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POLITICS OF CRIME IN THE 1970s:
A TWO CITY COMPARISON

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PREFACE

The research described here was conducted while I was a Research Fellow at the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. I am grateful to all those at the Center for making such research opportunities available and am especially grateful to the staff of the Reactions to Crime Project who assisted me. I received very helpful comments from those who read all or parts of this manuscript; Ted Robert Gurr, Herbert Jacob, Dan Lewis, Michael Maxfield and Armin Rosencranz. A special thanks to Marlene Simon for editing supervision, Wesley G. Skogan whose pushing and pulling got me to produce a final copy and to my wife, Mary Brooks, who served as my best critic and motivating force.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Crime and politics cross paths often on the American scene. In fact, the issue of crime has been on politician's lips for most of America's history. Because police are given the task of controlling crime, their involvement in politics parallels the story of crime and politics. With the increase in awareness of crime in the 1960s and 1970s (and most likely an increase in the actual amount of crime), crime became a leading political issue.

At the national level, Barry Goldwater introduced the problem of "crime in the cities" as a campaign issue in the 1964 Presidential campaign. After that campaign the nation began to see an increase in "law-and-order" candidates running for offices at all levels of government. Richard Nixon used a law-and-order platform in both his successful 1968 and 1972 Presidential campaigns.

Crime is a natural political issue. It is a subject that is of interest to a broad group of people, as is evidenced by the extensive coverage crime

is given by news and entertainment media. It is never publicly praised; therefore politicians are secure in taking stands against crime. A politician's concern about crime is always timely. Finally, it is an enduring issue. The world has no record of a society without crime. As with most enduring issues, however, public interest is not constantly focused on it.

The following pages trace politics-of-crime during the mid- 1970s in two cities: San Francisco and Philadelphia. The cities are very different, yet both share a concern over the issue of crime as exhibited in political activities.

San Francisco is a unique city. Because it is one of the smallest "big cities" in the U.S. (with a 1975 population estimated at 664,520), researchers often have difficulty classifying it. During the mid-1970s San Francisco had a crime problem and the issue of crime was constantly on the political agenda of the city, although it appeared in many different forms,

Three events were the focus of the politics-of-crime in San Francisco and are central to this

study: the Zebra killings, the police strike, and the election and attempted recall of Mayor Moscone, Sheriff Hongisto, and District Attorney Freitas.

Philadelphia is classified by researchers as a northeastern industrial city. To most persons it is known by its tourist labels like "Birthplace of the Nation" and "City of Brotherly Love". Systematic studies of the contemporary social and political interaction within the city are rare.

Before 1950 Philadelphia was among the "machine cities" of America. Then, in the 1950s and early 1960s, Philadelphia began to lose this image and became a model for reform advocates. That model disappeared with the election of Frank Rizzo as mayor in 1971. The retreat from reform that started with Mayor James Tate was intensified by Rizzo. Rizzo's policies were not considered unreasonable by many residents, however, as was demonstrated by his re-election victory in 1975. But under Rizzo the city became divided over the issue of race. One of the major reasons for Rizzo's popularity was his law-and-order approach. Having developed the reputation

as a "tough cop" before becoming mayor, he perpetuated his image as the leader who could do something about citizens' fear of crime.

It is therefore necessary for any study of politics-of-crime in Philadelphia in the 1970s to center on Frank Rizzo. The presentation here will trace the change of the city from a liberally oriented, reform-minded city to one with a leader who centered politics on fear and force.

The descriptions of the two cities are separate. Each is presented chronologically and most comparisons between the two cities are reserved for the last two chapters.

Since the method of research used for both cities was similar, a comparative analysis of the conclusions was possible. Each city was examined in three stages. First, general works about the city being studied were examined. These included political and historical narratives of activities in the city during the 1970s as well as more empirical studies of politics, crime, and/or police during this time.

The second step was designed to highlight politics-of-crime events of the 1970s for the cities. Using various indices of national publications, a chronology of major events was developed to guide later research. Using national indices served two major purposes. First, it confirmed and sharpened focus on important politics-of-crime events of the period. Local events which appear on the national media agenda are "super big" events in the local area and are therefore, important events on which to focus research. The second purpose of this stage was to discover "in-depth" research pieces on the events studied. These pieces provided extensive background for the final stage of the research.

The third stage involved the most specific research. First, in-depth articles were read. Second, area newspapers were read for each day during the time period studied, providing the quotes and descriptions used in the following pages. By reading the papers in chronological order, the researcher was able to develop an impression of the flow of events and attitudes projected by the media. Had

"spot checks" been made of newspapers articles, conclusions made here about politics-of-crime in these two cities could have been quite different. A detailed description of methodology used for this study and the sources used is provided in Appendix A.

The following abbreviations are used for the newspaper sources quoted in the report:

NYT - New York Times

PT - Philadelphia Tribune

SBG - San Francisco Bay Guardian

SFC - San Francisco Chronicle

SFE - San Francisco Examiner

Part I contains chapters covering politics-of-crime in San Francisco. Part II chapters consider politics-of-crime in Philadelphia and Part III, the final two chapters, uses the two case studies to reach some general conclusions about politics-of-crime in American cities.

Chapters Two and Eight are general descriptions of the two cities, providing background information for the description of events provided in Chapters

Three through Five and Nine through Eleven. Chapters Six and Twelve are brief descriptions of the political actors in the two cities during the 1970s, and Chapters Seven and Thirteen consist of concluding comments about politics-of-crime in each city. The last two chapters, Fourteen and Fifteen, provide a comparative framework for understanding politics-of-crime in an urban setting and how events in San Francisco and Philadelphia fit within the framework.

Our research was designed to examine politics-of-crime in these two cities through the end of 1977 and was written to reflect this arbitrary cut off date. Since the end of 1977, both these cities have experienced major politics-of-crime events. In San Francisco, Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk were assassinated by another Supervisor, Dan White. The resulting controversy over White's trial and sentence lead to Police Chief Charles Gain's resignation.

In Philadelphia, the U.S. Justice Department has pressed charges against the Philadelphia Police Department over alleged police brutality in the city.

Mayor Frank Rizzo is one individual named in the charges.

To include any more than a mention of these incidents would warrant a research project as extensive as the one presented here. Therefore, the case studies have not been changed but are written as if the history of these two cities ceased in early 1978.

PART I
SAN FRANCISCO

Chapter 2. San Francisco--A General Description

The following is intended as a general description of San Francisco: its image, and its atmosphere. It is not meant to suggest that any set of environmental causes brought about the events of 1974-77; it provides only a backdrop to add insight to those events.

San Francisco is one city in a metropolitan region that includes such diverse cities as Oakland, Berkeley and San Jose. It is surrounded by many small suburban communities which provide homes for thousands of people who stream into the city to work every day. San Francisco had a population of 664,520 according to the 1975 census estimates. As in other large cities, population declined between 1970 and 1975.

The city has a number of neighborhoods. Although some have undergone change, most have maintained a similar character through the years. Neighborhoods most frequently mentioned in relation to crime include the following: 1) Hunter's point--a poor, black area

with the typical problems of housing project failures, including unemployment. 2) the Tenderloin area--the skid-row area of the city. Like other similar areas across the U.S., high crime rates in the Tenderloin are not surprising. The crime issue in the Tenderloin is centered on prostitution and pornography and police efforts to prevent the spread of crime from the district. 3) Chinatown--which made frequent but brief appearances on the crime issue agenda. Articles about Chinatown gangs sometimes appear in the SFC. One especially violent period of gang wars in 1974 received extensive publicity. A tension seems to exist between the locals of Chinatown wishing to take care of their own problems and the need for intervention by "outsiders" like police and other social agencies. 4) The Sunset and Nob Hill areas--the middle class and wealthy, influential areas of San Francisco. They became a part of the politics-of-crime picture when the supposed "crime wave" moved into these areas and the crime problem moved up on the political agenda.

Economically, San Francisco has the image of being a "clean industry" town. The downtown area is the center for many investment and financial firms as well as headquarters for firms whose production sites are spread throughout the west (paper, mining, shipping, etc.). Another major industry for San Francisco is tourism. The famed cable cars, Chinatown and the Golden Gate Bridge attract visitors from around the world and the needs of tourists, including their safety, are a political issue.

Interaction of political institutions of the area is best described by Wirt (1974). The city is run by an eleven-member Board of Supervisors, the only city-county government in the state of California. Until 1977, the Board was elected on an at-large basis. Now they are elected from districts. The mayor is popularly elected but his/her power is subordinate to the supervisors. The mayor makes most appointments to the many commissions in charge of city agencies and can use his/her means of persuasion and veto to exert some control on city policy.

San Francisco also has its version of city manager--a Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is appointed by the mayor but serves for life, supposedly eliminating his/her political connections. The CAO is responsible for running the city, leaving politics of city government to the mayor.

The city is governed by a strict charter and almost all major actions need charter authority. Therefore, in every election citizens vote on many lengthy and sometimes conflicting charter propositions. Until the city worker and police/fire strikes described later, the proposition vote was the method used by city workers to guarantee their consistently high pay and benefit provisions.

As Wirt describes, these various forces in city politics leave the city with no single person or group to serve as an effective leader. Power is dispersed so that no one group can effectively work with the problems facing the city, much less the crises such as those described in the following reports.

Crime is a problem for San Francisco. No one

can accuse those politicians who point to the crime in San Francisco of creating an issue. Violent crimes have attracted the most attention. The Reactions to Crime Project (1978) has shown that the crime rate in San Francisco is higher than in both Chicago and Philadelphia, using both statistics on reported crimes and victimization surveys. The reported crime rates shown in Figure 1 demonstrate reasons for political concern.

Figure 1 about here

While all of these political, economic and population factors are important, one of the most important aspects of San Francisco is its image. First of all, California has the reputation of being the home of new and sometimes "strange" ideas, and San Francisco has an image of being the "strangest" of all California cities. For example, shortly after the assassination attempt on President Ford in San Francisco, a presidential aide described the city as "the kook capital of the world" (SFC, 25 September,

FIGURE 1. Reported Crime Rates for San Francisco 1974-1977.

(Taken from SFC 10 January, 1975; 15 January, 1977, 11 January, 1978)

	<u>1977</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1973</u>
Homicides	142	131	135	131	104
Forcible Rape	596	619(396)*	433	449	565
Robberies	5,424	6,628	5,689	4,451	4,845
Aggravated Assaults	3,211	3,385	2,765	2,694	2,657
Burglaries	19,258	21,992	17,508	14,385	15,505
Vehicle Theft	10,631	10,186	8,606	8,865	9,783

*Conflicting figures from 1977 and 1978 reports.

1976). A more reasonable description is provided by editors of Newsweek in the lead to an article on San Francisco crime.

From the lusty days of the Barbary Coast to the flowering of Haight-Ashbury, San Francisco has always been a city that valued wide-open life-styles and distrusted authority. (20 December, 1976, p. 34).

The best understanding of the phenomenon of San Francisco comes from Howard Becker and Irving Horowitz's description of San Francisco as having a "culture of civility" (Becker, 1971). The civility includes such things as giving up the common notion that "anyone who would do that (take dope, dress in women's clothes, sell his body or whatever) would do anything" (1971:6). They suggest that citizens of San Francisco do not subscribe to this "domino theory" logic. (This might be less true now as can be seen by the prostitution freedom and crackdown reaction of 1976-77). Becker and Horowitz sum up this attitude:

In short, San Franciscans know that they are supposed to be sophisticated and let that knowledge guide their public actions, whatever their private feelings. According to another well known law of social psychology, their private feelings often come to resemble their public actions, and they learn to delight in what frightens citizens of less civil cities. (1971:8)

The modern image goes back to 1967--the year of the "summer of love" when hippies settled in San Francisco arriving with "flowers in their hair" according to a popular song of the time. An excellent description of the summer and how it turned sour is provided by the Smith et al article in the Becker book (1971). In this article the authors describe the shift of Haight-Ashbury from a hippie center, to a drug abuse paradise, to a typical big city skid row. Since that time, San Francisco has become a haven from repression for social "deviants,"

Because of national exposure from the Patty Hearst, SLA, Manson and Squeaky Fromme incidents, the media has described the city as a center for radical groups. Justified or not, San Francisco has gained the reputation described and it does attract persons wishing to live in the open-attitude environment the image projects.

CHAPTER THREE: The Zebra Killings and Other
Craziness--1973-74

At the end of 1973 and for the first half of 1974, streets of San Francisco became barren of activity as residents became more and more concerned about a series of random shootings. With crime becoming a national issue, the national media developed the story of the San Francisco shootings-- events that became known as the Zebra killings.

"Zebra" was simply the police radio code used in this criminal case which became a political event as well. With press coverage, Zebra began to take on meanings never dreamed by the police--the most disturbing of which was a supposed reference to the black versus white nature of the killings.

The bay area was in the midst of celebrating the successful season of the Oakland A's who had won the pennant and soon would win a World Series Title. On the national scene, northern California liberal Democrats were shedding few tears for Spiro T. Agnew whose stonewalling had collapsed into a quick resignation, or for his boss, President Nixon, who was attempting to disregard all the "media hype" over the "third rate burglary" called Watergate.

On the crime beat, police had successfully solved the Nob Hill rapist case and were attempting to find the "paper bag murderer"--a young white man who kept a gun in a paper bag and

would shoot people seemingly without motive. Soon to make headlines would be the stir in the political community following the shooting of Oakland School Superintendent, Marcus Foster. After the shooting, police would begin to take seriously a group they knew little about, the SLA, when the group confirmed their involvement in the Foster slaying by noting that the fatal bullets had been tipped with cyanide.

On October 21 and 22 readers of San Francisco papers read of a gruesome execution-type slaying of a woman and the attempt to murder her husband. This was the start of the Zebra killings. Nathan Adams (1978) gives this description of the murder.

The first killing took place on October 20, 1973. It was an evening, and fog, like soft, wet cotton, had begun to creep in from the Pacific, masking the great bridge to Oakland across San Francisco Bay, and the Golden Gate, which links San Francisco with Marin County. In residential neighborhoods, it muffled the sounds of passing traffic. But the city's tawdry North Beach district was never quiet. Its topless bars and porno shops did a thriving business even on a damp, midweek night.

Shortly before 9:30 p.m., Quita and Richard Hague, a young married couple who lived on the outskirts of the North Beach section, finished dinner and decided to go for a stroll. Preferring the quiet of the side streets and alleyways, they headed away from the neon jungle of restaurants and stores shuttered for the night.

They had walked only a block or two when they noticed a tan-colored van parked at the curbside just ahead of them. Two young blacks--one shaved bald and dressed in a sport shirt, the other neatly attired in a suit jacket--lounged against the fender. Another man waited inside the van. As the Hagues approached, the shaven-headed black was handed a pistol from the

front seat. He held it out of sight. As the couple drew even with the van, he stepped forward, blocking the path.

"Don't give us any trouble," he told Richard Hague.
"Just you and your lady get in the van quietly."

Terrified, Quita Hague broke away and began to run.
"You better come back," the bald gunman called after her. "I'll kill him. I mean it."

She returned. Someone slid back the panel door, and the Hagues were flung into the van atop grimy rags and cardboard strips. Quita's hands were bound tightly behind her back, her face pressed against the floor. Nearby in the darkness, the abductors beat her husband into unconsciousness.

The van was moving. It stopped in an area off the main road, the door was slammed open and Quita Hague was dragged out onto the ground. A split second later, a heavy-bladed machete whistled down and all but severed her head from her body. Her executioner paused, then plucked off her wedding ring. Meanwhile, from a newly arrived auto, came the pop and sparkle of camera flash-bulbs.

At 11 o'clock that night, San Francisco police received a call from a motorist who had been hailed by a badly beaten man claiming to have been kidnapped. He said he had been left for dead. His wife was still missing.

Stabbed numerous times, bludgeoned, Richard Hague had somehow survived. While his statement to police was understandably rambling, detectives did manage to pinpoint the site of the attack -- a deserted railroad yard in the city's Portrero district. And there, lying across the rusted tracks, they found Quita Hague. It was a scene that made even the toughest of the investigators blanch and turn away. (1978, p. 205).

A month later (November 25) in a seemingly unrelated murder, a 53 year-old Palestinian shopkeeper was shot in the head with his hands tied behind his back. As \$1,000 was missing and robberies in this area were common, police listed the motive as "robbery." Only months later, when weapon comparisons were

made, did the police discover this was the first shooting in the Zebra murder spree.

An inside page of the December 12 edition of the SFC carried a brief, three paragraph article on the "motiveless" slaying of 26 year-old Paul Dancick. He was shot three times in the chest while making a call in a telephone booth. This later would be labeled as the third Zebra incident.

As indication of San Franciscans' immunity to crime stories, the next two Zebra shootings only received small notice in the SFC although both happened between 8 and 10 p.m. the night of December 13. One victim was killed and the other survived three shots in the chest.

A week later, Zebra killers would start a two-day spree that would touch off fear in San Francisco. On December 20, one man was killed and one woman survived the shootings. Two days later two more men were killed.

During the day before the second set of killings, police admitted to the public that there was a connection between the murders but could list the motive only as "senseless killings." The officer in charge of the case ordered an immediate expansion of the plain-clothes police force, placing officers in unmarked cars in all areas of the city, day and night. (SFC, December, 22, 1973).

The year ended with no more killings and newspaper stories on the random mass shootings disappeared. On January 28, police announced that they had solved the "paper bag murders" by arresting the son of a prominent San Francisco psychiatrist. The young man had started the random shooting shortly after his girlfriend had been raped. He said he would shoot men whom he thought had been the rapist. However, most of the random murders of the past few months were not solved by this arrest.

Two days later, as if acknowledging capture of their competition, Zebra killers struck five times in one evening. The five shootings resulted in four persons killed and one woman crippled when a bullet struck her spine.

The next morning the paper was filled with stories about the shootings (SFC, January 20, 1974: 1). One article detailed rumors of a theory that the killings were related to a rite of initiation by a white-hating black sect, a rumor denied by Chief of Inspectors, Charles Barca, who was in charge of the case. Mayor Joseph Alioto and the police chief asked all witnesses to come forward to help in the investigation. Captain Barca announced formation of the largest task force in the history of the police department and labeled it "Operation Zebra."

The killings began to receive national attention and residents of the city began to react to the news. Here are some excerpts from a front page SFC article headlined "The City Grows Edgy:"

The testament to death in San Francisco yesterday was fear and yellow chalk.

The fear was heavy, brooding and for the most part unspoken. From the darkness of early morning, through the bright chill of noon, deep into dusk, many of the city's streets were unnaturally swept clean of pedestrians. Some who were out walked quickly, darting glances over their shoulders, waiting in small knots for busses...

Epithets to the four who died in the two-hour march of death were grotesque sidewalk drawings in yellow chalk--round eyeless circles for heads, outsprawled ovals for feet and small crossed squares where bullet casings had been found.

There was nothing to designate where Mrs. McMillan had fallen but a russet-and-yellow scarf caught against the green picket fence surrounding the Edinburg street cottage into which she, her husband and their infant child had moved only 24 hours earlier.

The 100 block on Edinburg was deathly still in mid-day yesterday. Shades were drawn. Many children were kept home from school. One woman who would not speak to strangers had her 16 year-old son, her daughter and young grandson with her.

"We are very frightened," she said. "We do not know who they are or when they will come back."

No, she said, no one in her house saw "them," the ones who did the shooting.

"We heard the shots," she said. "My husband went outside. He wouldn't let me look. It was so bloody."

Resolutely she kept her eyes averted from the little green cottage. But all the blood was gone, washed down during the night by the Fire Department. Nothing was left but the russet and gold scarf no one yet had taken inside.

Far across the city at Geary boulevard and Divisadero street, a funeral was underway at Sinai Memorial Chapel...

Across the street from Sinai, Tana Smith, 32, was shot to death in front of a small medical supply house. Her blood, too, had been hosed from the sidewalk, but the yellow tracings remained.

"I wasn't here," said 20-year old Bob Falconer, a clerk in the store. "I had gone home."

He paused a minute. "But it's still scary," he said. "Even now in the sunshine. The whole neighborhood is scared. It's a terrible thing when you can't stand on the sidewalk and wait for a bus and all that's left of you is this yellow drawing"... (SFC, January 30, 1974: .1)

Even the widely read San Francisco columnist Herb Caen lead his January 30 column with these comments on Zebra.

After reading about the latest wave of San Francisco killings yesterday morning I walked out into the foggy street and looked both ways. Nobody was in sight. Was I the only person left alive in the city? "The Last Time I Saw Paranoia" is not my favorite song, but I felt a chill. Then a police car drove slowly past in the mist...

At the office, the first call I got was from a tough-sounding hombre who said: "You read the paper, right? Five white men dead, right? Tonight, we're goin' out and getting us 10 black men. Two for one is about right, don'tcha think?" Click. (SFC, January 30, 1974: .25)

The next day police made the unprecedented move to warn city residents not to go out on the streets alone after dark. Mayor Alioto contradicted this by suggesting that police effort made the streets safe. He also issued this formal statement:

I can assure the citizens of San Francisco that a maximum police effort is being made to apprehend the persons responsible for the recent series of street slayings.

I can assure them that the maximum effort is being made to protect residents of this city. Literally, every police unit is involved in the investigation and the protection of the public... (SFC January 31, 1974). p.2)

Although attempts were made by the mayor, police and newspapers to defuse the racial aspects of the incident, they were only partially successful. The rumor from Oakland of the

existence of a Black sect killing whites was strengthened when Oakland police admitted having investigated such a plan. The associations of this rumor to the Zebra shootings were hard to dispel. The city's blacks began to worry about threats of reprisal as well as the possibility that the killers would start turning on blacks because of the controversy.

For some unknown reason the shooting stopped and newspaper reports of fear of residents dried up. However, the city did not return to normal as quickly. The media blitz and national acclaim took time to wear off. Newspapers also had a new story to run. Just one week after the last set of shootings (February 6), Patty Hearst was kidnapped from her San Francisco apartment. This only added to San Francisco's notoriety in the national press, proved to residents the existence of more "weirdos" in their city, and added another burden to Zebra-pressed police.

February and March were quiet except for the intense Zebra investigation. Non-Zebra crimes, however, were pushing San Francisco to the title of "Crime Capital of the U.S." An April 3 SFC article carried the headline "A Murder in S.F. Every Other Day" recording the fact that in the first 87 days of 1974, San Francisco had 41 homicides. Eighteen were still classified as "unsolved."

Once press coverage of Patty Hearst's activities started to disappear, the Zebra killers struck again, this time shooting two Salvation Army workers, killing the man and injuring the woman.

The story of this shooting was familiar to police. It fit the description of all other Zebra shootings.

On Monday night, according to Salvation Army Captain Alfred R. Van Cleff, they (the two victims, Thomas Rainwater and Linda Story) participated in a study period from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m., after which the cadets have a 90 minute free period until the 10:30 curfew.

At 9 p.m., said Van Cleef, Rainwater and Miss Story signed out of the three-story training center with the notation "Mayfair" as their destination, meaning they were going to the supermarket, perhaps for a snack.

They walked the long two blocks downhill on Geary toward the market together, passing other cadets who had been to the store and were returning to the training center.

A short distance from the Weber street intersection, a shadowy figure fell in behind them on the narrow sidewalk, which is lined on both sides by trees and heavily shaded.

According to police, the stranger overtook them, and when he was several steps in front of them, abruptly wheeled about with a .32-caliber automatic.

The terrified couple turned to flee, and both were shot twice in the back.

Two officers, who were in a car a block away from the scene, said they heard the shots and sped to the corner, arriving within 15 seconds.

"If he'd run the other way, toward us," one officer said, "we'd have got him."...

The gunman, described as black, and wearing a green army field jacket, dark trousers and tennis shoes, ran into the St. Francis Square apartment complex nearby and escaped. (SFC, April 3, 1974: .2)

After these shootings there was little description of public fear.

Two weeks later Zebra killers returned when on April 14 two teenagers waiting for a bus were critically wounded and on the 16th a young man taking a carpet out of the trunk of a car was shot and killed. The Zebra toll then stood at thirteen

dead and seven wounded. This normally "open" city began to question citizen safety.

The shootings increased debate on gun control with some advocating drastic action like this letter writer to the SFC.

Editor--some people think we are being too soft on criminals. Mayor Alioto thinks the main solution is to take the guns away from everybody.

I personally believe that a gun on everyone's hip would probably show a great reduction in crime. In the old days we wore guns and we knew how to use them. The bad boys did not last too long. Of course, we knew how to use them.

The net result was very few bad actors left and they generally took off for foreign parts. I hope you will consider my suggestion. (SFC, April 17, 1974: .56]

With citizens afraid and demanding action, Mayor Alioto stepped into the Zebra case with an announcement that police were going to start stopping and questioning any black male fitting the description of the Zebra killers. Immediate response was positive--a way to stop the killings. It did not take long, however, before the stop-and-search order began to draw fire from the black community and white liberals concerned with civil rights.

What was once a set of events which had increased citizen fear became a political issue. Alioto was running for governor and this action gave him state-wide and national press. It also alienated the black community with the black police officers' association decrying "gestapo-type tactics" of the search (SFC, April 20, 1974: .14) and one black leader withdrawing his support of Alioto for governor.

ACLU and black leaders filed suit to have the stop-and-search order rescinded. The protesters won their suit but the search had already been almost eliminated because it had proven ineffective.

Although political controversy was getting media coverage, the man on the street was afraid. The SFC gives this description of the city.

The sharp winds of fear that have been buffeting San Francisco since the onset of the so-called Zebra street killings appear now to be having a serious impact on many facets of the city's life.

Whether the random, senseless murders of themselves have forced resident San Franciscans to restructure their activities is difficult to determine.

The ominous shadow of the Symbionese Liberation Army is somehow present, too, and with it, the threat of terror in districts of the city that until now have been models of serenity and security....

North Beach, for instance, is hurting badly. The lights are still as bright as ever on Broadway but business, say entrepreneurs, is terrible.

Davey Rosenberg, the street's portly spokesman, said flatly yesterday that "Zebra had petrified the city."

"Broadway is one of the safest and best patrolled areas of San Francisco," he said, "but people are staying away in droves. If it weren't for Japanese tourists we'd all be out of business.

"Until Zebra, our big shows at the Condor for instance, were at 11 p.m. and midnight. Now our main shows are at 8 and 9 o'clock and after 11:30 forget it"...

The test (for a restaurant's success) seems to be either valet parking availability of parking lots or garages.

"People simply won't walk the streets after dark any more, Rosenberg said...

A spokesman for one theater said a large out-of-town school group canceled its block of seats because the young people's parents "didn't want the kids in San Francisco after dark"... (SFC, April 23, 1974: .2)

Herb Caen, too, was getting frustrated with the panic when he commented:

Actually the "newsflash" I heard on "newsradio" last week did seem a bit far fetched: "San Francisco is in the grips of terror." There is blood and insanity in the streets, and let's not deny that the people are frightened, but life does go on" (SFC, April 23, 1974: .23)

A little over a week later he wrote:

Nobody asked me, but one of the disturbing aspects of the Zebra developments is the note of frantic haste and hysteria from the direction of City Hall, and the nagging feeling that we, on the outside, are being manipulated, by the media and other means, for reasons that are not altogether clear. Lord knows we all hope this is the end of the bloodletting, but can't the proceedings be conducted with a little less thrashing about?... All our prejudices are being put through the fire. Let us keep our cool. (SFC, May 3, 1974: .37)

On April 28, Alioto rushed home from a campaign tour in Los Angeles allowing only that he was returning on important city business. Two days later he announced dramatic leads on the Zebra case and that the killings were linked to a nationwide sect responsible for over 80 murders in California alone.

On May 1, in a late night "round up", seven black men were arrested on charges related to the Zebra case. Four of the seven were later released due to lack of evidence, but three were charged with some of the shootings as well as the Quita Hague murder.

The story behind the events of that dramatic week gradually emerged. Supposedly, out of fear for his own life and/or reward money, Tony Harris called the police to serve as an informer. After talking with police he became afraid and demanded to talk with the mayor. Alioto then became involved and gained access to the story of the Death Angels, the nationwide death sect,

Announcing the capture of the suspects, Alioto said, "people can feel safer with this announcement." (SFC, April 30, 1974; .1) Although citizens may have been safer, Alioto's political position became more precarious--some say due to his own actions. The first controversy was whether the police had been hampered by Alioto's public announcements and, therefore, had to make the arrests earlier than they had hoped. Police, traditionally loyal to Alioto, publicly denied the charge,

The second attack on Alioto was from Black Muslims who suggested Harris was a "crackpot" and that "the mayor wants to solve these murders because he wants his office to look good," (SFC, May 2, 1974; .3) This controversy faded with grand jury indictments of three black men and daily newspaper accounts of which murders over the past few years were "Zebra related" and which were not.

Follow-up to the case did not provide Alioto with the political benefit he probably had anticipated. In response to Alioto's announcement that the Death Angels were a state-wide and even nationwide threat, the California Attorney General suggested

Alioto might be somewhat overzealous and that, "I think the people in San Francisco, including the mayor, are scared to death. He's got a problem in his city and he's naturally concerned about it."

(SFC, May 1, 1974: .1) The Berkeley police chief and his colleagues from other bay area police departments also suggested that the 80 cases in the state might be an exaggerated number.

On May 3, Alioto flew off to Washington to share his information on the Death Angels with Attorney General Saxbe. Already in trouble with Californians by calling Patty Hearst a "criminal", Saxbe was very cool to Alioto. He treated the mayor as he would any other large city mayor but with little interest in the supposed nation-wide murder plot Alioto had discovered.

Before Alioto's trip to Washington, SFE's political reporter provided this analysis of Alioto and Zebra politics. After describing how Alioto took thoughtful and sensitive care in making the Zebra announcement, the reporter continues:

...But with all of this (care in speaking), the fact that Alioto is also a candidate for the gubernatorial nomination was inseparable from whatever action he took, whatever statement he made.

And, it seems, his actions and statements in this case could do nothing but help his campaign—a campaign that has been beset with a series of setbacks: Mrs. Alioto's 17-day disappearance, a municipal employees' strike, and the Zebra killings themselves...

But yesterday's arrests, most political observers seemed to agree, were nothing but a plus for the mayor's campaign.

"He's got the law-and-order image, for sure," one observer told The Chronicle, "and that's where a lot of conservative Democrats are—and those are the Democrats who vote."

Alioto yesterday declined to assess the effect of the arrests on his campaign. In fact, he went to great pains to say political considerations did not enter into his judgements at all. (SFC, May 2, 1974: .4)

The Zebra story did not stop with the arrests. The mayor's campaign for governor continued and his role in the Zebra case continued to be controversial. Herb Caen suggested, "Hizzoner's mishandling of the Zebra case is dropping him further down in the polls..." (SFC, May 8, 1974: .20)

Later Alioto stated, "The notion that this Zebra thing is going to hurt me on election day is ridiculous." (SFC, May 20, 1974: .10) Zebra or not, Alioto did not fare well in the primary election, losing to Jerry Brown who went on to win the general election in November. Most post-election analyses of the election, however, rarely mentioned crime or the Zebra issue. The California north-south split as well as Alioto's conflict of interest case were more often cited as reasons for his loss.

The Zebra story did not end for those arrested either. Their trial lasted a little more than a year, becoming the longest criminal trial in California history. It ended in conviction of the four defendants (three of the four were those arrested; the fourth was a black man already in jail for another murder).

The trial was given full coverage by local newspapers, giving San Francisco residents constant reminders of the terror that had plagued the city. Adding to the reminder of crime in the city was the complete coverage of the Foster murder trial in Oakland as well as the Patty Hearst stories.

An awareness of crime in San Francisco was the most important "left-over" of this time period. In part, the violence and apparent lack of motive made the Zebra killings especially memorable, but the total crime environment also had an impact. Residents of San Francisco during this time were continually reminded of threats to their safety. The Zodiac killer was still threatening police in letters to newspapers (this case is still unsolved); the Nob Hill rapist was only recently behind bars, and the Manson story filled the papers. Before the Zebra story started to fall together, the son of a wealthy, important San Franciscan was arrested as the paper bag murderer responsible for a number of random shootings.

Also, during this time, the SLA assassinated the Oakland School Superintendent and, two months later, captured the daughter of one of the most powerful and wealthy men in California. Even the Hearst family was not immune from the crime wave. When citizens would look to their political leaders during this time they would become only more frustrated. The Vice President and then the President resigned from office providing little leadership. The Attorney General dismissed Patty Hearst simply as a "criminal" and the mayor, when he attempted to take action against the Zebra crimes, was accused of playing politics with an emergency situation.

Simply stated, no one, regardless of social status, could avoid criminals. Most victims seemed to be randomly chosen and the leadership to help relieve the crime problems seemed non-existent. Little wonder that the city was full of fearful people.

A June SFE Sunday magazine article described the result of the Zebra murders this way:

...The toll, on April 18th, when a massive police manhunt was put into action, was twelve known dead and six wounded. By this time there was something tangible for people to pin their anxiety on, something real to fear.

There it was; A composite police drawing in all the newspapers and on television. And even though there were thought to be several involved in the killings, this face became linked with the code name in the public mind. The Zebra, a man who kills without motive.

What the nightclub owners knew when they counted their receipts; what the gun dealers and the locksmiths had known for months, finally surfaced.

"People are just plain scared," said Lt. Charles Ellis, head of the Homocide Detail.

They were still scared after police made seven dramatic pre-dawn arrests May 1 and it was revealed that there were other possible killers at large, members of a mysterious "death cult."

San Francisco became a city living in fear. "There is fear," says Dr. Martin Horowitz, director of the Stress Research Unit at Langley-Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute, "but not hysteria. And there is a realistic danger"...

"They (those troubled over Zebra) feel righteous indignation or rage and they're going to hurt someone. The danger of the (Zebra) situation is some kind of polarization of the races." That's why the stop and search idea was a bad one, he insists. "Also, when you stop and search, you establish a model for how cities respond to a crisis situation, and models can be repeated"...

Although the fear of becoming a Zebra victim is real enough, Dr. Horowitz sees little chance that it will get out of hand.

Police officials and the ordinary man and woman on the street agree.

Says Lt. Ellis of Homicide: "The people of San Francisco aren't going to panic, they're just going to be careful, and we hope they'll help police."

Talk to people on the street and you get a variety of reactions to the fear of becoming another Zebra victim.

"You bet I'm careful," says a young secretary who lives in the Mission District, "I'm getting so I like big crowds of people."

Even teenagers are becoming untypically cautious. One high school senior says, "No way I'm going to drive around downtown San Francisco at night."

Scared? Yes. The Zebra murders brought an atmosphere of fear in The City.

But panic? No. (SFE, CL-California Living, 2 June, 1974: .8)

Proof of the lingering remembrance of the Zebra events is found in the debate over Proposition B in 1977 which concerned the crime issue. It was not uncommon for a debater to recall the Zebra killings, to talk of how San Francisco attracts "weirdos" or to explain why people were afraid to walk the streets.

This reputation for crime was not only a local phenomenon. San Francisco developed a nationwide reputation. Herb Caen lamented this problem and gave his city a pep-talk in his May 29, 1974 column.

More seriously, if tourism is to be our bête noir, we are in trouble, for there is no doubt the San Francisco Image--those little cable cars climbing halfway, as usual --has been severely damaged by the SLA-Hearst story, the Zebra operation and the movie and TV series that have our gutters running with blood. (Actually, it's just plain dirt, not blood, that is uglifying "The Streets of San Francisco.") Typical of what is happening: a full-page spread in the London Observer titled "San Francisco: City of

Bad Dreams," with a blowup of gun-toting Miss Hearst superimposed over a black and sinister skyline. The accompanying story was tabloid journalism at its worst, every fact poisonously pointed and who knows how many Britishers this discouraged from visiting San Francisco?... Item: Before he left Malibu, his home, for his most recent appearance at the Fairmont's Venetian Room, Joel Grey found his way blocked by his youngest child, who wailed "Daddy, daddy, don't go to San Francisco--you'll get killed!"

However, with a philosophical sign, he who lives by the media dies by the media, and nobody can say San Francisco hasn't had a fair shake through the years. It all evens out: the same publications that once overpraised the city are now overcritical, and that, too, shall pass. San Francisco opened its arms and whatnot to the world, concocted easy-breezy-sleazy slogans ("Everybody's Favorite City," etc.) and set about taking the visitor for a ride on more than cable cars, which remain a legitimate attraction, if dangerous. The big media push began in the 1960's with the "Summer of Love" fiction, the flower power shuck and a spate of do-your-own-thing nonsense that ended in the nightmare that, to paraphrase McKuen, might be called "Haight-Ashbury and Other Sorrows." The winds of freedom do blow in San Francisco, but some extremely hard-eyed pushers, operators and racketeers benefit from the same breezes. There is hate in the streets of the cool grey city of love, and also beauty, generosity and pleasure--more pluses than minuses in what is still the best city in this strange land growing stranger. (SFC, 24 May, 1974: .25)

Tourism has recovered, and recent newspaper stories cover lack of hotel space and crammed cable cars. The national memory is shorter than that of the locals. Still, the Zebra case is an example of how the proper combination of events and actors can turn a serious crime problem into a national media event and an important, if only momentary, political issue.

Chapter Four: The Police Strike of August 1975

While the Zebra incident made San Francisco residents willing to assist police in reducing violent crime, a little more than a year later the job of policemen and the costs of police protection became a major issue in the city. Since the time of the San Francisco police strike, strikes by public service workers have become familiar. In 1975, however, such a story was not as common and the resolution of San Francisco's police/fire strike was unique.

Politics are always involved when politicians serve as "management" in a wage dispute. The police strike was no exception and involved politics in two ways. First, the strike was settled by the mayor with the three potential mayoral candidates on the Board of Supervisors adding to the controversy. Second, the police strike was an important factor in changing public attitudes towards the police. Although the importance of this shift became apparent in anti-police propositions on the following November ballot, the real political importance of the new attitude continued with the appointment of a new police chief in January 1976.

San Francisco is a pro-labor town. This attitude has existed ever since the days when it was a major port and dockworkers and other laborers developed strong unions. The liberal attitude of San Francisco's residents has also traditionally been sympathetic to the

labor movement. Labor's influence has extended into politics and most politicians court endorsement of the AFL/CIO and other unions in their campaigns. No one becomes mayor of San Francisco without some help from labor, and then-mayor Joseph Alioto was no exception. This pro-union attitude was demonstrated in March 1974 when most city workers (except police and firemen) went on strike for a week. Both newspapers carried extensive editorial condemnation of the strike, but the city seemed to function fairly well and citizens accepted the mediator role played by Alioto. (SFC, World, 24 March, 1974: 5) Workers went back to work after the week-long strike although teachers stayed out two weeks more before they reached an agreement--also with extensive Alioto involvement.

It was not until four months later that the settlement of the strike became an issue. In March, citizens were merely concerned about having city services; in July the city began to see how difficult it would be to pay wages agreed upon in March. During investigation of the new city wage package, it was discovered that, among other positions, San Francisco streetsweepers were the highest paid in the United States. They were reportedly making around \$17,000 per year. A discussion of pay scales, and how to find money to pay city workers continued throughout the summer.

Concern over city pay developed into struggles over various city propositions on the November ballot. Three such propositions

are important for this report. Propositions "H" and "M" were pro-police/fire propositions dealing with retirement and other benefits for these two groups. Propositions of this type were common items on the San Francisco Ballot. City employees have consistently placed working improvement propositions on the ballot to increase pay and other benefits. The liberal, pro-labor attitude in San Francisco had allowed these measures to pass with few problems.

The fall 1974 ballot contained another proposition, Proposition L, which was a direct result of the summer controversy over city wage scales. While not exactly an anti-union proposition, it was not favored by union leaders or city employees. The proposition was developed to make wages "fairer" across trades. It would allow the Civil Service Commission to determine prevailing wage rates for all occupations in the private sector and to propose comparable wages for public employees.

Proposition L was introduced and backed by Board of Supervisors president, Dianne Feinstein, a possible candidate for mayor. The proposition was advertised as making pay scales "fairer" for city workers and as a way to control the cost of government. It was opposed by labor and Alioto who suggested that, if the proposition passed, some employees would have their wages cut. They were joined by two unlikely allies, supervisors John Barbagelata and Quentin Kopp--the Board's two conservative members who were potential mayoral

candidates. These two were concerned that the proposition was too vaguely worded and would result in costly court battles possibly leaving the city open to more wage demands. Others suggested that their opposition was greater because they did not wish to give Feinstein a lead in the race for mayor by supporting the "Feinstein Proposition."

The results of propositions H, L, and M were all too close to call in pre-election speculation, but when final votes were tallied, pro-union propositions H and M won strong support while Proposition L lost by a slim margin. Although it lost, the narrow vote margin was suggestive of things to come. Mayor Alioto thought otherwise when asked about the effect of Proposition L's loss on the upcoming mayoral race. "But while the result demonstrated that there is still a very powerful labor vote when it relates to a labor issue, it doesn't translate to the same kind of strength in a campaign for mayor or other political office." (SFC, 7 November, 1974: 1)

Early in 1975 the mayoral candidates began to announce their intentions. Of the three top contenders for the job (George Moscone, John Barbagelata, and Dianne Feinstein, two were supervisors at the time of the police/fire strike (Barbagelata and Feinstein). In March, the Board of Supervisors granted a pay raise to 11,000 city employees, took note of the upcoming raises needed for Municipal Railway workers, police, and firemen, and approved a record \$707-million budget.

In July property owners of San Francisco received notices of their new, higher property assessments. Tom Emch and Gerald Adams described the reaction: "Citizens felt the sting and objected loudly. The outcry was not lost on the supervisors, who suddenly became very sensitive to the public mood. Eight of the eleven supervisors were running for office." (SFE, C.I., 12 October, 1975: 7) Feeling the squeeze from lack of money, supervisors let the public (and police and firemen) know that they would not commit themselves to the traditional wage formula in an announcement at a Candidates' Night at the Irish Cultural Center on July 31. This formula gave police a wage which was parity with the highest paid police department in the state. In 1975, that department was Los Angeles, meaning that the San Francisco police would receive a 13 percent increase. By city charter, the maximum that could be given was the parity figure. By suggesting that they were offering less, supervisors were not breaking any laws, just breaking a long standing tradition.

Once this was known, the Police Officers Association (POA) went into action. In San Francisco most police officers belonged to the POA. The only other officers' organization was the Officers For Justice (OFJ) made up mostly of minority officers. The POA's history is similar to many police associations. It started as a professional and social organization led, in most part, by inspectors and older, higher ranking officers.

According to Bopp et. al. (1970), the organization might have stayed this way except for court cases of the previous years concerning hiring practices of the police department. By organizing resistance to changes in hiring and promotion practices, the POA became involved in politics. Older, higher ranking officers were pushed out of office and leadership was taken over by "beat cops." Their leader at strike time was Gerald Crowley who became a post-strike political issue himself.

The position of the POA was simple---parity with the Los Angeles police (a 13 percent raise). On August 14, the POA took a strike vote and found that the organization had a mandate to hold a strike. The next few days indicated what the citizens should expect.

On August 15, Steve Solomon, attorney for the POA, notified the city's employee relations director, Roy Wesley, that the POA would not negotiate with Wesley's team. They would negotiate only with the full Board of Supervisors, who later declined to do so. The wage offer of the supervisors, unanimously agreed to, was to be a 6.5 percent increase and they wanted the POA to negotiate with Wesley's team.

Now both parties were polarized; the stage was set.

At City Hall on August 18 at 9:30 a.m. Mayor Joseph Alioto told a press conference, "If there is a strike, I have said before, I am going to recommend immediate suspension without pay of any policeman who strikes and a hearing after which, if the facts are found correctly, they will be fired."

At 2:45, supervisors voted ten to zero (with Al Nelder, the former police chief, abstaining because any vote on pay affects his pension) to formally offer the 6.5 percent. Reaction was immediate. In the board chambers, jammed with policemen, there were shouts of "strike;" some officers shook their fists at the supervisors in a prelude to the violence to come. (SFE, C.L., 12 October 1975: 8)

At 2:50 the strike was called. Cars were called back to the station with the comment that "Feinstein (Board of Supervisors President) is doing the arresting from now on." Pickets were set up at all police stations and, much to Police Chief Donald Scott's surprise, the strike was more pervasive than expected--some estimated it was 90 percent effective.

Violence erupted almost immediately as well. This is a brief description of the violence during the first afternoon and evening:

. . . Snipers fired at picketing cops, two strikers were run down by an angry motorist and another striker was beaten with a baseball bat.

There were three separate sniping incidents within a half hour and the strike took on the aura of a combat zone at the Ingleside Station.

Three youths in a speeding car sprayed the picketline with pistol fire. Then picketers were again chased off the line by two more sniper assaults, one from nearby Balboa Park and the other from the City College area.

Scores of pickets, most of them armed, set up posts at district stations and worried officials expressed concern that the presence of armed pickets--unprecedented in San Francisco--could create explosive confrontations.

An effort was made to persuade the pickets to leave their guns elsewhere while picketing but some said they intended to keep their guns on "in case anybody tries to create any problems." (SFC, World 24 August, 1974: 5)

During the next two days the negotiations looked hopeless, but behind the scenes some progress was being made. Crowley and the POA stood firm on their demand to negotiate directly with supervisors and supervisors refused. Alioto was then asked by supervisors to mediate the dispute and he agreed. The wage issue seemed impossible for any mediator, because the POA was not planning on backing down

from its 13 percent demand, and the supervisors were firm with their 6.5 percent offer. Crowley told the press: "I ask any citizen of San Francisco who is mugged, robbed or raped to call Supervisor Molinari and complain (SFC C.L. 12 October, 1975: 10). Molinari was the supervisor who made the motion for the 6.5 percent offer. Alioto announced on T.V. that striking policemen would be fired.

There were added problems for both sides in the dispute. The POA was given a restraining order by Superior Court Presiding Judge Robert Drews. From Tuesday morning onward, the policemen were all breaking the law with their strike. For the supervisors, the problems were worse. Both the 1,900 Municipal Railway carmen and the firemen had also threatened to strike.

Although the violence began on the first night of the strike, it was worse on the second. A rash of holdups and bands of looters accentuated the lack of police protection. The most dramatic incident was a bomb explosion at Alioto's home. No one was hurt but investigators found a note that stated: "Don't threaten us" as Alioto commented he did not think it was the work of striking policemen. To prove that the streets were safe, Alioto walked between negotiation meetings through the Tenderloin, known for its crime problems. Alioto said citizens "need have no real fear about walking the streets of San Francisco tonight."

About 200 persons—ranging from drag queens to middle-class tourists joined the mayor on this 20-minute walk before he went back to negotiating.

The Tenderloin folks voiced nothing but support for his efforts. Shouts such as "Fire the cops if they won't work" were heard from apartment windows.

A man wearing a big, floppy hat shook the mayor's hand and said: "Don't worry about the police, mayor. We're doing okay without them." (SFC, 20 August, 1975: 1)

Alioto demonstrated his influence with labor when he asked the help of other labor leaders in the dispute including Teamster boss, Jack Goldberger; head of the plumbers, Joe Mazola and president of the San Francisco Labor Council, Jack Crowley (no relation to POA's Crowley). These men helped late in negotiations to move the POA into a more flexible position. It is reported that Goldberger told POA leaders that they better start acting like labor men if they wanted the support of the Teamsters. (SFC, C.L. 12 October, 1975: 14)

Wednesday, the second full day of the strike, was a difficult one. The newspaper carried stories of vandalism.

. . . reports of police vehicles vandalized, keys broken off in ignitions, tires slashed (possibly as many as 100) and sabotaged transmissions. Early reports list some 34 cars damaged; strikers are blamed.

In addition to the destruction of city property, many private vehicles belonging to officers who have crossed the picket lines are vandalized. One sergeant at Central Station, cautiously parking four blocks away, returns to his car to find all windows broken and his tires slashed. Fire Chief Keith Calden declines to enumerate the damage to fire fighting equipment. But some firemen later say that their hoses were slashed and keys were broken off in ignitions of some of the engine company pumpers. . . .

Also it is learned that some non-striking officers at the Hall (of Justice) and at the district stations received telephone threats. (SFE, C.L., 12 October, 1975: 14)

In the evening, 90 percent of the fire department also walked out on strike. Their pay demand was the same as the police--a 13 percent pay increase. The only good news of the day was the Municipal Railway strike was settled at mid-day with the Muni drivers accepting a 6.5 percent raise.

The supervisors, before going home on Wednesday night, sent a telegram to governor Jerry Brown requesting 200 Highway Patrol officers. Alioto was opposed to this action and Brown could not respond to the request because Alioto had not placed the city in the state of emergency needed for Brown to act.

The supervisors were surprised the next morning to discover that the strike was over. Alioto had worked late into the night and at about 2:30 announced that a settlement had been reached. It was not anywhere near the supervisor's position.

The settlement provided a 6.5 percent wage raise on the one day July 1, 1975 so that police and firemen retiring this fiscal year would get the added pension benefit. Then wages would revert to the present scale, and finally go up 13.05 percent as of October 15.

This bundle, the mayor calculated, would cost \$9.6 million compared to the \$13.6 million demanded by the police and firemen and the \$6.9 million offered by the supervisors. (SFC, World, 31 August, 1975: 5)

All the supervisors were upset. In the afternoon meeting they unanimously voted to reject the settlement (with Nelder still abstaining). This did not change Alioto's actions. After receiving a favorable opinion from the city Attorney, he signed an emergency proclamation

giving him powers to settle the strike over the objections of the supervisors. Later he signed an amnesty agreement nullifying all of his previous threats to fire any strikers. The strike was over but the politics of the strike were only starting.

The reaction to Alioto's actions was harsh. Supervisor and mayoral candidate Barbagelata said, "The mayor becomes the first dictator in the United States." Supervisor Feinstein suggested Alioto was suffering from "male menopause" and Supervisor Terry Francois called Alioto "the most outrageous mayor in the history of San Francisco, with the possible exception of Mayor Schmitz" (a corrupt boss tried for graft over 60 years ago). (SFC, World, 31 August, 1975: 5)

The supervisors immediately drafted charter amendments which went on the November ballot. The amendments provided:

- *Any policeman or fireman who takes part in a strike would be subject to automatic dismissal.

- *The law pegging police and fireman's salaries to the highest paid in California would be abolished and henceforth they would be paid the average of pay in cities over 100,000.

- *Fireman's cherished 24 hours shifts would be abolished and they would be put on straight 8-hour shifts.

- *The pension plan would be repealed (the one voters approved last year before receiving their property evaluation).

- *An amendment would prohibit the mayor in the future from using his emergency powers to grant salary increases. (SFC, World, 31 August, 1975: 5)

Public sentiment seemed to be with the supervisors. One reporter described it this way:

Thus when police actually went on strike demanding a 13.5

percent raise, the switchboard at City Hall looked like a Fourth of July fireworks display. Callers begged the supervisors to hang tough and not bargain with "outlaw" strikers.

With eight of the 11 supervisors running for office in November, resistance came easy. It was made even easier by the rough tactics some of the striking police used and their defiance of Superior Court Judge Robert Drewes' ruling on Tuesday (August 19) that the strike was illegal and police must return to work; and his subsequent ruling that striking police must turn in their guns. (SFC, World, 31 August, 1975: 5)

The anti-strike letters to papers were strong on two themes:

- 1) The strikers were lawbreakers and had gone against the public trust.

As one writer suggested:

When an individual takes an oath to enforce the laws, and to protect citizens against lawbreakers, it is a solemn undertaking. When he finds that the compensation is inadequate and can no longer uphold his oath he should withdraw from the activity as an individual, upon due notice, and seek other employment. (SFC, 22 August, 1975: 8)

and 2) The cost was overburdening the taxpayer as described in this letter to the editor:

Everyone has a right to strike. It is time San Francisco had a property owners strike. If everyone refused to pay their property tax--then what would the city do? (SFC, 2 September, 1975: 36)

The Chronicle's political cartoonist, in a cartoon that received many positive letters and national citation, expressed the outrage best without words in the cartoon shown in Figure 2..

Figure 2 about here

The strikers also received support in the Letters to the Editor column. Most of these held the position that police and fire jobs are difficult and getting harder. They also protested that police and firemen need pay equal to other city employees. Here is a letter

FIGURE 2 SFC political cartoon on police strike (SFC, 20 August, 1975:46)



from one retired fireman.

My advice to a young man seeking a career in the service of San Francisco is this: Avoid the Police and Fire Departments as you would the plague. The examination is the most difficult, both physically and mentally, and the rewards will be minimal. You will have no process of arbitration. You will have to accept that which a vindictive Board of Supervisors desires to give you.

As a fireman you will have to work under conditions which inevitably will result in impaired health if you live long enough to receive a pension.

As a policeman your wife will never know whether you will return home from your tour of duty or if some nut, whom you stopped for a routine investigation, will blow your head off.

Instead, try to become a streetsweeper, perhaps a gardener or a truck driver. And if you are really ambitious, try to become one of the elite--a building tradesman in the city service. You will have to pass only the entrance examination and eventually you will receive more money and benefits than any police or fireman. (SFC, 29 August, 1975: 42)

After the strike, Herb Caen summarized the issues involved and the frustrations felt by many people.

The motives behind the police-firemen strike may have been pure, their cause just and their hearts in the right place, but their timing couldn't have been worse. Real estate assessments are high and going higher, to the point where something like a taxpayer's revolt is under way. The middle class is affronted, having last year voted police and fire pensions that are, in the words of a City Hall fiscal expert, "insanely generous". The Mayor, elected by labor, is trying to pay his debt with your money.

Finally, this is an election year. The Supervisors running for re-election or higher office are determined to look tough, dammit. Hold the line. Impress the voters. Don't give in. The lame-duck Mayor on the other hand leaves office at the end of the year. He wants to stick San Franciscans with that 13 percent increase the strikers demand. What does he care? Most of the strikers live out of town so what do THEY care?

To put it in sporting terms, the police are asking for a major pay raise while having a bad season. The crime rate here is rising faster than the inflation that makes salaries meaningless. Oldsters in the Tenderloin are terrified, with reason (they can't walk the streets with bodyguards, like the Mayor). Paranoia is everywhere. A policeman who interpreted (rightly) something I wrote as being anti-strike

snapped, "Don't forget I'm out there every night, buddy, putting my life on the line for people like you". He sounded as though he'd been DRAFTED into the police force. No denying that the policeman's lot is a risky one--that's why they are given higher pensions than any other city worker. The pensions in theory are generous enough to preclude strikes (the taxpayer who pays a patrolman \$16,644 as of now also pays \$9,586 annually into his retirement fund).

"I get less than a streetsweeper," another officer lamented. Streetsweepers aren't getting that widely-publicized \$17,000 a year, and their pension is about 16 percent of salary while the police officer's is 57.6 percent and firemen's 45.1 percent. Besides, the argument is fatuous. Rock stars make more than brain surgeons, baseball players get higher pay than Presidents ("But I had a better year", as Babe Ruth said when told he was making more than Herbert Hoover). It's called the free enterprise system.

As for the undoubted danger, turned into something ludicrous by dumb TV series and "Dirty Harry" movies, Homicide Inspector Dave Toschi put that into some kind of intelligent perspective when he told Terrence O'Flaherty: "Most of the police I know have never been involved in a shooting. I've used my gun only twice in my police career (22 years)." (SFC, 22 August, 1975: 23)

The SFC also began a campaign questioning the advisability of paying POA leader Crowley full seargent's wages although he worked full time as leader of the POA. This practice was a holdover from the time when the POA did not act as a union. Soon after the SFC editorial campaign, Crowley was told to go back to work for the city. Policemen were also criticized because many do not live in San Francisco and, therefore, do not pay taxes which go for high salaries. Although the issue was discussed, no laws have been passed yet to force city employees to live in the city.

As Caen pointed out, the city was only three months from an election at strike time. The mayoral candidates used the strike and Alioto's actions as campaign issues. All candidates with a chance

of winning opposed the mayor's actions so the strike became one of those issues which no one could oppose. Everyone was against Alioto, but few provided other concrete solutions to city strikes. The controversy helped bury the crime issue in the campaign.

In two of the reviews of the strike, the journalists suggested the important aspect of the strike.

San Francisco's police and firemen had won their battle, but it was possible they had lost the war. (SFC, World, 31 August, 1975: 5)

But perhaps the worst result of the strikes was the erosion of public confidence in their police and fire departments. (SFE, C.L., 12 October: 1975: 25)

Both of those comments were written before the November election. The "possible" and "perhaps" were not necessary. When the votes were tallied, anti-strike amendments had won big victories of 128,079 to 63,523 for the average pay formula and 135,472 to 55,332 to fire striking police and firemen.

After the defeat at the polls, police began what came to be an overwhelming public relations blunder. The morning after the election, officers started a ticket blitz of illegally parked cars. This action only further outraged citizens. One citizen remarked: "Such actions (ticket blitz) can only further widen the chasm between the voters and police" (SFC, 12 November, 1975: 42).

CHAPTER FIVE: Political Elections--1974-1977

In politics, crime is usually a "motherhood" issue--everyone in a campaign will denounce the problem of crime and promise to reduce crime rates--but little difference can be found between the candidates' positions. This was not the case in San Francisco 1974-1977. Crime became a major issue in the mayoral race of 1975 and the handling of crime was an important issue in the "recall" election of 1977. The change of crime from a "motherhood" issue to its importance in these campaigns and the return of crime to "motherhood" status, happened in three years.

Crime was an issue in the 1973 supervisors' elections. One supervisor who was elected was Al Nelder, the former San Francisco police chief who had reportedly been asked to leave by Mayor Alioto when he resisted Alioto's influence in police matters. Although Nelder did not poll the most votes in the election, he garnered enough to become a supervisor. During the campaign, he did not hide the fact he was a "cop's cop" and made crime a campaign issue as these two pre-election comments suggest.

The polls indicate that the issue that concerns most voters is crime in the streets and Nelder, known in his days with the department as a cop's cop, is making the most of it. (SFC, 30 October, 1973: .4)

Nelder's candidacy has been attractive partly because his is a fresh face in politics, at least in up front elective politics. His cop image goes well in a town where citizens get hustled and mugged and very often murdered. In voting for Nelder the folks will be saying something. From here it sounds like "help." (SFE, 4 November, 1973: 2B)

During his first year in office (1974), Nelder was able to show he was serious about some of his campaign ideas. Early in the year, San Francisco was shaken with the Zebra killings, Patty Hearst, Foster murder, etc.--a crime spree during which Nelder firmly supported the police.

In fall 1974 street crime was a big issue in the media and Supervisor Nelder developed what was known as the "Nelder Plan" to replace civilian traffic patrols in the downtown area with police officers who could also help restore "order to the streets." (SFC, 17 August, 1974: 1) This proposal received much support and forced police to start taking more visible action in the downtown area.

During this year, Alioto was running for governor with his law-and-order campaign. It was the year when San Francisco crime figures supported what newspapers and politicians were telling people--crime was on the increase. Also during the year, a controversy started over "victimless crime,"--crimes like prostitution and gambling. The police department had made some public relations blunders which fueled the controversy. The vice squad had spent a large amount of time investigating and finally raiding a well established house of prostitution. Instead of the silence normally attached to such operations, the madam of the house went to the media, accusing police officers of taking advantage of services of the house before the raid and suggesting that the action will

only move "her girls" out on the street instead of having them "safe" within her house. In another "blunder" the vice squad arrested an 83-year old bookie which gained extensive media coverage.

In the crackdown on downtown crime, police made a sweep of a street which was the center for many gay bars and stores. The sweep and arrests brought many cries of police brutality and talk arose about police harassment of homosexuals in general. Police were frequently accused of spending extensive amounts of time trying to catch gays "in the act."

These activities set the stage for elections in November 1975. Three offices were the center for electoral politics about the crime issue: Mayor, District Attorney, and Sheriff. Mayor Alioto was finishing his second term as mayor and could not run again, leaving an open field with many candidates vying for the position. The mayoral election was the only one which had to be decided by a runoff if no candidate received a majority of the votes. With eleven contenders, a runoff was expected.

The District Attorney's race was different. The incumbent, John Ferdon, was seeking re-election. He ran a D.A.s office complementary to the political persons in power (especially the mayor and the police department). As will be demonstrated below, he became embroiled in the crime issues that eventually lost him the election.

The Sheriff, Richard Hongisto, was also running for re-election. Hongisto was not a mainstream San Francisco politician. His disagreements with the mayor had been well publicized. He was proud

of his liberal attitudes and record. His actions to improve conditions in the county jail and his belief in "humane" treatment of prisoners as well as his extreme popularity with the gay and other "minority" communities were the political issues of the campaign for sheriff.

The mayor's race was the one that drew the most attention and reflected the political attitudes towards crime. Candidates announced their intentions of running almost a year before the election, making the campaign a long one. Political speculators were surprised when conservative Quentin Kopp announced he would not join the race, opening the way for John Barbagelata to announce.

Eleven candidates filed for the mayor's race. Almost all of them spoke about the crime issue during the campaign. Here is a sample of comments by the candidates during the election:

John Barbagelata. He will cut crime by "motivating criminals to go to other communities." Also, "I'll fire a police chief every six months until I get one who is tough enough." (SFC, 13 August, 1974: .4).

Dianne Feinstein. In her announcement speech she said she would "put more police officers on the streets because I don't think the black and white police cars prevent crime." (SFC, 23 April, 1975: .2) A description of one of her campaign appearances: "First come the scare statistics: Violent crime is 'tearing the city apart;' 17,000 burglaries caused a \$7-million property loss last year; homicides increased while arrest rates dropped. Her solution: More cops walking the beat, and bonus promotion points for policemen and other civil servants who live inside the city limits." (SBG, 10 October, 1975: .8).

Josie-Lee Kuhlman. In his announcement speech. "The people are not receiving the social services, cultural services and protection they pay for." (SFC, 2 May, 1975: .2)

Milton Marks. In his announcement speech. "I know well the kinds of problems that will face our city. Many of our citizens are fearful--fearful of the impact of the looming economic catastrophe of energy crises, of crime in the streets, of loss of confidence in the process of government itself." (SFC, 3 January, 1975: .2) Later he said, "The emphasis should be upon what we call serious crimes and not what we characterize as victimless crimes." (SFC, 15 March, 1975: .3).

George Moscone. "Police officers should spend less time in public toilets...and looking in bedrooms, and spend more time in the community making it safe." (SFC, 15 March, 1975: .3)

As described above, three months before the election, police and firemen went out on strike. The strike moved political discussions to the city's fiscal condition and response to the strike. As Herb Caen said during the strike:

Tensely dramatic line overheard at City Hall yesterday: "The next mayor of San Francisco will be elected this week"--meaning, of course, that the manner in which the various candidates react to the police strike, and the two others being threatened (firemen, Muni Railway), will make up the public's mind..." (SFE, 20 August, 1975: 33)

The only problem was that most candidates gave little indication what they would have done. Feinstein was the strongest in her suggested action by saying she would have fired Police Chief Scott and the entire Police Commission; an idea that Barbagelata called "baloney." An example of vague responses to the strike is shown by this summary of candidates' views made shortly after the strike was over:

Four candidates for mayor said yesterday the police strike would have been handled differently if they had been sitting in the big chair at City Hall.

Three of the four said they would have been involved in serious negotiations early enough so that the police walkout wouldn't have occurred.

Another, Supervisor Dianne Feinstein, said "We should have had a police commission and a police chief to announce (1) 'You're all suspended!' and (2) 'Turn in your weapons for the duration of the strike.'"

Senators George Moscone and Milton Marks and Superior Court Judge John Ertola expressed variations on the theme that they would have worked out the problems before the difficulties reached crisis stage. (SFC, 25 August, 1975: .18)

As the election started to draw to a close, the polls suggested that the election would produce a runoff between Dianne Feinstein and George Moscone. Aware of this, Feinstein saved most of her limited campaign funds for the general election and did little advertising. The other candidates, also aware of the polls, began to run against Feinstein. For example, Barbagelata ran a full page advertisement the day before the election, portions of which are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 about here

Feinstein was endorsed by both major papers and the SFE gave good coverage of her crime program which would set a goal of a minimum police reaction time of two minutes. Another part was to have two men per police car with one man walking near the car while the other man was driving instead of one or two men cruising in a patrol car.

To almost everyone's surprise, the election results showed the runoff would not include Feinstein but would be between Moscone and the more conservative Barbagelata. The mayoral runoff contest continued to focus on issues of crime and fiscal

COMPARE THE CANDIDATES

All the legitimate polls and forecasts indicate that the next Mayor will be either Barbagelata, Feinstein or Moscone. John and Dianne were both elected supervisors in 1969; let's compare their record on the key issues:

	Barbagelata	Feinstein
BUDGET	Inflated budget. Taxpayers will pay \$64 million more. And because of big spending policies it will have to be increased \$20 million more before the end of the fiscal year.	opposed approved
YERBA BUENA	True cost to taxpayers... \$864 million plus.	opposed approved
CITY PAY	Inequitable city pay packages. Costs you millions. 35% employees below scale, while others far above.	opposed approved
RETIREMENT	110% increase since 1970. You pay \$40 million more. (Feinstein is your representative on the retirement board.	opposed approved

Feinstein has made a difference all right

Feinstein controls the Budget and Finance Committees of the Board of Supervisors. Her proposals have needlessly cost the taxpayers of San Francisco millions upon millions of dollars, and driven thousands of jobs out of the City. Feinstein has not had any administrative or business experience whatsoever. Do you want a mayor who has never held a full-time job or had any managerial experience? As a supervisor, she directs only two city employees.

Feinstein has been in politics for twelve years. Can you recall any reforms or practical programs initiated by Feinstein? Her performance has been limited to promises. For instance, she is now promising a two minute response to police calls. At the same time, only last week, she voted against the 911 emergency telephone service which would have given you a 10 second response to all emergencies by dialing one simple number, 911.

All the police and fire reforms offered by Barbagelata were opposed by Feinstein until the very last minute when political expediency motivated another Feinstein switch.

Feinstein is supported by big money interests. Contributions to her campaign during the past six years amount to approximately \$600,000, as compared to contributions to the Barbagelata campaigns of less than \$125,000.

Feinstein is a professional politician with a bag full of obligations.

	Barbagelata	Feinstein
PAYROLL TAX	Initiated by Feinstein. Drove thousands of blue collar jobs out of the city, increasing unemployment.	opposed approved
FORCED BUSING	Needless... Costly... Millions down the drain. Schools in worse shape than ever before.	opposed approved
PIER 45	Massive waterfront giveaway adjoining Fisherman's Wharf. Environmental disaster.	opposed approved
PHONY NEW TAXES	(Utility and Sewer Tax). Will cost you, the taxpayer, \$25 million this year.	opposed approved
PROSTITUTION	Feinstein supports legalized prostitution but didn't say in whose neighborhood.	opposed approved

Barbagelata

John Barbagelata has 30 years of business experience. At 13, he was the leading newsboy in San Francisco. He worked his way through high school and college. At 28, he was general manager of the world's largest airline for Japan and Korea. He brought new ideas to air travel, such as tourist and economy fares, group discount fares and the first service of wine on flights.

For more than 30 years, Barbagelata has held top administrative and managerial positions, including his own business. He knows fiscally sound procedures and can adapt this experience to running the city as a business... the way it should be run.

John Barbagelata is a fiscal conservative. Since being on the board of supervisors, he has constantly opposed irresponsible spending. His only obligation is to the people of San Francisco.

Why wouldn't Feinstein and Moscone debate with Barbagelata? Is it because they know that he knows too much?

TAXES RAISED 40 TO 120%

HOMEOWNERS' taxes were raised 40% to 120% as of July 1, 1975.

RENTERS, don't think this doesn't affect you. Increased taxes means increased rents. The end result, more **FAMILIES** will move out of San Francisco, more

SENIOR CITIZENS will be forced to live in high crime areas. If you think this is the end of increased taxes, you are mistaken. The only way to keep taxes down is to keep spending down.

What has Barbagelata done for you?

Look at his Record

911 EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SERVICE ... for over a year, John Barbagelata tried to bring this system to San Francisco ... it will mean a 10-second response to all emergencies from dialing one simple number ... 911, ... from public phones, the number will be coin free ... Feinstein voted to kill the emergency phone.

POLICE ON THE STREETS ... others talk ... Barbagelata acts ... at his direction, police doing clerical jobs are being reclassified to their duties ... we need more police on the streets, not behind desks.

IMPROVING NEIGHBORHOODS ... John Barbagelata wrote the Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RAP), the only program in the nation to preserve family housing without massive federal aid. His innovative plan will provide millions in low-interest, long-term home improvement loans at no extra cost to the taxpayer!

STAGGERED WORKING HOURS ... his staggered working hours program (effective at the end of 1975) will improve muni service, at no cost to the taxpayer ... it will also ease congestion on the buses, streets and in downtown shops, restaurants, etc.

CLEANING UP THE PORT ... you've all read about the scandals on our waterfront, made public by John Barbagelata's four month investigation ... because of his findings, the Port is beginning to shape up ... he will do a lot more as Mayor.

CITY JOBS FOR CITY RESIDENTS ... John Barbagelata wrote the only residency rule that hasn't been wiped out by state law ... it says you have to be at least a one-year resident of SF to apply for a civil service job here ... contrary to Feinstein's campaign promises, state law prohibits cities from requiring employees to live in the city where they work.

HEALTH INSURANCE ... John wrote the only health and welfare plan most City workers receive ... his plan fair to workers and taxpayers alike is also competitive with private industry.

CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST LAW ... The conflict-of-interest law (later copied by Moscone) was authored by Barbagelata ... he feels public service means serving the public, not serving yourself to public funds.

HE WROTE THE CAMPAIGN SPENDING LAW. For the first time, there's a limit on contributions and spending in the Mayor's race ... so that a true grassroots candidate like John can run.

HE WROTE THE RUN-OFF ELECTION LAW. If no Mayoral candidate gets over 50% of the vote in November, the top two will face each other in December. The next Mayor will be the choice of the majority of voters.

FIGURE 3. Portion of full page political advertisement for John In 1975 San Francisco mayoral campaign. Highlighting of crime comments has been added. (SFC, 3 November, 1975:21)

responsibility. While stating fiscal conservatism, Moscone moved to a more liberal position in all other areas for the runoff. He took a liberal stand and forced Barbagelata to commit himself or hedge the issue. This strategy worked well by often making Barbagelata look indecisive. A good example was Moscone's announcement that he thought the police force should hire gay officers. Stunned by the announcement and aware of the gay vote, Barbagelata's responded he would "have to think about it."

Both candidates were hard on the police force, promising to make the force more efficient and less corrupt. Barbagelata stated, "If we have a tougher police department than, say, Los Angeles or San Jose, then the criminals will go there instead."

(SFC, 4 December, 1975: 8) Alioto tried to stay out of the election but criticism of the police led him finally to state:

"It's ridiculous the way these guys are talking about our police department. They're literally pandering to fear. The next time one of these Lincoln-Douglas guys pops off, somebody should ask'em what city has a better police department." (SFC, 5 December, 1975: 5)

This prompted a response from Herb Caen.

Joe Alioto in his 47th farewell address, "Name me a city with a finer police department." I will, Joe if you'll name me a city with a higher violent crime rate...: (SFC, 7 January, 1976: 27)

On December 12, Moscone was elected in the runoff. The voting was close and the election was followed by a recount controversy involving Barbagelata's campaign workers. In the end, Moscone was the clear victor and started trying to make good on

his campaign promises about crime. As an editorial titled "The Challenges Moscone Faces" suggested, "...crime is not dealt with properly, police department morale is low... (SFC, 15 December, 1975: 34).

The District Attorney's race ended up being a four way race between incumbent John Ferdon, Joseph Freitas, William Mollen, and Carol Ruth Silver. Mollen set the tone of the election when he said, "Many of San Francisco's citizens exist in a state of fear concerning the rise of violent crime in the city." (SCP, 28 May, 1975: 2) Dealing with violent crime was the campaign. Having held the job, Ferdon mentioned new programs but usually insisted he would do more of the same, only better. Silver and Mollen also dwelt on the need to prosecute criminals but were pale in their presentation compared to Freitas who came out strongly against spending time on "victimless" crime and suggested that efforts in that area should be redirected to the rising violent crime rate. He openly courted the gay community, prostitutes, and liberals. Both the SFC and SFE endorsed the incumbent; the SBG endorsed Silver but the voters supported Freitas.

Sheriff Hongisto's opponents were hardline law and order people. One was a San Francisco policeman; another was an Alioto politician (his body guard). Most candidates tried to discredit Hongisto's record but Hongisto fought back. The hardliners split the conservative vote (there were six candidates);

Hongisto also had the incumbant advantage. The liberal community liked Hongisto and his victory demonstrated to politicians that his approach to law enforcement could be supported in San Francisco.

Police Chief Donald Scott announced his retirement before the election to be effective at the end of the Alioto administration. Therefore, one of Moscone's first and most important appointments was a new Police Chief. It was speculated that the new Mayor's first choice was former Police Chief and present Supervisor, Al Nelder. Nelder disqualified himself when he discovered that he would lose his \$33,000 a year pension if he returned to city payroll.

Instead of Nelder, Moscone appointed Charles Gain. Gain was a controversial figure in San Francisco from the day his appointment was made public. Police officers were reportedly disappointed that the post did not go to someone from the department stating that an "outsider" did not understand their problems. Gain also was not a "cop's cop." While police chief in neighboring Oakland, he was given credit for keeping things calm during the racial riot period of the late 1960s. But, also when he was in Oakland, his officers were not happy with him and in 1971 the Police Officers Association members voted 375 yes to 100 no to 234 abstentions "no confidence" in him. (SFC, 14 January, 1976: 40). He had worked in a number of other cities since that time and most recently had served as assistant to liberal, controversial Sheriff Hongisto.

Abe Mellinkoff, political columnist for the SFC, described the job ahead for Gain.

The Chief's spot is--politically anyway--Mayor Moscone's most important appointment. Tax bills are always grounds for cursing City Hall but they only arrive once a year. Traffic tags, however, are a daily threat to all of us. If Chief Gain can keep some sort of lid on rising crime and on the police department--I don't know which will prove more elusive--the Mayor will look good. (SFC, 14 January, 1976: .40)

Gain started his service with the city by commenting on issues in the style he would always reflect--forceful, upfront, sometimes crude, but always indicating a professional posture.

He was going to see if some officers could be taken from desk jobs and placed on patrol, filling desk positions with civilian personnel. At swearing in ceremonies he said, "Perhaps more men can be put on the street. I don't know, but I'm going to find out...The days of juice (influence) are over." (SFC, World, 18 January, 1976: .5)

Gain walked into an office with a crisis in progress. Two supervisors, John Barbagelata and Quentin Kopp, had received bombs in their mail. Neither had exploded but Gain immediately had all bomb threats checked out and set up protection for all supervisors and Mayor Moscone.

The new Chief met with the new District Attorney and with his former boss, Sheriff Hongisto, shortly after the two newcomers took office. The results of the meeting resulted in a pledge by all three to work together. The meeting was also symbolic in that a new method of law enforcement had come to San Francisco. In the face of reports of rising crime rates, some of these tactics would work and some would fail, but almost all would encounter controversy.

One of the first failures was the announcement by DA Freitas that he would put little emphasis on "victimless" crime--a position affirmed by Gain. This announcement was received with "demonstrations" by prostitutes and gays dancing in the streets. Shortly after the announcement, residents and the business community began to complain that certain areas of the city were being taken over by prostitutes. Gain and Freitas argued that the problem was no different than normal.

In March the controversy reached the supervisors with Barbagelata stating, "I've lost confidence in the Chief. The red carpet is being rolled out for pimps and whores. (SFC. 16 March, 1976: .5) Gain responded, "We haven't laid out the red carpet for prostitution, if there ever was one. It is a continuing problem, not an increasing one." (SFC, 17 March, 1976: .3) Finally, political heat became too much and in January 1977, Gain made a shift in his newly reorganized department and put a "tough cop" in charge of the vice squad. Although it was something he obviously did not like doing, the action quickly silenced critics.

The Chief got into trouble for three incidents concerning police officers. In March and October he horrified conservatives, including many of his officers, by removing the American and San Francisco flags from his office. In October he moved some flags in the South Station. Critics of Gain tried to make an issue of these actions. In general, it backfired, because supporters of Gain suggested that his critics were dealing in petty

politics and should be concerned with what policemen should be doing--solving crime problems.

The second incident was Gain's hard stand on policemen who drink. San Francisco had a department with a tradition of an easy-going, almost wild-west approach to law enforcement and the idea of a policemen tipping one or two on the job was not that unusual. In his move to "professionalize" the department, Gain announced that the no-drinking-in-uniform departmental rule would be strictly enforced.

The third incident was Gain's announcement that he encouraged gay police officers to come "out of the closet". Although the statement received extensive press coverage and support from the gay and liberal segments of San Francisco, it only further alienated the police officers. The frustration over the drinking controversy is exhibited by this comment by Gerald Crowley, president of the Police Officers Association (POA):

"Gain's(actions) should lead a reasonable person to believe that San Francisco policemen are a group of drunken, insensitive children who must constantly be threatened in order to behave.

"We are tired of the Chief holding up the Police Department to public ridicule as an excuse for his apparent inability to properly administer a metropolitan police department. (SEC, 22 April, 1976: .7)

Gain's other "professionalization" move was to conduct a major re-organization of the department. Stating that he was holding to his promise that "juice" was out of the department, he promoted a number of young, articulate district patrol commanders.

Finally, Gain made good his promise to reach out to the community. He believed a major responsibility of the chief was to meet with private citizens and serve as a link between the department and the community. To accomplish this, he used a large part of his schedule for attending community meetings. He met frequently with groups like Margo St. James, a prostitutes' organization, and homosexual rights groups. This was hard for officers in an inwardly directed department to accept.

All of these actions resulted in extensive media coverage of the chief. Almost monthly throughout the spring and summer, newspapers had lengthy articles featuring the "embattled police chief." All this time, the chief had the full support of the mayor. These comments by Mayor Moscone best describe Gain's first six months as chief:

Moscone vigorously defended his controversial police chief, Charles Gain, and indicated he wasn't excessively bothered by the low state of morale in the department.

"Morale is very important," he said, "but the question is: Why do you lose morale? If the police department is telling me that they will only have high morale if they have a chief who gives them what they want and lets them maintain the department the way it was before, then I'm sorry about that.

"If the low morale they claim is because the chief wants to reform the department to make it a better department and in doing so he makes some changes (in situations) that they felt comfortable with before, then I guess we'll have to go with a lowering of morale."

He added that he thinks the "better policemen" will have high morale because of changes in the department, including the elimination of the political juice system in promotions and assignments.

Moreover, Moscone said, the public is supporting Gain and "they are the people whose morale is really at stake." (SFE, 9 May, 1976: 1)

This seemingly callous attitude towards morale did have some negative effects, however. A number of police officers left the force. One described his decision, in part, in this way:

San Francisco seemed more interested in punishing its cops than its criminals. The November elections had seen revisions made in police salaries, pensions and the right to strike. A liberal mayor, district attorney and sheriff were elected. Shortly afterwards an outsider chief, brought in to heal the wounds from the August police strike, succeeded only in alienating everyone. Fellow officers started looking to other departments.

It's getting time to take a hike. The challenge of September, 1972, is lost. (SFE. C.L., 30 May, 1976: .7)

By the fall, articles about Gain began to disappear because of the "Police Chief's New Popularity" as one headline read. One included this statement:

A veteran police inspector, who has served in several bureaus, described Gain as a "a good manager. Very honestly, I think we all know we needed a change."

"He (Gain) is a little abrasive at times--but his point eventually comes through. All he needs is to apply a little Vaseline." (SFC, 6 October, 1976: .3)

Gain was succeeding with the plan as described by Moscone.

Attention shifted from the personality of the chief to his job--crime prevention. During the fall preceeding Moscone's election, the crime rate in San Francisco began to rise and continued to rise throughout 1976. Both Moscone and Gain were quick to point out that rise in crime started before they could do anything about it. Gain was also adamant about the limited effect police activities have on crime statistics. He would point out that crime is a problem bigger than any police department

and that other factors like unemployment, poverty, and housing are a part of crime rates.

Gain's major move against the increase in crime was to eliminate uniformed officers performing desk jobs and reorganize the department to serve as a better crime prevention department. Some actions, like reducing the motorcycle patrol unit and making those officers "beat cops," were suggested as improving crime prevention but served political ends as well. The motorcycle patrol was one of the most traditional, therefore anti-Gain, parts of the department. All reforms were announced by Gain with the caution that they will not solve the crime problem by themselves.

In late October and early November an unusual rise in the number of senseless (motiveless) violent crimes brought demands for action. Some suggested that incidents like the slaying of a maitre d' in Nob Hill and the robbery of dinner guests in the home of former Mayor George Christopher brought an awareness of crime out of the ghetto and into neighborhoods of the wealthy and powerful and resulted in action. A New York Times article surveyed the situation this way:

And the crime rate is not so worrisome to the residents of poorer communities, who have always had to contend with muggings and other acts of random violence. They seem to be more concerned about other issues--the skyrocketing cost of housing, for example, and cutbacks of public services.

"There have been dozens of people killed in fires in the transient hotels down here, and that's not getting half the attention that happens when a few rich whites get robbed," said a young artist who lives in the predominantly black and Latin Mission District.

But the alarm is real in the well-to-do neighborhoods inhabited by the establishment that runs the city.

Local newspapers and television stations chronicle each new assault. Civic groups and politicians condemn the year-old administration of Mayor George Moscone as soft on criminals. (New York Times, 13 December, 1976: 22)

This may be a good assessment. Even Mayor Moscone admitted when he announced a \$1.7 million plan to fight crime, "Homicidal acts have been committed in Pacific Heights as well as Hunter's Point. There are no safe neighborhoods now." (SFC, 24, November, 1976: .1). The expensive plan was the result of politics around the crime issue. Seeing crime problems as a concern for citizens, a group of supervisors led by the team of John Barbagelata and Quentin Kopp, started demanding something be done about them. They held hearings, and went to the press about the problem.

Forced to take some action, Moscone announced his \$1.7 million plan. The plan which used federal funds from the Local Public Works Employment Act mainly called for hiring more police officers or civilian personnel to take over desk jobs, freeing patrolmen to go out on the street. This action upset the poor and minority community because it took funds that were originally to go to reduce unemployment and funneled them to the police force. It also went against the Moscone/Gain idea that more police will not help; the city needs to take care of social problems.

Gain's concern about the politics of the situation were obvious when the mayor announced his crime program.

Police Chief Gain denounced members of the Board of Supervisors--"Kopp, Nelder and others"--for "playing a political game" with the problem of crime: for making "ridiculous" statements about the prevalence of violence," and creating an "emotional bandwagon" when "they know we are short of police officers," and, in fact, were responsible for the cuts.

He challenged the supervisors to "put up or shut up" and restore the 250 positions his department had lost over the past few years. "Give us the resources and we'll do the job, said an angry Gain. (24 November, 1976: .1)

By now, lines were drawn and crime methods were an issue in the city. How each side viewed the problem was described in this exchange in a newspaper interview with Mayor Moscone and Supervisor Kopp.

Kopp: I think unemployment is a strong factor in crime and in terms of the crime rate in San Francisco. But focusing on 1976, I think there's unmistakably something more to it.

A major factor has been the attitude of leaders in law enforcement. Let me make it clear I'm talking about the chief of police, I'm talking about the district attorney and I'm talking about the sheriff. The chief of police has always been gracious and courteous. I want to make that clear too. But he has a sociological attitude about crime, about enforcement, about prevention of crime, and so does the district attorney.

I think that there is a tone and a tenor which was provided by law enforcement leaders at the very outset of the calendar year 1976 which has had an effect. The confusing dialogue about victimless crime occurred in January when the district attorney took office. It was reiterated in substance by chief of police. It was a signal to people engaged in prostitution to come to San Francisco. Now prostitution inevitably brings other crimes.

...And most people don't like to say this publicly but...San Francisco is a very hospitable place for the types of people who are the most uncontrollable in the sense of human experience and governmental experience. Now that's a plain fact.

George says the city seems to attract people who have lost hope in so many ways elsewhere and come here as an effort to regain it. Over and above that, I think we have an extraordinary amount of bizarre personalities in the San Francisco population mix... There has to be a way of making it inhospitable for those who have antisocial predilections. We've got a state, in my opinion, of fear and anxiety among people in San Francisco that is unparalleled in my experience. And those are the people whom we have the primary duty to, to the people who are now so threatened by crime and by the incidence of criminal acts that they are in many cases literally afraid and reluctant to leave their homes.

Moscone: Can I say just one thing to put this in perspective? I don't care how you do it—I drove down Polk Street to day just because I wanted to drive down Polk street. It's where I grew up. And I said, 'Jesus, I really miss the way life used to be on this wonderful street which is no longer the same.'

But nothing is the same. Let me tell you something. I was on the Board of Supervisors. If anybody had sent me a letter saying they were going to bomb my house at 10:47 and they were going to kill Jennifer, Johnathon, Rebecca and Christopher by name, or if anybody had sent me or my colleagues the presents that Quentin Kopp and John Barbagelata got (bombs), they wouldn't have believed it. We almost accept that now. They come by my house and I'm scared to death—a spotlight shining in my house. Well it turns out to be a police officer. I see him go down the street and he's hitting Peter Tamaras too. That's just standard procedure. Why? Because he's a supervisor and I'm the mayor.

I'm not saying "be sorry for us." I'm just saying "You get a pretty good idea of why we are groping."

[This was followed by a debate over whether police should institute stop and search procedure. Kopp was in favor; Moscone opposed.]

Question: Would more police make a difference?

Moscone: In your own newspaper just Tuesday of this week there was a report that has two police chiefs of major American cities supporting a Rand Corp. report that there is no basis on which you can assume that the presence of more police lowers crime.

What I said was "Let us try 90 days of this with a weekly reporting by the police department as to whether the addition of 60 new persons...has any kind of impact upon the incidence of crime in San Francisco."

Kopp: I want to see the results. I'm not altogether convinced about numbers because other cities, large cities, operate with fewer police officers than San Francisco, San Francisco has a rather high number of police officers per capita population, not the highest in the country...

Moscone: We're charged with several things. At this moment we're charged to do anything we can to stop crime. But...for several months that preceded this we were charged to do everything within our power to cut the cost of government. We didn't pick on the police department. We didn't pick on the fire department. Everything was done across the board...We can't make certain exceptions. That's the quick way to tear your city apart.

Now we have a crisis. I want the 90-day test. I'm not going to spend the City's money--federal or otherwise, nor is the board, unless we can show the people we're getting something in return. (SFE, 5 December, 1976: .1)

In January, attitudes began to heat up even more. In an evaluation of the mayor's first year in office, most leaders from all parts of the city including supervisors gave Moscone low marks on his leadership on the crime issue. As Supervisor Fienstein stated, "He (Moscone) has more or less left crime up to Gain and Freitas and has not come forward with any strong statements of concern."
(SFC 8 January, 1974: .4)

Also in January, Sheriff Hongisto was in the middle of a controversy over the International Hotel. The hotel was the residence of a number of older, poor persons in a run down part of the city. The hotel was to be destroyed, and Hongisto was to evict the residents. The hotel became a cause for the anti-development, pro-poor crusade and Hongisto refused to evict the residents. He went to jail for five days over the incident enraging his critics who suggested that, as an officer of the law, he should not be breaking it. Hongisto also outraged his critics by taking his two weeks of vacation to fly to Miami and support the gay rights movement against Anita Bryant. His critics again suggested that this was not the role of a sheriff.

Good news came in January when the crime rate eased slightly. When asked about it, Gain continued his attack on the politics-of-crime issue. "It distresses me greatly that people are running for office on the basis of crime and playing on the fears of citizens, thereby creating more fear and unrest." (SFE, 16 January, 1977; 4A).

Late in February, conservatives gave substance to their attacks. Barbagelata started to garner signatures on a petition for a sweeping proposition. The proposition would revise proposition T (which had mandated district elections), by cutting the terms of members of city commissions, and, most important cutting off terms of mayor, district attorney and sheriff making them run again in November. During the announcement, Barbagelata let the importance of the crime in the campaign be known.

Barbagelata called his plan "a reform, not a recall," but went on to blame Moscone, Freitas and Hongisto for the city's crime rate and general conditions.

"Name one thing that's running smoothly in San Francisco," he challenged the reporters. "Law enforcement? The Muni? We had the largest crime rate increased in the country last year and I blame those three officials." (SFC 25, February 1977: 24).

Barbagelata secured the required number of signatures to place the proposition on the ballot. It was put on the ballot with another proposition, a simple measure that would recall Proposition T.

As the year progressed, workers started campaigning either for or against the propositions. The proposition was not simply a vote on the crime issues. Many other issues were involved. The Barbagelata proposition (appropriately labeled "Proposition B") supporters talked of more than crime. They suggested that the city would develop into another Chicago with ward-politics and often suggested that Moscone was already a part of the "machine" run by Phillip and John Burton, Congressmen from San Francisco districts. The other proposition's ("Proposition A") supporters made similar arguments but argued they were not out to "recall" all officers. They suggested that the change to district elections was a mistake and a vote for "A" would give San Franciscans a chance to correct it.

Those against A and B were already organized from the same groups that were pro-Proposition T a few months earlier. They used similar arguments concerning the city being run by downtown interests and the need to have people who will represent the "common person."

Added to their anti-A and B comments were suggestions that recalling Proposition T without giving it a chance to work was unfair and rescinding the will of the people.

Those against B charged that it was a vindictive action by Barbagelata because he had lost the mayoral election and wanted another try. This suggestion was given support when a former Barbagelata aide mentioned that he had been asked to write up the "recall" proposition only weeks after Barbagelata was defeated.

Anti-B forces also suggested that the \$400,000 cost for a special election was a waste of taxpayers' money and voters should not support those who have such expensive ideas.

A good description of the issues of the campaign was given by Herb Caen.

Now that the Dade County Follies are behind us, so to speak, we may look forward with trepidation to the next dyn-o-mite election right here in Baghdad-by-the-Bay. That would be on August 2, when San Francisco's wildly assorted voters go to the polls to face the simple complexities of Propositions A and B, whose initials, you will note with gasps of surprise, anger or bliss, are those of Anita Bryant. There, however, the connection ends.

San Francisco is not Miami (all rise to shout "awrrr-right!") and the issues are not the same, although gay-connected to a degree. Proposition A is simple. Vote yes and Proposition T, which provides for Supervisors to be elected, is dead at birth, despite heavy voter approval last November.

Nobody asked me, but I'd like to see T given a chance. The argument against--"This is a small town, Supervisors should be elected at large. Prop. T would bring ward politics to San Francisco"--don't add up to much. This is a small town, yes but infinitely varied, and too many segments have never had representation in City Hall. We've had "ward" politics for years--one ward--run by powerful politico-economic coalition, pronounced "Downtown."

In fact, so far as I can find out, San Francisco is the only county in California that DOESN'T elect Supes from the district they live in. It's old hat, but the way we have been operating is even older and apparently just fine with those interests who believe they "control" the Board. They don't like Prop. T for that obvious reason.

Prop. B as in Barbagelata is an entirely different--well--proposition. You can get rational people to talk rationally about Prop A. But when B comes up they fall strangely silent, or become evasive. "I don't know, what do YOU think" is the usual response to a question about Barbagelata's radical proposal which, in effect, would recall a mess of people--Mayor, CAO, D.A., Sheriff, Supes, Commsr.--and force them to run again in November. As Ex-Mayor George Christopher has put it, it is a vote of confidence, an old ploy in Britain but something new here.

Today, the winds of change are blowing hard, and the chill can be felt in high places. That's why Prop. B is instructive, and thus valuable. We will learn a lot about San Francisco 1977. Barbagelata's brainstorm, whether induced by envy or sincerity, will give the ultras a chance to come out of the bushes. They can stand up and be counted in the anonymity of the voting booth--the law and order types, the gay-haters, the anti-blacks, those who blame all the ills of city on the bleeding hearts.

It is, classically, a liberal vs. conservative issue--with a few undertones. Much of Big Labor, offended by Moscone's limp attitude in the City strike, will vote with Barbagelata, despite the latter's anti-labor record. The police will vote for it. Them As Has (and would like to keep it) will vote for it. When I first heard about Prop. B, I thought Barbo had made a mistake by including too many targets, but now I see his astuteness. If you don't like Moscone OR Hongisto OR a certain Supe, you will vote "Yes"; you are less likely to vote "No" just because you like Freitas. The turning point FOR Prop B may have been Hongisto's trip to Miami, with Moscone's backing. (SFC, 12 June, 1977, Punch: .1)

This is not to suggest that crime was not used as an issue.

This description of pro- B forces shows how the issue was used.

Rourke (pro B worker) also touched on another key issue of the Yes on B campaign--the city's criminal justice system. Most Yes on B people complain about the "liberal" law enforcement programs of District Attorney Joseph Freitas, Sheriff Richard Hongisto and Police Chief Charles Gain.

"The bottom line is No on crime, Yes on B" said Bill O'Keeffe who is treasurer of the Yes on B group. O'Keeffe owns several plants that manufacture and sell plastic skylights in San Francisco.

Perhaps because crime is such a central issue in the Yes on B campaign, the committee has selected retired Deputy Policy Chief Mortimer McInerney as chairman of the campaign. O'Keeffe described McInerney as a "tough, hard nosed cop."

The San Francisco Police Officers Association which represents about 1500 mostly white police officers is also supporting the proposition with money and manpower. The association is directing its own Yes on B campaign out of their offices.

"We are very upset with the criminal justice system as it's being practiced by people in control," said Paul Schignell, a member of the board of directors of the POA and a patrolman. "The chief and the Police commission are paying more attention to alternative life style groups than to the rank and file patrolman. We have a difficult time talking to our own commission. They talk with White Panthers and Margo St. James, but the input isn't there from the rank and file. We're very frustrated." (SFC, 4 July, 1977: .4)

The proposition had public support of the Police Officers Association and their leader, Gerald Crowley. In June, Crowley announced a vote by the POA that showed police officers were dissatisfied with Gain, Hongisto and Freitas. He said dissatisfaction ran at 96 per cent for Gain and 88 percent for Hongisto and Freitas. This announcement brought a sharp response by those affected.

Mayor George Moscone, who appointed Gain to the top police post, joined in the fray by noting, "he (Crowley) is nothing but a malcontent, trying to strike fear in the hearts of the people. He is a political demagogue and I do not believe one word he says."

Moscone also accused Crowley of not being representative of the POA's membership--"he does not speak for the men and women of that department--and said Crowley was biased in favor of Proposition B on the August 2 ballot....

Freitas, for his part, called the POA survey, "a phony political poll, timed by Crowley to benefit (Supervisor John) Barbagelata's Proposition B campaign." (SFC, 15 July, 1977: 2).

During the campaign, statistics started to help the "liberal" law enforcement people. Rising crime statistics began to level off and go down. With constant caution, Gain would point out statistics but suggest that police work probably has little impact on bringing about any major change--up or down.

This tactic by Gain also drew criticism from POA's Crowley.

At one point, Crowley brought up the controversial subject of crime statistics, charging that the Moscone administration was playing a public relations game" by highlighting a recent five per cent drop in crime, but ignoring "an all time high of 24 per cent (crime increase) throughout (Gain's) year and a half tenure as police chief, "The POA comes up with this crap," Gain said, "and its' all negative. It is a great disservice to the citizens of this city." (SFC, 15 July, 1977: .2)

As the election drew near, newspapers endorsed Proposition A but not B. In a last blast, Barbagelata threatened to quit the Board of Supervisors if A and B lost. At the same meeting, Pro-B advocates continued to focus on the crime issue with former Deputy Police Commissioner Mortimer McNery contradicting the

claims of the administration that crime was on a downward trend,
(SFC, 1 August, 1977: .4)

Both proposition were defeated at the polls by margins of 72,014-yes to 97,242-no for A and 62,185-yes to 112,123-no for B. The vote was a victory for Moscone and others, and it provided them with the chance to say, "We won because we are doing the kind of job people want." As Moscone said, he would use the vote to "move (the city) in the direction I wish," (SFC, 4 August, 1977: .1)

One letters to the Editor writer expressed his belief that the election should settle the politics-of-crime issue when he stated; "How many elections will it take before the Police Officers Association gets the message that the people of San Francisco want their policemen to be policemen and not politicians?" (SFC, 12 August, 1977: 52).

With the question of district elections settled, political news moved to the upcoming election of supervisors in November, Barbagelata resigned from the Board of Supervisors the day after the deadline for Moscone to name a replacement for him, gave a bitter interview to the media and retired from the political scene.

Crime did not leave the political area with the defeat of Propositions A and B, but it changed character. The liberal law enforcement leaders were retained in power; the POA and conservatives had been defeated. Crime remained an issue but debates were no longer over how to run crime prevention. It had returned to the "motherhood" issue of pre-1975.

This is demonstrated by this quote from the SFC describing one candidate in the November supervisors election: "Like the other 113 candidates for supervisor in the city, she also strongly favors lowering both the crime rate and taxes." (SFC, 20 October, 1977: .5)

The change can also be seen from these notes taken by Mike Maxfield on Chief Gain's response to the question if crime has become less of a political issue.

He admits that it is less of an issue than 1976, but says that crime will always be an issue in a mayoral election year. Since he expects crime rate to increase slightly near the end of the year, this may be an issue. Low police morale another possible issue. Since he is not popular with patrolman's association, low morale and rising crime rate may be synergistic in placing crime on the political agenda. Agrees that exit of Barbagelata and Hongisto have quieted things down somewhat, and there is less personal-pressure on him. This is helped somewhat by low public support for police in San Francisco... (at one point referred to "devastating police strike") (Maxfield, 1978: .9).

CHAPTER 6: The Political Actors

Previous chapters have dealt with specific events of politics of crime in San Francisco. To develop a total picture of the situation, Chapters six and seven will not focus on any certain incident, but will take into account events of the four year period 1974-1977.

In San Francisco, many political actors played an important role in the politics of crime in that period. It is important to look at the people who make decisions, the positions they obtain in the political structure, and how they see these positions. Five positions and the persons who filled them will be considered here:

- 1) Mayor, 2) Chiefs of Police, 3) Police Union Leaders
- 4) Supervisors, 5) Other actors.

In San Francisco electoral politics, diverse structure of the governmental system and simplicity of the referendum procedure all contribute to an open political system. This openness allows for political personalities to come forth. Without strict rules on what political actors can and cannot do, their actions are as much a result of their personality as their position.

I. Mayors

As head of the administrative branch of the city, the mayor is responsible for implementing those programs and measures approved

by the Board of Supervisors. He/she is also responsible for developing the budget and much of the legislation approved by the Supervisors. Therefore the mayor has control over some parts of the policy direction of the city.

The mayor operates under many formal restrictions. Two of the most important are the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and numerous commissions that set policy for most administrative functions. The CAO is San Francisco's version of the City Manager. He/she is responsible for the administration of the city departments. Although the CAO is appointed by the mayor and approved by the Board of Supervisors, he/she serves for "life" so is under no direct control of the mayor.

A similar situation confronts the mayor with numerous commissions which set administrative policies. Although the members of the commissions are appointed by the mayor, the posts do not become vacant when a new mayor is elected. If a new mayor has different ideas on the operation of a department controlled by a commission, he/she cannot automatically appoint persons who agree with him/her and, therefore, has to persuade commission members of the new ideas. Although the mayor has only limited control of many parts of his/her administration, he/she is usually the person to catch the "heat" if anything goes wrong.

Joseph Alioto (Mayor, 1968-1975). If the cliché description of a politician as "flamboyant" fits anyone, it would be Joe Alioto. His eight years as mayor of the city were anything but dull.

He had the ability to dramatize any point. Herb Caen summed up Alioto's time as mayor,

...At the M&M Saloon at Fifth and Howard, a newsman was heard to sigh, "We don't have Alioto to kick around much longer," to which a cynic responded, "That works both ways."

Either way, he may have been a bad Mayor but he was good copy. In almost eight years, nobody ever heard him say publicly, "I don't know." He had answers to questions that weren't even asked. What a waste of talent and energy: a bright man--"too smart by half," in the British cockney phrase--whose facade is shiny with self confidence. Eight years ago, there was hardly anybody in town who wasn't for him and who didn't wish him well, and how rapidly he used up that credit. Eight years later it's the other way around.

Maybe we all expected too much from him, this man thrust into the race when Gene McAteer died unexpectedly. To the public at large, he was simply a personable, back slapping, flesh-pressing millionaire lawyer, an anti-trust specialist. "I'm convinced," a wag was to say a year after his election. "He lost my trust almost immediately." If his image was favorably vague at first, it soon became clear: big builders, big labor, big buildings, big ambitions.

No sooner had he been installed than he was off and running for Governor, then Vice-President. He spent more time away from his desk than at it. When the Mike Neyin scandal broke, he was in New York "on private business." Here was the Alioto-backed candidate for Sheriff, Alioto's own chauffeur and a S.F. policeman to boot, being arrested on a felony charge of vote fraud, and all an Alioto spokesman could say was "So what, it has been going on for years." So has murder but it's still illegal.

The Alioto years have provided an expensive education for thousands of San Franciscans who once were content to say, "I never think about politics." He forced them to, and the police-fire strike, which he settled so precipitously, not to mention unilaterally, turned out

to be a political error of the first magnitude. "Why, I had no IDEA we were paying so much pension money," was the refrain heard time and again, "and they want MORE?" Suddenly, it was "they," the beloved firemen a city had admired, without question, since 1906.

For decades, ballot measures to fatten the paychecks and pensions of police and firemen passed automatically. Nothing was too good for "our boys" who are not "they," strangers living across county lines and voting illegally. Nor has the lesson of New York's lavish pensions been lost. The Bloodless civil war erupts in the polling booths today, and this city will never be the same. (SFC, 4 November, 1975: .25)

Alioto liked to be in charge; he was an action oriented mayor. This tendency was visible in his work with police/crime politics. "Juice" or influence was said to be the most important factor in running the San Francisco Police Department. Although never stated publicly, well informed sources suggested that Police Chief Al Nelder (who later became a supervisor) resigned his post because he would not allow the Alioto juice to flow in his department. This was not the case with Chief Donald Scott, Alioto's choice to replace Nelder.

Until 1973, promotion to the bureau of inspectors, with its higher status and pay, was through "juice," the term used in the department to describe the influence of City Hall in promotions and assignments.

"In previous administrations (previous to Moscone), the mayor ran the police department despite the denials of the chief," said one observer. (SFC, 22 April, 1976: .7)

In return for being able to administer the police department from the mayor's office, Alioto was consistently loyal to the department, always defending it against its critics. He took pride in the department and attempted to use its record to support the law-and-order image he wished to project.

His involvement in the Zebra killings demonstrated his "take charge" personality. As fear about the Zebra murders grew in the city, Alioto announced the unprecedented move that police would stop and check all young black men meeting the description of the killers. Alioto was severely criticized for the action. During the entire stop-and-search controversy, Alioto was the one to announce the implementation of the process, answer questions and criticisms about it, and take credit and blame for its purpose--Chief Scott was rarely consulted by the press for his views on this police policy.

Also during the Zebra killings, Alioto backed up his statements about the safety of the streets and his confidence in the police by walking the streets to demonstrate how safe they were. At the end of the case, Alioto was the person who interviewed the informant who led to the prosecution of the case. In typical Alioto style, he took full advantage of this interview to warn the citizens of the "Death Angel" plot, personally fly to Washington to talk with Attorney General Saxbe about the plot, and in general, be the person central to the "solution" of the Zebra case.

He took advantage of this role in his race for governor. One commercial he had on television showed him holding an M-16 rifle saying "this was found in a school...my opponents say I'm too tough on law enforcement...so did the Zebra killers and the

SLA." [SFC, 28, May, 1974; .20]. These did not gain him the Democratic nomination for Governor but showed his willingness to use crime problems to his advantage. He presented his law-and-order-image to the Democratic party in hopes of becoming the "conservative" Vice-Presidential candidate in 1976. That was unsuccessful.

Alioto will also be remembered for his solution to the police and firemen's strike of 1975 (the detailed description is in Chapter Five.) Essentially, he used his long-standing relationship with labor to bring police and fire organizations into line and when they agreed to what he thought was reasonable, he settled the strike. When the Board of Supervisors rejected the settlement, he took charge by putting the city in a state of emergency and finalizing the settlement.

This action caused a political uproar and the mayor was called many things including a "dictator". Not the type to leave quietly, Alioto had a number of harsh words for the supervisors. An example is the text of a veto message to the supervisors when he vetoed the proposal to put a proposition on the ballot restricting the emergency power of the mayor--the powers Alioto had just used (the veto was subsequently overridden by the supervisors).

"I am convinced you are acting with a wave of high-emotion approaching hysteria," the mayor wrote in a message accompanying his veto of the amendment restricting his emergency powers.

"Your board is becoming the rallying point for every professional cop-hater in the area. You must restore a calm rule of reason in the community rather than rush into impetuous actions based on strong emotion," Alioto said.

"You may miscalculate the reaction of San Franciscans to the paradoxical alliance between reactionaries and professional cop-haters. That alliance based on contradiction is strongly centering around your board," he added.

Alioto renewed his contention that there is something suspicious about the unanimous stand the board has taken in connection with the public safety crisis.

"So long as you continue to act in unanimity on serious questions, the inference of a secret understanding (for political motives) becomes stronger," the mayor said. (SFC, 26 August, 1975: .1)

Soon after the strike he had to retire. In his retirement he divorced his wife (marital problems were another large chapter in Alioto's political life), married a Boston woman and continued to speak out on matters in San Francisco whenever the press would quote him. Although not totally responsible, he played a major part in the transformation of the city's political personality in 1976-77. Much of the electoral discussion and anti-downtown movements in the city were a negative reaction to the Alioto years, particularly the last few months.

George Moscone (Mayor, 1976-1979). In 1975 San Franciscans changed the perceived center of power; they also got a change in leadership style. Moscone was anything but flamboyant. In fact, the major criticisms of him after one year in office was that he lacked leadership skills of the former mayor. Responding to the criticism, he stated:

Moscone, in his own summing up, said he does the mayor's job with less flash than his predecessor, Joseph Alioto, but insisted that his record of quiet performance was more substantial than his critics believe.

The mayor admitted however, that he may have been too publicity shy in his first year and added that he hopes to get before the public more in 1977.

"Leadership isn't going on television every night and beating your chest: it's getting things done," he said. "I think we've got things done, but I'm not unmindful of the need to appear in a leadership role with the public. This year, I think we can do both." (SFC, 8 January, 1977: .4).

These comments were made before the recall initiative was placed on the ballot. The recall initiative forced Moscone to publicize his record and, in the end, may have helped him present the image of a leader.

Moscone is an administrator as well as an electoral politician. He works through a chain of command and is pleased when things are accomplished. One of the best examples of this process is Moscone's involvement with the politics-of-crime.

Although not a cornerstone of his election campaign, he promised to do something about crime if elected. His comments about crime during the campaign were more a reaction to programs and suggestions of other candidates in the race than a positive platform.

After becoming mayor he selected Charles Gain as his Chief of Police and, along with the chief, promised to take the "juice" (political influence) out of the department. This

was an excellent beginning political stance. Gain was a good politician himself and Moscone let Gain be the spokesman about crime in San Francisco. Because he promised not to interfere with the department, Moscone's statements about crime were either a comment on how his administration was concerned about the problem, working on it or statements expressing his support of Chief Gain.

Gain's response to the mayor was to discuss how the department is "professionally" dealing with crime. He would add that the mayor had never interfered with the operation of the police department and commend him for keeping his election promise to do so. This tandem approach to the crime problem allowed Moscone to escape getting caught trying to be a police chief and, if something went wrong, having to take all the blame. At the same time, when things started to go "right" in 1977 with crime rates falling, Moscone continued to praise the work of Chief Gain and indirectly stated that his own appointment and administration was solving the problem.

The criticism Moscone received for this approach was exemplified in this statement by former mayoral candidate and supervisor, Dianne Feinstein.

"He has more or less left crime up to (Police Chief Charles) Gain and (District Attorney Joseph) Freitas and has not come forward with any strong statements of concern" she said. "People expect more forceful leadership from the mayor." (SFC, 8 January, 1977: .4).

The controversy over the "recall" initiative in the form of Proposition B allowed Moscone to seek support of his administration and his approach to running San Francisco. Although Moscone did not raise the issue of his administration's record, his opponents suggested that Proposition B was a referendum on his administration. When asked if the fact that Proposition B made it to ballot status was not an indication that citizens were dissatisfied with his administration, Moscone replied:

Moscone: "Absolutely not, First of all, it takes only three per cent of the population to qualify an initiative such as Proposition B for the ballot. Of the less than 30,000 signatures which were collected by John Barbagelata, (Police Officers Association President) Jerry Crowley, and (Plumbers Union president) Joe Mazzola to qualify Proposition B, almost one in every five was disqualified by the registrar of voters. So they barely got the needed three percent. Secondly, John Barbagelata decided to go with an initiative rather than a straight out-and-out recall because he knew he could not pass a recall under any circumstance. Besides, a recall takes specific charges and John could not have come up with those. So, Proposition B does not evidence dissatisfaction with the Moscone administration."

At the same time, Barbagelata, the leader of Pro-B forces, stated the following reasons for the election:

"The dissatisfaction with the Moscone administration cuts widely across San Francisco," Barbagelata added. "It affects everyone, including minorities and gays, and that's why it is marshalling support throughout the city."

When asked if things were so bad they needed such drastic changes, Barbagelata continued:

"The changes in Proposition B are not drastic, but they are necessary. The city is in terrible shape and here are a few specifics--Moscone demoralizes the Police Department and cuts uniformed police by 10 per cent; crime rate soars, Moscone blames the

Board of Supervisors; the supervisors vote \$5 million of federal funds for the Police Department. Moscone vetoes it; Moscone deceptively manipulates crime statistics to claim the crime rate is down 27 per cent in February, but official statistics expose the deception. (SFC, 30 July, 1977: .4).

When the election was over and Moscone had "won", he obviously felt that the victory provided him with a mandate to continue his type of administration. He went on with "business as usual". He continued to express support in his appointments, intervening only at those times he thought absolutely necessary and appropriate. In general, he remained an administrator for day-to-day business of the city and a politician only when it came to election matters.

The two persons who served as mayor during the 1970s provide an interesting contrast in personality fitting with a position. The structure of city government in San Francisco allows the office of mayor to fit the personality of the office holder. Because the mayor has limited power to perform duties, the position is defined through the perception of the job by those who hold it. The limitations on power also prevent the mayor from gaining a monopoly on the politics of the city.

The major issue in the 1975 mayoral campaign was Alioto's solution to the police/fire strike. When Moscone took office, he was not one who "pounded his chest" as mayor and he left the perception that he would not provide unpopular Alioto-type solutions to the city's problems.

When Moscone faced his biggest challenge, Proposition B, he was also favored by events of time. First, the perceived crime rate was falling as the election approached. Moscone and Gain suggested this decline was the result of needed time for their programs to take effect. Before any long range proof to their claims could be made, the election had come and gone. Therefore, voters were left to choose between the pro-proposition B stance that crime is still serious because the administration was doing a poor job of solving the problem, or the anti-B position which suggested that new decline in crime rate was a sign of things to come.

A second aspect to the "recall" election was that the criticism generated by pro-B supporters gave the Moscone administration an opportunity to talk of its accomplishments. Without a flamboyant style, the mayor had difficulty getting coverage of his accomplishments. The good things he had done had been done quietly, uninterestingly. With Proposition B, the debate became the ability of the Moscone administration and what before was uninteresting became newsworthy.

This is not to say that Moscone is not a good politician. The contrary is true. He has an ability to sense the tenor of the voting public and present the image they want. He can also easily project a down to business, efficient, competent image that is popular to a post-Watergate, post-Alioto, and now, Proposition 13 electorate.

II. Police Chiefs

The office of police chief of San Francisco is under control of the mayor. It is probably the only position (other than personal aides) in the mayor's administration which is so directly controlled. Most other positions are recommended by the mayor and approved by a commission or the supervisors. Even though all commissioners are appointed by the mayor, they serve terms which extend beyond the mayor's. Therefore, most public officials are controlled by a commission which is not responsible to the mayor.

The one exception to this rule is the Police Commission, a three-person panel appointed by the mayor and serving at his pleasure. Therefore, the mayor has control over the Commission as well as the selection and firing of the chief (through the Commission). This arrangement led to accusations that during the Alioto administration, the police department suffered from extensive political influence at the top of the department.

Because of the close connection between the mayor and the Police Chief, operation of the police department reflects the type of mayor supervising the Chief of Police. This was evident during the tenure of the two police chiefs who served in San Francisco in the 1970s.

Donald Scott. (Police Chief, 1971-1975). These comments from an article about Scott describe him as Police Chief:

"Not a grandstander, not a bull-----er," said one cop.

"If he yelled at ya, he liked ya," said another.

"Never had a chief like this guy before," said a third.

"He actually delegated authority"....

The city's 26th chief of police, who retires after 37 years on the force, is a quiet man and an effective administrator. The worst his critics can say about him is that his profile was too low, that he should have taken firmer control.

He is a cop of the old school who doesn't believe there is such a thing as victimless crime. "The law's the law," he liked to tell his troops... (SFC, 15 December, 1975: .13).

To the policemen who worked for him, he was a "cop's cop" and that helped him control his troops. He was an insider who had worked his way up through the department. His tough stand also endeared him to most of those on the force who thought the cop's main job was to enforce the law--no matter what. On the other hand, when police went out on strike, he was not ready for it to happen. As he later admitted:

"I never thought we'd ever have one," he said, "I had talked it over with all the district captains. Some thought the men might strike, others said they definitely would not.

"One captain said there was nobody in his station that would walk out. Well, it turned out everybody did.

"Some estimates were more accurate than others; but nobody indicated it would be 100 per cent." (SFC, 15 December, 1975: .13).

As one writer suggested, this surprising action by striking police caused some problems during the strike.

Station after station is unmanned except for the captain, a lieutenant or two and perhaps a civilian clerk. There are no patrolmen, few sergeants and no radio cars in service. Taylor and Scott had expected the sergeants, as supervisory personnel, to remain on duty.

The pickets by this time have all entrances to the Hall of Justice blocked and are beginning to surround the district stations.

Chief Scott is informed that the strike is more effective than anyone had expected--and for a few moments there is some panic on the fifth floor of the Hall of Justice before the calm of professionalism returns. (SFE, C.L., 12 October, 1975: .9).

The rationale Mayor Alioto gave as his unprecedented, and some say improper, settlement of the strike was the need to return safety to the streets before things got out of hand. Whether this was political rhetoric or whether Alioto was really concerned with the lack of police protection will never be known. If there was some truth to Alioto's concern, it came in part from Chief Scott's mistaken perception of his men and the subsequent lack of preparation for coping with the strike. Whatever the case, administration of the department during the strike was one of the low points in Chief Scott's career.

The major asset Scott had in keeping his job was his ability to keep "his profile too low." As his boss enjoyed projecting a high profile, the chief was well advised to keep his low. As mentioned above, when a crime crisis struck San Francisco, the papers rarely quoted Scott--Alioto was the one to discuss police policy, as he did with the Zebra killings, Patty Hearst/SLA kidnapping and the police strike. An example is a speech Alioto made in Sacramento about the SLA:

The mayor said he has instructed San Francisco Police Chief Donald Scott "to activate a special investigative team to devote full-time to tracking down the kidnappers of Miss Hearst." (SFC, 16 April, 1974: .5).

Accounts similar to this one appeared regularly, making it difficult to believe they are just examples of political rhetoric. Alioto was in charge of the police department, down to arranging

special assignments. Throughout the Alioto years, Scott seemed to agree to this method of policing in San Francisco.

Charles Gain. (Police Chief, 1976-1980). As the type of mayor in San Francisco was changed by the voters, the new mayor, in turn, gave San Francisco a new type of police chief. From the day Mayor Moscone named him to replace retiring Chief Scott, Charles Gain has been a controversial figure. As described above, Moscone appointed Gain with the promise to take politics out of the police department, thereby allowing himself the opportunity to stay clear of police department problems except for occasionally supporting his chief. Gain was an excellent person to take over in this atmosphere.

Gain enjoys controversy and usually uses it to his advantage. His perspective on policing is very different than the one held by most San Francisco policemen when he arrived. He portrayed his views on policing as professional, modern and efficient. When criticized, he used morale problems caused by the police strike to his advantage. Inside the force, the strike caused dissension between officers over the question of professional conduct and Gain mentioned this in his comments on lack of professionalism. The strike also caused many citizens to lose respect for the department and Gain was able to use this dissatisfaction to win citizen support of his views.

Gain was on Oakland's police force from 1947 to November 1973, serving as Chief from 1967. During that time he was given credit for keeping Oakland from racial strife because of his community directed attitudes and strict limitations on officers'

use of firearms. However, his liberal attitudes did not please officers and, in 1971, they gave him a no confidence vote. His critics say this was the beginning of the end in Oakland and Gain was forced to leave in 1973. His supporters suggest that he left of his own free will. From Oakland he went to St. Petersburg, Florida where he stayed for only a year. Again, critics say he was forced to leave; he says he quit. From 1974 until his appointment as Chief in San Francisco he worked for liberal Sheriff Hongisto.

This is a good description of Gain:

Whichever interpretation you accept, Gain left the Oakland and St. Pete police forces radically changed. He intends radical change for the San Francisco department as well.

He clearly relishes the job. And he relishes the controversy. "It comes with the territory," he says, with a slight grin. "But I enjoy this job. There are a lot of problems here--that's the challenge."

The obstacles before the 52-year-old career cop are formidable.

He is an outsider in an inbred organization; a liberal among conservatives; a mover-and-shaker among rock-ribbed traditionalists; an anti-politician among those who grew up at the political teat. (SFE, 2 May, 1976: .1).

On his first day as Chief, Gain promised to stop the political influence in the department. He backed this up with his actions by later promoting many younger, college educated, "professional" men. He made waves by talking other controversial stands such as advocating hiring homosexual officers, encouraging gays in the department to "come out of the closet," setting stiff rules for officers caught drinking on the job, removing flags from his office, replacing them with plants and meeting with radical political groups.

His approach to policing is one of an outsider. This is how he described it to a reporter:

"Well some chiefs known to have been popular here are usually described on retirement as 'a cop's cop'" he noted.

"A cop's cop, from my experience, is someone who's not really serving the needs of citizens and making needed changes in the department. He's in effect, a king of overpaid patrolman."

Gain said that "numbers of policemen" are caught in "a role dilemma where they're inculcated to be crime fighters, but what they're really doing is going from incident to incident, capturing on paper what has already occurred," for others to investigate.

It amounts to "something of a trauma," he said and a community-minded chief like himself gets caught in the backlash of frustration.

"A lot of them feel you're giving away the police department, as it were, when you serve citizens and identify with them through things like family crisis intervention programs and landlords tenant intervention programs.

They don't recognize this as the essence of policing... police alone are not going to reduce and prevent crime. That's caused by underlying social, psychological and economic factors. All we can do is try to hold down certain crime problems." (SFC, 23 March, 1976: .4)

The attitude that police cannot have a big impact on crime statistics helped the chief with criticisms aimed at him during the 1976 "crime wave". Gain was quick to point out that he became chief after the trend started and it takes time for new policies to have effect on any crime wave. Because he also worked for a mayor committed to keeping costs down in the city, he was not an advocate for "throwing money at crime."

Noting that his department is currently short 126 uniformed personnel, Gain said the citizenry "must realize the limitations of police."

"No police department in a high crime city can be expected to stop crime; that is, to reduce it. Witness Oakland, Washington, D.C., Gary, Ind., or Detroit--wherever it may be. It's the underlying factors that give rise to criminality (factors), over which the police have no control."

"Our responsibility, then, given the resources we have is to do the best we can to bring about the greatest efficiency and effectiveness to impact on the most serious crimes." (SFE, 2 May, 1976: 16).

To get those things he wanted, he courted community organizations under the guise of "community orientation" and responded with vigor at those times when he was criticized by the local Police Officers Association (POA). His response to critics from within the department played to citizens dissatisfied with "unprofessional" abdication of duty by officers in the police strike.

Gain's response when some officers complained about his moving around some flags at the Southern District Station--the second flag uproar Gain had caused--is a good example.

Gain himself was infuriated to hear some of his men's reaction. "I am goddam sick and tired of crying and moaning police who demonstrate such immaturity. They'd better start learning who is managing the San Francisco Police Department...I'm sick and tired of this bull---- and you can quote me.

If they don't like the San Francisco Police Department, which is on its way to becoming a professional, sensitive and citizen-serving department, they can take their asses and go to some other police department."

And Gain sat behind his desk--five stories above the Southern Station in the Hall of Justice--a week ago Friday with a stack of paper towels on his desk. "These" he said, "are crying towels and are available to all the cry babies in the department." (SFC, World 24, October, 1976: .5).

Comments like these were warmly received by those who thought the police were wrong to strike.

His approach of community outreach and blasting the POA seemed to work. Only three months after he became chief, the SFC surveyed leaders of 26 neighborhood groups. Twelve approved of the Chief's performance, four disapproved and ten said it was too soon to judge. These comments from the leaders surveyed showed that Gain was not only getting support for his community orientation but also for his willingness to innovate and confront his men.

"The department has to be shook up," the Stanyon-Fulton Street Association noted. "No insider can do it."

"Gain could be a marvelous innovator," the Buena Vista Neighborhood Association added. "Given a chance, his fresh ideas on police responsibilities in the community--especially dispensing even-handed law enforcement among the city's highly diverse groups--could do wonders for San Francisco."

"Give the guy a chance," said the Forest Knolls Neighborhood Association. "He must be doing something right or the complacent police wouldn't be on his neck so much" (SFC, 22 April, 1976: .7).

Ten months after he took office, his strategy seemed to be working in some way in the department, too. Working on his rapport within the department, Gain seemed to develop more popularity with some policemen. Gain's need to lessen severity was also caught by a local cartoonist in Figure 4.

Figure 4 about here

Probably the biggest test of Gain's police practices was the Proposition B election campaign described in the last chapter. One issue in that campaign was the alleged "crime wave" in the city. Gain's liberal law enforcement colleagues (District Attorney Freitas and Sheriff Hongisto) were under attack in the "recall" election. With the support of Mayor Moscone, Gain continued his pattern of politics.

He continued to meet with community groups, serving as an advocate of neighborhood crime prevention through the use of the SAFE program. He also continued his attack on the POA and "hard line" officers in the department. When the POA surveyed their members and found that 96 per cent of the officers who responded said they were dissatisfied with Gain, Gain and Moscone took the offensive.

Gain responded quickly to Crowley's attack, charging that the POA's latest attack on him will be "as ineffective as anything else the POA has called for. The vocalizations of the POA will have no effect on the managing of the police department."...

Mayor George Moscone, who appointed Gain to the top police post, joined in the fray by noting, "he (Crowley) is nothing but a malcontent, trying to strike fear in the hearts of the people. He is a political demagogue and I do not believe one word he says."

FIGURE 4: SFC political cartoon on Chief Gain.
(SFC, 20 November, 1976: 23)



"I found it stuffed back in his closet . . . brand new, never been opened"

Moscone also accused Crowley of not being representative of the POA's membership--" he does not speak for the men and women of that department" (SFC, 15 July, 1977: .2).

With the defeat of Proposition B in August, Moscone declared that the city was going to go back to business as usual--at least the usual Moscone way. For Gain this meant that he, too, had won a victory and he could continue to streamline the department knowing he would have support from the mayor and the community.

III. Police Union Leaders

Had politics of crime been considered ten years ago, thoughts about "Police Union Leaders" would only be included in a discussion of the politics of the police department. The change of police organizations from internally oriented groups to externally oriented groups made them important. San Francisco has two police officers organizations (they are not officially called unions), the Police Officers Association (POA) and the Officers for Justice (OFJ). The POA has the most members and is a largely white, traditional, "hard core" police group. Originally the group was more a professional organization headed by "prestige" officers of the force and concerned with internal problems of the department and sponsoring anti-crime programs like youth service leagues. This changed when the courts began to mandate changes with the hiring practices of the department and the "club" atmosphere of the POA was threatened. What started as an organized movement to combat changes in hiring and promotion ended in a politically oriented, union-like POA. Its director under the new image was a street cop who often "went public" with problems of the POA.

Although blacks were not officially restricted from membership, characteristics of the POA understandably made black officers uncomfortable with joining the POA. They, instead, founded the OFJ whose membership is almost entirely black. This organization is also political, and often takes an opposing view from the POA.

Sgt. Jerry Crowley. (president, Police Officers Association). The story of the POA needs to be discussed in terms of Jerry Crowley as he has a fiery personality and much of the public opinion about the POA is public opinion about Jerry Crowley.

This was not true until autumn of 1975 when the police strike helped everyone understand who Jerry Crowley and the POA actually were. Until that time, Crowley's public appearances were those one would expect from the head of such an organization. He spent most of his effort speaking out for the cop on the beat.

In self-defense, rank-and-file cops have begun making their own peace with the police of San Francisco. In January, 1972, the POA joined forces with a broad spectrum of neighborhood groups to fight the closing of two of The City's nine remaining neighborhood district police stations. The bluecoats saw it as another defensive withdrawal from the neighborhoods, and the people feared a further deterioration of police services in their communities. The coalition persisted through two initiative elections and several lawsuits, and faced the determined opposition of the daily newspapers, the Mayor, the police hierarchy, and downtown business interests. But when it was all over, the voters not only forced the re-opening of the district stations, they called a halt to further centralization of the department by talking the power to close district stations away from the police hierarchy and vesting it in the popularly elected Board of Supervisors. The results left the department brass somewhat chastened. (SFE, 26, May, 1974: .8).

That all changed in late August 1975 after the police learned that they were not going to receive their expected pay raise. Crowley then began to suggest to the press that a strike was possible after taking a confidential poll showing that he had support of the members

of POA. At the same time Crowley (or his spokesman) raised another issue which was to be as touchy as the wage difference--the POA would not negotiate with the negotiating team set up by the supervisors; they would only negotiate with the supervisors. This issue polarized the two sides.

Why Crowley made such a demand is open to speculation, but it was a point often used by the supervisors to describe Crowley's unwillingness to discuss "substantive issues." Crowley was reported to have reached an understanding with Police Chief Scott that striking police would provide emergency services, which they did not. Crowley argued no such "understanding" had been reached. The fact that no emergency services were given by police was a POA public relations blunder and the report of agreed cooperation did not help their "deserter" image. That may not have been Crowley's fault because, as one newspaper reported, "It is rumored at the Hall of Justice that Crowley, at one point, was ready to provide an unspecified number of men for emergencies, but was voted down by his own strike committee." (SFE, C.L., 12 October, 1975: .10).

But Crowley became best known for his comments to the press. One description of him stated:

But he didn't act like the man some had called "the nut" during the bitter police strike.

That was when, earlier in the eventful week, bodyguards prevented service of a restraining order on Crowley the strike leader; and when Crowley, the man of power, had flushed angrily when detained a moment from marching into the mayor's office. (SFC, 23 August, 1975: .2)

One of his typical remarks was contained in his "announcement" of the strike: "I ask any citizen of San Francisco who is mugged, robbed or raped to call Supervisor Molinari and complain." (SFC, C.L. 12 October, 1975: .10) Once the strike was settled, Crowley set

the political tone of upcoming elections when he responded to the negative reaction of the Board of Supervisors to Alioto's settlement.

...Their (Supervisors) stands, he (Crowley) said, "do not reflect the priorities of the people of San Francisco but only their own re-election." (SFC, 22 August, 1975: .4).

During the campaign against anti-police propositions and for POA sponsored propositions, Crowley may have had different motives.

This comment was made by the SFC political columnist:

Crowley is waiting to see how he fares in the voting. He has won the strike--the money was good--and if he wins at the voting booths as well, he is reported ready to launch a national union for policemen. (SFC, 24 October, 1975: .38).

Immediately after the strike, Crowley himself became a political issue. The SFC began a campaign to have him no longer paid by the police department to work on POA activities. The campaign included two editorials and the cartoon in Figure 5. By December he was back in uniform but still talking about POA activities. In an interview he made these comments about police work, union activities, etc.


Figure 5 about here

"For years now, when you go to citizens groups and talk about police attitudes, what you really do is tell what the administration says. Well, I won't do that any more."

Instead, Crowley is speaking out for how he believes most police officers themselves feel. Some of it may surprise the public.

"The next 18 months will be crucial. If they don't allow policemen to speak for policemen, they'll get the Teamsters, the United Auto Workers or the Operating Engineers. I may not like it, but I understand it."

Crowley says that what he understands is that politicians--by which he means political leaders outside the department--have attempted to intimidate and frustrate rank-and-file leaders.



The Jerry Crowley doll

FIGURE 5: SFC political cartoon concerning Jerry Crowley.
(SFC, 16 October: 46)

Crowley says the public mistakenly believes the prime concern of police officers' groups is money, but this isn't true.

Instead, he says, officers would like to pull the department together, end divisiveness and make it possible for officers to communicate openly both within the department and with the public.

"There's no upward mobility in the department unless you do whatever the hell they tell you to. Under the old political system, you're not going to go to the special bureaus if you speak your own mind. You learn that early, the first year."

Yet Crowley doesn't blame officers who held their tongues and played the game. It was the only course open to them. He would like to see that change. But he explains:

"The administration can only change to the degree politicians will allow them to. The administration has to reflect what the legislators or the politicians say.

"Once policemen arrive at the policy making levels they can't speak out because there are constraints. By the time they arrive at the policy making level, they will either know what the limits are or they won't be selected." (SFE, 21 December, 1975: 4A).

When he spoke those words, little did he know the type of administrative changes to come. In January 1976, Mayor Moscone appointed his new police chief, Charles Gain, who became Crowley's new political issue.

When Gain was first appointed, Crowley expressed disappointment that Gain was an "outsider" but said the POA was willing to give him a chance. This lasted only as long as Gain was quiet. As soon as Gain's liberal posture was publicized, Crowley went on the attack. Only three months after Gain took office, Crowley had begun to publicly oppose Gain.

"We are tired," Crowley concluded, "of the chief holding up the Police Department to public ridicule as an excuse for his apparent inability to properly administer a metropolitan police department." (SFC, 22 April, 1976: .7)

This frustration led Crowley and the POA to join with their old political foe, John Barbagelata, when Barbagelata proposed his "recall" proposition (Proposition B). Barbagelata had been one of the harshest critics of the POA during the police strike. Now their joint distaste of the Moscone administration brought them together.

The San Francisco Police Officers Association which represents about 1500 mostly white police officers is also supporting the proposition with money and manpower. The association is directing its own Yes on B campaign out of their offices.

"We are very upset with the criminal justice system as it is being practiced by people in control," said Paul Schignell, a member of the board of directors of the POA and a patrolman. "The chief and the police commission are paying more attention to alternative life-style groups than to the rank-and-file patrolman. We have a difficult time talking to our own commission. They talk to the White Panthers and Margo St. James, but the input isn't there from the rank-and-file. We're very frustrated. (SFC, 4 July, 1977: .5).

During the election campaign, the POA took a poll of POA members to rate the job being done by Gain, District Attorney Freitas and Sheriff Hongisto. The POA found that 96 per cent of those responding were dissatisfied with Gain and 88 per cent were dissatisfied with Freitas and Hongisto. The announcement brought quick assessments of the POA from those rated.

(District Attorney Freitas) said that in his travels around California, the POA has become "the laughing stock of other police officers' associations in the state. The (San Francisco) POA has been captured by a small group of dissidents and doesn't represent the rank and file of San Francisco police officers."

Reached at his home, where he is nursing a touch of flu, (Sheriff) Hongisto said, "if anybody ever acted against the interests of the citizens regarding crime, it was the people who organized this poll and the police strike (of August, 1975), which left the citizens without protection." (SFC, 15 July, 1977: .2).

Crowley was unable to pinpoint causes of real dissatisfaction. He did attack what he saw as Gain's and Moscone's association with radical groups. He also talked to crime statistics.

At one point, Crowley brought up the controversial subject of crime statistics, charging that the Moscone administration was playing a "public relations game" by highlighting a recent five per cent drop in crime, but ignoring "an all time high of 24 per cent (crime increase) throughout (Gain's) year and a half tenure as police chief."

"The POA comes up with this crap," Gain said, "and it's all negative. It is a great disservice to the citizens of this city." (SFC, 15 July, 1977; .2).

Proposition B lost badly and the POA suffered another political defeat. They were usually on the losing end,

Why did Crowley and the POA falter? As a union, the POA had little experience. During the strike, Alioto called in traditional union leaders to help settle the dispute and they told Crowley to get the POA to "start acting more like a union." The POA also came across as a selfish organization, and unlike traditional unions, was not willing to bargain. Many unions use fiery rhetoric but, out of view of the press, they work with management. The POA did not.

After the strike, the POA also had difficulty realizing the extent of public dissatisfaction with police. They were surprised at the anti-police vote in November 1975. The ticketing blitz that followed the election was either a POA public relations blunder or an example of how little control the POA leadership had over its members. Either way, police lost even more support by reacting in that way to the vote.

Once in that position, attacking Gain did little to improve their image. Gain, aware of the POA's image in the community, obviously had the POA in a difficult position. But, instead of providing positive programs, most of the POA's activities continued to be negative. Rather than suggesting ways to solve the crime problem, they spent their energies fighting Gain's plans to solve the problem and accusing the administration of manipulating figures.

Officers for Justice. Unlike the POA, the OFJ's appearance in politics-of-crime events in San Francisco did not center on their leader. As a group, they have a small membership and have also taken stands which are non-controversial. The political impact of the group has grown during the period of the study. Their growth is due to an increase in membership due to the increase in black police officers and because actions described below have brought them respect from those they wished to influence.

The OFJ was first mentioned during stories on Zebra killings search. The black community was outraged with the Alioto stop-and-search order. The OFJ was in a difficult situation, not wishing to jeopardize its ties with the black community while still not wanting to undermine its fellow officers. They did come out opposed to the search in a harshly worded statement.

We do not approve of the gestapo-type tactics that are being used. We can only view this as another type of harassment. Moreover, we feel that the San Francisco Police Department should have relied upon the director of Community Relations and his members for some input and advice. (SFC, 20 April, 1974, p. 14).

The search was stopped but not because of OFJ objections.

The only other comments about the OFJ that surfaced in newspapers before the strike were items on subjects of concern to such an organization. They took strong stands supporting court decisions on hiring and promoting black officers, complained about discrimination in health services services provided to black officers and, in general, worked with specific concerns over welfare of their members.

During the strike, the OFJ decided not to be supportive. They quickly took the position that it was an officers' sworn duty to protect citizens of San Francisco and therefore he could not strike. Whether this was the belief of the members of OFJ or just a political move against the rival POA is not known. The action, however, did win the OFJ much praise and public support including that of Board of Supervisors president, Dianne Feinstein.

With post-strike activities, the POA began to receive more new coverage, and reporters called upon the OFJ for a comment in stories where the POA was mentioned. When Chief Gain was appointed, the OFJ was quick to praise the selection noting the promise to remove "juice" from the department ("juice" was sometimes translated to mean

the "right" ethnic background) and Gain's work with the black community in Oakland. The OFJ had long been advocating a department which was interested in community relations in general and the black community in specific.

As the year progressed and the POA moved from a neutral to an anti-Gain position, the OFJ continued its support of the Chief. Each time Gerald Crowley would blast Gain, the OFJ spokesman would support Gain and describe the difficult job the new chief had to do.

That open support changed in December 1976 when Gain transferred black police officer Rodney Williams from the Community Relations unit. The complaint was couched in professional tones, however, it was not a "broadside" at the Chief.

It is almost impossible that a city politician who ran on a platform stressing more community involvement in government could sit by idly and see more harm than good being done by his appointee (Gain) to those same citizens who elected him to office." (SFC, 31, December, 1976: .10)

Gain held his ground but was softspoken and stressed the move was a professional decision. Following the decision, Moscone and Gain worked closely with the black community to see that concern did not get out of hand.

Unlike the response to POA's criticism, the Gain-Moscone response to the OFJ's criticism was one seeking cooperating instead of confrontation. Obviously, Gain and Moscone did not want to alienate this constituency.

Even though the OFJ had concerns about the Police department, they supported the Moscone administration in the "recall" election in fall 1977. Although they may not have been in full support of the Moscone administration, they did not support the type of police

policies advocated by Barbagelata and the pro-Proposition B forces. Therefore, the working relationship between the OFJ and Moscone continued.

Although the OFJ has a smaller membership, lower profile and little support in the police department, it has been able to become a political force in San Francisco. This is, in part, due to the similarity of philosophy between the OFJ and the administration in power. It is also due to the ability of the leadership to understand citizen's concern and to present their policy stand in those terms.

III. The Supervisors

For the period of this study, members of the Board of Supervisors were all elected in at-large elections. As they served in the legislative branch of the government, they were responsible for general policy. Because there is a lack of geographic constituency, they acted in unison on many issues. The police strike is a good example. Because supervisors perceived that the general attitude in San Francisco was against spending, they decided against police and fire department's raises. The major issue of the strike were finances and taxes, not crime in the streets.

Four supervisors, however, were the leading persons to use crime as a political issue. Here is a description of their activities.

Al Nelder (Supervisor, 1974-1977). Nelder, a "crime candidate", used the crime issue to his electoral advantage. He served as Police Chief for San Francisco until 1971, when he left, reportedly because Alioto was attempting to influence the police department in ways with which Nelder disagreed. He reappeared in 1973 as a candidate for supervisor and used his "tough cop" image as the major thrust of his campaign. He promised

to help work with the police in solving the San Francisco crime problem.

During the time he was a supervisor, he kept his promise. He was influential in getting the Board of Supervisors and, therefore, Mayor Alioto, to accept some of his plans for policing the city. Although most were not officially acted upon in the Board's proceedings, the public exposure given to Nelder through his position on the Board brought about implementation of his ideas. Two examples include the improvement of policing the Market Street area and the effort to combat violent crime on the Muni.

Ironically, during the biggest crisis between the police department and supervisors--the strike--Nelder was forced to sit on the sidelines. He was forced to remain quiet because any solution to the strike would affect his pension benefits. He was also caught in a political dilemma. As a "cop's cop" he was on record as supporting police and was respected by officers on the force. At the same time, as a supervisor, he also felt pressure applied by taxpayers for supervisors not to give in to the strikers.

Nelder's image as a "tough cop" made him a prime candidate for the position of Police Chief for the new Mayor Moscone in 1976. Again, Nelder's pension benefits stood in the way. It was no secret that Nelder would have liked the job but he would have had to give up his benefits to return to the San Francisco payroll. He had to watch as a new chief took over and started to run the department in a way in which Nelder did not approve.

The new police chief's attitudes placed Nelder in another difficult political position. He was a supervisor elected from an anti-crime position.

If he complained about the way the new police department was being administered as he had done with the Alioto administration, he would be open to criticism. Also, if the new anti-crime program succeeded, his anti-crime position would dissolve. On the other hand, he personally believed that the new position was not a good one and probably would fail. Therefore, if he kept quiet and did not criticize, he would be grouped with supporters--a place he did not want to be. An example is this observation after Gain had been chief after one year, and a month before Barbagelata started Proposition B.

"This is absolutely the most lawless era in the history of San Francisco" says Supervisor Al Nelder, who was police chief in 1970-71."

Of Gain, he says, "I don't think he's been very good but in fairness to him, he's trying." Nelder said Gain has made some policy changes in the past month--like the crackdown on streetwalkers--which he finds desirable. (SFC, 12 January, 1977: .5).

Nelder also sat out the Proposition B controversy. A possible reason for his lack of public support may be because he believed Proposition B would fail and his support of an anti-Moscone measure would hurt him politically.

He did not run for re-election as a supervisor from his district in 1977 and his political future is unknown.

Dianne Feinstein (Supervisor, 1967-present). Dianne Feinstein was instrumental in moving crime from a "motherhood" issue to a specific issue. As President of the Board of Supervisors, she chaired debates with other supervisors on the crime situation. She was usually supportive of Supervisor Nelder's suggestions on crime problem and so gained

support in her campaign for mayor. But, like other supervisors, her impact on police actions was limited to mainly public calls for action. The major police policy decisions were made by the Alioto-run Police Commission.

Midway through the campaign for mayor and before the police strike, she announced her crime program, making her the first candidate to make serious statements concerning crime. Her plan was widely publicized and was given editorial support by those papers supporting her candidacy (SFC and SFE). Her plan put her opponents on the defensive and they, too, had to announce specific plans to fight crime. Suddenly, the crime issue in the campaign was no longer one of promises to make the reduction of crime a "high priority" but a discussion of specific police methods, manpower allocation, etc.

As this approach was starting to predominate, police went out on strike. The strike developed the crime fighting debate to a more realistic level. Now candidates had to discuss how they would fight crime economically. In all of these discussions, Feinstein had the initiative and kept the best position on the anti-crime issue throughout the election.

She did not lose the primary campaign because of her anti-crime stand. Two factors played a more important role in her defeat. First, she misjudged her campaign spending by relying on the polls which said she would win the primary and therefore did not spend enough money on it. The polls also led other candidates to run against her and, by attacking her, siphoned votes from her.

The second major problem was her position on the Board of Supervisors during the strike. As President of the Board, she attempted to take a rational position and find a solution. This allowed Moscone to attack

the whole strike situation (both the police and the Board) as an outsider. Barbagelata, on the other hand, never took a "reasonable" stand and was the rallying point of most anti-police votes in the city. He was able to present the image that he was the leader of the "hard line" stand against police. These views left Feinstein without an attractive position on the strike issue.

After her defeat as a mayoral candidate, she stayed on as a supervisor and won re-election in 1977 from her district. As a moderate, she did not support Barbagelata in either his race against Moscone or in the Proposition B fight. She has also remained somewhat supportive of the Gain/Freitas/Hongisto law enforcement trinity.

John Barbagelata (Supervisor, 1969-1977). Barbagelata was one of two Supervisors who consistently took a conservative stand. Of the two, Quentin Kopp seemed to be the more reasonable, successful politician. Most observers believed early in 1975 that Kopp would be a candidate for mayor. It was only after he announced that he would not be a candidate that Barbagelata announced his intentions of running.

Barbagelata is well known for his "outrageous" statements. When Alioto resolved the police/fire strike, Barbagelata made these comments about Alioto:

The mayor becomes the first dictator in the United States ...It boils down to a question of whether the unions or the city's elected representatives are going to run San Francisco. (SFC, 22 August, 1975: 22).

During the election campaign, he tried to present to the voters the image that he was the leader of the "hard line" against the police strike and was tough on crime. Responding to Feinstein's plans for reducing crime, Barbagelata promised he would "fire a police chief every

six months until I get one who is tough enough." (SFC, 13 August, 1974: .4).

He also attacked Feinstein in the campaign with comments like:

All the police and fire reforms offered by Barbagelata were opposed by Feinstein until the very last minute when political expediency motivated another Feinstein switch. Feinstein supports legalized prostitution but didn't say in whose neighborhood. (SFC, 3 November, 1975: .21)

Barbagelata continued these themes in his campaign against Moscone but Moscone was able to take the initiative more often, putting Barbagelata in difficult spots. In Barbagelata's attempt to move a little to the left in the runoff election, he came off as a "wishy-washy" candidate. Compare the response of the two candidates about victimless crimes in a newspaper interview.

BARBAGELATA: Well, that is a very misleading subject. You'd have to analyze each crime and determine truly whether it is a victimless crime. For instance, in prostitution, contrary to what some people say, there is a victim. It brings in all the services that are required by our prostitutes such as dope, pimps and criminal elements. You have to measure each crime as to whether it is truly victimless or not. There are certain crimes which people call victimless that I don't think are victimless.

MOSCONE: Well, the mayor is not going to change state law on what is and isn't a crime, and we're obviously not going to tell our people to ignore the law. But we're going to be setting priorities, and those priorities include at the top those crimes that have victims and at the bottom those crimes that don't have a victim. So, I guess we will be deemphasizing it in the sense that we're going to be shooting all of our resources into providing some safety on the streets from crimes of violence. (SFC, 3 December: .14).

When Barbagelata lost the race for mayor, he asked for a recount and some of his election workers caused problems with the official recount. This allowed Moscone to infer Barbagelata was not losing gracefully. That image came back to haunt Barbagelata when he pushed Proposition B.

As the debate on the Proposition began to get hot, a former Barbagelata aide said that he had drafted Proposition B for Barbagelata a few weeks after Barbagelata had lost the mayoral election. The aide also said Barbagelata had attempted to have others start the Proposition move so it would not look as if Barbagelata was being vindictive. This plan failed, according to the ex-aide, when Barbagelata could not find anyone to push the "recall" move.

Although Barbatelata planned on making the Proposition B election based on the Moscone administrative record, especially crime, the anti-B forces added other issues. The anti-B politicians took on Barbagelata and defended their records. They also suggested that Proposition B was a vindictive move by Barbagelata and that as San Franciscans expressed their opinions in an earlier election they did not need Proposition B. They also quickly added that if Barbagelata was truly a fiscal conservative, he would not have the city spend \$400,000 for the special election. Although Barbagelata attempted to fight off these statements, many times the issue of crime and the Moscone administration were lost to discussions of how the election was simply a personal duel between Barbagelata and Moscone.

In the end, Barbagelata lost Proposition B and resigned from the Board. His assessment of losing the Proposition fight was not that he had stood on the wrong side of the issues.

Barbagelata is proud of that (his) record. On judgement issues, he says, "I've probably been wrong as often as I've been right." But on "heavy issues, where the facts are there, not my facts, are where it's a matter of honesty and the people of the City are getting the shaft," he believes he's been right.

"But every time you touch a pressure group," he continues, "You make a tremendous amount of enemies. And if you don't get your pluses, as Mr. Good Guy, to offset your minuses, you're a loser."

Is that what happened with Prop. B? The subject of B, which would have required the mayor and others to run for re-election early, popped in and out of the conversation all afternoon. It obviously still rankles, though Barbagelata is hesitant to admit it. For now, the answer is: "With B, I wasn't doing anything unique that I hadn't been doing for eight years. But the whole thing was labelled as vindictive, sour grapes and such and such by the press and the media.

"If they had checked the record, they would have found out I was introducing the same kind of reform measures ever since I took office." Later, he added: "If I had thought it was going to be made a matter of personalities, with me competing with the Moscone-Burton-Brown machine, I would never have tried it. (SFE, 16 October, 1977: 4A).

Barbagelata says he is retiring from politics. He might set up a research group to monitor city hall. If so, probably one of the issues that the group will closely monitor is crime prevention actions taken by the mayor and police chief.

Quentin Kopp (Supervisor, 1971-present). John Barbagelata's partner on the Board of Supervisors was Quentin Kopp. Although the two politicians shared most political points of view, their public image was different. Kopp presented more "reasonable" statements to back his views. For example, after Alioto had vetoed anti-police/fire propositions proposed by supervisors after the strike, the Board overruled his veto. In his veto message Alioto called the supervisors "cassandras" acting on purely political motives. Kopp's response:

Kopp characterized the fiery language used by Alioto over the weekend as "intemperate." He said he will not respond in kind because "all that is going to do is lead to more intemperate talk, exactly what the mayor claims to be talking about." (SFC, 25 August, 1975: .18).

Most everyone was surprised when Kopp did not enter the race for mayor in 1975. He did become President of the Board of Supervisors by drawing the largest number of votes as supervisor. After Moscone was

elected and Gain was appointed police chief, Kopp kept his public pronouncements limited but it was obvious that Kopp and the "law enforcement trinity" of Gain, Freitas, and Hongisto did not get along. When Gain introduced newly painted blue and white police cars he dubbed the first one a "Kopp Car"--referring to the budget struggles Gain had with Kopp.

As a fiscal conservative, Kopp led the fight to limit the budget. This prompted a comment from District Attorney Freitas whose budget was cut especially deep: "I'm especially disappointed that it appears that Supervisor Kopp led the effort in chopping this budget...In the area of controlling violent crime I think Kopp had done a disservice to the public." (SFE, 23 May, 1976: A5).

As crime became a more visible and therefore important issue in late 1975-early 1976, Kopp was a leader in portraying the Moscone administration as the reason for the problem. Kopp made these statements in an interview in December 1976.

Kopp: I think unemployment is a strong factor in crime and in terms of the crime rate in San Francisco. But focusing on 1976, I think there's unmistakably something more to it.

A major factor has been the attitude of leaders in law enforcement. Let me make it clear I'm talking about the chief of police, I'm talking about the district attorney and I'm talking about the sheriff. The chief of police has always been gracious and courteous. I want to make that clear too. But he has a sociological attitude about crime, about law enforcement, about the prevention of crime, and so does the district attorney.

I think that there is a tone and tenor which was provided by law enforcement leaders at the very outset of the calendar year 1976 which has had an effect. The confusing dialogue about victimless crime occurred in January when the district attorney took office. It was reiterated in substance by the chief of police. It was a signal to people engaged in prostitution to come to San Francisco. Now prostitution inevitably brings other crimes.

...And most people don't like to say this publicly but...San Francisco is a very hospitable place for the types of people who are the most uncontrollable in the sense of human experience and governmental experience. Now that's a plain fact. (SFC, 5 December, 1976: .5).

In January, Kopp called a hearing on the crime problem in San Francisco. The hearing focused on Freitas, Gain and Hongisto. Hongisto's testimony at the hearing had to be delayed because he was in jail for his failure to evict the tenants of the International Hotel (see Hongisto below).

At a later hearing, Hongisto ended up in a shouting match with both Kopp and Barbagelata. Also, after the hearing, Freitas expressed the hope that Kopp would "stop playing politics with crime." (SFC, 29 January, 1977: .5).

One month after the hearing, Barbagelata started the Proposition B move and, as documented above, issues raised by Kopp over work of the "law enforcement trinity" became one part of the campaign. Kopp supported the Barbagelata initiative but was not as vocal or active a worker as was Barbagelata. After the defeat of Proposition B, Kopp went to work campaigning in his district to be reelected to the Board. He succeeded in winning reelection but the composition of the Board was much different due to the district elections.

V. Other Actors

When considering politics-of-crime in San Francisco during the period of this study, two more actors need to be discussed. They are the other two members of the "liberal law enforcement trinity." District Attorney Freitas and Sheriff Richard Hongisto were lumped together with Police Chief Gain by conservatives as the reason San Francisco was "easy on

crime." Their stories are much like the description of Chief Gain above and an important part of the election politics discussed in Chapter Five. Some additional comments should be made about them.

Richard Hongisto (Sheriff, 1972-1977). Hongisto was the trail blazer for the "new politics" and especially the "liberal" law enforcement attitude that came to San Francisco. The sheriff in San Francisco does not have many responsibilities that effect crime rate since the office has no policing. The major duties that brought Hongisto noteriety were his running of the county jail (and later the city jail) and serving and enforcement of warrants.

During the height of the Alioto years, Hongisto was about the only local politician to really oppose the mayor. One of his major efforts in office was to improve jail conditions. Even his critics agreed that he made remarkable changes. Some suggested he improved things too much, making the jails too nice for prisoners. As San Francisco is governed by a city-county government, Mayor Alioto had control over the budget allocation Hongisto received. In 1973 Hongisto complained to the mayor he was not receiving funds he needed to do the proper job. Alioto balked, so Hongisto went public with his complaint about the mayor and conditions at the jail. In the end, Alioto had to bow to public criticism and give Hongisto a portion of what he wanted. Politically, Hongisto then became an important force.

In 1976, Hongisto became involved in a controversy over a downtown hotel owned by an overseas firm which had become the home for a number of poor, older, and (as the press portrayed them) helpless residents. Owners of the hotel wanted to evict everyone and the liberal community said that it was unfair, especially as the residents had no

place to go. It became a cause and many demonstrations took place to save the hotel. Mayor Moscone attempted a number of plans to save it including conversion to public housing. Hongisto became involved when he was first given eviction notices. He refused to evict the residents stating that the Alioto budget did not give him enough funds to take such an action safely. Eviction would have been no problem but demonstrations surrounding it might have led to violence and he did not want to encourage such confrontations.

Conservatives were outraged at this suggestion and accused Hongisto of destroying confidence in law enforcement establishment and the laws. The outcry became stronger when Hongisto was cited for contempt of court and sent to jail for five days. While outraging the conservatives, Hongisto became a hero to counter culture elements of the city. Finally, they said, we have a law enforcement officer who understands the "little people" and stands up to the big business establishment.

Hongisto went to jail in January 1977 for five days. Upon getting out he explained that jail had been a good experience and he had kept a journal of his observations to help him with his job in running the San Francisco jails. In February, Supervisors Barbagelata started his Proposition B campaign which included the "recall" of Hongisto.

Later in the campaign, when Barbagelata was asked to comment on the Hongisto trail and jailing, he associated it with security measures given all supervisors because of bomb blasts and other threats to their lives: "I blame sheriff Hongisto more than anyone else for the reasons that supervisors have to maintain security around their homes." (SFC, 29 April, 1977: .1).

During the recall election, Hongisto ran on his record and his image of supporting the "little people". He also joined in the attack on conservatives, claiming they were destructive in their criticism. This was his response to the POA poll showing that 88 percent of the officers thought Hongisto was doing an unsatisfactory job.

Reached at his home, where he is nursing a touch of flu, Hongisto said, "if anybody ever acted against the interests of the citizens regarding crime, it was the people who organized this poll and the police strike (of August, 1975), which left the citizens without protection." (SFC, 15 July, 1977: .2).

In what some thought was a grave political error, two months before the election, Hongisto took his vacation time to fly to Miami to support the homosexual rights cause against Anita Bryant. Moscone supposedly approved his trip but publicly allowed only that what Hongisto did on his vacation was his business. If this move gained votes for Proposition B, it also rallied the sizable gay population to go to the polls and vote against B. Part of anti-B strategy was to have high voter turnout, knowing that the higher the turnout, the more likely Proposition B would lose.

With the victory of Proposition B's defeat, Hongisto became aware that causes for which he had been fighting were becoming the status quo. In December, 1976 finishing only the first year of his second four year term, Hongisto resigned as sheriff to become Chief of Police in Cleveland, Ohio. He was appointed by Dennis J. Kucinich, the "working man's mayor." It looked as if Hongisto was out to change law enforcement attitudes in another city.

Hongisto did not last long in Cleveland. He was fired by the mayor who, at the time, was under heavy fire and soon to face a recall election himself.

Joseph Freitas (District Attorney, 1976-present). The story of the election of Joseph Freitas is a fine example of the lack of a single power base for politics in San Francisco. He went out and campaigned on his own, building support as he went along and was elected without noticeable input from any one area. He was not endorsed by the two "establishment" newspapers nor did he receive the "counter-culture" support of the SBG. He was not a member of the "Moscone/Burton machine" nor strongly supported by labor.

He had two major opponents for the position; the incumbent, John Ferndon, and a common face running for public office, Ruth Silver. Both Freitas and Silver attacked the incumbent on the question of crime. They suggested that he was not vigorous enough in prosecuting violent crime. Freitas also won support in some areas of San Francisco by suggesting he was going to be "soft" on victimless crime and focus on violent crime (although he was not that explicit). The success of his campaign is shown by his comments after his victory. "The people of San Francisco clearly indicated they want the focus of the criminal justice system to be against violent crime." (SFC, 6 November, 1975: 6).

Freitas soon found out that implementation of his plan was not as easy as making promises. Upon taking office he announced he would "go easy" on vice cases and reorganize his office so that effort could go to the solution and prosecution of violent crime cases. Word of his announcement traveled quickly and that evening the prostitutes openly celebrated their new "freedom"--an event the newspapers gave full coverage.

By March, tenor of this policy had changed. Business interests in the city started to complain and newspapers began to pick up the story. According to journalistic accounts, San Francisco had become a "haven" for prostitutes and ladies of the evening were flocking to the city from all over the country. Fortunately for Freitas, most of the uproar caused by these opinions was directed at Chief Gain who had agreed with the Freitas policies. Gain had reorganized the department, deemphasizing the vice squad.

By January 1977, complaints had gotten so intense that Gain reorganized the department again and put a "tough cop" in charge of the vice squad and was able to get Freitas to admit in the newspapers that he also would be tough on vice. The announcement was made in terms of going after the pimps and "obvious" street walkers but, reading between the lines, it was also obvious that the Freitas-Gain approach to vice crimes had lost public favor and, because of political pressure, it had to be scrapped.

Freitas was also a part of the crime controversy of Proposition B. The District Attorney was another post which would have been "recalled" through the election. Freitas fought back in the same style as his colleagues of the "trinity." When asked about the rising crime rate he would suggest he also inherited the crime wave and that it takes time for new policies to work through the criminal justice system. As the election neared and crime statistics looked more favorable he suggested that the new approach was beginning to take hold.

His response to the Police Officers Association poll suggesting that he was not doing a good job was a rephrase of his other colleagues' statements.

Freitas, for his part, called the POA survey "a phoney political poll, timed by Crowley to benefit (Supervisor John) Barbagelata's Proposition B campaign.

He said that in his travels around California, the POA has become "the laughing stock of other police officers associations in the state. The (San Francisco) POA has been captured by a small group of dissidents and doesn't represent the rank and file of San Francisco police officers." (SFC, 15 July, 1977: .2).

When Proposition B was defeated, Freitas again followed along with his other colleagues. With the threat of a recall over, he returned "back to business" keeping an eye to the 1980 election. With his colleagues in the "trinity" he knew that the crime rate would have to be reduced to gain reelection. Whether they will be able to defuse the crime issue enough to maintain their offices is an open question. The supervisor elections of 1977, however, indicate that they may have started defusing the crime issue in their favor.

CHAPTER SEVEN: San Francisco--Some Conclusions

The crime issue has been a political one in San Francisco. Other more specific conclusions on why crime is so politicized will be explored here.

The three conclusions discussed address the question: Why was the issue of crime more than a "motherhood" political issue during the time studied? The type of crime in San Francisco made it a visible, politically beneficial issue just waiting to be used. In looking at the structure of government in San Francisco, the second conclusion is that the diffusion of power in San Francisco allows many power centers to place issues, including crime, on the agenda and that same diffusion forces political issues to be settled in public view. Finally, public opinion in San Francisco is an important factor in running the government and the success of what has been labeled in this study the "liberal law enforcement trinity" is due to their use of public opinion in conjunction with policy decisions.

I. The nature of crime in San Francisco makes it an obvious, viable public issue. Crime exists in all modern parts of the world but is usually considered a "cost of modern living" to be controlled as efficiently as possible. This is why, politically, it is usually a "motherhood" issue. From 1974 to 1977 the amount and type of crime combined with the city-image San Francisco projects changed this view.

As discussed in Chapter Two, San Francisco has the image of an

"open" city, one which attracts all types of people--even those a city might not want. Board of Supervisors President Quentin Kopp described the relation of this attraction to problems with crime.

. . . And most people don't like to say this publicly but . . . San Francisco is a very hospitable place for the types of people who are the most uncontrollable in the sense of human experience and governmental experience. Now that's a plain fact.

George (Moscone, Mayor) says The City seems to attract people who have lost hope in so many ways elsewhere and come here as an effort to regain it. Over and above that, I think we have an extraordinary amount of bizarre personalities in the San Francisco population mix . . . There has to be a way of making it inhospitable for those who have anti-social predilections. We've got a state, in my opinion, of fear and anxiety among people in San Francisco that is unparalleled in my experience. And those are the people who are now so threatened by crime and by the incidence of criminal acts that they are in many cases literally afraid and reluctant to leave their homes. (SFE, 5 December, 1976: 5)

The importance of this observation is linked with reporting of crime in the media. It is generally assumed that the media "over reports" bizarre and stranger-to-stranger crimes. The argument is that these stories gain readership while readers are not interested in stories about family fights, barroom disagreements, etc. The argument is made even stronger in the San Francisco area where both major newspapers are considered papers which "hype" sensational news.

The San Francisco newspapers seem to have almost daily reports of bizarre murders, hold-ups, kidnappings, etc. After getting heavy

doses of these stories, one begins to wonder if any crimes in San Francisco were ever just "normal". That, of course, is an exaggeration but it also can explain why the early "motiveless" shootings in the Zebra spree received little coverage in the press.

These conclusions have some factual backing. A report made by District Attorney Freitas stated that in 1974, 46 percent of murders in San Francisco were done by persons the victim knew. This is a low percentage in comparison to other cities. If stranger-to-stranger crimes are those people read about the most, citizens of San Francisco have, percentage-wise, more crime to read about.

Combined with this is the impression created by statistics. In late 1975-early 1976 the statistical crime rate in San Francisco soared. Causes for this rise are debatable. One suggestion is that police stopped making warrant searches on anyone who came in contact with the police. It is speculated that more crimes were reported after citizens realized their records would not be checked if they reported a crime. Although that is not the full explanation for the crime rise (victimization surveys also show an increase in crime), the dramatic jump in crime reported in news media rarely mentioned this possible cause.

Another aspect of the crime situation that allowed it to be a viable political issue was that crime was not discriminatory. Bluntly stated, crime was not closely associated to race relations. This was demonstrated in two ways. First of all, the "crime wave"

of 1975-76 was not located in a single area, Mayor Moscone said, "Homicidal acts have been committed in Pacific Heights as well as Hunter's point. There are no safe neighborhoods now." (SFC, 24 November, 1976: 1) Some national news articles suggested that because the rich areas were affected by the crime wave, it became a political issue.

Second, although political activities over the crime issue often attempted to describe crime as black versus white, rich versus poor, or we versus them, that description usually collapsed. When Mayor Alioto announced the stop-and-search order in the Zebra case, black activists attempted to show the actions as anti-black. These concerns were quieted both because the action evoked a positive citizen response (both black and white) and because the measure was soon abandoned because of its ineffectiveness. Alioto was again accused of being anti-black when presenting the "Death Angels" plot but this accusation was stifled when "facts" of the case were presented.

The other period of time when the crime problem might have been considered in "we versus they" terms is when Moscone announced his crime fighting measures and the Proposition B fight which followed. With the Moscone announcement of the \$1.7 million program to fight crime, the black community accused him of taking money from job programs. (SFC, 25 November, 1976: 1) With Proposition B, newspapers attempted to portray the election as a "have versus have not" vote. (SFC, 30 July, 1977: 4)

In each of these situations, the suggestion was subdued mainly because of the attitude shown by the Moscone administration. Gain, Freitas, Hongisto and Moscone all had consistently suggested that the way to reduce crime in the city is through "sociological" means (employment, better housing, etc.). Administration representatives regularly spoke up for the "have nots" and attempted to develop programs in the liberal tradition. The suggestion that proposition B was a "haves versus have nots" election was also disproved when voting results were tallied. The measure passed in only one of eleven districts, suggesting that if such a dichotomy existed, there were plenty of "have nots" in San Francisco.

The nature of crime in San Francisco during the study period attracted attention, making crime an issue ready to be used. Because crime was bizarre, perceived to be on the increase, and in all parts of the city, everyone was familiar with crime stories; thus it was an issue politicians could use. Also, because crime was not seen as a race issue, politicians did not have to risk losing minority support by discussing crime. The neighborhood approach used by Gain and Moscone focused attention of the crime issue to the voters' neighborhoods. This countered the overarching Barbagelata law-and-order stands. That type of law-and-order rhetoric might work in a city where people fear a certain group of people (usually poor blacks) and think they need to be brought under control. Where people perceive crime as often bizarre, motiveless and not originating in any area of the city, just

"getting tough" is not a successful approach.

II. The governmental structure of San Francisco makes it easy for issues like crime to be placed on the political agenda. This conclusion suggests that the institutional structure of the city forces politicians to settle issues in public. In San Francisco the mayor has very little power to get things done alone. If he/she wants something done he/she must convince the appropriate commission or the Board of Supervisors that it is the best policy. If he/she finds disagreement with the idea, then the only recourse is to appeal to the public to bring commissioners or supervisors to the mayor's point of view.

During the police strike, Alioto became very frustrated with this process. He therefore devised a way to work around the structure and settled the strike on his own. He did not plan on the intensity of the "backlash" that followed. He was not able to control this counter-movement against his actions and, when he went to the public for help against the "backlash" he found that the supervisors were the ones with support.

The supervisors, on the other hand, also have limited power. Because many commissions determine administrative policy, supervisors are limited in determining how the funds they appropriate are administered. Therefore, if they wish to change policy, they usually must put public pressure on the commission. The best example was the problem that

confronted Al Nelder who had become a supervisor because he promised to improve the crime situation. To have a major impact on crime he should have been a member of the Police Commission and not on the Board. To avoid this, he presented his ideas to the Board who then voted support for them, placing his plan on front pages of the papers. Public reaction forced Police Chief Scott and the Police Commission to react to the ideas and, often, they incorporated most of his ideas into official policy.

Chief Gain and Mayor Moscone developed a strategy to combat public interference in police work by those outside the administration by using the public in a different way. The first promise made by the Moscone administration concerning police was that the chief and the mayor would work to keep politics out of the police department. Any politician who tried to change the system, then, would be open to the accusation of "juicing up" the department again. This strategy was successful most of the time. The most noticeable exception was concern over prostitution where public opinion moved Gain to re-reorganize his department.

The Gain-Moscone strategy also changed discussion of crime. Because the politicians could not suggest specific reforms like Nelder did for Scott, they then had to attack Gain-Moscone on their total record. The argument shifted from "the police should do 'X' to fight crime" to "Gain-Moscone are not effective in battling crime". Proposition B brought the latter debate to a referendum and when Moscone won, the winner's

subtle response to critics was that the people had spoken--the Moscone-Gain way should continue.

The final aspect of the political structure that makes issues so public is ease of placing propositions on the ballot. Voting for candidates is issue general--the voter assumes the legislator or executive will act the way he wants--while propositions are issue specific. The police strike made the citizens of San Francisco dissatisfied. If in the following November election they could only elect candidates, their choice would have been from only "anti-strike" candidates. This would have blurred the issue of the role of police in society because all candidates stated that the police were wrong to strike, causing the issue to suddenly become an indistinct statement. With the anti-police propositions on the ballot, however, the debate over the propositions focused squarely on the issue of the legitimacy of the police strike.

A similar but cloudier situation appeared with the "recall" Proposition B. Although many issues were tied to the proposition, the major issue was the ability of the Moscone administration and the "law enforcement trinity." When voting for and discussing Proposition B, voters were not allowed to select between "wishy-washy" candidates--one was either "for" or "against" the proposition (i.e., the Moscone administration).

The structure of the political system in San Francisco allows for

greater visibility of the issues. Because politicians must rely on the public form to pressure their policy opponents and often political debates are on specific issues, crime became an issue that was no longer something everybody wanted to solve. The method and effectiveness of crime-fighting became the issue.

III. Public attitude is an important tool for political entrepreneurs in San Francisco. This conclusion is closely related to number II. Because politics in San Francisco is so open and free, public opinion is an important tool in promoting or defeating causes. The most successful politicians are those that exploit this aspect of the system.

Two examples reinforce this conclusion. The first is the change in Mayor Alioto's image before and after the police strike. Although Alioto was probably not universally acclaimed as a good mayor, in most public scraps with the supervisors he came out on top because of his honest, straightforward, down-to-business style. In fact, while he was negotiating the strike, his "fire the strikers" attitude was winning him praises. But, when he reversed positions and settled the strike saying that it was most important that the city have safe streets, his popularity collapsed.

Alioto's failure resulted in, as a second example, the success of Charles Gain. As Chief of Police, Gain had an almost impossible challenge--to change an inbred, conservative, self-centered police

department into one which put community service and concern for individuals as its top goals. Although the job is not complete, he has made a noticeable change. His major tactic for this change was to identify those attitudes he wished to change with the Police Officers Association. By doing this he was able to suggest that those who were resisting change were the same people who left the city without protection during the strike. Knowing little about police practices, the community was left to identify "good guys" and "bad guys" with Gain's help and provide their support accordingly. As Mayor Moscone said:

"The public is supporting Gain and they are people whose morale is really at stake." (SFC, 9 May, 1976: 1)

How a politician manipulates public opinion in the city is very important to success. An assumption of public support or a misjudgement of that attitude can radically change a politician's position in the political structure of the community. The city of San Francisco is an open, "free" city as described in the articles in Becker (1971). That spirit and image are reflected and combined in both "politics" and "crime." The city will always be plagued with crime problems, but those problems are somewhat different than those of the typical major metropolitan area. The nature of the city's image and economic structure make its major crime problems not those of a city having a large, poor ghetto and "white flight" to the suburbs. Instead, San Francisco's major crime problem is contending with the greater percentage of bizarre, "motiveless,"

irrational crimes. These crimes are more difficult to solve and receive more public exposure. Therefore, crime will always be a topic of interest to San Francisco citizens and therefore a prime candidate for the political agenda.

The "openness" of San Francisco is also reflected in its political structure and operations. Diffusion of power in the city forces issues to be debated in the media and not in backrooms or administrative offices of City Hall. Also, political entrepreneurs can grab at an issue and, very quickly, raise it to a noticeable level. Therefore, no politician is safe from an "issue ambush"-they cannot control the political agenda.

During the time of this study, crime was constantly being placed in front of the public as a political issue. Sometimes the issue was a specific incident (Zebra), sometimes it was in terms of police services (police strike/"liberal law enforcement trinity") or sometimes a general fear (the "crime wave", the campaigners "motherhood" approach). Because the rise and fall of the issue of crime on the political agenda was so rapid, it was easy to spot the persons and events that made crime an important political issue. Once crime became an issue some event was usually created to "resolve" the problem (election, administrative reorganization or dramatic announcement). Crime then fell from the important issue spot only to reappear months (and sometimes only a few weeks) later.

When the study ended, it looked as if the Moscone administration and the "law enforcement trinity" were attempting to slow down the rapid cycling of the crime issue through the political agenda. They may have been successful if the supervisor elections of 1977 are any indication. However, characteristics of crime and politics in San Francisco suggest that these attempts may fail and the crime issue will continue to rapidly appear, disappear, and reappear again.

PART II
PHILADELPHIA

CHAPTER EIGHT;

Philadelphia--A General Description

Politics of crime events in Philadelphia do not take place in a vacuum. The demographic, economic, and historical character of the city project a mood and an image of the city which is a backdrop for all political events. An important one of these elements is size. Philadelphia has always ranked among the ten largest cities in the United States. In 1970, it was the fifth largest city with a population of 1,948,609--a decrease from a high of 2,071,605 in 1950. Continued decrease in population is seen by the 1975 census estimate of 1,797,000.

This decline in population does not indicate that Philadelphia is a dying area, however. Like most large cities in the northeast, suburbanization of the Philadelphia area has been the main source of loss of population within city limits. It has been estimated that the city has lost at least 65,000 persons to the suburbs since 1970 (Muller et al., 1976). The Philadelphia SMSA which includes the counties surrounding the city was the fourth largest in the nation in 1970 and 1976.

The Philadelphia area is a part of the east coast "strip city" located midway between New York and Washington, DC/Baltimore. Suburbs that extend northeast from Philadelphia mesh with New Jersey towns of Trenton, Princeton and others closer to Newark and New York City. Those which extend to the southwest quickly mesh into Wilmington, Delaware which is only 30 miles away. Philadelphia also has suburbs which extend in the other two directions; Camden and Gloucester counties to the southeast and the prestigious area of Montgomery and Chester counties to the northwest of the city. Ease of suburbanization which has changed the character of Philadelphia effected the politics of the city.

The city itself has developed a unique character. For those with the historical image of Philadelphia, it is difficult to picture it as the fifth largest city in the nation with most of the same problems as other northeastern industrial cities. The map below (Figure 6) shows the variety of neighborhoods and the colorful names which reflect immigrant influence on the city's development. Most of these neighborhoods are still closely knit enclaves of ethnic groups wishing to live with "their own kind."

Figure 6 about here

The central city is experiencing a renaissance similar to many urban areas. New, modern office buildings are being built accompanied by high-rise apartments and condominiums. Along with this residential/business linkage has been a gentrification of the historical "Society Hill" area. Partly spurred by the Bicentennial, the area around Independence Hall has become a desirable place for upper and upper-middle income residents to restore formerly run-down historical homes. Another location for the more wealthy in Philadelphia are the suburban areas. This leaves a "doughnut" of Philadelphia neighborhoods undergoing change.

Other than the redeveloped central city, communities that touch on suburbs are the last enclaves for upper-middle class whites. Chestnut Hill is the most celebrated example because Mayor Frank Rizzo built a new home in this area. Traditionally ethnic areas which have been losing population to the suburbs and quickly gaining black citizens have been West Philadelphia, South Philadelphia, North Philadelphia and Germantown/Mt. Airy areas, with the latter becoming the location for the middle-class blacks. Locations of these areas are shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 about here

Many ethnic areas remain because those not as upwardly mobile have not been able to afford to move to suburbs or have not wanted to leave their neighborhood.



FIGURE 6: Philadelphia's neighborhoods.
(From Muller et al., 1976: 13).




FIGURE 7: The four major black ghetto clusters in the city of Philadelphia. (From Muller et al., 1976: 15).

The Poles and Irish have maintained neighborhoods in Kensington and Fishtown. The Italians have maintained a separate South Philadelphia neighborhood, although next door to black South Philadelphia. The Jewish population has settled and maintained neighborhoods in Oxford Circle and Overbrook neighborhoods. In recent years what was previously a minimal Puerto Rican community has been growing in the Fairmont area near the Center City. Because gentrification has been going in this direction, the neighborhood is very unstable.

Tensions developed by such strict boundaries are well described by Muller and his colleagues:

Tensions at the boundary between expanding neighborhoods of wealthy whites and less affluent communities are subtly manifested in a number of ways. Different lifestyles are involved. The wealthy people are indoor oriented, entertaining guests with cocktail parties or traveling outside the neighborhood to dine out, visit friends, and attend movies, plays, and concerts. Working class people make more use of the streets and sidewalks. These different perceptions and uses of spaces occasionally bring about conflicts between populations. Childless, indoor-oriented people complain about active, noisy, streets, failing to understand why neighbors do not "control their children", and frowning upon the "distasteful" practice of adult streetcorner lounging. Outdoor oriented people on the other hand are repeatedly offended by dog litter on their sidewalks, which piles up as the wealthier element frequently walks its canine "burglar alarms" along their neighbors' outdoor meeting grounds. And on occasion one might also hear a working class resident grumble about the bearded or braless bicyclists who "tour the neighborhood gawking at the people."

Much of the city consists of "defended space," as dozens of distinct communities, some with ethnic identities and others without, inspire strong personal attachments to Philadelphia's neighborhoods. A study of an Irish neighborhood in South Philadelphia by John W. Anderson offers some insights into this theme of neighborhood cohesiveness. One informant said: "This is a clannish neighborhood, family and working people, and we take care of our own. A man couldn't spit here without hitting a cousin; and you cross one guy, you answer to everybody." Another informant described the neighborhood in this manner: "This place is like a fort, and we're the pioneers who go outside the walls to work and get what we need and then shut the gate at night around our families to hold off the renegades." (Muller et al., 1976: .25)

Philadelphia is historically an industrial town. Unlike other large cities which have a single industry focus like Detroit, Seattle or Pittsburg, Philadelphia industry is diverse and made up of many smaller manufacturing industries. While this has the advantage of stabilizing the economy by making it less dependent on one type of industry, it also has disadvantages. With no concentration of industry type, smaller industries have little incentive to stay in the Philadelphia area. According to the state Department of Commerce, 252 factories with 17,358 jobs moved from Philadelphia to the surrounding suburbs between 1962 and 1971 (Muller et al., 1976:51).

The major impact of this movement has been in two areas. First, the desertion of industry from the city has added to erosion of the city's tax base, already decreasing due to residential movement to suburbs. Second, reduction of urban industry means reduction of jobs for those living in the city. Hardest hit are blacks who are faced with increasing unemployment rates. For the ethnic working class family, movement of industry encourages their decision to move with their job to the suburbs, further disintegrating traditional neighborhoods of Philadelphia. Revitalization of the Center City area has brought some business back to the city but not the type that hires semi-skilled or unskilled employees. New downtown high-rises house offices of lawyers and financial concerns as well as data-processing and consulting businesses.

With the economic base changing, the city is faced with a typical dilemma of Northeastern industrial cities. Demands for city services, especially human care services, are on the increase by those left behind while taxes to pay for those services are decreasing due to the smaller

tax base. Philadelphia, like other northern industrial cities, is making attempts to change this trend. The Northeast Industrial Park, and other smaller projects, has been successful in attracting businesses to the city. The other major effort is to improve commuting patterns so that commerce which stays in the city can draw from the employment pool of suburbs as well as the city. Also, improved commuting patterns would make it easy for those living in the city to reach jobs in the suburbs. None of these activities, however, have changed the trend of outward industrial migration.

The political structure of the city reflects extensive reform influence that developed the Home Rule Charter of 1951. The charter developed a strong-mayor form of government but legislatively restricted his ability to develop "evil" systems of patronage and corruption of big city machines. The Mayor is ultimately made "responsible for the conduct of the executive and administrative work of the City and for law-enforcement within its boundaries" (Ruchelman, 1974:15). The Mayor appoints four cabinet members who have authority over operation of the city. Most powerful is the Managing Director who is, like a city manager, responsible for directing the city departments. Almost as powerful is the Director of Finance who develops the city budget and controls expenditure of city funds. The other two positions are City Solicitor and City Representative who are responsible for legal and public relations for the city and mayor.

The city's civil service system restricts patronage appointments of the mayor. According to Ruchelman, only 200 of the 33,000 city employees can be hired by the mayor (1974:16). Also, the mayor can serve only two successive four year terms--a provision the present Mayor, Frank Rizzo, unsuccessfully attempted to change.

The legislative branch of city government, the City Council, is made up of seventeen members elected to four-year terms along with the Mayor. Ten members are elected from districts within the city while seven are elected on an at-large basis. Although elections are partisan, a party can nominate a maximum of five persons for at-large positions, guaranteeing the minority party at least two seats on the City Council. Power of this body is minimal, however. Although they can set spending limits, the mayor can decide to spend less than the council allocates without any recourse by the council. Because of the strong control the mayor and his cabinet has over development of information (creation of budgets, creation of budgets, creation of legislation) the Council portrays the image of a forum for discussion of issues while the Mayor is acting on them. The strong party system also dilutes power of the council when the mayor has "control" over those who run and are elected.

The description of political "division of labor" differs widely from the perspective provided on San Francisco. Unlike San Francisco, the mayor in Philadelphia has direct control of management of city departments and does not have to contend with independently appointed commissions to provide even temporary road blocks to appointments or legislative proposals. City Council members in Philadelphia were rarely interviewed in the press concerning major political issues and the Council was not a source for policy programs. Similarly, major political opposition to the mayor did not come from the City Council. As will be seen in the following reports, those debating issues of politics of crime exposed their differences through intra and inter-party debates.

Crime was a problem for the city but not to the extent as in San Francisco and Chicago. Whether crime is measured by Uniform Crime Report data or through victimization surveys, Philadelphia has the lowest crime rate of the

Reactions to Crime Project's three cities (Reactions to Crime, 1978). Although most recently there has been a drop in reported crime rate in Philadelphia, it has not returned to the rate of 1970 when this study was started. As the Reactions to Crime study indicates, Philadelphians do have an awareness of crime, take precautions to avoid crime areas and are active in their neighborhoods in crime preventive activities. Surveys show that even though the city has a lower crime rate than San Francisco or Chicago, on some measures, Philadelphians lead in anti-crime or crime avoidance activities.

Crime has entered the political arena in Philadelphia through the context of fear. Politicians in their political rhetoric and activities have used and heightened citizens' fears of being crime victims. Demographic structure, perceptions of citizens concerning crime and actions of politicians on the issue of crime are highly intertwined.

But it is undeniably true that city living today is seldom carefree living. Many residents of Philadelphia feel constrained in their behavior. Recent letters to the editors of Philadelphia's newspapers express strong anxieties. A reader complained to the Daily News: "Freedom from mugging is a human right... We have been made prisoners in our own home. What happened to our freedom?" A letter to the Philadelphia Inquirer stated that: "The parents have to worry about sending their children to school. They worry if they will come home all right after walking through changing neighborhoods." Another letter to the same newspaper echoed: "The kids coming out of school are faced with these situations which have come out of control here. You can't walk the streets without someone hitting you over the head; you're not even safe in your own home." (Muller et.al., 1976:2)

Reasons for "white flight" and tensions between neighborhoods may be racial but are closely linked to crime. This description of "white flight" demonstrates the link to crime.

The reasons for whites' reluctance to share residential space with blacks are complex, but many can be summarized in a single word -- fear. Important here are fears of becoming a crime victim and anxieties about the decline of real estate values in racially changing neighborhoods.

Apprehensions about race and real estate values are somewhat understandable, but are frequently based on misconceptions. If property values drop in a racially changing area, it is because the supply of available housing has exceeded the demand creating a buyers' market. Where mass flight occurs because of anticipated declines in real estate values, a surplus of vacant housing is created and property values actually do decline, thereby fulfilling the prophecy of the sellers. However, as demand catches up to supply, property values rise again. Thus, one sees areas in Philadelphia where whites are selling large homes at greatly deflated prices, and then putting down payments on smaller and probably overpriced tract houses located much farther from the core of the city. Professional landlords may buy these hastily disposed of houses, convert them to multiple occupancy, and then make a tidy profit renting to blacks.

(Muller et.al., 1976:17)

Fear feeds upon itself and citizens respond to their perceptions of risks from being victimized by retreating from their neighborhoods either to suburbs or just their own homes or autos. This behavior change does nothing to reduce one's fear of crime. It is especially noticable in a neighborhood divided city like Philadelphia.

The fear of violence pervades the city, and everywhere one sees defenses being set up--metal grates over windows; new locks and doors; and burglar alarms, both canine and electrical. The statement "you just can't go anywhere anymore" is typical and reflects the fact that people have been locking themselves up. The fact that legitimate users of city space have withdrawn has made it easier for illegitimate users--muggers, rapists, vandals, and dope peddlers--to score successes in their activities. In this way a vicious

cycle is formed: withdrawal offers the opportunity for more crime which then causes further lock-up, or, alternatively, more flight from the city. Because fear of crime extends beyond high crime zones, the area of extensive lock-up and withdrawal is larger than the high crime area, creating a potential for the further spread of crime. It is in this way that crime and the pervasive fear of it have diffused from the low income areas of the inner city throughout the metropolitan region, such that some suburban communities now have crime problems as serious as Philadelphia's.

(Muller, et.al., 1976:29)

The problems the city faces are similar to those confronting other large northeastern industrial cities. The institutional structure of government provides the mayor of Philadelphia extensive latitude to accomplish those things he/she wishes. Crime exists in Philadelphia and, more important, citizens' perception of crime is a motivating force for change in life-style in the city whether the citizen stays within the city or moves to the suburbs.

CHAPTER NINE:

Pre-Rizzo Philadelphia

In his 1965 comparative study of urban politics, Edward Banfield titles a chapter describing Philadelphia "Nice While it Lasted." By this title, Banfield indicates the fleeting experience Philadelphia had with reform politics. Although brief, impact of the reform moment on Philadelphia set the stage for some political issues related to crime in the 1970s. First it is important to trace changes in Philadelphia politics leading to election of Frank Rizzo as Mayor in 1971.

Like other United States cities before the end of World War II, Philadelphia was run by a political machine. Philadelphia was unique in that it was the only big city Republican machine that had weathered the Democratic Roosevelt years, staying in power for 68 years until 1951. It was also unique in that it was run in large part by upper-class business interests of the city. In 1951 voters inaugurated a new home rule chapter (described in the last chapter) and elected two reform-minded Democrats, Joseph Clark as mayor and Richardson Dilworth as District Attorney. These two candidates had been fighting the Republican machine since 1947 and by winning two "row office" elections in 1949 (comptroller and treasurer) laid ground work for their 1951 victory.

Their victory brought little joy to the Democrats of Philadelphia. Clark and Dilworth were reformers who used the Democratic party as the most efficient route to office. Once in power, they did not distribute "spoils" of victory to the party but instead gave many key positions to independents and urged strict compliance to civil service reforms of the new charter. Dilworth succeeded Clark in 1955 using the coalition of reformers and machine Democrats that had put Clark in office. Ironically,

lack of patronage positions in the city led to the downfall of the reformers. Without patronage the Democratic party had to rely on state politics for its spoils. This was possible because of the almost non-existent state civil service laws. When Democrats won the governorship in 1954 regular Philadelphia Democrats strengthened their power and no longer needed the reformers. In fact, with the change in governors, those wishing to keep jobs changed party affiliation. Banfield stated, "According to one Republican politician, the "bulk" of the present Democratic committeemen-around 1,200 to 1,300, are former Republicans" (1961:114).

This change in power forced Dilworth to cooperate with regular Democrats more often because he needed city council approval of his legislation. When Dilworth resigned in 1962 to start his unsuccessful campaign for governor, James Tate, a machine Democrat, moved into the spot of mayor. In this position he increased power of the machine through attempts to change the institutions and tradition of Philadelphia's ten year reform period.

Reformers had done damage to the regular Democratic party. However, Tate did not automatically become a "boss" with Clark's departure. He was able to win the election for his first term with the promise to reunite the party. When it came time for re-election he found himself in a hard fought battle against Alex Hemphill, a long time active Democratic Party regular. When the party supported Hemphill, Tate had to win nomination without help from reformers or the party.

He barely won the primary and then had to face Arlen Specter who, although running as a Republican, had gained support of the reform Democrats. It was through these elections that Tate needed an issue to garner support. Under the surface that issue became safety, law-and-order and race relations but the specific issue was Tate's promise to appoint Frank Rizzo as Police Commissioner.

Because of re-establishment of a political machine and hard fought battles in the elections, many reforms of the Clark-Dilworth era were eliminated. Two areas concerning politics-of-crime which saw setbacks were police policies and race relations.

Professionalism of police services in cities was a major goal of the reform movement. Such reform came to Philadelphia during the Dilworth-Clark decade.

Observers agree that prior to 1952 no major policy decision or personnel promotion was made in the Police Department without the approval of the Mayor and the "politicians" out in the wards. This surely included--according to these views--promotion and assignment of District Police Captains. These same observers of Philadelphia government agree that the first move to free the Police Department of its historical political control and domination began with the election of Mayor (now U.S. Senator) Joseph S. Clark and his "reform" ticket in 1952. According to this viewpoint, Mayor J. Richardson Dilworth continued this effort to insure the "independence" of the Police Department when he succeeded Clark in 1956. In the view of many persons, "cleaning the politics out of the Police Department" ranked with the most notable of the Dilworth reforms. (Lohman and Misner, 1966:37).

Specifically, the two mayors granted independence to their police commissioner and hired professionals to lead departments. The most notable example was Howard Leary who served as commissioner from 1963 to 1966 when he resigned under Mayor Tate.

The most dramatic example of reform influence on crime control was in October 1958 when Mayor Dilworth signed an executive order creating a civilian review board for police activities. It was the first such board in the nation to be comprised entirely of non-police members. Evaluations of the board gave it high marks in its impartial handling of cases. Success of the board also depended on integrity of the members and adamant support of the mayor.

In general, the reform mayors transformed the police department and supervision of its operations into what was considered a modern, professional police force. This evaluation of the department's activities in community relations could be expanded to all areas of police activities,

Special note should be taken of the fact that the Department has invested a considerable amount of personnel time and money in the development of innovative training programs in the community relations field. The Department undertook these programs earlier than most other large police departments in the nation. In addition, the Department has wisely made use of community resources not only in the development of the programs, but also in their staffing (Lohman and Minsner, 1966:72).

The independent, professional police force diminished under Mayor Tate. When Leary left Philadelphia, Deputy Commissioner Edward J. Bell was named Acting Commissioner and the mayor selected a prestigious committee to search for a new commissioner. Bell was a close friend of the mayor's and from the mayor's comments, his favorite candidate. The special committee felt pressure from the mayor to present Bell as their top choice and reacted by labeling Bell "qualified" but recommending another candidate. Tate, who had selected the committee to demonstrate the lack of "politics" in the selection was shocked with the committee's recommendation. He overruled the committee's recommendation and selected Bell, indicating to most Philadelphians that politics were back in the police department.

Politics also brought the police civilian review board to an end. The movement to eliminate the board was headed by the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) which was also in the midst of internal conflict. During this time almost 99 percent of the police Department belonged to FOP.

Early in 1959, the FOP brought suit against the board saying the board's powers went beyond advisory bounds. In December, they won their suit and throughout the next year the FOB and the board discussed compromises which would allow the board to exist but still be tolerable to the FOP.

Although reducing the board's power, it was still considered effective. It was supported by police commissioners Leary and Albert Brown (Leary's predecessor). In late 1962 Mayor Tate expressed his support of the board:

It serves an important function as an impartial forum designed to protect both the police and public from abuse--It is the recognized agency where all parties can air what they believe to be an encroachment of their constitutional rights. The nature of police activity, especially in these times of population mobility and change, demands that there be such a sounding board for shifting real, imagined and even contrived complaints. (quoted in Halpern, 1974:66)

In 1964 the political rift within the FOP broke. Similar to other "revolts" in police associations in the nation, lower-ranking officers wanted to change the character of their association to a more politically active organization (see chapter four). The Philadelphia "revolt" was led by John Harrington who in 1964 became lodge president, later going on to become the national FOP president (the headquarters are in Philadelphia). His two-to-one margin of victory in 1964 (after two unsuccessful tries in 1960 and 1962) was based on a campaign of "insist (ing) that the defensive and unaggressive posture of FOP leaders had contributed to declining respect in Philadelphia for law and law enforcement officers" (Halper 1974:67).

The new FOP chief almost immediately started a campaign to eliminate the review board. His timing was excellent because a month after announcing his opposition to the Board, Philadelphia suffered four days of rioting in 1964.

The Harrington-F.O.P. leadership asserted that the city riots of 1964 lasted as long as they did only because Philadelphia policemen were fearful of using adequate force less they be brought before the P.A.B. Harrington elaborated as follows:

You saw the pictures of the cannibals coming out of the stores with t.v. sets on their heads. If it hadn't been for the P.A.B. we would have grabbed them and if they resisted hit them with our black jacks.

The FOP filed suit in court to have the board eliminated. In 1967 a favorable decision from Judge Leo Weinrott abolished the board and restrained city officials from reinstating it. The political climate was changing and Mayor Tate refused to have the city appeal the decision. When the defunct board finally became so frustrated they appealed the decision on their own, the state supreme court overruled the Weinrott decision. Although back in business, the mayor did not provide the board with any financial help or office space. Finally on December 27, 1969 the mayor formally announced dissolution of the review board, stating it was a Christmas gift to the police. Among the happiest members of the audience was Tate's Police Commissioner, Frank Rizzo, whose actions and decisions had often been the subject of board action. The fate of the board and professional police practices were sealed by that action. As Halpern stated:

In the end the board's demise resulted from the political needs of a mayor beholden to his police commissioner and department and anxious to curry the favor of an electorate agitated over the issue of personal safety. Though the FOP was not directly the cause of Tate's decision to disband the board, we should not discount the ability of the police organization to have initiated debate on the board and related the issue of civilian review of police behavior to that of personal safety and public order in cities. (1974:74)

The character of Black/white relations in Philadelphia changed in the pre-reform era, during the reform era and again in the post reform era. Extent of the change can be seen by comparing this quote describing race relations in Philadelphia written by Banfield in 1965 to the Rizzo campaign for mayor.

Race relations in Philadelphia seem to be somewhat better than in most large Northern cities. One reason for this, perhaps, is the presence in the city of a quarter of a million Jews. Another may be the interest that the powerful Democratic organization has in maintaining itself and winning elections. The extension of the merit system by the reformers opened thousands of city jobs to Negroes. This not only attached the Negro to the Democratic party but also, in all likelihood, improved his morale. The reformers were not the only ones to take an interest in the Negro, however. Green put Negro candidates on the slate for Congress, the Common Pleas Court and the city council, and he saw / to it that they were appointed to important posts, including the Civil Service Commission. His successors will undoubtedly follow the same policy. (Banfield, 1965:118)

Change in race relations is best documented in descriptions of Black voting patterns and the changing character of police relations with the Black community. No conclusions can be made on the causes of change, only observations on the change, because many intervening factors were occurring simultaneously. Not only was the political structure of the city changing, but demographic nature of Black/white living space was changing. The civil rights movement was also increasing Black awareness of political participation as their numbers in Philadelphia were increasing.

The number of Blacks registered and voting in national elections kept increasing from 1954-1956 (Glantz, 1959:62). Since the New Deal era, Black votes in Philadelphia in national elections have been strongly Democratic, following the national trend. But, as Ekstrom (1973) has argued, the unique character of the changing Philadelphia city political scene makes use of party labels less descriptive of Black participation in city voting patterns. He uses in his analysis of Black voting the "public regarding"- "private regarding" dichotomy developed by Banfield and Wilson to describe Black support for the reform movement in Philadelphia. Blacks with "public regarding" attitudes are those "who use criteria emphasizing the overall good of the community" versus "private regarding" groups who approach politics with personal ,family , and group-based criteria.

Ekstrom's analysis of city elections from 1943-1969 shows that the Black vote in Philadelphia has not been controlled by either the Republican or Democratic political machine. In most elections, Black voters seem to be "public regarding" voters. They are not among the first to desert a political machine like upper-class whites. At the same time, they do not cling to "private regarding" political regimes like middle class whites, but slowly desert such political groups. In most elections, Blacks took a midway position between public-regarding and private-regarding voters.

The importance of this finding to the political nature of Black/white relations in Philadelphia is two-fold. First, the split in black voting demonstrates lack of political leadership in the Black community--a void that still exists today. Blacks who have been given a small portion of benefits of machine politics heavily back machine candidates. Blacks who have been left out and the upper class Blacks who share reformist values with upper-class whites voters support public-regarding candidates.

The second implication of this internal split in Black voting is that white political leaders can work on two strategies simultaneously. First, they can guarantee that Black voters need not be "reckoned with" by working to perpetuate the split among Black voters. At the same time they can disregard the entire Black population as long as they are split and/or do not participate in politics. A highly active, block voting Black constituency could control politics of Philadelphia simply through the number of eligible Black voters. Eckstrom describes the political power of the Black community and makes an accurate pre-Rizzo prediction of what was to come.

In the general election of 1967, Mayor Tate and the Democratic party barely survived. While some groups returned to the Democrats, relative to 1965, most groups drifted further away than in 1963. The slump was most pronounced among "public-regarding" status and ethnic groups and among Black voters. While whites, in general, swung back from 1965, Blacks retreated a little further. The trend data, however, should not obscure the fact that Black voters spelled the difference between defeat and victory for Mayor Tate and the Democrats. "Private-regarding" Italian wards moved slightly toward the Democrats, while "public-regarding" Jews moved strongly toward the Republicans. While largely Black wards did not follow "private-regarding" groups toward the organization, they provided it with the keystone of its victory.

The election of 1969 was a new low point for Democratic strength. All groups shifted away from them, especially the largely white wards. Their shift was partly the negation of the 1967 Democratic resurgence in these wards. The longer term 1965-1969 trend shows roughly the same degree of shift for wards classified by race. Largely Black wards continued to provide the party large pluralities, but the cumulative evidence of the last half of the decade indicates a steady backing away from their former overwhelming devotion. While largely white wards fled the party more conspicuously at some points, they also fluctuated and showed some tendency to return. Although Democrats remain in power in Philadelphia, the long-term prognosis appears bad among both racial categories. If Black trends away continue and whites rally no more strongly than in 1969, the party should experience a defeat in 1971. A change in style, either to reassert a reform appeal or to address the growing fear of the population for its safety, might alter the situation. (1973:102)

As described earlier, Philadelphia is divided. Throughout the history of the city, police/Black relations have not been the best. In the pre-reform era the police department was politically involved in the city. It was a department used by immigrants as a means of assimilation into the American mainstream. The prejudice against Blacks during this era was strong, an attitude carried to second and third generation police officers.

Development of a police department separated from politics and professionalized, meant improvement and some hope for the Black community. The department under Howard Leary encouraged the civilian review board to curb police abuses as well as emphasized a strong Police-Community Relations unit. Little descriptive information is available on the impact the professionalized police department had on police/Black relations. If nothing else, the setting of good police-community relations expectations concomitant with rising Black power attitudes made the shift away from a community-minded police force a bitter change for the Black community to accept.

Probably one of the biggest difficulties the Leary administration had to overcome in the Black/police relationship area was the traditional attitudes of both Blacks and police officers. A report on police relations with the minority community made shortly after Leary left Philadelphia demonstrated that this link was weak.

It is the general consensus that relations between the police and Negroes are poor. One youth worker states:

The police and Negro community relate negatively. The minorities have always gotten the short end with the police and the whole community feels this.

Several persons think the cause of poor relations is that police tend to think of Negroes with less respect than they are entitled to receive. A judge phrases the problem this way:

The more frequent the contact with the police the less the respect, and it follows that the better off you are, the less the contact.

This statement echoes the feelings of a substantial group, that the problem is not racial in character, but is rather based upon socio-economic status. One attorney states: "The problem is a pathological one, and the further down you go in terms of age, socio-economic class, and therefore, race, the more the problem is." Those who see the problem as one with racial overtones feel much of it is due to the officers' lack of understanding of the community and its problems.

Several persons feel that the Commissioner is aggravating the situation in North Philadelphia. It is alleged that "goof-offs" from other districts are assigned there as a disciplinary measure. Oddly, some Neogroes involved in the area seem unconcerned that there may be such a policy. Also significant is the fact that very few feel that police policy toward the residents is one of outright discrimination. (Lohman and Misner, 1966:97)

Immediately after Leary left, movement away from police-community relations became evident. When Bell was appointed Commissioner of Police, Frank Rizzo who was disliked in the Black community, became a Deputy Commissioner. Advancements the Leary administration had made were being quickly erased.

The history of police/Black relations was only briefly reviewed. It is a major factor in the political success of Frank Rizzo. The reform era in Philadelphia politics brought leaders to the city who attempted to improve the deteriorating police relations with the Black community. Their success was probably quite limited during their term in office and their attempts only demonstrated to the community what could be possible in this area.

The Dilworth/Tate era in Philadelphia politics is an interesting decade of activism. Their success in transforming the city from a machine to reform city was extensive. Just as interesting is how quickly their reforms were undone by their successors. The process of rebuilding a political machine was a difficult one for Mayor Tate--one that almost cost him his re-election. His success in overcoming these obstacles provided a base for further development of a Democratic machine by Tate's successor--Frank Rizzo. But as the rebuilding process could not use the political issue of "the machine" it needed another political issue to win elections and support. This issue was law-and-order which gave Frank Rizzo the chance to succeed Mayor Tate, and at that time, build control of the Democratic party.

CHAPTER TEN: Frank Rizzo: Who is this Mayor
and How Did He Get Here?

During his victory speech as mayor elect of Philadelphia, Frank Rizzo stated, "Only in America could a guy like Frank Rizzo be elected Mayor." This statement is a good one-sentence description of Frank Rizzo and the political attitudes which helped him to office. As was seen in the last chapter, Rizzo was a campaign issue in Mayor Tate's reelection bid in 1977. Four years later he was again the main campaign issue, and also the candidate. Possibly Philadelphia was waiting for a candidate like Rizzo and it was "inevitable" that a law-and order candidate would be elected. Some point to Rizzo's ability to use the issue of law-and-order to gain power.

Who is Frank Rizzo? This is what Rizzo says about himself:

"You guys wanna know about Frank Rizzo?" he started again, as if he were talking about someone else. "I'll tell you about Frank Rizzo. Frank Rizzo came up the hard way, all right? Is that what you wanna hear? You wanna hear about how Frank Rizzo never robbed anybody in his life? How he never took anything that didn't belong to him? How he never mugged anybody or snatched an old lady's purse? Is that it?"

He was wearing a smile of confidence at this point because this is Rizzo at his best. It is a speech he has made to countless people, his vision of himself as Horatio Alger. (Hamilton, 1973:101)

This image of Rizzo is fairly accurate. Rizzo is the son of an Italian immigrant. His father was one of the first Italians on the Philadelphia police force. The Rizzo family had a stable but meager income. Rizzo's father was a stern disciplinarian like most

other fathers in the neighborhood and, although he never finished high school, Rizzo left school filled with the values of a strict Catholic upbringing. Another lesson from his background was the importance of defending himself.

Rizzo moved from factory work to the police department. To do so, he had to appeal through the Republican ward committeeman--Rizzo's first real contact with city politics. When city political fortunes changed with the Clark/Dilworth election Rizzo had no reservation in moving to the Democratic party, having no real political loyalties. Rizzo just wanted to be a cop and at first he stayed clear of any political activity. Rizzo's police career combined his dedication to being the "best cop," and his showmanship. As a cop on the beat he had a policy of acting now and asking questions later which gained him the nickname "The Cisco Kid."

When in 1952 a minor scandal erupted in the police department, the normal hiring queue was abolished and Rizzo was appointed acting captain of the 16th Police District. Once there he acted in typical Rizzo style:

Rizzo said shortly after taking over the post that the area, predominantly Black, had the city's highest crime rate and that the trouble stemmed from the proliferation of speakeasies. In typical blitzkrieg fashion, Rizzo went after the speakeasies and the men who operated them. With sirens screaming and men bursting through doors, Rizzo began compiling an impressive record of arrests in the district. In March 1952, his men logged 657 arrests, and maintained an average of more than 600 a month during the rest of his time there. But his conviction rate was far below the arrest rate--statistics in Rizzo's crime-fighting history that have always been disproportionate. He has blamed at different times everyone but the police for the low conviction rate, never publicly admitting, what is a commonly known fact, that careless and sloppy police work is frequently responsible for cases being thrown out of court and defendants being acquitted. (Hamilton, 1973:48).

Although these antics gained him an unfavorable reputation in the DA's office because of the high number of complaints being filed against him and his men, he became a hero of merchants in his district. He was so well liked by them that his transfer to another district brought loud protests from many 16th District citizens and merchants. In his new district Rizzo continued his raiding tactics. After deciding that beatnik coffeehouses were corrupting young people, he staged almost nightly raids on them. Almost all arrests were thrown out of court but, through harassment, he was able to put most of those coffeehouses out of business.

Just as the police shake-up had placed Rizzo in the position of becoming captain, his promotion to inspector was due to a similar set of circumstances. In March 1959 Mayor Dilworth blundered and called some residents of South Philadelphia (Rizzo's Italian neighborhood) "a bunch of greasers." In an attempt to sooth the outcry following the statement, Dilworth promoted Rizzo to inspector. Similarly, in confusion that resulted in Tate appointing Edward J. Bell as Police Commissioner (see Chapter 9), Rizzo's hard work and popularity were rewarded--he became Deputy Commissioner.

The year of Mayor Tate's reelection, 1967, was when Rizzo moved to center stage and his leading role in politics-of-crime began. It started in March when preelection polls were predicting that Tate would lose his bid for reelection and the Democratic party slated former City Comptroller Alexander Hemphill as its candidate for mayor. That evening, police began a crackdown on selected, politically-connected

bars, alleging liquor law violations. Few doubt the action was directed by Tate--only the first move in the Tate strategy. Without Democratic party support Tate had to start running on issues and could not depend on the traditional Democratic coalition of Blacks and working class to win him votes. In fact, he had to win over white-ethnic wards in the city because Black voters were not a strong voting block. The issue he chose was law-and-order.

Shortly after the tavern intervention, Tate and Police Commissioner Bell reportedly had a falling out. In April, Bell, claiming he was suffering from hypertension, took a leave of absence and Frank Rizzo was named acting Police Commissioner. That action in and of itself almost guaranteed Tate all votes in Little Italy. Tate won the Democratic primary by 70,000 votes.

Just as polls were closing for the primary, Tate, confident of victory, continued his strategy in kicking off his general election campaign by announcing he was naming Frank Rizzo to the post of Police Commissioner to replace Bell, who was resigning for "health reasons." The general election was going to be more difficult because his opponent was the popular District Attorney, Arlen Specter. Tate was already using a page from Specter's campaign book.

But Tate, along with politicians in big cities all across the country, had detected an alarming trend. The blue-collar white voter was no longer automatically pulling the Democratic lever. That was made clear in 1965 when Specter, the man Tate would have to beat in November, was elected district attorney over Democrat James C. Crumlish. Specter won even though the Democrats had about 250,000 more registered voters than the Republicans, and he won by pitching his campaign directly at the problem that was troubling the white voters that Tate needed -- violence in the streets. Perhaps

his most effective weapon was a television commercial showing a white woman walking down a dark and lonely street, her heels click-clacking on the sidewalk. The noise of heel striking cement was, for a moment, the only sound in the commercial. Then, more ominous footsteps were introduced, the footsteps of a faceless street-prowling monster bent on rape. The click-clacking speeded up, the woman was terrified, running for her virtue, running for her life. Fade-out. Arlen Specter would handle the rapists. It worked. Whites who had voted for Tate in 1963 crossed over by the thousands to vote for Specter (Daughen and Binzen, 1972:129).

Tate did not totally ignore the Black vote in the campaign. He appointed some Black men to key cabinet positions and made a meager stab at summer unemployment. He did not have to work very hard for the Black vote--they had no reason to flee him and their Democratic party loyalties. Specter had done little before the campaign to draw Black voters to his camp.

The Democratic votes Tate had to win were whites who might end up voting for Specter. Law-and-order was the key tool. By not appealing the negative decision on the police civilian review board as described in the last chapter he gained support of policemen and their families. In July Tate declared an emergency proclamation banning street gatherings of twelve or more and Rizzo heartily endorsed the measure. They both took credit for keeping Philadelphia quiet that summer while other cities were suffering from racial tension.

The biggest campaign issue was Frank Rizzo.

Rizzo's reputation as a tough and fearless cop was soon receiving big play in the newspapers. For example, one photo printed during the election campaign showed him rounding up a group of young Blacks; another showed him in a crash helmet surrounded by his officers intent on breaking up a Black demonstration against a white merchant; a third photo showed him at the head of a flying wedge of policemen breaking into the headquarters of the Revolutionary Action Movement.

All during the campaign Tate kept reminding voters that Rizzo would stay on as Police Commissioner with him as mayor while Specter would not commit himself to retaining Rizzo. When Tate won by 12,000 votes, Rizzo was considered a major factor.

Upon taking office, Tate fulfilled his promise to Rizzo and to citizens. He reappointed Rizzo as Police Commissioner and promised to give him a free rein in running the department. With that debt of gratitude paid, he also thanked his supporters in the police department by finally putting the police civilian review board to rest.

At this point, Rizzo was popular throughout the community. In September 1967, The Bulletin reported that 84 percent of Philadelphians approved of Rizzo's performance. Much of this popularity was attributed to Rizzo's ability to "keep things quiet" during the previous summer.

Rizzo obviously liked the job of Police Commissioner. He worked ten to twelve hours a day spending as much time as possible out of his office working "with his men." No major event went by where Rizzo was not on the scene to personally direct police activities.

It was this activism combined with his desire to show-off that brought him support--and caused him trouble. Because of his close relationship with news media (see below), he was constantly in the news. His charisma always attracted people wherever he went and he could not resist making comments about situations.

Two incidents stand out as important examples of the combination of police work and rhetoric that made Rizzo either a loved or hated figure in Philadelphia. In November 1967 Black students were protesting lack

of Black studies in public schools in front of the School Administration Building. Rizzo, on the scene, perceived the demonstration getting out of control and ordered his men to break up the demonstration. The media reported he ordered his troops into action with the words, "Get their Black asses " (NYT Mag., 16 May, 1971: 65). He did this against the wishes of the school administration, led by liberal educational reformer Mark Shead.

The actions led to immediate denouncement of police actions by Shead, School Board President Richardson Dilworth (former mayor), and many civil rights organizations. Rizzo did not present his view of the facts but responded in his normal style.

Instead of replying to the criticism, Rizzo sought to capitalize on the antagonism that his supporters harbored for Black demonstrators. It was a tactic he would use again and again. Ignore the criticism. Attack the critics and their friends. Turn it into an us-against-them situation.

'The deterioration of police-community relations in Philadelphia is reaching a critical state,' the ADA report said, without mentioning Rizzo by name. 'We are concerned over the arrogance, lack of neutrality and violence exhibited by the police in a tense situation such as that of Nov. 17 (1967) at the School Administration Building, and the increasing "hardline" on civil liberties and civil rights activities.'

Rizzo's answer was to shout that 'they' were going to burn the town down. (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:133).

A second example was a series of raids police made on Black activist groups' offices. Police were purportedly reacting to a "tip" that the offices were being used to store dynamite. One raid backfired on Rizzo when the following morning the Daily News ran a picture of Black Panther members stripping in front of their headquarters that

had just been raided. According to some, police ordered the men to strip while others say the Panthers stripped without provocation to embarrass police. Whichever story one believes, the rumor spread that Rizzo was on the scene and gave the order. Many days later it was discovered that Rizzo was not there and had to be told of the incident. The important point is that facts of the incident were never investigated by police and Rizzo did little to dispel any rumors. He responded to the incident with his normal rhetoric about activist groups.

Lack of investigation was an example of Rizzo's "the Police--right or wrong" attitude.

Rizzo repeatedly maintained that he would not fault a mistake in judgment on the part of a policeman, but that he would blanch at a willful violation of a policeman's code of ethics. The problem was that Rizzo's loose interpretation of 'mistaken judgment' became a cover-up for the most blatant and unwarranted actions on the part of his men. Once, when he was defending one of his men in court, he shouted at a prosecuting attorney, 'Don't get involved with me or you'll be worrying about your own rights.' (Hamilton, 1973:49).

In his comments Rizzo did not wish to be seen as "soft on crime." He usually had a comment at the scene of any major crime event, making it more of a news event. Some examples:

Responding to Governor Shapp's announcement that the Governor will not use the electric chair: "I say it is cruel and unusual punishment to keep these criminals waiting there on Death Row year after year. It would be more merciful to carry out the verdict of the jury as provided by law--put them to death quickly."

After a murder of a suburban Philadelphia housewife: "When they come up with the people who did that, I could throw the switch myself." (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:141).

In a speech in 1970:

"For too many years now, the odds favored the criminal: let's give the law abiding citizens an even break. Today the citizens of Philadelphia demand an end to killings, beatings and robberies. Let us heed their pleas."

"Surely, it is not an unreasonable request on the part of our citizens that they walk the streets and operate their shops free from the fear of crime. Many small businessmen today work behind locked doors."

"Working together, we must and can change this climate of fear." (PT, 28 February 1970:6).

The longer Rizzo stayed on as police commissioner, the less popular he became with Blacks and the liberal white community. Biographers of Rizzo say the charge that he is a racist is one that upsets Rizzo the most. Two things lead to Rizzo's racist label. The first is that Rizzo had not gone out of his way to dispel the notion. In fact, he seems to make political mileage of his "off the cuff" remarks against Blacks and activists. The second reason is more subtle as described by Daughen and Binzen:

Rizzo would protest against (the racist) description of himself, but his unrestrained, implicitly violent public comments only served to strengthen that impression. Indeed, an examination of his record tended to support Rizzo. His truncheon was used with the same abandon on whites that it was on Blacks to polarize the city into pro- and anti-Rizzo blocks. (1977:131).

None of these images of Rizzo would have been salient, however, if it had not been for the news media. Rizzo at the time of his election was fond of saying "The working newspaperman made me what I am." Some would rephrase that: "The working newspaperman allowed Rizzo to use them

to make him what he is today." Actions of Philadelphia press corps during Rizzo's tenure as police commissioner were less than exemplary.

Rizzo understood the plight of police reporters and enjoyed speaking with them. His office was always open to those assigned to cover the police beat. Not only that, but Rizzo worked to make life easier for reporters by letting them in to take pictures and get interviews while police were conducting their investigations. He even used his influence to grant special personal favors to reporters. Rizzo also cultivated a working relationship with city editors.

Of everything Rizzo did with the press, most important was talking with reporters. Normally reporters would have to piece together stories relying mostly on police reports and minimal personal investigation allowed, due to deadlines. The result of Rizzo's cooperation was of benefit to both Rizzo and newspapers. For reporters and editors a normally lifeless crime story taken from a bureaucratic report became interesting because reporters were allowed on the scene and were given Rizzo quotes. For Rizzo, his name became associated with most crime fighting stories.

This friendship with the press did not stop with reporters and city editors. Rizzo became very good friends and dined often with Walter Annenberg, the owner of the Inquirer. This is the same Annenberg who was a strong supporter of Richard Nixon and was appointed by Nixon as ambassador to England. Annenberg also owned the Daily News, WFIL-TV and radio, and

TV Guide.

The city editor of the Inquirer during Rizzo's time as Police Commissioner and city editor of the Daily News during the Rizzo campaign, Harry Belinger, was one of Rizzo's closest friends. Needless to say, Rizzo rarely got unfavorable publicity from those two papers. Belinger was rewarded for his loyalty by being named to the Rizzo cabinet when Rizzo became mayor. According to one report, Rizzo hired between thirty and forty Philadelphia journalists to join him at city hall (Source: Public Television).

It would be inaccurate to accuse Rizzo of deliberately developing these friendships to further his political career. Rizzo respected journalists and hard work put in by police reporters. He liked to talk with reporters and enjoyed helping them do their job. Of course, he also enjoyed reading about himself in the newspapers. As for his friendship with Annenberg and Belinger, this developed from all three sharing similar beliefs and perspectives. In fact, Belinger was born and raised in the blue-collar Kensington neighborhood and shared similar childhood experiences to those of Rizzo.

This friendship with the news media existed long before the Watergate era when the investigative reporter became the newsroom hero. Philadelphia was a competitive newspaper town and interesting crime, fire and other spectacular stories sold newspapers. Added to this culture was the fact that Mayor Tate was a good administrator--so efficient, and therefore dull, that little exciting news ever came from City Hall. Simply stated, Frank Rizzo was the only consistently interesting news personality in the city.

Ironically Rizzo as a law-and-order commissioner presided over a city with an increasing crime rate. In 1969 the crime rate increased 10.8 percent and an amazing 23.4 percent in 1970. But even with the increasing crime rate

Rizzo claimed that Philadelphia was the safest of America's ten largest cities, using FBI data to support his claim. What Rizzo did not mention was that data was supplied to the FBI by Rizzo's department. An LEAA investigation showed that the gap between reported and actual crime was far greater than in any other city tested. Skogan stated, "Both Philadelphia and Milwaukee produce notoriously unbelievable crime reports each year" (1976:112). That did not go unnoticed outside of Philadelphia.

In 1968, for example, Baltimore Police Chief Donald D. Pomerleau noted to reporters that his city, with half the population of Philadelphia's, had reported 67,157 major crimes while Philadelphia reported only 33,439. Pomerleau then pointed out that Philadelphia reported more murders than Baltimore, adding the comment:

"Ha, I guess ole Frank can't hide bodies." (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:138).

Three other aspects of Rizzo's tenure as Police Commissioner were distressing to reform minded citizens of Philadelphia but of little interest to his supporters. In a survey for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, a University of Michigan study team ranked Philadelphia third in the nation in Black's assessment of police brutality (PT 31, March, 1970:2). Those charges could be verified by reading the Black newspaper for this time period. The extent of the brutality was brought to light later in Rizzo's career when he was mayor. In 1970 a future opponent of Rizzo's in the Democratic mayoral primary, city councilman David Cohen, set up a "hot line" in his council office where citizens could report abuses by police.

Police were also considered lacking by the reformers in minority recruitment. According to reports in 1971, the force at that time contained fewer Blacks than in 1966 and the number of police officers had increased during that time (PT, 2 January 1971: 1).

The final actions by Rizzo as Police Commissioner, a habit that came back to haunt him, were his extravagant spending habits. After Tate gave him virtually dictatorial power of police practices, Rizzo raised the police department budget to \$92 million, an almost 50 percent increase (Newsweek, 31 March 1971:36). This money gave him almost anything he wanted. It took the city council to stop him from purchasing two armored personnel carriers for use against riot activity.

His performance and the statistics were not investigated by the friendly press nor any of Rizzo's opponents. Even if crime was on the rise, Rizzo gave the impression that police were going to do something about it. By always being in the middle of the action, by decrying liberal judges and "soft" civil rights advocates he "proved" that police were doing the best they could. Police had a tough job but they were out there doing something about crime--something, he implied, no one else in the city could claim.

Frank Rizzo's performance was not important--Frank Rizzo the person was. James Tate's forced retirement was approaching with the 1971 election and a replacement was needed. The person Tate wanted was a personal choice and a practical reality. Tate not only owed a debt to Rizzo for helping win the election and therefore returning him to a position of influence in the Democratic party but Tate also personally liked Rizzo.

Tate set out to "sell" Frank Rizzo as the Democratic candidate to leaders of the party. This was not very difficult because others in the party realized that, as one stated, Rizzo was "the most popular man in town." One of the most important persons Tate needed to convince was Peter J. Camiel, Democratic City Committee chairman. Camiel was important because he appointed

the committee that endorsed candidates. With his support, a Rizzo endorsement was assured.

Rizzo had been a step ahead of Tate and was ready for Tate's visit to ask him to become a candidate. Before February second, Rizzo denied his candidacy stating he was not a politician and he enjoyed being Police Commissioner too much to be anything else. He denied it even with billboards advocating his candidacy springing up around the city. But on February 2 he made it official. His announcement said, in part:

"For years, I walked the inner city, observing first hand the shattered bodies and broken spirit of its inhabitants. I've witnessed the crippling effects of inferior education, dilapidated housing and stark poverty. I was there when young boys, approaching the power of manhood, died from overdoses of heroin. I've seen these problems--not as a candidate on a guided publicity tour--but in my work, day after day, night after night. I was not an absentee public servant. I was on the job when duty called. The city's heat never chased me to the seashore on weekends. Throughout the stifling summers, I remained at my post serving the people. I know city government inside out. I'm a man of action who gets things done. I'm my own master. Nobody owns Frank Rizzo."

He also promised:

"Of one thing you can be certain: There will be no ducking dodging or glib talk from Frank Rizzo. Come Election Day, the voters will know clearly and squarely exactly where I stand on all issues (Daughter and Binzen. 1977: 161).

Rizzo's critics say that is one promise that was never fulfilled Rizzo's campaign manager, former Inquirer newspaper man Albert Gaudio'si, understood that Rizzo was far in the lead due to his image and that the more he said the more it could hurt him. Rizzo did not appear in debates and did not answer newspapers' questions. The extent of Rizzo's appearances were in front of favorable groups like the Fraternal Order of Police, labor union persons and groups worried about crime. His stock speech was about crime and how liberals were assisting the breakdown of society. He avoided the Black community, liberal and civil rights groups. When criticized for

working his campaign this way, Rizzo responded, "I'm taking my campaign to the people."

The Daily News Editorial page repeatedly carried a picture showing Rizzo's face from his nose to his chin, lips tightly sealed. Below the picture ran the headline, "C'mon, Frank. Open Up."

The Philadelphia Inquirer published answers to questions asked of the candidates on the front page of several of its editions. Under Rizzo's picture they ran white spaces equal in length to the type under the other candidates' pictures. WFIL-TV, the ABC affiliate in Philadelphia, had Jim Blocker, host of a local talk show on Sunday afternoons, set up a panel discussion among the would-be mayors. Chairs were provided for all the candidates, and each except Rizzo's was filled. Blocker even provided the invisible candidate a water glass. The station later issued a public apology. (Hamilton, 1973:154).

Three candidates opposed Rizzo for the Democratic spot on the ballot. Because all three were seen as liberal, their activities played right into the Rizzo strategy. Rizzo forces had essentially written off Black and liberal votes. The three opponents effectively split Rizzo's opposition. One candidate was Hardy Williams, a Black state representative whose campaign centered on the idea that a Black man could become mayor of Philadelphia just as a Black was mayor in other cities in the U.S.

The next person to enter the race was City Councilman David Cohen. He had been a liberal critic of Rizzo for many years. The most threatening candidate to Rizzo was Congressman William "Bill" Green. Green was the son of the former machine boss of Philadelphia. This political connection had brought the Green family into close contact with the Kennedys and they became good friends. Green was seen as the model Kennedy politician with similar ideas and mannerisms.

When the three major opponents to Rizzo started to talk issues Rizzo would respond with law and order rhetoric. This made two issues central to the campaign 1) law-and-order and 2) Frank Rizzo, not necessarily in that order.

Some examples of campaign statements from the candidates.

COHEN: "Lack of confidence in the present city administration immobilizes our citizenry. Philadelphia needs a rebirth of hope. It needs a future where all citizens can develop a partnership with government in solving our critical problems." (PT, 27 February, 1971:1)

WILLIAMS: "My candidacy has been one for the people. It has reduced the polarization of races for I have demonstrated that people can and will work together. My opponents cannot say the same.

In the matter of crime I feel that the mayor should tell Council that the City Government and police have a duty to prevent crime and see to it that it is done." (PT, 15 May, 1971:1)

GREEN: "Both Hardy Williams and David Cohen are good men." he said, "but let's face it--they can't win. What we need is somebody who can beat Rizzo. This is why I feel working for Green is in the the best interests of black people.

I am definitely not satisfied with Rizzo's performance as Police Commissioner," he said, "For example, he said on many occasions that organized crime was not involved in the drug traffic in Philadelphia.

This is contrary to everything that's been learned by the federal authorities. He also said that the drug situation here is not much worse than it was 10 years ago, but all the parents in Philadelphia know that this is not true." (PT, 2 May, 1971:1)

RIZZO: "Crime.. You want to hear about crime? I'll tell you about crime. If the courts don't start putting the criminals in prisons, this city, this country, is going to fall apart. We break our asses locking up these hoodlums and the liberal judges let them out. Not one, two, or three times. Fifteen times. We got guys on parole who have been arrested for the same thing a dozen times. Is that crime? Let me tell you something..."

"You know why I'm going to run for mayor? Because I'm the only guy who can save this city. I know it. The people know it. And the politicians know it. That's why they're falling all over each other trying to throw in with me."

"These liberal bastards--don't get me wrong, it's not the liberals I mind, it's the dewy-eyed liberal--they'd give their ass to be in my position." (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:165)

Although Rizzo claimed when he announced his mayoral bid that he was not a "polarizing" candidate, his workers tell another story. Circulating through the white crowd in the parking lot of Sears Roebuck's store in Northeast Philadelphia one balmy Saturday afternoon in April, a Rizzo aide kept impressing on the voters, "If it weren't for Rizzo, the Zulus would be running the city." (NYT, 16 May, 1971:72).

In typical Rizzo style he came out of hiding to attack his most threatening opponent, Bill Green. In a speech he stated that Green had approached him five months earlier and had asked him to make a deal to serve as Green's Police Commissioner. This stung the Green Campaign and Green pulled back from his attacks on Rizzo. But Green got a break a few days later. In an emotional statement Cohen pulled out of the race and asked his supporters to help Green. Green also received the surprise endorsement of Pennsylvania Governor, Milton J. Shapp. Shapp had promised to stay out of the campaign. This was a wise decision because Shapp was attempting to reunite a split state Democratic party. The Governor's endorsement described the tenor of the campaign.

"I have tried to maintain my neutrality, but it is now apparent that the Democratic voters of Philadelphia must make a fundamental choice between the forces of hope and the forces of fear. For the future of this city and for the progress of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia must have a mayor who is progressive, enlightened, independent, and compassionate...a man who will protect the vital interest of all its people. But there are other reasons why I have become involved in this election. I am disappointed by the campaign of Mr. Rizzo. I am disappointed that he failed to respond to the legitimate question raised by the press and other concerned groups who wanted to know where he stood on the issues. I am distressed at his failure to testify before City Council on the pressing financial problems of the city. I am also deeply concerned by the rise in drug traffic, the increase in the crime rate, and the epidemic of gang killing which occurred while he was police commissioner. Mr. Rizzo's nomination would not encourage the forces of hope or increase protection afforded to Philadelphia citizens. His election would be a severe blow to the need in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, and, indeed, for the entire nation, for a just and decent society." (Hamilton, 1973:162).

The Green campaign still had two distinct disadvantages. First was the continued candidacy of Williams who was guaranteed to siphon off part of the Black vote. Just as difficult was the Democratic party endorsement of Rizzo. In the Black community, some prominent party regulars were campaigning for Rizzo, denying charges he was a racist.

Results show that the Rizzo strategy worked. Rizzo won with 177,000 votes, leaving Green and Williams in the dust with 128,000, and 45,000 votes respectively. Locations of support were expected as well. Green's support was from Black wards (where Rizzo got less than 12 percent) and from middle and upper class whites wards. Rizzo ran well in Italian wards as expected and took six of eight Jewish wards. (Newsweek 31, May, 1971).

Adding votes of Green and Williams together, even if all of Williams' votes had been given to Green it would have been a tight race. It was thought many Republicans crossed party lines to help Rizzo get the nomination. The Republican candidate, Thatcher Longstreth, faced little opposition in his primary bid. Although it would be easy to suggest that liberal reformers lost the election by battling between themselves, vote totals suggest something different. What happened in Philadelphia is described by Fred Hamilton (1973):

But Philadelphians of all walks of life shared at least one emotion in 1971--fear: fear of walking in the streets after dark, of taking a subway, of walking alone at any time. The man who stood to benefit from that fear, the man who the people thought could deal with the sources of that fear, whatever they were, was the swarthy, earthy Italian out of South Philadelphia. (1973:153).

In Rizzo the voters saw more than someone who would make homes safe again. He was a politician who promised to bring back stability and the better life they all remembered. Their viewpoint is well expressed in this letter to the editor of the New York Times, responding to their postelection editorial condemning Rizzo's victory and urging Democrats to desert their party to vote for Longstreth, thus repaying the favor of Republicans.

As a Philadelphian I feel it necessary to reply to your editorial of May 20 in which you denigrate Frank Rizzo, the victor in the recent Democratic primary for Mayor. What is depressing is not his victory, as you suggest, but the surprising attitude of liberals that the common man is incapable of voting wisely, unless of course the liberal's candidate wins.

Mr. Rizzo and the Black candidate Hardy Williams at least had something in common. They ran clean campaigns.

You complain about Frank Rizzo's "remarkable ignorance." He is smart enough to know that he cannot give an off-the-cuff answer in twenty-five words or less to reporters questions as to how he would solve every major city problem. Far from being authoritarian as you suggest, he has given every indication that he will seek the best advice he can get in running the city, from both Blacks and whites.

You even complain about his asking for bigger jails. The jails are obviously overcrowded. Is the liberal solution simply to open the gates?

In short, Frank Rizzo came across as being more honest and representative of the interests of the common man than did his scheming liberal opponents. That is why he won the primary. (NYT, 5 June, 1975:28)

Longstreth's former career hurt him in two directions. On the one hand, he was not able to get support of business. On the other, his previous positions on issues reflected his Republican, Chamber of Commerce background and were often opposed to those expressed by liberals and Blacks. In this contest, he needed liberal and Black support (anti-Rizzo) to win.

Longstreth spent most of his time chasing Rizzo around the city trying to get to him to speak up on the issue. This led Rizzo to charge that Longstreth had taken the "low road" in the campaign. The charge can be supported but the "low road" is often unavoidable in political campaign when the opponent does not discuss issues.

In mid-October Longstreth and Rizzo were finally put together on an hour-long televised debate covered by the three major networks. Most of the debate consisted of Longstreth making charges against Rizzo and Rizzo simply denying them without any information to back-up the denials. The only emotional outburst from Rizzo--something the Longstreth supporters were hoping for in large quantities--was the response to the suggestion for more debates when Rizzo stated, "Nobody knows who you are, Thatcher."

Just as in the primary campaign, the two major issues were crime and Rizzo. Some examples of the election rhetoric:

LONGSTRETH: "Not enough has been said about the Blacks who are the victims of crime. Most of the crimes that are committed have Black victims and yet whites react that crime is against them."

"State and federal authorities here have said over and over again that organized crime is definitely involved in the drug traffic here and I would believe them over Mr. Rizzo because they have no ax to grind. I think Rizzo's afraid to admit it because it would reflect on his own performance in office. (PT, 26 October, 1971: .1)

(In a public letter to Rizzo) "Your failure as police commissioner to go after pushers and higher-ups remains unexplained and a shocking indictment of your ability to come to grips with the realities of a situation. . . .

. . . Unlike you I have never instructed my staff to move among the crowds at my rallies spreading hate and divisiveness, setting race against race, blue collar against white collar, "my kind of people" against anyone else.

"Unlike you I have neither Ku Klux Klan adherents nor members of lawless motorcycle gangs such as the Warlocks wearing my buttons or rallying to my banners. The one thing you can say about these characters is that they don't need code words to tell them who their man is." (PT, 25 September, 1971:1)

RIZZO: (In a letter to voters) "The streets will be made safe... There will be no more unwanted public housing projects...busing for racial purposes will not be tolerated. (NYT: 21 October, 1971:60)

He said the whole country was watching this election because a Rizzo victory would be a return to the middle and would set a trend across the country.

"The bleeding hearts and ultra liberals would be out of jobs. They've been running this country and doing a lousy job of it." (PT 2, October, 1971: .2)

Despite the lengthy position papers that his staff issued on such subjects as housing, welfare, transportation, and city services, Rizzo in his public appearances, struck mainly to the issues he knew would elicit a favorable response from his followers.

Rizzo's newspaper friends had either left the city, joined his campaign or were not a strong enough influence on editorial staffs. Two of three major papers, the leading Black and Jewish papers, as well as the New York Times endorsed Longstreth. The Bulletin's endorsement read, in part,

"When crime and street violence is commonplace it is not surprising that some people will turn to a man who became the symbol of rugged law and order. But more is required to make a city truly liveable in addition to keeping the lid on." (NYT, 24, October, 1971: 60).

However, endorsements were not enough to provide victory for Longstreth. He was defeated by 50,000 votes -- Rizzo won with 391,000 and Longstreth received only 343,000. The racial division suggested by observers of the campaign was exhibited by the vote. All but predominately Black wards went for Longstreth. The map below shows that the core of the city where blacks live was the area of support for Longstreth.




FIGURE 8: 1971 Mayoral election returns in Philadelphia.
(From Muller, et al., 1976: 20).

The major point of dissension according to Rizzo's critics were law-and-order, but more subtly, race. Rizzo's supporters defended their choice, however, because he represented the "middle," the "silent majority's values."

In the white ethnic neighborhoods, though, things only seemed to get worse. It was their children who were shaken down for their lunch money. It was their taxes that were raised to pay increased welfare benefits. They were leaderless. When they did organize to protest, nobody listened. Worse yet, they came off looking like a bunch of red-necked bigots. And so they turned to Frank Rizzo....Rizzo professed his belief in Philadelphia. And his belief in the neighborhoods. Fishtown and Junita and Bridesburg had a right to guard their sections against change, especially racial change. Rizzo would defend that right. With Rizzo in charge Philadelphia would be a better, and safer, place. The women in the row house neighborhoods would continue to scrub their front steps in the morning. On summer evenings, the men would continue to sit on folding chairs on the sidewalk. The kids would continue to play on Lighthouse Field. Frank Rizzo would be their protector, their father figure, their padrone.
(Daugen and Binzen, 1977: 17)

Rizzo's supporters were not ashamed to describe their support for their candidate.

Julio Ranieri, a factory worker on the city's northeast side, will vote for Rizzo. He says: "It's gotten to the point on my block where my little girl can't play in the street anymore.

A lot of colored have moved in and taken over. I closed a deal on another house yesterday; we'll move out in a couple of months. Rizzo understands this. He understands crime and how we feel about it. He'll know what to do."

A cabdriver says: "Rizzo won't be real tough with the niggers, unless they get out of line. Then he'll bust their heads." (Life, 29, October 1971:51)

It would be easy to consider support for Rizzo simply a "white backlash," in Philadelphia. The vote for Rizzo was more, however. Samuel Lubell, who analyzed changes in voting patterns during the Wallace campaign described South Philadelphia in this way:

But these families stood as one in their determination not to be "forced out" of their homes by Blacks moving into their streets. . .

Everyone interviewed wanted school busing ended. Since nearly all the children in these families attended Catholic schools, they are not troubled directly by school integration.

But to these Italo-American families the presence of almost any Black person in the neighborhood seems like a hostile invasion. A cab driver's wife was particularly incensed that the few Negro children attending the Catholic school "don't show any respect for the nuns." She went on to explain: "They use curse words to them, but the nuns are afraid of them. If my kids did that, I'd want the nun to smack'em good, show'em respect."

The chief annoyance appeared to be the daily trek through the neighborhood of young blacks to and from South Philadelphia High School and the Bok Vocational School, both predominantly Negro.

Some residents protested, "It's dangerous how the colored flock around the Catholic schools" or "They come through here after school and frighten us." A construction worker pointed down the street and grumbled, "They pull down that doctor's sign every week." A storekeeper told how "they steal pies and cakes." (1970:93).

The Rizzo election only continued a trend of white ethnic voters voting for the man "in the middle." It demonstrated a realignment of political groups in the city. This realignment helped along with rhetoric from all candidates in both primary and general elections to make Rizzo more appealing.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: The Cop As Mayor

Frank Rizzo, the former Police Commissioner, became mayor of Philadelphia on January 3, 1972. He got to that position by promoting himself as a "man of the people," a non-politician taking a political position. Continuing that theme in his inaugural address he made some big promises: safe streets, no new taxes or increases, and "There will be no abuse of police power in the community." (NYT, January, 1972: 1).

When Rizzo took office the city was optimistic about his abilities. He had received endorsement of most major papers in the area and had support of the powerful Democratic party. After his election, even the Black community reluctantly called upon Rizzo to keep his promises to unite the city and offered their help in moving the city forward. How this unification was to be accomplished was in doubt; clearly, Rizzo thought he could run the city as he had the police department. Only too quickly did he discover that it was not the same. He had to learn politics and learn them quickly.

As soon as he had taken office, Rizzo was in trouble with the Black community with his statement, " I don't believe there is a Black leader or spokesman for the Black community in Philadelphia" (PT, 4 January, 1972: 1). Using this rationale, Rizzo appointed few Blacks to his administration, further convincing the Black community that he had little interest in their problems.

But, probably most convincing of Rizzo's disregard of the Black community were the dual problems of gang violence and police brutality. In Rizzo's first year, the problem of gangs began to gain attention. Although Rizzo's inaugural address contained the words "I will not tolerate gang rule or anarchy in the street," 39 persons were killed in gang violence in 1972 and gang membership was on the increase. Most gang violence was centered in Black sections of the city. Rizzo had no specific plans to confront the growing problem.

Problems of gang violence were coupled with concern about police practices. Reports of police brutality appeared in almost every edition of the PT. A report compiled by the District Attorney's office suggested that indiscriminate arrests were common in the department. They surveyed three of 22 police districts from August 1971 through 1972 and discovered that 50 percent of the arrests resulted in discharges at preliminary arraignments. (PT, 30 January, 1973: 1). Frustration felt by the Black community is shown by the political cartoon run often in the PT shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9 about here

During the year, Rizzo's crime rhetoric continued. He restored mounted police to the central city and announced plans to use federal Law Assistance Administration Funds to increase the police force by 1500 men. He also seriously suggested that one way to ease the financial burden of schools as well as to increase safety would be to combine neighborhood schools and police stations. Needless to say, that plan

FIGURE 9: Political cartoon from
Philadelphia Tribune.



went no further than the extensive press Rizzo received in making the announcement.

These actions and promises to reduce crime for all people did not impress the Black community, however. Black political leaders were highly critical of the mayor. For example, Black City Council woman, Dr. Ethyl Allen stated:

"The ghettos are alienated," she said. "They remember vividly his tactics as police commissioner. They see no change in rapport since his election. Now they see him fighting a Federal court ruling that he must hire more Black policemen. The communications gap between the Black citizen and the white policeman is very, very wide."

Charles W. Bowser, executive director of the Philadelphia Urban Coalition, has organized citizen patrols to combat mounting street crime in his neighborhood.

"I find no feeling that the streets are safer under Mayor Rizzo," he said. "Nothing of substance has been done about the gang problem. Meanwhile, we're the juvenile homicide capital of the world." (NYT 7 January, 1973: 56)

The greatest adjustment Rizzo had to make, however, was with the press. After his election, he discovered that it became more difficult to receive the kind of publicity for his actions as mayor that he had received as Police Commissioner. This change came about for many reasons. First, news media in Philadelphia were undergoing changes. Rizzo helped those changes by hiring over forty members of the media to his administration during his first year in office. In doing this he opened many positions that had to be filled with people who owed nothing to Rizzo and did not understand his relationship with the press. Another major press change was the departure of Rizzo supporter and newspaper/TV/radio owner, Walter Annenberg from

Philadelphia. Annenberg had been given an ambassadorship by President Nixon so he sold his newspapers and stations to interests less concerned with helping the Rizzo image. Investigation instead of cooperation was becoming a norm in newsrooms in Philadelphia as elsewhere in the country.

Even if the press had not been changing, it is doubtful that Rizzo could have maintained his special relationship with the media. The position of mayor is very different than that of Police Commissioner. Criticism of political leaders is greater than of public servants leading departments. In his new role, Rizzo had to face a critical media and, as relationships became worse, both sides became more defensive.

While press relations were the biggest adjustment he had to make, the area where he was most surprising was his role as a Democrat. Rizzo was not a political figure until he ran for mayor. His political loyalties were those he needed to exist as a policeman. In his first year as mayor he again acted in his independent manner and supported Richard Nixon for president, throwing the Philadelphia Democratic party into disarray.

When Frank Rizzo supported a Republican candidate by calling Nixon "the greatest President in our country's history," members of the Democratic party were upset and made it public that Rizzo was speaking for himself and not the party. Democratic Committee chairman, Peter Camiel, who was considered, next to Richard Daley, the most powerful political boss in America, was outraged. Although Camiel and the Democrats had supported Rizzo last November, this act of "treason" by Rizzo was the start of a Rizzo-Camiel feud for control of the party.

Rizzo's endorsement of Nixon did not please Democrats but it was beneficial for Philadelphia. Just after his endorsement of Nixon, Rizzo went to Washington to see the President and emerged from the White House with \$52-million in revenue sharing money for the city. Money was not the major reason for Rizzo's support of the President, however. The two men shared many of the same views on public issues and held similar political values.

When Nixon came to Philadelphia in October 1972, Rizzo had 39 anti-Nixon protesters arrested and held without charges even after the protesters had obtained a federal court order to prevent any interference with their protest. Rizzo continued to defend Nixon until the President left office even as Rizzo was facing similar political problems.

The financial help Nixon provided was still not enough. The mayor's biggest practical problem was money. He had promised that he would not increase taxes but it was becoming more difficult to pay bills. In January 1973, teachers went out on strike. The strike lasted eleven weeks and was settled when Rizzo gave up his hard line stand in face of growing protest demonstrations and the threat by the city's other unions of a one-day general sympathy strike. The strike hit hardest in the Black community. In "Rizzo country" a large proportion of students are enrolled in Catholic schools. The strike settlement pressed hard on Rizzo's promise for no tax increases. Money was difficult to find.

The mayor's search for money led him to suggest a scheme to have local businesses give "gifts" to the city of things the city needed.

When a local bank president balked at the idea Rizzo threatened to withdraw all the city funds from that bank and urge his supporters to do the same. The bank president refused to adhere and accused Rizzo of using "strong arm tactics." Publicity of the plan with suggestions of possible abuse quickly made Rizzo shelve the idea.

In looking for funds, Rizzo also came in conflict with then Governor Shapp. Rizzo was thinking of running for governor and when Shapp refused to give Philadelphia some funds requested by Rizzo, the mayor vowed to see that Shapp was a "one term Governor." Shapp retorted by referring to Rizzo's friendship with Nixon, "Why doesn't he take his money problems to his friend in Washington?" (NYT, 12 February, 1972: 24).

The addition of money to the police force was having little effect on its ability to control gang violence, or the increasing publicity about the problem. In the spring of 1973 Rizzo presented some surprising observations.

(The Mayor now) concedes that the best efforts of the police department's Juvenile Aid Division and a 60-man plainclothes gang control unit have not been able to stop the gang warfare.

To contain it completely, the Mayor has said, would require stationing a policeman on every corner, a step tantamount to a "police state." (NYT, 24 May, 1973: 32).

This lack of commitment to the problem brought a swift reaction by Black political leaders. Black state representative Hardy Williams proposed a bill to stop state funds for the Mayor's anti-gang programs as the Mayor admitted they were a failure.

Another Black state representative, David Richardson, sent a letter to the Mayor which, in part, stated:

"When running on a law and order platform for the office of Mayor, you made all types of big promises to stop gang wars in Philadelphia. Once elected, however, you turned a deaf ear to the problem and each year more Black youth lie dying in the streets.

'...If Black youth were killing white youth in the Northeast area, the problem of gang warfare would be solved immediately. However, since it is the Black youth who are being felled by bullets, you choose to neglect the problems as though it does not exist.

'There is no reason why the city administration should be taken off the hook by crying that they cannot do anything about the problem.' (PT, 26 May, 1973).

But Rizzo's biggest crime problem existed within his own administration. Incidents of wrongdoing and questions of his personal character developed out of his feud with Democratic party leader Camiel and City Council Chairman George Schwartz, a leader in the Camiel machine. The major split came when the party chose two candidates for District Attorney and Controller that Rizzo did not want. When Rizzo lost he called the pair crooks and threatened to send them to jail on corruption charges.

At the same time, the local newspaper ran stories confirming what many Philadelphia observers had thought was true all along--Rizzo had a special squad of police to investigate his political enemies. The two most closely watched, according to the papers, were Camiel and Schwartz. Rizzo blasted the newspapers and told one city editor that the paper should spend its time investigating the rumor that the editor was a "faggot"--a story which the paper ran on the front page.

Camiel responded by charging that Rizzo had offered him a bribe of the selection of architects and engineers for a list of projects if Rizzo could choose the D.A. candidate. The offer was to have taken place in the bathroom of a hotel during a political luncheon. In the name-calling that followed Camiel's accusation, a local paper offered to give all participants lie detector tests to see who was right. Camiel, the Mayor, and his assistant who were all supposedly at the meeting in the bathroom agreed to tests.

Before taking the test, Rizzo said "If this machine says a man lies, he lied." However, tests showed that Rizzo and his assistant lied on six of ten questions and Camiel had lied on none. Rizzo responded in two ways, either "This examination is not worth the paper it's written on." or "What's the big deal, you know about lying in a bathroom." He continued to deny he had done anything wrong and Camiel and Schwartz were the one who were really corrupt. He finally said "the people" should be the ones to decide. (NYT, 27 August, 1973: 19).

In some way they rendered their judgement in the row elections of November. Rizzo supported popular incumbant candidates for District Attorney and Controller. He also continued his condemnation of "liberal judges" and asked voters to vote four judges he found unacceptable out of office. The four were also supported by Camiel's Democratic party. To the surprise of many, Democratic candidates won and the four "unacceptable" judges ran at the top of the judges' ticket. With that defeat, Rizzo's plans for the statehouse which had been dimming were finally extinguished. As he said, "Without them big victories,

a politician is dead." (NYT, 4 February, 1974: 31).

Even though Rizzo recognized the realities of his situation he still did not believe he was "dead." As his 1971 mayoral opponent, Thatcher Longstreth, has said, Rizzo "has a most extraordinary ability to come out of seemingly impossible situations." (NYT, 27 August, 1973: 19). Part of Rizzo's staying power is support he receives from "his people." They do not back him because he is a Democrat but because he is Frank Rizzo.

That support was not from the party politicians, however. First, Rizzo attempted to make peace with the party. He described himself as so peace-making that "when I raise my arms, doves fly out of my armpits." When this failed he went on the offensive and attempted to run his candidate for the Chairmanship of the City Democratic Committee. That, too, failed and Camiel maintained control, casting doubt on party support for Rizzo's election bid in 1975.

Guaranteed to be a major issue in that election was Rizzo's police department. As a former Police Commissioner and with a consistent image of a "tough cop," Rizzo was closely associated with the department. In Spring 1974 three different reports were issued criticizing the department for brutal, discriminatory, corrupt, and deceitful practices.

It began in mid-March when the Pennsylvania Crime Commission announced that its 18 month investigation had "uncovered evidence of systematic, widespread corruption at all levels" of the 18,200 man police department, the fourth largest in the country.

Then, two weeks ago, a coalition that included the local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union jointly accused the police of habitually practicing discrimination and brutality against members of minority groups in the city.

Finally, on Sunday, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, an agency of the United States Department of Justice, made public its study in which the divergence between actual and reported crime in Philadelphia was disclosed. (NYT, 19 April, 1974: 74).

Response to all reports was predictable. Both Rizzo and Police Commissioner Joseph O'Neill suggested that the corruption report was talking about a few "bad apples" and they will make attempts to get rid of them but the whole department should not suffer for the bad acts of a few. They also demanded proof. O'Neill stated, "Innuendo and inference historically have been, and today remain, tools of cowards." (NYT, 12 March, 1973: 19). With the upcoming election, Rizzo also charged that the reports were politically motivated. But the root of the trouble is that police are so close to Rizzo. As he said, "I'm a cop myself. I can't take it any way but personal." (NYT, 19 April, 1974: 74). Nixon was too busy with his own problems to help. In fact, the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided money to help with the corruption investigation.

The other major issue for the upcoming election would be money. How was the city going to pay its bills? Rizzo was committed to a no-tax increase stand he had promised in the previous election. Problems this position made for the city were outlined in this PT

editorial.

The budget proposed last week by Mayor Frank Rizzo for fiscal year 1975 (beginning July 1 of this year) may very well turn into a political battle between the Mayor, aided by those citizens who are willing to suffer a decline in city services in order to prevent a tax hike . . .

The new "no tax increase" budget of \$979.7 million could bring severe cutbacks to the Black community, despite Rizzo's statements to the contrary. For one thing, the \$737.8 million General Fund budget, which pays for most city services, does not include any money for the city's 280 public schools. During the past two years, the city has transferred some funds from the General Fund to help balance the School District's budget.

In addition, the proposed budget does not include any money to continue the few Great Society programs remaining such as the Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Commission and Model Cities after their federal funds run out in the coming year.

Furthermore, the proposed elimination of 700 jobs (City Finance Director Lennox L. Moak has refused to say which departments will suffer the most lost jobs) would almost double the current annual rate of 450 jobs which the Rizzo Administration's job freeze has phased out in the past two years.

Some institutions which receive city funds have already said they expect sharp cutbacks. A Free Library source said, for example that "the impact of these cuts will be very grave," and Art Museum director Dr. Evan Turner said that cutbacks will force the almost half of the museum now open to the public to be closed.

In spite of these severe cutbacks, the budget includes pay raises for city employees totalling almost \$25 million. There is \$10 million in raises for policemen, \$9 million for non-uniformed employees, \$4 million for firemen and \$900,000 for top city officials.

Saying these new expenses will not require new taxes, Rizzo says they will come from increased real estate assessments, increased collections of traffic and parking violations, an improved method of collecting wage taxes, etc.

Council president Schwartz has already criticized Rizzo, stating that he should have "been honest" with the public about the cut in services he says will result from keeping the no-tax pladge. The Mayor insists, though that services will not be reduced in spite of all indications to the contrary.

It is likely that we are seeing only the first round of a long political fight. Depending on the public reaction to this battle, we will probably either wind up with a tax increase approved by City Council over the Mayor's objection or a cut in city services and jobs. Either prospect is not a very pleasant one for the average citizen. (PT, 6 April, 1974: 6)

Although crime and money were two policy issues that were central to the campaign, the main issue was who would control the Democratic Party in Philadelphia. The Camiel machine ran State Senator Louis Hill. Once in the battle, Rizzo decided to fight the machine on all fronts and, besides running himself, ran a slate of candidates for eleven of fifteen City Council seats and other slots on the ballot. In effect, two separate ward organizations sprang up around the city, Camiel Democrats and Rizzo Democrats.

Adding to Rizzo's credibility problems described above, newspapers had alleged that the Mayor was having a house valued at \$400,000 built for \$112,000; a project he abandoned under criticism. Also, a month before the election a grand jury indicted the Rizzo-appointed Managing Director on corruption charges. Rizzo claimed the charges were politically motivated.

But, Rizzo's disarming style of campaigning prevented his supporters from deserting him. He also maintained his familiar campaign style of talking only with those who supported him and strictly avoided the press or debates with his opponent. Some examples of Rizzo's campaign:

He shakes hands, tells jokes and answers questions. Regarding the lie detector test, he says he does not know what happened, that he did not lie.

"Would Frank Rizzo lie to you?" he asks.

The answer, almost always, is "No."...

He never fails to point out that he "held the line on taxes," his major campaign theme, and is fond of saying that Philadelphia is the safest major city in America.

Both assertions are questioned by his opponents....

On the crime issue, Police Department figures show a 4.8 percent increase in murder, robbery, rape, aggravated assault and burglary over the four years of the Rizzo administration....

Generally, except for the rare interview, the Mayor has avoided the press. Critics say this is to avoid questions and contradictions on such matters as crime and taxes.

Mr. Rizzo refused repeated demands for a debate with Mr. Hill--after saying he would be glad to debate him "every hour on the hour."

The last position prompted Mr. Hill to show up on City Hall for a mock debate with an opponent dressed as a giant yellow chicken.

The Mayor laughed and said, "The chicken won."

Mr. Rizzo has referred to his opponent as "Hill the Pill." Hill television commercials depict Alka-Seltzers being dropped into glasses to combat various Rizzo-induced city headaches--crime, corruption and the like.

Another Hill commercial shows him jogging through a forest, which prompts the Mayor to say he keeps "seeing my opponent chasing himself through the woods." (NYT, 18 May, 1975:51).

Questioned about an increase in reported rapes from 694 in 1973 to 796 in 1974, he replied:

"Now there's no way you can police the city. We'd have to put a policeman in every house. Of the total rapes reported, forty-four percent involved...were previously acquainted with each other. ... So, forty-four percent of them were previously acquainted with the offender, and two out of every three rapes were committed indoors. We'd have to put a cop under every water bed. You know, that's the day I resign and become an undercover policeman."

Even though he later became lighthearted, Rizzo started out the interview determined to make his point about the frugality of his administration.

"I am, again, quite pleased with the fact that this administration was able to, for four years, go without a tax increase," he said. "My critics said we couldn't do it, and we did it. I'm very proud of that. Detroit laying off city employees, New York--New York don't know whether their deficit is eight hundred million or a billion--Jersey City, Cleveland--not Philadelphia. We haven't laid anybody off, nor are we going to lay anybody off."

Rather than lay anybody off, Rizzo agreed to a new contract with the municipal employees' union just a few days before the election. The contract granted the employees a whopping 12.8 percent pay hike, at a cost to the city of \$26,200,000, starting in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1975. The only problem with the agreement was that the city didn't have the money to pay for it. But Earl Stout, head of the union, endorsed Rizzo for renomination and reelection. (Daughen and Binzen, 1976:274).

Louis Hill was a popular State Senator but a lackluster campaigner.

He kept pounding on issues--especially crime problems, corruption in the Rizzo administration and financial decisions that need to be made. Some examples of his statements show that the major campaign issue was Frank Rizzo.

"Right after he was elected, Rizzo set up his special spy squad," he stated. "He spent over \$1 million of your tax dollars. He took 34 policemen away from their job protecting the public, as well as three inspectors and five captains."

"For a long time Police Commissioner O'Neill and Mayor Rizzo strongly denied that the secret squad existed, whose only purpose was not to fight crime but to spy on his political opponents."

"Only after the Bulletin proved it conclusively, did the mayor admit it existed. It was just like Hitler's Germany and other Fascist countries. Rizzo says he disbanded the spy squad, but nobody believes he did."

In response to a question about police brutality, Hill chastized Rizzo and O'Neill for fighting Judge Fullam's order to make the police department provide a reasonable grievance machinery for brutality victims.

"Rizzo has fought the judge at every step instead of implementing the order," he declared. "When I'm the mayor, I'll put the order into effect and go much farther."

"Another problem is that our policemen spend too much time performing menial tasks. About 35 percent of a detective's time is spent typing. In New York civilians do most of this, and in London they also do traffic control. This can save the taxpayers a lot of money."

Hill claimed that the Rizzo Administration has failed to provide solutions for any of the city's problems and that all of its efforts have been directed at getting the mayor re-elected." (PT, 6 May, 1975:28).

"People know that Rizzo has done absolutely nothing to deal with gangs, housing and so many other issues. He made lots of promises but did not perform. He promised to have the drones in City Hall jump off the Henry Avenue Bridge, but in his administration the drones have fallen into a pile of clover. He has hired people who get paid high salaries and do no work at all." (PT, 18 March, 1975:23).

The issue of party leadership could be seen in advertisements for the candidates. Cecil Moore, a leading member of the Black community endorsed Hill in an advertisement which stated in bold type "There are 45 reasons why I'm supporting Lou Hill for Mayor. Here are 44 of them." The 44 were a list of Hill's legislative accomplishments listed in small type followed in bold type again with the statement, "Reason Number 45: He's Running Against Frank Rizzo."

The Rizzo advertisement was placed by other Black leaders listing Rizzo's accomplishments and concluded with this statement:

I do not wish to portray Mayor Rizzo as a great liberal or as a civil rights advocate, for he is not. What I do say and wish to emphasize is that his record as Mayor in his relation to Blacks is better than the record pertaining to Blacks in nearly all of the city offices which Pete Camiel controls. And that Blacks would be committing political hari-kari if by their votes they destroyed the only strong opposition to Pete Camiel's rule in the Democratic Party, thereby depriving Black voters of bargaining power for their votes, and making Pete Camiel the political dictator of Philadelphia politics.

Mayor Rizzo appears, at the very least, to be running departments under his control as well as those under the control of Pete Camiel and the Democratic City Committee, so far as it affects Blacks. (PT, 13 May, 1975:14).

As hard as the machine tried, Hill was soundly defeated by a vote of 183,672 to 151,948. This was over 7,000 votes more than Rizzo had received four years earlier. He also increased his share of the Black vote but a small percentage of Black voters took part in the election. As usual it was south Philadelphia and the Northwest that brought Rizzo victory. He won six of six wards in the south and twelve of fourteen in the northeast.

What the machine did not expect was victory of the Rizzo ticket. In spending all their time, money and effort in defeating Rizzo they had neglected other candidates. Eight Rizzo-backed candidates won positions on the city council as well as four other ballot spots. Rizzo's resiliency had paid off--he was back and more in control than ever.

With winning the Democratic nomination, Rizzo's re-election was almost assured. The election provided some interesting developments. Rizzo's Republican challenger was Thomas Foglietta. Foglietta's campaign was based on confrontation, but few people gave him support. This was especially true when former Assistant Mayor and then Urban League President, Charles Bowser, formed the Philadelphia Party and campaigned to be Philadelphia's first Black mayor.

Bowser was given support by many prominent anti-Rizzoites including his former boss U.S. Senator Joseph Clark.

"I have spoken with at least a half dozen well-to-do people who support Bowser, but wouldn't dare give their names," said Clark.

"There are businessmen who will contribute money (to Bowser) but are afraid of reprisals from Frank Rizzo."

Bowser said some of these supporters are builders in the city who "don't want their permits held up," and others, including ministers, who have projects supported by the city, but have been told by the mayor not to support his (Bowser's) candidacy.

"Our best counter is to mount a campaign to show these people that Rizzo is not going to be mayor, so they have nothing to fear," said Bowser.

He noted the bi-racial, bi-partisan group of business and civic leaders which make up his campaign staff and supports, and Senator Clark promised, "By Labor Day this will consist of all the decent people in Philadelphia."

Clark said Bowser's campaign today is similar to the one he successfully waged to become mayor of Philadelphia in 1951. "We were fighting a corrupt Republican machine and today we are still fighting a corrupt Republican machine...no one can say Rizzo is a Democrat." (PT, 24 June, 1975:1).

Again, crime, candidate and city finances were an issue in the campaign. The campaign was conducted at the same time the school busing was being fought in the streets of Boston, and so busing became an issue. Here are some examples of candidates views.

RIZZO: Recently a group of white South Philadelphia residents met with Rizzo at 27th and Wharton Streets to complain about black gangs in the area. They asked Rizzo what they could do to solve their problem, and his advice was: (These comments were recorded on film by WPVI-TV).

"If I were you, I'd grab one of those big baseball bats and lay right into the sides of their heads the next time they try to hurt your sons or you"(PT, 5 August, 1975:4).

FOGLIETTA: "I will lead a demonstration at the homes of members of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission...In Boston, they had the Boston Tea Party and they threw the tea in the river; we should throw the buses in the Schuylkill River" (PT, 5 August, 1975: 1).

After subpoenaing records on city's financial situation: "The budget deficit could be disastrous. The public has a right to know right now why there is such a huge deficit and how the Mayor is going to make it up in reality." (PT, 27 September, 1975:28).

BOWSER: "Hoodlums who strike at will to rob and attack families in their homes and on the streets are terrorizing the city. There is no law and there is no order. We have had almost three years of phony statistics and empty boastful promises about reducing crime. We have had passing-the-buck from police to courts and back again, as if that made a difference to the old woman whose skull is bashed in or to the young girl whose memory is scarred by a savage attack... I will use the power of the Mayor's office to help neighborhoods organize volunteer patrols which have proven effective in preventing crime, and I will develop a program which will provide for coordination between the citizen patrols and police patrols."

"My position is that busing is not a proper issue for a mayoralty campaign. Anyone using it is using a reprehensible tactic to play on the emotions of people. The fact of the matter is that it's a matter for the courts. I have taken a position that we should desegregate the schools. The upgrading of schools is essential if we're going to have desegregation, but busing is not the issue at all." (PT, 21 October, 1976:4).

In his advertisements, Rizzo returned to his familiar theme of providing safe streets for citizens although the crime rate had increased during his term in office. The direction of his campaign can be seen in the political advertisement shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10 about here

Rizzo needed little advertising, for he won by a landslide. The second place results were more interesting. Showing the strength of the black vote, Bowser and his Philadelphia Party took second, leaving the future of the shrinking Republican party in doubt. Bowser's victory was important because the minority party receives seats on the City Council. Whether the Republican or Philadelphia Party was the minority party was an issue debated extensively. More importantly, Bowser's victory proved that blacks can have an impact on Philadelphia politics. This is especially true because Bowser polled only 57% of the black vote giving Rizzo 34% of that vote.

The mayor had little time to savor his second term victory. Not two weeks after his re-election his Finance Director admitted that the bright picture of Philadelphia's finances was a political sham. The extent of the problem was expressed in this PT editorial.

FIGURE 10: Frank Rizzo campaign advertisement for 1975 re-election.

Mayor Rizzo has been fighting crime since 1943, when he first joined the police department. He's long been a critic of lenient judges who practice revolving-door justice that permits violent criminal-repeaters to walk the streets, preying on merchants and innocent men, women and children.

Mayor Rizzo not only cares about this problem, he's done something about it. He reactivated the mounted police, bolstered canine patrols and expanded police protection in the city's subway and elevated system.

And Frank Rizzo is no sit-behind-the-desk mayor.

In an emergency or catastrophe, Rizzo is upfront on the firing line where the going is toughest.

If you're worried about crime . . . if you're afraid to go out after dark . . . if you fear for the safety of your family, vote for Mayor Rizzo on November 4th.



RIZZO

cares about your safety.

Vote Straight Democrat November 4th

There is no doubt that Philadelphia is not in good shape. The only question is how bad the situation really is. Even Finance Director Lennox Moak has admitted to a group of newspaper business editors that the city could end the current fiscal year with a \$50 million deficit.

The situation may be much worse than that, however. The Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements, an independent group of business experts, says that the city will end up the year at least \$83.3 million in the red. Apart from being illegal (the City Charter states that deficit budgets are strictly prohibited), such a deficit would require astronomical tax increases to come anywhere near balancing the budget.

The Federation also expresses disbelief about a \$31 million allowance for city employee wage increases, speculating that the increase will really be much higher, thus pushing the expected \$83.3 million deficit up even more.

One reason why financial experts say the employee wage increases are totally unjustified, aside from the fact that they could help spell economic disaster for the city's taxpayers, is that they are already among the top paid municipal workers in the country.

Now is the time for Moak to level with the people of Philadelphia rather than waiting until the city's finances collapse like a deck of cards. If the city goes under, as New York is doing, every last resident here will be adversely affected. (PT, 18 November, 1975:4).

Within months of his inauguration, Rizzo had his staff announce that the city was to have a budget deficit of \$80 million and that he was declaring a "fiscal emergency." Measures needed were tax increases of 29 percent in property taxes, 30 percent in city wage taxes and 33 percent in business taxes. He also increased transit fares from 35¢ to 50¢ plus proposed layoffs of 500 to 1,000 city workers. The reaction was difficult for Rizzo to take.

The Mayor's inept handling of the financial issue angered much of his blue-collar constituency who were hit hardest by the new taxes. The normally outspoken Rizzo went into seclusion, lacking the courage to defend the unpopular tax increases or admit his deficit cover-up. "His claim that taxes would be stable was a monstrous lie," says Peter J. Camiel, former city Democratic boss and Rizzo's archenemy. "It was Rizzo's greatest mistake" (Nation, 30 October, 1976:424).

The cost cutting measure that caused most focused attention and sometimes violent demonstrations was the announcement that the city was closing Philadelphia General Hospital. This was a hospital for the poor of Philadelphia. With the closing, Rizzo made limited plans for taking care of those who had no other place to go for health care. Closing the hospital activated many previously apathetic blacks.

Under pressure of these crises not to mention the continued criticism of the police force, Rizzo "snapped" after a satiric column about the Mayor appeared in the 14 March edition of the Inquirer.

The column, by Desmond Ryan, professed to be written by Rizzo as a guest columnist. It contained such phrases as, "...I mean, who really wants broads on the police...? You want some bull dyke come charging on your property all ready with a swift kick in the lasagnas? Not while I'm Mayor." Rizzo unsuccessfully sought a court order restraining publication of the column. He then filed a \$6 million libel suit against the newspaper, charging the article was "treasonable." But in court Rizzo unwittingly confided that his brother, Fire Commissioner Joseph Rizzo, thought the Mayor had written the column (Nation, 30 October, 1976:424).

Five days later, about 250 members of the construction union, a pro-Rizzo group, blocked entrances to the Inquirer building for ten hours, preventing two issues from being printed. When police were asked to intervene, they stood on sidelines until United States Marshalls issued a restraining order. Although Rizzo defended the police action because it was only a "labor dispute" (the buildings union had no contracts with the Inquirer) few inside or out the administration doubted that it was orchestrated from the Mayor's office.

Reaction to work stoppage came from across the United States.

All local media denounced the action as did national news sources like

the New York Times and Walter Cronkite. Criticism also was forthcoming from most civil rights groups and even the Philadelphia Bar Association.

The Inquirer incident was the final straw. Anti-Rizzo forces felt that with tax increases and patronage abuses made public during the financial crisis they could garner support even in "Rizzo country." Also, the closing of PGH had sparked more activism in black areas. Instead of waiting for a new election, anti-Rizzo groups started a recall campaign. The recall committee was supported by Richard Bowser, Rizzo's recently defeated mayoral opponent.

Besides the Inquirer incident and the closing of PGH, the recall movement listed three other reasons, one being misrepresentation of the city's financial health. It was not the condition of the city that was disturbing as much as the opinion that Rizzo's re-election campaign had been deceptive. Second, Rizzo's refusal to meet with the press to consider city matters for over two years and, third, his political patronage system which helped place the city in financial difficulty were listed as further evidence.

The initial signatures were taken on April 17 at the Liberty Bell,

"Twenty-five years ago this fall, the citizens were up in outrage against the corrupt Republican administration," said former Democratic mayor and U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark as he became the first petition signer. "The slogan then was throw the rascals out. This time, it's singular: Throw the rascal out. He is a rascal, a liar, a man who is ignorant, arrogant and stupid." The hundred persons who gathered on Independence Mall to witness the signing applauded, then added their own signatures. (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:308).

As the recall was getting started, Rizzo went on television to be interviewed by the only television reporter he trusted. In true Rizzo form, he invoked his "get tough" policies against his opponents.

"I've been fighting the groups that have been trying to recall me all of my career," Rizzo told Kane. "I'm against busing, they're for busing. I'm for the death penalty, they're against the death penalty. They're for legalized prostitution, I'm against legalized prostitution."

Rizzo did not mention taxes or patronage. He did talk--briefly--about the blockade of the Inquirer, but he used the occasion not to explain why his police had done nothing but to advance his own grievances. Desmond Ryan, he said, "attempted to portray me as a buffoon." "I'm going to find out in a court of law whether Frank Rizzo, as the mayor of this city, as an Italian-American, and all the other ethnic groups have any rights." (Daughen and Binzen, 1977: 309).

Midway through the recall movement (they only had sixty days to gather 145,000 signatures) the important Democratic Presidential primary was being held in Pennsylvania. An important area for candidates is Philadelphia and, with his consolidation of the Democratic party, each candidate had to confront the issue of the Rizzo recall.

Senator Henry Jackson was Rizzo's favorite candidate and willingly accepted Rizzo's support but, at the same time, attempted to keep his distance from Rizzo. Jackson's leading opponent in the primary, Governor Jimmy Carter, took a stand against Rizzo comparing him to Pittsburgh's Mayor Flaherty who "doesn't run up \$80 million deficits and close public hospitals and inflate the public payroll with political patronage. I'm just as happy without the endorsement of the mayor who does those things, Frank Rizzo" (NYT, 23 April, 1976: 17).

Rizzo was still able to reach one of his goals in mid-May by ousting Camiel as Democratic leader in the city, replacing him with the man who had engineered Rizzo's 1975 re-election campaign.

The victory was somewhat hollow because the lengthy fight between Rizzo and Camiel had noticeably weakened the party and its new leader (Rizzo) was in poor political health.

Just as things were getting to be the worst for Rizzo, he fought back in his traditional manner. The recall was to announce its signature count on 31 May and was expected to announce it had gone over the top.

So on May 27, the very day that the council was passing the tax increases, Frank Rizzo, who hadn't held a news conference for more than two years and who had done nothing to end the blockade of the Inquirer, granted an exclusive interview--to the Inquirer. It was for use in the newspaper's Sunday, May 30 edition, and Rizzo had some important information to reveal.

The city had learned, Rizzo told the Inquirer, that thousands of "radicals, leftists," were coming to Philadelphia to disrupt the July 4 Bicentennial celebration. The situation was so ominous, he said that he was requesting the federal government to send in 15,000 troops to protect the city.

"When I tell you that the leftists, and that's what they are, intend to come in here in thousands from all over the country to disrupt, how about the rights of the majority who are going to be here to enjoy themselves with their families?" Rizzo said. The Mayor said he wanted "regular army" troops and he wanted them stationed "on the streets, and I'll tell you why. Because we have a bunch of radicals, leftists that have said they're going to disrupt."

"I hope that nothing happens that day," Rizzo continued. "You remember, I was a police chief and I'm very proud of that career of mine. While every other city burned, while every other city had deaths, not in Philadelphia."

Rizzo also told the Inquirer he was not concerned by the recall drive. "They'll never be successful," he said. "I know people who are friends of mine who have signed it. Mickey Mouse, Al Capone, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs...One guy wrote me the other day and said he had signed it seventy times."

"We're not kidding or trying to make headlines," Al Gaudiosi told the Inquirer, referring to the troop request. "This is a real request. The Mayor really wants the troops here to protect the visitors in case there is any trouble" (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:313).

The recall movement's announcement that they had enough signatures was overshadowed by Rizzo's dramatic announcement. To add to the drama, Rizzo sent a letter to President Ford requesting that federal troops be stationed in the streets during Bicentennial celebrations. This request had to be denied according to the Justice Department so Rizzo made his appeal to the Governor.

Meanwhile, the Rizzo controlled City Council rejected findings of the Election Commission that enough signatures on the recall petition were valid. The recall movement immediately took the council's decision to court to have the recall placed on the ballot.

July 4 festivities went on without incident as the courts were considering Rizzo's recall fate. The mayor was unable to take much credit for peaceful festivities. In fact, his use of "fear" over possible violence at the Bicentennial backfired. The number of visitors to Philadelphia was well below projections and local business leaders, hoping to benefit from the celebration, blamed Rizzo for scaring visitors from coming to their city.

In September, recall forces won their court case and plans were made to place the recall decision on the November ballot. This was a great concern to Rizzo supporters because the normally high turn-out for Presidential elections would work against Rizzo. A poll published by the Inquirer earlier in the year had given Rizzo a 63 percent disapproval rating. As one ward leader said, "The recall is like a steamroller rolling out of control down a hill" (Nation, 30 October, 1976: 423). Rizzo continued to fight back.

The Philadelphia Inquirer reported tonight that the Mayor, through one of his aides at City Hall, had implicitly conceded the difficulty of the recall race by warning that unless he has the support of former Gov. Jimmy Carter of Georgia, the Democratic Presidential candidate, the Mayor will turn his formidable Philadelphia machine against Mr. Carter in November.

The normally heavy Democratic turnout in this city often determines whether Pennsylvania goes Democratic or Republican in statewide elections.

The newspaper also said that the Rizzo organization relayed the same threat today to Representative William J. Green, a Philadelphia Democrat who is campaigning against Representative H. John Heinz III of Pittsburg, a Republican for the Senate seat of Hugh Scott (NYT, 17 September, 1976:18).

He also appealed the judge's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme court. Believing the court would uphold him, he expressed confidence if there was a vote as well. He said, "I am not going to campaign. I'm always geared up. I have the most important ingredient that every politician needs--the people" (NYT, 18 September, 1976:8).

One month before election the Supreme Court prevented the people from being an "important ingredient" by stating the recall provision in the charter was unconstitutional. Rizzo was happy saying, "My political career has suffered no blow. I never had my doubts the Supreme Court would rule on facts. The law is on my side" (NYT, 1 October, 1976: 1). He had a right to be happy. The Daily News announced results of a poll after the decision showing that the Mayor would have lost his recall election.

Although Rizzo was able to escape the recall bid, his political power was diminished. Although he had never been able to count on the black and liberal vote, he had counted on that opposition to be splintered and apathetic. The recall movement and the work of Bowser demonstrated that assumption could no longer be held. Also, Rizzo's support from the business community had dried up. In December a local committee of

businessmen issued a critical report of Rizzo's actions and their impact on the future of the city.

"In brief, except for firms which must remain inside the city limits, the current financial situation and tax structure is a strong deterrent to efforts to bring in new business and keep the old" (NYT, 20 December, 1976:20)

The mayor also lost more support when he announced the city was going to pay his \$50,000 legal bills incurred during the recall campaign. Taxpayers in the financially strapped city were not pleased.

In attempts to reunite the Democratic party the Mayor did an about-face from previous elections. He endorsed a black candidate for Controller and former opponents Louis Hill and liberal judge, Lisa Richette, for judgeships. He also supported incumbent, Emmett Fitzpatrick for District attorney--the candidate he had opposed four years earlier.

These attempts at fence mending were the kiss of death for Rizzo backed candidates. Both the D.A. and Controller that Rizzo supported lost in the primary. Even black voters were not willing to support a black candidate if he was a Rizzo Democrat.

Over the summer, Rizzo received more bad news. In July a Federal Grand Jury was empowered to investigate a charge of police brutality within the department. In September, the grand jury indicted three of Rizzo's policemen after the investigation. The investigation was the result of a campaign started in 1975 by the Inquirer on the brutality of the police force. The future did not look bright for the department either.

U. S. Attorney David W. Marston, 35, a Republican appointed by the Ford White House, convened the grand jury that delivered last week's indictments and aims to secure still more, for corruption as well as brutality. "The most shocking thing," Marston believes, "is that the political leadership hasn't stood up and said, 'If this has happened, it's wrong.' Rizzo has lobbied to get President Carter to replace Marston with a malleable Democrat, but so far has gotten nowhere. Carter owes Rizzo few favors. The city's blacks, hostile toward the Mayor, voted overwhelmingly for Carter in November (Time, 19 September, 1977:30).

On the other hand, summer and fall saw Rizzo and police showing restraint in attempting to evict members of the militant MOVE organization from a house in Philadelphia. Even after some of MOVE's neighbors sued the city for not taking action against the group, Rizzo ordered the police to wait out the group.

But the final chapter of Frank Rizzo's political career was written in 1978. He attempted to have the city charter changed so he could run for a third term. He stated explicitly what he had been saying implicitly for a decade when he told a ward meeting "Vote White." Reacting to the accusation that he is a racist, Rizzo contended, "My enemies think they can beat me with this racist bull shit issue. But they can't. They tried to do in '71. They tried in '75. I was elected both times." He then added, "We're going to win by 50,000. Philadelphia wouldn't be the same without Frank Rizzo" (Time, 30 October, 1978: 36).

The same or not, the city decided to try it without Rizzo. His proposal to change the charter was defeated by almost a 2 to 1 margin. The core of ethnic voters who had supported him during all of his career still supported him but they were the only group left. His defeat may have been as much of a sign of demographic changes in the past decade as any change in political ideology. But it was also a realization by

voters that the position of mayor involves more than statements on making the city safe from an undefined threat. Whether voters supported Rizzo because they believed he could protect them from crime or because they were "voting white," Rizzo was unable to protect them from either threat.

CHAPTER TWELVE: The Political Actors

The study of politics-of-crime now takes a different direction, looking at the "total picture." This and the next chapter will not focus on a specific time period but will try to take into account all events of the four years studied.

Consideration of political actors in the San Francisco report listed a large number of players and the extensive role they played in developing politics-of-crime issues in the city. In attempting to make a similar analysis in Philadelphia, results are very different. In Philadelphia politics-of-crime issues were almost synonymous with Frank Rizzo. Comments about political actors will therefore talk about pro and con Rizzo actors in the city. Like the San Francisco report this report will consider four positions and the persons who filled them: 1) Mayor, 2) Police Commissioners, 3) Police Union Leaders, 4) Others, mostly Rizzo opponents,

Philadelphia was transformed from a Republican machine city to a reformed city in the 1950s. The reform era lasted only about a decade and was replaced by a fragile but powerful Democratic machine. Reformers had hoped to develop a structure that would provide the mayor with power to accomplish successful implementation of policies but still restrict his power through the City Council and limit the power of patronage. As was seen in the Rizzo era, those limits were not enough to prevent widespread patronage abuse and to keep the mayor from almost complete dominance of the Council.

I. Mayors

Unlike San Francisco, the mayor in Philadelphia does not have to work in an open political environment. Rizzo was able to avoid the press for any meaningful discussion of issues for two years prior to the recall movement. Some suggest that he never, in his eight year term, discussed specific issues of concern to Philadelphia citizens. In the operation of the city, the mayor has almost complete control. Appointments to and removal from all top positions in the administration are under direct control of the mayor. He/she does not have to fight special boards or life terms of board members that confront the San Francisco mayor. Only the City Council has the power to control actions of the mayor. Due to the guarantee of minority party representation on the Council, mayor's programs almost always face dissenting votes in the Council but if the mayor "controls" the majority of the Council he/she has little concern about acceptance of proposals. Finally the mayor has the vast resources of city administration on his/her side to help "convince" reluctant members of the Council to support policy objectives.

Frank Rizzo (Mayor, 1972-1980). The story of the politics-of-crime in Philadelphia revolve around this individual. The previous three chapters have detailed the importance of Rizzo in presenting the crime issue in Philadelphia. That effort will not be repeated here. A major reason why Rizzo became mayor and why he is central to the crime issue in Philadelphia was because he was a popular policeman and then very popular Police Commissioner.

As a policeman, Rizzo was a vocal advocate of "law-and-order."

He believed that the best way to solve the crime problem was to be tough with criminals. This position was supported by those who live in and around his former working class neighborhood.

Rizzo's call to law and order ("You get them to the electric chair, I'll throw the switch myself") played upon the very real fears shared alike by young and old, rich and poor. But it was particularly effective among the white working classes whose neighborhoods border on the black ghettos and who care little about the social conditions that give rise to crime or long-range economic and rehabilitative programs that might eradicate those conditions.

To many of his followers, the issues of race and law-and-order were synonymous. Their attitudes could be summed up roughly as follows: keeping the colored in their place would take care of law and order; if they want to kill, rape, and rob one another, as the statistics showed they were doing, let them. But not in Kensington, or Fishtown, or Two Street. God forbid. Or Frank Rizzo forbid, and since the Good Lord seemed to have forsaken them, why not give Rizzo a shot at it?
(Hamilton, 1971:11-12).

But Rizzo was more than a law-and-order candidate. He also expanded his image beyond being just a "tough cop." As mayor he promised to consider those issues that were of the most interest to working class neighborhoods where he was a hero. He appealed to all the issues bothering those same people that made up Nixon's silent majority. He was for more discipline in the schools; no increase in the tax burden--especially to middle class homeowners; he was for improving neighborhoods and making living in the city full of the joys he and his supporters remembered from an earlier time.

During his campaign for mayor, Rizzo toned down his flamboyant style that had made him famous as a policeman. By "cooling" his style and mentioning issues other than crime, he was strongly supported in his bid for mayor. Even most liberals in the city were excited about the possibilities.

As Rizzo's time in office increased, optimism for the work he

was doing began to wane. His support from many areas began to diminish. But as his support slipped, Rizzo, who had run as a non-politician's politician, began to develop his skill at centralizing his political power and accepting "rewards" of such power. His interest in power led him to develop a 30-man police spy squad to spy on his personal enemies and to his development of a patronage system that defied the civil service laws of the city. Much of his political power struggle was with Peter Camiel, head of Philadelphia's Democratic machine. During Rizzo's re-election bid in 1975, this battle led to development of two machines in the city with Rizzo's finally becoming victorious.

Even before heading Philadelphia's political machinery, Rizzo had considerable power. He was able to provide himself with the trappings of office that were not exactly what one would expect from a "populist" politician. He had a luxurious office, chauffeur-driven limousine and moved from his working-class neighborhood to a luxurious home. How and who paid for those things is still a mystery. But the most obvious indication of Rizzo's power was the accusation made by reformist, former-mayor Joseph Clark during Rizzo's re-election in 1975. In supporting black candidate, Charles Bowser, Senator Clark said that many businessmen support Bowser but were afraid of stating their support publicly for fear of reprisals by the Rizzo administration,

The Rizzo years were an interesting attempt to mix political styles of Rizzo's two political heroes, Richard Nixon and Richard J. Daley. Rizzo admired the Daley machine and the way Daley was able to provide for the health of Chicago while still maintaining such power. In setting up ward organizations, Rizzo looked to the Daley

machine to see how to control a political organization.

Arrogance and defensiveness repeatedly got Rizzo in and out of trouble. It was his resilience and, at times, luck that provided him with his long tenure. When things would start going bad for Rizzo, something usually happened to help him. When the Democratic party wanted to run a strong candidate against Rizzo in the 1975 primary, the most preferred candidates bowed out. In the 1975 general election the strong black candidate started too late to develop enough support. When Rizzo was about to lose the recall vote, the courts upheld his position that the recall portion of the charter was unconstitutional.

Just as important was the unwavering support of working class voters. When things would start going badly, he would use the fear of crime issue to provide needed support from his loyalists. The best example was his introduction of the "fear" that Philadelphia would be overtaken by radicals during the Bicentennial which diverted public attention from Rizzo's recall problems.

As time progressed, Rizzo moved further from his promise when first elected that he would bring the city together. At that time he denied that he held any racist attitudes. As his support dwindled, especially in areas where it was strongest, he could no longer hide the race issue by speaking of it in terms of crime. His anti-black attitude was put into words instead of actions as in previous years. Reserving important appointments only for whites or impeding federal investigations of police brutality against blacks was no longer

sufficient. In March 1978 during a controversy over building government subsidized housing in the white Whitman Park neighborhood,

. . . Rizzo issued what has since come to be called the White Ethnic Declaration of Independence. "The Whites have to join together to get equal treatment," he said. "The whites have to--say, the Poles, the Germans, the Jews, the various ethnic groups that made this country great--suppose to join hands and say, 'Well, we're going to vote, we're not going to support any black man who runs for office.'" Later he stated that he would support candidates of any race so long as they "think like the majority." But he again excluded blacks from the list of ethnic groups who he said "fought and died for this country, got nothing for free and asked for nothing." (Christian Century, 20 June, 1978:859).

Then in October, when rallying a white ward organization to support votes to change the charter to allow him to run for a third term, Rizzo encouraged them to "Vote White." That encouragement did not work and he lost the vote.

However, it was probably not the crime or even the race issue that lost him the chance to stay in City Hall. Long before the 1978 charter amendment or even the 1976 recall vote, Rizzo had lost support of those backing issues of concern for black voters. Police brutality and ineffective response by the Rizzo administration to gang problems had alienated black and liberal voters years ago.

What led to Rizzo's downfall was his inability to keep the city in good financial shape. When in 1976 he had to raise taxes and the city budget indicated further tax increases, he lost support of Philadelphia's business community and many middle-class white homeowners. Part of the difficulty was that before his reelection he painted the city's financial picture as bright but after the election it was obvious that he and his highly trusted Financial Director had lied.

Alienation of the business community deepened with Rizzo's Bicentennial fiasco. By introducing fear of radical takeover of Philadelphia into the issue agenda to cover up Rizzo's recall problems, many businessmen believed he scared tourists away from the Bicentennial City and hurt their business.

When Rizzo proposed a charter revision to allow him a third term, part of the opposition to the revision was led by a committee of businessmen called the Committee for the Defense of the Charter. They were able to raise \$200,000 mainly for a media campaign against Rizzo's measure. Rizzo was not able to raise any crime or fear issue that could overcome such opposition.

Some critics of Rizzo have portrayed him as a Machiavellian character using the city of Philadelphia and its resources to his personal benefit. The best portrayal of Rizzo is that which he likes to present--the "tough cop." He is also politically independent. Unlike a Machiavellian character, he does not attempt to figure out every possible maneuver to help him gain power. He has specific ideas and works hard to accomplish what he thinks is necessary. Accomplishing the goal may involve some unethical tactics but he is not a grand thinker or schemer.

As much a part of his image is that he is a Police Commissioner now trying to run a city. Even as mayor he would still work with the details of running city departments (especially police and fire) and be "on the scene" of any major police or fire emergency. Spending this time on events and details, Rizzo did little long range planning for the city; inactivity that helped lead to the city's financial

problems.

In the end, it was a job that Rizzo obviously liked but one which overwhelmed him. He enjoyed being the wheeler-dealer politician and making the American dream come true. He also liked being in charge of those things which he could control. He was happiest telling people what to do, in (literally) putting out fires and controlling demonstrations.

Running a city takes more than a political diplomat, a policeman and a fireman. It takes someone who can look to the future and plan as well as make tough decisions instead of merely presenting promises.

Rizzo campaigned as a "strong man for a tough job," who would provide the leadership the people wanted. But his leadership as mayor was nonexistent. Not a single program, not a single goal, not a single display of vision marked his tenure. He proved to be a do-nothing mayor with a big mouth who spent his time trying to destroy his enemies while building his own power base, all at taxpayers' expense. He described himself as "a practical man, not a politician," but he proved to be the most political of mayors. As a campaigner, he noted that "the people want performance, not words." Yet his performance was almost entirely negative. His politics was of the "I'm against it" variety. His appeal was to people who wanted programs stopped, not started. He pledged NOT to do things. His physical courage was unquestioned but he never displayed the courage of a public official who is willing to risk his popularity to achieve difficult goals. To maintain that popularity, Rizzo made no demands on the people until he raised taxes in 1976. And that tax increase was not to do anything; it was just to keep bread on the table. (Daughen and Binzen, 1977:328).

For Rizzo, his inability to prepare the city for its financial problems and citizens' unwillingness to believe that the mayor could return the city to the safe, thriving, family place they remember eliminated his use of fear as a campaign issue. Unfortunately, that was the only campaign issue that Rizzo could count on to work.

Joseph Clark (Mayor, 1951-1955). Clark is the voice of reform in Philadelphia. He started his battle for reform by running against the Republican machine in 1947. In 1949 he won a row office position with his reform partner Richardson Dilworth which gave them a platform to change the city charter in 1951. That same year Clark became Philadelphia's mayor and instituted the new charter in the spirit of the reform movement.

In the area of politics-of-crime, Clark and his successor, Richardson Dilworth, are notable in moving the city away from a politically connected police department. For Police Commissioners, they hired professional men with the promise that they would improve professional standards in the department. As mayors they promised not to interfere with operations of the police department.

Clark moved from mayor to United States Senator but returned to city politics when he provided support to the anti-Rizzo movement. He first lent his support to the candidacy of black Philadelphia party candidate, Charles Bowser, who battled Rizzo in the 1975 mayoral campaign. In supporting Bowser's candidacy he lashed out at Rizzo.

Clark said Bowser's campaign today is similar to the one he successfully waged to become mayor of Philadelphia in 1951. "We were fighting a corrupt Republican machine and today we are still fighting a corrupt Republican machine. . . no one can say Rizzo is a Democrat." (PT, 24 June, 1975: 1).

When the Bowser candidacy failed, he assisted the Philadelphia Party in organizing the recall effort against Rizzo. Clark's was the first signature on the recall petition.

Richardson Dilworth (Mayor, 1956-1962). Dilworth followed Clark's reform policies in his administration. He continued to grant police political independence and consistently advocated greater professionalism

on the force.

The most dramatic reform was Dilworth's instituting a civilian review board for police activities in 1958. It was the first of its kind in the country and was used as a model for reformers in other cities to make police more accountable.

James Tate (Mayor, 1962-1971). The reformers running as Democrats had brought the Democratic party back to life in Philadelphia. Their strength improved with the Democrats taking the statehouse in 1954 and the patronage that went with it. Once the Democratic party was strong, it no longer needed the reformers so with Dilworth's departure, Tate, a non-reformer, took over.

Tate moved quickly to increase his power and eliminated many reforms in the process. He sided with police officers in the controversy over the civilian review board and, in the end, was responsible for its elimination. When the reformer-appointed police commissioner left, Tate appointed a good friend, Edward Bell, from the police force and moved to exert more influence over the department. When Bell resigned Tate named the popular cop's cop, Frank Rizzo, to the position.

Tate appointed Rizzo as much out of political necessity as for any other reason. When Bell resigned, Tate was about to start a fight for his own reelection without support of the Democratic Party. Tate needed an issue and he used law-and-order and, more specifically, Frank Rizzo as such. This not only introduced law-and-order as a political issue in Philadelphia but advanced Rizzo's career by connecting him to the law-and-order issue.

II. Police Commissioner

The position of Police Commissioner is not directly responsible to the mayor although, in reality, that has been the case since reformers have left city hall. The chain of command is supposed to be Police Commissioner to Managing Director (similar to a politically appointed city manager) to the mayor. As the managing director can be hired and fired by the mayor, even if the chain of command existed, the police commissioner would be under great pressure to follow the mayor's wishes.

Howard Leary (1963 to 1966). Leary is the most famous Police Commissioner appointed by the reformers. Leary was a motivating force and strong supporter of "liberal" reforms like the civilian review board and community relations activities. He also disagreed with Rizzo on how to handle the urban violence of the 1960s.

Leary left Philadelphia when New York City's Mayor John Lindsay, impressed with improvements Leary had brought to Philadelphia, asked Leary to become his police chief.

Edward J. Bell (Police Commissioner, 1966-1967). Bell was a transitional Police Commissioner who was respected by Leary but was able to play politics--to a point. That point came quickly and resulted in his short tenure. Bell's selection was the first indication that politics had returned to the running of the police department. Bell was not the first choice of an independent selection board but Mayor Tate disregarded the recommendation and selected his friend, Bell.

Tate was having political difficulty in 1967 and thought he needed

to use his power to guarantee his reelection. When the Democratic Party did not endorse him, Tate reportedly had police harass some local bars whose owners had sided with the party. Bell objected to such practices to Tate. Tate also needed the type of issue that Frank Rizzo could be. Those factors combined made Bell take a leave of absence and, on the day Tate won the primary, Bell submitted his resignation.

Frank Rizzo (Police Commissioner, 1967 to 1971). The description of Rizzo as a policeman is contained in Chapter Ten. As police commissioner Rizzo was given a blank check by Tate to run the department as he wished. He was also given almost all the funding he desired for the department. Even with the power and the money he had, the crime rate rose in Philadelphia during his tenure as Commissioner.

Even though not effective, Rizzo was still a popular Commissioner. He had personal charisma and was very popular with the press. Although he developed few crime fighting plans other than increasing manpower levels and budgets, he gave citizens a Commissioner who was always working. With help from his friends in the press he was always shown to be at important events and always making comments about how police were trying as hard as they can and it was others (usually liberal judges) who are responsible for increasing crime. It was through this image that he was able to move to the position of mayor.

Joseph F. O'Neill (Police Commissioner, 1971-present). When Rizzo resigned to run for mayor, he selected (although the announcement was made by then Mayor Tate) his Deputy Commissioner to take over the

police department. O'Neill has been a loyal servant of Rizzo. Although Rizzo was serving as Mayor he never relinquished his duties as Police Commissioner. O'Neill never objected to the mayor playing his dual role. Similar to Donald Scott in San Francisco, O'Neill was rarely quoted and, if he was, the words were those one would expect from Rizzo.

The tandem opinions were most obvious in 1977 when the department was under fire on many accounts. When six officers in the department were charged with brutality after a federal investigation, the U.S. attorney conducting the investigation charged that the department was uncooperative in the investigation.

"There has been and continues to be an official blind spot in police leadership and city leadership on police brutality," David W. Marston, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, said in an interview in his Philadelphia office.

"As long as there is an atmosphere where the top responsible officials are not even conceding there may be a problem, we're going to have a very serious problem," he said. (NYT, 25 September, 1977:14).

The Mayor in the earlier part of the investigation said he believed the officers would be exonerated. Later the Commissioner gave his views,

Commissioner O'Neill said, "Wrongdoing on the part of any police person will not be tolerated," but he added that he was sure the three officers indicated last week would be "vindicated." He also said: "Police personnel are not punching bags and will not be the subject of physical abuse on the part of anyone" (NYT, 25 September, 1977:14).

Because of support and involvement of the mayor in police problems, O'Neill had little problem with his job. Mayor Rizzo continued to increase financial allotments to the department and granted liberal salary increases to officers at contract time. As long as the Commissioner followed the Mayor's wishes, he had an easy time as Commissioner. O'Neill's future is in doubt now that Rizzo is leaving office.

III. Police Unions

The role of the police unions in politics-of-crime in Philadelphia is limited to the era of the reformer. Unlike San Francisco, they have not had the need to be publically vocal as the city administration has supported them throughout the 1970s. In Philadelphia there are two police unions--one for whites and one for blacks. Unlike San Francisco, the black organization has little influence. The white officers' organization, the Fraternal Order of Police, counts as its members almost all white officers (and many black officers) on the force. National headquarters of the FOP is located in Philadelphia.

As described in Chapter Nine, the FOP underwent an internal power struggle in 1964 with the major issue being the civilian review board. Winner of the struggle was John Harrington. Through his efforts, the organization filed suit in 1967 to have the board abolished. This was the start of the process that led to the board's official abolition by Mayor Tate in 1969. Harrington used his ability to fight review boards to gain the national FOP chairmanship and used his experiences in Philadelphia to increase FOP influence across the nation.

About the same time abolition of the police board was taking place, Frank Rizzo was being made Police Commissioner. Rizzo and the FOP got along well and the organization strongly supported Rizzo as Commissioner and as mayor.. The FOP was often cited as one of the friendly groups to which Rizzo would agree to speak.

With Rizzo in charge and agreeing with the FOP position, the organization had little to "go public" about. They issued statements

when reports about corruption, brutality or inefficiency were made. These statements were similar to comments being made by the mayor and Police Commissioner O'Neill so they did not receive extended press coverage. As with Commissioner O'Neill, appearance of a new mayor in Philadelphia may present the FOP with the need to become more public in their political activity.

IV. Others

Rizzo had many opponents during his term as mayor. Those who usually opposed him in election campaigns rarely confronted him using the crime issue. Rizzo rose to power by being a law-and-order candidate and few could out-politic him on the issue. During his first campaign for mayor he had no record except as Police Commissioner. For that reason his opponents would talk less of his ability to solve the crime problem and more that his experience in working with other aspects of government was limited.

In the 1975 reelection campaign, crime became more of an issue. By this time Rizzo had admitted that he and the police had no solution to problems caused by gangs in the city and, even the allegedly inaccurate records of the police department showed crime was rising in the city. When the rising crime rate was mentioned by candidates or the media, Rizzo would respond by stating that, even with a rising crime rate, Philadelphia was the safest of the ten largest cities in America.

In the 1975 primary campaign the crime issue was overshadowed by the major issue: the election was a fight between Rizzo and Democratic Party boss Peter Camiel. Most campaign information and advertisement centered on whether Rizzo would run the politics of the city or, if

Camel's candidate Louis Hill won, control over the Democratic Party and therefore politics of the city would remain with Camel.

It was only the general election when black Philadelphia Party candidate, Charles Bowser, entered the race that the question of crime became an issue. Bowser continually raised questions about gang violence and police brutality especially in the black community.

Until 1977 about the only persons raising concerns about the crime issue were representatives of the black community. Of course Rizzo's use of a secret police investigating team and suggestions of corruption in his administration were raised often by liberal political activists but they directed little attention to street crime. The black community should be most concerned about the crime issue as it was the black community that was suffering most from street crime in Philadelphia. It was in the ghetto that ineffectiveness of action (not ineffectiveness of promises) about preventing crime was felt.

City councilwoman, Dr. Ethyl Allen, State Representatives Richardson Dilworth and Hardy Williams as well as Urban League Director Bowser were all critical of police department activities in black areas of Philadelphia. After Rizzo's first year in office Dr. Allen stated that on crime control "He may have been effective (downtown) but not in the ghetto and outlying neighborhood" (NYT, 7 January, 1978).

However, it was not until the investigations in 1977 showed widespread corruption in the police department and brutality by officers that crime really became an issue outside of black areas. By this time, however, Rizzo was already in the middle of problems caused by the city's financial picture. The crime issue had to share the spotlight

with many other Rizzo woes in the recall and stop-charter-changes campaigns. Even in the black community, abuses by police were not as effective in motivating voters as was the closing of Philadelphia General Hospital.

This is not to say that the crime issue was not important for Rizzo's opponents. Most of them attempted to demonstrate conditions caused by crime in the city and how ineffective Rizzo had been at controlling the crime problem as either Police Commissioner or mayor. They had to tread lightly, however, because too much talk about crime-in-the-streets would raise fears that would play into Rizzo's law-and-order rhetoric. Also, other issues like city finances and corruption in the Rizzo administration were more forceful anti-Rizzo tactics, plus they did not concern Rizzo's main area of expertise or the area where his image was made.

PART III
POLITICS-OF-CRIME

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Philadelphia - Some Conclusions

In general, it is more difficult to define politics-of-crime in Philadelphia than in San Francisco. But since Frank Rizzo was promoted to captain of the Philadelphia police department for political reasons, the movement of Frank Rizzo from police to public politics has suggested existence of politics-of-crime in Philadelphia. It is hard to determine why politics-of-crime in Philadelphia so centered on one person and his ideas. This is in stark contrast to the way politics-of-crime seemed to be out of control of any one politician in San Francisco.

Crime and the question of race are closely linked in Philadelphia. In San Francisco crime-in-the-streets was not a phrase that had many subtle innuendos. In Philadelphia, on the other hand, those that lived where the most crime was committed did not support the law-and-order candidate. Those who supported Frank Rizzo were those who had concerns that went beyond crime--concerns related to the changing racial composition of the city.

Crime was also used as a defensive political issue while in San Francisco crime was an offensive political issue. Frank Rizzo seemed to have the "corner" on the crime issue market, using it to rally and maintain support. In San Francisco, on the other hand, the crime issue was developed as an offensive tactic to remove those in power by discussing how the city leaders had been ineffective in controlling crime.

The final conclusion is that Philadelphia has a closed political system which gives those in power the opportunity to control political debate as well as issues. This is contrasted to the wide-open politics of San Francisco where dissatisfied groups have many ways to express their grievances and reach political leaders.

I. The most striking demographic feature of Philadelphia is the rapid change in the racial composition of the city. The city is quickly moving towards having a black majority of citizens within its boundaries. Areas where most blacks are moving are not wealthy upper-class areas of the city (what few are left) but areas which join or engulf traditional ethnic, working class areas. Philadelphia has never been a unified city and this demographic shift is seen as a threat to the integrity of neighborhoods.

Those who do not like the changing character of the city are those who, in the 1970's, held political power through the voting box. When one of their own, Frank Rizzo, worked his way up to the top (mayor of the city), they were pleased and worked hard to see that their interests were served by a man like them. He not only represented their interests by being one of them but he spoke of values of discipline, hard work, respect for authority, and reminded them that all America needed was a bigger dose of the American dream. All of those values were best expressed through the image of being a "tough cop" and presenting "no nonsense" ideas.

From the time of his first promotion to the day he took office as Mayor, he has always been a stalwart champion of the policeman.

When, for instance, he became the department commissioner in the early nineteen-sixties, he immediately made it clear to those with general or specific complaints about the police that they would have to deal with him, and that he was of no mind to tolerate any troublemakers.

It was an era in which police departments and their administrations were frequent targets of criticism all over the country.

The antagonism was rooted in the civil rights movement of the South, nurtured in the campus protests and antiwar campaigns of those years and brought to its apex in the law-and-order politics of hundreds of candidates seeking public office.

Through it all, Mayor Rizzo took an unwavering stand on the side of the police, here and elsewhere across the nation even when the issue enlarged itself to the point at which individual politics frequently hinged on the single question of whether or not one "supported" one's local police.

At the same time, Philadelphia was undergoing dramatic demographic alterations. The accelerating flight of its white citizens to its suburbs was accompanied by a disproportionate increase in its inner-city black population and a proliferation of crime.

"It finally got to the point that most whites in the city felt it was them and the cops against the blacks " a Chamber of Commerce executive recalled. "Rizzo was the highly visible personification of the policeman and as such his entrance into politics was almost inevitable. He had a built-in constituency."

When he decided to run in 1971, he declined to alter his style. He waged a law-and-order campaign and thereby solidified the support of voting blocks that had previously been incompatible. They were united by Mr. Rizzo's mixture of police and politics.

A vote for the Police Commissioner was a vote against crime, the thesis ran--and it proved a successful technique. The man they called "Big Frank" and "Super Cop" became the Mayor of Philadelphia.
(NYT, April 19, 1974: 74)

Two strong indications of the link between race and crime come through in these reports. The first is rhetoric and actions of Frank Rizzo, the leading politics-of-crime figure in the city. Although Rizzo denied that he had racist attitudes and said that such accusations hurt him personally, sometimes his public pronouncements and actions got him into trouble.

As Police Commissioner he was quoted as uttering racial slurs during a demonstration by black students at the School Board Offices. As Mayor he appointed few blacks to important administrative positions. He reportedly said that he could not find qualified representatives of the black community. Then in 1978 he finally went public with more racist comments during his campaign to change the city charter.

But maybe the best indications of the crime-race link is the attitudes of Rizzo's supporters who lived in those areas that were undergoing racial change..

One of (Rizzo's supporters) was Mrs. Theresa O'Donnell, a friendly woman, a grandmother, a retired employee of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court system. She was well groomed, with short dark hair, and she was wearing a stylish blue suit. Pinned to the suit in various places were six Rizzo buttons. She was asked why she wanted Rizzo to be mayor.

"I'm not a Philadelphian," she said. "I'm a Times Square girl. I moved here thirty-five years ago and it was a wonderful city. But I've seen it go downhill. We need a man like Rizzo. We can't have a cultured, educated, gentle man. He couldn't handle it. He has to deal with...well, you know what he has to deal with.

"We need a tough man. Rizzo is a tough man. I used to live in North Philadelphia, but I had to move. There were some nice ones but then the others started moving in and I was scared. They'll shoot you in a minute. I had to move to Roxborough and pay three times the rent.

"I'm Italian, you know. I married an Irishman. Rizzo's like an Italian father. He's protective. He uplifts women. We need that. We need somebody stern, who will look out for us. I'm a grandmother. I don't want anything to happen to my grandchildren."

Mrs. O'Donnell was asked if she felt safer walking the streets because Rizzo was in the mayor's office.

"Look, one man can't do it all," she replied. "He can't put them in jail. I'll tell you what I like about Rizzo. He goes after the ones I blame. The judges. The judges are the ones. He does as much as anyone can." (Daughen and Binzen; 1977:14).

A second indication of the link between crime and race was the action taken against crime in the city. Rizzo consistently reminded his supporters that Philadelphia was the safest of American's ten largest cities although many investigations would doubt his statistics. His supporters could believe this because the real crime problem was not in white, ethnic areas of the city. The Reactions to Crime victimization survey shows, for example, that in three RTC cities, victimization rate for assault is higher for Blacks than for whites only in Philadelphia. And victimization rates for robbery/purse-snatching for Blacks in Philadelphia is almost twice that of Philadelphia whites. (RTC; 26-29).

When public attention was focused on the gang problem in 1973, Rizzo admitted that little could be done to solve the problem. This may have been true considering the difficulty other cities have had in controlling street gangs, but if the problems had been in the ethnic communities one wonders if words of resignation about solutions would have been as clear. As Black State Representative, David Richardson said in a letter to Rizzo;

" . . . If Black youth were killing white youth in the Northeast area, the problem of gang warfare would be solved immediately. However, since it is the Black youth who are being felled by bullets, you choose to neglect the problem as though it does not exist." (PT, May 26, 1973).

In general, the crime issue was primarily symbolic. Political debate was never centered on solutions to the crime problem as it was in San Francisco. Instead it was used to encourage fear people felt about crime and their concerns about the changing character of their neighborhoods.

II. Crime in Philadelphia was used defensively by those in power to protect their position. This differs from San Francisco where the mayor and others in authority found themselves in a position where the crime issue was used against them.

Considering Rizzo's move from the position of Police Commissioner it is logical that people would respect his opinions on matters of crime. The Mayor expanded his use of the crime issue by introducing it into issues that had little to do with crime. In this way he was able to rally support from those who were concerned with crime.

Daughen and Binzen describe Rizzo's use of this tactic when he was Police Commissioner.

Instead of replying to the criticism, Rizzo sought to capitalize on the antagonism that his supporters harbored for Black demonstrators. It was a tactic he would use again and again. Ignore the criticism. Attack the critics and their friends. Turn it into an us-against-them situation.

"The deterioration of police-community relations in Philadelphia is reaching a critical state," the ADA report said, without mentioning Rizzo by name. "We are concerned over the arrogance, lack of neutrality and violence exhibited by the police in a tense situation such as that of November 17 (1967) at the School Administration Building, and the increasing 'hardline' on civil liberties and civil right activities."

Rizzo's answer was to shout that "they" were going to burn the town down. (1977: 133).

During the 1975 campaign, Rizzo was attempting to battle the Camille machine and fight for his re-election. Not only did he not support Democratic candidates in the election but he attempted to use

law-and-order as an issue against some Democratic judges. Two days before the election (which left no time for the judges to respond) he selected four judges whom he said were especially "soft" on criminals and told voters to throw them out of office. Two were black and the other two were women--all four were Democrats. All four judges won the election and two years later Rizzo was supporting one of the women for a position on the State Supreme Court.

The best example of crime being used as a defensive political tactic was during the Rizzo-recall movement in 1976. At the very moment when the movement was to announce that they had enough votes to put them "over the top" Rizzo announced the threat of radicals taking over the city during the Bicentennial. This did not divert enough attention to make the recall movement disappear but the Bicentennial problem was exaggerated for political purposes.

The extent to which Rizzo was able to use the crime issue to his advantage was shown by his response to continual concerns being expressed about the gang problem in the city. After admitting that police could do little about it he was still getting questions about what to do. It was difficult if not impossible to debate crime prevention policies when the issue was considered in such terms.

Contrast the consideration of the crime issue as it was just described with the way crime was debated in San Francisco. From the time mayoral candidate Diane Feinstein introduced her crime prevention plan into the campaign until the mayor's supporters "won" the charter change referendum, debate in the city over crime was over specific

recommendations for actions to take to prevent crime. No one in the city was using the issue to defend their policies. Mayor Moscone would have preferred the problem to go away. Rizzo, on the other hand, was comfortable with the crime issue as long as he could define it the way he wished.

III. The closed political structure of Philadelphia was a major factor in Rizzo's ability to control the issue of crime as well as he did. This conclusion comes from comparison of Philadelphia to San Francisco where those with concerns about crime were able to interject them into the political campaigns as well as introduce propositions onto the ballot.

The definition of a closed political system is not precise. It takes into consideration such factors as number of players that can enter the political arena and have an impact; amount of competition based on issues; and speed at which politics change.

How closed the political system in Philadelphia is, is demonstrated by the type of consideration violent crime received by Rizzo and his policymakers. Very little was done to focus the crime prevention operation of the city in the ghetto where crime was a serious problem. If concerns of Black politicians and the leading Black newspaper can be used as an indicator of political concerns of Black people, during the 1970s reducing violent crime was a top policy priority. Rizzo or police never directly addressed this concern. Some said Rizzo never went into Black sections of Philadelphia during his term as mayor. That may be an exaggeration, although he never campaigned in Black sections. With the structure of politics in San Francisco, it

would be difficult to believe that any segment of the population would not have ways to express their concerns.

The mayoral contest in 1975 is a more specific incident which demonstrates how closed the political system is in Philadelphia. As has been the case with mayoral elections since the fall of the Republican machine, the victor in the Democratic primary is assumed to be the next mayor. The primary campaign is where leadership decisions are made. In 1975 the issue of the primary campaign was over which one of two men would run the Democratic party, and therefore, politics in Philadelphia. Voters in Philadelphia in 1975 heard issues of crime, finances and schools discussed, but the main issue was who would run the city.

Once Rizzo beat Louis Hill, most voters assumed Rizzo would be mayor. Rizzo assumed the same too, and did very little campaigning. His Republican opponent finished third in the race behind Philadelphia Party candidate, Charles Bowser. Bowser's candidacy was important because it was the base for further Philadelphia Party action including the recall movement the following year. But overall, the general election campaign produced little interest and voter apathy was high. The election was uninteresting compared with San Francisco's mayoral race with many candidates and a focus greater on issues than on power.

A final contrast that can be drawn between the two cities is over recall movements in both. Although the San Francisco recall movement was legally a charter revision, few assumed that motivation behind the proposition was other than to remove Moscone and others from office. In San Francisco, anti-Moscone forces needed only three

percent of the vote in the last election to place their measure on the ballot. In Philadelphia, anti-Rizzo forces needed more than three times that many to place the issue on the ballot.

After the anti-Rizzo forces received enough signatures the Rizzo- controlled city Council refused to accept the signatures, resulting in the court battle which finally prevented the recall from reaching the voters. In contrast, Moscone was not able to count on the independent Board of Supervisors to follow his wishes. The San Francisco system is more competitive.

What do these conclusions mean for the politics-of-crime in Philadelphia? First, it is obvious that political leaders in Philadelphia have ability to control to some degree important issues with which they work. In Philadelphia Frank Rizzo was able to control the crime issue and use it to his advantage. Although some of his control came from his image, it also came from the type of political system that exists in Philadelphia and from the type of people who supported Rizzo. No one was able to control the crime issue in San Francisco and political leaders always had to be wary of "issue ambushes" from either unexpected events or political opponents.

The closed political system in Philadelphia also means that those in leadership positions have extensive control over the system. Responses to issues of crime are under control of political leaders. The ease by which Rizzo was able to pass his legislation in the City Council and his ability to stop the recall movement indicates the amount of control he had over policy process. It is not likely in Philadelphia

that proposals presented to the city council would have an effect on the police department, as they would in San Francisco.

Finally, politics-of-crime in Philadelphia reflect demographic characteristics. Those who support leaders in power will have their concerns about crime attended to while those who do not support the leadership will be left to express their concerns without much response. Supporters of Rizzo see the crime problem more in terms of racial problems which they perceive in their neighborhoods. In response, Rizzo has talked about crime in those terms. The Black community has had little response to their constant calls for action in their neighborhoods.

In January 1980 a new mayor will take office in Philadelphia. More than likely, this person will be supported by the Democratic Party. What changes he/she brings about in Philadelphia are difficult to predict. The difficult financial problems of the city will demand most of the mayor's attention. Responses he/she makes to the crime issue will be related to his/her commitment to bringing divided communities in Philadelphia together. In short, how the new leader defines the crime issue will be a good indication of policy responses to it. In Philadelphia, he/she has more control over the issues and their resolution than he/she would if serving as mayor of San Francisco.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Crime and the Issue Agenda

Stories of politics-of-crime in Philadelphia and San Francisco can provide a general understanding of how city officials in the United States used the issue of crime. For although the two stories given here of Philadelphia and San Francisco suggest that in many ways the two cities are different, some general observations of politics-of-crime in urban America can be made. These two chapters will ask three questions:

- 1) What kind of issues are crime issues?
- 2) How are questions about crime debated in the political arena?
- 3) What relationship exists between the political arena and policies made about crime?

This chapter will first review current thinking on agenda building. Then, the issue of crime will be placed in the context of agenda building and some propositions will be given on how the politics-of-crime evolves on the political agenda. The next chapter will use case studies of San Francisco and Philadelphia to examine the propositions.

When considering politics-of-crime, the concept of agenda building is useful. The focus on agenda making has been in two areas. One concerns issues and how they come to the attention of decision makers. The other focus is on agenda builders, and the controls these persons have over the agenda.

The major work about issues is that of Downs (1972) who argues that issues go through cycles. During various stages the issue enjoys a high priority on the policy making agenda. Initially the issue has little public attention and cannot be seen on any policy agenda. Then

something dramatic happens to make the issue receive wide publicity, causing policy makers to give the issue their attention. Downs states that this place on the policy agenda is usually accompanied with a "euphoric enthusiasm" over possible solutions. When solutions cannot be found or they are too expensive, the issue starts to fall from the agenda. As the issue continues to fall off the agenda, people become discouraged about possible solutions and lose interest; while simultaneously becoming interested in fresh issues. The issue still exists and policies that were made when the issue was on the agenda are still in place. Having gone through the cycle, it has more public attention than one in the first stage but less than "hot" issues of the day.

Downs places some restrictions on the type of issues that are subject to such cycles. First, those considering problems make up large absolute numbers but small numbers relative to the rest of the population. If a large portion of the population was touched by the issue, it would not fall from the agenda. Second, the root of the problem often stems from some action or condition that benefits a powerful majority. Lastly, most problems have no dramatic "staying" qualities. An issue that captures public attention will stay on the top of the agenda only as long as it is dramatic or interesting.

The second general focus in agenda building concerns participants in the agenda building process. Much more work has been done in this area. Questions of who participates in decision making processes of government have always been concerns of students of politics. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) produced the issue in terms of policy making when

they introduced the concept of "non-decisions." They suggest that decisions not made or avoided by policy makers are as important as those that are made and subsequently studied. Cobb and Elder (1971) build upon this theme by suggesting that the study of "where public policy issues come from" is essential to understanding modern politics. They distinguish between a systemic agenda which includes those matters being considered by the policy, and the institutional agenda which contains specific polity items being considered by institutions of the polity. A wide discrepancy between the two types of agendas indicates that the viability of the polity may be in question.

Both agendas contain inherent biases which favor existing policies and support those in decision-making positions. As Cobb and Elder state, "The net effect (of the biases) is that new demands, particularly those of disenchanted or deprived groups are the least likely to receive attention on either the systemic agenda of controversy or the institutional agenda" (1971: 910).

This model is explained to a greater degree by Cobb et.al. (1976). After relabeling systemic and institutional agendas public and formal, respectively, they develop three models of agenda building depending on where the initiative for placing the issue originates and on which agenda the issue is placed.

The first is the outside initiative model where concern comes from non-institutional sources which have the issue placed on the public agenda and, if enough pressure is generated, on the formal agenda. In the mobilization model, the issue concern starts within decision making

institutions. This source makes placement of the issue on the formal agenda simple. But to have success there, the issue must gain public support so attempts are made to get it placed on the public agenda as well.

Finally, the outside initiative model considers those issues which are kept "in house." The source is within the institution but public support is not needed nor usually wanted. Therefore, issues usually rise quickly on the formal agenda until decisions are rendered.

The authors suggest that the model that an issue follows can be determined by how the issue moves through the four stages of being placed on the agenda: 1) Initiation-how the issue is introduced, 2) Specification-how the issue is identified, 3) Expansion-how the support for the issue is garnered or limited, and 4) Entrance-how the issue moves onto one or both agendas. The focus of the article is how the process of agenda building can be used to compare political systems.

AGENDA BUILDING AND THE ISSUE OF CRIME

Crime has been part of the urban political agenda through much of American history, and makes an excellent topic for agenda building analysis. It is also through use of such a diverse and enduring issue that shortcomings of models on agendas can be seen and possibly strengthened.

The major difficulty in considering the above concepts occurs when defining the "crime issue." This does not seem to be just a problem with the "crime issue" since, in reviewing the work on agenda building, little space is devoted to definition of the issue. Downs

often intermingles the terms "issue" and "problem," suggesting that they are the same. He also states that the "alarmed discovery" stage is " a result of some dramatic series of events, or for some other reasons, the public suddenly becomes both aware of and alarmed about the evils of a particular problem" (1972; 39). The implication of this stage is that the dramatic event is only a small part of the larger problem. Interaction between the small event and the larger problem is never considered. The question becomes whether the "issue" that received attention is the event or the larger problem.

What is meant by "issue" is even more confusing when discussed by Cobb, Ross, Ross. They have difficulty in differentiating between issues and policies. By using confusing phrases such as "successful implementation of these issues" and the announcement of a policy as their example of issues being mobilized by governmental groups, they add to the confusion of exactly what is being brought to the agenda. Certainly policies can be issues, such as when Mayor Alioto announced his "stop and search" plan during the San Francisco Zebra killings.

For use in this discussion an "issue" will be defined as a subject of concern to a segment of the population. It also will be one which that segment believes is a subject governmental decision-makers should consider and make a decision on--even if the decision is to do nothing. Two types of issues seem to exist: general and specific. This distinction, however, does not lend itself to accurate categorization of issues. Understanding is clearer by making a distinction between generic and events issues. Generic issues would be matters of concern

which cannot be specifically defined and cover many topics. The political scene is filled with generic issues, including the environment, inflation, taxes, energy, and the topic of this discussion, crime. With any of those issues it would be difficult to find a common definition between politicians and especially citizens of the issue.

All of the above issues are often considered "issue areas" because they cover such a broad range of concerns. For example, when a politician is labeled "pro-environment," does that mean that he/she is willing to support all environmental causes from opposition of nuclear energy to the creation of more wilderness areas on government land? Similarly, what is meant by the "crime issue" or "crime problem"? Is the problem police, courts, correctional institutions, interaction between them or something entirely different? These are all examples of generic issues.

The other type of issues are event issues. These are matters of concern which arise from a specific event or set of events. The approximate date that these issues surface can be defined. As the name implies, specific issues center on a limited space in time (although debate on specific issues can extend over a long period) and usually a limited geographic area. In the spring of 1979 the issue of aircraft safety suddenly appeared on the American political agenda. This was an event issue: the crash of an American Airlines DC-10 in Chicago was the referent event that put the issue on the political agenda. An example of a crime related issue would be the safety of the Chicago Transit Authority which was high on the Chicago

political agenda in 1978. Safety became an issue after a number of violent crimes (including murders) were committed on CTA buses in the space of a few weeks. These examples are very different from generic issues described above. One can easily point to why politicians and policy makers were considering these event issues.

The line between events and generic issues is fuzzy--issues can change from one type to another. Many times, event initiated issues grow into generic issues. An example is the issue of the future of nuclear energy rising in importance on the national policy agenda as a generic issue after the Three Mile Island events.

Some issues serve a dual role as events and generic issues. The urban riots of the 1960s are one example. On the events level, policy makers debated what to do about riots themselves. This resulted in increased spending on riot control equipment and training (Button, 1978; Welch, 1975). On another level, the issue of riots became a part of national debate over generic issues of poverty, civil rights and crime. In the late 1960s, considerations of these generic issues would usually include a mention of riots.

Also, on occasion, generic issues become events issues. This usually happens when policy makers attempt to solve generic issues by suggesting specific policies. Debate over the generic issue then becomes a debate on a specific policy. The community discussion in San Francisco over the Nelder Plan to reduce crime is an example of where the concern over the generic issue of crime was temporarily translated into a specific issue. Debate was not about what the city

should do about crime in general but over merits of the Nelder plan in coping with the crime problem.

Another issue receiving little attention in agenda setting literature is what happens to issues once they appear on the agenda. This is understandable because emphasis in this area of study has been to show the importance of the political process in getting issues to appear on the agenda. However, once there, as Downs has noted, some stay longer than others. Also, Cobb et.al. have shown that some issues move between public and formal agendas while others are "frozen" on one or the other.

The first set of propositions considers the amount of time that issues spend on the issue agenda.

Proposition 1: Generic issues are rarely removed from the public agenda but fluctuate in importance over time.

Proposition 2: Events issues appear on the public agenda for short periods of time, disappearing through problem resolution or by becoming incorporated into generic issues.

These propositions present the common sense notion that general, imprecisely defined issues rarely "go away." They may fade from prominence in public attention but predictably will return at some time to be considered a public issue. If nothing else, they will be considered at election time by most politicians.

Also, as seems reasonable, events issues do not have staying power. As Downs suggests, interest in them wears off quickly and new issues take their place. Some events issues especially crises, are "solved" and no longer have a place as relevant issues.

Proposition 3: Political leaders consider generic issues in a rhetoric mode while they consider events issues in a problem solving mode,

Once an issue arrives on the agenda for consideration, public officials respond. This proposition suggests that their response to issues will depend on what form that issue takes. Generic issues will be debated and considered in broad, general terms. Sweeping statements will be made about the issue and essentially meaningless stands will be taken. In short, responses of political leaders will be political rhetoric. On the other hand, if the issue being considered is an events issue, the response will be specific, direct and suggest specific solutions. Although debate may not end with an agreement on the "best" solution, debate will be over solutions.

The term "motherhood issues" best describes the rhetoric mode used by politicians when considering a generic issue. Motherhood issues are those where almost all politicians are in agreement. All politicians are for good health, clean air and water and are against taxes, crime and poverty. Taking stands on these issues in broad terms is easy for politicians and is standard fare in most political campaigns. But, when these same politicians are confronted with specifics, politics change and consideration given issues is directed toward problem solving. It is a "motherhood" stand for a leader to decry "crime in the streets" but it is another matter for him/her to take money from a popular street repair program and give it to a police program for reducing crime.

An important part of this proposition comes when it is tied to

considerations of those who emphasize the role of political leaders in defining issues. Therefore, they do not just respond to the type of issue but also play a key role in defining the type of issues that will appear on the agenda. It is not only important to discover which issues the powerful want on the agenda but also how they would like them defined. As described above, leaders can move issues from generic to events issues by redefining them into smaller units.

The way policies are considered also has implications for the types of policies developed in response to issues. The way in which policy makers consider items on the agenda has influence on the character of the policies and decisions that they make. This is expressed in the following proposition.

Proposition 4: The character of policies generated from generic issues is symbolic while the character of policies made on events issues is specific.

Again this proposition follows the notion that when considering broad, general issues like inflation and crime, policies from such debates will be in a large part symbolic. Because generic issues have little substance to attack (or too much substance to be considered in one attack), policy response is to set up commissions, to appoint special agencies to work with the problem.

Policies that come from events issues, however, have a focus. Because the issue has a starting point, implementation of a new policy can be considered the stopping point of the events issue. The policy usually contains specific remedies for specific problems or, at least, specific directions to confront the event issue.

Proposition 5: Policy changes which are the result of generic issues will be more incremental while policy changes which are the result of events issues will be more "innovative."

Generic issues are by definition durable and do not leave the issue agenda. Sometimes they will hold a prominent place on the agenda while, at other times, they will become a low priority on policy makers' agendas. Politicians are familiar with the issue and realize that little can be done to make it go away, so they rarely try anything different. This is the concept of issue inertia described by Cobb and Elder. Generic issues have classical ways of being considered. Whenever they rise to the top of the issue agenda, response is either to continue the same policies or to make small adjustments. When looking at the way American Presidents have suggested responding to economic problems of unemployment and inflation, few "innovative" suggestions have developed since FDR's post-depression economic policies.

Events issues present a different problem for policy makers. Often times the issue is a unique problem never faced before. The problem solving consideration mode prompts policy makers to accept all new ideas as solutions. The term "innovation" here is placed in quotes since the broadest definition of innovation is being used. Innovation is something different from existing policy. Using crime on the CTA issue, the idea of special transit police is something that has been used in other cities. It was different for Chicago and therefore would qualify as an innovation through diffusion. (Walker, 1969).

A diagram of the relationships expressed in the propositions is


shown in Figure 11. As suggested above, two types of issues are given two different types of consideration on both public and formal agendas. Movement between public and formal agendas follow the three models suggested by Cobb, et.al.- 1) outside initiative, 2) mobilization, and 3) inside initiative. Finally, a policy response to the issue is dependent on how the issue is defined.

Figure 11 about here

This leads to the question: Why are some issues generic issues and other issues events issues? There are two considerations. First is the nature of the issue itself. Second is the ability of decision makers-- often very limited--to define the issue in a generic or events mode. Some issues arise out of events and are not easily redefined in generic terms. During the Zebra killings in San Francisco, the crime issue was an events issue. Until the killers were put in jail, any generic discussion of crime in San Francisco always returned to the specific, events issue of the Zebra killers. The fact that some issues are events issues is uncomfortable for political decision makers. Events issues that are new and/or unexpected leave decision makers without an adequate response to an issue.

Other times, however, politicians prefer to define the issue in events terms. During the "recall" Proposition B movement in San Francisco, Supervisor Barbegelata preferred to talk about crime in terms of "facts and figures" of increasing crime rates and not just speak of "crime in the streets." In general, politicians feel most

Figure 11 : The relationship of issue type, consideration mode and policy type in agenda building.



comfortable when issues are defined in ways in which they want. Events issues often leave politicians open for "issue ambushes" where an issue appears on agenda without warning. Generic issues, on the other hand, are familiar and although rarely solvable, politicians know how to respond to their rise on the agenda.

Proposition 6: The more competitive the political system, the more problem solving the consideration of issue and, therefore, the more specific and "innovative" the policies.

As this proposition suggests, another major factor in how issues are defined is the nature of the political system. Use of the concept of competition in the proposition is to suggest greater participation by competing political groups and more competitive political elections. Some operational measures of this concept would be traditional ones used in political science of competitive political systems including interest group activity in politics and competitive elections.

This proposition first considers the type of issues most likely to appear on a city's issue agenda. Any issue agenda is unlimited to the number of issues that can appear on it, but is limited by the number of issues politicians can consider. No political leader has time to consider all issues and why some issues are considered and others are not is the focus of agenda building discussions. This proposition suggests that the type of political system helps determine the type of issues to be considered.

Conceptually, the meaning of this proposition can be understood by turning back to Figure 11. Because space for consideration of issues is limited, the amount of space in the "consideration" box of

Figure 11 is also limited. Therefore, there exists a ratio between considerations of issues in a rhetorical versus a problem solving mode. This ratio is determined, in part, by the type of political system. If the system lends itself to consideration of issues in a rhetorical mode, the issue agenda will have more room for generic issues instead of events issues and vice versa. This proposition suggests that in competitive political systems, there is more room for issue platforms and problem solving debate so competitive political systems will have more events issues on public and formal agendas.

The ratio between rhetorical and problem solving modes is never 100% in any direction. This is usually because the type of issue that appears on the agenda is also a factor. Those systems dominated by a rhetorical style will never be able to avoid events issues that arise. Likewise, those systems dominated by a problem solving mode can never solve generic issues, thus generic issues will keep cropping up on the issue agenda. Over a period of time, the ratio of rhetorical and problem solving modes will change. When one issue leaves the agenda, another will appear as well as new issues may appear and push some old issues off of the agenda. The ratio between the two modes will always be limited by the structure of the political system because it is through the structure that issues appear on the formal agenda and political issues become issues on the public agenda.

What about "non-decisions" and "non-issues?" So far the discussion has made little reference to decision makers and their influence on the issue agenda.

Proposition 7: Those issues on the public agenda which will be considered by decision makers will be those issues important to the "referent" political supporters of the decision makers. Also, decision makers will attempt to define issues as generic or events issues according to wishes of the "referent" political supporters.

This proposition is taken directly from agenda building literature. It acknowledges the importance of decision makers in the agenda building process. It also assumes that, in general, politicians are responsive to their political supporters. This implies that items that are considered on the political agenda will have some resemblance to concerns of groups active in formal agenda setting processes. Obviously correlation between interests of referent political supporters and the formal agenda will not be exact. This is due to: a) the formation of the agenda as "filtered" through decision makers and b) the ambiguity of the meaning of "referent" political supporters.

This proposition also suggests that political leaders will use opinions of their "referent" supporters to define issues. For example, if the decision leader "reads" his/her supporters as being more concerned about general issues of crime, he/she will attempt to bring crime to the issue agenda as a generic issue. If, on the other hand he/she thinks the mood of his/her supporters is to have the issue defined concretely and simply, the issue will be presented as an events issue. The difference was seen in Proposition B elections in San Francisco. The Moscone/Gain group attempted to talk generically about their general crime fighting philosophy while the Bargagelata

group kept discussing specific events like crime figures and specific crime incidents.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has looked at politics-of-crime with the goal of developing some generalizations about how crime becomes and is used as a political issue in urban America. The argument developed here expands upon the discussion of agenda building. Agenda building literature does not consider in detail either questions of how issues appear and disappear or what happens to issues once on the agenda that makes them rise or fall.

To help unravel those questions the argument presented here suggests that the study of issues on agendas needs to consider the type of issues as well as the agenda building process. When issues are considered by type, the way in which politicians and decision makers confront issues on the agenda is different. Finally, because the way in which decision makers deal with issues varies by type of issues, it is possible to predict a difference in policies resulting from issues appearing on the agenda. Propositions presented here came from studying San Francisco and Philadelphia, hence, looking at the two case studies can provide clarification of the framework.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Politics of Crime in San Francisco and Philadelphia- Some Conclusions

It is now time to return to the study of San Francisco and Philadelphia, this time drawing comparative conclusions. Crime was a political issue in both cities, but was handled differently by political leaders in each. The focus of this chapter will be to discover why the same issue can be on the public and formal agenda in two cities but be handled so differently. The common thread in answering that question will be the difference in how the crime issue was defined.

First, conclusions of the two case studies will be summarized. That will be followed with an examination of some statistical findings about crime in the two cities. Finally, the framework presented in the last chapter will be examined in the perspective of the case studies.

Three general conclusions were presented about the politics-of-crime in San Francisco:

1. The type of crime the city experienced in the late 1970s helped make crime a political issue.
2. The diffusion of power in the city's political system made it easy for interested parties to bring the crime issue to the agenda.
3. Public opinion was an important tool for political actors when considering the crime issue.

These conclusions come from a description of politics-of-crime in San Francisco as an issue with erratic appearances on the agenda but always volatile when it appeared. The crime issue most often appeared in response to one or many bizarre crime incidents or other crime related events. The type of crime in San Francisco affected the entire city.

It was often said that no area in the city was safe from crime. Methods used to combat crime incidents needed to be effective everywhere and not just give an appearance of bringing down an ambiguous crime rate.

Implementing specific programs was not that easy. The political system in San Francisco was open to many participants and no single individual or group of individuals were able to control the issue agenda. Therefore all kinds of political actors used the crime issue. The formal governmental structure of the city divided power to make policy decisions among many, usually autonomous, groups. Also, lack of any well established political parties prevented politics-of-crime from becoming a "one party" issue. The voting structure of the city and use of referenda to decide many issues limited political leaders and policy makers from serving as representatives of the public in making policy decisions.

Because the system is so diffuse in power and decision making, public opinion is important to political leaders in San Francisco. Political leaders who know how to shape public opinion can be successful. They need to be successful more than at times of their election. Policy decisions that could have an effect on their political career are often made by decision makers they cannot "control." Therefore, they have to use public opinion to indirectly guarantee that policy decisions they desire are made.

The conclusions about the politics-of-crime in Philadelphia are much different:

1. The crime issue was closely tied to the race issue in the city.
2. The crime issue was controlled by Mayor Rizzo and used by him as an offensive political tactic to stay in power.

3. The Philadelphia political system is more tightly controlled by a few individuals restricting the placement of the crime issue on the agenda.

Politics-of-crime in Philadelphia was defined during the 1970s in terms of one person, Frank Rizzo. He rose to power by being a "law-and-order" candidate appealing to white, ethnic, middle-class voters of Philadelphia. Although Mayor Rizzo would dispute any suggestions that he held racist attitudes, comments made by those who supported him (or opposed him) contained remarks indicating Rizzo supporters were anti-Black. In Philadelphia, "crime" became a code word for all problems white ethnic voters saw in the city as a result of a racially mixed city.

Because Mayor Rizzo had the reputation of being a "tough cop" and a "hard-liner" on crime issues, he gained support of those who felt that such stands were necessary to preserve the city. The mayor used this political image to his benefit and against his political opponents. When Rizzo's political power became threatened, he would bring out his anti-crime image. If concern over crime had lessened, he would rekindle a general fear of crime. This tactic was effective in opposing those who worked against him and he used it when necessary.

The nature of the political system in Philadelphia allowed the mayor to use the issue of crime to his favor. The mayor in Philadelphia is a much more powerful figure than the San Francisco mayor. The structure of the government provides him with more control over policy making aspects of government. Also, political party structure in Philadelphia is strong in comparison to most other American cities. When the mayor is a part of this party structure or creates his own as Rizzo did, it provides him with added political power. Through this

power the mayor can better control the formal issue agenda and influence the public agenda.

Contrasts in politics-crime in these two cities are sharp. In San Francisco the crime issue rises and falls on the agenda frequently. Sometimes those in power wish to place it on the agenda but they have little control over that process. Often it is others or random events which bring it to the agenda. When confronted with the issue of crime, decision makers are limited in their control over responses. The fragmented policy-making structure of the city allows no single decision-making group or individual to design a response. This forces greater public involvement in determining responses.

In Philadelphia it is different. The issue of "crime in the streets" is pervasive, not rising and falling as rapidly on the agenda as in San Francisco. Importance of crime on the formal agenda in Philadelphia seems to be determined by the mayor. Even in predicting crises he did not really expect to happen, as he did with Bicentennial demonstrators, he would raise the issue of "liberal judges" or "lack of school discipline" and link it to the crime problem. By raising the issue of crime on the agenda, the mayor would have enough control over the agenda so that it could be used to his best political advantage. He also had control over the policy-making apparatus so that quick "solutions" to lower the crime issue on the agenda could be made. That power over decision-making also eliminated the need to include extensive public involvement in making policy decisions.

Contrast in the cities is also seen when looking at crime statistics.

It can help answer the question of how the appearance of the issue of crime on the public and/or formal agenda coincides with the reality of crime. The problem in such analysis is in determining what the "reality" of crime has been for the two cities. Although fraught with difficulties, information provided by the Uniform Crime Reports is one way of judging the amount of crime in the two areas (Skogan, 1975, 1976).

Philadelphia is notorious for its under-reporting of crime in UCR reports. However, the Reactions to Crime Project discovered, that in comparison with victimization surveys, trends shown by UCR statistics for these two cities are fairly accurate. Also, although under-reporting is higher in Philadelphia than San Francisco, the indication that the San Francisco area has a higher incidence of per capita crime than Philadelphia is also true.

Figures 12, 13, and 14 are charts of crime trends in the two cities measured in various ways. Through examination of the differences in trends, some observations can be made about placement of the crime issue on the agenda compared with actual incidents of crime.

Figure 12, 13, 14

Most noticeable in all the graphs is the difference in crime rate between the two cities. For over twenty years San Francisco has consistently had a higher rate of per capita crime than Philadelphia. During that time in San Francisco there have been periods when crime was a low priority for political decision makers. Shortly after the Nelder Plan controversy was "resolved" and after the Moscone/Gain victory in defeat of Proposition B, political discussions seemed to be turned to topics other than crime. In Philadelphia, on the other hand, even during Rizzo's biggest political crises, the financial problems or the

FIGURE 12: Burglary Rate Comparisons
(RTC, 1978:13)

BURGLARY RATE SINCE 1968





FIGURE 13: Robbery Rate Comparisons
(RTC, 1978:14)

ROBBERY RATE SINCE 1968




LEGEND

- Chic
- + Phil
- * Sanf

FIGURE 14: Assault Rate Comparisons
(RTC, 1978:15)

ASSAULT RATE SINCE 1968



LEGEND

○ Chic

+ Phil

* San

school strike, crime was part of the political debate of the issue. During this period of high crime rates in San Francisco, crime issues were considered in more a problem solving mode while in Philadelphia, the issue was most often considered rhetorically.

A second aspect of crime trends suggest that statistical crime waves can be events issues. The graphs show that between 1974 and 1976 crime rates were rapidly increasing in San Francisco. This coincides with the rise of the crime issue on the public agenda. The 1977 "recall" election which centered on crime prevention followed the city's highest recorded robbery, burglary and assault rate in recent history.

This should be contrasted with Philadelphia. Although crime statistics for this city do not show the dramatic increases that are seen in San Francisco, crime rates are steadily increasing between 1969 and 1975. If the same patterns that existed in San Francisco existed in Philadelphia, concern over how to effectively control crime would have been highest in 1974 and 1975.

In fact, little to no problem solving consideration was being given to the crime issue during that time. In 1975 Frank Rizzo was waging an effective campaign for re-election using the generic crime issue to help his campaign. The fact that crime rates had been dramatically increasing since he had become mayor did not miss the attention of his political opponents, but that fact was never translated into a statement of disapproval of the job Rizzo was doing. The issue was rarely discussed in "problem solving" terms but always considered in generic terms.

The other comparison that statistical information can provide covers who suffers from changes in crime patterns. One reason given to why

crime became an important public and formal agenda item in San Francisco is that problems of crime moved from the ghetto to parts of the city where the rich and powerful live. Although the graphs do not show the race of those victimized, the racial composition of San Francisco has stayed somewhat stable in the 1970s. However, from 1974 to 1976, for example, the burglary rate for households went up from 42 households per thousand to 66 per thousand. Such figures suggest that such a dramatic increase in burglaries could have easily had an impact on the more wealthy areas. Similar suggestions could be made about robbery and assault.

That suggestion is further confirmed by results of the Reactions to Crime victimization surveys shown in Figures 15, 16 and the description of the rates.

...White victimization rates in San Francisco for (robbery and purse snatching) are so high that whites there and Blacks in Chicago suffered with approximately the same frequency from personal theft. This is quite contrary to the national norm, which places Blacks far above whites in this victimization category. In each of the other cities, Blacks are more likely to be victimized than whites, as national data would lead us to expect. (1978:29)

Figures 15 and 16

When those figures are observed for Philadelphia, differences between Black victimization and white victimization are dramatic. This demonstrates what was described in the Philadelphia case study--for Blacks in Philadelphia, crime is not a generic, general problem but a specific, events problem. The focus of campaigns by black candidates centered on the need to have better police services and less police brutality. Those who controlled the formal agenda and, to some degree, the public agenda, were not as concerned about being specific victims

FIGURE 15: Robbery/Purse Snatching Victimization Rates Comparison (RTC, 1978:31)

RACE AND VICTIMIZATION RATES
FOR ROBBERY/PURSE-SNATCHING





FIGURE 16: Assault Rates Comparison
(RTC, 1978:32)

RACE AND VICTIMIZATION RATES
FOR ASSAULT



of crime. They preferred to consider the crime issue in more generic terms.

What does this information have to say about the propositions stated earlier? Propositions 1 and 2 state:

Proposition 1: Generic issues are rarely removed from the public agenda but fluctuate in importance over time.

Proposition 2: Events issues appear on the public agenda for short periods of time, disappearing through problem resolution or by becoming incorporated into generic issues.

They talk about the endurance of issues. In both of these cities the generic crime issue has been on the agenda during the 1970s but in San Francisco the generic issue of crime became an events issue. The Nelder plan introduced in 1974 was in response to the high assault rate in the city plus the culmination of a group of bizarre crime-related events. Debate over an effective police force and how it should be run resulted from the police strike of 1975 and the "crime wave" that existed at the time.

The crime issue in Philadelphia was a strong generic issue staying high on the issue agenda. Philadelphia did not have the type of crime incidents that could be easily considered events issues. Crime in Philadelphia was "normal" and most newsmaking crime events were either police related (the raid on Black Panther headquarters) or Rizzo created (the Bicentennial threat). Nothing special happened in Philadelphia to transform the generic crime issue in Philadelphia into specific events issues.

Proposition 3: Political leaders consider generic issues in a rhetoric mode while they consider events issues in a problem solving mode.

Differences in consideration of the issue can be seen by comparing the campaign statements made by candidates. In Philadelphia, where the crime issue was being defined as generic, candidates' comments about the crime issue were in terms of instituting safety, taking action against crime and being "soft on crime," with little definition of those terms. In San Francisco, election debate was over whether the police department needed new leadership that was "tough on crime" or whether the department needed to be professionalized--two very different approaches to solving the crime problem.

In Philadelphia, Rizzo would talk about crime fighting in terms of "getting tough" with criminals, showing force in the war on crime, and reforming the judicial system. In contrast, San Francisco produced the Nelder Plan, the Alioto stop-and-search solution to the Zebra killings, and the Moscone promise to remove political influence from the department as specific ways to solve crime events issues.

Propositions 4 and 5 consider the type of policies which come from the definition of the issue.

Proposition 4: The character of policies generated from generic issues is symbolic while the character of policies made on events issues is specific.

Proposition 5: Policy changes which are the result of generic issues will be more incremental while policy changes which are the result of events issues will be more "innovative."

In Philadelphia, Rizzo's answer to the crime problem was in two directions. First, he suggested that non-police areas of the criminal justice system were at fault and that persons, especially "liberal" judges, were the root of the crime problem. Although these can be considered policy proposals, they did not result in any specific policies being implemented.

Similarly, another response to the crime issue was to make sure people saw Rizzo in the middle of any important anti-crime action and to have Rizzo provide statements of support for anti-crime organizations, especially police. These are, in most part, symbolic gestures that do not directly address the issue of crime.

The second Rizzo response to the crime issue was more money and more police. Even during hard times when the mayor was cutting other department budgets, Rizzo found more money for police. Usually, the call for money was not for specific crime fighting programs but for the fact that more police meant better crime fighting. His proposals were made in light of the fact that the crime rate in Philadelphia was rising even though the budget was being increased yearly. Any new policies that were instituted in the police department were usually previously tried changes that lasted only as long as the events issue that prompted the change was on the agenda.

In San Francisco, on the other hand, the events nature of the crime issue led to such "innovations" as the Nelder plan early in the seventies to reorganization of the department under an "outsider" police chief. Any attempts to "throw money" at the crime problem were resisted by Chief Gain with constant warnings that money will not solve the problems of crime.

The sixth proposition states:

Propositon 6: The more competitive the political system the more problem solving the consideration of issue and, therefore, the more specific and "innovative" the policies.

As seen in San Francisco, the political system there is very diffuse with many centers of power and many methods of placing issues on the

formal agenda. Within that environment the crime issue developed into a debate about appropriate responses to a variety of events. Even a desperate attempt to find the Zebra killers through an extensive stop-and-search procedure was not allowed to pass without major political debate. The entire recall movement was directed towards the issue of the best method of reducing crime in the community.

Philadelphia, on the other hand, has a closed political system. The city council is controlled by the mayor and political influence flows to and from Philadelphia and the rest of the state. In such a system, groups trying to place events issue on the formal or even public agendas find their work difficult. The recall movement in Philadelphia was never placed on the formal agenda --concerns over police brutality reached the public agenda but never the city's formal agenda. All of these questions were contained in the generic issue of crime and/or safety.

The final proposition states:

Proposition 7: Those issues on the public agenda which will be considered by decision makers will be those issues important to the "referent" political supporters of the decision makers. Also, decision makers will attempt to define issues as generic or events issues according to wishes of the "referent" political supporters.

This is related to the previous propositions because it considers which issues get placed on the agenda. Events issues of how to reduce crime reached the top of the public and formal agendas in San Francisco, when more people were becoming victims of criminal activity--especially victims who were the active constituents of the political leaders in the city. As mentioned above, events issues of crime were not high on

the public or formal agenda in Philadelphia. Throughout the Rizzo terms, the Democratic party had been able to write off Black voters. These were the persons who had concerns over crime events issues. It was the white ethnic voters--the Rizzo supporters--who could define the crime issue in a generic way and accept the rhetorical consideration Rizzo would give it.

CONCLUSION

Several conclusions about the politics-of-crime have been reached through the case studies and this framework for considering issue agendas. First, it has demonstrated that the study of agenda building needs further clarification. Three elements are key in the study of agendas-- a) the point in the issue cycle of the issue, b) the role of the political actors in placing issues on the agenda and, c) the type of issue or how the issue is defined. It has been proposed that issues be divided between generic issues or issues of broad definition and events issues which come from specific incidents in history.

When considering the crime issue in America, this distinction divides the crime issue between the issue of general safety, "crime in the streets," from specific crime events or crime programs which are only small parts of the generic crime issue.

Once the distinction is made between generic issues and events issues, the analysis of agenda building is easier to explain. As shown, when decision makers have control over the agenda building process, they can use that process to define issues and control the way issues will be considered. This is because they have control over the types of policies developed around the issue.

In Philadelphia, tight control of the agenda building process by the mayor and his "friends" allowed for the issue of crime to remain

generic most of the time. Therefore the crime issue was considered in a rhetorical mode. Crime policies in Philadelphia were, in general, symbolic responses to concerns, and tangible policies that emerged from the governmental system were incremental adjustments to existing policies.

In San Francisco, no group or individual has extensive power over agenda building. The issue of crime there is usually focused on events and therefore, consideration of the crime issue focuses on problem solving. Policies about crime in San Francisco have a specific focus and often times are very different from existing policies.

Development of this framework for understanding the politics-of-crime emerged from the case studies of Philadelphia and San Francisco. To further develop and test this framework as a useful way to consider urban political issues the propositions need to be tested by examining the politics-of-crime in other American cities. Also, if the framework has relevance to the study of issue building it should be useful for studying the politics of any issue in American cities.

APPENDICES

A: Research Methods and Bibliographies

These case studies were developed from the comments and views of participants in the events, whether they were politicians, policemen, criminals, victims, political journalists, or regular citizens. The research dealt with perceptions of the events as viewed by the political actors and did not investigate the "reality" of the events.

The research was conducted in three stages. The first step was to obtain some perspective on the cities, their politics and general characteristics. Secondly, the research focused on the events of the late 1970s. The final and most time consuming step was to investigate the important events of the period by looking closely at the controversy surrounding each.

Below are listed the resources used for each city in each of the three phases of the research and a discussion of the usefulness of each. Formal citations of all references follow.

San Francisco Research

1. General View. Books and articles were the main resource used to obtain a general view of San Francisco.

Reactions to Crime Project. "The Results of the Preliminary Analysis: Findings and Directions--April 28, 1978." This report did not provide much information on the politics-of-crime, but it did provide good insight on the legitimacy of the complaints about crime made in the political arena as well as some insight into the neighborhoods of San Francisco.

Rosencranz, Armin. "Interviews with San Francisco Officials." This report provided excellent background on the politics-of-crime. Although it lacks conclusions, the subjects raised in the report and.

the chronology provided by the author served as the starting point for this study. The specific interviews contained in the report are mentioned below.

Kaplin, Gail and Michael J. Lowy. "Difference Without Change: The Use of the Crime Issue in San Francisco." This was a useful report on the interaction of neighborhood groups with the politicians on the issue of crime prevention. It was most helpful for chapter Five.

Becker, Howard. Culture and Civility in San Francisco. This book was one of the best to set the stage for this type of investigation. The articles by Fred Wirt and Howard Becker & Irving Louis Horowitz were especially helpful. The others did not provide specific information but did suggest the mood or atmosphere that exists (existed) in and around the Bay Area.

Wirt, Fredrick. Power in the City. This book would be valuable to any political scientist interested in the specific problems confronting a diverse power structure in city politics. It was not as helpful here, however. Wirt's essay in Becker's book is a good summary and provided ideas used in this study. Wirt's general premise concerning the complications of decentralized, non-accountable power were repeatedly confirmed in our studies of the police strike and the Moscone recall election. His thesis is central to the conclusions made in this study.

2. The Period of 1974-1977. Using the resources listed below, a chronology of major events was developed to use in the research. A revised version of the chronology is provided in Appendix B.

New York Times Index. This was probably the most helpful of any index used. The "Crime-California" and "San Francisco" listings

provided written highlights of the important events for the year and referred the relevant articles.

Readers Guide to Periodical Literature and Social Science Index. Surprisingly, these indexes were very helpful for this type of research. If a San Francisco issue makes the Reader's Guide, it is certainly high on the media agenda. The articles referenced are worth reading as they either provide a general summary of the event or issue and therefore guidance for the final stage of research or they are helpful in-depth pieces.

San Francisco Chronicle Index. Unfortunately this index was not helpful for this project. The index starts in 1977 so only one year of this study was included. Also, issues and persons included cover too broad a range.

Christian Science Monitor Index and National Observer Index. These indexes are less helpful than the New York Times Index but can be useful. Both these publications have their own writers, so the articles are not wire service reprints (the National Observer ceased publication in 1976). Often the articles read like rewrites of wire service pieces, but as often they provide a new perspective and, occasionally, in-depth research. The coverage of the Zebra incidents is, for example, much less "slick" than the New York Times, and the weekly news magazines.

Other newspaper indexes. These were not used as most San Francisco news in these papers consists of the same wire service articles appearing elsewhere.

Academic Indexes. These were also avoided because of the nature of the research. Possibly, if time permitted, they could be

used. The Bopp et.al. article would have been overlooked if someone had not mentioned it to the researcher and it would have been found in a review of academic indexes. Such finds, however, are not worth the extra effort.

3. Specific Research. Once the events had been isolated, the long and tedious work began. First, the in-depth articles were read covering the three events chosen. Second, the local papers were read for each day during the four year period to obtain the quotes and descriptions used in the reports. By reading the papers in chronological order, the researcher was also able to develop an impression of the "flow" of events and attitudes projected by the media. By making just "spot checks" of newspaper articles, the researcher would likely have arrived at different conclusions concerning the crime issue in San Francisco.

Rosencranz, Armin. "Interviews with San Francisco City Officials." When first read, these interviews seemed to be filled with information that would be useful in the reports. However, rereading them before writing the reports, the researcher was surprised at how typical the comments of the interviews had become. In this "post-Watergate" era, it seems that San Francisco politicians are willing to either share no more with interviewers than their public statements or, just as likely, let their views be known to everyone and remain consistent. The interview comments are only duplications of comments made in the newspapers. This duplication of comments is an interesting statement on the politics of San Francisco.

Adams, Nathan M. "The Tracing of Baretta A47469." This article

was extremely helpful. It was difficult to piece together the actual Zebra story, from but this article described it in sequential order. It provides a good understanding of the police side of the Zebra events.

Bopp, William et al. "The San Francisco Police Strike of 1975." This article is to the police strike report what the Adams article is to the Zebra killings. It provides good background and a chronological description of the strike. However, it does lack any analysis of the politics and reactions to the strike.

Lembke, Daryl. "Moscone's Gamble On a New-Breed Police Chief" and Skolnick, Jerome: "Contemporary Law Enforcement in Democratic Society." These two articles, plus one from the Examiner's California Living magazine, gave good insight on the type of police chief Charles Gain is and wants to be. These were helpful in writing the report about Gain as a political actor. Knowing about Gain, what he wants, and how he goes about getting it are also an important part of the story of Moscone's success in defeating Barbagalata's proposition.

San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner. These two papers have an unusual agreement to publish their papers from the same printing plant while the editorial staffs are independent. They publish a joint Sunday paper with each staff editing different sections of the paper. The Northwestern Library has microfilm of only the Chronicle so the research here is based mainly on the SFC reports. However, as the Sunday paper is also microfilmed, the Examiner Sunday sections are used. Of the two, the SFC is the more conservative. Both papers are rated as poor in journalistic circles and, after reading four years of the papers, this evaluation seems accurate.

For these reports, the most helpful parts of the paper were the

news reports which usually had quotes from the vocal politicians of San Francisco. Also helpful were the letters to the editor which often became a never ending series of letters on crime, the police, etc. Two daily columns provided some insight as well. The "Question Man" would daily have people answer a standard question. Usually the questions were irrelevant but, on those times when they hit the fringes of political matters, crime would usually be mentioned in two or three answers. Herb Caen, the political gossip columnist was also worth reading for he would often project future political events and comment on responses to his opinions as well as attempt to sway others' opinions.

Although only the Sunday SFE could be used, the more in-depth, interview articles seemed to appear in the SFE. Therefore, it is often quoted in these reports.

San Francisco Bay Guardian. This paper provided a distinct contrast to the conservatism of the SFC. The Guardian made no attempts to hide its journalistic "war" with what it termed the "Chron/Exam monopoly." Although the articles in the SBG made no attempt to hide their bias, their side of the issues often became the winning side in the political struggles in 1976-77, including those concerning crime. The SBG had a good working relationship with Sheriff Hongisto and the gay community (among others) which provided a number of informative articles.

Other San Francisco area papers. None of the other "underground" papers in the area were worth reading for this type of research. In early 1977 the Oakland Tribune started an attempt to compete with the San Francisco papers. That effort came too late to help this project, however anyone doing research on San Francisco after 1977 might wish

to check the Tribune as a source for another perspective on the San Francisco area issues.

Philadelphia Research

The research process was the same used in studying San Francisco, But the research materials and final results were quite different. The research on Philadelphia started with seeking a general view of Philadelphia politics. Unlike San Francisco, however, few general books on Philadelphia politics have been written. Therefore, the researcher used a variety of books on more specific subjects. For example, the police department in Philadelphia has been the subject of much more research than the San Francisco department.

The second phase of the research, an attempt to identify the important incidents of the pre-1977 period, met with little success. Therefore, this phase of the research was used to identify general shifts in issues and attitudes towards the politics-of-crime.

Without specific incidents to highlight concerning the politics-of-crime, the third phase of the research also focused on general trends and shifts in attitudes.

1. General View. The books and articles used to gain a general perspective on Philadelphia fall into two general categories: those discussing Philadelphia as a city and those considering the Philadelphia Police Department.

Reactions to Crime Project. "The Results of the Preliminary Analysis: Findings and New Directions--April 28, 1978." This report provided information on crime and citizens' perceptions of crime but gave little information on the politics-of-crime. The statistics on Philadelphia it presents confirm the observations made in this report that Philadelphia is a divided city. It also shows that, although crime and victimization

rates are low, citizens are aware of crime and are very active in crime prevention activities.

Muller, Peter O., Kenneth C. Meyer and Roman A. Cybriwsky.

Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages. This was the most helpful book to provide an understanding of Philadelphia and is the basis for most of the information in Chapter Eight. It also is the most recent work on Philadelphia.

Banefield, Edward C. Big City Politics. This book provided a clear picture of the structure of Philadelphia government. It also provided some general insight into the changes brought about in Philadelphia government during the reform and post-reform eras.

Binzen, Peter. White Town U.S.A. Although a description of many cities, the comments on the frustration of white ethnics who are Frank Rizzo's people shed important light on Rizzo's political power base.

Baltzell, E. Digby. Philadelphia Gentlemen and Ershkowitz, Miriam and Joseph Zikmund. Black Politics in Philadelphia. Both books are too old to be of much help for this study except to describe the development of the ethnic areas of the city and black voting history.

Lohman, Joseph D. and Gordon E. Misner. The Police and the Community. Kephart, William. Racial Factors in Urban Law Enforcement. These two books are very outdated but do provide some insight into the work of the Philadelphia Police Department during the reform era when the department was being professionalized.

Halpern, Stephen C. Police-Association and Department Leaders and Ruchelman, Leonard, Police Politics. Both of these studies were made during the Rizzo years and so provide a contrast to the two mentioned above. The importance of the Fraternal Order of Police is vividly

described in both.

2. The Period of 1970-1977. Reading this information on Philadelphia presented only a disjointed understanding of the political interaction within the city. Like the San Francisco research, the next phase was highlighting the major politics-of-crime events prior to 1977. Using indexes as described below, a chronology of important events was developed. A revised version of this chronology is contained in Appendix B.

While making the chronology no set of two or three "big" events that related to the politics-of-crime appeared. But most events had one thing in common--Frank Rizzo. Almost any citation concerning Philadelphia and especially crime or the police had a comment by Rizzo or he was the source of the news event. After noticing this for the period of 1975-1977 the period of research was extended backwards to the election of Rizzo as Mayor, and the literature search expanded to include information on Rizzo. Sources used in this stage of the research were:

New York Time Index. Again, this was the most helpful source of information on city politics. The headings of "Crime-Pennsylvania," "Philadelphia," and "Rizzo, Frank" were referenced for each year in the study. Because Philadelphia is in closer proximity to New York than San Francisco, the Times reported news in greater detail about Philadelphia and even editorialized about Philadelphia politics. Most articles cited in the Index were read by the researcher.

Readers Guide to Periodical Literature and Social Sciences Index. Again, both these indexes were helpful in conducting research on

Philadelphia. They directed the research to articles which provided good summaries of the major events affecting the politics-of-crime in Philadelphia. Unlike San Francisco, however, they did not uncover any helpful in-depth articles of the politics-of-crime issues discussed in this study. This is largely due to the lack of any big issues (except Rizzo himself) and the biographical studies mentioned below provided a better description of the man and his politics than articles listed in these indexes.

Christian Science Monitor Index and National Observer Index. As with the San Francisco research, the articles cited in these indexes were good in providing a different perspective on the major news issues covered in this study.

Other newspaper indexes and academic indexes were not used after discovering their lack of usefulness in the San Francisco research.

3. Specific Research. This was the same long and tedious process used in the San Francisco research. After it was decided that Rizzo was central to the politics-of-crime in Philadelphia the specific research took two directions. First, two biographies of Rizzo were read. They provided the best political history of Philadelphia that could be obtained. Second, newspaper research was undertaken. Again, newspapers were read in chronological order to develop understanding of the flow of events and attitudes. Since the Chicago area libraries do not have copies of daily Philadelphia newspapers, two other newspaper sources were used. The Northwestern University library does have microfilm copies of the biweekly Black Philadelphia newspaper, The Tribune. Every issue from 1970-1977 was skimmed and articles concerning the politics-of-crime were noted. For a second source, almost all articles about Philadelphia in

the New York Times for this time period were also read.

Although this alternative strategy could not provide the same information as could have been gained from reading a daily Philadelphia paper, it was an adequate alternative. The Tribune usually reported on the major political events and contained the same information as could be found in a daily newspaper. Because of the bi-weekly printing schedule, the articles on political speeches, charges of police brutality and other incidents were in more summary form than would have been found in daily papers. The PT also gave the researcher extensive insight into the perspective of the Black population on the concerns about crime. The overwhelming importance of crime to the Black population and the alienation from the Rizzo regime was evident in almost every issue of the paper.

The New York Times did not report on the day-to-day events in Philadelphia but only those incidents it considered important. Many of their reports contained an anti-Rizzo bias. One article (NYT Magazine, 16 May, 1971) which appeared shortly before the Rizzo election contained many anti-Rizzo inaccuracies and was written by the wife of a political opponent of Rizzo, causing a controversy in journalism circles.

Hamilton, Fred. Rizzo: From Cop to Mayor of Philadelphia. This is the first of the two biographies of Frank Rizzo. Published in 1973, it provides little information on the performance of Rizzo as mayor of Philadelphia. It is, however, a good description of Rizzo's activities as a policeman and the events that led to his becoming the Police Commissioner. Of the two books, this is the most critical although neither provide a positive image of Rizzo.

Doughen, Joseph R. and Peter Binzen. The Cop Who Would be King: Mayor Frank Rizzo. Of all materials, this book provides the best description of Philadelphia politics during the mid-1970s. Although it is not an "insiders" view of the Rizzo administration and is often critical of the way the mayor operates, Rizzo's willingness to be open to Philadelphia reporters (which the two authors are) allowed the book to provide a comprehensive view of the way the mayor operates.

One difficulty in relying on biographies to provide information on the politics of a city is that it leads one to think the politics centered on one individual. On the other hand, Frank Rizzo has been very effective at silencing his critics and, because he is attracted to the center of controversy, has had the major impact on Philadelphia politics during the time of this study.

As is noted in the conclusions, Philadelphia's politics-of-crime was very much directed by a single individual or group of individuals while the politics-of-crime in San Francisco had a much broader involvement. The methodology used has implications for the conclusions because of the notable difference in sources used (and available) in research for both cities. One interpretation could be that the apparent difference in politics-of-crime between the two cities is based on the difference in the sources of information. On the other hand, it can be argued that the sources reflect the "reality" of the political situation in the two cities and, therefore, are only further evidence in demonstrating the politics-of-crime difference. This study is based on the latter assumption.

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B: Chronologies.

I. San Francisco Chronology of Major Events

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>PRE-1974</u>	
Sept. 1966	Hunters Point "riot"
Summer 1967	"Summer of Love" turns sour
Jan. 1968	Alioto becomes mayor
Nov. 1971	Alioto elected to second term as mayor
July, 1973	Sheriff Hongisto-transvestite controversy
Oct. 20, 1973	First Zebra incident (2 persons)
Nov. 6, 1973	M. Foster killed by SLA in Oakland
Nov. 25, 1973	Second Zebra incident (1 person)
Dec. 1973	Police hiring practices ruled invalid
Dec. 11, 1973	Third Zebra incident (1 person)
Dec. 13, 1973	Fourth Zebra incident (2 persons)
Dec. 20, 1973	Fifth Zebra incident (2 persons)
Dec. 22, 1973	Sixth Zebra incident (2 persons)
Dec. 24, 1973	Corpse found, later tied to Zebra case
<u>1974</u>	
January	
28	Seventh Zebra incident (5 persons)
February	
5	Patty Hearst kidnapped
15	Alioto's wife disappears for three weeks
March	
8	City worker's strike (not police/fire)

DATE

EVENT

1974-(continued)

April

1	Eighth Zebra incident (2 persons)
--	Stop-and-search controversy
14	Ninth Zebra incident (2 persons)
15	P. Hearst takes part in bank robbery
16	Tenth Zebra incident (1 person)

May

1	Zebra suspects captured
--	Police attempt to set trap for SLA after rumor of attempt to kidnap Alioto's grandchildren
17	SLA members die in Los Angeles fire

June

5	ELECTION: Brown wins over Alioto (Governor primary)
6	P. Hearst indicted (still not captured)

August

9	Nixon resigns
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September

--	Alioto conflict of interest case exposed
----	--

1975

January

--	First mayoral candidates announce
----	-----------------------------------

March

3	Zebra trial starts
---	--------------------

May

4	Court orders police to hire 60 women
---	--------------------------------------

DATE

EVENT

1975-(continued)

August

18-22 Police/firemen strike, Alioto's actions rejected by Board. Alioto settles anyway.

September

18 Patty Hearst captured

24 Assassination attempt on President Ford

October

-- Hearst pre-trial stories

November

4 ELECTION: Freitas (Dist. Attorney), Hongisto (Sheriff) win; Barbagelata vs. Moscone to runoff (Mayor) Proposition T (district elections) wins.

December

11 ELECTION: Moscone wins (Mayor)

1976

January

-- Bomb threats on supervisors

9 Moscone becomes mayor

13 Gain appointed Chief of Police

31 Municipal workers strike (not all, not police/fire)

March

20 P. Hearst found guilty

30 Zebra killers given life terms

May

-- All municipal workers' disputes resolved

DATE

EVENT

1976-(continued)

September

12 P. Hearst sentenced

November

24 Moscone announces \$1.7-million anti-crime plan

1977

January

-- Death threats on supervisors and others, Barbagelata's office shot-up.

-- Hongisto refuses to evict hotel tenants

February

5 Freitas' (D.A.) car bombed

25 Barbagelata announces "recall" proposition drive

May

-- Hongisto goes to jail for refusing to evict hotel tenants

August

2 ELECTION: Defeat of Proposition A (rescind district elections) and Proposition B (Barbagelata proposition)

November

-- ELECTION: District elections bring about diverse Board of Supervisors

II. Philadelphia Chronology of Major Events

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
<u>Pre-1971</u>	
1962	Tate replaces Dilworth as Mayor
1966	Bell replaces Leary as Police Commissioner
1967 April	Rizzo replaces Bell as Police Commissioner
July	Rizzo and Tate take credit for keeping city quiet during the summer
November	Tate wins over Specter for Mayor
November	Violent police response to black student demonstration at School District headquarters
December	Tate puts civilian police review board to end
1970 August	Black panthers "strip" for news cameras after police raid
<u>1971</u>	
February	Rizzo announces for Mayor
May	Rizzo wins Democratic primary over Green and Williams
November	Rizzo wins election for Mayor over Longstreath
<u>1972</u>	
January	Rizzo takes office
March	Gang violence becomes major topic of debate
September	Rizzo supports Nixon, gets \$52 million for Philadelphia in return
November	Nixon wins election
<u>1973</u>	
January	Teachers walk out on eleven week strike
March	Teachers return to work
August	Rizzo fails lie detector test over political bribe
November	Rizzo-backed candidates lose elections

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
<u>1974</u>	
March	Pennsylvania Crime Commission announces widespread corruption in Philadelphia police department.
April	ACLU and others release police brutality report LEAA says Philadelphia police department systematically under-reports crime to the FBI
<u>1975</u>	
April	Rizzo house building scandal exposed
May	Rizzo wins primary election over Louis Hill
October	Rizzo hurt while "on the scene" of a refinery fire
November	Rizzo wins general election over Bowser and Fogelleta
<u>1976</u>	
January	Rizzo begins second term in office Rizzo's staff announces city's \$80-million deficit and plans to close Philadelphia General Hospital
March	Trade union members block <u>Philadelphia Inquirer</u> plant after satirical article about Rizzo is published
April	Rizzo recall movement started
May	Rizzo announces "threat" to city from Bicentennial protesters Recall movement gets enough signatures
July	Bicentennial celebration without incident and low attendance
September	State Supreme Court removes recall from ballot
November	Jimmy Carter wins Presidential election
<u>1977</u>	
September	Grand jury indicts three policemen on brutality charges
November	Rizzo backed candidates lose in elections