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National Institute of Justice

## **Policing Research Workshop: Planning for the Future**

November 28-29, 2006  
Washington, D.C.

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# Policing Research Workshop: Planning for the Future

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## Overview

What direction should NIJ's policing research take in the future? Some 40 knowledgeable and experienced law enforcement professionals (including several police chiefs), academic leaders, and government officials came together to answer this question.

The group identified several areas of interest:

- Finding the best techniques for recruiting and retaining officers.
- Identifying effective training for entry-level police officers and leadership training for first-line supervisors.
- Understanding how best to use Compstat concepts.
- Better understanding of the internal dynamics of police organizations and the impact of technology on policing.

The group emphasized the need for a large-scale multiyear "life-course" research initiative to produce baseline data to use as a starting point for developing policing performance measures and as a platform for studies to (1) assess the impact of policing practices and techniques and (2) test innovative strategies. Among the many other issues discussed were:

- How, in what format, and to whom do we disseminate research findings so that this information is usable to, and in the end used by, practitioners?
- What more can be done to tease information from what we learn from research to guide police officials' decisions about which strategies to pursue and how to go about implementing them?
- How do we get to the point where we can develop performance measurement systems so that we can assess the quality and effectiveness of policing?

[Read the full summary of the meeting \(pdf, 4 pages\).](#)

## Commissioned Papers

The three papers below served as the foundation for the discussion. Luncheon speaker John Klofas, Rochester Institute of Technology, spoke on the value of researcher-practitioner partnerships in problem-solving initiatives.

- ["Police Organization and Management" \(pdf, 41 pages\)](#) by Stephen Mastrofski, George Mason University, discusses recruitment, training, department structure, leadership, use of technology, and community policing.
- ["Police Accountability" \(pdf, 38 pages\)](#) by Sam Walker, University of Nebraska, covers integrity, use of force, performance measures, and police and community relationships.
- ["Police Innovation and Crime Prevention: Lessons Learned from Police Research over the Past 20 Years" \(pdf, 33 pages\)](#) by Anthony Braga, Harvard University, and David Weisburd, Hebrew University Law School and the University of Maryland, sets the framework for the future by giving the historical perspective.

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**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE  
WORKSHOP ON POLICING RESEARCH  
Washington, D. C.  
November 28-29, 2006  
Workshop Discussion Summary**

**Introduction**

On Nov. 28, 2006, the U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of Justice (NIJ) convened a workshop involving experienced policing researchers and research-minded police officials to advise NIJ on setting a research agenda for the next decade. In preparation for the workshop, papers on future issues in three major law enforcement areas were commissioned and distributed to participants prior to the workshop.

The one and a half day workshop involved some 40 knowledgeable and experienced individuals from academic institutions and law enforcement agencies across the country. Christopher Stone, Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, served as workshop facilitator.

*Topical Presentations*

During the first day of the meeting, the three papers that were commissioned by the NIJ for the workshop were presented by their authors and discussed. The issue papers, their authors, and highlights of topics covered are as follows:<sup>1</sup>

*Police Organization and Management Issues for the Next Decade* (Stephen D. Mastrofski, Center for Justice Leadership and Management, George Mason University).

<http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218584.pdf>

This paper covered such topics as recruitment, training, department structure and organization, police management, leadership, use of technology and information, and community policing;

*Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs* (Samuel Walker, University of Nebraska at Omaha).

<http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218583.pdf>

This paper addressed such topics as integrity, use of force, performance measures, police unions, and police and community relationship;

*Police Innovation and Crime Prevention: Lessons Learned from Police Research Over the Past 20 Years* (Anthony A. Braga, PhD, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; David L. Weisburd, PhD, Hebrew University Law School and Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland).

<http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218585.pdf>

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<sup>1</sup> Copies of the futures papers may be accessed on line at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/events/policing-research-workshop/>

This paper dealt with recent strategic innovations in policing, their impacts, and their potential meaning for the future of law enforcement. These included Community Policing, Broken Windows Policing, Problem-oriented Policing, Pulling Levers Policing, Third Party Policing, Hot Spots Policing, Compstat, and Evidence-based Policing.

In a luncheon presentation on day one of the workshop, participants heard from Prof. John Klofas of the Rochester Institute of Technology's Department of Criminal Justice, on the subject of the application of the concept of "action research" in the field of policing, in which partnerships between police departments and researchers can facilitate effective strategic problem-solving to increase safety and security in their communities.

*A Policing Research Agenda for the Future: Highlights of the Workshop Discussion*

On the second day of the workshop, participants turned to their main charge: To identify future policing research needs for the NIJ's consideration in shaping a research agenda for the next five to ten years, building on the previous day's work. That discussion proceeded in a free-flowing manner and produced a wide range of insightful comments and observations on the efficacy of research in the field of policing.

Over the course of their discussions, workshop participants identified a number of specific contemporary and emerging topical issues in the field of policing that they said would benefit from study. These topics included:

- Police officer recruitment and retention
- Entry-level police officer training
- Leadership training for first-line supervisors
- Police management styles
- Early intervention strategies for changing problem-officers' behavior
- The impact of prisoner reentry
- Data-mining in support of homeland security initiatives, including state intelligence gathering fusion centers
- The role of federal law enforcement in policing
- The internal dynamics of police organizations
- Implementation of the Compstat concept
- Immigration law enforcement
- The impact of technology on policing
- Nightclub entertainment enforcement-related problems
- Transnational crime, such as criminal activity involving the Russian Mafia
- Women in policing
- Cultural changes in policing

In addition, the discussion also focused on the presentation and dissemination of research findings and the relevance and usefulness of information produced by policing research to practitioners in the field. Three key questions emerged from this discussion:

- How, in what format, and to whom do we disseminate research findings so that this information is usable to, and, in the end, used by practitioners?
- What more can be done to tease information from what we learn from research to guide police officials' decisions about which strategies to pursue and how to go about implementing them?
- How do we get to the point where we can develop performance measurement systems so that we can assess the quality and effectiveness of policing?

Participants contrasted research that results in findings which police officials may find “good to know” with research that produces information that police “need to know” and that is “practical” and produces actionable results. They suggested that, owing to funding constraints, policing research should be concentrated on producing information that will help inform police officials' decisions regarding selecting and implementing strategies to address the challenges that they face.

However, participants noted that a major impediment to arriving at such conclusive findings regarding the quality and effectiveness of the police and policing strategies, is the lack of the baseline information on policing activities that is needed to develop performance measures systems. Participants observed that without this baseline, measurement cannot be developed for assessing officer behavior and performance; evaluating police recruitment and training practices; or gauging the efficacy of operational strategies and techniques.

**Consensus emerged among workshop participants that the possibility of undertaking a large-scale multi-year “life-course” research initiative should be pursued to produce the baseline information needed as a starting point for developing policing performance measures. This initiative also could be used as a platform for multiple studies to assess the impact of policing practices and techniques and test innovative strategies. Participants admitted that it not only would take several years for this initiative to bear fruit, but likely would take some five to 10 years to put in place. In the meantime, efforts should be made to secure funding to pilot the concept and build support for carrying out the larger initiative.**

Several police officials argued that they have pressing needs that require more timely responses than would be possible under a large scale multi-year research initiative. Researchers agreed, but noted that once put in place, the baseline created under the initiative would provide a platform that could be used to meet both longer-term and the more immediate information needs of practitioners. In the meantime, the body of policing research carried out to date on such topics as community policing might be revisited to see if more information might be teased out to identify, and guide police officials' implementation of, promising strategies and techniques.

Participants acknowledged from the outset that a large scale life-course research initiative would cost in the millions of dollars – substantially more than the limited resources that

are available to the NIJ. Therefore, participants recommended that NIJ seek agency partners in the public and private sectors to help support this initiative.

**Document Title: Police Organization and Management Issues for the Next Decade**

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**This paper has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this paper available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies.**

**Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.**

# **Police Organization and Management Issues For the Next Decade**

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Police Research Planning Workshop

November 28-29, 2006



This paper offers some thoughts about issues of police organization and management to which researchers and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) should attend in the next five-to-ten years. Given the framework NIJ has established for the three papers at this workshop, I take the domain of police organization and management to include how to staff, structure, direct, and equip public (local) police organizations.<sup>1</sup> I have been asked specifically to cover the topics of recruitment, training, structure and organization, management and leadership, technology and information use, and community policing. I will not pretend to offer a comprehensive review of the many important issues that fall within these domains, since a volume could easily be devoted to each, and unfortunately time does not permit an extensive review of the extant literature on the topics I have selected for discussion. For each area I will describe what I regard as a few of the important issues that deserve the attention of police researchers. I will select issues that are important, both from an academic perspective (that is, intellectually interesting), and from a practical perspective (that is, useful for improving the quality of police organizations and police performance). Regarding the “community policing” category, I have expanded that to include a wide range of recent innovations, some of which bear little or no relationship to community policing but which have received considerable attention over the last two decades.

Readers may note that many of the issues I nominate have been around a long while. I nominate them for two reasons: (a) Evidence is currently insufficient to draw

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<sup>1</sup> Certainly a variety of other public and private organizations engage in activities that occupy our public police (Jones and Newburn 2006). However, I assume that NIJ’s principal interest focuses on (local) public police organizations in the United States.

conclusions on these matters, and (b) the issues are enduring; they will be with us for the next decade.

### **Police Recruitment**

Who can doubt that the nature of the people recruited into a police agency affects the quality of that agency's performance in profound ways? We know that the profile of American police has been changing for several decades and seems likely to continue to do so (Skogan and Frydl 2004:79-82, 137-152). There are more women on American police forces, more ethnic minorities, and more college-educated people. It is reasonable to expect these trends to continue for the next decade, so it makes sense to ask what their implications will be and whether it would be wise to attempt to alter them.

### **Women in Blue**

Over the last three decades there has been a considerable amount of discussion about the pros and cons of adding women in large numbers to the rank and file of America's police service. The increasing numbers of women on America's police forces (Zhao et al 2006) suggest a growing consensus that adding women is a good idea, yet the relatively small amount of available research has done little to answer key questions about this trend.<sup>2</sup> Below are some of the questions that deserve rigorous research.

- Is there a difference in the quality<sup>3</sup> of policing performed by women and men?<sup>4</sup> What are the sources of any differences detected?<sup>5</sup> Do street-level strategies that

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<sup>2</sup> The National Academies committee found "...that the body of available research is too small and the findings too variable to draw firm conclusions about the effects of officer sex on police practice" (Skogan and Frydl 2004:151).

<sup>3</sup> By "quality," I mean both the *nature* of policing and its *value*.

<sup>4</sup> Are women officers less aggressive and more nurturing than their male counterparts, as some argue (Skogan and Frydl 2004:151)? Are they less inclined to go in harm's way? Are they better or worse at selecting the right strategy for the situation?

<sup>5</sup> Some research suggests that women police behave differently from their male counterparts; some research suggests no appreciable difference (Skogan and Frydl 2004:151). The ambiguity of results and the weak methodology employed can hardly be the basis for conclusive results. Just as importantly, there is

work well for women work equally well for men and vice versa? When dealing with certain situations (e.g., disputes), does the make-up of the police response team (all male, all female, or mixed) have a notable effect on the outcome?

- How, if at all, has the presence of women on the police force changed the practices and performance of men on the force? Is there a threshold proportion of women police on the force beyond which significant changes in police practice and performance are more likely or more profound?
- Do women in police supervisory and leadership roles behave differently than their male counterparts, and if so, what are the consequences for their subordinates' performance?

Some might question the utility of exploring answers to these questions, since Equal Employment legislation, in an effort to end unfair sex-based discrimination, has made it easier for women to gain and keep police employment. Nonetheless, it would be very useful for shaping the training, supervision, and deployment of officers to know if and how the officer's sex makes a difference. For example, many officers think that (certain) members of the public respond differently to forceful female officers than forceful males. Over the years my casual conversations with police officers of both sexes suggest to me that officers themselves vary considerably in their answers to these questions. Some may argue that these questions are moot, since law requires that women and men have an equal opportunity for employment on police forces. However, we still have very little evidence about what the consequences of this trend are for policing and how best to prepare our officers and police agencies to deal with any risks and to take maximum advantage of opportunities.

### **Racial and Ethnic Minorities in Blue**

A similar set of questions arise for the race/ethnic identity of officers. The received wisdom, based on some evidence, is that any race/ethnic differences are

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practically no research that is able to offer a systematic judgment on whether any differences between the sexes can be interpreted as policing of a higher or lower quality.

overwhelmed by the processes of selection and acculturation that officers undergo (Skogan and Frydl 2004:148-150). Few, if any differences are found in most (but not all) of the existing research. Is there anything worth studying here? One might begin by pointing out that nearly all of the studies of racial differences compare black and white officers. Hispanic officers are by and large ignored and deserve attention, not to mention other racial and ethnic groups. One might also wish for a larger and more empirically rigorous body of research, as did the National Academies panel on police policies and practices. But I think there are other substantive issues that should be considered.

The vast majority of available studies focus on racial differences in the use of coercive authority: arrest and use of force. However, much of the reform literature that advocates hiring more minority officers for instrumental reasons<sup>6</sup> does so with the argument that minority officers will act in ways that treat minority citizens with greater respect and care and will perhaps sensitize white officers to the need to do this. Very few studies have assessed this argument. Doing so would require that researchers consider the sorts of street-level police performance dimensions that have been emphasized to enhance service delivery and police legitimacy (Mastrofski 1999; McCluskey 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002). And it means that researchers need to take into account the context of the street-level situation – especially the interaction between the officer’s race and the citizen’s race, as well as the neighborhood’s racial context (predominantly minority, predominantly white, and mixed). Further, we need research that assesses the extent of the benefits for being race-sensitive in assigning officers to neighborhoods. What, if any, are the advantages of matching minority officers to minority neighborhoods? Do multi-

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<sup>6</sup> The usual instrumental reason is that it will improve police performance. Of course there are other reasons, such as ensuring equal employment opportunity, which pertains whether or not performance benefits are realized.

racial teams work well? Do residents of those neighborhoods register greater satisfaction with the policing they receive than those where there is no racial matching? If researchers find, as reformers expected, that there are substantial benefits to having citizens policed by officers of a similar racial/cultural background, that has implications for beat assignment practices – a topic about which little research exists.

Related to the above issue is the recruitment of officers to deal with rapidly growing immigrant communities. This is an old issue, dating back to the policing of immigrant communities that were concentrating in Nineteenth Century urban America. Many American cities are again experiencing the influx of large numbers of documented and undocumented immigrants. It would be useful to know what sorts of officers do the best job of policing these communities. Facility with the immigrants' language is the most obvious concern, but knowledge of immigrants' cultures would also appear to be an important consideration. Do officers recruited from immigrant communities do a better job than those who are not from those communities? If so, how can other officers be effectively exposed to the knowledge and orientation of those officers?

### **Baccalaureates in Blue**

One of the most enduring and sacred of American police reform proposals over the last century has been that police should receive more formal education, and in recent times, that has meant more *college education* (Skogan and Frydl 2004:139-141). A clear trend in the last three decades has been an increase in officers acquiring at least some college credits and a baccalaureate degree. Enormous resources and funds (both private and government) have been devoted to increasing college education for police, yet the National Academies panel on police policy and practice concluded that the available

evidence was insufficient to draw conclusions about the impact of education on officer decision making:

The committee finds the available evidence inadequate to make recommendations regarding the desirability of higher education for improving police practice and strongly recommends rigorous research on the effects of higher education on job performance (Skogan and Frydl 2004:141).

The two groups that have the most to gain by promoting higher education for police are the police themselves -- who enjoy the increased status and material rewards that accompany a college degree -- and the academics who are in the business of higher education. What is not clear is how much and what kind of benefit is to be gained by policies that encourage, reward, or require a college education of our sworn officers.

First, we need to know what the college experience adds to the officers' performance -- independent of the effects of the screening process undergone to get into college. What skills and habits, if any, does college develop? Does college affect the morals and values of the students who become police officers? The capacity for moral reasoning (Muir 1977)? The inclination to conform and follow hierarchical direction or the inclination to question it? Further, assuming that there are substantial benefits to be obtained from officers with college degrees, we have been remarkably uninterested in assessing just what courses of study work best. Is there a difference in the quality of policing between people who obtain their degrees *before* they begin policing and those who acquire their degrees *after* they become police? Do programs of study concentrating on technical or professional matters produce better officers than those that require a broad range of more general topics (e.g., liberal arts degrees)? Do some police assignments benefit when college-educated officers perform them but others do not (e.g., officers who

are assigned to plan problem-oriented policing projects versus those who are assigned to respond to calls for service)?

If NIJ should take the National Academies panel’s recommendation to evaluate the marriage of the “badge and the baccalaureate” (Worden 1990), I have a couple of pieces of advice. First, we need research that can offer meaningful measures of police performance. Please deliver us from more studies of the impact of college education on officer attitudes and perceptions; they bear little, if any, relation to actual performance on the street. Researchers and police managers need to devise methods of measuring actual police practice – whether through third party observation, agency documentation, or self reports. Second, inasmuch as possible, these measures need to incorporate judgments not just about the choices officers make (e.g., Did Officer X make an arrest?), but about the *quality* of those choices (e.g., Did Officer X make the best decision here about what to do?).<sup>7</sup> Third, researchers need to employ the strongest evaluation designs possible. Randomized trials may not be possible, but useful quasi-experimental designs should be. Such studies will require considerable advance planning. At least some studies might pursue a developmental approach. It is conceivable that the effects of college, like the effects of the police academy experience, will dissipate over time. I should think that police organizations would benefit from studies that examine how to reinforce and sustain whatever benefits come from the college experience.

### **Training**

Training is the solution of choice, both to prevent problems and to correct affairs when, as Justice Cardozo said, “the constable has blundered.” There can be no question that police training in America has increased in quantity in the last four decades, but the

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<sup>7</sup> See p. 15 for a more detailed discussion of how to attend to the quality of police work.

National Academies panel reported once again that very little is validated with rigorous evidence about when and how training improves police performance (Skogan and Frydl 2004:141-147). Of course, it is axiomatic that police must receive training on a wide variety of topics, but here is a list of things about which we know little or nothing<sup>8</sup>:

- How effective are particular training programs in producing desired results? Most training evaluations include only pretest-posttest comparisons of knowledge gained or attitudes changed rather than looking at subsequent performance on the job.
- How successful is training that attempts to change values and beliefs versus training that attempts to develop knowledge and skills? What training most influences actual police practice?<sup>9</sup>
- What pedagogical styles and settings work best for a given type of training? For example, there are a variety of ways to set up the training of recruits and rookies. What works best? How much training should be in the classroom and how much experiential?
- Who are the best police training instructors for a given topic? Experienced police officers, civilian experts, or a mixed group? In selecting and developing trainers, how much emphasis should be placed on expertise on the topic, and how much on expertise in effective training methods?
- When should officers receive training of a given sort, at what intervals, and what intensity and duration?
- What are the minimum organizational requirements to make training effective? That is, what changes must be made to the organizational environment in supervision, performance monitoring, rewards and discipline, and other aspects of police leadership and management?

The last bulleted item above deserves additional comment. In my experience, many police departments (and universities) use training ineffectively when part of an

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<sup>8</sup> This list draws heavily on the National Academies panel report (Skogan and Frydl:146).

<sup>9</sup> It is remarkable, for example, that even training on topics that require simple legal compliance -- as opposed to the typically more challenging choices of "workmanship" (Bittner, 1983) -- may be rather ineffective. A study found that on average officers get only about half of the test questions right regarding on Fourth Amendment requirements, and that even extensively trained officers are incorrect on a quarter of the questions dealing with legal issues (Heffernan and Lovely 1990/1991). A study Jon Gould and I conducted showed that officers in one police department failed to comply with search and seizure requirements about 30 percent of the time, even though all had received training on the topic at one time or another (Gould and Mastrofski 2004).



organizational change strategy. These in-service training programs are treated as modular devices into which employees are “plugged.” Once they have completed the program they are presumed “good to go,” even though they often return to units led by people who do not understand or are not committed to implementing what the training tried to impart. As any competent farmer knows, at least half the problem is preparing the soil so that the seed planted will flourish. Evaluations of the impact of training need to take into account the organizational environment to which trainees return.

NIJ could fruitfully develop a two-pronged training assessment program. One would be short-term, designed to provide rigorous assessments of currently popular and promising training programs. For example, there are a host of programs offered around the nation that train police managers. Which are the most successful in producing good managers, and what makes them successful? There are a variety of programs billed as useful in helping officers find ways to reduce the tension in potentially troublesome encounters with the public and avoid the need to resort to force (e.g., “verbal judo”). Are these programs effective? Over the last decade or so, many police have been exposed to training on how to do problem-oriented policing. How well do these programs work in producing good problem-oriented policing?

The second prong of a training assessment program would be more developmental. Innovative police departments might be encouraged to collaborate in a research program that is committed to trying a variety of promising training methods. Participants would agree to a coordinated effort to conduct experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations of various training methods – much as NIJ sponsored with police interventions for domestic abuse in the 1980s and drug mapping in the 1990s.

This program of research could be used to answer some of the bulleted questions appearing above.

### **Structure and Organization**

There are a host of topics that fall into this category. I have selected four: (a) Is the locus of decision-making power changing, (b) How are organizations coping with community pressures to influence them, (c) How are police organizations using their resources, and (d) How are police responding to heightened concerns about terror and the influx of immigrants?

### **Who's Running the Show?**

Since the mid-Nineteenth Century police leaders in urban America have struggled to take command of their organizations – first attempting to wrest control from political machines and later from a machine of their own creation – the 911 rapid response calls for service system. The received wisdom is that control of the political machines was successfully overcome by mid-twentieth century (Fogelson 1977). The second struggle is a work in progress. The diffusion of the telephone into American homes made it possible for the public to summon the police conveniently, even as people were dispersing into suburbs. The automobile made it possible for police to respond rapidly to citizens' requests, and the two-way radio made it possible for headquarters to maintain contact with the officers, checking on the status of their work and giving directions.

Improvements in communications technology (the portable radio) and the computer made it possible to communicate more quickly and track large numbers of calls for service, as well as the availability of officers to respond. Police leaders found that they could create general orders and response protocols, thereby establishing priorities for the mobilization

of police officers, while tracking actual operations and documenting key aspects of what happened. This system, along with increased pressure (both internally and externally generated) to be as responsive as possible to the largest number of citizen requests, led to a sort of management-on-autopilot. The received wisdom is that the resulting calls-for-service response system came to take control of the lion's share of police resources. Many reformers came to argue that this "tyranny" of the 911 system interfered with attempts to be strategic in deploying police to deal with community problems effectively (Goldstein, 1990:18; Kelling and Coles, 1996:91; Sparrow et al. 1990:3-4, 105; Walker, 1992:92 ).

At the same time, certain aspects of police reform promoted more selective ways to use police resources – to replace at least in part the "you-call-we-haul" imperative of the 911 system. Many departments adopted a community policing style that paid more attention to what organized groups of citizens wanted (neighborhood associations, business, civic, and church groups). Problem-oriented policing advocates argued that analysis of problems and strategic interventions would be a more effective long-term strategy for reducing the calls-for-service workload by solving or reducing the problems (Goldstein 1990; Sparrow et al 1990). Hotspots policing required that officers concentrate their efforts in certain small geographic areas to deter and incapacitate disorderly and illegal activity. And Compstat called for an organizational structure that delegated key mobilization decisions to the middle managers running the precincts, while at the same time holding them accountable for results that were routinely reviewed by top management (Silverman 1999). Furthermore, some programs required that first-level supervisors take a more active role in how officers were deployed – some being freed

entirely from the responsibility of answering calls-for-service so that police could focus more resources on working with the community and solving problems (Skogan and Hartnett 1997).

The obvious first question is then, “What has happened to the ‘tyranny’ of 911?” Are relatively fewer person-hours of policing being devoted to the response to calls for service and more resources instead toward “strategic” interventions of one sort or another? If there is a shift in the direction that reformers desired, how widespread is it – just a few hard-core departments, or is it a more inclusive trend? If there is substantial variability in this trend, what accounts for it? Is it a matter of merely some chiefs wanting to do it and others not, or is it a matter of implementation problems? A study of this sort is important, because virtually all of the major police reforms of the last two decades require additional resources, which in practical terms means a capacity for police departments to disengage to a significant degree from the calls-for-service autopilot. There are many reasons to expect that any trend in the desired direction has been modest, and perhaps where accomplished, due mostly to the addition of more resources to policing (e.g., through COPS grants) rather than through what would probably be a painful allocation of existing resources. The public has come to expect the convenience of the rapid-response system, and many chiefs would be understandably wary of significantly reducing their agency’s response practices.

If the locus of decision-making is changing in American police departments, we should be curious about how it is shifting. It has become axiomatic among scholars that the greatest discretion in local American police agencies is found in the lowest ranks, and some brands of community and problem-oriented policing seem to accept this as

appropriate. However, Compstat attempts to harness precinct commanders' efforts to fulfilling top management's objectives, tracking their progress through a highly centralized system of accountability and control (Weisburd et al 2006). And the capacity of managers to oversee field operations in real time and to assess performance after the fact has never been greater. Rapid communications, GPS tracking, and digital video transmissions make it possible for supervisors to monitor their subordinates' work very closely. But how much direction are supervisors and managers giving their subordinates – either directly or before/after the fact? How are they monitoring their subordinates' performance? And how are street-level officers responding? If researchers were to conduct ethnographies or systematic observation of police patrol and detective work today, would they produce the same results as those conducted in the 1960s and 1970s – that is, that supervisors and managers have a tenuous and at most only indirect influence on how their subordinates exercise their discretion?<sup>10</sup> I suspect that the answer may vary from department to department. Initially, I would suggest the comparison of carefully matched agencies – some that have made a concerted and sustained effort to transform the nature of management and supervision compared to those that have not.

Answering these questions requires that researchers pay special attention to two things: (a) how and how much discretion police officers are exercising, and (b) what supervisors and managers are doing to direct, constrain, or guide that discretion. Some systematic observation of patrol in two community-policing departments conducted in 1996 and 1997 indicated that the mobilization of these officers was not overwhelmingly driven by 911 or the officers' supervisors – that three-fourths of their time was spent on activities selected at their own discretion (Mastrofski 2004:113). Further, supervisors

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Muir (1977) Skolnick (1966), Rubinstein (1973), Van Maanen (1974; 1983).

very rarely were present or otherwise communicated with subordinates about how they exercised their discretion during encounters with the public. Of course, supervisors need not provide hands-on direction to influence their officers, but we have few systematic studies that tell us how and how much direction is given by contemporary supervisors (cf. Engel 2000).

Two other ways that the discretion of the rank and file may be structured by management deserve attention, one bureaucratic and one professional – and neither requiring the direct intervention of the supervisory hierarchy in real time. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that information gathering and recording protocols, built into the hand-written and computerized forms officers complete, structure how officers conduct much of their work. The proliferation of these forms and systems for monitoring their completion, they argue, means an increase in hierarchical influence on street-level practice. This is an interesting, but not rigorously tested proposition that is amenable to experimental design evaluations. The second indirect way to structure discretion is through training, at least some of which is intended to invest officers with the skill and judgment to use their discretion wisely in circumstances where simple bureaucratic rules will not be very useful in producing the desired results (Muir 1977:ch. 12) – disputes, for example. Such training is intended, not just to avoid bad policing, but to promote good policing. Whether, in fact, it does either is certainly worthy of study, and the effect of training (and different types of training of this sort) can also be assessed with experimental design evaluations (see earlier section on this topic).

A final point I wish to make about the structuring of discretion is that researchers have by-and-large ignored the essential normative component required to determine what

produces whether police discretion will be exercised well or poorly. Consequently, much of our research, as interesting as it is from an academic perspective, does not address fundamental questions about how an organization can promote *better* policing and avoid *undesirable* policing. For example, we have expended a lot more effort to determine what influences whether an officer will make an arrest than what influences whether the officer will make a *good* arrest, or whether an arrest was even the best choice to make at all (Mastrofski 2004). We tend to focus on the quantity of policing and not its quality. Yet we know that the best results obtain when the *quality* of the officer's work is attended to, such as when police take the trouble to listen to citizens, show respect and concern for their situations – even when they are the object of enforcement (Tyler and Huo 2004).

Of course, distinguishing discretion well-exercised from discretion poorly-exercised is a complex matter. It first requires that we specify the criteria that distinguish good from poor performance, and we know that there are many dimensions, at least by the standards of the craft (Bayley and Bittner 1984). For example, the following seem to be a minimal list of concerns that a competent police supervisor would attend to in evaluating the work of a subordinate in handling a domestic dispute or a routine traffic violation stop:

- Dispositional justice (legality, priority, and deservedness of the disposition)
- Procedural justice (respect, listening/concern, neutrality/transparency)
- Victim treatment (Procedural justice + services)
- Safety and order at the scene
- Prospects for reducing future problem risk (based on theory and evidence)
- Cost efficiency (effort worth the likely payoff?)

Of course, there may be others, depending upon the preferences of the evaluator, and that raises an important issue. We do not know much about the diversity of views about what constitutes good policing – both within police organizations and among the various

constituencies served by the police. An important step then is to determine the extent to which there is consensus about what the important criteria are and how to weigh them. This can be accomplished through survey research (factorial designs lend themselves to this). Another important step is to attempt to construct a set of criteria that are outlined in an actual operational setting and then develop a system to give officers before-and-after-the fact guidance on how well they were doing according to these criteria. Such an exercise could be done as an experiment or quasi-experiment and could tell us a lot about the capacity of a more structured approach to discretion control to produce a higher likelihood that officers will exercise their discretion in more desirable ways.

### **What Is the Influence of Community Pressure on Police Practice?**

American police, at least as much as any other aspect of local service delivery, have long been the target of community efforts to influence practice. At the risk of a simplistic historical summary, we can say that until about the 1930s, America's urban police were heavily "penetrated" by the direct manipulation of local political machines. But the influence of machines waned, as over the next half century, the reform ideal was to seek ways to block such influence or weaken it through various "good government" filters (e.g., a professional, appointed city manager). But by the 1970s, significant segments of society, including the middle class, were seeking a less isolated, more responsive police (Fogelson 1977:ch. 11). And American police responded to this powerful stream of discontent much as the Army Corps of Engineers responds to untamed rivers: they attempted to channel at least some of this pressure through "partnership" arrangements that came to be known as a core component of community policing. These partnership programs – typically initiated by police and accomplished



through liaison with neighborhood associations -- have offered the public opportunities to “coproduce” safety and police services with the police, as well as offer venues to express preferences, complaints, and express their assessments on police performance (Skogan 2006b:28-34).

National surveys of America’s municipal police forces suggest that such partnerships have blossomed in the majority of these agencies (Roth et al. 2004), yet we know remarkably little of their character. What kinds of citizens and interests participate, and how much does this vary from community to community? How do police agencies attempt to channel their requests and demands? How do citizens respond? How effectively is the “river” of external pressure controlled? How much “power” is harnessed by the police in these partnerships? We are not without some very good research on these issues, but it comes from but a few cities, most notably Chicago, where researchers have been carefully monitoring that city’s CAPS program for over a decade (Skogan 2006a). The results in Chicago are interesting, and one would have to say encouraging in terms of the benefits that befall neighborhoods that organize well to deal with police and neighborhood problems (Skogan et al. 2004). However, we could use a much larger sample of communities so that we may better learn the full range of experiences; some researchers report a different sort of experience in other case studies (Lyons 1999). Ultimately, not only do we want to know more about the distributional effects of police-neighborhood partnerships on the distribution of police services among neighborhoods (the political science issue of who is getting what), but we should also be interested in how establishing these bonds affect the influence of other interest groups on the police (e.g., large business interests). Do police leaders (and their mayors) who have

established strong bonds with neighborhood groups behave differently toward other (sometimes competing interests) than those who have not established strong bonds?

### **What is the Business of the Police?**

Police reform in the early Twenty-first Century has some crosscurrents that offer interesting opportunities for research. On the one hand, community policing calls on police to broaden the mission of the police – embracing a host of order maintenance and service activities to which the public usually attaches high value. On the other hand, Compstat’s proponents argue that the police mission is first and foremost about controlling crime (Willis et al. 2007). And to add one more hand, the federal government expects local police to join the war on terrorism by strengthening both its capacity for responding to critical incidents and by gathering and sharing information that will strengthen intelligence on terrorist activities. On top of this, of course, is the continuing vitality of private organizations that engage in things for which the police have long been responsible (security, investigations, for example) (Manning 2006). This raises one of the fundamental questions about public police organizations: what is their business?

If one takes Bittner’s (1970) approach – examining what police do, rather than considering views about what they *ought* to do – one comes up with little hard evidence on actual police practice. At a presentation at the 2006 meeting of the American Society of Criminology meeting, Los Angeles police chief, William Bratton declared that American police forces today, more than any other time in the nation’s history, are focused on crime. Is this, in fact the case, or have police actually maintained or even expanded their efforts in peace-keeping and service activities? And how much effort has been expended on target-hardening, critical incident response, and intelligence gathering

in the war on terror? It would be useful to attempt to track the trajectory of police resource allocation among these different “missions” over time. And it would be useful to know which particular types of problems and activities within each category account for most of the change over time. This sort of analysis could tell us just how malleable local police organizations are, and it would enable us to assess the influence of different reform efforts and other trends on the business of public policing.

Of course, a number of conceptual and measurement challenges must be overcome. The rhetoric of American reform tends to blur the distinction between such categories of work as crime, peacekeeping, service, and anti-terrorism.<sup>11</sup> And obtaining good longitudinal data on resource allocations across these categories would be daunting. Nonetheless, some departments will be able to provide this sort of information, so that multiple-site longitudinal analyses should be possible. Ultimately we can learn something about where we’re going by a careful assessment of where we’ve been.

### **Impact of the War on Terror**

Because the times demand attention to terrorism, I want to focus a few comments on the impact of the sense of heightened risk of terrorist attack in America on local policing. An issue much on the minds of police leaders around the nation is whether their organizations have adequate resources to deal with “ordinary” crime and disorders while also doing their part in the war against terror – what is sometimes called the “dual role” issue. This is not an easy question to answer, because shifting risks can lead to shifting organizational priorities. What once might have been an acceptable level of police

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<sup>11</sup> “Crime-focused” activities depend upon your theory of crime control. If you believe that non-enforcement activities can contribute to crime reduction, then you can argue that police-sponsored midnight basketball leagues, neighborhood trash clean-up, DARE, and showing respect for citizens are all crime-focused. It may make more sense to focus on the nature of the activity (what police do) rather than what the intended goal is.

activity to guard against terrorism, may no longer satisfy. Perhaps communities are willing to accept a reduced effort against “ordinary” crimes and disorders to pay for increased protection against terror attacks. Or perhaps Americans expect no reduction in the former, while increasing the latter. Researchers might begin to address this issue by combining studies of local community preferences about the war on terror versus ordinary crimes/disorders (through, for example, public opinion surveys) and the actual efforts and resource allocations of the local police. Some communities may have a much higher fear of terrorist attack than do others, so naturally one would expect police in those communities to increase their allocations to anti-terrorist responses. If Department of Homeland Security financial awards do not cover these costs, then police management is faced with some hard choices about whether and how to redistribute resources previously allocated to ordinary crime and disorder. How are police organizations in different communities with different levels of fear adapting to this problem?

The central federal role in the war against terror is undeniable, but the U.S. Government has established multi-agency task forces involving federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (Joint Terrorism Task Forces). In addition, tremendous demands are being placed on local police agencies to feed information to agencies needing to develop intelligence on terrorist risks around the nation. Cooperation among levels of government in law enforcement has a mixed record in the U.S., and despite the pressure of the perceived risk of future terrorist attacks, the challenges are many. For example, local chiefs want access to timely and useful information about the risks of terror in their communities, and most bridle at the security restrictions placed upon them by federal agencies. And they sometimes are uncomfortable with the role federal

agencies want them to play in seizing, interrogating, and otherwise controlling suspects and persons of interest – especially in areas where there are large numbers of persons who are thought to be in a “prime” suspect pool (e.g., immigrants and persons from parts of the world believed to produce and shelter active terrorist groups) (Thacher 2005). The National Academies panel on police policies and practices raised the question in terms of whether in this environment local police would assume a more “militaristic” approach to their jobs – something seemingly counter to the community policing approach that dominated America’s police reform agenda until 2001 (Skogan and Frydl 2004:212-213). To the extent that local agencies can and will share information on the dynamics of their relationship with federal agencies, NIJ could advance knowledge on the challenges of inter-governmental collaboration in the war on terror and its consequences for police structure and practices.

Local efforts in the war on terror have also stimulated increased pressure for inter-agency collaboration across organizations with different functions in responding to a terrorist attack: law enforcement, fire, medical, transportation, communications, infrastructure, etc.). The Department of Homeland Security is sponsoring evaluations of how well these collaborations are working, but NIJ might focus more on how these collaborations are altering the structure and practices of local police organizations.

In examining the impact of the war on terror on local policing, two kinds of studies seem useful. One would focus on the specialist units given responsibility for terrorism-focused activities (e.g., intelligence units, SWAT teams). What do these units do to deal with terrorism? What anti-terror strategies and tactics are favored? What legal issues (e.g., constitutional protections) are raised and how are local police agencies

dealing with them? The past record of American local police departments is spotty (e.g., dealing with alleged communists, civil rights leaders, and anti-war activists). What steps, if any, are local police taking to “remember this history so they are not condemned to repeat it?” The other kind of study would focus on the much larger general police units that have as their primary function the response to ordinary crime and disorders. How, if at all, has the daily work of these persons changed? How has their approach to their work changed? There could be considerable variability among communities, which suggests a sampling strategy that can capture that variability. Ultimately, it will be important for studies of the war on terror to focus both on activities designed to strengthen public safety/security *and* activities that protect or threaten civil liberties.

### **Impact of Immigration**

Local police around the nation, not just at the borders, are confronted with increasing numbers of immigrants residing in their communities. Some are documented and some are not, but they present the not unfamiliar challenges of policing people who speak a different language, have a foreign culture, and are displaced from a stable community environment. How much variability is there in the relationship between local police and the cognizant federal authorities on immigration matters? How are American police agencies organizing to handle the burgeoning immigrant communities? To what extent do local police get involved in assisting federal agencies in identifying, capturing, and returning undocumented aliens? What are the patterns of street-officer decision making in how immigrant communities are policed compared to neighborhoods that have few or no immigrants?

### **Management and Leadership**

I wish to discuss three issues about police leadership and management: (a) in what ways are police leaders relevant to the practices and performance of their organization, (b) what makes the best police leaders/managers, and (c) how are American police leaders/managers made?

### **The Relevance of Police Leaders**

It is widely accepted that selecting the police chief is one of the most important decisions that can be made about how and how well the police organization performs (Sparrow et al. 1990; Wilson 1968). Yet in private, candid moments, most chiefs will admit that they are highly constrained in what they can do to direct and guide their organizations. Historical accounts of police leaders tend to emphasize the special contributions of celebrity chiefs – Vollmer, Wilson, and Parker and more recently Brown and Bratton. Of course, the historians tend not to select their samples randomly. What would a representative sample of chiefs show?

There is not much rigorous research on police leadership – most of which is limited to case studies of how chiefs matter or try to matter in shaping the policies, practices, and performance of their departments. There is a fair amount of such scholarship on CEOs in the private sector, and as one might expect, there is a considerable range of findings. An instructive pattern of findings, however, is that the turnover of private sector CEOs is only weakly related to the technical performance (e.g., profits) of their corporations (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996;168). If this pattern were to be found in the turnover of police chiefs, one might question the common assumption that police chiefs are a substantial influence on organizational performance. That is, the working hypothesis is that police chief tenure is largely independent of their

organization's performance. But if the police industry is operating in a technically efficient fashion, then those whose organizations perform better than their peers (for example, in reducing crime) should either retain their current jobs longer or enjoy job transfers that are a step up in occupational status (typically a bigger or more prestigious department). Of course, crime rates are not the only criterion by which a chief's performance is judged. Chiefs gain and lose their jobs because a new political leader takes office, collective bargaining units support or reject the person, and assorted scandals and crises arise.<sup>12</sup> A study of police chief turnover could take a wide range of such criteria into account and thereby learn something about the criteria used across the nation's communities. Knowing something about the market dynamics of police leadership can tell us useful things about the sorts of people who get selected and retained and why. If the market does not reward technical efficiency, then what does it reward – chiefs who clamber fastest onto the bandwagon of the current fad (Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Mastrofski 2002)?

Another way to examine the contribution of police chiefs is to ask how much each chief changed the structure, practices and performance from the trajectory of predecessors. Some police departments may be so intransigent that the "reform" chief's task is like "bending granite" (Guyot 1975). Other organizations may be equally immune to significant declines in performance, even when the leadership is weak because key structures are largely immune to serious degeneration. For example, the autopilot calls-for-service response process may have kept truly exceptional chiefs from making their organizations as effective as they could be, but the autopilot system may also have sustained the organization when it had poor or mediocre leadership.

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<sup>12</sup> Of course, sometimes police chiefs leave simply because they retire.



American police agencies, especially the larger ones, tend to keep their chiefs only a handful of years before getting a new one. This limits the capacity of any leader to change the organization and raises the question of whether the pattern in American departments is one of more or less sustained leadership and management in the same general direction (e.g., a particular model of community policing) – or whether the pattern is a lot more “zigging and zagging,” with new brooms undoing the work of their predecessor – either to correct what they believe to be failed practice or just to make their own mark. Longitudinal studies of the leadership of American police departments could help us identify their contribution to how smoothly police agencies move toward or away from a reform movement over time. The role of professional police leadership associations should be carefully considered as a force for sustaining trajectories of reform, even where turnover is high and the political winds shift frequently.

### **Making the Best Police Leaders**

The United States offers an interesting laboratory to learn what makes the best police leaders. Our decentralized system of local police agencies presumably means that there is considerable diversity in how people become chiefs. Of course, the vast majority move up the ranks within the police occupation, if not within the same organization, but they undoubtedly vary in their education and at least some aspects of training,<sup>13</sup> work experience, the mentorship they have received, their exposure to peer professionals (through professional associations), their collaboration with outsiders (for example, businesses and higher education), and the type of larger context in which they have worked (nature of the community and organization). To the extent that our local police

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<sup>13</sup> I suspect that a near constant for chiefs in medium-to-large departments is successful completion of the FBI's National Academy course.

vary on these sorts of potential influences, we have a natural opportunity to learn what produces the best leaders for a given type of police organization or circumstance.

The first order of business is to determine how we could measure “good leadership.” This might be done in terms of outcomes – for example, better-than-average crime rates or citizen satisfaction for departments of a given category. It might also be done in terms of process – for example, successfully implementing some important organizational structure or process.

Determining what produces the best leadership would then involve drawing a sample of chiefs and collecting information on them and their success in their current organization. Any useful analysis would certainly need to consider that different types of leaders may perform better in a given situation (e.g., small town versus big city, department in crisis versus one in a stable political environment). A particularly interesting question to consider is whether there is substantial value in having a chief who has undergone extensive police leadership education, such as what Bramshill provides to UK police leaders. The lack of this sort of national police academy for American police leaders was recently noted with regret at the 2006 American Society of Criminology meeting by William Bratton and Gil Kerlikowske, both prominent west coast police chiefs. Evaluators might attempt to get some sense of what the value added of such an educational experience would be by using educational proxies, such as the acquisition of a graduate degree in management or criminal justice by a police chief. Of course, there are some aspects of police leadership education and training that *are* accessible to experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations (short term leadership programs of a few weeks’ duration). Professional police associations and the providers of those

programs could agree to randomized trials and pre-post assessments of police leadership performance to detect short-term and long-term benefits of these programs.

Another interesting to know are the advantages and disadvantages of drawing top police leadership from persons who had little or no prior police experience in lower ranks. I do not know how many such chiefs there are of this sort in the United States, but even a study of a small sample might prove useful in considering the advisability of this approach. Another alternative is to go abroad to study nations that have adopted the creation of a separate “officer corps” of leaders who have not had the street-level experience of the rank-and-file officers.

### **The Making of Our Police Leaders**

In tandem with research on how best to fashion the selection of local police leaders, it would be useful to conduct research on how police leaders are *actually* selected. Here I propose a sort of “life-course” study of police, some of whom will eventually become top leaders in their field. What distinguishes those who get there from those who do not, and what does that tell us about the choices our communities are making about who gets to become their police leaders?

It might also be useful to study key parts of the selection process over time. For example, to what extent over the last 50 years has the market for police chiefs (especially in departments of 100 or more sworn) become a regional or national market instead of one limited to the same department or other departments in the locale? I suspect that national (and perhaps state) police chief associations play an important role in the selection process – not to mention private consultants. To what extent do their efforts homogenize the criteria used to select chiefs? Over time are we getting police chiefs in

the United States who are increasingly like each other? From a Darwinian perspective, diversification is a useful adaptive device, but if the national market is indeed changing, then we should expect to see that reflected in the characteristics of the chiefs hired.

### **Technology and Information Use**

This section briefly discusses two types of police technology: that which analyzes information gathered by or for the police, and that which gathers information through surveillance.

#### **Crime and Problem Analysis Information Technology**

A great deal has recently been made of the rapidly growing capacity of American police agencies to analyze information on crime and other problems to make possible more effective police interventions. Hotspots policing, pulling-levers policing, Compstat, and evidence-based policing all rely heavily on the presumed insights to be harvested from more efficient and sophisticated systems of information manipulation and analysis (Weisburd and Braga 2006b). Indeed, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that for some time western policing has been transforming into an enterprise heavily dependent upon innovations in information technology. Manning's (2006:108) recent review of police technology and reform in the United States makes him skeptical that much has changed due to limitations in the available technologies, their low capacity for inter-operations, and especially the strong occupational culture that resists abstract, general, and complex methods. This skepticism is buttressed from a variety of studies that suggest that the crime and problem analysis capacity of American police may be considerably overstated by those who argue that information technology has made substantial improvements to police crime control effectiveness (Cordner and Biebel 2005; Greenspan 2003; O'Shea

and Nicholls 2003; Willis et al. 2007). In my own field work on Compstat, I have been impressed by the size of the gap between the willingness and capacity of most police middle-managers to use mapping and other crime analysis methods and the capacity of those systems to analyze data. Part of it is undoubtedly habit, and another part is the lack of adequate education and training to use these technologies to greatest effect. Large numbers of managers still have more confidence that they can “map in their heads” and rely more on their private information pathways about crime in their districts than that this new technology can tell them something useful. Certainly most patrol officers have little time for these new methods.

The current limitations of crime analysis technology notwithstanding, we should recognize that the opera isn't over yet. There are strong incentives to rectify the technical flaws in the crime analysis systems. Moreover, occupational culture does not change overnight. As more police receive computer training, and college degrees, more of them will likely have an appreciation for and facility with these methods. And police organizations may increasingly draw upon civilian technicians who have all of the requisite technical skills to produce crime analysis. The real challenge comes in creating a sufficiently large class of adept internal “consumers” for this information – consumers who will use the information to guide their work. This will take time. NIJ should consider sponsoring research projects that track departments over time to learn more about whether and how an “information and analysis culture” emerges among police. And NIJ could fund experimental evaluations in which some police units (or entire departments) receive advanced information technology and some do not, evaluating the impact in terms of such things as case clearance and crime rates.

## **Surveillance Technology**

I now venture into an area about which I know little, but which strikes me as extremely important because it presumably influences the police capacity to prevent crime and apprehend criminals on the one hand and the police capacity to infringe on citizens' privacy and civil liberties on the other. Again, reaching with that third hand, I would say that there is the potential in much of the new technology to monitor more closely the practices and performance of the rank and file police as well.

One question is simply what is the state of local policing in the adoption and use of the rapidly developing technologies of surveillance? Which departments use which technologies and how extensively are they used? Here surveys and site visits to samples of police agencies could answer this question. A second question is, what impact does each of these technologies have on the capacity of the police to solve and prevent crimes? Especially with cutting-edge technologies, this question could be answered using experimental and quasi-experimental designs; the available research has produced mixed results (see NIJ Journal 2003 on CCTV technology, for example). We also need to know how intrusive and extensive these technologies are and how frequently and egregiously citizens' rights are violated. Since 2001 there has been considerable debate about what citizens' rights to privacy are, but a carefully performed evaluation could use multiple criteria to assess a given set of practices. The challenge, of course, is obtaining access to such information, and that is certainly no easy matter, especially where national security interests are claimed. However, it may be possible to conduct some evaluations using transcripts of civil suits.

Also, we might wish to know how technological innovations are changing the nature of police work. I am especially intrigued by the ways in which closed circuit television (CCTV) might change how police engage in enforcement and prevention activities. It is used much more extensively by police in the UK than the US, and in the former, research suggests that, unlike crime mapping technological innovations, the response across the ranks to CCTV has been almost uniformly positive (Levesley and Martin 2005). CCTV potentially reduces the need to allocate so many officers to traffic enforcement, and it might be developed as efficient alternative to random patrol in some areas – and perhaps even a deterrent in hotspot areas (NIJ Journal 2003).<sup>14</sup> However, it is still labor intensive for the purposes of monitoring locations, albeit this activity does not require sworn officers (Levesley and Martin 2005). Observational studies could be conducted to learn how police are using this technology and whether and how it alters the dynamics of crime prevention and law enforcement efforts.

The aspect of CCTV that seems fraught with the greatest potential to change the structure and practices of policing is the capacity for the organization to monitor more closely the activities of its own personnel. Systems not owned or operated by the police have been used on an occasional basis to determine whether officers misbehaved or performed unsatisfactorily in criminal and civil cases. CCTV is routinely used in many departments to monitor traffic stops. It is not difficult to imagine a not-too-distant future when each patrol officer will carry a portable device that transmits audio and video signals of the situation with which he or she is dealing. As this technology becomes available, NIJ should certainly conduct evaluations to determine how the technology

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<sup>14</sup> Current research, especially in the UK, suggests that CCTV is more effective in identifying offenders for later apprehension and conviction.

changes the way that police organizations supervise street-level police work. Do supervisors and managers attempt to give more direction to officers on the scene of events? Do they do more after-action reviews of performance? In what ways, if at all, will supervisors and managers be forced to engage their subordinates more directly in specifying what constitutes good performance?

### **Recent Police Innovations**

A recent edited volume on eight police innovations in strategy and practice over the last three decades offers essays both supportive and critical of community policing, broken windows policing, problem-oriented policing, third-party policing, hot-spots policing, Compstat, and evidence-based policing (Weisburd and Braga 2006b). These essays summarize and interpret the evidence pro and con about the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. I will not attempt to recount their points here, but I can note a few things that may help guide a research agenda on these reforms and their implications for the organization and management of the police. The editors argue, “These innovations represent fundamental changes to the business of policing” (Braga and Weisburd 2006a:339), but they also note that the evidence is far from conclusive about how successful these innovations are or could be. I suggest that there are two fundamental questions about these innovations.

First, just *how much* have they changed police organizations and the practice of policing? If police organizations *are* changing in fundamental ways, researchers should be able to observe and measure these changes. NIJ should consider developing a program to monitor the state of organizational transformation that goes well beyond analyzing LEMAS and other periodic mail surveys that ask a large sample of police



organizations to self-describe what they are doing that is relevant to innovative practices.<sup>15</sup> NIJ might consider sponsoring an on-the-ground assessment of a more selective sample of police agencies across America that is much more intensive.<sup>16</sup> It is simply not enough to know whether a police department has adopted a given program or practice; we need to know much more about the dosage of that implementation (Maguire and Mastrofski, 2000:38-39). How many resources have been committed? How extensive in the community is the treatment? How faithful has the execution of program protocols been? This could be conducted on an ongoing basis (reported annually) and done cost effectively by setting up long-term contracts with researchers located proximate to the selected departments (thereby allowing a close working relationship, the development of researcher knowledge of the site, and much less expensive than paying for the travel of out-of-town researchers). Aside from providing a much more useful measurement of the nature and scope of implementation of the various innovations, this program could also attempt to get information from participating departments about the difficulties they have faced in making their programs work properly and how they have attempted to deal with them.

The second fundamental question about these innovations is, “How well do they work? Do they produce desirable results? Any undesirable results?” While there are some studies with encouraging results for several of the eight innovations listed in the Weisburd/Braga volume (e.g., hotspots policing, problem-oriented policing, third-party policing, pulling-levers policing), there simply is not enough evidence to say

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<sup>15</sup> We are all well aware of the limits of self-description, especially when what we’re asking about carries a heavy valence of social desirability. Respondents tend to report themselves in idealized versions that may look very different to a disinterested observer who has detailed knowledge.

<sup>16</sup> Perhaps 100 such departments carefully selected could serve this purpose well.

conclusively that these innovations work or under what conditions. And there are other innovations where the evidence is mixed or virtually non-existent about the effects of the innovation (community policing, broken-windows policing, Compstat, and evidence-based policing). So NIJ could attempt to develop evaluation programs that strengthen our evidence on and confidence in conclusions about what works, when, and why. Here NIJ already has a good model for developing knowledge of this sort – the Spouse Abuse Replication Program, which was used to test and expand on the findings of the pioneering Minneapolis domestic violence study. In many cases it may be possible to conduct experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation studies that could offer a greater degree of confidence in conclusions drawn about the benefits and limitations of these innovations.

### **Conclusion**

I have outlined a rather selective agenda of research issues on police organization and management for NIJ to consider. As selective as it is, it is still quite ambitious and certainly well beyond NIJ's current financial capacity. It hardly needs to be said to this audience that the resources allocated by the federal government to dealing with these and other criminal justice issues are woefully inadequate. If I had to select just a couple of items from my list to suggest as the highest priorities, I would be inclined to select the systematic study of the implementation and effects of police innovations as the top priority and a systematic program for evaluating police training as the second priority. Please note the use of "systematic" to characterize both priorities. Given a greatly restricted resource base, I suggest that a few more comprehensive and rigorous programs of research on policing will serve the nation better than an eclectic collection of small research projects. I give these particular topics a high priority because so much effort,

money, and hope are invested in them as ways to improve policing. I understand the pressure that federal agencies are under to respond to “hot topics of the moment,” but if NIJ is able to adopt a more strategic approach, the long-term benefits seem greater to me.

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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY:  
CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH NEEDS

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Police Planning Research Workshop

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## INTRODUCTION

Accountability is a vital element of American policing. Both individual officers and law enforcement agencies should be held to account for their actions. Effective accountability procedures are essential if the police are to achieve their goals of lawfulness and legitimacy, as defined by The National Academy of Sciences. Lawfulness refers to compliance with the formal requirements of the law, including statutes and court decisions. Legitimacy refers to the perception that police conduct is both lawful and consistent with public expectations (National Research Council, 2004).

Lawfulness and legitimacy, in turn, are essential if the police are to achieve their goals of reducing crime and disorder, enhancing the quality of neighborhood life, and serving community needs. A lack of legitimacy inhibits the development of working partnerships that are an essential ingredient in community policing and problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990, Scott, 2000). Contrary to the popular view that effective crime control and respect for constitutional principles are competing values in policing (Packer, 1968), experts today increasingly recognize that lawful conduct and accountability are essential for crime-fighting (Bayley, 2002)

This paper examines the social science literature on police accountability procedures related to the conduct of individual officers. From the perspective of evidence-based policy-making, it seeks to determine whether there is reliable evidence that particular accountability procedures are effective.

### A Definition of Accountability

It is a fundamental principal of a democratic society that the police should be held to account for their actions. Accountability includes both what the police do and how they perform. Agency-level accountability involves the performance of law enforcement agencies with respect to controlling crime and disorder and providing services to the public (National Institute of Justice, 1999). Individual-level accountability involves the conduct of police officers with respect to lawful, respectful, and equal treatment of citizens.

Individual-level accountability procedures fall into two general categories: internal

and external. Procedures that are internal to law enforcement agencies include controlling officer conduct through written policies, routine supervision, regular performance evaluations, and the investigation of allegations of misconduct, and early intervention systems (EIS). External accountability procedures reviewed in this paper include citizen oversight agencies. For reasons of length and focus, this paper does not review external accountability procedures involving criminal and civil litigation against law enforcement agencies.

### Increased Interest in Accountability

Interest in police accountability on the part of police managers, policy-makers and police scholars has increased in recent years as a result of three developments.

First, Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act authorizes the U. S. Justice Department to bring suit against law enforcement agencies where there is a “pattern or practice” of abuse of citizens’ rights and to seek organizational reforms designed to end those abuses (Livingston 1999, 2004; Walker, 2005a). Under that law, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department has since 1997 reached settlements (consent decrees, memoranda of understanding, and letters) with about twenty agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, nd). These settlements include a roughly similar package of reforms. Most require agencies to adopt state of the art policies on the use of force, including both deadly and non-lethal force, to improve their citizen complaint procedures, to implement an early intervention system, and to improve training related to these matters (U.S. Department of Justice Special Litigation Section, nd; Walker, 2005).

Second, early intervention systems (EIS) represent an important new management tool designed to enhance accountability. An EIS involves a computerized data base on officer performance that permits analysis by police commanders for the purpose of identifying officers who appear to have recurring performance problems (e.g., high rates of use of force, citizen complaints, etc.). Officers who are identified are then subject formal interventions (typically counseling or retraining) designed to correct the performance problems (Walker, 2003; Walker, Alpert and Kenney, 2001). An EIS is now required by the Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 2006:35.9.1).

Third, there has been a steady growth in the number of external citizen oversight

agencies across the country. Civil rights and civil liberties activists have demanded external procedures for reviewing citizen complaints, arguing that they will be more effective than internal police complaint review procedures. The number of oversight agencies has grown from one in 1970 to 38 in 1990 and over 100 by 2001 (Perino, 2006; Walker 2001:6). Additional cities and counties have established oversight agencies since then.

All three of these developments reflect growing public concern about police accountability, and in particular the reduction of incidents of officer misconduct. They also reflect the willingness of many law enforcement agencies to adopt new accountability procedures voluntarily, and in a number of cases the willingness of elected officials to impose citizen oversight over the objections of their law enforcement agency. Despite this growing concern, little is known about the effectiveness of accountability procedures (National Research Council, 2004: 252-326). This paper is designed to fill that void in our knowledge about policing.

### An Evidence-based Policy-making Perspective

This paper is guided by the standards of the evidence-based policy-making movement (Committee on Law and Justice, 2005). Evidence-based policy making determines public policies to be effective only where there is evidence from scientific studies that embody the highest standards of research. This excludes purely descriptive literature and claims of effectiveness based on good intentions or flawed methodologies (University of Maryland, 1997).

The evidence-based policy movement is a new phenomenon that originated in the United Kingdom and has since spread to the United States and other countries. It has been applied to the areas of health care (Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, nd), education (Coalition for Evidence-based Policy, 2002; Oakley, 2002), criminal justice (Committee on Law and Justice, 2005; Tilley and Laycock, 2002; MacKenzie, 2000; Petrosino, et al. 2003; Sherman, 1999; University of Maryland, 1997), and other areas of social policy. The movement is institutionalized in several professional associations (Campbell Collaboration, nd; Evidence Network, nd).

### The Scope of This Paper

This paper is limited to policies and procedures related to holding individual officers accountable for their conduct. As already noted, agency-level accountability is not covered in this paper. The paper focuses on a selected set of accountability procedures. They include:

- (1) Formal agency policies on the use of police authority;
- (2) Routine supervision of officers by first-line supervisors;
- (3) Regular performance evaluations;
- (4) Early intervention systems designed to identify performance problems;
- (5) Procedures for investigating allegations of officer misconduct.

This list is not exhaustive. It includes those procedures that are generally regarded as the most important in routine police management. There are, of course, many other aspects of policing that have some impact on officer conduct: recruitment and training standards, the leadership of the chief executive, the police union (where one exists) and collective bargaining contract provisions, the informal police subculture, and the external political culture. Many community activists, meanwhile, have sought to improve police accountability through the courts, using strategies of criminal prosecution, tort litigation, and constitutional law change. These other approaches to accountability are not discussed in this paper largely for reasons of space and focus, and deserve proper consideration elsewhere.

For all practical purposes, the subject of this paper overlaps with the question of controlling police discretion (Davis, 1975; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1988; Mastrofski, 2004; Walker, 1993). The accountability procedures examined here generally seek to reduce misconduct involving the misuse of discretion, either directly through a policy directive, or through improved supervision or through a deterrence-based disciplinary action. Mastrofski (2004) points out that the literature on this subject is extremely limited, noting that the National Academy of Sciences (2004) report says very little about the control of discretion.

## CONTROLLING THE USE OF POLICE AUTHORITY THROUGH FORMAL AGENCY POLICIES

### The Concept of Administrative Rulemaking

The first accountability procedure to be considered involves the direction and control officer use of police authority through formal agency policies. This approach, generically known as administrative rulemaking, is a basic feature of modern police management, if not all public and private sector organizations. Administrative rulemaking consists of three elements: specifying approved and forbidden actions in written policies; requiring officers to file written reports on specific actions; requiring administrative review of officer reports (Davis, 1975; Goldstein, 1977:93-130; Walker, 1993).

The discussion that follows examines a few selected aspects of police discretion that are covered by administrative rulemaking. They are selected in part because they are particularly relevant to this discussion. A comprehensive review would include all critical incidents where the exercise of police authority poses some potential danger to the life, liberty, or safety of citizens. Administrative rulemaking first developed with regard to the use of deadly force. Over the last three decades it has extended to the use of non-lethal force, vehicle pursuits, domestic violence incidents, the deployment of canines, and other actions.

## Deadly Force

Administrative rulemaking in policing is most highly developed in the area of police use of deadly force. Departmental policies on this subject are arguably the most detailed of any area of police conduct. Despite some variations, a rough national consensus currently exists on the best policy, specifically that the use of deadly force should be limited to the defense of the life of the officer or other citizens. At the same time, the literature on the effectiveness of deadly force policies is arguably larger than any other area of police conduct (Fyfe, 1979; Geller and Scott, 1992).

In the pioneering study on the subject, Fyfe (1979) found that a new policy restricting the use of deadly force in the New York City Police Department was effective in reducing the overall number of firearms discharges. Additionally, the new policy did not result in any unanticipated adverse consequences such as officer deaths or injuries or an increase in the crime rate. Finally, Fyfe's data indicated only minimal attempts by officers to evade the requirements of the policy. Fyfe later played an important role in the Supreme Court case of *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985), and that decision spurred the

adoption of restrictive shooting policies by agencies across the country (Geller and Scott, 1992).

Additional evidence supports Fyfe's original study. Sparger and Giacomassi (1992) found a reduction in the overall rate of shootings by the Memphis Police Department following the adoption of a restrictive deadly force policy. Most notably, the policy completely eliminated all reported shootings in the most questionable shooting category of unarmed and non-assaultive persons. Finally, the Memphis data indicated a significant reduction in the racial disparity among persons shot and killed –primarily as a result of eliminating the shooting of unarmed and non-assaultive persons. National data on persons shot and killed between 1976 and 1998, meanwhile, support the latter finding. The disparity between African Americans and whites shot and killed by the police was cut in half. This period coincided with the adoption of restrictive deadly force policies across the country (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001). No study to date has identified adverse unwanted consequences of restrictive deadly force policies.

### Less Lethal Force

Less lethal force by police involves officer actions that utilize either an officer's body (e.g., hands, feet) or a less lethal weapon (baton, chemical spray, electromagnetic device, etc.) (Alpert and Dunham, 2004; Garner and Maxwell, 1999). The term "less lethal" has recently replaced "less than lethal" in recognition of the fact that weapons other than firearms are in fact potentially lethal.

Virtually all police departments have written policies governing the use of force, although policies vary considerably across departments with respect to many important details. Use of force policies typically specify the legitimate purposes for which force may be used, the types of force that are authorized and not authorized, and also the specific circumstances in which force is authorized or forbidden. Policies increasingly include a use of force continuum that relates the permissible use of force to the citizen's behavior (Department of Justice, 1999:37-38).

Virtually all of the research on police use of less lethal force investigates patterns in the use of force, particularly the situational factors associated with its use, the characteristics of citizens against whom force is used (Alpert and Dunham, 2004; Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). There are no studies that directly investigate



whether restrictive policies on the use of force reduce either the overall rates of force or the incidence of excessive force by police officers (National Academy of Sciences, 2004:283-286). Although the evidence on the effectiveness of restrictive policies on the use of deadly force suggests possible effectiveness with regard to less lethal force, the two types of force are different in important respects, and caution is advisable in the absence of empirical evidence. Less lethal force incidents are far more numerous and ambiguous than are deadly force incidents.

While the impact of restrictive policies on the use of force has not been investigated directly, there is indirect evidence from several studies suggesting that certain organizational characteristics of police departments are effective in reducing the incidence of the use of force. Alpert and MacDonald (2001) found that departments that require a supervisor or some other official to complete use of force reports have lower use of force rates than departments where the officer involved in each incident complete force reports. Presumptively, requiring a supervisor to complete use of force reports represents a more intensive level of supervision and accountability (in the sense that the reporting process is more independent therefore objective). Terrill (2001), meanwhile, found that close supervision was associated with lower levels of use of force by officers. Alpert and MacDonald (2001), meanwhile, found that departments that use force reports for a specific purpose have higher overall use of force rates. This finding is subject to different interpretations. One interpretation could be that using force reports for a specific purpose represents a more intensive level of supervision and accountability, in the sense that the department wants more information about officer conduct. The resulting higher rate of use of force is also a step in the direction of greater accountability to the extent that fewer force incidents are hidden from the purview of police commanders.

Several major methodological problems confront any attempt to measure the impact of restrictive policies on the use of force, particularly in multi-site studies (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999:61-74). First, as already noted, use of force policies vary considerably from department to department in terms of what kinds of force are mentioned and authorized, which kinds of force are required to be reported, and the process for reviewing force reports. Second, policies within individual departments are continually being revised, making retrospective studies difficult. Third, as Alpert and MacDonald (2001) found, force policies vary in terms of the use made of such reports (e.g., the level of review or analysis). By comparison, official data on the use of deadly force is relatively simple: a weapon was discharged or not discharged; a citizen was struck by a bullet or not struck; the shooting was fatal or not fatal.

There are also serious methodological problems with regard to the consequences of uses of force which might be used as outcome measures. Official citizen complaint data are highly problematic as a police performance measure (Walker, 2001:119-142). Civil litigation data are also very problematic, as a variety of local factors (the availability of local counsel; community activist group support; the local legal culture) affect the rate at which potential litigants actually file suits (Walker, 2005a:29-35).

### Deployment of Canine Units

The deployment of police canine units is increasingly recognized as a form of police use of force (Cambell, Berk, and Fyfe, 1998; Hickey, 2003; Mesloh, 2006). Bites by police canines inflict pain and possible injury. Allegations about the uncontrolled deployment of canine units led the U.S. Department of Justice to include a requirement that the department develop policies controlling deployment in some of its consent decrees with law enforcement agencies (Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati, 2002).

There are few studies investigating the impact of formal policies governing the deployment of canine units. Mesloh (2006) found that the more restrictive “bark and hold” training for canines was associated with higher bite ratios than “bite and hold” training. The reports of the Special Counsel to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, however, found a 90 percent reduction in the number of citizens bitten by LASD canines following the development of a restrictive deployment policy (Bobb, 1993, 1998, 1999). The Special Counsel’s reports do not meet the standards of evidence-based policy-making, but the evidence certainly suggests a positive impact of restrictive policies.

### Vehicle Pursuits

Vehicle pursuits are a potentially extremely dangerous police action. Research has found that pursuits can result in unacceptable rates of accidents and injuries and deaths to officers and citizens (Alpert and Dunham, 1990). Because they involve a discretionary decision that can result in injury or death, they can be considered a form of police use of force.

To reduce the potential risks, most police departments have adopted formal policies governing pursuits. Existing policies vary considerably with respect to their degree of restrictiveness (Alpert and Dunham, 1990; Wells and Falcone 1992). Existing policies typically restrict pursuits based on consideration of the suspected offense, weather and road conditions, and other risks to officer or citizen safety. Policies also typically limit pursuits to two police vehicles and forbid potentially dangerous tactics such as ramming a fleeing vehicle. Policies typically authorize supervisors and/or dispatchers to terminate pursuits when they feel the risks outweigh the potential benefits. (Alpert and Dunham, 1990).

The evidence also indicates that restrictive policies on vehicle pursuits reduces accidents, injuries and deaths. Studies have consistently found that relatively more restrictive policies reduce the overall number of pursuits and the adverse consequences of pursuits, including accidents, injuries and deaths to both officers and citizens (Alpert 1997; Crew, Kessler, and Fridell, 1994; Wells and Falcone 1992).

### Traffic Enforcement and Racial Profiling

Allegations of racial discrimination in traffic enforcement –referred to popularly as “racial profiling” or “driving while black” – have been a major controversy in policing since 1999 (ACLU, 2001; Fridell, et al 2001; Fridell, 2004; Harris, 2002). Civil rights groups alleged that people of color are stopped by the police on the basis of their race or ethnicity rather than suspected criminal activity (ACLU, 1999).

Several different strategies have been proposed and/or adopted in an effort to eliminate discrimination in traffic enforcement: traffic stop data collection (Fridell, 2004), formal policies controlling the use of race or ethnicity in traffic enforcement (Fridell, et al., 2001:51-53), formal policies governing procedures for all traffic stops (U.S. v. State of New Jersey, 1999), and training for police officers.

There are no studies investigating whether formal policies related to traffic stops and/or the use of race in traffic enforcement reduce the incidence of racial bias in traffic enforcement. Arguably, the most detailed set of controls over traffic stops in any law enforcement agency were imposed by the consent decree between the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) and the U.S. Department of Justice in 1999. These controls include a requirement that troopers report to a dispatcher when each stop is being initiated, to report data about the nature of the stop, to activate audio and video recording

equipment at the beginning of each stop, to conduct consent searches only under certain circumstances, and to complete a detailed report of each stop. Additionally, supervisors are required to review both stop reports and the audio and video recordings of stops. The court-appointed Independent Monitor found that the NJSP successfully complied with all the required terms of the consent decree at the end of the specified five-year period (Public Management Resources, 2006). While extremely thorough, the Monitor's report is a compliance audit and does not meet the standards of evidence-based policy-making.

A General Accounting Office (2000) report on new controls over searches for contraband by U.S. Customs suggests that such controls can be effective. It found that a new and restrictive policy on searches that, among other things, specified criteria for the decision to conduct a search and required supervisor approval for certain actions reduced the overall number of searches for contraband, reduced racial disparities, and increased the percentage of searches that successfully found contraband, (or the "hit rate.") (Harris, 2002:208-222). The GAO report, however, does not meet the standards of evidence-based policy making.

### Summary: The Impact of Formal Policies

The literature on the impact of formal policies on the exercise of police authority is extremely limited and leaves many questions unanswered. A small number of studies do meet the standards of evidence-based policy making and find that written policies that restrict the exercise of police officer discretion are effective in reducing undesirable outcomes. These studies are limited to the use of deadly force and vehicle pursuits. Some limited evidence from other studies, meanwhile, suggest that more intensive supervision reduces officer use of force. In most areas of police use of authority, however, the impact of formal policies has not been investigated.

### Research Questions

The limited literature on the impact of policies and procedures raises a number of questions for research.

1. To what extent do officers comply with specific policies and procedures?

- 1a. Are certain situational or organizational factors associated with different levels of compliance?
  - 1b. Does the level of compliance vary from agency to agency? If so, what organizational factors account for these variations?
  - 1c. Does the level of compliance vary according to the nature of the police activity involved, suggesting that some police actions are inherently more controllable than others (e.g., pursuits vs. less lethal weapons)?
2. Do policies and procedures achieve their intended effect?
- 2a. Are restrictive policies on the use of less lethal force associated with lower levels of reported excessive force or inappropriate use of force?
  - 2b. Are restrictive policies on less lethal force associated with fewer citizen complaints and/or civil suits against the agency?
  - 2c. Do official policies prohibiting or limiting the use of race in traffic enforcement reduce or eliminate racial bias in traffic enforcement? What is the relative impact of such policies compared with other factors (e.g., training, close supervision)?
  - 2d. Are restrictive policies on the deployment of canine units associated with fewer bites of citizens by canines, lower levels of civil litigation,
3. Do restrictive policies and procedures have unintended and undesirable consequences?
- 3a. Are restrictive policies on the use of less lethal force associated with higher levels of officer injury or death?
  - 3b. Do official policies on the use of race in traffic enforcement inhibit officers from effective traffic enforcement (“depolicing”) and/or contribute to higher levels of criminal activity?

## ROUTINE SUPERVISION

### The Role of First-line Supervision

It is an established principle in policing that first-line supervisors –sergeants– play a critical role in directing and controlling the behavior of officers in police-citizen interactions. Additionally, sergeants play a critical role in all of the other accountability mechanisms discussed in this paper. Sergeants review incident reports related to the exercise of police authority (Geller and Scott, 1992), prepare official performance evaluations (Oettmeier and Wycoff, 1997), and deliver the “interventions” in early intervention systems (Walker, 2003).

Despite their importance in policing, however, sergeants have been seriously neglected in police research. The report of the National Academy of Sciences (2004), for example, is virtually silent on the subject. There is minimal research, at best, on what sergeants do and how they interact with officers under their command. Engel (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) identified four different styles of supervision.

The issues involving the impact of first-line supervision include both individual-level and organizational-level factors. Individual-level factors involve the attitudes and supervisory styles of individual sergeants ( Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Organizational-level factors include the ratio of sergeants to officers (generally referred to as the “span of control”). Many departments have official policies requiring a ratio of, for example, one sergeant for every eight officers. Some investigations have found that misconduct problems have occurred where departments failed to meet their own span of control standard (Bobb, 2002:16). Other organizational factors include the formal role of the sergeant with respect to completing use of force reports.

There is little research on the impact of supervisors on officer conduct. Terrill (2001) found that close supervision was associated with lower levels of use of force by officers. A study in New York City found that close supervision resulted in lower levels of officer misconduct (Davis and Mateu-Gelabert, 1999).

Little is known about the factors that shape supervisory styles. It is not known whether they are entirely the result of individual preferences or influenced in varying degrees by organizational factors such as leadership, training, organizational culture, or other factors.

## Research Questions

The very limited literature on routine supervision in policing raises the following

research questions.

4. Are certain styles of supervision associated with higher levels of compliance with departmental policies and procedures?
  - 4a. Are certain styles of supervision associated with a lower incidence of excessive force, fewer citizen complaints, etc?
5. Are certain styles of supervision associated with higher levels of officer job satisfaction?
6. Are certain training programs for supervisors more likely to ensure a uniform and desirable style of supervision?
7. Are certain style of supervision more prevalent in certain departments compared with other departments?
  - 7a. What organizational factors are associated with the prevalence of certain supervisory styles in different departments?
8. Are formal policies specifying the ratio of officers to sergeants (the “span of control”) effective in ensuring proper supervision?
  - 8a. What is the prevalence of formal department policies regarding the ratio of officers to sergeants?
  - 8b. To what extent to departments with such policies comply with their own requirements on a routine basis?
  - 8c. Is compliance with a recommended span of control associated with a lower incidence of excessive force allegations, fewer citizen complaints, or lower levels of civil litigation?
9. Is it possible to identify specific “best practices” with regard to sergeant-officer interactions that are associated with positive outcomes (e.g., compliance with policies, higher levels of job satisfaction, fewer incidents of excessive force, etc.)?

#### IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

## The Role of Performance Evaluations

Regular performance evaluations are a basic element of the personnel process in policing, as is the case throughout the private and the public employment sectors. Regular evaluations are designed to identify and reward desirable performance, to identify and seek to correct performance shortcomings, and to terminate employees whose performance is substandard.

Existing performance evaluation procedures in policing have been severely criticized. A 1977 Police Foundation study found that they did not adequately reflect actual police work and generally provided inflated assessments of officer performance (Landy, 1977). A 1999 report, prepared in the context of community policing, made essentially the same criticisms, suggesting that little progress had been made in 20 years (Oettmeier and Wycoff, 1997). Consistent with these critiques, Falkenberg, Gaines, and Corder (1991) also found serious definitional problems in the performance evaluation categories used in one medium-sized department. Lilley and Hinduja (2006), meanwhile, found that a large proportion of agencies surveyed had not incorporated community policing principles into their performance evaluations.

There is very little research on the impact of performance evaluations. The National Academy of Sciences (2004) report contains no references to the subject. There are no studies investigating whether one particular approach to performance evaluation (e.g., regularity of evaluations, categories of performance evaluated, type of evaluation utilized, etc.) is associated with lower levels of undesirable outcomes (use of force, citizen complaints, civil litigation) than other approaches.

## Research Questions

The very limited literature on performance evaluations raises the following research questions.

10. What is the current state of performance evaluation in American police departments?
  - 10a. What percentage of departments have/do not have regular



- performance evaluations?
- 10b. What is the prevalence of annual, semi-annual, quarterly performance evaluations?
- 10c. What are the basic types of performance evaluation systems/procedures, and what is the relative distribution of each type?
11. Are certain types of performance evaluation more effective than others in shaping officer behavior?
- 11a. Are certain types of performance evaluation associated with reduced officer misconduct (citizen complaints, excessive force incidents, etc)?
- 11b. Are certain types of performance evaluation associated with higher levels of officer morale, productivity, and job satisfaction?
- 11c. Are certain types of performance evaluation associated with the promotion of officers who prove to be more successful supervisors?

## EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS

### The Nature and Purpose of Early Intervention Systems

Early intervention systems (EIS) involve a performance data base that permits police managers to identify officers with patterns of problematic conduct and then to provide specially tailored interventions designed to correct those conduct problems (Walker, 2003).

EIS vary considerably in terms of their scope, particularly the number of performance indicators they include. Some include as few as five indicators while others include as many as twenty or more. EIS also vary considerably in terms of the procedures for identifying officers with conduct problems (referred to generally as the “thresholds” problem), as well as the process for prescribing and delivering interventions. In short, EIS are extremely complex administrative tools and are not

comparable across departments.

Additionally, understanding of the potential uses of EIS has evolved since the concept first appeared. Many experts in the field argue that the principal role is not to discipline but to help officers whose performance is substandard. Current rhetoric involves professional development and “saving” careers (Walker, 2005b:5-6). Additionally, some agencies are attempting to use their EIS to identify “top performers” (Walker, 2003:11). At least one police department uses its EIS to hold supervisors accountable (San Jose Independent Police Auditor, 2001; Walker, 2005b:10-13). Some experts, finally, have discussed the potential for using EIS data (e.g., aggregate data on use of force trends) to engage community groups on the issue of accountability.

An evaluation of EIS in three large departments found that they were successful in identifying officers with more serious conduct problems and also effective in reducing officer misconduct among officers subject to interventions (Walker, Alpert, and Kenney, 2001).

The evaluation of EIS involves some difficult methodological issues. Evaluations that focus on the impact of interventions on individual officers are relatively simple to design (controlling for assignment, did the number of adverse performance indicators decline following formal EIS intervention?). Evaluations that seek to investigate the impact on overall departmental performance are far more difficult. They face the same problems discussed above with respect to the impact of formal written policies. Official data on use of force are not necessarily comparable over time within one department or among different departments. Similarly, citizen complaint data and civil litigation data are also highly problematic.

## Research Questions

The limited literature on early intervention systems raises the following research questions.

12. Are EIS interventions successful in correcting officer conduct problems?

12a. Do officers subject to formal EIS intervention experience

- improved performance in the months following intervention?
- 12b. Are certain officers and/or behavior patterns more susceptible to effective intervention?
- 12c. Are certain types of intervention more successful than others?  
Is it possible to develop a formula for matching officers and performance problems with different interventions?
13. What is the proper size and scope of an EIS with respect to performance indicators?
- 13a. Is there an optimal number of performance indicators (e.g., 5, 10, 20)?
- 13b. Are EIS with a relatively large number of performance indicators better able to identify officers with performance problems than What is the trade-off between the efficiency of a small EIS and the greater applicability of a larger EIS?
14. What is the best system of “thresholds” for selecting officers in need of intervention?
- 14a. If a fixed threshold system is used (e.g., 3 complaints in a 12 month period), what is the best formula?
- 14b. If only some officers identified by the EIS are selected for intervention, what procedures are both most effective and fair in making those selection decisions?
- 14c. Is a system of “internal benchmarking” (comparing officers with peers working the same assignment) an effective alternative?
15. Can an EIS be used to identify top performing officers?
- 15a. What formula is effective in identifying top performers?
- 15b. Can an EIS data be used effectively as a formal part of the promotion process?
16. Can an EIS be used effectively to hold supervisors accountable?
- 16a. What formula can be effectively to identify supervisors who

appear to be failing to supervise properly?

16b. Can an EIS be used to identify top performing supervisors?

17. Can an EIS data base be used effectively to identify important trends related to accountability of a department as a whole (e.g., trends in citizen complaints, vehicle pursuits, use of sick leave)?

17a. Can EIS data be used in a manner similar to COMPSTAT data to identify problems (e.g., increase in use of force complaints) that require prompt administrative attention?

## MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS

### Internal versus External Misconduct Investigations

Allegations of officer misconduct may come from either internal or external sources. Internal allegations involve reports by supervisors or other department employees. External allegations involve formal or informal complaints by citizens. All internally generated allegations are investigated by the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) or Professional Standards Units (PSU). A number of cities and counties have established external citizen oversight agencies with original jurisdiction for investigating citizen complaints (Walker, 2001). While many of the issues related to internal and external misconduct investigations overlap, it is necessary to discuss them separately.

### Internal Misconduct Investigations

The nature and quality of police internal investigations of citizen complaints have been a major part of the police-community relations problem. Civil rights groups have attacked police departments units for failing to investigate citizen complaints thoroughly or fairly. These allegations have been documented by external investigating commissions (Christopher Commission, 1991:151-180; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1978, 1981, 1994; Mollen Commission, 1994:70-89; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968:310-312).

The literature on IAUs is extremely limited. The only descriptive survey of IAUs is over twenty years old (West, 1988). While anecdotal evidence indicates considerable variations with respect to the structure, staffing, and procedures of IA/PSU units (Chevigny, 1969; Human Rights Watch, 1998; Mulcahy, 1995; Pate and Fridell, 1993; Sherman, 1978; West, 1988), there are no recent surveys specifying these variations. The most detailed information about IA/PSU units are the reports published by various citizen oversight agencies (Bobb, 2000; Office of Independent Review, 2005:17-31). The role of the police auditor style of oversight primarily involves conducting detailed reviews of internal police procedures and publicly reporting the findings on a regular basis (Walker, 2005a:135-170).

The social science literature on IA/PSU units is extremely limited. As already noted, current descriptive literature on the structure, staffing and procedures of internal investigation units is non-existent. Substantial anecdotal evidence indicates not only great variations in the organization and management of such units but also a process of steady change in such units over the years (Office of Independent Review, 2005:17-31; Office of Integrity and Accountability, 1999). U.S. Justice Department investigations related to “pattern or practice” of abuse of citizens have found substantial shortcomings in internal investigations in a number of departments across the country. These shortcomings include inadequate use of force policies, the failure of officers to complete required reports, and the failure of supervisors to review reports (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, 2004)

There are no studies evaluating police internal misconduct investigations that meet the standards of social science research. That is to say, there are no studies indicating that one approach to the structure and management of internal affairs units is more effective than alternative forms in reducing citizen complaints, use of force, or other unacceptable conduct. There are no studies indicating that certain investigative procedures (i.e., procedures for interviewing complainants, officers, or witnesses; policies for evaluating conflicting testimony; standards for determining whether a complaint should be sustained, etc.). The current CALEA Accreditation Standards include only a minimal list of required procedures for investigating complaints (Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, 2006:52-2). These requirements, however, are far less detailed than those adopted by some citizen oversight agencies (San Jose Independent Police Auditor, nd; Walker, 2005a:62-68).

Meaningful evaluation of internal misconduct investigations is severely limited by a lack of discussion of the evaluation criteria. Misconduct investigations, whether

internal or external, have multiple goals. These include providing thorough and fair investigations, deterring future misconduct, providing satisfaction to citizen complainants and to subject officers, improving public attitudes toward the police, and enhancing the professionalism of the department. While there is concern about the percentage of citizen complaints sustained in favor of the complainant (the “sustain rate”), there has been little informed discussion of what a reasonable standard should be (Walker, 2001:56-60).

Hudson (1972) attempted to compare the internal affairs unit of the Philadelphia Police Department with the (long since abolished) Police Advisory Board, but concluded that they could not be compared because of very different mandates which resulted in their handling different kinds of cases. Hudson’s study, moreover, is more than thirty years old and uses data that are more than forty years old.

### External Misconduct Investigations

There is a significant body of descriptive literature on external citizen oversight agencies and procedures. Several articles and books have developed classification schemes for external agencies identifying different roles, structures, and procedures (Goldsmith, 1988; Perez, 1994; Walker, 2001). Not all citizen oversight agencies have authority to independently investigate citizen complaints. Many simply involve the review of completed investigations by IA units, with authority to recommend a different disposition or that the case be reinvestigated. No external citizen oversight agency has the power to impose discipline of officers against whom complaints are sustained.

There are no studies evaluating the effectiveness of external citizen oversight agencies. As is the case with internal misconduct investigations (see above), there are no studies attempting to assess whether a particular organizational structure or procedure is more effective than another. Nor are there any studies attempting to assess whether the investigation of officer misconduct by external oversight agencies is more effective investigation by internal units. And also as is the case with internal misconduct investigations, there is only very limited discussion of the multiple goals of external misconduct investigations (Brereton, 2000).

As already noted with respect to internal complaint investigations, there is only very limited discussion of the multiple goals of external citizen oversight agencies:

thorough and fair investigation of complaints, deterrence of officer misconduct, providing a satisfactory experience for both complainants and officers, recommending alternative department policies and procedures, improving police-community relations (Walker, 2001:56-60).

## Research Questions

The very limited literature on both internal and external misconduct investigations raises the following research questions,

18. What are the current management practices with regard to IAUs (staffing levels, location of the unit, supervisory practices, investigative practices)?
19. Are certain IAU management practices associated with more effective investigations, lower rates of misconduct, greater satisfaction among complainants and officers, and improved police-community relations?
  - 19a. Is there an optimal ratio of IAU investigators to sworn officers?
  - 19b. Do police departments provide special training for IAU investigators? Is there any evidence that certain types of training are more effective than others?
  - 19c. Do police departments maintain procedure manuals related to the investigation of misconduct allegations? Is there any evidence that certain procedures are more likely to result in more thorough and fair investigations?
20. Are external citizen oversight agencies or procedures associated with lower levels of officer misconduct?
  - 20a. Are particular forms of citizen oversight more effective than other forms with respect to officer misconduct?
21. Do departments subject to external citizen oversight experience lower levels of officer misconduct than departments with no external citizen oversight?

22. What is the relative importance of the “code of silence” in inhibiting thorough and fair misconduct allegations?

22a. What is the prevalence of the “code of silence?”

22b. Are there certain management practices that reduce the impact of the “code of silence.”

23. What is the role of the police union and collective bargaining agreements in inhibiting thorough and fair misconduct allegations?

23a. Are there particular provisions of collective bargaining agreements that inhibit thorough and fair misconduct investigations?

23b. Are there particular management practices that limit the adverse impact of collective bargaining provisions?

## ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY

Effective accountability is vital to the achievement of the goals of policing. Many experts argue that law enforcement agencies that reduce problematic officer behavior will enjoy greater trust among citizens and, as a result, will receive greater cooperation from citizens in programs designed to reduce crime and disorder (Bayley, 2002; Harris, 2005).

The most important area in this regard involves the perceived legitimacy of the police and relations with racial and ethnic minority groups. Racial and ethnic tensions have beset the American police for over forty years, and persist despite the introduction of many different reforms. At the same time, since community policing is designed to develop effective partnerships with neighborhood groups, it follows that enhanced legitimacy and a reduction in racial and ethnic tensions will enhance the development of community policing (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997).

With these considerations in mind, it is important to ask whether specific accountability mechanisms –or some “package” of accountability mechanisms– enhance legitimacy and public perceptions of the police, particularly on the part of racial and ethnic minority groups.



## Research Questions

The absence of any literature on the relationship between accountability procedures and the perceived legitimacy of the police and racial and ethnic relations in particular raises the following research questions.

24. Do accountability mechanisms have a positive impact on police-community relations and the perceived legitimacy of the police?
  - 24a. Are citizens aware of the existence of specific accountability procedures (e.g., a revised use of force policy, an EIS?), and does that perception improve their attitudes toward the police?
  - 24b. Can citizen awareness of accountability procedures be increased through outreach programs on the part of a police department?
25. Are certain accountability mechanisms relatively more effective than others in enhancing perceived legitimacy?

## CONCLUSION

Holding individual police officers accountable for their conduct is an essential element of policing. It is directly and indirectly related to achieving the basic goals of policing: reducing crime and disorder, enhancing the quality of neighborhood life, and providing fair, respectful and equal treatment for all people.

As this paper indicates, the state of our knowledge about both traditional and new accountability mechanisms is very limited. In many instances we do not even have basic descriptive data on current practices. With respect to effectiveness, in only a few instances does the existing literature meet the standards of evidence-based policy making. The research needs identified in this paper have direct implications for police policy.

The research needs, in short, are enormous. We should not, however, underestimate the methodological challenges in meeting those needs. Measuring effectiveness raises a number of very difficult methodological issues. As is well-known, use of force data are extremely complex and not always comparable across jurisdictions. Citizen complaint data are extremely problematic. Specifying the impact of a single accountability mechanisms in the context of an organization experiencing several reforms simultaneously is extremely difficult.

### Additional Considerations

As indicated at the outset, this paper is not a comprehensive review of the subject of accountability. Primarily for reasons of focus and space, it has concentrated on a few selected accountability procedures. It has not examined criminal prosecution, tort litigation, or constitutional law change as accountability strategies. Nor has it examined the news media or the activities of private public interest groups with respect to bringing about change in police departments.

This has not discussed the subject of the police subculture. For many years, experts have argued that there is a police subculture, that it has a powerful effect on policing, and that this effect is largely negative with respect to accountability (Skolnick, 1994; Westley, 1970). Recent research, however, has found that the police subculture is far more complex and multidimensional than assumed in earlier research (Herbert, 1998; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Terrill, Paoline, and Manning, 2003). The subject of the police subculture, in turn, cannot be separated from the issue of police unions and collective bargaining agreements they negotiate. Police unions have been seriously neglected by police scholars (Walker, 2006). It is not known to what extent unions and certain provisions of collective bargaining agreements impede accountability. It is not known to what extent unions are a reflection of the subculture in a department, or give legal force to one set of tendencies within that subculture to the exclusion of others.

Finally, as explained at the outset, this paper has not discussed agency-level accountability. The two subjects should not be discussed in isolation from each other. Does the introduction of agency-level accountability procedures (e.g., demonstrable improvements with respect to crime, disorder, quality of life) have some feedback effect on individual-level accountability? Does the very idea of accountability in the one area increase sensitivity to its importance in the other area? Does, for example, training

related to community policing or problem-oriented policing have some positive “spill-over” effect with regard to individual-level accountability?

In short, a comprehensive discussion of police accountability would embrace a range of issues that go far beyond the specific topics covered in this paper.

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**POLICE INNOVATION AND CRIME PREVENTION:  
LESSONS LEARNED FROM POLICE RESEARCH OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS**

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## *Introduction*

In a recent volume (Weisburd and Braga, 2006), a group of leading scholars presented contrasting perspectives on eight major innovations in American policing developed over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. In response to rising crime rates and growing public dissatisfaction, police departments needed to improve their performance and innovation provided the opportunity to make these improvements. These innovations included community policing, “broken windows” policing, problem-oriented policing, “pulling levers” policing, third-party policing, hot spots policing, Compstat, and evidence-based policing.<sup>1</sup> These strategies represented fundamental changes to the business of policing. However, as many police scholars and executives point out, improving police performance through innovation is often not straightforward. Police departments are highly resistant to change and police officers often experience difficulty in implementing new programs (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, 1990; Capowich and Roehl, 1994; Sadd and Grinc, 1994). The available evidence on key dimensions of police performance associated with these eight innovations, such as crime control effectiveness and community satisfaction with services provided, is also surprisingly limited. These observations are not unique to the policing field. For example, as Elmore (1997) suggests, the field of education was awash in innovation during the 1990s, but there is little evidence examining whether those innovations advanced the performance of schools, students, or graduates.

While our knowledge about the effects of these innovations on police performance is still developing, we think there is much reason for optimism about the future of policing. This period of innovation has demonstrated that police can prevent crime and can improve their relationships

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<sup>1</sup> This is, of course, not an exhaustive list of innovation in policing during this time period. There is also some practical overlap across these categories. For instance, police departments engaging community policing may deal with specific crime problems

with the communities they serve. In the near future, we don't anticipate the dramatic strategic innovations that characterized the last two decades. Rather, we expect further refinement of our knowledge of "what works" in policing, under what circumstances particular strategies may work, and why these strategies are effective in improving police performance. The challenge for the future of policing is to continue making progress in further developing and implementing promising strategies while addressing the new problems of public safety that have been created by 9/11 and the concerns that it has raised about the threat of terrorism and the need for police commitment to homeland security.

#### *The Form and Character of Recent Police Innovations*

Community policing was one of the first new approaches to policing to emerge in this modern period of police innovation. Community policing programs were already being implemented and advocated in the 1980s (Trojanowicz, 1982, 1989; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988), and by the 1990s, the idea of community policing had affected most American police agencies. Police practices associated with community policing have been diverse and have often changed over time. Foot patrol, for example, was considered an important element of community policing in the 1980s, but has not been a core component of more recent community policing programs. Community policing has often been implemented in combination with other programs, such as problem-oriented policing, thus making it difficult to distinguish the core components of community policing from those of other innovations that developed during this time period.

One core element of the community policing movement was that the community should play a central role in defining the problems the police address, and that these problems should

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through problem-oriented policing and broken windows policing. Our approach was to identify innovations that had influence on



extend much beyond conventional law enforcement. As Kelling and Moore (1988: 4) argue, “during the 1950s and 1960s, police thought they were law enforcement agencies primarily fighting crime.” In the “community policing era,” the police function broadens and includes order maintenance, conflict resolution, provision of services through problem solving, as well as other activities” (Kelling and Moore, 1988: 2). One way to understand the early development of community policing is to recognize that it responds to the question: What is the justification for the police if they cannot prevent crime? While crime fighting has increasingly become a central concern in community policing over the last decade, an important contribution of community policing to police innovation was its recognition that there were many critical community problems that the police could address that were not traditionally defined as crime problems. The expansion of the police function was to become an important part of many of the innovations discussed in this paper. The definition of new tasks can be seen in part as a response to the failure of police to achieve the crime control goals of the professional model of policing (Kelling et al., 1974; Spelman and Brown, 1984; Greenwood et al., 1977).

Other innovations in policing in this period also looked to redefine the role of the police in one way or another. Broken windows policing also seeks to direct the police to problems that had often been ignored in standard police practices. Wilson and Kelling (1982) identified a link between social disorder and crime which suggested the importance of police paying attention to many problems that were seen in earlier decades as peripheral to the police function. Wilson and Kelling argued that concern with disorder was an essential ingredient for doing something about crime problems. The “broken windows” thesis suggested that serious crime developed because the police and citizens did not work together to prevent urban decay and social disorder. In the context of crime, Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that “untended behavior leads to the

breakdown of community controls” (31). Broken windows encourages the police to be concerned with problems of disorder, and moves crime itself to a secondary, or at least second-stage goal of the police.

Problem-oriented policing also sought to broaden the problems that police approached. In Herman Goldstein’s original formulation of problem-oriented policing in 1979 he argued that the “police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral problems that arise in the community” (1979: 242). Goldstein suggested that the police could impact crime and other problems if they took a different approach, in this case, the problem-oriented policing approach. In order for the police to be more efficient and effective, they must gather information about incidents and design an appropriate response based on the nature of the underlying conditions that cause the problem(s) (Goldstein, 1990). As summarized by Eck and Spelman,

Underlying conditions create problems. These conditions might include the characteristics of the people involved (offenders, potential victims, and others), the social setting in which these people interact, the physical environment, and the way the public deals with these conditions. A problem created by these conditions may generate one or more incidents. These incidents, while stemming from a common source, may appear to be different. For example, social and physical conditions in a deteriorated apartment complex may generate burglaries, acts of vandalism, intimidation of pedestrians by rowdy teenagers, and other incidents. These incidents, some of which come to police attention, are symptoms of the problem. The incidents will continue as long as the problem that creates them persists (1987: xvi).

And in Goldstein’s words, the problem-solving process requires:

Identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, weighing the merits of these alternatives, and choosing among them (1979: 236).

Pulling levers policing strategies adopt a problem-oriented approach, but provides a broader and more comprehensive combination of strategies than more traditional problem-oriented policing programs. Pioneered in Boston to deal with an “epidemic” of youth violence (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996), the pulling levers approach, in its simplest form, consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Kennedy, 1997, 2006).

Third party policing offers another solution to the failures of the standard policing model. It follows suggestions made by Herman Goldstein (1979) that the “tool box” of police strategies be expanded. In this case however, the resources of the police are expanded to “third parties” that are believed to offer significant new resources for doing something about crime and disorder. Third party policing asserts that the police cannot successfully deal with many problems on their own, and thus that the failures of traditional policing models may be found in the limits of police powers. Using civil ordinances and civil courts, or the resources of private agencies, third party policing recognizes that much social control is exercised by institutions other than the police and that crime can be managed through agencies other than the criminal law.

Hot spots policing was first examined in the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). Drawing upon empirical evidence that crime was clustered in

discrete hot spots (Pierce et al., 1988; Sherman et al., 1989), Sherman and Weisburd argued that preventive patrol might be more effective if it was more tightly focused. If “only 3 percent of the addresses in a city produce more than half of all the requests for police response, if no police are dispatched to 40 percent of the addresses and intersections in a city over one year, and , if among the 60 percent with any requests the majority register only one request per year, then concentrating police in a few locations makes more sense than spreading them evenly through a beat” (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995: 629). Hot spots policing does not demand that the police change their strategies, but requires that they focus them more carefully at places where crime is clustered.

Compstat also responds to the failures of the traditional model by critiquing the ways in which the police carry out their task. However, in the case of Compstat the focus is less on the specific strategies that the police are involved in and more on the nature of police organization itself. If as Herman Goldstein noted in 1979 that the failures of the standard model of policing could be explained by the fact that police organizations were poorly organized to do something about crime, Compstat sought to overcome that pathology. It sought to empower the command structure to do something about crime problems. William Bratton, the New York City police chief who coined the term and developed the program writes:

We created a system in which the police commissioner, with his executive core, first empowers and then interrogates the precinct commander, forcing him or her to come up with a plan to attack crime. But it should not stop there. At the next level down, it should be the precinct commander, taking the same role as the commissioner, empowering and interrogating the platoon commander. Then , at the third level, the platoon commander should be asking his sergeants... all the way down until everyone in the entire organization is empowered and motivated, active and assessed and successful. It works in all organizations, whether it's 38,000 cops or Mayberry, R.F.D. (Bratton, 1998:239).

Evidence based policing also traces the failures of traditional policing practices to the ways in which the police carry out their tasks. The approach is drawn from a much wider set of public policy concerns, and a broader policy movement concerning the use of rigorous evidence in forming practice (e.g. “evidence-based” medicine). Much police practice is based on tradition and clinical experience, and this is often the only guidance for criminal justice practitioners. Evidence based policing argues that it is understandable that standard models of policing had failed because successful strategies must be based on scientific evidence. This approach calls for the development of such evidence, and in particular for the expansion of controlled experimental studies of policing practices (Sherman, 1998).

#### *Categorizing Recent Police Innovations*

Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman (1997) suggest four distinct categories of police innovation: programmatic, administrative, technological, and strategic. These categories are not clearly separated from each other and, as Moore and his colleagues admit (1997), assigning any one innovation to one category over another is often a judgment call. Programmatic innovations establish new operational methods of using the resources of an organization to achieve particular results. These programs can include arresting fences as a way to discourage burglary, using police officers to provide drug education in the schools, and offering victim-resistance training to women. Administrative innovations are changes in how police organizations prepare themselves to conduct operations or account for their achievements. These include new ways of measuring the performance of an individual officer or the overall department as well as changes in personnel policies and practices such as new recruiting techniques, new training approaches, and new supervisory relations. Technological innovations depend on the acquisition or use of some

new piece of capital equipment such as nonlethal weapons, DNA typing, or crime mapping software.

Strategic innovations represent a fundamental change in the overall philosophy and orientation of the organization (Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman, 1997). These changes involve important redefinitions of the primary objectives of policing, the range of services and activities supplied by police departments, the means through which police officers achieve their goals, and the key internal and external relationships that are developed and maintained by the police. Strategic innovations include shifting from “law enforcement” to “problem solving” as a means of resolving incidents, forming working relationships with community groups as a tactic in dealing with drug markets, and recognizing citizen satisfaction as an important performance measure. These innovations are strategic because they involve changing some of the basic understandings about the ends or means of policing or the key structures of accountability that shaped overall police efforts under the standard model of policing (Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman, 1997). We feel that the eight innovations described in this volume represent related attempts to change the ends and means of policing and, therefore, should be regarded as strategic innovations.

Weisburd and Eck (2004) suggest that recent strategic innovations expand policing beyond standard practices along two dimensions: *diversity of approaches* and *level of focus* (see Figure 1). The “diversity of approaches” dimension represents the content of the practices employed or tools used by the police. As represented by the vertical axis, tools can range from mostly traditional law enforcement to a wide array of approaches. The horizontal axis represents the extent to which police practices are focused or targeted. Weisburd and Eck (2004) contrast standard police practices with hot spots policing, problem-oriented policing, and community

policing. The standard model of policing, with its emphasis on enforcing the law and its generalized application of law enforcement powers, scores low on both dimensions. Hot spots policing scores high on focus, but low on the diversity of tools used to control hot spot locations. Problem-oriented policing rates high on diversity of tools and focus as the approach challenges police officers to implement strategies designed to deal with the underlying conditions that give rise to discrete crime problems. Community policing, where police draw on a wider array of resources to prevent crime and engage the community in defining and dealing with problems, scores high on diversity of approaches. However, when implemented without problem-oriented policing, the approach is not well focused on crime problems and provides a common set of services throughout a jurisdiction.

Another dimension that could be added to Weisburd and Eck's (2004) classification of police practices is the degree to which the innovations change the goals of policing. Under the standard model, police departments were mostly focused on preventing serious crime by deterring and apprehending criminal offenders, serving justice by holding offenders accountable for their crimes, rendering immediate aid to people in crisis, and providing non-emergency services such as controlling traffic (Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994). While the eight innovations described identified above do not remove any of these goals from the tasks of policing, the new strategies rearrange the priorities among the goals and add new ones. Non-criminal and non-emergency quality of life problems receive much more attention from the new police strategies. Community and problem-oriented policing represent the most radical departures from standard police work. Community policing, in its various manifestations, challenges police officers to work with citizens to deal with a broader range of concerns, most notably fear of crime and social and physical disorder (Skogan, 2006). Problem-oriented policing similarly adds new goals

to policing, but it also reorganizes police actions from focusing on incidents as units of work to focusing on classes of problems to be addressed by responses that can be quite different from routine police activities (Eck, 2006). Other innovations represent less dramatic changes to standard police goals. For example, disorder policing, if engaged without community and problem-oriented policing, expands the police mandate to include social and physical disorder but does not radically change the tactics engaged by the police to deal with these problems (Sousa and Kelling, 2006; Taylor, 2006).

### *Crime and Disorder Control Effectiveness*

Research suggests that crime tends to cluster among a few places, offenders, and victims. For instance, Spelman and Eck (1989) examined several studies and estimated that 10 percent of the victims in the United States are involved in 40 percent of victimizations, 10 percent of offenders are involved in over 50 percent of crimes, and 10 percent of places are the sites of about 60 percent of crimes. In practice, the underlying conditions that give rise to crime problems and the resulting interventions to alleviate crime problems are likely to overlap these areas and, quite possibly, not fit nicely into distinct categories. For example, analysis of a gang violence problem may well reveal that much gang violence is retaliatory in nature (Decker, 1996) and that today's offenders are tomorrow's victims and vice versa. Analysis may also reveal that gang violence tends to cluster at particular places in the city (Block and Block, 1993; Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996). As such, police interventions to reduce gang violence may well address relevant features of places, offenders, and victims.

When police departments focus their efforts on identifiable risks, such as crime hot spots, repeat victims, and serious offenders, they are able to prevent crime and disorder (Braga, 2002;



Eck, 2003). The strongest evidence comes from evaluations of hot spots policing initiatives (Weisburd and Braga, 2006; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Braga (2001, 2005) presents evidence from five randomized controlled experiments and four quasi-experimental designs that hot spots policing programs generate crime control gains without significantly displacing crime to other locations. These crime prevention effects were reported at general crime hot spots (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), high-activity violent crime places (Braga et al., 1999), gun violence hot spots (Sherman and Rogan, 1995), and street-level drug markets (Weisburd and Green, 1995). Moreover, in the five evaluations that examined immediate spatial displacement, hot spots policing initiatives were more likely to generate a “diffusion of crime control benefits” to areas immediately surrounding the targeted hot spots (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994).

While the rigor of evaluation designs vary from simple before-after comparisons without control groups to randomized experiments, problem-oriented policing, when appropriately focused on specific crime problems, has been found to be effective in preventing crime (Sherman and Eck, 2002; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Researchers have found problem-oriented policing to be effective in controlling a wide range of specific crime and disorder problems such as burglaries in apartment complexes (Eck and Spelman, 1987), prostitution (Matthews, 1990), convenience store robberies (Hunter and Jeffrey, 1992), and alcohol-related violence in pubs and clubs (Homel et al., 1997). The available scientific evidence on third party policing is derived from a similar mix of studies with varying degrees of rigor. Nonetheless, Mazerolle and Ransley (2006) report that third party policing is effective in dealing with drug problems, violent crime problems and problems involving young people.

Pulling levers strategies also seem to be promising in controlling the violent behavior of groups of chronic offenders (Braga et al., 2001; Wellford et al., 2005; Kennedy, 2006). While

the pulling levers strategy has not yet been evaluated using the “gold standard” randomized controlled experimental design, five quasi-experiments and four simple assessments have found violence prevention effects associated with the approach. Quasi-experimental evaluations in Boston (Braga et al., 2001), Chicago (Papachristos et al., 2006), Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2006), Lowell (Braga et al., 2006), Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003) reported significant reductions in serious violence in the treatment cities and areas relative to comparison cities and areas. Simple pre-post assessments reported similar crime prevention gains in Baltimore (Braga, Kennedy, and Tita, 2002), Minneapolis (Kennedy and Braga, 1998), Stockton (CA) (Wakeling, 2003), and High Point (NC) (Coleman et al., 1999). This evidence provides an empirical basis for further program development, research, and evaluation (Welsh and Farrington, 2001).

As a general strategy, community policing has not been found to be effective in preventing crime (Mastrofski, 2006). The available research shows that unfocused community-oriented tactics such as foot patrol, storefront offices, newsletters, and community meetings do not reduce crime and disorder (Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). However, as will be discussed below, there is strong evidence to suggest that community policing tactics reduce fear of crime (Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). The available empirical evidence on the crime control effectiveness of broken windows policing is mixed (Sousa and Kelling, 2006; Taylor, 2006). It remains unclear whether police departments that engage a broad-based broken windows policing strategy actually reduce crime. Simple analyses of crime trend data suggest that cities experience decreases in crime after their police departments adopt Compstat (Silverman, 2006). However, since Compstat programs are often implemented in conjunction with other crime prevention initiatives such as broken windows and hot spots policing, it is very difficult to untangle the influence of Compstat on any observed

crime control gains (Weisburd et al., 2006). Moreover, in New York City and three other cities, further analysis revealed the observed decreases in crime began before the implementation of Compstat (Eck and Maguire, 2000; Weisburd et al., 2003; Weisburd et al., 2006). Compstat has yet to be proven as an effective crime control strategy in cities that have adopted the approach.

Evidence-based policing has not been empirically tested as an overall model of policing (Welsh, 2006). However, evidence-based police departments would draw policies and practices from a solid research base of strategies that have proven to be effective in controlling crime (Sherman, 1998). While an evidence-based approach to policing may have the unintended effect of limiting the ability of police to innovate by privileging evidence over experience (Moore, 2006), we do not believe that engaging an evidence-based approach would undermine the crime and disorder control effectiveness of police departments.

### *Community Reaction to Innovative Police Strategies*

In addition to concerns over the crime control effectiveness of the standard model of policing, police innovation in the 1980s and 1990s was also driven by high levels of community dissatisfaction with police services and a growing recognition that citizens had other concerns that required police action, such as fear of crime. Since citizen involvement in policing is a core element of community policing programs (Skogan, 2006), it is not surprising that we know most about citizen reaction to these types of programs. In general, broad-based community policing initiatives have been found to reduce fear of crime and improve the relationships between the police and the communities they serve (Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Community policing strategies that entail direct involvement of citizens and police, such as police community stations, citizen contract patrol, and coordinated community policing, have been found to reduce fear of crime among individuals and decrease individual concern about

crime in neighborhoods (Pate and Skogan, 1985; Wycoff and Skogan, 1986; Brown and Wycoff, 1987).

Community policing also enhances police legitimacy. Citizen support and cooperation is closely linked to judgments about the legitimacy of the police (Tyler, 2004). When citizens view the police as legitimate legal authorities, they are more likely to cooperate and obey the law (Tyler, 1990). Public judgments about the legitimacy of the police are influenced by their assessments of the manner in which the police exercise their authority (Tyler, 1990, 2004). The available evidence suggests that the police generally obey the laws that limit their power (Skogan and Meares, 2004). However, minorities consistently express significantly lower confidence in the police when compared to whites (Tyler, 2004). Community policing improves citizens' judgments of police actions (Skogan, 2006). For example, over an eight-year period of community policing, Chicago residents' views of their police improved on measures of their effectiveness, responsiveness and demeanor (Skogan and Steiner, 2004). Importantly, these improvements were shared among Latinos, African-Americans and whites (Skogan and Steiner, 2004). Clearly, community policing has been a strategic innovation that has helped bridge the police confidence gap in minority communities.

While there is a growing body of systematic research on the effects of community policing on citizen satisfaction with the police, there is a noteworthy lack of research assessing the effects of other police innovations on police-community relations. This gap in knowledge is noteworthy as many of the contributions to this volume suggest a tension between the crime prevention effectiveness of focused police efforts and their potential harmful effects on police-community relations (Meares, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Braga and Winship, 2006; Weisburd and Braga, 2006; Mazerolle and Ransley, 2006). Certainly, legitimacy is linked to the

ability of the police to prevent crime and keep neighborhoods safe. However, the police also need public support and cooperation to be effective in preventing crime. While residents in neighborhoods suffering from high levels of crime often demand higher levels of enforcement, they still want the police to be respectful and lawful in their crime control efforts (Tyler, 2004; Skogan and Mearns, 2004). Residents don't want family members, friends, and neighbors to be targeted unfairly by enforcement efforts or treated poorly by overaggressive police officers. If the public's trust and confidence in the police is undermined, the ability of the police to prevent crime will be weakened by lawsuits, declining willingness to obey the law, and withdrawal from existing partnerships (Tyler, 1990; 2001). The political fallout from illegitimate police actions can seriously impede the ability of police departments to engage innovative crime control tactics.

This dilemma has been described elsewhere as "the trust dilemma" (Altshuler and Behn, 1997). Innovation may be necessary for establishing public faith in the ability of government agencies to perform. But before the public grants government agencies a license to be truly innovative, it needs to be convinced that these same agencies have the ability to perform (Altshuler and Behn, 1997). Police departments should be encouraged to pursue effective strategies that aggressively focus on identifiable risks such as hot spots, repeat victims, and high-rate offenders. However, police departments must be careful in their application of these approaches to crime prevention. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that "broken windows" policing strategies enjoy broad community support as a legitimate way to reduce crime and disorder (Sousa and Kelling, 2006). However, when the "broken windows" approach is distorted into so-called "zero-tolerance" policing, indiscriminate and aggressive law enforcement can negatively affect police-community relations (Taylor, 2006). To avoid engaging tactics that will generate strong negative community reaction, police departments

should encourage and embrace community involvement in their crime prevention efforts. In Boston, the involvement of black ministers in the police-led pulling levers violence prevention strategy allowed law enforcement agencies to pursue more intrusive and aggressive tactics that would not have been possible without community involvement (Braga and Winship, 2006).

### *Police Reaction to Innovative Strategies*

The eight innovations differed in their degree of departure from the standard model of policing. The police most easily adopt innovations that require the least radical departures from their hierarchical paramilitary organizational structures, continue incident-driven and reactive strategies, and maintain police sovereignty over crime issues. In its most basic form, hot spots policing simply concentrates traditional enforcement activity at high crime places. The familiarity of the approach to police is straightforward as they have a long history of temporarily heightening enforcement levels in problem areas. While law enforcement tools are deployed in a new way, the pulling levers deterrence strategy focuses existing criminal justice activities on groups of chronic offenders. Broken windows policing involves making arrests of minor offenders to control disorder and, as an end product, reduce more serious crime. As Kennedy (2006) observes, “law enforcement likes enforcing the law.” Strategies such as hot spots, broken windows, pulling levers policing appeal to law enforcement practitioners primarily because they allow mostly traditional tactics to be deployed in new ways with the promise of considerably greater results. Compstat, as implemented by most American police agencies, has been focused more on reinforcing and legitimating the traditional bureaucratic military model of police organization than on innovation in the practices of policing (Weisburd et al., 2003; Weisburd et al., 2006).

While all major American police agencies report some form of community policing as an important component of their operations (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003), the police have been generally resistant to its adoption. This is not surprising since community policing involves the most radical change to existing police organizations. Skogan (2006) and Mastrofski (2006) report many shortcomings in the practical application of its three core elements: citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization. Citizens are generally used as information sources rather than engaged as partners in producing public safety. Officers prefer law enforcement strategies to developing and implementing alternative problem-oriented responses. Most “community-oriented” police agencies haven’t made the organizational changes necessary to decentralize decision-making authority to the neighborhood level. Similarly, the available research on problem-oriented policing suggests that police officers experience difficulty during all stages of the problem-oriented process (Braga and Weisburd, 2006). Problem analysis is generally weak and implemented responses largely consist of traditional enforcement activities. Problem-oriented policing as practiced in the field is but a shallow version of the process recommended by Herman Goldstein (1990). Given its close relationship to community and problem-oriented policing, it seems likely that police departments engaging third-party policing will encounter similar practical problems.

It is not remarkable that the strategies that require the most radical changes to existing police practices and structures report the greatest difficulties in implementation. Nonetheless, the available evidence indicates a gradual transformation in police attitudes towards adopting these new strategies. In addition to the widespread reporting of innovative police practices across the United States, police officers’ views towards the community and problem-oriented policing philosophy are becoming more positive. As summarized by Skogan (2006), studies

point to positive changes in officers' views once they are involved in community policing, positive findings with respect to job satisfaction and views of the community, and growing support for community policing in districts that engage the strategy compared to districts that maintain traditional activities. Police history shows that it takes a long time for new models of policing to fully develop. The standard model of policing was itself a reform in reaction to corrupt and brutal police practices during the so-called "political era" of policing (Walker, 1992). Initially, the reform movement progressed very slowly; in 1920, only a few departments could be labeled "professional" or engaging the basic tenets of the standard model. It wasn't until the 1950s that virtually all American police departments were organized around the principles set forth by O.W. Wilson, August Vollmer, and other reformers (Walker, 1992).

#### *Conclusion: Police Innovation and the Future of Policing*

What will the future bring? Will the police continue to innovate at a rapid pace? We don't anticipate a new wave of strategic police innovation in the near future. The current context of policing suggests that future innovation will be incremental in nature. The conditions in the 1980s and 1990s that created the pressure for innovation simply no longer exist. Indeed, the atmosphere is precisely the opposite of earlier decades. Overall crime is down and federal funds available for demonstration projects to spur innovation are very limited. While the available research evidence is not as strong as some police executives believe, there is a general sense that these police innovations work in preventing crime and satisfying community concerns. This perspective on the crime control effectiveness of new police practices is reinforced by the modest research evidence briefly described here and in other reviews (e.g. Skogan and Frydl, 2004) and by a cursory examination of crime trends over the 15 years. The Federal Bureau of



Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports reveals a 33% decrease in the Index crime rate from 5,820 per 100,000 residents in 1990 to 3,899 per 100,000 residents in 2005 ([http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table\\_01.html](http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01.html)). While no single factor, including innovative policing, can be invoked as the cause of the crime decline of the 1990s (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000), the "nothing works" view of policing in the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g. Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Bayley, 1994) is no longer a topic of discussion in most policing circles.

It is important to note here that a recent increase in violent crime has generated concern among many urban mayors and police executives. In 2005, for the first since 1991, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported an increase in the violent crime rate.<sup>2</sup> Nationwide, homicides increased by 5% between 2004 and 2005. In smaller cities, homicides had increased by as much as 12.5%.<sup>3</sup> In media accounts, academics and practitioners have suggested that these recent increases in homicide are linked to a resurgence of urban gang violence and the availability of firearms (Johnson, 2006; Mansnerus, 2006). While violent crime rates and homicide counts are nowhere near the levels seen in the early years of the 1990s,<sup>4</sup> urban mayors and police executives are placing pressure on the Federal Government to reinvest in innovative police programs that could help cities address these concerning increases in violent crime (Police Executive Research Forum, 2006).

Many innovative changes to policing appear positive and have shown crime control and community benefits. However, this brief review reveals the need for greater research and knowledge about the effects of these innovations on police departments and the communities

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<sup>2</sup> The violent crime rate increased from 463.2 per 100,000 residents in 2004 to 469.2 per 100,000 residents.

<sup>3</sup> In cities with a population of one million residents or more, homicides increased by only 0.5%. However, cities between 250,000 and 499,999 residents experienced an increase of 9.4%, cities between 100,000 and 249,999 residents experienced an increase of 12.5%, and cities between 50,000 and 99,999 residents experienced an increase of 12.4%. Data on weapons used in homicide were not released by the FBI in their preliminary report. <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/2005preliminary/05jan-dec.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> In 1991, there were 24,703 homicides and a violent crime rate of 758.2 per 100,000 residents. In 2005, there were 16,692 homicides and a violent crime rate of 469.2 per 100,000 residents.

they serve. Relative to other criminal justice institutions, the police are very open to research and evaluation activities with universities and other research institutions (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). We believe that the police will continue to work with researchers to better understand crime problems, community concerns, police behavior, and structural issues in their organizations. These collaborations will support the police in further refining their practices to become even more effective, fair, efficient, and accountable agencies in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Skogan and Frydl, 2004).

Over the next couple of decades, we anticipate that individual police departments will continue to institutionalize innovative practices by making administrative adjustments to their organizations and by developing a set of supporting strategies that fit the nature of their crime problems in the neighborhoods they police. Administrative arrangements and portfolios of crime prevention interventions will necessarily vary across departments as the police become more specialized in dealing with local crime problems. In essence, we believe police departments will continue their evolution from “production lines” that engage a static set of processes that are used over and over again to produce the same result to “job shops” where each police assignment is treated as a new challenge that might require a new solution (Moore, Sparrow, and Spelman, 1997).

We also anticipate some modest innovation in the development of systems to measure the performance of police departments. As police departments engage a broader set of tactics to deal with a wide range of community problems and concerns, there will be a need for sensible performance measurement that capture the value created by police along a number of dimensions such as reducing criminal victimization; calling offenders to account; reducing fear and enhancing personal security; guaranteeing safety in public spaces; using financial resources

fairly, efficiently, and effectively; using force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively; and satisfying customer demands/ achieving legitimacy with those policed (Moore, 2002).

Appropriate measurement plays a vital role in transforming police departments into the learning laboratories they are now positioned to become in the future (Maguire, 2004).

American police departments, however, will be challenged to maintain their current trajectory by the new set of homeland security demands created in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy. In many ways, this is a new crisis for police departments, as their goals will be further expanded by a new focus on preventing future terrorist attacks and dealing with potentially catastrophic events. On the one hand, this new set of demands, with its emphasis on collecting intelligence on terrorist networks, apprehending terror operatives, and protecting likely targets, may push policing back to a more professional model that is distant from the community. Indeed, there is real potential for a backward shift as federal financial support and attention has been directed toward enhancing local law enforcement's role in maintaining homeland security while, at the same time, funding for community crime prevention efforts has been drastically reduced. On the other hand, this crisis may create a new source for innovation as police departments will strive to continue their recent success in dealing with crime and community concerns. The U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services office has already sponsored working group sessions and conferences on using community policing strategies to respond to the challenge of homeland security (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004).

Over the last two decades, the police industry has undergone radical changes in the ends and means of policing. This period of innovation has yielded a set of very promising strategies that can improve the ability of the police to prevent crime and enhance their relationships with the communities they serve. Police departments will be challenged to continue developing these

new approaches while meeting the homeland security demands of the post-9/11 world.

Nonetheless, we believe that the future is promising for police agencies, as they will continue to evolve into more effective and legitimate governmental institutions.

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


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**Figure 1**  
**Dimensions of Policing Strategies**



Adapted from Weisburd and Eck (1994)