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BANKING LOW-RISK OFFENDERS: IS IT A GOOD INVESTMENT?

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
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Community justice departments, across the nation, are continually pressured to implement higher-intensity modes of supervision for serious offenders without the benefit of expanded resources. This study examines one county's response to these pressures. In 1997, the Multnomah County (Oregon) Department of Community Justice launched an ambitious effort to change the way in which adult community supervision services were provided. A departmental audit, state budget re-allocations, and continuing budget shortfalls all encouraged the Department to re-think the way in which its resources were expended. The overall goal of the redesign effort was to refocus time and resources on high-risk offenders, while providing less restrictive modes of supervision to lower risk offenders, without jeopardizing public safety.

Following empirically-validated best practices demonstrating that high-risk offenders are more likely to benefit from intensive intervention and treatment services than low-risk offenders, the Department launched a new mode of supervision that was grounded in solid research. Specifically, the redesign required increased transfers of limited and low-risk probationers and parolees to a casebank caseload. Casebank provides minimal face-to-face supervision and compliance reviews, thereby conserving Departmental resources for offenders who demonstrate a higher risk to re-offend. The redesign also provided differing service levels in response to the offenders' risks and needs, as well as a mobile structure for the transfer of offenders between supervision levels and caseloads in response to their behavior.

The cornerstone of the redesign is a validated risk assessment system used to identify the level of risk posed to public safety by an offender. The Oregon Case Management System includes an Initial Risk Assessment Instrument (administered upon admission to community supervision) and a Risk Reassessment Instrument (administered at least every six months for high, medium, and low supervision levels, and on an as-needed basis for limited supervision). Scores on individual items are combined to create a total score which translates to a supervision level. The level indicated by the raw score is the *calculated supervision level*. Discretionary overrides are permitted if the classification staff feels that, upon reviewing specific case information, the offender poses a more or less serious threat to public safety than that indicated by the calculated supervision level. Overrides to a higher supervision level are permitted if the offender has a history of assault, significant programming needs, a significant criminal history, new criminal activity, major non-compliance, or criminal associations. Overrides to a lower supervision level are permitted if the offender's compliance with supervision conditions is exemplary or if the offender is participating in a residential treatment program (and is therefore unavailable for supervision). Mandatory overrides are also required for certain types of offenses. The overridden supervision level is called the *actual supervision level*.

Together with program needs, the supervision level is part of the consideration for a caseload assignment. Over the years, the Department has had various caseload options available providing different levels of supervision, and offering different treatment services. Contact standards are based on the actual supervision level, and provide for a range of intensities and types of supervision. Contact types include face-to-face contacts with offenders or other persons with meaningful knowledge of the offender, home visits, file reviews, and compliance reviews.

The main strategy for responding to offender non-compliance is the application of sanctions. In 1995, the Department, along with other community corrections agencies in Oregon, implemented a structured intermediate sanctioning process, which permitted the imposition of limited periods of incarceration along with other sanctions in response to offender non-compliance. This process was designed to provide immediate sanctions for specific behaviors, serving as a consequence or treatment intervention to deter future non-compliant behavior. The imposition of sanctions was supposed to occur in a graduated fashion (i.e., escalating in severity with repeated violations) and to combine punitive actions (e.g., jail) with treatment services when necessary. The severity of different sanctions is measured in terms of "custody units," where one unit equals one day in custody, while other sanctions (e.g., program participation, letter of reprimand) equal partial custody units. The sanctioning system features a wide array of options designed to provide intermediate responses to behavior and thereby reduce the reliance on jail time.

Thus, the redesign effort first endeavored to identify offenders with different likelihoods of recidivism and to assign them to caseloads with levels of supervision and treatment services commensurate to their level of risk. In so doing, expensive staff and treatment resources could be reserved for higher-risk offenders. A process evaluation (Austin et al., 1999) demonstrated that the initial stages of the redesign had been properly implemented, yet questions remained about the extent to which contact standards were being met, sanctions were being imposed, and public safety was being protected. The current study's design addresses each of these questions.

Design

A quasi-experimental design was employed using non-randomized comparison groups consisting of offenders admitted to community supervision in 1995, 1998 and 2000. The 1995 cohort represents offenders processed through the traditional system of community supervision. The next two cohorts were exposed to the new form of supervision that relied on strategic decisions about supervision intensity and access to treatment resources, based on objective risk assessment. The 1998 cohort reflects offenders exposed to the first version of the new system of community supervision, which was the subject of Austin et al.'s (1999) process evaluation confirming the integrity of the initial implementation of the redesign. The 2000 cohort reflects this system of supervision as it has developed over time to become fully institutionalized within the Department.

Major Findings

- Except in a limited number of areas, the cohorts were very similar in terms of their demographic and legal status characteristics. Across the three years, increasing proportions of women, white offenders, probationers, offenders convicted of controlled substance and DUI offenses, and misdemeanor level offenses were evident among admissions to community supervision.
- The three cohorts were very similar in terms of the extent of their prior involvement with the criminal justice system. In 1998 and 2000, offenders on caseloads featuring higher levels of service had a higher number of prior arrests than offenders on caseloads with fewer service resources.
- Since 1995, the proportion of offenders with a calculated supervision level of limited or low has
 increased by approximately 10 percentage-points. In terms of the actual supervision level (which

accounts for overrides) a 20 percentage-point difference is evident. These changes may be due to two key factors: 1) an increasing proportion of probationers, who are disproportionately lower risk; and 2) increased use of overrides to reduce the offenders' supervision level. These are important considerations in the interpretation of changes in recidivism rates.

- In terms of initial caseload assignments, an increasing proportion of offenders were assigned to casebank from 1998 to 2000, with a consequent decrease in the proportion assigned to caseloads with higher levels of service.
- The caseloads have become more homogeneous, with greater concentrations of high and mediumrisk offenders assigned to generic caseloads and a greater concentration of limited and low-risk offenders assigned to the casebank.
- The backbone of the redesign, the objective risk assessment system, has some significant problems. The override rates are much higher than the accepted standard (40% in 2000), with most of the cases being overridden in the downward direction (23% of all cases in 2000). Because the higher rate of overrides indicates that the supervision levels are being driven by subjective or mandatory policy criteria, rather than by the validated, objective risk items, the Department should conduct an in-depth revalidation study to identify the source of and remedy for the problem and the operation of override criteria across gender.
- Although we intended to conduct an in-depth analysis of the type and intensity of supervision contacts across supervision levels and caseloads, the contact data were not reliable for such examination. Problems with the software created inflated estimates of the actual amount of contact. However, given that this inherent bias was equally distributed across all offenders, we were able to discern that the intensity of supervision increased by supervision level. Thus, it appears that low and limited supervision cases indeed received significantly fewer supervision contacts than medium and high-risk offenders, which is a key element of the casebank's cost-effectiveness.
- In general, the analysis of sanctions data revealed that approximately 27% of offenders in the 1998 cohort were sanctioned at least once, and 21% of offenders in the 2000 cohort were sanctioned at least once (these rates are not comparable due to differences in the length of the follow-up period). Differences in the custody units imposed varied as expected across legal statuses, with offenders on parole and post-prison supervision receiving longer custodial sanctions. The structured sanctioning system, despite its mission to decrease the reliance on custodial sanctions in response to offender non-compliance, continues to use "jail" and "jail plus a program" much more often than any other option. In addition, in approximately one-third to one-half of sanction events, the full sanction is never actually served, indicating a lack of integrity in the sanction program.
- In recent years, the level of reported crime in Multnomah County has decreased approximately 7%, while the number of arrests has increased approximately 2%. While the actual contribution of probationers, parolees, and post-prisoners to the reported crime and arrest statistics cannot be estimated with available data, this study confirms that the majority of offenders on community supervision are successful and are not re-arrested in Multnomah County during their periods of supervision.

- Over time, the 12-month recidivism rate decreased from 35.5% in 1995 to 27.1% in 2000. While it is plausible that the new form of supervision contributed to this success, the changing composition of the community supervision offender caseload should also be considered (e.g., an increasing proportion of women and probationers who are disproportionately low-risk). Overall, however, these findings provide sound evidence that the casebank model has been implemented without compromising public safety.
- The high rate of overrides of the calculated supervision level has hampered the risk assessment system's overall effectiveness. In contrast to the actual (i.e., overridden) supervision level, the calculated level provides for linear failure rates across levels. Overridden cases had recidivism rates corresponding more closely to their calculated supervision level than their overridden supervision level. Further, bivariate analyses showed a stronger relationship between the calculated level and the dependent variable (i.e., re-arrest) than did the actual supervision level.
- The redesign required low and limited-risk offenders to be assigned to a casebank featuring very low levels of contact and supervision. Despite the lower level of surveillance and treatment resources, offenders on the casebank caseload performed better (i.e., lower recidivism rates, less serious new offenses) than offenders on other, higher-intensity forms of supervision. One obvious caveat to this finding is the reduced risk of detection of new criminal behavior among offenders who are not supervised as closely. In general, however, it appears that eligible offenders have been appropriately targeted (i.e., they were at low-risk of re-offending) and that they performed well on the new form of supervision.
- A multivariate logistic regression analysis yielded an equation able to predict 78.4% of re-arrests. Variables included caseload assignment, legal status, actual supervision level, race, gender, age, current offense type, prior arrests, and sanctions. The variables performed as expected, with an increasing probability of recidivism for higher-service caseloads (e.g., generic and specialized) and offenders who abscond from supervision; greater risk of recidivism for offenders with higher assessed risk levels, those on parole and post-prison supervision, those with a greater number of prior arrests, and those who had been sanctioned. In terms of demographic characteristics, men were more likely to recidivate than women, and Black and Native American offenders were more likely to recidivate than offenders of other racial groups. Although age was identified as a significant predictor of recidivism in the bi-variate analyses, its effect appears to be mitigated by other factors in the multivariate equation.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In general, it appears that the redesign has accomplished its core objective: to assign offenders to caseloads based on risk, thereby allowing the reallocation of Department resources toward medium and high-risk offenders without compromising public safety. Offenders on limited and low supervision have significantly lower rates of recidivism, meaning that they do not pose a threat to public safety despite reduced contact levels and access to treatment services. While the decreasing recidivism rates are certainly encouraging, its exact cause cannot be located by research that does not feature an experimental design. For example, the drop in recidivism may be due to superior methods of offender supervision under the

redesign, but could also be attributed to an increasing proportion of low-risk probationers on the caseload who, as indicated by their risk level, commit fewer offenses. While the specific cause of the drop in recidivism rates cannot be pinpointed, it is important to note that the redesigned supervision model appears to work at least as well as the prior system of supervision that provided costly resources and services to all offenders, regardless of risk level. These results clearly encourage the continued use and refinement of the casebank model of supervision.

There are several recommendations flowing from this study. First, the Department should conduct a validation of its risk assessment system to determine the reasons for and impact of its high rates of override. Because the Oregon Case Management System is a statewide system, the Department is not permitted to make changes to the items, their relative weights or to the cut-points of the scale. Given that Multnomah supervises the majority of probationers, parolees, and post-prisoners in the state however, consideration should be given to a statewide revalidation study to isolate the items which may serve to classify offenders improperly, and the elements of the system in which the staff may lack confidence, both of which would serve to reduce the need for overrides in the first place. In general, it is recommended that state or local jurisdictions revalidate their classification systems every five years to ensure they are responsive to the changing characteristics of the offender population. In particular, because of the increasing proportions of probationers among the community supervision populations over the past five years, reconsideration of the precision of each item and the validity of the instrument as a whole appears warranted.

Of additional concern is the potential for the risk assessment system, as it is currently formulated, to over-classify women offenders who have demonstrably lower recidivism rates than men. A thorough evaluation of the validity of the system across gender would necessitate data on a sample of offenders' scores on each of the risk items (not available for this study) and the specific reason for overriding the calculated supervision level (also not available). Such a study would ensure that the instrument is valid for both genders, and would provide additional insight into the functionality of each of the risk assessment items and override criteria.

Short of a full-scale evaluation, the Department should conduct additional research into the causes of the high rates of overrides to the calculated supervision level. Ostensibly, override policies and procedures were developed to adapt the statewide instrument to the county's unique features. However, given that the calculated supervision level proved to be a better predictor of recidivism than the actual supervision levels (which take overrides into account), limiting the permissible override criteria could improve the overall integrity of the system of offender supervision. At the very least, the Department should review its mandatory and discretionary override policies, assess the distribution of all overrides across both genders, and examine the relative failure rates of overridden cases.

Currently available data on the type and intensity of supervision are not adequate to determine their impact on offender behavior. Eliminating the default setting in the MIS which serves to over-estimate the actual number of contacts with any given offender is a necessary first step in creating an internal capacity to monitor the level of contact across supervision levels. Second, given that the rates of recidivism among medium and high-risk offenders are rather high (55% to 70% over 24-months), the Department should consider a qualitative assessment of the interventions (contact type, intensity, and duration), needs assessment process, and treatment services that could improve the rates of success for these offenders.

This study could specifically target offenders on the caseloads of experienced PPO's with a demonstrated history of effective supervision. Identifying specific behaviors, types of contact, effective treatment programs, and general supervision styles, and developing training around these factors, could help to reduce the rates of recidivism over time. Further, the rates of success across specialized and generic supervision services were not statistically different, leading to the question "What makes specialized caseloads 'special'?" The Department may wish to reconsider the intended goal of these services, how resources are allocated across these caseload types, and the specific needs targeted by the specialized services. The relative efficacy of these caseloads should be examined using validated needs assessment data.

One of the most interesting findings emerging from this study is the relative interchangability of the various caseload types with respect to recidivism rates. Offenders of a given risk level (e.g., a high-risk sex offenders) would have approximately the same performance level regardless of the caseload to which they were assigned. Although the data on the type and level of service intensity was not judged to be valid for the purposes of this research, we did conclude that offenders of different risk levels receive *quantitatively* different levels of supervision. However, it appears that *qualitatively*, the levels of service do not appear to make much difference in terms of offender outcomes (i.e., the two caseloads are more similar in practice than intended in their design). This is particularly important in determining the relative efficacy of the specialized versus generic caseloads for medium and high-risk offenders. Thus, we recommend that the Department initiate a study, followed by internal quality assurance monitoring, to identify and expand upon those styles, tools, and methods of supervision that may positively affect recidivism rates in order to make the higher supervision caseloads more effective.

INTRODUCTION

Community justice departments, across the nation, are continually pressured to implement higher-intensity modes of supervision for serious offenders without the benefit of expanded resources. This study examines one county's response to these pressures. In 1997, the Multnomah County (Oregon) Department of Community Justice launched an ambitious effort to change the way in which adult community supervision services were provided. A departmental audit, state budget re-allocations, and continuing budget shortfalls all encouraged the Department to re-think the way in which its resources were expended. The overall goal of the redesign effort was to refocus time and resources on high-risk offenders, while providing less restrictive modes of supervision to lower risk offenders, without jeopardizing public safety.

Following empirically validated best practices demonstrating that high-risk offenders are more likely to benefit from intensive intervention and treatment services than low-risk offenders, the Department launched a new mode of supervision that was grounded in solid research. Specifically, the redesign required increased transfers of limited and low-risk probationers and parolees to a casebank caseload. Casebank provides minimal face-to-face supervision and compliance reviews, thereby conserving Departmental resources for offenders who demonstrate a higher risk to re-offend. The redesign also provided differing service levels responding to the offenders' risks and needs, as well as a mechanism for the efficient transfer of offenders between caseloads, in response to their behavior.

Shortly after the implementation of the redesign, the Department initiated a contract with the authors of this report to conduct a process evaluation to determine whether the new form of supervision had been properly implemented and to determine its impact on public safety¹. The process evaluation utilized one-day snapshots from 1995 through 1998 to examine caseload assignments and composition, and used a subsample of offenders from 1995 and 1998 to do a preliminary analysis of recidivism. The major findings of the process evaluation are summarized below:

- A major shift occurred in terms of the proportion of offenders assigned to the various caseloads.
 Far fewer offenders were being assigned to generic supervision and specialized caseloads, with a concurrent increase in the number of offenders assigned to the casebank.
- The new distribution of offenders across caseloads was accompanied by greater homogeneity within caseloads in terms of risk score, supervision levels, and offense type.
- Preliminary recidivism analyses indicated that the redesign appeared to be safe. Although offenders
 in the casebank received only minimal supervision, the large majority were successful in the
 community. Offenders in the casebank were re-convicted and re-incarcerated less often than
 offenders on generic or specialized caseloads.

While these results were promising, there were several limitations to the study. First, because of the recent tenure of the redesign, there were not a sufficient number of cases nor was a sufficient follow-up

¹Austin, J., K. Dedel, and W. Naro. (1999). *Multnomah County Adult Community Justice Supervision Redesign Program.*Washington, DC: The Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at The George Washington University and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

period available to ascertain the precise impact on public safety. Further, questions remained about the integrity of service delivery across the caseloads, and the extent to which sanctions were used in response to non-compliance.

Thus, in early 2000, The Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections at The George Washington University applied for, and received, a grant from the National Institute of Justice to respond to the outstanding issues. This report describes the study's design, methodology and findings.

KEY FACETS OF THE REDESIGN

The caseload redesign required a number of tools and options for the efficient management of offender supervision, including an objective risk assessment system, a variety of caseload options featuring different levels of service intensity and treatment resources, and a method to respond to offender non-compliance.

Risk Assessment

The cornerstone of the redesign is a validated risk assessment system to identify the level of risk to public safety posed by an offender. In 1989, the Oregon Department of Corrections implemented an objective risk assessment system (Oregon Case Management System; OCMS) designed to govern classification decisions for probationers and parolees, statewide. The goals of OCMS were to: 1) classify offenders based on their risk of recidivism; 2) manage the supervision of offenders using the least restrictive method; and 3) ensure statewide consistency in the classification and management of offenders. In 1994, following recommendations made by an independent evaluator, a revised and empirically derived system was implemented. The OCMS includes an Initial Risk Assessment Instrument (administered upon admission to community supervision) and a Risk Reassessment Instrument (administered at least every six months for high, medium, and low supervision levels, and on an as-needed basis for limited supervision).

The Initial Risk Assessment Instrument consists of eight items shown to be statistically related to the risk to re-offend. These items focus heavily on the offender's prior involvement with the criminal justice system, history of escape or failure to appear, and substance abuse. In addition to these items, the Risk Reassessment Instrument also examines the offender's behavior since the last assessment (e.g., employment, compliance with conditions of supervision). A few of the items have point ranges that include negative numbers to indicate exemplary behavior (e.g., employed 75 to 100% of the time since the last assessment). Scores on individual items are combined to create a total score which translates to a supervision level. The level indicated by the raw score is the *calculated supervision level*. The scoring guidelines are as follows:

| | <u>Initial Risk Score</u> | <u>Risk Reassessment Score</u> |
|---------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| High Supervision | 10 or higher | 7 or higher |
| Medium Supervision | 6 to 9 points | 4 to 6 points |
| Low Supervision | 1 to 5 points | 0 to 3 points |
| Limited Supervision | 0 or lower | -1 or lower |

Discretionary overrides are permitted if the classification staff feels that, upon reviewing specific case information, the offender poses a more or less serious threat to public safety than that indicated by the *calculated supervision level*. Overrides to a higher supervision level are permitted if the offender has a history of assault, significant programming needs, a significant criminal history, new criminal activity, major non-compliance, or criminal associations. Overrides to a lower supervision level are permitted if the offender's compliance with supervision conditions is exemplary or if the offender is participating in a residential treatment program (and is therefore unavailable for supervision). Mandatory overrides are also required for certain types of offenses. The overridden supervision level is called the *actual supervision level*.

Caseload Assignment and Supervision Intensity

Together with program needs, the supervision level is part of the consideration for a caseload assignment. Over the years, the Department has had various caseload options available providing different levels of supervision, and offering different treatment services. Contact standards are based on the actual supervision level, and provide for a range of intensities and types of supervision. Contact types include face-to-face contacts with offenders or other persons with meaningful knowledge of the offender, home visits, file reviews, and compliance reviews. Contact frequency standards are summarized below:

| | <u># Contacts</u> | <u>Frequency</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| High Supervision | 4 | monthly |
| Medium Supervision | 2 | monthly |
| Low Supervision | 1 | monthly |
| Limited Supervision | file check | monthly |
| · | compliance review | every 6 months |

Offenders can be transferred into and out of the different caseloads in response to their behavior or needs. The main caseload types are described below:

<u>Casebank</u>—as one of the key features of the redesign effort, the casebank generally serves low and limited-risk offenders and requires minimal contact with the offender. Probationers can be assigned to the casebank upon admission, but offenders on parole or post-prison supervision are only eligible after 90 days on a casebank with a higher level of supervision. A form of casebank operated in 1995, but it was not an immediate option upon admission as it was in 1998 and 2000.

Generic Field Supervision—while the services provided under generic field supervision have largely remained the same over time, the type of offender eligible for this caseload has changed significantly. In 1995, offenders of any supervision level were placed on this caseload, were supervised with face-to-face contact, and had access to the full array of treatment options. The core concept of the redesign was to conserve these resources (both staff time and treatment) for medium- or high-risk offenders, who have been shown through research to benefit more from these services than lower risk offenders. With the redesign effort, generic field supervision targeted medium and high-risk offenders.

<u>Specialized Caseloads</u>—the Department maintains a number of specialized caseloads, tailored toward offenders with special needs or special circumstances. Since 1995, the array of options has included sex

offender, mental health, gang supervision, women offender, DUI, African-American Project, and domestic violence. Each of these specialized caseloads features services designed to respond to the specific needs of offenders, either on-site or through contracted services.

There are a few caseload types that only operated in certain years included in this study. These include:

<u>Intensive Case Management</u>—operating in 1995, ICM was designed to serve high-risk offenders and to provide supervision contacts of greater frequency and duration. It was dissolved in 1996, with high-risk offenders being transferred to generic field supervision.

<u>Local Control</u>—with the passage of Senate Bill 1145, responsibility for the supervision of felons sentenced to prison for less than 12 months was transferred from the state to the county, as was the responsibility for offenders whose parole was revoked and who were ordered to serve an in-custody sentence of 12 months or less. Following the implementation of SB1145 in 1997, revocation rates to prison were expected to drop with a corresponding increase in the number of offenders serving revocation sentences in the Multnomah County Jail. In 1998, a report was issued showing that the impact of SB1145 was less significant than projected, due in part to the successful implementation of drug courts, effective utilization of lower-level interventions prior to revocation, and shorter-than-expected sentences ². These issues notwithstanding, a portion of offenders in the both 1998 and 2000 cohorts included in this study are identified as local control.

Structured Sanctions

The main strategy for responding to offender non-compliance is the application of sanctions. In 1995, the Department, along with other community corrections agencies in Oregon, implemented a structured intermediate sanctioning process, which permitted the imposition of limited periods of incarceration along with other sanctions in response to offender non-compliance. This process was designed to provide immediate sanctions for specific behaviors, serving as a consequence or treatment intervention to deter future non-compliant behavior. The imposition of sanctions was supposed to occur in a graduated fashion (i.e., escalating in severity with repeated violations) and to combine punitive actions (e.g., jail) with treatment services, as needed.

In 1998, the county's sanctioning provisions were revised. Instead of vesting the authority to sanction offenders in the Parole Board, this power was granted to the local authorities. For probationers, the Department has the authority to impose sanctions of up to 60 days, while sanctions of more than 60 days are imposed by the court. For offenders on parole or post-prison supervision, the Probation/Parole Officer (PPO), has the power to impose sanctions of 1 to 5 days, the PPO Supervisor may impose sanctions between 6 and 30 days, and the local hearing officer has the authority to impose sanctions of 31 to 60 days. The local supervisory authority may impose sanctions of 61 to 90 days. This change in sanctioning authority was accompanied by an administrative sanctioning grid that structures the types and duration of sanction that can be imposed for various non-compliant behaviors or specific violations of the conditions of supervision. The severity of different sanctions is measured in terms of "custody units," where one unit

²Oregon Department of Corrections. (1998). *Senate Bill 1145 Evaluation Report: Executive Summary.* Salem, OR: Oregon Department of Corrections.

equals one day in custody, while other sanctions (e.g., program participation, letter of reprimand) equal partial custody units. The sanctioning system features a wide array of options designed to provide intermediate responses to behavior by reducing the reliance on jail time.

Thus, the redesign effort first endeavored to identify offenders with different likelihoods of recidivism and to assign them to caseloads with levels of supervision and treatment resources commensurate to their level of risk. In so doing, expensive staff and treatment resources could be reserved for higher-risk offenders. A process evaluation (Austin et al., 1999) demonstrated that the initial stages of the redesign had been properly implemented, yet questions remained about the extent to which contact standards were being met, sanctions were being imposed, and public safety was being protected. The current study's design addresses each of these questions.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Obviously, it was not possible to use a true experimental design in which offenders were randomly assigned to the system of supervision services at different points in its evolution. Instead, a quasi-experimental design was employed using non-randomized comparison groups consisting of offenders exposed to community supervision in 1995, 1998 and 2000, displayed graphically below:

| Year | Admissions (n) | 93 94 | 95 | 96 97 | 98 | 99 | 00 | 01 |
|-------|----------------|-------|----|-------|----------------|----|-------------|----|
| 1995 | 10,094 | 0, | Χţ | 02 | | | | |
| 1998 | 12,565 | | | 0, | X ₂ | 0 | 2 | |
| 2000* | 9,604 | | | | | 01 | $\chi_{_3}$ | 02 |

Where:

 O_n represents measurement of impact measure either before or after intervention X_n has occurred;

 X_1 represents the community supervision model in place in 1995;

 X_2 represents the community supervision model in place in 1998;

 X_3 represents the community supervision model in place in 2000.

The intervention $(X_n, above)$ represents services received during the active period of supervision, until either a successful or unsuccessful termination was documented for each offender. The length of the observation $(O_n, above)$ is set at 24 months pre- and post-admission for the 1995 and 1998 cohorts, and 12-months pre- and post-admission for the 2000 cohort. A shorter observation period was utilized for the 2000 cohort in order to complete the research during the grant period.

The 1995 cohort represents offenders processed through the traditional system of community supervision. The next two cohorts were exposed to the new form of supervision that relied on strategic decisions about supervision intensity and access to treatment resources, based on objective risk assessment. The 1998 cohort reflects offenders exposed to the first version of the new system of community supervision, which was the subject of the process evaluation (Austin et al., 1999) described above. The 2000 cohort reflects this system of supervision as it has developed over time to become fully institutionalized within the Department. Originally, we hoped that this cohort would also reflect additional best practices governing the use of an objective needs assessment process with linkages to targeted services. However, despite efforts by the Department to implement the needs assessment process, its use remains sporadic and therefore, not amenable to inclusion in this research.

DATA ACQUISITION

At the outset of this research, the plan was to draw a sample of offenders from each admission cohort and to combine both automated data requests and manual data collection efforts to obtain the full scope of information needed for this study. However, we found that sufficient automated data were available to permit the inclusion of entire admission cohorts, which increases the external validity of the findings as the analyses are free from sampling bias. Data were acquired from a number of different sources and merged together using matching criteria (SID number and date of birth).

First, a list of offenders admitted to community supervision during each of the targeted years was requested from the Oregon Department of Corrections (the state's repository of all community supervision data). An *admission* was defined as an offender admitted to supervision a) for a new crime for which he or she was given a sentence to probation; b) after serving a prison sentence with additional time to serve on parole or post-prison supervision; c) upon returning to active supervision after previously absconding; and d) upon moving into Multnomah County from active supervision in another county or state. These conditions, in combination, capture the population of offenders "newly exposed" to community supervision during a given year. It excludes those who may be on supervision during a given year as the result of an admission from a previous year. The total cohorts included 10,094 offenders in 1995, 12,565 offenders in 1998, and 13,632 offenders in 2000.

Once the cohorts were identified, a variety of data were obtained from several criminal justice agencies. Data on demographics, current offense, legal status, risk/supervision level, and caseload assignments were obtained directly from the Multnomah County Department of Community Justice (DCI). Each month, the Oregon Department of Corrections sends the DCI a "monthly snapshot" which includes the targeted (and other) information on every offender on community supervision that month. Monthly snapshots were obtained from January, 1995 through June, 2001. Offenders who were not part of the cohort were deleted from the files. These data were used both to describe the different cohorts, and to examine differences across caseload types and supervision levels on various outcome measures.

Information on arrests and convictions was obtained from the newly-launched data warehouse, Decision Support System-Justice (DSS-Justice), which contains integrated, individual-level data from law enforcement (Portland Police Department and Multnomah County Sheriff), the District Attorney, and the Courts. DSS-Justice provided arrest and conviction data for each offender in the sample using the following parameters. For the 1995 and 1998 cohorts, data covered two years subsequent to the admission date

(follow-up data), and two years prior to the admission date (prior history data). For the 2000 cohort, the follow-up period was limited to one-year in order to complete the research during the grant period. These data were used to describe the offenders' prior criminal justice histories, and also included data for the key outcome measure (re-arrest).

Data describing the intensity of supervision of offenders in the sample were obtained from the Oregon Department of Corrections (as the repository of the County's community supervision data). For each offender, chronological records of all supervision contacts were provided, including the type of contact (e.g., person-to-person, telephone, mail, etc.) and the person contacted (e.g., offender, employer, etc.), for the entire period of supervision. These data permitted an assessment of whether the type and intensity of supervision varied across caseload types.

Finally, data on the use of sanctions were extracted from the DCI's Sanctions Tracking Data Base (STDB). This database, created in 1997, contains information on the non-compliant behavior triggering the sanction (i.e., the conditions violated) and the specific type and duration of the sanction imposed. These data were obtained for the 1998 and 2000 cohorts, covering the entire period of supervision for each offender. Unfortunately, data were not available to assess the use of sanctions for the 1995 cohort. Prior to 1998, sanctions data were not maintained systematically. Although the main information management system had a "sanctions module," its data were considered unreliable because of the tremendous number of fields that were not populated. Thus, the comparative analysis of the use of sanctions was limited to the 1998 and 2000 cohorts.

These data were merged, audited, and cleaned to ensure their accuracy and validity. Copies of all databases, and syntax used in their analyses, have been submitted to the National Institute of Justice, as required. Detailed findings are discussed below.

RESULTS

☐ Descriptive Analyses

A descriptive analysis of the three cohorts was conducted to identify any differences between the cohorts and across caseload types and supervision levels. These analyses were used to guide the recidivism analyses presented at the end of this section, and to identify key differences that needed to be controlled through multivariate analyses.

Demographics

Table 1, below, describes the three cohorts of offenders that were the subject of this study. The total number of offenders who were admitted to supervision during the targeted years was identified, and certain groups of offenders were excluded from the research because they were not actually subjected to community supervision.³ The total number of offenders included in each admission sample was⁴:

³More specifically, offenders who lived out of the county, were in an institution on another offense, were administratively transferred to a caseload for informational purposes, or who were on INS or Interstate Compacts were

| Table 1. Sample Sizes, 1995 | through 2000 | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| Year | N | % of cohort |
| 1995 | 8,506 | 84.3% |
| 1998 | 10,794 | 85.9% |
| 2000** | 8,353 | 87.0% |

Note: The 2000 admission cohort was limited to those offenders admitted January 1 through June 30, 2000.

As shown by the data in Table 2, the three cohorts are similar, with only a few notable trends. Since 1995, there was an increasing proportion of women admitted to community supervision (20.4% in 1995, 21.6% in 1998 and 24.4% in 2000). The proportion of offenders who are white has also increased slightly since 1995 (from 68.3% to 71.2% to 71.8%), with similar decreases in the proportion of Black offenders (from 24.4% to 21.5% to 20.5%). Due in large part to state sentencing guidelines requiring offenders to complete larger portions of their sentences in prison, thereby reducing the volume of offenders released to parole and post-prison supervision, there was a significant increase in the proportion of the adult supervision caseload on probation (from 60.7% in 1995 to 79.6% in 2000) versus various forms of parole and post-prison supervision (from 36.2% in 1995 to 17.3% in 2000). Further, along with decreases in the proportion of individuals convicted of person offenses (from 23.8% in 1995 to 16.8% in 2000), there were increases in the proportion of controlled substance and DUI offenders (from 31.9% in 1995 to 42.4% in 2000). Finally, there was a slight decrease in the proportion of felony offenders since 1995 (from 82.3% to 77.8%), and a slight increase in the proportion of misdemeanants (13.4% to 16.9%).

actually supervised by other criminal justice agencies. For a short time, the DCI utilized volunteers to supervise very low-risk misdemeanants. Because these volunteers were not deputized officers, their supervision practices were not appropriate for inclusion in the study. Finally, a number of offenders were excluded for other reasons (e.g., administrative transfers to caseloads, miscellaneous outcount reason) or because the necessary data to determine their caseload assignments were not available.

⁴In order to complete the study during the required time frame, the 2000 cohort was limited to those offenders admitted between January 1 and June 30, 2000. Table A (in the appendix) compares the demographic, legal status, current offense, and offense level for the half-year versus the full year 2000 cohort. While the half year cohort had a greater proportion of probationers (79.6% compared to 74.8%), there were otherwise no significant differences between the two groups.

| Characteristics | | <u>, T</u> | 400 | T | | |
|---------------------------|-------|--|--------|-------|-------|-------|
| Characteristics | 199 | | 199 | | 200 | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Total Admissions | 10094 | 100.0 | 12565 | 100.0 | 9604 | 100.0 |
| Included | 8,506 | 84.3 | 10,794 | 85.9 | 8,353 | 87.0 |
| Excluded | | | | | | |
| Out of the Country | 76 | 0.8 | 16 | 0.1 | 19 | 0.2 |
| Institution | 1 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| INS/Compact | 2 | 0.0 | 520 | 4.1 | 153 | 1.6 |
| Volunteer Misdemeanor | 651 | 6.4 | 19 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Outcount Reason | 485 | 4.8 | 734 | 5.8 | 806 | 8.4 |
| Missing | 373 | 3.7 | 478 | 3.8 | 273 | 2.8 |
| Gender | | | | | | |
| Male | 6,758 | 79.5 | 8,432 | 78.1 | 6,282 | 75.2 |
| Female | 1,739 | 20.4 | 2,335 | 21.6 | 2,035 | 24.4 |
| Missing | 9 | 0.1 | 27 | 0.3 | 36 | 0.4 |
| Mean Age | 33 ye | ars | 34 ye | ears | 34 ye | ars |
| Race/Ethnicity | | | | | | |
| White | 5,806 | 68.3 | 7,690 | 71.2 | 5,997 | 71.8 |
| Black | 2,072 | 24.4 | 2,323 | 21.5 | 1,692 | 20.3 |
| Hispanic | 365 | 4.3 | 435 | 4.0 | 348 | 4.2 |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 142 | 1.7 | 176 | 1.6 | 154 | 1.8 |
| Am. Indian/Alaskan Native | 112 | 1.3 | 141 | 1.3 | 123 | 1.5 |
| Missing | 9 | 0.1 | 29 | 0.3 | 39 | 0.5 |
| Legal Status | | ************************************** | | | | |
| Probation | 5,164 | 60.7 | 7,963 | 73.8 | 6,653 | 79.6 |
| Post-Prison | 1,922 | 22.6 | 1,688 | 15.6 | 1,011 | 12.1 |
| Parole | 686 | 8.1 | 479 | 4.4 | 290 | 3.5 |
| Parole and Post-Prison | 471 | 5.5 | 291 | 2.7 | 146 | 1.7 |

| Characteristics | 1995 | , | 1998 | | 2000 | | |
|------------------------------|-------|------|-------|------|--------|------|--|
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | |
| Other | 262 | 3.1 | 373 | 3.5 | 249 | 3.0 | |
| Missing | 1 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.0 | |
| Most Serious Current Offense | | | | | | | |
| Person | 2,022 | 23.8 | 1,809 | 16.8 | 1,400 | 16.8 | |
| Property | 2,716 | 31.9 | 3,034 | 28.1 | 2,308 | 27.6 | |
| Controlled Substance | 2,534 | 29.8 | 3,498 | 32.4 | 2,958 | 35.4 | |
| DUI | 175 | 2.1 | 886 | 8.2 | 587 | 7.0 | |
| Other | 987 | 11.6 | 1,469 | 13.6 | 1,036- | 12.4 | |
| Unknown | 72 | 0.8 | 98 | 0.9 | 64 | 0.8 | |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 7,001 | 82.3 | 8,193 | 75.9 | 6,501 | 77.8 | |
| Misdemeanor | 1,140 | 13.4 | 1,948 | 18.0 | 1,408 | 16.9 | |

Supervision Level

Table 3 presents the calculated and assessed supervision levels across each of the three cohorts. The "initial caseload" refers to the inmate's first risk assessment and the first caseload to which he or she was assigned.

Upon admission, each offender is assessed using an objective risk assessment instrument, which results in a calculated risk/supervision level. Since 1995, there has been an increasing proportion of offenders assessed as needing limited or low supervision at the initial assessment (54.3%, 59.7%, and 64.7% in 1995, 1998, and 2000, respectively). Based on the calculated supervision level, there was a 10 percentage-point difference in the proportion of limited/low-risk offenders in 1995 versus 2000. However, when examining the actual supervision levels (i.e., accounting for overrides), the differences among the cohorts become more pronounced, evidenced by a 20 percentage-point difference in the proportion of limited/low-risk offenders in 1995 versus 2000 (34.5% and 55.7%, respectively). These differences are likely due to two factors: 1) an increasing proportion of probationers in the 2000 cohort, who are disproportionately low-risk compared to the other legal statuses; and 2) a higher rate of overrides to lower supervision levels in 2000.

| | 1995 | | 1998 | | 2000 | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------|----------|------|---------|------|--|
| | N=8,506 | % | N=10,794 | % | N=8,353 | % | |
| Calculated Supervis | ion Level at Initial Assign | ment | | | | | |
| Limited | 1,748 | 20.6 | 2,774 | 25.7 | 2,282 | 27.3 | |
| Low | 2,864 | 33.7 | 3,673 | 34.0 | 3,121 | 37.4 | |
| Medium | 1,774 | 20.9 | 2,065 | 19.1 | 1,377 | 16.5 | |
| High | 1,660 | 19.5 | 1,903 | 17.6 | 1,374 | 16.5 | |
| Missing | 460 | 5.4 | 379 | 3.5 | 199 | 2.4 | |
| Actual Supervision | Level at Initial Assignmen | t | | | | | |
| Limited | 1,439 | 16.9 | 3,879 | 35.9 | 3,518 | 42.1 | |
| Low | 1,493 | 17.6 | 2,034 | 18.8 | 1,135 | 13.6 | |
| Medium | 3,400 | 40.0 | 2,241 | 20.8 | 1,903 | 22.8 | |
| High | 1,714 | 20.2 | 2,261 | 20.9 | 1,598 | 19.1 | |
| Missing | 460 | 5.4 | 379 | 3.5 | 199 | 2.4 | |

Caseload Assignment

The initial assessment is conducted during an intake session for probationers and upon release from prison for parolees and those on post-prison supervision. Once a supervision level is determined, each offender is assigned to a caseload. This <u>initial caseload</u> was defined as *the first caseload of record* for parole/post-prison supervision and the *first caseload after intake* for probationers. In addition to the standard caseloads described in the preceding section (e.g., generic, casebank, specialized, etc.), a number of additional statuses were created to account for offenders who did not fall cleanly into the active caseload types. These include:

- Intake: a significant number of offenders stayed in intake status beyond the usual onemonth period. A more in depth analysis of these cases revealed that they were held at intake for a number of administrative reasons and were supervised by the PPOs assigned to that unit.
- Abscond: a significant number of offenders did not report or absconded from supervision for a portion of the supervision period.

In terms of initial caseload assignment, Table 4 shows that an increasing proportion of offenders were assigned to casebank upon entry to the system (35.1% in 1998 and 47.6% in 2000). With the introduction of this form of supervision, the proportion of offenders assigned to higher-levels of supervision (i.e., generic, intensive case management, and specialized caseloads) steadily decreased from 88.0% in 1995, to 49.9% in 1998, and to 40.6% in 2000. This finding confirms that of Austin et al.'s (1999) process evaluation which showed a clear migration of cases into the casebank caseload with consequent decreases in the generic and specialized caseloads. This distribution across high-intensity and low-intensity caseloads remained relatively constant from the initial caseload assignment to the final caseload assignment. The proportion of offenders on abscond status increased between the beginning and end of the supervision period for all three cohorts (1995: from 2.8% to 13.1%; 1998: from 4.3% to 12.1%; and 2000: from 4.7% to 9.4%).

Supervision Level and Caseload Assignment

A cross-tabulation of caseload assignment and supervision level was conducted to assess the way in which offenders of different supervision levels are distributed across the caseload types. As shown in Table 5, in 1995, 58.4% of offenders assessed as needing limited supervision were assigned to the generic caseload, along with 82.5% of those requiring low supervision. High proportions of offenders requiring medium (71.9%) and high (53.6%) supervision were also assigned to the generic caseload. Because the DCI had so few options, the main form of supervision was rather heterogeneous and included offenders requiring vastly different levels of supervision.

As was the intent of the redesign effort, in 1998 and 2000, as the supervision options expanded with the creation of new caseload types, the homogeneity of the caseloads increased. Beginning in 1998, and becoming more pronounced in 2000, the vast majority of limited and low-risk offenders were assigned to the casebank option. In 1998, 63.3% of limited-risk and 54.6% of low-risk offenders were assigned to casebank, increasing to 87.5% of limited-risk and 62.3% of low-risk offenders in 2000.

However, as also shown in Table 5, in 1998, approximately one-fifth of limited (21.1%) and low (22.1%) supervision offenders were assigned to specialized caseloads (which are designed to provide higher intensity forms of supervision and access to specialized services). Under the re-design, this could represent a misdirection of DCI's resources, which were to be conserved for use with medium and high-risk offenders. In 2000, far fewer limited and low-risk offenders were assigned to specialized caseloads (1.7% and 7.8%, respectively).

The casebank was not available as an initial caseload assignment in 1995.

| | 1995 | | 1998 | | 2000 | | |
|------------------------|----------|------|----------|------|---------------------------------------|-----|--|
| | N=8,5067 | % | N=10,794 | % | N=8,353 | % | |
| Initial Caseload Assig | nment | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | |
| Casebank | N/A | 0.0 | 3,790 | 35.1 | 3,974 | 47. | |
| Generic | 5,690 | 66.9 | 2,428 | 22.5 | 2,092 | 25. | |
| ICM | 277 | 3.3 | N/A | 0.0 | N/A | 0. | |
| Specialized | 1,515 | 17.8 | 2,956 | 27.4 | 1,303 | 15. | |
| Local Control | N/A | 0.0 | 162 | 1.5 | 202 | 2. | |
| Intake | 784 | 9.2 | 991 | 9.2 | 372 | 4. | |
| Abscond | 240 | 2.8 | 467 | 4.3 | 410 | 4. | |
| Final Caseload Assign | nment | | | | | | |
| Casebank | 1,050 | 12.3 | 3,622 | 33.6 | 3,706 | 44. | |
| Generic | 3,577 | 42.1 | 2,571 | 23.8 | 2,138 | 25. | |
| ICM | 142 | 1.7 | N/A | 0.0 | N/A | 0. | |
| Specialized | 1,416 | 16.6 | 2,239 | 20.7 | 1,247 | 14. | |
| Local Control | 10 | 0.1 | 94 | 0.9 | 92 | 1. | |
| Intake | 362 | 4.3 | 373 | 3.5 | 186 | 2 | |
| Abscond | 1,116 | 13.1 | 1,310 | 12.1 | 785 | 9 | |
| Excluded | 833 | 9.8 | 585 | 5.4 | 199 | 2 | |

| | Actual Supervision Level | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|------|---------|------|--|--|--|--|
| Initial Caseload Assignment | Limit | ed | Low | | Medium | | High | | Missing | | | | | |
| Assignment | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | | | | |
| 1995 | 1,439 | 100 | 1,493 | 100 | 3,400 | 100 | 1,714 | 100 | 460 | 100 | | | | |
| Generic | 840 | 58.4 | 1,231 | 82.5 | 2,443 | 71.9 | 919 | 53.6 | 257 | 55.9 | | | | |
| ICM | 39 | 2.7 | 3 | 0.2 | 21 | 0.6 | 214 | 12.5 | 0 | 0.0 | | | | |
| Specialized | 99 | 6.9 | 143 | 9.6 | 831 | 24.4 | 422 | 24.6 | 20 | 4. | | | | |
| Intake | 404 | 28.1 | 47 | 3.1 | 56 | 1.6 | 103 | 6.0 | 174 | 37.8 | | | | |
| Abscond | 57 | 4.0 | 69 | 4.6 | 49 | 1.4 | 56 | 3.3 | 9 | 2.0 | | | | |
| 1998 | 3,879 | 100 | 2,034 | 100 | 2,241 | 100 | 2,261 | 100 | 379 | 100 | | | | |
| Casebank | 2,454 | 63.3 | 1,110 | 54.6 | 165 | 7.4 | 54 | 2.4 | 7 | 1. | | | | |
| Generic | 163 | 4.2 | 160 | 7.9 | 783 | 34.9 | 1,287 | 56.9 | 35 | 9. | | | | |
| Specialized | 818 | 21.1 | 450 | 22.1 | 948 | 42.3 | 614 | 27.2 | 126 | 33. | | | | |
| Local Control | 31 | 0.8 | 26 | 1.3 | 30 | 1.3 | 66 | 2.9 | 9 | 2. | | | | |
| Intake | 288 | 7.4 | 176 | 8.7 | 197 | 8.8 | 138 | 6.1 | 192 | 50. | | | | |
| Abscond | 125 | 3.2 | 112 | 5.5 | 118 | 5.3 | 102 | 4.5 | 10 | 2. | | | | |
| 2000 | 3,518 | 90.7 | 1,135 | 100 | 1,903 | 100 | 1,598 | 100 | 199 | 52. | | | | |
| Casebank | 3,077 | 87.5 | 707 | 62.3 | 136 | 7.1 | 51 | 3.2 | 3 | 1. | | | | |
| Generic | 103 | 2.9 | 106 | 9.3 | 920 | 48.3 | 937 | 58.6 | 26 | 13. | | | | |
| Specialized | 61 | 1.7 | 88 | 7.8 | 672 | 35.3 | 405 | 25.3 | 77 | 38. | | | | |
| Local Control | 26 | 0.7 | 19 | 1.7 | 31 | 1.6 | 104 | 6.5 | 22 | 11. | | | | |
| Intake | 65 | 1.8 | 113 | 10.0 | 85 | 4.5 | 40 | 2.5 | 69 | 34. | | | | |
| Abscond | 186 | 5.3 | 102 | 9.0 | 59 | 3.1 | 61 | 3.8 | 2 | 1. | | | | |

Comparisons Across Caseloads

Demographics

Several analyses were conducted to compare the demographic characteristics and criminal histories of offenders across caseloads (Tables C, D, E in the Appendix). Across all three cohorts, the casebank had a higher proportion of female offenders than any other type of supervision. There were no major differences in age across caseload types. Also, across all three cohorts, the higher-intensity forms of supervision (generic, intensive case management, local control) had a higher proportion of Black offenders than the other caseloads. In 1998 and 2000, the vast majority of offenders on casebank were probationers (90.7% and 94.7%, respectively), while offenders on the other forms of supervision were distributed more evenly across the legal statuses.

In terms of offense type, in both 1998 and 2000, the higher-intensity forms of supervision had larger proportions of offenders convicted of a person offense than the other forms of supervision. The vast majority of offenders on casebank were non-violent offenders convicted of property or drug-related crimes. In both 1998 and 2000, the specialized caseloads contained higher proportions of misdemeanants than the other forms of supervision, including casebank.

In terms of their prior criminal history, the cohorts were similar in their overall mean number of prior arrests during the 24 months prior to supervision (1.14, 1.33, and 1.04, in 1995, 1998, and 2000 respectively). In both 1998 and 2000, offenders in the local control and generic caseloads had the highest mean number of prior arrests. Offenders in the casebank caseload had a low mean number of priors (0.68 and 0.53 in 1998 and 2000, respectively). With the exception of the local control group, over three-quarters of the offenders on supervision had no prior convictions. These results are presented in Table B in the Appendix.

Supervision Level

One of the goals of the redesign effort was to develop more homogeneous caseloads to be connected with modes of supervision that were responsive to risk level. Prior to the redesign, the available supervision options were tasked with providing services to offenders with vastly different levels of risk. As shown in Table 6, in 1995, the main supervision option was the generic caseload, which was comprised of 14.8% limited-risk offenders, 21.6% low-risk offenders, 42.9% medium-risk offenders, and 16.2% high-risk offenders (with 4.5% of cases missing these data). This pattern led to what the DCI believed to be an inefficient use of resources, as expensive supervision and treatment resources could be consumed by low-risk offenders (who research had shown to do better with more limited contact and services).

This inefficiency was largely corrected by the redesign. In 1998, the resources available under generic supervision were reserved for higher risk offenders, as evidenced by a shift in the composition of this caseload to include 6.7% limited-risk offenders, 6.6% low-risk offenders, 32.2% medium-risk offenders, and 53% high-risk offenders (with 1.4% missing these data). This pattern becomes slightly more pronounced in 2000, when the generic caseload was comprised as follows: 4.9% limited-risk, 5.1% low-risk, 44.0% medium-risk, and 44.8% high-risk (with 1.2% of cases missing these data). This pattern suggests that higher intensity supervision and treatment resources are indeed being reserved for higher risk offenders.

This shift in the composition of the generic caseloads was accomplished through a successful migration of lower risk offenders to the lower-cost casebank option. In 1998, 94% of the offenders assigned to the casebank caseload were limited and low-risk offenders, while in 2000, this proportion increased to 95.2%.

The local control caseload remained comprised primarily of medium and high-risk offenders in 1998 and 2000 (59.2% and 66.8%, respectively). Offenders held at intake were evenly distributed across all risk levels in 1998 and 2000, although in 1995 just over half were limited-risk offenders. In both 1995 and 1998, offenders who had some period of absconding during supervision were distributed equally across the risk levels, although in 2000, a larger proportion of these offenders were limited-risk (45%). A similar analyses was conducted to examine the distribution across risk levels, by caseload, for the offenders' final month of supervision. The proportions noted in the discussion of the initial time period remained largely unchanged.

• Summary of Descriptive Analyses

- Except in a limited number of areas, the cohorts were very similar in terms of their demographic and legal status characteristics. Across the three years, increasing proportions of women, white offenders, probationers, offenders convicted of controlled substance and DUI offenses, and misdemeanor level offenses were evident among admissions to community supervision.
- The three cohorts were very similar in terms of the extent of their prior involvement with the criminal justice system. In 1998 and 2000, offenders on caseloads featuring higher levels of supervision had a higher number of prior arrests than offenders on low supervision caseloads.
- Since 1995, the proportion of offenders with a *calculated* risk level of limited or low increased by approximately 10 percentage-points. In terms of the *actual* risk level (which accounts for overrides) a 20 percentage-point difference is evident. These changes may be due to two key factors: 1) an increasing proportion of probationers, who are disproportionately lower risk; and 2) increased use of overrides to reduce the offenders' supervision levels. These are important considerations in the interpretation of changes in recidivism rates.
- In terms of initial caseload assignments, an increasing proportion of offenders were assigned to casebank from 1998 to 2000, with a consequent decrease in the proportion assigned to caseloads with higher levels of supervision and services.
- The caseloads have become more homogeneous, with greater concentrations of high and mediumrisk offenders assigned to generic caseloads and a greater concentration of limited and low-risk offenders assigned to the casebank.

| Actual | | | | | | Initia | ıl Caseloa | d Assign | ment | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------|------|-------|-----------|-----|-------------|------------|---------------|------|--------|-------|---------|-----|------|
| Supervision Level | Casel | bank | Gen | neric ICM | | Specialized | | Local Control | | Intake | | Abscond | | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | 9 |
| 1995 | 0 | | 5,690 | 100 | 277 | 100 | 1,515 | 100 | 0 | | 784 | 100 | 240 | 100 |
| Limited | N/A | | 840 | 14.8 | 39 | 14.1 | 99 | 6.5 | N/A | | 404 | 51.5 | 57 | 23. |
| Low | N/A | | 1,231 | 21.6 | 3 | 1.1 | 143 | 9.4 | N/A | | 47 | 6.0 | 69 | 28.8 |
| Medium | N/A | | 2,443 | 42.9 | 21 | 7.6 | 831 | 54.9 | N/A | | 56 | 7.1 | 49 | 20.4 |
| High | N/A | | 919 | 16.2 | 214 | 77.3 | 422 | 27.9 | N/A | | . 103 | 13.1 | 56 | 23.3 |
| Missing | N/A | | 257 | 4.5 | 0 | 0.0 | 20 | 1.3 | N/A | | 174 | 22.2 | 9 | 3.8 |
| 1998 | 3,790 | 100 | 2,428 | 100 | 0 | | 2,956 | 100 | 162 | 100 | 991 | 100 | 467 | 100 |
| Limited | 2,454 | 64.7 | 163 | 6.7 | N/A | | 818 | 27.7 | 31 | 19.1 | 288 | 29.1 | 125 | 26.8 |
| Low | 1,110 | 29.3 | 160 | 6.6 | N/A | | 450 | 15.2 | 26 | 16.0 | 176 | 17.8 | 112 | 24.0 |
| Medium | 165 | 4.4 | 783 | 32.2 | N/A | | 948 | 32.1 | 30 | 18.5 | 197 | 19.9 | 118 | 25.3 |
| High | 54 | 1.4 | 1,287 | 53.0 | N/A | | 614 | 20.8 | 66 | 40.7 | 138 | 13.9 | 102 | 21.8 |
| Missing | 7 | 0.2 | 35 | 1.4 | N/A | | 126 | 4.3 | 9 | 5.6 | 192 | 19.4 | 10 | 2. |
| 2000 | 3,974 | 100 | 2,092 | 100 | 0 | | 1,303 | 100 | 202 | 100 | 372 | 100 | 410 | 100 |
| Limited | 3,077 | 77,4 | 103 | 4.9 | N/A | | 61 | 4.7 | 26 | 12.9 | 65 | 17.5 | 186 | 45.4 |
| Low | 707 | 17.8 | 106 | 5.1 | N/A | | 88 | 6.8 | 19 | 9.4 | 113 | 30.4 | 102 | 24.9 |
| Medium | 136 | 3.4 | 920 | 44.0 | N/A | | 672 | 51.6 | 31 | 15.3 | 85 | 22.8 | 59 | 14.4 |
| High | 51 | 1.3 | 937 | 44.8 | N/A | | 405 | 31.1 | 104 | 51.5 | 40 | 10.8 | 61 | 14.9 |
| Missing | 3 | 0.1 | 26 | 1.2 | N/A | | 77 | 5.9 | 22 | 10.9 | 69 | 18.5 | 2 | 0.5 |

☐ Tools for Supervision

There are three main tools for classifying and supervising offenders under the new system: an objective risk assessment instrument designed to identify necessary levels of supervision (OCMS); standards that set the type and intensity of contact across supervision levels, and a range of custodial and non-custodial sanctions to respond to offender non-compliance.


An examination of each of these tools was critical to ensure their proper implementation, as well as the integrity of the redesign effort which depends on the functionality of each part. A valid risk assessment process is needed to ensure that distinct groups of offenders with different levels of risk to public safety can be targeted for appropriate levels of supervision. If it can be demonstrated that lower risk offenders receiving lower levels of supervision actually do recidivate less often, it will be important to demonstrate that offenders on caseloads featuring less intensive service levels actually do receive less supervision (i.e., they consume less of the Department's resources). If there were no quantitative differences in the intensity of supervision across caseloads, the cost-effectiveness of the casebank option would be questionable. Finally, the use of sanctions is important to understand both in its relationship to recidivism and for its ability to impact offender behavior without expensive custodial sanctions.


Risk Assessment


An issue of concern emerging from these analyses was the high rate of overrides observed in the risk assessment process. Figure 1 (below) and Table F (in the Appendix) illustrate this practice across all three cohorts. The *calculated supervision level* is the level indicated by the total score on the supervision assessment instrument, while the *actual supervision level* represents the risk level assigned after taking a number of discretionary and mandatory override factors into account.

The tables below show the changes in the proportion of the offender population assigned to each supervision level once the overrides are taken into account. For example, in 2000 (see Table F in the Appendix), using the calculated supervision level, the distribution across the levels is 28% limited, 38% low, 17% medium, and 17% high-risk. However, when the override factors are considered, the distribution across supervision levels changes considerably with 43% assessed as limited-risk, 14% as low-risk, 23% as medium and 20% as high. This represents an overall override rate of 39%, with 16% of offenders being overridden to a higher supervision level, and 23% being overridden to a lower supervision level. This pattern is also seen in 1998 (see Figure 1B). However, in 1995 (see Figure 1A), the pattern was reversed, with the majority of the overrides occurring in the upward direction (32% up, and 13% down).

The overall override rates greatly exceeded the accepted standard of between 5 and 15%. In 1995, 45.6% of all cases were overridden; in 1998, 31.9% were overridden, and in 2000, 39.4% were overridden. A more detailed analyses is needed, but in general, these override rates indicate one, or a combination, of interferences. For example, staff may not have confidence in the instrument and may override it to correct these perceived inadequacies. Another issue could be that certain policy directives (e.g., no treatment resources for limited-risk offenders) may run counter to the staff's perception of appropriate supervision. Because the risk assessment process is the backbone of the entire redesign effort, it is vitally important that the Department undertake a proper validation study to determine the specific issues driving the high override rates, and their impact across gender.







Supervision—Intensity and Type

While one of the key research questions was to examine the intensity of supervision and whether it met contact standards and differed significantly across caseloads, flaws in the data prevented a thorough analysis of this question. Tables G, H, and I (in the Appendix) illustrate an analysis which isolated several points in time through the offenders' periods of supervision. The amount and type of supervision received during each offenders' first, sixth, twelfth, eighteenth, and twenty-fourth month of supervision was compiled to provide a mean number of contacts and a description of the type of supervision contacts during that month. The contact data are separated by supervision level to permit comparisons to contact standards. The *n* of offenders decreases over time, as not all offenders were sentenced to a full 24-month supervision period.

When compared to the contact standards discussed in the previous section of this report (i.e., limited-risk offenders—monthly file check and six month compliance reviews; low-risk—one monthly contact, etc.), it became clear that the number of contacts across all supervision levels was greatly exceeding those required by the contact standards. For example, the number of contacts for limited supervision offenders in 2000 ranged from 2.7 to 3.2 per month, with between 42% and 59% of these reported to be person-to-person contacts with the offender or a collateral contact. After discussions with line staff and supervisors in the DCJ, we learned that these numbers were likely inflated because the default setting in the chronological contact mondule of the MIS was a person-to-person contact. Thus, anytime an activity was recorded for an offender, if the PPO did not change the contact type, it would be counted as an in-person meeting with the offender. We determined that these data were not a reliable source of information about the intensity or type of supervision contacts.

What can be concluded, however, is that the intensity of contact does appear to increase as the supervision level of the offender increases. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the bias inherent in the MIS is consistent across caseload types. Table I (in the Appendix) shows, for example, in month 12 of 2000, limited-risk offenders received an average of 2.7 contacts, low received an average of 2.9 contacts, medium received an average of 4.2 contacts, and high received an average of 5.0 contacts per month. This pattern of escalating intensity of supervision across risk levels is evident across all cohorts and risk levels. Thus, there is preliminary data to support the assertion that offenders on higher supervision levels indeed receive a greater number of contacts than offenders on lower supervision levels, as required by design.

Structured Sanctions

In 1995, the Department, along with other community corrections agencies in Oregon, implemented a structured intermediate sanctions program, which allowed parole and probation officers to impose limited periods of incarceration and other sanctions in response to offender non-compliance. There is a broad array of general and special probation and parole conditions, which have been categorized in the following fashion⁶:

• <u>Supervisory</u>—conditions that are fundamental to community supervision, such as physical presence in the community, availability, a known residence, not committing additional illegal acts. Examples include "Submit to supervision and visits" and "Remain in Oregon."

⁶See Salvo, W. (2001). *The Use of Structured Intermediate Sanctions in Multnomah County.* Portland, OR: Department of Community Justice, Research and Evaluation Unit.

- <u>Penalty</u>—conditions that would generally be construed to be punishments, depriving the
 offender of personal freedom, time, or money. Examples include "Court ordered restitution"
 or "Jail days imposed."
- Restrictions—conditions that are prohibitory or injunctive for specific situations or settings.
 Examples include "No use or possession or controlled substance" and "No contact with victim."
- <u>Treatment</u>—conditions that compel or direct the offender to be evaluated or attend treatment programs or ancillary services that support treatment programming, for example, "Submit to mental health evaluation."

A single sanction event may respond to multiple violations (e.g., violation of a supervisory and a penalty condition) and may include multiple sanctions (e.g., jail and a program). The tables below describes the use of sanctions in response to offender non-compliance in the 1998 and 2000 cohorts. (Sanctions data for the 1995 cohort were not available). From the 1998 cohort, a total of 2,950 offenders (27%) were sanctioned and a total of 1,714 offenders (21%) were sanctioned from the 2000 cohort. The 2000 cohort includes admissions from January through June and uses only a 12-month follow up period, so the numbers of offenders sanctioned are not comparable. For a comparative analysis of the use of structured sanctions, please see Salvo (2001).

As shown in Table 7 below, the mean number of violations for offenders sanctioned at least once from the 1998 cohort was 4.9 while the mean number of violations for offenders sanctioned at least once from the 2000 cohort was 3.4. Approximately 33% of 1998 sanctioned offenders violated six or more conditions during the 24-month follow up period, while approximately 16% of the 2000 cohort violated six or more conditions during the 12-month follow up period. The average time to the first violation was 7.7 months for 1998 offenders and 5.0 months for 2000 offenders.

Most often, offenders violated one of the general probation and parole conditions. In 1998, approximately two-thirds of all violations (62.3%) were of the supervisory type, as compared to 57.6% of all violations by offenders in the 2000 cohort.

Table 8, below, presents the most serious condition violated for offenders who were sanctioned at least once. The hierarchy of seriousness across condition types is supervisory, penalty, restriction, and treatment, with general and special conditions carrying equal weight. A slightly larger proportion of 1998 offenders had a violation of a supervisory condition as their most serious violation (86.5%), as compared to 2000 offenders (80.9%). In both cohorts, the majority of offenders receiving a sanction were under either medium or high supervision at the time of their most serious violation (80.7% in 1998 and 78.0% in 2000). This finding makes intuitive sense as one would expect medium and high-risk offenders to be more likely to fail to comply, but also because the greater intensity of supervision and the greater number of rules with which they must comply provide expanded opportunities to detect non-compliant behavior.

Over half of the offenders who were sanctioned at least once were on either parole or post-prison supervision (69.8% in 1998 and 63.9% in 2000), and over three-quarters of the offenders were on either generic or specialized caseloads (84.5% in 1998 and 78.5% in 2000).

| | 1998 | 1998 | | | |
|---|---------|-------|--|------|--|
| | N=2,950 | % | 2000 N=1,714 | % | |
| Total Number of Violations per Offender | | | L_ | | |
| 1 Violations | 497 | 16.8 | 363 | 21.2 | |
| 2 Violations | 546 | 24.0 | 411 | 24.0 | |
| 3 - 5 Violations | 932 | 31.6 | 658 | 38.4 | |
| 6 - 9 Violations | 593 | 20.1 | 226 | 13.2 | |
| 10+ Violations | 382 | 12.9 | 56 | 3.3 | |
| Mean Violations | 4.9 | | 3.4 | | |
| Time to First Violation | | | | | |
| First 6 Months | 1,438 | 48.7 | 1,065 | 62. | |
| 7 - 12 Months | 769 | 26.1 | 651 | 37. | |
| 13 - 18 Months | 490 | 16.6 | N/A | 0. | |
| 19 - 24 Months | 253 | 8.6 | N/A | 0.0 | |
| Mean | 7.7 | | 5.0 | | |
| Total Number of Violations | 14,521 | 100.0 | 5,892 | 100. | |
| General Probation and Parole Conditions Violate | d | | | | |
| Supervisory | 9,045 | 62.3 | 3,393 | 57. | |
| Penalty | 365 | 2.5 | 255 | 4. | |
| Restriction | 2,111 | 14.5 | 846 | 14. | |
| Treatment | 1,878 | 12.9 | 788 | 13. | |
| Special Parole Conditions Violated | | | ······································ | | |
| Penalty | 8 | 0.1 | 10 | 0 | |
| Restriction | 569 | 3.9 | 297 | 5. | |
| Treatment | 317 | 2.2 | 140 | 2. | |
| Special Probation Conditions Violated | | | | | |
| Penalty | 220 | 1.5 | 159 | 2. | |
| Treatment | 8 | 0.1 | 4 | 0. | |

Note: There are no special parole or probation conditions of the 'supervisory' type, and no special probation conditions of the 'restriction type.

Source: Department of Community Justice, Sanctions Tracking Data Base.

| | 1998 | 1998 | | 2000 | |
|---|---------|------|---------|------|--|
| | N=2,950 | % | N=1,714 | % | |
| Most Serious Condition Violated | | | | | |
| Supervisory | 2,553 | 86.5 | 1,388 | 80.9 | |
| Penalty | 90 | 3.1 | 111 | 6.5 | |
| Restriction | 256 | 8.7 | 182 | 10.6 | |
| Treatment | 51 | 1.7 | 33 | 1.9 | |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.1 | |
| Supervision Level at Most Serious Violation | | | | | |
| Limited | 315 | 10.7 | 287 | 16.7 | |
| Low | 253 | 8.6 | 91 | 5.3 | |
| Medium | 761 | 25.8 | 418 | 24.4 | |
| High | 1,618 | 54.9 | 920 | 53.6 | |
| Legal Status at Most Serious Violation | | | | | |
| Parole | 260 | 8.8 | 96 | 5.0 | |
| Post-Prison | 1,800 | 61.0 | 1,001 | 58. | |
| Probation | 890 | 30.2 | 619 | 36. | |
| Caseload at Most Serious Violation | | | | | |
| Casebank | 238 | 8.1 | 312 | 18. | |
| Generic | 1,603 | 54.3 | 938 | 54. | |
| Specialized | 891 | 30.2 | 409 | 23. | |
| Local Control | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0. | |
| Abscond | 54 | 1.8 | 0 | 0. | |
| Excluded | 164 | 5.6 | 55 | 3. | |

In response to these violations, the offenders received an array of sanctions. As mentioned previously, a single sanction event can include multiple sanctions for multiple violations. For example, during the 1998 cohort's 24-month follow up period, there were 6,341 sanction events that imposed a total of 7,641 sanctions. Over the 12-month follow up period for the 2000 cohort, there were a total of 2,654 sanction events that imposed a total of 3,031 sanctions.

For those offenders who received at least one sanction, Table 9 presents the number of sanctions imposed. In 1998, 47.6% received only one sanction, while 63.7% of offenders in 2000 received only one sanction. The mean number of sanctions imposed was 2.6 in 1998 and 1.8 in 2000. Again, these differences may be due to the differing lengths of the follow-up periods used. For a comparative analysis of the use of sanctions, please see Salvo (2001).

The distribution across the types of sanctions recommended were similar for the 1998 and 2000 cohorts. In approximately half of the sanction events, jail was recommended (52.5% in 1998 and 54.2% in 2000). Jail plus a program was recommended in 10.9% of the 1998 sanction events and 9.5% of the 2000 sanction events. A revocation of probation or parole/post-prison supervision was recommended for one in ten sanction events in 1998 and 2000. Non-custodial sanctions (programs with custody units and programs without custody units) were recommended for only about one-quarter of sanction events in both years. The average custody units (for both jail and programs) recommended differed according to the offenders' legal status. The total mean custody units recommended for parolees/post-prisoners who were sanctions was 89.7 in 1998 and 71.9 in 2000, compared to a mean of 12.6 custody units for probationers in 1998 and 12.7 custody units for probationers in 2000. This mean is computed per *offender*, using all sanctions recommended during the follow-up period, rather than calculating the mean custody units per *sanction event*. These differences are compatible with the sanctioning grids employed for the different legal statuses, which provide for a higher number of custody units for offenders on parole and post-prison supervision.

In terms of the sanctions actually imposed, revocation was actually imposed slightly less often than it was recommended (5.5% versus 10.6% in 1998 and 6.3% versus 10.7% in 2000), with consequent increases in jail and jail plus a program. The mean number of custody units actually imposed was significantly less than the number recommended for parole/post-prison (74.4 versus 89.7 in 1998 and 52.7 versus 71.9 in 2000), and only slightly less for probationers (12 versus 12.6 in 1998 and 11.2 versus 12.7 in 2000). Of the sanctions imposed, only about two-thirds were actually served (65.4% in 1998 and 68.1% in 2000). Most often, the program portion of the "jail plus a program" sanction was not actually served.

Table 10 presents the most serious recommended sanction for offenders who were sanctioned at least once. For approximately half of the offenders, the most serious sanction recommended was jail (46.3% in 1998 and 52.6% in 2000). A non-custodial sanction was recommended for approximately one-fifth of the offenders in both years. As with all sanctions recommended and imposed (discussed above), when considering only the most serious sanction, again there is a difference in the number of times revocation was recommended versus imposed (19.1% versus 11.0% in 1998 and 15.2% versus 9.4% in 2000). When considering the most serious sanction imposed, only about half of the sanctions were actually served (51.3% and 40.0% in 1998 and 2000).

| | 1998 | | 2000 | |
|--|---------|------|---------|------|
| | N=2,950 | % | N=1,714 | % |
| Total Number of Sanctions per Offender | | | | |
| 1 Sanctions | 1,405 | 47.6 | 1,092 | 63.7 |
| 2 Sanctions | 654 | 22.1 | 403 | 23.5 |
| 3 Sanctions | 403 | 13.7 | 155 | 9.0 |
| 4 Sanctions | 233 | 7.9 | 48 | 2.8 |
| 5+ Sanctions | 255 | 8.6 | 18 | 1.1 |
| Mean Sanctions | 2.6 | | 1.8 | |
| Total Number of Sanction Events | 6,341 | | 2,654 | |
| Recommended Sanctions | | | | |
| Revoke | 669 | 10.6 | 284 | 10.7 |
| Jail + Any Program | 691 | 10.9 | 253 | 9. |
| Jail | 3,326 | 52.5 | 1,438 | 54.2 |
| Program WITH Custody Units Only | 619 | 9.8 | 299 | 11.3 |
| Program WITHOUT Custody Units Only | 1,036 | 16.3 | 380 | 14. |
| Average Recommended Custody Units | | | | |
| Parole and Post Prison | 89.7 | | 71.9 | |
| Probation | 12.6 | | 12.7 | |
| Imposed Sanctions | | | | |
| Revoke | 346 | 5.5 | 166 | 6. |
| Jail + Any Program | 1,025 | 16.2 | 283 | 10. |
| Jail | 3,456 | 54.5 | 1,529 | 57. |
| Program WITH Custody Units Only | 405 | 6.4 | 259 | 9. |
| Program WITHOUT Custody Units Only | 1,109 | 17.5 | 417 | 15. |
| Average Imposed Custody Units | | | | |
| Parole and Post Prison | 74.4 | | 52.7 | |
| Probation | 12.0 | | 11.2 | |
| Sanctions Actually Served | 4,147 | 65.4 | 1,807 | 68. |

| | 1998 | | 2000 | |
|--|---------|------|---------|------|
| | N=2,950 | % | N=1,714 | % |
| Most Serious Recommended Sanction | | | | |
| Revoke | 564 | 19.1 | 260 | 15.2 |
| Jail + Any Program | 440 | 14.9 | 185 | 10.8 |
| Jail | 1,365 | 46.3 | 903 | 52.6 |
| Program WITH Custody Units Only | 198 | 6.7 | 149 | 8.7 |
| Program WITHOUT Custody Units Only | 383 | 13.0 | 219 | 12.8 |
| Most Serious Imposed Sanction | | | | |
| Revoke | 324 | 11.0 | 162 | 9.4 |
| Jail + Any Program | 694 | 23.5 | 218 | 12.7 |
| Jail | 1,372 | 46.5 | 970 | 56.5 |
| Program WITH Custody Units Only | 152 | 5.2 | 134 | 7.8 |
| Program WITHOUT Custody Units Only | 408 | 13.8 | 232 | 13.5 |
| Most Serious Sanctions Actually Served | 1,512 | 51.3 | 687 | 40.0 |

Summary

- The backbone of the redesign, the objective risk assessment system, has some significant problems. The override rates are much higher than the accepted standard, with most of the cases being overridden in the downward direction (23% of all cases in 2000). The Department should conduct an in-depth revalidation study to identify the source of and remedy for the problem and the operation of override criteria across gender.
- Although we intended to conduct an in-depth analysis of the type and intensity of supervision contacts across supervision levels and caseloads, the contact data were not reliable for such an examination as problems with the Department's software created inflated estimates of the actual amount and type of contact. However, given that this inherent bias is equally distributed across all offenders, we were able to discern that the intensity of supervision does escalate with increases in supervision level. Thus, it appeared that offenders on low and limited supervision indeed receive significantly fewer supervision contacts than medium and high-risk offenders, which is a key element of the casebank's cost-effectiveness.

In general, the analysis of sanctions data revealed that approximately 27% of offenders in the 1998 cohort were sanctioned at least once, and 21% of offenders in the 2000 cohort were sanctioned at least once (these rates are not comparable due to differences in the length of the follow up period). Differences in the custody units imposed varied as expected across legal statuses, with offenders on parole and post-prison supervision receiving longer custodial sanctions. The structured sanctioning system, despite its mission to decrease the reliance on custodial sanctions in response to offender non-compliance, continues to use "jail" and "jail plus a program" much more often than any other option. In addition, in approximately one-third to one-half of sanction events, the full sanction is never actually served, indicating a lack of integrity in the sanction program.

☐ RECIDIVISM ANALYSIS

The key research questions for this study revolve around whether the new form of supervision is safe (i.e., whether offenders recidivate more often than under the old system), and how rates of recidivism differ across supervision levels and caseload assignments.

State and County Level Context

Before looking at the recidivism rates across the three cohorts, it is important to examine the context within which the re-offending occurred. Originally, we planned to conduct a multiple time series analysis to permit an historical analysis of key impact indicators (i.e., arrest), not only for Multnomah County but also for a small number of comparable locations. It would be useful to compare Multnomah to other counties that did not "reinvent" their community supervision programs to see if they experienced similar trends with respect to arrest rates. Other outcome indicators could also be targeted, including the use of local detention and parole/probation revocations, but these data were simply not available in a reliable format.

Table 11, below, tracks the total number of arrests for the state of Oregon, Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas counties. Washington and Clackamas counties have relatively large populations and together with Multnomah, account for approximately 36% of arrests in the state each year.

When causation effects are believed to be lagged over time, traditional time series analyses requires over 20 data points in order to use ordinary linear regression analysis. At the outset of this research, we anticipated that we would be able to disaggregate annual arrest data to secure monthly data points. However, these data were not available. Although it provides a less detailed analysis of the relevant context, a simple computation of the changes in the number of arrests throughout the state, and within each county (shown in Table 12), sets the context for interpreting the changes in the rates of recidivism across time within the study cohorts.

As shown in Table 11, patterns in the number of arrests have been somewhat unstable over time with the state and counties experiencing significant fluctuations since 1995. Overall, in 2000, arrests statewide and in Multnomah County are approximately 2% higher than 1995 levels. Arrests have increased significantly in Washington County (33.5% increase between 1995 and 2000), but have decreased significantly in Clackamas County (-10.85% between 1995 and 2000). After a significant drop in arrests in 1998 and 1999 in Multnomah County, the number of arrests in 2000 is the highest in the six year history.

Table 12 shows changes in reported crime over a five-year period. In 2000, in Multnomah County and statewide, reported crime was down approximately 7%, while in Washington and Clackamas counties, reported crime was up 2.41% and 3.43%, respectively, in 2000 compared to 1996.

| Jurisdiction | State | Multnomah | Washington | Clackamas |
|--------------|---------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| 1995 | 164,708 | 36,293 | 10,840 | 10,535 |
| 1996 | 170,808 | 34,944 | 11,134 | 12,330 |
| 1997 | 174,260 | 35,131 | 14,259 | 11,755 |
| 1998 | 168,669 | 32,658 | 14,017 | 10,562 |
| 1999 | 154,333 | 31,789 | 14,318 | 8,955 |
| 2000 | 169,316 | 37,128 | 14,467 | 9,392 |
| % change | 2.79 | 2.30 | 33.50 | -10.84 |

| Jurisdiction | State | Multnomah | Washington | Clackamas | |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|------------|-----------|--|
| 1996 | 471,515 | 117,532 | 37,112 | 33,079 | |
| 1997 | 457,532 | 111,094 | 36,245 | 35,053 | |
| 1998 | 484,100 | 118,636 | 39,317 | 34,355 | |
| 1999 | 434,738 | 108,890 | 37,327 | 32,988 | |
| 2000 | 439,371 | 108,845 | 38,005 | 34,212 | |
| % change 1996-2000 | -6.82 | -7.39 | 2.41 | 3.43 | |

By Cohort

Table 13 shows the rates of re-arrest after 12- and 24-month follow up periods⁷. These rates were essentially the same in 1995 and 1998. Thus, even though the method of delivering supervision changed significantly between 1995 and 1998, with large groups of limited and low-risk offenders receiving very little supervision or treatment, public safety was not compromised. Further, the 12-month re-arrest rates for the 2000 cohort provide additional promising evidence that the redesign effort has been implemented safely. The 12-month re-arrest rate for the 2000 cohort is 27.1%, compared to 35.3% and 35.5% in previous years.⁸

A Kaplan-Meyer survival analysis was conducted to identify the key variables that were predictive of recidivism (or in the case of a survival analysis—the absence of recidivism, i.e., the offenders who "survive"). In general, the factors relevant to the length of time to re-arrest were roughly similar across cohorts. While there were annual differences across the cohorts, none appeared to be either driving the results or skewing the analyses.

As shown in Table 13, between 1995 and 2000, the proportion of offenders re-arrested for person-related offenses decreased from 15.7% to 9.3%, and the number re-arrested for property offenses decreased from 27.5% to 19.1%. The number arrested for DUI and controlled substance offenses remained approximately the same. Significant increases were witnessed in the number of offenders re-arrested for "other" crimes, which include public order offenses, low-level property offenses, trespassing, etc. The proportion of offenders with their most serious new offense in these categories increased from 29.0% to 35.5% to 42.9% across the years. In general, in addition to a decreasing proportion of offenders being rearrested, the severity of their subsequent offenses decreased.

An additional analysis looked at the extent to which the rate of re-arrests decreased using the time period prior to supervision, compared to a 12- or 24-month follow-up period. This is called a "suppression effect," with the following formula:

(# arrests during follow-up period / # arrests prior to supervision) - 1.00 = Suppression rate

If there had been a significant decrease in the rate of re-arrests, the suppression rate would be a large, negative number. Table 13 presents the suppression rates for the three cohorts. In all three years, the rates are small, positive numbers, meaning that the offenders were re-arrested slightly more often while on supervision, than they were prior to being admitted to community supervision. The 2000 cohort uses a 12-month prior time period and follow-up period; thus, the lower mean number of arrests for the 2000 cohort is due in part to a shorter time at risk. Overall, while the severity of re-offending decreased, the rate of re-offending has stayed the same.

While the rate of re-conviction is considered to be a superior outcome indicator, its use was not appropriate here because of the time lag involved in the cases reaching disposition, the data being transferred to the county's data warehouse, and the recency of the follow-up period for the 2000 cohort (ending in June, 2001).

⁸To assess whether the decreased recidivism rate was caused by delays in arrest data being reported to data sources, we examined the distribution of new arrests across the follow up period for the 2000 cohort (January, 2000 to June, 2001). The number of arrests mirrored the pattern of the number of offenders in the sample across the 18-month period, which supports their validity. The lower number of arrests at the beginning and toward the end of the follow-up period can be explained by a smaller number of offenders being monitored for recidivism. The arrest data were also verified by accessing the Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) directly and finding a match with the data reported by DSS-Justice.

| Table 13. Recidivism Analysis by Cohort. | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------|----------|---------------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------|
| | 1995 | | 1998 | | 200 | 0 |
| | N=8,506 | % | N=10,794 | % | N=8,353 | % |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | |
| % Re-arrested w/in 12 Months | 35.5 | | 35.3 | | 27.1 | |
| % Re-arrested w/in 24 Months | 46.9 | | 47.1 | | N/A | |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| Total n re-arrested | 3,989 | 100.0 | 5,079 | 100.0 | 2,268 | 100.0 |
| Person | 627 | 15.7 | 575 | 11.3 | 211 | 9.3 |
| Property | 1,095 | 27.5 | 1,078 | 21.2 | 433 | 19.1 |
| Controlled Substance | 997 | 25.0 | 1,395 | 27.5 | 553 | 24.4 |
| DUI | 106 | 2.7 | 206 | 4.1 | 73 | 3.2 |
| Other | 1,156 | 29.0 | 1,804 | 35.5 | 974 | 42.9 |
| Unknown | 8 | 0.2 | 21 | 0.4 | 24 | 1.1 |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior | 1.1 | | 1.3 | | 0.5 | |
| Mean Arrests - Sup.Period | 1.4 | | 1.5 | | 0.6 | |
| Suppression Rate | 0.22 | | 0.12 | | 0.0 | 1 |
| Reconviction | | | | | | |
| % Reconvicted w/in 12 Months | 21.7 | , | 22.9 | | 15. | 4 |
| % Reconvicted w/in 24 Months | 15.4 | | 15.5 | | N/A | |
| Source: Multnomah County Decision Support Sy | rstem-Justice (DSS-J) | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | |

Additional analyses were conducted isolating those offenders who were re-arrested. The total sample sizes for these analyses are as follows: $1995 \ (n=3,989)$, $1998 \ (n=5,079)$, and $2000 \ (n=2,268)$. Table 14, below, presents the demographic and offense characteristics of offenders who were re-arrested. Compared to Table 2, which presents the demographics of the full cohorts, we can see the following differences. The proportion of women who recidivated was slightly less than their overall proportion in the samples. There were also fewer white offenders, and more black offenders, among the recidivist group as compared to the full samples. The proportion of probationers is smaller than the full samples, while the proportion of offenders on parole/post-prison supervision is larger. There are also fewer misdemeanants compared to the full cohort.

| Characteristics | 1995 | | 199 | 8 | 2000 | | |
|------------------------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|------|--|
| | N=3,989 | % | N=,5079 | % | N=2,268 | 100% | |
| Gender | | | | | | | |
| Male | 3,250 | 81.5 | 4,041 | 79.6 | 1,776 | 78.3 | |
| Female | 737 | 18.5 | 1,036 | 20.4 | 481 | 21.2 | |
| Missing | 2 | 0.1 | 2 | 0.0 | 11 | 0.5 | |
| Mean Age | 31.8 | 3 | 33. | 1 | 34.2 | | |
| Race/Ethnicity | | | | , | | | |
| White | 2,409 | 60.4 | 3,313 | 65.2 | 1,476 | 65.1 | |
| Black | 1,311 | 32.9 | 1,437 | 28.3 | 650 | 28.7 | |
| Hispanic | 154 | 3.9 | 186 | 3.7 | 69 | 3.0 | |
| Asian/Pac. Island | 48 | 1.2 | 56 | 1.1 | 18 | 0.8 | |
| Am. Ind/Alaskan | 65 | 1.6 | 84 | 1.7 | 44 | 1.9 | |
| Missing | 2 | 0.1 | 3 | 0.1 | 11 | 0.5 | |
| Legal Status | | | | | | | |
| Probation | 1,919 | 48.1 | 3,421 | 67.4 | 1,624 | 71.6 | |
| Post-Prison | 1,280 | 32.1 | 1,105 | 21.8 | 428 | 18.9 | |
| Parole | 371 | 9.3 | 208 | 4.1 | 89 | 3.9 | |
| Parole and Post-Prison | 353 | 8.8 | 211 | 4.2 | 80 | 3.5 | |
| Other | 66 | 1.7 | 134 | 2.6 | 46 | 2.0 | |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.0 | |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 3,353 | 84.1 | 4,013 | 79.0 | 1,861 | 82.1 | |
| Misdemeanor | 438 | 11.0 | 760 | 15.0 | 290 | 12.8 | |
| Missing | 198 | 5.0 | 306 | 6.0 | 117 | 5.2 | |

By Supervision Level


As mentioned previously, given the centrality of objective risk assessment process to the redesign effort, the high rate of overrides brings this fundamental tool (and the efficacy of the redesign) into question. One method for assessing the validity of a risk classification system is to examine the relationship between the risk/supervision level and the incidence of re-arrest. The validity of the risk assessment instrument pertains to its ability to identify distinct groups of offenders with different likelihoods of re-arrest. In general, the incidence of re-arrest should follow a linear pattern, with the proportion of offenders who are re-arrested increasing as the level of risk/supervision increases. Figure 2, below, presents these failure rates by the initial actual supervision level (which accounts for any overrides to the calculated supervision level). Looking across cohorts during the 12-month follow up period, we can see that failure rates have decreased slightly across all risk levels from 1995 to 2000. More detailed data are available in Table J in the Appendix.


A Kaplan-Meyer survival analysis, described in the previous section, also showed that differences in the mean time to re-arrest across supervision were statistically significant. In other words, the "survival" of an offender (i.e., the absence of recidivism) was statistically dependent on the supervision level. These results are promising in terms of the overall efficacy of the risk assessment system that is currently in place. However, as will be discussed throughout the remainder of this report, slight modifications to the use of the override criteria could enhance the predictive validity of the risk assessment system.

As shown in Figure 2, in 1995 and 1998, the failure rates do conform to the linear patterns required to claim the basic validity of the risk assessment instrument. The proportion of high-risk offenders who are re-arrested is larger than the proportion of medium-risk, which is larger than low-risk, and so on. However, in 2000, this linear pattern is disrupted by the low and limited-risk offenders. The limited-risk category has a 17.8% failure rate, while the low-risk category has a 16.3% failure rate. You will recall that a large group of offenders were overridden from medium and low-risk categories into the limited-risk category. The question of whether these overrides were appropriate was examined with the subsequent analyses.

In order to look further into the question of linearity across supervision levels, Figure 3, below, presents the failure rates according to the calculated supervision level, which is based on the scoring of the risk items and does not account for any overrides. The linear pattern remains in 1995 and 1998, and is also now evident in the 2000 cohort with limited supervision failure rate of 12.3% and the low-risk failure rate of 21.6%.

⁹With regard to differences in demographics and offense type across supervision levels, there were no significant findings except that across all three years, a greater proportion of new arrests were felonies among high-risk offenders, as compared to their counterparts on other supervision levels. The proportion of felony arrests for high-risk offenders was 72.5%, 72.3%, and 69.3% in 1995, 1998, and 2000, compared to a range of 55% to 64% across other supervision levels. Table L. M, and N (in the Appendix) present recidivism analyses across supervision levels.





As discussed previously, the high rate of overrides may have a detrimental effect on the precision of the risk assessment system. Table 15 examines the extent to which the failure rates of cases whose supervision level was overridden differs from cases whose supervision level was not. The first section of Table 15 focuses on offenders who scored as low-risk but were overridden down to limited supervision (Low-Limited). In 1998 and 2000, these offenders had recidivism rates more comparable to those who score and stay low (Low-Low) than to those who score and stay limited (Limited-Limited). In other words, the Low-Limited recidivism rates are similar to what would be expected by the risk level suggested by their calculated score.

| Vaar | Limite | d-Limited | Lov | v-Limited | Lo | ow-Low |
|------|---------|------------------|---------|------------------|---------|------------------|
| Year | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) |
| 1995 | 659 | 16.8 | 452 | 23.0 | 1106 | 27.0 |
| 1998 | 2198 | 20.2 | 1169 | 30.7 | 1802 | 32.0 |
| 2000 | 1737 | 14.5 | 1492 | 22.5 | 992 | 20.5 |
| V | Limite | Limited-Limited | | Limited-Medium | | m-Medium |
| Year | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) |
| 1995 | 659 | 16.8 | 801 | 18.9 | 1292 | 47.5 |
| 1998 | 2198 | 20.2 | 379 | 17.7 | 1347 | 45.6 |
| 2000 | 1737 | 14.5 | 435 | 9.9 | 940 | 37.4 |
| V | Lo | Low-Low | | v-Medium | Mediu | ım-Medium |
| Year | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) | Total N | Failure Rate (%) |
| 1995 | 1106 | 27.0 | 1172 | 32.2 | 1292 | 47.5 |
| 1998 | 1802 | 32.0 | 501 | 29.5 | 1347 | 45.6 |
| 2000 | 992 | 20.5 | 513 | 25.9 | 940 | 37.4 |

The second section of the table focuses on offenders who scored as limited-risk, but who were overridden up to medium supervision (Limited—Medium). In 1998 and 2000, their recidivism rates were similar to, in fact lower than, those of offenders who scored and stayed at limited (Limited—Limited). The Limited—Medium recidivism rates are significantly lower than those who scored and stayed at medium (Medium—Medium).

Source: Department of Community Justice, monthly snapshots

The third section of Table 15 focuses on those offenders who scored as low-risk, but were overridden up to medium supervision (Low-Medium). Their rates of recidivism were more similar to those who scored and stayed low (Low-Low) than to those who scored and stayed medium (Medium-Medium). These analyses demonstrate that the calculated supervision level provides a more accurate assessment of the offenders' actual risk to re-offend than the overridden supervision level. These findings provide additional support to the recommendation that the Department should examine the reasons for and appropriateness of its override practices.

Several bivariate analyses were conducted to compare the ability of the calculated versus the actual supervision level to predict recidivism. The chi-square coefficient for the calculated supervision level ($x^2 = 2449.968$) was larger than the coefficient for the actual supervision level ($x^2 = 1381.369$) indicating a stronger relationship to the outcome variable. Further, for every level of increase in actual supervision level, the odds of recidivism increases 53.7% (Wald = 1317.367, p < .001, Exp (B) = 1.537). However, the odds of recidivism across supervision levels increases to 88.0% if the calculated supervision level is used (Wald = 2265.527, p < .001, Exp(B) = 1.880). These tests indicate that the calculated supervision level is superior to the actual supervision level in terms of its ability to predict recidivism. Most likely, this effect occurs because the high rate of overrides has blurred the distinction between the limited and low supervision levels.

Overrides affect a large number of offenders under the Department's supervision. The largest groups, presented in Table 15, account for n=2,049 offenders in 1998 and n=2,440 offenders in the first half of 2000. The data in the tables above indicate that, based solely on the risk to public safety, these overrides were not appropriate because the recidivism rates of the overridden cases were more similar to those of offenders in the supervision level suggested by their calculated score.

There are several consequences to this pattern of overrides. First, for the purposes of this research, the override patterns evidenced here mask some of the differences in failure rates between the groups. More specifically, the addition of low-risk offenders (who have higher failure rates) in the limited supervision category serves to increase the overall failure rate of the limited supervision category. Conversely, the addition of low-risk offenders (who have lower failure rates) to the medium supervision category may artificially deflate the failure rate of medium supervision offenders. Second, the placement of lower risk offenders in higher supervision levels is contrary to the very premise of the redesign—the resources available to the higher supervision levels are supposed to be reserved for higher risk offenders.

The high rate of overrides of the calculated risk assessment score is troubling. Given the particular structure and requirements of the OCMS system, the overrides may represent the County's efforts to tailor the statewide system to better match local needs. Two specific directives may be particularly relevant to the use of overrides: 1) offenders who are convicted of person-to-person offenses must be overridden to medium supervision during the first six months of supervision; and 2) overrides to medium supervision are permissible if they are done to provide access to needed treatment services. While data were not available on the reason for overrides, an examination of the distribution of overrides across offense types did not provide clear support for the first directive. It appears that many offenders are being overridden for reasons other than offense type, a practice which should be examined in further detail.

The OCMS is a statewide system under which the county is not permitted to make changes to the items, weights, or cut points on the scale. Given that the system does not appear to have the confidence of Multnomah county (as evidenced by its high rates of override of the calculated risk score), a revalidation of the state system is required to assess whether it can be better tailored to local needs. Best-practices suggest that risk assessments should be revalidated every five years to ensure it accounts for changes in the offender population. The last evaluation of this system was in the mid-1990's, suggesting a need for a comprehensive validation study.

By Caseload

Table 16, below, shows the failure rates across the different initial caseload assignments. Failure rates for 1995 and 1998 should not be compared to rates in 2000 because of differences in the length of the follow- up period. In 1995, the primary caseload options of generic, specialized, and intensive case management (ICM) had failure rates of 44.5%, 53.1%, and 79.1%, respectively. Offenders who absconded during part of their supervision period had high rates of failure (62.5%).

In 1998, when the casebank option was first implemented, the rate of failure for the generic caseload increased to 61.3% (as it was newly configured to supervise medium and high-risk offenders), with the failure rate of offenders initially assigned to casebank at 36.8%. Specialized and local control caseloads, had failure rates of 46.0% and 53.1% respectively. This finding indicates that the initial phase of the redesign effectively transferred offenders with lower rates of recidivism to the casebank caseload.

| 1 | 199 | 95 | 199 | 98 | 200 | 00 |
|-----------------------------|----------|------|-------|------|-----|------|
| Initial Caseload Assignment | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| Casebank | ~ | ~ | 1,393 | 36.8 | 736 | 18.5 |
| Generic | 2,531 | 44.5 | 1,488 | 61.3 | 808 | 38.6 |
| ICM | 219 | 79.1 | ~ | ~ | ~ | ~ |
| Specialized | 805 | 53.1 | 1,360 | 46.0 | 361 | 27. |
| Local Control | ~ | ~ | 86 | 53.1 | 88 | 43. |
| Intake | 284 | 36.2 | 468 | 47.2 | 109 | 29. |
| Abscond | 150 | 62.5 | 284 | 60.8 | 166 | 40. |

Source: Multnomah County Decision Support System-Justice (DSS-I) and Department of Community Justice, monthly snapshots

While the failure rates of the 2000 caseloads are not comparable to the previous years due to differences in the length of the follow up period, we can see that the casebank caseload had a relatively low

failure rate (18.5%) compared to the other forms of supervision, such as generic (38.6%), specialized (27.7%) and local control (43.6%). Offenders who absconded had relatively high rates of recidivism (40.5%). Within cohorts, differences in recidivism rates and characteristics across caseload types and supervision levels were also examined. These tables are located in the Appendix. These analyses used the caseload and supervision level at the time of re-arrest.

In terms of differences across caseload types, the Kaplan-Meier survival analysis found that the differences across caseloads in the mean time to re-arrest were statistically significant. In 1995 and 1998, offenders on casebank had a longer time to re-arrest (mean 17.3 months) than offenders on generic, intensive case management, and specialized caseloads (mean 5.9, 4.2, and 6.2 months, respectively). However, in 2000, offenders on casebank had a slightly shorter mean time to re-arrest than their counter parts on the other caseload types (mean 5.0 months versus 5.5, 5.4, and 5.3 months, respectively). The shorter than expected time to re-arrest for the casebank offenders may have been impacted by the high rates of overriding low and medium-risk offenders into the limited supervision group, and the consequent transfer of these offenders into casebank.

There were no major differences in offense types for the most serious new arrests, except that in 1995 and 1998, offenders on casebank were more likely to be re-arrested for a misdemeanor (versus a felony) than their counterparts on generic and specialized caseloads. In 2000, the proportion of misdemeanor versus felony arrests was similar across all caseload types. All of the cases had a positive suppression effect value, meaning that the mean number of arrests during supervision was *higher* than the mean number of arrests prior to supervision. These data are presented in Tables L, M, and N in the Appendix.

These analyses suggested additional questions about the relative efficacy of generic and specialized caseloads for medium and high-risk offenders. Table 17, below, compares the 12-month failure rates of medium and high-risk offenders being supervised on generic or specialized caseloads (i.e., they may have been transferred to this caseload at some point after their initial caseload assignment). Overall, it appears that the failure rates of medium and high-risk offenders have improved slightly (yet are still quite high), irrespective of the caseload to which they are assigned. In 1995, the failure rates were similar across caseload types. However, in 1998, medium and high-risk offenders performed better on specialized caseloads than on generic supervision. In 2000, medium-risk offenders performed better on specialized caseloads than on generic supervision, although high-risk offenders had very similar failure rates across these two caseload types.

Additional analyses were conducted to determine if these differences could be attributed to something other than risk level. There were significant differences between the two caseload types in terms of the current offense ($x^2 = 528.319$, p <.001; more person and DUI offenders on "specialized" and more property and drug offenders on "generic") and gender ($x^2 = 26.327$, p <.001; with "specialized" having more women offenders). These differences could explain the apparent superior performance of the specialized caseloads—rather than a superior style of supervision, the differences could be attributed to the composition of the caseloads, with specialized caseloads having higher proportions of offenders with lower likelihoods of re-offending (e.g., person and DUI offenders; women).

| Table 17. Comparison of Generic | s. Specialized Case | eloads for Mediun | n and High-risk of | fenders | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|---------|--|
| Supervision Level at | Generic (at arre | est or final) | Specialized (at arrest or final) | | |
| Re-arrest/Final | Total N % | | Total N | % | |
| 1995 | | | | | |
| Medium | 1,339 | 49.7 | 681 | 46.4 | |
| High | 830 | 64.8 | 409 | 63.8 | |
| 1998 | | | | | |
| Medium | 676 | 43.0 | 926 | 37.5 | |
| High | 1,184 | 65.2 | 669 | 59.6 | |
| 2000 | | | | | |
| Medium | 791 | 32.9 | 533 | 25.7 | |
| High | 1,019 | 55.4 | 409 | 53.3 | |

Note: uses caseload/supervision level at re-arrest for those who recidivate; final caseload/supervision level for those who do not; follow up period for all years is 12 months to permit cross year comparisons.

When these differences in offender characteristics were controlled through multivariate analyses, there were no significant differences in the performance of medium and high-risk offenders on specialized or generic caseloads. While there was a slight, statistically significant difference in the mean survival time (i.e., length of time before re-arrest), these differences were most likely due to the large sample sizes and the very small standard errors rather than any substantive difference in performance. Further, a Cox regression analysis showed that, once other factors were controlled (e.g., offense type, gender, etc.), the impact of specialized versus generic caseload assignments on the time to re-offend was negligible (Wald = .195, p >.05). These findings lead to the question "What makes the specialized caseloads 'special'?"

By Legal Status

As discussed earlier, one of the major changes to the composition of the total caseload under the supervision of the Department was a significant increase in the proportion of probationers. In 1995, probationers comprised approximately 60% of the total caseload, while in 2000, approximately 80% of the offenders on community supervision were probationers. The interpretation of the changes in the overall recidivism rates must be viewed within this context. The decrease in the overall failure rate from 37% to 26% from 1995 to 2000 can be partially explained by the fact that the overall caseload included a higher number of probationers who are disproportionately low-risk and did not re-offend as often as offenders of

other legal statuses. The table below presents the 12-month failure rates for offenders by cohort, separated across legal statuses.

| Table 18. 12-Month Recidivism Rates by | Legal Status, by Cohort | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| Legal Status | 1995 | 1998 | 2000 |
| Probation | 26.2% | 31.4% | 24.4% |
| Post-prison | 53.8% | 53.0% | 42.3% |
| Parole | 42.0% | 31.5% | 30.7% |
| Post-Prison and Parole | 63.9% | 57.7% | 54.8% |
| Other | 18.7% | 25.7% | 18.5% |
| Source: Multnomah Department of Com | munity Justice, monthly snapshots; | DSS-Justice | |

Table 18 shows that the recidivism rates for probationers were at their lowest point in 2000. This, combined with their increasing number in the caseload, can partially explain the improvement in 12-month recidivism rates across the cohorts included in this study. It is important to note that because this study could not, for obvious reasons, employ an experimental design with random assignment, attributions about causation are limited. It is also important to note, however, that the recidivism rates across the other legal statuses also declined, which could indicate that the model of supervision also may have been partially responsible for the improvements evident in 2000.

Predictors of Recidivism

A multivariate logistic regression analysis was performed to identify the factors which were predictive of recidivism. These results focus only on the 2000 cohort. Bi-variate analyses indicated that there were no significant differences between the cohorts; thus, while the actual predictive abilities of the variables differ, the pattern of their relative strengths remain the same. The variables included in the model were: caseload assignment, legal status, actual supervision level, race, gender, age, current offense type, whether the offender had a prior arrest, and whether the offender had been sanctioned. Taking these variables as a collective whole, they were able to predict recidivism ($x^2 = 1727.347$, p < .001) in 78.4% of the cases. In comparison to bivariate analyses conducted on each variable, the -2 log likelihood value indicated that the variables, together, were better able to predict recidivism than any of the variables on its own. Other analyses (not shown) indicated that collinearity between variables was not significant.

¹⁰A smaller value for the -2 log likelihood is indicative of a better fit of the predictive model. The -2 log likelihood value for the collective whole was 7823.776, compared to values obtained through bivariate analyses of 34,268.527 for caseload; 33,784.588 for legal status; 31,498.290 for calculated supervision level; 32,566.890 for actual supervision level; 34,910.505 for gender; 34,266.641 for race; 34972.609 for age; 31,413.143 for prior arrests; and 34,840.979 for current offense category.

Table 19, below, indicates the ability of each variable, when controlling for all others, to predict recidivism. A higher Wald value indicates a stronger relationship to recidivism. The overall strengths of the coefficients were as follows: caseload (Wald = 40.96, p < .001), legal status (Wald = 8.64, p=.070), actual supervision level (Wald = 14.92, p<.001), gender (Wald = 4.81, p < .05), race (Wald = 31.95, p<.001), age (Wald = .026, p=.871), crime category (Wald = 18.15, p=.003), prior arrest (Wald = 383.52, p < .001), and sanctions (Wald = 359.28, p<.001). These coefficients indicate that, with the exception of age, all of the variables have a strong association with recidivism. Bivariate analyses demonstrated that age, when considered alone, had a significant, inverse relationship to recidivism. When placed in a regression equation, however, other variables mediated the relationship between age and the dependent variable.

In logistic regression, one category in each variable must be selected as the control category to which all others are compared. While changing the control category will produce different values and probabilities, the rankings among the different categories will remain the same. While there are many numbers in Table 19, below, its interpretation is rather straightforward.

First, examine the caseload assignment variable. Compared to an offender assigned to generic supervision, an offender on casebank was 0.7% less likely to recidivate. Similarly, the risk of recidivism for an offender on specialized, local control, or intake caseloads was lower than that of an offender on generic caseload. Compared to an offender on generic supervision, however, an offender who absconded was 48.1% more likely to recidivate.

In terms of legal status, the control category was "other," which is not a particularly informative comparison group for the purposes of this study. However, the use of this category as the control permits an examination of the ranking of the other legal statuses in terms of the risk to re-offend. Offenders on both post-prison supervision and parole had the highest risk of recidivism (i.e., were 44.7% more likely to recidivate than the "other" group), followed by offenders on post-prison supervision (24.9% more likely to recidivate), offenders on parole (20.2% more likely to recidivate), and by offenders on probation (10.9% more likely to recidivate). While changing the control category would result in different actual probabilities, the ranking among the groups would remain the same, with offenders on both parole and post-prison supervision having the highest risk of recidivism.

The actual supervision level was constructed as an ordinal variable, wherein each step up the levels (e.g., from low to medium-risk) represents an increased value. Controlling for all other variables, for each step up in supervision level, the risk for recidivism increased 13.8%. In other words, an offender on high supervision was 13.8% more likely to recidivate than an offender on medium supervision, who was 13.8% more likely to recidivate than an offender on low supervision, and so on. This finding again supports the validity of the risk assessment system to identify offenders with significantly different risks to public safety.

Gender is a dichotomous categorical variable and in this case, female was the control category. Even when other variables were controlled, males were 14.1% more likely to re-offend than women. In terms of race, Asian was selected as the control category to permit a clear comparison among other race categories. Compared to an Asian offender, Native American offenders were 61.5% more likely to recidivate,

followed by African Americans (55.3% more likely), white offenders (38.9% more likely) and Hispanics (23.0%). Again, even though changing the control category would change the actual probabilities of rearrest, the ranking among the categories would stay the same. Using this particular model, age was not a significant predictor of recidivism, as its relationship to the dependent variable was mediated by other variables in the model.

| Variable (control category) | Wald | Significance | Risk (Probability) |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------------|--------------------|
| Caseload (generic) | 40.96 | .000 | |
| Casebank | .01 | .944 | -0.7% |
| Specialized | 4.76 | .029 | -15.3% |
| Local Control | .72 | .398 | -12.9% |
| Intake | .01 | .928 | -1.4% |
| Abscond | 23.90 | 000 | 48.1% |
| Legal Status (other) | 8.640 | .071 | |
| Probation | .29 | .591 | 10.9% |
| Post Prison Supervision | 1.64 | .200 | 24.9% |
| Parole | .77 | .379 | 20.2% |
| PPS and Parole | 4.27 | .039 | 44.7% |
| Actual Supervision Level | 14.92 | .000 | 13.8% |
| Gender (female) | 4.81 | .028 | 14.1% |
| Race (asian) | 31.95 | .000 | |
| White | 3.57 | .059 | 38.9% |
| African American | 9.18 | .002 | 55.3% |
| Hispanic | .76 | .383 | 23.0% |
| Native American | 8.01 | .005 | 61.5% |
| Age | .26 | .871 | 0.0% |
| Crime Group (other) | 18.15 | .003 | |
| Person | 5.36 | .021 | -18.7% |
| Property | 1.65 | .199 | 12.0% |
| Controlled Substance | .38 | .540 | 5.8% |
| DUI | .66 | .415 | 10.5% |
| Unknown | .11 | .736 | -13.2% |
| Prior Arrest | 383.52 | .000 | 27.7% |
| Sanctioned (no) | 359.28 | .000 | 72.4% |

When examining the current offense type, "other" was used as the control category. In comparison, property offenders had the highest risk of recidivism (12.0% higher), followed by DUI offenders (10.5% higher), and controlled substance offenders (5.8% higher). Compared to the "other" category, person offenders were 18.7% less likely to recidivate, and those with "unknown" offenses were 13.2% less likely to recidivate. Changing the control category would change the actual probabilities, but the rankings among offense types would remain the same.

One of the most significant findings was the power of the prior criminal history and sanctions variables. For every additional prior arrest, the risk of recidivism increased 27.7%. In other words, offenders with one prior arrest were 27.7% more likely to recidivate than offenders with no prior arrests. Of all the variables in the model, the sanctions variable had the largest predictive power. Offenders who had been sanctioned at least once were 72.4% more likely to recidivate than those who had not been sanctioned.

Risk Probabilities

From this analysis, we can calculate risk probabilities through comparisons to a control or comparison offender profile. For example, an Asian female with a current offense of "other", and a legal status of "other," who has absconded from supervision is used as a comparison subject. (Again, the control subject is used to examine the relative strength of the other categories). Compared to this profile, the relative risk of recidivism for a hypothetical 35-year old, African American male with one prior arrest, convicted of a controlled substance offense, on probation, with no sanctions, assessed as limited supervision and assigned to casebank is 22.2%. If only the race is changed to White, the relative risk of recidivism decreases to 18.4%. If this white offender is also female, the relative risk of recidivism decreases yet again to 13.7%. It is important to reiterate that these analyses do not pinpoint an actual risk to reoffend, but rather provide the ability to make comparisons in the relative risk across different variables (e.g., race or gender).

The most interesting risk probabilities were those structured around changes in caseload assignments. For the hypothetical limited-risk offender described above with a recidivism risk of 22.2% on casebank, changing the initial caseload assignment to generic resulted in a risk to re-offend of 22.3%; changing the caseload assignment to specialized resulted in a risk to re-offend of 19.1%. These findings indicate that a limited-risk offender would perform about the same (i.e., re-offend at the same rate) regardless of the caseload to which he is assigned. This pattern is true even for high-risk offenders, where the risk of recidivism was 30.8% for casebank, 31.0% for generic, and 26.9% for specialized. Whether the offender succeeds or fails has little to do with the type of caseload to which he was initially assigned. Given that the system of supervision is designed to be a mobile structure, an additional variable was constructed to examine the impact of the caseload assignment at the time of re-arrest (or the final caseload assignment if the offender was not re-arrested). These findings mirrored those for the initial caseload: offenders would perform about the same regardless of the caseload to which they were assigned. The most important practical application of this finding is in the area of specialized versus generic caseloads. Specialized caseloads are supervised by officers with specific training in the targeted area (e.g., sex offenders, domestic

violence, etc.), and are designed to access specialized treatment services. However, they do not appear to have a significant impact on the recidivism rates of offenders.

Summary

- In recent years, the level of reported crime in Multnomah County has decreased approximately 7%, while the number of arrests has increased approximately 2%. While the actual contribution of probationers, parolees, and post-prisoners to the reported crime and arrest statistics cannot be estimated with available data, the results of this study confirm that the majority of offenders on community supervision are successful and are not re-arrested in Multnomah County during their periods of supervision.
- Over time, the 12-month recidivism rate decreased from 35.5% in 1995 to 27.1% in 2000. While it is plausible that the new form of supervision contributed to this success, the changing composition of the community supervision offender caseload should also be considered (e.g., an increasing proportion of women and probationers who are disproportionately low-risk). Overall, however, these findings provide sound evidence that the casebank model has been implemented without compromising public safety.
- The high rate of overrides of the calculated supervision level has hampered the risk assessment system's overall effectiveness. In contrast to the actual (i.e., overridden) supervision level, the calculated level provides for linear failure rates across levels. Overridden cases had recidivism rates corresponding more closely to their calculated supervision level than their overridden supervision level. Further, bivariate analyses showed a stronger relationship between the calculated level and the dependent variable (i.e., re-arrest) than did the actual supervision level.
- The redesign required low and limited-risk offenders to be assigned to a casebank featuring very low levels of contact and supervision. Despite the lower level of surveillance and treatment resources, offenders on the casebank caseload performed better (i.e., lower recidivism rates, less serious new offenses) than offenders on other, higher-intensity forms of supervision. One obvious caveat to this finding is the reduced risk of detection of new criminal behavior among offenders who are not supervised as closely. In general, however, it appears that eligible offenders have been appropriately targeted (i.e., they are at low-risk of re-offending) and that they perform well under the new form of supervision.
- When certain offender characteristics (e.g., age, race, current offense, etc.) were controlled, there was no significant difference in the failure rate of medium and high-risk offenders on generic or specialized supervision. In other words, the types of supervision they provide are virtually interchangeable in terms of their impact on recidivism. One caveat to these findings is that the specialized caseloads were designed to respond to specific offender *needs*, on which reliable data were not available for this study.

• A multivariate logistic regression analysis yielded an equation able to predict 78.4% of re-arrests. Variables included caseload assignment, legal status, actual supervision level, race, gender, age, current offense type, prior arrests, and sanctions. The variables performed as expected, with an increasing probability of recidivism for higher-intensity caseloads (e.g., generic and specialized) and offenders who abscond from supervision; greater risk of recidivism for offenders with higher assessed risk levels and those on parole and post-prison supervision, those with a greater number of prior arrests, and for those who had been sanctioned. In terms of demographic characteristics, men were more likely to recidivate than women, and Black and Native American offenders were more likely to recidivate than offenders of other racial groups. Although age was identified as a significant predictor of recidivism in the bi-variate analyses, its effect appeared to be mitigated by other factors in the multivariate equation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, it appears that the redesign has accomplished its core objective: to assign offenders to caseloads based on risk, thereby allowing the reallocation of Department resources toward medium and high-risk offenders without compromising public safety. Offenders on limited and low supervision have significantly lower rates of recidivism, meaning that they do not pose a threat to public safety despite reduced contact levels and access to treatment services. While the decreasing recidivism rates are certainly encouraging, its exact cause cannot be located by research that does not feature an experimental design. For example, the drop in recidivism may be due to superior methods of offender supervision under the redesign, but could also be attributed to an increasing proportion of low-risk probationers on the caseload who, as indicated by their risk level, commit fewer offenses. While the specific cause of the drop in recidivism rates cannot be pinpointed, it is important to note that the redesigned supervision model works *at least as well* as the prior system of supervision that provided costly resources and services to all offenders, regardless of risk level. These results clearly encourage the continued use and refinement of the casebank model of supervision.

There are several recommendations flowing from this study. First, the Department should assess its risk assessment process to determine the reasons for and impact of its high rates of override. Because the Oregon Case Management System is a statewide system, the Department is not permitted to make changes to the items, their relative weights or to the cut-points of the scale. Given that Multnomah supervises the majority of probationers, parolees, and post-prisoners in the state however, consideration should be given to a statewide revalidation study to isolate the items which may serve to classify offenders improperly, and the elements of the system in which the staff may lack confidence, both of which would reduce the need for overrides in the first place. In general, it is recommended that state or local jurisdictions revalidate their classification systems every five years to ensure they are responsive to the changing characteristics of the offender population. In particular, because of the increasing proportions of probationers among the

community supervision populations over the past five years, reconsideration of the precision of each item, assessment of the validity of the instrument, and review of the mandatory and discretionary override policies and procedures appear warranted.

Of particular concern is the potential for the risk assessment system, as it is currently formulated, to overclassify women offenders who have demonstrably lower recidivism rates than men. A thorough evaluation of the validity of the system across gender would necessitate data on a sample of offenders' scores on each of the classification items (not available for this study) and the specific reason for overriding the calculated supervision level (also not available). Such a study would ensure that the instrument is valid for both genders, and would provide additional insight into the functionality of each of the risk assessment items and override criteria.

Short of a full-scale evaluation, the Department should conduct additional research into the causes of the high rates of overrides to the calculated supervision level. Ostensibly, override policies and procedures were developed to adapt the statewide instrument to the county's unique features. However, given that the calculated supervision level proved to be a better predictor of recidivism than the actual supervision levels (which take overrides into account), limiting the permissible override criteria could improve the overall integrity of the classification system for offender supervision. At the very least, the Department should review its mandatory and discretionary override policies, assess the distribution of all overrides across both genders, and examine the relative failure rates of overridden cases.

Currently available data on the type and intensity of supervision are not adequate to determine their impact on offender behavior. Eliminating the default setting in the MIS which serves to over-estimate the actual number of contacts with any given offender is a necessary first step in creating an internal capacity to monitor the level of contact across supervision levels. Second, given that the rates of recidivism among medium and high-risk offenders are rather high (55% to 70% over 24-months), the Department should consider a qualitative assessment of the interventions (contact type, intensity, duration), needs assessment process, and treatment services that could improve the rates of success for these offenders. This study could specifically target offenders on the caseloads of experienced PPO's with a demonstrated history of effective supervision. Identifying specific behaviors, types of contact, effective treatment programs, and general supervision styles, and developing training around these factors, could help to reduce the rates of recidivism over time. Further, the rates of success across specialized and generic supervision services were not statistically different, leading to the question "What makes specialized caseloads 'special'?" The Department may wish to examine the intended goal of these services, how resources are allocated across these caseloads should be examined using validated needs assessment data.

One of the most interesting findings emerging from this study is the relative interchangability of the various caseload types with respect to recidivism rates. Offenders of a given risk level (e.g., a high-risk sex offenders) would have approximately the same performance level regardless of the caseload to which they were assigned. Although the data on the type and level of service intensity was not judged to be valid for the purposes of this research, we did conclude that offenders of different risk levels receive *quantitatively* different levels of supervision. However, it appears that *qualitatively*, the levels of service do not appear to

make much difference in terms of offender outcomes (i.e., the two caseloads are more similar in practice than intended in their design). This is particularly important in determining the relative effectiveness of the specialized versus generic caseloads for medium and high-risk offenders. Thus, we recommend that the Department initiate a study, followed by internal quality assurance monitoring, to identify and expand upon those styles, tools, and methods of supervision that may positively affect recidivism rates in order to make the higher supervision caseloads more effective.

APPENDIX

| | 2000 (H | alf) | 2000 (Full |) |
|------------------------------|---------|------|------------|------|
| Characteristics | N=8,353 | % | N=13,632 | % |
| Gender | | - | | |
| Male | 6,282 | 75.2 | 10,269 | 75.3 |
| Female | 2,035 | 24.4 | 2,969 | 21.8 |
| Missing | 36 | 0.4 | 394 | 2.9 |
| Mean Age | 34 yea | rs | 34 years | |
| Race/Ethnicity | | | | |
| White | 5,997 | 71.8 | 9,362 | 68.7 |
| Black | 1,692 | 20.3 | 2,576 | 18.9 |
| Hispanic | 348 | 4.2 | 860 | 6.3 |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 154 | 1.8 | 242 | 1.8 |
| Am. Indian/Alaskan Native | 123 | 1.5 | 193 | 1.4 |
| Missing | 39 | 0.5 | 399 | 2.9 |
| Legal Status | | | | |
| Probation | 6,653 | 79.6 | 10,191 | 74.8 |
| Post-Prison | 1,011 | 12.1 | 1,820 | 13.4 |
| Parole | 290 | 3.5 | 594 | 4.4 |
| Parole and Post-Prison | 146 | 1.7 | 284 | 2. |
| Other | 249 | 3.0 | 441 | 3. |
| Missing | 4 | 0.0 | 302 | 2.2 |
| Most Serious Current Offense | | | | |
| Person | 1,400 | 16.8 | 2,355 | 17.3 |
| Property | 2,308 | 27.6 | 3,512 | 25.8 |
| Controlled Substance | 2,958 | 35.4 | 4,691 | 34. |
| DUI | 587 | 7.0 | 913 | 6. |
| Other | 1,036 | 12.4 | 1,699 | 12. |
| Unknown | 64 | 0.8 | 462 | 3. |
| Offense Level | | | | |
| Felony | 6,501 | 77.8 | 10,310 | 75. |
| Misdemeanor | 1,408 | 16.9 | 2,212 | 16. |
| Missing | 444 | 5.3 | 1,110 | 8. |

| Table B. Prior Criminal History and Initial Ca | iseload Assignment. | | |
|---|---------------------|------------|-------------|
| | 1995 | 1998 | 2000 |
| | N=8,506 % | N=10,794 9 | % N=8,353 % |
| Overall Sample | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 1.14 | 1.33 | 1.04 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Casebank | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | N/A | 0.68 | 0.53 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | N/A | 0.13 | 0.10 |
| Generic | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 1.01 | 2.04 | 1.68 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.23 | 0.46 | 0.45 |
| Intensive Case Management | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 2.82 | N/A | N/A |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.52 | N/A | N/A |
| Specialized | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 1.24 | 1.23 | 1.21 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.31 |
| Local Control | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | N/A | 2.92 | 2.89 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | N/A | 0.65 | 0.86 |
| Held at Intake | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 1.31 | 2.18 | 1.50 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.23 |
| Abscond | | | |
| Mean # Prior Arrests | 1.22 | 1.19 | 0.86 |
| Mean # Prior Convictions | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.16 |

| Table C Cohort Demographic | s and Legal Ch | aracteristi | cs by Caseloa | d Assignm | ent - 1995. | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|--|-----------|-------------|------|----------|-------|----------|------|
| Characteristics | Initial Caseload Assignment | | | | | | | | | |
| | Gener | ic | ICM | | Specialized | | Intake | | Abscond | |
| | N=5,690 | % | N=277 | % | N=1,515 | % | N=784 | % | N=240 | % |
| Gender | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 4,358 | 76.6 | 225 | 81.2 | 1,283 | 84.7 | 700 | 89.3 | 192 | 80.0 |
| Female | 1,324 | 23.3 | 52 | 18.8 | 231 | 15.2 | 84 | 10.7 | 48 | 20.0 |
| Missing | 8 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Mean Age | 33 Yea | rs | 34 Yea | ars | 33 Years | | 30 Years | | 34 Years | |
| Race/Ethnicity | | المسيوب والمساوا | | | | | | | | |
| White | 4,050 | 71.2 | 153 | 55.2 | 892 | 58.9 | 558 | 71.2 | 153 | 63.8 |
| Black | 1,293 | 22.7 | 113 | 40.8 | 502 | 33.1 | 102 | 13.0 | 62 | 25.8 |
| Hispanic | 172 | 3.0 | 5 | 1.8 | 62 | 4.1 | 106 | 13.5 | 20 | 8.3 |
| Asian/Pac.Isl. | 89 | 1.6 | 1 | 0.4 | 43 | 2.8 | 9 | 1.1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Am.Ind/Alaskan | 78 | 1.4 | 5 | 1.8 | 15 | 1.0 | 9 | - 1.1 | 5 | 2.1 |
| Missing | 8 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Legal Status | | | ······································ | | | | | | | |
| Probation | 3,768 | 66.2 | 53 | 19.1 | 708 | 46.7 | 508 | 64.8 | 127 | 52.9 |
| Post-Prison | 1,044 | 18.3 | 89 | 32.1 | 532 | 35.1 | 206 | 26.3 | 51 | 21.3 |
| Parole | 389 | 6.8 | 88 | 31.8 | 144 | 9.5 | 25 | 3.2 | 40 | 16.7 |
| Parole/PPS | 261 | 4.6 | 44 | 15.9 | 111 | 7.3 | 36 | 4.6 | 19 | 7.9 |
| Other | 228 | 4.0 | 3 | 1.1 | 20 | 1.3 | 8 | 1.0 | 3 | 1.3 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 |

| Characteristics | | | | Init | ial Caseload A | ssignment | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|------|-------|------|----------------|-----------|-------|------|--------|------|
| • | Generi | С | ICM | | Specializ | zed | intai | (e | Abscon | ıd |
| | N=5,690 | % | N=277 | % | N=1,515 | % | N=784 | % | N=240 | % |
| Most Serious Curren | t Offense | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 1,192 | 20.9 | 81 | 29.2 | 593 | 39.1 | 113 | 14.4 | 43 | 17.9 |
| Property | 1,956 | 34.4 | 102 | 36.8 | 382 | 25.2 | 189 | 24.1 | 87 | 36.3 |
| Control.Sub. | 1,663 | 29.2 | 64 | 23.1 | 321 | 21.2 | 408 | 52.0 | 78 | 32.5 |
| DUI | 120 | 2.1 | 8 | 2.9 | 14 | 0.9 | 18 | 2.3 | . 15 | 6.3 |
| Other | 724 | 12.7 | 16 | 5.8 | 190 | 12.5 | 44 | 5.6 | 13 | 5.4 |
| Unknown | 35 | 0.6 | 6 | 2.2 | 15 | 1.0 | 12 | 1.5 | 4 | 1.7 |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 4,552 | 80.0 | 248 | 89.5 | 1,276 | 84.2 | 713 | 90.9 | 212 | 88.3 |
| Misdemeanor | 877 | 15.4 | 15 | 5.4 | 188 | 12.4 | 44 | 5.6 | 16 | 6.7 |
| Missing | 261 | 4.6 | 14 | 5.1 | 51 | 3.4 | 27 | 3.4 | 12 | 5.0 |

| Characteristics | | | | | Initial | Caseload | Assignment | | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|------|---------|------|----------|----------|------------|-------|--------|------|--------|------|
| | Casebai | nk | Gener | ric | Speciali | zed | Local Co | ntrol | Intak | e | Abscor | nd |
| | N=3,790 | % | N=2,428 | % | N=2,956 | % | N=162 | % | N=991 | % | N=467 | % |
| Gender | | | | | | • | | | | | | |
| Male | 2,725 | 71.9 | 2,106 | 86.7 | 2,342 | 79.2 | 120 | 74,1 | 788 | 79.5 | 351 | 75.2 |
| Female | 1,064 | 28.1 | 321 | 13.2 | 609 | 20.6 | 38 | 23.5 | 187 | 18.9 | 116 | 24.8 |
| Missing | 1 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.0 | 5 | 0.2 | 4 | 2.5 | 16 | 1.6 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Mean Age | 34 Year | rs | 34 Yea | ırs | 34 Yea | ırs | 33 Yea | ırs | 33 Yea | ars | 34 Yea | .rs |
| Race/Ethnicity | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| White | 2,936 | 77.5 | 1,601 | 65.9 | 1,996 | 67.5 | 116 | 71.6 | 706 | 71.2 | 335 | 71.7 |
| Black | 656 | 17.3 | 672 | 27.7 | 688 | 23.3 | 38 | 23.5 | 170 | 17.2 | 99 | 21.2 |
| Hispanic | 97 | 2.6 | 80 | 3.3 | 177 | 6.0 | 1 | 0.6 | 67 | 6.8 | 13 | 2.8 |
| Asian/Pac.Isl. | 60 | 1.6 | 34 | 1.4 | 60 | 2.0 | 1 | 0.6 | 16 | 1.6 | 5 | 1.1 |
| Am.Ind/Alaskan | 40 | 1.1 | 40 | 1.6 | 29 | 1.0 | 2 | , 1.2 | 16 | 1.6 | 14 | 3.0 |
| Missing | 1 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.0 | 6 | 0.2 | 4 | 2.5 | 16 | 1.6 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Legal Status | | | | _ | | | | | | | | |
| Probation | 3,436 | 90.7 | 1,147 | 47.2 | 2,121 | 71.8 | 79 | 48.8 | 813 | 82.0 | 367 | 78.6 |
| Post-Prison | 192 | 5.1 | 797 | 32.8 | 464 | 15.7 | 33 | 20.4 | 135 | 13.6 | 67 | 14.3 |
| Parole | 117 | 3.1 | 197 | 8.1 | 122 | 4.1 | 4 | 2.5 | 22 | 2.2 | 17 | 3.6 |
| Parole/PPS | 18 | 0.5 | 187 | 7.7 | 59 | 2.0 | 4 | 2.5 | 16 | 1.6 | 7 | 1.5 |
| Other | 27 | 0.7 | 100 | 4.1 | 190 | 6.4 | 42 | 25.9 | 5 | 0.5 | 9 | 1.9 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |

| Characteristics | | | | | Initial | Caseload | Assignment | | | | | |
|----------------------|---------|------|---------|------|----------|----------|------------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|
| | Casebai | nk | Gener | ic | Speciali | zed | Local Cor | ntrol | Intak | e | Absco | nd |
| | N=3,790 | % | N=2,428 | % | N=2,956 | % | N=162 | % | N=991 | % | N=467 | % |
| Most Serious Current | Offense | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 339 | 8.9 | 494 | 20.3 | 816 | 27.6 | 12 | 7.4 | 102 | 10.3 | 46 | 9.9 |
| Property | 1,077 | 28.4 | 818 | 33.7 | 662 | 22.4 | 61 | 37.7 | 274 | 27.6 | 142 | 30.4 |
| Control.Sub. | 1,572 | 41.5 | 728 | 30.0 | 555 | 18.8 | 69 | 42.6 | 414 | 41.8 | 160 | 34.3 |
| DUI | 366 | 9.7 | 74 | 3.0 | 329 | 11.1 | 3 | 1.9 | . 57 | 5.8 | 57 | 12.2 |
| Other | 434 | 11.5 | 281 | 11.6 | 575 | 19.5 | 14 | 8.6 | 106 | 10.7 | 59 | 12.6 |
| Unknown | 2 | 0.1 | 33 | 1.4 | 19 | 0.6 | 3 | 1.9 | 38 | 3.8 | 3 | 0.6 |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 2,969 | 78.3 | 2,136 | 88.0 | 1,791 | 60.6 | 153 | 94.4 | 800 | 80.7 | 344 | 73.7 |
| Misdemeanor | 672 | 17.7 | 199 | 8.2 | 867 | 29.3 | 5 | 3.1 | 116 | 11.7 | 89 | 19.1 |
| Missing | 149 | 3.9 | 93 | 3.8 | 298 | 10.1 | .4 | 2.5 | 75 | 7.6 | 34 | 7.3 |

| Characteristics | | | | | Initia | l Caseload | d Assignmen | t | | | | |
|-----------------|---------|------|---------|------|----------|------------|-------------|-------|--------|------|--------|------|
| | Caseba | ank | Gener | ric | Speciali | zed | Local Co | ntrol | Intak | e | Absco | nd |
| | N=3,974 | % | N=2,092 | % | N=1,303 | % | N=202 | % | N=372 | % | N=410 | % |
| Gender | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Male | 2,706 | 68.1 | 1,841 | 88.0 | 983 | 75.4 | 163 | 80.7 | 287 | 77.2 | 302 | 73.7 |
| Female | 1,262 | 31.8 | 246 | 11.8 | 319 | 24.5 | 28 | 13.9 | 73 | 19.6 | 107 | 26.1 |
| Missing | 6 | 0.2 | 5 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.1 | 11 | 5.4 | 12 | 3.2 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Mean Age | 34 Yea | ırs | 35 Yea | ars | 35 Yea | ırs | 34 Yea | ırs | 33 Yea | ars | 34 Yea | ars |
| Race/Ethnicity | | | | - | | | | | | | | |
| White | 3,046 | 76.6 | 1,412 | 67.5 | 837 | 64.2 | 145 | 71.8 | 262 | 70.4 | 295 | 72.0 |
| Black | 657 | 16.5 | 537 | 25.7 | 322 | 24.7 | 37 | 18.3 | 58 | 15.6 | 81 | 19.8 |
| Hispanic | 138 | 3.5 | 72 | 3.4 | 78 | 6.0 | 7 | 3.5 | 30 | 8.1 | 23 | 5.6 |
| Asian/Pac.Isl. | 79 | 2.0 | 27 | 1.3 | 39 | 3.0 | 1 | 0.5 | 6 | 1.6 | 2 | 0.5 |
| Am.Ind/Alaskan | 46 | 1.2 | 39 | 1.9 | 25 | 1.9 | 1 | 0.5 | 4 | 1.1 | 8 | 2.0 |
| Missing | 8 | 0.2 | 5 | 0.2 | 2 | 0.2 | 11 | 5.4 | 12 | 3.2 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Legal Status | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Probation | 3,765 | 94.7 | 1,281 | 61.2 | 809 | 62.1 | 117 | 57.9 | 330 | 88.7 | 351 | 85.6 |
| Post-Prison | 95 | 2.4 | 547 | 26.1 | 267 | 20.5 | 36 | 17.8 | 31 | 8.3 | 35 | 8.5 |
| Parole | 81 | 2.0 | 119 | 5.7 | 64 | 4.9 | 7 | 3.5 | 6 | 1.6 | 13 | 3.2 |
| Parole/PPS | 9 | 0.2 | 82 | 3.9 | 40 | 3.1 | 4 | 2.0 | 4 | 1.1 | 7 | 1.7 |
| Other | 23 | 0.6 | 61 | 2.9 | 122 | 9.4 | 38 | 18.8 | 1 | 0.3 | 4 | 1.0 |
| Missing | 1 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.1 | 1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |

| Characteristics | | | | | Initia | l Caseload | d Assignmen | t | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|------|---------|------|----------|------------|-------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| | Caseba | nk | Gener | ic | Speciali | zed | Local Co | ntrol | Intak | e | Absco | nd |
| | N=3,974 | % | N=2,092 | % | N=1,303 | % | N=202 | % | N=372 | % | N=410 | % |
| Most Serious Curren | t Offense | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 346 | 8.7 | 488 | 23.3 | 481 | 36.9 | 17 | 8.4 | 31 | 8.3 | 37 | 9.0 |
| Property | 1,219 | 30.7 | 599 | 28.6 | 219 | 16.8 | 60 | 29.7 | 84 | 22.6 | 127 | 31.0 |
| Control.Sub | 1,655 | 41.6 | 623 | 29.8 | 228 | 17.5 | 91 | 45.1 | 178 | 47.8 | 183 | 44.6 |
| DUI | 364 | 9.2 | 77 | 3.7 | 98 | 7.5 | 6 | 3.0 | . 17 | 4.6 | 25 | 6.1 |
| Other | 385 | 9.7 | 288 | 13.8 | 271 | 20.8 | 15 | 7.4 | 40 | 10.8 | 37 | 9.0 |
| Unknown | 5 | 0.1 | 17 | 0.8 | 6 | 0.5 | 13 | 6.4 | 22 | 5.9 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Offense Level | | | | | | ···· | | | | | | |
| Felony | 3,189 | 80.2 | 1,700 | 81.3 | 805 | 61.8 | 180 | 89.1 | 286 | 76.9 | 341 | 83.2 |
| Misdemeanor | 643 | 16.2 | 278 | 13.3 | 381 | 29.2 | 8 | 4.0 | 42 | 11.3 | 56 | -13.7 |
| Missing | 142 | 3.6 | 114 | 5.4 | 117 | 9.0 | 14 | 6.9 | 44 | 11.8 | 13 | 3.2 |

| Calculated | | Actual Super | vision Level | | Total | Percent of |
|-------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|-------|-------------|------------|
| Supervision Level | Limited | Low | Medium | High | Total | Total |
| Limited | 659 | 256 | 801 | 32 | 1,748 | 22% |
| Low | 452 | 1,106 | 1,172 | 134 | 2,864 | 36% |
| Medium | 188 | 66 | 1,292 | 228 | 1,774 | 22% |
| High | 140 | 65 | 135 | 1,320 | 1,660 | 21% |
| Total | 1,439 | 1,493 | 3,400 | 1,714 | 8,046 | 100% |
| % of Total | 18% | 19% | 42% | 21% | 100% | |
| Overall Override | Rate - 45.6% | | Upward Rate - 32.6% | 6 | Downward Ra | te - 13.0% |

| Table F2. Calculated versu | ıs Actual Supervisior | ı Levels - Inifial | Assignment - 199 | 8. | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------|-------------|-------------|
| Calculated | | Actual Super | vision Level | | T | Percent of |
| Supervision - Level | Limited | Low | Medium | High | Total | Total |
| Limited | 2,198 | 146 | 379 | 51 | 2,774 | 27% |
| Low | 1,169 | 1,802 | 501 | 201 | 3,673 | 35% |
| Medium | 396 | 61 | 1,347 | 261 | 2,065 | 20% |
| High | 116 | 25 | 14 | 1,748 | 1,903 | 18% |
| Total | 3,879 | 2,034 | 2,241 | 2,261 | 10,415 | 100% |
| % of Total | 37% | 20% | 22% | 22% | 100% | |
| Overall Override | Overall Override Rate - 31.9% | | | 8% | Downward Ra | ite - 17.1% |

| Calculated | | Actual Super | vision Level | | Takal | Percent of |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|-------|---------------|------------|
| Supervision Level | Limited | Low | Medium | High | Total | Total |
| Limited | 1,737 | 69 | 435 | 41 | 2,282 | 28% |
| Low | 1,492 | 992 | 513 | 124 | 3,121 | 38% |
| Medium | 231 | 49 | 940 | 157 | 1,377 | 17% |
| High | 58 | 25 | 15 | 1,276 | 1,374 | 17% |
| Total | 3,518 | 1,135 | 1,903 | 1,598 | 8,154 | 100% |
| % of Total | 43% | 14% | 23% | 20% | 100% | |
| Overall Override R | ate - 39.4% | | Upward Rate - 16 | .4% | Downward Rate | - 22.9% |

| Table Inter | e G. sity of Supervision by Supe | rvision Lev | el - 1995. | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|-------|------|---------|-------------|------|------|
| | | Time | 1 | Time | e 6 | Time | 12 | Time | 18 | Time | 24 |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| | Total Offenders | 97 | 2 | 38 | 9 | 36 | 59 | 24 | 5 | 23 | 3 |
| | Total Contacts | 3,0 | 93 | 86 | 4 | 98 | 39 | 68 | 1 | 51 | 2 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | 2 | 2. | 2 | 2. | 7 | 2. | 8 | 2.2 | 2 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 1,699 | 54.9 | 451 | 52.2 | 498 | 50.4 | 303 | 44.5 | 247 | 48.2 |
| ي . | Administrative | 1,391 | 45.0 | 406 | 47.0 | 484 | 48.9 | 366 | 53.7 | 265 | 51.8 |
| LIMITED | Institutional | 3 | 0.1 | 7 | 0.8 | 7 | 0.7 | 12 | 1.8 | 0 | 0.0 |
| רו | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 1,065 | 34.4 | 346 | 40.0 | 444 | 44.9 | 304 | 44.6 | 208 | 40.6 |
| | Collateral | 1,730 | 55.9 | 447 | 51.7 | 419 | 42.4 | 296 | 43.5 | 224 | 43.8 |
| | Legal | 61 | 2.0 | 15 | 1.7 | 28 | 2.8 | 28 | 4.1 | 38 | 7.4 |
| | Institution | 6 | 0.2 | 16 | 1.9 | 11 | 1.1 | 16 | 2.3 | 1 | 0.2 |
| | Administration | 231 | 7.5 | 40 | 4.6 | 87 | 8.8 | 37 | 5.4 | 41 | 8.0 |
| | Total Offenders | 1,3 | 04 | 88 | 16 | 67 | 73 | 53 | 35 | 34 | 1 |
| | Total Contacts | 4,5 | 58 | 2,8 | 24 | 2,1 | 27 | 1,4 | 15 | 85 | .8 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | 5 | 3. | 2 | 3. | 2 | 2. | 6 | 2. | 5 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 2,383 | 52.3 | 1,343 | 47.6 | 1,041 | 48.9 | 745 | 52.7 | 440 | 51.3 |
| _ | Administrative | 2,173 | 47.7 | 1,473 | 52.2 | 1,083 | 50.9 | 668 | 47.2 | 414 | 48.3 |
| LOW | Institutional | 2 | 0.0 | 8 | 0.3 | 3 | 0.1 | 2 | 0.1 | 4 | 0.5 |
| | Person Contacted | T | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 2,249 | 49.3 | 1,322 | 46.8 | 999 | 47.0 | 686 | 48.5 | 394 | 45.9 |
| | Collateral | 1,570 | 34.4 | 1,185 | 42.0 | 916 | 43.1 | 589 | 41.6 | 374 | 43.6 |
| | Legal | 79 | 1.7 | 66 | 2.3 | 74 | 3.5 | 56 | 4.0 | 41 | 4.8 |
| | Institution | 6 | 0.1 | 15 | 0.5 | 5 | 0.2 | 4 | 0.3 | 13 | 1.5 |
| | Administration | 654 | 14.3 | 236 | 8.4 | 133 | 6.3 | 80 | 5.7 | 36 | 4.2 |

| Table Inten | e G. sity of Supervision by Supe | rvision Lev | el - 1995 | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------|------|-------|----------------|-------|------|------|------|
| | | Time | e 1 | Tim | e 6 | Time | : 12 | Time | 18 | Time | 24 |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| | Total Offenders | 3,0 | 43 | 2,1 | 56 | 1,3 | 70 | 95 | 52 | 47 | 0 |
| | Total Contacts | 12,9 | 37 | 7,9 | 51 | 5,0 | 07 | 3,4 | 76 | 1,6 | 76 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 4. | 3 | 3. | 7 | 3. | 7 | 3. | 7 | 3.0 | 5 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 7,020 | 54.3 | 4,413 | 55.5 | 2,825 | 56.4 | 1,853 | 53.3 | 924 | 55.1 |
| Σ | Administrative | 5,906 | 45.7 | 3,511 | 44.2 | 2,138 | 42.7 | 1,599 | 46.0 | 745 | 44.5 |
| MEDIUM | Institutional | 11 | 0.1 | 27 | 0.3 | 44 | 0.9 | 24 | 0.7 | 7 | 0.4 |
| Ξ | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 6,766 | 52.3 | 3,721 | 46.8 | 2,338 | 46.7 | 1,630 | 46.9 | 785 | 46.8 |
| | Collateral | 5,423 | 41.9 | 3,570 | 44.9 | 2,219 | 44.3 | 1,535 | 44.2 | 718 | 42.8 |
| | Legal | 278 | 2.1 | 246 | 3.1 | 164 | 3.3 | 111 | 3.2 | 70 | 4.2 |
| | Institution | 24 | 0.2 | 55 | 0.7 | 46 | 0.9 | 31 | 0.9 | 12 | 0.7 |
| | Administration | 446 | 3.4 | 359 | 4.5 | 240 | 4.8 | 169 | 4.9 | 91 | 5.4 |
| | Total Offenders | 1,5 | 67 | 1,0 | 32 | 99 |) 4 | 77 | 73 | 31 | 9 |
| | Total Contacts | 9,2 | 80 | 5,2 | 50 | 5,2 | :54 | 3,9 | 07 | 1,4 | 23 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 5. | 9 | 5. | 1 | 5. | .3 | 5. | 1 | 4. | 5 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 5,259 | 56.7 | 2,632 | 50.1 | 2,596 | 49.4 | 1,931 | 49.4 | 780 | 54.8 |
| _ | Administrative | 4,012 | 43.2 | 2,592 | 49.4 | 2,604 | 49.6 | 1,898 | 48.6 | 637 | 44.8 |
| HIGH | Institutional | 9 | 0.1 | 26 | 0.5 | 54 | 1.0 | 78 | 2.0 | 6 | 0.4 |
| _ | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 4,241 | 45.7 | 2,119 | 40.4 | 2,001 | 38.1 | 1,486 | 38.0 | 490 | 34.4 |
| | Collateral | 4,380 | 47.2 | 2,514 | 47.9 | 2,566 | 48.8 | 1,922 | 49.2 | 744 | 52.3 |
| | Legal | 260 | 2.8 | 272 | 5.2 | 272 | 5.2 | 191 | 4.9 | 106 | 7.4 |
| | Institution | 26 | 0.3 | 62 | 1.2 | 102 | 1.9 | 94 | 2.4 | 11 | 0.8 |
| | Administration | 373 | 4.0 | 283 | 5.4 | 313 | 6.0 | 214 | 5.5 | 72 | 5.1 |

| Table Inten | e H. sity of Supervision by Supervisio | on Level - 19 | 98. | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|----------|------|
| | | Time | e 1 | Time | e 6 | Time | 12 | Time | 18 | Time | 24 |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| | Total Offenders | 2,9 | 49 | 1,7 | 16 | 1,3 | 67 | 98 | 7 | 56 | 8 |
| | Total Contacts | 10,0 |)25 | 3,8 | 23 | 3,0 | 03 | 2,22 | 26 | 1,5 | 15 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | 4 | 2. | 2 | 2. | 2 | 2.3 | 3 | 2. | 7 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 6,274 | 62.6 | 1,752 | 45.8 | 1,314 | 43.8 | 1,071 | 48.1 | 774 | 51.1 |
| Ω | Administrative | 3,740 | 37.3 | 2,071 | 54.2 | 1,685 | 56.1 | 1,151 | 51.7 | 737 | 48.6 |
| LIMITED | Institutional | 11 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.1 | 4 | 0.2 | 4 | 0.3 |
| ֓֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞֞ | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 4,785 | 47.7 | 1,820 | 47.6 | 1,484 | 49.4 | 937 | 42.1 | 459 | 30.3 |
| | Collateral | 4,813 | 48.0 | 1,723 | 45.1 | 1,268 | 42.2 | 1,044 | 46.9 | 815 | 53.8 |
| | Legal | 188 | 1.9 | 86 | 2.3 | 104 | 3.5 | 145 | 6.5 | 150 | 9.9 |
| | Institution | 12 | 0.1 | 1 | 0.0 | 3 | 0.1 | 6 | 0.3 | 14 | 0.9 |
| | Administration | 227 | 2.3 | 193 | 5.0 | 144 | 4.8 | 94 | 4.2 | 77 | 5.1 |
| | Total Offenders | 1,4 | 30 | 81 | 5 | 68 | 36 | 45 | 0 | 17 | 74 |
| | Total Contacts | 5,1 | 99 | 2,0 | 83 | 1,5 | 84 | 1,0 | 66 | 47 | 78 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | .6 | 2. | 6 | 2. | 3 | 2. | 4 | 2. | .7 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 3,218 | 61.9 | 1,023 | 49.1 | 736 | 46.5 | 515 | 48.3 | 239 | 50.0 |
| _ | Administrative | 1,971 | 37.9 | 1,060 | 50.9 | 848 | 53.5 | 547 | 51.3 | 235 | 49.2 |
| LOW | Institutional | 10 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.4 | 4 | 0.8 |
| | Person Contacted | | · | | | · | | | | <u> </u> | |
| | Offender | 2,359 | 45.4 | 963 | 46.2 | 759 | 47.9 | 481 | 45.1 | 218 | 45.6 |
| | Collateral | 2,514 | 48.4 | 920 | 44.2 | 656 | 41.4 | 470 | 44.1 | 195 | 40.8 |
| | Legal | 109 | 2.1 | 71 | 3.4 | 67 | 4.2 | 49 | 4.6 | 32 | 6.7 |
| | Institution | 11 | 0.2 | 2 | 0.1 | 1 | 0.1 | 3 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.2 |
| | Administration | 206 | 4.0 | 127 | 6.1 | 101 | 6.4 | 63 | 5.9 | 32 | 6.7 |

| Table Inten | e H. sity of Supervision by Supervision | Level - 19 | 98. | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|
| | | Tim | e 1 | Tim | e 6 | Time | 12 | Time | 18 | Time | : 24 |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| | Total Offenders | 1,607 | | 1,263 | | 953 | | 700 | | 388 | |
| | Total Contacts | 8,8 | 92 | 5,7 | 49 | 4,1 | 85 | 2,80 | 00 | 1,4 | 32 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 5. | 5 | 4. | 6 | 4. | 4 | 4.0 |) | 3. | 7 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 5,165 | 58.1 | 3,019 | 52.5 | 2,266 | 54.1 | 1,502 | 53.6 | 799 | 55.8 |
| Σ | Administrative | 3,669 | 41.3 | 2,726 | 47.4 | 1,912 | 45.7 | 1,287 | 46.0 | 625 | 43.6 |
| MEDIUM | Institutional | 58 | 0.7 | 4 | 0.1 | 7 | 0.2 | 11 | 0.4 | 8 | 0.6 |
| Ξ | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 4,084 | 45.9 | 2,717 | 47.3 | 2,000 | 47.8 | 1,376 | 49.1 | 713 | 49.8 |
| | Collateral | 4,140 | 46.6 | 2,519 | 43.8 | 1,857 | 44.4 | 1,145 | 40.9 | 589 | 41.1 |
| | Legal | 255 | 2.9 | 213 | 3.7 | 144 | 3.4 | 138 | 4.9 | 72 | 5.0 |
| | Institution | 82 | 0.9 | 14 | 0.2 | 11 | 0.3 | 10 | 0.4 | 11 | 0.8 |
| | Administration | 331 | 3.7 | 286 | 5.0 | 173 | 4.1 | 131 | 4.7 | 47 | 3.3 |
| | Total Offenders | 1,3 | 97 | 1,1 | 07 | 1,0 | 19 | 74 | 5 | 33 | 35 |
| | Total Contacts | 9,2 | 13 | 6,1 | 33 | 5,4 | 14 | 3,5 | 17 | 1,5 | 558 |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 6. | .6 | 5. | 5 | 5. | 3 | 4.7 | 7 | 4. | .7 |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 5,562 | 60.4 | 3,448 | 56.2 | 2,984 | 55.1 | 1,929 | 54.8 | 853 | 54.8 |
| _ | Administrative | 3,572 | 38.8 | 2,668 | 43.5 | 2,409 | 44.5 | 1,571 | 44.7 | 696 | 44.7 |
| HGH | Institutional | 79 | 0.9 | 17 | 0.3 | 21 | 0.4 | 17 | 0.5 | 9 | 0.6 |
| | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 4,073 | 44.2 | 2,538 | 41.4 | 2,268 | 41.9 | 1,437 | 40.9 | 670 | 43.0 |
| | Collateral | 4,274 | 46.4 | 2,901 | 47.3 | 2,602 | 48.1 | 1,731 | 49.2 | 687 | 44.1 |
| | Legal | 313 | 3.4 | 286 | 4.7 | 215 | 4.0 | 154 | 4.4 | 81 | 5.2 |
| | Institution | 140 | 1.5 | 40 | 0.7 | 39 | 0.7 | 19 | 0.5 | 22 | 1.4 |
| | Administration | 413 | 4.5 | 368 | 6.0 | 290 | 5.4 | 176 | 5.0 | 98 | 6.3 |

| Table Inten | sity of Supervision by Supervision | on Level - 20 | 00. | | | | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------------------|---------------|--------|-------|--------|-------|---------|--|--|--|
| | | Time | Time 1 | | Time 6 | | Time 12 | | | |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | | | |
| | Total Offenders | 2,2 | 2,238 | | 880 | | 651 | | | |
| | Total Contacts | 7,1 | 7,149 | | 2,389 | | 1,784 | | | |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | 3.2 | | 2.7 | | 2.7 | | | |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 4,199 | 58.7 | 991 | 41.5 | 770 | 43.2 | | | |
|] ۾ | Administrative | 2,934 | 41.0 | 1,389 | 58.1 | 1,002 | 56.2 | | | |
| LIMITED | Institutional | 16 | 0.2 | 9 | 0.4 | 12 | 0.7 | | | |
| = [| Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 3,051 | 42.7 | 836 | 35.0 | 545 | 30.5 | | | |
| | Collateral | 3,412 | 47.7 | 1,137 | 47.6 | 891 | 49.9 | | | |
| | Legal | 414 | 5.8 | 296 | 12.4 | 252 | 14.1 | | | |
| | Institution | 31 | 0.4 | 28 | 1.2 | 23 | 1.3 | | | |
| | Administration | 241 | 3.4 | 92 | 3.9 | 73 | 4.1 | | | |
| | Total Offenders | 76 | 762 | | 201 | | 197 | | | |
| | Total Contacts | 2,5 | 2,568 | | 637 | | 569 | | | |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 3. | 3.4 | | 3.2 | | 2.9 | | | |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 1,420 | 55.3 | 323 | 50.7 | 273 | 48.0 | | | |
| | Administrative | 1,141 | 44.4 | 301 | 47.3 | 289 | 50.8 | | | |
| LOW | Institutional | 7 | 0.3 | 13 | 2.0 | 7 | 1.2 | | | |
| | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 937 | 36.5 | 293 | 46.0 | 273 | 48.0 | | | |
| | Collateral | 1,390 | 54.1 | 282 | 44.3 | 215 | 37.8 | | | |
| | Legal | 146 | 5.7 | 23 | 3.6 | 39 | 6.9 | | | |
| | Institution | 18 | 0.7 | 11 | 1.7 | 5 | 0.9 | | | |
| | Administration | 77 | 3.0 | 28 | 4.4 | 37 | 6.5 | | | |

| Table I. Intensity of Supervision by Supervision Level - 2000. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|-------|-------------|-------|--------|-------|---------|--|--|--|--|
| | | Tim | Time 1 | | Time 6 | | Time 12 | | | | |
| | | N | % | N | % | N | % | | | | |
| | Total Offenders | 1,8 | 1,803 1,270 | | 70 | 788 | | | | | |
| | Total Contacts | 9,8 | 9,859 | | 5,725 | | 3,332 | | | | |
| | Mean # of Contacts | 5. | 5.5 | | 4.5 | | 4.2 | | | | |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 5,696 | 57.8 | 3,117 | 54.4 | 1,749 | 52.5 | | | | |
| Σ | Administrative | 4,078 | 41.4 | 2,568 | 44.9 | 1,552 | 46.6 | | | | |
| MEDIUM | Institutional | 85 | 0.9 | 40 | 0.7 | 31 | 0.9 | | | | |
| | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 4,862 | 49.3 | 2,714 | 47.4 | 1,644 | 49.3 | | | | |
| | Collateral | 4,370 | 44.3 | 2,573 | 44.9 | 1,415 | 42.5 | | | | |
| | Legal | 276 | 2.8 | 182 | 3.2 | 114 | 3.4 | | | | |
| | Institution | 96 | 1.0 | 64 | 1.1 | 42 | 1.3 | | | | |
| | Administration | 255 | 2.6 | 192 | 3.4 | 117 | 3.5 | | | | |
| | Total Offenders | 1,4 | 1,477 | | 1,181 | | 725 | | | | |
| | Total Contacts | 8,6 | 8,615 | | 6,079 | | 3,622 | | | | |
| 1 | Mean # of Contacts | 5 | 5.8 | | 5.1 | | 5.0 | | | | |
| | Type of Contact | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Person-to-Person | 5,085 | 59.0 | 3,354 | 55.2 | 2,125 | 58.7 | | | | |
| | Administrative | 3,482 | 40.4 | 2,672 | 44.0 | 1,463 | 40.4 | | | | |
| HGH | Institutional | 48 | 0.6 | 53 | 0.9 | 34 | 0.9 | | | | |
| _ | Person Contacted | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Offender | 3,674 | 42.6 | 2,400 | 39.5 | 1,449 | 40.0 | | | | |
| | Collateral | 4,182 | 48.5 | 3,012 | 49.5 | 1,792 | 49.5 | | | | |
| | Legal | 290 | 3.4 | 284 | 4.7 | 157 | 4.3 | | | | |
| | Institution | 146 | 1.7 | 91 | 1.5 | 42 | 1.2 | | | | |
| | Administration | 323 | 3.7 | 292 | 4.8 | 182 | 5.0 | | | | |

| Cohort/Supervision Level | Total N | 12-month Failure Rate (%) | 24-month Failure Rate (%) |
|--------------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1995 | | | |
| Limited | 1,740 | 18.2 | 25.2 |
| Low | 1,770 | 22.4 | 33.4 |
| Medium | 2,659 | 42.0 | 56.5 |
| High | 1,877 | 59.0 | 71.3 |
| Missing | 460 | 18.5 | 25.7 |
| TOTAL | 8,506 | 35.5 | 46.9 |
| 1998 | | | |
| Limited | 4,022 | 23.2 | 32. |
| Low | 1,779 | . 31.1 | 44. |
| Medium | 2,174 | 37.9 | 51. |
| High | 2,440 | 58.9 | 73. |
| Missing | 379 | 15.3 | 22. |
| TOTAL | 10,794 | 35.3 | 47. |
| 2000 | | | |
| Limited | 4,123 | 17.8 | |
| Low | 564 | 16.3 | |
| Medium | 1,651 | 29.6 | |
| High | 1,816 | 50.6 | |
| Missing | 199 | 17.1 | |
| TOTAL | 8,353 | 27.1 | |

| Cohort/Supervision Level | Total N | 12-Month Failure Rate (%) | 24-month Failure Rate (%) |
|--------------------------|---------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1995 | | | |
| Limited | 1,751 | 15.4 | 21.6 |
| Low | 2,546 | 29.7 | 41.2 |
| Medium | 1,927 | 43.5 | 59.9 |
| High | 1,822 | 58.8 | 70.7 |
| Missing | 460 | 18.5 | 25.7 |
| TOTAL | 8,506 | 35.5 | 46.9 |
| 1998 | | | |
| Limited | 2,615 | 18.1 | 26. |
| Low | 3,409 | 30.1 | 43. |
| Medium | 2,077 | 43.9 | 57. |
| High | 2,314 | 57.8 | 71. |
| Missing | 379 | 15.3 | 22. |
| TOTAL | 10,794 | 35.3 | 47. |
| 2000 | | | |
| Limited | 2,146 | 12.3 | |
| Low | 2,890 | 21.6 | |
| Medium | 1,403 | 34.6 | |
| High | 1,715 | 50.1 | |
| Missing | 199 | 17.1 | |
| TOTAL | 8,353 | 27.1 | |

| Recidivism Analysis by Ca | aseload Ass | signment | 1995. | | | | | | | er upra | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|----------|---------|------|--------------|---------|------------|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|-------|------|-------|-------------|
| | | | | | | Caseloa | ıd Assignn | nent at Re | -arrest | | | | | |
| | Case | bank | Gener | ic | IC | М | Specia | alized | Inta | ıke | Abso | cond | Exclu | ıded |
| | N=54 | % | N=1,802 | % | N=199 | % | N=726 | % | N=145 | % | N=453 | % | N=156 | % |
| Supervision Level at Re-a | arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Limited | 8 | 14.8 | 129 | 7.2 | 16 | 8.0 | 22 | 3.0 | 77 | 53.1 | 48 | 10.6 | 31 | 19.9 |
| Low | 37 | 68.5 | 280 | 15.5 | 2 | 1.0 | 42 | 5.8 | 5 | 3.4 | 89 | 19.6 | 27 | 17.3 |
| Medium | 6 | 11.1 | 727 | 40.3 | 7 | 3.5 | 337 | 46.4 | 5 | 3.4 | 154 | 34.0 | 55 | 35.3 |
| High | 3 | 5.6 | 462 | 25.6 | 169 | 84.9 | 239 | 32.9 | 19 | 13.1 | 127 | 28.0 | 28 | 17.9 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 204 | 11.3 | 5 | 2.5 | 86 | 11.8 | 39 | 26.9 | 35 | 7.7 | 15 | 9.6 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Months to Rearr. | 17 | .3 | 5.9 | | 4. | 2 | 6. | 2 | 3. | 9 | 10 |).8 | 13 | .8 |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 11 | 20.4 | 320 | 17.8 | 25 | 12.6 | 118 | 16.3 | 17 | 11.7 | 31 | 6.8 | 21 | 13.5 |
| Property | 7 | 13.0 | 535 | 29.7 | 52 | 26.1 | 203 | 28.0 | 44 | 30.3 | 108 | 23.8 | 42 | 26.9 |
| Controlled Subs. | 9 | 16.7 | 429 | 23.8 | 65 | 32.7 | 204 | 28.1 | 59 | 40.7 | 100 | 22.1 | 43 | 27.6 |
| DUI | 3 | 5.6 | 56 | 3.1 | 1 | 0.5 | 13 | 1.8 | 1 | 0.7 | 6 | 1.3 | 10 | 6.4 |
| Other | 24 | 44.4 | 458 | 25.4 | 55 | 27.6 | 187 | 25.8 | 24 | 16.6 | 207 | 45.7 | 39 | 25.0 |
| Unknown | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.6 |
| Offense Level | | · | | | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | · | |
| Felony | 23 | 42.6 | 1,143 | 63.4 | 143 | 71.9 | 510 | 70.2 | 108 | 74.5 | 318 | 70.2 | 84 | 53.8 |
| Misdemeanor | 21 | 38.9 | 518 | 28.7 | 38 | 19.1 | 162 | 22.3 | 29 | 20.0 | 96 | 21.2 | 56 | 35.9 |
| Unknown/Other | 10 | 18.5 | 141 | 7.8 | 18 | 9.0 | 54 | 7.4 | 8 | 5.5 | 39 | 8.6 | 16 | 10.3 |

| Table L., Recidivism Analysis by C | aseload Assi | ignment - | 1995. | | | | ıd Assignn | · | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|---------|---|-------|-------------|------------|--------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
| , | Caseb | ank | Generi | С | ICI | 1 | Specia | llized | Inta | ıke | Absc | ond | Exclu | ded |
| | N=54 | % | N=1,802 | % | N=199 | % | N=726 | % | N=145 | % | N=453 | % | N=156 | % |
| Suppression Rate | <u> </u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 24 Months | 0.7 | 7 | 2.0 | | 3.0 | 0 | 2. | 2 | 2. | 8 | 1. | 6 | 1. | 3 |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 1.3 | 3 | 3.2 | | 3. | 3 | 3. | 4 | 3. | 0 | 2. | 4 | 1. | 9 |
| Suppression Rate | 0.8 | 5 | 0.59 | | 0.2 | 7 | 0.5 | 54 | 0.0 | 08 | 0.5 | 53 | 0.5 | 54 |

| Table M. Recidivism Analysis by C | aseload Ass | signment | - 1998. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------|---------|------|----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|------|-------|------|-------|------|
| | | | | | | Caseloa | d Assignm | nent at Re | -arrest | | | | | |
| | Case | bank | Gene | ric | Speciali | zed | Local C | ontrol | Inta | ıke | Abso | ond | Exclu | ded |
| | N=775 | % | N=1316 | % | N=1166 | % | N=6 | % | N=277 | % | N=371 | % | N=420 | % |
| Supervision Level at Re- | arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Limited | 453 | 58.5 | 73 | 5.5 | 207 | 17.8 | 2 | 33.3 | 39 | 14.1 | 88 | 23.7 | 222 | 52.9 |
| Low | 252 | 32.5 | 52 | 4.0 | 118 | 10.1 | 0 | 0.0 | 37 | 13.4 | 69 | 18.6 | 125 | 29.8 |
| Medium | 54 | 7.0 | 330 | 25.1 | 366 | 31.4 | 0 | 0.0 | 22 | 7.9 | 69 | 18.6 | 35 | 8.3 |
| High | 14 | 1.8 | 765 | 58.1 | 400 | 34.3 | 3 | 50.0 | 33 | 11.9 | 124 | 33.4 | 30 | 7.1 |
| Missing | 2 | 0.3 | 96 | 7.3 | 75 | 6.4 | 1 | 16.7 | 146 | 52.7 | 21 | 5.7 | 8 | 1.9 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Months to Re- arrest | 9. | 7 | 7.1 |] | 6.5 | | 7. | 8 | 2. | 7 | 8. | 9 | 5. | 3 |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 79 | 10.2 | 139 | 7.9 | 175 | 15.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 15 | 5.4 | 28 | 7.5 | 44 | 10.5 |
| Property | 133 | 17.2 | 352 | 19.9 | 195 | 16.7 | 2 | 33.3 | 88 | 31.8 | 84 | 22.6 | 94 | 22.4 |
| Controlled Subs. | 162 | 20.9 | 407 | 23.0 | 322 | 27.6 | 2 | 33.3 | 105 | 37.9 | 85 | 22.9 | 128 | 30.5 |
| DUI | 52 | 6.7 | 25 | 1.4 | 46 | 3.9 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 1.4 | 10 | 2.7 | 14 | 3.3 |
| Other | 344 | 44.4 | 836 | 47.3 | 423 | 36.3 | 2 | 33.3 | 65 | 23.5 | 161 | 43.4 | 140 | 33.3 |
| Unknown | 5 | 0.6 | 7 | 0.4 | 5 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 0.8 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 421 | 54.3 | 916 | 69.6 | 713 | 61.1 | 5 | 83.3 | 209 | 75.5 | 243 | 65.5 | 248 | 59.0 |
| Misdemeanor | 245 | 31.6 | 277 | 21.0 | 334 | 28.6 | 1 | 16.7 | 57 | 20.6 | 88 | 23.7 | 119 | 28.3 |
| Unknown/Other | 109 | 14.1 | 123 | 9.3 | 119 | 10.2 | 0 | 0.0 | 11 | 4.0 | 40 | 10.8 | 53 | 12.6 |

| Table M. Recidivism Analysis by | Caseload Ass | ignment | - 1998. | | | <u> </u> | | | | | : | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|---------|---------|-----|-----------|----------|---------|------------|-------------|-----|-------|------|-------|-----|
| | | | T | | | | | nent at Re | | | T | | Γ _ | |
| | Caseb | ank | Genei | ric | Specializ | ed | Local (| Control | Inta | ake | Abso | cond | Exclu | ded |
| | N=775 | % | N=1316 | % | N=1166 | % | N=6 | % | N=277 | % | N=371 | % | N=420 | % |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 24 Months | 1.1 | 1 | 2.9 | | 2.2 | | 4. | 8 | 4 | .3 | 1 | .7 | 2. | 0 |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 2.1 | 1 | 3.7 | | 3.1 | | 3. | 5 | 5 | .7 | 2 | .6 | 3. | 0 |
| Suppression Rate | 0.9 | 3 | 0.28 | 3 | 0.43 | | -0. | 28 | 0. | 34 | 0. | 51 | 0.5 | 54 |

| Table N. Recidivism Analysis by C | Caseload Ass | signment - | - 2000. | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|------------|---------|------|--------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|------|-------|---------------------------------------|-------|------|
| | | | | _ | | Caseloa | d Assignn | nent at Re | -arrest | | | | | |
| | Case | bank | Gen | eric | Specia | alized | Local (| Control | Inta | ıke | Abso | cond | Exclu | ded |
| | N=665 | % | N=795 | % | N=354 | % | N=10 | % | N=69 | % | N=128 | % | N=8 | - % |
| Supervision Level at Re- | -arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Limited | 579 | 87.1 | 22 | 2.8 | 16 | 4.5 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 5.8 | 25 | 19.5 | 3 | 37.5 |
| Low | 39 | 5.9 | 11 | 1.4 | 9 | 2.5 | 1 | 10.0 | 13 | 18.8 | 8 | 6.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Medium | 18 | 2.7 | 235 | 29.6 | 119 | 33.6 | 1 | 10.0 | 23 | 33.3 | 25 | 19.5 | 2 | 25.0 |
| High | 28 | 4.2 | 515 | 64.8 | 199 | 56.2 | 3 | 30.0 | 10 | 14.5 | 66 | 51.6 | 2 | 25.0 |
| Missing | 1 | 0.2 | 12 | 1.5 | 11 | 3.1 | 5 | 50.0 | 19 | 27.5 | 4 | 3.1 | 1 | 12.5 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • | | |
| Mean Months to Rearrest | 5. | 0 | 5. | 5 | 5. | 4 | 5, | 3 | 1. | 8 | 6 | .5 | 7. | 1 |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 68 | 10.2 | 81 | 10.2 | 38 | 10.7 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 2.9 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 12.5 |
| Property | 127 | 19.1 | 155 | 19.5 | 60 | 16.9 | 0 | 0.0 | 17 | 24.6 | 22 | 17.2 | 2 | 25.0 |
| Controlled Subs. | 135 | 20.3 | 224 | 28.2 | 97 | 27.4 | 3 | 30.0 | 20 | 29.0 | 19 | 14.8 | 1 | 12.5 |
| DUI | 28 | 4.2 | 23 | 2.9 | 10 | 2.8 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 2.9 | 2 | 1.6 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 294 | 44.2 | 305 | 38.4 | 147 | 41.5 | 7 | 70.0 | 27 | 39.1 | 85 | 66.4 | 4 | 50.0 |
| Unknown | 13 | 2.0 | 7 | 0.9 | 2 | 0.6 | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1.4 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Offense Level | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 375 | 56.4 | 496 | 62.4 | 223 | 63.0 | 8 | 80.0 | 47 | 68.1 | 88 | 68.8 | 2 | 25.0 |
| Misdemeanor | 203 | 30.5 | 225 | 28.3 | 100 | 28.2 | 2 | 20.0 | 18 | 26.1 | 28 | 21.9 | 2 | 25.0 |
| Unknown/Other | 87 | 13.1 | 74 | 9.3 | 31 | 8.8 | 0 | 0.0 | 4 | 5.8 | 12 | 9.4 | 4 | 50.0 |

| | | | | | | Caseloa | d Assignm | ent at Re | -arrest | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-----|-------|------|--------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|----|-------|-----|--------|-----|
| | Caseb | ank | Gen | eric | Specia | alized | Local C | ontrol | Inta | ke | Absco | ond | Exclud | ied |
| | N=665 | % | N=795 | % | N=354 | % | N=10 | % | N=69 | % | N=128 | % | N=8 | % |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 12 Months | 0.7 | , | 1. | 7 | 1. | 6 | 1. | 1 | 3. | 1 | 0.9 |) | 0.0 | † |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 1.7 | , | 2. | 2 | 2. | 1 | 2.0 |) | 3. | 2 | 1.7 | 7 | 1.8 | |
| Suppression Rate | 1.60 | 0 | 0.3 | 34 | 0.3 | 37 | 0.8 | 2 | 0.0 |)3 | 0.9 | 2 | N/A | \ |

| Table O. Recidivism Analysis by Supervision I | Level - 1995. | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|------|-------|------|---------|------|---------|------|-------|------|
| , | Limit | ed | Lo |)W | Med | lium | Hiç | gh | Missi | ng |
| | N=331 | % | N=482 | % | N=1,291 | % | N=1,047 | % | N=838 | % |
| Caseload Type at Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Casebank | 8 | 2.4 | 37 | 7.7 | 6 | 0.5 | 3 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Generic | 129 | 39.0 | 280 | 58.1 | 727 | 56.3 | 462 | 44.1 | 204 | 24.3 |
| ICM | 16 | 4.8 | 2 | 0.4 | 7 | 0.5 | 169 | 16.1 | 5 | 0.6 |
| Specialized | 22 | 6.6 | 42 | 8.7 | 337 | 26.1 | 239 | 22.8 | 86 | 10.3 |
| Intake | 77 | 23.3 | 5 | 1.0 | 5 | 0.4 | 19 | 1.8 | 39 | 4.7 |
| Abscond | 48 | 14.5 | 89 | 18.5 | 154 | 11.9 | 127 | 12.1 | 35 | 4.2 |
| Excluded | 31 | 9.4 | 27 | 5.6 | 55 | 4.3 | 28 | 2.7 | 15 | 1.8 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 454 | 54.2 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Months to Re-arrest | 7.7 | , | 8. | 7 | 7 | .2 | 6. | .4 | 9.2 | |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 47 | 14.2 | 65 | 13.5 | 206 | 16.0 | 160 | 15.3 | 149 | 17.8 |
| Property | 91 | 27.5 | 127 | 26.3 | 344 | 26.6 | 301 | 28.7 | 232 | 27.7 |
| Controlled Substance | 105 | 31.7 | 102 | 21.2 | 310 | 24.0 | 303 | 28.9 | 177 | 21.1 |
| DUI | 9 | 2.7 | 22 | 4.6 | 36 | 2.8 | 17 | 1.6 | 22 | 2.6 |
| Other | 79 | 23.9 | 164 | 34.0 | 393 | 30.4 | 262 | 25.0 | 258 | 30.8 |
| Unknown | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.4 | 2 | 0.2 | 4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.0 |

| Table O. Recidivism Analysis by Supervision Lev | el - 1995. | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------------|------|-------|------|---------|------------|---------|------|---------|------|
| | Limite | ed l | Low | | Medium | | High | | Missing | |
| , | N=331 | % | N=482 | % | N=1,291 | % | N=1,047 | % | N=838 | % |
| Re-arrest Level | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 208 | 62.8 | 280 | 58.1 | 806 | 62.4 | 759 | 72.5 | 518 | 61.8 |
| Misdemeanor | 101 | 30.5 | 157 | 32.6 | 372 | 28.8 | 206 | 19.7 | 258 | 30.8 |
| Unknown/Other | 22 | 6.6 | 45 | 9.3 | 113 | 8.8 | 82 | 7.8 | 62 | 7.4 |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 24 Months | 1.6 | | 1.4 | 4 | 1. | 9 | 2. | 4 | 1.9 | |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 2.5 | | 2.4 | 1 | 2. | 8 | 3. | 7 | 2.9 | |
| Suppression Rate | 0.56 | | 0.7 | 1 | 0.4 | 1 7 | 0.5 | 54 | 0.53 | |

| Table P. Recidivism Analysis by Supervision Le | evel - 1998. | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|------|-------|------|-------|--------|---------|------|---------|---------------------------------------|
| | Limi | ted | Lo |)W | Med | lium | Hi | gh | Missi | ing |
| | N=1,084 | % | N=653 | % | N=876 | % | N=1,369 | % | N=1,097 | % |
| Caseload Type at Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Casebank | 453 | 41.8 | 252 | 38.6 | 54 | 6.2 | 14 | 1.0 | 2 | 0.2 |
| Generic | 73 | 6.7 | 52 | 8.0 | 330 | 37.7 | 765 | 55.9 | 96 | 8.8 |
| Specialized | 207 | 19.1 | 118 | 18.1 | 366 | 41.8 | 400 | 29.2 | 75 | 6.8 |
| Local Control | 2 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Intake | 39 | 3.6 | 37 | 5.7 | 22 | 2.5 | 33 | 2.4 | 146 | 13.3 |
| Abscond | 88 | 8.1 | 69 | 10.6 | 69 | 7.9 | 124 | 9.1 | 21 | 1.9 |
| Excluded | 222 | 20.5 | 125 | 19.1 | 35 | 4.0 | 30 | 9.3 | 8 | 0.7 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 748 | 68.2 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| Mean Months to Re-arrest | 7. | 7 | 7 | .8 | 7 | .6 | 7 | .2 | 9.1 | |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 107 | 9.9 | 63 | 9.6 | 123 | 14.0 | 151 | 11.0 | 131.0 | 11.9 |
| Property | 214 | 19.7 | 141 | 21.6 | 175 | . 20.0 | 320 | 23.4 | 228.0 | 20.8 |
| Controlled Substance | 285 | 26.3 | 159 | 24.3 | 182 | 20.8 | 454 | 33.2 | 315.0 | 28.7 |
| DUI | 54 | 5.0 | 28 | 4.3 | 40 | 4.6 | 22 | 1.6 | 62.0 | 5.7 |
| Other | 418 | 38.6 | 261 | 40.0 | 349 | 39.8 | 416 | 30.4 | 360.0 | 32.8 |
| Unknown | 6 | 0.6 | 1 | 0.2 | 7 | 0.8 | 6 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.1 |

| Table P. Recidivism Analysis by Supervision Leve | l - 1998. | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----|------|-------|--------|---------|------|---------|------|
| | Limited | d | Lov | Low | | Medium | | High | | g |
| , | N=1,084 | N=1,084 % | | % | N=876 | % | N=1,369 | % | N=1,097 | % |
| Re-arrest Level | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 622 | 57.4 | 381 | 58.3 | 501 | 57.2 | 990 | 72.3 | 674.0 | 61.4 |
| Misdemeanor | 321 | 29.6 | 194 | 29.7 | 270 | 30.8 | 267 | 19.5 | 319.0 | 29.1 |
| Unknown/Other | 141 | 13.0 | 78 | 11.9 | 105 | 12.0 | 112 | 8.2 | 104.0 | 9.5 |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 24 Months | 1.5 | 1.5 | | 4 | 2. | .0 | . 3.0 | | 2.7 | |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 2.5 | | 2.4 | 4 | 2. | 8 | 3. | 6 | 3.6 | |
| Suppression Rate | 0.72 | | 0.7 | 6 | 0.4 | 45 | 0.2 | 23 | 0.31 | |

| | Limited | | Low | | Medium | | High | | Missing | |
|----------------------------|---------|------|------|------|--------|------|-------|------|---------|------|
| | N=649 | % | N=81 | % | N=423 | % | N=823 | % | N=292 | % |
| Caseload Type at Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Casebank | 579 | 89.2 | 39 | 48.1 | 18 | 4.3 | 28 | 3.4 | 1 | 0.3 |
| Generic | 22 | 3.4 | 11 | 13.6 | 235 | 55.6 | 515 | 62.6 | 12 | 4.1 |
| Specialized | 16 | 2.5 | 9 | 11.1 | 119 | 28.1 | 199 | 24.2 | 11 | 3.8 |
| Local Control | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 1.2 | 1 | 0.2 | 3 | 0.4 | 5 | 1.7 |
| Intake | 4 | 0.6 | 13 | 16.0 | 23 | 5.4 | 10 | 1.2 | 19 | 6.5 |
| Abscond | 25 | 3.9 | 8 | 9.9 | 25 | 5.9 | 66 | 8.0 | 4 | 1.4 |
| Excluded | 3 | 0.5 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 0.5 | 2 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.3 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 239 | 81.8 |
| Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Months to Re-arrest | 5.2 | | 4.9 | | 5.1 | | 5.6 | | 5.5 | |
| Most Serious Re-arrest | | | | | | | | | | |
| Person | 61 | 9.4 | 9 | 11.1 | 50 | 11.8 | 65 | 7.9 | 26.0 | 8.9 |
| Property | 130 | 20.0 | 12 | 14.8 | 85 | 20.1 | 142 | 17.3 | 64.0 | 21.9 |
| Controlled Substance | 126 | 19.4 | 23 | 28.4 | 84 | 19.9 | 253 | 30.7 | 67.0 | 22.9 |
| DUI | 30 | 4.6 | 1 | 1.2 | 21 | 5.0 | 11 | 1.3 | 10.0 | 3.4 |
| Other | 290 | 44.7 | 36 | 44.4 | 177 | 41.8 | 347 | 42.2 | 124.0 | 42.5 |
| Unknown | 12 | 1.8 | 0 | 0.0 | 6 | 1.4 | 5 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.3 |

| Table Q. Recidivism Analysis by Supervision Level | - 2000. | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|------|------|------|--------|------|-------|------|---------|------|
| | Limited | | Low | | Medium | | High | | Missing | |
| , | N=649 | % | N=81 | % | N=423 | % | N=823 | % | N=292 | % |
| Re-arrest Level | | | | | | | | | | |
| Felony | 355 | 54.7 | 52 | 64.2 | 230 | 54.4 | 570 | 69.3 | 168.0 | 57.5 |
| Misdemeanor | 205 | 31.6 | 24 | 29.6 | 151 | 35.7 | 180 | 21.9 | 96.0 | 32.9 |
| Unknown/Other | 89 | 13.7 | 5 | 6.2 | 42 | 9.9 | 73 | 8.9 | 28.0 | 9.6 |
| Suppression Rate | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean Arrests - Prior 12 Months | 0.7 | | 1.1 | | 1.3 | | 1.8 | | 1.2 | |
| Mean Arrests - Supervision Period | 1.7 | | 2.0 | | 2.2 | | 2.2 | | 2.0 | |
| Suppression Rate | 1.58 | | 0.75 | | 0.73 | | 0.21 | | 0.70 | |