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
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Final Report: Boot Camps' Impact on Confinement Bed Space Requirements

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FINAL REPORT

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Executive Summary

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (hereafter termed "the Act") offered states incentives to enact laws and adopt policies that would increase the use and duration of imprisonment for violent offenders.¹ Because these policies would increase prison populations in states already confronted with crowded prisons, the Act also authorized grants to states to plan, build, or expand correctional boot camps, which were to provide early release for selected non-violent inmates in order to free existing prison bed space so it could be reallocated to confine violent offenders. To help grantees develop or expand their boot camps, the Act also authorized the Corrections Program Office (CPO) to provide technical assistance.

This study examines two issues: (1) the extent to which the Act's boot camp grantees sought and received technical assistance (TA) from the CPO; and (2) the impact that selected correctional boot camps funded under the Act had on confinement bed space requirements in their respective correctional systems.

Utilization of Technical Assistance

Forty-three jurisdictions received grants under the Act to plan, enhance, or expand a correctional boot camp. About one-third of them (n = 15) sought and received technical assistance from the CPO. One grantee received TA twice, for a total of 16 TA events. The most common form of TA was to fund the costs of visits by officials in the grantee jurisdiction to observe existing correctional boot camps and to learn how they had been planned and how they operated. These visits accounted for half the total TA requests (n = 8). About one-fourth of the requests were for generalized planning support—for example, to have someone facilitate a stakeholders meeting, or to help outline a strategy for the planning effort. The remainder were requests related to specific problems faced by individual grantees (for example, setting up a particular treatment modality within a boot camp, analyzing existing correctional populations, etc.).

Grantees gave high ratings to the timeliness, relevance, and usefulness of the TA they received. Overall, grantees indicated they were very satisfied with the TA that they received.

CPO was unable to provide TA evaluation forms for about 40 percent of the TA recipients. In some cases it appeared recipients did not complete and return the forms. CPO moved to new offices during the evaluation and some returned forms may have been misplaced or misfiled. In any event, we suggest that CPO collect and track TA evaluation data more carefully.

¹ Pub. L. 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1796.

Boot Camps' Impact on Correctional Population Levels

We selected four boot camps—in Oregon, Washington, Maryland, and South Dakota—for in-depth study. Two served juvenile males (Oregon and South Dakota) and two served adult males and females (Maryland and Washington). In each jurisdiction we collected data needed to apply a boot camp population impact model that Abt staff developed.

Washington's boot camp reduced required confinement bed space by 365, compared to 148 in South Dakota. Oregon achieved a modest reduction of 17 beds. Under a high impact set of assumptions,² Maryland reduced confinement bed space requirements by 160 beds; however, under a low impact set of assumptions, Maryland *increased* confinement bed space requirements by 22 beds. In both Washington and South Dakota, the reductions in required confinement bed space equaled 123 percent of their boot camps' capacities. In Oregon, reductions equaled about 30 percent of its boot camp's capacity, compared to 35 percent in Maryland (under the high impact assumptions).

Key factors that affected boot camps' impact on required confinement bed space were:

- the probability that boot camp entrants would have been imprisoned if the boot camp did not exist (we termed this factor $p(\text{IN})$ in the impact model);
- the discount in time served for those who completed the boot camp;
- the in-program failure rates for those admitted to the boot camp; and
- the revocation rate for boot camp graduates.

In all four jurisdictions $p(\text{IN})$ was 1.0. In three (Oregon, Maryland, and South Dakota) correctional officials selected boot camp participants from among offenders sentenced to their custody. In Washington judges selected boot camp participants, but did so as "exceptions" to the state's sentencing guidelines. This process reserved boot camps for offenders whose presumptive guideline sentence was imprisonment.

The impact model indicated that if $p(\text{IN})$ fell to 0.84 in Oregon, 0.82 Maryland, or below about 0.74 in Washington or South Dakota, no bed space savings would result. In fact, as the $p(\text{IN})$ fell below these levels, boot camps in each jurisdiction would begin to increase, not reduce, prison bed space requirements.

2 Officials in Maryland were unable to provide precise data on variables needed to fully operationalize the model. Hence, project staff estimated ranges for some parameters from data that was provided. We ran two sets of estimates for Maryland, one which used a combination of variables which would produce a maximum impact on confinement bed space, and another that would produce a minimum impact.

States that offered bigger discounts in time served to offenders who completed boot camps achieved larger reductions in required confinement bed space than those that offered small discounts. The average amount of the discount is determined by four factors: (1) the average period of confinement offenders would serve if they were not in the boot camp; (2) the average duration of the boot camp for those who complete it; (3) the duration of the boot camp selection process; and (4) average amount of additional confinement officials used as a sanction for offenders who misbehaved in the boot camp, or who were removed from the boot camp and returned to the inmate general population.

Officials can increase discounts by targeting more serious offenders (who would serve longer prison terms if they were not in the boot camp), by operating shorter boot camps, by shortening the screening process—thereby getting eligible offenders into the boot camp quicker—and by minimizing the amount of added confinement time for inmates who misbehave in the boot camp or who are removed from it.

In-program failure rates varied from as low as 5 percent (South Dakota) to 26 percent (Maryland). This suggests that officials can modify failure rates by developing different regimens for dealing with recalcitrant participants. In South Dakota, for example, boot camp participants are not permitted to drop out voluntarily. Maryland officials are training drill instructors to use misbehavior as an opportunity to teach inmates about rational decision making, rather than to respond from a purely “enforcement” perspective.

The revocation rate for boot camp graduates was similar in all four programs, varying between 23 and 25 percent. In each jurisdiction a separate agency, or a separate division within the same agency, supervises boot camp graduates when they return to the community and makes decisions about their revocation. The near uniformity of revocation rates across jurisdictions suggests that DOC officials have had little influence on the revocation practices of autonomous parole boards or supervision authorities. Under Washington’s sentencing guidelines, however, technical violations do not result in a substantial period of re-confinement. Hence, revocations in Washington erode bed space savings less than in the other jurisdictions.

Correctional populations rose in all four jurisdictions during the period when boot camps were introduced, although in South Dakota boot camps enabled the state to eliminate a backlog of juveniles who were held in local facilities awaiting an opening in the state’s training school. None of the states achieved absolute reductions in correctional populations and associated costs after the introduction of boot camps.

Relative cost savings were attributable to boot camps in two states. Using the average daily cost (total annual operating costs divided by total person days of confinement), these relative savings were \$8.73 million per year in Washington, \$6.56 million per year in South Dakota. Maryland and Oregon were unable to provide data needed to compute cost savings.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter describes the development of correctional boot camps and discusses the major goals correctional officials sought to achieve with them. It describes how boot camps were expected to achieve those goals, and how the interplay among goals shaped boot camps' capacity to free up correctional bed space. Finally, this chapter describes the current study, and outlines the content of this report.

The first correctional boot camps opened in Oklahoma and Georgia in 1984 and early 1985.³ The number of boot camps increased rapidly during the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁴

Goals of Correctional Boot Camps

Political leaders embraced the concept because boot camps matched the public's desire for tougher no-nonsense sanctions. Correctional administrators wanted to achieve several different goals with boot camps.⁵ They wanted to reduce (a) recidivism by deterring participants from future crime and by rehabilitating them and (b) prison populations. Boot camps were expected to deter offenders by heightening their fear of future imprisonment.⁶ They were to rehabilitate offenders by improving participants' self-esteem, self-discipline, or respect for authority, or by creating an environment in which traditional correctional treatment programs were more effective.⁷

Boot camps were to reduce prison populations by shortening the prison terms that participants otherwise would serve. Reduced populations would lower operating costs, defer

3 Parent, Dale G., *Shock Incarceration: An Overview of Existing Programs*. National Institute of Justice (Washington, D.C.), 1989.

4 Cronin, Roberta, *Boot Camps for Adults and Juvenile Offenders: Overview and Update*. Research Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1994.

5 Parent, op. cit.

6 Offenders typically were given one chance to complete a boot camp. Hence, it was not the prospect of repeating the boot camp that was to deter. Rather, staff in early boot camps tried to instill or heighten offenders' fear of regular prison. Georgia's boot camp was located within a general population prison. While officials separated boot camp inmates from regular prisoners, many times during the day boot camp inmates passed within earshot of regular inmates who subjected them to threatening sexual taunts. During visits to Georgia's boot camp in the late 1980s, the principal author heard staff on several occasions emphasize to participants the risk of sexual victimization that they would face if they were to be confined in the general population.

7 New York's boot camps were designed around a modified therapeutic community program for drug involved offenders.

or avoid capital costs, allow officials to use existing beds made available by boot camps to confine more serious offenders for longer terms, or to achieve combinations of these.

These explicit goals played out in volatile political environments in which policy makers exploited "get tough" sentencing themes or campaigned on promises to expand use of boot camps. In several jurisdictions reluctant or skeptical correctional administrators faced a political rush to create boot camps, or lost control of boot camp development when choices about key design features were shifted from administrative to political arenas. Some correctional leaders openly used boot camps to reap political good will or public relations benefits.

Results of subsequent evaluations have cooled fervor over boot camps, at least regarding their impact on crime control. NIJ's multi-site boot camp evaluation found improvements in intermediate outcomes—for example, boot camp inmates were less alienated by their prison experience, and had more positive attitudes toward prison staff than regular inmates—but found no significant difference in post-release recidivism of boot camp graduates compared to non-participants.⁸ Similarly, OJJDP's evaluation of juvenile boot camps found no significant differences in post-release outcomes.⁹

How Boot Camps Affect Bed Space Requirements

Although correctional boot camps have existed for almost 15 years, we know little about how they actually affect prison bed space requirements because previous studies have focused mostly on their treatment effects. However, boot camps' potential to free up prison bed space was a key factor in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (hereafter termed "the Act"), which offered state and local governments grants to plan, build or expand correctional boot camps which would release less serious offenders earlier, thereby freeing prison space which could be used to expand confinement of violent offenders.¹⁰

In 1995 Parent observed that many correctional administrators and policy makers uncritically accepted the premise that boot camps would reduce prison crowding.¹¹ Their acceptance was

8 MacKenzie and Souryal. *Multi-Site Evaluation of Shock Incarceration. Evaluation Report*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1994.

9 Institute for Criminological Research and American Institutes for Research. *Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: Constructive Intervention and Early Support—Implementation Evaluation Final Report*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, 1992.

10 States also had to agree to a number of other initiatives, including revising sentencing laws to confine more violent offenders, and to enact Truth-in-Sentencing provisions, whereby imprisoned violent offenders would serve 85 percent of their imposed sentences.

11 Parent, Dale G., "Boot Camps Failing to Achieve Goals", *Overcrowded Times*, 5, no. 4 (1994) 8-11.

based on the logic that bed space would be freed up if inmates who completed boot camps were released from prison after being confined for shorter (e.g., 4 to 6 month) periods rather than their "regular" (e.g., 18–24 month) prison terms. Believing that this oversimplified a complex problem, Parent argued that it was difficult for correctional boot camps to reduce prison populations. The characteristics of offenders placed in the boot camp and the process by which they were selected were critical factors affecting the boot camp's impact on prison bed space. If officials placed offenders in boot camps who would have been on probation if the boot camp did not exist, no prison population reductions would occur. Thus, it was important to know the objective probability of imprisonment for categories of offenders who entered the boot camp. Probability of imprisonment was itself a function of two sets of factors: (a) offenders' characteristics—mainly their prior records and their current offenses—and (b) the locus of discretionary choices in the selection process—mainly, whether judges or corrections officials controlled selection.

In addition, Parent noted that little was known about how the interplay of design choices and operating practices affected bed space savings. What was the impact of recruiting offenders with higher or lower probabilities of imprisonment? What was the impact of changing the "discount"—the reduction in time served for those who completed the boot camp? How did differences in dropout rates (voluntary withdrawals by inmates) and washout rates (removal by staff for cause) affect bed space savings? How did variations in the duration of the boot camp affect bed space savings?

How did these variables work in different combinations? If a boot camp was able to provide only a small discount in time served for those who completed the program, what other factors could staff adjust to maximize the number of beds saved? Could bed spaces be saved by simply increasing the capacity of the boot camp, or were there certain combinations of design choices and operating practices under which expanding capacity would actually reduce bed space saving? Could a smaller boot camp produce a bigger population reduction than a larger boot camp if it had different design features? If so, what were they? Under what conditions would boot camps expand the overall prison population, and thereby add to crowding and costs?

Finally, Parent believed correctional administrators had not correctly conceived boot camps' effect on prison populations. He believed it was unlikely that boot camps would reduce prison populations, because in most states the capacity of boot camps was a tiny percent of the total capacity of prisons. At best, they might reduce prison populations by a percent or two, during a time when prison populations were rising by five to ten percent annually. Thus, the absolute population impact of boot camps was likely to be minuscule under the best conditions, and completely masked in the aggregate by broad and powerful sentencing trends.

Parent believed the important question was whether boot camps required correctional systems to provide more or fewer prison beds than would have been needed to house inmates compar-

able to those admitted to the boot camp if the boot camp did not exist. He argued, in short, that the focus should shift from absolute changes in total correctional population to relative changes in bed space requirements.

The Boot Camp Bed Space Impact Model

To improve understanding of these relationships, Parent developed a model to assess the impact of various boot camp design and operating practices on bed space savings,¹² and ran multiple simulations using data that mimicked real world boot camps. Based on these simulations, he hypothesized that if boot camps were to free existing prison capacity they must:

- recruit offenders who would have a high probability of being imprisoned if the boot camp did not exist;
- substantially shorten the durations of confinement for those recruited; and
- keep in-program failure rates low.¹³

Based on his observations of existing boot camps, Parent concluded that these conditions were seldom achieved, and that most correctional boot camps, in fact, were designed and operated in ways that increased correctional populations and costs. Boot camps that recruited offenders with a low probability of imprisonment would greatly increase prison capacity. They imprisoned many probation-bound offenders for short terms, but exposed them to high odds of in-program failure, for which they would serve a substantial prison term. If jurisdictions did achieve these three conditions, Parent also hypothesized that correctional agencies would have to operate boot camps on a large scale (relative to their agency's total inmate population) in order to achieve substantial bed space savings.¹⁴

Recruit Offenders with a High Probability of Imprisonment

Parent argued that most correctional boot camps did not recruit offenders who had a high probability of imprisonment. Boot camps usually were open only to non-violent offenders with minimal non-violent prior convictions who had not been in prison before. Such offenders were seldom sentenced to prison and, when they were, their prison terms typically were brief. Several factors limited boot camps' ability to target offenders with a high probability of imprisonment. These included:

12 Because the model was useful in planning new boot camps, Parent provided the model—which runs under PC spreadsheet programs—and documentation to all attendees at OCP's 1995 national workshop for boot camp grantees.

13 Parent, *Overcrowded Times*, op. cit.

14 Parent, *Overcrowded Times*, op. cit.

- conflicting goals;
- variations in selection processes; and
- security concerns.

Conflicting Goals

Boot camps did not have just one goal—to reduce prison populations. Instead, they typically had multiple goals, some of which conflicted with population reduction. These other goals led officials to recruit offenders who, as a class, had a low probability of imprisonment.

The goal of deterrence particularly conflicted with prison population reduction. For example, Georgia's first boot camp was intended to deter offenders from future crimes. As in prior "Scared Straight" programs, officials speculated that young and inexperienced offenders were most likely to be deterred. Accordingly, they restricted boot camps to young non-violent offenders who had never been imprisoned before.

Over time, the Georgia Department of Corrections renounced deterrence as an explicit goal of their boot camps. Like most later programs, officials in Georgia began to emphasize crime control via rehabilitation, but its early boot camps strongly influenced development of new programs in other states. The Georgia Department of Corrections had an active and able public information staff, who did a very effective job of publicizing the programs and facilitating media access to them. Georgia's boot camps got prominent national television coverage. Scores of correctional officials and political leaders from across America traveled to Georgia to view their boot camps in operation. Officials in many states uncritically adopted key elements of Georgia's programs—such as the deterrence-based eligibility criteria—when they developed their own boot camps.

Selection Processes

The selection process—how offenders are picked to enter boot camps—is critically important in determining the program's impact on correctional populations. In the broad sense, both corrections officials and other criminal justice practitioners make discretionary decisions that affect who ends up in boot camps. Prosecutors decide what charges to file against accused offenders. Prosecutors and defenders plea bargain with respect to charges and sentences. Within the limits of law and procedures, judges pronounce sentence(s) upon conviction. All of these discretionary choices influence whether an offender fits boot camp eligibility criteria.

In a more specific way, however, the formal roles of judges and correctional officials in the boot camp selection process vary among jurisdictions. In some states judges dominate. In others corrections officials dominate. In some judges and correctional officials share selection authority.

In the first approach, judges decide which convicted offenders go to boot camps. In Georgia, for example, judges' sentencing orders direct state corrections officials to place offenders who meet broad eligibility criteria in a boot camp. Under this approach judges determine the composition of the pool of candidates while corrections officials later cull the pool to screen out those who have medical or physical impairments.

In the second approach, correctional officials (who operate the boot camp) control selection, and pick participants from among offenders sentenced to their custody. In this approach, corrections officials also cull the pool of candidates to screen out those who are unfit.

In the third approach, selection is shared between correctional officials and judges. Usually, the DOC identifies and screens potential candidates from among its incoming inmates. The DOC then they asks the judge who sentenced that offender to approve their placement in a boot camp.

If judges select boot camp participants, there is a higher probability that most boot camp entrants would not have been imprisoned if the boot camp option did not exist. If a boot camp is restricted to young non-violent first offenders, those criteria describe the majority (perhaps a large majority) of the offenders coming before judges for sentencing. These offenders are the least serious ones that judges must sentence. Because studies have shown that the probability of imprisonment increases directly with the (a) severity of offenders' current crimes, and (b) the extent and seriousness of their prior records, young non-violent first offenders will have a low probability of imprisonment at sentencing.

If correctional officials control boot camp selection and select participants from among regularly sentenced inmates, everyone they consider would serve a regular prison term if they were not in the boot camp.

The distinction between DOC and judicial control of the selection process is sometimes blurred. It is possible, for example, that judges might change their sentencing behavior to (a) place certain offenders in prison where they can qualify for boot camp screening, or (b) ratify negotiated pleas designed to get offenders into boot camps.

Security Concerns

Security concerns also work against using boot camps to save prison bed space. Boot camps almost always are located in minimum security facilities, such as converted work camps, many of which do not have secure perimeter fences and are more vulnerable to escapes than higher security facilities. Therefore, correctional officials typically required that inmates must meet minimum security criteria under their internal classification systems before they enter a boot camp.

Prison classification systems vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but two generic features are important. First, they usually assign inmates initial custody levels based on the extent and severity of their prior criminal records, their prior behaviors under correctional custody (e.g., history of absconding, escapes, misconduct, etc.), and case-specific factors (e.g., mental illness, treatment needs, etc.). Second, they reduce custody levels over time for inmates who display good behavior.

Because boot camps are short-term facilities where inmates usually are placed at the front-end of their prison term, they generally are open only to inmates who initially qualify for minimum custody, not those who later earn reductions in custody levels. This also focuses recruitment on offenders convicted of non-serious crimes who have limited prior records.

Shorten Terms of Imprisonment

Parent also hypothesized that inmates who complete correctional boot camps would have to get much shorter terms of imprisonment than they otherwise would have served if substantial bed space savings were to be achieved. He referred to this as the "discount" for boot camp participation. To determine the real discount, officials need to know how long comparable inmates (that is, ones who fit the profile of inmates who will enter the boot camp) would have been imprisoned between their admission and initial release from prison in the period just before the boot camp started.¹⁵

It is difficult for boot camps to grant substantial discounts. The types of offenders most states allow in boot camps (young, non-violent offenders with limited prior records) typically serve the shortest prison terms of all inmates. In states that routinely use early release to lessen prison crowding, officials typically first target young non-violent offenders for early release—a practice which further reduces their already short prison terms, depletes the pool of boot camp-eligible offenders, and reduces inmates' incentives to enter the boot camp.

If corrections officials punish inmates' misconduct by extending the time they must spend in a boot camp, they also reduce both the discount and inmates' incentives to remain in and complete the program. If multiple extensions for misconduct occur, inmates could serve as much (or even more) time in a boot camp as they would have served if they had been placed in a regular prison.

¹⁵ In some states other benchmarks might be relevant. For example, in a state with presumptive sentencing guidelines, the discount would be the difference between an inmate's presumptive term of confinement under the guidelines and their real period of confinement between their admission to prison and their release from the boot camp. Similarly, if offenders were routinely paroled (presuming good behavior) after serving their minimum sentence or a fixed percent of their maximum sentence, those dates could be the expected durations of confinement used to compute the discount.

Keep In-program Failure Rates Low

Among early boot camps as many as 35 to 45 percent of those admitted failed to complete the program, either because staff removed them for cause (washouts) or because they voluntarily withdrew (dropouts).¹⁶ Boot camps are a difficult and trying experience for many young offenders. From a staff perspective, severe and certain consequences may be needed to deter serious misconduct, and to maintain discipline and safety. Staff may also believe that substantial penalties are needed to suppress dropout rates. Consequently, officials typically send non-completers into the general inmate population to serve their original term of imprisonment.

The simulation model suggests that how staff respond to inmate misconduct and rule violations has a big impact on their programs' potential to reduce prison bed space requirements, because in-program failures who are returned to the general population occupy prison beds that would be "saved" if they had remained in and completed the boot camp. The simulations show that high in-program failure rates quickly erode prison bed space savings. The key is to find responses to misconduct that can be applied quickly without invoking substantial prison terms, or to rely more on rewards and incentives to encourage proper conduct, or to do both. Boot camp practitioners must try to balance competing objectives—to respond in ways that maintain discipline and rule abiding behavior while minimizing the damage done to population control objectives.

Operate Large-Scale Boot Camps

In most jurisdictions boot camps—even if they operated at full capacity—could process only a very small percentage of the total inmates committed to the jurisdiction's custody. Therefore, their impact on available bed space (positive or negative) could easily be masked by minor variations in the agency's inmate population. Boot camps might increase required prison bed space but the agency's total inmate population might drop slightly. Conversely, boot camp might save prison bed space, but the agency's total inmate population might rise sharply due to dozens of factors—changes in sentencing laws, toughening attitudes to violent offenders, even a single new prosecutor in one major metropolitan county—beyond officials' ability to control.

Parent argued that if "successful" boot camps—those which achieved positive savings in prison bed spaces—were to have a substantial impact on total inmate populations, the

16 MacKenzie, Doris L. and Parent, Dale G., "Boot Camp Prisons for Young Offenders." In *Smart Sentencing: The Emergence of Intermediate Sanctions*, Byrne, Luripio, and Petersilia (eds.) Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992.

corrections agency would need to operate a large scale boot camps,¹⁷ so that the number of inmates processed through boot camps would be a significant proportion of the total inmate population.¹⁸

This scenario is difficult for most states to achieve.¹⁹ It requires a substantial redirection of correctional resources. It also requires a population of eligible inmates that is large enough and entry and retention rates that are high enough to provide the “flow” needed to keep boot camps running at or very near capacity. Most states would have expand eligibility criteria to include much more serious offenders in order to yield a large enough pool of eligible offenders.

If jurisdictions want boot camps to have a relative effect on prison bed space, they need to develop a means to compare bed space requirements for inmates confined in boot camps with bed space requirements for those inmates if the boot camps did not exist. If bed space requirements are less under boot camps, they have “saved” prison beds. If bed space requirements are greater under boot camps, they have added to prison bed space requirements.

The Current Study

In 1996 Abt Associates submitted a proposal to NIJ to study the extent to which boot camps funded under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 freed up prison bed spaces. The proposal was funded, with two special conditions: first, NIJ wanted us to examine both juvenile and adult boot camps. Second, NIJ wanted us to assess technical assistance delivered to correctional boot camps funded under the Act.

Among other things, the Act authorized grants to states and localities to plan, construct, or expand correctional boot camps. The boot camps were to be designed to provide early release to non-violent offenders, thereby freeing bed space which could be used to confine violent offenders for longer terms. States also had to embark on other reforms designed to increase use of confinement sentences for violent offenders, and to provide “Truth-in-Sentencing,” under which imprisoned violent offenders would serve 85 percent of their pronounced sentence. These other reforms would increase prison populations, and the Act promoted boot camps as one means of cushioning that increase.

17 On the other hand, if jurisdictions operated “unsuccessful” boot camps—those that achieved a *negative* savings in bed spaces—they would only exacerbate their bed space shortfall by operating large-scale programs.

18 For example, in the New York State Department of Corrections over 10 percent of the inmate population were housed in correctional boot camps. By contrast, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections could accommodate only about 1 percent of its inmates in boot camps.

19 New York is one of the few states to have been able to achieve this.

The Corrections Program Office (CPO) administered these boot camp grants. In 1995 and again in 1996 the CPO held national workshops to inform potential grantees about the availability of funding and to help them prepare and submit their applications. Altogether, 43 jurisdictions received boot camp grants under the Act. Twenty-eight grants were to state agencies, ten to local agencies, three to territories, and two to Indian tribes. Eleven of the grants were for juvenile boot camps.

Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following questions.

1. With respect to technical assistance:
 - a. What proportion of jurisdictions awarded boot camp grants under the Act received technical assistance on problems related to the planning, expansion, or construction of their programs?
 - b. What types of technical assistance did they get?
 - c. How satisfied were they with the timing, quality, and usefulness of the technical assistance they received?
2. With respect to boot camps' impact on prison bed space savings:
 - a. To what extent did the boot camps funded under the Act free up prison bed space in their respective correctional systems?
 - b. What were the most important design and operating choices that affected their impact on prison bed space?
 - c. How did changes in other variables affect the boot camps' impact on available prison bed space?

Organization of the Report

Chapter 2 examines the use of technical assistance by jurisdictions that got boot camp grants under the Act. It describes the number who got technical assistance, the types of assistance they requested and received, and summarizes their satisfaction with it.

Chapter 3 examines the impact of four selected correctional boot camps on bed space requirements in their respective jurisdictions. It describes how we selected the sites, collected data,

and conducted the analyses. It describes the four programs we selected for in-depth study and presents results of our analysis, as well as simulations of the impact of alternative design options and operating practices for each program on bed space requirements.

Chapter 4 summarizes findings and discusses their implications for policy makers and administrators. An appendix describes and documents the simulation model.

This report is not an evaluation of boot camps' impacts on intermediate or long-term outcomes. We describe boot camps' design and operational features in the four jurisdictions, but we do so in order to focus on features relevant to understanding programs' goals or to assessing their impact on required correctional capacity. We present information obtained from the jurisdictions on outcomes, such as revocation and return rates for boot camp graduates, but only as variables in our model which affect demand for prison space.

Chapter 2: Assessment of Technical Assistance Provided to Boot Camp Grantees

This chapter examines the process by which grant recipients requested and received technical assistance (TA), describes the number and type of technical assistance requests grantees made, and describes their satisfaction with the technical assistance they received.

Methods

We obtained a list from the Corrections Program Office (CPO) of all jurisdictions that received boot camp grants under the Act. In April and May, 1997 we telephoned the official listed as project director in each of 43 jurisdictions. During this interview we obtained data we needed to select four sites for more intensive study. In addition, we asked each respondent if their project had requested TA offered through the CPO. If so, we asked questions about their level of satisfaction with the timeliness, relevance and utility of the TA they received. When it was available, we also obtained documentation from the CPO relative to technical assistance delivered. This included a description of the TA request and the recipient's evaluation of the TA they received.

Description of the Technical Assistance Process

Grantees may learn about the availability of TA in several ways. In 1995 and 1996 CPO hosted national workshops for jurisdictions interested in boot camp grants. At these workshops CPO presented information about how to request technical assistance.

Each fiscal year the Corrections Program Office publishes its *Technical Assistance Plan*, which is sent to all grantees. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) also publishes its annual *Program Plan*, which contains information about TA available from CPO.

The CPO is responsible for processing TA requests from boot camp grantees. Sites must submit a written application—using either a letter detailing their TA request, or the application form that CPO has developed. The form guides applicants through the application process, and ensures that all necessary information is obtained.

All TA requests are first screened by CPO staff, who contact applicants if clarification is needed. The application is then forwarded to the CPO's Chief of Technical Assistance and Conferences, who oversees the application process. Once the Chief has approved the request, the application is forwarded to the TA provider—an organization that contracts with CPO to manage the actual delivery of TA to the sites.

Within ten days the TA provider must confer with the applicant and develop a work plan to respond to the TA request. The work plan describes specific tasks to be done and sets forth time lines for their completion. After completing the work plan, the TA provider sends the work plan to CPO's Chief of Technical Assistance and Conferences, who has three days to approve, modify, or disapprove the work plan.

Findings

Use of Technical Assistance

Altogether, 15 of the 43 grant recipients (about 32%) requested TA. One agency requested and received TA twice, for a total of 16 TA events. In three jurisdictions, TA was delivered after our telephone interviews were completed. In addition, CPO records show that TA was delivered to two jurisdictions that did not, in our interviews, indicate that they had requested TA. Hence, Abt's information on "consumer satisfaction" covers only 10 of the 15 TA recipients. One jurisdiction obtained TA from non-CPO sources.

One further data limitation should be mentioned: CPO was unable to provide to Abt copies of their TA reports for 9 of the 16 TA events. Hence, we did not attempt an analysis based on the 7 reports that CPO was able to provide. It is unclear why the additional 9 evaluations were unavailable. In some instances the TA recipient may not have completed and submitted their portions of the reports. These evaluations first go to the National Institute of Corrections, and are then forwarded to CPO. During this time period the CPO moved to new offices, and it is possible that some of the forms had not been unpacked, or were misplaced in the move.

Types of Technical Assistance Requested

The most common type of assistance requested was visits to existing boot camps, accounting for eight of the 16 TA requests (50.0%). On average, each requestor visited two boot camps, usually in different states. In one instance, the requestor visited a boot camp and its aftercare program, which were located in two different areas of the same state. In these events several officials from the requesting agency usually traveled to one or more existing boot camps.

The next most common type of assistance request for help in general program planning. This accounted for four of the 16 requests (25.0%). In two instances, recipients asked for someone to "facilitate" key stakeholder meetings which were intended to build support for their proposed boot camp.

One grantee asked for TA on analyzing their offender flow in order to identify a target population. Another asked for help in developing a specific treatment program within their

boot camp. Due to absent reports, we could not determine the subject of the TA requests from the remaining two recipients.

Grantee Satisfaction

During our telephone interviews we asked recipients how relevant the TA they received was to their problem. We asked them to respond on a seven point scale, where 7 was "highly relevant," 4 was "moderately relevant" and 1 was "not at all relevant." Ten TA recipients responded to this question.

Six recipients (60%) said their TA was "highly relevant" (a score of 7); an additional three (30%) gave a score of 6, and one gave a score of 5. In sum, TA recipients were very satisfied with the relevancy of the assistance they received.

We asked recipients to rate the timeliness of the TA they received, again using a 7 point scale, where 7 was "very timely," 4 was "moderately timely" and 1 was "not at all timely."

Eight of the ten respondents (80%) said their TA was "very timely" (a score of 7), and two (20%) gave a score of 6. Thus, TA recipients were very satisfied with the timeliness of the TA they received.

We asked the recipients how helpful the TA was, using a 7 point scale, where 7 was "very helpful," 4 was "moderately helpful," and 1 was "not at all helpful".

Six respondents (60%) gave a score of 7 (very helpful); three gave scores of 6, and one a score of 5. Thus, TA recipients were very satisfied with the helpfulness of the TA they received.

Finally, we asked TA recipients how satisfied they were with the TA they had gotten, again using a 7 point scale, where 7 was "very satisfied," 4 was "moderately satisfied," and 1 was "not at all satisfied."

Four recipients (40%) gave scores of 7 (very satisfied); five gave scores of 6, and one gave a score of 5. Thus, TA recipients were, on the whole, very satisfied with the TA they received.

Chapter 3. Assessment of the Boot Camps' Impact on Confinement Bed Space

This chapter describes how we conducted the analysis, how we selected the four boot camps for the study, relevant characteristics of each boot camp, and findings of our analysis of each system.

The Boot Camp Bed Space Impact Model

Abt developed a model to simulate boot camps' impacts on prison bed space requirements. A simplified version of the model is shown in Figure 1. Basically, the model compares the number of bed spaces required to operate the boot camp with the number that would be required to house offenders eligible for the boot camp if the boot camp did not exist.

The use of the model specifies the number of offenders who are eligible for the boot camp. The proportion of eligible offenders who enter prison is determined by a variable called the probability of imprisonment, or $p(\text{IN})$, which is based on an historical analysis of sentencing data or other valid information about sentencing dispositions for offenders who meet the eligibility criteria.


The model calculates $p(\text{OUT})$, the probability that offenders eligible for the boot camp would have been placed on probation if the boot camp did not exist, which is defined as $1 - p(\text{IN})$ —for example, if $p(\text{IN}) = 0.4$, then $p(\text{OUT}) = 0.6$. The model adjusts the number of probationers who would have entered prison due to probation revocation. However, if $p(\text{IN}) = 1.0$ —meaning that all those admitted to the boot camp would have been imprisoned in the past—then $p(\text{OUT}) = \text{zero}$, and the probation side drops out of the model.

The prison side of the model has two tracks—a base line track and a boot camp track. The baseline track computes the number of person months of confinement that would be required to house boot camp eligible inmates if the boot camp did not exist—in Figure 1 this is labeled "PMC(BL)". The following variables are used to compute PMC(BL):

- Durations:
 - Expected average months of confinement between admission and first release;
 - Average duration of reconfinement following parole revocation.

- Probabilities:
 - Probability of parole revocation and reimprisonment.

Figure 1: The Boot Camp Bed Space Impact Model



Similarly, the boot camp track calculates the number of person months of confinement required to house eligible inmates in the boot camp--this is labeled "PMC(BC)". The following variables are used to compute PMC(BC):

- Durations:
 - Average duration of confinement for boot camp graduates
 - Average duration of added confinement for boot camp
 - dropouts
 - washouts
 - Average duration of reconfinement for revoked boot camp graduates
- Probabilities:
 - that boot camp admittees will
 - dropout
 - washout
 - that washouts and dropouts will serve regular prison terms
 - that boot camp graduates will be revoked and returned to prison.

Within each track the PMC calculations are based on flow models, which specify relevant decision points, the probabilities of different paths at each decision point, and the durations associated with each decision or path. These probabilities and durations are based on historical information or current analysis of data in particular facilities.

Finally, the model subtracts the PMC(Base) from PMC(Boot). If the result is negative, then the boot camp has reduced total required person-months of confinement. If the result is positive, the boot camp has increased total required person-months of confinement.

The model is fully documented in Appendix A.

Site Selection and Data Collection

We interviewed staff in all agencies that were awarded boot camp grants under the Act to get basic information needed to select the four programs. Once we selected the four, we conducted telephone interviews with staff at each of the four boot camps, with other officials in those state's correctional agencies, and with other criminal or juvenile justice officials in those jurisdictions. We collected available written materials from each site, such as copies of reports and evaluations. We conducted a two-day visit to each site to interview staff directly and to observe how the program operated. When necessary, we contacted agency research staff to obtain or clarify data. From these sources we obtained the information needed to specify the variables in the impact model for each jurisdiction.

During initial telephone interviews with all of the Act's boot camp grantees, we asked officials about their boot camp's status—was it still being planned, was it being built, or was it operational? For operational boot camps we asked when it opened, and got basic information about offender eligibility and flow, and about how the selection process worked. We asked about eligibility criteria, and about how eligible offenders were identified. We asked how many offenders were eligible in a year, how many were screened out before entering the boot camp, and who made the selection and screening decisions? How many offenders (on average) entered the boot camp per month? What was its capacity? How many were males and how many were females? We asked if the boot camp served adults or juveniles and got brief descriptions of the main program elements.

We ultimately selected four sites. Because we wanted to cover both juvenile and adult programs, we decided to select two juvenile and two adult boot camps.

We excluded all grantees whose boot camp was not fully operational by early spring, 1997. We also excluded operating boot camps whose occupancy rates and average monthly admissions were very low (relative to capacity and expected rates of admission) because we believed—based on prior observations of under-utilized boot camps—that operating practices were likely to be unstable. In such programs, department and project staff typically modify the program frequently in an effort to increase utilization and retention.

These criteria left two juvenile facilities available for the study—Oregon's Tillamook Youth Accountability Camp, and South Dakota's Patrick Henry Brady Boot Camp. Both served juvenile males from throughout their respective states.

These criteria left adult correctional boot camps in five states available for consideration—Washington, Maryland, Illinois, Delaware, and Mississippi. We excluded Illinois and Mississippi because corrections officials in each state reported that they could not provide the data we needed for the study.

We excluded Delaware because recent legislative changes had disrupted the program. The Legislature passed a law classifying drug offenses as violent crimes, which had the unintended effect of making drug offenders ineligible for the boot camp. As a result, Delaware's boot camp was beginning to have serious recruitment problems, and its population was dropping rapidly.

Thus, we selected Maryland's Herman Toulson Boot Camp and Washington's Work Ethic Camp for the study. Both programs had been in existence for several years. Both served inmates from throughout their respective states. Maryland's program represented a more traditional boot camp, with strong emphasis on drill and ceremony, military discipline and courtesy, hard work, and a strong commitment to rehabilitative program elements.

Washington's program was devoid of overt military elements, but emphasized instead hard work and treatment programming.

Description and Analysis of the Selected Sites

This section describes the four boot camps that participated in this study—the Herman Toulson Boot Camp in Jessup, Maryland; the Work Ethic Camp in McNeill Island, Washington; the Tillamook Youth Accountability Camp in Tillamook, Oregon, and the Patrick Henry Brady Boot Camp in Custer, South Dakota. It describes, for each, the findings of our analysis. The Maryland and Washington programs serve adult offenders; the Oregon and South Dakota programs serve juvenile offenders. The two adult boot camps serve both male and female inmates (though their populations are overwhelmingly male), while the two juvenile programs admit only males. In three programs (Maryland, South Dakota, and Oregon) officials in the correctional agency select boot camp participants; in one program (Washington) judges select boot camp participants.

We will cover the two adult boot camps first (Maryland and Washington) and then the two juvenile boot camps (South Dakota and Oregon).

1. Maryland

Description

The Herman Toulson Boot Camp was opened in August, 1990, and is located in Jessup, Maryland adjacent to several other state correctional facilities. It is operated by the Division of Corrections of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. It has a capacity of 454 inmates, 430 males and 24 females.

According to Division officials, the goals of the Toulson Boot Camp are:

- To help alleviate prison overcrowding;
- To encourage participants to become productive citizens and to provide them the means to do so; and,
- To create a more positive environment for both inmates and staff.

The first goal is to be achieved by releasing selected inmates who complete the boot camp, and who would have been confined for a shorter period than non-graduates or eligible non-participants.

The second goal is to be achieved by providing a strict physical and military regimen to change inmates' behavior and destructive attitudes, and by providing programs to deal with inmates' needs, deficits, and problems. Toulson's programs are intended to emphasize:

- teamwork
- personal responsibility
- positive work ethic
- positive self-esteem
- challenges
- motivation
- wellness
- respect for authority, and
- self-discipline.

The Toulson Boot Camp offers the following programs:

- Military drill
- Physical training
- Education
- Therapeutic community
- Drug abuse education
- Drug abuse treatment
- Social skills and decision-making
- Vocational skills training
- Community service projects.

The third goal is achieved by having staff lead by example. Staff are supposed to model the behavior and attitudes they expect from inmates.

Originally the Toulson Boot Camp was limited to offenders serving their first prison term, whose sentences were five years or less, and who were convicted of non-violent crimes (these are termed Part I inmates). In addition, offenders could not have a history of escapes, or a detainer,²⁰ had to be medically, physically, and psychologically fit for the program, and had to volunteer. Part I inmates confined in regular prisons had to serve 25 percent of their minimum sentence before they were eligible for parole; however, by completing a boot camp program Part I inmates could be released before they had served the full 25 percent.

In 1991 eligibility was extended to inmates serving their second prison terms, who have sentences up to 10 years (these are termed "Part II" inmates). Part II inmates include a few

20 A detainer is a legal document filed against a confined inmate by another jurisdiction, demanding physical custody of that offender when they are released by the agency currently confining them. A detainer means the offender is wanted in another jurisdiction to face a deferred legal process, such as trial on new alleged crimes.

convicted of less serious crimes against persons. All other criteria (no serious violent crimes, no detainees, etc.) remained the same. Part II inmates comprise about one-fifth of all admissions. Part II inmates had to serve 50 percent of their maximum sentence before they were eligible for parole. Participation in boot camp did not shorten this required prison term, but could be an element of a program that ensured the release of a Part II inmate at their earliest eligibility.

Inmates admitted to the DOC who appear to meet eligibility criteria are transferred immediately to the Toulson Boot Camp, which is located adjacent to the main reception facility. At Toulson they undergo medical exams and screening for suitability. If inmates are deemed suitable, they are offered a Mutual Agreement Program (MAP) contract, which describes the program components and the conditions that the inmate must satisfy, and which establishes a firm release date for those who complete the program.

The basic boot camp program is six months long. Recruitment and screening typically take an additional two months, so boot camp graduates will have been confined for about 8 months, on average.

For short-term inmates—those with sentences of 18 months or less—the DOC established a short track boot camp program at Toulson, which runs for 3 months. In 1995 Toulson added a boot camp for drug-involved inmates. It involves a seven month program at the boot camp, followed by a four month intensive aftercare program.

Toulson's population level has been variable and usually well below capacity. In 1996 its average daily population was just under 300, including those being screened for admission. In January 1997 its population had dropped to just 95 inmates; by December 1997 its population was 222 inmates, including 217 males and 5 females.

When Toulson was planned officials did not conduct an analysis of offender flow to determine the capacity required given the other design features of the program. The decision to locate Toulson at its present site was one of convenience. The facility was available for use and was proximate to the reception center, which made screening easier. From the outset Toulson was housed in a facility too large for its needs. Underutilization was aggravated by a high rate of declinations by eligible inmates who were offered admission, and a high non-completion rate by inmates who started the boot camp but withdrew.

Underutilization produced a continuing dynamic within the department to fill the program, especially when its other facilities were seriously overcrowded. This caused officials to make numerous changes in the program in a effort to increase Toulson's population. As noted above, they added a short-track boot camp for inmates with very short sentences. They added a drug treatment track for offenders with serious substance abuse problems. At one point

they considered adding a short punishment-based track for parole violators, but dropped the plan due to lack of resources for the community phase of the program.

In 1997 DOC officials instituted a policy termed "mandatory remediation" in an effort to increase Toulson's population. Under this policy, if the DOC determines that an inmate has a treatment need that can be addressed by an available program, the Department can require the inmate to enter and complete the program. Inmates who refuse to enter a mandated program, or attempt to withdraw from such a program before completion commit a disciplinary infraction for which they can be sanctioned. The Toulson Boot Camp is covered by the mandatory remediation policy. If an inmate refuses to participate in the boot camp or tries to withdraw from it before completion, the DOC punishes them with a "set-back"—that is, requires them to stay in the program for an additional 30 days. Recalcitrant inmates can receive up to three set-backs at the Toulson Boot Camp.

Under mandatory remediation Toulson's population began to grow, reaching slightly over 300. In recent months, however, intake has dropped off, and the population has declined to about 240. Officials have no ready explanation for this recent drop, but have intensified efforts to ensure that institutional case managers throughout the Maryland prison system identify eligible inmates in a timely way and forward their records for screening.²¹

Between its opening and January, 1997 3,011 offenders entered the Toulson Boot Camp, including 2,901 males and 110 females. About 74 percent of the males (2,147) completed the program, compared to 67 percent (74) of the females. Twenty percent of the admittees were part II offenders.

Department officials have noted, in recent months, a rise in inmate misconduct. They believe it is linked to the mandatory remediation policy, which has caused more inmates to have "attitudes" about being compelled to participate. Drill instructors generally have responded in an "enforcement" mode—confronting negative behavior and imposing sanctions for misconduct. The in-program failure rate has increased to about 26 percent (similar to its long-term average). The commander recently instituted a revised drill instructor training program to teach them to use inmates' misconduct or challenging behavior as learning opportunities which result in inmates recognizing and modifying their negative thinking. The commander hopes this new approach will reduce frequency of misconduct, integrate treatment objectives into the management strategy, and lower the washout rate.

21 Maryland officials noted that due to turnover periodic retraining of case managers is needed. In addition, there is some evidence that case managers resist the mandatory remediation policy because it infringes on one of their prior discretionary choices—to link inmates to programs that can meet their needs.

Findings

Maryland officials were unable to provide precise data for a few key variables in the simulation model, including average expected term of confinement, and length of time between admission to the Department and release from Toulson for those who complete the program.²² Instead, they were able to give ranges of values for these variables. For some variables, our analysis suggested a different value than that provided by program staff. Based on this information we have developed low and high impact scenarios.

Offender Flow

In an average year about 400 inmates are referred for screening. Boot camp officials typically screen out about 25 percent, leaving an offender pool of about 300 who enter the program. Thus, the pool is not sufficient to fill the boot camp to its capacity of 460. In the past 18 months the population has fluctuated between 240 and 300 inmates.

Probabilities

The probability of imprisonment for those admitted to the boot camp is 1.0. From the outset (almost 9 years ago) the DOC has fully controlled targeting, recruitment and screening. We could find no indication that judges play any role in identifying or recommending offenders for placement in Toulson.

The probability of imprisonment for in-program failures is also 1.0. Anyone who leaves the boot camp for any cause returns to Maryland DOC prisons and serves their regular prison term. The department does not distinguish between dropouts and washouts—especially since they implemented the mandatory remediation policy. Accordingly, we set the probability of imprisonment for washouts to 1.0 and the probability of imprisonment for dropouts to zero, which causes the latter to fall from the model.

The probability of in-program failure is 0.26. This is about the historical average rate since the Toulson Boot Camp was opened. According to program staff, the rate was higher in the program's early years, but had fallen in recent years. However, it returned to this level after the mandatory remediation policy was introduced in 1997.

The probability of parole revocation and return to prison for boot camp graduates is 0.2.

The probability for revocation and return to prison for boot camp eligible parolees (who did not enter boot camp) is .25.

22 Officials would have had to conduct extensive original research to collect the required data from inmates base files. This was deemed too costly to conduct.

Durations

Officials estimated that the average expected duration of imprisonment for boot camp eligible inmates as between 14 and 21 months.

Officials estimated that the average duration of the boot camp is 8 months. The data suggests that it may be as high as one year. If about 300 are admitted per year and populations are as high as 300, inmates would have to be being confined for about one year on average. With 300 annual admissions and a population of 240 (the population in early April, 1999) the average duration of confinement would be 9.6 months. Either of these figures is plausible, because of the use of 30 day setbacks for non-compliant offenders who are compelled to enter and remain in the boot camp. Officials estimated that approximately 25 percent of the inmates get one setback, about 10 percent get two, and a small percent get three. Accordingly, we use a range of 8 (DOC officials' estimate) to 12 (our maximum estimate) months to do our simulations.

The average duration of confinement for boot camp dropouts is between 12 and 18 months. This is estimated by noting when most dropouts occur—usually within the first two months after inmates enter boot camp—and subtracting that time from the expected average term of imprisonment. Under state law inmates not in the boot camp must serve at least their full minimum sentence. As a practical matter, inmates serve somewhat longer on average, because not all are released at their initial parole eligibility—so the expected average term of imprisonment can serve as a reasonable benchmark for determining additional prison time that boot camp dropouts face. Accordingly, for our low range parameter, we subtract 2 months (time to failure assuming an 8 month average boot camp duration) from 14, the low range estimate for average expected prison term, leaving an added confinement time of 12 months. For the high range estimate, we subtract 3 months (assuming a 12 month boot camp duration) from 21 months (our upper estimate on expected average prison term), leaving an added confinement time of 18 months.

The duration of re-confinement for boot camp graduates whose release is revoked is also a range—a low of 6 months to a high of 9 months. The low amount is determined by subtracting the low estimate of boot camp duration (8 months) from the low estimate of prison duration (14 months). The high among is determined by subtracting the high estimate of boot camp duration (12 months) from the high estimate of prison duration (21 months).

Because $p(\text{OUT}) = 0$, the duration of imprisonment for probation revocation drops out of the model.

The duration of re-confinement for boot camp-eligible parolees (who were not in boot camp) is about 4 months.

Impact on Bed Space

We developed two sets of projections. The first represents the combination of estimated parameters that likely would produce the lowest impact on bed space savings, along with other variables set to their known values. The second projection uses the combination of estimated parameters that likely would produce the highest impact on bed space savings, along with the other variables set to their known values.

The low impact scenario combines the shortest average expected prison term and the longest average boot camp duration which yields the shortest discount. Under the low impact scenario, the model projects that the Toulson Boot Camp has *increased* required prison bed space by 22. In short, under these assumptions it has consumed 22 regular prison beds, rather than freeing them.

The high impact scenario combines the longest average expected prison term and the shortest average boot camp duration, which yields the longest discount. Under the high impact scenario, the model projects that the Toulson Boot Camp has freed up 160 prison beds.

Tests of Alternative Policies

Officials in the Maryland Department of Corrections want to reduce Toulson's in-program failure rate, which has increased since introduction of mandatory remediation in 1997. As noted above, a special in-service training program has been instituted to help drill instructors respond to recalcitrant inmates in a "therapeutic" rather than a purely "enforcement" mode. To simulate the possible impact of such a policy, we ran the high and low impact scenarios, but reduced the probability of in-program failure from 0.26 to 0.13. Under the low impact scenario, we found that halving the in-program failure rate changed the bed space impact from -22 to +9. Under the high impact scenario, halving the in-program failure rate increased bed space savings from 160 to 210.

2. Washington

Description

The Work Ethic Camp (WEC) was opened by the Washington Department of Corrections on McNeill Island in November 1993. It serves both male and female adult inmates committed to the DOC.

Unlike the other boot camps in our study, sentencing judges select the offenders who enter the WEC. However, Washington has developed a unique policy that integrates WEC eligibility and screening into the state's Sentencing Guidelines. This policy ensures that judges send only prison-bound offenders to WEC.

Washington's Sentencing Guidelines give judges an unambiguous presumptive disposition—either a community sentence or a confinement sentence—for every convicted felony offender. For every confinement sentence, the guidelines also provide a presumptive duration of confinement. The presumptive dispositions and durations are shown on a sentencing guidelines grid, and are graduated so as to be proportional to the severity of conviction offenses (one axis of the grid) and the extent and seriousness of offenders' prior records (the other axis). Any confinement duration of more than 12 months is to be served in state prisons. Shorter confinement sentences are served in local jails.

The guidelines provide four “categorical exceptions” which let judges impose less severe sentences than the presumptive disposition or duration. The four categorical exceptions are:

- First Offender Sentencing Alternative
- Sexual Offender Sentencing Alternative
- Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative
- Work Ethic Camp

Under the First Offender Sentencing Alternative judges may give community sentences to offenders for whom the guidelines recommend imprisonment, or may pronounce shorter confinement sentences than recommended in the guidelines. The purpose of the First Offender Sentencing Alternative is to provide a treatment-based disposition or placement for novice felons. Under their respective exceptions, judges can sentence drug offenders or sex offenders to shorter prison terms than provided in the guidelines, if they enter and complete prison-based treatment programs.

Under the WEC categorical exception judges can sentence offenders to the WEC if their presumptive disposition is prison, their presumptive duration is at least 16 but not more than 36 months, if they have not been convicted of a violent offense (past or present), and they are at least 18 years old. Every year, judges give WEC categorical exceptions to about 60 percent of the eligible offenders who come before them. The balance go to prison to serve their full presumptive prison term.

Judges also have the option of imposing an “exceptional sentence” (this is termed a “departure” in most other states with sentencing guidelines). With an exceptional sentence, judges can alter the presumptive disposition (e.g., give prison instead of probation, or probation instead of prison) or the presumptive duration (e.g., shorten or lengthen the presumptive duration). According to the director of the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, exceptional sentences involving WEC offenders are “very rare.”²³

23 Interview with Roger Goodwin, Executive Director, Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, March 26, 1999.

The net effect is that virtually all offenders sentenced to WEC are certain to have been in prison if WEC did not exist. Hence, their probability of imprisonment is 1.0²⁴

The DOC screens inmates admitted with a WEC sentencing recommendation to ensure they have the physical and mental capacity to do the program, and meet requirements to be placed in minimum custody (i.e., no recent history of escapes, no recent serious misconduct while confined, etc.). Roughly 14 percent of these inmates are screened out by the DOC.

WEC is based on the notion that inmates can learn behaviors and attitudes associated with a strong work ethic and can transfer them to other areas of their lives. The camp's regimen is intended to provide discipline, structure, and opportunities for offenders to succeed in work, education, and life.

WEC's institutional phase includes work, education, training in employment readiness, chemical dependency education, and physical fitness. While inmates wear uniforms and are expected to behave in a courteous manner, a strict military regimen (including drill and ceremony) is absent. The day is long—from 4:30 a.m. until 10 p.m., and there is no idle time. Participants work on clean-up and maintenance assignments on the island. The education program stresses GED completion, and is tailored to inmates' individual needs. Recreation is structured, emphasizing team building and fitness. Discipline is linked to work behavior. Misconduct can result in removal from the program or "re-setting"—requiring the offender to start the program again.

Findings

Offender Flow

In Washington, the flow of eligible offenders in the DOC slightly exceeds that required to keep the WEC operating at or very near capacity. With a capacity of 295 inmates, a 6.5 month average period of confinement (WEC duration plus screening time) the annual throughput is 531 inmates. Of those admitted 21 percent fail in the program and are replaced,

24 Sentencing Commission staff acknowledge that some manipulation to get offenders into WEC sometimes occurs. (Interview with Roger Goodwin, Executive Director, Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, March 21, 1999.) Defenders and prosecutors sometimes strike a plea bargain to drop the most severe charge, so that offenders end up with a presumptive prison term of less than 36 months. If offenders are convicted of a non-violent crime (including drug sales) and have no violent prior record, they could earn their release in about 5 months by doing WEC, rather than a 2.5 to 3 year prison term. Sometimes, prosecutors and defenders plea bargain for a durational departure (hoping the judge will go along) to reduce a prison term to a level that make offenders WEC-eligible. In all these examples, however, the direction is from more to less severe sanctions. While the practices may be debatable from an overall policy perspective, they all involve offenders who otherwise face certain and more lengthy imprisonment under the guidelines.

opening an additional 111 slots for inmates in the eligibility pool, giving WEC an adjusted maximum throughput of 642 inmates a year. According to their data, about 652 annually survive DOC and judicial screening and are available to enter WEC. Hence, the existing offender flow is just sufficient to support the WEC as it is designed and operated.

The following variables are used in the model to assess WEC's bed space impact on Washington's prison system.

Probabilities

The probability of imprisonment is estimated to be 1.0 for those identified and screened by the DOC. All are inmates regularly committed to the DOC custody by the sentencing judges. Almost all have gotten WEC categorical exceptions under the state's sentencing guidelines, which ensures that the presumptive sentence in lieu of WEC would be confinement.

The probability of washout is 0.17, and the probability of dropout is 0.04. The probability of revocation for WEC graduates placed on community custody is 0.20 within one year.

Durations

The average duration of confinement for those who complete the WEC is 6.5 months—four months at the WEC and 2.5 months in screening and assessment after their arrival into custody.

The average expected term of imprisonment (the duration WEC inmates would serve if they were not in the WEC) is 17.3 months. This is calculated by finding the average sentence for those eligible for WEC (24.7 months) and subtracting jail credit (an average of 2.0 months) and then subtracting an additional 30 percent for expected good conduct credits.

Both washouts and dropouts serve the remaining time on their presumptive prison terms as specified in the Washington Sentencing Guidelines. The duration of added imprisonment for those who fail in the WEC is 16.8 months. This is determined by finding the average sentence for WEC non-completers (30.5 months) and subtracting jail credit (an average of two months) and the amount of time spent in pre-WEC screening (an average of 2.5 months). Finally, an additional 30 percent is subtracted to reflect expected reductions for future good conduct credit.

Finally, the average duration of re-imprisonment for revoked WEC graduates is 3.5 months.

Impact on Bed Space

Given these parameters, the model estimates that the 295 bed WEC reduces DOC bed space needs by 365 inmates. Our projection is almost identical to the DOC's estimate that WEC saved the department 364 beds in 1998.

Tests of Alternative Policies

Washington's bed space savings are the product of several factors. First, officials did an appropriate analysis of offender flow when planning the program, and carefully balanced the capacity and throughput of the WEC with the available pool of eligible inmates. Hence, there are enough inmates to keep the WEC operating near its capacity, and WEC officials have been spared pressure to alter program elements (such as increasing program duration) to keep the average daily population up.

Second, WEC gives completers a substantial discount in time served—slightly over 10 months on average. Third, in-program failure rates are moderate—a total of about 21 percent. Finally, revoked graduates do not return for long confinement terms—just 3.5 months on average. Under Washington sentencing law, paroled inmates have already served their confinement sentence. By guideline policy, if alleged new crimes are serious enough to warrant imprisonment, criminal justice officials are expected to file new charges. Short periods of re-confinement are intended to be proportional to non-criminal breaches of supervision rules.

Given WEC's success, it may be difficult to further increase bed space requirements. Several avenues could be explored, however. For example, if judges used the WEC categorical exception more frequently for eligible offenders, more inmates would be available to enter the program. Because the current WEC consistently operates very near capacity, the DOC would have to expand capacity to accommodate more offenders. For example, if judges used the exception in 80 percent of the eligible cases, bed space savings would increase by 120 beds to a total of 487. Of course, the DOC would have to add about 55 beds to the boot camp to house the larger eligible population.

The DOC could also try to shorten its screening process. Some other boot camps complete screening in 3 to 4 weeks, while WEC takes an average of 10 weeks. If WEC screening time could be shaved to one month, the average WED graduate would be confined for 5 months rather than 6.5 months. This change alone would increase bed space savings from 365 to 446.

3. South Dakota

Description

The Patrick Henry Brady Boot Camp was started in November, 1996 by the South Dakota Department of Corrections, an agency which provides correctional services for both adult and juvenile offenders. The boot camp is a 120 bed minimum security facility for juvenile males located on the grounds of the Custer Youth Corrections Center in Custer, South Dakota.

Until July, 1996 judges made placement decisions for youth committed to the Department of Corrections. Judges decided which juveniles would be placed in training schools, which would be placed in less secure residential programs in the community, and which would be placed on probation. At that time, juvenile commitments exceeded the capacity South Dakota's juvenile confinement facilities. But because the DOC had authority to defer accepting custody of committed youth when its facilities were full, about 160 youth were on a waiting list for admission to state facilities in late 1996. These youth were in a variety of local placements—some were in detention centers, some in contracted residential programs, and some living at home under supervision of probation officers. The DOC paid the daily confinement costs of committed youth held in detention and in private residential programs.

In 1996 the Legislature passed a law that gave the DOC authority to make classification and placement decisions for all youth committed to its custody. Judges no longer play a role in these decisions.

One goal for the boot camp was to eliminate the backlog of youth awaiting an opening in a state facility. That was to be accomplished by giving those admitted to the boot camp shorter periods of confinement than they otherwise would have served, thereby speeding their passage through the system and back onto community supervision. This would free bed space which would be used to (a) move juveniles off the waiting list and into state facilities, and (b) provide longer terms of confinement for a small number of serious violent offenders. This process was expected to "distill" the residual population—that is, to increase the proportion of serious violent offenders among those confined in the training school.

The weekly schedule at the Brady Boot Camp includes 20 hours of education, 15 hours of treatment, 15 hours of physical training, 10 hours of work, seven hours of drill, two hours of structured recreation, and seven hours of free time. Juveniles with substance abuse problems are released to a community-based alcohol and drug treatment program.

To be eligible for the Brady Boot camp, male juvenile offenders must be 14–17 years old, be committed for a non-violent crime, be in good physical health, and not have serious mental health or emotional problems. According to DOC officials about 90 percent of the youth admitted to their custody meet these basic eligibility criteria.

Staff screen eligible offenders to weed out those with histories of escape. Juveniles who have been in the boot camp before may be readmitted if they meet the other criteria. The boot camp takes newly-adjudicated offenders as well as those whose community supervision (probation or parole) has been revoked, leading to confinement.

Juveniles must volunteer to be in the boot camp. Once in, however, they cannot withdraw voluntarily. The non-completion rate is very low—just five percent of those admitted fail to finish. About one-third of the non-completions are due to physical injuries suffered during sports, physical training, or work; the rest were removed by staff for cause, such as chronic failure to adjust or for assaulting staff or residents.

Offenders enter the boot camp once a month in platoons. The average size of new platoons was 26 during the first 2 years of operation. The program is intended to run for 120 days; the average duration for graduates during the first 2 years was 117 days.

Most juveniles who complete the boot camp are placed in the community under the supervision of probation or parole officers. If juveniles have a drug or alcohol problem, they may be placed in a substance abuse treatment program operated by the DOC. Others may be placed in a variety of programs operated by a network of private vendors. Aftercare lasts a minimum of six months, and longer if needed to address specific problems or to adequately protect the public.

Findings

Offender Flow

The Patrick Henry Brady Boot Camp has a capacity of 120 beds. The average duration between admission to the Department and release to the community for graduates is 5 months, including time in screening. This gives it a basic throughput of 288 juveniles a year. The total non-completion rate is five percent, allowing officials to backfill another 15 juveniles, for a total throughput of 303.

According to DOC data 450 juveniles were admitted to the department's custody in 1997 who met basic boot camp eligibility criteria. Of those the DOC screened out approximately 20 percent for cause. This left a pool of 360 eligible for entry. Thus, the offender flow is adequate to support the boot camp as it was planned and designed to operate.

Probabilities

The probability of imprisonment is 1.0. The DOC selects participants from among regularly committed youth. While juvenile judges controlled placements in the past, a 1996 law vested

that authority in the DOC. There is no existing data base containing information on judges' juvenile dispositional decisions before or after the 1996 change.

The Brady Boot Camp has a five percent non-completion rate. Overall, about one-fourth of the Brady Boot Camp graduates had their release revoked during their first year on supervision.

Durations

The average duration from admission to the DOC to release to the community for boot camp completers was 5.0 months.

During planning, the DOC examined data on youth in its custody who fit the boot camp eligibility criteria and found that, on average, they were in custody between admission and return to the community for 12.0 months. Hence, the average discount for boot camp graduates is 7.0 months.

On average, dropouts serve an additional four months while washouts reportedly serve an additional 10 months before first release to the community. However, only half the washouts remained in DOC facilities—the rest were placed in the community. (Officials could not readily describe the events that lead to a community placement for half these washouts—but the number was small ($n = 2$) at the time of our data collection and the placements could have been due to exceptional circumstances.)

Typically, revoked boot camp graduates are returned to DOC custody, where they remain for an average of 7 months before re-release.

Impact on Bed Space

Given these parameters, the model indicates that the 120 bed facility has reduced DOC juvenile bed space needs by 148. This projected reduction is consistent with DOC estimates. As noted above, when the Brady Boot Camp was opened about 160 youth who had been committed to the DOC were held locally awaiting an available opening in DOC juvenile facilities. By early 1998 this waiting list had been eliminated, allowing the DOC to take immediate custody of committed youth.

Tests of Alternative Policies

South Dakota officials appear to have done a good job of designing and operating the Brady Boot Camp so as to free up confinement beds. Already 90 percent of its committed youth fit the boot camp eligibility criteria. The DOC screen out rate is modest—just 20 percent. The

program is relatively short. Screening time is modest. In-program failure rates are the lowest among the four boot camps studied.

The revocation rates for boot camp graduates is the only variable that substantially erodes saved bed spaces. If the revocation and return rate for boot camp graduates were cut in half (from .25 to .125), the model estimates that 25 additional beds would be saved, bringing the total bed space savings to 172.²⁵

4. Oregon

Description

In 1995 the Oregon Legislature authorized the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) to establish a youth accountability camp based on a boot camp model. The OYA opened the 56-bed Tillamook Youth Accountability Camp (TYAC) in March, 1997.

TYAC is a 4 month intensive boot camp program, followed by 8 months of community aftercare. By law, serious violent offenders (e.g., homicides, assaults, kidnaping, robbery, sexual offenses and arson) are not eligible. TYAC serves only 15–18 year old male juvenile offenders.

The Oregon Youth Authority controls the screening and selection process for TYAC. About 300 male youth who meet the statutory eligibility criteria are committed to OYA annually. OYA staff screen the pool of eligible offenders to determine if they (a) are medically and mentally fit for the program, (b) have “offender-to-offender” problems with a juvenile housed at TYAC, and (c) have treatment goals that can be met at the TYAC. Probation or parole officers (who know about the juvenile’s social and criminal history, problems and adjustment in prior placements) are asked for their recommend on TYAC placement, but their recommendations are advisory, not controlling. Probation officers are local court employees, whereas parole officers are OYA employees.

Judges play no active role in screening or selection. While judges are free to recommend a placement to OYA, at the time of our initial telephone survey none had committed a youth to OYA with a recommendation that they be placed at TYAC. In March, 1999 TYAC staff characterized such judicial recommendations as very “rare,” occurring in less than 10 percent

25 We did not study the characteristics of the revocation process (which exist outside the structure of the boot camp), so we cannot speculate on the feasibility of specific changes. However, if a substantial number are “pure” technical violations, and if the DOC could substitute non-confinement responses for them, further reductions in confinement capacity could be achieved.

of all cases screened by the OYA.²⁶ About one-third of the eligible youth are screened out by OYA staff.

Committed youth are taken into custody at the OYA Central Intake Facility near Salem, where OYA staff screen, assess, and classify them, and develop a treatment plan. This process takes one to two weeks. Those who are eligible for TYAC and who volunteer are transferred to a holding cottage at MacLaren Youth Center (Salem) where they remain until the next TYAC enrollment—an average of about two weeks. Hence, on average youth enter TYAC after having been in OYA custody for 3 to 4 weeks.

Originally officials wanted full 26 member platoons to enter once every two months. However, they quickly decided they did not want to leave vacancies (created by dropouts and washouts) open until the next platoon entered. Hence, they shifted to a monthly admissions cycle.

TYAC averages about 15 admissions per month. The average daily population is 48. On average about 12 offenders successfully complete the program each month. The washout rate has declined from about 30 percent for the first few platoons to about 12 percent in 1999. The dropout rate is zero. Officials attribute this low overall in-program failure rate to a revised intake process that stabilizes juveniles' behavior more quickly after their entry into the OYA intake facility, thereby reducing rates of misconduct during the early days of their residence at TYAC.

About 23 percent of TYAC graduates return to OYA custody, mostly with new adjudications for drug and property offenses. By OYA policy, returns to custody for "pure" technical violations (a rule infraction, but no alleged or charged new criminal or delinquent conduct) are extremely rare. Since August, 1997 slightly more than 200 youth have graduated from TYAC, and only two have returned to OYA custody for pure technical violations. Those who return serve the time remaining on their original sentence plus time on the new adjudication.

Findings

Offender Flow

About 225 juveniles are committed to the OYA annually who meet the boot camp eligibility criteria, of whom about 30 percent are screened out by OYA staff. Hence, about 158 are admitted to the TYAC annually. This flow is adequate to keep TYAC operating at its intended capacity.

²⁶ Telephone interview with Terry Yunkin, March 15, 1999.

Probabilities

The probability of imprisonment for juveniles admitted to the TYAC is 1.0. The OYA, not judges, control the selection process, and it recruits only youth who have been committed to its custody and who would—if not placed in the boot camp—be placed in some other OYA facility. OYA staff indicate that judicial recommendations for TYAC are rare overall, and were non-existent in the program's first year of operation.

OYA records show that in the past year 12 percent of admittees failed to complete TYAC, down from 30 percent in the first months of operation. OYA records show that 23 percent of TYAC graduates are returned to custody within one year—the same rate as all OYA releasees.

Durations

The average duration of TYAC is 4 months. Youth spend an additional 3 to 4 weeks in screening at reception center—so the total average duration in custody for those who complete TYAC is 4.8 months. OYA research shows that the average expected confinement time between admission and first release for youth who fit boot camp eligibility criteria but who were committed to OYA just before the TYAC opened was 6.7 months. Hence, TYAC graduates shorten their terms of confinement by 1.9 months on average.

In-program failures return to their regular placement in the OYA. We do not have data on actual time served until release by those who failed to complete TYAC: hence, we used the staff estimate that failures serve the past average of 6.7 months. Because in-program failures usually occur during the first one-third of offenders' stay in the boot camp, we reduce 6.7 months by 1.3 months to reflect credit for time confined in the boot camp. Thus, the duration of additional confinement for in-program failures is estimated to be 5.2 months.

Surprisingly, "pure" technical violations are almost non-existent—only two of the more than 200 program graduates were revoked and returned to OYA custody for violating rules without also having an adjudication for a new offense. Almost 99 percent of the revoked TYAC graduates have new adjudications, for which they have received new sentences to OYA. Because none of the graduates were returned under the terms of the old sentence, we do not factor them into simulation model. That is, their return to confinement (which caused them to occupy a confinement bed) is predicated on their status as a newly adjudicated delinquent, not on their status as a revoked boot camp graduate. Likewise, the duration of their new confinement term is determined by their new adjudication, not their prior sentence.

Impact on Bed Space

Applying these parameters to the simulation model we estimate that the TYAC has reduced required confinement bed space by 17 beds. This is a significant accomplishment, given the

small size of the program and the very small discount available in time served for boot camp completers. It is possible because officials have reduced in-program failure rates from 30 percent initially to 12 percent currently. If the non-completion rate had remained 30 percent, only 5 confinement beds would have been freed up.

OYA officials also have taken steps to keep the TYAC occupancy high by staging eligible youth so they can enter the camp every three weeks. By doing so, they have increased the agency's total bed space savings.

Tests of Alternative Policies

We examined alternative policies to see what OYA officials might do to increase bed space savings. It seemed unlikely that the already low non-completion rate could be further reduced. We focused on two possible policy changes. First, we assessed the impact of targeting a more serious offender population, which we simulated by increasing the average prison duration in the model from 6.7 months to 12 months. This change increased the bed space savings to 78.

The second policy alternative was to shorten the duration of the boot camp from 4.8 to 3 months. This saved an additional 23 beds, from 78 to 101.

Impact on Costs

This section examines cost savings attributable to the operation of correctional boot camps.

Estimating comparable cost impacts of correctional programs in different jurisdictions is difficult, especially if (as in this study) one has to rely on available data provided by the operating agencies. All correctional facilities have construction or renovation costs which should be amortized over time and considered as a part of their operating cost. However, states' practices with regard to amortizing capital costs vary. Likewise, states differ in how they compute operating costs. For example, in some states employee benefits costs are included in operating appropriations to the correctional agency; in other states benefit costs are appropriated separately to a central personnel department, and may not be included in DOC-reported operating costs. Per diem operating costs will vary according to the number of inmates housed in a facility or program. Under-utilized programs will have higher per capita costs than either fully-utilized or over-utilized programs.

Different policy environments affect comparability estimates of cost savings across jurisdictions. If prisons are not overcrowded, costs of providing boot camps are added to the cost of running prisons. If prisons get more crowded, the total marginal costs of increasing confinement may be smaller than the costs of adding and operating boot camps. If states attempt to build their way out of crowding, however, the cost savings from boot camps could

be substantial, because boot camp costs are general lower than the cost of building and operating prisons. Given these limits, we should focus more on general trends rather than absolute dollar amounts when comparing costs across sites.

We have relied on cost data provided by the four agencies that operate the boot camps we studied. All four were able to provide average daily cost figures per inmate for their boot camps and for the facilities in which the boot camp inmates would have been confined if the boot camp was not available. In all four agencies the average daily cost is found by dividing the total annual operating cost of a facility by the total number of person-days of confinement that facility provided during the year. Average daily costs covers things like staff salaries, consumables, cost of medical care, etc. It includes facility maintenance and repair costs, although the cost of some long-term items like replacing a boiler may be spread over a number of years. Average daily costs does not include capital expenditures on major renovations or additions to facilities.

Only one of the four agencies were able to estimate marginal costs—the costs associated with adding or subtracting one inmate from a facility's population—for their boot camp and for other facilities in their system. For boot camps that have small impacts on total bed space requirements, one could argue that savings should be estimated using marginal, not average daily costs, because having a few inmates more or less will not change most facility's staffing patterns or the number of housing units they must operate. If total reductions in bed space are larger, it may be possible to close some living units or even some complete facilities, and to make major changes in staffing levels. At this point, it may make more sense to rely on average daily costs as an estimator of savings. In the analysis that follows, we present cost estimates based on marginal cost in the one jurisdiction that provided it. We also provide cost estimates based on average daily costs for all facilities.

Finally, we note that the correctional populations of all four agencies were increasing during the time they implemented their boot camps. This is important, because they were unable to use cost savings from declining populations to operate their boot camps. Instead, they had to spend more money to operate their boot camps. Thus, in our analysis we subtract costs to operate the boot camp from savings, if any, achieved by the boot camp.

Maryland

We estimate that, under the low-impact assumptions, Toulson Boot Camp increased required confinement capacity by 22 beds. Again, such a small total increase would have minimal impact on particular facilities in an agency as large as the Maryland DOC, whose inmate population was almost 22,000 by the end of 1998). Hence, it would be appropriate to assess impact using marginal cost figures—which the Maryland DOC was unable to provide.

Under the high impact assumptions, we estimate the Toulson Boot Camp freed up 160 beds in regular prisons. During the time the boot camp operated total prison populations in Maryland rose consistently from about 14,000 in 1990 to almost 22,000 by the end of 1998. There is no evidence that officials focused or concentrated bed space savings in particular facilities in a effort to maximize costs reductions. Hence, the reasonable basis for assessing the high-impact scenarios also would be marginal costs—which the Maryland DOC could not provide.

For purposes of example, we decided to estimate the impact on net costs if officials had decided to focus bed space savings. If they had achieved the \$48.56 average daily cost figure, a reduction of 160 beds would have saved a total of \$2.82 million. To achieve that they would have needed to operate a 300 bed boot camp which would cost \$54.29 per day for a total cost of \$5.95 million. Thus they would have *increased* total correctional costs by \$3.13 million.

South Dakota

We estimate that the Brady Boot Camp reduced required confinement capacity by 148 beds. This is consistent with DOC estimates, and reflects the decline in private facility and detention placements shown in Table 3-1, below.

Table 3-1

South Dakota Department of Corrections Juvenile Population Trends, 1995 to 1999

Placement	7/1/95	7/1/96	1/1/97	7/1/97	1/1/98	7/1/98	1/1/99
Training School	94	94	99	94	112	112	114
Forestry Camp	52	52	49	51	56	66	55
Boot Camp	0	0	86	121	120	123	128
Private Facilities	120	162	66	19	15	38	21
Detention Centers	15	24	7	7	5	8	3
TOTAL	281	332	307	292	308	347	321

Source: Memo from Kevin McLain, South Dakota DOC, dated 3/30/99.

In the two years before the boot camp became operational, there were an average of about 160 placements in private facilities and detention centers. Since the boot camp became fully

operational, placements in private facilities²⁷ and detention centers have fallen to average of 29, or a decline of 131 juveniles.

The DOC had been paying an average of \$125 per day for each committed juvenile who was held in a private residential program, and \$95 per day for each juvenile held in a detention center. These were real daily costs which were prescribed in contracts between the DOC and private vendors and authorities operating detention centers. We estimate that the DOC saved an average of \$121.56 per day for each juvenile not housed in a private placement or detention center, based on the proportions of juveniles held in each setting for the prior two years and the average daily costs of the respective placements.

South Dakota saved \$6.56 million dollars a year by reducing its private and detention placements by 148 beds (148 X \$121.56 X 365 days). To do this, South Dakota had to operate a 120 bed boot camp, which cost it \$64.21 per day per juvenile, or a total of \$2.81 million a year. Thus, we estimate South Dakota's net savings to be \$3.75 million due to the boot camp. According to South Dakota officials, they have used these cost savings from the boot camp to expand and improve programming and services for their confined juvenile population, and to defray costs associated with a rising population of confined youth.

The South Dakota Department of Corrections was the only agency able to distinguish marginal costs for their boot camp and for other juvenile facilities. Using these figures, we estimate that South Dakota saved \$78,700 annually by housing offenders in the Brady Boot Camp.

Washington

In Washington we estimate that the WEC reduced required confinement bed spaces by 365. This number is large enough to make use of the average daily cost a reasonable foundation for estimating cost savings—if correctional officials had focused bed space savings in particular facilities so as to maximize reductions in operating costs. There is no evidence that this occurred. At the time prison populations in the Washington Department of Corrections were rising steadily, and far out paced the saved bed space we attribute to the WEC. As a result, bed space savings from WEC appear to have been dispersed across the entire system, whose population rose from about 7,000 in 1990 to about 14,000 inmates by 1999.

Washington officials routinely compute a department-wide marginal cost figure, but were unable to distinguish marginal costs in separate facilities. Hence, we cannot conduct an analysis based on marginal costs.

27 The DOC continues to use some private placements for juveniles when their treatment needs can be best met in such facilities. Currently, the DOC is budgeted for an average daily population of 15 youth in private placements.

For purposes of example, however, we decided to estimate cost savings that would have resulted if Washington officials had acted to focus WEC's bed space savings so as to achieve real reductions in operating costs. We estimate that 365 regular prison beds would have been freed up, at an average cost of \$65.54 per day, for an annual savings of \$8.73 million. To achieve that the Washington DOC would have had to operate a 250 bed boot camp, at \$78.85 per day per inmate, for an annual cost of \$7.19 million. Thus, the net savings to the Washington DOC would have been about \$1.54 million.

Oregon

We estimate that the Tillamook Youth Accountability Camp saved the agency 17 confinement beds. This savings was probably too small to achieve a focused impact—there are eight OYA facilities whose populations range from 50 to 250, so bed space savings would virtually disappear in terms of real cost reductions if they were dispersed around the system. Oregon was unable to provide data on marginal costs. Hence, estimates of cost savings were not possible.

Chapter 4: Summary and Conclusions

Relative to their capacities, boot camps in Washington and South Dakota saved a substantial number of prison beds, while Oregon's boot camp achieved a modest bed space savings. The impact of Maryland's boot camp varied from a modest savings in the high impact scenario to a modest increase in required prison bed space (that is, a negative savings) in the low impact scenario.

Important Design and Operating Features

Probability of Imprisonment

The probability of imprisonment, or $p(\text{IN})$, was 1.0 for all four boot camps we selected. We did not screen out boot camp because their $p(\text{IN})$ was less than 1.0; those screened out were eliminated for other reasons. Only two juvenile boot camps survived initial screening—both were included in the study. Of the five adult boot camps that survived initial screening only one—Mississippi—had a $p(\text{IN})$ of less than 1.0²⁸, and it was excluded because the Department could not provide the data we needed.

When $p(\text{IN})$ is 1.0, the probation track drops out of the boot camp population impact model. Hence, we did not observe directly how the dynamics of probation affect boot camps' prison bed space impact. Nonetheless, the uniformity of $p(\text{IN})$ among the sites let us focus more clearly on the population effects of other design features within confinement facilities.

Three of the boot camps achieve a $p(\text{IN})$ of 1.0 by having correctional officials identify and screen eligible offenders from among regularly committed inmates. In each of these jurisdictions we interviewed informed officials and found no evidence that judges, prosecutors, or defenders modified their discretionary choices to manipulate specific offenders into correctional boot camps. We did not conduct before and after empirical analysis of sentencing practices in these states—an effort far beyond the scope of this study.

Washington's Sentencing Commission integrated selection for boot camps into the state's sentencing guidelines, so that judges can use WEC only to impose less severe sentences on offenders who otherwise would serve prison terms ranging from 16 to 36 months.

In order to illustrate the powerful impact $p(\text{IN})$ has on bed space savings, we ran simulations for all four programs holding all variables constant at current practice, but varying $p(\text{IN})$ from 1.0 to zero. The results are shown in Table 4-1.

28 In Mississippi judges select boot camp participants at the time of sentencing, subject to the broad eligibility criteria established in law.

Table 4-1**Impact of p(IN) on Confinement Beds Saved by Correctional Boot Camps**

Value of p(IN)	Boot Camp				
	Washington	Oregon	South Dakota	Maryland	
				Low Impact	High Impact
1.0	365	17	148	-22	160
0.75	-1	-9	11	-129	-57
0.5	-366	-35	-126	-235	-273
0.25	-732	-61	-262	-341	-490
0.0	-1098	-88	-399	-447	-707
Breakeven p(IN)	0.75	0.84	0.73	NA	0.82

As p(IN) declines the number of required prison bed spaces increases, and programs that save prison beds when p(IN) is 1.0 quickly become consumers of existing prison beds. In Washington, for example, WEC saves 356 prison beds when p(IN) is 1.0, but would consume 1,098 prison beds if p(IN) were to fall to zero.

Using the model we also can determine each boot camp's "break-even" rate—that is, the probability of imprisonment at which net bed space savings equals zero. The most efficient boot camps—Washington and South Dakota—had lower break-even rates—.75 and .73 respectively—than less efficient boot camps. Oregon would begin to consume prison beds if its p(IN) fell below 0.84; Maryland (high impact scenario) would begin to consume prison beds if its p(IN) fell below 0.82.

Discount in Time Served

The discount in time served for boot camp completers is an important factor distinguishing the four programs we studied. Boot camps which save the most prison beds gave the biggest discount to completers. Boot camps which saved few beds, or which increased required bed space, had the smallest discounts.

The discounts in the boot camps studied are shown in table 4-2. Washington, which saved 365 beds, gave an average discount of 10.8 months. South Dakota saved 148 confinement beds—its average discount was 7.0 months. Under the high impact scenario, Maryland saved 160 prison beds—its average discount was 13.0 months.

By contrast, Oregon, which saved just 17 confinement beds, offered an average discount of only 1.9 months. Under Maryland's low impact scenario, which caused a 22 bed increase required confinement space, the average discount was just 2.0 months.

Table 4-2

Bed Space Saved and Discounts in Time Served

State	Washington	South Dakota	Maryland High Impact	Oregon	Maryland Low Impact
Beds Saved	365	148	160	17	-22
Average Discount	10.8 mo.	7.0 mo.	13.0 mo.	1.9 mo.	2.0 mo.

The basic discount was determined by subtracting the amount of time between admission to the correctional agency and release to the community from the boot camp from the expected average term of confinement that eligible inmates would have served if the boot camp did not exist. Two factors, however are important in fine-tuning the discount.

The first is the time required to identify, screen, and enroll inmates in boot camps. Some programs performed this function in as little as 2 to 3 weeks, while others took as long as 8 to 10 weeks. Shaving time from the screening process is a quick way to increase the discount.

The second is the use of added confinement time (or program setbacks) as punishment for misconduct in the boot camp. To the extent that boot camps add time for misconduct, they shorten the discount, and erode bed space savings. Maryland officials made boot camp participation mandatory (in part because their discount was too low to make enough eligible inmates volunteer for the boot camp), and subsequently noted a rise in misconduct resulting in greater use of setbacks (added time in the boot camp), which further reduced both the discount and inmates' incentives to enter and complete the boot camp.

In-Program Failure Rates

Table 4-3 compares bed space savings and in-program failure rates in the four boot camps.

Table 4-3

In-Program Failure Rates and Bed Space Savings

State	Washington	South Dakota	Oregon	Maryland
Beds Saved	365	148	17	-22 to 160
In-Program Failure Rate	21%	5%	12%	26%

The rates vary considerably across the four programs, from 5% in South Dakota to 26% in Maryland. In studies of earlier boot camps Parent noted that in-program failure rates of 30 to 35% were common.²⁹ Two of the programs reported that their in-program failure rates had been higher in the past, and had been reduced over time. This suggests that staff can alter failure rates by changing the program regimen, incentives, or policies governing responses to recalcitrant inmates. Because of this, programs seeking to maximize impact on confinement bed space should develop alternative procedures for responding to inappropriate behavior by inmates.

Revocation Rates for Boot Camp Graduates

The revocation rate for boot camp graduates had a moderate impact on bed space savings. Table 4-4 shows the bed space savings and revocation rate for graduates for each of the four boot camps.

Table 4-4

Bed Space Savings and Revocation Rates for Boot Camp Graduates

State	Washington	South Dakota	Oregon	Maryland
Beds Saved	365	148	17	-22 to 160
Revocation rate for Boot Camp Graduates	20%	25%	23%	20%

Revocation rates for graduates were very similar across all four boot camps, ranging from 20 to 25%. Revocation decisions are not made by boot camp staff, but by parole officers acting under the direction of policies set by the paroling authority. Hence, there may be little boot camp staff can do to affect the revocation and return rate.

However, if parole supervision is provided by another branch of the same correctional agency that runs the boot camp, and if the correctional agency is committed to maximizing the boot camp's impact on confinement bed space, the agency may work with the paroling authority to develop alternative placements (in lieu of return to prison) for selected boot camp graduates who violate terms of their release.

²⁹ Parent (1989) op. cite.

Program Costs

Only one of the four states—South Dakota—appeared to have achieved a real and substantial cost savings via its boot camp. That result was due to an exceptional circumstance in which the Department was paying high per diem costs to private residential providers and local detention centers to house juveniles for whom it had no room. In effect, its average daily costs for the contracted placements were the marginal costs it faced due to crowding. Officials reallocated these savings to other needed programs for confined juveniles. However, when that crowding was corrected (due mostly to the boot camp's impact), and the Department no longer had to pay for contracted placements, marginal cost savings dropped to about \$78,700 a year.

In Washington, Oregon, and Maryland (high impact scenario) officials did not focus bed space savings in one or two facilities, so that they could potentially maximize savings in average daily cost by closing living units, reducing staffing, etc. Instead, projected savings were dispersed across the systems. In Washington, at least, the potential for focused cost savings was considerable, but unrealized.

Implications for Future Design and Operation

In retrospect, it appears that the fervor for prison boot camps has subsided, both among policy makers and correctional practitioners. Several of the jurisdictions that got boot camp planning grants under the Act did not open a boot camp, either because officials decided against it during planning, or because subsequent federal funding for construction or implementation was not provided. Since 1995 there has been a 28 percent reduction in the number of boot camps operated by correctional agencies in the United States.

Nonetheless, the lessons learned about boot camps' impact on prison bed space apply with equal validity to any prison-based program whose goals include reducing use of confinement. In this regard, the key lessons are:

- States should analyze offender flow during program planning in order to determine the size of the program required. It is important to avoid implementing a boot camp whose capacity is too big to be filled with the available flow of offenders. In overcrowded correctional systems chronically under-used programs face strong pressure to modify their programs to fill their beds. Officials may institute some program changes—like lengthening program durations—that reduce their ability to save prison beds.³⁰

³⁰ In this analysis, researchers should also identify offender characteristics relevant to designing elements of the program, such as education levels, employment histories, substance abuse problems, etc.

- The program should be used for offenders whose probability of imprisonment is very high. The easiest way to achieve this is to have correctional officials select participants from among regularly imprisoned offenders. If sentencing judges select participants, stringent controls should be placed on their decisions—as in Washington’s Sentencing Guidelines—to ensure they only select prison-bound offenders.
- The program should maximize the discount offered to inmates who complete it. This can be done by targeting more serious offenders, by making the program (including time consumed in screening) as short as practical, and minimizing the use of added confinement time as punishment for misconduct.
- DOCs should minimize revocation rates and durations of re-imprisonment for program graduates who commit non-criminal breaches of supervision rules.
- Even if such programs save bed space, cost savings are unlikely unless jurisdictions can achieve large marginal cost reductions.

Postscript on WEC

In the Spring of 1999 the Washington State Legislature amended the WEC legislation in a manner that will substantially modify how judges can use the WEC categorical exception. The change was made in response to a growing concern that the existing legislation allowed courts to send the wrong kinds of offenders to WEC.

Before the recent change, many offenders convicted of drug crimes met the guidelines’ criteria for placement in either WEC or the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA). If they completed WEC they would be released in about 7 months. However, it would take them 12–14 months to complete DOSA, and while in DOSA they would have to partake in a much more intensive drug treatment regimen than existed in WEC. Understandably, many drug-involved offenders plea bargained to get a WEC exception. Offenders sentenced for drug crimes had consistently comprised 80 to 90 percent of all admissions to WEC. At the same time DOSA struggled to get enough admissions to keep the program going.

The amended law prohibits placing any drug-involved offenders—those convicted of possession as well as sales—in the WEC, leaving judges the option of placing them in DOSA or giving them a regular prison term. As for the WEC, the legislation allows the

category exception to be used for non-violent offenders not sentenced for a drug crime, who have prison terms of 12 months to 36 months.

DOC officials are skeptical whether this change—dropping the lower duration from 16 to 12 months—will yield enough new inmates to keep WEC operating at its current level. In addition, if WEC continues to be a 6 month program (and admission and screening continues to take almost 2 months) the discount will fall to just about 4 months, on average. This will reduce the incentive for inmates to enter WEC, and will depress its effects on bed space savings. The impact model indicates that if the average discount were 4 months, it would reduce bed space savings from 365 to just 104.

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Appendix A: Documentation for the Boot Camp Bed Space Impact Model

Boot Camp Bed Space Impact Model

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NOTE: This model runs under Lotus 1-2-3 version 2.1 or higher. It can be imported into any spreadsheet that reads or converts .WK1 files.

E12

Number of eligible offenders per year

Enter the number of offenders who fit the eligibility criteria you have established and who come before the authority each year that selects offenders for the boot camp. If selection is done at sentencing, this is the total number of offenders who come before the court(s) who fit the established criteria. If selection is done at prison, this would be the number of offenders admitted to prison in a twelve month period who fit the selection criteria.

You should obtain this number by doing an analysis of the annual flow of offenders through the agency that will select the boot camp participants. When you conduct this analysis, collect all data items needed to determine offenders' eligibility, (e.g., age, current conviction offense, prior record, gender, etc.) as well as all data needed to plan the boot camp program content (e.g., information on offenders' needs and problems, education levels, substance abuse history, etc.) or aftercare (county of residence, etc.). If data on offender characteristics and criminal record are maintained in different systems (for example, corrections has data on offender characteristics and current offense, but a state criminal justice information system has the data on their prior records) you may have to draw a sample of cases based on selection criteria related to offender characteristics from one data system and hand-check that sample against criminal history records maintained in the other system.

The number you input here is of critical importance. If you do a good job of analyzing offender flow, you will have a solid foundation for the simulation model. If not, the old maxim applies: "Garbage in, garbage out!" Boot camps that fail to do a good job of analyzing offender flow

often overbuild their programs, and then face the problem of underutilization—e.g., a 400 bed boot camp whose average daily population is 65.

D13-D20

Screenouts 1 - 8 percent who are removed at each screening point

The model provides space to simulate the effects of up to eight decision points where eligible offenders may be screened out. (If more than eight screenouts are needed, you can insert extra row(s) after row 20 and copy the formulas in cell E20 to any new added screenouts.

For example, assume prison officials identify boot camp-eligible offenders from among those regularly committed to prison. Screenout 1 might be medical screening. Screenout 2 might be classification (i.e., some offenders may be screened out because they are classified as high security risks and the boot camp is low security facility). Screenout 3 might be a caseworker review. Screenout 4 might be inmate rejection (that is, their decision not to volunteer). Enter the screenouts in the chronological order in which they would occur in your system. You can change the label by typing in your name for each screenout you use.

Enter the estimated percent of the eligibility pool who will be lost due to each screenout. For example, a medical screening might produce a relatively low screenout rate, say, 4 to 6 percent. However, as many as 30 to 40 percent of those remaining eligibles may refuse to volunteer.

Enter percents in decimal form—that is, enter **.05 for 5%**, **.15 for 15%**. The worksheet will properly format your input.

The model reduces the number eligible by the percentage specified in the first screenout, and prints the number who remain in the eligibility pool. It repeats this process for each successive screenout for which a rate is entered.

If you don't need all eight screenout points, just leave the rates blank for all unused screenouts.

B22

Annual Admissions

This is the remaining eligibility pool after all screenouts have been subtracted. This is the number from E20.

E22

+B22/(12/E27)

Boot camp beds

This is the number of boot camp beds needed to house the annual admissions (from B22), given the average boot camp duration specified in E27. The model calculates this number.

B26

p(IN)

The probability that the category of offenders admitted to the boot camp would have been imprisoned if the boot camp did not exist. The range of probabilities is from zero to one.

If prison officials select boot camp entrants from among regular prison admissions, set $p(IN) = 1.0$. If judges select boot camp entrants from among persons sentenced who fit boot camp eligibility criteria, each jurisdiction will have to determine the probability of imprisonment for eligible offenders who come before the court for sentencing. In most states with judicial selection models, $p(IN)$ probably will be quite low (.1 to .3) for the kinds of offenders typically legally eligible for boot camps (typically, non-violent offenders).

E26

Expected average prison duration

The expected average prison duration is the length of time (in months) that persons admitted to the boot camp would be confined in regular prison if they were not in the boot camp. Do not use maximum sentence. Use actual time incarcerated.

Best estimates can be obtained if a state has parole or sentencing guidelines. Otherwise, users must rely on state by state data as available. It is important to stress that this must be the average duration for persons who fit boot camp eligibility criteria and who were in the past imprisoned and released. If you do an offender flow analysis as part of your boot camp planning you should collect data on duration of imprisonment for each inmate in the pool of eligible offenders.

If you are using the model to plan a new boot camp, you can vary this factor to simulate the effect of targeting different categories of offenders. For example, you could simulate targeting property offenders with limited prior records by selecting a low expected average prison duration (e.g., 6 months to one year). Or one could simulate targeting a more serious or chronic offender population by selecting a higher expected average prison duration (e.g., 36 to 42 months).

B27

1-B26

$p(\text{OUT}) = 1 - p(\text{IN})$.

Sentencing options are presumed to be dichotomous (e.g., either prison or probation) if boot camps do not exist. Hence, the model automatically computes $p(\text{OUT})$ when the user specifies $p(\text{IN})$.

E27

Average Boot Camp duration

This is the average length of time (in months) between admission to the agency and first release to the community for the boot camp graduates. This duration should include the length of time the offender is involved in screening, or is held in a staging area pending openings in the boot camp. It should also include the amount of time, if any, between completion of the boot camp and release to community supervision.

In planning stages, the intended duration (3 months, 6 months, etc.) plus expected screening time could be used. Once the boot camp is in operation, adjustments could be made to reflect real screening durations and added periods of confinement due misconduct.

B28

$p(\text{IN-if boot camp dropout})$

The probability that the person will serve a regular prison term if they voluntarily withdraw (dropout) from the boot camp after they are admitted, but before they complete. The default value is 1.0, which reflects current practices of most existing boot camps.

The user may set a lower probability to reflect local practice, policy, or preference. However, if $p(\text{In-if boot camp dropout})$ is not extremely high, boot camp inmates will have strong incentive to withdraw from boot camps in order to return to probation. In practice, that does not occur generally. Some boot camps, particularly those where judges select participants, return to probation a very small number of participants who are unable to complete the program due to a medical problem or injury. That could be simulated by adopting a high value (but less than 1.0) for $p(\text{IN-if boot camp dropout})$, e.g., .95 or so.

E28 +E26-(E27*0.33)

Average duration of confinement for boot camp dropouts

This is the average duration in months boot camp dropouts will be confined before first release from prison. The default value is the expected average term of imprisonment minus one-third boot camp duration, because dropouts typically occur during the first one-third of the boot camp program.

Users can override the default and insert a different formula, based on specific state's experience, policies, or preferences.

If you override the default, you will need to review and verify the propriety of your inserted formula for each additional simulation in which you alter other key elements of the boot camp program.

B29

p(IN-if boot camp washout)

This is the probability that washouts will serve a regular prison term. In typical boot camps the probability is 1.0, which is the default value.

User can specify a lower probability if desired. However, as the probability declines, boot camp inmates have a growing incentive to fail in the program in order to get placed on probation. While none of the current programs reward misconduct with release to probation, there may be some instances in which a small percent (e.g., 2 or 3 percent) of washouts ought to be returned to the community.

This variable provides a parameter in the model to achieve that and to accommodate its effect on bed space requirements.

E29 +E26-(E27*0.5)

Average duration of confinement for boot camp washouts

This is the average prison term that washouts will serve before first parole. The model uses a default value of the expected average prison term minus one-half of boot camp duration, because (1) most washouts occur later in the program cycle than most dropouts, (2) and completion rates rise as inmates approach end of the boot camp.

Users can override this default value by inserting a different formula that reflects their jurisdiction's experience or preference.

If you override the default, you will need to review and verify the propriety of your inserted formula for each additional simulation in which you vary key elements of the program.

B30

p(dropout from boot camp)

This is the probability that an offender admitted to the boot camp will dropout. Dropout rates from .2 to .4 are not uncommon.

The user can specify different rates, based on experience, preference, or policy considerations. If based on experience, the user should enter the percent obtained by dividing total dropouts by total admissions for a time period equaling at least the duration of the boot camp program. Rates during the first few months of operation may be unstable; hence, for a 90 day boot camp operating for one year, the rate could be computed for those admitted between months 3 and 9 and followed for three months.

E30 +E26-E27

Duration (boot camp graduate rev)

This is the average term of re-imprisonment that boot camp graduates would serve before re-release if they violate terms of their community supervision and are returned to prison. The model uses a default value of the expected average term of imprisonment minus duration of the boot camp. Thus, if an inmate serves 3 months in a boot camp (and graduates) instead of the 18 he normally would serve in prison, the model assumes he will serve the difference (18 - 3 = 15 months) if he is revoked.

The user may override this default formula by inserting an average duration based on experience or policy in their jurisdiction.

If you override the default, you will need to review and confirm the propriety of your inserted formula for each simulation in which you alter other characteristics of the program.

B31

p(washout from boot camp)

This is the probability that boot camp admissions will be removed from the program for violating program rules, if they do not drop out.

The user should enter the probability here obtained by dividing the number of washouts by the number of boot camp admissions. The model corrects for the fact that washout is assumed to be conditional upon not dropping out.

E31 +E26

Duration of confinement (probation rev)

This is assumed to be the expected average duration of imprisonment (from E17) for probation violators who are comparable to offenders admitted to the boot camp. The model automatically includes this value.

The user can override this by inserting a duration or formula based on their jurisdiction's experience or policy.

If you override by inserting a different formula or value, you will need to check propriety of that value each time you run a simulation using different options.

B32

p(rev boot camp graduate)

The probability that boot camp graduates will violate conditions of their release, be revoked, and be returned to prison. Experience shows that revocation rates are in the 16 to 20 percent range after one year, and rise to around 30 to 35 percent after three years.

E32

Duration of confinement (parole rev)

This is the amount of new prison time by those revoked under p(rev parole) would serve. The model sets a default value of 4 months.

In most states this will be set by parole board or DOC administrative policy, and typically will be relatively short for technical violations and longer for those with alleged new crimes.

The user may insert a different value to reflect a particular jurisdiction's experience, policy, or preference.

B33

p(rev probation)

The probability that boot camp entrant who would have gotten probation if the boot camp did not exist—defined as annual capacity X p(OUT)—would have violated probation and come to prison anyway. Note that if p(IN) = 1.0, then p(OUT) = 0, and the number of person months of confinement due to probation revocations drops to zero.

Users must provide their best estimate of probation revocation rates for categories of offenders eligible for boot camps. The impact of this factor increases as p(OUT) grows larger. If p(OUT) is large (e.g., .6 to .9), and states are unable to compute a probation revocation rate for a group of probationers who fit boot camp eligibility criteria, it probably is best to assume that such probationers have a fairly low risk of violation, based on the fact that boot camp eligibility criteria usually require (a) current non-violent felony, (b) no prior felony conviction, and/or (c) no prior incarceration. Such probationers probably comprise a low-risk pool, given the nature of most states' overall probation caseloads.

E33

Months. to parole rev

This is the average number of months to parole revocation for categories of parolees who fit boot camp eligibility criteria. The model uses a default six months. The user may set a different value to reflect their particular jurisdiction's practice, experience, or preference. If based on past practice, officials should use the average number of months until parole revocation for offenders who either (a) match boot camp entrants or (b) fit boot camp entrance criteria, but who have, in the past, served regular prison terms followed by parole.

B34

p(rev parole)

This is the probability that persons admitted to the boot camp who would have served regular prison terms if the boot camp did not exist would have violated their post-prison term parole and would be returned to prison.

The user must specify the value, based on analysis of past parolees who fit the boot camp eligibility criteria.

Because most boot camps restrict eligibility to those who (a) have a non-violent current conviction, (b) have no prior felony conviction, or (c) have no prior prison term, it is likely that parolees with those characteristics will have a low revocation rate. Hence, if officials are unable

to compute an actual revocation rate for such parolees from available data, they should estimate it using an appropriately low figure.

$$\text{C36} \quad (+B22*B26*(E26-E27))-(B22*B27*E26)-((E22*B27)*B34*E32)$$

Initial reduction person-months of confinement saved.

Initial person months saved = annual admissions X p(IN) X (average prison term - boot camp duration) - (annual admissions X p(OUT) X average boot camp duration minus number of boot camp beds X p(OUT) X probability of revocation after parole X duration of re-imprisonment following parole revocation).

$$\text{C37} \quad +B22*B30*B28*E28$$

Person-months lost due to dropouts

Number annual admissions X probability of boot camp dropout X probability of imprisonment if boot camp dropout X duration of imprisonment for dropouts.

$$\text{C38} \quad (+B22-(B22*B30))*(B31/(1-B30))*B29*E29$$

Person-months lost due to washouts

(Number of annual admissions minus number of dropouts) X probability of washout/(1 - probability of dropout) X probability of imprisonment if washout X duration of imprisonment for washouts.

$$\text{C39} \quad ((B22-(B22*B30)-((B22*(B22*B30)*B31))*B32*E30)-(+B22*B27*B33*E31)$$

Net person-months lost due to revocations

((Number annual admission - washouts - dropouts) X probability of revocation for grads X duration of imprisonment for revoked grads)-(number admitted annually who would have gotten probation X the probability of probation violation X average prison term for probation violators)

C41 +C36-(+C37+C38+C39)

Net reduction in person months of confinement

Initial person months of confinement saved minus all reductions due to dropouts, washouts, and revocations.

C42 +C41/12

Net reduction in number of prison beds needed

Net reduction in person months of confinement (from C41) divided by 12. Negative reductions (**that is, increases**) are shown in parentheses. For example, "250" indicates that the boot camp as configured will reduce prison bed space needs by 250, while "(250)" indicates that the boot camp will increase prison bed space needs by 250.

C43 +E26+E32+E33

Months to achieve net change in prison beds

This is the time needed to attain the net change in number of prison beds needed (shown in cell C42). Bed space changes will increase or decrease until this time, and then will level off. It is the sum of average prison duration (E26) + duration of re-imprisonment following parole revocation (E32) + time between parole and revocation (E33).

Users can estimate changes in bed space requirements for specific time intervals that are shorter than months to achieve maximum change in prison beds. For example, if it will take 30 months to reach maximum impact, but the user wants to know the approximate bed space impacts after 12 and 24 months, the user can divide net change in bed space (C42) by months to achieve (C43) and multiply by 12 (for one year) or 24 (for two years).

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