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THE MEASUREMENT OF SERIOUSNESS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

Previous studies of crime seriousness focused on ordinary street crimes and typically neglected to include cases of police misconduct. This paper examines seriousness evaluations of police corruption provided by both police officers and the public. The respondents – police officers, Police College students, Police High School students, and college students from Croatia – were asked to evaluate the seriousness of 11 hypothetical scenarios. The results suggest that, while absolute evaluations of seriousness differ, their relative rankings match closely across various groups of respondents regardless of their theoretical knowledge of and practical experience in policing. A comparison of the seriousness evaluations by Police College students and college students also indicates that, despite the changes in the political and social environment in the five-year period (1996-2001), both the absolute and relative evaluations of seriousness remained stable.

DEFINING POLICE CORRUPTION

"3 Officers Found Guilty of Corruption."

(West New York, NJ, 1999; Peterson, 1999)

"Detroit Cops Guilty in Corruption Trial."

(Detroit, MI, 1998; Shepardson, 1998)

"Three More Plead Guilty in FBI Corruption Sting."

(Cleveland, OH, 1998; Rollenhagen, 1998)

"Two Convictions Close Corruption Case."

(New Orleans, LA, 1998; Perlstein, 1998)

"Two Cops Plead Guilty to Corruption."

(Atlanta, GA, 1995; Rankin, 1995)

"3 D.C. Officers Found Guilty in Corruption Case."

(Washington, DC, 1994; Locy, 1994)

Virtually no police department is entirely free of corruption. Despite the fact that the police officers' actions vary greatly from "systematically extorting money and favors from the owners of some of the city's most popular restaurants and nightclubs" (*Police Corruption Trial*, 1988, at A9), "bustling organized crime enterprise that collected and shared as much as \$1.5 million in illegal gains" (Peterson, 1999, p. B5), to "[keeping] money, guns and drugs seized from crack houses, [planting] phony evidence and falsified police reports" (Shepardson, 1998, p. 1), "conspiring to distribute cocaine" (Rollenhagen, 1998), and "working as armed escorts for what they thought was an international drug organization shipping" (Locy, 1994, p. B1), their common feature is that police officers in all of these cases were convicted for behavior that would be commonly understood as corrupt. However, legal codes in most countries do not incorporate a crime explicitly entitled "police corruption." What, then, is police corruption?

Police scholars strive to go beyond the fragmented elements contained in legal descriptions of various crimes prohibiting behavior classified as corrupt and to attain the goal of providing a general, unified definition of police corruption. To illustrate that

behavior under examination violates the societal expectations of the appropriate conduct of police officers, scholars typically resort to one of the following three approaches.

The first approach is to determine that the behavior represents a violation of criminal law (i.e., behavior is *criminal*), as was the case, for example, in the definition of police corruption in the final publication of the conference on police integrity organized by the U.S. Department of Justice (Gaffigan and McDonald, 1997, p. 46). In the second approach, in addition to, or instead of, defining police corruption as a violation of criminal law, police corruption is defined as a violation of departmental rules or legal rules in general (i.e., behavior is *illegal*). For example, in their typology of police corruption, Roebuck and Barker (1974) begin with the definition of police corruption that includes violations of at least one of the following sources of legal rules: (1) criminal laws; (2) formal departmental rules; and (3) informal departmental rules. The third approach is to avoid specifying which particular types of legal rules have been violated and instead link police corruption with *abuse or misuse of official position, authority, or organizational power* generally. Accordingly, in his definition of police corruption, Misner (1975, p. 46) relies on "the abuse or illegal use of office" and emphasizes the importance of the official position for the distinction between the corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Similarly, in his typology of drug-related police corruption, Carter (1990, p. 88) also included "the abuse of occupational position" as one of the crucial elements of the definition.

Corruption is different from other forms of police misconduct because of its motivation: achievement of personal gain. This notion has not escaped policing scholars; they typically include the element of personal gain into the definitions. For example, in his definition, Goldstein (1975, p. 3) views corruption "... as acts involving the misuse of authority by a police officer *in a manner designed to produce personal gain...* [emphasis added]."

In this paper, we define *police corruption as an action or omission, a promise of action or omission, or an attempt of action or omission, committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterized by the police officer's misuse of the official position motivated in significant part with the achievement of personal gain*. This way of defining corruption goes beyond the usual quid-pro-quo assumption and thus allows us to include behavior that could be otherwise classified as extortion, robbery, burglary, or theft. The true heterogeneous nature of police corruption is best captured in the typology developed by Barker and Roebuck (1973), which we later use in the empirical part of this paper.

On the basis of empirical data, Barker and Roebuck (1973, p. 21) classified diverse types of police corruption according to five dimensions: act and actors involved, nature of norms violated, degree of peer group support, required degree of deviant organization, and departmental reaction. The first type involves cases of *corruption of authority* – "the officer's authority is corrupted when he receives officially unauthorized, unearned material gain by virtue of his position as a police officer without violating the law *per se*" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 21). This category is very broad; the authors provide examples ranging from the acceptance of free drinks, free food, discounts on merchandise, to providing property protection for a fee.

The next few types of police corruption share several characteristics: they are examples of typical corruption in which a police officer receives a payment in exchange for overlooking an illegal or criminal activity. Therefore, the second type of police corrup-

tion involves *kickbacks* – the acceptance of goods, services, or money for referring business to various businesses and service providers, including towing companies, ambulances, garages, lawyers, doctors, etc. (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 24). The third type of police corruption in Barker and Roebuck's typology involves *shakedowns* which occur upon the police officer's discovery of the criminal violation and the violator, and result in the police officer's acceptance of a bribe in order not to make an arrest (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 27). The fourth type of police corruption involves *protection of illegal activities*. Individuals involved in illegal activities provide services and goods to the citizens and reward police officers in order to operate without police harassment (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 31). The fifth type of police corruption is *the fix*, in which a police officer fixes the case in exchange for a gain. Instances of the fix may include "the quashing of prosecution proceedings following the offender's arrest and ...the taking up (disposal of record) of traffic tickets" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 34).

The next two types of corruption include cases in which a police officer violates the criminal law without engaging in an activity prohibited exclusively for public officials. The sixth type of police corruption, then, involves *opportunistic theft* from arrestees, victims, crime scenes, and unprotected property (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 26). These thefts may be classified as police corruption because they satisfy the necessary condition – the misuse of the police officers' authority: they are facilitated by the opportunities provided through their police occupation. The seventh type of police corruption is the police officers' involvement in direct *criminal activities*; "policemen directly commit crimes against the person or property of another for material gain, acts which are clear violation of both departmental and criminal norms" (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 35-36).

The last, eighth type of police corruption involves *internal payoffs*; both the corrupters and the corrupted are police officers, who sell or buy assignments, off-days, holidays, promotions, etc. (Barker and Roebuck, 1973, p. 36).

MEASURING SERIOUSNESS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

Prior literature on crime seriousness, starting from Sellin and Wolfgang's first study in 1964, examined the degree to which seriousness evaluations of various crimes differ across respondents from the same society and across societies. Sellin and Wolfgang (1964, p. 268) found that, despite the differences in the *magnitude* of seriousness estimates (i.e., absolute seriousness), the relative order or *ranking* of these crimes (i.e., relative seriousness) seemed quite similar across several groups of respondents. Thus, they concluded that "implicit judgments about the severity of crime are imbedded in our social institutions" (Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985, p. v). Indeed, research studies consistently have indicated that, despite differences in the *absolute* values between various groups – offenders and non-offenders (Velez-Diaz & Megargee, 1971; Figlio, 1975), men and women (Rossi *et al.*, 1985), African-American respondents and Caucasian respondents (Rossi *et al.*, 1985; Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985), the old and the young (Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985), and victims and non-victims (Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985) – there is a high degree of similarity in terms of *relative* seriousness (Velez-Diaz & Megargee, 1971; Figlio, 1975; Rossi *et al.*, 1985; Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985).

Traditional studies of crime severity not only rarely used police officers as offenders in the descriptions of hypothetical cases (see, e.g., Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985), but also rarely included them as respondents in the surveys (see, e.g., Selling and Wolfgang, 1964; Kelly and Winslow, 1970; Hsu, 1973). On the other hand, police officers' evaluation

of police misconduct seriousness is of considerable interest to the scholars in the area of policing.

Barker (1978) engaged in one of the first studies of this type. His subjects were police officers in "a southern city" whom he asked to evaluate the level of "wrongness" for several cases of police misconduct. The results showed that the respondents evaluated police brutality as the least serious form of misconduct, less serious than sex on duty or sleeping on duty. On the other hand, the most serious forms included police perjury and drinking on duty.

More recently, samples of police officers from Illinois and Ohio have been asked to evaluate the seriousness of several hypothetical cases of police misconduct, including police corruption (see Martin, 1994; Knowles, 1996). The results suggest that the acceptance of a bribe and theft of property were consistently perceived to be among the most serious forms of police misconduct, while the acceptance of free food and fixing of a parking ticket were perceived to be among the least serious forms of police misconduct (Martin, 1994; Knowles, 1996).

The Australian Criminal Justice Commission (1999) asked four samples of Australian first-year police constables to evaluate the seriousness of a number of hypothetical cases of police misconduct. The respondents could have picked one of the answers on a 10-point scale from "1" being the least serious to "10" being the most serious. According to the Australian rookies (*Criminal Justice Commission*, 1999), the least serious cases involved acceptance of holiday gifts, pick-up of personal equipment outside of the patrol area, and punching an arrested suspect being led into the cells. On the other hand, they evaluated cases involving falsification of official records (e.g., adding words to the suspected rapist's statement), stealing items of small value from the crime scene, and stealing and selling confiscated drugs to be among the most serious.

Huon *et al.* (1995), McConkey *et al.* (1996), and the *Criminal Justice Commission* (1999) all discovered that police officers' experience and/or their rank may have an impact on the absolute evaluations of case seriousness. Huon *et al.* (1995) reported that police recruits (the least experienced group) and senior supervisors (the most experienced group, also having a higher rank) evaluated the same cases as more serious than either the line officers or the first-line supervisors (sergeants). Using the same seven scenarios, the *Criminal Justice Commission* (1995) also found that recruits, the least experienced group, ranked cases as the most serious, followed by the first-year constables, while detectives, the most experienced group, provided the least serious evaluations. Although these two studies reported differences in absolute evaluations of seriousness between the least and most serious groups of respondents, the rank-orders of case seriousness were rather similar. In fact, *Criminal Justice Commission* (1995, p. 19), wrote that "there was a *fair* amount of agreement amongst respondents that it was a serious matter for an officer to steal goods from a crime scene, interfere with the enforcement of the law against a family member, or 'verbal' a suspect."

In the descriptions of hypothetical cases, McConkey *et al.* (1996, p. 34) varied the nature of gain (personal v. community gain), the place where the activity occurred (public v. private), and the outcome of the activity (positive v. negative). They discovered that all of these factors have an impact on the police officers' perceptions of seriousness. When personal gain was involved, when the activity occurred in public, and when the outcome of the activity was negative (e.g., the interference with an arrest of a son when the son is guilty), the same case was evaluated as more serious.

Son *et al.* (1998) also systematically varied several factors (e.g., race of the suspect, types of drugs used, the amount of money involved) and found that, in a case describing a forced confession, the type of force used and the type of suspect were the key factors that influenced the respondents' evaluations of seriousness. Contrary, the respondents evaluated the case describing the use of excessive force in arresting a shoplifter "as a fairly serious form of misconduct regardless of the suspect's race, the suspect's behavior toward the officer, the consequences of using force, and the characteristics of the neighborhood" (Son *et al.*, 1998, p. 24-25).

This paper provides the results of a study that, in a quantitative way, measures police officers' perceptions of seriousness of a number of types of police corruption identified by Barker and Roebuck (1973). The paper contributes toward the existing literature not only by providing a systematic measure of the police officers' evaluations of seriousness, but also by comparing them with the evaluations of seriousness provided by college students, police high school students, and students at a Police College. Finally, the paper examines how perceptions of college students and students at a Police College change over a five-year time span.

THE SURVEY

The questionnaire we use in this study, originally designed by Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (Kutnjak Ivković and Klockars, 1996; see also Klockars *et al.*, 1997), consists of eleven hypothetical cases. Ten cases describe various types of police corruption, while one of the cases focuses on the use of excessive force (Appendix 1). Three cases refer to corruption of authority (Case 1, Case 2, and Case 4), one case involves a shakedown (Case 3), and another one describes a kickback (Case 6), while two cases focus on opportunistic thefts (Case 5 and Case 11). There are also two cases with internal payoffs (Case 7 and Case 8) and one case including protection of illegal activities. The order in which these cases follow in the questionnaire is random.

Each case is followed by a series of questions inquiring about the seriousness of the case, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to report it. The first question, the foundation of the analyses reported in this paper, asks the respondents to evaluate each case in terms of its seriousness. The answers ranged from 1 "not at all serious" to 5 "very serious."

RESPONDENTS

The data used in this study come from two applications of the same survey. The first application (1995/1996) included Croatian police officers, Croatian college students, students at the Croatian Police College, and students at the Croatian Police High School. The second application (2001) included Croatian college students and students at the Croatian Police College. The samples differ widely in terms of their theoretical knowledge of and experience in policing, from actual police officers to members of the public (i.e., college students).

The sample of *Croatian police officers* is a stratified national sample of 1,649 police officers from 41 police stations, selected in a manner that reflects as closely as possible the national distribution of the police by region, size, type, and district. In 1995, the questionnaire was sent by courier to each of the police stations. Most of the police officers (74%) had been police officers for five years or less, and most (85%) had worked at their present police station for five years or less. About 19% of the respon-

dents were employed in supervisory ranks. Most of the police officers reported performing patrol (41%) or traffic (21%) assignments. The majority (57.1%) worked in small police agencies (25-75 officer) and an additional 27.7% worked in medium-sized (75-200 officer) police agencies.

The sample of *Croatian college students*, surveyed in 1996, includes 534 University of Zagreb students. The questionnaire was distributed during regular class hours at four different schools within the University: the School of Educational Studies (44.6%), the School of Physical Education (31.0%), the School of Electrical Engineering (11.9%), and the School of Veterinary Medicine (12.5%). The respondents were mostly advanced students: only 39% were first-year or second-year students. The majority (73.9%) did not plan to become police officers; only a few planned to become or already were police officers (1.5%), and one-quarter of the respondents were undecided about whether they would become police officers (24.6%).

The 2001 sample of college students is composed of 511 respondents. Most of the respondents attended the School of Educational Studies (20.8%), the School of Physical Education (20.0%), or the School of Electrical Engineering (19.8%). Two-thirds were either first- or second-year students. The majority (73.7%) did not plan to become police officers, one-quarter were undecided (24.8%), and only a few planned to become police officers (1.5%).

A whole generation¹ of the *Police High School students* was surveyed in 1995 at the beginning of their two-year program. They were high-school juniors who spent the previous two years in regular high schools across the country. Most of the third-year curriculum at the Police High School consisted of police-related courses. Therefore, these respondents had theoretical knowledge about policing and were about to obtain practical experience in the police stations. The sample includes a total of 379 students.

The *Police College student sample* collected in 1995 consists of 223 respondents. Forty-two percent were first-year students and the remaining 58% were second-year students in a two-year program leading to an Associate Degree in Criminalistics. Approximately one-half of the respondents (45.4%) were active police officers with at least two years of experience, while the other half (50.5%) was comprised of citizens who were high-school graduates. The 2001 sample consists of 271 respondents, out of which only 4.2% were police officers, while the overwhelming majority (92.0%) were citizens who were high-school graduates.

EVALUATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION SERIOUSNESS

Based on the answers by each group of respondents, we calculated the mean values and presented them in Table 1. We then rank-ordered cases based on the mean value from the smallest value of the mean to the largest value of the mean. We draw several conclusions.

First, regardless of the extent of their knowledge of and practical experience in policing, all groups of respondents perceived the described cases of police corruption to vary greatly in terms of their seriousness. Mean values range on a five-point scale from close to 2.0 to close to or even above 4.5 (Table 1).

Second, for all eleven cases, the analysis of variance revealed statistically significant differences and the follow-up post-hoc Tukey test indicated pairs of means with significant differences. For each case there were 6 different pairs of mean, yielding an

overall number of pairs for all 11 cases to be 66. Out of the 66 possible combinations, significant differences were noted in one-half (33). In determining whether a statistically significant difference in mean seriousness scores also signaled a real and meaningful difference of opinion, we use a rule of thumb: if the difference in the mean scores exceeds .50 in absolute terms on the five-point scale, we regard it as substantively important. Using that criterion, we focus on four cases with substantive differences.

In two cases – Case 8 (Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident) and Case 10 (Excessive Force on Car Thief) – the respondents with no practical experience in policing, namely college students and Police High School students, evaluated these cases to be substantively more serious than did respondents with more extensive experience, namely police officers and students at the Police College. Both of these cases do not fit the typical quid-pro-quo arrangement. The first case, Case 8 (Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident), can be viewed by police officers as an extended case of police collegiality in which there is no obvious direct personal gain, but, rather, an uncertain benefit of getting the same courtesy if and when the police officer finds himself in such a situation. Citizens and inexperienced Police High School students, unfamiliar with the norms of the police culture and the justification it can provide for such behavior, have probably evaluated such case as a more serious one.

The second case in which citizens and Police High School students evaluated the case as more serious involved the only non-corruption case, Case 10 (Excessive Force on Car Thief). Although it involves the use of excessive force, the case is designed in a way that includes in-the-heat-of-the-passion given one-too-many blows on a fleeing car thief. The context of the behavior makes the behavior much easier to justify by almost any police officer who has chased a suspect several blocks. On the other hand, this contextual nature sounds just like a decoration in a hypothetical story to "inexperienced" college students and students at the Police High School who probably focus more on the activity itself: punching a subdued suspect.

On the other hand, in two cases – Case 2 (Free Meals, Discounts on Beat) and Case 3 (Bribe from Speeding Motorist) – college students evaluated the case as less serious than some of the other groups of respondents did. When it gets to the prohibition of the acceptance of gratuities, as Case 2 describes, the opinions are controversial, but the fact remains that it is difficult to draw the line between the value of the allowed gifts and the value of the prohibited gifts. In a culture in which corruption is a way of life (see Kregar, 1999, p. 11), it may be more difficult for the public to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior than it is for police officers, who should be more familiar with both the relevant sections of the criminal laws and organizational rules prohibiting such conduct.

The second case (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist) in which college students perceived the case as less serious than any other group of respondents describes a classic case of police corruption (bribery) and possibly one of the most frequent forms of police corruption in the countries in transition.² The reasons for less serious evaluations by college students may lie in the combination of the relative tolerance for corruption prevailing in the Croatian society (see Kregar, 1999, p. 11) and the fact that this is the only case in which college students can be perceived as "partners in crime." In other words, while in all other 10 cases police officers are the culprits, in this case there are two sides to the transaction and college students may well view themselves to be on the other side.

Third, while there were some differences in absolute terms (i.e., in mean values), the relative order of case seriousness – the ranking of the cases based on their mean values (Table 1) – is quite similar across the four groups. An exceptionally high Spearman's

correlation coefficient of .80 or higher between the pairs of rankings implies that the four groups of respondents evaluated the relative rankings of the eleven cases in an analogous way. The four groups of respondents unanimously evaluated the three cases describing corruption of authority (Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business; Case 2 – Free Meals, Discounts on Beat; and Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants) to be on the least serious side of the scale (with means close or around 2.0 on a five-point scale). On the other end of the scale of seriousness are two examples of opportunistic theft (Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch; Case 11 – Theft from Found Wallet) and a shakedown case (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist).

CHANGES IN THE EVALUATIONS OF CORRUPTION SERIOUSNESS

To examine if and to what extent evaluations of seriousness have changed over a period of five years, we compare estimates of seriousness provided by the 1995 sample of college students and the 1995 sample of Police College students with the estimates of seriousness provided by the two respective samples in 2001 (Table 2). Three important findings emerge.

First, evaluations of seriousness differ extensively across cases, from the mean values close to 2.0 (Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants; Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business) to 4.7 (Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch; Table 2). All four groups estimated that the behaviors described in the eleven cases vary greatly.

Second, the absolute estimates of seriousness (i.e., mean values) differ significantly across the four samples (see F-test in Table 2). The post-hoc Tukey test suggested that, out of the possible 66 combinations of pairs of means, there were significant differences between 25 pairs (38%). However, these pairs with significant differences were not distributed equally across all 11 cases, but were concentrated in three cases (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist; Case 8 – Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident; Case 10 – Excessive Force on Car Thief). In these three cases there were also substantive differences.

In most of the cases (7 out of 11), there were no substantive differences across the two sample types (college students v. Police College students) and across time (1995 v. 2001). In fact, estimates of seriousness provided by the two samples of college students were remarkably similar in all eleven cases (Table 2). Estimates of seriousness provided by the two samples of Police College students, while similar in most of the cases (9 out of 11), exhibited substantive differences in two cases (Case 8 – Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident; Case 10 – Excessive Force on Car Thief). In both of these cases, the 2001 sample viewed the case on a five-point scale as being more serious by almost one point. Such large differences can partially be explained by the nature of cases in question: for example, the Police Law of 2000 changed the scenery with respect to the use of force. The differences could also potentially be explained by the sample characteristics: while one-half of the 1995 sample was composed of police officers (with at least two years of experience), the 2001 sample contained only a few police officers.

Third, relative estimates of rankings of case seriousness are very similar, with correlation coefficients above .90. The same three cases (Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants; Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business; and Case 2 – Free Meals, Discounts on Beat) were evaluated as the least serious by three out of four groups of respondents. On the other hand, the same three cases (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding

Motorist; Case 11 – Theft from Found Wallet; and Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch) were viewed as the most serious by the four groups.

CONCLUSION

While of great interest to the policing scholars, the seriousness of police corruption has been studied infrequently. Previous studies of crime seriousness focused on ordinary street crimes and typically neglected to include cases of police misconduct. This paper examines evaluations of seriousness of police corruption provided by both Croatian police officers and the Croatian public. The level of knowledge of and experience with policing among our respondents ranges from actual police officers (the most experienced group) to members of the general public (the least experienced group).

The results show that our respondents provided similar estimates of seriousness across varying level of experience with policing. While absolute evaluations of seriousness differed somewhat across the groups, the relative rankings were remarkably similar across the groups, regardless of their experience. A comparison of the seriousness evaluations by Police College students and college students over a five-year period (1996-2001) also indicates that, despite the changes in the political and social environment, both the absolute and relative evaluations of seriousness remained stable over time. Such a homogeneous view of relative seriousness suggests that there is a shared hierarchy of perceptions of police corruption seriousness.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 The whole generation consisted of 14 classes. We surveyed 13 classes of students who were to be employed by the Ministry of the Interior as police officers. The 14th class, which we did not survey, consisted of students who were to be employed by the Ministry of Justice and were to serve as security officials in the courtrooms.
- 2 Frič and Walek estimate the acceptance of a bribe from a driver to be one of the three most frequent forms of corruption in Hungary and Poland (2001, p. 43, 49).

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Table 1 - Reports of Own Perceptions of Seriousness by Croatian Police Officers, Police College Students, High School Students, and College Students

	Police officers		Police college students		High school students		College students		F-test
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	
Case 1 - Off-Duty Security System Business	2.57	2	2.37	2	2.62	2	2.12	2	13.36***
Case 2 - Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	3.01	4	2.79	5	2.80	3	2.50	3	16.67***
Case 3 - Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.47	10	4.46	10	4.40	10	3.89	9	36.99***
Case 4 - Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.13	1	1.79	1	1.95	1	1.83	1	9.92***
Case 5 - Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.72	11	4.69	11	4.69	11	4.57	11	4.06**
Case 6 - Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	3.86	7	3.55	6.5	3.60	6	3.41	5	16.57***
Case 7 - Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-Up	4.09	8	3.98	8	3.80	7	3.71	7	14.34***
Case 8 - Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	2.79	3	2.57	3	3.15	4	3.45	6	34.63***
Case 9 - Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	3.85	6	3.55	6.5	3.85	8	3.38	4	19.51***
Case 10 - Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.03	5	2.77	4	3.34	5	3.82	8	44.63***
Case 11 - Theft from Found Wallet	4.57	9	4.27	9	4.18	9	4.31	10	16.81***

*p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 2 - Reports of Own Perceptions of Seriousness by Croatian Police College Students and College Students in 1995 and 2001

	College students 1995		Police college students 1995		College students 2001		Police college students 2001		F-test
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	
Case 1 - Off-Duty Security System Business	2.12	2	2.37	2	2.04	2	2.16	2	3.37*
Case 2 - Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	2.50	3	2.79	5	2.92	3	2.75	3	9.48***
Case 3 - Bribe from Speeding Motorist	3.89	9	4.46	10	4.12	9	4.41	10	20.21***
Case 4 - Holiday Gifts from Merchants	1.83	1	1.79	1	2.03	1	2.02	1	4.40**
Case 5 - Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.57	11	4.69	11	4.68	11	4.77	11	4.22**
Case 6 - Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	3.41	5	3.55	6.5	3.77	6	3.94	8	14.17***
Case 7 - Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-Up	3.71	7	3.98	8	3.75	5	3.85	6	3.42*
Case 8 - Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	3.45	6	2.57	3	3.92	7	3.39	4	57.21***
Case 9 - Drinks to Ignore Late Bar Closing	3.38	4	3.55	6.5	3.41	4	3.60	5	2.44
Case 10 - Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.82	8	2.77	4	4.03	8	3.91	7	52.04***
Case 11 - Theft from Found Wallet	4.31	10	4.27	9	4.35	10	4.35	9	0.34

*p <.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

APPENDIX 1: CASE SCENARIOS

- Case 1.** A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
- Case 2.** A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
- Case 3.** A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift for half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
- Case 4.** A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
- Case 5.** A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
- Case 6.** A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
- Case 7.** A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during the coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.
- Case 8.** At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
- Case 9.** A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.
- Case 10.** Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.
- Case 11.** A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.