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SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVIĆ

SHARING THE VIEW: LINE OFFICER AND SUPERVISOR EVALUATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION SERIOUSNESS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

This paper focuses on evaluations of seriousness of police corruption provided by 451 line officers and supervisors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Sarajevo Canton). Line officers viewed the ten hypothetical cases of police misconduct to vary greatly in terms of their seriousness and thought that most officers in their agencies would evaluate them in the same way. Supervisors also perceived the cases to represent a heterogeneous set of corrupt behaviors and, with the exception of three cases, thought that the majority of police officers in their agencies would evaluate them similarly. Finally, a comparison between line officers' and supervisors' own evaluations of seriousness reveals that the evaluations are quite similar, both in absolute and in relative terms.

INTRODUCTION

The police in the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, much like the country itself, are divided. They are highly compartmentalized, consisting of as many as 14 police forces. The overall impression about the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not bright at the moment, as pointed out by the International Crisis Group in 2002 (p. i):

Despite more than six years of increasingly intrusive reforms carried out at the behest of the UN Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the local police cannot yet be counted upon to enforce the law. Too often—like their opposite members in the judiciary—nationally partial, under-qualified, underpaid, and sometimes corrupt police officers uphold the law selectively, within a dysfunctional system still controlled by politicized and nationalized interior ministries.

Recent public opinion polls (see International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 1) confirm this view: "only 48.1 per cent think the police are nowadays more professional than the pre-war milicija, and only 42.7 per cent think they treat all people equally." Part of the problem appears to be police corruption. Compared to most countries in the world, Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to be among the countries more tolerant of corruption in general. According to the 2003 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Bosnia and Herzegovina received a score of 3.3 on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). Such a low score indicates that business people, academics, and risk analysts perceived the country as being corrupt.

The international community has been helping Bosnia and Herzegovina to restructure the police in accordance with modern, professional standards (see International Crisis Group, 2002). Moreover, according to the Transparency International (Lambsdorff, 2004), Bosnia and Herzegovina is among the countries in which corruption is highly tolerated. Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a particularly interesting and relevant case study of police officers' perceptions of seriousness of police corruption. While previous studies of seriousness of police misconduct focused exclusively on the police in the countries characterized by relatively low levels of corruption (Australia, USA), this paper uses the data from a country on the opposite side of the

spectrum. Using the data collected in the Sarajevo Canton, I analyze police officers' (both line officers' and supervisors') perceptions of seriousness of police corruption and examine their perceptions regarding the seriousness levels that the majority of their fellow police officers would attach to the same cases.

POLICE AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CRIME SEVERITY

Since the seminal study by Sellin and Wolfgang (1964), studies of crime severity predominantly focused on street crimes and only infrequently extended to white-collar crimes. Even when police misconduct is included as a part of the survey, the range of behaviors covered by the study mostly targets the more pronounced, typical forms such as the acceptance of a bribe. For example, Wolfgang *et al.* (1985) focused on bribery and found that the recipient's official position had an impact on the evaluations of seriousness of bribe acceptance. The bribery was evaluated as the most serious when the bribe was accepted by a county judge in exchange for a lighter sentence, somewhat less serious when accepted by a legislator in exchange for voting for a law favoring a company, and the least serious when accepted by a police officer in exchange for non-interference with an illegal gambling operation.

Several studies (e.g., Rossi *et al.*, 1974; Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985; Rebovich and Layne, 2000) suggest that the evaluations of seriousness are influenced by who the offender is (i.e., a public official v. a citizen). In particular, although a typical bribery–payment provided by a citizen to a police officer in exchange for not enforcing the law—has two sides, the bribe-giving by the citizen is viewed as less serious than the acceptance of a bribe by the police officer. Rossi *et al.* (1974) found that their respondents regarded the acceptance of a bribe by a public official as more serious (average score 6.240 on a nine-point scale) than the offer of a bribe to a public official (average score 5.394). Similarly, Wolfgang *et al.* (1985) found that the acceptance of a bribe by a legislator was evaluated as more serious than the offer of a bribe by a company to a legislator, even when the amount of the bribe accepted was ten times lower than the amount of the bribe offered. Finally, based on their recent study of perceptions about white-collar crimes, Rebovich and Layne (2000) reported a similar conclusion: the acceptance of a bribe by a public official was viewed as more severe than the offer of a bribe by either a private citizen or a corporation.

Policing literature embraced the idea of studying crime severity and focused on the topic of police misconduct. Rather than studying how seriously the respondents viewed cases of police misconduct *compared* to street crimes, policing studies are more interested in comparing seriousness estimates *across* various forms of police misconduct.

Barker's study of one police agency in "a southern city" (1978) is a premier example of this approach. When police officers were asked to judge how wrong the described behavior was, their answers indicated that they not only could discriminate well among various forms of police misconduct, but also could differentiate among various types within the same form. Police brutality, sex on duty, and sleeping on duty were perceived to be among the least serious forms of police misconduct. On the other hand, the most serious forms included police perjury and drinking on duty.

More recently, Martin (1994) and Knowles (1996) asked a stratified sample of police officers in Illinois and Ohio, respectively, to evaluate the seriousness of 35 hypothetical cases. These cases included examples of various forms of police misconduct, from police corruption and drug use to falsification of evidence and the use of excessive

force. Behaviors evaluated to be the most serious included acceptance of a bribe, theft of property, planting of a weapon on a suspect, and drug use (see Martin, 1994, p. 23). On the other end of the scale was classified behavior that included racial profiling, flashing a badge to avoid a traffic citation, and speeding when there is no emergency (see Martin, 1994, p. 23). Martin (1994, p. 23-24) reported that the extent of agreement among the respondents about the seriousness of these 35 cases varied across cases, being the strongest for the cases classified as the most serious and the least serious. She further wrote that "there was considerable disagreement among respondents concerning the seriousness of misconduct. Of the 35 vignette behaviors, only one (accepting bribe) had almost complete agreement as to its seriousness" (Martin, 1994, p. 24).

RANK AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CRIME SEVERITY

A few studies also examined how respondents of different rank and experience evaluate seriousness of police misconduct. Huon *et al.* (1995) asked 257 police officers and 406 police recruits in Australia to evaluate the seriousness of 20 cases. A comparison of personal estimates of seriousness shows that recruits provided the highest estimates of seriousness, while constables, senior constables, and sergeants provided the lowest (see Huon *et al.*, 1995, p. 11). Judgments of seriousness meted out by senior sergeants and commissioned officers fall between those of the recruits and other police officers. The results of multivariate analyses provide further evidence that rank and experience both have an independent effect on seriousness evaluations, with rank exhibiting a stronger relation with the perceptions of seriousness than experience does (Huon *et al.*, 1995, p. 9).

The Australian Criminal Justice Commission (1995) relied on the eight cases developed by Huon *et al.* (1995) to examine the degree of differentiation between the opinions of 59 recruits, 56 first-year constables, and 65 experienced police officers. Their findings provided further evidence that experience mattered in absolute evaluations of seriousness: recruits—individuals with the least experience in policing—provided the most serious evaluations and experienced police officers provided the least serious ones. Results of another study (McConkey *et al.*, 1996) that also used cases developed by Huon *et al.* (1995), namely an opportunistic theft of cigarettes and abuse of a foreign order to get some equipment for Sunday building job, consistently reported that the respondents' own evaluations of seriousness were related to their rank: commissioned officers provided the highest evaluations of seriousness, while constables provided the lowest (see McConkey *et al.*, 1996, p. 30-31).

Another way of studying perceptions of seriousness is to focus on the relative order of cases and see whether the ranking of cases (from the least serious to the most serious case) remains relatively stable across various groups, regardless of their rank or experience. In the original study by Huon *et al.* (1995), cases in the questionnaire varied both in terms of the forms of police misconduct and the types within a particular form, but speaking rudely to the youth and trying to avoid the fine when caught speeding seemed to be the least serious cases, whereas fabricating a story of pursuit to cover reckless driving and fluffing up the rapist's statement were evaluated as the most serious ones. Similarly, Criminal Justice Commission (1995, p. 19) wrote that "there was a *fair* amount of agreement amongst respondents that it was a serious matter for an officer to steal goods from a crime scene, interfere with the enforcement of the law against a family member, or 'verbal' a suspect."

A TYPICAL POLICE OFFICER AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CRIME SEVERITY

Some of the aforementioned studies also asked the respondents to predict how serious a typical officer in their agency would evaluate the same hypothetical cases. When Huon *et al.* (1995) asked their respondents—257 police officers and 406 police recruits—how serious they thought that others would view the same cases the respondents were asked about, the results indicated that predictions of seriousness evaluations by a typical police officer were much closer to own estimates of seriousness provided by constables and senior constables and sergeants (that is, the "average" evaluations) than to the own estimates of seriousness provided by either recruits or senior sergeants and commissioned officers.

The Australian Criminal Justice Commission (1995) reported that the all three groups of respondents, namely the recruits, first-year constables, and experienced police officers, saw the management as providing the most severe evaluations of seriousness, followed by the public and their own evaluations. A typical police officer was perceived to view the cases as less serious than the respondents themselves, but the gap was the smallest for experienced police officers (Criminal Justice Commission, 1995, p. iv). Three subsequent applications of the same survey (1996-1998) administered to the first-year constables showed that the respondents' own evaluations of case seriousness were consistently somewhat higher than their perceptions of the way a typical police officer would judge the same case (see Criminal Justice Commission, 1999).

McConkey *et al.* (1996, p. 30-31) study provided further evidence that, compared to the respondents' own evaluations of seriousness, a typical officer was consistently expected to evaluate the cases as less serious. This finding was affected by the rank and experience: the higher the rank, the larger the gap between the respondent's own evaluations of seriousness and expectations of seriousness evaluations by a typical police officer.

DATA & METHODS

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

To gather police officers' views on misconduct seriousness, I rely on ten hypothetical cases from the questionnaire designed by Klockars and Kutnjak Ivković (Kutnjak Ivković and Klockars, 1996; see also Klockars *et al.*, 1997). Nine cases focus on police corruption and vary from the acceptance of gratuities and holiday gifts (Case 2 – Free Meals, Discounts on Beat; Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants) to opportunistic thefts (Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch; Case 11 – Theft from Found Wallet) and shakedowns of speeding motorists (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist). The remaining case describes the use of excessive force on a fleeing car thief.

A series of seven questions follows each case description. They focus on perceptions of case seriousness, rule violations, adequate and expected discipline for the described violations, and willingness to report such violations. Two questions used in the study ask the respondents to evaluate how serious they perceived the case to be and how serious they thought that most of the police officers in their agencies would perceive them to be. The respondents are asked to select the most appropriate answer on a five-point scale from 1 "not at all serious" to 5 "very serious."

Each questionnaire also contains a limited number of questions about the respondents' demographic characteristics. As the goal was to maximize the chances that the respondents would provide honest answers, the number of demographic questions was

limited to just a few to avoid possible identification of the respondents. A question relevant for the study inquired whether a respondent was in a supervisory position. For the purposes of this study, if the answer was "yes," I classified such a respondent as a supervisor. Alternatively, if they answered in negative, I assumed that they were line officers.

RESPONDENTS

Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), each maintaining their own police. The police within the Federation are further compartmentalized: each of the ten cantons within the Federation has its own ministry of the interior that enjoys substantial autonomy. The Federal ministry's role is rather limited. It is responsible for "coordinating inter-entity and inter-cantonal cooperation, especially in regard to terrorism and other serious and organized crimes, protecting VIPs and guarding diplomatic premises" (International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 9), while the cantonal ministries are responsible for all other aspects of policing.

Questionnaires were distributed in fall of 2003 to sworn police officers working in four police stations in the Sarajevo Canton (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Five hundred police officers included in the survey constituted approximately 45% of the police force in the Sarajevo Canton. Questionnaires were returned by 451 respondents, yielding a response rate of 90%.

The respondents were experienced police officers: less than twenty percent of police officers had less than five years of experience (16.9%), one-third (36.8%) had between six and ten years of experience, and an additional one-third (30.2%) had between eleven and fifteen years of experience. In terms of the nature of their work, three out of four respondents reported performing the patrol assignment. About twelve percent were employed in supervisory ranks.

RESULTS

LINE OFFICERS' VIEWS ON SERIOUSNESS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

The questionnaire asks police officers to evaluate how serious each case is and to select a number from 1 ("not at all serious") to 5 ("very serious") that best represents their opinion. Based on their responses, I calculated the mean values for each case (see Table 1) and rank-ordered the cases from the least serious (1) to the most serious (11).

The results show that line officers thought that the described cases are quite heterogeneous in terms of their seriousness, from those closer to the least serious side (2.43 for Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants; 2.87 for Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business) all the way to those very close to the serious end of the scale (4.66 for Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch; 4.70 for Case 11 – Theft from Found Wallet). When asked how they thought that most police officers in their agencies would evaluate the seriousness of these same cases, the respondents said that their fellow officers would also perceive these cases to vary greatly in terms of their seriousness (see Table 1), from the least serious Case 4 (Holiday Gifts from Merchants) with the smallest mean of 2.38, to the most serious Case 5 (Crime Scene Theft of Watch) with the largest mean of 4.57.

Comparing line officers' own estimates of seriousness with their assessments of the seriousness estimates provided by most police officers in their agencies yielded statisti-

cally significant differences in five cases (Table 1). However, a statistically significant difference does not automatically imply a real and meaningful difference of opinion. Rather, I use the rule of thumb whereby I regard the difference in the mean scores in excess of .50 in absolute terms on the five-point scale as substantively important. A comparison of the respondents' own estimates of seriousness with the one expected to be provided by other police officers suggests that the difference reaches the threshold of .50 in none of the cases. If the respondents' own evaluations of seriousness are used as a measure of how serious the majority of police officers evaluate these cases, then this remarkable result—a lack of substantive differences between their own estimates and their estimates of others' seriousness—indicates that the police officers as a group exhibited an accurate prediction of how the majority would evaluate these cases.

Finally, a comparison of the two rankings based on the respondents' own estimates of seriousness and their estimates of others' seriousness, suggests that they are very strongly related: the correlation coefficient is .939.

SUPERVISORS' VIEWS ON SERIOUSNESS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

Just like line officers, supervisors also evaluated cases described in the questionnaire to be very diverse in terms of their seriousness. Among the least serious cases are those describing the acceptance of gratuities (Case 4 – Holiday Gifts from Merchants; Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business), while cases involving opportunistic thefts (Case 11 – Theft from Found Wallet; Case 5 – Crime Scene Theft of Watch) and classic bribery (Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist) tended to be evaluated as the most serious (Table 2).

When supervisors' own estimates of seriousness are compared to their assessments of the estimates of seriousness by the majority of police officers in their agencies, the results indicate that in most cases these are very similar in substantive terms (Table 2), and the values of the t-test show that they were statistically significantly different in only two cases (with a third case being marginally significant). In all three cases with substantive differences (Case 1 – Off-Duty Security System Business; Case 2 – Free Meals, Discounts on Beat; Case 3 – Bribe from Speeding Motorist), supervisors tended to view these cases as more serious than they expected most officers would have.

A comparison of the supervisors' estimates of seriousness evaluations by the majority of police officers for Case 1 (Off-Duty Security System Business) and the seriousness estimate provided by actual line officers in our sample (see Table 1) shows that they are very similar. Line officers, who constitute the majority of police officers in each agency, evaluated this case as less serious than the supervisors did, just as supervisors predicted. In the situation in which police salaries can be best described as inadequate and irregular (International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 45), barely exceeding the price of a basket of consumables needed to keep a family of four (International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 44), and seriously hampering the hiring and retention of police officers (International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 45), it comes as no surprise that line officers, who were less likely than supervisors to evaluate this behavior as the violation of official agency rules, did not view the case of a police officer who supplements his income by running an off-duty security system business as serious.

The second case in which supervisors estimated that most officers in their respective agencies would evaluate the case as less serious than they did is Case 2 (Free Meals, Discounts on Beat). The fact that supervisors and line officers were almost equally likely to say that the acceptance of gratuities represents a violation of the official policy

(73.1% v. 69.1%) eliminates the illegality of the act as the dominant explanation. Rather, it is quite possible that economic reasons—e.g., smaller salaries, barely sufficient to cover the consumables for a family—may prompt line officers to report that the acceptance of gratuities is less serious than supervisors do. Moreover, a comparison of how seriously the supervisors thought that most officers would evaluate the case (see Table 2) with seriousness estimates line officers actually provided (see Table 1), reveals that reported seriousness estimates fall in between the supervisors' expectations and supervisors' own evaluations.

Finally, supervisors evaluated Case 3—Bribe from Speeding Motorist—to be a rather serious case with the mean value of 4.60 on a five-point scale (Table 2), but thought that the majority of officers in their agencies would view this case as somewhat less serious (the mean value of 3.94). Yet, when line officers were asked the same question (see Table 1), they viewed it as seriously as supervisors did. Why is there such a gap between supervisors' perceptions and line officers' evaluations of seriousness? At least two explanations are possible. First, it is conceivable that line officers may not have been entirely sincere while they filled out the questionnaires. There are several reasons why this was not necessarily the case. For one, the number of demographic questions in the questionnaire is severely limited to guarantee respondents anonymity and thereby encourage the respondents to provide truthful answers. Also, the last question in the questionnaire asked the respondents whether they lied while filling out the questionnaire (if they answered in the affirmative, their answers were not used in the analysis). Second, in a country in which corruption is tolerated (see Lambsdorff, 2004) and in which, like Hungary and Poland, getting a bribe from a speeding motorist could be one of the most frequent forms of police corruption (see Frič and Walek, 2001, p. 43, 49), it is possible and indeed likely that supervisors underestimated police officers' views on case seriousness.

Finally, the examination of the relative order of seriousness (i.e., rank-order of cases based on the case mean value) suggests that the ranking based on the supervisors' own estimates of seriousness and the ranking based on their estimates of seriousness for other officers match closely (the correlation coefficient is .839).

A COMPARISON OF LINE OFFICERS' AND SUPERVISORS' EVALUATIONS OF SERIOUSNESS

The last part of the analysis focuses on the comparison of own estimates of seriousness provided by line officers with those provided by supervisors. I highlight three key points. First, as pointed out previously, both groups thought that cases vary greatly in terms of their seriousness, from Case 4 (Holiday Gifts from Merchants) and Case 1 (Off-Duty Security System Business) as the two least serious cases, to Case 11 (Theft from Found Wallet) as the most serious one.

Second, a comparison of mean values for the two groups (see Table 3) suggests that they viewed the seriousness of these 10 cases similarly. In only two cases the differences were both statistically significant and substantively important (see Table 3). In both cases supervisors—part of administration—viewed them as more serious than line officers did. Specifically, Case 1 describes an opportunity for off-duty income supplement (Off-Duty Security System Business). It is a behavior which, according to the majority of both line officers and supervisors (63.1% and 71.2%), violates the official policy. In an environment in which police salaries are low and there are not paid on a regular basis (see International Crisis Group, 2002, p. 44), line officers could probably justify such conduct more easily than their supervisors (whose task it is to enforce the laws and official rules *within* the agency).

Case 9 (Excessive Force on Car Thief) is the only case in the questionnaire that does not focus on police corruption. Because of their supervisory position and the responsibility of enforcing the laws attached to it, supervisors were more likely to recognize this behavior as a violation of official policy than line officers (78.8% v. 66.0%) and probably less likely to share the view that the fleeing suspect actually triggered this abusive behavior himself by defying the police in the first place. The "he got what he deserved" view that relies on the pretext of the case is thus probably the justification more readily used by line officers.

Finally, an exceptionally strong correlation (.912) between the rankings of cases by supervisors and by line officers clearly shows that the respondents' perceptions of relative seriousness is shared across the ranks.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study show that, despite the increased level of tolerance of corruption in the country, police officers are quite capable of judging the seriousness of a variety of police corruption cases. Furthermore, line officers and supervisors mostly share the view about the seriousness of these cases. With a few exceptions, their own evaluations of seriousness—both absolute and relative—were quite similar across the ranks. Such a strong finding indicates that there may be an underlying hierarchy of seriousness shared by members of the same (police) culture.

This result, suggesting a presence of an underlying hierarchy of seriousness of police corruption shared by line officers and supervisors, is consistent with the findings reported by several earlier studies on crime severity in general (see, e.g., Velez-Diaz & Megargee, 1971; Figlio, 1975; Rossi *et al.*, 1985; Wolfgang *et al.*, 1985). Despite certain differences in absolute evaluations of crime seriousness between various groups of respondents, such as students and police officers, the relative rank-order of the crimes based on their seriousness is rather similar across the groups. Sellin and Wolfgang (1964, p. 268) discussed the results of their seminal study as follows: "[a] pervasive social agreement about what is serious and what is not appears to emerge, and this agreement transcends simple qualitative concordance; it extends to the estimated numerical degree of seriousness of these offenses."

The results reported in this paper support this argument from two different perspectives. First, they indicate that there is a hierarchy of crime seriousness in the domain of one specific subset of police criminality, in particular, police corruption. Second, they suggest that the sharing of the hierarchy across the members of the same culture in a society extends across not only police officers and students, but also across line officers and supervisors, members of the same police culture.

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Table 1 - Reports of Police Officers' Own Perceptions of Seriousness and Estimates of Seriousness for Most Police Officers in Their Agencies

	Own seriousness		Others seriousness		Difference	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Point estimate	t-test
Case 1 - Off-Duty Security System Business	2.87	2	2.77	2	+10	.906
Case 2 - Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	3.65	5	3.32	3	+33	2.961**
Case 3 - Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.64	8	4.35	8	+29	3.757***
Case 4 - Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.43	1	2.38	1	+05	.455
Case 5 - Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.66	9	4.57	10	+09	1.257
Case 6 - Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.24	6	3.82	6	+42	3.155**
Case 7 - Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-Up	4.32	7	4.03	7	+29	3.964***
Case 8 - Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	3.54	3	3.37	5	+17	1.418
Case 9 - Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.55	4	3.33	4	+22	1.905
Case 10 - Theft from Found Wallet	4.70	10	4.52	9	+18	2.381*

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 2 - Reports of Supervisors' Own Perceptions of Seriousness and Estimates of Seriousness for Most Police Officers in Their Agencies

	Own seriousness		Others seriousness		Difference	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Point estimate	t-test
Case 1 - Off-Duty Security System Business	3.44	2	2.94	2	+50	1.714
Case 2 - Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	4.02	5.5	3.38	3	+64	2.158*
Case 3 - Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.60	9	3.94	7	+66	2.587*
Case 4 - Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.87	1	2.63	1	+24	.746
Case 5 - Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.54	8	4.44	9	+10	.397
Case 6 - Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.23	7	4.71	10	-48	1.199
Case 7 - Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-Up	4.00	4	3.77	5	+23	.859
Case 8 - Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	3.90	3	3.50	4	+40	1.437
Case 9 - Excessive Force on Car Thief	4.02	5.5	3.81	6	+21	.788
Case 10 - Theft from Found Wallet	4.67	10	4.38	8	+29	1.707

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 3 - Reports of Own Perceptions of Seriousness by Line Officers and Supervisors

	Line officers		Supervisors		Difference	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank	Point estimate	t-test
Case 1 - Off-Duty Security System Business	2.87	2	3.44	2	-.57	-2.344*
Case 2 - Free Meals, Discounts, on Beat	3.65	5	4.02	5.5	-.37	-1.684
Case 3 - Bribe from Speeding Motorist	4.64	8	4.60	9	+05	.314
Case 4 - Holiday Gifts from Merchants	2.43	1	2.87	1	-.44	-1.807
Case 5 - Crime Scene Theft of Watch	4.66	9	4.54	8	+13	.805
Case 6 - Auto Repair Shop 5% Kickback	4.24	6	4.23	7	+01	.036
Case 7 - Supervisor: Holiday for Tune-Up	4.32	7	4.00	4	+32	1.685
Case 8 - Cover-Up of Police DUI Accident	3.54	3	3.90	3	-.36	-1.679
Case 9 - Excessive Force on Car Thief	3.55	4	4.02	5.5	-.46	-2.265*
Case 10 - Theft from Found Wallet	4.70	10	4.67	10	+03	.186

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

APPENDIX 1: CASE SCENARIOS

- Case 1.** A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
- Case 2.** A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
- Case 3.** A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift for half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
- Case 4.** A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
- Case 5.** A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
- Case 6.** A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
- Case 7.** A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during the coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.
- Case 8.** At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
- Case 9.** Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.
- Case 10.** A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.