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POLICE NEGOTIATORS' RECONCILIATION OF INTERPERSONAL AND COERCIVE ROLE DEMANDS IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUSPECTS

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ABSTRACT

The police crisis negotiation presents the police negotiator with conflicting role demands to be at once interpersonal and coercive with the suspect in the relationship formed with him. I argue that some form of understanding by the officer of how to reconcile these conflicting demands is minimally necessary to prevent interference from the mixed personal reactions to the suspect that will usually accompany these roles. It should also be necessary to permit appropriate decision-making about the strategic approaches taken in the negotiation relationship. Although the literature gives limited attention to the police negotiator's personal reactions to the suspect, it does seem to imply several different understandings of how the officer might reconcile these conflicting role demands. These include: 1) avoidance of role conflict through conversion of the softer, interpersonal role into an "act"; 2) psychological or internal integration through self-observation to control the mixture of emotional reactions to the suspect; and 3) avoidance of role conflict through reliance upon other negotiating team members or a psychological consultant to take responsibility at any given time for the experience of one role or the other. Exploration of these possibilities and others with police negotiators who are experienced with psychological management of this role conflict would be a useful means of developing its implications for negotiator selection, training, and debriefing. It would also assist with the organization's decisions about SWAT team structure and dedication of resources to the use of psychological consultants in crisis negotiation incidents.

POLICE NEGOTIATORS' RECONCILIATION OF INTERPERSONAL AND COERCIVE ROLE DEMANDS IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUSPECTS

I. INTRODUCTION

We are confused about our police, about who they are and who we want them to be. We have organized them in military fashion, with emphasis upon submission to authority and the use of force. And we have trained them like good soldiers to deindividuate and be obedient at a time when the vast majority of calls for police are for human problem-solving assistance that requires not adherence to rigid rules and procedures but the flexible exercise of discretion. We expect them to "get tough" on criminals and avoid waste of resources on non-criminal activities, yet we also decry their "insensitivity" in interactions with citizens (Klyver and Reiser, 1983). Indeed, as the country was outraged by the excessive use of force by the police in the Rodney King case, an FBI study involving interviews with convicts who murdered police officers about their perspectives on why the officers were killed concluded that "[t]he most salient behavioral descriptors characterizing these officers appear to be their good-natured demeanor and conservative use of physical force as compared to other law enforcement officers in similar circumstances" (Pinizzotto, 1992, p. 33). These investigators cautioned that no single mistake caused the death of an officer; the perpetrators rather evaluated a whole series of actions or inactions on the officer's part before considering a lethal assault. Even so, many have come to understand this study to suggest that police officers relate to the public in a more relaxed way only at their peril.

Arthur Niederhoffer offerred one explanation for the conflict expressed in contemporary attitudes toward the police: that of the police officer as a Rorschach test onto

whom we project our own fantasies (Niederhoffer, 1967). According to this view, members of the public, police departments, officers' friends and families, as well as police officers themselves all project unconscious feelings for archetypal protective and punishing parents onto the police officer. Thus, we make them into superhuman figures whom we double-bind, or regard ambivalently (Bonifacio, 1991). We expect the impossible in the form of omnipotence or perfection, only to attribute malevolence or weakness to them when they inevitably fall short. Caught up in the same projective process that transforms them into heroes or villains, police officers in turn respond ambivalently, at once needing the admiration of the public they so seldom obtain and feeling contempt and anger for the very same "helpless" and dangerous public. In short, the police are met with stress-producing ambivalence from everyone they encounter and respond in kind (Bonifacio, 1991).

Bonifacio proposes that one antidote to this form of stress is the officer's development of more tolerance for feelings of vulnerability and imperfection. While this notion may well offer police officers a more livable image of themselves, it seems not to address squarely the issue of the real dimension of their role conflicts. That is, police work does in fact involve a conflicting set of role demands that officers must somehow negotiate. They must "put on the velvet glove and keep their iron hand in shape" (Skolnick, 1988). The ability to reconcile these conflicting role demands seems essential, therefore.

Some psychologists concentrate their efforts to assist with this reconciliation at the level of the police organization. A recent study of the use of excessive force, for example, stresses in addition to officer selection and traditional psychological and peer interventions for individual officers: 1) the importance of adequate training in threat assessment and situation control, including non-physical methods and decision-making about choice of approach; and 2) supervisory training in good management of behavior problems and monitoring for early detection of them (Scrivner, 1994).

To complement such efforts, it should also be useful to examine the reconciliation of role demands taking place within the individual officer's experience of interactions with citizens. Because it is the involvement with people that introduces the interpersonal demand on the officer, it stands to reason that it is in these interactions, or varying forms of relationships, that this role conflict will manifest most sharply. The officer enters into relationships with citizens prepared to use coercion to maintain order or enforce the law yet also susceptible to some extent to the emotional pulls exerted on him or her through interpersonal interaction with the individual.

While the metaphor of "iron hand and velvet glove" conveys a general sense of the content of this role conflict within the officer's experience of relationships with citizens, its precise definition is elusive. It is perhaps best conceived as a tension, the two poles of which shift across individual police officers and situations. At times, the tension at issue is between a more humanly engaged, even caring mode of dealing with a citizen and a more "hardcore" approach in which the citizen is viewed as a target of the officer's physically or manipulatively coercive tactics. At times, the tension resides between the use of a confrontational approach and the more passive reliance on "communications skills" like listening or empathic reflection, even if these skills are used for the purpose of manipulation. The variations in meaning are subtle and numerous.

The balance of "hard" and "soft" within the role conflict with which the officer is presented and the acuteness of that conflict in any given citizen interaction would appear to depend upon a number of factors. Generally, the more tactical the particular police task, the greater the level of threat, and the shorter the time for interaction, the less interpersonal demand and therefore the less acute role conflict the officer is apt to experience. For example, ordinary street encounters often require higher levels of tactical caution on the officer's part because of their unpredictable and uncontained nature. Moreover, they are usually quite brief and do not allow time for the emergence of emotional pulls and tugs on the officer with which he or she must then contend. The duration of undercover or

community policing relationships, on the other hand, should provide more opportunity for the role conflict to materialize.

For a variety of reasons, relationships formed with suspects in police crisis negotiations seem particularly well suited to an examination of the role conflict and its reconciliation in the personal experience of police officers. Briefly, these are "escalated" situations in which suspects who are armed and/or threatening violence are barricaded into a particular location as a result of their own actions, containment efforts of the police. or some combination thereof. These incidents can involve criminals whose escape from a crime scene was interrupted, parties to domestic disputes, suicidal people, terrorists, and prisoners in revolt, and they may or may not involve the presence of hostages. Typically, the police utilize a two-pronged approach of tactical containment and negotiation in such situations. The suspect is made aware that he cannot escape and that he will be injured or killed if he uses violence, while a negotiator establishes communication with him in an attempt to persuade him with a variety of techniques to surrender peacefully.

Unlike more secretive police relationships, like those formed in undercover work, negotiation relationships are more accessible to researchers. Moreover, both hard and soft elements are sufficiently present in negotiation relationships to permit clear exposition of the conflict and its resolution. The nature of a police crisis negotiation is such that it depends upon the development and use of a relationship with another to bring about the peaceful resolution of the crisis incident. It unfolds over time, providing opportunity for negotiators to experience interpersonal effects, but also presents a high degree of tactical risk to the public and other officers, even if not to the negotiators themselves. Finally, negotiation relationships involve people in crisis and therefore a high emotional intensity for all concerned. Thus, not only do crisis negotiation relationships provide the time for the development of interpersonal experience but they also potentially demand this experience on the part of the police negotiator.

In this time of increasing reliance on "interpersonal policing," such an examination of the officer's experience of conflicting roles in crisis negotiation relationships offers many potential benefits to policework in general. First, it is likely that certain experiences and methods of role reconciliation are more associated with misperceptions of citizens. It may be easy to discredit the threats of a truly suicidal individual, for example, if the intervenors insulate themselves against genuine empathy and instead conceive of their concerned behavior with the individual as simply an "act." Attention to the way in which the officer handles the experience of role conflict promises to bring such a tendency to misperceive to the surface and to make it more accessible to adjustment through training or debriefing.

Further, the psychological processes involved in the management of role conflict seem directly related to those at play in decision-making regarding whether to pursue coercive/forceful versus non-coercive approaches in situation control generally. Attention to the degree to which the officer handles role conflict through reliance upon others rather than autonomously, for example, may predict a particular kind of difficulty that officer might have in choice of approach decision-making when functioning alone on the street. The more accurate the trainer's or supervisor's understanding of the officer's difficulty, the better able they should be to guide the officer into improved performance. Such an understanding should also facilitate managerial decision-making about whether specific lone officers or teams should respond to particular situations. Thus, more understanding of these psychological processes should assist officers to make more appropriate choices and should beneficially inform selection, training, and debriefing efforts, as well as staffing decisions.

Finally, because the officer's experience and management of the tension between two conflicting roles also affect stress level, better comprehension of these issues should also lead to the development of better ways, at both the levels of the organization and the individual, to combat stress.

II. THE LITERATURE OF CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS: OVERVIEW

Law enforcement has long been aware of the utility of police-citizen relationships as tools of the trade (Soskis, 1983). The cultivation of relationships with citizens can substitute for the use of force in police-citizen encounters (Principles of Good Policing, 1993; Head, 1987) and can result in decreases in police callbacks, increased safety for the public as well as the officers, increased public confidence in the police, more cooperation from victims in criminal justice system follow-through, and reduced stress for police officers (Klyver, 1987).

To realize the potential of these relationships in crisis negotiations, law enforcement has increasingly come to rely on consultation with psychologists but has also imported into its literature psychological knowledge, skills, and methods concerning issues in the formation of such relationships ranging from crisis intervention techniques to personality assessment. Although these relationship-related issues are normally understood in the mental health context to have interpersonal implications that affect both parties to the relationship, they typically shed these interpersonal implications when transferred to the policing context. In policing, the officer's experience of the relationship - of the citizen's behavior and its influence upon his or her response - receives little attention. Rather than a "two-person" interaction, the officer's engagement with the citizen is understood largely as a tactical maneuver to bring the latter's behavior under the desired control (Soskis, 1983), almost as if the other were a physical object to be moved by the officer's use of verbal "force." Counselling techniques become "tactics"; diagnostic information becomes "intelligence."

Thus, in the process of transferring psychological knowledge to the police negotiation context, the negotiator's own psychological experience of the relationship with the suspect essentially drops from view. Moreover, this literature does not squarely address another incident of the negotiator's participation in a relationship used as a law

enforcement tool: the tension created by the antagonistic roles of helper and potentially coercive authority figure.

III. THE CRISIS INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK

The generally accepted basis of modern police negotiations is crisis intervention theory. Emphasizing the similarities to mental health crisis intervention, Strentz (1991) notes the crisis nature of the barricade or hostage event not only for any hostages involved but also for the suspect, in that he has an unsolved problem, is disorganized, often panicky or frustrated or defeated, and the incident is of limited duration. Strentz divides the event into four stages: 1) alarm, 2) crisis, 3) accommodation, and 4) resolution. The initial alarm phase is the most dangerous period when most hostage killings occur, because the suspect's emotions run high as he desperately tries to consolidate his position or ensure his dominance over hostages. In the opening contact with the negotiator, the suspect often vents anger at him or her, threatens, and makes demands. In the next, or "crisis," phase the suspect continues to have some emotional outbursts, but his anxiety level drops, reason is restored, and he becomes frustrated by the failure of his plans. In the subsequent "accommodation" phase, his demands and expectations apparently abate as he begins to trust the negotiator. In the final, or "resolution," stage he is fatigued and resigned to a face-saving, peaceful solution that he has worked out with the negotiator.

Strentz' account of the negotiator's function implies the transformation of crisis intervention principles in the police context from therapeutic in purpose to gaining control over the suspect. The negotiator's task is to contribute "honestly" to the development of the suspect's trust and to encourage ventilation. Both kinds of efforts facilitate manipulation of the suspect by lowering his anxiety and eliciting information from him that is necessary for psychological assessment of him. Similarly, the negotiator uses "active listening" skills, always keeping the suspect and his concerns at stage center and placing

him in charge of decision-making, both to restore his problem-solving capacity and to fatigue him.

The conflict between the direction to be "honest" with the suspect while also manipulating him is not problematized, let alone resolved, however. Moreover, the link between "active listening" or other skills borrowed from Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy and their origin in the intervenor's own experience has been attenuated. That is, the client-centered therapist's acceptance and empathic understanding of the client are genuine, and they are conveyed through non-directive techniques like clarification, echoing, and active listening to facilitate the client's personal growth. The police negotiator, in contrast, is instructed to use these techniques not as expressions of genuine esteem for the suspect but rather as manipulations. Finally, while one would expect the intervenor to have personal reactions to the intense danger of the opening phase of the negotiation or to the angry and personalized harangues delivered to him or her, these issues go unaddressed in Strentz' application of crisis intervention principles to police negotiations.

Smith and Kaufmann (unpublished manuscript, 1994) offer a model that implies the importance of taking into account the negotiator's experience of the relationship with a suspect. They set forth a four-stage process of actual negotiations (not including a pre-contact intelligence gathering stage) that matches Strentz' stages. Moving beyond Strentz to the negotiators' experience, however, they note that the value of organizing the process of crisis negotiations into this four-stage structure is to permit police negotiators to focus on specific goals in a certain sequence, rather than ask them to view the negotiation as an "undifferentiated conversation." It seems fair to infer that structuring the negotation task in this way is a means of making it not only more concrete but also more familiar to police officer-intervenors who are trained to formulate goals and to take concrete steps as a routine part of their police work. Structure and familiarity should have important anxiety binding benefits for them.

Smith and Kaufmann also offer elaboration of the psychological strategy involved and of the particular way in which crisis intervention principles undergo transformation in the police negotiation setting. Notably, the introductory phase of a negotiation is concerned with the development of a bond with the suspect. The aim is to greet him with helping concern as a means of lowering his resistance and facilitating his anxiety reduction. In the next phase, the negotiator concentrates on developing the relationship with the suspect, especially through the use of listening, empathic reflection of understanding, and trivial self-disclosure. Through the use of these techniques, the negotiator hopes to encourage the suspect to vent so that he can become calm and be restored to a more rational state in which he will be better able to problem-solve. Although these writers conceive of the suspect's venting primarily as abreactive or cathartic in function, it can also be characterized as a means of reducing the likelihood of physical action through the ego activity of putting feelings into words. In the third phase, the negotiator enlists the suspect in collaborative problem-solving activity designed to produce a face-saving end to the crisis (the fourth, or resolution phase), to which the suspect will feel committed because of his participation in its devising.

Following Schlossberg (1974), the originator of modern crisis negotiations, Smith and Kaufmann stress the difference between the use of these crisis intervention principles in mental health and their use in police negotiations, however. They note that the police negotiator's purpose is not to safeguard the suspect's mental well-being but rather to manipulate him out of the crisis, without harm to others. Negotiators create only the illusion of themselves as concerned helpers; they are good actors or con artists who must be "sensitive enough to be believable." In this statement of the skilled negotiator's apparently paradoxical characteristics, moreover, the writers offer some illumination of the problem implied by Strentz concerning the officer's personal reconciliation of soft and hard ways of relating to the suspect. Strentz referred to the negotiator's dual task of being both honest and manipulative with the suspect. Similarly, Smith and Kaufmann speak of the

negotiator's dual role as both concerned helper and manipulator. These writers, however, recognize the antagonism between the two roles and offer reconciliation of them in the negotiator's experience through the falsification of the concerned helper role into an "act."

While Smith and Kaufmann offer no further discussion of the negotiator's personal experience, their account of the negotiation team structure seems to imply both recognition of the influence of the negotiator's experience on the relationship and a means of facilitating the "con artist" solution to the problem of the negotiator's reconciliation of the two antagonistic ways of relating. In their model, the negotiator who actually talks to the suspect - the tactical negotiator - functions as little more than a mouthpiece. A secondary, or strategic, negotiator listens to the negotiations and helps with strategy by feeding ideas about other approaches to the tactical negotiator. A third, or coach, negotiator has responsibility for monitoring the tactical negotiator for signs of bond with the suspect and for helping the tactical negotiator to avoid "points of conflict" or "volatile issues." The virtual division of personality functions among the three negotiators seems well designed to inhibit the tactical negotiator from responding as a whole person to the suspect and therefore also to cushion him or her from an acute experience of the conflicting ways of relating. The less acute this experience is, the more comfortably a negotiator should be able to make use of the idea that any concern communicated to the troubled suspect is simply an act.

It is useful to digress briefly from the discussion of the application of principles of crisis intervention to police negotiations to review the empirical support for the notion that a capacity to mask manipulativeness with the appearance of sensitivity and concern for the suspect is the most desirable means of reconciling the two sides of the negotiator's job. Gelbart's 1978 dissertation on hostage negotiator characteristics is the only study of this issue that has come to light. In his review of the literature, Gelbart cited a San Francisco Police Department training manual from 1976 that identified the negotiator's dual tasks of 1) seeking a non-violent solution 2) while also staying aware that the suspect may have to

be killed if he becomes a clear target. To accomplish these tasks, the negotiator was supposed to use one set of behaviors visible to the suspect - genuineness, empathy, honesty, feeling, understanding, trustworthiness, respectfulness - and another set invisible to the suspect - judgmentalness, one-upsmanship, gamesmanship, apathy, dominance, manipulativeness, and the abilities to foster dependence, exploit weakness, and remain impersonal. Gelbart cited Schlossberg for the same proposition: that the negotiator needs a "dual personality," because he or she must be able to develop tactical plans while simultaneously working out the suspect's problem, and the negotiator should never have real empathy.

The Gelbart study used measures of personality traits, including the California Personality Inventory (CPI) and peer and instructor ratings, to predict whether Los Angeles Police Department subjects would be selected or rejected for negotiator training. The relevant finding was that the general CPI profile of a manipulative, pushy, determined person whose social skills mask bias did predict selection for negotiator training. This interpretation of the CPI profile reflected Gelbart's effort to reconcile high scores of selected subjects for being outgoing, easy to talk to, and able to seem strong with low scores on the responsibility, socialization, and femininity subscales manifesting in impulsive, biased, and demanding characteristics.

There are reasons to challenge the Gelbart results, however. Most significantly, he identified only those selected for negotiator training, and not successful negotiators. Further, the generalizability of his results to contemporary negotiators on police forces that have undergone significant liberalizing trends in the last fifteen years is open to question. This is so because: 1) his subjects were from a police department that had a reputation until more recently for a more coercive approach to crisis incidents; and 2) ethnic minorities and women are represented in the negotiator population today far more than they were in 1978.

A third view of crisis negotiations (Donohue et al., 1991) represents a blend of crisis intervention and communications theories that illuminates the effects of crisis upon

individuals' behaviors designed to resolve the crisis. These writers introduce the concept of "crisis bargaining" to distinguish intense conflict bargaining from more routine bargaining contexts, like labor management bargaining. They define crisis as an event that takes us by surprise, challenges our high priority goals, causes us to feel intense resistance to these goals from the other party, and deprives us of the capacity to think cooperatively about how to resolve it. Their thesis is that crisis bargaining behaviors occur in a "twilight zone" that falls short of physical violence, when the crisis event has degraded the parties' capacities to use more cooperative means of resolving it. These behaviors are characterized by: 1) reliance on coercion, produced by fear and the unavailability of a more cooperative approach; 2) a sense of the extremely high, life-and-death stakes involved; and 3) the resulting high emotional intensity and sense of urgency. The task for the crisis bargainers is to move out of crisis bargaining mode into a more rational mode of resolving the crisis. In bargaining with each other, the parties must address three kinds of issues to accomplish this transition: 1) relational issues, including the communication of trust and acceptance to the other party; 2) content issues, including the sorting through of the problem's complexity and exploration of one another's feelings; and 3) various strategies for achieving crisis resolution, e.g., using messages designed to win the other party's agreement.

Donohue et al. demonstrate the applicability of this approach in a discussion of excerpts from a hostage negotiation that seems to lift the negotiator out of the crisis bargaining relationship. That is, their model explicitly contemplates a two-person interaction in crisis bargaining, in which both parties are susceptible to the high stakes, the extreme emotional intensity and urgency, and to the tendency to use coercion rather than accommodation. Yet without explaining how the negotiator overcomes the propensity for the intense conflict to disrupt the transition from crisis to normal bargaining, they portray the negotiator as one who functions from the outset in a rational bargaining mode. Nor does this incongruity seem to be explained by an assumption that it is the suspect and not

the negotiator who is disorganized by crisis. According to the Donohue model, crisis bargaining is characterized by the participation of two parties, challenging and resisting each other. "Each side stands firm with their [sic] initial positions by engaging in a variety of threatening actions and warnings to communicate the firmness of their positions" (p. 137). Once again, the negotiator's personal experience of a two-person interaction with the suspect is implied but unaddressed.

IV. DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORY ADJUSTMENTS TO THE BASIC FRAMEWORK THEORY

A similar silence is apparent in the literature regarding adjustments to the basic crisis intervention-derived strategy that are necessitated by differences in the mental status of the suspect. Through an analysis of 245 hostage incidents reported to law enforcement between 1976 and 1983, Strentz found that 52-59%[1] of suspects suffered from mental difficulty (Fuselier, 1988; Soskis and van Zandt, 1986). Neither more current figures nor figures for the larger category of crisis incident, in which the suspect barricades himself or threatens suicide but takes no hostages, are available.

Schlossberg (1974) first articulated the purpose of psychological assessment in the hostage negotiation setting: not to understand the suspect for the purpose of helping him but to modify or manipulate his behavior. Specifically, knowledge of the suspect's mental status assists efforts to predict his propensity to be violent as well as his response to

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[1] Because Strentz' 1985 study is unpublished and unavailable, the precise findings and the methods used to derive them are unknown. Fuselier (1988) presents Strentz' main finding as 52% "mentally disturbed," while Soskis and van Zandt (1986) present it as 59% "mentally disordered or suffering emotional turmoil from personal or family problems." Moreover, Fuselier (1988) and Strentz (1991) seem roughly to agree that most hostage takers with mental difficulty fall into one of four categories: 1) paranoid schizophrenia, 2) severe depression, 3) antisocial personality, and 4) inadequate personality. Soskis and van Zandt interpret Strentz' findings far more broadly to include in addition: 1) bipolar disorder, 2) substance abuse, and 3) emotional turmoil stemming from personal or family disputes.

various negotiation tactics. Indeed, Poythress (1980) notes the research-based predictive power of certain clinical variables. Empathy, for example, is the most frequently cited clinical variable distinguishing violence-prone suspects from the non-violent. Poythress would expect those who lack empathic capacity like sociopaths, extremely depressed individuals, or schizophrenics to be poor candidates for negotiation. Suspects with reactive depressions and prisoners concerned with prison conditions, however, are apt to respond well to negotiation. Poythress also notes the presence of substance abuse as another good predictor of violence.

A series of papers by FBI personnel who are not psychologists illustrates the effort to make use of assessment data to adjust standard negotiation strategies to diagnostic category (Strentz, 1986; Strentz, 1983; Lanceley, 1981). A review of one of those papers should illustrate this application. In the handling of paranoid schizophrenic (PS)[2] suspects, Strentz (1986) generally advocates non-confrontational listening and the communication of sincere interest to permit anxiety-reducing ventilation. He also notes that the negotiator can expect to be rejected because of the PS suspect's inability to trust. Although one might quibble with the reliance solely on interested listening and with the omission from Strentz' recommendations of structuring, ego-supportive interventions like identifying courses of action to counter the PS suspect's fragmentation and sense of helplessness, the main concern here is the negotiator's experience. In that regard, Strentz' anticipation of rejection by the PS suspect can be seen as a useful means of preparing the negotiator to cope with the personal reactions one can expect to have when dealing with a schizophrenic. The neglect of a more direct discussion of those personal reactions in this literature is noteworthy, however, especially given the extensive treatment of the issue in the mental health arena.

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[2] The definition of the disorder is found in the old Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders-III.

Blumenreich (1987), for example, stresses the importance of genuineness in empathy expressed to severely disturbed and violent hospital patients who will detect its absence. In contrast to Schlossberg, Smith and Kaufmann, and Gelbart, all of whom advocate pretended empathy, Strentz may intend at least to approach the concept of genuine empathy in his discussion of "sincere interest." It seems insufficient simply to counsel the use of this technique, however. This is particularly so with police officers whose discomfort with the unfamiliar and often bizarre behavior of such individuals often leads them to take fast action to bring closure to the encounter when taking the time to develop some form of relationship would permit the officer to gain control more effectively (Klyver, 1987). How the negotiator is suddenly to become sufficiently comfortable to convey sustained and sincere interest is left unaddressed. Moreover, the neglect of the negotiators' personal reactions to a PS suspect deprives them of valuable cues for determining whether their approach is appropriate. For example, the countertransference reactions of fear and anger that a PS individual can elicit can lead to negative expectations of his responsivity that in turn can cause the intervenor to engage in punitive overreactions (Blumenreich, 1987).

Thus, the literature on the adjustment of negotiating strategies to fit different diagnostic categories provides advice to negotiators about various techniques to use but does not assist with the personal reactions that will complicate the attempt to use them. These shifts in negotiating strategy notwithstanding, however, the basic crisis intervention framework of police negotiations remains in place throughout these discussions. The negotiator is always advised to provide the suspect with an opportunity to vent over time so that calm and fatigue together will lessen his need to act and promote his inclination and capacity to resolve his dilemma.

V. AN ALTERNATIVE PSYCHODYNAMIC FRAMEWORK THEORY

Arcaya (1989) describes another, psychodynamic approach to general police encounters with emotionally disturbed people. He observes that the use of a crisis intervention approach rests upon the assumptions that: 1) the individual will believe the officer's assurances that he is not alone and that the officer can be trusted to have the individual's best interests in mind; and 2) the individual can be rationally persuaded that compliance or surrender is in his best interests. Arcaya argues that these assumptions are unjustified when dealing with irrational people. The assumption that the irrational individual will trust the officer is unfounded, because he may well not wish or be able to form a trusting relationship with anyone, let alone a police officer. It is less likely, moreover, that such a person will perceive that the officer knows what is best for him and believe that his problems will be solved if he follows the officer's advice. In effect, even though the officer is right, the irrational individual could still reject his or her good advice.

More so than the crisis intervention approach, Arcaya's psychodynamic approach focuses not on establishing external control over the disturbed individual but on helping him to regain internal control over himself. This is to be accomplished through interventions that assist the suspect's ego in the management of anxiety stemming from perceived threats in the environment, from superego conflicts, and from distressing impulses. Arcaya maintains that through interaction with him, the police officer can glean enough about the nature of the individual's intrapsychic conflicts to be able to assist in this manner. For those individuals who are disorganized and fearful because of their distorted perceptions of reality as threatening, the officer must either offer a direct clarification of the reality or provide psychological containment to the person by remaining professionally neutral and unprovoked. When an individual's self-destructive and provocative behavior to others, unconsciously calculated to turn them into punishing consciences, gives evidence of disturbed superego functioning, the officer must again avoid being drawn in by the provocations. He or she can also help the person to become aware of the guilt-induced

distortions in his judgment by addressing these distortions. Finally, through verbalization of the person's disowned impulses, the officer can help the person's ego to regain control over impulses channeled into acting out.

Arcaya does not address the negotiator's experience of the disturbed individual. The interventions he proposes, however, seem unavoidably to require officers to have the capacity to register their own emotional responsivity in the accurate, empathic detection of the individual's hidden or disavowed feelings. Superficial or deceptive comments designed to convey the appearance of understanding, like those advocated by Schlossberg or Smith and Kaufmann, will be unproductive according to Arcaya, because they will miss the mark. Further, Arcaya's interventions imply the ability to remain sufficiently distant from the individual's turmoil to be able to reflect understanding without getting drawn into or provoked by it. This too would seem to require officers' awareness of their own emotional reactions as a means of checking the influence upon their behavior that these reactions might otherwise have.

Although he maintains that police officers can be trained to use such an approach with severely disturbed people, Arcaya offers no discussion of the feasibility of such training. Psychodynamic therapists require many years of clinical training under supervision to develop the mental muscles necessary to perform the psychological functions Arcaya contemplates. Nor does he discuss the application of this approach originating in the "consulting room" to street conditions of danger, high pressure, and fast-moving events, where the officer's attention cannot be dedicated solely to the emotional dynamics of the individual before him or her. Yet similar objections might have been raised about training police officers, in the pre-Schlossberg era of hostage negotiations, to use techniques and principles from crisis intervention.

These questions about the practicality of his approach aside, Arcaya's model for police officer-disturbed individual interactions introduces yet another variation on the theme of the officer's personal reconciliation of soft and hard ways of relating that stands in

interesting contrast to the version propounded by Schlossberg, Gelbart, and Smith and Kaufmann. In this view, the integration is psychodynamic, involving the dynamic interaction within the officer's own mind between experiencing self and observing self. That is, much like the therapist who must connect emotionally with the client while also remaining sufficiently removed to observe, understand, avoid overinvolvement, and take appropriate action when necessary, Arcaya's officers too get emotionally involved but not at the cost of their ability to step back, observe, and continue to function as police officers. The "soft" capacity to register and make use of genuine emotional content in the interaction and the "hard" capacity to remain a separate, observing, rational self are both present and work cooperatively together within the officer's own experience.

VI. THE NEGOTIATOR'S EMOTIONAL RESPONSE: STRESS

The issue of the negotiator's emotional response to a suspect is treated more directly in two areas of the literature. First, the negotiator's "stress" reactions receive attention from several writers. Davidson (1981) offers little elaboration of the meaning of "stress" in this context but does recommend a means of lessening the negotiator's experience of it. Drawing on his own experience with cotherapy, he recommends a team approach. Working with a partner reduces stress by increasing the amount of information coming to the negotiator and by providing both emotional and instrumental support for him or her. Thus, Davidson recognizes the need to take into account the emotional experience of the negotiator for the combined purpose of maintaining the officer's wellbeing and conducting more effective negotiations.

In the only study of the emotional impact of a negotiation upon negotiators, Mirabella and Trudeau (1981) shed more light on the matter. These researchers surveyed 23 California police negotiators about specific points of stress during hostage negotiations, emotional effects on the officer, and negotiating strategies. They found that during the negotiation, subjects experienced: 1) anger at hostages because of their angry personal

attacks upon negotiators, their questioning of the negotiator's competence, their defense of the suspect, their panic, and their interference; and 2) compassion for the suspect because of the suspect's fear of police, because of the negotiator's sense that the suspect was psychologically unaware of the reality of the situation, because of empathy for the suspect's history of failure, or because of identification with the suspect's difficulties. Informants also reported multiple symptoms of physical stress often experienced in combination, including nervousness, rapid pulse, excessive perspiration, and dehydration. After the negotiation, negotiators reported exhaustion, disappointment, anger, feelings of failure, heroism, elation, satisfaction, and relief. 59% endorsed the usefulness of post-incident debriefings to promote "release" of these feelings. Although there was virtually no agreement on the most stressful aspects of these incidents, subjects reported a variety of stressful features including: the suspect's irrationality, homicidality, or suicidality; initial contact with the suspect; convincing him that the police would not kill him; discovering what to say to a quiet or passive suspect; continuing to come up with things to talk about; and interference by command personnel.

Mirabella and Trudeau recommend that other team members refrain from the expression of negative reactions to the suspect in the primary negotiator's presence, to permit him or her to remain sensitive to the suspect's needs for the purpose of enlisting the latter's trust. This recommendation is puzzling, however, because it implies that one cannot remain sympathetic unless one is unambivalently sympathetic. These researchers also observe that because of the intensity of the crisis incident and the negotiators' concerns about performance, negotiators are unlikely to be able to evaluate their own feelings or fatigue for effect upon their wellbeing and negotiating performance. For this reason, they advocate ongoing assessment of the negotiators' physical and emotional status by other negotiating team members. As another means of protecting the negotiators' wellbeing and preventing emotional interference with performance, Mirabella and Trudeau suggest training roleplays in which the "emotional impact on the negotiator can be addressed." The

latter recommendation, although unclear, appears to contemplate that the officers can make use of training roleplays to familiarize themselves with tendencies in their own emotional responsivity as a means of managing the emotional pulls and tugs upon them of relationships with suspects in real incidents. Even with these contemporaneous and preparatory efforts to assist negotiators in dealing with their own reactions during an incident, the researchers anticipate that negotiators will usually need to share their feelings with others in a post-incident debriefing as well. The debriefing is apparently not contemplated as an opportunity, like the training roleplays, to help negotiators to understand their emotional reactions so that they themselves are better equipped to manage them the next time. Instead, it is understood largely as an opportunity for emotional release through venting.

The recommendations of Mirabella and Trudeau suggest a dual strategy for the negotiators' handling of feelings elicited in the interaction with the suspect as they must simultaneously perform their duty as police officers. The structuring of the negotiating team to provide auxiliary ego functioning for primary negotiators in the form of the monitoring of their emotional state during the incident, as well as the ego support offered through the post-incident debriefing with others who listen and affirm their performance as police officers, are one part of this strategy. This part seems predicated on the notion that the crisis nature of the incident has some degree of disorganizing impact upon the police officer that necessitates ego support for him or her from others, just as it does for the suspect. The experiencing and more detached, self-observational functions of the negotiator's personality are divided between him or her and the other team members, respectively, so that it is in effect the "team personality" that negotiates with the suspect. In this way, the negotiator can simultaneously engage with the suspect and stay on track as a police officer with a job to do. Put another way, the soft and hard roles are divided in this model, as they are in Smith and Kaufmann's model, between the tactical negotiator and other negotiating team members.

The second part of the strategy outlined by Mirabella and Trudeau comes to play only when the negotiator is removed from the fray, in training sessions. This part seems directed to the negotiators' development of the intrapsychic capacity to do for themselves what their team assists them to do during a real incident: lessen the interference with their work from their own emotional reactions through observation and understanding, and therefore better management, of these reactions. It is, in effect, the psychodynamic model of internal integration of conflicting role demands glimpsed in Arcaya's work.

VII. THE NEGOTIATOR'S EMOTIONAL RESPONSE: COUNTERTRANSFERENCE

The second area of the literature that attends in particular to the negotiator's personal reactions conceives of these reactions as countertransference. One well elaborated variant of this countertransference is a version of the Stockholm Syndrome that is thought to take place at the level of the negotiator/suspect relationship. Named for a 1973 hostage incident in Sweden in which the hostages feared the police more than their captors and bore no ill will toward the latter after the incident, it is widely recognized to manifest in one or a combination of the following three conditions: 1) the hostage's positive feelings for the suspect; 2) the hostage's negative feelings for the police; and 3) the suspect's positive feelings for the hostage. Circumstances facilitating the development of this syndrome in a hostage-suspect relationship include positive contact between the hostage and the suspect and the passage of time. Soskis and van Zandt (1986) also consider the shared danger uniting the hostage and suspect to be a precondition of the syndrome. All writers also agree generally that the implications of the syndrome for negotiation strategy are that negotiators should not trust hostages but should promote the development of the syndrome nonetheless on the assumption that increased humanization of the hostage in the suspect's eyes will reduce the risk that the latter will harm the hostage.

There is considerable disagreement, however, on the psychological dynamics of the syndrome. Kuleshnyk (1984) reviews several possible explanations of it, including the

hostage's genuine agreement with the suspect and a cognitive dissonance theory according to which the hostage, recognizing the adaptive benefit of being nice to the suspect, eludes a feeling of hypocrisy through the operation of cognitive dissonance. Soskis and van Zandt (1986), however, properly clarify that there are many reasons for a hostage's positive attachment to a suspect, including various conscious coping efforts. These conscious efforts, however, are to be distinguished from an actual Stockholm Syndrome which is in their view a distinctly deeper, temporary identification with the suspect than the other kinds of alliances a hostage might form with a suspect.

In the view of Turco (1987), the syndrome is an identification with the aggressor in response to a trauma that induces hostages to regress to a primitive infantile danger state in which they depend on a powerful suspect for protection. Soskis and van Zandt (1986), however, correctly observe that identification with the aggressor is an incomplete explanation of the hostage's tie to the suspect. That tie is based not simply on the suspect's aggressive power and, indeed, is unlikely to materialize when the suspect is only sadistic and withholding with the hostage. Rather, the tie evolves as a result of contact with a powerful suspect's nurturing or protective qualities. These writers offer an alternative formulation to the effect that the syndrome is a positive identification from childhood that arises from the hostages' magnification of any concern shown them by the suspect who both endangers and controls their wellbeing. Ochberg (1983) essentially agrees with this view, emphasizing that it is the hostage's experience of the suspect as a parent who removes the aversive conditions of infancy (helplessness, hunger, isolation) that becomes the basis for the hostage's positive attachment to him. Ochberg, however, considers the attachment to be a "pathological transference," rather than an identification, that arises from the hostage's blend of terror, gratitude, and infantile dependence. This view seems the correct one, because the concept of identification seems unjustifiably to add to the hostage's attachment to the suspect the notion of the hostage's experience of him or herself as the same as the suspect.

Finally, Symonds (1983) offers a still more analytically precise formulation of this syndrome that clarifies the relationship between the trauma-induced regression to a primitive terror state and the positive attachment to the aggressing suspect. In his view, there are two parts of the syndrome: "traumatic psychological infantilism" which accounts for the hostage's regressed condition and "pathological transference" which accounts for the hostage's view of the suspect as good. Terror from which there is no escape produces a freezing of affect in the hostage that becomes split off from cognition so that hope for survival is focused on the suspect. Like children of abusing parents, hostages respond to their infantile experience of isolation and helplessness with primitive, adaptive clinging to the very one who endangers their life. The hostage can experience the suspect as good, because as the one with the power to decide whether the hostage will live or die, the suspect chooses to allow the hostage to live.

Nowhere in this literature does anyone discuss the dynamics of the suspect's development of compassion or concern for the hostage. One can speculate, however, that the hostage's clinging dependency upon the suspect, as if the latter were a protective parent, can elicit in the suspect the nurturing or protective concern of a parent, or a parental countertransference. At the level of the negotiator/suspect relationship, however, the psychological explanation for the negotiator's positive attachment to the suspect receives more attention. Several writers recognize the parallel Stockholm Syndrome-like phenomenon that takes place at the level of the negotiator/suspect relationship, even in the absence of hostages. Some characterize it simply as a "positive reciprocal relationship" in which the negotiator comes to care about the suspect (Strentz, 1991; Turner, 1985; Bolz, 1983). Reiser (1982), however, adds elaboration of the dynamics of this relationship in his discussion of transferences experienced by both suspect and negotiator. He counsels the importance of perceiving and relating these positive transferences to the dependency needs inherent in the crisis incident.

Presumably, Reiser's reference to dependency issues contemplates the fearful suspect's transference to the negotiator as a protective parent; similarly, his mention of the negotiator's responsive countertransference may also contemplate the negotiator's experience of him or herself as a protective or nurturing parent in relation to the suspect. In any event, Reiser believes that negotiators will encounter not only their own positive personal reactions to the suspect's feelings of dependency, but also negative, combative reactions to his dominance wishes. He also recognizes strategic utility in the intelligence about all of the suspect's wishes that understanding of both suspect and negotiator transferences would supply.

VIII. THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTANT

Reiser's introduction of the concept of the negotiator's countertransference and the possibility of making strategic use of it raises the issue of the role of the psychological consultant who, unlike police officers, is usually trained to perceive and make use of transference material. Although all agree that psychological consultants should not negotiate because of their lack of police training, psychologists largely agree on a number of other possible functions for them in police negotiations. These include: 1) assessing the suspect's personality and mental status; 2) devising negotiating techniques; 3) post-incident critique; 4) post-incident counselling of officers and victims; and 5) training.

Based on a survey of 34 police departments on their actual use of psychological consultants in hostage negotiations, Fuselier (1988) reports that mental health consultants are used most frequently for assessment, post-incident counselling of the police officer, post-incident critique of the incident, and negotiation technique, in descending order. Butler et al. (1993) conducted a similar survey and, except for the finding on use of

consultants for post-incident critiques,[3] replicated Fuselier's results on a sample of 300 police agencies. Other findings in the Butler study were: 1) a significant positive correlation between police departments using mental health consultants for negotiating technique and the percentage of incidents resolved by negotiated surrender ($r = .54, p < .01, n = 122$); 2) a significant negative correlation between use of consultants for the same purpose and hostage incidents resolved by tactical entry ($r = -.35, p < .01, n = 122$); 3) a significant negative correlation between use of consultants for assessment of the suspect and instances of serious injury to or killing of hostages ($r = -.31, p < .01, n = 122$).

The investigators caution that these results may be confounded by the possibility that it is the better trained police departments that use psychological consultants. They might also have noted that these results may be weaker than they seem, because at least the first and second findings are presumably not independent of each other. Indeed, it may be that the second and third findings suffer from the same problem as well, because one would suppose that a psychological consultant's assessment of a suspect would inform the consultant's advice on negotiating technique. The definition of variables in the Butler report, however, does not provide adequate basis for making such an observation.

Wardlaw (1984) and Reiser (1982) advert to another role for psychological consultants in police negotiations. They emphasize the consultant's utility in monitoring the behavior of team members during the negotiation to maintain an optimal relationship with the suspect and to guard against the tendency to premature closure by tactical action. Specific consultant functions in this regard include the provision of emotional support to negotiating team members, suggestions for dealing with stress, and alerting command personnel about the negotiator's physical or emotional condition if necessary. Reiser, as noted, also mentions the advantages of having a consultant present to perceive and make

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[3] The Butler report suggests that subjects were not asked about post-incident critique by mental health consultants (p. 216).

strategic use of transferences occurring in the negotiator/suspect relationship. Again, Reiser seems to contemplate that such psychological monitoring of the negotiator's experience of the relationship with suspect would inform a consultant's advice to the team about negotiating technique.

Although consultation about negotiating technique correlated significantly with better outcomes in the Butler study, insufficient information in that report about the data upon which the consultants based their advice on technique does not permit the firm conclusion that attention to transferences promotes effective negotiation. The work of Reiser and Wardlaw on the psychological monitoring of negotiators is suggestive, however, of another variant of reconciliation of the negotiator's conflicting role demands. In this variation, the negotiator's interpersonal response to the suspect is entrusted not to other members of the negotiating team, but to a psychologist who takes over the responsibility for managing its effect upon the negotiation relationship. In effect, the negotiator reconciles the conflict by jettisoning this side of his or her experience of the suspect.

IX. INTEGRATION OF ROLE DEMANDS: GENERAL STREET ENCOUNTERS

The theme of conflicting roles and how police officers manage them is developed further in the literature concerning the election of approach in general street encounters, especially involving the possible use of lethal force. In 1976, Lovitt conceptualized the two modes that police officers must employ in their dealings with citizens as alliance and coercion. The alliance mode involves the establishment of a working relationship with the citizen consisting of collaborative, rational problem-solving and emphasis upon the citizen's autonomy and investment in the solution. The coercion mode pertains to the more familiar, authoritarian stance assumed by police officers which is complemented by the citizen's position of having no choice, feeling resentful and powerless, and lacking "ownership" of the solution to the problem imposed upon him or her by the officer.

Lovitt's concern was with the training of police officers to recognize conditions for the use of each mode and to be competent to develop alliance with citizens when that is appropriate under the circumstances. He recommended that, upon entry into an unstable situation, the officer should first establish order to ensure the safety of all present. Next, the officer is to assess the possibility of forming an alliance with the citizen(s). This assessment is to be accomplished through attention to behavioral cues and responses from the citizens involved, without emotional overreaction, after putting aside prejudices and biases, and by checking the tendency to rush into premature closure.

Lovitt's recommendations amount to a tall order and leave one wondering how the officer avoids emotional overreaction, puts aside prejudices, and checks the tendency to act quickly to end an encounter while deciphering an upset individual's behavioral cues to determine whether an alliance is possible. Beyond this, the clean distinction between alliance and coercion seems somewhat artificial in that it implies that the alliance mode is free of any effort to control or subtle coerciveness on the officer's part. If that were the case, then one must ask what distinguishes the police officer's "alliance" mode from the work of a social worker or other counselor who helps upset clients with problems, for example.

Scrivner's 1994 interview study of the use of excessive force by police officers also addresses the officer's election of (lethal) force versus non-physical approaches to police-citizen encounters. She reviews several field studies and conceptual articles that question stereotypes about the officer's use of lethal force in police-citizen confrontations. Examples of such stereotypes are: that the decision to use such force is the result of a "mystical sixth sense" that cannot be explained; that this decision invariably occurs in a "split second." The lines of research reviewed by Scrivner strongly indicate that, on the contrary, excessive force is but "one outcome of a complex decision-making process that is influenced by multiple variables interacting to either escalate or defuse the process" (p. 27). Among other proposed preventive efforts, Scrivner maintains that better training in non-

physical strategies and skills for controlling citizens, and their use in an earlier stage of the confrontation, can contribute to the reduction of the use of excessive force.

Reports of two training programs developed from field studies attend in particular to officers' personal experience of citizens that can complicate their efforts to decide appropriately on, and then use, non-physical skills. Torres (1992) describes the contribution of a Metro-Dade Police Department violence reduction training program to the decrease in citizen reports of dissatisfaction with the police force, even as calls for service increased. This program involves roleplay opportunities to decide which course of action to follow as well as instruction on firearms, non-lethal physical tactics, and the use of an interpersonal relations model to increase officer sensitivity to citizens. The interpersonal relations model offers an approach to the police task of eliciting desired behaviors from others that is as follows: my feelings affect my behavior, which affects your feelings and therefore your behavior to me, which in turn affects my feelings. Fyfe's (1989) account of the same Metro-Dade program suggests the relevance of this model not only to the actual use of interpersonal skills to handle citizens but also to officers' ability to decide appropriately on the use of an interpersonal approach in a given situation.

The second research-driven training program addressing officers' personal experience in the effort to avoid or "de-escalate" force developed from a combination of survey and observational data and a trial-run of training in skills to de-escalate potentially violent confrontations. In this study, Nicoletti (1990) found that poor training in situation control was one factor causing overreactions and the use of force due to officers' elevated stress and decreased confidence in the absence of this training. He recommended training on de-escalation emphasizing: 1) the importance of the integration of tactical and verbal skills in the form of the ability to assess each for appropriateness at any given point in every situation; and 2) the need for officers to reach physical arousal levels in training that replicate their arousal level on the street, through lifelike training roleplays. Nicoletti maintained that without this equivalence in arousal level, learning gleaned from the practice

of techniques and decision-making during training will be unavailable on the street because of the higher anxiety experienced by officers there. With inadequate access on the street to what they learned in training, anxiety will lead officers to over- or underreact to citizens. A third training recommendation was the debriefing or processing of officers' physical and emotional reactions during the training activities. These reactions are to be related to the officers' decisions on course of action. The aim here is to permit officers to have more control over decisions made under stress through enhanced awareness of their personal reactions and of how these reactions affect decision-making and skill performance.

These three researchers recognize the existence of officers' personal reactions to citizens as well as the real influence of these reactions upon their effectiveness at controlling the people and situations they encounter. Fyfe and Nicoletti, in particular, concern themselves with the effect of officers' personal reactions upon their ability to decide at any given moment whether to proceed coercively or interpersonally. Most important, all support the notion that it is through the awareness of personal reactions that the officer comes to be able to limit their interference in his or her skill performance and decision-making and therefore to take appropriate control.

Although negotiators, unlike officers in street encounters, usually bear no direct responsibility for using force if warranted, they do collaborate with the tactical wing of the crisis (SWAT) team in the decisions whether and when to use force against the suspect. Further, although the tactical containment of the suspect usually removes the element of personal risk to the negotiators, they do assume anxiety-provoking responsibility for the safety of tactical officers and citizens present at the incident. Thus, although there are obvious differences between general street encounters and crisis negotiations, their similarities arguably warrant consideration of the applicability to police negotiations of several issues identified in the literature on the two modes that police officers employ with citizens on the street.

First, although the distinction between tactical and interpersonal approaches in the police negotiation setting applies most obviously to the division of labor between the two wings of the SWAT team, it should not obscure the "tactical", or more coercive, elements of the negotiators' function. Their work consists of both interpersonal and coercive components that must in some way be integrated. Second, attention to negotiators' personal reactions to the encounter with the suspect could be useful to limit interference from these reactions and therefore to improve the negotiators' ability not only to use interpersonal skills with the suspect but also to assess the need for coercive versus interpersonal approaches. Finally, the ability to make such an assessment, in turn, may call for not simply an objective decision-making algorithm but also some form of reconciliation of the two roles within the negotiator's own personal experience. Put simply, in developing the technical ability to size up a situation for the proper strategic approach at any given moment, negotiators may benefit from having some internal understanding of what it feels like to be both "coercive" and an "allied" partner in the interaction with the suspect. Indeed, much like the psychodynamic approach described by Arcaya and Mirabella and Trudeau, this literature suggests that the officer's control can be enhanced by his or her awareness and understanding of personal reactions that accompany the conflicting roles assumed in the encounter with the suspect.

IX. CONCLUSION

The literature relevant to the psychology of police crisis negotiations focuses primarily on the external, technical aspects of the negotiator's handling of the relationship with the suspect. In effect, it offers a useful "how-to" manual of techniques and strategies for negotiators. Attention to the negotiator's experience of the relationship with the suspect, however, is limited, compartmentalized, and not integrated with discussions of overall strategy, specific techniques, or psychological assessment. Further, this literature explicitly addresses neither the effect of the negotiator's experience upon the relationship

nor his or her reconciliation of the two antagonistic roles; despite the importance of both issues recognized in the context of general street encounters.

Notwithstanding the minimal attention to the negotiator's experience, this literature is suggestive of several ways in which negotiators might understand how to engage interpersonally with a suspect while remaining ready to use coercion if necessary. These variations include: 1) avoidance of role conflict through denial of personal reactions and perception of positive behavior toward the suspect as an act; 2) internal integration of the two roles through the use of self-observation to control emotional reactions to the suspect; and 3) avoidance of role conflict through reliance on other negotiating team members or a psychological consultant to take responsibility at any given time for the experience of one role or the other.

Given these theoretical possibilities for understanding how to manage the conflicting demands of these incidents to be at once "iron-handed" and "velvet-gloved," it would be useful as a next step to explore the perspectives of actual police negotiators. As bearers of this role conflict, police negotiators are "experienced" with it, not only in the sense of being expert but also in the sense of having an internal experience of it. For these reasons, they are likely to have insight into the conflict and understanding of how to go about the task of reconciliation. Negotiators' own understandings should have implications not only for their selection, training, and debriefing, but also for decision-making at the organizational level regarding the structuring of crisis negotiation teams and whether to devote resources to psychological consultants in connection with crisis incidents. Moreover, it is likely that a richly textured picture of police officers' experience of role conflict and how they manage it would offer important education to the experts. Such a picture should make this particular policework challenge, of developing and controlling relationships toward a specific law enforcement end, more accessible to those from other disciplines who want to be helpful.

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VELVET GLOVE AND IRON HAND: HOW POLICE NEGOTIATORS RECONCILE INTERPERSONAL AND COERCIVE ROLE DEMANDS IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUSPECTS

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I. Introduction

The issue of conflicting role demands upon police officers - to be both interpersonal and coercive with citizens - is on the "mind" of the law enforcement community today. We see this in broad contemporary concerns regarding the two extremes of excessive and inadequate force used by the police (Scrivner, 1994; Pinizzotto, 1992). And we see it more specifically in the attention given to striking the proper balance in any given incident: for example, efforts to train officers in decision-making concerning the selection of force versus non-physical approaches to situation control (Torres, 1992; Nicoletti, 1990).

Many concentrate their efforts to assist with the reconciliation of these two antagonistic roles at the level of the police organization, in the form of improved training and supervision. Because the officer's own understanding or internal, psychological experience of what it feels like to engage in two conflicting roles simultaneously will accompany the behavior constituting each role, it should also be useful to examine the issue at the level of the individual officer's personal experience of interactions with citizens. Because it is the involvement with people that introduces the interpersonal demand on the officer, moreover, it stands to reason that it is in more extended interactions, or relationships, that the officer's experience of role conflict will manifest most sharply. The officer enters into these longer relationships with citizens prepared to use coercion to maintain order or enforce the law, yet also susceptible to some extent to the emotional pulls exerted on him or her through interpersonal interaction with the individual.

The literature on police officers' use of relationships with citizens as a law enforcement tool is sparse in general, and it reveals little about their experience of such relationships. To a psychologist, omission of attention to the issue of the police officer's experience of the relationship with the citizen is an obvious one because of what we understand about the mutual influence of therapist and client in the therapy context. Indeed, there is an elaborate fund of psychological knowledge about psychotherapy as a two-way, interpersonal interaction, in which each participant is affected by the other in ways that shape the response of each to the other (e.g., Aron, 1991; Hoffman, 1983). The literature of crisis negotiations, for example, treats the police negotiator's rapport-establishing task in these incidents almost exclusively as a matter of external, behavioral skills or techniques. Two tiny exceptional instances of explicit attention to the negotiator's experience are in the areas of stress (Mirabella & Trudeau, 1981) and a variant of the Stockholm Syndrome thought to exist at the level of the negotiator-suspect relationship (Strentz, 1991; Bolz, 1983; Reiser, 1982).

Read carefully, however, this literature does seem to imply several different understandings of how the officer might reconcile these conflicting role demands within his or her own experience. These include: 1) avoidance of the experience of role conflict through conversion of the softer, interpersonal role into an "act;" 2) avoidance of role conflict through reliance upon other

negotiating team members or a psychological consultant to take responsibility at any given time for the experience of one role or the other; and 3) psychological or internal integration through self-observation and reflection to control the mixture of personal reactions to the suspect (Arcaya, 1989; Mirabella & Trudeau, 1981; Schlossberg, 1974).

Because police negotiators are experienced with psychological management of this role conflict, I turned to these experts to explore the understandings culled from the literature, as well as others, in a qualitative interview study, with an eye toward the implications of their expertise for negotiator selection, training, and debriefing.

II. Methodology

Using a phenomenological methodology developed by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960's, known as Grounded Theory, I selected a sample of negotiators from seven different police agencies across the state of Michigan. The sample was chosen from a pool of 55 negotiators to whom I presented the study with an invitation to participate. From the nineteen (35%) who volunteered, I used three different sampling strategies to select thirteen subjects. In a rudimentary effort to separate out individual from organizational differences, I selected at least two negotiators from each SWAT team. I also selected subjects to vary around several a priori, "objective" variables, such as geographical location or years of negotiating experience, and several "theoretical" variables (Corbin, 1986), such as the degree of integration between tactical and negotiation wings of the SWAT team, that emerged as the data set and analysis developed.

Comparison of subjects with non-volunteers suggested that subjects were more psychological-minded or interested in psychology and non-coercive police methods. It also suggested that subjects were either more tolerant of anxiety or reliant on ways of coping with it that did not rule out their participation in a potentially anxiety-provoking psychological research interview. Heavy reliance on a partner to cope with job stress was one example of a method of coping with anxiety that seemed to mitigate against participation in a research interview in which the officer would have had to function alone with a psychologist.

The inquiry procedure consisted of a minimally four-hour protocol that included demographic questions, roleplay exercises, core areas for inquiry, and an open portion in which I invited the subject to contribute any other relevant thoughts. The roleplay exercises featured two audiotaped crisis negotiation scenarios, after each of which subjects were asked to respond to the voice of the suspect on the tape as they would during a real negotiation event. These exercises were intended to provide some means of checking to see if the subjects do as they say they do. The core areas of inquiry concerned specific aspects of the officer's experience of two or three relationships with suspects in different crisis negotiation incidents.

The data consisted of transcripts of interviews and roleplay demonstrations and my observational notes and, accordingly, included both my construction of subjects' intended meaning and my own, often differing view. I attempted to preserve the tension between their perspectives and mine at all levels of the analysis and in the report of the findings.

After segmenting each protocol into meaning units (MU), each of which represented one thought, I used a qualitative analytic procedure known as the constant comparative method (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) for sorting of MUs into content categories. This method required a constant cycling back and forth between the data and the developing category set to make category judgments based on inductive comparison and contrast of MUs and on deductive testing of the data against hypotheses derived from logic and my own training and experience. Moreover, category judgments were continually revised in the light of new data and new understanding to achieve consistency across protocols and to stay close to, or "permeable" by, the data.

To discipline my thinking about my own influence on the data, through interactions with subjects in the interviews, and to justify my use of the interview process as an additional base for understanding subjects' accounts of their experience of negotiation relationships, I borrowed the concept behind a statistical model known as the Social Relations Model (Kenny & LaVoie, 1984), which parses the systematic variance among dyadic interactions into actor, partner, and relationship effects. Briefly, the "actor" effect is the typical behavior of A (the subject) in multiple dyadic interactions; the "partner" effect is the typical response from others elicited by B (me) in multiple dyadic interactions; and the "relationship" effect is the particular adjustment made by A to B that cannot be explained by the actor or partner effects or by error. The concept of an actor effect delimited my understanding of some portion of the subject's reactions to me in the interview as similar to his or her accounts of reactions to suspects in crisis negotiation dyads. Further, the concept of the relationship effect enabled me to focus on and identify that portion of the subject's reactions to me that seemed peculiar to the interview interaction and therefore not generalizable to the subject's experience and behavior with suspects. Category judgments were limited to the subject's actor effect, and I reported significant relationship effects in two cases in the findings.

Finally, to provide some independent measure of the reasonableness of the fit of the data to my category set, I utilized another qualitative methodology, known as peer debriefing. After analysis of the fourth and again after analysis of the tenth protocols, I organized the existing category set into statements of my developing theory of negotiators' experience of relationships with suspects in such a way as to expose the basis for the category judgments in the data. Three other psychologists then critiqued the fit of the data to the categories, and their comments were incorporated into my ongoing analysis.

III. Findings

Introduction

The findings consisted of an orderly description of three types of experience of relationships with suspects (control relationships) reported by negotiators - dominating, impersonal, and humanly engaged - from their and my perspectives. In their descriptions of specific control relationships, negotiators usually presented themselves as blending types of experience, within and across suspects and situations. In their discussions of them in the abstract, however, subjects seemed to prefer to see their experience as primarily impersonal: they presented themselves as "just doing business," or as "taking nothing personally." To me, however, four or five seemed to describe themselves as dominating: a shifting combination of aggression, deceptiveness, and manipulativeness in service of a wish to "get over" on the suspect. These latter negotiators were most uncomfortable with a psychological research interview and most concerned about their appearance to, and relations with, tactical officers. Another four negotiators seemed to me to be humanly engaged: capable of and comfortable with emotional engagement with suspects in certain cases. These tended to be those officers having some familiarity with mental health work or their own therapy and those officers who were aware of personal benefit gained from crisis negotiation training.

Dominating negotiators

Dominating negotiators saw themselves as operating only on an external, behavioral level (with focus on techniques or tactics used). Their accounts, however, conveyed a heightened internal experience of aggression, which they could at times recognize but seemed to prefer to deny. That is, they preferred to see the suspect as the only one who becomes emotionally involved in the control relationship. These negotiators understood empathy, in which they are extensively trained, to mean a verbal behavioral skill, like active listening, or the false expression of similarity to the suspect. For example, to the suspect who complains about his wife, these negotiators might say, "Yeah, I know what you mean; my wife's a bitch too." Related to their understanding of empathy, moreover, was their tendency to misread the suspect.

These negotiators also emphasized control. Indeed, the content of the control relationship was primarily about aggressive contest, and the kind of stress most troubling to them was stress over lack of control. They spoke of the importance of the suppression of their own personal reactions as a means of maintaining control and also deemphasized the suspect's autonomy. That is, they dehumanized the suspect through their manipulation of him: the suspect was not so much a person as a target of the "force" of their verbal tactics. Consistently with these attributes of their relationship experience, the dominating type of negotiator was also associated with heavier reliance

on the team's tactical function, rather than on its relationship function, to achieve the crisis negotiation purpose and with focus on the goal of the negotiation, rather than its process.

Finally, the dominating negotiators tended to reconcile conflict between the two modes of relating (interpersonal and coercive) through avoidance of feeling. Sometimes the avoidance was a denial of any feeling - whether hostile or compassionate - for the suspect, coupled with the insistence that their participation in the relationship consisted only of behavioral-level "techniques." At times, the avoidance of feeling took the form of banishing from mind the experience of only one role. Strategies for accomplishing this included: 1) falsification of their friendly behavior toward the suspect into an "act" and 2) the assignment of responsibility to other team members, when the negotiator was drawn in to either a hostile or overly sympathetic experience of the suspect, for restoring the opposite approach to the control relationship. Both degrees of avoidance of feeling seemed to permit dominating negotiators to avoid the experience of inner conflict between their roles.

Impersonal negotiators

Like the dominating negotiators, these officers too perceived themselves to operate solely on a behavioral level, denied personal reactions to the suspect, and maintained that feeling is incompatible with their control aims. Aggression, however, was much less evident in their accounts of their experience of these control relationships. In short, these negotiators were more believably impersonal than the dominating type.

In further comparison to dominating negotiators, those with impersonal characteristics conceived of the control relationship not only as control contest but also as collaboration. Accordingly, their sense of the suspect's autonomy appeared to be more developed than that of the dominating officers. They also tended to see the suspect as a mixture of both bad and good qualities and could tolerate having a more mixed sense of him: e.g., they were able to relate honestly with the suspect while also having manipulative intentions toward him or her. Their sense of the suspect, however, tended to be the product of a cognitive, rather than an emotional, process. Further, and as one would expect given their cognitive approach, they expressed a more sophisticated understanding of empathy as perspective-taking, or understanding another's point of view. Significantly, these officers were able to understand the suspect's feelings without having to make themselves similar to him or her. They could contemplate staying connected with him or her without having to say that they shared the suspect's feelings.

Like the dominating negotiators, these officers too tended to mute conflict between their two roles through the avoidance of feeling. In the absence of significant emotional experience of the two conflicting roles played in these relationships, any conflict between them operated exclusively on a behavioral level, where it could be regarded as an "external" matter of choice of

tactics, rather than as personally felt conflict. Finally, and again in keeping with the other attributes of their experience of these relationships, they ascribed greater importance to the relationship function of the SWAT team.

Humanly engaged negotiators

These were the negotiators who saw themselves as capable of emotional engagement with the suspect, as catalysts of psychological change within him or her. In contrast to the other two types who espoused the view that feelings are incompatible with control, these officers tolerated and even openly valued the role of their own personal reactions in these relationships. The value placed on their own reactions was evident in their greater comfort with mixed emotional reactions to the suspect and in their use of affective sharing to understand better and to form the bond with him or her. Beyond this, these negotiators believed that their own emotional reactions actually further their control aims, for example, by making them more credible to the suspect. Thus, they regarded themselves as capable in certain cases of participation in a mutual relationship with a clearly affective dimension.

Their experience of connecting emotionally to the suspect notwithstanding, however, these negotiators were largely able to maintain a sense of themselves as separate from the suspect. Empathy, for example, was a matter of brief and disciplined affective sharing - of "tasting the soup without having to jump into the bowl." Some even appeared to be able to make use of self-observation to avoid overinvolvement. For example, one negotiator was so frustrated and angry with a suspect who repeatedly hung up the phone on him that he felt like choking the man. Rather than give way to his anger by allowing himself to get pulled into an increasingly hostile discussion with the suspect, however, the negotiator became aware of his increasing anger. After doing so, he simply found an appropriate time - when he could do so without making the man feel guilty - to express his own frustration with the suspect's hanging up on him when he simply wanted to help. Because he could tolerate awareness of his anger, rather than deny it, he found an appropriate way to express the anger without also jeopardizing his rapport with the suspect.

The humanly engaged negotiators deemphasized the contest content of the relationship and emphasized its collaborative nature. Consistently with their allowance of room for the suspect as an autonomous partner in a collaboration, moreover, these officers seemed to suffer less stress over control lapses. That is, they saw real limits to the degree of control one can take (non-coercively) over another human being. Further, they also differed from the other two types in the high value they placed on the relationship to resolve crisis and in their focus on not only the goal but also the process of the negotiation.

It was only one or two of the humanly engaged negotiators who showed a capacity for internal psychological integration of their interpersonal and coercive roles. As noted, they

appeared to accomplish this through tolerance of the mixed personal reactions attending their conflicting roles and through the use of reflection to keep these reactions from interfering in the work. Although the humanly engaged negotiators had a tendency to avoid one set of feelings too, their avoidance was a less successful strategy to resolve role conflict than it was for the other two types. This may have been so, because the strong belief held by the other two types, that feelings must and can be suppressed, was not available to the humanly engaged officers. In the absence of this credo, the latter may have been less well-protected from the clash of feelings associated with their two opposing roles and from guilt or shame resulting from it. Apt here is the example of one female negotiator's account of her guilty sense of betrayal of a male drug dealer who had come to have feelings for her when she had worked years before in undercover narcotics.

Indeed, these negotiators showed the hazards of emotional engagement in the form of heightened stress not from control lapses but from difficult emotions they encountered in these control relationships. An excellent example of this comes from the report of one especially intuitive negotiator who described an incident involving a successful, elderly suspect threatening to kill a hostage with whom he believed his young wife to be having an affair. In their discussions, the suspect would briefly mention what was troubling him but then decline the negotiator's repeated efforts to engage him in talk about his troubles and assert that he no longer cared about anything. This suspect repeatedly hung up the phone but always answered when the negotiator called back, and the negotiation continued in this fashion. Doggedly, the officer stayed with this angry and depressed individual, feeling the suspect's despondency and his own powerlessness and inadequacy in the face of it but also continuing his effort to connect with the man. After some time, the negotiator reported feeling driven to take the "last resort" risk of going "face to face" to talk to this suspect. When he did so, the elderly suspect finally asked if his guns would be confiscated by the police. With the negotiator's assurance that they would not, the man surrendered.

Years later in his interview with me, this negotiator reported continuing feelings of failure over this incident; he could credit himself with no responsibility for its successful conclusion, because he perceived himself to have actually been as powerless and inadequate as this severely depressed man had made him feel. As clinicians would hasten to point out, severely depressed people commonly elicit unpleasant feelings of helplessness and inadequacy in those who try to help. This does not necessarily mean that the intervenor is really inadequate, however; it simply indicates something about the anger that often underlies depression. Without the benefit of such a perspective on the emotional exchange in these relationships, this humanly engaged negotiator was indeed burdened with the difficult feelings the control relationship had elicited in him.

Central Findings

From both the negotiators' and my perspectives, the central distinction among these portraits is that between the humanly engaged negotiators on the one hand and the dominating and impersonal negotiators on the other. In the negotiators' views, the dominating and impersonal types differ from the humanly engaged in their report that feelings are incompatible with control and that they can keep feelings out of control relationships. To me, however, the main difference between the two camps is not the absence of feeling among the dominating and impersonal officers, but rather their different experience and management of affect. It is a distinction that concerns differential attitudes toward, experience, and management of feeling in control relationships.

A digression to offer some theoretical context is warranted here. Irene Fast and Anne Thompson are two theorists who have integrated Piagetian cognitive development and psychoanalytic theories of object relations (recurring patterns in one's feelings about self and other) into a useful object relational theory of the development of affect (Thompson, 1986; Fast et al., 1985) that helps to understand this central distinction as I see it. This theory contemplates that as individuals develop psychologically, so too does their experience of their feelings and their sense of self and others. In infancy, there is little differentiation among feelings, oneself, and any object or other person with whom one interacts; everything is instead lumped together into what Fast terms an "event." An example is the "here-I-am-with-mom-who-holds-the-rattle-as-I-have-fun-trying-to-grasp-it" event. In such an event, affects cannot be separated from actions, or how it feels when I grasp the rattle is not discrete from the act of grasping the rattle. Further, one's sense of self is not separate from one's sense of others, so that mom who holds the rattle that I grasp is just part of the mom-me-grasp-rattle event. Finally, the feelings in any given event have an intense and universal quality, as if no others have or will ever exist.

Briefly, as people mature, their cognitive functions develop along with their affects so that all the components of these events eventually become differentiated. Maturity is reached when individuals can be comfortable with more modulated (not universal and less intense) affects; with entertaining mixed feelings (tolerance of ambivalence); with the capacity to feel in the mind alone, without having to act or physically express the feeling in some other way; with the use of thought to manage feeling; and with the appreciation of other people as equipped with their own emotional lives and as separate from one's own needs and feelings about them.

How the humanly engaged negotiators experience and manage their own feelings and experience the suspect in these relationships seems to approach the greater affect maturity described by Fast and Thompson. These officers are more able to tolerate awareness of feelings for the suspect, including mixed feelings (compassion and hostility) for him or her, without sacrificing the sense of their own separate existence. They are able to experience these feelings without having to

turn them into verbal actions that interfere in their relationship with the suspect, have slightly more tendency to manage them through reflection, and view the suspect as a separate, autonomous individual.

From the tolerance for their own feelings about the suspect, without having to slip into role violations through actions taken like the wrong words said or wrong approaches used, I suggest that it follows that the police credo of suppression of feeling is apparently not essential for all police officers to the capacity to stay in control of either themselves or the situation. Humanly engaged negotiators become emotionally engaged but not overinvolved, because they begin with more appreciation for whose feeling is whose. They can let themselves know what they are experiencing so that they can examine it in the light of thought and reason before deciding what action to take. I also suggest that it follows from the view of another person as autonomous, with a will of his own, that one's sense of the control it is possible to take over him (without coercion) is less absolute and more flexible. Humanly engaged negotiators, for example, are more apt to believe that it is the suspect, rather than the negotiator, who will bring him- or herself under control. Their reduced stress from the sense of control failure may well be attributable to this aspect of their level of affect development. Finally, their higher affect maturity is also associated with a more developed sense of personal autonomy that permits them to draw as often upon their own emotional resources as they do upon the assistance of team members.

In short, as a consequence of their greater affect maturity, humanly engaged negotiators can form more mature relationships with suspects that echo, in their ways of gaining control over the suspect's emotional state, the negotiators' personal ways of regulating their own affects. Dominating and impersonal negotiators rely instead on avoidance of their own emotional experience - or any mixed feelings - with a corresponding relative disregard for the suspect's separate experience or autonomy. I suggest the two latter types place high value on beliefs about the avoidance of feeling to prevent interference with control, because it helps them understand what would otherwise be, given their affective characteristics, a confusing and contradictory psychological task.

The more mature relationship experience of the humanly engaged type may have certain advantages over those experienced by the other types, both for job performance and individual well-being. These include: 1) more accurate reading of the suspect; 2) more efficient development of the bond with the suspect; 3) more capacity to function alone if necessary, without other officers; and 4) reduced experience of stress over the long-term from a sense of control failure. Their disadvantages include heightened stress from the difficult feelings and mixtures of feelings charging the control relationship and the likelihood that these officers will integrate less well with tactical units.

In sum, these findings largely support the three understandings culled from the literature of how one engages in conflicting, interpersonal and coercive, roles in one and the same relationship. This study goes further, however, to suggest that these understandings are not discrete and random, but are rather connected along a continuum of affect development.

IV Recommendations

These findings became the basis for recommendations for training and debriefing to assist negotiators in the management of emotional stress produced by these control relationships and to enhance their skill at maintaining control over the situation. The internal focus of the study, on the officer's experience and management of feeling, suggests the tailoring of training and stress management approaches to this dimension of the officer's personality. The humanly engaged type of negotiator should benefit from advanced training in affect management that concerns the use and control of the affects that will inevitably arise for them in these relationships. These benefits should include improved performance of the negotiation task from enhanced intelligence gathering, better avoidance of interference from feelings, and more rapid formation of bond. They should also include reduction of the particular kind of stress - from the difficult feelings themselves - experienced more often by these officers.

Despite their different psychological makeup, I suspect that many dominating and impersonal officers too may privately appreciate exposure to a new tool such as this for possible use in crisis negotiations. Certainly, they are more apt to appreciate training in the use and control of feeling in these relationships to the degree that it is clearly linked to their police purpose and to skill development. One way to underscore the concrete, skill-based value of these issues might be through training on the assessment and management of suicidal suspects: issues about which all negotiators in this sample expressed uncertainty. The intervenor's emotional response to the suicidal person is a standard diagnostic tool for clinicians, provides valuable ideas about strategies for talking the person out of suicide, and, when properly understood, helps the intervenor to minimize the emotional stress of such interactions.

Even so, their different psychological makeup may indicate that such an approach, which sanctions the presence of feeling in policework, will encounter resistance from many dominating and impersonal negotiators. These negotiators may be more receptive to training that addresses the particular form of stress - from control lapses - they are more apt to identify. Such training might offer more external ways of managing this stress so that it does not interfere in the officer's negotiating efforts. These might include: 1) reinforcement of crisis negotiation as a team undertaking; 2) more intensive training on techniques for handling control lapses (e.g., the suspect's repeated hanging up the phone); and 3) training that casts the control-frustrating behaviors of the suspect as a normally occurring obstacle that is an inherent part of the challenge

confronting the officer. To the degree that stress reduction during the negotiation affects performance, it should also enhance negotiating skill for these officers.

Debriefing recommendations are directed toward two kinds of insufficiencies in ordinary post-incident debriefing, reported by dominating and impersonal negotiators: 1) no lasting effect (just temporary venting) and 2) their tendency to avoid these debriefings because they understand it to be stigmatizing mental health intervention. To address both concerns, I have proposed "skill development" debriefing. Like the ordinary post-incident debriefing, this too would include review of the negotiator's personal experience of the incident but would add emphasis on the linkage between this experience and choices of approach. If, for example, the intuitive officer who negotiated with the severely depressed, elderly man were exposed to this form of debriefing, he might have the opportunity to link his feeling of powerlessness to the risky decision he made to go "face-to-face" with the suspect. Forearmed with the knowledge that he may tend to take risks in part as a means of restoring his sense of efficacy and control, he can only be better equipped to make these decisions in the future - one way or the other - for the right tactical reasons.

Such skill development debriefing, then, would be designed to lessen interference from personal reactions and to promote longterm capacity to manage stress more autonomously, through enhanced understanding of personal reactions. It would make explicit that the purpose of examining emotional response is not to correct or help the officer in need but to learn methods of reducing future stress and to improve negotiating technique. Additionally, to tap into the preference among dominating and impersonal officers to avoid feeling and rely on other team members to manage personal reactions they may have, it might also be useful to explain the value of attending to the negotiator's personal reactions as a means of sharpening the secondary negotiator's skill at the task of monitoring the primary negotiator's performance.

V. Concluding Thoughts on the Application of these Findings

The contribution of this study to police crisis negotiations can perhaps be characterized as the discovery of an association among the officer's preferred way of managing feeling, his or her manner of role reconciliation, and the content of the stress experienced in control relationships. Apart from the implications of this discovery for the fine tuning of debriefing and training efforts to match the officers' individual styles, it also has potential relevance for the selection of negotiators to fit the particular structure of the SWAT team and the resources available to it. Whether officers must frequently negotiate alone, whether funds are available to secure the consulting services of a psychologist, and whether tactical and negotiation wings are tightly integrated are examples of features of the SWAT team situation that might call for different types of negotiators.

Beyond its implications for crisis negotiation, this study also bears on other aspects of policing. While one cannot conclude from this work that negotiators who can form more mature

relationships with suspects are the better officers, one might predict from their higher affect development that it is these officers who approach other policing tasks with more ability to differentiate citizens (i.e., less reliance on fixed stereotypes) and more flexibility in terms of how they are to be treated. The relevance of this quality to the crucial importance of the officer's ability to decide on the correct approach in any given patrol situation seems evident. Further, the findings on the ways in which negotiators manage role conflict have the potential to alert trainers and supervisors to the nature of the difficulty certain officers may have in making good decisions. For example, it may be easy to discredit the threats of a truly suicidal individual, if officers insulate themselves against genuine empathy and a genuine wish to understand and instead conceive of their concerned behavior with the individual as simply an "act." Attention to the way in which police officers understand the reconciliation of role conflict promises to bring such a tendency to misperceive others to the surface and to make it more accessible to adjustment through training, supervision, or debriefing.

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