cooperation tended to weaken overall control by the radical leadership. Campsite rules had been followed by acquisition of positions of leadership by "moderate" spokesmen who were familiar with parliamentary procedures. When the police did elect to use defensive force on the last day, radical leaders found themselves in a position of impotence where they were unable to respond quickly with any kind of effective counteraction.

After the public comments about "betrayal," it was briefly feared that demonstration leaders may have come to the conclusion that cooperation with police was incompatible with their goals. If, having lost the game in this way, the demonstrators concluded that they should not have played at all, that would be most unfortunate. All of the good things learned through the Miami Beach experience would be moot if demonstration leaders henceforth rejected any offer of cooperation or assistance from the police. On the day after the Republican National Convention ended, such fears were put to rest. Many of the leaders who had been involved in negotiations with the police actually dropped by the police station to say goodbye before they left town. The community relations officer reported that the general tone among the leaders was that of having lost a skillfully

played chess game. They felt they had been tactically defeated. The bitterness of the previous day had already faded enough to permit them to share a cup of coffee and shake hands before departure.

POLICE AGENCIES. The dramatic conclusion to the Republican National Convention dispelled most of the talk about police being "over prepared." Following the prolonged inactivity of the forces assigned to the DNC, some observers within the police profession had become convinced that the apparent police "success" in Miami Beach resulted from the fact that the potential for violence and destruction simply was not present in Miami Beach in 1972, at least not to the degree that it was present in Chicago in 1968. The events that occurred during the RNC caused many of these individuals to set aside this notion. The potential for lawlessness was clearly present in Miami Beach in 1972. The fact that this potential violence was diverted or subdued with minimum force is a credit to all of the law enforcement agencies that were involved. The agencies so involved are aware of this fact and generally look back with some pride on their performance during the political conventions.

Another important aftermath of the conventions was the recognition on the part of senior police commanders that the law enforcement experience gained during the conventions could be beneficial to other members of the profession. As noted in the Introduction to this report, as early as September 6, 1972, Chief Pomerance wrote, "The summer of '72 has proven to the world that our honored profession can operate successfully within the framework of our Constitution in spite of great provocation . . . . I believe that the insight and experience gained this past year should not be lost to the police profession." The impulse within the police profession to record the experience for the benefit of others led eventually to the production of this report.

Certain tactical innovations utilized by local police units during the political conventions became incorporated into standard operating procedures after the conventions ended. Most notable among these was the introduction of the "mobile task force" concept. The police agencies called upon to supply manpower for these task forces did so reluctantly and with some misgivings before the conventions began. By the end of the RNC, however, both the Florida Highway Patrol and the city of Miami enthusiastically supported the mobile task force to the degree of incorporating the system into their own organizational structure.

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. The involvement of Miami Beach police personnel in key positions within the intelligence system used during the political conventions provided them with valuable experience that was considered to be directly transferrable to the needs of their own community. Miami Beach is said to attract numerous organized crime figures who "retire" there. Miami Beach is also a world famous resort that attracts numerous foreign dignitaries and celebrities who could be the targets of subversive or criminal elements. In the aftermath of the political conventions, a decision has been made to create a criminal

intelligence unit within the Miami Beach Police Department that will be based in large part on skills developed during the conventions.

PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION. By the end of the Republican National Convention 1, 194 arrests had been made, but only a handful of these arrests were for felonies. The vast majority were misdemeanor charges that resulted from symbolic, or at least unresisting, submission to mass arrest procedures. A "speedy trial" law in Florida requires that all misdemeanor cases be brought to court within 90 days or be dropped. On November 8, charges against all but 115 defendants were dismissed following arguments by Public Defender Phillip Hubbart that "the warrants authorizing their arrests were not properly witnessed." A trial date for the remaining 115 was set for November 22. On that date, only two persons showed up for trial, and cases against the others were dropped. One of the two cases resulted in a dismissal. One case involved a disorderly conduct charge against a 19-year-old girl. She was found guilty. The Judge who heard the case later commented: "She showed up, and the police officer showed up. She was the honest one of the group." No sentence was imposed.

Following the highly successful emergency court procedures implemented during the conventions, a permanent committee has been created by Judge Lee to continue the work of coordinating efforts of the police and the courts in that area.

FUTURE CONVENTIONS. In hosting both national political conventions during 1972, Miami Beach strengthened its claim to the mythical title of "Convention City, USA". Tourism is a major industry in Miami Beach, and hosting conventions is an important factor in attracting tourists. The national political conventions themselves are usually not directly profitable, but most business interests consider them a good investment because of the widespread publicity they command. During 1972, Miami Beach hosted a total of 72 conventions, producing a gross income of about \$45 million for the city.

Despite these commercial assets, the political conventions will not automatically be welcomed back to Miami Beach. The numerous frustrations encountered while providing effective law enforcement, dependent on the relatively fragmented resources of the metropolitan area, produced at least a temporary backlash against political conventions. Miami Beach Mayor Chuck Hall, while maintaining that he was proud of the manner in which the two conventions were handled, recommended that future conventions should be policed by "a trained convention police force financed by the federal government, so our police here can handle traffic and local calls."

The disorders of the final day of the Republican Convention did much to convince local residents that political conventions were not necessarily a good thing for the community. The widespread use of gas by police on that final Wednesday was also criticized. Consequently, local politicians, who



are sensitive to the feelings of a local constituency, continue to voice public disapproval for future conventions. The present City Manager, Frank Spence, who was assistant city manager during the 1972 conventions, made the following statement in August, 1973: "The ultimate decision on whether we host the conventions is up to the City Council in power in 1975, but my recommendations will be that we do not hold the conventions in Miami Beach."

Wherever the national political conventions are held in 1976, or 1980, or beyond, it seems a very safe assumption at this point that the two national political conventions will indeed be held. That much was far from certain before the 1972 conventions were handled as they were.

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